[Senate Hearing 108-206]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY APPROPRIATIONS FOR FISCAL YEAR 2004
----------
TUESDAY, MAY 6, 2003
U.S. Senate,
Subcommittee of the Committee on Appropriations,
Washington, DC.
The subcommittee met at 10 a.m., in room SD-124, Dirksen
Senate Office Building, Hon. Thad Cochran (chairman) presiding.
Present: Senators Cochran, Campbell, Byrd, Inouye,
Hollings, Leahy, and Kohl.
DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY
STATEMENT OF HON. ASA HUTCHINSON, UNDER SECRETARY,
BORDER AND TRANSPORTATION SECURITY
DIRECTORATE
OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR THAD COCHRAN
Senator Cochran. The committee hearing will please come to
order. This morning we continue our hearings on the fiscal year
2004 budget request for the Department of Homeland Security. We
review this morning the programs and activities of the Border
and Transportation Security Directorate. I am very pleased to
welcome the Under Secretary for Border and Transportation
Security, Asa Hutchinson. I think the President and Secretary
Tom Ridge have chosen a very able and experienced public
servant for this very difficult and important undertaking.
The Homeland Security Act of 2002 transferred the United
States Customs Service, the Office of Domestic Preparedness,
the Transportation Security Administration, the Federal Law
Enforcement Training Center, and the Federal Protective Service
to this directorate. In addition, the directorate is
responsible for integrating two-thirds of the former
Immigration and Naturalization Service with the United States
Customs Service and with quarantine inspection activities of
the Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service. For fiscal year
2004, the President's budget requests $16.2 billion in
discretionary funds for border and transportation security,
along with an additional $1.8 billion in offsetting
collections.
Mr. Secretary, we look forward to hearing from you. We have
your prepared statement which we will make a part of the
committee's hearing record, and we invite you to make any
statement in explanation of the budget request which you think
would be helpful to our committee's understanding of the budget
request.
At this time, I am pleased to yield to other Senators of
this committee for any opening statements they may have.
Senator Byrd.
STATEMENT OF SENATOR ROBERT C. BYRD
Senator Byrd. There are two things they haven't developed
yet, how to create a good public address system and how to
fashion milk cartons so they will open as stated on the top of
the carton.
I join you, Mr. Chairman, in welcoming Under Secretary
Hutchinson. This is his first time appearing before the
committee in his current capacity. We look forward to hearing
from him and to working with him. There is no greater
responsibility than that of making our Nation's borders and
transportation system secure. It is our failure to do so prior
to that tragic day in September 2001 that led to the loss of
the lives of thousands of innocent Americans and others, and it
was in reaction to those horrific events that the President and
this Congress created the Department in which you now serve.
Our role in Congress is to ensure that you and the many
other dedicated employees of the Department of Homeland
Security have the resources that you need to do your jobs, and
to do your jobs well. In that regard I have questioned some of
the requested funding levels for certain activities of the
Department, such as the revised entry/exit visa system that we
discussed last week with Secretary Ridge, and the appearance of
a singular focus on aviation security in what is supposed to be
an agency dedicated to the security of all forms of
transportation. I and other Members will address these and
other issues in our questions, and we look forward to your
testimony.
Thank you.
Senator Cochran. Senator Campbell.
STATEMENT OF SENATOR BEN NIGHTHORSE CAMPBELL
Senator Campbell. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I will make my
opening statement very brief and ask that my complete statement
be included in the record.
Senator Cochran. Without objection, so ordered.
Senator Campbell. Welcome, Under Secretary Hutchinson. I
guess what we're learning with this whole problem with homeland
security is that those people who would do us some damage have
learned how to use the very liberties that we cherish against
us.
The use of American money to be filtered to foreign
operatives, the opportunity to enroll in our universities, in
our flight schools, and to travel without documentation, all of
the things that we sort of take for granted, they have learned
how to use as weapons against us, and I think it was certainly
a rude awakening September 11, and it has changed our world
forever, but when we need to protect about 7,500 miles of land
border and 95,000 miles of shoreline, or whatever it is, and at
the same time make sure that we don't infringe on civil
liberties or the rights of people that they have come to accept
as the American way of lifestyle is a darned difficult thing,
and all of us are fumbling along, I think, trying to do the
best we can, and I just wanted, as one Senator, to say that I
certainly support your efforts and look forward to a time when
the Nation is safer, and we never get back to what we once
thought of as total freedom in this country, but certainly we
can find, I think, a better balance in protecting those
liberties I mentioned, at the same time decreasing the amount
of danger.
Sometime ago, right after 9/11, I remember sitting in a
hearing, and there was some discussion about those areas that
seem to be pretty weak yet and would be an opportunity for the
people who are going to do us some damage to attack, and having
been a former private pilot myself, I thought at the time that
we still had a weakness in general aviation.
PREPARED STATEMENT
We've done an awful lot when it comes to the commercial
aviation. The number of bag screeners and the number of things
that we have to go through I think has made it a lot safer, and
when I mentioned I thought there was still a weakness in
general aviation I got an immediate call from the ALPA
complaining that I would make such a terrible statement, but as
I read just recently in the paper, that is certainly one of the
alerts that we're facing now, the possibility of people using
private planes, since they don't have the same degree, at FBOs,
of security that they do at the terminals, that there still may
be a possibility of that, so I'm interested in knowing maybe a
little bit more of that as we proceed with the discussions.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
[The statement follows:]
Prepared Statement of Senator Ben Nighthorse Campbell
Thank you Chairman Cochran. I'd like to thank the Under Secretary
for taking the time to come talk with us today.
Security procedures in place prior to the tragic events of
September 11th were obviously seriously flawed. While I realize that
many steps have been taken to address these concerns, including the
creation of the Department of Homeland Security, I wonder whether or
not enough has been done. As I fly back to my home State of Colorado
every weekend, and wait in line at the baggage screeners and walk
through the metal detectors, I wonder if these procedures really ensure
my safety.
We need to protect the 7,500 miles of land border, and 95,000 miles
of shoreline, in addition to our nation's transit systems and energy
and power infrastructures. This is imperative to our country's economy
that is dependent on travel and the mobility of commerce. Additionally,
the people of the United States deserve the ability to move about our
nation in a safe manner. I believe that the TSA, Customs Service, Coast
Guard, and other agencies in the Department have made great strides in
improving our sense of safety since September 11, 2001.
I believe that we have made great advancements quickly by upgrading
security procedures, response plans, and increasing security. There is
no issue more important to me than the safety of the American people.
Again, thank you, Mr. Chairman. I look forward to hearing the
testimony of our guest, and I will have a number of questions to ask at
the appropriate time.
Senator Byrd. Mr. Chairman, the distinguished Senator is
still a private pilot.
Senator Campbell. Yes, sir.
Senator Byrd. Of a Harley-Davidson.
Senator Campbell. Still have an airplane, too, just not
current.
Senator Cochran. Senator Inouye.
Senator Inouye. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. I just
wish to welcome Under Secretary Hutchinson. Welcome, sir.
Senator Cochran. Senator Hollings.
STATEMENT OF SENATOR ERNEST F. HOLLINGS
Senator Hollings. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Secretary, we have got a wonderful Border Patrol School
down there now in Charleston. There was a heck of a contest in
the midnineties when we had an immigration crisis and we were
looking to train additional border patrol agents. Now some
6,000 have graduated. Over half of your border patrol agents
are graduates of that school. One, they're not paid enough.
Incidentally, in the school they have about a 30 percent to 40
percent dropout. There are about 55 in a class, and they have
about 15 classes. They've got perfect facilities. They've got a
driving range, they've got a rifle range and everything else
down there, and they like it, but at $27,000, a GS-7 trained in
speaking Spanish, trained in law enforcement, trained in
computer programs, they leave and come over to the airline
security because they get more pay, so by the time I'm training
them in Charleston, they leave to train for the air marshall's
job because they pay more. Let's look at that, because I want
to write something in that bill to equalize your different
security folks so you don't train for one function and all of a
sudden lose too many of them to another function in the same
agency.
But it is an outstanding facility, and we invite you to
come down and look at it, because we've got to expand the
barracks facilities there to accommodate the increase in
training.
But thank you very much. We look forward to your testimony.
Senator Cochran. Thank you.
Mr. Secretary, you may proceed.
STATEMENT OF HONORABLE ASA HUTCHINSON
Mr. Hutchinson. Thank you. Mr. Chairman and Senator Byrd,
members of the committee, thank you for your welcome and your
comments this morning. It is a pleasure to be with you to
testify on the President's 2004 budget for the Border and
Transportation Security Directorate of the Department of
Homeland Security. It was just a couple of months ago that the
Department brought nearly 180,000 employees from 22 different
agencies together into one new Department. I want to express
the thanks of the men and women of Homeland Security to this
committee for your support in this reorganization, and also for
your support in the recently concluded operation, Liberty
Shield. In our view, and as was stated by Senator Byrd, there
is really not more of a serious job in all the land than
stopping future terrorist incidents from occurring on American
soil, and the Border and Transportation Security Directorate,
along with the Coast Guard, really represent the operational
front line of homeland security. We're the operations folks.
We're the ones that not only play defense, but also offense.
We're not alone in that effort. We have to rely upon our
partnership with State and local governments, and part of my
job is to make sure we enhance those partnerships, increase
that coordination, and we're working very hard to do that.
Under the leadership of Secretary Ridge, we have already
accomplished a substantial amount in terms of reorganization.
We have unified our border efforts under the Customs and Border
Protection Bureau. We have created the new Bureau of
Immigration and Customs Enforcement that put our enforcement
efforts under one chain of command that gives us a clearer
focus, and the President's 2004 budget is the first complete
new budget for the Department, and it is a good foundation for
the future.
I believe it is important we develop sound management
principles and meaningful performance measures as we enact
budget levels, and we are working hard to do that. If I might
just comment briefly on the 2004 budget. First of all, for the
directorate, it is a broad and a very expensive mission. It is
an enormous challenge that we face. Each year, more than 500
million persons, 130 million motor vehicles, 2\1/2\ million
railroad cars, and 5.7 million cargo containers must be
processed, screened, or inspected at or even before they reach
our borders. Security decisions by our inspectors must be made
within seconds, and we need to be right every time. That is
difficult, and as Senator Hollings pointed out, sometimes they
do not get paid what they get paid in the private sector, and
so their commitment is very important.
The $18.1 billion requested for this directorate by the
President does provide for greater accountability for a more
integrated border and transportation security organization. I
know that sounds like boilerplate language, but that really is
what I see as the responsibility of my directorate, and the
uniqueness of this directorate is that we have the
transportation and border agencies together, and we can enhance
that integration and cooperation and exchange of information.
We are increasing the security of our international shipping
containers. The budget will allow us to continue implementation
of the congressional mandates that have been wisely provided.
A few highlighted priorities in the budget. First, under
the Bureau of Customs and Border Protection. It provides for an
increase of $1.7 billion over the 2002 budget, and this will
allow us to support the Customs-Trade Partnership Against
Terrorism program at a level of $18 million, which increases
the supply chain security and expedites the clearance of
international commercial cargoes and conveyances. In the budget
we're also providing for the enhancement of the Container
Security Initiative, with $62 million requested, which puts
personnel in key international ports to examine high risk cargo
before it is placed in U.S.-bound ships. This is a very
important part of our overall strategy at Homeland Security.
And then we have the capital improvements to our IT systems
from the international trade data system to the automated
commercial environment system, and if these requests are
approved, it will be nearly $1.1 billion that have been
dedicated since 2001.
I am pleased also that there is $119 million for
nonintrusive inspection equipment. This allows us not to just
simply flood the border with people, but provide security at
our borders wisely with technology and with better systems.
As was mentioned, the budget also supports continued
implementation of the comprehensive U.S. VISIT system. The goal
is to track the entry and exit of visitors to the United
States. It provides for $100 million in new resources, for a
total of $480 million. This is an important objective that the
Border and Transportation Security Directorate will engage in
over the next couple of years.
When it comes to the Immigration and Customs Enforcement
arena, it has 14,000 employees, and a budget of $2.8 billion,
which is a 16 percent increase over 2002. It will allow us to
support our investigative activities, including immigration
fraud, smuggling of illegal aliens, international money
laundering, export enforcement, forced labor, trade agreement
investigations, smuggling of narcotics, weapons of mass
destruction and other contraband, illegal transshipment, and
vehicle and cargo theft. That is a broad mandate for an
investigative agency, but we will be prioritizing and working
in those broad arenas. The budget will allow us to continue our
traditional roles as well as enforcement of all of our
immigration laws.
The Transportation Security Administration has done a good
job in increasing the professionalism of our screeners, and I
am proud of the job that they have done. The budget requests
$4.8 billion for TSA, $2.4 billion of that will be offset by
collections from aviation passenger security fees and airline
security fees. Collection of these fees will be suspended from
June 1 to September 30 of this year, in accord with the
provisions of the Emergency Wartime Supplemental Appropriations
Act.
The total request, $4.3 billion, supports direct aviation
security activities, including a professionalized passenger and
baggage screening workforce and additional equipment to prevent
weapons and other contraband on the aircraft. We will also be
reimbursing our State and local law enforcement agencies for
their work in providing now roving patrols and supporting our
screeners. We will be funding the Federal Air Marshal Service
and, in addition, enhancing our cargo and passenger screening
methods and increasing our use of technology.
One of the important new initiatives is the transportation
worker identification credential, or the TWIC, that will allow
us to have more security background checks of our
transportation workers, and create a credential that will allow
them to have access to various transportation security
facilities.
We also have the Office for Domestic Preparedness and the
Federal Law Enforcement Training Center. Both are essential for
training first responders, training of our Federal law
enforcement agencies, and I am pleased and proud of the work
that they are doing.
PREPARED STATEMENT
Finally, our directorate supports, through our operations,
the President's national strategy for homeland security. This
is a benchmark and a framework for our enforcement
responsibilities. We want to be able to manage our
responsibilities in coordination and integration with all of
our Federal partners and our State and local efforts. These are
the two benchmarks that guide us as we work in the Border and
Transportation Security Directorate.
Thank you for your support. I look forward to your
questions.
[The statement follows:]
Prepared Statement of Asa Hutchinson
Introduction
Good morning Chairman Cochran, Senator Byrd, distinguished members
of the Subcommittee. It is a pleasure to be with you today, and I am
pleased to be here to discuss the President's fiscal year 2004 budget
request for the Department of Homeland Security's Border and
Transportation Security (BTS) Directorate and its component
organizations.
Just a couple of months ago, the Department of Homeland Security
brought nearly 180,000 employees throughout the Federal Government
together into one agency. I am grateful for the focus and support
Congress provided in creating the Department, and I also wish to thank
you for recently providing critical supplemental resources to support
the Department's efforts in Operation Liberty Shield and the brave men
and women serving in our military during this challenging time.
The President's National Strategy for Homeland Security provides
the framework for mobilizing and organizing the nation--the Federal
Government, State and local governments, the private sector, and the
American people--to undertake the complex mission of protecting our
homeland. It makes the Department's strategic objectives abundantly
clear: prevent terrorist attacks within the United States, reduce
America's vulnerability to terrorism, and minimize the damage and
assist in recovery should a terrorist attack occur.
There is no more serious job in all the land than stopping future
terrorist incidents from occurring on American soil. This is especially
true in light of recent world events. The Border and Transportation
Security Directorate, along with the U.S. Coast Guard, serves as the
front line operational force for the Department in achieving its
objectives. But we are not alone in this effort. The President,
Secretary Ridge, and I fully understand that our partnerships with
State and local governments are critical for ensuring the success of
our mission.
Under the able leadership of Secretary Ridge, the BTS Directorate
has already taken significant steps forward. We have reorganized the
BTS Directorate's nearly 100,000 employees to unify border and
transportation security activities, integrate our front line
operational forces, and yet preserve the expertise and functional
relationships BTS employees have developed over the years.
This has resulted in the creation of two new bureaus within BTS.
The inspection and border patrol functions of the former U.S. Customs
and Immigration and Naturalization Services, and the Agriculture Plant
Health Inspection Service now reside in the new Bureau of Customs and
Border Protection (BCBP). The investigation and enforcement functions
of those agencies, along with the Federal Protective Service, now
reside in the new Bureau of Immigration and Customs Enforcement (BICE).
We have also brought first responder resources in the Office for
Domestic Preparedness (ODP) to improve assistance to our State and
local partners as they do their part to protect the homeland.
The fiscal year 2004 budget is the first ever for the new
Department and the Bureaus of Customs and Border Protection (BCBP) and
Immigration and Customs Enforcement (BICE). It is the foundation on
which the Department and the BTS Directorate will be built. In laying
this foundation, we have a valuable opportunity to develop sound
management principles and meaningful performance measures. We will use
these principles and measures to guide our efforts and gauge our
progress in carrying out the President's Management Agenda.
Budget Request for fiscal year 2004
In his fiscal year 2004 budget, the President requested $18.1
billion, including fees, and roughly 108,000 full-time equivalents
(FTE) positions for the Border and Transportation Security Directorate.
The request reflects the Administration's commitment to the mission and
priorities of the Directorate.
The Border and Transportation Security Directorate secures the
nation's borders, transportation systems, points of entry, and points
in between. This includes nearly 7,500 miles of land border, 95,000
miles of shoreline and navigable rivers, and our Nation's airports,
highways, rail, maritime, pipeline, and transit systems. This
Directorate is responsible for preventing the illegal entry of people
or goods, while at the same time facilitating the unimpeded flow of
legitimate commerce and people across our borders and throughout the
national transportation system. This presents an enormous task. Each
year more than 500 million persons, 130 million motor vehicles, 2.5
million railcars, and 5.7 million cargo containers must be processed,
screened, or inspected at, or even before they reach, our borders.
The $18.1 billion requested by the President for the BTS
Directorate will: provide greater accountability through an integrated
border and transportation security organization; create smart borders
that are more secure; increase the security of international shipping
containers; continue implementation of the Aviation and Transportation
Security Act of 2001, the USA PATRIOT Act, and the Maritime
Transportation Security Act; and ensure that our Nation's first
responders are trained and equipped to address the threat of terrorism
through efforts consolidated in the Office for Domestic Preparedness.
The following sections detail the budget requests for the Border
and Transportation Security Directorate components.
The Bureau of Customs and Border Protection brings together
approximately 42,000 employees including 11,000 Border Patrol Agents,
and 19,000 inspectors from the Agriculture Plant Health and Inspection
Service, and the former Immigration and Naturalization and U.S. Customs
Services, including canine enforcement officers. The Bureau focuses its
operations on the movement of goods and people across our borders to
prevent the illegal entry into the United States of people or goods at
or between ports-of-entry while facilitating the movement of legitimate
trade and international travel.
The budget includes $6.7 billion for the Bureau of Customs and
Border Protection, an increase of $1.7 billion (33 percent) above
fiscal year 2002. These resources will support the Customs-Trade
Partnership against Terrorism (C-TPAT) program, which increases supply
chain security and expedites the clearance of international commercial
cargoes and conveyances. It also supports the expansion of programs
such as the Container Security Initiative, which puts personnel in key
international ports to examine high-risk cargo before it is placed on
U.S.-bound ships. The request funds the International Trade Data System
(ITDS) and the Automated Commercial Environment System (ACE), two
capital projects for which, if the request is approved, nearly $1.1
billion will have been dedicated since fiscal year 2001.
The Bureau of Customs and Border Protection will ensure compliance
with customs and immigration laws, determine the admissibility of
persons to the United States, and prevent the admission of terrorists
and other criminals. The Bureau will also focus on deterring illegal
crossings, seizing illegal drugs, currency, and monetary instruments,
processing $1.2 trillion in imports, and collecting $20 billion in
duties on the same, while inspecting 147 million vehicles and more than
one million aircraft. The budget also supports continued implementation
of the comprehensive U.S. VISIT system to track the timely departure of
visitors to the United States.
The Bureau of Immigration and Customs Enforcement brings together
the enforcement and investigative arms of the former Customs and
Immigration and Naturalization Services, and the Federal Protective
Service. The reorganization involves approximately 14,000 employees,
including 5,500 criminal investigators, 4,000 employees for immigration
and deportation services and 1,500 Federal Protective Service staff.
The Bureau will address the full range of immigration and customs laws
within the United States, in addition to protecting specified Federal
buildings. The air and marine enforcement functions of the former
Customs Service will also be a part of this Bureau.
The fiscal year 2004 request for the Bureau of Immigration and
Customs Enforcement (BICE) includes $2.8 billion, an increase of nearly
$400 million (16 percent) above fiscal year 2002. Nearly $1.1 billion
of this amount will support investigative activities, including
immigration fraud, smuggling of illegal aliens, international money
laundering, export enforcement, forced labor, trade agreement
investigations, smuggling of narcotics, weapons of mass destruction
(WMD) and other contraband, illegal transshipment, and vehicle and
cargo theft. Furthermore, the budget will continue our ability to
apprehend, detain and remove illegal aliens, and strengthen visitor and
immigrant arrival and departure control by facilitating timely
enforcement actions against violators. These funds will also reduce
infrastructure vulnerabilities, promoting safe and secure Federal
properties for both employees and visitors.
The Transportation Security Administration (TSA) continues its
mission to protect and secure our nation's transportation systems,
while ensuring the unencumbered movement of commerce and people. The
President's budget requests $4.8 billion for TSA, approximately $2.4
billion of which will be financed by offsetting collections from
aviation passenger security fees and airline security fees. Collection
of these fees will be suspended from June 1 through September 30, 2003
in accord with the provisions of the fiscal year 2003 Emergency Wartime
Supplemental Appropriations Act, with collections renewed on October 1,
2003.
Of the total request, approximately $4.3 billion supports direct
aviation security activities, including a professionalized passenger
and baggage screening workforce, and supporting equipment to prevent
weapons and other contraband on aircraft. The budget also supports
reimbursement to State and local law enforcement agencies, funding for
the Federal Air Marshal Service to provide in-flight security, and it
supports improvements in both air cargo and passenger screening methods
and technology to reduce security risks.
The request for TSA includes funding for new air cargo security and
armed pilot initiatives, and it supports TSA's work to develop and
implement security standards for non-aviation modes of transportation.
Furthermore, it will advance the TSA's work on the Transportation
Worker Identification Credential (TWIC) initiative.
The Office for Domestic Preparedness will strengthen the readiness
capabilities of State and local governments that play a critical role
in the Nation's ability to prepare for and respond to acts of
terrorism. ODP will manage the Department's First Responder initiative,
providing grants for preparedness. ODP will award $3.5 billion to
States to address the equipment, training, planning and exercise needs
identified in their updated response plans. These State plans
strategically outline goals and objectives for preparedness, State and
local enforcement anti-terrorism initiatives, and Citizen Corps
preparedness activities. ODP will also continue supporting a number of
unique training facilities, and provide technical assistance for State
and local planning efforts.
The Federal Law Enforcement Training Center (FLETC) will continue
to serve as a leading Government provider of high-quality law
enforcement training to Federal, State, and local law enforcement
officers. The fiscal year 2004 budget request for the Federal Law
Enforcement Training Center is $146.1 million, including capital
acquisitions. With these funds, FLETC will provide cost-effective and
contemporary law enforcement training, support the specialized training
needs of State, local, and international agencies, and deliver
preventive and investigative law enforcement methodologies and
terrorism training.
Conclusion
The budget request for the Department of Homeland Security's Border
and Transportation Security Directorate supports the President's
National Strategy for Homeland Security, which is the framework for
mobilizing and organizing the resources of the Federal Government,
State and local governments, the private sector, and the American
people to accomplish our unwavering and complex mission to protect the
homeland. We have a good start on this work, but we are only at the
beginning of what will be a long and difficult road. Many challenges
lie ahead.
The fiscal year 2004 budget request provides the resources to
enable the Border and Transportation Security Directorate to manage its
responsibilities and continue its work to secure the homeland to
protect and serve the American people. We are committed to preventing
terrorist attacks, reducing America's vulnerability, and responding to
and recovering from attacks that occur. I look forward to continuing to
work with you to successfully accomplish these objectives.
Mr. Chairman, Senator Byrd, and Members of the Subcommittee, this
concludes my prepared statement. I would be happy to answer any
questions you may have at this time.
CHALLENGES OF UNDER SECRETARY'S OFFICE
Senator Cochran. Thank you, Mr. Secretary, for your
statement. The other day we had the Secretary of the Department
of Homeland Security, Tom Ridge, before our committee talking
about the overall budget request for the Department and the
challenges that face him and the President and all of you who
are responsible for the individual directorates and carrying
out the responsibilities of the Department of Homeland Security
Act.
I wonder, as we celebrated the first 100 days just recently
of the creation of this new Department, what you view as your
most challenging responsibilities. You have had experience in
other Federal offices, specifically the Drug Enforcement
Administration, heading up that office. Tell us what your most
difficult and challenging moments have been as Under Secretary.
Mr. Hutchinson. Well, thank you, Mr. Chairman, and it has
been challenging. I think any time you are setting up a new
organization there exists an incredible organizational
challenge. You overlay that with being in the Government, and
then you overlay that being in a high threat environment, and
our hostilities in Iraq enhanced our operational challenges,
and so all of that together combined for a very challenging
start.
I have been pleased, quite frankly, with the momentum for
the merging of the cultures between the 22 different agencies,
and I think the reason we are having a better time than other
Government reorganizations is because there is really a strong
commitment to the homeland security effort. It gives our
employees a tremendous sense of pride to be a part of this
Department.
STAFFING
Senator Cochran. Has there been a very high turnover in the
offices, particularly the principal offices of leadership in
the enforcement agencies and the inspection services that now
come under your jurisdiction? Have you had to go out and find
new people to hire, or are you bringing over a lot of folks who
worked in the offices and were in charge before the new
Department was created?
Mr. Hutchinson. Senator, it has not been a particular
problem with attrition or being able to recruit top-quality
executives or middle-level management for the work we are
doing. I think when you saw TSA created a couple of years ago,
I was at the DEA at that time, and you saw a lot of changeover
in Federal law enforcement. There was a lot of attraction to
that new mission. There were some competitive advantages to TSA
as they set up. I think the dust has settled since then, and
stabilized in our Federal law enforcement workforce. We have
people really knocking on our doors because they want to be
engaged in this tremendous new mission, so I don't identify
that as a problem.
Senator Cochran. There is a specific amount in the budget
request for you to hire employees and to staff up your own
office. Have you completed that work now, and to what extent is
the budget request sufficient to provide you with the number of
employees in your office that you need to carry out your
responsibilities?
Mr. Hutchinson. Well, in the 2004 budget request for my
operational team at the Under Secretary level it will be a part
of the overall Department management budget, and in my judgment
it has been adequate thus far. I believe it is adequate for the
2004 time frame.
We have budgeted for, I believe it is 67 personnel in the
Under Secretary's Office. That is relatively small number to
oversee 110,000 employees in the different agencies, but I
think it is wise not to start up with a huge bureaucracy. We
have detailed people from different agencies as part of that 67
in the near term. That gives us support, and with the
allocation we have I think that we've got a good team that
we're putting together for that purpose.
STATE OF READINESS IN PORTS
Senator Cochran. I know that when you mentioned the hiring
of port directors, you've been traveling around the country
meeting and getting to know some of the people that are in
these offices throughout the country, including recently in our
neighboring city of New Orleans. What do you consider to be the
state of readiness to protect the security of our Nation's
ports at this point in time?
Mr. Hutchinson. Well, first of all it is much improved, as
compared to prior to September 11. We have made enormous
strides and progress with our ports. There has been an
increasing number of ports that have done vulnerability
assessments. That is an ongoing process. In addition, the
information systems have improved, where the inspectors on the
front line have access to more databases to check cargo and
people, and it has been a partnership with the private sector.
They have invested a substantial margin in the security of our
ports. We have a greater distance to go in the future, but I
believe that the personnel are ready and the systems are
getting into place.
When I was there in New Orleans I saw some from your State,
Biloxi, that came over, doing an outstanding job there, so I
think that the state of readiness is good.
Senator Cochran. Senator Byrd. I am prepared to yield to
you, sir.
TRANSPORTATION SECURITY ADMINISTRATION RESOURCES FOR MARITIME AND LAND
SECURITY
Senator Byrd. Well, thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Secretary, you have referred to the $4.8 billion TSA
budget. Only $86 million is requested for maritime and land
security activity while over $4.3 billion is requested for
aviation security. This means that less than 2 percent of your
transportation security budget request is for maritime and land
security, less than $1 in $50. In fact, the budget request for
administrative costs associated with TSA headquarters and
mission support centers, $218 million, is two-and-a-half times
greater than the request for maritime and land security. How do
you explain that?
Mr. Hutchinson. Well, Senator, of course, subsequent to
September 11 and really prior to that there was a great focus
on airport security, airline security. Much of that was--of
course, all of that was based upon a mandate from Congress to
have 100 percent checked baggage inspection, as well as
screening of each passenger, so that's where the emphasis has
come from. But as you noted, the TSA has a broader mandate than
just airline security, and we are moving in that direction.
I don't think we treat every mode of transportation the
same. Whenever you're looking at rail, we want to act on best
practices with strong relationships with the modal
administrations at the Department of Transportation, so we are
mindful of our responsibility there. We are moving forward with
stronger efforts in the other modes of transportation, and we
will do it based upon threats and the vulnerabilities that we
assess.
Senator Byrd. All right. You have introduced my next
question, and you've partially answered it. Why has more
funding not been requested for other, equally important modes
of transportation?
Last month, Secretary Ridge provided the committee with a
written statement of his priority guidelines for addressing
vulnerabilities to another terrorist attack. He included
attacks on confined spaces, such as rail and air transportation
systems, that could be used to spread contamination. He
expressed concern about catastrophic economic damage that could
come from an attack on transportation systems and on petroleum
facilities at our ports, and, yet, the request for adequate
resources is not there. We've concentrated on the $4.3 billion
requested for aviation security.
I'm all for that, but, the budget request for
administrative costs associated with TSA headquarters and
mission support centers is two-and-a-half times greater than
the request for maritime and land security. Are port and
maritime security lower priorities? They must be. Why? Is it
because there hasn't been a terrorist attack here yet? The
terrorist track record is to exploit vulnerabilities. The first
attack on the World Trade Center used truck bombs.
The attempted millennium attack in Washington State sought
to exploit our porous borders. The 9/11 attack used airplanes.
I think we should have learned from this track record to
address all of our vulnerabilities, and not just those that the
terrorists have used most frequently.
PRIORITIES IN TRANSPORTATION SECURITY ADMINISTRATION BUDGET
Senator Byrd. Mr. Secretary, why is the security of our
ports, why is the security of our bus and subway systems, why
is the security of our rail systems, Amtrak, for example, why
do they have such a lower priority in your budget?
Mr. Hutchinson. Well, you're absolutely correct that we
have to address the broad range of vulnerabilities in our
transportation systems. Whenever you look at the airlines, we
responded both to vulnerability but also an incident, and now
we're conducting assessments, and it is important to conduct
these assessments of the vulnerability of our transportation
system so we know exactly how we're spending our money and
where it should be invested.
In the 2004 budget, $62 million is requested for the
Container Security Initiative assessments. This also is an
important part of our efforts to provide, both from the private
sector and with our taxpayer partnership, greater security
efforts in our ports. When it comes to other areas of critical
infrastructure, we have the Directorate of Information Analysis
and Infrastructure Protection. This directorate has requested
$500 million to go toward critical infrastructure protection,
and this has the broader arena of infrastructure.
Part of it will be in the transportation sector, part of it
will be in the petroleum or the energy sector, and there will
be other aspects of critical infrastructure that have to be
protected, so we'll go through the assessments, and then we
will be assigning the responsibilities for the protection based
upon those vulnerabilities.
Senator Byrd. It appears to me from what you've said that
you feel that the budget requests are inadequate. What would be
an adequate request, in your judgment, to meet these
vulnerabilities about which you have spoken?
Mr. Hutchinson. With due respect, Senator, I believe the
2004 budget request is appropriate. I think it is important not
to measure success simply by the dollar amounts that are
invested, but also by the strategy that is being implemented,
and I think it is an appropriate strategy to logically go
through the evaluations and the assessments and then put the
money where the threats and greatest vulnerabilities are, so
clearly down the road there is going to be additional money
that is needed, but in terms of the 2004 budget, I think it is
a correct strategy and the right amount to complete these
assessments.
Senator Byrd. How much did you request at the OMB level for
these items?
Mr. Hutchinson. I do not have that figure as to that
discussion.
Senator Byrd. You don't know what you requested at the OMB
level?
Mr. Hutchinson. I do not have that in front of me, sir.
Senator Byrd. Will you supply it to the committee, please?
Mr. Hutchinson. We will be glad to look at that and get the
information to you.
Senator Byrd. You will be glad to supply that information
to the committee?
Mr. Hutchinson. Provided there are not any issues there
that I am unaware of at this time in terms of the
communications that we had with OMB, but we will certainly want
to support your request for that information and be able to
answer you appropriately.
Senator Byrd. Well, you have fuzzed up that response. I've
been in Congress now more than 50 years, and I know when an
answer, is a solid, firm, straightforward answer, and when it
is not. So, please supply that information to this committee.
It's our business to try to fund the needs to protect the
people of this country, and on the basis of your testimony, I
think that the budget request is inadequate. So, will you
please supply that information so that this subcommittee can
respond in an adequate fashion, as we are here to do and want
to do? Do you understand that?
Mr. Hutchinson. I understand, and will be happy to respond
to your question.
[The information follows:]
A separate line item was not included in the fiscal year 2004 TSA
budget for these items. Rather, budget requirements to address these
needs and similar requirements across all sectors of the Department of
Homeland Security were consolidated under the Directorate for
Infrastructure Analysis and Infrastructure Protection.
The budget requests that agencies send to OMB are part of the
Executive Branch's deliberative process for developing the President's
Budget submission to Congress. The longstanding Executive Branch
position has been that agencies are to preserve the confidentiality of
these internal deliberations and not release the funding requests that
they send to OMB.
COAST GUARD GRANTS FOR PORT SECURITY
Senator Byrd. I will just finish with one more question.
The Coast Guard has estimated already the cost of improving
port security at $1.4 billion for fiscal year 2004, and there
are no dollars, none, in the budget request. Do you want to
comment on that?
Mr. Hutchinson. Well, an assessment was done by the Coast
Guard. Obviously, when you look at needs for port security,
part of it is borne by the private sector. A substantial part
of that they are investing. In addition, we again are providing
money to complete the assessments, and there are some grants
that are available through TSA that would be broader than
simply an assessment that would be grants for improvement of
security.
Senator Byrd. Mr. Chairman, I have further questions, but I
will wait.
Senator Cochran. Thank you, Senator Byrd. Senator Campbell.
OFFICE FOR DOMESTIC PREPAREDNESS GRANT-MAKING PROCESS
Senator Campbell. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I have about,
maybe 10 questions. Some of them I will submit in writing, too,
with your permission.
The portion of your budgets dedicated to managing the
Department's first responder initiative providing for grants
for preparedness, I think my office is like many of them here,
and that is we have some disparity about how it ought to be
administered at the State level. It seems like every town, at
least major-sized towns in my State, would like to have their
own Homeland Security office and their own network, their own
system, and the States would prefer it go through the States.
Could you explain very quickly how the process that's in place
now, how it awards the grants?
Mr. Hutchinson. Yes, Senator. The broad overarching
principle is that we want to go through the State Homeland
Security directors to channel the money flow to the first
responders at the local government level, and the reason is
that we want to make sure that a security response is highly
coordinated, that there is a multijurisdictional response to
any terrorist incident or the planning for it. The only way to
do that is to have a State coordinating body that will make
sure that the local entities are coordinating and moving in the
same direction.
Senator Campbell. So the grant is given to the State and
they, in turn, disseminate it to communities as they see fit?
Mr. Hutchinson. That is correct. Now, in reference to the
most recent supplemental that was provided, over $2.2 billion,
the bulk of that will go through the States, but Congress
wisely put on a requirement that it has to go from the States
to the local governments within 45 days. Sometimes in the past
it has stayed there too long, and so that 45 days will move it
in a more quick fashion to the local governments. There will be
pressure from the bottom, and we will be putting pressure from
the top.
You also allowed, I think it was $10 million at least, for
technical assistance, so ODP will be providing more technical
assistance to the States to help them to get that money out to
local governments. We recognize how important it is to get to
the local governments. We are going to be working to accomplish
that, but still, it's important to run that money through the
State for coordination purposes.
Senator Campbell. Okay, thank you.
EMERGING TECHNOLOGIES RELEVANT TO BORDER AND TRANSPORTATION SECURITY
There must be literally dozens of groups who have already
come to you, and certainly they have come to us, that have some
kind of a new, sophisticated technology that they think should
be in the mix somewhere in trying to provide better security,
particularly on airlines. I saw one about 6 months ago that
was--I'm not a really high tech person, and it kind of amazed
me. It was a very tiny monitor that could be put literally
anywhere in the plane, in the cabin of the plane, and you
almost couldn't see it. It was just like a little, small eye,
and it was coupled with a screen on the ground so people on the
ground at the appropriate agencies could actually watch what
was going on inside the cabin of the plane and could
communicate with the people on the ground, too. I thought that
was really pretty advanced.
Is there a process now in place in which these new emerging
technologies, which are often done by very small groups around
the country, is there a process in place now where they can get
into the system and show their wares and have someone evaluate
it?
Mr. Hutchinson. Yes, there is, and I was pleased that one
of the directorates created at Homeland Security is the Science
and Technology Directorate, which is--I equate it to an R&D
shop in private industry, and Dr. Chuck McQueary, does an
outstanding job there, and as we see either new emerging
technologies or maybe even existing technologies in the private
sector that may have an application for border security or
transportation security, we will ask them to evaluate it, to
test, pilot it, to see if it can work on the border, or we
might give them an idea that they will go out in the private
sector and solicit bids for a particular project.
So they do the evaluation, the piloting of it, we do the
request, and then the implementation of it if it does have that
application. I have encouraged those in private industry to
check our Web sites. They have ways in which they can present
their ideas to Homeland Security.
Senator Campbell. And along that line, before 9/11 there
was very little way to be able to communicate from the air to
the ground, other than the normal channel to the tower, and the
air marshals, do they have a way of communicating with the
ground now, when they are on the airplane, and by the way, if
there is something you shouldn't say in public, or before the
committee, that's fine.
Mr. Hutchinson. Senator, let me get back with you on that
answer, if I might.
[The information follows:]
Pursuant to House Conference Committee Report 107-593, TSA's
Federal Air Marshal Service (FAMS) was provided $15 million to begin
implementation of an Air to Ground Communications program. TSA intends
to utilize this funding to purchase a Commercial Off-the-Shelf (COTS)
product, which includes hardware and software, for implementation of
the Air to Ground communications system. This initial system will allow
FAMS to utilize a portable, quickly deployable air to ground
communications system which will seamlessly integrate existing FAMS
wireless technology. This comprehensive wireless communications system
may also be used by other local, State, and Federal agencies, and the
Department of Defense, to achieve secure communications through a
dedicated law enforcement network.
MONITORING UNTENDED AIRSTRIPS
Senator Campbell. I mentioned in my opening statement, too,
one of the weaknesses I saw, which raised some hackles of
private aviation, but I know that there are literally hundreds
and hundreds of runways around the country, many of them paved,
by the way, that are on the FAA maps, but there's nobody
around. They're just, literally abandoned.
I know of two just within a few miles of my own home town,
in fact, no towers, no FBOs, nothing on it, where people could
land, and certainly the drug runners know most of these
airports, and they are the ones who are using them.
Is there anything that we are doing to catalog them, or
monitor them, do something so that they would be less
attractive as a place to put explosives on a private plane, as
an example?
Mr. Hutchinson. Well, there are a couple of things that
we're doing. First of all, the general aviation industry has
been very supportive in terms of, if they see something that is
suspicious, they report that. We had a number of different
reports that we've investigated based on their information, so
they're really our eyes and ears out there if they see
something strange or get an unusual request. The general public
obviously is helpful.
We have in the Bureau of Immigration and Customs
Enforcement the Air and Marine Division, in which we monitor
aircraft, in conjunction with other agencies that might be
coming into our country. We, during Operation Liberty Shield,
deployed many of those air assets to the Northern border. That
helps us to track pilots that are unaccounted for, or might be
operating under suspicious circumstances.
So a combination of our own intelligence and law
enforcement activities on the ground with our monitoring of our
border air security gives us a pretty good idea of what's going
on in that arena.
Senator Campbell. Well, good luck in that arena, because I
just think there's a huge weakness there yet.
PRIVATIZING AIR TRAFFIC CONTROL
Recently, President Bush issued an Executive order that
deleted a clause in a previous order signed by President
Clinton that described air traffic control as an inherently
governmental function. The administration, this administration
has proposed studying whether to hire a private company to take
over the air traffic control system. What effect would that
have? Do you think it would solve any problems, or would it
help the current system, or hinder the current system?
Mr. Hutchinson. If there were private contractors for air
traffic control?
Senator Campbell. Yes.
Mr. Hutchinson. I really wouldn't be in a position to
comment from an expert standpoint on that. Obviously, we look
at the private sector where appropriate. That is one that has
to be closely integrated and we have to be careful about, but I
would wait for the comments from the FAA before I would want to
submit my own comments on that.
Senator Campbell. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Senator Cochran. Thank you very much. Senator Inouye.
Senator Inouye. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
FURLOUGHING OF AIR PASSENGER INSPECTORS
Mr. Secretary, recently TSA issued hundreds of yellow slips
throughout the system, many to recently trained inspectors.
Does that reflect itself on the budget, because I noticed,
personnel, you have increased it?
Mr. Hutchinson. It does, and the reason for that was
twofold. One, there is a cap on the number of employees. This
reduction, or right-sizing, as Admiral Loy calls it, will bring
the screener workforce down to 49,000, and then secondly, there
naturally needs to be an adjustment out there for efficiency
purposes. The organization stood up very quickly. Not all of
our personnel were allocated in the right way. We have to
adjust it to allow for the traffic flow. There is going to be a
reduction of 6,000, I think, in the next 6 months. It will be
phased in.
About half of those will happen through normal attrition.
Others will be done through performance evaluations. There is
some accommodation for those that have to be moved, so Admiral
Loy is working closely with the workforce on that and with the
management at TSA to do this in the best way, but it's
something that was necessary from a budget standpoint and a
management standpoint, and in answer to your question, it does
save hundreds of millions of dollars by this reduction in
force.
Senator Inouye. Do you have similar caps in other areas?
Mr. Hutchinson. In other areas of Homeland Security?
Senator Inouye. Yes.
Mr. Hutchinson. No. That is the only statutorily mandated
limitation on numbers. Of course, others are fixed in terms of
the amount that could be used for personnel, but that was a
unique circumstance in which we had to stand it up so quickly.
There was a limitation that was placed on it, and that is the
only one that, because of budget constraints, TSA is the only
one that had to do a right-sizing of the workforce.
Senator Inouye. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. May I
submit my other questions?
Senator Cochran. Senator, thank you. Certainly, and we hope
you will be able to respond, Mr. Secretary, to the written
questions within a reasonable time.
Mr. Hutchinson. I would be pleased to do so.
Senator Cochran. Senator Hollings.
PORT SECURITY
Senator Hollings. Mr. Chairman, on Senator Byrd's question
of your request to OMB, add how much OMB cut your request, will
you, please?
Mr. Hutchinson. I will add that to the request.
Senator Hollings. And this is friendly, because I'm with
you, and I want to work with you, but you're way behind the
curve when you intimate that, for example, the port security
assessments are on course, and that security at ports is good.
Let me--harken the actual facts.
When we passed the port security bill in the United States
Senate, it wasn't just an estimate. That was a determination of
$4\1/2\ billion, and $1.4 billion immediately. That was voted
on by every Republican and every Senator, 100 to nothing. When
we got over on the House side, they bucked all year long, and
we had to finally compromise just making an authorization bill
in November.
Again, in the emergency supplemental we had a billion in
there that we could spend during the rest of this fiscal year.
I know Senators, Republican Senators that wanted to cosponsor,
wanted to vote for it, and word came from the White House,
don't vote for that. There's no money.
And when you intimate that money could come from the
private sector, it won't come from the private sector. It won't
even come from the public. Working with these folks you learn
quickly, they don't want security. The name of the game at the
port is to move it as fast as they possibly can, and so they're
in competition, and they just cross their fingers and say,
well, they'll blow up Houston, or they'll blow up Philadelphia,
they won't come to mine, and I'm not going to spend my time and
money on that particular story, and incidentally the law says
the captain of the port is in charge of security, which means
you, Mr. Secretary, the buck stops with you. We need that
money. We need it right away.
We do not have--for one, you testified, the transportation
worker identification credentials. That's supposed to be
available next month, in June, and these truck drivers coming
on the port facility, they don't have credentials. They can't
enforce it now, but that's what we said last year, that by June
of this year we would have a card that you had approved in the
Department of Homeland Security, and that Department would
issue it, and then everybody would have an identification card.
We have virtually no security whatever. I can identify
every plane that approaches the coast of the United States. I
cannot identify every ship. Now, we made the shipowners provide
transponders, but we do not have the money for the channel
towers. It just came out the other day when Secretary Ridge was
here, and he testified that we don't have that money yet.
You've got to get your Department on top of this particular
problem, because Osama bin Laden has got 10 vessels that he
owns. He used a rust bucket to go into Mombasa, the port of
Kenya, to blow up U.S. Embassies in Nairobi and Tanzania, and
they could come up to Houston, or come up the Delaware River.
They could come up on, not on one of those rust buckets,
they could take over--like they did the planes, they could take
over an Exxon tanker coming right up there, throw the captain
overboard and run it into the tank farm there, blow the whole
thing. That would close down the eastern seaboard for several
months--we've got Booz-Allen studies. All of this has been, not
just estimates, but studies showing the tremendous danger that
we're in, but to come to say, we're on course and the port
security is good? I want to work with you and get on with that.
We need the money now, and your budget doesn't call for it.
Otherwise, there's been an ongoing, trying to get an
additional 500 Customs agents. We debated an old textile bill
back when President Reagan was in. I tried to get the 500
there. Then when we debated another bill, NAFTA, in 1994--he is
now the ranking member of the Budget, but Congressman Spratt,
that you know very well, he voted for NAFTA on the promise that
he would get 500 Customs agents. He hasn't gotten them yet.
Now we go to the Customs agency and say, look, you say the
$5 billion in train shipments in violation of textiles, and the
agent looks at you and says, Senator, you want me to check
drugs or do you want me to check textiles? He said, I'm
checking drugs as best I can. Now, the agent says, excuse me,
I'm checking terrorists, then I'm checking drugs, then I might
get to your textiles, so you're way behind the curve on Customs
agents, so I just suggest that you get on top of that.
I see according to my news reporter here on the right we're
getting rid of Mitch Daniels in 30 days.
Senator Leahy. Hallelujah.
Senator Hollings. Hallelujah is right. Let's get the money
and get on, because you're the one that's going to be in
charge. The buck stops there.
I appreciate you've got a difficult task, and a lot of old
things like the Customs things and identification card and the
Port Security money. The money hasn't been there on rail
security, it's not there on port security.
Mr. Hutchinson. Senator, I just want to thank you for your
comments. You have been a very constructive partner in this,
and I take your admonitions very seriously, and I certainly do
not mean to represent that everything is perfect in the
security realm. We understand the many challenges that we face.
Senator Hollings. Your problem is money, and let's get it
out of that crowd.
Mr. Hutchinson. Thank you for your comments, Senator.
Senator Cochran. Senator Leahy.
Senator Leahy. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I checked--any
further news? I'm so tempted to say something, but I'm not
going to do that. I don't get the Arkansas wire here.
Mr. Hutchinson. You're a wise man.
Senator Leahy. I only get the Vermont political wire.
Mr. Hutchinson. I'm staying right where I am.
I think.
RESTRUCTURING OF IMMIGRATION AND CUSTOMS
Senator Leahy. Let me ask you a question. You and I have
known each other and worked with each other for years, and I am
thinking back to when you testified before the Judiciary
Committee in March, and I asked you to make good use of the
excellent former, now former INS employees from Vermont that
you inherited. Vermont is home to the administrative offices
for the INS that provides oversight administration for much of
the eastern half of the United States. I mention them because
the workers have always received the highest rankings for their
work and efficiency, and most have felt it was a good bang for
the buck, and you told me it was essential to get the facts and
to communicate with them clearly.
Now, since that testimony, the former INS and Customs
employees of Vermont still want to know what the restructuring
means to them. Of course, some confusion is inevitable. I was
looking at the organizational chart of the Department of
Homeland Security. It's a pretty daunting one, so could you
tell me what is the current state of restructuring for the
Bureau of Immigration and Customs Enforcement, and how will
that command structure differ from what the INS now has?
Mr. Hutchinson. Thank you, Senator, and first of all the
Law Enforcement Service Center in Vermont does an outstanding
job. Mike Garcia, the Acting Assistant Secretary in charge of
ICE has been up there. I'm also aware of how critical a role
they play in providing local law enforcement with information
on alien absconders and other issues that they have to
confront, so I'm very impressed with the work that they do in
terms of our organizational structure with Immigration and
Customs Enforcement. I call it ICE.
This Bureau came into Homeland Security by simply linking
the chain of command at the top, and so you had your
immigration enforcement and you had your Customs enforcement.
They just came up to the top. Now we're bringing those middle
management structures together, and we're going to be moving
forward in the next couple of weeks. The management of
Immigration and Customs Enforcement is ready for this unified
leadership change. I do not see that this impacts the
enforcement services there in Vermont. We do not plan to reduce
the staff there. They're doing an outstanding job, and they're
very needed in this mission, and they will remain a critical
part of Immigration and Customs Enforcement.
LEADERSHIP ISSUES IN REORGANIZATION OF BORDER SECURITY AGENCIES
Senator Leahy. Thank you. I was just wondering. I don't
envy you having to do this, but you have to integrate the old
INS, Customs, other agencies into the Bureau of Customs and
Border Protection. If you've got overlapping personnel and
administrative support staff and so on, how do you determine
who takes the lead? Who is in charge? I mean, ultimately you
are, I understand, but to make it function, how do you
determine that?
Mr. Hutchinson. Well, it is a challenge whenever you're
looking at whether it's immigration enforcement director or
Customs traditional enforcement, SAC, that takes the lead, when
you bring the management structure together you look at their
experience, you look at their grade level, and things like
that, put an interim person in charge. Then you will go to a
merit-based selection process where everybody can present
themselves for that, so it's a process we're going through
that's working fairly smoothly.
The biggest challenge is with the services side and
splitting things off there, because you had support functions
that supported both the enforcement side as well as the
services side, as well as the inspection side, and so you've
got some blend. That's more difficult to split, but
Commissioner Bonner, Mr. Garcia, and Eduardo Aguirre, who is
head of the services side, have a working group between them
that work on these issues, and they're resolving them very
well. It's a challenge, but they are making progress on it.
One of the biggest challenges, by the way, is the overseas
offices, because usually in a small overseas office they serve
everyone, and they're funded in many instances by the services
side fee collection, and that is a difficult issue we're
wrestling with.
Senator Leahy. I am sure it is. I have other questions
about TSA staff reductions, certainly at the Burlington Airport
and others. I will submit that for the record.
And I will make the same invitation to you I made to
Governor Ridge. The snow has gone out in Vermont. It has now
melted. The maple syrup crop is in. Come to Vermont and talk to
these people. I really wish you would. They are amazing. I have
spent a lot of time both in South Burlington and St. Albans,
where we have so many INS, Customs, others up on the border,
and I use that term, INS, Customs, all just realizing that has
changed, but to indicate who I'm talking about.
These are remarkable people. They are highly dedicated
people, alien tracking system that you referred to in law
enforcement. I remember one time we had 20 inches of snow
overnight. This had to stay open around the clock. Everybody
showed up to work on time, and I said something and they said,
well, there has to be somebody here, of course. I mean, there's
just never any question.
So come on up there sometime. I would love to show you
around.
Mr. Hutchinson. Thank you. I'd be happy to do so.
Senator Leahy. And I will submit my other question, if I
might, for the record.
Senator Cochran. Thank you, Senator Leahy.
ENFORCEMENT ROLES AND COORDINATION UNDER REORGANIZATION
Mr. Secretary, in your directorate there are several sub-
bureaus focused on enforcement of current law, specifically the
Bureau of Customs and Border Protection, the Bureau of
Immigration and Customs Enforcement, and the Transportation
Security Administration. How do you intend to coordinate the
policies and the investigations procedures of these different
entities within your directorate? Will they be coordinated, or
will they function more or less independent of each other?
Mr. Hutchinson. They will be coordinated, and we're doing
it in a couple of ways. First of all, every Friday we have a
policy council, BTS policy council that meets. The heads of
each of the agencies under the Border and Transportation
Directorate meet and we work on this coordination every week,
high level.
For example, use of force. Whenever you have a multitude of
different agencies coming from the Justice Department, the
Treasury Department, Transportation coming over, everybody has
a different policy. We want to unite them together. This
afternoon I'll be meeting with the Deputy Secretary about the
procurement of boats. Whenever you have Coast Guard, it's not
in the BTS, but we're trying to coordinate that with our
Immigration and Customs Enforcement procurement of some air and
marine assets, so we're working at that level as well.
Probably most importantly, though, is the IT architecture,
the information infrastructure. We're working with Steve
Cooper, our Chief Information Officer for the Department, and
building it together. For example, TSA is proposing and trying
to pilot the CAPPS-II program, which is an information-sharing
system I also emphasize over and over again that ultimately we
want to be able to collect information from our visa programs
overseas and the consular offices, make sure that information
is available to our inspectors at the airports and our land
ports of entry. Furthermore the information that is collected
must be Government-based, not any private databases there, but
appropriate to be shared, can be shared, and so we want to
integrate these functions together.
It is a humongous challenge. I think there's almost 3,000
different mission-oriented programs for our information
infrastructure. That's a huge challenge, to coordinate those
together, but we're working on it through policy development in
our policy council.
CONSOLIDATED PROCUREMENTS
Senator Cochran. In that connection, I think there could be
opportunities for substantial savings if you bring together the
procurement processes too. You mention the boats and ships that
might be under the jurisdiction of the Coast Guard or some of
the other agencies, but a number of automobiles and other
vehicles like buses and helicopters are used by the Border
Patrol, Investigations, Detention, and TSA. It seems to me that
they could be consolidated in a procurement regime under your
directorate, and you could end up saving money and become more
efficient in the process. Is that your plan, and to what extent
are you implementing that kind of plan?
Mr. Hutchinson. That is the plan, and it will result in
some savings. For example, the Canine Enforcement Divisions.
TSA has a canine enforcement program, bomb-sniffing dogs. We
have drug-sniffing dogs in terms of the border inspection, and
we want to look at ways that we can bring these programs
together, not just for cost savings, but also for better
standards and better training, so that's one area.
As you mentioned, there's a whole host of others.
Helicopters is a good example, and not just in procurement but
also in cross-training capabilities. I was in a meeting of
employees where you had the Border Patrol having their
helicopters, and then you had the Air and Marine Division of
Immigration and Customs Enforcement with their helicopters, and
they said, you know, we'd have less down time if we were cross-
trained, we could actually use the other's helicopters, so this
is something that's being pushed at both the ground level and
at a high level.
In some instances we won't be able to have joint
procurement. If we can't, we want to be able to explain why and
check it out.
CONSOLIDATED INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY
Senator Cochran. You mentioned information technology. Do
you intend to consolidate hardware and software systems within
your directorate so you eventually end up with one single
technology platform, or will it be a combination of systems?
Mr. Hutchinson. The ultimate goal is that they're
integrated and that the information is shared. As to how you
technically reach that goal, I will leave that to Steve Cooper,
our Chief Information Officer, who has the technical
capabilities, but I am working with him to accomplish that. It
is not going to be--we can't stop every program development
right now to say, wait till we get all this coordinated, but
we're trying as we develop a program saying, make sure that
this is going to be able to tie in to the other programs that
we know have to be developed, so ultimately we will be measured
by that, and we're committed to having success on that.
Senator Cochran. Well, I wish you well. I think it is a
very challenging responsibility that you face. To what extent
do you try to impose your will on the agency heads within your
directorate?
I'm thinking about some of the specific requirements for
security precautions at our Nation's airports. There still
seems to be a good deal of controversy surrounding some of
those things, whether they're needed or not, whether they take
too long, do you have too many people as screeners, or not
enough at some places. How much are you going to get involved
in the details of those decisions?
Mr. Hutchinson. Senator, first of all I have a lot of
confidence in the agency heads. They're good managers. They are
very thoughtful, and certainly want to do a good job for the
country, so I don't want to micromanage them. We give broad
direction to them, but we do ask the tough questions, and
that's my responsibility, and so that is one of the reasons I
get out in the field. I see how it's working out there, I come
back and push them on a number of these things, and then we
have our own initiatives, some of those I have mentioned, to
bring them together.
The greatest challenge, but opportunity, we have is to
bring these cultures and operations together in a way the
American public expects. For example, the sharing of
information, where a boat operator does not have to send the
cargo information to three different agencies but can send it
to one--a common sense approach, and we're doing that. Those
are the kinds of initiatives we want to be able to drive with
them. Good managers, though. They have a lot of flexibility,
but we are working for Department objectives that they will
implement, and we're going to make sure that happens.
Senator Cochran. Thank you. Senator Byrd. Excuse me,
Senator Kohl. Senator Byrd is willing to yield to you for any
questions you might have. We've been operating under sort of a
loosely determined 5-minute rule for questions.
REDUCTION OF AIRPORT SECURITY SCREENERS
Senator Kohl. Thank you. I appreciate it very much.
Mr. Secretary, recently the Administration announced that
it intends to cut 6,000 security screeners at airports around
the country. I do understand that some airports may well have
more screeners than they need, and so I'm not opposing the
reductions in their entirety. However, I'm concerned about a
few airports in my State of Wisconsin that I believe will have
a difficult time dealing with staff cuts.
First, Dane County Airport is listed as going from 81 to 63
screeners. I have been told that this is based on some
misunderstanding about the number of security lines at that
airport in Madison. TSA thought that Madison had only one
security line when in fact it has three.
I have also been informed that this confusion is in the
process of being sorted out and that Madison should get an
additional screener, which would bring it to a total of 82. Is
my understanding correct, and can we expect a decision on this
fairly soon?
Mr. Hutchinson. There have been some--you know, in the
process of adjustments there were errors made that have had to
be reevaluated. Originally we had received some inaccurate
information about the number of lanes in Wisconsin. The field
resubmitted that information, and the numbers will be finalized
in the next couple of weeks to reflect the added lane you
mentioned. I will be glad to get back with you more
specifically on your question to give you the commitment that
you're asking for, but that is the information that I have
right now, and we will continue to work on that.
Senator Kohl. I appreciate it, and will stay in close
touch.
At another airport, at the Outagamie County Airport in
Wisconsin, which serves the Appleton area, it's slated to go
down to 29 screeners from its current level of 51. However,
even with 51 screeners Outagamie County Airport is paying 10
percent of its screeners' employment costs now in overtime, so
the question is, why would screeners be reduced when TSA is
currently paying overtime on a regular basis in this location?
Mr. Hutchinson. I would have to look at that, too, and get
back to you. The methodology for the changes that were made
looked at passenger loads and the numbers of lanes, the use of
part-time and seasonal employees. The split shifts were
considered, but that doesn't answer the question that you're
asking, and we will be glad to get back with you as to how the
overtime that they were having to commit justifies the
reduction that you refer to.
Senator Kohl. Okay. Well, I would like to be able to stay
in touch with you and the Department on that one.
SMUGGLING OF PSEUDOEPHEDRINE
Mr. Secretary, in January of 2002 a trafficking operation
operating in several U.S. cities was found to be smuggling
pseudoephedrine, a precursor to meth, into the United States
from Canada. Meth is a major problem in my own State of
Wisconsin and throughout the Midwest, but what's even worse,
the proceeds of that trafficking ring have been traced to
Hezbollah and other terrorist groups operating in Yemen and
Lebanon. In what ways has the Department of Homeland Security
tightened its processes and procedures at the borders to stop
the smuggling of illegal drugs or their precursors into the
United States, in light of the link between drug trafficking
and terrorism?
Mr. Hutchinson. Excellent question, and I appreciate that
both from my current standpoint of protecting the borders and
the point I made when I was at the DEA. We are very concerned
about these types of operations at Homeland Security. Illegal
drugs constitute one of the biggest weapons of mass destruction
that we suffer, and so it is appropriate that we protect our
borders from both terrorist weapons and also drugs.
What you refer to is Operation Mountain Express, a very
successful investigation of the pseudo-traffickers, and as you
mentioned, some of that money went to the Middle East, some of
which went into the hands of some terrorist organizations. What
we're doing at the border--and I was there at some of the ports
of entry on the Northern border, and our inspectors are looking
at shipments that may be suspect in terms of pseudoephedrine
that would come from Canada.
We're also certainly encouraging our Canadian counterparts
to regulate pseudoephedrine so they do not have the legal
capability of procuring it there and moving it through the
Canadian commerce chain before it comes across our border. We
are keeping an eye on that from an inspection standpoint at the
borders, from an investigative standpoint through Immigration
and Customs Enforcement, and finally working with the Canadian
Government to regulate pseudoephedrine.
Senator Kohl. Thank you.
SEVERE ACUTE RESPIRATORY SYNDROME (SARS)
A last question, Mr. Secretary. We can all be thankful SARS
has not taken serious hold in our country. However, SARS has
shown us that a deadly illness can be introduced and spread by
visitors to our country, or upon the return of an American
citizen who has traveled abroad. What is the Department of
Homeland Security doing to ensure that visitors who come into
the United States at border crossings or by airplane or by boat
are not carrying SARS? What is the Department doing to prepare
for and safeguard against other, possibly more lethal diseases?
Mr. Hutchinson. It has been a wake-up call for all of us
that have responsibility at our ports of inspection. In
reference to SARS, we provided training information for our
inspectors to know what SARS is about, how to identify the
symptoms of that, and what to guard for.
We certainly give them the protective equipment whenever
they have reason to believe they might be exposed so they can
protect themselves. We are closely working with the Center for
Disease Control and Secretary Thompson's shop to make sure we
have the right information.
As we see passengers that come from areas of the world that
have an outbreak of SARS we will give them information that CDC
prepared, that they know that the passenger would be able to
identify the symptoms and be able to check with a doctor if
they encounter those symptoms.
So it's training, it's information that we're providing for
the passengers, and then we're looking down the road in the
event it becomes more serious, or a greater concern, what
additional steps we should take. That is difficult, difficult
obviously when people are coming to our land borders
particularly. There is very little that we can do, but we do
want to be able to provide the training and the information,
and to see if there's any additional action we can take in
conjunction with CDC.
Senator Kohl. I thank you very much, Mr. Secretary.
Mr. Chairman, thank you.
Senator Cochran. Thank you, Senator.
Senator Byrd.
ENTRY/EXIT SYSTEM
Senator Byrd. One crucial component of ensuring our
homeland security is ensuring that we as a government know
which foreigners are visiting our country, why they are here,
and that they depart when they are required to do so. Our
existing visa tracking systems are not doing the job. The
budget before us requests $480 million for the new entry/exit
visa tracking system. This is only a $100 million increase over
last year's level of funding.
A few days ago, Secretary Ridge announced a major change in
the program, proposing to create the U.S. VISIT system. The
Secretary has testified about the potential use of biometrics
in the system, but he offered very few other details when he
appeared before the panel last week.
Many Members of Congress and outside experts are concerned
about the lack of progress in implementing the previous system,
much less this revised system. It's my understanding that the
Department has not yet determined what technology will be used
in developing the system. Do you have anything new on that
point?
Mr. Hutchinson. I believe Secretary Ridge set the goals and
the direction for us in his testimony he presented to this
committee. He has directed us to go through a review of the
program that we inherited to see how we can meet the objectives
that Congress set for us in their deadlines, but also the goals
that Secretary Ridge has set. There are a number of policy
decisions that have to be made in order to determine how we get
to these objectives. We are due to provide the Appropriations
Committee a report on this, and we look forward to getting that
to you as soon as we can conclude this review.
Senator Byrd. Considering the track record of the former
INS in tracking foreign visitors, let alone identifying
potential terrorists or even coordinating watch lists with
other Federal agencies, I did not have much faith in that
service's ability to get the job done. Shortcomings have
plagued the INS, and are not far from plaguing the Border and
Transportation Security Directorate. There remain too many
holes in our borders and not enough agents. There are millions
of visitors to this country, and there is not even an ability
to guarantee that they are who they claim to be.
What steps are being taken to ensure that this system is on
track, and that it can be deployed in a timely fashion?
Mr. Hutchinson. Well, first of all, the goal that was given
to us in 2003 was to deploy, to have an entry/exit system for
our airports and our seaports. As Secretary Ridge indicated,
we're going to meet that congressionally mandated deadline.
We're going to have that capability.
In addition, really in my view further than the law
requires, we're going to have the capability of capturing and
reading biometric identifiers at that time in our airports and
seaports, so we look forward to working with Congress to
accomplish that goal.
The second part of the mandate is to have the same type of
system in the 50 land ports of entry by the end of 2004. We are
moving forward aggressively to evaluate what has been done by
the former INS in developing this system. As soon as we
complete that review, we will report to the Congress as to
where we will be in reference to the 2004 deadlines, but we're
working very aggressively to accomplish that.
When you talk about tracking visitors, a part of it is also
getting better information on our visitors and checking them
out at our consular offices overseas. We are working with the
Department of State right now for a memorandum of understanding
with them to transfer some of the oversight and training
responsibilities on that from the Department of State to the
Department of Homeland Security, which was a part of the
legislation that created this Department.
TRACKING OF STUDENTS AND EXCHANGE VISITORS
Senator Byrd. One of the criticisms of the former INS,
Immigration and Naturalization Service, was and remains its
inability to adequately track the entry and subsequent exit of
non-U.S. citizens who come to the United States and for
whatever reason overstay their visa. For instance, only last
month, the Department of Justice's Inspector General released a
report stating that there are significant deficiencies in the
tracking of foreign students.
Your Acting Assistant Secretary of the new Bureau of
Immigration and Customs Enforcement agreed with the IG's
conclusion that they need more resources to properly manage one
of the many tracking systems. What is your take on that? Are
additional resources required to implement the new system?
Mr. Hutchinson. Well, the Department of Justice Inspector
General report was on the SEVIS system, which was the tracking
system for foreign students that come to our educational
institutions, and this has been a very successful deployment,
in my judgment, by the former INS, and now, the Immigration and
Customs Enforcement responsibility. There were some bugs in it,
as was pointed out by the Inspector General. Those we are
attempting to address, and working with the universities to
accomplish the very important goal of being able to track our
students.
You asked about the resources. What we are creating is a
lot of information for us to evaluate. We know, for example,
that the universities will call in foreign students who have
foreign student visas but they do not show up for class. Now,
why is that? Do they just get a job somewhere? Do they go back
to their home? If we have over 2,000 names of people, students
who do not show up for class, we have a responsibility to check
those out, and we are trying to develop that capability.
So we want to be able to get information but also to have
an enforcement mechanism to investigate and to prosecute those
who violate our law. That is a challenge for us. We are trying
to meet that. Do we need more resources? That is part of the
2004 budget that I think will be adequate. We are going through
to see what greater capability we need. I would be happy to
report back to you, because I want to make sure we do not just
get information from all these different tracking systems, but
we have a capability to follow up on that information.
COUNTERFEIT IDENTIFICATION DOCUMENTS
Senator Byrd. Last year, the Senate Finance Committee
tasked the General Accounting Office with sending agents out to
try to enter the United States from Canada, from Mexico, and
from Jamaica, using false names and counterfeit identification
documents. In short, in each instance those GAO officials
succeeded in using these fake documents to enter the United
States. On at least one occasion, they were not even stopped as
they crossed over at one point of entry.
They created fictitious driver's licenses and birth
certificates, using off-the-shelf computer graphics software
that is available to any purchaser. Additionally, they obtained
and carried credit cards in the fictitious names that were used
in the test. The agents entered the United States from all
three locations using the fake names and documents. Officials
of the former Immigration and Naturalization Service and the
U.S. Customs Service whom the GAO agents encountered never
questioned the authenticity of the counterfeit documents, and
the GAO agents encountered no difficulty entering the country
using the fake documents. On two occasions, INS officials did
not ask for or inspect any identification documents when the
GAO agents entered the United States. On another occasion, an
agent was able to walk across a major border checkpoint without
being stopped or inspected by any government official. The
results of the exercise led the GAO to conclude that, (1)
people who enter the United States are not always asked to
present identification, (2) security to prevent unauthorized
persons from entering the United States from Canada from at
least one location is inadequate, and (3) inspectors from the
former INS are not readily capable of detecting counterfeit
identification documents.
Now, what steps, Mr. Secretary, do you intend to have
implemented in order to address the gaps, such as better
training, more intense document scrutiny, and what additional
resources do you need in order to accomplish these things?
Mr. Hutchinson. Thank you, Senator. First of all, we need
to learn from those type of GAO reports and to take those
lessons and apply them in the field. A couple of points there.
In that GAO attempt to enter the country, they utilized, I
believe, in most of the instances, State driver's licenses. Our
inspectors, with 50 different States, are not as trained in
identifying all the nuances of the different States' driver's
licenses versus foreign passports, and so it can be addressed
by more training. It can also be addressed by the States
implementing more security in the issuance of their driver's
licenses that are more resistant to forgery, so we need to
approach it in both ways.
Secondly, I would point out that these are American
citizens that were reentering the country, and our law does not
require American citizens who travel to Canada and back to have
any travel document, other than simply their affirmation or
perhaps a driver's license that they are an American citizen.
If we required our American citizens to have passports when
they leave the country and return, obviously that would be a
greater security measure, but I'm not sure we want to do that
yet.
I would also point out that I was pleased that there was an
instance, I believe it was in a Niagara point of entry, that an
Iranian came across the border with fraudulent Australian
passports, and who was apprehended at the time. So I think
there's a difference between capability of our inspectors in
picking up on false passports versus a driver's license from
the different States. So we need to work on training, we also
need to work with the States to enhance the security of their
travel, a driver's license and other documents.
Senator Byrd. Mr. Chairman, I have further questions, but I
would be glad to await your questions.
TRANSPORTATION SECURITY ADMINISTRATION RESPONSE TO SECURITY ALERT
LEVELS
Senator Cochran. Thank you very much, Senator Byrd. In
connection with the Transportation Security Administration,
while you don't get involved in the minutiae of day-to-day
administration responsibility, you do have the responsibility
of providing guidance and supervision of those who do run that
agency on a day-to-day basis, and I wonder about the impact of
these different stages of alert, the red alert, yellow, orange,
or all the rest. To what extent are you involved in helping to
determine exactly what the Transportation Security
Administration does when it changes from one state of alert to
another?
Mr. Hutchinson. I am substantially involved in that. In
fact, when we brought on TSA from Transportation, other
agencies from Justice, they had different ways of responding to
the different alert levels, so one of the first things we did
under my leadership was to ask for a review of the actions that
were taken when we raised the alert level, and to make sure
that they are complementary of each other. We are very much
involved from a leadership standpoint in the actions that are
taken by those agencies.
We also, most recently during Operation Iraqi Freedom,
developed our own operation, Liberty Shield, in which we
provided the leadership to the agencies working with them as to
what should be the response and the additional security
measures that would be taken as a result of the hostilities
overseas.
AIRPORT SCREENER REDUCTIONS
Senator Cochran. Also, with respect to the Transportation
Security Administration, we observed that Admiral Loy, who is
the Administrator, has announced he plans to cut the number of
airport screeners, 3,000 during this month and another 3,000 by
the end of the fiscal year. How did the Transportation Security
Administration get in the position of having such a large
number of screeners--I have been advised the number is 55,000--
when there is a statutory cap for full-time permanent positions
at 45,000? Is this an indication that at least 10,000 of these
were viewed as temporary employees, and it didn't violate the
statutory cap?
Mr. Hutchinson. That's correct, either temporary or part-
time, so it either could be a contract or they could be part-
time. The full-time equivalency, Admiral Loy submitted to
Congress that those statutory caps were met, but
notwithstanding that, the reduction of the screener force came
about. We closely monitored this working with Janet Hale, our
Under Secretary for Management, looking at it from a budget
standpoint, knowing that there was going to be a shortfall in
the TSA budget, and there is this need to be met.
We worked with Congress, the Appropriations Committee with
this, to know how we needed to address it, and as a part of
that we were going to have this reduction in force. There were
other components to meeting the budget requirements, but this
was one phase of it.
COST OF SECURITY INVESTMENTS AT SMALL AIRPORTS
Senator Cochran. One other issue in this airport security
area that is troublesome is the cost of security investments
for small airports. For many of us, we represent States that
don't have large airports but do have substantial investments
through local governments and airport authorities in air
transportation facilities. These smaller airports are being
held to the same standards as larger more financially able
airports, they are required to make changes for explosive
detection systems and many other things. It looks to me, that
we're going to either put some of these smaller airports out of
business or make it very, very expensive for local taxpayers to
fund the changes that are being ordered at the airports.
You mentioned Biloxi, Mississippi, a while ago when you
were talking about your visit to the New Orleans port. Not only
do we have ports along the Mississippi Gulf Coast, but that's a
rapidly growing area in our State. Air transportation demands
are increasing enormously, and while they've done a good job of
keeping pace, the airport now is being asked to relocate
facilities for security purposes.
They were asked to move the parking areas way beyond where
they were, to shut down existing parking facilities, all at
tremendous expense, and then some of those decisions were
changed, actually repealed. I'm not complaining that they were
repealed, but the fact is they went and incurred enormous
expenses, and then they said well, we changed our mind, you
really don't have to do exactly what we asked you to do before.
Is there any plan for the administration to try to help
meet the needs, the financial needs, of local airports, like
the Biloxi, Jackson, Mississippi, Airports and others in our
State, that are having to try to figure out how they're going
to pay for all of this?
Mr. Hutchinson. It is a burden that is shared by your
airports in Mississippi but also my airports in Arkansas that
I'm very familiar with that are under similar circumstances. It
has been a burden, and it reminds us that we certainly need to
have enhanced security, but it also creates a real mandate on
the private sector and expense on their part. We did get the
EDS equipment in, but it was in very awkward places, many times
out in front of the ticket counters, and they needed to be
moved. The airports wanted them moved, and so that's a process
we're going through.
FUNDING FOR EDS INSTALLATIONS
Approximately $1 billion in funding has been appropriated
for EDS installations, $738 million in 2002, and $265 million
in 2003. Of that, about half of that has been spent, and so
there will be more that has been put out in the field based on
that appropriation. The President's 2004 budget did not include
additional funding for EDS employment in light of that $1
billion that is already appropriated, but the most recent war
supplemental did provide for the possibility of letters of
intent to the airports for in-line EDS installations, and we
are committed to utilize that mechanism if the airports believe
that is appropriate and helpful.
AIRPORT MODIFICATION FUNDING PRIORITIES
Senator Cochran. Do you have a procedure, or some kind of
priority in mind for making these grants? How are you going to
determine which airports are eligible, or which applications
are going to be approved? I assume you can't approve every
application for Federal funding assistance.
Mr. Hutchinson. That is correct, and there is a ranking of
priority. Part of it is first of all those airports which
utilized alternative means of baggage screening, and so they
would have a priority first for the EDS installation, and then
there are other rankings in priority. I would be glad to answer
that more specifically and get that back to you.
[The information follows:]
Funds will be utilized for modifications to airports in two ways.
TSA will continue to fund through an existing contract with Boeing for
completion of work already assigned to Boeing by TSA. Second, TSA
expects to utilize these funds towards in-line EDS solutions. TSA is
developing a plan to be completed in the near future which outlines the
Federal Government's long-term commitment for this purpose.
Senator Cochran. We would appreciate being informed about
procedures and the priorities that the TSA is going to follow
in making funds available to local airport authorities. We just
hope the smaller ones don't get left out. That's the whole
point.
Mr. Hutchinson. Absolutely.
Senator Cochran. I know there are priorities for the larger
airports, and maybe that's where the greatest threats occur and
are. I have some other questions as well, but on other topics,
but I'm happy to submit those to you.
I think you've done an excellent job, coming in to the
responsibility as you have with a lot of pressure, a lot of
visibility. A lot of people want answers to questions that
maybe can't be answered right away, and you have to work your
way through a lot of these challenges. But I've been impressed
with the way you've taken on the job and I appreciate the fact,
just personally, that you've agreed to serve in this capacity.
It is a very important responsibility, but you have a high
level of energy and enthusiasm for it, and we appreciate your
service very much.
Mr. Hutchinson. Thank you, Senator.
Senator Cochran. Senator Byrd.
Senator Byrd. Mr. Chairman, I agree with your statement and
your assessments of the Secretary's authority and his
dedication, and I want to echo the same.
PORT SECURITY GRANTS
Earlier, we discussed port security. In February, the
Congress approved $150 million in the Omnibus Appropriations
Act for port security grants. Three months later, your agency,
Mr. Secretary, had done nothing to make those funds available
to the ports, where the dollars can actually make our homeland
more secure. What are your comments on this? Will you commit to
using the $150 million right away to meet some of the $1
billion in applications that are sitting on your desk in
response to the recent competition for the $105 million
appropriated in the fiscal year 2002 supplemental?
Mr. Hutchinson. Senator, you're absolutely correct that
that money is needed out there, and that money needs to move.
Clearly TSA, with its budget constraints, in which they have
had many aspects of direction and demands placed on them both
from reality, but also from Congress, has demands greater than
the resources they have right now. I know they have to evaluate
these demands in conjunction with the Under Secretary for
Management and OMB, and hopefully that money will be available
to be put out in the field in the near future. We are waiting
for the completion of that review and determination by our
management folks.
Senator Byrd. On November 25, 2002, the same day the
President signed the Homeland Security Act, he also signed the
Maritime Transportation Security Act.
The Coast Guard has estimated that it will cost $1.4
billion in the first year and $6 billion over 10 years to
implement the Act. The Congress has included in three separate
emergency supplemental bills, as well as, in the fiscal year
2003 Omnibus Appropriations Act, funding for port security
grants, and a total of $348 million has been provided. However,
none of this was requested by the administration.
Only $93 million has been distributed to the ports to date.
So, while the administration was eager to sign the Maritime
Transportation Security Act, the administration has been
somewhat silent on the costs associated with implementing it.
Do you have any further comment, Mr. Secretary?
Mr. Hutchinson. Simply that we value our partnership with
Congress, and that certainly reflects that you all provide
leadership as well in this arena. The Coast Guard is
responsible for conducting the port security assessments at the
top 55 of our Nation's military and economically strategic
ports. This is what has been mandated by the Maritime
Transportation Security Act.
They have moved forward on this. The part of the funding
out of the 2004 budget to complete this includes $62 billion to
complete the assessments. They have done 20 of them. They have
35 more to do. That is completed in the assessments out of the
2004 budget, so the Coast Guard will be moving forward on this
and will be working closely from the TSA perspective and the
Customs and Border Protection perspective with the Coast Guard
to accomplish that mandate.
COMPUTER ASSISTED PASSENGER PRESCREENING SYSTEM (CAPPS II)
Senator Byrd. Mr. Secretary, in the Transportation Security
Administration's budget request, $35 million is for the new
passenger screening program, known as the computer-assisted
passenger pre-screening system number 2. This new system is
designed to enhance airline passenger safety by mining
commercial databases of personal information and using pattern
analysis to predict which passengers might engage in terrorist
activities. It seems to me that this is a dangerous path that I
fear will delve into every nook and cranny of an individual
American's life. Under this new system, as I understand it, the
TSA will assign each passenger a risk level of green, yellow,
or red, and they will use that determination to prevent certain
passengers from boarding the plane.
Now, you're walking on a tightrope. Remember in the old
silent movies, but perhaps you don't go back that far, they had
people walking on tightropes without a safety net. You may be
on such a tightrope. I don't know whether you have a net or
not. You're designing a new system to screen airline and
airplane passengers that may run headlong into individuals'
rights to privacy. Your effort to identify potentially
dangerous passengers is a good goal, but your mechanism, the
so-called CAPPS-II system, is frankly scary. I'm not sure there
is a safety net out there.
Mr. Hutchinson. I've heard of them.
Senator Byrd. I was there, and I've heard that--well,
perhaps do you want to comment at this point before I go
further?
Mr. Hutchinson. I would be pleased to. Let me start by
saying I was traveling with my chief of staff the other day on
a commercial airline, and whenever my chief of staff received
her ticket, it had selectee there, and this was coming from the
airline. So right now you have the airlines designating who is
going to be subject to secondary inspection based upon a very
inadequate system. The design of CAPPS-II is to put a little
more rhyme and reason into who would be subject to a secondary
screening, and it is important. I worked in Congress on privacy
issues, and I'm very concerned about that aspect of it, and
CAPPS will not collect personal data such as credit history.
Information collected will come from already available
commercial databases, but there will be a firewall so that it
will not be collected by the Government or retained by the
Government. That firewall is very, very critical, and it is
important, as you point out, that that firewall not be
breached.
I'm pleased that Homeland Security has brought on board a
privacy officer, Nuala O'Connor Kelly, who from a privacy
standpoint will be reviewing this system, and we will work with
her and other privacy groups in terms of making sure that their
concerns are addressed, that the firewall is in place, that the
Government will not retain data, and that we will not collect
that data that would be offensive to Americans.
Senator Byrd. I've heard that personal indebtedness is one
of the criteria to be evaluated when looking at a passenger's
risk potential. Can you confirm that?
Mr. Hutchinson. That is not correct. There will not be a
review of personal indebtedness and creditworthiness. The
Government will not be doing that.
Senator Byrd. Well, I'm glad to hear you say that. It would
seem a bit odd, wouldn't it?
Mr. Hutchinson. Yes, it would.
Senator Byrd. I fear that there's something there that
would smack of elitism.
Mr. Hutchinson. It would be inappropriate.
Senator Byrd. There's a risk of abuse by the Government.
Mr. Hutchinson. I might not qualify to fly if that was the
case.
Senator Byrd. That is frankly un-American, so I'm glad to
hear you answer that question as you did.
Congress built a number of safeguards into the Homeland
Security Act to protect against privacy invasions, but to date
the Department has not made available to the public any
information about development of the system, nor has it
confirmed that it will publish guidelines for the program. How
is Congress to know that privacy rights will be respected?
Mr. Hutchinson. Well, I do believe that Admiral Loy has
made an extraordinary effort to keep the public informed
through communication with privacy groups, and he has met with
groups from the ACLU to other privacy advocates going over what
the CAPPS program is and what it is not, and listening to their
concerns. I think there has really been an extraordinary amount
of communication to the public through those groups of concern
and a great deal of public comment on it. In fact, I think he's
going to be testifying in a hearing on it very shortly.
So actually contrary to the development of some databases,
this has been done through education and communication with the
privacy groups, and we hope to continue to do that and listen
to their concerns.
Senator Byrd. What data sources are being mined, m-i-n-e-d?
CAPPS-II has raised privacy concerns that the Department has
not yet addressed, so what data sources are being mined? Who
has access to the data? What mechanisms will the Department use
to verify the accuracy of the data?
Mr. Hutchinson. The Government will not be looking at any
of these data sources. It will be only looking at the
Government databases such as the terrorist watch list, then
there will be the firewall, in which the commercial databases
will be looked at from a commercial vendor's standpoint, but it
will not be retained or examined by the Government. That is
where the firewall comes into place, and that goal is, of
course, to verify the passenger's identity and therefore refine
the security screening selectee process and eliminate the
majority of mistaken identity situations.
The personal data will not be collected by the Government,
and will not be retained by the Government, and I think these
are standards that are important in the development of this
system.
Senator Byrd. Will the appropriate congressional committees
be given an opportunity to review the proposed CAPPS-II
guidelines before they are finalized?
Mr. Hutchinson. Absolutely. We would be happy to make sure
that you or your staff or any of the committee staff be
briefed.
Senator Byrd. Very well.
ADDITIONAL COMMITTEE QUESTIONS
Mr. Chairman, I believe I would submit the remainder of my
questions for the record, and I thank you, and I thank the
Secretary.
Senator Cochran. Thank you, Senator Byrd.
[The following questions were not asked at the hearing, but
were submitted to the Department for response subsequent to the
hearing:]
Questions Submitted by Senator Thad Cochran
department start-up issues
Question. Please provide the Committee with the dollars, positions,
and full-time equivalents that have been allocated to the Under
Secretary's office in fiscal year 2003, requested for fiscal year 2004,
and under which appropriation has requested these resources have been
requested.
Answer. See below
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Fiscal year Fiscal year
2003 Source Appropriation 2004 Source Appropriation
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Funding........................... $1,990,111 Departmental $9,715,000 Departmental
Operations. Operations
Positions......................... 67 ..................... 67 .....................
FTE............................... 39 (est.) ..................... 67 .....................
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Substantial additional support, including facilities costs, desktop information technology and telephony
services, security, and postage costs are funded centrally.
Question. Will there be a centralized Office of Legislative Affairs
within the Under Secretary's office? Or do you plan to have legislative
affairs responsibilities handled by each of your sub-bureaus?
Answer. The Office of Legislative Affairs is centralized in at the
Department with legislative affairs personnel assigned within our
components to provide direct support.
Question. What specifically has changed, and what has not yet
changed for these agencies that transferred into your Directorate?
Answer. Interim structures have been established, including interim
port directors in the Bureau of Customs and Border Protection (BCBP)
and interim District Directors within the Bureau of Immigration and
Customs Enforcement (BICE). The Transportation and Security
Administration transferred as a whole entity and has maintained their
management structure.
Question. How are you mitigating the impacts of this transition on
the capabilities of each of the transferring agencies to continue to
perform their homeland security missions and their non-homeland
security missions?
Answer. Operational personnel that perform daily activities; have
been maintained in respective geographic locations to ensure the level
of expertise and continuity that existed prior to March 1, 2003 is
continued.
Question. What specific steps have you taken to integrate the
chains of command and the personnel of these organizations without
interfering with their current capabilities to perform their missions?
Answer. Interim structures have been established, including interim
port directors in the Bureau of Customs and Border Protection (BCBP)
and interim District Directors within the Bureau of Immigration and
Customs Enforcement (BICE). This will provide the most effective
consolidated organizational structure with the least disruption to
operations and personnel.
Question. The area that may present the most difficulty for
integration are the three inspections services. After March 1, 2003,
who assumed control of the inspections functions at each of the ports-
of-entry? How were the decisions made in appointing the acting port
directors?
Answer. On March 1st, approximately 40,000 employees were
transferred from the U.S. Customs Service, the Immigration &
Naturalization Service, and the Animal and Plant Health Inspection
Service to the new Customs and Border Protection (BCBP) agency in the
Department of Homeland Security. To address our priority mission of
preventing terrorists and terrorist weapons from entering the United
States, a single, clear chain of command was established. For the first
time, there is one person at each of our nation's ports of entry in
charge of all Federal Inspection Services. A group of senior managers
from the legacy agencies (Customs, INS and APHIS) met to decide and
apply criteria for identification of interim leaders. Designated
interim port directors were identified by considering a number of
factors including grade level, complexity of operational activity and
size and variety of staff. A similar process to make the structure
permanent will be completed in fiscal year 2003.
Question. What concrete steps are you taking to meld the different
cultures of these organizations in a way that preserves any unique,
positive aspects while creating an overall ``Border and Transportation
Security (BTS) Directorate'' culture?
Answer. Our challenge is to convey to our over 170,000 employees
that while the name of the agency has changed their mission remains the
same. The success of BTS hinges on our men and women in the field and
in our headquarters. When the Under Secretary and senior management
travel they almost always have a roundtable or town meeting for all BTS
employees in order to hear concerns and convey the Department's
commitment to unify employees.
Question. How do you intend to effectively and decisively respond
to resistance to change from these separate ``cultures'' coming over to
BTS?
Answer. Through sound management practices and regular recurring
meetings with BTS component senior staff, issues are addressed in a
timely and effective manner. I also take every possible opportunity to
hold town hall type meetings with employees to dispel misperceptions
and reinforce the mission objectives of DHS/BTS. I have also instructed
each of the respective agencies/bureaus within BTS to do the same.
Question. When will you be able to provide more detailed transition
plans to Congress that will outline more specific steps that are
occurring to accomplish the transition?
Answer. According to the Homeland Security Legislation, The
Department of Homeland Security and the Border and Transportation
Security Directorate (BTS) must report to Congress on a regular basis
concerning the status of the transition and the reorganization. For
example, 100 and 20 days after the legislation's enactment, DHS must
report to Congress on the proposed division and transfer of funds
between the Bureau of Citizenship and Immigration Services and the BTS.
Furthermore, one year after the legislation's enactment, DHS must
report to Congress on the implementation of visa provisions in the Act.
We welcome this opportunity to report to you about our progress and the
daily challenges that we confront during this tremendous undertaking.
COORDINATION ISSUES
Question. What steps will you be taking to ensure that the three
sub-bureaus focused on enforcement within your own organization, the
Bureau of Customs and Border Protection, the Bureau of Immigration and
Customs Enforcement, and the Transportation Security Administration,
will be coordinating information, policy, intelligence, and
investigations?
Answer. Within the organizational structure of the Border and
Transportation Security Directorate are offices of Policy and Planning,
as well as Operations. These offices will ensure continuity,
coordination and direction within BTS.
Question. As just one example, the Container Security Initiative,
and the Customs Trade Partnership Against Terrorism are both being run
by the Bureau of Customs and Border Protection (BCBP), and Operation
Safe Commerce is the responsibility of the Transportation Security
Administration (TSA). While one is focused on screening high risk cargo
before it leaves the outgoing port, the other two operations are to be
focused on total supply chain security. How will these projects be
coordinated to ensure no duplication of effort and the best use of the
funding provided?
Answer. BCBP has the sole statutory and regulatory responsibility
for container security on containers destined for the United States.
Although this authority is clearly delineated through the
implementation of enforcement programs like Container Security
Initiative (CSI) and Customs-Trade Partnership Against Terrorism (C-
TPAT), BCBP strives to comply with its mission in coordination with
other equally vital offices within the Department of Homeland Security
which have statutory and regulatory responsibility over a segment of
sea transportation.
Coordination and communication with our department partners ensures
an effective and streamlined security process. For example, BCBP has
established a protocol with the United States Coast Guard to handle
certain types of serious threats through the High-Interest Vessel
program. Also, BCBP has shared interest with DOT and TSA in developing
industry partnership programs that improve container security (and
other types of transportation security) and are consistent for domestic
and international shipping.
BCBP and TSA are working together through a jointly chaired
steering committee that makes the final project selection decisions for
Operation Safe Commerce. The Federal Register notice that initiated the
Operation Safe Commerce program makes specific references to C-TPAT and
CSI as initiatives that may be considered as part of Operation Safe
Commerce business practices and technology supply chain ``test bed''
initiatives.
As a voluntary government-business initiative, the C-TPAT
complements the overseas targeting of the CSI and the development of
new security techniques under Operation Safe Commerce. As of May 9,
2003 C-TPAT membership includes over 3,000 companies that account for
approximately 37 percent of all U.S. imports by value and approximately
93 percent of all U.S.-bound sea-containerized cargo. By creating a
significant network of reliable and secure companies, C-TPAT enables
BCBP to direct its CSI targeting to areas of greater risk and
establishes a mechanism for incorporating the best practices and new
high-tech equipment identified by Operation Safe Commerce.
Question. What steps have you taken to ensure that good
coordination is established between your organization and the new
Bureau of Citizenship and Immigration Services (BCIS)?
Answer. Working groups have been established to ensure proper
coordination between BICE, BCIS as well as BCBP. These groups will
address issues that affect all components and develop protocols to
address these issues in a manner that satisfies the needs of all
members of the working groups. Coordination on day-to-day issues is on-
going between all components.
Question. We are looking forward to getting the report on the
implementation plan for the separation of personnel and funding between
the BTS and the BCIS as called for in Section 477 of the Homeland
Security Act. Please outline for us what steps you are taking to put
this plan into place.
Answer. On March 1, 2003, the Immigration and Naturalization
Service ceased operations and its functions were transferred to three
new Bureaus within the Department of Homeland Security. Recognizing the
complexity of this transition, the Department adopted a phased
approach, which focused first on realigning the operational components
and chains of command within the Department. To ensure continuity of
operations, no changes were made on March 1 in the areas of shared
corporate and administrative support functions. For the interim, the
former INS support functions continue to support former INS components,
and the former Customs support functions continue to support former
Customs components. Work is currently underway to identify existing
resources and options for organizing these functions in the longer-
term. Transition offices have been established to coordinate and manage
the transition process, and a number of working groups have been formed
within the Department to address these issues, including a senior-level
BICE, BCBP, BCIS group, which meets weekly. The Department will be
forwarding a report with more specific information on the
implementation plan later this month.
Question. Another important Directorate within the Department of
Homeland Security is that for Science and Technology. How will you
ensure that the experience and knowledge of front-line employees is
being used effectively by the Science and Technology Directorate in
deciding research priorities?
Answer. Science and Technology and Border and Transportation
Security are developing a BTS technology strategy and plan. This would
integrate the technology needs of the border and transportation
security bureaus into one consolidated strategy, taking advantage of
economies of scale, prioritize needs across mission areas, create
synergistic opportunities among the bureaus and reduce unnecessary
duplication. It would engender the confidence of the operational
community, help demonstrate effective budget execution and justify the
technology budget.
Question. What plans do you have to ensure smooth coordination with
the Department of Justice, in such areas as the Executive Office for
Immigration Review and the Office of Federal Detention Trustee (OFDT)?
Please provide a detailed description of how you plan to structure the
relationship with the OFDT.
Answer. The benefits of cooperation between law enforcement
agencies are clear. To take advantage of existing efficiencies and
economies of sale, and to avoid competition for detention space, the
Office of Detention and Removal (DRO) pursued a service provider
relationship with the Bureau of Prisons (BOP) and the Office of the
Detention Trustee (OFDT). The DOJ/BOP/OFDT and DHS/ICE/DRO is
developing and negotiating an Interagency Agreement that would allow
DOJ to act as service provider for non-Federal detention services. At
this time, the nature of support would include: the procurement of
detention services; the inclusion of privately operated secure
detention facilities and alternatives to detention; the establishment
of intergovernmental service agreements with State and local entities
for secure detention services; administration of contracts and
agreements; management of Justice Prisoner and Alien Transportation
Program; and oversight of the detention standards program.
Question. How do you plan to work with the Department of State to
coordinate the policies governing the issuance of visas?
Answer. The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) and Department of
State (DOS) currently are negotiating a memorandum of understanding
(MOU) to implement section 428 of the Homeland Security Act (HLSA),
which governs the visa issuance process. The MOU will address how DOS
and DHS will issue regulations, policies, procedures, and other
guidance that affect the visa process. Both agencies recognize there
will be a need to develop standard operating procedures to further
elaborate operationally on various aspects of the MOU. DHS and DOS,
however, intend to work cooperatively and in a consultative manner to
create an effective and efficient visa issuance process.
INTEGRATION OF PHYSICAL ASSETS
Question. Virtually every individual program under your direction
has a need and a budget for buying vehicles. What steps are you taking
to review these budget items? What plans are there for consolidation of
procurement, retrofitting, and maintenance?
Answer. Within the Department we are working on these very issues
as we develop our internal processes. We intend to look at requirements
and find opportunities for economies and best value in procurements,
improvements and maintenance support. In the interim we are seeking
best practices and contract opportunities that offer efficiencies
across components within the directorate as well as across the
department and other partners.
Question. The Border Patrol has helicopters and fixed wing
aircraft, while the Customs' Air and Marine Interdiction program
transferred to your Directorate has fixed wing aircraft and marine
assets. How do you plan to review these programs to see if there are
possibilities for merger? Do you have any estimated cost savings that
could be seen from the integration of maintenance?
Answer. While the priority will be to maintain the operational
effectiveness of the Border Patrol and the BICE Air and Marine
Interdiction program's, we will be reviewing the operational
effectiveness and efficiency gains envisioned by the President when he
submitted the proposal to create the Department of Homeland Security.
BTS has already convened a group to look at the aircraft acquisition
for BICE and the Coast Guard. As a result of the work group, the Deputy
Secretary has directed the Department to establish procedures to ensure
economies of scale for major procurements. This practice will be
utilized in conjunction with the DHS investment review board.
Question. Do you plan to sit down with the U.S. Coast Guard to see
what potential there is in applying best practices to your procurement
or maintenance programs? What potential is there in possibly
integrating some of the physical assets operated by your Directorate
with the Coast Guard?
Answer. BTS has already convened a group to look at the aircraft
acquisition for BICE and the Coast Guard. As a result of the work
group, the Deputy Secretary has directed the Department to establish
procedures to ensure economies of scale for major procurements. This
practice will be utilized in conjunction with the DHS investment review
board.
Question. Do you plan to review all of the canine programs run by
the various components of BTS? Do you have any estimated cost savings
that could be seen from the integration of these various canine
programs?
Answer. BCBP has established a working group to review all of the
canine programs, as well as to identify overlaps in missions. Output
from this working group was provided to the Transition Team for the
Commissioner's review and comments. The working group is waiting for
direction on the final structure of the canine programs; however, the
working group is being proactive in developing standards for like
functions such as narcotics detection. Work is ongoing to standardize
such things as evaluations, certifications, etc. At this time, the
efforts would be budget neutral should they be implemented.
NON-HOMELAND SECURITY MISSIONS
Question. What changes did you make in the fiscal year 2004 budget
requests for these new entities to reflect the homeland security
priorities of the new Department?
Answer. The fiscal year 2004 budget represents an increase of
nearly 100 percent from the fiscal year 2002 enacted level for the new
entities. Compared to fiscal year 2002, the Bureau of Customs and
Border Protection request represents an increase of 33 percent, the
Bureau of Immigration and Customs Enforcement nearly 16 percent, and
the Office of Domestic Preparedness request is 12 times greater than
fiscal year 2002.
Question. In deciding fiscal year 2004 budget allocations, did you
change any of the allocations for non-homeland security missions and
capabilities from the amounts appropriated in fiscal year 2003? If yes,
what were those changes?
Answer. The fiscal year 2004 budget requests allocations for non-
homeland security missions and capabilities were made consistent with
the fiscal year 2003 request and prepared in advance of the fiscal year
2003 appropriations.
Question. How do any changes in these fiscal year 2004 allocations
represent compliance with the Homeland Security Act direction?
Answer. The Department's primary mission is the protection of the
American people. The fiscal year 2004 request focuses on consolidating
border and transportation security functions, merging response
activities, creating a central point to map terrorist threats against
vulnerabilities in our critical infrastructure. The Department also
ensures that non-homeland security missions and capabilities are not
diminished.
INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY INVESTMENTS AND INTEGRATION
Question. The fiscal year 2004 budget for BCBP requests $30.2
million for an Information Technology Transformation to Homeland
Security Fund, and has a separate request for $22.3 million for an
Information Technology Infrastructure program called ATLAS. In the
Bureau of Immigration and Customs Enforcement (BICE) budget request
there is an additional $17.7 million for ATLAS. Are these separate
program needs? If not, please explain in detail what each of there
initiatives will accomplish and how they will be coordinated across the
two bureaus. How do these two initiatives fit in with the request for
$5.7 million for the International Trade Data System? How do they
relate to the ongoing Automated Commercial Environment (ACE) project.
Answer. The Information Technology Transformation to Homeland
Security Fund creates a fund to address Information Technology (IT)
compatibility and interoperability issues that will arise during the
transition to the Department of Homeland Security, including, but not
limited to: mission systems, electronic mail, networks, collaborative
tools, and administrative capabilities. In addition, the transition
creates an opportunity for broader sharing of border security and
enforcement-related IT capabilities. This fund will be used to extend
the enterprise architecture to provide expanded access to IT
capabilities in support of the Homeland Security mission. This
initiative is separate from the ATLAS request.
The request for funding for the International Trade Data System
(ITDS) will support the development of a Government-wide system that
will provide the trade community with a single interface to file
international trade data with the Government. The ITDS initiative is an
e-Government strategy that will implement an integrated, government-
wide system for the electronic collection, use, and dissemination of
the international trade transaction data required by the various trade
related Federal agencies. Development of ITDS functionality will be
coordinated with the Automated Commercial Environment (ACE) and the
overall modernization effort, and will impact both border security and
trade compliance within multiple Federal departments, agencies, and
areas within the participating government agencies.
ATLAS funding will allow the upgrade of legacy INS infrastructure
to be compatible with existing Customs and Border Protection
infrastructure, thus establishing a basis for interoperability.
All information technology investments are reviewed for compliance
with our enterprise architecture framework to ensure technical
compatibility and alignment with business goals.
Question. How do you plan to coordinate and integrate all of the
information technology initiatives and legacy systems, like ACE?
Answer. BCBP is sponsoring an interagency integration team with
ICE, BCBP and APHIS to address the myriad of integration issues, and is
also working with DHS on information technology investments and
architecture to ensure alignment within the Department of Homeland
Security.
Question. What steps will you take to avoid the merger and
integration problems that have been experienced by so many other
agencies before you? Have you consulted with other agencies such as
DOD, IRS, and the FBI for ``lessons learned'' from their unhappy
experiences?
Answer. The BCBPs experience with the ACE initiative has provided
an effective model for the planning and management of large scale
information technology management systems. This model, the interagency
integration teams mentioned above, and the established BCBP enterprise
architecture will guide this process. The ACE business plan is based on
lessons learned by the DOD, IRS, and FBI among others.
PERSONNEL IMPACTS
Question. When will you have an estimate of potential job
dislocations and job losses for your Directorate, and when will you
inform the workers affected and the Congress?
Answer. Program Managers within the Border and Transportation
Security Directorate are currently reviewing the merged organizations
to determine where consolidation of resources is appropriate.
Competitive service employees within the Directorate will receive
appropriate notification, as stated in the Reduction-In-Force
regulations of Title 5, if and when a decision is made to close a
facility or transfer a function to a new geographic location. We will
ensure that Congress is notified in a timely fashion as soon as any
decisions are made concerning worker dislocation.
Question. What specific criteria are you establishing to determine
who will be dislocated and who will lose their jobs, and will you
provide affected employees a fair process in which they can appeal
these decisions and the application of these criteria?
Answer. Competitive service employees retain full rights under the
Reduction-In-Force regulations in Title 5, to include appeal rights to
the Merit Systems Protection Board. Any decision regarding which
employees will be impacted will be based on the criteria as set out in
these regulations to include creditable service, performance, and
veterans' preference.
Question. Secretary Ridge in his testimony last week mentioned that
working groups have been created to allow current employees the
opportunity to participate in the creation of the new system. How
specifically is this working with your Directorate?
Answer. The DHS Human Resources System design team has
representatives from employee groups from throughout the Border and
Transportation Security Directorate. Employees and managers will also
have an opportunity to participate at town hall meetings and focus
groups that will be conducted in the field over the next 2 months.
Question. At this point, what changes do you envision for your
employees in terms of performance evaluations, compensation, and
collective bargaining arrangements?
Answer. The DHS Human Resources design team is currently reviewing
a variety of alternatives in all of these functional areas, and will be
creating a set of options to be reviewed by a Senior Review Committee.
Ultimately, the Secretary and the Director of the Office of Personnel
Management will determine the final set of options that compose the new
HR System.
Question. A central issue in the rank and file of the Inspections
officers will be the reconciliation of the highly disparate pay and
benefit systems with which they are compensated. How will you approach
the resolution of these pay and benefit issues? Do you anticipate
proposing a legislative package addressing pay reform? When will that
proposal be sent forward?
Answer. The DHS Human Resources Design team has been fully briefed
on the disparities in pay and benefits for employees across DHS and
specifically in the Inspector occupation. This team will be providing
options (which may include recommendations for new legislation) to
address these disparities to a Senior Review Committee (SRC) later this
summer. The SRC will then review the options and make recommendations
to the Secretary and the Director, OPM, who will make the final
determination on which options will be implemented.
MERGING AGENCY REGIONAL STRUCTURES
Question. What specific objectives have been established for
creating a new regional structure for your Directorate, and what
specific issues are being considered in developing this plan? Do you
anticipate that each of your major sub-components, BCBP, BICE, and TSA,
will maintain separate regional structures?
Answer. The overarching objective is to fulfill the DHS mission in
support of the National Strategy for Homeland Security; to provide for
unity of purpose among agencies. True integration of mission and
department-wide effectiveness would be jeopardized with significantly
different regional structures among DHS agencies.
Question. Which of the agencies transferring to your Directorate
would you expect to be most affected by the regional restructuring
plan? APHIS? Customs? INS? TSA?
Answer. We are in the data gathering and baseline analysis process,
and the regional structure has not been developed. Impacts to various
Departmental components cannot be estimated yet.
Question. Which is a more important objective for the plan--to save
money or to increase operational effectiveness? How do you intend to
make trade-offs between operational effectiveness and cost savings?
Answer. Increased operational effectiveness is not incompatible
with cost effectiveness. It will be important for the Department to
develop a regional concept that optimizes key factors including cost
while maintaining the highest level of operational effectiveness.
Question. What specific criteria are you using to evaluate the pros
and cons of the changes being considered, and which of these criteria
do you consider most important and less important?
Answer. DHS is evaluating the best way in which to merge the field
operations of twenty-two legacy agencies, represented by nine different
regional alignments. To accomplish this, the DHS directorates,
including BTS, are working to: (1) develop a baseline understanding of
the current regional structures in the component organizations; (2)
develop the options for a regional concept to ensure day-to-day
operations and incident responses are well coordinated and planned.
Question. Do you have any preliminary estimates of the costs to
implement the changes you are contemplating, and of the savings that
might be made? When can we expect the costs to occur and the savings to
be realized?
Answer. No. The baseline analysis currently underway will provide a
better sense of the magnitude of the effort required to harmonize the
regional structures of the legacy agencies.
Question. How long would you expect it to take to fully implement
the plan should Congress approve it?
Answer. We won't know until the baseline analysis is complete.
Question. What specific progress are you making in developing the
plan?
Answer. BTS is working with other DHS components to analyze various
data and develop a baseline understanding of the relevant issues
associated with the creation of a new Department-wide regional
structure. An initial round of data collection has been completed and
been passed to DHS staff for analysis.
Question. What schedule has been established to complete the
restructuring plan and to inform Congress and the affected employees
about your recommended course of action? Are you ahead, behind, or on
that schedule?
Answer. We intend to create an implementation plan upon completing
the baseline analysis.
Question. Please provide for the record the Statement of
Objectives, Terms of Reference, Fiscal Guidance, Operational
Assumptions, and mandated schedule that have been issued to guide the
development of this plan.
Answer. These elements could be developed as part of an
implementation plan, which would follow completion of the baseline
analysis. The overarching objective is to fulfill the DHS mission in
support of the National Strategy for Homeland Security; to provide for
unity of purpose among agencies. True integration of mission and
department-wide effectiveness would be jeopardized with significantly
different regional structures among DHS agencies.
BORDER PATROL
Question. Now that the Border Patrol is part of your Directorate,
do you intend to keep the National Border Patrol Strategy that the
former Immigration and Naturalization Service has attempted to
implement over the past 9 years?
Answer. The Border Patrol's national strategic plan was written in
1994 with the focus of implementation in the areas with the highest
level of illegal immigration. The plan is achieved with the ``forward
deployment'' and proper balance of agents, equipment, technology, and
border infrastructure (cameras, sensors, roads, lights, fences or other
border barriers).
Areas of operations that have become the focus of this plan have
proved this to be an effective enforcement action. Participating
sectors have seen a prolific change since the inception of their
corresponding operations.
--El Paso--Hold the Line (arrests down, crime reduced)
--San Diego--Gatekeeper (29 year record low in apprehensions, crime
reduced)
--McAllen--Rio Grande (crime and arrests reduced)
Changes have occurred since the strategy's implementation, most
notably following the September 11, 2001, attack on the United States
The strategy's Phase IV implementation was accelerated to respond to
the potential threats on the northern border. The upgrades and
application of technology for border deterrence and enforcement has
also improved.
Continuation of the proven and successful National Border Patrol
Strategic Plan is warranted in order to respond to emerging threats and
changes in the past trends of illegal border entries.
Question. What changes might you consider making to the strategy to
increase its effectiveness and reduce migrant deaths?
Answer. Due to concentrated border enforcement efforts, organized
smugglers have shifted their techniques and areas of operation from
traditional unlawful entry points near the ports of entry to extremely
remote and dangerous areas. The intense summer temperatures and arduous
terrain associated with these areas account for the majority of
documented deaths. BCBP has been increasing efforts to identify and
prosecute smugglers who choose more dangerous methods and routes to
smuggle unsuspecting aliens. Yearly enhancements allow for BCBP to
apply resources where the deaths occur to effectively deter and disrupt
illegal border traffic. BCBP is also expanding its Border Safety
Initiative, which incorporates a multi-pronged approach to making the
border a safer environment. BCBP is increasing the number of qualified
medical/rescue agents and is cooperating with Mexican counterparts at
an unprecedented level. For example, a meeting of field representatives
has just concluded, which produced a collaborative strategic plan for
reducing deaths on both sides of the international border. As the
strategy evolves other initiatives will be developed and supported.
BCBP leadership is convinced that when the proper balance of personnel,
equipment, technology, and tactical infrastructure exists, the illegal
crossings will decline, bringing a commensurate decline in deaths and
injury.
Question. Given the level of additional resources that have been
put into the Northern Border will you be revising that portion of the
strategy?
Answer. Since its implementation in 1994, the Border Patrol's
National Strategic Plan has been the basis for a multi-year, multi-
phased approach for the deployment of additional personnel and
resources, for the purpose of increasing control of our Nation's
borders. The cornerstone of this strategy calls for ``prevention
through deterrence'' as the means to restrict illegal entry attempts
into the United States. Along the southwest border, the strategy has
concentrated Border Patrol resources into those specific geographic
areas experiencing the highest level of illegal activity. The key to
the successful implementation of this strategy has been the deployment
of the proper balance of personnel, equipment, technology and
infrastructure into those areas.
As originally written, the final phase of the National Strategic
Plan calls for enhancing our enforcement posture along the northern
border and coastal areas of the United States. Securing the northern
border has traditionally presented many unique enforcement challenges
for the Border Patrol. Our shared border with Canada is approximately
4,000 miles long and is the longest non-militarized undefended border
in the world. In the past, this vast expanse, coupled with an
inadequate number of personnel and a lack of resources and
infrastructure, has significantly limited the Border Patrol's deterrent
effect upon illegal activity. In the wake of September 11, 2001,
vulnerabilities and deficiencies along the northern border have
received increased attention, which has caused the Border Patrol to
accelerate its efforts in increasing our enforcement presence along the
northern border.
The current Northern Border Strategy encompasses interagency and
international cooperation and coordination, effective technology
development and deployment, and innovative resource allocation. The
geographic and environmental conditions found on the northern border
have led to the historic economic and cultural interdependence of the
United States and Canada. In light of the long-standing cooperation and
economic interdependency, the Border Patrol has conducted activities
along the northern border with significantly fewer resources than were
dedicated to the southwest border. For these reasons, the Border Patrol
cannot simply replicate the same enforcement strategy implemented on
the southwest border.
The Northern Border Strategy relies upon maximizing existing
resources in order to strengthen control of the border. The Northern
Border Strategy also requires the proper balance of personnel,
equipment, technology and infrastructure. To improve our effectiveness,
the initial area of emphasis is the expansion of liaison and increased
intelligence sharing with other Federal, State and local law
enforcement agencies, as well as our counterparts within the Canadian
government. The second emphasis is on the deployment of enforcement
related technology along the border to act as a force multiplier,
thereby increasing the area that can be adequately covered by available
manpower. The final emphasis of the strategy calls for the deployment
of additional personnel into our northern border sectors. As mentioned,
subsequent to September 11, 2001, the Border Patrol accelerated into
this phase by redeploying agents from the southwest border to the
northern border.
U.S. VISITOR AND IMMIGRANT STATUS INDICATOR TECHNOLOGY (U.S. VISIT)
Question. BICE had been taking the lead on this project. Where will
the responsibility for implementing the U.S. VISIT system lie?
Answer. The Border and Transportation Security Directorate (BTS) is
establishing a program office to oversee the project for which funds
are requested under BCBP in fiscal year 2004.
Question. In his testimony last week, Secretary Ridge said the
entire project is under review. When will this review by complete? Who
is conducting this review?
Answer. The preliminary review was provided to the Secretary on May
16, with an internal review completed by May 30. The U.S. VISIT Office,
in conjunction with the BTS and other Department stakholders, is
conducting the review.
Question. In your budget request the funds for this system were
requested under BCBP. Is this appropriate place for those funds?
Answer. The Secretary delegated the implementation of the U.S.
VISIT program to the Under Secretary of BTS. The U.S. VISIT program
will ensure that funds appropriated for this system will be spent in
accordance with the Spending Plans which are required under the fiscal
year 2003 Omnibus Appropriations Act and Emergency War Supplemental
Act.
Question. What is the Department's acquisition strategy for the
U.S. VISIT system? Does the strategy include the development of a
prototype? Will the final solution include the selection of a single
prototype or selected aspects of multiple prototypes?
Answer. The acquisition strategy will not be finalized until the
Spending Plan has been reviewed and approved by the Secretary of DHS.
Question. A recent report by the Justice and State Departments and
the National Institute of Standards stated that implementation of the
entry/exit system at land borders was at least 1 year behind schedule.
What is your current timeline for fielding the U.S. VISIT system at
land border ports of entry?
Answer. The entry/exit system, now known as the U.S. VISIT Program,
is expected to be delivered on schedule as required by the Data
Management Improvement Act. The law requires that travel documents
contain biometric identifiers not later than October 26, 2004. The DOS
requested an extension of this requirement. This does not affect the
implementation of the U.S. VISIT program at the land borders.
Question. What is your Department's position on the Justice and
State Department reports?
Answer. The report stated that the Department of State will require
an additional year to implement changes to their processes and systems.
There is a conflict in the report between implementing the U.S. VISIT
program and the requirement for biometric identifiers in travel
documents.
Question. The entry/exit system will likely require substantial
increases in staff and infrastructure modifications at 150-some land
ports, particularly for the departure component. What assessments has
the Directorate performed to determine the extent of additional staff
needed?
Answer. Workforce analysis and workforce staffing issues have been
identified as part of the U.S. VISIT 45-day Spending Plan.
Question. What assessments has the Directorate performed to
determine the physical infrastructure changes that might be needed and
their associated costs?
Answer. Estimated physical infrastructure, environmental, and
construction costs have also been identified as part of the 45-day
Spending Plan. The scope and unique nature of this program required
extensive assessments of the physical infrastructure. A facilities
project team has been dedicated to the program on a full time basis,
since March 2002. The facilities team is an integral part of the U.S.
VISIT Program. The U.S. VISIT Program facilities team partnered with
the General Services Administration (GSA) in early April 2002 to
prepare the foundation for facilities and infrastructure improvements
related to the U.S. VISIT Program. The facility team is charged with
the development and implementation of facilities and infrastructure in
accordance with the program objectives and requirements. Direction and
guidance to the facilities program team is provided by a Steering
Committee staffed by Senior Executives from BICE, BCBP, and the General
Services Administration.
The work to date has included:
--Collected basic facilities planning data in a Geographic
Information System data base for all 165 Land Ports of Entry,
including
--environmental data from State and Federal resource agencies
--high-resolution aerial photography of all Land Ports of Entry
(POE)
--operational data for all Land Ports of Entry
--documentation on real estate ownership
--Modeled traffic flows for the 50 largest Land Ports of Entry
--Developed proto-type designs for the 60 small Land Ports of Entry
--Completed Feasibility Studies for the 51 small Land Ports of Entry
--Completed environmental baseline studies for each Land Ports of
Entry
--Initiated a Strategic Environmental Appraisal for each Land Ports
of Entry
STUDENT AND EXCHANGE VISITOR INFORMATION SYSTEM (SEVIS)
Question. Has that transition of authority from BCIS to your
Directorate taken place? Who within the BICE will have formal
responsibility for carrying out this program?
Answer. Yes, authority for the Student Exchange Visitor Program
(SEVP) has transitioned to BICE. The Director of SEVP will have
responsibility for carrying out the program.
Question. In March of 2003, the Department of Justice, Office of
Inspector General (OIG) issued a report on SEVIS questioning whether
the program has been fully implemented. What steps are you taking to
remedy the problems in school certification that were found by the OIG?
Answer. The Bureau is in the process of reviewing the issues raised
in the OIG report and is preparing a response. We will make available
our response to you as soon as it is completed and delivered to the
OIG. We expect to have that reply completed by the end of May 2003.
Question. Under the current timeline, the SEVIS system will not
have complete information entered into it on every foreign student in
the United States until August of 2003. This is 2 years after the
events of September 11--some of those terrorists were on student
visas--and 20 months after receiving full funding for the system. The
Congressional mandate was to have the system completed by January 2003.
Why is this taking so long? And what is being done to track these
students in the meantime?
Answer. The DHS worked hard to meet the aggressive deadline for
SEVIS implementation (January 2003) set forth in the USA PATRIOT Act.
On July 1, 2002, 6 months before the deadline, the SEVIS was initially
deployed to begin preliminary enrollment of accredited schools on a
volunteer basis. Also in July 2002, the core foreign student program
functionality was made operational and schools began to utilize SEVIS.
By January 1, 2003, the all facets of the SEVIS system, including
exchange program and exchange visitor functionality, and all system
interfaces were deployed. By regulation, all schools and exchange
programs, certified to admit foreign students or exchange visitors,
were required to utilize SEVIS for all new students as of February 15,
2003. All continuing foreign students must be entered into SEVIS no
later than August 1, 2003. The primary reason for a phased approach to
collecting information on foreign students (e.g., entering students
followed by continuing students) was to ensure program integrity. The
schools needed adequate time to review and convert the considerable
data on their continuing students to SEVIS.
This multi-phase approach was described in proposed regulations
published in May 2002 and highlighted in testimony before the U.S.
House of Representatives, Committee on the Judiciary, Subcommittee on
Immigration, Border Security, and Claims (September 18, 2002) as well
as before the U.S. House of Representatives, Committee on Education,
Workforce Subcommittees on Select Education and 21st Century
Competitiveness (September 24, 2002). Finally, the multi-phase approach
was codified in DHS final regulations in December 2002.
Until August 1, 2003, foreign students already in the United States
continue to be monitored under the paper-based processes of former INS
information systems. Schools are still required to maintain records and
report updated information on these continuing students and are
required to report violations of status to the DHS.
Question. What steps have you taken to tighten the oversight and
training of contractors who are out there actually doing the on-site
reviews of schools? What steps are being taken to improve the training
being provided to adjudicators and inspectors?
Answer.
Training of Contractors.--The primary role of contractors
conducting the on-site review of schools is to gather information
pursuant to a standardized questionnaire developed by BICE. Once the
information is collected, it is forwarded to BICE adjudicators where it
is incorporated with other information and used in the decision-making
process with respect to a school's certification or denial to SEVIS.
BICE has actively managed the on-site contractors. Initially three
firms were employed by BICE for on-site reviews. Due to poor
performance, one of the three firms was removed. The two remaining
firms have demonstrated sufficient capacity to complete the on-site
reviews without delay. Adjudicators have been instructed to bring
deficient reports to the attention of the Contacting Officer's
Technical Representative (COTR) so that these issues may be addressed
with the relevant contractor. The COTR meets and communicates regularly
with managers from the two contractors to discuss deficiencies as well
as best practices. When fully staffed, BICE will use its compliance
officers to perform many of the functions currently performed by the
contractors.
Training of Adjudicators.--Officers assigned to adjudicate I-17
school certifications were provided with two separate group-training
sessions in June and August of 2002. Since that time, we prepared and
disseminated a comprehensive update to the Adjudicators Field Manual
(the core guidance to adjudications officers of all benefit
applications) that covers all adjudicative aspects of the foreign
student regulations. Additionally, Headquarters has been conducting
weekly regional conference calls with all officers adjudicating I-17s
to keep them current on the status of on-site reviews and to answer any
general questions regarding the adjudication of cases or to address the
specifics of an actual case. Finally, Headquarters provides one-on-one
training for officers newly assigned to this duty, on an as needed
basis.
Training of Inspectors.--In January 2003, the BCBP inspections
branch trained more than 300 inspectors at over 100 ports-of-entry via
a web-based, interactive teleconference system. A copy of the training
materials was provided to each port for follow-up training, conducted
locally. The BCBP inspections branch continues to update its SEVIS
related training.
Question. An important purpose of the SEVIS system is to allow for
the tracking down of those students who have fraudulently entered this
country with no intent to abide by their visa status. Have procedures
been set up to identify and refer potential fraud for enforcement
action?
Answer. Yes, procedures have been set up to identify and refer
potential fraud for enforcement action. Leads are received from
schools, from a variety of sources including the SEVIS system. The
leads are entered into a database and record checks are conducted by
the Law Enforcement Support Center against a number of databases
including the Foreign Terrorist Tracking Task Force databases and the
Non-immigrant Information System.
When it is determined that a student or exchange visitor entered
the United States, failed to comply with his or her status and then
failed to depart, the lead is then deemed to be a viable lead which is
referred for enforcement action. All viable leads are entered into
immigration lookout databases. The leads are then prioritized based on
national security concerns and, if appropriate, assigned to field
offices for further investigation.
With regard to the enforcement of SEVIS, approximately 3,000 leads
have been received from schools since December 2002, resulting in over
1,000 viable leads. All of these viable leads have been entered into
automated lookout systems and 206 of these leads have been assigned to
field offices based upon national security considerations. To date, 21
arrests have taken place and 2 violators were denied entry into the
United States. 84 cases are still pending in the field and the
remaining cases were resolved without arrests.
INTEGRATED INVESTIGATION STRATEGY
Question. The new Bureau of Immigration and Customs Enforcement
BICE brings together the investigation arms of the Customs Service, the
investigative functions of the former Immigration and Naturalization
Service, and the Federal Protective Service. This unification of
investigative functions is intended to enhance information sharing
between Federal bureaus and provide for more cohesive enforcement of
immigration and customs laws within the interior of the United States
in addition to protecting Federal institutions and interests. Can you
describe in more detail the nature of the Bureau's functions and how
you plan to delegate specific roles and responsibilities within the
Bureau?
Answer. The Bureau's functions will fully integrate the previous
investigative responsibilities held by the Special Agents of the
Customs Service and the Immigration and Naturalization Service. The
investigative components of BICE will enforce the full range of
immigration and customs laws of the United States. By unifying the
previously separate investigative functions, the new Bureau will
enhance information sharing with Federal, State and local law
enforcement and develop stronger relationships with the U.S. Attorneys'
Office.
The American public will only be able to identify a former Customs
or INS agent as a BICE agent. To this end, all agents will receive
training in the disciplines of their new counterparts to facilitate a
cohesive effort in furtherance of the investigative mission of BICE.
BICE will accomplish its mission through effective leadership,
cooperation and coordination with internal components, law enforcement,
other governmental agencies and through the development of information
technology and appropriate sharing and use of intelligence information
to assess threats and prioritize targets. BICE will further develop and
enhance partnerships with international, Federal, State, and local
entities to help identify, prosecute, and/or dismantle criminal
organizations and to locate, apprehend, prosecute, and/or remove
individuals who threaten the peace and stability of the nation. The IIP
will focus its resources on the issues and threats identified as most
severe and will systematically identify and prioritize those activities
and apply all available laws and tools to counter those threats.
Question. When do you anticipate putting together an integrated
investigations strategy that will blend the customs and immigration
responsibilities of BICE and sharing it with the Committee?
Answer. The challenges of the 21st century and the aftermath of the
September 11, 2001 attacks demand an integrated investigations strategy
that provides a highly organized global approach with regard to the
customs and immigration enforcement responsibilities. The unique
authorities possessed by BICE special agents will allow them to play an
integral role in defending the United States and securing its borders.
BICE is currently endeavoring to implement an integrated
investigations strategy, which should be completed in the near future.
Putting together an integrated investigations strategy means the
recognition that BICE must partner with other law enforcement and
intelligence agencies to protect and defend the United States. It will
seek strong functional liaisons, and will formulate an aggressive,
integrated investigations strategy and infrastructure with its
partners. However, the process of integration takes time--not only to
integrate several program specific investigations strategies--but also
to ensure the compatibility with interdependent systemic
infrastructures including information technology, human and budgetary
resource options. For example, a new chain of command (integrating the
two agencies) will be established, agents will be cross-trained in the
disciplines of their counterparts at Customs or INS, differences in
operational policies will be reconciled, and joint facilities may need
to be secured. Currently, under the direction of the Assistant
Secretary, we are ensuring steady progress toward addressing these
issues, including the process of assembling an integrated, efficient
and effective investigations strategy. The Bureau looks forward to the
opportunity to share these developments with the Committee, as they
occur.
Question. BICE has responsibility for investigating everything from
intellectual property to smuggling of contraband. How do you plan to
ensure that non-homeland security investigations are maintained at the
same level?
Answer. Because law enforcement investigative priorities must
concurrently evolve with the trends in criminal activity, each year
BICE will review its investigative priorities and establish a
comprehensive investigative strategy.
BICE will continue to collaborate with other law enforcement
agencies to identify, prioritize, and pursue threats to the homeland.
In addition, BICE will continue constant coordination with the
intelligence community and with private, public, State, local, and
Federal law enforcement agencies. This coordination will be a key
component of achieving the strategic approach to the full range of
investigations for which BICE is responsible.
Question. There are approximately 355,000 individuals who have been
issued final deportation orders that have just walked away, absconded.
The fiscal year 2003 Consolidated Appropriations Resolution included
$10 million for increased investigative staff to pursue absconders.
What is the status of bringing on these new investigators? How do you
plan to tackle the absconder situation?
Answer. BICE is planning to dedicate the $10 million in new funds
to locating, apprehending and deporting criminal alien fugitives in
fiscal year 2003. These new funds will be used to acquire equipment as
well as hire and train 69 new officers solely devoted to the initiative
to locate, apprehend and remove absconders. Eight new fugitive
operations teams will be deployed in key strategic locations; Georgia/
North Carolina, the Maryland/Washington DC/Virginia corridor,
Massachusetts/New England, Mid-Atlantic, Illinois/Midwest, Central
Texas, Pacific Northwest, and supplements to the existing Los Angeles
team. Some of the positions will also be used to establish permanent
staff at the Law Enforcement Support Center to aid in the entry of
alien records into the National Crime Information Center (NCIC) which
is used as a force multiplier.
The $10 million supplements the $3 million from the counter-
terrorism supplemental the former INS received from the Patriot Act in
fiscal year 2002. That $3 million was used to hire 40 new officers,
deployed as 8 teams in 7 cities, devoted solely to fugitive operations.
The locations included New York City (2 teams), Detroit, Miami, Newark,
Chicago, Los Angeles and San Francisco.
In order to provide a solid foundation to these teams, BICE has
developed a new specialized training course for the members of the
fugitive operations teams. The first class will begin training in July
2003.
Tackling the absconder problem will require an integrated system to
arrest and remove current absconders in conjunction with programs
designed to reduce the future absconder population. One element of this
system will be the creation of new multi-agency task forces to focus on
the problem of absconders. BICE has reached out to other Federal
agencies, such as the U.S. Marshals, IRS, Social Security
Administration and the Department of Labor as well as State and local
law enforcement agencies, to expand the enforcement net and ensure that
every tool available is utilized to find these aliens. Another key
element of the system includes greater use of intensive supervision to
ensure aliens show up for proceedings and removals, thus reducing the
growth of absconders.
AIR AND MARINE INTERDICTION
Question. What is the status of the modernization review of all air
and marine assets?
Answer. With respect to Air and Marine Interdiction assets, BICE
has completed a review of all air and marine assets and expects to
complete a revised modernization plan in late July 2003. We estimate
delivering the plan to Congress in August 2003.
The Border Patrol developed a replacement/enhancement plan for
their air and marine assets in fiscal year 2000. The acquisition of new
assets is based upon availability of funds for each fiscal year.
Additional new aircraft and marine vessels acquisitions are planned for
in fiscal year 2003.
Question. Currently the base budget for Air and Marine Interdiction
is spilt between BCBP and BICE, with the operations and maintenance
budget in BCBP and a portion of the salaries and expenses of the
personnel in BICE. What is the appropriate placement of this important
program? Please provide the rationale for that decision.
Answer. The Air and Marine Interdiction budget was deliberately
placed in BICE. Some of the reasons for this decision are:
Air and Marine staff and capital assets are deployed primarily for
interdiction. The principal goals of interdiction are to enhance the
BICE investigative process to prevent terrorist activity and to further
investigations of major smuggling operations whether they be drug,
alien, or terrorist in nature.
As a key part of the BICE integration of the immigration and
customs enforcement mission with other Federal agencies, OAMI will
support investigative processes at Coast Guard, Secret Service,
Emergency Management, TSA, and FPS. OAMI will support investigative
processes at non-DHS agencies from DEA to FBI.
The use of OAMI mission and assets must be closely connected to the
BICE intelligence mission and operations to be effective. It is this
connection that ensures that the limited air and marine assets are
effectively deployed to specific targets over a vast sea or border
resulting in maximum deterrence capability. BICE intelligence based
operations must be the lynchpin of OAMI strategy.
Operationally, OAMI is more identified with investigations than
inspections or surveillance activity. OAMI has historically reported
through the investigations division of Customs. In fiscal year 2002,
approximately 60 percent of OAMI flight hours supported customs
enforcement. With the integration of customs and immigration
enforcement, we estimate that more than 80 percent of OAMI operational
flight hours will directly support BICE investigations, foreign
operations, border and maritime patrols. The remaining 20 percent will
support transportation of people and assets, as well as training and
maintenance, and other customers for support flights.
Based upon the above factors, placement of OAMI within BICE
accomplishes the objectives of intelligence-based operations; more
effective support of DHS and inter-agency law enforcement missions; and
furtherance of investigations of terrorists and other crime syndicates.
Air and Marine support of border protection functions will continue
under this placement and will be formalized in an upcoming management
directive. The proper placement of all our programs remains subject to
periodic review.
Question. Please provide the fiscal year 2004 positions, FTE, and
dollars for the following: operations and maintenance, to include the
proper level of adjustments to base; salaries and expenses to, include
the appropriate level of administrative overhead from the legacy
appropriation and adjustments to base.
Answer. In order to fund the authorized strength of 1,105 FTE, the
legacy appropriation with adjustments to base includes $112 million for
salaries and expenses in the fiscal year 2004 budget request. An
additional $175.05 million is included in the fiscal year 2004 budget
request for legacy operations and maintenance with adjustments to base.
Appropriate levels of administrative overhead are pending the
completion of administrative support and structures between BCBP and
BICE.
FEDERAL LAW ENFORCEMENT TRAINING CENTER
Question. How do you plan to balance the training needs of the
Border and Transportation Directorate with the training needs of other
Departments?
Answer. The Federal Law Enforcement Training Center (FLETC)
conducts training and provides training support services for 75 partner
organizations from across all three branches of Federal Government.
FLETC also provides training for international, State and local law
enforcement agencies on a selective basis. In the President's fiscal
year 2004 request, FLETC was projected to train 45,208 students for a
total of 183,202 student weeks of training at Glynco, Georgia, Artesia,
New Mexico and Charleston, South Carolina. In early fiscal year 2004, a
fourth site in Cheltenham, Maryland, is anticipated to be fully
operational for requalification training in the Washington, DC
metropolitan area. Currently, training statistics for Cheltenham are in
the developmental stage and are not part of the President's budget
request. Of the projected student weeks of training, 65 percent will
come from the nine law enforcement agencies transferred to the
Department of Homeland Security.
The fiscal year 2003 projections are unprecedented for FLETC. To
meet the training needs, FLETC will continue a 6-day workweek, which
was started in January 2002, at its largest site in Glynco. Further,
FLETC has a priority training system, which ensures that all mandated
entry level law enforcement training is given first scheduling
priority. The FLETC has received updated projections for fiscal year
2004. The new training projections have increased significantly and
FLETC is currently evaluating the impact of the increased requests for
training. If these requests are substantiated the FLETC will have to
explore other options, including extended work days, realignment of
training among sites under FLETC's scheduling control, and the use of
other available Federal, State and local training resources on a
periodic basis.
OFFICE FOR DOMESTIC PREPAREDNESS
Question. How does the Administration propose to allocate the $500
million requested for firefighters and the $500 million proposed for
law enforcement? For example, do you intend to retain the current grant
programs now being managed by the Emergency Preparedness and Response
Directorate (formerly FEMA) which provide emergency management
performance grants to states or grants directly to fire departments
through the Assistance to Firefighters Grant program?
Answer. There are two separate allocations of $500 million in the
fiscal year 2004 request. One $500 million allocation will be for the
traditional Fire Act program being transferred from FEMA. Since its
inception, DHS's Office for Domestic Preparedness has enjoyed a strong
relationship with the nation's fire service. The planned transfer of
the Fire Act program to ODP will not change the manner in which the
program is administered nor is it an attempt to merge the program with
ODP's formula grant program. The program will continue to be managed
consistent with the statutory requirements as a direct, competitive
grant program to address the health and safety of firefighters.
The other $500 million allocation request for State and local law
enforcement for terrorism preparedness and prevention activities which
include: training and equipment for WMD events, support for information
sharing systems, training of intelligence analysts, development and
support of terrorism early warning methods, target hardening and
surveillance equipment, and opposition force exercises.
Question. There was controversy during consideration of the
Homeland Security Act as to whether the Department's Border and
Transportation Security Directorate or its Emergency Preparedness and
Response Directorate should properly manage and oversee the first
responders program. Do you believe that the Office for Domestic
Preparedness is properly placed under the Department's Border and
Transportation Security Directorate?
Answer. I support moving ODP to the Office of State and Local
Coordination. With ODP's ever-expanding responsibilities and broadening
scope, I think it is important for the agency providing funding to
States and locals to reside within the office assigned in acting as
liaison to those very States and locals. Therefore, the proposition of
moving ODP from BTS to the Office of State and Local Coordination will
be a means to several ends. Moving ODP will enhance the Office of State
and Local Coordination because of ODP's long standing relationships
with State and local public safety agencies and responders. Perhaps
most importantly, a move will give DHS a ``one-stop-shop'' for all
first responder funding within the Department.
Question. No additional funding is requested for fiscal year 2004
for critical infrastructure protection grants (funded in the fiscal
year 2003 Emergency Wartime Supplemental Appropriations Act) or for
high-threat urban areas (funded in the fiscal year 2003 Consolidated
Appropriations Act and the fiscal year 2003 Emergency Wartime
Supplemental Appropriations Act). Do you foresee a need to continue
funding for either of these grant programs in fiscal year 2004?
Answer. The $200 million appropriated in the 2003 Emergency Wartime
Supplemental Appropriations Act was for reimbursement of states for
expenses incurred protecting critical infrastructure during Operation
Liberty Shield.
Urban Area Security Initiative (UASI) was developed and implemented
after the fiscal year 2004 budget request was developed. We believe the
states will find this program an integral part of their strategic
planning, and continue to fund it with grant funds ODP allocates to
them on an annual basis.
Question. First responders funding has been awarded to states with
a pass-through to local governments on the basis that statewide plans
are developed to deal with the issues of terrorism preparedness,
vulnerability assessments and the like, and that the funds be spent by
the States and local governments consistent with this plan. How
important do you believe the statewide plans are in assuring the proper
expenditure of this assistance at the State and local level?
Answer. The State Homeland Security Strategy is designed to give
each state and territory one comprehensive planning document that
includes response requirements for a WMD terrorism incident,
irrespective of the sources of funding. It is developed based on
assessments of threats, vulnerabilities, capabilities at both the State
and local jurisdiction levels. It should serve as a blueprint for the
coordination and enhancement of efforts to respond to WMD incidents,
using Federal, State, local, and private resources within the State.
Because of the importance of this information, the grants are awarded
based on the submission of this state plan to ensure the state uses the
funds according to the needs identified in the strategy.
There have been many concerns from the government as well as first
responders in the field regarding the grant funding reaching local
jurisdictions in a timely manner. Therefore, the fiscal year 2003 State
Homeland Security Grant Program I (SHSGP I) and SHSGP II incorporate a
strict timeline to facilitate the release and obligation of this
funding.
The SHSGP I application kit was posted online on March 7, 2003.
States had to submit their applications to ODP within 45, by April 22,
2003. Applications were reviewed at ODP within 7 days of submission.
Once approved by ODP, grants will be awarded to the States within 21
days. States have 45 days to obligate funds from the time the grant is
awarded. As mandated by Congress, 80 percent of the equipment funds
must be provided to local units of government. The required bi-annual
Categorical Assistance Progress Reports must reflect the progress made
on providing funds to the local jurisdictions.
The SHSGP II application kit was posted online on April 30, 2003.
States must submit their applications to ODP within 30 days, by May 30,
2003. Applications will be reviewed at ODP within 7 days of submission.
Once approved by ODP, grants will be awarded to the States within 21
days. States have 45 days to obligate funds from the time that the
grant is awarded. As mandated by Congress, 80 percent of the total
amount of the grant to each State must be provided to local units of
government. The required bi-annual Categorical Assistance Progress
Reports must reflect the progress made on providing funds to the local
jurisdictions.
Question. In testifying before the Senate Appropriations Committee
on the fiscal year 2003 supplemental request and again before this
Subcommittee last week, Secretary Ridge indicated that there may be
reason to rethink how we distribute future terrorism preparedness
funding, whether the population-based distribution formula historically
used by the Office for Domestic Preparedness is appropriate, or whether
it should take into account such factors as threat, vulnerability,
critical infrastructure needs, and the like. Does the Administration
plan to propose a formula change for distributing this funding? What
formula change will you be seeking?
Answer. The current formula for the allocation of ODP funds to the
States for the fiscal year 2003 State Homeland Security Grant Program
(SHSGP) I and SHSGP II was computed on a base, pursuant to the Patriot
Act, plus a population formula. Starting in fiscal year 2004, the
Department will seek to make changes in how it distributes funding to
the States. Each State and territory will continue to receive a base
amount, but the balance of funds will utilize a multi-faceted formula,
taking into account factors including threat and risk assessments,
critical infrastructure of national importance, and population density.
Until the overall formula is changed, each State must take into
consideration needs and capabilities when allocating their State funds
to local jurisdictions.
Question. What formula was used to award the approximately $100
million in fiscal year 2003 funds for grants to high-threat urban areas
announced by the Department on April 8, 2003, for distribution to seven
U.S. cities (New York City, N.Y.; Washington, D.C. and the National
Capital Region; Los Angeles, CA; Seattle, WA; Chicago IL, San
Francisco, CA; and Houston, TX)? Do you expect to use this same formula
to award the additional $700 million provided in the fiscal year 2003
Emergency Wartime Supplemental Appropriations Act?
Answer. While the specifics of the formula used to award the
approximately $100 million, and subsequent $700 million, for the Urban
Areas Security Initiative is classified, it includes a weighted linear
combination of current threat estimates, critical assets within the
urban area, population and population density, the result of which is
used to calculate the proportional allocation of resources.
______
Questions Submitted by Senator Pete V. Domenici
UNMANNED AERIAL VEHICLES AT THE LAS CRUCES, NEW MEXICO INTERNATIONAL
AIRPORT
Question. I was pleased to learn of Secretary Ridge's interest in
using unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) for improved surveillance along
our nation's borders. I strongly support such action to improve our
nation's ability to patrol our borders, particularly in less-populated
areas.
Southern New Mexico is already the site of ongoing UAV flights out
of the Las Cruces International Airport. This airport is the
headquarters of New Mexico's emerging UAV Center of Excellence, the
newly formed joint regional UAV Systems and Operations Validation
Facility (USOVF), a partnership between the 46th Test Group at Holloman
Air Force Base and the Physical Science Laboratory of New Mexico State
University. The USOVF is pre-approved by the Federal Aviation
Administration for file and fly in a regional flight area of 300,000
square miles in the western United States. The Las Cruces International
Airport is situated less than 40 miles from the U.S.-Mexico border, and
in a central location among U.S. border states.
I understand that Senator Stevens is interested in using UAV's to
patrol the maritime border between Alaska and Russia in the Bering
Straight. What do you anticipate will be the size and scope of the
Department of Homeland Security's deployment of UAV's on our borders?
Answer. BTS has asked the Science and Technology Directorate to
evaluate the use of UAVs in a Border and Transportation Security
environment. S&T was also asked to evaluate other potential
applications.
Question. What funding and facilities will the Department need for
a UAV program?
Answer. Until the requirements have been scoped to determine the
feasibility and extent of a UAV program, we cannot predict what amount
of funding and the type of facilities might be appropriate for the
Department to implement a UAV program.
Question. On what timeline will the Department implement this
initiative?
Answer. At this time, it is unknown what the timeline would be for
the Department to implement this type of initiative. A proposed project
plan including milestones and deliverables is expected to be ready for
review by June 2003. The project plan will discuss the BTS-specific
project as well as strategies in developing UAV initiatives in the
near, mid, and long term for DHS venues such as borders and ports.
Question. Based upon the characteristics of the Las Cruces, New
Mexico International Airport, could you provide an assessment of its
potential for utilization by the Department of Homeland Security for
serving as a platform for the deployment of UAV's for Homeland Security
purposes?
Answer. Based upon the description of the Las Cruces, New Mexico
International Airport, the facility appears to have potential for
serving as a platform for UAV deployment for Homeland Security
purposes. After UAV program feasibility, requirements and scope is
determined a more detailed assessment on available testing and
deployment facilities would need to be made.
BORDER ISSUES
Question. It has been 17 years since the Federal Government
launched a major effort to upgrade U.S. borders and that effort focused
only on the Southwest border.
I have just sponsored the Border Infrastructure and Technology
Modernization Act (S. 539). The new bill will focus on U.S. borders
with Canada as well as Mexico. This bill has the dual goals of
facilitating the efficient flow of trade while meeting the challenges
of increased security requirements.
This will include:
--More funding for equipment at our land borders
--Additional funding for personnel
--Additional funding for training, and
--Additional funding for industry/business partnership programs along
the Mexican and Canadian borders.
It is important for the border enforcement agencies to work with
the private sector on both sides of the border and reward those
partners who adopt strong internal controls designed to defeat
terrorist access to our country.
What are your thoughts on the importance of trade partnership
programs along the Southwest border?
Answer. Industry Partnership Programs (IPP) allow the BCBP to
expand our influence beyond the borders and into Mexico, Central
America, South America and the Caribbean. Under the umbrella of the
Customs-Trade Partnership Against Terrorism (C-TPAT), these priority
initiatives include the Land Border Carrier Initiative Program (LBCIP),
the Business Anti-Smuggling Coalition (BASC) and the Americas Counter
Smuggling Initiative Program (ACSI). Each IPP enables the Trade to
tighten our borders through the enhancement of supply chain security
standards that deter smugglers from using conveyances and cargo to
smuggle terrorist devices and narcotics. These complementary programs
benefit both BCBP and the private sector by securing the integrity of
shipments destined for the United States while promoting the efficient
flow of trade.
We are currently working on additional security requirements that
take into account the additional terrorist and drug threat on the
Southwest border for conversion of the LBCIP carriers to C-TPAT. BASC
chapters have been established throughout Ecuador, Colombia, Costa
Rica, Mexico, Panama, Peru, Venezuela and most recently in Jamaica,
where a chapter was founded in March 2003. The ACSI Teams continue to
support BASC through security site surveys, briefings on smuggling
trends and techniques and security and drug awareness training.
The primary purpose of LBCIP is to prevent smugglers of illegal
drugs from utilizing commercial conveyances for their commodities.
Carriers can effectively deter smugglers by enhancing security measures
at their place of business and on the conveyances used to transport
cargo. By signing agreements with the BCBP, land and rail carriers
agree to enhance the security of their facilities and the conveyances
they use and agree to cooperate closely with BCBP in identifying and
reporting suspected smuggling attempts.
BASC is a business-led, BCBP supported alliance created to combat
narcotics smuggling via commercial trade that was formed in March 1996.
BASC examines the entire process of manufacturing and shipping
merchandise from foreign countries to the United States, emphasizing
the creation of a more security-conscious environment at foreign
manufacturing plants to eliminate, or at least reduce, product
vulnerability to narcotics smuggling. BCBP supports BASC through ACSI,
which are teams of BCBP officers that travel to the BASC countries to
assist businesses and government in developing security programs and
initiatives that safeguard legitimate shipments from being used to
smuggle narcotics and implements of terrorism.
Question. What plans do you have to increase cooperation with the
Mexican government on border issues?
Answer. Under the C-TPAT programs consisting of the Americas
Counter Smuggling Initiative (ACSI), and the Business Anti-Smuggling
Coalition (BASC), BCBP is engaging the Mexican trade community and
Mexican Customs in a cooperative relationship against the smuggling of
drugs and implements of terror. Meetings have been held with Mexican
Customs through a bilateral U.S.-Mexican Government Working Group.
Through this working group, the United States and Mexico can work
jointly through these programs to establish a secure supply chain
between our countries, while facilitating cross border trade. BCBP is
also working with Mexican Customs to identify what areas in Mexico
should be targeted for the establishment of new BASC chapters.
Under the high-level United States and Mexico Customs Bilateral
Working Group, a demonstration project to test a fast and secure lane
at El Paso is underway. This bilateral program is designed to expedite
and facilitate commercial truck crossings at the Ports of Entry (POEs)
by implementing the mandated requirements of securing the flow of
people, transportation, and goods under a secure infrastructure. This
program is aimed at facilitating cross border trade, while improving
and ensuring the supply chain security of the participants that range
from manufacturing, to transportation, to importation.
BCBP has two ACSI teams travelling throughout Mexico to work with
the BASC Chapters in Monterrey, Ciudad Juarez and Mexico City to
prevent drug smugglers and elements of terrorism from using legitimate
cargo to enter their illegal merchandise into the U.S. BASC, which was
initiated in March 1996, continues to be a private sector business-led,
BCBP supported alliance under C-TPAT that complements and enhances our
efforts to secure the supply chain. C-TPAT is an anti-terrorism
response to the events of September 11, 2001 which engages the trade
community in a cooperative relationship with Customs in the war against
terrorism. C-TPAT will work with foreign manufacturers, exporters,
carriers, importers and other industry sectors emphasizing a seamless,
security conscious environment throughout the entire commercial
process.
FEDERAL LAW ENFORCEMENT TRAINING CENTER (FLETC)
Question. Congress created the Federal Law Enforcement Training
Center (FLETC) to be the consolidated training center for almost all
law enforcement agencies. As the law enforcement training arm of the
Department of Homeland Security (DHS) it seems logical that FLETC
should develop and conduct standardized training for all Homeland
Security law enforcement and inspection personnel.
Such a training approach would ensure that all law enforcement
personnel receive appropriate and consistent instruction. This is
particularly important as you retrain and cross-train border agencies
which have been merged under DHS (e.g. Customs, Immigration, and
Agriculture Inspectors).
Congress specifically created the Federal Law Enforcement Training
Facility in Artesia, New Mexico to handle the advanced and special
training of almost all Federal law enforcement personnel.
In the past, Federal agencies have chosen not to use FLETC
facilities for training and instead have contracted with non-Federal
institutions. Over the past few years, Congress has provided over $30
million for the FLETC Artesia facility, alone.
When the need for Federal Air Marshal training arose after
September 11, FLETC-Artesia answered the call to duty by developing and
providing this training in a remarkably short period of time. By way of
example, FLETC-Artesia brought in three 727 airplanes for use in
training to go along with the 18 firing ranges and 3 shoot-houses.
FLETC-Artesia boasts 683 beds, state-of-the-art classrooms, and a
brand new cafeteria to accommodate approximately 700 students a day,
yet it has been running at around 320 students during fiscal year 2003.
FLETC-Artesia's close proximity to the Southwestern border,
recently constructed facilities and optimal training conditions
certainly suggest the center should be highly utilized by DHS.
Question. How do you intend to provide training for the newly hired
DHS personnel as continued training for existing DHS personnel in light
of the new security challenges facing our country?
Answer. As we enter a new era in law enforcement operations in the
United States, the FLETC is a good example of the new government
approach intended by the legislation creating the DHS: a means to
harmonize the work of many law enforcement agencies through common
training, while at the same time maintaining quality and cost
efficiency. In fiscal year 2003, 65 percent of the FLETC's projected
training workload will come from nine law enforcement agencies
transferred to the new Homeland Security department. In fiscal year
2004, this workload will continue to be above 73 percent of our
estimated total Federal training workload.
FLETC intends to work closely with all segments of DHS. Placing
FLETC within the DHS will help to support the ``unity of command'' and
the coordination and efficiency themes sought in the public law that
created DHS. FLETC has a long history of service to many of the DHS
components--the U.S. Secret Service, the former Customs and Immigration
and Naturalization Services including the U.S. Border Patrol (USBP),
the Federal Protective Service, and more recently, the Transportation
Security Administration (TSA).
With the start-up of the Bureaus of Customs and Border Protection
and Immigration and Customs Enforcement, FLETC is ready to help
facilitate, develop, and implement new training and cross training
programs. We recognize that much of this effort and expertise will
necessarily come from the agencies involved, but there likely will be
significant adjustments made over time to all DHS-related training
programs, basic and advanced. Already, an effort is underway to
systematically review existing training for these new entities and to
address whatever capabilities are needed to meld the duties of the
participants. In the meantime, training will continue unabated to
achieve all of the hiring expectations of our agencies.
Question. How do you intend to use FLETC facilities for training
DHS employees?
Answer. The national ``war on terrorism'' precipitated by the
events of September 11, 2000 placed new and increased demands on the
nation's Federal law enforcement agencies. Officers and agents
immediately began to work extended hours and many have been reassigned
geographically and/or to expanded duties. Nearly all Federal law
enforcement agencies made plans to increase their cadre of qualified
officers and agents, and submitted urgent requests to the FLETC for
basic law enforcement training far in excess of the FLETC's normal
capacity. These requests were for increased numbers of graduates and
for their speedy deployment to buttress the hard-pressed Federal law
enforcement effort.
The events of September 11 also increased the need for certain
advanced law enforcement training conducted at the FLETC, especially
classes associated with such issues as counter-terrorism, weapons of
mass destruction, money laundering, etc. Likewise, the need for
instructor training classes increased, to strengthen the cadre of
instructors qualified to handle the training surge--at the FLETC and
within the agencies.
In addressing the unprecedented increase in training requirements,
FLETC has conducted capability analyses to determine the set of actions
most likely to result in optimum throughput without compromising the
qualifications of graduating officers and agents, and maximizing the
use of each of its training facilities. With the consultation and
concurrence of its partner organizations (POs), FLETC leadership
directed that training be conducted on a 6-day training schedule
(Monday through Saturday), thus generating a 20 percent increase in
throughput capability. More importantly, the 6-day training schedule
drives a corresponding compression of the length of each training
program, effectively delivering each class of new law enforcement
officers to their agencies weeks sooner than under the conventional
training schedule. Should the 6-day training schedule be insufficient
to meet the demand, an extended work day will be considered.
In addition to the 6-day training schedule, FLETC has expanded its
staff with a supplemental cadre of re-employed annuitants (primarily
retired Federal law enforcement officers) who are contributing their
skills and experience as instructors to help sustain the surge in
training operations. This is a 5-year authority provided by Congress in
fiscal year 2002.
Further, the Federal Law Enforcement Training Center has been
tasked by BTS with establishing a Training Academy Committee to
identify and assess the training capabilities of all of the BTS
training academies. This study will be the basis for determining the
schedule and priority for training elements of DHS in a coordinated
manner.
Question. How should DHS use FLETC Artesia's facilities and
specialized training capabilities?
Answer. FLETC intends to utilize its Artesia facility to its
maximum potential. I have tasked the Federal Law Enforcement Training
Center with establishing a Training Academy Committee to identify and
assess the training capabilities of all of the BTS training academies.
The Committee will use a two-phase methodology to identify the training
assets and to develop a plan for operating the facilities employed by
each of the Directorate's bureaus, and will also include the Coast
Guard, Secret Service, and the Bureau of Citizenship and Immigration
Services. The operational plan will provide the framework for
coordinating academy training in all BTS bureaus. The Committee will
develop and submit a report at the conclusion of each phase. Once the
Committee has identified all of the BTS training capabilities, FLETC
can develop a more definitive utilization plan for Artesia and all
other sites.
PURCHASE OF THE TOWN OF PLAYAS
Question. Approximately 1 week ago, I sent you a letter suggesting
the Department of Homeland Security purchase the town of Playas for the
training of state and local first responders.
As you are aware, Playas is a deserted company town in Southern New
Mexico that could be used as a real world anti-terrorism training
center.
Playas incorporates almost 260 homes, several apartment buildings,
a community center, post office and airstrip, a medical clinic,
churches and other typical small town structures.
This town would cost the government $3.2 million dollars--a bargain
that should not be passed up. While Federal law enforcement has access
to modern training facilities at FLETC, state and local first
responders do not have access to the same quality of facilities. Playas
can meet this vital need in a cost-effective manner.
Currently, New Mexico Tech, a member of Homeland Security's
National Domestic Preparedness Consortium, has put together a proposal
for the Department of Homeland Security through their Office of
Domestic Preparedness to purchase Playas.
Question. What role do you foresee Playas playing in the defense of
our homeland?
Answer. At this time, a decision as to the role of Playas is
undetermined, although the site could have potential value in a
national training architecture. Playas' usefulness as a location for
homeland defense preparedness training must first be assessed through a
feasibility study to determine if acquisition of the property will make
a contribution to the national first responder training program.
Question. Will you evaluate the feasibility of using Playas as a
training site for State and local first responders before we lose this
unique opportunity?
Answer. A feasibility study to determine the potential use of
Playas as a training center would be the first step in the decision-
making process. If upon review of the completed feasibility study a
decision is made to move forward with utilizing the property for a
training facility, a detailed plan will be developed to determine the
most advantageous manner in which to acquire the property. This would
be a lengthy process given the many legal issues involved, particularly
if the decision is for the Federal Government and ODP to purchase or
lease the property.
NATIONAL GUARD ISSUE
Question. I have been told that the Department of Defense has
decided to terminate National Guard support to the Department of
Homeland Security's border inspection operations. I believe that the
National Guard has been an intricate partner with Customs for well over
a decade, providing the extra hands necessary to help inspect cargo at
our land borders, seaports, and mail facilities. I believe there are
approximately 350 National Guardsmen working alongside Customs in this
capacity, at any given time.
This work is of particular importance to New Mexico on our border
with Mexico. There are approximately 52 guardsmen along the New Mexican
border supporting a total of 90 plus Customs, Immigration and
Agriculture inspectors. It is my understanding that for every guardsman
who works searching cargo or screening mail allows an extra Department
of Homeland Security (DHS) inspector to be on the frontlines looking
for terrorists.
As I understand, the Defense Department would like to place these
guardsmen in positions (along the U.S. border) that are more ``military
unique'', such as intelligence collection.
Is now the time for DOD to move these guardsmen from these critical
positions?
Answer. In September 2002, DOD officially informed the U.S. Customs
Service, now Bureau of Customs and Border Protection (BCBP), that they
would discontinue funding National Guard counternarcotics support of
BCBP's Cargo and Mail Inspection operations (the only BCBP operations
supported by National Guard soldiers) effective September 30, 2003. DOD
subsequently changed this date to September 30, 2004. The reason for
discontinuing the National Guard support, as stated by DOD officials,
is that they wish to phase out all National Guard counternarcotics
support that does not require unique military skills.
As a result of the September 2002 notification, aggressive hiring
strategies to offset any negative impact of losing National Guard
support were implemented. Through regular appropriations, supplemental
funding and an overall increase in our inspector corps as a result of
the March 1, 2003 transition to BCBP, our agency is prepared to do
without National Guard support beginning October 1, 2004.
Question. Shouldn't we be increasing the number of guardsman at our
borders?
Answer. As a result of the significant increase in BCBP staffing,
as outlined above, it is not necessary to retain National Guard support
at our borders, nor is it necessary to increase the number of National
Guard soldiers at the border locations. BCBP welcomes National Guard
support beyond September 30, 2004, but the support is not critical for
BCBP to accomplish its mission.
Question. If DOD pulls the Guard from the border will DHS need more
funding to replace personnel?
Answer. No. Through regular appropriations, supplemental funding
and an overall increase in our inspector corps as a result of the March
1, 2003 transition to BCBP, our agency is prepared to do without
National Guard support beginning October 1, 2004.
______
Questions Submitted by Senator Ben Nighthorse Campbell
FIRST RESPONDERS
Question. A portion of your budget is dedicated to managing the
Department's First Responder initiative, and providing grants for
preparedness. Within this initiative, you plan to award grants to
states to address the equipment, training, planning and exercise needs
(as recognized in their updated response plans, which identified goals
and objectives for preparedness, State and local enforcement anti-
terrorism initiatives, and Citizen Corps preparedness activities). What
do you believe is the most efficient way to get funding into the hands
of those first responders, who so desperately need it?
Answer. There have been many concerns from the government as well
as first responders in the field regarding the grant funding reaching
local jurisdictions in a timely manner. Therefore, the fiscal year 2003
State Homeland Security Grant Program I (SHSGP I) and SHSGP II
incorporate a strict timeline to facilitate the release and obligation
of this funding. Also, as mandated by Congress, 80 percent of the
equipment funds in the SHSGP I, and 80 percent of the total amount of
the grant to each state in the SHSGP II, must be provided to local
units of government. The required bi-annual Categorical Assistance
Progress Reports for both grant programs must reflect the progress made
on providing those funds to local jurisdictions.
Question. Can you explain to me the process in place for awarding
the grant program?
Answer. The fiscal year 2003 State Homeland Security Grant Program
I (SHSGP I) application kit was posted online on March 7, 2003. States
had to submit their applications to ODP within 45 days, by April 22,
2003. Applications were reviewed at ODP within 7 days of submission.
Once approved by ODP, grants will be awarded to the States within 21
days. States have 45 days to obligate funds from the time the grant is
awarded.
The SHSGP II application kit was posted online April 30, 2003.
States must submit their applications to ODP within 30 days, by May 30,
2003. Applications will be reviewed at ODP within 7 days of submission.
Once approved by ODP, grants will be awarded to the States within 21
days. States have 45 days to obligate funds from the time the grant is
awarded.
TRANSPORTATION SECURITY ADMINISTRATION
Question. In the hours following the attacks on the Pentagon and
the World Trade Center, it was clear that the lines of communication
between everyone involved in air travel--the FAA, Federal authorities,
airlines, and customers--was severely deficient, if not to say
completely inadequate. What steps have been taken to improve this so
that information moves quickly and accurately from the air traffic
controllers to the airlines to the passengers, and most importantly, to
the appropriate agencies in the event of another emergency?
Answer. The communications flow between air traffic controllers,
airline corporate headquarters and security divisions, Department of
Defense, and other Departments occurs under processes established among
the Federal Aviation Administration, Transportation Security
Administration, Department of Homeland Security, and the Department of
Defense. In cases where there is a known threat to aviation security,
the agency that identifies the threat establishes communications with
the other agencies via established conference calls, at which time all
command centers are brought into a coordination conference call. In
addition to these interagency conference calls, each agency initiates
calls within its own organization for coordination with internal
response and information sources to build and maintain situational
awareness. The Transportation Security Administration establishes
direct links to internal and external agencies via secure and non-
secure means for information gathering and direction. The communication
systems are tested regularly to identify and correct glitches in the
lines of communication so that we are confident there will not be any
problems in a real emergency. At the end of every test, we conduct an
outbrief to review the exercise and identify areas for improvement.
These communications links encompass the full spectrum of agency
capabilities to respond to any threat to aviation security. Additional
details on the secure elements of the communication links can be
provided in a classified setting.
AIR MARSHALS
Question. On September 11th, it became apparent that our nation's
protectors of the commercial skies, the U.S. Air Marshals, needed to be
in better communication--not only with their superiors but also with
each other. Who knows what could have been averted, and how many lives
could have been saved had communications technology been available.
I know that over the past year or so, the TSA has been working with
technology companies in order to develop a communications system that
allows the air marshals to communicate in real time with officials on
the ground, as well as other air marshals stationed on other commercial
aircraft. I think this is necessary so that our air marshals are not
isolated at 30,000 feet.
Do you have any knowledge of the progress of this technology
development?
Answer. Pursuant to House Conference Committee Report 107-593,
TSA's Federal Air Marshal Service (FAMS) was provided $15 million to
begin implementation of an Air to Ground Communications program. TSA
intends to utilize this funding to purchase a Commercial Off-the-Shelf
(COTS) product, which includes hardware and software, for
implementation of the Air to Ground communications system. This initial
system will allow FAMS to utilize a portable, quickly deployable air to
ground communications system which will seamlessly integrate existing
FAMS wireless technology. This comprehensive wireless communications
system may also be used by other local, State, and Federal agencies,
and the Department of Defense, to achieve secure communications through
a dedicated law enforcement network.
BAGGAGE SCREENERS
Question. The TSA recently announced plans to eliminate 3,000 more
airport screening jobs by the end of September, coupled with 3,000
others announced in March, amount to about 11 percent of the 55,600
screeners employed.
This plan will save the TSA an estimated $280 million. I applaud
the TSA's effort to trim their budgetary needs, however, is a good idea
to cut the work force and putting some workers on part-time hours? Do
you believe this to be a wise decision at this time?
Answer. TSA acknowledges the requirement to reduce and re-
distribute some of the screener workforce. Getting the right number of
screeners at airports will continue to be a management challenge. It
will be essential for us to use our work force in a flexible manner if
we are to avoid long lines after the reduction. Part time employees
will be essential for staffing checkpoint lanes during peak periods.
Through the implementation of good management principles and practices,
TSA will be able to maintain its charter of world-class security with a
more efficient, more effective screener workforce.
Question. Will we still have enough workers to screen 100 percent
of the bags?
Answer. Yes. The resulting workforce, made up of full and part time
employees, will be able to electronically screen 100 percent of the
bags when the balance of baggage screening equipment is deployed to the
remaining airports.
AIR TRAFFIC CONTROLLERS
Question. A year ago, we discussed the need for accountability in
the security screeners and airport employees as a whole. Then Congress
passed the Aviation and Transportation Act which federalized those
employees. Recently, President Bush issued an executive order that
deleted the clause in a previous order signed by President Clinton that
described air traffic control as an ``inherently governmental
function.'' The Administration has proposed studying whether to hire a
private company to take over the air traffic control system. What
effect will privatizing the Air Traffic Controllers will have on the
current system?
Answer. Because the safe operation of the Nation's air traffic
control system is the responsibility of the Federal Aviation
Administration (FAA), an agency within the Department of Transportation
(DOT), this question is more appropriately addressed to that agency.
Question. Do you believe it will solve current issues, or create
problems?
Answer. Because the safe operation of the Nation's air traffic
control system is the responsibility of the Federal Aviation
Administration (FAA), an agency within the Department of Transportation
(DOT), this question is more appropriately addressed to that agency.
CROSS-CHECK OF PASSENGER IDENTITY
Question. When passing the Aviation and Transportation Act,
Congress felt the need to include the Computer Assisted Passenger Pre-
screening System (CAPS II). CAPS II would scan government and
commercial databases for potential terrorist threats when a passenger
makes a reservation. Under this program, passengers will be required to
provide their full name, address, telephone phone number, and date of
birth. The airline computer reservation system will then automatically
link to the Transportation Security Administration (TSA) for a computer
background check that can include credit, banking history, and criminal
background checks. The TSA will then assign a score to the passenger
based on the agency's risk assessment of the traveler.
However, the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) has doubts about
the project and believes that there may be better use for the money
slated for this project, and has the power to remove the project if
they deem appropriate. Not to mention the potential infringement on
personal privacy, and the possibility for mistakes effecting innocent
people.
Do you believe the CAPPS II program is necessary, and what are you
doing to ease the OMB's worries regarding the program's effectiveness
and operation?
Answer. Yes, TSA believes that the CAPPS II program is necessary.
Not only will it enhance security, but it will improve security
resource allocation (including screeners and FAMs) and it will relieve
the airlines of the burden of running the current CAPPS program
(estimated at $150-200 million annually). TSA has submitted a Business
Case for CAPPS II which is under review.
QUALIFIED ANTITERRORISM TECHNOLOGIES
Question. The Homeland Security Act of 2002 (Sections 862) provided
the Department of Homeland Security with authority to compile a list of
``qualified antiterrorism technologies'' that would qualify or receive
certain protection under that Act. Has this list been compiled? If not,
why?
Answer. The list of ``qualified antiterrorism technologies'' has
not yet been compiled. The regulations to govern implementation of the
SAFETY Act must be completed before the SAFETY Act can be implemented.
Promulgation of these regulations is a high priority, and DHS is
working with the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) to finalize an
initial set of SAFETY Act regulations. We expect to publish these
regulations for comment very shortly. Following the public comment
period, the regulations will be finalized and issued. As soon as the
regulations are issued, applications can be made to DHS for
consideration of possible technologies that are determined to meet the
criteria set forth in Subtitle G, Sec. 862.
Question. If this list has been compiled, can Members of this
Committee get a copy of this list?
Answer. This list has not yet been compiled; please see answer to
Question BTS-S56 for current status.
Question. How would a company that has an antiterrorism technology
be considered for approval?
Answer. DHS has developed plans for both an immediate
implementation path, and for a longer-term ``ideal state'' process, to
implement the SAFETY Act. Public notification of the application
process and of the select categories of technologies that will be
considered for certification will be made through the DHS website after
regulations are issued.
Question. Do they need to wait for the rulemaking process to be
completed to apply for approval?
Answer. Yes, companies will need to wait until after the rulemaking
process has been completed. DHS does not yet have an application or
approval process in place. Final application and approval processes are
contingent upon issuance of regulations. DHS wants to ensure that
applicants are well informed about requirements so that they can make
informed decisions regarding submitting their technologies for
consideration
Question. If so, when will that process be completed?
Answer. Until DHS and OMB have completed their review and issued
guidance for the actual implementation of the SAFETY Act, it is not
possible to determine an actual date for completing the process.
However, the Department does place a high priority on completing the
necessary guidance and regulations and is prepared to act quickly after
issuance of the guidance.
BORDER SECURITY
Question. This Directorate arguably has one of the toughest jobs in
the Department. Ideally, if this Directorate performs its job to
perfection, then the concerns of terrorists coming into our country to
attack our citizens or our infrastructure are reduced to a great
extent. With 7,500 miles of land borders with Canada and Mexico and
95,000 miles of coastline to keep watch over, short of building a large
wall around the country, how much success have you had in strengthening
our border security?
Answer. The priority mission BCBP is to detect and prevent
terrorists and terrorist weapons from entering the United States at and
between Ports of Entry (POEs) while simultaneously facilitating
legitimate trade and travel.
In order to carry out its priority mission, BCBP has developed and
is implementing Smart Border initiatives with other nations and with
the private sector, such as the Container Security Initiative (CSI),
the Customs-Trade Partnership Against Terrorism (C-TPAT), NEXUS, and
the Free and Secure Trade (FAST) Program, and will continue to push our
zone of security outwards.
Our layered inspection process and the components of a Smart Border
include:
--Advance electronic information
--Automated targeting tools
--Identifying and facilitating low-risk travelers and shipments
--Non-intrusive inspection technology
--Industry partnerships
--Training
--Pushing security beyond our borders
BCBP uses various large-scale, portable and hand-held technologies
in different combinations to substantially increase the likelihood that
a nuclear or radiological weapon or weapons grade material will be
detected. We have identified and are deploying nuclear and radiological
detection equipment to include personal radiation detectors, portal
radiation monitors and radiation isotope identifier devices.
In combination with our layered enforcement process, these tools
currently provide BCBP with significant capacity to detect nuclear or
radiological materials.
Additional initiatives include, but are not limited to:
--Training to further develop a highly skilled and trained workforce;
--Sensors to remotely monitor low volume ports of entry; and
--Exchange of intelligence and information to identify potential
nuclear and radiological smuggling threats.
Our goal is to examine 100 percent of all high-risk cargo and
conveyances and to screen all high-risk people, cargo and conveyances
for radiation. The Border Patrol, a component of the Bureau of Customs
and Border Protection, is responsible for preventing the illegal entry
of any persons crossing between the ports of entry along the 8,000
miles of international border with Canada and Mexico. To accomplish
this enormous mission, there are currently over 10,000 agents deployed
on the border to deter, detect, and apprehend any illegal entrants at
the border. These dedicated agents have historically arrested in excess
of 1,000,000 illegal entrants annually. In order to improve the
enforcement effectiveness of these agents, the use of technology and
enhanced detection systems are continuing to be deployed along the
border. In addition to the technology, additional border barriers, high
intensity lighting units and improved border roads have been used to
assist the agents in providing the maximum in border security measures
between the ports of entry. The success of these measures has recently
lead to reductions in illegal entry arrests along certain major border
areas, as well as the continued disruption of organized smuggling
efforts on the border.
Question. Are any of these projects visible to our country's
citizens to make them feel safer?
Answer. BCBP has developed a multi-layered process to target high-
risk shipments while simultaneously facilitating legitimate trade and
cargo. Our Smart Border initiatives include components that are
invisible to a majority of the traveling public. These include
cooperative efforts with other nations to push security beyond our
borders, advance electronic information, automated targeting tools,
intelligence and partnering with industry.
Portions of our layered enforcement process are highly visible to
the general public. These include our inventory of hand-held, portable
and large-scale non-intrusive inspection (NII) technologies deployed to
our nation's air, land and seaports of entry, as well as the additional
personnel and canine resources necessary to support the technology.
Many of the Border Patrol's newest assets are visible to the
citizens who reside in our many border communities. Those assets
include the latest in state of the art helicopters, which frequently
patrol over these communities. In addition, there are infrastructure
improvements in fencing, checkpoint facilities and expanded canine
units for locating persons and contraband hidden in vehicles and train
boxcars. Also visible to our citizens is the increase in the number of
agents patrolling in marked sedans and four-wheeled drive trucks along
the border. In addition, every Border Patrol sector has a community
out-reach program to educate and inform the local communities of the
activities of the Border Patrol and to reassure the citizens of the
Patrol's efforts in providing security along the border of the country.
While many of the assets used by the Border Patrol are not readily
visible to the public, such as surveillance and detection equipment,
the results of the increased presence of agents along the border
continues to be favorably noted by the local media and civic
organizations in many border communities.
______
Questions Submitted by Senator Robert C. Byrd
EXPIRATION OF COBRA FEES
Question. The COBRA fees--which fund nearly all overtime for the
legacy Customs inspectors among others--expire at the end of this
fiscal year. Have you submitted legislation to the appropriate
authorizing committees and discussed with them the need for the
extension of these fees? Also, what contingency plans, if any, do you
have in place to cover the costs of the current COBRA-funded functions
should the fees not be extended in time?
Answer. We have briefed both the House Ways and Means Committee and
the Senate Finance Committee staffs on the need for an extension of the
COBRA fees, and both Committees have developed proposals to extend the
fees. The expiration of the COBRA fees will present numerous problems
for BCBP, as well as fee paying parties-in-interest. Other existing
statutes require that airlines be billed for overtime services and
preclearance (19 USC 267 and 31 USC 9701) and that foreign trade zones
and bonded warehouses be billed for inspectional and supervision
services (19 USC 81n and 19 USC 1555). Other charges, such as fees for
reimbursement of compensation of boarding officers under 19 USC 261
will also need to be reinstated. These statutes are held in abeyance
while the COBRA fees are in effect (see 19 USC 58c(e)(6)). While the
reimbursements from these other statutes would offset some of the
losses from the expired COBRA fees, the amounts are not expected to be
significant. If the COBRA fees expire, service to international
passengers and the trade would need to be reduced to a level
commensurate with available funding.
It should also be noted that the failure to reauthorize the fees
provided for under the COBRA statute (19 USC 58c) will result in an
additional loss in collections of approximately $1 billion annually.
This represents the Merchandise Processing Fees, which are deposited
into the General Fund of the Treasury as an offset to the commercial
operations portion of the BCBP budget.
legacy custom service and immigration and naturalization service fees
Question. A significant portion of the budgets of the new Bureaus
of Customs and Border Protection and Immigration and Customs
Enforcement are based on the assumed collection of fees from the legacy
Customs Service and Immigration and Naturalization Service. What
happens if these fees do not materialize or materialize at levels lower
than estimated? How do you intend to bridge that funding gap should one
occur?
Answer. If funding shortages occur because of smaller fee receipts,
BCBP will adjust the level of inspection services accordingly in order
to function within available resources.
ANTI-DUMPING AUTHORITY (BICE AND BCBP)
Question. What is the expected cost in fiscal year 2003 of
administering the anti-dumping authority in section 754 of the Tariff
Act of 1930 (19 USC 1675c)?
Answer. While enforcement of the Tariff Act is a major priority of
the BCBP, its efforts to enforce this legislation cut across many
different programs and organizations which are concurrently performing
a variety of trade compliance functions within BCBP. Therefore, the
cost of BCBP's enforcement efforts in this area is not easily tracked
or monitored in a way that enables BCBP to provide a quick and easy
answer to this question. Ultimately, any answer would be an estimate of
BCBP's costs.
BUDGET DOCUMENTS
Question. The budget justification documents for BCBP and BICE do
not include detailed legacy information on the agencies/accounts broken
out in a manner similar to that which used to be provided by the former
Customs Service. Was information provided to the Department by the
former Customs Service staff prepared in that format? Please provide
the Subcommittee with a copy of that submission to assist us in tracing
the budgets from fiscal year 2003 to fiscal year 2004?
Answer. The former Customs Service did not provide a draft of the
FISCAL YEAR 2004 BUDGET TO THE DEPARTMENT IN ITS TRADITIONAL FORMAT.
DHS FIRST 100 DAYS
Question. Secretary Ridge noted in his list of the Department's
accomplishments for the 1st 100 days that BCBP had ``acquired and
deployed additional ``A-STAR'' and ``HUEY'' helicopters to bolster
enforcement efforts along the U.S. Southern border''. With what fiscal
year funds were these aircraft purchased? Are other rotary or fixed-
wing aircraft in the procurement pipeline? If so, where is their
planned deployment?
Answer. The purchase of the additional ``A-STAR'' helicopters was
made in fiscal year 2002 with funding received from counter-terrorism
supplemental appropriations in that year. The ``HUEY'' helicopters were
obtained through the military on-loan program for special operations
and tactical training requiring the mission capabilities of that
aircraft. The deployment of the ``HUEY'' helicopters to bolster border
enforcement operations occurred in fiscal year 2002.
NATIONAL CAPITOL REGION AIRSPACE PROTECTION
Question. Last week, in his commemoration of the first 100 days of
the new Department of Homeland Security, Secretary Ridge noted that the
Department's Bureau of Immigration and Customs Enforcement Office of
Air and Marine Interdiction has, ``provided 24-7 airspace security
coverage over Washington, D.C.'' I understand that Blackhawk
helicopters were transferred to this area to provide this ``airspace
security''. How many assets have been assigned to this region and from
which parts of the country are they being borrowed? How long are they
expected to be assigned to this region? What are the impacts on the on-
going operations at the other regions from which these assets have been
borrowed? Is there a long term ``fix'' in the planning stages for this
problem? Does the Department intend to establish an air security branch
for the National Capitol Region?
Answer. The Bureau of Customs and Immigration Enforcement (BICE),
Office of Air and Marine Interdiction (OAMI) is providing two Blackhawk
helicopters and two Citation Tracker aircraft with associated aircrews
and support personnel for National Capital Region (NCR) air security
operations. Additionally, OAMI is providing Detection Systems
Specialists (DSSs) and four operator consoles from the Air and Marine
Interdiction Coordination Center to establish and provide 24-7 law
enforcement air surveillance to the NCR. These assets are drawn from
throughout the OAMI program and are rotated on a regular basis to
minimize the impact to any one sector. The impact on aircraft
maintenance at the other regions is the reduction of man-hours. There
is no expectation of this mission terminating.
Question. Given the importance of all of these missions, as well as
the limited number of Department air assets, why are no funds requested
in your fiscal year 2004 budget for additional aircraft? Further, if
you decide to create a National Capitol Region program, how much money
is required to do so?
Answer. The Department of Homeland Security's fiscal year 2004
budget will leverage existing assets to accomplish this mission.
RESTRUCTURING AIR AND MARINE PROGRAM
Question. What are the plans for updating and restructuring the Air
and Marine program? Will pilots who train and graduate from the same
academy as agents be eligible to become 1811's? Will there be any
equipment upgrades? Will there be new offices set up in the New York
Metro and National Capitol Region? Will new offices with assets in
these areas be cost effective in the event of changing security levels?
Answer. In addition to NCR coverage, OAMI has developed plans to
expand air security and interdiction operations beyond the traditional
southern focused alignment to include the Northern Border. Currently
OAMI has a ``permanent'' temporary air unit in the Northwest and
routinely deploys air units to other Northern Border locations. Also,
in order to meet the increased demands from Northern Border operations,
OAMI plans to increase the capacity of the OAMI national training and
standardization center to include flight simulators. This will increase
the safety and proficiency of OAMI personnel.
BICE Special Agents, Pilots, Air Interdiction Officers, Air
Enforcement Officers and Marine Enforcement Officers attend and
graduate from the Federal Law Enforcement Training Center. Graduation
from this academy qualifies personnel as Criminal Investigators (1811).
The OAMI Modification Plan is a living document and currently under
revision. Previous versions have been forwarded to OMB and Congress for
consideration. This includes equipment upgrades as well as
recapitalization of aircraft and vessels. OAMI has a standing
requirement to upgrade operational equipment to keep pace with
technological advancements.
Currently there are no plans to set up additional offices in New
York City other than the existing Air Unit. However, AMI has
established a communication and radar surveillance infrastructure for
the New York City area that can be easily accessed and used for
training or operational events. There is a plan for a National Capital
Region Air Branch and NCR Coordination Center.
OPERATION GREENQUEST
Question. By all accounts, the on-going anti-terrorism initiative
known as ``Operation Greenquest'' is working quite well. However, there
have been rumblings that the FBI may be attempting to take control of
the Operation from the Department's Bureau of Immigration and Customs
Enforcement. Is this true? If so, does the Department support shifting
control of the program from legacy Customs to the FBI? For what reason?
What is the status of negotiations with other Departments and agencies
regarding terrorism financing (Operation Greenquest) and Narcotics
investigations (Title 21)? Are you pushing to ensure that ICE Agents
retain this authority?
Answer. In an effort to unify the U.S. Government's war against
terrorist financing, the Departments of Homeland Security and Justice
entered into a Memorandum of Agreement (MOA) on May 13, 2003. This MOA
assigns lead investigative authority and jurisdiction regarding the
investigation of terrorist finance to the Federal Bureau of
Investigation (FBI).
Those cases that are determined to be ``terrorist financing'' cases
will be investigated only through participation by the Bureau of
Immigration and Customs Enforcement (BICE) in the FBI Joint Terrorism
Task Forces (JTTF). All appropriate BICE-developed financial leads will
be reviewed by the FBI, and if a nexus to terrorism or terrorist
financing is identified, the leads will be referred to the JTTF under
the direction of the FBI's Terrorist Financing Operations Section
(TFOS). There are no provisions in the current agreement between DHS
and DOJ that allow for delegation of authority of terrorist financing
investigations.
In accordance with BICE's independent authority and jurisdiction
relative to other financial crimes and money laundering investigations,
BICE will be the lead investigative agency for financial investigations
that are not specified as ``terrorist financing'' cases. BICE will
continue to vigorously and aggressively proceed with its DHS mission to
target financial systems that are vulnerable to exploitation by
criminal organizations, and to protect the integrity of U.S. financial
infrastructures.
AQI FUMIGATION INVESTIGATION
Question. The Agriculture Department's Animal and Plant Health
Inspection Service--Agriculture Quarantine Inspection (AQI) program was
transferred by law to the Department of Homeland Security. However, the
investigators who follow-up, review and investigate the importation of
prohibited goods from prohibited countries remain part of the
Agriculture Department. Similarly, the personnel responsible for
fumigation, following the discovery of pests, remain at USDA. Does this
make sense? Is the Administration considering a legislative fix to
correct this contradiction?
Answer. The separation of mutually dependent program functions,
such as the USDA investigators and personnel responsible for
fumigation, from the AQI program transferred to the DHS is problematic
and requires high levels of cooperation, communication, and
coordination at multiple levels. To facilitate this, DHS and USDA
addressed issues early by including relevant Articles in a Memorandum
of Agreement (MOA) required by the Homeland Security Act of 2002.
Specifically, there are Articles for separating functions and then
coordinating these functions once separated. Further, additional and
more specific agreements are necessary and are being developed. The MOA
will be periodically reviewed and modified as mutually agreed to by DHS
and USDA. Through the MOA and additional, more specific agreements, DHS
and USDA will have an opportunity to re-adjust the assignment of
program functions and responsibilities to maximize collective ability
to carry out respective missions. Program officials from both DHS and
USDA are working together to accomplish this. Legislative fixes offer
another means to accomplish necessary and beneficial re-adjustments and
changes. DHS Agricultural Inspection Policy and Program staff is not
currently working on developing legislative fixes.
JUSTICE DEPARTMENT'S RECENT DECISION REGARDING ILLEGAL IMMIGRANTS
Question. On April 24, Attorney General Ashcroft announced that his
agency has determined that broad categories of foreigners who arrive in
the U.S. illegally can be detained indefinitely without consideration
of their individual circumstances if immigration officials say their
release would endanger national security. Apparently, Homeland Security
officials appealed that decision but their objections were overruled by
the Attorney General. There are significant costs that are born by
detaining illegal immigrants until their eventual deportation. For
instance, it is estimated that the detention of Haitians in Florida
over a 6 month period has cost the Department $12.5 million. Given that
the Justice Department decision could have a significant impact on the
Homeland Security Department's budget, how will the costs of these
policy decisions be paid and by whom? Is the Department making further
appeals of the Justice Department's ruling in this case?
Answer. BICE is fully supportive of the decision by the Attorney
General to allow national security implications to be considered as
part of bond determinations. This decision was requested by BICE in the
face of a recent Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) decision which had
ruled that bond determinations could only be based on individual
circumstances.
DETENTION AND REMOVAL
Question. The fiscal year 2004 budget request for detention and
removal activities appears to be cut by $37.4 million below the level
appropriated in the fiscal year 2003 Omnibus Act. Given Attorney
General Ashcroft's decision to permit the detention--on national
security grounds--of entire categories of aliens found entering or
residing in the United States, as well as the already relatively
crowded conditions at ICE detention facilities across the country, how
can the Department justify any reductions in this activity? Will the
Justice Department provide additional funds to bridge any potential
resources gaps or will this just become yet another unfunded mandate?
Answer. As stated previously, BICE is fully supportive of the
decision by the Attorney General to allow national security
implications to be considered as part of bond determinations. This
decision was requested by BICE in the face of a recent Board of
Immigration Appeals (BIA) decision which had ruled that bond
determinations could only be based on individual circumstances.
There were two significant reductions to the funding level for the
fiscal year 2003 Detention and Removal budget. In the appropriate
account, $615 million identified for the Office of the Federal
Detention Trustee was reduced by $22 million in the Conference Report.
In the User Fee account, Detention and Removal funds were reduced by
$5.6 million due to a decrease in expected User Fee revenue. As a
result, 1,081 beds would have to be reduced. If a reduction in beds is
necessary, the result will be 9,729 fewer aliens being detained. For
aliens in detention, approximately 92 percent are removed, while
approximately 13 percent of aliens on the non-detained docket are
removed. Thus, the reduction in 1,081 beds may result in 7,686 fewer
removals.
LETTERS OF INTENT
Question. The fiscal year 2003 Iraqi War Supplemental (Public Law
108-11) included a provision allowing the Under Secretary for Border
and Transportation Security to issue letters of intent to airports to
provide assistance in the installation of explosive detection systems.
What is the status of this issue? Is the Office of Management and
Budget delaying the issuance of these letters?
Answer. TSA has received OMB approval to begin using the LOI
process. Once an LOI is established, TSA and the relevant airport
development authority enter into a Memorandum of Agreement (MOA) to
outline the specific details of the work to be accomplished to complete
an in-line explosive detection system (EDS) solution.
HIGH THREAT URBAN AREAS
Question. Just last week the Office for Domestic Preparedness
released the application kit for the $100 million High Threat Urban
Area program that Congress funded in the fiscal year 2003 Omnibus
Appropriations Act. The applications for the seven eligible cities are
due June 16. By the time the funds get to the cities, it will have been
at least 4\1/2\ months since the Omnibus bill was signed into law.
Getting out this first round of money required a lot of work on the
part of the Department. You had to develop a funding formula from
scratch, and had to design an application kit. But I'm concerned about
the next round of funding.
In the fiscal year 2003 supplemental, Congress appropriated $700
million for the high threat urban area program. I do not want cities--
and this time it will be more than just seven eligible cities--to wait
4 months to receive their grants. When will you award the $700 million?
Congress required that the $700 million be allocated to high threat
urban areas within 60 days of enactment, which is June 11, 2003. Given
that applications for the first round of funding are due June 16, can
the Department award all $800 million at that time? This would prevent
cities from applying more than once for the same program, and would
allow for coordinated planning and implementation.
Answer. Due to concerns from the government as well as first
responders in the field regarding the grant funding reaching local
jurisdictions in a timely manner, the grant application for the
approximately $100 million for the Urban Areas Security Initiative
incorporates a strict timeline in order to facilitate the release and
obligation of this funding. The application kit was posted online on
April 30, 2003, with a deadline for applications due June 16, 2003. The
additional $700 million referenced in Public-Law 108-11, The Wartime
Supplemental Appropriations, was not allocated by DHS before April 30,
2003. On May 14, 2003, DHS announced how the $700 million was
allocated, identifying the cities that are eligible to participate in
the program. Therefore, the first application cannot be combined with
the next application for the $700 million. To expedite the grant awards
for the $700 million, ODP will again adhere to a strict timeline.
FIRE GRANTS AND FIRST RESPONDER FUNDING
Question. Mr. Secretary, FEMA--in conjunction with the National
Fire Protection Association--released a study on January 22, 2002,
entitled ``A Needs Assessment of the U.S. Fire Service'' which reported
that only 13 percent of our nation's fire departments are prepared
handle a chemical or biological attack involving ten or more injuries.
Last year, FEMA awarded $334 million in fire grants but received more
than 19,000 applications that requested over $2 billion.
Given the critical unmet needs of our nation's first responders, I
simply do not understand the Administration's lack of commitment to
this program. In fiscal year 2002, the President refused to spend $150
million approved by the Congress for this program. For fiscal year
2003, the President proposed to eliminate all funding for the program.
For fiscal year 2004 you are proposing a 33 percent reduction to the
fire grants program from the 2003 enacted amount of $745 million.
Please explain to the Subcommittee why the Administration does not
view this program as a critical part of our strategy to secure the
homeland.
Answer. ODP has been providing Federal assistance to State and
local emergency responders through grant funding since 1998. Eligible
disciplines for these grant funds include the fire service, law
enforcement, emergency medical services, and other emergency services
disciplines. While the allowable costs for these grants do not include
hiring of operational personnel such as fire fighters, they do include
many items related to prevention, response and recovery, such as:
equipment, exercises, training and administrative staff and overtime
costs. All of these items are crucial to the support and readiness of
fire departments.
The Department of Homeland Security budget request for fiscal year
2004 includes at least an additional $500 million in grants that
contribute to firefighter preparedness, as well as $2.5 billion for
State domestic preparedness grants to provide equipment, exercises,
strategic planning, and support to the national training and exercise
program. This amount is in addition to the $566.295 million in State
domestic preparedness grants available through the fiscal year 2003
State Homeland Security Grant Program (SHSGP) I, and the $1.5 billion
in State domestic preparedness grants that is available for the SHSGP
II. Basic turn-out gear covered under the Fire Act is also equipment
that would be used in response to a terrorist event, therefore funds
that are available for the State homeland security grants can be used
to provide much needed equipment and other direct services to the fire
fighting community.
FISCAL YEAR 2003 TSA FINANCIAL PLAN
Question. The Transportation Security Administration advised the
Congress that we would be provided with a spending plan for how you
intend to obligate the funds appropriated to your agency for this
fiscal year. We have now entered the 8 month of this fiscal year--and
we have yet to be provided with such a spending plan. We are told that
TSA faces a significant funding shortfall--perhaps in excess of $900
million. We have not received a supplemental request from the President
to meet this shortfall. The Administration opposed efforts to add
funding to the recent supplemental to close the operating deficit. Do
you believe that TSA can live within its current budget and, if so,
what steps are you and they taking to live within that budget? Why has
TSA waited 3 months since enactment of the Omnibus to deliver a plan?
Answer. Since enactment of fiscal year 2003 Omnibus Appropriations
Act (Public Law 108-7) in February and the Emergency Wartime
Supplemental Appropriations Act (Public Law 108-11), TSA has been
working with the assistance of the Department of Homeland Security and
the Office of Management and Budget to develop a budget execution plan
that will meet the needs of the agency within the funding provided.
Since the establishment of TSA, the agency has confronted a series
of unforeseen and extraordinary requirements as it worked to meet
mandated deadlines and to establish normalized business practices. In
addition, development of a fiscal year 2003 budget plan was
particularly challenging since the Omnibus Appropriations Act contained
a large number of earmarks that were not budgeted. The transfer of TSA
from the Department of Transportation to the Department of Homeland
Security on March 1 was another unusual dynamic.
TSA has prioritized its spending needs for fiscal year 2003,
resulting in a budget plan that has been transmitted to the Congress as
a reprogramming notification. TSA will adhere to this plan and will
closely monitor its execution for the remainder of the fiscal year.
INS CONSTRUCTION BACKLOG
Question. Please provide the Subcommittee with details on the
current INS construction backlog.
Answer. The DHS will begin addressing these backlogs following a
strategic, multi-year approach.
PRIVATE MAIL RADIATION DETECTION EQUIPMENT
Question. The Department has provided its employees who inspect
U.S. Postal Service mail with radiation detection equipment. Does it
also provide similar equipment for employees who inspect United Parcel
Service and FedEx mail? If not, why not? Is there a plan to provide
this equipment in the future?
Answer. The Bureau of Customs and Border Protection (BCBP)
personnel are equipped with radiation detection devices at FedEx and
United Parcel Service (UPS) facilities. At the present time BCBP
personnel use both Personal Radiation Detectors (PRD) and Radiation
Isotope Identification Devices to screen cargo at both FedEx and UPS
facilities.
Both UPS and FedEx are in the process of procuring and installing
company owned radiation detection devices at overseas locations. Once
completely installed, this equipment will allow these companies to
screen all incoming cargo and parcels before entering the commerce of
the United States. Both companies will be relying on several types of
equipment, such as Hand-Held Devices and Radiation Portal Monitors, at
their overseas facilities. The types of radiation screening devices
used will depend on the size of the facility and amount of cargo
screened.
BUREAU OF IMMIGRATION AND CUSTOMS ENFORCEMENT: ON-GOING OPERATION
Question. My staff recently was briefed on an on-going Bureau of
Immigration and Customs Enforcement activity referred to as ``Operation
Blue Girard''. Is there money in the fiscal year 2004 budget request
specifically designated for this activity? If so, how much and for what
purposes?
Answer. Operation Blue Girard is one part of a multifaceted port
security program coordinated by the BICE SAIC/Miami, which falls under
Operation Enduring Vigilance, which is a comprehensive multi agency
approach to securing the seaports, cruise passengers and sea cargo in
South Florida. Agencies from the Federal, State and local governments
combine resources to address the threat to homeland security and from
drug or alien smuggling. There is no funding in the fiscal year 2004
budget request specifically designated for this activity. Funding for
maritime port security operations such as Operation Enduring Vigilance
is handled internally within the agency budget process to include
special operations funding.
WYDEN AMENDMENT TO S. 165--AIR CARGO SECURITY IMPROVEMENT ACT
Question. During mark-up of S. 165 in the Commerce Committee,
Senator Wyden won voice vote approval of an amendment requiring a
report on plans by the Transportation Security Administration to gather
data on plane passengers. He said he wanted to determine how the
collection of data impacts civil liberties and privacy. Has the
Administration taken a position on the Wyden provision? Does it share
the same concerns about personal privacy and data mining issues?
Answer. The Administration does not oppose the Wyden provision. TSA
is committed to ensuring that personal privacy is protected in the
CAPPS II program and welcomes the opportunity offered by Senator Wyden
to demonstrate that commitment. With regard to data mining, while the
Administration believes that it can be an important tool, the CAPPS II
program will not be involved in data mining.
PORT SECURITY ASSESSMENTS
Question. Have you reviewed the port security assessments that have
been completed to date to determine if there are patterns in port
vulnerability that ports generally should begin to address immediately?
Answer. Review of the port security assessments completed to date
has yielded valuable preliminary information regarding security
enhancement requirements. These assessments have identified a number of
physical security enhancements that were either non-existent or needed
improvement, such as fencing, lighting, and closed circuit television
systems. Other common recommendations included: standards for
transportation worker identifications systems, security plans,
communications systems, and screening equipment standards for cargo and
passengers.
ENFORCEMENT OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAWS
Question. The enforcement activities of the Customs Service are
critical to the health, safety and well being of U.S. citizens and our
economy. Historically, Customs has been our first line of defense and
this is reflected by the responsibilities we have given Customs through
the laws granting it powers to detain citizens and cargo and, if
necessary, to seize and forfeit goods.
In the 5 fiscal years from 1998 to 2002, Customs stopped over
19,700 shipments because of trademark and copyright violations. Customs
seized over $373.9 million of counterfeit and pirated product. Because
of the public health and safety risks posed by counterfeits and the
injury to our commercial enterprises, these enforcement activities
should continue in order to protect our national economic security.
In several well-publicized cases, millions of dollars made from
cigarette smuggling were funneled to terrorist groups. Given that there
may be numerous priority areas for our new bureaus with border
responsibilities (Bureau of Customs and Border Protection and Bureau of
Immigration and Customs Enforcement), where is the issue of product
counterfeiting and piracy on your list of priorities?
Answer. Customs and Border Protection's top priority is the
detection and apprehension of terrorism and terrorism related material.
Interdiction of counterfeiting and piracy remain a priority because of
the potential use of money generated from the smuggling of
counterfeited and pirated goods for terrorist activity
Question. Also, the security of the United States has many
dimensions. How are the new agencies--the Bureau of Customs and Border
Protection and the Bureau of Immigration and Customs Enforcement--going
to increase the needed protection of our commercial enterprises from
those who bring counterfeit and illegal products into the United
States?
Answer. BCBP has increased protection of commercial enterprises by
implementing stringent cargo manifest rules, increasing importation
research, and conducting more high-risk shipment exams.
Question. The enforcement responsibilities of the Bureau of Customs
and Border Protection and the Bureau of Immigration and Customs
Enforcement appear to be distinct; yet, overlapping. How will these two
bureaus not only coordinate their enforcement efforts but also
strengthen efforts to stop trafficking in counterfeit and illegal
products in the United States?
Answer. The combining of agencies and personnel under DHS will
increase the research and examination capabilities of each agency. The
increase of research and investigative personnel leads to a broader and
more productive work force.
Question. In fiscal year 2002, Customs stopped over 5,000 shipments
that involved intellectual property theft, amounting to nearly $100
million. Will this continue to be an area of enforcement in view of the
magnitude of the violations?
Answer. Due to the sheer volume and monetary value of BCBP seizures
involving intellectual property theft, IPR will continue to be a
priority. IPR will continue to be a focus for enforcement in order to
protect the owners of intellectual property and prevent the movement of
terrorist funds through this illegal activity.
Question. The U.S. Customs Service has been split between the
Bureau of Customs and Border Protection and Bureau of Immigration and
Customs Enforcement. How will this new structure increase the number of
inspections of containers?
Answer. The restructuring of BCBP and BICE will potentially
increase the number of inspections. It will allow for a greater amount
of personnel dedicated to the research, exam and investigations leading
to the apprehension of terrorists or others that commit violations of
U.S. laws and regulations.
Question. Given the terrorist link, how can the new Department
better target containers and seize illegal products entering the United
States?
Answer. BCBP is able to update and implement targeting systems and
research shipments related to entities associated with terrorism or
commodities associated with acts of terrorism. Advanced technology and
cooperation from foreign countries have increased the targeting and
interdiction of illegal products from entering the United States.
Question. In terms of budgeting and personnel and training, what is
being proposed for fiscal year 2004 compared to the last several years?
Answer. Current projections for fiscal year 2004 are to train
approximately 5,000 new inspectors and 2,000 new Border Patrol agents.
Past training workloads for new recruits are indicated in the table
below.
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Border Patrol INS Agriculture OFO \1\
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
2001............................................ 2,100 1,110 192 460
2002............................................ 2,000 2,720 308 1,210
2003............................................ 1,980 2,960 334 1,830
2004 (est.)..................................... 2,000 N/A 432 5,000
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ With the establishment of DHS, legacy INS, Customs and Agriculture inspectors become part of the Office of
Field Operations in Customs and Border Protection. Legacy Border Patrol becomes its own office in Customs and
Border Protection.
Question. In fiscal year 2002, U.S. Customs seizures of
intellectual property reached a new record and eclipsed the previous
year by over 33 percent. Illegal cigarettes shot up from the 5th
largest commodity to the top commodity being smuggled into the United
States. Is the large increase in tobacco smuggling due to operations
run by foreign terrorists?
Answer. Tobacco smuggling has not been linked solely to the funding
of terrorist operations. Tobacco smuggling is known to be a profitable
and highly lucrative cash commodity. However, through the use of BCBP
databases tobacco shipments can be tracked and monitored for possible
illicit or terrorist activity when linked to direct intelligence or
derived from investigations.
Question. What efforts are you taking to intercept cigarette
smuggling?
Answer. Efforts to intercept cigarette smuggling include greater
scrutiny of imports from international sources known to be lenient to
smuggling activity as well as importation trends, and the greater use
of non-intrusive examinations. The use of automated targeting systems
allows for efficient review of import information. Non-intrusive exams
are utilized to uncover false compartments or other methods of
concealment.
Question. In the fiscal year 2002 appropriations, $800,000 was
designed for ``tobacco smuggling task forces''? What have the task
forces done to increase the number of seizures of illegal product?
Answer. To combat cigarette smuggling, the U.S. Customs Service
created a Tobacco Task Force at headquarters. Last fiscal year, two
full time agent positions and one full-time intelligence research
specialist position were filled. Additionally, one full time agent
position in Brussels was filled. This agent serves as coordinator with
related European entities as part of the Tobacco Task Force. The Task
Force provides coordination and investigative expertise to numerous
complex international tobacco smuggling investigations involving
Federal, State and Foreign law enforcement agencies. The Task Force
provided funding and training in support of joint State/Federal Tobacco
Smuggling Task Force members and funded an International Cigarette
Smuggling conference in September 2002 for all disciplines of the U.S.
Customs Service, to several Federal prosecutors, and to some of our law
enforcement counterparts from around the world. These efforts have lead
to a large increase in tobacco related investigations and has
contributed significantly to the increase in seizures as well. No
additional appropriations were earmarked for the Task Force in fiscal
year 2003.
Question. In the fiscal year 2002 appropriations, $5 million went
to the Intellectual Property Rights Center and Investigations
Initiative. Could you please explain their activities and
accomplishments? How does this investigative unit relate to the new
bureaus--BCBP and BICE--and how will it increase the likelihood of
seizures of illegal products?
Answer. The enforcement of intellectual property rights was a high
priority trade strategy for the U.S. Customs Service, Office of
Investigations, throughout fiscal year 2002. Since the reorganization,
BICE has retained its foremost position. The IPR Center provides
coordination and expertise to the BICE field offices in IPR-related
investigations. It is a centralized collection and analysis point for
allegations of Intellectual Property crime and investigative leads
generated by law enforcement agencies, industry associations, the right
holders and the public.
In fiscal year 2002, the IPR Center funded twelve Special Agent and
nine Intelligence Research Specialists positions. The IPR Center funded
positions have allowed the placement of investigative resources in
Customs Attache offices located in Beijing, Hong Kong, Bangkok, and
Singapore, as well as, field offices located in Houston, Los Angeles,
Miami, San Francisco and New York. These resources provided the
technical expertise and support, which facilitated successful outcomes
in domestic and foreign investigations.
During fiscal year 2002, the Center received over 200 incoming
allegations and complaints from industry sources and right holders.
After analyzing the information, multiple cases were referred to
Customs field offices. During this period, the U.S. Customs Service
initiated over 75 IPR related criminal investigations, which resulted
in multiple arrests and convictions. In addition, over 85 IPR related
seizures were effected by the Customs Service.
During fiscal year 2002, the Center personnel conducted dozens of
training and outreach activities to domestic and foreign law
enforcement officials, industry groups and associations. The Center
personnel are regularly called upon to present the enforcement programs
in the IPR arena to foreign dignitaries and delegations, who visit the
United States as part of the State Department's Foreign Visitor Program
and on other initiatives.
The Center is one of the leading members of the INTERPOL
Intellectual Property Crime Action Group, which is a joint industry-law
enforcement group designed to promote and coordinate IPR enforcement
around the world. The IPR Center is now part of the Immigration &
Customs Enforcement. The BICE and BCBP elements involved in the
enforcement of Intellectual Property laws are continuing their
respective duties and operational relationship. The Director of IPR
Center continues to chair the BICE-BCBP IPR Trade Strategy Board
meetings and represents BICE as the leading component of the joint
effort in this area.
Question. Could you provide this Subcommittee with a report
detailing your plans in fiscal year 2004 for the interdiction of
illegal products in the United States and how you would measure success
in this critical area? I would appreciate having such a report within
30 days for the Subcommittee's use in consideration of the fiscal year
2004 budget request of the department.
Answer. BCBP agrees to provide the report.
Question. One example cited of a decrease in emphasis on
intellectual property (IP) enforcement is the cancellation of training
sessions. I am told that several ports of entry including Honolulu,
Buffalo, Cleveland, Champlain (NY), Detroit, Port Huron (MI), St.
Alban's (VT), San Francisco/Oakland, and Minneapolis have cancelled
scheduled IP training sessions. The reason given is that a lack of
resources and new mission priorities make IPR enforcement a non-
essential activity. Are you aware of these cancellations and don't you
believe these sessions remain important to the Department's overall
mission? What figures do you have on the number of training sessions
cancelled this fiscal year? Should such training be centralized through
the Department or left to the individual ports?
Answer. Port directors are free to accept or reject offers of
product identification training offered by parties-in-interest. Given
the fact that antiterrorism is, and must continue to be, our first
priority, field resources have been reallocated to respond to this
threat, leaving fewer resources available for IPR enforcement. In the
case of the vast majority of the ports cited, they have not
historically been major points of entry for IPR violating goods, thus
the need for such training is not critical to these locations.
Question. These same companies indicate that Customs inspectors
familiar with IPR enforcement are being reassigned at alarming rates.
For example, the Port of Newark, New Jersey reportedly had 40
inspectors assigned to conduct IP investigations before the move the
DHS, and now it has one. We have heard that Los Angeles has seen a
similar reduction. Is this true? Have there been actions at other ports
to divert agents from IP inspections to other functions?
Answer. In order to respond to our antiterrorism mission, it has
been necessary to reallocate resources at all locations.
Question. What is the effect of changes in the Threat Advisory
Level to Custom's mission priorities? Has DHS established enforcement
or operations guidelines for the different security levels? What impact
does a change from Code Yellow to Code Orange have on the enforcement
of intellectual property rights?
Answer. When the nation is at Code Orange, all cargo examination
criteria which do not have an antiterrorism, national security, or
public health and safety nexus are suspended.
Question. The Container Security Initiative (CSI) is designed in
part to allow Customs to search more cargo containers, better target
suspect shipments, and still facilitate trade. Will CSI also help in
the detection of other nefarious products such as drugs and counterfeit
merchandise, or is it restricted to protecting against weapons? What
steps are you taking to ensure that programs such as the CSI aren't
used against the United States to facilitate trafficking in illegal
goods that don't pose an immediate threat to the public?
Answer. The twin goals of the BCBP are to increase security and to
facilitate trade. BCBPs obligation to make our borders and our country
safer, includes making sure that legitimate goods continue to enter
efficiently. In order to fulfill our twin goals, we have developed and
implemented many important initiatives designed to carry out both of
those goals effectively.
In a standard CSI in-country team, BCBP officers target with the
host nation cargo containers destined for, or transiting through, the
United States. If during the course of the manifest targeting or
container screening processes the BCBP officer discloses a shipment
containing goods which violate a U.S. law or regulation, the
information is transmitted to our National Targeting Center, the port
of destination, and the appropriate Bureau of Immigration and Customs
Enforcement office for action.
The CSI in-country team pre-screens and inspects commodities prior
to lading in the host nation. Commodities rejected for potential
weapons of mass destruction (WMD) or terrorist contraband will not be
permitted to continue on its course to an U.S. port. Furthermore, that
ship will not be allowed into U.S. territorial waters.
If, on the other hand, a container is targeted for inspection for
commercial reasons, and is not inspected in the foreign port, it will
be inspected when it reaches the intended U.S. port of entry. Under
this scenario, BCBP officers at the U.S. port of entry will initiate
the appropriate enforcement and penalty against the member the chain
supply (carrier, importer).
Question. In an article posted on its website describing Operation
Green Quest, Customs States that one of the many criminal enterprises
used to fund terrorist organizations derive is the sale of counterfeit
merchandise. To what extent has Operation Green Quest investigated or
uncovered the connection between intellectual property theft and
terrorist financing? To the extent that this link has been made,
shouldn't Customs continue to focus on IP enforcement as a means to
foreclose counterfeiting and piracy as a source of funding for
terrorists?
Answer. Operation Green Quest investigations have revealed that a
variety of criminal activities serve as funding sources for various
criminal elements, some of which are alleged to have ties to terrorist
organizations. Among these are violations of laws protecting
intellectual property rights and prohibiting the manufacture,
trafficking and sale of counterfeit merchandise. The Bureau of
Immigration and Customs Enforcement is conducting several on-going
investigations involving the use of proceeds derived from the sale and
trafficking of counterfeit merchandise, alleged to support designated
terrorist organizations. BICE is committed to investigating any
violation of Federal law that may be used to fund criminal enterprises.
______
Question Submitted by Senator Patrick J. Leahy
AIRPORT SCREENERS
Question. I understand the TSA has finished assessing how many
screener positions--full- and part-time--are needed at each airport
around the country and that 6,000 airport security jobs will be trimmed
by the end of this fiscal year. What is the average percentage of cuts
taking place at airports nationwide? And what is the percentage of cuts
you expect at the Burlington International Airport in Vermont? In
addition, did the cuts planned for Burlington take into account that
bomb-detection machines are not yet in place at the airport?
Answer. Nationwide, the percentage reduction of passenger and
baggage screeners is 11 percent. To screen passengers' baggage at BTV,
all baggage screening equipment has been deployed and the screener
workforce at the airport has been hired and fully trained to provide
the proper operation of this equipment. TSA has taken into account
BTV's recent receipt of twelve additional Electronic Trace Detection
machines. TSA is concluding a second round of modeling to determine
final screener staffing numbers for each airport.
SUBCOMMITTEE RECESS
Senator Cochran. Mr. Secretary, we appreciate very much
your cooperation with our subcommittee. We had planned to
continue to review the fiscal year 2004 budget request for the
Department of Homeland Security on Thursday, with witnesses
being the Commissioner of the Bureau of Customs and Border
Protection, the Administrator of the Transportation Security
Administration, and the Director of the Federal Law Enforcement
Training Center, but because of schedule conflicts my intention
now is to try to reschedule that hearing for next week. We will
make an announcement about our next hearing as soon as
possible.
Senator Byrd. Senator, do I understand you, Mr. Chairman,
to say that the Thursday meeting this week may be rescheduled?
Senator Cochran. Yes, sir. We will try to reschedule that
hearing for next week.
Senator Byrd. I'm glad you're doing that, because the Armed
Services Committee is marking up the DOD authorization bill at
the same time Thursday morning that the subcommittee had
planned that hearing.
Senator Cochran. I thank you for advising me of that
conflict. The subcommittee will stand in recess.
[Whereupon, at 11:52 a.m., Tuesday, May 6, the subcommittee
was recessed, to reconvene subject to the call of the Chair.]