[Senate Hearing 108-206]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY APPROPRIATIONS FOR FISCAL YEAR 2004
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THURSDAY, APRIL 10, 2003
U.S. Senate,
Subcommittee of the Committee on Appropriations,
Washington, DC.
The subcommittee met at 2:35 p.m., in room SD-192, Dirksen
Senate Office Building, Hon. Thad Cochran (chairman) presiding.
Present: Senators Cochran, Domenici, Byrd, and Inouye.
DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY
Science and Technology Directorate
STATEMENT OF DR. CHARLES McQUEARY, UNDER SECRETARY
Senator Cochran. The hearing will please come to order.
Today we continue our review of the fiscal year 2004 budget
request for the Department of Homeland Security. We will
consider at this hearing the programs and activities under the
Department's Science and Technology Directorate.
I am pleased to welcome the Under Secretary for Science and
Technology, Dr. Charles E. McQueary.
The Science and Technology Directorate is one of four
directorates that makeup the Department of Homeland Security.
The Homeland Security Act of 2002 transferred certain research
and development functions of the Department of Defense, the
Department of Energy, and the Department of Agriculture to the
Department of Homeland Security. These functions and activities
that have been transferred are now under the jurisdiction of
the Science and Technology Directorate.
For fiscal year 2004, the President's budget requests $803
million for activities of this directorate.
Mr. Secretary, thank you very much for submitting a
prepared statement to the committee which we will print in full
in the committee's hearing record. We invite you to make any
statement and explanation of the budget request which you think
would be helpful to the committee as we review the request for
appropriations.
I am pleased now to yield to my friend from West Virginia,
the distinguished Senator from West Virginia, Mr. Byrd for any
statement he might have.
Senator Byrd. I do not have any opening statement. I will
just reserve my time for questions. Thank you.
Senator Cochran. Thank you. Senator Inouye.
Senator Inouye. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. I just
wanted to come by and congratulate and welcome our new under
secretary. May I request that questions be submitted?
Senator Cochran. Without objection, it is so ordered.
They will be submitted. Mr. Secretary, we hope you will be
able to respond to those questions within a reasonable time.
Senator Inouye. May I be permitted to leave? I have got
some conference matters.
PREPARED STATEMENT
Senator Cochran. Of course, best wishes to you. I also ask
that a statement submitted by Senator Craig be submitted in the
record.
[The statement follows:]
Prepared Statement of Senator Larry Craig
I appreciated meeting with Dr. McQueary prior to his confirmation,
to discuss use of Department of Energy national laboratories to
implement the research agenda of the Department of Homeland Security.
Prior to the creation of the Homeland Security Department, the national
laboratories of the Department of Energy were already investigating
many of these security challenges related to critical infrastructure
protection, detection of dirty bombs, cybersecurity and sensors to
detect chemical and nuclear materials. In my view, the Department of
Homeland Security, through its Directorate for Science and Technology,
should continue and expand this important work but it should not re-
invent the wheel. In addition to saving money, using the Department of
Energy national labs for this research will also serve the purpose of
deploying these technologies into the field, and enabling them to
protect us, sooner rather than later.
Senator Cochran. Mr. Secretary, you may proceed.
STATEMENT OF DR. CHARLES MCQUEARY
Mr. McQueary. Thank you, sir.
Good afternoon Chairman Cochran, Senator Byrd, and Senator
Inouye also, even though he has had to leave.
It is a pleasure for me to be here with you today to
discuss the President's fiscal year 2004 budget request for the
Department of Homeland Security's Science and Technology
Directorate. Secretary Ridge has already testified and provided
the Department's overall fiscal year 2004 budget request and
the role expected of Science and Technology to make the Nation
safer.
It is a great honor and a great responsibility to lead the
science and technology efforts of this Directorate and the
Department to meet the challenges of protecting our homeland
and our way of life.
The most important mission for the Science and Technology
Directorate is to develop and deploy cutting edge technologies
and new capabilities so that the dedicated men and women who
serve to secure our homeland can perform their jobs more
effectively and efficiently and indeed, those men and women are
my customers.
FISCAL YEAR 2004 PLANS AND MISSIONS
Our plans for fiscal year 2004 reflect this relationship
and our desire to provide capability to the field as rapidly as
possible.
Our mission is to conduct, stimulate, and enable research
and development, test and evaluation, and timely transition of
homeland security capabilities to Federal, State and local
operational end users.
The Information and Analysis Infrastructure Protection
Directorate is supported by Science and Technology through our
Threat and Vulnerability, Testing and Assessment and Critical
Infrastructure Portfolios. In addition, the Science and
Technology Directorate will support the mission needs of the
Border and Transportation Security Directorate, the United
States Coast Guard, the United States Secret Service, and the
Emergency Preparedness and Response Directorate through
coordinated and focused research and development programs.
Throughout the initial planning process for the Science and
Technology Directorate we were guided by current and future
threat assessments, our current capability to respond to that
threat, and by the priorities spelled out in the President's
National Strategy for Homeland Security.
SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY DIRECTORATE GOALS
Our goals are several and they are: develop and deploy
state-of-the-art high-performance, low operating cost systems
to prevent the illicit traffic of radiological and nuclear
materials and weapons into the United States; provide state-of-
the-art high-performance, low operating cost systems to rapidly
detect and mitigate the consequences of the release of
biological and chemical agents; provide state-of-the-art high-
performance, low operating cost systems to detect and prevent
illicit high explosives transit into and within the United
States; enhance missions of the Department's operational units
through targeted research, development, test and evaluation and
systems engineering and development; develop and provide
capabilities for protecting cyber and other critical
infrastructures; develop capabilities to prevent technology
surprise by anticipating emerging threats; and finally,
develop, coordinate, and implement technical standards for
chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear (CBRN)
countermeasures.
The threats to our homeland are many. We must constantly
test and assess our threats and vulnerabilities, develop new or
improved capabilities to counter these threats, and mitigate
their effects should an attack occur. Our program must also
enhance the missions of the Department to protect and provide
assistance to civilians in response to natural disasters, law-
enforcement needs, and other activities. We will develop close
partnerships with private industry, academia and government
agencies to focus a national research and development effort
aimed at protecting the homeland. We are requesting $803
million in fiscal year 2004 to conduct our mission. We will
implement our activities through focused portfolios that
support our mission. These portfolios are Biological
Countermeasures; Chemical and High Explosives Countermeasures;
Radiological and Nuclear Countermeasures; Critical
Infrastructure Protection; Threat and Vulnerability Testing and
Assessment; and the standards State and local program.
HOMELAND SECURITY ADVANCED RESEARCH PROJECTS AGENCY
Through the Homeland Security Advanced Research Projects
Agency, our program will explore cutting-edge approaches to
assessing current and emerging threats. It is our estimate that
at least $350 million of the overall request will be carried
out by HSARPA in fiscal year 2004. Our strategy includes
evaluation, prototyping and rapid deployment of available
technologies to the field. To do this, we will establish a
technology clearinghouse in partnership with the Technical
Support Working Group which has performed a similar mission for
the past several years with great success for the Departments
of State and Defense. Through this partnership we will
encourage and support innovative solutions to enhance homeland
security and will engage the private sector in rapid
prototyping of homeland security technologies.
EDUCATIONAL PROGRAMS
A knowledgeable workforce focused on homeland security is
essential to our ability to address advancements in science and
technology. Declining enrollments in specific academic fields
such as radiochemistry is leading to a lack of workers in areas
of science and technology which is important to America's
effort to protect the homeland. Thus, we will establish
fellowship programs at the graduate and post-graduate levels to
encourage research activities in these areas and thus develop
the foundation America needs to sustain our technical advantage
in the war against terrorism. We will also establish University
Centers of Excellence to provide an enduring and focused
resource to the Nation in this effort.
PREPARED STATEMENT
Mr. Chairman, I thank you again for the opportunity to
appear before the Subcommittee. This concludes my prepared
statement and I do thank you for including my more lengthy
remarks in the record.
[The statement follows:]
Prepared Statement of Charles McQueary
Introduction
Good afternoon. Chairman Cochran, Senator Byrd, and distinguished
members of the subcommittee, it is a pleasure to be with you today to
discuss the President's fiscal year 2004 budget request for the
Department of Homeland Security's Science and Technology Directorate.
Secretary Ridge has already testified and provided the Department's
overall fiscal year 2004 budget request and the role expected of
science and technology to make the nation safer. It is a great honor
and a great responsibility to lead the science and technology efforts
of this Directorate and the Department to meet the challenges of
protecting our homeland and our way of life.
The most important mission for the Science and Technology
Directorate is to develop and deploy cutting edge technologies and new
capabilities, so that the dedicated men and women who serve to secure
our homeland can perform their jobs more effectively and efficiently--
they are my customers. Our plans for fiscal year 2004 reflect this
relationship, and our desire to provide capability to the field as
rapidly as is possible.
The threats to our homeland are many. We must constantly monitor
these threats and assess our vulnerabilities to them; develop new or
improved capabilities to counter chemical, biological, radiological,
nuclear, explosive, and cyber threats; and mitigate the effects of
terrorists attacks should they occur. The Science and Technology
Directorate's program must also enhance the conventional missions of
the Department to protect and provide assistance to civilians in
response to natural disasters, law enforcement needs, and other
activities.
Throughout the initial planning process for the S&T Directorate we
have been guided by current threat assessments, our understanding of
capabilities that exist today or that can be expected to appear in the
near term, and, importantly, by the priorities spelled out in the
President's National Strategy for Homeland Security.
Thus, our key specific areas of emphasis are to:
--Develop and deploy state-of-the art, high-performance, low-
operating-cost systems to prevent the illicit traffic of
radiological/nuclear materials and weapons into and within the
United States.
--Provide state-of-the art, high-performance, low-operating-cost
systems to rapidly detect and mitigate the consequences of the
release of biological and chemical agents.
--Provide state-of-the art, high-performance, low-operating-cost
systems to detect and prevent illicit high explosives transit
into and within the United States.
--Enhance missions of all Department operational units through
targeted research, development, test and evaluation (RDT&E),
and systems engineering and development.
--Develop and provide capabilities for protecting cyber and other
critical infrastructures.
--Develop capabilities to prevent technology surprise by anticipating
emerging threats.
--Develop, coordinate and implement technical standards for chemical,
biological, radiological, and nuclear (CBRN) countermeasures.
Research, Development, Test and Evaluation Portfolio
We are requesting $803 million in fiscal year 2004 to provide
applied research, development, demonstrations, and testing of products
and systems that address these key areas of emphasis. The Science and
Technology Directorate will implement its activities through focused
portfolios that address biological, chemical, radiological and nuclear,
and cyber threats; support the research and development needs of the
operational units of the Department; and receive innovative input from
private industry and academia as well as national and Federal
laboratories. In particular, the Homeland Security Advanced Research
Projects Agency (HSARPA) will have an essential role in meeting the
goals and objectives of the Department and the Directorate across the
range of the portfolios. These portfolios and activities are described
as follows:
Biological Countermeasures.--Biological threats come in many forms.
They can be toxins, viruses, or bacteria, distributed by airborne
aerosols, or in food or water supplies, or in the case of contagious
diseases, spread among infected people or animals. Some biological
threats require considerable technical sophistication on the part of
the adversary and others do not. Timely detection and early initiation
of prophylaxis and decontamination is the key to mitigating the
consequences of any biological attack, should it occur. We are
requesting $365 million in fiscal year 2004 to:
Develop and deploy a Biological Warning and Incident
Characterization System (BWIC). BWIC will consist of two major
elements: a nationwide biosurveillance system that looks for early
indicators of the exposure of people, animals and plants to biological
agents; and environmental monitoring networks in selected cities that
can detect the agent directly. This activity will be available as a
pilot in fiscal year 2004.
Continue the National Biodefense Analysis and Countermeasures
Center (NBACC), initiated in fiscal year 2003, as a key component in
implementing the President's National Strategy for Homeland Security.
The NBACC will leverage the expertise of America's cutting-edge medical
and biotechnical infrastructure to focus on the biological agent
threat, including performing risk assessments and determining which
countermeasures require priority research and development. It is an
essential, new approach to integrating national resources for homeland
security, supporting public health, law enforcement, and national
security. The analytical capabilities of the NBACC will be functional
in fiscal year 2004.
Protect our agricultural infrastructure by providing the most rapid
means of detecting infected animals before they exhibit signs of the
disease to contain the original introduction, providing vaccines and/or
therapeutics and a vaccination/therapy program to deter the spread of
the disease, and providing genetic data that can be quickly used to
identify the source, virulence and potential for spread of an
introduced foreign disease.
Chemical Countermeasures.--According to the National Research
Council's Report Making the Nation Safer, ``chemicals continue to be
the weapon of choice for terrorist attacks. They are readily available
and have the potential to inflict significant casualties.'' In fact,
terrorist attacks on civilian populations with chemical warfare agents
have already occurred. In the Aum Shrinrikyo attack on the Tokyo
subway, casualties were limited only because the attackers did not use
an effective agent dispersal method. Similarly, accidental releases of
toxic industrial chemicals have demonstrated that materials relatively
widely available in modern industrial societies can result in large
number of casualties.
Significant work on chemical defense in military situations has
been conducted, focused on battlefield attacks using chemical warfare
agents. However, major gaps exist regarding civilian defense, most
notably in strategies for dealing with the broader spectrum of threats
(e.g. toxic industrial materials); detection systems capable of
continuous monitoring with very low false positive rates; deployed
chemical defense systems; and a robust forensic capability. The
Chemical Countermeasures portfolio is requesting $55 million to address
these shortcomings through a balanced mix of activities: (1) systems
studies will be used to prioritize efforts amongst the many possible
chemical threats and targets; (2) new detection and forensic
technologies will be developed and demonstrated; (3) protective systems
that integrate physical security, ultra-sensitive detection,
information management, and consequence management strategies will be
developed and piloted in selected high value facilities such as
airports and subways; and (4) the Science and Technology Directorate
will work with the Information Analysis and Infrastructure Protection
Directorate to characterize and reduce the vulnerability posed by the
large volumes of toxic industrial materials in use, storage or
transport within this Nation.
High Explosives.--Detection of high explosives and mitigation of
their use has been a prime focus, historically of the Federal Aviation
Administration, and now the Transportation Security Administration
(TSA). The current terrorist threat extends beyond air transport to all
other modes of transportation and to fixed facilities. The Department
of Homeland Security will build on TSA's R&D in this area to develop
and deploy more effective explosives detectors that can address the
broader threats. Development of reliable stand-off detection capability
of large quantities of explosives, especially in vehicles, is
particularly needed. For this purpose $10 million in fiscal year 2004
is requested.
Radiological and Nuclear Countermeasures.--Countering the threat of
radiological or nuclear attack is one of the top priorities of the
Department of Homeland Security and the Science and Technology
Directorate. The Radiological and Nuclear Countermeasures portfolio is
requesting $137 million to address this threat through a comprehensive
systems approach that emphasizes early detection; effective
intervention capabilities at the Federal, State and local levels;
development of mitigation technologies and science-based consequence
management programs for use should an attack occur; and effective
training at all levels of response. Concurrent efforts focused on
deployment, evaluation and improvements to currently available
technologies; a research and development program for advanced
technologies and their continuous insertion into operational use; and
the provision for an enduring science and technology base to address
long-term challenges such as the detection of highly-enriched uranium
and heavily shielded radioactive sources is used to address both
today's threats and those of the future.
Threat and Vulnerability, Testing and Assessment.--The purpose of
the Threat and Vulnerability, Testing and Assessment (TVTA) program is
to create advanced modeling, information and analysis capabilities that
can be used by the organizations in the Department to fulfill their
missions and objectives. One thrust of this program is to develop
advanced computing, information, and assessment capabilities in support
of threat and vulnerability analysis, detection, prevention and
response. This portfolio also conducts extensive research and
development activities in the area of cybersecurity, addressing areas
not currently addressed elsewhere in the Federal Government. An example
of this is developing tools and techniques for assessing and detecting
the insider threat. The TVTA program uses a strategy of multi-year
investments that infuse new capabilities into the DHS mission
directorates on a regular basis based on strategic 5 year road maps. A
spiral development process ensures early use and feedback by intended
users and operators of all technologies developed within the program.
Successively more complete and refined prototypes lead to operational
pilots and fully operational systems for the Department organizations.
$90 million is requested in fiscal year 2004 to support this activity.
Critical Infrastructure Protection.--Our national infrastructure
provides the continual flow of goods and services that are essential to
the defense and economic security of the United States. Many of these
functions are so vital that major disruptions would cause severe
consequences to the behavior and activities of our citizens. Our free
society and the high quality of life that we value depend upon the
reliable operation of the infrastructure. In addition, we must protect
the lives of our citizens (especially whenever they gather in large
numbers) and key assets including many national monuments and icons.
The Critical Infrastructure Protection (CIP) portfolio has three
primary goals: (1) develop, implement, and evolve a rational approach
for prioritizing CIP strategies and resource allocations using
modeling, simulation, and analyses to assess vulnerabilities,
consequences, and risks; (2) propose and evaluate protection,
mitigation, response, and recovery strategies and options; and (3)
provide real-time support to decision makers during crises and
emergencies. $5 million is requested in fiscal year 2004 for this
activity, which also leverages work being done elsewhere in the Federal
Government and the Department of Homeland Security.
Standards/State and Local Program.--Standards should be applied to
all elements of the homeland security infrastructure to ensure a robust
capability to defend against and to respond to any crisis situation--
whether it is the result of terrorism, natural causes, or a
catastrophic accident. Organizing and integrating the efforts of the
government and the private sector will enable the Department of
Homeland Security to develop standards for equipment used for detection
of materials that could be used in a terrorist attack. This will reduce
the probability of a successful terrorist attack on the United States
and facilitate development of a vital and enduring ability to respond
to national emergencies.
The Standards/State & Local Program will provide consistent and
verifiable measures of effectiveness of homeland security related
equipment and systems in terms of basic functionality, appropriateness
and adequacy for the task, interoperability, efficiency, and
sustainability. The Science and Technology Directorate will facilitate
the development of guidelines in conjunction with both users and
developers. The guidelines will encompass user needs and operating
conditions, as well as the capabilities and the limitations of the
technologies. The Standards/State and Local Program will develop, in
collaboration with operational end-users, performance measures, testing
protocols, certification methods, and a reassessment process
appropriate to each threat countermeasure and for the integrated
system. The Standards/State and Local Program will address all elements
of the homeland security mission including equipment, information,
analyses, personnel, and systems. Special emphasis will be placed on
soliciting input from the actual users in the State and local response
communities, and on providing effective methods for communicating
information back to these agencies.
Major program objectives include working with the private sector to
establish a network of homeland security certification laboratories.
This will provide a consistent level of assurance in the effectiveness
of detection and other operational equipment. Consistent standards for
training and certification of personnel will also be developed. The
program will continue to broaden the suite of technical standards for
various forms of equipment and systems and will provide protocols and
standard data collection formats for test and evaluation projects
undertaken by the Science and Technology Directorate. $25 million is
requested in fiscal year 2004 to support this important effort.
Support to Department of Homeland Security Components.--The Science
and Technology Directorate has the responsibility to provide Federal,
State and local operational end-users with the technology and
capabilities to protect the United States homeland from catastrophic
terrorist attacks and enhance their capabilities for conducting their
conventional missions. An essential component of this responsibility is
to coordinate and collaborate with the other components of the
Department to assist and enhance their technical capabilities through
integrated research and development activities. The integration of the
Science and Technology Directorate research and development efforts
with the Information Analysis and Infrastructure Protection Directorate
is specifically described in the Threat and Vulnerability, Testing and
Assessment, and the Critical Infrastructure Protection portfolios. In
addition, the Science and Technology Directorate will support the
mission needs of the Border and Transportation Security Directorate,
the United States Coast Guard, the United States Secret Service and the
Emergency Preparedness and Response Directorate through coordinated and
focused research and development programs. Research and development in
potentially high payoff technologies will be emphasized. $55 million is
requested in fiscal year 2004 for this purpose.
Rapid Prototyping Program.--Significant capabilities exist in
private industry for the rapid development and prototyping of
technologies in support of the homeland security mission. A mechanism
to quickly and easily access the capabilities of private industry will
allow the Department of Homeland Security to more effectively fulfill
its mission requirements.
The Science and Technology Directorate will establish a partnership
with the Technical Support Working Group (TSWG) to provide the
Department with a technology clearinghouse to encourage and support
innovative solutions to enhance homeland security and to engage the
private sector in rapid prototyping of homeland security technologies.
$30 million is requested in fiscal year 2004 to solicit from the
private sector near-term capability that can be rapidly prototyped and
fielded.
Homeland Security Fellowship Programs/University Programs.--
Advancements in science and technology have the potential to change or
increase the threats to our security; these advancements also improve
our ability to thwart these emerging threats. A knowledgeable workforce
focused on homeland security is essential to our ability to address
advancements in science and technology.
The vast scope of the science and technology needed to address
homeland security coupled with declining enrollments in specific areas
such as nuclear science and technology, and radiochemistry are leading
to a lack of qualified applicants for relevant research and
development. This program requests $10 million to support strategic
partnerships with the academic community to provide support for
qualified students and faculty.
Emerging Threats.--Advancements in science and technology have the
potential to change or increase the threats to our security. These
advancements also improve our ability to thwart these emerging threats.
The Emerging Threats program will support the exploration of
innovative, cross-cutting, out-of-the box approaches for anticipating
and responding to new and emerging threats. It will also establish and
support studies and analyses to be conducted by the new Homeland
Security Institute. $22 million is requested in fiscal year 2004 for
this purpose.
The scope of the work to be conducted by this budget is broad but
focused on the areas that improve our capabilities to thwart terrorist
attacks by early detection and identification of the threat, effective
protection and intervention technologies, mitigation of potential
consequences should an attack occur, and a robust forensics and
attribution capability. Our strategy includes early deployment of off-
the-shelf technologies to provide initial defensive capability and
near-term utilization of emerging technologies to counter today's
terrorist threats and the development of new capabilities to thwart
future and emerging threats. A key part of our efforts will be
conducted through the Homeland Security Advanced Research Projects
Agency to engage industry, academia, government, and other sectors in
innovative research and development to meet operational needs. Although
I have described the budget request along product lines, such as
biological and chemical countermeasures, it is our estimate that at
least $350 million of the overall request will be carried out by HSARPA
in fiscal year 2004.
Mr. Chairman and members of the subcommittee, this concludes my
prepared statement. I would be pleased to address any questions.
COOPERATION WITH DHS AND NON-DHS ENTITIES
Senator Cochran. Thank you very much, Mr. Secretary.
While there were certain specific functions transferred to
the Department of Homeland Security over which you now have
jurisdiction or responsibility, there were some that were left
out that are under the overall Department's responsibility,
such as the Coast Guard, the Secret Service and others.
Does that present any kind of challenge administratively
for you, or do you share in the responsibility for working on
science and technology issues with those other parts of the
Department of Homeland Security, even though they are not
directly under your jurisdiction?
Mr. McQueary. Yes, sir, we do share in that responsibility.
In fact, as a part of our organization with in Science and
Technology, we have individuals who have transferred into the
S&T organization from all of those agencies that you mentioned,
to be in our spaces, if you will, to help influence the Science
and Technology portfolio direction that we will take.
So while the organizations that you mentioned do not report
directly to me, we do have oversight responsibility for the
science and technology work done in those organizations. We
have also already established a partnership with the laboratory
directors from all of those agencies that you mentioned so that
we can begin working closely with them. And so far I have been
very pleased to see the great enthusiasm with which the leaders
of the scientific organizations have come together, recognizing
that there is more power in a larger scientific community than
there is in what I would call smaller groups.
Senator Cochran. There are other Federal agencies, too, and
activities of the Federal Government not within the Department
of Homeland Security that have responsibilities for helping to
protect our homeland against terrorist attacks. I think
immediately of the Postal Service and the challenge that they
have in trying to help ensure that we are able to detect any
efforts to transmit through the mail anthrax and other harmful
agents.
To what extent will your office be involved in providing
information, in terms of science and technology, to those other
independent agencies or other departments of Government such as
the U.S. Postal Service?
Mr. McQueary. First of all, it is very important that one
of the first things that we do is understand exactly what is
going on not only within the government but also in private
industry and universities in the areas that relate to homeland
security.
In the specific instance of the Post Office, the Office of
Science and Technology Policy has been working with the Post
Office since we had the anthrax issue right after 9/11. I have
already established a very close relationship with Dr. John
Marberger, who heads up the OSTP organization. So we will have
very close coordination with the work that is being done there.
If we need to have working groups with the Post Office, I would
see no reason why there should be an impediment to doing so.
ROLE OF THE PLUM ISLAND ANIMAL DISEASE CENTER
Senator Cochran. If a terrorist decided to target American
farms and ranches with some effort to carry out a bioterrorism
act, we are limited in what we know about how diseases can be
transmitted and spread. But we are trying, through the
activities of the Plum Island Animal Disease Center which is
now part of the Department of Homeland Security, to understand
how to better fight efforts that would target America's farms
and ranches.
To what extent is your Directorate going to be involved in
helping to map a strategy to effectively quarantine animals or
to prevent the spread of diseases in this kind of situation?
Mr. McQueary. Certainly. As you correctly point out, Plum
Island does transfer into the Department of Homeland Security.
That occurs on the first of June.
We had interactions as the planning process was going
through. I have not personally been to Plum Island yet,
although that is high on my list of things to be done within
the next several days, to get more familiar with Plum Island
and the details thereof.
As I see it, though, they play a very important function,
particularly in helping to protect our country from animal
diseases that could come in inadvertently. And therefore by
doing this, they also put us in a better position to understand
how to protect against those diseases.
CRITERIA FOR DETERMINING CENTERS EXCELLENCE
Senator Cochran. I know that there are probably going to be
a lot of requests from around the country from colleges and
universities to ask you to designate them as ``Centers of
Excellence'' in research in this area. How are you going to
approach that challenge? How are you going to pick and choose
among all the colleges and universities as to who gets to be a
center?
Mr. McQueary. Well, first of all, I am pleased with the
legislation as it came out in giving us the latitude to be able
to work that issue. There are a number of criteria that are
called out in the legislation establishing the Department of
Homeland Security, and certainly that will be an important part
of what we need to examine as we decide what to do.
My opinion, if I might render a professional opinion at
this point, is that it would be very difficult to find a single
university that has the breadth and expertise so that they
could call themselves the very best there is in the country in
all of the expected areas. So my personal preference is to do
an early assessment of where the best work is being done in the
areas of counterterrorism interest, and then choose centers of
excellence based upon that judgment.
And I would certainly expect that we will call upon the
scientific community to help us render that judgment. That will
not be strictly a Department of Homeland Security S&T call by
itself.
Senator Cochran. Senator Byrd.
ADEQUACY OF EXISTING TECHNOLOGIES AND CAPABILITIES
Senator Byrd. Mr. Secretary, the Homeland Security Act
gives you the responsibility to develop a national policy and
strategic plan for identifying priorities, goals, objectives,
and policies for and coordinating the Federal Government
civilian efforts to identify and develop countermeasures to
chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear and other emerging
terrorist threats.
In recent testimony, FBI Director Robert Mueller said his
greatest concern is that our enemies are trying to acquire
dangerous new capabilities with which to harm Americans.
Terrorists worldwide have ready access to information on
chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear weapons via the
Internet.
Mr. Secretary, our agencies have identified new and
existing technological capabilities that can be used today to
help prevent terrorism, but they have not received the budgets
to obtain them. Do you think that our agencies are adequately
equipped and prepared with existing technologies and
capabilities?
Mr. McQueary. Sir, I believe the reason the Science and
Technology Directorate was created as a part of the Department
of Homeland Security was to help improve the overall situation
at our borders and provide added protection. So I think the
answer has to be that the country has decided we are not
adequately protected and we still have work to be done. And I
believe that we are chartered with the responsibility of
leading that effort in concert with the other units that make
up the Homeland Security Department, deciding what needs to be
done and doing it.
I do believe that it is very important that we understand
quickly what kinds of capabilities exist in the country today,
so that we can implement those things that will make a
difference as quickly as we can because speed is important in
the business that we are in.
IDENTIFICATION OF SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY NEEDS
Senator Byrd. Last year Congress appropriated additional
funds to purchase technology and equipment critical to homeland
security but the Administration rejected the funding. This
year, as we continue to operate under a heightened state of
alert, the Administration did not request specific funding for
this technology in the supplemental spending bill.
I speak with respect to technology that has been identified
by the agencies, such as radiation portable monitors and non-
intrusive inspection equipment for the Bureau of Customs and
Border Protection and radiation pagers and isotope identifiers
for Coast Guard officers who board suspect vessels. There were
attempts to add funding to the emergency supplemental a few
days ago that would have provided Homeland Security agencies
with additional technologies and capabilities.
Secretary Ridge and the Attorney General have said that
there was a high-risk of a terrorist attack right now. Are you
working with the various Homeland Security agencies to identify
existing technologies and capabilities that could immediately
be deployed to the men and women securing our homeland?
Mr. McQueary. Yes, sir, that is a significant
responsibility that we have. And indeed, the role that we play
in the Department of Homeland Security is to be the supplier of
technologies to the other agencies and units that make up the
Department of Homeland Security.
I have described this as a customer/supplier model, if you
will, having come from the industrial side of things, in which
they are the customers, as are the people working on the front
lines. And we are to be the suppliers of the technologies that
are needed. And our job is to help evaluate, determine what
should be done and help implement the rapid deployment of those
things that are needed.
Senator Byrd. Could you provide the subcommittee with some
examples?
Mr. McQueary. Examples of things that we are doing?
Senator Byrd. Are you working with the various Homeland
Security agencies to identify existing technologies and
capabilities that could immediately be deployed to the men and
women securing our homeland?
Mr. McQueary. If I may, we have been in existence just
since the first of March. We have a relatively small staff at
this particular point. I take that fully as a responsibility
that we have.
I cannot tell you today specific examples other than there
are radiological detectors at our borders even today and there
are upgrades that are underway in many of those locations. But
has Science and Technology affected those in any great way to
date? The answer would be no, simply because we have not been
in existence nor have we had people.
If you would recall when Homeland Security was formed,
there were no people that transferred into Science and
Technology. So we are building our organization a person at a
time today in order to be able to do the work and accomplish
the responsibilities that the Congress has given us in the
construction of the bill.
Senator Byrd. Since the threat of terrorism is imminent,
should you be focusing on both longer-term development of
technologies and technologies that are currently available so
that the Homeland Security personnel can work more efficiently
and effectively?
Mr. McQueary. Yes, sir. I believe that is very important
that we have a multi-layered strategy in what we do. And in
fact, that indeed is a part of our planning and strategic plan
that we are working on, and that we expect to publish in the
near future. Very important.
If I may, the Homeland Security issue is a very large
systems engineering problem if I may describe it coming from
the background which I do, in which we have large numbers of
inputs and outputs. And the important thing is to understand
how this system needs to work to provide the protection.
From that understanding will come the ability to be able to
determine what we must do in terms of long-range developments,
as well as to be able to use those things that we know already
exist. And there are many companies that have things out there
today, as certainly you alluded to, that maybe, that probably
will be, very beneficial to us as we make this country safer
than what it is today.
MANPAD STRATEGY
Senator Byrd. There has been much talk about the need to
secure our commercial airliners from the threat of shoulder-
fired surface-to-air missiles. Last November it was reported
that Al Qaeda operators fired two shoulder-fired missiles at an
Israeli passenger plane. The cost to purchase these weapons is
roughly $5,000 to $30,000, and over 500,000 are available
worldwide on the black market.
Secretary Ridge announced on Tuesday that the Government
should pay for research and technology to protect commercial
airliners from this type of attack. Has the Secretary discussed
this with you? And if he has, what steps are you taking to
pursue this?
Mr. McQueary. Yes, sir, he has discussed it with us a few
weeks ago. We are aware of the MANPAD strategy you describe. It
is a very serious issue and one in which we have already begun
to participate in a systems engineering analysis to determine
what would be an equitable approach for our private airline
industry.
There has been work. It has gone on in the Department of
Defense, and certainly we would build upon that work. But there
is not a system, as I understand it, that exists today that one
could simply apply onto a commercial airliner with no
additional development work.
Senator Byrd. I want to yield shortly to the Chairman, who
will in turn then call upon Senator Domenici, but let me get
this further question, if I may.
Your budget justification does not include anything
specifically on this issue. TSA has requested $75 million in
research and development to improve current security
technology. Industry estimates that the cost to design and
certify effective countermeasures for different aircraft types
will cost close to $55 million. So can you tell me where the
funding will come from to do this?
Mr. McQueary. Sir, I cannot today. I can tell you that we
have included within the budget the study work that would be
necessary for Science and Technology to provide its technical
judgment on how to approach this problem and that is not a
large expense. In fact, I would estimate that is a $1 million
to $2 million maximum kind of effort for us.
Of course, the major cost would be in the procurement of
such systems and I have not been engaged in the discussion
about how that would be paid for.
Senator Byrd. Thank you.
Senator Cochran. Thank you very much, Senator. Senator
Domenici.
Senator Domenici. Mr. Chairman, I have to chair another
subcommittee, as I think you are aware, but I very much
appreciate the opportunity to ask one question.
COLLABORATION WITH NATIONAL LABORATORIES
First, Dr. McQueary, it is good to see you. You have a very
big job and we look forward to working with you.
As you know, in my State, we have two great national
laboratories. And one of my subcommittees is the subcommittee
that funds all of the national laboratories for the Department
of Energy, some 18 laboratories from Argonne to ones in New
York and up and down the line.
Obviously, I am correct in saying you intend to work with
those laboratories as they have either know-how or technology
that would be helpful to you in implementing your role; is that
correct?
Mr. McQueary. Yes, sir, that is absolutely correct. They
have great talent in those laboratories.
HOMELAND SECURITY ADVANCED RESEARCH PROJECTS AGENCY
Senator Domenici. Homeland Security Advanced Research
Projects Agency is known as, I guess, HSARPA.
Mr. McQueary. HSARPA, some call it. I wish I had been here
sooner to name it something else, but I was not.
Senator Domenici. We will try our best.
As we understand it, the purpose for that is to use it as a
tool to move ideas from the drafting board to the front lines
as quickly as possible. And in so doing, to use your funds so
that you can bring to bear all of the resources of the United
States, including private industry, universities, and the
national laboratories, on an issue or a need in this particular
field; is that correct?
Mr. McQueary. That is absolutely correct, sir.
Senator Domenici. When do you think that that agency is
going to be up and running?
Mr. McQueary. I believe it will be up and running soon. We
have done a lot of planning for it. It will actually be up and
operational around the first of October simply because of the
way the budgets are done.
Senator Domenici. Who do you think will head it up?
Mr. McQueary. I have interviewed many people and I am still
looking for people to do that. I think it is essential that we
get the right kind of technical talent to lead that. And
therefore, I am continuing to look.
Senator Domenici. Do you have any idea how many employees
would be working there and where they might be located, Doctor?
Mr. McQueary. We have not reached that point because that
is an organization whose size will be driven largely by the
number of programs that we have implemented, and so we will
need program managers to run programs, and so the size will be
driven by that.
Senator Domenici. Once again, it is very important that the
way you set it up will permit it to interact with the national
laboratories in the best possible way; is that not correct?
Mr. McQueary. That is absolutely correct.
Senator Domenici. Without that, you are losing a great deal
of talent and capacity that already exists. You do not have to
duplicate that.
Mr. McQueary. And we will not, or we will make every effort
not to duplicate it, I can assure you.
Senator Domenici. I have some additional questions with
reference to how you are going to go about doing that, but I
just wanted to leave you with the further admonition that just
because we have a new problem, we do not have to, in each
instance invent a new agency or a new institution to solve it.
You have a very big job. Part of it is to make things work
and pull things together that are already out there and apply
them to an existing problem. And I am hopeful that in the
months to come, as we bring you here, you will be able to show
us how you have arranged this so that the great strength of our
private sector research and our laboratories is brought to bear
on some of these terrorist issues.
Are you going to give us assurance that that is the
direction that you will be moving?
Mr. McQueary. I can assure you, that is my intent, sir.
Senator Domenici. Thank you very much. Thank you, Mr.
Chairman.
COMPREHENSIVE ENTRY EXIT SYSTEM
Senator Cochran. Thank you, Senator.
Let me ask you another question on the subject of the
Border and Transportation Security Directorate. There is a
project that is being planned, as I understand it, which is
called the Comprehensive Entry Exit System. There is a
legislative requirement that the Entry Exit System be able to
read biometrics, which is the system to use fingerprint
technology, facial recognition technology, or maybe even iris
scan technology, to verify the identity of people traveling
into or even maybe out of the United States.
There have been investments already by the Department of
Justice in improving fingerprint technologies. Do we need to do
the same sort of thing for facial recognition technology and
iris scan technology, in your opinion?
Mr. McQueary. I believe that those two latter areas that
you mentioned are certainly behind fingerprint recognition
systems, though a lot of good work has been done in the
industry and I think that we can draw upon that to make the
decision of what direction we should go in choosing one of the
two latter ones you mentioned as being the added biometric to
be used for the Border Entry Exit System.
BIOMETRIC TECHNOLOGIES
Senator Cochran. Do you plan to use funds that are
appropriated to your Directorate to develop a new generation of
biometric technologies?
Mr. McQueary. Sir, I cannot remember at this point whether
we have included that in this budget or not. If I may answer
the question. The answer is yes. I apologize, I should have
known but it has been a long day and I simply did not remember.
TECHNOLOGY CLEARINGHOUSE
Senator Cochran. We are already beginning to get inquiries
from people around the country who know about the new
department. And those of us who serve on this funding
subcommittee are being contacted and urged to be sure that
their ideas and their suggestions get reviewed. How are you
going to go about reviewing all those requests? You are going
to have more suggestions and more ideas about how to improve
the state of the world in so many different areas. Are you
going to establish a clearinghouse of some kind to review these
things?
Mr. McQueary. Yes, sir.
Senator Cochran. How are you going to deal with that?
Mr. McQueary. As I mentioned in my opening statement, we
have partnered already with the Technical Support Working
Group, which has been in existence for several years. We expect
to issue broad agency announcements indicating what areas of
technology we are interested in in industry. We have a
reprogramming action that has been proposed and if it gets
approved as we proposed it, we then will issue the broad agency
announcements, and industry will be able to see the areas that
we are interested in.
With that being said, what I am asking in people who come
to see me is, do not ask me how can you use my thing in your
solution. I am asking people to help me define what the
solution needs to be. Because this, as I mentioned, is a very
large systems problem. We are going to have some very talented
people. But I can assure you we will not have the talent to be
able to conceive of all the possibilities.
So we need people who come in with ideas to help us think
about how it can be used in a large system context because that
is the problem that we face.
Senator Cochran. Our job is to decide how much money you
need.
Mr. McQueary. Yes sir.
UNIVERSITY-BASED CENTERS
Senator Cochran. Of course, we consider the request that is
submitted by the President, but sometimes, and I am not
suggesting this is true with this Administration, but sometimes
Administration officials submit numbers knowing the Congress is
going to have to increase the number. That just happens. No use
to pretend that it does not.
I wonder about the $15 million that is requested in this
budget, for example, to establish university-based centers and
support strategic partnerships with the academic community.
That sounds like a pretty small amount of money to me.
Mr. McQueary. I do not believe it is so small when you are
just starting out. I think it is important that we have a good
plan in place. I think it is important that we not take a lot
of time to figure out what the plan is.
But I would like to be able to come before you and present
a plan that I know I have studied sufficiently to be able to
say I believe this is the one that can and should be
implemented to accomplish the things that the Congress has
asked us to do in the legislation.
So I am not personally uncomfortable with the amount of
money in that area now, quite frankly.
Senator Cochran. Thank you, very much. Senator Byrd.
DEFENSE DEPARTMENT'S BIOMETRICS INITIATIVE
Senator Byrd. On biometrics, Dr. McQueary, are you aware of
the Defense Department's biometrics initiative?
Mr. McQueary. Sir, I am only aware in a very general sense.
I have not had a scientific review of that, but it is certainly
an important thing for me to do.
Senator Byrd. Do you plan to work with the Defense
Department and other agencies to build on the testing already
done and the lessons already learned?
Mr. McQueary. I would view that we have not done our job
unless we do that. We certainly must do that, because that is
the way we determine how much money really should be spent, by
knowing that we are using what has already been done.
Senator Byrd. The Defense Department has been quite active
in this area, and I hope that you will pursue that opportunity
to build on the testing there.
Mr. McQueary. I assure you we will.
MANPAD STRATEGY
Senator Byrd. If Secretary Ridge believes that there is a
serious threat of a shoulder-launched missile being fired at a
commercial airliner, why did the Administration oppose an
amendment in the Senate a few days ago to provide $55 million
to test existing technologies on commercial aircraft?
Mr. McQueary. Sir, I do not know the answer to the
question, but I can try to find out to respond back to you. But
I do not know.
Senator Byrd. Could you give us a timeline for coming
forward with your recommendations?
Mr. McQueary. I, first of all, have to determine in concert
with Secretary Ridge whether it is appropriate that the Science
and Technology group make that recommendation or whether it
should come out of one of the operational directorates. I
cannot answer the question today but certainly I should be able
to answer it soon. And I can certainly discuss that with
Secretary Ridge and get back to you.
Senator Byrd. Would you supply to the subcommittee an
answer to that question, after you have had that discussion?
Mr. McQueary. Yes sir.
PERFORMANCE MEASURES
Senator Byrd. You are responsible for developing a national
policy and strategic plan for identifying priorities, goals,
objectives, and policies for and coordinating the Federal
Government's civilian efforts to identify and develop
countermeasures to chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear
and other emerging terrorist threats, including annual
measurable objectives and specific targets.
On page 26 of your budget justification, you find these
words: performance measures for the Science and Technology
Directorate have not been established. And yet you are
requesting an $803 million budget, including $242 million or a
43 percent increase over last year.
How is this subcommittee supposed to evaluate your request
if we do not have any performance standards to go by?
Mr. McQueary. I think you should ask us to provide those
performance measures and I agree with that. The response that
we have there is the one we have today but it is not
satisfactory long-term. And we do need to have performance
measures. I agree. I come out of an industry where if you
cannot measure it, you cannot be sure it has been done.
Senator Byrd. Exactly. I would suggest that you do your
best then, Mr. Secretary, to provide the subcommittee with
reliable performance measures during the fiscal year 2004
budget process, so that we can evaluate your $803 million
request.
Mr. McQueary. Yes sir.
Senator Byrd. Congress has appropriated billions of dollars
since 9/11, much of which has gone to the development of
technological capabilities to prevent terrorist attacks. This
subcommittee is going to be working very hard to make sure that
the investment is spent wisely. So please take steps, since you
do not have anything on paper, please take steps to develop
performance measures, as you have indicated you will, so we
will know if the money is appropriately being spent
effectively.
Mr. McQueary. Yes sir.
HOMELAND SECURITY ADVANCED RESEARCH PROJECTS AGENCY
Senator Byrd. I have one other question.
Public Law 107-296, the Homeland Security Act, created the
Homeland Security Advanced Research Projects Agency. The agency
is modeled on the Advanced Research Projects Agency except that
the goal of the agency is to develop technologies that would
benefit homeland security.
In your prepared testimony you estimate that $350 million
of your overall request of $803 million would be carried out by
this new Advanced Research Projects Agency. But the Homeland
Security Agency Act authorizes only $500 million. Why is there
a $150 million gap between your funding requests and the
authorized amount?
Mr. McQueary. Sir, my approach, having come out of the
industrial side, is we are in the business of funding products
and systems, and those products and systems in general will cut
across not only the Homeland Security Advanced Research Project
Agency, but the work that is done in the laboratories.
And so my belief, and a strong belief, is that developing a
budget based upon products and systems is a better way than
doing an organizational budget which would be equivalent to
saying how much are we going to spend in HSARPA? I assume the
$500 million may have been an estimate that someone had and the
$350 million that we have estimated is certainly that. It is an
estimate, because the detailed programs have not been put
together through competitive approaches or through work that is
done in the laboratories.
Senator Byrd. In 1959, Congress approved $485 million for
what was then known as the Advanced Research Projects Agency,
ARPA. This was the first year it received an annual
appropriation.
I do not know what is the matter with my throat today. I am
not smoking any cigars, although I do like them.
Mr. McQueary. Perhaps I could join you in a private moment
then, with one of those.
Senator Byrd. Let us try that. Do you have anything else on
your hip?
I think you would acknowledge that to date research and
development activities in support of homeland security have
been underfunded. In light of that, what do you think an
appropriate funding level for this agency would be?
Mr. McQueary. I missed which agency, sir. For the
Department of Homeland Security?
Senator Byrd. The next question is pertinent. Are you
planning to request a higher level for HSARPA in future years?
Mr. McQueary. Sir, it is premature to say yes or no to
that, because I think it is important that we examine the needs
of the directorates that make up the Department of Homeland
Security, and from that determine what the program should be.
Those needs will be looked at from the standpoint of ``do we
need to be funding work ourselves or do we need to simply be
buying what already exists out in America today?''
And we have to answer that question, and you have every
expectation that we should.
Senator Byrd. Thank you, Mr. Secretary. Thank you, Mr.
Chairman.
Senator Cochran. Thank you, Senator Byrd.
FISCAL YEAR 2003 REPROGRAMMING REQUEST
Mr. Secretary, yesterday we received a request from the
Department of Homeland Security to reprogram fiscal year 2003
appropriations for your Directorate.
Mr. McQueary. Yes.
Senator Cochran. This reprogramming could not have been
anticipated when the budget request we are reviewing today was
composed. Will the request for fiscal year 2004 be changed if
this reprogramming request is approved? Specifically, do you
believe that the balance of funds resulting from a
reprogramming will be sufficient to carry out the biological
research and defense activities for the Fort Detrick Biowarfare
Center for the remainder of this fiscal year?
Mr. McQueary. Yes, I do. In fact, the budget for Fort
Detrick, we explicitly know that that is sufficient for this
year because, as you know, we do not have a lot of the fiscal
year left, and therefore it is not necessary to spend as much.
And that is part of the thinking that went into that.
STANDARDS FOR FIRST RESPONDER EQUIPMENT
Senator Cochran. The detection equipment used by first
responders to alert the public of threats from chemical,
biological, or radiological sources is an important line of
defense for first responders to use to alert the public if a
terrorist attack is taking place or has taken place. There
currently are no standards for much of the equipment that is
being used for the detection of these attacks. Once standards
and technologies are developed, the Homeland Security Act
authorizes the Secretary to create a system for transferring
Homeland Security technologies to Federal, State and local
Governments in the private sector.
Can you tell us if there are standards and criteria being
developed now by the Department for the equipment that will be
used to respond or alert the public to a terrorist attack when
it occurs?
Mr. McQueary. We specifically have a group working on
standards. That group is working in concert with NIST and the
American National Standards Institute because we are not trying
to create standards all by ourselves. We are relying upon work,
very good work, that has been done within the Government
previously.
We have already issued a draft, I believe it is a draft,
for radiation detectors for comment already. So that has been
done and we are actively working on that.
And you will see we have, in the fiscal year 2003
reprogramming action, as well as in the proposed budget for
fiscal year 2004, we have money in there to continue to work
the standards issue. It is a very important issue to help the
local responders be able to save money because now with no
standards they are more or less subjected to whatever happens
to be sold to them and rendering the judgments themselves.
Senator Cochran. Do you intend to take into account the
views and suggestions of the local end-users, such as the first
responders themselves, who have had experience in these
matters, the police, fire, the transit authorities, so that you
can develop the most sophisticated detection devices possible?
Mr. McQueary. Sir, those are the customers for what we do
and the answer is emphatically yes, because that is where we
need to be getting the requirements for what we do, is at the
first responder level. We do have plans in place to be able to
accomplish that, so that we do have their inputs.
Senator Cochran. Will there be any effort by the Department
to provide funding to those in the private sector who are
working on these standards and technologies for devices?
Mr. McQueary. I would view the standards work as being
more--where the opportunity would be is when you have
development of laboratories that would be testing--similar to
Underwriters Laboratories. We certainly do not intend to build
a government laboratory. So anything that we would do would go
to the private sector or the Government, if labs are available
to be able to do that.
Senator Cochran. Or could some of this research be done at
the university centers?
Mr. McQueary. Absolutely. Yes sir.
APPLICATION OF DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE TECHNOLOGIES, EXPERIENCE AND
EXPERTISE TO MEET HOMELAND SECURITY REQUIREMENTS
Senator Cochran. The U.S. military has methods of detecting
chemical attacks, and certainly in the Operation Iraqi Freedom
this is something that has been utilized. But there is a large
difference between the military and the private sector and the
civilian population.
How do you intend to utilize the expertise and the
experience of the Department of Defense in helping develop
technologies for the civilian population and our civilian
agencies that will be called upon to help protect our homeland?
Mr. McQueary. We certainly intend to draw on the enormous
amount of work the Department of Defense has done in this area.
As I would see it, a crucial issue for us, however, is that we
have to have a low false alarm rate. The military is in a
slightly different position. If they have a false alarm and go
to general quarters, they can stand down if they find there was
nothing. Whereas in the civilian population, we cannot afford
to constantly have our people being in an excited state because
alarms were put forth and they turned out to have no merit.
So I see the major effort that we have to accomplish is in
that area of determining, from a technological standpoint, how
we can keep the false alarm rate at a level the country can
live with in the civilian population.
Senator Cochran. I know our staff members have reviewed the
statement that you submitted very carefully. We will probably
be submitting some additional questions to you to fill out our
hearing record to be sure we understand the request you have
submitted, and to be assured that we know enough about it to
make an intelligent decision about the amount of funding you
need for the coming fiscal year.
But we wish you well in this undertaking. This is a very
important responsibility that you have assumed. We appreciate
your service and the good work that the Department officials
are doing to organize this new department, get it running, and
get it off to a good start.
We wish you well.
Mr. McQueary. Thank you very much. I look forward to it and
I look forward to working with this committee and to better
educate you on what we are doing because I think the better off
we all will be. So I look forward to that.
ADDITIONAL COMMITTEE QUESTIONS
Senator Cochran. Senator Byrd, any further comments or
questions?
Senator Byrd. I join with you in your good wishes and I
thank the Secretary and wish him well.
Mr. McQueary. Thank you, sir.
Senator Cochran. Mr. Secretary, we appreciate your
cooperation with our committee. Other Senators may submit
written question, as well, and we ask you to respond to them
within a reasonable time.
[The following questions were not asked at the hearing, but
were submitted to the Department for response subsequent to the
hearing:]
Questions Submitted by Senator Thad Cochran
DEVELOPMENT OF STANDARDS
Question. The detection equipment used by first responders to alert
the public of chemical, biological, or radiological threats is the
front-line of defense for first responders to alert the public if a
terrorist attack took place. As you are aware, there are currently no
standards for much of the equipment that is being used for the
detection of these attacks. Once these standards and technologies are
developed, the Homeland Security Act authorizes the Secretary to create
a system for transferring homeland security technologies to Federal,
State, local governments and the private sector. What standards and
criteria are being developed by the Department of Homeland Security for
the equipment that will detect and respond to any attack that may
occur?
Answer. The need for standards and criteria for equipment being
developed by the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) was recognized
during the initial stages of developing the Science and Technology
(S&T) Directorate's long-range strategy. During the transition phase,
the need for standards to address design, procurement, deployment, and
use of the radiological and biological detectors was determined to be a
key need. In collaboration with the National Institute of Standards and
Technology (NIST), the American National Standards Institute (ANSI) and
the Institute of Electrical and Electronic Engineers (IEEE), the DHS
S&T transition team began development of standards for four high-
priority classes of radiation detection equipment. The four classes are
personal dosimeters (``pagers''), alarming hand-held detectors, hand-
held isotope identifiers, and radiation portals. These standards have
been released in draft form and will soon go to ballot, in accordance
with ANSI process requirements for national consensus standards. A
contract to develop a standard test method for hand-held bulk anthrax
immunoassay kits is being prepared.
Work is also progressing in the areas of training standards and
personnel certification. Additional standards needs for both detection
and response are being identified as part of a systematic evaluation of
capabilities versus needs for standards to support the homeland
security mission related equipment, operators, models and analyses,
data and information, and integrated systems.
Question. How will the Department take into account the needs of
the local end-user, such as the police or the mass transit authorities,
to develop the most sophisticated detection devices? Does the
Department intend on providing any pilot or seed money to involve the
private sector in working on these sets of standards? What are the
complexities in establishing such a system, and how would you
characterize your progress so far in meeting this responsibility?
Answer. The needs of the local end-user community are a key part of
the DHS S&T standards development process. The very first step in our
process includes input from users to help determine performance
guidelines. The actual development of performance measures, facilitated
by standards experts, represents a balance among three drivers. The
user is engaged to provide guidance on operating conditions, procedures
and functionality. Analysts who help define the threats provide
information on the problem to be solved by detection devices. Finally,
developers who understand governing scientific principles and the
relative sophistication of the equipment provide information on the
technical capabilities and limitations of the detectors. Reassessment
of the standards based on lessons learned and equipment evolution is
also an integral part of the planned process.
The actual mechanism for engaging the user community--which
includes State, local, and Federal Government end-users--varies. For
the standards currently in development, the users have been engaged
through established organizations that represent a wide range of users.
One example is the Interagency Board for Equipment Standardization and
Interoperability (IAB). The State Homeland Security Advisors are also
anticipated to be key resources for providing the right staff for input
to the process. We expect that these groups and other technical
organizations will provide a nucleus around which a capability will be
built to obtain State and local responder participation in future
standard development efforts and to provide information about how
specific technologies conform with standards for procurement purposes.
Organizations throughout the Department work with representatives of
these entities and other key end users on a day-to-day basis, and we
will leverage user input and feedback through these relationships.
The private sector has already been involved in the process of
developing voluntary consensus standards. Manufacturers, academics, and
professional societies have been strongly represented in the groups
that have already been activated. The traditional method for producing
standards involves volunteers to lead and staff the writing groups.
Some funding has been set aside to support the writing committee
chairs. Funds have also been planned to help support the ANSI Homeland
Security Standards Panel that will aid in cataloging and coordinating
standards development with the professional societies that are the
traditional source for United States' national voluntary consensus
standards.
In terms of the complexity in establishing a system that addresses
standards relevant to DHS, the development of a suite of standards is a
significant undertaking. The interrelated nature of the homeland
security defensive system for emergency response--plus the need to
ensure that the emergency system is interoperable and integrated with
the existing infrastructure also adds to complexity. Incorporating the
requirements of Federal, State, and local responders into a coherent
and flexible system is essential but creates a very large-scale problem
set. Finally, we are dealing with both a rapidly evolving threat and
with constantly evolving technologies. Therefore, there is a crucial
need to ensure flexibility in the standards that are developed or they
will quickly become unusable, and an obstacle to the deployment of next
generation technologies.
We would characterize our progress to date as satisfactory. The
process for developing standards traditionally takes a minimum of 18
months and some standards have taken up to 15 or more years to develop.
The proposed radiation detection standards have been developed in about
6 months--and the rollout of the draft occurred less than a month after
the Department became operational. Our future efforts will continue to
use the ANSI existing standards development organizations and their
memberships to expedite development and adoption of relevant standards.
We also will provide funding to support what were heretofore strictly
volunteer efforts, to expedite writing of critical standards for
homeland security. We will champion the inclusion of users in all major
stages of standards development--including the formulation of
operational test protocols. We will also encourage the use of automated
tools and web-based review and tracking to streamline the process. The
assets provided by ANSI will be leveraged to build on existing
standards and standard development expertise to fill the gaps and needs
in our current system of standards.
CONCERNS FOR RURAL AREAS
Question. While there is concern about the Nation's largest urban
areas being vulnerable to terrorist attacks there should also be equal
concern about the Nation's rural areas. Much of the Nation's critical
infrastructure such as bridges, highways, railroads, electric power
lines, pipelines, and drinking water reservoirs and dams are located in
rural America. Advances that have been made in information technology
and the internet should make the task of securing the homeland easier
and more cost effective by putting this technology to work in rural
America to protect these critical infrastructures.
(a) Does the threat and vulnerability, testing and assessment
program include funding for technologies and systems which meet the
threats that may arise in rural America?
(b) Can you elaborate on the proposed formation and activation of
the advanced research and development center that will include advanced
technology support to the Department?
Answer. (a) The Threat and Vulnerability, Testing and Analysis
(TVTA) program's planned activities address the needs of rural regions
in several ways. We are developing advanced information systems, tools
and sensors in order to better detect possible terrorist intentions,
and to help analysts map threats to specific targets including rural
reservoirs, power generation plants, and agriculture. Many of these
tools will be designed to be usable by local officials to aid in
regional efforts to combat terrorism. The cost of deploying new sensor
technologies in remote areas has often been high due to communication
infrastructure needs. To enable a lower cost, rapidly deployable
alternative, we are planning a demonstration of new capabilities to
link sensors to central monitoring stations using existing Federal and
private communications infrastructures. New portable technologies to
detect threats, such as improved radiation and biological agent
detectors, are being developed by the S&T Directorate. Sensors alone
cannot solve the problems associated with potential terrorist threats.
Looking beyond sensor technology, we will develop models of the
behavior and motivations of terrorist organizations to better
understand the conditions that may lead to a rural attack.
(b) It is the S&T Directorate's role to support the needs and
requirements of the Department of Homeland Security. The Science and
Technology Directorate carries the responsibility for ensuring that the
necessary research, development, test and evaluation (RDT&E) activities
are carried out to support the Information Analysis and Infrastructure
Protection (IAIP) mission in cybersecurity. To satisfy this mission as
it relates to cybersecurity, it is our intention to create a RDT&E
center for the Department's cybersecurity needs.
The DHS Cybersecurity Center will team through partnership and
cooperation with NSF and NIST. This center will be available to us
through the academic community--including partners from industry, the
national labs and other government programs. We see this as critical--
to combine all resources and efforts across the government R&D
community to accelerate the technical solutions towards this issue.
The Center will have five primary roles or functions, as follows:
--Provide communication and coordination among various public and
private organizations dealing with the many diverse aspects of
cybersecurity. The Center will foster national and
international cooperation in creating a robust and defensible
cyber infrastructure.
--Support the operational needs of the IAIP Directorate relative to
vulnerability assessments and new tools and methods for
enhancing cybersecurity. Through public-private interactions,
this center will also facilitate the implementation of
security-enhancing tools and methods by government and private
agencies.
--Direct Support to IAIP: in addition to responding to DHS RDT&E
needs, the center may be asked to provide on-call technical
expert capabilities in support of emergency response for rapid
vulnerability mitigation in response to cyber threats.
--The center will further identify and then implement RDT&E programs
to address specific gaps in the R&D community. A unique feature
of the DHS Center will be the utilization of existing or the
development of test beds where new cybersecurity methods,
tools, and approaches can be exercised in a controlled
environment and evaluated against common, accepted standards.
Developing the test beds and measurement-performance standards
will be an element of the center's program.
--In order to have the necessary human resources who possess the
requisite knowledge and skills to advance and secure the
nation's cyber infrastructure, the center will foster
educational programs and curriculum development. This will be
done in conjunction with participating universities who can
serve as a nucleus for developing and disseminating new
materials to have the broadest possible benefit to the nation
and the upcoming stream of scientists and engineers.
DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES COORDINATION
Question. The Homeland Security Act authorizes Secretary Ridge to
set research and development priorities for anti-terrorist
countermeasures, but it also gives authority to the Secretary of Health
and Human Services to set priorities in civilian human health-related
terrorism countermeasures.
Have you entered into discussions with the Department of Health and
Human Services to establish priorities for basic and applied biodefense
research?
Answer. Yes. In compliance with Homeland Security Act of 2002,
Public Law 107-296, Section 302(2), the Department of Homeland Security
(DHS) and the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) are working
together on biodefense research priorities. During the transition
period leading to establishment of the DHS, the HHS provided an
individual to the Homeland Security Transition Planning Office.
Subsequently, several steps were taken to formalize a continuing
interaction. An interagency coordinating committee, co-chaired by The
Executive Office of the President's National Science and Technology
Council (NSTC), the Homeland Security Council (HSC) and the Office of
Management and Budget (OMB), has been established as the vehicle for
coordinating and prioritizing the national bio-defense research,
development, test and evaluation agenda. A Memorandum of Understanding
(MOU) between the Department of Health and Human Services and the
Department of Homeland Security has been established to enable closer
coordination on issues that are specific to DHS and HHS.
Question. How do you propose to cooperate with the Department of
Health and Human Services to set priorities and resolve conflicts?
Answer. Two key steps are being taken to formalize our cooperation
with the Department of Health and Human Services in setting priorities
and resolving conflicts. First, an interagency coordinating committee,
co-chaired by The Executive Office of the President's National Science
and Technology Council (NSTC), the Homeland Security Council (HSC) and
the Office of Management and Budget (OMB), has been established as the
vehicle for coordinating and prioritizing the national bio-defense
research, development, test and evaluation agenda. This Chemical,
Biological, Radiological and Nuclear Research Coordinating Committee
(CBRN-RCC) will be the primary vehicle for coordinating and
prioritizing the multi-agency annual bio-countermeasures research
agenda and portfolio and will be responsible for planning for specific
R&D efforts in bio-countermeasures. Second, the Memorandum of
Understanding (MOU) established between the Department of Health and
Human Services and the Department of Homeland enables closer
coordination on issues that are specific to DHS and HHS.
HOMELAND SECURITY ADVANCED RESEARCH PROJECTS AGENCY (HSARPA)
Question. The newly created Homeland Security Advanced Research
Projects Agency (HSARPA) was patterned after the Department of
Defense's (DoD) Advanced Research projects Agency and intends to speed
up the development of technologies that would address homeland security
vulnerabilities. There is concern whether the $350 million requested
can be effectively and efficiently used and whether the Department of
Defense's Advanced Research projects Agency is applicable for homeland
security research and development.
What is your schedule for creating this agency, do you intend to
staff it with existing personnel or new personnel, and when do you
expect it will begin operations?
Answer. HSARPA will be operational no later than June 1, 2003. At
that time it will have few dedicated staff, and will be operated by
personnel from S&T headquarters in a ``dual-hatted'' mode. HSARPA will
be staffed with new personnel.
Question. What are the major tasks that must be accomplished to
create this agency, and what do you consider to be the most difficult
challenges you will face its creation?
Answer. Key tasks are staffing, and developing the contracting
processes needed to access the private sector. Staffing HSARPA with
people of the highest quality, and with knowledge and skills at the
cutting edge of technology, represents the most difficult challenge in
setting up the Agency.
Question. Of the $350 million requested for this new entity in how
much of these funds include efforts funded elsewhere in the Department
or by other agencies in fiscal year 2003 and prior years and how much
represents funding for new activities?
Answer. All of the efforts contemplated for HSARPA in fiscal year
2004 are either new starts in fiscal year 2004, or continuations of
activities started within DHS (S&T) in fiscal year 2003.
Question. How much of the $803 million requested for the Science
and Technology Directorate in fiscal year 2004 continues ongoing
programs, and how much funds new research and development activities?
How much of these funds goes for actual technology and systems
development and how much for more generic basic and applied research?
Answer. $400 million of the $803 million represents new activities.
The remainder are continuations or enhancements to activities initiated
in fiscal year 2003. How much of the funds will go for actual
technology development versus basic and applied research is difficult
to answer at this time; DHS does not break down its RDT&E efforts into
6.1-6.4 categories like DOD. It is safe to say, however, that our
initial focus will not be in basic research (6.1), but rather 6.2-6.3
(to use DOD categories). There are exceptions, however. Some of the
cyberforensics efforts will be 6.1 in nature, as will our efforts in
the social sciences (such as behavioral or autonomic indicators of
hostile intent, or efforts to develop an understanding to peoples'
reactions to threat warnings).
Question. The largest component of these funds is $365 million for
Biological Countermeasures, much of which may be executed through the
less than 1-year old National Biodefense Analysis and Countermeasures
Center that transferred from DOD. How much of these funds are for new
activities, and how much for efforts less than 1 year old that have
transferred from DOD?
Answer. Of the $365 million in the fiscal year 2004 Biological
Countermeasures budget, approximately $180 million is for the National
Biodefense Analysis and Countermeasures Center (NBACC). Of that $180
million, $90 million is for continuation of activities begun in fiscal
year 2003 to address recognized deficiencies in the nation's
preparation and response to bioterrorism. The remaining $90 million is
for initiation of construction of the NBACC facility that is a
continuation of the $5 million fiscal year 2003 investment in
construction planning and design. These are activities over and above
existing Department of Defense programs, the need for which was
recognized by both the then Office of Homeland Security and the
Department of Defense in their original request for NBACC. The Homeland
Security Act of 2002 transferred these responsibilities to the new
Department of Homeland Security.
Question. How much of these funds are for continuing older
activities at DOD?
Answer. None of the requested NBACC funding is for continuing older
activities at the DOD. The NBACC appropriations and programs were
initiated in fiscal year 2003 to address recognized deficiencies in the
nation's preparation and response to bioterrorism. These are activities
over and above existing Department of Defense programs, the need for
which was recognized by both the then Office of Homeland Security and
the Department of Defense in their original request for NBACC.
Question. Do you intend to alter any of the research priorities
established by DOD for these programs?
Answer. There is no intent to alter the vision or research
priorities of the National Biodefense Analysis and Countermeasures
Center (NBACC) program identified by the Department of Defense (DOD).
The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) supports the NBACC research
priorities originally established by the DOD, and now supported by DHS.
The NBACC program includes addressing the issues of characterization of
these biological threats. Highest priority is given to this risk and
vulnerability analysis, which identifies the nature of newly emerging
threats and potential countermeasures to mitigate these threats. This
information and data will comprise a net assessment and will be used to
provide a scientific foundation to comply with the provisions of Public
Law 107-296, Section 302(2). The NBACC will operate in a hub and spoke
laboratory model, with the majority of the funds distributed to high
value facilities in academia, industry and the national laboratory
system. Four centers are being established in fiscal year 2003, each
setting research priorities, and each partnered with a principal
Federal agency. The Bioforensics Center, as an example, is partnered
principally with the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) to develop
an unimpeachable program for analysis and attribution studies of
biological materials obtained from legal casework or foreign materials
identified as potential bio-terrorist or biological warfare threats.
Question. The submitted statement indicates that the $137 million
sought for Radiological and Nuclear Countermeasures will, in part, fund
concurrent efforts to deploy, evaluate, and improve currently available
technologies and R&D on advanced technologies.
Concurrent efforts usually require a certain level of maturity in
the underlying technologies before they can deployed successfully. What
technologies in this area do you think will be mature enough to support
this type of development in fiscal year 2004?
Answer. Nuclear material portal monitors, hand-held search and
isotope identification equipment, personal dosimetry devices, and
imaging systems are commercially available. Immediate limited
deployment in fiscal year 2004 of this equipment in varied operational
and environmental contexts will meet three objectives: getting
available nuclear detection equipment into the field at key locations,
focusing research and development by more thorough elucidation of
technical limitations and operational issues and constraints of
existing commercially available equipment, and establishing field test-
beds for rapid testing and evaluation of prototype equipment as it
becomes available. This three-pronged approach is important for
assuring that the right research and development projects are pursued
and that the products can be quickly and effectively implemented into
the countermeasure system that meet end-user needs.
Question. Within the limits of unclassified information, what are
the most promising advanced technologies that you will be developing in
the Radiological and Nuclear Countermeasures area?
Answer. The existing nuclear technology base was developed for
applications including nuclear materials safeguards, environmental
monitoring and clean-up, and nuclear facility decommissioning and
demolition. This technology base is an important starting point for
advanced technology research and development initiatives that address
current and future nuclear and radiological threats. These initiatives
include technologies for passive detection and discrimination of
radiological and nuclear materials that will benefit multiple DHS
missions. Specific passive detection thrust areas include room
temperature detector technologies, imaging systems, low-cost detector
concepts, and mobile detection systems. Active interrogation
technologies will also be developed to address critical gaps in our
current capabilities (e.g. detection of highly enriched uranium and
shielded nuclear and radiological material). Concepts in this area
include gamma-induced fission systems and neutron interrogation
systems. New capabilities to search for and neutralize threats are
needed and will be pursued; specific areas include broad area search
and characterization, information analysis and assessment, and render
safe technologies. Development efforts to provide rapid detection,
triage and decontamination technologies will address identified
consequence management and recovery technology gaps.
Question. The submitted statement discusses plans for ``continuous
insertion (of these advanced technologies) into operational use.'' A
major challenge for research and development activities is the actual
transition of technologies into fielded systems. Incomplete, delayed,
or unsuccessful transition is not uncommon, at least in Defense
Department advanced technology programs.
What specific steps will you take to minimize the problems usually
associated with transitioning advanced technologies into operational
use?
Answer. Technology transition is a key goal for the DHS S&T
Directorate. We are taking a multilayered approach. First, we involve
the user community at the outset of any project we undertake in order
to develop program goals. As the program matures, the user community
will also contribute to the development of system requirements and
operational concepts. Second, we will engage in demonstrations
periodically through the development process to generate feedback from
the user and reduce technical risk. Finally, HSARPA will engage, where
appropriate, in pilot deployments of the technology, where operators
use the equipment in an operational setting while DHS S&T provides
technical support and funds the operations and support costs. This
pilot deployment concept reduces operational risks to the user,
provides insight for product improvement, and allows the user to budget
for system procurement and support costs at an appropriate level of
maturity.
Question. In providing support for other DHS components, such as
the Coast Guard and Border and Transportation Security Directorate, you
stated says ``research and development in potentially high payoff
technologies will be emphasized.''
What potentially high payoff technologies exist in this area, and
how do they differ from those already being developed by R&D funds
sought in separate R&D budget requests in some of these components,
such as TSA and the Coast Guard?
Answer. The purpose of DHS S&T is to ensure alignment with the
National Strategy and implement an overall DHS/S&T strategy. The DHS
S&T strategy includes coordinating and incorporating the strategies of
individual components such as TSA and Coast Guard to ensure our efforts
are leveraged to the maximum extent possible.
From the Coast Guard's perspective, the greatest opportunities with
S&T funding lie in developing technologies for the detection of threats
in the chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear (CBRN) domain.
The tools developed by S&T's investments will have significant
applicability for the U.S. Coast Guard in the maritime environment. The
Coast Guard is positioned in this effort to work with S&T to help
integrate various types of sensors to improve overall capability,
including portability, and to identify capability gaps in detection
where technology offers opportunities. The support and collaboration
DHS S&T provides will accelerate the development and deployment of
these critical CBRN detection technologies and capabilities; clearly
the CG enjoys a complimentary relationship with DHS S&T in this
endeavor.
Another high payoff technology example is Unmanned Aerial vehicles
(UAVs) for both Border and Transportation Security as well as Coast
Guard applications. DHS S&T is investigating whether implementing UAVs
could strengthen security along the borders and ports as well as
monitoring the safety and integrity of critical infrastructures.
Additionally, as part of the Integrated Deepwater System, the Coast
Guard plans to utilize UAVs.
High payoff technologies to detect and counter biological,
chemical, and radiological and nuclear threats and attacks will benefit
multiple components of DHS.
Question. DHS statements about its R&D activities frequently refer
to rapid prototyping, and $30 million of the $803 million requested is
``to solicit from the private sector near-term capability that can be
rapidly prototyped and fielded.''
Is this $30 million the only funding for rapid prototyping efforts,
and what are the key technologies and capabilities that you believe are
ready for rapid prototyping?
Answer. The $30 million is intended to solicit from industry near-
term technologies that may be available for rapid prototyping in
priority areas in homeland security. Our expectation is that this will
be sufficient funding for that purpose. Areas of interest where we
expect substantive responses include personal decontamination
technologies; protective gear; remediation technologies; sensors;
cybersecurity capabilities; public training and outreach tools; and
forensics.
Question. The private sector is naturally optimistic about the
readiness of its technologies for rapid prototyping. What factors will
you evaluate to assess whether rapid prototyping potential is real or
overstated?
Answer. We will rely heavily on evaluating the technology on its
scientific and engineering merits; the maturity of same; operational
suitability (in terms of false alarm and miss probabilities,
throughput, training, reliability, and support costs); and
manufacturability.
Question. What are the principal components of the $803 million
request that comprise the $350 million intended for the new Homeland
Security Advanced Research Projects Agency?
Answer. The research activities that we will conduct in HSARPA cut
across the priorities for DHS S&T. Thus, the research activities
planned include:
--Biological Countermeasures.--This includes remediation
technologies, and development of the next generation of
environmental sensors.
--Chemical Countermeasures.--This includes remediation technologies
and development of facilities monitoring and response systems.
--High Explosives Countermeasures.--Included here are activities
designed to detect at range large quantities of high explosives
(i.e. truck bombs).
--Radiological and Nuclear Countermeasures.--Included here are new
concepts for actively probing for the presence of fissile
material, and for taking advantage of long residence times in
ship containers to passively detect fissile material.
--Critical Infrastructure Protection.--Included here is reaching out
to the academic community to develop and test methodologies for
systematically revealing interdependencies among
infrastructures.
--Support to DHS Components.--Included here are activities supporting
conventional missions of the Department, such as advanced
biometrics, and advanced techniques for monitoring the border.
--Rapid Prototyping Program.--Organizationally, the technology
clearinghouse is managed under HSARPA. Thus, the TSWG BAA, and
rapid prototyping activities occur here.
--IT Infrastructure.--Included here is developing advanced scalable
techniques for organizing extant disparate databases and
conducting queries of same efficiently.
______
Questions Submitted by Senator Ted Stevens
SAFETY Act
Question. The purpose of the SAFETY Act provisions (at Subtitle G--
Sections 861-865) in the Homeland Security Act was to encourage
immediate deployment of existing anti-terrorism technologies--
especially for high risk potential targets. However, nothing has yet
been done to implement the SAFETY Act. We understand that OMB has
drafted implementing regulations that are awaiting review at the
Department of Homeland Security.
When will these regulations be issued?
Answer. It is not possible at this time to identify a specific date
on which these regulations will be issued. The regulations to implement
the SAFETY Act are a high priority and are presently under review at
DHS. DHS is working with the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) to
finalize an initial set of SAFETY Act regulations. We expect to publish
these regulations for comment very shortly. Following the public
comment period, the regulations will be finalized and issued.
Question. Will they be effective immediately?
Answer. The point at which the regulations will become effective
following their finalization is also under discussion.
Question. How does DHS plan to staff implementation of the SAFETY
Act so that technologies can be qualified quickly?
Answer. DHS has researched using a combination of private and
public sector certification efforts to help understand the likely
needs--in terms of process, facilities, and staff. DHS will reach out
to the private sector to staff and perform specific tasks in the
process. DHS will also leverage current USG assets and processes to the
extent possible to proceed quickly with SAFETY Act implementation.
Question. In order to avoid the delay associated with a lengthy
rulemaking and qualification process, will DHS consider an emergency
qualification process that at least lets the top10 high risk sites get
technology in place?
Answer. There are plans for both an immediate implementation path,
as well as for a longer-term ``ideal state'' process that would
implement the SAFETY Act. The technologies that will be considered in
both types of processes will focus on those technologies and systems
that have been demonstrated to make the largest contribution to risk
reduction for the homeland security defensive system--and that meet the
criteria contained in Subtitle G. Each geographical site and type of
facility will have different types of vulnerabilities. They will also
have different probabilities for attack and different means of attack
will have different consequences. Understanding the contribution of a
specific technology on the total system must include consideration of
the synergies and the respective degree of impact on overall risk.
Question. What steps can DHS take right away to qualify key
technologies for high priority sites?
Answer. An expedited process for consideration of high profile,
high-consequence technologies is being developed. The technologies must
meet the criteria of Subtitle G. They must also be assessed to be
effective with respect to significant reduction of overall system
vulnerability and adequate information and data must be available to
allow DHS to address the effectiveness and adequacy of the technology
in the system context.
Question. Is it correct that DHS has several pending applications
for qualification?
Answer. DHS does not have an application process in place. The
process will be contingent upon issuance of regulations. Public
notification of the application process and of the select categories of
technologies that will be considered for certification will be made
through the DHS website after regulations are issued.
Question. Does DHS have a list of high priority sites and their
needs?
Answer. DHS has been considering overall system vulnerabilities and
methods to assess gaps and needs. Many methods have been used to
develop this understanding, and much of this knowledge has been derived
from studies done by other USG agencies that had homeland security
responsibilities prior to March 1, 2003. This process will become
increasingly more rigorous as a more complete suite of tools is
developed and implemented. Thus, we expect our assessment of high
priority aspects of the system to evolve in response to both increased
understanding and with changing conditions.
Question. If not, what can be done to get that information rapidly
before DHS?
Answer. The question of specific sites versus system vulnerability
is answered above.
Question. What else can we do to reduce delay in making this
technology available?
Answer. It is critical that, both in the initial stages of SAFETY
Act implementation as well as in the future when the process has
reached its ideal state, that only the most important technologies, in
terms providing major risk reduction, are considered for certification.
The system will quickly become overloaded and extremely burdensome if
every conceivable technology must be reviewed or evaluated.
Question. Can you report back to us within a week as to how an
emergency process might begin?
Answer. Until DHS and OMB have completed their review and have
issued guidance for the actual implementation of the SAFETY Act, it
would be premature to discuss an emergency process. However, much
thought and research is going into this topic so that the Department
will be prepared to move out quickly after issuance of the guidance.
______
Questions Submitted by Senator Mitch McConnell
Question. Would you please describe the process that the
Department, or more specifically, the Science and Technology
Directorate, will use in soliciting and evaluating research proposals
so as to ensure that the highest quality proposals receive funding?
Answer. In all cases the Department will rely on review by experts
in the field. In addition, for directed (e.g. applied) research,
selection criteria will also include responsiveness to the programs
needs, schedule and cost realism, and key personnel.
Question. Would you please describe what proportion of the Science
and Technology efforts of DHS will focus on basic research and what
proportion will focus on application of new technology?
Answer. This question is difficult to answer at this time; DHS does
not break down its RDT&E efforts into 6.1-6.4 categories like DOD. It
is safe to say, however, that our initial focus will not be in basic
research (6.1), but rather 6.2-6.3 (to use DOD categories). There are
exceptions, however. Some of the cyberforensics efforts will be 6.1 in
nature, as will our efforts in the social sciences (such as behavioral
or autonomic indicators of hostile intent, or efforts to develop an
understanding to peoples' reactions to threat warnings).
Question. Presumably, universities and private sector industries
will conduct much of this research. What proportion of total research
funding will be provided to universities and what proportion will be
provided to the private sector?
Answer. At this time, no requests for proposals for the work have
been issued or proposals received. We will award funds based on
technical merits, responsiveness to program needs, schedule and cost
realism, and other metrics as appropriate. However, some funds will be
applied to university centers of excellence, and to graduate and
postdoctoral research efforts in support of homeland security. The
President's budget request includes $10 million for these latter
activities.
Question. In your testimony you mentioned that you are requesting
``$10 million to support strategic partnerships with the academic
community to provide support for qualified students and faculty.'' I
believe other Federal agencies that fund research also fund graduate
fellowship or traineeship programs. Will the Department, or more
specifically, the Science and Technology Directorate, fund graduate
fellowships or traineeships? If so, would you please describe in
general terms how that funding program will operate?
Answer. The S&T Directorate is committed to building a cadre of
dedicated scientists and engineers who will pursue careers in homeland
security related disciplines and who will, in turn, encourage the next
generation of experts to follow in their footsteps. To that end, we are
working with national organizations such as the American Association of
Universities, American Association for the Advancement of Science, the
National Academy of Sciences, and the National Science Foundation to
develop mechanisms that maximize our ability to tap the wealth of
talent at the nation's universities and colleges to pursue disciplines
related to the diverse portfolio of homeland security programs. A key
element of this effort will be the establishment of the Homeland
Security Scholarship and Fellowship Program. Our goal is to make this a
premier program--on par with those of NIH, NRC, NASA and others--that
encourages outstanding students and faculty to work in homeland
security related fields. The key to making this program a success will
be the engagement of university and college faculty and administration
throughout the process. In fiscal year 2004 we will model the execution
of this program on the fellowship/scholarship programs sponsored by the
National Science Foundation.
______
Questions Submitted by Senator Richard Shelby
Question. What is the Directorate doing to develop a national
structure for science and technology analysis and development?
Answer. Section 302(2) of the Homeland Security Act requires the
development of a national strategy and policy for homeland security
research, development, test and evaluation (RDT&E). In fiscal year
2003, DHS S&T is committing $10 million to develop this strategy, which
includes efforts to catalog Federal efforts in this area, and, working
with the Information Analysis and Infrastructure Protection
Directorate, conducting threat analysis and vulnerability assessments
to assist in prioritizing the national effort.
Question. Alabama, and specifically the Huntsville metropolitan
area, offer a unique opportunity for the Department of Homeland
Security's Science and Technology Directorate. The Huntsville area
maintains one of the highest, if not the highest, number of PhD's per
capita in the nation. These individuals' immeasurable expertise in
areas unique to the Homeland Security and Defense industries is too
great a resource to leave untapped by the Department. I would encourage
you to consider the Huntsville area when you continue to discuss the
framework of the Science and Technology Directorate. To that end, what
is the Directorate doing to take advantage of this great source of
information, analysis, and invention?
Answer. DHS S&T is well aware of the technical and scientific
capabilities resident in the Huntsville area, which includes many
significant Federal systems engineering and scientific facilities such
as NASA, SMDC, MICOM, as well as a significant and highly capable
contractor base. DHS S&T will avail itself of the entire National RDT&E
enterprise, including as appropriate the significant capabilities
resident in Huntsville, Alabama. Dr. McQueary visits the Huntsville
area on May 12, 2003, as a result of their invitation.
______
Questions Submitted by Senator Larry Craig
CRITICAL INFRASTRUCTURE PROTECTION
Question. I have worked with the Department of Energy for some
time, on programs to secure the nation's critical infrastructure from
attack. I have worked to provide funding in Energy and Water for the
establishment of a Critical Infrastructure Protection Test Range at the
Idaho National Engineering and Environmental Laboratory. I think it is
essential to actually put these systems under mock attack and see if
the protection technologies work. Much effort is being expended to
develop extensive models of our critical infrastructures and their
interdependencies. There is no question that protection of our critical
infrastructures is a vital priority for our nation. However, I have
concerns that huge sums are being invested in computer models without
having adequate data to support them. Idaho's lab provides a unique
capability to do this, because it is a remote, 900 square mile Federal
installation with its own electrical, communications and water systems.
Almost like a virtual city, it has everything from its own traffic
lights to its own nuclear reactors. Given my work on this issue,
however, I would suggest to you that your requested budget for critical
infrastructure protection--$5 million out of a budget of $803 million--
is inadequate. This isn't sufficient to develop technologies, much less
test them. I will be looking closely at your plans in this area.
Please explain the requested level of your budget given our
security needs in this area.
Answer The S&T Directorate has actually budgeted a total of $15
million for Critical Infrastructure Protection for fiscal year 2004. In
addition, there will be several technology programs in the Critical
Infrastructure Protection area supported by the Information Analysis
and Infrastructure Protection Directorate which is DHS' lead component
for critical infrastructure protection, and with which S&T's activities
are coordinated. There is a need for data for model validation and
experimental verification of all computer models, simulations, and
analyses. We have met with the staff of the Idaho National Engineering
and Environmental Laboratory and they are working with us to develop
Critical Infrastructure Protection R&D programs.
RADIOLOGICAL ATTACK
Question. Much of the work of countering the threat of radiological
attack resides in detecting these materials before they are brought
into an area and detonated. Department of Energy national laboratories
have been doing work on this issue for years. Through their work on
nuclear fuel cycles, DOE labs such as Argonne, have a lot of expertise
in detecting and measuring radiological events. I would not want to see
this work duplicated elsewhere.
Could you provide for the record any plans you have for conducting
research on detection and intervention capabilities along these lines
at the national laboratories?
Answer. Detecting materials that might be used in a radiological
attack requires understanding the potential threats and how specific
technologies and systems of multiple technologies can impact these
threats. Research and development in systems integration and systems
analysis will provide an effective, integrated system architecture and
the capability for regularly assessing and rapidly optimizing the
nuclear countermeasure system. Development of needed detection
technologies and countermeasure systems will build on the previous
efforts of the national laboratories. Detecting radiological and
nuclear threats before they become dangerous requires new capabilities
for new operational deployment strategies. These new technologies and
systems will augment the currently available capabilities (commercially
or from government and academic laboratories) that can be employed
today in the nuclear countermeasure system.
______
Questions Submitted by Senator Robert C. Byrd
UNDER SECRETARY FOR SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY
Question. For each portfolio and activity described in the
congressional budget justification, please provide a detailed
description of the programs and initiatives being funded in your base
budget as well as the request for fiscal year 2004, including the cost
associated with each.
Answer. See table below. For the fiscal year 2003 base, which
reflects activities transferred to the Department in Public Law 107-
296, a reprogramming letter has been submitted to the House and Senate
Appropriations Committees.
Question. Provide the number of FTE associated with each portfolio
and activity described in your fiscal year 2004 budget justification.
Answer. See table below:
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Fiscal Year
Request FTE
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Biodefense.............................. $365 63
Nuc/Rad................................. 137 22
Chemical Countermeasures................ 55 10
High Explosives......................... 10 2
Threat and Vulnerability Testing and 90 16
Assessment.............................
Standards/State & Local Programs........ 25 4
Rapid Prototyping....................... 30 5
Emerging Threats........................ 22 4
Critical Infrastructure Protection...... 5 2
Support to DHS Components............... 55 10
HS Fellowship Programs/Univ Programs.... 10 2
-------------------------------
TOTALS............................ 804 \1\ 140
------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ Excludes 40 FTE's associated with the Directorate's management and
61 FTE's for the Environmental Measurements Laboratory.
Note: Numbers rounded to nearest thousand.
Question. For each office on the ``S&T Organizational Chart''
provided to the Subcommittee provide a budget estimate and associated
FTE's for fiscal year 2003 and fiscal year 2004.
Answer. The Directorate will have 79 FTEs associated with the
Office of the Under Secretary; the Office of Plans, Programs and
Budget; the Office of Research and Development; and HSARPA. The
estimated salary cost of fiscal year 2003 FTE's is approximately $8.5
million. The S&T Directorate plans to have a staffing level for fiscal
year 2004 of approximately 180 FTEs plus 61 FTE for the Environmental
Measurements Laboratory (EML). The estimated salary cost of these FTEs
is approximately $22 million to $27 million.
Question. On page 25 of your budget justification, no funding is
provided for ``Adjustments Necessary to Maintain Current Levels.'' Does
the fiscal year 2004 budget account for the President's proposal for
pay or any other economic assumptions? Provide an explanation of why
``Adjustments to Maintain Current Levels'' are not included in your
fiscal year 2004 budget estimates.
Answer. Yes, the budget accounts for the President's pay and
economic assumptions. These amounts are included in the budget numbers
in fiscal year 2004 but not specifically broken out in Adjustments to
Maintain Current Levels. Because most of the Science and Technology
fiscal year 2004 activities are new or significantly increased, the
portfolio-by-portfolio estimates were developed assuming that increases
for pay and other economic assumptions would be accounted for within
the overall portfolio growth.
Question. Pursuant to Public Law 107-296, provide a detailed list
of the functions transferred from other agencies to the Science &
Technology Directorate, including personnel (FTE) transferred, physical
infrastructure (if any), and associated funding with each function
transferred.
Answer. The Environmental Measurements Laboratory, Department of
Energy, with an authorized 61 FTE's and 53 existing personnel
transferred to the S&T Directorate. Six FTE's as well as the six
incumbents of the National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA),
Department of Energy, also transferred to the Directorate.
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Transferred From Program Description FTEs Personnel Funding
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Energy........................................ Chemical Biological National 4 4 $48,005,527
Program.
Nuclear Smuggling............... ...... ......... ...........
Nuclear Assessment Program...... 2 2 5,584,000
Biological and Environmental ...... ......... 20,000,000
Research.
Advanced Scientific Computing R ...... ......... 3,068,000
& D.
Environmental Measurements 61 53 3,048,287
Laboratory.
Agriculture................................... Plum Island Animal Disease ...... ......... ( \1\ )
Center.
Defense....................................... Biological Research and Defense ...... ......... 420,000,000
programmatic activities.
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ Determination Order has not been finalized, since Plum Island Animal Disease Center transfers 6/03 to DHS.
Question. What is your current on-board staffing level? What is
your estimated staffing level for the end of fiscal year 2003? To
better understand the makeup of the Science and Technology
Directorate's workforce, provide a list of all positions by grade and
job title or job classification.
Answer. As of April 22, 2003, the entire S&T Directorate has 92
personnel working. Thirty-seven are in the immediate Office of the
Under Secretary; the Office of Plans, Programs, and Budget; and the
Office of Research and Development. Two are in HSARPA. Fifty-three are
at the Environmental Measurements Laboratory (EML) in NYC. The 92
personnel consist of permanently assigned employees, employees detailed
from within and outside DHS, Intergovernmental Personnel Act (IPA)
assignments, and contractor support from the National Laboratories. The
Directorate anticipates filling its 79 authorized FTE's, not including
the 61 authorized the EML, by the end of fiscal year 2003. The
Directorate may not be able to fill the 8 vacant FTE's at EML until the
funding issue is resolved. Funding was transferred from DOE to cover
only the 53 filled positions.
The Directorate is currently writing position descriptions and
having them classified. At this point, we are unable to provide a list
by title, series and grade. Most of the positions will be classified as
GS-13, 14, 15, ST, and SES and will be in the engineering (800) and
sciences (400, 600, and 1300) series. Supporting positions will be
primarily administrative, analytical, and program management at the GS-
7 through 15 in the 301, 340, 343, and 1515 series.
Question. Provide the number of employees detailed from other
agencies that are currently working for the Science and Technology
Directorate.
Answer. As of April 22, 2003, the Directorate had a total of seven
personnel on detail from outside the Department
Question. Provide a list (if any) of contracts entered into with
federally funded research and development centers in fiscal year 2003,
including the name of the research center and the amount of the
contract.
Answer. No contract has been entered into at this time in fiscal
year 2003 with any FFRDC. DHS (S&T) is planning on contracting in the
near term with the MITRE Corp to provide studies and analyses in
support of our system engineering mission, for a sum of $1.2 million.
Question. When will the Homeland Security Advanced Research
Projects Agency (HSARPA) be established? How many employees will be
employed at the HSARPA?
Answer. HSARPA was established by Public Law 107-206, November
2002, and will be operational no later than June 1, 2003. At that time
it will have few dedicated staff, and will be operated by personnel
from S&T headquarters in a ``dual-hatted'' mode. HSARPA will be staffed
with new personnel. Currently planned FTE count is 56 at the end of
fiscal year 2004. This number may change as program requirements and
workload are analyzed in more detail.
Question. Provide a list of all ongoing R&D activities, by agency
and funding amounts, within the Department of Homeland Security.
Answer. Outside of the S&T directorate, the following R&D
activities are underway in the Department of Homeland Security:
--The Transportation Security Administration (TSA) request includes
$75.2 million for research through TSA's Technology Center.
--The Coast Guard request includes $22 million in fiscal year 2004
for research and development projects in areas such as
contraband detection, vessel stopping, Command Center Concept
Exploration, and Intelligent Waterways Research.
--The Information Analysis and Information Protection (IAIP)
Directorate request includes $5 million in fiscal year 2004 for
cybersecurity research projects conducted by the National
Communications System.
Question. Describe efforts underway to coordinate and integrate all
research, development, demonstration, testing, and evaluation
activities of the Department of Homeland Security.
Answer. The S&T Directorate is working very closely with the other
operational directorates in DHS to coordinate and integrate the RDT&E
portfolio of the Department. To that end, all the S&T Portfolio
managers also serve as liaisons to one of the operational organizations
(e.g., BTS, IAIP, EP&R, USCG, USSS) with many of these staff being
matrixed from their home organizations. The S&T budget directly
reflects requirements identified by these end-users. In addition, the
S&T Directorate has assumed government oversight for the Federal
laboratories that transferred into the Department in fiscal year 2003.
The S&T Directorate has an Office of Federal Laboratories that is
responsible for ensuring that these facilities and programs are
integrated into the overall RDT&E enduring capability of the
Department.
Question. Provide a list of Research & Development contracts the
Science & Technology Directorate has entered into in fiscal year 2003
and those planned for fiscal year 2004. For fiscal year 2003, the list
should include the amount for each contract and the entity receiving
the contract.
Answer. The S&T Directorate has not yet entered into any new R&D
contracts in fiscal year 2003. The S&T Directorate has assumed
responsibility for direction and guidance for those programs
transferred from other agencies to the S&T Directorate, including their
existing R&D contracts. We will provide additional information on the
scope and nature of those transferred programs upon request.
The S&T Directorate has not yet determined the R&D contracts needed
for fiscal year 2004 as these will be based on the final fiscal year
2004 program plans and user requirements to meet the DHS mission.
Question. For the Homeland Security Institute and the Homeland
Security Science and Technology Advisory Committee, provide a timeline
for the establishment of each organization, including progress to date
and associated costs.
Answer. The Homeland Security Science and Technology Advisory
Committee will be established before the end of fiscal year 2003. The
Homeland Security Institute will also be established before the end of
fiscal year 2003. For the latter, a draft Request for Proposal (RFP)
has been created, in consultation with Department of Defense FFRDC
management.
Question. Provide a summary of the Homeland Security Institute and
the Homeland Advisory Committee's roles and responsibilities in
furthering the development of homeland security science and technology.
Answer. The Homeland S&T Advisory Committee will operate as a board
of directors for the Directorate, in terms of providing strategic
advice, management advice, and undertaking focused studies and projects
as needed. The Homeland Security Institute will provide analytic
support of unquestioned objectivity in such areas as threat and
vulnerability assessments, technical assessments, cost analyses,
systems analyses, test and evaluation criteria, and actuarial analyses.
Question. Provide a list of cities where the Biological Warning and
Incident Characterization System (BWIC) has been deployed, including
plans for future deployment.
Answer. The first phase of BWIC is known as BioWatch. The BioWatch
deployment is more extensive than originally planned because of the war
in Iraq and the associated heightened alert status. As a result,
BioWatch is currently collecting data in 26 of the most populated
cities. These cities are: New York, Los Angeles, Chicago, Houston,
Philadelphia, Phoenix, San Francisco, Dallas-Ft. Worth, Boston,
Detroit, Atlanta, Miami, Minneapolis-St. Paul, Cleveland, San Diego,
St. Louis, Denver, Tampa, Washington D.C., Baltimore, San Antonio,
Austin, Columbus, and Milwaukee. Please treat this list as For Official
Use Only since revelation as to which cities do or do not have BioWatch
might influence subsequent terrorist activity.
If the current decreased alert status continues, it is our intent
to scale back at the end of fiscal year 2003 the number of BioWatch
cities to a subset of those highest on the threat list and to work with
the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) and the Centers for Disease
Control and Prevention (CDC) to seek transition funding for these. In
fiscal year 2004, we will field a pilot of the next generation wide
area detection system in one of these cities. That system will support
50 samples per day at the same operational cost as the existing
BioWatch system which handles 10-12 samples per day. Local public
health officials have identified this increased sampling as a critical
step toward improved consequence management. Concurrently, we will be
conducting R&D on advanced detectors which should enable us to upgrade
BioWatch by replacing the air filters, which are currently collected
manually and then brought to a central analysis lab, with distributed
detectors that do the analysis at the point of collection and within an
hour--thereby greatly reducing the warning time without increasing the
operational costs.
Question. Your fiscal year 2003 reprogramming request, received on
April 9, 2003, makes reference to the Biowatch program. What is the
difference between the BWIC and Biowatch programs?
Answer. BioWatch is the first phase of an enhanced capability
within the BioWarning and Incident Characterization System (BWIC).
Deployed in response to the heighten tensions surrounding the Iraq
conflict, BioWatch provides for early detection of possible aerosolized
release of key agents in many of our cities and metropolitan areas. It
does so by deploying aerosol collectors at existing EPA sites in and
around these cities, then collecting the filters from these collectors
every 24 hours and taking them to the nearest CDC Laboratory Response
Network (LRN) lab for analysis. As noted in the answer to S&T-S52
above, the plan is to upgrade this capability in the future to provide
increased spatial and temporal sampling while maintaining or reducing
the operational costs associated with the current BioWatch pilot.
This upgraded environmental portion is one of three critical arms
of BWIC. The second key arm of BWIC is an integrated biosurveillance
system. Integrated biosurveillance will augment traditional clinical
surveillance with less traditional surveillance techniques such as
syndromic surveillance, advice nurse calls, over the counter drug sales
and veterinary reports in the desire to provide a still earlier
indication of potential exposure to a pathogen. We are currently
working with CDC to define the key elements of such an integrated
surveillance system. The third key arm of BWIC is to integrate the
information from both the environmental monitoring (BioWatch) and
biosurveillance systems with appropriate consequence managements tools
(e.g. plume hazard prediction models and epidemiological models) to
provide the incident commanders with the best possible estimate of the
extent of the event so as to better guide the response. The integrated
combination of these three elements--environmental monitoring,
biosurveillance, and their integration into consequence management
tools--comprises the BWIC system.
Question. For the $91 million included in the Lands and Structures
Object Classification line, please provide a detailed description of
the project or projects planned with this funding, the amount for the
project or projects previously appropriated, and the total amount
necessary to complete the project or projects, the total amount
currently authorized (if any), and whether additional authorization is
required for the project or projects planned with this funding.
Answer. The National Biodefense Analysis and Countermeasures
Centers (NBACC) is to be established on a hub and spoke model with the
NBACC hub--high security, biocontainment facilities--located at Fort
Detrick, Maryland. The NBACC spoke facilities are partnering Federal
laboratories as well as contract public and private sector specialty
labs. Existing national biocontainment laboratory infrastructure,
especially with the capability for safe, effective and controlled
generation of biothreat agent aerosols within biocontainment
laboratories, is insufficient to meet NBACC program needs. This was
demonstrated by conducting a publicly advertised, sources sought,
market survey in April 2002, and by examination of others' construction
plans. The NBACC is comprised of four centers: (1) Bioforensics
Analysis Center for unassailable analysis to support attribution of the
use of biothreat agents (BTA) by criminals, state and non-state actors;
(2) Bio-Countermeasures Test and Evaluation Center for validated
countermeasure testing against BTA aerosol lab challenge; (3)
Biodefense Knowledge Center to provide relevant training, data
integration, analysis, and information dissemination while exploiting
artificial intelligence technologies; and (4) Biothreat Assessment
Support Center for laboratory studies of potential BTA and
countermeasure efficacy to provide the essential scientific basis for a
BTA net assessment and prioritization. The fiscal year 2003
appropriation supporting the NBACC contained $5 million for facility
planning analysis and design; these studies are presently incomplete.
Additionally, the NBACC is being planned and coordinated as a component
of the biocontainment laboratory infrastructure on the Fort Detrick
BioDefense Campus. Participants include the Department of Defense and
other Federal departments having operations at Fort Detrick. Since
plans are presently incomplete, the full scope of NBACC facility
requirements-individually and as shared infrastructure-and the detailed
costs and schedules to complete these construction projects is not yet
available. Existing authorization for these efforts is sufficient.
Question. Will there be a National headquarters laboratory within
the Science & Technology Directorate? If so, where?
Answer. In accordance with the Homeland Security Act, the S&T
Directorate has established an Office of National Laboratories. This
office has the ability to access the expertise of all of the existing
national laboratories through a Memorandum of Agreement signed by the
Secretary of Homeland Security and the Secretary of Energy in February
2003. DHS does not intend to establish a headquarters laboratory, but
rather, it will sponsor homeland security programs at a variety of
sites that leverage the vast talent of the national laboratory complex.
The national laboratories are crucial elements of the enduring
scientific and technical capability that DHS needs to execute its
mission in the long term.
Question. Describe the role the Science & Technology Directorate
has played (if any) in responding to the Sudden Acute Respiratory
Syndrome (SARS).
Answer. S&T is monitoring the SARS outbreak closely with other
Federal and State public health officials. The S&T Directorate has not
funded any activities associated with SARS that normally fall under the
jurisdiction of HHS, CDC and the Public Health Service.
Question. Your budget shows a $30 million increase in equipment
costs in fiscal year 2003 and then a decrease of $30 million in fiscal
year 2004. Why was there such a large increase for equipment costs in
fiscal year 2003?
Answer. The $30 million is for equipment associated with the Bio-
Watch system that will be purchased and deployed in the fiscal year
2003.
______
Questions Submitted by Senator Daniel K. Inouye
UNDER SECRETARY FOR SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY
Question. In your written testimony you state, a key part of our
efforts will be conducted through the Homeland Security Advanced
Research Projects Agency. It is my understanding that this agency will
be modeled after DARPA, a program I have seen first-hand meet with
great success. Your fiscal year 2004 budget request assumes that
approximately $350 million will be used for this purpose. Could you
please provide us with an update on the creation of that Agency and an
estimated timetable for solicitation of the first round of grants?
Answer. HSARPA will be operational no later than June 1, 2003. At
that time it will have few dedicated staff, and will be operated by
personnel from S&T headquarters in a ``dual-hatted'' mode. However, it
is anticipated that several Broad Agency Announcements that cut across
the portfolios within the Directorate will be issued soon afterwards.
Question. I support the Directorate's Homeland Security Fellowship
Program as an effort to support university-level study of science and
technology. It is anticipated that this will help meet our country's
need for qualified applicants for security related research and
development positions. However, enrollment of U.S. citizens in graduate
science and engineering programs has not kept pace with that of foreign
students. I understand that this program would provide support to
students and faculty, but I believe we need to work to encourage
students to enter these fields, not only support those who choose these
fields. How would the fellowship program work to entice U.S. citizens
to enter into these fields?
Answer. The S&T Directorate is committed to building a cadre of
dedicated scientists and engineers in the United States who will pursue
careers in homeland security related disciplines and who will, in turn,
encourage the next generation of experts to follow in their footsteps.
A key element of this effort is the establishment of the Homeland
Security Scholarship and Fellowship Program. Our goal is to make this a
premier program--on par with those of NIH, NRC, NASA and others--that
encourages outstanding students and faculty who are U.S. citizens to
work in homeland security related fields. The key to making this
program a success will be the engagement of university and college
faculty and administration throughout the process.
Question. Your Directorate will develop standards for State and
local homeland security infrastructure equipment. Do you anticipate
that these standards will be guidelines and suggestions, or do you
anticipate that our State and local entities will be required to
purchase equipment and implement training programs in compliance with
the standards your Directorate develops? If these standards will be
mandatory, what financial assistance will the Department provide for
the purchase of compliant equipment?
Answer. In accordance with OMB Circular-119, the standards
developed and used by DHS for homeland security equipment will
primarily be voluntary consensus standards. As such, these equipment
standards will function as guidelines that set minimum performance
specifications to ensure that the equipment will have basic
functionality, will be adequate for the task for which it is intended,
and demonstrates a basic level of efficiency, interoperability, and
sustainability. In general, specific equipment purchases will not be
mandated by DHS. However, we anticipate that the existing grant
programs will tie allowable purchases to equipment that has been shown
to meet an accepted DHS standard. In addition, if equipment standards
are established or mandated as part of a National Incident Management
System, then failure to adopt those standards will, per Homeland
Security Presidential Directive #5, render a jurisdiction ineligible
for any preparedness-related grant or contract funding, not just
equipment-related grants. Our plan is to ensure that training programs
providing proficiency on equipment that meets standards will also be
covered to some extent by the existing USG funding programs. There is
great interest from the State and local emergency response community in
having the standards needed to make intelligent and potentially life
saving decisions when it comes to equipment purchase. Therefore,
providing these standards is a very important component of our mission.
HR5005 invests the Secretary with regulatory authority. There may
be some very specialized cases where issues of human health and safety
dictate promulgation of regulations. Those special cases where specific
types of equipment are made mandatory will likely be considered
separately in terms of government funding that would be made available
for deployment.
SUBCOMMITTEE RECESS
Senator Cochran. This concludes our hearing today.
We will continue to review the fiscal year 2004 budget
request for the Department of Homeland Security on Wednesday,
April 30, at 10 a.m. in room 106 of the Dirksen Senate Office
Building. Our witness at that time will be the Secretary of
Homeland Security, Tom Ridge.
The subcommittee stands in recess.
[Whereupon, at 2:54 p.m., Thursday, April 10, the
subcommittee was recessed, to reconvene at 10 a.m., Wednesday,
April 30.]