[Senate Hearing 108-176]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE APPROPRIATIONS FOR FISCAL YEAR 2004
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WEDNESDAY, APRIL 9, 2003
U.S. Senate,
Subcommittee of the Committee on Appropriations,
Washington, DC.
The subcommittee met at 10:03 a.m., in room SD-192, Dirksen
Senate Office Building, Hon. Ted Stevens (chairman) presiding.
Present: Senators Stevens, Cochran, Shelby, and Inouye.
DEFENSE AGENCIES
Missile Defense Agency
STATEMENT OF LIEUTENANT GENERAL RONALD T. KADISH, USAF,
DIRECTOR
ACCOMPANIED BY THOMAS P. CHRISTIE, DIRECTOR, OPERATIONAL TEST AND
EVALUATION
OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR TED STEVENS
Senator Stevens. Our distinguished co-chairman is stuck in
traffic.
General Kadish. So were we, sir.
Senator Stevens. Since it took me a long time to get in
this morning and I only live 5 miles away, I appreciate what
you're saying. He has asked us to proceed, if that's all right,
and we'll do that.
We welcome you and Mr. Christie, General. Thank you for
being with us. You're really a trusted partner in the whole
endeavor for national missile defense, and I'm sure Senator
Inouye will make similar comments. This capability that you
have in Alaska is very encouraging to us and we plan to go up
there as soon as possible. We had one trip scheduled and had to
cancel it. Our staff will be going over to Hawaii in the coming
recess to visit that area, and we know that there has been a
great deal of change. If it's possible, we'd enjoy both of you
coming to join us on our trip, but I'm not sure that will be
possible. We haven't got it scheduled yet because of the
problems we have in the appropriations process right now.
We look forward to receiving an update from you, and
Senator Inouye will make some comments when he comes in, but
right now, I would appreciate it if you would proceed with your
statement.
General Kadish. Thank you, Senator. Good morning, Mr.
Chairman, members of the committee. I would like to take just a
few minutes to highlight some of the key points about our
missile defense program that we have today and really
underscore the progress we've made to date.
And if you would allow that my prepared statement in its
entirety be----
MISSILE DEFENSE PROGRAM
Senator Stevens. Your statements will go in the record.
General Kadish. In early 2001, we started restructuring the
missile defense program to develop capabilities to defend the
United States, our allies, our friends, and our deployed forces
against all ranges of missiles in all phases of flight. With
the support of Congress and in particular this committee, we
have made considerable progression in demonstrating key missile
defense technologies and the integration of those technologies
into a system.
Our testing analysis gives us confidence that hit-to-kill
technology works and that we can take the initial steps we are
proposing to provide a modest initial defensive capability
where none exists today.
Altogether, we have made great progress in our missile
defense program. Our testing has been aggressive and
productive. Over the past 2 years we achieved four for five
successful ground-based intercepts of long-range targets and we
are three for three in our sea-based intercepts of medium-range
targets. We were five for seven with the Patriot Advanced
Capability, or PAC-3 interceptor.
We are making steady progress with the airborne laser to
develop the revolutionary speed of light technologies, but we
have had failures and in all probability, we will have some
more failures in this process. But this score card has
increased our confidence in our basic technical approach.
Last December, the President directed the Department of
Defense to field an initial set of missile defense capabilities
in view of our technical progress, and our total lack of
missile defenses against the intermediate and long-range
ballistic missiles. Given our fielding approach using the
testbed we have been working on, and given our testing
successes and our analysis of those to date, I believe we are
ready for this step. With the President's decision, we now have
a clear basic near-term architecture for a limited system to
address a range of missile threats.
I want to stress that we have no fixed long-term
architecture, however. We will evolve and improve the
capability of the Block 04 system over time so that when we
propose to field initially--so what we propose to field
initially in fiscal year 2004 and fiscal year 2005 may evolve
to look very different maybe a decade later.
EVOLUTIONARY CAPABILITY-BASE ACQUISITION APPROACH
The number and type of missile defense assets and their
locations and basing parameters may be expected to change to
make the system more integrated and more capable. This is
consistent with the approach I have described in previous
hearings. We are building and fielding limited military useful
capabilities as soon as they can be made available.
We have said all along that when we do field, we will not
have a system that will fully meet our missile defense needs,
so there are no illusions there. The system we will be fielding
initially will be modestly operational, but we went down this
road knowing we would need improvement and we have a process
that's specifically designed to make those improvements as soon
as practicable.
With an evolutionary capability-based acquisition approach,
we put capability into the field, we test it, use it, get
comfortable with it, learn what works well and what doesn't,
and improve it as soon as we can. Before the President's
decision, the fiscal year 2004 President's budget would have
reflected the development of a set of testbed capabilities that
could have been made operational. Today we are asking Congress
to authorize and appropriate funds to allow us to add to this
testbed and make it operational in fiscal year 2004.
OPERATIONAL TESTBED
In other words, instead of building a testbed that might be
used operationally, we are fielding an initial defensive
capability that we will continue to test. Because of this
relationship between initial defense capability and testing, we
are asking that all associated funding with both efforts be
under the defense-wide appropriations funding.
Now with respect to the issue of operational testing before
deployment, I would argue that we are faced today with some
timely issues. This is a unique and unprecedented technology in
its early stages of maturity. We have to strike a balance
between our desire for perfection in missile defenses that we
employ and our desire to have as soon as possible some
defensive capability which does not exist today.
We can continue to test the elements and components of the
system and we can use them to defend ourselves. I believe we
can do this because we have shown that the nuts and bolts of
the missile defense system and its capabilities we are funding
to build upon Block 04 can work.
Over the past 2 years, we have conducted a total of 55
flight tests and 60 ground tests. Seventeen of these tests were
intercept flight tests. These tests built our confidence. We
know hit-to-kill works. We have had a significant degree of
repeatability represented in the testing up to date, and we are
well along our goal of demonstrating this reliability.
Mr. Christie will state that our relationships, I believe,
that we are building between Operational Test and the Missile
Defense Agency are in good shape, and that we are structured to
make the best decisions in the interests of missile defense.
Regardless of the names we apply to our testing, we must
have the assets and infrastructure in the field if we are going
to begin to test the system in operationally realistic
conditions. If we do not have the weapons and sensors fielded
in operationally useful locations, we cannot really do a good
job of looking at how they work. This program and its budget
proposes to do just that.
Our intentions are to test the complete system as soon as
possible. Over the next 2 years we are planning another 68
flight tests, 58 ground tests, and about the same number of
intercept tests as before. We have done the testing and have
confidence to proceed, and we want to continue to strike the
right balance in the testing effort.
The elements of the testbed will also have some inherent
defensive capability. We can do operational testing while
having the system on alert. We should take advantage of that.
I believe, Mr. Chairman, that we are ready to take the next
step in missile defense for another reason. Our testbed
evolutionary approach to a missile defensive capability is
rational from a cost standpoint as well. We do not now have
adequate understanding of our long-term architecture to submit
a budget committing tens of billions of dollars, and we don't
need to submit such a budget to achieve our goals in the
interim.
FIELD CAPABILITY
We are able, however, to purchase a fielded capability,
through small numbers, and this approach will allow us to
control costs. With an increase of about $1.5 billion over 2
years, we can provide this country with a modest missile
defense capability where none exists today.
Mr. Chairman, America's missile defense program is on
track. The Missile Defense Agency is doing what we told
Congress it would do, and your support has been important to
the progress we have made. We listened to your concerns and we
sought to address them in a responsible manner. Our tests and
analysis have given us the confidence we can take the first
steps toward initial defensive operations while we continue to
prove out our technology and demonstrate missile defense combat
utility through a realistic testing regime.
PREPARED STATEMENT
I believe there are tremendous benefits in putting some
threat-precedented technology into the field in manageable
increments to provide some defense, to learn more about it and
gain experience, and improve it over time. Thank you, Mr.
Chairman, and I think I will stop there to allow more time for
questions.
[The statement follows:]
Prepared Statement of Lieutenant General Ronald T. Kadish
Good morning, Mr. Chairman, Members of the Committee. It is an
honor to appear before you to present the Department of Defense's
fiscal year 2004 Missile Defense Program and budget.
In early 2001 we restructured the missile defense program to
develop the capability to defend the United States, our allies and
friends, and deployed forces against all ranges of missiles in all
phases of flight. With the support of Congress, we have made
considerable progress in demonstrating key ballistic missile defense
(BMD) technologies and system integration. Our testing and analysis
give us confidence that hit-to-kill technology works and that we can
take the initial steps we are proposing to bolster defenses against
short- and medium-range ballistic missiles and introduce a modest
defensive capability to defeat a limited long-range threat. Today I
will review our progress, discuss why we are confident in our approach,
and outline our plans and challenges ahead.
Over the past two years we have conducted several successful
intercept tests. We achieved four for five successful long-range,
Ground-based Midcourse Defense (GMD) intercept flight tests,
demonstrating the hit-to-kill technologies of the Exo-atmospheric Kill
Vehicle, critical sensor technologies, and the integration of many
geographically dispersed missile defense assets. The failure of the
most recent such test (Integrated Flight Test-10) last December
resulted from the non-separation of the interceptor and the surrogate
booster rocket. This was not a failure of new missile defense
technology, but a failure of our quality control processes. We are
increasing our already focused quality control efforts. We are taking
steps to ensure this separation problem is not repeated. Furthermore,
future GMD tests will no longer use the surrogate booster and instead
will use one or both of the boosters currently under development.
We are three for three in our ship-based exo-atmospheric intercept
tests. Last year Aegis BMD successfully completed its Aegis Lightweight
Exo-Atmospheric Projectile (LEAP) Intercept (ALI) project. Based on
these results we accelerated the insertion of the follow-on Aegis BMD
capability into the Test Bed. Our third intercept in November 2002 was
the first ever intercept of a ballistic missile in the ascent phase of
flight.
Patriot Advanced Capability 3 (PAC-3) has made significant strides.
Since January 2001, we have had five for seven successful intercepts of
ballistic missile targets and have begun fielding the first PAC-3
missiles. We also executed more than a dozen successful test flights of
the Airborne Laser (ABL) aircraft, completed significant aircraft
modifications, and accomplished successful subsystem testing and full-
up ground-tests of the first laser module. While we are in the
difficult phase of integrating the components into the ABL, our
progress to date has increased our confidence that ABL can eventually
be integrated into the BMD system (BMDS).
Mr. Chairman, America's missile defense program is on track. The
Missile Defense Agency is doing what we told Congress it would do. We
listened to your concerns and have sought to address them in a
responsible manner. We have faced significant technical and management
challenges, but through aggressive testing we have proven that hit-to-
kill technology works. We have demonstrated system integration through
complex system testing. These tests, combined with analysis of
simulations and exercises, give us confidence that the system can take
the first steps toward initial defensive operations while performing as
a test bed for further realistic testing and continued spiral
development.
The President's fiscal year 2004 budget will allow us to continue
this significant progress and is structured to incorporate the
recommendations of the Defense Science Board summer study of 2002.
Evolutionary Approach to Missile Defense
The BMD system involves many sensors and interceptors that are
integrated and layered to enable engagements against hostile missiles
in the boost, midcourse, and terminal phases of flight. Layered
defenses can allow multiple shot opportunities across all of the
engagement segments and potentially within each one of those segments,
greatly enhancing our ability to handle countermeasures and destroy in-
flight missiles and their payloads.
As I have explained in past hearings, we are building the missile
defense system using an evolutionary acquisition approach, so that the
system's capability can be enhanced over time. Our plan continues to be
one of incrementally providing the decision makers the ability to field
militarily useful capabilities based on their technological readiness,
suitability for operational use and threat developments.
Last December the President directed the Department to field an
initial set of missile defense capabilities in order to reduce the
vulnerabilities of the United States, our troops, and our allies and
friends. Given our fielding approach, and given the successful testing
we have accomplished to date, I believe we are ready for this. The
proposed budget for fiscal year 2004 and across the 2004-2009 Future
Years Defense Program (FYDP) supports Research, Development, Test and
Evaluation (RDT&E) activities to accomplish that goal. We plan to begin
operating modest land and sea defense capabilities in 2004 to provide
limited protection of our country as well as our troops and critical
assets overseas.
In missile defense, we deal routinely with revolutionary
technologies and unprecedented engineering requirements. The program we
are currently executing recognizes the unique challenges we face and
sets out a disciplined course to develop the BMD system in an
evolutionary way. Having spent the last couple of years looking at
different missile defense options, we are now narrowing our program
activities and focusing on development and fielding of the most
promising elements.
Consistent with the approach I have described in previous hearings,
we are building and fielding limited, militarily useful capabilities as
soon as they can be made available. This approach takes into account
known and projected threats and the present state of technology. With a
capability-based acquisition approach we put capability into the field,
test it, use it, get comfortable with it, and learn what works well and
what does not. We have structured Test Bed fielding opportunities to
occur in ``blocks'' every two years to improve what we have fielded as
needed. Block 2004 (initial defense capabilities) represents 2004-2005,
Block 2006 represents 2006-2007, and so on. These blocks will deliver
elements and components that are ready for continued rigorous testing
and full integration into the system.
With the President's decision, we now have a basic near-term
architecture for a limited system to address a range of missile
threats. I want to stress that we have no fixed, long-term
architecture. We will evolve and improve the capability of the Block
2004 system over time, so that what we propose to field initially in
2004 and 2005 may evolve to look very different a decade later. The
number and type of missile defense assets and their locations and
basing arrangements may be expected to change to make the system more
integrated and capable.
We have adopted this evolutionary approach because a single
acquisition cycle is not responsive to rapid changes in threat and
technology and is not structured to deal with surprise. We want to
avoid prematurely constraining system design by using the traditional
requirements process and waiting up to twenty years or more for a
defensive capability that would result from using traditional
acquisition rules. In a world marked by increasing ballistic missile
activity, our nation, forces, and allies cannot afford to wait that
long.
In using this evolutionary approach, we still have the ability to
incorporate the discipline and intent of the traditional acquisition
process. For example, the warfighting community has been heavily
involved from the beginning in the development of system elements and
components. We are successfully using a spiral development process to
put new technologies into play more quickly than if we were to use the
traditional approach. Spiral development requires regular dialogue and
active participation between user and developer for delivering a
militarily useful set of capabilities. Once we field the initial
capability, uniformed personnel will operate the system.
Despite the many uncertainties we face, this approach allows us to
be good stewards of the taxpayers' money. The President's recent
announcement stands as a good example of this. We are not making an
early commitment to large-volume serial production and very large-scale
investments. Our fielding commitment will be scaled over time and rise
with our confidence that we are on the right development path for this
complex, multifaceted system.
Aggressive Research, Development and Test Activities
As we prepare to implement the President's directive, we plan to
continue the program's intensive testing activities up to and beyond
the 2004-2005 timeframe. We have a single, robust RDT&E program
dedicated to the development and demonstration of missile defense
technologies and integration concepts. In fact, consistent with our
investments over the past two years, the lion's share of the fiscal
year 2004 budget request of $7.7 billion for the Missile Defense
Agency, roughly $6 billion, will support RDT&E activities that are not
directly tied to system fielding. Significant development efforts in
fiscal year 2004 include continued work on Theater High Altitude Area
Defense (THAAD), ABL, and kinetic energy boost-phase interceptors in
the post-Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty environment.
These aggressive RDT&E activities are the basis for proceeding as
the President has directed and for continuing development work to build
a multi-layered BMD system. We will continue our practice of assessing
these activities on a regular basis to see if they can be accelerated
or whether they must be truncated or modified in some manner. RDT&E
activities occurring in fiscal year 2004 will contribute to Blocks
2004, 2006, 2008 and 2010.
We are still evaluating the impact of our withdrawal from the ABM
Treaty. The treaty successfully did what it was intended to do. It
severely restricted missile defense development and fielding options.
The President's action has made it possible to begin to develop and
test aggressively the full range of missile defense technologies and
pursue capabilities that make the most sense from the standpoints of
technology, operations, and cost.
For example, as a result of the treaty withdrawal, Aegis BMD, the
sea-based defense element, began its successful participation in GMD
integrated flight tests conducted last October and December. While
initially only collecting boost and ascent phase radar data, Aegis BMD
has begun engineering efforts to become a full participant in future
tests and will eventually provide fire control data to the BMD system.
Our intercept tests against long-range ballistic missiles are very
complex, yet since October 1999 we were forced to restrict ourselves to
the same intercept flight geometries because of artificial constraints
in our current Test Bed and our obligation to remain compliant with the
ABM Treaty. Today, in order to test our GMD interceptors, we must
launch targets from Vandenberg, AFB in California and interceptors from
Kwajalein Atoll in the Pacific Ocean. We are changing that. The Test
Bed we are building will introduce flexibility into our test approach
and help overcome some basic geographic and geometric limitations by
allowing us to test weapons and sensors against ballistic missiles of
all ranges along different azimuths and using different trajectories.
For test purposes we will introduce variable target launch and impact
points and engagement areas.
Robust, realistic testing is absolutely critical to developing an
effective missile defense system. Over the past two years we conducted
a total of 55 flight tests and 60 ground tests. Seventeen of these
tests were flight-intercept tests. Each test builds our confidence in
the BMD system. From our flight-testing, we know that the hit-to-kill
approach works. We know our sensors can successfully detect and track
the target and that our software algorithms can discriminate between
reentry vehicles and basic decoys and debris. We know our battle
management system can generate orders that put a kill vehicle in a
position to achieve intercept. We will continue to refine and improve
the system's performance in all areas. Our test program continues to
add to our confidence that the basic technologies are sound and that
they will work together to provide the nation an effective BMD system.
Our program and budget will continue to maintain a high tempo of
increasingly complex ground- and flight-testing. Over the next two
years we are planning another 68 flight tests, 58 ground tests, and
maintaining the same pace of intercept tests as before. We do system
testing to give us confidence that we have the ability to integrate
geographically dispersed missile defense elements and components into
an effective system. This does not include the many experiments we
conduct routinely, the modeling and simulation activity, and the
wargame exercises. Our computer predictions are very valuable in this
process and give us a great deal of confidence that we are on the right
paths.
We remain committed to our aggressive testing approach, where we
mature midcourse, boost, and terminal missile defense components and
elements through rigorous testing under increasingly realistic and
challenging conditions. When we have adequately demonstrated
technologies, decisions can then be made concerning their integration
into blocks for fielding. Testing activities remain central to what we
do and are well supported within our funding request.
Initial Defense Capabilities
The Congress has already funded plans to put five midcourse
interceptors into the test bed in silos at Fort Greely in Alaska,
develop Aegis BMD, and test the SM-3 interceptor at the Pacific Missile
Range Facility in Hawaii. Other activities are currently underway to
improve the missile defense Test Bed by upgrading or developing launch
sites (including Vandenberg, AFB), radar sensors, battle management and
command and control components, communications terminals and networks,
and associated test infrastructure in the United States and the
Marshall Islands (including airborne, sea-based, and ground-based data
collection assets).
Today we are asking the Congress to appropriate funds that will
allow us to add to this Test Bed and make it operational by 2004. These
initial defense capabilities, fielded over a two-year period, will
include ground-based interceptors to counter long-range threats, sea-
based interceptors to defeat short- and medium-range threats,
additional PAC-3 units, and early warning and tracking sensors based on
land, at sea, in the air, and in space.
Before the President's decision, the fiscal year 2004 President's
Budget would have reflected the development of a set of Test Bed
capabilities that could have been made operational. Instead of building
a Test Bed that might be used operationally, we are fielding an initial
defensive capability that we will continue to test. All RDT&E
activities will support the initial defense capability, and the system
elements and components we field will continue to support RDT&E.
Because of the relationship between initial defense capabilities and
testing, we are asking that all funding associated with both efforts be
under Defense-wide appropriations RDT&E. With the December announcement
we have quickened the pace at which we are moving forward, but we have
not changed the direction in which we are moving.
We are proposing to do in fiscal year 2004 what we said we were
going to do in previous hearings, that is, field tested missile
defenses a little at a time using a step approach. The missile defense
operations we are proposing are unprecedented, and there still is much
to learn. I believe there is tremendous benefit in putting this
unprecedented technology into the field, in manageable increments, to
provide some defense, to learn more about it, gain experience with it,
and improve it over time.
The Israeli Arrow program stands out as an example of how fielding
militarily useful capability in block increments and in a timely manner
can work and how successful it can be. With only four successful
intercept flight tests, Israeli officials declared their first Arrow
battery operational on October 17, 2000 and fielded that country's
first capability to defeat incoming ballistic missiles launched from
nearby states. The Israeli system has been operational for more than
two years now, and during that time it has conducted additional
intercept and flight tests to enhance the system's performance. Plans
are moving forward to augment it even further. Surrounded by states
having an active interest in ballistic missiles, Israel found a way to
field a limited defensive capability on an accelerated timeline and at
a time when it could not afford to wait for system testing to be
completed.
We in the United States, of course, are not strangers to fielding
an unprecedented military capability on an accelerated schedule. Our
leadership struggled in the early stages of deploying the first
reconnaissance satellites and land- and sea-based ballistic missiles.
Urgent national security requirements pressed us to deploy capability
soon, and through trial and error we did. Despite test failures, the
country persevered and made militarily useful capabilities operational.
Since that time, we have dramatically improved the capabilities of
those first-generation systems. The parallels between these pioneering
programs and the missile defense program are clear.
I believe, Mr. Chairman, that we are ready to take this next step
in missile defense. Our fielding approach will not only help
rationalize the force structure we deploy from the technological and
threat standpoints, but also from the standpoint of cost. We do not now
have adequate understanding to submit a bill of many tens of billions
of dollars for a huge, long-term fixed architecture. We are able,
however, to purchase, produce, and field capabilities in small numbers.
This approach will allow us to control costs. With a modest investment
and increase by the Department of a total of $1.5 billion spread over
the fiscal year 2004 and 2005 budgets, we will provide this country
with militarily useful capabilities where none exists today.
In short, this $1.5 billion primarily will add a small number of
ground-based interceptors as well as more SM-3 interceptors to the test
bed capability we are already building. Future fielding decisions, as
we have said all along, will be made in the outlying years based on the
progress of technology and the evolution of the threat, subject to the
annual congressional appropriations process.
Confidence in Initial Defensive Operations
In assessing our level of confidence with the planned initial
missile defense capabilities, we have to strike a balance between our
desire for perfection in the missile defenses we deploy and our desire
to have as soon as possible a defensive capability where none exists
today.
Adequate testing is the key to achieving that balance. And while
this testing may not fit the mold of classical operational testing that
would traditionally take place prior to full-rate production, we do
follow a testing discipline that I believe can give us the confidence
to say that what we deploy will work as we have said it would under
threat circumstances that we believe we might have to face.
I believe that to strike the right balance we must go through an
intense period of testing to demonstrate that the technologies on which
we are relying can work consistently under conditions that are
increasingly stressful and realistic. We have spent the past two years
demonstrating the technologies we propose to employ in the Block 2004
Test Bed. We have said all along that when we do field we will not
field a system that will fully meet our missile defense needs. We will
face limitations and have gaps, let there be no illusions there. The
system we are initially fielding will be limited operationally. But we
went down this road knowing that there would be gaps and with a process
that is specifically designed to fill those gaps and make up for
performance limitations as soon as practicable.
Among the limitations that should be included here is that of
operational experience. We need to build operational experience over
time with the system that will be guarding our nation and our troops.
There is no better way to do that then to put basic elements out into
the field and to begin working with those assets to develop the
doctrine and concepts of operation we will need and to train the
military personnel who will operate it.
We have spent significant amounts of money on testing the GMD and
Aegis BMD elements of system. All of the tests to date have been what
we have called ``developmental tests.'' Regardless of the names we
apply to our testing, we must have assets and infrastructure in the
field if we are going to begin to test that system under operationally
realistic conditions. If we do not have the weapons and sensors fielded
at operationally useful locations, we cannot really do a good job of
hooking it all up to make sure it works.
The President's decision allows us to put this materiel out in the
field for testing, in locations that make sense from an operational
point of view. Given the recent events in the international security
environment, the President's decision reflects an urgent need to make
that test bed as operational as we possibly can. That decision also
recognizes that we will not be fielding the perfect system at the
outset.
What we are faced with today is a timing issue. Must we do what has
been traditionally called ``operational testing'' before we can say
that we have a capability we can use in an extreme security situation,
or can we do both? Can we continue to test the elements and components
of a system we also could use to defend ourselves if needed? I believe
we can.
Why do I believe that? Because we have shown that the nuts and
bolts of the missile defense capabilities we are planning to field in
Block 2004 can work. We have had a significant degree of repeatability
represented in the tests we have conducted to date, and we are well
along in our goal of conducting these tests reliably. We are now to the
point where we need to assemble selected missile defense elements into
a test bed that will permit operationally realistic testing using
different azimuths and trajectories, different launch and target
points, and different arrangements in our sensors and weapons. That
test bed will allow us to test in different ways so that we can refine
our all-too-important battle management and command and control
infrastructure. The elements of the test bed also will have some
inherent defense capability. We can do operational development testing
while having the system on alert. We should take advantage of that.
Our intentions are to test the complete system and to be ready to
respond to ballistic missile threats against the United States, our
deployed forces, and our friends and allies. We have conducted the
rigorous testing needed to give us the confidence that we are far
enough along to do operationally realistic testing in an integrated
way. Testing will always be an important part of this system--always.
We will always be improving what we have in the field. The budget we
have submitted will support the testing required to ensure that the
elements of the Block 2004 system we would like to field will
adequately serve the defense needs of this nation.
Our RDT&E activities are extensive and are important part of our
acquisition approach. Below are three areas of special interest.
BMD System Radar Activity
The MDA's Family of Radar concept is continuous and flexible global
detection, tracking, discrimination, and hit assessment. Ideally, we
want to be able to watch missile payloads deploy and accomplish prompt
and early battle assessment. We are currently pursuing multiple sensor
technologies and identifying and developing sensors to give the BMD
system the ``eyes'' it will need. In order to identify the most
promising technologies and reduce risk, we are investigating, in
parallel, sensor alternatives on land-, sea-, air- and space-based
platforms to add robustness to the BMD system and improve opportunities
to collect multiple phenomenology on the threat missile or target
complex. Evaluations of different sensor and weapon combinations and
alternatives will help us assess their overall benefit to an
integrated, layered BMD system. An important element in this effort is
the mobile Sea-Based X-Band radar (SBX), which we plan to build by
September 2005 to greatly improve both testing and our initial defense
capability.
The BMDS Radar project, a new activity, is funded in the fiscal
year 2004 budget to expand the engagement battle space and assess
missile defense concepts of operation that we were not allowed to
consider under the ABM Treaty. We will validate the concept of forward-
basing and sensor layering and evaluate advanced algorithms using both
MDA- and non-MDA-owned sensors. Current plans call for the BMDS Radar
to be available for integration into the Test Bed in late 2006. We will
support continuous sensor research to improve capabilities and develop
advanced algorithms for Block 2008 and beyond.
BMD System Infrared Sensor Activities
The Department restructured the Space Based Infrared System-Low
(SBIRS Low) element in fiscal year 2002, renaming it the Space Tracking
and Surveillance System (STSS). We will explore new technologies to
enhance missile detection, improve reporting on ballistic missile
launches regardless of range, azimuth, or launch point, and provide
critical midcourse tracking and discrimination data.
The Russian-American Observation Satellites (RAMOS) project is a
cooperative effort between the United States and the Russian Federation
to improve early warning technologies. RAMOS represents an innovative
space-based sensor R&D initiative. We are proceeding towards a joint
Preliminary Design Review this summer and expect to conclude the design
and development phase in early fiscal year 2005. The United States is
actively striving to reach a bi-lateral agreement to conduct activities
beyond the design and development phase. If we are able to move forward
with this project, we would launch two satellites in late fiscal year
2008.
BMD System Interceptor Activity
Our longer-term goal is to develop low-cost enhanced interceptors
for integration with different platforms to defend against missiles in
the boost, midcourse, and exo-atmospheric terminal phases of flight. We
are consolidating all next-generation kinetic energy interceptor
(booster and kill vehicle) development efforts and placing them under
our BMDS Interceptor activity. Relying heavily on existing hardware and
proven technology, we will develop a hit-to-kill boost phase capability
by Block 2008 and deliver capability enhancements for Block 2010 and
beyond.
In fiscal year 2004 we will begin developing a space-based kinetic
energy interceptor Test Bed to explore the technological feasibility
and operational advantages of engagements from space. This plan is
consistent with the Defense Science Board's recommendation, released
last August, to establish a comprehensive development program for a
space-based kinetic system. Following up on last year's successful
experiments to understand key sensor technologies, we will conduct in
2004 a Near Field Infra-Red Experiment to observe from space a boosting
rocket. This data will assist in the selection of seeker and sensor
technologies for a ground-based boost interceptor and development of
interceptor guidance and homing algorithms.
Block Activities and Budget
We are working within the MDA and with the Department's operational
community to meet the President's objective to establish an initial
defense capability in 2004, which begins with Block 2004. The following
describes by block our planned fielding opportunities across the FYDP.
Block 2004
This block continues development and integration of elements,
components, and facilities in the Test Bed. Block 2004 RDT&E funding
will deliver capabilities directed by the President for operational use
in fiscal year 2004-2005. We plan to add different capabilities to
point-defense capabilities already provided by PAC-3 units. This
initial fielding will grow the RDT&E program and expand the physical
infrastructure of the Test Bed.
Funds in this block will enable us to conduct major target and
countermeasure development and capability demonstrations, integration
tests, and experiments. We are investing in a substantive system test
program to test system command, control, and battle management (C\2\BM)
and communications across the elements. The Block 2004 Master Test Plan
lays out the strategy for conducting a comprehensive set of integrated
and distributed ground- and flight-tests to verify performance and
characterize the capability of the system. This test program will form
the basis of operational and military utility assessments of the Block
2004 initial defense capability.
We will have three major system integration flight tests, the first
of which is a large-scale integration event that tests C\2\BM and
communications during multiple element intercept tests. We plan to
demonstrate C\2\ capabilities and communications among C\2\ and battle
management nodes, weapons, and sensors and to continue work with the
Services, Combatant Commands, and the Office of the Secretary of
Defense to ensure BMD system interoperability with legacy and planned
Department systems and standards.
We are requesting $3.2 billion in fiscal year 2004 to support RDT&E
for fielding Block 2004. Our estimated expenditure for Block 2004
activities across the FYDP is $6.2 billion (see Table 1).
TABLE 1.--BLOCK 2004 FUNDING FISCAL YEAR 2002-09
($M then-year) \1\
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Fiscal year-- FYDP Totals
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------- fiscal fiscal
Project year year
2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2004-09 2002-09
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
C\2\BMC Block 2004.................................. 21 80 114 79 ........ ........ ........ ........ 194 295
Hercules Block 2004................................. ........ ........ 18 27 ........ ........ ........ ........ 46 46
Joint Warfighter Support Block 2004................. ........ ........ 24 13 ........ ........ ........ ........ 37 37
Test & Evaluation Block 2004........................ 47 57 37 33 ........ ........ ........ ........ 70 174
Targets & CM Block 2004............................. 75 104 197 170 ........ ........ ........ ........ 367 547
THAAD Block 2004.................................... 808 888 622 635 65 ........ ........ ........ 1,322 3,018
GMD Test Bed Block 2004............................. 636 452 1,205 868 ........ ........ ........ ........ 2,073 3,161
Aegis BMD Test Bed Block 2004....................... 413 440 648 894 98 ........ ........ ........ 1,640 2,492
ABL Block 2004...................................... 454 348 345 150 ........ ........ ........ ........ 494 1,296
---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
TOTALS........................................ 2,454 2,369 3,212 2,868 163 ........ ........ ........ 6,242 11,065
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ Numbers may not add exactly due to rounding.
Boost Elements.--We are developing directed energy and kinetic
energy boost phase intercept capabilities to create a defense layer
near the hostile missile's launch point. We require quick reaction
times, high confidence decision-making, and redundant engagement
capabilities to counter ballistic missiles in this phase.
ABL is currently under development to acquire, track, and kill
ballistic missiles in boost phase using speed-of-light technology. ABL
integrates three major subsystems (Laser; Beam Control; and Battle
Management, Command, Control, Communications, Computers and
Intelligence (BM/C\4\I)) into a modified commercial Boeing 747-400F
aircraft. We will continue major subsystem integration and testing
activities. Block 2004 activities involve completion of ground-testing,
to include first light on the test bed aircraft, first flight of the
complete weapons system, and the successful track and high-energy laser
engagement of a missile-shaped target board dropped from high-altitude.
In fiscal year 2005, we will deliver one aircraft for BMD system
integration and testing and demonstrate a missile shoot-down against a
boosting threat-representative target.
Midcourse Elements.--Midcourse defense elements engage ballistic
missiles in space after booster burnout and before the warhead re-
enters the atmosphere. The GMD element defends against long-range
ballistic missile attacks, and Aegis BMD will counter from the sea
medium- and short-range ballistic missiles.
The Department's plans are to add by the end of fiscal year 2004
one more Ground-Based Interceptor (GBI) at Fort Greely in Alaska for a
total of six GBIs at that site, and four interceptors at Vandenberg Air
Force Base, for a total of up to 10 interceptors at both sites. The
decision to develop two interceptor sites is consistent with our
layered approach and operational concept and will allow us to work
through critical integration, battle management, and command and
control issues early on.
There are a number of other activities we need to undertake in
fiscal year 2005. We are asking for appropriations to produce up to ten
additional GBIs for fielding at the Fort Greely site, for a total of
sixteen interceptors in Alaska and four in California. We also plan to
produce by the end of 2005 between ten and twenty SM-3 missiles for
deployment on three Aegis ships converted to the missile defense
mission. Because we are starting from a base of zero, each interceptor
we field between now and 2005, up to the full complement of twenty
ground-based and twenty sea-based interceptors, will increase
significantly our overall capability to defend this country, our
troops, and friendly countries against long- and medium-range threats.
Included in the Test Bed and as part of the initial missile defense
architecture are plans for integrating Early Warning Radars (EWR) at
Eareckson AS (the Cobra Dane radar at Shemya, Alaska) and Beale AFB
(Upgraded EWR). We will add to this infrastructure multiple fire
control nodes and improved lines of communications connecting sites in
Alaska and the continental United States using fiber optics and
satellites. As you know, the Administration is working to secure allied
approval to upgrade and integrate into the BMD system early warning
radars currently located in the United Kingdom and Thule, Greenland to
view threat missiles launched out of the Middle East. The United
Kingdom already has approved the use of the Fylingdales radar. We also
plan to build by September 30, 2005 a Sea-Based X-Band Radar (SBX) to
improve the testing regime and enhance initial missile defense system
performance.
We have made dramatic progress in recent months with the GMD
element, including in the areas of silo construction, development of a
nationwide communications network, and integrated flight-testing. We
have excavated six silos at Fort Greely, seven weeks ahead of schedule,
and we are in the process of constructing and establishing appropriate
security for multiple Test Bed facilities at Fort Greely and Eareckson.
By the end of 2005, we will upgrade SPY-1 radars on fifteen Aegis
warships for enhanced surveillance and track capability. Three
prototype surveillance and track Aegis destroyers will be available
starting in 2003; we will modernize additional destroyers for
surveillance and track and BMD engagement capability. Two Aegis
cruisers in addition to the USS LAKE ERIE, our test cruiser, will
receive BMD engagement modifications.
The next SM-3 flight test, scheduled for later this year, will use
a reengineered Monolithic Divert and Attitude Control System (MDACS)
for the first time in the interceptor's kinetic warhead. MDACS has
proved to be more reliable than the previous model, faster to build,
and less expensive. Five at-sea flight tests and numerous tracking
exercises, including participation in GMD integrated flight-tests, are
planned through 2005. Our cooperative research with Japan will continue
to enhance the capabilities of the SM-3 interceptor. The focus of that
research is on four components: sensor, advanced kinetic warhead,
second stage propulsion, and lightweight nosecone.
Terminal Elements.--THAAD is designed to be rapidly deployable and
protect forward-deployed United States and friendly troops, broadly
dispersed assets, population centers, and sites in the United States by
engaging short- to medium-range ballistic missiles or their payloads at
endo- and exo-atmospheric altitudes. THAAD could have more than one
intercept opportunity against a target, a layering potential that makes
it more difficult for an adversary to employ countermeasures
effectively. This terminal defense capability will help mitigate the
effects of a WMD payload.
This year we will complete missile and launcher designs, initiate
manufacturing of missile and launcher ground test units, and begin
testing the first completed radar antenna. We will continue fabrication
of the second radar and building the battle manager and launcher test
beds. A total of four exo-atmospheric flight tests at the White Sands
Missile Range, New Mexico are planned for fiscal year 2004-05.
PAC-3 provides terminal missile defense capability against short-
and medium-range ballistic missiles, anti-radiation missiles, and
aircraft with a low radar cross-section employing advanced
countermeasures. PAC-3 successfully completed initial operational
testing last year, intercepting ballistic missiles, aircraft, and
cruise missiles. The tests uncovered problems that we have since
corrected in collaboration with the Army. We have completed development
of the PAC-3 missile and made C\2\BM modifications to enable PAC-3's
integration into the BMD system. We will continue to conduct PAC-3
tests this year. Later in Block 2004 we will demonstrate PAC-3's
integration with other BMD system elements.
With the support of Congress, the Department already has
accelerated PAC-3 missile production and currently has a plan to
increase that production rate to 20 missiles per month in 2005. Given
current production plans, by the end of 2005 the PAC-3 inventory will
stand at 332 missiles.
The Department has transferred PAC-3 procurement and RDT&E funding
to the Army, which is reflected in the Army's fiscal year 2004 budget
request. The MDA will retain responsibility for defining and testing
BMD system interoperability and continue to work with the Army on PAC-3
engineering, development, and testing. The Department realigned the
Medium Extended Air Defense System (MEADS) program on March 31, 2003 to
the Army.
The Arrow Weapon System, developed jointly by the United States and
Israel to counter short- to medium-range ballistic missiles, is
operational at two sites in Israel and interoperable with U.S. missile
defense elements. We worked with Israel to deploy its first two Arrow
batteries, and are currently assisting that country to procure a third
battery.
The Arrow System Improvement Program, a spiral development upgrade
of the current operational system, includes technical cooperation to
improve the performance of the Arrow system and test it at a U.S. test
range. The first flight test was conducted successfully on January 5,
2003. We continue to support additional Arrow flight-testing to assess
technology developments and overall system performance and to collect
data and conduct annual hardware-in-the-loop exercises with Israel to
enhance interoperability.
Block 2006
Block 2006 work continues to improve existing capabilities and
provide new sensors and interceptors for integration with fielded
elements. Our focus will be on evolving and integrating the capability
to achieve a more synergistic and layered BMD system. We will continue
rigorous system and element flight-test demonstration and validation
efforts and use wargames to help develop concepts of operation and
operational procedures.
We are requesting $2.2 billion in fiscal year 2004 to support RDT&E
for Block 2006. Our estimated expenditure for Block 2006 activities
across the FYDP is $11.3 billion (see Table 2).
TABLE 2.--BLOCK 2006 FUNDING FISCAL YEAR 2002-09
($M then-year) \1\
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Fiscal year-- FYDP Totals
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------- fiscal fiscal
Project year year
2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2004-09 2002-09
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
C\2\BMC Block 2006.................................. 4 27 53 104 116 ........ ........ ........ 273 304
Hercules Block 2006................................. ........ ........ 19 18 45 45 ........ ........ 127 127
Joint Warfighter Support Block 2006................. ........ ........ ........ 12 24 12 ........ ........ 48 48
Test & Evaluation Block 2006........................ 1 1 2 9 41 39 ........ ........ 92 93
Targets & CM Block 2006............................. 1 4 32 110 213 172 ........ ........ 526 530
THAAD Block 2006.................................... ........ ........ 109 208 598 498 113 ........ 1,525 1,525
GMD Block 2006...................................... 2,460 2,109 1,605 1,774 1,354 1,235 ........ ........ 5,969 10,538
Aegis BMD Block 2006................................ ........ ........ 24 73 377 299 ........ ........ 773 773
ABL Block 2006...................................... ........ ........ 10 86 150 79 81 55 461 461
BMDS Radars Block 2006.............................. ........ ........ 101 145 134 ........ ........ ........ 380 380
STSS Block 2006..................................... 55 232 276 285 285 204 75 35 1,160 1,447
---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
TOTAL......................................... 2,520 2,372 2,232 2,823 3,335 2,583 270 90 11,333 16,225
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ Numbers may not add exactly due to rounding.
Boost Elements.--We will enhance and test the integration of the
ABL aircraft into the BMD system. Candidate enhancements include
improvements in BMC\4\I, interoperability, pointing and tracking, and
target engagement. We will continue evaluation of the ABL test aircraft
capability against a range of threats. This aircraft will be available
to provide an emergency operational capability except for a maximum of
six months during fiscal year 2007 when it may undergo modifications
and enhancements.
Midcourse Elements.--We plan to enhance defensive capability and
further develop the Test Bed by maturing hardware and software of all
GMD interceptor, sensor, and C\2\BM components. We will continue our
ground- and flight-testing to demonstrate improved weapon and
discrimination performance and critical interfaces with external
sensors. We also plan to complete the upgrade of the Thule EWR should
we get approval from Denmark.
Aegis BMD flight missions will incorporate remote engagements of
targets as well as demonstrations against intermediate-range ballistic
missile (IRBM) targets. We will continue development of Aegis BMD
sensor discrimination capability. Prototype BMD signal processors will
be tested aboard Aegis ships with SPY-1 radar modifications. SM-3
missile deliveries will begin in 2004. Our plans are to build an
inventory of up to thirty-five SM-3 interceptors by the end of 2006.
Also, if directed, we would prepare to field up to twenty additional
SM-3 interceptors in 2007. We will proceed with our cooperative BMD
research with Japan to enhance the SM-3. We have two joint flight tests
of the advanced nosecone planned in the fiscal year 2005-2006
timeframe, and we will continue to look at possibilities for co-
development.
Terminal Elements.--The THAAD interceptor begins in the third
quarter fiscal year 2006 a series of five flight tests that are
scheduled to conclude in first quarter fiscal year 2008. We will
improve THAAD's exo-atmospheric and endo-atmospheric endgame
discrimination capability against increasingly complex targets.
Sensors.--Current plans call for a new forward-based radar in late
2006 for positioning close to the threat at sea or on land. Enhanced
forward-based sensor capabilities and improved sensor netting will
enable the BMD system to handle threats posing a more difficult
discrimination challenge and provide a launch-on-remote capability. A
midcourse radar will be added as part of our layered approach.
Additional radar configurations will be procured as necessary to
satisfy Block 2006 objectives.
Current plans are to launch two low-earth orbit satellites in
fiscal year 2007 to validate space-based sensor concepts for target
acquisition, tracking, and discrimination and to provide a space node
for the Test Bed. STSS will improve in subsequent blocks to provide
data fusion, radar/sensor cueing over-the-horizon, and interceptor
handover and fire control. Production alternatives will be evaluated at
least annually based upon element performance and integrated BMD system
performance.
Block 2008
Block 2008 represents a major step in BMD system evolution. We plan
to complete multiple layers of weapons and sensors, based on fixed and
mobile platforms, to counter a range of ballistic missiles. This block
will include C\2\BM components that enable integrated control of all
system assets throughout the battlespace. Primary development projects
include adding boost phase weapons to the Test Bed, integrating space
sensor platforms, and fusing multi-sensor discrimination products. We
will integrate capability-based targets and payload suites (to include
new and more complex countermeasures) into our system testing to
demonstrate effectiveness against evolving threats.
We are requesting $572 million in fiscal year 2004 to support RDT&E
for Block 2008. Our estimated expenditure for Block 2008 activities
across the FYDP is $16.3 billion (see Table 3).
TABLE 3.--BLOCK 2008 FUNDING FISCAL YEAR 2002-09
($M then-year) \1\
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Fiscal year-- FYDP Totals
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------- fiscal fiscal
Project year year
2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2004-09 2002-09
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
C\2\BMC Block 2008.................................. ........ ........ 1 12 27 144 145 147 476 476
Hercules Block 2008................................. ........ ........ 19 17 17 17 62 60 192 192
Joint Warfighter Support Block 2008................. ........ ........ ........ ........ ........ 12 29 31 71 71
Test & Evaluation Block 2008........................ ........ ........ 1 1 4 13 85 87 190 190
Targets & CM Block 2008............................. ........ ........ ........ 57 77 68 239 253 694 694
THAAD Block 2008.................................... ........ ........ ........ ........ 237 227 369 300 1,134 1,134
GMD Block 2008...................................... ........ ........ ........ ........ ........ ........ 878 877 1,756 1,756
AEGIS BMD Block 2008................................ ........ ........ ........ 116 186 322 470 386 1,481 1,481
ABL Block 2008...................................... 11 237 256 402 582 561 366 267 2,435 2,683
BMDS Radars Block 2008.............................. ........ ........ ........ ........ ........ 136 102 22 261 261
STSS Blk 2008....................................... ........ ........ ........ ........ ........ 82 177 89 348 348
BMDS Interceptor Block 2008......................... 54 100 296 529 1,013 1,562 1,939 1,890 7,229 7,383
---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
TOTAL......................................... 65 337 572 1,134 2,145 3,146 4,862 4,409 16,268 16,669
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ Numbers may not add exactly due to rounding.
Boost Elements.--ABL will integrate new technologies to improve
performance and lethality and enhance operational suitability. We will
continue development of promising technologies for insertion into Block
2008 and beyond and design and develop a system-level ground-test
facility for ABL. We plan to test a second ABL aircraft in the Test Bed
during Block 2008.
Plans also are to develop and integrate a mobile ground-based boost
phase hit-to-kill capability into the Test Bed for flight-test
demonstration. We will initiate a space-based test bed development to
determine the feasibility of intercepting missiles from space. Initial
on-orbit testing would commence with three to five satellites in Block
2008.
Midcourse Elements.--We will conduct up to three GMD flight-tests
annually to demonstrate advanced engineering and pre-planned equipment
improvements for the boosters, interceptors, early warning and fire
control radars, and C\2\BM and communications software builds. We plan
to enhance the Aegis Weapons System AN/SPY-1 radar to improve
discrimination for engaging both unitary and separating targets. We
will assess GMD integration with the BMDS Interceptor and also test the
interceptor on board an Aegis warship.
Terminal Elements.--We will complete the development and testing of
the THAAD weapon system. We are planning up to eight developmental and
operational-type flight tests to stress interceptor, radar, and C\2\BM
performance in realistic scenarios that include advanced
countermeasures.
Sensors.--Our work will build on the initial BMDS Radar
configuration and conduct sensor research to improve capabilities and
develop advanced algorithms. We will improve Family of Radar coverage,
performance, and flexibility and address vulnerability within the
context of the overall BMD system global sensor network. STSS
operations will continue to be integrated with other BMD elements in
the Test Bed and support enhanced C\2\BM development initiatives. STSS
will demonstrate the ability to acquire, track, and discriminate
midcourse objects with space-based infrared sensors.
Block 2010
Work in this block will continue spiral development projects for
weapon and sensor improvements and platform integration. C\2\BM and
communications improvements will enable highly resolved sensor data to
be exchanged with all BMD system elements.
We are requesting $24 million in fiscal year 2004 to support RDT&E
for Block 2010. Our estimated expenditure for Block 2010 activities
across the FYDP is $4.7 billion (see Table 4).
TABLE 4.--BLOCK 2010 FUNDING FISCAL YEAR 2002-09
($M then-year) \1\
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Fiscal year-- FYDP Totals
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------- fiscal fiscal
Project year year
2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2004-09 2002-09
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
AEGIS BMD Block 2010................................ ........ ........ ........ ........ ........ 8 104 145 257 257
STSS Block 2010/2012................................ 179 55 24 44 232 565 750 1,065 2,680 2,914
BMDS Interceptor Block 2010......................... ........ ........ ........ ........ 97 146 585 974 1,803 1,803
---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
TOTAL......................................... 179 55 24 44 329 719 1,439 2,184 4,740 4,974
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ Numbers may not add exactly due to rounding.
Boost Elements.--Block 2010 activities will improve exo-atmospheric
BMDS Interceptor performance and enable greater basing mode
flexibility, to include possible adaptation to sea-based platforms. We
will develop and test an advanced space-based test bed to augment or
replace the Block 2008 space-based test bed.
Midcourse Elements.--We will continue flight-testing improved
weapon and sensor components and work toward the integration of an
advanced BMDS Interceptor. Aegis BMD will incorporate prior block
developments into the Navy-developed next-generation, open architecture
Combat System.
Terminal Elements.--THAAD will integrate proven technologies to
enhance its capability against longer range and faster ballistic
missiles without sacrificing existing mobility and performance.
Fielding and survivability upgrades also are planned to demonstrate a
capability against both IRBM and ICBM threats.
Sensors.--New technologies will be inserted into subsequent STSS
blocks to provide precise threat tracking and improved discrimination.
We will develop and launch a satellite with improved sensors integrated
into the first common satellite bus, and develop and integrate advanced
ground station equipment and software. The Block 2010 STSS will deliver
a space-based capability to acquire, track and discriminate ballistic
missiles based on larger aperture track sensors, increased vehicle
lifetime, and increased, near-real-time on-board data processing. The
funding also includes launch services for Block 2010 satellites. C\2\BM
funding focuses on integrating STSS data into the sensor net.
Mission Area Investments
Our Mission Area Investments are investments common to the entire
BMD system that enable us to implement over time our block fielding
approach. Mission Area Investments maintain core development and
testing infrastructure and facilitate the integration of future block
capabilities. The President's Budget requests $1.69 billion in fiscal
year 2004 for these investments. This program activity accounts for
about $11.3 billion, or just over 20 percent of the total funding
estimate across the FYDP. Table 5 provides a detailed breakdown of
funding for each investment activity.
TABLE 5.--MISSION AREA INVESTMENTS FUNDING FISCAL YEAR 2002-09
($M then-year) \1\
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Fiscal year-- FYDP Totals
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------- fiscal fiscal
Project year year
2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2004-09 2002-09
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
System Engineering.................................. 236 397 436 474 501 510 580 578 3,079 3,713
C\2\, BM & Communications........................... 16 16 119 125 178 201 204 218 1,045 1,076
Test & Targets...................................... 359 332 338 332 328 352 316 333 1,998 2,688
International Programs.............................. 211 205 148 215 129 100 89 89 769 1,185
Advanced Concepts................................... 347 176 388 418 363 437 524 534 2,664 3,187
Program Operations.................................. 232 170 264 252 283 306 317 333 1,754 2,156
---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
TOTAL......................................... 1,400 1,296 1,692 1,817 1,783 1,904 2,029 2,083 11,309 14,005
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ Numbers may not add exactly due to rounding.
The significant Mission Area Investments are as follows:
System Engineering
The System Engineering activity defines, manages, and integrates
the layered BMD system. Capability-based acquisition requires continual
assessment of technical and operational alternatives at the component,
element, and system levels. Our system engineering process assesses and
determines system design and element contributions and the impact of
introducing new technologies and operational concepts to ensure
properly synthesized system blocks. These activities provide the
technical expertise, tools, and facilities to develop the BMD system
and maintain an intelligence and research capability to ensure that the
system evolves in a way that is responsive to known and anticipated
threats.
We are increasing our focus on risks related to producibility,
manufacturing, quality, cost, and schedule of the BMD system elements.
We dedicate resources to examine the applicability of technology to
system needs and transition readiness. Industrial and manufacturing
investment strategies for achieving system affordability and
facilitating insertion of successive new capabilities are increasingly
vital to the program.
Command and Control, Battle Management & Communications
(C\2\BMC)
Our activities related to C\2\BMC create interoperability among a
wide variety of legacy systems and emerging elements over joint and
coalition networks. The C\2\BMC activity will continue development and
integration of the C\2\BM and communications functions for the BMD
system. By fielding software development spirals that improve system
synergism, integration capability, and interoperability with external
systems, this activity expands the inherent C\2\BM capabilities of
fielded terminal, midcourse, and boost defenses. Communications funding
will develop and improve BMD system-wide communication links and sensor
netting functions to enable enhanced early warning and quicker
interceptor response times. The Joint National Integration Center
(JNIC) provides a common environment for the BMD elements to conduct
experiments, demonstrations, and exercises and is a key-operating
C\2\BM component of the Test Bed.
BMD Tests & Targets
The missile defense program includes significant test and
evaluation infrastructure, test execution capabilities, and analytical
tools for program-wide use. The Agency conducts risk reduction,
developmental, and operational element and component testing as well as
tests to collect critical measurements, such as plume signatures. We
also have a rigorous measurements test program to collect data in
support of design, development, and engineering activities.
Measurements from dedicated test events and targets of opportunity
enable us to design components, characterize potential countermeasures,
test algorithms, undertake lethality and kill assessment, and validate
our critical models and simulations.
Investments providing ballistic missile targets, countermeasures,
and other payloads support our test objectives. Presentation of the
targets and payloads for flight test events involves designing,
prototyping, developing, procuring, certifying, and qualifying for
testing. In fiscal year 2003 we will establish a single prime
contractor to further enhance system level management of targets and
countermeasures activities.
In fiscal year 2004 we will continue to resource critical test
facilities, launch capabilities, instrumentation, telemetry,
communications, and safety systems underpinning our testing regime.
With the enhanced realism of the Test Bed, the increasing complexity of
our tests, and the escalating tempo of test activity, our investments
in this area will emphasize flexibility, standardization, and mobility.
International Programs
The President has underscored the importance of working with other
countries to develop missile defenses and provide protection against
ballistic missile threats. We are building defensive layers that could
potentially involve a variety of locations around the globe and
probably involve many other countries. Last summer interagency teams
briefed key allies on the international participation framework. Today
we are well along in our discussions with several governments regarding
their possible participation in the missile defense program and
improvements in our industrial relationships.
Advanced Concepts
We have several Science and Technology (S&T) initiatives to
increase BMD system firepower and sensor capability and extend the
engagement battle space of terminal elements. In fiscal year 2004, we
will continue to focus on the Miniature Kill Vehicle (MKV) project,
which could lead to a flight-test in fiscal year 2005. Fiscal year 2004
funding will support investigating Early Detection and Tracking (ELDT)
technology, Laser/LADAR technologies for improved tracking, weapon
guidance, and imaging, and technologies for a space-based, high-power
laser. While our S&T activities are not on a critical path for
insertion into the BMD system, each one of them is being considered for
their block enhancement value.
Program Operations
Our Program Operations expenses are primarily for government
personnel performing management support activities, contractors that
assist in performing these activities, and O&M-like costs associated
with operations and maintenance at numerous facilities around the
country, supplies and equipment, communications and printing, travel
and training, and information technology management.
Management and Oversight
The missile defense program uses an acquisition approach tailored
to the unprecedented nature of the technology involved in missile
defense. We will continue to work very hard to ensure that the program
has adequate management and congressional oversight. There is an
improved process in place within the Department that preserves
management, technical, and financial oversight by cognizant authorities
on the Senior Executive Council and the Missile Defense Support Group.
Senior warfighters, including the Joint Requirements Oversight Council,
have reviewed missile defense objectives and will continue to do so
several times a year. Internally we have in place configuration
management procedures, and we produce on a regular basis the necessary
threat, system, and configuration control documentation to ensure that
our activities continue to support our development and fielding
objectives. As directed in the 2002 and 2003 Defense Authorization
Acts, we have identified cost, schedule, testing, and performance goals
and developmental baselines in the President's fiscal year 2004 Budget
justification materials and shown clear linkages between the Agency's
budget and key performance measures.
Closing
Mr. Chairman, we are on track with our missile defense program. We
know that the technology fundamental to the current generation of
missile defenses works. We have demonstrated many times over the past
two years that we can collide with a warhead and destroy it. We have
the confidence to proceed with plans for an initial defense capability.
A few years ago, I could not have said this to the American people.
Today I can. We will build confidence in the system over time as we
invest in the program.
We also recognize that we have much more work to do to improve the
BMD system. The architecture we have in 2004 and 2005 will probably be
very different a decade later, depending on how our RDT&E efforts
proceed. Our objective continues to be one of improving missile defense
capability over time. We have made considerable progress in missile
defense over the past three years. With the President's direction, and
with your approval of our budget request, we will take another
important step on that long road before us.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
OPENING STATEMENTS
Senator Stevens. Thank you very much, General.
I apologize to my colleagues. I had some things in the way,
and I didn't call on the Senators. Senator Cochran, did you
have an opening statement?
Senator Cochran. Mr. Chairman, thank you very much. I will
be glad to proceed to hear from Mr. Christie. I think they have
done a great job with this program, but I appreciate the
recognition.
Senator Stevens. Senator Shelby.
Senator Shelby. Same with me. I'd rather hear from the
witnesses.
OPERATIONAL TESTING
Senator Stevens. Mr. Christie.
Mr. Christie. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and distinguished
members of the committee. I also appreciate this opportunity to
appear before you today to discuss operational test issues
involved with building a missile defense testbed that may also
have some inherent defensive capability.
Let me emphasize up front my strong support for building
this testbed as a means of conducting more realistic ballistic
missile defense testing. It will provide us with an excellent
capability to test the integrated missile defense system
against more challenging targets and under more realistic
engagement conditions. Designed to accomplish this testing
mission, this testbed will have some limited capabilities to
defend against an actual threat, depending of course on certain
assumptions about intelligence of an imminent attack and the
positioning of sensors to acquire, track, and target the
threat.
Regardless of what we call this initial collection of
equipment, communications, and personnel, the fact remains that
we must build this test capability and put it in the field
before we can test the system. Additionally, it is prudent to
develop operational concepts and to train personnel in concert
with the testbed's development so that whatever inherent
capability exists in the testing infrastructure, it could be
employed to defend the United States in the event of a
ballistic missile attack.
I understand and share the concerns raised by several
members of Congress with the precedent of fielding operational
systems without adequate operational testing. The Missile
Defense Agency (MDA) under General Kadish is proceeding with a
design and development strategy that is very proactive when it
comes to testing. My staff and I are involved on a daily basis
with the MDA and the program managers for the various ballistic
missile defense system developments. We are reviewing test
plans, participating in planning meetings, witnessing tests,
providing coordinated advice, and responding in written reports
to Congress on the adequacy of these testing programs. I have
access to all the information I need to fulfill these
responsibilities.
I have completed my assessment of the PAC-3 initial
operational test and evaluation and documented the results in a
classified beyond low rate initial production report that was
provided to the Congress last November. I have also completed
my annual assessment of the overall MDA testing programs and
submitted that report to the appropriate committee of this
Congress.
In that report I do conclude that the ground-based
midcourse defense (GMD) element of the Ballistic Missile
Defense System (BMDS) has yet to demonstrate operational
capability. This conclusion is based on the fact that many
essential components of the GMD element have yet to be built.
We cannot test the GMD element without these critical
components and we cannot test it realistically without the
testbed.
This was illustrated recently when the exoatmospheric kill
vehicle failed to separate from the booster in Integrated
Flight Test 10. MDA subsequently restructured the flight test
program, eliminating further testing with the old booster
system. This decision considered the poor performance of the
surrogate booster system, and the risks of diverting booster
developers from the objective booster design effort, compared
with the advantages of gathering additional data from those
flight tests.
Beginning later this year and prior to the 2004 decision,
testing will resume with two flight tests for each of the
candidate boosters and a risk reduction flight for a target
launched from Kodiak in Alaska. Intercept testing will continue
in IFTs-14 and 15, using a new booster motor. This is followed
by integrated ground testing of the testbed and culminates in a
system test readiness review.
Current plans call for three more intercept flights for the
Aegis Ballistic Missile Defense system prior to the end of
fiscal year 2004; the first two intercepts against a non-
separating target and the last flight conducted against a
separating target. Additional flight testing beyond this point
is still in the planning stage. The purpose of the testbed is
to establish and define a baseline capability to realistically
integrate and test components of the BMDS, and to enhance
capability incrementally through block development.
The real challenge is to develop an operational concept for
using this testbed that integrates components of the BMDS as
they become available in order to evaluate the operational
capability of the system and to defend against a ballistic
missile attack, if needed. If we don't develop an operational
concept and an attack does come, then we will have failed in a
most serious way. On the other hand, if an effort to refine an
operational concept for an interim system significantly
distracts from building the objective system in an expeditious
fashion, then we risk similar failure against more
sophisticated threats down the road.
While the testbed is a research and development system,
this does not preclude us from addressing operational test and
evaluation. In fact, it is common for systems in development to
combine developmental and operational test objectives. The
testbed, including missiles, will provide us an early
opportunity to acquire valuable ground test data on intra- and
interoperability between the command and control center and the
silo/missile complex; on the system and missile health and
status built in testing capability; and on system safety,
reliability, maintainability, and logistics supportability.
Availability of this data will permit lessons learned from the
testbed to be considered in improving the objective GMD.
Every major GMD ground and flight test, both prior to and
after the 2004 testbed is available, formally addresses both
developmental testing and operational testing objectives,
consistent with the maturity level of the system. The Service
Operational Test Agencies personnel are dedicated to planning
the details of the operational test portions of these ground
and flight tests, and analyzing and reporting relevant
operational test data. My staff is working with these agencies
to define independent operational plans for the operational
test activities. I will review and approve these operation test
and evaluation plans and their associated data requirement. I
will use both developmental and operational test data as the
basis for my operational assessment in advising General Kadish
and the Defense Acquisition Executive. This assessment will
also be the basis for my annual report to the Congress.
Mr. Chairman, ladies and gentlemen, my staff has worked
diligently with the MDA staff to build what I feel is a very
effective relationship. I will continue to work closely with
General Kadish to ensure that the mission of the testbed, as a
testbed, is kept in perspective. I will continue to monitor
planning and testing activities to ensure that we test as
realistically and as thoroughly as we can, advise the Director,
MDA of operational testing concerns, and report my assessments
of progress to the Secretary and to you.
This concludes my opening remarks and I welcome your
questions.
[The statement follows:]
Prepared Statement of Thomas P. Christie
Mr. Chairman, Senator Inouye and distinguished members of the
committee, I appreciate this opportunity to appear before you today and
discuss operational test issues involved with building a missile
defense testbed that may also have some limited inherent defensive
capability. Let me emphasize up front that I strongly support building
this testbed as a means of conducting more realistic ballistic missile
defense testing. It will provide us with an excellent capability to
test the integrated Ballistic Missile Defense System (BMDS) against
more challenging targets under more realistic engagement conditions.
Designed to accomplish this testing mission, this testbed will have
some limited capability to defend against an actual threat, depending,
of course, on certain assumptions about intelligence of an imminent
attack and the positioning of sensors to acquire, track, and target the
threat.
Regardless of what we call this initial collection of equipment,
communications, and personnel, the fact remains that we must build this
test capability and put it in the field before we can test the system.
Additionally, it is prudent to develop operational concepts and train
personnel in concert with the testbed's development, so that whatever
inherent capability exists in the testing infrastructure could be
employed to defend the United States in the event of a ballistic
missile attack.
I understand and share the concerns raised by members of Congress
with the precedent of fielding operational systems without adequate
operational testing. Let me take a moment here to discuss my assessment
of this situation.
The Missile Defense Agency under General Kadish is proceeding with
a design and development strategy that is very proactive when it comes
to testing. My staff and I are involved on a daily basis with the
Missile Defense Agency and the program managers for the Ballistic
Missile Defense System elements. We are reviewing test plans,
participating in planning meetings, witnessing tests, providing
coordinated advice, and responding in written reports to Congress on
the adequacy of the testing programs. I have access to all the
information I need to fulfill these responsibilities.
I have completed my assessment of the PAC-3 Initial Operational
Test and Evaluation test results, which is documented in a classified
Beyond Low Rate Initial Production report, provided last November to
the Congress. I have also completed my annual assessment of the MDA
testing programs and submitted the report to the appropriate committees
of the Congress. In that report, I conclude that the Ground-based
Midcourse Defense element of the BMDS in essence has not yet
demonstrated operational capability. This conclusion is based on the
fact that many essential components of the GMD element have not yet
been built. We cannot test the system without these critical
components, and we cannot test it realistically without the testbed.
This was illustrated recently, when the exoatmospheric kill vehicle
(EKV) failed to separate from the booster in Integrated Flight Test-10
or IFT-10. MDA subsequently restructured the flight test program,
eliminating further testing with the old booster system. This decision
considered the poor performance of the surrogate booster system and the
risks of diverting booster developers from the objective booster design
effort, compared with the advantages of gathering additional data from
those flight tests.
Beginning later this fiscal year and prior to the 2004 decision,
testing will resume with two test flights for each of the candidate
boosters and a risk reduction flight for a target launched from the
Kodiak target launch site in Alaska. Intercept testing will continue in
IFTs-14 and 15, using the new booster. This is followed by integration
ground testing of the testbed and culminates in a system test readiness
review.
Current plans also call for three more intercept flights for the
Aegis Ballistic Missile Defense system prior to the end of fiscal year
2004, with the last flight conducted against a separating threat
target. Additional flight testing beyond this point is still in the
planning stage. The purpose of the testbed is to establish and define a
baseline capability, to realistically integrate and test the components
of the BMDS, and to enhance capability incrementally, through block
development.
The real challenge is to develop an operational concept for using
the testbed that integrates components of the BMDS as they become
available, in order to evaluate the operational capability of the
system and defend against a ballistic missile attack if so needed. If
we don't develop an operational concept and an attack does come, then
we will have failed in a most serious way. On the other hand, if an
effort to refine an operational concept for an interim system
significantly distracts us from building the objective system in an
expeditious fashion, then we risk similar failure against more
sophisticated threats down the road.
While the testbed is a research and development system, this does
not preclude us from addressing operational test and evaluation issues.
In fact, it is common for systems in development to combine
developmental and operational test objectives. The testbed, including
missiles, will provide an early opportunity to acquire valuable ground
test data on intra- and interoperability between the command and
control center and the silo/missile complex; on the system and missile
health and status or built in testing capability; and on system safety,
reliability, maintainability, and logistics supportability.
Availability of this data will permit lessons learned from the testbed
to be considered in improving the objective Ground-based Midcourse
Defense system.
Every major GMD ground and flight test, both prior to and after the
2004 testbed is available, formally addresses both developmental
testing and Operational Testing objectives, consistent with the
maturity level of the system. The Service Operational Test Agencies
personnel are dedicated to planning the details of the operational test
portions of the ground and flight tests, and analyzing and reporting
relevant operational test data. My staff is working with the
Operational Test Agencies to define independent evaluation plans for
the operational test activities. I will review and approve these
Operational Test and Evaluation plans and their associated data
requirements. I will use both developmental and operational test data
as the basis for my operational assessment, in advising General Kadish
and the Defense Acquisition Executive. This assessment will be the
basis for my annual report to the Congress.
Mr. Chairman, Ladies and Gentlemen, my staff has worked diligently
with the MDA staff to build what I feel is a very effective
relationship. I will continue to work closely with General Kadish to
ensure that the mission of the testbed, as a testbed, is kept in
perspective. I am working with the Service Operational Test Agencies to
identify data requirements for an operational evaluation plan that I
will review and approve. I will continue to monitor planning and
testing activities to ensure that we test as realistically and
thoroughly as we can, advise the Director, MDA of operational testing
concerns, and report my assessments of progress to the Secretary and to
you.
This concludes my opening remarks and I welcome your questions.
Senator Stevens. Thank you very much, Mr. Christie. Senator
Cochran.
Senator Cochran. Mr. Chairman, thank you very much.
I first want to congratulate both of you, General Kadish
and Mr. Christie, for a very workman-like and outstanding
performance in the duties that you have. This is a very
challenging task that we have given to you, but I think you
have demonstrated an ability to use the resources that you have
been given by the Congress and to develop tests and field some
very impressive missile defense systems. I think the
comprehensive approach is the right approach, for long-range
ballistic missile defense to shorter-range tactical challenges
that we face, and most recently in Iraq.
I would like, building on the experience we have had in
Iraq, to ask you what your assessment is of the missile systems
that we utilize to protect our troops and population centers in
the recent conflict. Could you tell us specific observations
that you have about the efficacy of the PAC group for example,
and other systems that we may have used?
General Kadish. Let me start first, Senator Cochran, and
give you some insight from where we sit on the Patriot as a
system and Patriot-3 in particular, and Mr. Christie can add to
it.
PATRIOT SYSTEM PERFORMANCE
As you would expect, a lot of the data that I would like to
talk about is classified, so I will keep it in the unclassified
range. But I guess when you look at the performance right now
of Patriot as a system, which includes earlier versions of
Patriot as well as Patriot-3, I would characterize the overall
performance as very encouraging. And the reason I say it that
way is that I think it is probably more proper for us to
discuss this when the war is over and we have the chance to
look in detail at all the engagements of Patriot and Patriot-3
that occurred during the war.
Now having said that, I would like to talk about some of
the things that we really know about the engagements and some
of the things that we think we know about the engagements.
What we know about the engagements is that from a ballistic
missile standpoint, we have engaged I think nine ballistic
missiles of short range character. In addition, what we know is
we have engaged those nine targets with a combination of
Patriot-2s and 3s. And the final thing we know is that they
didn't hit their targets for one reason or another. There were
some shots that we let go because they did not threaten any
particular defended area, but overall, the performance is very
encouraging from that standpoint that we seem to have engaged
the targets successfully.
Now what we think we know enters into a lot of speculation
because of the data gathering from the war and those kinds of
things we have ongoing, and it is probably better to wait until
the end of the war and we will have some more information
coming in to make definitive statements about it.
But from every indication I have seen and from the data
available, we have a pretty good combination and capability
against these missiles, and effectively it provides a national
missile defense capability, if you will, for Kuwait and so
forth.
In addition to that, I think you know that the Israeli
system, the Arrow is working in combination with their own
Patriot-2s and are in country on that side. So overall, the
performance of Patriot, and particularly Patriot-3, which has
had two specific engagements against BDMs, has been very very
good and as expected, but there is a lot of data we have to
gather to make sure that we can stand behind those statements
based on the battlefield type of information we're getting.
But it is a major first step and kind of a microcosm of
what we are trying to do in missile defense, because I can
conclude now that if this data proves out to be as I expect,
that hit-to-kill works in combat conditions, at least against
short range missiles.
Senator Cochran. Mr. Christie, do you have any comments?
Mr. Christie. I would add a couple thoughts to that. You
have received my classified report of last fall which pointed
out some problems that we experienced in the initial
operational testing. I am heartened that it appears some of the
more serious problems encountered in the operational testing
had been addressed and fixed by the Army before the deployment.
While we cannot get into the classified aspects of Patriot
Performance, it appears to have worked quite well.
My other comment is that I am concerned about the
fratricide incidents, and of course they are under
investigation. We don't know at this point in time whether we
can blame them on Patriot or blame them on problems with the
aircraft that were engaged.
I support General Kadish's statements otherwise.
U.S. NAVY INTEGRATION IN MISSILE DEFENSE
Senator Cochran. The other day we had before the committee
the Chief of Naval Operations (CNO), Vern Clark, and he made
some comments about the Navy's capabilities that they were
testing and developing, that he said offered promise for I
think a midrange defense surveillance system based on cruisers.
Tell me what your assessment is now of our capabilities and the
promise that we may be able to utilize the Navy in that way.
Are you encouraged by the progress of testing programs or do
you have plans for more aggressive testing in this area to
prove these systems?
General Kadish. Yes, Senator. The Aegis system itself is
part of the testbed that we're talking about here, and the
early fielding of equipment. We are very encouraged by the SM-3
successes, which is a component of that system now. We were
three for three and planning more tests this year and next
before we actually start building more of these early missiles.
In addition to that, I will just point out again that in
the Gulf area, the U.S.S. Higgins has been providing early
warning cues to the Patriot system for these engagements, which
is again, the type of integration that we want to see between
the systems and among the systems to make them work better.
So, I am very encouraged with the Aegis BMD program and the
Navy is working very well with us to handle the operations
impact of having surveillance capability as well as potentially
a defense against medium range missiles in the 2004 time frame,
very big steps forward in that regard.
Senator Cochran. I'm only going to ask one more question
and then yield to others.
MISSILE DEFENSE TESTBED
The fact that you have made a decision to use the testbed
in Alaska as a deployed system in fact that would provide our
Nation some defense or a defense capability against ballistic
missiles is encouraging to me, and I applaud you for it, and I
want you to know you have supporters in that decision. And I
wonder, when do you think you will be able to have the first
test of that testbed, what is the timetable?
General Kadish. I think we're still nailing down some of
the details, but I think it will be in the first quarter of
calendar year 2005 is when we're planning the first integrated
test of the testbed with an intercept test. Prior to that time
we will be doing an awful lot of ground testing, integration
testing on all the equipment across the board. So if I'm not
mistaken, I think that's the target time frame.
Mr. Christie. In particular, we will be using different
geometries, firing the target from Kodiak with an intercept or
launching from Vandenberg. That would be the first time we have
gotten away from the relatively unrealistic geometries used in
testing to date with the interceptors out of Kwajalein and the
targets from Vandenberg.
General Kadish. The plan currently includes, and we're
still debating this internally, two to three tests a year out
of the testbed configuration involving intercepts, and many
more ground tests involved. And we are even starting the
planning to do multiple systems integration, where we will try
to do a test against a long-range missile and at the same time
will try to intercept a medium-range missile with Aegis and
other types of systems. So that planning is ongoing and we
haven't nailed all those things down because this is new and
quite complicated, but that's the direction we're going.
Senator Cochran. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Senator Stevens. Senator Shelby.
MINIATURE KILL VEHICLE (MKV)
Senator Shelby. General, would you tell us what you can
about where the development of the miniature kill vehicle, the
MKV program currently is, and what improvements your 2004
budget request will allow you to make in this program? And just
say what you can. I understand where we are.
General Kadish. The miniature kill vehicle advanced
development is ongoing. We have an acquisition strategy to put
contractors on contract to actually build these vehicles and
start testing them. And I am very encouraged by the whole
process. In fact, we're looking even closer at how we can do
that better than where we started because of what we found out
over the past year.
And the budget request supports that effort in the overall
process, and we're looking cautiously optimistic about having
that added to the architecture in the latter part of the
decade, if we have the success that we expect.
STRATEGIC MISSILE DEFENSE COMMAND
Senator Shelby. What about the role of the SMDC and the
Technical Center is playing in this? They are right in the
center of this, are they not?
General Kadish. That's right. The SMDC and the folks
surrounding that, particularly in the Huntsville area, have
been the key to a lot of our successes. In fact when I look
across the board, we have an awful lot of people counting on us
across the country, particularly in places like Huntsville and
others at SMDC, to make it successful. And we only have about
550 some odd days before we want to actually declare the
testbed in operational capability, and everyone is working hard
to make that work.
Senator Shelby. General, do you feel pretty confident that
the mission of the MKV is on track to meet your flight
experience test goal in 2005.
General Kadish. I do, Senator. It's not going to be easy.
Senator Shelby. Like Senator Cochran says, it's a real
challenge but, you have been meeting those challenges.
General Kadish. We have, and I'm confident in our planning
and the management approach that we're taking, it all comes
down to people in the end, and we have some good people.
Senator Shelby. General, I fully support the President's
plan to field initial BMD capabilities in 2004. Establishing
the testbed is a critical step for the ground-based missile
defense strategy. This initial BMD strategy will set the stage
as we have been talking about, for a more robust and realistic
testing of ground integration of the future layered ballistic
missile defense capability. I expect there's enormous
complexity to this program, more than complex, I guess, and
want you to succeed.
GROUND BASED MID-COURSE DEFENSE
But some of us are concerned about the health of the
ground-based midcourse defense segment. I am concerned that the
GMD segment has been used to cover other funding requirements
within the MDA, to the extent that near-term objectives are
threatened. Is the GMD segment currently facing a budget
shortfall and if so, how large?
General Kadish. Well, Senator, we always have more
requirements than we do funding. So starting from that premise,
as I look at the GMD budget, we have increased the budget over
our last year's request in the 2004 column by about $400
million. We have added some tasks to make the operational
testbed portion of this, and I would say that overall in every
program, we rebalanced and reallocated, and it was somewhere
around $400 million to $800 million that had to be readjusted,
but there is a net increase to the overall budget in GMD. And
it's a matter of prioritizing the tasks to be done, and at this
point in time, I believe our request is adequate for what we
have set out to do. However, just like any other program, if we
run into problems and we have issues that we have to use money,
we're going to have to make some tough decisions in the overall
process.
Senator Shelby. Do you believe that you will be able to
meet your deployment testing and development objectives of GMD?
General Kadish. I believe we can under the current
framework, and I will be the first to let you know if we run
short.
Senator Shelby. Yes, sir, let this committee know.
General Kadish. Yes, sir.
MDA NATIONAL TEAM
Senator Shelby. Lastly, we are concerned about the impact
of the National Team. Is it fair to say that the National Team
is central to the MDA's ability to accomplish its mission?
General Kadish. I believe it is, and we have been--there is
some misunderstanding about what I mean by the National Team.
What I mean by the National Team is it includes government,
contractors, industry members across MDA to pull together and
do the hard engineering among and between the systems. And
quite frankly, I don't know how to get the technical job done
without that kind of effort.
And we have been 14 or 15 months into it. I would like it
to be a little further downstream in terms of our ability to
solve some of the problems.
Senator Shelby. Is that your major concern?
General Kadish. I think so, it's a major concern, but you
know, from a realistic standpoint, I think we're doing about as
good as we possibly could do at this point in the process. And
by this time next year, I think we will be much better off than
we are today in that regard.
Senator Shelby. General, we appreciate the job you're doing
and the leadership that you have shown. Thank you, Mr.
Chairman.
Senator Stevens. Senator Inouye.
Senator Inouye. Thank you very much. I regret that I was
late, Mr. Chairman, and I request that my statement be made
part of the record.
Senator Stevens. It will be.
[The statement follows:]
Prepared Statement of Senator Daniel K. Inouye
Today I am pleased to join our Chairman in welcoming to the
committee Lieutenant General Ronald T. Kadish, Director of the
Missile Defense Agency and Mr. Thomas Christie, Director of
Operational Test and Evaluation.
Missile defense is, of course, a program of great interest
to many, and one not without controversy. Indeed, the missile
defense program is one of the most critical national security
issues of today and for the foreseeable future.
There is no question that the ballistic missile threat
against our nation and our troops in the field will continue to
grow as technologies to develop and acquire ballistic missiles
continues to proliferate.
The question our country faces is how best to meet this
threat. The administration's plan calls for a ``layered''
defense to intercept ballistic missiles of all ranges, and in
all phases of flight to defend the United States, our allies
and friends, and our deployed forces around the world.
This is an expensive program. The fiscal year 2004 budget
request includes over $7.7 billion for the Missile Defense
Agency. It is also a complex program. Despite successes in
recent tests--and for that I commend you both--there are still
many technological hurdles to overcome.
Let me assure you, General Kadish, this committee views the
missile defense program as critically important to our national
security. And we will do our best to support your efforts.
Nevertheless, given the risks and costs of this program we will
remain ever vigilant in our oversight.
Today's hearing provides the committee an important
opportunity to understand the Department's fiscal year 2004
budget request and the priorities and challenges of the missile
defense program.
Gentlemen, we welcome your testimony.
AIRBORNE LASER (ABL)
Senator Inouye. General, can you give us an update to the
status of the airborne laser, its cost, its schedule, the so-
called weight increase, and why the funds were less for 2004
than this year?
General Kadish. Senator, the overall situation in the ABL
is that I guess I would characterize it is we are cautiously
optimistic about our ability to execute the ABL effort. We have
about 18 percent of the effort left to go if you measure it in
terms of the cost versus the tasks that we think we have to do.
So, about 80 percent done or thereabouts, with the toughest 18
percent to go.
From a cost standpoint, I believe we have enough budget to
handle the program as we currently understand it. We are
heading towards a shoot-down of a ballistic missile sometime in
the 18 to 20 month timeframe ahead of us. We're working that
schedule hard every day because when, if you look at Edwards
Air Force Base where we have all the hardware coming together,
it's all out there and we're putting it in the ground, and the
system that we have there in the carcass of a 747.
One of the things I'm looking forward to right now this
year is something we call ``first light''. That is, when we get
the laser to work in the ground-based configuration that we
have, and then we're going to put it in the airplane and do it
in the air, prior to shoot-down. If we accomplish that first
light this year, my confidence in meeting our scheduled goal of
18 to 24 months or thereabouts to do the shoot-down will go up
tremendously.
So that's what I'm looking for next, and we're having some
technical issues meeting those schedules, but I think on
balance we're doing pretty good given the technology.
There's this issue that kind of surrounds the program about
the weight of the laser modules in the airplane. Now certainly,
I would invite the committee members to go out to Edwards to
see this technical marvel, in my opinion. If you look in the
back of that 747, you can imagine how big the back of this
cargo airplane is. We fill up that cargo airplane with a lot of
plumbing and a lot of exotic material, and things that produce
this laser and the beam surrounding it.
The weight issue gets down to how heavy all this equipment
is for the overall airplane, and the fact that some of it is in
a certain part of the airplane. And you can overgross a part of
an airplane in terms of its floor weighting and that type of
thing, but not affect the overall weight of the airplane and
how it flies. So it's a complex interaction but the way I would
say it is, the weight issue is really not a problem with the
lasers, from my opinion. We know what it is.
What it affects is how long it flies; instead of 4 hours it
may be 3\1/2\ hours before refueling. And we know that it meets
the individual weight requirement for where we put it in the
airplane. So it's pretty heavy for the spot we put it in, but
it's still okay for the overall weight. Now what it means for
the long-term health of ABL is whether or not we can make the
airplane stay airborne longer from the overall operational
context, and certainly that will be desirable. But my main goal
right now, along with the many hundreds of people working that
program, is to make the laser work and shoot down a missile
with it, and the weight issue is not preventing us from doing
that and in fact is not something that we're worried about too
much for this configuration, it will be for later.
The budget request for fiscal year 2004, I think is a
little bit less than what we asked for last year, but that
reflects the fact that we want to be finished with this
particular part of the program in the fiscal year 2004 time
frame.
Now we're going to have to look at our performance on the
airplane to see whether or not we're actually going to finish
on time. As I said, we still have some uncertainty between 18
to 24 months, or when exactly that shoot-down is going to
occur. But to sum it all up, I am cautiously optimistic.
The cost issue, we potentially could overrun somewhere
between 15 to 20 percent on the program. We have enough budget
to cover the program effort and we are right on the edge of
making this very revolutionary technology to prove itself or
fail, and we just don't know the answer to that question, yet.
Senator Inouye. So we should not be too concerned about
your reduction in the request?
General Kadish. At least not right now, Senator. It's kind
of like I was telling Senator Shelby about the ground based. It
will depend on how well we can execute this year's budget for
ABL, and I think we have enough money now.
NAVY INTEGRATING, AEGIS
Senator Inouye. What is your arrangement with the Navy on
the Aegis system? There's a cruiser under your command isn't
there?
General Kadish. That's right. We needed to have a dedicated
vessel to do a lot of our testing for Aegis and in talking with
the Navy senior leadership, particularly the CNO, Admiral
Clark, we came to an arrangement where the Navy will actually
give us a cruiser to use for full-time testing. And they are
also working, having operational ships doing the mission for
the testbed that we described earlier. So we have been making
pretty good progress and we have the assets now, and we can do
the job.
Senator Inouye. So you would say you are pleased with the
agreement so far?
General Kadish. Yes, sir, very pleased.
Senator Inouye. Thank you very much. Thank you, Mr.
Chairman.
LASER FUNDING
Senator Stevens. Thank you, Senator.
General, I'm a little concerned about the reduction in
laser money funding too. Is there any real reason for that in
terms of, was that your decision or was that a decision of
others?
General Kadish. Well, Senator, that was done internally at
MDA and we basically made the allocation decisions I guess over
the past 6 or 8 months, and that's what you're seeing in the
final budget release. But as I said earlier, the time
difference between when we put the budget together and the
execution of the program may yield a different answer, but
right now I believe we have enough dollars to do the job. I
could get back with you later, both you and Senator Inouye,
with details of that for the record, and talk to you about it.
[The information follows:]
Airborne Laser
We were able to rephase ABL's fiscal year 2004 and fiscal
year 2005 funding between the submittals of PB03 and PB04. The
fiscal year 2004 reduction from $830 million to $610 million is
due primarily to the ``just in time'' payment schedule of the
``Green aircraft'' in fiscal year 2005 and stretching of the
iron bird funding and a better definition of the Block 2004
requirements.
MDA TESTBED, FORT GREELY
Senator Stevens. Is your Initial Operational Capability
(IOC) for Fort Greely still the same?
General Kadish. It is.
Senator Stevens. For 2004 or 2005?
General Kadish. We're heading--I have to be more precise in
order to manage the program and set goals, so our precise date
is September 30, 2004. Now recognize that date could move
depending on the problems we deal with in execution, but we are
driving the schedules to that date on balance.
Senator Stevens. And how many interceptors does that call
for at Fort Greely?
General Kadish. That's up to 10 interceptors.
Senator Stevens. Will there be any interceptors at Kodiak?
General Kadish. No, sir.
Senator Stevens. Will there be any at Vandenberg?
General Kadish. There will be four at Vandenberg and six at
Fort Greely, and then the next year we add 10 to Fort Greely.
AIRBORNE LASER
Senator Stevens. Back to the laser. Do you have a schedule
for that in terms of what its IOC is?
General Kadish. I guess the way, the sort of short answer
is no right now, because we have to actually do the
demonstration and the test before we can be confident on when
we can actually build more of those systems. But another way to
look at it is that once we have the shoot-down with the
airplane that we have today, we will have a basic capability in
that airplane if it's needed for other reasons, just like we do
with the ground-based testbed.
So, a prerequisite for me to answer that question with some
certainty is when we actually demonstrate the capability to
shoot down a missile with high energy laser from that airplane,
we could make a decision on whether or not we should proceed or
how we should proceed to build more of those systems. That
planning is ongoing now but we haven't nailed down a date. I
would assert that it would be as soon as practical if it's
successful, because it's such a big addition to the overall
architecture.
BOOST VEHICLE TESTING
Senator Stevens. Our staff tells me that the Director of
Operational Test & Evaluation (DOT&E) fiscal year 2002 Annual
Report indicates that testing of boost vehicles thus far has
been limited to relatively low velocity intercepts, which tests
only a small portion of the threat engagement space. What's
your comment on that? Why is that?
General Kadish. That's true. This gets back to having the
test geometry that flies our targets out of Vandenberg and
intercepts the interceptors out of Kwajalein. Two years ago we
didn't know whether hit-to-kill could actually work, so what we
were trying to do with that basic test geometry is to show that
it not only can work but it can repeatedly do it in the same
geometry. We have proven that.
So it is true that the overall envelope, if you will, all
the different points that we could actually possibly intercept
an incoming missile, has not been tested. But the key element
of whether or not we could do it at all and do it reliably has
been tested in a very small part of that envelope. Now we have
models and simulations that tell us that all the other parts of
the envelope, even with that limited amount of testing, we
could be confident to some degree that this thing would work if
it was in the right place and deployed configuration.
So I think this is a natural progression, and that is why
we need the testbed, so that we could take different geometries
and plot them within the overall envelope, and then we would
have more confidence in our computer models and simulations,
even more than we do today, that it's accurate with real data.
So, we started out very legitimately with what we are
testing today, and that provides us some data but it's directed
to a very limited part of the envelope. Now we want to build a
testbed and over the next few years fill out the rest of it,
and that will give us more confidence in our operational
capabilities.
PATRIOT FRIENDLY FIRE INCIDENTS
Senator Stevens. Turning to Patriot, there have been two
instances in Iraq where the Patriot has really locked on to
friendly force equipment. It was explained to us that that was
the result of a failure of the use of proper Identification,
Friend or Foe (IFF) codes. Is that true?
General Kadish. Well, certainly that might be a
contributor, but I just don't think we know yet based on all
the things that we need to have from the investigation of that
problem. Now certainly what we call combat identification,
which these IFF codes help us with, has been a problem for
friendly fire incidents for a long time, and any system like
this has to deal with it. But I don't think we can definitively
answer that question until we get the investigation over with
and we get the ops tempo of the war to the point where we can
do even more investigation on it.
Senator Stevens. Have we ever tested the Patriot-3 against
Scuds?
General Kadish. Yes, Senator, we have, and Scud-type
materials, and we have a pretty good characterization of what
we think Patriot-3 can do against those types of threats. Going
beyond that, I would prefer to give you more classified
information on that.
PATRIOT TESTING/PERFORMANCE
Senator Stevens. I'm just interested in whether we have
really explored the full capability and envelope on what the
Patriot should be relied upon and whether there is a gap there
in terms of our basic missile defense system.
General Kadish. I would say that with the testing we've
done, we have anchored the models and simulations. I think
maybe Mr. Christie could add some comments to this, but we have
a pretty good analytical capability anchored in actual test
data on the capabilities of Patriot-3.
Senator Stevens. Mr. Christie?
Mr. Christie. As I stated earlier, we forwarded a
classified report to Congress last November which is explicit
as far as the PAC-3 system's demonstrated capabilities and
against the various threat targets, that we feel confident
about.
Senator Stevens. I'm not familiar with that report. Did you
give it to the Armed Services Committee?
Mr. Christie. That was a report sent to Congress in
November 2002, and we can certainly make sure that you get a
copy.
The report was based on the testing that was done prior to
that time, the initial operational testing for PAC-3. PAC-2 was
used during those tests also. As I stated earlier, problems
that we encountered in testing, the Army took action to clear
up. Without getting into detail, I would recommend that you
take a look at the classified report.
SEA BASED X-BAND RADAR
Senator Stevens. I will. Those are PAC-3s that are over
there now, right?
Mr. Christie. Yes. I think we have fired four.
General Kadish. We have fired four PAC-3s, but most of the
engagements have involved the PAC-2 version in the blast
fragmentation activities, so it's an integrated system, and
they've used it to good advantage. One of the reasons we're not
using only PAC-3s in my view is that we just don't have enough
of them in the initial production, and I think the PAC-2 is
handling it.
Senator Stevens. You know, I feel a little responsible for
that to a certain extent, given that we asked the question of
why it should be used solely against an incoming vehicle, I
remember that, but we asked the military to boot it up to a
PAC-2 level and now this PAC-3 level.
But I really don't totally understand the problem of
interception with a combat identification or IFF concept. Maybe
we ought to talk about that in classified session.
General Kadish. I think that would be helpful.
Senator Stevens. Why don't we do that, and I want to ask is
whether that's a defect in the system or a defect in the
application of the system.
General Kadish. I think it may be both, it could possibly
be both.
Mr. Christie. There are investigations underway into each
of the three incidents. I think we should wait until they are
complete before we begin jumping to conclusions as to where the
fault lies.
Senator Stevens. You talked before about this in terms of
the sea-based X-band radar concept. Where does that stand now
and where is the platform?
General Kadish. The sea-based approach is ongoing and they
are doing the engineering and naval architecture and everything
they need to do to build that radar. I believe the platform is
about ready to be brought to the United States for construction
and modification, and we're on the verge of doing that.
Senator Stevens. What's the time frame on that?
General Kadish. I believe that's imminent. I would have to
get you the exact date for the record.
[The information follows:]
Sea-based X-Band Radar
The SBX platform departed Sandefjord, Norway, under tugboat
power, on April 25, 2003. It arrived in Brownsville, Texas, on
May 30, 2003.
Senator Stevens. This has been significantly accelerated,
as I understand it; is that right?
General Kadish. I'm not sure it's accelerated, but it's an
aggressive plan that we had to build this radar. The platform,
we were planning on doing it by September 2005, have it in the
testbed and part of the test for architecture.
Senator Stevens. Is that going to be added or part now of
the ground-based midcourse defense system?
General Kadish. From a testbed standpoint, yes, and then we
will have to decide whether or not it can contribute from an
operational standpoint.
Senator Stevens. Is it planned to move that to various
portions of the world to test it?
General Kadish. There is a plan to move it all around the
Pacific, to be a part of the tests that we have been describing
here. And that's important, because that also has an envelope
that we have to characterize. And the disadvantage we have now
with the radar we have in Kwajalein is that it's out of place,
it's too far back in the trajectory. And these radars are
rather huge, this is a 5 million pound radar, the construct
it's going to sit on. And the advantage we have is that we can
move it around the Pacific, we don't have to place it on land
somewhere, and then do the types of trajectory tests that we
need to do. So it's key from that standpoint.
Senator Stevens. I hate to tell you, General, but my mind
goes back to the films my son showed me when he was the captain
of a king crab boat, a 170-footer, in the Pacific facing 30-
foot seas. I hope your people are nautical enough to know what
you're doing to put that kind of a weight on a barge and trying
to move it around the North Pacific.
General Kadish. That's something we're paying a lot of
attention to, Senator. The last thing we want to do is
jeopardize that type of an asset. We appear, and I have good
confidence in the naval architects that are doing this and all
the contractors involved, and I have seen the data on the 100-
year wave type of activity, and operationally I don't envision
we would be putting it in that kind of harm's way unless we
absolutely had to.
Senator Stevens. Well, respectfully, I don't think you can
tell you which direction they are going to come from out there.
That earthquake that hit Hawaii put a tidal wave up our inlet,
and it came across the sea as a 60-foot wave. Anything that was
even anchored on shore in either Hawaii or Alaska was destroyed
and a cruise ship. I really seriously question putting that
kind of equipment--it's going to be on a platform, it's going
to be barge-operated, isn't it, pulled by a barge?
General Kadish. No, it has its own power.
Senator Stevens. It's self-propelled? What's its dimension,
do you remember, how wide is it?
General Kadish. I would have to get the actual numbers for
the record but I think it's got, the platform on top is at
least 300 yards wide.
[The information follows:]
Sea-based X-Band Radar
The SBX platform is self-propelled, and when complete it
will be able to travel at a maximum rate of approximately 10
knots. Normal transit speed will be approximately 7 knots. The
Moss CS-50 platform is 238 feet across at its beam and 389 feet
long. It is 137 feet tall, from its keel to the main deck.
Senator Stevens. So it's self-propelled and 300 yards wide?
General Kadish. This type platform operates in the North
Sea today doing oil drilling, so it's designed to be
stationary.
Senator Stevens. I've seen it; in fact, it's Norwegian.
General Kadish. That's right.
Senator Stevens. It has a drilling rig on it, it didn't
have that kind of weight on it. Well, I'm not going to belabor
it, but I have serious questions in terms of, you know, the
shores of Alaska are just loaded with barges which got struck
broadside by a wave.
General Kadish. I understand, and we're taking those
concerns to heart, Senator.
MEDIUM EXTENDED AIR DEFENSE SYSTEM (MEADS)
Senator Stevens. With regard to the MEADS concept, this is
an international program now with Germany and Italy, correct?
General Kadish. That's correct, Senator.
Senator Stevens. Last year we transferred that program to
MDA and this budget transfers it back. Is this going to be a
ping pong game? Why is it coming back within 1 year?
General Kadish. Well, I think there are a couple reasons
for that. One is that the basis of the MEADS program is the
PAC-3 missile. As a key component we decided to make that
particular weapons system, and overall it is an international
practical system designed to take a PAC-3 missile and make the
radars and the mobility of this system fit our operating style
for the next decade. It is fundamentally an air defense system
with a ballistic missile defense capability, basically what
Patriot is today.
And so that combination, along with the fact that we're
using the Patriot-3 missile which we basically developed
already, makes sense to put it under the management of the
United States Army as an integrated system, within Patriot, and
have a transition from Patriot to a MEADS type of configuration
over time. And we discussed this long and hard within the
Department, and the overall conclusion is that this is a better
way to manage the program and I think you will see management
or program improvements as a result of this process. And from
an overall funding perspective, it makes sense to integrate
these programs within the Army, and that's why you see it
coming back into the Army line.
It is more than just budget, it is how we manage the
program. Now, we will still have partnership with the Army over
its integration into the overall missile defense system and
we're working that management linkage today. But fundamentally
it needs to be an air defense and ballistic missile defense
integrated system, which is best managed with the Army handling
those issues. I don't know if you wanted to add anything.
Mr. Christie. No, I agree with that. In fact, we just had a
review of the program, I guess Monday morning, at which these
issues were aired in support of the decision to transfer the
overall management responsibility to the Army because of the
considerations that General Kadish has outlined here.
Senator Stevens. Have the current problems we have with
Germany and Italy at all affected this program?
General Kadish. I think actually we're coming to the end of
what we call the Program Definition and Risk Reduction (PDRR)
phase, the research and development stage of this program,
getting ready to negotiate the next section of the
international agreement. And I think overall, they haven't
affected the execution of the present program in the process.
Now we may need some adjustments as we go forward into the next
phase of the program.
Senator Stevens. This will require a contribution from all
three countries to affect this newest phase?
General Kadish. That would be the hope, yes, Senator, so we
can share some of the development costs with the partners that
are enrolled. If I recall correctly, I think the cost share is
somewhere in the neighborhood of 45 percent for our partners
and 55 percent for us, so if we can really make this
relationship work, we get a better deal from the overall
cooperative program.
MDA TESTBED--KODIAK
Senator Stevens. This is my last question. You made a
comment about the Kodiak phase of this, that there would be no
interceptors there, just the missiles to be tested, right?
General Kadish. Targets.
Senator Stevens. The target missiles; is that right?
General Kadish. That's the current plan.
Senator Stevens. Have you put a schedule out for that, so
we will know in advance how many of those will be tested there?
General Kadish. I think we're working on the next 2 years,
and we will get you that information.
[The information follows:]
Kodiak Targets Schedule
Over the next two years, our current plan shows two tests
using the Kodiak Launch Complex. A STARS target launch
conducted as part of a GMD Integrated Flight Test in the 1st
Qtr fiscal year 2004 and a STARS target launch conducted as
part of a GMD Risk Reduction Flight in the 4th Qtr fiscal year
2004. On the first test the target will fly a trajectory
towards Kwajalein. The second test will include a target flying
a trajectory toward the open ocean area west of Vandenberg AFB.
Senator Stevens. I was just wondering, how far out is it
going, 2 years?
General Kadish. Right now we're working on the next 2 years
with the follow-on program right after that.
Senator Stevens. That's fiscal year 2004?
General Kadish. Fiscal years 2004 and 2005, and then we
will work on the next 2-year process as soon as we get that.
Senator Stevens. Again, I congratulate you. I share Senator
Cochran's point of view that utilizing the testbed concept and
having some missiles available, due to the tensions that exist
in the North Pacific, is a very wise course to be on, and I
congratulate you for it. You were ahead of the curve on that
one.
Certainly with some of the developments taking place over
there now, I just told Senator Inouye, I went home and talked
to them about some of the things that have been going on, and
our people are very worried about what's going on in North
Korea, and we have every reason to worry about it.
But we look forward to perhaps getting a schedule,
gentlemen, if you wish, right after we come back, if we could
have a classified session, no hearing, just session where you
might talk to the people here who are really concerned about
the security phase of this, I would appreciate it.
General Kadish. I would be more than happy to, Senator.
Senator Stevens. Senator Cochran, further questions?
THEATER HIGH ALTITUDE AIR DEFENSE (THAAD)
Senator Cochran. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, I do have a
couple more questions. One is about the theater high altitude
air defense program, which seemed to have gotten off to a
pretty fast start, and there was some sense of urgency
following the Gulf War that we needed this system. But it seems
that it slowed down, and a fairly low risk schedule at this
point seems to characterize the program. I wonder what your
plans are for your next intercept test. I understand it's not
scheduled until fiscal year 2005. Is that going to be a program
that's going to go slower rather than faster?
General Kadish. I think, if I may take a crack at that
first, I think some of the lessons we learned from that in what
we call the PDRR phase in the latter part of the nineties, we
took it to heart and as you know, the last two intercepts were
very successful, gave us great confidence in proceeding with
THAAD and the program.
The program we put together basically redesigned the
missile and the processes involved within THAAD as well as some
of the radar work to get a much more capable system than what
we had been working on, even in the PDRR phase.
That flight test program was laid up, I guess we started
that in the 2000 time frame, and we have been working real hard
on that. And the first flight tests are still scheduled for
late 2004, early 2005, with the first two tests of the missile
being a non-intercept test.
And we believe that is exactly the right development
approach for us to take and there are two reasons for that. One
is that we're doing extensive ground testing right now at the
component level so that we can wring out the quality and design
flaws at the component level before we assemble them and then
test them in these first two or three flight tests. The second
reason why I think that's important is that if we are
successful in doing what I just described, that I would have
high confidence that our early intercept tests would all be
successful. And under those conditions, we could move faster
with the balance of the program than if we had failures in the
overall sequence.
So, I'm expecting now that we are about 30 percent and
climbing complete, almost 40 percent overall finished with this
design phase, that we will have done the job that I described
and we will set the foundation for success and that in the end,
we will have made THAAD in a deployed configuration sooner than
if he had tried to go faster. And I know that has been a major
debate, but only time will tell if we were right about that.
Mr. Christie. I totally agree with that. I think we learned
some harsh lessons, and in fact that's where the term rush to
failure was coined in the description of some of the activities
that we had underway in THAAD. As General Kadish says, we have
backed up and are doing some component testing which have been
successful recently, walking before we run and doing this
right, so when we get to the actual flight tests of the system
next year, the latter part of next year, we will have
confidence and we will not encounter some of the problems that
we had before.
SPACE TRACKING SURVEILLANCE SYSTEM (STSS)
General Kadish. And I would add one thing. If we add those
successes early on, we will find it's taking major risks if we
accelerate, and we feel that it is adequate.
Senator Cochran. Last year you restructured the Space Based
InfraRed System (SBIRS) low program and renamed it STSS. What
does that stand for?
General Kadish. Space tracking and surveillance system.
Senator Cochran. My question is, it seems to be a less
ambitious program than the earlier version. Do you still think
that you need to have these advanced tracking systems deployed
in space, or are you rethinking that entirely?
General Kadish. I know we're rethinking the combination of
sensors we have without the treaty now. We want to make sure
that we have the best combination of sensors, and there is a
major debate inside the community, if you will, over whether we
should have space sensors or land-based or terrestrial-based
radars, or a combination of things based on affordability
reasons and a whole host of other catch phrases. In my view,
that debate is not resolved yet, and the STSS program that we
put together is designed to get us more data than just view
graphs to base the decision on, and it is important for us to
proceed in that regard.
So, we are rethinking the overall sensor requirements for a
system without treaty restriction. What I see today does not
dissuade me that we do not need to do--I should probably say
that I am persuaded that the track we're on is the right track,
and we need to get these systems better understood. And a
fundamental issue around STSS is whether the long-wave infrared
is the appropriate technology to use for that satellite, and we
will answer that question with the STSS program.
Senator Cochran. Thank you.
Senator Stevens. Senator Inouye?
Senator Inouye. Thank you very much.
MISSILE DEFENSE COUNTERMEASURES
Mr. Christie, some of the critics have suggested that very
inexpensive countermeasures such as balloons or chaff can foil
our very expensive missile defense systems. Are we testing more
complex countermeasures and decoys?
Mr. Christie. As we go on with our flight tests, yes, we
will, you know, address more complex countermeasures than we
have in the past. You know, one has to step back and think, do
these complex countermeasures, we have a difficult time
building them ourselves, and we have to wonder what kinds of
capabilities are really going to be there with the enemy's
system. But yes, we do plan to get into more complex, more
difficult countermeasures.
We, again, in the program or test flights that we've had to
date, we were trying to demonstrate primarily the hit-to-kill
capability, and we were using simple countermeasures to get
some idea about the ability of the seeker to discriminate. And
again, that was walk before you run, so some of the criticisms
I think have been misplaced. You can't just jump in with a
massive countermeasure to defeat the purpose of your original
test, which was more technology oriented. But as we go along
with our flight tests, our present plan is to increase the
complexity of the systems that we are targeting, yes.
MDA TEST SCHEDULE
Senator Inouye. So you're satisfied with your testing
schedule?
Mr. Christie. Well, as a tester, one would always want to
test more, but I understand and support the concepts of the
plan that we have underway right now, and I think it's so
important that we get this testbed in place in order to
overcome some of the artificialities that we have had in our
testing to date, which the critics have jumped on. This testbed
will permit us to do far more realistic testing, not just in
the context of countermeasures, but geometries, velocities that
we talked about, crossing angles and other parameters that we
need to be looking at in a more realistic fashion.
ADDITIONAL COMMITTEE QUESTIONS
Senator Inouye. Like my colleagues, I would like to tell
you that I am very satisfied with the work your agency is
doing, and I for one will be in favor of keeping your roles.
But, as you know, my friend from Alaska and I do live in the
Pacific, and we do get a little edgy once in a while. Thank
you.
Senator Stevens. Any more questions, Senator?
Senator Cochran. No, sir.
[The following questions were not asked at the hearing, but
were submitted to the Department for response subsequent to the
hearing:]
Questions Submitted to Lieutenant General Ronald T. Kadish
Questions Submitted by Senator Dianne Feinstein
aggressive testing schedule
Question. Thomas P. Christie, Director of Operational Test and
Evaluation for the U.S. Department of Defense, cited the past tests
lacked realistic positioned midcourse sensor to track incoming enemy
missiles and variety in test intercept locations, and asserts more
stringent and improved testing procedures are needed to ensure the
success of the program.
Can you confirm that we have in fact embarked on an aggressive
testing schedule that adequately addresses the real world intercept and
decoy scenarios a missile defense system may face?
Answer. Yes, I can confirm that both the ground and flight testing
that is planned for the BMDS system and its elements are aggressive and
build in complexity, to include more realistic test geometries and more
sophisticated countermeasures. One of the characteristics of the
capabilities based approach is to take manageable steps toward the
objective system, while learning how to improve performance and expand
coverage based on its performance during earlier block testing. This is
particularly important in and evolving threat environment.
availability of a mature effective bmds
Question. At our current rate of testing and development, when do
you think we will have the technological maturity to fully field an
effective missile defense system?
Answer. Since the state of threat technology continues to progress,
we will have to continually improve BMDS performance and verify new
capabilities through testing. This will include conducting tests
against new, more challenging targets, and associated countermeasures.
In this respect, technological maturation will continue even after full
fielding is realized. If we successfully complete testing that is
currently scheduled, I believe that we will improve the BMDS and, more
importantly, our confidence in its performance, so that by the end of
the decade we will have a well-characterized capability that can be
relied upon. It is more difficult to predict whether or not
countermeasures designed to defeat the BMDS will keep pace with
development.
booster enhancements for aegis
Question. Before deployment, the Sea and Ground Based Mid-Course
segment will need to improve the effectiveness of the Standard Missile-
3 (SM-3) to intercept ICBMs during the ascent phase of mid-course
flight. To achieve this, the current SM-3 will need to be larger and
faster than the current model used for testing.
Is the improved SM-3 ready for testing?
Answer. Because the Block 04 Aegis BMD is not intended to engage
ICBMs, only SRBMs and MRBMs, no propulsion improvements to the SM-3
missile are currently planned. Consequently, readiness for testing
becomes moot.
no aegis boost phase capability in block 04
Question. If not, will any delay dramatically affect the
capabilities of the Block 04 system the administration is looking to
deploy?
Answer. The lack of an enhanced booster for the Aegis BMD system
will not affect the capabilities of the Block 04 system. The role of
Aegis in the Block 04 system will be to provide engagement capability
against SRBMs and MRBMs, surveillance and tracking of long-range
targets, automatic search and acquisition of a target from a cue
provided by an external sensor, and limited ship self defense. The
target cue provided by Aegis will be used by the Ground-based Midcourse
element of the Testbed to launch ground-based interceptors at the
threat. Subsequent block development will include the enhancements to
the Aegis Weapon System for IRBM capability.
Question. The 2004 missile defense budget is seeking $7.7 million
for RDT&E (research, development, test and evaluation).
Given the high costs that have already been projected for RDT&E,
based upon current research and success, what do you estimate the
complete layered system will cost?
Answer. As directed by the President, we have a near-term
architecture for a limited missile defense system. A capabilities-based
architecture provides the flexibility to evolve the system over time in
response to changes in threat and technology. Fielding opportunities
occur throughout the development, starting with Block 2004. The cost of
a ``complete'' system is unknowable at this time because the threat we
may have to counter is unknowable. We're embarking on an affordable R&D
program that fields modest capabilities in fiscal year 2004 and then
improves them over time to keep pace with an evolving threat.
Question. The completed ballistic missile defense system will need
to be an overlapping system-of-systems that is reliable, robust,
capable of incorporating up-grade features as their feasibility is
demonstrated, and able to engage threats at each stage of their
employment-boost phase, midcourse, and terminal. The President
requested to have a missile defense system in place by fiscal year 2004
and the implementation of a final overlapping system-of-systems by
fiscal year 2010.
Based on the current success of the program, do you believe that
this milestone will be met?
Answer. We have an aggressive RDT&E program that is on track to
develop a set of missile defense capabilities for initial defensive
operations in fiscal year 2004. Our recent testing and analysis gives
us confidence in responding to the President's December direction to
deploy an initial capability, and we will continue robust RDT&E to
build on that initial capability in an evolutionary manner to keep pace
with emerging threats and technological advances.
Question. In the fiscal year 2004 budget request, there was a
request for an exemption of further operational testing of the
ballistic missile defense system. In March, the Undersecretary of
Defense, Edward Aldridge announced, ``It was not our intent to waive
operational testing.''
If the intent was not to exempt testing prior to fielding the
weapon system, what was the purpose of the exemption request?
Answer. The question refers to proposed section 8061, which read in
full:
``Sec. 8061. Funds available to the Department of Defense under the
heading, `Research, Development, Test and Evaluation, Defense-Wide' may
be used to develop and field an initial set of missile defense
capabilities, and such fielding shall be considered to be system
development and demonstration for purposes of any law governing the
development and production of a major defense acquisition program. The
initial set of missile defense capabilities is defined as `Block 04'
Ballistic Missile Defense system fielded in fiscal year 2004 and 2005.
Subsequent blocks of missile defense capabilities shall be subject to
existing laws governing development and production of major defense
acquisition programs.''
This was not drafted to waive operational testing, as the fielded
developmental items will continue to be tested. However, we understand
concerns that the language ``and such fielding shall be considered to
be system development and demonstration for purposes of any law'' would
have that effect, and agree to delete it and all that follows.
Question. Does testing under the guidelines of the Director of
Operational Testing and Evaluation negatively impact the program?
Answer. No, the program is not negatively impacted by DOT&E testing
guidelines. MDA and DOT&E have established an effective working
relationship. DOT&E is a member of the Missile Defense Support Group
and provides testing advice to the Director, MDA and to USD (AT&L).
Additionally, DOT&E produces a congressionally directed annual report
on the status and effectiveness of the MDA test program.
Question. What is the current MDA position on this request?
Answer. MDA supports striking all after ``capabilities'', so that
Sec. 8061 will read as follows: ``Funds available to the Department of
Defense under the heading, `Research, Development, Test and Evaluation,
Defense-Wide' may be used to develop and field an initial set of
missile defense capabilities.''
______
Questions Submitted to Thomas P. Christie
Question Submitted by Senator Kay Bailey Hutchison
Question. Is the Theater High Altitude Area Defense program
experiencing a shortfall in funding that will delay the program's
progress? If so, please explain your plan to remedy the situation.
Answer. The THAAD program is not experiencing a shortfall in
funding that would delay the program's progress. The THAAD element just
completed a program re-plan that provides for the most efficient use of
resources, the most effective program schedule, and realigns the flight
tests for a balanced program. The program is progressing well in Block
04 and executing on plan to initiate Block 04 flight-testing with first
flight in 4QFY 2004, followed by four additional flight tests to be
conducted before the end of Block 04 (December 2005). The THAAD program
is currently engaged in intensive piece part, assembly, and component
ground testing to assure Block 04 flight test success.
______
Questions Submitted by Senator Dianne Feinstein
Question. Mr. Christie, in your statement, you mentioned your
initial assessment (annual review) concluding the GMD (Ground-based
Midcourse Defense) element of the BMDS has not yet demonstrated
operational capability is based on the fact that many essential
components of the GMD element have not yet been built.
What are these components?
Answer. Booster motors, sea-based radar (x-band), missile silo
complex at Fort Greely and Vandenberg.
Question. Are any of these components scheduled for procurement at
a later block?
Answer. Booster motors.--Booster motors that are currently under
development will be used for the Block 2004 Test Bed and initial
defensive operational capability. Testing of the OSC and BV+ boosters
is a high priority for MDA, and there will be four flight tests (two
booster verification flights and two integrated flight tests with
simulated intercepts) during the rest of this fiscal year.
SBX.--The SBX is planned to be added to Block 2004 at the end of
2005.
Missile silo complex at Fort Greely and VAFB.--The silos at Fort
Greely are currently under construction as part of the Block 2004
initial GMD parts of the BMDS Test Bed and IDO capability. The
additional silos at VAFB will be renovated to support Block 2004 IDO.
Question. When should we expect the essential components to be
fielded?
Answer. Booster motors.--Booster motors will be fielded in the
initial defensive operational capability no later than September 30,
2004.
SBX.--The SBX is planned to be added to Block 2004 at the end of
2005.
Missile silo complex at Fort Greely and VAFB.--Six silos at Fort
Greely and four at VAFB will be a part of the initial defensive
operations capability fielded in 2004.
Question. When will the MDS be accurately tested for operational
capability?
Answer. With the President's decision to field an initial set of
missile defense capabilities, we now have a clear, basic, near-term
architecture for a limited system to address a range of missile
threats. The initial testbed will be used to test maturing BMD systems
as they become available to evaluate the operational capability of the
system.
Current testing of the Ground-Based Midcourse Defense (GMD) Element
developmental prototype is structured as combined Developmental
Testing/Operational Testing (DT/OT), occurring in a Combined Test Force
(CTF) environment. A CTF environment brings together developmental and
operational testers from both the prime contractor team and the
government in a common forum to plan and execute all testing in
accordance with combined DT and OT objectives to the maximum extent
practicable. Because GMD is an evolutionary development, at designated
intervals this process culminates in BMD Elements characterization,
performed by the Operational Test Agencies (OTAs), i.e., Army Test and
Evaluation Command (ATEC), Air Force Operational Test and Evaluation
Center (AFOTEC), and Joint Interoperability Test Command (JITC).
The Aegis Ballistic Missile Defense Program has a Memorandum of
Agreement with Commander, Operational Test and Evaluation Force
(COMOPTEVFOR), the Navy's OTA, to participate in the planning and
observe all Aegis BMD Block 04 testing. Within 60 days of the
conclusion of each test, COMOPTEVFOR provides a ``Letter of
Observation'' which provides formal OTA feedback regarding system
performance to the Program Director, Aegis BMD. COMOPTEVFOR's
recommendations are then considered and, if possible, implemented in
subsequent testing. Flight Mission 9, which is currently the last test
of the Aegis BMD Block 04 program, is currently being planned as a
combined DT/OT in that COMOPTEVFOR will conduct a formal Operational
Assessment of the system.
Current planning efforts for Initial Defensive Operations (IDO),
scheduled to be in place on September 30, 2004, include the
identification of test objectives based upon element interoperability;
Command and Control, Battle Management, and Communication (C\2\BMC);
Engagement sequences, and Warfighter operational control issues. These
will be overlayed onto GMD and Aegis BMD element tests scheduled
between now and IDO that will afford an opportunity for an operational
assessment of BMDS Initial Defensive Capability (IDC). Tests will be
conducted in the BMDS Test Bed with operational configurations and user
participation.
Question. Mr. Christie, if the initial fielding of the BMDS is to
develop a testbed for further research and not employ an actual defense
system, wouldn't it be more cost effective to complete the testing
under the initial fielding, with minimum missiles, than to field the
budget request and have to go back later to retrofit?
Answer. Before the President's December decision to deploy a
missile defense, the fiscal year 2003 President's Budget reflected the
development of a set of test bed capabilities that could be made
operational. The fiscal year 2004 President's Budget I, based on the
President's direction, asks Congress to authorize and appropriate funds
to allow us to add to this test bed and make it operational in 2004.
Therefore, instead of building a test bed that might be used
operationally, we are fielding an initial defensive capability that we
will continue to test.
There is tremendous benefit to fielding this unprecedented
technology, in manageable increments, to provide some defense, to learn
more about it, gain experience with it, and improve it over time. To
achieve this benefit for MDA and our warfighters, we must have the
assets and infrastructure in the field if we are going to begin to test
the system under operationally realistic conditions. If we do not have
the weapons and sensors fielded at operationally useful locations, we
cannot realize these benefits and ensure the integrated system works in
a useful manner for our military.
Additionally, there is historical precedence in this approach as
evidenced with development of our first reconnaissance satellites and
land- and sea-based ballistic missiles. Urgent national security
requirements pressed us to deploy capability soon, and through trial
and error we did. The parallels between these pioneering programs and
the missile defense program are clear.
Our test bed evolutionary approach to initial defensive capability
is rational from a cost standpoint as well. We do not now have adequate
understanding of our long-term architecture to submit a budget for many
tens of billions of dollars, and we don't need to submit such a budget
to achieve our goals in the interim. We are able to purchase and field
capabilities in small numbers and this approach will allow us to
control costs and mitigate the requirement for retrofitting.
Finally, we have to strike a balance between our desire for
perfection in missile defenses that we deploy, and our desire to have,
as soon as possible, some defensive capability where none exists today.
SUBCOMMITTEE RECESS
Senator Stevens. Thank you very much, General Kadish and
Mr. Christie. We appreciate you being with us this morning and
look forward to you talking to us after the recess.
The subcommittee will next meet on April 30 for the defense
medical program hearing. Thank you very much.
[Whereupon, at 11:17 a.m., Wednesday, April 9, the
subcommittee was recessed, to reconvene at 10 a.m., Wednesday,
April 30.]