[Senate Hearing 108-158]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
DEPARTMENTS OF COMMERCE, JUSTICE, AND STATE, THE JUDICIARY, AND RELATED
AGENCIES APPROPRIATIONS FOR FISCAL YEAR 2004
----------
THURSDAY, APRIL 10, 2003
U.S. Senate,
Subcommittee of the Committee on Appropriations,
Washington, DC.
The subcommittee met at 10:03 a.m., in room S-146, the
Capitol, Hon. Judd Gregg (chairman) presiding.
Present: Senators Gregg, Hollings and Kohl.
DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
Federal Bureau of Investigation
STATEMENT OF ROBERT S. MUELLER, III, DIRECTOR
OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR JUDD GREGG
Senator Gregg. The hearing will come to order.
We appreciate Director Mueller taking time out of his very
busy schedule at the FBI, which is obviously one of the premier
agencies in this country for protecting our Nation in this time
of heightened concern. The FBI has taken, I think, a dramatic
role in the area of leading this effort and has a huge
portfolio and, thus, it is nice to have the Director here to
talk to us about his budget and about his game plan.
And, Senator Hollings, do you have an opening statement?
Senator Hollings. No. Thank you.
Senator Gregg. So we will turn to you, Director.
Mr. Mueller. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, Senator Hollings. I
beg your indulgence for a short statement.
Senator Gregg. Certainly.
OPENING STATEMENT OF ROBERT S. MUELLER
Mr. Mueller. Let me just start by saying as I think you
have pointed out, and due in no small part to the support we
have had from this committee, the FBI is undergoing
extraordinary and, I believe, positive changes. I believe we
are more prepared today than we ever have been to meet the
threats posed by terrorists, foreign intelligence services and
criminal enterprises. The changes we have made in the past 18
months, and many others that are ongoing, will ensure that the
FBI stays on top of current and future threats well into the
21st century.
I believe that our fiscal year 2004 budget request will
give us the resources we need to continue our positive
momentum. As you are well aware, our total request is $4.6
billion, and we are requesting program changes totaling $513
million including 2,346 new positions, 503 of which will be for
special agents.
I would like to spend a moment walking you through some of
our progress to date in certain areas, the assessment of the
threats that we still face in this country, and the changes
that we are making to align our resources to the threats we
confront.
COUNTERTERRORISM
As I know you are aware, our top three priorities currently
are counterterrorism, counterintelligence and cyber crime. In
turning first to counterterrorism, since the attacks of
September 11th, the FBI has made the prevention of terrorist
attacks our number one priority. I am pleased to report our
efforts have yielded major successes over the last 18 months.
As you are aware, we have disrupted suspected terrorist cells
in Buffalo, Detroit, and Portland. And the recent apprehension
in Pakistan of Khalid Shaikh Mohammed, a key planner and the
mastermind of the September 11th attack, is also a significant
achievement in the war on terrorism.
We also have been successful in choking off terrorists'
ability to fund their acts of terror. We have frozen $125
million from more than 600 accounts around the world, and
conducted 70 financial investigations with 23 convictions to
date.
Also in Pakistan, last month the Pakistanis apprehended
Mustafa Ahmed al-Hawsawi, a major financial planner for Al-
Qaeda.
As Al-Qaeda and other terrorist organizations change
tactics, the FBI must be equally agile. We, too, must evolve,
and we are evolving. We have dramatically increased our
intelligence analysis and dissemination capabilities and are
now focusing on long-term strategies to upgrade these
capabilities.
Our fiscal year 2004 request includes approximately $1
billion in direct support for counterterrorism. Understandably,
the number of counterterrorism cases has risen dramatically
since September 11, 2001, and the recent capture of high-
ranking Al-Qaeda operatives and the information we have gleaned
from their debriefings suggests that those numbers will
continue to climb.
We need to have the resources to handle those increased
numbers of counterterrorism cases. Nearly 50 percent of all of
our requested program changes in 2004, or $250 million,
supports our counterterrorism mission. In particular, the 430
positions proposed in the budget will strengthen investigative
support in the field and improve counterterrorism management
and coordination at Headquarters.
Additionally, the requested amounts would support 66 of--
the 66 Joint Terrorism Task Forces we have nationwide, which
are critical to facilitate information sharing and act as a
first line of defense against terrorist attacks.
COUNTERINTELLIGENCE
The second priority for us is counterintelligence. We
have--we look at our counterintelligence mission in four
sectors. First and most significant is the potential for an
agent of a hostile group or Nation to produce or use weapons of
mass destruction. Second is the potential for a foreign power
to penetrate the intelligence community. Third is the targeting
of Government-supported research and development. And finally,
the fourth is the potential compromise of certain critical
national assets spread across the United States.
Just as we are transforming our counterterrorism program,
we are also transforming our counterintelligence. We have
reorganized the program and realigned our resources to
concentrate on emerging threats. We now have full-time
counterintelligence squads in 48 of the 56 field offices
dedicated to investigating hostile foreign intelligence
services. In the 2004 budget, we are requesting $63 million and
599 positions of which 94 would be for agents.
Let me turn for a second to briefly discuss the events that
occurred yesterday in Los Angeles. As you are aware, I believe,
yesterday in Los Angeles a retired FBI supervisor, Special
Agent James J. Smith, was arrested along with a former
intelligence asset, Katrina Leung. For many years, Smith, who
had recruited Leung, served as her primary handler. The
allegations against Smith and Leung are contained in criminal
complaints which were unsealed yesterday. And because the
matter is pending in Federal Court, I really cannot comment on
the merits of these cases or on the strength of the evidence
against Smith and Leung.
I do want to point out, however, that when I learned of
these--of this possibility in January of this year, we
immediately took steps to address this issue. I brought in a
person by the name of Randy Bellows who had done the report on
Wen Ho Lee in the Justice Department, an experienced prosecutor
from the Eastern District of Virginia, to go out to Los Angeles
and review what had occurred in those cases and to come back
and give me recommendations.
Based on his recommendation, I appointed an Inspector in
Charge, and it was the individual who was the lead agent in the
Aldrich Ames case, to conduct a thorough covert investigation
of the charges in Los Angeles. We gave him a task force in
excess of 30 individuals who were separate and apart from the
Los Angeles field office. And he conducted that investigation
leading to the charges yesterday.
I have also asked the Inspector General to look at the
performance of the Bureau with regard to this and other cases
out there. And I am not content to wait for the Inspector
General's review. I have asked the Inspection Division to look
at the managers who may have had some responsibility and
immediately get back to me a report on their responsibility for
what happened out there.
I also want to point out that it is--we have, since January
of last year, instituted a number of reforms out at the FBI
Headquarters to ensure that these types of problems are
corrected, not only out there, but throughout the FBI. In June
of this last year, we established a rigorous Asset Validation
Review Program to strengthen agent accountability and
management oversight, and made significant changes in the
senior management within the Counterintelligence Division. And
as I have said before, we have promulgated a national
counterintelligence strategy with centralized program
management.
We cannot minimize the problems in the Los Angeles program,
but we have moved firmly to correct those problems. And quite
obviously, I believe that to be an isolated event and I remain
proud of the work of the many thousands of men and women of the
FBI for the service they render every day to the United States.
But we, as an organization, must learn from the mistakes of the
past so that we do not repeat them in the future.
CYBER CRIME
Leaving counterintelligence, the third priority is cyber
crime. We, as just about everybody else in the United States,
continue to see an explosive growth in cyber crimes. Last year
we established a consolidated new Cyber Division at
Headquarters to manage these investigations and to help us
coordinate our public and private sector partners.
In our 2004 budget request, we are requesting $234.4
million to protect the United States against these attacks. We
are seeking 194 positions, of which 77 would be for agents.
In addition to the traditional cyber crimes, over the past
6 years, we have seen cases involving child sexual exploitation
grow in number from 113 to over 2,300. The requested resources
for 2004 will help us to keep pace with this burgeoning
caseload.
Lastly in the cyber area, 6 out of 10 of our investigations
currently require some level of computer forensic support.
History tells us that the number of cases requiring this
support will grow. These resources would allow us--the 2004
resources which we request would allow us to expand our ability
to conduct computer forensics examinations.
TECHNOLOGY PROGRESS
A last moment on our technology progress. We have made
substantial progress in the last 18 months. On March 28, we
completed the Trilogy Wide Area Network. It was completed 3
days ahead of schedule. There were some that said that we could
not do it, much less do it on time. That wide area network has
been deployed to 622 FBI locations. Over the last 18 months, we
have also installed 21,000 new desktop computers and nearly
5,000 printers and scanners.
We are now focused on implementing the data warehousing
capability that will bring together our information into a
database or databases that can be accessed by agents throughout
the world, as well as our analysts, as soon as that piece of
information is developed.
In today's world, we cannot afford to allow our technology
to become obsolete. And it is essential that we preserve these
investments by ensuring there is sufficient funding for life
cycle operations and maintenance of systems and for technology
refreshment, and the 2004 budget request includes a request for
$82 million for this purpose.
Mr. Chairman, in addition to the priorities I outlined
today, the FBI is also requesting funding to continue
restructuring our security programs, to augment nuclear DNA
efforts, and to support our ongoing crackdown on corporate
corruption.
prepared statement
I believe that my Bureau is in the process of turning a
corner in its history. We have made substantial changes to
better equip us to protect America over the last 18 months. We
must continue to evolve. We must continue to grow. And with
your support, we can give our agents the resources and tools
they need to carry out their mission of protecting America.
Thank you for the opportunity to give a brief statement.
Senator Gregg. Thank you, Director. We appreciate that.
[The statement follows:]
Prepared Statement of Robert S. Mueller, III
introduction
Good morning. Chairman Gregg, Senator Hollings and members of the
Subcommittee, I welcome the opportunity to appear before you to discuss
the FBI's fiscal year 2004 budget request. The FBI is undergoing
extraordinary, positive change, to better meet the threats posed by
terrorists, foreign intelligence services, and criminal enterprises. We
have changed our organizational structure to address the greatest
threats facing our country, to be more dynamic and flexible, and to
ensure accountability. And we are dramatically upgrading our
information technology. These changes, and many others that are
ongoing, will ensure that the FBI stays on top of current and future
threats well into the 21st century.
The FBI's fiscal year 2004 budget request will give us the
resources we need to keep this positive momentum. Our total request is
$4.6 billion. We are requesting program changes totaling $513 million,
including 2,346 new positions, 503 of which are Special Agents. This
morning, I would like to briefly walk you through our progress to date,
our assessment of the threat and the changes we are making to align our
organization and resources to address the threat.
Before beginning, let me make one caveat to my testimony. We are
still analyzing the impact of the 2003 Omnibus Appropriations Act on
our 2004 request. It is possible that some changes to the request may
be required to reflect the 2003 enacted level. We will be working with
the Appropriations Committee on this analysis.
counterterrorism progress
The prevention of another terrorist attack remains the FBI's top
priority. We are thoroughly committed to identifying and dismantling
terrorist networks, and I am pleased to report that our efforts have
yielded major successes over the past 18 months. Over 228 suspected
terrorists have been charged with crimes, 113 of whom have been
convicted to date. Some are well-known--including John Walker Lindh and
Richard Reid. But, let me give you just a few recent examples:
--In March, Khalid Shaikh Mohammed was located by Pakistani officials
and is in custody of the United States at an undisclosed
location. Mr. Mohammed was a key planner and the mastermind of
the September 11th attack. Since the arrest, the FBI worked
with other agencies to disrupt his financial network in the UAE
and Pakistan and we are continuing to get extremely valuable
information from him.
--On March 16, Abdullah al-Kidd, a U.S. native and former University
of Idaho football player, was arrested by the FBI at Dulles
International Airport en route to Saudi Arabia. The FBI
arrested three other men in the Idaho probe in recent weeks.
And the FBI is examining links between the Idaho men and
purported charities and individuals in six other jurisdictions
across the country.
--In February, members of the Palestinian Islamic Jihad, including
Professor Sami Al-Arian, were arrested by the FBI and charged
under Racketeering Influence and Corrupt Organizations with
operating a racketeering enterprise from 1984 until the present
that engaged in violent activities.
--Six individuals in Portland, Oregon, were arrested by the FBI and
charged with conspiracy to join al Qaeda and Taliban forces
fighting against U.S. and allied soldiers in Afghanistan. All
six have entered plea negotiations.
--And, in Buffalo, the FBI arrested seven al-Qaeda associates and
sympathizers. These individuals, members of a suspected sleeper
cell, were indicted in September 2002 for providing material
support to terrorism.
In addition, we are successfully disrupting the sources of
terrorist financing, including freezing $125 million from 62
organizations and conducting 70 financial investigations, 23 of which
have resulted in convictions.
counterterrorism threat
Despite these successes, tangible terrorist threats remain. During
this period, we are clearly focused on immediate threats to the nation
because of the war in Iraq. In order to respond to potential threats,
our Strategic Information and Operations Center at FBI Headquarters and
our field special command posts are operating on a 24 hour basis. We
established an Iraqi Task Force. And, our agents have interviewed over
9,000 individuals and are obtaining important information to help
protect the American public.
But, even as we guard against this potential Iraqi threat, we
believe that for the foreseeable future, the al-Qaeda network will
remain one of the most serious threats facing this country. While the
United States has made progress in disrupting al-Qaeda at home and
overseas, the organization maintains the ability and the intent to
inflict significant casualties in the United States with little
warning.
changing to meet terrorist threats
As al-Qaeda and other terrorist organizations change their tactics,
the FBI, too, must evolve. And we are evolving.
Our new Analysis Branch in the Counterterrorism Division has
produced 30 in-depth analytical assessments, including a comprehensive
assessment of the terrorist threat to the homeland. We have also
improved analyst training and dramatically beefed up our language
translation capabilities.
I am now focusing on long-term strategies to enhance our ability to
collect, analyze, and disseminate intelligence. I have put in place a
new, formal structure that will enable the FBI to assess gaps and to
establish formal policies and strategic plans for intelligence
collection. A new Executive Assistant Director for Intelligence (EAD/I)
will have direct authority for the FBI's national intelligence program,
and will ensure that we have optimum intelligence strategies,
structure, and policies in place.
We are establishing, in every field office, Intelligence units
staffed with Reports Officers. These specially-trained individuals
collect and extract intelligence from FBI investigations and share that
information with our law enforcement and intelligence partners.
fiscal year 2004 counterterrorism request
Our fiscal year 2004 request includes approximately $1 billion in
direct support for counterterrorism. Nearly 50 percent of all requested
program changes, or $250 million, supports counterterrorism. In
particular, the 430 positions proposed in the fiscal year 2004 budget
will strengthen operational support around the country and improve CT
management and coordination at FBI Headquarters. New personnel would
provide an increased level of guidance, legal advice, and operational
support to investigators on the front line of the war on terrorism. We
must also continue to grow our cadre of strategic analysts. The number
of FBI counterterrorism cases more than doubled last year, and with the
recent capture of high-ranking al-Qaeda operatives, the number of cases
will continue to climb.
The requested amounts would support 66 JTTFs--critical multi-agency
task forces that facilitate cooperation and information sharing, and
act as a ``first line'' for preventing terrorist attacks. It would
expand vital international partnerships by adding new FBI Legal
Attaches in Sarajevo, Bosnia; Kuwait City, Kuwait; Tashkent,
Uzbekistan; Kabul, Afghanistan; and Belgrade, Serbia, and by enhancing
our presence in several existing locations to handle a growing
workload.
Approval of this budget request would also improve FBI crisis
response capabilities, so we are prepared to respond to the scene of a
terrorist attack at home or abroad quickly and effectively, with the
equipment we need.
counterintelligence progress
Mr. Chairman, so far this morning I have focused on the terrorist
threats facing this country. Our counterintelligence efforts are also
vital to national security. I want to emphasize that the FBI is
thoroughly engaged in fighting the serious threat from foreign
intelligence services and their assets. The FBI had several successful
investigations in this area. Last month, Brian Regan agreed to accept a
life sentence for attempted espionage and unlawful gathering of defense
information. In October 2002, Ana Montes was sentenced to 25 years in
prison following her plea of guilty to one count conspiracy to commit
espionage on behalf of Cuba.
counterintelligence threats
Intelligence threats fall into four general categories. The most
significant--and our top counterintelligence priority--is the potential
for an agent of a hostile group or nation to enhance its capability to
produce or use weapons of mass destruction. A second threat is the
potential for a foreign power to penetrate the U.S. Intelligence
Community. A third threat is the targeting of government supported
research and development. The individuals awarded research and
development contracts in support of ongoing operations and war-making
capabilities constitute the highest risk. The fourth threat is the
potential compromise of Critical National Assets (CNAs). The nation's
CNAs are those persons, information, assets, activity, R&D technology,
infrastructure, economic security or interests whose compromise would
do damage to the survival of the United States.
changing to meet intelligence threats
Just as we have worked to transform ourselves within the
counterterrorism program, we have made significant changes to the FBI's
counterintelligence program. Last May, when I announced the second
phase of the FBI reorganization, I indicated that we would be
refocusing our counterintelligence program to focus on the four threats
I outlined. That effort is progressing with a centralized, nationally
directed program. We established a Counterespionage Section responsible
for overseeing all of the FBI's counterespionage efforts, including
economic espionage, and we clarified our priorities and objectives in a
``National Strategy for Counterintelligence.''
With your support, we reprogrammed 216 positions from criminal
investigations to counterintelligence, and we now have full-time
counterintelligence squads in 48 of the 56 field offices.
fiscal year 2004 counterintelligence budget request
For fiscal year 2004, we ask your support for program changes
totaling $63 million and 599 positions, including 94 agents, to further
our counterintelligence strategy. These resources would provide the
necessary investigators, analysts, and surveillance capabilities needed
to address emerging global threats, bolster both our fixed and mobile
surveillance capabilities, and improve our ability to detect espionage
activities targeting national assets and universities.
cyber crime progress
Next, I would like to discuss our third priority--cyber. We have
created a consolidated new Cyber Division at Headquarters to manage
investigations into Internet-facilitated crimes, to support
investigations throughout the Bureau that call for technical expertise,
and to help us coordinate with public and private sector partners.
This strategy is proving successful. Our computer intrusion
program, for example, has identified over 5,000 compromised computers,
and resulted in 320 convictions and $20.4 million in restitutions.
During 2002, Innocent Images National Initiative investigations
resulted in 692 arrests, 648 indictments/informations, and 646
convictions. And despite using only 5 percent of all FBI resources, the
Cyber Program is facilitating investigative activities across all
Bureau programs.
cyber crime threat
Unfortunately, we are seeing explosive growth in cyber crime--both
traditional crimes such as fraud and copyright infringement that have
migrated on-line, and new crimes like computer intrusions and denial of
service attacks.
To date, terrorists have posed only low-level cyber threats, but
some organizations are increasingly using information technology for
communication. Terrorist groups are increasingly computer savvy, and
with publicly available hacker tools, many have the capability to
launch nuisance attacks against Internet-connected systems. As
terrorists become more computer savvy, their attack options will
increase.
changing to meet cyber threats
Looking forward, our Cyber Program will focus on identifying and
neutralizing: (1) individuals or groups conducting computer intrusions
and spreading malicious code; (2) intellectual property thieves; (3)
Internet fraudsters; and (4) on-line predators that sexually exploit or
endanger children. Our success will depend on maintaining state-of-the-
art technical capabilities to handle complex investigations and forming
and maintaining public/private alliances.
fiscal year 2004 budget request
For fiscal year 2004, the FBI is requesting $234.4 million to
protect the United States against cyber-based attacks and high-
technology crimes. This request represents program changes of $62
million and 194 positions, including 77 agents. These resources will
enable the FBI to staff computer intrusion squads in field offices,
enhance technical capacities to identify persons illegally accessing
networks, and provide funding for the training and equipment we need to
more aggressively investigate cyber incidents. The requested resources
will enable the FBI to increase its efforts to detect the sexual
exploitation of children on the Internet. Over the past six years we
have seen these cases grow in number from 113 to over 2,300. We must
increase our commitment here. Finally, the resources would allow us to
expand our ability to conduct computer forensics examinations. Right
now, 6 out of 10 investigations require some level of computer
forensics support. History tells us that the number of cases requiring
this support will continue to grow and that the number of forensic
examinations required per investigation will also continue to grow.
technology progress
I would like to touch on our efforts to upgrade FBI technology.
Over the past two years the FBI has made significant progress in
modernizing our information technology infrastructure to better support
our investigative needs. On March 28, we completed the Trilogy Wide
Area Network--three days ahead of schedule. High-speed local area
networks have been deployed to 622 FBI locations. Over 21,000 new
desktop computers and nearly 5,000 printers and scanners have been
provided. The Enterprise Operations Center, which will manage our
computer networks, becomes operational early this spring.
We are now focused on implementing a corporate data warehousing
capability that is key to FBI intelligence, investigative, and
information sharing initiatives as well as to our records management
system.
Trilogy will change the FBI culture from paper to electronic. It
will replace redundant searches of stove-piped systems. Agents will
search multiple databases--linking thousands of data points of
evidence, leads and suspects--through a single portal. Trilogy is the
base for a modern computer architecture. Trilogy computers, servers,
and networks will support state-of-the-art applications. Using Trilogy
to transport, the Integrated Data Warehouse will link 31 FBI databases
for single-portal searches and data mining. The Collaborative
Capabilities program will allow electronic data sharing with other
agencies.
fiscal year 2004 budget request
We are now at the point in our information technology upgrade where
it is essential that we preserve these investments by ensuring there is
sufficient funding for life-cycle operations and maintenance of systems
and for technology refreshment. The fiscal year 2004 request includes
increases of $82 million to fund technology refreshment and operations
and maintenance. These resources will ensure that the equipment we have
deployed stays in good working order, and that it is replaced in an
orderly manner. The FBI can never again allow its equipment to become
obsolete.
other programs
We are completely restructuring our internal security programs and
processes. We have created a dedicated Security Division and are
consolidating security functions under a single management structure.
As we implement these changes to improve security, we are addressing
recommendations in the Webster and Rand reports. The fiscal year 2004
request includes increases of $37 million and 126 positions, including
32 agents. These resources will fund polygraph examinations, guard
services, and other security expenses.
The FBI Laboratory's R&D efforts generated more than 120 projects,
providing more than 100 deliverable products to the operational units,
58 technical publications, and 126 scientific presentations, in the
last three years. The FBI's Combined DNA Index System software is used
by 185 domestic and 23 foreign laboratories. The fiscal year 2004
request includes $3.28 million and 32 positions funding nuclear DNA and
the Federal Convicted Offender Program.
I will conclude with the FBI's Criminal Program. We have opened
more than 85 major corporate fraud investigations. At the end of fiscal
year 2002, the FBI had five corporate fraud investigations with losses
in excess of $1 billion. Currently, this number has increased to eight.
Forty-five FBI field offices are participating in multi-agency
corporate fraud working groups. The fiscal year 2004 request includes
$16 million and 164 positions, including 54 agents. The request will
fund additional investigators to support this initiative.
closing
The FBI has turned a corner in its history. With the support of
Congress, we have been able to make dramatic and substantive changes.
Our transformation continues because the threats facing the U.S.
homeland continue to evolve. I want to reassure you that we are
committed to protecting this country from those who seek to harm us
through acts of terror, espionage, cyber attacks, or criminal acts.
Every citizen must be able to enjoy the basic freedoms this great
nation provides. The men and women of the FBI understand their roles in
these challenging and uncertain times. With your support, we can give
them the resources and tools they need to carry out our mission.
Thank you.
COUNTERTERRORISM
Senator Gregg. Maybe you could give us your thoughts on
where we stand in fighting terrorism.
Mr. Mueller. Looking at it from our perspective alone, the
FBI is responsible for understanding the terrorist threats
within the United States. Each month as we reorient our work
force, as we increase our information technology (IT)
capability, as we grow analytical capability, as we bring on
more translators, as we focus on addressing counterterrorism as
our number one priority and, as everyone in the organization
comes to understand that, I think we have grown in our
capability of understanding the threats within our borders.
That does not mean that we could not still face individuals
coming into the United States, sleepers who come in
individually under our radar screen and, pursuant to some plot
originated and directed overseas, contemplate a terrorist
attack. But each month I believe that we have moved to better
our capabilities and understanding of the terrorist threats
within our borders.
And if you couple that with the successes overseas, the
arrest of Abu Zabaydah, the arrest of Ramzi Binalshibh, the
detention of Khalid Shaikh Mohammed, the detention of Mustafa
Ahmed al-Husawi, and our continuing debriefings of these
individuals, our view of the capabilities of Al-Qaeda becomes
more transparent and it gives us more confidence that we have
an understanding of plots in the past, plots that were on the
table as future possibilities.
We still face a substantial threat, principally from Al-
Qaeda and their desire, willingness, capabilities, and unity of
mission to kill Americans. So on the one hand, I think we are
doing a much better job both here and overseas. On the other
hand, we still face a substantial threat.
Senator Gregg. What percentage of the agents are now
involved in counterterrorism?
Mr. Mueller. I believe it is up to--let me just check for a
second if I could.
Senator Gregg. Yes.
Mr. Mueller. Yes, it is 23 percent. I had to check my
figures.
Senator Gregg. And what percentage are involved in the
counterintelligence? And is that an overlapping number?
Mr. Mueller. It is not an overlapping number, although--let
me just--let me see if I can give you the figures, the
percentage.
I was just informed that we generally do not--I would be
happy to provide the number of counterintelligence in closed
session. Generally we do not give out the percentages or the
numbers in open session.
I will tell you that it is not an overlap. However, the--
since September 11th, my directions to the SACs, Special Agents
in Charge, around the country is that their first priority is
counterterrorism. There should be no counterterrorism lead that
goes unaddressed. And consequently, we have overburned, as you
would say, in counterterrorism substantially in the wake of
September 11th, and that continues to drop until October of
this year. And then as we ginned up for the response to the, at
that time, probable incursion into Iraq, the numbers that were
dedicated to counterterrorism ramped up again.
And so there will be and there has been in the wake of
September 11th, and there has been in anticipation and during
the war in Iraq, a number of individuals who have been taken
from other programs, including counterintelligence, to meet the
short-term needs of addressing the September 11th
investigation, and then the responsibility for protecting the
United States from terrorist attacks which might have been
associated with the war in Iraq.
CHICAGO FIELD OFFICE
Senator Gregg. Let us take the field office, arbitrarily
choosing Chicago as a large one. How many agents approximately
do you think you have there? Do you know?
Mr. Mueller. I just do not have that off the top of my
head.
Senator Gregg. Let us say it is 500. What----
Mr. Mueller. I would say----
Senator Gregg. What percentage----
Mr. Mueller [continuing]. Yes, probably 500 or 600 in
Chicago.
[The information follows:]
Number of Agents in Chicago Field Office
As of April 10, 2003, the Chicago Field Office had a Funded
Staffing Level of 422 agents.
Senator Gregg. What percentage would be doing
counterterrorism, and what percentage would be doing
counterintelligence, and what percentage would be doing what
they have always done in Chicago, chasing city officials?
Mr. Mueller. I would be happy to get you those figures, but
I can tell you in the wake of September 11th, there would have
been a ramp up, a substantial ramp up in which probably 50 to
60 percent of the agents in the months from October 2001 to
April, May or June 2002, were addressing counterterrorism.
As you got further away from September 11th, the numbers
would drop back and be addressing the other programs, so that I
would venture to say in a place like Chicago, 30 percent would
be doing counterterrorism at the low point, August, September,
before we started ramping up for Iraq. Now it is probably
higher. And it certainly has been higher in the last several
weeks because we completed, around the country, interviews in
excess of 9,000 individual Iraqis who have provided us with
tremendous information helpful to the forces overseas. But we
have undertaken and completed 9,400 interviews around the
country and we had to use agents from different programs.
So if you look at it today, the percentage who would be
working on what we say is counterterrorism would be a lot
higher. If you looked at it back in August, I would say
probably 20 to 30 percent of the Chicago office was working on
counterterrorism. A lesser percent would be working on
counterintelligence. A lesser percent would be working on
cyber. And then a substantial number in the overall criminal
programs, probably close to 40 percent, 30 to 40 percent, would
be on all of the criminal programs. That would be public
corruption, violent crime, gangs, organized crime, all lumped
together under the criminal programs.
[The information follows:]
Clarification: Percentage Increase of Agents in Chicago Field Office
Focusing on Counterterrorism Prior to September 11 to May/June of 2002,
and During War With Iraq
``In the wake of September 11, there would have been a ramp
up, a substantial ramp up in which probably 50 to 60 percent of
the agents in the months from October of 2001 to April, May or
June of 2002, were addressing counterterrorism.''
In fiscal year 2001 (October 1, 2000-September 30, 2001)
12.1 percent of all FBI field agents Bureau-wide were working
counterterrorism. In the Chicago field office, 14.1 percent of
agents were working counterterrorism.
From October 1, 2001 through December 31, 2001, 52.4
percent of all FBI field agents were working counterterrorism.
In the Chicago field office, 34.7 percent of agents were
working counterterrorism.
From October 1, 2001 through June 30, 2002, 34.5 percent of
all FBI field agents were working counterterrorism. In the
Chicago field office, 26.7 percent of agents were working
counterterrorism.
``As you got further away from September 11th, the numbers
would drop back and be addressing the other programs, so that I
would venture to say in a place like Chicago 30 percent would
be doing counterterrorism I would say at the low point, August,
September, before we started ramping up for Iraq. Now it is
probably higher.''
From October 1, 2002 through December 31, 2002, 22.3
percent of all FBI field agents were working counterterrorism.
In the Chicago field office, 19.2 percent of agents were
working counterterrorism.
From October 1, 2002 through March 31, 2003, 24.4 percent
of all FBI field agents were working counterterrorism. In the
Chicago field office, 19.6 percent of agents were working
counterterrorism.
The chart below illustrates these figures.
The number of FBI agents involved in counterintelligence in
the Chicago office is classified. The classified response is
provided in a separate document.
SUMMARY CHART OF AVERAGE FIELD AGENT ONBOARD FOR TOTAL FBI AND THE CHICAGO FIELD OFFICE
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Bureau \1\ Chicago \1\
-----------------------------------------------------------
Time Period Avg. Avg. CT Percent Avg. Avg. CT Percent
Agents Agents of Total Agents Agents of Total
Onboard Onboard Agents Onboard Onboard Agents
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Fiscal year 2001: 10/1/00-9/30/01................... 9,048 1,092 12.1 384 54 14.1
Fiscal year 2002, 1st Qtr: 10/1/01-12/31/01......... 8,904 4,666 52.4 377 131 34.7
Fiscal year 2002, 3rd Qtr: 10/1/01-6/30/02.......... 8,791 3,029 34.5 371 99 26.7
Fiscal year 2003, 1st Qtr: 10/1/02-12/31/02......... 8,826 1,964 22.3 381 73 19.2
Fiscal year 2003, 2nd Qtr: 10/1/02-3/31/03.......... 8,884 2,172 24.4 378 74 19.6
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ These number do not include Supervisory Special Agents.
COUNTERTERRORISM TRAINING
Senator Gregg. What percentage of the curriculum at
Quantico is dedicated to counterterrorism?
Mr. Mueller. I can tell you that it has increased. I do not
know the exact percentages. The basic skills, and by that I
mean the skills that cut across all of the various substantive
programs of the Bureau, probably take up 50 or 60 percent--and
this is off the top of my head, and I would have to get you the
exact figures. It is probably 50 to 60 percent.
Thank you. For a percentage--I can tell you that since
September 11th, we have added 32 hours of counterterrorism and
counterintelligence training to the--on the counterterrorism
and counterintelligence curriculum for the new agents. We also
are putting in a separate training session specifically for
counterintelligence.
[The information follows:]
Percentage of Curriculum at Quantico Dedicated to Counterterrorism (CT)
Currently, New Agents receive 116 hours of Investigative
Training. Of these, 55 hours (approximately 47 percent) are
dedicated directly to counterterrorism and counterintelligence
training. Because these two training initiatives are extremely
inter-related, singling out CT-exclusive training is difficult.
All other training, such as Legal, Forensics, and Firearms, is
an integral part of New Agent Training, but is not program-
specific. Additionally, CT analysts are also trained at
Quantico in the College of Analytical Studies. The training
includes a basic six-week course. Several advanced analyst
courses have been developed as well.
FBI CULTURE
Senator Gregg. I guess my question goes to this: How much
has the culture changed? I mean, does the agent in the field
today think that he is primarily a counterintelligence,
counterterrorism agent? Or does he still think he is a super
police officer----
Mr. Mueller. I think the----
Senator Gregg [continuing]. Or she?
Mr. Mueller. No, I think that there are a couple of ways of
looking at it. At the outset I would say when we talk about
culture and when you think on it, if you looked at your FBI
agent, the FBI agent is patriotic needless to say, dedicated,
honorable, wants to do the job that is set by their country, in
the same way that the military is. When a person joins the
military, they do what the President directs for the military,
to be one place one day and the next place the next day.
In the past, we have been focused on cases with the
expectation that a case would go to court. I believe since
September 11th, almost everyone in the organization understands
that you have to look at a piece of information as a piece of
information, whether it is a piece of information for purposes
of intelligence or a piece of information that can be used all
the way into a courtroom. But it is very important for that
piece of intelligence, that piece of information available to
be looked at in a larger context of the intelligence mission of
the Bureau.
I have heard and believe that around the country, agents
who want to do counterterrorism find that the skills that they
have developed on the criminal side lend themselves to
counterterrorism investigations, and that the mix of
counterintelligence or counterterrorism experience is ideal.
There are those around the country, and there probably always
will be, who prefer doing drug investigations or white collar
crime investigations. But I believe that the Bureau has shifted
remarkably since September 11th to address and understand the
importance of the intelligence function.
I also have to give them the tools to do it. I have to give
them the analysts. I have to give them the information
technology. I have to develop the reports officers, and strip
off the sources and methods so that we become a greater part of
the intelligence community. I have to develop a cadre not just
of reports officers, but intelligence officers who will look at
things not just from the case perspective but also from the
perspective of a particular strategic target, and adopt that
which MI5 does well in certain areas in order to be successful.
And the last point I would make is the--I have looked at
MI5. I have looked at other intelligence areas, and I believe
that the combination we have of intelligence capability and law
enforcement capability under one roof is by far the best way to
go, and avoids the stovepiping that we see elsewhere.
Senator Gregg. I have a lot of other thoughts and
questions. But I will turn to Senator Hollings.
Senator Hollings. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
I first observe, Director Mueller, that you are not in any
trouble. Otherwise, this table would be filled up, you know.
It is not all of us here, just us chickens.
TERRORISM
With respect to the status of terrorist that the chairman
asked about, of course the real question is: Are they creating
them faster than you get rid of them? You meet every morning
and brief the President I believe.
Mr. Mueller. Yes, sir.
Senator Hollings. I wonder about the statement made by
Mubarak in Cairo to the effect that we are creating 100 bin
Ladens. That is what we have really got to worry about. We have
got to make sure that we bring, as we are doing now, a quick
end to Saddam. Otherwise, when we get that government going,
but more particularly get the President's roadmap for peace in
the Middle East ongoing--I notice that Chirac has announced a
different roadmap. Tell the President to stick to his roadmap
because--that is the creation of the terrorism.
I mean, you can put on all of these numbers of agents,
dedicate so many more agents to terrorism rather than to drugs
or to crime or white collar, this or that, but unless and until
we get to the source of the creation of them, they are creating
them fast. That was the whole--but we have got our fingers
crossed right now about the victory in Iraq. We have hit the
bowl. The question is whether the follow-through is going to
really work. And it is going to be extremely difficult to get
all of these religious sects and get a democratic government.
It is going to be tough.
But that is the answer to the question of the status of
terrorism, because it could be that we are creating them faster
than you can get rid of them.
Otherwise, on the culture, that is another difficult job
that you have. And you talk about the agent out there, and
you--it is a question of how do you get them so that they
believe they are beyond the law or they can out-trick the law
or they devolve into corruption or that kind, where they swap
sides. We have had Miller and Hanssen, for one thing. I would
have burned Hanssen. I do not know where you all get this that
you can get more--I mean that was one clear-cut case and the
files got him. So we had all the more that we could have gotten
out of him.
And if you do not really treat it as treason they will
continue to say, ``Well, the jail is not so bad.'' I know we
have built one down in South Carolina. I went to see it, and
they had better rooms in the jail than they had the Citadel
when I went to school. They have TV there. They have exercises,
you know, and you can play ball in the afternoon and all of
that kind of stuff. So the fellow who is hungry and out there--
I have worked on jails--if he does not have a pretty good go at
it, he said he can get three squares and a warm place, and they
get into crime.
Similarly, if there is no real penalty and they get just
wonderful security and three squares, what is the risk? You
know what I mean.
Mr. Mueller. Yes, sir.
COUNTERINTELLIGENCE
Senator Hollings. Otherwise, we and the State Department
swap around our ambassadors and chiefs of stations. We find--is
there a swap-around system particularly in counterintelligence,
where they just do not stay there and get corrupted in that
sense? The Methodist ministry does that. I know we do that with
Circuit judges in South Carolina.
Somehow we have got to give polygraphs to everyone in
counterintelligence. Every 3 years, I think, is the practice.
When last did J.J. Smith get a polygraph?
Mr. Mueller. I am not certain, Senator, on J.J. Smith. I
can tell you that on the--on Ms. Leung, the other individual,
she was polygraphed back in the 1980s but not more recently
than that. I have to----
Senator Hollings. Well, now----
Mr. Mueller [continuing]. Tell you that we have changed our
policy in the wake of----
Senator Hollings. You have changed your policy?
Mr. Mueller. We have changed our----
Senator Hollings. Thank goodness.
Mr. Mueller. We have dramatically improved our----
Senator Hollings. I asked Judge Freeh about Hanssen----
Mr. Mueller [continuing]. Use of polygraphs.
Senator Hollings [continuing]. And he had not had one in 20
years.
Mr. Mueller. I also took one before my confirmation.
Senator Hollings. Yes, sir.
Mr. Mueller. So I have been through it along with everybody
else, and it was an experience.
[The information follows:]
Most Recent Polygraph of Special Agent James J. Smith, Subject of
Espionage Case in Los Angeles, California
Operating under previous policies, Agent Smith never
received a polygraph examination, as he retired prior to the
Hanssen case. Under the current polygraph policies, an agent in
a similar position would be subject to periodic 5-year
reinvestigations requiring a counterintelligence-specific
polygraph, and would also be subject to random testing. In
addition, all new employees are subjected to a pre-employment
polygraph.
Senator Hollings. I was on the Intelligence Committee, and
we knew good and well where the leaks were in the staff, and so
you never ask a man to do something that you are not going to
do yourself. We learned that in the war. So I went over to the
Capitol Police; it was a 2-hour thing. And the first question,
I started my answer, I said, ``Well, in my humble opinion,''
and the damn needle just went right straight across.
Senator Gregg. I am not sure a polygraph has been designed
that would be able to handle your answers----
Senator Hollings. But in any event----
Senator Gregg [continuing]. Or understand them.
DOMESTIC INTELLIGENCE
Senator Hollings. When 9/11 occurred, it was like--it is
like that, ``When in danger, when in doubt, run in circles,
scream and shout.'' And one of the screams was, ``We need a
whole new division of domestic intelligence rather than the
FBI. I think you are handling it. You are reorganizing it, but
it has sort of been top secret in that sense that--I have
explained to colleagues what you have been doing. Somehow you
have a PR man. That is all J. Edgar had. Find out his
descendant and get him.
And tell what is going on, that can be told, because they
do not realize the tremendous effort you have made on domestic
intelligence.
TRILOGY
With respect to the Trilogy, as I understand you said you
were going to have a cost overrun of $137.9 million. And we
asked you to take it out of the hide of the budget, and that
was going to require a reprogramming.
Mr. Mueller. Yes, sir.
Senator Hollings. Have you got that reprogramming request
before us?
Mr. Mueller. I have the--it is over at the Department of
Justice at this point.
[The information follows:]
Status of the Trilogy Reprogramming Request
As of April 10, 2003, the Trilogy reprogramming request was
at the Department of Justice. The request was forwarded to the
Office of Management and Budget (OMB) on April 17, 2003, and
approved by OMB on April 25, 2003. On May 21, 2003, the request
was transmitted to Congress.
Senator Hollings. I see. What about keeping, now, that
Trilogy up to date? If we get all of this stuff and everything
else like that, but do we have an ongoing plan to keep it
moving and going?
Mr. Mueller. Yes, absolutely. Yes. Let me back up a second
and say that----
Senator Hollings. Yes.
Mr. Mueller [continuing]. I would take responsibility for
the cost overruns.
Senator Hollings. Yes.
Mr. Mueller. When I came in, it took me a while to
understand the information technology or lack thereof in the
Bureau, and the current plans to upgrade it. And it takes a
while to get it into my head because I am not a computer
programmer at all. But as we went along, it seemed to me that
our plans and what we had budgeted for and what Congress had
given us would be inadequate to the mission that we had, in the
sense that it was not upgrading our essential databases, giving
and putting it into a new, upgraded database architecture that
would be a platform for the future. And as has been described
to me by others in the Bureau, what we were doing in the
previous budget was putting lipstick on a pig.
Senator Hollings. Yes.
Mr. Mueller. In other words, the pig is our old databases
and we are putting a GUI, Graphical User Interface, on it that
would make everybody happier in terms of input and output, but
would not enable us to use the analytical tools that we needed.
So I had them go back to scratch. And in going back to scratch
and developing the database structure that I believe will be
the foundation for the future, it ended up costing more. That,
coupled with the fact that we had two contractors and we need
an integrator, is principally responsible for the overruns.
Now, I believe that those changes that we have made are
absolutely indispensable to our ability to continue to refresh
our information technology down the road. It makes no sense for
us to have and put into place that which will be obsolete in 2
years. And we are increasingly looking at and focusing on what
we do in-house as a foundation for the future, whether it be 5
or 10 years down the road, and enhancing our capability to get
commercial-off-the-shelf, COTS, products in to augment what we
are doing, as those COTS products get developed by the various
contractors out in the field.
So we have asked for, I believe, something in the range
of--what is it? $82 million, is it? Yes, $82 million in the
2004 budget, principally directed at enhancing our information
technology.
[The information follows:]
Clarification: Amount Requested for Information Technology in Fiscal
Year 2004
In fiscal year 2004, the requested increase for information
technology is $82 million. The FBI requests $80 million for
Trilogy operations and maintenance (O&M) and technology
refreshment and $2 million for the Top Secret/Sensitive
Compartmented Local Area Network O&M.
Mr. Mueller. As to the $137.9 million, you are right. You
did say take it out of our base funding, and we are taking it
out of our base funding. We have the reprogramming over at the
Department of Justice. And I am looking at the information
technology dollars with a view to making certain that every one
of those dollars is spent wisely.
CRIMINAL JUSTICE INFORMATION SERVICES (CJIS)
While I am on this subject, because it is important to the
future of the Bureau----
Senator Hollings. Yes.
Mr. Mueller [continuing]. I will tell you that we have
tremendous capabilities out at CJIS, for instance, Integrated
Automated Fingerprint Identification System, or IAFIS, the
fingerprint databases, NICS, National Instant Criminal
Background Check System----
Senator Hollings. How long does it take with the
fingerprint thing? If I am----
Mr. Mueller. Seconds.
Senator Hollings [continuing]. The highway patrol and I
take a fellow and I have his fingerprints----
Mr. Mueller. Seconds.
Senator Hollings. Seconds?
Mr. Mueller. Seconds.
Senator Hollings. It used to take 1 month or 2 months.
Mr. Mueller. Seconds.
Senator Hollings. Yes, good.
Mr. Mueller. And with the expansion of our database, we
have a number of cases now where we have gone back 20 or 30 or
40 years and provided fingerprint matches to State and local
law enforcement entities that have enabled them to solve
homicides in ways they had not been able to solve them in the
past.
There were two officers who were killed out in Los Angeles,
something like 30 years ago. And with our enhanced
capabilities, fingerprint capability--they still have not
forgotten about that case in that police department out there.
They sent the fingerprints in from the crime scene, and it was
matched with an individual who lived down in--it may have been
South Carolina, but one of the Carolinas. I do not know which
one, or Georgia. And it turned out he had been living there for
a number of years, married, had a family, but he was
responsible for killing these two police officers 30 years ago,
and they brought him back and he pled guilty last week. That is
the kind of work that is done out at CJIS.
Now as we grow as an organization, what we have to do is
enhance our information technology capabilities there and
better integrate it in to what we do in the Bureau overall.
[The information follows:]
Clarification: IAFIS Case in Los Angeles
More than 45 years ago, two California police officers were
shot and killed. A latent fingerprint was developed from a
vehicle involved in the case, but searches of that print met
with negative results. Last year, detectives in the Los Angeles
County Sheriff's Office initiated a search of the latent
fingerprint against the database of the Integrated Automated
Fingerprint Identification System (IAFIS). The search resulted
in the identification and arrest of Mr. Gerald Mason, who was
in the database because of a 1956 burglary arrest. The FBI
notified the Los Angeles County Sheriff's Office. Mr. Mason was
located and arrested at his residence in South Carolina on
January 29, 2003.
Mr. Mueller. I do not mean to get on my hobbyhorse on that,
but----
DRUGS/TERRORISM FINANCING
Senator Hollings. Oh, no, it is better to know that you
have a grasp of it, and that was really the question. And you
really know more about it than I do.
But I am a little concerned--of course, I am--sometimes I
get our chairman and so forth and we find out what we are going
to do on drugs. I started 30-some years ago right at this table
and we were burning the poppy fields in Turkey, and then we
went to Marseilles and broke up the factories, went down into
Paraguay and up to Colombia and over to the triangle at Chiang
Mai, up in Laos, and I met with the Japanese and the
Australians and everybody else. I said, ``Let us go into Burma
now and look.'' But they said, ``Oh, no, they have armies over
there. You would get killed.'' They were shipping in 50,000
pounds of heroine out through Bangkok every week, that kind of
thing.
And now, I pick up the morning paper, and the drug war in
Colombia has spilled over into Venezuela. However, the--you
keep telling us, you folks in law enforcement, that this
terrorism is financed by drug money. And I looked and see where
you moved 567 agents from drugs to counterterrorism. Can we not
ask for just more and get them--have them keep going, not
necessarily on the ordinary drugs and everything, but at least
the money part? Because that is what finances the terrorism.
Mr. Mueller. Well, we are--whenever we have--as I said,
terrorism is our first priority.
Senator Hollings. Yes.
Mr. Mueller. If it relates in some way to----
Senator Hollings. And the money part----
Mr. Mueller [continuing]. Financing by narcotics----
Senator Hollings [continuing]. Is the first priority of the
first priority.
Mr. Mueller. First is--we take that as a priority. We
recently did a case in New York where we found that heroin from
Afghanistan was being sold in the United States, distributed in
the United States, and the monies were going back to
Afghanistan to the Taliban and Al-Qaeda. And so we address
cases like that, and we have done a number of cases involving
the FARC out of Colombia, where it looks like cocaine monies
were being used to purchase weapons and the like.
I took 400 initially, 400 positions from the drug programs
in a reorganization and reprogramming because I believe that we
had to reorient ourselves, first of all, as an agency before I
came back to either the administration, the Justice Department
or the Congress for additional resources. And in looking at it,
it seemed to me that, first of all, I needed to put our house
in order, focus on our priorities, be absolutely clear on what
our priorities are up and down the line, and then have not only
the FSL, funded staffing level, the manpower directed towards
the priorities, but also the financing.
The process I went through in making those decisions was to
go to the Special Agents in Charge and say, ``What do you need
to do in each of your territory's divisions to address either
perceived counterterrorism, mission or threat in that
division?'' And they came back with various numbers of agents
that they believed they needed, depending on the division.
Now, quite probably, one or more of them came back and
said, ``Well, the Director is going to give us new resources,''
and maybe gave me more numbers than they really actually
needed. So we cut them down and looked at it across the
country, and came up with approximately 500 that the Special
Agents in Charge said, ``We need these numbers in our divisions
to address counterterrorism.''
And I went back to them and said, ``In your divisions, what
are your priorities? What programs would you take these agents
from?'' And coming back, it was 400 that came from the drug
program. And I looked at that and I said, ``Okay. Why are we
taking them from the drug programs?'' And we looked at areas
where we overlapped with the DEA in terms of addressing the
cartels, and we looked at areas where we do standalone drug
cases that increasingly can be done by State and local law
enforcement, standalone methamphetamine case, standalone
marijuana cases.
And what I wished us to remain focused on, are the
organized crime drug enforcement task force cases, the high
intensity drug trafficking areas cases, and those areas where
we bring something special to the table and where we do not
overlap with other Federal agencies or State and local
agencies.
Now, as we go down the path and I hear from State and local
law enforcement, many of them are saying, ``We miss you in the
drug area. We want you back more than you were before,'' and
that is something that I will have to address down the road.
LEGATS
Senator Hollings. Well, as I understand it, Judge Freeh was
putting these Legats out into the different countries as drug
agents, and now I see you have them in Sarajevo, Bosnia,
Kuwait, Uzbekistan, Kabul, Afghanistan, Belgrade, Serbia, that
they have really moved from drugs to counterterrorism. You have
been putting them down in the West Bank. You have put them
somewhere in Beirut. You have put them in Syria. You have put
them in Cairo. You have put them down in Riyadh. When you have
them in Bosnia and Sarajevo, you are still chasing drugs.
Afghanistan, you still--well, I mean, you might find some Al-
Qaeda left there. But look at that, because what we have got to
do is get both, to tell you the truth----
Mr. Mueller. The list----
Senator Hollings [continuing]. Of where the real money is
coming from.
Mr. Mueller. The list that you have read off----
Senator Hollings. Yes.
Mr. Mueller [continuing]. Are those that we are
requesting----
Senator Hollings. Yes.
Mr. Mueller [continuing]. Expansion on in those particular
cities. We do have a Legat in Cairo. We have Legats in Riyadh.
We are expanding the Legat in Riyadh and minimizing--or I
should not say minimizing, but cutting back the territory that
was--or for which Riyadh was responsible. So we are adjusting
our Legat distribution to reflect the new challenges of
addressing counterterrorism. Even in South America, where there
may well be enhanced activity from those who are affiliated
with either Al-Qaeda, Hezbollah, or Hamas, our Legats down
there are now finding that they are handling that type of
activity rather than narcotics activity.
And lastly, we do want to put a Legat in Beirut. We have
been discussing that with the State Department for some time.
The State Department has the embassy there, but because of the
threat level, you need to have the personnel working the
embassy in secure compound grounds. They simply do not have
room now. They are anticipating building a new embassy to be
completed in, I think, 2006, and then they will have space for
us. And in the meantime, we are going to be exploring having a
greater presence in Beirut than we currently do.
Senator Hollings. Yes, you have to get to them and tell
them to move somebody out. You cannot wait until 2006.
One final question--Mr. Chairman, you have been very good
to me.
REORGANIZATION
How do you coordinate our--just looking at the breakdown
now that you have in the reorganization of the Bureau itself,
and you have all of this Trilogy and you have all of these
different officers and responsibilities. But where is the
coordination? And how is that working so that you are informed?
We cannot have another Minnesota situation where they kept
calling the Headquarters but somehow it did not get through.
Mr. Mueller. Well, there are actually three ways. The first
way is--every time I speak to groups at the FBI, I say, ``I
want to know the bad news.'' Inevitably, the good news has a
way of reaching the top. It is the bad news that does not.
Senator Hollings. Yes.
Mr. Mueller. When I find that I do not get the news of
those things that are wrong and substantial, I am not happy and
that word has gone out. And so I have tried to change and make
people understand that I would be twice as mad about not
hearing about a mistake than hearing that a mistake was made.
We are going to have to take risks. I want people to be
aggressive investigators.
And people will take risks, and I want them to take risks,
and I do not want them to feel that they will be disciplined
for taking the risk. We all make mistakes; I will make more
than most people in the organization. But I want to hear about
the issues such as what happened in Los Angeles, such as what
happened in Minneapolis.
The second way is by changing the accountability and
responsibility for the national programs. And by that I mean
counterterrorism, counterintelligence and cyber. Whereas in the
past it would be the field office that was responsible for any
particular case, in those national programs it is the Assistant
Director in charge of counterterrorism that is responsible for
the success or failure of a case. That means that individual
has to know what is going on around the country. The Assistant
Director does not do the investigation but must know about the
investigations. And when it is in counterterrorism, there has
to be direction from the center. There has to be accumulation
of intelligence, analysis of that intelligence, dissemination
of that intelligence, and undertaking operational
responsibilities for that intelligence.
So centralizing responsibility and accountability in those
programs, I think, is going to make a substantial difference
from the way we operated prior to September, prior to September
11th.
And the third way is that I have expanded--thanks to the
approval of my initial reorganization, I have now four
Executive Assistant Directors who have a much smaller span of
control than before. Before September 11th, there were I think
12 Assistant Directors, all reporting to the Deputy Director
and then to me. Now I have a Deputy Director and there are four
Executive Assistant Directors who report to the Director and
the Deputy Director. So the span of control in these various
areas is much more narrow than it was prior to September 11th.
Senator Hollings. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Senator Gregg. Senator Kohl.
HYDROGEN CYANIDE WEAPONS
Senator Kohl. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, Senator Hollings,
Director Mueller.
Within the past month, the FBI has warned law enforcement
agencies nationwide that terrorists could build a simple but
deadly chemical weapon out of readily available materials.
Specifically, the FBI cited hydrogen cyanide or chlorine gas as
easy-to-make chemical weapons. What is so disturbing is how
easy it is to obtain cyanide. As you know, it is readily
available at chemical supply warehouses, from mail-order
catalogs, and even via the internet.
As you probably know much better than I do, terrorists may
well use cyanide in a future attack. Attorney General Ashcroft
told this subcommittee last week that he would work with us to
prevent terrorists from acquiring this simple chemistry to
launch an attack. We also hope that you can pledge to work with
us to address this concern.
How serious of a threat does the widespread availability of
toxic industrial chemicals like cyanide pose? And what do you
suggest we do? Are you prepared to work with us on some
legislative improvement to the problem?
Mr. Mueller. Well, we sent out a bulletin several weeks ago
relating to a relatively simple explosive device, the schematic
for which we had picked up in one of our searches overseas. It
was to alert State and local law enforcement to be aware of
this potential threat out there.
We have over a period of time received threats about the
possible, the potential use of cyanide in an attack. We have
received threats internationally. Working closely with the CIA,
the FBI has focused on addressing and identifying the expertise
for use of this compound, amongst other types of poisons. We
have also focused on the individuals in Al-Qaeda who may have
that expertise and understanding, and those individuals in Al-
Qaeda that may be participating in a network that would
undertake such an attack utilizing cyanide.
And when we receive the threats relating to use of the
cyanide, we also may see in the same genre threats relating to
the use of ricin, sarin, or other such compounds.
With specific regard to cyanide and its ease of use in the
United States, whenever we have an indication in a case that
there is a potential for the use of cyanide, we utilize every
arrow in our quiver, whether it be Foreign Intelligence
Surveillance Act (FISA) intercepts or aerial or individual
surveillance to make certain that we address that threat
immediately.
We also have reached out to the chemical companies, and the
groups that represent chemical companies, to develop a liaison
so we can do a better job in trying to identify misuses of
cyanide compounds within the United States. As you know, it is
very easy to get. It is prevalent--well, I should not say it is
prevalent. But it is not hard to get. You can get it off of the
internet, and we were exploring ways to curtail it, curtail
that.
We actually recently had a prosecution up in--I guess it
was in Chicago, an individual who was--he had not--he was
storing sodium cyanide and potassium cyanide and other toxic
chemicals in passageways under the streets of Chicago. And we
were onto that, we identified it and successfully prosecuted
that individual. So where we find an indication of the use of
cyanide, we investigate it, and we prosecute.
We are working with the chemical industries within the
United States to do more on that. We are certainly willing to
cooperate and work with you in terms of additional legislation
to address that threat.
Lastly, we are working with the CIA and other agencies both
within the United States and outside of the United States, to
address any threats relating to the use of cyanide or any such
compounds that comes from overseas.
CIGARETTE SMUGGLING/TERRORISM FINANCING
Senator Kohl. Within the past month, the FBI has warned--I
am sorry. Recent ATF investigations reveal that tobacco
smugglers are using the profits they make from illegal
operations in the United States to fund terrorist organizations
like Hezbollah among others.
I raised this issue with the Attorney General last week,
and he seemed genuinely interested in helping to tackle this
issue. This is a serious problem that is not getting the
attention I believe that it deserves. It is a funding source
for terrorism. Should the FBI play a role in investigating the
terrorism-related aspect of this problem? Do you agree that
this is a serious terrorism-related concern? And can you pledge
to work with us on finding some remedy for terrorist
organizations which use the legal profits from the tobacco
industry?
Mr. Mueller. Yes, I--we have had several recent cases,
principally Hezbollah, where cigarette smuggling has been one
of the illegal activities engaged in by individuals affiliated
with Hezbollah, to gather monies, of which have been siphoned
off to terrorist organizations overseas.
We had a successful prosecution most recently in North
Carolina in which a number of Hezbollah-associated individuals
were convicted for their actions in cigarette smuggling. We
recently had a case up in, I believe it was Detroit, that we
indicted where there were a number of illegal activities by a
group of individuals again associated with Hezbollah, and the
charges there are racketeering charges.
So we have a number of areas where we have seen this as one
of the illegal activities engaged in principally by those
associated with Hezbollah to gather funds. We are looking at it
individually and through our Joint Terrorism Task Forces, by
addressing the terrorist groups engaged in all types of illegal
activities, including cigarette smuggling, extortion and other
traditional racketeering crimes.
We also have a terrorism financing section that was
established after September 11th in the Counterterrorism
Division, that has been working hard on all means and
mechanisms of the financing of terrorists--not just profits
that come from cigarette smuggling but also from narcotic
trafficking, from extortion, and as well as from non-
governmental organizations (NGOs), charitable organizations. So
that section was established with experts in finance to focus
on the sourcing and the funding of terrorists.
And lastly, I would say we are working hand in glove with
the CIA because most of the terrorism financing does not stop
at our borders. It is integrated with other pockets of
financing overseas, whether it be in the Middle East or in
Europe. And so we are working very closely with our
counterparts and with the CIA to focus on financing, to have a
comprehensive strategy to address terrorism financing around
the globe, of which the financing in the United States is but a
part of it.
Senator Kohl. Thank you for that answer.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY
Senator Gregg. Thank you, Senator.
I think it was Mr. Lowery who was reported to say that
there is going to have to be a number of items in technology
activity that would not be pursued in order to pay for the
Trilogy. That was reported in the Federal Register. I think it
was the Federal Register. Oh, Federal Times.
What would be the items that you would not be pursuing in
order to pay for Trilogy?
Mr. Mueller. That is--he was misquoted.
Senator Gregg. Oh. We have all experienced that.
That is a good answer.
That is a good answer.
Mr. Mueller. It is also the accurate answer.
He was misquoted. As I think we--as I have said before, to
fund $137.7 million, we are taking those funds from a number of
areas that I think we have let you know of. None of them are
from other information technology projects. They are from--let
me see. I know I have it some place here.
We are taking the monies from unobligated balances from the
emergency supplemental, as I know you will--we will probably
discuss at some point; from prior year unobligated balances, as
well as a reallocation of certain funds available in the
current year. And they include some funds that we have set
aside for information technology.
I am tremendously frustrated, was when I first came and
still am, at the fact that our information technology is not
where I want it and need it to be tomorrow and today. I have
come to learn through trial and error that I have to make
certain that when we put pieces in place, that they are well
thought out, that those pieces fit into the overall
architecture and puzzle of the Bureau so that we do not have
these same stovepipes. But there is so much more we could do
with information technology, that every dollar I can get in our
budget that I can put into advances in information technology,
I am looking to put in. Now, that is difficult when I am having
to ramp up the agent strength in our various programs, but
particularly counterterrorism and counterintelligence, but I am
loathe to take monies away from information technology for
anything else.
[The information follows:]
Clarification of Sources of Trilogy Reprogramming
The FBI proposes to fund the $137.9 million needed for
Trilogy from prior year unobligated balances, current year
funds, available information technology funding, and $33
million in excess user fees. The FBI submitted a reprogramming
request to the Department of Justice and the Office of
Management and Budget. The detailed request was transmitted to
Congress on May 21, 2003.
Senator Gregg. Well, I agree with what you say. I think
there is no question that the Department has had an antiquated
technology capability for a long time, the agency, the Bureau.
But the problem that we have seen, especially with the Bureau,
but with other groups that we oversight in this committee, is
that we build these, we make a commitment to move down these
technology roads and then we build them out and we find that we
have made huge errors, and we spend a lot of money. IAFIS was
an example. NCIC was an example. Trilogy as it started was a
classic example. The worst, of course, is the INS, which is in
a category of its own when it comes to having wasted money on
technology. It does not even communicate within the Department.
And so we agree with you, that you need funds for
technology. But our concern is if we give you too much money
too fast, you end up buying stuff that does not work simply to
spend the money and you end up going down roads that lead to
dead ends or do not produce product, that do not create the
integration that you need. So that is our reservation on some
of this.
I think you have done a good job of getting the technology
on the Trilogy back together and up and focused, and that is
great.
I think, though, the same concept, the same fear, at least
as far as my feeling, is with the amount of money that we are
putting into the Bureau. It is coming in very fast, and you are
shifting gears from a national police force to being a
counterterrorism and counterintelligence force. And you are
setting up, as you have to, all sorts of different things very
quickly.
The question is: Are we going to, by giving you this much
money this fast, do you a disservice because you will end up
going down the road of creating activity that 2 years, 3 years
from now we will find out was just a waste?
Mr. Mueller. Well----
Senator Hollings. If you will yield on that point.
I thought when you called about Smith, that you were going
to call about the supplemental and I had the answer that you
had $123 million unobligated. That is what you are talking
about, right?
Mr. Mueller. That is one of the answers.
Senator Hollings. Yes.
Mr. Mueller. Well, let me try to address those----
Senator Gregg. Right, the $320 million is just----
Mr. Mueller. Well, let me try to address those in some form
of order. I think 18 months ago we had very little credibility
in many places up here. And I came to see it because we had not
put into place in my mind the individuals and the structure to
address something that you need outside expertise to advise on.
I think in the world, the FBI Special Agents, I think they are
the best information gatherers in the world, best
investigators.
But when it comes to information technology, when it comes
to financial posterity or financial planning, when it comes to
running a 27,000-employee business, that background does not
easily lend itself to that kind of organizational structure.
And the biggest change I think we have made in the last 18
months is bringing in individuals who have expertise in those
areas. Whether it be Tina Jonas behind me as chief financial
officer (CFO), who is familiar with this particular area, or
Wilson Lowery, who came from IBM where he was part of the team
that was doing re-engineering, or a chief information officer
(CIO) that came from outside, the individuals we brought in I
need to advise me and make certain that we are on the right
track.
And it is not just one person, as I have explained before.
It is somebody who understands the finance; somebody who
understands the technology; somebody who understands the
project and getting the project done on time. All of these are
talents that are specific and unique unto themselves, and you
need all of them to reach the finish line. We have a number of
those talents. We need some more.
The other thing is, for my own sake, I mean, I come in from
having been a prosecutor for a long time. Yes, I ran a criminal
division at the Department of Justice, but I had not run a
27,000-person institution where you needed to transform the
institution and the technology. It has been a learning
experience.
And the one thing I have learned is that if I do not
understand it and do not know and keep track of what is
happening on the information technology side, it is going to go
awry. Even though I am not a CIO, even though I am not a
computer programmer, I do believe in order to transform the
institution, you have to keep track of it from the very top and
force yourself to learn it. And I am responsible ultimately for
the success or failure of that program. I was delighted, as was
everybody else, when we put in the wide area network and it
came in on time.
I will tell you that in October, as I may have mentioned to
you before, we had what I call the ``graybeards'' come in and
sit down with us for 2 days and go through our IT plans. And
these are persons from Sandia Laboratories and elsewhere, and
both Federal Government and outside computer specialists, to
look through what we plan to do. And they came up with two
points.
One is that they said we would have substantial difficulty
putting in the wide area network (WAN), because we were
utilizing switches developed by the intelligence community that
had never been put into a wide area network that size. And so I
had some fear and trepidation that we actually would not get to
the finish line on that, but we did.
The second thing I learned is that--I had assumed that, for
instance, you could put all of the information in a database,
into one database. They came back and said no; for security
reasons, no, keep separate databases.
And so it is a combination of learning as we go along,
having persons responsible for looking at the financial part of
it, and where we are going. Are we spending our dollars
correctly? Do we have the right contractors? Do we have the
right technology? And will this technology put us where we want
to be 5 years down the road?
And these are the issues that I spend a substantial amount
of time on now, because they are so integral to the future of
the Bureau.
Senator Gregg. Well, we appreciate that. And we also spend
a substantial amount of time on that, and do appreciate
communication in that area.
Mr. Mueller. I always am open to suggestions, also. If we
are doing it wrong, I want to know it, and I want to know it
earlier rather than later. And so I am always open to
suggestions as to how we can do it better.
COUNTERTERRORISM
Senator Gregg. As an ancillary issue, you are now setting
up, it appears to me, and which you have to, a whole series of
counterterrorism intelligence task forces. You have TTIC. You
have the foreign terrorism task force. As I understand it,
every field office is going to have an intelligence officer who
is the coordinating individual, which may have been set up
outside without contacting the Congress, which we will need to
discuss, but probably not here.
Are we putting up so many of these groups that we are going
to be back to where we were before 9/11, where there is just
too many people out there doing the same stuff, or relatively
related stuff, but they are not communicating with each other?
Should we put the foreign task force in with the TTIC or----
Mr. Mueller. Well, now, let me address a number of those
issues. What I have tried to do in the Counterterrorism
Division is specialize in certain areas such as finances and
communications. The Foreign Terrorist Tracking Task Force,
which is database mining for a particular operational mission,
all of those are operational in the sense that they gather
information in a particular area and then will run operations
by that, further investigations in particular areas to identify
terrorists, terrorist financing, terrorist communications, etc.
And I consider those to be operational, and what we need to
develop within the Counterterrorism Division to support the
counterterrorism responsibilities nationwide.
At the same time, I believe we had to enhance the focus on
intelligence within our organization. I take full
responsibility and I apologize for not having done the
reprogramming that should have been done in anticipation of
announcing the selection of an individual to be Executive
Assistant Director for Intelligence. I had an Executive
Assistant Director. It was my naive thought that since I had an
open Executive Assistant Director position, I could put the
person in there and call that person the Executive Assistant
Director for Intelligence, without running it past Congress,
for which I apologize.
And with regard to the intelligence units in each of our
field offices, we have intelligence units scattered around most
of our field offices. And I wanted to make certain that that
becomes an established program down the road. That also I
should have run past you, and we will. But my expectation is
what we will lend to our field offices is the capability of
having an entity there that will be charged with gathering that
intelligence and pushing it up, and as you look at it, I think
you will find it beneficial.
The last issue is: Do we have too many task forces? Do we--
are we----
TERRORIST THREAT INTEGRATION CENTER/FOREIGN TERRORIST TRACKING TASK
FORCE
Senator Gregg. Well, specifically, the Foreign Terrorist
Task Force, why should that not be folded into this TTIC?
Mr. Mueller. Because I believe it is operational--it is
looking at identifying individuals who may fit a particular
match of a terrorist and requires investigation as part of
that.
Now, when you look at what the TTIC is going to be--I
believe in it. I am very supportive of the Terrorist Threat
Integration Center because I believe we need an analytical
center that focuses on terrorist threats, an analytical center
where you have analysts that are pulling the pieces of
information together from the various separate databases with
regard to particular threats. But I do not believe that that
should be operational.
Senator Gregg. All right. That explains that.
Well, let me just say on my behalf and I think I speak for
most of the folks up here: We think you are doing a great job.
You are trying hard, and you are certainly focused. And you are
changing a ship that has been going one way for many years, and
that has got to be done, and it is going fairly well. We are
very impressed with the work you do.
We appreciate the fact that your agents out there are
trying to defend us and make us safe as a country, and we want
to thank them for their service. We know they are working long
hours, and they are out there trying to do something to protect
us. And we appreciate that. Thank you.
Senator Hollings. I concur.
conclusion of hearings
Mr. Mueller. Thank you.
Senator Gregg. Thank you very much.
Senator Hollings. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Senator Gregg. Thank you.
[Whereupon, at 11:12 a.m., Thursday, April 10, the hearings
were concluded, and the subcommittee was recessed, to reconvene
subject to the call of the Chair.]