[Senate Hearing 108-1032]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
S. Hrg. 108-1032
FIREFIGHTING AIRCRAFT SAFETY
=======================================================================
HEARING
BEFORE THE
COMMITTEE ON COMMERCE,
SCIENCE, AND TRANSPORTATION
UNITED STATES SENATE
ONE HUNDRED EIGHTH CONGRESS
SECOND SESSION
__________
JUNE 2, 2004
__________
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Transportation
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SENATE COMMITTEE ON COMMERCE, SCIENCE, AND TRANSPORTATION
ONE HUNDRED EIGHTH CONGRESS
SECOND SESSION
JOHN McCAIN, Arizona, Chairman
TED STEVENS, Alaska ERNEST F. HOLLINGS, South
CONRAD BURNS, Montana Carolina, Ranking
TRENT LOTT, Mississippi DANIEL K. INOUYE, Hawaii
KAY BAILEY HUTCHISON, Texas JOHN D. ROCKEFELLER IV, West
OLYMPIA J. SNOWE, Maine Virginia
SAM BROWNBACK, Kansas JOHN F. KERRY, Massachusetts
GORDON H. SMITH, Oregon JOHN B. BREAUX, Louisiana
PETER G. FITZGERALD, Illinois BYRON L. DORGAN, North Dakota
JOHN ENSIGN, Nevada RON WYDEN, Oregon
GEORGE ALLEN, Virginia BARBARA BOXER, California
JOHN E. SUNUNU, New Hampshire BILL NELSON, Florida
MARIA CANTWELL, Washington
FRANK R. LAUTENBERG, New Jersey
Jeanne Bumpus, Republican Staff Director and General Counsel
Robert W. Chamberlin, Republican Chief Counsel
Kevin D. Kayes, Democratic Staff Director and Chief Counsel
Gregg Elias, Democratic General Counsel
C O N T E N T S
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Page
Hearing held on June 2, 2004..................................... 1
Statement of Senator Boxer....................................... 4
Prepared statement........................................... 5
Statement of Senator Burns....................................... 2
Statement of Senator Cantwell.................................... 58
Statement of Senator McCain...................................... 1
Statement of Senator Smith....................................... 6
Prepared statement........................................... 6
Statement of Senator Wyden....................................... 3
Witnesses
Conners, Hon. Ellen Engleman, Chairman, National Transportation
Safety Board................................................... 7
Prepared statement........................................... 10
Grantham, William H., President, International Air Response Inc.. 45
Prepared statement........................................... 46
Rey, Mark E., Under Secretary for Natural Resources and
Environment, U.S. Department of Agriculture.................... 19
Prepared statement........................................... 21
Sabatini, Nicholas A., Associate Administrator, Regulation and
Certification, Federal Aviation Administration................. 14
Prepared statement........................................... 17
Timmons, Mark, President, Neptune Aviation Services, Missoula
International Airport.......................................... 24
Statement from Douglas R. Herlihy, Air Safety Investigator,
Herlihy & Leonard.......................................... 24
Article dated May 16, 2004 entitled, ``Large Air Tanker
Airworthiness and Modernization'' by Ronald F. Livingston.. 33
Prepared statement........................................... 40
Appendix
Baucus, Hon. Max, U.S. Senator from Montana, prepared statement.. 65
Letter dated May 19, 2004 to Kristen Schloemer, President,
Neptune Aviation Services from Kathleen A. Yodice, Yodice
Associates..................................................... 67
FIREFIGHTING AIRCRAFT SAFETY
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WEDNESDAY, JUNE 2, 2004
U.S. Senate,
Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation,
Washington, DC.
The Committee met, pursuant to notice, at 9:31 a.m. in room
SR-253, Russell Senate Office Building, Hon. John McCain,
Chairman, presiding.
OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. JOHN McCAIN,
U.S. SENATOR FROM ARIZONA
The Chairman. Good morning. Today's hearing is to address
the recent decision by the Department of Interior and the
Department of Agriculture to cancel contracts for all 33 of the
large firefighting aircraft. That action has a substantial
impact on many states in their efforts to fight forest fires.
According to the Forest Service, 20 percent of all retardant
used to suppress wildfires was delivered by these 33 aircraft.
We are told these cancellations were in response to a
safety recommendation letter issued by the National
Transportation Safety Board that reviewed three accidents
involving firefighting aircraft. However, it should be pointed
out that the key recommendation in the NTSB letter was not for
the agencies to cancel contracts. It was that the contracting
agency should further develop a maintenance and inspection
program to ensure the safe operation of these planes. Rather
than instituting such a safety system, however, the agencies
involved simply canceled the contracts for the aircraft.
Some Forest Service officials were quoted in the press as
being, ``surprised,'' that the NTSB concluded that they had
responsibility for the safety of these planes. But there is no
justifiable reason for such a reaction. This issue has been
around for years, with reports by the General Accounting
Office, the USDA Inspector General, and even a joint report by
FAA and the Forest Service, all of which recommended
improvements to the safety oversight program.
Moreover, after two accidents in 2002 the Forest Service
contracted with Sandia National Laboratories to develop a
better safety oversight plan for these aircraft. Sandia visited
every aircraft operator and developed a number of
recommendations. Among the recommendations was a requirement
that each of the 33 aircraft receive an in-depth inspection.
The majority of these inspections were completed by Sandia and
the FAA in 2003.
The NTSB report briefly discussed the Sandia study as
follows, quote: ``The Safety Board is aware that the Forest
Service has recently embarked on a multi-year plan to evaluate
and improve the airworthiness of its airtanker fleet, including
modification of its maintenance program so that it more closely
reflects the firefighting mission. The board supports this
initiative and looks forward to learning more about the
progress and results of this plan.''
Again, the NTSB report did not recommend grounding these
planes. In fact, according to the excerpt I just read, the NTSB
supported the approach that was being recommended by Sandia.
While the safe operation of these aircraft is of paramount
importance, we cannot lose sight of the fact that lives on the
ground are also at risk. We are already well into fire season
in many states. The destruction that wildfires can cause is
almost beyond comprehension. In Arizona, for example, the
85,000-acre Rodeo fire that occurred in 2002, which had already
been declared the worst in Arizona's history, merged with the
Chattasky fire to form an inferno that destroyed 468,000 acres
and more than 400 structures. A total of more than 630,000
acres in Arizona burned in that year alone.
Therefore, during today's hearing I hope we will receive
testimony from the agencies on what actions are being taken to
return the tanker aircraft safely to service. They clearly are
a critical part of our Nation's firefighting arsenal,
especially when used for initial attacks on emerging fires,
where the use of tankers buys time for fire crews on the
ground, and when used to protect buildings.
I look forward to hearing from our witnesses.
Senator Burns.
STATEMENT OF HON. CONRAD BURNS,
U.S. SENATOR FROM MONTANA
Senator Burns. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman, and thank
you for holding this hearing. And thanks for inviting Mark
Timmons, who is President of Neptune Aviation Services out of
Missoula, Montana. We are happy to have him here. As you may
know, Neptune has played a vital role in firefighting in my
state and many others states in the West. It represents the
very best of the companies contracted to fight fires and, as
you can imagine, I am very concerned about the company's well-
being.
My concerns also carry over to the entire West. We are
about to head into another fire season, which is probably going
to be another record. The drought conditions continue in the
West and just institutional knowledge will tell us that we are
going to need some aircraft to fight fires.
I also believe that we have a situation that can be
alleviated if we can get some good faith negotiation between
the appropriate agencies and the companies involved. Both
government and private entities have the same two goals: the
aircraft need to be safe, they need to be properly maintained;
we need resources to fight this year's fires.
I want to emphasize that wildfires still concern us in the
West. Last year wildfires nationally burned 3.6 million acres
and cost $750 million. Within that, in Montana we burned up
860,000 acres at a cost of $260 million. So we are concerned.
Over the past 4 years, nationally 22 million acres have burned.
That is 34,000 square miles, with a cost of over $4 billion. In
Montana we account for 2.3 million acres. In a fire season
alone we have 190 million acres that is at risk due to insects,
disease, and hazardous fuel accumulation. We still have those
conditions even though we are working on them every day.
Mr. Chairman, we have a drought condition in the Rocky
Mountain states of my state and Idaho, Wyoming, Nevada,
Colorado, Utah, New Mexico, and Arizona. They remain--those
levels remain in severe or extreme fire danger. Even with the
current rainfall in Montana, 70 percent of the subsoils are
short of moisture. Many snowpack water equivalent sites are 50
percent of normal. The scenario is not good and I believe we
need all the resources that we can gather and utilize them this
summer.
Finally, I hope that we can find some solutions today. In
my meetings with the various agencies and others involved, I
have found that there is a lot of finger-pointing and, quote,
``My hands are tied'' talk. I see a company like Neptune, who
has civil airworthiness certificates in the FAA certified
maintenance program, suffer from this decision. I do not know
if we need a study that looks at each operator individually,
but I would like to examine our short and long-term options.
Flying any airplane is dangerous business, as you well
know. Let us get the safety measures in place, acknowledge that
there are those who already have those safety measures in hand
and are doing them today. Good companies should not suffer from
a blanket decision that did not take everyone into account
individually.
So thank you for holding this hearing, Mr. Chairman. We
have got--I think we can work this whole thing out. I did not
know the issue was going to get this big, to be honest with
you. But there are so many grey areas in this thing, and
everybody kind of--it is kind of a CYA thing, but we have to
resolve it because we are in the fire season.
Thank you again for having this hearing.
The Chairman. Thank you.
Senator Wyden.
STATEMENT OF HON. RON WYDEN,
U.S. SENATOR FROM OREGON
Senator Wyden. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I too appreciate
your holding the hearing. We have got four westerners here and
it is a bipartisan quartet, and that is exactly what I think it
is going to take in order to turn this problem around, because
it is pretty obvious that we have a responsibility vacuum. It
seems that everybody thought somebody else was in control of
ensuring that these tankers were safe for wildfire fighting and
at the end of the day it seems that nobody was really in
charge.
I am particularly interested in making sure that today it
is clear that there is now a plan for dealing with this problem
and that it is clear who is responsible for taking the lead in
ensuring that the recommendations, the safety recommendations,
from the National Transportation Safety Board, with whom I met
yesterday, are actually followed.
I think it is also important that we look at new ways to
ensure that there is enough scientific information to design a
safety program that takes account of the special stresses of
firefighting. Certainly that means that there has got to be a
process for obtaining the data. One question that I want to ask
is whether the installation of flight data recorders on
aircraft in the firefighting fleet would be of some value in
collecting data immediately during this fire season.
So there are important issues to be dealt with and, with
the four of us all coming from the West, it is pretty obvious
that for the next few months we are going to see people all
over the West grabbing their belongings, fleeing their
communities. I think there is a responsibility to get this
tanker policy right to ensure that we have the tools for
wildfire fighting. I look forward to working with you, Mr.
Chairman, and our colleagues to do that.
The Chairman. Thank you.
Senator Boxer.
STATEMENT OF HON. BARBARA BOXER,
U.S. SENATOR FROM CALIFORNIA
Senator Boxer. Thanks very much, Mr. Chairman. You could
not have picked a more important topic for my state right now,
and I know all of us in the West are so worried about the
conditions.
I would ask unanimous consent that my full statement be
placed in the record and I will summarize it as fast as I can.
The Chairman. Without objection.
Senator Boxer. We all have to just look back to the
devastating wildfire season last year, when fire swept through
Ventura, Los Angeles, San Bernadino, Riverside, and San Diego.
It was a result of many conditions, including not enough
rainfall and the bark beetle infestation that killed trees
throughout the region and turned them into kindling. Twenty-
four people died, 750,000 acres were burned, and 3,700 homes
were lost, give or take a couple.
One important tool for us then was the Forest Service
contracting for aerial tankers. There were 23 used in those
efforts, which were contracted from private companies. After
three airtanker accidents, one in 1994 and two in 2002, the
NTSB released recommendations that Department of Agriculture
and Interior develop maintenance and inspection programs for
firefighting aircraft.
Now, rather than do that, the Department of Interior and
the Forest Service simply canceled the contracts. So we may
well lose this vital resource. Now, I wrote to Secretary
Veneman and Interior Secretary Norton and requested information
on what measures are being taken to ensure that airtankers will
be available when needed in light of the decision to terminate
their contract for 33 large airtankers. Mr. Chairman, I have
yet to receive a response. That is why I think this hearing is
so critical.
I just want to quote Fire Chief Bill Smith from San
Bernadino after he read that the tankers were grounded. This is
someone on the ground. This is not a political person. He said,
``In reality, it is just pretty scary going into this type of a
fire season without this fire resource. When they are
available, when they can be used, they have a major effect on
fighting.'' And he went on to say the tankers were especially
helpful in getting a handle on the fires in the early stages.
In Victorville, we know flames were approaching, airtankers
were used to get the fire under control. During fires last
year, David Weldon, San Diego County Sheriff's helicopter
pilot, hovered over the Cedar fire in Cleveland National Forest
and was unable to do anything about it. He said if airtankers
had been deployed the Cedar fire could have been put out.
Now, we know we have used helicopters, but they are not a
substitute. We are hoping that your alternative plan is not the
one we think it is, which is to use California's airtankers,
because that is just not enough. We used all of those the last
time.
Agriculture Under Secretary Mark Rey stated at the Energy
and Natural Resources Committee--Mr. Rey, you are here today--
that ``Thousands of wildland fires are suppressed without the
benefit of air support.'' So I hope I am not reading into the
fact that you do not think that these tankers work, because if
that is your position that is contrary to my people on the
ground who are dealing with this every single day.
So, Mr. Chairman, thank you. I think maybe we need to look
to the FAA on this whole matter. This hearing is so crucial.
Again, I thank you for holding it.
[The prepared statement of Senator Boxer follows:]
Prepared Statement of Hon. Barbara Boxer, U.S. Senator from California
Mr. Chairman, thank you for holding this important hearing today.
Last year, California had a devastating wildfire season. The fires
extended through Ventura, Los Angeles, San Bernardino, Riverside, and
San Diego counties. This was a result of many conditions, including not
enough rainfall and bark beetle infestations that killed trees
throughout the region and turned them into kindling. From these fires,
24 people were killed, 750,043 acres were burned, and 3,710 homes were
destroyed.
One important tool in combating the fires was the Forest Service
contracted aerial tankers. There were 23 used in the efforts, which
were contracted from private companies.
After three air tanker accidents--one in 1994 and two in 2002--the
National Transportation Safety Board released recommendations that the
Department of Agriculture and the Department of Interior develop
maintenance and inspection programs for firefighting aircraft.
Rather than doing so, the Forest Service just simply cancelled its
contracts for air tankers. Therefore, we may well lose a vital
resource.
Right after the tankers were grounded, I wrote to the Agriculture
Secretary Ann Veneman and Interior Secretary Gale Norton and requested
information on what measures are being taken to ensure that air tankers
will be available when needed, in light of the decision to terminate
their contract for 33 large air tankers.
After the news that the tankers were grounded, San Bernardino
County's Running Springs Fire Chief Bill Smith said in a local
newspaper, ``In reality, it's just pretty scary, going into this type
of a fire season . . . without this fire resource. When they are
available, when they can be used, they do have a major effect on
fighting.''
Fire Chief Smith continued to say that the tankers were especially
helpful in getting a handle on the fires in the early stages.
During the wildfires last fall, tankers were used to control the
fires. In Victorville, as the flames were approaching, air tankers were
used to get the fire under control quickly.
During the fires last year, David Weldon, San Diego County
sheriff's helicopter pilot hovered over the Cedar Fire in the Cleveland
National Forest and was unable to do anything about it. He said that if
air tankers had been deployed, the Cedar Fire could have been put out.
In California, there are other resources to combat fires, such as
23 commercially operated fire-fighting helicopters--which includes
three Sikorsky Skycranes--and 23 S-2s, which are smaller air tankers
belonging to the California Department of Forestry and Fire Protection.
There are also military aircraft in California.
In some cases, helicopters are a better choice to put out fires in
the mountains, but we still need the tankers, especially for longer
distances.
I understand that the Forest Service has come up with an
alternative plan-which has the Forest Service relying on California's
air tankers.
Agriculture Under Secretary Mark Rey stated at the Energy and
Natural Resource Committee that ``thousands of wildland fires are
suppressed without the benefit of air support.'' But, in the fires in
California last year, we needed all the resources--including air
tankers--to effectively fight them.
I hope to hear from these witnesses today about solutions to this
problem.
First, should the tankers continue to be grounded because that was
not the recommendation from the NTSB?
Second, should the FAA be given the authority to set standards for
the tankers, so they can continue to be used to fight fires?
Third, if the tankers are too old to fly, then we need to
appropriate more funds to replace the tankers or increase access to
more military aircraft to ensure that all the resources are there to
fight these fires.
Last year's fires were devastating to my state of California. This
year, we have already had large wildfires. The major fire season is
only a few months away. We need to act now to protect our people and
property from these fires.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
The Chairman. Thank you.
Senator Smith.
STATEMENT OF HON. GORDON H. SMITH,
U.S. SENATOR FROM OREGON
Senator Smith. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you for
holding this hearing. I will submit my statement for the
record, Mr. Chairman.
The Chairman. Without objection.
Senator Smith. But I thank you as well for holding this
hearing. It is, I think as Senator Boxer said, a very important
hearing, even a life and death hearing, for many of our
communities. I have a number of questions I hope I am able to
stay long enough to ask Secretary Rey about the needs of State
land, private land that adjoins forest land, and the need of
the Oregon Department of Forestry to utilize the tankers that
they have hired in the event that these are in fact grounded,
and it is just too late sometimes to stop a fire that is
roaring when it comes to private land. The truth is it does not
know the border, and sometimes the bureaucracy involved really
can be damaging, in this case downright dangerous.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
[The prepared statement of Senator Smith follows:]
Prepared Statement of Hon. Gordon H. Smith, U.S. Senator from Oregon
I want to thank Senator McCain for holding today's hearing which
affects both of our states considerably. In fact, 15,000 acres have
already burned in Arizona this season. I expect that number to be far
worse in the next few months.
Notwithstanding my concerns about how we got into this 11th hour
crisis, I have several issues that must be addressed on behalf of
Oregonians today. I fear the image of airtankers grounded on the
Redmond airfield while the Deschutes National Forest and adjacent homes
needlessly burn all around it.
The state of Oregon and the Oregon Department of Forestry must be
given the ability to protect homes and property within their
jurisdiction. That will be rather difficult if the state has to wait
for a wildfire to reach someone's back yard before attacking 11. At the
very least, there should be a clear process for determining when it is
appropriate to use State-contracted resources.
I would call on all Federal agencies represented here today to
continue working collaboratively to create a certification process for
the rest of the firefighting fleet. Otherwise, bureaucratic paperwork
may just further fan the flames of an already uncontrollable wildfire.
The Chairman. Well, thank you, Senator Smith. I just want
to mention again that we all know, Senator Boxer mentioned, all
of us in the West, we all know what is going to happen in the
next few months. And here we are at a time where there is no
such thing as any act of God being inevitable, but the chances
of a devastating forest fire, plural, is extremely good, given
the drought conditions that exist.
At the same time, an extremely valuable asset has now been
taken from the inventory, even though the National
Transportation Safety Board did not make such recommendation,
as we will hear. There was an interesting letter in the Arizona
Republic from Ms. Kathleen Clark and Dale Bosworth--Kathleen
Clark is the head of BLM and Mr. Bosworth of Agriculture, the
Forest Service--who say ``That is why we terminated the
contract pending a determination that they can be operated
safely. The National Transportation Safety Board has determined
that the tankers have potential structural problems that might
lead to a catastrophe if we send them to fight a fire. The NTSB
has further determined there is no means to immediately ensure
the airworthiness of these aircraft.''
I think we are going to hear testimony today that is not
true. It is remarkable that in my home town newspaper the head
of BLM and the head of the Forest Service would make a
statement that is at best disingenuous and at worst absolutely
false.
I happen to have an aviation background and I do not have a
firefighting background, but I do know that the NTSB is the
ultimate arbiter in this kind of situation with regards to
aviation safety, not the Department of Agriculture, not the
Bureau of Land Management, and certainly not the Forest
Service. That is why I was motivated to having this hearing
today and that is why I think it is important that we have the
witness from the National Transportation Safety Board here this
morning.
So our panel is: the Honorable Ellen Engleman Conners,
Chairman of the National Transportation Safety Board--we thank
you for coming today--Mr. Nicholas Sabatini, Associate
Administrator for Regulation and Certification of the FAA; Mr.
Mark Rey, Under Secretary for Natural Resources and
Environment, U.S. Department of Agriculture; Mr. Mark Timmons,
President of Neptune Aviation Services, Missoula International
Airport; and Mr. William Grantham, President, International Air
Response Incorporated, Chandler, Arizona.
We will begin with--I want to thank all the witnesses for
coming today. We will begin with Ms. Engleman.
STATEMENT OF HON. ELLEN ENGLEMAN CONNERS, CHAIRMAN, NATIONAL
TRANSPORTATION SAFETY BOARD
Ms. Conners. Good morning, Chairman, members of the
Committee. My name is Ellen Engleman Conners and it is truly my
privilege to serve as the Chairman of the National
Transportation Safety Board, representing the board's 429
dedicated professionals. Thank you for the invitation to
testify before you today regarding the board's recent safety
recommendations that resulted from three separate accidents
involving firefighting airtankers.
Chairman we have submitted our written testimony, if we
could have that as part of the record, and I will summarize it.
The Chairman. All the written testimony will be made part
of the record.
Ms. Conners. Thank you, sir.
Please let me begin by acknowledging the tragic loss of
lives in the accidents being discussed today. Pilots and crews
from the states of California, Montana, and Nevada were killed
during these three accidents. It is our hope that out of these
tragedies and through the NTSB independent safety investigation
and recommendations that good will come.
Our investigators and staff spent more than 2,500 man-hours
investigating these three tanker accidents. The accident
aircraft were surplus military aircraft built after World War
II. From the beginning of the investigation, it was understood
that these aircraft were investigated in the category of
public, as distinguished from civil operations and therefore
were not required by the Federal Aviation Administration to
comply with many of the FAA regulations codified in 14 CFR.
For example, regulations pertaining to aircraft
certification and maintenance and flight crew training and
licensing are not applicable to public operations.
Additionally, aircraft used in public operations are not
required to be equipped with flight data or cockpit voice
recorders. Therefore, it was the opinion of the board that the
operator, in this case the U.S. Department of Agriculture,
Forest Service, was primarily responsible for their safe
operation.
As in the case with all of our investigations, open
discussions were held with the parties involved. The Safety
Board worked closely with the aviation personnel from USDA-
Forest Service, Department of Interior, and FAA from early
stages of the Walker and Estes Park investigations through the
final release of the accident report and the Safety Board's
recommendation letter.
Early in the investigation, within the first month or so,
it became evident that there were serious issues concerning the
airworthiness of these airplanes and the oversight to ensure
their safe operation. As the NTSB drafted its recommendations,
we held biweekly meetings and teleconferences with the FAA and
the Forest Service to share our concerns and our proposed
recommendations with them.
As per our normal investigation procedures, the NTSB did
not inspect all aircraft in the firefighting fleet, nor did we
investigate all companies involved in aircraft firefighting.
The safety issues identified in the accidents were potentially
present in all large airtanker operations. Thus, the NTSB
safety recommendations were applicable to the entire large
airtanker industry.
An example of safety recommendations being applicable to
the broader industry was shown also in 1996 with the TWA Flight
800 accident. The airplane exploded off the coast of Long
Island, killing 230 people. The NTSB did not investigate all
manufacturers of large aircraft, but the recommendation to
inert the center wing fuel tank was aimed at all transport-
category aircraft.
Our recommendations regarding firefighting aircraft were
specific. In order to ensure that there is robust oversight and
inspection infrastructure that will ensure the safe operation
of aircraft used in firefighting operations, the NTSB
recommended that the USDA and the Department of Interior
develop maintenance and inspection programs for aircraft used
in firefighting operations that take into account five specific
factors, require that the aircraft in firefighting operations
be maintained in accordance with those programs, and hire
appropriate personnel to conduct oversight of those programs.
In addition, because some of these public use aircraft
might be used for civil use at other times, we recommended that
the FAA require the same maintenance and inspection programs.
We also recommended that the FAA serve as the focal point for
collecting continuing airworthiness data about surplus military
aircraft from the original equipment manufacturer or the
military in order to ensure that--in order to share that with
subsequent owners and operators.
Our recommendations for safety apply to any airframe,
regardless of age, used in firefighting. Whether an old
airplane or a new airplane or an airplane still being designed,
the recommendation to have a maintenance and inspection program
is the same.
We note that in March 2004, the industry's Consortium for
Aerial Firefighting Evolution released the Strategic Aerial
Firefighting Excellence report. The conclusion contains a
parallel finding to the Safety Board's finding. The safety
report concluded that the local load environment in which the
current and future aerial firefighting fleet remains largely
unknown; until this environment is adequately characterized,
there is an unknown level of risk that unanticipated in-flight
structural failures may occur in both the current and future
operational fleets.
The industry's SAFE report also concludes: ``There is a
need to implement structural health monitoring programs on a
large number, if not all, of the current airtankers. Data
obtained from these programs will define criteria against which
the suitability of future aerial firefighting aircraft can be
evaluated prior to conversion and ensure the ongoing safe and
economic management of the current fleet until such time as it
can be replaced.''
The Safety Board is also aware that the USDA began work
with the Sandia Laboratory to develop a maintenance and
inspection program for firefighting aircraft. We noted in our
safety recommendation letter that the Safety Board is aware
that the Forest Service has recently embarked on a multi-year
plan to evaluate and improve the airworthiness of its tanker
fleet, including modification of its maintenance program so
that it more closely reflects the firefighting mission. The
board supports this initiative and looks forward to learning
more about the progress and results of this plan.
In addition, the Canadians have developed an extensive
program to conduct appropriate inspection of these aircraft.
However, neither the nascent USDA nor the mature Canadian
programs are currently in place in the United States.
The National Transportation Safety Board recognizes that
aerial firefighting is an intrinsically high-risk operation. We
believe, however, that the risk of an in-flight structural
failure should not be considered an unavoidable risk of
firefighting. The increased risk of fatigue cracking and
accelerated crack propagation can and should be addressed
through proper maintenance programs.
Thank you for the opportunity to testify today on these
important safety matters. I will be happy to answer any
questions you have.
[The prepared statement of Ms. Conners follows:]
Prepared Statement of Hon. Ellen Engleman Conners, Chairman,
National Transportation Safety Board
Good morning, Chairman McCain, Senator Hollings, and Members of the
Committee. My name is Ellen Engleman Conners, and it is my privilege to
serve as the Chairman of the National Transportation Safety Board
(NTSB), representing the Board's 429 dedicated professionals. Thank you
for your invitation to testify before you today regarding the Board's
recent safety recommendations that resulted from three separate
accidents involving firefighting air tankers. Please let me begin by
acknowledging the tragic loss of life in the accidents being discussed
today. Pilots and crews from the states of California, Montana and
Nevada were killed during these three accidents. It is our hope that
out of these tragedies and through the NTSB independent safety
investigations, good will come.
Our investigators and staff spent more than 2,500 man-hours on
these investigations. These investigations were conducted by our
regional aviation investigators, with assistance of specialists from
our headquarters in Washington, D.C. Over 2,000 aviation incidents and
accidents (2,059 in 2003) are conducted every year by the NTSB's
approximately 35 regional investigators.
As you know, the Safety Board is an independent Federal agency and
not a regulatory or enforcement agency. We are charged by Congress with
investigating every civil aviation accident in the United States and
significant accidents in the other modes of transportation--railroad,
highway, marine and pipeline--and issuing safety recommendations aimed
at preventing future accidents. NTSB reports are based on facts,
science, and data--not supposition, guesswork, or desire. And, as you
are also aware, the NTSB is not required to perform cost-benefit
analysis of its safety recommendations.
Since its inception in 1967, the Safety Board has investigated more
than 124,000 aviation accidents and over 10,000 surface transportation
accidents. In so doing, it has become one of the world's premier
accident investigation agencies. On call 24 hours a day, 365 days a
year, NTSB investigators travel throughout the country and to every
corner of the world to investigate significant accidents and develop
factual records and safety recommendations.
Our final reports are a Safety Board product, not the opinion of
any one individual at the NTSB. Our professional staff investigates the
accidents and then provides a draft report to the five Presidentially
appointed Members of the Board, who then review and vote on the report,
the probable cause, and the safety recommendations.
The Safety Board has issued more than 12,000 recommendations in all
transportation modes. In 1990, the NTSB began highlighting some issues
on a Most Wanted list of safety improvements. Although the NTSB does
not regulate transportation equipment, personnel or operations nor do
we initiate enforcement actions, our reputation for impartiality and
thoroughness has enabled the Board to achieve such success in shaping
transportation safety improvements that more than 82 percent of its
recommendations have been adopted by those in a position to effect
change. Many safety features currently incorporated into airplanes,
automobiles, trains, pipelines, and marine vessels had their genesis in
NTSB recommendations.
I want to briefly describe the Board's investigations of the three
firefighting air tanker accidents and the recommendations that resulted
from those investigations.
The first accident occurred August 13, 1994, in Pearblossom,
California, and three people were killed. While in level flight, the
airplane's right wing separated. The Board's original probable cause
was released in 1995. Based on evidence discovered in the 2002
investigation of a C-130 accident at Walker, California accident, the
NTSB went back to the site of the Pearblossom accident to search for
additional pieces of metal to examine. We took those pieces to our
laboratory in Washington, D.C. Our laboratory examination of right
side, center-wing fragments revealed two fatigue cracks that propagated
to overstress fractures. One of the cracks was in the underside wing
skin below a doubler, and the other was in the doubler itself. As a
result, the Safety Board issued a revised probable cause in 2004.
The airplane had been retired from military service in 1986. At the
time of the accident, the airplane had a total of 20,289 flight hours,
19,612 of which were acquired during its military service. Of note, the
wing failure occurred after the plane accumulated only had 677 hours
out of military service. The inspection and maintenance programs used
by the operator, which were based on military standards, included
general visual inspections for cracks, but did not include enhanced or
focused inspections of highly stressed areas, such as the wing
sections, where the fatigue cracks that led to the accident were
located. The operator did not possess the engineering expertise
necessary to conduct studies and engineering analysis to define the
stresses associated with the firefighting operating environment and to
predict the effects of those stresses on the operational life of its
airplanes.
The second accident occurred on June 17, 2002, in Walker,
California, also killing three people. The airplane was making a fire
retardant drop over a mountain drainage valley when the wings separated
from the fuselage. Our metallurgical examination of the center wing box
lower skin revealed a 12-inch-long fatigue crack on the lower surface
of the right wing beneath the forward doubler. The portion of the wing
skin containing the fatigue crack was covered by a manufacturer-
installed doubler, which hid the crack from view and, therefore,
prevented detection of the crack during a visual inspection of the
exterior of the airplane.
The airplane retired from military service in 1978. At that time,
it had accumulated about 19,545 hours in service. Additionally, the Air
Force had replaced the wing center section shortly before it left
military service. At the time of the accident, the aircraft had
accumulated 21,863 hours in service. It is important to point out that
the new wing center section failed after just more than 2,300 hours in
firefighting service.
The third accident occurred on July 18, 2002, in Estes Park,
Colorado, and claimed two lives. The airplane was maneuvering to
deliver fire retardant when its left wing separated and the airplane
crashed into mountainous terrain. Our examination revealed extensive
areas of preexisting fatigue in the left wing's forward spar lower spar
cap, the adjacent spar web, and the adjacent area of the lower wing
skin. The portion of the wing containing the fatigue crack was obscured
by the retardant tanks and was not detectable during an exterior visual
inspections
The airplane was in military service until 1956. It was not
designed to be operated as a firefighting airplane. However, in 1958,
the airplane was converted to civilian use as an air tanker and served
in that capacity until the time of the accident. The investigation
revealed that the owner developed service and inspection procedures for
the air tanker; however, those the procedures did not adequately
describe where and how to inspect for critical fatigue cracks. The
procedures were based on U.S. Navy PB4Y-2 airplane structural repair
manuals that had not been revised since 1948.
Many of these large air tankers are surplus military aircraft and
some were built shortly after World War II. From the beginning of the
investigations, it was understood that these aircraft were investigated
in the category of public (as distinguished from civil) operations, and
therefore, were not required by the Federal Aviation Administration
(FAA) to comply with many of the Federal aviation regulations codified
in 14 Code of Federal Regulations (CFR). For example, regulations
pertaining to aircraft certification and maintenance and flight crew
training and licensing are not applicable to public operations.
Additionally, aircraft used in public operations are not required to be
equipped with flight data or cockpit voice recorders. Therefore, the
operator, in this case the U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA) Forest
Service, is primarily responsible for their safe operation.
The aircraft have been issued restricted-category type and
airworthiness certificates from the FAA. However, we must be clear as
to what this means. The requirements for issuance of a restricted-
category type certificate to surplus military aircraft are contained in
14 CFR 21.25(a) (2) and state, in part:
(a) An applicant is entitled to a type certificate for an
aircraft in the restricted category for special purpose
operations if he shows . . . that no feature or characteristic
of the aircraft makes it unsafe when it is operated under the
limitations prescribed for its intended use, and that the
aircraft----
(2) Is of a type that has been manufactured in accordance with
the requirements of and accepted for use by, an Armed Force of
the United States and has been later modified for a special
purpose.
According to the FAA in a letter dated November 15, 2002, from
Ronald T. Wojnar, Deputy Director, FAA Aircraft Certification Service,
to Tony Kern, USDA Forest Service National Aviation Officer (attached
for the record):
FAA-restricted type design certification of these surplus military
aircraft is primarily based on military records and service history,
unlike certification of normal or transport-category aircraft, which
must be certificated to applicable FAA airworthiness standards (e.g.,
14 CFR Part 23 or Part 25).
Because these aircraft do not meet standard-category airworthiness
standards, they have numerous restrictions placed on them. These
restrictions are implemented through the operating limitations attached
to the airworthiness certificate, as well as the operating limitations
in 14 CFR. Significantly, the operating restrictions contained in
restricted-category airworthiness and type certificates of surplus
military aircraft typically do not include any enhanced maintenance
requirements beyond those that applied when the aircraft left military
service.
As is the case with all of our investigations, open discussions
were held with the parties involved. The Safety Board worked closely
with the aviation personnel from the Forest Service (FS), DOI, Interior
and the FAA from the early stages of the Walker and Estes Park
investigations through the final release of the accident report and the
Safety Board's recommendation letter. Early in the investigation
(within the first month or so) it became evident that there were
serious issues concerning the airworthiness of these airplanes and the
oversight to ensure their safe operation. The Safety Board staff was
well aware that corrective actions needed to be initiated immediately.
As the NTSB drafted its recommendations, we held biweekly meetings and
teleconferences with the FAA and the FS to share our concerns and our
proposed recommendations with them. All told, the Safety Board has
spent hundreds of hours and participated in dozens of meetings or
telephone calls with members of FAA, FS, and DOI on this topic.
The Safety Board also met with the Blue Ribbon committee several
times during the course of its investigation. The Commission's report
parallels the NTSB's safety recommendations. The Safety Board also
briefed the General Services Administration's (GSA) Interagency
Committee for Aviation Policy (ICAP), which advises GSA on the
technical and operational issues related to aviation management, to
ensure that the issues and concerns we had would be used to foster
safe, effective, and efficient aviation in other U.S. government
agencies. The Safely Board is a member of ICAP.
The Safety Board's investigation of these three specific accidents
focused on airworthiness and maintenance issues associated with the
large air tankers. However, because all aircraft engaged in
firefighting operations are exposed to the same harsh environment and
increased stresses and are likely operating outside the manufacturers'
original design intent, the NTSB report noted that the deficiencies
identified may well apply to all aircraft in the firefighting fleet.
Frequent and aggressive low-level maneuvers with high acceleration
loads and high levels of atmospheric turbulence are an inherent part of
firefighting operations. A 1974 report by the National Aeronautics and
Space Administration (NASA) noted that ``. . . Because the maneuver
loading, in both the repeated and high magnitude applications, is so
severe relative to the design loads, shortening of the structural life
of the aircraft should be expected.'' Similar findings were included in
a November 1996 Supplemental Structural Inspection Document issued to
Conair, a Canadian manufacturer and operator of firefighting aircraft.
We did not inspect all aircraft in the firefighting fleet, nor did
we investigate all companies involved in aircraft firefighting.
However, the safety issues identified in these investigations are
present in some, if not all, other large air tanker operations. Thus,
the NTSB safety recommendations that result from those accidents are
applicable to the entire large air tanker industry. In order to meet
the intent of these recommendations, that is assessing the structural
integrity of the tankers, the owners and operators must have in place
the appropriate programs and personnel. It is for the operator, in this
case, the U.S. Forest Service, to determine that the recommendations
have been accomplished. An example of safety recommendations being
applicable to the broader industry is shown in the 1996 TWA flight 800
accident. The airplane exploded off the coast of Long Island, killing
230 people. The NTSB did not investigate all manufacturers of large
aircraft, but the recommendation to inert the center wing fuel tank was
aimed at all transport category aircraft.
In the NTSB air tanker investigation, the Board found that no
effective mechanism currently exists to ensure the continuing
airworthiness of firefighting aircraft. Specifically, the maintenance
and inspection programs being used do not adequately account for the
increased safety risks to which these aircraft are being exposed as a
result of their advanced age and the severe stresses of the
firefighting operating environment. In the case here of the air
tankers, the NTSB did not need to look at more operators/aircraft. Our
report concluded that there are no adequate standards and oversight
programs for heavy firefighting aircraft either in the FAA or the DOI.
No one appears to dispute that finding. Indeed, responsible private
operators concur in the judgment that all firefighting aircraft should
be maintained in accordance with specialized procedures that take into
account the age and operating environment of the aircraft. What the
NTSB has recommended is that the Federal standards for this need to be
established and once again responsible operators are awaiting the
establishment of such standards premised on an in-flight monitoring
program--the heart of such an inspection program.
The primary purpose of aircraft maintenance programs is to ensure
the aircraft is airworthy, that is, in safe condition and properly
maintained for its intended operation. Historically, service experience
has demonstrated that it is essential to have regularly updated
knowledge concerning the structural integrity of the airframe. In the
case of air tankers, the structural integrity of the airplanes is of
particular concern, because factors such as fatigue and corrosion tend
to manifest themselves over time as the aircraft age. Accordingly,
owners and operators must be aware that because the airplane is being
used in a manner significantly different from its originally intended
mission profile, they must maintain and inspect these aircraft in
accordance with a program that is continuously evaluated and updated
based on technical and engineering support and the manufacturer's
knowledge of in-service experience.
However, for many aircraft used in firefighting operations, very
little, if any, ongoing technical and engineering support is available
because either the manufacturer no longer exists or does not support
the airplane, or the military no longer operates that type of aircraft.
Further, the current operators of these firefighting aircraft are
typically unable to structure a maintenance program that accounts for
the new mission profile because: (1) the airplane's design and service
life information (such as service reports and maintenance data) is not
readily available; (2) the operator lacks the necessary engineering
expertise; (3) the magnitude of maneuver loading and level of
turbulence in the firefighting environment is not defined; and (4) the
effects of this operating environment on the service life of the
aircraft structure are undefined.
Currently, there is not sufficient data to make engineering
decisions or conduct engineering studies or modeling. A minimum amount
of loads data is just becoming available. In some cases there may be no
inspection techniques that can identify some of the hidden damage that
we have found on the airplanes. We are not aware of any current
Original Engineering Manufacture (OEM) support for these airplanes that
is sophisticated enough to be effective. We know some of the history of
some of these planes because they came from the military, but we do not
have the type of structural load history that would define the
structural health when they entered firefighting service. We certainly
do not know the history while in firefighting service. We need to be
able to predict the problem, preclude the problem, and short of that,
find the problem before there is a structural failure. These require
more sophistication than we believe is being applied.
In order to ensure that there is a robust oversight and inspection
infrastructure that will ensure the safe operation of aircraft used in
firefighting operations, the NTSB recommended that the USDA and the
Department of Interior (DOI) develop maintenance and inspection
programs for aircraft used in firefighting operations that take into
account five specific factors require that aircraft in firefighting
operations be maintained in accordance with those programs; and hire
appropriate personnel to conduct oversight of those programs. In
addition, because some of these public use aircraft might be used for
civil use at other times, we recommended that the FAA require the same
maintenance and inspection programs. We also recommended that the FAA
serve as the focal point for collecting continuing airworthiness data
about surplus military aircraft from the OEM or military in order to
share that with subsequent owners and operators.
Our recommendations apply to any airframe, regardless of age.
Whether an old airplane, a new airplane, or an airplane still being
designed, the recommendation to have a maintenance and inspection
program is the same. However, we are not locked into a rigid format for
a solution. There may be many processes that can be used to prevent or
predict these types of accidents. They can take on many forms, and we
are happy to see any that work.
We noticed that in March 2004, the industry's Consortium for Aerial
Firefighting Evolution (CAFE) released the Strategic Aerial
Firefighting Excellence (SAFE) report. The conclusion contains the
parallel to the Safety Board's finding. The report ``focuses on mapping
a course that will ensure the ongoing safe and economic utilization of
both the current and future aerial firefighting fleets for many years
to come.'' However, the CAFE also concludes that ``the load environment
in which the current and future aerial firefighting fleet remains
largely unknown. Until this environment is adequately characterized,
there is an unknown level of risk that unanticipated in-flight
structural failures may occur in both the current and future
operational fleets.''
Furthermore, the industry SAFE report states: ``Many of the
aircraft operating in the aerial firefighting role are not well
supported by their Original Equipment Manufacturers (OEMs). This is
often a result of the OEMs no longer being in business or wishing to
avoid economic/liability issues associated with operating a limited
number of aircraft in a severe role, for which they were not originally
designed. For this reason, every attempt should be made to procure the
original design/modification engineering data for future aerial
firefighting aircraft.''
``The original design of most of these aircraft assumed that their
primary mode of operation would be take-off, climb to altitude
(typically from 14,000-30,000 ft ASL), cruise at altitude, descend and
land. Consequently, their continuous use in a low-level environment
(defined as less than 2,500 ft AGL) during aerial firefighting
operations is quite different from the passenger/cargo role for which
they were primarily designed. As has been documented on many occasions,
aircraft performing any role in a low-level environment are subject to
a far more severe loads environment as a result of a significant
increase in frequency and, on occasion magnitude, of the gust and
maneuvers load spectra they experience. In the case of aerial
firefighting aircraft, the severity of the low-level environment is
further exacerbated by the increased turbulence that is frequently
encountered near the fire. Continued operation in this type of
environment can result in either an increased frequency of known
structural problems and/or the occurrence of structural problems that
have not been previously exhibited by similar aircraft operating in
their original passenger/cargo design role. In past years, much
emphasis has been placed on the high g-loads that have been recorded by
aircraft operating in the aerial firefighting role. While the
occurrence of such loads is obviously of some concern, there is a
growing body of evidence to suggest that they are not the primary cause
of the operational failures. Rather, the majority of the damage
sustained by aerial firefighting aircraft structures appears to be
attributable to cumulative effect of the large number of cyclic
(fatigue) repetitions of relatively low-level (magnitude) loads to
which the aircraft are subjected.''
The industry's SAFE report concludes:
``There is a need to implement structural health monitoring
programs on a large number, if not all, of the current air
tankers. Data obtained from these programs will define criteria
against which the suitability of future aerial firefighting
aircraft can be evaluated prior to conversion and ensure the
ongoing safe and economic management of the current fleet until
such times as it can be replaced. While some steps were taken
to address this issue during the 2003 fire season, to date only
funding to support the limited FAA program has been assigned
for the 2004 fire season. As far as CAFE is aware, the USDA/FS
has so far allocated no funding to support structural health
monitoring programs during the upcoming 2004 and subsequent
fire seasons.''
The Safety Board is also aware that the USDA began work with the
Sandia Laboratory to develop a maintenance and inspection program for
firefighting aircraft. In addition, the Canadians have developed an
extensive program to conduct appropriate inspections of these aircraft.
However, neither the nascent USDA nor the mature Canadian programs are
currently in place at in the United States.
The National Transportation Safety Board recognizes that aerial
firefighting is an intrinsically high-risk operation. However, the risk
of in-flight structural failure should not be considered an unavoidable
risk of firefighting. This increased risk of fatigue cracking and
accelerated crack propagation can and should be addressed through
proper maintenance programs.
Again, thank you for the opportunity to testify today on these
important safety matters. I will be happy to answer any questions that
you might have.
The Chairman. Thank you very much.
Mr. Sabatini, I welcome you and I amend my previous
remarks. Both the FAA and the NTSB are the people we rely on to
give us the information that we need concerning aviation
safety, and I apologize for leaving you out. Mr. Sabatini,
welcome.
STATEMENT OF NICHOLAS A. SABATINI, ASSOCIATE
ADMINISTRATOR, REGULATION AND CERTIFICATION,
FEDERAL AVIATION ADMINISTRATION
Mr. Sabatini. Thank you.
Good morning, Mr. Chairman, members of the Committee.
Senator Burns. You might want to pull that microphone up a
little bit closer. Thank you.
Mr. Sabatini. You are welcome.
My name is Nick Sabatini. I am the Associate Administrator
for Regulation and Certification in the FAA. I am pleased to
appear before you today to discuss the respective roles that
the FAA, the Forest Service, and the Department of the Interior
play in the safety oversight of Forest Service and DOI
firefighting operations.
Recent decisions by the Forest Service and DOI to terminate
contracts with companies that operate airtankers followed NTSB
recommendations that arose out of investigations of fatal air
tanker accidents. Because the decisions to terminate the
contracts were safety-related, a clarification as to why the
Forest Service and DOI and not the FAA are making safety
determinations with respect to these aircraft is appropriate.
The heart of this issue is the safety and airworthiness of
aircraft, and so I understand why people believe that only the
FAA should make such determinations. We are the premier
aviation safety oversight agency in the world and I am proud of
our record and reputation. But from the very beginning and at
all times during the existence of the FAA, there has been a
clear statutory distinction between civil and public aircraft
operations. FAA has regulatory and safety oversight authority
over civil aircraft operations. Public aircraft operations are
conducted by or on behalf of many different government agencies
and departments, both State and Federal.
By statute, authority for the safety oversight of these
operations belongs to the agency or department responsible for
the operation. While FAA can and does provide technical support
to assist other agencies with their safety oversight
responsibilities, the law is quite clear that FAA cannot direct
or compel another agency to impose specific safety requirements
or force them to meet existing FAA requirements for the civil
aircraft fleet.
Over the years, Congress has narrowed and clarified the
definition of ``public aircraft.'' Today it is the type of
operation that defines a public aircraft. Public aircraft
operations are limited to only those operations that are
inherently government in nature, such as firefighting, search
and rescue, prisoner transport, and military operations, to
name a few.
These government functions oftentimes involve dangerous
missions and may require aircraft to be operated in a manner
that is beyond what the FAA may consider to be safe for civil
operations. It is one reason FAA regulations do not apply to
them. The functions could not be performed effectively within
the bounds of existing FAA regulations.
It is critical that you understand our statutory
responsibilities and limitations in order to appreciate that we
are not dismissing or in any way discounting the importance of
aviation safety, regardless of whether the operation is civil
or public. Whether or not FAA is primarily responsible for the
safe operation of public aircraft, we know that our expertise
in aviation safety is invaluable to other agencies in the
development and implementation of safety standards and
practices to oversee their public aircraft operations.
We have also been working with the Forest Service and DOI
to help them define the firefighting environment and its
effects on aircraft structure. In the civil arena, FAA has
decades worth of information detailing how the structure of an
aircraft is affected by the different types of operation, which
has enabled us to create maintenance and inspection programs
that make our civil fleet the safest in the world.
There is little data with respect to firefighting
operations, which require low-altitude operation in turbulent
air with heavy loads. Understanding how and where this type of
operation results in stresses on the airframe that may lead to
fatigue and cracks will translate into the ability to develop
maintenance and inspection programs that are appropriate for
the firefighting environment. Realistically, it will take some
time to obtain sufficient data to develop precise programs, but
FAA will readily lend its expertise to help the Forest Service
and DOI to refine the required programs as new information
warrants.
Since early 2003, we have also advised the Forest Service
and DOI large tanker airworthiness review program conducted by
Sandia National Labs. The review evaluated the certification,
maintenance, operation, and other aspects of aerial
firefighting in order to improve the airworthiness of its
airtankers following two in-flight structural failures in 2002.
This advice was provided in the form of comments on Sandia's
draft reports and was incorporated in Sandia's final
recommendations to the Forest Service and DOI.
Finally, in response to significant Congressional concern
expressed recently with respect to the Forest Service's and
DOI's decisions to terminate airtanker contracts, yesterday FAA
provided the Forest Service and DOI with broad criteria to
establish the basis for an effective maintenance and inspection
program for the firefighting environment. In addition, we
provided guidance on the type of data the Forest Service and
DOI should be obtaining and reviewing as part of their
maintenance and inspection program. Finally, we provided to the
Forest Service and DOI the names of FAA designees who could
assist them with both immediate technical assistance and
ongoing support.
Mr. Chairman, aviation safety is critical to the national
interest regardless of the type of operation or who is
responsible for its oversight. Firefighting is also of
paramount importance to the safety and well-being of our
country. I understand why Congress is so concerned that the
Forest Service and DOI are able to meet the demands they face
in the coming fire season. FAA is committed to assisting the
Forest Service and DOI in any way we can to ensure that its
firefighting operations are conducted as safely as possible,
given the inherently dangerous environment in which the
aircraft must operate.
While our statutory responsibilities limit our safety and
regulatory oversight to the civil fleet, we appreciate that our
technical expertise can be valuable to other agencies
conducting public aircraft operations. Improving aviation
safety is in everyone's best interests and FAA will continue to
be dedicated to having the safest system in the world.
I will be happy to answer your questions at this time.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Sabatini follows:]
Prepared Statement of Nicholas A. Sabatini, Associate Administrator,
Regulation and Certification, Federal Aviation Administration
Good morning Chairman McCain, Senator Hollings, Members of the
Committee; My name is Nick Sabatini. I am the Associate Administrator
for Regulation and Certification in the Federal Aviation Administration
(FAA). I am pleased to appear before you today to discuss the
respective roles the FAA, the Forest Service, and the Department of the
Interior (DOI) play in the safety oversight of firefighting operations
conducted on behalf of the Forest Service and the DOI. Recent decisions
by the Forest Service and DOI to terminate contracts with companies
that operate air tankers have resulted in 33 air tanker aircraft being
unavailable for use this fire season. Because the decision to terminate
the contracts was safety related, a clarification as to why the Forest
Service and the DOI, and not the FAA, are making safety determinations
with respect to these aircraft is appropriate.
Earlier this year, the National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB)
issued recommendations that arose out of its investigation of two fatal
aircraft accidents in 2002 in which fatigue cracking caused the wings
on the aircraft to separate during flight. The aircraft were conducting
firefighting operations on behalf of the Forest Service and the DOI at
the time of the accidents. The NTSB recommendations, in conjunction
with those of a Blue Ribbon Commission that also studied the accidents,
Jed the Forest Service and the DOI to conclude that continued use of
the aircraft tankers posed unacceptable safety risks. Consequently, the
contracts were terminated and this action resulted in understandable
concern about how not utilizing these aircraft would affect the ability
of the Forest Service and the DOI to meet the challenges of this year's
fire season.
Because the heart of this issue is the safety and airworthiness of
aircraft, I understand why people believe that only the FAA should make
such determinations. We are the premier aviation safety oversight
agency in the world and I am proud of our record and reputation. But
from the very beginning and at all times during the existence of the
FAA, there has been a clear statutory distinction between civil and
public aircraft operations. FAA has regulatory and oversight authority
over civil aircraft operations. Public aircraft operations are
conducted by or on behalf of many different government agencies and
departments, including state and federal, from the Forest Service and
the DOI, to the Justice Department to the U.S. military. By statute,
authority for the safety oversight of these operations belongs to the
agency or department responsible for the operation. While FAA can and
does provide technical support to assist other agencies with their
safety oversight responsibilities, the law is quite clear that FAA
cannot direct or compel another agency to impose specific safety
requirements or force them to meet existing FAA requirements.
Over the years, the definition of what is a public aircraft
operation has changed. In response to the death of the governor of
South Dakota in an accident involving a public aircraft flight,
Congress narrowed what could be considered a public aircraft operation
in order to impose FAA regulatory standards on a greater number of
operations. Until the statutory change in 1994, an aircraft was largely
used as a civil aircraft or public aircraft throughout its life. Since
1994, the function of the operation defines whether it is civil or
public. Using the example of the governor, when his flight crashed, it
was a public aircraft operation merely because it was being operated by
the state of South Dakota. Congress felt that transporting the governor
from point A to point B was not an inherently governmental function; in
other words, that there was no reason that the flight could not be
performed by a civil aircraft meeting FAA standards. As a result, the
law was changed and today, public aircraft operations are limited to
only those operations that are inherently governmental in nature, such
as firefighting, search and rescue, prisoner transport, and military
operations to name a few. These government functions may require
aircraft to be operated in a manner that is beyond what the FAA may
consider to be safe for civil operations. It is one reason FAA
regulations do not apply to them; the functions could not be performed
effectively within the bounds of existing FAA regulations.
Another issue central to today's hearing is surplus military
aircraft. Although many public aircraft operations, including
firefighting, could be performed using FAA certificated aircraft, many
operators use aircraft that have been retired by the military. The
aircraft that crashed in 2002 were both former military aircraft. From
FAA's perspective, the difference between other FAA certificated
aircraft and a surplus military aircraft is significant. An FAA
certificated aircraft holds two certificates for each aircraft. The
first is a type certificate that certifies that the aircraft design
meets specified FAA safety standards. This certificate would be issued
for each aircraft type, such as a Boeing 777 or an Airbus A320. For
each individual aircraft, the FAA issues an airworthiness certificate
that certifies that the specific aircraft conforms to the approved
design. Before each civil aircraft operation, the operator must confirm
that the aircraft is in airworthy condition and must operate it within
limitations'' prescribed by its type certificate.
Military aircraft are not required to meet FAA design standards or
to receive an FAA type certificate. During their operation in the
military, the operation and maintenance of these aircraft do not
necessarily conform to FAA standards. Therefore, when the military
wants to surplus them, FAA is not in a position to confirm that the
aircraft are fit for civil operation. However, surplus military
aircraft offer an affordable option for performing specific
governmental functions, especially if the operations adhere to defined
limitations. A non-military state or Federal agency with a surplus
military aircraft can apply to the FAA for a restricted category type
certificate. Similarly, if a private Part 137 operator (an entity
holding a certificate for agricultural operations) has surplus military
aircraft, they could also apply to the FAA for a restricted category
certificate. (Part 137 of the Federal Aviation Regulations specifies
that, in a public emergency, a person operating under this part may
deviate from the regulatory requirements for relief and welfare
activities approved by an agency of the United States or a state or
local government. This enables Part 137 operators to be compensated for
conducting public aircraft operations on behalf of a government
entity.)
FAA reviews the information submitted with each application.
Although the amount and type of information the FAA is provided varies
from aircraft to aircraft, we look at what the aircraft was used for in
the military, its maintenance records, its service history, its
modification records, and the purpose for which the aircraft is
expected to be used. We also inspect the aircraft. Based on our
evaluation, FAA may issue a restricted category type certificate. The
issuance of the certificate is based on the fact that the aircraft had
been acceptable to the U.S. military and that the military was
satisfied with its operation and with the maintenance performed on it.
The requirements for continuing airworthiness are generally based on
using the military maintenance and inspection manuals that accompany
the aircraft. The type certificate sets forth specific limitations
designed to minimize the risk of operating the aircraft. The
limitations include, forexample, that the aircraft cannot be operated
over populated areas, that it cannot carry passengers or cargo, and
that it cannot be operated in another country without permission of
that country. The certificate would also restrict the type of operation
the aircraft could perform to that which the agency had reviewed. In
other words, an aircraft approved only to conduct agricultural
operations could not also be used for weather control operations. The
operational approval is very limited. Once an aircraft receives a
restricted category type certificate, the operator has an ongoing
responsibility to ensure that the aircraft continues to conform to the
certificate and is in a condition for safe operation, much as is the
case with civil aircraft operations. The difference is that with a
public aircraft operation, ensuring that the operator is meeting the
safety standards falls to the agency on whose behalf the operation is
being conducted, not the FAA.
It is critical that you understand our statutory responsibilities
and limitations in order to appreciate that we are not dismissing or in
any way discounting the importance of aviation safety regardless of
whether the operation is civil or public. Whether or not FAA is
primarily responsible for the safe operation of public aircraft, we
know that our expertise in aviation safety is invaluable to other
agencies in the development and implementation of safety standards and
practices to oversee their public aircraft operations.
We have been working with the Forest Service and the DOI to help
them define the firefighting environment and its effects on aircraft
structure. In the civil arena, FAA has decades worth of information
detailing how the structure of an aircraft is affected by different
types of operation. This information has enabled the FAA to create
maintenance and inspection programs that make our civil fleet the
safest in the world. There is little data with respect to firefighting
operations, which require low altitude operation in turbulent air with
heavy loads. Understanding how and where this type of operation results
in stresses on the airframe that may lead to fatigue and cracks will
translate into the ability to develop maintenance and inspection
programs that are appropriate for the firefighting environment.
Realistically, it will take some time to obtain sufficient data to
develop precise programs, but FAA will readily lend its expertise to
help the Forest Service and the DOI to refine the required programs as
new information warrants.
Since early 2003, the FAA has advised the Forest Service and the
DOI large air tanker airworthiness review program, conducted by Sandia
National Labs. The review evaluated the certification, maintenance,
operation and other aspects of aerial firefighting in order to improve
the airworthiness of its air tankers following two in-flight structural
failures in 2002. This advice was provided in the form of comments on
Sandia's draft reports, and was incorporated into Sandia's final
recommendations to the Forest Service and the DOI.
FAA has also identified specific aircraft certification offices
(ACOs) as focal points for some restricted category aircraft. For
example, the Atlanta ACO is designated as the focal point for the
Lockheed C-130A. The Los Angeles ACO is designated as the focal point
for Lockheed P2V as well as the Douglas military variants. The Forest
Service and the DOI or any other federal, state or local entity may
utilize these resources to access technical assistance to improve their
safety oversight.
Finally, in response to the significant Congressional concern
expressed recently with respect to the Forest Service's and the DOI's
decisions to terminate their air tanker contracts, FAA committed to
immediately provide to the Forest Service and the DOI broad criteria to
establish the basis for an effective maintenance and inspection program
for the firefighting environment. In addition, we will provide guidance
on the type of data the Forest Service and the DOI should be obtaining
and reviewing as part of their maintenance and inspection program. And
finally, we will provide to the Forest Service and the DOI the names of
FAA designees who could assist them with both immediate technical
assistance and ongoing support.
Mr. Chairman, aviation safety is critical to the national interest
regardless of the type of operation or who is responsible for its
oversight. Firefighting is also of paramount importance to the safety
and well being of our country and I understand why Congress is so
concerned that the Forest Service and the DOI are able to meet the
demands they face in the coming fire season. FAA is committed to
assisting the Forest Service and the DOI in any way we can to ensure
that its firefighting operations are conducted as safely as possible,
given the inherently dangerous environment in which the aircraft must
operate. While our statutory responsibilities limit our safety and
regulatory oversight to the civil fleet, we appreciate that our
technical expertise can be valuable to other agencies conducting public
aircraft operations. Improving aviation safety is in everyone's best
interest and FAA will continue to be dedicated to having the safest
system in the world.
This concludes my prepared remarks. I will be happy to answer your
questions at this time.
The Chairman. Thank you.
Mr. Rey, welcome.
STATEMENT OF MARK E. REY, UNDER SECRETARY FOR
NATURAL RESOURCES AND ENVIRONMENT,
U.S. DEPARTMENT OF AGRICULTURE
Mr. Rey. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I would like to submit my
statement on behalf of the Department and the Department of the
Interior for the record in its entirety.
The Chairman. Without objection.
Mr. Rey. And I will just summarize briefly how we got to
this point and what our plans are in going forward from here. I
think your opening statement, Mr. Chairman, accurately
summarized the history of how we got to this point.
Essentially, after the fatalities in 2002, with the advice of a
Blue Ribbon Commission chartered by the Chief of the Forest
Service and the Director of the Bureau of Land Management and
the expertise of the Federal Aviation Administration, we
contracted with Sandia Laboratories to develop a more robust
inspection and maintenance program and to modify the operations
of our large airtanker contract fleet.
We were hopeful that, as we knew that an ongoing NTSB
investigation was under way, that the measures that we were
taking would be adequate to assure the safety of the fleet and
to continue its operation. On April 23 of this year, we
received the final NTSB report, which indicated that for the
fleet as a whole there was no way to assure the airworthiness
of the aircraft. Faced with that report and the pendency of the
upcoming fire season, we had essentially one decision and in my
view one decision only to make, and that decision is this: In
the face of the availability of alternative aircraft which were
demonstrably safer, would a prudent person continue to fly
these airtankers? We concluded, given the risks associated with
airtanker crashes and fatalities, the answer to that question
is no.
That set us on a very quick march program to secure
alternative aircraft and reconfigure our firefighting aircraft
fleet. That effort was completed yesterday and provided to the
Committee last night. We will be retaining the contracted
assistance of up to 46 single-engine airtankers, 21 type-1
heavy lift helicopters, 45 type-2 medium helicopters, 2 CL-215
airtankers, and in addition taking over the season-long use of
8 U.S. military C-130 aircraft equipped with modular airborne
firefighting systems.
Those aircraft are presently being contracted for. Some
have already been contracted for and are in the process of
being deployed. Some have already been deployed.
The single policy objective that drove the reconfiguration
of the fleet and the contracting of replacement aircraft was
this: Over the last several years, the Forest Service and the
Department of the Interior have enjoyed effectiveness at
initial attack for wildfires of suppressing nearly 99 percent
of ignitions at initial attack. The direction that we gave to
the aerial experts in the Forest Service and the BLM was to
reconfigure the fleet with adequate replacement aircraft to
maintain that level of effectiveness at initial attack.
In a memo to the chief of the Forest Service, the director
of fire and aviation management in announcing the reconfigured
fleet stated yesterday: ``This plan was developed with an
objective to maintain near-99 percent initial and extended
initial attack success rates. I believe the plan will
accomplish this objective.''
So those are the new aircraft that have been contracted and
are being contracted for. The fleet will be larger as we will
be using different models of aircraft to fill the role of the
airtankers, and it will be deployed differently to account for
the different delivery times that different makes of aircraft,
models of aircraft, also provide for. But it is our judgment
that it will be equally effective as the fleet was last year in
assisting us in achieving the near-99 percent initial attack
success rate.
So the decision was made at the beginning of the fire
season, at a time when there was not a great deal of time to
dally. It was not made lightly because the large airtankers
have served us gallantly and valiantly over a large number of
years. But it was made with the certainty that if we lost one
of the large airtankers in the wildland-urban interface, in a
subdivision, in a school, that we would be here having a quite
different hearing that would not be very pleasant, and I am not
assuming this hearing is going to be very pleasant.
Now, all that having been said, some Members of Congress
and other elected officials have raised the good and fair
question: Why not give the large airtanker fleet a chance to
show that they can demonstrate airworthiness, and if they can
then return them to service and save some money in the process,
since they are more cost-effective than the alternative
aircraft that we are contracting to take their place?
That seemed like a fair approach. So, again with FAA's
expert assistance, we have over the last 2 weeks developed
baseline criteria and a profile for the contractors to provide
information to us with FAA's assistance, to assess whether the
information necessary to assure their airworthiness can be
secured and evaluated properly. Today each of the eight
affected contractors will be receiving a letter from the Chief
of the Forest Service and the Director of the Bureau of Land
Management asking them to provide that information if they so
choose, and the information will be used by the Forest Service
and Department of the Interior and FAA-certified engineering
representatives to evaluate whether we can assure the
airworthiness of part or all of the fleet.
If we believe, in our combined expertise, that we can, then
we will be submitting that information to NTSB to see if we can
get a further evaluation and a modification of their
recommendations. We are doing that, not because we lack
confidence in the reconfigured fleet that we are contracting
for, but because it seems an equitable thing to do and also
raises the possibility that if some portion of the large air
tanker fleet can be restored to service we can do the
firefighting job equally well at less cost to the public and
with less taxpayer dollars being expended.
Let me close with just a quick summary of the difference
between the perception of the use of large air tankers and the
reality of the use of large airtankers. The perception is that
large airtankers extinguish big forest fires. That perception
is not correct. Large airtankers have their greatest use to us
in the firefighting mission on initial attack and extended
initial attack in fires where on-the-ground access is a
problem. They are good for initial attack to try to extinguish
a fire where we cannot get a crew in easily--either a ground
crew or an engine crew. They are useful to us on extended
initial attack to drop retardant to slow down a fire front
where we are trying to build a perimeter around it and where
nothing within that perimeter is anything that we want to try
to save. But those are their two primary missions, and we
believe those missions can be filled by the reconfigured fleet.
As the Chairman's opening statement correctly noted, last
year only somewhat less than 20 percent of the total water and
retardant that we used was dropped by large multi-engine
airtankers. We also reduced the hours of the large airtankers
as part of the Sandia protocol by about 42 percent. So they are
a useful part of our fleet, without question. They are a very
cost-effective part of our fleet. But they are not an essential
part of our fleet to maintain firefighting effectiveness and
public safety.
Thank you very much.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Rey follows:]
Prepared Statement of Mark E. Rey, Under Secretary for Natural
Resources and Environment, U.S. Department of Agriculture and P. Lynn
Scarlett, Assistant Secretary for Policy, Management, and Budget,
United States Department of the Interior
Introduction
Mr. Chairman and members of the Committee, thank you for the
opportunity to discuss, on behalf of the Department of Agriculture and
the Department of the Interior, the recent termination of contracts for
33 large air tankers used for firefighting due to concerns over their
airworthiness.
Our decision to terminate the contracts was ultimately based on the
unacceptable safety record of these large air tankers that has resulted
in multiple aviators deaths from airworthiness failures. The land
management agencies are responsible for the safety of aviators,
firefighters, and the public during firefighting operations and based
upon the recommendations of the National Transportation Safety Board
(NTSB), there was no other alternative. At the same time, I want to
stress that our ability to fight wildfires and protect communities
continues at a high level. The reduction of 33 air tankers from our
fleet of hundreds of aircraft changes, but in no way diminishes, our
firefighting efforts.
Airworthiness
On May 10, 2004, the Forest Service and the Bureau of Land
Management terminated the contracts for 33 large air tankers due to
concerns presented in the NTSB Safety Recommendations about the
airworthiness of the aircraft and public safety. The large fixed winged
air tankers were used in wildland firefighting to drop fire retardant
primarily at the beginnings of fires (known as initial attack). Private
companies operated the 33 air tankers during the fire season under
contracts with the Federal agencies.
The decision to cancel the contracts was based on a series of
events and the cumulative findings of two reports: (1) the Blue Ribbon
panel of aviation experts which issued its findings in December 2002;
and, (2) the April 23, 2004 National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB)
report on three air tanker accidents.
The Blue Ribbon Panel cited numerous concerns with the reliability
of the large air tankers, composed of aging retired surplus military
aircraft. These reliability issues presented safety concerns, as well
as operational problems. For a time, the Forest Service and Bureau of
Land Management thought they could work through these concerns,
following the Panel's recommendations for a more robust inspection and
maintenance program, and relying on the efforts of the aircraft owners
and the Federal Aviation Administration certification process for
private use.
The report of the NTSB validated the Blue Ribbon panel but added
critical findings that led us to conclude we could not continue to use
these aircraft under the current circumstances. One critical finding of
the NTSB report states ``. . . no effective mechanism currently exists
to ensure the continuing airworthiness of these firefighting
aircraft.''
Since most of the large air tankers were designed and used for
military operations before their acquisition by contract companies, the
NTSB recommendations also indicated that a complete history, including
maintenance and inspection records, is not available for many of the
air tankers. The average age of the large air tankers is 48 years with
some tankers more than 60 years of age. There is a lack of baseline
data to determine the level of stress placed on the airframes during
firefighting. Further, there is missing documentation for some
airplanes about their previous missions flown, and what additional
stresses those flights might have put on the structure of the aircraft.
Time has caught up with this program and with the air tankers. Since
the NTSB identified the Forest Service and Department of the Interior
as the agencies responsible for the safety of these aircraft, it was
time to make this decision.
Since 1958, more than 130 large air tanker crew members have died.
The Blue Ribbon Panel reported that, if ground firefighters had the
same fatality rate, this would equal more than 200 on the-job deaths
per year. This is totally unacceptable. The Chief of the Forest Service
and the Director of the Bureau of Land Management terminated the air
tanker contracts because the risk to aviators' lives is too great and
because alternative aircraft are available. We could not continue to
use these aircraft, putting aviators and ground firefighters at risk
for more catastrophic accidents when we don't have enough data or the
ability to confidently assess the risk, nor a program in place to
mitigate the risk. We could not subject the same communities we are
trying to protect from wildfire to the additional risk of an air tanker
breaking apart over homes in the wildland urban interface.
Firefighting Operations
There is a widespread perception that we can drown a wildland fire
if we drop enough water and retardant, and that without the large air
tankers, homes and forests are at greater risk. We need to be clear--
wildfires are put out on the ground. The large air tankers were useful
in the initial attack of fires. However, they were only one of the
tools fire managers use in deciding how to fight fire safely. Fire
retardants are chemicals that impede the progress of wildfire, but do
not stop it. Fire retardants slow the fire's growth and rate of spread
to give ground forces more time to complete suppression actions. Those
ground forces are the key--firefighters put out fires, not air tankers.
Moreover, even though air support is a valuable tool, it extends
beyond large air tankers. It includes helicopters and Single Engine Air
Tankers (SEATS). Fire intensity levels, determined by factors like wind
speed, rate of fire spread, and smoke inversions, determine if aircraft
may or may not be the right tool to slow a wildfire. At lower fire
intensities, aerial support generally is not needed and at high fire
intensity, fire retardant is not useful. Aviation assets are also
affected by weather conditions. There were several days during the
California fires that aircraft could not fly because of wind conditions
and the associated turbulence in the air over wildland fires.
Over the past few years, we have gradually increased the use of
helicopters in firefighting support. The fixed wing air tanker fleet
was actually only delivering about 20 percent of all suppressants,
including retardant, foam and water. Although fixed wing aircraft can
often arrive faster, travel faster, and carry more to a fire, they are
limited by the maneuverability limits over mountainous terrain, and
proximity of a suitable and secure airport with reload facilities. In
many ways, the smaller aircraft and helicopters provide increased
flexibility in their use than the larger tankers.
We have the best trained and best equipped Federal wildland
firefighting forces in the world, and our state and local firefighting
partners make us even stronger. Tens of thousands of initial attack
efforts are successful every year without any aerial support from large
air tankers. In fact, approximately 98 percent of all fires targeted
are suppressed upon initial attack. Firefighters know how to set
protection priorities and employ strategies and tactics to be safe and
successful in suppressing the wildland fire.
Operations for 2004
Firefighting resources are coordinated at the national level by the
National Multi-agency Coordination group at the National Interagency
Fire Center in Boise, Idaho. The group is made up of Federal agencies
and the National Association of State Foresters. Eleven geographic area
coordination centers provided information on anticipated needs for the
2004 fire season. The information was developed into the 2004 strategy
that addresses the initial and extended attack needs for the Nation.
This plan will be reviewed and modified on a bi-monthly basis or as the
severity of the fire season dictates.
We are currently activating all of our aircraft so they are
prepared to assist the ground firefighters. Helicopters and single
engine air tankers are pre-positioned throughout the country based on
intelligence regarding drought, anticipated weather conditions and
expected fire activity. The National Interagency Coordination Center
will continue to move aerial assets as needed through this summer's
fire season to support the ground firefighters.
Through new contracts, we have increased our fleet of other aerial
firefighting support assets in order to reduce the impact of the loss
of the large airtankers. Contracts are being negotiated to add large
helitankers, which can deliver up to 2,000 gallons of retardant and
large helicopters with buckets, which can deliver up to 1,000 gallons
of retardant. Details are being finalized for the short term plan to
maintain our success rate suppressing wildfires at initial attack.
Questions have been raised about the use of the large air tankers
by the states. The National Multi-agency Coordination group has issued
guidance on the use of aviation assets. State contracted large air
tankers will be used on Federal lands where states have formal
prote9tion responsibility and are in operational control of the fire.
No Federal personnel may be assigned as state contract officers on an
unauthorized tanker, nor may any Federal employee be assigned to a
position to exercise operational control of an unauthorized tanker.
We have been working with the FAA to develop a protocol for
assuring airworthiness of the firefighting craft, and their testimony
today reflects our mutual intent in that regard. We are also engaged
with the FAA in developing criteria to review the airworthiness of the
33 air tankers that were the subject of the terminated contracts. We
expect to finalize a process in the next couple of days, and will share
that with the Congress as soon as possible.
The Administration recognizes the need for a long term strategy for
firefighting operations, integrated with the overall operations of the
affected agencies, and we are working to develop that long term plan.
We are currently conducting an evaluation of the cost effectiveness of
aviation resources, including tradeoffs between different types of
resources, and we expect to incorporate the results of that study as
the long term strategy is developed.
Summary
We appreciate the work of the members of the Blue Ribbon Panel, the
NTSB, the FAA, and Congress to help us deal with this issue. This will
be a challenging fire year, but not because of the absence of
airtankers. With the drought, too much fuel on our forests and
rangelands, and the expanding wildland urban interface, fires will
continue to be tough to suppress. Where appropriate, we will manage
wildland fires for resource benefits including fuel reduction, and
suppress wildfires that present a danger to lives and property.
During the past several years, we have limped along with an aging
air tanker fleet by reducing delivery capabilities, restricting flight
hours and pouring tax dollars into enhancing maintenance and inspection
programs. Continuing to pay more for less capability in a fleet of
unknown airworthiness is a doomed strategy, poor public policy, and bad
stewardship of taxpayer dollars. Safety is the most important value of
the firefighting community. To continue to use these large air tankers
when no mechanism exists to guarantee their airworthiness presents an
unacceptable level of risk to aviators, to the firefighters on the
ground, and to the communities we serve.
Thank you for the opportunity to testify today on this important
safety matter. I am happy to answer any questions you might have.
The Chairman. Thank you.
Mr. Timmons.
STATEMENT OF MARK TIMMONS, PRESIDENT, NEPTUNE AVIATION
SERVICES, MISSOULA INTERNATIONAL AIRPORT
Mr. Timmons. Mr. Chairman, I want to thank you for the
honor of testifying before this committee and I would like to
submit my testimony for the permanent record.
The Chairman. Without objection.
Mr. Timmons. I have two formal documents: one from Doug
Herlihy, an independent forensic aircraft investigator who is a
former lead investigator for the NTSB; the second one is Ron
Livingston, a contractor hired by the U.S. Forest Service to
oversee airworthiness programs for the U.S. Forest Service. I
would like both of these documents to be part of the record.
The Chairman. Without objection.
[The material referred to follows:]
Statement of Douglas R. Herlihy, Air Safety Investigator,
Herlihy & Leonard
Are We Ready for the 2004 Wildfire Season
Mr. Chairman and Members:
I am a forensic aircraft accident reconstructionist, an instructor
in aviation safety at the University of Southern California, and
formerly an Operations Group Chairman with the National Transportation
Safety Board National Go-Team. Prior to employment with the NTSB, I
served as Chief, Search and Rescue Branch of the United States Coast
Guard, Atlantic Area and a rescue aircraft commander with 20 years of
USCG service. I hold an FAA Airline Transport Certificate with type-
ratings in large aircraft including the Lockheed C130, and have
approximately 17,000 pilot-in-command hours.
As a forensic aircraft accident investigator and reconstructionist
since 1994, I have investigated, submitted to courts, and published
reports on a number of aviation accidents occurring to aerial
firefighting airplanes. The analysis and scholastic study of the
circumstances and causes of the accidents in this sector is part of my
ongoing work at the University of Southern California, School of
Engineering.
The objective of this submission is to provide input from the
private sector, as an expansion of and in addition to the recent NTSB
Safety Recommendations relating to certain ``In-Flight Breakups of
Firefighting Aircraft,'' \1\ and to provide input to the safety
considerations in the use of large aerial tankers for the 2004 wildfire
season and beyond.
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\1\ NTSB Safety Recommendation A-04-29 through 33, dated 23 April
2004
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Abstract
As the Nation enters the 2004 wildfire season, forecasts of
dangerous woodland conditions have raised urgent questions regarding
the suitability, airworthiness and sufficiency of the aerial tanker
fleet.
Tragic accidents involving three large aerial tanker airplanes are
the sole focus of NTSB investigations and recommendations that question
the continued airworthiness of aging aerial tankers.
Alternative issues, facts and circumstances regarding those tragic
accidents are presented here that support, expand and sometimes
contradict the Safety Board's conclusions and findings.
Importantly, this submission raises questions of scope and accuracy
of the Safety Board's information that became the bases for their
recommendations. Particularly, the broad-brush NTSB report of aerial
tanker shortcomings, seems to lack a full understanding of the existing
resources and advances of some leading tanker operators.
Neptune Aviation Services of Missoula, Montana, a leading operator
in the aerial tanker industry, is selected here for exemplar analysis,
albeit briefly, to highlight the solid advances in maintenance and
operations that can be and are currently being achieved.
Finally, conclusions are offered that ask for additional study of
issues not addressed by the NTSB Safety Recommendations, along with
greater support from those governmental agencies tasked with forest
resource protection.
Background Statement: History and Factors in Aerial Tanker Accidents
Involving In-Flight Breakup 1994 and 2002
Aerial firefighting airplanes have been instrumental in saving
lives and property for over 50 years. That fact is indisputable. And
though many of the thousands of accounts may only be anecdotal, the
suppression of fires by large airdrops of cooling slurry has proved
crucial in season after season, and is measurable in property saved
versus cost of operation. Aerial tankers reflect solid cost-
effectiveness. The 1995 National Air Tanker Study \2\ cited the
benefit-to-cost ratio of the large air tanker program to be nearly 9 to
1. In 2003, more than one hundred airplanes and helicopters, operated
by nearly 20 commercial aerial tanker companies were engaged in
wildfire suppression.\3\
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\2\ Source: U.S. Department of Agriculture-US Forest Service, and
Department of Interior study 1995, 8.7 in benefit to cost of program.
\3\ Source: Aerial Firefighting Industry Association (AFIA)
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Recent Tragic Losses
Regretfully, accidents and fatalities in aerial firefighting have
taken the lives of scores of aircrew-firefighters, in this hazardous
occupation. These accidents occur, under extremely difficult flight
environments, often long flight or standby days, and urgent mission
pressures. It is important to point out however, that human failure \4\
provides the majority, albeit not the only, causal factor, to aircraft
accidents in the aerial firefighting industry. In 2002, a Lockheed
C130A and a Consolidated P4Y, two large aerial tankers operated by
Hawkins and Powers of Greybull, Wyoming, were lost following structural
failures to their airframes. The NTSB in issuing its recent safety
recommendation has cited these accidents as well as a 1994 in-flight
breakup at Pearblossom, California, focusing on continued
airworthiness. While the NTSB reported that both the C130A and the P4Y
were maintained and flown by one company, Hawkins and Powers, of
Greybull, Wyoming, the safety recommendation(s) addressed continuing
airworthiness issues in broad generalities, suggesting that the entire
large aerial tanker fleet was problematic.
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\4\ Aeronautical decision-making, airmanship, attempt at visual
flight in instrument conditions and mid-air collisions lead the causes.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
In my opinion, this broad-based fault finding, goes far beyond what
the facts would support in the limited inquiry done following the loss
of the P4Y and C130A crashes of a single company. Moreover, the
original NTSB accident investigation of the 1994 Pearblossom C130A
accident was so flawed as to ignore the basic operational and
structural issues, resulting in an erroneous finding of cause. Eight
years later, the NTSB re-examined limited and old parts, and still
failed to focus on operational realities that the Hercules airplane was
being operated nearly 40 knots beyond its limiting speed.\5\ This
represents a significant omission in the second NTSB report, similar to
the ``reverse-science'' \6\ approach taken in the first accident that
found only those factors needed to support witness accounts of an
``explosion.''
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\5\ The 1996 forensic investigation team found by NTAP (national
tracking--RADAR recording program) calculations that the C130A airplane
was being operated at over 250 knots true airspeed (between 218 and 228
knots indicated) when the certificated (by STC) and Lockheed/USAF limit
was set at 180kts.
\6\ The NTSB used over 15 witness statements in the Pearblossom
accident investigation to support a theory that an ``explosion''
(interpreted by witnesses) ``blew the wing off.'' And though the
probable cause was issued as an explosion, not a single piece of
wreckage at the crash site exhibited overpressure signatures,
characteristic of an explosion. Moreover, top-center-wing sections
found 1,700 feet before the impact site showed remarkably no fire or
heat damage.
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Similar to the witness statements made in the Pearblossom accident,
witnesses at the Walker, California crash saw and heard explosions and
told of the wing being blown off. Fortunately, investigators in this
later accident had the significant advantage provided by film crew
video of this tragic event. In the Walker event, the top center wing
section can clearly be seen lifting off in the early stages of the
breakup.
Lessons Not Learned
The C130A aircraft lost in the in-flight breakup events of 1994 and
2002 show remarkable similarity, in service hours and modification.
According to the NTSB, both aircraft were sold to a single company,
Hemet Valley Flying Service of California with exactly the same
history.\7\ Both airplanes were modified with 3,000-gallon slurry drop
tanks at the same facility in Hemet Valley at approximately the same
time. Hemet Valley Flying Service designed and installed the structure
at their facility. At the time these aircraft were modified, the FAA-
Approved STC \8\ limited the airplane to a gross weight of 120,000
pounds, but allowed the airplane to be loaded with a full 3000 gallons
of retardant.\9\ Calculations easily show that the C130A airplanes
configured with a cargo capacity approximating 30,000 pounds left
little more margin than for 15,000 pounds \10\ of fuel allowable in the
wings \11\.
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\7\ Both Lockheed C130A airplanes N135FF (lost in August 1994 at
Pearblossom, CA) and N130HP (lost at Walker, CA in June 2002) were
manufactured inn the same year (1957), delivered to the U.S. Air Force
the same year, and acquired the exact same flight hours (19,547) when
transferred to the U.S. Forest Service in 1988.
\8\ Supplemental Type Certificate approving the installation with
operational instructions for the 3,000-gallon retardant tank, issued to
Hemet Valley Flying Services.
\9\ Depending on the solution and other factors, the slurry may
weigh between 9 and 11 pounds per gallon, with a full retardant tank on
the C130A weighing between 27,000 and 33,000 pounds.
\10\ On average jet fuel weighs 6.5 pounds per gallon, and the
Allison T-56-7 engine consumed at least 1,500 to 1,700 pounds per hour
per engine at low level/high power. (over 900 degrees turbine-inlet-
temperature TIT).
\11\ A nominal C130A empty weight, with crew, equipment, spares,
and oil, weighing 85,000 pounds could carry only 15,000 pounds of fuel
(less than 2 hours of operation with 45 minutes reserve), if the
retardant tanks were full.
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The Lockheed C130 Flight Manual cautions, in part, ``During
maneuvering and flight through turbulent air, additional loads are
imposed on the airplane. These loads, caused by the acceleration of the
airplane, are added to the normal 1.0g load which the structure is
supporting. The most important structure is that of the wings that must
sustain the airplane in flight. AS THE PAYLOAD IS INCREASED, THE WINGS
BECOME MORE AND MORE VULNERABLE TO THE LOADS IMPOSED BY TURBULENCE,
SUDDEN CONTROL MOVEMENTS, OR EXCESSIVE ANGLES OF BANK. (caps added). .
. . Each outboard wing tank must contain 715 pounds of fuel more than
that of the inboard tank. For flight, this distribution helps reduce
wing UPBENDING (caps added) by maintaining a spanwise center of gravity
of the fuel that is outboard of the center lift of the wing.''
These cautions were intended for a brand-new, zero-time airplane.
The up-bending of the center wing section (due to light fuel loads and
heavy cargo loads) places the top skin in compression, and the bottom
skin in tension. Conversely, a flexing of the wing in turbulence or
rapid control movements, places the top skin in compression and the
bottom of the wing in tension. The unique construction of the box-type
stringer-to-skin design, allows for a single row of holes to be drilled
and rivets to be placed all along this structure. This design is
somewhat different than the construction of other airplanes. Both the
Pearblossom and Walker aircraft were subsequently lost when their
center wing sections failed in precisely the same location.\12\ Both
the civilian forensic investigators and the re-investigation by the
NTSB found fractures in the center wing section of both N135FF and
N130HP that originated at rivet holes along angle-braces inside the
wing box (points of stress concentration--``stress risers'') in the
wing skin structure.
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\12\ The C130 series airplane has a wing designed without a spar.
Instead, wing boxes, including a 440-inch hollow box which forms the
center wing section, spans the fuselage, 220 inches on each side.
Strength is maintained by the structural integrity of all four surfaces
of that box, and unlike a normal spar-wing.
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Human Errors Remain as Primary Causal Factor
It is human failure that remains consistent with the commercial and
private aircraft findings of cause of aircraft accidents. Similar to
causal factors in the aerial tanker accidents over a long history,
crew-caused accidents lead the numbers by far.\13\ Even in cases where
system or structural failure has been found as a proximate cause, the
complex contributing factors of human failure cannot be discounted as
the underlying cause.
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\13\ Fatal Accidents, commercial jet aircraft, 1988 through 1997
were caused primarily by human failure, ``Controlled Flight Into
Terrain'' (CFIT), airmanship, mid-air collisions, landing, takeoff,
runway incursions, all result from human failure (Source: Boeing
Commercial Airplane Company 1998). Previous studies in ``crew-caused
accidents'' (ref: Gallimore, Boeing Commercial Airplane Company, 1987)
found that in the period 1977 through 1986, flight crew errors were
responsible for aircraft loss 70.6 percent of the events vs. 13.4
percent in airplane-caused failures. During the previous period
recorded (1959 through 1976) crew-caused accidents were 73.5 percent
vs. 12.1 percent airplane-caused failures.
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One may ask, ``Can human error in the design and installation of an
aircraft modification, or the human error in the failure of oversight
by government inspectors be any less contributing factors than the
pilots?'' Such consideration of human failure is particularly absent in
the NTSB Safety Recommendation, which cites the NTSB re-investigation
of the 1994 Pearblossom C130A crash (findings revised 2002-2003),\14\
wherein structural fatigue was found as the cause. This seems to be a
simple answer of ``what happened'' and not ``why it happened.''
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\14\ NTSB Investigation LAX-94-F-A323
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In an earlier 1996 re-examination \15\ by a team of forensic
investigators, cause was found to be rooted in the complex operational
factors leading to structural failure. In those findings, the C130A
aircraft was operating, at the time of in-flight wing failure, at a
speed of nearly 40 knots higher than maximum allowable and certificated
airspeed, in an environment of 102 degrees Fahrenheit, and in moderate
turbulence, while merely ``enroute to the fire.'' While the 1994 NTSB
investigation published a finding of an ``explosion'' of unknown
origin, the 1996 NTSB re-investigation found fatigue fractures in its
examination of what little remained of the airplane's structure.
Neither the NTSB 1994, nor the 2003, report considered the apparent
stress to the airframe that was crew-induced. Moreover, neither report
emphasized the apparent total absence of cockpit resource management,
which could have prevented the airplane to be flown in that manner only
400 feet above the 8,000 foot ridge tops of the California Sierras.
Sadly, in retrospect, whether or not the 2002 loss of the Hawkins and
Powers C130A or the Hawkins and Powers Consolidated P4Y ultimately
broke up as a result of airframe failure, the industry and the aircrews
lost a most valuable opportunity to study, over an 8-year period, the
operational, as well as the airworthiness factors of the Pearblossom
loss.
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\15\ Zaremba v. Lockheed et al., SDSC680802, Calif Sup Ct, San
Diego; In re: Crash of Lockheed C130A near Pearblossom CA., August 13,
1994
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However, the NTSB Safety Recommendation, without a full
appreciation for the facts, focuses on continuing airworthiness. The
errors that destroyed these airplanes may have been simply explained in
the original Lockheed cautions, warnings and performance calculations
in the manufacturer's instructions. Tragically, even with the knowledge
of the operational and structural failures available to the government,
the loss of a second and then a third large tanker airplane had to
occur before any action was taken.
In my opinion, the failure of the human system is ignored because
it is a difficult subject to quantify and change. Measuring cracks and
X-raying for flaws is a simple solution; changing operational
procedures and developing effectual governmental oversight in
operational procedures proves more difficult, especially when
government inspectors are neither trained, experienced nor current in
the large airplanes flown as aerial tankers. Neither are government
inspectors practiced in the CRM \16\ (crew resource management) gained
only through experience in multi-crew cockpits.
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\16\ Crew Resource Management, (see Wiener, Kanki, Helmreich
Cockpit Resource Management), Academic Press, 1993 for treatise on the
subject.
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Complex Factors In All Accidents
Why do airplanes fail in flight? It is a complex mixture of
operational, aerodynamic and structural dimensions. It is all too easy
to find ``what happened'' to the airplane structure, and not ``why it
happened''. Furthermore, ``fatigue'' cracks found in wreckages often
provide little ``historical'' significance. As an example, the 1996 re-
examination of the C130A (Pearblossom) wreckage, while finding ``low
cycle fatigue fractures between rivet holes along wing skin stringers
of the center wing sections,'' it was remarkable that none of these
fractures revealed pre-existing fatigue. \17\ Such a finding of fatigue
without pre-existing signature has a straightforward explanation. As an
example of ``new fatigue,'' one only has to repeatedly bend a new
paperclip ten times before it breaks in ``low cycle fatigue.'' This is
not to suggest that the 20+-year old Pearblossom C130A was new, but the
presence of pre-existing fatigue cracks may not be easily
differentiated, especially when the wreckage has suffered the elements
of eight years of neglect. Neither does it suggest that fractures were
not propagating before the crash. It simply means that insufficient
information exists about the true state of the airframe before the
accidents.
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\17\ Findings confirmed by the California engineering laboratory of
Fowler, Inc.
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However, we do know, based on weight calculations, performance
limitations and installation criteria, that the operational limitations
of the C130A aircraft were likely and routinely exceeded by the flight
crews. Lack of adherence to limitations, lack of recurrent and initial
training on G-limitations and operating parameters, urgency of
missions, ignorance of light wing loading vs. heavy cargo phenomena,
are all operational factors that comprise poor aeronautical decision-
making leading to accidents and not, as the NTSB suggests, a problem
based primarily on the airworthiness of the airplane. While
airworthiness is always important, the primary considerations should be
operationally focused, not structurally focused, as it is always
possible to break even a brand new airplane. The original manufacturer
(Lockheed) clearly pointed that out in original 1957 flight manuals.
The Maturation of the Aerial Tanker Industry
Aerial tanker operations have evolved from a fleet of generally
agricultural application airplanes, to single-engine de-militarized
attack airplanes, to still more complex and capable aircraft and
helicopters. Too, over the years, changes in forest and population
dynamics have occurred as resource and recreational use has shifted and
remote settlement on forestland has become commonplace. Because of
these changes, government experts indicate that fighting fires is more
complex and challenging, as well as larger and more dangerous to
population centers as seen in the recent years. The potential for great
fire losses seems to be looming for the 2004 fire season as well. The
``Wildland Fire Outlook'' \18\ for eleven areas \19\ surveyed by the
National Interagency Coordination Center predicted ``above normal''
wildfire outlook beginning early in 2004.\20\ Clearly, the need for
large quantities of retardant, from large capacity aircraft will be a
critical consideration. In a national publication it was reported that,
``Firefighting tankers are often the first aircraft available to
contain a backcountry fire.'' \21\
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\18\ National Wildland Fire Outlook, May 1 to May 31, 2004
\19\ Ibid, U.S. national areas predicted for ``above normal''
wildfire potential include the Northwest US, Southern California,
Northern Rockies, Eastern Great Basin, Southwest US, Rocky Mountain US,
and Eastern US.
\20\ Ibid. Prepared May 1, 2004
\21\ William B. Scott, Initial Attack, Aviation Week & Space
Technology, November 3, 2003
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NTSB Focuses on Continued Airworthiness
The loss of three tanker aircraft \22\ provides the entire bases
for NTSB Recommendations \23\ seeking broad development of maintenance
and inspection programs impacting the aerial tanker industry. In the
wreckages of the Hemet Valley and the Hawkins and Powers airplanes, the
NTSB found fatigue cracks that propagated to the point of structural
failure to be related to the probable cause(s) of these accidents.
Specifically, two of the airplanes were products of the same
installation facility, that had little more than cursory FAA oversight
at the time.\24\ The findings and recommendations, in the NTSB accident
reports, as well as in the Safety Recommendation,\25\ however, raise a
number of unresolved questions not easily addressed, especially those
relating to human performance. Furthermore, the NTSB Safety
Recommendations clearly paint all tanker operators with the same broad
brush, without the benefit of an in-depth analysis or ``Special
Study.'' \26\
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\22\ Aero Firefighting Lockheed C130A at Pearblossom, California 8/
13/94; Hawkins and Powers Lockheed C130A at Walker, California 6/17/02
and Hawkins and Powers Consolidated Vultee P4Y near Estes Park,
Colorado, 7/18/02.
\23\ NTSB Recommendation A-40-29 through 33.
\24\ Both the 1994 NTSB investigation and the 1996 forensic
investigation found no evidence that FAA airworthiness oversight at
Hemet Valley was an in depth process. The facility was modifying the
structures of FAR Part 137 (agricultural) airplanes, and maintenance
waivers from military procedures were granted due to the lack of test
and support equipment available to that company in the private sector.
\25\ NTSB Recommendation A-40-29 through 33.
\26\ Under 49 CFR 800 et seq., the National Transportation Safety
Board may conduct Special Studies to examine system wide, or other
broad issues affecting transportation safety.
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High Standards Do Exist in the Aerial Tanker Industry
In my opinion, the NTSB Safety Recommendation, though well meaning,
is short on the facts as they pertain to certain ``state-of-the-art''
heavy tanker operators and repair facilities. While this investigator
has not studied the Hawkins and Powers procedures and facility enough
to make comment, another operation stands out, as likely the best in
the industry, on a par with the repair facilities of airline operators.
Since 1993, Neptune Aviation Services, Inc., has been applying the
newest inspection technology and airworthiness analysis processes.
Moreover, Neptune has been the leader in tanker pilot training and CRM
procedures, formalizing airline standardization and crew coordination
equivalent to FAR Part 121 procedures (some learned from tragic pilot-
error accidents).\27\
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\27\ On July 29, 1994 near Squaw Peak, MT, Neptune Tanker 04
crashed when pilots lost situational awareness and flew into a mountain
valley without exit; and on June 27, 1997, Neptune Tanker 08 crashed at
Reserve, NM in a maneuvering stall accident while the copilot was
believed to be controlling the airplane.
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According to an examination of the Neptune maintenance facility at
Missoula, Montana in 2003 by Michael L. Stockhill,\28\ a former NTSB NW
Regional Supervisor, ``Neptune (maintenance) is head and shoulders
above Part 135 \29\ maintenance, essentially at Part 121 \30\ and
better.'' A nationally circulated magazine article (AW&ST)\31\
highlighted Neptune's professional CRM procedures, while another
nationally circulated maintenance journal highlighted Neptune's
advanced repair facility and process. Advances in this company's
maintenance process clearly rivals the best of the FAR Part 121
(airline) maintenance facilities. The inspector-author stated, ``The
maintenance (Neptune's) program appears to be as methodical and
stringent as FAR 121 (airline) maintenance standards.\32\'' State-of-
the-art maintenance and airworthiness assurance are notable, setting
``benchmarks for the international firefighting industry'' (AW&ST).
Noteworthy advances at the Neptune Aviation Missoula facility include
an FAA Certified-Part 145 approved and continually inspected
maintenance facility equivalent to airline standard, featuring:
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\28\ In addition to having served as an FAA Inspector, and a career
NTSB Investigator-in-Charge, Mr. Stockhill holds an FAA Aircraft and
Powerplant Certificate, with FAA Inspection Authority (A&P/IA)
\29\ FAA Part 135 refers to the certificate holders who maintain
and fly scheduled commuter and on-demand aircraft.
\30\ FAA Part 121 refers to the certificate holders who maintain
and fly scheduled airline operations.
\31\ Neptune Aviation Services was featured in Aviation
Maintenance, November 2003/Vol.22; and Aviation Week & Space
Technology, November 3, 2003.
\32\ Stockhill, Aviation Maintenance, November 2003/Vol. 22, Number
11
Complete depot-level overhaul of its P2V airplane fleet,
removing each airplane from service for over a year, for
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complete disassembly, inspection and refurbishment.
FAA-Approved and monitored AAIP (Approved Aircraft
Inspection Program) (progressive maintenance).
Ownership of original Lockheed P2V engineering drawings and
specifications to assure repair to original new standards.
Ownership of original Curtis-Wright engineering drawings to
return overhauled parts to original specifications.
Ownership of original Westinghouse J-34 turbojet engine
drawings along with the ownership of the original Westinghouse
Type Certificate. Engines repaired and remanufactured to
original type-certificate data sheet specifications (TCDS).
Ownership and design authority for Supplemental Type
Certificates for the R-3350 reciprocating engine, the J-34
turbojet engine and the fire retardant tank.
Ownership of FAA-Approved Field Approval, modifying the P2V
airplane for operation with spoiler/speedbrake.
Full FAR Part 145 Repair Station certification and continual
FAA oversight for the aircraft maintenance program, including
Part 145 certification on the Curtis-Wright R-3350 engine with
all special tooling comparable to the original manufacturer's
standards; and Part 145 certification for the Hamilton-Standard
24260 propeller and special tooling to the original
manufacturer's specifications. This FAA Part 145 certification
includes a dedicated FAA-Approved Inspection Manual, as
approving standard to return each repaired airplane and
component to airworthiness status.
Full inspection protocol in place to comply with problem
areas as defined by airworthiness directives, with dedicated
NDI personnel.\33\
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\33\ Non-destructive inspection and testing personnel qualified to
Level II magnetic particle, and other NDI protocol
Overhaul protocol that includes complete rewiring, new
instrument panel, new plumbing and tubing throughout,
completely overhauled engines, stripping, total corrosion
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
examination and repair, and finally, repainting.
Complete replacement of retardant tanks on set cycles to
assure each airplane has virtually a new tank.
A complete in-house engine overhaul facility, assuring newly
manufactured engine condition and performance.
4-axis CAM (computer assisted manufacturing) milling for
parts no longer manufactured, assuring tolerances to new
standards for 40+-year-old airplanes.
Bar-codes and computer-tracked supply and part supply.
Newly manufactured tires in original molds.
Each mechanic in the maintenance facility, or the field, is
equipped with their own company laptop, containing fully
computerized maintenance and parts description.
Formalized and recurrent classroom training for mechanics,
(only required to be a standard for Part 145 facilities in the
future by the FAA)
Adherence to a Master Minimum Equipment List (MMEL),
originated by Neptune, and previously unavailable from Lockheed
or the military operator, the U.S. Navy.
Field mechanics, dispatched with every tanker airplane
deployment, completely supplied with common parts and
consumables, have the capability of digitized photograph
transmissions back to the Neptune Missoula facility with every
anomaly or problem on which he needs technical advice.\34\
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\34\ It was common practice and government-encouraged in previous
years that pilots fly and fix their airplanes at remote firebases, as a
cost saving measure. Neptune initiated the now-accepted practice of
providing ground support and dedicated mechanics to repair airplanes
after the missions, allowing aircrews to rest after flying all day.
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Human Performance: An Important Factor in Neptune's Aerial Tanker
Operations
Notwithstanding the state of the Neptune Aviation maintenance
facility at Missoula, the management recognized crew performance as the
key to safe operations over 10 years ago. Regretfully, across the
industry lessons have been learned from the loss of aircrews, time and
time again through human failure. While the aerial tanker industry has
always boasted of pilots with excellent airmanship and piloting skills,
the loss of tankers through the years repeatedly were known to be from
poor pilot decision-making in a stressful environment, fatigue-related
loss of situational awareness, and the total ignorance of multi-pilot
cockpit coordination (CRM skills). Neptune Aviation Services, again,
has provided benchmarks for the international air tanker community. Its
advances include:
Installation of air-conditioned cockpits (not even available
in the original U.S. Navy models) to reduce environmental
stress and fatigue for flight crews.
Year-round salaried pilots, avoiding seasonal lay-offs,
providing a higher level of experience and currency.
Annual formalized Cockpit Resource Training at Dallas,
Texas, for both captains and copilots.
Annual pre-season crew refresher training including classes
on weight and balance, airplane charts and performance,
airplane systems, IFR procedures, approaches, clearances, and
emergency procedures.
Annual full-motion heavy airplane simulator training
Unlimited training hours to enhance currency and
proficiency.
Strict check flight standards to FAR Part 121 (airline)
proficiency each year.
Each captain must pass an FAA Part 61.58 \35\ checkride in
the actual airplane (not simulated), prior to the fire season,
before approval for each year's operations. Copilots, as well,
must pass FAA Part 61.55 checkrides in the actual company P2V
airplanes.
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\35\ Part 61.58 Pilot in Command proficiency check; Operation of
aircraft requiring more than one flight crewmember
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Neptune's Aerial Tankers Are Truly IFR-Capable
It is especially noteworthy to examine the changes to the
navigation and communications capabilities of airplanes in the Neptune
fleet. In the past, and presently continuing with other operators,
aerial tanker airplanes and their operating aircrews rarely enjoyed
even minimum capability to fly in instrument meteorological conditions
(IMC). Many air tankers have been lost, or nearly lost, when they
encountered instrument conditions. Improvement to cockpit
instrumentation is the standard for Neptune's P2V airplanes. IFR
(instrument flight rule) improvements go far beyond original equipment
and make the P2V airplane and operating crews truly capable of flying
in instrument conditions, returning to an airport with weather at field
minimums. In the past, aerial tankers, or the flight crews, rarely had
this capability. Neptune IFR improvements include:
Annual classroom recurrent training in IFR and approach
procedures.
Airline (FAR 121) level checkrides annually.
Full motion heavy airplane training annually on instruments
Annual CRM, cockpit resource management, training on IFR
procedures, cockpit and ATC communications.
Each operational P2V equipped with MMEL-required state-of-
the-art instrumentation and navigation equipment including, but
not limited to, Garmin GNS-530 satellite navigation and
communication (COMM/GPS) coupled to Ryan 9900BX TCAD
instrument/display; King Nav/Comms, King Navigation Receivers
and Mode C (altitude reporting) transponders.
The C130 and the P2V Aerial Tankers
Wing structures of the P2V and the C130 series airplanes are simply
not the same. While the C130A and the P2V model airplanes both
originate at a Lockheed facility, significant differences exist in the
design of their structures. Essentially, the wing of the P2V has a much
stronger rib design, utilizing ``box-type'' stringers, placed span-wise
between the 15 percent bulkhead chord and the rear 60 percent bulkhead
chord. While both the P2V and the C130 series have box-constructions,
the C130A internal skin surface utilizes aluminum angle braces, single-
row riveted on the undersurface. Fractures found in the Pearblossom and
Walker accident analysis demonstrated that the single row of rivets
likely became stress risers and points of fracture propagation as the
wing root was exposed to tension and compression flexing.
Moreover, Neptune Aviation Services' maintenance facility in
Missoula conducts X-ray inspection of wing components annually or every
325 cycles (whichever comes first) and removes and inspects the wing
stress panels every two years for visual inspection. Neither Navy
records nor civilian databases have any recorded instance of an in-
flight wing failure of a P2V.
The C130 and the P2V: Different Missions, Different Strengths
Likely, the original requirements by the U.S. Navy, and subsequent
structural design by Lockheed, took into account the fundamental
differences in mission assignment. The P2V was designed to fly with
extended fuel loads and bomb loads (including heavy nuclear weapons) at
weights of 80,000 pounds, and bank angles to 60 degrees.\36\ (Neptune
Aviation Service limits its P2V airplanes to a 71,000-pound ramp
weight.) While the later C130A airplane was designed as a transport,
the SP2V (original Navy designation) was designed for anti-submarine
warfare (ASW) requiring the aircraft to be flown continuously in tight,
high G-loaded, turns at low level over the ocean, in the worst of
weather.\37\ In fact, Navy operating limitations allowed for maximum
speed (350 knots) in moderate turbulence, and recommended a reduction
to between 150 to 190 knots in severe turbulence.
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\36\ NAVAIR P2V Aircraft Operating Limitations, allowed for bank
angles up to but not exceeding 60 degrees, and operation in turbulence
up to and including moderate to the maximum speed of 350 knots below
3000 feet altitude.
\37\ P2V pilots continually flew ``MAD-traps'' (magnetic anomaly
detection) of submarines in tight circles and figure 8s, sometimes in
45 or more angle-of-bank turns, hours on end. Likewise, ``Sonabouy''
patterns were flown, in even tighter turns to relocate listening
devices dropped in the ocean to detect submarine sounds.
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Other performance limitations underscore the huge differences
between the P2V and the C130. Beside a 45-degree bank angle limitation,
the C130 series should not be slipped or skidded, and while it can be
done by a pilot with caution, he risks losing control due to a
phenomenon called ``fin stall'' wherein the vertical stabilizer (as a
vertical wing) actually stalls and aircraft control is lost as it
rotates about its vertical axis. Similarly prohibited in the C130
series is the use of asymmetric power conditions, except in the
emergency loss of an engine. The P2V airplane's Navy limitations
actually allow ``slipping or skidding'' as required, and the use of
asymmetric power conditions or for landing approaches, skidding or
slipping at indicated airspeeds up to 230 knots.\38\
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\38\ Change 1 to NAVAIR NATOPS 01-75EDA-1, Part 4
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Effective Airworthiness Programs are Alive and Well
The NTSB Safety Recommendation at page 7 presents a finding that,
if meant to apply to the aerial tanker fleet as a whole, is simply
wrong. The Safety Board's statement is fundamentally flawed by the lack
of full knowledge and review of existential conditions in the
community. Stating,
``Therefore, it is apparent that no effective mechanism
currently exists to ensure continuing airworthiness of these
firefighting aircraft. Specifically, the maintenance and
inspection programs currently being used do not adequately
account for the increased safety risks to which these aircraft
are now exposed as a result of their advanced age and their
more severe stresses of the firefighting environment''.
(continuing) ``The Safety Board notes that the inspection and
maintenance programs used by Hawkins and Powers for the C130A
and the P4Y accident airplanes, which were based on military
standards, included general visual inspections of cracks but
did not include enhanced or focused inspections of highly
stressed areas, such as the wing areas, where fatigue cracks
that lead to the accidents were located.''
Without fully knowing the scope of the Safety Board's review of the
aerial tanker industry, it is hard to believe the NTSB would suggest in
its Safety Recommendation that the maintenance limitations and
inspection shortcomings revealed in the C130A accidents and the P4Y
accident should be applied to other FAA approved and state-of-the-art
maintenance facilities. Specifically addressing the Safety Board's
concerns, certainly as it applies to Neptune Aviation Services, readily
shows precisely the opposite findings:
Neptune's P2V airplanes are not exposed by ``advanced age.''
Manufacturers drawings and specifications as well as full-
computer aided replication of worn parts ensures that the
airplanes are likely every bit as good as new production
airplanes.
Neptune's P2Vs are electronically, magnetic-particle and X-
ray inspected especially in high stress wing areas.
Neptune Aviation Service does possess the engineering
expertise necessary to conduct studies and engineering analysis
to define the stresses associated with the firefighting
operating environment and to predict the effects of those
stresses on the operational life of the airplane, and its
components. State-of-the-art CAM equipment to replicate to OEM
specifications, and engineering personnel, and the ownership of
full OEM airframe and component drawings and engineering data,
place this engineering and maintenance facility at the
forefront of the aviation industry, including Part 121
certificate holders.
Neptune's maintenance and inspection programs, quality
assured by an FAA-Approved and reviewed Part 145, Quality
Assurance Airworthiness Program does, in fact, ensure
continuing airworthiness.
The P2V design and Neptune's professional operational
oversight ensures that the aircraft never exceeds its reduced G
load limitations, notwithstanding the fact that their aircraft
likely approach original manufacturer's design load
limitations.
The Need for a Full Safety Study of the Industry and Government
Oversight
In summary, the continuing airworthiness of aerial tankers and
their reliable service to the wildfire suppression efforts of the
various government agencies can be assured though the efforts of
professional and proactive operators such as Neptune Aviation Services.
To group any or all of the aerial tanker operators into one
classification and issue failing grades does a disservice to the
industry as a whole and reflects poorly on the review or analysis done
by the Safety Board.
Recognizing the NTSB to be among late arrivals \39\ to study the
problems and offer solutions to the aerial tanker community, it is long
overdue that the Safety Board, within its 49 CFR 800 authority,
undertake a Special Study of the entire industry and governmental
oversight, to examine not only the limitations and needs, but the
achievements of essentially a reliable, self regulating, self
sustaining, and creative sector of the U.S. aviation industry.
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\39\ Prior to 1994 the NTSB had no statutory authority to
investigate mishaps in these ``public use'' aircraft, and even since
that time, have spent little time or resources in the investigations
following the loss of these large airplanes. The NTSB itself should ask
why its own investigation into the tragic C130A loss at Pearblossom was
so blatantly flawed, publishing unsupportable and unscientific
conclusions. Eight years had to pass and other lives had to be lost
before the Safety Board acknowledged what many professionals knew about
the more probable cause of that accident.
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______
Large Air Tanker Airworthiness and Modernization
Issue Paper Developed by Ronald F. Livingston--May 16, 2004
This document describes the issues involved with the decision to
terminate the U.S.D.A. Forest Service and Department of the Interior
large air tanker contracts. Part I offers a brief recommended solution
to the issue and Part II is supporting data with a more detailed
description to substantiate the recommended solutions in Part I.
Part I--Recommended Solutions
Contract Termination
Reinstate all 33 large air tanker contracts effective immediately
based on the fact these aircraft were required contractually to have
in-depth inspections, as recommended by Sandia National Laboratories
last year (2003), prior to being returned to service as large air
tankers.
NTSB Recommendations
Notify the NTSB that the U.S.D.A. Forest Service and Department of
the Interior have responded to Recommendation A-04-29 3) by developing
a Structural Health Monitoring Program for large air tankers designed
to collect loads and strain data in the wild land firefighting
environment. Three large air tankers are currently equipped with
recording equipment.
Sandia National Laboratories
Provide additional funding to Sandia National Laboratories
Structural Health Monitoring initiative so that data obtained from this
years fire season can be evaluated and applied to the current large air
tanker fleet as well as modernization initiatives to comply with NTSB
Recommendation A-04-29 in its entirety as well as A-04-30.
U.S.D.A. Forest Service and Department of the Interior Contracting
Appoint an independent commission made up of private sector
executives and government contracting personnel to evaluate and develop
a contracting mechanism that will allow for modernization of the large
air tanker fleet by offering incentives for bringing new aircraft into
the fleet.
Establish a contract that is for five to seven years with penalty
clauses for early termination by either party. This will allow business
owners to obtain necessary funding for modernization projects.
Require that all large air tanker operators be required to be
certified as Repair Stations under 14 CFR Part 145 with limited ratings
for the type of aircraft they operate as a large air tanker to include
airframe, engine(s), and propeller(s). Those operators that are not
currently certified Repair Stations with these limited ratings would
have to start the certification process for these limited ratings
immediately.
Install Structural Health Monitoring equipment on all large air
tankers utilized in wild land firefighting operations with a Structural
Health Monitoring program capable of monitoring the strains and loads
of each flight with established inspection criteria if pre-established
limits are exceeded. This should be in place by the 2005 contract
inception.
Federal Aviation Administration
Develop a Memorandum of Understanding between the contracting
agencies, U.S.D.A. Forest Service and Department of the Interior, and
the regulatory agencies FAA Flight Standards and Aircraft Certification
stating the responsibility for airworthiness and compliance with FAA
Approved Flight Manuals and FAA Approved Inspection Programs regardless
of the use of the aircraft.
Government Agencies Cooperation
A National Air Tanker Working Group and steering committees for the
three models of large air tankers are under development. Finalize the
charters for these groups. Establish a realistic time line for the
final charters wording and subsequent signatures by all participants.
Schedule a time for the first working meeting dealing with issues as
established in each charter.
Part II--Supporting Data
Contract Termination
The U.S.D.A. Forest Service and the Department of the Interior on
May 10, 2004 came to the decision to terminate the contracts of 33
large fixed-wing air tankers based on the following statements from the
NTSB Recommendation report dated April 23, 2003:
``it was apparent that no effective mechanism currently exists
to ensure the continuing airworthiness of these firefighting
aircraft.''
The U.S.D.A. Forest Service and the Department of the Interior
continue to operate approximately 725 other aircraft both
fixed-wing and rotary-wing in the firefighting environment.
What mechanism currently exists to ensure the continuing
airworthiness of these 725 firefighting aircraft?
The NTSB report also indicated that a complete history of
maintenance and inspection records are not available for many of the
military surplus large air tankers.
This may have been true for the large air tankers that had the in-
flight breakups described in the NTSB report and the NTSB discovered
this during their investigation however, when Sandia National
Laboratories conducted their evaluation of the large air tanker
operators early in 2003, not having a complete history of maintenance
and inspection records was not among their findings.
The average age of the large air tanker fleet is 48 years with some
more than 60 years.
Many of the 725 remaining aircraft are close to the same age as the
large air tankers such as the Sikorsky helitanker S-64 & CH-54. These
aircraft went into production in 1962. Some of the medium size
helicopters such as the Bell 205 first flew in 1961. With the exception
of a few aircraft, the entire firefighting fleet of aircraft is old and
not limited to just the large air tankers.
NTSB Recommendations A-04-29--31
Role of the Forest Service and Department of the Interior
``The Safety Board is aware that the Forest Service has recently
embarked on a multiyear plan to evaluate and improve the airworthiness
of its air tanker fleet, including modification of its maintenance
program so that it more closely reflects the firefighting mission. The
Board supports this initiative and looks forward to learning more about
the progress and results of this plan.''
With this statement in the NTSB report it is clear the Board did
not intend to remove the large air tankers from service. The Board was
aware that initiatives were underway to improve the inspection programs
and the Board desired to learn more about this undertaking not to
ground the large air tanker fleet.
NTSB Recommendation A-04-29--Part 3) the magnitude of maneuver loading
and the level of turbulence in the firefighting environment and the
effects of these factors on remaining operational life.
This particular portion of NTSB Recommendation A-04-29 is currently
being conducted. Three large air tankers are currently equipped with
Structural Health Monitoring equipment. The Structural Health
Monitoring equipment installation was started in the summer of 2003.
The three aircraft are a DC-7 (Tanker 66), a P2V (Tanker 48), and a P-3
(Tanker 25). Tanker 66 (the DC-7) was operable by the fall of 2003 and
collected a small amount of data from the California fires. This data
will be evaluated when funding continues for this project. Tanker 25
and Tanker 48 finalized their installation during the winter are
operable and ready to collect data during the 2004 fire season. This
equipment will measure the g-loads and strains the large air tankers
are subjected to in the wild land firefighting environment. The
Structural Health Monitoring equipment will collect data daily and the
flight crew will download this data daily via the Internet and send the
data to a computer managed by Sandia National Laboratories. Sandia
National Laboratories personnel will perform engineering evaluations
(NTSB Recommendation--Part 5 of A-04-29) and compare this data to the
airplanes original design intent (NTSB Recommendation--Part 1 of A-04-
29). NTSB Recommendation Part 2 and 4 of A-04-29 will be used to revise
the FAA Approved Inspection Programs. FAA Aircraft Certification
Service has requested access to this information for future
certifications of large air tankers as well as any other group of
aircraft subject to low-level firefighting operations. No other group
of aircraft involved in wild land firefighting operations is currently
conducting this type of program.
Additional funding will be required to conduct in-depth engineering
analysis to comply with NTSB Recommendation A-04-29 and A-04-30.
A separate large air tanker operator that operates two Lockheed C-
130A aircraft has the same Structural Health Monitoring equipment
installed. One of the C-130A aircraft collected some data from wild
land firefighting operations conducted in Europe in 2003. This operator
has formed a group called the Low Level Loads Working Group. The FAA
Aircraft Certification Offices in Los Angeles and Atlanta personnel are
members of this group with the purpose of implementing an appropriate
and realistic, economical Structural Health Monitoring program for
special mission aircraft used in the low level environment.
Recommendation A-04-30--Require that aircraft used in firefighting
operations be maintained in accordance with the maintenance and
inspection programs developed in response to Safety Recommendation A-
04-29.
Contractually the large air tankers are required to maintain their
aircraft in accordance with an FAA Approved Inspection Program. As
stated above, the FAA Approved Inspection Program will be revised once
the Structural Health Monitoring data has been analyzed compared to the
original design intent, and all flight hours in all operations
considered.
Recommendation A-04-31--Hire personnel with aviation engineering and
maintenance expertise to conduct appropriate oversight to ensure the
maintenance requirements specified in Safety Recommendation A-04-29 are
met.
This has been accomplished in part by contracting with Sandia
National Laboratories to evaluate the current large air tanker
operators (Sandia has qualified engineers assigned to this project).
Mr. Ron Livingston, Large Air Tanker Program Manager Airworthiness and
Modernization, was hired to provide management oversight for Sandia
National Laboratories and to ensure the recommendations made by Sandia
National Laboratories were completed as they pertain to airworthiness
issues and to evaluate modernization initiatives for suitability to
wild land firefighting operations.
Mr. Livingston previously worked for the FAA Flight Standards as an
Airworthiness Safety Inspector and is currently a Designated
Airworthiness Representative, Mechanic with Airframe and Powerplant
Ratings, and Inspection Authorization.
Sandia National Laboratories
Sandia National Laboratories was contracted in December of 2002,
after the Blue Ribbon Panel findings were released, by the U.S.D.A.
Forest Service to support the Forest Service Air Tanker Modernization
Program:
Task number one--2003 evaluate the existing large air tanker
operators FAA Approved Inspection Programs for applicability to aging
aircraft issues and the wild land firefighting environment.
Sandia National Laboratories visited every large air tanker
operator starting in February 2003 and ending in April of 2003. Sandia
National Laboratories evaluated the following areas FAA Approved
Inspection Programs, operator facilities, maintenance personnel
experience, training, and qualifications, and Non Destructive
Inspection capability.
Sandia National Laboratories wrote three draft reports based on
these evaluations. The reports were separated by the model of aircraft.
One report for the Douglas DC-4, 6, & 7, one report for the P2V
aircraft, and one report for the P-3. These reports contained
recommendations. Some recommendations were for the U.S.D.A. Forest
Service, some recommendations were for the particular make and model of
aircraft, and other recommendations were specific to the particular
large air tanker operator. The draft reports were submitted to the
U.S.D.A. Forest Service and the FAA Aircraft Certification Office in
Washington, D.C. for their review and comments.
Basically the Sandia National Laboratories recommendations included
performing depot level maintenance with particular attention paid to
the critical structural areas in the wing box and wing attaching areas.
Other recommendations were to revise the FAA Approved Inspection
Programs to include these inspections on a more frequent basis and to
include a section in the FAA Approved Inspection Program covering
inspection requirements for overweight landings, and in-flight overload
conditions.
The U.S.D.A. Forest Service incorporated a contract modification to
require all large air tanker operators to comply with the Sandia
National Laboratories recommendations. The U.S.D.A. Forest Service paid
for the inspection costs but the large air tanker operators were
responsible for the costs incurred for repairs that would be required
after the inspection.
All large air tanker operators complied with these requirements and
were inspected in-depth only one year ago. Some of the large air
tankers were delayed in going on contract because of these enhanced
inspections. The large air tanker operators revised their FAA Approved
Inspection Programs per the recommendations submitted by Sandia
National Laboratories.
Task number two--2004 Collect data from the Structural Health
Monitoring program, develop database, and begin engineering
evaluations. Additional task is to review modernization program.
Sandia National Laboratories statement of work extends on into 2006
for continued engineering support, operational assessment, system
safety, fleet management improvements, training, and strategic planning
of the large air tanker fleet.
U.S.D.A. Forest Service and Department of the Interior Contracting
Large Air Tanker Operators must be currently certified under
Federal Aviation Regulation (CFR) 14, Part 137 (Agricultural Aircraft
Operations).
This is an operating rule that allows aircraft conducting
agricultural operations to deviate from the provisions of 14 CFR Part
91 General Operating and Flight Rules while conducting dispensing
activities directly affecting forest preservation.
The FAA Flight Standard District Office issues this certification
and is responsible for conducting inspections on agricultural operators
within their district. The current FAA Flight Standards national policy
is to inspect 1/10th of the agricultural operators in their district
annually.
A Federal, State, or local government conducting agricultural
aircraft operations with public aircraft need not comply with this
subpart (14 CFR 137.11(c)).
Large Air Tankers shall have been issued a Standard or Restricted
Airworthiness Certificate.
Airworthiness Certificates are issued by the FAA and are required
for civil aircraft by 14 CFR Part 91.203. Before an aircraft can be
issued an airworthiness certificate the aircraft must have been issued
a Type Certificate issued by the FAA. The Type Certificate is a formal
description of the aircraft. The Type Certificate lists the limitations
and information required for Type Certification. In order to issue an
airworthiness certificate the FAA inspects the aircraft to insure the
aircraft meets the requirements on the type certificate and is in a
condition for safe operation.
The current contract requires that large air tankers have an FAA
Approved Inspection Program in accordance with 14 CFR Part
91.409(f)(1).
14 CFR Part 91.409(f)(1) is under Subpart E of 14 CFR Part 91 which
is entitled Maintenance, Preventive Maintenance, and Alterations. 14
CFR Part 91.401 Applicability (a) states ``This subpart prescribes
rules governing the maintenance, preventive maintenance, and
alterations of U.S. registered civil aircraft operating within or
outside of the United States.''
Federal Aviation Administration
The FAA is responsible by law to promote safety of flight for civil
aircraft in air commerce.
FAA Aircraft Certification Service is responsible for issuing Type
Certificate Data Sheets. Flight Standards is responsible for issuing
Airworthiness Certificates, approving inspection programs for large air
tankers, and for issuing Operating Certificates under 14 CFR Part 137
for Agricultural Aircraft Operators.
According to the definition for public aircraft the large air
tankers are considered public aircraft because of the governmental
function of firefighting and only the U.S. Government uses the
aircraft.
The FAA Flight Standards understands these aircraft are civil
aircraft during the period when the aircraft are not on contract with
the U.S.D.A. Forest Service or Department of the Interior. However, FAA
Flight Standards feels it does not have any responsibility during the
time the aircraft are on contract and that the aircraft are public
aircraft and the FAA Flight Standards is concerned that during the
contract period they do not know how the aircraft are operated and
maintained.
The fact of the matter is that the aircraft are operated in
accordance with the Approved Flight Manual and the aircraft are
maintained in accordance with the Approved Inspection Program. This is
a contractual requirement.
There should be a Memorandum of Understanding between the U.S.D.A.
Forest Service and the Department of the Interior that states the large
air tankers will be operated and maintained in accordance with their
Approved Flight Manual and Approved Inspection Program respectively
during the contract period when the large air tankers are used for
firefighting operations.
Government Agencies Cooperation
A National Air Tanker Working Group is being formed at the national
level which membership consists of FAA Aircraft Certification, FAA
Flight Standards, U.S.D.A. Forest Service, Department of the Interior
Bureau of Land Management, Air Tanker Board, P2V Steering Committee,
Douglas Steering Committee, P-3/L-188 Steering Committee, Sandia
National Laboratories, Low Level Loads Working Group, and Transport
Canada. A charter is currently under development to be approved by all
participants.
The National Air Tanker Working Group--Certification and
airworthiness will support the selection, certification, alteration,
and continuing airworthiness of large fixed-wing air tankers used to
support wild land firefighting operations.
Steering Committees have been organized for three groups of
aircraft that are currently being operated as large air tankers. They
are Lockheed P2V, Douglas, and P-3/L-188. Charters for these committees
are currently being developed and will be approved by all participants.
A meeting was held at the Los Angeles Aircraft Certification Office
with all of the operators of P2V aircraft, FAA Aircraft Certification,
FAA Flight Standards AFS-300, FAA Flight Standards Principal
Maintenance Inspectors, FAA Flight Standards Aircraft Evaluation Group,
Sandia National Laboratories, U.S.D.A. Forest Service, and Department
of the Interior Bureau of Land Management.
These committees are a collaborative effort led by the large air
tanker operators with representation from the FAA, USDA, and DOI, whose
main goal is to ensure the continued airworthiness of the large air
tanker fleet. Their main tasks will be to review FAA Approved
Inspection Programs, Identify In-Service Problems and Solutions, and
Serve as a Focal Point for all Continued Airworthiness Issues on the
large air tanker aircraft.
Mr. Timmons. Thank you, sir.
I would like to address a number of issues today that my
colleagues here and fellow panel members have discussed, one
being the NTSB safety recommendations, the termination for
convenience of our contracts with the Department of
Agriculture, and the state of current FAA oversight on the
local level.
On April 23, 2004, the NTSB released safety recommendations
concerning the airworthiness of the current airtanker fleet.
This was a flawed document. It was lacking in any due diligence
in its research to determine the capabilities of the airtanker
industry as it stands currently. They were either unaware of
the work conducted by the Sandia National Labs or they never
bothered to contact them. They were unaware that the U.S.
Forest Service had hired an airworthiness program director. The
only operator they investigated was the one who had suffered
the tragic loss of two airtankers. No other operators were
contacted. Yet the NTSB made wide statements concerning the
industry's capabilities and procedures in maintaining aircraft.
They were unaware that there are operators that have full
OEM support, manufacturing support. Neptune is one. We have an
agreement with Lockheed that provides full engineering data
support for our equipment.
While I cannot address individual operators' procedures, I
can discuss what we do at Neptune. It is my assumption that
other operators have similar maintenance programs in place.
Neptune has all aircraft records detailing their full
operational life of their aircraft, as do other operators. In
the case of Neptune, we have full engineering data for the
production of the P2V that we acquired from Lockheed a few
years ago. This allows us to manufacture parts and equipment to
new standards.
Neptune's aircraft are put through a full airframe depot-
level inspection once every 8 years, in addition to its yearly
heavy airframe inspection that occurs yearly. Since 2002, our
wings and carry-throughs have received a full engineered damage
tolerance assessment, and the FAA has approved the inspection
procedures addressed from that assessment.
In addition, our wings are given an expanded depot-level
inspection every 2 years. This includes X-ray, dye penetrant,
and visual inspections. All components that can be removed--all
components are removed and are inspected. This includes stress
panels, access panels, leading edges, fuel tanks, retardant
tanks, and wing ribs. All components are inspected and
replaced, if needed, with parts manufactured to new standards.
To address accumulated fatigue issues, we use an
accelerated maintenance program. For every hour that our
aircraft fly, we put 3 hours on that airframe in terms of our
maintenance program. So a one to three ratio. This is precisely
the program that Air Transport Canada uses for their airtanker
maintenance programs and certification. Yet the U.S. Forest
Service is still discussing bringing Canadian aircraft south of
the border to fight fire in the U.S., utilizing the exact same
procedures for accumulated fatigue.
Independent investigators have examined our operation many
times and they have stated that Neptune Aviation's maintenance
is equal to or exceeds 121 standards--airline standards. I am
sure that other operators of heavy airtankers are operating at
the same level.
There seems to be quite a bit of confusion concerning civil
versus public aircraft. It is a grey area that has been debated
for over 50 years now. It was truly designed for government-
owned and operated aircraft. Yet now we have the government-
leased aircraft included into that category, aircraft that the
government truly does not have any operational control over.
I know that the U.S. Forest Service has expressed concern
for liability reasons with relation to heavy airtankers.
However, the U.S. Forest Service has only been successfully
sued once in relation to a heavy airtanker accident. In that
one accident, it was a U.S. Forest Service lead plane aircraft
that collided with an airtanker on short final in Ramona,
California, and the U.S. Forest Service aircraft was deemed at
fault. In all other cases, the courts have ruled that it is the
companies that operate these aircraft that are responsible for
maintenance and flight training and the flight crews are
responsible for exercising good command judgment.
In every other case the U.S. Forest Service has been
involved with, they have argued that these aircraft are civil
use aircraft, not public. If you go back through the court
records and you look at the testimony given, you will find that
the Department of Agriculture has argued that these aircraft
are civil use. Now we are hearing a different argument. If the
question is truly liability, there are ways to address these
concerns through contracting language.
Our aircraft are certified as civil aircraft. Yet during
the 100 days we are on contract with the U.S. Forest Service,
the national office of the FAA considers us public use
aircraft. Yet at no time are we removed from FAA oversight.
Even during the fire season, we are under constant supervision
by the FAA. We can do nothing with those aircraft without FAA
approval.
We are all required to hold civil airworthiness
certificates for our aircraft. We are required to adhere to all
FAA regulations throughout the year. Our maintenance programs
and procedures are approved and continually evaluated by the
FAA year-round. The FAA has been providing oversight to the
airtanker industry all along. It seems to me it would be a
small step for the FAA to say that they are conducting some
level of oversight of these operations, since in the real world
that is precisely what they are doing.
I have been informed yesterday that the FAA has stepped up
to the plate by providing recommendations concerning how to
inspect aging aircraft, providing inspection procedures and
knowledge that are rooted in their experience with aging
aircraft. I have also been told that the U.S. Forest Service
has taken these guidelines and expanded what the FAA recommends
by adding an additional third recommendation, that they have
done so without consulting the FAA. The FAA did not require
this third recommendation, nor did they know about it, and from
what I have been told are in disagreement over it.
This third recommendation is to test for widespread fatigue
damage, WFD. It is a predictive tool based on data gathered in
the flight environment. Without that data, there is no way to
predict widespread fatigue damage. The industry, in conjunction
with the Sandia National Labs, were in the process of
accumulating this data at the time of the termination of these
contracts. It is a shame that by terminating these contracts
this flow of data has been interrupted.
It should also be clear that there is no way to test for
widespread fatigue damage. It is a predictive tool, not
something you can test for. There is no accepted procedure to
do so with our current technology; that there is no data to
support these new inspections, yet the U.S. Forest Service, a
non-aircraft certifying agency, is requiring that this be a
part of any inspection to return these aircraft to service.
As I remember, one of the reasons that the U.S. Forest
Service terminated these contracts was that they lacked the
experience and the people to oversee the airworthiness concerns
addressed in the NTSB safety recommendations. Yet, somehow they
have accumulated this expertise and decided that they needed an
additional inspection for widespread fatigue damage, one the
FAA, the certifying agency for aircraft, deemed unnecessary and
unattainable without flight data.
The Chairman. Mr. Timmons, I would like for you to
summarize since we are over time.
Mr. Timmons. No problem, sir.
It is my view that this is nothing but a war of attrition.
The U.S. Forest Service will continue to raise the bar just
high enough that the industry cannot accomplish the task or it
is not economically achievable to accomplish this task. And if
the industry accomplishes the task, it will be assigned a new
one. After all, the industry has either accomplished or
exceeded every task it has been assigned since the tragic loss
of aircraft in 2002.
Thank you.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Timmons follows:]
Prepared Statement of Mark Timmons, Owner and Chief Executive Officer,
Neptune Aviation Services
Mr. Chairman and Members:
I am the owner and Chief Executive Officer of Neptune Aviation
Services, a former contractor with the Department of Interior and
Department of Agriculture to provide Heavy Airtankers for wildland fire
suppression. Prior to the Termination for Convenience by the Department
of Agriculture of our contacts on May 10, 2004 we had seven (7)
aircraft contracted for the upcoming wildland fire season, five full
time contracts and 2 exclusive use spares. We are based in Alamogordo
New Mexico and Missoula Montana, with our corporate offices in Missoula
Montana. We employ one hundred and (100) people of whom 35 are A&P
mechanics and 8 and IA's, and nineteen flight crewmembers. Our physical
plant consists of a hangar and shop facilities in New Mexico that
allows us to put one (1) of our aircraft inside at a time for
maintenance and a retardant tank manufacturing facility. In Missoula,
we have a facility where we can put two aircraft inside for maintenance
at one time; a full machine shop and engine overhaul facility. Neptune
Aviation has been identified by many outside sources as having
facilities and maintenance procedures and process that are equal to, or
exceeding the best of the FAR Part 121 (airline) standards (see
Herlihy's Submission To The Oversight Hearing on Firefighting
Preparedness: Are we ready for the 2004 Wildfire Season on May 13,
2004). Neptune Aviation Services is certificated as a FAA Part 145
Repair Station No. N16R011N with the following ratings: Airframe Class
1&3, Limited Airframe for the Lockheed P2V-5 and P2V-7, Limited Power
Plant with Overhaul capabilities for the Curtis Wright R-3350, Limited
Radio, Limited Propeller with Overhaul Capabilities for the Hamilton
Standard model 24260, Limited Accessory, Limited Instrument,
Nondestructive Inspection, Testing and Processing. Neptune Aviation is
in the process of incorporating the Lockheed L-188C into the Repair
Station operation specifications including the Rolls Royce 501-D13
power plant the Aero Products 6440 series propeller. FAA 137 Commercial
Agricultural Aircraft Operations certificate number CILG838C.
The objective of this testimony is to provide input from an aerial
firefighting contractor for heavy airtankers concerning the recent
actions of the Department of Agriculture and Department of Interior to
Terminate for Convenience their contracts with said contractors based
on an incomplete and flawed N.T.S.B. Safety Recommendation. An
additional objective is to convey to this committee what the industry
has done and is doing concerning the NTSB report and the Sandia
Laboratories report of 2003. Lastly, I would like to address the
question of FAA oversight over the companies that have historically
contracted with the aforementioned mentioned agencies.
Termination For Convenience
On May 10, 2004 at 14:20 hours Eastern Standard Time, The
Department of Agriculture and The Department of Interior notified the
contractors of Heavy Airtankers that their contracts with their
respective agencies would be terminated at 17:00 hours Eastern Standard
Time on May 10, 2004. The means of Notification of Termination of these
Contracts was provided by fax, and preceding the notification to the
companies involved, notification was provided to the press. Thus, the
first notification of termination to the companies and personal
involved was provided by the press, not by the Department of
Agriculture and the Department of Interior. No personal contact was
made by the agencies that terminated these contracts to the companies
that were involved. At the time of the termination for convenience many
of the companies had aircraft and support crews in the field fighting
wildland fire. In the case of Neptune Aviation, we had two (2) aircraft
in the field fighting wildland fire; it was unfortunate that these
crews had to continue to operate their aircraft with the knowledge that
they would no longer have a contract at the end of the business day.
The question of aircrew safety was apparently not a concern in the
timing of the termination of these contracts. It was a testimony to the
quality of the aircrews and companies that they finished the day safely
fulfilling their contracts and obligations to the very agencies that
had terminated their contracts with out regard for their safety.
While it may seem that the Department of Agriculture was taken by
surprise by the content of the NTSB report, the agencies were in
possession of the draft copy of the NTSB report for over one (1) year
prior to the release of the final draft (testimony by The Honorable
Ellen Engleman-Conners during the Oversight Hearing on Firefighting
Preparedness in U.S. House of Representatives on May 13, 2004). In fact
the Department of Agriculture was a partner throughout the two (2) year
investigative process. We can only conclude, that while not all of the
NTSB's recommendations may have been present in the draft report; the
major conclusions concerning their findings were present. During this
period of the time while, the Department of Agriculture was aware of
the draft findings of the NTSB report, they were continuing to
encourage the operators of the heavy airtankers to modernize their
fleets by making large investments of capital. On December 10, 2003 in
Boise Idaho, and again via a telephone conference on April 16, 2004 The
Department of Agriculture encouraged the heavy airtanker industry to
modernize their fleet of aircraft prior to the 2008 contracting period
or be in risk of not being awarded any future contracts. In fact,
Neptune Aviation acquired two (2) L-188 for the purpose of modernizing
our fleet at a cost of over one and a half million dollars.
NTSB Safety Recommendation A-04-29 through -33
While the NTSB Safety Recommendation provided a concise and an
accurate evaluation of the two tragic accidents that occurred in 2002,
it failed to accurately access the current condition of the heavy
airtanker industry, nor did it even attempt to determine the changes
that had, and are occurring within the heavy airtanker industry today.
This oversight can only be described as negligent, both in its lack of
effort and in its scope to determine the current state of the industry,
and incompetent in their failure to conduct any type of coherent
research on current airworthy programs.
The NTSB either failed to contact or was ignorant of the Sandia
National Laboratories detailed study of the airworthiness of the
individual aircraft and companies involved in the airtanker industry in
2002. Sandia issued draft reports concerning each company and their
aircraft in 2003 outlining what steps each company needed to accomplish
in order to maintain the airworthiness of their aircraft. Prior to the
start of the 2003 wildland fire season, Neptune Aviation Services was
in compliance with all the recommendations contained in the Draft
report, as were all airtanker companies. In order to accomplish this
all the airtanker companies expended large amounts of capital, out of
their own pockets, to meet or exceed the recommendations of the Sandia
Laboratories. The final draft of the P2V Sandia report has been sent to
the FAA for review and comment is expected to be finalized and released
at any time. The Final report for the P3A has already been released by
the FAA, the reports concerning the DC 4/6/7 are also soon to be
released by the FAA.
The NTSB was either unaware or was not concerned with the fact that
The Department of Agriculture had hired a Airworthiness Program
Director who was tasked with airtanker airworthiness and modernization.
The research and recommendations that Ron Livingston had developed and
presented was never used in the NTSB report. In fact, Mr. Livingston
has stated that the heavy airtanker operators and the DOA are in
compliance with the recommendations that the NTSB makes in its report
(see Ron Livingston's submission to this committee). It is his belief
that all the 33 large airtanker contracts should be reinstated based on
the in-depth inspections that were recommended by the Sandia National
Laboratories in 2003.
Prior to the release of the NTSB report there was no attempt by
that agency to determine what each operator's capabilities were to
maintain their aircraft, and maintain their aircraft in an airworthy
state. The only operator that was examined was the operator that
suffered the tragic loss of the two (2) aircraft in 2002. Not one other
operator was visited, evaluated or consulted with. Rather, the NTSB
made broad generalizations concerning the capabilities of the industry
as a whole without regard to any due diligence or care for accuracy in
the NTSB report. In doing so, the NTSB caused significant damage to the
reputation of individual operators causing the real potential of future
financial damage. This is an example of gross negligence and disregard
for the companies that are involved in contracting Heavy Airtankers.
FAA Oversight/Civil vs. Public Aircraft
The NTSB states in their Safety Recommendation that ``. . . public
firefighting flights are not statutorily required to comply with most
FAA regulations (including those pertaining to airworthiness and
maintenance) nor, accordingly, are they subject to FAA oversight in
those areas. Therefore, the Forest Service and the DOI, as the
operators of these flights, are primarily responsible for ensuring the
safety of these operations.'' In reality this does not reflect current
practice with respect to the companies that operate heavy airtankers.
There is a perception at the national level of the FAA that little
to no oversight is being conducted over the companies that operate
heavy airtankers, and the oversight that is provided is nothing more
than eye floss. On April 20 and 21, 2004 at Long Beach California,
during Long Beech P2V Air Tanker Maintenance Steering Committee Frank
Lieberman of the FAA Washington Office AFS 300 stated that he was very
surprised and impressed to hear that there were approved Airtanker
Operators MEL's, AIP's, Maintenance Programs, and STC's. In addition,
he was pleased there was so much in the FAA Approved substantiation met
for these aircraft.
Contractually, all contractors that provide aerial firefighting
aircraft to The Department of Agriculture and the Department of
Interior are required to possess U.S. Airworthiness Certificates and
the operators must have Code of Federal Regulations (CFR) Part 137
Agricultural Operating Certificates by the FAA. In order to acquire an
Airworthiness Certificate the operator must be in position of an FAA
issued Type Certificate (TC) under FAR 121 that will specify operating
limitations and maintenance requirements.
Having been issued TC's, Airworthiness Certificates, Pilot
Certificates, Mechanic Certificates, and 137 Operating Certificates,
the FAA is responsible for evaluating and determining that applicable
regulations are adhered to. These regulations include Title 14, CFR's
and determining what applicable regulations are adhered to.
These regulations include Title 14, CFR's 21, 25, 39, 43, 45, 47,
61, 65, 67, 91, 137 and in some cases 145. In order to determine
regulatory compliance status of the operators, field inspectors are
assigned inspection items that must be accomplished each year, in the
same fashion as they do with CFR 135 and 121 certificated air carriers.
The FAA's authority to perform the inspections cannot be avoided by the
operator and are not affected by Department of Agriculture or
Department of Interior decisions regarding air tanker operators. In
reality this oversight continues into and during the wildland fire
season. At no time are Neptune Aviations aircraft, as well as other
operators are removed from FAA supervision.
In order to resume operations in 2002 after the tragic accidents
each aircraft was required to undergo extensive inspections and repairs
that were approved by the FAA. This also included a continuing
airworthiness program for each aircraft and the wing structures
specified in the AD (Airworthiness Directive) that was issued by the
FAA. Adherence to this airworthiness program is under the oversight of
the FAA.
While the debate continues on the national level of who is
responsible for assuring that heavy airtankers are maintained in a
airworthy state, the local FSDO's have been taking that responsibility
and have been providing oversight over maintenance and flight
operations, both during the period when the aircraft are under contract
to The Department of Agriculture and The Department of Interior, and
when they are not.
Airworthiness of the Current Airtanker Fleet
Shortly after the tragic loss of two aircraft in 2002 the
Department of Agriculture, the Department of Interior and the FAA
grounded the heavy airtankers pending an evaluation and examination of
the wings of the respective aircraft. This was accomplished by
contracting with various FAA designated engineering representatives. In
order to resume operations in 2002 each aircraft was required to
undergo extensive inspections and repairs that were approved by the
FAA. This also included a continuing airworthiness program for each
aircraft and the wing structures specified in the AD (Airworthiness
Directive) that was issued by the FAA.
While I cannot comment on what each operator does for airworthiness
inspections, I am sure that they each have similar inspection and
repair procedures that have been approved by the FAA. In the case of
Neptune Aviation Services, the aircraft received an expanded Depot
Level inspection on each of the aircraft wings prior to returning to
service in 2002. Each aircraft was completely dismantled from wing
station 0--192 on both sides of the aircraft. This included the removal
of upper stress panels, retardant tanks, fuel cells, liners and ribs.
Full replacement of the internal doublers was completed using a
modified version engineered and approved by a structural DER and the
FAA. Detailed inspections (X-ray, fluorescent penetrate, detailed
visual) of center wing and associated structures were completed. Outer
wing structures were inspected for abnormalities. In the case of one
aircraft, this included the replacement of one complete outer wing
panel for preventive measures related to a previous repair prior to
Neptune Aviation Services owning the aircraft. An aircraft was
disassembled at the manufacturing breaks including outer wing panels
and tail locations to verify Neptune Aviation Services was not missing
any possible hidden areas of corrosion or concern. All wing attachment
bolts were magnetic particle inspected. Sandia National Laboratories
inspected Neptune Aviation Services in November 2002, they had only one
operational recommendation directed to Neptune: to include a
supplemental document incorporated in the AAIP for over weight landing.
This inspection program to assure airworthiness of Neptune Aviation
Services aircraft has become incorporated in our yearly inspection
process. Once every other year each aircraft undergoes an expanded
Depot Level inspection of each aircrafts wings. These inspections
entail over five hundred (500) additional man-hours per aircraft every
other year, which Neptune Aviation Services is not reimbursed. This
inspection is identical to the inspection completed in 2002 and is in
addition to the full airframe Depot Level inspection that each aircraft
undergoes every eighth (8) year.
The NTSB in its Safety Recommendations expressed a number of
concerns with the operation of ex-military aircraft and aging standard
category aircraft. Some of these concerns are due to lack of diligence
in conducting proper research or a through omission of fact.
In the CRS Issue Brief for Congress, Transportation Issues in the
108th Congress, undated May 18, 2004, the NTSB cites two (2) reports
that were conducted on firefighting aircraft in the firefighting
environment. The NTSB states on the bottom of page fifteen (15) and the
top of page sixteen (16) ``The Safety Board located studies performed
in the early 1970s by NASA on the Lockheed P2V and the Douglas DC-6
that examined the effects of the low-level firefighting missions on
these converted surplus military airplanes plus a Canadian study on
civilian Fokker F27 also converted to the firefighting mission. The
results of the P2V study indicated that there were no adverse effects
to the airframe structure due to the tank installation and the mission
flown. The data for the DC-6 study drew conclusions that indicated
that, unlike the P2V study, the firefighting mission did impact the
structural life of the airplane. The report concluded that, ``The
severity of maneuver load applications, in both magnitude and frequency
of occurrence, is such that significant shortening of the structural
life of the aircraft should be expected.'' In it's Safety
Recommendation, the NTSB included the information concerning the DC6 as
well as the F27, however it did not cite NASA's conclusions concerning
the P2V. Rather it implied that the studies done on the three aircraft
drew the same conclusions.
Many operators are all ready taking into account the potential of
significant shortening of the structural life of their individual
aircraft types. In the case of Neptune Aviation we are using a Three
(3) to one (1) ratio for the P2V in the wildland fire environment. For
every hour of flight we are counting three (3) hours flight on the
airframe. For the L-188, which we are in the process of conducting a
Depot Level inspection, prior to tanking, we will be using a five (5)
to one (1) ratio. This results in an accelerated maintenance program
and provides an increase in safety and takes into account the potential
shortening of the structural life of individual aircraft types.
Prior to the termination of the heavy airtanker contracts the
industry, in conjunction with the Sandia National Laboratories, was in
the process of gathering data to determine the magnitude of maneuver
loading and the level of turbulence in the firefighting environment and
the effects these factors have on the remaining operational life of the
aircraft in question (NTSB Recommendation A-04-29--Part 3). The Sandia
Laboratories installed on three (3) aircraft (Tanker 48, a P2V, Tanker
66, a DC-7 and Tanker 25 a P3-A) Structural Health Monitoring
equipment. The data was gathered during the 2003 wildland fire season
and was downloaded to a computer managed by the Sandia National
Laboratories. The intent of this project was to provide the FAA with
engineering evaluations and allow the FAA to revise the current FAA
approved inspection programs of the individual operators. It is
unfortunate that the Department of Agriculture terminated these
contracts prior to the study generating the data needed to evaluate
current airtankers, and future airtanker platforms.
The NTSB states in its Safety Recommendation that ``. . . for many
aircraft used in firefighting operations, very little, if any, ongoing
technical and engineering support is available. This is because either
the manufacturer no longer exists or does not support the airplane, or
the military no longer operates that type of aircraft'' (page 7). While
this may be the case for the aircraft that were involved in the tragic
accidents in 2002, this is not the case for the remaining fleet of
aircraft. Both Lockheed and Douglass provide full OEM support for their
aircraft. This includes the DC-4/6/7, the P3-A and the P2V. Neptune
Aviation has a contract with Lockheed to provide full OEM support and
has enjoyed a productive relationship with Lockheed. Neptune Aviation
also has acquired from Lockheed the full engineering drawings and
specifications on the P2V aircraft. In addition Neptune Aviation has
the full engineering drawings from Curtis-Wright and Westinghouse,
along with the ownership of the original type certificate data sheet
specifications (TCDS) for the J-34 turbojet engine. . This support
allows Neptune Aviation to assure repair to original new standards and
remanufacture to original type-certificate data sheet specifications
(TCDS). Other operators have similar resources at their disposal.
Because the NTSB failed to evaluate the entire industry their
research failed to uncover that the operators of heavy airtankers have
access to OEM engineering support, that the majority of the operators
also have complete records for their aircraft and that the Sandia
National Laboratories in conjunction with the FAA were already involved
in developing a dynamic maintenance program for these aircraft. That in
fact, the operators of the heavy airtankers had already conducted Depot
Level maintenance base lines for critical structures within their
aircrafts wings. The lack of due diligence in their research resulted
in the NTSB coming to the incorrect conclusion on page seven (7) of
their Safety Recommendation. ``Therefore, it is apparent that no
effective mechanism currently exists to ensure the continuing
airworthiness of the these firefighting aircraft. Specifically, the
maintenance and inspection programs currently being used do not
adequately account for the increased safety risks to which these
aircraft are now exposed as a result of their advanced age and the more
severe stresses of the firefighting operating environment.'' In fact
all the operators are involved in a dynamic FAA approved maintenance
program that takes into account the concerns the NTSB identify in their
Safety Recommendations.
Conclusions
There is a wide spread misconception in Washington, D.C. concerning
the current state of the heavy airtanker Industry. The NTSB, by coming
to a conclusion through faulty research, and lack of due diligence came
to the conclusion that there was no effective mechanism to assure the
continuing airworthiness of the Heavy Airtankers. Further, in doing so
they made the recommendation that the DOA and DOI should take
responsibility to assure that the aircraft in question should be
airworthy. By coming to this conclusion without any basis in data, they
in effect placed the DOA and DOI into regulatory situation which the
DOA and DOI are ill suited to accomplish. It is unfortunate that the
NTSB failed to conduct their research on the Heavy Airtanker industry
with any form of due diligence, for if they had they would have
concluded that there are indeed mechanisms in place to assure that
these aircraft are indeed maintained in a airworthy state. The FAA on
the national level does not have an understanding of what is occurring
on the Local FSDO level with respect to FAA oversight and the level of
interaction between the FAA and the operators of Heavy Airtankers. In
addition there is a perception that the companies that operate these
aircraft are a bunch of cowboys who fly and maintain their aircraft by
the seat of their pants. This may have been the case in the past for
some operators, however the Heavy Airtanker Industry has undergone a
significant evolution in the past ten (10) years, and a radical
revolution of its maintenance and flight programs in the past two (2)
years under the oversight of the Sandia Laboratories and the FAA. The
costs that are associated with the expanded maintenance have been, for
the most part, born by the companies involved in Heavy Airtanker
operations.
The FAA has failed to recognize that it has, all along, been
involved in approving maintenance programs and in assuring the
airworthiness of these aircraft. At the Local FSDO level of the FAA
there is no doubt that the operators are under constant oversight, even
while on contract to the Department of Agriculture for firefighting.
The Department of Agriculture has become concerned that they are
libel for future and past Heavy Airtanker accidents because the
aircraft are considered ``public aircraft''. However, the courts do not
seem to share that same opinion. The Federal Government has only been
successfully sued once in the matter of a Heavy Airtanker accident. In
that case, the accident was directly caused by a USFS lead plane
colliding with an airtanker on short final for landing at Ramona
California. In all the other cases involved in the loss of a heavy
airtanker the courts have ruled that the liability of aircraft
maintenance and flight operations lies with the individual operators.
Further, if there is a desire to remove the question of ``Public vs.
Civil'' aircraft in relation to Heavy Airtankers there are contractual
ways to remove that concern.
Lastly, The Department of Agriculture and The Department of
Interior have decided to focus their attention on solely the question
of airworthiness on the Heavy Airtankers. In their report the NTSB
refers to all aircraft in the wildland fire environment. Many of the
aircraft that are replacing the Heavy Airtankers are not under any form
of FAA oversight. Their maintenance is conducted out side of any repair
station, avoiding the involvement of the FAA, yet The Department of
Agriculture and The Department of Interior are contracting with large
numbers of these aircraft.
It appears that no one is a fan of Harry Truman in any of the
agencies on the national level that are dealing with the Heavy
Airtanker issue; no one is willing to accept the responsibility that
``the buck stops here''. In the meantime the operators of Heavy
Airtankers are be held hostage by the FAA, DOA, DOI and NTSB in a
series of finger pointing with no one taking any responsibility. The
result being, the public is being denied a critical resource in
fighting wildland fire, and in the process putting their property and
lives at risk. It is my concern that we are involved in a war of
attrition, the finger pointing will continue until the last of the
companies have expended the last of their financial resources and have
gone out of business. The resulting loss would be fifty (50) years of
wildland fire experience.
The Chairman. Thank you very much, Mr. Timmons.
Mr. Grantham.
STATEMENT OF WILLIAM H. GRANTHAM, PRESIDENT, INTERNATIONAL AIR
RESPONSE INC.
Mr. Grantham. Thank you to the Committee and particularly
you, Senator McCain, for allowing me to testify here today. I
want to start off by saying that the other operators here and
myself and our company totally agree with what Mr. Timmons'
statement he has just read.
On May 10, 2004, the Departments of Agriculture and
Interior announced cancellation of the large air tanker
contracts. I would like for my testimony to be entered in the
record, too.
The Chairman. Without objection.
Mr. Grantham. Thank you, sir.
This action resulted in the loss of a critical firefighting
resource, termed a national resource by the sitting President.
The action transfers an unacceptable risk to other firefighting
resources and leaves individuals, states, forests, and urban
areas and wildlife interface communities in an unprotected
position during what has been projected to be one of the worst
fire seasons in history.
The basis of the contract termination is the recently
released NTSB safety recommendations. While their assessments
may have been reflecting a situation that existed in 2002 among
some companies, it fails to take account of the strides of the
last 2 years. It appears the NTSB has not been made aware of
the cooperative, collaborative efforts made with industry and
the FAA. Neither was it made aware of efforts with the U.S.
Forest Service and BLM-sponsored programs that included Sandia
National Laboratories, which resulted in strides to improve
safety of the existing airtanker fleet.
The NTSB letter cited: ``There appears to be no effective
mechanism in place to assure airworthiness of these
firefighting aircraft.'' This statement does not recognize that
immediately following the blue ribbon panel's report on aerial
firefighting issued in 2002 operators began cooperative
programs with the FAA, Forest Service, BLM-sponsored program,
Sandia National Laboratories, and the airworthiness assurance
group. Deficiencies that were noted in both the blue ribbon
panel and NTSB have either been addressed or in works of
progress to be corrected.
An effective mechanism has been developed and can in fact
assure the continued airworthiness of the majority of the
fleet. The industry has fully cooperated and complied with any
and all requirements that have been issued by FAA, USDA, Forest
Service, BLM, and Sandia up to the cancellation date of the
contracts.
Actions compiled include: airworthiness directives,
enhanced aircraft inspections, review of aircraft inspection
programs, personal qualifications, recordkeeping, and many
other prerequisites prior to the start of 2003 and 2004
contract periods. Aircraft loads and structures health
monitoring programs have been initiated and great progress was
being made to satisfy this crucial need for information that is
meant not only to ensure structural airworthiness of the
current firefighting fleet, but the suitability of any future
aircraft, modified and purpose-built.
Statements have been made regarding the lack of FAA
oversight of firefighting aircraft. Our industry records exist
to prove all contractors receive visits from respective FAA
district offices, I believe around 1,500 hits in the last year
is what the FAA uses for terminology, which is quite a few. All
the firefighting aircraft that were withdrawn from use in 2002
as well as those whose contracts were terminated have FAA
airworthiness certificates, FAA-approved supplemental type
certificates issued for the special purpose of firefighting,
FAA-approved inspection programs. Private engineering firms
with FAA DER's have been hired. Furthermore, all operations are
conducted in accordance with Title 14 CFR Parts 43.61, 65, 91,
137, and other appropriate airworthiness regulations.
At no time has the FAA found it necessary to take action on
the certificates or flight status of these aircraft other than
issuance of airworthiness directives, with which operators of
affected aircraft immediately complied.
Incorrect statements have also been made about the lack of
records pertaining to aircraft prior usage. These statements
are also incorrect. At no time has any operator been visited by
the NTSB personnel to look at airtanker records other than
during the specific investigations related to the accidents of
2002.
With regard to the necessity to upgrade the fleet and
modernize equipment, the industry concurs and always has
concurred with this necessity. No contractor advocates or
desires to operate any aircraft that is found to either be
unsafe or no longer able to have its airworthiness assured. In
accordance with recognized FAA-approved procedures, it is the
desire and commitment of our industry to work collaboratively
with the agency to develop a safe, responsible, and economical
plan of transition to an evolving, appropriate fleet of
aircraft. Whatever perceived problems remain can be addressed
through cooperation between industry, FAA, and the responsible
accountable leaderships within the agencies.
We therefore respectfully request the Committee give due
consideration to providing full support of the current and
continuing efforts of industry, FAA, Sandia, and the Inter-
Agency Air Tanker Board to immediately restore all available
firefighting aircraft to operational status. We further request
direction and support be given to the agencies with industry to
begin a process of determining a safe, responsible, sustainable
economic transition plan, appropriately funded, to ensure our
Nation is not placed in this situation again.
Thank you, Chairman, for the time.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Grantham follows:]
Prepared Statement of William H. Grantham, President,
International Air Response Inc.
I would like to thank this committee and particularly Chairman,
Senator McCain, for this opportunity to provide you with facts related
to the perceived safety concerns which resulted in cancellation of the
large airtanker contracts by the Departments of Agriculture and
Interior.
On May 10, 2004, the Departments of Agriculture and Interior
announced the cancellation of the large airtanker contracts. This
action has resulted in the loss of a critical firefighting resource,
termed a ``National Resource'', by a sitting President of the United
States. The action transfers unacceptable risk to other firefighting
resources, and leaves individual states, forests and urban wildland
interface communities, in an under protected position during what has
been projected to be one of the worst wildfire seasons in our history.
The basis for the contract termination is the recently released
NTSB Safety Recommendation. While their assessment may have reflected a
situation that existed in 2002, it fails to take into account the
strides of the last two years. It appears the NTSB has not been made
aware, of the cooperative and collaborative efforts made by industry
and the FAA. Neither was it made aware, of efforts with the USFS/BLM
sponsored programs that included Sandia National Labs, which resulted
in strides to improve the safety of the existing airtanker fleet.
The NTSB Letter cited, ``There appears to be no effective mechanism
in place to assure the airworthiness of these firefighting aircraft''.
This statement does not recognize that immediately following the Blue
Ribbon Panel's report on Aerial Firefighting issued in December of
2002, operators began collaborative programs with the FAA, and the
Forest Service-BLM sponsored program with Sandia National Labs
Airworthiness Assurance Group. Deficiencies noted by both the BRP and
the NTSB have either been addressed or were works in progress. An
effective mechanism has been developed that can in fact assure the
continued airworthiness of a majority of the fleet.
The Industry has fully cooperated and complied with, any and all
requirements that had been issued by the FAA, USDA/FS, BLM and Sandia
up to the cancellation date. Actions complied with include
Airworthiness Directives, enhanced aircraft inspections, review of
aircraft, inspection programs, personnel qualifications, record keeping
and many other prerequisites prior to the start of the 2003 and 2004
contract periods. Aircraft Loads and Structural Health Monitoring
programs have been initiated and great progress was being made to
satisfy this crucial need for information, that is meant to not only
assure the structural airworthiness of the current firefighting
aircraft, but determines the suitability of any future aircraft either
modified or purpose built.
Statements have been made regarding a ``lack of FAA oversight'' of
firefighting aircraft and our industry in general. Records exist that
prove all the contractors receive visits from their respective FAA
District Offices. ALL firefighting aircraft that were withdrawn from
use in 2002 as well as those whose contracts were terminated have FAA
Certificates of Airworthiness, FAA Approved Supplemental Type
Certificates issued for the special purpose of firefighting, FAA
Approved Inspection Programs, private engineering firms with FAA DER's
have been hired. Furthermore, all operations are conducted in
accordance with Title 14 CFR Part 43, 61, 65, 91, 137 and other
appropriate airworthiness regulations. At no time has the FAA found it
necessary to take action on the certificates or flight status of these
aircraft, other than the issuance of Airworthiness Directives with
which operators of affected aircraft immediately complied. Incorrect
statements have also been made about a lack of records pertaining to
aircraft prior usage. These statements are also incorrect. At no time
has any operator been visited by NTSB personnel to look at airtanker
records, other than during the specific investigations related to the
accidents of 2002.
With regard to the necessity to upgrade the fleet to modem
equipment, industry concurs, and has always concurred with this
necessity. No contractor advocates, desires or would operate any
aircraft that is found to be either unsafe or no longer able to have
its airworthiness assured, in accordance with recognized FAA approved
procedures. It is the desire and commitment of our industry, to work
collaboratively with the agencies to develop a safe, responsible and
economic plan of transition, to an evolving appropriate fleet of
aircraft.
Whatever perceived problems remain; can be addressed through
cooperation between our industry, the FAA and responsible, accountable
leadership within the agencies.
We therefore respectfully request this committee; give due
consideration to providing its full support of the current and
continuing efforts of industry, FAA, Sandia and the Interagency
Airtanker Board, to immediately restoring all available firefighting
aircraft to operational status. We further request direction and
support be given to the agencies to work with industry, to begin the
process of determining a safe, responsible, sustainable and economic
transition plan, appropriately funded to ensure our Nation is not
placed in this situation again.
Thank you.
The Chairman. Thank you, Mr. Grantham.
Mr. Rey, you mentioned that you made the decision--when was
the decision made, a week ago was that announced?
Mr. Rey. The reconfiguration decision was finalized
yesterday.
The Chairman. No, the decision to cancel the contracts on
the tankers?
Mr. Rey. That was May 11.
The Chairman. May 11, about 3 weeks ago.
Why was not this decision made last fall?
Mr. Rey. Last fall we were still working with Sandia
Laboratory and FAA and the contractors on the modified
operating procedures and the more robust inspection and
maintenance program and communicating that information as we
went to NTSB. So it was our hope that, as I said in my
statement, that that would be adequate to assure the
airworthiness of the tanker fleet.
The Chairman. But what actually happened was that, instead
of making a decision to ground the fleet so that perhaps
Sandia's recommendations, the NTSB, the FAA recommendations
which you have been given could have had time to have been
implemented before we are into the fire season, you delayed and
made the decision at a point where now we have actual fires
going on.
Mr. Rey. The point of the work with Sandia was to implement
the recommendations of the Blue Ribbon Commission and FAA. So
that was in process.
The Chairman. And were Sandia's recommendations
implemented?
Mr. Rey. They were as far as we received them. We were
still waiting for additional information from Sandia.
The Chairman. Well then, how could the Department of
Interior determine, and I quote, ``There is no method currently
in place to adequately ensure the safety and airworthiness of
the aircraft''? Was the money to Sandia wasted?
Mr. Rey. That was a quote from the NTSB report. I think
what our reading of the NTSB's conclusions, our interpretation
of their conclusions, was that they felt that the work with
Sandia was either inadequate and/or not coming online fast
enough to assure that the aircraft could be safely flown in
this fire season.
The Chairman. A decision that could have been made last
fall, right, Ms. Conners?
Ms. Conners. Well, sir, we were in discussion with the
Forest Service as a party to the investigation, so where we
were headed was being discussed, but we did not issue our
formal recommendations until April 23.
The Chairman. Until when?
Ms. Conners. April 23, sir, is when we issued our final
recommendation letter.
Mr. Rey. As it turns out, it was fortuitous that the final
decision came out at the outset of the fire season, because if
we were into the middle of the fire season it would have been
significantly more difficult to contract the additional
aircraft necessary to reconfigure the fleet.
So it would have been somewhat better had we gotten their
final report last fall, but nevertheless not crippling to our
firefighting effort to get it when we got it.
The Chairman. Well, my point is that the FAA has now given
you some guidelines--right, Mr. Sabatini?
Mr. Sabatini. Yes.
The Chairman. And you are announcing these today, after
announcing on May 11 that the contracts were canceled. It is
very bad timing. We are now faced with a crisis situation. We
were not last fall because of the end of the fire season. I
would have hoped that that would have been taken into
consideration in the decisionmaking process. Obviously it is
not.
Mr. Rey, anybody who understands the speed and range of a
helicopter as opposed to one of these aircraft does not agree
with your assessment that somehow these are adequate
replacements. I have been around too long in aviation to buy
that one.
Senator Wyden.
Senator Wyden. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
My sense is, with Chairman McCain and colleagues here
putting some heat on, and we are going to keep it on, we are
going to figure out a way to deal with this now and we are
going to have people reporting and the like. But my sense is
that there is still going to be tremendous confusion about
accountability.
I would like to ask each of you whether you think it would
be clearer and simpler to just put FAA in charge of safety
issues. That is what Congress recommended in 1993. It would
require a change of statute to do it. But it seems to me that
once the hot light of Congressional oversight passes and we get
through this we will be back in the same vacuum of
responsibility that we are in now.
So let me see if I can get you all on the record on this,
on changing the statute and putting FAA in charge of safety
issues. Why do we not start with the Forest Service.
Mr. Rey. That is an option available to the Congress. It
would require a statutory change, given the current
configuration.
Senator Wyden. But would you support that now?
Mr. Rey. We are moving forward as aggressively as possible
with FAA----
The Chairman. Try to answer the question, Mr. Rey.
Senator Wyden. Yes or no? I am interested in working on a
bill so that there is clear straightforward authority on
safety. It is what Congress recommended. I would like a yes or
no answer about whether or not you would support that.
Mr. Rey. We would not oppose that.
Senator Wyden. Good, very good.
The FAA?
Mr. Sabatini. We will certainly follow the will of the
Congress.
Senator Wyden. Yes or no with respect to whether you would
support it?
The Chairman. I would ask the witnesses to answer the
question. It is pretty straightforward questions. We would like
yes or no answers, affirmative or negative. You can elaborate
if you would like. But I am growing a little weary of people
coming before this committee and not answering straightforward
questions with straightforward answers.
Mr. Sabatini, your question is very clear.
Mr. Sabatini. I could not support that, and I would like to
elaborate. I think that the United States military is a shining
example of how public aircraft can be operated very safely.
They are a world-class organization. They have a competency and
an expertise equal to what we have in the civil side of the
FAA.
Congress back in 1994, this very committee, debated this
very issue and the changes that they made was to take the
transportation of people that was not inherently government and
place that under FAA responsibility and jurisdiction. But it
made very clear and very explicitly stated that there are
operations which are so inherently dangerous that they do not
fit into the civil side of the fleet and that it should remain
the responsibility of the operating authority, such as the
Forest Service or the military, in activities such as
firefighting, search and rescue, et cetera.
So in answer to the question, Senator, I would not like to
see that.
Senator Wyden. Mr. Timmons, Mr. Grantham----
The Chairman. Thank you very much, Mr. Sabatini.
Senator Wyden.--yes or no?
Mr. Grantham. Yes.
Mr. Timmons. Yes, I would agree.
Ms. Conners. Sir, we have a five member partisan board. I
cannot speak for the other members.
Senator Wyden. Just you, just your opinion?
Ms. Conners. I will give you my opinion. I believe that it
would be a slippery slope of expansion of policy. You would
have incredible resource requirements for the FAA. When you
look at, as suggested by Mr. Sabatini, some of the other safety
operations such as the Coast Guard helicopter search and
rescue, police operations, et cetera and so forth, the
expansion is so far, taken to its ultimate conclusion beyond 33
tankers or even 700 vessels, airframes, that are used in
firefighting, that I think the Congress needs to look very
seriously at it beyond this immediate moment on such a policy
change.
That is the opinion of only one board member, not the board
itself.
Mr. Rey. If I could elaborate just for a second, because I
did not do so priorly. Whether Congress makes that change or
not, we are committed to working with FAA and they are
committed to giving us their expertise to solve this problem,
and we will move to solve it.
Senator Wyden. I guess that is what I am skeptical of. I
think once oversight and the exposure passes I question that.
And it is not a question of your desires, Mr. Rey. The FAA
provided the Forest Service and various other people with their
phone number and yet I do not see any evidence of any real
follow-up.
I guess I got three out of five votes here today to put the
FAA in charge of safety, but it is an issue I am going to
continue to pursue.
Let me ask about one other matter because I know colleagues
have questions. I have real reservations about whether the FAA
has the information that is needed now about the stresses of
the firefighting environment and that there is not adequate
science on it. What does this panel think about the idea of
putting black box flight data recorders on firefighting planes?
Obviously there would be questions about cost and the matter of
installation and the like. But obviously something that would
ensure that we have got the data that realistically looked at
what was going on there strikes me as constructive.
Let us just go down the row. Mr. Grantham, is this a
sensible thing to be looking at?
Mr. Grantham. Yes, it is, sir. Actually, after the 2002
tragic accidents the FAA paid to install telemetry wiring
equipment in our two C-130A aircraft. They have operated
continually since 2002. They operate on U.S. Department of
Defense contracts. We fight fire in foreign countries since the
U.S. Forest Service won't use them.
The equipment takes readings all through the wings area,
the fuselage, many points. It is on a disk. It can be pulled
any time you want to pull it. It is analyzed. And it is not
only for the current airworthiness safety measures for that
aircraft, but it is for establishing a future baseline for
safety of these aircraft and to determine what the aircraft is
doing and what it is not doing and what the stress loading is.
As of this date, it has not pulled up any data that shows
that there are excessive stresses on that aircraft in this
mission, and it has been used. Both of our aircraft were on
military contract last week. One of them is operating this
week. And they continually take these readings and it is
supplied to the FAA.
Senator Wyden. Mr. Timmons, the rest of the panel, black
box recorders or something similar?
Mr. Timmons. I would concur. I have no problems with the
black box. Sandia has already put health monitoring equipment
into a P2V, a DC-6, and a P3A. That data was gathered through
the 2003 fire season. The data has not been analyzed and with
the cancellation of these contracts there will be no more data
coming in. So I would encourage both.
Senator Wyden. Mr. Rey, Mr. Sabatini, Ms. Conners? Because
that is the point. With the cancellation of the contracts, we
are not going to get this data, and I am interested in these
policies that are going to allow us to track the science in the
future.
Mr. Ray, what do you think of the idea?
Mr. Rey. I think, as Mr. Timmons said, that we are
beginning to collect that kind of information under the Sandia
protocol. I do not have any problem with that.
Senator Wyden. Good.
Mr. Sabatini?
Mr. Sabatini. I would support flight data recorders.
Senator Wyden. Good.
Ms. Conners. The Board is on record in supporting data
recording in all modes of transportation.
Senator Wyden. Mr. Chairman, I know colleagues want to ask
questions, but I am very pleased again that you are holding
these hearings. I think that clearly there has been some
confusion about the key safety questions. Certainly the Forest
Service at times thought the FAA was looking at issues of
ongoing inspection and compliance when clearly FAA was not
doing any such thing.
So I hope that, through clarifying the safety oversight
responsibility--I continue to believe that we ought to do what
Congress recommended, and that is to put FAA in charge of
safety issues, and then following the science with something
along the lines of a requirement for a black box recorder on
these flights so that we can track stress. Those are the kinds
of suggestions that are going to help us turn this around.
But I am very appreciative as a westerner of your holding
these hearings and giving us a chance to force as much change
out of this process as we can.
The Chairman. Thank you.
Senator Burns.
Senator Burns. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
I want to start--we have already asked some of the
questions that I was going to ask, but I want to clarify one
thing here. Mr. Rey, this signing of the MOU with the FAA and
using their recommendations on this thing, and say the
operator-by-operator basis to make your judgment, how quickly
could you put qualified tankers back in the air? Have you got
any estimate on that?
Mr. Rey. That was a question that we struggled with
yesterday with our engineers, both at FAA and the Forest
Service. The best answer we can give you right now is the
shortest time period and the longest time period. The longest
time period is never. Some of these aircraft----
Senator Burns. That is like the market: How low can it go?
Zero.
Mr. Rey. Right. Some of these aircraft may not be able to
secure and provide the data necessary to assure their
airworthiness. I will sort of take on faith that the two
operators here can provide that. I suspect some others will not
be able to. So that is the outside number, never.
The inside number is that we believe as we send them the
request for information to the contractors today, if they can
turn around that information request relatively quickly, we can
have the results and recommendations to put before the NTSB in
about 30 days time.
Senator Burns. Mr. Chairman, that 30 days seems like a long
time. If you have gotten the information--Mr. Timmons, give me
a real world estimate. They require this information. You
supply them that information as correctly as you can, and from
my understanding you have as good records as anybody in the
business. How long would it take you to get those records to
the Forest Service?
Mr. Timmons. With the records that we have in place, if
they are not asking for any additional engineering data, we
could acquire and send them those records probably within 2
working days.
Senator Burns. And then, then you are going to forward
those, those records, to who to make a decision? Are you going
to take it to the FAA or the NTSB?
Mr. Rey. We will sit down with the FAA-designated
engineering representatives and review the information to
assess first whether it's complete, second whether it is
adequate to assure a recommendation of airworthiness, third to
evaluate whether more information will be needed, and we will
make that a fair evaluation.
Then, wrapping all that together, if we conclude that the
answer to those questions is yes and not no, then we will
submit that to the NTSB to see if we can get some modification
of their recommendations.
Senator Burns. Well, the NTSB, they are not a regulatory
agency. They investigate and report.
Mr. Rey. That is correct, but they often continue to
investigate agencies' ongoing compliance with their
recommendations. It would be our preference here, in this case,
to give them that material, to see if they want to give us any
advice per their original recommendations. They may choose not
to, in which case then we and the FAA will have to make a
decision.
Senator Burns. Given that information, Mr. Sabatini, how
long would it take?
Mr. Sabatini. The responsibility to provide the data to
demonstrate compliance with the criteria that has recently been
provided to the Forest Service rests with the operator, in
essence the applicant. The Forest Service is positioned today,
with the expertise that they have developed over time with our
assistance--I want to make clear, with our assistance--and they
can now have available to them, we have provided them a list of
designated engineering representatives who are designees,
authorized by the FAA to do work on behalf of the FAA, but who
are not FAA employees. They are available to the Forest
Service.
They and they alone are responsible for the decision
against the criteria which we helped them develop. If they wish
to submit that data to us for review, we will continue to
support them and lend our significant expertise in that area.
But the final decision as to returning those aircraft to
service would be the responsibility of the public organization
responsible for the public operation--firefighting.
Senator Burns. I want to make it very clear what my intent
is with this line of questioning. I know what bureaucratic run-
around is and I want to prevent that if I can. But I realize
you go down there in this, there is going to be some faceless
little person, and their eyes are very close and they speak in
tongues, who can give us a run-around and we will not get one
damned airplane off the ground or put out one fire.
That is what concerns me more than anything else, is the
process here more than anything else. If an operator has the
records and complies with everything that they are asked to do,
why can't that be dealt with in a timely manner so everybody
can get back to the business of protecting our national forests
and our national treasures?
Mr. Rey. There is no reason they cannot. If they have the
records, if the records are adequate, if the records
demonstrate that the vehicles are airworthiness--those are
three ifs--then we are committed by the work that we have done
with FAA's guidance to try to give them every opportunity to
get back in the fleet, because they are cost-effective. But if
that does not happen--and I hazard a guess that it will not
happen for some number of the large airtanker fleet. If it does
not happen for any of them, then we are confident that we will
fight fires and maintain a nearly 99 percent success rate at
initial attack with the reconfigured fleet.
The Chairman is correct, helicopters do not get to the
fires as fast. That is why what we have done is retained more
of them, because we are going to deploy them in a more
dispersed fashion. Once they are there onsite, they have other
advantages. Their turn times are shorter and they can deliver
more water and retardant.
So one of the things I want to leave for the benefit of the
confidence of your constituents is that we have reconfigured
the fleet in a fashion that is going to result in an effective
firefighting effort. That being said, if those things occur
that we have just discussed, if they occur to the satisfaction
of the Forest Service and the Department of the Interior, with
FAA's expert counsel, and we get some judgment that we are
making progress against NTSB's recommendations, they will have
the opportunity to return to the fleet and we will use them
gladly.
Senator Burns. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
The Chairman. Senator Boxer.
Senator Boxer. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
I am very concerned, Mr. Rey, that you do not exhibit the
attitude of a can-do person to me, really. You are telling us
to tell our people not to worry. Let me tell you, I am not
going to lie to my people, because I have got your plans for
firefighting resources in southern California. Here is what you
do. You have taken away 22 of these very important federally
contracted airtankers with a capacity between 1,800 and 3,000
gallons. You are giving us five more helicopters.
Now, how am I going to go to my people with a straight face
and tell them they are safer than they were? You are sitting
here--and I can tell because I am watching you and I am
listening to you and you say: Even if we do not have one
tanker. You do not intend to put any of them back.
I agree with Senator Burns. He gets it, too.
Mr. Rey. If we did not----
Senator Boxer. Wait. I am going to ask you a question.
Mr. Rey. OK.
Senator Boxer. But I have to say, I am confused. Ms.
Conners says to us very clearly ``By statute authority for the
safety oversight of these operations,'' meaning the tankers,
``belongs to the agency or department responsible for the
operation.'' Did you not know you were responsible for the
safety before?
Mr. Rey. The responsibility devolves to the operator of the
aircraft.
Senator Boxer. That is not what Ms. Conners said. Is that
correct, Ms. Conners? Did you not say what I just said? ``By
statute, authority for the safety oversight of these operations
belongs to the agency or department responsible for the
operation?''
Ms. Conners. Yes, ma'am, we said that in this case the
Forest Service and the Agriculture Department----
Senator Boxer. Thank you.
Ms. Conners.--would be primarily responsible for the
operation.
Senator Boxer. Exactly.
Who in your shop was responsible when those accidents
occurred? Who did you turn to and say, what work have you been
doing?
Mr. Rey. We turned to our Fire and Aviation Branch that
continues to work on the safety of these aircraft and asked
them to charter an independent review of the safety of the
aircraft, which we did, to install additional operation and
maintenance requirements, and configure some of the operation
of the aircraft to try to assure airworthiness. That effort has
been ongoing since December 2002.
Senator Boxer. So do you have confidence in those people in
your shop, since they are required under law to be responsible?
Do you have confidence in them?
Mr. Rey. I have confidence in them as far as their
expertise goes. To the extent that we are solely responsible
for assuring airworthiness without the advice of FAA, I do not
think they are adequate for that purpose. That is why we have
sought FAA's and received FAA's advice to assist.
Senator Boxer. Well then, why would you not endorse Senator
Wyden's point? You are sitting here telling us your shop is not
adequate.
Mr. Rey. By itself.
Senator Boxer. Yes.
Mr. Rey. I did not oppose his point. I just said that----
Senator Boxer: Well, your answer was: I would not oppose
you. And if you need more resources, why do you not tell us?
But Mr. Rey, we need an honest evaluation. You are telling us
you have a shop, but you do not have full faith that they have
enough expertise to handle the deal. So instead of coming to us
and saying to our Chairman, we need more resources to get some
top people on board absent a change in law, you are saying: We
are just going to ground these things.
The bottom line is I have no confidence that you have any
intention to allow these tankers to do their job. I am telling
you that my people on the ground are saying they are absolutely
necessary.
Mr. Rey. I would dispute the proposition that they are
absolutely necessary----
Senator Boxer. What is your background in fighting fires?
Mr. Rey. I have a forestry background and we have
considerable expertise----
Senator Boxer. In fighting fires?
Mr. Rey.--in firefighting.
Senator Boxer. Do you have as much as the people who are
the fire chiefs on the ground? Do you have the same background
as they have?
Mr. Rey. I have staff with superior expertise in wildland
firefighting.
Senator Boxer. Superior to the people who are doing this
every day?
Mr. Rey. They are doing it every day.
Senator Boxer. OK. So do they not agree with my people who
say in reality it is pretty scary going into this type of
season without this resource, they have a major effect on
fighting? You would disagree with that?
Mr. Rey. I disagree with the statement that they have a
major effect on fighting large wildland fires. They have a
major effect in two narrower areas: initial attack when access
is an issue; and extended initial attack to slow down a fire.
Senator Boxer. Mr. Chairman, let me tell you what I am
getting from this witness between the lines here. I do not see
someone that is very motivated to fix this problem in the short
term. I am very concerned about it.
Mr. Timmons, do you have--since you and Mr. Grantham----
The Chairman. Maybe Mr. Rey would like to respond to that.
Mr. Rey. I would like to respond to that, because maybe I
have not been----
Senator Boxer. But could I finish this question?
The Chairman. After he responds, you can have extra time.
Senator Boxer. Thanks.
The Chairman. Go ahead.
Mr. Rey. Maybe I have not been sufficiently enthusiastic,
but let me reiterate what I said in my initial statement. As a
matter of equity and cost effectiveness, it would be helpful if
we can assure the airworthiness of the large airtanker fleet
and restore some portion of them to our firefighting effort. We
are doing that on a very quick step basis, with FAA's
assistance. In a matter of less than a couple of weeks, FAA has
provided us with an engineering profile, the necessary data
call that we have to make on the part of the contractors, as
well as designated engineering representatives to assist our
limited staff.
Senator Boxer. Thank you. You have told us this before. But
I come back to the point--and sometimes when a witness says
something they do not even realize, when they say: Or even if
we do not have any tankers you are going to be safer. I will
tell you that is an outrageous statement. I see what your plans
are for my state and we will not be safer. I continue to
believe that in your heart of hearts, from what you have said
to the House people, from what you have said to us, this does
not appear to be something that is upsetting to you.
I would just like to ask the gentlemen who know about these
aircraft if they agree with Mr. Rey on the effectiveness of the
tankers?
Mr. Grantham. We do not agree with Mr. Rey.
Senator Boxer. Could you give us some facts on it?
Mr. Grantham. Well, we can give you the same facts. I have
been an initial attack airtanker pilot for around 38 years. I
forget how many. And we have been in business that long, too.
The large airtanker probably has been historically the most
useful tool in combatting wildland fires.
One of the problems that has happened in the last 10 to 15
years, the Forest Service has mismanaged even using the large
fixed-wing airtanker. As Mr. Rey now states, it is ideal for
initial attack and follow-up attack. The firefighting methods
have switched from early morning times of day when you have
advantage over the fire to fighting it during the critical burn
period of the day, and this is not a good firefighting method
which the Forest Service has gone to. It is more dangerous on
equipment, personnel, adds more stress loads to the aircraft
with the turbulence, and you have less advantage over the fire.
You have to fight fire early in the morning.
But along with the helicopter and the single-engine
airtanker and the other equipment, which is also--they are
susceptible to the same dangers we have and the same structural
problems. None of them are going through these same FAA
certification situations the large airtankers are going
through. So they are out there adding this equipment on in a
more unsafe atmosphere than the large airtanker fleet that is
the most heavily inspected fleet today that you have, probably
the safest fleet to put back into existence.
The Chairman. Now, Mr. Grantham, it cannot be the safest if
it had three tragic accidents now. Let us put it in context
here.
Mr. Grantham. Firefighting is inherently dangerous. They
average probably----
The Chairman. But these tankers crashed, the helicopters
did not and others did not.
Mr. Grantham. Helicopters do crash.
The Chairman. And they were because of failure, material
failure.
Mr. Grantham. I think you can look to individual companies
for some of that problem.
The Chairman. I am sure the families do not look at
individual companies, Mr. Grantham. Go ahead.
Senator Boxer. Well, the point is that they are effective.
The safety issue is what needs to be addressed, and we all
agree on that. The problem that I have and I think Senator
Burns has, just listening to him, is we want to make sure that
you have--we have accidents all the time. It is horrible, lots
of aircraft. But we make sure that we have in place the best
kind of system to make sure that these planes are airworthy.
In the law today, you are responsible for that. You have
said here you do not think you have enough expertise in your
shop. I find that troubling, Mr. Chairman, because if they do
not have enough expertise in their shop, A, we have to either
change the law or, B, get them more money so they can get the
expertise so that we can get these tankers up and running
again. I have a slew of people who have testified as to the
importance of the airtankers.
Here is Tom Innocencio, Assistant Manager at the airtanker
base in San Bernadino, which is run by the U.S. Forest Service,
said: ``There is no question that airtankers saved homes in the
Serrito fire between Corona and Lake Elsinore.''
So I mean, the people on the ground, they seem to believe
that this is a very important tool. I believe it is as well.
And I share the Chairman's concern. We want them to be safe.
But let us make it--let us be can-do about it, or we would
never fly any plane, because there has to be a way we can make
this work.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman, for your patience.
Mr. Rey. I will be as can-do as I can be. There is an
option C, Senator Boxer, and that is for the FAA to provide us
the assistance they are and, hopefully, if the operators can
provide the information we need, to then get them airworthy
doing that. That is just what we are doing. As I told Senator
Burns, with audible gasps from our engineering staff at both
the Forest Service and the FAA behind me, that if everything
works right in terms of their ability to provide the
information and the information does provide the necessary
basis for assuring their airworthiness, we can have that done
in 30 days or thereabouts.
Senator Boxer. Thank you.
The Chairman. More time, Senator Boxer?
Senator Boxer. No, thank you.
The Chairman. Senator Cantwell.
STATEMENT OF HON. MARIA CANTWELL,
U.S. SENATOR FROM WASHINGTON
Senator Cantwell. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
I have a question, Mr. Rey. It is not often I have a chance
to ask you a question before this committee, but we have had
many exchanges before the Energy Committee. We are about 30
days away from the anniversary, the 3-year anniversary of the
30-Mile Fire, in which we lost several young firefighters in
the state of Washington. So safety for us has been a primary
concern. While the 30-Mile Fire I do not think would have been
necessarily aided by these particular tankers, we are talking
about this morning, I think it does bring up a question about
the priority of safety and security.
I think we have queried you numerous times about a separate
safety and security budget number from the agency, which I am
not sure we have even gotten resources on that. So now here we
are with this particular incident. I personally believe the
agency spent a lot of time undermining environmental law in the
last several years. So my question is, if you spent that much
time on these environmental changes why did you not spend this
much time on the safety of this particular situation?
So my first question is, when exactly did we make this
determination? When did you first find out? What date, what
memo, what document in which the agency first determined that
these tankers were not going to be sufficient for this season?
Mr. Rey. The inquiry into the safety of the large airtanker
fleet commenced immediately after the fatal incidents in 2002.
After that we established an independent review committee co-
chaired by the former Chairman of the NTSB, the previous
Administration, and a state forester from Texas who has some
expertise in the use of aviation assets.
We also consulted at that point with FAA. From the
recommendations of FAA and the Blue Ribbon Independent Review
Commission, we contracted with Sandia Laboratories to develop a
more robust inspection and maintenance program for these
airtankers, as well as to modify some of the operating
procedures to assure a larger margin of safety. We reduced, for
instance, fuel loads--not fuel loads, but retardant loads under
certain circumstances.
Throughout the course of implementing the recommendations
of Sandia Laboratories and FAA's recommendations, we were
communicating with the NTSB. It was our hope that as NTSB's
report was finalized that the changes that we had made would be
sufficient for a different kind of conclusion from NTSB. That
hope was not realized and so the question then became, as I
indicated earlier in the hearing, upon receipt of the NTSB
report the sole question available was, would any prudent
person continue to fly these aircraft in the presence of
available alternatives?
We concluded on May 11 that no prudent person would do that
in the presence of available alternatives.
Senator Cantwell. So during this time period, Mr. Rey,
since the 2002 period, did you ever inform any committees or
Members of Congress that an ultimate solution to this might be
grounding of the tankers?
Mr. Rey. No. There were hearings, primarily in the House,
in 2003, I think, that asked about the status of the
firefighting effort generally and airtanker safety
specifically.
Senator Cantwell. But nowhere did you give notice to
members that, hey, we might be at a critical juncture here
where we are grounding these tankers?
Mr. Rey. No. It was our hope that we would not have to
reach that point. Unfortunately, that hope was not realized.
Senator Cantwell. In hindsight, do you not think you wish
you would have given some people the heads-up, given that we
are now on the precipice of the fire season, and particularly
in our state, we are back again to a dry dry season and we
expect that we are going to have severe conditions that will be
very ripe for this kind of thing? So we are on the precipice of
that, and then to say to a region of the Northwest, we do not
think we are going to have these large tankers?
Mr. Rey. As I said earlier, the advent of the fire season
forced the issue in terms of the timing of the decision,
because we needed to move quickly to secure alternative
aircraft to replace the tankers. So yes, it would have been
more fortuitous if we would have made the decision earlier, but
it would have been more disastrous--or difficult, if we would
have waited on the decision, argued it back and forth, and then
been further into the fire season unable to secure replacement
aircraft.
Senator Cantwell. I am not questioning that. I am
questioning the time period of discussion about the fact that
we might get to this critical moment. God forbid if we were
doing this in Iraq and all of a sudden we said we do not have a
plan, no one ever thought of it. I am questioning now the
agency's commitment to safety, and from my own experience in
trying to get the cultural awareness on the incidents from the
30-Mile fire or even get a safety budget, what does the agency
spend on safety--that is mandated in the wildland bill and yet
your agency still does not track safety numbers. I cannot get a
number of what you spend on safety and security.
So now we get to this situation and it is the eve of the
situation. I am not even questioning your decision as much as I
am questioning why we get to this point right at the precipice
and all of a sudden, pop, here is this decision. My question is
notification to members and to states that are going to be
gravely impacted from this about whether other alternatives--
what other plans, what other considerations would be
considered.
I have a follow-up question. I know my time is running out.
Mr. Rey. We did notify our state cooperators in the
firefighting effort. In fact, we reconvened the Blue Ribbon
Commission to assess their views as to whether this was the
right course of action.
Senator Cantwell. Good. So I would like to ask a question
about that. I did not mean to interrupt, Mr. Rey.
Mr. Rey. No, go ahead.
Senator Cantwell. So what states have endorsed this
proposal now? What states have said, yes, Mr. Rey, this is the
way to handle the situation?
Mr. Rey. We got a letter from about six Governors from the
western United States this week. I will make it available for
the record. I cannot remember which ones they are.
Senator Cantwell. And it says, we all support your plan?
Mr. Rey. It says this is the best course in a bad
situation, is how I would paraphrase it.
Senator Cantwell. So you think you have an endorsement from
states?
Mr. Rey. I would not hold them to that, no. But it is a
measure of some support for the path that we have taken and
that we are taking.
Senator Cantwell. I am not sure that is what I have heard
from our state, but I will be happy to see your letters,
because I think that is the other issue here, is that states
are critical partners in a solution to this.
Mr. Rey. Absolutely.
Senator Cantwell. And I am not hearing from ours that this
is the preferred path that they would like to see.
Mr. Rey. I will not suggest that all of the states are
unified on this course. We have had a variety of input from the
states. But with regard to some of them being supportive of the
path that we have taken, there are some. And I am always eager
and willing to talk to any State cooperator who wants to talk
about alternatives.
Senator Cantwell. If I could just submit, I will submit
something for the record. But we have had questions about these
unmanned planes that are now being used in our international
efforts, being used as reconnaissance for more specific targets
on firefighting, that would help in safety. So I will submit
that to the panel. Maybe we can get some feedback on whether
that is something the FAA and others would consider. Obviously
it does not help with the actual distribution and treatment,
but it does help on reconnaissance.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
The Chairman. Thank you.
Mr. Rey, the recommendations in the NTSB report are not
that different from the recommendations made by the Blue Ribbon
Commission established by the Forest Service in 2002. What
aspect of the NTSB recommendations that were not in the Blue
Ribbon Commission report made you cancel the contracts?
Mr. Rey. I think that the work that we did to respond to
the Blue Ribbon Commission report was work we hoped would stand
us in good stead as the NTSB completed its review. Our judgment
was after the NTSB reviewed the work that we had completed and
found it still inadequate to assure airworthiness we had taken
our last swing in this particular at-bat.
So it was a function of the timing of the two. We moved to
do as much as we could to respond to the Blue Ribbon Commission
report between their report in December 2002 and the NTSB's
report. We got the NTSB's report, as I said in the answer to
Senator Cantwell, we looped back to the Blue Ribbon Commission
and said: ``What do you think we ought to do at this
juncture?'' And their advice--and I believe that Jim Hull from
Texas is going to submit a statement for the record; he
testified over on the House side--their advice was to ground
the planes, and I think that was sort of the final straw, if
you will.
The Chairman. Ms. Conners, did you see the Sandia
recommendations?
Ms. Conners. Yes, sir. The Sandia recommendations were
reviewed during part of the investigation.
The Chairman. Did you find them any different from the
conclusions or recommendations that you have arrived at?
Ms. Conners. Well, actually, sir, the Sandia report was
essentially an evaluation of the existing maintenance and
inspection programs. It provided that programs needed to be
implemented, but we felt Sandia pretty much stated the obvious
and did not provide information as to how the Forest Service
could address the situation itself.
It is a systematic issue. It is a process of procedures. It
is a question of acquiring significant data. If I may, I would
like to quote from the March 2004 Consortium for Aerial
Firefighting Evolution report. It says: ``The limited data
collected to date indicates that the cyclic fatigue spectrum
experienced in aerial firefighting aircraft is far more than
the cyclic spectrum experienced by aircraft operating in a
passenger cargo role. This can either accelerate the damage
cracking of known structural problem areas and/or introduce
damage cracking areas that have not been previously experienced
by the worldwide fleet. The suitability of an aircraft in the
aerial firefighting role can only be assessed by evaluating its
structure against a load spectrum that correctly characterizes
the aerial firefighting role.''
This load spectrum, sir, is the key to the issue of the
records. It is not just a question of when the oil was changed.
It is a question of analyzing and acquiring load data,
providing a sophisticated analysis of that load data.
The Chairman. I do not think anyone thought that it had
anything to do with oil change, Ms. Conners.
Ms. Conners. No, sir. I am just referencing the fact that
this is not--it is a systemic issue. It is not simply a
situation----
The Chairman. I think all of us concluded that it was
because of the failure of the wings of the aircraft.
Ms. Conners. Yes, sir, you are correct.
The Chairman. So what has that got to do with oil changes?
Ms. Conners. I apologize, sir. I did not mean to appear
glib. My statement was meant that we believe that a systematic
approach to developing the maintenance program, as you stated
in your opening remarks, is a process and the beginning
initiation of that process that was occurring immediately after
the accidents should continue with the assistance of the FAA.
It is not a simplistic solution, and that is why our
recommendations were that, because the risk cannot be precisely
calculated, that the program needs to be put into place and
this will take some time. However, it should be able to be
done.
The Chairman. Mr. Rey, were the Sandia recommendations
implemented?
Mr. Rey. They are in the course of being implemented. Not
all of them were completed.
The Chairman. Those recommendations were made in 2002, were
they not?
Mr. Rey. Some of them were made in 2002 regarding
inspection and maintenance. Others were still ongoing. Indeed,
we were waiting for a final report from Sandia on some of the
testing protocols that the NTSB Chair just mentioned.
The Chairman. Mr. Sabatini, the set of recommendations that
you have come up with, that the FAA has come up with, if those
are implemented, suppose that all of those recommendations are
implemented, then who would then have the final decision on
whether those aircraft would fly again?
Mr. Sabatini. It would be the Department of Interior.
The Chairman. So I guess we come back to you, Mr. Rey. If
those recommendations are implemented, would that mean that you
would be disposed to allow these contracts to be renewed?
Mr. Rey. That would be our intention if all the
recommendations are made. I would like to submit the
recommendations to NTSB to see if they would provide any
additional investigative findings.
The Chairman. Would you need additional funds?
Mr. Rey. No. Actually, if we recontracted we would probably
save money, because we would take some of the other replacement
assets to a lower status and replace them with the airtankers.
As I said earlier, the airtankers are more cost-effective.
The Chairman. Do you have any idea how long it would take
you to review and implement the FAA recommendations?
Mr. Rey. That was the ``between 30 days and never'' time
span that I gave to Senator Burns. As I said, it is I think a
reasonable supposition that some of the airtankers are not
going to be able to provide, some of the operators are not
going to be able to provide the required information for us,
with the FAA's assistance, to review the airworthiness
question. Those would be never.
But if everything works right in terms of all the
information being available, I think 30 days to get something
prepared is within a reasonable stretch.
The Chairman. Mr. Timmons, Mr. Grantham, I would be glad to
grant you some closing comments if you would like to make them,
beginning with you, Mr. Timmons. Pull the microphone close to
you, please.
Mr. Timmons. Thank you.
The Chairman. Thank you.
Mr. Timmons. I appreciate the opportunity to testify here
and talk. My concern is that as time goes on June will turn
into July and July will turn into August and we are still going
to be attempting to come to a conclusion what and who is going
to be responsible for getting the aircraft back in the air.
By that time, the 50 years of experience that are within
this industry will be gone. These companies do not have the
luxury of hanging on for a year and a year and a half. Most of
these companies have expended all their resources to get ready
for this fire season. In the case of Neptune, we traditionally
borrow money in order to complete the maintenance inspections
that we do on our aircraft. Those are not all reimbursed
through our contract, especially the new inspections that were
instituted and required by Sandia. We are spending per airframe
almost 500 additional man-hours on wing inspections alone each
year.
So we do not have that opportunity. At this point in time
we are borrowing money to make payroll.
The Chairman. Thank you, Mr. Timmons.
Mr. Grantham.
Mr. Grantham. I have basically the same comments Mr.
Timmons would have, Your Honor. So thank you. We just hope it
can get solved, and none of us want to fly unsafe equipment and
all of us feel, I think this industry as a whole is a
professional firefighting industry and we do not want to have
accidents either.
The Chairman. Thank you.
I think particularly our government witnesses recognize how
important this issue is. Mr. Rey, I will not argue with your
point that perhaps the assets have been, quote, ``replaced,''
unquote. But in some of these fires that have taken place,
particularly when they are simultaneous and in different
states, we do not have enough assets. So to simply replace
assets is not--I am afraid is not sufficient.
We are all very worried, because every expert tells us
there will be a repetition of last summer, given the same
conditions that prevail throughout the West, particularly in
the Southwest. It is the seventh year of a drought now. So I
hope that we can make every asset available.
But I also take your point, both Ms. Conners and Mr.
Sabatini and yours, Mr. Rey, that safety has to be paramount.
There have been three tragic accidents and unwarranted delays
are not acceptable. But at the same time, we have to always
recognize in our frustration that safety is paramount and we
owe that to the families and individuals who will be flying
these aircraft.
So I understand that is a tough balancing act, but I also
take Senator Burns' point: Let us try to reach conclusions. In
other words, if these aircraft can be made airworthy then let
us do it. If they cannot, let us not. But let us not drag out
the decision-making process, which, particularly where safety
is concerned, is sometimes the easiest route.
I thank the witnesses for being here this morning. I thank
you. This is a very important issue and I hope that all of us
understand that we have to do what we can, however we can, to
make sure that as we face the almost inevitable devastation
that lays ahead of us that we are as best equipped to address
it.
I thank the witnesses. This hearing is adjourned.
[Whereupon, at 11:17 a.m., the Committee was adjourned.]
A P P E N D I X
Prepared Statement of Hon. Max Baucus, U.S. Senator from Montana
The 2004 fire season is already bearing down on us, and none of us
need reminding that all indications are that this season could be at
least as severe as the past several fire seasons. Add to that, the
sudden announcement by USDA Forest Service and Bureau of Land
Management to terminate every contract for large fixed wing air-tankers
without a clear plan or next steps, and suddenly people in my home
state of Montana and Westerners tell me they are bracing for a fire
fighting season like no other.
All of us are familiar with the fire which broke out in New Mexico
last week and the criticism by New Mexico Governor Bill Richardson that
for the lack of a single heavy air tanker a 100 acre blaze blew up to
over 23,000 acres and now burns even as we gather today to discuss what
will become of our Federal heavy air tanker fleet.
As many of you are aware last year in my home state of Montana we
experienced one of the most severe fire seasons on record across the
state. We received good support from Canada in addition to our own
heavy air-tankers and the aircraft which make up the Federal
firefighting fleet. In fact at one point in August 2003 nearly 18,000
of the nation's 28,000 Federal firefighters were fighting fires in my
state of Montana alone.
Even so, given the complexities and dangers of fighting fire let me
be clear and say without hesitation that firefighter and public safety
is the number one priority in all firefighting operations. Irregardless
of the resources that may or may not be available, safety always
remains paramount.
But today I am really troubled that heavy air tanker companies like
Neptune Aviation of Missoula, Montana with signed Forest Service
contracts, arrived in their offices early on the clock and ready for
work last month to find a faxed form letter advising them business as
usual was terminated. That's just not right.
Additionally, I am discouraged that Neptune and others were allowed
to spend several millions of dollars to prepare for the upcoming fire
season after signing contracts in January 2004, without any warning
from the Forest Service at all.
It is my understanding that Neptune and the other six companies
received a termination notice from the Forest Service in the form of a
faxed form letter, with no phone call or follow-up. These contracts
were terminated after the companies were at their weakest financial
point having invested all their remaining capital to prepare for a
challenging fire season in anticipation of scheduled steady work.
Neptune Aviation, Owner Mark Timmons and President Kristin
Schloemer told me they never received any indication from the Forest
Service or anyone else that they should hold up on their costly pre-
season preparations and build their own back fire.
Last week in a memo on Wildland Firefighter Safety for 2004 the
National Interagency Fire Center at Boise, Idaho cautioned us to
remember that a loss of heavy air-tankers ``gives us one less tool in
the toolbox and we must improvise and adapt to that loss.'' The memo
discussed the potential impacts of a shortage of heavy air-tankers and
that this factor could increase the likelihood of fires which escape
initial attack measures and therefore result in the need for more
firefighters.
Yet the Forest Service assures Congress, people at home in Montana,
across the West and throughout the Country that they are working
overtime with the Federal Aviation Administration on both short and
long term plans to address concerns about how to suddenly make do
without resources firefighters and Westerners have counted on for more
than fifty years with no transition plan or any clear next steps.
In fact two weeks ago, Dale Bosworth, Chief of the Forest Service
and his undersecretary for Natural Resources and Environment, Mark Rey
told me again, firefighting resources across the west are well in hand
for the upcoming season. Additionally, Chief Bosworth told me again the
Forest Service would be working with the FAA to get more information
from heavy air tanker companies about how to answer concerns about
airworthiness.
From my perspective the May 10, 2003 National Transportation Safety
Board report which started the chain of events we have been involved in
throughout the past several weeks, began with a conclusion that all
heavy air tankers are dangerous while, taking cues from some reasonable
concerns raised in the 2002 Blue Ribbon Panel on the Aerial
Firefighting Program.
However, in my mind the NTSB Report appears to have made a
conclusion which should be a hypothesis to be proven--not a foregone
conclusion. My understanding is that an NTSB study looks at a unique
event, like a heavy air tanker crash through a wide-angled lens and
then assesses all the factors which contributed to the cause of a
specific accident. The NTSB offers specific time-critical
recommendations sent on to the Federal Aviation Administration to
remedy the conditions which allowed the event to ever even occur.
For example you may recall the ValuJet Crash into the Everglades in
1996. As a result of that crash, planes of that type across the
industry were all grounded immediately upon a recommendation of the
NTSB to FAA. As a remedy to ensure airworthiness for these planes, the
NTSB also recommended that the FAA dispatch teams of inspectors to make
immediate on-site visits across the country to each plane to ``re-
certify'' them as airworthy or ground them for further inspection if
necessary.
However, the NTSB did not recommend dismantling an entire industry
as a result of a troubling and tragic crash. Furthermore, as you may
recall within two weeks most of these planes (many more than the 37 we
are discussing today) were back in the air. That is how a typical NTSB
report with recommendations to the FAA works.
But that is not the path which the NTSB report took in this case.
Rather, this NTSB report appears to be something altogether different;
a broad-brushed statement about the culture and nature of the heavy
air-tanker industry.
The May 10 NTSB report also fails to make any clear recommendations
to the FAA which--again, is typical to nearly every NTSB accident
study, which nearly always directs a Federal regulator like FAA to
address safety in a specific way after an accident.
This action by NTSB appears atypical in many ways of most other
reports they have issued. And Chairman McCain and Members of the
Committee, that is the issue.
The National Transportation Safety Board, the Federal Aviation
Administration, the Forest Service and the Bureau of Land Management
have concerns about safety as well they should.
However this NTSB report is ambiguous and non-scientific, the FAA
has received no clear mandate as a result of this report, and the
Forest Service and Bureau of Land Management who are not regulators,
are suddenly citing wide-spread fatigue as their greatest concern about
heavy air tanker airworthiness, without attaching substantiated
evidence to corroborate their decision to suddenly terminate these
contracts with no transition plan and no next steps. Furthermore, the
report as it now stands has become the impetus to shut down an entire
industry.
Last night as my staff and I prepared this statement I learned from
Neptune Aviation that indeed they had just received a list of follow-up
requirements from the FAA on additional documents that agency would ask
Neptune to provide to certify the airworthiness of their heavy air
tankers. As I mentioned, two weeks ago Chief Bosworth and
Undersecretary Rey had promised this list of follow-up requirements
would be forthcoming to companies like Neptune.
The immediate feedback I received from Neptune was positive. They
told my staff they were certain they could supply all of this
information to the FAA with ease to re-establish that their aircraft
are indeed airworthy.
But then just a few minutes later, I also received a draft response
from the Forest Service to the FAA outlining a new round of concerns by
the Forest Service about general airworthiness of these aircraft.
Again, the Forest Service offered a broad-brush approach to the
entire industry by citing additional unsubstantiated concerns that each
and every aircraft in the heavy air tanker fleet are plagued by
systemic wide-spread fatigue.
Additionally, I am really troubled that the Forest Service
terminated these contracts without any warning or a clear transition
plan for the operators and firefighters already gearing up for the
season. In fact I am told some of these heavy air tankers were already
deployed to the ground for the firefighting season.
Montanans--including myself, simply want to see the NTSB and the
FAA sit down with the Forest Service and BLM and have a think session
to identify an FAA team that can get out on the groimd this week to
work with local FAA inspectors and the heavy air tanker operators to
get these planes inspected and certified as airworthy or not, to
protect our home states, while we work out a parallel transition plan
and next steps to address the broader issues and over-arching concerns
brought forward by the Forest Service and the NTSB report.
These heavy air tanker companies don't have days, weeks, months or
years to hang on and keep their teams in place, while the Federal
Government gets their ducks in a row. Companies like Neptune Aviation
tell me they have already issued some lay-off notices to their staff.
The past tragedies of heavy air tankers like those which crashed in
Wyoming two years ago have indeed prompted an unprecedented look at the
Nation's aviation program. And in the past two years of discussion we
have learned that some companies are indeed better actors than others,
some companies provide us with a better value as taxpayers than others
and some aircraft are more airworthy than others. But we have not yet
received inconclusive evidence that our heavy air tanker industry as it
stands today merits a dismantling and that all heavy air tanker
companies are the same.
Dispatching FAA teams to each heavy air tanker facility to
conclusively establish airworthiness based upon a fixed list of
criteria is a measured and warranted approach. But to continue to raise
the ante and arbitrarily move the goal posts on how these companies
will be measured and assessed is unreasonable and unnecessarily
penalizes companies like Neptune with solid maintenance and FAA
certification records.
We all know leadership is not easy. People in positions to make
decisions must be called out to roll up their sleeves to do so. In the
West we don't finger-point at one another and suggest another guy ought
to go and fix a problem first. We roll up our sleeves and get after it
for the good of the order. Heavy-air-tanker contractors and Westerners
just want, and deserve, expeditious answers and to be treated
individually by their elected officials and Federal agency staff.
I believe it is our collective duty to ensure that the companies we
are discussing today, like Neptune, are treated fairly as well as to
ensure that our firefighters and our communities have all of the
available tools they need to fight the upcoming fire season.
______
Yodice Associates
Washington, DC, May 19, 2004
Kristen Schloemer,
President,
Neptune Aviation Services,
Missoula, MT.
Dear Ms. Schloemer:
On behalf of Neptune Aviation Services, you have asked us to write
an opinion of counsel letter regarding the definition of a ``public''
versus a ``civil'' aircraft. These are terms that are found in the
Federal Aviation Administration's statute and regulations and dictate
the rules that must be followed when operating an aircraft. All
aircraft being operated in the United States fall into one definition
or the other. Essentially, public aircraft are aircraft that are
operated by the government for a function of the government not
involving compensation or hire. The number of aircraft that qualify as
public aircraft is very limited. A classic example of a public aircraft
is a military armed forces aircraft, and in those instances, the
aircraft is not registered with the FAA, does not have an airworthiness
certificate issued by the FAA, is not required to comply with FAA
maintenance regulations, and is relieved from compliance with many of
the operating rules. The vast majority of aircraft being operated in
the United States, including many aircraft being operated on government
business, are civil aircraft.
Neptune Aviations Services provides firefighting flights for the
U.S. Forest Service, an Agency under the Department of Interior,
pursuant to a government contract executed annually between Neptune and
the Forest Service. Basically, the contract provides that Neptune will
provide fire-fighting services, including aircraft and crew, to the
Forest Service in exchange for monetary compensation. The question that
has arisen recently is whether the operations conducted by Neptune for
the Forest Services are considered to be operations by a public
aircraft or a civil aircraft.
Congress defined civil and public aircraft in the U.S. Code, as
part of the FAA's enabling statute. The FAA has adopted those
definitions, in summary fashion, in its Code of Federal Regulations,
and the FAA has issued guidance material to aid in the application of
those definitions to industry operations. Only a few cases have
discussed the issue. When determining whether an aircraft is public or
civil, you are required to consider the type of operation the aircraft
is involved in and not necessarily the purpose that the aircraft was
built or the person who owns the aircraft. Historically, the definition
of public aircraft has been strictly interpreted, seeming to err on the
side of finding that there should be FAA regulation, control, and
oversight, rather than not.
In pertinent part, 49 U.S.C. Sec. 40102(a)(41) defines ``public
aircraft'' as follows:
(A) Except with respect to an aircraft described in
subparagraph (E), an aircraft used only for the United States
Government, except as provided in section 40125(b).
. . .
(B) An aircraft owned or operated by the armed forces or
chartered to provide transportation to the armed forces under
the conditions specified by section 41125(c).
49 U.S.C. Sec. 40125(b) provides that, ``An aircraft described in
subparagraph (A), (B), (C), or (D) of section 40102(a)(37) [sic] does
not qualify as a public aircraft under such section when the aircraft
is used for commercial purposes or to carry an individual other than a
crewmember or a qualified non-crewmember.'' The same section also
provides that, ``The term `commercial purposes' means the
transportation of persons or property for compensation or hire . . .''
and ``The term `governmental function' means an activity undertaken by
a government, such as . . . firefighting . . . .'' 49 U.S.C.
Sec. 40102(a)(16) defines ``civil aircraft'' as ``an aircraft except a
public aircraft.''
Thus, the statutory definition of public aircraft, as it would
apply to the firefighting services that Neptune is performing for the
Forest Service, may preclude a conclusion that Neptune is operating
public aircraft. Under its contract with the Forest Service, Neptune is
providing the aircraft, and all related services, and performing an
operation for the United States Government that may be identified as a
governmental function. However, Neptune is in control of these
operations and is performing these operations for a commercial purpose,
i.e., has been hired by the Government and is being compensated by the
Government. Consequently, Neptune would be considered to be operating
civil aircraft.
The FAA definitions and interpretations comport with this
conclusion. In pertinent part, the FAA defines public and aircraft as
follows:
Public aircraft means any of the following aircraft when not
being used for a commercial purpose or to carry an individual
other than a crewmember or qualified non-crewmember:
(1) An aircraft used only for the United States
Government; . . .
(i) For the sole purpose of determining public
aircraft status, commercial purposes means the
transportation of persons or property for
compensation or hire, . . .
(ii) For the sole purpose of determining public
aircraft status, governmental function means an
activity undertaken by a government, such as
national defense, intelligence missions,
firefight, search and rescue, law enforcement
(including transport of prisoners, detainees,
and illegal aliens) aeronautical research, or
biological or geological resource management.
. . . .
Civil aircraft means aircraft other than public aircraft.
14 C.F.R. Sec. 1.1. The FAA has drafted guidance on these
definitions and application of them within the industry in FAA Advisory
Circular No. 00-1.1 (April 19, 1995). ``The purpose of this advisory
circular (AC) is to provide guidance on whether particular government
aircraft operations are public aircraft operations or civil aircraft
operations under the new statutory definition of `public aircraft.' ''
The FAA notes that its ``long-standing interpretation has been that,
where there is a receipt of compensation, such an operation is `for
commercial purposes' and that such an operation therefore is not a
public aircraft operation. . . . The general purpose of the new law, as
reflected in the legislative history, is to extend FAA regulatory
oversight to some government aircraft operations. In part, Congress
determined that government-owned aircraft, which operate for commercial
purposes or engage in transport of passengers, should be subject to the
regulations applicable to civil aircraft.''
The applicable key phrase that stands to remove an aircraft from
public aircraft status is ``for commercial purposes,'' which is defined
as being for compensation or hire, i.e., when the operator of the
aircraft is receiving direct or indirect payment. The Forest Service
hired Neptune to conduct firefighting flights in exchange for
compensation. This arrangement is captured in a written contract
between the two parties. Thus, although the aircraft are being used to
perform a governmental function, the aircraft are nonetheless engaged
in aerial operations for compensation or hire. The Forest Service is a
customer who has paid an independent contractor for an aviation
service, albeit to satisfy a Forest Service responsibility.
Moreover, Neptune has always operated its aircraft as civil
aircraft. Neptune holds an FAA-issued type certificate for its P2V
aircraft, which ``prescribes conditions and limitations under which the
product for which the Type Certificate was issued meets the
airworthiness requirements of the Federal Aviation Administration.''
Neptune has registered its aircraft with the FAA, and the aircraft are
marked with U.S. registration ``N'' numbers, in accordance with 14
C.F.R. Part 47. The FAA has issued airworthiness certificates to
Neptune's aircraft, which specifically identifies the civil
airworthiness maintenance requirements that must be satisfied to
operate the aircraft in an airworthy condition. And, Neptune complies
with Airworthiness Directives issued by the FAA pursuant to 14 C.F.R.
Part 39, which are issued by the FAA at any time that the FAA
determines that an unsafe condition exists in a product and that
condition is likely to exist or develop in other products of the same
type design, thus requiring compliance with an identified maintenance
procedure. The FAA conducts inspections of Neptune's aircraft, pilots,
and facilities for compliance with the FAA's regulations. Neptune's
pilots hold current and appropriate FAA-issued pilot and medical
certificates. And, Neptune holds a certificate under and complies with
14 C.F.R. Part 137, which is required of civil aircraft involved in
forest firefighting aerial operations.
The principles applicable to defining public and civil aircraft are
not limited to a model or type of aircraft, but may apply to any
aircraft. The critical distinction for purposes of concluding the
public or civil status of the aircraft is the manner in which the
aircraft is operated.
Sincerely,
Kathleen A. Yodice
[all]