[Senate Hearing 108-1031]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
S. Hrg. 108-1031
PASSENGER AND FREIGHT RAIL SECURITY
=======================================================================
HEARING
BEFORE THE
COMMITTEE ON COMMERCE,
SCIENCE, AND TRANSPORTATION
UNITED STATES SENATE
ONE HUNDRED EIGHTH CONGRESS
SECOND SESSION
__________
MARCH 23, 2004
__________
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Transportation
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SENATE COMMITTEE ON COMMERCE, SCIENCE, AND TRANSPORTATION
ONE HUNDRED EIGHTH CONGRESS
SECOND SESSION
JOHN McCAIN, Arizona, Chairman
TED STEVENS, Alaska ERNEST F. HOLLINGS, South
CONRAD BURNS, Montana Carolina, Ranking
TRENT LOTT, Mississippi DANIEL K. INOUYE, Hawaii
KAY BAILEY HUTCHISON, Texas JOHN D. ROCKEFELLER IV, West
OLYMPIA J. SNOWE, Maine Virginia
SAM BROWNBACK, Kansas JOHN F. KERRY, Massachusetts
GORDON H. SMITH, Oregon JOHN B. BREAUX, Louisiana
PETER G. FITZGERALD, Illinois BYRON L. DORGAN, North Dakota
JOHN ENSIGN, Nevada RON WYDEN, Oregon
GEORGE ALLEN, Virginia BARBARA BOXER, California
JOHN E. SUNUNU, New Hampshire BILL NELSON, Florida
MARIA CANTWELL, Washington
FRANK R. LAUTENBERG, New Jersey
Jeanne Bumpus, Republican Staff Director and General Counsel
Kevin D. Kayes, Democratic Staff Director and Chief Counsel
C O N T E N T S
----------
Page
Hearing held on March 23, 2004................................... 1
Statement of Senator Allen....................................... 6
Statement of Senator Biden....................................... 13
Prepared statement........................................... 13
Statement of Senator Boxer....................................... 8
Statement of Senator Breaux...................................... 2
Prepared statement of Hon. Ernest F. Hollings................ 3
Prepared statement........................................... 5
Statement of Senator Cantwell.................................... 59
Statement of Senator Carper...................................... 16
Prepared statement........................................... 19
Statement of Senator Dorgan...................................... 12
Statement of Senator Hutchison................................... 54
Statement of Senator Lautenberg.................................. 7
Statement of Senator McCain...................................... 1
Prepared statement........................................... 2
Statement of Senator Snowe....................................... 9
Prepared statement........................................... 10
Witnesses
Guerrero, Peter F., Director, Physical Infrastructure Issues,
U.S. General Accounting Office; accompanied by Norman J.
Rabkin, Managing Director for Homeland Security, U.S. General
Accounting Office.............................................. 32
Prepared statement........................................... 35
Hamberger, Hon. Edward R., President and Chief Executive Officer,
Association of American Railroads.............................. 68
Prepared statement........................................... 70
Hutchinson, Hon. Asa, Under Secretary for Border and
Transportation Security, U.S. Department of Homeland Security.. 21
Prepared statement........................................... 23
Jamison, Hon. Robert, Deputy Administrator, Federal Transit
Administration................................................. 28
Prepared statement........................................... 30
Millar, William W., President, American Public Transportation
Association.................................................... 75
Prepared statement........................................... 77
O'Connor, John, Chief of Patrol, National Railroad Passenger
Corporation.................................................... 82
Prepared statement........................................... 84
Riley, Ph.D., Jack, Director of Public Safety and Justice, RAND
Corporation.................................................... 61
Prepared statement........................................... 63
Rutter, Hon, Allan, Administrator, Federal Railroad
Administration................................................. 26
Appendix
Mehra, Ajay, President, OSI Systems, Inc. Security Group,
prepared statement............................................. 102
Rockefeller IV, Hon. John D., U.S. Senator from West Virginia,
prepared statement............................................. 101
Response to written questions submitted to Hon. Asa Hutchinson
by:
Hon. Ernest F. Hollings...................................... 106
Hon. Frank R. Lautenberg..................................... 110
Hon. John McCain............................................. 103
Hon. John D. Rockefeller IV.................................. 110
Response to written questions submitted to Hon. Allan Rutter by:
Hon. Ernest F. Hollings...................................... 115
Hon. Frank R. Lautenberg..................................... 119
Hon. John McCain............................................. 112
Response to written questions submitted to Peter F. Guerrero by:
Hon. John McCain............................................. 119
Response to written questions submitted to Jack Riley by:
Hon. John McCain............................................. 120
Response to written questions submitted to Hon. Edward R.
Hamberger by:
Hon. Ernest F. Hollings...................................... 124
Hon. Frank R. Lautenberg..................................... 125
Hon. John McCain............................................. 121
Response to written questions submitted to William W. Millar by:
Hon. Ernest F. Hollings...................................... 126
Hon. John McCain............................................. 125
Response to written questions submitted to John O'Connor by:
Hon. Ernest F. Hollings...................................... 128
Hon. John McCain............................................. 126
Hon. John D. Rockefeller IV.................................. 129
PASSENGER AND FREIGHT RAIL SECURITY
----------
TUESDAY, MARCH 23, 2004
U.S. Senate,
Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation,
Washington, DC.
The Committee met, pursuant to notice, at 10:04 a.m. in
room SR-253, Russell Senate Office Building, Hon. John McCain,
Chairman, presiding.
OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. JOHN McCAIN,
U.S. SENATOR FROM ARIZONA
The Chairman. Good morning. The Committee meets today to
consider the state of rail security in the United States.
Obviously, the recent attacks on Madrid's commuter rail system
have demonstrated all too vividly that our own transit system,
Amtrak and the freight railroads, could be vulnerable--and I
emphasize, could--be vulnerable to terrorist attacks. The
attacks in Spain were carried out with horrifying precision and
apparent ease, killing 191 and injuring more than 1,400.
Only modest resources have been dedicated to maritime and
land security over the past two and a half years compared to
the investments made to secure the airways. That is a fact. The
good news is that the Federal Transit Administration, FTA,
individual commuter agencies, Amtrak, and the freight railroads
have on their own initiative taken steps to safeguard
passengers, facilities, and cargo. These efforts, accomplished
at a very small cost to the Federal Government, have helped
make our rail system safer.
But rail security efforts remain fragmented. The Department
of Homeland Security has still not signed memorandums of
agreement with the Department of Transportation, as recommended
by the General Accounting Office, to make clear each
Department's roles and responsibilities with respect to rail
security.
Further, the Transportation Security Administration's
Maritime and Land Security Division has yet to complete a
threat and vulnerability assessment for the rail system and
prepare an integrated security plan that reflects the unique
characteristics of passenger and rail and freight rail
operations. The Maritime and Land Division is pursuing a number
of individual projects, but does not appear to have an overall
strategy for improving rail security.
We are fortunate that we are not in the position today of
having to make decisions about rail security in the wake of a
terrorist attack here at home. The efforts of the freight
railroads, DHS, FTA, and the FRA can help Congress and the
administration target additional resources that may be needed
effectively. With our Nation facing a half trillion dollar
deficit, we must use the taxpayers' money wisely.
Shortly after the terrorist attacks on September 11, the
Commerce Committee reports rail security legislation co-
sponsored by myself and Senator Hollings. That proposal was
aimed primarily at Amtrak and included a number of projects
that were part of Amtrak's original request that even Amtrak
has since discredited. Unfortunately, the full Senate has not
acted on rail security legislation.
I hope that following this hearing the Committee can
develop a bipartisan bill to address rail security needs and
the fire and life safety work in the Penn Station tunnels.
I want to welcome our witnesses. I look forward to their
statements and hearing their recommendations about how best to
improve our Nation's rail security.
[The prepared statement of Senator McCain follows:]
Prepared Statement of Hon. John McCain, U.S. Senator from Arizona
The Committee meets today to consider the state of rail security in
the United States. The recent attacks on Madrid's commuter rail system
demonstrated all too vividly that our own transit system, Amtrak, and
the freight railroads could be vulnerable to terrorist attack. The
attacks in Spain were carried out with horrifying precision and
apparent ease, killing 191 and injuring more than 1,400.
Only modest resources have been dedicated to maritime and land
security over the past two and one-half years compared to the
investments made to secure the airways. The good news is that the
Federal Transit Administration (FTA), individual commuter agencies,
Amtrak, and the freight railroads have, on their own initiative, taken
steps to safeguard passengers, facilities, and cargo. These efforts,
accomplished at a very small cost to the Federal Government, have
helped make our rail system safer.
But rail security efforts remain fragmented. The Department of
Homeland Security (DHS) has still not signed memorandums of agreement
(M-0-As) with the Department of Transportation (DOT) as recommended by
the General Accounting Office (GAO) to make clear each department's
roles and responsibilities with respect to rail security. Further, the
Transportation Security Administration's Maritime and Land Security
Division has yet to complete a threat and vulnerability assessment for
the rail system and prepare an integrated security plan that reflects
the unique characteristics of passenger and freight rail operations.
The Maritime and Land Division is pursuing a number of individual
projects, but does not appear to have an overall strategy for improving
rail security.
We are fortunate that we are not in the position today of having to
make decisions about rail security in the wake of a terrorist attack
here at home. The efforts of the freight railroads, DHS, FTA, and FRA
can help Congress and the Administration target additional resources
that may be needed effectively. With our Nation facing a half trillion
dollar deficit, we must use the taxpayers' money wisely.
Shortly after the terrorist attacks on September 11, 2001, the
Commerce Committee reported rail security legislation co-sponsored by
myself and Senator Hollings. That proposal was aimed primarily at
Amtrak and included a number of projects that were part of Amtrak's
original request that even Amtrak has since discredited. Unfortunately,
the full Senate has not acted on rail security legislation. I hope that
following this hearing, the Committee can develop a bi-partisan bill to
address rail security needs and the fire and life-safety work in the
Penn Station tunnels.
I want to welcome our witnesses. I look forward to their statements
and hearing their recommendations about how best to improve our
Nation's rail security.
The Chairman. Senator Breaux.
STATEMENT OF HON. JOHN B. BREAUX,
U.S. SENATOR FROM LOUISIANA
Senator Breaux. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
I have a statement from Ranking Member Senator Hollings,
that I would like to make part of the record. He could not be
with us. He is attending a funeral service today for a good
friend and former Governor and Ambassador and could not be with
us. But his statement will be made part of the record if there
is no objection.
The Chairman. Without objection.
[The prepared statement of Senator Hollings follows:]
Prepared Statement of Hon. Ernest F. Hollings,
U.S. Senator from South Carolina
The Commerce Committee has taken the lead on transportation
security issues. We have authored legislation on aviation security and
port security and had to push the Administration to implement the
provisions of those laws. We are here today to push them once again,
this time on rail security.
Two weeks ago, I re-introduced rail security legislation similar to
S. 1501 passed unanimously by this Committee in October 2001. It is now
2004, and still we have not seen anything comprehensive done on rail
security. Yesterday, the Washington Post highlighted the lack of
commitment to rail security. (I will include a copy of the article for
the record.)
Transportation security is a matter of national security.
Terrorists have made public transportation a new theater of operations.
Algerian extremists set off bombs in the subways of Paris in 1995 and
1996; a nerve gas attack on Tokyo's subways by members of the Aum
Shinrikyo sect in 1995 killed 12 and injured over 5,000 people; in 1999
a bomb injured three people at a Sydney rail station; in 2000 bomb
threats shut down London's underground; one bomb injured nine in
Dusseldorf's Underground; another bomb killed nine and injured 60 on
the Metro in Manila. Earlier this month, we saw the devastation in
Madrid, where over 200 were killed and some 1,600 injured. Security of
our rail system is no longer a function that we can leave to the
private sector or Amtrak and public transit operators that can barely
cover their operating costs.
As we have seen in Madrid, for the terrorists determined to kill
indiscriminately, public transportation is an ideal target. Precisely
because it is public and used by millions of people daily. Attacks on
public transportation, the circulatory systems of urban environments,
cause great disruption and alarm, which are the traditional goals of
terrorism.
We have focused a lot of attention on aviation security concerns
following 9/11, while this has been extremely important, it is
important to address the security needs of all modes of transportation.
It has been reported that Undersecretary Hutchison told the House
Homeland Security Committee last week ``the attacks in Madrid were not
a big shock or a wake up call.'' The terrorist attacks of September
11th were the wake up call, and now Madrid is an alarm clock that
reminds us that we need to develop and protect ALL modes of
transportation. Unfortunately it seems like the only way we can get the
Department of Homeland Security to act on anything is for the Congress
to pass legislation which mandates when and how the Administration
should identify and begin to protect our vulnerabilities.
I look forward to hearing from the witnesses. I understand that
there are a number of things that have been done by Amtrak and the
private railroads. Additionally, the Federal Transit Administration is
widely regarded as doing an admirable job on a shoestring budget
working with public transit operators to conduct training and public
awareness campaigns.
But at the end of the day, we created the Department of Homeland
Security to improve the security of our country, that is their charge,
it is not the function of the Federal Transit Administration's or
Amtrak or the freight railroads. At a minimum, the Department of
Homeland Security should have taken a comprehensive look at rail
transportation system in this country, assessed the threats and risks
and made recommendations for improvements. For over two years, such a
threat assessment has been discussed, but we have nothing to show, no
budget requests dedicated to rail security, insufficient staffing at
the Department, and the agency has repeatedly ignored questions posed
by this Committee.
We cannot continue to neglect transportation sectors that are so
vital to our economy. Transportation security requires a balanced and
competitive system of transportation alternatives. We cannot be overly
reliant on any single mode of transportation, therefore we need to
ensure that we have a balanced and secure system.
Senator Breaux. Mr. Chairman, you correctly alluded to the
situation with the Madrid accidents. We are clearly here today
because once again the world has seen what happens when
terrorists target a particular means of transportation that the
general public, innocent civilians, utilize on a day to day
basis. We have spent billions of dollars to upgrade our
aviation security, and appropriately so, after the 9/11
attacks. We have pushed and had hearings in the field and here
in Congress on port security and I think we are making progress
on port security. Every day we see new innovative measures
being taken to protect the ports.
Now once again we are here to push for something that is
equally as important, if not more so, and that is the question
of railroad security. The budgets for rail security and funding
have clearly lagged far behind what we are spending in these
other areas. As an example, this year $4.5 billion is budgeted
for aviation security while only approximately $65 million has
been set aside for the Nation's public transit operators, even
though daily, about five times more people use the train system
than take airplanes in this country.
The United States has literally thousands of miles of
railroad and transit tracks, obviously these are very difficult
to protect. We know this, but we also recognize that security
is a multi-layered system, consisting of various types of
intelligence and coordination among state, local, and federal
officials, the rail and transit operators and a number of
devices and techniques that are capable of reducing the risk
and the damage of terrorist attacks.
Mr. Chairman, we have attempted to address the question of
rail security. In October 2001, right after the 9/11 events, I
had the opportunity to chair a hearing on rail security. Only
about a month after the attacks by al-Qaeda. We responded, we
thought, in a quick fashion by reporting out a bill that would
have required at that time, the Department of Transportation to
perform an assessment of the risks associated with passenger
and freight rail systems, to prioritize recommendations for
security improvements, and also to make grants to carry out
some of those recommendations.
Now, two and a half years later, we have a Department of
Homeland Security, but I still remain concerned about the lack
of attention to the rail security system. Although now the
Transportation Security Administration has been moved from the
Department of Transportation to the Department of Homeland
Security, as the Chairman said, we still do not have a
comprehensive risk assessment identifying the rail security
priorities and we have not been able to get a response from the
Department of Homeland Security about the funding and the
personnel that are going to be dedicated to rail security.
I will close by saying, Mr. Chairman, this is a gigantic
task, to be able to protect every person that is engaged in
transportation in this country 24 hours a day, 7 days a week.
But I think that we have to understand, as we saw in Madrid,
that our rail system is really a potential target in this
country. We have done a great deal of work in these other
areas. We now need to focus on rail security, and that is the
purpose of this hearing.
[The prepared statement of Senator Breaux follows:]
Prepared Statement of Hon. John B. Breaux, U.S. Senator from Louisiana
Unfortunately we are here today because of the terrible tragedy in
Madrid, which serves as a reminder of the vulnerabilities common to all
of the world's rail transportation systems. We have spent billions of
dollars to upgrade aviation security in the U.S. after the attacks of
9/11. We have pushed and pushed for port security, and it is finally
beginning to get attention. It appears we are here today to push again,
but now for rail security.
Budgets for rail security, and funding, clearly have lagged far
behind our aviation programs, this year $4.5 billion is budgeted for
aviation security, while only $65 million has been set aside for
preparedness for the Nation's public transit operators, even though
five times as many people take trains as planes every day.
The U.S. has hundreds of thousands of miles of railroad and transit
tracks, which are difficult to protect. We know this, but we also
recognize that security is a multi-layered system, consisting of
various types of intelligence, coordination among state, local and
Federal officials and rail and transit operators, and a number of
devices and techniques capable of reducing the risks and damage of
terrorist attacks.
With the recent attack in Spain, it has become clearer that we must
focus our resources and efforts on all aspects of transportation
security. Amtrak, for example has spent millions of dollars on security
post-9/11, but the ability of organizations like Amtrak or public
transit providers to make the necessary investment to provide
protection from a potential attack on our rails is a matter of national
responsibility.
Let me be clear, we know that surface transportation cannot be
protected in the way we protect commercial aviation. Trains and buses
must remain readily accessible, convenient, and inexpensive. Passenger
profiling, the elaborate deployment of metal detectors, explosive
detection equipment, hand searches, and armed guards which are features
of the landscape at airports, cannot be transferred easily to subway or
train stations. The delays would be enormous and the costs prohibitive.
Rail lines, like power lines and pipelines, are extremely difficult to
protect.
This does not mean, however, that nothing can be done.
Transportation operators and security officials in areas that have been
subjected to terrorist attacks have developed some effective
countermeasures. Although they cannot entirely prevent terrorist
attacks--because no security system can stop terrorists from setting
off bombs in public places--good security measures can make terrorist
operations more difficult, increase terrorists' likelihood of being
detected and identified, keep casualties and disruptions to a minimum,
reduce panic, and reassure passengers in a crisis.
At issue today, is what has been done to address rail security? In
October 2001, I chaired a hearing on rail security approximately one
month after this country was attacked by al-Qaeda. We quickly reported
out a bill that would have required at that time, the Department of
Transportation to perform an assessment of risks associated with the
passenger and freight rail systems, prioritize recommendations for
security improvements, and make grants to carry out such prioritized
recommendations. Two and a half years later, we have a Department of
Homeland Security, but I remain concerned about the lack of attention
on rail security. Although the Transportation Security Administration
has moved form DOT to DHS, we still do not have a comprehensive risk
assessment identifying rail security priorities, and we have not been
able to get responses from the Department of Homeland Security about
the funding and personnel dedicated to rail security. The Department of
Transportation's modal agencies, the Federal Railroad Administration
and Federal Transit Administration are not responsible for security nor
are they provided the budgets to address this important issue.
About one-third of terrorist attacks around the world reportedly
target transportation. A lot of attention has been focused on aviation,
but other modes are just as vulnerable, and if we only focus our
efforts at antiterrorism to aviation, we will set ourselves up for
disaster in one of the other modes of transportation. Last year, Amtrak
provided passenger service for more than 24 million riders and public
transit provided 3.5 billion passenger rail trips. We want to support
and encourage transit use, so the issue of security is critical.
Securing cargo from attack is also crucial. Efficient flow of
intermodal cargo and bulk cargoes are vitally important to this nation,
however, they also pose risks to our population. For instance,
railroads in this Nation operate 120,000 miles of railroad tracks, many
of them traversing, operating under, or over, large metropolitan
centers. They carry every sort of commodity, including hazardous and
explosive materials. In 1999, Class I railroads carried close to two
million carloads of chemicals, and just over 500,000 carloads of
petroleum and coke. A single train can carry over 120 carloads, and be
over 1 mile in length. I remember, while attending law school at LSU,
that the State of Louisiana evacuated the entire Baton Rouge area when
a chlorine ship sank. How prepared are we to deal with a railroad
hazmat situation? Are we any better prepared than before September 11?
I do not bring these issues up lightly, nor do I want to infer that
our system of rail transportation is not secure and safe. I have faith
in our transportation system. However, we have to reevaluate our system
of security, we cannot continue to ignore the new realities--we must
improve now or subject ourselves to greater regrets later.
We need to explore what steps the government and the private sector
have taken to prevent acts of terrorism, and to explore what further
steps could be taken to protect the public. I look forward to hearing
from our witnesses and hope that this hearing will help advance this
issue.
The Chairman. Thank you very much, Senator Breaux, and
thank you for mentioning Senator Hollings' abiding and
longstanding interest and commitment to this issue. He is
unable to be here because of the death of the former Governor
of South Carolina. Thank you.
Senator Allen.
STATEMENT OF HON. GEORGE ALLEN,
U.S. SENATOR FROM VIRGINIA
Senator Allen. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
As you stated, the recent attacks, the terrorist attacks in
Madrid, Spain, logically make rail security the focus of the
attention of this committee. The terrorist attacks indicate
clearly a susceptibility of in this country our urban subway
systems, our passenger rail, as well as our freight trains, and
including our ports, to terrorist attack. The ports are
diverse; so are our transportation systems. The ports in
Virginia are different than the ports in New Orleans or in Long
Beach.
What we need to do, Mr. Chairman, is assess where we are
now. We need to adapt, we need to innovate, and we need to
improve. With you as the Chairman, I know there is always
action as well. This hearing I think will give us an
outstanding opportunity to assess where we are, recognize the
steps that need to be taken as we assess the vulnerability, and
proceed with policies to improve the security.
The rail operations as far as freight rail, this hearing
will I think be of some help in allowing us to recognize what
much, many of the freight rail systems have already done at
their own expense, not waiting for the Government to act, and
they are to be commended. As we look at this, we have to figure
out, as we did, and as I argued in the aviation area, is let us
look at new technologies, let us see if there are ways of
utilizing technologies so that we can effectuate these security
measures in a way that is the least disruptive.
One of the great things, our two Senators here from
Delaware know, is about passenger rail, is it is so much easier
and pleasant to get onto a train and not have to lug your
luggage in some other place. We do not want to have it so
everyone is so clogged up and unnecessarily delayed. But the
question is are there some technologies, sensors and so forth,
that might could be utilized as far as whether it is our subway
systems or America or passenger rail. Aggravating delays are
not what our goal should be.
You get to this capital region here, Mr. Chairman, and that
is a unique situation with the Washington Metropolitan Area
Transit Authority, which is essential for just not citizens,
but also the operation of government and the many employees who
are essential in so many functions of government. We need to
make sure there is clear communication and that we are taking
all reasonable necessary precautions.
In the freight rail industry, I think it is important that
we both provide the necessary security regulations, but at the
same time try to regulate practically, which is sometimes a
difficult thing for the Federal Government to do. I believe the
American public is much better served with a standard of
security as opposed to a process that micromanages the industry
or our ports.
That being said, Mr. Chairman, thank you for holding this
hearing after the tragedy and the terrorist attacks in Madrid.
I believe we have to recognize and assess our vulnerabilities
and address the high-risk areas of passenger rail as well as
freight rail infrastructure and do it in a common sense way. I
look forward to asking some questions from some of our
witnesses where they are talking about diverting some freight
from certain areas, which actually could make it not only harm
commerce but actually make it a more dangerous situation.
So again, Mr. Chairman, thank you for the hearing. I thank
all our witnesses for appearing before us today to address this
serious issue.
The Chairman. Thank you.
Senator Lautenberg.
STATEMENT OF HON. FRANK R. LAUTENBERG,
U.S. SENATOR FROM NEW JERSEY
Senator Lautenberg. Thanks, Mr. Chairman. Obviously, this
hearing could not be more opportune in the wake of what
recently took place in Spain.
We have made some significant progress in air travel
security, but we do not see the same kind of commitment to our
homeland's surface transportation systems, and I hope, Mr.
Chairman, this hearing will steer us in the right direction.
In my home state of New Jersey, it is practically
impossible to travel to work without using a bridge, a tunnel,
a railroad, or a subway, and it is imperative that we do
everything possible to increase the security of our surface
transportation infrastructure and systems.
Mr. Chairman, I think we are seeing that wherever people
gather, there is a potential target. But I do think that we
have to approach the security problems piecemeal as we
recognize the particular danger. Warfare has changed. I just
came back from Iraq. Note that there no longer is a common type
of warfare gun to gun, face to face. We have remote bombs,
things that can be put someplace and triggered off by someone
miles away from the scene. So it makes the problem particularly
complicated.
The Administration's eleventh hour announcement to do
something about rail security was very pleasing. But, it is a
late effort, focused more on response to terrorist acts and not
enough in my view focused on prevention of terrorism in
America. There are many things that we can do to improve
security in our rail system and they require money for
security-related capital projects as well as operations. The
transit agencies identified $6 billion in security needs and,
to my knowledge, to date the Administration has released only
$35 million in grants. I am curious to hear from our witnesses
about the status of the other $65 million that we appropriated
to them specifically for this purpose.
Amtrak spends tens of millions of dollars every year on
security and yet not one dollar in the President's 2005 budget
is specified for securing our Nation's intercity passenger rail
service, and the 25 million riders who take Amtrak each year.
Rather, the Administration chooses to dodge the responsibility
of Amtrak's funding, recommending only half of what Amtrak says
it needs to operate the Nation's intercity rail system safely
and efficiently.
Amtrak is not even eligible to apply for a grant under any
Department of Homeland Security grant program. The fact of the
matter is, the Administration needs to do much more to improve
the security of our surface transportation systems by
preventing terrorism up front, not operating solely in the
reaction mode.
The decisions we make now could very well come back to
plague us. An ounce of prevention may save many American lives.
No equation can tell us where we ought to be or what to do. We
know that we need to get busy on this and we should not be
looking for cheap security. That has been the theme of my
campaign to keep the FAA intact, it is a very significant part
of the security system of aviation.
We decided to take the baggage screeners away from the
private sector and put the 28,000 of them into the Government
sector. The costs of operating have gone up significantly. But
don't all of us feel better about it? I do.
So, Mr. Chairman, I once again thank you for holding this
hearing and I look forward to hearing from our witnesses.
The Chairman. Thank you, sir.
Senator Boxer.
STATEMENT OF HON. BARBARA BOXER,
U.S. SENATOR FROM CALIFORNIA
Senator Boxer. Thank you so much, Mr. Chairman. By the way,
thank you for your testimony at the Foreign Relations
Committee. I thought it was very important.
I want to welcome our colleagues today. I have worked with
them on this issue particularly Senator Biden. He and I have
served here for a long time. One of the things people think
about when they think about ``Amtrak'' is the East Coast. I am
here to tell you we are very busy; there are a lot of Amtrak
passengers in California, and I will get into that. So this is
a key issue from East to West.
Mr. Chairman, with your guidance, we passed an excellent
bill right after 9/11. It is unfortunate that it did not become
the law of the land. It dealt with many of the improvements
that we need to make to our rail system.
We learned from the aviation attack that if you are not
ready, the results can be devastating. We have been working to
improve aviation security. Senator Lautenberg discussed that.
But, we can and should do more. We have begun to improve port
security, but we must do more. I look forward to working with
all of you on these issues.
Clearly, after Madrid we have to address the vulnerability
of our rail systems. We needed to before Madrid, now it has
been brought home to us in stark pictures.
I was disturbed to read a quote from the Department of
Homeland Security Under Secretary for Border and Transportation
Security. He said, quote: ``It is very important that we do not
simply react to an incident that happens anywhere in the
world,'' unquote, and that the administration was not seeking
more funding for train security.
And he further said, and this I found really shocking: ``An
aircraft''--and this is a direct quote: ``An aircraft can be
used as a weapon. A train cannot be hurled through the air in
the same fashion,'' unquote.
Obviously, we now see the tragedy that can come from
attacks on rail. Let me show you a picture. Let us show the
network of passenger lines here. All these represent different
lines. Now let us show the freight lines. There are many
targets of opportunity here! Look at this. This is our U.S.
freight rail network.
We need to take steps. I personally think the bill that
came out of this Committee is a good first step. I would like
to see us do that again. I have taken a small portion of and
immediate funds for police for K-9 patrols and put it into a
bill. I have also asked the GAO to take a look at what the
Department is doing.
But again, as Senator Breaux pointed out, it is hard to
obtain information from Homeland Security. Secretary Ridge
claims the new initiatives he is going to implement will not
require new funding. He thinks they can absorb the costs. I am
surprised to hear that because they were running a tight ship
prior to the events in Madrid. I am not one who believes you
throw money at a problem. I am one who believes you take steps,
and if you do it on the cheap, we will pay the price
eventually.
I will put the rest of my statement in the record.
California has the second highest Amtrak ridership in the
country. This means a lot to us, and I thank you very much for
holding this hearing.
The Chairman. Thank you.
Senator Snowe.
STATEMENT OF HON. OLYMPIA J. SNOWE,
U.S. SENATOR FROM MAINE
Senator Snowe. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thank you for
holding this hearing today. Obviously it is very timely, very
appropriate, in the aftermath of the tragic events in Madrid.
Also, Mr. Chairman, I do think it is appropriate for us to
be conducting oversight on the issue of rail security because
of, I think frankly, the lack of a coordinated rail security
plan. I think many of the questions that need to be raised here
today obviously, some of them have already been raised by those
who have spoken previously, but the lack of funding for rail
security.
We provide .8 percent of that that is invested in aviation
security. We spend--certainly we have addressed this in the
Committee since 9/11. More than $515 million worth of grants
have been authorized by this Committee, but, regrettably, it
has not passed Congress.
So one is that we obviously have to have a plan on rail
security. Second, I think, Mr. Chairman, we can take measures
now that I think that would be very appropriate to protect the
public, for example to have a greater police presence on trains
and platforms, bomb-sniffing K-9 units. We could have the
requirement of identification for passengers. Only a quarter of
all passengers now show any kind of identification.
I have also introduced legislation that would require a
pilot initiative to examine X-ray explosive device techniques,
also technology for examining passenger baggage as well on
passenger trains. And I understand as a result of a report
yesterday that the Department of Homeland Security will speed
up plans for such a pilot program to test whether or not these
explosive detection technologies can be used to screen rail
passengers and bags, and that the technology will be tested at
a commuter rail station.
So I think we need to know exactly when this pilot program
will be up and running, where it will take place, what kinds of
technology will be used.
In addition, Mr. Chairman, we also, as you mentioned,
referred to the lack of coordination between TSA and the
Department of Homeland Security. Again, I think that that is an
issue that we also need to follow up on. When Congress created
the TSA, it charged the agency--and I am quoting from the
statute--``responsibility for security on all modes of
transportation.'' TSA does have a grant program for port
security, but it does not have a grant program for rail
security.
So I think that obviously we have to address that. Now, I
understand TSA is in the process of developing an intermodal
transportation security plan and also a rail-specific security
plan. I think the question is where is that in this process,
has it been completed, have we done a vulnerability assessment
of both rail and freight systems as well? That should be done,
Mr. Chairman. We should have a plan. In fact, it has been
indicated, the General Accounting Office indicated last spring,
that the Secretary of Homeland Security should work with the
Secretary of Transportation to develop a risk-based plan to
specifically address rail security, which should establish
timeframes for actions to protect hazardous materials rail
shipments.
The question is whether or not that is being undertaken
currently, what is being done, when will it be completed, so
that we can move forthwith on a comprehensive, coordinated, and
effective plan to implement rail security. I think that is
certainly something this country deserves and all those who use
the systems, both on the freight side as well as on the
passenger side.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
[The prepared statement of Senator Snowe follows:]
Prepared Statement of Hon. Olympia J, Snowe, U.S. Senator from Maine
Thank you, Mr. Chairman, for holding a hearing on this Committee's
oversight of passenger and freight security. And I want to thank Under
Secretary Hutchinson and our other witnesses for coming to discuss
issues that have taken on a great deal of urgency since the recent
attacks in Madrid.
Since the terrorist atrocities here in America two-and-a-half years
ago, I have strongly believed that a critical component in our fight
against terrorism is protecting the security of the length and breadth
of our transportation system, including our rail system. As Madrid
tragically reminded us, we must assume that every facet of our
transportation system is and remains a target for violence.
Securing our passenger rail system against terrorism is a
tremendous challenge, an entirely different challenge than securing our
aviation system. Some 10 million train and subway trips are taken every
day in America, of which Amtrak carries 66,000 of those passengers -
two-thirds of them through the Northeast Corridor. The Washington Metro
system alone moves 600,000 people daily. The key question we must
answer at today's hearing is what--if anything--can we do to prevent
Madrid-style attacks from occurring on a system so extensive, so open
and carrying so many people, and what has been accomplished in this
country since 9/11.
What we do know is that--compared to other transportation modes--
federal investment in rail security programs since 9/11 has been
virtually nonexistent. While about $4 billion is being spent this year
to shore up aviation security, a grand total of $50 million was
appropriated in domestic-preparedness grants for local transit and rail
agencies during FY 2004. Several times since 2001, this Committee, with
my support, has approved legislation authorizing DHS to make $515
million in grants to upgrade security across the entire railroad
system. Given the carnage we saw in Madrid earlier this month, it is
clear that the amount of money we are spending on rail security -just
0.8 percent of that invested in aviation security in FY 2004--is not
enough to protect against this kind of an attack.
While it's generally agreed that the cost and inconvenience of
airport style screening of every train passenger would outweigh the
benefits, there are several quick, relatively cheap measures that
Amtrak, transit and commuter rail agencies can take to protect against
such an attack that we must implement as soon as possible. These
include increased police presence on trains and platforms; sweeps with
bomb-sniffing K-9 units; removal of large fixtures that can hide a
bomb, like trash cans and vending machines; and requiring picture ID
with ticket purchase before boarding trains. I will be asking our
witnesses what DHS and other agencies are doing to help rail
authorities implement these security measures.
At the same time we are underinvesting in rail security, we know
that al-Qaeda and its allies are interested in striking the U.S. rail
network. In late January, the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI)
issued a bulletin to local law enforcement warning that terrorists
remained interested in striking U.S. rail lines, which could result in
a ``substantial loss of life.'' As if that weren't enough, this threat
was underscored by Iyman Faris, the Ohio truck driver who pleaded
guilty last May to providing material support to al-Qaeda, told
investigators that the organization wanted to derail a train near
Washington. So even if the recent Madrid bombings had not occurred,
this issue would still be a vital one for Congress and the country, and
I look forward to hearing how quickly the Homeland Security
Department's threat and vulnerability assessments with regard to our
rail system are moving.
I have long been interested in what we can do to secure our rail
system. In November 2001 and again in September 2003, I introduced two
bills in an effort to help us ascend the steep learning curve on
transportation security we as a country faced in the wake of the
September 11 terrorist attacks; one that would require the General
Accounting Office (GAO) to study security innovations and measures on
foreign rail systems, with an eye toward applying them in the United
States; and the second that would create a new pilot initiative to
screen passengers and carry-on baggage on the Amtrak passenger rail
system.
These provisions have since been incorporated into several broader
rail bills--the latest being Senator Hollings' Rail Transportation
Security Act introduced just after the Madrid attacks--but have yet to
be enacted. I am pleased that, with regard to the foreign rail security
study, GAO met with my staff recently and is in the initial stages of a
study, which I requested along with Representatives Castle and Quinn.
As GAO begins its work, I suspect that our friends in Europe, Asia, and
other regions, may be able to provide valuable insight on how we can
improve our rail transportation security, and I look forward to hearing
any initial observations GAO might have today.
The bottom line is that confronting the multitude of transportation
security challenges in this country requires a ``must-do'' attitude. We
can't let ourselves off the hook with excuses about what ``can't be
done.'' We can't afford to take any chances, and we can't afford to
assume that time is on our side.
I look forward to hearing how our witnesses intend to carry out his
critical piece of the homeland security puzzle--securing our Nation's
passenger and freight rail systems. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
The Chairman. Thank you.
Senator Dorgan.
STATEMENT OF HON. BYRON L. DORGAN,
U.S. SENATOR FROM NORTH DAKOTA
Senator Dorgan. Mr. Chairman, I know you want to get to the
witnesses, and I was thinking the two Senators from Delaware
are probably the only Members of Congress who are million
milers on the rail.
I will make two points. One, we have dramatically improved
aviation security. But we are lacking with respect to trains
and subways. 14 million people a day ride trains and subways. I
think this hearing is a very important inquiry into what we are
doing and how we can improve. The surface transportation
systems with respect to security have fallen behind aviation
security. That is what this hearing is about.
I would like to mention one more point. In addition to
security dealing with terrorism, we have other issues. As you
know, in Minot, North Dakota, 2 years ago there was a train
derailment and anhydrous ammonia cars went off the track. That
City of nearly 50,000 people was enveloped in deadly anhydrous
ammonia gas at 2 o'clock in the morning. One died, many were
injured, many went to the hospital. It could have been a real
catastrophe. It fortunately was short of that.
I wanted to mention that the NTSB report took a little over
2 years. It should not have taken that long, but it was
released within the last 2 weeks. I will read one paragraph and
then I will be done. It says: ``The tank cars were pre-1989
non-normalized steel tank cars. They have a lower fracture
toughness than normalized steel cars made after 1989. 60
percent of the pressure tank cars currently in service were
built before then and were likely constructed from non-
normalized steel.''
So here is what they say: ``The NTSB is concerned about the
continued transportation of Class 2 hazardous materials in the
pre-1989 tank cars.'' They believe that using these cars to
transport Class 2 hazardous materials under current conditions
poses an unqualified but real risk to the public.
I raise only to say that this is a security issue for the
American people and we need to consider the context of this.
Again, Mr. Chairman, thank you for holding this hearing. I
think it is very timely.
The Chairman. Thank you very much.
I would like to welcome our two colleagues from Delaware,
Senators Biden and Carper. I would like to tell them that it
will be the intention of the Committee to mark up another bill
before we go into recess and have it ready for floor
consideration. This time, given the gravity of the situation,
we would have to, if it is not brought up as a stand-alone
bill, we would have to consider it as an amendment. I look
forward to working with the two Senators from Delaware on this
very important legislation.
We usually take the oldest and the ugliest first, Senator
Biden, so we will take you.
[Laughter.]
STATEMENT OF HON. JOSEPH BIDEN,
U.S. SENATOR FROM DELAWARE
Senator Biden. I appreciate that. Thank you very much, Mr.
Chairman, and I promise that I will not say anything nice about
you today to have Rush Limbaugh get all excited again.
[Laughter.]
Mr. Chairman, let me begin--I am going to break my pledge
already. Let me begin by thanking you, no malarkey. You made a
commitment when I was on the floor hollering immediately after
we appropriated $15 billion to bail out the airlines without a
lot of discussion in 4 days. I was on the floor and I was
excited, which is not a surprise. It is something you and I
occasionally have in common.
You made a commitment. You are the only one that made it
and you are the only one in the entire outfit to keep it. You
said: Joe, do not add this to airlines, do not come up with
your rail security bill; I promise you I will hold a hearing
and report out an authorization immediately when we get back.
And you did it.
I agree with Senator Boxer. I think the 1.35 you voted out,
we should vote out right away, flat up. But I understand that
there is another bill that Senator Carper and I, led by
Hollings, have introduced, and maybe there is another way you
want to go. I will leave it to your judgment because I trust
you.
I want to remind everybody what happened the last time. You
did your job. You went to the floor and fought for it. We could
not get it cleared for discussion or debate on anything for
over a year and a half. We could not clear it to get it on the
floor.
I hope that what has happened now is that we are beyond
that. I hope we are beyond that.
Let me ask unanimous consent that my statement be put in
the record and summarized.
The Chairman. Without objection.
[The prepared statement of Senator Biden follows:]
Prepared Statement of Hon. Joseph Biden, U.S. Senator from Delaware
Thank you, Mr. Chairman, for the opportunity to speak here this
morning before your committee.
The security of our Nation's rail system, and especially our
passenger rail system, is on everyone's mind in the wake of the
horrific events in Madrid.
As you listen to testimony here today, I urge you and the members
of this committee--we cannot wait. We cannot let the perfect be the
enemy of the good.
There is much we can learn about how to secure the very open rail
system in this country.
But we do know a lot about the basics of physical security, the
things we can do right away to make that system safer.
More dogs to sniff for explosives. More police officers, better
lighting, closed-circuit television surveillance, fencing--nothing
fancy or experimental, just resources to do what we already know can
work.
That is one thing we can do throughout the system to make our
citizens safer.
But the other top priority, Mr. Chairman, has to be securing the
most vulnerable and most valuable targets.
We know that the targets with the highest payoff for terrorists are
the ones that have the greatest potential for both catastrophic levels
of casualties and stunning symbolic effect.
And the six tunnels under New York City, heading into Penn Station,
are just that kind of target. The newest was built in 1910, long before
the kinds of threats we are discussing today could even be imagined.
And such a target is the tunnel that runs right here under Capitol
Hill--under the Senate Offices, the Supreme Court of the United States,
and the House Office Buildings.
It wouldn't take a high-tech explosive, it wouldn't take a dirty
bomb, to do the kind of massive damage that terrorists want.
It would just take a small explosion on a freight train carrying
some everyday hazardous cargo such as chlorine, and another date would
join December 7 and September 11 in infamy.
So let's do what we know needs to be done to make those tunnels
secure. We knew this years ago. To wait another day would be wrong.
We have talked about this issue long enough.
You and I started down this path over two years ago, in a late
night session on the Senate floor debating fifteen billion dollars of
assistance to the airline industry in the immediate aftermath of 9/11.
Twelve billion for financial assistance, three billion for security
needs.
I came to the floor with Senator Carper and others, and we had an
amendment to that legislation, an amendment that would have given
Amtrak the money to begin the process of securing the system--from the
tunnels on the Northeast Corridor to stations and yards around the
Nation.
You asked me to withhold that night, Mr. Chairman, not to delay
passage of that important legislation. And I did.
You gave me your word that you would report a bill out of this
committee as soon as possible. And you did.
But that was over two years ago. I don't think either one of us
thought we would be here, at this point, still talking about rail
security, with virtually nothing done about it.
For all of the last Congress that bill, which simply authorized
$1.3 billion for Amtrak security upgrades, was blocked here in the
senate. Someone on your side of the aisle had a hold on that bill, Mr.
Chairman, a secret hold, that blocked passage of a bill that simply
authorized funds for Amtrak security.
We know that passenger rail has been identified as a potential
target. The FBI told us that last year.
We have seen the devastation that can be wrought when passenger
rail is hit.
On any given day, Mr. Chairman the number of people moving in and
out of Penn Station in New York is the equivalent of over a thousand
Boeing 767's--if they were in airplanes instead of trains, they would
be protected by a new security system.
But the Congress has failed, utterly failed, in its responsibility
to make passenger rail more secure.
And the Administration, and the Department of Homeland Security,
have stood quietly by, asking for no resources to protect passenger
rail, taking no action.
I thank you for the opportunity to speak here today, Mr. Chairman,
and I thank you for this hearing. But I must say that I hope this is
the last time we sit down to talk about rail security before we take
action.
We ought to have a passenger rail security bill rushed out the
doors of Congress and onto the President's desk, just the way we did
for the airlines.
That it took another tragedy to move us to action is a sad
commentary, Mr. Chairman.
I am writing today to Majority Leader Frist, and asking him to make
rail security legislation the top priority for the Senate floor when it
comes out of this committee.
We may not know everything there is to do, Mr. Chairman, but we
know how to get started.
I know we can count on you to get legislation moving so we can make
our rail system more secure.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Senator Biden. Mr. Chairman, you and I both know, because
we have spent a lot of time on this issue, there is no easy
answer to this one. It is not like sealing the cockpit doors or
putting security folks, at a check-in points. Let us set goals
and think about how al-Qaeda and the international terrorist
organizations function.
The reason they picked the Trade Towers and not a 20-story
building in downtown Wilmington, Delaware, is because
symbolically and practically, with non-lethal technology, they
could render us apparently helpless at the moment and kill
thousands upon thousands of people. That is the modus operandi,
that is the M.O. of these guys.
There is something we can do immediately, that would have
the benefit of putting people to work. We can redo the tunnels.
Now, my friend from North Dakota pointed out what happened when
ammonium chloride, derailed in the wide-open prairie near a
town of 50,000 people. The same exact thing happened in the
Baltimore tunnel, built in 1869. Remember, my friend from
Virginia, 18 months ago there was a fire in that tunnel and it
shut down all of Baltimore. The entire Inner Harbor shut down.
That tunnel is solid granite, no escape, no ventilation, no
lighting, no switching, no security. As we speak today, in
Frank Lautenberg's area 357,000 people are going to be
underground in New York City in six tunnels, the most recent of
which was built in 1910.
There are tragedies and there are tragedies. Can we stop a
Madrid occurrence somewhere between here and California over
the road? Probably not with certainty. But can we stop an
explosion of incredible consequence underneath the Supreme
Court of the United States as we speak today?
Where do you think these guys are going? If you have a
tunnel that was built in 1904 it needs to be inspected. Tom and
I went out to the Philadelphia Airport. It turned out that the
guy running the security outfit there was a convicted felon. He
also hired 37 felons who were checking people going through
security. We went up and witnessed this.
Literally, ask them to take you through the tunnel on a
walk-through. What do you think would be the consequence of an
explosion in that tunnel? It would blow up the Supreme Court of
the United States of America or a House office building. Why do
we think they would only send a plane into the Capitol?
The point is this. New technologies matter and there are a
lot of things we can and should be looking at. But certain
things are just rock simple. We should fix the tunnels now,
number one. You voted that out once already.
Number two, in terms of commerce, I am less concerned about
affecting commerce overall on the margins than I am about
security. We shut down Reagan Airport. We do not let private
planes fly into Reagan Airport any more.
Senator Allen. I do not agree with that.
Senator Biden. Well, you may not agree with that. I agree
with that. It is above my pay grade to know whether that is
necessary. But I want to tell you something. It will make
sense.
What happened when the Valdez went down? We said we need
double hulls on tankers. Why do we not require that on new
construction tankers, why do we not require greater safety?
There are basic things that we have to do. I will end with
this. Mr. Chairman, there are basic, simple things like Senator
Snowe talked about: station dogs on the highest commuter rail
systems, just walking up and down and sniffing. It is a
deterrent and it may work.
But the idea that we are going to stop everything, I hope I
do not hear on the floor. I hope I do not hear anyone on the
floor arguing with me when I am, or others are saying that we
need to do something. You cannot guarantee rail security. But
you can guarantee that a catastrophe of the proportions along
the lines of 9/11 does not happen if we are smart.
I know you know this and I know you believe it. The agency
has told us for 2 years that rail is a target. Please, do what
you did before, let all of us go to the floor and say: Act now.
The Chairman. Thank you very much, Senator Biden. I want to
assure you again we will mark up a bill and have it ready, with
your and Senator Carper's input, and do everything we can to
give it the priority.
Senator Biden. I trust your judgment, Mr. Chairman. There
is no right answer.
The Chairman. I am somewhat confident that the
Administration recognizes the need for this as well. We may
have some differences. I hope we can work them out.
Senator Biden, I know you have other responsibilities and
you cannot stay. We appreciate always your enlightening and
entertaining testimony.
Senator Biden. Well, I know you love saying that, John. I
find you entertaining on the floor too when you explode. But I
want to stay for my younger, better looking colleague and hear
what he has to say. I may learn something, and then I will
leave. But thank you.
The Chairman. Thank you, sir.
Senator Carper, welcome. Thank you for your, and along with
Senator Biden, deep involvement in this issue.
STATEMENT OF HON. THOMAS R. CARPER,
U.S. SENATOR FROM DELAWARE
Senator Carper. Thanks, Mr. Chairman. We appreciate your
championing this cause and holding this hearing. And to each of
our colleagues who are here and particularly those of you who
have spoken, we are grateful.
Senator Biden alluded to a tunnel in Baltimore that was
shut down last year because of a fire. He and I came through
that tunnel today on a train to Washington, as we do many
mornings, and we will go back home through that tunnel tonight.
Today the number of people who will be using trains to travel
from Washington to New York exceeds significantly the number of
people who will be traveling by airplane between Washington and
New York.
Yesterday I did something I do not often do. I took the
train and went the other way from Delaware and I went to New
York. I could not believe the tumult of people coming in and
out of Penn Station as I prepared to catch the 5 o'clock train
to head for home. I am told that there are more people that are
in and out of Penn Station to take the subways and the trains
at any given time than in all three airports combined in New
York City.
I share those numbers and those thoughts with you today.
This is a real concern. It is a concern to us because we ride
the train a lot and we have a lot of our constituents who do.
But in Delaware, in the Northeast Corridor, and in other places
where train passenger service is growing, particularly
California, the West Coast, it is a concern as well.
In the weeks and the months after September 11, we took
unprecedented steps to secure our Nation's airlines, and I
think for good reason and to good effect. We all know about the
added security, the baggage checks, the passenger screening,
because we all see it every time we go to the airport. Let me
say, I hope we do not end up, as we move to strengthen security
around train stations and passenger rail, see people remove
their shoes in order to get onto a train. But we can do better
than we have done and we need to.
We have not been as diligent when it comes to protecting
our railways, which is even more alarming given the number of
people who travel by rail. This year some 24 million people
will ride Amtrak, 24 million. All told, there are about 3.4
billion passenger trips in this country this year. Yet we have
done very little to protect rail from terrorist attacks. We
have created an Achilles heel, I believe, in the Nation's
efforts to secure our transportation system.
Amtrak, freight railroads, and local transit agencies are
doing what they can, but the Federal Government--that is us--
the Federal Government has not done its fair share, and it is
time for us to stand up and for us to assume that
responsibility.
We come before you today, I come before you today, as a
member of the Government Affairs Committee, which oversees the
Department of Homeland Security. During the creation of that
agency a year or so ago, I along with several of my colleagues,
including you, Senator McCain, Senator Hollings, and Senator
Biden, tried to provide funds for Amtrak to secure its trains,
its facilities, and its infrastructure. But the language that
we included in the authorization bill in creating the
Department of Homeland Security was stripped in the middle of
the night and subsequent efforts to provide for specific
funding for rail security have been blocked.
At various hearings with the Homeland Security officials,
including Secretary Ridge and Deputy Secretary Loy, I have
consistently urged that the administration address our rail
security needs. Time after time I have been told that the
Department understands these needs and is looking at ways to
secure our rail system.
Secretary Ridge, for example, said during his confirmation
hearing last year, and I am going to quote: ``Amtrak and
freight rail are at considerable risk of terrorist attack,''
close quote. He has also stated that the Transportation
Security Administration was working on a number of its own
initiatives to help identify and mitigate security threats.
Likewise, Deputy Secretary Loy in November of last year
acknowledged the danger posed to our rail system and said rail
would need to be a part of transportation security plans that
his Department apparently is preparing.
Despite these assurances, however, I have yet to see much
progress. Maybe one of the good things coming out of this
hearing today was an announcement yesterday from the Department
of Homeland Security that they are at least piloting an effort.
So something good has come out of the tragedy in Madrid and I
think out of the holding of this hearing today.
But in a lot of ways our Nation's rail infrastructure is
probably as vulnerable today as it was on 9/11. To my
knowledge, the administration has not undertaken a coordinated,
systematic assessment of the risks to our passenger and freight
railroads. No funds other than those granted to Amtrak to
reimburse security costs immediately after 9/11 have been made
available for security upgrades.
In fact, when my staff recently asked Homeland Security
officials about rail funding, the Administration said it was
not sure Amtrak was even eligible for money through any
existing grant program.
Now, the Administration responded to the Madrid attacks by
saying that it had provided about $115 million to address rail
security. Going back to what I think Senator Lautenberg said,
to my knowledge only about $35 million of that money has
actually been made available, and then only to local transit
agencies and not to Amtrak and not to freight railroads.
As a member of the Banking Committee, I know we need to do
more to protect our subways and our metro lines, too. No one is
saying that we do less. But we should not be ignoring Amtrak,
its passengers, or the need to secure the hazardous materials
that travel over our freight lines, as Senator Dorgan alluded
to before.
Of course, President Bush's budget for this year, like
those he has proposed in previous years, is silent on rail
security. The budget we just passed in the Senate includes no
specific rail security money. The Department of Homeland
Security announced a handful of new security initiatives
yesterday. We welcome those, but it is unclear how they will be
funded and how aggressively they will be pursued.
I believe the recent tragedy in Madrid has opened the eyes
of many of our colleagues to the security risks that face our
railways today. I would urge them and you and others and the
Department of Homeland Security to step up our efforts to
improve the security of our rails.
My friend Joe Biden and I have joined Senators Lautenberg,
Hollings, and Senator Snowe, in introducing the Rail
Transportation Security Act, which will help us begin to
address some of the rail security needs. I think we have seen
this show before, but the need, the urgency, is greater than
ever. This legislation would order the Administration to
undertake a risk assessment of rail security threats and devise
threats that railways can take to protect passengers,
facilities, and infrastructures around the country.
This is what we are asking for, assess the risk, set some
priorities with respect to addressing those risks. Look at the
rest of the world, what are other countries doing to address
these kinds of concerns of their own?
Well, there are many challenges in front of us. We all know
that. Certainly, from a feasibility perspective we cannot
expect to secure all the rail lines or screen all the rail
passengers. But we should be taking a serious look at ways that
we can help railroads, States, cities, and transit agencies to
do what they can do to improve efforts, such as hire more
police or those bomb-sniffing dogs. They work.
Many rail operators, especially Amtrak, barely have enough
resources to operate from day to day. We cannot expect them to
shoulder 100 percent of their security costs, just as we do not
expect the airlines to shoulder 100 percent of theirs.
In closing, I hope the Committee today will ask tough
questions of our witnesses and ascertain the true nature and
status of the Administration's rail security efforts. We
received a lot of assurances from the Administration. I am
sorry to say we have seen very little action. But I hope
today's hearings can help build momentum to strength the
security of our Nation's rail system.
[The prepared statement of Senator Carper follows:]
Prepared Statement of Hon. Thomas R. Carper, U.S. Senator from Delaware
I'd like to thank the Commerce Committee for inviting me here today
to discuss something that is a serious concern to millions of
Americans, especially in light of the tragedy that occurred in Madrid,
Spain a few weeks ago. As a daily Amtrak passenger and a former member
of the Amtrak Board of Directors, I have known for some time about the
unique security needs of our Nation's rail transportation system.
Today, nearly 25 million passengers ride Amtrak each year and there
are nearly 3.4 billion rail transit trips annually. With that in mind,
I have worked since September 11, 2001 with a number of my colleagues,
including you, Mr. Chairman, and Senator Hollings, to improve the
security of our Nation's passenger, freight and commuter railroads.
We are mindful every time we visit an airport or board an airplane
of the work we have done in the years since September 11th to make air
travel safer in this country. We have also made strides in other areas,
such as port security. I firmly believe that we have an obligation to
ensure that Americans who ride trains are as safe as those that travel
by air or any other mode of transportation. Likewise, citizens across
America deserve to know that the thousands of rail shipments carrying
hazardous materials that pass through their communities on a daily
basis are as secure as is reasonably possible. Amtrak, freight
railroads, and local transit agencies are doing all that they can to
strengthen the security of their systems, but the Federal Government
must do more to help them, as we have done with other transportation
sectors.
I come before the Committee today as a member of the Governmental
Affairs Committee, which has general oversight over the Department
Homeland Security. During the creation of the Department and through
numerous oversight hearings, I've attempted to bring the issue of rail
security to the attention of my colleagues. In hearings with Homeland
Security officials such as Secretary Ridge and Deputy Secretary Loy,
I've urged that they consider the needs of rail security and have
sought to understand what rail security efforts are ongoing at the
Department.
On the legislative front, I cosponsored Senator Hollings' original
rail security measure in the 107th Congress and worked to support his
efforts with Chairman McCain to pass the Rail Security Act of 2001.
Following this, I successfully offered a rail security amendment to the
bill creating the Department of Homeland Security that was reported out
of Governmental Affairs. That language was ultimately dropped from the
bill before final passage, despite my opposition to its removal. Since
then, I've introduced ARRIVE-21 with Senators Hollings and Collins, a
comprehensive rail infrastructure financing package and Amtrak
reauthorization, which includes funding for rail security. I've also
cosponsored a separate effort, S. 2216, the Rail Transportation
Security Act, introduced last week.
Time after time, I've been told that the Department understands the
real security needs of our rail transportation system. During his
confirmation process in January 2003, Secretary Ridge stated;
``I believe that Congress will need to address Amtrak and
freight rail security. Amtrak and freight rail are at
considerable risk to terrorist attack. Moreover, state and
local police and fire officials have confirmed their limited
ability to respond to a major attack. . . . I look forward to
working with Congress to support legitimate security
enhancements such as better fencing, enhanced lighting, video
surveillance for stations, bridges and tunnels, and
implementing measures to screen passengers and baggage for
dangerous weapons and explosives.''
Additionally, the Secretary acknowledged the role that the
Department has in ensuring the security of Amtrak, saying;
``I think there is a need for us to take a look at the
legitimate security enhancements with Amtrak, and obviously,
through whatever appropriation measure that the Congress may be
supportive of in the future . . . and if you don't fund it,
then we will have to work with you to find some other ways to
help them on a priority basis deal with most problematic
vulnerabilities. I can't tell you what they are, but we need to
do a vulnerability assessment and then set priorities and then
go about addressing them.''
Secretary Ridge has also stated that the Transportation Security
Administration was working on a number of its own initiatives. He said
they were considering installing Radiological Dispersal Devices (RDD)
at key freight rail locations and were addressing the movement of bulk
hazardous materials through a ``chlorine initiative'' pilot project. He
also said they had been developing a Rail Inspection Guide for use by
rail employees in identifying security risks. I urge my colleagues to
inquire today as to the status of these efforts.
At his confirmation hearing this past November, Admiral Loy also
acknowledged our Nation's rail security needs and said rail would need
to be a part of the transportation security plan that Homeland Security
is apparently developing. At that same hearing, however, he hinted that
it probably is not possible to make rail as secure as the aviation
sector, saying we should focus more on how to recover from an attack
than on how to prevent one.
While this statement is alarming, Admiral Loy makes a valid point.
It is not possible, nor necessarily desirable, to implement exactly the
same kinds of security measures at train stations as we have at
airports. However, there is much we can do and I have not seen a
concerted effort at Homeland Security to strengthen rail security using
all available and reasonable means. In a lot of ways, our Nation's rail
infrastructure is probably as vulnerable today as it was on September
10, 2001.
To date, the Department of Homeland Security has been unable to
tell me the amount of resources and the number of staff that are
specifically dedicated to rail security. To my knowledge, they have not
undertaken a coordinated, systematic assessment of the vulnerabilities
of our national passenger and freight railroads, beyond ad hoc local
efforts. In addition, no funds other than those granted to Amtrak to
reimburse security costs directly associated with 9111 have been made
available for increased intercity passenger rail security. In fact,
when my staff recently asked Homeland Security officials, they said
that they were not sure if Amtrak was even eligible for funds from the
Department through any existing grant program.
On a related point, the $100 million for life safety improvements
given to Amtrak through the U.S. DOT for the New York rail tunnels in
2002 is primarily for safety improvements, not security, as the
Administration has claimed. Indeed, we still have $775 million in unmet
safety improvements for Amtrak's Northeast Corridor tunnels. Much has
also been made of the $115 million Homeland Security has made available
for transit security grants. It is my understanding, however, that only
$35 million of this $115 million has actually made it out to local
transit agencies. In addition, this money does nothing to address
Amtrak and freight rail security.
President Bush's FY 05 budget, like its predecessors, requests no
specific funding for rail security efforts. The budget we passed just
before recess also includes no specific rail security money. The
Department of Homeland Security announced a handful of new rail
security initiatives just yesterday but it is unclear right now how
they will be funded and how aggressively they will be pursued.
I believe the recent tragedy in Madrid has opened the eyes of many
of my colleagues to the security risks that our railways face. I urge
them and the Department of Homeland Security to step up efforts to
improve the security of our railroads. The first step should be to
begin conducting comprehensive risk assessments of our major rail
assets, as Secretary Ridge has already endorsed. We should also have
TSA study the possibility of selected screening of rail passengers.
Secretary Ridge stated before the Governmental Affairs Committee that
TSA is already engaged in such a study, saying;
``TSA is working with Amtrak to identify requirements for a
test project using screening technologies as designated
locations. The team's effort is focused on identifying cost
effective technologies that can be implemented with minimum
impact on the passenger flow and efficiency of rail operations.
. . . DHS and TSA will continue to work closely with the rail
carriers to implement appropriate countermeasures and
technologies that will ensure the security of the tunnels and
bridges on Amtrak's northeast corridor and in Washington, D.C.
area specifically.''
However, I'm unaware of the status of this effort and understand
that a pilot screening project at a station near Washington, D.C. has
been indefinitely postponed.
We need to begin a serious effort to help railroads, states,
cities, and transit agencies pay for key rail security efforts, such as
more police and bomb sniffing dogs. Many rail operators, especially
Amtrak, barely have enough resources to operate from day to day. We
can't expect them to shoulder 100 percent of their security costs, just
as we don't expect the aviation industry to cover all of its security
costs.
S.2216, the Rail Transportation Security Act, incorporates many of
these suggestions and provides dedicated resources for rail security to
the DHS. I urge its quick review and adoption by the Senate.
I hope the Committee today will ask tough questions of our
witnesses and attempt to ascertain the full scope and status of the
Department of Homeland Security's rail security efforts. We have
received a lot of assurances, but I believe we've seen very little
action. I hope today's hearing can help us build momentum for efforts
to strengthen the security of our rail system.
The Chairman. Thank you very much. I thank both of you for
being here. Thanks again.
Senator Biden. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
The Chairman. I look forward to working with you.
Our first panel is: the Honorable Asa Hutchison, the Under
Secretary for Border and Transportation Security, U.S.
Department of Homeland Security; the Honorable Allan Rutter,
who is the Administrator of the Federal Railroad
Administration; the Honorable Robert Jamison, Deputy
Administrator, Federal Transit Administration; and Mr. Peter
Guerrero, who is the Director of Physical Infrastructure Issues
at the U.S. General Accounting Office, who is accompanied by
Mr. Norman Rabkin, who is the Managing Director for Homeland
Security at the U.S. General Accounting Office.
Welcome back, Secretary Hutchinson. I want to thank you for
all your efforts on this issue. I want to thank you for
appearing here today. I want to thank you for your visit to my
State of Arizona. I want to thank you for your renewed
commitment to the security of our borders. I want to thank you
for your active commitment to that and your understanding of
the enormous challenges that we face all along our border, and
I appreciate the actions that the Department of Homeland
Security and the President of the United States have been
taking on this very humanitarian and terrible issue.
Thank you and welcome, Secretary Hutchinson. It is nice to
see an old friend.
STATEMENT OF HON. ASA HUTCHINSON, UNDER SECRETARY
FOR BORDER AND TRANSPORTATION SECURITY,
U.S. DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY
Mr. Hutchinson. Thank you. May I proceed?
Mr. Chairman----
The Chairman. Pull that a little closer, Mr. Secretary.
Mr. Hutchinson. Mr. Chairman, Members of the Committee: It
is a pleasure to be here today, and thank you, Mr. Chairman,
for your comments. I did enjoy my recent trip to Arizona and
hope we have some great success there. I am grateful for your
leadership and the Committee's leadership on efforts to enhance
passenger rail and mass transit security. Obviously, the recent
attacks against passenger rail in Madrid on March 11, but also
in Moscow on February 6, gives us constant reminders that the
global threat of terrorism remains and there is much to be
done.
I would emphasize that, as was pointed out earlier, there
has been historical threats to rail and transit. We do not see
any recent indicators that indicate that the threat level
should be raised or there is enhanced possibility of an attack.
But in the months preceding these attacks overseas the
Department and others have continued to cooperate, taking
significant steps to address the vulnerabilities that we see in
the rail and transit systems.
After the attack in Madrid, we immediately sent out two
information bulletins that provided intelligence to our transit
operators, our rail operators, suggested specific protective
measures. We hosted a series of telephone conferences that
included over 250 State and local participants and transit
authority participants, getting both information as to what
they were doing and the level of preparedness and also offering
assistance and the intelligence that we had at the time.
I also wanted to commend the mass transit and rail industry
and the State and local governments for the immediate action
that was taken to enhance security immediately following the
attacks. It was a natural step to take in order to increase the
uniform patrols, the explosive detection teams, increase
surveillance, and the public awareness campaigns in the
passenger rail and mass transit environment. In addition, I
would emphasize the cargo rail companies continue to operate at
alert level 2, which increases their security on a day by day
basis.
From the Department's perspective, we recognize that there
is a Federal role to play in transit authority and this
authority has been given by the Congress of the United States.
Through the TSA and our Information Analysis and Infrastructure
Protection Directorate, as well as in cooperation with the
Department of Transportation, criticality assessments have been
conducted in the high intensity urban transit arena. This has
allowed us to identify and allocate $115 million in targeted
security grants through our Office of Domestic Preparedness.
Through TSA, we are also coordinating intelligence
information and threat-sharing with the railroads and the
Public Transportation Association. In the area of preparedness
and response, we have developed a number of security exercises
that have addressed potential gaps in anti-terrorism training
among rail personnel. We have had an exercise at the Naval War
College in Newport, Rhode Island, in which State and local law
enforcement transit authorities were invited to participate.
In addition, as was noted, yesterday Secretary Ridge
emphasized additional steps that the Department will be taking.
First, we intend to engage industry and State and local
authorities to establish baseline security measures. This is
based upon the best practices, the common sense approach that
is taken in a higher threat environment. In addition to this
baseline, we will have additional measures that will be taken,
layered measures based upon threat-specific intelligence that
we receive, or going to a higher threat level of orange.
In addition, whenever we want to move to a higher level of
security we can issue security directives and technical
assistance, and this willingness to use this authority
represents a substantial increase in the Federal leadership
role in rail and mass transit security. We expect this baseline
to be considered interagency within 2 weeks. The Department of
Homeland Security will share the enforcement responsibilities,
ensuring compliance, with the Department of Transportation.
The second aspect of the initiative is threat response
support capability through the development of rapid deployment
mass transit K-9 teams that would be available whenever the
need is there, when the threat is there, identified
intelligence for a particular concern and that we can offer
assistance.
In addition, we will be deploying a transit inspection
pilot. This is not to mirror the solution in the aviation
industry, but it is to develop our expertise so that when we
have a particular transit system or particular threat then we
can have the experience to deploy a more comprehensive
screening of luggage and carry-on bags and personnel.
In addition, we will engage more comprehensively in
education and public awareness. The thousands and millions of
transit passengers each day provide us the best protection. We
can increase to awareness and education. Through our Federal
Law Enforcement Training Center, we are enhancing our training
of transit authorities' and the law enforcement personnel to
know what to look for and to assist them in their education
awareness programs.
Finally and very importantly is the research and
development component. We need to have a new generation of
technology that is applicable to the rail and transit
environment, that is more mobile, that can look through the
passenger areas without intense personal screening in order to
detect the presence of explosives. Is this on the horizon? We
will wait and see, but we are investing money in research and
development, increasing this effort. $5 million will be going
out in a broad area announcement very soon in order to partner
with private industry to develop this new generation of
technology.
Those are some of the things that we are working on in
addition to the traditional roles that we have at the
Department. We look forward to working with this Committee and
look forward to the discussion today.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Hutchinson follows:]
Prepared Statement of Hon. Asa Hutchinson, Under Secretary for Border
and Transportation Security, Department of Homeland Security
Good morning Mr. Chairman, Senator Hollings, and Members of the
Committee. It is my pleasure to be here today to speak with you about
the Department's ongoing and planned efforts to enhance Passenger Rail
and Mass Transit security.
The tragic bombings that occurred in Madrid on March 11, and those
that occurred in Moscow on February 6 were terrible reminders that the
war 'on terror is not yet over and that much work remains to be done.
Our prayers and our deepest sympathies are with the families and
friends of the hundreds of innocents who died in these attacks, and
with those for whom the road to recovery will be long and painful. And
our resolution remains firm. We will not tolerate these sorts of
cowardly acts, nor will they deter us from support of the liberties
that make our Nation great.
I would like to begin by stating that we do not have any specific
indications that terrorist groups are planning such attacks in the U.S.
Furthermore, in the months preceding the Madrid and Moscow incidents,
the Department, in close cooperation and coordination with our partners
at the Department of Transportation, and state and local governments
and transit and rail operators, has taken a number of steps to respond
to vulnerabilities in the rail and transit systems and improve our
security posture against similar attacks.
In the immediate aftermath of the Madrid attacks, the Department
released two Information Bulletins on the Madrid Bombing to the
transportation sector, state and local homeland security officials,
public safety community, and law enforcement. The Bulletins provided
specific indicators of such operations and suggested protective
measures. It is important to note that over the last year, the
Department has issued a number of such bulletins to rail and transit
operators. We have long been aware of the possibility of such attacks
and have sought to provide as much information as possible to those at
the state and local level who are responsible for keeping the trains
running on time, so to speak.
After Madrid, the Department also hosted a National Conference Call
with over 170 participants from federal, state and local public safety
communities, all State and Territorial Homeland Security Advisors, and
officials from 50 major urban areas. In addition, we hosted a
conference call with approximately 75 participants from Association of
American Railroads (AAR), American Public Transportation Association
(APTA), and the Surface Transportation Information Sharing and Analysis
Center (ST-ISAC), and representatives from the Nation's largest transit
systems. We used these calls to communicate current information on the
attacks, obtain an assessment of the level of preparedness of transit
and rail systems in the U.S., and determine what short-term measures
ought to be taken to reduce vulnerabilities across our Nation's transit
and rail systems.
It is also very important that we analyze carefully what happened
in Spain two weeks ago and apply lessons learned in order to deter and
prevent similar attacks in the United States. To that end, DHS is
working closely with Spanish authorities to examine available
information, and generate ``lessons learned'' on how these terrible
attacks transpired for application here in the U.S. In addition, the
Department continues to share intelligence and other information with
state and local authorities, as well as with the private sector, to
ensure vigilance in light of these incidents.
DDS Initiatives
Prior to the attacks in Moscow and Madrid, agencies within the
Department were already working with their Federal and state
counterparts to bolster the security of rail and mass transit systems
for the approximately 11.3 million passenger trips each weekday. DHS
efforts have focused on information sharing, awareness, prevention,
response and recovery to a potential terrorist rail attack in the
United States.
Over the last two years, DHS and DOT have worked with transit and
rail operators to improve security significantly. TSA, the
Infrastructure Protection Division of the Information Analysis and
Infrastructure Protection (IAIP) Directorate, and DOT's FRA and FTA
have conducted criticality assessments of rail and transit networks
operating in high-density urban areas. As a result of these
assessments, these systems produce robust security and emergency
preparedness plans.
Between FY 2003 and this year, DHS has used information from these
assessments to allocate $115 million to high-risk transit systems
through the Urban Area Security Initiative (UASI) in the Office of
Domestic Preparedness. Sixty-five million dollars ($65 million) was
allocated in Fiscal Year 2003 and $50 million was allocated in Fiscal
Year 2004. Grantees may use these funds for such expenses as the
installation of physical barricades, video surveillance systems, motion
detectors, thermal/IR imagery and chemical/radiological material
detection systems, integrated communications systems and for prevention
planning, training and exercises, among other things.
The Department is coordinating information and threat sharing
through the Information Sharing and Analysis Center in partnership with
the Association of American Railroads and American Public
Transportation Association. As part of the significant partnership that
the Department has developed with AAR and the ST-ISAC, TSA hosts ST-
ISAC representatives at the Transportation Security Coordination Center
(TSCC) in Virginia.
TSA has partnered with FTA on its ``Transit Watch'' Program, and is
coordinating with FRA to develop a rail system inspection guide for use
by rail law enforcement and security personnel to inspect trains for
explosives and other threats. The BTS Federal Law Enforcement Training
Center has provided security training to rail and transit operators;
and TSA has distributed educational information to transit system
employees on how to recognize and respond to potential terrorist
attacks.
TSA has also hosted numerous security exercises to bring together
rail carriers, Federal and local first responders, and security
experts, to address potential gaps in antiterrorism training among rail
personnel. One such security exercise occurred at Union Station
Washington, DC in July 2003 and involved stakeholders, emergency
responders and enforcement agencies all working to implement the
station's Emergency Response Plan. The lessons learned from this
exercise are being utilized to enhance rail security for the entire
Northeast corridor.
In another security exercise, DHS, through TSA, co-partnered with
the Naval War College Gaming Department to conduct the exercise game,
``Operation Heartland'' at the Naval War College in Newport, Rhode
Island on January 27-28, 2004. Operation Heartland was designed to
exercise and evaluate security awareness, prevention, response and
recovery of the national transportation system to a security incident.
Participation included eleven Federal agencies, state and local
agencies from Iowa and Illinois, Amtrak, and representatives from
private industry including BNSF Railroad, Union Pacific Railroad, and
Ingram Barge Company.
State/local/private sector actions
In addition to the Federal Government's actions and initiatives, I
would be remiss if I didn't commend the mass transit and rail industry,
and State and local governments, for their proactive response in
addressing homeland security issues, both pre and post-9/11, and
following the Moscow and Madrid bombing incidents. Most recently,
transit and rail system operators have enhanced their existing security
plans by taking various preventive measures in cooperation with the
Department. While specific examples should not be given in a public
forum, significant commitments have been made in increased canine and
uniformed patrols, increased surveillance, and reporting and awareness
campaigns in the passenger environment. Relatedly, cargo rail companies
are continuing their Alert Level 2, which includes increased security
at designated facilities, security plan review, and increased spot
identification checks.
Near Term Actions
In the wake of Madrid, the Department immediately identified
additional measures that could be implemented in the near term to
further strengthen our rail and transit systems. A working group
comprised of senior members of my staff, officials from the
Transportation Security Administration (TSA), the Information Analysis
and Infrastructure Protection (IAIP) Directorate; the Department of
Transportation's (DOT) Federal Railroad Administration (FRA) and
Federal Transit Administration (FTA), identified several such measures.
Yesterday, Secretary Ridge and I met with rail and transit officials
and announced the following measures to provide additional Federal
leadership and guidance in the rail and transit security arena:
Leadership
The Department will build on many of the security measures
recommended during the past two years for implementation to mass
transit and passenger rail authorities by DHS, the Federal Transit
Administration (FTA) and the Federal Railroad Administration (FRA). The
Department will engage the industry and state and local authorities to
establish base-line security measures based on current industry 'best
practices'. This includes all existing security measures currently
being implemented consistently in the mass transit system and the
commuter rail environment. These base-line measures could be adjusted
in consultation with transit and rail system owners and operators in
response to higher threat levels or specific threats in the future.
Additional measures could be achieved through the use of security
directives or technical assistance, which would specifically target
mitigation of identified vulnerabilities. DHS, in coordination with
DOT, will ensure compliance with security standards for commuter and
rail lines
Threat Response Support Capability
Mass Transit K-9 Program
The Department will develop a rapid deployment Mass Transit K-9
program by utilizing existing Homeland Security explosive K-9
resources. These mobile DHS response teams will be prepared to assist
local law enforcement teams. Federal Protective Services K-9 teams
would also be cross-trained for utilization in the rail and transit
environment. Building upon TSA's work in the aviation context, DHS will
partner with local authorities to provide additional training and
assistance for local K-9 teams. The mobile program would predominantly
be used in special threat environments and provide additional Federal
resources to augment state and local transit and rail authorities
security measures.
Transit Inspection Pilot
TSA will implement a pilot program to test the feasibility of
screening luggage and carry on bags for explosives at rail stations and
aboard trains. The initial program will be implemented at one station
with commuter rail service in conjunction with Amtrak and the Federal
Railroad Administration. The pilot program would not resemble an
aviation type solution to transit and rail, but rather provide the
Department with a venue to test new technologies and screening
concepts. The lessons learned from .the pilot could allow transit
operators to deploy targeted screening in high threat areas or in
response to specific intelligence.
Education and Awareness
DHS will integrate existing passenger and rail education and
awareness programs that have been developed by industry, TSA and FTA.
Where necessary, the Department will create new programs to increase
passenger, rail employee, and local law enforcement awareness through
public awareness campaigns and security personnel training. A number of
training templates and rider education materials are currently in
development by TSA and FTA allowing the Department to leverage existing
efforts to generate additional public awareness. The Department's
Federal Law Enforcement Training Center will also accelerate current
security training programs for transit law enforcement personnel.
Future Technological Innovations
The Department's Science and Technology division is focusing on
development of a number of homeland security technologies. Many of
these could or are being used in the mass transit environment including
chemical and biological countermeasures.
High Explosives Countermeasures
The Department's Homeland Security Advanced Research Project Agency
is developing a Broad Agency Announcement on bomb interdiction for
truck and suicide threats with approximately $5 million in funding that
will be released in the coming months. This program will focus on
research and development of next generation technology for High
Explosives Countermeasures. In the future, these countermeasures could
address the threat that terrorists might use explosives in attacks on
buildings, critical infrastructure, and the civilian population of the
United States. The goal of the program will be to develop and test
field equipment, technologies and procedures to interdict suicide
bombers and car and truck bombs before they can reach their intended
targets while minimizing the impact on the American way of life. This
effort will be closely coordinated with the activities ongoing in TSA
to ensure that research and development activities are complementary
and allow potential future testing be carried out through TSA's Transit
Inspection Pilot.
Thank you again for the opportunity to appear before you on this
important topic. I look forward to answering any questions you may
have.
The Chairman. Thank you very much.
Welcome back, Mr. Rutter.
STATEMENT OF HON. ALLAN RUTTER, ADMINISTRATOR, FEDERAL RAILROAD
ADMINISTRATION
Mr. Rutter. Thank you, sir. Chairman McCain, Members of the
Committee: I appreciate the opportunity to appear today to
discuss the prospects for rail security in the United States. I
have submitted testimony to the Committee that goes into detail
about what the Federal Railroad Administration has been doing
on security in addition to our work in advancing rail safety. I
request that this statement be included in the record of this
proceeding and I will be happy to entertain questions at the
conclusion of opening statements.
The Chairman. Without objection, your full statement will
be made a part of the record.
Mr. Rutter. The Federal Railroad Administration has
advanced the cause of security by using many of the methods we
use in improving rail safety. We have acted as a partner, a
catalyst, an adviser, a facilitator, a technician, and an
inspector. In the past, rail safety and security were
intertwined. September 11 made it clear, however, that more
attention and resources for security issues was going to be
required in all modes of transportation.
Creation of the Department of Homeland Security catapulted
security to the forefront of the Federal Government's
priorities, and the primary responsibility for rail security
was designated to that Department. Yet, since many of the basic
functions will continue to be intertwined, FRA works closely
with DHS on security issues, while on a daily basis we use the
skills and knowledge of FRA professionals to help make
railroads more secure for passengers, for rail employees, and
for communities served.
Allow me to summarize some of the activities we have
participated in since September 11, as described in my
testimony. We have assisted Mr. Jamison's colleagues at FTA in
conducting security assessments of the ten largest commuter
railroads, contributing our technical expertise and some modest
funding. After the Madrid bombing, FRA conducted on-site
inspections of terminals, stations, passenger equipment, and
facilities on Amtrak and the 18 commuter railroads under our
safety jurisdiction. The purpose of these inspections was to
monitor the implementation of enhanced security measures.
FRA and RSPA have worked extensively with DHS to develop
options to enhance the security of railroad tank cars that
carry hazardous materials. And the FRA has hired the RAND
Corporation to work with Amtrak to develop a comprehensive
strategic security plan to coordinate security across the
entire Amtrak system.
Let me make three additional points to accompany my written
statement. First, while I have read many comments about the
challenges facing rail security since the Madrid bombings and I
certainly expect that many on your second panel will not be shy
about asking for more financial assistance, I do not want the
Committee or the American public to ignore the substantial
accomplishments and activity of this industry since and before
and after 9/11.
Much the excellent progress has been made as a result of
the hard work of rail system owners and operators. While we
remain vigilant in sensing the need for additional statutory,
regulatory, and financial steps to advance security, I remain
impressed by how much has been accomplished.
Second, I think we need to be conscious of the differences
between passenger rail operations and aviation, as the security
regimes for both need to be different. One small example. In
commercial aviation we have extensive systems for detecting
metal objects that can be used as a weapon to hijack a plane.
Since control of a moving train in most cases takes place by
people not accessible to the passengers, metal detection is not
as important as explosives detection. DHS continues to research
portable explosion detection technologies that could be used
aboard trains or for random checks of persons boarding trains,
operating in the challenging environmental conditions that
commuter rail passengers face all around the country. This,
coupled with increased K-9 patrols, may be a more effective
security strategy than screening all passengers and bags at
every train station.
Third, I continue to believe that one of the major
contributions our agency and I can make in security discussions
is to remind people of the importance of the functionality of
our rail transportation system. For example, in order to guard
against the possible effects of terrorist acts against rail
shipments of hazardous materials, it might be tempting to
simply suggest re-routing such shipments around major
metropolitan areas. But we would have to consider the
operational consequences on major cities, for which the
shipments of critical products that contain highly hazardous
materials are destined. Most major cities must have chlorine to
purify water supplies. Anhydrous ammonia is critical for
agricultural production. Many citizens in rural areas depend on
liquefied petroleum gas for home heating.
Considering the consequences of even significant delays in
transit, much less a ban on these substances, we are working
with DHS to consider the operational issues in considering
HAZMAT security strategies.
My point is this: Security is a very important function of
the Federal Government, but it is not its only purpose. The
promotion of domestic tranquility and the promotion of the
common defense is balanced in our Constitution's preamble with
the purpose of securing the blessings of liberty for our
citizens and our posterity. The Nation's rail transportation
system is an important link to how people build, make, and sell
things and how they get to their jobs. We at the FRA will
continue to advocate for a balance between security and
economic liberty so that our citizens can be protected from
those who wish to do us harm as we continue to offer
opportunities for personal and economic freedom.
Thank you. I look forward to responding to your questions.
The Chairman. Thank you very much.
Mr. Jamison.
STATEMENT OF HON. ROBERT JAMISON, DEPUTY ADMINISTRATOR, FEDERAL
TRANSIT ADMINISTRATION
Mr. Jamison. Mr. Chairman and Members of the Committee:
Thanks for this opportunity to provide you with information
about Federal Transit Administration's efforts to deter,
detect, and respond to terrorism on our Nation's rail transit
systems. Some form of rail transit serves 30 cities and 22
states. Many cities have more than one form of rail transit,
including commuter rail, heavy rail, or subway systems and
light rail systems.
As you are aware, transit is designed and operated in an
open environment. It is a potential high visibility, high
consequence target that, if attacked, could have a significant
economic impact on the community and the Nation. Rail transit
carries over 11 million passengers each day. In one week
transit moves more passengers than Amtrak carries in a year. In
one month transit carries more passengers than U.S. airlines
transport in a year. The majority of transit riders are in
dense urban environments that run under or near major
employment centers, government operations, or cultural icons.
Our challenge is to ensure that we maintain robust mobility
and transportation options that support the economic and
mobility needs of our citizens, while making our transit
systems as safe and secure as possible. In fact, as the
experience of September 11 has demonstrated, public transit
systems are essential to our national security. Transit trains
and buses were key to the swift evacuation of affected areas
and were used to transport emergency workers and supplies to
the rescue and recovery sites and they served as emergency
triage centers and temporary shelters.
Prior to September 11, most transit agencies focused their
security programs primarily on routine crime and vandalism. The
situation has changed. The industry has responded. FTA began
conducting counterterrorism threat and vulnerability
assessments at 37 of the Nation's largest transit systems
within 60 days of September 11. We employed an aggressive
nationwide transit security program with the full cooperation
and support of every transit agency.
In addition to the counterterrorism readiness assessment,
FTA has awarded 83 grants for emergency drills conducted by
transit agencies in conjunction with police, fire, and
emergency responders, provided onsite counterterrorism
technical assistance to 29 transit agencies, with plans to
reach all the top 50 transit agencies, conducted 18 regional
emergency preparedness forums, completed 4 regional transit
terrorist war games in conjunction with the American Public
Transportation Association, provided employee awareness
training to more than 46,000 transit employees, developed and
distributed standard protocols and guidelines for responding to
chemical and biological incidents in rail, tunnel, and vehicle
environments, championed transit agency participation in FBI's
Joint Terrorism Task Forces, funded and worked on a daily basis
with the transit-specific intelligence sharing and analysis
center, in which 160 agencies now participate, launched Transit
Watch, a nationwide emergency response passenger awareness
program, provided and actively monitored the largest 50
agencies' actions with respect to FTA's top 20 security action
items list, funded research to identify and adapt security
technologies such as chemical weapon detection to a transit
environment, developed and issued to transit agencies specific
recommended action steps to take at each homeland security
advisory system threat level.
Mr. Chairman, we recognize that intelligence is our
Nation's first line of defense in transit environments and we
rely on the Department of Homeland Security and the FBI for
such information. We also recognize that, while we must
continue to pursue technology solutions, there is no
technological quick fix for security concerns, nor is there a
substitute--and I will repeat--nor is there a substitute for an
alert and well-prepared transit workforce and passenger
community.
Therefore, FTA continues to focus its primary efforts and
three key priorities: employee training, public awareness, and
emergency preparedness. FTA's top 20 action items has helped to
institutionalize these security programs, focusing on
management and accountability, security problem and
identification, employee selection, employee training, security
audits and emergency response drills, document control, and
access control.
The 30 largest transit agencies accounted for at least 80
percent of these action items in Fiscal Year 2003. In Fiscal
Year 2004, FTA is focused on maintaining this success and
expanding it to the next 20 largest transit agencies.
Mr. Chairman, we must keep our communities safe and moving,
maintaining the important balance among security demands,
mobility needs, and economic viability that transit provides to
every community it serves.
I would be pleased to answer the questions the Committee
may have.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Jamison follows:]
Prepared Statement of Hon. Robert Jamison, Deputy Administrator,
Federal Transit Administration
Mr. Chairman and Members of the Committee, thank you for the
opportunity to testify today on behalf of the Federal Transit
Administration (FTA) regarding security on America's rail transit
systems.
America has some form of rail transit (i.e., some combination of
subway, light rail and/or commuter rail systems) in 30 cities and 22
states. These systems provide 11.3 million passenger trips each
weekday. In fact, of the 3.5 million rail trips taken annually, 77
percent are on heavy rail systems, more commonly known as subways. All
rail transit systems are locally operated and controlled, and it is
important to note that FTA does not provide operating funds for these
systems.
As you know, public transportation is inherently an open,
accessible system intended to help people move rapidly and efficiently
between home and work, shopping, medical care, and other community
activities on a daily basis. Let me put the challenges of securing
these environments in perspective:
Prior to their destruction on September 11, the World Trade
Center and Fulton Street subway stations alone handled over
380,000 people each day--the equivalent of the entire
population of Miami, Sacramento, or Pittsburgh..
Over 1,600 people per minute hurry through dozens of access
points into New York's Penn Station during a typical rush hour.
Every weekday, the people of Chicago take over 1.5 million
trips on the elevated railway's 222 miles of track, compared to
the approximately 100,000 passengers who board planes at the
Chicago O'Hare Airport.
In Washington DC, Metrorail operates a fleet of over 840
railcars on 103 miles of track in two states and the District
of Columbia. In 2002, 181 million trips were taken on
Metrorail, 25 times more than the 7 million trips originating
at Washington's Reagan National Airport.
As both the Department of Homeland Security and the Department of
Transportation recognize, our Nation's approach to security must be
necessarily different in the fast-paced, congested environment of rail
transit than in the relatively closed environment of airlines and
airports. Nevertheless, we have pursued increased rail transit security
no less vigorously than air travel security.
Since September 11, 2001, FTA has undertaken an aggressive
nationwide security program with the full cooperation and support of
every transit agency involved. In each of these important rail cities,
FTA has, in concert with the transit agencies, conducted risk and
vulnerability assessments; deployed, at no cost to the transit agency,
expert technical assistance teams to help strengthen security and
emergency preparedness plans; and, as part of a $3 million program
involving 83 transit agencies, funded emergency response drills
conducted in conjunction with local fire, police and other emergency
responders.
Based on the full complement of threat and vulnerability
assessments that have been conducted, as well as consultations with
security experts around the world, FTA has pursued a consistent
strategy of promoting emergency preparedness planning, employee
training, and public awareness as the best way to prevent and mitigate
the consequences of a terrorist attack. Among other important steps,
FTA has done the following:
Issued a list of the Top 20 Action Items for transit
agencies, identifying the most important elements to
incorporate into their Security System Programs. These elements
formed the basis of one of four FTA Core Accountabilities for
Senior Executives in Fiscal Year 2003, and I am pleased to
report that the 30 largest transit agencies accomplished at
least 80 percent of these action items. This year, our goal is
to ensure that those agencies complete 90 percent of the action
items and to help the next 20 largest transit agencies complete
at least 80 percent.
Developed the ability to communicate instantaneously with
the general managers and heads of security of the 100 largest
transit agencies. This communications system is tested and used
on a regular basis to provide updates on incidents, as well as
security information bulletins and advisories.
Funded and worked on a daily basis with the public transit
Information Sharing and Analysis Center (ISAC) operated under
the auspices of the American Public Transportation Association
(APTA), to provide two-way communication between the
intelligence community and the transit industry, as well as
transit-specific intelligence analysis.
Developed and launched ``Transit Watch'' in the fall of
2003. Transit Watch is a nationwide emergency response
passenger awareness program, developed and implemented in
partnership with the APTA, Community Transportation Association
of America (CTAA), the American Transit Union (ATU), and the
Transportation Security Administration (TSA).
Developed and will deliver this spring, Security Design
Criteria for use by transit agencies as they design or redesign
infrastructure, communications, access control systems, and
other transit system components.
Developed and delivered new security courses through the
National Transit Institute (NTI), including Counterterrorism
Strategies for Transit Police, Conducting Emergency Drills, and
Passenger Monitoring and Awareness, as well as updated versions
of transit security courses and security needs assessments.
Developed and will deliver this spring, a web-based training
tool for use by communities to conduct table-top emergency
preparedness drills to test agency procedures, share best
practices, and identify needs.
Tested and provided targeted manufacturers and key transit
agencies with information on the costs and benefits of chemical
and biological detection systems.
Developed, in conjunction with Argonne National
Laboratories, and distributed to transit agencies standard
protocols and guidelines for responding to chemical and
biological incidents in rail, tunnel and transit vehicle
environments.
Issued to transit agencies specific guidelines outlining
steps to take at each Homeland Security Advisory Level.
Have substantially completed development and will soon
deliver, a passenger behavioral monitoring course that
incorporates the latest in international counter terrorism
techniques. This course will heighten the effectiveness of the
transit industry's awareness training portfolio.
During the recent ``Orange Alert,'' the 30 largest transit agencies
provided, at PTA's request, information about the specific actions they
were taking as a result. These actions include the following:
Assigning bomb-sniffing dogs to patrol bus yards and train
repair facilities.
Maintaining all police specialty vehicles in a state of
operational readiness.
Conducting more frequent Operational Control Center critical
system backup checks.
Sending reminders to all transit employees, including bus
and rail operators, about what to look for and how to respond
to suspicious packages and individuals.
Assigning transit police to the local police department
command center.
Participating in conference calls with the FBI and emergency
management personnel from the region.
Notifying rapid response team members of potential for call-
up.
Issuing pager and text message alerts to operators and
police.
Checking all security systems, including lighting and
intruder alarms.
Consistent with the current alert level, most transit agencies are
now operating under ``Yellow Alert'' guidelines. However, based on
specific intelligence information, several large systems continue to
operate at the higher ``Orange Alert'' level.
The President's FY 2005 budget also reflects a continued commitment
to making our public transportation systems as safe and secure as
possible. In FY 2005, we have requested $37.8 million for security
initiatives, which remain a high priority. This reflects the one-
percent of Urbanized Formula Grant funding that grantees are required
by statute to use to increase the security and safety of an existing or
planned mass transportation system, as well as FTA investments in
security training for transit system employees, emergency preparedness
and response activities, and public awareness efforts.
Finally, I would note that we continue to work directly with the
Department of Homeland Security (DHS) on a daily basis, particularly in
the area of intelligence analysis. We are confident that DRS, as it
prioritizes all of our Nation's security needs, threats and
vulnerabilities, can and does take into account these issues with
respect to transit.
Despite the complete devastation of three subway stations and over
1,500 feet of track in Lower Manhattan on September 11, no passengers
or subway personnel lost their lives in the attacks, thanks to the
training and quick thinking of train operators, dispatchers, and
transit managers. Today, we are proud to say that America's subways,
light rail systems, and commuter trains are even better prepared to
help prevent and respond to such emergencies.
We appreciate the Committee's continued interest in and concern
about rail transit security, and I would be pleased to respond to any
questions you may have.
The Chairman. Thank you very much.
Mr. Guerrero.
STATEMENT OF PETER F. GUERRERO, DIRECTOR, PHYSICAL
INFRASTRUCTURE ISSUES, U.S. GENERAL ACCOUNTING
OFFICE; ACCOMPANIED BY NORMAN J. RABKIN, MANAGING
DIRECTOR FOR HOMELAND SECURITY, U.S. GENERAL
ACCOUNTING OFFICE
Mr. Guerrero. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
We appreciate the opportunity to provide testimony on the
security of our Nation's rail systems. Terrorist attacks around
the world, including the recent attacks in Spain, have shown
that rail systems, like all modes of transportation, are
potential targets of attack. Passenger and freight rail
services are critical to our economic well-being. Transit
agencies provide an average of 1.2 million passenger trips each
weekday and Amtrak operates a 22,000-mile network providing
service to 64,000 passengers each day. The Nation's freight
network also handles 42 percent of domestic intercity freight,
everything from lumber to vegetables to hazardous materials.
Even before the recent terrorist attacks in Spain, rail
systems have been the target of terrorist attacks worldwide.
The first large-scale attack using a chemical weapon occurred
in 1995 on the Tokyo subway system. It killed 11 people and
injured about 5,000. According to the Mineta Institute, surface
transportation systems were the target of more than 195
terrorist attacks from 1997 through the year 2000. Rail systems
accounted for over one-third of these attacks.
Passenger and freight rail providers face significant
challenges in improving the security of their systems.
Challenges include the funding of security improvements, the
interconnectivity of the rail system with other transportation
modes and with our economy, and coordination among the large
number of stakeholders involved in rail security.
A key challenge faced by all rail systems is that of
funding security enhancements. For example, eight of the ten
transit agencies we visited estimated security enhancements
would cost $700 million and one transit agency alone estimated
that a closed circuit TV system would cost them $250,000. That
amount is equal to at least a quarter of the capital budget of
a majority of the transit agencies we surveyed.
The economic environment at the time we did our work made
it difficult for private industry or State and local
governments to make security investments. The weak economy had
decreased ridership and revenues and large State and local
budget deficits had forced difficult tradeoffs between security
investments and other needs, such as service expansion and
equipment upgrades.
In addition to these broad challenges, certain
characteristics of mass transit systems make them inherently
vulnerable to terrorist attacks and difficult to secure. Mass
transit systems are open and designed to move large numbers of
people quickly. It is difficult to secure these systems and to
monitor and control who enters or leaves the systems. Transit
and rail agencies must balance security concerns with
accessibility, convenience, and affordability.
The size and diversity of the freight rail system also
makes it difficult to adequately secure. The freight rail
system's extensive infrastructure crisscrosses the Nation and
extends beyond our borders to move millions of tons of freight
each day. There are over 100,000 miles of rail in the United
States and the extensiveness of this infrastructure creates an
infinite number of targets for terrorists.
The transportation of hazardous materials by rail is a
particular concern because serious incidents involving these
materials have the potential to cause widespread disruption or
injury. In 2001, over 83 million tons of hazardous materials
were shipped by rail. We visited a number of local communities
to obtain their views about their ability to respond to
hazardous material incidents involving rail and to determine
what concerns they might have about the transportation of these
materials through their communities. A number of issues
emerged, including:
The need for measures to better safeguard hazardous
materials temporarily stored in rail cars while awaiting
delivery to their ultimate destination, a practice the rail
industry refers to as ``storage in transit'';
The advisability of requiring companies to notify local
communities of the types and quantities of materials stored in
transit and the appropriate amount of information rail
companies should be required to provide to local officials
regarding hazardous materials shipments that pass through their
communities.
Since September 11, passenger and rail freight providers
have worked to strengthen security. Although security was a
priority before September 11, the terrorist attacks elevated
its importance and urgency. Passenger and rail freight
providers, as you heard this morning, have taken a number of
actions, including: conducting vulnerability and risk
assessments; increasing the frequency of emergency drills;
revising and updating security plans; and providing additional
employee training.
The Federal Government has also taken steps to enhance rail
security. As you also heard this morning, the Federal Transit
Administration has provided grants, emergency drills, offered
security training, conducted assessments, and provided
technical assistance. We reported last summer that TSA was
moving forward with efforts to secure the entire transportation
system, such as developing standard risk assessment tools and
establishing security standards.
Mr. Chairman, although steps have been taken to enhance
passenger and freight security since September 11, the recent
terrorist attacks in Spain naturally focuses our attention and
what more can be done. In our previous work on transportation
security, we identified future actions that could be taken. In
our December 2002 report on mass transit, we recommended that
the Secretary of Transportation seek a legislative change to
allow mass transit agencies more flexibility in using Federal
grants for security-related expenses. We have also advocated
using a risk management approach to direct Federal resources to
areas of highest priority, where threats, critical assets, and
vulnerabilities intersect.
Finally, we reported in June 2003 that the roles and
responsibilities of TSA and DOT in transportation security,
including rail security, were not clearly delineated, creating
the potential for duplication and conflicting efforts as both
entities work to enhance security. To clarify the roles and
responsibilities of TSA and DOT in transportation security, we
recommended that the Secretary of Transportation and the
Secretary of Homeland Security use a mechanism such as a
Memorandum of Agreement to clearly delineate their respective
roles and responsibilities. This is especially important in
light of DOT's continuing responsibility for transportation
safety and its potential overlap with DHS's role in security.
This concludes my statement and we would be pleased to
answer any questions.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Guerrero and Mr. Rabkin
follow:]
GAO Highlights
Rail Security
Some Actions Taken to Enhance Passenger and Freight Rail Security, but
Significant Challenges Remain
Why GAO Did This Study
Passenger and freight rail services are important links in the
Nation's transportation system. Terrorist attacks on passenger and/or
freight rail services have the potential to cause widespread injury,
loss of life, and economic disruption. The recent terrorist attack in
Spain illustrates that rail systems, like all modes of transportation,
are targets for attacks. GAO was asked to summarize the results of its
recent reports on transportation security that examined (1) challenges
in securing passenger and freight rail systems, (2) actions rail
stakeholders have taken to enhance passenger and freight rail systems,
and (3) future actions that could further enhance rail security.
What GAO Recommends
In our previous report on transportation security (GAO-03-843), we
recommended that the Department of Homeland Security and Transportation
use a mechanism, such as a memorandum of agreement, to clarify and
delineate TSA's and DOT's roles and responsibilities in transportation
security matters. DHS and DOT generally agreed with the report's
findings; however, they disagreed with the recommendation. We continue
to believe our recommendation has merit and would help address security
challenges.
What GAO Found
Securing the passenger and freight rail systems are fraught with
challenges. Some of these challenges are common to passenger and
freight rail systems, such as the funding of security improvements, the
interconnectivity of the rail system, and the number of stakeholders
involved in rail security. Other challenges are unique to the type of
rail system. For example, the open access and high ridership of mass
transit systems make them both vulnerable to attack and difficult to
secure. Similarly, freight railroads transport millions of tons of
hazardous materials each year across the United States, raising
concerns about the vulnerability of these shipments to terrorist
attack.
Passenger and freight rail stakeholders have taken a number of
steps to improve the security of the Nation's rail system since
September 11, 2001. Although security received attention before
September 11, the terrorist attacks elevated the importance and urgency
of transportation security for passenger and rail providers.
Consequently, passenger and freight rail providers have implemented new
security measures or increased the frequency or intensity of existing
activities, including performing risk assessments, conducting emergency
drills, and developing security plans. The Federal Government has also
acted to enhance rail security. For example, the Federal Transit
Administration has provided grants for emergency drills and conducted
security assessments at the largest transit agencies, among other
things.
Implementation of risk management principles and improved
coordination could help enhance rail security. Using risk management
principles can help guide Federal programs and responses to better
prepare against terrorism and other threats and to better direct finite
national resources to areas of highest priority. In addition, improved
coordination among Federal entities could help enhance security efforts
across all modes, including passenger and freight rail systems. We
reported in June 2003 that the roles and responsibilities of the
Transportation Security Administration (TSA) and the Department of
Transportation (DOT) in transportation security, including rail
security, have yet to be clearly delineated, which creates the
potential for duplicating or conflicting efforts as both entities work
to enhance security.
______
Statement of Peter F. Guerrero, Director, Physical Infrastructure
Issues; and Norman J. Rabkin, Managing Director, Homeland Security and
Justice Issues, United States General Accounting Office
Mr. Chairman and Members of the Committee:
We appreciate the opportunity to provide testimony on the security
of our Nation's rail systems. Although most of the early attention
following the September 11 attacks focused on aviation security,
emphasis on the other modes of transportation has since grown as
concerns are voiced about possible vulnerabilities, such as introducing
weapons of mass destruction into this country through ports or
launching chemical attacks on mass transit systems. Moreover, terrorist
attacks around the world, such as the recent terrorist attack in Spain,
have shown that rail systems, like all modes of transportation, are
potential targets of attack.
As you requested, our testimony today focuses on (1) challenges in
securing rail systems, (2) steps rail stakeholders have taken to
enhance security since September 11, and (3) future actions that could
further enhance rail security. Our comments are based on our reports
and testimonies on the security of the entire transportation system,
the security of mass transit systems, and railroad safety and security
\1\ as well as a body of our work undertaken since September 11 on
homeland security and combating terrorism.
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\1\ U.S. General Accounting Office, Transportation Security:
Federal Action Needed to Help Address Security Challenges, GAO-03-843
(Washington, D.C.: June 30, 2003); Rail Safety and Security: Some
Actions Already Taken to Enhance Rail Security, but Risk-based Plan
Needed, GAO-03-435 (Washington, D.C.: April 30, 2003); and Mass
Transit: Federal Action Could Help Transit Agencies Address Security
Challenges, GAO-03-263 (Washington, D.C.: December 13, 2002).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Summary
Securing passenger and freight rail systems is fraught with
challenges. Some security challenges are common to passenger
and freight rail systems, such as the funding of security
improvements, the interconnectivity of the rail system, and the
number of stakeholders involved in rail security. For instance,
government agencies at the federal, state, and local levels and
private companies share responsibility for rail security. The
number of stakeholders involved in transportation security can
lead to communication challenges, duplication, and confusion.
Other security challenges are unique to the type of rail
system. For example, the transport of hazardous materials by
rail is of particular concern because serious incidents
involving these materials have the potential to cause
widespread disruption or injury. We recommended in April 2003
that DOT and DHS develop a plan that specifically addresses the
security of the Nation's freight rail infrastructure.\2\ DHS
has informed us that this plan is in progress.
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\2\ GAO-03-435.
Passenger and freight rail providers have acted to enhance
security since September 11. For example, passenger and freight
rail providers have implemented new security measures or
increased the frequency or intensity of existing activities,
such as performing risk assessments, conducting emergency
drills, and developing security plans. The Federal Government
has also taken steps to try to enhance rail security. In the
wake of September 11, Congress created the Transportation
Security Administration (TSA) and gave it responsibility for
the security of all modes of transportation. As TSA worked to
establish itself and improve the security of the aviation
system during its first year of existence, the Department of
Transportation's (DOT) modal administrations acted to enhance
passenger and freight rail security. For example, the Federal
Transit Administration provided grants for emergency drills to
mass transit agencies and the Federal Railroad Administration
assisted commuter railroads with the development of security
plans. With the immediate crisis of meeting many aviation
security deadlines behind it, TSA has been able to focus more
on the security of all modes of transportation, including rail
security. We reported in June 2003 that TSA was moving forward
with efforts to secure the entire transportation system, such
as developing standardized criticality, threat, and
vulnerability assessment tools, and establishing security
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
standards for all modes of transportation.
Although actions have been taken to enhance passenger and
freight security since September 11, the recent terrorist
attack on a rail system in Spain naturally focuses our
attention on what more could be done to secure the Nation's
rail systems. In our previous work on transportation security,
we identified future actions that the Federal Government could
take to enhance security of individual transportation modes as
well as the entire transportation system. Two recurring themes
cut across our previous work in transportation security--the
need for the Federal Government to utilize a risk management
approach and improve coordination of security efforts. Using
risk management principles can help guide Federal programs and
responses to better prepare against terrorism and other threats
and to better direct finite national resources to areas of
highest priority. A risk management approach can help inform
funding decisions for security improvements within the rail
system and across modes. We reported in June 2003 that TSA
planned to adopt a risk management approach for its efforts to
enhance the security of the Nation's transportation system. In
addition, improved coordination among rail stakeholders could
help enhance security efforts across all modes, including
passenger and freight rail systems. We reported in June 2003
that the roles and responsibilities of TSA and DOT in
transportation security, including rail security, have yet to
be clearly delineated, which creates the potential for
duplicating or conflicting efforts as both entities work to
enhance security. To clarify the roles and responsibilities of
TSA and DOT in transportation security matters, we recommended
that the Secretary of Transportation and the Secretary of
Homeland Security use a mechanism, such as a memorandum of
agreement, to clearly delineate their roles and
responsibilities. To date, this recommendation has not been
implemented.
Background
Passenger and freight rail services help move people and goods
through the transportation system, which helps the economic well-being
of the United States. Passenger rail services can take many forms. Some
mass transit agencies, which can be public or private entities, provide
rail services, such as commuter rail and heavy rail (e.g., subway) in
cities across the United States.\3\ Through these rail services, mass
transit agencies serve a large part of the commuting population. For
example, in the third quarter of 2003, commuter rail systems provided
an average of 1.2 million passenger trips each weekday. The National
Railroad Passenger Corporation (Amtrak) provides intercity passenger
rail services in the United States. Amtrak operates a 22,000-mile
network, primarily over freight railroad tracks, providing service to
46 states and the District of Columbia. In Fiscal Year 2002, Amtrak
served 23.4 million passengers, or about 64,000 passengers per day. The
nation's freight rail network carries 42 percent of domestic intercity
freight (measured by ton miles) in 2001--everything from lumber to
vegetables, coal to orange juice, grain to automobiles, and chemicals
to scrap iron.
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\3\ Commuter rail is characterized by passenger trains operating on
railroad tracks and providing regional service (e.g., between a central
city and adjacent suburbs). Heavy rail is an electric railway that can
carry a heavy volume of traffic. Heavy rail is characterized by high
speed and rapid acceleration, passenger rail cars operating singly or
in multicar trains on fixed rails, separate rights-of-way from which
all other vehicular and foot traffic is excluded, sophisticated
signaling, and high-platform loading. Most subway systems are
considered heavy rail.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Prior to September 11, 2001, DOT--namely, the Federal Railroad
Administration (FRA), Federal Transit Administration (FTA), and
Research and Special Programs Administration (RSPA)--was the primary
Federal entity involved in passenger and freight rail security matters.
However, in response to the attacks on September 11, Congress passed
the Aviation and Transportation Security Act (ATSA), which created TSA
within DOT and defined its primary responsibility as ensuring security
in all modes of transportation.\4\ The act also gives TSA regulatory
authority over all transportation modes. With the passage of the
Homeland Security Act, TSA, along with over 20 other agencies, was
transferred to the new Department of Homeland Security (DHS).\5\
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\4\ P.L. No. 107-71, 115 Stat. 597 (2001).
\5\ P.L. No. 107-296, 116 Stat. 2135 (2002).
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Throughout the world, rail systems have been the target of
terrorist attacks. For example, the first large-scale terrorist use of
a chemical weapon occurred in 1995 on the Tokyo subway system. In this
attack, a terrorist group released sarin gas on a subway train, killing
11 people and injuring about 5,500. In addition, according to the
Mineta Institute,\6\ surface transportation systems were the target of
more than 195 terrorist attacks from 1997 through 2000. (See fig. 1.)
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\6\ The Mineta Transportation Institute was established by Congress
as part of the Intermodal Surface Transportation Efficiency Act of 1991
(ISTEA). The Mineta Institute focuses on international surface
transportation policy issues as related to three primary
responsibilities: research, education, and technology transfer.
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Figure 1: Targets of Attacks on Public Surface Transportation Systems
Worldwide, 1997 to 2000
[GRAPHIC NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
Source: Based on information from the Mineta Transportation
Institute.
Numerous Challenges Exist in Securing Rail Systems
Passenger and freight rail providers face significant challenges in
improving security. Some security challenges are common to passenger
and freight rail systems; others are unique to the type of rail system.
Common challenges include the funding of security improvements, the
interconnectivity of the rail system, and the number of stakeholders
involved in rail security. The unique challenges include the openness
of mass transit systems and the transport of hazardous materials by
freight railroads.
Common Security Challenges Confront Passenger and Freight Rail Systems
A challenge that is common to both passenger and freight rail
systems is the funding of security enhancements. Although some security
improvements are inexpensive, such as removing trash cans from subway
platforms, most require substantial funding. For example, as we
reported in December 2002, one transit agency estimated that an
intrusion alarm and closed circuit television system for only one of
its portals would cost approximately $250,000--an amount equal to at
least a quarter of the capital budgets of a majority of the transit
agencies we surveyed.\7\ The current economic environment makes this a
difficult time for private industry or state and local governments to
make additional security investments. As we noted in June 2003, the
sluggish economy has further weakened the transportation industry's
financial condition by decreasing ridership and revenues. Given the
tight budget environment, state and local governments and
transportation operators, such as transit agencies, must make difficult
trade-offs between security investments and other needs, such as
service expansion and equipment upgrades. Further exacerbating the
problem of funding security improvements are the additional costs the
passenger and freight rail providers incur when the Federal Government
elevates the national threat condition. For example, Amtrak estimates
that it spends an additional $500,000 per month for police overtime
when the national threat condition is increased.
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\7\ GAO-03-263.
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Another common challenge for both passenger and freight rail
systems is the interconnectivity within the rail system and between the
transportation sector and nearly every other sector of the economy. The
passenger and freight rail systems are part of an intermodal
transportation system--that is, passengers and freight can use multiple
modes of transportation to reach a destination. For example, from its
point of origin to its destination, a piece of freight, such as a
shipping container, can move from ship to train to truck. The
interconnective nature of the transportation system creates several
security challenges. First, the effects of events directed at one mode
of transportation can ripple throughout the entire system. For example,
when the port workers in California, Oregon, and Washington went on
strike in 2002, the railroads saw their intermodal traffic decline by
almost 30 percent during the first week of the strike, compared with
the year before. Second, the interconnecting modes can contaminate each
other--that is, if a particular mode experiences a security breach, the
breach could affect other modes. An example of this would be if a
shipping container that held a weapon of mass destruction arrived at a
U.S. port where it was placed on a train. In this case, although the
original security breach occurred in the port, the rail or trucking
industry would be affected as well. Thus, even if operators within one
mode established high levels of security, they could be affected by the
security efforts, or lack thereof, in the other modes. Third,
intermodal facilities where passenger and freight rail systems connect
and interact with other transportation modes--such as ports--are
potential targets for attack because of the presence of passengers,
freight, employees, and equipment at these facilities.
An additional common challenge for both passenger and rail systems
is the number of stakeholders involved. Government agencies at the
federal, state, and local levels and private companies share
responsibility for rail security. For example, there were over 550
freight railroads operating in the United States in 2002. In addition,
many passenger rail services, such as Amtrak and commuter rail, operate
over tracks owned by freight railroads. For instance, over 95 percent
of Amtrak's 22,000-mile network operates on freight railroad tracks.\8\
The number of stakeholders involved in transportation security can lead
to communication challenges, duplication, and conflicting guidance. As
we have noted in past reports, coordination and consensus-building are
critical to successful implementation of security efforts.\9\
Transportation stakeholders can have inconsistent goals or interests,
which can make consensus-building challenging. For example, from a
safety perspective, trains that carry hazardous materials should be
required to have placards that identify the contents of a train so that
emergency personnel know how best to respond to an incident. However,
from a security perspective, identifying placards on vehicles that
carry hazardous materials make them a potential target for attack.
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\8\ Freight railroads and commuter rail agencies also operate
between Boston Massachusetts, and Washington, D.C., on the Northeast
Corridor, which is primarily owned by Amtrak.
\9\ U.S. General Accounting Office, Mass Transit: Challenges in
Securing Transit Systems, GAO-02-1075T (Washington, D.C.: Sept. 18,
2002); U.S. General Accounting Office, Homeland Security: Effective
Intergovernmental Coordination Is Key to Success, GAO-02-1011T
(Washington, D.C.: Aug. 20, 2002); and, U.S. General Accounting Office,
National Preparedness: Integration of Federal, State, Local, and
Private Sector Efforts Is Critical to an Effective National Strategy
for Homeland Security, GAO-02-621T (Washington, D.C.: Apr. 11, 2002).
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Passenger and Freight Rail Systems Also Face Unique Challenges
In addition to the common security challenges that face both
passenger and rail systems, there are some challenges that are unique
to the type of rail system. In our past reports, we have discussed
several of these unique challenges, including the openness of mass
transit systems and the size of the freight rail network and the
diversity of freight hauled.
According to mass transit officials and transit security experts,
certain characteristics of mass transit systems make them inherently
vulnerable to terrorist attacks and difficult to secure. By design,
mass transit systems are open (i.e., have multiple access points and,
in some cases, no barriers) so that they can move large numbers of
people quickly. In contrast, the aviation system is housed in closed
and controlled locations with few entry points. The openness of mass
transit systems can leave them vulnerable because transit officials
cannot monitor or control who enters or leaves the systems. In
addition, other characteristics of some transit systems--high
ridership, expensive infrastructure, economic importance, and location
(e.g., large metropolitan areas or tourist destinations)--also make
them attractive targets because of the potential for mass casualties
and economic damage. Moreover, some of these same characteristics make
mass transit systems difficult to secure. For example, the number of
riders that pass through a mass transit system--especially during peak
hours--make some security measures, such as metal detectors,
impractical. In addition, the multiple access points along extended
routes make the costs of securing each location prohibitive.
Further complicating transit security is the need for transit
agencies to balance security concerns with accessibility, convenience,
and affordability. Because transit riders often could choose another
means of transportation, such as a personal automobile, transit
agencies must compete for riders. To remain competitive, transit
agencies must offer convenient, inexpensive, and quality service.
Therefore, security measures that limit accessibility, cause delays,
increase fares, or otherwise cause inconvenience could push people away
from mass transit and back into their cars.
The size and diversity of the freight rail system make it difficult
to adequately secure. The freight rail system's extensive
infrastructure crisscrosses the Nation and extends beyond our borders
to move millions of tons of freight each day (see fig. 2.). There are
over 100,000 miles of rail in the United States. The extensiveness of
the infrastructure creates an infinite number of targets for
terrorists.
Figure 2: Map of Class I Rail Lines
[GRAPHIC NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
Source: GAO.
Note: Class I railroads are the largest railroads, as defined by
operating revenue. Class I railroads represent the majority of rail
freight activity.
Protecting freight rail assets from attack is made more difficult
because of the tremendous variety of freight hauled by railroads. For
example, railroads carry freight as diverse as dry bulk (grain) and
hazardous materials.\10\ The transport of hazardous materials is of
particular concern because serious incidents involving these materials
have the potential to cause widespread disruption or injury. In 2001,
over 83 million tons of hazardous materials were shipped by rail in the
United States across the rail network, which extends through every
major city as well as thousands of small communities. (Figure 3 is a
photograph of a rail tanker car containing one of the many types of
hazardous materials commonly transported by rail.) For our April 2003
report on rail security, we visited a number of local communities and
interviewed Federal and private sector hazardous materials
transportation experts.\11\ A number of issues emerged from our work:
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\10\ Federal hazardous material transportation law defines a
hazardous material as a substance or material that the Secretary of
Transportation has determined is capable of posing an unreasonable risk
to health, safety, and property when transported in commerce (49 U.S.C.
Sec. 5103). It includes hazardous substances such as ammonia, hazardous
wastes from chemical manufacturing processes, and elevated temperature
materials such as molten aluminum.
\11\ GAO-03-435.
the need for measures to better safeguard hazardous
materials temporarily stored in rail cars while awaiting
delivery to their ultimate destination--a practice commonly
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
called ``storage-in-transit,''
the advisability of requiring companies to notify local
communities of the type and quantities of materials stored in
transit, and
the appropriate amount of information rail companies should
be required to provide local officials regarding hazardous
material shipments that pass through their communities.
Figure 3: Hazardous Material Rail Tank Car
[GRAPHIC NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
Source: Department of Homeland Security.
We recommended in April 2003 that DOT and DHS develop a plan that
specifically addresses the security of the Nation's freight rail
infrastructure.\12\ This plan should build upon the rail industries'
experience with rail infrastructure and the transportation of hazardous
materials and establish time frames for implementing specific security
actions necessary to protect hazardous material rail shipments. DHS has
informed us that this plan is in progress.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\12\ GAO-03-435.
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Rail Stakeholders Have Taken Steps to Improve Security
Since September 11, passenger and freight rail providers have been
working to strengthen security. Although security was a priority before
September 11, the terrorist attacks elevated the importance and urgency
of transportation security for passenger and rail providers. According
to representatives from the Association of American Railroads, Amtrak,
and transit agencies, passenger and freight rail providers have
implemented new security measures or increased the frequency or
intensity of existing activities, including:
Conducted vulnerability or risk assessments: Many passenger
and freight rail providers conducted assessments of their
systems to identify potential vulnerabilities, critical
infrastructure or assets, and corrective actions or needed
security improvements. For example, the railroad industry
conducted a risk assessment that identified over 1,300 critical
assets and served as a foundation for the industry's security
plan.
Increased emergency drills: Many passenger rail providers
have increased the frequency of emergency drills. For example,
as of June 2003, Amtrak had conducted two full-scale emergency
drills in New York City. The purpose of emergency drilling is
to test emergency plans, identify problems, and develop
corrective actions. Figure 4 is a photograph from an annual
emergency drill conducted by the Washington Metropolitan Area
Transit Authority.
Figure 4: Emergency Drill in Progress
[GRAPHIC NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
At a planned emergency drill, firefighters practice rescuing
passengers from a Washington Metropolitan Transit Authority
subway car.
Source: GAO.
Developed or revised security plans: Passenger and freight
rail providers developed security plans or reviewed existing
plans to determine what changes, if any, needed to be made. For
example, the Association of American Railroads worked jointly
with several chemical industry associations and consultants
from a security firm to develop the rail industry's security
management plan. The plan establishes four alert levels and
describes a graduated series of actions to prevent terrorist
threats to railroad personnel and facilities that correspond to
each alert level.
Provided additional training: Many transit agencies have
either participated in or conducted additional training on
security or antiterrorism. For example, many transit agencies
attended seminars conducted by FTA or by the American Public
Transportation Association.
The Federal Government has also acted to enhance rail security.
Prior to September 11, DOT modal administrations had primary
responsibility for the security of the transportation system. In the
wake of September 11, Congress created TSA and gave it responsibility
for the security of all modes of transportation. In its first year of
existence, TSA worked to establish its infrastructure and focused
primarily on meeting the aviation security deadlines contained in ATSA.
As TSA worked to establish itself and improve the security of the
aviation system, DOT modal administrations, namely FRA, FTA, and RSPA,
acted to enhance passenger and freight rail security (see tab. 1.). For
example, FTA launched a multipart initiative for mass transit agencies
that provided grants for emergency drills, offered free security
training, conducted security assessments at 36 transit agencies,
provided technical assistance, and invested in research and
development. With the immediate crisis of meeting many aviation
security deadlines behind it, TSA has been able to focus more on the
security of all modes of transportation, including rail security. We
reported in June 2003 that TSA was moving forward with efforts to
secure the entire transportation system, such as developing
standardized criticality, threat, and vulnerability assessment tools;
and establishing security standards for all modes of
transportation.\13\
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\13\ GAO-03-843.
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Table 1.--Key Actions Taken by DOT Modal Administrations to Help Secure
the Rail System, September 2001 to May 2003
------------------------------------------------------------------------
DOT modal administration Security efforts
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Federal Railroad Shared threat information with
Administration railroads and rail labor.
Reviewed Association of American
Railroads' and Amtrak's security plans.
Assisted commuter railroads with
their security plans.
Provided funding for security
assessments of three commuter railroads,
which were included in FTA's assessment
efforts.
Reached out to international
community for lessons learned in rail
security.
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Federal Transit Awarded $3.4 million in grants to
Administration over 80 transit agencies for emergency
response drills.
Offered free security training to
transit agencies.
Conducted security assessments at
the largest 36 transit agencies.
Provided technical assistance to
19 transit agencies on security and
emergency plans and emergency response
drills.
Increased funding for security
research and development efforts.
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Research and Special Established regulations for
Programs Administration shippers and transporters of certain
hazardous materials to develop and
implement security plans and to require
security awareness training for hazmat
employees.
Developed hazardous materials
transportation security awareness training
for law enforcement, the industry, and the
hazmat community.
Published a security advisory,
which identifies measures that could
enhance the security of the transport of
hazardous materials.
Investigated the security risks
associated with placarding hazardous
materials, including whether removing
placards from certain shipments improves
shipment security, and whether alternative
methods for communicating safety hazards
could be deployed.
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Source: GAO presentation of information provided by DOT modal
administrations.
Risk Management and Coordination Key to Enhancing Security
Although steps have been taken to enhance passenger and freight
security since September 11, the recent terrorist attack on a rail
system in Spain naturally focuses our attention on what more could be
done to secure the Nation's rail systems. In our previous work on
transportation security, we identified future actions that the Federal
Government could take to enhance security of individual transportation
modes as well as the entire transportation system. For example, in our
December 2002 report on mass transit security, we recommended that the
Secretary of Transportation seek a legislative change to give mass
transit agencies more flexibility in using Federal funds for security-
related operating expenses, among other things.\14\ Two recurring
themes cut across our previous work in transportation security--the
need for the Federal Government to utilize a risk management approach
and the need for the Federal Government to improve coordination of
security efforts.
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\14\ GAO-03-263. DOT agreed to carefully consider our
recommendations as it moved forward with its efforts to improve transit
security.
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Using risk management principles to guide decision-making is a good
strategy, given the difficult trade-offs the Federal Government will
likely have to make as it moves forward with its transportation
security efforts. We have advocated using a risk management approach to
guide Federal programs and responses to better prepare against
terrorism and other threats and to better direct finite national
resources to areas of highest priority.\15\ As figure 5 illustrates,
the highest priorities emerge where threats, vulnerabilities, and
criticality overlap. For example, rail infrastructure that is
determined to be a critical asset, vulnerable to attack, and a likely
target would be at most risk and therefore would be a higher priority
for funding compared with infrastructure that was only vulnerable to
attack. The Federal Government is likely to be viewed as a source of
funding for at least some rail security enhancements. These
enhancements will join the growing list of security initiatives
competing for Federal assistance. A risk management approach can help
inform funding decisions for security improvements within the rail
system and across modes.
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\15\ U.S. General Accounting Office, Homeland Security: A Risk
Management Approach Can Guide Preparedness Efforts, GAO-02-208T
(Washington, D.C.: October 31, 2001); and Combating Terrorism: Threat
and Risk Assessments Can Help Prioritize and Target Program
Investments, GAO/NSIAD-98-74 (Washington, D.C.: April 9, 1998).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Figure 5: Representation of Risk
[GRAPHIC NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
Source: GAO.
A risk management approach entails a continuous process of
managing, through a series of mitigating actions, the likelihood of an
adverse event happening with a negative impact. Risk management
encompasses ``inherent'' risk (i.e., risk that would exist absent any
mitigating action), as well as ``residual'' risk (i.e., the risk that
remains even after mitigating actions have been taken). Figure 6
depicts the risk management framework. Risk management principles
acknowledge that while risk cannot be eliminated, enhancing protection
from known or potential threats can help reduce it. (Appendix I
provides a description of the key elements of the risk management
approach.) We reported in June 2003 that TSA planned to adopt a risk
management approach for its efforts to enhance the security of the
Nation's transportation system. According to TSA officials, risk
management principles will drive all decisions--from standard-setting,
to funding priorities, to staffing.
Figure 6: Risk Management Framework
Source: GAO analysis.
Coordination is also a key action in meeting transportation
security challenges. As we have noted in previous reports, coordination
among all levels of the government and the private industry is critical
to the success of security efforts. The lack of coordination can lead
to such problems as duplication and/or conflicting efforts, gaps in
preparedness, and confusion. Moreover, the lack of coordination can
strain intergovernmental relationships, drain resources, and raise the
potential for problems in responding to terrorism. The administration's
National Strategy for Homeland Security and the National Strategy for
the Physical Protection of Critical Infrastructures and Key Assets also
emphasize the importance of and need for coordination in security
efforts. In particular, the National Strategy for the Physical
Protection of Critical Infrastructures and Key Assets notes that
protecting critical infrastructure, such as the transportation system,
``requires a unifying organization, a clear purpose, a common
understanding of roles and responsibilities, accountability, and a set
of well-understood coordinating processes.''
We reported in June 2003 that the roles and responsibilities of TSA
and DOT in transportation security, including rail security, have yet
to be clearly delineated, which creates the potential for duplicating
or conflicting efforts as both entities work to enhance security.
Legislation has not defined TSA's role and responsibilities in securing
all modes of transportation. ATSA does not specify TSA's role and
responsibilities in securing the maritime and land transportation modes
in detail as it does for aviation security. Instead, the act simply
states that TSA is responsible for ensuring security in all modes of
transportation. The Act also did not eliminate DOT modal
administrations' existing statutory responsibilities for securing the
different transportation modes. Moreover, recent legislation indicates
that DOT still has security responsibilities. In particular, the
Homeland Security Act of 2002 states that the Secretary of
Transportation is responsible for the security as well as the safety of
rail and the transport of hazardous materials by all modes.
To clarify the roles and responsibilities of TSA and DOT in
transportation security matters, we recommended that the Secretary of
Transportation and Secretary of Homeland Security use a mechanism, such
as a memorandum of agreement to clearly delineate their roles and
responsibilities. The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) and DOT
disagreed with our recommendation, noting that DHS had the lead for the
Administration in transportation security matters and that DHS and DOT
were committed to broad and routine consultations. We continue to
believe our recommendation is valid. A mechanism, such as a memorandum
of agreement, would serve to clarify, delineate, and document the roles
and responsibilities of each entity. This is especially important
considering DOT responsibilities for transportation safety overlap with
DHS' role in securing the transportation system. Moreover, recent
pieces of legislation give DOT transportation security responsibilities
for some activities, including the rail security. Consequently, the
lack of clearly delineated roles and responsibilities could lead to
duplication, confusion, and gaps in preparedness. A mechanism would
also serve to hold each entity accountable for its transportation
security responsibilities. Finally, it could serve as a vehicle to
communicate the roles and responsibilities of each entity to
transportation security stakeholders.
Observations
Securing the Nation's passenger and freight rail systems is a
tremendous task. Many challenges must be overcome. Passenger and
freight rail stakeholders have acted to enhance security, but more work
is needed. As passenger and freight rail stakeholders, including the
Federal Government, work to enhance security, it is important that
efforts be coordinated. The lack of coordination could lead to
duplication and confusion. More importantly, it could hamper the rail
sector's ability to prepare for and respond to attacks. In addition, to
ensure that finite resources are directed to the areas of highest
priority, risk management principles should guide decision-making.
Given budget pressures at all levels of government and the sluggish
economy, difficult trade-offs will undoubtedly need to be made among
competing claims for assistance. A risk management approach can help
inform these difficult decisions.
This concludes our prepared statement. We would be pleased to
respond to any questions you or other Members of the Committee may
have.
Appendix I: Key Elements of a Risk Management Approach
Threat Assessment. Threat is defined as potential intent to cause
harm or damage to an asset (e.g., natural environment, people, man-made
infrastructures, and activities and operations). A threat assessment
identifies adverse events that can affect an entity and may be present
at the global, national, or local level.
Criticality assessment. Criticality is defined as an asset's
relative worth. A criticality assessment identifies and evaluates an
entity's assets based on a variety of factors, including importance of
a function and the significance of a system in terms of national
security, economic activity, or public safety. Criticality assessments
help to provide a basis for prioritizing protection relative to limited
resources.
Vulnerability assessment. Vulnerability is defined as the inherent
state or condition of an asset that can be exploited to cause harm. A
vulnerability assessment identifies the extent that these inherent
states may be exploited, relative to countermeasures that have been or
could be deployed.
Risk Assessment. Risk assessment is a qualitative and/or
quantitative determination of the likelihood of an adverse event
occurring and the severity, or impact, of its consequences. It may
include scenarios under which two or more risks interact, creating
greater or lesser impacts, as well as the ranking of risky events.
Risk characterization. Risk characterization involves designating
risk on a categorical scale (e.g., low, medium, and high). Risk
characterization provides input for deciding which areas are most
suited to mitigate risk.
Mitigation Evaluation. Mitigation evaluation is the identification
of mitigation alternatives to assess the effectiveness of the
alternatives. The alternatives should be evaluated for their likely
effect on risk and their cost.
Mitigation Selection. Mitigation selection involves a management
decision on which mitigation alternatives should be implemented among
alternatives, taking into account risk, costs, and the effectiveness of
mitigation alternatives. Selection among mitigation alternatives should
be based upon pre-considered criteria. There are as of yet no clearly
preferred selection criteria, although potential factors might include
risk reduction, net benefits, equality of treatment, or other stated
values. Mitigation selection does not necessarily involve prioritizing
all resources to the highest risk area, but in attempting to balance
overall risk and available resources.
Risk mitigation. Risk mitigation is the implementation of
mitigating actions, depending upon an organization's chosen action
posture (i.e., the decision on what to do about overall risk).
Specifically, risk mitigation may involve risk acceptance (taking no
action), risk avoidance (taking actions to avoid activities that
involve risk), risk reduction (taking actions to reduce the likelihood
and/or impact of risk), and risk sharing (taking actions to reduce risk
by sharing risk with other entities). As shown in figure 6, risk
mitigation is best framed within an integrated systems approach that
encompasses action in all organizational areas; including personnel,
processes, technology, infrastructure, and governance. An integrated
systems approach helps to ensure that taking action in one or more
areas would not create unintended consequences in another area.
Monitoring and evaluation. Monitoring and evaluation is a
continuous repetitive assessment process to keep risk management
current and relevant. It should involve reassessing risk
characterizations after mitigating efforts have been implemented. It
also includes peer review, testing, and validation.
The Chairman. Thank you very much, Mr. Guerrero.
Secretary Hutchinson, GAO's concern here is the fact that
the responsibilities of the Transportation Security
Administration, the Department of Transportation in
transportation security, including rail security, have yet to
be clearly delineated, which creates a potential for
duplicating or conflicting efforts.
They have been many recommendations, including more
flexibility and use of risk management. But can you respond to
that particular recommendation of theirs?
Mr. Hutchinson. Certainly. And I believe that the
recommendation for an MOU has really been overtaken by the
issuance of a Presidential Directive No. 7 that delineates the
responsibilities on critical infrastructure, including
transportation. So that sets the parameters for it. Within that
context, there may be some narrowly targeted MOU's that may be
adopted, such as TSA has one with the FAA, and we w look at
others on an as-needed basis.
I would point out that we have a very good relationship.
Whenever we set up a working group to look at additional steps
that can be taken in rail and mass transit, the Department of
Transportation at every level was very much a partner in that
effort.
The Chairman. It is my understanding that you plan to
develop a national transportation system security plan. What is
the timetable for this initiative?
Mr. Hutchinson. That hopefully will be completed by the end
of the year. Obviously, in every different mode there is a
different timetable, but that is an ongoing effort, not just
with our efforts at TSA, but also working with the IAIP
Directorate.
The Chairman. I think we need that plan as quickly as
possible, because I do not think--I think it is extremely
difficult to determine whether there are requirements for
additional funding and in what areas without the comprehensive
plan. Would you agree with that, Mr. Guerrero?
Mr. Guerrero. Absolutely.
The Chairman. So I hope you will give that a high priority.
Mr. Secretary, we all react to events. We would not be
having this hearing if it were not for Madrid. Maybe we are all
guilty of reacting rather than acting in anticipation of
events, but I believe that a fundamental is a national
transportation system security plan and I hope we can--that you
would give that a very high priority.
Mr. Jamison, how much do you estimate the FTA and the
transit authorities have spent on security since September 11?
Mr. Jamison. I do not have a total on exactly how much the
industry spent, although I understand that the survey estimates
a total of $1.7 billion. FTA has spent well over $25 million in
response to September 11, in putting together a comprehensive
program that I described in my testimony.
The Chairman. Mr. Rutter, you heard Senator Biden and
Senator Carper's statement here. Understandably, they place a
very high priority on the Northeast Corridor tunnels. In light
of any terrorist attack, obviously we would like to maximize
the damage and the publicity.
Do you sort of accept--do you accept that theory, that that
is probably our greatest vulnerability, so therefore should
have our highest funding priorities?
Mr. Rutter. I think from a safety as well as a security
standpoint, certainly this Committee has heard from our agency
and from the Inspector General about the life safety
implications of the New York tunnels.
The Chairman. And the Baltimore tunnel.
Mr. Rutter. And Baltimore, New York being probably the
higher number of people coming in and out of them. I think that
one of the things we have been and will continue to do with
Amtrak is look at their security needs from a strategic point
of view. Certainly, should Congress want to fund those type of
improvements----
The Chairman. I am asking your opinion. Do you feel that
that is a proper--we cannot do everything at once. We are going
to have to prioritize. Do you agree with that, that that should
be a priority area to be addressed?
Mr. Rutter. I think that is one of the things that we ought
to do to enhance passenger rail security nationwide.
The Chairman. Mr. Guerrero?
Mr. Guerrero. The transportation network, as you know, Mr.
Chairman, is an interconnected network and the intermodal links
in that network are critical. So I would agree that those are
very important links.
The Chairman. And of course, very, very expensive when we
are talking about overall funding.
So do you have any thoughts on that, Secretary Hutchinson?
Mr. Hutchinson. The specific point they were making was the
investment in the Amtrak security, particularly the intermodal
exchanges. Obviously, that has to have a priority for
enhancement. I think as to where that comes from will be the
debate this Committee will engage in.
I would emphasize that in the 2005 budget under the Urban
Areas Security Initiative grants there will be $1.4 billion,
which a doubling of that amount allows a great deal of
flexibility. So we are looking to that fund to help cover some
of these type of needs.
The Chairman. Well, I think that is going to be a very hard
part of this plan when you come up with it, and that is why the
plan is needed, is to where we feel the needs are the most
immediate. I could argue that Casa Grande, Arizona, is an area
of great vulnerability, but I think that the argument that
Senator Biden and Senator Carper were making bears some
scrutiny and some perhaps serious consideration.
Senator Breaux--and I thank all the witnesses for being
here today.
Senator Breaux. As do I. Thank you all very much.
Mr. Hutchinson, you have so much on your plate with you and
Secretary Ridge to look after. I was just wondering, does the
Administration consider the potential of terrorist attacks of
railroads to be less than on airlines or about the same or
greater?
Mr. Hutchinson. Less. I mean, you look at the historic
reporting, there has been more intelligence indicating that al-
Qaeda continues to target the airline industry versus other
modes of transportation. Certainly mass transit is included in
that reporting, but I believe there is a higher level of threat
in the aviation arena in terms of the reporting that we
receive.
Senator Breaux. It would seem to me, if I think like a
terrorist, and saw that the United States had spent $4.5
billion improving airline security, hiring more Federal
inspectors, incorporating the highest luggage and cargo
screening technology, and sealing the doors of all aircraft, I
would make a decision if I wanted to cause great havoc in this
country not to make the airlines a target. I would go after the
rail transportation system. I can walk on a train here at Union
Station with two huge suitcases loaded with anhydrous ammonia
like they used to blow up the Oklahoma building, no one would
look at it, no one would do a background check. I could get on
here in Washington or I could get on right up the road and
detonate it somewhere between here and New York City.
So it seems to me that if you still think that airlines are
a greater target after spending $4.5 billion, it would seem to
me that a far greater target would be an area where we have
spent only a relatively insignificant amount of money and that
there are almost no restrictions or requirements whatsoever.
Does that not make sense?
Mr. Hutchinson. There is certainly a logic that goes with
that reasoning, and I would agree completely that we have a
responsibility, not just to look at the aviation arena, even
though that is where intelligence reporting continues to come
and be pointed, but also the other modes of transportation and,
not just that, but our other critical infrastructure, to make
those safe every day.
So since we do sense that responsibility, that is why we
have started, started long before the Madrid, but there is more
that can be done and that is part of the initiative we
indicated yesterday.
Senator Breaux. Well, we spent, according to our figures,
approximately $4.5 billion on aviation security, and everybody
understands in general what we have done. There is probably a
lot more we do not know about. But only about $65 million in
comparison has been set aside for preparedness for the Nation's
public transit systems.
It seems to me that difference is monumental. We have
neglected this, it has become the stepchild of the
transportation system, and until the Madrid tragedy I did not
think a lot was happening. Right after Madrid, the
Administration reacted, but that was after the fact.
Let me just ask the question: From what you know, what
anyone knows, of what happened in Madrid, what would have had
to be in place from a security standpoint to prevent that from
happening? If we do not learn from tragedies, then we run the
risk of suffering another tragedy down the line. So, looking at
what happened in Madrid, what type of system would have had to
be in place to prevent that from happening?
Mr. Hutchinson. Of course, we are still getting the
intelligence in. We will continue to evaluate that. But
clearly, explosive detection capability is an important part of
the equation.
Senator Breaux. That is not in our plan anywhere that I
have seen, is it?
Mr. Hutchinson. Absolutely, it is.
Senator Breaux. For passengers getting on board trains?
Mr. Hutchinson. Well, it is part of the research to develop
that technology, is an investment we are making, in addition
to----
Senator Breaux. Well, do we not already have that
technology with regard to people getting on an airplane?
Mr. Hutchinson. It would be a totally different technology.
We have to have the capability in a mass transit environment
not to run everybody through a magnetometer or explosive
detection equipment that is slow and cumbersome, but something
that is mobile, that can work in a mass transit environment.
But in addition, the K-9 deployment teams that we are
implementing, that is already in use out there, will be
directed at that.
Senator Breaux. It sounds like if I wanted to get into a
business I would get into the dog business.
Mr. Hutchinson. It is not a bad business to get into.
I do not mean to imply that we have the capability to stop
that today, but those are an area that we can work on to reduce
the possibility of that.
In addition, when we look at our baseline security measures
that need to be in place, we have to look at the receptacles in
which a bag can be deposited, what are the security measures
there, what are the surveillance cameras detecting, and are
they being reviewed. These type of security measures are very
helpful in that environment.
Senator Breaux. Well, I am certainly not an expert, but it
is a huge challenge. I am just pointing out that people get on
the train between here and New York at several different
locations; it is hard to set up that mechanism at every
location, people getting on and off. But they are all getting
on the same train. It would seem like the system could be on
the train, and you would not have to have it at every station
if it is on the train itself. So when people come onto the
train, the detection mechanism would be part of the train
system and not at each station or at every stop.
Mr. Hutchinson. Well, that is one of the purposes of the
pilot project, is to look at what type of screening can take
place in a mass transit environment.
Senator Breaux. Well, I just hope we do not study it to
death. It seems like every time Congress or the Administration
comes up with another study, another assessment, or another
risk assessment, we never see it. I think we have a great track
record on transporting hazardous materials. I do not think a
single person lost their life in a train accident last year
riding the train. This is a remarkable record.
But we have not been attacked by terrorists like they were
in Madrid. As important as studies are, I would like to start
seeing some things implemented, and I know that is your goal.
Mr. Jamison. Senator Breaux, if I might I would like to
respond to the Madrid question. I think we can learn some very
important lessons from Madrid: one, that we must remain ever
vigilant; and two, that we are on the right track. The
information is still coming in from overseas, but what we do
know, there are some significant differences on how Madrid is
reacting to security versus what we are doing in the United
States.
Number one, there is no security awareness training regime
in Spain. We have trained over 46,000 transit employees to be
the front line eyes and ears, to spot suspicious activity, that
might be able to detect al-Qaeda techniques and other types of
techniques that are using to case our Nation's systems.
They did not have any explosive detection capability in
Spain from our understanding. Many of the agencies, especially
the high-risk agencies, have deployed transit K-9 dogs that can
do some type of bomb detection and have portable bomb detection
type of devices.
They had no public awareness campaign in Spain. We have
rolled out an aggressive transit watch public awareness
campaign across the Nation and many transit agencies are
constantly notifying their passengers to be ever vigilant and
to detect this type of activity.
So there are several things that we can learn from Spain. I
think we are very much on the right track.
Senator Breaux. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
The Chairman. Senator Allen.
Senator Allen. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Listening to the answers here to Chairman McCain and
Senator Breaux, trying to assess what all the targets are and
the vulnerabilities, you have to break them all down. Clear
targets, aviation, maybe that is number one. Ports have
different levels of concern: the ports in Virginia because of
the big Navy presence; New Orleans because it is for the whole
heartland of America as far as barge and shipping traffic; New
York and New Jersey because of the population.
We know of target cities. We are right here in a target. We
are in the bull's eye of a target in Washington, D.C. New York
City is a target, Chicago, maybe other cities in different
variations.
When you get into rail, you have three different areas. You
have the mass transit, you have the passenger rail which has
longer runs, and then you have freight. In the freight, the
railroad companies of course do have their security, their own
police. Then you have a gradation or variation on those that
are having hazardous materials cars versus those that are non-
hazardous materials.
So in all of these you have to make a judgment as to what
is the most vulnerable and where the action ought to be taken.
In my mind--and this is just listening to all of this--where
you get a convergence of priorities in the area of rail, it
would strike me is you would care first and foremost about mass
transit in target city areas, which would in my view be the
Washington, D.C., area and the New York City area.
Now, recognizing what needs to be done, if you turned these
railroads, the mass transit in this area or I think anywhere in
this country, into something like airports, you are going to
end up with more people driving. They are simply not going to
go through such nightmares as we go through at airports, and
aggravation, for mass transit, which is to get to and from work
in a reasonable period of time.
The new technologies, the pilot programming, the dogs, the
sensors, whatever you all may want to do, I think makes sense,
but try to make it so people can get through, whether it is
Penn Station, Union Station, or, heck, getting on at one of the
Metro stops in the D.C. area.
Now, I would like to ask you, Secretary Hutchinson, how
does the Department of Homeland Security intend to address
already identified high priority critical infrastructure
vulnerabilities in the capital-intensive sector, such as HAZMAT
transit, in which the remedies sometimes fall beyond the scope
of the existing assistance initiative at the Department of
Homeland Security, such as the Office of Domestic Preparedness'
urban area security initiative? If you could answer that and
will you eliminate, at least support eliminating, the current
prohibition on using the Office of Domestic Preparedness funds
for the renovation or construction of facilities to provide
transit agencies with greater flexibility in addressing their
critical infrastructure needs?
Mr. Hutchinson. Well, I think it is certainly very
important to have that flexibility there in the funding that
goes. It is obviously important to have the assessment and that
the money goes toward the security plans that are in place.
In reference to the HAZMAT concerns, on the routes for that
in the capital region, that is something that IAIP has worked
very aggressively on with the capital region here and they have
identified and made progress in that area and have identified
some solutions to address. We would be happy to give a more
specific response to your question in writing.
Senator Allen. All right. Well, I look forward to receiving
that.
Now, as far as the hazardous materials in the D.C. area,
Senator Biden was talking about a tunnel built in the 1800s, in
the late 1800s, in Baltimore. Regardless of the dates the
tunnels are constructed, whether they actually dug these
tunnels out in 1869 or 1969, the vulnerability of those tunnels
is something that we ought to look at.
There are those--and you brought this up in answer to my
first question about re-routing hazardous materials around
Washington, D.C. What is your view of doing that? Any of you
can answer this. It does not have to be just Secretary
Hutchinson. If you rerouted the hazardous materials around
Washington, D.C., what assets would be put in place to ensure
the security of the materials on another route?
Mr. Hutchinson. Well, of course the security is layered in
terms of the way the shipment is done, background checks of the
drivers, that is an ongoing project.
Senator Allen. I am talking about rail, not trucks.
Mr. Hutchinson. In the rail environment, of course part of
it is the safety measures that are in place for that. In terms
of the security side of it, that is worked in conjunction with
the Federal Railroad Administration.
Mr. Rutter. I think one of the things that the Secretary
said was that, frankly in response to interest on the part of
the D.C. government about wanting to do something with the CSX
rail line that comes into the District, our agency and
constituent agencies of DHS have been working on and are in the
process of a targeted vulnerability assessment and mitigation
measures that are appropriate.
Certainly the District would like to see rerouting done.
That may or may not be the best thing to do to provide
additional security for the District and the kinds of material
that come through there.
One of the reasons why we are so excited about that project
is because one of the things we can do is take the lessons we
have learned from D.C., which frankly is relatively simple
because we are talking about one rail line rather than lots of
them, and then maybe pilot that on another couple of cities
that are more complicated, have multiple rail lines, more
shipments coming through, and take that and use it as a
template that can be offered to major metropolitan areas, for
them to walk through the process of thinking about what do we
have, what are the risks, how do we mitigate those, and provide
a layer of additional protection nationwide, not just here in
the District.
Mr. Guerrero. Senator, it is precisely because of this, the
question you just raised and other questions like it, that we
recommended a year ago that the Department of Homeland Security
and the Department of Transportation work on a risk-based plan
for identifying these issues and working through strategies for
how to deal with them. They are complex issues, not just the
question of routing hazardous materials and rerouting those
materials to avoid population centers, but also some of the
issues I raised in my statement about storage of hazardous
materials in transit and notification to communities.
All those were open questions and they remain open
questions.
Senator Allen. Thank you, gentlemen. I look forward to
continuing this dialogue on this subject. Thank you.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
The Chairman. Senator Lautenberg.
Senator Lautenberg. Thanks, Mr. Chairman.
To all of you, I am glad to hear your views. I am disturbed
by the fact that in large measure what we have gotten, as
Senator Breaux said, is agreements to have studies, and when we
see that Secretary Ridge has deferred consideration of funding,
providing any funding to transit systems, it is discouraging.
I would tell you, Mr. Chairman, I also had the tunnel
experience. I was a Commissioner of the Port Authority of New
York and New Jersey before I came to the Senate, and one of the
first things I did when I took that seat was to go through the
tunnels that traverse the Hudson River between New York and New
Jersey.
Not only was the envelope so tight that people who were
working there had to actually get into niches along the way to
protect themselves from being brought in by the force of the
air there; and we found all kinds of difficult things. The
electricity system was not the way it should be, but rather
something in series. If one part of it went out, the whole went
out. The fire doors were locked. It was a terrible situation.
Much of that has been cleared up. But we send every day
over 100,000 people across that river and we just are running
out of capacity. When we think about what happened on 9/11, the
only available sensible transportation system was rail. That is
how the delegation came up from Washington to New York. The
aviation system was totally shut down.
So I hope, Mr. Chairman, that when we think of writing
legislation that we make sure that we include some of the
funding for another, a third tunnel there, just as we would
looking at the Baltimore problem that Senator Biden described.
The thing that I want to ask: Mr. Hutchinson, why has not
the administration requested any funding specifically for
Amtrak rail security? We carry 24 million passengers a year. We
cannot ask them to provide funds out of their losses which they
sustain each and every year as to passenger rail services
across the globe.
Why has it not been requested in any of the budgets that we
see?
Mr. Hutchinson. Well, there may need to be a budgetary fix.
If some of the urban area grant money would be used for Amtrak
security funding, I think we are certainly open to that
discussion. Whenever you look at Amtrak and our funding
mechanisms, it is $1.4 billion in the 2005 budget through those
security grants.
In addition, the Department of Transportation of course
provided, I believe it was, $100 million for the superstructure
there at Penn Station, which serves Amtrak as well. So there
are additional needs, but there might have to be a legislative
fix to help on that funding flow.
Senator Lautenberg. I think one of the hardest things for
people to understand is, now that we have seen what happened in
Madrid and what happened in Japan when that attack on the
subway system took place, is how in the world we can commit $88
billion to reconstruct Iraq--and I got back from there last
week and I believe we have to spend money there, I believe we
have to do it--why we cannot find money to provide those
millions of passengers who use the rail systems each and every
year, every week practically, some funding to start to provide
sensible security arrangements for them.
It just, it is not fair to our constituents or the people
who are required to use rail service. So I would urge that you
help us with that legislative direction that you described.
I would ask something else. We had hearings here, Mr.
Chairman, last year in April, so that is just about a year ago.
Questions that were asked related to Amtrak and freight rail
security problems, and the questions were simple: What has the
Department done to improve the security of rail transportation
for both intercity travel and commuter service?
Frankly, we are just now getting answers. The answers came
in connection with this hearing, Mr. Chairman, and that
provoked a response from the transportation, the needs. Why
does it take so long to get an answer to questions that are put
before the witnesses, when before you and your Department, why
can we not get a quicker response. The record was held open, it
said to submit the question in writing. We did all of those
things and heard nothing in response.
Mr. Hutchinson. We certainly want to be responsive to your
questions to Congress and am delighted to work on the speed of
those. But we are here today to answer any questions.
Senator Lautenberg. Well, the questions that relate to the
almost lackadaisical response to what has been an urgent
problem. It has become highlighted as a result of the situation
in Madrid. Can Madrid happen in this country?
Mr. Hutchinson. Obviously, we would never guarantee that we
do not have vulnerabilities or that we are free from a
terrorist incident in this country. I believe we have more
protective measures that are in place than what we see in some
of the rail transits there in Spain.
But if I might, sir, the contrast--Senator Breaux mentioned
$65 million in contrast to the billions that we are spending on
the aviation arena, and there is a difference there in funding
levels, I will concede that point. But I do not think $65
million paints the picture whenever we have given $26 million
to New York City transit, $5 million to Chicago transit, and on
down that adds up to $115 million to the different transit
authorities over and above the amounts invested in the Marine
and Land Division at TSA.
But also, we have our Directorate of Infrastructure
Protection that works on these issues. We have our science and
technology that is investing really hundreds of millions of
dollars in technologies that will be applicable to the mass
transit arena, as well as what Department of Transportation is
doing and Customs and Border Protection.
So there is a disparity, but we are doing certainly a lot
more than simply what is reflected in that one amount.
STATEMENT OF HON. KAY BAILEY HUTCHISON,
U.S. SENATOR FROM TEXAS
Senator Hutchison. [presiding]. Senator Lautenberg.
Senator Lautenberg. Thank you very much, Madam Chairman.
Senator Hutchison. Thank you.
Senator Boxer.
Senator Boxer. Thank you very much, Madam Chairman.
I just want to thank all of you. This has been a good
hearing. I thank my colleagues very much.
Mr. Hutchinson, when I quoted I was quoting you, and so I
wanted to give you a chance to react to the way I read your
quotes. You said after Madrid: ``It is very important we do not
simply react to an incident that happens anywhere in the
world,'' and went on to say the Administration was not seeking
more funding for train security. And then I said, ``An aircraft
can be used as a weapon; a train cannot be hurled through the
air in the same fashion,'' something I think we all understand.
But when I read your testimony, in the first page you
mention Madrid five times. So maybe I am assuming that this was
not an accurate quote or it was taken out of context, because
the war on terror, as we all know, is a global war and things
that happen all over the world must be looked at, because
terrorism is all over the world.
Mr. Hutchinson. Absolutely, and thank you, Senator, for
giving me a chance to comment on that. The quotes are accurate
and I believe it is important that we do not simply react to
incidents. What I mean by that is that we ought to invest in
security based upon our intelligence, based upon what this
Committee has been emphasizing, which is the assessments that
are made on vulnerabilities.
Certainly there is a level of reaction in the sense of
reviewing what we are doing, what more can we do, what lessons
can we learn. So I do not want to diminish in any way the
sensitivity toward the tragedy that happened there or the
lessons that we can learn from it.
Senator Boxer. Well, if you are not backing off your quote,
I just want to again say I found it very disturbing. So we just
do not agree on that point. I think that, looking at--where is
that freight line chart, if I could see that again. If you just
take a look at the target of opportunity here and the fact
that, as Senator Lautenberg has pointed out, you could set
charges all over the rail system, you are talking about
something that, whether a train can be hurled through the air
into a building or not is not the point.
Do you know about the nuclear waste dump at Yucca Mountain?
Are you familiar with it?
Mr. Hutchinson. Yes, I am.
Senator Boxer. Do you know how many trips by rail we are
going to have over the life of the project carrying that
nuclear waste?
Mr. Hutchinson. I am not--I am familiar with it. I
addressed that issue in Congress, also obviously to a certain
extent at Homeland Security, but I do not know that level of
detail.
Senator Boxer. Well, I want to tell you that it is 18,000
trips, and I need you to think about this. That dump is going
to open in a few years. And we are talking about not, quote
unquote, ``low level waste,'' which is dangerous enough. We are
talking about serious heavy waste that is potentially
disastrous if there were to be an accident.
So therefore, if we are not going to take Madrid as a
signal, let us look here in our country and see what is coming.
18,000 shipments of the most dangerous nuclear wastes known to
humankind, 18,000 trips by rail. So I would like to put that on
your agenda.
Now, you said you do not need new money, but you are taking
all these steps. Where are you taking the money from?
Mr. Hutchinson. Well, in reference to the K-9 teams that we
are deploying, Federal Protective Service has 50 of those
teams. We have five in training. As we deploy those and have
those available for deployment, we will look to see whether
that needs to be enhanced.
In reference to the research and development, that is
because we have in the science and technology $500 million for
research in this area, so we are utilizing some of that for the
enhanced explosives detection capabilities. Whenever you look
at our pilot project for screening, that is within the existing
budget of TSA. We need to deploy that very quickly.
Senator Boxer. So what is the next cost? What is the new
level of expenditure to meet this threat? You are talking about
putting into place right away these teams of dogs, etcetera.
What is the cost of all that?
Mr. Hutchinson. Those items that I mentioned plus the
security directives and the baseline is within existing budget.
Where the new money is would be in the----
Senator Boxer. So wait a minute. So you have a surplus in
your budget that you did not need and you are using it for this
new program? Is that what you are telling us, your budget was
fat and you are taking this extra money that you were not using
in any other place and you are using it for this?
Mr. Hutchinson. I do not think that is a correct reflection
of what I just described----
Senator Boxer. Well, where are you getting it from?
Mr. Hutchinson.--as to our initiative.
Senator Boxer. You came to us with a budget. You said, we
need this for rail, we need this for air marshals. We have all
been involved in this budget, a tremendous amount involved in
it, because, speaking from my point of view, every one of those
planes was going to my State and now I am looking at Amtrak
with the second busiest Amtrak in the country.
So I am just curious. You are saying you do not need money.
You have got to be getting it from somewhere, and you just keep
repeating what you are doing. Where are you getting the money
from to pay for this?
Mr. Hutchinson. Let me see if I can address that----
Senator Hutchison. Senator Boxer, let us let him answer the
question.
Senator Boxer. Well, I am trying to, but I know what a
filibuster is when I see one. I am trying to find out where you
are cutting it from.
Senator Hutchison. He is--just let him have a chance to at
least respond, and then you.
Mr. Hutchinson. There is two aspects to this. One is the
Federal leadership role which I have described. The security--
--
Senator Boxer. I am sorry?
Mr. Hutchinson. Federal leadership role, which would be in
defining the baseline of security and having the capability of
threat response, research and development.
The other aspect is the funding of the money. The grant
money that would be available for the urban areas will more
than double in the President's 2005 budget to $1.4 billion.
That is available for mass transit and the Secretary has
indicated that he will earmark some of that money so it will
specifically go to mass transit and rail security. I think that
is an appropriate balance.
Senator Boxer. As opposed to? As opposed to where?
Mr. Hutchinson. Well, it goes directly to the urban areas
for their discretion and flexibility. The fact is the last time
that the money went to the urban areas the cities or the
governmental authorities did not put much in mass transit. We
are saying that has to be a higher priority. So they did not
put it there, so we are going to earmark some of that to make
sure it goes to mass transit, as we did the $115 million.
Senator Boxer. Thank you, and I will just ask you one more
question.
Senator Hutchison. Senator Boxer----
Senator Boxer. These new things that you are doing, how
much do they cost?
Senator Hutchison.--your time is up. Senator Boxer, your
time is up.
Senator Boxer. This is important.
Senator Hutchison. I am going to let you finish this
thought.
Senator Boxer. Everybody else went over time. This is my
last question.
Senator Hutchison. This is your last question.
Senator Boxer. Can you just tell me how much this new
program, this new program to respond to this threat, how much
are you now going to spend on this as a result of Madrid?
Mr. Hutchinson. The initiatives that I outlined that
reflect the Federal leadership role, in threat response, in
research and development, in the security lines----
Senator Boxer. How much? How much?
Mr. Hutchinson.--there should be no additional money except
for the science and technology investment. The additional money
will come in the urban area security grants----
Senator Boxer. How much?
Mr. Hutchinson.--that has more than doubled in the
President's budget to $1.4 billion.
Senator Boxer. You are spending a new $1.4 billion----
Senator Hutchison. Mr. Secretary.
Senator Boxer.--on rail security, is that what you said?
Senator Hutchison. Mr. Secretary.
Senator Boxer. I am so confused.
Senator Hutchison. Mr. Secretary, I would like to talk
about the disparity between the Northeast Corridor and the rest
of the country in Amtrak. At this point, from my figures,
Amtrak received $100 million to secure the New York tunnels,
but spent a mere $5 million on the rest of the nationwide
network.
Now, I certainly understand that New York is a priority,
and I think there are other priorities on the Northeast
Corridor. However, I think that disparity is pretty stark, and
these trains are going through Chicago, they are going through
Dallas, they are going through Houston. These are huge
metropolitan areas.
Do you think that that allocation is going to stand or are
we going to try to show some concern for these other
metropolitan areas, not to mention the rural areas that they go
through?
Mr. Hutchinson. I think your point is well taken.
Obviously, whenever you look at the Amtrak security that needs
to be put in place, it is a combination of what they do for
their own rail systems--I think they put that one particular
section in New York City as a priority. We have to look at
other security around the country and we are doing that through
the infrastructure protection. We went to a higher alert level.
We did deploy more security measures. But I think that we can
balance that more effectively, from what you are saying.
Senator Hutchison. Let me just bring up another point, and
this goes into the freight area and the issue of port security.
Many of us are very concerned. Senator Breaux actually had
great hearings that went on the ports really along the southern
border of our country, and we found that port security is
probably the most in need of attention. We have a situation in
Houston where you have a major port, a major international
port, also a major chemical complex, and a huge railroad
meeting place where all the railroads come in to put the
freight on the ships.
I would like to ask you if port security is on your radar
screen, particularly in this context, where you have rail lines
that go into the ports. I am sure that is also the case in the
New Orleans port and probably all the ports in our country. Do
you give a special emphasis for rail areas at ports and are you
taking any special precautions there?
Mr. Hutchinson. Each port has to do the assessments which
have been completed, and so that would be a part of the
evaluation of vulnerabilities. Then I think it was last year I
think $165 million went out for port security grants that did
include that concern you expressed on the rail intermodal
connection at those ports, and that would be a part of that.
I would have to look specifically as to how much went in
that arena.
Senator Hutchison. Are you concerned about our port
situation, particularly with rail and port together?
Mr. Hutchinson. Yes. I think that our ports as a whole, we
have to be able to enhance the security measures there. That is
a combination of what is done by the private sector and what we
invest, and we need to continue to build on that.
Senator Hutchison. Do you think the industry is stepping up
to the plate in the area of adding to its security and
infrastructure--I'm talking freight industry now--because there
should be some allocation of responsibility here. I do not
think they are stepping up to the plate as much as we would
like for them to. I would like to know your opinion of that and
if you think there is some fair allocation that industry should
bear in this whole security area.
Mr. Hutchinson. You know, it is hard to just come up with
percentages, but clearly we expect the private sector to invest
in it. When it comes to the freight rail sector, I know that
they have invested in security, and I think that there is
certainly more that needs to be done. I think that they have
invested----
Senator Hutchison. Are you satisfied with the amount that
the freight industry has done on its own?
Mr. Hutchinson. I will withhold judgment at this point.
More needs to be done, but I think they have certainly been a
very willing participant up to this point.
Senator Hutchison. Thank you, Mr. Chairman--thank you. I am
the Chairman.
[Laughter.]
Senator Hutchison. Senator Cantwell. McCain's ghost is
standing behind me.
STATEMENT OF HON. MARIA CANTWELL,
U.S. SENATOR FROM WASHINGTON
Senator Cantwell. Thank you, Madam Chairman.
Secretary Hutchinson, thank you for your attention to the
northern border. We appreciate that very much.
I had a question. I cannot remember the timing of your
appointment and the formation of a freight protocol with
Canada. I think that happened roughly about the same time, but
that is within your jurisdiction. And I wondered, given the
situation that we have in only making our border secure as the
cooperation with our neighbors, do you believe that we need to
have a passenger protocol with Canada established to make sure
that we are coordinating screening and various processes with
Canada?
Mr. Hutchinson. Yes, I think we need to do more in that
arena. If you are looking at rail passengers, first, we are
hoping to get advanced information on those passengers so that
we can review those before they come into the United States. If
you are looking in terms of the auto passengers that come
across the borders, we are continuing to build on our
cooperation with Canada. You are speaking of the freight area?
Senator Cantwell. I am saying we have a freight
transportation protocol, because obviously the point of origin
of cargo and goods coming into the United States, we wanted to
have better security. Obviously, I think the same would apply
for passenger rail, that you would want to establish some sort
of U.S.-Canadian protocol on how we treat security and
screening at those various points of origin.
Mr. Hutchinson. That is exactly correct. We are first
addressing it in a cooperative fashion, but we are also
mandating, working to get the information on the passengers
that come in in advance of departure so that we can vet those
names. In the inspection process, we are continuing to look at
more opportunities for partnering with Canada in that regard.
Senator Cantwell. So that would be establishing a protocol?
I mean, I would encourage the Department and the agency to
establish a protocol, given the case in Washington where we had
somebody load up with explosives and go to the U.S.-Canadian
border and try to come over through Port Angelis. It was only
the great work of a Customs, actually Immigration and Customs
working in tandem, that was able to find a carload of
explosives on the way to either the Space Needle or LAX.
So getting that porous situation basically bolstered by a
protocol on cooperation I think would be very helpful.
Mr. Hutchinson. I agree completely and that is our
intention.
Senator Cantwell. Great.
The second question: Do you think that pilot programs in
and of themselves are a deterrent? Do they create a deterrent
atmosphere in the sense that people are aware of the pilots and
what is going on?
Mr. Hutchinson. In a limited way. I think if you are
looking at the mass transit, the rail passenger pilots,
anything that we are investing in security that is visible is
helpful as a deterrent, yes. But when you are looking at a
massive United States system and we are piloting in one area,
it probably has limited impact.
But the greatest ability is whenever we develop that
capability and we see a threat that we know we have the
expertise that we can respond with that implementation of
enhanced screening.
Senator Cantwell. So you actually think it is somewhat of a
deterrent, I guess is what you are saying?
Mr. Hutchinson. It depends upon the pilot and the nature of
it. I think that the fact that this would be visible certainly
is a deterrent in that area, absolutely.
Senator Cantwell. Well, given the Madrid situation and
given that we are dealing with explosives and backpacks--and
nothing against the Northwest because they are great people,
but we carry backpacks like some people carry briefcases. So
our trains are filled with people with backpacks. So why not
establish one of the pilot programs in the Northwest--or why
not have a couple of these pilot programs as a way to establish
the different use and activities that are going on within those
regions?
Mr. Hutchinson. We will continue to look at appropriate
locations for that, and we might potentially be able to expand
that. I think when you look at deterrence, the greatest
deterrent is the use of K-9's that actually go through a mass
population center, a station, and when people are traveling and
see that presence I think that would certainly discourage
illegal behavior and explosives particularly.
Senator Cantwell. I am glad you brought up that point
because I am a little confused. I want to understand exactly
how this works. Obviously, we are subjected to this every day
on a daily basis as we come in and out of the Capitol. But a
lot of people get on the Amtrak system, throw their backpacks
in the overhead compartment, and leave them there. Are we
saying that K-9's walking through the corridor of a train are
able to detect whether a backpack in an overhead bin has
explosives in it?
Mr. Hutchinson. Well, they might have to get a little bit
closer in proximity. But I think that would have some benefit
because they would be sniffing trash receptacles and other
places where it could be deposited to accomplish damage. But
also prior to entry onto the station, as the population is
milling in the waiting area before embarking on the train,
their presence there would have not only a deterrent effect,
but a real detection capability. That is why they are used very
effectively already.
Mr. Jamison. Senator, I would like to also add that when
you take into account many of the transit agencies which carry
substantially more passengers than Amtrak have adopted
unattended bag policies and called the bomb squad and
appropriate officials when they have an unattended bag, which
allows them to focus on that detection capability.
Senator Cantwell. Well, I am actually a big fan of the K-9
units because of our porous northern border, where we have been
unable to have significant manpower, and we have used them
successfully in parts of Okanogan County where we do not have a
lot of huge population transportation, but we have a lot of
people trying to sneak through. Somebody just found I think it
was a half a million dollars in a backpack from a drug deal
that had gone wrong along that area.
So those K-9's have been effective. I guess I would ask you
to consider a pilot in this region and consider the challenge
of people getting on and off the system at various points. So
you would either have to have some sort of screening of that
backpack or cargo of the individual or a K- 9 unit at every
stop, because literally it is that porous, where anybody can
get on the system.
Mr. Hutchinson. Absolutely. It is not an optimum solution
to have that type of inspection for people who expect to get on
an open system. So it would be, hopefully, only deployed on a
limited basis in response to a particular threat. But we need
to have that experience.
Senator Cantwell. I see my time has expired.
Senator Hutchison. I want to thank all of you for coming.
Mr. Secretary, you certainly took the majority of the
questions, and I understand we are going to have a port
security hearing tomorrow at which you will be in attendance.
So we appreciate that because these two dovetail and we must
address them, I think, a little more, in a more comprehensive
way. I think this is a vulnerability that we have and I would
like to see us make it a higher priority.
Mr. Hutchinson. Thank you, Senator.
Senator Hutchison. Thank you all very much, and I would
like to call the second panel. The second panel is: Dr. Jack
Riley, the Director of RAND Public Safety and Justice, from the
RAND Corporation; Mr. Ed Hamberger, President and Chief
Executive Officer of the Association of American Railroads; Mr.
William Millar, President of the American Public Transportation
Association; and Mr. John O'Connor, Chief of Patrol, National
Railroad Passenger Corporation.
[Pause.]
Senator Hutchison. We certainly thank all of you for
attending. You will provide a little different perspective from
the ground and we appreciate that very much.
I will start to my left, with Mr. Riley.
STATEMENT OF JACK RILEY, Ph.D., DIRECTOR OF PUBLIC SAFETY AND
JUSTICE, RAND CORPORATION
Dr. Riley. Thank you, Madam Chairwoman. I have provided
written testimony that I ask be included in the record.
Senator Hutchison. Without objection.
Dr. Riley. In that event, I will keep my remarks brief. I
will start with a quick summary of what we know about rail
terrorism. The RAND terrorism data base, which chronicles and
details more than 16,000 terrorist incidents across the world,
would rank the Madrid attacks among the most deadly and the
most sophisticated that we have ever encountered. That said,
however, rail attacks are generally in the mid-range in terms
of attacks on public transportation and surface transportation
systems. They are more frequent than attacks on air
transportation systems, but they are less frequent and
generally less deadly than those that occur against bus
transportation.
In recent years there has been no discernible trend, no
increase or decrease that we can note, in terms of rail
attacks. Generally, the rail attacks that exist out there are,
particularly in places like Spain, the Chechen Republic, and
other places, are tied to separatist conflicts and long,
ongoing conflicts between ethnic parties.
Like air and bus transportation, rail transportation has
several unique vulnerabilities that make it attractive to
terrorists. I think the two most important, one each on the
passenger and freight side: on the passenger side, rail
facilities are by their very nature open, they have very high
passenger densities, and they could be attacked with something
as simple as a backpack-sized bomb, as we saw in Madrid.
In contrast, freight rail is responsible for moving
approximately 40 percent of our intercity freight and half of
the Nation's hazardous materials, often through densely
populated urban areas. Thus these are potentially important and
visible targets to terrorists in this country.
What has been done to secure our rail transportation?
Others will testify in detail. I will recount some of the more
important steps that I have seen taken. Prior to September 1-
September 11 and the terrorist attacks of 2001, the FRA had
already required passenger rail systems to have drills, to have
emergency plans in place, and to be ready for serious
incidents. This is in part a function of the number of
passenger rail accidents that occur, natural hazards, things
like floods, hurricanes, and earthquakes, power outages, and so
forth. But there was a fair amount that was in place even prior
to September 11, 2001.
These evacuation skills and this preparedness were very
useful in the collapse of the World Trade Center because the
PATH train network was directly responsible for evacuating more
than 5,000 people from the basement of the World Trade Center
prior to its collapse and probably preventing many additional
casualties.
Since September 11, 2001, passenger systems have conducted
further drills, testing, preparation for emergencies. Many
systems, as you have heard, have initiated suspicious package
programs and many systems are experimenting with systems to
detect chemical, biological, and other weapons.
Freight rail initiatives again you will hear in detail. I
will not go into much, but they have included: strengthened
coordination with the Department of Homeland Security; improved
oversight over operations, equipment; and increased
surveillance.
There is more that we can do. Perhaps the best lesson and
the best set of incidents that we could learn from prior to the
Madrid bombings were the sustained IRA attacks on the United
Kingdom's rail system. What we learned from those attacks was
the importance of securing access to rail facilities, improving
surveillance, integrating blast-resistant trash bins, and
training of personnel and passengers to be the eyes and ears
and be a part of security.
Many of these lessons can be adapted both to U.S. passenger
rail systems and to the freight rail system. Further
information is needed on how much should be spent on rail
security relative to the security of other potential targets.
No system of security will be perfect, but the rail system
decisionmaking process in the context of security is very
decentralized. Federal policy on rail terrorism should really
define a Federal role in preventing or mitigating such attacks
and define the roles and responsibilities of government
agencies, transportation companies, and system users in
preventing attacks and responding to their consequences.
In short, we need the threat and vulnerability assessments
that have been called for and we need the assessments to
generate the corresponding list of priorities.
I would be happy to answer any questions.
[The prepared statement of Dr. Riley follows:]
Prepared Statement of Jack Riley,\1\ Director, Public Safety and
Justice, RAND Corporation
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ The opinions and conclusions expressed in this testimony are
the author's alone and should not be interpreted as representing those
of RAND or any of the sponsors of its research. This product is part of
the RAND Corporation testimony series. RAND testimonies record
testimony presented by RAND associates to federal, state, or local
legislative committees; government-appointed commissions and panels;
and private review and oversight bodies. The RAND Corporation is a
nonprofit research organization providing objective analysis and
effective solutions that address the challenges facing the public and
private sectors around the world. RAND's publications do not
necessarily reflect the opinions of its research clients and sponsors.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Introduction
Chairman McCain, Ranking Member Hollings, and members of the
Committee, I am very pleased to be here today to testify about our
state of knowledge on terrorism and rail security. As the recent events
in Madrid, Spain demonstrate, terrorist acts against our rail system
can have deadly consequences.
My testimony today is built on the RAND Corporation's long
involvement in analyzing the dynamics of terrorism. Since the 1970s,
RAND has maintained databases of terrorism incidents now containing
information on more than 16,000 terrorist attacks. Our contributions to
terrorism studies prior to the attacks of September 11 included
analysis of the rise of extremist religious motivations in terrorist
attacks, the first independent and empirical assessment of national
preparedness for domestic terrorism, and support for the Gilmore
Commission (formally, the Advisory Panel to Assess Domestic Response
Capabilities for Terrorism Involving Weapons of Mass Destruction).
Since the attacks of September 11, RAND has advised on terrorism risk
at the highest levels of the public and private sectors, including our
support for the Department of Homeland Security's development of the
National Response Plan/National Incident Management System, our
modeling of national smallpox vaccination strategies, and our
development of a Center for Terrorism Risk Management Policy that
conducts policy analyses on complicated aspects of terrorism risk,
liability and compensation.
Prior to the recent Madrid and Chechen terrorist train bombings,
RAND also initiated terrorism risk reduction studies for the Federal
Railroad Administration (FRA) and for Amtrak. Because this work is
still in progress, my comments today will focus on only published RAND
research results and information from other sources.
Terrorist Attacks on Rail Transportation Targets
Between 1998 and 2003, there were approximately 181 attacks on
trains and related rail targets such as depots, ticket stations and
rail bridges worldwide.\2\ Attacks on light rail systems and subway
systems are included in these estimates. Attacks have occurred in all
comers of the globe, including Venezuela, Colombia, India, Pakistan,
Spain and the United Kingdom. These attacks resulted in an estimated
431 deaths and several thousand injuries. Bombs were the most
frequently used weapon in these attacks, although firearms and arson
have also been used. Table 1 summarizes terrorist incidents and deaths
from attacks on rail facilities for 1998-2003.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\2\ These estimates are taken from the RAND-MIPT Terrorism Incident
Database, which covers terrorist incidents from 1998 to the present.
The database can be accessed at: http://db.mipt.org/mipt_rand.cfm.
Given the short time available to prepare this testimony, the figures
used from the database should not be regarded as precise counts.
Table 1.--Terrorist Rail Attacks, 1998-2003
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Year Incidents Deaths Notable incident
------------------------------------------------------------------------
1998 48 92 Train bomb in Pakistan killed
23.
1999 5 2 Two die in Ethiopia; only
fatal rail attack of year.
2000 13 0 No rail deaths from terrorist
acts.
2001 41 275 Angolan rebels kill 252 with
bomb, gunfire.
2002 60 41 Track sabotage kills 20 in
India.
2003 14 21 Bomb in Mumbai, India commuter
train kills 10.
------------------------------------------------------------------------
TOTAL 181 431 ..............................
------------------------------------------------------------------------
The recent attack in Madrid, thought to be the work of al Qaeda
sympathizers, ranks among the most sophisticated rail terrorist
attacks, with its near simultaneous detonation of 10 charges. In terms
of overall casualties, it would rank second to an August 2001 attack by
Angolan separatist rebels who, using a combination of remote detonation
of explosives and directed gunfire, killed 252 rail passengers. Such
attacks are outliers among those of recent years. Aside from the 2001
Angola attack, for example, Table 1 shows that the average rail attack
between 1998 and 2003 resulted, on average, in about one death per
incident.
Rail in Comparison to Other Transportation Targets
Rail attacks are more numerous and deadly than those on airports
and airplanes, but have not been as numerous or resulted in as many
deaths as those on buses and related infrastructure such as ticket
offices and depots. Table 2 summarizes terrorist attacks on other
transportation targets between 1998 and 2003. Buses and related
infrastructure such as ticket offices and depots have been attacked by
terrorists half again as often as trains and their related
infrastructure, with about 1.6 deaths per incident. A large proportion
of the bus incidents involve sniper fire at Israeli vehicles moving
through the Occupied Territories. Spain, Colombia, India and Pakistan
are other frequent locations of bus attacks. Most modem terrorist
attacks on transportation systems can be tied to ongoing separatist
conflicts, including those by Chechen rebels in Russia, Basque
guerillas in Spain, Irish Republican Army terrorists in the United
Kingdom, and Palestinians in Israel and the Occupied Territories. There
appears to be little significance in the year-to-year trends of attacks
against transportation targets.
Table 2.--Terrorist Attacks against Transportation Targets, 1998-2003
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Trains/Rail Airports/Airplanes Buses and Other
Year -----------------------------------------------------------
Incidents Deaths Incidents Deaths Incidents Deaths
------------------------------------------------------------------------
1998 48 92 15 2 57 150
1999 5 2 6 0 21 8
2000 13 0 2 0 38 2
2001 41 275 11 3 57 52
2002 60 41 24 3 96 159
2003 14 21 11 25 24 96
------------------------------------------------------------------------
TOTAL 181 431 69 33 293 467
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Rail Vulnerabilities and Issues
Like air and bus transportation, rail transportation has several
unique features making it inherently vulnerable to attack. Rail
passenger facilities in particular rely on open architecture and the
rapid and easy movement of patrons in and out of facilities and on and
off trains. In addition, both freight and passenger rail networks
traverse dense urban landscapes that may offer multiple attack points
and easy escape as well as vast rural stretches that are difficult to
patrol and secure.
Below we consider further some of the specific vulnerabilities of,
and security issues regarding, passenger and freight rail systems.
Passenger Rail
Passenger rail facilities present potentially inviting targets for
terrorists for a variety of reasons. They are easily penetrated and may
have high concentrations of people. The logistics of a passenger rail
attack are comparatively simple. For example, given the typical
passenger density in a passenger rail station, substantial casualties
can be inflicted with a backpack-sized bomb. This is a substantially
lower logistical burden than the one faced by the terrorists who
committed the September 11 attacks.
In addition, terrorists likely perceive psychological benefits to
attacking passenger transportation networks. Rail transportation, like
air travel, necessitates the passengers' willingness to put personal
safety in the hands of others. An attack is likely to leave passengers
reluctant, however temporarily, to travel on the passenger rail system.
The measures used to secure airports and airplanes are likely to be
impractical with passenger trains. Airports make extensive use of
passenger profiling, passenger screening, metal detectors, X-ray
machines, explosives sniffers, hand searchers, and armed guards.\3\
Such measures necessarily add to costs and travel times. Passengers
expect rail transportation, including commuter lines and subways, to be
fast and inexpensive. Security measures resulting in increased fares or
longer travel times would likely lead to losses in ridership. Physical
space constraints in some locations, coupled with commuter densities,
make it nearly impossible to construct rail station ``safe zones'' like
those separating check-in counters from departure gates at airports.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\3\ Brian Michael Jenkins and Larry N. Gersten, ``Protecting Public
Surface Transportation Against Terrorism and Serious Crime: Continuing
Research on Best Security Practices,'' Mineta Transportation Institute,
College of Business, San Jose State University, September 2001.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
At the same time, while passenger rail facilities and networks in
and of themselves may be attractive targets, it seems unlikely that
terrorists could exploit the passenger rail network as a weapon in the
way that the air transportation network was exploited on September 11.
Given that trains travel dedicated routes, they are less likely to be
diverted to specific targets. In recent decades, there are few examples
of train hijackings, and apparently none that have been identified
since 1998.
Freight Rail
Freight rail does not offer terrorists high densities of passenger
targets, but it does provide terrorists with some opportunities that
passenger rail does not afford. In particular, freight rail is used to
transport hazardous materials and dangerous cargoes. An estimated 40
percent of inter-city freight, including half of the Nation's hazardous
materials (based on ton miles), moves by rail.\4\ In some
circumstances, these cargoes are transported through densely populated
urban areas. Two accidents involving freight rail help illustrate some
of the potential issues associated with hazardous cargoes:
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\4\ ``Freight Railroad Security Plan,'' Association of American
Railroads at www.aar.org/rail safety/rail security plan.asp accessed on
August 8, 2003.
A train carrying liquid fertilizer derailed in a small North
Dakota town in January 2002. The incident killed one and
hospitalized 15. The accident punctured 18 cars and resulted in
a toxic cloud. Residents within a 3-mile radius of the incident
were evacuated.\5\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\5\ ``Derailed Train Leaks Gas in ND City.'' NBC News.com. January
18, 2002.
In July 2001 a railcar caught fire in a tunnel under
downtown Baltimore. The fire, which took five days to
extinguish, involved chemicals and other cargo on the train.
Rail movements throughout the Northeast Corridor, fiber optic
communications, light rail passenger trains in the downtown
area, and Amtrak passenger trains were all disrupted during the
incident.
What Has Been Done to Secure Rail Transportation?
In the aftermath of the September 11 terrorist attacks, rail
transportation and security officials undertook a variety of measures
to improve passenger and freight rail security.
Passenger Rail
Even before the September 11 terrorist attacks, the FRA had
required passenger trains to have emergency plans in place. One reason
for this requirement, and for the attention the Railroad Administration
has had to give such general issues, is that passenger train accidents
are not infrequent. According to FRA statistics, there were 265
passenger train accidents in 2000 and 201 in 2001.\6\ The emergency
response skills that operators of passenger trains had acquired were
crucial to limiting casualties in the immediate aftermath of the
September 11 terrorist attacks, when Port Authority Trans-Hudson (PATH)
trains helped evacuate more than 5,000 persons from the basement of the
World Trade Center.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\6\ Accessed at http://www.railroad-accident.com/html/stats.html,
March 22, 2004.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Since the September 11 terrorist attacks, passenger systems have
conducted further drills, testing, and preparation for emergency
situations. Some systems are experimenting with chemical and biological
detection systems. The sarin attacks in the Tokyo subway system are one
reminder that the next attack on transportation systems may not involve
conventional weapons. The Washington, D.C. subway system recently
initiated a program for identifying suspicious packages in its system.
It is unclear how much training non-security personnel have had in this
program, but such a program can be an important element in increasing
public awareness about the dangers of such packages, and thereby in
reducing the danger from them.
Freight Rail
In the aftermath of the September 11 attacks, the leadership of the
freight rail industry generated more than 100 action items, a multi-
stage alert system, and round-the-clock communications with homeland
security and national defense officials.\7\ These action items were
based on the results of a strategic review of the transportation of
hazardous materials, the security of the industry's information
infrastructure, freight rail operations and infrastructure, and
military needs relating to the rail network. The critical action items
included the need to: \8\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\7\ Freight Railroad Security Plan,'' Association of American
Railroads at www.aar.org/rail_safety/rail_security_plan.asp accessed on
August 8, 2003.
\8\ Curt Secrest, ``Railroad Security Issues,'' presented to the
Pennsylvania Joint Rail Freight Seminar on May 9, 2002, Philadelphia,
PA.
Integrate protective housings, valves and fittings into
hazardous transport infrastructure to prevent tampering and
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
facilitate emergency response.
Increase surveillance of freight equipment, through training
of staff on observation and the installation of video
surveillance equipment.
Improve operations by monitoring for signal tampering;
requiring crews and dispatchers to verify communications for
train movements and dispatches; and locking locomotive doors to
prevent hijackings.
Secure the information infrastructure that terrorists could
use to enhance attacks or cause systemic shutdowns.
Collaborate with the Department of Defense (DOD) to ensure
the viability of STRACNET (Strategic Rail Corridor Network)--
designated rail lines that are capable of meeting unique DOD
requirements, such as the ability to handle heavy, high or wide
loads.
What Can Be Done to Improve Rail Security?
Because few rail systems have been confronted with sustained terror
campaigns, it is difficult to evaluate the effects of security
measures. The United Kingdom's experience with IRA attacks on rail
infrastructure offers one of the better opportunities to understand
both terrorist behavior and the value of security measures. Analysis of
the IRA bombing campaigns in London shows that the terrorists sought to
exploit simple gaps in security.\9\ Examples of such gaps included
breaks in fencing allowing access to certain targets, poor lighting
allowing concealment of actions, and litter bins allowing hiding of
packages.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\9\ Brian Michael Jenkins and Larry N. Gersten, ``Protecting Public
Surface Transportation Against Terrorism and Serious Crime.''
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The analysis of these incidents led to the development of a broad
security strategy that addressed some of the more glaring weaknesses
exploited by the terrorists. The security elements included:
Repairing gaps in fei1cing to provide more control around
the perimeter of rail facilities.
Improving lighting, both to deter terrorists and to improve
facility observation.
Installing blast resistant trash containers to reduce the
utility of placing bombs in trash containers while ensuring
that passengers had a place to dispose of trash (and that
bombers would be less able to hide explosives among accumulated
trash).
Installing close-circuit television to provide
stationmasters and security personnel with better visibility
throughout the facilities.
Installing signage to increase awareness about the danger of
unattended packages and to improve the ability to evacuate
facilities during emergencies.
Training of personnel and passengers to have a role in
security by reporting suspicious behavior, identifying
suspicious (especially unattended) packages and luggage, and
improving readiness for evacuation and emergency actions.
Other methods used in Britain included covert testing of security
measures, increased presence of armed personnel and security officers,
and the use of public communication strategies to advise on threats,
service disruptions and the availability of alternate routes and
transportation methods.
It is also important to prepare for hoaxes and false alarms, both
of which can disrupt rail operations. If there were to be a passenger
rail attack in the United States, it seems likely that there would be
an increase in false alarms in the aftermath (as, for example, happened
in the aftermath of the anthrax letters of 2001). It is therefore
important for rail officials to develop policies and procedures for
dealing with hoaxes and false alarms so that these would not unduly
burden rail operations.
The U.K. security measures are broadly applicable to the U.S.
passenger rail system. Nevertheless, there are two important gaps in
our knowledge. First, it is not clear how much should be spent on rail
security relative to security at other potential targets. Second, the
cost effectiveness of these rail measures has not been assessed. Threat
assessments are required to address both of these issues.
Improving Freight Rail Security
Many of the elements identified as improving security for passenger
rail are applicable to freight rail as well. To a considerable extent,
the security of the Nation's freight rail system is in the hands of the
private sector. At the same time, freight rail competes with trucks and
other transport modes for business, and thus it is important that the
size and incidence of security costs be considered, and how the private
sector might be provided with incentives to improve security.
There is concern about the resilience and robustness of the freight
rail system. Many key freight corridors are heavily used, compete with
passenger trains for track space, and suffer from a lack of alternative
routes. Attacks on critical freight nodes or functions could therefore
create substantial bottlenecks and throughput pressures. Some
characterize the freight rail system as ``growing simultaneously more
robust and more fragile.'' \10\ Robustness is evident in the
considerable growth in the freight rail industry, and the relatively
large shares of freight by tonnage and value that the rail system
carries.\11\ Concerns about fragility arise from the continued focus on
just-in-time manufacturing and logistics, and the freight rail
industry's corresponding need to build capacity that serves these
manufacturing patterns.\12\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\10\ Michael Wolfe, ``Freight Transportation Security and
Productivity,'' paper for the FHWA Office of Freight Management and
Operations, April 2002.
\11\ ``Freight-Rail Bottom Line Report,'' American Association of
State Highway and Transportation Officials (AASHTO), 2003.
\12\ AASHTO, 2003, pp. 46-47.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Some, however, are more confident that the national transportation
infrastructure is resilient and that the system is unlikely to collapse
because of any single attack. The National Research Council concluded
that surface transportation systems are more vulnerable to point
attacks than systemic attacks ``because of the decentralized,
multimodal character of surface transportation, mounting a system-wide
attack with large spatial and temporal impact would be difficult.''
\13\ In particular, experience with natural disasters that have
affected multiple elements of the system suggests a substantial amount
of systemic resilience.\14\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\13\ ''Improving Surface Transportation Security: A Research and
Development Strategy,'' National Research Council, 1999, Washington,
D.C.
\14\ Michael Wolfe, Freight Transportation Security and
Productivity: Complete Report. Long Beach, CA: Intermodal Freight
Security and Technology Workshop, April 27-29, 2002. p. 12.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Next Steps
No security system for passenger and freight rail will be perfect.
It is therefore critical to consider the consequences of what security
failures might mean, and to balance these potential consequences with
priorities for preventing them. Little is known about how long it might
take to restart the passenger and freight rail systems in the aftermath
of an attack similar to those of September 11. Similarly, there are
complex issues of liability that relate to existing legislation such as
the Terrorism Risk Insurance Act.
There are tools at our disposal that will help improve our
understanding of passenger and freight rail security issues. Simulation
exercises and games, for example, can help identify weaknesses in
response capacities and deepen our understanding of how to resume
activities in the aftermath of an attack. Similarly, threat assessments
can be useful for guiding decisions about how much, and where, to spend
on passenger and freight rail security programs.
There is a need for a coordinated Federal policy on rail security,
encompassing freight, passenger and commuter rails. Compared to other
transportation sectors, decision-making appears to be quite
decentralized between a number of federal, state, local, and private
concerns. A coordinated approach for counterterrorism measures in the
rail transportation system should undertake three tasks. First, it
should define the Federal role in preventing or mitigating such
attacks. Second, it should prioritize investments needed for preventing
attacks against rail transportation systems with those needed to
prevent attacks against other transportation systems. Third, it should
define the roles and responsibilities of federal, state, and local
agencies, transportation companies, and passengers and freight shippers
in preventing terrorist attacks against rail systems and in responding
to their consequences.
Given the magnitude of the recent attacks in Spain, it would be
prudent to undertake such planning steps in the near future.
Senator Hutchison. Thank you.
Mr. Hamberger.
STATEMENT OF HON. EDWARD R. HAMBERGER,
PRESIDENT AND CHIEF EXECUTIVE OFFICER,
ASSOCIATION OF AMERICAN RAILROADS
Mr. Hamberger. Thank you, Madam Chairman. On behalf of the
members of the Association of American Railroads, thank you for
holding this hearing today and giving us the opportunity to
testify. AAR members account for the vast majority of freight
rail mileage, freight employees, and freight revenue in the
United States, Canada, and Mexico.
Let me just address your question right out, Madam
Chairman: Did we step to the plate? I believe that the railroad
industry reacted swiftly and positively to the terrorist attack
of September 11. But more importantly, Admiral James Loy,
Deputy Secretary of the Department of Homeland Security,
testified recently on the House side, saying: ``AAR and its
members have been terrific in coming to the plate and helping
us figure strategic plans for the transportation sector.''
Recognizing the character of some of the cargo that we
carry and having a history of putting the safety of our
employees and the communities in which we operate as our top
priority, railroads did on their own initiative conduct a
thorough risk analysis of the rail network to identify
vulnerabilities and develop countermeasures. This resulted in
the implementation of an industry-wide, risk-based rail
security plan that used CIA and intelligence communities best
practices.
I emphasize that we went outside of our industry to use
these outside experts with a background in intelligence
because, as Senator Biden pointed out earlier this morning, we
did not know how terrorists think. We wanted to look at our
system the way terrorists would look at our system. Using this
perspective, we came up with a plan that defines four security
alert levels and details specific actions to be taken at each
level.
It also raised our baseline of security by implementing 53
permanent changes in rail operations, including one suggested
by the gentleman on my right, employee training and awareness
so that we have an army of over 200,000 sets of eyes and ears
out there on the railway.
We are currently at level 2, which tracks very closely the
specific countermeasures suggested to the private sector to be
taken at Code Level Orange by the Department of Homeland
Security.
But, as has been discussed here, the rail network is vast
and open. Our risk assessment identified over 1300 critical
assets based on the need for protection of commerce,
population, and military cargo. Consequently, we needed to come
up with a security infrastructure that would allow railroads to
focus our resources on where the threat is greatest. This
requires that railroads quickly receive the latest intelligence
data, including threat information, from government agencies.
Consequently, we are in constant communication with pertinent
intelligence and security personnel at DHS, DOD, Department of
Transportation, the FBI's National Joint Terrorism Task Force,
as well as State and local enforcement agencies.
Knowledgeable railroad analysts literally work side by side
with government intelligence analysts at the NJTTF and DHS to
help evaluate information at the Top Secret level. To my
knowledge, we are the only industry sector to have made this
commitment.
The heart of this communications system is the Railway
Alert Network, or RAN, which was established after 9/11 to
provide terrorism threat information to the industry. The hub
of the RAN is in the AAR's operations center a few blocks from
here, which operates at the Secret level and is staffed with
mobile communications around the clock. The RAN is liked to the
Surface Transportation Information Sharing and Analysis Center,
yet another acronym, the ST-ISAC, which was created by the AAR
at the request of the Department of Transportation, to collect,
analyze, and distribute security information to protect both
physical assets and information technology systems. Personnel
there are cleared at the Top Secret level and it operates 24
hours a day.
In addition to the freight railroads, Amtrak and 75
commuter and transit rail authorities are members of the ST-
ISAC.
Of course, one area that receives special attention from
the railroads is the movement of hazardous materials. The
uninterrupted flow of hazardous materials is necessary for the
health and safety of the United States as well as its economic
growth. Chlorine, for example, is critical to physical health
because it is used to purify more than half of the Nation's
water supplies and is used in the manufacturing of a huge array
of pharmaceutical products.
This vividly underscores the tension between the need for
the free flow of commerce and the need for security.
Recognizing this tension, the railroads worked closely with the
Government agencies and major customer groups to avoid
logistical gaps in the supply chain. For example, the Chlorine
Institute used the same outside expert security team that we
did to develop a chlorine transportation security plan that
dovetails very closely with the railroads' plan.
Let me just say that the railroads are opposed to
legislation that would grant State and local governments the
ability to restrict rail movements of hazardous materials.
Because rail transportation is interstate in nature, it
requires a uniform set of standards that apply nationwide. This
uniformity would be severely jeopardized if states or
localities sought to force rerouting by prohibiting the
transportation of hazardous materials within their
jurisdictions.
Rerouting would lead to an increase in miles traveled,
increased switching and handling of cars, thereby potentially
increasing exposure, and only transfer that exposure from one
community to another. It could also lead to the diversion of
hazardous materials shipments to the highways, and the most
recent DOT data indicate that on a ton-miles basis hazardous
material releases are 16 times as likely to occur on highways
as on rails.
Freight railroads are proud of the efforts we have taken to
keep our Nation's vital rail transportation link open and
secure since the terrorist attacks of September 11 and we will
continue to work with this committee, others in Congress, the
Federal agencies, our customers and other relevant parties to
further enhance the safety and security of the Nation's
railroads.
Thank you.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Hamberger follows:]
Prepared Statement of Edward R. Hamberger, President and Chief
Executive Officer, Association of American Railroads
On behalf of the members of the Association of American Rai1roads
(AAR), thank you for the opportunity to meet with you today to discuss
railroad security. AAR members account for the vast majority of rail
mileage, employees, and revenue in Canada, Mexico, and the United
States.
The AAR and its members join the rest of our Nation in extending
our sympathy and condolences to the victims of the recent terrorist
attacks in Madrid. Those senseless attacks underscore the unfortunate
reality that the global war on terror remains unfinished. The attacks
also remind us of the importance of security as it relates in
particular to railroads.
Freight railroads are keenly aware of the tension between the need
for transportation efficiency and the assurance that our transportation
systems are adequately protected from terrorist threats. We urge
Congress to strike a proper balance between protecting our country's
transportation assets and its citizens, and providing for the free flow
of goods and promoting our international competitiveness. As Secretary
Mineta has remarked, ``What we don't want is for our checkpoints to
become chokepoints.''
Below I will discuss the many ways that U.S. freight railroads have
addressed security in the post-9/11 era.
The Immediate Aftermath of September 11
The rail industry reacted swiftly to the events of September 11, in
full cooperation with government authorities. In the immediate
aftermath of the attacks, railroads tightened security and intensified
inspections across their systems. Major railroads--which maintain their
own police forces to help assure the security of employees, property,
and freight--put into place more than 50 countermeasures to help ensure
the security of the industry. For example, access to important rail
facilities and information was restricted. The industry significantly
increased cyber-security procedures and techniques. Employee records
were compared with FBI terrorist lists. Security briefings, like safety
briefings, became a daily part of many employees' jobs.
In late September 2001, the AAR Board of Directors established a
Railroad Security Task Force. The task force had the full participation
of AAR members, including our Canadian and Mexican members and the
American Short Line and Regional Railroad Association (ASLRRA). The
overarching focus of this task force was (1) to ensure the safety of
rail employees and the communities in which railroads operate; (2) to
protect the viability of national and regional economic activity; and
(3) to ensure that railroads can continue to play their vital role in
the military mission of our Nation.
Over the next several months, the task force conducted a
comprehensive risk analysis of the freight rail industry. Using CIA and
national intelligence community ``best practices,'' five critical
action teams (consisting of more than 150 experienced railroad,
customer, and intelligence personnel) examined and prioritized railroad
assets, vulnerabilities, and threats. The critical action teams were:
1. Information Technology and Communications: This team examined
the security of railroad communications, control systems, and
information systems, including the evaluation of procedures regarding
system redundancy, data confidentiality, emergency incident handling,
and reconstitution of service. Based on the efforts of this team, many
security measures were implemented immediately across the industry.
2. Physical Infrastructure: This team assessed the physical
security of essential bridges, buildings, dispatch centers, tunnels,
storage facilities, and other structures. A database of critical assets
was created and recorded in a Geographic Information System. Amtrak's
critical assets are inc1uded in this database. The team also addressed
cross border and port ``gateway'' physical security issues.
3. Operational Security: This team documented the ``life cycle of a
train'' and determined ways to minimize exposure to unplanned
occurrences while trains are in operation. It also addressed the issue
of fuel supply.
4. Hazardous Materials: This team examined the transport of
hazardous materials by rail, with emphasis on materials (such as
potentially poisonous gases) that pose the greatest potential safety
risk. The team identified current shipping patterns for these materials
and worked closely with the chemical industry and tank car
manufacturers to evaluate alternatives, inc1uding routing restrictions,
product remanufacturing, and packaging.
5. Military Liaison: This team worked with the Department of
Defense and its Military Traffic Management Command (MTMC) to determine
immediate and ongoing military traffic requirements and to identify
capacity, security, and equipment needs of the industry to meet
military demand. The Department of Defense relies on freight railroads
to move ordnance and equipment. For example, railroads transported some
98 percent of the ammunition used by the United States in the Iraq war.
The MTMC, recently renamed ``Surface Deployment and Distribution
Command,'' has designated 30,000 miles of rail corridors--known as the
Strategic Rail Corridor Network (STRACNET)--as essential to the
national defense. The AAR is in full agreement with this assessment.
Our nation's railroad route structure is vital to both homeland
security and to the support of DOD initiatives.
In addition to the above activities, freight railroads cooperated
fully with a separate team, involving the Federal Railroad
Administration (FRA), commuter railroads, and Amtrak, dealing with rail
passenger security.
The Terrorism Risk Analysis and Security Management Plan
The end result of the work of the freight railroad critical action
teams was the development of a Terrorism Risk Analysis and Security
Management Plan (``Plan''), a comprehensive, 24/7 priority-based
blueprint of actions designed to enhance the security of the Nation's
freight rail network and its ability to support our economy, national
defense, and public health.
The AAR Board of Directors adopted the Plan on December 6, 2001,
and it remains in effect today. The security processes and analyses
detailed in the Plan, including actions and countermeasures, are
periodically evaluated--and modified, as appropriate--for effectiveness
and to ensure maximum efficiencies from advances in security technology
and procedures.
The Plan defines four security alert levels and details the actions
to be taken at each level as the terrorist threat increases. Alert
level actions are applied in the areas of operations (including
transportation, engineering, and mechanical), information technology/
telecommunications, and railroad police.
Alert Level 1 is ``New Normal Day to Day Operations'' and exists
when a general threat of possible terrorist activity exists but
warrants only a routine security posture. Thirty-two actions are in
effect at this level, including conducting security training and
awareness activities; restricting certain information to a need-to-know
basis; restricting the ability of unauthenticated persons to trace
certain sensitive materials; and periodically testing that security
systems are operating as intended.
Alert Level 2 is ``Heightened Security Awareness'' and applies when
there is a general non-specific threat of possible terrorist activity
involving railroad personnel and facilities. Twenty-one additional
actions are in effect at this level, such as including security and
awareness briefings as part of daily job briefings; conducting content
inspections of cars and containers for cause; conducting spot content
inspections of motor vehicles on railroad property; and increasing
security at designated facilities.
As of today, the freight rail industry is at Alert Level 2, with a
number of added security actions focused on transportation of certain
hazardous materials in several metropolitan areas. These extra
precautions are in place to address special circumstances as described
to the railroad industry by the Department of Homeland Security.
Alert Level 3 is put into place when there is ``a credible threat
of an attack on the United States or railroad industry.'' It applies
when an increased, credible, and more specific threat of terrorist
activity exists than at Level 2. A decision to declare Level 3 will be
evaluated in light of the specificity of threat against railroad
personnel and facilities. The 40 additional actions in Level 3 must be
capable of being maintained for weeks without causing undue hardship on
railroads or their customers. Examples of Level 3 actions include
further restricting physical access and increasing security vigilance
at control centers, communications hubs, and other designated
facilities and requesting National Guard security for critical assets.
Alert Level 4 applies when a confirmed threat against the railroad
industry exists, an actual attack against a railroad or an attack in
the United States causing mass casualties has occurred, or other
imminent actions create grave concerns about the safety of operations.
There are 19 additional actions to be implemented at this level that
will be instituted for up to 72 hours and periodically evaluated for
continuation. These include stopping non-mission-essential contract
services with access to critical facilities and systems; increasing
vigilance and scrutiny of railcars and equipment during mechanical
inspections to look for unusual items; and ensuring continuous presence
of guards at designated facilities and structures.
Alert Levels 3 and 4 can be declared industry-wide for a short
period of time or can be declared in a particular geographic or
operational area (e.g., the Midwest or hazardous materials) where or
when intelligence has identified that terrorist action against a
specific location or operation is imminent.
The Railway Alert Network and ST-ISAC
To help ensure that the parties involved have access to pertinent
intelligence and other information, the rail industry is in constant
communication with intelligence and security personnel at the
Department of Homeland Security (DHS), the Department of Defense (DOD),
the Department of Transportation (DOT), the FBI's National Joint
Terrorism Task Force (NJTTF), state and local law enforcement, and
others. A railroad police officer and knowledgeable railroad analysts
work literally side-by-side with government intelligence analysts at
NJTTF and in two intelligence offices within DHS (the Information
Analysis and Infrastructure Protection Directorate and the
Transportation Security Administration) to help evaluate intelligence
at the Top Secret level.
The heart of this communication system is the Railway Alert Network
(RAN). The major purpose of the RAN, which was established by the AAR
shortly after September 11, is to monitor the level of threat to the
rail industry and to alert the industry if it changes. The hub of the
RAN is AAR's Operations Center, which operates at the Secret level and
is staffed with mobile communications around the clock at Alert Level 2
and is physically staffed at Levels 3 and 4.
The RAN is linked to the Surface Transportation Information Sharing
and Analysis Center (ST-ISAC). The ST-ISAC, which was created by the
AAR at the request of the U.S. Department of Transportation, provides a
robust capability for collecting, analyzing, and distributing security
information from worldwide resources to protect vital physical assets
and information technology systems. Cleared at the Top Secret level,
the ST-ISAC also operates 24-hours-a-day, 7-days-a-week. Along with the
freight railroads, Amtrak and approximately 75 transit and commuter
rail authorities (through the American Public Transit Association) are
members of the ST-ISAC.
Obviously, rail security efforts depend a great deal on the efforts
of railroads' dedicated and highly professional employees--including
engineers and conductors aboard trains, maintenance of way crews and
inspectors working along the tracks, railroad police officers, and
others. They are the ``eyes and ears'' in the industry's security
effort, and we should all be grateful for their vigilance and care.\1\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ Under existing Federal law, railroad police officers have law
enforcement authority only while on the property of their own railroad.
However, Section 212 of S. 1402 (the ``Federal Railroad Safety
Improvement Act''), which passed the Senate in November 2003 and has
been referred to the House Committee on Transportation and
Infrastructure, would grant railroad police enforcement authority on
any railroad. Railroads strongly support this provision and commend
this committee for its support of it.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
In recognition of the thoroughness of the railroad security plan
and the dedication with which it has been put into effect, in June 2003
the Association of American Railroads was named a recipient of the U.S.
Department of Defense's James S. Cogswell Award for Industrial
Security. The Cogswell Award is the most prestigious award in the
industrial security field. Of nearly 11,000 cleared contractors, only
15 were selected to receive the award in 2003. The railroad industry is
also one of the few private sector industries to receive an ``A'' for
its security efforts in a recent independent analysis by The Washington
Post.
Notwithstanding all of these rail industry efforts, we recognize
that there can be no 100 percent guarantee against terrorist assaults.
If such an assault involving freight railroads occurs, railroads have
established programs and procedures that can and will be invoked that
are designed to respond to, mitigate, and minimize the impact of
dangerous and unusual incidents. The programs and procedures include
the establishment of emergency response plans for hazardous materials
incidents, operational administration redundancy, and the training of
rail employees and public emergency response personnel.
Railroad Hazardous Materials Movements
Railroads work to ensure the continued safety of hazardous
materials transport in numerous ways.
For example, railroads provide rigorous tank car quality assurance
programs, field testing, and inspections of chemical loading
facilities; assist communities in developing and evaluating emergency
response plans; provide hazmat training for emergency responders; and
support Operation Respond, a nonprofit institute devoted to improving
the communication of emergency response information to police and fire
departments.
Tank cars must meet stringent U.S. DOT specifications if used to
transport hazardous materials. For example, they must be equipped with
pressure relief devices (to protect the tank in the event of fire) and
double shelf couplers (to prevent tank punctures by a coupler). Some
cars also have steel ``head shields'' at each end of the car (to
further protect against puncture), thermal shields, jacketed insulation
systems, and protected top and bottom fittings.
The AAR and the railway supply industry jointly fund the Tank Car
Safety Research and Test Project. This project monitors tank car
accidents and is continually updating a comprehensive database on the
precise nature of damage to tank cars. Analysis of these data improves
safety by improving researchers' ability to identify the causes of tank
car releases and how to help prevent future occurrences. The project
database is often cited by the U.S. DOT as a role model for other modes
of transportation. In addition to its ongoing safety data collection
and analysis activities, the project also has a number of ongoing
research efforts, including efforts aimed at developing better steels
for tank cars and developing a method for testing the effectiveness of
surge suppression devices for tank cars.
Going forward, the railroad industry is committed to using
resources at its disposal and continuing to work closely with Federal
security agencies and with local and state authorities to help ensure
that our Nation's security and safety are not compromised. At the same
time, it must be recognized that the flow of many types of essential
products--including some products that are characterized as ``hazardous
materials''--cannot be unreasonably disrupted without causing
significant damage to our Nation's health and economic well being.
Chlorine, for example, is potentially extremely dangerous if
misused or mistreated. At the same time, the chemical is absolutely
critical to our physical health because of its widespread use as a
purifier at water treatment facilities, in a huge array of
pharmaceutical products, and in hundreds of other uses. Even a brief
shutdown of the transportation of chlorine would have potentially
devastating effects.
The rail industry cautions against actions that might appear
appealing at first glance, but in reality could be contrary to the
public interest. For example, railroads oppose Section 443(g) of S.
1978, the ``Surface Transportation Safety Reauthorization Act of
2003,'' which passed the Senate as part of the TEA-21 reauthorization
bill. This provision authorizes the U.S. DOT to grant to state or local
authorities the power to preempt Federal law regarding hazmat
transportation during certain ``emergency'' situations. Railroads also
oppose efforts to grant to local governments the authority to restrict
rail movements.
Railroads operate as part of an integrated national network and
regulatory constraints on operations can have a ripple effect
throughout the rail system. The effect is not circumscribed by state or
local boundaries. Because rail transportation is inherently interstate
in nature, the safe rail transport of any commodity, including
hazardous materials, requires a uniform set of standards that apply
nationwide.
This uniformity would be severely jeopardized if states or
localities sought to force rerouting by prohibiting the transportation
of hazardous materials within their jurisdictions. If this happened,
optimal transportation routes, from the perspective of national safety
and security, might be foreclosed. For example, rerouting can involve
an increase in miles traveled, and those additional miles could be on
rail infrastructure less suitable (for a variety of reasons) to
handling hazardous materials. Emergency response capability along
alternate routes may lack requisite expertise in handling the most
dangerous commodities. Additional switching and handling of cars along
with added ``dwell time'' in yards--all potential consequences of using
less efficient routes--also have the effect of increasing exposure.
Indeed, given the limited routing options for rail transportation,
rerouting mandates of this sort could effectively result in the near
cessation of hazardous materials transportation by rail, leading to the
diversion of such traffic to the Nation's highways where the likelihood
of accidents involving hazardous materials is far higher.\2\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\2\ According to U.S. DOT data, rai1roads and trucks carry roughly
equal ton-mileage of hazardous materia1s, but trucks have nearly 16
times more hazmat releases than railroads.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Recently, the D.C. City Council has raised concern about the
transportation of hazardous materials through the city. The railroad
industry is cooperating fully with the DHS, the DOT, and the city
government to assess the security of the rail corridor that runs
through Washington, DC. Within the last week, vulnerability assessment
teams conducted an intense review of the railroad property within the
Beltway. Since the terrorist attacks on September 11, 2001, CSX
Transportation, which owns the railroad, has ``hardened'' that corridor
by adding surveillance, restricting access, enhancing Communications,
and coordinating with local law enforcement, U.S. Capitol Police and
the Department of Defense. This ongoing assessment will identify any
additional countermeasures that may be required.
The rail industry agrees that vigilance in the transportation of
hazardous materials must be maintained, and efforts must be made to
increase hazmat safety where possible and practical. But decisions to
reroute potentially hazardous products must be based upon sound
analysis of the consequences. To address problems associated with the
transportation of important chemicals, the rail industry is working
closely with the chemical industry, DOT, DHS, the Homeland Security
Council at the White House, and others to address potential
vulnerabilities--and recommend appropriate safeguards--in an analytical
and comprehensive fashion.
One of the issues of concern identified by the rail industry in the
course of its risk assessment is a Federal requirement to place
placards on rail cars carrying hazardous materials. Local first
responders use the information posted on placards to determine car
contents. The industry is working with the FRA and the Transportation
Security Administration to study alternative means of providing car
content information to the emergency response community. If successful,
this could serve as a substitute for the reliance on placards.
In developing the industry's security plan, the railroads closely
coordinated with major customer groups to avoid logistical gaps in the
supply chain. For example, the Chlorine Institute subsequently
developed a chlorine transportation security plan that dovetails with
the railroads' plan. The American Chemistry Council and the AAR are
working toward agreement on how to coordinate security measures for
shipments of other hazardous materials.
Passenger Railroads
More than 90 percent of the route mileage over which Amtrak
operates, as well as a significant portion of the trackage over which
many commuter railroads operate, is actually owned and maintained by
freight railroads. Therefore, actions taken by freight railroads to
enhance security also benefit passenger rail. Freight railroad police
coordinate with and support Amtrak police to, among other things,
increase uniformed police presence in rail passenger stations. Amtrak,
commuter rail and transit authorities, and the freight railroads
receive and share threat and incident information through the RAN and
the ST-ISAC. That said, freight railroad security-related plans and
procedures are not specifically designed to protect passengers or to be
a substitute for actions that Amtrak or other passenger railroad
operators might choose to take.
Port and Border Security
The issue of port security is separate and distinct from the issue
of rail security, although railroads, by virtue of the fact that they
carry millions of containers unloaded from or loaded on to steamships
each year, are certainly impacted. Ports have spent hundreds of
millions of dollars enhancing their security, much of it funded by
Federal grants. Railroads work closely with the Captains of Ports to
ensure compliance with Coast Guard regulations regarding port facility
security.
Freight railroads operating in the United States, Canada, and
Mexico form a seamless, coordinated, and heavily-traveled network, with
hundreds of thousands of railcars and intermodal units crossing each
border each year. Railroads work diligently with the U.S. Bureau of
Customs and Border Protection (CBP) and others to enhance border
security.
For example, one year ago, United States and Canadian customs
agencies and Canada's two major railways signed a declaration of
principles to enhance security at the Canada-U.S. border and to ensure
secure rail access to the United States. The declaration--signed by
CBP, Canada Customs and Revenue Agency (CCRA), Canadian National
Railway (CN), and Canadian Pacific Railway (CP)--outlines principles
for targeting, screening, and examining rail shipments transported by
the Canadian carriers into the United States. The declaration includes
guidelines for the electronic transmission of cargo information by the
railroads to customs officials in advance of each train's arrival at
the border and installation of Vehicle and Cargo Inspection System
(VACIS) and radiation detection equipment at CN and CP border
crossings.
Rail VACIS systems, which are also in use at rail border crossings
with Mexico, use gamma ray technology to scan entire trains one railcar
at a time. The gamma ray source and detectors are stationary as the
train moves through the system. Inspectors examine scanned images of
rail cars for contraband, potential terrorists, or terrorist weapons
without opening them and potentially endangering lives. Suspicious rail
cars are segregated for inspection, with minimal disruption to the flow
of legitimate commerce. Today, where CBP has installed this equipment
on the borders with both Canada and Mexico, 100 percent of rail cars
are screened.
U.S. freight railroads are also active participants in the Customs-
Trade Partnership Against Terrorism (C-TPAT). C-TPAT is a joint
government-business initiative within the CBP to build cooperative
relationships that strengthen overall supply chain and border security.
Through this initiative, CBP is asking businesses--including
railroads--to ensure the integrity of their security practices and
communicate their security guidelines to their business partners within
the supply chain. I am happy to report that all U.S. Class I railroads
are currently C-TPAT certified. The certification process involves a
comprehensive review of a railroad's procedural security, physical
security, personnel security, education and training, access controls,
manifest procedures, and conveyance security.
Railroads have also been active participants in the significant
expansion of Integrated Border Enforcement Teams (IBET) across the
U.S./Canada border. The mandate of these teams is to enhance border
integrity and security by ``identifying, investigating and interdicting
persons and organizations that pose a threat to national security or
engage in other organized crime activity.''
Finally, on January 5, 2004, final regulations issued by the CBP
went into effect requiring all transportation modes to submit cargo
information electronically before arriving at the U.S. border; the rail
industry was an active participant in the regulatory process. The
required minimum advanced notification for rail cargo is two hours.
Railroads are complying with this requirement. The two-hour requirement
is a substantial improvement over the 24-hour notification period first
proposed by CBP, which would have been devastating to the efficient
flow of commerce within our Nation.
Funding
Railroads have been underwriting the cost of security measures for
the benefit of the general public and for national defense, in addition
to normal expenditures made to ensure the safety of rail operations.
Additional protective measures required at the highest alert levels
cannot be sustained by the industry alone. This is reflected in the
railroads' Plan, which, at these higher levels of alert, calls for the
use of National Guard and local law enforcement support to augment
industry protection of critical infrastructure. In order to effectively
achieve such protection, advanced planning will be required to
coordinate the process among all the relevant parties.
The rail industry is also seeking to continue technical research
into protective measures and emergency response protocols and has
identified a need for $15 million in Federal assistance to help achieve
these objectives.
Finally, the rail industry may wish to request assistance for the
costs brought about by extraordinary security measures required by any
future government mandates.
Conclusion
U.S. freight railroads are proud of the success they achieved in
keeping our Nation's vital rail transport link open following the
September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks. Since then, railroads have taken
a number of steps to increase the security of our Nation's rail
network, including the development of a comprehensive security
management plan that incorporates four progressively severe alert
levels. We will continue to work with this committee, others in
Congress, Federal agencies, and all other relevant parties to further
enhance the safety and security of our Nation's railroads.
Senator Hutchison. Thank you.
Mr. Millar.
STATEMENT OF WILLIAM W. MILLAR, PRESIDENT,
AMERICAN PUBLIC TRANSPORTATION ASSOCIATION
Mr. Millar. Thank you, Madam Chair. It is my pleasure, on
behalf of the 1,500 organizations of the American Public
Transportation Association, to appear before you this morning.
It is particularly important that you are holding this
hearing in light of the recent terrorist attacks in Madrid, and
I have particularly appreciated watching all the Senators who
have attended today as they have asked their questions. Clearly
there is an understanding on this Committee of many of the
basic issues that face us, and we look forward to continuing to
work with the Committee as it seeks to put together legislative
recommendations.
I cannot overemphasize the importance of working to improve
security for the 32 million Americans who will board public
transportation vehicles today. Over 11 million of those
boardings will be on rail systems. While this Committee has
jurisdiction primarily over the rail area, we have to look at
surface transportation programs in their entirety and the full
spectrum of public transportation services, whether it be
commuter rail, rapid rail, bus, ferry boats, or paratransit.
Also, this intermodal relationship extends beyond the
passenger world, and I am very pleased to be appearing with my
colleague, Ed Hamberger, from the Association of American
Railroads, because obviously making sure that freight flows
easily and quickly as the passenger service flows easily and
quickly is important as well. Many freight railroads operate
some part of the passenger rail system and some of the commuter
rail systems handle significant amounts of rail freight. So
this relationship has to be taken into account.
Our public transit systems, as you have heard from other
speakers, are of necessity an open environment, meaning there
are literally tens of thousands of places that our customers
can reach our services. Over 9.5 billion times last year,
people used public transit. This is something like 16 times
more people than use the airline system, 450 times more than
travelers who use the Amtrak system. So the Nation's public
transit systems are an integral part of our transportation
network, they are available in all 50 states, and we need to
consider this as we plan nationwide.
Our transit employees who work on these systems are part of
the front line of the Nation's fight against terrorism. Indeed,
they are part of the first responder teams. If a terrorist
event occurs on a transit system, they become the initial first
responders that are there. Besides the obvious role that they
would play in that region, we are also expected to be part of
any mass evacuation that might be necessary in times of
emergency. Again, other speakers have spoken about September
11, 2001, when literally hundreds of thousands of Americans
exited from the danger areas on public transportation systems.
So safety and security is a top priority of our industry.
It was a top priority before September 11. Unfortunately, as
the earlier speaker has said, there have been events around the
world on public transportation systems, be they the IRA
bombings in the British Isles or the saran attacks in Japan or
any of the more recent attacks. So our industry has known about
these and has been working to develop and implement plans for
quite some time.
Since September 11, 2001, we have identified some $1.7
billion that State and local governments have invested in
security and emergency preparedness, which has been very
important in making our transit systems more secure today than
they were before. Our members and APTA continue to work closely
with a number of Federal agencies, particularly the Federal
Transit Administration and the Federal Railroad Administration,
which have been most helpful in developing plans and helping us
do assessments of need and in implementing good strategies to
meet those assessments.
More recently, the Department of Homeland Security, as you
heard this morning, is taking a much greater interest in our
sector and we are grateful for that.
Security assessments for all the rail, transit, and
commuter rail systems in the country have been developed and
the plans that have resulted from those assessments are now
being implemented. My written testimony includes background
information on this issue.
APTA is also pleased to have been designated the public
transportation sector coordinator by the U.S. Department of
Transportation and is very much involved in the Information
Sharing and Analysis Center, the so-called ISAC, process. One
of our concerns, however, is that the funding for that expires
in February, 2005. We doubt that the need for the ISAC will
expire in 2005.
We have recently completed a survey of our members. We will
be releasing the full details of the survey next month and we
will make those available to the Committee. But the preliminary
analysis shows that our members find approximately $6 billion
that ought to be invested in increased security. Now, that is
over and above the regular and continuing part of the transit
systems' budgets that I testified to earlier, where they are
spending State and local resources in that regard.
So we do believe that it is time for the Department of
Homeland Security to step up to the plate and provide
additional funding to make our systems even more secure. We
respectfully request the help of this Committee as we seek to
have the President's 2005 budget amended to include specific
line items for transit and railroad security. We think that we
have done enough work now in the past 3 years that we
understand the priorities of where this money ought to be spent
and we want to work with Congress and the Department of
Homeland Security to make sure a proper program is developed
over the next several years and funds made available so that we
can invest the funds wisely.
Given the recent events, given the focus now, the
Department of Homeland Security and the U.S. Department of
Transportation and our industry need to work more closely
together than ever. We thank you again for holding this
hearing, Mr. Chairman, and we will be pleased to answer
questions or provide additional information as the Committee
may desire.
Thank you very much.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Millar follows:]
Prepared Statement of William W. Millar, President,
American Public Transportation Association
Mr. Chairman, thank you for this opportunity to testify on the
security and safety of passenger rail and public transportation
systems. We commend the Senate Commerce Committee for holding this
hearing today particularly in light of the recent terrorist attacks in
Madrid, Spain.
About APTA
The American Public Transportation Association (APTA) is a
nonprofit international association of over 1,500 public and private
member organizations including transit systems and commuter rail
operators; planning, design, construction, and finance firms; product
and service providers; academic institutions; transit associations and
state departments of transportation. APTA members serve the public
interest by providing safe, efficient, and economical transit services
and products. Over ninety percent of persons using public
transportation in the United States and Canada are served by APTA
member systems.
Passenger Rail and Public Transportation Security
Mr. Chairman, we do not need to emphasize the critical importance
of keeping America's public transportation secure in this time of
heightened national security. While this Committee has jurisdiction
over passenger and freight rail, we must look at the security of our
surface transportation program in its entirety and that includes the
full spectrum of public transportation services. At intermodal hubs
such as Washington's Union Station there are blend of services
including--intercity passenger rail, commuter rail, subway, and bus
transportation. Congress should examine the unique security needs for
all of America's public transportation.
This intermodal relationship extends to the Nation's freight
railroads, and APTA is pleased to work closely with the Association of
American Railroads in this regard. Many commuter rail services are
operated on freight-owned lines. Moreover, many commuter rail systems
handle significant amounts of rail freight traffic. For example, the
Southern California Regional Rail Authority (SCRRA) provides the right-
of-way for the movement of 50 to 75 freight trains a day on property it
owns, including all the rail freight traffic out of the Port of San
Diego and 10-15 percent of the rail freight traffic out of the Ports of
Los Angeles and Long Beach.
America's public transportation services are by design and
necessity an open environment. Over 9 billion transit trips are taken
annually on all modes of transit service. People use public
transportation vehicles over 32 million times each weekday. This is
more than sixteen times the number of daily travelers aboard the
Nation's domestic airlines and over 450 times the number used by Amtrak
intercity services. The numbers of customers using public
transportation each and every day creates ongoing challenges for
enhancing security within our transit environments.
In addition, transit employees are on the front line in our
Nation's effort against terrorism. They are the first responder
evacuation teams who will assist in getting the public out of critical
incident areas and our cities in the event of a terrorist attack. This
was evident on September 11, 2001, when public transportation in New
York City, New Jersey and Washington, D.C. helped safely evacuate
citizens from center cities. Indeed, this same story was true around
the country as transit systems quickly and efficiently evacuated people
from closed airports and downtown areas. We remember that the
interstate highway program was begun by President Eisenhower as a
national defense interstate highway program. It is clear now that
public transportation too has a significant national defense component
and is a fundamental element in responding to community disasters and
emergencies.
In that connection, APTA is honored to play a critical role in
transportation security, and works closely with a number of Federal
agencies in this regard, notably the Federal Transit Administration
(FTA) and the Federal Railroad Administration of the U.S. Department of
Transportation, and the Transportation Security Administration (TSA),
the Office of Domestic Preparedness (ODP), and the Directorate of
Information Analysis & Infrastructure Protection of the U.S. Department
of Homeland Security. At the program level, APTA works closely with
these agencies to administer an industry audit program that oversees a
system safety and security management plan for transit systems around
the country. Our safety audit program for commuter rail, bus, and rail
transit operations has been in place for many years, and includes
elements specific to security planning and emergency preparedness.
Separately, in connection with Presidential Decision Directive Number
63, we are pleased to have been designated a Public Transportation
Sector Coordinator by the Department of Transportation, and as my
testimony notes below, we have established a Transit Information
Sharing Analysis Center that provides a secure two-way reporting and
analysis structure for the transmission of critical alerts and
advisories to transit agencies around the country.
Since the events of 9/11, state and local public transit agencies,
like all state and local entities, have spent significant sums on
police overtime, enhanced planning and training exercises, and capital
improvements related to security. In response to a 2004 APTA survey,
transit agencies around the country have identified in excess of $6
billion in transit security needs. These include both one-time capital
investments and recurring operating expenses related to security. It is
important to note that these costs are above and beyond the capital
infrastructure needs we have identified under the TEA 21
reauthorization effort.
Background
Mr. Chairman, prior to and following September 11, 2001--the date
of the most devastating terrorist attack in U.S. history--APTA has
played a key role in addressing the safety and security issues of our
country. American public transportation agencies have also taken
significant measures to enhance their security and emergency
preparedness efforts to adjust to society's new state of concern.
Although agencies had a wide range of security initiatives in place at
the time of the World Trade Center and Pentagon attacks and already had
developed emergency response plans, the September 11 incidents focused,
strengthened and prioritized security efforts throughout the industry.
Transit agencies have had a good safety record and have been
working for many years to enhance their system security and employee
security training, partly responding to government standards, APTA
guidelines, and by learning through the attacks on transit agencies
abroad. For example, the 1995 sarin gas attack in the Tokyo subway
system caused U.S. transit properties managing tunnels and underground
transit stations to go on high alert. The San Francisco Bay Area Rapid
Transit District, for instance, responded to the possible threat of
chemical weapons attacks by sending a police team to Fort McClellan,
Alabama, to learn response tactics from U.S. Army chemical weapons
experts.
In the months following the September 11 terrorist attacks, transit
agencies of all sizes worked to identify where they might be vulnerable
to attacks and increased their security expenses for both operations
and capital costs. The agencies subsequently upgraded and strengthened
their emergency response and security plans and procedures, taking
steps to protect transit infrastructure and patrons and increase
transit security presence while giving riders a sense of security.
Some initiatives around the country include:
Increased surveillance via closed circuit TV
Increased training for employees
Hired more police, K-9 units added
Chemical detection systems being tested
Infrastructure design to eliminate hiding places
Drills are routinely held with first responders
Encouraging riders to be vigilant for suspicious activities
or items.
After September 11, many transit organizations worked to prevent
unauthorized entry into transit facilities. The need for employees and
passengers to stay alert and report suspicious occurrences became a key
goal of many agencies. These efforts are paying off. While many transit
agencies are more secure than prior to September 11, more needs to be
done.
Since the attacks, APTA and the Federal Transit Administration have
emphasized the need for effective transit security and emergency
preparedness. FTA has sent security resources toolkits to transit
agencies; completed security-vulnerability assessments of the Nation's
largest transit systems; and provided technical support and grants of
up to $50,000 to fund agency emergency drills.
FTA continues to provide emergency preparedness and security forums
nationwide. In emphasizing the importance of enhancing transit
security, FTA Administrator Jennifer L. Dorn noted that thousands of
lives were spared on September 11 in New York City and Washington
``because of the quick action of first responders and transit
workers.''
APTA has launched many additional efforts to further transit
industry security and preparedness, collaborating with FTA in
developing emergency preparedness forums, and sponsoring and organizing
security-related conferences and workshops. Moreover, APTA developed a
list of critical safety and security needs faced by the transit
industry, which it has provided to the Department of Transportation and
the U.S. Congress. Mr. Chairman, I would be pleased to submit this and
other data discussed in my testimony for the record.
Public Transportation Information Sharing Analysis Center (ISAC)
Presidential Decision Directive #63 authorizes and encourages
national critical infrastructures to develop and maintain ISACs as a
means of strengthening security and protection against cyber and
operations attacks. APTA is pleased to have been designated a public
transportation Sector Coordinator by the U.S. Department of
Transportation, and in that capacity has received a $1.2 million grant
from the Federal Transit Administration to establish a transit ISAC.
APTA recently formalized an agreement with a private company to
implement the ISAC and make it available to public transit systems
around the country.
This ISAC for public transit provides a secure two-way reporting
and analysis structure for the transmission of critical alerts and
advisories as well as the collection, analysis and dissemination of
security information from transit agencies. The public transit ISAC
also provides a critical linkage between the transit industry, the U.S.
Department of Transportation, the Transportation Security
Administration, and the Office of Homeland Security. A request for
funding to continue this ISAC has been submitted to the Department of
Homeland Security's Directorate of Information Analysis &
Infrastructure Protection.
Ongoing Transit Security Programs
Mr. Chairman, while transit agencies have moved to a heightened
level of security alertness, the leadership of APTA has been actively
working with its strategic partners to develop a practical plan to
address our industry's security and emergency preparedness needs.
Shortly after the September 11 events, the APTA Executive Committee
established a Security Task Force under the leadership of Washington
Metro's CEO, Richard A. White. The APTA Security Task Force has
established a security strategic plan that prioritizes direction for
our initiatives. Among those initiatives, the Task Force serves as the
steering group for determining security projects that are being
implemented through over $2 million in Transit Cooperative Research
funding through the Transportation Research Board.
Through this funding, APTA held four transit security workshop
forums for the larger transit systems with potentially greater risk
exposure. These workshops provided confidential settings to enable
sharing of security practices and applying methodologies to various
scenarios. The outcomes from these workshops were made available in a
controlled and confidential format to other transit agencies unable to
attend the workshops. The workshops were held in New York, San
Francisco, Atlanta, and Chicago.
In partnerships with the Transportation Research Board, the APTA
Security Task Force has also established two TCRP Panels that
identified and initiated specific projects developed to address
Preparedness/Detection/Response to Incidents and Prevention and
Mitigation. The Security Task Force emphasized the importance for the
research projects to be operationally practical.
In addition to the TCRP funded efforts, a generic Checklist For
Transit Agency Review Of Emergency Response Planning And System Review
has been developed by APTA as a resource tool and is available on the
APTA website. Also through the direction of the Security Task Force,
APTA has reached out to other organizations and international
transportation associations to formally engage in sharing information
on our respective security programs and directions and to continually
work towards raising the bar of safety and security effectiveness.
Within this concept of partnership and outreach, APTA also
continues in its ongoing collaboration with the Federal Transit
Administration to help in guiding and developing FTA programs. Among
these are regional Emergency Preparedness and Security Planning
Workshops that are currently being delivered through the Volpe Center
and have been provided in numerous regions throughout the U.S. The
primary focus of such workshops has been to assist particularly smaller
transit systems in building effective emergency response plans with
first responders and their regional offices of emergency management.
Also within this partnership, APTA has assisted the FTA and the
National Transit Institute in the design of a new program ``Security
Awareness Training for Frontline Employees and Supervisors.'' This
program is now being provided by NTI to transit agencies throughout the
Nation.
Collaborative efforts between APTA, FTA, Volpe Center, and the
National Transit Institute are also underway to establish a joint
website that will specifically gather and disseminate effective transit
practices with initial emphasis on safety and security.
As you may be aware, APTA has long-established Safety Audit
Programs for Commuter Rail, Bus, and Rail Transit Operations. Within
the scope of these programs are specific elements pertaining to
Emergency Response Planning and Training as well as Security Planning.
In keeping with our industry's increased emphasis on these areas, the
APTA Safety Audit Programs have similarly been modified to place added
attention to these critical elements.
APTA's Committee on Public Safety, continues to provide a most
critical forum for transit security professionals to meet and share
information, experiences and programs and to also provide valuable
input to programs being developed by the FTA.
Security Investment Needs
Mr. Chairman, after the awful events of 9/11, the transit industry
invested some $1.7 billion in enhanced security measures building on
the industry's considerable efforts already in place. At the same time,
our industry undertook a comprehensive review to determine how we could
build upon our existing industry security practices. This included a
range of activities, some of which I discussed earlier in my testimony,
including research, best practices, education, information sharing in
the industry, surveys and the like. As a result of those efforts we are
now at a phase where we know what we can most effectively do in terms
of creating a more secure environment for our riders, and have
accordingly identified critical security investment needs.
Our latest survey of public transportation security identified
needs of at least $5.2 billion in additional capital funding to
maintain, modernize, and expand transit system security functions to
meet increased security demands. Over $800 million in increased
operating costs for security personnel, training, technical support,
and research and development have been identified, bringing total
additional transit security funding needs to more than $6 billion.
Responding transit agencies were asked to prioritize the uses for
which they required additional Federal investment for security needs.
Priority examples of operational needs include:
Funding current and additional transit agency and local law
enforcement personnel.
Funding for over-time costs and extra security personnel during
heightened alert levels.
Training for security personnel.
Joint transit/law enforcement training.
Security planning activities.
Security training for other transit personnel.
Priority examples of security capital investment needs include:
Radio communications systems.
Security cameras on-board transit vehicles and in transit
stations.
Controlling access to transit facilities and secure areas.
Automated vehicle locator systems.
Security fencing around facilities.
Transit agencies with large rail operations also reported a
priority need for Federal capital funding for intrusion detection
devices.
To date the DHS has allocated some $115 million for public
transportation security through its Office of Domestic Preparedness,
and we appreciate this support from the Department. We trust that we
can now begin to build on those initial investments and address the $6
billion in critical needs the transit industry has identified; the
Administration's FY 2005 budget, however, does not specifically call
for investment in public transportation security. We think it should.
Currently ODP grants for transit systems are made available through the
states, which means that our transit systems do not have a direct
relationship with DHS, and which also means that the process of getting
the funds to the local transit systems can be lengthy. Mr. Chairman,
our Nation's transit systems have a direct and cooperative working
relationship with DOT's Federal Transit Administration which allocates
Federal capital investment quickly to the local level, and we believe
this is an excellent model that we would like to see developed over
time with the DHS. We stand ready to help in any way we can in that
regard.
Conclusion
Mr. Chairman, in light of our Nation's heightened security concerns
post-9/11, we believe that increased Federal investment in public
transportation security by DHS is critical. The public transportation
industry has made great strides in transit security improvements since
9/11 but much more needs to be done. We look forward to building on our
cooperative working relationship with the Department of Homeland
Security and Congress to begin to address these needs. We again thank
you and the Committee for allowing us to testify today and your
commitment in the Nation's transportation infrastructure, and look
forward to working with you on safety and security issues.
The Chairman. [presiding]: Thank you very much.
Mr. O'Connor, welcome.
STATEMENT OF JOHN O'CONNOR, CHIEF OF PATROL, NATIONAL RAILROAD
PASSENGER CORPORATION
Mr. O'Connor. Thank you, Senator, Mr. Chairman. Thank you
for the opportunity to provide comment and information on
matters involving rail security in the United States. I am here
representing Ron Frazier, my boss, who is Chief of the
Department, who could not be here due to the sudden passing of
his mother.
The Chairman. Please extend our sympathy.
Mr. O'Connor. I will.
First a few comments about Amtrak and the police and
security department. Amtrak is the Nation's only intercity
passenger rail transportation company and operates over 300
trains per day over some 22,000 miles of rail, with
approximately 540 stations in 46 states. Amtrak carried over 24
million passengers last year and, like rail transportation
systems worldwide and mass transit systems in the United
States, Amtrak functions in a very open transportation
environment.
Because of advantages such as easy access, convenient
locations, and intermodal connections, rail and mass transit
systems are completely different from the structure and
organization of the airline transportation and airport
industry. As a result, the security framework that works
ideally in the airport setting is not transferable to the rail
transportation system.
A prime example of this dichotomy can be observed by
looking at the Amtrak service routes. In Penn Station, New
York, there are literally hundreds of thousands of people using
the facility on a daily basis, with passengers boarding and
unboarding trains that are operated by Amtrak, Long Island
Railroad, and New Jersey Transit. Penn Station is a vast,
bustling intermodal transportation facility with detailed
passenger planning coordinated with the dispatch, arrival, and
departure of trains on a minute by minute precision basis. In
addition, Amtrak also has numerous stations that are unmanned
or are merely platforms that are located throughout its
national service route.
Because of this diverse and complex organization, any
delays built into this framework with security regulations
would drastically affect the operation of rail transportation
and the valued openness of its environment. While this
certainly presents a formidable security challenge here in the
United States, as well as in other countries throughout the
world, these elements are the key reasons why rail and mass
transit systems remain as popular and useful transportation
modes.
The Amtrak police department has 342 sworn officers, with
most of its security force located in the Northeast Corridor,
where Amtrak runs and operates the tracks and infrastructure.
In 1992, it received the distinction of being the first
national law enforcement agency accredited by the prestigious
Commission on Accreditation of Law Enforcement Agencies, and
has been re-accredited in 1997 and 2002.
The department has oversight responsibility for the
planning, assessment, and evaluation of Amtrak's passenger,
critical infrastructure, and station security emergency
response plans and operations. Though the Amtrak police
department has operated as a traditional police force that did
not focus on counter-terrorism, since September 11, 2001, our
department has worked to develop terrorism-based vulnerability
and threat assessments, emergency response and evacuation
plans, as well as security measures that address not only
vandalism and other forms of street crime, but the potential
for explosion and blast effects at critical infrastructure
locations.
Amtrak has also developed a security threat level response
plan that mirrors the homeland security advisory system and
requires Amtrak to engage in specific security countermeasures
according to the existing threat level.
To effectively engage in these responsive measures, Amtrak
also created a security coordinator program. Within each Amtrak
division, a security coordinator closely works with Amtrak
police and security personnel to review the security components
and steps under the threat level response plan and to ensure
that employees within their divisions are undertaking the
required steps.
Amtrak reinforces security measures and guidelines through
this program and has also established a security information
center to increase employee awareness about security issues and
to directly provide security tips, bulletins, and specific
information on security policies and procedures.
Amtrak has also increased its K-9 patrols by adding 12
explosives detection K-9 teams to conduct random sweeps of
baggage rooms, train platforms, and stations. The police
department has also purchased full-face respirators for all
sworn personnel and deployed these devices for Amtrak's first
responders to protect against a chemical, biological, or
radiological attack.
In major stations, gamma and neutron radiological detectors
have also been deployed to address radiological threats.
Finally, Amtrak has instituted a practice of conducting
random photo identification for passengers purchasing tickets
and instituted a plan for placing weight restrictions on
baggage at certain levels of heightened security.
As part of its ongoing efforts, the Amtrak police
department does budget for elevations in the Homeland security
advisory system because manpower costs during the orange level
alert are roughly $11,000 per day. However, there have been so
many days this Fiscal Year already at this alert level that
Amtrak is coming close to surpassing its reserve budget, while
such a focus on counterterrorism makes Amtrak less effective in
providing general police service to its travelers and station
users.
Though Amtrak continues to prepare to prevent an attack on
our rail system, we also recognize we must stand ready to
manage an incident if and when there is some form of an attack.
Through our Office of Emergency Preparedness, we conduct
training for first responders, over 21,000 so far, situated
along the Amtrak service route. We have purchased a public
safety database which lists each police, fire, and emergency
rescue agency in order to facilitate State and local emergency
response and to establish a clear record of agency training.
The Amtrak police and security department also has
developed close working relationships with our Federal partners
at DHS, TSA, in particular with Mr. Chet Lunner, Under
Secretary there or Assistant Administrator; the DOT; and the
FRA, Bill Fagan from the security department, to ensure that
effective communications exist and our security efforts are
coordinated.
Amtrak is working with the FRA to arrange for and conduct
blast vulnerability studies of train equipment and is working
with DHS, FRA, and TSA to develop a basic security awareness
training course for all Amtrak employees. There have also been
numerous collaborations with the above agencies that address
rail security matters. Some of these initiatives include the
land transportation and anti-terrorism training that was
provided by FLETC, the Federal Law Enforcement Training Center,
to Amtrak police personnel and security coordinators, as well
as two emergency response drills in which scores of Federal,
State and local agencies conducted exercises related to a
terrorist incident. All these initiatives were sponsored by the
TSA.
Amtrak has detailed its immediate and critical security
needs in a confidential plan to the TSA. While not being able
to identify funding at this time, TSA has generally approved
the basic concept and approach of the plan. The plan calls for
approximately $110 million in funding, with another 10 to $12
million per year in recurring operating costs. The general
concerns cited in the plan are as follows:
Security for Amtrak's largest stations. The Amtrak plan
cites the need to continue to upgrade its security at its four
largest stations, as well as nonpublic locations such as
loading docks, adjacent yards and buildings.
Tunnel security. The plan would secure all tunnel access
points and improve security for trains traveling through
tunnels throughout the Northeast Corridor. This would be in
addition to the fire and life safety program under way in the
North and East River Tunnels under New York City, for which
$100 million----
The Chairman. Mr. O'Connor, we would like you to summarize
if you can.
Mr. O'Connor. Certainly.
Finally, Amtrak strongly suggests that Congress enable rail
police to have access to the same forms of funding initiatives
as similarly situated mass transit police agencies. Recently,
$50 million in security grants were made available to mass
transit law enforcement agencies by the Department of Homeland
Security. These grants are available to the other departments,
but currently there is no enabling legislation to allow Amtrak
access to those funds.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Frazier follows:]
Prepared Statement of E. R. Frazier, Sr., Esq., Chief of Police
and Security Department, Amtrak
Mr. Chairman and Members of the Senate Commerce, Science and
Transportation Committee, I would like to thank this Committee for the
opportunity to provide comment and information on matters involving
rail security in the United States.
First, however I believe that it may be helpful for the Committee
to know a little about Amtrak and its Police and Security Department.
Amtrak is the Nation's only intercity passenger rail transportation
company and operates over 300 trains per day over some 22,000+ miles of
rail with approximately 540 Stations in 46 states. Amtrak carried over
24 million passengers in the last fiscal year. Like rail transportation
systems worldwide and mass transit systems in the United States, Amtrak
functions in a very ``open'' transportation environment. Because of
advantages such as easy access, convenient locations and intermodal
connections, rail and mass transit systems are completely different
from the structure and organization of the airline transportation and
airport industry. As a result, the security framework that works
ideally in the airport setting is not transferable to the rail station
system.
A prime example of this dichotomy can be observed by looking at the
Amtrak service route. In Penn Station, New York there are literally
hundreds of thousands of people using the facility on a daily basis
with passengers boarding and unboarding trains that are operated by
Amtrak, LIRR and New Jersey Transit commuter trains. Penn Station is a
vast, bustling intermodal transportation facility with detailed
passenger planning coordinated with the dispatch, arrival and departure
of trains on a minute-by-minute precision basis. In addition, Amtrak
also has numerous stations that are unmanned or are merely platforms
that are located throughout its national service route. Because of this
diverse and complex organization, any delays built into this framework
with security regulations would drastically affect the operation of
rail transportation and the valued openness of its environment. While
this certainly presents formidable security challenges here in the
United States as well as in other countries throughout the world, these
elements are also the key reasons why rail and mass transit systems
remain as popular and useful transportation modes.
The Amtrak Police Department has 342 sworn officers with most of
its security force located in the Northeast Corridor where Amtrak runs
and operates the tracks and infrastructure. In 1992, it received the
distinction of being the first national law enforcement agency
accredited by the prestigious Commission on Accreditation of Law
Enforcement Agencies (CALEA) and has been reaccredited in 1997 and
2002. The Department has oversight responsibility for the planning,
assessment and evaluation of Amtrak's passenger, critical
infrastructure, and station security, emergency response plans and
operations.
Though the Amtrak Police Department is a traditional police force
that does not focus on counter terrorism, since September 11, 2001, our
department has worked to develop terrorism-based vulnerability and
threat assessments, emergency response and evacuation plans, as well as
security measures that address not only vandalism and other forms of
street crime but the potential for explosion and blast effects at
critical infrastructure locations. Amtrak has also developed a Security
Threat Level Response Plan (ASTLRP) that mirrors the HSAS and requires
Amtrak to engage in specific security countermeasures according to the
existing threat level. To effectively engage in these responsive
measures, Amtrak also created a Security Coordinator Program. Within
each Amtrak division, a Security Coordinator works closely with Amtrak
Police and Security personnel to review the security components and
steps of the ASTLRP and to ensure that employees within their division
are undertaking the required steps. Amtrak reinforces security messages
and guidelines through this program and has also established a Security
Information Center to increase employee awareness about security issues
and to directly provide security tips, bulletins and specific
information on security policies and procedures.
Amtrak has also increased its police canine patrols by adding
twelve explosive detection canine teams to conduct random sweeps of
baggage rooms, train platforms and stations. The Police Department has
also purchased full-face respirators for all sworn personnel and
deployed these devices for Amtrak's first responders to protect against
a CBR attack. In major stations, gamma/neutron radiological detectors
have also been deployed to address radiological threats. Finally,
Amtrak has instituted a practice of conducting random photo
identification for passengers purchasing tickets and instituted a plan
for placing weight restrictions on baggage at certain levels of
heightened security.
As part of its ongoing security efforts, the Amtrak Police
Department does budget for elevations in the HSAS because manpower
costs during an ``Orange'' level alert are roughly $11,000 per day.
However, there have been so many days this Fiscal Year already at this
alert level that Amtrak is coming close to surpassing its reserve
budget. Also, such a focus on counter terrorism makes Amtrak less
effective in providing its general police service to its travelers and
stations users.
Though Amtrak continues to prepare to prevent an attack on our rail
system, we also recognize that we must stand ready to manage an
incident if and when there is some form of attack. Through our Office
of Emergency Preparedness we conduct training for first responder
agencies (over 21,000) situated along the Amtrak service route. We have
purchased a public safety database that lists each police, fire and
emergency rescue agency in order to facilitate state and local
emergency response and to establish a clear record of agency training.
The Amtrak Police and Security Department has also developed close
working relationships with our Federal partners: DHS, TSA, DOT, and FRA
to ensure effective communications exist and that our security efforts
are coordinated.
Amtrak is working with FRA to arrange for and conduct blast
vulnerability studies of train equipment and is working with DHS, FRA
and TSA to develop a basic security awareness training course for all
Amtrak employees. There have also been numerous collaborations with the
above agencies that address rail security matters. Some of these
initiatives include Land Transportation Anti-terrorism training that
was provided by FLETC to Amtrak Police personnel and its Security
Coordinators as well as two emergency response drills in which scores
of federal, state and local agencies conducted exercises related to a
terrorist incident. All of these initiatives were sponsored by TSA.
Amtrak has detailed its immediate and critical security needs in a
confidential plan to the TSA. While not being able to identify funding
at the time, TSA has generally approved the basic concept and approach
of the plan. The plan calls for approximately $110 Million in funding
with another $10-12 million per year in recurring operating costs. The
general concerns cited in the plan are as follows:
Securing Amtrak's Largest Stations--Amtrak's plan cites the
need to continue to upgrade its security at its four largest
stations as well as at non-public locations, such as loading
docks, adjacent yards and buildings.
Tunnel Security--The plan would secure all tunnel access
points and improve security for trains traveling through
tunnels throughout the NEC. This would be in addition to the
fire and life safety program underway in the North and East
River tunnels under New York City for which $100 million was
appropriated in 2002.
Amtrak Tracking, Communications and Critical Incident
Response - Amtrak possesses several Dispatch, Command and
Control Centers that require redundancy and centralization.
Further, while Amtrak can effectively track train movements
within the Northeast Corridor, it is unable to do so throughout
the rest of the national system. The plan would address both of
these needs.
Anti-Terrorism Screening--Presently, this project is in
collaboration with DHS/TSA and ICE to upgrade the manner in
which international passenger information is provided to border
inspection forces. It is also anticipated that the Amtrak
Police and Security Department will become more involved as a
law enforcement agency in a ``watchlist'' technology when TSA
identifies and approves a suitable identification system.
It is imperative that Amtrak, in conjunction with TSA and all other
related agencies, be able to address the aforementioned rail security
concerns as soon as possible. Amtrak has provided this security plan to
its Authorizing and Appropriations Committees of jurisdiction and
stands ready to work with Congress and the Department of Homeland
Security.
Finally, Amtrak strongly suggests that Congress enable rail police
to have access to the same forms of funding initiatives that similarly
situated mass transit police agencies have. Recently, $50 million in
security grants were made available to mass transit law enforcement
agencies by the Department of Homeland Security. These grants addressed
first responder issues and could be helpful to rail police who also
patrol passenger stations and protect critical infrastructure. Because
rail police do not fall under the classification of ``state or local
law enforcement'', however, we remain ineligible. We therefore ask that
this be changed since rail police share the same front line as its mass
transit partners and need to act and communicate in the same fashion as
law enforcement throughout the United States in this time heightened
alert.
Thank you for this opportunity to provide testimony to the
Committee.
The Chairman. Thank you very much.
Senator Hutchison.
Senator Hutchison. Thank you.
I would like to go back to the rail security--the freight
rail security at the ports. I would like to ask you, Mr.
Hamberger, if you are satisfied from your industry standpoint
with the progress that is being made at rails that feed into
ports. Particularly, I have to mention the ports where there
are chemical complexes, and if you think--if you do not think
that enough is being done, what do you think the next step
should be?
Mr. Hamberger. I would like to answer that in more detail
in writing if I can. But at this point at the ports we
primarily coordinate with the Coast Guard and adhere to the
Coast Guard requirements. As far as the security for the
containers themselves, that is, I understand, being addressed
further up the supply chain. So that by the time those
containers, for example, come to the railroads to be pulled
whatever security they have gone through has already been
accomplished.
At the land borders, however, between Canada and Mexico,
there are VACUS machines, which is an acronym that stands for
something, but basically they are gamma ray machines that do
inspect the contents of the containers as they come across from
Canada and Mexico. Of course, there has to be advanced
notification as well of the consist. I believe it is 4 hours
before it gets to the port under the Customs regulation.
So, I am a little bit more familiar with that than I am
with what happens at the deepwater ports. So if I could respond
in more detail in writing, I would appreciate that.
Senator Hutchison. Do you think the containers go through
the same rigorous security coming from another foreign country
besides Mexico or Canada.
Mr. Hamberger. Like I say, I really cannot speak to that. I
do not know the answer to that.
Senator Hutchison. Mr. Riley.
Dr. Riley. I can comment a little bit.
Senator Hutchison. Doctor Riley.
Dr. Riley. Yes. We are capturing and doing better in terms
of prescreening an increasing portion of the containers through
a couple of different programs. CTPAT, the Customs Trade
Partnership Against Terrorism, which helps link up high volume
ports that send goods to our ports and some prescreening; and
then CSI, the Container Security Initiative, which uses
intelligence and other pieces of information to identify high
priority containers and cargo for deeper inspection.
The combination of those programs with the increased
physical screening of containers once they reach U.S. ports is
not only leading to increases in port security, but also I
think has positive spillover effects for the rail system since
such a very high proportion of the goods that are shipped by
rail come out of ports.
Senator Hutchison. So you think progress is being made?
Dr. Riley. Progress is definitely being made. I would liken
it to the following analogy. If you harken back to the original
terrorist attacks against aircraft, not on September 11, 2001,
but back in the 1960s and early 1970s when the hijackings
started, we had to reconceptualize how we thought about airline
and airport security. We started with things like screening
passengers, physical setbacks for aircraft, and a variety of
different security mechanisms.
It takes a long time to transform a system as complicated
as air traffic. It takes an even longer time to transform a
system as complicated as port and rail security. But I do
believe that fundamental transformation is in process and well
under way.
Senator Hutchison. Let me just say that one of the problems
that I have had for the last year is air cargo security, that
we have not secured our air cargo nearly to the extent that we
have secured baggage and passengers in the top of the airplane.
The Senate has passed a bill twice that would put in place air
cargo security measures, and yet it has not yet passed the
House and so is not in place.
So let me ask you on rail cargo, not necessarily foreign
rail cargo coming into ports, but I would like to ask both Dr.
Riley and Mr. Hamberger: Are you satisfied that we have a good
security system in place for rail cargo that is domestically
transported?
Mr. Hamberger. Yes, I believe that we do. I believe that,
working with again the Chlorine Institute, working with the
American Chemistry Council, to address your specific chemistry
concerns, we have really dovetailed, particularly with the
Chlorine Institute, our plan with their plan to try to address
any hole in the logistics chain.
So I believe that we have a pretty well-coordinated effort
ongoing, and also with the American Chemistry Council, to
address the broader range of hazardous materials that we
transport.
Senator Hutchison. Dr. Riley?
Dr. Riley. I would echo those comments, and I would also
harken back to how I summarized my testimony, which is: Without
those threat and vulnerability assessments, we really do not
know where the biggest gaps are and what the highest priorities
should be. So those really are critical elements to
understanding how our resources should be allocated.
Senator Hutchison. Well, thank you, Mr. Chairman. My time
is just about up, but I appreciate your holding this hearing,
changing the hearing last week to rail security after what
happened in Madrid, because I think it is long overdue. I would
just hope that all of our panelists would tell us what kind of
act we should pass to assure rail security, and I am pleased
that we are having a port security hearing tomorrow because I
think that that is the other area that has not been fully
addressed.
Thank you.
The Chairman. Thank you, Senator Hutchison. I thank you for
the active role you have played on this issue and I look
forward to working with you as we try to produce another piece
of legislation and mark it up as quickly as possible on rail
security.
Thank you.
Mr. Hamberger, do you agree with Senator Hutchison's
assessment that we have got to have an overall threat
assessment and prioritize here?
Mr. Hamberger. Well, Mr. Chairman, we have tried to address
that internally with our study, with our threat assessment.
That has been shared with the Federal Railroad Administration,
the Department of Transportation, Transportation Security
Administration, DHS, and it is an ongoing effort. The risks,
the threats always change, and so I think--I would hope that we
could build upon that, not recreate the wheel but use the work
that the industry has done and then go forward to build upon
that.
So I think that the effort is always worthwhile, yes.
The Chairman. Let me get with all the witnesses just on
this issue of priorities. If the priority is where the greatest
vulnerability is, would that argue that the tunnels are a high
priority? Beginning with you, Dr. Riley? And the concentration
of people and traffic on the eastern corridor? Or would you
argue that perhaps the rail system from Dallas to Houston,
which is a major area, would also--in other words, how are we
going to sort this out?
We are not going to be able to address every area all at
the same time. This is what I think we are going to be
wrestling with as we try to shape some meaningful legislation
and assist in this effort.
We will begin with you, Dr. Riley, and go down.
Dr. Riley. Not to sound like a broken record, but those
threat and vulnerability assessments are critical because,
while organizations like AAR have done an outstanding and very
proactive job within their sector, one of the things that we
really cannot do at this point is compare across freight,
passenger, and infrastructure vulnerabilities to draw up that
list.
Subject to that caveat that there is no master threat and
vulnerability analysis that lets us sit back, I do believe that
the tunnels and the passenger corridors and the subway systems
in the high priority cities that were identified earlier today
are probably the places to begin.
The Chairman. Mr. Hamberger?
Mr. Hamberger. Mr. Chairman, we have identified 1,308
critical assets. We have them prioritized 1 through 1,308.
The Chairman. Submit those for the record, please.
Mr. Hamberger. They are classified, but to the extent we
can do that we would do that, yes, sir.
The Chairman. All right. If they are classified, then do
not submit them for the record.
Mr. Hamberger. We have shared that, of course, with DHS,
and as the threat level goes up we have tried to deploy our
assets as far down that list as we can. We compiled that list
based upon three criteria: one, what would the threat be to the
economy; two, what would the threat be to population; and
three, what would the threat be to military transportation?
Using the overlay of those three analyses, we prioritized
our assets. You may be surprised to know that tunnels are not
near the top. In fact, tunnels from our standpoint are
relatively easy to recover from. What is not easy to recover
from are bridges that link important sections of the country.
So we have identified bridges that we have worked with the
Department of Homeland Security on to provide a hardening of
those assets, both at current levels of protection and alert
and higher levels of alert.
The Chairman. Well, that is very interesting. I would like
to see your unclassified argument that bridges are a very high
priority.
Mr. Hamberger. Based to a large extent on the ability to
recover from the damage.
The Chairman. Mr. Millar.
Mr. Millar. Yes. In our survey that I spoke of in my
testimony, we asked our members responding to the survey to
prioritize the areas that they see funding. In general, two
types of funding. One I would describe as one time only,
capital investments. The priorities in this area were as
follows: modern, up-to-date and coordinated radio
communications systems; security cameras on board transit
vehicles and throughout transit stations.
Number three would be controlling access to the facilities
and secure areas, and that would include tunnels.
Number four was automatic vehicle locator systems, so we
would always know, particularly in the bus area, where the
vehicles were.
Number five was increased security fencing around
facilities.
Within the operating area, there were six top priorities. I
do not think any of these are surprises. We have heard them
here today in the testimony, and they relate to mostly
personnel costs, particularly law enforcement, and additional
transit agency costs, especially during the times of heightened
alerts; additional costs for training personnel, particularly
joint training between people in our industry and the first
responder community outside our industry; security planning
activities and security training for other transit personnel
other than the police and security.
So I am not sure any of these are big surprises, but very
clearly those are the priorities, and when we have completed
our analysis of our study I will submit it to the Committee,
including the priorities and the listing of more detailed
priorities within each of these categories.
The Chairman. How soon will you have that?
Mr. Millar. We expect to have it early in April. I can
certainly try to get you something before that, though. It
sounds like you are on a faster timetable than that.
The Chairman. Well, we are trying to mark something up
within a couple of weeks, so that brings us into April. And
then I would not think we would have floor consideration right
away, so we do have some leeway. But we feel that would be
important information for us.
Mr. Millar. Thank you, sir. As early as I can, I will get
it to you within the next couple of weeks then.
[The information referred to follows:]
[GRAPHICS NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
The Chairman. Thank you very much.
Mr. O'Connor.
Mr. O'Connor. Senator, I will be briefer than my opening
remarks. Internally----
The Chairman. Your opening remarks were just fine, Mr.
O'Connor.
Mr. O'Connor. Thank you.
The Chairman. Despite your accent is incomprehensible.
[Laughter.]
Mr. O'Connor. So I have been told.
Internally, we have tried to protect against the most
catastrophic of events, first against people and then against
infrastructure. In answer to your question, the tunnels, that
is where the two points meet. That is where the most people
concentrate and that is where the most damage can be done to
our infrastructure and we believe to the economy of the whole
eastern region.
The Chairman. What about the bridges?
Mr. O'Connor. Bridges are a concern. They are probably in
our top ten, but the tunnels come first.
The Chairman. And the argument--I am from the West,
obviously, and I am not--I do not have any bias in this issue.
I want us to establish----
Mr. O'Connor. Our engineers tell us that they can replace a
bridge easier than they can build a tunnel and unflood a
tunnel.
The Chairman. Could you make the argument, based on
concentration of population and use, such as East Coast and
West Coast--Senator Boxer pointed out that the West Coast, that
California has a very high concentration of users of mass
transit. How do you factor in all that?
Mr. O'Connor. Again, you can improve security almost
anywhere, whether it be a one whistle stop platform or Penn
Station where 600,000 people----
The Chairman. But we are trying to look at where we think
it would be most likely. We want to take care of them all, as
you say. But we have to have some prioritization.
Mr. O'Connor. Right, and we know that places like New York
and Washington have been targets before and most likely will be
targets again.
The Chairman. So you would argue from what we know that
areas of greatest population and concentration of traffic would
be normally the highest priority? It just seems there is a
certain logic to that.
Mr. O'Connor. The intelligence also seems to back that up,
and that is probably something that the Committee would want to
speak to the Department of Homeland Security about.
The Chairman. Well, one thing I have gotten out of this
hearing is we need threat assessment very badly and an overall
picture from the Department of Homeland Security, and I hope
that this hearing has motivated our friends over at DHS to
provide that.
I thank you all for your testimony and your appearance here
and your patience today. Thank you very much.
[Whereupon, at 12:45 p.m., the Committee was adjourned.]
A P P E N D I X
Prepared Statement of Hon. John D. Rockefeller IV,
U.S. Senator from West Virginia
Mr. Chairman,
Right now we are at war with the terrorists. There is no question
that they mean to do us harm. I just returned last week from Iraq,
viewing first hand the situation on the ground. I also spend probably
half of every day in briefings or meeting on Al Qaeda and other
terrorist threat activities.
What we do know, is that events in the course of our Nation's
history have dictated actions. Whether it is Pearl Harbor or 9/11.
Madrid, for Europe, clearly has become a mobilizing force as the
European Union has focused on revamping its security networks. Here, we
also must understand that Madrid is an event we cannot, and must not,
ignore.
Looking at our vital and critical infrastructure--rail, this
morning, and a seaport security hearing tomorrow morning--we have vast
and diverse systems, giving us the benefits of a highly mobile
transportation system, while at the same time providing potential
target for terrorists.
Millions of Americans board Amtrak trains and public transit
at hundreds of stations across the country every day.
Millions of tons of dangerous chemicals and other hazardous
materials pass through Charleston, West Virginia and countless
other communities every day.
We also know that we have not devised a comprehensive security plan
to minimize the risk to the people that ride the rails and for the
communities that abut the rails. Right now, we have left it to local
communities, transit agencies, railroads, and shippers to develop their
own threat assessment and security plans. Each, I am reasonably
certain, is acting diligently. For example, I know we will hear about
efforts by the rail and chemical industry to establish emergency
communications systems and other efforts to ensure that first
responders have the best information available. However, the Federal
Government is not moving quickly enough to develop a national risk
assessment for rail infrastructure nor providing the resources
necessary to protect these assets.
I remain particularly concerned about the vulnerability of the
millions of tons of hazardous materials--notably chemicals that are
shipped through my state and almost every community. I recently hosted
a homeland security summit in West Virginia, and my state and local
officials are very concerned that they will not be able to adequately
respond to an attack on a train carrying dangerous chemicals or other
substances. I commend the efforts of the chemical industry and the
railroads to address this issue, but we cannot rely on their efforts
alone. This is a national security issue.
The Transportation Security Administration has developed multiple
layers for aviation security, which I believe is the appropriate
approach as no one layer is perfect. The same must be done for rail and
transit systems. Simply allowing local communities to conduct
vulnerability studies, without funds to turn them into action plans, is
not sufficient. Look at aviation--we are spending billions on it, and
making progress. It took a Congressional mandate, backed by funding to
get to this point. We need the same commitment with respect to rail.
Secretary Ridge yesterday acknowledged that we can not apply aviation
standards to rail, but that should not end the discussion. We also
cannot simply shift resources from one mode to the next, but instead
must have sufficient budget requests to get the job done. We cannot do
homeland security on the cheap. We need to be investing billions more
to prevent and deter threats to our transportation infrastructure. We
need to focus on developing the new technologies that will ultimately
make us safer and be more cost-effective.
I hope that our witnesses today will speak to what the
Administration and the industry have done to identify the
vulnerabilities of our rail system, what is being done to protect then,
and how the Federal Government is going to help local communities meet
the challenge of responding to a terrorist attack against a freight
train full of deadly chemicals or other hazardous materials.
______
Prepared Statement of Ajay Mehra, President,
OSI Systems, Inc. Security Group
Mr. Chairman and Senator Hollings, I thank you for the opportunity
to provide testimony to the committee about the pressing issue of
improving the security of our Nation's rail system. In light of the
recent tragic attacks in Spain, I applaud the Committee for
bringing the issue of rail security once again to the fore. As
President of the OSI Systems Security Group, I am eager to lend my
organization's collective experience to the formulation of a policy on
rail security. We strongly support this legislation and the efforts of
this committee to secure an important modality promoting commerce and
transportation, our railroads.
My hope is to inform the Committee of the most effective way to
address the potential threats posed by terrorism to the Nation's rail.
I will provide a brief description of OSI System's expertise in
providing transportation and border security, and then offer our best
solution to rail security.
OSI Systems, Inc. provides a variety of non-intrusive inspection
technologies for securing nearly every transportation modality,
including railroads
OSI Systems is the leading developer and manufacturer of non-
intrusive inspection (NII) technologies under the Ancore, Aracor, Metor
and Rapiscan brands. Our technology portfolio includes multi-energy X-
ray imaging, diffraction X-ray, backscatter X-ray imaging, gamma ray
imaging, computed tomography, nuclear quadrupole resonance, metal
detection, and neutron activation analysis. We have supplied over
20,000 security screening systems to customers worldwide and are
dedicated to providing quality equipment and excellent customer service
in a cost-effective manner. The company has over 1,000 employees in the
United States and many additional employees around the world.
As a security technology provider, OSI Systems has extensive
experience in rail security. We have helped the Chinese government
develop their rail inspection system and have installed cargo and
passenger screening systems around the world for nearly every
transportation modality. We have examined the issues surrounding rail
security, and we believe that relatively simple modifications to
current technologies can be made to effectively safeguard our rail
system.
Rail security presents distinct challenges and threats from other
transportation modes
In contrast to the security issues surrounding aviation and sea
transport, rail security presents variety of new threats and security
needs. We at OSI Systems believe the necessary first step in protecting
rail passengers and freight is to define the types of potential threats
that could be faced in rail attack scenarios and how they differ from
our current understanding of the threats in aviation and sea transport.
While we must strive to prevent all attacks, the amount and types of
explosives and weapons of mass destruction (WMD) terrorists use differ
by target. Smaller levels of explosives are catastrophic in aviation,
but rail cars are more accessible. After we define the vulnerabilities
and threats, we can establish the most effective and efficient means to
prevent and detect these threats.
As demonstrated most terribly in Spain, the principle threats to
railway safety are explosives and WMD. With that in mind, railway
transportation has its own distinct threat levels of explosives. We
encourage Congress to direct TSA to determine these threat levels as
soon as possible. This will allow industry partners, like OSI Systems,
to design technologies aimed at detecting these weapons.
I want to stress, that technology exists today that can effectively
inspect train cargo and passengers. However, we should first clearly
define our vulnerabilities and the potential threats, so that we
install systems designed for rail security.
Passenger screening is a key component of rail security
Millions of passengers ride trains every year. Yet none of these
passengers passes even through rudimentary screening systems such as
those you all walked through to get to this committee room. The
differences from aviation are even more striking. Considering that
every piece of carry-on baggage, checked baggage and every passenger
are inspected before boarding an airplane while none of these efforts
are made in rail safety, it seems that rail security is wide open to
potential attack. And, as terribly demonstrated in Spain earlier this
month, this is clearly a gap that terrorists will exploit.
With passengers and carry-on luggage constituting the principle
delivery mechanisms, we must array our detection technology against
these channels, focusing detection on explosives and weapons. While
these threats faced in a rail environment differ somewhat from the
threats to aviation, the technologies and configuration used are
essentially the same.
Similar to airport checkpoints, portal metal detectors would be
placed along side of carry on baggage X-ray systems for rail
checkpoints. These systems would be combined with currently employed
trace element Explosive Detection Systems or any type of explosive
material specific technology. The number of checkpoints needed would be
configured to give the best throughput possible based on the specific
rider-ship typical for that station. It is important to note that there
is far less checked baggage in rail travel than aviation so the baggage
inspection requirements should be dramatically less intrusive and
costly.
We recommend that the Committee consider using currently employed
TSA qualified technologies. Using TSA qualified technologies makes
policy sense for the ease of use, familiarity and ease of procurement.
These technologies are available off the shelf. OSI Systems, along with
other industry leaders, produce all of these systems. TSA screeners are
extremely familiar with TRX systems, portal metal detectors and trace
element detectors. No additional training is required for operators of
these systems. Maintenance of these technologies is also familiar to
the TSA.
TSA also has sufficient procurement vehicles in place to acquire
the needed passenger screening technology. TSA should use the currently
active contracts to accommodate for this additional need for rail
security. These technologies have long since been vetted through the
procurement process, so only the time of production and delivery until
solutions could be in place.
We view freight as separate and much less of a concern than carry-
on baggage for delivery of explosives, as freight is carried in
separate rail cars, and not in the belly of a passenger car like a
plane. The TSA should develop appropriate screening protocols to insure
the safety of freight, however, our main concern with this legislation
is securing the rails for passengers.
Maintaining the stream of commerce will potentially be the largest
hurdle to implementing a rail security strategy. However, because the
threats posed to railroads are considerably different than those in
aviation, the technology should be able to inspect passengers and cargo
more quickly.
Rail security screening systems are available and can be quickly
deployed to protect train passengers and the rail system
Securing large parts of the rail system is well within capability
of the U.S. government and current screening technologies. With only
minor modifications, current TSA employed technologies should be able
to detect these threats effectively. Portal metal detectors, TRX carry-
on X-ray systems and trace explosive detection technologies are well
known by the TSA. They require no training, no new configurations, and
no new procurement vehicles.
OSI System is committed to placing the best tools in the hands of
our government to secure our homeland. I am honored to add our
experience to address the issue of rail security. I want to thank the
Committee again for this opportunity to testify.
______
Response to Written Questions Submitted by Hon. John McCain to
Hon. Asa Hutchinson
Question 1. What is TSA's role with respect to rail security and
what should it be in the future?
Does TSA have a unique role or should rail security be overseen by
other agencies within DHS and the Department of Transportation?
Why has most of the progress that has been made in improving rail
security taken place outside of TSA, the agency with primary
responsibility for rail safety?
If the issue is that most of the funds and attention have been
focused on airline and airport security, why is the Administration not
asking for more funds now to address rail security?
Combined Answer. The responsibility of securing our Nation's rail
and mass transit systems is shared among a number of Federal, State,
and local partners. TSA does have a specific role, in that no other
organization is uniquely positioned to effectively coordinate all of
the activities and manage the development, implementation, and
oversight of any necessary security protocols and standards.
The Department has consistently held that security responsibility
must involve the coordination of appropriate Federal, State, tribal,
local and private industry partners, many of whom were already in the
business of providing security for their particular piece of the
transportation sector. DHS, Department of Transportation (DOT), and
other Federal agencies are working together to enhance rail and transit
security in partnership with the public and private entities that own
and operate the Nation's rail and transit systems.
Presidential Directive 7 (HSPD-7), directs the establishment of ``a
national policy for Federal departments and agencies to identify and
prioritize United States critical infrastructure and key resources and
to protect them from terrorist attacks.'' In accordance with DHS's
HSPD-7 implementation plan and in partnership with other Federal
stakeholders, TSA is coordinating the development of the Transportation
Sector Specific Plan (SSP). A first draft of the SSP is due to DHS by
early summer, 2004 (at the same time when SSPs from the other 12
critical infrastructure sectors are also due). In developing the
transportation SSP, TSA is working under BTS guidance and with partners
in the U.S. Coast Guard and DOT. The SSP will discuss how Federal and
private-sector stakeholders will communicate and work together; how
important assets in the transportation sector will be identified,
assessed,; how protective programs will be developed and prioritized;
how progress in reducing risk will be measured; and how R&D will be
prioritized in the sector. In the Transportation Sector, the SSP will
further the efforts currently underway and help ensure that they are
systematic, exhaustive, and consistent with the efforts in the other 12
sectors. DHS will build on the foundation of the SSP to provide overall
operational planning guidance on rail security. The SSP will ensure
that modal security plans are integrated into an effective concept of
operations for security management of the rail sector within our
Nation's transportation system.
As an example of TSA's collaboration with other Federal agencies
and rail industry stakeholders, TSA, Amtrak, Maryland Transit
Administration, and the Federal Railroad Administration have combined
efforts to institute a passenger and carry-on baggage screening
prototype for explosives in a rail environment known as the Transit and
Rail Inspection Program (TRIP). Under the first phase of this program,
TSA screened Amtrak and MARC commuter train passengers for explosives
at the New Carrollton, Maryland train station during the month of May
as part of a test program to make rail travel more secure. The pilot
project is testing existing and prototype technologies to determine
their usefulness in a rail environment.
The DHS grant program for improving rail and transit security in
urban areas has awarded over $115 million since May 2003. Additionally,
the Administration has requested $24 million for TSA to advance
security efforts in the maritime and surface transportation arenas, and
has requested that $37 million of the Federal Transit Administration's
Urban Security Bus grants be available for security related projects.
On March 22, 2004, Secretary Ridge announced additional measures to
strengthen security for our rail and transit systems. DHS will build on
many of the security measures recommended during the past two years for
implementation to mass transit and passenger rail authorities by DHS,
the Federal Transit Administration, and the Federal Railroad
Administration.
Since the time of this hearing, DHS has issued Security Directives
(SD) requiring protective measures to be implemented by passenger rail
operators. The measures instruct commuter, transit, and passenger rail
systems to comply with requirements that range from removing or
replacing station trash cans to utilizing canine explosives detection
teams. The directives will be administered by TSA and took effect on
May 23, 2004. These measures, in addition to others already in place,
will advance our mission to ensure rail passengers are protected.
Question 2. In 2003, the Maritime and Land Division of TSA
indicated it would develop security standards for all modes of
transportation by the end of the year. However, no standards have been
issued and yesterday Secretary Ridge announced that DHS would begin
working with industry to develop ``best practices''. Why has no
progress been made so far and what is your timetable for developing
best practices?
Answer. In general, TSA is responsible for ensuring that all modes
of transportation are secured by partnering with the appropriate
Federal, State, tribal, local and private industry stakeholders, many
of whom were already in the business of providing security before the
creation of TSA. TSA's role in securing the transportation system
begins at the system or sector-wide level, across the individual modes,
thus ensuring consistency and consideration of inter-modal issues (such
as assets, incidents, or supply chains that straddle multiple modes,
and inter-modal facilities).
Furthermore, as noted above, DHS recently issued SDs requiring
protective measures to be implemented by passenger rail operators. The
SDs took effect on May 23, 2004 and apply to all passenger rail owners/
operators.
In the aftermath of the recent events in Spain, Russia and
elsewhere, passenger rail operators have implemented a number of robust
security measures. TSA has partnered with the private and non-Federal
sector to develop and disseminate best practices with regard to
securing non-aviation modes:
TSA developed a series of security awareness tools for mass
transit employees such as tip cards, pamphlets, and posters.
These products are intended for all mass transit employees as a
reminder or checklist on what to look for during mass transit
operations to prevent a terrorist attack. Similar products are
under development for mass transit passengers.
TSA held a security awareness workshop in October of 2003,
which drew representatives from the motorcoach, school bus,
mass transit and enforcement organizations from around the
country. Attendees were briefed on the tactics and tools of
suicide bombers, provided an overview of the latest detection
technology and provided an overview of possible scenarios to
encourage discussion of best practices.
In addition, DHS has assigned TSA primary Sector Specific
Responsibility for the development of the Transportation Sector
Specific Plan as DHS implements Homeland Security Presidential
Directive 7 (HSPD-7), which directs the establishment of ``a
national policy for Federal departments and agencies to
identify and prioritize United States critical infrastructure
and key resources and to protect them from terrorist attacks.''
In accordance with DHS's HSPD-7 implementation plan, TSA is
coordinating the development the Transportation Sector Specific
Plan (SSP) under BTS guidance and with partners in the U.S.
Coast Guard and the DOT. A first draft of the SSP is due to DHS
by early summer 2004. An important role of the SSP will be to
facilitate and improve both the development and the sharing of
``best practices'' in transportation security among government
and private sector stakeholders to ensure that they are
systematic and complete.
Question 3. Of the $1.45 billion in the President's Fiscal Year
2005 budget for the Urban Area Security Initiative, how much will be
available for mass transit grants? Do you believe Amtrak should be
eligible to receive such grants?
Answer. The President's Budget request includes $1.45 billion for
continuation of the Urban Areas Security Initiative, including $1.2
billion for the UASI grant program, $200 million for Critical
Infrastructure Protection (CIP), and $46 million for Port Security.
Depending on the outcome of the FY 2005 congressional appropriations,
the Department will make final funding decisions, which may include
funding for mass transit systems out of the UASI grant program. At this
point, final decisions have not been determined, but mass transit
security is a priority of the Department and the Administration.
Question 4. Pursuant to the statutory direction of Congress in
appropriations acts and the Homeland Security Act of 2002, ODP grant
program funds are meant to assist State and local units of governments
and emergency responders prevent, prepare for, and respond to acts of
terrorism. Furthermore, as a Federal entity, Amtrak is not eligible to
receive grant funds from the Office for Domestic Preparedness. ODP
firmly believes that its grant funds should be focused on assisting
State and local emergency responders.
Amtrak's President. David Gunn, indicated stated last year that it
should be TSA's responsibility to fund additional security personnel
for Amtrak. Do you agree?
Answer. Generally speaking, however, TSA does not envision a role
providing operational security staff to Amtrak or other rail systems.
Security is a shared responsibility between appropriate Federal, State,
tribal, local, and private industry entities. Given the vast
infrastructure comprising passenger rail, any Federally-supported
security enhancements must be the product of careful risk assessments
and cost benefit analysis.
TSA will continue to coordinate these efforts under the guidance of
DHS and BTS, identifying gaps and working with appropriate partners to
ensure that existing security gaps are filled. Last year, TSA provided
comments to the President and Chief Executive Officer, David Gunn, on
Amtrak's official security plan, submitted April 10, 2003. This close
coordination has been established and ongoing among Amtrak, Federal
Railroad Administration, and TSA and remains essential as we move
forward together to enhance rail security.
Question 5. Could you please give the Committee an update on the
installation of railcar screening equipment at the northern and
southern borders?
Answer. U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP) has a long history
of working in the rail environment. The ever-increasing volume of rail
traffic has made physical inspections of rail shipments difficult and
time-consuming. To improve the examination efficiency at Southern and
Northern border rail crossings, CBP developed a rail screening strategy
incorporating Rail Vehicle and Cargo Inspection System (rail gamma-ray
scanner) technology through an adaptation of the large-scale imaging
technology deployed to our land border and seaport environments.
Rail gamma-ray scanner technology allows CBP to safely and quickly
screen an entire train for contraband, including potential terrorists
and the implements of terror. Rail gamma-ray scanners allow CBP to
segregate suspicious shipments and minimize the possibility of
dangerous goods entering the United States while facilitating
legitimate trade and cargo.
CBP has done much to mitigate the threat posed by terrorists
seeking to smuggle radiological material into the United States through
risk management and CBP's layered enforcement strategy. In addition to
Rail gamma-ray scanner equipment, CBP Officers currently utilize
personal radiation detectors and radiation isotope identifiers to
screen for radiation at rail examination sites. More robust radiation
detection technology such as radiation portal monitors will be deployed
to rail crossings in a phased approach.
Southwest Border
There are eight rail crossings on the U.S./Mexico border. Rail
gamma-ray scanner systems have already been deployed to seven of these
crossings. The gamma-ray system will be deployed to the eighth rail
crossing during calendar year 2004. Once this system is deployed, CBP
will have the capability to screen 100 percent of the rail traffic
arriving in the United States from Mexico.
Northern Border
There are 23 rail crossings on the U.S./Canada border. Eight gamma-
ray scanner systems have been deployed to seven U.S. locations. Four
systems will be deployed at two locations in Canada. CBP estimates the
first two systems will be operational by the fall of 2004 and total
deployment completed in Canada by the fall of 2005. The 12 rail gamma-
ray scanner units deployed to these nine northern border rail crossings
will provide CBP with the capability to screen up to 90 percent of all
rail traffic arriving in the United States from Canada.
Along with rail gamma-ray scanner technology, railcar examination
facilities have been built. These facilities provide CBP officers with
the capability to unload railcars and examine their contents when
necessary. Rail gamma-ray scanner technology, along with rail
examination facilities, further strengthens existing border security
and enhances CBP's anti-terrorism efforts.
CBP intends to deploy rail gamma-ray scanner units to the remaining
14 rail crossings on the northern border. Once fully implemented, our
northern border rail initiative will provide CBP with the capability to
screen 100 percent of the rail traffic arriving in the United States
from Canada.
Response to Written Questions Submitted by Hon. Ernest F. Hollings to
Hon. Asa Hutchinson
Question 1. In response to the question ``In Washington, Amtrak and
commuter trains operate through tunnels under Capitol Hill. What has
DHS done to ensure that these tunnels are properly secured,'' posed by
Senator Hollings, from the April 2003 hearing, Secretary Ridge
responded with ``The Virginia Avenue Tunnel is owned by CSX. CSX has
posted security guards around the clock at each end of the tunnel since
September 11, 2001. CSX is currently installing intrusion technology at
both ends of the tunnel to replace the security guards.''
What is the status of these security efforts? Has the intrusion
technology been installed? Is CSX undertaking these efforts alone and
at their own expense?
Answer. There is an intrusion detection system monitoring both ends
of the Virginia Avenue Tunnel, as well as a meteorlogical station that
monitors the atmospherics in case of an emergency involving the release
of chemical being transported. The CSX Police Communications Center
monitors the intrusion detection system 24 hours a day/seven days a
week. Most alarms are referred to the U.S. Capitol Police for response
due to their close proximity and interest in hazardous material
shipments transported close to the U.S. Capitol and associated
surrounding buildings.
Question 2. Should DHS be playing a more active role in either
providing personnel or helping to finance the security of our key rail
bridges and tunnels? If so, do you plan to request specific funds for
this activity in the near future?
Answer. TSA already plays a very active role in assisting passenger
and freight railroad industries in addressing vulnerabilities and
facilitating mitigation strategies. TSA has deployed a model to
determine criticality of transportation facilities and assets, and with
partners within the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) and the
Department of Transportation (DOT), is conducting vulnerability
assessments of transportation assets, such as rail and transit, to
determine their susceptibility to attack or compromise. The Department
coordinates information and threat sharing for rail and transit through
the Surface Transportation Information Sharing and Analysis Center (ST-
ISAC), in partnership with the Association of American Railroads (AAR)
and the American Public Transportation Association.
TSA provides comprehensive security reviews for railroad owners and
operators. We meet with stakeholders to review and assess security
plans and to ensure that baseline security measures address different
threat levels. Upon completion of the review, we provide guidance for
improving overall system security. Many railroad carriers have taken
additional security measures to protect their rail transportation
system against terrorism. TSA is benchmarking existing industry best
practices to recommend potential mitigation measures to industry
stakeholders. In addition we are considering the feasibility of
intrusion detection systems and unmanned aerial vehicles to monitor and
protect rail infrastructure, bridges, tunnels, and other fixed assets.
In the Washington D.C. metropolitan area, TSA is leading a multi-agency
task force to conduct a comprehensive security review of rail
infrastructure used to convey hazardous materials and to create a plan
to address any vulnerabilities uncovered. An interagency working group
will conduct similar reviews in two to three other high-threat urban
areas.
All of these programs are being implemented using existing funds,
and we do not anticipate that the Administration will request
additional funds in FY 2005.
Question 3. The original question above about the security of the
trains which run under the Capitol, was directed more specifically
towards the security of the 1st street tunnel, which runs under the
Capitol and the Supreme Court, not the Virginia Avenue Tunnel, which
runs parallel to the House buildings. In light of this clarification
what has DHS done to secure the 1st street tunnel? Currently how secure
is it? What more must be done to fully secure the tunnels and how soon
must it be accomplished?
Answer. The 1st Street Tunnel is owned and maintained by Amtrak and
used to carry passenger trains only. U.S. Capitol Police and Amtrak
personnel closely monitor the area surrounding the tunnel. Future plans
include installing cameras at the Amtrak/CSX interchange point which is
approximately 500 feet away from the tunnel, to enhance existing
surveillance capabilities provided by the Capital Police and Amtrak and
provide a deterrence measure.
TSA is working on developing and deploying an integrated
monitoring, detection, and alerting system with the ability to
distinguish, track, and display anomalous human behavior in multiple-
stream video feeds for the identification of possible terrorist attacks
in a commuter rail setting. TSA and the Technical Support Working Group
(TSWG) have a partnership with Amtrak to prototype this project at the
30th Street Station in Philadelphia, PA. This technology may be used in
the future to secure infrastructure such as the 1st Street Tunnel as
well as other key assets.
Question 4. Since 9/11, DHS has provided more than $30 billion in
Federal funding for aviation concerns related to 9/11, yet has expected
the rail industry to largely fund their own efforts. Can you explain
this discrepancy in Federal responsibility and funding? Does the
Administration simply believe that aviation concerns are a higher
national priority, despite the resent attacks in Madrid and evidence
sited in testimony given by the Rand Corporation citing the
pervasiveness of attacks against railroads?
Answer. Ensuring that our Nation's transportation systems are
secure must be accomplished through effective partnering among
appropriate Federal, state, local and private industry entities. Much
of TSA's activities support our mission across the various
transportation modes, making them difficult to categorize as
exclusively benefiting a single mode.
Although the creation of a Federal screener workforce has meant
that DHS currently provides a greater proportion of the security costs
for aviation compared to other modes, transportation security is a
partnership among Federal, state and local governments and the private
sectors.
In aviation, the Federal jurisdiction and operational
responsibility is clearly significant. For these reasons, DHS has known
that the aviation model would not work as well for securing all modes
of transportation. Thus, we have worked with our State, tribal, local,
regional and private partners to help secure our transportation system.
In coordination with DOT, state, local and private sector partners,
DHS's efforts in non-aviation security over the past two years have
focused on greater information sharing between industry and all levels
of government, assessing vulnerabilities in non-aviation sectors to
develop new security measures and plans, leveraging existing security
initiatives, increasing training and public awareness campaigns, and
providing greater assistance and funding for non-aviation security
activities.
DHS, DOT, and other Federal agencies are working together to
enhance rail and transit security in partnership with the public and
private entities that own and operate the Nation's rail and transit
systems. Part of TSA's responsibility is the coordination of these
entities, many of whom have always been and continue to be in the
business of providing security for their particular piece of the
transportation sector. Working with our partners, TSA plays an active
role throughout the entire transportation system providing research and
development, advisory services, and intermodal coordination. A number
of steps have already been taken to address vulnerabilities in the rail
and transit systems and improve our security posture against attacks.
Question 5. Does DHS have a special responsibility for securing
Amtrak since it is a national carrier that is significantly funded by
the Federal Government and its key asset--the Northeast Corridor--is
owned by the U.S. DOT? Isn't this akin to the U.S. government's
ownership of the air space and our responsibility to secure aviation?
Answer. The responsibility of securing our Nation's rail and mass
transit systems is shared between DHS, DOT, and other Federal agencies
in partnership with the public and private entities that own and
operate those systems. To our knowledge, the Northeast Corridor was
purchased by Amtrak from the bankrupt Penn Central at the time of its
restructuring. Operators in the corridor include New Jersey Transit
(NJT), Southeastern Pennsylvania Transportation Authority (SEPTA),
Massachusetts Bay Transportation Authority (MBTA), Metro North
Railroad, CSX and NS. Amtrak utilizes its own police and security
forces and takes the lead in providing security for this section of
critical transportation infrastructure.
Question 6. Is Amtrak currently eligible for any grants or other
funding from DHS for security improvements? If so, through what
programs?
Answer. As a Federal entity, Amtrak is not eligible to receive
grant funds from the Office for Domestic Preparedness.
Question 7. The Department has stated that, in conjunction with the
FRA, it has conducted ``comprehensive vulnerability assessments'' of
rail networks in high density urban areas. How many rail vulnerability
assessments have been concluded at present? Who has primarily provided
the funding for these assessments? How many more are planned?
Answer. The FTA funded ``security risk assessments'' for at least
50 of the largest transit agencies in the nation, which included the 10
largest commuter railroads under FRA's jurisdiction. FRA participated
in all of the security risk assessments on those 10 commuter railroads
and contributed to the funding for three of those risk assessments. TSA
has reviewed FTA's 34 ``vulnerability assessments'' on transit systems
in high density urban areas and three vulnerability assessments on
commuter rail lines and provided a gap analysis to FTA.
Additionally, TSA is finalizing for delivery a hazardous material
rail security assessment that includes vulnerability assessment/hazard
analysis in the Washington, D.C. area. This will be followed by two
additional HAZMAT assessments as well as four to five passenger
assessments. These assessments will be coordinated with FRA, FTA, RSPA
and IAIP.
Question 8. Once vulnerability assessments have been concluded,
does the Department have the ability to compel rail carriers or transit
agencies to address the vulnerabilities identified?
Answer. The Department has the authority under 49 U.S.C. 114(f) to
require transportation owners and operators, including rail carriers
and transit agencies, to address identified vulnerabilities. As an
example, on May 20, 2004 DHS issued Security Directives (SD) to ensure
the best of these practices are implemented throughout the industry.
The SDs, which are being administered by TSA, establish mandatory
protective measures for commuter and transit passenger rail, inter-city
train, and regional services. To enforce the directives, in
coordination with the rail operator, TSA will designate Security
Partnership Teams comprised of representatives from DHS/TSA and DOT.
Team visits will be prioritized based on criticality, threat, and the
status of the last vulnerability assessment.
Question 9. It is still unclear from the testimony presented at the
March 24, 2004 Rail Security Hearing, whom exactly is in charge of rail
security and ultimately responsible for coordinating the multitude of
federal, state, local, and industry rail security efforts. Is this
primarily DHS's job? What role does FRA have? Is TSA spearheading the
effort for the Department?
Answer. TSA is responsible for coordinating security efforts across
the intermodal passenger and supply chain. This responsibility must
involve the coordination of appropriate federal, state, local and
private industry partners, many of whom have always been, and continue
to be, in the business of providing security for their particular piece
of the transportation puzzle. TSA's main charge, both under the
Aviation and Transportation Security Act (ATSA) and now as part of the
DHS family, is to coordinate these efforts under the guidance of the
Secretary and the Under Secretary for Border and Transportation
Security (BTS), identifying gaps and working with appropriate partners
to ensure that existing security gaps are filled. Under DHS leadership,
TSA is responsible for (1) establishing consistent national
transportation security standards across all modes, (2) monitoring
compliance with these standards by transportation stakeholders, (3)
evaluating risk to the system across a changing array of threats, (4)
sharing threat and risk information with transportation stakeholders
(public and private), and (5) in the event of a transportation security
incident insuring rapid restoration of service and public confidence.
TSA is currently engaged in this process through rulemaking, risk
modeling and contingency planning. The challenge in implementing this
strategy centers on the proper balance between public and private
responsibility/investment in achieving an acceptable security level.
TSA/DHS will work with transportation stakeholders (public and private)
to develop consistent security standards across all transportation
modes.
DHS, DOT, and other Federal agencies are working together to
enhance rail and transit security in partnership with the public and
private entities that own and operate the Nation's rail and transit
systems. Homeland Security Presidential Directive 7 (HSPD-7) directs
the establishment of ``a national policy for Federal departments and
agencies to identify and prioritize United States critical
infrastructure and key resources and to protect them from terrorist
attacks.'' Under HSPD-7, DHS has the lead role in coordinating
protection activities for ``transportation systems, including mass
transit, aviation, maritime, ground/surface, and rail and pipeline
systems,'' while DOT is responsible for promoting the safety,
efficiency, effectiveness, and economic well-being of the Nation's
transportation systems.
DHS has assigned TSA primary Sector Specific Responsibility (SSR)
for the Transportation Sector. TSA is developing and coordinating the
Transportation Sector Specific Plan (SSP) in conjunction with our
partners at DOT and USCG and under the guidance of the Undersecretary
for Border and Transportation Security. DOT and its component modal
administrations have subject matter expertise, substantial
relationships, and frequent interactions throughout the entire
Transportation Sector, as well as some regulatory authority. For these
reasons, as well as requirements in HSPD-7, TSA collaborates closely
with DOT's modal administrations, including FRA, on transportation
sector security and will continue to do so.
The SSP will discuss how Federal and private-sector stakeholders
will communicate and work together; how important assets in the
transportation sector will be identified, assessed, and prioritized;
how protective programs will be developed; how progress in reducing
risk will be measured; and how R&D will be prioritized in the sector.
In the Transportation Sector, the SSP will further these efforts
currently underway and help ensure that they are systematic, complete,
and consistent with the efforts in the other 12 sectors. The first
draft of the Transportation SSP is due shortly.
Question 10. According to the Department of Homeland Security, $115
million in Federal grants have been authorized, but the American Public
Transportation Association (APTA) reports that only $35 million have
actually reached the transit authorities so far. Can you explain what
is holding up the distribution of these funds to transit authorities?
Answer. The Department of Homeland Security, through the Office for
Domestic Preparedness, provided $65 million in Fiscal Year (FY) 2003 to
19 designated mass transit systems. Although administered by the ODP,
the Urban Areas Security Initiative (UASI) Transit System Security
Grant Program has been coordinated with the Transportation Security
Administration and the Department of Transportation's Federal Transit
Administration. This support was continued through the FY 2004 UASI
program, which provided $50 million for 25 transit systems. As in FY
2003, ODP worked closely with TSA to determine those transit systems to
receive support through this program.
To date, none of the FY 2003 UASI Transit Security Grant funds have
been drawn down by the recipient agencies. Attached is a chart
detailing specific information about the FY 2003 awards, including
grantee, award date, award amount, and current draw down information.
It should be noted, though, that recipients of the FY 2003 UASI Transit
Security grants have 24 months to expend their funds. Given that most
of these awards were made in late 2003, the grantees have until late
2005 to draw down their awarded funds. As we have seen with the
Homeland Security Grant Program awards and the Urban Areas Security
Initiative awards, the reasons for lack of draw down of these funds can
vary based on the recipient agency--including length of time required
for grantees to contract or sub-grant these funds, time required to
procure specialized equipment, and variances in state and local laws
and regulations governing the acceptance and expenditure of Federal
funds.
As you know, the Secretary has convened a Homeland Security Funding
Task Force to examine the varying reasons for delays in states and
localities expending homeland security funds. The Task Force, composed
of state, county, city, and tribal representatives, is examining the
funding process to ensure that Department of Homeland Security funds
move quickly to local first responders. The Task Force will identify
state and local funding solutions that work effectively and can be
extended to situations where there are impediments to the efficient and
effective distribution of state and local homeland security funds.
______
Response to Written Questions Submitted by Hon. Frank R. Lautenberg to
Hon. Asa Hutchinson
Question 1. Why has the Administration not requested any funding
specifically for Amtrak rail security?
Answer. DHS, in coordination with its Federal, state, local and
tribal government partners, as well as its private sector partners, is
committed to improving the security of our Nation's passenger rail
system. While, the President's Fiscal Year 2005 budget request for TSA
does not include specific funding for Amtrak security personnel, DHS
will continue to carefully monitor the rail security situation.
The President's 2005 Budget proposes $1.4 billion for Amtrak
beginning in 2006, assuming fundamental reforms are instituted. If
Amtrak were to develop a security plan that received DOT and DHS
approval, this amount could help fund life-safety and security
projects.
Question 2. Does BTS follow up on the security recommendations
issued by the Infrastructure Protection Directorate to infrastructure
owners/operators? Are IAIP's security recommendations are designed to
improve security to a certain objective level, or just provide options
for where any new spending on security should be directed?
Answer. The Office of Information Analysis (IA) within the
Information Analysis and Infrastructure Protection (IAIP) Directorate
provides threat information in the form of Information Bulletins and
Threat Advisories to owners and operators of various sector facilities,
including the transportation sector. IA/IP's products are designed to
provide threat awareness based upon current intelligence reporting and
suggested protective measures. Specific recommendations or guidelines
are often subsequently issued by BTS component agencies, including the
Transportation Security Administration, Immigration and Customs
Enforcement, and U.S. Customs and Border Protection.
Question 3. New radiological detection equipment has been deployed
to screen cargo on trucks leaving the ports. Similarly, does BTS intend
to screen rail cars leaving ports?
Answer. BTS utilizes radiological detection equipment, assigned to
inbound cargo processing, to screen outbound cargo for vessel, air,
truck and rail shipments leaving the country when a review of the
export documentation indicates that a shipment may be high risk. CBP is
looking for weapons of mass destruction, conventional weapons and their
component parts that potentially could fall into the hands of
terrorists. CBP's goal is to prevent terrorists or criminal
organizations from obtaining the components of WMD or conventional
weapons.
______
Response to Written Questions Submitted by Hon. John D. Rockefeller IV
to Hon. Asa Hutchinson
Question 1. Local communities, companies and Amtrak have all had to
go out and conduct their own vulnerability assessments. Many of these
have probably been done by public transit agencies. How many
assessments has TSA/DHS carried out?
Answer. TSA, in coordination with its Federal, State, local and
private sector partners, is finalizing a hazardous material rail
security assessment that includes vulnerability assessment/hazard
analysis in the Washington, D.C. area. This will be followed by two
additional HAZMAT assessments as well as four to five passenger
assessments, which will be coordinated with FRA, FTA, RSPA, and IAIP.
Additionally, to date TSA has generated 543 criticality assessments to
prioritize and identify our most critical assets.
TSA has also developed the TSA Self Assessment Risk Model (TSARM).
This is designed to assist asset owners/operators in developing a
security plan. The tool captures an asset's baseline security posture
and identified additional measures that could be undertaken to reduce
vulnerabilities. This tool is available at no-cost to users. Currently,
a maritime module is operational with development efforts underway for
General Aviation and Mass Transit. It is TSA's intent to have modules
for each transportation mode.
Question 2. Other than the public transit agencies, how many grants
has TSA given out for those studies?
Answer. The Federal Transit Administration (FTA) funded ``security
risk assessments'' for at least 50 of the largest transit agencies in
the nation, which included the 10 largest commuter railroads under
Federal Railroad Administration's (FRA) jurisdiction. FRA participated
in all of the security risk assessments on those 10 commuter railroads
and contributed to the funding for three of those risk assessments. TSA
has reviewed FTA's 34 ``vulnerability assessments'' on transit systems
in high density urban areas and three vulnerability assessments on
commuter rail lines and provided a gap analysis to FTA.
Additionally, TSA is finalizing for delivery a hazardous material
rail security assessment that includes vulnerability assessment/hazard
analysis in the Washington, DC area. This will be followed by two
additional HAZMAT assessments as well as four to five passenger
assessments. These assessments will be coordinated with FRA, FTA, RSPA,
and IAIP.
In addition to rail assessments, TSA has provided grant funding to
over 50 intercity bus agencies to conduct security assessments. Also,
TSA has awarded 32 grants to specifically provide security assessments
for maritime facilities. Security assessments currently are not
required to be completed by public transit companies, although some
have done them voluntarily.
Question 3. Once a study is completed, what does TSA do with the
information--how do you harden these systems?
Answer. This response assumes that the word ``study'' in the
question refers to vulnerability assessments. As a matter of policy, in
allocating the UASI funds the Secretary dedicated to transit security,
DHS required that transit applicants complete assessments and have
security plans in place. The funds were targeted to assist in
implementation of security plans.
Question 4. How do you share intelligence threat information with
the various entities?
Answer. The DHS goal of domain awareness across all modes of
transportation is served by enhanced information sharing with the
increased access to both tactically actionable products and background
information on groups and individuals. Information sharing is one of
the critical mission areas that the Department of Homeland Security
(DHS) has set as a priority for better preparing the homeland.
The DHS Office of Information Analysis (IA), in conjunction with
other DHS entities, prepares warning products and distributes them to
State, local, Tribal, major city, and private sector officials. These
products, which include both Homeland Security Information Bulletins
and Threat Advisories, allow DHS officials to communicate threats and
suggested protective measures to regions and/or sectors of concern,
within each threat level. Additionally, unclassified information is
shared through a daily Homeland Security Operations Morning Brief and
the weekly joint DHS-FBI Intelligence Bulletin. The Office of State and
Local Government Coordination also coordinates bi-weekly conference
calls with all of the Homeland Security Advisors in all the states and
territories to help relay important departmental information as well as
respond to queries from advisors.
The Department has also paid for and established secure
communication channels to all of our state and territorial governors
and their state emergency operations centers. This investment in
communication equipment included secure VTC equipment along with Stu/
Ste telephones. DHS has also worked to ensure every governor has been
cleared to receive classified information and are working with the
Governors and their Homeland Security Advisors to provide security
clearances for five additional people who support the Governors'
Homeland Security mission. This provides DHS an avenue for
disseminating classified information directly to the location that
needs the information.
Lastly, one of the primary ways in which DHS is improving its
communication with its constituents is through the Homeland Security
Information Network (HSIN) and specifically through the Joint Regional
Information Exchange System (JRIES). Using this network, Federal,
State, and urban area homeland security advisors will be able to
communicate with each other and with DHS, as will federal, state, and
urban Emergency Operations Centers, and the National Guard and the
state adjutant generals. Once connected, user groups will have access
both to communication streams with each other and DHS, as well as to
DHS warning products distributed by IA.
______
Response to Written Questions Submitted by Hon. John McCain to
Hon. Allan Rutter
Question 1. The transportation of hazardous materials by rail
presents unique risks to the communities through which these shipments
pass.
(a) What can be done to minimize these risks?
Answer. My prepared statement provides a broad overview of some of
the Department's regulatory, research, and other programs intended to
minimize the risks of transporting hazardous materials by rail,
including the Department's work, under the coordination of the Homeland
Security Council, with the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) to
develop a plan to enhance rail security of hazardous materials that are
toxic by inhalation (TIH materials). Let me focus now on this
particular interagency initiative. The plan is the culmination of an
over a year-long cooperative effort with DHS, with vital support in the
aggregation of data from the U.S. rail industry.
Specifically, the Department of Transportation (DOT) and DHS are
doing the following:
Assessing the vulnerabilities of high-population areas where
TIH materials are moved by rail in significant quantity,
working with industry to put in place measures for mitigating
identified vulnerabilities, compiling a nationwide
vulnerability assessment, and completing pilot security plan
implementation projects in cities of concern by the end of 2004
(beginning with the Washington, D.C., corridor).
Conducting vulnerability assessments of those High Threat
Urban Areas where the largest quantities of TIH chemicals are
transported by rail and developing vulnerability remediation
and protection plans.
Developing by September 2004 predetermined protective
measures, based on the threat level, specific intelligence, and
vulnerability assessments, that selectively restrict the
movement of TIH materials by rail around high-density
population centers, without impeding the delivery of essential
goods and services.
Assessing the compliance with, and the effectiveness of,
existing hazardous materials security plans as they
specifically relate to TIH shipments by rail, and determining
whether and how to amend the regulations of DOT's Research and
Special Programs Administration (RSPA) that require those
plans.
Over the longer term, DOT and DHS have established an interagency
regulatory working group to review existing regulations and to do the
following:
Explore the potential risk reduction from making rail
shipments of TIH materials less identifiable to terrorists,
with careful consideration of the needs of first responders.
Evaluate options for eliminating the use of rail tank cars
for the temporary storage of TIH materials at user sites or
rail yards in high-population areas, or improving the security
surrounding these areas during temporary storage. If DOT and
DHS determine that storage requirements may be warranted, we
will develop additional rail yard protective measures for tanks
cars used for temporary storage of TIH materials, and we will
publish a notice in the Federal Register by August 1, 2004,
requesting comments.
Consider the feasibility and cost effectiveness of
establishing minimum communication standards for transporters
of TIH material, such as the real-time satellite tracking of
railcars containing TIH material and the real-time monitoring
of tank car conditions, as well as requiring intended
recipients of TIH shipments to report non-delivery within
agreed-upon delivery windows.
(b) Is it feasible to reroute some hazardous materials shipments?
Answer. The Nation's towns and cities were built on rail lines, and
routing alternatives on the national rail system are very limited.
Where routing alternatives do exist, making the route less direct would
increase the cost and could also increase the safety risk for carriers
and shippers. For example, some routes outside of cities may pose
higher safety risks because the lines involved have low maximum
operating speeds and are, therefore, subject to less robust track
standards.
As I've discussed, our agency is participating in joint efforts
with DHS and the Homeland Security Council to conduct a review and
security risk assessment of rail shipments of certain hazardous
materials (i.e., TIH materials) through major metropolitan areas in
order to better understand our potential vulnerabilities and to take
protective actions. The risk assessment of these rail shipments in
Washington, D.C., is currently underway. We hope that this effort will
serve as a precursor and model for similar risk assessments in other
metropolitan areas that have significant amounts of hazardous materials
shipments.
Question 2. How has FRA modified its safety regulations since
September 11, 2001 to improve rail security?
Answer. Since the September 11 attacks, FRA has used its rail
safety rulemaking authority to pursue many rulemakings that benefit
rail security, including several that are explicitly grounded on
security concerns or that have clear security benefits. FRA has issued
an interim final rule and a final rule requiring that trains operating
in the United States be dispatched from the United States, except under
certain limited conditions. The preamble to the final rule notes that
current technology allows dispatching of domestic rail operations from
anywhere in the world, including countries that may not offer the same
levels of security and security measures that are offered by domestic
agencies. We have also established a Railroad Safety Advisory Committee
working group to use recent FRA-sponsored research to develop
recommendations to improve FRA's Passenger Equipment Safety Standards
and passenger train emergency preparedness standards. Further, we have
progressed a rulemaking to establish performance standards for positive
train control systems, which help prevent collisions and overspeed
derailments, in both ordinary and security situations; a final rule is
in clearance in the Executive Branch.
Finally, as I discussed in my prepared testimony, FRA and RSPA
contemplated a rulemaking involving personnel security, but decided not
to proceed after all. In coordination with DHS, which has the lead on
transportation security, FRA and RSPA looked closely at the issue of
whether the transportation of explosives by rail presented a sufficient
security risk to warrant issuance of regulations concerning the
backgrounds of railroad operating employees. Our analysis, jointly
issued by the Transportation Security Administration (TSA), RSPA, and
FRA and published in the Federal Register on June 9, 2003, indicated
that railroad operating employees did not present a sufficient security
risk requiring further regulation at that time because of the extensive
regulation of the transportation of all hazardous materials, including
explosives, by DOT; the protections inherent in rail operations against
improper use of those materials by railroad employees; and the security
safeguards already taken by the railroads themselves, including
background checks. In that publication, we also noted, however, that
the issue of whether to mandate background checks for railroad
employees who transport hazardous material remains open.
TSA is currently evaluating the need for and nature of
background checks on transportation workers, in addition to
those in the aviation and trucking industries, who are in a
position to cause or control serious security-related events.
TSA is taking a risk-based approach to security regulations so
that the government and private sector can prioritize resources
based on threat information, vulnerability assessments, and
criticality determinations. TSA is engaged in such an analysis
concerning background checks for transportation workers in the
maritime and rail industries. TSA continues to evaluate the
need for additional regulations concerning this population and
potential threats, and may issue additional security
requirements concerning railroad employees engaged in the
transportation of [hazardous material].
68 Fed. Reg. 34474.
Question 3. Your written testimony states the many actions that
have been taken by FRA and RSPA to safeguard the transportation of
hazardous materials. But in light of the 2002 Minot, North Dakota
derailment, in which one person died and 11 others were injured because
8 tank cars carrying anhydrous ammonia ruptured, doesn't more need to
be done to improve tank car integrity? What should be done to phase out
or rebuild older pressurized tank cars, like those in the Minot
accident? The National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) concluded
that the type of steel used for the tank shells of the Minot cars
contributed to the ruptures. Nearly 60 percent of the pressurized tank
cars in service today were built using the same type of steel as the
Minot cars. The NTSB indicated these cars could remain in service until
2039.
Answer. It is unlikely that all of the pressurized tank cars built
before 1989 will be in use for TIH chemicals for another 35 years for
economic reasons: the operating and maintenance costs of the vehicles
begin to exceed the leasing revenues for tank car owners after 25-30
years. Nevertheless, FRA will continue to explore whether retrofit or
operating restrictions are needed for these cars.
For many years FRA and RSPA have been actively pursuing
improvements in tank car structural integrity through the Association
of American Railroads' (AAR) Tank Car Committee, of which the NTSB is a
member, and we will continue to do so. Among the research items being
investigated is a comprehensive analysis of the impact resistance of
steels in the shells of pre-1989 pressurized tank cars, which must be
completed before we can begin to assess and evaluate risk or to develop
any necessary operating restrictions. When this initial study is
finished, the results can be applied to design specific fracture
toughness standards for tank cars built in the future. Furthermore, the
most effective testing methods to replace the periodic retest
requirement will need to be identified.
Overlying all of this effort is research into defining the
operating environment for tank cars and the stresses they encounter in
actual transportation. These efforts have been continuous since the
mid-1990s and are looking at buff and draft forces, switching impacts,
and forces developed during train accidents. FRA's Office of Research
and Development is sponsoring an on-going program at the Volpe Center,
the University of Illinois at Chicago, and Southwest Research Institute
to evaluate in-train forces associated with train derailments. The
development and validation of a model of such forces are expected to be
complete in early 2006. Another research and development project being
conducted jointly with the AAR and the tank car industry is the
validation of previously developed data on the tank car operating
environment to effectively determine the adequate service integrity of
tank cars during their life. These programs are well on their way
toward providing the agency with the necessary tools to better predict
the action of such forces on tank cars in hazardous materials service.
Finally, as part of our new cooperative initiative with DHS, we are
exploring the possibility of making tank cars that transport anhydrous
ammonia and other TIH materials (TIH cars) better able to withstand
deliberate attack. DOT and DHS have begun working with the AAR Tank Car
Committee to evaluate options and methods for strengthening TIH cars
against intentional assault, such as might be committed by a terrorist.
Based upon a review of current intelligence, terrorist capabilities,
feasibility, and cost effectiveness, DHS and DOT are working on a
Design Basis Threat (a profile of the type, composition, and
capabilities of an adversary), from which potential improvements in
rail car design may be derived. DOT and DHS are also surveying
technologies for strengthening TIH cars against terrorist attack,
either through design modification or retrofit; any such strengthening
would also help improve the crashworthiness of the TIH fleet. It is our
hope that, by September 2004, we will publish a notice in the Federal
Register requesting comments from the general public and the industry
on options and methods for strengthening such cars against deliberate
attack.
Question 4. In January 2003, I asked FRA and TSA to help Amtrak
develop a security plan and a security investment plan. The plan FRA
and TSA reviewed and provided comments on, however, was not Amtrak's
final plan. You indicated at the time, Administrator Rutter, that FRA
has hired Ensco, Inc., to review Amtrak's security plan and provide
assistance in updating and revising it. Now I understand FRA has
contracted with the RAND Corporation to review Amtrak's security
programs.
(a) Has this review been completed and are you satisfied with
Amtrak's plan?
Answer. FRA's reviews noted that current security investment
decisions are often strategically and tactically ineffective. Expected
completion of the review is December 2004.
(b) In your opinion, is Amtrak's current security-related funding
request based on its security plan?
Answer. Amtrak's funding request is based on security
recommendations from its police chief. To improve Amtrak's ability to
identify and quantify its needs, FRA contracted with RAND to assist
Amtrak in developing a program to fully identify risk and threat-based
vulnerabilities.
(c) With all FTA is doing on transit security, did FRA think about
having FTA review Amtrak's security plan?
Answer. Yes, but FTA handles transit and commuter railroads, not
Amtrak. FRA regulates Amtrak, and as FRA Administrator, I sit on
Amtrak's board. FRA thought it would be best to have an independent
third-party contractor with extensive expertise in the security area to
review Amtrak's security plan.
(d) Have these consultants been funded by Amtrak or FRA?
Answer. FRA initially funded the RAND study, but in order to gain
more detailed information on operational security issues, the Amtrak
Office of the Inspector General also provided funding for the RAND
work.
(e) Has FRA provided other security-related financial assistance to
Amtrak, and if so, how much funding and for what purposes?
Answer. In Fiscal Year 2002, FRA received an emergency supplemental
appropriation of $105 million for Amtrak rail security as a result of
9/11. Of that amount, $100 million was for fire and life-safety
improvements to Amtrak's New York tunnels, and $5 million was for
overtime for Amtrak police and security personnel. To date,
approximately $75 million of the $100 million for the tunnels has been
obligated. Please note that FRA issues the general capital, Northeast
Corridor capital, and operating grants for Amtrak, portions of which
are used for security purposes.
Question 5. (a) What are the principal duties of FRA's Chief of
Security?
Answer. FRA's Chief of Security spearheads FRA's efforts to assist
TSA and the railroad industry implement practical measures to improve
railroad security. He prepares procurement requests for, and provides
technical management for, contracts to conduct security assessments. He
coordinates railroad security issues and activities with the railroad
industry and rail labor, with Federal, State, and local law
enforcement, and with homeland security agencies. Working with DOT's
Office of Intelligence and Security, DHS, and the railroad industry, he
has established communication channels for rapid dissemination of
threat information. Working with RSPA and our hazardous materials
staff, he is developing guidance for evaluation of railroads' hazardous
materials security plans. Working with FRA's regional staffs, he has
helped plan and evaluate reviews of station security and plans for
security enhancement in passenger rail facilities. As FRA and DHS
clarify ongoing responsibilities for rail security, he may assume
additional responsibilities for program management.
(b) How big a security force does FRA have?
Answer. FRA is currently authorized one Railroad Security
Specialist (Risk Management) (the official title of the position held
by FRA's Chief of Security, according to the position description).
There is a broad overlap between FRA's historic rail safety
responsibility and the new emerging rail security concerns. To date,
FRA has been identifying and using existing resources to assure they
address where possible both safety and security. Also, to a limited
extent, FRA has been reprogramming existing resources to meet specific
security needs (e.g., using FRA safety inspectors to check the
security-related plans and preparedness at Amtrak and commuter rail
stations).
Question 6. How might the duties of FRA inspectors be changed to
help fight terrorism? What role could they potentially play in
prevention, emergency response training, and emergency response?
Answer. My prepared testimony indicates some of the ways that FRA's
rail safety inspectors are supporting the effort to improve rail
security. DHS is considering certain actions it may take in the future
to enhance rail security, and FRA will work with it on reaching a
specific agreement concerning how FRA inspectors may be able to assist
DHS's initiatives.
______
Response to Written Questions Submitted by Hon. Ernest F. Hollings to
Hon. Allan Rutter
Question 1. a. How many FRA employees are dedicated to rail
security at the FRA?
Answer. As I told Senator McCain in answer to his earlier question,
FRA is currently authorized one Railroad Security Specialist (Risk
Management), which is the official title of the position held by FRA's
Chief of Security, according to the position description. There is a
broad overlap between FRA's historic rail safety responsibility and the
new emerging rail security concerns. To date, FRA has been identifying
and using existing resources to assure that they address where possible
both safety and security. Also, to a limited extent, FRA has been
reprogramming existing resources to meet specific security needs (e.g.,
using FRA safety inspectors to check the security-related plans and
preparedness at Amtrak and commuter rail stations).
b. Do you see the FRA or the DHS as having a leadership role in
this area?
Answer. Under applicable statutes, DHS is the lead Federal
Government agency for railroad security. Section 101 of the Homeland
Security Act of 2002 provides that the primary mission of DHS is to
prevent terrorist attacks within the United States, reduce the
vulnerability of the United States to terrorism, and minimize the
damage and assist the recovery from terrorist attacks that do occur
within the United States. Section 114 of title 49, U.S. Code, vests in
the Transportation Security Administration, which is now part of DHS,
the responsibility for security in all modes of transportation,
including railroads and mass transportation systems.
On December 17, 2003, the President issued Homeland Security
Presidential Directive (HSPD) 7, which ``establishes a national policy
for Federal departments and agencies to identify and prioritize United
States critical infrastructure and key resources and to protect them
from terrorist attacks.'' See HSPD-7, Paragraph 1. In recognition of
the lead role assigned to DHS for transportation security, and
consistent with the applicable powers granted to TSA by the Aviation
and Transportation Security Act, Pub. L. 107-71, 115 Stat. 597
(November 19, 2001), the directive provides that the roles and
responsibilities of the Secretary of Homeland Security include
coordinating protection activities for ``transportation systems,
including mass transit, aviation, maritime, ground/surface, and rail
and pipeline systems.'' See HSPD-7, Paragraph 15. In furtherance of
this coordination process, HSPD-7 provides that DHS and DOT will
``collaborate on all matters relating to transportation security and
transportation infrastructure protection.'' See HSPD-7, Paragraph
22(h).
While DHS plays the primary role in fostering rail security, FRA
plays a supportive role. FRA contributes to this security effort, using
the agency's broad delegated authority over ``every area of railroad
safety.'' The Administration's rail safety reauthorization bills
transmitted to the Congress in July 2002 and July 2003 include a
provision to clarify that the Secretary of Transportation's safety
authority includes the authority to address threats to rail security.
FRA believes that its current authority inherently includes security,
but such a clarifying amendment would help FRA to preempt and quickly
rebuff any judicial challenges to FRA safety rules and orders that are
issued to enhance rail security, and any objections to FRA safety
inspectors' examining vulnerability assessments and security plans of
railroad carriers and railroad shippers in cooperation with DHS. A
comparable clarifying provision was passed by the Senate in November
2003 (section 205(b) of the Federal Railroad Safety Improvement Act (S.
1402)).
c. Does the FRA budget contain funds specifically for rail security
efforts? If not, how are current FRA rail security efforts being
funded?
Answer. FRA was given funds for, and has hired, a rail security
specialist. As I said earlier, FRA has been seeing to it that the
agency's existing resources address both safety and security where
possible and, occasionally, reprogramming existing resources to fulfill
particular security needs.
Question 2. a. What are the various layers of security that are now
deployed to protect rail and transit security?
Answer. The security measures currently in effect for railroads and
transit systems may be divided into three categories: (1) measures to
prevent security incidents through detection of security threats and
deterrence of conduct that contributes to those threats; (2) measures
to mitigate casualties through design; and (3) measures to mitigate
casualties through emergency preparedness and hazard communication. My
prepared testimony has dwelt quite a bit on casualty-mitigation
measures, so I will focus now on preventive measures. These include (1)
two-way threat-communication systems, (2) measures incorporated in the
security plan of an individual railroad or transit system to address
its identified vulnerabilities, (3) Federal oversight of the content
and implementation of these security plans, and (4) special measures
for U.S.-bound international cargo.
Two-Way Threat-Communication Systems
The Railway Alert Network (RAN) is a tool employed by FRA, under
the direction of the Department of Transportation's (DOT) Office of
Intelligence and Security, both to relay classified or sensitive
information from intelligence and law enforcement sources to the
railroad industry and to receive related threat information from the
industry, all via secure communications. FRA and the railroad industry
also use the RAN to exchange information on ways to address the
specific threat. FRA, at no cost to the industry, provides the
Association of American Railroads (AAR), railroad labor, the American
Public Transportation Association (APTA), commuter railroads, and The
American Short Line and Regional Railroad Association, with current
information, threat assessments, and security bulletins. Designated FRA
staff are available around the clock, seven days a week, to receive
this vital information and to share it with senior DOT and FRA
officials, railroad police, and national security agencies. Begun under
a different name many years before 9/11, the RAN is currently funded
jointly by DOT and AAR and is operated up to the Secret level. The RAN
is now linked to the AAR's Operations Center and to another, more
recently established threat-communication network, the Surface
Transportation Information Sharing and Analysis Center (ST-ISAC).
DHS is the lead Federal agency for the ST-ISAC, which is run in
partnership with both AAR and APTA and which serves the same users as
the RAN as well as public transit agencies. DHS's Transportation
Security Administration hosts the ST-ISAC personnel at the
Transportation Security Coordination Center in Virginia. FRA, at no
cost to the railroad industry, provides the ST-ISAC with current rail-
related information, threat assessments, and security bulletins. The
ST-ISAC operates up to the Top Secret level.
DOT also operates a Crisis Management Center to improve the
dissemination of threat information throughout the Federal Government
and the transportation industry as a whole. It is available 24/7 and is
linked to the RAN and the ST-ISAC. The Crisis Management Center
operates up to the Secret level.
Measures Incorporated in the Security Plan of an Individual Railroad or
Transit System to Address its Identified Vulnerabilities
DHS's Information Analysis and Infrastructure Protection
Directorate, the Federal Transit Administration (FTA), and FRA have
jointly conducted comprehensive security vulnerability assessments of
rail and transit systems in high-density urban areas. FTA funded these
studies for the 50 largest transit agencies in the United States, which
include the ten biggest commuter railroads, railroads subject to FRA's
safety authority. FRA participated in each of the vulnerability
assessments for these ten commuter railroads and helped to fund three
of the ten assessments. These vulnerability assessments identified
where resources should be directed now and in the future.
Currently, security measures intended to prevent security incidents
by addressing these vulnerabilities vary with the individual transit
system or railroad. FTA Deputy Administrator Jamison can provide
details on transit systems not within FRA's jurisdiction. The commuter
railroads' security measures include the following:
monitoring by uniformed and plain-clothes police;
use of closed-circuit television for surveillance;
security sweeps of terminals and trains;
use of bomb-sniffing dogs to detect explosives;
efforts to prevent unauthorized access to train platforms,
rail yards, and passenger car maintenance and cleaning
facilities;
notices and job briefings of employees on how to be more
aware of suspicious persons and packages;
public announcements or printed notices to passengers to
warn them to be alert for such persons and packages and to
notify railroad personnel directly or through communication
systems located in trains or in stations; and
special training of security personnel.
Amtrak's security measures are similar and described in some detail
in its prepared testimony. I might also note with regard to training
efforts that FRA has developed and made available a terrorism-awareness
training program to educate railroad employees, local law enforcement,
first responders, and railroad and shipper security managers. This
education process provides insight into terrorist organizations,
tactics, and planning, surveillance techniques, and attack protocols
(i.e., ways a terrorist might attack a person and what the person
should look for, e.g., someone wearing an overcoat in Washington, D.C.,
on July 4).
As for preventive measures in the security plans of freight
railroads, the AAR's testimony outlines the security plan adopted by
the AAR Board of Directors for its member freight railroads. That
security plan establishes four security alert levels and describes the
actions to be taken at each level. At Alert Level 1, when there is ``a
general threat of possible terrorist activity[,]'' 32 actions are to be
taken, both to prevent incidents and mitigate casualties. Preventive
measures include security education, limiting access to certain
information to those with a need to know, curbing the unauthorized
tracing of certain materials, and regularly verifying that security
systems are working properly. At Alert Level 2, ``when there is a
general non-specific threat of possible terrorist activity involving
railroad personnel or facilities[,]'' 21 more preventive or casualty-
mitigation actions are to be taken. The additional preventive actions
include discussing security and awareness during each day with
employees; making ``content inspections of cars and containers for
cause;'' making ``spot content inspections of motor vehicles on
railroad property; and increasing security at designated facilities.''
Currently, the freight railroad industry is at Alert Level 2, and has
undertaken some additional preventive measures in various urban areas
as advised by DHS. Further security actions are prescribed in the AAR
plan for Alert Levels 3 and 4. The same alert levels are used by the
shortline railroads.
Federal Oversight of the Content and Implementation of these Security
Plans
Federal monitoring of railroads' security plans is another layer of
security. DHS has primary responsibility for reviewing and overseeing
these security plans. FRA uses its inspectors to monitor implementation
of security measures in response to elevated threats. Soon after the
Madrid bombings on March 11, 2004, in coordination with DHS, I
instructed FRA's regional offices to undertake multi-day team
inspections of Amtrak and each of the 18 commuter railroads to see what
additional security measures had been put in place. Almost 200 FRA
safety inspectors participated in this project. When they found
security problems, they alerted senior railroad managers so that the
problems could be remedied. Finally,, for railroads that carry
hazardous materials, RSPA's regulations require security plans and
security training for their employees who handle hazardous material.
Railroads must adhere to those plans and update them to meet new
situations. We are looking forward to assisting RSPA and DHS in
checking how the railroads are putting these plans into action.
Special Security Measures for U.S.-Bound International Cargo
Finally, for railroads that handle international, intermodal
freight, DHS's Container Security Initiative provides important
additional security protections at the Nation's land and sea borders.
That initiative involves four core elements: (1) identifying high-risk
containers in foreign countries before the containers are loaded onto
vessels destined for the United States; (2) pre-screening those
containers before shipment; (3) using detection technology, such as
radiation detectors and large-scale X-ray-type imaging equipment; and
(4) using tamper-evident containers so that U.S. Customs and Border
Protection officers can determine whether the cargo has been tampered
with after it was screened overseas.
FRA has continued to increase its railroad inspections at the
borders, and continues close coordination with U.S. Customs and
Immigration authorities. FRA coordinated the optimum placement of X-ray
machines at railroad border crossings with U.S. Customs, and FRA is
helping Customs' efforts to have trains inspected in Canada before
being granted access to the United States.
b. Who bears the cost of these security measures?
Answer. The costs of existing security measures are borne by the
Federal, State, and local governments and by the private sector. Some
security measures, such as the RAN, are funded by the Federal
Government and the AAR. Other security projects, such as vulnerability
assessments for the 50 largest transit agencies, and many of Amtrak's
security efforts are paid for by the Federal Government.
c. How do our layers compare to those deployed by other countries?
Answer. In almost all cases for countries on the European
continent, railroads are owned, and often even operated by, the
government of the country. Therefore, security measures to protect
railroads are planned for, and provided by, one or more government
security agencies. For example, in France, protection of the SNCF
railroad's assets and operations is provided by the French National
Police, as well as the French military, not by the SNCF railroad. A
security liaison function within the SNCF closely works with these
government assets. Security liaison staff at the railroads usually is
made up of former government security members or, as is the case in
Germany, is from the intelligence community. In addition, the
International Rail Association (French acronym, ``UIC''), headquartered
in Paris, helps coordinate European rail security operational aspects,
and FRA, as an associate member of the UIC, since 9/11 actively
participates in this rail security policy-planning and policy-making
effort and disseminates available information to relevant U.S. rail and
transit entities.
In the United Kingdom, local and national police, including
Scotland Yard for major incidents, assist the privatized rail industry
with security issues. In the case of Japan, the privatized major
railroads have their own security forces, and they closely work with
various national and local security forces. China's huge government-
owned and -operated railroad has a considerable Railways Police force,
with wide ranging powers, including meting out capital punishment, and
an extensive prison system. Russia's equally huge rail system is being
restructured, and we assume that security will continue to be provided
by a mix of railroad police and Russian military. The Russian
government continues to consider the rail system as a ``national
monopoly,'' and security is tightly and centrally controlled in Moscow
at a separate, high security command center.
d. What is the annual spending by country for implementing these
layers?
Answer. FRA does not have this information. Because security is
more often than not provided by either a foreign country's military or
its other national assets, information on spending for protection
programs is impossible for FRA to ascertain or obtain.
Question 3. What percentage of the DHS/TSA budget is dedicated to
rail/transit security and how is that money used?
Answer. FRA respectfully defers to DHS to answer that question.
Question 4. How much research funding is being spent each year, and
for future years?
Answer. For Fiscal Year 2004 (FY 04), FRA's Office of Research and
Development (OR&D) has several ongoing and planned security
initiatives, some of which I've described in my prepared testimony.
Those initiatives, along with their respective funding amounts for FY
04, are as follows:
(a) OR&D plans to spend about $200,000 in FY 04 to assess the
vulnerabilities of passenger cars by evaluating the results of
a passenger car explosion.
(b) FRA OR&D also plans to provide $200,000 in FY 04 to assist
the TSA with a railroad Passenger Check-Point Screening Pilot
Program.
(c) The Tank Car Security Evaluation is an ongoing project with
a total funding amount of $400,000 from FY 03. This cooperative
project with DHS evaluates the integrity of tank cars through
the detection of tank car breach utilizing sensors on the tank
cars.
(d) The Passenger Car Manifest Study is an ongoing initiative
prompted by a National Transportation Safety Board
recommendation. The total funding amount of $225,000 was
provided in FY 03, and no FY 04 funding is required. Currently
the study is being performed to define one or more options for
a real-time manifest system for Amtrak trains.
(e) The Transportation Security Situation Display (TSSD) has
been funded at a total amount of $125,000, which was provided
in FY 03, and no FY 04 funding is required. The TSSD is a
developmental activity involving DOT's Volpe National
Transportation Systems Center and others. The TSSD is intended
to help first responders to allocate their resources by
providing on a computer monitor a visually displayed map of a
localized area where there is a security situation, a natural
disaster, or a weather-related disruption.
For FY 05, FRA OR&D has requested $400,000 to continue the study
initiated in FY 04 for passenger car explosion testing. Work will also
be initiated on bridge and tunnel security monitoring.
______
Response to Written Question Submitted by Hon. Frank R. Lautenberg to
Hon. Allan Rutter
Question. Why has the Administration not requested any funding
specifically for Amtrak rail security?
Answer. Again, DHS is the Federal Government's lead agency on
transportation security. FRA defers to DHS on how to deal with the
security needs of Amtrak. FRA has been working closely with DHS and
Amtrak to define security investment priorities, and I expect that in
the future these will be represented in specific security-related
resource requests. My answers to some of Senator McCain's earlier
questions on Amtrak security provide further explanation.
______
Response to Written Questions Submitted by Hon. John McCain to
Peter F. Guerrero
Question 1. What are the various layers of security that are now
deployed to protect rail and transit security? Who bears the cost of
these security measures? How do our layers compare to those deployed by
other countries? What is the annual spending by country for
implementing these layers?
Answer. Passenger and freight rail stakeholders have taken a number
of steps to improve the security of the Nation's rail system since
September 11, 2001. Although security received attention before
September 11, the terrorist attacks elevated the importance and urgency
of transportation security for passenger and freight rail providers.
Consequently, passenger and freight rail providers have implemented a
number of new security measures or increased the frequency or intensity
of existing activities, including performing risk assessments,
conducting emergency drills, and developing security plans. The Federal
Government has also acted to enhance rail security. For example, the
Federal Transit Administration has provided grants for emergency drills
and conducted security assessments at the largest transit agencies,
among other things.
The costs of security enhancements have been borne by rail and
transit providers and all levels of the government. For example, the
Department of Homeland Security provided about $115 million to transit
systems for security enhancements, such as physical barricades, video
surveillance systems, and integrated communications systems, in Fiscal
Years 2003 and 2004. In addition, the transit industry has invested
$1.7 billion in security enhancements since September 11, according to
the American Public Transportation Association. Funding needed security
enhancements is a challenge for both passenger and freight rail
systems. Although some security improvements are inexpensive, such as
removing trash cans from subway platforms, most require substantial
funding. The current economic environment makes this a difficult time
for private industry or the government to make additional security
investments. Given the tight budget environment, rail providers must
make difficult trade-offs between security investments and other needs,
such as service expansion and equipment upgrades.
At the request of several Members of Congress, including Members of
the Senate Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation, we are
beginning a review of passenger rail security that will examine the
security practices of our Nation's passenger rail systems and compare
them with the practices of systems in select foreign countries. In
particular, we plan to (1) identify vulnerability assessments of U.S.
passenger rail systems that have been done and examine the results of
these assessments, (2) identify measures that are currently in place or
planned to screen rail passengers and their baggage and identify the
limitations of these measures in securing the rail systems, and (3)
examine passenger rail security measures that select foreign countries
employ and determine the feasibility of applying these measures
domestically. To the extent possible, we will also examine the costs of
passenger and baggage screening measures in the United States and
select foreign countries. We expect to complete this review next year.
Question 2. What percentage of the DHS/TSA budget is dedicated to
rail/transit security and how is that money used? How much research
funding is being spent each year, and for future years?
Answer. As part of our passenger rail security review, we will
examine Federal spending on rail security activities. We expect to
complete this review next year.
In addition to our review of passenger rail security, we also are
currently examining the Federal Government's research and development
efforts for all modes of transportation, including rail, at the request
of several Senate and House committees. In particular, we are examining
(1) the extent to which DHS/TSA has managed its transportation security
R&D program according to applicable laws; (2) the extent to which DHS/
TSA resources are committed to research and development across all
transportation modes and to next generation technologies, systems, and
equipment; and (3) the nature and scope of DHS/TSA coordination of its
research and development program with other government and private
sector organizations. We expect to complete this review in August 2004.
______
Response to Written Questions Submitted by Hon. John McCain to
Jack Riley
Question 1. Do you think there is any way the Madrid attack could
have been avoided? If so, how?
Answer. Given the size, yet simplicity, of the Madrid attacks (10
backpack bombs detonated near simultaneously), it is unlikely that the
event could have been completely averted by any combination of rail
security measures. Passenger and employee awareness programs might have
reduced the number of successful detonations. Explosive-sniffing dogs
might have caught a few more. The only measures that could have
prevented the attack in its entirety are intelligence and surveillance
that resulted in preemption of the attack.
Question 2. Your written testimony states ``There is a need for
coordinated Federal policy on rail security, encompassing freight,
passenger and commuter rails. Compared to other transportation sectors,
decision-making appears to be quite decentralized between a number of
federal, state, local and private concerns.'' Based on everything you
have heard today, do you think we have a well-coordinated rail security
program?
Answer. While there has been a substantial amount of rail security
activity (even prior to the Madrid attacks), it is not particularly
well-coordinated. For example, the freight industry has moved rapidly,
but they are motivated by a desire to avoid regulation. TSA is the
logical locus of that coordination, so that tradeoffs between rail and
air and maritime, or between passenger and freight security. However,
TSA has yet to emerge as the focal point. Thus, while there is a clear
focal point for airport and airline security best practices, there is
not for rail. This is the primary reason that I think rail security is
not well-coordinated.
Question 3. Mr. Riley, given your company's extensive work on
security, what do you believe are the three most important steps to
take to secure the Nation's rail system?
Answer. In the short run, the best steps for passenger rail:
visible security measures (patrols, cameras, explosive sniffing dogs,
etc) as a deterrent; passenger awareness campaigns; employee awareness
campaigns; and blast resistant containers. Beyond these short run
efforts, I do not believe the analytic work has been done (see 4-5
below) to justify other, large expenditures. For example, I do not
believe we have the basis for justifying passenger screening programs.
For freight security, the best immediate steps are slightly
different: employee awareness campaigns and visible (and effective)
efforts to secure cargo that can be weaponized. Beyond these short run
efforts, I do not believe the analytic work has been done (see 4-5
below) to justify other, large expenditures. It is also important to
note that a large fraction of freight rail cargo originates at U.S.
ports. Thus, to the extent that we succeed in securing the ocean
container supply chain we will also be improving the security of the
freight rail system.
In terms of infrastructure security (i.e., tunnels, bridges,
tracks, etc.), I think most of the emphasis will need to be on
mitigation. Do tunnels have adequate ventilation? Are there escape
routes? Do we have alternatives to key bridges? Questions like these
are necessary in the event that we do not succeed in preventing
attacks.
Last, but not least, as mentioned in ``1'' above, the issue of
intelligence and surveillance is an important one.
Question 4. Since we cannot protect everything, how should
decisions be made about how much to spend on rail security and what our
priorities should be?
Answer. The first priority should be understanding, through
simulation, surveys, interviews, and other methods, what the potential
catastrophic rail attack events are. For example, how easily could
tunnels be breached by explosions? What characteristics might future
attacks have? Thus, we need to formally review the types of attacks
that might occur and assess where they might do the most damage.
Second, we need to map these vulnerabilities to the likelihood of
attack (that is, to the threat). We are most interested in identifying
events that are high(er) likelihood and high consequence.
Question 5. How can Congress evaluate the costs and benefits of
rail security measures in an objective way?
Answer. Spending decisions on rail security need to be made in the
context of other security needs, particularly in the context of
security for other critical infrastructure. To accomplish this, we need
a national threat assessment and the vulnerability analysis from (4)
above for rail and other critical infrastructure. Only then can we
begin to make informed decisions about how much we should spend on rail
security relative to spending on other infrastructure security.
______
Response to Written Questions Submitted by Hon. John McCain to
Hon. Edward R. Hamberger
Question 1. What has happened to the insurance market for the
freight railroads since September 11, 2001? Have the railroads been
able to obtain terrorism insurance?
Answer. While certainly the commercial insurance market was turned
upside down from the tragic events of Sept. 11, and the impact on the
availability and affordability of various lines of insurance continue
to exist, the impact to the freight railroads depends on the line of
coverage. For the most part, under the general liability lines, the
freight railroads have been able to secure comparable coverage,
including coverage for acts of terrorism, albeit with significant
increases in premiums.
While general liability coverage is still relatively available in
the commercial marketplace, property damage coverage is difficult to
secure; and where such cover is even offered in the commercial markets,
the terms and conditions are severely restrictive and the costs are
essentially prohibitive. In most cases the freight railroads have gone
outside of the commercial marketplace and have instead utilized the
coverage created by the Federal Terrorism Risk Insurance Act of 2002
(TRIA) for property damage. The railroads pay premiums for the TRIA
coverage through captive insurance companies.
The railroads are pleased to be able to obtain this coverage for
property damage and urge that TRIA be extended beyond its current
expiration date in 2005. However, it should also be noted that TRIA
insurance has yet to be used. As a result, uncertainties remain as to
the full cost of participation in the event of a terrorist act against
another party, the process for determining when coverage will be
triggered by the Secretary of the Treasury, and the timing of and
process of any insurance payments by the fund. Also, TRIA coverage only
applies to an international, and not domestic, terrorist act. These
issues should be considered during the debate over TRIA's extension.
Question 2. Your written statement indicates that under the rail
industry's security plan, at the highest level of alert (when there has
been a confirmed threat against the rail industry or a terrorist attack
has occurred), the railroads would stop ``all non-mission-essential
contract services with access to critical facilities and systems.''
What exactly are ``non-mission-essential contract services''?
Answer. Examples of ``non-mission-essential contract services with
access to critical facilities and systems'' that the railroads would
stop at the highest alert level are:
Janitorial service
Vending machine service
Newspaper deliveries
Food deliveries
IT and communications contract services such as maintenance
and deliveries
Question 3. Under what conditions does the railroads' plan call for
rerouting hazardous materials?
Answer. The Terrorism Risk Analysis and Security Management Plan
(``Plan'') implemented by the railroad industry addresses the security
of hazardous materials transport in many ways. Depending on the alert
level, railroads impose increasingly stringent security measures to
protect these shipments. This security management approach provides a
proper balance between the need for increased security and the need to
meet delivery requirements for critical commodities. The Plan provides
for rerouting as an option that can be considered in very limited
circumstances and for periods of short duration so as to avoid serious
disruption to the operations of certain rail customers, such as water
treatment facilities and pharmaceutical manufacturers.
Question 4. Your written testimony states that ``Tank cars must
meet stringent U.S. DOT specifications if used to transport hazardous
materials.'' But in light of the Minot, North Dakota accident, in which
one person died and 11 others were injured because 8 tank cars carrying
anhydrous ammonia ruptured in a derailment, doesn't more need to be
done to improve tank car integrity?
What can/should be done to phase out or rebuild older pressurized
tank cars, like those in the Minot accident? The National
Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) concluded that the type of steel
used for the tank shells of the Minot cars contributed to the ruptures.
Nearly 60 percent of the pressurized tank cars in service today were
built using the same type of steel as the Minot cars. The NTSB
indicated these cars could remain in service until 2039.
Answer. The tank car issue is about steelmaking techniques,
including a thermal process called normalization, and how steels fail
when overstressed. It appears that NTSB is asking FRA to prioritize
hazardous materials that are transported in 32,818 non normalized cars
today so that the most hazardous and most likely to be subject to
rupture in cold temperatures can be moved into normalized steel cars,
while allowing the non normalized cars to be used for less hazardous
materials. While the railroads are nor the owners of these tank cars,
they are able, through the AAR Tank Car Committee, to influence tank
car design, research, and utilization. The committee is already looking
at the issues raised by NTSB in their recommendations to FRA, and we
will cooperate with FRA and others to accomplish improvements in tank
car safety. Many improvements have been made to tank cars over the
years as a resu1t of research initiated and paid for by the rail
industry (including the railroads and the tank car builders & lessors/
owners) through the RSI-AAR Tank Car Safety Research and Test Project
NTSB and the regulators need to be cognizant, however. that This
cooperative approach could be jeopardized if government action would
make cars obsolete for marginal benefits, As information, the current
pressure car fleet is comprised of 60,849 cars, 32,818 of which were
constructed prior to 1989.
Question 5. What has been the cost to the rail industry to modify
your track and facilities to accommodate screening technology at our
borders with Mexico and Canada? What additional expenditures do you
estimate will be incurred in implementing the technology at additional
border crossings?
Answer. Following 9/11, Customs changed its enforcement strategy to
include the deployment of Rail VACIS (Vehicle and Cargo Inspection
System) at the southwest and northern border rail crossings. A rail
VACIS uses gamma ray technology to scan each rail car as the train
slowly (1-8 mph) moves past the VACIS equipment, which remains
stationary. The full image of the vehicle and its contents are produced
at a nearby console, which is operated by a trained inspector. From the
X-ray image, inspectors can find unidentified articles and hidden
compartments within the rail car.
Railroad Vehicle and Cargo Inspection System (VACIS)
According to the Department of Homeland Security, U.S. Customs has
deployed seven out of eight southwest border rail VACIS systems which
are expected to cover 100 percent of the southwest border rail
traffic.\1\ The 8th system is expected to be installed by the end of
2004. U.S. Customs is planning to place nine rail VACIS systems on the
northern border, which are expected to cover 90 percent of northern
border rail volume entering the United States from Canada.\2\
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\1\ Among the U.S.-Mexico railroad crossings are San Diego, CA;
Calexico, CA; Nogales, AZ; El Paso, TX; Eagle Pass, TX; Laredo, TX
(Seranno Yard), Brownsville, TX. At Laredo, a new rail cargo
inspections facility, completed in April 2003, was built on land owned
by Union Pacific.
\2\ There are 9 U.S.-Canadian border crossings with VACIS: (7)
facilities on U.S. soil at International Falls/Rainier, MN; Portal, ND;
Buffalo, NY; Blaine, WA; Noyes, MN; Champlain/Rouses Point, NY and
Eastport, ID and (2) facilities on Canadian soil at Sarnia, Ontario
(Sarnia Yard) and Windsor, Ontario (Walkerville Yard). Not all
locations are up and running.
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Canadian National and Canadian Pacific Railroad have signed
agreements with both the Canadian and U.S. customs agencies concerning
VACIS. The railways will build the facilities, but U.S. Customs will
purchase, install and maintain the equipment at Sarnia, ON; Windsor,
ON; Buffalo, NY; Champlain/Rouses Point, NY; Noyes, MN; International
Falls/Rainier, MN and Portal, ND.
While U.S. Customs has funded the purchase of the VACIS machinery
through DHS's FY 2002 and 2003 appropriations, the freight rail
industry is assuming costs to accommodate this screening technology.
These include expenditures such as the use of right of way, track,
signaling, buildings, pads and toplifters. The biggest expenses are
creating and locating physical infrastructures that meet Customs
security standards for any cars that need to be set out of the train
for a resulting intensive exam, including the cost to switch out the
rail car or intermodal unit. Work is also usually required on railroad
property to position the VACIS machine itself. Costs among the Class 1
railroads vary significantly. Some railroads have reported minimal
direct costs, while in one case expenditures are expected to reach $8
million.
An additional cost is the requirement to operate at a maximum speed
of 6 MPH. While some technology improvements may soon allow speeds up
to 8 MPH, that is still less than half the speed that railroads would
normally operate at the border without VACIS speed restrictions.
Reduced speed not only impedes productivity, it also results in
blocking road crossings for longer that necessary at all gateways.
Question 6. The freight railroads have identified a need for $15
million in federal assistance to continue technical research into
protective measures and emergency response protocols. What specific
projects should be funded?
Answer. The projects contemplated in the $15 million figure are a
continuation of a joint rail industry/DHS/FRA effort. The projects are
designed to develop security enhancements for the transportation of
hazardous materials and tools for emergency responders. Extensive
testing already has been accomplished and additional funding is needed
for the next phase. Due to the sensitive nature of these projects, they
should not be discussed in a public forum. My staff and I would be
happy to meet with the committee in a closed session should additional
detail be required.
______
Response to Written Questions Submitted by Hon. Ernest F. Hollings to
Hon. Edward R. Hamberger
Question 1. Do you believe that intelligence information is being
appropriately coordinated among various Federal agencies and then
directed to appropriate private and public sector officials? How is
information passed on to first responders?
Answer. There is considerable room for improvement in the way
government shares information among agencies and with industry. Because
approximately 85 percent of all critical infrastructure is owned by the
private sector, government should treat industry as full partners in
the intelligence cycle. All barriers to including industry in the
analytical stage through early warning must be removed immediately in
order to protect critical infrastructure and services against terrorist
attacks.
AAR does not have any information as to how government communicates
intelligence information to first responders.
Question 2. What types of technologies are available (e.g., portal
screening systems/identification systems/facial recognition) to screen
passengers and baggage in rail or transit situations?
What is the feasibility and potential cost for the United States to
implement these efforts at high risk or otherwise appropriate Amtrak
and commuter rail facilities or services in this country?
Answer. AAR is not familiar with passenger screening technologies.
Amtrak and/or the Transportation Security Administration may be able to
provide this information.
______
Response to Written Question Submitted by Hon. Frank R. Lautenberg to
Hon. Edward R. Hamberger
Question. Many Class I railroads employ railroad police. Outside of
law enforcement and security activities, what activities do these rail
police perform for railroads?
Answer. In addition to their law enforcement and security
activities, railroad police officers perform such other functions as
they may be assigned and for which their professional training has
qualified them.
These functions include a wide range of duties. For instance,
railroad police act to promote public safety at accident scenes, at
grade crossings with malfunctioning warning devices, and in the
community. Railroad police enforce company policies (including policies
prohibiting the possession of alcohol and firearms). Railroad police
conduct lawful investigations when criminal wrongdoing is suspected.
And railroad police observe and report safety violations--a
responsibility that all senior rail officials share.
In short, railroad police undertake those functions that are
necessary to ensure the safety, security, and integrity of each
railroad, consistent with their sworn obligation to uphold the law and
to act within the limits of statutory authority and corporate
governance.
______
Response to Written Questions Submitted by Hon. John McCain to
William W. Millar
Question 1. Given that transit systems are intentionally open
systems for easy and convenient access, what can reasonably be done to
protect transit systems from terrorism?
Answer. Americans should be able to use public transit in the U.S.
without fearing for their safety and security. In that regard, and
within the confines of limited budgets, public transportation systems
have been engaged in a number of activities to enhance safety and
security. These include security operational activities, including
security awareness training for employees, public outreach programs and
drills. Transit systems have also been improving their radio
communications systems, surveillance systems and limiting and securing
access points to transit facilities and equipment.
Nonetheless, much more needs to be done. In a recent transit
security survey, APTA members identified $6 billion in unmet transit
security needs. While, public transit agencies have already spent $1.7
billion on transit security out of their own budgets, the Federal
Government has only provided $115 million in Federal grant funding for
transit security since September 11, 2001. We believe that
significantly more Federal resources should be made available to make
our transit systems as safe and secure as possible.
Question 2. Given limited Federal resources, what should our
highest priorities be for funding?
Answer. The public transportation industry has identified security
priorities through a survey recently conducted by APTA. Priorities for
capital needs include improved inter-operable radio and other
communications systems, strengthening access control to facilities,
establishing emergency operations control centers, and a variety of
other capital improvements that would enhance security. Priorities for
security related operating costs include threat assessments, enhanced
planning, public awareness, training, drills, and reimbursement for
transit security police for overtime expenses as a result of heightened
Federal alerts.
Question 3. How effective has the Information Sharing and Analysis
Center (ISAC) been in effectively communicating intelligence about
terrorist activities?
Answer. APTA is sector coordinator for the Public Transportation
ISAC. The ISAC is an effective means of communicating intelligence
about terrorist activities. Approximately 197 public transportation
systems are receiving daily security reports through e-mails that
provide critical alerts and advisories. Among its 197 members are
membership organizations, including the Community Transportation
Association of America which represents numerous small urban and rural
transit agencies. The ISAC provides a secure two-way 24/7 reporting and
analysis structure that links the transit industry to the U.S. DOT, the
TSA, the DHS and other government agencies. The Public Transportation
ISAC is a member of the 13 member ISAC Council, which provides valuable
interaction among the other established critical infrastructure
sectors, such as finance, energy, information technology and
telecommunications.
Question 4. In its 2003 review of FTA's security initiatives, GAO
recommended that legislation be passed to allow transit agencies to use
Federal urbanized area formula funds for security-related operating
expenses. What is FTA's position?
Answer. To the best of our knowledge, the FTA has not established a
position on this particular GAO recommendation.
______
Response to Written Questions Submitted by Hon. Ernest F. Hollings to
William W. Millar
Question 1. Do you believe that intelligence information is being
appropriately coordinated among various Federal agencies and then
directed to appropriate private and public sector officials?
Answer. Consistent with Presidential Decision Directive--#63, APTA
has established the Public Transit Information Sharing Analysis Center
(ISAC) that enables communication of security intelligence information
to transit systems on a 24-hour/7 day a week basis. The Public Transit-
ISAC is linked with DHS, TSA, FBI and several other intelligence
sources. Over the past six months within DHS's Directorate of
Information Analysis & Infrastructure Protection has taken steps to
develop stronger coordination ties with the various ISAC's.
Question 1a. How is information passed on to first responders?
Answer. Public transit is actually regarded as a first responder.
We utilize the Public Transit ISAC to transmit information.
Question 2. What types of technologies are available (e.g., portal
screening systems/identification systems/facial recognition) to screen
passengers and baggage in rail or transit situations?
Answer. While transit agencies do not have adequate funding to
fully embrace technological applications, there are a number of
technologies that transit systems are using regarding security. These
technologies include: CCTV, intrusion detection, GPS, Smart-Card
identification for employees and contractors, emergency intercoms on
rail cars and station platforms, public address systems, chemical agent
detection, and inter-operable radio communication. There is no
practical, cost effective technology currently available for passenger
screening in the public transit environment.
Question 2a. What is the feasibility and potential cost for the
United States to implement these efforts at high risk or otherwise
appropriate Amtrak and commuter rail facilities or services in this
country?
Answer. Given the large numbers of passengers using public transit
every weekday, the feasibility of introducing portal screening, etc.,
for commuter rail and rail transit systems other than on a random basis
does not appear to be realistic at this time.
______
Response to Written Questions Submitted by Hon. John McCain to
John O'Connor
Question 1. More than a year ago, I asked TSA and FRA to work with
Amtrak to develop both a security plan and a security investment plan.
Both agencies provided comments on an investment plan that Amtrak's
President David Gunn informed me was not Amtrak's final security plan.
With security such a high priority, why hasn't Amtrak submitted a final
funding plan until today?
Answer. The plan submitted pursuant to your hearing cannot be
viewed as a final security plan. While it addresses Amtrak's known and
obvious vulnerabilities and threats, it attempts to mitigate these
threats.
The submitted plan called for operating costs, which would be
recurring (more police and security officers).
In addition, many of these initiatives require funding. As has been
well documented, Amtrak has had to stabilize the Corporation and
railroad system along with increasing security. The former was, and
still is, the highest priority. With stabilization occurring
(contingent upon sufficient Federal funding), Amtrak is addressing
security issues in a more substantive manner. The recently released
five year capital plan contains numerous security projects and
demonstrates Amtrak's commitment to improving security.
Question 2. Have FRA and TSA given Amtrak comments on this final
plan, including the cost estimates for the various projects?
Answer. FRA representatives attend all Amtrak Board of Directors
meetings and are intimately aware of our needs and proposals regarding
security. Amtrak received a written response from TSA in May of 2003.
TSA could not provide funding, but indicated general support of the
security plan. The TSA response is enclosed.
Amtrak is working with the RAND Corporation following their review
of security and a recommendation to conduct a systemwide vulnerability
assessment. The findings and recommendations from this vulnerability
assessment and compliance with the TSA security directives will drive
Amtrak's security funding plan.
Question 3. How does Amtrak coordinate its security efforts with
Metro-North, the Long Island Railroad, and MTA in New York City?
Answer. It must be pointed out that overall management of NYPS is
complex and an interagency effort. Through agreement, there is an
established Penn Station Control Center (PSCC) where agencies work
side-by-side, interacting and coordinating train operations on a daily
basis. A part of this overall endeavor is the Penn Station Security
Committee (PSSC) in which law enforcement personnel coordinate and
handle PSNY security issues. In addition, there is regular
communication between these law enforcement agencies.
There is also a Fire and Life Safety Committee that addresses
safety and emergency response issues. Also, a modern multi-agency
command center is activated in Penn Station. In the event of a security
or life safety emergency, first responders manage incidents through the
incident command system.
Question 4. FRA Administrator Rutter testified that FRA recently
hired the RAND Corporation to review ``Amtrak's security posture and
current programs, focusing on the adequacy of preparedness for
combating terrorist threats''. What is the status of this review and
what effect might it have on the funding request you have made today?
Answer. The RAND report has been communicated to senior Amtrak
officials. Amtrak has already taken steps to address recommendations
contained in the report. However, a primary recommendation of the
report is that Amtrak should commission to have a systemwide
vulnerability assessment conducted. Amtrak continues to work with RAND
in the development of the format for this type of assessment in a
national passenger rail system and is expected to have a product
available shortly. It has also committed FY'05 funds to have this study
completed as soon as possible. It can reasonably be anticipated that
additional funding requests can stem from the findings and
recommendations of this vulnerability study.
The results of the vulnerability assessment and compliance with the
TSA security directives will drive Amtrak's funding plan.
Question 5. The National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) has
criticized Amtrak for its inability to provide passenger car manifests.
When Amtrak's Auto Train derailed on April 18, 2002, near Crescent
City, Florida, Amtrak told the NTSB incident commander there were 468
people on the train. ``The day after the accident, Amtrak gave the
incident commander a computer printout list, which contained
information that did not match either of the two lists provided on
April 18. In fact, Amtrak never provided the incident commander an
accurate count of the persons on board the train.'' The actual
passenger count was ultimately determined to be fewer passengers than
indicated by Amtrak.
What is Amtrak doing to address this situation? I can understand
the difficulty in providing manifest information for some trains, but
the Auto Train does not make station stops between the train's origin
and destination.
Answer. We continue to look for realistic ways of improving our
ability to maintain accurate passenger counts on our long distance,
overnight, and reserved trains. We currently employ procedures on all
long distance reserved trains, which periodically undergo refinement
(see e.g. Chapter 16, Part D of the Service Standards Reference Manual
for Management Employees). We continue to study realistic operational
and technological methods to enhance the efficiency of recording
ticketed and non-ticketed passengers. We have communicated with both
the TSA and the FRA and have pledged our cooperation with them in their
efforts to address this area. And, Amtrak has invited any practical
solutions that the NTSB may have that specifically accommodate all of
the variables involved. While not offering any solutions, the NTSB has,
pending Amtrak's study of methods to enhance passenger and crew
accountability, classified Crescent City Safety Recommendation R-03-10,
dealing with passenger accountability as ``Open-Acceptable Response.''
And, to avoid the type of confusion that ensued after Crescent
City, we have suggested to the NTSB that future on-site inquiries
concerning passengers and crew be directed to the conductor, or a
person representing him/her in the event of his/her unavailability.
After the initial count is provided, the senior Amtrak representative
on site will designate one Amtrak representative to be the single point
person concerning the number of passengers and crewmembers.
The system now in place on the Auto Train has undergone several
refinements since the Crescent City derailment. Currently, all
passengers are met upon arriving at the Sanford or Lorton stations to
determine their ticketing status and the number of people traveling
corresponding to a particular automobile. The ticket agent at the booth
checks the tickets and assigns the automobile a loading number. Those
passengers who are not ticketed but who appear on the loading manifest
are sent to the ticket office to pick up tickets and/or pay for them.
All passengers are then instructed to pull up to unload and turn over
their automobiles for boarding and to go to the ticket office and check
in with either coach or sleeper accommodations. At that time, the
passengers are given boarding passes and the agents reconcile this
information with the computerized manifest list. Should any upgrades be
required, this is also handled at the ticket office.
All passengers are given boarding passes and collection of the
tickets is handled at the ticket office. The passengers are placed on a
boarding car diagram by which car and accommodation location they are
sitting, for coach or sleeper. This places them in their proper
location for the trip. All data for all passengers traveling on the
train is entered into Amtrak's database.
______
Response to Written Questions Submitted by Hon. Ernest F. Hollings to
John O'Connor
Question 1a. Do you believe that intelligence information is (sic)
being appropriately coordinated among various Federal agencies and then
directed to appropriate private and public sector officials?
Answer. This matter is difficult to answer. For the most part, an
entity like Amtrak will not be aware of the actual coordination efforts
among Federal agencies. However the level of coordination efforts that
include Amtrak has risen significantly in the past few years.
The Amtrak Police and Security Department, through its senior
management level officials, has established strong working
relationships with various Federal agencies. Most notably, Amtrak has
regular contact and exchanges with the DHS and TSA. The Amtrak Police
Department provides information to the Transportation Security
Operations Center (TSOC) in Herndon, VA and works closely with high-
level officials in TSA's Maritime and Land Security Branch. As
information, the Amtrak Police Department received 152 intelligence
reports from 52 different sources over a five days span after the
Madrid bombings. 85 were ``Law Enforcement Sensitive'', 50 were ``For
Official Use Only'', 15 were ``Open Source'' and 2 were ``Classified
Briefings''. Although Amtrak would desire intelligence information in a
more-timely manner, overall it would classify its relationship with
Federal agencies as strong.
Also, Amtrak works closely with its industry counterparts in
coordinating and disseminating intelligence information. It works with
the Surface Transportation--Infrastructure Security Advisory Center
(ST-ISAC) and the Rail Alert Network (RAN), a part of the AAR. Further,
the Amtrak Police Department works closely with the industry law
enforcement representative assigned to the FBI's National Joint
Terrorism Task Force (NJTTF).
Finally, the Amtrak Police Department has personnel dedicated to
intelligence related functions. A management official is assigned to
Criminal and Terrorist Intelligence, an investigator is assigned to the
FBI Joint Terrorism Task Force in New York, and an administrative
officer provides intelligence gathering support and analysis as well as
coordinating development and enhancement of the Corporation's
Industrial Security Clearance Program.
Question 1b. How is information passed on to first responders?
Answer. The Amtrak Police Department provides security information
and appropriate intelligence information updates to its sworn police
personnel directly through Special or General Order announcements, roll
call, or through a Security Alert.
Question 2a. What types of technologies are available (e.g., portal
screening systems/identification systems/facial recognition) to screen
passengers and baggage in rail or transit situations?
Answer. For your convenience, I have attached the TSA powerpoint
presentation identifying the equipment used during the recent TRIP
pilot initiative at New Carrollton Station, MD. This may be more
beneficial to answer your question.
Question 2b. What is the feasibility and potential cost for the
United States to implement these efforts at high risk or otherwise
appropriate Amtrak and commuter rail facilities or services in this
country?
Answer. TSA estimated that its costs for personnel and equipment
for the New Carrollton, MD less than 30 day TRIP initiative was $1.3
Million. The Amtrak Police Department spent $16,755 over this period.
This was one of the smaller low passenger volume stations in the Amtrak
route system. To extrapolate this to encompass the entire national
passenger rail and commuter systems would be difficult and speculative.
However, the costs would be unwieldy and enormous in all likelihood.
Amtrak would defer further response to the DHS and TSA on the costs
of a national screening system.
______
Response to Written Questions Submitted by Hon. John D. Rockefeller IV
to John O'Connor
Question 1. We all know that Amtrak is hurting financially. We also
know you have to target your limited resources. My guess is that most
of your security efforts focus on the East Coast and perhaps West Coast
corridors. How much have you spent on security overall, and what is the
breakdown on funding for areas other than the East and West Coasts?
Answer. FY03 provides the latest full-year actual spending results
and can be broken down into the following regions:
------------------------------------------------------------------------
(Millions)
--------------------------
Region FY03 FY03 FY04
Actual Budget Budget
------------------------------------------------------------------------
1East $26.2 $25.5 $26.9
Beech Grove/New Orleans/Ft. Worth 1.0 1.0 1.0
Chicago 1.9 1.8 1.9
West 1.7 1.7 2.0
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Total $30.8 $30.0 $31.8
------------------------------------------------------------------------
In addition to the operating budget, capital funded projects over
the past two years are listed below:
Security Fencing--$1.3 million/annual (5 year program)
Electronic Message Boards--$0.4 million
Emergency Notification System--$0.1 million
Access Control System Improvements--$0.1 million
Los Angeles Yard Security Improvements (assessment)--$0.5
million
National Communications Center Technology Improvements--$0.1
million
In response to your inquiry on increased security costs post 9/11,
note that three work element numbers had been established over a period
of time to cover increased security costs.
1. 976407--Established immediately after 9/11. Police along with
Engineering charged $11.9M during a period covering Sept. 2001
to Nov. 2002.
2. 976477--Picked up where 976407 left off although there is some
overlapping. Charged $489k from May 2002 to June 2002 and then
picked up again in March 2004 thru July 2004.
3. 976494--Totals $1.4M from Sept. 2002 to June 2004 and again, some
overlapping with 976477.
Operating budgets post 9/11 are as follows:
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Year Budget Headcount
------------------------------------------------------------------------
FY02 $26.9M 412
FY03 30.0M 423
FY04 31.8M 435
------------------------------------------------------------------------
The FY03 Capital Program consisted of 4 projects totaling $2.4M:
1. Security Fencing
2. Electronic Message Boards
3. Emergency Notification System
4. Employee ID Cards (cancelled mid-year)
The FY04 Capital Program* consisted of 7 projects
totaling $1.7M:
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\*\ Security Fencing continued in FY04 as an Engineering Department
initiative.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
1. Electronic Message Boards (continued from FY03)
2. Emergency Notification System (continued from FY03)
3. Access Control System Improvements
4. NCC Technology Improvements
5. Automatic External Defibrillators
6. Firearms Simulation System
7. Police Vehicle Equipment Replacement
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