    [Senate Hearing 108-875]
    [From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]

                                                            S. Hrg. 108-875

                       IMPLICATIONS FOR THE DEPARTMENT OF
                       DEFENSE AND MILITARY OPERATIONS OF
       PROPOSALS TO REORGANIZE THE UNITED STATES  INTELLIGENCE  COMMUNITY

    =======================================================================

                                    HEARINGS

                                   before the

                          COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES
                              UNITED STATES SENATE

                          ONE HUNDRED EIGHTH CONGRESS

                                 SECOND SESSION

                                   __________

                             AUGUST 16 AND 17, 2004

                                   __________

             Printed for the use of the Committee on Armed Services

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                          COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES

                        JOHN WARNER, Virginia, Chairman

    JOHN McCAIN, Arizona                 CARL LEVIN, Michigan
    JAMES M. INHOFE, Oklahoma            EDWARD M. KENNEDY, Massachusetts
    PAT ROBERTS, Kansas                  ROBERT C. BYRD, West Virginia
    WAYNE ALLARD, Colorado               JOSEPH I. LIEBERMAN, Connecticut
    JEFF SESSIONS, Alabama               JACK REED, Rhode Island
    SUSAN M. COLLINS, Maine              DANIEL K. AKAKA, Hawaii
    JOHN ENSIGN, Nevada                  BILL NELSON, Florida
    JAMES M. TALENT, Missouri            E. BENJAMIN NELSON, Nebraska
    SAXBY CHAMBLISS, Georgia             MARK DAYTON, Minnesota
    LINDSEY O. GRAHAM, South Carolina    EVAN BAYH, Indiana
    ELIZABETH DOLE, North Carolina       HILLARY RODHAM CLINTON, New York
    JOHN CORNYN, Texas                   MARK PRYOR, Arkansas

                        Judith A. Ansley, Staff Director

                 Richard D. DeBobes, Democratic Staff Director

                                      (ii)

                                C O N T E N T S

                                   __________

                        CHRONOLOGICAL LIST OF WITNESSES

     Implications for the Department of Defense and Military Operations of
        Proposals to Reorganize the United States Intelligence Community

                                august 16, 2004

                                                                       Page

    Schlesinger, Dr. James R., Former Secretary of Defense, Chairman,
      The Mitre Corporation..........................................     8
    Carlucci, Frank C., Former Secretary of Defense, Chairman
      Emeritus, The Carlyle Group....................................    17
    Hamre, Dr. John J., Former Deputy Secretary of Defense, President
      and Chief Executive Officer, Center for Strategic and
      International Studies..........................................    20

     Implications for the Department of Defense and Military Operations of
        Proposals to Reorganize the United States Intelligence Community

                                august 17, 2004

    Rumsfeld, Hon. Donald H., Secretary of Defense; Accompanied by
      Dr. Stephen A. Cambone, Under Secretary of Defense for
      Intelligence...................................................    91
    McLaughlin, Hon. John E., Acting Director of Central Intelligence   101
    Myers, Gen. Richard B., USAF, Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff....   107

                                     (iii)

     IMPLICATIONS FOR THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE AND MILITARY OPERATIONS OF
        PROPOSALS TO REORGANIZE THE UNITED STATES INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY

                                  ----------

                            MONDAY, AUGUST 16, 2004

                                           U.S. Senate,
                                   Committee on Armed Services,
                                                        Washington, DC.
        The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 2:40 p.m. in room
    SH-216, Hart Senate Office Building, Senator John Warner
    (chairman) presiding.
        Committee members present: Senators Warner, McCain,
    Roberts, Sessions, Collins, Talent, Chambliss, Dole, Cornyn,
    Levin, Kennedy, Lieberman, Reed, Bill Nelson, E. Benjamin
    Nelson, Dayton, and Clinton.
        Committee staff member present: Judith A. Ansley, staff
    director.
        Majority staff members present: Charles W. Alsup,
    professional staff member; Brian R. Green, professional staff
    member; Thomas L. MacKenzie, professional staff member; Paula
    J. Philbin, professional staff member; and Richard F. Walsh,
    counsel.
        Minority staff members present: Richard D. DeBobes,
    Democratic staff director; and Creighton Greene, professional
    staff member.
        Staff assistants present: Alison E. Brill, Andrew W.
    Florell, and Bridget E. Ward.
        Committee members' assistants present: Cord Sterling,
    assistant to Senator Warner; Darren M. Dick, assistant to
    Senator Roberts; Lindsey R. Neas, assistant to Senator Talent;
    Russell J. Thomasson, assistant to Senator Cornyn; Sharon L.
    Waxman, Mieke Y. Eoyang, and Jarret A. Wright, assistants to
    Senator Kennedy; Frederick M. Downey, assistant to Senator
    Lieberman; William K. Sutey, assistant to Senator Bill Nelson;
    Eric Pierce, assistant to Senator E. Benjamin Nelson; Mark
    Phillip Jones, assistant to Senator Dayton; and Andrew Shapiro,
    assistant to Senator Clinton.

           OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR JOHN WARNER, CHAIRMAN

        Chairman Warner. The committee meets this afternoon to
    receive testimony from three very distinguished former public
    officeholders, all of whom have performed service that
    eminently qualifies them to provide to the committee, and to
    the Senate as a whole--indeed Congress--their views. Former
    Secretaries of Defense (SECDEF) James Schlesinger and Frank C.
    Carlucci, and former Deputy Secretary of Defense John Hamre are
    with us today. We welcome each of you back before this
    committee.
        Your views on the various recommendations for reform of the
    U.S. Intelligence Community, particularly the recommendations
    of the 9/11 Commission and the proposals of President Bush, are
    critical to this committee's understanding of how those
    recommended changes will impact the Department of Defense (DOD)
    and future military operations.
        I note that the committee also invited former SECDEF Harold
    Brown to testify. He was unable to join us today, but, without
    objection, I shall place his statment in this record. It is a
    very interesting letter. I'm not sure but I think it was
    provided to each of you.
        [The information referred to follows:]

        [GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]

        Chairman Warner. The findings and recommendations of the
    9/11 Commission have captured the interest of our President,
    Congress, and perhaps most important, the American people. We
    are privileged to have with us today three individuals who have
    been attending a number of the hearings on behalf of the
    families, and, indeed, one who was a survivor of the attack.
    Mrs. Loreen Sellitto, of Families United to Bankrupt Terrorism,
    you lost your 23-year-old son in Tower 1; Mary Fletchet, Voices
    of September 11, you lost your 24-year-old son in Tower 2; and
    Rosemary Dillard, a critically-injured Pentagon survivor.
        The Commission has given the Nation--and, indeed Congress--
    a roadmap, a series of recommendations to move forward. It's
    now the responsibility of Congress, working with the
    administration, to thoroughly examine and evaluate these
    recommendations and to enact those changes which will
    strengthen--and I emphasize ``strengthen''--our Intelligence
    Community (IC).
        The hearings we are conducting this week, together with the
    many hearings that other committees in both the Senate and the
    House have conducted or are conducting during the recess
    period, are an important part of this process. I commend the
    President, both for the swift action he has taken to embrace
    certain elements of the Commission's recommendation, and also
    for the many things he has done to make our Nation safer since
    the fateful day in September 2001.
        Of the 41 recommendations made by the Commission, some have
    already been enacted over the past several years, more will be
    done through executive order. As the Commission noted: ``in the
    nearly 3 years since September 11, Americans have been better
    protected against terrorist attack.'' But we must constantly,
    Congress and the administration, work to improve it. It's not
    going to stop. Such legislation as we may enact will have to
    continue year after year to work on it.
        Our focus, however, today is on the DOD. As our witnesses
    know, the DOD is home to the largest portion of the IC, and DOD
    is second only to the President as the largest consumer of the
    intelligence produced by the IC. We must not lose sight of
    these facts as we consider the way ahead. My overriding
    concern, as I examine changes to our IC, is, what changes will
    best help the warfighter--the soldier, the sailor, the airman,
    and the marine--who is fighting today and tomorrow and in the
    future to keep the terrorist threat far from our shores? How
    can we better provide the necessary intelligence to these
    warfighters?
        I think we can all agree that the U.S. Armed Forces are the
    finest in the world. One of the reasons for that is, we have a
    very professional military intelligence organization. An
    organization starts with the combat support agencies (CSA), the
    Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA), the National Security Agency
    (NSA), and the National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency (NGA),
    which feed through the regional joint intelligence centers to
    the unified commanders, and then to the lowest-level tactical
    unit on the ground. This intelligence structure is an essential
    part of our military operations.
        This has not always been the case. This committee was very
    deeply involved in overseeing the military actions in Iraq. It
    was not that long ago when national-level intelligence support
    to the warfighter was deemed by many of the professionals as
    somewhat inadequate. The military's experience during Operation
    Desert Storm was a watershed event. General Schwarzkopf
    testified before this committee, in June 1991, and told
    Congress that responsive national-level intelligence support
    for his mission in the first Persian Gulf War was
    ``unsatisfactory.''
        Since then, the Department, together with other elements of
    the IC, has painstakingly built the intelligence and
    operational capabilities that we saw so convincingly
    demonstrated on the battlefields of Afghanistan and Iraq. As we
    examine ways to reform our IC in this process we're in now, we
    must ensure that we do nothing to break or degrade those
    aspects of the IC that are working well now.
        We simply must not make any changes which could, despite
    the best of intentions, hinder the ability of our troops to
    successfully fulfill their missions. As members of this
    committee, it is our responsibility to ensure that the quality
    and timeliness of intelligence support to our regional
    combatant commanders and our deployed forces, as well as our
    Nation's leaders, is in no way degraded. We, in this mission
    here, seek to make it better.
        The commissioners correctly pointed out that our
    intelligence structure failed to connect the dots, in terms of
    observing and then fusing together the indicators of the
    significant threat from al Qaeda in the recent years and months
    leading up to the actual attack on our Nation on September 11,
    2001. Most agree that the most significant problems were an
    unwillingness to share information, on the part of some
    agencies, and a structural inability to combine domestic and
    foreign intelligence. The recommended solution, however, is to
    recognize the entire community, not just to focus on parts that
    were unsatisfactory. We must examine the reasons for these
    dramatic proposals by the 9/11 Commission, and understand how
    the recommended solutions do or do not address the problems
    identified in the Commission's report.
        As I've considered the recommendations of the Commission
    and the unique challenges for our military forces in fighting
    the global war on terrorism, a number of questions come to
    mind. What is the essence of the problem: organization, budget
    authority, effective leadership, or the appointment authority?
    How can the National Intelligence Director (NID) and the SECDEF
    establish a more effective partnership to achieve success at
    all levels--national, regional, and tactical military
    operations?
        Under current law, the Director of Central Intelligence
    (DCI), certainly on paper, in the statute, has significant
    budgetary authority over all elements of the IC. How has this
    authority been exercised, or not been exercised, in the past?
    Is there a view that that current statutory authority is
    inadequate? What should be the role of the SECDEF, in the
    budgets and operations, as he now performs them, on behalf of
    the agencies which consume constantly about 85 percent of the
    National Foreign Intelligence Program? Were the SECDEF to be
    excluded in some means, how can we assure that the requirements
    of the Department, the combatant commanders, and the warfighter
    be addressed?
        These are sobering questions, and they're questions that
    require careful consideration. Clearly, we must seize this
    opportunity to act if we deem it necessary, but we also have a
    responsibility to ensure our actions are prudent, carefully
    analyzed, and thoroughly debated. Legislation of a similar
    importance to our national security structure, such as the
    National Security Act of 1947 and Goldwater-Nichols Act of
    1986, were considered very carefully over a period of time
    before Congress acted. I am confident that we, Congress, can
    act, if we deem it necessary, during this session of Congress.
        I have committed publicly that I, personally, am not
    engaged in a turf war with any other committee or any other
    part of this system. I, personally, will do everything I can,
    working with my colleagues here in the Senate, most
    particularly on this committee and the Intelligence Committee
    on which I am serving, to try and strengthen and to pass such
    legislation as we deem essential to achieve that strengthening.
        Thank you.
        Senator Levin?

                    STATEMENT OF SENATOR CARL LEVIN

        Senator Levin. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        First, let me join you in welcoming our witnesses today.
    They are very important witnesses. They've made major
    contributions to the security of this Nation. We're grateful to
    them for that service, as well as for being here.
        This is the first hearing of the Armed Services Committee
    on the recommendations of the 9/11 Commission and the
    implications of those recommendations for the DOD and military
    operations.
        We have suffered from massive intelligence failures in the
    last several years. First, as reported by the 9/11 Commission,
    the IC failed to share information necessary to connect the
    dots in a manner that might have warned us of the coming
    terrorist attacks. Second, as reported by the Intelligence
    Committee, much of the intelligence analysis and the evidence
    in the possession of the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA)
    leading up to the war in Iraq was overstated, or unsupported,
    or exaggerated, or mischaracterized.
        The 9/11 Commission performed a valuable service to the
    Nation in evaluating the intelligence problems preceding the
    attacks and recommending changes intended to improve our future
    intelligence and national security. Its identification of the
    huge failures of the intelligence agencies to share information
    with each other before September 11 is very similar to the
    findings of the joint investigation of the Senate and House
    Intelligence Committees that was released in July 2003. Those
    findings led to significant reform of the IC, including the
    creation of a new Terrorist Threat Integration Center (TTIC).
        The 9/11 Commission recommends the creation of a similar
    National Counterterrorism Center (NCTC) which, like the TTIC,
    would be responsible for the fusion and analysis of terrorist
    intelligence. The main difference between the proposed NCTC and
    the recently established TTIC would be the NCTC's additional
    duty of joint planning, including operational tasking of
    counterterrorist operations, including, apparently, those
    conducted by military forces under the DOD.
        The 9/11 Commission also recommended that we create the
    position of an NID within the Executive Office of the
    President, with authority over the national intelligence budget
    and the hiring and firing power over the leader of the national
    intelligence agencies, including agencies that reside within
    the DOD.
        Although the President has agreed to the establishment of
    an NID, he apparently does not support placing the proposed
    director in the Executive Office of the President, or giving
    him control over the national intelligence budget, or the
    hiring and firing power over the leader of the national
    intelligence agencies. Without such authority, the 9/11
    Commission argues that the new NID would not have the power
    needed to manage and oversee the IC effectively.
        Similarly, while the President has agreed to the
    establishment of the NCTC, he apparently does not support the
    Commission's recommendation that the head of the NCTC ``must
    have the right to concur in the choices of personnel to lead
    the operating entities,'' and that he should have the authority
    to jointly plan for and assign operational responsibilities to
    other agencies, and should be subject to Senate confirmation.
        The DOD has expressed concern that some of the proposals of
    the 9/11 Commission could make us less secure by confusing the
    chain of command for military operations and by separating
    warfighters from the tactical intelligence that they need on an
    urgent basis. Our committee has a special responsibility to
    weigh the impact of these proposals on the DOD and its military
    operations in light of these concerns. While we are clearly
    involved in a different kind of war than the Cold War, the
    lines between what might have been characterized in previous
    times as national or strategic intelligence and intelligence
    that is more tactical have become much less clear and distinct.
        In trying to draw such lines, we should not overlook the
    fact that the military is involved directly in the war on
    terrorism. Tactical intelligence requirements of the combatant
    commanders include having information on al Qaeda and Osama bin
    Laden and the Taliban. That intelligence is essential in the
    war on terrorism. Indeed, combatant commanders are heavily
    engaged in the part of the war on terrorism, and that
    intelligence, therefore, is not just ``national intelligence,''
    it is clearly tactical, critically-needed-urgently
    intelligence.
        Regardless of what responsibilities that we choose to give
    to the proposed NID and the NCTC, and wherever we decide to
    place these offices on the organization chart, we must take
    steps to avoid the shaping and exaggeration of intelligence
    information to support the policies of an administration.
    Independent and objective intelligence is a matter of vital
    national importance. Objective, unvarnished intelligence should
    inform policy choices.
        Policy should not drive intelligence assessments. We must
    take steps in any reorganization to minimize the potential for
    politicizing intelligence. In that regard, placing the NID in
    the White House may be problematic, because this placement
    would seem to increase the likelihood of politicization rather
    than to decrease it.
        I look forward, Mr. Chairman, as I know all of us do, to
    hearing the witnesses' testimony. Again, we're very grateful to
    them.
        Chairman Warner. Thank you very much.
        Dr. Schlesinger, we invite you to lead off. I'd like to say
    to the committee that I had the privilege of knowing Dr.
    Schlesinger for many years. We served together in the DOD in
    1972, 1973, and 1974. I was fortunate to work with you when you
    were in DCI. In all these many years, we have maintained a
    close personal and professional contact, so it's particularly
    enjoyable to see you here today, and you have extraordinary
    experience on which to address these issues.

      STATEMENT OF DR. JAMES R. SCHLESINGER, FORMER SECRETARY OF
                DEFENSE, CHAIRMAN, THE MITRE CORPORATION

        Dr. Schlesinger. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
        Mr. Chairman, members of the committee, I am grateful to
    this committee for providing this opportunity to comment on the
    nature of intelligence and on the reforms proposed by the 9/11
    Commission.
        The 9/11 Commission has given us a detailed and revealing
    narrative of events leading up to September 11. It has also
    proposed a substantial reorganization of the IC, changes that
    do not logically flow from the problems that the Commission
    identified in its narrative. It is, therefore, incumbent upon
    us to examine the Commission's proposals with care, lest in our
    haste, we do more harm than good.
        The Commission has rightly observed that the events leading
    up to September 11 represented a failure of imagination, yet
    one should not assume that changing wiring diagrams is a sure-
    fire way to stimulate imagination. Imagination always has an
    uphill fight in bureaucratic organizations. Creating an
    additional bureaucratic layer scarcely leads to bringing
    imagination to the top.
        Mr. Chairman, in these brief remarks I shall attempt to
    discuss the issue of intelligence reform under three headings.
    First, the inherent problems of intelligence. Second, why
    control of intelligence from outside of the DOD is a
    particularly bad idea. Given the evolution of U.S. technology
    and military strategy, it would not, following your remarks,
    Mr. Chairman, be of help to the warfighter. Third, to draw some
    implications for intelligence reform.
        First, intelligence is inherently a difficult business.
    Intelligence targets naturally seek to conceal what they are
    doing, and have a strong tendency to mislead you. A central
    problem in intelligence is to discern the true signals amidst
    the noise. The relevant signals may be very weak. Without
    question, there is a great deal of noise.
        Countless events are being recorded each day, and countless
    events are failing to be recorded, or are deliberately hidden.
    Moreover, false signals are deliberately planted. We may talk
    glibly about ``connecting the dots,'' but that is far easier ex
    post than ex ante. It is only in retrospect that one knows
    which dots were the relevant dots among the countless
    observations and the unobserved phenomena, and how those
    relevant dots should be connected. Prior to that, one has only
    a mass of observations and possible evidence subject to a
    variety of hypotheses and interpretations.
        Mr. Chairman, if I may?
        [The information referred to follows:]

        [GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]

        Dr. Schlesinger. These are the dots that we can observe in
    advance. They are of different phenomena, they are of different
    size. There are hidden dots amongst them. After the event,
    certain dots stand out, as would be these four dots. But not in
    advance. Then when we look back, we can easily see, there is
    Mohammed Atta, and here are one-way tickets, and there are four
    Arab-looking men in aisle seats, and here they paid cash. After
    the event, we can see that very clearly.
        I'll slip this up there for now. I'll come back to that
    later.
        Mr. Chairman, even if there are no preconceptions or
    initial biases, organizations will drift toward a structured
    theory of an issue under study. Thus, an organization, any
    organization, develops a concept of reality. Over time, that
    concept likely will harden into a conviction or mindset that
    discounts observations or evidence in conflict with the
    prevailing concept, and highlights observations that seem to be
    supportive as evidence. Evidence to the contrary is regularly
    shaken off. Thus, the quality of analysis becomes critical in
    providing good intelligence. That is why reducing competition
    in analysis is the wrong way to go, especially in quest of the
    false goal of eliminating duplication. Centralization of
    intelligence analysis is inherently a dubious objective when
    there is a wide range of consumers of intelligence with a
    variety of interests, responsibilities, and needs.
        Second, intelligence is increasingly interwoven with
    military operations. The advance of military technology and its
    embodiment in our military forces have made intelligence ever-
    more integral to our military strategy and battlefield tactics
    and to this country's immense military advantage. That military
    advantage is reflected in such rubrics as information
    superiority, information dominance, battlefield awareness, and
    net-centric warfare. In brief, it relies upon rapid detection
    of targets through sensors, the rapid communication of those
    target locations to command centers, the assignment of
    precisely guided weapons to those targets at the discerned
    locations, and damage assessment, again communicated to command
    centers, to determine whether additional weapons delivered are
    necessary. In all of this, the accuracy, the immediacy, and the
    believability of intelligence are crucial.
        Thus, in recent decades, intelligence, when wedded to
    command, control, and communications (C\3\), has become the
    core of America's battlefield dominance and military
    superiority. In short, C-cubed-I (C\3\I) has, in itself, become
    almost a powerful weapons system. But commanders in the field
    must have confidence that the intelligence assets will be
    available with certainty and that information will be reliably
    and quickly disseminated. It is for this reason that plucking
    intelligence away from C\3\ has become increasingly unwise.
    C\3\ and intelligence should be designed and operated as an
    integrated whole.
        It has taken many years to persuade our military commanders
    that national assets will reliably be available to them in the
    event of conflict. This started in the 1970s, but did not
    really reach fruition until the Gulf War, in 1990-1991.
    Following your comments, Mr. Chairman, on that Gulf War, if one
    talks to those who participated, like General Horner, he is
    still irate about the failures of the national assets to be
    delivered to him in a timely way.
        Sustaining that confidence of our military commanders that
    national assets will be designed and exercised with their
    wartime needs in mind remains crucial. In the absence of such
    confidence, the temptation for our combatant commanders will be
    to try to develop intelligence assets under their own control,
    even if those assets are inferior.
        To possess intelligence assets of one's own is a time-
    honored goal for virtually all major decisionmakers. That is
    why intelligence assets are so widely distributed. That is why
    the perennial quest for greater centralization has been both
    delusory and invariably negated.
        To shift control over crucial intelligence assets outside
    the DOD risks weakening the relative military advantage of the
    United States, and, at the same time, creates the incentive to
    divert resources into likely inferior intelligence capabilities
    which would further reduce the available forces.
        But that is not the end, Mr. Chairman. The question would
    be, where does one draw the line? Take one critical example:
    Now central to information dominance and to our military
    operations is the Global Positioning System (GPS). It is an
    information system not normally regarded as part of the IC.
    Nevertheless, it is critical for effective intelligence
    operations and, thus, to the effectiveness of our military
    forces. Does budget control over GPS also pass to an NID?
        In a complex system of systems, the perceived need to move
    further, beyond what historically has been defined as
    intelligence, will not cease. Historic intelligence and non-
    intelligence systems are now siamese twins. King Solomon had a
    comparatively easy task in proposing to split the baby in half.
        Third, intelligence management, like intelligence, itself,
    is an inherently difficult business. There are countless
    questions. Which are the ones to bring to the attention of the
    decisionmakers? There are countless observations. Some are
    relevant signals, most are noise. Where are the missing
    signals? Only in retrospect can one be sure of the answer.
    Regrettably, we are not clairvoyant. Predicting the future is
    especially fraught with difficulty.
        To speak of the failure of imagination is really to
    acknowledge the limitations of the human intellect. Individual
    analysts will all have their slightly different interpretations
    of what is going on. Their views must be selected and combined.
    Though we regularly urge ourselves to think outside of the box,
    that is mostly an exhortation. The problem with thinking the
    unthinkable is that nobody believes you. Analysts will temper
    their views within the range of acceptability. Those who
    stretch receptivity likely will be viewed, or dismissed, as
    worrywarts, zealots, or, even worse, oddballs. That does little
    to enhance one's status in the organization, or one's career.
        As mentioned earlier, organizations also have their
    inherent limits. Different organizations will gravitate towards
    different ways of organizing reality, based upon their range of
    responsibilities and also on their interests, in a narrower
    sense.
        Most individuals make themselves comfortable in their own
    organizations by not challenging a prevailing consensus. It
    would be an immense help if management were to encourage
    criticism, contrarian views that challenge the prevailing
    orthodoxy. One way of doing this is to establish a devil's
    advocacy organization within the larger organization to
    challenge the predominant beliefs. But it is an imperfect
    solution; at best, an ameliorative. The individuals assigned to
    such an organization will have to be protected, at the top,
    from subsequent retribution.
        Mr. Chairman, we should always bear in mind that
    intelligence assessments, hopefully objective, will then rise
    through the political hierarchy to inform the judgments of
    decisionmakers. Politics, under normal conditions, is typically
    an engine to soothe and to reassure. It reflects that political
    imperative known as optimism. Until the Nation is aroused,
    alarmist views are treated with disbelief.
        I recall an episode in 1950 when an intelligence analyst,
    examining the indicators, had concluded that Chinese troops had
    already been introduced, in large numbers, into North Korea, as
    the United Nations command advanced towards the Yalu. The
    recipient--he was peddling this tale around Washington, and
    ultimately reached high into the Department of State--of his
    briefing listened very politely. When it was over, he responded
    as follows, ``Young man, they wouldn't dare.''
        Moreover, national perspectives frequently are dominated by
    political axioms, and intelligence failures--so-called--are
    quite frequently the failures of prevailing political axioms.
    In 1990, Iraq's neighbors reassured themselves that, ``An Arab
    state would never attack another Arab state.'' In 1973, a
    prevailing political axiom in Israel, an axiom which affected
    the intelligence, was that their Arab neighbors would never
    dare attack, as long as Israel had air superiority. Of course,
    I should mention the conviction--international, as well as
    national--that, without question, Saddam Hussein has weapons of
    mass destruction.
        The process of fashioning such a political axiom is
    strongly abetted that, over time, any caveat coming up from
    lower levels in the IC gets stripped away as information moves
    up the political hierarchy.
        Mr. Chairman, I trust that Congress will remember
    Hippocrates' injunction, ``First do no harm.'' In altering the
    structure of the IC, it is essential to deliberate long and
    hard, and not to be stampeded into doing harm.
        On page 339 of the report of the 9/11 Commission, the
    commissioners wisely state, ``In composing this narrative, we
    have tried to remember that we write with the benefit and the
    handicap of hindsight. Hindsight can sometimes see the past
    clearly, with 20-20 vision, but the path of what happens is so
    brightly lit that it places everything else more deeply into
    shadow.''
        Mr. Chairman, our understanding of past events becomes
    perfect only in hindsight, if then. There will never be any
    corresponding perfection in intelligence organizations, which
    necessarily must operate with foresight. Reform may now be
    necessary. Yet in the vain pursuit of a perfect intelligence
    organizations, do not shake up intelligence in a way that does
    do harm and, in pursuit of this will-of-the-wisp perfection,
    damage, in particular, those military capabilities that we
    alone possess.
        Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        [The prepared statement of Dr. Schlesinger follows:]
                 Prepared Statement by Dr. James R. Schlesinger
        Mr. Chairman, members of the committee: I am grateful to the
    committee for providing this opportunity to comment on the nature of
    intelligence and the reforms suggested by the 9/11 Commission. The 9/11
    Commission has given us a detailed and revealing narrative of events
    leading up to September 11. It has also proposed a substantial
    reorganization of the Intelligence Community (IC)--changes that do not
    logically flow from the problems that the commission identified in its
    narrative. It is, therefore, incumbent upon us to examine the
    commission's proposals with care, lest in our haste we do more harm
    than good. The commission has rightly observed that the events leading
    up to September 11 represent ``a failure of imagination.'' Yet, one
    should not assume that changing wiring diagrams is a sure fire way to
    stimulate imagination. Imagination always has an up-hill fight in
    bureaucratic organizations. Creating an additional bureaucratic layer
    scarcely leads to bringing imagination to the top.
        Mr. Chairman, in these brief remarks, I shall attempt to discuss
    the issue of intelligence reform under three headings: first, the
    inherent problems of intelligence; second, why control of intelligence
    from outside of the Department of Defense is a particularly bad idea,
    given the evolution of U.S. technology and military strategy; and,
    third, to draw some implications for intelligence reform.
        1. Intelligence is inherently a difficult business. Intelligence
    targets naturally seek to conceal what they are doing--and have a
    strong tendency to mislead you. The central problem in intelligence is
    to discern the true signals amidst the noise. The relevant signals may
    be very weak and, without question, there is a great deal of noise.
    Countless events are being recorded each day--and countless events are
    failing to be recorded or are deliberately hidden. Moreover, false
    signals are deliberately planted. We talk glibly about ``connecting the
    dots,'' but that is far easier ex-post than ex-ante. It is only in
    retrospect that one knows which dots were the relevant dots, among the
    countless observations and unobserved phenomena--and how those relevant
    dots should be connected. Prior to that, one has only a mass of
    observations and possible evidence--subject to a variety of hypotheses
    and interpretations.
        Even if there are no preconceptions, or initial biases,
    organizations will drift toward a structured theory of an issue under
    study. Thus, an organization--any organization--develops a concept of
    reality. Over time, that concept likely will harden into a conviction
    or mindset that discounts observations or evidence in conflict with the
    prevailing concept and highlights observations that seem to be
    supportive as evidence. Evidence to the contrary is regularly shaken
    off.
        Thus, the quality of analysis becomes critical in providing good
    intelligence. That is why reducing competition in analysis is the wrong
    way to go--especially in quest of the false goal of eliminating
    duplication. Centralization of intelligence is inherently a dubious
    objective, when there is a wide range of consumers of intelligence--
    with a variety of interests, responsibilities, and needs.
        2. Intelligence is increasingly interwoven with military
    operations. The advance of military technology and its embodiment in
    our military forces have made intelligence ever more integral to our
    military strategy and battlefield tactics and to this country's immense
    military advantage. That military advantage is reflected in such
    rubrics as ``information superiority,'' ``information dominance,''
    ``battlefield awareness,'' and ``net-centric warfare.'' In brief, it
    relies upon rapid detection of targets through sensors, the rapid
    communication of those target locations to command centers, the
    assignment of precisely-guided weapons to those targets at the
    discerned locations, and damage assessment, again communicated to
    command centers, to determine whether additional weapons are necessary.
    In all of this, the accuracy, the immediacy, and the believability of
    intelligence is crucial.
        Thus, in recent decades, intelligence, when wedded to command,
    control, and communications, has become the core of America's
    battlefield dominance and military superiority. In short, C\3\I has in
    itself almost become a powerful weapon-system. But commanders in the
    field must have confidence that the intelligence assets will be
    available with certainty and that information will be reliably and
    quickly disseminated. It is for this reason that plucking intelligence
    away from command, control, and communications has become increasingly
    unwise. They should be designed and operated as an integrated whole.
        To illustrate the now-enhanced role of intelligence in the system-
    of-systems that under girds U.S. military advantage, I have included as
    a backup an illustration from Vision 2020, with which you likely are
    familiar. It illustrates the crucial role of information superiority in
    binding together the several aspects of military engagement to achieve
    battlefield dominance.
        It has taken many years to persuade military commanders that
    national assets will reliably be available to them in the event of
    conflict. This started in the 1970s, but did not really reach fruition
    until the Gulf War in 1990-1991. Sustaining that confidence of our
    military commanders that national assets will be designed and exercised
    with their wartime needs in mind remains crucial. In the absence of
    such confidence, the temptation for our combatant commanders will be to
    try to develop intelligence assets under their own control, even if
    they are inferior. To possess intelligence assets of one's own is time-
    honored for virtually all major decision-makers. That is why
    intelligence assets are so widely distributed. That is why the
    perennial quest for greater centralization has been both delusory and
    invariably negated.
        To shift control over crucial intelligence assets outside the
    Department of Defense risks weakening the relative military advantage
    of the United States--and at the same time creates the incentive to
    divert resources into (likely inferior) intelligence capabilities,
    which would further reduce the available forces.
        But that is not the end. The question is: where does one draw the
    line? Take one critical example. Now central to information dominance
    and to our military operations is the Global Positioning System (GPS).
    It is an information system, not normally regarded as part of the IC.
    Nevertheless, it is critical for effective intelligence operations--and
    thus to the effectiveness of our military forces. Does budget control
    over GPS also pass to a Director of National Intelligence? In a complex
    system-of-systems, the perceived need to move further beyond what
    historically has been defined as intelligence--will not cease. Historic
    intelligence and non-intelligence systems are now Siamese twins. King
    Solomon had a comparatively easy task in proposing to split the baby in
    half.
        3. Intelligence management, like intelligence itself, is an
    inherently difficult business. There are countless questions. Which are
    the important ones to bring to the attention of the decisionmakers?
    There are countless observations. Some are relevant signals; most are
    noise. Where are the missing signals? Only in retrospect can one be
    sure of the answer. Regrettably, we are not clairvoyant. Predicting the
    future is especially fraught with difficulty.
        To speak of the ``failure of imagination'' is really to acknowledge
    the limitations of the human intellect. Individual analysts will all
    have their slightly different interpretations of what is going on.
    Their views must be selected and combined. Though we regularly are
    urged to ``think outside the box,'' that is mostly an exhortation. The
    problem with ``thinking the unthinkable'' is that--nobody believes you!
    Analysts will temper their views within the range of acceptability.
    Those who stretch receptivity likely will be viewed--or dismissed--as
    ``worrywarts, zealots, or even worse, oddballs.'' That does little to
    enhance one's status in the organization or one's career.
        As mentioned earlier, organizations also have their inherent
    limits. Different organizations will gravitate towards different ways
    of organizing reality--based upon their range of responsibilities and,
    also, their interests in a narrower sense. Most individuals make
    themselves comfortable in their own organizations by not challenging a
    prevailing consensus. The only solution within an organization is to
    establish a Devil's Advocacy organization to challenge the prevailing
    beliefs. But, it is an imperfect solution, at best an ameliorative, and
    the individuals assigned to such an organization will have to be
    protected at the top from subsequent retribution.
        Mr. Chairman, we should always bear in mind that intelligence
    assessments, hopefully objective, will then rise through the political
    hierarchy to inform the judgment of decisionmakers. Politics, under
    normal conditions, is typically an engine to soothe and to reassure.
    (It reflects that political imperative known as optimism.) Until the
    Nation is aroused, alarmist views are treated with disbelief. I recall
    an episode in 1950, when an intelligence analyst, examining the
    indicators, had concluded that the Chinese had already introduced large
    numbers of troops into North Korea, as the United Nations command
    advanced. He was pedaling this tale around Washington and ultimately
    reached high into the State Department. The recipient of his briefing
    listened very politely. When it was over, he responded as follows:
    ``Young man, they wouldn't dare.''
        Moreover, national perspectives frequently are dominated by
    political axioms--and intelligence failures, so-called, are quite
    frequently the failures of prevailing political axioms. In 1990, Iraq's
    neighbors reassured themselves that ``an Arab state would never attack
    another Arab state.'' In 1973, a prevailing political axiom in Israel
    (which affected intelligence) was that their Arab neighbors would never
    attack as long as Israel had air superiority. Of course, I should
    mention the conviction, international as well as national, that
    ``without question, Saddam Hussein has weapons of mass destruction.''
    The process of fashioning such a political axiom is strongly abetted
    that over time any caveats coming up from lower levels in the IC get
    stripped away as information moves up the political hierarchy.
        Mr. Chairman, I trust that Congress will remember Hippocrates'
    injunction: ``First, do no harm.'' In altering the structure of the IC,
    it is essential to deliberate long and hard--and not to be stampeded
    into doing harm. On page 339 of the Report of the 9/11 Commission, the
    commissioners wisely state:

            ``In composing this narrative, we have tried to remember that
            we write with the benefit and the handicap of hindsight.
            Hindsight can sometimes see the past clearly--with 20/20
            vision. But the path of what happened is so brightly lit that
            it places everything else more deeply into shadow.''

        Mr. Chairman, our understanding of past events becomes perfect only
    in hindsight--if then. There will never be any corresponding perfection
    in intelligence organization--which necessarily must operate with
    foresight. Reform may now be necessary. Yet, in the vain pursuit of a
    perfect intelligence organization, do not shake up intelligence in a
    way that does do harm--and in pursuit of this will of the wisp, damage,
    in particular, those military capabilities that we alone possess.
        Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I shall be pleased to answer any questions
    that you or members of the committee may have.

        Chairman Warner. Thank you, Dr. Schlesinger. That's a very
    strong and clear message.
        Secretary Carlucci, I'd like to also advise my colleagues,
    that while you are best known, maybe, for serving as SECDEF,
    you also served as the Deputy to the Director of CIA for some 4
    years, am I not correct?
        Mr. Carlucci. Three years.
        Chairman Warner. So, much like Dr. Schlesinger, you've
    worked at both of those agencies and the Department.
        Mr. Carlucci. Yes, sir.

     STATEMENT OF FRANK C. CARLUCCI, FORMER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE,
                  CHAIRMAN EMERITUS, THE CARLYLE GROUP

        Mr. Carlucci. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thank you for
    including me with this distinguished panel.
        Senator Levin, members of the committee, I think this
    hearing is very important because any organization, any
    reorganization--and I've been through a number--is disruptive.
    You have to be certain that the long-term gain exceeds the
    short-term loss. You also have to be certain that the solution
    fits the problem.
        Mr. Chairman, I have a prepared statement. I'm going to
    summarize it, with your permission.
        Chairman Warner. Without objection, it will be admitted
    into the record.
        Mr. Carlucci. We need to be sure that the solution fits the
    problem. It's tempting, because we have 15 organizations with
    the label ``intelligence'' on them, to say they ought to be
    under common management. But as Jim Schlesinger has just
    pointed out, some competition, particularly among the
    analytical agencies, is, indeed, healthy; I would argue,
    necessary.
        As this committee is well aware, unity of command is
    necessary for any military operation. So is intelligence, and
    Jim Schlesinger has discussed that in some detail, and I agree
    with virtually everything he has said.
        The failings of September 11, as I read the report, were in
    the areas of human resources intelligence (HUMINT) and
    analysis. These can be improved without disrupting the DOD
    chain of command. The CSAs are already subject to the DCI's
    programming and budgeting authority, as you, Mr. Chairman,
    pointed out in your opening statement. The DCI has the
    concurring authority on people. I question whether much more is
    needed. It is true that DIA, on the analytical side, competes
    with CIA in some areas, but that is, by and large, healthy.
        I cannot find in the 9/11 Commission Report a convincing
    case that September 11 stemmed from any Pentagon failure to
    coordinate. The dots problems were mainly between domestic and
    foreign intelligence--and intelligence, on the one hand, and
    law enforcement, on the other--and the NCTC, as proposed by the
    9/11 Commission, should go a long way to solving these
    problems.
        I would have the center report to the DCI. I do not favor
    the creation of an NID, certainly not in the White House, for
    reasons, Senator Levin, that you have already discussed. I
    lived through that, as National Security Advisor, in the wake
    of Iran-Contra.
        The dilemma is that if you give teeth to the NID, you risk
    disrupting combat support, as Jim has described in some detail,
    you disrupt the unity of command, and you have agency heads in
    one department, DOD, reporting to somebody outside that
    department--hardly a healthy relationship. If you don't give
    teeth to the NID, then you've created a useless layer. In
    either case, you've weakened the DCI, and you've created a
    competitor to the National Security Advisor.
        A better approach, in my judgment, at least one that's less
    disruptive, would be to set up the NCTC and strengthen the
    DCI's authority in areas where analysis may show it's needed. I
    question whether it's needed. I think, Senator Lieberman and
    Senator Levin, you heard this morning from former Director
    Stansfield Turner, that he had plenty of authority at the time
    he was director. I can vouch for that, because I was his
    deputy, as I think you mentioned this morning. So I question
    how much more is needed. It may be just a question of
    exercising existing authority.
        There's been a lot of focus on the organizational issue.
    Let me mention some other shortcomings which I think are at
    least as important. They are not mentioned--some of them are
    not mentioned in the 9/11 Commission Report.
        I see no mention of better trade-craft in the recruitment
    of hard targets. I learned many years ago, as a Foreign Service
    Officer (FSO) in the field working with case officers, that the
    best way to recruit is to be able to protect sources and
    methods, or at least have the perception that you can protect
    sources and methods.
        Unfortunately, the perception out in the real world is that
    our country can't protect sources and methods. I can remember,
    when I was Deputy DCI, the head of a European Intelligence
    Service saying to me, ``Frank, we don't give you all our
    information, because you can't keep a secret.'' Imagine,
    Senators, that you were an Iraqi under Saddam Hussein, and a
    CIA case officer came to you, and you took a look at the leaks
    coming out of the U.S. Government--there are a couple of
    investigations underway already--the Freedom of Information Act
    being applied to the CIA, and the proliferation of oversight
    committees. Would you put your name on the rolls? All the
    skilled in the world won't do us any good in that secretive
    part of the world unless we do a better job of keeping our own
    secrets.
        The Commission did have some positive recommendations to
    make on the classification of information and on congressional
    oversight. But, in general, they were hostile to the need-to-
    know principle. I can't imagine distributing information to
    people who don't need to know. I think we need to retain the
    need-to-know principle.
        Good collection of intelligence entails risk-taking in the
    recruitment process. Ever since the days of the Church
    Committee, we have discouraged risk in our intelligence
    organizations. We've indicted professionals for carrying out
    their responsibility. We've made it more complicated, or put a
    chill on the recruitment of people with human-rights violations
    on their record, when, indeed, those are some of the very
    people we need to be going after.
        Sure, there are failures, and we need to determine why
    those failures came about; but there are also successes,
    largely unheralded, and we should not risk the successes by
    excessive finger-pointing at the failures.
        Final point is resources. I think we can all agree that, in
    the 1990s, we shortchanged DOD, State, and our intelligence
    agencies. The rebuilding process is underway, thanks to members
    of this committee, among others, but it will take longer to
    rebuild than it takes to tear down. When I think of the length
    of time required to recruit, train, organize hard-cover for
    intelligence case officers, I agree with George Tenet when he
    says the rebuilding process will take 5 years. Let's hope that
    we don't prolong this process by hasty and ill-advised
    organizational moves.
        Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        [The prepared statement of Mr. Carlucci follows:]
                    Prepared Statement by Frank C. Carlucci
        Mr. Chairman, Senator Levin, members of the committee: It is a
    pleasure to appear before you today and I commend you for holding these
    hearings. Reorganizations are always disruptive and we must be certain
    the long-term gain outweighs the inevitable short-term loss.
        We must also be certain the solution fits the problem. Just because
    15 agencies carry an intelligence label doesn't mean they all should be
    integrated. Indeed managed competition is a healthy component of good
    intelligence.
        Unity of command is essential for military operations. So is good
    intelligence, as the 9/11 report acknowledges. Leaving aside the
    reluctance of policy makers to act on warning, the failings of
    September 11 appear to be principally in HUMINT and analysis. Improving
    HUMINT can be done without disrupting the Pentagon chain of command.
    Eighty percent of the Intelligence budget is frequently cited as
    disproportional DOD control. These assets are mainly in the hardware
    area and hence very costly. The NRO, NSA and NGA are already subject to
    the DCI's budgeting and programming authority. I question whether
    further DCI control is needed or desirable. The service HUMINT
    operations are largely tactical and nobody proposes separating them.
    DIA's HUMINT largely comes through the Attache System and is
    coordinated by Ambassadors at the local level. DIA's analytical effort
    can and should compete with that of CIA.
        I fail to find in the 9/11 report a convincing case that the
    September 11 problem stemmed from the failure of the Pentagon agencies
    to coordinate. On the contrary, the ``dots'' problem seems to be mainly
    between the CIA and the FBI on the one hand, and law enforcement and
    intelligence on the other, not with DOD. TTIC and the Patriot Act have
    gone a long way to solving some of these problems. The Counterterrorism
    Center, which would build on TTIC, is a good idea despite the dangers
    of putting intelligence and operational planning close to each other.
        I believe the Counterterrorism Center should report to the DCI. I
    do not favor creating the post of NID, certainly not in the White House
    where it would be too close to both the political and the policy
    process. Its main value would be to serve as a coordinator of domestic
    and international intelligence. The dilemma is that if you give the NID
    budget and personnel authority over DOD, even if he or she is not in
    the White House, you jeopardize combat support and disrupt the military
    unity of command. You also create a competitor to the National Security
    Advisor. On the other hand, if you don't give the NID budget and
    personnel authority, you add a useless layer and weaken the DCI in the
    process. A better approach would be to set up the Counterterrorism
    Center and strengthen the DCI's concurring authority over the CSA's
    where it may be inadequate. The main thing though is to make sure the
    DCI has clout over both the CIA and the FBI.
        If one goal is to improve HUMINT there are shortcomings more
    important than organizational structure. They are not dealt with in the
    9/11 report. I learned as an FSO working with case officers in the
    field that the key to good HUMINT is the ability to protect sources and
    methods, or better said the perception that we can protect sources and
    methods. In the intelligence business perception is as important as
    fact.
        Unfortunately the widespread perception is that we can't protect
    our sources and methods. I can recall the head of a major European
    Intelligence Service telling me when I was DDCI that he withheld
    information from us because we ``couldn't keep a secret.''
        Imagine you were an Iraqi under Saddam Hussein and a CIA case
    officer approached you. Knowing about extensive leaks, the constant
    pressure on the Agency (including by the 9/11 Commission) to reveal
    more information, the use of FOIA to reveal CIA material and multiple
    congressional oversight committees, would you want your name on the
    rolls? All the skilled Arabist's in the world won't be able to recruit
    in the highly secretive Middle East unless we commit to better
    protection of sources and methods.
        The commission did make some positive recommendations for a tiered
    classification system and streamlined congressional oversight but their
    overall thrust was to abolish ``need to know'' and have a more open
    intelligence process--an oxymoron. It is good to disseminate
    information, but the dissemination process is useless unless there is
    reliable information to disseminate. One source compromised means many
    sources not recruited.
        Good collection also requires risk taking. Much of our approach to
    intelligence since the Church Committee has been to discourage risk.
    Whether it is indicting professionals for carrying out policy or making
    it complicated to recruit human rights violators we have put a chill on
    entrepreneurial activity. There will be failures and we should
    determine why, but there are successes, largely unheralded, and we
    should not risk them by seizing on every failure to point fingers of
    blame.
        A final word on resources. They are needed. It is clear we cut DOD,
    State, and Intelligence too much in the 1990s--over 30 percent. The
    capability we lost can be rebuilt but not as quickly as it was
    eliminated. Bearing in mind the time required to recruit, train and
    organize effective cover in tightly closed societies or terrorist
    groups I think George Tenet's estimate of 5 years is on the mark. I
    hope we don't prolong that period by making the wrong organizational
    moves.

        Chairman Warner. Thank you, Mr. Secretary. Another strong
    statement, very clear in your views.
        Secretary Hamre?

      STATEMENT OF DR. JOHN J. HAMRE, FORMER DEPUTY SECRETARY OF
      DEFENSE, PRESIDENT AND CHIEF EXECUTIVE OFFICER, CENTER FOR
                  STRATEGIC AND INTERNATIONAL STUDIES

        Dr. Hamre. Chairman Warner, Senator Levin, thank you for
    inviting me.
        I acknowledge I come here with severe disadvantage,
    compared to my colleagues at this table who have such deep
    richness of talent and experience compared to me, but I do have
    the indisputable advantage in that I worked for all of you for
    10 years. So I throw myself on your mercy, and hope that you
    remember kindly your children. [Laughter.]
        Chairman Warner. Before you further demean your
    credentials----[Laughter.]
        --let me point out that you perhaps have as much experience
    as any of us with regard to the issue of budgeting. In the
    course of the colloquy here between my colleagues and myself
    and the witnesses, we will try and define your individual views
    on that.
        Dr. Hamre. I'd be happy to respond to that, sir.
        Chairman Warner. You do have experience there.
        Dr. Hamre. I do, sir. Thank you.
        Let me say, I am grateful to the work of the 9/11
    Commission for having opened up, for all of us, a debate we
    really should have as a country. How do we need to organize our
    intelligence services that support us in this important
    endeavor to protect the country? As I've written before, my
    concern about the recommendations that flow from them is that
    they are organizing, or reorganizing, the IC too narrowly
    around one set of problems.
        Yes, the connect-the-dot problem is very real, and we do
    need to anticipate, in our structure, how we try to solve that
    problem. Just as important, in my view, is the collective
    narrowness of thinking that's endemic in the intelligence
    process when it's supporting decisionmaking. Those two, I
    think, are, frankly, in tension with each other.
        If you try to organize the entire IC around one dimension,
    connecting the dots, frankly, I feel that we're going to make
    it much susceptible for a narrowness and a group-think to set
    in if we put everything under one person. If, by contrast, we
    try to keep broad diversity in the IC, as we have now, we have
    a coordination problem. So it's these two, I think, that we
    have to try to solve simultaneously.
        My concern about the 9/11 Commission is that it creates an
    NID and tries to coordinate by bringing all of the budget and
    personnel control under his authority. I must tell you, I would
    be very uneasy with that, having been the Comptroller in the
    DOD, and having been the Deputy Secretary. To have a major
    element of my department really working for another cabinet
    individual is, I think, a real mistake. You can't help but have
    that become a source of great friction over time, and I think
    that would not be healthy.
        I also think it is really not a good idea to strip away
    from the Cabinet Secretaries their assessment capacity to
    evaluate intelligence on their own. They need to come into a
    meeting with the President--and, frankly, come before all of
    you in hearings on the Hill--with their own independent
    capacity to reach a judgment, not just simply receiving it from
    a central authority.
        So I do not think it's a good idea to focus in such a
    narrow way that we get one point of view coming out of an IC. I
    really think a far greater risk lies in having that too
    narrowly constrained, and for Cabinet Secretaries, like these
    two gentlemen, not to come before you in a hearing, or not to
    come before the President, to make their case on their own
    assessment.
        Now, I've seen what the Commission has recommended, what
    Senator Kerry has recommended, and I've seen what the President
    has recommended. I, probably much like my two colleagues here,
    think that the current situation is preferable to the two that
    are on the table before you. I, personally, think that the 9/11
    Commission's recommendation would create a very dysfunctional
    situation in the executive branch. But I also think that the
    President's recommendation is going to create a very weak NID
    and, the way it was announced, could weaken the CIA in the
    process. I think that's a step back.
        So I come to a conclusion. If the politics is going to
    drive us to have an NID, then, I have to conclude, we have to
    find a way to make that individual have some genuine heft in
    the process. They're not going to be strong just simply running
    interagency coordination structures. They're going to have to
    have institutional depth.
        So my recommendation, which I realize is controversial,
    would be to move the intelligence factories--and that is the
    NRO, the NSA, and the NGA--under the NID. Just the factories.
        Now, some have asked me why do I not recommend that we move
    HUMINT. Frankly, those aren't factories. Those are artisan
    craft shops, and I don't think they're of the same scale. I
    think we should keep them where they are. I think they ought to
    be with the CIA and, to a lesser extent, the DOD or the Defense
    Human Intelligence Service. I think you should leave them
    there. But the factories that produce the raw material, I feel
    could be brought under this and give genuine depth to the NID.
        Now, Secretary Schlesinger rightly raised how crucial it is
    for us, in the DOD, to have reliable intelligence for our
    warfighting. It isn't a matter of just getting a finished
    intelligence product. We need the electrons. We need the
    electrons on the battlefield, almost in real time, to be able
    to do our job.
        Now, I will say that a good number of those platforms that
    produce tactical intelligence are under the management and
    control of the DOD already, and that would not change by moving
    the parent of the NSA to this new NID. But I do think that
    there would be problems that would emerge if you were to move
    the factories over under this individual. But I think they're
    manageable problems. At least I know how I would manage it if I
    were to do that. We come to this--we, DOD--would come to this
    with considerable clout, frankly. Each of those three agencies
    would collapse if we pulled out our people and our resources.
        Dr. Schlesinger said that there would be a tendency to
    reproduce those capabilities. Frankly, we can't afford it. I
    mean, we are going to rationalize our process. We've had to do
    that by the expense of these platforms already.
        So I think that there would be a--no question, there would
    be some tensions, but I think it is something we could manage.
    I, personally, would recommend that the deputies--myself, if I
    had been in the job, the deputy--or the Vice Chief of the Joint
    Chiefs, as well as other deputies--serve as a board of
    directors to the NID on, really, a daily basis, to ensure that
    we're getting the kind of support and product that we need.
        As I said, I don't think this is--I propose this really
    because I'm trying to find a path. If it is inevitable that
    we're going to have an NID split away from the CIA, we have to
    have a strong position, and I think this is a plausible way to
    do it, although I do acknowledge that there are going to be
    some challenges. I look forward to answering your questions or
    talking with you about them.
        [The prepared statement of Dr. Hamre follows:]
                    Prepared Statement by Dr. John J. Hamre
        Chairman Warner, Ranking Member Levin, distinguished members of the
    committee, thank you for inviting me to participate in this critical
    hearing. I am grateful that you are undertaking this review. How we
    organize our government to undertake critical intelligence is one of
    the most fundamental problems we face. We need your thoughtful review
    and considered judgment. This is not something to rush. Please take
    your time to think through these issues carefully.
        With your permission, I would ask that you accept as my statement a
    copy of the article I wrote that appeared Monday in the Washington
    Post. It outlines everything I would otherwise want to say this
    morning. I would like to amplify on that statement, however, to discuss
    the implications this holds for the Defense Department.
        Let me say at the outset that American warfighting is more
    dependent on intelligence today than at any time in our history. The
    globe is not getting smaller; our forces are, so we have to get maximum
    efficiency by being precise in our planning and operation. We depend on
    superb tactical intelligence.
        A good deal of those capabilities are organic to our operating
    forces. But we also depend on the intelligence support we receive from
    the National Security Agency (NSA), the National Geospatial-
    Intelligence Agency, and the National Reconnaissance Office. I honestly
    believe we can count on that support and have it tactically relevant,
    even if those organizations are transferred to a new central
    intelligence organization under a new DNI. But there are some steps we
    should take.
        First, I believe we should continue to send our military personnel
    to those institutions, even after transfer. Frankly we need to do that
    because we don't have the rotation base exclusively within the military
    services to support our force structure and manage our personnel. We
    need the wider job rotation base that these agencies provide. So it is
    in our interests for two reasons--to insure they continue to focus on
    us and to insure that our best tactical intelligence operators have a
    rotation base.
        Second, I would explicitly establish a very senior board of
    directors to oversee the new department. These individuals would
    actually be representatives for the Cabinet Secretaries who have the
    constitutional missions assigned them by the President. The
    Intelligence Community (IC) should be accountable to them, and we need
    a standing structure that insures that oversight and accountability.
        Third, I believe that we are on the edge of a new set of military
    intelligence platforms--long dwell unmanned vehicles is a good
    example--that provide needed tactical intelligence, but which also feed
    the national system. I would make those DOD investments and keep them
    in the Defense Department. We already know how to jointly task them for
    tactical and national missions.
        Fourth, I think the two Armed Services Committees need to
    strengthen their oversight of intelligence. But the focus should be on
    outputs, not on inputs. Too much of the oversight today is devoted to
    the review of the annual budget inputs to the system, not an assessment
    of the capabilities we get from the systems. Your oversight will help
    insure that the new intelligence system is responsive to our
    warfighters.
        Thank you for inviting me to participate today. I am pleased to
    answer any questions you have at the appropriate point.

        [GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]

        Chairman Warner. Thank you. The committee will now proceed
    to its 6-minute round. I'll start off with Dr. Schlesinger.
        On page 4--I repeat your testimony--``To shift control over
    crucial intelligence assets outside the DOD risks weakening the
    relative military advantage of the United States,'' and so on.
    The operative word is ``to shift control.''
        Then I look at the statement by the National Security
    Advisor to the President, Ms. Rice, and she said the following,
    ``We expect that the NID would have significant input into the
    development of a budget.'' Now, that's not shifting control in
    the President's position. Now, I recognize September 11 is on a
    different----
        But let's go back and explore. Is there a bridge between
    these two ``poles,'' so to speak, of shifting absolute control
    and the question of significant input? May I suggest the
    following, which I have mentioned publicly, and that is, let
    the SECDEF retain the budget structure, the actual people who
    work on all of these things and put it together. It's very
    complicated. We're talking about tens of thousands of people in
    these various agencies, am I not correct in that?
        Dr. Schlesinger. Yes.
        Chairman Warner. Tens of thousands of people. Leave them
    put. Let the SECDEF create the budget, but in coordination with
    the NID, allowing the maximum of input. At the time, presumably
    and optimally, when they would have a concurrence on the
    various points--that they would then jointly submit that budget
    to the President so that there would be accountability to both
    individuals.
        Dr. Schlesinger. I have little problem with that. I think
    that Frank has already observed that we have moved a long way
    in that direction. I think that both Don Rumsfeld and George
    Tenet would say that they already have that degree of
    collaboration. This might formalize it.
        Chairman Warner. I think that would be the objective of the
    legislation, which I hope, by the way, would not be driven by
    politics, Dr. Hamre. I hope it would be driven by good sense.
        So on that point, you feel that that is a bridge between
    some of the poles here.
        Mr. Carlucci. Yes.
        Chairman Warner. Would you like to speak to that, Secretary
    Carlucci?
        Mr. Carlucci. I think already, or at least when I was in
    the CIA, the Director put together the National Foreign
    Intelligence Program (NFIP), which was then worked out with the
    SECDEF. I can remember when I was in the job John Hamre was in,
    as Deputy Secretary of Defense, I persuaded the Office of
    Management and Budget (OMB) to let me determine the
    intelligence budget, because it was a straight tradeoff with
    the DOD budget, because the President had already determined
    the top line of the DOD budget. I gave intelligence a higher
    growth rate than I gave DOD. So a collaborative relationship
    already exists, and I think your suggestion is appropriate.
        Chairman Warner. In your study of the 9/11 report, and in
    my study, I'm not sure that they recognize fully the extent to
    which this is currently done. Am I correct in that observation?
        Dr. Schlesinger. I think that's correct, Mr. Chairman. If
    you recall, I think that what they're saying is, we have failed
    to connect the dots.
        Chairman Warner. Right.
        Dr. Schlesinger. That does not mean that there's not
    coordination on the budget.
        Chairman Warner. No. I think we've reached consensus.
        Dr. Hamre, how do you feel? You've had a lot of experience.
        Dr. Hamre. I sure have, and I've put together eight
    budgets, four of them as the comptroller, then four when I was
    in the deputy's job. To be honest, there's not nearly the close
    review of the intelligence budget that people think there is.
    When you look at what we submit to all of you, it's really
    quite skimpy by comparison to what it is that you ask that we
    submit for the DOD. There is coordination, but it's really
    quite limited.
        To be candid, I think the quality of oversight inside the
    executive branch isn't as strong as it ought to be of the
    intelligence, so that ought to be strengthened. But I think the
    reason it hasn't been, frankly, so strong is that there has
    been a de facto tug-of-war between DOD and the IC over who has
    the lead. In that struggle, frankly, that--just really has not
    dug into it as deeply as we probably should have.
        Chairman Warner. All right, then do you feel that the
    creation of the post of NID, with what I outlined, is a joint
    responsibility? While the people would be retained in the DOD,
    the actual work product would be coordinated carefully with the
    NID, and then they would both sign off on it, and both names
    would appear as it goes to the President. Do you think that
    would help remove some of the criticisms?
        Dr. Hamre. I think that that is, as the secretaries have
    said, quite similar to what's done now. It needs to be
    strengthened, no matter what. Is it going to get better by
    creating the NID? Not necessarily. It isn't necessarily going
    to be better if you create the NID. The process is weak right
    now because there are two bosses and there are two separate
    chains, and, frankly, there's a lot of ambiguity between those
    two chains. That's, frankly, replicated up here on the Hill.
    We've divided the oversight of the intelligence budgets and the
    armed services budgets.
        Chairman Warner. But that's a separate problem, budgets.
        Dr. Hamre. So we see this throughout the system.
        Dr. Schlesinger. Mr. Chairman?
        Chairman Warner. Yes?
        Dr. Schlesinger. The Secretary of Defense and the Secretary
    of Energy jointly sign off on the stockpile requirements for
    our nuclear weapons. There is also a Nuclear Weapons Council
    that is made up of members of the DOD and Energy Department,
    and that may be the model you're seeking.
        Chairman Warner. Right. Let me just take it to the next
    step, and that is the hiring and firing. Here, I draw on some
    modest experience I had in 5 years working for you, Jim, and
    the two predecessors, Laird, Elliott, Richardson--three of
    them. The heads of DIA, traditionally--NSA--have been military
    officers. I can recall that each of the military secretaries
    were asked to nominate--you recognize that, too, in your
    experience--and maybe a dozen or more individuals. The SECDEF,
    together with the secretaries of the military departments,
    really had a lot of personal knowledge about each of those
    individuals, and the selection process was driven almost
    entirely on credentials and experience, and those were the
    factors that made the final decision.
        Now, the NID simply doesn't have the benefit of having
    gotten to know those individuals through the many trips that
    each SECDEF and service secretaries make to the commands, visit
    with them and families, and everything else. Therefore, I
    think, again, I draw another parallel with the budget, and that
    is that there would be a joint consideration and a joint
    submission of that name. But given that the DOD would have more
    insight, certainly, into the military nominees--now, I don't
    suggest that they always have to be military.
        So, again, I come down to a similar process on the hiring
    and firing, and that would be collaborative between the SECDEF
    and the NID, and then a joint recommendation. Would I be
    correct in that assumption?
        Dr. Schlesinger. At the moment, there is collaboration on
    the hiring side. I think that that collaboration would break
    down on the firing side.
        Chairman Warner. Let's hope it wouldn't.
        Dr. Schlesinger. Yes.
        Chairman Warner. They both have to remain accountable, if
    they have their two names on that nominee.
        Dr. Schlesinger. I think when you were the Secretary of the
    Navy, Mr. Chairman, you might have been hesitant to share
    certain information with somebody who was necessarily reporting
    to somebody outside the building. I'd ask you to reflect on
    that possibility.
        Chairman Warner. I think that we've come to the point--
    there's the old adage, ``need to know,'' but we also now have
    the ``need to share,'' and there has to be a greater sharing of
    information.
        Dr. Schlesinger. One very useful thing that an NID can do
    is to break down the classification boundaries among these
    intelligence agencies.
        Chairman Warner. You and I have discussed that.
        Dr. Schlesinger. Yes.
        Chairman Warner. Secretary Carlucci, to you for an answer
    on the hiring and firing-sharing?
        Mr. Carlucci. I think there would need to be a mechanism
    for breaking down an impasse. That is to say, if they can't
    agree, eventually one of them sends a name forward to the
    President, with a dissent by the other, so that the President
    can make a decision.
        Chairman Warner. If there were an impasse, I would presume
    that the President would be involved----
        Mr. Carlucci. Yes.
        Chairman Warner.--and perhaps reconcile it.
        Mr. Carlucci. The other point I would make--your comment
    that the DCI doesn't have the opportunity to know military
    people--my recollection is that either the DCI or the DDCI has
    to be a military officer, at least in----
        Chairman Warner. It has been that practice.
        Mr. Carlucci.--by practice, so that one or the other of
    them should have knowledge of the military people who are
    proposed.
        Chairman Warner. Some knowledge, but perhaps not to the
    degree of the SECDEF.
        Senator Levin?
        Senator Levin. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Under the current law, the DCI is responsible for
    developing and presenting to the President the annual budget.
    That's the current law. So, in terms of preparation of the
    budget, it's right where the 9/11 Commission is saying it
    should be prepared, it seems to me, under law.
        When it comes to execution of the budget--by executive
    order, that is now basically in the DOD. But, Secretary
    Carlucci, when you were deputy to Admiral Turner, as you just
    indicated and he indicated this morning, in the Carter
    administration, that was done differently, by executive order
    at that time. That execution of the budget was in the hands of
    the intelligence people. Is that correct? That's what Admiral
    Turner, at least, told us this morning. I thought you were
    indicating something like that earlier today.
        Mr. Carlucci. I have trouble understanding what you mean by
    ``execution.'' Do you mean, has the money been spent or has the
    program been carried out the way that Congress directed?
        Senator Levin. Including reprogramming.
        Mr. Carlucci. Including reprogramming?
        Senator Levin. Right.
        Mr. Carlucci. The answer to your question, then, is yes,
    that was done by the DCI.
        Senator Levin. That was done by the DCI, so that--by
    executive order, I emphasize--this shift could be made back, if
    it were desirable----
        Mr. Carlucci. Sure.
        Senator Levin.--to the intelligence----
        Mr. Carlucci. That's the----
        Senator Levin.--the head of intelligence.
        Mr. Carlucci.--point I tried to make, that we don't
    necessarily have to have statutes here.
        Senator Levin. Right.
        Mr. Carlucci. There is some flexibility.
        Senator Levin. So that's, it seems to me, point one. To the
    extent that it's desirable to shift back, reprogramming into
    the DCI or a successor, that could be done by executive order
    without legislation.
        Now, when we look at the September 11 failures, what I
    don't see is any connection between the failures and where that
    reprogramming authority on the budget should lie. I don't see
    any connection to the remedy which is proposed. Do any of you
    see the relationship between the remedy proposed, which is,
    basically, put reprogramming or execution of the budget back in
    intelligence, and the failures which preceded September 11?
        Mr. Carlucci. I think we're fixing a non-problem, to be
    honest with you.
        Senator Levin. Do either of the other witnesses see the
    relationship between that remedy and the flaws before September
    11?
        Dr. Schlesinger. No. Here's the thing, Senator Levin. One
    of the commissioners confirms that they spent 18 months
    studying the problem of September 11, and 3 weeks to put
    together this reform of the IC. I think that that tells----
        Senator Levin. But specifically, though. That's a general
    comment. But specifically then, at least--and I won't--Dr.
    Hamre, unless you have a difference on this, I'll say, so far
    we don't have any connection between the flaws before September
    11 and that particular remedy, relative to who has the
    reprogramming power.
        Dr. Hamre. The reprogramming isn't really going to solve a
    problem like that. It's really your capacity to structure the
    IC prospectively through your budget----
        Senator Levin. Through the budget, which, by law, by
    title----
        Dr. Hamre. Right.
        Senator Levin.--Section 403-3 of----
        Dr. Hamre. Right.
        Senator Levin.--50 USC, belongs, or is, right now, in the
    DCI.
        Now, if this is right, what we've said so far, we have this
    situation, that the remedy, relative to the budget change, does
    not correct the flaws. To the extent it's desirable, anyway, it
    can be done by executive order. Now, that's my summary of what
    your testimony is so far.
        Now, on the personnel side of this issue, we have, under
    current law, the requirement that the SECDEF obtain the
    concurrence of the DCI before submitting to the President any
    nomination to head the NSA or NGA or NRO. The only one left out
    of that would be the DIA. So, right now, under law, with that
    one exception, which I think would be continued, probably, by
    the 9/11 Commission, although I may be wrong--right now, the
    concurrence of the DCI is required before the appointment, at
    least, is made. So that if that is robustly implemented,
    presumably we have a DCI who has a veto over any intelligence
    head of those three agencies. Is that--are you with me so far?
    Okay.
        Is that not an adequate input into who the heads of that
    agency is--those agencies are to meet the goals, it seems to
    me, which are desirable goals, of the 9/11 Commission. Namely,
    which is that there be a significant input into who is going to
    run the intelligence for those three agencies? Does it meet the
    9/11 Commission's very legitimate point about having the person
    responsible for intelligence also having hiring authority for
    the people who are going to be collecting it?
        Mr. Carlucci. I think it does.
        Dr. Schlesinger. It does.
        Senator Levin. Do you agree with that?
        Dr. Schlesinger. It does.
        Mr. Carlucci. I agree with it.
        Senator Levin. Okay.
        Now, just on the accountability issue. Perhaps one of the
    two most troubling things to me is that the Commission did not
    address, in my book, the accountability failures prior to
    September 11. I disagree with you here, Dr. Schlesinger. When
    you have all those dots up there, it's not just that the dots
    weren't connected; it's that the information was not shared
    which would have allowed for the dots to be connected. You put
    dots on a board, and obviously, there's no automatic logic to
    connecting them. But the information which would have allowed
    the dots to be connected was not shared, as required by job
    description. You had people in the CIA who knew that al Qaeda
    operatives, who had attacked the U.S.S. Cole and were members
    of al Qaeda, had entered the United States, and never notified
    the FBI, as their responsibility was. You had FBI people--in
    Minneapolis, in Phoenix--who did what they were supposed to do,
    notified the national FBI office, the bin Laden desk at the FBI
    office, and nothing was done with critically actionable
    information about people in the United States who were clearly
    connected to bin Laden. Those are failures to do one's job and
    there's no one been held accountable for that.
        How do we get greater accountability into this process to
    address those kind of failures which were at the heart of the
    September 11 failure? They weren't who has budget
    responsibility; it was people not doing their jobs. How do we
    get that into this process?
        Mr. Carlucci. If this were today--if that were being--
    happening today, we would look to TTIC. Presumably, after we
    set it up, we'd look to the NCTC.
        Senator Levin. My time is up but do either of you have
    anything to add to that?
        Dr. Schlesinger. My only observation is that, after the
    1970s, it was prohibited to share intelligence information with
    law enforcement, and that that was one of our problems. I agree
    fully, Senator Levin, that we did not share as much as we
    could. But there were restrictions.
        Chairman Warner. Thank you very much, Senator Levin.
        Senator McCain.
        Senator McCain. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        I want to thank the witnesses for being here. There aren't
    three individuals for whom I have greater respect and
    appreciation for your incredible contributions to our country,
    and I'm very grateful they're here.
        I must say, though, that I think I've had an out-of-body
    experience here, because when I summarize the testimony of the
    witnesses, we really don't have to do anything substantive, as
    far as reorganizing our ability and enhancing our ability to
    fight the war on terrorism, which all of us agree is going to
    be with us for a long time.
        Secretary Carlucci mentioned we have to keep our own
    secrets. I don't know anyone who would disagree with that. The
    need to know--Senator Levin just pointed out that somebody felt
    it was such a need to know that they didn't inform the proper
    agencies that people were taking pilot training in Phoenix,
    Arizona. Risk-taking is at a minimum now, according to
    everything that I've read, and that is that our now-
    intelligence services sit in the embassy and wait for the
    somebody to walk in.
        I don't know how long we're going to keep blaming the
    Church Committee. It's been about 30 years now since the Church
    Committee had their hearings. Maybe the effect of the Church
    Committee would have some kind of half-life after awhile.
        Yes, we've had successes. But for us to rest on those
    successes, given the ample evidence of massive failures that
    caused the worst attack on the United States of America in our
    history, I think would not be satisfactory to my constituents.
        Secretary Carlucci, you mentioned that rebuilding is
    underway, and that former DCI Tenet said it would take 5 years.
    What was he doing the previous years when he was in charge? As
    a member of the Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) Commission, I
    have been finding out more and more information, most of which
    is public knowledge, that there were massive failures. A guy
    named ``Curveball'' gives information which was accepted on its
    face and somehow became a part of Secretary of State's
    testimony before the United Nations Security Council--that, and
    other information he now deeply regrets--that he presented as
    fact. According to Mr. Woodward, the WMD information was a
    ``slam dunk'' to the President of the United States.
        I guess my counter-argument to the testimony is, for us to
    maintain the status quo is simply not acceptable. I am not a
    Member of the Intelligence Committee. But, reading this report,
    no matter whether they spent 3 days or 3 weeks or 3 months,
    they did some incredibly valuable work.
        I'd be glad to hear your responses, but my question also is
    that, in your testimony, none of you have addressed the
    recommendations for a fundamental reorganization of how
    Congress exercises its oversight. They're very critical of
    Congress's oversight capabilities and activities,
    responsibility and blame that I think is well deserved,
    because--not because of the nature of the individuals, but the
    nature of the system. I'd like to hear your comments to mine,
    but also response to--if you have any ideas or thoughts--on
    reorganizing how Congress could better exercise its oversight
    responsibilities.
        Dr. Schlesinger?
        Dr. Schlesinger. Fools rush in where angels fear to tread,
    and recommendations as to how Congress should reorganize
    itself----
        Senator McCain. I could help you.
        Dr. Schlesinger.--usually fall on deaf ears. I think that
    you should carefully consider the joint-committee procedure
    that we had for atomic energy as a better way of organizing
    activities on both sides of the aisle. I'm not recommending it;
    I think you should consider it.
        As to what is wrong with intelligence, that is a matter of
    good analysis, improved analysis, and hiring good people. The
    problem was not the Church Committee, it was the reaction to
    the Church Committee in law and executive orders that said,
    ``Don't talk amongst each other.'' There's some very silly
    examples that occurred as a response to those injunctions.
        Senator McCain. I'd be glad to hear from Secretary
    Carlucci, but, in response, again, there was no law or any
    custom or anything else that prevented the information about
    people taking pilot training in Phoenix from getting to the
    right----
        Dr. Schlesinger. Absolutely right.
        Senator McCain. There are a lot of things that happened
    that there's neither law nor action of the Church Committee
    that would have prevented this incredible stovepiping which has
    been identified by a large number of experts as one of the
    serious problems that we have.
        Dr. Schlesinger. That's absolutely right, and we need to
    get rid of the stovepiping, and that's one of the things that
    an NID can, indeed, do. Because only the clout of somebody with
    authority from the President can eliminate some of those
    classification barriers.
        Senator McCain. Secretary Carlucci?
        Mr. Carlucci. Senator McCain, I didn't mean to give the
    impression, and I hope I didn't, that I think everything is
    fine and we shouldn't make any changes. Indeed, I think we
    ought to set up the NCTC, and that's a major change. What I was
    saying is, be careful about moving the organizational boxes
    around, because you may make the problem worse.
        So you can enhance the DCI's authority. Let's look at it--
    as Senator Warner is already doing, let's look at the DCI's
    authority and see where the shortcomings are, set up the NCTC,
    and proceed from there. There may be things that we could do
    afterwards that would be important. But, to take what Jim
    Schlesinger said, ``First do no harm.''
        Senator McCain. Do you have any comment about reorganizing
    Congress's oversight responsibilities?
        Mr. Carlucci. It's not been my area of expertise. Clearly,
    there are too many committees. To set up some kind of a joint
    committee would be a highly desirable thing to do.
        I mentioned trade-craft. There's been a lot of talk about
    connecting the dots, and that was the failing of our
    intelligence system. Okay, so be it. But had we had one asset
    inside of al Qaeda, we might have had highly accurate
    information. So let's also look at our trade-craft. Let's not
    just say it's a matter of organizational structure or
    connecting the dots.
        Dr. Hamre. Senator McCain, first I--our current system of
    budgeting, as we--when it comes to the IC--and it's because we
    have two different chains--and, frankly, there's a lot of
    ambiguity over who's in charge. People fight for the authority,
    not necessarily following through with the kind of details that
    we should have. I, frankly, see the same extending up here on
    the Hill. The quality of oversight is very uneven. The
    committees are too big, as Secretary Carlucci said. Far too
    much time is being devoted to arguing over budget inputs, not
    enough about what's coming out of the system. The Intelligence
    Committees and the Armed Services Committees compete with the
    Appropriations Committees to try to do the same job: control
    dollars. I think that's something that we really should look
    at.
        There is a range of things. I have some ideas. I think it
    would be useful to have, as Secretary Schlesinger said, a joint
    oversight committee that is comprised of the two Intelligence
    Committees to really do oversight of the intelligence process.
    So there are a number of things that need to happen. It's a
    rather wide set of recommendations I think you'd want to
    consider if you were looking at oversight for the community.
        You don't have any jurisdiction, for example, over--or the
    Intelligence Committee really doesn't have much--over the FBI,
    and yet the connecting-the-dots problem was very much a
    domestic/foreign-intelligence issue. Those all have to be put
    on the table. How you structure it to deal up here is going to
    involve some fairly big changes.
        I'd be happy to come and talk later. I got myself in a lot
    of trouble in the House for being too public, but I'll do it
    again, if you want.
        Senator McCain. You never get in trouble here. [Laughter.]
        Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Chairman Warner. Thank you, Senator McCain.
        Senator Kennedy.
        Senator Kennedy. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I join with all
    of those in welcoming a very distinguished panel.
        I had the chance over the last 10 days or so to go through
    pretty much all of the 9/11 Commission Report, and it obviously
    has to bring back to all the families those extraordinary
    moments and times of deep loss, and you can't read through that
    extraordinary report without recognizing it. It's also a
    tremendous challenge for the country.
        Now we are attempting to deal with these recommendations.
    It's against a background where I think all of our panelists
    have acknowledged the extraordinary progress that's been made,
    in terms of communications, intelligence, and information. The
    Gulf War, won 72 hours from the time of siting onto a target
    until the time weapons could be delivered, to--now to 20
    minutes--the progress that's been made has been extraordinary.
    No one wants to upset that. No one wants to disturb it.
        But the fact is, we're facing a newer world, a newer world
    with al Qaeda. A newer world with al Qaeda. This is not the
    issue of changing, ensuring that government is going to do what
    it has to do and should do, and has the most important
    responsibility to do, and that is to protect its people--to
    protect its people--and also to secure, obviously, the best
    that we can, in terms of our national--of our defense forces.
    That's obviously important.
        We're mindful that this is an issue which--in asking the
    Congressional Research Service, which I did in preparation for
    this hearing--this issue about how we can make our intelligence
    systems more effective, they've given me 15 different reports,
    going back to Herbert Hoover, about steps that could be taken,
    most of them not enormously dissimilar from the 9/11
    Commission. Not enormously dissimilar. Not enormously
    dissimilar.
        The one I want to speak to you about--I haven't got the
    time to go on through them--is the Scowcroft Commission Report.
    This isn't someone who is reckless in recommendations; this is
    a person who has served under seven Presidents, been a
    distinguished military leader, been a national security
    officer, heads the National Security Office for Bush 1, now the
    head of the Foreign Intelligence. He had some enormously
    important recommendations that are not greatly dissimilar from
    the recommendations of the 9/11 report.
        Let me just summarize. This is a--just very quickly, from a
    New York--or from a Time magazine story. ``Scowcroft chaired a
    year-long study on the subject and sent his report to the
    President in March. There, it collects dust. At a black-tie
    dinner last week''--this is in December 2002--``when he
    presented an award to CIA George Tenet, Scowcroft broke cover
    again. `For years, we had a poorly organized intelligence
    system,' he said, `but it didn't matter, because all the
    threats were overseas. So now we have a huge problem. It is
    unfair,' he said, `to ask Tenet to take responsibility for
    intelligence matters when he has authority over only some of
    them. I think it's time we give him all the tools he needs to
    do the job.' The room, full of spooks, spy chiefs, exploded in
    applause.' ''
        Now, maybe the Scowcroft Commission recommendations aren't
    the answer, maybe September 11 is not the answer, but the
    American people know we're dealing with al Qaeda that's out
    there in towns and communities, trying to steal weapons of mass
    destruction, bioterrorism, working day and night, in terms of
    its kind of a threat. I think we have to be able to evaluate--I
    don't know why we can't look at the Scowcroft Commission and
    make the recommendations--but we have to have serious
    recommendations, rather than, as Senator McCain has mentioned,
    just saying, ``Things are working okay.''
        Let me ask you, Mr. Hamre. How satisfied are you, today,
    given what you know and given what you understand is the
    current situation, that we are doing everything that we can--
    should be doing, in terms of dealing with the threat of al
    Qaeda?
        Dr. Hamre. Senator, this is a--that's a much broader
    question than just the issue before us. I think that--first of
    all, I would say, I think there's a good deal more cooperation
    between the intelligence and law enforcement communities than
    ever existed before. Is it sufficient to divert the next
    attack? Maybe not, I don't know, but it's certainly much, much
    better than it was. The focus--we have many more people who are
    now worrying on this issue, compared to what we had before.
        Now, institutionally, you'll have to ask, is that--does
    that have staying power? I think the issue in front of you and
    the rest of Congress is, do you need to put an institutional
    framework to this? I, personally, think that the system that we
    have right now is, we tend to have a weak coordination
    structure. It's not that the authorities aren't strong for the
    DCI--he has very strong authorities--but he's not chosen to use
    them all, and they've fallen into, frankly, disrepair, because
    he's bucked up against very powerful SECDEFs through the years.
        So I think you--now you have to ask the question, do you
    change that? Do you basically ask him to override the SECDEF,
    or do you institutionally give him more standing, independence,
    and power, as was recommended by the Commission? At some point,
    we're going to have to restore, in a more institutional way,
    some of those authorities to coordinate across the government.
    But I think that there is a lot of risk of doing it the way the
    9/11 Commission recommended.
        Senator Kennedy. Are you familiar with the recommendations
    of the Scowcroft Commission?
        Dr. Hamre. Sir, I have never read it, because I don't think
    it's been publicly released, but I am aware of the
    recommendations.
        Senator Kennedy. Could you give us any reaction as to----
        Dr. Hamre. I think they were also trying--they recommended
    creating an NID, separated from the CIA director. I worry that
    there's not enough basis inside the Scowcroft recommendations
    for a strong NID, because, under that formula, he's still
    largely going to be managing a set of procedures, and I think
    that it needs to be stronger than that, frankly.
        Senator Kennedy. Could I ask the other--if my time
    permits--Secretary Schlesinger and Secretary Carlucci, whether
    you're familiar with the Scowcroft Commission and what you
    could tell us about it?
        Dr. Schlesinger. Yes, I am familiar with it. I make the
    first observation, General Scowcroft's remarks at the black-tie
    dinner, he said, ``In the past, the threat has been overseas.''
    The inference from that is that we have to have better
    coordination between the agency and the other intelligence
    agencies and the FBI, which has been perhaps the weakest point
    of all. The reforms that he suggested do nothing about that.
        Senator Kennedy. My time's up. Do you think we ought to
    have that before the committee, the Scowcroft Commission?
        Dr. Schlesinger. I think that, whatever you do, you must
    have a better coordination between CIA and FBI, for the very
    reasons that you remind us----
        Senator Kennedy. I was thinking about the report.
        Dr. Schlesinger. On the report. As my remarks indicated, I
    do not think that it would be wise for the warfighter or for
    the DOD to take coordination between C\3\ and intelligence out
    of the DOD. I think that that would do damage to the
    warfighter, and I think that the attempt of commanders in the
    field will be to substitute other assets for the ones that they
    think have been lost to them.
        Mr. Carlucci. Just one quick point. Nobody has said that,
    ``The intelligence system is working fine. Let's keep it the
    way it is.'' We've all made recommendations for change. I agree
    with what Jim has just said.
        Senator Kennedy. Thank you.
        Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Chairman Warner. For the record, the Scowcroft Commission
    Report has not been released by the White House, so--there have
    been some public discussion of its major points, and we're
    going to look into seeing whether or not we can have greater
    access to it.
        Senator Roberts.
        Senator Roberts. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        I just had a talk with Brent Scowcroft last Thursday. Even
    at my age, I begged him, on hands and knees, to release the
    report to the Intelligence Committee and to the Armed Services
    Committee. He pointed out he is still the president of the
    President's Foreign Policy Advisory Board, and, as such, comes
    under the jurisdiction of the National Security Council (NSC)
    and would have to receive clearance from the White House to
    make that report public. I agree with Senator Kennedy, and I
    agree with you.
        Finally, after struggling from my hands and knees, I said
    that Senator Rockefeller and I would make that request, and
    that we would also make a personal call to the White House to
    see if we couldn't get that done. With all of the horsepower
    that the chairman has, and the vice chairman has, I am very
    hopeful we can get that done.
        Let nobody state that we are abrogating our
    responsibilities and challenge to try to implement the goals of
    the 9/11 Commission and to meet our responsibilities with the
    families. Senators Collins and Lieberman just concluded a
    hearing, as of this morning, where they had the DCIs, Webster,
    Woolsey, and Turner. All three indicated that they were for an
    NID, with some modification--I don't want to say that carte
    blanche--and also the NCTC. There was no comment on how we fix
    the oversight of Congress in which, by my count, we have at
    least eight committees, plus OMB, in charge of these decisions.
        Let me say that, with Senators Warner and Levin and myself,
    I was also hopeful that Senator Rockefeller would be able to
    attend, being the Vice Chairman of the Intelligence Committee--
    we share their very strong feeling that we must preserve the
    tactical intelligence to the warfighter. That's a given. That's
    the tactical intelligence and related activities (TIARA) part
    of the program, in regards to tactical intelligence.
        Now, we have seven committees, I think, that have held
    hearings during this break. It's not a break. We have about 13
    to go, and it'll probably be up to 20 by the time we come back
    into session. So I think there is real work being done in
    September and I am very thankful for that.
        Mr. Chairman, I'd like to ask unanimous consent that the
    speech you made on the Senate floor, as of July 22, be inserted
    into the record at this point.
        You spoke before the Senate as the chairman of the Senate
    Armed Services Committee. You talked about the 9/11 report
    being a roadmap, but then you also pointed out, made the
    comment that amounted to a sweeping indictment that we have
    been dysfunctional in our oversight.
        I've been a member of this committee for 8 years. Of
    course, you've been the chairman, off and on, along with
    Senator Levin. You pointed out that you structured the
    Goldwater-Nichols legislation and we created the Special
    Operations Command. Through the efforts of Senator Lieberman
    and Senator Coats, you have also created a Subcommittee on
    Emerging Threats and Capabilities. That subcommittee, by the
    way, warned, in 1999, what could happen to the World Trade
    Center. In that subcommittee, we have made a lot of progress
    with regards to joint experimentation, homeland defense,
    counterterrorism, and future technologies and concepts that
    will be needed to confront all sorts of future threats.
        Then you had a minority-view report. This report is 10
    years old, signed by Senators Warner, Danforth, Stevens, Lugar,
    and Wallop. Bottom line, ``Reductions in the U.S. intelligence
    capabilities in this period of international stability are
    unwise and do not serve the Nation's long-term security
    interests.'' There's more. Basically, this is 1994, 10 years
    ago.
        So I'd like the entire speech to be made part of the
    record. I think it's pertinent. In setting the record straight,
    I congratulate you, sir, and I think you made some fine
    comments.
        Chairman Warner. Without objection. I think we should also
    note that you've been the distinguished chairman of the
    Subcommittee on Emerging Threats and Capabilities since the day
    it was created.
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        Senator Roberts. As always, your humble servant, sir.
        Let me just say that if I can sum up the testimony--and I
    know that I should not do this with Senator Collins being
    present, who's doing an outstanding job, along with Senator
    Lieberman, on the Governmental Affairs Committee--but the three
    of the witnesses there pretty much got on the NID stage and the
    counterterrorism stage and left town. Now, they didn't leave
    town, but at least that was their recommendation. From what I
    hear of the witnesses, I'm not sure if you're on the NID stage,
    or not.
        Do you support really granting the NID direct supervision
    and control over the DOD elements of the NFIP? Now, saying
    that, there are 15 agencies; there are 4 of them under the DOD;
    then you have the 4 Services, that's 8; and then the rest of
    them are under the Intelligence Community, as all 3 of you well
    know. The suggestion has been made by the distinguished
    chairman that somehow we could work out some kind of an
    arrangement whereby there is better coordination. But it was
    just like Senator McCain said, I think, with the 9/11
    Commission, with a lot of support in this town, and with the
    administration moving toward that goal, and it's not a set
    policy yet that they are for the NID, and they are for this
    NCTC. Yes/no, are you for it or against it?
        We'll start with you, Jim. Pardon me. Secretary
    Schlesinger? And K State fan.
        Dr. Schlesinger. Thank you, sir.
        Now, we used to have greater uniformity in that, prior to
    the 1970s, the CIA was under the control of the Armed Services
    Committee. So what we have been doing on the Hill has been to
    split those authorities, reflecting the public reaction to the
    so-called ``scandals'' of the 1970s.
        No, I don't think that the authorities in the DOD should be
    placed under the NID.
        Senator Roberts. Secretary Carlucci?
        Mr. Carlucci. I agree with the concept of an NCTC. I do not
    favor an NID. If we're going to have an NID, I don't think he
    ought to have line management over the CSAs.
        Senator Roberts. Dr. Hamre.
        Dr. Hamre. Sir, I do not favor the 9/11 Commission
    recommendation that gives the NID authority over DOD agencies.
    If you're going to have an NID, you'll want a strong one. If
    you're going to have a strong one, I think you're going to have
    to give him some real things to manage, other than just
    interagency coordination processes.
        Senator Roberts. Let me give you the counter-argument. I
    have noted what appears to be very redundant, often wasteful,
    procurement of intelligence system, in my own view as chairman
    of the Intelligence Committee, shared by many across the
    several intelligence budgetary mechanisms down through the
    years, different agencies and different congressional
    committees--obviously, that's no surprise. You have the
    entrenched interest of several of these bureaucracies. We may
    see that, when an intelligence requirement is levied, the NRO
    always finds one of its satellites to be the best solution, if
    not all of them. The NGA will feel its imagery is the best. The
    NSA may offer signals intelligence. The Air Force may prefer
    its unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV). The CIA may obviously feel
    an agent collecting information is the best, not to mention a
    poor marine who would just want new tires on his high utility
    mobile mechanized vehicle.
        Sadly, all of these programs may be funded to meet similar,
    or even redundant, needs. Yet the SECDEF cannot do all that. We
    have an Under Secretary of Intelligence now who has his hands
    full. The SECDEF certainly has his hands full. Would an NID,
    with more powerful authorities, be able to make the tough and
    unpopular decisions that fiscal responsibility requires? It
    doesn't have to mean that you put the whole agency out of the
    DOD over to the NID, but at least that person would have
    funding authority, hiring and firing authority, shifting
    personnel authority, and also transfer authority in regards to
    funds.
        What I'm trying to say is the reprogramming--is your answer
    still no?
        Jim?
        Dr. Schlesinger. I think that the NID can do much more in
    the area of centralizing collection, which is the big money
    area, as your question raises. The NID should not be engaged in
    suppressing competition among the agencies. The SECDEF and the
    Joint Chiefs should have their own DIA.
        Mr. Carlucci. The way you've described it, I can see an NID
    building a huge staff right now, and that would be just another
    layer. So I think we have to be cautious about giving him all
    this authority. Either he builds his staff or he yanks
    something out of DOD. There's no in-between.
        Senator Roberts. Dr. Hamre?
        Dr. Hamre. I'd agree with what Dr. Schlesinger just said to
    you.
        Senator Roberts. Okay. My time is expired, and I thank you,
    Mr. Chairman.
        Chairman Warner. Thank you, Senator Roberts.
        Senator Lieberman.
        Senator Lieberman. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thanks to you
    and Senator Levin for these hearings.
        As has been indicated, Senator Collins and I have been
    involved in holding some hearings and we welcome--there's a lot
    of overlap between our two committees, Mr. Chairman. We look
    forward to working with you as our committee produces the
    legislation that Senator Frist and Senator Daschle have asked
    us to produce sometime in September.
        I want to pick up on the questioning of Senator Roberts and
    some of the others, the line of questioning that they've been
    following.
        You can't read the 9/11 report without concluding that it's
    an indictment of the status quo, in some measure. They don't
    quite say this, but it certainly left me with the impression
    that if the kind of reorganization they recommend was in place
    prior to September 11, maybe it wouldn't have happened. It goes
    to the connecting of the dots, to the focusing of resources
    where they were necessary. The bottom line seems to be, no one
    was in charge. The Commission says that. Mr. Zellico, the
    executive director, testified to the Governmental Affairs
    Committee that that remains the case. No one's in charge of the
    American IC. As a result, there is stovepiping, there's not an
    overview by somebody at the top of where priorities are and,
    therefore, where the money should go.
        In that report, I believe it says that our IC is organized
    according to the best management principles of the 1950s, which
    is not surprising, because it came into being in the late
    1940s, when the world was very different and the enemy was very
    different--Soviet Union, as opposed to all the diffusion of
    terrorism.
        Incidentally, we know the toughest part of this is what to
    do about the Defense intelligence budget. Questions have been
    raised. It's true that a lot of the criticism in the 9/11
    Commission Report was focused on other agencies, particularly
    the failure of CIA, FBI, et cetera, to cooperate. But there is
    some criticism of the NSA, which is in the DOD, obviously.
        I'll just read from the Commission report, page 80, ``The
    NSA began''--let me start with page 87--``An almost obsessive
    protection of sources and methods by the NSA and its
    avoidance--its focus on foreign intelligence and its avoidance
    on anything domestic would, as will be seen''--in the report--
    ``be important elements in the story of September 11.''
    Basically, an accusation that the considerable assets of the
    NSA were not being focused on the war on terrorism.
        They say, ``The NSA began putting caveats on its bin Laden-
    related reports that required prior approval before they're
    sharing their contents with criminal investigators and
    prosecutors. These developments further blocked the arteries of
    information-sharing.''
        Finally, from page 417, ``In the September 11 story, for
    example, we see examples of information that could be accessed,
    like the undistributed NSA information that would have helped
    identify Nawaf al Hazmi, in January 2000.'' It goes on.
        So there is some direct connection in the report to
    failures of cooperation by intelligence assets now under the
    control of the DOD.
        Senator Roberts asked about whether you were for the NID,
    and there was--as recommended, I think you generally said no.
    Bob Gates, former DCI, said in testimony he submitted to our
    committee this morning--strong statement--``The new
    intelligence director, as described''--he actually talks about
    the White House. He says, ``The President recently announced
    his initial decisions in response to the Commission
    recommendation. I hope, as the White House spokesman has
    suggested, that these decisions are only a first step, because
    the new intelligence director, as described, will impose a new
    layer of bureaucracy, but has no troops, no budget authority,
    and no power. Therefore, the new position would be worse than
    the current arrangement.''
        So what's my question? [Laughter.]
        My question is this. You've answered, in part. Let me go at
    it this way. You've had the extraordinary experience in
    administration, both in the public and the private sector. How
    can we, in something so fundamental as this war on terrorism,
    go on without having somebody in charge? If you put somebody in
    charge, doesn't that mean they have to have budget authority
    over the DOD--or at least significant non-TIARA, non-tactical
    parts of the DOD intelligence budget?
        Secretary Carlucci?
        Mr. Carlucci. I think we can do that without creating
    another layer. That's the point I tried to make, that we ought
    to look at the DCI's authority, and where they are found
    wanting, let's change that. But to create another layer with a
    whole staff, I agree with Bob Gates, that either he's
    toothless, in which case it's a useless layer, or he's a
    nuisance because he's intervening in the warfighting process of
    DOD.
        Senator Lieberman. Okay, so that's helpful for me to
    understand. In some ways, you're saying if there's need for
    coordination and more strength, including some budget
    authority, give it to the DCI----
        Mr. Carlucci. Absolutely.
        Senator Lieberman.--instead of creating an NID.
        Mr. Carlucci. Absolutely.
        Senator Lieberman. Secretary Schlesinger?
        Dr. Schlesinger. The first point that I make is that the
    stovepiping that has so badly damaged our ability to deal with
    September 11, evidenced beforehand, was basically between the
    FBI and the CIA, and that if that is the area that you must
    bring greater integration, how far the TTIC does in bringing
    FBI information to the benefit of the counterterrorism area, I
    don't know. The FBI has historically been outside, really, of
    the IC.
        Second point, you mentioned that the NSA was obsessive
    about protecting its sources and methods and information, and
    the reason that it was obsessive was that during the 1970s and
    1980s, we told the NSA, ``Never eavesdrop on an American
    citizen.'' If you tell people not to hear things, and then,
    certainly, if they've heard things inadvertently, not to pass
    them on, they will be obsessive.
        Senator Lieberman. As you know better than anybody.
        Dr. Schlesinger. Yes.
        Senator Lieberman. You'd say it yourself, we're not in the
    1970s and 1980s anymore; we're in a new century with a new
    enemy, about whom we----
        Dr. Schlesinger. Absolutely.
        Senator Lieberman.--need to know everything there is to
    know.
        Dr. Schlesinger. Absolutely.
        Those restrictions should be dropped, and they have been
    dropped.
        Senator Lieberman. Dr. Hamre?
        Dr. Hamre. Senator Lieberman, you really don't need to add
    more authority to the DCI on budget. He already has very strong
    authority, but he doesn't really use it. The reason is, he's up
    against very strong Cabinet Secretaries.
        Senator Lieberman. So how do we deal with that? Because we
    know the SECDEF has a lot of authority and power. How are we
    going to equalize that competition, that tension, in a way that
    gives more resources to the war on terror?
        Here we have, ``George Tenet declares war on terrorism as
    DCI in''--as the Commission report said, ``in 1998.'' Nobody
    responds to him. Maybe it's because they didn't think it
    mattered, because he didn't have any budget authority over
    them.
        Dr. Hamre. But, Senator, it's not the only war we're
    fighting. We have a lot of things we're having to do besides
    war on terrorism. It is not the only focus. I think that's the
    primary worry I have: we're going to organize around just that
    one concept. I think that's where I have to ask you to be
    careful.
        Senator Lieberman. My time's up. But, obviously, we're not
    going to organize just around that one concept. The problem--my
    fear is--and this report documents it--this is the great threat
    to the security and lives of the American people, and we're not
    devoting enough of our intelligence resources, in a coordinated
    way with somebody in charge, to it.
        Thanks, Mr. Chairman.
        Chairman Warner. Thank you, Senator Lieberman.
        Dr. Schlesinger. May I, Mr. Chairman?
        Chairman Warner. Yes.
        Dr. Schlesinger. There are bureaucratic problems within the
    CIA, and when George Tenet, quite rightly, said, ``We are at
    war,'' even within the CIA, there was not the resource shifts
    that should have come, given the fact that we were at war.
        Senator Lieberman. It's a point well made.
        Chairman Warner. Thank you.
        Senator Sessions.
        Senator Sessions. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        We're talking about the problems, and I think the panel has
    dealt with the problems, the deficiencies we had at the time of
    September 11. But a lot has happened since September 11, for
    heaven sakes. The NCTC that's been established, with CIA as the
    head officer--I think it's in the FBI building, supported fully
    by FBI--and every bit of intelligence involving terrorism is
    filtered through there so it can be properly analyzed. I guess,
    first of all, that's a big step forward, I think, and it's the
    kind of thing that was not happening before September 11. Also,
    I notice in the Commission's report that our expenditures for
    intelligence fell every year from 1990 to 1996. From 1996 to
    2000, it was flat, except for a Gingrich supplemental, they
    note.
        But since then, we've been spending a lot more money on
    intelligence, particularly HUMINT and other things that we know
    we were, in the aftermath of the disaster of September 11, to
    do better about.
        Do any of you doubt that there is a great deal more
    cooperation within the agencies now, a great deal of effort to
    knock down the stovepiping, that obviously existed before
    September 11, in the months since September 11? Secretary
    Hamre, I guess you're the most recent----
        Dr. Hamre. Sir, just by way of disclosure, I serve on an
    advisory board to both the FBI and the NSA, and there is more
    cooperation than I have ever recalled between these agencies
    and with the NSA and with the CIA. There is dramatically more
    cooperation. There still are organizational impediments. The
    law enforcement perspective is constraining, from an
    intelligence standpoint, to be candid. So there are issues like
    that.
        But, as you pointed out, lots has happened. Lots of good
    things have happened.
        Senator Sessions. Secretary Hamre, I know you served as
    Deputy Secretary and also as the Comptroller to the DOD under
    President Clinton's administration, but let me ask you about
    this. It's the ``Central'' Intelligence Agency. I presume that
    means it's supposed to be the central source of intelligence
    for the country. Was that the purpose of the founding of this
    agency, or one of the purposes of it?
        Dr. Hamre. Sir, it's supposed to be the one and only all-
    source intelligence center that's supposed to provide.
        Senator Sessions. So if we create another one now, we're
    putting layer on layer. Is that what you're concerned about?
        Dr. Hamre. Sir, I think the proposal that the Commission is
    recommending is not to duplicate the CIA, but, indeed, to split
    off the central coordination role of the DCI from the CIA.
    That's where my concern lies, is that I think that
    recommendation, if left at that, will actually weaken both, and
    that's not a good idea.
        Senator Sessions. I had an opportunity to have dinner with
    some CIA agents and station chiefs and it was 8 o'clock. They
    said that was the earliest they had been at home. They're
    working 7 days a week to serve this country. I don't think they
    think that this Congress or the American people have any idea
    of what they do. My impression was, they simply felt that what
    they were doing was critical to this country, and they were
    doing it because they love this country.
        Mr. Carlucci, you mentioned ``disruption'' and Secretary
    Schlesinger, ``do no harm.'' Isn't it important that we not do
    anything that damages the morale and the motivation of those
    agents in CIA and DIA around the world who are at risk for us
    this very moment?
        Mr. Carlucci. I'm glad you raised that, Senator Sessions,
    because I don't think enough focus has been given to the
    recruitment of human assets around the world. I have worked
    with these people throughout a 26-year Foreign Service career.
    I have seen them do their day job during the day, do their CIA
    work all night. I've seen the strain on families. I've seen the
    dedication. There's no recognition. They can't become
    ambassadors. They just do it out of pure dedication. We need to
    support them. The name Dewey Claridge probably doesn't mean
    much these days, but there is a man who was indicted for
    carrying out his professional responsibilities. We don't treat
    them well. We need--one of the things--people say, ``Well,
    we're not recommending change.'' I'm recommending a very
    serious change, that we make sure we support our intelligence
    officers in the field. Recognize, sure, there are mistakes,
    there are intelligence failings, but there are a helluva lot of
    dedicated people out there doing a fine job.
        Senator Sessions. Perhaps what Mr. Tenet meant when he said
    it would take 5 years to get this thing back on a level we'd
    like to see it move to, he was talking about the delays that
    occur when you establish HUMINT. You just can't do that
    overnight, isn't that correct, Mr. Carlucci?
        Mr. Carlucci. You have to organize some cover. You have to
    train, you have to organize cover. You don't just go out and
    hire an Arab-speaking officer and send him into Iraq or
    Afghanistan and say, ``Recruit.'' It takes years to get good
    cover, non-official cover. You can do embassy cover very
    quickly. But non-official cover, which is what you have to do
    against the terrorist target, or against hard targets, like
    North Korea or Iraq, takes years to develop.
        Senator Sessions. Secretary Schlesinger, you've headed two
    cabinet agencies. I happened to be a prosecutor when we did the
    drug czar. That was supposed to coordinate all the Federal
    agencies on the drug front. I'm not saying it did not have some
    positive benefits, but it's pretty hard, is it not, to have
    some non-cabinet-level official order cabinet-level officials
    around?
        Dr. Schlesinger. My observation is that, unless a czar is
    given an agency, that, sooner or later, like Nicholas II, he
    winds up at Ekaterinburg with a bullet in his head. [Laughter.]
        Two quick points, Senator. First, the disruption that Frank
    referred to does not just affect our ability to recruit agents;
    it affects the morale of the people in the Department. When you
    shuffle around agencies, you're going to pay at least a short-
    term price, because individuals in the system will be concerned
    about where they fit into the new system.
        Second point, we are now dealing with a different kind of
    conflict, and the CIA was established to bring together all of
    the information that came from the then-Army and Navy that was
    lost during the runup to Pearl Harbor. It was not designed to
    bring in the FBI.
        When I joined the government in 1969, the Director of the
    FBI was Herbert Hoover, who had given orders to all FBI
    personnel never to speak to anybody in the CIA. Now, that is
    real stovepiping. Of course, there were all these clandestine,
    if I may use--these exchanges of information, because the
    people in both the FBI and the CIA recognized that, to some
    extent, they had to work together.
        Chairman Warner. Thank you very much, Senator.
        Senator Reed.
        Senator Reed. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
        Thank you, gentlemen, not only for your testimony, but for
    your service to the Nation over many years.
        It seems to me we've had two extraordinary failures in
    intelligence, both September 11 and Iraq. There were failures
    in collection, analysis, distribution of information, and,
    ultimately, decisionmaking. They represent--if not two sides of
    a coin, slightly different phenomenon. I would suspect that if
    we focus only on September 11, we might not fully realize all
    the changes that we have to make.
        The September 11 problem has a domestic component, which is
    not the case if we look at North Korea, we hope, or Iran. Those
    are strategic problems we have to deal with. In September 11,
    it was more of a failure of warning. In Iraq, it certainly
    wasn't a failure of warning.
        Consistent, though, were belief structures. We believed,
    before September 11, they could never do anything like this.
    With respect to Iraq, we believed they were going to do
    something the next day.
        So, again, a very general question, but in terms of
    collection, analysis, distribution, decisionmaking, what
    specific advice would you have for us? Also, what about this
    notion of belief structure, about--we fool ourselves
    sometimes--not the bad guys, but we fool ourselves.
        Dr. Schlesinger. Let me comment on WMD, if I may.
        Senator Reed. Yes, sir.
        Dr. Schlesinger. Given the information that the analysts
    had, theirs was not an unreasonable conclusion, that Saddam
    Hussein had WMD, given his history. The problem with the
    intelligence that went public was that it did not include the
    caveats that should have been included, all of the doubts, all
    of the holes.
        The real problem with intelligence on WMD was not the
    analysts; it was the failure to have effective HUMINT from
    inside Iraq, which is, unlike the Soviet Union or China, more
    readily penetrable. That we had no solid information. The
    analysts were working on the basis of inferences, and that's
    all they had, and the inferences are not unreasonable.
        Senator Reed. Mr. Hamre?
        Dr. Hamre. Sir, I think you've identified a very central
    problem, which is this--as you've talked about, belief
    structure, or some people call it ``group think,'' which sets
    in. I can only think of one really structural solution to that,
    and that's to make sure that the various elements of the
    government that have to come together to make a decision in the
    executive branch have to report to different oversight
    committees up here on the Hill and explain it to people with
    different perspectives. That's the only way I can think you can
    do that. Therefore, they need to keep--retain intelligence
    capabilities for assessment purposes and for their own
    department.
        Senator Reed. That presupposes that our oversight will be
    vigorous and consistent.
        Dr. Hamre. Yes, sir, and I hope it will.
        Senator Reed. Thank you.
        This issue of stovepipes is interesting. We all understand
    about stovepipes, but eventually they end, and that's in the
    National Command Authority, where the President--not just this
    President, but any President--has to challenge these agencies.
        Dr. Schlesinger. Usually stripped of their caveats.
        Senator Reed. Caveats, yes. But that's where the President
    will ask about the caveats, one would hope, because to assume
    that this is all simple stuff, I think misses point from the
    beginning, which raises a question. Maybe it's a mundane
    question, but with all this anticipated moving around of
    institutions and organizations and analysis, how will that help
    the President and the White House make better decisions? I
    think it is really one of the fundamental questions, and I'd
    appreciate your comments.
        Dr. Schlesinger. Look at the issue of the WMD once again.
    My problem with that is that the agency that had the best
    technical knowledge was disregarded. The Department of Energy
    said, ``All of our people who have looked at it said that these
    particular tubes are not intended for centrifuges,'' and that,
    in the overall, was pushed aside. You have to have a system
    that has respect for those who have the closest technical
    knowledge.
        Senator Reed. Again, I think that kind of nuance and detail
    is not being captured in the discussion of creating an NID
    and----
        Dr. Schlesinger. No.
        Senator Reed.--the TTIC. But that's really where it--
    eventually, you make the judgment, which is, basically, giving
    the experts their play, letting them give you the analysis. In
    that case, they did connect the dots.
        Dr. Schlesinger. Yes.
        Senator Reed. But they were ignored. So it's not all the
    time about just connecting the dots; it's having decisionmakers
    who are willing to listen and to probe the analysis.
        Dr. Schlesinger. We not only want to connect the dots, we
    want to connect them correctly.
        Senator Reed. It looks as if we will do something. I would
    ask you, what do you think is the minimum we should do, Mr.
    Carlucci and Dr. Schlesinger and Dr. Hamre? Then what things,
    specifically, we might defer because they're hard and they
    require more cogent thought and they require, perhaps, just
    more time?
        Did you have any thoughts in that regard?
        Mr. Carlucci. Let me start. I think we ought to go ahead
    and create the NCTC with the operational planning component in
    it. I'm a little nervous about putting operational planning too
    close to intelligence, but I think, given the changed
    circumstances--Senator Lieberman, you said, ``It's not the
    1970s''--we ought to do that. We ought to find ways to tighten
    up cooperation between domestic and foreign intelligence. I
    would do that by looking at the DCI's authority, seeing if that
    could be enhanced, seeing what kind of participation the FBI's
    going to have in the NCTC.
        I would defer the question of an NID until we've had
    opportunity to give it more study.
        Senator Reed. Dr. Hamre? Dr. Schlesinger?
        Dr. Hamre. Jim?
        Dr. Schlesinger. Go ahead.
        Dr. Hamre. As I said, I think that the 9/11 Commission
    recommendation would give us too strong an NID for what we
    want, and I think the President's recommendation is too weak an
    NID. So if we're going to have an NID, I think you have to
    ground him with enough institutional heft so he can carry out
    the duties that I think Secretary Carlucci just outlined. He's
    not going to become a strong coordinator if he has no
    underlying institutional base for it.
        Senator Reed. Dr. Schlesinger?
        Dr. Schlesinger. I agree with what Frank said, and
    partially agree with what John said.
        The point to keep in mind is that one can establish a czar
    who has a sunset provision, not at any fixed date. But the
    power of a czar tends to fade over time. So when it's first
    established, there's great fanfare, and so on.
        Two things that the NID could do. One is to break down the
    impediments to the flow of information that are represented by
    each agency having its own special classification system. There
    is no way that much of the agency material cannot pass from one
    to another, and somebody with the authority of the President,
    whether in the White House or out of the White House, can break
    down those classification barriers.
        The second point that I would make is, going back at least
    to the time of Henry Kissinger, the National Security Advisor
    has done a lot of coordinating for the President. We can have
    that coordination formally established through an NID. But if
    the NID does not have large number of troops under his control,
    sooner or later his power will fade.
        Senator Reed. Thank you.
        Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Chairman Warner. Thank you, Senator.
        Dr. Schlesinger, for the record, you replied to an earlier
    question by Senator Reed comparing the former Soviet Union,
    China, and Iraq with regard to the ability to get HUMINT in.
    Would you, once again, repeat that? Because I understood you to
    say it would be easier to get into Iraq than China or Russia.
        Dr. Schlesinger. That would be correct.
        Chairman Warner. All right. Then the record is correct.
        Senator Collins.
        Senator Collins. Thank you.
        I want to return to the issue that was raised by Senator
    Lieberman and Senator Levin, albeit from different
    perspectives, about whether there is a link between the
    failures prior to September 11 and the issue of budget
    authority for the NID. I want to return to this, because I
    think there is a link, and that there is an important link,
    which the 9/11 Commission revealed.
        The Commission talks about DCI Tenet issuing a directive in
    December 1998 in which he says the following, ``We are at war.
    I want no resources or people spared in this effort, either
    inside the CIA or in the community.'' But the Commission goes
    on to note that nothing really happened after that directive
    was issued.
        To me, that is directly attributable to the fact that the
    DCI does not have the authority to mobilize resources across
    the government, and that's why I do think the idea of an NID
    with significant authority is part of the answer.
        Secretary Carlucci, you mentioned this morning Stansfield
    Turner testifying before the Governmental Affairs Committee. He
    endorsed the creation of an NID. He tells a story about how,
    shortly after he took over as DCI, you came into his office, as
    deputy, and said something to the effect of, ``We have a lot of
    levers in this office, but I've come to the conclusion that the
    wires have been cut and that they aren't actually connected.''
    I love that quote, because I think it sums up what's wrong,
    that we have, on paper, a position that looks like he would
    have considerable authority, but that when it comes to
    mobilizing the entire IC, the powers that are needed, the
    authority's simply not there.
        Secretary Carlucci, I'll start with, could you respond to
    that, since I'm quoting, or trying to quote you?
        Mr. Carlucci. I've not had the opportunity recently to do
    an analysis. Certainly, I felt that Stan had ample authority,
    and exercised that authority.
        My point is that if you don't have the requisite authority
    with the DCI, don't create another layer. Give the requisite
    authority to the DCI. Let's analyze that, see what he needs--he
    or she--and make sure that that person has the tools to do the
    job. I'm very much afraid of the disruption that goes with
    creating another layer, and the impact that might have on our
    warfighting capability, as well.
        Senator Collins. Dr. Schlesinger?
        Dr. Schlesinger. When DCI Tenet made that observation in
    1998, that we are at war, he certainly had authority within the
    CIA, which has large numbers of people. Every element of the
    CIA said, ``That's right. Just don't take any resources away
    from me,'' so that you wound up with 6 or 8 or 10 people being
    assigned to Osama bin Laden. It wasn't that he did not
    recognize the problem. It was that there was bureaucratic
    resistance, or lethargy, whatever you want to call it.
        I am sure that if the DCI talks to the Director of NSA and
    says, ``This is our problem. Listen carefully,'' that the
    Director of NSA will respond to that. If he doesn't, a
    conversation with the SECDEF would have been, should have been,
    sufficient.
        The problem was that DOD was not responsive in that period.
    There was reluctance to get involved. Secretary Cohen, as John
    Hamre will remember, talked about the threat of WMD on U.S.
    soil, but DOD did not devote the resources, and was certainly
    opposed to any military action to go after al Qaeda.
        Senator Collins. Dr. Hamre?
        Dr. Hamre. Senator Collins, I think if you were to look at
    the statute that currently gives authority to the DCI, you'd
    find it really gives the authority that you're seeking in the
    NID. So, to Secretary Carlucci's point, you could--you really
    could--it's already there. The authority is there. I think you
    have to ask, why hasn't it worked? Why hasn't it happened? I
    think the candid reaction is that the DCI bucks up against big,
    powerful Cabinet Secretaries, and there's always compromise in
    all that. I don't want to quarrel about the priorities of the
    1990s, but we were fighting other wars at the same time, and so
    you're using--you're always apportioning your scarce
    resources--your intelligence resources, your military
    resources--for a range of things, and you're making a judgment
    as to where you have to put them at the time. I don't think
    anybody consciously said, ``Well, we know there's a big
    terrorist threat out there. We're just going to ignore it.''
    Nobody ever said that. I think there was a consciousness change
    on September 11 that made all of our decisions on September 10
    irrelevant. I think that's now what we're looking at. We're
    looking back at that period with the consciousness we now have,
    on September 11, that we didn't have before. Now, you have to
    ask yourself, ``What do I do about that,'' in terms of changing
    the government.
        Senator Collins. That's true. But it seems to me that when
    you have a call to action that is as stark as George Tenet's
    was in 1998, when he says, ``We are at war. I want no resources
    or people spared in this effort throughout the entire IC,'' and
    yet little happens, that suggests to me a flaw in our
    structure, and that's why we're striving so hard to fix that.
        I see my time has expired. Thank you.
        Chairman Warner. Senator Collins, your question, to me, it
    goes to the heart of a point that I raised in my opening
    statement. Dr. Hamre said that the DCI has all the authority he
    feels he needs now; it's a question of whether to exercise it.
    I wondered, did the other two witnesses concur that the DCI,
    under current law, has sufficient authority to do those things
    that we envision an NID will do?
        Mr. Carlucci. I haven't made a study of it, but I think he
    does. Certainly he did when I was in the CIA.
        Chairman Warner. I don't think the law has been changed
    that way.
        Dr. Schlesinger?
        Dr. Schlesinger. I think that--I don't know whether he has
    all the authority. He certainly has a great deal more authority
    than was exercised.
        I might observe, Mr. Chairman, that we had national
    complacency in that period. It is important not to blame
    national complacency on the failure of the IC. It was a general
    national failure.
        Mr. Carlucci. Moreover, we don't know what actions George
    Tenet tried to take where he was blocked. I've not heard any
    evidence to that effect. He issued the warning. Did he do
    anything to follow up on the warning? I don't know.
        Chairman Warner. Thank you.
        Senator Ben Nelson?
        Senator Ben Nelson. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        I'm intrigued by the discussion about solving the right
    problem, because I think that the tendency in Washington, or in
    other areas of government and in the States is, typically if
    there's a problem, we need more money, a reorganization, some
    other layer of bureaucracy to solve it, and that's what we
    typically do. So I'm hopeful that we will avoid doing that
    here.
        In that regard, I also hope that we will solve the current
    problem, rather than the problem on September 11. Let me be
    clear on that. I get the impression that maybe some of the
    circumstances that existed on September 11 have either been
    self-correcting or have had some correction along the way with
    subsequent knowledge and experience. If that's the case, isn't
    it important that we make sure that the recommendations that
    the 9/11 report have are for the current situation, versus the
    prior situation? I'd like to get your thoughts about that.
        Dr. Schlesinger. I think that the first act of this
    committee might well be to make an inventory of the changes
    that have actually occurred in the IC and beyond the IC since
    September 11. Then you will be able to deal with the situation
    as you see it today rather than the defects of the period
    before September 11.
        Mr. Carlucci. I think your point is right on, and endorse
    what Jim said.
        Dr. Hamre. I agree.
        Senator Ben Nelson. Now, in that regard, holding back,
    perhaps, on the NID might make a lot of sense, because if
    you're going to put somebody in a position to be part of the
    solution, you're going to have to deal with the authority
    issue. That'll relate to budgeting, hiring and firing, policy
    relating to implementation. Would that also require an
    inventory of what really needs to be within the power of that
    NID if we choose to make that part of the solution?
        Dr. Schlesinger. I think that you might well indicate to
    that NID the priority tasks, because, otherwise, you have an
    endless list of things that might be done, and there are
    certain things that are high priority that should be done.
        Mr. Carlucci. I now have visions of an enormous bureaucracy
    turning itself inside out to reorganizing, everybody writing a
    job description, trying to figure out where they're going to be
    the next day, figuring out what pieces of the CIA should go to
    the new NID, how we ought to intervene, what kind of command-
    and-control arrangements he ought to have over the CSAs. I
    think we may be creating a real confusing mess.
        Senator Ben Nelson. I was about to say that that's what we
    had with the Department of Homeland Security, but I would
    suggest that we're still having it.
        Dr. Hamre?
        Dr. Hamre. I'd agree with what you just said, and I would
    agree with what my colleagues said.
        Senator Ben Nelson. Well, what an agreeable group.
    [Laughter.]
        I really appreciate that.
        As we relate to the executive branch, with the oversight
    from the legislative branch, can you give us some
    enlightenment, your thoughts, about how we exercise oversight
    in this particular area, with a number of committees having
    some degree of oversight, some of it overlapping? Is there a
    way to help straighten out the relationship between the
    executive and legislative branches? Having served in both,
    myself, at the State level, and then here now, in the
    legislative branch--is that a bigger question than we have time
    for?
        Dr. Schlesinger. Senator, if you can persuade your
    colleagues to put protection of turf further down their
    priority list, you will have accomplished a great deal.
        Senator Ben Nelson. Are you going to touch that one, Mr.
    Carlucci?
        Mr. Carlucci. I've never been on the Hill, so I'll bow out
    of that one.
        Dr. Hamre. Sir, I worked up here for 10 years, and,
    frankly, congressional oversight amplifies the stovepipes in
    the executive branch.
        Senator Ben Nelson. Do you think it also can--when you say
    ``amplifies,'' it just creates----
        Dr. Hamre. It reinforces----
        Senator Ben Nelson. Reinforces them?
        Dr. Hamre.--reinforces the parochialism inside the
    executive branch. The hearings, Congress tends to hear from its
    favorite departments and agencies, and that gets reinforced in
    the bureaucratic fights that we take into the executive branch.
    So it's--there does--it really does, in many ways, start here.
    I would think that spending some time figuring out some reform,
    bringing yourselves together in a cleaner oversight, would help
    a great deal.
        Senator Ben Nelson. Probably we'd have to have some outside
    suggestions brought to us, because it's probably not easy to
    reform ourselves, when we have our own interests. But I do
    think that that will have to be part of the solution when we
    put together whatever the recommendations and/or legislation
    that might be forthcoming.
        Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Chairman Warner. Thank you, Senator.
        I believe, under the leadership of Chairman Roberts and
    Vice Chairman Rockefeller, that that is the subject of review
    of the Intelligence Committee on which I serve.
        Senator Ben Nelson. I don't believe the process will work
    without reform on the inside here, as well.
        Chairman Warner. Thank you.
        Senator Talent.
        Senator Talent. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I really want to
    thank you for holding this hearing. It's been one of the best
    I've attended. I came in here really leaning towards this whole
    idea of an NID, and, I have to say, you've made a very powerful
    case against it, which, in all candor, I don't think has been
    shaken very much by those who have questioned you and who
    support it.
        It seems to me--and tell me if I'm wrong--that what you're
    basically saying is, if we create this NID and he's too weak,
    it's just another layer of bureaucracy, which nobody wants; and
    if he's too strong, there is a considerable risk that he will
    disrupt the actions of his new directorate, will disrupt the
    considerable amount of good work that is going on within the
    agencies, certainly within the Department, without fixing what,
    in your judgment, really went wrong. Because, I take it from
    your testimony, that you just think there is no substitute for
    getting good people on the ground who are exercising good
    analytical judgment on the basis of both good technical and
    human intelligence. Is that a pretty fair summary of what
    you're saying?
        Mr. Carlucci. Perfect.
        Senator Talent. Perfect. Mr. Carlucci, I was going to raise
    a lot of issues and try and think of some hypotheticals about
    why an agency, let's say, station head or an agency official
    might not always share, in order to protect his sources. But I
    think the one you came up with in your testimony about the
    hypothetical Iraqi official who you're trying to recruit, and
    if he knows the watchword of the day throughout the Government
    of United States is ``share everything,'' he might be a little
    bit disinclined to put his neck on the line, wouldn't want that
    floating up in every discussion that goes on in Washington.
        Mr. Carlucci. Back in the days, Senator Talent, when we
    could protect sources and methods, I can remember as an FSO
    having a particularly important, but highly sensitive contact.
    I deliberately turned him over to the agency because they could
    run him in a covert way, and that would better benefit the U.S.
    Government, even though it would not help my career.
        Senator Talent. So you turned him over to the agency
    because you knew they could stovepipe it.
        Mr. Carlucci. Yes, I knew----
        Senator Talent. Put it that way.
        Mr. Carlucci. Exactly.
        Senator Talent. They could protect that source.
        Mr. Carlucci. They could protect that source, and he went
    on being protected for years.
        Senator Talent. All right. So it seems to me--and tell me
    if I'm wrong--that you're recommending several things. One of
    them--and I think I heard you all very strongly on this, and
    I'm really inclined to agree with this--that there has been no
    effective case made, either by the 9/11 Commission or
    otherwise--and certainly sitting on this committee, both here
    in the Senate, and in the House, I agree with this--there's
    been no case made that the collection and dissemination of
    intelligence within the Department, for the purpose of
    supporting tactical military operations in theater, is broken.
    That is working, and working because of efforts made throughout
    the Department ever since--well, for the last 20 years, and
    certainly since Operation Desert Storm. So we must, at all
    accounts, not break that. In other words, it took a lot of
    effort to get that to where it is, and we have to be careful we
    don't break it. Is that a fair statement?
        Mr. Carlucci. Jim made the case very well, I thought.
        Dr. Schlesinger. May I----
        Senator Talent. Yes, go ahead. Please.
        Dr. Schlesinger.--go back to your first statement? It was
    perfect, except in one respect----
        Senator Talent. Yes.
        Dr. Schlesinger.--that NID can be too strong and too weak
    at the same time. [Laughter.]
        Senator Talent. Having only 5 minutes, I don't know that
    I'll go into it; besides which, I understand in the less
    nuanced way that you've presented it to this point, and I don't
    know that I want to mess up my understanding.
        I feel strongly about that, also. I have seen this work--I
    think we all have--in classified settings, and I know that
    commanders in theater now have confidence in this. I think if
    we turn this over to a directorate, I think you're absolutely
    right, Dr. Schlesinger, there's a tremendous danger that either
    it won't work, or they'll believe it won't work in theater, and
    that could cost us lives. The funny thing is, if it does cost
    us lives, and there's some huge failures, we'll probably
    appoint some commission and then have a bunch of hearings after
    that, and go back and ask ourselves why that happened, and it
    will have been the result of not being careful not to fix what
    isn't broken.
        The second point I hear you saying is, look, if there are
    further obstacles to prevent sharing between FBI and CIA, we
    ought to get rid of them. Now, to utter a little dissenting
    point of view. I remember some of the abuses in the 1970s that
    were the reason why those Chinese walls were set up. Can we do
    the sharing without the abuses? I guess this isn't any of your
    field of expertise, but do you want to comment on it?
        Mr. Carlucci. One thing that that ignores is the degree of
    oversight that you currently have.
        Senator Talent. Yes.
        Mr. Carlucci. Jim Angleton couldn't perform today the way
    he had performed--the way he performed back in the 1970s.
    Congress would have full knowledge of the activities. So I
    think oversight takes care of that problem.
        Senator Talent. Okay. So, again, yes, allow the sharing,
    encourage the sharing, but have effective and honest people in
    charge to do the oversight.
        Mr. Chairman, that's all I have to say. I had more coming
    in. I think they've made a pretty strong case. I appreciate
    your holding the hearing.
        Thank you.
        Chairman Warner. I appreciate, Senator, your arranging your
    schedule to be back here for today and tomorrow, and your
    participation. Thank you.
        Senator Dayton.
        Senator Dayton. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I join with the
    others in thanking you for convening this and tomorrow's
    hearings. Gentlemen, thank you for your appearance and your
    service.
        I want to focus on a different set of failures that were
    disclosed in the 9/11 Commission Report, which were the
    failures to, as I read it, follow some of the existing
    protocols and procedures, and, thereby, a failure to the
    respond to the actual attack, on September 11. Given especially
    your experience at the very top of the civilian chain of
    command, I'd just like to see whether what strikes me as some
    egregious disconnects were, in fact, what I perceive them to
    be.
        Because we talk about this need for fundamental
    reorganization or reform and these different words at these
    levels of sophisticated intelligence gathering, coordination,
    et cetera, which I don't dispute. We've spent now this morning
    in another committee hearing and this afternoon. It's about 6
    hours well spent on these various aspects.
        But according to the Commission report, at least two, and
    probably three, orders from the Vice President of the United
    States, through a military aide, to North American Aerospace
    Defense Command (NORAD) to communicate to the fighter planes
    that were in the air at that time, the authority to shoot down
    an incoming enemy plane, a hijacked plane, were not passed on
    to the fighter pilots by the mission commander. On page 83,
    both the NORAD mission commander and the senior weapons
    director indicated they did not pass the order to the fighters
    circling Washington and New York because they were unsure how
    the pilots would or should proceed with this guidance. Leaving
    aside that this authorization from the Vice President, based
    on, as he's communicated, his conversation with the President
    occurred 2 hours after the first hijacking began, and 10
    minutes after the last plane actually had crashed in the fields
    of Pennsylvania, the fact that it was not passed on by NORAD to
    the pilots, to me, just is astonishing.
        The Commission goes on in the next paragraph to say, ``In
    most cases, the chain of command authorizing the use of force
    runs from the President to the Secretary of Defense, and from
    the Secretary of Defense to the combatant commander.'' The
    President apparently spoke to Secretary Rumsfeld the first time
    that morning shortly after 10:00. No one can recall the content
    of this conversation, but it was a brief call in which the
    subject of shoot-down authority was not discussed.
        Then the SECDEF, who I give full credit for going
    courageously to the site of the Pentagon explosion, returned at
    10:39--this is 2\1/2\ hours now after--almost 2 hours and 25
    minutes after the first hijacking commenced--and the Vice
    President is understandably of the belief that he's passed on
    these orders and that they're being carried out, and the SECDEF
    seems to be--very appropriately is saying, ``Who did you give
    the direction to?''
        The SECDEF, ``Let me''--you know, ``Has that directive been
    transmitted to the aircraft?''
        The Vice President, ``Yes, it has.''
        Secretary of Defense, ``Just to be clear, so you have a
    couple of aircraft up there that have those instructions at the
    present time.''
        Vice President, ``That is correct. It's my understanding
    they've already taken a couple of aircraft out.''
        Now, if you were the SECDEF in this situation, and that
    order from the Vice President of the United States, transmitted
    that way to the defense of this country has not been
    communicated to the pilots up there? I mean, is that an
    acceptable procedure, or is that as egregious a failure to
    defend this country as it appears to me?
        Mr. Carlucci. It's certainly not acceptable. Defense never
    trained for this kind of circumstance.
        Senator Dayton. Well, but----
        Mr. Carlucci. But that's no excuse. But that's a fact.
        Senator Dayton. They trained to follow out the command--I
    mean, that's what I'm trying to understand. Is it a failure to
    establish the proper chain of command? If the SECDEF had given
    a command from the President of the United States, would that
    have been carried out without question? Or, in this case, given
    that it came from the Vice President, based on a verbal
    conversation with the President, who's up on Air Force One,
    understandably--is up there and, by his own testimony, is
    having difficulty with the communications system there, which
    is another concern, to communicate in an ongoing line of
    communication with the Vice President. The Vice President
    transmits an order from--or an instruction from the President
    to NORAD, and it's not passed on. Where is the breakdown here?
    Just because it hasn't been rehearsed?
        Mr. Carlucci. I can't answer that.
        Senator Dayton. No, I mean, I--is it--I mean, I'm
    astonished----
        Dr. Hamre. Sir, I'm not going to try to answer it. But for
    something of this nature, there are procedures that an action
    officer in a command center will check that he's received a
    valid order. Very few action officers actually are talking to
    the Vice President on the other end. So there is a procedure
    and a set of very specified directions so that you get a
    validated order, so you know you are under the authority of the
    Commander in Chief of the United States to taken an action.
        I surmise that those--that that wasn't in place. It was
    happening so--in such a chaotic way, and it just wasn't there.
    People said, ``Well, wait a minute, we don't--we didn't get X,
    Y, Z kind of a message from such and such,'' and they probably
    said, ``Well, how do you know this is real?''
        I'm speculating here, sir, but I--we need to be--we know
    now that we have to be ready for this. We didn't have that
    consciousness on September 11, and my guess is, is that they
    didn't have the--they didn't follow a predesignated format for
    authenticating a communication from the President of the United
    States. We know how to do that for nuclear war. We've never had
    that for an episode like this. So before we just say that there
    was an egregious failure of duty, my guess is there are some
    operational details I need to understand better before I could
    jump to the conclusion that said that it was a dereliction of
    duty.
        Senator Dayton. I'm not suggesting that at all. I think
    people were individually responding according to their own
    judgment. Certainly, the Vice President was running the command
    post there.
        Dr. Hamre. Yes, sir.
        Senator Dayton. The fact that we didn't receive--weren't
    receiving the kind of incoming enemy attack that we thought we
    would be receiving----
        Dr. Hamre. Yes, sir.
        Senator Dayton.--in some other circumstance----
        Dr. Hamre. Yes, sir.
        Senator Dayton.--obviously, is----
        Dr. Hamre. I certainly understand your question. Yes, sir.
        Senator Dayton. The other point I would just make, because
    it leads to--and I know I'm out of time here--but due to the--I
    think, the good graces of the chairman of the committee and
    his--the location of the National Airport at--in the State of
    Virginia, we're operating that with some risk to the Capitol,
    to the White House, and the like. We had a situation with the
    Governor of Kentucky which has been largely overlooked by
    Congress and by, I think, the powers that be in the last--about
    2 months ago that says to me, if you look at the failure,
    again, of communications--we evacuated this entire complex. A
    couple of thousand people were literally running for their
    lives out of the buildings because of a failure again--and I
    can't get into this all--of the Federal Aviation Administration
    (FAA) to communicate with NORAD, to communicate, in this, with
    the Capitol Police. So, the axiom, what is condoned continues--
    yes, we were caught very much by surprise on September 11, but
    I see continuing evidence of a failure of the established
    procedures to be followed in a situation 2 months ago.
    Fortunately, it was the Governor of Kentucky in a propellor
    plane rather than some other kind of attack. But it really
    alarms me.
        Mr. Chairman, I just would submit that I hope we can pursue
    this, because we can do all the intelligence reorganization,
    and we can spend billions more, or billions differently, but if
    we don't have basic lines of authority that we're going to
    follow in those situations of a national emergency, it doesn't
    matter, frankly, how much we spend, it's going to fail again.
        Thank you.
        Chairman Warner. Senator, your point is well taken. The
    Senator's point is well-taken.
        Dr. Schlesinger?
        Dr. Schlesinger. I can well understand why you are
    perturbed----
        Senator Dayton. Stunned.
        Dr. Schlesinger.--but not astonished. The order to shoot
    down a passenger airliner is met with a certain incredulity,
    and we were not prepared for this occasion. A fundamental point
    to bear in mind is, we had a clear chain of command, and yet
    there was a failure. Reorganization is not going to solve that
    problem.
        Senator Dayton. Right. Thank you.
        Thank you.
        Chairman Warner. Thank you very much.
        Senator Chambliss.
        Senator Chambliss. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Gentlemen, you bring a wealth of experience and knowledge
    to this particular issue. By being here today, you're again
    performing a great public service to your country, so we thank
    you for your service here today.
        I'm one of the folks who started out not being supportive
    of an NID, and for a lot of the same reasons that you have
    enunciated here today; particularly, Secretary Carlucci, your
    statement regarding another level of bureaucracy continues to
    bother me today, even though I've come around to thinking we
    need this position. But if we create simply another level of
    bureaucracy, we're going to do a lot more harm than we're going
    to do good, and the next 9/11 report's going to be twice as
    thick, say the same thing, and yet we're going to have another
    incident that has occurred.
        But the fact of the matter is that there are a number of
    agencies involved. We've talked about a lot of them here today.
    We've been primarily concentrating on DOD, but there are a
    number of department heads that we've not even alluded to
    today, some of which are scratched, from a surface standpoint,
    in the 9/11 report. For example, the Department of
    Transportation. We were just talking about the FAA here. You
    have Amtrak involved. You have all of our major transportation
    systems in every major city in the country that would have to
    be involved.
        The one major issue that, again, is touched on by the 9/11
    Commission Report that complicates this issue even further is
    the immigration issue. We're in the process right now, Senator
    Kennedy and I, of trying to make some major changes relative to
    how we deal with visas and who comes into this country. You
    have to have some mechanism for tying all of these issues--
    whether it's defense, immigration, transportation, or
    whatever--together and make sure that all of that information
    is getting into one funnel, and that that funnel is where it
    ought to be, and it can get there in real time--and not just
    get in the funnel in real time, but get out to the other people
    that need that information in real time.
        Because of that, I have come to the conclusion that an NID
    can act in the same manner as a chief executive officer of a
    major corporation if he has the right tools with which to do
    it. If you don't give them to him, then he's not going to be
    able to do it.
        But there's nobody out there right now--even with the
    powers that the DCI has, he has no control over the FBI.
    Director Mueller is responsible to Attorney General Ashcroft,
    he should be, and we can't change that structure. DIA is
    responsible to the SECDEF. We can't change that structure. You
    are absolutely right that the warfighter who is on the ground
    in Iraq has to have the confidence that his military superiors
    are the ones who are going to give that answer to him.
        So there has to be somebody out there to get all of this
    information together, and get their arms around it, and make
    sure that these folks are talking to each other, the stovepipes
    are broken down. The Chinese walls, Dr. Schlesinger, that you
    referred to, between law enforcement and intelligence, are--
    they're down as a result of the Patriot Act. They have to stay
    down. It's absolutely imperative that they do. Somebody has to
    coordinate all of that.
        I guess it's our job to try to figure out, taking the
    information that you and other folks are giving us as to how we
    do that--there is a statement that you made, Dr. Hamre, which I
    appreciate, and I wrote it down, where you said that an NID
    really has to have an institutional base if he's going to be
    successful. I know your comments relative to moving NRO and our
    other two agencies out of DIA--or DOD--under an NID would go
    towards doing that. But I'd like you to expand a little bit on
    that.
        What else does this individual need to have? We can say he
    ought to be able to hire and fire, he ought to have budget
    authority, but, as you and I were talking earlier, from a
    practical standpoint that is going to be extremely difficult,
    and we're not going to be able to do this by the October 1
    deadline that's been imposed on us.
        But would you expand on what you mean by that institutional
    base and where we need to go?
        Dr. Hamre. Yes, sir, Senator Chambliss. The reason I don't
    want to take away DIA from the SECDEF is the same as why I
    don't want to take the Bureau of Intelligence and Research away
    from the Secretary of State. They need those things. But there
    are a set of--the large collection agencies, the factories--
    they run the satellites, they run the listening stations.
    They're in the business of just collecting wholesale, large
    amounts of information and then distributing it to the
    analysts. My view is that that could be brought under this NID.
    This would be a very significant institution. These would--this
    would be tens of millions--or tens of thousands of people, tens
    of billions of dollars annual budget. It would be a very
    substantial base, and he would be--or he or she would be the
    supplier, then, of intelligence to the analytic agencies, which
    would remain with the secretaries. That would be considerable
    institutional clout.
        Now, it also means that everybody else in the government is
    going to be in the position of demanding better quality from
    him and those factories. Those factories need now to support
    all those people. Right, now, in DOD, frankly, we tend to spend
    more time defending them because they're in our budget, rather
    than demanding they give us good quality. We tend to do that
    through different channels.
        So I don't personally believe that you need to have budget
    control in order to get good quality out of those agencies.
    Frankly, it hasn't been budget tools that we've largely used to
    get the coordination at the tactical level, it's been direct.
    It's making it a CSA. I, personally, would be--would want to
    make sure that the head of those agencies is a military
    officer, and remains under military command and control. I
    think there are ways you can handle that. But that way, you'll
    put genuine heft underneath that NID. If you don't have that,
    then he really--I think, a little like Secretary Schlesinger
    said, he's a czar, with power for the first half a year, and
    then it starts to atrophy quite quickly.
        Senator Chambliss. Anybody else have a comment on that?
        Dr. Schlesinger. The first comment is that any
    reorganization is going to have advantages and it's going to
    have disadvantages, and you want to be sure that the advantages
    outweigh the disadvantages.
        The second point is this. There are a variety of ways to
    handle this. You could raise the DCI from executive-level two
    to executive-level one. You could double-hat him as not only
    the head of the CIA and DCI, but he could be the--designated as
    part of the executive office as advisor to the President
    without splitting the analytic activities in a way that simply
    adds another layer to the system. You can create, by
    legislation, that the clandestine services, the Directorate of
    Operations is handed off to a deputy. You could do what has
    happened in the Department of Energy, which is to strip out the
    national security functions and put it under a quasi-
    independent agency known as the National Nuclear Security
    Administration, in which the clandestine services would be
    responsive to an administrator of clandestine services,
    whatever you call it.
        So there are a whole variety of things that can be done,
    but having a DCI and an NID at the same time, it seems to me,
    is going to be counterproductive.
        Chairman Warner. Thank you very much, Senator.
        Senator Clinton.
        Senator Clinton. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thanks to our
    witnesses for being here today.
        Mr. Chairman, it seems to me that we're struggling with two
    very significant questions that are difficult to answer. One
    is, in a system with different and sometimes competing
    intelligence agencies, both for collection and analysis, how do
    we ensure accountability? The second is, how do we ensure that
    executive branch officials do not cherry-pick the intelligence
    that most conforms to their views, or, I think, in the words of
    Secretary Schlesinger, the concept of reality that they hold?
        We're dealing with human beings, we're dealing with
    politics, we're dealing with, unfortunately, partisan politics.
    You had a DOD that already controlled 80 to 85 percent of the
    intelligence budget, and yet the current SECDEF thought it
    necessary to create an Office of Special Plans, and go and find
    even more intelligence to be used for whatever concept of
    reality existed. You had a Vice President who went over to the
    CIA--not once, but enumerable times--to find out what he could
    find out that would fit his concept of reality.
        So we need a system that can ensure accountability, but
    also put some checks and balances back into this system. It is
    certainly clear that many signals were missed. There's no doubt
    about that. But I think it would be a shame and a tragic
    indictment of all of us if we are not more straightforward and
    honest about the problems we face.
        I listened with great interest to my friend Senator
    Sessions go on and on about the questions concerning trade-
    craft and the exposure of people, yet I have not heard one call
    from anyone on the other side of the aisle to conduct a
    congressional investigation into the outing of Valerie Plame.
    Talk about an example that's going to send shockwaves through
    the existing CIA and any of our friends and allies around the
    world. There's no drumbeat for any congressional investigation.
    Why? Because it's in partisan politics.
        So I think we can rearrange the deck chairs on the Titanic
    from now until doomsday, but we need to reassert a sense of
    ethics and responsibility that go beyond partisan politics
    again to get back to an old-fashioned American patriotism where
    our highest obligation is to whatever the facts lead us to. I
    don't know how we get that by changing statutes, laws, and
    rearranging government positions.
        I also think it would be irresponsible of our committee not
    to take a hard look at Defense intelligence. It may very well
    be--and I think the arguments are quite compelling--that you
    don't want to interfere with the chain of command or in any way
    upset the tactical intelligence that's needed in combat. But
    there have been mistakes, and there have been missed
    opportunities, both operational and tactical.
        I still don't understand what happened at Tora Bora. I
    don't understand what happened when the Predator allegedly had
    bin Laden in their sights and didn't fire. I don't know what
    happened. I think we need to know what happened.
        So even if we conclude that it is not prudent to put any
    overarching authority over Defense intelligence, we'd better
    make sure we're doing whatever is needed to improve Defense
    intelligence, both collection and analysis, and not act as
    though, ``Oh, well, we're not going to mess with Defense
    intelligence, because that might possibly interrupt the chain
    of command and tactical.'' We need to make sure we're doing the
    best job we can with Defense intelligence.
        There was an example, and the 9/11 Commission talks about
    it. They call it ``the millennium exception.'' At a certain
    point in time, all the forces of our government were called
    into a room, day after day after day, run by the National
    Security Advisor, because, after all, all of these decisions
    ultimately are going to be decided in the White House. I don't
    care who you put in charge anywhere else. What we need to do is
    to figure out how to have a system that replicates what worked
    the one time in our recent history where we think it worked,
    and that required literally having people in the same room,
    being held accountable, having their information vetted, asking
    for further information from the collection, as well as the
    analyst, side.
        So I think that it's important that we take seriously the
    need to reorganize if it is necessary, but there's a much more
    important, deeper issue at stake here. That is to try to de-
    politicize the collection, analysis, cherry-picking utilization
    of intelligence, no matter where it comes from. I hope that
    that won't even be an issue post-September 11. But, as I say,
    the outing of Valerie Plame does not give me a lot of
    confidence that we would use a CIA operative for partisan
    political advantage.
        So I guess, from my perspective--and I take very seriously
    what each of you have said; I have high regard for your
    opinions, based on many years of service--but let's focus for
    just a minute in the area of each of your expertise. Are there
    types of changes that you think our Defense and military
    intelligence need to make to improve on its performance, going
    forward, in both battlefield situations like Afghanistan and
    Iraq and with respect to the point that my colleague Senator
    Dayton made? He's been beating this horse quite vigorously in
    every hearing, because he is--as, I think, rightly so--quite
    appalled by what the ticktock is that broke down the chain of
    command under unusual, but, nevertheless, pressing
    circumstances. So could each of you just address the Defense
    and military intelligence issue for a moment?
        Dr. Schlesinger. Several comments. The first, Senator
    Clinton, is, there may be cherry-picking, but it does not
    affect, in my judgment, collection, which you mentioned. I
    think that the collection activities go on. I think that the
    attempt--we have had failures in collection--most obviously,
    HUMINT, in Iraq--but I don't think that the problem of
    collection is either partisan politics or cherry-picking. Now,
    the interpretation is a problem.
        The second point that I would make is, in the past, we
    have, as you indicated, had less partisan politics, and I join
    with you in wishing that we could return to those days. But one
    must distinguish between partisan--problems of partisan
    politics and the problems of real policy differences. Real
    policy differences are appropriate, and people will disagree
    with regard to what should be done, given certain
    circumstances. They may do that for partisan reasons, but there
    are irreducible level of policy differences.
        The third point I would make is, while you're here on Armed
    Services, strengthen the DIA. You ask, what do you do about
    Defense intelligence? It is not a real competitor, in my
    judgment, for the CIA, and we would be better off,
    analytically, if we had a stronger DIA.
        Mr. Carlucci. I'd just make--certainly, I think we can all
    agree, those who have served professionally, that partisan
    politics is very damaging to our intelligence capability and to
    our military efforts.
        I think the one area that requires some attention is, the
    distinction between national intelligence and tactical
    intelligence becomes increasingly blurred. You mentioned Tora
    Bora. That fighter in the field actually has to know everything
    there is to know about Osama bin Laden, his whereabouts. Things
    that used to be considered national intelligence now have to
    get into the tactical area. So that argues, once again, for
    some kind of closer relationship between the DCI and the DOD
    intelligence agencies.
        Dr. Hamre. Senator, I would--lots of areas that we need to
    work. Specifically, I think the need in DOD is for what we call
    ``long dwell'' in collection capabilities. We have two types
    right now. We have collection that comes from airplanes that
    fly around. That's a little like looking over an area with a
    spotlight. So it doesn't--you can only look at a little spot
    for a period of time. Then, of course, we have satellites, and
    they have huge coverage, big floodlight-type thing. But they
    last for 10 minutes and then they won't be back for another
    hour and a half.
        What we're really needing in the Defense world is what we
    call ``long dwell,'' the capacity to get broad-area
    surveillance that can linger. So it has the best attributes of
    both. It has the capacity to see wide areas, but stay over the
    target area for a long time.
        Now, that's going to be done with a new generation of--
    remotely piloted vehicles, largely, is going to be the way
    we'll do this. It's a ways away, and there are some very
    serious technical challenges associated with it. They should be
    military assets, in my view. They should be funded under the
    TIARA and Joint Military Intelligence Program, because you want
    them integrated into warfighting. But they'll have tremendous
    capacity in the national world, as well. That's a very good
    example of where the tactical systems will feed the national
    environment. We do that a lot. That's a good case-in-point,
    where you would not want to break that relationship, and you
    probably would want to put the lead on developing that inside
    the DOD. But that's a case-in-point, and we could come up with
    other examples like that for you.
        Senator Clinton. Thank you.
        Chairman Warner. Thanks, Senator. Senator, I'm sure you're
    fully aware, because of your interest in the situation,
    Ambassador Wilson's wife--that the FBI is now conducting an
    ongoing criminal investigation. It's been my experience that,
    when that is taking place, should a parallel investigation
    begin in Congress, it could impede or imperil the work of the
    FBI.
        Senator Clinton. Mr. Chairman, I remember very well Federal
    grand-jury investigations that had congressional investigations
    going on simultaneously.
        Chairman Warner. I defer to your recollection.
        Senator Clinton. I have personal experience with that.
        Chairman Warner. Senator Dole.
        Senator Dole. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Let me say to each of you, it's a privilege to have you
    testifying here today. I certainly appreciate your outstanding
    service to this country. I've had the privilege of working with
    two of you in past lives, so I particularly want to welcome you
    here today.
        I'd like to follow up on what Senator McCain and Senator
    Nelson said earlier. Since the 9/11 Commission has made its
    recommendations, we, as lawmakers, have been told to look at
    ourselves in the mirror. Congressional oversight has been
    called ``lax,'' ``uneven,'' and ``dysfunctional.'' Critics have
    attested that overlapping jurisdiction and turf battles are
    promoted, rather than the desired result, which is
    accountability.
        I think we can point to the recently created Department of
    Homeland Security as an example of where lessons may be learned
    in incorporating a government overhaul of this magnitude. While
    we've been at war, Secretary of Homeland Security Tom Ridge and
    his top deputies have testified at 290 hearings in the past
    year and a half. They've received more than 4,000 letters from
    Congress requesting information. Furthermore, 88 committees and
    subcommittees assert jurisdictional interest over the
    Department of Homeland Security.
        Is it not instructive to look at this most recent example
    of a major government overhaul as a reality check for a
    realistic timetable for Congress to work under, and perhaps a
    reason to exercise prudence and discipline, rather than rushing
    to judgment in considering the proposed recommendations?
        Secretary Hamre?
        Dr. Hamre. Yes, absolutely.
        Mr. Carlucci. I agree.
        Senator Dole. Anything else you'd like to add, utilizing
    this example?
        Mr. Carlucci. I think the disruption that goes with a
    large-scale reorganization can't be overestimated.
        Senator Dole. Right.
        Mr. Carlucci. It's very harmful to performance. So I think
    your point is right on.
        Dr. Schlesinger. Senator Dole, I'd be happy to submit my
    testimony to the House Select Committee on those 88 committees
    of oversight and how they have stretched out the senior
    officers of the Department of Homeland Security. I fully agree
    with your observations.
        [The information referred to follows:]

        [GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]

        Senator Dole. Secretary Schlesinger, you've stressed the
    necessity of cautious interaction between intelligence and
    policymaking. Secretary Kissinger has said recently--this was a
    Washington Post piece, just in the last couple of days--
    ''Intelligence should supply the facts relevant to decision.
    The direction of policy and the ultimate choices depend on many
    additional factors, and must be made by political leaders.''
        How effectively would the administration's proposal allow
    our national policymakers to direct the intelligence efforts
    without compromising the independence and quality of analytical
    products? Are there better alternatives in this regard?
        Dr. Schlesinger. I think that this adds that other layer,
    and that it compromises what Secretary Kissinger was calling
    for, which is that the facts should come up to the political
    leaders. The political leaders must decide on a policy. Their
    task is different from that of intelligence; and the division
    of authority that is being proposed, I think, compromises what
    he outlined.
        Senator Dole. Secretary Hamre, since September 11,
    intelligence sharing and analysis have been significantly
    improved, with assistance from both the legislative and
    executive branches. How many of the Commission's
    recommendations would you estimate have already been addressed?
    Could you highlight the major ones? Would implementing any of
    the Commission's recommendations require the intelligence
    agencies to fix what is essentially not broken?
        Dr. Hamre. Senator Dole, forgive me for not having that at
    the top of my head. Can I respond to you for the record on
    that?
        Senator Dole. Surely.
        Dr. Hamre. I don't have the 42 recommendations under my
    belt, and what's been done. I've heard it said that a large
    number have been implemented, but I just don't know that
    personally, and I'd be glad to get back to you on that.
        Senator Dole. Fine. Just submit it for the record.
        [The information referred to follows:]

        I have reviewed the 39 recommendations contained in the Commission
    report. Some of them are rather general and some are specific. Some are
    easy to categorize and some are not. After considerable study, I would
    assess them in the following categories:

    Completed..................................................            0
    Not a recommendation but an observation....................            3
    To be decided (e.g. congressional action needed)...........            8
    Tried and (largely) failed.................................            2
    Nothing or very little has happened........................            4
    Lots of rhetoric, very little substance....................           11
    Significant progress, work ongoing.........................           11

        Senator Dole. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Chairman Warner. Thank you very much.
        Senator Bill Nelson.
        Senator Bill Nelson. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Mr. Chairman, in your opening remarks you made reference
    that the committee's purpose in this examination is, in many
    ways, to look at the structure, the resources, and the
    leadership in trying to arrive at a decision. I've heard from
    the witnesses--and thank you, again, as to what has been said
    over and over, for your public service over the years to your
    country; thank you for that--I've heard them testify to
    basically that the structure they think that is there now is
    sound; it may need some tweaking. I've heard them say that the
    resources--there seems to be the resources that are committed
    to it, but I haven't heard the examination of the third issue
    that you raised, Mr. Chairman, which is the leadership.
        So what I would like to ask is the question that is begged.
    Do we have a system that is set up that is too sensitive to the
    personalities of the people--the personalities of the
    President, the SECDEF, the Secretary of State, the DCI, the
    Attorney General? If so, how do we fix it?
        Dr. Schlesinger. The second question is a lot harder than
    the first. Sure, we have a system that is sensitive to the
    personalities. That is, I think, unavoidable. Some of those are
    elected officials, some of them are appointed officials. The
    appointment of officials comes for a variety of reasons,
    including campaign contributions, in some cases. Obviously,
    you're going to have different levels of ability, as well as
    backgrounds, that may or may not be appropriate for the jobs to
    which these individuals are appointed.
        I can't answer the second question. That's the nature of
    our system. We have to--the system, in part, adjusts to weak
    personalities in different executive-branch positions, and they
    lose influence, and others take over, to a greater extent.
        Mr. Carlucci. I would agree that the system is very
    sensitive to personalities, but I would argue that that may not
    be totally undesirable. That's why we have elections. If we're
    not satisfied with the personalities, we throw them out.
        It is true, as Senator Clinton pointed out, that we need to
    try and insulate intelligence from political vagaries. Some
    thought could be given to a fixed term, but I don't know that
    that totally insulates the DCI from politics.
        I think you asked a very fundamental question, but I don't
    have a ready answer, unlike Jim.
        Senator Bill Nelson. You must have the answer, then.
        Dr. Hamre. No, sir, I certainly don't have the answer. But
    I think--first of all, I think the collection environment, the
    collection process is less, I think, susceptible to
    personalities. I think it tends to be in the assessment, how do
    you--what do you make of what it is that's in front of you?
    Here, my only recommendation is, I think that you want lots of
    diversity in that, and you want those people to have to come up
    to different committees in Congress and explain why they think
    that. We need to force our system--as much diversity and
    perspective in our system as possible, and I think that's--use
    more open-source material, make sure that the oversight system
    up here is quite rigorous, that there is--I have a ``long
    dwell'' fly here, excuse me--that collection is available to
    everyone, that you are putting us through a process of
    explaining our thinking, both in classified and unclassified
    hearings. I think much more rigorous oversight and insistence
    that we come forward and explain what we're doing would be
    good. I think that would be the most helpful thing you could
    do, sir.
        Dr. Schlesinger. Can I add something to that, Senator? We
    have something called ``noise,'' and each of these agencies
    takes the signals--or we hope it takes the signals--and forgets
    about what it regards as noise. But some other agency may not
    regard that as a noise. If that ``noise'' were disseminated--
    what is regarded by one agency as noise selectively, were
    disseminated more generally, we might be able to get something
    that is closer to the truth.
        Senator Bill Nelson. In summary, I sense that there are two
    things, two ideas, around which you all would clearly
    congregate, that came out of the 9/11 Commission Report
    recommendations. A number of them that you disagreed with,
    which we appreciate very much your input. But these two, I
    think you would. Obviously, congressional oversight and
    direction ought to be much more robust. Then the other one is,
    I've heard all of you speak favorably--and correct me if I'm
    wrong--about an NCTC, that being the place that you could bring
    together all the collected information so that you're getting
    analysis of it, and that all the various agencies dealing with
    intelligence would be knowledgeable of that, and participate
    in, that analysis, and then determine how to use it.
        Mr. Carlucci. Agreed.
        Dr. Schlesinger. Those in the community who keep their
    nuggets to themselves and refuse to share them should be
    removed from the community.
        Senator Bill Nelson. I would suggest that the most recent
    example of that--and it wasn't specifically defined as
    intelligence, but it was certainly critical information--was
    when the Governor of Kentucky's inbound plane--the transponder
    wasn't working, and the FAA was all happy with it, and they
    knew about it, but they forgot to tell the military. Then they
    send the alert to the Capitol Police. Of course, we get this
    emergency announcement, ``You get out of the building
    immediately. There's an inbound aircraft.'' So there, sadly, is
    another example of where one hand is not knowing what the other
    hand is doing.
        Dr. Schlesinger. There's a distinction between a failure of
    communication and a deliberate failure of communication; and
    the latter, I think that we should be able to cope with.
        Senator Sessions [presiding]. The Senator from Texas?
        Senator Cornyn. Thank you.
        Thank you, gentlemen, for being here, and for hanging in
    there.
        Dr. Schlesinger. Senator, Senator Cornyn has been very
    patient.
        Senator Cornyn. You were patient, too, to wait until we get
    all the way down at this end of the table for questions. I
    appreciate that very much.
        I especially appreciate all three of you talking, at the
    outset, about the fact that solutions must logically flow from
    problems identified. In other words, I trust that we will be on
    guard about a solution looking for a problem.
        Indeed, I was also interested to hear a number of
    references to the fact that the specific causes of September
    11, as identified by the 9/11 Commission, had very little to do
    with the issues that we are talking about when we talk about
    budget authority, and particularly the role of the DOD in
    supporting the warfighter. But I think this is a very
    constructive and important exercise, and I commend the members
    of the 9/11 Commission for doing an outstanding job. But I
    think it's a difficult and complex subject.
        The one thing that I think cannot be overlooked is the fact
    that this administration and this Congress have not waited for
    3 years for the 9/11 Commission to issue its report to act in
    many ways that I think have been very constructive, and
    designed to solve the problems that we all know have existed.
    For example, we've talked some about the creation of the TTIC.
    The NCTC, which is one of the 9/11 Commission's
    recommendations, would indeed build on that to enhance the
    information-sharing between the CIA and the FBI, as appropriate
    under the law.
        We also need to identify the fact--as Attorney General
    Janet Reno and Attorney General John Ashcroft, and others
    testified to at the hearing--about the fact that it was the
    Patriot Act--sometimes maligned, but frequently misunderstood--
    that was responsible for tearing down the wall between law
    enforcement and intelligence agencies, and allowing the kind of
    sharing of information that has, indeed, I believe, made
    America safer. Indeed, of course, the creation of the
    Department of Homeland Security, billions of dollars being
    appropriated to first-responders--variety of potential targets
    for terrorists.
        But I believe, of the recommendations that have been made
    by the 9/11 Commission--the NCTC and certainly the legislative
    oversight reform, which we have not talked about much here
    today, other than to avoid the subject because it is not
    necessarily the role of this committee, but certainly a matter
    of interest--but to me it seems less important when we look at
    reform to try to see how we can reorganize the wire diagram or
    the organizational chart. Indeed, as I think has been alluded
    to several times, the kind of authority that some have proposed
    giving to the NID already exists since 1997, when Congress
    passed legislation which created a Deputy DCI for Community
    Management, and gave that person responsibility for
    coordination of all intelligence agencies. I hope we wouldn't
    give too much--we wouldn't elevate the anecdote about DCI Tenet
    declaring war in 1998--we wouldn't elevate that too much,
    because, indeed, we all know it takes more than a declaration
    of war by the DCI to make things actually happen. That is
    really where the rubber meets the road.
        But let me ask a question that, I think, Dr. Hamre, you
    alluded to, but we haven't seemed to talk about very much. I
    don't think the 9/11 Commission Report really addresses this.
    In addition to the failure of HUMINT, which has literally made
    us blind, what happened in Iraq since 1998--and I fear we won't
    talk about it here--but I fear that is not an isolated event--
    open-source intelligence collection. We spent a lot of money on
    satellites and all sorts of interesting gizmos that, indeed, I
    think are very useful, in terms of intelligence collection. But
    are you familiar with any effort in our IC anywhere to have a
    systematic and comprehensive open-source intelligence
    collection?
        Dr. Hamre. Sir, there are procedures that the IC uses to
    survey the thinking in the private sector on issues as they're
    trying to derive an assessment. For example, the National
    Intelligence Council will routinely go out and pull in the
    thinking of outsiders. It tends to be in the assessment phase.
    That's a little different from open-source, which is seen as a
    collection, as well as an assessment, activity.
        I think you will find that there's also a strategic study
    group that works for the Agency which routinely goes out to
    outside of government to try to augment its classified
    activities, but they tend to be bringing perspective more
    toward to the tail-end of an assessment, as opposed to being
    seen as a routine source of information-collection. I think the
    advocates--and I certainly do advocate wider use--of open
    source is to use it as a collection modality, as well, not just
    simply a second guess on the assessment phase.
        Senator Cornyn. Secretary Schlesinger?
        Dr. Schlesinger. I think, Senator, if you look at the
    fusion methods of the Special Operations Command down in Tampa,
    that they have brought together, or have attempted to bring
    together, open-source information, in part because the part of
    the world that they deal with, you have basically more open-
    source information than you have secret information. A problem.
    It is a long, historic problem of the CIA, or has been, that if
    something's good, it has to be secret. Sometimes we just get
    the gems out of open-source.
        Senator Cornyn. I've sometimes joked among my colleagues
    that I have learned in classified briefing sessions since I've
    been in the Senate as much by reading the New York Times and
    Washington Post, and watching cable news. I wonder whether we
    are missing opportunities as hundreds of new newspapers and
    news sources arise in places like Iraq and all around the
    world, gleaning, systematically, information we could obtain
    from non-classified public sources of information, and do that
    on a more systematic and rigorous basis.
        Dr. Schlesinger. We should.
        Mr. Carlucci. May I comment, Senator?
        Senator Cornyn. Secretary Carlucci?
        Mr. Carlucci. We, of course, have FBIS, where we monitor
    all the radio broadcasts around the world, and CIA has had a
    Domestic Collection Division for some time. But, more
    fundamentally, what you describe is a basic responsibility of
    embassy reporting. It is up to the embassies around the world
    to deal with open-source information, to tell the Department of
    State what the press is doing in Country X or Country Y, what
    the politicians are saying. That's why we have political
    sections in our embassies.
        Senator Cornyn. Thank you. My time is expired.
        Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Chairman Warner [presiding]. Did you wish to follow up on
    Secretary Carlucci's response to you?
        Senator Cornyn. Are we going to have another round, Mr.
    Chairman?
        Chairman Warner. Yes.
        Senator Cornyn. I'll reserve any other questions.
        Thank you very much.
        Chairman Warner. Thank you, Senator.
        Senator Levin and I feel that we'll just take a brief round
    of questions apiece here. Let me see if I can bring some
    conclusion to this very important contribution that each of you
    has made.
        It seems that you would want Congress to very carefully
    explore what we could do, by way of law, to give to the DCI all
    those powers needed, such that he or she, as the case may be,
    would then be on a coequal basis with the Secretary of Defense,
    Secretary of Homeland Security, Secretary of State, and that
    that would, in my judgment, require less disruption. If you
    start pulling DIA and NSA out of DOD, and all of the things
    accompanying that, at a critical time in our history of this
    country, when we are on the verge of a presidential election, a
    congressional election, with the understanding that we'd take a
    look at how that works for a period of time, and then perhaps
    come back and reexamine the need to have some other individual,
    or converting the DCI to the NID and then bring in subordinates
    under him to do the work of the agency, is that a possible
    thing that we should consider, Secretary Schlesinger?
        Dr. Schlesinger. I think so, and I think you were out of
    the room, Mr. Chairman, but we were elevating the DCI to
    executive-level one, which makes them coequal.
        Chairman Warner. Yes, I heard that testimony.
        Dr. Schlesinger. Yes. There are a number of things that can
    be done.
        Chairman Warner. Putting him on a total par----
        Mr. Carlucci. You may not need legislation. It's good to
    look at the possibility of legislation.
        Chairman Warner. We'll figure that out----
        Mr. Carlucci. But, as Senator Levin pointed out, you may
    not need it.
        Chairman Warner. My point is, use that as an interim step.
        Mr. Carlucci. Oh, yes.
        Chairman Warner. With the extraordinary confluence of
    events taking place in the United States now, two very
    significant elections of both the President and Congress----
        Dr. Schlesinger. Some DCIs have been very timid about
    exercising the community power.
        Chairman Warner. Yes.
        Dr. Schlesinger. I think that a strong statement from
    Congress, that we expect the DCI to be seriously in charge of
    the community, would be helpful.
        Mr. Carlucci. With oversight followup on that.
        Chairman Warner. I understand that.
        Dr. Hamre, we were exploring, as you stepped out
    momentarily----
        Dr. Hamre. I sure did, sir.
        Chairman Warner.--whether or not an interim step, given the
    confluence of the events facing us--a presidential election and
    a congressional election--but if Congress desired to act in
    this current Congress, which is due to expire here in October,
    unless we have a lame duck--of addressing whether it needs to
    be in law, or otherwise, elevating the DCI to equate, in every
    respect, by way of authority, emoluments, and everything else,
    with the Secretaries of Defense, State, and Homeland Security
    as an interim step, and see how that system might work, and
    that would be less disruption, as envisioned by other proposals
    on the table.
        Dr. Hamre. I think I agree with my colleagues, I think it
    certainly would be less disruption. I think it's very hard to
    keep energy behind an initiative like that for every long.
    Things will fall back into their old patterns very, very
    quickly.
        Chairman Warner. So then your conclusion, we have to go to
    the NID.
        Dr. Hamre. No, sir. I think you need to take time to make
    sure we get this right and I know you're going to do that.
        Chairman Warner. I'm sure the leadership of Congress will
    make certain we do take the time.
        Dr. Hamre. Yes, sir.
        It isn't the sort of thing, just by putting emphasis behind
    it--will fade quite quickly, so you'll need to decide whether
    or not you want to make this decision or take other structural
    changes to increase the standing and stature of the DCI if you
    want to stay with the current structure.
        Chairman Warner. I'm not suggesting that the current
    structure--I think we could enhance the DCI considerably so
    that he's on a total par. Very often, in your testimony----
        Dr. Hamre. Sure.
        Chairman Warner.--today, you feel that the SECDEF--and I'm
    not suggesting the personality of the current----
        Dr. Hamre. No, no----
        Chairman Warner.--but the office itself is overwhelming of
    the DCI, and that, therefore, he's not been able to exercise
    maybe some of the current authority he now has in law.
        Dr. Hamre. The DCI actually has more expansive authorities
    than the SECDEF does in oversight and use of funds and that
    sort of thing, than--he has enormous authorities, authorities
    that the SECDEF had 50 years ago.
        Chairman Warner. All right.
        Secretary Schlesinger said, often some of the personalities
    did not fully exercise that, for whatever reason.
        Dr. Hamre. Right. They've been neutralized through the
    process, the interagency process, through time.
        Chairman Warner. Do you all think that's a proposal that we
    should at least consider?
        Dr. Schlesinger. Yes.
        Mr. Carlucci. Yes.
        Dr. Hamre. Yes.
        Chairman Warner. It's worthy of consideration.
        I thank you.
        Senator Levin.
        Senator Levin. Mr. Chairman, I think what the witnesses are
    saying is that, interestingly enough, that if you put the
    SECDEF on a par with the DCI, or whatever the successor to the
    DCI is, you will demote the DCI, legally, from where the DCI
    now is, legally, in terms, at least, of developing and
    presenting the budget. Because under Title 50, it is the DCI
    who is responsible to develop and present that budget. It's not
    par. It's the DCI who has responsibility. Now, for various
    reasons, which our witnesses have outlined, that has been
    watered down over the years, for interagency conflicts and
    whatever the reasons are. But, by law, to the extent we worry
    about such things, under Title 50--I'm reading it--I think I'm
    reading--and this is an exact quote, I hope--``The development
    and presentation to the President of the annual budget for the
    NFIP is the responsibility of the DCI.'' I'm not sure I would
    want to change that. That would be a reduction in the authority
    of the----
        Chairman Warner. I've not suggested that be changed.
        Senator Levin. You said ``par,'' though. That would put him
    on a par, in terms of that. But I think what you're suggesting,
    Mr. Chairman, if I can be a little technical here and
    legalistic--which I know is not my wont, but let me try it
    anyway--not too much laughter here. [Laughter.]
        My wife may be watching this. When it comes to
    reprogramming and the execution of the budget, I think, what
    the chairman--and I don't want to put words in his mouth--would
    like to see is a greater equality. Because, right now, that
    really belongs to the SECDEF, rather than to the DCI, when we'd
    come to the reprogramming.
        Now, the SECDEF has a serious responsibility in that,
    because I believe that there must be concurrence under current
    law when it comes to reprogramming. Does the SECDEF have to----
        Dr. Hamre. That depends entirely on where the dollars are
    appropriated and what part of fiscal law is governing. There's
    enormous flexibility in the intelligence budget.
        Senator Levin. No, but in the law itself----
        Dr. Hamre. There's very little flexibility----
        Senator Levin.--in Title 50, when it comes to the
    reprogramming power----
        Dr. Hamre. But, sir, it all depends on where it's
    appropriated up here.
        Senator Levin. All right. Okay.
        Dr. Hamre. That's what is governing.
        Senator Levin. But, in any event, I think that's an area
    where we ought to be looking, because that's a very critical
    area.
        Then when it comes to the hiring and firing point there, we
    have in the DCI in effect, the power now to veto in law, except
    for the DIA. But for these other three agencies, a concurrence
    of the DCI is required under 10 USC. So that's a pretty
    powerful position that the DCI is now in. He doesn't exercise
    it, apparently. But that's not the lack of authority; that's
    the lack of a will to exercise it. I don't know if we can
    legislate willpower, but, nonetheless, that's where the current
    law is.
        So I think that the one area where we really have to focus,
    in terms of where the chairman is discussing this--at least
    from my understanding of what he's saying, or perhaps his
    intent--is that area of budget execution, or the reprogramming
    area. That's where it seems to me there's real need to consider
    this power question.
        Chairman Warner. Let me just comment on that, because I was
    addressing this question of how the Secretaries of the many
    Departments--Defense, Homeland Security, and so forth--which
    contain the affected element or elements of the IC, does not
    object to such reprogramming transfer. Now, it seems to me if
    we took the--they have veto power now, and what I was trying to
    do is to make certain that the DCI--I didn't mean to demote
    him; I don't know how I'd be demoting him if we passed laws to
    further strengthen him----
        Senator Levin. Developing and presenting the budget?
        Chairman Warner. That's right, and also to eliminate these
    vetos over his reprogramming.
        Senator Levin. Now, reprogramming, I misspoke. Let me just
    go back to the reprogramming issue.
        Chairman Warner. At some point we'd want to hear from the
    witnesses.
        Senator Levin. Yes, but I misspoke, and I'd like to get
    their reaction to see if I want to correct myself.
        By executive order, the reprogramming power is now in the
    DOD. But, as Secretary Carlucci has said, when he was the
    deputy to the DCI, and as Admiral Turner said today, when he
    was the DCI, President Carter put that power in the DCI so that
    by executive order, with the stroke of a pen, literally, that
    power on reprogramming could go back to the DCI if that's what
    President Bush or the next President wants to do. So we don't
    even need a legal change for that one, because that's an
    executive order allocation. That's my question. Am I correct on
    that, Mr. Carlucci? Then I'd ask the others.
        Mr. Carlucci. That's my understanding.
        Senator Levin. Now, do our other witnesses want to come in
    on that? Then I'll be done on that.
        Chairman Warner. That's all right. Take your time.
        Dr. Schlesinger. I'm not sure I'm answering your question
    or the Chairman's observation, but it would really help if the
    senior leadership got together every once in awhile and just
    talked--the head of NSA, the DCI, the head of DIA. Right now
    you have people coming to what used to be--is now the foreign
    intelligence something-or-other board and their representatives
    of their agencies. It would help enormously if we had the
    principals meeting.
        Senator Levin. That's true. But I'm being very precise.
    There's an executive order, number 12333, which now designates
    the SECDEF the power to provide fiscal management for the NSA,
    for defense and military intelligence, and national
    reconnaissance entities. That means that by executive order,
    the SECDEF is given the power to supervise execution, including
    reprogramming, of that NFIP budget. That's an executive order.
    That can be changed back to what it was in the President Carter
    years, when it was the--if we want to, or if the President
    wants to--not me, or us--if the President wants to, he can give
    that power right back to the DCI or the successor.
        Dr. Schlesinger. Right.
        Senator Levin. So I just want----
        Dr. Hamre. That's true, sir, but I'll tell you, there's
    remarkably thin budget-justification material that comes with
    the intelligence budget. It's nothing compared to what you
    insist coming from us in DOD. I remember when the NRO piled up
    $3 billion worth of cash and nobody knew about it. I didn't
    know about it. I was the Comptroller, I didn't know about it.
    Okay? I mean, this happened. They do not get much oversight.
    They have tremendous flexibility right now.
        So I'm not sure that this is really the panacea that you
    think it is.
        Senator Levin. What?
        Dr. Hamre. Moving the authorities around a little bit for
    more flexibility, for money. They have so much flexibility,
    they don't even know where the money all is.
        Chairman Warner. My simple question was, if we did, by a
    combination of execution order and, if necessary, statutory
    change, elevate the DCI to level one, put him on a par--and
    hopefully, they would meet, Mr. Secretary--would that be an
    interim step, avoiding a lot of dislocation at this critical
    point in our----
        Mr. Carlucci. I see no objection to that.
        Chairman Warner. Do you have any support for it?
        Mr. Carlucci. I think it helps.
        Chairman Warner. All right.
        Mr. Carlucci. Gives him a little more clout.
        Dr. Schlesinger. I think that it might be desirable to
    establish a committee of principals----
        Chairman Warner. All right.
        Dr. Schlesinger.--and force the heads of these agencies to
    talk about their common interests.
        Chairman Warner. That's certainly in the realm of the
    President. All right, thank you very much.
        Senator Sessions.
        Senator Sessions. Mr. Chairman, this has been just a
    marvelous hearing and a marvelous discussion about government
    and responsibility and how to improve it. We have some of the
    finest people that I know of that work in our government
    agencies, spent 15 years at Department of Justice, and I know
    how fine the FBI agents are, and I've worked with them. But
    bureaucracies intercede, and we have real, real problems.
        The best example that I've seen in my experience of change
    in government was early in the Reagan administration, when he
    put a young leader in charge of coordinating law enforcement
    around America. It was Rudi Giuliani. He was third in command
    in the Department of Justice, but everybody knew he was setting
    the policy on law enforcement, and he made things happen.
        The drug czar, a non-cabinet agency, which we're talking
    about here, under Bill Bennett's leadership for several years,
    was a pretty significant force in establishing drug policy and
    coordinating drug efforts for a number of years. But I'm
    willing to bet that our drug czar today, his name is not known
    by the majority of the Drug Enforcement Agency agents. They
    probably don't even know his name, although John Walters is a
    fine person, doing a good job. But as Secretary Hamre said, it
    tends to fade. They have 150 people, and they're going to tell
    the Department of Justice how to run their business? Somebody
    with 200-300 people is going to order the DOD around? It just--
    over time, it doesn't seem to work.
        So I guess I am intrigued and more inclined to be
    supportive of your views that, let's take the system we have,
    see if it is broken so badly we need major reform, or maybe the
    better approach is to see if we can't deal with the problem
    itself.
        Now, we talk about these agencies, and they deal with one
    another as if they're foreign nations. They enter memorandums
    of understanding which are the equivalent of treaties. They--
    and it takes years of negotiating these things. It's worse than
    dealing with the Russians to get an agreement. Sometimes they
    never agree on issues.
        It seems to me that, really, the President can set this
    tone. If the President says, ``The CIA is going to coordinate
    my intelligence. Every agency is going to back--and if they
    don't, I want him to come tell me, and then I'm going to call
    in the Secretary of Defense and the Secretary of State, and
    we're going to have a prayer meeting over why he isn't working
    with the CIA Director.'' Am I off base on that?
        Mr. Carlucci. Sir, you're absolutely right. The one thing
    we haven't really talked much about is the NSC and the role of
    the NSC in implementing that kind of presidential directive.
        Senator Sessions. I know the President has really stepped
    up his commitment to this. The whole Nation, bipartisan,
    Republicans and Democrats--since September 11, we have dealt
    with many of the problems we've talked about today already, and
    made a lot of progress. Together we've done that. But I do
    think, ultimately, that if the President does not assert
    himself effectively, we won't see the progress there, because
    these agencies will retreat to their turf.
        One thing that still I believe is not completely fixed with
    the Patriot Act--Senator Cornyn, you might correct me--but it
    seems to me we still have some fear on the part of the foreign
    intelligence agencies, the CIA, that if they are involved with
    somebody who may be a citizen, even though they're connected to
    a foreign power, that they feel somewhat intimidated and
    reluctant to pursue that. Shouldn't we make sure that it's
    crystal clear that if an individual--there's probable cause to
    believe an American individual citizen is connected to a
    terrorist organization or a foreign power hostile to the United
    States, that they ought to be covered under the Foreign
    Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA)?
        Secretary Schlesinger?
        Dr. Schlesinger. Yes.
        Mr. Carlucci. I would agree, but I'm not a lawyer, and I
    think you'd have to--well, you are--but what the legal
    constraints on the CIA are on that score, I don't know.
        Dr. Hamre. Sir, I think the key is what you said, probable
    cause. That's where the complication comes in, is what does it
    take to establish probable cause for purposes of the
    surveillance? That's where it has been problematic in the past.
    It's not difficult, once you have probable cause, to get a FISA
    court order.
        Senator Sessions. No, you're correct.
        Dr. Hamre. It's that standard of probable cause that has
    been very high.
        Senator Sessions. Dr. Hamre, you're correct. I think--and
    on a normal surveillance of a foreign operative, you don't have
    to have, to reach the level of probable cause----
        Dr. Hamre. Right.
        Senator Sessions.--which is a very high burden----
        Dr. Hamre. High burden.
        Senator Sessions.--as a prosecutor, I know----
        Dr. Hamre. Yes.
        Senator Sessions. But maybe we ought to relax that when
    there is a connection to terrorism and foreign intelligence.
        Dr. Hamre. I actually think there have--there actually have
    been some changes in that regard. I'm not a lawyer, myself. I'd
    want to defer to general counsel out at NSA. I think they're
    actually, the minimization rules are still in place, but I
    think that there are some greater flexibilities. We use them.
    But I'd defer to them to answer that for you, sir.
        Senator Sessions. It's referred to some in the Commission
    report, but I should study it more carefully.
        Dr. Hamre. Yes, sir.
        Chairman Warner. Thank you very much, Senator.
        Senator Sessions. Thank you.
        Chairman Warner. Senator Dayton.
        Senator Dayton. I don't really have any more questions, Mr.
    Chairman. When I was in Iraq last year with the Chairman, I
    resolved never to leave a room before he did, so----[Laughter.]
        It's held me in good stead.
        Chairman Warner. Thank you very much.
        Senator Dayton. Although I could say, if you're aware of
    any other $3 billion just lying around any of these entities,
    if you could let us know, that would be great. [Laughter.]
        Thank you.
        Dr. Hamre. Yes, I was pretty surprised to find it.
        Senator Dayton. All right.
        Chairman Warner. Thank you very much.
        The distinguished Senator from Texas can wrap it up.
        Senator Cornyn. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        I just have one final area of questioning, and that has to
    do with the dangers of consolidation in the IC. The best
    analogy I can think of is how much different your world view
    would be each day if you only read one newspaper and it was the
    Washington Post, and how much different it would be if, every
    day when you got up, instead of the Washington Post, you read
    the Washington Times. I worry that if we are consolidating all
    of our intelligence collection and analysis, and routing it up
    without the caveats, perhaps, as it goes through each layer, we
    present a nice, pretty package. We claim we have now
    consolidated the authority in one person, the NID, but, in
    effect, we are limiting the range of information that the
    policymakers really need in order to make the best possible
    decisions. Is that a poor analogy?
        Mr. Carlucci. It's a good analogy. Too much uniformity in
    the intelligence business is bad.
        Senator Cornyn. It strikes me that there's some benefit to
    having the competition or the diversity of voices. I know
    sometimes people wonder how in the world can you find out
    what's happening in Washington or anywhere else? I always say
    you need to read a lot of different newspapers. You need to
    read several different news magazines. You need to look at
    several different Internet news engines, like Google or Yahoo
    or whatever. Maybe then you will have some concept of what in
    the world is going on. But if you limit yourself to one source,
    that seems like that is fraught with danger.
        So I just hope that during the debate and discussion, as
    you have counseled us already, that we look for those things
    that are going to provide us better intelligence and not just
    claim that, yes, we've redrawn the organizational chart, we've
    created somebody with a new title, and we pat ourselves on the
    back under the misimpression that we've actually made America
    safer. Thank you very much.
        Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Chairman Warner. Thank you, Senator. But if I might, just
    to take an observation from your very important observations
    you made, the one thing that goes through this report that has
    struck me is the word ``imagination.'' Is not imagination the
    direct product of competition of differing intelligence views?
        Dr. Schlesinger?
        Dr. Schlesinger. Yes. It's unquestionably a--look, there
    were balls that were dropped here, and with--given the episode
    in Manila, given the seizure of the French aircraft that was
    supposed to fly into the Eiffel Tower, our problem was a
    failure of imagination, not to be cured--not to be cured--by
    restructuring. In Manila, it was said--whoever the name, I've
    forgotten--he said that, ``We were going to take an aircraft
    and drive it into Langley headquarters of the CIA.'' I would
    think that that would really get the attention of the CIA.
        Chairman Warner. I expect it would, too. But it is the
    product of competitive intelligence analysis. Again, going
    back, as I did with my colleagues on the Intelligence
    Committee, and looking at the problems, the DIA was very
    skeptical, as was the Energy Department, about certain aspects
    of the findings in the CIA.
        Again, is not imagination a product, Mr. Carlucci?
        Mr. Carlucci. It's a problem--I think that the report
    performs a useful service in pointing that out, but the report
    also points out that the policymakers do not act on warning,
    which is another issue that we haven't discussed today. That's
    beyond the realm of just pure intelligence. But the interaction
    between the IC and the policymaker is very important.
        Chairman Warner. Dr. Hamre?
        Dr. Hamre. Sir, I strongly believe that you want
    competitive analysis----
        Chairman Warner. To give you the imagination----
        Dr. Hamre. Absolutely.
        Chairman Warner.--as a product.
        Dr. Hamre. Absolutely.
        Chairman Warner. Gentlemen, thank you. You win an endurance
    contest. We're almost at 4 hours. Thank you very much.
        The hearing is adjourned.
        [Whereupon, at 6:20 p.m., the committee adjourned.]

     IMPLICATIONS FOR THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE AND MILITARY OPERATIONS OF
        PROPOSALS TO REORGANIZE THE UNITED STATES INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY

                                  ----------

                            TUESDAY, AUGUST 17, 2004

                                           U.S. Senate,
                                   Committee on Armed Services,
                                                        Washington, DC.
        The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 10:21 a.m. in
    room SR-325, Russell Senate Office Building, Senator John
    Warner (chairman) presiding.
        Committee members present: Senators Warner, McCain,
    Roberts, Sessions, Talent, Chambliss, Graham, Dole, Cornyn,
    Levin, Kennedy, Lieberman, Reed, Bill Nelson, E. Benjamin
    Nelson, Dayton, Bayh, and Clinton.
        Committee staff members present: Judith A. Ansley, staff
    director; and Leah C. Brewer, nominations and hearings clerk.
        Majority staff members present: Charles W. Alsup,
    professional staff member; Brian R. Green, professional staff
    member; Thomas L. MacKenzie, professional staff member; and
    Paula J. Philbin, professional staff member.
        Minority staff members present: Richard D. DeBobes,
    Democratic staff director; Evelyn N. Farkas, professional staff
    member; Creighton Greene, professional staff member; and Maren
    R. Leed, professional staff member.
        Staff assistants present: Andrew W. Florell, Nicholas W.
    West, and Pendred K. Wilson.
        Committee members' assistants present: Christopher J. Paul,
    assistant to Senator McCain; Darren M. Dick, assistant to
    Senator Roberts; Lance Landry, assistant to Senator Allard;
    Lindsey R. Neas, assistant to Senator Talent; Steven R. Norton,
    assistant to Senator Chambliss; Aleix Jarvis, assistant to
    Senator Graham; Russell J. Thomasson, assistant to Senator
    Cornyn; Mieke Y. Eoyang, assistant to Senator Kennedy;
    Frederick M. Downey, assistant to Senator Lieberman; Neil D.
    Campbell, assistant to Senator Reed; William K. Sutey,
    assistant to Senator Bill Nelson; Eric Pierce, assistant to
    Senator E. Benjamin Nelson; and Todd Rosenblum, assistant to
    Senator Bayh.

           OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR JOHN WARNER, CHAIRMAN

        Chairman Warner. The committee meets today to receive
    testimony from Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld; Acting
    Director of Central Intelligence, John E. McLaughlin; and
    Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, General Richard B.
    Myers, on the implications for the Department of Defense (DOD)
    and current and future military operations of proposals to
    reorganize the U.S. Intelligence Community.
        We welcome our witnesses. I see that you're joined by Dr.
    Cambone. We welcome you.
        First, an administrative announcement to members of the
    committee. In consultation with Senator Levin, we have
    scheduled a hearing of this committee for immediately following
    our return on September 9. The question at that time will be
    the oversight review of our committee of the remaining reports,
    as we understand it, concerning the prisoner abuse situation in
    Iraq. Those remaining investigations, particularly the Fay-
    Jones investigation into the role of the military intelligence,
    and the Schlesinger-Brown panel's overall view, should be
    completed in that period of time--would that be correct, Mr.
    Secretary?--and available for review. Your Department has so
    advised me of that.
        Secretary Rumsfeld. That is the current schedule. Whether
    something would come up that would cause one of them to delay
    for some reason or another, I can't know. But, at the moment--
    what is the date you're planning to be back?
        Chairman Warner. September 9.
        Secretary Rumsfeld. As far as I know, those two that you
    mentioned would be completed.
        Chairman Warner. We've received excellent cooperation from
    your staff on this in the scheduling, and I've had an
    opportunity to work along with Dr. Schlesinger on these
    issues----
        Secretary Rumsfeld. Good.
        Chairman Warner.--so I thank you, Mr. Secretary.
        Now, the views of our witnesses today on the various
    recommendations for reform of the U.S. Intelligence Community,
    particularly the recommendations of the 9/11 Commission and the
    proposals of President Bush, are critical to this committee's
    understanding of how those recommended changes would impact the
    DOD in future military operations.
        The impressive work of the 9/11 Commission has given
    America a roadmap, a series of recommendations on how to move
    forward. I might add that the Governmental Affairs Committee
    this morning is hearing from the families and some survivors of
    the tragedies of September 11, and I think I join with all my
    colleagues, we're very impressed with their contributions into
    this national debate.
        So now it's time for Congress to thoroughly examine and
    evaluate all of these recommendations, and to enact such
    changes as we deem will strengthen our Intelligence Community.
        President Bush has taken swift action to embrace certain
    elements of the 9/11 Commission's recommendations prior to the
    9/11 report. We must be mindful of that, because this is a
    continuum of steps that have been taken, all the way from the
    Patriot Act to the establishment of the Terrorist Threat
    Integration Center, those steps to make our Nation safer each
    day that we go forward.
        Of the 41 recommendations made by the 9/11 Commission, some
    have already been enacted over the past 3 years. More will be
    done through executive order, and, quite possibly, Congress
    will provide legislation in the very near future.
        But as the 9/11 Commission noted, in nearly 3 years since
    September 11, Americans have become better protected against
    terrorist attack. But none of us can rest. We must constantly
    work--each day, each week, each month--to make America safer.
        As our witnesses are well aware, the DOD is home to the
    largest dollar--that is, budget allocation--within the
    Intelligence Community. DOD is the largest consumer of the
    intelligence produced by the Intelligence Community. We must
    not lose sight of these facts as we consider the way ahead.
        My overriding concern, speaking for myself as I examine
    changes and proposals and recommendations to the Intelligence
    Community, is, what changes will best help provide the
    strategic warning we need to protect the Nation, to keep our
    President and his subordinates fully informed while at the same
    time supporting the warfighter--the man, the woman, the sailor,
    the soldier, the airman, the marine--who, at this very moment,
    is taking risks throughout the world and fighting to keep the
    terrorist threat from our shores? How can we better provide the
    necessary intelligence to all of these consumers?
        It was not long ago when the national-level intelligence
    support to the warfighter was inadequate. All of us on this
    committee remember very well. The military's experience during
    Operation Desert Storm was a watershed event. From the time
    General Norman Schwarzkopf came before this committee in June
    1991 and advised us that responsive national-level intelligence
    support for his mission in the first Persian Gulf War was
    unsatisfactory.
        The Defense Department, together with other elements in the
    Intelligence Community, has painstakingly, since that time,
    built the intelligence and operational capabilities that we saw
    so convincingly demonstrated on the battlefields of Afghanistan
    and Iraq in the recent past. As we examine ways to reform our
    Intelligence Community, we must ensure that we do nothing to
    undermine the confidence that the battlefield commanders have
    in the intelligence support on which they must depend.
        The 9/11 commissioners correctly pointed out that our
    overall intelligence structure failed to connect the dots, in
    terms of observing and then fusing together the indicators of a
    significant threat from al Qaeda in the years and months
    leading up to the actual attack on our country on September 11,
    2001. The recommended solution, however, is to reorganize the
    entire community, not just focus on the parts that were
    unsatisfactory; therefore, we must examine the reasons for
    these dramatic proposals and understand how the recommended
    solutions address, or do not address, the problems identified
    in the 9/11 Commission's report.
        Clearly, we must seize the opportunity to act--and I,
    personally, am confident that Congress can and will do
    something in the balance of this session--but we should do it
    with great care. I'm ever mindful of the legislation to our
    national security structure, the National Security Act of 1947,
    and the Goldwater-Nichols Act of 1986, which many of us on this
    committee were full participants. These were not considered in
    haste, and we must not be rushed to judgment in this case.
        I, personally, as I've studied all the recommendations,
    feel, first and foremost, that we must be mindful that this
    Nation is at war at this very moment, with tremendous risks
    being undertaken by many people. We're at war, Mr. Secretary.
    Were we to try and do massive dismemberment of the DOD at this
    point in time, I think--and I listen to the Secretary and our
    witnesses--it could result in turbulence that might degrade
    this level of intelligence so essential as we continue to fight
    this war, as we continue to hear, almost every week or month,
    of the threat levels against this Nation, quite apart from the
    conflicts in Iraq and Afghanistan.
        So, with that in mind, I, personally, want to proceed, but
    with great caution, and do what we can to strengthen this
    system; at the same time, cause hopefully no turbulence or
    disruption in the intelligence system that now, I think, serves
    this Nation reasonably well--can be better.
        I look at the proposal by which we could take the current
    position of the Director of Central Intelligence, elevate it
    to--in every possible way, to that of a full cabinet status. As
    I look at the current body of law, you have extraordinary
    powers already on the statute. Perhaps some correction could be
    made, or addition, by Congress, to the existing powers so that
    there is no limitation to your ability to work as a coequal
    with your peer group, be it the Secretary of Defense, Secretary
    of Homeland Security, Secretary of State, or whatever the case
    may be.
        Perhaps we could change the name, call it the National
    Intelligence Director (NID). But if it's desired of Congress to
    move forward and create the entire new entity and a new layer,
    then I think we ought to do it in such a way that it's a
    partnership relationship between the Secretary of Defense
    working in consultation with the NID and his structure. At such
    time as the budgets are brought forward, they work on them
    together and present those budgets jointly, as they would
    present jointly to the President any recommendations for key
    personnel to serve in the various intelligence agencies.
        So those are two approaches that this Senator is
    considering, such that we minimize any disruption to the
    essential collection of intelligence today.
        Senator Levin.

                    STATEMENT OF SENATOR CARL LEVIN

        Senator Levin. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Let me join you in welcoming our witnesses today. This is
    our committee's second hearing on the recommendations of the 9/
    11 Commission to reorganize the Intelligence Community and the
    implications of such reorganization for the DOD and military
    operations.
        We have suffered from two different types of intelligence
    failures in recent years. The first was the failure of agencies
    to share information necessary to connect the dots before the
    September 11 attacks. That failure is attributed, by the 9/11
    Commission, mainly to problems in the organization and
    management of the Intelligence Community.
        The second failure, the massively erroneous intelligence
    assessments relied on before the war in Iraq, appears, in
    significant part, to have been the result of the shaping of
    intelligence by the Intelligence Community to support the
    policies of the administration.
        As we consider legislation for the reorganization of the
    Intelligence Community, we should recognize the significance of
    both types of failures: those resulting from poor organization
    and management, and those resulting from politicizing
    intelligence. Changing the organization of the Intelligence
    Community, as proposed by the 9/11 Commission, may help address
    intelligence-sharing problems, but does not address
    politicizing intelligence, and could even make that problem
    worse.
        Relative to the failure number one, the 9/11 Commission
    made major recommendations to reorganize the Intelligence
    Community that could have significant implications for our
    military which we want to explore today.
        One recommendation is to create the new position of a
    National Intelligence Director who would have greater authority
    over the national intelligence budget and programs and over
    hiring and firing people to head the national intelligence
    agencies, including agencies that are currently located within
    the Defense Department, such as the National Security Agency
    (NSA), which is responsible for collecting signals and breaking
    codes, and the National Reconnaissance Office (NRO), which is
    responsible for building satellites.
        Another recommendation is to create a new National
    Counterterrorism Center (NCTC) which would combine all-source
    fusion and analysis of terrorist intelligence, similar to what
    the Terrorist Threat Integration Center (TTIC) now does, but
    with the additional function of planning and tasking
    counterterrorist operations, including those conducted by
    military forces under the DOD.
        Another recommendation is to transfer the lead
    responsibility for all paramilitary operations, both overt and
    covert, to the DOD. Currently, the CIA is responsible for
    covert operations, which require a presidential finding and a
    prior notification to Congress.
        These recommendations raise a host of questions that need
    to be considered as we reform our Intelligence Community. The
    relationship between intelligence and defense entities and
    their specific responsibilities and authorities are not
    questions of turf. They are vitally important to both the
    security and well-being of our Nation and the safety of our
    troops.
        I would hope that our witnesses will address, in their
    opening statements, whether they agree with the following five
    recommendations of the 9/11 Commission. I'm quoting these
    recommendations.
        Recommendation number 1: The National Counterterrorism
    Center should perform joint planning. The plans would assign
    operational responsibilities to lead agencies, including
    Defense and its combatant commands.
        Recommendation number 2: The National Intelligence Director
    should have, ``the authority to reprogram funds among the
    national intelligence agencies to meet any new priority.''
        Recommendation number 3: The National Intelligence Director
    should approve and submit nominations to the President of the
    individuals who would lead the Central Intelligence Agency
    (CIA), Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA), NSA, National
    Geospatial-Intelligence Agency (NGA), NRO, and other
    intelligence capabilities.
        Recommendation number 4: Again, I'm quoting, ``Lead
    responsibility for directing and executing paramilitary
    operations, whether clandestine or covert, should shift to the
    Defense Department.''
        Recommendation number 5: The National Intelligence Director
    would manage this national effort, managing the national
    intelligence program, and overseeing the component agencies of
    the Intelligence Community with the help of three deputies,
    each of which would also hold a key position in one of the
    component agencies.
        Now, if we fail to make needed reforms, we may be leaving
    ourselves vulnerable to future intelligence failures. But if we
    unwittingly create a system that results in confused, unclear,
    or duplicative lines of command or responsibility, our security
    would be diminished. So we need to proceed urgently, but
    carefully, as we consider reforming our intelligence system.
        Regardless of the responsibilities that we might choose to
    give to the proposed National Intelligence Director and
    National Counterterrorism Center, and wherever we decide to
    place these offices on an organization chart, we must take
    steps to avoid the second major intelligence failure, the
    shaping of intelligence assessments to support administration
    policies--any administration's policies. Independent and
    objective intelligence is a matter of vital national
    importance. Objective, unvarnished intelligence should inform
    policy choices. Policy should not drive intelligence
    assessments.
        The Intelligence Committee's report of July 9, 2004, on the
    Intelligence Community's prewar intelligence assessments on
    Iraq is a multi-count indictment of faulty intelligence
    assessments.
        For example, when the CIA's unclassified white paper said
    that, ``Most intelligence specialists assess that Iraq was
    trying to obtain aluminum tubes for a centrifuge program for
    nuclear weapons,'' it did not explain that the Department of
    Energy, the Intelligence Community's nuclear experts,
    specifically disagreed with the assessment that the aluminum
    tubes were intended for Iraq's nuclear program.
        Similarly, when the CIA's unclassified National
    Intelligence Estimate stated that, ``Iraq maintains several
    development programs, including for an Unmanned Aerial Vehicle
    (UAV) that most analysts believe is intended to deliver
    biological warfare agents,'' the CIA eliminated a footnote to
    the effect that U.S. Air Force intelligence, the Intelligence
    Community agency with primary responsibility for technical
    analysis on UAV programs, did not agree with that assessment.
    When the CIA's unclassified white paper included the statement,
    ``potentially against the U.S. homeland,'' with respect to the
    use by Iraq of biological weapons, it did not acknowledge that
    its own classified National Intelligence Estimate on the same
    subject did not include that frightening assessment.
        When the Director of Central Intelligence's testimony
    before the Intelligence Committee addressed, ``training in
    poisons and gases,'' of al Qaeda by Iraq, which, ``comes from
    credible and reliable sources,'' the Director did not mention
    that the underlying intelligence in his own classified
    statement called into question the reliability of the sources
    of this information.
        Now, these are but a few examples from the highly critical
    intelligence report of the Senate Select Committee on
    Intelligence on the intelligence failures before the war with
    Iraq. It is unacceptable for the senior U.S. intelligence
    official, whether that be a Director of Central Intelligence or
    a National Intelligence Director, to exaggerate the certainty
    of intelligence assessments and tell the President, Congress,
    the American people, and the world that something is an open
    and shut case, ``a slam dunk,'' when it isn't, when the
    underlying intelligence, in fact, has uncertainties and
    qualifications. Whatever changes we make to the organization of
    the Intelligence Community, we must do all that we can to
    ensure that the intelligence upon which our Nation relies,
    often for life-and-death decisions, is independently and
    objectively analyzed and presented.
        Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Chairman Warner. Senator Levin.
        Mr. Secretary, we welcome, again, your appearance here. I
    would recognize you just got back from an important trip to our
    forces abroad, and I recognize that you've been in consultation
    this morning--at the White House, I presume--perhaps on this
    subject and others, and we're anxious to hear your views.
        May I courteously ask that you bring the microphone up as
    close as possible, because we have a very full room, and the
    acoustics somewhat diminished.

      STATEMENT OF HON. DONALD H. RUMSFELD, SECRETARY OF DEFENSE;
       ACCOMPANIED BY DR. STEPHEN A. CAMBONE, UNDER SECRETARY OF
                        DEFENSE FOR INTELLIGENCE

        Secretary Rumsfeld. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, members of the
    committee.
        I appreciate this opportunity to discuss the subject of
    strengthening the Intelligence Community in the United States,
    as well as some of the recommendations of the 9/11 Commission.
        Needless to say, some of what I will be saying will be my
    personal views, because, while the President has made a number
    of decisions--and announced them--that he believes will improve
    the Intelligence Community, some aspects of his proposals are
    still under discussion, and, in that case, I may very well be
    back someday to discuss those decisions as they arrive.
        He's proposed the establishment of a National Intelligence
    Director, as the 9/11 Commission recommended, the creation of
    an NCTC, and the issuance of a number of executive orders to
    implement other recommendations of the 9/11 Commission, such as
    reform of the community's information-sharing.
        I think what I'd like to do is to ask my complete statement
    be put in the record, and I will abbreviate it substantially.
        Chairman Warner. Mr. Secretary, a very wise course. All
    statements by the three witnesses will be admitted into the
    record.
        Secretary Rumsfeld. The President will continue to listen
    to the debate on the subject of intelligence reform, as will
    others in the executive branch. I think the hearings are a good
    thing. The experts that have been testifying have a lot of
    background and experience and knowledge, and certainly add
    dimension to the discussion.
        The objective of Intelligence Community reform is to
    provide the community with a renewal, to refashion it to better
    succeed in this still new and different 21st century. Those
    objectives include improved indications and warning of
    impending events in enough time to anticipate them and to
    permit effective action.
        This requires, in my view, aggressively breaking down the
    stovepipes within and between domestic, foreign, and military
    intelligence; integrating domestic intelligence into the
    Intelligence Community while providing for the appropriate
    protections for civil liberties--and that's not an easy task;
    it's a big issue for this committee and for the country--
    authorizing and enabling intelligence users to access required
    intelligence data wherever it may reside; improved analysis of
    the environment to reduce the likelihood of surprise,
    especially by terrorists, and this requires conducting, in my
    view, competitive analysis within the offices of the NID and
    within and among departments and agencies based on all-source
    intelligence; seeking to avoid ``group think,'' as recommended
    by the 9/11 Commission; balancing the need for intelligence and
    warning against the current threats in light of the need for
    longer-term strategic analysis; improved ability to use
    intelligence to effectively deter and disrupt, defeat, and
    defend against attacks on the United States' interests,
    especially by terrorists--it requires ensuring that departments
    and agencies charged with deterring and defending U.S.
    interests possess highly capable all-source intelligence
    capabilities, commensurate with their missions; developing and
    executing integrated joint responses by executive departments
    to effectively employ the instruments of national power
    appropriate to the task or mission; maintaining clear lines of
    authority and responsibility between the President and the
    heads of the executive departments and those operating
    agencies.
        Mr. Chairman, I come to this subject with a background of
    interest in intelligence capabilities. As I recall, I appeared
    before this committee in January 2001, more than 3\1/2\ years
    ago, for a confirmation hearing, and I was asked by one of the
    members of the committee what subject kept me up at night. I
    answered, simply, with one word: intelligence. The answer
    remains the same.
        Adversaries have many advantages in denying information
    too, and deceiving intelligence analysts and policymakers,
    alike, about their capabilities and their intentions. As a
    result, they're capable of surprising us, as well as surprising
    friendly foreign countries. This is the reality our country
    faces as we consider various proposals for improving
    capabilities to the U.S. Intelligence Community to meet the
    21st century problems.
        A variety of proposals for achieving these objectives have
    been advanced. I'm persuaded that the attributes we seek in the
    Intelligence Community--imagination, intuition, and
    initiative--may best be encouraged and developed by
    organizations where planning is centralized but the execution
    of the plans is decentralized. An Intelligence Community
    organized around areas of substantive expertise--for example,
    foreign, domestic, and military intelligence--would possibly be
    more likely to generate, in a timely fashion, the indications
    and warning of crisis and provide intelligence support needed
    by the executive departments of government in the performance
    of their respective missions than is one organized around a
    single or preeminent national intelligence organization.
        As some have suggested, organizing the U.S. Intelligence
    Community around national collections agencies, like NSA, NGA,
    and NRO, and aligning them under direct NID leadership, could
    conceivably lead to some efficiencies in some aspects of
    intelligence collection, and some modest but indefinable
    improvement in support of those agencies provide to other
    elements of the government. At the same, however, it's possible
    that, by their sheer size and the broad extent of their
    activity, those collection agencies could come to form the
    center of gravity of the NID's organization. If a consolidation
    of those agencies outside DOD were to be considered, we should
    be certain that it would actually help resolve the
    intelligence-related problems and difficulties that have been
    described by the 9/11 Commission and that we face, and that
    they would not create additional problems.
        As an example of the latter, we would not want to place new
    barriers or filters between military combatant commanders and
    those agencies when they perform as combat support agencies. It
    would be a major step to separate these key agencies from the
    military combatant commanders, which are the major users of
    such capabilities.
        With respect to solving problems that have been identified,
    my impression is that the technical collection agencies collect
    more than we can analyze today. This suggests that we need more
    analysts and capacity to process data.
        It's also my conviction that we must repair our human
    intelligence capabilities. They were especially hit in the
    budget cuts during the 1990s. It's my belief that any changes
    that are made to meet the objectives identified earlier need to
    focus on building a community for the 21st century along 21st
    century lines, networked and distributed centers of analysis
    within executive departments and agencies, with access to all
    available data, focused on employing instruments of collection,
    wherever they reside, as tools for exploring hypothesis and
    conducting alternative analysis--this implies a National
    Intelligence Director with authority for tasking collection
    assets across the government--setting analytic priorities; and
    ensuring all-source competitive analysis throughout the
    Intelligence Community. Importantly, the personnel management
    and training to alter the culture in the community--it's not
    something that's been discussed extensively, but real change--
    most people are discussing organizational changes, and, in my
    view, we need to think also about the culture. If you think of
    the DOD and the number of--almost decades it's taken to instill
    the culture of jointness in that institution, it ought to
    remind us of the importance of culture with respect to the
    Intelligence Community's issues. Information, security, and
    access policies, information technology standards and
    architectures across the community are also enormously
    important. Reallocating resources in a year of budget
    execution. As I said, the precise extent of such authorities
    and other issues are still under consideration, but an NID
    likely will need some authorities of these types.
        The Department, through the Services and the combatant
    commands, has worked to break down stovepipes between foreign
    and military intelligence that support DOD activities. The
    impetus for this effort was, as you pointed out, Mr. Chairman,
    the lessons learned from Operation Desert Storm, some 12 years
    ago. You recalled the disappointment that existed with the
    timeliness, speed, and scope of intelligence support for those
    operations.
        The result of a decade's effort to establish a timely and
    seamless interaction between DOD and CIA activities has become
    apparent in Afghanistan and Iraq and in the ongoing war on
    terror. I suppose anyone can have their own opinion, but, in my
    view, we are about as well-connected as we ever have been,
    although we're probably not as well-stitched together as we
    conceivably could or should be. But any change to the
    Intelligence Community, it seems to me, should be designed to
    help us close, further, those gaps and seams, not to reopen
    them.
        The 9/11 Commission has focused the Nation's attention--and
    very usefully--on questions related to strengthening the
    community. I think it would be unfortunate if we were to lose
    sight of the 9/11 Commission's reflections on the nature of the
    world in which we live and the recommendations for the national
    security policies needed to protect and defend the country and
    the American people.
        In addition to the recommendations offered by the 9/11
    Commission, we could usefully consider the following:
        Further improving U.S. domestic intelligence capabilities
    while preserving U.S. civil liberties. I think that is one of
    their most important recommendations, and it's receiving
    relatively little attention and discussion. As part of that
    initiative, I would just mention that the DOD appointed a
    panel, headed by Newt Minow, to look at ways and means of
    achieving our domestic intelligence capabilities--the defense
    intelligence capabilities--consistent with our laws and values,
    to help counter 21st century threats. It's conceivable that
    such an outside panel could be useful in this instance.
        The President's been actively engaged in developing
    initiatives that engage people at risk to subversion by
    extremist ideologies. In no case is this more evident than his
    broader Middle East initiative. These initiatives could be
    embraced by Congress so that educational institutions abroad
    that emphasize religious toleration are supported, including
    provision for information technologies for schools.
        Foreign scholarships and fellowships for exchanging
    American and foreign students and scholars are established to
    improve cultural understanding.
        Helping to mobilize private philanthropy and non-
    governmental groups to promote ideas and amplify those local
    voices that oppose transnational terrorism and extremist
    ideologies and provide counterweights to terrorist-related
    organizations.
        Providing the executive branch with the necessary
    flexibility to manage the 21st century war of terror.
        Congressional approval of the administration's request for
    funds for combatant commanders' use in the field to aid in
    humanitarian relief and reconstruction. Those of you who've
    visited Iraq and Afghanistan know that our combatant commanders
    believe that those dollars are as powerful as bullets in the
    work they're doing.
        I think, a reexamination of the train-and-equip authorities
    and missions to explore opportunities for improving the
    efficiency and effectiveness of such assistance programs.
        Consider conducting an interagency roles-and-missions study
    to rationalize responsibilities and authorities across the
    government to meet the 21st century threats.
        In pursuit of strengthening our Nation's intelligence
    capabilities, I would offer one cautionary note. It's important
    that we move with all deliberate speed. We need to remember
    that we are considering these important matters, however, while
    we are waging a war. If we move unwisely, and get it wrong, the
    penalty would be great.
        If you think back, the National Security Act of 1947
    established the DOD. By 1958, it had undergone no fewer than
    four major statutory or organizational changes. Another round
    of major change was inaugurated with the Goldwater-Nichols Act
    in 1986. I doubt that we should think of intelligence reform
    being completed at a single stroke.
        Intelligence is expensive. The community suffered
    substantial reductions in the budget in the last decade and in
    people. Those reductions were made on the theory that, the end
    of the Cold War, U.S. reliance on intelligence for security
    would not be as substantial as it had been. Events have proven
    otherwise, and we need to recognize that.
        To conclude, let me return to where I began. I'm still
    concerned about our country's intelligence capabilities, but
    that concern stems not from a lack of confidence in the men and
    women in the Intelligence Community. They have fashioned
    important achievements over recent years, and I believe our
    country owes them a debt of gratitude. It will be a long time,
    if ever, that many of their achievements are fully and broadly
    known and appreciated.
        The DOD and its counterparts in the Intelligence Community
    are forging, during a war, a strong interlocking relationship
    between intelligence and operations, between national and
    tactical intelligence, and between foreign and military
    intelligence. We've worked hard to close the gaps and seams
    that these terms imply.
        Now, my concerns are rooted in the new realities of this
    21st century, and certainly the Department is ready to work
    with you to further strengthen our ability to live in this new
    and dangerous world.
        Thank you.
        [The prepared statement of Secretary Rumsfeld follows:]
                   Prepared Statement by Hon. Donald Rumsfeld
                                  introduction
        Mr. Chairman, members of the committee. I appreciate the
    opportunity to discuss the broader subject of enhancing the
    Intelligence Community, as well as some of the 9/11 Commission
    recommendations.
        I want to point out that what I will be saying represents my
    personal views, in that I am appearing before the President has made
    his final decisions on many of the important issues.
        As members know, the President has reached a number of decisions
    that should improve the capabilities of the Intelligence Community:

             Establishment of a National Intelligence Director.
             Creation of a National Counterterrorism Center.
             Issuance of a number of executive orders that will
            implement other recommendations of the commission, such as
            reform of the Intelligence Community's information sharing.

        In addition, the President has called for substantial reform of
    congressional oversight.
        The way Congress decides to conduct its oversight certainly impacts
    the way the executive branch does its business. If we are to become
    more agile and flexible in fighting the war on terrorism and rapidly
    adjusting to meet new circumstances, Congress will likely need to
    adjust its practices.
        The President will continue to listen to the debate on the subject
    of intelligence reform. He will continue to take the counsel of a broad
    range of experts, including those who have written and/or testified
    before you and other committees, on this important subject as he
    considers additional details relative to his proposals and frames new
    initiatives.
                                   objectives
        The objective of Intelligence Community reform is to provide the
    community with a renewal, to refashion it to succeed in this still new
    and different 21st century. Those objectives include:

             Improved indications and warning of impending events
            in enough time to anticipate them and permit effective action.
            This requires:

                     Aggressively breaking down the stovepipes
                    within and between domestic, foreign, and military
                    intelligence.
                     Integrating domestic intelligence into the
                    Intelligence Community while providing for appropriate
                    protection for civil liberties.
                     Authorizing and enabling appropriate
                    intelligence users to access required intelligence data
                    wherever it may reside.

             Improved analysis of the environment to reduce the
            likelihood of surprise, especially by terrorists. This
            requires:

                     Developing an integrated and authoritative
                    understanding of trends and events, at home and abroad,
                    and whether and how they might evolve into threats to
                    U.S. interests.
                     Conducting ``competitive analysis'' within the
                    offices of the NID and within and among departments and
                    agencies, based on all source intelligence, seeking to
                    avoid ``group think'' as recommended by the 9/11
                    Commission.
                     Balancing the need for intelligence and
                    warning against current threats in light of the need
                    for longer-term strategic analysis.

             Improved ability to use intelligence to effectively
            deter, disrupt, defeat, and defend against attacks on U.S.
            interests, especially by terrorists. This requires:

                     Ensuring that departments and agencies charged
                    with deterring and defending U.S. interests possess
                    highly capable, all source intelligence capabilities
                    commensurate with their mission.
                     Developing and executing integrated, joint
                    responses by executive departments to effectively
                    employ the instruments of national power appropriate to
                    a task or mission.
                     Maintaining clear lines of authority and
                    responsibility between the President and the heads of
                    the executive departments and those operational
                    agencies.

             Improved process for setting national goals,
            priorities, missions, and requirements for the collection and
            analysis of intelligence. This requires:

                     A more integrated approach to setting these
                    goals, priorities, missions, and requirements.
                     Enhancing the role of policy makers and
                    intelligence analysts in this process; and
                     Ensuring that the process produces
                    intelligence and capabilities to deter, defeat, and
                    defend against adversaries, especially terrorists that
                    are agile, flexible, and responsive.
                           the need for a renaissance
        Mr. Chairman, members of the committee, I come to this subject with
    a record of interest in the Nation's intelligence capabilities.
        When I appeared before your committee in January 2001, more than
    3\1/2\ years ago, as the nominee to be Secretary of Defense, I was
    asked what subject kept me up at night.
        I replied, without hesitation, ``intelligence.''
        My prior experience as chairman of two congressionally-mandated
    commissions--one on the ballistic missile threat to the U.S. and the
    other on the organization and management of national security space--
    had impressed on me how difficult it is to acquire intelligence,
    convert it into useful information and then use it in support of
    operations.
        In our global environment, adversaries can exploit international
    trade, finance, and communications to acquire expertise, technology and
    systems--often on the open market--with which they can do great harm to
    the American people and the Nation's interests.
        My concern back in 2001 was, and remains today, that a combination
    of terrorists and states that wish us harm, will exploit that global
    environment, and gain access to or develop weapons of mass destruction.
        The efforts of the Intelligence Community to identify such threats
    in a timely and precise way that permit us to act decisively are
    frustrated by the reality that:

             Our adversaries are keenly aware of our
            vulnerabilities;
             They need to succeed only occasionally whereas we are
            obliged to defend against them everywhere and at all times;
             Through a combination of espionage against the U.S.,
            irresponsible leaks, demarches, official disclosures and the
            general advance of scientific and technical knowledge,
            adversaries have learned far too much about how we collect,
            analyze, and use intelligence;
             Adversaries have many advantages in denying
            information to and deceiving intelligence analysts and
            policymakers alike about their capabilities and intentions; and

             As a result, they are capable of surprising us as well
            as friendly foreign countries.

        This is the reality our country faces as we consider various
    proposals for improving the capabilities of the U.S. Intelligence
    Community to meet 21st century problems.
        It is a reality borne out by the work of the 9/11 Commission and by
    the continuing review of intelligence prior to Operation Iraqi Freedom
    by the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, as well as the good
    work done by this committee, the House Armed Services Committee, the
    House Intelligence Committee, and other committees of Congress.
        In the face of this reality, and enlightened by the experience of
    the last 43 months, I come to this subject with a healthy respect for
    the magnitude of the task our country is tackling.
        I also come to it with an adage in mind that I find useful: ``To
    those who would tear down what is falls the responsibility of putting
    in place something better.'' I would remind that it is far easier to
    critique and find fault than it is to build.
                      how might those results be achieved
        A variety of proposals for achieving the objectives I outlined have
    been advanced.
        My experience as Secretary of Defense and in the pharmaceutical and
    electronic industries persuades me that the attributes we seek in the
    Intelligence Community--imagination, intuition, and initiative--are
    best encouraged and developed by organizations wherein planning is
    centralized but the execution of plans is decentralized.
        An Intelligence Community organized around areas of substantive
    expertise--for example, foreign, domestic and military intelligence--
    would possibly be more likely to generate, in a timely fashion, the
    indications and warning of crises and provide the intelligence support
    needed by the executive departments of government in the performance of
    their respective missions than is one organized around a single and
    preeminent national intelligence organization.
        As some have suggested, organizing the U.S. Intelligence Community
    around the national collection agencies--NSA, NGA, and NRO--now located
    in the DOD, and aligning them under direct NID leadership, could
    conceivably lead to some efficiencies in some aspects of intelligence
    collection and some modest but indefinable improvement in the support
    those agencies provide to other elements of the government. At the same
    time, however, it is possible that by their sheer size and the broad
    extent of their activity, those collection agencies could come to form
    the ``center of gravity'' of the NID's organization.
        If a consolidation of the NSA, NGA, and NRO outside DOD were to be
    considered, we should be certain that it would help resolve the
    intelligence-related problems and difficulties we face and not create
    additional problems. As an example of the latter, we wouldn't want to
    place new barriers or filters between the military combatant commanders
    and those agencies when they perform as combat support agencies. It
    would be a major step to separate these key agencies from the military
    combatant commanders, which are the major users of such capabilities.
        With respect to solving problems that have been identified, my
    impression is that the technical collection agencies--NSA, NGA, and
    NRO--collect more than we can analyze today. This suggests we need more
    analysts and capability to process data. It is also my impression that
    we must repair our human intelligence (HUMINT) capabilities. They were
    especially hard hit in the budget cuts beginning in the early 1990s.
        The President has not yet made a decision on these issues. He will
    undoubtedly continue to listen to the debate and take different views
    into consideration in reaching decisions. He has not ruled anything
    out.
        It is my belief that any changes that are made to meet the
    objectives identified earlier need to focus on building an Intelligence
    Community for the 21st century along 21st century lines:

             networked and distributed centers of analysis within
            executive departments and agencies, with access to all
            available data;
             focused on employing instruments of collection
            wherever they reside as tools for exploring hypothesis and
            conducting alternative analysis; and
             whose activities, priorities, and production schedules
            are directed by the NID.

        This implies a NID with authority for:

             tasking collection assets across the government,
             setting analytic priorities and ensuring all source,
            competitive analyses throughout the Intelligence Community,
             the personnel management and training to alter the
            culture in the community,
             information security and access policies,
             information technology standards and architectures
            across the community, and
             reallocating resources in the year of budget
            execution.

        As I said, the precise extent of such authorities, and other
    issues, are under consideration by the President and Congress. But an
    NID likely will need some authorities of this sort.
        I have been asked about the commission's recommendation for
    shifting paramilitary operations to DOD. We will give that
    recommendation careful consideration. This, like other recommendations,
    is complicated. The executive and legislative branches will need to be
    comfortable that any changes that might be made take account of the
    difference in the authorities and capabilities of the CIA and DOD and
    the changing needs of a President for access to a broad range of
    capabilities to meet the various challenges the Nation will be facing.
                              implications for dod
        The Department of Defense seeks and welcomes changes in the way the
    Nation does its intelligence business. It is greatly to the advantage
    of the U.S. Armed Forces that the Intelligence Community is better able
    to serve it and the other executive departments of the government,
    especially those associated with our Nation's homeland security. If the
    government as a whole is better able to act in a timely fashion, the
    frequency and duration with which the men and women of our armed forces
    will be called for combat operations abroad might be reduced.
        I believe DOD's experience with changing the way it does its
    business over the last decade, and especially since 2001, might help
    inform the proposals being offered to change the Intelligence
    Community.
        For example, the Department, through the Services and the combatant
    commands, has worked hard to break down stovepipes between foreign and
    military intelligence that support DOD activities. The impetus for this
    effort was the lessons learned from Operation Desert Storm. You may
    recall General Schwartzkopf's disappointment with the timeliness,
    speed, and scope of intelligence support to the operations he
    commanded.
        The result of a decade's effort to establish a timely and seamless
    interaction between DOD and CIA activity has become apparent in
    Afghanistan, Iraq, and in the ongoing war on terror. We are as well
    connected as we ever have been, but we're probably not as well stitched
    together as we could or should be; gaps and seams may still exist. But
    any change to the Intelligence Community should be designed to help us
    close further those gaps and seams, not reopen them.
        I hope that the change in the relationship between foreign and
    military intelligence and operations that has occurred since Operation
    Desert Storm will be matched by similar changes between domestic and
    foreign intelligence as the result of any reform. I am sure much has
    been done since September 11 to improve that relationship, but very
    likely more can and should be done.
        Second, DOD is pursuing a network-based intelligence, operations,
    and communications capability to replace its hierarchical and serial
    practices. As part of this effort, the DOD is developing and deploying
    new sensors, communications systems and establishing new standards and
    protocols to permit the secure transmission of a high volume of
    classified and unclassified data and information at the lowest possible
    levels of operations. This will permit the armed forces to conduct
    highly decentralized operations in response to centralized direction.
        This has enabled quicker decisionmaking, increased the prospect for
    immediate action in response to actionable intelligence, improved the
    precision of military operations, and provided combatant commanders at
    all levels with far greater situational awareness. A similar approach
    to networks and decentralized execution within the Intelligence
    Community would likely yield for it similar results.
        Third, as part of the effort to network its capabilities, DOD has
    tightened the connection between the operating forces and the combat
    support agencies--NSA, NGA, and NRO. I know General Myers will say more
    about this.
        This connection has been crucial to improving the effectiveness and
    capabilities of the U.S. Armed Forces in combat against enemy
    conventional forces, unconventional forces, and terrorists.
        We now have an opportunity to create government-wide networks that
    can strengthen the connection of the components of the Intelligence
    Community located in other executive departments--especially on the
    domestic side--to NSA, NGA, and NRO. Extending access to the network
    infrastructure DOD is already building to other Departments would help
    in this regard. The NID could well establish the standards and
    protocols governing the construction and use of the resulting networks
    for intelligence purposes.
                              other considerations
        The 9/11 Commission has focused the Nation's attention on questions
    related to strengthening the Intelligence Community. It would be
    unfortunate if we were to lose sight of the commission's reflections on
    the nature of the world in which we live and the recommendations for
    the national security policies needed to protect and defend the Nation
    and the American people.
        In addition to the recommendations offered by the commission, we
    could usefully consider the following:

        1. Further improving U.S. domestic intelligence capabilities while
    preserving U.S. civil liberties:

             As part of this initiative, appointing a bipartisan,
            blue-ribbon panel, not unlike the Minow Panel we set up in DOD,
            to look at the ways and means of enhancing our domestic
            intelligence capability, consistent with our laws and values,
            to help counter 21st century threats.

        2. The President has been actively engaged in developing
    initiatives that engage peoples at risk to subversion by extremist
    ideologies. In no case is this more evident than his Broader Middle
    East Initiative. Those initiatives could be embraced by Congress so
    that:

             Educational institutions abroad that emphasize
            religious toleration are supported, including provision of
            information technologies for schools
             Foreign scholarships and fellowships for exchanging
            American and foreign students and scholars are established to
            improve cultural understanding.
             Economic aid and assistance programs that utilize
            private-public partnerships are more widely developed to
            encourage small business development, banking sector
            development, and local infrastructure improvement, and to teach
            skills that workers will need in the 21st century.
             Private philanthropy and non-governmental groups are
            mobilized to promote the ideas and amplify those local voices
            that oppose transnational terrorism and extremist ideologies,
            and provide counterweights to terrorist-related organizations.

        3. Providing the executive branch with the necessary freedom to
    manage the 21st century war on terror:

             Congressional approval of the administration's
            requests for funds for the combatant commanders use in the
            field to aid in humanitarian relief and reconstruction.
             Adoption of contracting rules to streamline contract
            awards while retaining appropriate oversight to the
            circumstances so that critical projects like equipping local
            security forces are not unduly delayed.
             A reexamination of ``train and equip'' authorities and
            missions to explore opportunities for improving the efficiency
            and effectiveness of such assistance programs.

        4. Realigning and reorganizing the U.S. Government's functions and
    responsibilities to meet the challenges of the 21st century:

             Consider undertaking a fundamental re-look at the
            roles and missions of the U.S. Government to meet the national
            security challenges of the 21st century. Consider developing a
            new National Security Act--not simply another incremental
            update of the 1947 act. This new organizational design could be
            coupled to a Unified Executive Branch Plan, outlining
            responsibilities and assigning lead and supporting
            responsibilities among departments for national security tasks,
            as we do for military forces.
             Introduce Goldwater-Nichols type reforms to increase
            ``jointness'' across Federal agencies. Consider establishing a
            National Security University (like National Defense University
            for the Department of Defense) to educate national security
            officials and an interagency training exercise process to build
            capacity for interagency crisis management and national
            security planning and operations.
             Establishment of a Reserve Force of civilians for a
            new Office of Stability and Reconstruction Operations in the
            Department of State, including incentives for service and
            commitments to train and deploy overseas when directed.
             Consideration of the creation of Joint Interagency
            Task Forces, led by statutory members of the National Security
            Council (NSC), to conduct integrated planning for the
            employment of all instruments of national power for particular
            missions (e.g., attacking/disrupting terrorist networks,
            protecting homeland, and engaging in ideological struggle).
             Consideration of the conduct an Interagency Roles and
            Missions Study to rationalize responsibilities and authorities
            across the U.S. Government to meet 21st century threats.
                          moving with deliberate speed
        In pursuit of strengthening our Nation's intelligence capabilities,
    I would offer a cautionary note. It is important that we move with all
    deliberate speed; however, moving too quickly risks enormous error, as
    this committee has heard from former senior officials, military and
    civilians, with broad experience in this matter. We are considering
    these important matters while waging a war.
        National security is not easily achieved in this new century. If we
    move too unwisely and get it wrong, the penalty will be great. The
    National Security Act of 1947 established the DOD. By 1958 it had
    undergone no fewer than 4 major statutory or organizational changes.
    Another round of major change was inaugurated with the Goldwater-
    Nichols Act in 1986. We shouldn't think intelligence reform will be
    completed at a stroke, either.
        Intelligence is expensive. The Intelligence Community suffered
    substantial reductions in its budget in the last decade. Those
    reductions were made on the theory that, with the end of the Cold War,
    U.S. reliance on intelligence for security would not be as substantial
    as it had been. Events have proven otherwise. It was a mistake, and we
    are paying the penalty.
        It was with that in mind that the President developed his
    ``Strengthening Intelligence Initiative.'' It seeks to increase the
    number of HUMINT operators, linguists, and analysts and provide them
    with needed infrastructure support. The first increment of funding for
    the initiative was included in the fiscal year 2005 budget recently
    enacted by Congress. Between now and 2009 that initiative seeks to add
    thousands of personnel to the Intelligence Community. They are needed.
        George Tenet and I worked over recent years to increase the numbers
    and capabilities of HUMINT operators in our respective areas of
    responsibility. More will need to be done in this area. But HUMINT
    operators are not created overnight.
                                   conclusion
        To conclude, let me return to where I began, before this committee
    in January 2001. I am still concerned about our Nation's intelligence
    capabilities. That concern stems not from a lack of confidence in the
    men and women of the Intelligence Community. They have fashioned
    important achievements over recent years. Our country owes them a debt
    of gratitude. It will be a long time, if ever, that many of their
    achievements are fully and broadly known and appreciated.
        DOD and its counterparts in the Intelligence Community are forging,
    in the crucible of war, a strong, interlocking relationship between
    intelligence and operations, between national and tactical
    intelligence, and between foreign and military intelligence. We have
    worked hard to close the gaps and seams these terms imply. Our people,
    our budgets, and our activities are closely intertwined. That close
    relationship between DOD and CIA is a driving cause of shared
    successes.
        My concerns are rooted in the realities of the 21st century. Our
    Intelligence Community will need to improve to meet the challenges we
    face, and DOD is ready to work with you to further strengthen our
    ability to live in this new and dangerous world.

        Chairman Warner. Thank you, Mr. Secretary.
        Director McLaughlin?

       STATEMENT OF HON. JOHN E. McLAUGHLIN, ACTING DIRECTOR OF
                          CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE

        Mr. McLaughlin. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Mr. Chairman, as this committee considers reorganization
    proposals by the President, the Kean Commission, and Congress,
    I want to speak for a moment about the structure and
    capabilities of the U.S. Intelligence Community, as it exists
    today, not in 2001. I think it's important that we do that at
    the beginning of these deliberations.
        I believe that today's Intelligence Community provides a
    much stronger foundation for any changes you want to make as we
    move forward than most people might realize. That said, there
    is no question we can still do better, and I'll close with some
    thoughts on how that can be accomplished.
        Three years of war have profoundly affected the American
    Intelligence Community. Since September 11, our capacity and
    effectiveness have grown as our resources have increased--a
    very important point, our resources have increased
    dramatically--and as we have taken steps to address many of the
    issues that others have highlighted. This has been the most
    dramatic period of change in my personal memory.
        Some examples:
        Our policies--the Nation's, and the Intelligence
    Community's have changed dramatically. We're on the offensive
    against terrorists worldwide, and many of the most dangerous
    are captured or dead.
        Our practices have also changed. Intelligence, law
    enforcement, and military officers serve together and share
    information realtime and on the front lines around the world.
    Here in Washington, I chair an operational meeting every day
    with Intelligence Community and law enforcement officers
    present. Decisions made there go immediately to officers in the
    field--immediately--whose penetration and disruption of
    terrorist groups yields the kind of increasingly precise
    intelligence you've seen in the last couple of weeks.
        Our worldwide coalition has changed. It is broader, deeper,
    and more committed than before or at September 11. Where
    terrorists found sanctuary before, they now find our allies,
    and we are seeing the results from Panama to Mexico City.
        Our laws have changed--the Patriot Act has given us weapons
    in the war we did not have then--and we've saved lives because
    of them.
        Our institutions have changed. The Terrorist Threat
    Integration Center did not exist then. It enables us to share
    intelligence collected abroad with law enforcement information
    collected at home, and plots have been stopped in the U.S.
    because of that.
        Twenty-six different data networks now flow there, to the
    Terrorist Threat Integration Center, to be shared by officers
    from the widest array of foreign and domestic intelligence
    agencies ever assembled in one organization. People who think
    we can't break down the so-called stovepipes need to visit the
    Terrorist Threat Integration Center.
        In turn, such changes affected our ability to wage war, and
    the impact of change has been striking. It was imaginative
    covert action, CIA officers working with the U.S. military,
    that helped drive military operations and ousted the Taliban
    from power in Afghanistan, and broke up the sanctuary that al
    Qaeda had used.
        Terrorist arrests are increasing steadily. You see that in
    just about every morning newspaper.
        CIA, Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), Treasury, and
    other partners at home and abroad are starving al Qaeda of its
    lifeblood: money.
        CIA has worked with the FBI as it has taken down extremists
    in Lackawanna, Columbus, and New York City.
        Our coalition partners include, by varying degrees, Libyans
    and Russians, Chinese and Hungarians, Pakistanis and Saudis,
    and more, along with our traditional allies in Europe and in
    Asia.
        In short, the situation has changed dramatically from where
    the 9/11 Commission left off. Two things, however, are still
    true: al Qaeda and other terrorists remain dangerous, and there
    is still room for improvement in the Intelligence Community.
        But the image that many seek to perpetuate, of a community
    that doesn't share information or work together, a community of
    turf-conscious people competing with each other for influence,
    I must tell you, that's not the community I lead. It's a
    caricature that does a great disservice to the men and women
    who put it on the line every day, 24/7.
        Because of this committee's special responsibilities, I
    need to say a word, as the Secretary did, about the
    Intelligence Community's support for the warfighter. As we
    discuss various proposals for restructuring the Intelligence
    Community today, let me be clear about one thing: No matter
    what course the administration and Congress choose,
    intelligence support to the military, especially in time of
    war, should not be allowed to diminish. I believe such support
    can and will be preserved under any of the options being
    considered. No one would think about it in any other way.
    Everyone in the Intelligence Community understands that NSA,
    NGA, NRO, all vital parts of the National Intelligence
    Community, are also combat support agencies.
        Let me give you the assurance that the relationship between
    the Intelligence Community and the uniformed military--and the
    military, in general; the Defense Department, in general--has
    never, in my personal experience, been closer. The Secretary
    alluded to this.
        Some data points:
        The Secretary of Defense, to his great credit, has met
    frequently with George Tenet and myself to coordinate policies
    across the board in an almost unprecedented manner, in my
    experience.
        A Navy SEAL three-star, Vice Admiral Callon, sits right
    across the hall from me at CIA headquarters with the mission of
    ensuring that we and the military are connected and that both
    sides are getting what they need. I see him two or three times
    every day.
        CIA and U.S. military officers have been living and
    fighting together in Afghanistan for 3 years in the mountains
    and plains, where they have al Qaeda on the run. Our
    collection, operational, and analytic support to military
    efforts in Afghanistan and Iraq is close and continuous, as I
    think most of you have seen during your trips to those areas. I
    have a lot of data here about the number of operations, liaison
    teams that we've sent to U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM), and so
    forth.
        I have frequent video conferences with CENTCOM Commander
    General Abizaid to personally assure that we understand his
    perspective and his needs.
        We've upgraded information technology support to the
    military in the field so that Intelligence Community products
    are now available in 80 military intelligence centers around
    the globe.
        It is a different world from the one that General
    Schwarzkopf, I think, described accurately after the first Gulf
    War.
        Looking ahead now, it's important to note that the
    terrorist threat is in no way stagnant. We've had victories.
    But these organizations learn, and they adapt. It's not enough
    for us to keep up. We have to anticipate and keep ahead.
        As we seek to build on the improvements we've made in
    recent years, we should keep in mind a few of what I would call
    ``first principles.''
        First, speed and agility are the keys to the war on
    terrorism and profoundly important to the Nation's other
    intelligence challenges. We sometimes have literally only
    minutes to react to a lead that allows us to go after
    terrorists. Speed and agility are not promoted by complicated
    wiring diagrams, more levels of bureaucracy, increased dual-
    hatting, or inherent questions about who is in charge.
        Second, as in architecture, form should follow function.
    The functions intelligence must perform today are dramatically
    different than during the Cold War. Back then, we focused
    heavily on large strategic forces--where were they, for
    example--and where countries stood on the bipolar competition
    that characterized that era. Today, the focus is more on
    locating people, sometimes one person in a city of 17 million,
    tracking shipments of dangerous materials, understanding
    politics, now down to the tribal level, in a world where the
    only constant is change.
        Third, in this world, clear structure and a clear chain of
    command is better than the opposite.
        Fourth, most important to knowing how and what to change is
    consensus on what we want from our intelligence agencies, along
    with constancy in resource and moral support for them, through
    good times and bad, and patience. The 9/11 Commission says that
    the country cannot be patient. But to quote a saying I learned
    during my Army years, ``If you want it bad, you will get it
    bad.''
        Drawing on these principles, I believe that short, clear
    lines of command and control are required in whatever structure
    you establish, regardless of what you call its leader. Three
    words are key: agility, flexibility, and speed. You need to
    build these into any new structures and procedures.
        No matter how successfully we anticipate future challenges,
    we won't foresee them all, so we will need the ability to adapt
    our organizations to change easily and quickly. We will need
    flexibility in shifting resources, people, and money to respond
    to shifting priorities.
        The DCI can do some of this now, with existing authorities;
    but, frankly, it's too complicated, cumbersome, and ponderous.
    It involves more negotiations and sign-offs than current
    requirements permit.
        That's why, should the President's proposal to create a
    National Intelligence Director be adopted, I believe that that
    individual should have the clear authority to move people and
    resources, and to evaluate the performance of the national
    intelligence agencies and their leaders. This should be
    accomplished in the cleanest and most direct manner you can
    devise.
        People often remark that the DCIs allow too much in the
    Intelligence Community to be--the phrase often used is, ``CIA-
    centric,'' whether it's the staffing of centers or the
    preparation of national estimates. Well the reason is simple.
    It's because a DCI can. That is, these are the troops he
    directly commands and can task and move with little effort or
    resistance. If the DCI had enhanced authorities along the lines
    I've suggested, or if you create a National Intelligence
    Director like that, you should expect to see much more
    integration of effort in the community, and a greater capacity
    to create cross-community task forces and centers in a more
    agile and seamless way. You should also see more progress by a
    DCI, or a National Intelligence Director, on things like common
    policies for personnel, training, security, and information
    technology.
        Now, as you consider all of this, here is a key thing to
    think about:
        Who will you hold responsible, not just when things go
    well, but when something goes wrong with intelligence? Today,
    it's the DCI, even though his authorities over the rest of the
    community outside CIA are limited.
        If, in the future, it will be a National Intelligence
    Director, what authorities would be commensurate to that kind
    of responsibility if that's the person you choose to hold
    responsible?
        What would that person actually be responsible for? What
    the community concludes substantively about major issues, like
    Iraq, North Korea, or terrorism? If the answer is yes, that
    person will need direct access to sizeable numbers of
    collectors and analysts, just as the DCI has today. The
    question then arises about where those people will come from
    and with what impact.
        Or would the National Intelligence Director be responsible
    less for substantive matters and primarily for the management
    and integration of resources? Can substantive and management
    responsibilities be separated? If they can, will responsibility
    and accountability be harder to pin down than it is now,
    especially in view of the fact that the person you now hold
    responsible, the head of CIA, would then be at least a layer
    away from the top?
        I regret to close with a series of questions, but I believe
    they illustrate the complexity of these issues and the need to
    proceed cautiously and with care as we contemplate changes to
    an intelligence system on which the Nation must depend more
    than ever for its security.
        Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
        [The prepared statement of Mr. McLaughlin follows:]
                    Prepared Statement by John E. McLaughlin
        Mr. Chairman, as this committee considers reorganization proposals
    by the President, the Kean Commission, and Congress, I want to speak to
    the structure and capabilities of the Intelligence Community as it is
    today, not as it was in 2001. I believe that today's Intelligence
    Community provides a much stronger foundation than many people realize
    for whatever changes you decide to make. That said, we can still do
    better, and I will close with some thoughts on how this can be
    accomplished.
                          intelligence community today
        Three years of war have profoundly affected the Intelligence
    Community. Since September 11, our capacity and effectiveness have
    grown as our resources have increased and as we have taken steps to
    address many of the issues others have highlighted. This has been the
    most dramatic period of change in my memory. Some examples:

             Our policies--the Nation's and the Intelligence
            Community's--have changed--we are on the offensive against
            terrorists worldwide and many of the most dangerous are
            captured or dead.
             Our practices have changed--intelligence, law
            enforcement, and military officers serve together and share
            information real time on the front lines at home and abroad. In
            Washington, I chair an operational meeting every day with
            Intelligence Community and law enforcement elements
            represented. Decisions made there go immediately to officers in
            the field whose penetration and disruption of terrorist groups
            yields the kind of increasingly precise intelligence you have
            seen in the last 2 weeks.
             Our worldwide coalition has changed--it is broader,
            deeper, and more committed. Where terrorists found sanctuary
            before, they find our allies now--and we are seeing the results
            from Manama to Mexico City.
             Our laws have changed--the Patriot Act has given us
            weapons in the war we did not have and we have saved lives
            because of them.
             Our institutions have changed--The Terrorist Threat
            Integration Center (TTIC) enables us to share intelligence
            collected abroad with law enforcement information collected at
            home--and plots have been stopped in the U.S. because of that.
            Twenty-six different data networks now flow there to be shared
            by officers from the widest array of foreign and domestic
            intelligence agencies ever assembled in one organization.
            People who think we can't break down the so-called
            ``stovepipes'' need to visit TTIC.

        In turn, the changes affected our ability to wage war and the
    impact of change has been striking.

             It was imaginative covert action--CIA officers working
            with the U.S. military--that helped drive military operations
            and ousted the Taliban from power in Afghanistan and broke up
            the al Qaeda sanctuary.
             Terrorist arrests are increasing steadily. That
            evidence comes with your morning newspapers nearly every day
            now.
             CIA, FBI, Treasury, and other partners, at home and
            abroad are starving the al Qaeda of its lifeblood--money.
             CIA has worked with the FBI, as it has taken down
            extremists in Lackawanna, Columbus, and New York City.
             Our coalition partners include, by varying degrees,
            Libyans and Russians, Chinese and Hungarians, Pakistanis and
            Saudis--and our traditional allies in Europe and Asia.

        In short, the situation has changed dramatically from where the 9/
    11 Commission left off. Two things, however, are still true: al Qaeda
    and other terrorists remain dangerous and there is still room for
    improvement in the Intelligence Community. But the image that many seek
    to perpetuate of a community that does not share information or work
    together, a community of turf-conscious people competing for
    influence--that is not the community I lead. It is a caricature that
    does a great disservice to the men and women who put it on the line
    every day, 24/7.
                           supporting the warfighter
        Because of this committee's special responsibilities, I need to say
    a word about the Intelligence Community's support to the warfighter. As
    we discuss various proposals for restructuring the Intelligence
    Community today, let me be clear about one thing: no matter what course
    the administration and Congress choose, intelligence support to the
    military, especially in time of war, should not be allowed to
    diminish--and I believe such support can and will be preserved under
    any of the options being considered. Everyone in the Intelligence
    Community understands that NSA, NGA, and NRO, all vital parts of the
    National Intelligence Community, are also combat support agencies. Let
    me give you the assurance that the relationship between the
    Intelligence Community and the uniformed military has never been
    closer. Some data points:

             The Secretary of Defense has met frequently with
            George Tenet and myself to coordinate policies across the
            board.
             A Navy Seal Three Star--Admiral Calland--sits right
            across the hall from me with the mission of ensuring we and the
            military are connected and that both sides are getting what
            they need.
             CIA and U.S. military officers have been living and
            fighting together for 3 years in the mountains and plains of
            Afghanistan where they have al Qaeda on the run.
             Our collection, operational, and analytic support to
            military efforts in Afghanistan and Iraq is close and
            continuous.
             The CIA deployed 12 Crisis Operations Liaison Teams to
            CENTCOM specifically tailored to work side-by-side with Special
            Operations and conventional forces in Afghanistan and Iraq.
             I hold frequent video conferences with CENTCOM
            Commander Abizaid to personally assure that we understand his
            perspective and needs.
             We have upgraded information technology support to the
            military in the field, so that Intelligence Community products
            are now available in 80 military intelligence centers around
            the globe.
                               thoughts on reform
        Looking ahead now, it is important to note that the threat from
    terrorist organizations is not stagnant. These organizations learn and
    adapt. It is not enough for us to keep up, we must anticipate and keep
    ahead. As we seek to build on the improvements we've made in recent
    years, we should keep in mind a few of what I would call ``first
    principles'':
        First, speed and agility are the keys to the war on terrorism, and
    profoundly important to the Nation's other intelligence challenges.
    Speed and agility are not promoted by complicated wiring diagrams, more
    levels of bureaucracy, increased dual hatting, or inherent questions
    about who is in charge.
        Second, as in architecture, form should follow function. The
    functions intelligence must perform today are dramatically different
    than during the Cold War. Back then, we focused heavily on large
    strategic forces and where countries stood in the bipolar competition
    of the day. Today, the focus is more on locating people, tracking
    shipments of dangerous materials, understanding politics down to the
    tribal level in a world where the only constant is change.
        Third, in this world clear structure and clear chain of command is
    better than its opposite.
        Fourth, most important to knowing how and what to change is
    consensus on what we want from our intelligence agencies, constancy in
    resource and moral support for them through good and bad times, and
    patience. The commission says that the country cannot be patient. But
    to quote a saying I learned during my Army years: if you want it bad;
    you will get it bad.
        Drawing on these principles, I believe that short, clear lines of
    command and control are required in whatever structure you establish,
    regardless of what you call its leader. Three words are key: agility,
    flexibility, and speed. You need to build these into any new structures
    and procedures.
        No matter how successfully we anticipate future challenges, we will
    not foresee them all. So, we will need the ability to adapt our
    organizations to change, easily and quickly. We will need flexibility
    in shifting resources, people and money to respond to shifting
    priorities. The DCI can do some of this with existing authorities. But
    frankly, it is too complicated and ponderous. It involves more
    negotiation and signoffs than the times will allow.
        That is why, should the President's proposal to create a National
    Intelligence Director be adopted, I believe that individual should have
    the clear authority to move people and resources and to evaluate the
    performance of the national intelligence agencies and their leaders.
    This should be accomplished in the cleanest and most direct manner you
    can devise.
        People often remark that DCIs allow too much in the Intelligence
    Community to be ``CIA-centric''--whether it is the staffing of centers
    or the preparation of national estimates. Well, the reason is simple.
    It's because the DCI ``can''--that is these are the troops he directly
    commands and can task and move with little effort or resistance. If the
    DCI had enhanced authorities along the lines I've suggested or if you
    create a NID like that, you should expect to see much more integration
    of effort in the community and a greater capacity to create cross-
    community task forces and centers in a more agile and seamless way.
        You would also see more progress by a DCI or NID on things like
    common policies for personnel, training, security, and information
    technology.
        As you consider all of this, here is a key thing to think about:
    who will you hold responsible not just when things are going well but
    when something goes wrong with intelligence? Today, it is the DCI even
    though his authorities over the rest of the community outside CIA are
    limited. If in the future it will be a National Intelligence Director,
    what authorities would be commensurate with that kind of
    responsibility? What would that person actually be responsible for?
    What the community concludes substantively about major issues, like
    Iraq, North Korea, or terrorism? If the answer is yes, that person will
    need direct access to sizeable numbers of collectors and analysts, just
    as the DCI has today. The question then arises about where those people
    will come from and with what impact.
        Or would the NID be responsible less for substantive matters and
    principally for the ``management'' and integration of resources--and
    can the two be separated? If they can, will responsibility and
    accountability be harder to pin down than it is today--especially in
    view of the fact that the person you now hold responsible--the head of
    CIA--would then be at least a layer away from the top?
        I regret to close with a series of questions, but I believe they
    illustrate the complexity of these issues and the need to proceed
    cautiously and with care as we contemplate changes to an intelligence
    system on which the Nation must depend, more than ever, for its
    security.

        Chairman Warner. Thank you very much, Director McLaughlin,
    for a very frank and candid appraisal of this situation,
    drawing on many, many years of experience that you've had at
    the Agency.
        General Myers?

       STATEMENT OF GEN. RICHARD B. MYERS, USAF, CHAIRMAN, JOINT
                            CHIEFS OF STAFF

        General Myers. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, Senator Levin, and
    members of the committee, for your support of our ongoing
    efforts to improve our intelligence capabilities.
        Our military has been working diligently since September 11
    to break down intelligence barriers and to better integrate
    with other agencies of our government and our allies. We've
    accomplished a great deal, but we still have much work left to
    do. I can think of no more important issue to our national
    security and to the men and women of our Armed Forces in harm's
    way around the world.
        Reorganizing the Intelligence Community is a complex and
    difficult task, and the decisions made will have enormous
    consequences far into the future. Opportunities like this only
    come along once in a long time, perhaps in a lifetime. The last
    intelligence reform of the magnitude we're now considering was
    in 1947. So we have to be careful as we proceed.
        While I support the concept of a National Intelligence
    Director, I'd like to articulate what I think are some critical
    parameters as we move forward.
        As Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, I am continually
    mindful of the fact that the DOD's intelligence capabilities
    are an important part of the Nation's overall Intelligence
    Community, and these assets support national security in the
    broadest sense.
        At the same time, to the warfighter, from the combatant
    commander down to the private on patrol, timely, accurate
    intelligence is literally a life-and-death matter every day. In
    my judgment, the military's dependence on intelligence is
    unique and on a scale unparalleled in our government. In fact,
    in today's threat environment, we no longer have a distinct
    boundary between operations and intelligence.
        Traditionally, we thought of intelligence as support, a
    support function. That's an outmoded, outdated way of thinking.
    DOD's intelligence people are an integral part of the
    warfighting team.
        When coalition forces captured Saddam Hussein in December
    2003, we saw this integrated team in action as they turned
    information into action quickly. That's just one example out of
    thousands. But intelligence reform initiatives need to further
    this ability to integrate operations and intelligence.
        As we move forward, we cannot create any institutional
    barriers between intelligence agencies--and, of course, that
    would include the National Security Agency, the National
    Geospatial-Intelligence Agency, and the National Reconnaissance
    Office--and the rest of the warfighting team. We've made great
    progress integrating this team, as was evident in our military
    successes in Afghanistan and Iraq.
        I share the concerns of the Secretary and others who have
    testified on this issue, that we proceed with caution on any
    decision that increases centralized control of intelligence. In
    some areas, greater centralization might improve coordination,
    create resource efficiencies, and clarify responsibilities. On
    the other hand, we must absolutely protect the competition, the
    inherent cross-checking function that comes from independent,
    all-source analysis. The combatant commanders and the Joint
    Chiefs have also voiced this same concern.
        We must also protect the dynamic we have today that
    encourages innovative thinking. I believe the more you have
    centralized control, the less you have the kind of
    entrepreneurial spirit and agility that I see in our service
    men and women every day. The officers and noncommissioned
    officers (NCOs) and civilians in the field who see a problem
    and create a solution contribute immeasurably to our overall
    intelligence capabilities.
        Traditionally, we have used the terms ``national,''
    ``strategic,'' and ``tactical'' to define intelligence
    functions, assets, and customers. Today, I believe those terms
    highlight, and even perpetuate, stovepipe thinking. The data
    that the private in the foxhole needs right now might be the
    same information the President needs, and the reverse could
    certainly be true. The same, by the way, is true of the terms
    ``intelligence,'' ``surveillance,'' and ``reconnaissance,'' or
    ISR. I often challenge people to convince me there's a
    functional distinction between them. No one has succeeded yet.
    I point it out for two reasons. One is to show that there are
    still stovepipes out there that we need to overcome, but also
    to highlight the challenge in dividing tasks and assigning
    responsibilities in a way that will be productive and
    effective. We simply haven't caught up to information-age
    warfare in this new national security environment that we find
    ourselves.
        Above all, intelligence reform must further result in
    better information-sharing. We have to get beyond the thinking
    that intelligence is proprietary. This really is a cultural
    issue. Traditionally, the producer of intelligence has been
    considered the owner of that intelligence. That's clearly
    unsatisfactory, as September 11 showed. As Director McLaughlin
    said, we've made a great deal of progress in that area, as
    well. In my view, we still have more to do.
        We have to move from the thought process of ``need to
    know'' that dominated our Cold War mindset to a ``need to
    share'' mindset. We need to reexamine how we balance risk, from
    a security and classification perspective, versus the benefits
    that come from sharing information.
        Right now, I believe we depend, in large measure, on
    personal relationships and memoranda of understanding to force
    information-sharing across organizations and agencies. In fact,
    I've dropped a roll of duct tape on the podium during a speech
    to emphasize this point, because, in a sense, we're duct-taping
    together organizations and processes that weren't designed to
    be well-connected. We've made progress, as said, but, again,
    there is more to do.
        We have to, to the best we can, institutionalize
    information-sharing to provide a much greater degree of
    transparency for all intelligence customers. I think that's one
    function a National Intelligence Director might perform very
    well.
        We also tend to focus on vertical information-sharing,
    getting information up and down the chain of command. We have
    much room for improvement, not just in sharing information
    between the headquarters and the foxhole, but also between
    foxholes. Here, I'm using the term ``foxhole'' figuratively, of
    course. It's also the ship and the aircraft and the guard-posts
    of the front gate of a base.
        A National Intelligence Director should also oversee needed
    integration of intelligence resources. Competition for
    resources is a big challenge for the Intelligence Community,
    and we need an improved process for coordinating intelligence
    programs--and here, I'm thinking of the major procurement
    programs--perhaps modeled after the Joint Requirements
    Oversight Council that we use in the DOD. This process must be
    transparent within the entire intelligence communities and
    those departments and agencies that are concerned.
        I appreciate the efforts of this committee to stay focused
    on intelligence reform at its broadest level. Certainly, the
    terrorist attacks of September 11 and the struggle to defeat
    violent extremists are at the forefront of this debate. But we
    can't lose sight of the fact that we are making decisions that
    will have ramifications well beyond the war on terrorism. We
    don't know with any certainty what the next threat to our
    security and our prosperity will be, but we do know we can't
    afford to be taken by surprise. That was the most important
    lesson, of course, from Pearl Harbor and the most important
    lesson of September 11.
        As Senator Levin said, and the Secretary said, we have to
    be very thoughtful and, at the same time, proceed with the
    proper sense of urgency. As we get more and more clarity on the
    gaps and deficiencies in our intelligence today, we have to
    guard against creating new problems.
        The details matter very much. I highly recommend an
    interagency tabletop exercise to work through any recommended
    options to war-game the second-, third-, and fourth-order
    effects, and highlight problems before they're
    institutionalized.
        Once again, on behalf of the men and women in uniform, I
    thank you for your support. This is a sacred responsibility
    that we share, protecting the lives of our service men and
    women, preserving our way of life for future generations. I
    look forward to working with you in this important work, and to
    answering your questions.
        Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Chairman Warner. Thank you very much, General, for an
    important contribution.
        We'll now proceed to a round, 6 minutes per Senator.
        I want to approach my questions just in a very practical
    way. Let's face the realities of where we are--Congress, the
    executive branch and, indeed, how our Government is functioning
    at this very moment.
        We're in recess. Nevertheless, some 20 committees have come
    back--or held 20 hearings. I think that shows strong
    participation by Congress.
        The President has indicated--and I read his statement
    today, ``Today, I'm asking Congress to create the position of
    National Intelligence Director.'' Now, that person will serve
    as the President's principal intelligence advisor and will
    oversee and coordinate the foreign and domestic activities and
    intelligence. This is a broad mandate. The National Security
    Advisor, in response to a question put to her, said, ``We
    expect the National Intelligence Director would have
    significant input into the development of a budget.'' We're
    awaiting further clarification from the administration, maybe
    actually a bill, itself.
        Now, it's important that we try to do what we can, given
    the realities that we're in an election of our President, we're
    in an election of the entire House of Representatives, a third
    of the Senate, and we have but a few weeks time left after we
    come back here in September. I, personally, think something can
    be done, providing it's constructive and adds to strengthening.
        But I pick up on your comment, Secretary Rumsfeld, and, I
    think, a very wise one, as you recited the history of reforms
    that this country has had, beginning in the 1947 Act, the
    Goldwater Act, and so forth; we didn't do it in a single
    stroke.
        So as I approach my individual responsibilities--and, of
    course, our committee will meet and decide how we condense the
    information we've received and forward it to other committees,
    and possibly to the President--but I'm of the opinion that we
    should not try and do the whole 9/11 Commission recommendation
    in a single stroke. That's my view. If you'll look at the one
    provision, which I think is most important, here on page 412,
    ``Second, the National Intelligence Director should manage the
    national intelligence program and oversee the component
    agencies of the Intelligence Community, would submit a unified
    budget,'' and it goes on.
        Now, Mr. Secretary, I'd have to ask you, very bluntly and
    strongly, if we were to rubberstamp that provision and enact it
    into law in the next few weeks, would that put at risk, in your
    judgment, the ability for this country to perform as well as
    it's performing today in its intelligence collection
    activities?
        Secretary Rumsfeld. Mr. Chairman, those are issues that are
    being discussed extensively in the executive branch, as well as
    here in the committee. They're important questions. Trying to
    find that right balance, I think it might be useful, just for
    the record, if we took the two big issues with the National
    Intelligence Director, personnel and budget----
        Chairman Warner. Budget. All right.
        Secretary Rumsfeld. --and explain how it currently works.
        The Director of Central Intelligence today has very broad,
    extensive authorities in being. They may be executed in varying
    ways by different DCIs over time, but, in fact, in writing,
    there's tremendous authority. I wouldn't think of suggesting
    somebody to the President for the NSA or the NGA or for the NRO
    without developing criteria with the DCI, without discussing
    candidates, without interviewing candidates, without each
    agreeing that those candidates--this individual is the right
    individual, and making a joint recommendation. That's how it's
    done. With respect to the budget, the current Director of
    Central Intelligence does develop that budget. The issue, I
    think, is not so much that as it is the reprogramming
    authority, and part of that is bureaucracy in the Agency, in
    DOD, and in the Office of Management and Budget (OMB), and part
    of it's bureaucracy in Congress. John McLaughlin is here and
    can comment on that. But the role, today, on both budget and
    personnel, for the DCI is extensive, and my guess is, it ought
    to be, for a NID.
        Chairman Warner. Then one route, which I strongly endorse,
    could be that we could, if necessary, formalize, in statute,
    what exists today by way of joint cooperation between yourself
    and the Director of Central Intelligence in the formulation of
    the budgets, and those budgets could be, in a sense, jointly
    submitted. Am I not correct?
        Secretary Rumsfeld. I would have to go back and refer to
    the statute to see what's already in there, Mr. Chairman.
        Chairman Warner. I think you'll find that that is the
    spirit of it. I think if we did that, that would remove some of
    the concerns that the 9/11 Commission had. If we did the same,
    in terms of appointments, as you point out, you wouldn't think
    of putting someone in there that was not acceptable to the
    DCI--so formalize that and have a joint submission of the
    nominations of the heads of the various departments at DIA,
    NSA, and the like. Would that seem to you to be an acceptable
    advancement?
        Secretary Rumsfeld. It is the practice we're using.
        Chairman Warner. Fine.
        Secretary Rumsfeld. I've found it, working with George
    Tenet, that it worked very well. We communicated extensively
    about these individuals, and made the recommendation to the
    President, saying that each of us agreed that this was an
    appropriate thing, to appoint or nominate or to extend the term
    of any one of those individuals. Except for DCI, less formal
    there. Certainly with the national collection agencies. With
    the Director of Defense Intelligence, with that post, we had
    the same discussion. But it is a slightly different role, and I
    don't know that I would include it if you're going to be doing
    something with a statute.
        Chairman Warner. We could look at that. But if this
    sweeping proposal here of the 9/11 Commission--and I don't mean
    to be critical of it; I'm just being bluntly factual about it--
    if that were to be adopted as stated here, would that derogate
    your, I think, prime responsibility--namely, the Tactical
    Intelligence and Related Activities (TIARA) budget--which
    supports the warfighter?
        Secretary Rumsfeld. Senator, we are still looking at these
    things. They're considerably important, and I am not in the
    position to say anything other than, the devil's in the
    details.
        Chairman Warner. Right, I accept that. But the work of
    Congress is moving ahead. We have some momentum in these
    committees. We're coming up with ideas. The sooner we can get
    those guideposts from our President and the administration, the
    better we will be able to form our work.
        I would ask you, Director McLaughlin, I've suggested
    possibly that Congress would enact such laws to change the
    position so that the Director is on an equal footing with the
    members of the Cabinet--most particularly, the Secretary of
    Defense. Could you, if not now, show the committee your
    recommendations of what legislative actions need to be taken to
    strengthen the DCI such that he can stand on an equal footing,
    with regard to budget matters and other matters, with the
    Secretaries of Defense and State?
        Mr. McLaughlin. Mr. Chairman, if I'm not mistaken, the
    current statute really accomplishes that.
        Chairman Warner. I think it does, but others do not think
    it does.
        Mr. McLaughlin. The existing statute gives the DCI the
    authority to put together the budget for the Intelligence
    Community. In fact, I could walk you through the steps by which
    that's done, if you wish. So that exists in the statute
    currently.
        Chairman Warner. I ask you to examine the balance of the
    statutes and advise the committee. In the first place, you're a
    level two, which is one step below the level of the Secretary
    of Defense. Is that correct?
        Mr. McLaughlin. That's correct. But, in fact, the process
    currently works as the Secretary described. The DCI, based on
    intelligence priorities that are now established by the DCI in
    consultation with the National Security Council, puts together
    an intelligence budget by suggesting to each of the constituent
    agencies what their budget ought to include, what the
    priorities ought to be. Those agencies put their budgets
    together----
        Chairman Warner. My time is going along. But my point is,
    you're a level below, in terms of protocol, pay, and otherwise.
    We could raise it to the same level as the Secretary, could we
    not?
        Mr. McLaughlin. You certainly could.
        Chairman Warner. All right. That's, I think, an important
    matter.
        Mr. McLaughlin. Why would I argue against that? [Laughter.]
        Chairman Warner. Fine. No, no----[Laughter.]
        I understand that. But yesterday's panel--a very
    distinguished panel, of Dr. Schlesinger and Frank Carlucci, who
    know a great deal about these issues were concerned, together
    with Dr. Hamre, that even though there is the law there,
    because of your level-two position, not level-one, you could
    be--not you, personally, but that person occupying--at some
    disadvantage in the customary competition that goes on among
    the cabinet officers--I'm not suggesting you become a cabinet
    officer--but the cabinet officers as they work through the
    budget and the personnel appointments. So that's my point.
    Perhaps we could change it so you're on an absolute coequal
    status, and give you the title of NID, and try it for a while,
    and see if it would work. Otherwise, I guess we're awaiting
    further comments from the administration. [No response.]
        All right.
        Senator Levin.
        Senator Levin. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        I'd like to ask the Secretary his personal view, then, on
    some of the specific recommendations of the 9/11 Commission
    relative to the powers of the National Intelligence Director
    and the proposed National Counterterrorism Center. It's clear
    to me that we should create both. We will create both, I hope,
    and do it promptly. The issue is going to be the powers and
    responsibilities. I'd like your personal view on those issues.
        First, should this proposed National Counterterrorism
    Center be able to assign operational responsibilities to
    combatant commands? Your personal view. Do you agree or
    disagree, or can't you answer one way or the other simply?
        Secretary Rumsfeld. Are you talking about the center or the
    NID?
        Senator Levin. This is the NCTC.
        Secretary Rumsfeld. The NCTC. Right now, the folks in the
    interagency process are working hard to find out----
        Senator Levin. You don't have a personal view you can share
    with us now?
        Secretary Rumsfeld. I think that the statutory
    responsibilities of the departments and agencies pretty much
    establish where responsibility for operations ought to be,
    and----
        Senator Levin. There's a proposal----
        Secretary Rumsfeld. --number one----
        Senator Levin. There's a proposal--I just want to know,
    because I----
        Secretary Rumsfeld. Well, I'm doing----
        Senator Levin.--I mean, I'm trying to----
        Secretary Rumsfeld. --my best.
        Senator Levin. Well, I know, but if you can't give us
    ``personally, you agree,'' ``personally, you disagree,'' or,
    ``it's not that simple,'' I'll accept that you can't give us
    one or the other. That's acceptable to me. You can either
    agree, or you disagree, with that. I mean, that's a specific
    recommendation. Mr. Secretary, we got specific
    recommendations----
        Secretary Rumsfeld. I understand.
        Senator Levin.--from the 9/11 Commission. I'm quoting them.
    I just want to ask your personal agreement or disagreement. If
    you can't give us that, that's okay, but just say you can't
    give us a personal yes or no from your perspective.
        Secretary Rumsfeld. I can't do it with a yes or no----
        Senator Levin. Thank you.
        Secretary Rumsfeld. --that's for sure.
        Senator Levin. Thank you.
        Secretary Rumsfeld. It's a vastly----
        Senator Levin. Now, the next----
        Secretary Rumsfeld. --more complex question.
        Senator Levin. Okay. Well, it's a very specific
    recommendation.
        Now, by executive order now, the reprogramming authority is
    in the Secretary of Defense. That's by executive order. The 9/
    11 Commission is recommending, essentially, that we give the
    new National Intelligence Director the budget reprogramming
    authority. Do you agree or disagree with that, personally?
        Secretary Rumsfeld. Certainly an effective NID would need
    to be intimately involved in reprogramming. How the authority
    ought to work, whether DOD, NID, or OMB, is something that,
    just by its very nature, requires coordination among all three
    and Congress. Quite honestly, Congress has been one of the
    biggest difficulties with respect to that issue.
        Senator Levin. I'm going to ask that the five questions
    which I asked for specific agreement or disagreement be
    answered. Mr. Chairman, I'm going to ask, for the record, that
    our witnesses answer whether they agree or disagree with those
    specific recommendations, because of the time requirements
    here. Is that all right, for the record?
        Now, this is for Mr. McLaughlin. Whatever the reforms are,
    we must promote objectivity and the independence of
    intelligence assessments. The 9/11 Commission said that the
    report of a meeting in Prague between the lead hijacker, Atta,
    and the Iraqi Intelligence Officer, al Ani, was not supported
    by available evidence. Yet that report of the meeting was
    repeatedly referred to in public statements of the
    administration as key evidence of a link between Iraq and al
    Qaeda. CIA had doubts. We found out later, because those CIA
    doubts were in classified documents. The CIA had doubts about
    the reliability of the reports of that meeting. Why were the
    doubts of the CIA left classified, while the report of the
    meeting, which clearly was reported--there was a report--was
    just repeatedly referred to? Why were your doubts classified
    until recently?
        Mr. McLaughlin. This is a story that evolved over a long
    period of time.
        Senator Levin. Very specifically, though, why were your
    doubts left classified until recently? That's my question.
        Mr. McLaughlin. They were spelled out very explicitly in a
    classified paper----
        Senator Levin. But the----
        Mr. McLaughlin.--published on January 29.
        Senator Levin.--report of the meeting was used repeatedly
    as evidence of the link between al Qaeda and Iraq. That report
    of the meeting was repeatedly referred to by administration
    sources as being credible, and yet your doubts about the
    meeting, in the CIA, remained classified. My question to you
    is, why did the CIA, in its public statements, just simply say
    that, ``Yes, there is a report which can neither be confirmed
    nor denied,'' but why did you leave the fact that you had
    doubts about that meeting classified? That's my question.
        Mr. McLaughlin. The vast majority of what we produce is
    classified. It goes to members of the administration and it's
    available to Congress so that people have a very clear
    understanding, at any moment, what we----
        Senator Levin. Not the public.
        Mr. McLaughlin.--what we think.
        Senator Levin. But the public did not know that you had
    doubts.
        Mr. McLaughlin. Our job is to make our views available as
    clearly and objectively as we can to the policymaker and to
    Congress, frequently in classified--almost always in classified
    channels, because the information is sensitive. We're dealing
    with liaison sources here. We're dealing with intelligence
    collection techniques. That's why it's classified. It's then
    there for anyone who wishes to draw on it, as they wish to draw
    on it, in shaping their public comments.
        Senator Levin. Mr. McLaughlin, the CIA said----
        Mr. McLaughlin. But the 9/11 Commission was, I think,
    careful in saying that we were objective on this point. This is
    one of the points where the 9/11 Commission----
        Senator Levin. No, they----
        Mr. McLaughlin.--gave us----
        Senator Levin.--they didn't say that. It was the
    Intelligence Community that made a reference to that.
        Mr. McLaughlin, the CIA said, in a classified document,
    that assisting Islamic terrorists would be an extreme step for
    Saddam Hussein. Why was that left classified, when the
    administration was saying that Saddam Hussein would give
    Islamic terrorists a weapon of mass destruction at any day, any
    moment? Why did you leave that critical fact classified?
        Mr. McLaughlin. I think the answer to that is simply that--
    the one I gave before, that our job is to say, as objectively
    and clearly as we can, what we think to be the case--and we did
    that--for the benefit of both policymakers and Congress. It was
    there----
        Senator Levin. Classified.
        Mr. McLaughlin.--it was there for all to draw on. I think
    most of our work is classified.
        Senator Levin. Many of your statements, though, however,
    were unclassified.
        Mr. McLaughlin. I think, on that point, we issued one or
    two unclassified statements----
        Senator Levin. Right.
        Mr. McLaughlin.--largely in response to questions from
    Congress. As I recall without consulting them, those statements
    were very carefully phrased, in terms of the limitations we put
    on describing that relationship. In an unclassified form, as
    well.
        Senator Levin. And----
        Mr. McLaughlin. I believe, in response, actually----
        Senator Levin.--you believe it's that----
        Mr. McLaughlin.--to a letter that you----
        Senator Levin.--you believe that statement, when it was
    finally unclassified, that it would----
        Mr. McLaughlin. Yes, sir.
        Senator Levin. Excuse me. When the statement was finally
    unclassified, that the CIA believed it would be an extreme step
    for Saddam Hussein to give a weapon of mass destruction, you
    believe that that was consistent with what the administration
    was saying about the likelihood of Saddam Hussein giving al
    Qaeda a weapon of mass destruction?
        Mr. McLaughlin. Well----
        Senator Levin. Is that your judgment?
        Mr. McLaughlin. We've talked----
        Senator Levin. I'm asking you a direct question.
        Mr. McLaughlin.--we've talked about this before, and I
    don't think it's our job to comment----
        Senator Levin. We've never gotten a clear answer to that
    question. Let's get it now.
        Mr. McLaughlin. I don't think it's our job to comment on
    the public statements of the administration or of Congress.
    There are times, as we've explained in the past, when we will
    take someone aside--either a Member of Congress or a member of
    the administration--and quietly tell them, ``That's--there's
    new information on this, and I would describe it differently.''
        Senator Levin. My time is up.
        Thank you.
        Chairman Warner. Did you feel you had adequate time to
    respond to those questions?
        Mr. McLaughlin. I do.
        Chairman Warner. Fine.
        Senator McCain?
        Senator McCain. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and I thank you
    for announcing that we'll have the hearing in September. I hope
    that we also have a hearing on the latest administration
    proposal on troop realignment.
        Chairman Warner. Yes. We will.
        Senator McCain. I'm concerned about it, and I hope we can
    get as full an explanation as possible. I'm particularly
    concerned about moving troops out of South Korea when North
    Korea has probably never been more dangerous than any time
    since the end of the Korean War. I hope, as some critics
    allege, this is not a retreat to Fortress America. So I'll look
    forward to hearing from the administration on this very
    important announcement.
        Chairman Warner. I assure you, Senator and other
    colleagues, Senator Levin and I discussed that yesterday, and
    we will promptly advise the committee of a date.
        Senator McCain. Also, I think we need a hearing on this
    latest mismanagement identified by the DOD Inspector General of
    $2.6 billion being spent on C-130 aircraft that can't be used
    in combat. Remarkable. Same people that were involved in the
    Boeing deal.
        Director McLaughlin, the reports, from whatever source,
    indicate that our greatest--or certainly the top two or three
    greatest failings has been in human intelligence. Mr. Lindh,
    from California, was able to join and train with the Taliban
    and fight against the United States, but we've never been able
    to insert any kind of person into the al Qaeda or other
    terrorist organizations. What, in the 9/11 Commission
    recommendations, do you believe will help us in this issue?
        Mr. McLaughlin. First, Senator, with all due respect, I
    would dispute the premise. In closed session, I could explain
    that we have been able to achieve what you suggest we haven't
    been able to achieve.
        Senator McCain. It's not my suggestion; it's the suggestion
    of the 9/11 Commission.
        Mr. McLaughlin. I'm talking----
        Senator McCain. It's a conclusion of the 9/11 Commission.
        Mr. McLaughlin. The way I would characterize it is, at the
    time of September 11, we clearly had human sources within the
    sanctuary, or we would not have been met on the ground on
    September 27 by people welcoming us into Afghanistan. So we had
    a network of human sources in Afghanistan at that time. I
    believe the 9/11 Commission notes that.
        Senator McCain. I only have 6 minutes----
        Mr. McLaughlin. Since September 11----
        My comment, at the outset, frankly, was more about the
    post-September 11 period, when I think our human intelligence
    (HUMINT) has improved.
        Now, in terms of your question about what, in the 9/11
    Commission recommendations, would help us acquire better
    HUMINT, I think----
        Senator McCain. I guess I have to rephrase my question. Do
    you believe that we need to improve our human intelligence?
        Mr. McLaughlin. Absolutely. Absolutely.
        Senator McCain. Then what is it that needs to be done?
        Mr. McLaughlin. Director Tenet's comment before the 9/11
    Commission, that it would take 5 more years, I think, was
    misinterpreted by almost everyone who heard it. He was not
    saying, at the time, that, ``We are starting now, and 5 years
    from now we'll be in good shape.'' What he was saying, and what
    I would strongly endorse, is that we probably need about 5 more
    years to get to where we need to be.
        But you have to appreciate where we started from. In 1997,
    at the end of those reductions of about 25 percent in our
    overall capability, I would say we were in Chapter 11. We were
    only training about a dozen or two dozen, what we call, case
    officers, the people who recruit human spies. Over the last 5
    to 7 years we've rebuilt that capability, thanks to the
    resources that Congress and the administration have provided--
    and that's extremely important--to the point where we're now
    graduating the largest classes of HUMINT source collectors in
    our history. We now have an array of people around the world,
    and an array of HUMINT sources, including sources--the very
    people who are allowing us to capture people like Khalid Sheikh
    Mohammed. That was a HUMINT source operation. The people who
    are allowing us to bring forth the kind of information that we
    brought forth in the last couple of weeks on the casing reports
    of major financial institutions, that came about as a result of
    HUMINT source operations.
        Are we where we need to be? Absolutely not. We need more
    core collectors--case officers, if you will--who are out there
    recruiting spies. We need more people with languages that help
    them do that. We need more people in our clandestine service,
    who don't look like me, who can circulate freely in parts of
    the world where people like me would stand out.
        So bottom line here is, that's what we need to get to the
    point where we need to be on HUMINT source collection.
        Senator McCain. In your written statement, you said,
    ``Should the--that's why, should the President's proposal to
    create a National Intelligence Director be adopted, I believe
    the individual should have the clear authority to move people
    and resources, and to evaluate the performance of the national
    intelligence agencies and their leaders.'' Does that include
    control over their budgets?
        Mr. McLaughlin. The Secretary said, this is all being
    debated. If you want my personal view, I would say yes.
        Senator McCain. Thank you very much, Director McLaughlin. I
    also want to thank you for your outstanding service to the
    country for many years. We're very appreciative of it, and we
    know it will continue.
        Finally, could we talk about stovepiping again? Do you
    believe that the recommendations will prevent a reoccurrence of
    such has happened when FBI agents reported that people were
    taking pilot training in Phoenix and the information never got
    to the right people?
        Mr. McLaughlin. I think we're close to fixing that problem
    now, and I think some version of a National Counterterrorism
    Center would take us even further.
        The reason I think we're close to fixing that now, a whole
    series of things have changed since September 11. It goes to
    the kind of--let me start at the top--personal relationship
    that exists between the Director of the FBI and the Director of
    the CIA. During these last 2 weeks, for example, when we were
    struggling with the terrorism alerts, Bob Mueller and I were on
    the phone continuously with each other, working through issues.
    There's no impediment there.
        We now have senior FBI officers embedded in our
    Counterterrorism Center. One comes every day, a senior officer,
    to my meeting at 5 o'clock, where we work through terrorism
    problems around the world, and that person is responsible for
    making sure that everything at that table, the most sensitive
    intelligence, is available back in the FBI.
        In the Terrorism Threat Integration Center, it's not
    inconsequential what's going on there. It's not built yet,
    entirely, but we now have FBI officers, CIA officers, officers
    from Homeland Security, and any number of other agencies
    sitting in one building, a stone's throw away from each other,
    exchanging information.
        So I actually think--oh, and the other thing I'd point
    out--and Bob Mueller needs to speak for himself on this, but I
    work closely enough with him that I think I could characterize
    something he's doing that relates to the problem you've just
    pointed out. He has underway a vigorous effort to develop a
    reporting system from all of his constituent field offices
    coming into a central hub where that reporting would then be
    funneled out to people who need it. That's essentially the kind
    of reporting system we've had in the foreign intelligence arena
    for many years. Case officer meets someone in a back alley in
    Egypt, sends in a report, that's distributed to people all
    around the world who need to see it. That's what Director
    Mueller's working to create, and making progress in creating.
        Not to say there aren't problems to go here, but we're
    moving in the right direction.
        Senator McCain. Thank you very much.
        Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Chairman Warner. Thank you, Senator McCain.
        Senator Kennedy.
        Senator Kennedy. Thank you very much. Welcome, gentlemen.
        Secretary Rumsfeld, you referenced that civil liberties--
    the commission emphasized by the 9/11 panel--do you have any
    problems with that being included in any proposal that would
    pass Congress? [Pause.]
        I want to keep moving. I know you want to give things a
    complete answer, but I----
        Secretary Rumsfeld. I am not in a position to answer yes or
    no to questions on issues that the President and the
    interagency process is discussing.
        Senator Kennedy. Well, I----
        Secretary Rumsfeld. I clearly believe that the issue of
    domestic intelligence is an important one and requires that we
    address the questions of privacy and our values as a society.
        Senator Kennedy. If I could join in, perhaps I'll add that
    on to Senator Levin's questions for the panel to see what's
    your reaction.
        Because there is a very specific proposal on that. We're
    looking at these proposals. It's a matter of enormous
    significance and importance no matter what we do in this area.
    We'll have more of a chance to deal with it in the Judiciary
    Committee on Thursday, but I did want to get your response.
        As the Commission Report--Lee Hamilton--summarized, we need
    the best intelligence we can for our troops. But as September
    11 made clear with 3,000 Americans, we also need to protect the
    American people from terrorists. Clearly, the status quo is not
    sufficient.
        Now, if we look back on what has been stated by the
    intelligence agencies, going back to a quote that was mentioned
    yesterday, December 4, 1998, DCI Tenet, at that time, issued a
    directive, ``We are at war. I want no resources or people
    spared in this effort, either inside the CIA or the
    community.''
        Now, that was on December 4, 1998. Coming into 1999--
    February 2, 1999--George Tenet said, at the worldwide threat
    briefing, ``Let me mention two specific concerns. First, there
    is no slightest doubt that Osama bin Laden, his worldwide
    allies, his sympathizers are planning further attacks against
    us.'' He continues, ``Bin Laden's overarching aim is to get the
    United States out of the Persian Gulf. He'll strike whatever in
    the world he thinks we are vulnerable.''
        Then he continues in February 3, 2000, ``Osama bin Laden is
    still foremost among terrorists because of the immediacy and
    seriousness of the threat he poses. Everything we have learned
    recently confirms our conviction he wants to strike further
    blows against America.''
        Then in the 9/11 Commission, you were noted--and I read
    from page 208, ``Rumsfeld noted to us his own interest in
    terrorism which came up after--in his regular meetings with
    Tenet. He thought the Defense Department, before September 11,
    was not organized adequately or prepared to deal with the new
    threats, like terrorism. But his time was consumed with getting
    new officials in place and working on the foundation documents
    of a new Defense policy, the Quadrennial Defense Reviews, the
    Defense Planning Guidance, and the existing contingency plans.
    He did not recall any particular counterterrorism issue that
    engaged his attention before September 11, other than the
    development of the Predator unmanned aircraft system.''
        That is the problem. That's the problem that the 9/11
    Commission is dealing with. Evidently Secretary Scowcroft
    believed the same. I'm asking, Mr. Secretary, will you support
    the request of the chairman of the committee and Chairman
    Roberts to declassify the Scowcroft Commission, as well, since
    it's dealing with this same issue as the September 11, in terms
    of the accountability issue and intelligence-gathering? Will
    you?
        Secretary Rumsfeld. I have been briefed on the Scowcroft
    Commission Report. I don't see any reason why there shouldn't
    be a process, going through and see what portion of it can be
    declassified. I don't know who classified it in the first
    place. It wasn't the DOD, to my knowledge.
        Senator Kennedy. No, it was a presidential request, and,
    therefore, it's a presidential decision about the
    declassification, not yours. So the only question is--it's
    right on target on the issue that we're trying to consider here
    before the committee, the 9/11 Commission, and it is made by a
    very distinguished figure that's served with President Bush-
    one, serves with President Bush-two, served with Republican and
    Democratic Presidents, and also understands the importance of
    intelligence-gathering and that the current system is not
    functioning.
        So I gather that you will at least--it's your position that
    you would welcome the Scowcroft Commission Report. It's been
    reported in the newspapers. It's on this issue. Do you think it
    would be useful for us to have that?
        Secretary Rumsfeld. As I say, I've been briefed, I haven't
    read it recently, and it would have to be declassified.
        Senator Kennedy. When you were briefed, was there anything
    in it that bothered--that you didn't think could be classified?
        Secretary Rumsfeld. Not that I can recall.
        Senator Kennedy. Thank you.
        Let me ask a question about--we've talked a good deal about
    what is the actual statutes that govern the allocation of
    responsibilities between the Secretary of Defense and the head
    of the intelligence agency. But if I ask the head of the
    intelligence agency--if you had a dispute, for example, with
    the DOD. Say it was on Syria. You wanted to have a program to
    find out about the penetration of al Qaeda in Syria, and DOD
    wanted to have a report on whether the Syrian bridges could
    hold American tanks, do you win on that, or does the DOD make
    the final judgment decision? If you wanted to have a satellite
    to gather radioactive information technology, in terms of being
    able to further your different interests in a particular
    targeted area, and the DOD wanted to use that satellite for
    other purposes, who makes the final cut on those kinds of
    issues?
        Mr. McLaughlin. In truth, now, Senator, it's a negotiation.
    When we have----
        Senator Kennedy. Who makes the final cut?
        Mr. McLaughlin. The----
        Senator Kennedy. Who makes the final judgment? Someone has
    to say----
        Mr. McLaughlin. If we----
        Senator Kennedy.--this is----
        Mr. McLaughlin.--if the two of us can't agree--and
    typically we do come to an agreement, because of the
    consultation process--it goes to the President as a tiebreaker,
    which is one of the reasons why a DCI has always----
        Senator Kennedy. Has that happened, in your recent memory?
        Mr. McLaughlin. It has not. It is one of the reasons why a
    DCI always consults with the Secretary of Defense, because no
    DCI wants to put the President in the position of being the
    tiebreaker.
        Senator Kennedy. My time is up, Mr. Chairman. Thank you.
        Chairman Warner. Thank you very much.
        Senator Roberts?
        Senator Roberts. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Let me just say again that Senator Rockefeller and I have
    written to Mr. Scowcroft, and he is perfectly willing to come,
    I think, before Congress, either in a classified setting or a
    non-classified setting. He is the president of the President's
    Foreign Policy Advisory Group, which puts him in a category
    that does not permit him to come before Congress and make a
    classified document public. The person who would make that
    decision, I think, is the National Security Director, and we
    are working on that, and I am very hopeful that we can have his
    testimony. I would agree with Senator Kennedy, it would be very
    helpful.
        Director McLaughlin, I've, along with others, tossed a few
    brickbats over in your shop, and then I asked you the other day
    if you could provide me with a list of some things that have
    changed since the infamous National Intelligence Estimate (NIE)
    of 2000 and also since September 11. You've done that, and I
    would like to ask permission, Mr. Chairman, to put this list of
    nine positive changes that the CIA has made in the record at
    this point.
        Chairman Warner. Without objection.
        [The information referred to follows:]

        [GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]

        Senator Roberts. I'm not going to read them all, but I
    would just simply say that when we go to war, why, the
    intelligence and the military forces do now live together, they
    fight together; the military, law enforcement, and Intelligence
    Community does hear the latest intelligence reports; and the
    acting Director does direct action on the spot. The
    intelligence and the law enforcement communities are much more
    closely linked than they ever were before, and that's all
    across the world. The number of FBI officers serving in the
    NCTC has doubled. I think the number in the clandestine service
    with the CIA has tripled. You sent 60 people over to Terrorism
    Threat Integration Center (TTIC). I could go on and on, but I
    think that's a good-news story, from one who has been very
    critical of the CIA, more especially after our Senate inquiry.
        Let me just say the snapshot that we are taking today of
    the CIA is a different snapshot than we took with our inquiry
    and dating back to the NIE 2000 and also September 11.
        Now, you said, on page 12 of your testimony, you would also
    see more progress by a DCI or NID on things like common
    policies for personnel, training, and security and information
    technology. My question, does the current structure allow the
    DCI to set common policies for personnel, training, security,
    and information and technology? My answer to you is that it
    does, because, in 1947, the National Security Act, you and your
    predecessors have had that authority. But my question to you
    is, can you enforce those policies?
        Mr. McLaughlin. You put your finger on the issue, Senator.
    We have the authority to set the policies, but it's difficult
    to enforce them. We do our best, and we have a process for
    making progress, which we have made, but the enforcement is not
    as strong as----
        Senator Roberts. Then all this talk about the 1947 National
    Security Act and you have all the authority that you need, if,
    in simplistic terms, you would just enforce it, everything--
    well, it wouldn't be fine, but it would be better. I don't
    think you can enforce it, because of the way--this breakdown,
    in terms of TIARA and National Foreign Intelligence Program
    (NFIP) and Joint Military Intelligence Program (JMIP). I'm not
    going to go into all these acronyms, but that's the tripod of
    what the Intelligence Community and the DOD simply has now.
        Yesterday, Mr. Secretary--and I'm talking about Secretary
    Rumsfeld--we had two former Secretaries of Defense and a key
    member of the DOD. I asked them, do you support a NID? Do you
    support a NID with budget authority and also reprogramming
    authority? Without getting into the fact that we would
    obviously leave the tactical part in the military--I am talking
    more about the NFIP and the CIA, NSA, DIA, NGA, NRO, FBI--it's
    a real mouthful--Homeland Security, State, Treasury, and
    Energy--we didn't talk about moving those agencies over to the
    NID, just whether or not he had the authority to reprogram and
    hire and fire and have some control over the budget, and the
    answer was no.
        Yesterday morning, why, Senator Collins and Senator
    Lieberman, in the Governmental Affairs Committee, had three
    witnesses--they were former CIA directors--asked them the same
    question, and they said yes.
        Nobody has dared to wander onto the thin ice on how we
    reform our own situation here with the fractionalization and
    the way we handle, say, intelligence. We are having 20
    hearings. I think we've had eight; 12 more to come, as the
    Chairman has indicated. We'll have one tomorrow in the
    Intelligence Committee. We are going to have a lady who wrote a
    book about the history of the National Security Act. Since
    1947, 15 times we have tried to implement reform--if, in fact,
    it is reform--and 15 times, we've failed. She's going to say
    why. We have David Kaye to talk about intelligence centers.
    Everybody's talking about intelligence centers. The Iraq Survey
    Group (ISG) is probably a good one. We have Charles Boyd, who's
    a four-star from the Air Force, and somehow got Julian Bond,
    Newt Gingrich, Gary Hart, and Warren Rudman all to agree on one
    premise. That's almost a miracle. He's going to talk about the
    Bremer Commission, the Gilmore Commission, the CSIS study,
    Aspen-Brown, and Hart-Rudman, and say why on Earth haven't we
    moved prior to this time.
        The Intelligence Committee is drafting legislation. So
    we're going to share it with Susan Collins and with Joe
    Lieberman, and we're going to share it with this committee. We
    have already started the business of sharing it with the
    administration. We have also shared it with you, sir. We're
    going to share it with the Armed Services Committee. We think
    that it follows along the lines like the Chairman has
    indicated, and at least it's a step forward.
        Let me ask you a question, since my time has run out and
    I've made a speech. Practically speaking, how could a National
    Intelligence Director who did not possess the ability to
    control execution of the budget or control over personnel
    decisions, effectively break down stovepipes in the
    Intelligence Community and improve the sharing of information
    across the community? How could he not do that--I mean, how
    could he do that if he didn't have that authority?
        Secretary Rumsfeld. I think it's possible to give a
    National Intelligence Director, or a Director of the CIA, the
    authority to break down stovepipes and give that direction to
    the entire community and have it accomplished, quite apart from
    the budget question.
        It seems to me that--to go to your earlier comment on
    budget flexibility--the problem we have, one of the problems,
    is that the budget is developed in 1 year, it's worked on by
    Congress in another year, and it's executed in the third year.
    It's obvious that it doesn't work that way. The world changes
    out there. Flexibility is necessary.
        Now, if a portion--a same piece of intelligence can
    simultaneously be a piece of national intelligence and a piece
    of battlefield or tactical or military intelligence. The idea
    that either the DOD or CIA should go in and, without
    consultation, reprogram, it seems to me, would be unwise. You
    could disrupt things because of not understanding the fact that
    that same piece of intelligence is simultaneously national and
    military or battlefield. Therefore, it takes--simply because of
    the complexity of it, it takes both to be involved in a
    reprogramming process. That's not bad; it's prudent.
        Senator Roberts. I'm not advocating anything other than
    what you have said, in terms of the cooperation. If you had a
    Special Forces trooper in Afghanistan, and he was involved in
    battle, which they are today, that's tactical. If all of the
    sudden he happens to be in the no-man's land where Osama bin
    Laden is, that becomes strategic, and then the NID would be
    involved, just as well as you would be involved there. There
    has to be a way to put this together.
        I thank you all for coming.
        Chairman Warner. Thank you, Senator Roberts.
        General Myers. Senator Warner, can I just----
        Chairman Warner. Yes, of course. I want to just say one
    word. I want each witness to feel that you have adequate time
    to respond. Take it, and if you're not getting it, draw the
    attention to the Chairman. I'm trying, best I can, to give that
    opportunity to all.
        General, please proceed.
        General Myers. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I would just like
    to comment on Senator Roberts' question to the Secretary on,
    really, how you force change. I think everybody knows this, but
    you can't, just by moving boxes around on a chart or appointing
    a National Intelligence Director, even if he has it in statute,
    say there will be change. We're talking about some very
    ingrained cultural issues with a diverse group of
    organizations, and it's going to take more than creating that
    position. You're going to think very seriously about how you
    empower him and what tools you give him or her to do their
    task.
        When you wanted to reform the military and make us more
    joint, in Goldwater-Nichols--and most of you know this a lot
    better than I do--but I think the debate went on for 3 years.
    At least 3 years. There was, obviously, philosophical debates
    before then, but the debate here on Capitol Hill and in the
    offices of Washington, DC, for 3 years. Then you created some
    new offices--and I can think of the Vice Chairman of the Joint
    Chiefs of Staff--and some new processes--and I can think of the
    Joint Requirements Oversight Council. But you also mandated
    some personnel policies that we have to report on to Congress
    today--however many years later that is, 16-17 years later--and
    education. You mandated certain educational matters, as well.
        So I don't think we should--and I'm sure everybody
    understands this, and I know Senator Roberts understands it,
    but for those who don't, this is more than just creating
    somebody and saying, ``Okay, good, we got that done.''
        This is going to be a tough job. This is leading cultural
    change, which is the most difficult. We have a community that
    is, I think, performing very well today. What we're trying to
    do is tune it up and enhance its performance, but it's going to
    take some of those items, I believe, if you're going to get
    there.
        Chairman Warner. Thank you.
        Yes, Mr. Secretary?
        Secretary Rumsfeld. Mr. Chairman, I appreciate your
    inviting us to feel that we have been able to respond fully.
        I'd like to comment on a question that Senator Levin raised
    about the NCTC and operations, and make very clear that the
    President has indicated that--not in public announcements, but
    in private comments, internally--that he does not want anybody
    in between him and operations. So, in terms of the operations
    in the Central Intelligence Agency or operations in the DOD,
    the President would not have that NCTC in the middle of that,
    from an operational standpoint, and I didn't want any doubt
    about that.
        The second thing I'd like to clarify is, I welcome the idea
    of hearings on global posture. We have provided extensive
    congressional briefings. We have had extensive briefings with
    our allies around the world. There is nothing in it that even
    begins to approximate Fortress America.
        The Cold War is over. We are not expecting a Soviet tank
    attack across the North German Plain. It is appropriate to
    adjust that force posture. We have met with a great deal of
    support in the briefings we've had with our friends, with our
    allies. With respect to North Korea, I would not want the
    implication to be left that we would, in any way, weaken that
    deterrent.
        The Korean War ended 50 years ago. South Korea has a gross
    domestic product (GDP) that's probably 25 or 30 times the North
    Korean GDP. We have been working with the South Korean
    Government to transfer responsibilities so that the deterrent
    would remain strong. General LaPorte has done a superb job in
    working with them. They are--over a period of years, will be
    incrementally assuming additional responsibilities.
        The Defense Department has, in addition, been investing in,
    and making arrangements for, other kinds of capabilities to be
    available, and I don't think there will be any doubt but that
    the combined capability of the South Korean military and the
    United States of America will be fully adequate to the task.
        I would say one of the things that we're really having
    trouble with--change is hard for everybody, and I understand
    that. There's a great resistance to it. We're just going to
    have to work our way through it. But I think, in the 21st
    century, we have to be very careful to not equate quantities of
    things with capability.
        If you have a ``smart bomb'' that can do the work of 8
    ``dumb bombs,'' the fact that you go from 10 ``dumb bombs'' to
    5 ``smart bombs'' does not mean you've reduced your capability.
    What we are doing, we have incrementally improved our
    capability over time in that theater. We intend to remain with
    a presence and strength. I think there will be no doubt in the
    minds of the people in that region that we have maintained the
    proper balance and the proper types of capabilities that fit
    the 21st century and the circumstances. We've been very pleased
    with the cooperation of the South Korean Government, in terms
    of that, taking over some of those responsibilities--and we'd
    be happy to come up and have a full hearing and testify on it--
    and have benefitted from the many briefings that have been
    given to the staffs and offered to members over a sustained
    period of time on this subject.
        Senator McCain. Mr. Chairman, could I just comment very
    quickly? I have neither been offered nor received any briefing,
    nor do I know of any member of this committee who has.
        Chairman Warner. Senator, I think that we can show you that
    there have been some staff briefings on this----
        Senator McCain. There have been staff briefings. No member
    that I know of has been offered a briefing. I would have liked
    to have one--received one, with alacrity.
        Senator Sessions. I asked for one, and got one, and several
    of us made a trip to Europe to look at the bases there.
        Chairman Warner. I think there's been a record of----
        Senator McCain. I've been to Europe many times, too.
        Senator Sessions. We went down to look at bases that may be
    closed and may be strengthened.
        Chairman Warner. Let me just say, for the record, there
    have been, I think, communications on this subject. We knew it
    was forthcoming. You've actually made public pronouncements on
    it on several occasions, am I not correct?
        Secretary Rumsfeld. This has been going on for close to 3
    years.
        Chairman Warner. Correct.
        Secretary Rumsfeld. I'll be happy to arrange for a briefing
    for any Member or any staff person.
        Chairman Warner. Right.
        Secretary Rumsfeld. It is important. It is just in its
    early stages of beginning discussions with foreign countries,
    in terms of specifics. It is something that will roll out over
    a period of probably 5 to 10 years. It is not something that's
    going to be done precipitously. As I say, we'd be happy to come
    tomorrow if appropriate.
        Chairman Warner. I think we've covered it. I think it's
    important that we took a few minutes on that.
        Senator Reed.
        Senator Reed. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
        Mr. Secretary, you have carefully avoided any opinions
    about many of the proposals of the 9/11 Commission, but I think
    it's important to get another one on the table, and that's the
    suggestion that the DOD assume all the covert paramilitary
    operations--those conducted by the CIA, as well as operations
    conducted by the DOD. Do you have an opinion, for the record?
        Secretary Rumsfeld. I'll say this. There are clearly things
    that the Central Intelligence Agency does that are covert that
    the DOD ought not to do. There are things in the middle where
    we both do things and where we have individuals involved in
    teams that are led by them or led by us, and there be a mixture
    from time to time. I think it's a subject that lends itself to
    a classified hearing better than a public hearing. But the
    short answer is, I have not proposed such a thing. It is
    something that we've asked our people to look at and the agency
    to look at, but, at the moment, I certainly wouldn't recommend
    it. It's something that is being discussed internally.
        Senator Reed. Now, Mr. Secretary, are some of your concerns
    based upon the different frameworks that soldiers operate, vis-
    a-vis CIA operatives--both legal, ethical, and cultural
    dimensions--or is this simply a--the practical, that they do
    things that we don't want to do?
        Secretary Rumsfeld. They do things that are authorized by
    statute and by findings that we're not organized, trained, or
    equipped to do, and don't want to do. There are things that
    involve preparation of a battlefield which are not public, but
    eventually become public, which we, in the DOD, do do, as we
    should. I think that, again, that's about as far as I'd want to
    go in a public hearing.
        Senator Reed. Let me just--again, the final point is that,
    from your answer, there are things that they are authorized to
    do by law and custom that the DOD is not authorized to do, is
    that correct?
        Secretary Rumsfeld. Absolutely.
        Senator Reed. So this consolidation would require Congress
    to change the law, as well as just simply authorizing a
    consolidation of effort--or change several laws.
        Secretary Rumsfeld. That, I don't know, because I don't
    know what anyone would propose by way of responsibilities. We
    have responsibilities that are authorized by law--preparation
    of the battlefield--and they have responsibilities that--no one
    that I know of is suggesting transferring out of the agency. So
    whether or not--I doubt that a law would have to be changed,
    but I simply don't know, because I don't know what anyone would
    propose to change.
        Senator Reed. Mr. McLaughlin, do you have comments on this
    topic?
        Mr. McLaughlin. Yes, I would--as the Secretary has pointed
    out, this is being discussed in the administration, and we've
    actually been asked to consult on it and come up with a
    position. If you want a personal view, I would not accept that
    recommendation, for a couple of reasons. I mean, this is,
    again, personal view. I think we have a perfect marriage now of
    CIA and military capabilities. CIA brings to the mix agility
    and speed. The military brings lethality. That was the
    combination that was so effective in Afghanistan. There are
    also special authorities that the DCI has by statute--Section 8
    authorities, for example--that allow the DCI to do things--for
    example, to purchase equipment that's useful in paramilitary
    operations, without competitive bidding. It's a small point,
    but--actually, a large point. It means that the DCI, under
    current statute, is empowered to move quickly on things that
    have a paramilitary nature.
        It's important to realize there's a vast difference in
    scale here. Without giving the numbers, we're tiny on this
    score. DOD is large when it comes to special operations. So we
    have a niche role here that I think is very important.
        The other thing I would say is that--not well understood--
    is the fact that our paramilitary capability undergirds our
    whole covert-action program. It isn't just the kind of image
    that comes across in the movies about what we do; it's that our
    covert-action program, across the board, which covers many
    different areas, has, as part of its infrastructure, for a very
    wide array of things, this paramilitary capability.
        Senator Reed. General Myers, do you have a comment,
    particularly from the perspective of a uniformed-military
    officer, about the blending of these two different cultures?
        General Myers. I think my advice would be along the same
    lines that you've heard from the Secretary and from the acting
    director in that, right now, we have well-defined military
    missions in the world. This would change some of that, if we
    were to adopt that recommendation. I think we have to think
    very carefully about that.
        I know there is--as we have begun to consider it, there is
    not a lot of enthusiasm at this point for that kind of change.
    I think it's important that, as people see the military uniform
    around the world--and we are around the world, we work with--
    over a couple-of-year period, we probably work with most
    nations in this world, in one form or another--and that they--
    that we maintain that, that we are the U.S. military, and we're
    not involved in other things.
        Senator Reed. Mr. Secretary, the 9/11 Commission was a very
    intensive review--after-action report, if you will--of a major
    intelligence failure. We've had similar failures with respect
    to Iraq. Has the DOD conducted a major after-action review of
    the intelligence failures in Iraq? If so, what are the
    recommendations for change, not only within the DOD, but
    coordination with the CIA and other agencies?
        Secretary Rumsfeld. The DOD, through the Joint Forces
    Command, embedded a cluster of people in the beginning of the
    war, and as it went along it conducted a lessons-learned, a
    portion of which included intelligence. They then completed
    that, and then initiated a series of interrogations of Iraqis
    and looked at lessons learned, not from our standpoint, but
    from what the Iraqis thought they were doing and what they
    thought they knew or didn't know. That was then completed.
        In addition, the CIA has conducted some aspects of it from
    their perspective.
        Senator Reed. These reports are available and----
        Secretary Rumsfeld. We'd be happy to give you or the
    committee a briefing on the lessons learned. I've found them
    fascinating. I've probably spent 20 hours being briefed on
    those two lessons learned that the DOD did. I have not been
    briefed on the agency's piece.
        Senator Reed. Thanks, Mr. Secretary.
        Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Chairman Warner. Thank you very much, Senator Reed.
        Senator Sessions?
        Senator Sessions. Chairman Myers, can you share with us how
    the military officers, maybe your chiefs, feel about the new
    National Intelligence Director proposal? I know there's some
    frustration. I sense that we wish that we had had better
    intelligence on--I guess in every conflict we've ever been in.
    But how are your--do your people respond to this?
        General Myers. One of my responsibilities, of course, is to
    represent, to the Secretary and others in the National Security
    Council, and the President, of course, is the thinking of our
    combatant commanders, and, for that matter, the Joint Chiefs of
    Staff. Let me start out by saying, we clearly have the greatest
    military in the world. Part of the reason it is the greatest
    military in the world is because we have this integration of
    operations and intelligence that I talked about earlier in my
    opening statement.
        So with that as a backdrop, we have talked now, on many
    occasions, with our combatant commanders and to the service
    chiefs on intelligence and intelligence reform. I think they
    would sign up to my opening statement and some of the tenets in
    there and some things that we hold very important. They're
    clearly in favor of breaking down any bureaucratic barriers to
    getting information, and information-sharing, and they
    addressed that. As we had this discussion, that's one of the
    primary topics that comes up.
        They strongly believe that it's hard to differentiate
    between the national, strategic, and tactical levels of
    intelligence. They understand that, and think that intelligence
    needs to move seamlessly, not only vertically, but horizontally
    between organizations, services, analytical elements, whatever,
    as well as vertically. So they understand that.
        They would make a big point, if they were sitting here,
    about the need for competitive analysis. I mentioned that in my
    opening statement, again. But they think all-source analysis,
    it's--with several different elements, is the way you get to
    the--to understand what the intelligence probably really means
    and----
        Senator Sessions. In other words, they don't want to be--to
    have only one source of information. They prefer that other
    entities and agencies would be able to share information
    directly if they thought it was appropriate.
        General Myers. Senator Sessions, that's absolutely right.
    The need for----
        Senator Sessions. The other Secretaries of Defense that
    testified yesterday expressed that concern quite clearly, also.
        General Myers. Competitive analysis is certainly to all our
    benefits, and then we can make whatever judgments we have to
    make. But that would be important. Then as they get into the
    details--and, of course we were--when we were talking when I
    was--the last time I solicited their opinions, we were talking
    about some of the fundamentals, not some of the specifics, of
    the 9/11 Commission Report, although we referred to that. We
    said there are recommendations out there, but they would not be
    for any other bureaucratic hurdles that removes the warfighter
    or the commander--be it a combatant commander or a joint task
    force commander--from the intelligence process--collection and
    dissemination and so forth. They've worked that very hard.
        In my opening statement, I talked about the entrepreneurial
    spirit that exists at the other end of this intelligence chain
    as being important to providing our best intelligence, not just
    to the warfighter, but to the national community, as a whole.
    They're part of that entrepreneurial spirit. That's where it
    resides, and further down, as well. So they'd like to preserve
    that. I think those were their overall concerns. They're very
    engaged in this process, and will follow it along.
        Senator Sessions. I think there's a pretty firm belief on
    this committee that we ought not to undermine the success that
    we've had with regard to intelligence, and we should strengthen
    it, not weaken it.
        Director McLaughlin, thank you for your service. I think
    you have every right to speak aggressively about the good
    things that have occurred since September 11. I think that
    after that date everything changed and people began to
    reevaluate entirely, whether it's the FBI, the DOD, or any
    other agency. A lot of policy changes have occurred. Senator
    Roberts mentioned nine specific ones that I think have dealt
    with many of the problems that the 9/11 Commission has referred
    to, or at least attempted to deal with them.
        So let me ask you briefly just your opinion. Do you feel
    like, with regard to the 9/11 Commission's report and
    recommendations, that many of those recommendations have
    already been accomplished and that--you indicated the report
    seemed to stop as of September 11. Were they fully informed on
    the changes that have occurred since when they made the report?
        Mr. McLaughlin. I would say, Senator, a lot of the things
    that they recommended or spotted as problems have been dealt
    with. My sense is that the 9/11 Commission did spend some time
    looking at post-September 11. But that isn't in their report,
    particularly. Their report seemed to have been written from a
    September 11 perspective.
        There is still more to do.
        Senator Sessions. I know, but you have taken care of a lot
    of those things.
        Mr. McLaughlin. But I don't want to--it's important that I
    not convey a sense of complacency or satisfaction here, because
    in this business there is, frankly, never any perfection, and
    there never will be. The nature of the business is such that
    you're constantly finding--as you've solved one problem,
    another one comes up on the horizon.
        Senator Sessions. Yes.
        Mr. McLaughlin. So, yes, we've made a lot of progress, but
    there's still a lot to go.
        Senator Sessions. I was present during the time we did the
    drug czar. The drug czar, as I understand it, had the power to
    review the budgets of all agencies affecting narcotics. It
    establishes, by consulting with the agencies involved in
    narcotics, a national drug policy. The President then is asked
    to sign off on the national drug policy. Then the drug czar
    reviews the budgets of the agencies to make sure that they're
    spending their money on things that accomplish the agreed-upon
    strategy.
        I guess my question would be--in some sense, that's
    supposed to be, in theory, CIA's role. Some suggest that,
    ``Well, you can't do it, because you have operational
    responsibility, as well as oversight responsibilities.'' Could
    CIA fulfill that role? Can it today? If it needed some
    additional legislation, and that were passed, could you do it,
    as well as a new National Intelligence Director?
        Mr. McLaughlin. To make sure I understand your question,
    Senator, are you saying, could the DCI, with some augmentation,
    carry out the duties that are laid out in the report for a
    National Intelligence Director?
        Senator Sessions. Or at least with regard to the powers and
    compared to the drug czar.
        Mr. McLaughlin. The short answer would be yes. The DCI, as
    many people here have noted, has extensive authorities. Some of
    them--they're all--the ones recorded in statute give the DCI
    the power to do various things that we've talked about here. To
    some degree, though, any DCI's authority stops at a certain
    point, and persuasion takes over, so that the effectiveness of
    a DCI depends, to a large degree, on the personal relationship
    that he or she develops with leaders of the community, with the
    Secretary of Defense, and just how he runs the operation.
        I meet with--as George Tenet did--all of our program
    managers every couple of weeks to go over everything. We
    harmonize policies. There is a point, though, where I think
    Senator Roberts was leading with some of his questions, where
    your ability to enforce these policies drops off. So you can
    coordinate, you can improve, you can approve, you can launch,
    but there is a point where, as DCI, you're basically in a
    negotiation and persuasion mode.
        Senator Sessions. My time has expired, Mr. Chairman. But I
    thank you, Mr. Director.
        Chairman Warner. Thank you very much.
        Colleagues, as we know, the Governmental Affairs Committee
    started in quite early this morning with a hearing. It would be
    my intent now, out of respect to--Senator Collins, the
    chairman, and Senator Lieberman worked to schedule our
    hearings--I'd like to turn to Senator Lieberman, but understand
    a colleague has a very critical--Mr. Nelson, you were next. Can
    you two sort it out, who would go first here?
        Senator Bill Nelson. Mr. Chairman, I have a little problem
    back home, called Ground Zero, named Punta Gorda, that I'm
    going back to.
        Chairman Warner. Would you, then, go ahead--and then I'll
    go to Senator Lieberman.
        Senator Lieberman. I'll be glad to yield to Senator Nelson.
        Chairman Warner. Thank you.
        Senator Bill Nelson. I thank you.
        Gentlemen, thank you for your public service, and thank
    Senator Collins for her graciousness in allowing me and others
    to sit in on her hearings, of which we've just had testimony
    from the members of the families of September 11.
        Senator Clinton had been gracious to the families to offer
    to ask questions, and--that the families would like to--and
    since I was last in the pecking order, a family member passed
    up a question to me that I think gets to the heart and soul of
    a lot of this discussion as we try to exercise our legislative
    prerogative under the Constitution and our congressional
    oversight.
        If I may, gentlemen, direct this question to you from Carol
    Ashley, who is a member of the Family Steering Committee.
        Chairman Warner. Senator, would you yield?
        The Chair notes that a number of the families have joined
    us here at the conclusion of the hearing that Senator Collins
    and Senator Lieberman had.
        Please proceed.
        Senator Bill Nelson. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        The question is, General Myers, please explain why giving
    the National Intelligence Director control over intelligence
    funding causes problems with an effective military response to
    terrorism overseas.
        This is one of the significant policy issues that we are
    facing in deciding with regard to the new National Intelligence
    Director.
        General Myers?
        General Myers. I think the Secretary has talked a great
    deal about the budget and the implications of the budget. I
    would go back to the fundamentals that I had in my opening
    statement, in that it's not the budget authorities that are the
    problem at all. That can be whatever people decide it is, as
    far as I'm concerned.
        The thing that you have to maintain through this is the
    fact that we now have, in terms of overseas, a warfighting
    team. It's a warfighting team that operates in peacetime or
    wartime. It produces intelligence that is used at the national
    level and is used at the tactical level. This team depends on
    all the different departments and agencies that have
    intelligence responsibilities, not just those that are in the
    DOD. They are, as Director McLaughlin talked about, pretty
    tightly integrated today. So I've never said, one way or
    another, where the budget authority should be. That is still
    being debated inside the administration; it's being debated
    here today.
        I would just say, as we look at placing budget authorities
    we need to make sure that this extremely important element of
    our intelligence apparatus--and I will call it ``military
    intelligence,'' but it doesn't really do it justice because
    we're so tightly linked and integrated today--but we don't
    break that apart. That, whatever we do budget-wise, we don't--
    that everybody has a voice in the process. Today, that pretty
    much happens.
        So, as has been said before, the first thing we should do
    is, do no harm. It's a lot better than it was on September 11.
    As I said in my statement, it's pretty good. We can still
    improve that.
        Senator Bill Nelson. As a uniformed military officer, do
    you think that giving the NID budgetary authority is going to
    cause you a problem, militarily, to respond to terrorism
    overseas?
        General Myers. The devil's in the details, and I don't
    think, inherently--inherently, no, I don't think that will
    necessarily cause a problem. But the devil is in the details.
    In this town, we have people that have certain authorities, but
    there is no czar in this town. That's not how the business
    works. It is a town where we collaborate and coordinate. That's
    certainly true in the Intelligence Community, where, again,
    there are many different agencies and departments that are
    involved in that work.
        No, I have no problems with moving budget authority around,
    as long as we work through the details to make sure that the
    collaboration and the coordination that needs to take place
    recognize the things that I said earlier.
        Senator Bill Nelson. Secretary Cambone, same question.
        Dr. Cambone. Sir, the question is how the budget and its
    allocation translates into front-line capabilities, and that,
    in turn, is representative of the various interests that are at
    play in building that budget at the direction of the DCI today.
        Within the DOD, something like 68 percent of personnel in
    the NFIP budget are from DOD, so the budget that is built by
    the DCI is 68 percent personnel from the DOD. Among those 15
    agencies that everyone talks about, 83 percent of all U.S.
    intelligence, NFIP/JMIP/TIARA, the personnel are DOD personnel.
    DOD personnel are integrated across all of the activities of
    the Intelligence Community, and they are there to be certain
    that two things happen simultaneously. One is to assure
    national support. The Secretary of Defense is obliged, under
    title 50, to lend that support to the DCI. They are obliged to
    be assured that the DCI--that the Secretary of Defense is able
    to discharge his title 10 responsibilities relative to the
    Armed Forces of the United States.
        The budget, all in one place, with all of those decisions
    being made in one place, Defense or the DCI or the NID, would
    probably be changing those relationships in ways that we don't
    understand today. That's why today we actually have a bargain
    here, a partnership between the DCI and the Secretary of
    Defense. The DCI builds the budget, the Secretary of Defense is
    expected to see that it's executed against those priorities
    that were set for national intelligence and meets the military
    intelligence requirements. So that's the bargain we struck.
        Senator Bill Nelson. So you would think that there might be
    a problem created if someone outside the DOD--namely, the
    National Intelligence Director--has budgetary authority over
    all intelligence, which, as you said, huge part of that
    personnel and money is within the DOD.
        Dr. Cambone. I'd be concerned about two words, Senator:
    ``sole'' authority and ``all'' activities. So you have to
    work--again, it's a partnership, and it was designed that way,
    by Congress and by Presidents and DCIs and Secretaries of
    Defense in the past, to make sure it is a partnership so that
    no one has sole authority or all of the authority.
        Senator Bill Nelson. Secretary Rumsfeld, would you care to
    respond?
        Secretary Rumsfeld. I would agree with what I said earlier
    and what Dr. Cambone just said.
        Chairman Warner. Thank you very much, Senator, particularly
    for asking the question on behalf of the families.
        Senator Collins, again, we commend you for the series of
    hearings that you've held on this important subject. I've been
    able to attend two of them myself. The Chair now recognizes you
    for purposes of questioning.
        Senator Collins. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you, Mr.
    Chairman. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. If I say it three times--
    I'll get it loud enough, eventually. [Laughter.]
        Director McLaughlin, I know there's been discussion before
    I was able to join the panel today about the issue of budget
    authority, but I want to probe that a bit further with you.
    When I read the 9/11 Commission Report, I was struck by the
    information on a directive issued in December 1998 by DCI Tenet
    in which he said, ``We are at war. I want no resources or
    people spared in this effort, either inside CIA or the
    Community.'' The 9/11 Commission concluded that--despite that
    call for action, that, in fact, very little happened within the
    Intelligence Community, that there wasn't a marshaling of
    resources. That's one reason that I think the issue of budget
    authority is so important.
        It's my understanding that the National Security Act gives
    you the authority to guide the Intelligence Community agencies
    as they prepare their budget submissions for the NFIP; but you
    don't, however, have budget execution authority over any of the
    NFIP, except that portion that goes to the CIA and the
    Community Management Program. As I interpret that, that means
    that you help set the budget levels for the Intelligence
    Community, but then you don't have any control over the funds
    once they are appropriated, except in the CIA direct control;
    rather, it's the DOD that has that control, and we know that's
    more than 80 percent of the total intelligence budget.
        The 9/11 Commission recommends that budget execution
    authority--that is, the control over the funds once they've
    been appropriated--be given to a new National Intelligence
    Director, as you're well aware. Perhaps, to me, the strongest
    rationale for this recommendation is, it would allow the NID to
    marshal the resources in a way that George Tenet apparently
    could not, according to the findings of the 9/11 Commission.
        Now, ironically, Dr. Cambone summed up the rationale for
    giving this authority very well last week when he testified
    before the House Armed Services Committee (HASC). He was
    talking about the need for the National Intelligence Director
    to set information technology standards for the entire
    Intelligence Community. This quote is not in the August 11 HASC
    testimony.
        To me, that sums up why you need to have budget execution
    authority--not just the ability to shape the budget
    submissions, but execution authority vested, at least for the
    NFIP, in the new National Intelligence Director.
        So, with that rather long introduction, I'd like to ask you
    whether you believe the NID does need to have budget execution
    authority if our goal is to have the Director successfully be
    effective in overseeing and coordinating the Intelligence
    Community. As Dr. Cambone said, when talking about intelligence
    standards, if the person doesn't have the ability to, ``push
    the money in the right places to get it done, or withhold it,''
    can the NID truly be effective?
        Mr. McLaughlin. As we've said several times, Senator,
    discussions are ongoing within the administration on this, and
    nothing is off the table, from the administration's point of
    view. So I can give you my personal view on that----
        Senator Collins. That is what I'm seeking.
        Mr. McLaughlin.--based on personal experience, but without
    any sense that that is ``the view'' that would prevail.
        There's a couple of things you have to say at the outset to
    frame this a bit. First, I think we're talking principally
    about the NFIP agencies, not about all 15 of the agencies.
        Senator Collins. Right.
        Mr. McLaughlin. A number of the agencies in that 15 fall
    into the TIARA. We're talking about the service intelligence
    organizations and so forth. I don't think that the National
    Intelligence Director should have budgetary authority over all
    15 of these agencies. I think it ought to be narrowed to the
    NFIP agencies, which would be, of course, NSA, NRO, NGA, and
    CIA. So when you're looking at the NFIP, it's that.
        Second, another thing that needs to be said is, in any
    arrangement--and I mentioned this in my testimony--but,
    fundamentally, in any arrangement that you have, whoever has
    this authority would have to accept ironclad accountability for
    support to military intelligence requirements. That would have
    to be built in, either by understanding or statute or executive
    direction, because you just--as I said, these agencies are
    combat support agencies, and everyone in the intelligence
    business realizes that, even though they serve more than one
    department, which is what makes them national.
        Against that backdrop, a third point. While we don't have
    execution authority in the year of the budget, we do have the
    authority to reprogram. I think you and I have talked about
    this once before. The reprogramming, as it currently works,
    works; but it is cumbersome. It requires that when I'm--and you
    reprogram for a number of reasons. Sometimes you do it because
    one program is doing better than another, another time because
    someone is not doing as well as they should, another time
    because something else is more essential, in your judgment.
    Typically, you require the approval of the agency that's
    surrendering funds; you require the approval of the department
    head who oversees that agency, usually the Secretary of
    Defense; you require the approval of OMB; and you require the
    approval of six congressional committees. Typically that takes
    about 5 months. So you can see that's not very agile to the
    needs of today.
        So what does all of this, my long answer to you, add up to?
    My view is that that National Intelligence Director ought to
    have the authority to move those funds, because--with the
    caveats that I built into this: absolute accountability for
    military needs. Frankly, even in that circumstance, with that
    authority, a National Intelligence Director, I can safely
    predict, would consult closely with the Secretary of Defense as
    funds were moved around; but in the circumstance that you and I
    have just discussed, that person would have the final
    decisionmaking authority.
        I think if you look within the NFIP, the National Foreign
    Intelligence Program--just as another fact to put on the table,
    I think about 30 percent of the personnel in the NFIP are
    military.
        So all of that has to go into the mix. Sorry for the long-
    winded answer. But as all of us have said, this is complicated.
        Senator Collins. Thank you.
        Chairman Warner. Thank you very much, Senator.
        Senator Collins. Thank you.
        Chairman Warner. I feel that question is so important that
    I'm going to ask Senator Lieberman to defer. Frankly, Mr.
    Secretary, your views in response to that question would be
    helpful.
        Again, Senator Roberts has drawn up a bill, you're drawing
    up a bill, Senator Levin and I may contribute some language. We
    respect the fact that the President hasn't come forward as yet.
    He's not--he's going to do it. I suggested that he wait until
    the committees work through their--this was my own personal
    recommendation yesterday--work here, these 20 hearings. But as
    we do our work, to the extent we can get some of the personal
    views and guideposts, I think it would be very helpful to us.
        So the question propounded by our distinguished colleague
    from Maine, I think, Mr. Secretary, would you desire to have an
    opportunity to respond?
        Secretary Rumsfeld. I'll add to what I've already said in
    my remarks. I've pointed out that the role of an NID at least
    implies--although the administration's not come forward with
    specifics--but it implies authority for tasking collection
    assets across the government. The DCI currently has that. It
    implies setting analytical priorities and ensuring all-source
    competitive analysis throughout the Intelligence Community; the
    personnel management and training to alter the culture in the
    community; information, security, and access policies;
    information technology standards, as Dr. Cambone mentioned in a
    hearing, and architectures across the community; and
    reallocating resources in the year of budget execution.
        Now, what does the DCI currently have? He currently has the
    authority for directing collection and production, currently
    has the responsibility for developing the budget, and currently
    has the authority to recommend reprogramming, which, for the
    reasons I stated earlier, avoiding--I mean, the principal user
    of intelligence is the DOD; that's the major user. So
    reprogramming--once the budget's set, reprogramming is
    difficult, as he says. It's difficult because government's a
    big bureaucracy. It's difficult because the congressional
    committee system is what it is. But there is not--neither the
    DOD nor CIA ought to be reprogramming without very close
    coordination, for fear of disrupting the process that each has
    already agreed to.
        Now, the real problem is, as I said, that the budget's
    developed in 1 year; it takes a second year for Congress to
    deal with it, and a third year for its execution. Any budget's
    going to require change. It is not a budget to be executed; it
    is a plan to be tested against what actually happens in the
    world, and then adjusted as those changes and events occur. So
    it's going to take the ability for the DCI, the Defense
    Department, OMB, which is--the ultimate decision-maker is
    certainly not the DOD or DCI, currently; it's OMB--the
    President and OMB as its instrument.
        Now, it seems to me that this is very important. It needs
    to be discussed, as it is being in this committee. I think it
    merits a great deal of care and attention.
        Chairman Warner. I assure you, I think Congress is giving
    it a great deal of attention, and I thank you, and we're trying
    to get such guideposts as we can at this time.
        Now, Senator Lieberman?
        General Myers. Senator?
        Secretary Rumsfeld. Could General Myers----
        Chairman Warner. Oh, General Myers, yes, of course.
        General Myers. Sir, could I make a comment to the budget
    execution business?
        As I tried to answer with Senator Nelson, I think you're
    talking budget execution authority. Again, this has to be done
    in a collaborative way. Creative tension in the intelligence
    business is the only way, I think, that policymakers, Congress,
    or people are going to understand the situation. There cannot
    be a czar that just starts pointing and pulling levers. There
    is no ``Wizard of Oz'' here that's going to solve this, in my
    opinion. It has to be a collaborative effort. Creative tension,
    in this case, is good.
        I would add one other thing to this mix in budget, and it
    goes--it's not execution authority, but it goes back to the
    budget preparation.
        I think that anything we could do to reform the process by
    which we decide on major systems procurement would be a very
    good thing to do. In the DOD, we have such a process. A major
    part of that process came out of Goldwater-Nichols. We have a
    fairly new process in the Intelligence Community, but it's far
    from perfect, in my judgment, and it needs to have more
    visibility inside the community, inside those departments and
    agencies that have systems that are affected, and it ought to
    be end-to-end, and we don't--we often don't think about the
    end-to-end pieces of this system. So when we're talking about
    major systems, major procurement of those systems, something
    like our Joint Requirements Oversight Council that was mandated
    by Goldwater-Nichols would be a fairly good process for us to--
    perhaps, to at least look at for the Intelligence Community.
        So that's--but it's not execution; it's planning and
    programming, more appropriately. But I make that comment.
        Chairman Warner. Thank you very much. Any further comments
    to that important series of questions?
        Senator Sessions. Mr. Chairman?
        Chairman Warner. Yes?
        Senator Sessions. One question. With regard to this large
    amount of money that goes to Defense for intelligence, General
    Myers or Dr. Cambone, does that include every military officer
    in the military? Do you know, does it go down to the brigade or
    the military intelligence (MI) units out there or----
        Dr. Cambone. Sir, it does.
        Senator Sessions. So----
        Dr. Cambone. That's how we get to such a large fraction of
    the total.
        Senator Sessions. Yes, that explains some of that.
        Dr. Cambone. But, just for the clarity, as Mr. McLaughlin
    says, there is the NFIP, in which there are U.S. military
    personnel covered. The individuals you just asked about, the
    Service people, doing Service jobs, if you will, are in either
    the TIARA accounts, or in a JMIP, which are inside the DOD and
    on which, by regulation and custom, the DCI consults. So there
    are three pockets of dollars here that we're talking about, and
    military personnel are in all of them.
        General Myers. But where the rubber meets the road--and
    that's with combatant commanders and joint task force
    commanders and our troops out there doing peacekeeping to
    combat--they don't understand these budget classifications and
    the systems they deal with, they don't care where the
    intelligence comes from. They don't care if it's an NFIP, a
    JMIP program, a TIARA program. In fact, at that level, they're
    all mixed, and the people are all mixed, and they're all
    working to the benefit of the mission. So if you were to pick
    one piece of this up here and say, okay, now we have somebody
    with budget execution authority, and thinking that that's not
    going to have some impact on this entrepreneurial mix that we
    have down here that's really making things happen. That's not
    benefitting just the soldiers in the foxhole, that's also
    benefitting the President, because it enables all sorts of
    intelligence capabilities. It's something that has to be
    considered as we think about this. You can't separate the
    parts. It's not as easy, if you go to al Dhofar, if you go to
    Baghdad, to separate these parts. They don't care. It's easy
    here in Washington, I think, when we are used to looking at
    lines in a budget.
        Mr. McLaughlin. Senator, the cryptologic support group that
    might be in Baghdad belongs to the NFIP out of NSA, supporting
    a special operations team that isn't in the intelligence budget
    at all, working with the tactical HUMINT team member from the
    Army down in the TIARA accounts, working to bring together the
    information from a satellite, which is in the NFIP account, and
    an airplane, which is in the JMIP account. They don't see any
    of that. It's all information and data flow down to the point
    of operation.
        Secretary Rumsfeld. If I could add one thing as I notice
    people are thumbing through the 9/11 book, it seems to me it's
    important, when we're talking about a possible change, that we
    connect it to a problem. If you think about it, that 9/11
    report, it talked about communication problems between CIA and
    FBI; it discussed the law enforcement orientation of FBI; it
    talked about the need for domestic intelligence-gathering; it
    talked about the need for all-source intelligence; it talked
    about the problem of stovepiping; it talked about the need for
    congressional reform; it talked about the need for accelerating
    the clearance, the ethics approvals, the security clearances,
    and the confirmation process so that people didn't end up, like
    the DOD, with 15, 20, 25 percent vacant in presidential
    appointees that require Senate confirmation; it talked about
    group-think; and it talked about deficiencies in human
    intelligence.
        Now, we have to ask ourself, okay, if those are the things
    that they identified--and I think that's probably at least
    three-quarters of things they identified--the question is, what
    reform is going to fix those things? What reform is going to
    improve the situation? What reform or change is going to add
    more value than it's going to cause in disruption or
    difficulty. Those are tough questions. They really are tough
    questions, and it's hard for me to see how the question that
    has been elevated here is--necessarily bears on any or all of
    these things.
        Chairman Warner. I think your observation is well taken,
    and--I don't mean to criticize the Commission--they've also
    suggested some reforms in areas in which they have not
    identified a problem. Now, do you concur in that?
        Secretary Rumsfeld. I'm trying to think of one.
        Chairman Warner. I want go to Senator Lieberman, and we'll
    come back to that.
        Senator Lieberman?
        Senator Levin. If Senator Lieberman would just yield for
    one second----
        Senator Lieberman. Go right ahead.
        Senator Levin. As I indicated, I want to make something
    part of the record at this point. First of all, that yesterday
    in the Senate Governmental Affairs Committee, we asked former
    DCIs Webster, Woolsey, and Turner that very question, as to
    whether there was any relationship between the recommendation
    relative to budget execution and the problems that the 9/11
    Commission had identified. I think it's fair to say that at
    least two of the three unequivocally said there was no
    relationship between that recommendation, relative to budget
    execution, and the problems which had been identified by the 9/
    11 Commission.
        What I would like to make part of the record is not just
    that reference, which I think reinforces what Secretary
    Rumsfeld was just saying, but also Executive Order 12333,
    because it is that executive order which allocates the budget
    execution to the DCI. By the stroke of an executive pen, that
    could be--let me start over again.
        It is that Executive Order 12333 which allocates budget
    execution to the DOD. Before that, as one of our witnesses
    pointed out yesterday, the budget execution authority under the
    Carter administration was in the DCI. It was shifted after that
    to the DOD. It could be shifted back, if that's desirable. With
    all of the qualifications that have been mentioned here, it
    could be shifted back to the DCI or to the new Director of
    National Intelligence, if we adopt one, by an executive order,
    by the stroke of a pen.
        I only want to put this order in the record here now to
    make it clear that this is not necessarily a legislative issue,
    since that budget execution power has been allocated by
    executive order, currently to the DOD, that previously had been
    in the intelligence agency, and could be reallocated back. So
    that's the portion of the executive order that I'd like made
    part of the record at this point.
        Chairman Warner. Without objection.
        [The information referred to follows:]
             Executive Order No. 12333--Dec. 4, 1981, 46 F.R. 59941
                     united states intelligence activities
    Section 1.11 The Department of Defense
        (j) Direct, operate, control and provide fiscal management for the
    National Security Agency and for defense and military intelligence and
    national reconnaissance entities;

        Chairman Warner. Senator Lieberman.
        Senator Lieberman. Thanks, Mr. Chairman.
        Mr. Secretary and witnesses, thank you for being here.
        Mr. Secretary, I wanted to share this experience. As I
    arrived late from the earlier hearing, I said to a few of my
    colleagues, ``How are things going?'' They said, with a certain
    unease, ``The Secretary, contrary to what we normally expect of
    him--opinionated--refreshingly opinionated, quite often--is not
    responding to specific questions about the authority of the
    National Intelligence Director proposal.'' I found the kind of
    unease that you'd have on a day when your dog stopped barking.
    You'd say, ``He's not feeling well.''
        But I understand the reason why you're doing it, and I want
    to say that I find it encouraging. I find it encouraging in
    that you have said, and others at the witness table, that the
    administration, the White House, has not finally decided where
    it is on some of these critical questions.
        I was first puzzled--I was pleased when the President
    endorsed the National Intelligence Director, Counterterrorism
    Center, puzzled by some of the vagueness of the language used
    that day about the powers of the NID, troubled when Andy Card
    specifically, I thought, said that the NID, as he saw it, would
    not have any budgetary authority of real consequence. I was
    encouraged last week when the National Security Advisor
    Condoleezza Rice said that, in fact, ``It seems to be going in
    a better direction, as far as I'm concerned,'' and I'm, in that
    sense, encouraged by what you have said about--and the others
    have said--about where the process is.
        Yesterday, we had three former DCIs at our committee, one,
    Bob Gates, Acting DCI under President Reagan, CIA Director
    under the first President Bush--submitted written testimony,
    because he couldn't be there, and had a very strong statement,
    ``The President recently announced his initial decisions in
    response to the Commission's recommendations. I hope, as the
    White House spokesman has suggested, that these decisions are
    only a first step, because the new National Intelligence
    Director, as described, will impose a new layer of bureaucracy,
    but have no troops, no budget authority, and no power. In its
    present form''--I took that to mean in the form of the
    discussion--``the new position would be worse than the current
    arrangement.''
        So I hope that we're in a process here that ends, as it
    should, in a non-partisan executive/legislative branch
    agreement on what should happen to improve our intelligence
    apparatus.
        I think you spoke--incidentally, in the list of budget
    authorities, or authorities that the NID would have that you
    read from your initial statement, you mentioned the
    reprogramming authority, but the Commission clearly recommends
    much greater authority, that the whole intelligence budget be
    in the National Intelligence Director, almost the opposite of
    what exists now, that all--95 percent, from what I can tell, of
    the intelligence budget goes through the DOD, including the
    CIA's budget.
        So let me ask you a question about one part of this that,
    after I arrived, you did speak to, and that is the National
    Counterterrorism Center, and what you take to be the
    President's clear position. I believe you did say it, that they
    announced the support of these recommendations, that there not
    be anybody between himself and the Secretary of Defense with
    regard to operations. I understand that completely.
        I do think that the counterterrorism--that the Commission
    makes a strong recommendation about these counterterrorism
    centers, that if you have essentially everybody involved around
    the table sharing information on intelligence, that it makes
    sense to have them work together on planning operations. I want
    to ask you whether there isn't a way, perhaps borrowed from
    your current joint operations with CIA, for instance, where you
    couldn't have the Counterterrorism Center's planning
    operations--but then subject it to a review or a veto by the
    Secretary of Defense so we don't lose the plus, the synergy, of
    everybody being around the table together.
        Secretary Rumsfeld. Senator, first, the reason the dog
    didn't bark is clear. Number one, the executive branch is
    wrestling with these issues----
        Senator Lieberman. Right.
        Secretary Rumsfeld. --and they are tough issues, and the
    President has not come to final conclusions on them. Second is,
    I have been inviting in former Secretaries of Defense, former
    DCIs, former National Security Advisors, as--I met at lunch
    with--Dick Myers called in the former Chairman and Vice
    Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. I've called people to
    talk about these issues, because they're terribly important.
    I've spent a lot of time. I have not developed conviction on a
    lot of the details that--and, as we said, the devil's in the
    details--you darn well better get it right, because we're
    dealing with very important things for our country. I just
    haven't gotten conviction down to the third and fourth level in
    this yet, to feel that I can sit here and say authoritatively
    something.
        Senator Lieberman. I understand that, and I respect it.
        Sir, if I might, Stansfield Turner, retired admiral and
    former Director of CIA, DCI, it would be interesting to talk
    to, as Senator Levin suggested. I hadn't realized this, but he
    testified yesterday that President Carter, by executive order,
    essentially made him an NID, National Intelligence Director,
    with the authorities fundamentally that the Commission has
    recommended now. The combination of his military background
    plus that experience, I think, makes him somebody interesting
    to talk to.
        Secretary Rumsfeld. One thing that's not come up in this
    hearing, or in the--at least that I recall--in the 9/11 report,
    is an issue that we ought to think about, and that is, has this
    government lost the ability of keeping a secret? I don't know
    the answer to that. But it seems to me it's worth asking that
    question and whether there are changes or reforms that we ought
    to think about in that connection. Because what's taking place
    is, we are systematically advantaging the enemy. They go to
    school on us, they learn a lot, and we help them. We help them
    with a hemorrhaging of information from the United States
    Government on a regular basis, and that's a problem.
        Senator Lieberman. I agree with you. I want to quote
    something----
        Chairman Warner. Senator, I must say that in the time
    allocated the Senators----
        Senator Lieberman. Yes.
        Chairman Warner.--I have to get to moving.
        Senator Lieberman. I wonder if I could just ask for a
    quick----
        Chairman Warner. All right.
        Senator Lieberman.--answer to the question that I posed
    about the Counterterrorism Center, whether you'd take a look at
    whether it's possible to create--to not lose the synergy of the
    joint operation planning, but still protect the chain of
    command from your warfighters to you to the President.
        Secretary Rumsfeld. The idea of someone planning and
    passing a plan off to the executors, I think, is a poor idea.
    Executors need to be involved in the planning.
        Second, in those instances where more than one agency is
    going to be involved in an operation, there already is joint
    planning. There has to be.
        So I cannot imagine quite how that would work, myself. I
    think that once you get down to the point where you have a plan
    that's executable, it darn well had better have been intimately
    crafted and shaped to fit the circumstances and the talents and
    the skill sets and the assets and the circumstances of that
    situation.
        Chairman Warner. I thank the Senator.
        Senator Chambliss.
        Senator Chambliss. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
        Mr. Secretary, I'll tell you, that issue actually did come
    up yesterday in our hearing. Former Secretary Carlucci cited
    the specific problem that you just alluded to, and he even gave
    an example of how, when he was Secretary of Defense, he was
    able to protect a source that, today, he did not think he'd be
    able to protect. You're exactly right, that's one of the major
    problems we have. We lay everything out in public hearings, and
    there's no town in the world that has leaks greater than what
    comes out of this town. So that's an entirely separate problem,
    obviously.
        The one thing that I have gleaned from everything you've
    said thus far is something I alluded to yesterday, and that is
    the fact that, whatever we do relative to reorganization or
    changes that we might make, this is such a complex issue that,
    if we're not careful, we're going to mess this thing up and
    create a lot more problems if we're not very careful in the
    direction in which we go.
        The major reform that's recommended by the 9/11 Commission
    is the total restructuring of the Intelligence Community
    relative to the creation of the Director of National
    Intelligence and who reports to him, not just the budget
    authority. So I want to stay away--you've discussed the budget
    issue, I think, pretty thoroughly, and I think we all have a
    general idea of what you're talking about there. But in this
    reorganization recommendation, the chart that the 9/11
    Commission has set forth, on page 413 of their report, is
    critically important. What it does is spell out who reports to
    who under the National Intelligence Director.
        I'd like for each of the three of you to comment on this
    and respond in this way. If you think that flow chart and that
    restructuring of the Intelligence Community will work, fine. If
    you think it will not work or there are problems associated
    with it, I wish you'd comment on that.
        Mr. Secretary?
        Secretary Rumsfeld. I don't have it in front of me, but I
    can recall seeing and not understanding it sufficiently.
        Chairman Warner. Let us take a moment to provide it to the
    Secretary.
        Secretary Rumsfeld. Oh, I don't need it. I remember looking
    at it, and I remember that a chart is a chart, an organization
    chart, and I could not tell from it--and I could not if I had
    it in front of me now--how it would work. I think that the--all
    of the granularity that is necessary underneath that is what
    either makes it work or not work, or--in the last analysis,
    frankly, you can have the best organization chart and bad
    people, and you're not going to have much of an organization;
    and vice versa, you can have good people and a lousy
    organization chart, and it works pretty darn well. But I'm
    uncomfortable with what I see there.
        Senator Chambliss. General Myers?
        General Myers. It's one of those issues that I think is
    fundamental as you decide what it is--what responsibilities and
    authorities you want this National Intelligence Director to
    have. This organization under him is fundamental to that. I
    think we're wrestling with the first part. Until you decide
    that, I think it's very difficult, then, to start plugging in
    the boxes underneath that. We need to wrestle with the first
    part before I'd be comfortable saying that particular
    recommendation in the 9/11 report is the right recommendation.
        Mr. McLaughlin. Senator, I think Chairman Myers hit the
    nail on the head, and this was why I emphasized, in my
    testimony, that it's critically important, at the outset, for
    form to follow function here; meaning that we have to decide
    what we want this NID to actually do. As an acting DCI, I have
    a list of about 30 things long that I do.
        Would you want this person to be the person who walks in to
    brief the President every day? Would you want this person to be
    the person who came up here and sits where the DCI normally
    sits to brief you on, say, the worldwide threat posture each
    year? Would you want this person to be the person who speaks
    for the Intelligence Community on what's happening with North
    Korea's weaponry? Would you want this person to be the person
    who defines the requirements for the community?
        Those are currently things the DCI does. If you had this
    person assigned those tasks, the person sitting, I think, a
    layer down in that chart, heading the CIA, would have more
    limited responsibilities for all-source analysis, clandestine
    operations overseas, covert action, and science and technology.
        So if you were to choose to assign all of those
    responsibilities that I just enumerated to this National
    Intelligence Director--as distinct from a more limited range of
    responsibilities having to do more with the czar
    responsibilities that involve basically composing a budget,
    coordinating it, ensuring that it's carried out, and so forth--
    but if you assigned that full block of responsibilities to this
    individual, as General Myers says, that would really affect
    that organizational chart. My reaction to it is similar to the
    Secretary's. I'm uncomfortable with it, because, first, I don't
    know exactly what this person would do day-to-day, in a
    practical sense; and, second, if you had this person doing,
    day-to-day, the range of things that I just laid out, I think
    it's awfully complicated, and it would make it harder to do
    those things than it currently is, because a number of the
    people in those seats down there are dual-hatted; it wouldn't
    be clear what the reporting chains are, and so forth.
        I have, in my own mind, a chart that I would draw up if I
    were doing this, but I'd leave that to another day, because I
    think we have to first talk about what this person actually
    does.
        Senator Chambliss. I think it's pretty clear that what the
    recommendation from the 9/11 Commission does do is that it
    takes away a lot of the jurisdiction, a lot of the power and
    authority of the Director of Central Intelligence, and it gives
    that power and authority to the National Director of
    Intelligence. It does call for reporting requirements to go
    from the NID to the President, as opposed to the CIA to the
    President, so it makes drastic changes in who's going to report
    to who. I know my time is up, but, just very quickly, John,
    what would that do to morale in the agency? Do you have any
    thoughts on that?--if the role of the Director of the CIA is
    diminished?
        Mr. McLaughlin. I speak as a career CIA employee, so I come
    here with a certain bias that I can't erase. People who work in
    the Intelligence Community--in the NFIP, not just the CIA--have
    grown up with the thought that the DCI is the leader of the
    community. I think anything that diminished the role of the
    person who sits in that chair would take quite a bit of
    adjustment on the part of CIA employees.
        Senator Chambliss. Thank you.
        Chairman Warner. Thank you very much, Senator.
        Senator Ben Nelson.
        Senator Ben Nelson. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        I want to go back to the movement of troops. There's merit
    in moving, I believe, troops from Germany and Europe,
    realigning our force structure, location of troops in that
    area, because I think the threat, we all understand, of
    communism and of the threat of the former Soviet Union is no
    longer what it once was. Also, I think it's an important thing
    to design a personnel structure that lengthens stays at a
    particular Army or Air Force base or a naval station. General
    Schoomaker has already talked about this, and clearly that's, I
    think, desirable to the families of almost every person in
    uniform, and has merit.
        But moving troops from South Korea, as a matter of
    interest, I think might be a different story. South Korea, as
    we all know, faces a conventional threat from North Korea, just
    as Asia and the United States face a strategic threat from
    North Korea. I know that you've thought about this. Although
    our forces in South Korea are not as large as those in Iraq, I
    worry about removing any troops at this time so--to avoid
    having it viewed as a sign of weakness or, some might suggest,
    a reward to a regime that's proliferating weapons and weapons
    technology to the highest bidder. I know that we're engaged in
    multiparty talks with North Korea, and it's important that we
    keep that in mind, keep in mind the audiences of South Korea,
    the region, and, unfortunately, Kim Jong Il. Because of his
    insular and isolated position, I am very concerned that this
    will, in some way, suggest to him preemptive--as I think
    retired Lieutenant General Daniel Christman said--some sort of
    preemptive concession, as opposed to simply a realignment of
    troops and reassessing our strength needs/requirements in that
    particular area.
        I wish you would comment on that. I know that you've
    thought about it. I certainly agree that moving the troops from
    Seoul south to another location so they're not right in the
    heart of the city has been under consideration. I assume that
    may be part of the overall restructuring there. But perhaps,
    Secretary Rumsfeld and General Myers, you might be able to
    share your thoughts on this.
        Secretary Rumsfeld. I'll be very brief. The deterrent will
    not be weakened in any way. It is a mistake, in my view, to
    equate numbers with lethality and capability. Speed, agility,
    and precision are enormously important--more important than
    numbers--simply counting up numbers of people or numbers of
    bombs or numbers of something else--and we're going to have to
    get our thinking adjusted to that.
        The process will take place over time. It's been 50 years
    since the end of the Korean War. South Korea is vastly more
    powerful and more capable, from an economic standpoint, than
    the North. We are in a process that General LaPorte has been
    undertaking of transferring responsibilities to the South
    Korean military. They're accepting those responsibilities. We
    are rearranging our forces on the peninsula, and we are adding
    capability. That costs money. That adds lethality. That is not
    trivial. The suggestion that that deterrent will be weakened,
    in my view, is inaccurate. I would like General Myers to
    comment on it.
        General Myers. I would just add to that. The South Korean
    Armed Forces, they have 560,000 people on Active Duty. They
    have 3.8 million in Reserves. We're going to make a modest
    change in our force structure there--by a fraction, a small
    fraction of those numbers. But it really does come down to
    capability. It comes down to the speed, agility, and precision,
    as the Secretary said. It also comes down to our ability to
    command and control, to battle-manage our assets. Any
    comparison of the security situation in the South and our
    abilities to deter and dissuade the North are unmistakable. Our
    deterrent posture will not change. If anything, it's going to
    get better over time.
        It was just a couple of years ago, this committee, we were
    considering a paucity of precision-guided weapons. Through your
    action, our coffers are pretty full. It was only a couple of
    years ago when the commander of U.S. Forces Korea and Combined
    Forces Command worried about not having those precision
    weapons. Today, I mean, just a couple of years, that situation
    has changed dramatically, where it is the bedrock of General
    LaPorte's war planning. So there should be no mistake, I think,
    on anybody's part that actually our capability is increasing
    day by day. It is also important that the Republic of Korea
    take the steps necessary to assume those missions to gain that
    capability so they can be, with their resources, with these
    tremendous numbers in their Armed Forces, prepared--better
    prepared, and continue to evolve too. So it is not an issue of
    numbers; it's an issue of capability in their case, as well.
        So we're working this really hard. We talked about this
    with the Joint Chiefs. We've talked about it with the combatant
    commanders. There's nobody currently responsible for this part
    of the world--or, for that matter, anywhere in the world--that
    thinks this is going to diminish our capability to deter,
    dissuade, or influence North Korea. In fact, we think it is all
    for the better, for all the reasons, Senator Nelson, some of
    which you stated, and some of which we stated here.
        Secretary Rumsfeld. Actually, I just add that the force
    adjustments on the Korean Peninsula have absolutely nothing to
    do with the four-, or five-, or six-party talks with the North
    Koreans with respect to their nuclear activities. They know it,
    we know it, the other participants know it.
        Senator Ben Nelson. Do you think the North Koreans
    understand that, exactly, with such an isolated position that
    they hold in the world and totally an insular government, as I
    understand it?
        Secretary Rumsfeld. I guess, let me rephrase--or let me
    answer this question. I absolutely do not think that there's
    any risk that the North Koreans are going to misunderstand the
    combined military capability--yesterday, today, and tomorrow--
    of South Korea and the United States of America.
        Senator Ben Nelson. Our resolution to stay and support that
    Republic?
        Secretary Rumsfeld. Absolutely.
        Chairman Warner. Thank you, Senator.
        Senator Ben Nelson. Thank you.
        Chairman Warner. Senator Dole.
        Senator Dole. Gentlemen, there are no shortages of
    proposals to reorganize the Intelligence Community. A spectrum
    of ideas can be found in the recommendations advanced by the 9/
    11 Commission, the administration, the Scowcroft Commission,
    numerous legislative efforts, and the proposals by
    distinguished individuals, such as Secretary Hamre, whom we
    heard from yesterday, Bob Gates, just to name a few.
        Now, these proposals, all well-intentioned, are worthy
    attempts to achieve unity of effort in our Intelligence
    Community and enhance our national security. The diversity
    among these numerous proposals affects the operations of
    numerous governmental departments and agencies, as we all know,
    all of which fall under the jurisdiction of multiple
    congressional committees. As a result, attaining a
    comprehensive assessment and comparison of these proposals has
    been elusive, at best.
        The testimony and subsequent debate that we heard yesterday
    in our hearing illuminated numerous concerns about intelligence
    reform, as well as the merits of reform. The assessments
    spanned the spectrum. Secretary Hamre noted that connecting the
    dots and avoiding group-think are in tension with each other.
    Implementing an organizational solution to just one of the
    problems will worsen the other.
        The 9/11 Commission suggested that we, as lawmakers, look
    ourselves in the mirror. I touched on this point in yesterday's
    hearing. There are those who have called congressional
    oversight ``lax,'' ``uneven,'' and even ``dysfunctional.''
    Problems raised include overlapping jurisdiction and turf
    battles.
        Now, as a freshman Senator, I don't claim to be an expert
    in congressional oversight. But as a veteran of a number of
    different branches of government, perhaps as much as 35 years
    in the executive branch, I do have concerns with some proposals
    that have been made, and I believe rushing to judgment on
    implementing them would be a mistake.
        The Department of Homeland Security serves as a perfect
    example. While we have been at war, Secretary Tom Ridge and his
    top deputies have testified at 290 hearings in the past year
    and a half, they've received more than 4,000 letters from
    Congress requesting information; furthermore, 88 committees and
    subcommittees assert jurisdictional interest over this
    Department.
        I'm not sure how many committees would have jurisdiction
    over a National Intelligence Director, but I imagine it would
    be more than a few. A back-of-the-envelope survey suggests at
    least seven full committees, just in the Senate.
        Dr. Lowell Wood, of Stanford University, I think made a key
    point, and I want to quote at length from him: ``Only when
    Congress makes major changes in its own ways of doing business
    in any area does the rest of the government take note and begin
    to believe that it's really serious about the corresponding
    change and that things, indeed, must change. Really big changes
    are needed in the Nation's strategic intelligence functions,
    and just tinkering with executive structures and titles and
    organizational arrangements and locations is a fooling-some-of-
    the-people-some-of-the-time type of solution. It surely won't
    fool, even for a moment, the hard-eyed types that infest the
    mean streets of the present-day world. Instead, Congress must
    significantly change itself, as well as the executive.
    Difficult though this may be, anything less simply fails to
    rise to the demands of the present challenge posed to
    America.''
        I spoke last week with former Director of Central
    Intelligence Bob Gates, who advised against the temptation to
    find a middle road, a compromise that mitigates controversy and
    unhappiness both in the executive and legislative branches, but
    does not solve the problems identified by the 9/11 Commission.
        Secretary Rumsfeld, Henry Kissinger has called for a pause
    for reflection to distill the various proposals into a coherent
    concept. A small group of men and women with high-level
    experience in government could be assigned this task with a
    short deadline. In your opinion, Secretary Rumsfeld, how does
    the current committee structure in Congress have to be reformed
    in order to be able to deal with a massive intelligence
    overhaul without running into jurisdictional issues and turf
    wars? Based on your experience, do you feel that Dr.
    Kissinger's proposal for an outside panel of experts--elder
    statesmen, let's say--should be considered for implementing the
    Commission's recommendations?
        I would like to ask just this one question--or these two
    questions--of each of you on the panel, please.
        Secretary Rumsfeld. Senator Dole, thank you.
        With respect to the last question, I have not seen the
    specific recommendation that Dr. Kissinger made, but I have
    been, in effect, doing that, inviting in outside experts,
    senior people, elder statesmen, to use your phrase, because I
    value their thoughts and their ideas. I've had in Secretary
    Cohen and Secretary Brown, and Dr. Kissinger. I've talked to
    about these things, and any number of other people from both
    parties. I think it's a useful thing for this committee to do.
    Whether it ought to be formalized, I guess, is for others to
    decide.
        With respect to your question on Congress, I guess--I
    haven't served in Congress for 35 or 40 years, so I don't think
    I'm really current. Further, I guess it's really none of my
    business, technically. On the other hand, I appreciate the
    invitation.
        Chairman Warner. Don't feel any constraints. Go ahead and
    let us have it. [Laughter.]
        Secretary Rumsfeld. I appreciate the invitation.
        It is a problem. Let me first look at it in a macro sense.
    We are conducting a global war on terror with peacetime
    constraints, in large part. If you think of the different
    circumstances we can be in--we can be at peace; we can be in a
    partial emergency situation, where we have partial authorities;
    you could be over in full mobilization; you could be in a
    declared war--and the authorities that Congress delegates to
    the executive branch change. They change depending on which
    circumstance we're in.
        What is the global war on terror? Where does it fit across
    that spectrum? How ought we to be arranged for this period,
    which could be a long, tough period, a dangerous period, in the
    21st century where technologies have evolved, where things move
    faster? That would be a very useful thing for Congress to
    address. I think it could be done usefully, and I think it
    could be--significantly inform what we do so we could look at
    it in a macro sense rather than each little piece.
        Do we need better contracting authorities in a crisis?
    Ought the DOD to be--ought we to be able to do more with
    respect to training and equipping foreign forces, so we can use
    them instead of our forces, when it costs a fraction as much?
    Yet we're all tangled up in that issue, for 3 years now. We
    weren't able to do the training and equipping for the Afghan
    army after the war. We had to go around tin-cupping the world.
    So there's a--this is a big issue. It's an important issue.
        Now, with respect to the committee situation, sure--I mean,
    I'm not an intelligence expert, and I don't have to testify on
    intelligence matters, normally. But if we're worried about
    keeping a secret, if we're worried about congressional
    oversight and assuring that Congress has a full role in a fast-
    moving world, I would think that smaller committees or a joint
    committee on intelligence might very well serve that need
    better. I would think that--it's none of my business, again--
    but the idea that there's a--people who get to be experts on
    intelligence then have to leave the committee, as I understand
    it, on a rotating basis--maybe that's a good idea; maybe it
    isn't a good idea. I think there are things that Congress could
    do.
        Clearly--you mentioned the homeland security situation, and
    the multiplicity of committees--Dr. Cambone, I think, and John
    McLaughlin mentioned the number of committees that have to
    approve reprogramming. If we're building a budget one year,
    getting it approved the next, and not implementing it until the
    third year, the idea that you have to spend 4, 5 months trying
    to get a change in a budget that you know you're going to need
    changes in is mindless in the 21st century. We have to fix
    that.
        Chairman Warner. Dr. McLaughlin?
        Senator Dole. Thank you.
        Mr. McLaughlin. Senator, those are really important
    questions, and I welcome the chance to comment on them.
        First, for the Intelligence Community--and CIA, in
    particular--engagement with Congress is very important. In
    2003, we had something like 1,200 separate meetings with
    Congress. These weren't with committees now. Some were with
    committees, but I'm including in that count briefings to
    individual Members and so forth. In 2004, the number is up to
    about 780. I'm not complaining. This is important to us. It's
    important to us for a number of reasons--those kinds of
    meetings, plus oversight.
        With the military, the military's connected to the American
    people in a variety of ways. So many people serve in the
    military, every town has a recruitment station. People
    understand the military.
        People don't understand intelligence, generally. We don't
    have a natural constituency. Our oversight process is the thing
    that really ties us to the American people in very important
    ways. So let me say that I start as a strong supporter of
    oversight, and believe it's essential, actually, to the health
    of this community.
        Now, I wouldn't make any recommendations about committee
    structure--one, two, or more. At present, we typically report
    to about six committees when we do our budget, and I think you
    know which ones they are.
        I would comment a little bit about the way oversight works.
    I think the words, to me, that are most important--if I were
    characterizing the ideal oversight situation, the two words I
    would use would be ``continuous'' and ``constructive.'' In
    other words, oversight has tended to focus, I think, very
    heavily on our faults and our mistakes. I would not ask that it
    do anything less on those issues. In other words, when we make
    an error, when we make a mistake, it needs to be brought
    forward, and we need to address it with our oversight
    committees.
        I think there is more scope for what I would call the
    ``constructive''--that's constructive, in its own way--but for
    a different kind of oversight that also includes frequent
    engagement with us on issues of the day. Oversight committees
    ought to have more hearings on things like what's going on in
    China, what's going on in Iran, exploring the issue. Oversight
    committees also ought to look more carefully at our successes,
    not to give us a pat on the back, but to learn from why we've
    succeeded somewhere. How is it that we took down the A.Q. Khan
    network? How did that happen? How is it that we have captured
    so many leading figures in al Qaeda since September 11? How did
    that happen? Now, it isn't just an academic question, because
    embedded in the ``How did it happen?'' is ``What do we need?''
    to do more of that. My own view, in my own experience, not
    enough of that goes on in the oversight process.
        So----
        Chairman Warner. Thank you. I must----
        Mr. McLaughlin.--I would just stop there.
        Chairman Warner.--interrupt, if I may.
        Senator Dole. Thank you for excellent comments.
        Chairman Warner. This panel has to be at the White House at
    promptly 2:30. We have five, six Senators that have yet to have
    their opportunity.
        So I thank you, Senator, and I thank you, Dr. McLaughlin.
    You may extend your remarks, for the purpose of the record,
    voluminously, if you so desire.
        Mr. McLaughlin. I was finished.
        Chairman Warner. Thank you.
        Senator Dayton.
        Senator Dayton. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, gentlemen.
        Mr. Secretary, the 9/11 Commission report, according--here
    on page 43, states, ``In most cases the chain of command
    authorizing the use of force runs from the President to the
    Secretary of Defense, from the Secretary to the combatant
    commander.'' President Bush, because of--by his account and
    others, communications problems onboard Air Force One that
    morning, was having difficulty establishing communication with
    the Vice President on a consistent basis. The Commission goes
    on to say here that the President spoke with you for the first
    time shortly after 10 o'clock, which would have been almost 2
    hours after the first hijacking began. No one can recall the
    content of this conversation, but it was a brief call in which
    the subject of the shoot-down of these incoming hijacked
    planes, authority, was not discussed. At 10:39, the Vice
    President updated you on the air threat. The Vice President
    was, understandably, under the belief that since he had
    communicated twice, possibly three times, according to this
    report, through a military aid to North American Aerospace
    Defense Command (NORAD), the authority from the President to
    shoot down an incoming plane that did not detour, that that was
    the instruction that had been passed on. The NORAD commander
    told the Commission--both the mission commander and the senior
    weapons director of NORAD indicated--and according to, again,
    the Commission report, they did not pass the order to the
    fighters circling Washington and New York because they were
    unsure how the pilots would or should proceed with this
    guidance.
        What is the necessary chain of command to be established so
    that an order directed from the President verbally from the
    Vice President to NORAD is carried out--or is communicated, I
    should say, to those who must carry it out?
        Secretary Rumsfeld. Dick Myers and Dr. Cambone were with me
    that day. The way you've stated it is not the way I recall it,
    the 2-hour figure you used. My recollection is, the first tower
    was hit sometime around 8:46, I think.
        Senator Dayton. Sir, I said the first hijacking commenced
    at 8:14.
        Secretary Rumsfeld. Oh, the first hijacking, I beg your
    pardon.
        Senator Dayton. You're right, though, about an hour and a
    half after the first plane----
        Secretary Rumsfeld. I think the way to respond to this,
    Senator, is as follows. Under the way the national security
    arrangement is, and was--I should say ``was''--the
    responsibility of the DOD was essentially to defend our country
    from external threats. Indeed, the responsibility for internal
    threats, which is obviously what was taking place on September
    11, not an external threat--it was from within the country--was
    the responsibility of the FBI, and, in the case of a hijacked
    aircraft, the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA). The
    responsibilities of DOD was as a supporter of an attack on our
    country, in the event we were asked. But Congress and the
    country has, for many decades, kept the DOD out of the law
    enforcement business, out of the crime business, out of
    internal law enforcement issues under the Posse Comitatus Act.
        So the DOD was oriented externally. Our radars were pointed
    out, not in. The FAA was the one that then had the
    responsibility to say, ``There's a hijack,'' and then ask the
    DOD, say, ``will you track and report on that hijacking?''--the
    hijacking, traditionally, being a situation where a plane is
    taken for the purpose of going someplace and then getting some
    political advantage for it, not flying it into a building.
        So the way you characterized the chain of command is
    correct--from the President to the Secretary of Defense to the
    combatant commander--but it applied to things from external
    threats, not the responsibility of the FBI or the FAA.
        Senator Dayton. I respect, sir, that the circumstances of
    that morning were very different from what anybody had
    foreseen. Given, however, that the Vice President, at that
    point, from the command-control bunker of the White House is
    communicating--again, I'm using the 9/11 Commission report's
    information here--via military aide, to NORAD the President's
    verbal authority to shoot down a plane, and that information is
    not--that instruction is not communicated, then, to the fighter
    pilots circling the United States Capital and New York City, is
    that the way it's supposed to function? Would that happen again
    if we were to be surprised again today?
        Secretary Rumsfeld. I'm going to ask General Myers to add
    to this, but the answer is, of course not. Since that day, a
    great many adjustments and changes have been made, and we have
    various types of fighter aircraft on alert. We have established
    an Assistant Secretary for Homeland Security in the DOD. We
    have established a Northern Command, that never existed, for
    the DOD to be addressing the homeland security issues from a
    Defense Department standpoint. We have a new Department of
    Homeland Security that exists. There's just a dozen things that
    are different.
        The way to stop airplanes is, clearly, from the ground--
    that is to say, to have air marshals and to have reinforced
    doors and to have baggage inspections and to not allow
    terrorists on aircraft that they can then take that aircraft
    and fly it into a building.
        Now, as a last resort, is it possible that we could shoot
    down an aircraft in the event that was necessary? Yes, it's
    possible. Airplanes fly right past the Pentagon every 5
    minutes, and what it takes is simply to lower your nose and go
    into something. Could we stop that? No. I mean, the fact of the
    matter is, with all the airplanes flying around in the skies,
    it is not possible to do it in many instances. We do spend a
    lot of money and a lot of effort to try to stop it, both from
    the ground and from the air.
        The answer to your question is, yes, a great deal has
    changed.
        Senator Dayton. Anyway, my time has expired. Mr. Chairman,
    if I may just ask the----
        Chairman Warner. Let's have General Myers----
        General Myers. Yes, sir.
        Senator Dayton.--may I ask him also--well, yes, sir.
        Chairman Warner. Go ahead, Senator.
        General Myers. Senator Dayton, I would just add, to the
    Secretary's remarks, now that NORAD is focused inward as well
    as externally, that there are rules of engagement that have
    been promulgated, that are well-understood--in a classified
    session or outside this room we could talk about that, if you
    want to--but they're very well-understood up and down the chain
    of command, and it's practiced all the time.
        Clearly, we're talking about some very serious issues here,
    as the Secretary said. It also involves ground defenses, not
    just air defenses. But the rules of engagement, the command and
    control structure that's set in there is completely different
    because the mission for NORAD changed after September 11, and
    no longer were they asked to look just externally, but also
    internally.
        The relationship between NORAD and the FAA has also changed
    dramatically, and we've worked those arrangements where we
    have, I think, very good communications today. I talked to
    General Eberhardt today about that particular issue, and he
    certainly agrees.
        Senator Dayton. Mr. Chairman, if I may just ask that he
    respond, also--Mr. Chairman, if you would--in writing, to the--
    I think it's inference, but it's also really an explicit
    accusation made in the substance of the report on,
    particularly, page 34, that NORAD's testimony, 20 months after
    September 11, to the 9/11 Commission about the sequence of
    events, particularly the failure of the FAA to inform NORAD in
    a timely basis of three of the four hijackings, was inaccurate.
    The statement made by NORAD publicly 1 week after September 11,
    which is very similar to that testimony made 20 months later,
    was also inaccurate, seriously misleading anybody trying to
    assess the response and non-response that day in a way that I
    think is far more alarming about FAA's failure--proper response
    than NORAD's, but I--if you would please review that testimony
    and see, because I don't believe anybody has held those
    discrepancies--or anyone to account for those discrepancies
    that I consider them to be--more than just oversights. I think
    they're serious misrepresentations of the facts. Thank you.
        Senator Dayton. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        General Myers. Could I make just a comment on that, Senator
    Dayton? I liken this to an accident investigation board when an
    aircraft crashes. I've been a reviewing official at the table
    at many of those. Normally what happens when an incident
    happens, there is the first report, which has some accuracies
    and many inaccuracies. So statements, what people believe
    happened immediately afterwards and in the next week or 2
    weeks, is what they believe. But as they continue to harvest
    the facts, and as we go to machines that record things--like
    aircraft recorders, like radar scope recorders, and so forth--
    the facts become clearer, and what people thought they saw or
    thought they understood or thought they heard changes over
    time. That's the nature of these kind of investigations.
        I think NORAD would be the first to say that, because of
    the access that the 9/11 Commission had to certain parts of
    this apparatus that was collecting this data, that it sharpened
    their focus, too, and things they thought happened turned out
    to be either different or incomplete. It took a lot of work and
    a lot of months to come to what was ground truth. The same
    thing is true in accident investigations. It takes us sometimes
    many months to come to ground truth, and what people thought
    they heard, what they thought they saw, will be changed as they
    review the facts. I think that's the case.
        I've talked to General Eberhardt about this. I do not know
    what the motivation of NORAD would be to ever lie or deceive. I
    mean, that's not what they're pledged to do. They're pledged to
    do the same thing we all are, in uniform, and that's defend
    this country. I would take exception to anybody that thinks
    they had any other motive.
        Chairman Warner. Thank you very much, General.
        Senator Dayton. If I could say, Mr. Chairman, this 20 is
    months after--sworn testimony to the Commission 20 months after
    the event, I think, is worthy of your scrutiny, please.
    Furthermore, because--I bring this up, not just for historical
    reasons--2 months ago--and if you have a chance to review the
    circumstances, the plane that caused the evacuation of the
    Capitol complex, with thousands of people running for their
    lives here, being informed to do so by the Capitol Police
    because of, again, a failure of FAA--and that's almost entirely
    based on the evidence I have--their failure to communicate just
    basic information to air defense, to anyone else, including the
    Capitol Police, that we had a situation there, the closest
    simulation I think we could possibly have--because people
    thought it was a real threat, until they found out otherwise--
    that we could have--and here, 2\1/2\ years after September 11
    has occurred, we find, basically, again, a complete breakdown
    of communication by the Federal authorities--and, again,
    primarily FAA--but to National Defense Command and to others so
    that we don't have a response. We talk about things not
    changing as a result of September 11, this, to me, is the most
    horrific example that I could imagine. If we don't deal with
    the fact that we failed----
        Chairman Warner. Senator----
        Senator Dayton.--now a second time on the basic elements of
    communication and----
        Chairman Warner. Senator, I have to----
        Senator Dayton.--following protocols----
        Chairman Warner. Thank you.
        Senator Dayton.--and procedures. Sir, I waited, sir, for 3
    and 4 hours here----
        Chairman Warner. Yes----
        Senator Dayton.--if I just may finish.
        Chairman Warner.--but you're cutting out the time of other
    Senators to be able to ask----
        Senator Dayton. I've waited----
        Chairman Warner.--a single question.
        Senator Dayton.--a long time, sir.
        Chairman Warner. I ask your indulgence to supply, for the
    record, please, so that I can turn----
        Senator Dayton. Before September 11 happens again, I ask
    that we review that evidence.
        Thank you.
        General Myers. Senator Dayton, I'll respond to that, for
    the record, if I may, Mr. Chairman and Senators.
        [The information referred to follows:]

        The incident in question involved the Governor of Kentucky's
    aircraft. Despite communication shortfalls, the end result is that the
    checks and balances in effect prevented a tragedy from taking place.
    The North American Aerospace Defense Command (NORAD) took appropriate
    action and did not shoot down the aircraft.
        The Kentucky Governor's aircraft did not have a pre-flight waiver
    for flying into the Air Defense Identification Zone (ADIZ) without a
    transponder. Upon airborne notification of a transponder malfunction,
    the pilot requested and the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA)
    granted permission to continue to Ronald Reagan Washington National
    Airport. NORAD was not informed that the aircraft would be permitted to
    fly into the ADIZ without a functioning transponder and that FAA
    controllers were in communication with the plane. However, NORAD assets
    tracked and positively identified the aircraft prior to its landing.
        Since the incident, FAA has made it mandatory that all aircraft
    must have an operational transponder in order to enter the National
    Capital Region ADIZ. In addition, FAA has provided the same radar
    displays used by Potomac Terminal Radar Control to people in the
    National Capital Region Command Center.

        Chairman Warner. I'm going to have to ask, respectfully,
    that you provide--this is an important colloquy, but I've had
    Senators waiting just as long.
        Senator Cornyn, it is your time.
        Please reply for the record, General.
        Senator Cornyn. Undoubtedly, the 9/11 Commission has
    performed an important public service. But, by definition,
    their focus was on the causes of that terrible event on that
    terrible day. I think we should all be chastened by some of the
    testimony we've already heard here today that any solution
    should logically flow from the problem that has been
    identified--or, I believe, Director McLaughlin, you said the
    form ought to follow the function. I think that's good advice.
        It seems to me that a number of the solutions are directed
    toward preventing another September 11. For example, the
    National Counterterrorism Center, perhaps, something that's
    been described as ``TTIC on steroids,'' the congressional
    oversight reform, which I think is an important subject, and
    which--it's been touched on a little bit today. But I guess the
    question I have really relates to the National Intelligence
    Director, because it seems to me that, in some ways, what we're
    doing is creating a position and then trying to find things for
    that person to do, which, to me, seems like the opposite of how
    we ought to address it, because I do believe that we ought to
    let the form follow the function, or the solution logically
    flow from the problems that have been identified.
        Which leads me to the question--Director McLaughlin,
    specifically--you alluded to a number of things that have
    happened since September 11 which have made America safer:
    passage of the Patriot Act, tearing down the wall between law
    enforcement and intelligence authorities, creation of the
    Department of Homeland Security, creation of the Terrorist
    Threat Integration Center. But could you tell us, sir, today,
    what additional authority could this Congress provide to you,
    as the Director of Central Intelligence, or to the National
    Intelligence Director, that would make this country safer and
    which would be more likely to prevent another September 11?
        Mr. McLaughlin. I think--I would start by the things that,
    from where I sit, I need most at this point in the fight
    against terrorism. The first thing I would say is, I need more
    experienced people. We've done a lot since September 11 and in
    the last 5 or 6 years to build up our staff that is on the
    front line against terrorism, but we need still more people,
    and we need them with experience.
        The second thing I need in order to get that is still more
    time, in the sense that you don't produce those kinds of people
    overnight; they have to be in the pipeline, they have to be
    training, they have to be in the field, they have to learn
    their business. So as much as we have improved, there's still a
    ways to go on that score.
        Looking through the 9/11 recommendations, the things that
    jump out at me as things that would most improve our
    counterterrorism posture are things like a common
    intelligence--a common information-technology architecture for
    the Intelligence Community. At the end of the day, sharing
    intelligence, sharing information, means moving information. I
    think counterterrorism, at the end of the day, is--apart from
    the people who fight terrorists--all about fusing information.
    It's about taking the information you get from some highway
    patrolman in Indiana, some agent of yours in the Middle East,
    an overhead satellite, an intercepted conversation, and having
    that all come together on a desk somewhere, where someone looks
    at it and says, ``I see connections that I didn't see before.''
        So that means putting people together, as we have in TTIC.
    To the extent that--if you walk through TTIC now, you would see
    that the thing they probably most need to deal with the 26
    networks that flow into that place is a common information
    architecture to merge them all together so that every
    individual has all of that information popping up on their
    screen every day.
        Now, I should be brief here, but the other thing is, if you
    want to look at these recommendations, and you wanted to pick
    out something that would make a difference, I think a separate
    budget appropriation for the NFIP would make a difference; that
    is, separating that out so that it would have, just by virtue
    of its separation, fewer congressional committees to go
    through. It would make a lot of things simpler.
        I could go on, but those are the first things that occur to
    me.
        Senator Cornyn. I know all of us are interested in
    improving our intelligence outputs, and I hope we just don't
    look at budgetary inputs and minutia like that when we really
    need to be focusing on, ``How do we improve our intelligence
    and not do anything that would harm what we currently have, or
    the improvements that have occurred since September 11, and
    perhaps other unintended results that would be detrimental to
    the security of our country?''
        Mr. McLaughlin. That's why I say the fusion of data is most
    important. If you bring it together, and you see the picture,
    and then you have the ability to act on it, as we must,
    literally within minutes, transmitting a picture that we've
    developed to someone in the field who takes action, anything
    that helps that fusion and transmission is critical.
        Senator Cornyn. Thank you, my time is up.
        Chairman Warner. Thank you, Senator, for your courtesy.
        Senator Bayh.
        Senator Bayh. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Gentlemen, thank you for your service to our country. I
    deeply appreciate your grappling with these tremendously
    important issues. I know they're not easy. While we want to
    move with as much haste as possible, it is important that we
    get it right. So I thank you for your dedication to that.
        It seems to me that we, Mr. Chairman, have all gathered
    here for the same purpose. We may have different ways of
    getting to the goal, but it's to try and prevent a future
    September 11. It seems to me that our ability to accomplish
    that objective is going to depend upon how well we grapple with
    the profound change that has swept the world since over the
    last 50 to 60 years when the Intelligence Community was first
    organized, and particularly the last 15 to 20--rogue nations,
    collapsed states, non-state actors, proliferation of weapons of
    mass destruction that are difficult to contemplate.
        My concern, gentlemen, is that in the private sector, there
    is an engine for change. It's the bottom line. You either
    succeed or you perish, and that's fought each and every day. In
    the governmental-side thing, you don't have quite the same
    impetus to stay up with the changing times, and so governments
    adapt more slowly. It sometimes takes a great shock, as we have
    experienced, to serve as the impetus for the kind of change
    that is necessary.
        So I think, while we want to make sure we get it right, at
    the same time, I hope we can think big, and use this as an--not
    just as a challenge to be met, but as an opportunity to perhaps
    make some of the changes that, in government, are too often too
    long in the coming.
        I am somewhat concerned, not by what you've said here
    today, but just the general drift of events, that perhaps we
    have let the moment pass, that the momentum for constructive
    change has been dissipating, that perhaps the bureaucratic and
    congressional inertia is reasserting itself. I hope that's not
    the case, but I am somewhat concerned.
        So I have one question, Mr. McLaughlin, for you, and then
    two observations that I'd like to make before my time expires.
        My question, Mr. McLaughlin, is a followup on something
    that Senator Collins first raised. I'd like to ask it in a
    little bit different way. That is, the comment's been made by
    members of the committee and the panelists here today that
    we're at war. That is undeniably true, we are at war. This
    observation was, I think, first made by a previous DCI, Mr.
    McLaughlin, even before September 11, when Mr. Tenet observed
    that Osama bin Laden has declared war on us, and we are at war
    with him, and he sought to mobilize the resources of the
    community. But, in the opinion of the 9/11 Commission,
    apparently the message wasn't received or internalized by
    enough people. I think the head of the NSA, when I asked about
    that statement--and his response was, he wasn't aware that the
    DCI had declared war on al Qaeda.
        My question to you, George Tenet was not a wallflower. He
    was a fairly strong personality. I can't think that he didn't
    make his wishes known. What powers did he lack to put into
    effect the notion that we were at war, and that we needed to
    mobilize ourselves as if we were at war, and act as though we
    were at war? What powers does the DCI lack that prevented him
    from acting upon his observation?
        Mr. McLaughlin. Well, it's a----
        Senator Bayh.--or getting others to act upon his
    observation.
        Mr. McLaughlin. Yes. It's a complicated question and a
    complicated answer, but I'll be brief.
        I think the 9/11 Commission probably underrated, to some
    degree, the responsiveness that we saw. That said, it probably
    wasn't all that it should have been. There are many reasons for
    this. Part of them may lie in authorities. Inevitably, if a
    Director has authority to move people and money and individuals
    rather than relying on the power of persuasion and the force of
    personality that you allude to, the Director can do more things
    more rapidly.
        TTIC is a good example. I was able to put 60 people in TTIC
    overnight, because they were my people. I took them right out
    of CIA and put them there. A week after I said go, they were
    going. So there's a directness of authority that improves
    things.
        Senator Bayh. But could I--I don't want to cut you short--
    forgive me for that. Let me cut to the chase here. We had a
    long set of discussions about the whole budget issue----
        Mr. McLaughlin. Yes.
        Senator Bayh.--which is one of the things we need to do. I
    understand the administration is grappling with that. In your
    opinion, if there had been a different alignment of budgetary
    authority, as has been suggested by the Commission and the DCI,
    would it have elicited a different response?
        Mr. McLaughlin. If it would have hastened and made more
    direct the Director's ability to put people together and
    determine what they were doing, day in and day out, yes, it
    would have made a difference.
        Senator Bayh. I suspect it would have. Let me follow up----
        Mr. McLaughlin. There are other things in the climate. I
    just need to say, though, that it isn't just--in that time, it
    wasn't just budget authority; it was that--for lack of a better
    term, the crystalizing event of September 11 had not happened.
    Even in the summer of 2001, when we had high threat warning, it
    was still difficult, not just for people in the United States,
    but for our liaison partners, our intelligence partners
    overseas, to digest the seriousness of it. Once that event
    occurred, as I said in my testimony, everything changed, and
    the limited authorities we had were more effective. So that's
    part of it, too.
        Senator Bayh. We all see the world differently following
    September 11 than before. But it did strike me that it was with
    some remarkable clairvoyance that he announced we were at war.
        Mr. McLaughlin. Oh, and he said it in worldwide threat
    testimonies, in 1998, 1999, and----
        Senator Bayh. My two observations, and then my time has
    expired, are as follows. First, Mr. McLaughlin, you said that--
    I think you asked--you said the most important question we
    needed to keep in mind is, who will we hold responsible? I
    think that's right. But I would disagree with you when you said
    that today it's the DCI. From my point of view, if we were to
    ask those who were responsible to appear before us today, it
    would be three or four individuals. All of you have the
    authority. You have mentioned that actually enforcing the
    authority is sometimes difficult, takes the force of
    personality, working collegially, those kinds of things. There
    may be other issues there. It seems to me today the person we
    hold responsible is the Commander in Chief, the President of
    the United States. I wonder if that situation serves him or the
    Nation well, and that, regardless of how we come down--and
    whether it's a DCI with more authority, a NID without--a super-
    empowered NID, a NID that's just simply serving a coordinating
    function--we do need to try, as much as we can, to answer that
    question, ``Who do we hold responsible?'' In some ways, I think
    you were being a little tough on yourself.
        My final observation, Mr. Secretary, deals with something
    you mentioned. I said to Senator Lieberman--he left the room--
    he said he thought the dog hadn't barked. I said, ``You missed
    the Secretary's enthusiasm for the subject of congressional
    reform. That certainly energized his testimony.'' My comment
    simply would be--it's something that I think is absolutely
    appropriate--I hope that Congress--Congress's zeal for reform
    will involve as much a look in the mirror as it does a scrutiny
    of what you do. Because, from my vantage point, we take up a
    lot of your time, and yet our oversight is more the appearance
    of oversight than efficient oversight, in fact. So I hope that
    meaningful congressional reform will be a part of this agenda.
    I think we will all know it has arrived when some of us have
    been willing to cede some of our authority for the cause of
    reform, as much as it is asking you to look at what you do and
    perhaps cede some of yours.
        Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Secretary Rumsfeld. I do, Senator, very briefly. Thank you
    very much, Senator.
        Anyone in positions of responsibility who has lived through
    September 11 feels an enormous sense of urgency. Do not think
    for a minute that that sense of urgency is not there. It is,
    and we are determined to continue to force this system to
    perform better for the American people and the country.
        A second comment. You said, ``Who's accountable?'' I think
    the--it's important to say, ``Who's accountable for what?''
    Because there's a tendency to equate counterterrorism--you said
    we're here to avoid another September 11--that's true, to be
    sure. But we're dealing with the entire Intelligence Community,
    and the entire Intelligence Community has tasks well beyond
    counterterrorism. We have counterproliferation, we have
    intelligence for the warfighter, there are tasks of deterring
    and defending--and, if necessary, fighting--for this country
    that the Intelligence Community contributes to all of that. We
    ought not to think that the task before us is to redesign the
    Intelligence Community to fit one of the many important
    functions that it has.
        Chairman Warner. Thank you very much.
        Senator Talent.
        Senator Talent. Thanks, Mr. Chairman.
        Senator Bayh's comments and the Secretary's comments are a
    good segue for me into my areas of interest.
        First of all, empowering the DCI--I'm glad Senator Bayh
    said what I've been thinking the whole hearing--the President
    can empower the DCI, anytime he wants to, to move budgets
    around or personnel around, isn't that right, Mr. McLaughlin?
        Mr. McLaughlin. There is a statute that determines all of
    that. It's in the--there are legislative requirements, I think.
        Senator Talent. Yes. I don't know that I want DCIs to be
    declaring war on anything on their own authority, under this
    system or a new system. I thought that's what the President
    did, and Congress did.
        Let me go into the whole issue. Rather than me going into
    the whole issue, I'm going to focus on one thing, given the
    lack of time, but on the National Intelligence Director
    proposal, and particularly with regard to those aspects of the
    Intelligence Community that today support warfighters, which
    Secretary Rumsfeld mentioned.
        If Congress created a directorate, as has been proposed,
    and gave the Director authority over budgets and personnel, and
    that Director decided that too much of the NSA's or the NGA's
    or the NRO's resources were going to support combat operations
    on the ground, and wanted to draw resources away--under that
    scenario I've painted, who could overrule that decision? If we
    empowered him with control over budgets and personnel--by
    definition, the only person would be the President, right? He'd
    be, effectively, a Cabinet-level officer, acting on behalf of
    the agencies in this department.
        Mr. McLaughlin. Yes, that's correct. I would say, though,
    that it's very difficult for me to imagine circumstances in
    which anyone who heads the Intelligence Community would arrive
    at the conclusion you just arrived at. For example, I
    understand that in the case of those agencies, NSA, NGA and so
    forth, I think there's a--the Chairman will correct me if I'm
    wrong--biannual review of their combat readiness, or their
    readiness to support combat. That would have to continue. I
    would recommend that whoever has this authority, that would
    have to continue. So I just can't imagine circumstances where
    someone would take away from that accessability.
        Senator Talent. I've heard this repeatedly, ``We can't
    imagine the circumstances where we give somebody a power and he
    would not exercise it in a way that we don't agree with.''
    Maybe that would be the case in the next 6 months or the next
    year. We don't know what's going to happen 2, 3, or 4 years
    from now. Probably this Director is going to be somebody who
    comes from the civilian Intelligence Community, comes from
    somebody who's interested in covert operations or non-
    proliferation or domestic surveillance--I'm not trying to argue
    with you, Mr. McLaughlin, I'm trying to air my concerns here.
        The only person I think could overrule him would be the
    President. Where is the President, under this scenario I've
    painted, getting his view of intelligence and intelligence
    priorities? From this person. So the President's hearing--and
    because we don't want him to hear a whole lot of different
    views, he's getting one view from this Director, who then says,
    after presenting it, ``Mr. President, I really think we need to
    take some of these resources and personnel away from combat
    support operations, because that's okay right now, and we need
    to put it into this counterintelligence. If we don't, we can't
    prevent another September 11.'' What's the President going to
    do?
        Or, under the current system, this committee would have
    something to say about it, because we have jurisdiction over
    the activities of the armed services. But if we followed
    through with the recommendations and turned all congressional
    jurisdiction over to one committee--and who would they be
    hearing from? Who would they be getting their intelligence
    information from? This one person.
        We're all presenting this as if this can't possibly happen.
    Let's think back on people who have run intelligence agencies
    and who have acquired a great deal of power, over time, at
    least over their particular areas. I think we're rushing--as
    Secretary Schlesinger said yesterday before the committee--that
    fools rush in where angels fear to tread.
        You say--near the end, Mr. McLaughlin, you say you'd also
    see more progress by a DCI or NID on things like common
    policies for personnel, training, security, and information
    technology. The NSA, the NGA, the NRO, their personnel and
    training policies, and certainly their information technology,
    are designed to be compatible with what's going on in the rest
    of the department that they support. Isn't that correct?
        Mr. McLaughlin. For the most part.
        Senator Talent. Yes, and so----
        Mr. McLaughlin. They also support other departments.
        Senator Talent. I got you. But--so we could have a
    Director, the NID who says, ``I'm not so sure I agree with how
    the Army is setting up the architecture for future combat
    systems. I don't know that I want our satellite technology to
    fit in exactly with that.'' Then if he decided that, who'd be
    in a position to tell him he was wrong?
        Mr. McLaughlin. I also said in my testimony--and bear in
    mind now, it's important----
        Senator Talent. I understand you're not----
        Mr. McLaughlin. No, but it's important to----
        Senator Talent. I'm deliberately using you as----
        Mr. McLaughlin.--step back----
        Senator Talent.--a sounding board, because these are my
    concerns.
        Mr. McLaughlin. It's important to step back here and say
    the Intelligence Community didn't raise this. We're all talking
    about it because it was raised by the 9/11 Commission. You need
    our professional judgment on what would happen if you did what
    the Commission recommends. That's just to get that in context
    here.
        So my view would be, if you did what the Commission
    recommended here, with the National Intelligence Director, you
    would need the assurance--you raise a valid question--that that
    National Intelligence Director would not take away from the
    combat support capabilities of those agencies. You might need
    to have that assurance through an executive order. You might
    need to have it through legislation. But you would need that
    assurance. Anyone who enacts this would need to build that into
    the system.
        Senator Talent. I appreciate that, and your service and
    your testimony.
        Mr. Chairman, I agree with something you said right at the
    outset of this. This is the committee--it's been our
    responsibility and our privilege to make sure that our men and
    women in the field have what they need to defend us, and for as
    many of them to come home as possible. I know you and the
    ranking member take that very seriously. I think we need to
    look at this with that in view.
        The one part of the intelligence operation that we all
    agree is working is the support of these agencies of tactical
    combat operations, and we don't want to--we don't want to break
    what isn't broken in an attempt to fix what is.
        I thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Chairman Warner. Senator Clinton. Thank you for your
    patience, Senator.
        Senator Clinton. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I thank you for
    holding these hearings.
        There are so many questions, and so little time, and
    everyone has been here for so long, I would ask unanimous
    consent to submit some additional questions for the record, Mr.
    Chairman.
        Chairman Warner. The record will remain open until the
    close of business today for further questions to the panel by
    all members.
        Senator Clinton. Thank you.
        Senator Clinton. There are a number of questions that the
    September 11 families have provided that I feel are very
    important, and I want to submit them.
        Senator Dayton was able to ask a variety of questions about
    the activities on the day of September 11, the chain of
    command, NORAD, et cetera. I think he will be furthering those,
    and I will add to them, as well.
        I don't think any of us disagree with the very strong
    assumption that whatever we do cannot, and should not, in any
    way undermine the provision of intelligence to our warfighters
    and our combatant commanders. But I think there is a concern on
    the part of, not just the September 11 families, but many
    people who have watched the interplay between the DOD and the
    intelligence agencies and the provision of information to the
    Commander in Chief over a number of years, that, at the end of
    the day, the Defense Department has an enormous amount of
    authority, both explicit and implicit, which it operates under,
    and which it does use to influence how intelligence is not only
    collected and analyzed, but how it's used for decisionmaking.
        So among the questions that the September 11 families have
    asked me to pose to you, Secretary Rumsfeld, are the following:
        Imagine, for the sake of argument, that there is an NID, as
    proposed by the 9/11 Commission. What are the assurances that
    you would need in the legislation that would enable you to feel
    comfortable that the warfighters and combatant commanders were
    provided for and that the primary obligation of providing
    tactical intelligence was protected?
        Second, with respect to tactical intelligence, I think it
    is important, as I said yesterday, that we not go into this
    assuming that everything is 100 percent perfect in the area of
    tactical intelligence. I think that would be a mistake. I think
    that there are questions that need to be raised, and among them
    are those that have been raised by officers who have testified
    before this committee, starting last spring, with respect to
    lessons learned. In the 9/11 Commission, pages 210 to 212,
    there is a description of the coordination problems between DOD
    and CIA that resulted in what they call a missed opportunity to
    use armed Predators to attack Osama bin Laden. There have also
    been questions raised with respect to the intelligence that was
    used, or not used, in the battle situation known as Tora Bora.
    So I think that part of our obligation on this committee is,
    not just to assume that everything DOD does has a level of
    perfection, and we're only looking at the intelligence outside
    of DOD. I know that, inside DOD, there are lots of after-action
    reports and lessons learned, and I think it's important that,
    as we proceed with his inquiry as to how to reform
    intelligence, we have the advantage of your recommendations
    with respect to changes at the tactical level that could
    influence some of these decisions going up the chain.
        Finally--this is also directed to Under Secretary Cambone--
    it is bewildering to me that there were pieces of information
    within DOD, within CIA, within FBI that were not shared. That
    has nothing to do with budget authority, it has nothing to do
    with human intelligence capacity. It has to do with a breakdown
    somewhere in the chain that would have gotten information
    pushed to the top and shared among respective agencies. If any
    of you can lend any light to the operational opportunities that
    were missed, again, as set forth in the 9/11 Commission on
    pages 355 and 356, I think for any of us who read this, it is
    very hard to understand how the FBI wouldn't be given
    information that the CIA had.
        That continued with respect to Iraq. As I understand the
    problems with the, so-called, source ``Curveball,'' that
    information was not conveyed to the CIA as to the background of
    this individual, the reliability of his information.
        So we can spend a lot of time talking about rearranging the
    boxes on the organization chart, but unless there is a
    fundamental commitment to the sharing of information at all
    levels--national, strategic, operational, tactical--we're just
    spinning our wheels.
        Finally, because I know you have to put in a lot of words
    before the time goes up, this whole question of secrecy is
    something that I think deserves a lot of attention. My
    predecessor, the late Senator Moynihan, wrote a book called
    ``Secrecy,'' which I commend to you because in it he raises
    some very interesting questions about what we need to keep
    secret and what we don't need to keep secret. In fact, we have
    over-classified a whole lot of information that, if not kept
    secret, could have actually helped people at all levels of our
    government respond to situations that they were confronted by.
    It is, I think, a legitimate concern that we have to figure out
    how to keep secret what is worth keeping secret, but we have to
    quit this over-classifying, and create almost an incentive for
    people to share information, and sometimes to, I think, very
    detrimental consequences, such as the outing of Valerie Plame
    and also the latest outrage, which was the revealing of Mr.
    Khan's name. I find those things just inexcusable and
    unbelievable, and it happens all the time. So I think the whole
    question about secrecy, what should or couldn't be classified
    needs to be looked at at the same time.
        So, having exhausted, I'm sure, my time, I'd appreciate any
    response that any of you might have to any of these points.
        Secretary Rumsfeld. I'll leave the CIA/FBI piece to John
    McLaughlin, but let me just say that you're exactly right, that
    the problem of stovepiping and not sharing information is a
    serious one. It is addressed in this report by the 9/11
    Commission, properly. It's been addressed by the executive
    branch. It occurs not only between organizations, as you
    suggest, but within organizations.
        Second, I am familiar with Pat Moynihan's book ``Secrecy,''
    and you're correct there, too, it is--when you're dealing with
    these things every day, I very often ask, ``Why is this
    classified,'' and, ``Give me a declassified version,'' that
    comes out almost the same. It is because, I suppose, people are
    busy; they want to be safe, not sorry; and there's a process,
    always, to review, after some period of time. But the over-
    classification is, I agree, something that, very properly,
    ought to be addressed in a serious way, and we'd be happy to
    respond to some of the other questions and your comments, for
    the record.
        Senator Clinton. What about the issue of Curveball?
        Dr. Cambone.
        Mr. McLaughlin. That probably is--well, maybe Steve has a
    comment on it, but it's properly in my arena, as well.
        My sense, looking back at that one, was that the real
    problem, Senator Clinton, was the fact that we, collectively--
    the Defense Intelligence Agency and CIA--did not have direct
    access to that source, which generated over a hundred
    technically--seemingly solid reports from a technical basis. I
    think that was the key thing that impeded our use of that
    source.
        I don't know whether Dr. Cambone has something to add on
    that or not.
        Chairman Warner. Thank you very much----
        Yes?
        Mr. McLaughlin. May I just answer one or two of your other
    points, Senator Clinton?
        On the secrecy issue, I think this is a complicated
    question in our age, and particularly when it comes to
    terrorism. If you think about it, back in the Cold War, or even
    prior to September 11, the kinds of secrets we had to go out
    and find were mostly in governments, ministries, cabinets, and
    so forth, overseas. Today, the enemy we're facing, particularly
    in terrorism, compartments secrets down to a handful of people
    in a cave somewhere. It's very well-documented in the 9/11
    report how few people knew about that.
        So what I take from this is, they use secrecy as a
    strategic weapon. It's a strategic weapon for them. Because
    it's asymmetric--asymmetrically, it works against us because we
    don't keep secrets very well. Most of what we have to say, most
    of what--it's all out there. As the Secretary said, they go to
    school on us.
        So while I support a lot of what Senator Moynihan had to
    say--and I'm familiar with his book--I just think we do need to
    rethink the whole secrecy thing when we're going against
    terrorists.
        On the information-sharing, this is another complicated
    issue. We have to be careful not to point fingers on this,
    because it is complicated. People have different memories of
    what was shared, what wasn't shared. CIA has some differences
    with the 9/11 Commission on this point, particularly on the
    issue of sharing with FBI. We have pointed out to them that the
    original reporting, for example, on the two hijackers--pointed
    out to the 9/11 Commission--that the original intelligence on
    them was available to a wide array of agencies, including FBI,
    CIA, NSA, State Department, and so forth. We pointed out to
    them that we made an association, with the FBI, between one of
    these hijackers and the U.S.S. Cole bomber, one of the U.S.S.
    Cole bombers, Khaled, in approximately December 2000, I believe
    it was. For some reason, they didn't accept that, and the
    report says what it does. That said, there were many instances
    where information wasn't shared. But I just think it's been a
    bit overdrawn in the report.
        Chairman Warner. Thank you, Director McLaughlin.
        Thank you, Senator Clinton.
        Senator Graham.
        Senator Graham. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Mr. McLaughlin, I've heard the story often repeated that
    Zarqawi--is that the way you say the person's name?
        Mr. McLaughlin. Abu Musab al Zarqawi, yes.
        Senator Graham. Did he go to Baghdad, at any time, to
    receive healthcare treatment?
        Mr. McLaughlin. We think he did.
        Senator Graham. Okay. We think he went to Baghdad when
    Saddam Hussein was in power, is that correct?
        Mr. McLaughlin. Yes.
        Senator Graham. One thing that I've learned from looking at
    this report very briefly is, it tells us a lot about the past,
    and some things about the present, but it also tells us about
    the future. The one thing that I get from this report that I
    think we're overlooking a bit is that this war is going to go
    on a lot longer than any of us begin to realize. The report
    says, ``The enemy is just not terrorism, it is the threat posed
    specifically by Islamist terrorism, by Osama bin Laden, and
    others, who draw on a long tradition of extreme intolerance
    within a minority strain of Islam that does not distinguish
    politics from religion, and distorts both. The enemy is not
    Islam, the great world faith, but a perversion of Islam. The
    enemy goes beyond al Qaeda to include the radical ideological
    movement inspired in part by al Qaeda that has spawned other
    terrorist groups and violence. Thus, our strategy must match
    our means to two ends: dismantling the al Qaeda network and, in
    the long term, prevailing over the ideology that contributes to
    Islamist terrorism.''
        Do all of you agree that the American public needs to
    understand that, for years to come, we will be at war with
    these groups? Is that a correct statement? Do you agree with
    the 9/11 Commission's findings there?
        Mr. McLaughlin. I do.
        Senator Graham. Having said that, the structural changes
    that we're debating here today are important to me. Now, I've
    come away with one conclusion. If we're going to have a
    National Intelligence Director, he or she needs to be the
    person held accountable, and they need all the power, not part
    of the power.
        I came in here as a believer in that position. Now I'm not
    so sure. The reason I'm not so sure is because the functions
    you just described that you currently have--if given to the
    National Intelligence Director, I don't know how you
    incorporate all those functions and, at the same time, give the
    President a variety of options and a variety of opinions.
        But having said all of that, my question to you, Secretary
    Rumsfeld--the Commission tells us that if we're going to win
    this war, we have to deny our enemies sanctuaries. Could you
    tell the committee, without disclosing any secret information,
    what countries, in your opinion, are providing sanctuary to al
    Qaeda, or terrorist groups like al Qaeda, and what strategy do
    we have to dry up that sanctuary?
        Secretary Rumsfeld?
        Secretary Rumsfeld. Yes, I'm doing something that's
    strange: I'm thinking how to respond.
        Senator Graham. Because that's a tough question.
        Secretary Rumsfeld. It is a tough question.
        Senator Graham. Who are they, and what do we do about them?
        Secretary Rumsfeld. Let me answer the first question first.
    You talked about whether or not the NID ought to have all the
    power. I think it's terribly important that we ask ourselves
    the question, ``All the power for what?''
        Senator Graham. Right.
        Secretary Rumsfeld. You were talking about the global war
    on terror. The Intelligence Community, as we said, has a much
    broader set of tasks. We do not want to organize the
    Intelligence Community to fit one element----
        Senator Graham. Right.
        Secretary Rumsfeld. --important, to be sure--but to fit any
    one element, because the responsibilities are so broad.
        Second, with respect to sanctuaries, you used the phrase,
    ``Which countries are providing it?'' There are sanctuaries
    that are provided by countries, as we know. There are also
    sanctuaries that are not provided by the countries at all. They
    have portions of their countries that they do not govern
    effectively, and cannot govern effectively. Then there are
    countries that aren't countries, that are--I mean, Somalia is a
    situation that is a geographical country, but, in terms of a
    government, it--I don't think it could be said--John, correct
    me if you disagree--but I don't think it could be said that
    they have a government that presides over the real estate in
    that country in an effective way.
        I guess the word ``sanctuary'' also is a problem, because
    you have to define it. Is the ability to use the banking system
    a sanctuary? Is the ability to use wire transfers, cyberspace,
    is that a sanctuary?
        We know that seams are used effectively. The Pakistan/
    Afghan border is a problem. The Saudi/Yemeni border is a
    problem. The Syrian/Iraqi border is a problem. The Iranian
    border is a problem.
        We know that countries vary in their behavior with respect
    to terrorists, that some are aggressive and go after them, that
    some tolerate them and don't do much about them, and, in
    effect, are, kind of, fellow travelers with it, but not
    active----
        Senator Graham. Would Iran be in the country that tolerates
    and does very little about them?
        Secretary Rumsfeld. It's a mixture. I think John would be
    better to answer this. But clearly they are active with
    Hezbollah, and that's a terrorist organization by our
    definition. Clearly there have been, and probably are today, al
    Qaeda in Iran that they have not dealt with in a way that a
    country that was against al Qaeda would have done. They have
    had the Ansar al Islam organization back and forth across their
    borders.
        John, do you want to elaborate? You're the expert.
        Mr. McLaughlin. Those are all the right points, Mr.
    Secretary. If you're talking about Iran--I think the Secretary
    said it accurately--it's, on this score, a bit schizophrenic.
    You'll find elements of the government that are uncomfortable
    with this, but the prevailing elements in that government are
    tolerant toward terrorists, and there's no question that they
    support, actively, Hezbollah. Hezbollah draws its inspiration
    and origins from Iran, back in the late 1970s, and continues,
    to this day, to be dedicated to the destruction of Israel and
    to receive support from Iran for that purpose.
        Chairman Warner. Senator, I thank you. I thank the
    witnesses. We've had an excellent----
        Yes, Mr. Secretary?
        Secretary Rumsfeld. I apologize, Mr. Chairman. I do want to
    have the record clear. Senator Warner, you and Senator Levin
    were briefed on our global posture----
        Chairman Warner. That is correct----
        Secretary Rumsfeld. --at a breakfast----
        Chairman Warner.--in your office.
        Secretary Rumsfeld. --in my office by me, by the Chairman,
    by Andy Hoehn.
        Chairman Warner. Correct.
        Secretary Rumsfeld. Since then, the committee's
    professional staff have been briefed at least twice. Four or 5
    weeks ago, briefings were conducted for the personal staffs of
    all committee members. There is, and has been, an outstanding
    offer to brief any committee member. We have briefed a
    significant number of Members of the Senate and the House, and
    staffs of not just your committee, but the Appropriations
    Committee, the Armed Services Committee, the Foreign Relations
    Committee, and the MILCON Subcommittees of some House and
    Senate Members. We have made a major effort on the global
    posture because it is a big and important issue; and I would
    not want the record to suggest that those opportunities have
    not been available to staff members, because they have.
        Chairman Warner. I've indicated to you that I verified
    those facts. There has been a complete disclosure by you to the
    Senator and myself and others over the course of time.
        Senator Levin. Mr. Chairman, just to clarify further, I
    thank the Secretary for those briefings that he made reference
    to, including the very general one in his office. However, I
    think it is fair to say that the actual decision that was made,
    the details of it, were not briefed to Members of the Senate,
    were not offered, as is usually the customary courtesy, that,
    prior to an announcement of something of this dimension, that
    Members of the Senate would be offered a briefing of that
    particular decision, to the details that were so critically
    important that were outlined yesterday were not briefed, either
    in your office, as far as I remember, or offered.
        Secretary Rumsfeld. They were briefed, and they were
    offered.
        Senator Levin. The details?
        Secretary Rumsfeld. The details that have been released and
    that we know. We're now at the very beginning of the process of
    going to country after country and deciding, with them, what we
    will do with them, and to what degree will we have usability of
    their forces, but----
        Senator Levin. In which case----
        Secretary Rumsfeld. --there's no question----
        Senator Levin.--in which case, there weren't many details
    yesterday. I guess that's the summary, then.
        Secretary Rumsfeld. There weren't. Because they will roll
    out as each country is dealt with. When one country may be our
    first choice, and we would go to them, try to work out an
    arrangement; if it doesn't work out, we have other options.
    Then we would slide off that and go somewhere else. But the
    broad thrust of it was what we briefed, and what we have
    offered to brief. As I said earlier, we'd be happy to hold a
    hearing on this and give you anything we have.
        Chairman Warner. That opportunity will be given.
        I thank you, Mr. Secretary. I thank you, Director. I thank
    you, General. We've had a very good hearing. We are adjourned.
        [Questions for the record with answers supplied follow:]
                   Questions Submitted by Senator Carl Levin
                problems in the dod in the reprogramming process
        1. Senator Levin. Secretary Rumsfeld, during the hearing we
    discussed the 9/11 Commission's recommendation on giving overall budget
    execution authority for the National Foreign Intelligence Program
    (NFIP) to a new National Intelligence Director (NID), including
    authority for reprogramming funds during the execution of the budget.
    Could you provide any examples where there have been problems within
    the administration within the last 3 years of getting approval to
    reprogram funds in NFIPs?
        Secretary Rumsfeld. The Department has not experienced problems
    getting approval to reprogram funds in NFIP programs. The DOD has not
    opposed any NFIP reprogramming.

                problems in the cia in the reprogramming process
        2. Senator Levin. Director McLaughlin, could you provide any
    examples where there have been problems within the administration
    within the last 3 years of getting approval to reprogram funds to
    correct emergent problems in NFIPs?
        Director McLaughlin. Over the last 3 years, there have never been
    formal written objections by the Secretary or Deputy Secretary of
    Defense to NFIP reprogramming actions. However, significant
    coordination issues occasionally increase the amount of time required
    to obtain concurrence by the OSD and move the transfer request through
    the approval process. For example, in 2002, OSD delayed concurrence for
    an NRO reprogramming action for 6 months to ensure sufficient General
    Transfer Authority would be available for DOD reprogramming actions.
    Eventually Congress appropriated funds for the project in a
    supplemental and NRO withdrew its request.

        3. Senator Levin. Director McLaughlin, during the hearing, you
    mentioned a figure of 5 months as representative of the time that is
    required to obtain approval of an NFIP reprogramming request. Could you
    provide some specific examples of reprogramming actions, including the
    times it took to obtain Department of Defense (DOD), Office of
    Management and Budget (OMB), and congressional approval, that led you
    to this assessment?
        Director McLaughlin. Each reprogramming request is unique, and the
    time required to obtain approval can vary depending on the type of
    reprogramming and the authority under which the action is requested. On
    average, after the programs submit requests, Community Management Staff
    (CMS) and OSD staffing require about a month to coordinate with the
    programs and General Counsel, prepare the transfer documents, and
    obtain approvals. OMB approval generally adds another 2 weeks to the
    process and congressional notification takes up to a month. OSD
    apportionment takes only a couple of days. Generally, the greatest
    delays arise as a result of the staffing process, legal
    interpretations, or debates over offset choices within and among the
    programs, CMS, OSD, and OMB. All in all, reprogramming requests
    requiring congressional notification require approximately 5 months;
    those that do not take between 3 and 4 months.
        CMS works closely with the programs on reprogrammings and
    transfers, even before requests are formally submitted to CMS, so
    specifying the exact amount of time it takes for programs to submit
    reprogramming requests to CMS can be inexact. The staffs also attempt
    to mitigate delays by working concurrently with OSD and OMB
    counterparts while formal approvals are being obtained. This allows the
    staff to address concerns expeditiously and alleviate delays that are
    inherent in the sequential approval process.

                            restructuring checklist
        4. Senator Levin. Secretary Rumsfeld, I am going to list a series
    of recommendations that the 9/11 Commission makes and would appreciate
    your telling the committee whether you agree or disagree with each
    individual recommendation and why:

             The National Counterterrorism Center (NCTC) should
            perform joint planning. The plans would assign operational
            responsibilities to lead agencies, such as Department of State
            (State), the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), the Federal
            Bureau of Investigation (FBI), Defense and its combatant
            commands, Homeland Security, and other agencies.

        Secretary Rumsfeld. The DOD has had nearly 20 years of experience
    with ``jointness'' and is proof of how powerful a joint perspective
    driving joint operations can be as evidenced recently in Afghanistan
    and Iraq. I endorse adopting the DOD model (following Goldwater-Nichols
    Act 1986) of centralized planning and decentralized execution for the
    NCTC as a means of improving indications and warning and more
    actionable intelligence in support of the counterterrorism mission. In
    this construct, the NCTC would provide strategic guidance, mission
    parameters, and broad operational concepts to the designated department
    or agency to facilitate operational planning and mission execution. The
    department/agency would develop an operational counterterrorism plan,
    suitable for mission execution with close review by the NCTC. The
    designated department/agency would execute those plans in receipt of an
    executive order from the national authority. Throughout the process of
    operational planning and execution, the NCTC and the designated
    department/agency would be generating intelligence at the strategic and
    operational level thereby ensuring competitive analysis. In addition,
    the operations themselves would be creating new intelligence that in
    the end will enhance our ability to provide indications and warning and
    a better intelligence product to the national command authority and to
    the operator.

             The NID should have the authority to reprogram funds
            among the national intelligence agencies to meet any new
            priority.

        Secretary Rumsfeld. The NID should have authority to reprogram
    funds among the national intelligence agencies when there is a higher
    priority or unforeseen intelligence requirement. I can't imagine that
    the NID would not want to consult with the head of the department or
    agency head.

             Should the President issue a new Executive Order 12333
            that would give a NID budget execution authority, including
            reprogramming authority, for DOD intelligence agencies?

        Secretary Rumsfeld. Since the August 17 hearing, the President has
    issued Executive Order 13355, ``Strengthened Management of the
    Intelligence Community,'' which expands the authority of the Director
    of Central Intelligence over reprogramming of intelligence funds. On
    September 8, the White House announced that the President supports
    providing this expanded authority to a newly created NID.

             The NID should approve and submit nominations to the
            President of the individuals who would lead the CIA, Defense
            Intelligence Agency (DIA), FBI Intelligence Office, National
            Security Agency (NSA), National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency
            (NGA), National Reconnaissance Office (NRO), Information
            Analysis and Infrastructure Protection Directorate of the
            Department of Homeland Security, and other intelligence
            capabilities.
             Should Congress amend section 201 of title 10 which
            gives the Secretary of Defense the authority: (1) to nominate,
            after seeking the concurrence of the Director of Central
            Intelligence, the Directors of NRO, NGA, and NSA; and (2) to
            nominate the Director of DIA, after consulting with the
            Director of Central Intelligence?

        Secretary Rumsfeld. I support the President and his plan to create
    a strong NID.

             Lead responsibility for directing and executing
            paramilitary operations, whether clandestine or covert, should
            shift to the Defense Department.

        Secretary Rumsfeld. The DOD and the CIA have embarked upon a study
    of this question. The Department will report to the President by
    February 18, 2005.

             The NID would manage this national effort [managing
            the national intelligence program and overseeing the component
            agencies of the Intelligence Community] with the help of three
            deputies, each of which would also hold a key position in one
            of the component agencies.'' (NOTE: The organization chart in
            the Commission's report implies that these deputies, including
            the one for Defense, the Under Secretary of Defense for
            Intelligence, would be responsible for all hiring, training,
            acquiring, equipping, and fielding of intelligence capabilities
            within their respective departments.)

        Secretary Rumsfeld. I support the position put forward by the
    President.

      director of central intelligence commenting on public statements of
                            administration officials
        5. Senator Levin. Director McLaughlin, in responding to my question
    about the difference between the internal intelligence assessment on
    the likelihood that Saddam Hussein would give a weapon of mass
    destruction to terrorists, you said, ``I just don't think it's our job
    to comment on the public statements of the administration or of
    Congress. There are times, as we've explained in the past, when we will
    take someone aside, either a Member of Congress or a member of the
    administration, and quietly tell them there's new information on this
    and I would describe it differently.''
        In an October 7, 2002 letter, the DCI, George Tenet, to Senator Bob
    Graham, Chairman of the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, said:

              ``Saddam for now appears to be drawing a line short of
            conducting terrorist attacks with conventional or chemical or
            biological warfare (CBW) against the United States.
              ``Should Saddam conclude that a U.S.-led attack could no
            longer be deterred, he probably would become much less
            constrained in adopting terrorist actions. Such terrorism might
            involve conventional means, as with Iraq's unsuccessful attempt
            at a terrorist offensive in 1991, or CBW.
              ``Saddam might decide that the extreme step of assisting
            Islamist terrorists in conducting a weapons of mass destruction
            (WMD) attack against the United States would be his last chance
            to exact vengeance by taking a large number of people with
            him.''

        But the same day, October 7, 2002, in a speech in Cincinnati, the
    President said:

              ``Iraq could decide on any given day to provide a biological
            or chemical weapon to a terrorist group or individual
            terrorists. Alliances with terrorists could allow the Iraqi
            regime to attack America without leaving any fingerprints.''

        Are you aware of any attempts to inform the President that the
    intelligence assessment of Saddam Hussein sharing weapons of mass
    destruction would likely be done as ``his last chance to exact
    vengeance by taking a large number of people with him'' rather than,
    ``on any given day?''
        Director McLaughlin did not respond in time for printing. When
    received, answer will be retained by in committee files.

        6. Senator Levin. Director McLaughlin, in an October 8, 2002,
    interview with the New York Times, Director Tenet said ``there is no
    inconsistency'' between the CIA views in the letter and those of the
    President. Is such a public statement by Director Tenet consistent with
    a policy not ``to comment on the public statements of the
    administration or of Congress?''
        Director McLaughlin did not respond in time for printing. When
    received, answer will be retained by in committee files.

     consolidating personnel and budget control to improve information flow
        7. Senator Levin. Secretary Rumsfeld, Director McLaughlin, and
    General Myers, there apparently was a number of instances where
    components of the Intelligence Community possessed information that
    might have helped other agencies take action before the September 11
    terrorist attacks. The 9/11 Commission has recommended giving a new NID
    control of personnel and budget of the national intelligence program,
    which I assume would equate to the NFIP. A large portion of the NFIP
    funding currently supports organizations that work for both the
    Secretary of Defense and the Director of Central Intelligence.
        One specific example of failure to share information was the CIA's
    failure to share information on the presence of two of the September 11
    plotters with the Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) or the
    FBI. This was despite the fact that the CIA staff and budget were
    operating under the control of the DCI (the current version of the
    proposed NID). Will each of you indicate if you believe that there are
    currently impediments to sharing data that can only be broken down by
    changing organizational relationships, and if so, what laws need to be
    changed?
        Secretary Rumsfeld. DOD strongly supports improving information
    sharing and supports the President's proposal on this subject.
        Director McLaughlin. [Deleted.]
        General Myers. I do not believe there are currently any impediments
    to sharing information that can only be solved by changing
    organizational relationships. The information-sharing problems we have
    experienced are, for the most part, rooted in cultural bias, not
    structural obstacles.

        8. Senator Levin. Director McLaughlin, is there any reason to
    believe that the CIA's failure to share data with the INS or FBI was
    influenced in any way by the DCI's personnel and budget execution
    control of the CIA?
        Director McLaughlin did not respond in time for printing. When
    received, answer will be retained by in committee files.

        9. Senator Levin. Secretary Rumsfeld, Director McLaughlin, and
    General Myers, are any of you aware of any evidence that DOD agencies
    had unshared data that might have helped prevent any of the September
    11 attacks?
        Secretary Rumsfeld. I am not aware of any evidence that there was
    unshared data in a DOD agency which could have prevented the September
    11 attacks.
        Director McLaughlin. No, CIA is not aware that any of the DOD
    agencies, or for that matter, any U.S. Government entity, had any
    unshared data that might have helped prevent any of the September 11
    attacks. It is likely that CIA, FBI, and NSA all had bits and pieces of
    information that were somehow related to one or more of the 19
    hijackers, but none of that information, even if it had all been
    amalgamated prior to September 11, would have been enough to have
    prevented the September 11 attacks. We still would have been missing
    the answers to the who, what, when, or where questions.
        General Myers. No. I am not aware of any evidence that DOD agencies
    had unshared data that might have helped prevent any of the September
    11 attacks.

     nctc authority to assign operational responsibilities to the military
        10. Senator Levin. Secretary Rumsfeld and General Myers, the 9/11
    Commission recommended the following: ``Lead responsibility for
    directing and executing paramilitary operations, whether clandestine or
    covert, should shift to the Department of Defense. There it should be
    consolidated with the capabilities for training, direction, and
    execution of such operations already being developed in the Special
    Operations Command.'' Tasking for counterterrorism paramilitary
    operations would be from the NID through the National Counterterrorism
    Center (NCTC) to the operational force. The Commission report is silent
    on tasking for paramilitary activities other than on behalf of
    counterterrorism. If the NCTC were to have the authority to ``assign
    operational responsibilities'' to combatant commanders to conduct
    counterterrorist operations, how could we avoid creating conflicting or
    confusing chains of command?
        Secretary Rumsfeld. The shape and functions of the National
    Counterterrorism Center (NCTC) are presently being addressed in
    accordance with the President's existing executive order and the
    Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004 by an
    interagency task force in which DOD is participating. We are also
    addressing the 9/11 Commission's recommendation on paramilitary
    operations under a November 18, 2004, presidential directive for a
    joint review by myself and the Director of the Central Intelligence
    Agency. On both the NCTC and the Paramilitary question, DOD, the CIA,
    and other elements of the interagency are working together closely to
    provide a coordinated set of responses and recommendations to the
    President. As to the suggestion that operational taskings should flow
    directly from the NCTC to the operational force, if the taskings were
    intended for execution by DOD, such a construct would be unacceptable
    due to its infringement on the chain-of-command responsibilities
    inherent to the Department and its military forces.
        General Myers. If the NCTC were to have the authority to ``assign
    operational responsibilities,'' it would violate the chain of command
    and lead to confusion and loss of unity of effort. If the NCTC were to
    have such responsibility, it is imperative that the NCTC recommend any
    requirements for combatant commanders to the Office of the Secretary of
    Defense for Secretary of Defense approval and military advice. This
    would be the only way to keep the chains of command clear.

        11. Senator Levin. Secretary Rumsfeld and General Myers, how would
    a combatant commander resolve conflicting directives from the DOD chain
    of command and from the NCTC? Wouldn't such an arrangement be violating
    the fundamental principal of unity of command?
        Secretary Rumsfeld. Routing all military directives via the Office
    of the Secretary of Defense would mitigate any potential conflicts and
    would ensure unity of command. The Office of the Secretary of Defense
    and the Joint Staff ensure that military advice is provided to the
    President and coordination is effected for all operational directives.
        General Myers. Routing all military directives via the Office of
    the Secretary of Defense would mitigate any potential conflicts and
    would ensure unity of command remains intact. As stipulated by law, the
    military chain of command originates with the President of the United
    States, through the Secretary of Defense to the combatant commanders.
    Furthermore, this arrangement permits the Secretary of Defense to get
    military advice from the CJCS and JCS as well as permits combatant
    commanders to address perceived conflicting guidance directly with the
    Office of the Secretary of Defense without injecting confusion within
    the NCTC.

        12. Senator Levin. Secretary Rumsfeld and General Myers, would the
    President and the Secretary of Defense have to approve each such
    assignment?
        Secretary Rumsfeld. As the principal assistant to the President in
    all matters relating to the Department of Defense, the Secretary of
    Defense would approve the assignment of operational responsibilities to
    combatant commanders in support of counterterrorist operations
    coordinated by NCTC.
        General Myers. As the principal assistant to the President in all
    matters relating to the Department of Defense, the Secretary of Defense
    would approve the assignment of operational responsibilities to
    combatant commanders in support of counterterrorist operations.
        The NCTC should not have command authority and should not inject
    itself in the chain of command by directing commanders to perform
    actions. As suggested by the 9/11 Commission's report, the NCTC will
    likely work through existing government agencies. The 27 August 2004
    executive order directing the establishment of the NCTC states the NCTC
    shall be ``implemented in a manner consistent with the authority of the
    principal officers of agencies as heads of their respective Agencies'',
    and heads of agencies ``shall keep the Director of the Center fully and
    currently informed of [their] activities.'' The declared goal of
    creating NCTC is to strengthen intelligence analysis, strategic
    planning against global terrorist threats and to ensure intelligence
    support to operations.

        13. Senator Levin. Director McLaughlin, what effect would such
    operational assignment authority within the NCTC have on the
    counterterrorist operations of the CIA?
        Director McLaughlin. [Deleted.]

                      lead for all paramilitary operations
        14. Senator Levin. Secretary Rumsfeld and Director McLaughlin, the
    government is currently operating in foreign areas with a clearly
    defined separation of functions between the DOD and the CIA. The CIA is
    responsible for conducting covert action operations, where the
    government has the ability to deny involvement in such activities if
    they are compromised. The DOD is responsible for conducting other
    clandestine or secret operations where the potential revelation of U.S.
    Government involvement would not be so sensitive. Under the current
    system, this possible covert action would be approved through the
    normal executive branch approval process and the President would submit
    a finding to Congress before executing such an operation. Upon approval
    and appropriate notification, the DCI would task the CIA to conduct
    this mission. Under the 9/11 Commission recommendations, the process
    for presidential approval and congressional notification would
    presumably be similar, but the NID would task someone within DOD. It is
    not exactly clear whether the Commission intends that the tasking would
    be to the Secretary of Defense or directly to the Special Operations
    Command or to one of the combatant commanders. Then forces working for
    the Special Operations Command or forces working for the combatant
    commander would execute the mission. I would like to ask each of you,
    do you agree that this is the way such operations would be changed?
        Secretary Rumsfeld. I do not support direct taskings of U.S.
    Special Operations Command or any other combatant command outside the
    channels constituted by the legally prescribed chain of command which
    runs from the President, through the Secretary, to those commanders.
    Current statutes and the military chain of command preclude direct
    tasking of the U.s. Special Operations Command or any other combatant
    command by the National Counterterrorism Center (NCTC) or the Director
    for National Intelligence.
        Director McLaughlin did not respond in time for printing. When
    received, answer will be retained by in committee files.

        15. Senator Levin. Secretary Rumsfeld and Director McLaughlin, do
    you believe it would be appropriate, and consistent with our
    obligations under the Geneva Conventions, for U.S. military personnel
    to become involved in conducting covert operations pursuant to
    presidential findings?
        Secretary Rumsfeld. Pending the completion of the presidentially
    directed study on the 9/11 Commission paramilitary recommendation, it
    would be inappropriate for me to comment.
        Director McLaughlin did not respond in time for printing. When
    received, answer will be retained by in committee files.

        usd(i) reporting to national intelligence director rather than
                              secretary of defense
        16. Senator Levin. Secretary Rumsfeld, Director McLaughlin, General
    Myers, and Under Secretary Cambone, the 9/11 Commission recommends that
    the new NID should approve and submit the nomination to the President
    for the Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence, who would then
    report to the NID. Currently the Under Secretary of Defense for
    Intelligence is recommended by, and reports to, the Secretary of
    Defense. I'd like to ask each of you, what are the pros and cons of
    having the Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence selected by and
    reporting to the NID, vice the Secretary of Defense, and do you agree
    with this recommendation?
        Secretary Rumsfeld and Secretary Cambone. The position of the Under
    Secretary of Defense for Intelligence was created by law (section 137
    title 10) to be the principal staff assistant and advisor to the
    Secretary of Defense and Deputy Secretary of defense on intelligence-
    related matters, counterintelligence and security. I support the
    President's position on this subject.
        Director McLaughlin. While it may be implicit in the context of its
    recommendations for appointing the other two Deputy NIDs for Foreign
    and Homeland Intelligence, the 9/11 Commission report does not
    explicitly spell out who would approve and submit the nomination of the
    Deputy NID for Defense Intelligence (the USD(I)). But the commission is
    clear in making the point that the three Deputy NIDs would also hold
    key positions in their component department or agency. So even if the
    NID were to ``approve and submit'' the nomination for the USD(I), the
    Secretary of Defense would still play a major role in selecting this
    official. The fundamental problem with the proposal is less a question
    of who appoints the three deputies than it is of potential for conflict
    inherent in a situation where officials are asked to wear two hats.
        While I understand the commission's position, I do not support the
    recommendation. One of the reasons behind the commission's proposal to
    create an NID was the judgment that the Director of the CIA wears too
    many hats. Creating a structure where key intelligence officials also
    wear departmental hats is, I believe, the wrong approach. Even more
    important in my view, the Deputy NIDs as proposed by the commission,
    would constitute an unnecessary layer of management interposed between
    the NID and the heads of the major IC agencies. To be effective in
    today's environment, the NID needs to be able to direct and guide the
    activities of the CIA, DIA, NGA, NRO, NSA, and other agencies. Placing
    a deputy layer between the NID and those agency heads would actually
    have an effect opposite to the one the commission intended.
        General Myers. The Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence is a
    key member of the Secretary's staff. It is not clear how an official in
    this position would be selected by someone other than the Secretary. I
    do not agree with this recommendation.

        17. Senator Levin. Secretary Rumsfeld and General Myers, would you
    have concerns about inserting the Under Secretary of Defense into the
    chain of command for tasking the intelligence activities within the
    Department of Defense?
        Secretary Rumsfeld. In current law, the Secretary of Defense has
    the authority to task collection elements within the Department of
    Defense. In practice, the Under Secretary generally does not engage in
    the day-to-day operations within the Defense Intelligence Community.
    USD(I) serves as the staff assistant and advisor to the Secretary and
    Deputy Secretary of Defense, and has as a principal duty the overall
    supervision of all intelligence and intelligence-related affairs of the
    Department of Defense. These responsibilities and functions do not
    equate to being engaged in the substantive side of tasking, processing,
    exploiting, ad disseminating intelligence.
        General Myers. The Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence is a
    vital staff position. As a principal of the Secretary's staff and a key
    figure in the policy process, USD(I) clearly has intelligence needs
    that must be supported; however, this position is not in the military
    operational chain of command nor should it be.

            revealing sources and compromising intelligence missions
        18. Senator Levin. Director McLaughlin, press accounts suggest that
    revealing the name of the Pakistani individual who was cooperating with
    U.S. officials searching for al Qaeda operatives compromised the
    mission after the public disclosure of his name. Is that an accurate
    impression?
        Director McLaughlin. [Deleted.]

        19. Senator Levin. Director McLaughlin, a USA Today article from
    August 10, 2004, quotes National Security Adviser Condoleezza Rice as
    saying that the name of the individual had been disclosed to reporters
    in Washington ``on background.'' Should the name of any such
    cooperating individual be released under any circumstances?
        Director McLaughlin did not respond in time for printing. When
    received, answer will be retained by in committee files.

        20. Senator Levin. Director McLaughlin, were you asked and did you
    approve the decision to reveal the source's name publicly or on
    ``background'' to a reporter?
        Director McLaughlin. No, the DDCI was not asked to approve the
    decision to reveal the source's name publicly or ``on background'' to a
    reporter.

       effect of a national intelligence director on competitive analysis
        21. Senator Levin. Director McLaughlin, during the development of
    the National Intelligence Estimate (NIE) on Iraq's WMD capabilities,
    which was prepared prior to the war and which proved to be so
    inaccurate in its judgments, a number of intelligence analysts in the
    U.S. Government held views that differed from the prevailing CIA view.
    Notable examples of this include the Department of Energy and State
    Department Intelligence and Research Bureau (INR) assessments on
    whether the now-famous aluminum tubes were intended for centrifuges,
    and the Air Force Intelligence Agency assessment of whether Iraqi
    unmanned aerial vehicles were intended to deliver WMD. Both of these
    differing assessments have been validated since, but were overruled by
    the CIA in developing the NIE. The 9/11 Commission recommends
    consolidating control and budgeting responsibility for national
    intelligence activities under a new NID. If Congress were to give a
    National Intelligence Director that authority, what steps should we
    take to encourage competing analyses and ensure differing views and
    debate within the Intelligence Community to improve the quality of our
    intelligence?
        Director McLaughlin. The views of the Department of Energy and INR
    were fully presented in the NIE on Iraq's WMD.
        Striking a balance between greater centralization of authority,
    including authority over resources, while retaining healthy competitive
    analysis, is one of the critical issues in intelligence reform. Almost
    every committee (or commission) that has looked into this matter has
    come out in favor of greater authority at the center of U.S.
    intelligence, whatever the title of the official occupying that center.
    At the same time, these same studies and proposals have warned against
    the danger of ``group think.''
        There is a major difference between empowering an individual to
    give central direction to the Intelligence Community and allowing that
    individual to impose his or her views on the community. No one is
    suggesting the latter formulation. There must always be a healthy
    competition of views on major issues.
        Encouraging competitive analysis and ensuring differing views will
    involve one part  internal mechanisms such as analytic training that
    emphasizes personal integrity; management that fosters competitive and
    alternative analyses; and the willingness to ``tell it like we see it''
    to policymakers, along with effective evaluation and ``lessons
    learned'' mechanisms--and one part active oversight in both the
    executive and legislative branches. One key component of oversight will
    be an active effort to ensure that objectivity remains the cornerstone
    of any and all analytic efforts.

        22. Senator Levin. Director McLaughlin, what steps should be taken
    to ensure that the Intelligence Community provides independent,
    objective, and accurate analyses?
        Director McLaughlin. Again, we start with a sense of the values of
    the profession, the first of which is that our job is to provide
    accurate, timely information because our national security is dependent
    on it as are the lives of the American people we serve. We must
    continue to train our employees on the centrality of this mission from
    their first day on the job, and we must continue to emphasize this, in
    word and in deed, throughout their careers. Beyond that we can build
    internal mechanisms to reinforce this sense of integrity. We need the
    benefit of active external oversight to ensure that we are always
    meeting our standards in this area.

        23. Senator Levin. Director McLaughlin, would consolidation of
    budget control of most of the intelligence analysts, as well as hiring
    and firing authority over national intelligence agency leaders under a
    single official, support or hurt this aim?
        Director McLaughlin. We simply must accept one basic fact: One
    consequence of consolidating budget control, along with personnel
    (hiring and firing) over the entire community in the hands of a single
    official will be the need for active, ongoing efforts to ensure that a
    desirable consolidation on the resource side does not make inevitable
    the homogenization of analysis or of analytic perspectives. I emphasize
    the word ``ongoing;'' this cannot be a ``set it and forget it''
    approach to the processes that ensure that honest, competitive analysis
    remains the hallmark of U.S. intelligence.

              dci authorities compared to nid authorities (budget)
        24. Senator Levin. Director McLaughlin, the 9/11 Commission has
    recommended giving a new NID sole responsibility for budgets of the
    national intelligence agencies. As I understand the process now, the
    DCI is responsible for developing and submitting the budget for the
    NFIP to the President, but, since Executive Order 12333 confers
    authority for fiscal management for the DOD combat support agencies to
    DOD, the DCI would have to obtain the concurrence of the Secretary of
    Defense before requesting OMB approval of any reprogrammings involving
    the DOD combat support agencies. If the Commission's recommendations
    were implemented, would this change in reprogramming authority be the
    principal difference between the DCI's current budgeting authority and
    what the budgeting authority of the NID would be?
        Director McLaughlin. No, other changes would be necessary to
    enhance the DCI's or NID's authority over the NFIP budget to address
    the recommended actions of the 9/11 Commission. The DCI or the NID
    would need:

             Authority to decide independently the content of the
            NFIP budget request to the President. In the past, the DCI,
            under the National Security Act, had the authority to
            ``develop'' the NFIP budget, but Secretary of Defense approval
            was needed to incorporate DCI decisions into the Defense budget
            before submission to the President, and ultimately, to
            Congress. The President recently gave this authority to the DCI
            in Executive Order 13355.
             Authority to manage the allocation of enacted
            appropriations to Intelligence Community components. Making
            appropriations for the NFIP to a single appropriation to be
            allocated by the DCI, after apportionment by OMB, would further
            enhance the NID's ability to control the NFIP budget.
             Authority to transfer appropriations or personnel
            within the NFIP without the approval of the Secretary of
            Defense or any other head of a department with NFIP resources.
            The National Security Act currently requires that the head of
            the affected department(s) ``not object'' to transfers.

        The President's proposal would provide the NID:

             Authority to decide independently the content of the
            NFIP budget request to the President.
             Authority to manage NFIP appropriations through the
            comptrollers of cabinet departments.
             Authority to transfer appropriations after
            consultation with the Secretary of Defense or any other head of
            a department with NFIP resources.

        The President's proposal also would prevent disclosure of the total
    amount of intelligence funding.

        25. Senator Levin. Secretary Rumsfeld, what would the consequences
    for DOD be of giving the new NID the authority to reprogram funds out
    of DOD programs and activities without the approval of the Secretary of
    Defense?
        Secretary Rumsfeld. My understanding is that NID authority to
    reprogram funds would be for designated programs, not all DOD programs,
    and would be after appropriate consultation with the Secretary of
    Defense.

        26. Senator Levin. Secretary Rumsfeld and Director McLaughlin, who
    would resolve any potential conflict between supporting DOD
    requirements and supporting broader requirements of decisionmakers and
    other agencies?
        Secretary Rumsfeld. Under the President's proposal, the NID.
        Director McLaughlin. It is not yet certain what the authorities of
    the proposed NID will be. Under current law (section 103 of the
    National Security Act), the DCI establishes the requirements and
    priorities to govern the collection of national intelligence by
    Intelligence Community elements. He also approves collection
    requirements, determines collection priorities, and resolves conflicts
    in collection priorities levied on national collection assets, except
    as otherwise agreed with the Secretary of Defense pursuant to the
    direction of the President. The new Executive Order on intelligence (EO
    13355) contains similar language.
        It seems likely that the NID will have at least as much authority
    as the DCI currently has in this area. It also bears noting that, as a
    practical matter, the DCI and the Secretary of Defense have always been
    able to work out their differences over the tasking of national
    collection assets, and have never had to refer such a dispute to the
    President for resolution.

            dci authorities compared to nid authorities (personnel)
        27. Senator Levin. Director McLaughlin, as I understand the process
    now, the Secretary of Defense must obtain the concurrence of the DCI in
    appointing anyone to head the NSA, the NRO, or the NGA. For the head of
    the DIA, the Secretary must only consult with the DCI on that
    appointment. The 9/11 Commission has recommended giving a new NID sole
    responsibility for hiring and firing of leaders of the national
    intelligence agencies, including the head of DIA. Is there any
    indication that the heads of the DOD combat support agencies have been
    unresponsive to the direction or tasking of the DCI?
        Director McLaughlin. First of all, I would note that the ``combat
    support'' agencies are national intelligence agencies. The inclusion of
    the word ``national'' in the names of the three agencies was not an
    accident; it clearly signaled the intent of Congress, and the
    administration at the time of their formation, that a principal role of
    NGA, NRO, and NSA was to support the national intelligence mission as
    defined by the National Security Council and carried out by the DCI.
    Although the NRO is not a combat support agency and NSA is not a combat
    support agency for all purposes, each agency has a combat support role,
    a function that becomes primary when U.S. forces are engaged in combat
    operations and combat support becomes, in effect, the highest national
    intelligence priority. Non-DOD agencies, notably the CIA, also have
    combat support roles that they have always carried out with
    distinction.
        In my view, the Directors of NGA, NRO, and NSA do an excellent job
    of balancing their national missions with their combat support
    functions. They all have resources in the DOD, JMIP, and TIARA programs
    that help them respond to specific tactical needs, but a considerable
    portion of their national programs is used to support the military as
    well.
        The ability of these agencies to successfully carry out both sets
    of responsibilities does mean that serving two masters is the ideal way
    to operate. NGA, NRO, and NSA must participate in strategic planning,
    program and budgeting, requirements definition, and policy development
    processes in both the Intelligence Community and the Department of
    Defense. While we have made efforts to minimize redundancy where
    possible, the fact remains that the agency heads now must respond to
    two bosses, with all the potential for redundancy and conflict that
    entails. Establishing a strong NID would help to reduce this redundancy
    and conflict, thereby minimizing overhead and enabling these agencies
    to devote more of their resources to both the national and military
    support missions.

        28. Senator Levin. Secretary Rumsfeld and General Myers, do you
    have concerns about any effects on support to military operations or
    otherwise of transferring this authority (particularly for DIA) to a
    new NID?
        Secretary Rumsfeld. I support the President's proposals.
        General Myers. At this stage of the intelligence reform process,
    without knowing or working out all the necessary agreements between the
    Department of Defense and the NID that establish intelligence support
    priorities, it is difficult to address all concerns. In broad terms,
    every commander requires timely and accurate intelligence to support
    decisionmaking across all missions, ranging from combat to theater
    security cooperation. Regardless of the final Intelligence Community
    structure, combatant commanders must have the ability to influence
    national intelligence priorities and intelligence asset allocation. Any
    initiative or reform that creates gaps between the intelligence
    agencies or that dilutes the DOD's ability to influence intelligence
    resource allocation and prioritization of intelligence efforts or
    removes and/or transfers senior DOD intelligence analysts outside of
    the Department causes me concern because of the impact on the
    warfighter and the ability to successfully execute the mission.

        29. Senator Levin. Secretary Rumsfeld and General Myers, do you
    believe there is a way to do so and still ensure that military
    requirements for intelligence are satisfied?
        Secretary Rumsfeld. I support the President's proposals.
        General Myers. The heads of defense intelligence agencies are
    properly appointed by the Secretary of Defense. Current statute
    requires DCI concurrence for the appointments of the heads of the NSA,
    NGA, and the NRO. Appointment of the Director of the DIA requires
    consultation. We have worked very hard for a number of years to develop
    synergy from integrating defense and national requirements and
    activities. Over these years, a reasonable state of balance has been
    achieved between defense and national requirements. As combat support
    agencies in the Secretary of Defense chain of command, military
    requirements receive an emphasis that could be lost under an alternate
    arrangement.
                                     ______

                   Questions Submitted by Senator Mark Dayton
                     presidential ``shoot-down'' authority
        30. Senator Dayton. General Myers, was the presidential shoot-down
    request withheld from the pilots by the Northeast Air Defense Sector,
    as identified on page 43 of the 9/11 Commission report?
        General Myers. The pilots were not informed of the presidential
    engagement authority. However, direct, positive command and control was
    maintained between the commanders and the pilots at all times on
    September 11, 2001, and the authority would have immediately been
    relayed had there been a target.

        31. Senator Dayton. Secretary Rumsfeld, was there an investigation
    into the decision not to forward this order to the pilots? If an
    investigation or after-action review was conducted, identify the
    investigation/review officer and provide a written copy of the report
    to the committee for review.
        General Myers. No, an investigation was not required and therefore
    not conducted into the decision regarding forwarding presidential
    engagement authority to the pilots.

        32. Senator Dayton. Secretary Rumsfeld, a statement on page 17 of
    the 9/11 Commission report indicates that the Defense Department and
    National Command Authority considered the need to shoot down a
    commercial airliner prior to September 11, 2001:

            ``Prior to September 11, it was understood that an order to
            shoot down a commercial aircraft would have to be issued by the
            National Command Authority (a phrase used to describe the
            President and Secretary of Defense). Exercise planners also
            assumed that the aircraft would originate from outside the
            United States, allowing time to identify the target and
            scramble interceptors. The threat of terrorists hijacking
            commercial airliners within the United States--and using them
            as guided missiles--was not recognized by North American Air
            Defense Command (NORAD) before September 11.''

        Did NORAD conduct exercises or develop scenarios, prior to
    September 11, 2001, to test a military reaction to an aircraft
    hijacking which appeared destined to result in a suicide crash into a
    high-value target? If so, identify the five exercises conducted on, or
    immediately prior to September 11, 2001; include dates, participants,
    scenario, and synopsis of exercise results.
        General Myers. Prior to September 11, 2001, NORAD exercises were
    not designed to exercise or develop procedures to shoot down civilian
    airliners. Pre-September 11 exercises were designed to practice command
    and control procedures, rules of engagement, external agency
    coordination and hijack shadow and/or escort procedures.
        The following five exercise hijack events included a suicide crash
    into a high-value target. Synopses of exercise results are not
    available. They were discarded in accordance with DOD directives.

      Exercise Name: Vigilant Guardian 01-1
      Exercise Date: 23 Oct 00
      Participants: HQ NORAD/Continental U.S. NORAD Region (CONR)/Sectors
      Scenario: Weapons of Mass Destruction directed at the United
            Nations--an individual steals a Federal Express aircraft and
            plans a suicide attack on the United Nations Building in New
            York City.
      Synopsis of actions: Conducted an interception, exercised command and
            control and coordinated with external agencies.

      Exercise Name: Vigilant Guardian 01-1
      Exercise Date: 16 Oct 00
      Participants: HQ NORAD/Cheyenne Mountain Operations Center/CONR/
            Canadian NORAD Region/Sectors
      Scenario: Due to recent arrests involving illegal drug trafficking in
            Maine, an individual steals a Federal Express plane and plans a
            suicide attack into the United Nations Building in New York
            City.
      Synopsis of actions: Exercised command and control, coordinated with
            external agencies and followed hijack checklists.

      Exercise Name: Falcon Indian 99-3
      Exercise Dates: 5 Jun 00
      Participants: CONR/Sectors
      Scenario: Learjet hijacked maintaining tight formation with Canadair
            airliner, loaded with explosives. Learjet planned to crash into
            the White House.
      Synopsis of actions: Exercised command and control, coordinated with
            external agencies and followed hijack checklists.

      Exercise Name: Falcon Indian 00-1
      Exercise Dates: 5 Jun 00
      Participants: CONR/Sectors
      Scenario: Communist party faction hijacks aircraft bound from western
            to eastern United States. High explosives on board. Intends to
            crash into the Statue of Liberty.
      Synopsis of actions: Cross-sector hand over. Exercised command and
            control, coordinated with external agencies and followed hijack
            checklists. Federal Aviation Administration requested
            assistance.

      Exercise Name: Falcon Indian 00-1
      Exercise Date: 6 Nov 99
      Participants: CONR/Sectors
      Scenario: China Air from Los Angeles to JFK airport hijacked east of
            Colorado Springs by five terrorists. If not intercepted,
            intends to crash into United Nations building.
      Synopsis of actions: Cross-sector hand over. Exercised command and
            control, coordinated with external agencies and followed hijack
            checklists.
                                     ______

             Questions Submitted by Senator Hillary Rodham Clinton
          questions from the survivors of the victims of september 11
        33. Senator Clinton. Secretary Rumsfeld and General Myers, before
    today's Armed Services Committee hearing, I attended a hearing of the
    Senate Governmental Affairs Committee where representatives of the
    September 11 families testified about the 9/11 Commission report.
    Specifically the Governmental Affairs Committee heard testimony from
    Mary Fetchet, the Founding Director, Voices of September 11 and Member,
    Family Steering Committee; Stephen Push, Co-Founder and Board Member,
    Families of September 11; and Kristen Breitwieser, Founder and Co-
    Chairperson, September 11 Advocates Member, Family Steering Committee.
    During that hearing, I asked the family representatives if they wanted
    me to ask you any questions during the hearing. They asked me to convey
    the following questions to you.
        One family member stated it is unacceptable for the Department of
    Defense to claim it cannot both take care of the boots on the ground as
    well as reorganize their departments to be more effective, because al
    Qaeda and other terrorist groups are doing a thousand things at once.
    How would you respond to that concern?
        Secretary Rumsfeld. The DOD has not taken such a position. To the
    contrary, that family member should be reassured that we are doing
    things simultaneously every day. We are deploying military forces to
    fight and win the global war on terrorism, we are transforming
    departmental organizations and capabilities to deal with the threats of
    the 21st century, and we are devoting extraordinary energy and
    resources to support the training, protection, health, welfare, and
    morale of the heroic men and women in uniform that so diligently serve
    their nation. I view these efforts as inseparable and mutually
    supporting. Each is a necessary component of and adjunct to the others.
        General Myers. It is a fundamental responsibility of the Department
    of Defense to take care of servicemembers and their families while
    meeting our security obligations and ensuring we are prepared for the
    future. The Department dedicates the appropriate level of effort to
    every aspect of these responsibilities. This includes improving quality
    of life for families and assisting them in dealing with the demanding
    operational tempo of their servicemembers. It also includes ensuring
    that members of the military receive the best possible training and
    equipment available. At the same time, we are involved in an extensive
    effort to transform departments to be more effective. This effort is
    designed to prepare us to better succeed in the challenges we face
    today while ensuring the U.S. military is ready for the security
    challenges of the future.

        34. Senator Clinton. Secretary Rumsfeld and General Myers, another
    family member asked you to imagine there is a NID as proposed by the
    Commission--what assurances does the Department of Defense need to be
    secure that the existence of a NID won't negatively effect military
    operations?
        Secretary Rumsfeld. DOD must have the authority and capability to
    conduct or task, and to receive all-discipline information (HUMINT,
    SIGINT, GEOINT, etc.) and to return all-source analysis to support
    defense needs, including military operations.
        General Myers. The Department of Defense relies extensively on
    national assets for the planning and execution of military operations.
    In an era with a NID, the Department needs processes and procedures
    that ensure the NID plans and budgets for those assets (material and
    manpower) required for military operations and operates them against
    priorities that support military planning and operations, including
    future threats that U.S. forces might someday face. We have worked hard
    over the years to ensure a mutually supportive relationship between the
    Secretary of Defense and the DCI. We must ensure this rapport is not
    harmed.

        35. Senator Clinton. Secretary Rumsfeld and General Myers, another
    family member asked for an explanation of the protocols for the
    military and NORAD on September 11 with respect to the hijackings. Can
    you provide a description of NORAD's reaction on September 11?
        Secretary Rumsfeld. In accordance with Department Defense
    directives in effect on September 11, NORAD was to monitor and report
    the actions of any hijacked aircraft, as requested by the Federal
    Aviation Administration. We had procedures for potential air
    hijackings, which were based on the premise that a hijacked aircraft
    would be used for ransom or political purposes, not as a weapon.
        General Myers. On the morning of September 11, NORAD was conducting
    a command post exercise and was postured for ``wartime conditions.''
    Six minutes prior to the first attack on the World Trade Center, the
    Federal Aviation Administration informed NORAD of potential hijack of
    American Airlines Flight 11. Throughout the attacks of September 11,
    NORAD responded by launching fighter aircraft and instituting airspace
    controls. Immediately after the attacks, armed fighters flew around-
    the-clock air patrols. Within a 24-hour period, NORAD had over 400
    aircraft airborne and on ground-based alert to prevent additional
    attacks.

                                dod intelligence
        36. Senator Clinton. Secretary Rumsfeld and General Myers, although
    the 9/11 Commission largely focuses on national and strategic
    intelligence, tactical intelligence for military personnel on the
    ground and coordination among agencies to capitalize on that
    intelligence is also critical to winning the global war on terrorism.
    The 9/11 Commission report details the issues surrounding the use of
    the Predator unmanned aircraft to strike Osama bin Laden during the
    March to September 2001 timeframe. What caused the confusion that
    existed among CIA, OSD, and the Air Force regarding the authority to
    strike Osama bin Laden (detailed on pages 210-212 of the 9/11
    Commission report)?
        Secretary Rumsfeld. The 9/11 Commission report cites interviews
    with U.S. Government officials regarding discussions of the Predator
    during the March-September 2001 timeframe. Two main interagency policy
    issues arose regarding use of an armed version of the Predator, then in
    development: (1) whether DOD or CIA was liable for the costs associated
    with the operation, and (2) whether DOD or CIA should operate the
    system and other employment considerations (Was it legal to kill Osama
    bin Laden? Who would authorize strikes? Who would pull the trigger?).
        General Myers. There appears to be a slight factual
    misunderstanding concerning this timeframe, since no armed Predators
    were in Afghanistan during March to September (armed Predators were
    being modified and tested through the summer of 2001). However, the 9/
    11 Commission report accurately captures the dynamic environment within
    the National Security Council during spring and summer 2001 as policy
    options were explored to counter the al Qaeda threat. The Air Force was
    already in the early stages of developing an armed Predator and had
    their first missile launch from a Predator in February 2001. As this
    technology was proving to be promising, CIA was considering the
    desirability of deploying this capability as soon as it was viable.
    While the technology was being developed and tested, the policy
    direction was being evaluated and crafted. As Director Tenet stated,
    ``this was new ground,'' and there were serious policy and statutory
    issues to reconcile. The open discourse and range of opinions captured
    in the 9/11 Commission report reflect a robust policy development forum
    for use of a new technology rather than confusion. There were no missed
    opportunities by unmanned Predators to strike Osama bin Laden during
    the period of policy resolution as the armed Predators were not yet
    ready for deployment.

        37. Senator Clinton. Secretary Rumsfeld and General Myers, is there
    a clear determination on how this operation would happen if the
    opportunity presented itself again today?
        Secretary Rumsfeld. Yes. By August 2002, a more detailed Concept of
    Operation and Memorandum of Agreement were established between DOD and
    CIA that resolve the lines of authority and implement decisionmaking on
    armed Predator operations.
        General Myers. If the opportunity to strike Osama bin Laden
    presented itself today where we have military forces deployed, we have
    clear authority to act.

        38. Senator Clinton. Secretary Rumsfeld and General Myers, are
    there clear rules of engagement and release authority for striking
    other targets that need immediate approval authority?
        Secretary Rumsfeld. Yes, there are clear rules of engagement and
    release authority for striking other targets that need immediate
    approval authority.
        General Myers. Yes. Combatant commanders (CBTCDRs) have been
    provided clear rules of engagement (ROE) and release authority to
    strike emerging and/or time sensitive targets. In broad terms, ROE
    promulgated to the CBTCDRs:

              1. Clearly establishes the identity of hostile forces.
              2. Identifies what type of force and/or weapons are
            authorized for use.
              3. Identifies categories of targets and authorizes strikes
            against those targets.
              4. Identifies areas of operation.
              5. Defines high collateral damage targets and restrictions
            against those targets (if any).

        [Deleted.]

        39. Senator Clinton. Secretary Rumsfeld and General Myers, near the
    end of major combat operations in Afghanistan it appeared as if Osama
    bin Laden was restricted to the Tora Bora mountains and possibly within
    our grasp. Did readily available intelligence get to the soldiers on
    the ground quickly to possibly assist them in his capture or were there
    problems with the tactical intelligence provided to our forces that
    helped him escape?
        Secretary Rumsfeld. Joint Task Forces conducting combat operations
    routinely utilize all intelligence data provided by both defense and
    national intelligence entities. These range from tactical
    reconnaissance data gathered by maneuver forces, to DOD airborne ISR
    platforms, to geospatial and other overhead collection capabilities.
    DOD has made significant strides in recent years in ensuring that
    tactically relevant data, from both defense and national sources, is
    pushed to the lowest echelon of military units as rapidly as possible,
    and many of those capabilities were employed in the Tora Bora operation
    (e.g. live overhead video feeds of the tactical engagements were used
    by multiple tactical consumers across the depth of the battlespace).
    While we acknowledge that more work needs to be done to make this
    intelligence sharing and distribution even more robust in the future,
    there is no reliable way for DOD to calculate whether the survival of a
    given combatant is a direct or indirect result of a particular
    intelligence shortfall. Tactical engagements, particular ground combat,
    are far too chaotic and complex for such links to be drawn.
        General Myers. At that point in our Afghanistan operations, all-
    source intelligence reports gave us a high level of confidence that
    Osama bin Laden was in the Tora Bora area; however, his presence there
    was never confirmed. Tora Bora quickly became CENTCOM's main
    operational effort and the primary focus of all national, DOD and
    CENTCOM intelligence collection and reporting. From CENTCOM's Tampa
    headquarters, CENTCOM J-2 and J-3 operated a co-located operations and
    intelligence fusion cell that provided direct and continuous support to
    the forces deployed in the Tora Bora area. Intelligence fusion was
    facilitated by interagency, special operations, and other government
    agency representation in the Tampa cell that was reporting directly to
    the commanders on the ground in Tora Bora. Intelligence dissemination
    to U.S. forces was continuous and direct, bypassing other layers of
    command in order to enhance the agility of the warfighter.
                                     ______

     Questions Submitted by Senators Mark Dayton and Hillary Rodham Clinton
                      norad's performance on september 11
        40. Senator Dayton and Senator Clinton. Secretary Rumsfeld, we have
    a question posed by April Gallop, a September 11 survivor, that we
    would like answered for this hearing's record. Your testimony on August
    17, 2004, indicates the North American Air Defense Command's mission
    structure on September 11, 2001, was designed to defend our country
    from external threats. Was an investigation or after-action review
    conducted regarding NORAD's activities/actions on September 11, 2001?
    If an investigation or after-action review was conducted, identify the
    date of investigation, the investigating/review officer, and provide a
    written copy of the report to the committee for review.
        Secretary Rumsfeld. The Department of Defense did not conduct an
    after-action review regarding NORAD's actions on September 11, 2001.
    However, during the course of the 9/11 Commission's investigation,
    NORAD provided thousands of documents and numerous personal accounts of
    NORAD's response to the terrorist attacks. In the aftermath of
    September 11, NORAD has strengthened its ability to detect, assess,
    warn, and defend against threats to North America. Today, NORAD forces
    remain at a heightened readiness level. Pilots fly irregular air
    patrols over metropolitan areas and critical infrastructure facilities.
    NORAD has partnered with the FAA to enhance its ability to monitor air
    traffic within the interior of the country. We have established a
    system of conference calls to facilitate the sharing of information
    among the White House, DOD, FAA, U.S. Customs, and law enforcement
    agencies. In addition, the President and the Secretary of Defense have
    approved rules of engagement to deal with hostile acts within domestic
    airspace.

        41. Senator Dayton and Senator Clinton. General Myers, who was held
    accountable for NORAD's inability to effectively respond to the airline
    hijackings and FAA response requests?
        General Myers. The military chain of command is accountable for
    NORAD's actions on September 11. However, no disciplinary measures are
    warranted. Prior to September 11, NORAD's aerospace warning and control
    missions were oriented and resourced to detect and identify all air
    traffic entering North American airspace. On the morning of the
    attacks, existing rules of engagement provided no guidance for civilian
    aircraft participating in, or with clear intent to participate in, an
    attack against our Nation. As the September 11 attacks unfolded, NORAD
    responded immediately with fighters and appropriate airspace control
    measures. Unfortunately, due to late notification and the constraints
    of time and distance, they were unable to influence the tragic
    circumstances.

        [Whereupon, at 2:35 p.m., the committee adjourned.]