[Senate Hearing 108-867]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
S. Hrg. 108-867
U.S. POLICY AND MILITARY OPERATIONS IN IRAQ AND AFGHANISTAN
=======================================================================
HEARING
before the
COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES
UNITED STATES SENATE
ONE HUNDRED EIGHTH CONGRESS
SECOND SESSION
__________
APRIL 20, 2004
__________
Printed for the use of the Committee on Armed Services
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COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES
JOHN WARNER, Virginia, Chairman
JOHN McCAIN, Arizona CARL LEVIN, Michigan
JAMES M. INHOFE, Oklahoma EDWARD M. KENNEDY, Massachusetts
PAT ROBERTS, Kansas ROBERT C. BYRD, West Virginia
WAYNE ALLARD, Colorado JOSEPH I. LIEBERMAN, Connecticut
JEFF SESSIONS, Alabama JACK REED, Rhode Island
SUSAN M. COLLINS, Maine DANIEL K. AKAKA, Hawaii
JOHN ENSIGN, Nevada BILL NELSON, Florida
JAMES M. TALENT, Missouri E. BENJAMIN NELSON, Nebraska
SAXBY CHAMBLISS, Georgia MARK DAYTON, Minnesota
LINDSEY O. GRAHAM, South Carolina EVAN BAYH, Indiana
ELIZABETH DOLE, North Carolina HILLARY RODHAM CLINTON, New York
JOHN CORNYN, Texas MARK PRYOR, Arkansas
Judith A. Ansley, Staff Director
Richard D. DeBobes, Democratic Staff Director
(ii)
C O N T E N T S
__________
CHRONOLOGICAL LIST OF WITNESSES
U.S. Policy and Military Operations in Iraq and Afghanistan
april 20, 2004
Page
Wolfowitz, Hon. Paul, Deputy Secretary of Defense................ 8
Myers, Gen. Richard B., USAF, Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff.... 31
Grossman, Hon. Marc, Under Secretary of State for Political
Affairs........................................................ 33
(iii)
U.S. POLICY AND MILITARY OPERATIONS IN IRAQ AND AFGHANISTAN
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TUESDAY, APRIL 20, 2004
U.S. Senate,
Committee on Armed Services,
Washington, DC.
The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 9:33 a.m. in room
SD-106, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Senator John Warner
(chairman) presiding.
Committee members present: Senators Warner, Allard,
Sessions, Collins, Ensign, Chambliss, Dole, Cornyn, Levin,
Kennedy, Lieberman, Reed, Akaka, E. Benjamin Nelson, Dayton,
Bayh, Clinton, and Pryor.
Committee staff member present: Judith A. Ansley, staff
director.
Majority staff members present: Charles W. Alsup,
professional staff member; L. David Cherington, counsel; Regina
A. Dubey, research assistant; Gregory T. Kiley, professional
staff member; Patricia L. Lewis, professional staff member;
Lucian L. Niemeyer, professional staff member; Lynn F. Rusten,
professional staff member; and Diana G. Tabler, professional
staff member.
Minority staff members present: Richard D. DeBobes,
Democratic staff director; Richard W. Fieldhouse, professional
staff member; Maren R. Leed, professional staff member; Gerald
J. Leeling, minority counsel; Michael J. McCord, professional
staff member; and William G.P. Monahan, minority counsel.
Staff assistants present: Andrew W. Florell, Bridget E.
Ward, and Nicholas W. West.
Committee members' assistants present: Jayson Roehl,
assistant to Senator Allard; Arch Galloway II, assistant to
Senator Sessions; Derek J. Maurer, assistant to Senator
Collins; D'Arcy Grisier, assistant to Senator Ensign; Clyde A.
Taylor IV, assistant to Senator Chambliss; Christine O. Hill,
assistant to Senator Dole; Russell J. Thomasson, assistant to
Senator Cornyn; Mieke Y. Eoyang, assistant to Senator Kennedy;
Elizabeth King, assistant to Senator Reed; Davelyn Noelani
Kalipi and Richard Kessler, assistants to Senator Akaka; Eric
Pierce, assistant to Senator Ben Nelson; William Todd Houchins,
assistant to Senator Dayton; Todd Rosenblum, assistant to
Senator Bayh; Andrew Shapiro, assistant to Senator Clinton; and
Terri Glaze, assistant to Senator Pryor.
OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR JOHN WARNER, CHAIRMAN
Chairman Warner. The Armed Services Committee meets today
in another of its series of hearings on the worldwide threat
situation, with emphasis on Afghanistan and Iraq. We welcome
our witnesses: Deputy Secretary of Defense Paul Wolfowitz;
General Richard B. Myers, U.S. Air Force, Chairman of the Joint
Chiefs; and Secretary Marc Grossman, Under Secretary of State
for Political Affairs.
Each of our witnesses is very well qualified to discuss the
full range of the topics before the committee today. All have
been deeply involved in the planning for post-conflict
stabilization and reconstruction activities in both Iraq and
Afghanistan. General Myers just returned Sunday from a trip to
the region, visiting our troops in both Iraq and Afghanistan.
We look forward to the testimony of our witnesses.
Colleagues and friends, the past few weeks have been
particularly challenging for our Nation. We are ever mindful of
the risks our troops face every day, those of the coalition
forces, and the sacrifices made by the families and the
communities that support them, as those who have been removed
from power seek to delay their inevitable defeat and as
terrorists lash out at the loss of another area in which to
train and spawn terrorism throughout the world. We mourn every
loss of life and salute those who serve and their families for
their bravery, their commitment, and their sacrifices.
The timeliness and importance of this hearing cannot be
overstated. We are at a critical juncture for coalition
operations in both Iraq and Afghanistan. I returned, several
weeks ago, from a trip to both of those countries. The
brilliant military victories achieved by our Armed Forces,
together with the coalition partners, have presented an
opportunity to fully defeat violence and terror in Iraq and
Afghanistan. These are nations whose previous rulers had
perpetrated violence and terror not only on their own
populations and their neighbors, but throughout the world.
The cycle of violence that has gripped this part of the
world must end if we are to win the global war on terrorism and
make America and our friends and allies a safer place.
Deviation from our current course will only embolden those who
are intent on bringing about instability and anarchy, not only
in the region, but elsewhere in the world.
We have achieved extraordinary success in a relatively
short period of time in Iraq. Saddam Hussein and the threat he
posed are gone. The future is hopeful for the Iraqi people. We
must continue to send a strong message of resolve to the people
of Iraq, to our troops, to our coalition partners, and to the
rest of the world, that the United States will stay its course
and get the job done.
As President Bush stated last week, ``Now is the time and
Iraq is the place in which the enemies of the civilized world
are testing the will of the civilized world. We must not
waver.''
President Bush has set a course that calls for the direct
turnover of political sovereignty to Iraqis on June 30, 2004.
It is critical that we end our status as an occupying power and
give Iraqis an increased stake in what happens in their future
and the Nation. This date was endorsed by the United Nations
(U.N.) Special Representative Brahimi. Mr. Brahimi and the U.N.
are playing an important role in the transition to sovereignty
and will continue to play a critical role in helping Iraq on
its path to democracy. This committee will learn today, from
this distinguished panel, further details on that operation.
The President's appointment yesterday of a trusted
international statesman and current U.S. Ambassador to the
U.N., John Negroponte, as the first Ambassador to a free and
democratic Iraq, is another important step in this process. I
have had the opportunity through the years to know Mr.
Negroponte quite well and have the highest personal regard for
him.
Continued U.S. commitment to the June 30, 2004, transition
date is of enormous importance to the Iraqi people and to the
region. It will be the day that Iraq takes its place in the
community of free nations and the day the Iraqis assume a
greater degree of responsibility for their future. The
coalition forces, however, will remain on standby status and
involve themselves in the security of that nation.
A free democratic Iraq means defeat for the forces of
terrorism and instability in Iraq. Clearly, the recent surge in
violence in Iraq is related to the imminent transfer of
sovereignty. Those who fear democracy are trying to delay its
arrival. Those who incite terror realize their days are
numbered. Opponents of a free democratic Iraq are desperate and
will become even more desperate, unfortunately, in the days to
come.
We will be prepared for more violence as June 30, 2004,
approaches. We must not waver in the face of terror and
intimidation. Our troops, members of our coalition, and the
people of Iraq need the continued strongest support of the
Congress of the United States.
Many countries shared in the military effort to liberate
Iraq. Other nations, not involved directly in the military,
have joined in the rebuilding of Iraq. A total of 38 nations
are now involved in this overall endeavor. I welcome the
increased participation of the U.N. in the political transition
process. I applaud President Bush for his consistent efforts,
efforts that began in September 2002 at the U.N., to build and
expand the coalition of nations who have the courage and the
conviction to fight tyranny and terror in order to make the
region and the world a better, safer place.
As our Nation is focused on developments in Iraq, we must
not lose sight of ongoing developments in Afghanistan. The U.S.
and coalition forces continue to eliminate remnants of al Qaeda
and the Taliban regime that harbored them. North Atlantic
Treaty Organization (NATO) forces are taking increasing
responsibility to provide security and reconstruction
assistance across many parts of the country. The recent donors
conference in Berlin secured commitments from the international
community to provide the assistance Afghanistan will need to
recover from decades of war and oppression.
A constitution has been approved and elections are
scheduled. These are important steps on Afghanistan's path to
full democracy. The future is finally hopeful for the people of
Afghanistan, but challenges remain.
Speaking for myself personally, as a consequence of my
visit there I remain very interested in our witnesses' view on
how we can help Afghanistan to conquer a very serious drug
trade, which is growing, not diminishing, at an alarming rate.
The hearing today is an opportunity to review current
policies and future challenges. I hope our witnesses can
provide insights into a number of questions, among them the
issue of the $700 million. I will also put the details of the
briefings that this committee received, and it was on a
bipartisan basis, with regard to the use of those funds in
today's record.
[The information referred to follows:]
Summary of DOD Briefing to Senate Armed Services Committee Staff on
Pre-War Expenditures in the U.S. Central Command Area of Responsibility
Congress made available to the Department of Defense $17
billion in September 2001 and $14.2 billion in July 2002 to support the
execution of the global war on terrorism. Funding was appropriated to
``respond to the terrorist attacks on the United States . . . and to
deal with other consequences of the attacks . . . including for the
costs of . . . providing support to counter, investigate, or prosecute
domestic or international terrorism . . . and supporting national
security.''
The authorities were broad and provided the basis for
Operation Enduring Freedom and Operation Noble Eagle. On an ongoing
basis, there were discussions, briefings, and hearings with Congress on
the execution of these supplemental funds.
By July 2002, in the course of preparing for a contingency
in Iraq, CENTCOM developed rough estimates of $750 million in
preparatory tasks.
DOD Office of the Comptroller reviewed CENTCOM's request.
The Comptroller recommended funds be made available to activities that
were executable and consistent with authorities included in the
supplemental appropriations for the global war on terror.
In August and September 2002, $178 million (DERFI) was
made available to support CENTCOM including funding for communications
equipment, fuel supplies, humanitarian rations, and improvements to
CENTCOM's forward headquarters.
All investments were designed to strengthen our
capabilities in the region or support ongoing operational requirements.
No funding was made available with Iraq as the exclusive
purpose.
Congress approved an Iraq Resolution on October 11.
Consistent with congressional statutory requirements
regarding military construction activities, $63 million in
notifications were delivered to Congress October 15. After October 25,
more than $800 million was made available over the following months to
support Iraq prepatory tasks. Many of these tasks were those identified
by CENTOCM in July. These plans were consistent with both the global
war supplemental appropriations authorities and the congressional
authorization for use of military force against Iraq.
Chairman Warner. Our committee records show that on
February 13, 2003, the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) J-4 briefed
the committee staff. Later, on February 23, 2003, then-
Department of Defense (DOD) Comptroller Dov Zakheim briefed the
staff. Lastly, representatives from the Office of the Secretary
of Defense (OSD) Comptroller provided a classified briefing on
April 4, 2003.
The questions regarded the use of funds, that is operations
and maintenance (O&M) funds, to do what is predominantly
military construction (MILCON) type functions. We have in the
committee records, for the inspection of our members, a
classified document dated April 4, 2003, detailing those
expenditures. Nevertheless, Secretary Wolfowitz, I hope you can
elaborate on that issue.
Further, the questions before the committee today: Are
current troop levels in Iraq, as recently requested by General
Abizaid, sufficient? Do our troops have sufficient equipment
and correct equipment to carry out and complete the mission?
How will the Iraqi Interim Government be formed and how are
Iraqis reacting to the recent U.N. proposal? What role will the
U.N. and other international organizations play in the
reconstruction of Iraq after the transition of sovereignty?
Will the U.S. seek a U.N. Security Council resolution to cover
the next phase of activities, political and military, in Iraq?
What are the details that we have at hand with regard to
the all-important status of forces agreement which spells out,
hopefully, or will, perhaps coupled with a U.N. resolution
which I believe will be forthcoming, the exact relationship
between the new transfer of power to an Iraqi government and
the utilization of our troops and those of coalition forces for
further security?
I now recognize our distinguished ranking member, Senator
Levin.
STATEMENT OF SENATOR CARL LEVIN
Senator Levin. Thank you Mr. Chairman. I want to join you
in welcoming our witnesses this morning: Secretary Wolfowitz,
Secretary Grossman, and General Myers. These three witnesses,
representing as they do defense policy, diplomacy, and military
planning, provide us an opportunity to explore a number of
important issues relating to Iraq and Afghanistan. I join you,
Mr. Chairman, and every member of this committee in expressing
our gratitude to our troops, who demonstrate such constancy and
courage.
This would be an important hearing no matter when it was
held, but events of the last few months have made it even more
crucial. Today's hearing takes place in a month that has,
tragically, seen more U.S. military deaths from combat in Iraq
than any other month since the start of Operation Iraqi
Freedom. It is a month that has also seen an outbreak of
insurgent violence in Fallujah and elsewhere in central Iraq,
consisting primarily of Sunnis and foreign jihadists, and
militia resistance in several cities in southern Iraq,
consisting mostly of Shia.
Despite the obvious setbacks that we have experienced, I
believe that we can succeed in bringing peace and stability to
Iraq. It will help to achieve that goal if we are willing to
learn from our mistakes. The first step is to recognize that
mistakes were made, and that may be the most difficult step of
all.
Our uniformed military always conducts after-actions,
lessons learned reviews, so that the mistakes that have been
made are not repeated in the future. That practice needs to be
followed by the civilian leadership of the executive branch,
including both the Defense and State Departments. For example,
instead of merely tossing off the continuing violence as a
``tough period of days,'' there should be an assessment as to
whether we adequately planned for the possibility of post-
Saddam chaos.
Most expert commentators agree with former Army Chief of
Staff General Shinseki that we did not have enough troops in
Iraq to deal with the situation once the Saddam Hussein regime
had fallen. The looting that took place and the damage to
government buildings and public infrastructure that resulted
might have been avoided or been of less severity if General
Shinseki's advice had been heeded instead of his being
disparaged by the civilian leadership.
Most experts agree that it was a mistake to totally disband
the Iraqi army beyond, of course, removal of dedicated
Baathists and Saddam loyalists.
Most experts agree that the de-Baathification program went
beyond what was needed to assure that the Baathist leadership
was not maintained. As Mr. Brahimi stated last Wednesday, ``It
is difficult to understand that thousands upon thousands of
teachers, university professors, medical doctors and hospital
staff, engineers, and other professionals who are sorely needed
have been dismissed within the de-Baathification process, and
far too many of these cases have yet to be reviewed.'' The fact
that the widely disliked and distrusted Mr. Chalabi was put in
charge of the de-Baathification program wa a mistake that still
needs to be corrected.
The restriction of the U.S. military to a minor role in
planning for the stability phase or Phase IV of Operation Iraqi
Freedom, as General Franks described it to Chairman Warner and
me several weeks ago, was, in my judgment, clearly a mistake.
Despite all the talk about the Iraqi security forces being
the largest force in Iraq and the ones who would soon be the
first line of defense against the former regime elements and
jihadists, the fact is that there has been a failure to
adequately train more than 4 percent of the Iraqi police until
now. Surely there are lessons to be learned from that.
Perhaps the greatest mistake was the failure to appreciate
the importance of securing international support through the
United Nations before initiating hostilities against Iraq. The
United States was unable to convince the other members of the
Security Council that Iraq posed an imminent danger and we cut
U.N. weapons inspections off before they were concluded.
The difficulty following the war in obtaining broad
international support, including troops and police from Muslim
countries, is the result. The price we are paying is an
extremely high one.
Even before our troop rotation, we were providing more than
80 percent of the troops in Iraq (a figure that will rise with
the impending withdrawal of the Spanish and Honduran troops)
and, although it is difficult to ascertain the extent of
contributions of other nations, we are providing far in excess
of 80 percent of the financial assistance for Iraqi Iraq
reconstruction.
After keeping the U.N. at arm's length throughout the
occupation of Iraq, the President finally recognized the
central role of the U.N. in finding a way to an interim
government which will be accepted by the people of Iraq. When
asked last week about the Iraqi entity to whom sovereignty will
be restored on June 30, the President said ``That is going to
be decided by Mr. Brahimi,'' a quite reversal of the prior
posture of the administration towards the U.N., and long
overdue.
Formal U.N. involvement in the transition to a new interim
Iraqi government as our full partner would help provide
essential legitimacy in many parts of the world. U.N.
endorsement of a process of selecting an interim government and
authorizing a multinational force after the restoration of
Iraqi sovereignty might also open the door to troops and police
officers from other nations, including Muslim nations, and to
NATO involvement in Iraq. Some nations will, however, require a
more formal role for the U.N. in the continuing political
development of Iraq as a condition for their participation or
continued participation there.
Conversely, a failure to give the U.N. a major and formal
role after restoration of sovereignty would make it difficult
for a number of nations to keep their forces in Iraq, not to
mention attracting new troops and police.
I visited U.N. headquarters in New York last Friday and met
with U.S. Ambassador Negroponte and with the British, French,
German, and Pakistani ambassadors as well. I attended a
Security Council meeting at which Ambassador Negroponte
reported to the council on the efforts and the progress of the
U.S.-led multinational force in Iraq.
I met with Secretary General Kofi Annan and in the course
of our meeting he expressed his disagreement with statements in
the press that the U.N. would choose the people who would make
up the new interim government. He said that the U.N. would
hopefully help produce a process by which the Iraqi people
would choose their leaders, which is very different from the
U.N. choosing them and far, far different from the United
States and the coalition occupying powers choosing them.
In response to my question to him about a plan B if Mr.
Brahimi is unable to help produce a satisfactory consensus by
June 30--in other words, if there is no credible, broadly
supported government to whom sovereignty by that date can be
restored--Secretary General Kofi Annan said that there is not
enough time to come up with a plan B, so the only alternative
would then be to extend the existence of the Iraqi Governing
Council.
I know the administration intends to stick to the June 30
date. But the task of putting together the pieces of a
sovereign government which the various factions of the Iraqi
people support, by an artificial and in a relatively short
time, is a massive one.
If the U.N. does not have the pieces together by June 30,
the worst thing we could do is to attempt to restore
sovereignty to leaders that appear to be our choices instead of
the Iraqis. Even greater chaos and possibly civil war could
result. So while the administration does not want to talk about
the possibility that the U.N. does not succeed by June 30, I
hope the administration has a plan for what they will do in
that event because the possibility is a real one. We cannot
repeat the lack of planning which marked the post-Saddam
period.
For our military, one of the thorniest issues is whether a
new sovereign Iraqi government will be able to change the
status of our forces or will a prior or new U.N. resolution
assure continuity. A gap in the ability to do what is required
militarily is unacceptable.
Other key issues for our leadership include:
How many U.S. troops will be required to ensure
stability in Iraq in both the short and long term?
How will the forces of nations like Spain and Honduras,
that plan to withdraw their troops from Iraq be
replaced?
As for Afghanistan, which has received significantly less
attention since the start of the Iraq conflict, 2004 started
with good news as the Constitutional Loya Jirga was completed
and NATO decided to expand its role there. However, the last
few weeks have seen a number of challenges to the government of
President Karzai from regional warlords and their militias.
Additionally, NATO nations have not fulfilled requests for more
troops and the narcotics problem in Afghanistan seems to be out
of control. What specific plans are there to address these real
concerns?
Finally, I would note that questions have been raised as to
whether Congress was adequately informed and involved
concerning the expenditure of hundreds of millions of dollars
for construction activities in preparation for war with Iraq.
As our chairman noted, our witnesses need to address that
matter.
I look forward to our witnesses addressing these and many
other vital questions of concern to our committee.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Warner. Thank you, Senator Levin.
We will now proceed to hear testimony. Your statements
prepared which have been submitted to the committee will be a
part of the record. You may address those parts that you think
pertinent for your opening statements.
At the present time, the committee intends to have a brief
closed session following this open session in room 222 of the
Russell Senate Office Building.
Secretary Wolfowitz, you may kindly proceed.
STATEMENT OF HON. PAUL WOLFOWITZ, DEPUTY SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
Secretary Wolfowitz. Mr. Chairman, Senator Levin, members
of the committee: I have quite a long prepared statement which
I will submit for the record. In the interest of time, I will
just summarize and read some portions of it.
I would like to begin, though, by citing what a Marine
company commander wrote to his father as this Marine prepared
to lead his troops into action in Fallujah recently. I quote:
``This battle is going to have far-reaching effects on not only
the war here, but in the overall war on terrorism. We have to
be very precise in our application of combat power. We cannot
kill a lot of innocent folks. There will be no shock and awe.
This battle is the Marine Corps' Belleau Wood for this war.
``A lot of terrorists and foreign fighters are holed up in
Fallujah. It has been a sanctuary for them. The Marine Corps
will either reaffirm its place in history,'' this company
commander wrote, ``as one of the greatest fighting
organizations in the world or we will die trying. The Marines
are fired up. I am nervous for them, though, because I know how
much is riding on this fight. However, every time I have been
nervous during my career about the outcome of events when young
Marines were involved, they have always exceeded my
expectations. ``God bless these great Americans,'' he wrote,
``who are ensuring that we continue to fight an away
schedule.''
Let me add, God bless these wonderful Marines and soldiers
and all the members of our Armed Forces. Our prayers are with
him and with all of our people, military and civilian alike,
currently serving in Iraq and Afghanistan. They are making
America and the world more secure by helping the Iraqi and the
Afghan people build free and prosperous democracies in the
heart of the Middle East.
Whether members of active duty, Reserve, or National Guard
units or civilians, these heroes embody the best ideals of our
Nation, serving so that others may be free and so that our
children and our grandchildren can be more secure. We thank
them all for the sacrifices they endure.
We also owe a profound debt of gratitude to the roughly
19,000 men and women from our 35 coalition partners, who are
also serving the cause of freedom in Iraq. We would be remiss
if we did not acknowledge the contributions made by civilians
from a wide assortment of nongovernmental agencies (NGO) in
Iraq and with the Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA). They
have recently become a particular focus of terrorist attacks.
One heroine, Fern Holland, who quit practicing law in the
United States in order to go to Iraq and help improve the lives
of Iraqi women, was brutally murdered a few weeks ago for the
work she was doing. Though it is small consolation to her
family and friends, she wrote to a friend that if she died she
would die doing what she believed in.
Finally, I would like to thank the members of this
committee and Congress as a whole for their continued strong
support for our members of our Armed Forces.
Mr. Chairman, a little over a year ago we all watched the
statue of Saddam Hussein fall in the heart of Baghdad. On that
day, some 25 million of one of the most talented populations in
the Muslim and Arab world were liberated from one of the worst
tyrannies of the last 100 years.
According to a theme that one hears often these days, the
world is full of bad guys and Saddam Hussein was just another
bad guy. Any time that I hear Saddam Hussein referred to in
that way, I know that the person making the statement really
does not understand who Saddam Hussein was and is. During my
career I have had the experience of working up close and
personal with some truly bad guys--Ferdinand Marcos of the
Philippines, President Suharto of Indonesia. To paraphrase
someone else on a very different occasion, I knew Ferdinand
Marcos; Saddam Hussein was no Ferdinand Marcos.
Saddam Hussein was more than just another bad guy. He
institutionalized and sanctioned brutality on a scale that is
simply unimaginable to most Americans. He ruled by fear,
creating a society in which the ideal citizen was a torturer or
an informer.
I have traveled to Iraq several times since liberation. I
have spoken to hundreds of Iraqis, both there and here in the
United States, and one of my strongest impressions is that the
fear of the old regime still pervades Iraq, a smothering
blanket of fear woven by 35 years of repression, where even the
smallest mistake could bring torture or death or fates worse
than death, like the death of one's children or the rape of
one's relatives. That fear will not be cast off in just a few
weeks or even just a year or two.
Saddam Hussein began weaving this blanket of fear from the
very beginning. In 1979 when he formally assumed power as
president, he had a sweeping purge of top Baathist Party
leaders. At a meeting of the Iraqi National Assembly, Saddam,
with tears running down his cheeks and puffing on a cigar,
talked about the confession of disloyalty they had received
from a top party member and then continued one by one to name
other guilty colleagues.
One by one, guards dragged these people out of the meeting.
Then Saddam asked top ministers and leaders of the party for
their first loyalty test. They were required to participate in
the firing squads that executed those he had identified. He did
not stop there. He had videos made of the whole event and
distributed throughout the Middle East, so that people would
know what kind of a man he was.
Implicating members of his regime in his worst crimes and
ensuring that his potential victims understood that his threats
were to be taken seriously, in doing that Saddam Hussein
applied the techniques that any FBI agent will tell you are the
techniques of a gangland boss. But he did it on a national
scale and as the head of an internationally recognized
government.
One of the most heartbreaking stories to come out of Iraq
almost defies belief. Scott Ritter, the former UNSCOM inspector
and an opponent of the war, described a prison in Baghdad whose
stench he said was unreal, an amalgam--I quote--``of urine,
feces, vomit, and sweat.'' Where prisoners were howling and
dying of thirst. In this prison, the oldest inmates were 12,
the youngest mere toddlers. Their crime--being children of the
regime's political opponents.
I recount these stories to illustrate what one writer has
accurately called the density of evil that permeated Iraq. In
very many ways, its effects are also like a torture that does
not end. Such evil and fear are so alien to our own American
experience that I think it is necessary to talk about it to
understand the plight of Iraqis today, if we are to have a
proper understanding of one of the most formidable challenges
still facing us.
Because, Mr. Chairman, this is not just history. I did not
tell these stories in order to educate people about the past.
It is the present. When we use this rather anodyne term,
``former regime elements,'' to describe the people that we
capture and the people that are organizing much of the fighting
in Fallujah, my view, the more correct term would be ``the
torturers and killers of the old regime.''
One example--and I would like to submit the full classified
statement for the record, Mr. Chairman. But this is an analysis
from the Defense Intelligence Agency of one branch of the
former Iraqi Intelligence Service called the M-14, the so-
called Special Operations and Anti-Terrorism Branch. ``Anti-
Terrorism,'' it is Orwellian. This branch specialized in
kidnappings, hijackings, bombings, and assassinations. It was a
terrorist branch.
These people are in the field today. As that report says:
``Former Iraqi Intelligence Service operatives from M-14 have
been involved in planning and conducting numerous improvised
explosive devices, vehicle-borne improvised explosive devices,
and radio-controlled improvised explosive devices for anti-
coalition attacks throughout Iraq.''
It goes on to say that: ``cells of former M-14 personnel
are organizing and conducting a terrorist IED campaign against
coalition forces throughout Iraq. The explosives section of M-
14 prepared for the invasion by constructing hundreds of
suicide vests and belts for use by Saddam fedayeen against
coalition forces. The Iraqi Intelligence Service established a
campaign that was purposefully decentralized so that attacks
could be carried out in the event that cell leaders were
captured or killed.''
It goes on to mention that: ``Given their high level of
skill, M-14 tactics, including explosives, are likely to be
sophisticated.''
I would like to submit the full--I do not have page
numbers; it is about a seven-page document, and the detail is
stunning in my view.
Chairman Warner. Without objection, Mr. Secretary, that
will be done.
[The information referred to follows:]
[Deleted.]
Secretary Wolfowitz. Given that kind of presence, it is not
surprising to me that we get accounts like this one that came
recently from the Marines on the battle front. I guess I should
always say that first reports in war are frequently wrong and
even second reports can be wrong, and I do not know whether
this is a first, second, or third. But it strikes me it is
probably true.
The Marines reported a fire fight in a small village
northeast of Fallujah called Karmah. They basically stumbled
across what seemed to be a large enemy position. The enemy
swarmed in attack on the Marines. The result of a very intense
fire fight was over 100 enemy killed in action.
The significant thing, which I am looking to confirm, the
report says upon termination of hostility the local townspeople
approached the Marines, thanking them for their action, because
the enemy had taken over their town and had been effectively
holding them hostage.
I can confirm more reliably, Mr. Chairman, that a similar
situation prevailed in the town of Samarra further east in the
area of operation of the Fourth Infantry Division, which is now
run by the First Infantry Division, a situation not as bad as
Fallujah but in some ways perhaps emblematic of the Fallujah
problem. General Odierno of the Fourth I.D. about 2 months ago
undertook a cordon and search operation where they closed off
the town and systematically went after the anti-democratic
forces that had been organizing and terrorizing that town. I
have heard different estimates ranging from 200 to 700 enemy
captured and detained, but what is in no disagreement is that
once those people were gone Samarra was a different place, and
indeed it has been a different place during the violence of the
last few weeks.
Jim Steele, who is a retired Army colonel with incredible
bravery and also incredible expertise about police forces in
third world countries--he has been in Iraq for the last year--
he gave a report about a recent visit to Samarra. He said: ``It
is a different place from what it was during my last visit in
December. The number of active police stations has more than
doubled. The attitude toward the coalition forces was much
improved as well. Sammara is an excellent example of local and
regional cooperation. In fact, during the recent fighting the
police in Sammara performed well.''
This is from a report from Major General John Batiste, the
commander of the First Infantry Division, which now took over
from General Odierno. He said: ``We stood up a security working
group in Sammara in advance of the April 9th to 12th Arbayeen
celebrations to keep the peace and, if necessary, respond with
firmness. There was some violence on the 12th of April in
Sammara, but Iraqi security forces were part of the solution
and the violence was contained. I am using the Sammara model
throughout the region.''
I mention all of this, Mr. Chairman, because, as bad as the
situation is in Fallujah--and I do not in any way mean to
minimize it--I think the enemy that we are facing is an enemy
that rests on killing and death and terror, not an enemy that
has genuine popular appeal. We have to work on our side on
improving the belief of the Iraqi people in their future and
the belief in what we can do for their future, though we also
have to work to overcome the fear that these people implant.
Mr. Chairman, members of the committee: Iraq has been a
free country for a single year, after decades of systematic
abuse. A year after its liberation, it is important to pause
and consider what we have accomplished together with the Iraqi
people. The indisputable fact is that, after 35 years of
unimaginable horrors, Iraq has seen the beginnings of a
tremendous transformation for the better in the 12 months since
its liberation.
For 35 years, the Iraqi people were ruled by terror and
Saddam's personal fiat. Baathists suppressed dissent through
murder, torture, and arbitrary imprisonment. Iraqis had no real
rights, only temporary privileges subject to the whims of
Saddam and his sadistic sons.
Today Iraqis have an interim constitution that contains
assurances of freedom of religion, freedom of expression,
freedom of the press, freedom of assembly, freedom of
movement--provisions that are highlighted in that chart on my
right.
Through 35 years of tyranny, money earmarked for lifesaving
medicines were used by Saddam's regime to buy the means to end
life. Money marked for hospitals went to rebuild palaces. Many
of Iraq's hospitals and clinics that did remain open served as
ammunition or command bunkers. Today health care spending in
Iraq has increased 30 times, that is 30 times, over prewar
levels and children are receiving crucial vaccinations for the
first time in years.
After 35 years of tyranny, Iraq's economy was moribund due
to state control, rampant corruption, and the systematic
misallocation of resources to palaces and weapons and to the
favorites of the regime. Today the Iraqi economy is starting on
a path of recovery, even though the full effect of the $18.4
billion that Congress provided is only just starting to be
felt.
This is still, I would emphasize, an area of great concern
to us. But we are making progress in the face of years of
neglect. It is that progress which the enemy seeks to stop
today and which we must make increased efforts to accelerate.
For 35 years, Mr. Chairman, Iraq's oil revenues helped to
build Saddam's palaces and line his pockets and those of his
cronies. Today that revenue goes to the Development Fund for
Iraq, where it helps to build a new infrastructure and a new
future for the Iraqi people. At 2.5 million barrels per day,
Iraqi oil production has reached its prewar levels and a total
of $7.5 billion has been generated for the Development Fund for
Iraq. That, I would add, is on top of roughly $8 billion from
past revenues out of the Oil for Food program, so that Iraq has
contributed $17 billion approximately of its own resources,
$16.9 billion to be precise, to the reconstruction effort
already.
After 35 years of tyranny, Iraq's dilapidated power plants
were in a state of unimaginable disrepair. Saddam corrupted the
Oil for Food program and diverted the wealth of the country for
his own power and comfort. Today power generation has surpassed
prewar levels and is more evenly distributed throughout the
country.
For 35 years, Iraqi schools were propaganda factories for
Saddam's cult of personality and Baath Party fascism. Today
that fanaticism no longer pervades the national education
system. 64,000 secondary school teachers and 5,000 school
principals and administrators have been retrained in modern
teaching methods. Endless references to Saddam in the textbooks
have been removed and coalition forces have rehabilitated more
than 2,500 schools.
After 35 years of genocidal repression of Iraq's Marsh
Arabs, the historical marshlands of southern Iraq were on the
verge of extinction. A lush ecosystem the size of New Jersey
had been converted into a barren desert by Saddam's vindictive
attempt to destroy a people, the Marsh Arabs, whose history
goes back thousands of years. Today the marshlands are
gradually being restored and that ancient culture is being
revived.
For 35 years, the Iraq people's only link with the outside
world was the poisonous propaganda of Iraq's state-run media.
Today Iraqis have a wealth of independent news sources,
including 170 newspapers.
For 35 years, Iraqis had no voice in their government or
their nation's future. Today more than half of the Iraqi
population is active in community affairs and one in five
belongs to a nongovernmental organization.
I read in ``The Guardian'' of London that recently in the
overwhelmingly Shia province of Diyala in southern Iraq 17
towns held local elections using ration cards in the absence of
registration rolls, their first genuine elections ever, and in
almost every case either secular independents or nonreligious
parties outpolled the Islamists.
Perhaps most important, in the year since Iraq has been
liberated no new mass graves have been filled with the bodies
of innocent Iraqi men, women, and children capriciously
murdered by a brutal regime, and the torture rooms and
execution chambers have been shut down for good.
Despite all the uncertainty and violence caused by the
enemies of a free Iraq, it is clear that Iraqis sense dramatic
improvement and anticipate much more. According to a recent
Oxford Research International poll, despite all the
difficulties that are correctly described in Iraq today, 56
percent of Iraqis said their lives were much better or somewhat
better than a year ago, and a full 71 percent expect their
lives will be much or somewhat better a year from now.
Mr. Chairman, members of the committee, I am not here to
paint a rosy picture or to view this through rose-colored
glasses. There are enormous problems. Some of them are indeed
the result of what General Petraeus, who recently commanded the
101st in Iraq and will be going back, by the way, to perform a
crucial role in building Iraqi security forces--General
Petraeus called it the man on the moon phenomenon. That is to
say: You Americans can put a man on the moon; how come my
electricity does not work? How come the sewers are not fixed?
How come everything is not perfect after liberation?
I believe that it is critical not only for the concrete
benefits that come from employing people and fixing their basic
services, I believe it is also critical in terms of maintaining
faith and confidence in the United States, that we have to
speed up this reconstruction effort. We are trying to
understand--Senator Levin referred to lessons learned. One of
the lessons we are trying to learn is the roadblocks that have
made it slower than I believe is acceptable to get projects
moving.
Some of those roadblocks are unavoidable. They are the
inevitable result of an insecure situation. Some of them are
self-imposed red tape or in some cases I think legislation. I
hope we can work together with Congress to eliminate both where
they are unnecessary obstacles.
We have a strategy. It has three basic elements. The first
one involves building capable Iraqi security forces. The
picture there is mixed. We have lessons learned, important
lessons learned from the last few weeks, but I believe on
balance it is one of the most critical elements. But Jim
Steele, whom I quoted earlier, also reported visiting police
stations in two critical sections of Baghdad, in Adamiyah and
Sadr City, late at night during the recent disturbances and
was, frankly, surprised, but pleasantly surprised, to find the
chief of police there on duty and working.
One of the problems is, through our slowness in getting
equipment into the field, many of these Iraqi police were
outgunned by the militias that they faced. That is a problem we
can fix. In fact, if I were an Iraqi policeman I guess I would
be asking, why did you not fix it sooner? We are moving to fix
it as rapidly as we can.
The second element involves nurturing Iraq's capacity for
representative self-government, with the aim of creating a
government that the Iraqi people will feel is theirs and that
moves us out of the position of being an occupying power.
Can someone put up the chart, please, that shows that
process.
[The information referred to follows:]
[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
I would emphasize it is a process. Things will not change
overnight on July 1. While many think July 1 will be a magical
date on which CPA will suddenly transition all of its
responsibilities to a new Iraqi government, it is actually,
like the process in Afghanistan that was started in Bonn in
December 2001, just one step in the process.
Already, free Iraqis have been assuming responsibility for
government functions for quite some time. Iraq now has a
functioning judiciary. At the local and provincial levels,
elected assemblies are up and running. I think this is
important: The July 1 transition is just one of three important
steps in the future. It will be followed by the elections to
establish a Transitional Government in January of 2005. Let me
emphasize, elected, not appointed by the Americans, not
negotiated by Ambassador Brahimi, but fully elected, early next
year.
That government in turn will be replaced by a permanent
elected government under a constitution at the end of 2005.
The third element of the strategy, Mr. Chairman, involves
the reconstruction of Iraq's infrastructure and the restoration
of essential services to provide better lives for Iraqis and
put people back to work. Again, this is an area where we have
to speed things up. I think things are speeding up and there is
no question that the infusion of money that Congress provided
last year is starting to be felt and will be felt on a larger
scale over the course of this calendar year.
Mr. Chairman and members of the committee, at the same time
the Iraqis are undergoing a significant transition we will be
transitioning from the CPA under Ambassador Bremer's leadership
to a new American embassy led by one of our most distinguished
career diplomats, John Negroponte, our current Ambassador to
the United Nations, as was just announced yesterday.
We have been working closely with our colleagues in the
State Department. An example of extraordinarily good
cooperation, I have with me retired General Mick Kicklighter,
who has been working on these issues for the Defense
Department, and Ambassador Frank Ricciardone, doing them for
the State Department. We sometimes are not quite sure whether
they are the Bobbsy Twins because we always see them together,
but they are here and they are a resource.
Chairman Warner. I wonder if they would stand up.
Secretary Wolfowitz. If they would stand up, I think it
would be helpful. They deserve at least some recognition for
the extraordinary work they have been doing. [General
Kicklighter and Ambassador Ricciardone stand.]
Secretary Wolfowitz. Thank you.
Chairman Warner. Thank you.
Secretary Wolfowitz. Mr. Chairman, in my testimony I give
details about the timeline in the Transitional Administrative
Law on these three phases. I think it is important to
understand that there are three phases and that July 1 is not
an all or nothing kind of date.
I cannot sit here today and predict the exact form of
government that will result from this process, any more than I
could have predicted in December 2001 what would result in
Afghanistan from the Bonn process. The Iraqis will decide to
establish the exact provisions of their permanent constitution
and who will emerge as the leaders of a new Iraq. Particularly
after 35 years of what they have been through, it is a
complicated task.
But Americans, of all people, should understand that
democracy does not guarantee specific outcomes. It opens up
ideas for debate. One need only look back to our own
Constitutional Convention to be reminded that any attempt to
establish rule for the people and by the people will involve
uncertainty and controversy.
Throughout the world, particularly in Eastern Europe and
East Asia, new democracies have emerged in the last 10 or 20
years in countries that had no prior historical experience of
democracy. They are all different. None of them are perfect.
Neither are we. But even an imperfect Iraqi democracy will be a
light years improvement over what that country has been like
for the last 35 years.
Let me say one more thing here. I think it is wrong to
assume that Iraqi Arabs and Kurds and Christians and Turkomen,
some of the most intelligent people in the world, are incapable
of achieving what Lithuania or Korea or the Philippines or
Indonesia or Croatia or other newly emerging democracies have
accomplished over the last couple of decades.
Since the liberation of Iraq a year ago, Iraqis have
conducted themselves impressively well for a nation so long
exposed to Saddam's unique level of sadism. I guess I would
say, well, if someone is sitting there saying, what on earth is
he talking about when we read these scenes in Fallujah or we
read about Mr. Sadr, let me just give you one example.
We did not read about the massive Arbayeen pilgrimage. I do
not know the estimates. I think roughly a million Shia pilgrims
on the road for that celebration, very emotional celebration of
the martyrdom of Ali. We anticipated, we were afraid of massive
violence during that event. There was no news because there was
no violence.
The Shia of Iraq on the whole have conducted themselves
with incredible restraint in the face of repeated provocations,
both from the Zarqawi terrorists, from the former regime
killers, and from this small-time gangster Mr. Sadr.
I do want to recognize that we have disappointments with
the performance of security forces. We are learning lessons
from that. I cite three in particular at length in my
testimony. The first is the need for stronger leaders. The
second is that Iraqi security forces need an Iraqi rallying
point. They need to feel and to have their friends and
relatives feel that they are fighting for Iraq, not for the
Americans. That is one of the reasons why General Abizaid and
our commanders were those who were pushing so hard to
accelerate the transition to a sovereign government. That is
the reason why they found, and I felt with them, that this
label of occupying power was not a good one to hang onto for
another year and a half if there was any way to avoid it.
Third, and this is our responsibility, Iraqi security
forces need more and better equipment and they need it faster.
Mr. Chairman, I have some comments about Afghanistan. I
will be happy to discuss that in questions. I would like to
stress that I think the American people need to know what their
forces are accomplishing in Iraq and in Afghanistan, that the
efforts of our service men and women are transforming the lives
of 50 million people, overwhelmingly Muslims, and transforming
two regions that have for too long accommodated despotism and
terrorism, to the detriment of its people.
Both our friends and our enemies, and our friends
particularly, in Iraq and Afghanistan need to know that this
country has the will and resolve to accomplish our objectives.
I suppose it is worth highlighting for the international
audiences that the debate in this country seems to be about
whether we have enough troops or whether we should have more
troops, not about whether we should abandon the people of Iraq
or the people of Afghanistan. That is an incredibly important
message. It is one of the most valuable messages we can
deliver, because it builds confidence in the people, it
encourages people to cooperate with our troops, and it will
allow us to defeat this ugly enemy sooner rather than later.
Mr. Chairman, in the interest of time I think I am going to
abbreviate here. I do want to say that there are quite a few
myths out there and I cite some of them in this testimony. It
is a myth to say that the June 30 date for the transfer of
sovereignty is completely arbitrary, and even more of a myth to
say it is driven by the demands of U.S. electoral politics.
There are very good important reasons in Iraq for doing it, and
I would note that in fact it was our friends in the United
Nations, particularly France, that were most critical when we
established the Governing Council that Iraq needed a sovereign
government, not an American occupation.
Chairman Warner. Mr. Secretary, I think we can probably
perceive the benefit of your additional points in the exchange
we will have on questions.
Secretary Wolfowitz. Let us do that. If I could just
conclude, Mr. Chairman, I would like to read one impressive
quote from General Jack Keane in his retirement, because I
think this is a message to the world. The General said that:
``The foreign terrorists, the Baath Party sympathizers, the
extremists who wantonly kill Americans and innocent people from
many nations have no idea what they are up against. They think
they know us,'' General Keane said, ``because they have heard
of Lebanon in 1983 or Somalia in 1994 or the U.S.S. Cole in
2000. They think we are morally weak and we will lose our
resolve.
``But their knowledge is superficial and their
understanding is shallow. To understand America and
Americans,'' General Keane said, ``they need to understand the
Marne in 1918 or Tarawa in 1943 Omaha Beach in 1944, or the
Chosin Reservoir in 1950. They need to understand that a Nation
that produces Alvin York and Audie Murphy, John Pershing and
George Marshall, Chesty Puller and George Patton, Randy Shugart
and Gary Gordon, produces heroes in every generation. They are
out there now performing every day.''
The General concluded: ``Our enemies are cunning, but they
are ignorant, and their ignorance will be their undoing. They
do not know our will, our courage, or our character.''
Thank you, Mr. Chairman. God bless those wonderful men and
women who serve our country so well, and I thank this committee
and Congress for the support you give them.
[The prepared statement of Secretary Wolfowitz follows:]
Prepared Statement of Hon. Paul Wolfowitz
introduction
Mr. Chairman and members of the committee: As he prepared to lead
his troops into action in Fallujah, a Marine Company Commander took
time to write his father, a retired marine. ``This battle is going to
have far reaching effects on not only the war here,'' he wrote:
``But in the overall war on terrorism. We have to be very
precise in our application of combat power. We cannot kill a
lot of innocent folks. . . . There will be no shock and awe. .
. . This battle is the Marine Corps Belleau Wood for this war.
. . . A lot of terrorists and foreign fighters are holed up in
Fallujah. It has been a sanctuary for them.
The Marine Corps will either reaffirm its place in history as
one of the greatest fighting organizations in the world or we
will die trying. The marines are fired up. I'm nervous for them
though because I know how much is riding on this fight.
However, every time I've been nervous during my career about
the outcome of events when young marines were involved they
have ALWAYS exceeded my expectations.
God bless these great Americans who are ensuring we continue
to fight an ``away'' schedule.''
Our prayers are with him and all of our people currently serving in
Iraq and Afghanistan. They are making America--and the world--more
secure by helping the Iraqi and Afghan people build free and prosperous
democracies in the heart of the Middle East. Whether members of Active
Duty, Reserve, or National Guard units, or civilians, these heroes
embody the best ideals of our Nation--serving so that others may be
free--and we thank them all for the sacrifices they endure.
We also owe a sincere debt of gratitude to the roughly 19,000 men
and women from our 34 coalition partners, who are also serving the
cause of freedom in Iraq. We would be remiss if we did not acknowledge
the contributions made by civilians from a wide assortment of NGOs in
Iraq who have recently become the target of terrorist attacks, such as
Fern Holland, who quit practicing law in the United States in order to
go to Iraq and help improve the lives of Iraqi women. Ms. Holland was
brutally murdered for the work she was doing, and although it is small
consolation to her family and friends, died doing what she believed in.
Finally, I'd like to thank the members of this committee for their
continued support to the members of our Armed Forces.
iraq: 35 years of unimaginable tyranny, one year of progress
A little over a year ago, we all watched the statue of Saddam
Hussein fall in the heart of Baghdad. I remember watching the live
coverage of that historic moment. Iraqis, eager to start a new page in
their national history, enthusiastically tried to pull the statue down
with the limited resources available to them--a length of rope that did
not even reach all the way to the ground. Eventually, a group of U.S.
marines saw what was happening, and aided the Iraqi effort. Working
together, the Marines and Iraqis brought down that symbol of oppression
and provided an image that will be etched in our collective memory
forever.
On that day, 25 million of some of the most talented people in the
Muslim and Arab world were liberated from one of the worst tyrannies of
the last 100 years. According to a somewhat popular theme these days,
the world is full of bad guys, and that Saddam Hussein is just another
bad guy. When I hear Saddam Hussein referred to that way, I can only
conclude that there still exists a lack of real understanding of Saddam
Hussein. In my career, I've known some bad guys up close and personal,
people like former Philippine dictator Ferdinand Marcos and former
Indonesian dictator Suharto. To paraphrase a famous vice-presidential
debate, I knew these men, and Ferdinand Marcos was no Saddam Hussein;
Suharto was no Saddam Hussein.
Saddam Hussein was more than just another bad guy. He
institutionalized and sanctioned brutality on a scale that is simply
unimaginable to most Americans. Hussein ruled by fear, creating a
society in which the ideal citizen was an informer. The superintendent
of the Baghdad policy academy told me that he had spent a year in jail
for having made a disparaging comment about Saddam--to this best
friend. In such a Republic of Fear, friendship itself became a weapon.
I have traveled to Iraq several times. I have spoken to hundreds of
Iraqis, both in Iraq and here in the United States. One of my strongest
impressions is that fear of the old regime still pervades Iraq. But, a
smothering blanket of apprehension woven by 35 years of repression--
where even the smallest mistake could bring torture or death--won't be
cast off in a few weeks' time.
Saddam Hussein began weaving this blanket of fear from the very
beginning. In 1979, one of his first acts as President was a sweeping
purge of top Baathist leaders. At a meeting of the Iraqi national
assembly, Saddam tearfully talked about a coerced ``confession'' of
disloyalty from a top party member, and then continued to name other
guilty colleagues. Guards then dragged these people out of the meeting.
Then, Saddam asked top ministers and leaders of the party for their
first loyalty test--he called on them to form the firing squads that
executed those he'd identified.
Saddam had videos of the whole event distributed throughout the
Middle East, so people would know what sort of leader he was.
Implicating members of his regime in his worst crimes and ensuring that
his potential victims understood how seriously to take his threats,
Saddam Hussein applied the techniques of a most brutal gangland boss,
but on a national scale and as the head of an internationally
recognized government.
One of the most heartbreaking stories to come out of Iraq almost
defies belief. Scott Ritter--the former UNSCOM inspector and an
opponent of the war--has described a prison in Baghad, whose stench, he
said, ``was unreal,'' an amalgam of urine, feces, vomit and sweat''; a
hellhole where prisoners were ``howling and dying of thirst.'' In this
prison, the oldest inmates were 12, the youngest mere toddlers. Their
crime--being children of the regime's political enemies.
General Richard Myers, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, was
recently returning from a trip to Iraq, and stopped at Ramstein AB,
where he was told about some Iraqi businessmen who had recently passed
through on their way to the United States, to the Texas Medical Center
in Houston, where they were to undergo surgery to repair some of the
damage inflicted on them some 10 years ago. When Iraq's economy was
falling into shambles, Saddam's way of placing blame was this: he
ordered that a few merchants be rounded up. With flimsy evidence, they
were found guilty of destabilizing the Iraqi economy and were sentenced
to lose their right hands. Black Xs tattooed on their foreheads branded
them as criminals. The amputations were filmed, and the video--as well
as the hands--were sent to Saddam. In a Houston doctor's office, one
man was quoted as saying: ``You spend your whole life doing and saying
the right things. Then someone comes and cuts your hands off for no
reason at all. It's a torture that never ends.''
I recount these stories to illustrate what one writer has called
the ``density of evil'' that permeated Iraq. In very many ways, its
effects are also like a torture that doesn't end. Such evil and fear is
so alien to our own American experience that I think it's necessary to
talk about it to understand the plight of Iraqis today, if we are to
have a proper understanding of one of the most formidable challenges
facing us right now. Even though Saddam's regime is gone and he himself
has been captured, the fear of Saddam and his henchmen is still alive
in the minds of Iraqis facing the difficult choice of whether to
cooperate with us and with other brave Iraqis to build what they call
``the New Iraq.'' Until Iraqis are convinced that Saddam's old regime
has been permanently and irreversibly removed, and until a long and
ghastly part of their history is put to rest and overcome, it is only
natural that that fear will remain. That history of atrocities and the
punishment of those responsible are directly linked to our success in
helping the Iraqi people build a free, secure and democratic future.
The people of Iraq have much valuable information that can help us
root out the remaining Baathists and help Iraqis find justice. To the
extent that people of Iraq are willing to take part in the civic and
political institutions that will constitute a new Iraq is linked to
their understanding that the Saddamists are finished, and will never
again return to power in Iraq.
Convincing them of this truth--that Saddam and the Saddamists are
finished--will continue to require investments in our time and our
resources to continue to build trust among the Iraqi people.
Iraq has been a free country for a single year after decades of
systematic abuse by a regime of murderers and torturers. A year after
Iraq's liberation, it is important to pause and consider what we have
accomplished together with the Iraqi people. For amidst the episodes of
violence and tragedy of the loss of innocent life in suicide bombings,
the good news of what is happening in Iraq often gets obscured or
ignored. As one soldier recently wrote to the Houston Chronicle, ``The
reality is we are accomplishing a tremendous amount here, and the Iraqi
people are not only benefiting greatly, but are enthusiastically
supportive.''
The indisputable fact is that after 35 years of enduring
unimaginable horrors, in the year since its liberation Iraq has seen
the beginnings of a tremendous transformation for the better:
For 35 years, the Iraqi people were ruled by terror and Saddam's
personal fiat. Baathists suppressed dissent through murder, torture,
and arbitrary imprisonment. They tortured children in order to coerce
their parents, and raped women to punish their families. Iraqis had no
real rights, only temporary privileges subject to the whims of Saddam
and his sadistic sons.
Today, Iraqis have an interim Iraqi constitution that is the most
liberal basic governance document in the Arab world. The Transitional
Administrative Law (TAL) contains assurances of:
Freedom of Religion
Freedom of Expression
Freedom of the Press
Freedom of Assembly
Freedom of Movement
The TAL guarantees equal rights for all citizens of Iraq regardless
of ethnicity, denomination, or sex. It acknowledges the Islamic
character of the majority of Iraqi society and, at the same time,
affirms the right to freedom of religious belief and practice for every
Iraqi. It provides for other fundamental pillars of true democracy,
including separation of powers and an independent judiciary, rule of
law, fundamental civil rights, and civilian control of the military.
This constitution emerged from an often heated, but ultimately healthy,
political debate, one that would have been impossible a year ago--and
one that is still impossible in many areas of the world.
Through 35 years of tyranny, money earmarked for life-saving
medicines were used by Saddam's regime to buy means to end life. Money
marked for hospitals went to rebuild palaces. Many of Iraq's hospitals
and clinics that remained open to the public also served as ammunition
or command bunkers. Today, health care spending in Iraq has increased
30 times over its pre-war levels, and children receive crucial
vaccinations for the first time in years.
After 35 years of tyranny, Iraq's economy was moribund due to state
control, rampant corruption, and Saddam's misallocation of resources to
palaces and weapons and to the favorites of his regime. Today, the
Iraqi economy is on the path of recovery and prosperity. Unemployment
has fallen, inflation is a quarter of what it was before the war, and
the New Iraqi Dinar has become the most heavily traded currency in the
Middle East. This is before the full effect of the $18.4 billion in
reconstruction grants you helped provide the Iraqi people is felt. This
is still an area of great concern to us, but we are making progress
despite years of neglect. It is that progress which the enemy seeks to
stop today and which we must make increased efforts to accelerate.
For 35 years, Iraq's oil revenues helped build Saddam Hussein's
palaces and lined the pockets of Saddam and his cronies. Today, Iraqi
oil revenue goes to the Development Fund for Iraq, where it helps build
a new infrastructure and a new future for the Iraqi people. At 2.5
million barrels per day, Iraqi oil production as reached its pre-war
levels, and oil proceeds to date exceed $7.5 billion and are projected
to be $14 billion this year.
After 35 years of tyranny, Iraq's dilapidated power plants were in
a state of unimaginable disrepair. What electricity was produced was
diverted to Baghdad in order to reward Saddam's cronies and punish the
people whom Saddam despised. Today, power generation has surpassed
prewar levels and is more evenly distributed, and new, modern power
plants are being built.
For 35 years, Iraqi schools were propaganda factories for Saddam's
cult of personality and Baath party fascism. Today, that fanaticism no
longer pervades the national education system and its teaching
materials. 64,000 secondary teachers and 5,000 school principals and
administrators have been retrained in modern teaching methods, and 72
million new textbooks will be distributed before the end of the school
year. To date, coalition forces have rehabilitated more than 2,500
schools. The Iraqi people have clearly demonstrated their preference
for the new educational system, as school attendance this year has
surpassed pre-conflict levels.
After 35 years of genocidal repression of Iraq's Marsh Arabs, the
historical marshlands of southern Iraq were close to extinction. A lush
ecosystem the size of New Jersey had been turned into a barren desert
by Saddam's vindictive attempt to destroy a people whose history goes
back thousands of years and make of them an example to warn anyone who
would challenge his rule. Today, the marshlands are gradually being
restored, and that ancient culture is being revived.
For 35 years, the Iraqi people's only link with the outside world
was the poisonous propaganda of Saddam's state-run media. Today, Iraqis
have a wealth of independent news sources. One hundred seventy
newspapers are currently published in Iraq, and the Iraqi Media Network
reaches more than 80 percent of the Iraqi population. The market in
satellite dishes is booming.
For 35 years, Iraqis had no voice in their government or their
nation's future. Today, more than half of the Iraqi population is
active in community affairs and one in five belongs to a non-
governmental organization. Ninety percent of Iraqi towns and provinces
have local councils, which we think is a pretty good sign that the
Iraqi polity is moving in the right direction. Recently, in the
overwhelmingly Shia province of Diyala in southern Iraq, 17 towns have
held local elections--their first genuine elections ever--and in almost
every one secular independents and non-religious parties did better
than the Islamists.
Perhaps most importantly, in the year since Iraq has been
liberated, no new mass graves have been filled with the bodies of
innocent Iraqi men, women, and children capriciously murdered by a
brutal regime, and the torture rooms and execution chambers have been
shut down.
Despite all the violence and uncertainty caused by the enemies of a
free Iraq, it is clear that Iraqis sense dramatic improvement in their
everyday lives and anticipate much more. According to a recent Oxford
Research International poll, despite the difficulties we all read about
56.5 percent of Iraqis said their lives were much better or somewhat
better than a year ago. Despite the prevalence of alarmist quotes
depicting some Iraqi ``man-on-the-street'' lamenting the good old days
under Saddam Hussein, only 18.6 percent of those polled said they were
much or somewhat worse off than a year ago. A full 71 percent expect
their lives will be much or somewhat better a year from now.
Moreover, the Iraqi people are expressing their optimism with their
feet. Despite the continued threat of violence in Iraq, and the
horrific terrorist attacks against Iraqi civilians intended to derail
progress in Iraq, as several thousands of Iraqi refugees are returning
to their homeland.
the coalition's strategy to achieve victory in iraq: capacity building
Despite the violence of recent weeks, we need to continue to move
forward on all fronts implementing the coalition's strategy to set
conditions that will ensure a free Iraq that is stable and at peace
with its neighbors. Events of the past month have taught us several
lessons learned that have influenced our policy decisions. These
lessons include:
The importance of local initiative for fast action:
local commanders should get a special allocation of
reconstruction funds.
The importance of Iraqi leadership and the need to
intensify our efforts to train and develop Iraqi leaders
We need to cross-attach coalition and Iraqi
liaison officers, and more heavily embed coalition
trainers and mentors.
We need to continue to recruit vetted former
senior (Colonel--Brigadier) Iraqi officers for the
Iraqi Armed Forces and Ministry of Defense.
We need to speed police advisors and
specialized trainers to police stations and academies.
The importance of having an Iraqi rallying point and
looking for ways to shorten the process by which Iraqis quickly
create a government that embodies Iraqi nationality and
sovereignty.
We need to continue to install and highlight
an Iraqi chain of command: new defense minister,
commander of the Armed Forces, chief of staff, new
interior minister.
We need to carry out de-Baathification process
in a way that is non-punitive to those with clean
records.
We need to strengthen the legitimacy of an
Iraqi interim government and the constitutional
process.
We need to focus the Iraqi media spotlight on
political activities of leading Iraqis, including
Governing Council members.
We need to continue to encourage local
elections.
The importance of equipment and support and the need
to accelerate the equipping of Iraqi security forces.
We need to rush delivery of critical items
(weapons, ammunition, vehicles, radios)
We need to upgrade required items in light of
current experience.
We need to enhance protection for security
forces and police fixed sites.
Our strategy involves three interdependent lines of operations to
build indigenous Iraq capacity and transition responsibilities from the
coalition to Iraq rapidly, but not hastily. While these lessons to be
learned from the violent events of the past few weeks affect the way we
pursue these three lines of operation, these are still the three key
elements that will bring success in Iraq.
The first element involves building capable Iraqi security forces
to achieve stability. Accordingly, we have redoubled our efforts to
recruit, train, equip and, most importantly, mentor Iraqi security
forces--Police, Iraqi Civil Defense Corps, Army, Border Police, and the
Facilities Protection Service. Over the next few months our aim is to
certify the ability of these forces, that they are ready to assume
greater responsibilities from coalition forces. Similarly, through
technical assistance and mentoring by U.S. prosecutors and judges of
their Iraqi counterparts, we have been helping to build the capacity of
the Iraqi criminal justice sector: the Judicial Review Commission has
reviewed and vetted all currently sitting judges and prosecutors; the
Central Criminal Court of Iraq, established to deal with those who have
committed the most notorious crimes in Iraq, is investigating and
trying cases; and every pre-war local criminal court in Baghdad is
open, fully functional, and every week more cases are set for trial or
tried as compared to the week before.
The second element involves nurturing Iraq's capacity for
representative, self-government with the aim of creating a government
that the Iraqi people will feel is theirs and that moves us out of the
position of being an occupying power. While many think that July 1 will
be a magical date on which Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA) will
suddenly transition all of its responsibilities to a new Iraq
government, it is actually just one step in a process. Already, free
Iraqis have been gradually assuming responsibility for governmental
functions for quite some time. Many Iraqi ministries report to the
Governing Council rather than the CPA. Iraq now has a functioning
judiciary to provide equal justice for all. At the local and provincial
levels, elected assemblies are up and running. When the Interim
Government assumes office on July 1, its most important task will be to
prepare the way for elections to establish the Transitional Government
in January of 2005. That government in turn will be replaced by
elections for a fully constitutional government at the end of 2005.
The last element of the strategy involves the reconstruction of
Iraq's infrastructure and the restoration of essential services that
are providing better lives for Iraqis and putting people back to work.
Iraq has tremendous potential. It has well-educated and industrious
people. It has fertile land and water resources and it has abundant
natural resources. Our strategy aims to put Iraq on course to realizing
that potential and to setting conditions for Iraqis to reap greater
prosperity in the future.
lessons learned and challenges ahead
Although the progress the Iraqi people have made in their climb up
from tyranny has been both encouraging and impressive, significant
challenges still remain.
Security in Iraq
When planning the military campaign to liberate Iraq, this
administration and the combatant commanders chose to launch a campaign
that emphasized speed rather than mass. The astonishing speed of this
military campaign enabled us to avoid many of the nightmare scenarios
that were predicted before the war. Lest anybody forget, in part thanks
to this war plan we managed to avoid most of the horror scenarios we
feared going into this war:
Iraq's oil fields were not turned into an ecological
and economic disaster;
Massive destruction of dams and bridges was prevented;
Large-scale refugee flows were not generated;
There was no humanitarian crisis from food or medical
shortages;
No friendly governments in the region collapsed
because of the pressures of a protracted war.
Iraq's neighbors did not intervene, nor did Israel;
Ethnic conflict did not break out in mixed populations
in northern Iraq or elsewhere; and
There was no ``Fortress Baghdad'' with street-to-
street fighting and heavy civilian casualties.
The avoidance of these calamities was not by accident, but rather
the result of careful planning.
Because we did not wait to mass half a million forces in theater
before launching Operation Iraqi Freedom, Saddam was not able to
organize the large-scale urban warfare campaign about which so many
military analysts warned. The historically unprecedented speed of the
campaign may have led many Iraqi forces, such as the Fedayeen Saddam
and Mukhabarrat, to disperse throughout the country rather than stand
and fight in the streets as anticipated.
In order to destroy the last vestiges of Saddam's tyranny, it was
always necessary that we defeat these forces. The current violence is
not an issue of reconstruction planning, nor is it due to a lack of
forces. Overall, the decision to emphasize speed rather than mass was a
deliberate choice, recommended by the Combatant Commander, General
Franks, but approved by the President and the Secretary of Defense and
concurred in by the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Like all choices it involved
necessary tradeoffs, but overall it has saved lives and helped to avoid
terrible humanitarian and environmental disasters.
The timing of the current violence was not entirely unexpected.
President Bush warned that we could expect increased violence in the
months leading up to the transition to Iraqi sovereignty. We knew that
the enemies of democracy in Iraq would do everything they could to
disrupt the transition to sovereignty. This expectation was confirmed
when we intercepted a letter from Abu Musab Zarqawi to his Al Qaeda
colleagues in Afghanistan. In this letter, Zarqawi expressed
disappointment that previous mass attacks were failing to shatter the
unity of the Iraqi people. He advocated stepping up attacks to kill
large numbers of Shi'a in order to provoke a sectarian civil war in
Iraq. Some of the recent violence, including the attacks on Shi'ite
worshippers in Karbala and Baghdad during the Ashoura holiday in early
March which killed 140 Iraqis, bear Zarqawi's hallmark.
However, the same political situation that is driving such attacks
also is a source of optimism for the Iraqi people and their coalition
partners. Zarqawi recognized that the fast-approaching turnover of
sovereignty would further weaken his cause, saying:
``With the spread of the [Iraqi] army and the police, our
future is becoming frightening. The problem is you end up
having an army and police connected by lineage, blood and
appearance to the people of the region. How can we kill their
cousins and sons and under what pretext, after the Americans
start withdrawing? This is the democracy . . . we will have no
pretext.''
Zarqawi's letter strongly suggests that we are seeing an upsurge in
violence precisely because the terrorists and extremists in Iraq
believe we are winning and that their time to derail democracy in Iraq
is running out.
U.S. Government Transition after CPA
We face another daunting challenge as we execute the transition
from the Coalition Provisional Authority to a sovereign Iraqi
government bolstered by a U.S. embassy less than 90 days from now.
Fortunately, planning for this transition is well underway within the
Defense and State Departments. LTG (USA, Ret.) Mick Kicklighter and
Ambassador Frank Ricciardone lead Transition Teams for the two
Departments, and they have worked hand in glove with the CPA and
Defense and Army staffs since early January to make the transition a
success. They have formed an Interagency Transition Planning Team
(ITPT) and provide the State and Defense leadership for drafting an
Operations Plan for the transition. Experts from 16 subject matter
sectors (such as Security, Human Resources and Personnel, Facilities,
Finance, Medical and Health Services, etc.) from State and Defense
coordinate closely to draft the highly detailed, time-phased plan. The
ITPT as a whole meets almost daily, with sector leads meeting with
their teams more often as required. General Kicklighter and Ambassador
Ricciardone meet several times each week to ensure that planning and
implementation of the plan are on track.
Transitional Administrative Law
While the ITPT sets the course for the U.S. Government transition,
the TAL establishes a clear way forward for drafting and ratifying a
permanent constitution for Iraq and the election of a government in
accordance with its terms. This political transition is scheduled to
evolve over three phases:
Phase I (June 30, 2004)--Iraqi Interim Government
Phase II (January 2005)--Iraqi Transitional Government
Phase III (January 2006)--Iraqi Government under
Permanent Constitution
According to the timeline laid out in the TAL, the Iraqi Interim
Government will take power on June 30. This Interim Government will be
selected by procedures being developed through intensive consultations
among Iraqis, led by Ambassador Brahimi, the U.N. Secretary General's
Special Advisor on Iraq. We believe the ideas put forth by Mr. Brahimi
are promising and we look forward to more details from the U.N. CPA
officials will remain in close contact with Mr. Brahimi, members of the
Iraqi Governing Council and other Iraqis as these procedures are
completed in May. The Interim Government will serve until the
Transitional National Assembly (TNA), is elected in either December
2004 or January 2005.
The TNA will then elect a three-person Presidency Council comprised
of a President and two Deputies, who will appoint by unanimous vote the
Prime Minister and, on the Prime Minister's recommendation, a Council
of Ministers. The Prime Minister and Council of Ministers must obtain a
vote of confidence from the TNA before taking office. Together, the
TNA, the Presidency Council and the Council of Ministers will comprise
the Iraqi Transitional Government.
In addition to being the legislature, the TNA will also draft a
permanent constitution for Iraq, which will be submitted for popular
ratification by October 15, 2005. Elections under this new constitution
are to be held by December 15, 2005, and the newly elected government,
operating under the permanent constitution, will take office by
December 31, 2005.
The TAL provisions relevant to security arrangements also provide
the appropriate framework for implementing our security strategy in
Iraq. Article 59(B) of the TAL states that Iraqi armed forces will be
``a principal partner in the multinational force operating in Iraq
under unified command pursuant to'' UNSCR 1511. Article 59(C) states
that the elected Iraqi Transitional Government ``shall have the
authority to conclude binding international agreements regarding the
activities of the multinational force,'' and that ``nothing in this Law
shall affect rights and obligations . . . under UNSCR 1511 . . . which
will govern the multinational force's activities pending entry into
force of those agreements.'' Perhaps most importantly, article 26(C)
ensures that CPA orders and regulations ``shall remain in force until
rescinded or amended by legislation duly enacted and having the force
of law.'' This includes CPA Order #17, which provides SOFA-like
protections for Coalition Forces, and will stay in effect until an
international agreement is negotiated with the sovereign Iraqi
government.
Now, I cannot sit here today and predict the exact form of the
permanent government. Iraqis will decide to establish the exact
provisions of their permanent Iraqi constitution, or who will emerge as
the leaders of the new Iraq. After 35 years of totalitarian
dictatorship, it is a complicated task to build new political
institutions and it cannot happen overnight.
Americans of all people should understand that democracy does not
guarantee specific outcomes, it opens ideas up for debate. One need
only look back at our own Constitutional Convention to be reminded that
with any attempt to establish rule for the people by the people, there
is always a great deal of uncertainty and controversy, right up until
the ink has dried and even afterwards. We should not expect Iraqis to
achieve immediately what we and the British, for example, have labored
to accomplish over the course of centuries. Throughout the world,
particularly in Eastern Europe and in East Asia, new democracies have
emerged in the last 10 or 20 years. They are all different and none are
perfect. Neither is ours. But even an imperfect Iraqi democracy will be
an improvement light years beyond what that country has endured for the
past 35 years.
Let me say one more thing here. I believe it is wrong to assume
that Iraqi Arabs and Kurds, some of the most intelligent people in the
world, can not achieve what Lithuania, Korea, and other newly emerging
democracies throughout Eastern Europe and East Asia have accomplished
in the past 20 years. Since the liberation of Iraq a year ago, Iraqis
have conducted themselves extraordinarily well for a nation so long
exposed to Saddam Hussein's unique level of sadism. In a remarkably
short period of time, Iraqi leaders, for all their diversity, have
shown they are learning the arts of political compromise and that they
are dedicated to their country's unity.
Iraqi Security Forces
One institution we are focusing intently on is the Iraqi Security
Forces, whose performance during the spike in combat activity over the
past 3 weeks has been mixed. At least half of the security forces stood
their ground and in Fallujah some ICDC units fought bravely and well.
Other units did not face the enemy, avoided contact altogether, and a
small proportion cooperated with the enemy.
Our disappointment with the security forces has to be tempered with
realism. Overall, they were not capable by themselves of deterring or
withstanding the recent attacks, and that fact should not surprise us.
We have been fielding Iraqi security forces as fast as we could, but we
never intended for Iraqi security forces to take over responsibility
for Iraq's security on June 30, much less April 5. Our plan was and is
for Iraqi forces to develop strength, capability, and experience under
the security umbrella of the coalition, while the coalition retained
overall security responsibilities. Recent events provide lessons we can
apply to increase the impact of what we are doing.
The first lesson is the need for stronger leaders in the security
forces. We will build on the leaders whose units fought and we will
replace those whose units did not. We will integrate Iraqi officers
with coalition forces and we will embed coalition officers with the
Iraqi security forces. This cross-attachment provides liaison, which
produces mutual confidence, and it also helps us develop Iraqi
leadership. Similarly, we need police advisors and specialized trainers
to get down to police stations around the country to provide confidence
and set the example.
Second, it is clear that the members of the security forces, most
of whom are Iraqi patriots, need an Iraqi rallying point. They need to
understand they operate under an Iraqi chain of command, and that at
the top of that chain of command is a lawfully constituted Iraqi
government. The chain of command is being put in place now. A defense
minister has been named, along with a commander in chief of the Armed
Forces and a chief of staff. A new interior minister has also taken
office. We need to fill in the rest of the chain, but Iraqis in the
security forces can see today that there are Iraqis at the top.
The other and harder part of creating a national rallying point for
the security forces is the creation of an Iraqi government. This is one
of the important reasons to maintain the momentum of the governance
process, including not only the June 30 transition but the important
steps beyond.
Third, the Iraqi security forces need more and better equipment. We
had not planned for them to be fully equipped at this point, but some
of our ICDC units were outgunned in recent action, so we are relooking
the equipment requirements. We have also incurred some delays in
equipping the Iraqi security forces. Part of the delay has been caused
by challenges in the contracting process and we hope those problems
have been fixed. We need to make up some of our lost time, but any
delay is unacceptable.
The greatest factor in the mixed performance of the security forces
was an intangible: fear. The fear of becoming a casualty is doubtless
ever-present; almost 300 members of the Iraqi security forces have been
killed and almost 700 wounded. But fear of the future is a much greater
factor. The enemies of a democratic future for Iraq have so terrorized
the cities of central Iraq that many members of the security forces
doubt that they or their families can be protected from the retribution
that may follow their participation in operations alongside the
coalition. The intimidation is crude but often effective, especially in
a society in which keeping your head down was an essential survival
technique for over 30 years. That fear takes time to overcome.
The enthusiasm of Iraqis to go into combat alongside the coalition
is also colored by their perception of our commitment to the new Iraq.
If they sense that we will not see them through to a new constitution,
an election, and strong Iraqi institutions, we should not be surprised
to see them melt away or even work a deal with those who would shoot
their way to power. That is why it is so important in this time of
stress to show that our commitment to their freedom is rock-solid.
Afghanistan
We also confront challenges in Afghanistan where the United States,
its coalition partners, and NATO have committed to helping the Afghans
build a moderate, democratic, and representative government. Despite
some setbacks, Afghanistan has made enormous progress on several
fronts.
In January of this year, the Afghan people reached a critical
milestone when they adopted a constitution laying the foundation for
strong democratic institutions and guaranteeing civil liberties such as
freedom of religion and equality between men and women. The Afghans
have made steady progress in disarmament, with 40 percent of the heavy
weapons around Kabul secured. A nation-wide heavy weapons survey is
identifying all remaining heavy weapons in the country for removal by
June 2004. The Afghan Ministry of Defense will likely meet its goal of
9,500 Afghan National Army troops by the summer. The 7,646-strong force
has already contributed to the success of Coalition stability
operations in the south and east. The army allowed the central
government to respond effectively to the recent unrest and factional
fighting in Herat and Meymaneh.
With the more than $2 billion that you helped provide, the
President was able to commit personally to accelerate progress in
Afghanistan's reconstruction and security. This commitment has allowed
us to increase the number of Provincial Reconstruction Teams throughout
Afghanistan. The coalition recently established its 13th team in the
southern province of Oruzgan. We hope to set up three more in the south
and east by June of this year. Countries leading PRTs include the U.K.,
New Zealand, and Germany. These teams play an active role in defusing
regional tensions among rival warlords, engage in public works
projects, and help provide security for reconstruction activities
through presence patrols and assistance to local police and security
forces, among other things.
Operation Mountain Storm is underway in the south and east, where
al Qaeda networks and the Taliban continue to threaten stability and
reconstruction. We are following up these combat operations with
focused reconstruction and humanitarian assistance. One vehicle for
this focused reconstruction and humanitarian assistance will be the
Regional Development Zone, which will be rolled out in the less
developed and more insecure regions.
We are improving relations between Afghanistan and Pakistan and
enhancing cooperation in counterinsurgency operations along the Afghan
border with Pakistan. In 2003, we established a Tripartite Commission
made up of U.S., Afghan, and Pakistani authorities that meets regularly
to share military intelligence and address common security concerns.
We are actively engaging NATO countries to expand their security
presence in Afghanistan. NATO recently completed an operations plan for
expanding the International Security Assistance Force beyond Kabul and
Konduz. We are lobbying NATO countries to contribute the resources
necessary for this expansion.
false pessimism about the iraqi transition
But while it is important not to view the accomplishments in Iraq
and Afghanistan through rose-colored glasses, some critics seem to have
given themselves over completely to the darkest of pessimism. To some,
all progress in Iraq is illusory, every silver lining has a cloud.
It is important to address and correct the misperceptions about
developments in Iraq. The American people need to know what their
forces are accomplishing in Iraq, how the efforts of our servicemen and
women are transforming the lives of 25 million Iraqis for the better,
and transforming a region that has for too long accommodated despotism
to the detriment of its freedom starved populations. Both our friends
and our enemies, in Iraq and Afghanistan, need to know that we have the
will and resolve to accomplish our objectives.
For example, some say the June 30 date for the transfer of
sovereignty is completely arbitrary, driven more by the demands of U.S.
electoral politics than by actual conditions in Iraq, and that
therefore the deadline should be extended. The choice of an early date
as opposed to a later date was not arbitrary at all. If you will
recall, our original plan envisaged a sovereign Iraqi government only
at the end of a multi-step process of drafting a new constitution and
holding elections by the end of 2005. The President decided to shorten
this timetable, for two key reasons having to do with our strategy in
Iraq.
First, the Iraqis seemed to hold back from taking responsibility as
long as the CPA was in total charge. A shorter timetable was seen as a
necessary incentive to prepare the Iraqis for sovereignty. For without
the sense of urgency and accountability that a fixed deadline imposes,
Iraqi leaders have been unable to resolve the difficult issues required
to conduct elections and shape a new government.
Second, an early end to the occupation is essential to our
political strategy to defeat the terrorists. A sovereign Iraqi
government will be better able to marginalize its extremist opponents
politically while coalition forces defeat them militarily. As the
letter from Zarqawi demonstrates, such a transformation is the worst
possible scenario for those who oppose the emergence of democracy in
Iraq. They fear it, and that's why they are trying so hard to derail
it.
Moving ahead is important to inspire Iraqi confidence that the
transition is moving forward and that their country will not be
occupied indefinitely. But it is important also to make clear that
coalition forces will not leave on July 1--there will still be threats
to security in Iraq. But, on July 1, Iraq will be governed by an Iraqi
government. This is in accordance with the expressed wishes of the
Iraqi people. In a recent public opinion survey, 60 percent of Iraqis
said that U.S. and other coalition forces should remain in Iraq for
more than 1 year, until security is restored, or until an Iraqi
government is in place.
Some say the transfer of authority to Iraqis will not be genuine,
that it will only be symbolic. This is also not true. On July 1, an
Iraqi government will be given responsibility for day-to-day governing
of Iraqi state affairs. Iraqis will control all 26 ministries with
strong U.S. support. The Iraqi Police, Border Patrol, and Facilities
Protection Forces--80 percent of the Iraqi Security Forces--will be
under the new Iraqi Interior Ministry. The Iraqi Civil Defense Corps
and Iraqi Army will, for purposes of operational control, be under the
unified command of the Multi-National Force Iraq, commanded by General
Sanchez. However, administratively they will be under the command of
the Ministry of Defense. These arrangements are similar to those
utilized in Germany and Korea during the Cold War, put real power into
the hands of our Iraqi partners, and go beyond any token symbolism.
Some say that we are in Iraq with an ``illegitimate'' coalition
that is just window dressing for this administration's unilateralism.
However, the Coalition's mission to reconstruct Iraq has been an
international effort from the start. Thirty-four Nations besides the
United States have forces on the ground in Iraq, spearheaded by the two
multinational divisions led by the British and the Poles. These 34
nations include Britain, Japan, and Italy--three G-7 countries--plus
Poland, South Korea, and many others. Jordan and the United Arab
Emirates are training Iraqi police forces. Over 70 nations participated
in the Madrid Donors' Conference, pledging between $14-19 billion
dollars for Iraqi reconstruction, including significant pledges from
the World Bank and IMF.
Thirty-four of our closest friends have troops that are bravely
fighting alongside us in Iraq. British, Italians, Bulgarians, Thais,
Poles, Danes, Estonians, Ukrainians, and Spanish have been killed while
trying to advance freedom and democracy in Iraq and it is wrong to
denigrate their efforts. Perhaps most significantly, more than 250
Iraqis have died in the line of duty fighting for a free Iraq since
June 1.
Some say that just as we should have waited for the United Nation's
permission to go to war, we should bring the United Nations into Iraq
today. This is a misleading statement, as this administration has made
a significant effort to involve the United Nations in the
reconstruction of Iraq. The Coalition's ongoing efforts in Iraq have
repeatedly received the endorsement of the UN. U.N. Security Council
Resolution 1483--passed May 22, 2003--supports the formation of the CPA
and an Iraqi Interim Administration. UNSCR 1500--passed August 14,
2003--welcomed the establishment of the Governing Council. UNSCR 1511--
passed October 16, 2003--authorizes a multinational force under U.S.
command. All three of these resolutions were unanimously endorsed by
the U.N. Security Council.
The administration has worked closely with the U.N. Secretary
General throughout the past year. Before his tragic murder by
terrorists, U.N. envoy Sergio Viera de Mello was instrumental in
establishing the Iraqi Governing Council. Since then we have welcomed
the proposals of the new U.N. envoy, Lakdar Brahimi, regarding the
creation of the Iraqi Interim Government. Since the tragic bombing of
the U.N. Headquarters in Baghdad last August--which Zarqawi boasts was
his doing and which was clearly aimed at driving out the U.N.--security
for the U.N. has been a major challenge. However, the U.N.
representative for Security Coordination's Office has been in Baghdad
since mid-January. A U.N. Election Commission headed by Carina Perelli
has in Iraq this month. Ambassador Brahimi has already conducted two
important missions to Iraq and we look forward to his return next
month.
Some say the recent attacks against Coalition forces by Muqtada al-
Sadr's militia signal the start of a major Shi'a uprising that would
pit Iraq's Shi'a--who are a majority of the population--against the
coalition. In reality, however, Sadr does not have widespread support
in the Iraq Shi'a community. A recent ABC News poll showed that only
one percent of Iraqis named al-Sadr as the National leader they trust
most. Last week in Najaf, Iraqi residents of that city distributed
leaflets against Sadr that said: ``We don't want anyone, whoever he is,
to surround himself with armed bodyguards and return us to an era of
slavery for the Iraqi people.'' Immediately after al-Sadr urged his
followers to attack U.S. forces, the Shiite clerical establishment
issued a statement calling for Sadr to stop ``resorting to violence,
occupying public buildings, and other actions'' that make him an
outlaw.
That is what Muqtada al-Sadr is, an outlaw. He does not represent a
``legitimate voice'' in Iraq, but rather a threat to the legitimate
rule of law in Iraq. Immediately after the liberation of Iraq he
ordered his followers to begin taking over the mosques of moderate
Shiites. He has been indicted by an Iraqi judge for complicity in the
assassination of a prominent moderate Shi'a cleric, Ayatollah Abdel
Majid al-Khoei, in April 2003.
Muqtada al-Sadr's reliance on armed gangs to deny Iraqi men and
women their basic freedoms, his use of intimidation and possibly murder
against his political rivals, and his imposition of vigilante law and
illegal courts are incompatible with the New Iraq that most Iraqis
want.
Some say we have no plan for the scheduled transition to Iraqi
sovereignty on July 1. Such statements ignore the progress made in our
discussions with the U.N. over the last 2 months. U.N. envoy Ambassador
Brahimi just announced on April 14 his general concept for the Iraqi
Interim Government that will govern from July 1 to early 2005. That
concept is the product of weeks of consultation by U.N. and coalition
officials with Iraqis. Ambassador Brahimi remains confident that the
process of setting up an Interim Government could be completed in a
relatively short period of time. It is worth recalling that some
permanent members of the U.N. Security Council complained that CPA's
plan was moving too slowly to sovereignty.
As for the shape of the U.S. presence, the Command and Control
relationships are in the process of being finalized. DOD will create
the Office of Security Cooperation (OSC) that will be headed by General
David Petraeus. OSC will consist of the Coalition Military Assistance
Training Team (CMATT) and the Civilian Police Advisory Training Team
(CPATT). General Petraeus will have authority and responsibility for
effectively using available resources and for recruiting, equipping,
training, and positioning the Iraqi Security Forces.
Some say the new Iraq will be dominated by the Shi'a majority that
will inevitably establish an Iranian-style theocracy in Iraq. Although
the eventual shape of the permanent Iraqi government will be for the
Iraqis themselves to determine, thus far events on the ground are cause
for cautious optimism. Over the past 2 months, 17 local elections have
been held in overwhelmingly Shiite provinces in Southern Iraq. In
almost every case independents and representatives of non-religious
parties did better than the Islamists.
In addition, certain key provisions of the TAL suggest Iraqis have
already chosen a more tolerant course. First, the TAL reflects a
unanimous consensus of the Governing Council that includes Shi'ite
representatives, Sunni Iraqis, Kurdish Iraqis and others. These Iraqis
embraced a democratic form of government that reflects the principle
that there shall be neither the tyranny of the majority nor tyranny of
the minority. The rights, beliefs and practices of all Iraqis are
protected.
The TAL also achieves a reasonable balance with regard to the role
of Islam in Iraq, combining clear guarantees of religious and other
freedoms with recognition of Islam's role in Iraqi society. Article
13(F) states that ``Each Iraqi has the right to freedom of thought,
conscience and religious belief and practice. Coercion in such matters
shall be prohibited.'' Article 7(A) states that ``Islam is the official
religion . . . and is to be considered a source of legislation.'' No
law may contradict ``the universally agreed tenets of Islam, the
principles of democracy, or the [individual] rights'' granted in the
TAL. The exact meaning of this will of course have to be worked out in
practice. But it incorporates the view that the ``universally agreed
tenets of Islam'' are compatible with democracy and individual rights.
Some say this administration is leading the American people into
another Vietnam-like quagmire that can never be won. As Senator McCain,
former Senator Fred Thompson, and many others have pointed out, that
comparison is more emotion than analysis. In Vietnam, the Communists
were an entrenched movement, with a strong nationalist credential,
external support from two major Communist powers, and a friendly
population in many parts of the country. In Iraq, the extremism in the
Sunni triangle represents a small minority of the Iraqi population
seeking to restore the regime of terror that gripped Iraq for more than
three decades--plus an admixture of foreign jihadists and Iraqi
extremists, some of them associated with Al Qaeda. While we do not know
how much these groups work together--and while their long term goals
may diverge--they are united in the common purpose of defeating us and
preventing a free Iraq from emerging. They offer no positive vision to
Iraqis but only visions of death and terror.
One possible resemblance with the Vietnam experience, however, is
the enemy's hope that it can shape perceptions here--demoralizing the
American people as well as our servicemen and women in the field. That
was a decisive factor in the outcome in Vietnam. That is why Senator
Kerry's strong statement that America must stay the course in Iraq is
so important. That is the message, we in Washington, must convey on a
bipartisan basis not only to our own people, not only to our servicemen
and women, but also to the Iraqis, both friend and foe.
It seems that this message is starting to get through to Bin
Laden's associate Zarqawi. In the same letter I quoted previously, he
lamented that America would not be pushed out ``no matter how numerous
its wounds become and how much of its blood is spilled.'' That is an
accurate description of this country's courage and staying power in a
just cause. Conveying that message can shorten the conflict.
conclusion: only one option--to win
Finally, some say there are no good options in Iraq. This is not
true. In fact, there is only one option in Iraq--to continue moving
ahead and helping the Iraqi people build a free and prosperous
democracy. This will not be easy. Only the most naive person would
think that. It will be a long road. After the abuse it has suffered, it
will take time for Iraq to catch up even with the new democracies of
Europe and Asia, much less long-established ones like our own.
But Iraqis recognize these challenges and embrace them as a
revolutionary opportunity to build a free nation and to better their
lives. Recently, Nesreen Berwari, the woman serving as the Iraqi
Minister of Municipalities and Public Works said: ``On April 9, 2003,
Iraqis were offered the opportunity to begin to dream their future.
Before April 9, 2003, we were not allowed to dream. We could not
imagine life with the kinds of positive challenges we face today.''
Minister Berwari's optimism persists even though she recently survived
a second assassination attempt on her life which killed her bodyguard.
From the start of the global war on terror it has been clear that
we would have to face many difficult challenges and endure many
sacrifices in order to ensure the safety of our citizens and our way of
life. But as Minister Berwari suggests, these should be seen as
positive challenges not as excuses for inaction or retreat. When has it
ever been the American way to back down from such a challenge?
Last October, in his farewell speech, General John Keane aptly
described the American character in the face of challenges such as we
face today in Iraq. General Keane said:
``I want to tell you something about this war against terror
we are fighting in Iraq and around the world. The foreign
terrorists, the Baath Party sympathizers, the Islamic
extremists who wantonly kill Americans and innocent people from
many nations, have no idea what they are up against.
Their strategic objective is the political and moral will of
the American people. They want to destroy our confidence. They
think they know us because they have heard of Lebanon in 1983,
or Somalia in 1994, or the U.S.S. Cole in 2000. They think we
are morally weak and we will lose our resolve. But their
knowledge is superficial and their understanding is shallow.
To understand America and Americans, they need to understand
the Marne in 1918, or Tarawa in 1943, Omaha Beach in 1944, or
the Chosin Reservoir in 1950. They need to understand that a
nation that produces Alvin York and Audie Murphy; John Pershing
and George Marshall; Chesty Puller and George Patton; Randy
Shugart and Gary Gordon; produces heroes in every generation.
They are out there now . . . performing every day.
Our enemies are cunning, but they are ignorant and their
ignorance will be their undoing. They do not know our will, our
courage, or our character.''
Last summer, a colonel in the 101st Air Assault Division told me
that he explained the job in Iraq to his soldiers like this: He told
them that what they're doing in Iraq is every bit as important as what
their grandfathers did in Germany or Japan in World War II or what
their fathers did in Europe and Asia during the Cold War.
Those soldiers are helping to reshape history in a way that will
make America and the world safer. Like the joint effort to pull down
Saddam's statue a little over a year ago, our troops are supporting the
Iraqi people in their effort to overcome their tyrannical past and
build a better, more peaceful future.
Needed Enhance Authorities
One of the most important ways in which Congress can support the
global war on terrorism is to support three special authorities we have
requested:
(1) $500 million to train and equip military and security
forces in Iraq, Afghanistan, and friendly nearby regional
nations to enhance their capability to combat terrorism and
support U.S. operations in Iraq and Afghanistan. It is critical
that this authority include security forces because the
terrorism threat in Iraq is inside its borders. Security
forces--not the New Iraqi Army --play the primary role in
confronting this threat.
(2) The Commanders Emergency Response Program ($300 million)
to enable military leaders in Iraq and Afghanistan to respond
to urgent humanitarian relief and reconstruction needs. This
has been a remarkably successful program. With quick turnaround
projects averaging about $7,000 each, commanders not only help
people in their operations area, but also gain their support in
defeating terrorists and building themselves a better future.
As we have already done in fiscal year 2004, we propose to
expand CERP to Afghanistan, as well as to continue the program
in Iraq.
(3) Increased drawdown authority ($200 million) under the
Afghanistan Freedom Support Act, to provide additional help for
the Afghan National Army. During this pivotal year, this
authority is critical for advancing democracy and stability in
Afghanistan. During my visit to Afghanistan, everyone I met
gave very high marks to the professionalism and competence of
the ANA.
The President's fiscal year 2005 budget does not request specific
appropriations for these three authorities, and therefore the
Department would need to reprogram funding to use them. This
underscores the importance of Congress increasing the Department's
General Transfer Authority (GTA) to $4 billion--which would still
represent just one percent of total DOD funding. Higher GTA also would
give us a greater ability to shift funds from less pressing needs to
fund must-pay bills and emerging requirements. As we have seen in the
past 3 years, such requirements have become a constant feature of our
military programs.
This administration looks forward to continuing to work with the
Members of Congress to help support our Armed Forces throughout the
world who are doing their part to make American and her people more
secure. Thank you.
Chairman Warner. Well, Mr. Secretary, we on this committee
have the highest regard for General Keane. I hope he is doing
well.
General Myers.
STATEMENT OF GEN. RICHARD B. MYERS, USAF, CHAIRMAN, JOINT
CHIEFS OF STAFF
General Myers. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, Senator Levin,
members of the committee. Once again I thank you for your
unwavering support of our Armed Forces and, more specifically,
our men and women in uniform as they fight this all-important
war on terrorism.
As Chairman Warner said, I just returned from visiting Iraq
and Afghanistan. Certainly, the spike in violence that we have
all seen in central Iraq over the last week is a challenge, no
doubt about it. We mourn every coalition soldier that we lose.
But I can assure you today that we are as firm as ever in
our resolve to help create a free, prosperous, a democratic
Iraq. The violent minority, a small marginal minority, cannot
be allowed to defeat the hopes of the Iraqi people. This is no
popular uprising. This violence is a desperate attempt by
frustrated, isolated groups, such as the insurgents in Fallujah
described by Secretary Wolfowitz and Sadr's thugs, to derail
the progress that we are making.
According to recent polls, as Secretary Wolfowitz said, the
majority of Iraqi people want Iraq to succeed and their are
positive about what the future holds, thanks in large part to
the efforts of our service men and women. I know you all are as
proud as I am of how well they are performing. They are so
tremendously dedicated. They understand their mission very
well. They also understand what a huge difference they are
making.
The contrast between our troops and the anti-coalition
forces they are fighting could not be greater. In Fallujah we
have seen the enemy unload weapons from ambulances, use mosques
as operating bases, deliberately put children in the line of
fire as human shields, and attack innocent civilians
indiscriminately by firing mortars into marketplaces. Our
service men and women, on the other extreme, are going to
extraordinary lengths to conduct the most humane operations
they can. That means at times we accept greater risk in order
to avoid civilian casualties.
Make no mistake, we are hitting the enemy very hard and we
are devastating them. But our troops are also very
compassionate. Their strength of character in the end I believe
will be a major factor in determining Iraq's future.
I see the same thing in Afghanistan as well, with 12
Provincial Reconstruction Teams now working on security and
civil affairs for the Afghani people.
Let me close by sharing a letter that a member of my staff
received from a private first class. This young man enlisted
after 1 year of college. In fact, he was in college on an ROTC
scholarship. But because after September 11 he saw an
opportunity to make a difference, he is now serving in one of
the more dangerous areas in central Iraq.
He describes how he went on a mission to look at the
structural integrity of some of the bridges. In the course of
the patrol, they talked to many of the Iraqis, especially the
children. They had their medical corpsman take care of the
children's medical problems. By the time they drove off,
everyone in the town was smiling and waving at them.
I will quote, and here is what he said: ``What I am trying
to say to you guys is this''--and ``you guys'' are his parents.
``We are making a difference here. An area smack dab in the
infamous Sunni Triangle, known for its ruthlessness, is
gradually, patrol by patrol, becoming safe and free.''
``Patrol by patrol,'' that means we still have a long way
to go in this war, beyond the transfer of sovereignty in Iraq,
as Secretary Wolfowitz said, and elections in Afghanistan. But
let us not forget that our troops are making a huge difference
every day, and they know it.
We are truly blessed with amazing men and women to do this
important work, and I include in there their families and for
the Reserve component, the Guard and the Reserve, the employers
who support them so well.
Again, I thank this committee for its strong support.
Chairman Warner. Thank you very much, General.
Mr. Grossman.
STATEMENT OF HON. MARC GROSSMAN, UNDER SECRETARY OF STATE FOR
POLITICAL AFFAIRS
Mr. Grossman. Mr. Chairman, Senator Levin, members of the
committee, thank you all for the opportunity to testify before
you today. Senator Warner, I thank you for putting my full
statement in the record, and I am pleased to summarize what I
have to say, I hope in a short way.
Before I begin, let me add my voice to the committee's and
to my fellows here at this table to pay tribute to all of
those, military and civilian, who are today serving our country
around the world and specifically in Iraq and in Afghanistan.
I also want to thank the committee for their support of the
State Department, because without your support and without
Congress's support we would not have been in a position a year
ago, 2 years ago, to do what we have had to do in Afghanistan
and Iraq, and I will talk a little bit more about that. But I
thank you in the very beginning for the strong support of
Congress for the Secretary's goals in making the Department an
effective institution.
I also would like to say, as you did, Mr. Chairman and
Senator Levin, that we are delighted with the President's
nomination yesterday of Ambassador Negroponte as our first
ambassador to the new Iraq and we look forward to his
confirmation hearings and his confirmation by the Senate. We
thank you for your words of support to Ambassador Negroponte.
Mr. Chairman, Senator Levin, in your letter of invitation
to me you asked me a series of questions about how the
transition was going to go between the CPA and a new embassy. I
wanted today to take a few minutes to talk about where we stand
in that transition and try, as specifically as I can, to answer
your questions.
First let me say that in my view we have the guidance we
need about how to do this. We have the direction we need about
what we are supposed to do. As I hope to convince you, we also
have a plan about how to move forward between now and June 30,
July 1, so that a U.S. embassy and a United States ambassador
representing the United States of America are there to
represent us in Iraq.
Our guidance obviously, Mr. Chairman, as you have quoted,
comes from the President. Our central commitment, he said last
Tuesday, is the transfer of sovereignty back to the Iraqi
people on June 30. It is important that we meet that deadline.
Our specific direction, as you can imagine, comes from
Secretary Powell and he has set as the goal of the State
Department to make sure that we are ready to take on this
responsibility on the 1st of July. I might also say how proud
we are of Lieutenant General Kicklighter and also Frank
Ricciardone who are spearheading this effort for us. Now
Ambassador Negroponte will come and join us and add effort and
add focus to this, to the effort that we are making.
I can tell you that the Secretary's involvement in our
transition planning continues daily. We send to the Secretary
each evening a report on what has gone on during the day to
move issues forward. We are also sending him a weekly
consolidated summary. To execute our plan we have obviously
been working closely with all of our interagency colleagues,
not just DOD and Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS). We have consulted
with Congress, with our allies, with our coalition partners, so
people know what it is that we are doing and how it is that we
are moving forward.
As an early step, one of the I think very best ideas of
Ambassador Ricciardone and General Kicklighter, the transition
planning team sent out very expert people to Iraq to try to
tell us what were the main sectors that needed to be dealt with
in this transition. They came up with 15, 16 sectors that we
are now moving forward on every day. These sectors are broken
down into individual tasks or milestones. Every one of them
needs to be accomplished.
Although we list on our major charts 15 or 16 of these
milestones, in fact the sectors relate to more than 500
milestones that we have. Just to show you that, we have a
series of charts that we are using to make sure that those with
the responsibility to do these jobs are doing them. Senator
Warner and Mr. Levin, I would invite members of the committee
or members of the committee staff to come and have a look at
these. They are all on the web and at the State Department on
our classified systems, and people are welcome to come and look
at them at any time and see how it is that we are doing.
There is responsibility, there is a completion date, there
is a desire to get these things done, and we intend to do them.
It is obviously a living document. New issues come up each day.
New responsibilities have to be assigned. But we are doing our
very best to keep to this plan.
I would like to take today, of these 15 or 16 items, 4 of
them just to talk about briefly. First, let me talk about
people. State Department officers, as both Ambassador Wolfowitz
and General Myers know, have been in Iraq from the very
beginning, with General Garner in the Office of Reconstruction
and Humanitarian Assistance (ORHA) and now under Jerry Bremer
in CPA.
We have 170 people in Iraq today. Like Secretary Wolfowitz
and General Myers, we are also immensely proud of our people's
work that is being done in Iraq. I can tell you that they have
come from dozens of Washington agencies, dozens of missions
overseas, foreign service, civil service, from brand-new
officers to sitting ambassadors.
The question we are asking ourselves now is how big will
this embassy be on the 1st of July, and one of the questions
you asked me in your letter of invitation. We the State
Department have so far announced positions for 142 Americans
employees and 155 locally-engaged staff. In addition, Secretary
Powell has written to all of his cabinet colleagues asking them
to identify the contributions that they wish to make to this
embassy, and to date he has received 10 replies for requests
for a presence in our mission in Baghdad, for a total of 254
Americans and 280 locally hired personnel, looking forward to
the fiscal year 2005.
Long-term, because these 10 are not the only people who
will look for representation at the mission, we look for a
total of between 350 and 400 permanently assigned Americans
from probably 12 or 15 cabinet agencies that will serve under
the chief of mission in Iraq. I would also note that a number
of people who work at CPA today we hope will also move under
the embassy and allow us to continue with the great expertise
that they have developed.
I can also report to you that, of this announced 142
positions for our new embassy at the State Department, we have
had over 200 bidders on these jobs. We have not had any problem
at all enticing people to be assigned to Iraq. Of the 142
positions that we have announced, we have assigned 97 people,
another 32 are pending, and we will have all of these people
assigned well in time to meet our obligations.
We also, Senators, are starting to begin the process to
hire locally hired people, Iraqis, which is a big challenge, as
you might imagine. But we have hired our initial Iraqi
employees and they are undergoing training here in Washington
so they can help us then hire more.
Mr. Chairman, one of the questions that is around and was
in your letter of invitation was what is going to be the
responsibility of the American ambassador there, given the
obviously large military role that will remain in Iraq after
the 1st of July. I can tell you that the American ambassador,
once confirmed by the Senate, will carry with him to Iraq a
letter from the President, as all our ambassadors carry letters
from the President, that spells clearly his authority.
It will say that he, as the chief of mission and personal
representative of the President reporting through the Secretary
of State, will have full responsibility for the direction,
coordination, and supervision of all United States Government
executive branch employees in Iraq, except those under command
of a U.S. area military commander or on the staff of an
international organization.
Of course, as Paul and I have talked about a lot, our
ambassador and our military commanders will need to work very
closely together. We do this around the world. We will be able
to do this successfully in Iraq.
Mr. Chairman, the second of these areas is security.
Obviously, our top priority is security. It was our top
priority before the last couple of weeks. It remains our top
priority and we have already begun the security upgrade of the
planned interim embassy buildings and have selected a site for
a future new embassy compound based largely on security
features.
We have 32 officers from the State Department's Diplomatic
Security Service already in Iraq to define the mission security
requirements and begin to meet them, as well as to help protect
CPA officers and visitors. Deputy Secretary Armitage and our
Assistant Secretary for Diplomatic Security were in Iraq over
the past few days to continue this consultation.
Iraq is, not just for our military colleagues, but for us
as well and for all of our civilian colleagues, a dangerous
place to work. Our people know that, but it is worth saying out
loud. Protecting our people in a wartime environment is
difficult, it is expensive, but we will continue to meet our
responsibilities.
Mr. Chairman, also in terms of a building, I have laid out
in my statement our plan for creating interim facilities for
the 1st of July and then our plan for building an embassy after
that. I just want you to know it is there and I am glad to talk
about it and we are glad to consult about it at any time.
Then finally is the question of finances, how much is it
going to cost and do we have the money. Let me just share with
you the current thinking on the financial resources needed to
ensure a smooth transition to Embassy Baghdad, and if I could
just emphasize as much as I can that the costs I report to you
today are a snapshot. They are where we are on April 20,
because we have some responsibilities to meet and we believe
that they will be costly, but we can meet them.
In order to open an embassy on the July 1, we have to, as I
said, meet basic security needs, technology needs, housing
needs, for our people. So far Congress has provided us money
with which to do some of this job. In fiscal year 2004, we have
$97 million for an interim embassy facility and interim
operations. In addition, we expect to have available, in the
fourth quarter, a portion of the operating expense budget
appropriated to the CPA--that is about $198 million--and
pursuant to the fiscal year 2004 supplemental, up to one
percent of the Iraqi Relief and Reconstruction Fund which could
be transferred, which is about $184 million.
We are also now working to determine the joint mission
costs, which I would say to you are going to be in the range of
$500 to $600 million for the balance of fiscal year 2004, and
how we will allocate those costs among the various embassies.
In addition, we are trying to figure out and look for the
amount of money that we need to move forward to operate our
mission in 2005, which could be on the order of a billion
dollars.
We are working closely with CPA, with the DOD, the Office
of Management and Budget, to refine these estimates. We look
forward to providing you as accurate information as we can and
we will consult with you and your colleagues before anything is
made final.
Mr. Chairman, I have talked in my statement a little bit
about Iraq's transition to sovereignty, but I think Deputy
Secretary Wolfowitz, with his charts and comments, has made
many of the comments that I would have wanted to, and also
about the Iraqi Interim Government.
Might I just jump, if I could, to talk for a moment about
the U.N. Security Council, since both you and the ranking
member had raised this issue. Obviously, we are looking to go
for another U.N. Security Council resolution. Both President
Bush and Secretary Powell have discussed this. We are now in a
conversation inside the administration about what kind of
resolution might be appropriate, how to go forward with it,
when to go forward with it, and the possible elements of that
resolution.
As you both said in your statements, the new resolution
should extend a hand to this new Iraqi government. It could
also deal in regularized reconstruction activities, including
the future of the Development Fund for Iraq; deal with the
continuing need for security to enable the Iraqi people to
complete the political process. It could encourage other
nations, as you both said, to get involved on both security and
reconstruction efforts. A new resolution could structure a role
for the U.N. in this new political framework, particularly in
supporting progress towards elections.
Mr. Chairman, you both, and the ranking member, talked
about Afghanistan. Let me just be brief, if I could, about
those two issues since I think they are extremely important and
we do need to keep paying attention to them. We have tried to
pursue a policy in Afghanistan that has to do with increased
security, reconstruction and economic growth, and the growth of
constitutional, democratic, and effective government.
These things are all related and as we move forward on one
and have success on one we believe that they will have positive
outcome on the others. As you both said, the challenges in
Afghanistan remain daunting and we need to pay particular
attention to them.
You asked me, in your letter, about elections. President
Karzai announced that elections for the presidency and the
lower house of parliament would take place in September, and we
are doing all we can to support the U.N. effort to help the
Afghans have a successful election. This announcement is
consistent with Afghanistan's new constitution, which said that
these parliamentary and presidential elections ought to be held
together.
As you said, there was the Bonn agreement, there was the
loya jirga of 2002, the constitutional loya jirga of 2004, and
we believe that we can make progress here toward these
elections.
The U.N. reports that about 1.8 million Afghans have
registered to vote as of last week, with registration so far
focused on urban centers, and the number will rise
significantly as people reach out to other Afghans. I would say
just parenthetically that 29 percent of registered voters are
women and that percentage is steadily rising, and over the past
2 weeks women have represented 39 percent of those registered.
Finally, a word about narcotics because, as you say, this
is a very important challenge to what we are doing in
Afghanistan. The narcotics production and trafficking is
probably the single most serious threat to our common mission
in Afghanistan and, just as you and the ranking member said,
all indicators point toward a significant increase in poppy
cultivation this year, and we should make no bones about that.
This is a real challenge that we are going to have to deal
with.
We are working with President Karzai. I know that you saw,
a couple of weeks ago at the Berlin conference, he called for a
``jihad against drug trafficking,'' and we are doing all we can
to fight this problem with him.
Mr. Chairman, in the carve-up of responsibilities in
Afghanistan, the United Kingdom has the lead on
counternarcotics initiatives and between the United Kingdom and
the United States, we now have a very comprehensive strategy to
try to deal with some of this problem. The United Kingdom's
efforts started this month and ours will start the beginning of
next month. We have put about $40 million extra into a
government-led eradication program. We are training teams to do
eradication. President Karzai has set the goal of eradicating
25 percent of the crop this year and we want to help him
succeed in meeting that goal.
Just let me end by saying that, although we have talked a
lot about Iraq here and Afghanistan has come at the end of your
statement and at the end of my statement, this is something we
are paying tremendous attention to and I would be glad to talk
about this and anything else in the question period.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Grossman follows:]
Prepared Statement by Hon. Marc Grossman
Mr. Chairman, Senator Levin, and members of the committee. I
appreciate the opportunity to come before the committee today.
Before I begin, I would like to pay tribute to the men and women
who are serving their country and the cause of freedom in Iraq.
Secretary Powell, Deputy Secretary Armitage and I are immensely proud
of the Americans--civilian and military--who demonstrate the highest
degree of dedication, determination and courage as they work to bring
security, democracy and prosperity to Iraq. I also want to thank our
many coalition partners for their steadfast support.
Thank you also for your support of the State Department.
I know that you saw the President's announcement yesterday of his
nomination of Ambassador John Negroponte to be the first Ambassador to
the new Iraq. We are delighted.
Before coming here today, I read closely the letter of invitation
from the committee. You had these questions: How are we going to ensure
a smooth transition from CPA to an Embassy? How are we going to put in
place the right people, resources and organizational structure to do
the work of the American people, without interruption, on July 1?
To what kind of Iraqi Government will the American ambassador be
accredited? What powers will that government have and how will it be
formed? What is the role of our coalition partners, the United Nations
(U.N.) and the international community in the weeks and months ahead?
These are the right questions. They are the same ones that we are
working through. We do not yet have all the answers. As Secretary
Powell said earlier this month to your colleagues here in Congress,
``Creating a democratic government in Iraq will be an enormous
challenge, but Ambassador Bremer--with the Iraqi Governing Council, the
United Nations and our coalition partners--is committed to success.''
What did the Secretary say next? ``When the State Department assumes
the lead role this summer in representing and managing U.S. interests
in Iraq, we will carry on that commitment. We're already thoroughly
involved, and we will succeed.''
We have the guidance we need, the direction required, and a plan
for a successful transition in Iraq. I am pleased to report today on
what we are doing to establish effective American representation in,
and support for, the new Iraq.
guidance, direction, plan
Our guidance comes from President Bush. He repeated it last Tuesday
night. ``One central commitment'' the President said of our mission to
liberate Iraq, ``is the transfer of sovereignty back to the Iraqi
people. We have set a deadline of June 30. It is important that we meet
that deadline. As a proud and independent people, Iraqis do not support
an indefinite occupation--and neither does America.''
The President went on to describe that day: ``On June 30, when the
flag of free Iraq is raised, Iraqi officials will assume full
responsibility for the ministries of government. On that day, the
Transitional Administrative Law, including a bill of rights that is
unprecedented in the Arab world, will take full effect. The United
States, and all the Nations of our coalition, will establish normal
diplomatic relations with the Iraqi government. An American embassy
will open, and an American ambassador will be posted.''
Our specific direction comes from Secretary Powell. The Secretary
has set the State Department in motion to support the President's goal
of a smooth transition on June 30.
After the Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA) and the Iraqi
Governing Council signed the November 15 Agreement and established the
June 30 transition date, the Secretary called Ambassador Francis
(Frank) Ricciardone back to Washington to head our transition team. In
his first day on the job, Ricciardone went to the Pentagon to meet with
his counterpart as the Iraq Transition Team leader for the Department
of Defense (DOD), LTG (ret.) Mick Kicklighter. Ricciardone and
Kicklighter head one interagency team.
Our interagency team has established a cell in Baghdad under
Ambassador John Holzman. Ambassador Holzman works on transition
planning and implementation in immediate consultation with CPA
Administrator Bremer and CJTF-7 Commander General Sanchez.
The Secretary's involvement in our transition planning continues
daily. Each evening we send the Secretary a consolidated summary of the
Department's transition-related activities for the day. The notes
demonstrate a broad range of interagency, bilateral and multilateral
requirements, and highlight issues to solve and those resolved. We also
provide the Secretary a more in-depth weekly report that highlights key
challenges and the steps we are taking to address them.
So, following the President's guidance and Secretary Powell's
direction, we have developed a plan to get us to--and through--June 30.
To execute our plan, we have and continue to work closely with our
interagency colleagues, and we consult regularly with Congress and
coalition partners in Baghdad, in Washington, and in capitals.
transition from cpa to embassy
We are proceeding in close coordination with our interagency
colleagues and with CPA. This chart demonstrates our path forward.
As an early step, the transition planning team established teams in
key sectors which we thought critical to ensuring a successful
transition on June 30. We also sent assessment teams to Iraq to examine
the situation on the ground and report their findings.
These sectors are listed on the chart behind me.
Each of these sectors is broken down into individual tasks or
milestones that need to be accomplished. The sectors actually represent
more than 500 milestones. Behind these milestones are individual tasks.
Responsibility for each task has been assigned to a particular
agency or office, and target completion dates have been established. As
you can see, there is a great deal of green in the individual tasks'
matrix. This is a living, working document.
In the personnel sector, for example, there are 26 individual
milestones that have been identified to date. All but four are
``green,'' indicating that they are either completed or on schedule. On
the chart, however, the personnel sector is still yellow. We are going
to remain conservative in our planning, recognizing that there is no
room to ``round up'' in this exercise.
We at the State Department are glad to brief you or your staff on
any of the tasks represented here. Let me offer full access to our
Transition Planning Team intranet website to any of your staff willing
to visit us in the Department of State and use computers with access to
our intranet.
Today, I would like to spend a few minutes going into some detail
on our planning and progress in four key sectors of transition
planning: people, security, buildings, and money.
people
State Department officers have been in Iraq from the beginning,
alongside Jay Garner and ORHA and under Jerry Bremer and CPA. We have
more than 170 people in Iraq today. These men and women have come from
Washington and dozens of missions overseas, Foreign Service and Civil
Service, from our newest Junior Officers to sitting Ambassadors. We are
proud of their professionalism and sense of service.
How big will our new Embassy in Baghdad be?
The State Department has announced positions for 142 American
employees and 155 locally engaged staff.
In addition, in January of this year, the Secretary asked his
Cabinet colleagues to identify contributions their agencies might offer
in Iraq. To date, 10 agencies have requested a presence in Embassy
Baghdad for a total of 254 American and 280 locally hired personnel for
fiscal year 2005. Long term, we estimate a total of 350-400 permanently
assigned Americans from some 12-15 agencies, other than State, will
serve under the Chief of Mission in Iraq.
A number of CPA staff will continue after July 1 in a temporary
capacity under Chief of Mission authority to ensure the continuity of
the transition process and support Iraq reconstruction efforts. The
transition team, working closely with CPA, is currently identifying the
number of staff that will carryover.
Thanks to the eagerness of so many State Department people to
volunteer for service in Iraq, we have made excellent progress in
assigning them to the future Embassy. More than 200 people have
requested to be assigned to the new Embassy--many of whom have already
served in Iraq. Of the 142 Foreign Service positions announced to date
for Embassy Baghdad, we have formally assigned 97 people. Thirty-two
more assignments are pending.
We have also already begun interviewing for the local hire
positions, and have hired our first employees. These first hires are
undergoing training here in Washington in order to prepare to help us
hire others for service in the Embassy. In the short run, however,
pending the Embassy's ability to bring on all the direct-hire Iraqi
personnel that we ultimately will need, the Embassy will rely on Iraqi
and third country staff now under the U.S. Army's ``Logcap'' contract
to provide many basic support services.
We have heard questions about the role of the American ambassador,
given the large military presence that will remain in Iraq after July
1.
The American ambassador, once confirmed by the Senate, will carry
with him to Iraq a letter from the President--as all our Ambassadors
do--that spells out clearly his authority in Iraq. It will say that he,
as the Chief of Mission and personal representative of the President,
reporting through the Secretary of State, will have full responsibility
for the direction, coordination, and supervision of all United States
Government executive branch employees in Iraq, regardless of their
employment categories or location, except those under command of a U.S.
area military commander or on the staff of an international
organization.
Of course, the Ambassador and the military commander will have to
work closely together to ensure that their respective operations are
fully coordinated and best serve the interests of the United States in
Iraq.
One last comment on State personnel. The response from the
professional men and women in the State Department has been exemplary.
Many of those who have asked to serve in the new embassy have already
served in Iraq over the past year. Without the additional personnel
made possible through congressional support for the Diplomatic
Readiness Initiative, we would have been unable to provide this kind of
support to CPA, or be in such good shape heading for June 30.
We look for your continued support to ensure that new requirements
like Iraq are permanently funded to ensure the personnel resources
remain available to respond to crises.
security
Our top priority is to keep our people safe. This is a dangerous
mission. We have already begun the security upgrade of the planned
interim Embassy buildings, and have selected a site for a future new
embassy compound based largely on its security features. We have 51
armored vehicles in Iraq and another 98 are on order. These vehicles
have already saved American and Iraqi lives.
Thirty-two Diplomatic Security (DS) staff are already in Iraq to
define the Mission's security requirements and to begin to meet them--
as well as to help protect CPA officers and visitors.
There are difficult questions related to security still to be
answered. The Deputy Secretary and Diplomatic Security Assistant
Secretary Frank Taylor were just in Baghdad to keep trying to answer
these questions.
Iraq is, and for some time will remain, a dangerous place to live
and work. Protecting our people in a wartime environment is difficult
and expensive, but we must continue to spare no effort or expense to
meet this challenge.
buildings
Director of Overseas Building Operations Chuck Williams traveled to
Baghdad in February to complete plans for interim and potential
permanent mission facilities. We have identified a building in the
green zone to serve as the Embassy from July 1 until a more permanent
facility can be established. This building, which we refer to as the
temporary Chancery, is already under renovation and will be ready for
occupancy in advance of the transition.
The temporary Chancery will serve as the office of the Ambassador
and a limited number of staff. In addition, until we build a new
Embassy compound, we will continue to use the former Republican Palace,
where CPA is currently located, for most non-public operations, and we
will continue to use the current residence that is being occupied by
Administrator Bremer.
Most embassy employees will be housed in trailers currently being
occupied by CPA personnel. We have already contracted for an additional
75 trailer units to accommodate 150 personnel to ensure that we have
adequate and appropriate space to house our staff until permanent
facilities can be established.
The location of our temporary and potential permanent Embassy sites
are noted on this photograph of central Baghdad. We have begun the
planning process to develop a new American Embassy facility.
financial outlook
Finally, I would like to share our current thinking on the fiscal
resources needed to ensure a smooth transition to Embassy Baghdad, and
the continued operation of the mission thereafter.
I need to emphasize that the costs I report to you today are only a
snapshot.
In order to open an Embassy on July 1, we must meet basic security
needs and must make an investment in technology and communications
equipment. Congress has provided in fiscal year 2004 $97 million for an
interim embassy facility and interim operations. In addition, we expect
to have available the fourth quarter portion of the operating expense
budget appropriated for the CPA ($195.8 million), and, pursuant to the
fiscal year 2004 supplemental, up to 1 percent of the Iraq Relief and
Reconstruction Fund, available for transfer ($184 million).
The State Department must be prepared to cover both its initial
start-up and operating expenses, as well as follow-on costs from the
CPA to assure continuity of operations. There are significant
challenges in the funding demands that we are working are way through,
and it is clear that we will need to make sure that all agencies cover
their respective share of joint costs.
We are now working to determine those joint mission costs which may
be in the range of $500-$600 million for the balance of fiscal year
2004 and how those costs will be allocated among agencies. In addition,
we estimate that the costs in fiscal year 2005 to operate the U.S.
mission could exceed $1 billion. We are working closely with CPA, DOD,
and Office of Management and Budget (OMB) to refine these estimates and
will provide you as much accurate information as quickly as we can. We
will consult with you and your colleagues before anything is finalized.
iraq's transition to sovereignty
Let me speak briefly about the political process in Iraq, and the
restoration of Iraqi self-government on June 30.
Here, too, our guidance and direction is clear. The President, on
the night he announced the start of Operation Iraqi Freedom, March 19,
2003 said: ``We come to Iraq with respect for its citizens, for their
great civilization and for the religious faiths they practice. We have
no ambition in Iraq, except to remove a threat and restore control of
that country to its own people.''
The plan for restoring Iraqi sovereignty is laid out in the
November 15 agreement. That agreement, signed by CPA and the Iraqi
Governing Council, called for a Transitional Administrative Law,
encompassing a basic bill of rights for all Iraqis. The agreement
called for the selection of an interim Iraqi government to oversee the
preparation of national elections, and the transfer of governing
authority to the interim government by June 30, 2004. The agreement
established a timeline for national elections, the drafting and
ratification of a new constitution and the election of a government
under that constitution by December 31, 2005.
There have been changes since November 15. But the basic framework
and timeline still holds.
transitional administrative law
The first step was the Governing Council's unanimous agreement on
the Transitional Administrative Law (TAL) nearly 2 months ago. This
marked an important achievement. As Secretary Powell said on March 8,
``Just imagine the impact that this document is going to have, not only
in Iraq but in that part of the world. The rights of all citizens, to
include women, committing this Arab nation to democracy; a free and
independent judiciary; the military firmly under civilian controls.''
The TAL provides for equal rights for all Iraqis, without regard to
gender, sect, opinion, belief, nationality, religion or origin. It
confirms Iraq as a single state with Federal structures, affirms
civilian control of the Iraqi security services and the independence of
the judiciary. Finally, the TAL establishes the general framework for
national elections by January 31, 2005, the drafting of a permanent
constitution by August 15, 2005 and the transition to a
constitutionally-based post-transition Iraqi government by December 31,
2005.
the iraqi interim government
Following the U.N. Secretary General's February 23 report and the
signing of the TAL on March 8, the Governing Council on March 17 asked
the U.N. to return to Iraq to advise and assist on forming the Iraqi
Interim Government and preparing for elections for the Transitional
National Assembly. On April 5, Ambassador Brahimi returned to Iraq to
resume intensive consultations with Iraqis for this purpose.
As President Bush said last Friday, ``We welcome the proposals
presented by the U.N. Special Envoy Brahimi. He's identified a way
forward to establishing an interim government that is broadly
acceptable to the Iraqi people. We thank the U.N. and Secretary General
Annan for helping Iraqis secure a future of freedom. We're grateful
that Mr. Brahimi will soon return to Iraq to continue his important
work.''
In our consultations with the U.N. and Iraqis, we have made clear
that while Ambassador Brahimi and Iraqis will chose the specific
formula for the interim government, there are fundamental criteria that
must be met.
First, the interim government should represent the diversity of
Iraq.
Second, it should not have a law-making body. The structure of the
government should be effective, simple and, in order to avoid deadlock
in the interim period, should not be overly large.
Third, the process of selecting the government should be as simple
as possible.
Fourth, the interim government should have the necessary
authorities to lead Iraq into the community of nations, undertake
agreements to push forward economic reconstruction, and prepare the
country for elections.
We were pleased by the sketch Ambassador Brahimi provided of his
proposed way forward and believe his idea fits well with our vision.
Ambassador Brahimi envisions establishing by mid-May an interim
government led by a Prime Minister that also includes a President and
two deputy presidents. A council of ministers would report to the Prime
Minister. An Advisory Body, selected in July by a National Conference,
would serve alongside the Executive but have no legislative authority.
We look forward to further discussions with Iraqis and in New York
with the Secretary General as we consider the way forward. We also look
forward to Ambassador Brahimi's return to Iraq in the weeks ahead to
continue consultations with Iraqis countrywide.
I would also highlight Ambassador Brahimi's statement regarding the
central importance of elections. We agree. In fact, the call for
national elections in early 2005 was a key part of the November 15
agreement.
In this regard, we are grateful for the continued work of the U.N.
election team, headed by Carina Perelli. The team has been in Baghdad
since late March and is working closely with our officials and experts
to accelerate election preparations. As Ms. Perelli has said, the
timeline for elections by January 2005 is very tight. A top priority
remains establishing an independent Election Commission as soon as
possible. We look forward to further discussions with the U.N. on the
way ahead.
unscr
President Bush and Secretary Powell have both discussed a new U.N.
Security Council resolution on Iraq. We are considering what kind of
resolution might be appropriate and are looking at possible elements
that would be in the resolution. For example, a new resolution could
extend a hand to a new Iraqi government. It could deal with
reconstruction activities, including the future of the Development Fund
for Iraq and with the continuing need for security to enable the Iraqi
people to complete the political process. It could encourage other
nations to get involved on both the security and reconstruction
efforts. A new resolution could structure a role for the United Nations
in the new political framework, particularly in supporting the process
towards elections.
july 1
So, as I sit before you on April 20, what do I think Iraq will look
like on July 1? There will be an American ambassador, running a large
but recognizable Embassy. His highly experienced deputy chief of
mission and country team will include representatives from a broad
range of USG agencies. There will still be more than 100,000 U.S.
troops on the ground, helping provide security and train Iraqi army and
police forces. When the Ambassador drives off to call on Iraqis, he
will be meeting with the Prime Minister and the President of a
sovereign Iraq.
But our work will not be complete. Iraq will still be in
transition; elections will need to be held; a permanent constitution
will need to be drafted; economic reconstruction will remain
unfinished. The United States is committed until we reach our
objective--a democratic, prosperous Iraq governed by a duly-elected,
representative government, at peace with itself and its neighbors.
We have guidance; we have direction; we have a plan. We are already
executing that plan.
afghanistan
I would also like to take a moment to address your questions
regarding the political developments in Afghanistan and the threat
posed by increased levels of poppy cultivation and narcotics
trafficking.
On the occasion of President Karzai's visit to Washington in
February 2003, President Bush joined President Karzai in reaffirming
their common vision for an Afghanistan that is prosperous, democratic,
respectful of human rights, and at peace. The two Presidents pledged to
work together to ensure that Afghanistan is never again a haven for
terrorists.
The Secretary of State has worked closely with others in the
Cabinet--and with support from Congress--in making the President's
vision a reality. When he was in Kabul last month, the Secretary
repeated our long-standing commitment to rebuild Afghanistan and help
establish a democracy that the international community and every Afghan
can be proud of.
With guidance from the President and direction from the Secretary
of State, we have developed a three-fold, integrated plan for
Afghanistan. Carried out under the guidance of Ambassador Zalmay
Khalilzad in Kabul, our strategy focuses on security, reconstruction
and good governance.
Improved security will create conditions for
accelerated reconstruction and stronger government;
Reconstruction and economic growth will boost
stability and confidence in the government by giving Afghans a
stake in a peaceful future and evidence that their leaders can
deliver on their promises; and
The growth of constitutional, democratic, and
effective government will create a political arena for the
resolution of differences and discredits those who would return
Afghanistan to the violence of the past.
While the challenges in Afghanistan remain daunting, we have made
real progress on all three tracks of this strategy.
On the security track, the Afghan National Army is already
deploying to regional hotspots, reasserting the role of the central
government, and the Afghans are well on the way to fielding 20,000
newly trained police officers. We and our friends in NATO will continue
to contribute on the security front. Just last month in Brussels, NATO
reiterated that Afghanistan would remain its number one priority.
On the reconstruction track, we are continuing to focus on
rebuilding the road network linking major cities as well as on building
schools, clinics and irrigation systems, and creating the environment
for investment, job creation and economic growth.
With respect to democratic governance, I am happy to report that
Afghanistan's regional leaders are beginning to focus less on their
militias and more on how to compete in a democratic political process.
Let me now briefly turn to two specific areas that the committee
noted in your letter of invitation: elections and counternarcotics.
elections
Last month President Karzai announced that elections for the
presidency and the lower house of parliament would take place in
September. This announcement is consistent with Afghanistan's new
constitution, which calls for ``best efforts'' to ensure that
Parliamentary and Presidential elections are concurrent.
Afghanistan has already passed three major milestones on the road
to constitutional democracy:
The Bonn Agreement of December 2001 set an agreed
framework for political reconstruction.
The Emergency Loya Jirga of June 2002 inaugurated a
representative government, with President Hamid Karzai as
President and all major ethnic groups represented.
The Constitutional Loya Jirga, on January 4, 2004,
approved Afghanistan's first nationally mandated constitution
in 40 years--a constitution that Afghans can be proud of and
that can provide a solid foundation on which to build the
functioning elements of a stable democracy.
Elections are now the fourth major milestone, and we are committed
to working with the Afghans to ensure that they too are successful.
The U.N. reports that 1.8 million Afghans have registered to vote
as of last week, with the registration effort focused on urban centers.
The number will rise significantly in coming months with the onset of
Phase 2 registration where registration teams fan out into every
district--to reach men and women of every ethnic group of Afghanistan.
U.N. data show that many Afghans are traveling significant distances to
register--a sign of the people's enthusiasm for democracy.
About 29 percent of registered voters are women, and that
percentage is steadily rising as the registration process continues.
Over the last 2 weeks, women have represented 39 percent of those
registering.
Meanwhile, efforts are underway to register political parties, pass
an elections law, and put in place the necessary logistics and security
to carry out the elections in September. A massive voter education
effort is also moving forward.
Some 350,000 Afghan men and women have participated in civic
education meetings and millions of posters and leaflets have been
distributed. In coming months, over 1,200 civic education workers will
be in all provinces working side by side with partners in the NGO
community.
Most Afghans have never voted and have had no direct exposure to
democracy, so this will be a learning experience for the country. It is
essential that the election not only perform the function of selecting
leaders, but that it set the stage for future elections by giving
Afghans an authentic experience of democracy. Equally as important is
providing a credible electoral process that the world can point to as
an unqualified success. This requires dedication and resources.
The U.N. estimates that $224 million will be needed in all, of
which approximately $160 million has been provided or pledged to date.
The United States accounts for over $50 million--almost one third--of
what has been contributed to date.
counternarcotics
Narcotics production and trafficking is probably the single most
serious threat to our common mission in Afghanistan. All indicators
point toward a significant increase in poppy cultivation since last
year.
We continue to work closely with President Karzai and members of
his government, and they are firmly committed to fighting the drug
industry in their country. Two weeks ago President Karzai called for a
``jihad'' against drug trafficking. He views drugs as a key factor in
supporting corruption, the warlord militias and other key challenges
facing Afghanistan. As he said at the recent donors conference in
Berlin, ``the fight against drugs is the fight for Afghanistan.''
We are working closely with the United Kingdom, which has the lead
on counternarcotics initiatives in Afghanistan. We have a comprehensive
strategy that includes integrating eradication, building law
enforcement and interdiction capacity, and alternative development.
Crop eradication initiatives supported by the United Kingdom are
underway in coordination with provincial governors.
Next month the United States will begin implementing a nearly $40
million central government-led eradication program, using a 150-member
eradication team that will manually destroy poppy crops. An additional
three 150-member teams will be trained and deployed by mid-June.
Combined with the eradication conducted by provincial governors, we are
striving for a goal of destroying 25 percent of the crop this year.
In Afghanistan, too, we have guidance and direction from the
President and Secretary of State. We have developed a plan in
cooperation with our many allies on the ground to help build an
Afghanistan that is prosperous, democratic, respectful of human rights,
and at peace. We will stay the course to ensure that Afghanistan is
never again a haven for terrorists.
With that I will be pleased to take your questions. Thank you.
Chairman Warner. Thank you very much, Mr. Secretary.
We will now proceed to a round of 6 minutes for each
member.
My question is going to come down to one sentence after I
make a preliminary observation. What is the status of the
American GI on the morning of July 1, 2004? I am going to
assume that there is an Iraqi Interim Government in place
following the procedure that you have alluded to today. I would
like to know, what is the probability of the status of forces
agreement likewise being in place and what are the guidelines
that will be followed in writing that up?
By way of background, I make the following observations. We
are using interchangeably now the terms that on July 1, 2004,
there will be a transfer of power to the Iraqi Interim
Government. Others, including the President, have said there
will be a transfer of sovereignty. Well, the word
``sovereignty'' can mean everything.
So I would like to know, who is going to give that GI the
orders and what is he expected to do? Now, we have the
Transitional Administrative Law (TAL) which says as follows:
Iraqi Armed Forces will be, ``a principal partner in the
multinational force operating in Iraq under a unified command
pursuant to United Nations Security Council Resolution 1511.''
So I go to that, and that is very generalized. By the way,
that was dated October 16, 2003, and an awful lot of
developments have occurred since that time. But it generally
says, authorizes a multinational force under a unified command
to take all the necessary means to contribute to the
maintenance of security and stability in Iraq, and so forth and
so forth.
I think this has to be updated and clarified, and to the
extent that you can advise this committee this morning--and I
put the question to all witnesses: Who is going to give the
orders to the security forces on June 30, 2004, and should
there be a difference of views between, say, the U.S. military
commanders as to what should be done to meet whatever
contingencies may arise on June 30, 2004, and thereafter, who
is going to reconcile those differences between the
professional military and a brand-new government that will have
been in office for but a day?
Mr. Secretary, can you lead off?
Secretary Wolfowitz. I will and I am sure that General
Myers and Ambassador Grossman can supplement here.
The question you ask obviously is a crucial one. We have
spent a lot of time studying it. I would emphasize it is not a
unique situation. We went through transition to a sovereign
government in Afghanistan, as I noted earlier, in December
2001. We have been operating with our forces in Bosnia with a
sovereign government since the Dayton Accords of 1995. Indeed,
if you look around the world there are many, many countries
where you have sovereign governments and American forces under
American military commanders, not the least Korea.
Each one of these cases is different. In the case of Iraq,
the principal authority is in fact the authority that you
cited, provided by----
Chairman Warner. I beg your pardon? The what is?
Secretary Wolfowitz. In the case of Iraq, the principal
authority is the authority in U.N. Security Council Resolution
1511, which creates a multinational force to provide for
security in Iraq until a permanent constitutional government is
established, which would be the end of next year; and that that
force is under the command of an American commander.
As you also noted, the Transitional Administrative Law
(TAL) has the Iraqi Governing Council placing Iraqi forces
under that command, as part of that command. In fact, Iraq is
one of the most important, if not the most important, members
of that coalition force. That provides enormous authority and
discretion to our commanders.
Should there be another U.N. Security Council resolution--
and I think Ambassador Grossman can comment on the likelihood;
I think it is very likely--we would, I assume, either continue
that authority or specify it in any further detail if it were
necessary or useful.
Further, we have CPA Order No. 17, I believe it is, that
goes into more detail about the rights and privileges and
immunities that pertain to foreign forces providing for
security in Iraq.
Finally, after an elected government, transitional elected
government, takes power, takes office next January, and only
then----
Chairman Warner. Excuse me, Mr. Secretary. We can get to
January. I am still worried that, say there is a major
insurrection that occurs early on in July and our military
commanders have to decide to the extent that force must be
applied. We have seen recently in the Fallujah operations where
there has been some honest differences of opinion between
members of the Iraqi Governing Council, the current governing
body, and our military commanders as to the timing, the
quantum, and the use of force.
Fortunately, as you say, Fallujah may be taking on a
brighter status here if these negotiations continue to be
fruitful. But given military operations, you cannot sit down
and deliberate over an extensive period of time what to do. You
have to react and react very swiftly.
If you are going to give them sovereignty and at the same
time our military commander, as I believe you are saying, has
the authority to make those decisions as to how to apply force,
I see a basic conflict of interest here.
Secretary Wolfowitz. But Mr. Chairman, the issue, as I
think your comment correctly implies, is political, not legal.
We have that issue today with a different legal framework. The
use of force in someone else's country has always got potential
political ramifications and political controversy. We have had
this on numerous occasions with President Karzai's government
in Afghanistan, and the answer there is you have to be prepared
to discuss, to negotiate, and also at the end of the day to use
the authority that is granted to us.
That I would say describes the way we are proceeding in
Fallujah. It is the way we will have to proceed until such time
as Iraq is fully in control of whatever forces are there.
General Myers, do you want to?
Chairman Warner. The safety and welfare of the American GI
may be at risk in a matter of hours if there is indecision and
a lack of, I think, specific authority as to who can make what
decisions.
General, can you address this?
General Myers. Sure. I do not think I am going to say
anything different than what the Secretary said, but there is
nobody that believes, Iraqi or coalition, that on July 1 the
security situation is going to dramatically change. It is going
to be what it is and it is going to go over the transition.
Chairman Warner. Right. Let us hope it improves.
General Myers. Certainly, certainly.
Chairman Warner. That is a goal.
General Myers. But from June 30 to July 1 we do not--there
is not going to be a change to the security situation, nor in
the responsibility of the coalition forces, as outlined in the
U.N. Security Council Resolution 1511, which is the basis for
our action even today and will be the basis for our action in
the future, if we do not get a new U.N. Security Council
resolution, and I will let Secretary Grossman speak to that.
The way we have structured our military forces for the
post-1 July period is to have a partnership with Iraqi forces
that goes from the tactical level all the way up to the
political level in Iraq, to the ministry of interior, to the
ministry of defense. The command and control, the command post
that we will have set up, will be in partnership with Iraqi
security forces, and that is the way it is set up.
I do not see a problem with our authorities right now,
given the TAL, given the CPA mandates, and the U.N. Security
Council resolution we just talked about. Our forces will have
the authority and the wherewithal to do what they need to do to
provide security, as they must, for Iraq.
Chairman Warner. So irrespective of the word total
``sovereignty'' or power turn over, General Abizaid or his
deputies can make the decision to use or not to use force in
their own judgment? They may consult the government, but it is
their decision as to how, when, and where to apply force?
General Myers. That is correct. As I said, I mentioned the
word ``partnership.'' As we proceed down this path, we want
this to be more of a partnership.
Chairman Warner. But partners disagree and you cannot have
a lot of disagreement.
General Myers. Right. But I said in the end--or I was going
to say, in the end, Mr. Chairman, we are going to have to do
what we have to do.
Chairman Warner. Secretary Grossman, do you agree?
General Myers. We think we have the authority to do that as
well.
Secretary Wolfowitz. Just as we do in Afghanistan, for
example, or in Bosnia.
Mr. Grossman. I have nothing to add except to say, as both
have invited me to, I certainly believe we will be seeking a
new U.N. Security Council resolution, and one of the elements
of it will be to see if we cannot just maintain our authorities
under 1511, but see if we can get others to join us in carrying
them out.
Chairman Warner. So we transfer sovereignty, but the
military decisions continue to reside indefinitely in the
control of the American commander; is that correct?
General Myers. That is correct.
Chairman Warner. Senator Levin.
Senator Levin. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
General Myers, what options are you looking at should we
need an increase in the number of U.S. troops in Iraq?
General Myers. We have done a scrub of forces that could be
available essentially immediately, in the next few weeks to the
next couple of months, in case we need more forces. We have a
fairly extensive list of those forces and the support that goes
with them, and in the closed session I would be happy to talk
in a little bit more detail. But we have done that look. That
has been presented to Secretary Rumsfeld, and we are going to
continue to refine that list as we look at those forces.
Obviously, we have set ourselves some administrative
guidelines to try to protect time home back from overseas and
so forth and we are looking at that. But we do have forces that
have been identified.
Senator Levin. Has the Third Infantry Division been alerted
about the possibility of an earlier redeployment to Iraq than
had been earlier planned?
General Myers. Sir, I will check. Senator Levin, I will
check. I do not have that list in front of me. Like I say, I
will do it in the closed session. I do not think so. I do not
think the Third I.D. has been alerted.
Senator Levin. Now, prior to the war there was a joint
staff assessment as to the number of U.S. forces that would be
needed or expected to be needed 1 year after the commencement
of Operation Iraqi Freedom. What was that assessment?
General Myers. The only assessment I know of is that there
was an assessment done by Central Command, I think before
combat operations began, which had in September 2003 said: Here
is what we think the troop strength is going to be. This is
from the field commander at the time, and as I recall that
number was somewhere around 60,000.
I do not know--I will tell you personally I did not believe
that number was correct, and I do not know that many of the
Joint Chiefs believed that number was correct. But that was the
number on a chart that I recall. I do not know how long that
was the number that anybody was standing up to. That is the
only number I can ever remember seeing, sir.
Senator Levin. When you say you did not believe it was
correct, you mean that it was too low?
General Myers. I thought it was too low, sure.
Senator Levin. Secretary Wolfowitz and Secretary Grossman,
the U.N. is attempting to work out a process through Mr.
Brahimi where the Iraqis will reach a consensus on the form of
the entity to whom sovereignty is to be restored on June 30. It
is important that that deadline be met. I think everybody
acknowledges that, since it has now been set and it is very
clearly the expectation. But the challenge is immense in order
to put the pieces together and to get a broad consensus in Iraq
among its people for such a sovereign government.
We are talking about a sovereign government, a government
to which sovereignty is going to be restored. It is going to
make critical decisions about who will draft a constitution for
the people of Iraq and other critical decisions.
Now, I asked Kofi Annan last week if the pieces cannot be
put together by June 30, then what? Is there a plan B? He said
there is no time for a plan B; the only alternative would be
for the Governing Council to continue until an interim
government, which has broad support of the people of Iraq can
be put together.
Now, we hope that Mr. Brahimi will succeed in putting
together that consensus. But if he does not, does the
administration have a plan for what to do?
Secretary Wolfowitz. Senator Levin, I think it is important
to understand what this interim government is empowered to do
and what it is not----
Senator Levin. I wonder if I could just interrupt you,
because my time is running out. If you could just----
Secretary Wolfowitz. It is not in fact picking the people
to write the constitution----
Senator Levin. I do not care. I am not asking you what is
in the plan.
Secretary Wolfowitz. Its main role is to establish a
framework for elections so that the government, the
transitional government that comes in in January, is an elected
government.
Senator Levin. I understand that. But that plan for a
government will draft a constitution, the government that it
drafts the plan for. But my question is----
Secretary Wolfowitz. No, it will not. It will provide
elections for a group that then----
Senator Levin. I agree, I agree with that. My question to
you is this: If the pieces cannot be put together by June 30,
does the administration have a plan for what it would then do?
That is my only question. Either you have a plan or you do not.
I know you do not want it to happen. Nobody does.
Ambassador Brahimi does not want it to happen. Kofi Annan does
not want it to happen. Everybody wants that interim government
to be established by the people of Iraq, presumably, that will
have the broad support of people. But if the pieces cannot be
put together, my simple question is does the administration
have a plan?
Secretary Wolfowitz. There are certainly ways to proceed if
it cannot be done by July 1. But the reason for keeping so much
pressure on July 1 is, as I said earlier, it will improve the
security situation in the country enormously if people stop
thinking of themselves as occupied, if they have some
confidence, as we have been able to build out of the Bonn
process in Afghanistan that Mr. Brahimi also led, the sense
that there is a road to full and complete elected
constitutional government.
But this is a 6-month interim appointed group based on a
consensus that hopefully Ambassador Brahimi will be able to
distill out of his many discussions in the country.
Senator Levin. Thank you. It is important not just because
it will devise a plan for elections for people who will draft a
constitution, but for the reasons that the chairman and I have
mentioned before, is that a sovereign country may be able to
change the status of forces. Those are our forces and we have
to make sure that they have the military authority to act and
that if we put in place a sovereign government that means that
they presumably would have sovereignty to decide what troops
can do in their own country. That raises significant issues. I
do not want to go beyond what you have already said.
Secretary Wolfowitz. Actually, Senator, that sovereignty is
limited by the U.N. Security Council resolution that arranges
for the security issues, as I said to Senator Warner.
Senator Levin. Thank you. One other question. In response
to my request from November of last year, Under Secretary Feith
promised in February that he would provide me with numerous
documents produced by the Office of Special Plans and the
Policy Counterterrorism Evaluation Group. I have still not
received the documents that he promised and I would ask that
you intervene and get me those documents with him.
But relative to the Feith office, in August and September
of 2002, Under Secretary Feith presented a briefing to the
Secretary of Defense and then after that it was presented by
Under Secretary Feith to the National Security Council staff
and the staff of the Vice President, and this is relative to a
relationship, the extent of it, between Iraq and al Qaeda.
It was a briefing which was very critical of the CIA,
disagreeing with the CIA's assessment that there was not a
strong relationship or a clear relationship between al Qaeda
and Iraq.
My question to you is this: Were you aware of the fact that
that briefing was being given to the staff of the National
Security Council (NSC) and the Office of the Vice President and
that the CIA was not aware of the fact that the briefing was
being given to the Vice President, the Vice President's office,
and to the staff of the NSC?
Secretary Wolfowitz. I can no longer recall whether I was
aware or not. There is nothing unusual, Senator Levin, about
different staffs in the government discussing material, and the
material under discussion was in fact material generated by the
CIA. The issue was how to assess various intelligence reports
produced by the CIA. Essentially the same briefing was
presented, I believe, previously to a collection of CIA
analysts.
Senator Levin. It was a very different briefing in a very
critical respect.
Secretary Wolfowitz. There was one slide that was
different, Senator; that is all.
Senator Levin. That one slide was highly critical of the
CIA.
Secretary Wolfowitz. That one slide listed some assumptions
that Mr. Feith's staff thought were at issue. One of those
assumptions it seems to me in fact has been proven out to be
wrong. That was the assumption that, because bin Laden was a
secularist--excuse me--an Islamist and Saddam a secularist,
they were incapable of cooperating. We have since seen
evidence--in fact, there was evidence, it turns out, in the
sealed indictment of Osama bin Laden issued in February of 1998
that said that bin Laden and Saddam had concluded an agreement
not to attack one another and to cooperate with each other.
So I think it was perfectly appropriate to ask the question
whether one should analyze these reports on the basis of an
assumption which in fact has turned out to be a false
assumption.
Senator Levin. But you were not aware, in any event, of the
fact--you do not remember whether you were aware that the
briefing to the Vice President's office and the NSC staff was
being made without the knowledge of the CIA?
Secretary Wolfowitz. I think it overstates it to--first of
all, there is nothing unusual about staff talking to each
other. The only thing----
Senator Levin. I am just asking, you do not remember
whether you were aware of it? That is my question.
Secretary Wolfowitz. I do not remember, but it is also not
the dramatic event that I think you are describing.
Senator Levin. There were additional slides to the one that
you made reference to.
Secretary Wolfowitz. One additional slide and I think I
have described it.
Chairman Warner. We thank you, Mr. Secretary. Thank you
very much.
Senator Allard.
Senator Allard. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
I would like to thank the panel for giving us an update
this morning. There have been some who have suggested that what
is happening in Iraq has a lot of parallels with what was
happening in Vietnam, Secretary Wolfowitz. For the life of me,
I feel I do not see hardly any correlation at all. I am curious
to know how you respond to those who try and characterize our
efforts in Iraq as that similar to what happened in Vietnam?
Secretary Wolfowitz. I am with Senator McCain. I think
there is no comparison at all, except I guess it is important
to say that our soldiers fought with enormous courage in
Vietnam as well and the enemy's people would be better off
today if they had won.
But I think, as I have said in my statement, I think one
enormous difference--and I hope the killers out there, the
enemies of democracy in Iraq, have gotten this message--is that
the debate in this country is not about whether to abandon
Iraq; the debate is about whether to keep 135,000 troops there
or to add more troops. That is really where the issue lies.
The other huge difference is that, without being an
apologist for Ho Chi Minh or his Viet Cong, they at least made
credible pretensions to doing something for the Vietnamese
people. The people that we are fighting in Iraq today are a
combination of killers who abused and tortured that country for
35 years and newcomers, some from outside, some from inside,
like Mr. Zarqawi, who makes abundantly clear in this infamous
letter that we captured that his goal is simply destruction and
death, and indeed he thinks that the goal in life is to worship
death and be willing to sacrifice yourself for martyrdom.
He sees democracy as the enemy, makes no pretense in fact
of doing anything other than bringing chaos and instability.
I think it is important, not only in analyzing the problem
we are up against, but I would be much more concerned if I
thought we were dealing with a genuine popular uprising. I do
not want to--again, I want to be sure not to put on rose-
colored glasses. There is a lot of broad dissatisfaction,
especially in the Sunni Arab community, partly with the pace of
progress--and the terrorists have done their best to slow down
the pace of progress--partly because, after all of this
historical experience, I think Iraqis believe that it is winner
take all and if the Shia take all now the Sunnis will be
abused. It is partly misunderstandings, frankly, more
misunderstandings than actual fact, about the de-Baathification
policy.
We need to work harder and we are looking precisely at how
to work harder to win back the Sunni moderates. I think they
are, again, I think the overwhelming majority of that
community.
But the basic enemy, the enemies of democracy in Iraq, are
just killers.
Senator Allard. General Myers, if you read the papers and
listen to the TV, I think the impression that tends to come
across is that we do have a lot of battles and a lot of
conflicts going on in Iraq. I was over in Iraq about a month
ago. I saw a lot of good things happening around Mosul and a
lot of the other towns that I was visiting, a lot of
reconstruction, a lot of positive things.
What is happening now with the conflict? Just put a general
picture over there. I have always perceived that north and
south was pretty much settled and our real problem was the
Sunni Triangle. So I would like to have you comment about what
we are seeing now on TV today and reading in the papers.
General Myers. Well, in the last couple of weeks what we
have seen are really two different events inside Iraq. One was
Sadr and his militia, which is fairly small, sent out or rose
up in several towns in the south. All those towns, with the
exception of al-Najaf, where his headquarters is, are back
under Iraqi and coalition control. Coalition forces and Iraqi
police are on duty in al-Kut, Nasariya, and the other cities
where there were uprisings.
These were small and easily contained because Sadr is
increasingly being marginalized. He is not a popular figure
with most Iraqis. He is preaching violence against the
coalition. He has come out against the Transitional
Administrative Law, which the Iraqi Governing Council has
approved. My view is he will continue to be marginalized.
But he is in al-Najaf and Iraqis are negotiating and
dealing with him right now, as well as some negotiators from
the CPA and Ambassador Bremer.
The other fight was the fight that Secretary Wolfowitz
described, which are these extremists, which by the way if you
compare and contrast with Vietnam, they are not fighting for an
ideology. They are fighting to disrupt progress. They have no
ideology other than to go back to the terror of the former
regime, if that is an ideology. So as to why they are fighting
I think is an important question when you try to compare it to
other events.
This occurs in the same area as you pointed out, where we
have had a lot of our instability. Fallujah has been the heart
of that. We have been in Fallujah from time to time and then we
come out. As you remember, we went in because of the atrocities
on the Blackwater Security personnel, the four personnel that
were killed and later burned and then hung on the bridge.
We went in because we had to and to find the perpetrators.
What we found was a huge rats nest that is still festering
today, and needs to be dealt with. Right now we are dealing
with it through negotiations and through a ceasefire. I will
say that the ceasefire is only on the side of the Marines that
are in Fallujah. It is not on the part of the folks in Fallujah
that are the extremists and so forth. They are still firing.
They are using--just I think it was yesterday or the day
before, a Red Crescent, the equivalent of the Red Cross,
ambulance trying to get into Fallujah was stopped and weapons
were found inside. They are trying to resupply themselves with
weapons and ammunition. I mentioned the mosques and the schools
and using women and children. They have done that. That was all
out of Fallujah.
So that area is still very, very hot, and that extends into
Baghdad, by the way. Sadr City is still a problem area,
although it is relatively calm today compared to when Sadr
was--those uprisings were going on, about a week ago.
In the north, interestingly enough, with events in Fallujah
there were lots of demonstrators in Mosul. The demonstrators
were dealt with by the Sunni, basically the Sunni government in
Mosul and the Iraqi police in Mosul and the Civil Defense
Corps. So it is a very different picture in the north right
now, relatively stable, economically doing quite well.
It is the central area that has remained the problem, and I
could go into it, but I do not want to take any more time. Part
of it is going to have to be dealt with by military force in my
judgment. Obviously, a big part of it has to be dealt with, by
making sure we have a strategy that enfranchises the Sunni
population, and that is being worked very hard. I spent a lot
of time on that particular subject in Iraq just recently.
Senator Allard. Thank you for your response.
Mr. Chairman, I just want to conclude with this brief
statement. This last Saturday I happened to participate in a
welcome home for Bravo Company of the 244th Engineering
Battalion in Fort Collins, Colorado. This is a local unit. The
report that came back from our troops verifies pretty much what
you were saying about the morale of our troops in Iraq. They
were very proud of what they were doing. They were building a
lot of infrastructure and they felt like they were really doing
something to improve the country because they were improving
the infrastructure, sewer and water and roads, and providing an
education there.
One of the comments I think that was made at that was:
there is a lot of pride and a lot of good morale, people feel
good about what they are doing. They are professional soldiers,
but they emphasized time and time again: The American people
need to stand behind us.
So I think that that is a message that they need to know,
is that we are very proud of what they are doing and we are
standing behind them. Thank you.
General Myers. Thank you, Senator Allard.
Chairman Warner. Thank you, Senator.
Senator Kennedy.
Senator Kennedy. Thank you. Thank you very much, Mr.
Chairman.
General Myers and gentlemen, we all do stand behind our
service men. But we have some responsibilities to find out
about the policy and where it is going that is requiring the
presence of those service men and women.
Mr. Secretary, I must say I found your presentation here
this morning somewhat disingenuous. I was here when the
administration made the case for going to war and the case for
going to war was the threat that the United States was facing
from nuclear weapons that were going to be provided to al Qaeda
by Iraq, and here we have your statement is all about the human
rights violations.
Everyone knows that Saddam Hussein is a brute, despicable,
deplorable, murderer. I will include in the record the State
Department's filing about human rights violations around the
world, about what the Chinese are doing to the Tibetans, what
the North Koreans are doing in terms of torture, forced
abortions, infanticide, what the Burmese are doing, and the
rest of the world. I want to make that as a part of the record.
[The information referred to follows:]
[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
There was not a word in this presentation about the weapons
of mass destruction, in this presentation here this morning.
Now, Mr. Secretary, you were one of the principal
architects of war with Iraq. It has been on your agenda since
the end of the Gulf War, 1991. It is now clear that Iraq was
high on the agenda of the administration from day one, even
though the outgoing Clinton administration made it clear in the
briefings during the transition that al Qaeda was the most
serious threat to our security.
Dick Clarke, the former counterterrorism czar, wrote that
when he raised al Qaeda in the first meeting of the deputies in
April 2001 you, Mr. Secretary, said: ``I just do not understand
why we are beginning by talking about this one man, Osama bin
Laden.''
At every stage, even after September 11, it seems that you
treated al Qaeda as less than a main threat, as a diversion
from the real priority, which was Iraq. In his book Bob
Woodward says that the administration diverted resources from
the war in Afghanistan to plan for the war in Iraq.
Now, we have in the newspapers this morning, the Washington
Post, ``Al Qaeda intends to strike, officials say. U.S.
intelligence community believes al Qaeda is intent on launching
terrorist attacks in this country some time between now and the
November election.''
Are we not paying a high price and is not the world paying
a high price because of the administration's obsession with
Iraq?
Secretary Wolfowitz. Senator Kennedy, actually I welcome
the opportunity to correct the record on some of these things,
although I would have preferred you had not used that word
``disingenuous.'' I am trying my best to be candid with this
committee and with the American people.
But the notion that an invasion of Iraq has been on my
agenda since 1991 is simply wrong, sir. Until September 11 I
thought the problem of Saddam Hussein was something that should
be dealt with by Iraqis, although I was consistently critical
of the lack of American support for those Iraqis who were
prepared to liberate their own country. We will never know,
because history unfortunately only tells you what happened on
one course of action, but we will never know whether some of
our problems today might have been avoided if at earlier times
we had enabled the Iraqis to do the job for themselves.
Second, Mr. Clarke's book is just full of gross
inaccuracies. He has Secretary Rumsfeld attending a critical
September 4 meeting that the Secretary was not even at. He has
the Secretary in the Pentagon on a secure videoteleconference,
a rather dramatic, memorable moment, when the Secretary did not
turn up until an hour later. He puts quotes in my mouth that
are about 165 degrees opposite of anything I could possibly
have said. He is simply wrong when he says that I dismissed the
threat of al Qaeda or the threat of terrorism.
To the contrary, Senator, one of the concerns I had, I have
had for many years, was the question of who did the World Trade
Center in 1993, the most serious act of foreign terrorism on
American soil prior to September 11, which it turns out was
done by the nephew of the man who was the mastermind of
September 11. There is a straight line from 1993 to the tragedy
of September 11.
I was concerned that this was obviously not just a rogue
bunch of misfits operating out of a mosque in Brooklyn, that
there was international expertise behind it. When I served on
the Rumsfeld Commission in 1998, we asked for a briefing from
the Counterterrorism Center, I did, on who was behind it
because it seemed to me, correctly, that if we are concerned
about missile attack on the United States we also need to think
about a terrorist attack on the United States.
[The information referred to follows:]
I was fully aware that the Department was using some of the funding
that Congress provided to respond to the terrorist attacks on the
United States, to provide support to counter domestic or international
terrorism, and to support national security to finance unfunded global
war on terrorism requirements for U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM). In
July 2002, CENTCOM identified over $700 million of requirements that it
said that it needed to fight the global war on terrorism to include
potential preparatory tasks for a possible war against Iraq. After
reviewing CENTCOM's request, we considered some of requirements as
being necessary for the broader war on terrorism, which Congress
authorized. Prior to the passage of the joint resolution by Congress in
October 2002, the Department limited the funding for CENTCOM's
requirements to those projects that were designed to strengthen U.S.
military capabilities in the region or to support ongoing military
operations. Thus, we considered these projects to be dual use in
nature, that is, projects that would benefit overall global war on
terrorism operations by improving military capabilities throughout the
areas of responsibility for CENTCOM.
The Department fully funded requirements identified specifically
for global war on terrorism military operations against the Taliban and
al Qaeda in Afghanistan and other areas of the world. Given the
military successes in Afghanistan, the overall costs of military
operations for global war on terrorism did decline. In August 2002
costs were about $1.5 billion and in September costs had declined to
about $1.0 billion. Some of these savings were applied to CENTCOM's
$700 million request. Congress recognized the decline in global war on
terrorism operations and rescinded $244 million of Defense Emergency
Response Fund (DERF) resources in the Fiscal Year 2002 Emergency
Supplemental (Public Law 107-206).
Senator Kennedy. Why did we have the diversion, because my
time is going? Why did we have the diversion, then, of funds,
if we are going after al Qaeda?
Secretary Wolfowitz. Because they are part of the single
conflict.
Senator Kennedy. Why are we not going after----
Secretary Wolfowitz. When Mr. Clarke errs, he says there is
not a shred of evidence about al Qaeda and Iraq. Excuse me. He
was in charge of counterterrorism----
Senator Kennedy. No, but I am talking now about--
Secretary Wolfowitz.--when that secret indictment was
issued, and he was in charge of counterterrorism, Senator
Kennedy, when Saddam Hussein for 10 years harbored Abdul Raqman
Yassin, who was the only bomber from the 1993 World Trade
Center event who is still at large. His lack of curiosity about
why the Iraqis were holding a man who was responsible for what
in the 1990s was the most serious act of foreign terrorism on
the United States is a mystery to me to this day.
Senator Kennedy. We will take all the criticisms that you
have of Mr. Clarke. Can you tell me why the administration
diverted funds, though, when we were beginning to target Osama
bin Laden, had him evidently effectively trapped in Tora Bora,
and then the administration diverted $700 million out of that
to go to begin the process or advance the process in terms of
Iraq? If so, how much responsibility do you bear in that?
Secretary Wolfowitz. Again, I appreciate the opportunity to
set the record straight. We did not divert funds. We were----
Senator Kennedy. My time is up, but I am addressing the
Woodward issue.
Secretary Wolfowitz. I would be happy to put it in the
record. We were very careful in making sure that we applied
money to the broader war on terrorism that Congress had
authorized, and we specifically withheld funding for those
projects that were specifically Iraq-related until after the
joint resolution passed Congress. We were very conscious of
Congress's authority in this area and we tried as scrupulously
as I know how to live up to our obligations.
Senator Kennedy. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Warner. Thank you very much, Senator Kennedy.
Secretary Wolfowitz. Mr. Chairman, with your permission I
will submit for the record these points that I would have made.
Chairman Warner. Correct. Did you have adequate time to
reply to the important question raised by Senator Levin,
Senator Kennedy, and myself about that $700 million?
Secretary Wolfowitz. If I could have a few more minutes, I
would----
Chairman Warner. I will give you a minute or 2, because it
is very much on the minds of all of us.
Secretary Wolfowitz. In the course of--that $750 million
number comes from a set of tasks that CENTCOM put together in
the summer of 2002 as things that they would want to have in
the event of an Iraq contingency. The DOD Comptroller looked at
this list with a view to those things that were consistent with
existing authorities in the settlement appropriations, the
global war on terror, and to distinguish between those and
things which would be Iraq-specific, as I said.
Based on that exercise, in August and September of 2002
$178 million was made available to support CENTCOM's global
efforts, including funding for communications equipment, fuel
supplies, humanitarian rations, and improvements to CENTCOM's
forward headquarters. All the investments were designed to
strengthen our capabilities in the region or support ongoing
operational requirements. No funding was made available for
those things that had Iraq as the exclusive purpose.
On October 11, as you are well aware, Congress passed the
Iraq resolution and, consistent with Congressional statutory
requirements regarding military construction activities, we did
notify Congress about $63 million in MILCON. After October 25,
some $800 million was made available over the following months
to support Iraq preparatory tasks consistent with that joint
resolution.
Chairman Warner. Thank you very much.
Senator Collins.
Senator Collins. Secretary Wolfowitz, all of us share your
admiration and your gratitude to the men and women who are
serving in Iraq. They are the best that our country has to
offer. That is why I am increasingly concerned about the strain
that we are putting on our reservists and our guard members,
their families, and their employers.
Now, Secretary Rumsfeld testified recently before our
committee that only 7 percent of the Guard and Reserve have
been involuntarily mobilized more than once in the past 13
years. I have to tell you that has not been our experience in
Maine at all. I have talked to numerous guard members and
reservists who have been deployed three times in the last
decade.
To illustrate my concern, I want to tell you about the
specific experience of a specific Reserve unit. That is the
94th Military Police (MP) Company. This unit has been deployed
2.5 of the past 4 years. They spent 9 months in Bosnia. They
have now been in Iraq for more than a year. They originally
were scheduled to come home last fall. Then the Pentagon
changed the policy to 1 year boots on the ground, so their tour
was extended.
That year expired on Easter weekend and they were literally
on the bus to their plane to take them back to the United
States when they got the news that once again they would be
extended. I have to tell you that this has been devastating to
the families and demoralizing to many of the soldiers who serve
in this unit.
General Abizaid testified before us last year that one of
the most important things for any soldier to know is when they
are coming home when they are employed in a combat zone. He
went on to say, ``We owe those soldiers the answer as to when
that might be.'' Well, the answer has changed time and again,
and I am very concerned about what the impact is on these
troops, their families, and their employers.
I have three questions for you. First, does not the fact
that we are repeatedly deploying the same reservists and the
same members of the Guard over and over again suggest that we
do not have the right mix of skills in the Army? Second, are
you concerned that changing the rules and extending deployments
repeatedly, plus having a very high rate of deployment, is
going to hurt our ability to retain skilled soldiers such as
those in this unit? Third, is the Pentagon considering any
extra compensation for the members of units that have been
involuntarily extended beyond the year that they originally
thought they were going to have? Actually, it is even longer
than that because of the change in policy last fall.
Secretary Wolfowitz. I will ask General Myers to comment
also, especially on that last question. But the issue you raise
is a very important issue. We have been, even before this came
up with your unit, your military police unit from Maine, we
knew we had a big problem because of a decision that was really
made I think 20 or 30 years ago, that we would have--it is
basically a Cold War military, that could not go to war unless
we are in a condition where the Reserves were mobilized on a
massive scale.
From that flowed a decision to take certain military
occupations--and military police, which is the unit you are
talking about, was one of them--and put them almost exclusively
in the Reserves. As a result, I think the unit from Maine was
deployed to Bosnia as military police. We need military police
in every one of these, whether you call it peacekeeping, which
is not Iraq, or stability operations or low intensity war,
which is what Iraq is.
If you are part of that 7 percent that is mobilized more
often, it does not matter to you that it is only, ``only'' 7
percent. I think the Secretary was clear about that.
General Schoomaker has put together a plan that will move
100,000 positions, shift them from the Active Force to the
Reserve or from the Reserve to the Active Force, so that we can
begin to cover these needs in a more balanced way with the
Active Force, so that we are not constantly going back to the
same well on reservists for certain occupations that do not
exist. Military police is one, civil affairs is another. That
is going to take some time, but it is a major part of the fix.
The second major part of the fix is to increase the
effective size of the Army. Now, I said ``effective size''
because what General Schoomaker's plan is is focused with about
a 30,000 temporary increase in Active Army manpower to work
through a plan, as I think you have been briefed but it is
worth repeating, that will add at least 10 active brigades to
the 33 in the Army now, and if we get to that point of 10 and
think we should go further he has a plan to go to 48, which
would be a 50-percent increase in the number of active combat
brigades in the Army with this roughly 30,000 personnel
increase. That 30,000 increase will be mostly temporary,
particularly if we top off at 43.
There is no question it would be nice right now to have a
larger Army. The problem is if we decided now or a year ago to
have a larger Army, you cannot just--these people do not just
walk in. It is not like hiring for a check-writing
organization. You have to grow the units, and once you have
grown them if it turns out that you have built up something you
do not need then you go through the pain of the 1990s of
demobilizing people who you recruited in.
So it is something the Army and the civilian leadership
undertake with some care. I think we have a good plan here that
gives us a chance to get more combat power into the Army, and
if we ultimately decide a permanent increase is necessary we
can do that. But none of that, I am afraid, helps your
wonderful people from Maine.
On the question of--let me ask General Myers to speak to
that. I certainly want to look into whether there are things
that we can do on the compensatory front. General Myers?
General Myers. Senator Collins, your first question, does a
repeated deployment mean we have the wrong mix? As Secretary
Wolfowitz said, absolutely. We are not structured for the
security environment we are in. To put a little texture on the
100,000 that the Army is going to be restructuring, they are
going to take down field artillery battalions, air defense
battalions, and turn them into--and others, but those are two
of the primary ones--and turn those into military police units,
transportation units, petroleum distribution, water
distribution units, the kind of units that are in very high
demand, and also put more of those in the active force.
That work has already started. It will continue for the
next 4 or 5 years as we rebalance. It is a very important part
of it.
Retention. Clearly, this unit has worked very hard. MPs are
in high demand. I can remember right after September 11 the MPs
that showed up at Fort Myer, where I live, to provide
additional security for the post, and there were some active
duty for a while, and then pretty soon some Guard and Reserve,
and sometimes forces that were not trained to be MPs that were
retrained to come up there and help.
So clearly we have to do a better job with this whole mix.
The retention issue is huge. I would only say that as we look
at recruiting and retention this mission is so important that I
think these people, besides being disappointed, their families
being tremendously disappointed, and their employers being
disappointed, what they are doing is so important that I hope
that that along with other incentives will convince them to
stay with us.
This is an important time to serve. I think they realize
that. They are terrific men and women, as most of these MP
companies are.
The third point was extra compensation, and absolutely, we
are. Within our authorities, we have authority for providing
extra compensation and for those that are going to be extended
past the 1 year. We call it, boots on the ground in Iraq. There
will be additional compensation.
Senator Collins. Thank you.
Chairman Warner. Thank you very much, Senator.
Senator Lieberman.
Senator Lieberman. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Thanks, gentlemen, for your service and for your testimony.
I agree with what has been said both by members of the
committee and Secretary Wolfowitz that, and all of you, that it
is important to look back so that we move forward with success.
But I am sure that all of us also agree that the emphasis has
to be on looking forward and moving forward with as much
success as we can achieve in Iraq and more broadly in the war
on terrorism.
The second thing about looking back is that if you spend
too much time looking back at the various paths that you took
to get to where we are now we may lose sight of the fact that
we are all heading in the same direction, that as we focus on
the now and the future in Iraq I see a very heartening
consensus emerging, certainly among the American people and
particularly in the American political leadership community. I
think we ought not to hold ourselves back from seeing that,
because it is a source of strength.
I have not heard anybody in a responsible position,
certainly no one on this committee, call for a withdrawal or a
retreat from Iraq. Whether that is because we feel, as I do,
that the war was a necessary and noble undertaking in pursuit
of our values, our security, or whether we feel, whether some
feel that because we are there now, departing hastily would
cause chaos in Iraq and the region, endanger American security,
embolden the terrorists--everyone in a position of authority in
American government, regardless of party, wants to win in Iraq,
and it is very important for observers not to be confused
either by the very healthy questioning that goes on at a
hearing like this or by the crosscurrents of an American
political campaign.
We are together in this. It is important that the American
men and women in uniform understand that we are not only behind
them--of course we are; they are our sons and daughters, our
neighbors, our brothers and sisters--but that we are behind
them in a quest for victory.
It is very important also that the rest of the world,
including particularly our enemies in Iraq, understand that. I
was very pleased that Senator Kerry in a statement last week
made quite clear that no one in the world should be under the
impression that the outcome of the American election this
November will alter the basic thrust of American policy on
Iraq.
That policy has drawn closer. People have moved. As you
said, Secretary Wolfowitz, the debate now is not over whether
to withdraw troops; it is how many troops to add to secure the
situation. There has been debate over, as we look back, about
the extent to which we should have and could have involved the
United Nations or NATO. The fact is we are involving the United
Nations now and trying to involve NATO more.
So that consensus is important through all of the comment
and controversy to recognize, because it is a source of our
strength, and it is very much in line with the quote that you
read from General Keane.
I want to ask a few questions. First, I want to say,
General Myers, that I was heartened to hear that the
administration, the Pentagon, is looking at alternatives for
sending more troops into Iraq in the short term, because as we
approach June 30 and the period afterward leading up to
elections obviously our enemies, the fanatics, the terrorist
insurgents, the Saddam remnants, will seek to disrupt the
movement of progress and freedom, and it is very important for
them to understand that. I am encouraged by that.
I understand, and I also took heart from the President's
statement at his press conference last week, that there are
discussions going on with NATO about the possible increased
NATO involvement in peacekeeping. I should say not increased,
but NATO involvement in peacekeeping. It has not been before,
either on the borders or in the section of Iraq now overseen by
the Polish forces.
Secretary Wolfowitz, can you give us any update on that, on
those discussions with NATO?
Secretary Wolfowitz. I would be happy to. I want to thank
you, Senator Lieberman. You have shown extraordinary leadership
on this issue over more than 10 years. What you just said about
the message to the Iraqi people and to the enemies of democracy
in Iraq, that they should not confuse debate in this country as
a lack of will, is a very important statement.
I was in Najaf last July and I was struck at both the level
of confusion about our politics, which I think I could
straighten out, and the level of paranoia about whether we
would abandon them as they, I think with some justification,
felt we had done in 1991. On the latter point, the question
came in the form of: Are you Americans just holding Saddam
Hussein as a trump card over our heads? It sounds like
paranoia, but if you have been through what they have been
through it is not so paranoid.
I was delighted a couple weeks later when we could tell
them: Well, we have the two sons and we are after the father.
It was a huge event in December to have captured Saddam
Hussein. It will be an even bigger event, frankly, Senator,
when a new Iraqi government has the legal authority to try him
and bring him to justice.
Senator Lieberman. I agree.
Secretary Wolfowitz. As early as December 2002, I spoke to
the NAC in Brussels and proposed a range of possibilities for
the alliance role in Iraq, including the use of NATO collective
assets, the provision of support services for those allies who
would participate, and, most of all, a NATO role in postwar
humanitarian and stability operations.
The alliance did decide to play a role. It has provided
planning and other support services for the Polish division
which is in the critical central-south area, to include force
generation, planning, and communications support. We have 17 of
the 26 allies with us and 7 partners.
We are asking NATO to look at ways it could expand its
contribution, including to assume leadership of that
multinational division currently led by Poland, to possibly
provide an additional multinational unit led by NATO, and to
provide additional logistics support for coalition operations.
Of course, any decision in that regard would be a political
decision that would have to be taken by allies.
I do think in this regard, a successful transition to a
sovereign government in July, hopefully another U.N. Security
Council resolution might ease some of the concerns, at least of
some of our allies, about joining in that kind of consensus
decision. NATO, as you well know, is an organization that
operates on consensus and there are limits to what it can do
when only--only--17 of 18 or 19 members are supporting
something.
But I think it has already made a big contribution. We
would like to see more.
Senator Collins. Thank you.
General Myers.
General Myers. Senator Lieberman, can I just add onto that?
In terms of Afghanistan, I think NATO has over 6,000 forces in
there and they are responsible, sir, for the security in Kabul.
They are doing a very good job of that. They want to expand
their responsibilities. They have the ambition to expand their
responsibilities, in Afghanistan by establishing some NATO-led
Provincial Reconstruction Teams. There are a couple right now.
There is one led by the Germans. We are in discussions with the
Italians on another one. New Zealand has one. The Brits have
one.
We are looking at others. It remains to be seen whether
they will have the resources to do that, but that is their
ambition. That is what we are in discussions on with them. It
is a long way from Europe, but they understand the importance
of that and I am optimistic, as Secretary Wolfowitz is, that
beyond their role of providing the force generation capability
for this Polish division in the center-south region of Iraq,
that perhaps they can play a larger role in the future.
Senator Lieberman. That is very encouraging. I thank you
all.
Remember--there have been discussions about comparisons to
Vietnam. Remember that there is a doctrine, a military doctrine
that emerged from Vietnam that bears the name of the current
Secretary of State, the Powell doctrine. Generally applied, it
is to make sure that we do not ever go into combat again
without all necessary forces.
Mr. Chairman, I thank you. My time is up. I do want to say
that I hope the committee will focus on the end of Secretary
Wolfowitz's statement where he calls for three enhanced
authorities, which I would guess that we will all agree on one,
for $500 million to train and equip military and security
forces in Iraq, Afghanistan, and friendly nearby nations, to
enhance their capability to combat terrorism; second,
commanders' emergency response program to enable military
leaders in Iraq to respond to urgent humanitarian relief and
reconstruction; and third, an increased drawdown under the
Afghan Freedom Support Act to provide additional help for the
Afghan National Army.
I hope, in the spirit that I began my statement, that
together we might on this committee take the lead in responding
to those requests as rapidly as the urgent circumstances on the
ground require.
Chairman Warner. Senator, we will do that. I think I share
with you the importance of those requests.
Senator Sessions.
Secretary Wolfowitz. Thank you very much for that last
intervention.
Senator Sessions. Thank you also, Senator Lieberman, for
those excellent comments.
I would like to join with Senator Collins in her concern
about guard units that have been extended. We have an MP unit
from Alabama that has been extended and I know how painful that
is for family members who were on the verge of expecting them
home. But we trust, and we will be in contact with you as we go
forward, that this was required.
One of the great strengths of America is that we are self-
critical. We have heard today a litany of mistakes. We have
been hearing about how many errors we made prior to September
11. But I would like to make a point or two that I think must
be made, and that is we need to recognize how much progress has
been made to date on the war on terrorism, which President Bush
told us from the beginning would be long and difficult, years
in effect, and he stated that.
But there have been a number of accomplishments. Pakistan,
when confronted and challenged, it was playing footsy with the
Taliban and al Qaeda, chose to be with us and the civilized
nations, and making a big difference in the world right now.
That is a great nation that chose to abandon terrorism.
The Taliban chose wrongly. They rejected our call and they
have been removed from power, and al Qaeda bases in Afghanistan
have been eliminated and their leaders, the ones that still
exist, are hiding in caves somewhere in the mountains.
Saddam Hussein failed the opportunity he had to avoid
military action and he has been removed from power, found
hiding in a cave, a hole in the ground, like the rat that he
is.
Libya has come in now and renounced terrorism after that
event, and Muamar Qadafi actually appears to be seriously
wanting to join the civilized nations of the world.
Abdul Khan, the Pakistan scientist who was involved in
proliferation of nuclear technology to North Korea, to Iran, to
Libya, has confessed and told what he was doing. While we were
signing treaties prohibiting that, he was doing it. That
activity on his part was ended as a result of military action
and encouraging leadership by the President.
Most unexpected and most blessed to date is we have not had
another attack on this country. I would not have thought that
was possible, that we would have gone almost 3 years without
another attack. I know that we can expect our elections to be
in danger, that some will try to disrupt that and maybe achieve
a Spanish result. But I do not think the American people will
lose their poise if that were to happen. Pray God it does not.
These are not mistakes. These are accomplishments. No war
comes out like you expect it completely. It is no doubt that we
are facing today a troubling surge of violence in Iraq. The
Iraqi people have had a history--have not had a history of law
and order or representative government. The severe oppression
under which they have suffered has clearly scarred them,
keeping emotions raw, paranoia widespread, and fear high. Their
history has been that the winner, the leader, is the one who
uses violence and power to achieve power.
Thus, as that government formation moves forward there
remains a window of opportunity for these terrorists, these
violent guys who want to take control of this country by power,
to seize power. There is a window of opportunity for them. They
are using every tool at their disposal, fomenting hatreds,
distorting religion, and utilizing violence to create
instability.
Our challenge has proven difficult indeed. I had hoped
things would be doing better now. The war went better than I
ever thought it would go and this has been more difficult in
recent weeks than I expected for sure.
We have made progress in a number of areas in Iraq, as you
have stated. Our goal, a free, stable, and prosperous Iraq, is
noble and important for us and the world and the war against
terrorism. The President, this Senate by over a three-fourths
majority, and the American people have set the goal. No one
wants to achieve it more than you do, the members of this
panel. No one knows the situation better than you. You are
tireless and dedicated to this goal.
My advice to you is to stay the course, stay fixed on the
goal, and continue to be flexible. Every war throughout history
is different from the ones preceding it. Adjust as you go,
learn from the situation, keep your eye on the goal of a free
and prosperous Iraq.
There is going to be a lot of difficulties as we go
forward. There will continue to be unexpected difficulties. But
if we keep our poise and our head about us I believe we can
make it.
The critics and second-guessers are vocal. Those who say
thanks for the accomplishments and who pray daily for our
troops are not so visible, but they are many. This will test
the American people and Congress.
Prime Minister Tony Blair has said, however, that it is our
destiny at this time in history to lead. Our soldiers must know
we support them completely. So despite the naysayers, we will
meet the challenge, I believe, that is before us. The whole
world for decades to come will benefit from our constancy and
courage, and I salute you for it and I particularly salute the
men and women in uniform who are putting their lives on the
line to make this a safer world and a better Iraq.
General Myers, I understand General Petraeus will be going
to Iraq. If you would tell us when you expect him to arrive and
what ideas you may have for strengthening the local police and
security forces that I believe is critical to our long-term
success, and what if anything this Congress can do to help you
achieve that goal?
General Myers. Senator Sessions, thank you for your tribute
to our men and women in uniform. As Secretary Grossman pointed
out, there are lots of other men and women from lots of
different countries, some wearing uniforms, some not, that show
a great deal of courage in that country day in and day out.
As far as General Petraeus, I think he is in country now.
He was certainly going to arrive this week. I think he has
arrived. He will be--he comes off a very successful tour as the
division commander of the 101st Division. They were in northern
Iraq. He showed a great deal of innovative thought in how he
worked with the local governance in that area, helping to
improve their economies, and so forth, and did a terrific job,
I think in everybody's estimation.
He is going back to work security cooperation. The Defense
Department has the responsibility for all security forces,
which include the Iraqi police, the New Iraqi Army, the border,
the Civil Defense Corps, and the Facilities Protection
Services.
As Secretary Wolfowitz said, we have not equipped them as
fast as we needed to do, and that is one of the issues that we
have to work. I think we have solved all the hurdles that we
either had here in Washington or in Baghdad. Those hurdles have
been solved. We have contracts. Equipment is arriving. I have
seen the--there is in fact a very good British officer that
showed me the plan for equipping the police, great detail in
terms of equipment and where in the country and so forth. They
have it mapped out. We have the resources to do that. We have
just got to follow through.
We have to continue the training of all these forces. In
particular, the police have undergone some training, but there
is a large number of police that have not been trained. We need
to do that. Then once they are trained and they go to their
individual police stations, what needs to happen is they get
the proper mentoring, because in some cases the leadership may
not be all that good in these police stations. So you get one
of these recruits that has been trained and you have to keep
their enthusiasm up and keep them on the right track.
We have civilian police from around the world that the
State Department is organizing, that is to do that, that task.
Then I think General Abizaid is exactly right. As he has
said I think many times and that we are now saying, and
Secretary Wolfowitz said earlier, they have to feel like they
are responding to Iraqi authority. We have to connect those
dots between the local police station and the province on up to
the ministry of interior in Baghdad and to the political
leadership that will stand up 1 July.
That part has yet to happen, but there are efforts under
way to make all that happen. I think what Congress has done to
ensure we have the funding for the equipping and training of
these forces right now is adequate, and it will just, it will
take some time. It is certainly going to take beyond 1 July.
We think by the end of this year that we will have clearly
the majority of these forces properly equipped and trained and
in the field and connected to their command authority, if you
will.
Senator Sessions. Well, General Petraeus did a great job
with the 101st in Mosul and I think a lot of us have confidence
in him, and we want to support you in that effort.
General Myers. Thank you. He will do very well.
Chairman Warner. Thank you very much, Senator.
Senator Reed.
Senator Reed. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Secretary, you urge us all to show will and resolve and
you emphasized that by those very compelling letters from those
young privates and captains who are showing will and resolve.
But around here in Washington the usual measure of will and
resolve is the budget, and when General Schoomaker, General
Jumper, and General Hagee were here they said that without a
supplemental appropriation by October 1 they could be running
out of money in critical accounts for this operation.
Commentators like Anthony Cordesman have suggested there is a
$50 billion hole that has to be filled by a supplemental.
When will the Department of Defense show its will and
resolve by sending a supplemental up to Congress?
Secretary Wolfowitz. Senator Reed, if we think one is
necessary, when we think it is necessary. We had a session with
the same chiefs that you quoted, I think about a week ago, to
precisely address where we stand with this process. What
happens is as you go through the year certain accounts start to
run short because you are spending more money on them than you
planned, and clearly the unanticipated higher level of
deployment leads to some accounts being overspent and you hear
about that quickly.
Other accounts spend slower than was planned and they start
to have surpluses there, and I can assure you people do not
come running down the hall with their hair on fire to tell you,
I have a surplus in my account.
We have a process called the mid-year execution review,
which is conducted by the DOD Comptroller. It is under way now.
As a result of that meeting with the Secretary, we have speeded
up the schedule by a week so that if there is a problem we can
identify it sooner rather than later and come for help if we
need it.
One kind of help we really do need and that is general
transfer authority. In fact, at the end of my testimony those
three points that Senator Lieberman pointed out--I also said
that most of all in this kind of wartime situation where you
are dealing with unpredictable events it is important to have
more rather than less flexibility.
I think we asked for $4 billion, which is 1 percent of our
budget, last year and it was cut by roughly half. The more
flexibility, the sooner we can rebalance accounts. Of course we
can reprogram. That takes time. But the sooner people know that
money is going to be available from an account that has a
surplus into an account that has a deficit, the better we can
manage the resources we have.
The bottom line, though, Senator--and I think you and I
agree on this--is the troops need to have what they need and we
need to make sure they do.
Senator Reed. Well, I think the bottom line, Mr. Secretary,
is you need a supplemental up here. This is not a shortage of
several billion dollars. This is a growing shortage and, as you
point out, when the chiefs testified the anticipated force
level would be 105,000, not 135,000 as it is today.
General Myers, is it your professional judgment that there
are adequate resources without a supplemental to continue
operations without seriously harming other important Defense
Department programs?
General Myers. Senator Reed, we are evaluating that right
now. I have to withhold judgment for just a little bit more
time. Obviously the extension of the First Armored Division,
the Second Light Cavalry Regiment, and their combat support,
combat service support is going to increase our costs. The
operations tempo is also higher. So we know that we have
additional costs that we have to find funding sources for.
We also know there will be execution issues with some of
our acquisition systems and so forth. So I think we need to
wait until the OSD Comptroller can look at these, these issues,
before we can have a firm decision. We thought before, with
what the services were identifying as shortfalls, that we could
bridge the gap between, for the last month of this fiscal year
and cover our expenses. I think we just have to ensure
ourselves that is still true given the higher expenses that we
have right now.
Senator Reed. General Myers, another issue has become
relevant in the last few days, certainly since the terrible
attack on the contractors in the Fallujah area. That is the
huge number, 20,000 estimated, of armed security contractors.
This presents a problem today, but it certainly will present
even a greater problem after July 1. What rules of engagement
will they operate under in this new sovereign Iraqi entity? Can
an Iraqi minister of interior hire 200 former Special Forces
for his own private army? What is their status?
This is to me a startling departure from previous doctrine
of using these contractors in security positions. What is your
view and what are you going to do about it?
General Myers. What we are doing about it is providing
Central Command and General Abizaid and General Sanchez with
the policy guidance that will allow them to handle this issue.
You raised the questions. We do have a lot of contractor
support, not only in the security area but also in a lot of our
logistics capability--truck drivers.
Senator Reed. Relatively noncontroversial.
General Myers. Right. But still it raises issues as to
their status, their arming, and so forth. You are right, the
security forces are probably the--and we are providing that
guidance to Central Command so they know how to handle this
situation.
By the way, I would just say parenthetically that when I
was there one of the issues I looked at was the coordination
between the coalition military forces and security forces. I am
assured there is a pretty robust mechanism for security forces
inside Iraq to make sure that they have the latest intelligence
or information and that they share information back and forth.
I was a little bit worried about that after the Blackwater
issue in Fallujah and some of the things I heard about that. I
think General Sanchez and his folks do a pretty good job of
that.
Senator Reed. Just a final point. My time has expired.
General Ikenberry conducted a report or a review of
security forces several months ago. We have been endeavoring to
obtain a copy of that report, if it is classified certainly
under those classified terms. It seems to me unfortunate that
it takes us weeks and weeks and weeks to get reports which you
have acknowledged, both the Secretary and uniformed leadership,
exist, that you have, that you reviewed, and that we cannot get
access in a timely way.
I just think it is unfortunate, more than unfortunate. I do
not think it is appropriate. Can you assure us that we will get
access to this report within days?
Secretary Wolfowitz. I will check on that, Senator, and I
can not assure you. I will do my best to see if it is
appropriate--
Senator Reed. Why can you not assure me, Mr. Secretary?
This is a report that was prepared by an officer in the United
States Army to inform the Department of Defense, but also this
is the Armed Services Committee. We should have access to those
reports in a timely fashion. If they are classified, we can go
up to 407. We can read them under the circumstances and the
classifications.
It seems to me this is unacceptable that you, the Deputy
Secretary of Defense, say: I will try, but I cannot promise you
you will get a report.
Secretary Wolfowitz. Senator, we try to give you everything
that we can. We also have to make sure that we manage the whole
process of reports like this and reviews like this so that
people give us candid opinions. Quite frankly--
Senator Reed. Well, no; we deserve a candid opinion, Mr.
Secretary.
Secretary Wolfowitz.--we put a lot of effort into getting
this Ikenberry mission out there against some people who did
not really want to have people looking and examining how we
were doing. Lessons learned are a wonderful thing. We need to
do lessons learned. We also need to manage and we need to
manage between the Executive and Congress in an appropriate way
so that people do not begin to fear every time someone comes
out to do an Ikenberry report or to do an assessment or do a
lessons learned it is time to shut up and not give them any
information because the next thing you know----
Senator Reed. Mr. Secretary, that is totally unfounded. We
are constitutionally required to supervise the activities of
the DOD. We have just as much of a right to get this
information as you do. You seem to be saying we do not. You
seem to be saying that we cannot get access to reports prepared
in the course of business of the DOD. Is that what you are
saying?
Secretary Wolfowitz. Senator, I will do my best. I have not
looked at this issue. I would like to get you the report. If I
can get it for you----
Senator Reed. What you seem to be saying, Mr. Secretary, if
you do not want the contents of that report disclosed to us,
you will not get it for us. If those contents are embarrassing
to the administration, you will not get it for us. If those
contents suggest that the problems we saw 2 weeks ago were
understood or anticipated or should have been----
Secretary Wolfowitz. Senator, that is not the issue. Please
do not do that.
Senator Reed. Well, what is the issue, Mr. Secretary?
Secretary Wolfowitz. The issue is how to protect the
decisional processes that I think are in the country's
interest, the candor that is required in pre-decisional
documents, and the equally important responsibility to keep
Congress informed. I believe that you can see this report, but
I do not know.
Senator Reed. Mr. Secretary----
Chairman Warner. Senator, I must say there are seven
colleagues waiting. It is an important issue. Senator Levin and
I will address the issue.
May I also thank you for bringing up the question on the
contractors. General Myers, that is a matter that is before the
committee for review right now, because they are providing an
absolutely essential service, not only to our security side but
the logistics side. We have to do what we can, particularly
those that have affiliation with the coalition partners.
Senator Reed. Mr. Chairman, I appreciate the fact--I
apologize to my colleagues. This is an astounding statement by
the Deputy Secretary of Defense, saying that if he wants us to
get the information he will give it to us, but if he does not
he will not.
Secretary Wolfowitz. This is not a personal thing, Senator
Reed.
Senator Reed. It is not for any legal reason----
Secretary Wolfowitz. I think you know that there are issues
about what documents are pre-decisional and what things need to
be shared. Let us be clear. The Ikenberry report is something I
did personally push for because I thought it was important to
have a thorough examination of this issue, and it met some
resistance because people are afraid sometimes to have things
examined.
I said, and I repeat, I will do my best, if I am
permitted--it is not me personally--to make that report
available to Congress.
Chairman Warner. Senator Levin and I are now reviewing, in
the context of some requests by Senator McCain, the committee
and others, as to how we are going to work out a smoother and a
more understandable exchange of information.
Senator Reed. Mr. Chairman, would you indulge me for one
moment?
Chairman Warner. Yes.
Senator Reed. My understanding is that reports that are
prepared by the DOD are classified and that, subject to those
classifications, people have access to it. I assume we have a
sufficient clearance level on this committee to have access to
the report I am talking about and probably everything that is
prepared at the DOD. If I am in error----
Secretary Wolfowitz. Senator Reed, I am going to do
everything I can to get you the report. I just did not want to
promise something I am not sure I can deliver. I will do my
best.
Chairman Warner. Senator Reed, we just simply have to move
on in fairness to my colleagues and your colleagues on both
sides here.
Senator Cornyn.
Senator Cornyn. Thank you, gentlemen, for being here today.
I for one agree, I believe, with the comments of Senator
Lieberman and Senator Sessions and those who have associated
themselves with the importance of this committee conducting
proper oversight, and particularly in dealing with matters that
are of present concern and planning for the future. I think we
are at our best when we do that. I think we are at our worst
when we look back and try to dissect lessons learned while we
are still at war in the battlefield. That unfortunately,
particularly in a supercharged political environment leading up
to a November election, I think is not as constructive as we
could or should be in dealing with the present and plans for
the future.
But unfortunately, in this environment when questions are
raised and statements are made and not responded to, or when
the context of the answer is not made clear, unfortunately that
has to be addressed. So it is in that context that I want to
ask two questions.
Over the weekend we heard some unfortunate claims, one
related to the $87 billion supplemental that I wanted to ask
you about; and one goes to the very nature of the conflict that
we are currently engaged in in the war on terror. The first
question I have involves the $87 billion supplemental that
Congress passed to fund the war on terror. It was said this
weekend that even the generals in Iraq said that moneys in that
bill had no impact on their ability to continue to fight. It
was also said that that vote would never--that vote would never
have prevented, that is a negative vote against that
supplemental, would never have prevented any of the body armor,
ammunition, or anything from getting to our troops.
Now, I had heard that statement earlier and it caused me to
ask in another hearing, a SASC hearing at which the Vice Chief
of Staff of the Army, General Casey, appeared. I asked him
about that $87 billion appropriation and if it had not passed
what the consequences would have been to our troops. He was
unequivocal. He said: ``This supplemental appropriation has
enabled us to significantly increase the protection for our
soldiers throughout the theater of Afghanistan and Iraq.''
I asked him: ``If Congress had not stepped up and funded
the $87 billion supplemental, that would have meant or resulted
in increased casualties as a result of the failure to provide
those up-armored high-mobility multipurpose wheeled vehicles
(HMMWVs) and body armor?'' General Casey agreed that: ``It
would have meant more casualties or the Army would have had to
gut the Army budget to find the money to do this, that is pay
for the body armor or up-armored HMMWVs by other means.''
My question for you, Secretary Wolfowitz and General Myers.
Did the $87 billion supplemental have an impact on the ability
of our men and women to fight and win the war on terror in
which we are currently engaged?
Secretary Wolfowitz. Senator Cornyn, I cannot imagine how
we could continue conducting operations without that
supplemental. It not only provided for basic operations, but it
also provided substantial amounts for things like body armor
and up-armored HMMWVs and various force protection measures.
There were two different pieces of the supplemental, of
course. There was the roughly $67 billion that goes directly to
our troops, which is absolutely indispensable. Then there is
the $18 billion, $18.6 billion of reconstruction funds, which
are spending slower, but they are already having an impact. I
think it is very important. As we said in testifying on the
reconstruction funds, that money can help to create Iraqi
security forces that can take the place of Americans. That
money can help to create a positive political environment
inside Iraq that will make our forces safer.
So really the whole $87 billion I think--and it covers
Afghanistan as well--was essential to this war on terror.
Senator Cornyn. General Myers?
General Myers. Really, I do not know how I can add anything
more to that. That supplemental is absolutely essential to our
ability to operate in Iraq and Afghanistan. Secretary
Wolfowitz, I think we approved $750 million for force
protection initiatives alone and we can do more if required in
that regard.
But the general just paying for our operational tempo, if
we did not do that General Casey would be right, you would gut
the Army budget, and not only the Army budget but the Air Force
and the Marine Corps and the Navy budgets as well. So it is
absolutely essential to our operations.
Senator Cornyn. This last week I was at the Red River Army
Depot, where they are providing additional armor or metal
containers essentially to upgrade HMMWVs for additional armor
and protection for troops currently in the battlefield. It is
that kind of additional protection which I believe has led to
the greater security and greater likelihood of success of our
troops in the field.
My only other question really relates to the nature of the
conflict in which we are engaged, in which at least count I saw
we had 135,000 troops currently in Iraq fighting this conflict.
It was said this weekend again--a reiteration of an earlier
claim--that the war on terrorism is not primarily a military
operation, but that it is an intelligence-gathering, a law
enforcement, and public diplomacy effort. Now, I disagree with
that completely and I believe that indeed treating the war on
terror previously, after we had been attacked, after the World
Trade Center bombing in 1993 for example, as a criminal
investigation and a law enforcement matter, as we have seen
before the 9/11 Commission, has led to insecurity and
endangered American lives because of the lack of information-
sharing, among other things.
But I would just ask your response, Secretary Wolfowitz. Do
you agree that what we are engaged in in Afghanistan and Iraq
is not primarily a military operation, but is rather an
intelligence-gathering, law enforcement, and diplomatic
mission?
Secretary Wolfowitz. Senator Cornyn, I think that I
resisted these comparisons initially when people said this is
like the Cold War, it is going to be as long as the Cold War
and as difficult as the Cold War, in the immediate aftermath of
September 11. Increasingly, I think it has all those
characteristics and then some, and it requires all the elements
of national power, as the President has said over and over
again, including military, including intelligence, including
law enforcement, including diplomacy, including economic
assistance--all of those things working hand in hand,
reinforcing one another.
The fact is that one of the biggest successes in the
intelligence-law enforcement arena in this war on terrorism was
capturing the mastermind of September 11, Khalid Sheik Mohamed,
in Pakistan. I would note, by the way, for those people who say
we were diverted by Iraq, it was done the month before
Operation Iraqi Freedom that we captured this villain.
But we would never have gotten him in Pakistan if he were
still hiding in Afghanistan, if they still had that sanctuary.
It is important to take the sanctuaries away from these people.
At least in the case of Afghanistan and Iraq, it could not have
been done except by military means.
But then we see the case of Libya, where the military
without doing anything plays a critical role in supporting
diplomacy, which achieved an enormous amount, in part thanks to
some great work by the intelligence people that uncovered what
Qadafi was doing.
So all these things have to work together. That is point
number one. Point number two: I really do think, if there is a
single lesson from September 11, to me it is that we cannot
wait until after the fact to find the perpetrators of events,
of terrorist acts, and either bring them to court or bring them
to trial, or if they are foreign countries punish them with
some kind of cruise missile retaliation. We have to do
preventive action.
Preventive action in the last resort may sometimes be
military. But when I say ``preventive action,'' I mean on a
very broad scale. I think one of the most important kinds of
preventive action we could be undertaking as a country, and we
are starting to--I would like to see us do more--is to help
countries like Pakistan that are trying to redo their education
system, so that instead of breeding terrorists in these
madrassas that preach nothing useful and a lot of hatred, young
poor Pakistani children can go to a school where they learn how
to succeed in the modern world.
So all of those instruments are necessary. It is a very
broad effort. It is a big mistake to suggest that it can be
narrowed.
Chairman Warner. We thank you, Senator.
Senator Cornyn. Thank you. My time has expired.
Chairman Warner. We thank our witness.
Senator Ben Nelson.
Senator Ben Nelson. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Secretary Wolfowitz, I am a little confused about the
development of the security forces within Iraq. It was my
understanding that what we were going to do is build up the
Iraqi security forces, therefore we could take down our
presence militarily because of the increasing capacity of the
Iraqis to support themselves for their security needs.
I thought I just heard you say that by staffing the Iraqi
security forces we would make it safer and we would be able to
do that. Then I thought I heard you earlier say that they were
having trouble because they needed stronger leaders and they
need to fight for Iraq and they need more and better equipment.
I am a little confused about that, but I suspect you and I can
resolve that, that confusion.
What I would like to do is to give you an idea and see how
this fits with where the plans for the Iraq political
transition would fit in. I have been advocating for some time
that at the point of handover on June 30 that the new sovereign
government at that point would ask the U.N. to help with this
transition, this governmental transition from the interim to
the transitional and then the constitutional government, by
helping them develop and carry out free elections; and that the
new sovereign government would then ask the NATO countries to
come in and NATO as a group to come in and provide security--
not the United States asking for another U.N. resolution.
We have not had a great deal of success in getting other
countries to come in and I do not believe we are going to get
the U.N. to come in until there is security. It seems to me
that we can decide the chicken or the egg here and we say that
both have to be accomplished at the same time, the U.N. come in
and NATO come in, which I hope would reduce our presence, which
I am going to ask General Myers to give us some idea of what
additional NATO forces we might receive.
I thought I heard that the administration's approach, from
Secretary Grossman, is for us to ask for U.N. help. I have met
with ambassadors from Germany and France and run this by them
and they did not make any commitment, of course, but they did
not say no to considering whether if the new Iraqi government
would ask, which would be different than an occupying force or
an occupying presence such as the United States represents
right now, which is creating some of the consternation between
us and other countries.
Secretary Wolfowitz. Some good questions. If I could go
back just briefly and see if I can clarify what may have
sounded like confusion. I do not think it is. I think the
difference lies in when Iraqi security forces can actually
assume the role we would like to see them assume.
I would also like to stress, the most important thing is
not so that we can reduce our numbers, although that is clearly
something we would like to do, but even more important so that
we can have Iraqi forces out in front and on the streets. Just
to give you one important, obvious example, if you have to go
into a mosque because it is being used as a military base, and
we have had that happen, having Iraqis go in and do that kind
of work is much, much better.
Senator Ben Nelson. Are they doing that?
Secretary Wolfowitz. They are in some cases, and in some
cases we do not have them. As you might expect, the results are
generally better when they can do it.
Now, we never thought that by this April they would be
ready to operate independently, and the report Senator Reed was
asking about was in fact stimulated by my concern that things
were not moving as fast as they should have. I think we have
found through General Ikenberry's efforts some ways to speed
things up, and it is important.
But particularly when in some cases they were literally
outgunned by the enemy, then it is not surprising that they had
problems. There are other problems, leadership problems,
training problems. I think it is the right course. We should
not--we should push it, we should push it faster. We should not
assume success until we have success.
On the question you asked about other countries, and
particularly NATO and NATO countries, contributing, Ambassador
Grossman or General Myers might want to add to this, but I
think, first of all, one reason why we would very much like to
see this transition take place on July 1--and I cannot stress
enough times, from a political point of view the last thing you
want is to be undergoing a transition like this in the middle
of an American political season. But from a military point of
view and an Iraqi security point of view, the sooner you have
an Iraqi government that can ask allies to come in, the better
off we will be. The sooner we have an Iraqi government that can
try Saddam Hussein, the better off we will be.
So that will be a step forward, number one. Number two, I
do think there are quite a few countries who are not going to
come in until it is safer to come in. They may say it is the
lack of this or the lack of that or this U.N. resolution or
that. The fact is this is not peacekeeping; it is combat. Until
it becomes peacekeeping, a lot of countries are probably going
to still stay on the sidelines.
Finally, some countries have real capabilities and others
do not. The country that has the potential to have real
capability is Iraq itself. In pure numbers they are now the
largest member of the coalition. In number of people killed in
action, it is over 250 Iraqi police and Civil Defense Corps and
Army have been killed fighting for a new Iraq.
Senator Ben Nelson. In the line of action?
Secretary Wolfowitz. In the line of duty, since June 1. It
is second only to the United States. It is not a number I want
to see grow on either side, but they will probably--who knows.
I should not predict. But they are up there fighting. The
better we equip them, the better we train them, the more they
will be fighting. It is their country; they should fight for
it.
Chairman Warner. Thank you very much, Senator.
I wonder, Secretary Grossman, would you like to contribute
to this important question?
Mr. Grossman. Yes, sir, just in a----
Senator Ben Nelson. If I might ask, it was because I heard
you say that we would secure a U.N. resolution as opposed to
the Iraqi government doing it. That is what caused me some
confusion about the timing.
Mr. Grossman. Senator Nelson, if I could, I think as we
have all of us here today paid tribute to those people who are
contributing in Iraq, I think it is worth noting that, although
the U.N. left in large numbers after the murder of Brahimi, I
give great credit to the people who, on behalf of the U.N.--
United Nations Childrens' Fund (UNICEF), World Food Program--
local Iraqis have continued to work. I think it is worth saying
that, in terms of our immunization program and our food
programs, without UNICEF, without World Food Program, we would
not be able to accomplish that task.
Second, I think that it is important to know that the Iraqi
Governing Council, along obviously with the CPA, invited
Ambassador Brahimi to come back. It is the Iraqi Governing
Council that has invited this very admirable Ms. Pirelli who
works on elections for the United Nations to come back.
So I agree with you completely that I would hope that in
the 1st of July a new interim authority, a new interim Iraqi
government, would be very much welcoming further United Nations
help and support, and we will be there with them.
In terms of seeking a Security Council resolution, I would
imagine from all that I have heard from Iraqis they would
seek--they would welcome a Security Council resolution. But I
do think that that is some of the responsibility that we take
on as permanent members of the Security Council. So I think if
we drive forward for it, it is a good thing for us, I am sure
Iraqis will support it.
Chairman Warner. Thank you very much, Senator.
Senator Ben Nelson. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Warner. I just observe to one of your responses,
Mr. Wolfowitz, the sooner the Iraqi government gets in the
sooner they can invite other nations to join. But let us make
it clear from what you said, once they join and contribute
forces, it is the Commander in Chief, the President of the
United States, that has control over the use of those forces.
Am I not correct?
Secretary Wolfowitz. Absolutely. We can repeat it multiple
times. It is very important.
Chairman Warner. Everybody talks about giving sovereignty.
You look at the definition, it is everything. It is
sovereignty, but the security remains clearly within the
control, as we have stated, with the U.S. President on down.
Senator Dole.
Senator Dole. Secretary Wolfowitz, there have been charges
that the war on Iraq took our focus off of al Qaeda and the war
on terror as a whole. Just like you, Mr. Secretary, I found the
memo written by captured al Qaeda operative Zarqawi to be very
interesting and compelling. In noting concern that the
Mujahadeen may lose its foothold in Iraq, he wrote:
``There is no doubt that our field of movement is shrinking
and the grip around the throat of the Mujahadeen has begun to
tighten. With the spread of the army and the police, our future
is becoming frightening.''
Can you elaborate on this memo and its significance,
please?
Secretary Wolfowitz. It is pretty amazing. When I first
read it I wanted to make sure that we were absolutely certain
this was not some forgery that someone had presented to us
hoping to get paid for it or otherwise manipulate us. I have
been assured multiple times that, no, the circumstances of our
obtaining it were that we captured it off of a senior terrorist
who was carrying it, I think in the form of a computer disk,
from Iraq back to Afghanistan, and it was in response to
apparently a query from Mr. Zarqawi's al Qaeda friends in
Afghanistan as to whether they should send people to Iraq.
I think it is important to emphasize, since it is a strange
name and, even though Secretary Powell spent some time talking
about Mr. Zarqawi at the U.N. in February of last year, I am
surprised how often people are completely unaware of who he is.
He is not some local figure. He ran a terrorist camp in
Afghanistan, a training camp, for a number of years when bin
Laden was in charge there.
We use the word ``al Qaeda-associated,'' I think primarily
because we are not sure about whether he has formally pledged
allegiance to bin Laden, whether he to some extent runs his own
operation. But it is a substantial operation. It is credited
with being involved in planning terrorist plots that were
broken up in London, in Paris, and one that was pulled off
successfully in Casablanca.
He is a world terrorist. He has murdered probably, we
believe, our diplomat in Jordan, Ambassador Foley. He is wanted
under a warrant in Jordan for attempting to assassinate a
senior Jordanian official. In fact, when the Jordanians went to
the Iraqi government in 2002 to ask to have him extradited, he
miraculously just disappeared.
This man, we have been surprised, frankly, at the extent of
his network in Iraq or the size of it. It is not a few tens. It
seems to be at least some scores of people.
But what is most striking in that letter that you cite is
the length in which he describes this sense of desperation. He
even uses the word ``suffocation'' at one point, in part
because--and I think I quoted it in my testimony and I will
paraphrase it--the Americans, he says, the most cowardly of all
peoples, are not going to leave no matter how many wounds they
suffer.
It is interesting. Though he calls us cowardly, he
understood that we are not. He understood that we are not
leaving. Therefore he lays out, his strategy has to be--and he
seems to have a sense of desperation that he needs to do this
before there is a sovereign Iraqi government, although he does
not use precisely that phrase.
The strategy has to be to promote chaos and division in
Iraq by attacking four targets he identifies: the Iraqi
security forces, the Kurds, the Americans, and most importantly
the Shia. That seems to conform with both the attacks we saw in
Irbil, two suicide bombers who blew up some 150 people in an
horrific incident; and then, even more significantly, the
attacks on the Shia population in southern Iraq.
I think that the exposure of that letter plus our offensive
operations that have captured by now more than 30 of his people
may have set him back. The exposure of the letter I think
helped to make sure that the Shia understood that if there were
more bombings he was the man responsible.
I guess I would just like to conclude with this point, the
only comment I would make on Senator Sessions' eloquent
intervention earlier. One of our great assets I think is the
sheer evil of our enemy. They attacked us on September 11
believing that we would be divided and that we would retreat.
They failed. They attacked Indonesia and Bali, believing this
would cause the Indonesians to waver and weaken, the
Australians to pull out, because mostly Australians killed.
They failed.
They attacked synagogues in Istanbul and the British
Cultural Center in Istanbul, thinking that this would divide
Turkish Muslims from Turkish Jews and Turks from British, and
they failed.
With the unfortunate exception of Madrid, they have failed
time and time again. In Saudi Arabia, May 12, they attacked an
American compound, residential compound, in Saudi Arabia. It
has led to the largest, most successful crackdown on al Qaeda
that we have--up until May 12 we were not successful in getting
the Saudis to undertake.
Most importantly, they have attacked innocent Iraqis,
innocent international aid workers, innocent Kurds, Shia, and
Sunni alike in Iraq, and I think they are failing. But we have
to keep at it to make sure they do.
Senator Dole. Thank you.
Mr. Secretary, I would like you to respond to another
quote, please. This time, George Shultz in an excellent opinion
piece in the Wall Street Journal just recently, and I quote:
``The most important aspect of the Iraq war will be what it
means for the integrity of the international system and for the
effort to deal effectively with terrorism. The stakes are huge
and the terrorists know that as well as we do. That is the
reason for the tactic of violence in Iraq. The message is that
the United States and others in the world who recognize the
need to sustain our international system will no longer quietly
acquiesce in the takeover of states by lawless dictators who
then carry on their depredations, including the developing of
awesome weapons for threats, for use, for sale, behind the
shield of protection that statehood provides.''
Would you comment on the significance of this statement as
it relates to what you have seen in Iraq and what you are
seeing?
Secretary Wolfowitz. I think I remember reading that whole
article.
Senator Dole. Excellent.
Secretary Wolfowitz. Mr. Chairman, if I could add it to the
record of this hearing. It is, as most things that George
Shultz does, it is a terrific piece.
[The information referred to follows:]
[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
Secretary Wolfowitz. In my less eloquent way, let me just
say I think what he points out correctly is that you cannot go
after terrorist networks and ignore what states do to support
terrorism. I mentioned earlier in my testimony this division of
the Iraqi International Service called M-14 that was the so-
called Anti-Terrorism Section. It was not anti-terrorism. These
are the people who developed over many years the kind of
explosives expertise that was then handed off to terrorists.
These are the people who conducted their own assassinations,
who today in Iraq are allied with terrorists.
To simply say, well, Saddam Hussein harbored Abu Nidal and
Abu Abbas, but they were not al Qaeda, it seems to me ignores
the basic point that, given what we saw on September 11 and
given what we know terrorists might do with even more terrible
weapons, we simply cannot afford--we have to have a zero
tolerance policy. We can no longer afford to have states in the
business of using terrorism as an instrument of national
policy.
Hopefully, we can get the world to change without having to
undertake one military operation after another. But I think
there is no question, as Secretary Shultz says in that article,
that what happened to the Taliban and what happened to Saddam
Hussein is a very salutary lesson for other states that may be
tempted to continue on that course.
Senator Dole. Thank you very much. My time has expired.
Chairman Warner. Thank you very much, Senator.
Senator Dayton.
Senator Dayton. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Books like this are amazing to me, how high-level people
will reveal their supposedly top secret information or disclose
proceedings at the highest level meetings. I guess my colleague
Senator Reed has left, but if we want to get some of these
documents he was requesting from the Deputy Secretary of
Defense I think we should ask Mr. Woodward to get us copies,
because he seems to get everything quite readily.
But one of the other insights I got from reading through
this is that--I and I think the people who elected me and sent
me to Washington delude ourselves that we have some, in the
Senate, some legitimate and constitutional role, and then to
find out how contemptuously we are regarded in the executive
branch, starting with the President himself, who was quoted as
saying here in a meeting where Senator Levin, who was then the
chairman of the Armed Services Committee, referenced some deep
concerns that the U.S. military had just prior to the
resolution. The President said: ``It would be nice if they''--
meaning the military--``expressed their reservations to the
President, rather than just someone in the Senate.''
But it goes beyond that. In my reading of this book, it
goes clearly into the duplicities and the deceptions that were,
and misrepresentations, that were made to Members of Congress.
Those who want to look at--those who are preventing others of
us from looking at the misuse of intelligence information
before the congressional resolutions were adopted and
thereafter should look at what was said, according to the
quotes in this book, to Members of Congress by highest
administration officials, that are even more emphatic in their
representations of intelligence information that turned out to
either be erroneous or intentionally misrepresented.
I find it just horrifying. So when we get into these
matters of the lack of legitimacy for anyone to question
anything that has been decided, anything that has been done or
has not been done, anything that has been represented, that has
been found to be totally untrue, and find once again, as we
have in other times in history, that anybody who raises those
questions is guilty of either failing to support our Armed
Forces, whose heroism is beyond belief and description, which
we all recognize--and those of us who have been there, who have
seen them, have talked to their families, those who are over
there now, who are anxiously awaiting to find out whether their
loved ones are coming back alive or not, those who are not
coming back at all, those families--to have it be suggested
that any of us here lack that support because we are raising
questions about what decisions were made and what pretexts were
given for entering into this war and what has transpired since
and what happened in the last weeks--and the statement at the
conclusion, Mr. Deputy Secretary, of your remarks that if they,
meaning the--well, I will read the whole paragraph here:
``The enthusiasm of Iraqis to go into combat along side
the coalition is also colored by their perception of
our commitment to the new Iraq. If they sense that we
will not see them through to a new constitution, an
election, and strong Iraqi institutions, we should not
be surprised to see them melt away or even work a deal
with those who would shoot their way to power. That is
why it is so important in this time of stress to show
that our commitment to their freedom is rock solid.''
Mr. Secretary, I can only speak for myself. I am not going
to presume to speak for others. But my commitment to their
freedom is rock solid, my commitment to our troops is rock
solid, and that is exactly why here we should have had the
opportunity, and we have had very limited opportunity, to find
out the realities of the military situation. Rather, we have
been given a series of just glossy overstatements of what
transpired over the last year and how bad Saddam Hussein is,
which we know.
The fact that there are not any weapons of mass destruction
and that our Armed Forces are now, as the ranking member said,
suffering greater casualties than at any other time--what we
hear is that, well, he is a really bad man, he is a really
really bad man.
That is not the point here. The point is we have a right to
know and we should be told what is going on over there in
factual terms, in military terms. I have sat through now most
of the last 3 hours and watched other parts of it on television
to find out that virtually nothing has been said. So I find
this extremely disappointing, but I find it a continuation of
this attitude that Congress is just to be duped and basically
led along to this and the less that is presented to us that we
can actually know what is going on the better, and as long as
we can be led to believe whatever suits the purposes of those
who are carrying this out then fine, just ignore us or lie to
us or use us in whatever way you possibly can get away with. I
find it just abhorrent.
I would like to ask General Myers one question regarding
the transition that is described here, the political
transition. What is the military equivalent of that? We have
had our troops over there. We have seen the first evidence of
the Iraqi security forces, how they have responded and failed
to respond, and I gather it is a mixed situation over there in
the last couple weeks.
What is the Iraq military transition for our Armed Forces
getting out with a victory, the victory that we all want
secured, the freedom we all want secured?
General Myers. Senator Dayton, what we are going to be
doing simultaneous to that--and if you go back, I think the
chart goes to--well, we can see; we can look at April there. We
will stand up shortly this new Multinational Force Iraq, that's
what it is going to be called. We are going to have an
overall--the coalition commander will be U.S. It will be
General Sanchez that will be overall responsible for security
in Iraq.
Below him he will have a couple of significant offices. One
will be the tactical commander, that is Lieutenant General Tom
Metz. He and Sanchez are working side by side right now, and
General Metz will take the tactical situation. Then we talked
about General Petraeus coming over to work the office of I
think security transition we call it now--I think that is
right--which will work the equipping and training of the Iraqi
security forces, police on through border patrol--important
functions.
Throughout that organization will be woven Iraqis who will
be part of the police and the new Iraqi army and all those
other Iraqi security force entities, will be woven in that. It
is envisioned that this commander of the Multinational Force
Iraq will be very close to our chief of mission over there,
that they will be a team that will work those issues that they
are going to have to work together, because there is going to
have to be a lot of collaboration, as there is in Afghanistan
with our Ambassador Khalilzad and General Barnow. They have
offices that are essentially feet apart, 20, 30 feet apart.
Senator Dayton. General, excuse me, but my time is limited
here. Sir, we are given here the political transition through
2006. This is the Armed Services Committee. I would like to
know, what is the military transition through 2004, 2005, 2006
as it affects American forces, because, as Senator Collins and
others have said, we have a lot of people back in my State of
Minnesota who want to know when their men and women are coming
home.
General Myers. Right, and I was going to get to that. I was
talking about the command and control structure, which is very,
very important to our military transition, and if we do not do
that right we are not going to----
Senator Dayton. All right, I accept that. I apologize.
General Myers. No, I was too long, I guess.
Our forces will continue. We are looking at the next
rotation of forces and the rotation after that and, as we have
done between the first rotation and the one we are currently
in, trying to stretch this out so it does not all occur in one
lump of time. We are looking at those forces that will support
it out into the future, certainly as far as that chart goes.
Obviously, we do not have perfect clarity on the forces
that are going to be needed in 2005 and 2006. So we are
planning for that. We are basing that on estimates that we get
from General Abizaid, and as we get closer and closer that will
be further and further refined. But we are planning for a
presence there to help with security throughout that period.
Senator Dayton. Mr. Chairman, my time has expired. But I
would ask that, either in the closed session or subsequently,
we get some statistical representation of what that transition
is going to look like, please.
General Myers. We would have to do it in closed session.
Senator Dayton. All right. Thank you.
Senator Sessions [presiding]. Thank you, Senator Dayton.
Senator Ensign.
Senator Ensign. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
I want to thank all three of you for sitting through quite
a long session. These are very, very important times and
important questions to have answered.
I believe very strongly that the only way that we lose in
Iraq, Afghanistan, really this whole global war on terrorism,
but especially right now in Iraq, is if we lose the support of
the American people, if it is a political loss, if the American
people somehow are not behind the President, behind Congress,
in support of what is going on over there. The reason I say
that at the beginning is because the politics of what is
happening here in the United States affects the support of the
American people, and there are comments that have been made, as
a matter of fact--and I want to get your sense of the political
comments that are made here, how it affects the military
operation and the morale of the terrorists and the insurgents
over in Iraq.
Recently, I think Senator Kennedy even said that ``Iraq is
George Bush's Vietnam.'' Two days later, al-Sadr declared that,
``Iraq will be another Vietnam for America and its occupiers.''
Iran's Islamic Revolution Guard Corps Press Office warned ``A
fate more horrifying than Vietnam awaits America in the morass
of Iraq.''
With those kinds of statements following the statements
made in the United States, I believe in free speech as strongly
as anybody, but I also believe that there is responsibility
with free speech, especially when we are in critical times.
How does that affect what is going in with our military and
the whole military strategy in Iraq?
Secretary Wolfowitz. Senator Ensign, I guess the way I
would answer--and I am actually glad I have an opportunity to
comment on a couple things Senator Dayton said--we simply
cannot allow the enemy to deny us the right to hold free
debate. Our men and women out there in the front lines are
fighting so that we can have a free country and a country where
we debate freely, and I think everybody in that debate has to
think about what their proper role is.
But what I have said, I said it clearly in my testimony, I
applaud what Senator Lieberman said. I think it is very
important that we do what we can to send a message to the enemy
that, do not confuse American debate for American weakness. I
think that is critical.
Senator Dayton, the reason I talked about the nature of the
Saddam Hussein regime is because that is still the enemy. We
are still fighting them. They are still threatening Iraqis in a
way that is part of our challenge. It is not getting into old
debates.
As far as I know, everyone was working off the same
intelligence. I think it was Senator Rockefeller actually who
characterized the threat as imminent, which is not a
characterization I would have used. I do not think anyone is,
to use your words, lying or deliberately misrepresenting. I
think we are trying our best. Sometimes we do it publicly and
sometimes we do it in classified sessions. I think on virtually
a weekly basis we have had classified briefings to this
committee or to the full Senate on the nature of the operations
in Iraq.
There is no question that part of the battle there is an
information warfare battle. When those people took those four
American bodies and burned them and strung them up, they had
Somalia on their minds, I am sure. They probably told each
other, ``This is Mogadishu all over again.''
But I think we are winning, as that letter from Zarqawi
makes clear. We are not leaving. He knows we are not leaving.
It is suffocation for him. Some of what we are seeing--I do not
mean to diminish it. We are all very concerned about the level
of sophistication of the Fallujah-based attacks.
Let me--Senator Dayton, if you think we have not been
talking about the character of the military operation, let me
just say I think we have been. We are trying to say Sadr is a
very different kind of problem, both militarily and
politically. He is a marginal figure with not very capable
forces. In the Sunni heartland we are dealing with a different
problem where politically we are not comfortable with our
position vis a vis the Sunnis and where militarily we are now
facing an enemy that at least stands and fights in squad and
occasionally company-sized units.
But I think that the end result of this action is going to
be to set them back further.
Senator Ensign. Mr. Secretary, if I just may interrupt very
quickly because I do not have a lot of time. I want to get to
another question.
Secretary Wolfowitz. Sorry.
Senator Ensign. I appreciate the free debate that we have
in this society and I think it is very important that we have
that free debate. I just think that it needs to be emphasized
that there is responsibility with that debate. Part of that, as
you said, is that when we are debating to emphasize once again
that that does not mean that we are going to back down from
what is going on.
We do not want to have what happened in Spain, where
terrorist attacks decide what happens internally within the
United States. We are free and independent. We debate, but when
we go overseas we are united in our purpose to defeat
terrorism.
Now, a question on the oil----
Chairman Warner. Senator, we have to make it pretty brief.
Senator Ensign. Okay, this is going to be a very brief
question and maybe I can get it in writing. Two quick questions
and I will take the responses back in writing.
One is on the Oil for Food program that we had and the
corruption involved with the Oil for Food program. It has to do
with countries that were involved at the U.N. Security Council
level with the Oil for Food program and the corruption that was
involved. Could we have at any time, in your opinion, ever
gotten their support? I mean, there is this talk of more
internationalizing the efforts in Iraq. Could we have--was
there any way to get their support?
The second question has to do with the drug problem that we
have going on in Afghanistan. I asked this, it was in a
classified session but it was not a classified question, I
asked this last year on the drug problem and the support of
terrorism. Last year there was not a lot of import put into
this, and I thought at the time that it was one of the biggest
problems that we had in Afghanistan and in other parts of the
world, in supplying the money to the terrorists.
At that time, as a matter of fact, there was not a lot of
import put on the question. So I would like the response--
whether it is in a classified response I am not sure. But the
bottom line is how much money is from the drugs and also what
is our strategy for agressively dealing with that.
Thanks, Mr. Chairman.
Secretary Wolfowitz. Can we reply for the record, but if I
could make a quick comment on this?
[The information referred to follows:]
[Deleted.]
The Department of Defense (DOD) is serious about addressing the
narcotics problem in Afghanistan. The growing narcotics trade is
endangering the U.S. and coalition success in Afghanistan and
corrupting the governmental institutions we are trying to build. We are
addressing the problem in two areas. First, we are working with U.S.
Central Command, the Combined Forces Command-Afghanistan and U.S.
Embassy Kabul to quickly review and improve our strategy.
Counternarcotics is a major piece of our overall strategy for
Afghanistan. Second, we are participating in an NSC-chaired interagency
working group to improve the implementation of an integrated U.S.
counternarcotics strategy. In both areas, we are working closely with
the U.K., which is the lead nation for the counternarcotics effort. DOD
representatives communicate with U.K. representatives on a daily basis
in Afghanistan and on a weekly basis here in Washington.
Secretary Rumsfeld was in Afghanistan on August 10 and his
discussions with Afghan, U.S. and U.K. representatives focused on the
narcotics problem. Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for
Counternarcotics Mary Beth Long was in Afghanistan earlier developing
the details of the problem with the Afghan Minister of Interior and his
police chiefs; the U.S. Central Command staff in Qatar; the Commander,
Combined Force Commander-Afghanistan (CFC-A) and U.S. Embassy Kabul.
But we are not just talking. Thanks to your support for the $73
million supplemental funds last year, DOD is:
Assisting the Afghan National Police, Highway Police
and Border Police with personal and communications equipment
and refurbishing 14 provincial police stations.
Providing tactical and narcotics related training and
equipment to the U.S. Drug Enforcement Administration and
Afghan Counternarcotics Police to establish an urban
interdiction force.
Providing a mix of 4-6 refurbished and leased MI-17
helicopters to the Afghan Minister of Interior for police
interdiction operations.
Developing an Afghan narcotics information fusion
center for the police, to include equipment and training.
Refurbishing and constructing the Spin Boldak border
crossing point on the Afghan-Pakistan border, a major smuggling
route.
Developing an Afghan Minister of Interior public
outreach program to communicate a government message in support
of counternarcotics activities.
U.S. forces have instructions to seize and destroy narcotics and
related material during the course of normal military operations, when
the situation permits. U.S. forces occasionally come across refined
narcotics and take appropriate action, in accordance with guidance
issued by the U.S. Central Command.
As we work with the U.K. to implement the above near-term
initiatives, we will also focus attention on the long-term approach. To
that end, it would help if Congress would reconsider the Department's
request to expand the coverage of the Fiscal Year 2005 Defense
Appropriation Act authority to train and equip Afghan military forces
to include Afghan police forces, as well as the Army. Although we have
this authority in our counternarcotics program, that program does not
have sufficient funds to undertake a large security force training
program.
Chairman Warner. It is a very important question and I
associate myself with that question.
Secretary Wolfowitz. Then go to Mr. Grossman on the second
one.
On the first one, just very quickly. I think the notion
that--I cannot predict what France might have done if we had
waited 6 months or 12 months or 18 months. But the notion that
we would not lose anybody by waiting is wrong or at least not
knowable. I think if we had had this May 12 bombing in Riyadh
not after the liberation of Iraq and after we were able to tell
the Saudis we were going to finally take our Air Force out of
Saudi Arabia after 12 years of bombing Iraq out of Saudi
Arabia, we might have had very different results.
We had some people who were with us in critical ways in
that war who could have been shaken by any number of events. So
the notion that if we had simply waited we would have had more
people I think fails on both counts.
Ambassador Grossman might say something on the
counternarcotics.
Mr. Grossman. If I might just very quickly, first of all I
would be glad to try to answer the question in specifics on the
numbers because I think it is very important. But I think you
make an extremely important point, Senator, which is that drugs
fuel terrorism. I have testified in this committee on a number
of times about what we are doing in Colombia. Two years ago we
started to call people what they are, which is narcoterrorists.
There is not a separation there. Around the world, as you say,
particularly in Colombia, but I think in Afghanistan, we will
find there is this connection. I would be glad to answer the
question, but it is something we take very seriously. They are
narcoterrorists and we ought to call them that.
Senator Ensign. Just real quickly, Mr. Chairman, the reason
I brought that up as a question is because my question last
year is, why are we not going all out with the military
against, for instance, in Afghanistan. We are more limited in
what we can do in Colombia, but we are not limited in what we
can do in Afghanistan on these poppy fields. Obviously we are
limited in what we can do in Pakistan. But once again,
Afghanistan is someplace where we have our military there to
affect a great deal of the drug trade, and I just did not see a
huge effort going toward that.
Chairman Warner. That question needs to be answered. Now, I
am going to have to ask you to do it for the record----
Secretary Wolfowitz. We will do it for the record.
Chairman Warner. --because we have colleagues here.
Secretary Wolfowitz. We are increasing our effort, is the
short answer.
[The information referred to follows:]
Although the narcotics economy has plagued Afghanistan for nearly a
century, it grew significantly after Soviet withdrawal in 1989 and
continued apace throughout the 1990s, as provincial, warlord-dominated
governance prevailed in a country without. any strong, central
governing authority. Since the fall of the Taliban, even though general
political and economic circumstances are stabilizing, impoverished
Afghans continue to produce and trade all forms of opiate products. The
country's weak security environment and limited enforcement
capabilities have also allowed narcotics production and trade to
continue. In 2003, Afghanistan produced three-quarters of the world's
illicit opium, approaching historically high production levels.
We do not know to what extent al Qaeda profits from the drug trade
in Afghanistan. We have anecdotal reports of drug trafficking by
elements aligned with al Qaeda, but there is no evidence that such
activities are centrally directed. We remain concerned, however, about
the possibility that substantial drug profits might flow to al Qaeda
and continue to be vigilant. for signs that this is occurring.
The involvement of anti-government Afghan extremists in the drug
trade is clearer. In 2002, U.S. troops raided a heroin lab in Nangarhar
Province linked to the Hizb-I Islami Gulbuddin and officials from the
United Nations and the Government of Afghanistan (GOA) report that the
Taliban earn money from the heroin trade. Based on the information
available, however, we can neither quantify how much these groups earn
from the drug trade nor can we determine what percentage of their
overall funding comes from drugs.
In addition, extremists and terrorists in Afghanistan may sometimes
turn to the same network of professional smugglers used by drug
traffickers to move personnel, material, and money.
Along with the international community, we have been working
closely with President Hamid Karzai and the GOA to create permanent
interdiction institutions and strengthen criminal law enforcement.
President Karzai has declared a ``jihad'' against the narcotics
economy--focused on growers, refiners, and traffickers--stating that
``Narcotics is one of the things which threatens our dignity, our
economy, our agriculture. It threatens our government and our roots--
and it is against our religion. . . This is a widespread jihad which
covers the entire country.'' Our recent successes include a tripartite
counternarcotics campaign that integrates law enforcement, poppy
eradication, and alternative economic development as a substitute for
drug cultivation. We are also working with the GOA to establish a
national eradication force that effectively targets the drug industry
and its links with extremist groups.
Chairman Warner. I cannot overemphasize the importance of
that question, because I asked it when I was in Afghanistan
just weeks ago.
Senator Akaka.
Senator Akaka. Mr. Chairman, thank you very much.
Secretary Wolfowitz--and General Myers, if you would add to
this question--I would like to ask some questions about our
forces, our force requirements and force deployment tempos. One
of the things that DOD has been looking at for the last few
years is whether we can reduce the burden on our forces by
decreasing our participation in some longstanding operations.
Obviously, our actions in Iraq have really eliminated the need
for Operations Southern and Northern Watch, and we have drawn
down on our participation in the Balkans.
My question is are there other longstanding operations that
we are looking to cut back on? If so, which are they?
Secretary Wolfowitz. Senator Akaka, we are looking
carefully at our entire global footprint, as we call it, to
make sure that, particularly given the stresses on our forces
and what it costs to deploy them, that we do not just
mechanically proceed with the force posture that we inherited
at the end of the Cold War.
I remember when I was in the Pentagon the last time,
leaving in 1993, that we had 100,000 troops in Europe and
100,000 in the Asia-Pacific region and it seemed like that was
a reasonable position to start from post-Cold War, but that I
thought over the next 10 years we would probably reduce some,
especially in Europe. To the contrary, we found our troop
levels in Europe going up.
Some of that does not make sense. I think it can be
adjusted. The world has changed enormously. At the same time,
we have no intention of abandoning our fundamental commitments.
I give you one more example. Korea is a case where, one of
the most important security commitments that we have, to the
security of South Korea. At the same time, we have looked very
closely. We are convinced that we can do what we need to do in
many ways, redeploying our forces, investing more in them so
they are more capable, and ultimately making some adjustments
in the numbers. So the commitment remains, but how you fulfil
the commitment changes depending on the threat and the
circumstances and what your forces can do.
General Myers. Senator Akaka, I would only add to that
that, besides the Balkans and the areas that Secretary
Wolfowitz mentioned, one of the reasons we are such an
effective Armed Forces is that we exercise very rigorously, and
that is one of the areas that we have actually cut back on
during these times because of the tempo on our forces.
Secretary Wolfowitz. Could I? Remembering that you are from
the State of Hawaii, I think it is an opportunity to stress, my
own view is that one area of the world where there is a lot
that can go wrong if the United States disengages is this huge
vast area, the Asia-Pacific region, where we have some of the
most rapidly growing, biggest, potentially most powerful
countries in the world.
I think as we adjust our footprint, I just really want to
make it clear, particularly in the Asia-Pacific region, we are
very mindful of the fact that American engagement in that
region is a key element of stability and we do not intend to
abandon it.
Senator Akaka. General Myers, General Pace last week said
that he has evaluated force requirements for continued
operations in Iraq for years out into the future and that we
can maintain planned force levels, and I quote him, ``for as
long as we need to.'' I am reassured by his comments, of
course, but have a few follow-up questions about our ongoing
commitments.
One of the questions: How long do you expect that we will
continue to need a force of 135,000 in Iraq?
General Myers. That is--I am sorry.
Senator Akaka. I know that your position is that we can
sustain this force level indefinitely, but I am wondering about
what this does to the deployment tempo of our forces, both
active and Reserve. Can you tell us how often a given active or
Reserve member, say an infantryman for example, would expect to
be deployed versus how long they would be at home under various
scenarios? Likewise, besides the infantryman, a helicopter
pilot or a logistician?
Another question is what do you expect the Reserve
component participation to be in Operation Iraqi Freedom 3 and
4 if we continue at the current level, force levels?
My last question is, what expectations do you have about
force requirements in Afghanistan?
General Myers. Thank you, Senator Akaka. We talked about
Senator Dayton's question about how long we predicted, that we
planned for. As you said, we cannot determine exactly what the
requirements are going to be. They will be driven by events on
the ground. Lots of factors to go into that. We listen to
General Abizaid and General Sanchez currently on their
predictions.
For planning purposes, like most reasonable people I think,
we tend to be very, very conservative in our estimates. We are
not--we do not put a very optimistic face on it. We say, okay,
if we are needed what is the maximum number of forces that
might be required. Then we try to source for that. That is the
process we are in right now.
To your question about how often, for active duty we hope
that those forces that are deployed will have at least a year
back home before we would have to use them again. That is for
active duty.
For Reserves, we call them up for a maximum of 2 years.
Most Reserve Forces--some will serve 2 years, as we talked
about with Senator Collins, or even over that in a fairly short
period of time. But for the most part, the majority of our
forces, Reserve Forces, will serve up to 2 years. They will not
all serve 2 years. Some will be released earlier. It depends on
how long it takes to mobilize them and demobilize them, and
that is almost unit-specific and mission-specific to that unit.
Again, we would hope they would be mobilized for 2 years
and then our rule of thumb is--and it is just a rule of thumb--
is that we would not mobilize them except once out of every 6
years, would be our approximate estimate.
The force requirements in Afghanistan. Again, the situation
in Afghanistan I think is actually pretty good. We have a major
NATO commitment in there. NATO wants to expand its role in
Afghanistan. Good coalition partners. We have about 13,000 U.S.
forces there right now. We bumped them up just recently because
of the upcoming elections and the fact that this is the time of
year when we generally see an increase in incidents by the
Taliban or former al Qaeda and we have to be ready to thwart
that.
We have actually changed our tactics in Afghanistan. We are
very active in those areas in south and southeast Afghanistan.
Every day of the week basically we have soldiers out there
humping their packs and walking the ground to make sure that
that threat is subdued and does not emerge.
Now, everything I have said are rules of thumb. There is
nothing in concrete about any of those, because the overriding
issue is, just for the same reason that we extended forces in
Afghanistan--or in Iraq here recently, was that the mission
will dictate what we have to do. We have to keep coming back to
this, I think in my mind. This is a very serious threat. It is
a threat to our way of life and the things that we stand for.
It is this generation of members of the Armed Forces that
are going to play a major role, not the only role certainly,
but a major role in combatting that threat. I will give you a
couple of examples. I was flying on a 130 to Mosul last
Thursday night and the navigator was a Reserve lieutenant
colonel. He had been promoted to colonel, but refused to put on
the rank because if he did they would send him home. He says:
Nope, I want to serve.
When I got to Mosul, I am in the hospital in Mosul.
Unfortunately, there had been a mortar attack. Three
individuals were injured. I went in the hospital, I met a
doctor. He is going to celebrate his 40th year in the Armed
Forces here this month. He was a brigadier general and they
needed his skills in Iraq, but they said: You cannot go as a
brigadier general. He said: Okay, I will take that rank off;
what do you want to make me? They said: We will make you a
colonel. He is over there serving.
We will have our rules. We will try to provide
predictability. We are as aware and as concerned as anybody
about taking care of this force properly. They are working
hard, but the threat, the threat requires it.
Chairman Warner. Thank you very much, Senator, General.
Senator Akaka. Thank you for your responses.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Warner. That is very interesting.
Senator Bayh.
Senator Bayh. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Gentlemen, thank you. Your stamina has been exhibited here
today at great length and we appreciate that.
Let me begin, Mr. Chairman, by saying I agree with
something that our colleague Senator Lieberman said when he
indicated that we are all committed to success. The stakes on
the up side are significant, the risks on the down side are
significant. There is no substitute for success. I agree with
what he had to say there.
Secretary Wolfowitz, I agreed with two things that you said
in your opening statement: first, your commendation of our
military men and women for their heroism and their idealism. I
found the letter of that young Marine you read to be quite
moving.
Second, with regard to the--well, let me move on. I agreed
with what you said with regard to that. Oh, I know what it was.
The second thing, with regard to the historic magnitude of the
malevolence and the evil of the former regime in Iraq. I do not
think that there can be any serious debate about that. It is a
good thing that Saddam is gone.
Saying that, there are some growing concerns about the
efficacy of the political transition and whether some of the
problems that we may be experiencing there are imperiling all
the good that we hope to do for both the Iraqi people and the
cause of freedom in the world and ultimately for our own
security.
So with that in mind, after 3\1/2\ hours of listening, I
have two questions. First, how do we define, how do you define,
sovereignty, the sovereignty that we will be conveying to this
new interim entity, particularly when it does not come, as it
cannot come under current circumstances, with responsibility
for security? Most importantly, how does the truncated
sovereignty that we are transferring create--and here is the
point I want to emphasize--legitimacy in the eyes of the Iraqi
people? Because ultimately it is not sovereignty that we hope
to transfer, it is legitimacy that we hope to create, because
it is only legitimacy that will ultimately enlist the Iraqi
people in the cause of establishing their own freedom and their
own independence.
So I am somewhat concerned that we are elevating
expectations that may be somewhat disappointed, that could lead
to disillusionment and ultimately to opposition.
If I could just conclude by saying, with regard to my first
question, in some ways we may be trying to have it both ways.
We are saying we are transferring sovereignty. That is
significant, that is big. But at the same time we are saying,
well now, we have to understand the real mission of this
interim entity is really quite limited; it is to set the stage
for elections, which are in fact interim elections, held at the
end of this year, and the real elections will not be held for a
year after that.
So how does this sovereignty that we are transferring lead
to legitimacy, which at the end of the day is critically
important to our success?
Secretary Wolfowitz. Senator Bayh, if I could compliment
you, not only for your stamina, but for a terrific question. It
does not have a simple answer. I think there is a basic tension
here, which is you need to set people's sights not at the
ceiling, but above the floor. I would go back to some comments
I made too, that there are a lot of countries in Eastern Europe
now that are properly described as democracies, but they still
have a long way to go even to get as far as we have gotten, and
we are not perfect.
So when we use those words about Iraq, we use them with
some recognition of how challenging it will be. But at the same
time, I think we need to go in a step by step way that does not
just stop at, well, anything, anything that is not the old
regime is good enough for us. I do not think that can be the
standard.
Now, I will add one more problem to the questions that you
put on the table about this interim authority, and I have
mentioned it earlier. That is, in addition to the questions you
asked, we have a real challenge I think particularly with the
Sunni Arabs, in getting them convinced that they have a real
role in the future of Iraq. They have to understand that role
is not the old role. If they think that they ran Iraq--and I am
not sure they really do; I think they know Saddam Hussein ran
Iraq. But if they think it is still winner take all and they
would like to be the winners and take all, that is not the
story. But it cannot be winner take all either that the Shia,
just because they are a majority, are going to run the
government in Baghdad and everyone else is going to have to do
what they say, the way they did in the old days.
I think a significant part of the answer to that comes out
of our own constitutional--constitution, our political process.
That is to say, more local control, more decentralization. It
is a country that has been centralized, unfortunately, for a
lot longer than just Saddam Hussein. The more people believe
that they can run their own affairs, I think the more they will
accept the overall situation.
This government that will come in on July 1, part of its
effect is going to be based on its being purely temporary. It
is not going to be broadly legitimate and Iraqis are going to
stand up and cheer and say, this is my government. Hopefully we
will get a little bit of bounce from that. But most
importantly--and they will run ministries, they will run the
police force, in coordination with CENTCOM because this is not
a normal police situation.
But most importantly, they will be setting up elections. As
you remember, we were in this uncomfortable position for the
United States of having to argue last fall against elections
because it was not timely. Well, it is going to be timely. I
mentioned in my testimony we have seen some local elections in
southern Iraq that apparently worked.
Senator Bayh. Would you forgive me for interrupting.
Secretary Wolfowitz. Sure.
Senator Bayh. I do not mean to interrupt, but I do have the
one other question and I am about to run out of time.
Secretary Wolfowitz. Go ahead.
Senator Bayh. Basically, the legitimacy ultimately that we
seek will more than likely--we have a greater chance of
achieving that in either the interim elections or the ultimate
elections than this sort of interim----
Secretary Wolfowitz. It is a step by step and it will grow
over time.
Senator Bayh. I am concerned that we may have elevated
expectations either within our own country or perhaps there,
and disappointment is not a helpful thing.
Secretary Wolfowitz. If you can help us calibrate
expectations, that is a good thing.
Senator Bayh. My second question is somewhat related, and
it has to do with the degree of popular support for our role
and what we are trying to do. I am interested in your concern
about the potential for Iraqi nationalism to at some point
trump their gratitude for the liberation and their hopes for
the future, because as long as we are only fighting the
remnants of a despised despot we will ultimately win. As long
as we are fighting outsiders who are there and no friends of
the Iraqi people, we will ultimately win. But if at some point
this morphs into, as I understand it did to the British in 1920
in some respect, a broader sense of Iraqi nationalism and we
are on the wrong side of that, then the task becomes much, much
more difficult.
So I am particularly--we heard the polls cited and those
are obviously important. So I am interested in your concern
about that, what if anything we can do to keep that from
happening, and some disconnect between the polls and what we
read in the popular press in our own country. I would just cite
as one example the Washington Post story of Sunday where it
says:
``The crisis has stirred support for the insurgents across
both Sunni and Shiite communities, has also inflamed tensions
between Arabs and Kurds. `The Fallujah problem and the Sadr
problem are having a wider impact than we expected,' a senior
U.S. official involved in Iraq policy said. The effect has been
profound. The insurgency appears to be generating''--this is
not a quote now, just from the story. ``The insurgency appears
to be generating new alliances and tensions among the major
sectarian and ethnic groups in Iraq.''
Just two final things: ``The crises have helped boost the
standing of more radical Shiite and Sunni political leaders.''
Finally and perhaps most disturbingly: ``The extent of popular
support for the resistance is unclear. In nationwide surveys
taken before the sieges of Fallujah and Najaf, a growing
percentage of Iraqis said that they saw the U.S. forces as
occupiers, not liberators.''
I am concerned that at some point this may tragically morph
into the bad guys being aligned with Iraqi nationalism, and
what can we do to keep that from happening? Is it your sense
that that is in fact a real danger we are confronting, as at
least this anecdotal information or at least some of the
reports in our press suggest that it may be?
Secretary Wolfowitz. Even though I think some of that
anecdotal information is overstated--and it is amazing how
quickly people 8,000 miles away will conclude after 2 days
about some trend in Iraq--nevertheless, that basic concern is
very real. It has been something that has concerned me,
concerned General Abizaid, concerned everybody who is dealing
with this issue from day one.
What General Abizaid calls ``consent,'' which we had on a
large national scale on April 9 of last year, starts to slowly
slip away. How long you hang onto it, no one knows. But because
you know you do not hang onto it forever, it means it is very
important to accelerate the governance process. That is why I
believe it was the absolutely right thing to bring about this
transfer of sovereignty. If anything, I would have preferred to
see it even earlier.
Second, it is why it is so important to do things like
restoring electricity. It is not only jobs for people but it is
the sense that the Americans really meant what they said,
because the enemy propaganda out there, just so you know, is:
The Americans are going to leave; we are coming back; they just
came here to steal your oil and be gone. If the electricity
does not work, it sort of plays into that conspiracy theory.
There are two specific phenomena in the recent troubles
that are troubling and are referred to in those anecdotes. One
is with respect to the Sunni community, where we have troubles
to begin with. The impression created that we are creating
wholesale civilian casualties is terribly damaging, and the
lies transmitted on Al-Jazeera--and I use that word
deliberately. It is not a matter of how you balance the news or
which things you choose to cover. They absolutely make up
stories about American use of cluster bombs, American torture,
absolutely fabricated out of whole cloth.
Those lies, combined with the unfortunate truth that there
are civilian casualties in a fight like this, is one of our
challenges and one of the reasons for working with the
Governing Council in trying to find a solution in Fallujah that
at least minimizes the violence, even if we cannot avoid it
completely, is critical to that community.
With the Shia, I think it is a different story. Whatever
that allusion was that the radicals are getting more traction,
what I actually see is that we are seeing more and more
evidence that most Shia think this fellow Sadr, although his
father was a hero and a martyr and that is part of his
standing, that he is a gangster. On the other hand, they do not
want us marching into the holy city of Najaf with foreign
troops to take him out.
So the restraint that we are showing I think in dealing
with him I think is paying dividends. It is an information
warfare battle, as the military says. It is two different
fronts, very different fronts. I would not want to say that we
have won it, but I think if we are careful we can come out of
this ahead.
Senator Bayh. Thank you, gentlemen.
Mr. Chairman, my final just brief comment, two sentences.
This is a very difficult situation. If the consent necessary to
our being successful is a diminishing asset and the legitimacy
ultimately necessary for keeping that consent from diminishing,
but in fact increasing, does not occur until next January, in
fact a year from next January, we need to avoid a tipping point
at some place in there to make sure that we are ultimately
successful and the Iraqis are, too.
Chairman Warner. Senator, I would like to also say I
associate myself, and earlier in this hearing my first question
was on this question of sovereignty. The dictionary--this is
the dictionary definition: ``supreme and independent power or
authority in a state.'' I think we take note in this hearing of
the concern in myself, the Senator, and perhaps others. I think
we should start using the term ``limited sovereignty'' at this
time, rather than kind of saying we are transferring
sovereignty. I really feel strongly we could be raising
expectations and problems in the future if we do not be careful
right now.
Senator Clinton.
Senator Clinton. I agree with the chairman and Senator
Bayh. I think that this is a serious issue, because it is not
only the possibility that the definition will take on a life of
its own, causing all kinds of unintended consequences, but that
in fact the earlier questions that the chairman raised about
the rules of engagement for our military and the authority that
they have following this period of sovereignty, however one
defines it, I think are going to be very sticky.
Then you throw into the mix all these private contractors
running around, heavily armed, I think it becomes even more of
a challenge. So I believe, Mr. Secretary, you have gotten, at
least from some of us, a concern about what this means, how it
is going to be operationalized.
I just have, one suggestion would be to look for some
tangible way to demonstrate the benefits that flow from this
interim period to individual Iraqis. You said in passing that
one of the concerns we have to address is the efforts to
undermine our legitimacy and our role in Iraq by not only
making up stories about actions that never occurred under our
military control, but also this whole idea we are there to
steal the oil.
When I was in Iraq, I spoke with Ambassador Bremer. I have
raised this in other settings. I really urge the administration
to look at ways that we could demonstrate clearly that the
results from increased production of oil in Iraq are going to
benefit individual Iraqis. I am not an expert on this, but back
in the days when we opened the North Slope of Alaska for oil
exploration the State of Alaska, in conjunction with I think
the Federal Government, created a trust fund for the Alaskans.
Literally checks were sent out to Alaskans, saying: This is
your land; it is being exploited; this oil is going all over
the world; but you are given a stake in this future.
When I raised this with Ambassador Bremer, I said: Trust is
in short supply. As we know, consent and trust are essential
ingredients for success in this undertaking. We need to do
something and we need to be in the process of doing it before
sovereignty, however it is defined, takes over and all kinds of
deals are cut, because I am deeply concerned about those in the
Governing Council and those who might be on any expanded
transitional entity, who seem to be making out quite well, and
that will further undermine legitimacy.
So I raise it again. I hope that something, if not that,
can be looked at as a means of demonstrating both our
commitment to the Iraqi people in a tangible financial way and
also removing some of the sting of this idea that we are there
to steal the oil.
General Myers, as you may recall, during several hearings
before this committee I raised the subject of medical tracking
and surveillance of our troops. Both on February 13 and on
February 25, 2003, I asked what efforts were being taken
regarding medical tracking and surveillance and follow-up care.
I also requested and received a briefing from the DOD on the
proposed medical tracking plan for troops being deployed to
Iraq.
I came at this issue in large measure because of my
concerns about the problems that many of our veterans had after
the First Gulf War when they returned home and had a syndrome
of undiagnosed illnesses which at first were, frankly,
dismissed, chalked up to all kinds of personal stress-related
issues, and then only gradually taken seriously, and then
finally we were able to secure veterans benefits for a lot of
those troops.
Now, I raise this today because of the troubling treatment
of members of the 442nd Army National Guard MP unit out of
Orangeberg, New York. My staff and I have met with members of
this unit and they have a very disturbing story to tell.
Specifically, 12 of them were med-evaced out of Iraq for
various injuries--fractured feet, problems with HMMWVs rolling
over, all kinds of action-related injuries. But they were also
suffering similar symptoms to those that we heard out of the
First Gulf War: dizziness, headaches, sleeplessness, cramps,
blood in their urine, blood in their stool.
Yet when they went to the Army to ask for testing, they
were given the run-around. They became concerned about possible
exposure to radiation because of information they were given by
Dutch personnel who were stationed near them during their time
in Iraq. Based on some tests that the Dutch medical personnel
did of the place they were assigned to be, including using
radioactive detectors and other devices to test the
environmental exposure, the Dutch said they were leaving, they
would not stay there, and they moved their troops to another
location.
Several of the members of the 442nd who were medics were in
ongoing discussions with the Dutch, who were telling them: You
should move, too; there is all kinds of problems here. There
were bombed-out Bradley fighting vehicles and other equipment
that had been dragged and dumped there after the military
actions and other kinds of issues that, at least in the minds
of the Dutch, as it has been reported to us, caused them to
act.
So when these men returned home and kept trying to get
somebody to talk to them and were not given much of an answer,
they went to a New York newspaper. They went to the New York
Daily News with their concerns, and that newspaper paid for
testing and their blood was tested, being sent to Germany,
which had some advanced equipment.
The results came back saying that several of them had
elevated levels of radiation exposure, and they attributed it
to exposure to depleted uranium. Whether or not that is the
causation I am not here to suggest. But my bottom line is that
I think our troops deserve better.
I have already requested another briefing on medical
tracking, especially with respect to radiation exposure, which
we hope to schedule soon. But I think this raises a red flag
for me, because I had hoped that we would not make the mistakes
we made before. I now, on further investigation, have learned
that we have hundreds of troops sitting at Fort Dix who have
ongoing medical complaints and ailments, and they are basically
being given two choices: sit there--some have been sitting
there for months, Mr. Chairman--sit there and wait to be given
an appointment at Walter Reed or an appointment at someplace
else; or go ahead and sign this document and leave the military
and do not worry about it.
Some leave. But others are saying: Wait a minute; I want to
find out what is wrong with me; I am not going to leave; I want
treatment.
So, General, again I would ask that you take whatever
action is necessary--and Mr. Secretary as well on the civilian
side--to ensure that, first, these members of the 442nd get
whatever going is appropriate and necessary; that we take a
hard look at these radiation exposure numbers back; that we use
the more advanced testing techniques that are available in
Germany and Japan, but which our military are not currently
using. The tests that we are using for exposure to uranium or
radiation is not as specific as the tests that are being done
in Europe and Japan, and that we try to make sure that the
plans for medical surveillance, tracking, and treatment that I
was told about are actually implemented.
Specifically, I would appreciate a report about what is
happening at Fort Dix. I do not know, but I am concerned by the
story. We heard a lot of anecdotes today about how great
everybody is feeling about their mission, and I am glad to hear
those anecdotes. But I am increasingly hearing a lot of
anecdotes about how poorly people are being treated when they
return home.
So, General, I would like a very specific report as soon as
possible on the 442nd, on conditions at Fort Dix, what the Army
and the rest of the services intend to do about radiation
exposure, other kinds of environmental problems that may be
contributing to some of these symptoms.
General Myers. Thank you, Senator Clinton, and you are
absolutely right. We have to do a first class job of taking
care of our troops. We will look into the Fort Dix situation. I
have not--I do not believe I have seen those reports, but we
will look into that. That is very important.
In terms of the 442nd, my understanding is we have tested
some of their members through urine samples, which is the way I
guess you detect things like the depleted uranium and so forth.
We have not found anything. I will look at the differences
between European testing, Japanese testing, and our testing.
But you are right, we need to monitor and make sure we do
not overlook things that could cause them problems later on.
That is a very important part of our responsibility. So I will
get you those two reports.
Senator Clinton. I would look forward to that and a
continuing effort to keep me informed about what we are doing
on this medical testing and surveillance. I do not want to go
through what we went through after the First Gulf War.
Finally, Mr. Chairman, if I could, I appreciated Secretary
Wolfowitz's response to Senator Cornyn about the many tactics
that we should employ with respect to the war on terrorism. I
especially appreciated what you said about education. I spoke
this morning to the Council on Foreign Relations and urged that
we place universal education on a much higher priority than we
have heretofore. I will be introducing legislation to try to
better position our own country to do just what needs to be
done with respect to education.
I share your concern about the madrassas. I spoke with
President Musharraf when I was in Islamabad, and I feel
strongly that we need a system that can leverage public support
and private support. I also obviously am concerned about
investing in girls' education because it is still the smartest,
best investment with respect to promoting democracy and
stability, and girls still face enormous obstacles.
So I would welcome the support of the administration in my
Education for All legislation. I would welcome the support of
members of this committee on both sides of the aisle. Even if
we could not be immediately successful this year, it would send
the kind of statement that, frankly, I think we are in some
need of sending to the rest of the world, that we are not only
pursuing military action, not only recognizing the need for
intelligence and law enforcement, but that education and health
are critical components in our leadership in the war against
terrorism and on behalf of freedom.
Secretary Wolfowitz. Senator Clinton, I agree with you. I
think women are one of the most important forces for progress
and moderation in the Muslim world, for fairly obvious reasons.
Actually, in Iraq they are a substantial majority because of
the unfortunate killing that took place over the last couple of
decades. They are critical allies.
Chairman Warner. Senator Clinton, I would like very much to
work with you on that issue of education. I share that. I will
bring to your attention some interesting research I have done
on the subject.
Secretary Grossman, would you like to respond? Please do
so.
Mr. Grossman. I do not want to hold up the show here. But I
hope that you might also take for the record some information I
would like to provide to Senator Clinton on what is going on
with women and girls, both in Iraq and in Afghanistan.
[The information referred to follows:]
afghanistan
Since overthrowing the Taliban in Afghanistan in 2001, the United
States has implemented more than 175 projects for Afghan women aimed at
increasing political participation, building civil society, creating
economic opportunities, and increasing access to education and health
care.
Nearly 4 million Afghan children are enrolled in school. About 37
percent of those enrolled are girls, many more than at any point in
Afghanistan's history. Since 2001, the United States has dedicated
$60.5 million for primary education, to construct schools, to train
teachers, and to provide books and supplies. Nine public libraries in
eight provinces are participating in a campaign for women's literacy.
The United States has allocated $2.5 million for the construction
of Women's Resource Centers in 14 provinces throughout Afghanistan, and
is building three other provincial centers. In Kabul and nearby towns,
the United States supports the establishment of 10 neighborhood-based
Women's Centers. These centers will provide educational and health
programs, job skills training, and political participation training to
women. Through the U.S.-Afghan Women's Council, the United States is
providing $1 million in educational training at the Centers.
In addition, the Department of State's Bureau of Educational and
Cultural Affairs, on behalf of the U.S.-Afghan Women's Council, will be
awarding grants to U.S. public and private non-profit organizations
which responded to a recent Request For Proposals to support a series
of exchanges and training programs promoting women's political,
educational, and economic development in Afghanistan. These programs
will be carried out in partnership with provincial Women's Resource
Centers in Afghanistan.
On electoral assistance, the United States is providing $15 million
for voter registration, and $8.86 million for elections in Afghanistan,
including civic and voter education, focus group research, training for
political parties, and civic activists. The United States also provided
training in political advocacy for female delegates to the
Constitutional Loya Jirga in December 2003.
As media and journalism training is also important in building a
strong civil society, the United States has provided more than $500,000
to train female journalists and filmmakers, some of whom produced
``Afghanistan Unveiled,'' a film documentary about abuses against women
by the Taliban.
We have financed healthcare programs in Afghanistan totaling more
than $58 million, with $50 million forthcoming over the next 2 years.
These programs include: construction of women's wings in hospitals and
dormitories for female medical students; curriculum development for
healthcare workers; and maternal and child health, family planning, and
nutrition. The United States has rebuilt 140 health clinics and
facilities, and will rebuild 400 more over the next 3 years. We have
provided basic health services to more than 2.5 million people in 21
provinces; 90 percent of the recipients are women and children.
iraq
In Iraq, the United States has strongly supported Iraqi women's
participation in the political, economic, and social reconstruction of
their country. As in Afghanistan, our efforts are guided by the Iraqi
women themselves. The United States has dedicated $27 million to
projects that specifically help women and children.
In March, Secretary Powell announced two new initiatives aimed at
helping women in Iraq: a $10 million Women's Democracy Initiative and
the U.S.-Iraq Women's Network. The Democracy Initiative will extend
grants to non-governmental organizations to help Iraqi women acquire
skills and develop practices for effective participation in public
life. Grants will include projects on democracy education, leadership,
political and entrepreneurship training, indigenous NGO coalition-
building, and media initiatives. The Network is a voluntary public-
private partnership to forge links between U.S. and Iraqi women's
organizations.
The U.S. Agency for International Development's civil society
program for Iraq supports organizations that promote women's political
participation, legal enforcement of women's rights, and equal access to
public services. The program seeks to increase the ability of civil
society organizations to educate both women and men and advocate
effectively for women's legal, economic, and political rights.
The United States also supports the rehabilitation and equipping of
11 regional Women's Centers throughout Iraq. These centers offer
education, literacy classes, job skills, education and training for
financial independence, and access to information regarding health
care, legal services, and women's human rights.
We are also working with the Coalition Provisional Authority and
Members of Congress, in cooperation with the House Iraqi Women's Caucus
and Members of the Senate, on plans for an Iraqi women's training
program in Washington, DC. The program would feature sessions on public
service and advocacy, including how to be a public servant and how to
run for office.
As of December 2003, the United States has committed $86.8 million
on school projects. Emphasis is placed on ensuring equal benefits for
Iraqi women and girls. The Accelerated Learning Program, a pilot
program established in five Iraqi cities to provide out-of-school
children a second chance for education, has increased registration
among schoolage children--especially girls. Regarding higher learning,
Iraqis are participating in the Fulbright Program for the first time in
14 years. The first group of 19 men and 6 women included
representatives from all major ethnic and religious communities in
Iraq.
After years of neglect under Saddam Hussein, Iraq is beginning to
modernize its health services. Women's opportunities in the health
professions and maternal and child-care receive particular attention.
Through a master training program, more than 2,000 primary healthcare
providers are being trained to treat and prevent a range of medical
conditions. A review of the training program has shown that doctors'
skills have improved significantly, especially in women's healthcare. A
grant to the Iraqi Nursing Association will facilitate the recruitment
and training of hundreds more female nurses and will fund purchases of
new uniforms and nurses' kits. The United States has contributed to a
$2 million program to address emergency health needs, including the
completion of 18 primary health centers and the training of more than
97 midwives and 247 health promoters in Najaf and Karbala.
Mr. Grossman. I was not quick enough after Senator Sessions
spoke and General Myers responded, to just thank General Myers
for noting the role of the State Department in the creation of
the Iraqi police force. I just wanted to let Senator Sessions
know that we are committed to this, that we are committed to
support that mission, that our training people in Jordan,
training we are doing in Iraq, the money that Congress has
given us, is something we want to absolutely support, and that
is part of our mission as well and I wanted you to know that.
Thank you.
Chairman Warner. Thank you.
I say to my witnesses, do you feel there is any issue that
we have covered today--and we have covered a great many issues
in what I think is an excellent hearing--that you felt that you
needed another minute to address any particular point?
Secretary Wolfowitz. I think one thing I would like to do
for Senator Levin is get back to him as quickly as I can, first
on his request for information that he said he had been looking
for for months; and what I was trying to reconstruct from
memory about those briefings, because I want to confirm that my
memory is accurate.
Chairman Warner. I think you made that clear.
Senator Levin wanted to take a minute or 2 on the record
here.
Senator Levin. On that issue, I appreciate your looking
into the delay in obtaining documents that were promised long
ago from Mr. Feith. I will put into the record now the letter
which he wrote to me, which is now 2 months old, promising
those documents and promising them on a rolling basis as they
were collected, so that he did not have to collect them all
before he sent them, but as they were collected he committed to
send to me, through the chairman as a matter of fact and to all
the members of the committee through the chairman, these
documents that have not been forthcoming. So I would like that
to be made a part of the record, and I appreciate your follow-
up on that.
[The information referred to follows:]
[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
Senator Levin. Second, just one comment. You made reference
in terms of the briefings that were provided to the Office of
the Vice President and the staff of the NSC and the difference
between that briefing and the one that you received or the one
that the CIA received. There were significant differences. It
is not just one chart, and I think that you should want to
clear up the record on that matter.
There were many charts that were added for the National
Security Council staff and for the White House. There were
perhaps 40 differences between, in the briefings. It was not
just one chart--the one that was highly critical of the CIA--
but many charts, including a key chart on any alleged
relationship with Mohammed Atta and the Iraqi police at a
meeting that was referred to as possibly taking place in
Prague, but which the CIA is highly dubious about.
But there was a chart on that issue, according to published
sources. I have to rely on published sources, but I have also
seen the charts, on that issue.
So your statement about trying to minimize the difference
is inaccurate. I would appreciate your comparing those
briefings and just confirming for the record that there were
significant differences or numerous differences between those
two briefings, not just the one chart.
[The information referred to follows:]
[Deleted.]
Senator Levin. You said that it is common for there to be
conversations between staffs, discussions between staffs, as
though this kind of a 20- to 30-slide briefing on intelligence
matters by the DOD is something which was common. I would ask
you for the record if you know of any similar intelligence
briefing by a group inside the DOD with the Office of the Vice
President or the staff of the NSC on intelligence matters?
This was a very structured, perhaps 30-slide briefing,
handled by the Feith office without the knowledge of the CIA,
and to kind of just casually way, well, these discussions take
place commonly, is to cast this as an occurrence which is not
unusual. If this was a usual occurrence, I would like to know
if there is any other example you can provide us for the record
of formal, structured, intelligence presentation to the Office
of the Vice President, the National Security staff, by the
Defense Department outside of the CIA channels. This was a
presentation about CIA intelligence to those two very high-
level offices.
If you could present that evidence, if you have any, for
the record that would be appreciated.
[The information referred to follows:]
[Deleted.]
Senator Levin. Finally, if you would tell us for the record
whether you were aware of the classified letter from Under
Secretary Feith to the Senate Intelligence Committee dated
October 27, 2003, providing answers to questions for the
record, that was then reportedly leaked to The Weekly Standard.
That was a very major leak and a very major document allegedly,
because of what the Vice President said to the press on January
9, 2004, when he said that that Top Secret-Codeword document
allegedly reported by The Rocky Mountain News was ``your best
source of information,'' to use the Vice President's words, on
the relationship between Iraq and al Qaeda.
For the record, if you would tell us whether you were aware
then of that classified letter from Mr. Feith to the Senate
Intelligence Committee.
That will take care of my questions for the record, Mr.
Chairman.
[The information referred to follows:]
[Deleted.]
Chairman Warner. My quick round-up. I want to direct my
thoughts to Secretary Grossman, and I appreciate your joining
us today. This chart that has been displayed here, could you
tell us the extent to which the United Nations was involved in
formulating that, whether the Secretary General has--
understandably, Dr. Brahimi has indicated this is basically his
format. Has the Secretary General, so to speak, associated
himself with the accuracy of this; and the extent to which the
Security Council has reviewed this chart and, so to speak,
gives their blessing to it?
Mr. Grossman. Well, Senator, the chart of course comes from
the TAL, which was designed by the Iraqi Council. So no, that
was not something that the U.N. was involved in.
Chairman Warner. No, but it was adopted I think by the
Iraqi Council.
Mr. Grossman. By the Iraqi Council, that is correct. That
is their job. We were there, we obviously participated in that.
But that is their document and a good document.
The TAL then laid out this process. Then what you had after
the TAL was the Iraqi Governing Council and the CPA write to
the Secretary General of the United Nations and say: We need
help, we need help here in putting together the interim
government, and we also need some help and some advice on
whether it is possible to have elections, as the TAL originally
talked about.
Brahimi has been there, Ambassador Brahimi has been there a
couple of times----
Chairman Warner. Speak into your mike directly. We are
losing some of your voice.
Mr. Grossman. Ambassador Brahimi has been there a couple of
times and will go back the beginning of May. As I said, Ms.
Pirelli has been there to help on the election side. So I think
it would be fair to say--they would have to speak for
themselves--that everybody has essentially adopted this time
line.
We will have to wait and see. When Ambassador Brahimi
reports to Kofi Annan, he will come out and say: Yes, I accept
this----
Chairman Warner. That is important.
Mr. Grossman. Absolutely.
Chairman Warner. That bridge has not been crossed yet.
Mr. Grossman. No, sir.
Chairman Warner. The Secretary General is reviewing this?
Mr. Grossman. Yes, sir. Ambassador Brahimi--just a
technicality--went to Italy after he was in Iraq, and he will
be on his way to New York to make a report to the Secretary
General.
Secretary Wolfowitz. Actually, Brahimi did help to
negotiate the TAL specifically on the point that the interim
government does not have to be elected. As you recall, that was
the big point of dispute between the Governing Council and
Sistani.
Chairman Warner. That I understood.
Now, the Security Council, the extent to which they have
given any views with regard to this?
Mr. Grossman. They have not given views in regards to this
yet, no.
Chairman Warner. So the use of this chart today is I think
much clearer now in my view, and I want to make that
distinction for the record.
Lastly, Secretary Grossman, this issue which a number of us
raised about the use of the word ``sovereignty.'' I think I am
not mistaken. I followed the President's press conference the
other day very carefully. I believe he used the word
``sovereignty'' without any qualifications. Do you have some
concern that expectations could be raised unduly if we do not
start using phraseology which indicates very clearly that
limited sovereignty at this time, or something? Because I do
not find that what we are doing is consistent with the
dictionary definition, nor with the common acceptance of the
term ``sovereignty'' in international law.
Mr. Grossman. Well, you asked us to take seriously what
this committee has said today and we certainly will. But I
think what Paul said earlier in response to a question is
right, which is to say that there is limited sovereignty in
Iraq certainly on the 1st of July, and it is limited by the----
Chairman Warner. It is limited.
Senator Levin. Limited by what?
Mr. Grossman. By the TAL and also by U.N. Security Council
Resolution 1511. It seems to me--my opinion about this is
Iraqis, near as I can tell, have a vision for where they would
like to take their society, and they realize they cannot get to
that vision without security, and they cannot get to security
without the support of the coalition.
Chairman Warner. I concur in that totally. I just think
that in the use of the term on what is happening on the 30th we
would be wise to employ some equivocation, or maybe not
equivocation but some limitation on what the sovereignty is.
Mr. Grossman. I take your point.
Chairman Warner. Fine. Thank you.
Senator Levin. Mr. Chairman, just on that point, on whether
the TAL binds a sovereign government, are you saying that the
agreement that was arrived at without a sovereign Iraqi
government being involved is binding on a sovereign, limited or
otherwise, Iraqi government?
Mr. Grossman. We certainly believe that it is binding on
the government that will take over on the 1st of July.
Senator Levin. Can you give us the legal opinion on that? I
think it is very important, these questions about--because it
affects our status of forces, among other things; also the
Iraqi group, the Survey Group, but a lot of other things. Could
you give us the legal opinions on this issue that a number of
us have raised, as to whether or not a sovereign government in
Iraq is bound by the TAL, is bound by--and whether the U.N.
resolution relative to the force that is there protects our
force after July 1, 2003, to take whatever military action we
determine is appropriate despite what the wishes could be of a
sovereign government?
[The information referred to follows, along with a response
from the DOD:]
[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
The Law of Administration for the State of Iraq for the
Transitional Period (TAL) is the supreme law of Iraq. The Interim Iraqi
Government (IIG), the first phase of the transitional period, will have
the power with respect to: making appointment of persons within the
government; the use of the Iraqi Armed Forcs; and, concluding
international agreements in the areas of diplomatic relations and
economic reconstruction, including Iraq's sovereign debt. However, it
will not be able to amend the TAL. The annex to the TAL also states
that the IIG, as an interim government, will refrain from taking any
actions affecting Iraq's destiny beyond the limited interim period.
After elections are held and the Iraqi Transitional Government, the
second phase of the transitional period, is in place, Article 3 of the
TAL provides that ``[n]o amendment of the TAL may be made except by the
three-fourths majority of the members of the National Assembly and the
unanimous approval of the Presidency Council.''
Chairman Warner. Those are the points that we have raised.
I think we need to get the legal opinions that support
this. For myself, I hope it is true, by the way, so I am not
questioning whether or not, the sufficiency of the wisdom. But
we have to be comfortable that our forces in fact have that
kind of power and are not going to be restricted by a sovereign
government. Otherwise they are going to be in limbo. There is
going to be a period of great uncertainty, which our troops
should not be confronted with.
I would simply add, should there be some disagreement as to
the conduct of say an individual soldier or a military person,
what recourse could be taken against them, and how are we going
to protect them in the performance of their duties.
While, General, you say quite appropriately the Iraqi army
then becomes a partner, I would hope that they would not be
issuing any orders. I am not sure what partnership means when
it comes to the military. I want to make certain that U.S.
commanders and to the extent the British commanders are
associated in that chain of command, and coalition commanders,
that is the chain. When we introduce the Iraqi army as a
partner, I think we need clarification of exactly what that
would mean on the command chain.
Secretary Wolfowitz. Mr. Chairman, we will get you that
information. I think it is very important to have clarity, and
I appreciate the opportunity.
I think it is also important to be clear, this is not
something brand new. I mean, we have a similar situation in
Afghanistan. The government, the sovereign government in
Bosnia, has been constrained by Dayton ever since it was
established. I do not want to make too much comparison. These
are different situations. But with our NATO allies and with
Korea, there are obviously provisions in wartime that transfer
military command to U.S. commanders.
Chairman Warner. I just want to make certain that those
protections are in here, because you can use those as examples.
In the 25 years I have been here, I have worked through almost
all of those situations. But here we have 100,000-plus
Americans involved and it is exceedingly important, and a level
of insurrection which is most regrettable at this point in time
and no certainty that is going to cease and desist on June 30.
Senator Levin. Would you include in that, please, what did
the President mean, then, when he said the other night that we
would be negotiating the status of forces agreement with the
new sovereign government on July 1? What did he mean by that?
If we already have a status of forces agreement under U.N.
resolution and under the TAL, then what does that mean when he
said that? If you could include that, it would be helpful.
[The information referred to follows:]
Article 59 of the TAL provides that Iraq's Transitional Government,
which will assume authority no later than January 31, 2005, following
national elections, will be authorized to conclude binding
international agreements (which could include a SOFA regarding the
activities of the Multinational Force (MNF) in Iraq under UNSCR 1511
and any subsequent relevant resolutions.)
We are currently planning to defer consideration of a negotiated
SOFA with Iraq until the Transitional Government has been established.
Pending entry into force of any future security agreement, the TAL
recognizes that UNSCR 1511 and any subsequent relevant resolutions will
govern the activities of the MNF in Iraq. Our view is that the ``all
necessary measures'' language in UNSCR 1511 authorizes immunities from
Iraqi jurisdiction to the extent such immunities are necessary for the
fulfillment of the MNF's mission.
Chairman Warner. My own view is I hope a lot of this is
rewritten carefully not to rely on the U.N. resolution of
October 3, 2003, that we really have a new resolution that will
bring greater clarity to this entire situation, the status of
forces and what degree of sovereignty Iraq will have on the
June 30, 2004.
Thank you very much. We will now go upstairs to room 222.
The hearing is adjourned.
[Additional information follwows:]
Senator Warner. Describe the role and powers of the U.S. Ambassador
to Iraq after June 30, 2004.
Mr. Grossman. As Chief of Mission, the U.S. Ambassador to Iraq,
John Negroponte, will have full responsibility for the direction,
coordination, and supervision of all USG employees in country--except
those under the command of the U.S. area military commander or seconded
to an international organization. Working closely with the area
military commander, the Ambassador will also be responsible for the
security of the mission as well as the personnel (or whom he is
responsible.
The Ambassador will report to the President, through the Secretary
of State, and be responsible for the overall coordination and
supervision of all USG policies and activities in Iraq--apart from
those which fall under the authority of the U.S. area military
commander. The President has charged the Ambassador and the U.S. area
military commander to ensure the closest cooperation and mutual
support.
Other responsibilities of the Ambassador will include the regular
review of programs, personnel, and funding levels, and ensuring that
all agencies attached to the mission do likewise. Every executive
branch agency under ambassadorial authority must obtain the
Ambassador's approval before changing the size, composition, or mandate
of its staff.
Additionally, all USG personnel (again, other than those under the
command of the U.S. area military commander or on the staff of an
international organization) must obtain country clearance before
entering Iraq on official business. The ambassador may refuse country
clearance or may place conditions or restrictions on visiting USG
personnel as necessary.
Finally, the ambassador must discharge all responsibilities with
professional excellence and in full conformance with the law and the
highest standards of ethical conduct, ensuring equal opportunity and
tolerating no discrimination or harassment of any kind.
[Questions for the record with answers supplied follow:]
Question Submitted by Senator Susan Collins
lakhdar brahimi's proposal
1. Senator Collins. Mr. Grossman, the United Nations (U.N.) envoy,
Lakhdar Brahimi, proposed that the Iraqi Governing Council be dissolved
when the United States hands over power on June 30 and be replaced with
a caretaker government of cabinet ministers who would rule until
elections are held. Under Brahimi's plan, the ministers, a president,
and two vice presidents would be chosen by the U.N., in consultation
with the U.S. occupation authority, the Governing Council, and other
institutions. President Bush recently praised Brahimi's efforts. While
this proposal is a fresh approach to the dilemma over Iraq's
transition, it would effectively allow Iraqis less participation in the
choice of the interim government than they would have had under the
original U.S. plan to hold caucuses in each of Iraq's 18 provinces--a
plan that was itself rejected by the country's top Shiite Muslim cleric
for being insufficiently representative. Already, several members of
Iraq's Governing Council have spoken out against a U.N.-appointed
transitional government. We are only a couple of months away from the
June 30 handover date and, currently, we still have no concrete
transition plan. I understand the details of the Brahimi proposal are
currently being negotiated. Can you update us on where these
negotiations stand right now and give us an assessment of whether a
plan is close to being finalized?
Mr. Grossman. As we meet today, U.N. Special Envoy Lakhdar Brahimi
has returned to Iraq to resume consultations with Iraqis and U.S.
officials to identify candidates for key positions--prime minister,
president, two deputy presidents, and cabinet ministers. He is working
to form a consensus among Iraq's communities on the structure,
composition, and authorities of the Iraqi Interim Government (IIG). The
U.N. has assumed a leading role in achieving key near-term political
priorities--forming the interim government and preparing for elections.
We expect the U.N. to continue to play a vital role on political and
economic reconstruction after June 30.
This Iraqi Interim Government will be the internationally
recognized, sovereign government of Iraq. Its legitimacy will derive
both from anticipated Iraqi domestic consensus that it is the highest
political authority in Iraq and expected international backing. The
Iraqi Interim Government is a crucial, albeit transitional, step toward
a representative, elected government--and its structures reflect the
understood desire of the Iraqi people that only an elected government
should have the power to decide the longer-term future of Iraq.
______
Question Submitted by Senator Daniel K. Akaka
radioactive sources in iraq
2. Senator Akaka. General Myers, I have a question on the security
of radioactive sources in Iraq. This is an issue I raised with
Secretary Rumsfeld in a hearing almost a year ago. I remain deeply
concerned about the possibility terrorists could obtain radioactive
material and use it to explode a dirty bomb. I received a response from
the Defense Department in January, at which time I was told that all
radiation sources, which total over 600, have been consolidated at a
central location and are under continuous guard. On April 11, the
International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) issued a report that states
that ``there has been extensive removal of equipment and, in some
instances, removal of entire buildings. Other information available to
the Agency indicates that large quantities of scrap, some of it
contaminated, have been transferred out of Iraq, from sites monitored
by the IAEA.'' Could you comment on the IAEA report? Is radioactive
material in Iraq secure or not and is some of it missing?
General Myers. [Deleted.]
[Whereupon, at 1:42 p.m., the committee adjourned.]