[Senate Hearing 108-865]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
S. Hrg. 108-865
ACCELERATING U.S. ASSISTANCE TO IRAQ
=======================================================================
HEARING
BEFORE THE
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS
UNITED STATES SENATE
ONE HUNDRED EIGHTH CONGRESS
SECOND SESSION
__________
SEPTEMBER 15, 2004
__________
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COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS
RICHARD G. LUGAR, Indiana, Chairman
CHUCK HAGEL, Nebraska JOSEPH R. BIDEN, Jr., Delaware
LINCOLN CHAFEE, Rhode Island PAUL S. SARBANES, Maryland
GEORGE ALLEN, Virginia CHRISTOPHER J. DODD, Connecticut
SAM BROWNBACK, Kansas JOHN F. KERRY, Massachusetts
MICHAEL B. ENZI, Wyoming RUSSELL D. FEINGOLD, Wisconsin
GEORGE V. VOINOVICH, Ohio BARBARA BOXER, California
LAMAR ALEXANDER, Tennessee BILL NELSON, Florida
NORM COLEMAN, Minnesota JOHN D. ROCKEFELLER IV, West
JOHN E. SUNUNU, New Hampshire Virginia
JON S. CORZINE, New Jersey
Kenneth A. Myers, Jr., Staff Director
Antony J. Blinken, Democratic Staff Director
(ii)
?
C O N T E N T S
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Page
Biden, Hon. Joseph R., Jr., U.S. Senator from Delaware, opening
statement...................................................... 4
Bowab, Mr. Joseph W., Deputy Assistant Secretary for Foreign
Assistance Programs and Budget, Bureau of Resource Management,
U.S. Department of State, Washington, DC....................... 17
Prepared statement........................................... 18
Lugar, Hon. Richard G., U.S. Senator from Indiana, opening
statement...................................................... 1
Schlicher, Mr. Ronald L., Deputy Assistant Secretary for Iraq,
Bureau of Near Eastern Affairs, U.S. Department of State,
Washington, DC................................................. 9
Prepared statement........................................... 13
Additional Questions Submitted for the Record
By Senator Lugar............................................. 46
By Senator Biden............................................. 59
(iii)
ACCELERATING U.S. ASSISTANCE TO IRAQ
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WEDNESDAY, SEPTEMBER 15, 2004
U.S. Senate,
Committee on Foreign Relations,
Washington, DC.
The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 9:35 a.m. in room
SD-419, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Hon. Richard G. Lugar
(chairman of the committee), presiding.
Present: Senators Lugar, Hagel, Biden, Feingold, and Bill
Nelson.
OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR RICHARD G. LUGAR, CHAIRMAN
The Chairman. This hearing of the Senate Foreign Relations
Committee is called to order. The committee meets today to
discuss the progress in the reconstruction of Iraq.
We welcome our witnesses, Mr. Ron Schlicher, Deputy
Assistant Secretary of State in the Bureau of Near Eastern
Affairs, and Mr. Joseph Bowab, Deputy Assistant Secretary for
Foreign Assistance Programs and Budget.
Nearly two months ago, Mr. Schlicher testified before this
committee on progress in Iraq after the transfer of sovereignty
to the new Interim Iraqi Government. He told the committee that
Ambassador Negroponte had initiated a comprehensive
reevaluation of U.S. assistance. Today, the committee looks
forward to discussing the results of this review and the plans
for assisting Iraq in the coming months.
Of the $18.4 billion that Congress appropriated for Iraq
more than 10 months ago, only $1.14 billion has been disbursed
as of September 8. Although we recognize these funds must not
be spent unwisely, this slow pace of reconstruction spending
means that we are failing to fully take advantage of one of our
most potent tools to influence the direction of Iraq. As Iraqis
prepare for elections, they are looking for signs of stability.
Few signs of stability are more convincing than successful
reconstruction projects that boost the economy, repair
infrastructure, and restore municipal services.
This week, the administration announced it would be
shifting more than $3 billion from funds intended for Iraqi
reconstruction projects to other purposes; mainly, enhancing
security by accelerating the training of Iraqi security
personnel. Expanding Iraqi security forces and improving their
capabilities are vital and urgent objectives, but we must be
clear that the purpose of establishing security is to pave the
way to achieve other goals, including physical reconstruction
and economic regeneration. If the shift of these funds slows
down reconstruction, security may suffer in the long run.
In short, security and reconstruction must be achieved
simultaneously. If a lack of funding threatens to impede
reconstruction, the administration must replace the
reprogrammed funds with allied contributions or new requests
for appropriations. The United States must continue to use
every tool at our disposal to accelerate stabilization and
reconstruction in Iraq and to strengthen the nascent Iraqi
Government.
I would like to quote from a remarkable letter my office
received in August from a U.S. Marine second lieutenant serving
as a platoon leader in Iraq. He writes,
My guys never fail to step up to any challenge we are
given as a platoon. It is pretty awe inspiring to roll
up on what you suspect to be an IED--that's an
improvised explosive device--on the side of the road--
common here--and to hear one of your PFCs say, ``No
problem, sir,'' when you say to him you need him to
take a closer look before the platoon can pass through
the area. Then to watch him sling his rifle across his
back, and crouch dangerously close to the suspected
device with a set of binoculars in his hands to confirm
whether it is or is not an explosive makes you feel
very proud.
This war is one that cannot be won by marines and
soldiers. The only thing we can do is to keep a lid on
it and buy time. We chase the Mujahadin around and in
so doing catch and kill a few, or at least deter their
actions. However, in a society with no jobs, a
faltering economy, and little or no infrastructure,
there is plenty of incentive to fight. That incentive
needs to be removed. Marines and soldiers don't remove
it. Civil Affairs teams and NGOs do. There are not
enough of these people in Iraq, and they are not
organized in such a way so that they can respond to
specific needs. You are less likely to shoot the guy
who is trying to build a school for your kids and turn
on your water. These individuals need to take greater
risks and be out there with us. That same PFC who will
run up dangerously close to what could be a command-
detonated explosive will less willingly and adeptly
build a school or turn on the power for a village. It
is not in his job description. However, he will do a
superior job providing security for the civilians who
do perform these tasks.
I simply add--that's the end of the quote--that this is the
theme of our hearing today.
What this young lieutenant recognizes is that economic
rehabilitation is not secondary to the military mission--it is
a vital and necessary component of our security strategy.
Economic progress is dependent on security, but security can be
improved only so much without corresponding economic gains that
give the responsible majority of Iraqis a greater stake in
their own future. Reconstruction progress gives Iraqis a
tangible reason to hope, to take risks, and to struggle for a
society that is not dominated by forces of destruction.
The lieutenant's words also underscore the need to improve
our overall capacity to stabilize failing or war-torn nations
and to assist in their reconstruction, sometimes called
``nation building.'' Earlier this year, the Foreign Relations
Committee unanimously passed the Stabilization and
Reconstruction Civilian Management Act of 2004. I appreciate
the State Department's letter endorsing the purposes of S. 2127
and ask that the letter be submitted in the record.\1\ The
Defense Science Board is also expected to support the
legislation in a forthcoming study.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ The letter referred to follows this statement.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The State Department has now established an Office for
Reconstruction and Stabilization as called for in the
legislation. The new office, headed by Carlos Pasqual, is doing
a government-wide inventory of the civilian assets that might
be available for stabilization and reconstruction tasks. It is
also pursuing the idea proposed in S. 2127 of a Readiness
Reserve to enable rapid mobilization of post-conflict
stabilization personnel.
In addition, I hope that the office will develop the
concept of a 250-person active duty Response Readiness Corps.
In Army terms, that is less than a small battalion of well-
trained people--a modest but vigorous force-multiplier that
would greatly improve our nation's stabilization capacity. This
Corps would be composed of State Department and USAID employees
who have the experience and technical skills to manage
stabilization and reconstruction tasks in a hostile
environment.
As we move to improve our own civilian operations in Iraq,
we must continue to press the international community for help.
The recent National Conference held in Iraq resulted in a real
choice of delegates. This is a good first step toward holding
an election next January for a National Assembly that will
draft a permanent constitution and prepare for full national
elections by the end of 2005.
The United Nations provided some expertise to help convene
the National Conference, but it seems reluctant to provide more
extensive and enduring assistance. Ambassador Qazi, the new
United Nations Special Representative in Iraq, has expressed
his commitment to returning UN workers to Iraq in the near
future. But recent conversations with UN staff indicate that a
significant UN presence will not be in place until November. I
would encourage the Secretary General to move more boldly to
reestablish a meaningful UN presence in Iraq.
I am pleased that NATO has sent a team of 57 officers to
begin training Iraqi security forces and will help rebuild
Iraq's Defense Ministry. A proposal to extend this mission, and
perhaps set up a training academy in the region, is circulating
among the Alliance. The United States should continue to press
our allies to provide as much assistance as possible.
The terrorists and insurgents must know that the world will
remain steadfast despite their killing of innocents. Every
terrorist act around the globe, in Madrid, Israel, Russia,
Indonesia or elsewhere, reminds us that we cannot afford to let
Iraq become a failed state or a haven for terrorists.
Americans must reassure the Iraqis that the U.S. will
remain a steady partner for the long term and that we not only
share their hopes for peace and a better life, but will
continue to provide assistance to help them get there.
------
United States Department of State,
Washington, DC, 20520, August 11, 2004.
The Honorable Richard G. Lugar, Chairman,
Committee on Foreign Relations,
United States Senate.
Dear Mr. Chairman:
The Department of State has reviewed the Stabilization and
Reconstruction Civilian Management Act of 2004 (S. 2127) as reported by
your committee.
The Department supports the purposes of S. 2127 and the
Administration has been leading a similar effort as recently notified
to your committee. The Secretary has established an Office of the
Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization (S/CRS) within the
Office of the Secretary. S/CRS will oversee and coordinate intra-
Departmental and interagency civilian post-conflict and crisis response
efforts. This Office's vision is largely in line with the vision in
your bill.
The Department is currently working to secure necessary interagency
involvement including details from key agencies to provide requisite
expertise in specialized areas of reconstruction, stabilization, and
humanitarian assistance. The Department is also developing an
Operational Readiness Reserve concept to enable and test methods for
agile and responsive mobilization of staff to meet these needs.
Experience gained in the formation and initial operation of S/CRS will
inform Administration decisions that could lead to creation of a more
robust Office of Stabilization and Reconstruction Operations. As
currently envisaged, this office would have many of the attributes
called for in S. 2127.
During this formative stage, sufficient authority exists to
establish S/CRS and develop the concept to mobilize agency resources.
As we move forward, we will work with you and provide more detailed
comments on the entire bill. However, of greatest immediate benefit
would be the provisions set forth in Section 5 of S. 2127 that
authorize the President's request for a $100 million account to meet
immediate needs in a complex crisis and provide other special
assistance authorities including waiver of certain transfer and
drawdown limitations. The ability to reallocate resources from a broad
range of accounts in a time of crisis is essential if there is to be an
effective and timely response to the situation in the affected country
or region. We would appreciate your support in securing appropriations
and authorities in Section 5.
The Department greatly appreciates the willingness of your
Committee to address how best to respond to failing, failed, or post-
conflict states. The Department looks forward to working with you on
creating the resource framework for the new Office in the near term and
on future efforts that could lead to building a robust operational
capability in sequence.
The Office of Management and Budget advises that there is no
objection to the submission of this report from the standpoint of the
President's program.
Sincerely,
Peter N. Petrihos,
Acting Assistant Secretary,
Legislative Affairs.
The Chairman. We look forward to the insights of our
expert witnesses on these issues.
I would like now to call upon the ranking member, Senator
Biden.
OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR JOSEPH R. BIDEN, JR.,
RANKING MEMBER
Senator Biden. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
Gentlemen, welcome.
As you've indicated, Mr. Chairman, we have two very bright,
informed, and dedicated public servants before us today, and
dealing with an area that, I think, unless we get a much better
handle on, we are going to, quote, ``lose Iraq.''
There's such a disconnect between what I hear stated about
how well things are going and the reality in the situation on
the ground. And I think both of you, because you've testified
before and we've talked before, know that I've tried to find
the positive sides about the things we're doing. I think, to
use a phrase that former Deputy Defense Secretary Hamre used a
year ago, the window of opportunity is closing. I think it's
about ready to slam shut.
So the two witnesses we have today, Mr. Chairman, are the
guys who have been given the dubious distinction and
responsibility of actually making the policy that the
administration, with the support, or lack thereof, of the
Congress, has said should be implemented. I think this is our
single-highest foreign-policy priority right now, in the next
weeks. And I hope we have an opportunity, Mr. Chairman, before
we go out, to hear from--and they won't know as much as you
guys know, but from senior administration officials at the
Secretary level, to get a sense of whether or not--how much of
a priority this is, how urgent they see the responsibilities
you're exercising are.
The President has frequently described Iraq as, ``the
central front on the war on terror.'' Well, by that definition,
success in Iraq is a key standard by which to measure the war
on terror. And by that measure, I think the war on terror is in
trouble.
We're all glad that Saddam sits in jail. We're all glad
that Saddam is awaiting justice, the justice he deserves. But
16 months after all this talk and banter and the political to
and fro about ``mission accomplished'' and making fun of the
phrase ``mission accomplished,'' Iraq remains a very active and
increasingly active war zone. Increasingly active war zone. Not
diminishing; increasingly active war zone.
And the insurgency is growing. It is more lethal. I will
not mention, because it was in a closed hearing, who the senior
official was that told us not many months ago, briefing us all,
``This is just a bunch of thugs out there.'' And I remember our
friend John McCain going ballistic and saying, ``Don't say
that.''
We have a much broader problem here than the way it was
characterized 8 months ago. And it's clear that it is. We're
yielding control. And I'm not second-guessing the military
judgment. I don't know enough to know whether or not they have
the capacity to do something other than that, but the number of
attacks on our forces have increased from 700 in March to
nearly 2,700 in August. This turning over of sovereignty, we
turned over sovereignty without capacity. Allawi has
sovereignty and very little capacity.
The Defense Secretary, God love him, says, last Thursday,
``We trained up 90,000 Iraqi forces.'' Give me a break. Not one
single solitary Iraqi policeman has gone through the totality
of the training, including the 24 weeks on-the-ground training.
Not one, to the best of my knowledge. Maybe something happened
in the last 5 days.
My frustration is not directed against you guys. It's time
we level here, we level with the American people.
We recently passed the ominous milestone of a thousand
dead. The part that goes unnoticed--and it's real--a real
horrific impact--is, in the month of August, there were 900
casualties of American troops, beyond the dead.
And, you know, we can go back--and I'm not going to do it--
and argue about--because some of the stuff you guys even said
should be done didn't get done--argue whether or not the
miscalculations that were referenced by the Chief Executive
were ``miscalculations.'' The way he said ``miscalculations,''
it reminds me of people talking about domestic violence. You
say ``domestic violence,'' it sounds kind of domesticated, like
a cat. It's the most vicious, ugly kind of violence there is.
These miscalculations were incredibly consequential. And it's
time to correct the miscalculations, but I don't think there is
much time.
Virtually every problem we've encountered was predicted
before the war by this committee, by outside experts, by some
of you inside the administration. But the part that I don't see
here is a learning curve. I don't see any learning curve from
the repeated mistakes in judgment we've been making and from
the civilian side.
And I'm not going to go through the litany, because it's
almost piling on these days. We all know it: Greeted as
liberators, Chalabi was the guy, you know, the expatriates
would bring legitimacy, there would be plenty of oil, we go
through the whole thing. It's not worth going back over it.
That's past. We were wrong. The administration was dead wrong
in its assumptions.
But now, what do we do? And I think that we're going to be
judged from this point on not by our miscalculations, but the
squandered opportunities, which gets me to the last trip with
Senators Lindsey Graham and Tom Daschle that I--now I guess
it's 8 weeks--we were sitting there on a Sunday talking to our
flag officers, seven in a room, private. And they're the first
to tell you they don't have the right mix of forces. They're
the first to tell you that they need, desperately, this money
spent.
General Chiarelli of the 1st Cavalry, you know, a guy who
can shoot straight and kill people, tough guy, serious player,
brings us into the 1st Cavalry headquarters. He has Sadr City,
and he does something, Mr. Chairman, I've not seen before. You
know, they laid out a classic military PowerPoint presentation
and they said, ``Let me show you the piles of garbage in Sadr
City.'' And they actually showed you pictures. And then they
put up a hot-point in Sadr City with 12-feet piles of garbage,
raw garbage. Then they showed Humvees. They had a picture of a
Humvee going through sewage in Sadr City, past homes, that was
up to above the hubcaps. Then we saw kids sitting there. They
went through this, and I wonder, where is all this going? Then
they overlaid a map of the violent incidents in Sadr City with
another map which plotted those areas of Sadr City lacking in
essential services. And guess what? The two maps matched up
exactly. Exactly. And then Chiarelli says to us, now, while I
have been able to spend however many millions of dollars,
here's where I spent it. And he showed where he spent it and
what he did.
How long will it take to build a sewage system? Well, you
ask the engineers that, and they say, well, 2\1/2\ years, we
can have a system for Baghdad. And this guy's saying, hey, I
don't need a system for Baghdad. I need PCV coming out of this
home going into the Tigris River temporarily so the kids in
this family don't have to swim in feces as they walk out their
front door.
So he does this overlay, and he shows us, concretely, the
number of attacks, the discontent coming from the area where he
spent the $30- or $40 million, whatever it was, and it drops
off a cliff.
And then I find out we've spent out of $18.4 billion that
Kerry and Bush are beating each other up about, only about a
billion.
And so, folks, you know, the supplemental was presented to
us almost exactly a year ago. They said, ``This is''--I'm
quoting Bremer--``This is urgent. The urgency of military
operations is self-evident. The funds for nonmilitary action in
Iraq are equally urgent. Unless this supplemental passes
quickly, Iraqis face an indefinite period with blackouts 8
hours daily. The link to the safety of our troops is indirect,
but real.'' He also said, ``No part of the supplemental is
dispensable, and no part is more important than any other. This
is a carefully considered request.''
How many months ago was that? And one of my first questions
was, hey, guys, how much money have we spent? This urgent
supplemental. It's incompetence, from my perspective, looking
at this.
I know you're going to present us with the details of the
plan to restructure the aid program, and I hope there's a
specific plan to use the money more effectively and more
quickly. And there are other critical questions. What is the
administration's plan? What is the administration's plan on how
to deal with the no-go zones in the Sunni triangle, which seem
to get bigger and bigger and bigger? Are we just going to cede
the triangle? That may be the right thing to do, but what's the
plan? Don't tell me we're doing better, when you're ceding more
and more and more cities within the triangle to the control of
the old Ba'athists and insurgents. What's the administration
going to do to secure the commitment from NATO for a meaningful
contribution to the training program of the Iraqi military?
Where is the administration going to get additional police
trainers from countries that have expertise? What's the plan?
I sat with the President of the Bundestag yesterday. I
think you may have met with him, as well. I was very blunt with
him. I said, ``Mr. President, you Germans don't like--
especially the SPD--you don't like the fact that we're in Iraq.
Well, you've got to get over it. You've got to get over it.''
This administration, in my view--just me speaking--has,
from a civilian side of this, made one blunder after another
since Saddam Hussein's statue has fallen. But don't wait for a
Kerry administration; (a) it may not come, and, (b) if it
comes, it may be too late.
And he looked at me, and I said--and I quoted President
Chirac's comments to me from Christmas. He said, ``The worst
mistake you all made was sending in 150,000 American forces.
The only mistake that would be worse than that would be pulling
them out.'' And I looked at him, and I said, ``Get ready.''
This becomes Lebanon, somebody--this President, the next
President, whoever the President is, is going to be turning and
saying, OK, guys, you don't want to help? No problem. It's your
problem.
So my question is, What's the administration doing? What
are you doing to get these people trained? You could, tomorrow,
take a thousand Iraqis, 500, 250--we're trying to do this--
potential leadership corps, put them on a plane and send them
to Germany. They know how to train the gendarmerie. They know
how to train cops who are paramilitary. Where is the sense of
urgency?
What's the administration's plan to recruit a dedicated
force, called for by Resolution 1546? This is above your
paygrade, and mine, to answer this question. But, seriously,
all kidding aside, What's our exit strategy? I'll finish this
up, Mr. Chairman.
My frustration--I apologize for letting it show--I have
been trying to be good the last 2 years here and not let this
frustration show, but I think we're at the end of our rope. I
think we're at the end of our rope here, unless we get smart
real quick.
The President says, in the Post today, ``We're going to
have elections.'' Tell me how we're going to have elections.
Tell me how you're going to set up thousands of polling places
by January when we haven't even gotten the commitment from the
Security Council that they made to get roughly 3,500 forces to
protect the U.N. Security--a U.N. force to go in there and set
up these polling places. The expectation, honestly, by everyone
when that passed was that Kofi would be able to put somewhere
between 2,000 to 3,500 people in there. He's now talking 35--
three-five. And there's going to be elections?
As an old joke used to go, ``What's the plan, Stan?''
What's the plan? There is a deafening silence from the
administration. Incredible rhetoric. Deafening silence. How are
you gonna get the force that the Security Council said would be
provided for the U.N. to set up these elections? Or someone
tell me we don't need the force.
And, by the way, I'm not suggesting that you're going to
get the French to send in troops, or the Germans. But a little
imagination. Maybe we say to the French and the Germans, OK,
let's make a side deal. Put even more troops in Afghanistan,
allowing us to take troops out of Afghanistan to put into Iraq
to protect the security--this force. So what's the plan? What's
the plan to convince our allies to make good on their pledges,
including financial assistance, debt relief?
I mean, my colleagues here, the three gentlemen I'm with,
they've forgotten more about this than most people know. But
just read the U.N. resolution. It's very specific. It is not a
generic commitment the Security Council made. It's a specific
commitment. To the best of my knowledge, not one single
solitary commitment made in that resolution has been met by a
single solitary member of the Security Council.
Well, I apologize for my frustration. But I'll tell you
what, Mr. Chairman--it's going to sound melodramatic, but it's
reality--you know, as I said once before, I'm from Delaware.
The Dover Air Force Base is the place that every single coffin
out of Afghanistan and Iraq sets on U.S. soil first. We owe it
to those young women and men to get this right. We owe it to
them to get it right. We owe it to them to have a plan.
And so hope today, on one piece of than plan, how we are
going to--or why we can't distribute, after--what is it? How
many months?--12 months, 13 months, 9 months, whatever the
number is, when we urgently responded to the urgent request of
the administration to urgently pass this supplemental, to
urgently get $18-plus-billion to Iraq because, as the former
Administrator of the CPA said, there is an indirect, but real,
connection between whether or not the lights go on, the sewage
gets cleaned up, the school gets built and whether or not an
Iraqi is there shooting or aiding and abetting, or hiding, or
allowing someone else to shoot and kill an American soldier. I
believe Bremer was right when he said there's a direct
connection.
So what are we going to do about it? That's the purpose,
from my perspective, and the reason why I'm here, to try to
find out some answers to those questions.
I'm sorry, Mr. Chairman, I have trespassed on the time. You
have been a gentleman, allowing me to speak. And I apologize to
my colleagues for my frustration. In different ways, I'm sure
you all share it. You are just better at being able to
articulate it than I am. But I am really frustrated, because I
think we're at the last piece of that rope. We're hanging on.
We can still climb that rope, but, man, there's not many more
handholds on that rope, and we had better get it right.
I thank you, Mr. Chairman.
The Chairman. Well, thank you, Senator Biden.
We look forward now to the testimony from our witnesses.
Let me just say that your statements will be made a part of the
record in full, and you may proceed as you wish.
Mr. Schlicher.
STATEMENT OF RONALD L. SCHLICHER, DEPUTY ASSISTANT SECRETARY
FOR IRAQ, BUREAU OF NEAR EASTERN AFFAIRS, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF
STATE
Mr. Schlicher. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Chairman and members of the committee, thank you today
for the opportunity to appear before you to discuss the efforts
of our government to assist the Iraqi people and the Interim
Iraqi Government as they rebuild their country and they prepare
for national elections in January, in face of the grave
challenges that you have mentioned in your opening statement.
Eleven weeks ago, the U.S. Embassy in Baghdad opened for
business. Mr. Chairman, it's been a very busy 11 weeks in
Baghdad, as, indeed, it has been here in Washington for those
of us working to support our colleagues on the ground in Iraq.
They have fanned out across the country, traveling and working
with coalition forces from Basra to Mosul, to offer assistance
on reconstruction and development. They stood alongside Iraqi
officials, who welcomed more than a thousand of their fellow
citizens to Baghdad for a National Conference, a key step
toward democracy. They took a hard look at existing plans and
priorities for the Iraq Relief and Reconstruction Fund, called
the IRRF, and at finding ways to hire more Iraqis faster in
order to put more men and women to work rebuilding their own
country.
When I appeared before you in July, I promised to return to
provide an update on our efforts in Iraq, including on plans to
speed up assistance, improve the security posture of the Iraqi
Interim Government and to help the Iraqi people as they plan
for national elections in January. I am pleased now to offer
you that update.
My colleague, Joseph Bowab, Deputy Assistant Secretary for
Resource Management, will be describing the current plan in
more detail. But, first of all, please allow me to tell you
what we've accomplished in the area of reconstruction during
the past 11 weeks since the transition to sovereignty.
When the embassy opened for business, the Coalition
Provisional Authority had disbursed $400 million of the $18.4
billion of the IRRF authorized in the fiscal year 2004
supplemental. At that time, the national power grid provided an
average of just under 11 hours of daily power throughout Iraq,
while, on average, oil production remained just short of prewar
levels. We can take some justifiable pride in our progress in
those 11 weeks. Now, more than 111,000 Iraqis have been
employed in U.S. Government-managed projects, not to mention
Iraqis previously employed by projects funded under the
Development Fund for Iraq, DFI. The disbursement of IRRF moneys
has surpassed $1 billion, up from that $400 million figure 11
weeks ago. That's more than double the amount on July 1, but,
as you point out, very rightly, this is still too low. We need
to keep pressing ahead on disbursement, and we will.
More Iraqis have access now to sewer service and clean
drinking water, and more people outside of Baghdad are getting
electricity. Since the handover on June 28, electricity
generation has grown by 10 percent, and consistently exceeds
110,000 megawatts of power each day, despite the frequent
attacks on the electricity grid that lead to outages such as
that of yesterday, September 14.
In addition, despite the repeated attempts of terrorists to
disrupt oil production and exports, oil production is at the
highest level since the beginning of the war. And, last Friday,
exports reached a postwar peak of two million barrels a day.
With the additional investment in oil infrastructure, we
anticipate, in the coming months, Iraq should have an even
greater capacity to increase oil production.
Much of that progress is due to the groundwork laid by CPA.
But as the Iraqi Interim Government assumed control of the
country and our new team in Baghdad geared up under the
leadership of Ambassador Negroponte and General Casey, we felt
it important to take a look at the existing priorities and
circumstances on the ground to ensure that we're putting the
money to use as quickly as possible in the ways most needed
according to our team's on-the-ground analysis of the evolving
needs.
A primary consideration in that review was security.
Violence and the threat of violence has slowed down the rate of
progress on reconstruction. Projects throughout Iraq have
suffered from attacks by insurgents. The largest single
increase in spending we are proposing, $1.8 billion, will go
for security and law enforcement, such as hiring more police,
border guards, and soldiers. But there also must be political
and economic components to defeating the insurgents. Thus, we
seek a comprehensive approach to all those needs, an integrated
approach, though we know that the provision of adequate
security up front is requisite to rapid progress on all other
fronts.
In short, one of our main weapons against the insurgents is
the hope and the creation of more hope. When Iraqis have hope
for the future, and real opportunities, they will reject those
who advocate violence. And nothing makes for faith in the
future like a good job. We plan to put hundreds of thousands of
Iraqis to work, creating perhaps more than 800,000 short- and
long-term jobs over the next 2 years. Additionally, U.S.
Government programs should spur employment in the Iraqi private
sector. The bulk of the new employment would be short-term
jobs, many of 1-month duration in community-development
projects. Others will be longer-term jobs, many in the security
services, which our assistance makes possible through the
provision of training and equipment.
Understanding that the only way to generate good long-term
employment is by broad-based growth of a vibrant economy, we
have allocated some funding to help the Iraqis develop a policy
environment to stimulate economic growth. But, in the near
term, we believe that the projects and priorities identified by
our review will provide a quick impact on local communities,
will demonstrate to the people the tangible benefits of peace
and stability, and will offer hope to people who have suffered
for years without it.
We also intend to set aside the funds necessary to enable
the United States to participate in early and deep debt relief
for Iraq, which is important for several reasons. It will make
possible the international borrowing a new Iraq needs to
continue the efforts already begun by donors to rebuild its
infrastructure, its schools, its hospitals, and its economy. It
will remove a gigantic debt overhang that would otherwise
hinder investor interest in Iraq and the country's integration
into the global economy. Our relatively small budgetary outlay
will leverage much larger levels of debt relief from Iraq's
other creditors.
The emphasis on these priorities will mean that we will
have less to spend on large-scale infrastructure projects, such
as sewage-treatment plants and power plants. Projects in those
sectors, that were scheduled to begin in 2005, will be delayed,
which, unfortunately, means we cannot guarantee that as many
Iraqis will have these essential services by 2007, as we had
originally intended. But we have not forgotten these worthwhile
plans, and we believe that other donors and the Iraqis
themselves will find the money for many of them.
But we have heard from those people on the ground in Iraq,
as, indeed, we have heard from you here in Washington, that we
need to focus on projects that will make an immediate impact.
We are focused on one deadline, in particular; and that is the
date for the national elections, on January 31, 2005--no later
than that date. The Independent Electoral Commission of Iraq is
now working closely with the United Nations to ensure that the
elections are legitimate and credible, and that all eligible
Iraqi voters have the opportunity to cast a ballot. We've
monitored the progress of the Electoral Commission to organize
these elections in the daunting security environment under what
is, without question, an ambitious timeframe.
Despite those challenges, we are confident that they will
succeed. With the assistance of a team of U.N. elections
experts currently on the ground in Baghdad, the Iraqis have
begun to pull together a voter registration system, design a
public-information campaign, and complete the necessary
election rules and procedures. We have provided support along
the way, and, most recently, allocated $40 million from USAID
to an NGO to assist in the logistical preparations for the
elections. The Iraqi Interim Government and the Multinational
Forces Iraq are working toward a security plan to ensure that
voting is possible nationwide. We are committed to helping the
Electoral Commission hold those elections by January.
We know that some expect the elections to fall behind
schedule, or, indeed, doubt that they will be held at all. The
Iraqis confronted similar doubts in the weeks before the
opening of the National Conference this summer. And, indeed, it
was reasonable to wonder, only a few weeks after the transfer
of authority, whether a thousand Iraqis, representing the wide
spectrum of ethnic and religious groups, could come together
from all parts of the country to debate their nation's future
in a peaceful conference in Baghdad.
Mr. Chairman, you may remember early press reports about
the conference, proclaiming that it was dissolving in acrimony.
In fact, the delegates to the National Conference rose to the
occasion. They ignored mortar rounds that fell nearby on the
first day. They engaged in heated, but peaceful, debate on a
wide range of issues to ordinary Iraqis. And they insisted that
the conference be extended an extra day to accommodate
democratic debate. They also came up with resolutions on
security, governance, human rights, and reconstruction.
The conference's security committee called for the
disbanding of militias, while the reconstruction committee
urged that projects rely more on Iraqi industries and create
more Iraqi jobs. The conference completed its most prominent
task by approving a slate of delegates to sit on an Interim
National Council, which has already started to meet in Baghdad,
and to expand the range of participation in Iraqi politics.
Perhaps the finest hour of the National Conference was on
its second day, when the members took the initiative to
dispatch a delegation to Najaf to support the Interim
Government's efforts to peacefully resolve the standoff with
the militia of Muqtada al-Sadr. The delegates did not call for
compromise with al-Sadr. They did not urge the government to
back down. Rather, they explicitly sought what the residents of
Najaf wanted: an end to the fighting, a disarming of the
militia, and a return of the shrines to the control of the
legitimate religious authorities. It was a wholly Iraqi
endeavor, backed up by the security assistance of the coalition
forces. And it ultimately contributed to the resolution of the
standoff.
We commend the delegates for their initiative, and the IIG
for its patience, restraint, and resolve in reaching a peaceful
solution. And we're determined to assist the government in
rushing reconstruction aid to that city.
Likewise, we support Prime Minister Allawi's efforts to
reach out to cities and disaffected constituencies in the Sunni
community in order to bring all Iraqis into the political
process. We believe the Interim Government's evenhanded
approach in Najaf could serve as a model to resolving conflicts
with armed opposition elsewhere in the country, just as the
strong performance of the Iraqi security forces will give them
confidence in confronting other armed aggression.
In Najaf, Iraqi army special operations forces, along with
Iraqi intervention forces, national guard and police, fought
well alongside coalition forces. The Iraqi forces were
instrumental in setting the conditions for the withdrawal of
al-Sadr's militia and the preservation of the Imam Ali Shrine.
And while Multinational Force Iraq provided extensive military
and logistical support, the Interim Government was in charge
throughout the standoff.
The Iraqi people have been anxious for such a demonstration
of resolve by their government. As we discussed in July, they
have made clear that security is their top priority. They want
what we all want: safe streets, peaceful neighborhoods, freedom
from fear. The Interim Government has responded to their
concerns. And now, every day, there are more and more police on
the street.
As a result of ongoing assessments of the needs of security
officials, we have increased the number of police we will train
by one third, to a total of 135,000. Likewise, in consultation
with the Interim Government, we have doubled the number of
border forces we intend to train to 32,000. The border is
better patrolled every day, limiting the number of foreign
fighters slipping into Iraq, although, of course, that does
remain a major concern.
Mr. Chairman, I heard, from members of the committee in
July, that you were troubled by the situation in Iraq. Of
course, we also are. We grieve for our losses and for the death
of all Iraqi innocents. We are troubled that Iraqis, who
suffered for decades under an oppressive government that
decimated their society, have yet to fully enjoy the fruits of
democracy and stability. But with our help, Mr. Chairman, they
will. They will build a new Iraq on the basis of respect for
human rights, the rule of law, a free economy. They will build
an Iraq that is a model of democracy for the region and a
responsible member of the international community.
It is a monumental undertaking, as you all have alluded to
in your statements this morning, as well. But the Iraqis do not
despair. And as you said in your statement, sir, we must not
let them down. We will not let them down. We know that a
stable, democratic Iraq will make for a safer United States.
As President Bush said recently, ``Free societies are
peaceful societies. Someday, an American President will be
talking to a duly elected leader of Iraq, talking about the
peace, and America will be the better for it.''
Mr. Chairman, members of the committee, thank you, again,
for the opportunity to testify about the situation in Iraq, and
I look forward, later, to answering any questions you may have.
Thank you.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Schlicher follows:]
Prepared Statement of Ronald L. Schlicher
Mr. Chairman and Members of the Committee, thank you for the
opportunity to appear before you today to discuss the efforts of the
United States to assist the Iraqi people and the Iraqi Interim
Government (IIG) as they rebuild their country and prepare for national
elections in January.
Eleven weeks ago, the U.S. Embassy in Baghdad opened for business.
Mr. Chairman, it has been a busy 11 weeks in Baghdad, as it has been
here in Washington for those of us working to support our colleagues on
the ground in Iraq. They have fanned out across the country, traveling
and working with Coalition forces from Basra to Mosul to offer
assistance on reconstruction and development. They stood alongside
Iraqi officials who welcomed more than a thousand of their fellow
citizens to Baghdad for a National Conference, a key step toward
democracy. They took a hard look at existing plans and priorities for
the Iraq Relief and Reconstruction Fund (IRRF), and they are finding
ways to hire more Iraqis, faster, in order to put more men and women to
work rebuilding their country.
When I appeared before this committee in July, I promised to return
to provide an update on our efforts in Iraq, including our plans to
speed up assistance, improve the security posture of the IIG, and help
the Iraqi people as they plan for national elections in January. I am
now pleased to do so.
My colleague Joseph Bowab, Deputy Assistant Secretary for Resource
Management, will be describing the current plan in more detail. But
first of all, allow me to tell you what we've accomplished in the area
of reconstruction during the last 11 weeks. When the Embassy opened for
business, the Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA) had disbursed $400
million of the $18.4 billion of the IRRF authorized by the FY04
Supplemental. At that time, the national power grid provided an average
of just under 11 hours of daily power throughout Iraq, while on average
oil production remained just short of prewar levels.
We can take justifiable pride in our progress since then. Now more
than 111,000 Iraqis have been employed in USG-managed projects--not to
mention Iraqis previously employed by projects funded by the
Development Fund for Iraq--and disbursement of IRRF monies has
surpassed $1 billion, more than double the amount on July 1. This is
still too low, however; we need to keep pressing ahead on disbursement.
More Iraqis have access to sewer service and clean drinking water, and
more people outside of Baghdad are getting electricity. Since the
handover on June 28, electricity generation has grown by 10 percent and
consistently exceeds 110,000 MW hours of power each day, despite the
frequent attacks on the electricity grid that lead to outages such as
that of September 14. In addition, despite the repeated attempts of
terrorists to disrupt oil production and exports, oil production is at
the highest level since the beginning of the war, and last Friday,
exports reached a post-war peak of 2 million barrels a day. With the
additional investment in oil infrastructure we anticipate in the coming
months, Iraq should have even greater capacity to increase oil
production.
Much of that progress is due to the groundwork laid by CPA. But as
the Iraqi Interim Government assumed control of the country, and our
new team in Baghdad geared up under the leadership of Ambassador
Negroponte and General Casey, we felt it important to take a look at
the existing priorities and circumstances on the ground to ensure that
we are putting the money to use as quickly as possible in the ways most
needed, according to our team's analysis of the evolving needs on the
ground.
Over six weeks the entire Country Team worked to come to a
consensus on the most urgent programs and the required funding levels.
Ambassador Negroponte also consulted extensively with the Iraqi Interim
Government to ensure that the Iraqis fully understand these priorities.
Our proposed revisions to IRRF spending address the need to improve
security, a key to all reconstruction efforts, while devoting
additional resources to improving the economic and political
environment in advance of the elections, including job creation. The
shifts will require commensurate cuts in the important sectors of
water, sanitation and electricity, and, as a result, we will not meet
our previous targets in these areas in the same time frame.
A primary consideration in the review was security. Violence, and
the threat of violence, has slowed down the rate of progress on
reconstruction. Projects throughout Iraq have suffered from attacks by
insurgents who are terrorizing cities and villages. The largest single
increase in spending we propose--$1.8 billion--will go for security and
law enforcement, such as hiring more police, border guards, and
soldiers. But there must also be political and economic components to
defeating the insurgents. We seek a comprehensive approach to all these
needs, though we know that the provision of adequate security is
requisite to rapid progress on all other fronts.
In short, one of our main weapons against the insurgents is hope.
When Iraqis have hope for the future and real opportunities, they
reject those who advocate violence. And nothing makes for faith in the
future like a good job.
We plan to put hundreds of thousands of Iraqis to work, creating
perhaps more than 800,000 short- and long-term jobs over the next two
years. Additionally, USG programs should spur employment in the Iraqi
private sector. The bulk of new employment would be short-term jobs,
many of one-month duration in community development projects. Others
will be longer-term jobs in the security services, which our assistance
makes possible through the provision of training and equipment.
Understanding that the only way to generate good long-term employment
is by the broad-based growth of a vibrant, free-market economy, in the
near-term, we believe that the projects and priorities identified by
our review will provide a quick impact on local communities, will
demonstrate the tangible benefits of peace and stability, and will
offer hope to people who have suffered for years without it.
We also intend to help finance debt relief, which is important for
Iraq for several reasons: it will free the resources that a democratic
Iraq needs to rebuild its infrastructure, its schools, its hospitals
and its economy to the benefit of the Iraqi people; it will remove a
gigantic debt overhang that otherwise would hinder Iraq's attempts to
foster investor interest in Iraq and the country's integration into the
world economy; and our relatively small budgetary outlay will leverage
much larger levels of debt relief from Iraq's other creditors.
The emphasis on these priorities will mean we have less to spend on
large-scale infrastructure projects such as sewage treatment plants and
power plants. Projects in these sectors that were scheduled to begin in
2005 will be delayed, which unfortunately means fewer Iraqis will have
these essential services by 2007 than we had originally intended. We
have not forgotten these worthwhile plans, and we believe that other
donors, and the Iraqis themselves, will find money for them. But we
have heard from those on the ground in Iraq, as we have heard from you
here in Washington, that we need to focus on projects that will make an
immediate impact.
We are focused on one deadline in particular, and that is the date
for the national elections, January 31, 2005. The Independent Electoral
Commission of Iraq (IECI) is now working closely with the United
Nations to ensure that the elections are legitimate and credible, and
that all eligible Iraqi voters have the opportunity to cast a ballot.
We have monitored the progress of the IECI to organize these
unprecedented elections in a daunting security environment under what
is, without question, an ambitious timeframe. Despite those challenges,
we are confident that they will succeed. With the assistance of a team
of UN elections experts on the ground in Baghdad, they have begun to
pull together a voter registration system, design a public information
campaign, and complete election rules and procedures. We have provided
support along the way and allocated $40 million from USAID to an NGO to
assist in the logistical preparations for the elections. The IIG and
MNF-I are working towards a security plan to ensure that voting is
possible nationwide. We are committed to helping the IECI hold
elections by January.
We know that some expect the elections to fall behind schedule, or
doubt they will be held at all. The Iraqis confronted similar doubts in
the weeks before the opening of the National Conference this summer.
Indeed it was reasonable to wonder, only a few weeks after the transfer
of authority, whether a thousand Iraqis representing the wide spectrum
of ethnic and religious groups could come together from all parts of
the country to debate their nation's future in a peaceful conference in
Baghdad. Mr. Chairman, you may remember early press reports about the
conference proclaiming that it was dissolving in acrimony.
In fact, delegates to the National Conference ignored mortar rounds
that fell nearby on the first day, engaged in heated--but peaceful--
debate on a wide range of issues of concern to ordinary Iraqis, and
insisted that the Conference be extended an extra day to accommodate
debates over the election of the Interim National Council and
resolutions on security, governance, human rights and reconstruction.
The Conference's Security Committee called for disbanding militias, for
instance, while the Reconstruction Committee urged that projects rely
more on Iraqi industries and create more Iraqi jobs. The Conference
completed its most prominent task by approving a slate of delegates to
sit on the Interim National Council, which has already started to meet
in Baghdad and expand the range of participation in Iraqi politics.
Perhaps the finest hour of the National Conference was on its
second day, when members took the initiative to dispatch a delegation
to Najaf to support the IIG's efforts to peacefully resolve the
standoff with the militia of Muqtada al-Sadr. The delegates did not
call for compromise with al-Sadr, they did not urge the government to
back down; rather, they explicitly sought what the residents of Najaf
desperately wanted: an end to the fighting; a disarming of the militia;
and a return of the shrines to the control of the legitimate religious
authority. It was a wholly Iraqi endeavor, backed up by the security
assistance of Coalition forces, and it ultimately contributed to the
resolution of the standoff. We commend the delegates for their
courageous initiative and the IIG for its patience, restraint, and
resolve in reaching a peaceful solution, and we are determined to
assist it to rush reconstruction aid to the battered city. Likewise we
support Prime Minister Allawi's efforts to reach out to cities and
disaffected constituencies in the Sunni community in order to bring all
Iraqis into the political process.
We believe the IIG's even-handed approach to Najaf may serve as a
model to resolving conflicts with armed opposition elsewhere in the
country, just as the strong performance of Iraqi security forces will
give them confidence in confronting other armed aggression. In Najaf,
Iraqi Army Special Operations Forces--along with Iraqi Intervention
Forces, National Guard, and Police--fought well alongside Coalition
forces. The Iraqi forces were instrumental in setting conditions for
the withdrawal of al-Sadr's militia and the preservation of the Imam Au
Shrine. And while Multi-National Force-Iraq provided extensive military
and logistical support, the IIG was in charge throughout the standoff.
The Iraqi people have been anxious for such a demonstration of
resolve by their government. As we discussed in July, they have made
clear that security is their top priority. They want what we all want--
safe streets, peaceful neighborhoods, freedom from fear. The IIG has
responded to their concerns, and now every day, more and more police
are on the street, helping to stabilize and secure Iraq.
As a result of ongoing assessments of the needs for security
officials, we have increased the number of police we will train by one
third, to a total of 135,000. Likewise, in consultation with the IIG,
we have doubled the number of border forces we intend to train to
32,000. The border is now better patrolled every day, limiting the
number of foreign fighters slipping into Iraq.
We expect that NATO will soon be contributing to the readiness of
Iraqi security forces. The NATO Training Implementation Team assessment
is complete, and in fact its report is scheduled to be delivered to the
North Atlantic Council today. Proposed training missions for NATO
include helping to establish staff colleges and an Iraqi training
command, coordinating professional military education to be conducted
in NATO countries, and advising Ministry of Defense and Joint
Headquarters officials.
The international community continues to make other significant
contributions to rebuilding and securing Iraq. In addition to the
United States, the Coalition includes more than 30 countries
contributing 23,000 personnel. We are working with the UN and the IIG
on calling upon members of the international community to provide
financing for troop contributions to protect the UN in Iraq, as called
for in UNSCR 1546, to enable the UN to carry out its leading role in
advising and assisting Iraqis with elections and in carrying out
humanitarian, economic reconstruction and other activities. A joint
State-DoD team is heading to Romania, Ukraine, Georgia, and Azerbaijan
to discuss potential contributions to a force to protect the Untied
Nations. Meanwhile, the United Nations has hired two inner-ring
security teams from Fiji that are scheduled to be on the ground in Iraq
on October 7. European Union Foreign Ministers have indicated a
willingness to offer support for elections, help build infrastructure,
strengthen the rule of law, and train police or military forces.
Bringing these efforts to fruition will require much hard work on our
part and the part of our allies, but we will see it through.
We will consult extensively with members of the international
community next week during the upcoming session of the UN General
Assembly. We look forward to meeting with other donor nations in Tokyo
in October to coordinate our assistance to the Iraqi people.
Mr. Chairman, I heard from Members of this committee in July that
you are troubled by the situation in Iraq. We are also. We grieve for
our losses and for the death of all Iraqi innocents. We are troubled
that Iraqis, who suffered for decades under an oppressive government
that decimated their society, have yet to fully enjoy the fruits of
democracy and stability. But with our help, Mr. Chairman, they will.
They will build a new Iraq on the basis of respect for human rights,
the rule of law, and a vibrant and free economy, an Iraq that is a
model of democracy in the region and a responsible member of the
international community. It is a monumental undertaking, but they do
not despair. And we will not let them down. We must not. We know that a
stable, democratic Iraq will make for a safer United States.
As President Bush said recently, ``Free societies are peaceful
societies. Someday, an American President will be talking to a duly-
elected leader of Iraq, talking about the peace, and America will be
better for it.''
Mr. Chairman and Members of the Committee, thank-you again for the
opportunity to testify about our progress in Iraq. I look forward to
answering any questions you may have.
The Chairman. Well, thank you very much, Mr. Schlicher.
We'll proceed to the testimony of Mr. Bowab, and then we'll
have questions from our members.
Mr. Bowab.
STATEMENT OF JOSEPH W. BOWAB, DEPUTY ASSISTANT SECRETARY FOR
FOREIGN ASSISTANCE PROGRAMS AND BUDGET, BUREAU OF RESOURCE
MANAGEMENT, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE
Mr. Bowab. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
My written statement goes into detail, as far as the
reallocation of the $3.46 billion. So in my opening remarks, I
will just summarize from the written statement.
The Chairman. Very well.
Mr. Bowab. The strategic review of the current spending
plan began in Baghdad on July 1. After 7 weeks, and with the
full participation of the embassy, implementing agencies, and
the Iraqi Interim Government, Ambassador Negroponte and his
team presented a detailed plan to realign resources to better
respond to the changing realities on the ground.
For the past 3 weeks, the administration has closely
scrutinized that plan. And it is our consensus that this plan
offers the best way forward. This week, we briefed senior
authorization appropriation staff members on the proposed
reallocation plan.
The plan recommends shifting $3.46 billion from sector
allocations contained in the July 2207 report that we provided
to Congress into six key areas. Those areas are: security and
law enforcement, oil infrastructure enhancements and improved
export capacity, economic development, debt relief,
accelerating employment for Iraqis, and support for democracy
and governance.
To meet these needs, an equivalent amount of funding needs
to be shifted out of other sectors. Those sectors are: water
and sewage, electricity, and refined oil purchases.
Establishing security by helping the Iraqis defeat
terrorist and criminal elements that oppose a free Iraq is the
key building block in promoting successful reconstruction
efforts in Iraq. An uncertain security situation affects all
potential economic and political development, including private
investment, both foreign and domestic. Based on that review,
DOD concluded that a number of infrastructure and Iraq force
structure capability enhancements, totaling $1.8 billion, were
critically needed to meet the current threat environment. The
funding is primarily needed to train, equip, construct, and
refurbish existing facilities for an additional 80,000 police,
border guards, and military personnel.
During the review, the embassy worked closely with the
Iraqi Ministry of Oil to identify projects that quickly could
increase output capacity and additional export revenues for the
Interim Government. Based on that analysis, we are recommending
moving $450 million for targeted projects that can increase
export output quickly.
Although the oil sector dominates the economy, for the most
part its capital-investment nature yields limited employment-
creation potential. To encourage diversification and develop a
competitive sector surrounding Iraq's natural endowment of oil,
we recommend shifting $380 million to increase employment and
increase productivity in the private sector, including the
agriculture sector.
At Sea Island, the President and the G-8 leaders committed
to providing debt relief for Iraq. In order to build a
consensus among creditors for significant reduction of Iraqi
debt, we believe that we need to move quickly to forgive the
approximate $4 billion in bilateral debt that Iraq owes the
United States. The cost associated with eliminating this debt
is $360 million.
To generate employment and provide immediate assistance in
areas threatened by insurgency, we recommend shifting $286
million to programs that have more labor-intensive high-impact
effects. Our program implementation partners estimate that this
funding will generate significant Iraqi short- and long-term
employment.
To support the upcoming January elections and provide
assistance for election monitoring, local and provincial
government strengthening and Interim Government support, we are
recommending shifting $180 million into democracy and
governance programs.
The $3.46 billion that is recommended to the current IRRF
spending plan are urgent, and they must be funded in the next
few months, given the reality on the ground. From improving the
security situation, to the upcoming elections, to the need to
generate employment, to debt relief, all these are critical
near-term requirements that must be addressed now.
The choices were not easy, but difficult decisions had to
be made to realign resources from within the IRRF to support
these crucial activities. The only way to fund the proposed
increases to the six sectors was out of the electricity and
water sectors.
We did not take lightly moving three billion out of these
sectors without due consideration. We are working closely with
the Iraqi Interim Government to identify alternative sources of
funding to offset the shifting of these funds, including from
the Iraqi budget, through the use of earnings from enhanced oil
exports, to urging international donors to provide funding in
support of infrastructure projects in Iraq.
Finally, Mr. Chairman, we need the support of Congress in
order to shift these resources, due to the sector limitations
that are currently in the IRRF statute. We will also need
affirmative authority for debt relief that currently is not
available for Iraq in existing law. To ensure that we can act
quickly on these crucial changes, the administration will
continue to work with Congress to address these important
issues.
Mr. Chairman, I will stop there and take your questions.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Bowab follows:]
Prepared Statement of Joseph W. Bowab
Mr. Chairman and members of the Committee, thank you for the
opportunity to appear today to discuss the efforts the United States is
taking in support of the Iraqi Interim Government to accelerate
reconstruction efforts in Iraq.
Ten months ago, the Congress demonstrated the generosity of the
American people by appropriating over $18 billion in reconstruction
assistance to assist the people of Iraq in rebuilding their country.
While the plan for those resources that Ambassador L. Paul Bremer
described identified discreet and valid requirements, much has changed
on the ground in Iraq since that time.
With the downturn in the security situation and the agreed plan to
hold elections in January 2005, Ambassador John Negroponte committed to
undertake a strategic review of the spending plan for the $18.4 billion
in the Iraq Relief and Reconstruction Fund--or ``IRRF''--immediately
upon his arrival in Baghdad.
Ambassador Negroponte has now done so, with the expert assistance
of many U.S. Government Agencies and in close consultation with the
Iraqi Interim Government (IIG).
The result is a plan that addresses the most pressing requirements
we face in Iraq today: improving security, providing jobs to improve
the standard of living of the Iraqi people, and supporting the
democratic transition in Iraq.
The plan is one that empowers the Iraqi people by giving them the
capacity to provide for their own security.
It empowers the Iraqi people by improving the economic viability of
their country through support for oil revenue generation and through
increased efforts to tap into an already skilled Iraqi labor force.
It empowers the Iraqi people by giving them the tools to shape and
mould their political landscape and by helping them fulfill the
responsibilities of democracy and good governance.
The strategic review recommends shifting $3.46 billion from sector
allocations outlined in the July 5, 2004 Section 2207 report to
Congress into six key areas:
$1.8 billion more for Security and Law enforcement;
$450 million for oil infrastructure enhancements and
improved export capacity;
$380 million for comprehensive economic development;
$360 million to forgive approximately $4 billion in
bilateral debt owed to the United States Government;
$286 million to accelerate Iraqi employment; and
$180 million to support democracy and governance.
To meet these needs, an equivalent amount of funding would be
shifted out of three sectors:
$1.94 billion from water and sewerage;
$1.07 billion from electricity; and
$450 million from oil (refined oil purchases).
SECURITY AND LAW ENFORCEMENT
Establishing security by helping the Iraqis defeat terrorists and
criminal elements that oppose a free Iraq is the key building block in
promoting successful reconstruction efforts in Iraq. An uncertain
security situation affects all potential economic and political
development, including private investment, foreign and domestic.
As part of the strategic review, the Department of Defense (DoD)
under the leadership of General George Casey and Lieutenant General
Dave Petraeus conducted an extensive review of Iraqi security and law
enforcement programs funded out of the current IRRF spending plan.
Based on that review, DoD concluded that a number of infrastructure
and Iraqi force structure capabilities enhancements were critically
needed to meet the current threat environment. The increase of $1.8
billion includes:
$788.4 million for the Iraqi Police Service to train and
equip an additional 45,000 police officers, including
increasing training capacity at regional training sites;
$190 million for the Department of Border Enhancement to
train and equip an additional 16,000 border officers;
$442 million for the Iraqi National Guard to train and equip
an additional 20 battalions, including establishing regional
training bases and infrastructure support for 99 border posts;
$221.4 million for the Civil Intervention Force, Bureau of
Dignitary Protection, and Emergency Response Unit for training,
equipping and refurbishment and construction of critical
infrastructure;
$62.5 million for the Iraqi Army Special Operations Forces
for training, equipping, and expansion of the Iraqi special
operations base;
$48.7 million for the Iraqi Intervention Force to support a
logistics support base and logistics support unit to improve
deployment capabilities; and
$22.5 million for the Iraqi Army to upgrade facilities and
provide equipment and life support for a transportation
battalion.
OIL INFRASTRUCTURE AND CAPACITY
Oil is the most prominent feature of the Iraqi economy. Iraq has
proven oil reserves estimated at 112 billion barrels, ranking it second
in reserves behind Saudi Arabia.
During the strategic review, the Embassy worked closely with the
Iraq Ministry of Oil to identify projects that could quickly increase
output capacity and additional export revenues for the IIG. Based on
that analysis, we recommend shifting $450 million for oil capacity
enhancements:
$195 million specifically targeted for oil infrastructure
projects in cooperation with the Ministry of Oil;
$150 million to expand Kirkuk production and exports,
including the Al Fatah pipeline crossing, building a new
pipeline from Kirkuk to Al Fatah and refurbishing gas oil
separation plants (GOSPs) wet crude facilities;
$100 million for Rumaylah crude oil production and exports,
including water flood facilities and GOSPs; and
$5 million for a National Energy Strategy Study, including
oil, gas, electricity and water.
Pending security conditions, these projects can be completed in six
to nine months.
ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT
Although the oil sector dominates the economy, for the most part
its capital-intensive nature yields limited employment creation
potential.
To encourage diversification and to develop a competitive sector
surrounding Iraq's natural endowment of oil, we recommend shifting $380
million to help increase employment and increase productivity in the
private sector.
The funding also provides support for higher education and
humanitarian and resettlement assistance to vulnerable internally
displaced persons (IDPs).
Major economic development activities include:
$100 million for economic reform to spur employment, growth
and attract domestic and foreign investment. Key components
include financial and managerial capacity for the Central Bank
of Iraq, electricity and telecommunications regulatory
capacity, and tax, fiscal, customs, monetary policy, banking,
commercial law, and institutional reforms to promote
investment;
$100 million to promote and strengthen the private sector,
including restructuring and privatization of State Owned
Enterprises, trade policy, market access and trade and
promotion, capital market development and micro-lending and
small and medium enterprise development;
$100 million to assist the IIG with restructuring its
agriculture sector. Programs include developing policy and
institutional reform options, improve crop technology and live
stock, develop private sector agribusiness, and produce and
process high-value products for domestic and export markets;
$70 million to provide emergency relief assistance to over
100,000 Arabs and 50,000 Kurds, resettlement assistance to
300,000 Kurds, and establish contingency capability to respond
quickly to sudden population displacement due to violence or
natural disasters; and
$10 million to support higher education programs to purchase
computers and equipment for labs at 20 universities and 46
colleges throughout Iraq.
DEBT RELIEF
The President and other G-8 leaders committed at the Sea Island
summit to provide debt relief for Iraq. Paris Club creditors have
aligned themselves with that commitment.
As a prerequisite to a Paris Club agreement with the United States
and other Paris Club creditors, normalization of Iraq's relations with
International Financial Institutions, and access to international
lending markets, we believe that we need to move quickly to forgive the
approximately $4 billion in bilateral debt that Iraq owes the United
States. The cost associated with eliminating this debt is $360 million.
The United States has led the effort to build a consensus among
creditors for significant reduction of Iraqi debt, and we will use our
action to address U.S.-Iraq bilateral debt to press other nations,
including non-Paris Club regional creditors, to do the same to support
Iraq and its transition.
ACCELERATING IRAQI EMPLOYMENT
To generate employment, stimulate economic activity, and provide
immediate assistance in areas threatened by insurgency, we recommend
shifting $286 million to programs that have more labor-intensive, high
impact effects.
Our program implementation partners estimate that this funding,
combined with other programs (e.g., elections assistance), will
generate approximately 800,000 Iraqi short and long-term jobs.
Employment programs and activities include:
$200 million to USAID's Office of Transition Initiatives.
With this funding USAID estimates that it can provide an
additional 2,500 to 3,000 grants and employ an average of
40,000 Iraqis a month over the next year in labor-intensive
projects to meet essential service needs in areas of conflict
such as Baghdad, the Sunni Triangle, and South Central Iraq;
and
$86 million to the Commander's Humanitarian Relief
Reconstruction Program for small-scale economic development
projects in priority areas such as Baghdad, Samara, Ramadi,
North Babil, and other areas.
DEMOCRACY AND GOVERNANCE
To support the upcoming January elections and provide assistance
for elections monitoring, local and provincial government
strengthening, and interim government support, we are recommending
shifting $180 million into democracy and governance activities.
Democracy and governance programs include:
$40 million to ensure the Iraqi Electoral Commission has the
technical capacity to run and certify free and fair national
elections, including establishing 8,000 polling stations and
300 regional elections offices, training 150,000 election staff
members to register 15 million voters, 100 political parties,
and certify 25,000 elections monitors;
$20 million to rollout a nation-wide elections monitoring
program. Civil society will help identify, train, and mobilize
over 25,000 domestic monitors and execute a voter education
campaign to reach eligible voters. Funding will also be used to
field at least three domestic poll monitors per polling station
and facilitate the limited participation of international
monitors to ratify Iraq's elections as free and fair;
$100 million to continue strengthening local and provincial
government on budgetary training, administration, and public
service standards to effectively and transparently deliver
services, foster local economic development, and involve
citizens in decision-making. Iraqi leaders will be better
informed on decentralization policy issues that balance power
between the central and local governments and guard regions
breaking away from a national, democratic and multi-ethnic
state; and
$20 million to support the interim government's Presidency
Council, Council of Ministers, National Council, and Interim
National Assembly--each of which is standing up much more
rapidly than envisioned.
The $3.46 billion in recommended changes to the current IRRF
spending plan are urgent and they must be funded in the next few months
given the reality on the ground. From improving the security situation
to the upcoming elections to the need to generate employment to debt
relief, all of these are critical near-term requirements that must be
addressed now. The choices were not easy, but difficult decisions had
to be made to realign resources from within the IRRF to support these
crucial activities.
The security and law enforcement, water and sewerage, and
electricity sectors comprise almost 70% of the current IRRF spending
plan. Water and electricity alone account for 50% of the overall $18.4
billion.
The only way to fund the proposed increases to the six sectors
discussed above was out of the electricity and water and sewerage
sectors. We did not take lightly moving almost $3 billion out of these
sectors without due consideration.
In developing our recommendations, we looked at programs that were
not scheduled to begin until the 4th quarter of FY 2005. We worked
closely with the IIG, including the Ministries of Oil and Electricity
to identify FY 2005 and out-year activities that could be reduced.
We are working closely with the IIG to identify alternative sources
of funding to offset the shifting of these funds, including from the
Iraqi budget through the use of earnings from enhanced oil exports to
urging international donors to provide funding in support of
infrastructure projects such as electricity and water.
LEGISLATIVE REQUIREMENTS
The IRRF appropriation allocates the $18.4 billion in
reconstruction assistance by sectors. The statute limits movement of
the funding into and out of these sectors. The legislation allows
movement between sectors of 10%, except that the total for the
receiving sector may not be increased by more than 20%.
In order to shift the funding as described above, we would need
legislative relief from the sector limitations as currently provided
for in the IRRF statute.
For debt relief, we also need affirmative authority that currently
is not available for Iraq in existing law. Although the House Foreign
Operations and Export Financing Bill for 2005 does contain a debt
relief provision for Iraq, we do not anticipate passage of this Bill
soon.
To ensure that we can act quickly on these crucial changes, the
Administration will include these two legislative proposals as part of
an overall package of legislative recommendations for inclusion in the
FY 2005 Continuing Resolution (CR).
Mr. Chairman and members of the Committee, I urge you to support
inclusion of these important legislative changes in the forthcoming CR.
I will stop there and take your questions.
The Chairman. Thank you very much, Mr. Bowab.
We'll have a round of 10 minutes for each of the Senators,
followed by another round, if that is required.
Let me begin by saying that this committee has had,
according to our best count, 23 hearings during the 108th
Congress, on Iraq. At one of the recent hearings that Mr.
Schlicher mentioned, in July, the committee made the point--and
many Senators were present--that clearly more money was
required in the communities of Iraq for jobs, for effects that
could be seen, for building the infrastructure, and for what
some of us call ``walking-around money.'' I used that term at
the White House, directly to the President. He agreed, exactly,
that's what we ought to do prior to the recess.
What confounds me is that you have tediously taken 7 weeks
to come to this conclusion to reallocate $3.4 billion. Now,
while we appreciate the fact that everybody in the State
Department, the Defense Department, and the White House has to
be involved, the fact is, it was very clear in July that money
needed to be moved, and could be moved, and that there were
very adept people in the field in Iraq who could move the money
and could do the job. And I just have to say, because we have
an oversight responsibility, this is an extraordinarily
ineffective administrative procedure. It is exasperating for
anybody looking at this from any vantage point.
Now, having finally got to this monumental decision to
reallocate $3.4 billion of the $18.4 billion appropriated last
Fall, begs the question, What happens to the other $15 billion?
I suppose, just doing the math, if one has been spent and three
is going to happen at this point, in the fullness of time, I
suspect, two, three, four, five, six years down the trail,
something would occur. But as my colleague has pointed out, we
have an emergency problem now. And we had one in July. And we
had one before that. The inability to seize the emergency
situation and to respond to it may be beyond our ability as a
nation. But I don't think so.
It seems to me that we presently have a modest program. And
I'm not going to argue with it. I would say, clearly, the
question would be raised on the security money. Of course that
money is needed. But each one of us who have visited with Iraq,
who visited with people on the ground, during the Bremer time
or subsequently, have known, from our people in the field
there, that thousands of Iraqis needed to be trained, and
trained right away and that this was imperative if security was
to occur.
Now, in fairness, some training is occurring. A lot of
brave Iraqis have lost their lives, 50 even in the last week,
attempting to provide some security. If we had extensive
opportunities today, we would question, I suppose, how the
arming of these security personnel is going, how the flow of
equipment--that we have promised to buttress what they are
doing is happening. These items are absolutely critical. There
is nothing else in the program you've presented that is more
critical than expediting the training and equipping of Iraqis
to establish security. Because elections won't work very well,
nor will the economy, nor will utilities, nor will the oil
wells, if things are being blown up as fast as we are building
them.
So, of course money has to be spent for security. If $1.8
billion is not enough, you ought to ask for more. You ought to
get on with it, in essence. Even having said that, we know that
the technical training of police and military people takes
time, and our forces, therefore, are the safety net that really
holds the thing together while that training occurs.
I applaud you for the steps that are being taken here, but
I would just express, I suppose, the same frustration each one
of the members of this committee will, at some point. That's
the purpose of the hearing today: to say. This really has to
move ahead.
Finally, let me just say that 110,000 jobs, 111,000 jobs
have been created, and that is to the good. You've suggested
maybe as many as 800,000 will be created, although some of them
only for 1 month. That's tremendously important, given whatever
the rate of employment is. And that is hard to gauge, as all of
you know, out in that particular economy.
But I have some optimism about the outcome of this. I saw a
good piece by Fareed Zakariah in the Washington Post, an op-ed
that I thought was well-taken. He pointed out that there are
not insurgents in every town and village of Iraq. As a matter
of fact, there are a great and large number of places in which
life proceeds and in which people are trying to go about their
work, albeit with very limited resources, which we could
enhance. In other words, there are many, many areas of, not
only stability, but progress going on there, which offer,
really, the future.
Now, there are areas--Fallujah and some others--where, in
fact, there are insurgents, and there's absolute war. Those
have to be isolated and dealt with. The Iraqis need to be
consulted. They are doing the job, at least advising us of what
we need to do in that process, because they can't have a
country with these pockets of insurgents.
But the whole country is not wrought up in insurgency. The
whole country is not in revolt. The fact is that there is a
broad base of progress going on. You have reflected that
accurately, through the oil figures, through the power figures,
through various other indices that might be presented. I would
just encourage you to present to us as much of that information
as you can. We are always scraping for some even anecdotal
information as to what kind of economic indicators are
proceeding in Iraq, currently.
Having said all of that, I'm hopeful that you will convey
back to whoever the planners are that, clearly, we're in favor
of the security aspect, but we are also still in favor of money
getting out to these towns and villages where a lot of people
are doing a lot of good things and need encouragement.
Now, that does not denote a long-term contract. Without
going over the past assumptions, let me just touch upon
something Senator Biden said. Our committee heard blithely
optimistic people from the administration prior to the war, and
people outside the administration, what I call the ``dancing in
the street crowd,'' who postulated that we simply would be
greeted with open arms. We asked one witness, ``How long do we
stay?'' ``Not very long. You get out of there. America fights
the war. We get out. People are free. Saddam is gone. And then
they're rejoicing. They've established democracy.''
Now, the nonsense of all of that is apparent. The lack of
planning is apparent. But the fact is, we still are at a point
where we need the help of the State Department with the work
that this committee and the Department of Defense have done in
trying to think through a nation-building capacity--some group,
either in State, Defense, NSC, the White House, that, in fact,
is there, so we don't reinvent the wheel for the ninth time
again. And that must go on at the same time that we are doing
Iraq, because, in due course, there will be other problems.
Now, the State Department is working on this. The Defense
Science Board has done an extensive study, which will be soon
shared with the public. I applaud every effort.
This is factored into legislation that we presented, which
may or may not pass. It may also be formulated by the
administration without legislation. But the whole mindset is to
finally get a group of people in our administration--any
administration; this one, the next one, the one after that,
that understands the complexities of stabilization and
reconstruction. A group of experts that will plan, that will be
ready, that understands electricity and oil, and infrastructure
at the village level, as well as how to produce jobs and how to
call up reserves all over this country, of the types I
mentioned earlier who can step in and execute a plan when
needed--and clearly we will need to do this again. We've had,
from the beginning in Iraq, the wrong people in the wrong
numbers.
Now, hopefully, we're getting it right. Hopefully, in
addition to the money, they're getting people over in Iraq who
know how to spend this money properly, who know civil
administration, know job creation, know all the rest of it.
This is something other than huge long-term infrastructure
projects that need to be bid for 9 months or a year or whatever
it takes to get it through. We're talking, really, about very
short-term or intermediate-term projects that can make a
difference, in terms of morale in the place.
So I appreciate this opportunity simply to address you. I
really don't have questions of you. You've outlined what your
plan is, and asked for our support, and we are going to give
that. But a whole lot more has to happen. That's the purpose of
our hearings, not only to have oversight, but to have
encouragement and indicate our support, our willingness to work
with the administration, but prayerfully much more urgently,
much more rapidly. It's been 2 months since July, a lot of
water had gone over the dam. As I watch the press accounts of
this, I wonder why in the world are they taking 5, 6, 7 weeks?
We're in a war, and we need to move as rapidly as those events
dictate.
I yield now to my distinguished colleague, Senator Biden.
Senator Biden. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman, for your
leadership.
You know, it's one thing for me to express my frustration,
but your integrity has dictated that you, as chairman of this
committee, in a more difficult circumstance, express your
frustration, as well.
You know, it's that old bad joke, you know, ``We're from
the Federal Government. We're here to help.''
And there's a disconnect in the logic of this request that
you're making, to me, that goes to the essence of the issue of
the sense of urgency. I haven't requested any time recently,
but the President has been available in the past. We've gone
down, and we've individually talked to him; we've talked to him
together. I mean, the idea that probably one of the most
honorable nonpolitical guys in all the Senate used the phrase
``walking-around money''--seriously. I mean, I know it sounds
funny. But it reflects the intensity of our frustration of the
failure to do things we know should be done.
As the mayor of Indianapolis, three decades ago, if the
city's burning, he doesn't--he didn't wait. He didn't wait--no
mayor does--for a commission to finish its report, long-term
efforts, how we're going to change the environment in the
neighborhoods that are most discontent. You go in, and you hire
the people, you hire them right away. You have them do
something. You make work. You do something, so they're not
shooting the cops that are coming in there.
There seems to be no sense of that, except with our
military. I have now, how many times? In three visits to Iraq,
the only guys that seem to get it are the military guys. I
mean, right from the beginning, right even when the CPA was
screwing everything up. And they were, by the way. They were,
in my view. Right from the beginning. Why was Petraeus--why did
Petraeus become a star? He's a frustrated guy. He became a star
because he's in the north, and he was improvising. He wasn't
going through ``the process.'' He was improvising on the spot--
bing, bing, bing, bing, bing.
Anyway, here's the disconnect, as I see it.
The amount involved we're talking about right now is $3.5
billion. I mean, there's roughly $18 billion out there, $17.5--
$3.5 billion. Of this, as I understand it from this testimony,
$286 million is specifically targeted for job creation. And
this is supposed to create--as I understand it, roughly
generate 800,000 jobs.
Now, in a country where the official unemployment rate is
29 percent--and, unofficially, State guys tell me it's 50 to 60
percent--jobs are key to ending the insurgency, or even as we
found out in other experiences why we need to relearn this--you
want to disband the militia, you're going to take their gun and
what they get paid by the warlord and/or the insurgency or what
they can loot and take--you've got to give them something. You
don't say, give me your AK-47 and go home and have a nice day.
And it begs the question of why more of the remaining $18.4
billion is not being reoriented. Why only $3.5 billion? And why
the disconnect between, as I see it, the smallest portion here,
$286 million, to create jobs? I know it may be--not with you
guys--ideologically inconsistent to have a giant WPA program.
I'll never forget, the three of us were sitting with Mr.
Bremer the day we arrived--well over a year ago, in Iraq, and
it was a day--and I will welcome being corrected by my
colleagues if I'm wrong, because I may be off by a click here--
Bremer was about to--or had just announced the day before, or 2
days before, that he was disbanding the army, and he initially
was going to shut down all government-subsidized businesses.
Remember that, guys? And I forget which of us asked the
question, but, OK, are you Jeffrey Sachs? And is this Poland? I
mean, tell me this now, what's the immediate objective here?
What are all those people going to do?
And so these 800,000 jobs we're talking--they're going to
average a month or so at a time, so they're really not jobs. I
mean, they're jobs. Important. Don't get me wrong. Big deal.
Big deal.
But I have two questions. I have a lot of questions, but
I'll try to stick to two.
Sir, you indicated that debt relief is important. The three
of us, at our peril, politically, led the effort here--and I
think maybe my friend from Florida, as well--against what was a
perfect--a perfect--populist argument that was available to our
conservative and liberal friends alike on the floor, that we
wanted to forgive debt. This $18-some-billion in reconstruction
funds of the $87 billion we were going to forgive it. We
weren't going to tie it to oil revenues. We weren't going to
tie it to anything. And some of us, all of us, have a few scars
in our back to demonstrate how hard that is to explain to your
constituency at home why we believe that's so important.
The President was able to--through the leadership of the
Secretary of State, I assume--to get in Resolution 1546
language on debt relief, as well, on the part of others.
So my question to you is this. In addition to us coming up
with spending a quarter of a billion dollars to forgive $4
billion, roughly--and it's really a bookkeeping--consequential,
but it's a bookkeeping measure--what is any other country
doing? What are the French doing? What are the European Union
countries doing? What are the members of the Security Council
who voted for this resolution--what are they doing on debt
relief? Doesn't mean we shouldn't do it. I'm not doing this
counter-budget stuff: you know, if they don't, we won't.
But you put your finger on it. You're the first guys that
have been straight up about it. In order for this government to
survive, they've got to be able to borrow. Unless they can deal
with the debt overhang--and the IMF says you need to forgive 95
percent of debt in order for the World Bank to come in and say,
OK, now we'll get in the deal, so we'll lend money to what we
all know is ultimately the solution, and that is private
entrepreneurs, private businesses, private enterprise, a
private economy, you know, not the government economy--though,
that's a poor choice of terms--to get the World Bank in.
What are others doing? What prospects do we have? And, by
the way, if I'm not mistaken, this meeting takes place the end
of this month. I think the meeting of the World Bank, these
decisions are going to be made at the end of the month, in--
like, in weeks. What are others doing? And if they do nothing,
is our debt forgiveness of an additional $4 billion, roughly,
is that enough to get the World Bank and the IMF to step up to
the ball and open up the lending spigot here? And does that
have any impact on confidence of investors to come in to open
up anything from the dress shop to the porcelain factory?
That's my first question.
Mr. Schlicher. Thank you, Senator, for the question.
In my testimony, I mentioned that the G-8 leaders at Sea
Island committed themselves to provide deep debt relief for
Iraq. You mentioned the upcoming World Bank meetings where this
is going to be a subject. The Paris Club is also going to be a
forum where this is all going to have to be done. There have
been a lot of, like, diplomatic discussions building up to----
Senator Biden. Let me cut right to it. Has a single nation
in the G-8--a single nation--stepped up to the ball and
formally said, or requested of their parliaments, to forgive
Iraqi debt?
Mr. Schlicher. Not yet. No, sir. We have some
understandings from some governments that that's exactly what
they intend to do.
Senator Biden. When? Do we know? I mean, what timeframe are
we anticipating----
Mr. Schlicher. I think we are aiming to have an agreement
on Iraqi debt still by the end of the year. So it's going to be
a very active 3 months on the debt-relief front.
Senator Biden. With all due respect, by the end of the year
is getting close to the time in which the first election is
going to take place. All of this goes to confidence. I'd
respectfully suggest that's too late, No. 1.
No. 2--and I'll conclude with this, Mr. Chairman--the happy
talk about progress--and there is progress in some areas--let
me put it this way, there is the potential for real progress to
mine those parts of the country where there is a desire to
actually have an independent government that is not fueled by
an insurgency.
The administration set goals in 2003. And it's important
that we just state it so we know what we're talking about. We
were told by 6/04, June of this year, there would be 6,000
megawatts of power. We were told there would be three million
barrels of oil per day by October. We were told that there
would be a minimum of 38,000 trained police officers, 40,000
army trained. And now we're told--and, in fact, electricity, we
have 4,500 megawatts, 10 hours of blackouts. We have two
million barrels of oil. We say we have 32,000 cops. I would
argue we don't have a single trained police officer. I'd like
you to dispute that, if you will. And, at maximum, we have
5,000 trained--5,000 trained--military forces.
And if you look at the testimony of a guy who is a real--I
mean, it's like ice water runs in his veins; that's why he has
so much credibility among Democrats and Republicans--Anthony
Cordesman. Anthony Cordesman says that--let me--I beg your
pardon, Mr. Chairman, to get the first page here. Cordesman
says, ``The new U.S. approach essentially defers most key
actions to the military risk units after U.S. elections while
it raises growing issues about the timing of long-term goals.
It essentially defers any decisive U.S. military action unless
it is forced on the U.S. Everything will consist of limited
operations and strength until a new Iraqi force is ready.''
Now, to me--and my time's up, so I'll just leave the
question hanging here, and hopefully maybe we can get to it--it
seems to me there's a race, fellows, in security. There's a
race between the growing impact of the insurgency, which
diminishes the optimism and the willingness of the Iraqi people
to participate in the prospect of a democratic society and the
training of an Iraqi military force, national guard, army, or
police. And I respectfully suggest we are losing that race
badly.
And, for the record, I'd like to know, what constitutes a
trained Iraqi police officer, from the administration's
standpoint? What constitutes a trained Iraqi guardsman? What
constitutes a trained Iraqi army personnel? And how many do you
expect to have in place?
General Petraeus does not use the figure in the field. Our
staffs were just there--how long ago? Two weeks? Three weeks
ago--he does not use the figure the Secretary of Defense uses.
We have to be honest and figure out what it is and what's being
done to increase that training.
I'm well over my time. I apologize. I'll submit some
additional questions in writing for you. But if you can be as
precise as you can and just answer yes or no, Do we have 32,000
trained Iraqi cops on the street? Trained? Not cops on the
street. Trained Iraqi cops?
Mr. Bowab. No, sir.
Senator Biden. Thank you very much.
The Chairman. Senator Hagel.
Senator Hagel. Mr. Chairman, thank you.
Gentlemen, thank you for coming before this committee this
morning.
I want to make a couple of comments before I ask some
questions. One, this Senator--and I suspect all who are here
this morning on this panel--recognize that you did not frame or
shape or mold the foundation from which we now work from. That
foundation was formed about a year and a half ago, certainly a
year ago, and you have inherited, gentlemen, a mess. So I say
that because it's important to put a frame of reference to what
we're talking about here.
The Secretary of Defense wanted to run Iraq. The CPA ran
Iraq. We've got a lot of problems. I don't need to tell you how
many, and how deep, and how wide. But one of the things that we
all appreciate what you're saying today, and the directness and
the honesty to come forward and ask for a reprogramming of the
funds, is a clear acknowledgment that we are not holding
ourselves hostage to some grand illusion that we're winning.
Now, if you step back for a moment and understand what
we're doing this morning. You are talking about reprogramming
$3.4 billion--taking $3.4 billion, most of it for water and
sewer and electricity, out of those accounts--and moving them
mainly to accounts to enhance security. Now, that does not add
up, in my opinion, to a pretty picture, to a picture that shows
that we're winning. But it does add up to this: an
acknowledgment that we are in deep trouble. And, for that, we
are grateful.
This Senator is not putting the blame on you for where we
are today. Now, I say that, because I think it's important to
be said, to be stated on the record, for the frame of reference
and the context that we're dealing with this issue in Iraq.
Before I move from that, let me use one example of what I'm
talking about here, Mr. Schlicher. I understand the business
that you're in. And I understand you are here not to explain to
this committee how bad things are, but you're here also to try
to present the positives and what has been accomplished. And
there have been things accomplished. So I understand that. And
I understand you have to have clearances, all the way up to the
White House as to what you're saying this morning.
But let me draw one example, in your testimony, to what I
was talking about, not allowing ourselves to become hostage to
some grand illusion that we're winning. You say, in your
testimony this morning, and I quote, ``The Iraqi forces were
instrumental in setting conditions for the withdrawal of al-
Sadr's militia and the preservation of the Imam Ali Shrine. And
while Multinational Force Iraq provided extensive military and
logistical support, the IIG was in charge throughout the
standoff.''
And what I find interesting about that statement is, no
reference to the fact that the leading Shia cleric in Iraq, al-
Sistani, was not noted in this. We all know that al-Sistani had
more to do with what happened there than anybody, more to do
with al-Sadr and his militia standing down than the Interim
Iraqi Government or our military forces. This is how we get
into trouble, when we delude ourselves into thinking that we
have done something we haven't done, in the fullness that we
somehow state it.
Now, the followup to the Madrid Donor Conference scheduled
for Tokyo in October, where are we? Just as a reminder, this is
a followup on pledges, I think, of approximately $13 billion,
grants and loans from other countries, IMF, World Bank. This
follows on with Senator Biden's questions about debt relief. We
found out this morning that, unless I misunderstood what you
said in answering Senator Biden's questions, there has been no
other country forthcoming in debt relief. And that leads me to
another question about Jim Baker's efforts, which were greatly
heralded a few months ago, that he has gotten our partners into
a position to help us with some of these other issues. I'd like
to get a sense--an update on Secretary Baker's efforts, where
that stands. But let's stay with the Tokyo conference. What do
we expect?
Mr. Schlicher. OK, sir. The Tokyo conference is, as you
say--I think it's the 13th and 14th of October, and
preparations leading up to that conference are ongoing right
now, and different consultations. The British people were here
yesterday, for example, to consult about the strategy in that.
Secretary Baker's efforts did, in fact, create an
environment that's going to be very conducive to that deep-debt
relief. We fully expect that the conference and the Paris Club
meetings and what we want to do on debt relief, in terms of the
IRRF review, are going to, in fact, result in deep debt relief
by the end of the year. But all of these milestones, these
meetings, are going to have to take place before we get final
results.
We think we're going to get there, and we think we're going
to get there on time----
Senator Hagel. When you say ``we think we're going to get
there,'' what do you mean?
Mr. Schlicher. I think that, by the end of the year, we
will succeed in getting the international community to give
Iraq deep debt relief.
Senator Hagel. What about the donor part of this, the
pledges that were made, $13 billion?
Mr. Schlicher. Joe.
Mr. Bowab. Yes, there was $13 billion pledged, of which
about $5 billion was international financial institution
multilateral-type pledges, which left about $8 billion in
grants and loan-type pledges. Where we stand right now with
those pledges, as of June, there's been almost $1.2 billion
disbursed by the international donors to Iraq for
reconstruction.
Senator Hagel. Of the $13 billion pledged.
Mr. Bowab. Well, the $5 billion's kind of out of play until
we can get to a point where, on the debt-relief side, that the
multilaterals will actually provide any lending. Until we can
get through the debt relief, that $5 billion is just kind of
sitting there.
Senator Hagel. So it would be fair to say that the pledges
that came in from the Madrid conference, versus the reality of
the money that actually has been put on the table, there is
significant distance between the two.
Mr. Bowab. I think if you do the math, it's about 13
percent of what was pledged has been disbursed.
Senator Hagel. Well, that's a significant distance, in my
opinion.
When you add up debt relief, pledges, casualties that the
Americans have taken, versus our so-called ``coalition of the
willing,'' it's rather dramatic. I mean, you're not here this
morning to talk about casualties. We've now, I think, as of
this morning, we've lost 1,018 dead, over 7,000 wounded. And I
saw some DOD numbers yesterday that showed something like 60-
some dead from our coalition partners, 130-some wounded. I
think that's generally about right.
So, again, going back to any grand illusions, kidding
ourselves about who's carrying the burden here, big time--big
time--it's the United States.
Now, let me ask about the 800,000 jobs that you've talked
about. How are we going to do that?
Mr. Schlicher. Yes, sir. As Senator Biden mentioned, the
request is for $286 million for employment-generating programs.
USAID's Office of Transition Initiatives has asked for $200
million. Now, with this funding, USAID estimates that it can
provide 2,500 to 3,000 grants that employ an average of 40,000
Iraqis a month over the next year in labor-intensive projects--
the WPA-works sort of idea--that are going to meet needs,
especially in conflict areas, like Baghdad, the so-called Sunni
triangle, and South Central Iraq. Eighty-six million of that
would go to the Commander's Humanitarian Relief Reconstruction
Program, which is, kind of, the same idea as the SERP program
that the commanders had during the CPA era. And that would be
available to commanders to fund small-scale, quick, economic-
development projects, especially, like, in Baghdad, Samara,
Ramadi, North Babel and those areas.
The revised spending plan also, of course, talks about
additional police. The number would move from ***90,000 up to
35,000, which, in turn, would create 45,000*** new jobs there.
It would double the number of border-enforcement people from
16,000 to 32,000, for an additional 16,000 jobs.
Senator Hagel. How quickly can this be implemented? You got
into some of the timeframes of the jobs--and I know, Mr.
Chairman, my time's up, but if I could just ask him that one
followup point--how quickly can you assimilate that into the
social fabric of Iraq? How can you get these jobs down? We've
been hearing about this for more than a year, as the chairman
has noted. The critical nature of this, the priorities of it.
Money was appropriated a long, long time ago. It is, I
recognize, a very difficult, complicated process, especially in
the middle of a war. And we don't minimize that. But my
question is, it is one thing to state this. Good intentions.
The funding is there, even though the funding hasn't been used
in many of these cases. So how can you do this in time to make
a difference, especially to try to stabilize the country of
Iraq by January for these elections, using one piece, that
800,000 job piece, that has to fit into this somewhere? That's
the question. How can you get these jobs down into the
communities that need them in time?
Mr. Schlicher. Yes, sir. On the USAID OTI transition
initiative side, that office has existed since the CPA era. It
has the grant-making capacity. I will ask my USAID colleagues
for a particular answer of whether they think that there's
going to be any additional mechanism they need to do.
[The information referred to above was not available at the
time this hearing was sent to press.]
Mr. Schlicher. But the grant-making capacity certainly
already exists within the office.
Senator Hagel. Let me just--I'll close with this, Mr.
Chairman--for the record, I'd like to ask that a Washington
Post piece this morning, page A22, ``U.S. Plans to Divert Iraqi
Money, be included for the record.
The Chairman. It'll be placed in the record.
[The article referred to follows:]
[From the Washington Post, Wednesday, September 15, 2004]
U.S. Plans to Divert Iraq Money
ATTACKS PROMPT REQUEST TO MOVE RECONSTRUCTION FUNDS TO SECURITY FORCES
(By Jonathan Weisman)
The Bush administration asked Congress on Tuesday for permission to
transfer nearly $3.5 billion from Iraqi water, sewer and electricity
projects to pressing security, economic and electoral programs,
acknowledging that increasing violence has forced a sharp shift in its
rebuilding effort.
Including previous reallocations, the administration hopes to
redirect more than 20 percent of $18.4 billion in reconstruction funds
to cope with an escalating insurgency and the glacial pace of
rebuilding. With two weeks left in the fiscal year, and 11 months after
Congress approved the money, only $1.1 billion of it has been spent,
because of attacks, contracting problems and other unforeseen issues,
according to figures released by the State Department.
Marc Grossman, the U.S. undersecretary of state for political
affairs, concluded that ``without a significant reallocation of
resources for the security and law enforcement sector, the short-term
stability of Iraq would be compromised and the longer-term prospects of
a free and democratic Iraq undermined.''
The redirected money would be used for, among other things, 82,000
more Iraqi security personnel, including an increase of about 65
percent in police forces and a near-doubling of the number of border
agents.
The shift of funds ``is a de facto recognition that [the occupation
authority's] ambitious plans to restructure Iraq's entire economy have
failed,'' said Anthony H. Cordesman, a security analyst at the
nonpartisan Center for Strategic and International Studies, ``and that
. . . efforts to plan the long-term structure of Iraq's economic
development have foundered in the face of insurgent attacks, theft and
looting, [and] bad planning.''
Even administration allies said the State Department has been slow
coming to terms with a security environment radically different from
what was envisioned when the reconstruction plans were drafted last
fall.
In October, President Bush fought to preserve ambitious plans to
repair Iraq's electrical and water systems, build hospitals and
prisons, and construct roads, bridges, rail lines and ports.
About $7.1 billion has since been directed to contractors, but
little of it has hit the streets. Of $4.2 billion designated for water
and sanitation, $16 million has been spent, according to State
Department documents sent to Congress. Of $786 million earmarked for
health, $2 million has been spent. Only $7 million has been used from
the $367 million designated for roads and bridges. Just $43 million of
$1 billion designated has been spent on justice, public safety and
civil society programs.
``I don't think anyone can deny we have not been as successful as
we would have liked,'' said Rep. Jim Kolbe (R-Ariz), chairman of the
House Appropriations Committee's foreign operations subcommittee, which
has jurisdiction over the funds.
``Fewer people will get potable water. Fewer people will get the
electricity they need in their homes or their businesses,'' Kolbe said.
``But that's just a recognition of the reality that unless you have the
security you need, you can't have reconstruction.''
The State Department hopes to shift $1.8 billion to security and
law enforcement, $450 million to Iraqi oil production, $380 million to
economic reforms, agriculture and private sector development, $286
million to short-term job creation projects, $180 million to prepare
for elections scheduled for January, and $360 million toward forgiving
long-standing Iraqi debt to the United States. Even with the shift,
Grossman said ``substantial money'' would remain for improving water
and electricity services.
Most of the transferred money would go toward training and
equipping 45,000 more Iraqi police, 16,000 border patrol officials and
20 additional battalions of Iraqi national guardsmen.
``If the shift of these funds slows down reconstruction, security
may suffer in the long run,'' Senate Foreign Relations Committee
Chairman Richard G. Lugar (R-Ind.) says in a statement scheduled to be
delivered today on Capitol Hill.
Rand Beers, a security adviser to the presidential campaign of Sen.
John F. Kerry, was also critical. ``Belatedly moving money from
reconstruction to security is necessary but won't make up for the
George Bush's massive failure to plan for the peace in Iraq,'' he said.
Deputy Secretary of State Richard L. Armitage will defend the
request Sept. 24 at a House hearing.
Questions have emerged about what little reconstruction money has
been spent. In an essay yesterday e-mailed to reporters and policy
analysts, Cordesman charged that much of it ``has been wasted due to
sabotage, attacks, and bad planning; has been spent outside the
country; or has been spent on foreign security forces.''
The State Department wants additional funding for several security
forces, including police, border patrols, the Iraqi National Guard, a
Civil Intervention Force and an Iraqi Intervention Force. Congressional
aides from both parties questioned how all those additional forces
could be brought on quickly when training is already at capacity.
The administration also wants $450 million to expand oil production
from Iraq's northern and southern oil fields, but congressional aides
say production is more limited by insurgent attacks than by antiquated
infrastructure.
``It's clear to me that the postwar planning thus far has been a
failure. What I want to know is that this reshuffling the numbers can
improve the situation, that they've finally come up with a plan that
works,'' said Rep. Nita M. Lowey (N.Y.), the ranking Democrat on the
foreign operations subcommittee. ``Flexibility is necessary, but `trial
and error' is no way to prosecute a war and no way to win a peace,''
she said.
Senator Hagel. Thank you.
And, Mr. Schlicher, if you've not seen this--and my time's
up, and maybe I can come around on the second go-round--but
there are about two paragraphs in this story. They talk about
how much has not been spent. I mean, it's beyond pitiful, it's
beyond embarrassing; it is now in the zone of dangerous. And
so--it's not having anything to do with your credibility when
you come up here to talk about this, but the facts are not very
good here as to what we're dealing with, what we have been
dealing with. And these are State Department numbers, by the
way, that are quoted in the Washington Post.
Thank you.
The Chairman. Thank you very much, Senator Hagel.
Senator Nelson.
Senator Nelson. Mr. Chairman, please let Senator Hagel
continue with his line of questioning there. I'm in no hurry.
The Chairman. Very well. Senator Hagel, do you have
another----
Senator Hagel. Well, thank you. Let me, then, just take a
moment to pursue this story, because it does cut, Mr.
Schlicher, to what we're talking about here. Then, if Senator
Nelson is still willing and very gracious, then I'll add one
additional point. Thank you.
Quote from the Washington Post, State Department numbers,
``About $7.1 billion has since been directed to contractors.''
Now, this starts with referencing President Bush's statements
in October of last year about plans to repair Iraq's electrical
and water systems, build hospitals and prisons, and construct
roads, bridges, rail lines, and ports. ``About $7.1 billion has
since been directed to contractors. But little of it has hit
the streets. Of $4.2 billion designated for water and
sanitation, $16 million has been spent.'' I'll repeat that. Of
$4.2 billion designated for water and sanitation, $16 million
has been spent. I pick it up from there. Again, quoting the
State Department numbers, according to State Department figures
sent to Congress, ``Of $786 million earmarked for health, $2
million has been spent. Only $7 million has been used, from the
$367 million designated for roads and bridges. Just $43 million
of over $1 billion designated has been spent on justice, public
safety, and civil-society programs.''
I think the point's clear here, Mr. Schlicher, and that's
why some of us--and I speak only for myself--are very skeptical
when I hear these numbers and when I talk to other colleagues
and listen to people who are close to Iraq, and see that we
have not made the kind of progress that we had all hoped to
make, understanding the realities of war, the uncertainties,
the uncontrollables, the unknowables, and the uncertainties
about it.
Now, let me followup with this one question. There was a
September--I think, September 3 report from the Secretary
General of the United Nations, Kofi Annan. And I will quote one
of the things that was stated in this report. ``At this
juncture, circumstances do not permit the United Nations to
implement to the fullest extent the essential tasks under its
mandate pursuant to Resolution 1546''--which already has been
discussed here this morning--end of quote.
Would you talk now a little more, in some detail, about the
security problem that we're all talking about this morning. You
have recognized, obviously, for the reprogramming request that
you're coming forward with--and how that's impacting--how you
see that impacting on what the Secretary General is talking
about? The U.N. is a rather significant part of this, if, for
no other reason, than elections. And I know we're all playing
for that. But that September 3 report is a very--and I've read
the report--I don't know if you've seen it--is a very
unsettling report as to the next few months to try to align the
stars and the forces in Iraq to prepare for a free, open, fair
election, which we must have.
Thank you.
Mr. Schlicher. Yes, sir. Thank you for the question.
We do see the U.N. as a vital partner in Iraq, especially
in the next months, as we gear up for elections. The United
Nations, of course, is still suffering from the memory of the
terrible terrorist blast that occurred at their headquarters
last year that killed the Secretary General's special
representative, Sergio de Mello. And I can't speak for the
United Nations, but I think those folks always have that
tragedy in the back of their minds.
We do want more people on the ground in--U.N. people on the
ground there. Lakhdar Brahimi, as you recall, played an
absolutely vital role earlier this year in the setting up of
the Iraqi Interim Government. The new special representative of
the U.N. in Iraq, Ambassador Qazi, who was Ambassador here in
Washington, also played a very important role during the
National Conference and the setup of the Interim Council.
The U.N. elections team has been on the ground for several
months now. They're there now. They're working very intensely
with the Iraqi Independent Electoral Commission on all of the
logistics and the rules for the elections. They're deeply
engaged in that. We're deeply engaged with both of them. We
have recently allocated $40 million to go to IFES to support
their planning efforts, as well.
Now, the United Nations, of course, needs its own security,
as per 1546. There are different aspects of that security.
There's the close, inner-ring security to protect the U.N.
principals on the ground there. There has been some progress
made in identifying PSDs, personal security details, to take
care of those needs. We're also looking for middle-ring
security, as well, for, like, you know, the next ring out,
after which the multinational forces kick in, in doing their
duties. There is a DOD/State team that's leaving this week to
go and talk to several countries about the possibility that
they would be willing, as a collective, to provide the troops
for that protection force, as well. And those different
countries, of course, have different needs that--to which--and
if those needs were met, they might be able to respond in a
positive way. So we're working through that with them right
now.
We do understand that the U.N. needs to ramp up the number
of people that it has right now. They're still operating under
a self-imposed ceiling of personnel. We would hope that they
would take a look at that ceiling in--by looking at the needs
for what they have to get on the ground, because the logistics
of setting up the elections are going to be very daunting in
any case. And their role is essential there. We're willing to
help them. We're working with them and the Iraqis. We do want
them to have a full presence there. And I think we will get
there, although it's a tough slog.
Senator Hagel. Thank you, gentlemen.
Mr. Chairman, thank you.
Senator Nelson, thank you.
The Chairman. Thank you, Senator Hagel.
Senator Nelson.
Senator Nelson. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And thank you for
calling this hearing.
When I think of meeting an emergency and being prepared for
it, I can't be reminded, because of my tired physical condition
right now, of going through three hurricanes, the third of
which is about to hit my state in just a few hours. There is a
plan on the shelf. When the disaster strikes, that plan is
executed, the resources are provided, and improvisation is
there as things change.
And as we look back on this, there was a plan on the shelf;
albeit, it was a little loosey-goosey, as we well knew, as we
tried to get that plan out of the administration prior to the
war. And then they had a general in charge. And his name was
General Garner--by the way, a Floridian. And a major part of
his security plan was: keep the Iraqi army in place and deal
with the Ba'athist officers, but keep 500,000 people employed.
And when he was given the boot and replaced by Mr. Bremer, that
was reversed.
So then we had a plan, we're going to train all of these
people. And we've had the testimony here already.
I went to one of those cop training facilities. And the
particular one that I went to was outside of Amman, Jordan. And
in 8 weeks, we were supposed to have a trained police officer.
And the question was asked of you all, are there 30-some-
thousand trained cops? And the answer that you gave us was no.
Senator Hagel testified we had a plan, we appropriated the
money. This money was going to be spent. It was U.S. money. And
very little of it has been spent. We also had a plan that we
were going to have the international community pledge. And they
only pledged $13 billion. And very little of those pledges have
been forthcoming.
And then I read an article like today's Philadelphia
Inquirer, which I would like to enter into the record, Mr.
Chairman.
[The article referred to follows:]
[From the Philadelphia Inquirer, Wednesday, September 15, 2004]
Outlook: The Growing Insurgency Could Doom U.S. Plans
for Iraq, Analysts Say
(By Jonathan S. Landay and Warren P. Strobel; Inquirer Washington
Bureau)
Washington.--The U.S. strategy to create a stable, democratic Iraq
is in danger of failing, some current and former American analysts say,
and the anti-American insurgency is growing larger, more sophisticated
and more violent.
A wave of attacks across Iraq included the deadliest single bombing
in Baghdad in six months yesterday and at least seven bombings in the
capital Sunday.
The violence increasingly appears to threaten nationwide elections
planned for January, which are key to President Bush's hopes for
reducing the number of U.S. troops, now 140,000, and making a graceful
exit from Iraq.
Some experts on Iraq say the best that can be hoped for now is
continued chaos that falls short of a civil war.
``The overall prospects . . . are for a violent political future,''
said Jeffrey White, a former senior analyst with the Defense
Intelligence Agency.
Top officials in the Bush administration acknowledge that the
insurgency is getting worse. But they point out that they had predicted
an increase in violence as Iraq's January elections approached.
The officials insist that the elections will go ahead. And, they
say, the United States has no choice but to persevere as it builds up
Iraq's own security forces to maintain order.
``Over time, you will see it being brought under control,''
Secretary of State Colin L. Powell said of the insurgency in a Sunday
television interview.
``We said at the time of turnover that this is the time of maximum
danger as the insurgents come after us,'' he said, referring to the
handover of power to an interim Iraqi government in June.
The insurgency appears to have gained strength since the handover.
White, the former intelligence analyst who is now at the Washington
Institute for Near East Policy, said his conservative estimate was that
there were 100,000 Iraqis involved in the Sunni insurgency, including
fighters, messengers, and people who provide logistical, housing and
other assistance. He discounted estimates by senior U.S. military
commanders that the Sunni resistance numbered about 5,000 fighters.
Bush and interim Prime Minister Ayad Allawi could face a series of
unpleasant choices in the weeks ahead.
They can continue escalating attacks against rebel-held cities in
the Sunni Triangle and against followers of Shiite cleric Muqtada al-
Sadr. But that is likely to bring more civilian casualties and more
anger at the United States and Allawi's unelected government.
Or they can press forward with elections in Iraq's relatively
stable areas, which are predominantly Shiite and Kurdish. But that
risks bringing to power an overtly religious Shiite government likely
to be rejected by Iraq's Kurdish and Sunni Muslim minorities.
In tacit recognition of the ugly realities, the Bush administration
yesterday announced that it was asking Congress to shift almost $3.5
billion from Iraqi reconstruction projects to improve security.
The funds would be used to train more Iraqi police and security
forces, boost oil production, reduce Iraq's debt, and prepare for the
elections. The money would come from funds earmarked for the
reconstruction of water, sewage and electricity services, although
officials said there would be sufficient amounts left to continue those
efforts.
``The security situation presents the most serious obstacle to
reconstruction and economic and political development in Iraq,'' said
Undersecretary of State Marc Grossman. A reassessment team led by U.S.
Ambassador John Negroponte ``faced hard choices, but they decided that
without a significant reallocation of resources to the security and
law-enforcement sector, the short-term stability of Iraq would be
compromised and the longer-term prospects for a free and democratic
Iraq undermined.''
Rep. David R. Obey of Wisconsin, the top Democrat on the House
Appropriations Committee, said he was skeptical that shifting funds
would help. ``I think Congress is being asked to put a Band-Aid on a
bleeding wound,'' he said.
In Baghdad, Allawi, who faces growing popular discontent because of
the security situation, said Monday that his government had a security
plan and said the situation would improve as quickly as October. He
insisted Iraq would hold elections for an interim assembly in January.
Counterinsurgency specialists say the Bush administration appears
to be caught in a trap that has afflicted many foreign occupiers in
centuries past: Too little military force allows rebels to flourish,
but too much causes a popular backlash and increases grass-roots
support for the insurgents.
``This is the classic contradiction of counterinsurgency,'' said
Steven Metz of the U.S. Army War College in Carlisle, Pa. ``In the long
term, winning the people matters more. But it may be that in the short
term, you have to forgo that in order to crush the insurgents. Right
now, we are trying to decide whether we have reached that point. In
Vietnam, we waited too long. When we did make that decision in 1970, it
was too late.''
The White House, which faces a challenge from Democratic
presidential nominee John Kerry on Iraq, has insisted it will follow
the current course in the country and hold elections in January.
For now, the U.S. strategy is to try to retake Sunni-dominated
cities such as Fallujah that are under insurgents' control and that act
as bases for attacks on U.S. forces and the Iraqis who support them.
To retake the cities, U.S. military commanders have resorted to
increasing use of air power, ordering strikes that have occasionally
hit civilian targets--including an ambulance that was struck in
Fallujah on Monday, according to Iraqi hospital officials.
The linchpin to the U.S. strategy is the training and equipping of
Iraqi security forces to take increasing responsibility.
Secretary of Defense Donald H. Rumsfeld said yesterday the effort
was making ``good progress,'' with 105,000 Iraqi security officers now
trained and equipped, and an additional 50,000 due to complete the
process by the end of the year.
White said the spreading insurrections had forced the interim Iraqi
regime and U.S.-led coalition onto the offensive before the fledgling
Iraqi security forces were ready.
``They can arrest people,'' he said. ``Can they conduct offensive
operations against the insurgents? That's at least months away, if not
years away.''
Senator Nelson I'll just read three paragraphs. ``The U.S.
strategy to create a stable, democratic Iraq is in danger of
failing, some current and former American analysts say, and the
anti-American insurgency is growing larger, more sophisticated,
and more violent.
``A wave of attacks across Iraq included the deadliest
single bombing in Baghdad in 6 months yesterday, and at least
seven bombings in the capital Sunday.''
And I'll just conclude with this remaining paragraph, ``Top
officials in the Bush administration acknowledge that the
insurgency is getting worse.''
I served in the military, and wore the uniform of this
country during Vietnam. And that's getting awfully close to
creating the conditions for failure as we had in Vietnam. And I
don't want it to be that way. Because what's clearly in the
interest of the United States is a stable Iraq that can govern
itself.
So I would first ask about the international effort. What
is the administration's position to bring in the international
community to be more involved, both with security, as well as
with the financial burden? What is the administration's
position?
We have to do that. It seems to me that it is clearly self-
evident that we can make the case, particularly to Europe, that
it's in their interest to have a stabilized Iraq. First of all,
Iraq is a lot closer to them than it is to us. But look at the
size of their Muslim population. There's about 10 percent of
France's population that is Muslim. It would seem that a
sincere prayer session with the leadership of European
countries could convince them that they have to participate
with us in this effort to stabilize Iraq.
What are the plans of the administration to do that?
Mr. Schlicher. Yes, sir. I think on the financial side,
we--going through the different milestones on debt relief, I
hope we've answered that part of your question, on the economic
side.
On the security side, I think there are two main pillars
right now that are being worked. One is----
Senator Nelson. Well, just--let me just----
Mr. Schlicher. Yes, sir.
Senator Nelson [continuing]. Stop you right there, because
I don't think you've answered the question with regard to the
spending of money on the economic side, by virtue of what
Senator Hagel just quoted from the Washington Post today. So
could you give us an answer of how you're going to remedy all
of those things that he enumerated?
Mr. Schlicher. Sir, I thought your question was about the
international economic participation in Iraq.
Senator Nelson. No. 1. No. 2, the economic expenditures, as
enumerated by the Senator. And, No. 3, the security.
Mr. Schlicher. OK. On the international economic
participation between the debt-relief strategy that we're
implementing, and using Tokyo to try to speed up the
disbursements of other international commitments, we will do
much better.
On speeding up the disbursements that Senator Hagel
commented on, this is what we, at State, have been intensely
interested in and speeding up since we acquired responsibility
for it on June 28. And although we're certainly, by no means,
satisfied, we have more than doubled the disbursements since
June 28. That just has to--we have to do much better, and we
will.
Senator Nelson. On both of these.
Mr. Schlicher. Yes, sir.
Senator Nelson. All right. Now, that's the debt question
and economic spending. You said we will do better.
Mr. Schlicher. We are doing better, and must do much
better.
Senator Nelson. Who is in charge?
Mr. Schlicher. The Department of State is lead agency on
these things.
Senator Nelson. Is Secretary Powell in charge?
Mr. Schlicher. He is--yes, sir, we are. We're in charge
of----
Senator Nelson. If we want to hold somebody accountable,
who's in charge?
Mr. Schlicher. The Secretary of State.
Senator Nelson. OK. Now, you said, on the debt relief, that
we will do better. That's what your words were there. How are
you going to do better?
Mr. Schlicher. We are going to do better through making our
own commitment, I hope, with your approval, on our part of the
debt relief, and levering what we have done on debt relief with
the other creditor nations. We're going to do better by making
sure that the upcoming World Bank-IMF meetings focus intensely
on this issue and come up with the right result. We're going to
do better by making sure that the Tokyo donors conference is a
success. And those things are going to culminate in deep debt
relief for Iraq by the end of the year.
Senator Nelson. And how are you going to make that a
success, since the last time, in the Madrid conference, they
have blown you off?
Mr. Bowab. Senator Nelson, the purpose of the October
meeting is to get back together and look at the Madrid--what
they promised in Madrid. Now, remember, the Madrid promise was
a 4-year promise; it wasn't a 1-year. OK? It was a 4-year
promise to do it. And what we're going to do is, we're going to
get back with those donors in October, we're going to look at
the balance sheet, and we're going to talk to them about where
they stand on meeting their commitment.
Senator Nelson. Well, what do you have in your hip pocket
to convince them?
Mr. Bowab. What we have is what they promised at the Madrid
conference, as far as providing reconstruction funding to Iraq.
That's what we have.
Senator Nelson. And what's the basis for your optimism that
they're going to come through, when all we've been done is been
dissed thus far?
Mr. Bowab. Well, I don't think, sir, we've been dissed,
because at about 13 percent of what the Madrid conference came
out with, which I think--we're probably just a little bit
behind what they committed to do over a 4-year period. And we
will push that effort in October with them.
Senator Nelson. I don't think there is anybody up here that
thinks that 13 percent is optimistic. But let me go back----
Mr. Bowab. Sir, could I raise one more----
Senator Nelson. Please.
Mr. Bowab [continuing]. Point, because Senator Hagel----
Senator Nelson. And we still have hanging the question of
security. Please.
Mr. Bowab. Senator Hagel raised it, and you have raised it.
And you're right, we have to do better on disbursing funds out
of the IRRF. And we will do better. We have a weekly meeting
with Baghdad, and we're asking the tough questions on
obligation and disbursements.
The second thing is, I think we need to understand we're
dealing with about five different types of funding sources in
Iraq right now. And this is just one of them. So when we look
and we say things aren't happening on the ground, a lot of
things are happening on the ground. What we have--you remember
IRRF-1, we had a $2.4 billion appropriation from the Congress
for Iraq. We have the DOD Train and Equip Program operating in
Iraq, a separate appropriation. We have the Commanders'
Emergency Response Program operating in Iraq, a separate
appropriation. And, of course, we have the Development Fund for
Iraq that CPA had the ability to use those funds to do things
in Iraq. So a lot of money--a lot of money--has been disbursed
in Iraq. Not specifically out the $18.4, but we are fixated on
the $18.4.
Senator Biden brought up the point, and they do it quickly.
Well, DOD is getting it right and doing it quickly, but they're
not doing it out of the IRRF; they're doing it out of these
other accounts I talked about that doesn't have the
restrictions around how we can spend the IRRF money. As you
remember, Congress put a lot of strings attached to procurement
and to awards of these contracts that we have to live up to.
And we are living up to them. It takes a little bit longer. But
when DOD is on the ground putting the PVC pipes in the homes
that you talked about, they are using a source of funds that's
immediately available to them to do that. So they do have the
flexibility to do it, they're doing great programs.
On the employment side, the 286 that we're talking about, a
lot of those programs that DOD will do, and a lot of those
programs that USAID will do, will be putting PVC pipes in
homes. Much of that money is dedicated to doing electricity,
water, and sewage quickly and efficiently for the things that
the--Senator Biden talked about.
Senator Nelson. May we get the answer with regard to
security?
Mr. Schlicher. Yes, sir. On the security front, on
international participation in security issues, I would say
there are three distinct pillars that are being worked right
now. I mentioned one earlier, in the dispatch of a joint DOD/
State team to several countries to assay their interest in
serving as part of the U.N. protection force. Another big-
ticket item that's underway right now is defining the role of
NATO in training of security forces for Iraq.
For the last 5 weeks, I think it is, there's been a NATO
training mission that has been in Baghdad and over Iraq.
They've completed their initial training. And today there's a
meeting in the North Atlantic Council in which they're going to
chart out a future path. We're waiting to see what the results
of that today are, but it should be important.
The third pillar, I would call ``coalition maintenance,''
and that is making sure that the current coalition's members
stay involved and productive on the ground in Iraq. And I would
note that, for example, the South Koreans are going to be
coming online soon, and be stationed in the northern part of
Iraq. That's 3,000 people.
So these are the three basic big areas of activity on
international cooperation on the security front right now.
Senator Nelson. Who made the decision to disband the Iraqi
army?
Mr. Schlicher. Sir, I think Ambassador Bremer, as CPA
Administrator, did.
Senator Nelson. Who counseled him to do that? Did Secretary
Powell counsel him to do that?
Mr. Schlicher. Sir, I don't know. I wasn't involved in
Iraqi affairs at that point.
Senator Nelson. Do you know, Mr. Bowab?
Mr. Bowab. No, sir, I don't.
Senator Nelson. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
The Chairman. Well, thank you very much, Senator Nelson.
Gentlemen, I have five very quick questions, which I'll ask
quickly, and perhaps you can give concise responses.
In Mr. Bowab's testimony, at the end, under legislative
requirements, he said, ``To ensure that we can act quickly on
these crucial changes, the administration will include these
two legislative proposals as part of its overall package of
legislative recommendations for inclusion in the fiscal year
2005 continuing resolution.''
I just want, as a matter of information, to know what steps
have you taken to get these items. Are you working with the
Appropriations Committee presently? Do they understand the
requirements and the specifics that you have outlined here, in
terms of the percentage of changes? And give me at least some
assurance that this is likely to happen.
Mr. Bowab. Let me start from the beginning and say that we
have submitted the requested changes in legislation to the
Office of Management and Budget. The Office of Management and
Budget is putting together a list of legislative proposals that
will come to the Congress soon.
Do the appropriators understand it? Yes. We have briefed
the appropriators on where we stand as to what we can and can't
do, absent the legislation.
The Chairman. But presumably the continuing resolution
you're talking about must pass the Congress by September 30,
which is 2 weeks away.
Mr. Bowab. Yes, sir. We are aware of that, and so is the
Office of Management and Budget.
The Chairman. And hopefully the appropriators.
Mr. Bowab. Yes, sir, we've briefed the appropriators.
The Chairman. In both houses, and what have you.
Mr. Bowab. Both houses, both the foreign ops and the
defense appropriators.
The Chairman. Now, let me just ask, under the contingency--
and this remains a longshot, but we hear these discussions in
our caucuses--if the House of Representatives should pass a so-
called omnibus appropriation bill in which they wrap together
the remainder of the bills, and send it over here, Senator
Stevens has indicated he would be receptive, obviously, to
having debate. Now, whether the Senate would pass the bill or
not remains conjecture, I suspect. But under that contingency,
are you covered also? If you got into an omnibus thing, are
your provisions presumably in the House activity that's
underway?
Mr. Bowab. The only provision that is in the House
activity--and it is in the House-passed bill--is debt relief
for Iraq.
The Chairman. Yes, I see.
Mr. Bowab. The relief from the sector limitations is not in
the House bill.
The Chairman. Well, I would just suggest, take a look at
that. That is a conceivable outcome, although a less likely one
than a continuing resolution covering those appropriation bills
that have not passed. But it would be a shame to lose on a
technicality. This is the purpose of our trying to think
through, to make sure you're making all the preparations that
you need to make to get done the things that you have suggested
today.
The second thing I want to ask is, after the $1.8 billion
for security, training, and equipment for the police and the
national guard, border and security forces is allocated, do you
forecast, or do the experts that are advising you forecast,
that this is what is needed? In other words, is this another
incremental step, or is there some analysis of how large the
Iraqi forces need to be, how much equipment they need, so that
this covers it? After the deliberations, has this been a
question, an issue, that you and your colleagues have
discussed?
Mr. Bowab. We've certainly worked long and hard with
General Casey and General Petraeus on this issue, and the plan
that they have presented us is the plan that they feel, in
their mind, will get us to where we need to get.
Now, it's not a plan that's going to happen overnight. It
involves a number of things, including training, equipping, and
increasing the infrastructure, the capability to produce these
people. That infrastructure doesn't exist right now, so it's,
kind of, a total-package approach that we need in order to make
this happen.
The Chairman. But by ``total-package,'' that means that
once you get that done, your judgment is that this is the kind
of security that the Iraqi Government can utilize to make a
move on its own.
Mr. Bowab. Well, we did extensive consultations with the
Iraqi Government on this plan, and we were both in agreement
that this is where we needed to go.
The Chairman. And this is the number of people they believe
they need to provide security in their country, albeit after
the training occurs, after the equipment arrives, and after the
infrastructure that undergirds this is built?
Mr. Bowab. These are the numbers, yes, that they have
agreed to.
The Chairman. Now, let me ask, with regard to the United
Nations, yesterday Ashraf-Jehangir Qazi, the special
representative of the Secretary General, stated to the U.N.
that the U.N. will not run or administer the elections, but
will assist the Iraqis in organizing their own elections.
Clearly, the U.N. has security problems which may or may
not have been addressed by the United States, the Iraqis, or
others; and, clearly, they have not been eager to send
personnel. The number of people that Senator Biden suggested
that they are thinking about is a very small token in
comparison to what might have been contemplated. What do you
foresee will be the work of the U.N. if people do not arrive
before November, which I understand is one of the planning
admonitions they've given here? And, you know, physically, how
do they fit into this preparation for the election? Do you have
a thought on that, Mr. Schlicher?
Mr. Schlicher. Yes, sir. I know that the U.N. has been
working cheek-by-jowl, side-by-side, with the Iraqi Electoral
Commission since the commission was stood up. I know that
they're providing them training, they're providing them
technical advice. They are planning together for elections that
the Iraqis want to administer themselves, but for which the
Iraqis want the imprimatur of the international community,
especially as represented by the United Nations, although maybe
not exclusively by the U.N. I would have to talk to the U.N.
electoral people to see exactly how they might see their roles
shifting in the coming months between now and the elections.
The Chairman. Well, I hope you will do that, because this
imprimatur is important, but----
Mr. Schlicher. Yes, sir.
The Chairman [continuing]. It could be pretty well
stretched, given the size of the country, the number of polling
places, and so forth. If there are very, very few U.N.
personnel visible, the credibility both for the Iraqis and
internationally could be suspect.
Mr. Schlicher. Yes, sir. We are making sure that our allies
in this enterprise at the U.N. know that we think it's
exceptionally important that they have adequate levels of
people there.
The Chairman. And would you, just in an interim way, not
every day or every week, but, regularly sir, report to the
committee how this is going? This is very important, for the
reasons you've suggested. The Iraqis feel this is important, in
terms of the credibility of their elections.
Mr. Schlicher. I'll stay in touch on it, sir.
The Chairman. We would appreciate that.
Various think tanks here in Washington have published
reports offering advice. I cite one of them, CSIS. Experts
there recommend that the United States aid focus on providing
direct assistance to Iraqis, to the local and provincial
governing councils to generate local ownership in the
rebuilding process. It also suggests that we give funding
priority to the Iraqi judiciary branch. We haven't discussed
today how that might be evolving.
In general, have you taken into consideration reports such
as the CSIS report? I cite just a couple of items from what is
a very comprehensive view. These people may not eventually have
governing responsibility, but frequently many people writing
these reports have been involved heavily in governmental
responsibility in the past, and are very knowledgeable.
Mr. Schlicher. Yes, sir. In fact, I try to read all of the
think-tank productions on Iraq that I can, and articles in the
Foreign Affairs quarterlies, to attend think-tank sessions on
the issues. USIP, for example, has had several very useful ones
on elections. And I think there will be more. So I think those
things are all very useful in helping us to try to calibrate
things properly, and particularly useful at asking outsiders
questions to make sure we're not only talking to ourselves.
The Chairman. We've talked a little bit today about the
local and provincial governing councils. We haven't discussed
the judiciary system. How is our assistance buttressing the
strengths of these local councils and their judicial
procedures?
Mr. Schlicher. Oh, let me think where to start, for a
second. First of all, one of the good CPA legacies that was
left to Iraq was the principle of devolution of authority from
the center to the outside. You know, that's something that
Iraqis are still in the process of learning the merits of,
frankly, because there's, I think, an inherent tension between
the center and the outlying areas, especially in a period
that's unsettled. So, on the one hand, you have to try to
assert the authority of the central government; on the other
hand, you have to try to keep alive the principle of
decentralization.
The Iraqis have been working amongst themselves to try to
find what the right procedures of communication between the
center and the provinces are. And it's been rather rocky.
One thing that I think that our Iraqi friends are going to
consider is, what sort of revenue generation will the outlying
areas be able to have for themselves? What is the degree to
which they will be able to make their own laws and regulations
to govern their areas? Those things are still under definition
right now. But I think it is very, very important that the
Iraqis not lose sight of the value of decentralization as they
move ahead.
On judicial training, I know there's a lot going on. I'm
sorry, I don't have the details of how much, but I'll be glad
to get back to you with it.
[The information referred to above was not available at the
time this hearing was sent to press.]
The Chairman. Well, that would be great; for completion of
the record, that certainly would be important. The first part
of what you've said, I think, is critically important and
difficult in our own government. The whole idea of federalism,
as it's evolved over two centuries, has been very, very
important and, as you say, rocky from time to time.
Clearly, one reason why there is some optimism on the part
of many observers about Iraq is that some useful things are
happening in these local level councils. There are people
stepping forward, actually doing some governance that seems to
have some equilibrium, even under the stresses that are
involved there. We've not gotten today into what is happening
with the Kurds in the north and so forth, but there appears to
be a structure of government there, perhaps engendered by a
period of protection by the United States and Operation
Northern Watch, that offers some hope.
Mr. Schlicher. Yes, sir. And your question's a good
reminder that after we collectively meet the challenge of the
elections, that then another challenge is immediately going to
arise, and that's going to be the Iraqi constitutional
process----
The Chairman. Constitutional framework.
Mr. Schlicher [continuing]. In which exactly these issues
have to be hammered out.
The Chairman. Would provisional reconstruction teams, like
those that have been set up in Afghanistan, help out in Iraq,
to get workers out of the Green Zone more easily, and to offer
some protection and security? Has thought been given as to
whether there are any parallels between the Afghanistan
experience and reconstruction in Iraq?
Mr. Schlicher. Yes, sir. I know a lot of thought's been
given to it. And I would note, in fact, that our new director
of IRMO is, in fact, Ambassador Bill Taylor, who was our
coordinator for Iraq. So--excuse me, for Afghanistan--so I can
guarantee you that he will have all of the good lessons he
learned from the Afghan experience in his mind in his new job.
PCO, which is the implementing arm for IRRF in the new
mission, has sites all across Iraq at this point. I could get
back to you with the exact number, but their aim is to have
reach all over the country in order to have, you know, in the
localities, the resources they need to do the projects in those
localities.
The Chairman. Well, please, if you could furnish for the
record your best ideas about how many there are and what they
are doing, that would be helpful, to supplement our confidence,
at this point.
Mr. Schlicher. Yes, sir, I'll get it to you.
[The information referred to above was not available at the
time this hearing was sent to press.]
The Chairman. Thank you.
Senator Hagel.
Senator Hagel. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
I have just really one question. But I wanted to go back to
Mr. Bowab's response to Senator Nelson on how much money is
being spent in Iraq.
The issue--the question is really not whether we're
spending enough money on Iraq. We're spending a lot of money in
Iraq, and you're exactly right. The issue that we're talking
about this morning, Mr. Bowab, is the $18.4 billion for
economic development and jobs.
Now, the chairman of the committee, in his opening
statement this morning, talked about the military is not going
to ultimately win Iraq. The military is a very important part
of that. But there was a great phrase that many of you will
remember, and we used it in Vietnam, ``winning the hearts and
minds of the people.'' You don't win the hearts and minds of
the people at the end of a barrel of a gun. You do that through
the process that we started here in the Congress, appropriating
$18.4 billion, the human dynamics, the quality of life, the
improvement of their lives--jobs, economic development. That's
what we're talking about. Not talking about how much money's
been spent, or not enough. I don't know--you're right, I don't
know, maybe you've got a calculation of how much we've spent
there. Probably over $200 billion. We're spending more than $5
billion a month. I don't know if anybody really understands how
much we're spending. We're talking in our caucuses about more
supplementals.
But I don't want this subject to drift here from whether
we're putting enough money in it. We're talking about something
very specific in this hearing this morning, and that's what
you're charged with doing.
Now, I say, again, you didn't create this problem. You
inherited this mess. So you're the ones up here. Maybe we ought
to have a hearing--the inventors of this, have them come back
up, all these smart guys that got us in there and said, ``Don't
worry, Senator Hagel, you're nitpicking. We've got plans, we
know where we're going.'' Maybe we bring them all up. Isn't a
bad idea to start the new Congress, maybe next year, bring all
the smart guys up that said how easy this was going to be and
who reassured us not to worry.
Now, with that said, let me ask this question. Regional
initiatives--diplomatic, economic, security--we've really not
touched on that today. We've talked about everything but that.
What are we doing regarding the region, the partners, the other
nations that are affected by what we're doing in Iraq and the
outcome of Iraq?
Mr. Schlicher. Yes, sir. Several things are underway right
now. One thing, we're working with the Iraqis on setting up a
meeting that will feature their neighbors, plus others in the
international community, for, we hope, sometime in the fall, to
show the support of the international community for the Iraqi
Government, for the security efforts there, and for the
election process, as well. The Iraqis have also been
participating in their own group of just them and all of their
neighbors. There have been six meetings, I think it is, to date
of that group, and another one is scheduled, I think, for the
first week of October.
The Iraqi Foreign Minister has been on a regional tour
quite recently, which has taken him, I think, at least to
Jordan and to Cairo, where he's going to do some Arab League
diplomacy. The Iraqi Interior Minister was in Damascus last
week to discuss security issues and to discuss the return of
Iraqi assets that are located in Syria. The Iraqi Deputy Prime
Minister, I think in the last month it is now, has also made a
trip to Damascus, and I think he made a trip to Iran, as well,
but I would have to check and make sure that it's he who did
that.
So, you see, we're being active, the international
community is being active, and, very pleasingly, the Iraqis
themselves have been extremely active.
We also expect that, in the upcoming UNGA, that there are
going to be lots more opportunities for the Iraqi's bilateral
diplomacy with other attendees and for multilateral diplomacy,
as well.
I would also add the NATO effort on training, which is
largely a security thing, of course, as part of the diplomatic
strategy, as well.
Senator Hagel. Thank you.
Gentlemen, thank you both. And give our thanks to your
colleagues.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
The Chairman. Well, thank you, Senator Hagel.
And we do thank our witnesses for your presence, your
testimony, your forthcoming responses. We have asked for a lot
of items for the record. I am hopeful that the text in the
transcript will be helpful. You may have taken notes on that.
We do want to have a very complete record of this hearing as
another benchmark of our progress in this situation.
Undoubtedly the committee will hold additional oversight
hearings on these very subjects. These efforts are crucial to
the success of the Iraqis and to our success in working with
them.
We thank you for your leadership, and the hearing is
adjourned.
[Whereupon, at 11:42 a.m., the committee adjourned, to
reconvene subject to the call of the Chair.]
----------
Responses to Additional Questions Submitted for the Record
Responses of Ronald L. Schlicher to Additional Questions for the Record
Submitted by Senator Richard G. Lugar
reallocation of the irrf for debt relief
Question 1. When were these loans made and by what USG entity?
Answer. Two USG entities, the Department of Agriculture's Commodity
Credit Corporation (CCC) and the Export-Import Bank (EXIM), carry all
of Iraq's debt to the U.S. Government. CCC is far and away the largest
creditor, with debt of about $3.8 billion. CCC had programs for Iraq in
the 1980's to mid-1990. Iraq borrowed money from about 10 U.S. banks to
purchase American agricultural products through a USDA program. In July
1990, Iraq ceased making payments to U.S. banks for loans guaranteed
under the GSM-102/GSM-103 program. An additional $36 million was lent
specifically for dairy exports under the OGSM program. All of these
programs were shut down on August 2, 1990, pursuant to Executive
Orders: 12722 and 12723. As a result, CCC paid over 5,000 claims
totaling just over $2.05 billion.
EXIM's debt, including principal and late interest, is over $116
million. EXIM's claims are for short-term insurance financing for goods
shipped between August 1988 and July 1990. Items shipped covered a wide
range of manufacturing goods, such as construction machinery, motor
vehicle parts, surgical appliances and supplies, machine and metal
tools, as well as goods related to pharmaceutical manufacture.
Question 2. How much is the total Iraq debt held by the U.S.
Government?
Answer. The table below gives a breakdown of the principal and
interest charges owed to the two U.S. agencies that carry Iraqi debt,
as of September 30, 2004. Interest will continue to accrue on the
claims until a bilateral debt restructuring agreement enters into
effect with Iraq. U.S. and Iraqi authorities are in the process of
reconciling these claims.
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Agency Principal Projected past-due interest Total
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
USDA $2,082,500,436.46 $1,700,828,106.72 $3,783,328,543.18
EXIM $ 49,763,411.58 $ 66,428,879.73 $ 116,192,291.31
Total $2,132,263,848.04 $1,767,256,986.45 $3,899,520,834.48
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Question 3. If this is full debt relief, why is it important to
wipe it all clear now? Why not some lesser amount?
Answer. Iraq faces an enormous and immediate reconstruction
challenge. It will not be able to meet that challenge unless its
massive external debt burden is significantly reduced in the very near
term. For example, potential investors in Iraq will not be willing to
risk new resources unless the debt is reduced and relations between
Iraq and its creditors are regularized.
G-8 leaders agreed at the Sea Island summit in June 2004 that debt
reduction for Iraq was critical and should be agreed by the end of this
year. Following the summit and subsequent discussions among creditors,
considerable diplomatic momentum has been generated to pursue a debt
reduction agreement this year. Delay would reduce the chances for a
successful outcome.
The exact amount of debt reduction remains under discussion among
creditors. Given the enormity of the debt stock ($125 billion,
including late interest) and Iraq's development challenge, the United
States believes the vast majority should be forgiven. An analysis by
the IMF confirms that lesser amounts of debt reduction would still
leave Iraq with an unsustainable level of debt.
Question 4. What are we asking/expect of other nations in terms of
debt relief?
Answer. Discussions among Paris Club creditors continue, and the
details of terms under review remain sensitive. The Iraqi Interim
Government (IIG) has requested reduction of the vast majority of its
Paris Club debt. The USG supports the IIG request, has urged other
creditors to support it, and has urged non-Paris Club creditors to
extend comparable terms at the appropriate time.
Question 5. What loss are we asking private creditors to take on
the debt they hold?
Answer. To promote burden-sharing, Paris Club debt restructuring
agreements typically oblige the debtor to seek comparable treatment
from its non-Paris Club creditors, including private creditors. An
agreement with Iraq would be no exception.
Question 6. Does it make economic sense to forgive the debt, rather
than restructure it as some economists have argued? What would be the
budget cost of restructuring? If the Iraqis began repayments on the
current debt,: what would it be?
Answer. The IMF's debt sustainability analysis has confirmed that a
mere rescheduling of Iraq's debt would leave the country with an
unsustainable and growing debt burden, thus hampering reconstruction
and development. This would not make economic sense.
Under current budget scoring methodology, there would be no
associated budget cost for a debt restructuring (rescheduling).
The debt reduction agreement to be negotiated with creditors will
specify the level of near-term repayments, if any. Given the damage to
the Iraqi economy caused by years of Saddam's misrule and the large
reconstruction needs, Iraq's debt servicing capacity is very low.
Question 7. Haven't arrears to the international financial
institutions already been covered?
Answer. Iraq cleared its arrears to the IMF ($81 million) on
September 22, 2004. It is also taking steps to clear arrears ($100
million) to the World Bank but has not completed this process.
Question 8. Is this the best use for $360 million at this time?
Will this bring us more security and stability in Iraq more so than
foregone public works projects?
Answer. U.S. law requires that funds be appropriated to cover the
budget cost of reducing USG claims on a foreign government. Absent this
appropriation (and authorization), the U.S. would not be able to
participate in the U.S.-led multilateral effort to reduce Iraq's
unsustainable debt burden. U.S. nonparticipation would likely threaten
the entire exercise. In fact, this is a very sound use of $360 million,
since this sum will potentially leverage many tens of billions of
dollars in total debt reduction for Iraq. As noted above, debt relief
is a precondition for reconstruction and development, which over time
will promote security and stability in Iraq.
Question 9. Do the Iraqis agree with this use of $360 million?
Answer. Yes. The U.S. Embassy in Baghdad held extensive
consultations with IIG officials on their proposals to re-allocate the
IRRF, including the debt relief provision. The Iraqis understand our
statutory requirement to appropriate funds for debt forgiveness, seek
urgent debt relief from creditors, and are grateful for U.S. efforts in
this respect.
Question 10. Last Fall, Ambassador Bremer and Secretary Rumsfeld
testified a number of times in relation to this supplemental and stated
clearly that these IRRF funds would not be used to pay Saddam's debts.
What has changed?
Answer. Ambassador Bremer and Secretary Rumsfeld testified that
none of the IRRF funds would be used to help Iraq repay debts to
foreign creditors. This remains true. In fact, because this is a
multilateral exercise, authorization to use IRRF funds to cover the
U.S. budget cost of debt forgiveness will facilitate reduction of
Iraq's debt payments to foreign creditors.
Question 11. Please provide to the committee a detailed list of
projects that are being deferred or canceled based on this shift in
funds.
Answer. Please see attached chart.
Question 12. I understand from your briefings to committee staff
that in some cases you have obligated funds to some of the projects
being canceled (signed contracts, mobilized people, etc.). Please
provide an accounting of this. What would it cost to fully finance
these contracts/projects or work orders?
Answer. The $450 million identified for reallocation within the oil
sector had previously been allocated to purchase refined products from
the Defense Energy Support Center. The proposed reallocation would
invest this money in infrastructure projects designed to help the IIG
reach its production goal of 3 million bpd. Within the electricity
sector, $126.55 million of the $1.075 billion identified for
reallocation has been obligated. These funds were allocated to complete
units 4 and 5 of the Baiji Power Plant.
It is difficult to estimate the exact cost to fully finance these
projects, as costs are so heavily influenced by the security situation
and changing conditions on the ground.
Question 13. As Mr. Schlicher said in testimony, ``We have not
forgotten these worthwhile plans, and we believe that other donors, and
the Iraqis themselves, will find money for them.'' If money comes along
later, would you choose these same or similar projects?
Answer. Should additional funding be made available at a later
date, we would, of course, defer final judgment to the Iraqi
Government, but our recommendation would be to fund the same or similar
projects that are identified for cuts in the IRRF reallocation.
Question 14. Has the Department deployed its own IG contingent to
Iraq to look after the reconstruction spending? How many people area
currently in country? How many are planned and what should we expect in
the short term in the way of results?
Answer. State/OIG's work relative to Iraq essentially dates from
June 28, 2004, with the establishment of the embassy there. Two OIG
representatives recently returned from Baghdad following 90-day
assignments. One result of this deployment was an audit of the new
embassy's cash-management situation and of the training that is being
done to equip Iraqi employees to assume responsibilities for this
function.
Iraq-related OIG work in progress includes a review of off-site
support for our mission in Iraq, a joint DOD/State assessment of the
program to train Iraqi police (a program funded through the Department
of State's Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement--INL),
and an evaluation of life/safety measures at Embassy Baghdad. These
projects will be completed over the next few months, funding
permitting.
A senior OIG representative will go to Iraq in October to examine
with the embassy the priority and feasibility of other OIG work.
Question 15. A June MOA between all of the relevant Inspectors
General indicated Ambassador Negroponte would make a recommendation, by
September as to the future of the IG functions for Iraqi
Reconstruction. Could you provide a copy of his recommendation to the
committee for the record?
Answer. The MOA stipulated that the Inspectors General of State,
DOD, USAID and CPA, in consultation with Ambassador Negroponte, make a
recommendation to the Secretaries of State and Defense as to whether
further administrative or legislative action should be pursued relative
to the CPA/IG. OIG solicited the ambassador's views, but has not
received a written response.
Question 16. Training and Equipping Iraqi National Guard, Police
and Border Enforcement:
How far out does your planning extend on all of these
issues?
Answer. Our planning for the Iraqi Security Forces (ISF--Police,
Civil Intervention Force, Emergency Response Unit, and Border
Enforcement Police under the Ministry of the Interior and Iraqi
National Guard under the; Ministry of Defense) is tied to meeting the
objectives laid out by Ambassador Negroponte and Generals Casey and
Petraeus in the IRRF reprogramming request. Our planning in this regard
extends well into 2006.
Question 17. Will the extra $1.8 billion for security training and
equipment produce all the police, national guard, border and facility
forces that the experts forecast are needed?
Answer. General Petraeus' charter, when assuming the job in Iraq,
was to conduct a ``bottom-up-review'' of the ISF and Iraqi military in
consultation with Iraqi officials. That data was folded into the IRRF
review that was recently completed. Based on the assessment of Embassy
Baghdad and Generals Casey and Petraeus, we anticipate that the
additional $1.8 billion will meet the objectives of the IRRF
reprogramming in terms of the number of ISF personnel needed. However,
the requirements of the ISF are constantly being monitored to ensure
that we meet our objectives in Iraq. Ultimately, the responsibility for
deciding what sufficient Iraqi security and law enforcement forces
entails resides with the Iraqi Government. The U.S. will remain engaged
to ensure that U.S. taxpayer dollars are well spent on training and
equipping Iraqi security forces.
Question 18. Do you take into account attrition and casualties?
Answer. Yes. MNSTC-I has tried to purge the ISF of unfit or
unqualified officers even as it attempts to recruit and train new ones.
For example, to enhance the effectiveness of the Iraqi Police Service
(IPS), we are working with the Ministry of Interior to remove unfit or
unqualified individuals from the IPS. MNSTC-I's recruiting efforts also
take into account recruiting replacements for ISF casualties, as well
as to replace members of the ISF that fail to perform as expected in
combat. MNSTC-I's training priority remains on turning out more
qualified and effective members of the ISF.
TRAINING AND EQUIPPING IRAQI NATIONAL GUARD, POLICE AND BORDER
ENFORCEMENT
Question 19. I have said before, and I think I hear it from you two
today, we have to settle ourselves in for the long term, a marathon and
not a sprint.
Does the Department of State which traditionally has carried
out police training, civil society and law enforcement
assistance have the internal resources, particularly trained
personnel, to implement the large increases in these areas?
Answer. Yes. The State Department, Bureau for International
Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs (INL) has recently acquired
additional staff with extensive experience in international criminal
justice development and training generally and in Iraq specifically.
Additionally, INL has reorganized to give greater emphasis and
resources to international civilian police training and operations
including those in Iraq and Afghanistan.
Question 20. How is Iraq assistance different from other law
enforcement programs? Was the type of assistance required not foreseen
until this review?
Answer. The principal differences between the Iraq program and
others designed and operated by INL are:
1. The Iraq police program is the largest effort of its kind
ever undertaken. While the components are similar to other
post-conflict police programs, the sheer numbers of trainers,
advisors and Iraqis far exceeds any previous training effort;
2. Lack of an Iraqi police organizational and physical
infrastructure after the conclusion of principal military
operations against Saddam's regime thus necessitating a
wholesale development effort;
3. The lead role of the U.S. Department of Defense in
civilian police development and training; and
4. The high level of ambient violence and security problems
which have prevented the free movement of trainers and mentors
throughout the country and have delayed the start of a formal
police field training program.
Question 21. Has there been progress in equipping security
personnel who have already been trained? General Petraeus' staff called
equipping these forces ``the long pole in the tent.'' Is this process
still delayed?
Answer. MNSTC-I has made progress in equipping the ISF. MNSTC-I
currently has trained close to 100,000 trained ISF members. The
equipment for those forces is flowing into Iraq in large quantities,
particularly in recent months. We will shortly begin to put out for bid
additional contracts to equip the additional ISF units as requested by
the IRRF reprogramming. While the equipment required for the original
ISF numbers, has been ordered with deliveries ongoing, the equipment
required for the expanded ISF has not yet been ordered. Priority
remains in expediting equipping these units with communications, body
armor, weapons, and vehicles.
Question 22. We are only 4\1/2\ months from planned elections. Are
you comfortable with the preparations that have been done for elections
to this point? Are we getting the assistance from the UN that we expect
and need?
Answer. The UN has been instrumental in Iraq's political
transition. The UN led the process to put together the Independent
Electoral Commission of Iraq (IECI), as well as the Interim Iraqi
Government and August's National Conference. Currently there are three
substantive electoral experts in Iraq. The UN is working to recruit
individuals to fill five additional positions by the end of the month.
UN elections experts in Baghdad have advised us that preparations
for the elections are on schedule, although the logistical and security
challenges are significant.
We believe--and have urged--that the UN should increase the size of
its team and speed up deployment in order to assist the IECI conduct
elections by January 31, 2005. Meanwhile, we have allocated $40 million
from USAID to IFES (formerly called the International Foundation for
Election Systems), an NGO specializing in elections assistance, to
assist the IECI and the UN in the logistical preparations for the
elections.
Question 23. From a September 3rd report from the UNSYG and follow-
up conversations with UN officials, I understand that the UN may ``not
have sufficient security and personnel in place until sometime in
November. I do not gain a great sense of urgency on their part . . .
will that be time enough?
Answer. Security concerns have impeded the UN deployment to Iraq.
The UN has established a policy that limits the number international UN
personnel in Iraq to 35 at any one time. Currently there are about 30
international UN personnel in Iraq, including administrative,
electoral, security, humanitarian, and support staff for Special
Representative of the Secretary General Qazi. There are now three
substantive electoral experts in Iraq. The UN is working to recruit
individuals to fill five additional positions by the end of the month.
Provisional UN staffing plans envision 40-45 international
personnel in Baghdad, 26 in Basrah, and 26 in Irbil by November;
however, the UN Iraq Policy Group is reluctant to recommend that that
UN Secretary General Kofi Annan lift the 35-person ceiling for security
reasons.
We expect that the first UN Personal Security Detail (PSD) team,
which is from Fiji, will be deployed to Baghdad by the end of October.
U.S forces will continue to provide PSDs for high-ranking UN officials
in the interim. We continue to push for an earlier deployment of these
PSDs. We hope the first UN guard units deployed to protect residences
and offices--also from Fiji--will also be in Iraq by the end of
October, but they are not needed until the UN takes possession of
independent facilities. Work continues to rehabilitate UN facilities in
Baghdad to ensure that they meet UN security requirements.
Despite the logistical and security challenges, the UN has advised
us that election preparations are on schedule. We are determined to
assist the UN and the Independent Electoral Commission of Iraq in
holding elections by January 31, 2005.
Question 24. What further does the United States need to do to help
the Iraqis organize elections on time? In short, what is our back-up
plan?
Answer. We have allocated $40 million to IFES (formerly the
International Foundation for Elections Systems) to assist the
Independent Electoral Commission of Iraq (IECI) and the UN with
logistical preparations and voter education for the elections. Over the
next four months, we will continue to provide this type of assistance,
while consulting with the IECI, the UN, and the Iraqi Interim
Government (IIG) on other ways the USG can help ensure elections are
held on schedule. Furthermore, the Multinational Forces-Iraq (MNF-I) is
working with the IIG on security preparations for the elections.
Our goal is to help the Iraqis hold elections by the end of January
2005. Both Prime Minister Allawi and the IECI are committed to that
timetable, and we intend to do all we can to ensure it is met.
Question 25. What are we doing to combat rumors that elections may
not take place in January?
Answer. The Iraqi Interim Government has made clear its commitment
to hold elections in Iraq in January 2005; the UN, the Independent
Electoral Commission of Iraq (IECI), and the U.S. Government share this
conviction. The U.S. is working to ensure that the IECI and the UN have
enough resources and support to proceed with elections preparations. We
are providing $40 million through IFES (formerly the International
Foundation for Elections Systems) to assist the IECI and UN with
logistical preparations, and Multinational Forces-Iraq are working with
the Iraqi Interim Government (IIG) on security plans for the elections.
The work that the IECI is carrying out--such as a voter registration
effort that will begin in a few weeks--will demonstrate to Iraqis that
elections will be held according to schedule.
We are also supporting a ``democracy advertising campaign'' that
the IECI is planning to launch to inform Iraqis of the elections
process and encourage their participation. Through this campaign, which
includes television, radio, and print (newspapers and posters
advertising), public awareness of the elections timetable should
spread, helping to combat rumors of a delay.
Question 26. I hear sweeping generalizations about the composition
of the insurgency that sound like the composition of the looters from
last spring: a criminal element, former regime elements, and
terrorists. Can you describe the insurgency more specifically and how
it has evolved?
Answer. There is no one insurgency. There are several different
groups of insurgents. Some insurgents are former regime and regime
military elements that seem to hope that through their violence they
can derail progress toward democracy and re-install a regime much like
that of the former Ba'ath dictatorship. Others are groups, such as the
one loyal to Muqtada al-Sadr, that use violence to gain regional or
local power. Some of these groups may appeal to Iraqi nationalists who
fear that the U.S. intends to remain in occupation of Iraq, or Iraqis
fighting for more personal reasons, including avenging the deaths of
friends and family. Religious extremists, many from outside of Iraq,
form a third group, and would likely attack U.S. or friendly interests
regardless of our activities in Iraq. All of these groups are
reinforced by criminal elements resorting to violence for money. While
there are indications of occasional or transactional cooperation
between several of these elements, they in no sense represent a
monolithic insurgency, despite having certain common points on their
individual agendas.
The intelligence community and the Department of Defense are well
placed to provide more specifics on the insurgency and terrorist
groups, as well as their evolution.
Question 27. The security situation has affected the presence and
freedom of movement of NGOs on the ground. Kidnapings and murders have
shocked the world. What efforts are, there to provide assistance with
security? Are those under contract responsible for their own security?
Do you see a significant decline in NGO participation in the
reconstruction of Iraq?
Answer. Generally, companies working in Iraq under contract with
the USG (and their subcontractors) are required to provide for their
own protection. MNF-I, however, provides contractors threat information
and, when necessary and available, security assistance to contractors
which come under attack or we believe are being specifically targeted.
We have seen anecdotal reporting that some international NGOs have,
withdrawn from Iraq or limited their presence in country due to
security concerns. However, many international NGOs remain active
across the country in the humanitarian, educational, human rights,
democratization and reconstruction efforts.
The Department of Defense may be able to provide you with more
information.
Question 28. Describe Ayatollah al-Sistani's role in the recent
Najaf truce. How are our relationships with him and his organization?
Have he and PM Allawi formed an alliance?
Answer. Ayatollah al-Sistani supported for the Iraqi Interim
Government's demand that the insurgent forces leave the Imam Ali shrine
in Najaf. His efforts further underscored the illegitimacy of the
insurgents' seizure of the shrine and their violent activities.
The United States continues to have contacts with a wide variety,
of Iraqis, including some close to Ayatollah al-Sistani.
Ayatollah al-Sistani and Prime Minister Allawi, like a large number
of Iraqi figures, have expressed their firm support for an independent,
unified, peaceful, and democratic Iraq. However, I would not speculate
on whether Ayatollah al-Sistani and Prime Minister Allawi have formed
an ``alliance.''
Question 29. Has the situation in the Sunni triangle improved in
any appreciable fashion? What are going to be the keys to cracking that
problem? What has happened of late in Ramadi and Samarra?
Answer. Prime Minister Allawi has urged all Iraqis to join the
political process, reaching out in particular to particular areas and
cities with disaffected constituencies, notably in Samarra and in al-
Albar governorate. He has, at the same time, demonstrated a firm
resolve against armed groups that are continuing to terrorize these
areas and using violence to try to derail progress toward democracy.
In Najaf, Iraqi and Coalition forces fought side by side against
insurgents, creating the conditions that allowed for a peaceful
resolution to the standoff. Such cooperation by security forces,
combined with a robust political outreach and a follow-up with stepped
up reconstruction efforts, will be necessary in other communities beset
by violence, including those in Sunni areas. As Secretary Powell has
said, our major effort for the next several months must be to recover
those cities inside predominantly Sunni areas in which government
control is inadequate, including Samarra and Ramadi.
Question 30. Can you comment on reports that Allawi's support may
be waning? Is it simply exasperation over a worsening security
situation?
Answer. There is no clear evidence that support for Prime Minister
Allawi is waning. The security situation in Iraqi is a challenge, but
Prime Minister Allawi has been firm and committed in his efforts to
meet this challenge.
Question 31. Is it true that Allawi is relying heavily on former
Ba'athists to run the country? It appears as if the Interior Ministry
in particular has seen a large influx of former Ba'athists, many of
whom are known publicly for their roles in Saddam's government and are
generally despised. Can you provide some information on this?
Answer. There has been no large influx of Ba'athists into the Iraqi
Interim Government. The provisions of the de-Ba'athification order
still apply in Iraq and it would be illegal for any high-ranking
Ba'athists to take up senior positions in government. This applies to
all Ministries, including the Ministry of Interior.
Some amendments have been made to the implementation of the de-
Ba'athification order, but these were aimed solely at enabling useful
public servants, like teachers and doctors, who had no criminal
background and were not in the most senior ranks of the party, from
returning to their jobs and serving the Iraqi people.
Question 32. What became of Saddam's old police chiefs? Did they
suffer the same fate as senior military officers?
Answer. Unlike the Iraqi Armed Forces, the Iraqi Police Force was
not dissolved during the Coalition Provisional Authority period. Other
than in accordance with the policy on de-Ba'athification, there was no
systematic policy of dismissing senior police officers.
In practice, many police chiefs have been relieved of their
positions since the end of the war. But these dismissals were most
often made after consultations with local councils, where the police
chief was deemed as being incompetent, unpopular or corrupt.
Question 33. A credible and active judiciary will be key to
establishing the rule of law, providing for stability in all civil
sectors and cracking the insurgency. We all followed the initial steps
in the Saddam trial and I am aware that some of these officials have
undergone training with USIP here in the U.S., but could you provide
for the record a thorough update as to their training and activities to
date?
Answer. The Department of State's Office of International Narcotics
and Law Enforcement Affairs (INL) has been working with the Department
of Justice's Office of Overseas Prosecutorial Development, Training and
Assistance to provide legal advisors to assist with judicial training
in the Iraqi Interim Government (IIG). The goal of the program is to
help establish the rule of law in Iraq and build the fledgling
independent court system in Iraq. Since June 2003 through the present,
these activities have included:
Vetting the judiciary through the Judicial Review Committee
(a CPA-constituted body to vet former judges and examine
potential new judges for suitability to serve in the new
independent judicial system) to remove incompetent, corrupt and
former senior Ba'athist Party judges. More than 20 percent of
860 reviewed judges were removed because of corruption;
Conducting 6-week training seminars for 175 judges (150 from
Baghdad and 25 from outlying areas);
Establishing and maintaining liaison with the Court of
Cassation and Supreme Court to encourage independence and
adherence to the rule of law;
Maintaining daily liaison with Central Criminal Court of
Iraq through an advisor that sits at the CCCI, and provides
technical guidance and input as cases are being tried,
including helping answer technical and procedural questions and
furnish suggestions regarding case processing and adjudication;
Providing legal instruction and mentoring to judicial
investigator candidates; and
Mentoring judges in 16 Baghdad area courts to assist in
coordination with police.
Additionally, as security permits, OPDAT plans to extend its,
activities to regional hubs to further provide above training and
mentoring throughout Iraq.
Finally, once the Iraqi Special Tribunal has been fully
constituted, it will be provided specialized training to ensure the
trial of Saddam Hussein and other high value detainees are tried in an
open and transparent process that follows the rule of law.
Question 34. How much of the $13 billion pledged at the Madrid
Donors' Conference last years has been received? I understand there's
another conference planned for October in Tokyo. What are our
expectations/goals for this conference?
Answer. Of the $13.5 billion pledged at Madrid over four years, the
World Bank and IMF pledged over $5.5 billion in lending and other donor
governments pledged $8 billion. The World Bank and IMF are now in
discussions with the IIG on their interest in accessing their lending
programs. Of the $8 billion pledged by other donors over 2004-2007, our
estimates are that over $1.3 billion has been disbursed so far.
The third meeting of the Donors' Committee of the International
Reconstruction Fund Facility for Iraq (IRFFI)--the UN and World Bank
trust funds--will be held in Tokyo on October 13-14, 2004 at the
invitation of Japan as host and as chair of the Facility's Donors'
Committee.
Our key objectives for the meeting are to provide the new sovereign
Iraqi Interim Government the opportunity to articulate Iraq's
reconstruction priorities, and to review the progress to date on
disbursements and project implementation by donors and by the the
United Nations and World Bank trust funds that comprise the IRFFI.
Question 35. Over the past two months, PM Allawi has made visits to
Iraq's neighbors, including Syria, Jordan, Egypt, Lebanon, Saudi Arabia
and Kuwait to request help. What has resulted from those meetings?
Answer. Prime Minister Allawi's trips to neighboring capitals were
aimed primarily at securing regional support for Iraq's progression to
full democracy and to encourage these countries to fulfill their
obligations as laid out in UNSCR 1546.
Prime Minister Allawi appears to have achieved real progress toward
these objectives. He hastened the normalization of relations with
Kuwait, made progress with Jordan regarding the training of Iraqi
security forces, and made clear to Syria how it could live up to its
commitments on border security and ending support for insurgents.
Through his regional trips, Prime Minister Allawi also set the
stage for the international conference that will take place this fall.
His bilateral visits serve as important markers in the normalization of
post-war Iraq's relations in the region, and lay the basis for the
Iraqi Interim Government working with its neighbors and other
participants to set an agenda for the conference.
Question 36. We have addressed the subject of PD at great length in
this committee. Let me raise for a moment the now well-quoted survey
done in March by the Pew Center. It found, for example, that 70 percent
of Jordanians believe suicide bombings against Americans in Iraq are
justifiable and only 8 percent of Pakistanis believe Iraqis will be
better off with Saddam gone--and Jordan and the Pakistanis are our
allies. Further, a recent State Department poll, completed before the
flare-up in Najaf, indicated that while the interim government still
retained popularity as of mid-July, security remained the number one
concern of Iraqis. And, disturbingly, 40% of Iraqis viewed attacks
against U.S. and Coalition troops as ``more helpful than harmful'' to
Iraq's development. Please provide a comprehensive overview of the
various Coalition and U.S. PD programs in place. Can you measure their
effectiveness? What else is planned?
Answer. The Department recognizes that Iraq represents possibly the
most challenging public diplomacy environment in which we have
operated. Polling information indicates that many Iraqis do not support
the continued presence of U.S. and Coalition forces in Iraq.
Additionally, many Iraqis have indicated that they would feel more
secure in Iraq if U.S. and Coalition forces were to leave the country,
even though the U.S. presence in Iraq seeks to achieve stability for
the Iraqi people. Insightful and sensational reporting by several pan-
Arab media outlets likely serves to reinforce these anti-American
views.
Within this challenging operating environment, and in order to
support U.S. objectives for the establishment of a stable, secure and
prosperous Iraq, the Department, in cooperation with USAID, the BBG,
DOD, our Coalition partners, has implemented a comprehensive,
integrated public diplomacy program in Iraq. The Department's public
diplomacy activities in Iraq stress the serious U.S. commitment to
assisting the Iraqi Interim Government (IIG) and the Iraqi people in
achieving security within Iraq, rebuilding their civil society, and
reconstructing their economy and infrastructure as a means toward
achieving these goals. Specific public diplomacy objectives of the
Department include:
Improving the effectiveness of our communications with the
Iraqi public.
Countering anti-American/Coalition messages from insurgents
and hostile media reporting in the region.
Enhancing and supporting the communications capabilities of
the IIG, Iraqi Ministries, the Iraqi Interim National Council
and the Independent Electoral Commission of Iraq (IECI) to
improve the perceived legitimacy of these bodies by the Iraqi
people.
Supporting the Iraqi political process, including providing
media support and training for the upcoming elections.
Supporting the growth of an independent, responsible and
free Iraqi media.
Promoting educational, professional and cultural linkages
and exchanges between Iraqis and Americans.
To support the U.S. Government's public diplomacy efforts in Iraq,
Ambassador Negroponte has assembled one of the Department's most senior
and talented Country Teams. Within the Embassy, the Public Affairs
Section, in cooperation with the NSC, MNF-I, DOD, USAID, our Coalition
partners and other foreign affairs agencies, coordinates the
Department's day-to-day public diplomacy strategy in Iraq. Furthermore,
the Embassy and MNF-I work together on a daily basis to ensure that
Iraqis understand that counter-insurgency and security operations are
aimed at eliminating terrorists and insurgents, and are not targeting
Iraqis working toward stability, and participating in the political
process.
Over the past year, the Department, USAID, DOD, MNF-I and the BBG
have succeeded in furthering public diplomacy objectives in Iraq
through the successful implementation of a range of programs. In fact,
the Department alone has spent $6.75M thus far during FY04 on public
diplomacy programming in Iraq. Examples of key U.S. Government public
diplomacy initiatives in Iraq that have attempted to enhance the
visibility, involvement and commitment of the United States to the
stability and improvement of life for the Iraqi people include:
The Embassy has provided extensive media and public affairs
support throughout the Iraqi Government to ensure that their
messages reach the Iraqi people.
The first 22 Iraqi Fulbrighters were recruited and arrived
in the United States following a 14-year hiatus to start their
studies at universities throughout the United States.
The launch of a range of civil society International Visitor
Programs, bringing Iraqis to the U.S. to gain critical insight
into NGO management, journalism and the media, and elementary
and secondary education.
The production and distribution of the 23-part ``Principles
of Democracy'' papers throughout Iraq, as well as the
distribution of over 40,000 copies of Hi Magazine.
The development and launch of the Embassy Baghdad Web site,
which provides up-to-date information on U.S. activities and
successes in Iraq in both English and Arabic.
Providing a range of logistics and training support to
Iraq's Summer Olympics and Paralympics athletes to enable them
to represent Iraq on the world stage.
Substantive support has been provided to shore up the
infrastructure of the Iraqi National Museum, protect
archeological sites and provide conservation training for Iraqi
National Library and National Museum curatorial staffs.
The BBG launched Radio Sawa and Alhurra, two new services
that provide Iraqis with round-the-clock news, information and
cultural programs to counter the anti-American reporting in the
pan-Arab media that frequently distorts U.S. activities and
objectives in Iraq.
To facilitate the educational ambitions of the Iraqi people,
USAID has distributed over 2.4 million secondary and primary
teachers and student kits, which included basic supply items
such as: 159,005 student desks, 26,437 teacher desks, 59,940
teacher chairs, 26,050 metal cabinets, 61,500 chalkboards, and
58,500 teacher kits.
Measurement of the effectiveness of public diplomacy programs in
Iraq is a difficult undertaking. The Department's Bureau of
Intelligence and Research (INR) does, however, maintain a robust
polling capability in Iraq, which seeks to ascertain the opinions of a
broad cross section of Iraqi society on a range of issues of importance
to the U.S. Government. The INR polling program provides the Department
and other foreign affairs agencies and decision makers across the
government with actionable information that is used to shape our public
diplomacy tactics in Iraq to address shifting Iraqi attitudes. In
addition to State INR polling, the International Republican Institute
also conducts U.S. Government funded research on civic life in Iraq,
Iraqi views on democracy, and the upcoming elections. All of this
research, in the aggregate, permits the U.S. Government to assess the
effectiveness of reconstruction and democratization programs in Iraq,
with improvements leading to positive impressions of the United States
by the Iraqis, and deficiencies resulting in the identification of
concerns and lack of support for the United States from the Iraqi
people.
In addition to our national polling initiatives, the Department is
also going to great lengths to evaluate and measure the effectiveness
of our cultural and exchange programs, which represent one of our more
visible efforts aimed at building understanding between the people of
Iraq and the United States. The Bureau of Educational and Cultural
Affairs (ECA), which manages a range of exchange programs, utilizes
independent, external professional evaluators to assess the outcomes of
exchange programs. These outcomes include the ability to measure
changes in attitudes, knowledge, skills, and behavior. ECA's mandate is
to increase mutual understanding and build trust through exchange
activity. Data is normally collected through a combination of methods,
including paper surveys, on-line surveys, and focus groups.
Two examples of evaluation efforts capable of measuring the
effectiveness of our exchange programs in Iraq include:
ECA's Partnerships for Learning Youth Exchange and Study
(YES) Program: Recent measurements of the effectiveness of the
YES Program with students from predominantly Muslim countries
enabled the Department to determine that YES participants a)
were extremely satisfied with the program, b) gained a more
balanced view of the U.S. and learned to view their own
countries with new eyes, c) felt empowered and learned a wide
range of life skills, and d) made important relationships with
their American hosts and believed that these relationships will
continue. Students from Iraq have just arrived in the United
States as part of the second wave of PLUS. We will be able to
report on their experiences at the end of this academic year.
Fulbright Program: There are currently 22 Fulbrighters from
Iraq studying and conducting research in the United States.
Results from the Evaluation of the Visiting Scholar and
Visiting Student Programs show that regardless of which country
scholars hail, the Fulbright experience is transformative both
personally and professionally. Our ability to measure their
experience has indicated that Fulbrighters actively share what
they learned during their Fulbright experience with their home
communities. Most importantly for the prospect of world peace,
the international relationships that Fulbrighters forge during
their programs with colleagues and friends are enduring.
Building on ECA's success in measurement and evaluation, we are
expanding these efforts to other parts of the public diplomacy family.
The Under Secretary for Public Diplomacy and Public Affairs has
established the Office of Policy, Planning and Resources to coordinate
public diplomacy activities, resources and evaluation. The Office
recently created the Public Diplomacy Evaluation Council, an inter-
bureau organization that will coordinate the measurement of public
diplomacy programs and initiatives. This Council will continue to work
on the assessment of the effectiveness of continuous improvements in
our ability to influence our standing with the Iraqi people and
overcome the objections of many Iraqis to our continued presence in
their country.
During the coming fiscal year, the Department will continue to
build upon the gains we have achieved to date, and address the need to
expand our ability to communicate and interact with the Iraqi people.
For instance, it is our intention to continue to enhance our ability to
support the upcoming elections scheduled for January 2005, bolster the
ongoing emergence of a free and responsible Iraqi media, and expand
upon the critical exchange programs which link Iraqis with Americans
and bridge the gap between our respective societies.
Question 37. Polls suggest the Iraqi people are optimistic.
Returning Operation Iraqi Freedom veterans report a positive reception
among most Iraqis, saying the news media have failed to get the story
right. This conflicts with recent ICG and CSIS reports that say we are
failing more than succeeding 18-months into this mission. How can we
measure this and what is your view?
Answer. The Department believes that, while significant challenges
lie ahead in bringing stability, security and prosperity to the Iraqi
people, our initiatives are making a difference in improving the lives
of the Iraqi people. One of the challenges in assessing the true
situation in Iraq lies with the way in which data are gathered,
extrapolated and interpreted on Iraq by various organizations. As you
indicated, the Iraqi people, while acknowledging a range of serious
concerns, are nonetheless optimistic that steps taken by the Coalition
and Iraqi Interim Government are likely to lead to future improvements
in their lives.
The dangerous security environment in Iraq has prevented many of
the positive stories in Iraq from reaching the American people and
international audiences. Journalists have been the target of kidnaping
attempts by insurgents within Iraq, and the ability of journalists to
travel freely throughout Iraq is hampered by the need to utilize large
personal security details to protect journalists. That said, many
positive stories have reached both American and international
audiences. Although some stories continue to focus on the perceived
shortcomings of the activities of the United States and our Coalition
partners, as well as the security issues in Iraq, other journalists
have focused on the many positive personal and political freedoms that
the liberation of the Iraqi people has brought.
Measuring the perceptions of the Iraqi people regarding the actions
of the United States and our Coalition partners in Iraq is a difficult
undertaking; however, we've made significant advancement in this area.
The Department's Bureau of Intelligence and Research (INR) maintains a
robust polling capability in Iraq, which seeks to ascertain the
opinions of a broad-cross section of Iraqi society on a range of issues
important to the U.S. Government. The INR polling program provides the
Department and other foreign affairs agencies and decision makers
across the government with actionable information that is used to shape
our public diplomacy objectives and strategy in Iraq to address
shifting Iraqi attitudes. In addition to State INR polling, the
International Republican Institute also conducts U.S. Government funded
research on civic life in Iraq, Iraqi views on democracy and the
upcoming elections. All of this research, in the aggregate, permits,
the U.S. Government to assess the effectiveness of reconstruction and
democratization programs in Iraq, with improvements leading to positive
impressions of the United States by the Iraqis, and deficiencies
resulting in the identification of concerns and lack of support for the
United States from the Iraqi people.
Building on INR's success in measurement and evaluation of Iraqi
opinions and perceptions of United States involvement in Iraq, we are
expanding these efforts to other parts of the public diplomacy family.
The Under Secretary for Public Diplomacy and Public Affairs has
established the Office of Policy, Planning and Resources to coordinate
public diplomacy activities, resources, and evaluation. The Office
recently created the Public Diplomacy Evaluation Council, an inter-
bureau organization that will coordinate the measurement of public
diplomacy programs and initiatives. This Council will continue to work
on the assessment of the effectiveness of the U.S. Government's public
diplomacy initiatives in Iraq, leading to continuous improvements in
our ability to influence our standing with the Iraqi people and
overcome the objections of many Iraqis to our continued presence in
their country.
Question 38. CPA was routinely under-staffed by 30% or more. Post-
conflict planning reports note that despite individual dedication and
desire, in many cases, we did not have our ``A-team'' on the ground. I
understand that by month's end, the Embassy will have 90% of the
necessary State Department personnel onboard, a notable mark. How are
other USG agencies coming along in staffing the mission?
Answer. Of the 141 State employees, 130 (92%) will be in Baghdad by
the end of October. State staff is also augmented by temporary duty
personnel. Agriculture, Commerce, Labor, and Transportation are all at
100% staffing. Staffing of other agencies varies. Given the security
situation, some organizations are not at full strength because they
would be unable to carry out their programs.
Question 39. What is your current estimate of Embassy staffing
size?
Answer. The current Embassy staffing consists of 1,025 U.S. and 580
locally engaged staff positions approved through the NSDD-38 process.
Projecting the Embassy size for purposes of a New Embassy Compound is
in process. We are engaged with other agencies and the Embassy and
expect to have a projection soon.
Question 40. How are plans progressing on building the embassy?
Answer. A 104 acre site has been selected for the new embassy
compound (NEC) in Baghdad, and an agreement to acquire the site is
awaiting signature. A boundary, topographic, and utility survey of the
site is in preparation and will be completed this month. A preliminary
concept development plan for this site has been prepared. The plan will
be refined once the proposed staffing for the NEC is determined. Also,
at that time an updated cost estimate will be developed for the
project. The objective is to complete the NEC within 24 months after
receiving funds. Multiple prime contractors and standard building
designs will be used to meet this aggressive schedule.
______
Responses of Ronald L. Schlicher to Additional Questions for the Record
Submitted by Senator Joseph R. Biden, Jr.
security force training
Question 1. The January 13, 2004 Department of Defense Iraq Status
report lists 203,400 Iraqi security personnel ``currently operating''
with an additional 7,100 ``currently in training.'' Yet on September
10, 2004, Secretary Rumsfeld said that we had 95,000 fully-trained and
fully-equipped Iraqi security forces. At today's hearing, Mr. Bowab
stated that, contrary to the current State Department Iraq Weekly
Status report, we do not yet have 32,000 fully-trained police officers.
Can you explain the discrepancy between the figures provided
by the Administration in January and the figures presented by
Secretary Rumsfeld earlier this month?
Answer. The Department of State is not in a position to address
statistics provided by the Department of Defense. Mr. Bowab's comment
refers to the fact that the Multi National Security Transition Command-
Iraq (MNSTC-I) Civilian Police Advisory Training Team indicates the
security situation in Iraq permits delivery of classroom training for
police, but not implementation of the follow-on field training
component. In addition, the 32,000 figure represents graduates from all
types and lengths of police training courses, not just the 8-week basic
skills course for new police.
Question 2. Can you provide data on the numbers of fully trained,
fully equipped Iraqi forces and information on what that training and
equipment consists of?3
Answer. Under NSPD-36, the Department of Defense in the person of
the Commander, USCENTCOM, has the responsibility to, ``. . . direct all
United States Government efforts and coordinate international efforts
in support of organizing, equipping, and training all Iraqi security
forces.'' That responsibility has been assigned to the Multi-National
Security Transition Command-Iraq (MNSTC-I) commanded by Lt. Gen. David
Petraeus. MNSTC-I, in turn, has delegated the task of military security
force development to the Coalition Military Advisory Training Team
(CMATT) and the civilian law enforcement development to the Civilian
Police Advisory Training Team (CPATT).
The U.S. Department of State has played no role in military
training or development and, therefore, is unable to provide a response
to the portion of the question pertaining to military security forces.
Similarly, the State Department has not equipped any of the Iraqi
security forces and cannot comment on this subject.
The State Department's Bureau for International Narcotics and Law
Enforcement Affairs (INL) has supported and continues to actively
support, CPATT in the training of the Iraq Police Service and is able
to respond to the question concerning Police training.
Police training, as approved by Ambassador L. Paul Bremer in
September 2003, consists of two principal alternatives; a three-week
orientation course for existing police personnel known as the
Transition Integration Program (TIP), and an eight-week Basic Police
Skills training course for new police recruits taught at one of several
police academies. Both of these courses were to be followed by a period
of field training and evaluation.
The TIP curriculum and lesson plans were developed by personnel
supplied by the U.S. Justice Department's International Criminal
Investigative Training Assistance Program (ICITAP) and were intended to
provide an introduction to policing in a free society and to human
rights principles and standards. TIP was delivered initially by U.S.
Army instructors. The TIP course was eventually taken over by an Iraq
training cadre and is being phased out as the pool of Iraqi personnel
with prior police experience is exhausted.
In its most recent weekly report, CPATT reports that a total of
23,142 Iraq police have participated in the TIP training through June
25, 2004, the last date upon which the U.S. Army reported these
statistics to CPATT. TIP covers the following subjects:
Course Introduction and Administration
New Iraqi Police Mission, Philosophy and Role
Democratic Policing Principles
Policing in a Democratic Society
What are Human Rights?
Non-discrimination, a Basic Element of Human Rights
Principles of Non-discrimination; Women in Society
International Law Basics
Basic Source of International Law
Right to Life
Prohibition against Torture
Liberty and Security of Persons
Pre-Trial Police Behavior; Potential Violations Of H/R
Domestic Violence
Rights of Children and Juveniles
Freedom of Thought, Conscience and Religion
Freedom of Assembly and Association
Freedom of Movement
Police Ethics and Values I
Standards for Code of Conduct
Evolution of Democratic Policing
Community Policing
International Standards for Police Use of Force
Officer Survival
Interviewing Witnesses and Taking Statements
Report Writing
Note-taking
Communications
Handcuffing
Searching Suspects
Patrol Procedures I
Patrol Procedures II
Iraqi Criminal Law, Procedures, Searches and Laws of Arrest
Firearms--9mm and AK 47
The eight-week Basic Police Skills training course is currently
taught at the Jordan International Police Training Center (JIPTC), the
Baghdad Public Service Training Academy (BPSA) and the Al-Kut,
Sulaymaniyah, Ar Ramadi and Basrah. All institutions use the same
curriculum which consists of four weeks of classroom instruction
followed by four weeks of practical exercises, vehicle operation and
firearms training. Through October 5, 2004, CPATT reports that a total
of 8,818 Iraqi police cadets have graduated from the Basic Police
Skills training course. The training consists of the courses listed
below:
Introduction; Iraqi Police Basic Academy Program
New Iraqi Police Service, Mission, Values and Role
Organization and Structure of the Iraqi Police Service
Police Ethics
Human Rights and the Police Service (Part 1)
Diversity Awareness
Policing Hate-Motivated Crimes
Gender Equality and Women in Law Enforcement
Human Rights and the Police Service (Part 2);
The Systematic Approach to Policing Incidents
Use of Force, Standards for the Iraqi Police Service
Human Rights and the Police Service (Part 3); Prohibition
Against Torture and Mistreatment of Persons by the Police
Communication Skills
Note-taking
Trafficking of Persons
Stress Management
Terrorist Tactics and the Police Response (Part 1)
Terrorist Tactics and the Police Response (Part 2); The
Police Response to Bomb Threats
Terrorist Tactics and the Police Response (Part 3); The
Police Response to Suspect Devices
Terrorist Tactics and the Police Response (Part 4); The
Police Response at the Scene of a Terrorist Explosion, and
Chemical, Biological, Radiological, and Nuclear Incidents
Iraqi Traffic Law
Traffic Accident Scene Management
Drugs Awareness
The National Disciplinary Code for the Iraqi Police Service
In addition, INL has entered into interagency agreements with
federal law enforcement agencies to provide specialized and advanced
training in the following subjects:
Management Development
Internal Controls
Basic Criminal Investigations
Counter-Terrorism
Post Blast Investigations
Forensic Evidence Collection and Analysis
Intelligence and Drug Investigations
Kidnaping Investigations
Witness Protection
Question 3. How many new police recruits have completed the 24-week
field training program? If there are none, when do you expect the first
group of graduates from the field training program?
Answer. The Field Training Officer (FTO) Program portion of Iraq
police training was intended to be delivered by International Police
Liaison Officers (IPLOs). Due to the security hazards currently being
experienced in Iraq, and the associated difficulty in performing the
on-the-job training, mentoring and evaluation activities resulting from
those hazards, no formal field training program has yet been
undertaken. Although the Iraq Police Field Training Program has not yet
commenced, CPATT has informed INL that when it begins, the Program will
consume 18 weeks rather than the originally planned 24-week period of
time. CPATT has also informed us that a modified version of post-
academy training is being pursued whereby IPLOs assemble academy
graduates in a secure setting and provide follow-on instruction in
police practical and applied skills. No statistics are presently
available regarding the numbers of trainees who have completed this
instruction.
Question 4. Can you please provide a schedule for the completion of
the field training program?
Answer. The uncertainties presented by the security situation in
Iraq have precluded the implementation of a formal police FTO program.
CPATT indicates that a formal FTO program will begin as soon as the
security situation permits IPLOs to engage in the activities associated
with that Program.
Question 5. How many field trainers are deployed?
Answer. Five hundred (500) American IPLOs have been deployed to
Iraq and are assisting with various aspects of Iraq Police Service
development (recruiting, testing, selection, records generation,
communications, etc.) pending the time when the security situation will
allow them to begin the formal police FTO program.
Question 6. Are any other countries participating in the field-
training of Iraqi police? What efforts are being made to recruit
others?
Answer. International response to Department of State requests for
contributions to support efforts to re-establish police, justice and
prison functions in Iraq following the May 1, 2003 end of major combat
operations has been very weak. While Canada, Norway and the UK
contributed to the U.S.-led on-the-ground assessment in May-June 2003,
strong international participation in training Iraqi police has been
limited to the Jordan International Police Training Center (JIPTC).
Unofficial/informal inquiries indicate that until the security
environment dramatically improves, international police participation
in classroom or field training in Iraq will be very limited.
Question 7. Please describe the training program for each of the
security services--how long is it, what does it consist of?
Answer. Other than that described above for the Iraq Police
Service, the State Department has no detailed knowledge with respect to
the training program for the other security services.
Question 8. As of September 1, 2004, just over $1bn of the $18.4bn
in Iraqi reconstruction funds provided in P.L. 108-106 had been
expended.
By what date do you expect the entire $18.4 billion to be
expended?
Answer. As of September 15, $1.189 billion of the Iraq Relief and
Reconstruction Fund (IRRF) had been disbursed--more than triple the
amount disbursed 12 weeks ago when the United States transferred
sovereignty to the Iraqi Interim Government. Disbursement rates should
continue to accelerate as many of the large infrastructure projects
move from the planning and design phase to the construction phase.
Security has a significant impact on the progress of reconstruction
efforts, and an improved security situation will allow for us to
disburse funds more expeditiously. It is important to note that
disbursement of reconstruction funds is contingent upon construction
progress, and many of these projects will require several years to
complete.
The IRRF reprogramming, by placing some emphasis on quick-impact,
high-employment projects, should also accelerate the rate of
disbursement of IRRF funds.
Question 9. In reprogramming $3.5 billion in funds, what lessons
have been learned from the past year that will allow for faster
disbursal in the future?
Answer. A primary consideration in our review remains security, a
key to all reconstruction efforts as well as to consolidating political
objectives. Violence, and the threat of violence, has slowed down the
rate of progress on reconstruction. We have therefore proposed to
increase the number of Iraqi security and law enforcement personnel,
realizing that an improved security situation will allow for faster
disbursal of reconstruction funds. Experiences over the past year have
also led us to concentrate our efforts on hiring more Iraqi firms (vice
international firms), and to focus on high-impact, labor-intensive
local community development projects in order to put more Iraqis to
work rebuilding their country.
Question 10. By what process were Iraqi priorities considered in
developing the reprogramming?
Answer. Ambassador Negroponte and his entire Country Team consulted
extensively with the Iraqi Interim Government during the review of IRRF
priorities. The Iraqi Interim Government fully understands these
priorities.
Question 11. Were there any changes the Iraqis specifically
requested or vetoed?
Answer. Although the Iraqi Interim Government understands our
reprioritization of IRRF funds, the IIG is understandably concerned
about the potential impact of delaying projects in certain sectors to
compensate for costs of increasing security and accelerating employment
opportunities. We hope that these projects will eventually be funded,
either by the Iraqi Government's own budget or through contributions
from other international donors. As part of our ongoing discussions
with donors, we have encouraged other countries to consider projects in
the water, sanitation and power sectors that have been affected by the
IRRF review.
Question 12. How does the administration plan on ensuring that U.S.
foreign assistance to Iraq is spent in a fair and equitable manner
throughout the country?
Answer. The administration has created the Iraq Reconstruction
Management Office (IRMO), which has its principal operations in the
U.S. Embassy in Baghdad. IRMO, working with Washington agencies,
provides coordinated, daily oversight of assistance goals and the
implementation necessary to achieve those goals. One of IRMO's primary
tasks is to work together with the IIG to evaluate program
recommendations and ensure that U.S. assistance is regionally balanced.
Question 13. Mr. Schlicher states in his testimony that the
reprogramming request will mean that fewer Iraqis will have essential
services by 2007 than we had originally intended. Please provide a
detailed sector-by-sector breakdown with projections showing the
effects of the reprogramming.
Answer. Proposed $1.9 billion cut in water sector results in
longer-term (2005-2007) shortfalls:
Currently, about 1.5 million Iraqis have access to sewage
treatment. With the proposed cut, this number will increase by
13 million; vice 5 million with full funding.
Currently, few Iraqis have access to potable water. With the
proposed cut, 7.5 million Iraqis will gain access to potable
water, vice 15 million with full funding.
Currently, there are 4.5 million hectares of irrigated
agriculture land. With the proposed cut, this will grow by
440,000 hectares vice 900,000 with full funding.
With the cut, 18,000 Iraqis would be employed at peak
employment periods in the water sector, vice 36,000 with full
funding.
The IRRF reprogramming, however, is expected to generate overall
number of jobs created by U.S.-administered projects could total as
many as 800,000 over the next two years.
Proposed $1.1 billion cut in electric sector results in:
Currently, electricity generation capacity averages 4960MW.
With the proposed cut, this will increase by 2,200MW, vice a
3,400MW increase with full funding.
With the cut, 12,000+ Iraqis will be employed at peak, vice
16,000+ with full funding.
Question 14. In his testimony before the Senate Foreign Relations
Committee on September 24, 2003, Ambassador Bremer told us that he
hoped oil production would be at 3 million barrels per day by October
2004 and that, by 2005, this would provide for a $5 billion surplus for
Iraq to help fund its own reconstruction.
What is Iraqi oil production today?
Answer. On 15 September, the monthly average of crude oil
production is 2.47 million barrels per day (MBPD).
Question 15. In his testimony before the Senate Foreign Relations
Committee on September 24, 2003, Ambassador Bremer told us that he
hoped oil production would be at 3 million barrels per day by October
2004 and that, by 2005, this would provide for a $5 billion surplus for
Iraq to help fund its own reconstruction.
When do we expect it to reach 3 million barrels per day?
Answer. The end of year goal is to produce between 2.8 to 3.0
million barrels per day (MBPD). This range was the pre-war production
capacity of Iraq's oil infrastructure. The reallocation of $450 million
in the Iraq Relief and Reconstruction Funds (IRRF) will be used to
complete oil projects, which will help in attaining the year-end goal.
Reaching the 3.0 MBPD, the high end of the spectrum, will require a
security environment that allows the $450 million in oil infrastructure
projects to be implemented.
Question 16. In his testimony before the Senate Foreign Relations
Committee on September 24, 2003, Ambassador Bremer told us that he
hoped oil production would be at 3 million barrels per day by October
2004 and that, by 2005, this would provide for a $5 billion surplus for
Iraq to help fund its own reconstruction.
What do you expect Iraqi oil, revenues to be this year and
next year?
Answer. As of September 15, Iraq has earned $11.78 billion as a
result of oil sales. If prices, production, and exports remain at
current levels, then 2004 revenue will be approximately $16 billion. In
2005, Iraqi oil revenue should be between $16-$19 billion in 2005. This
range is based on the IIG's budgetary assumption that the oil price
will be $26/barrel and export levels remain between 1.8 to 2.0 MBPD.
The $26/barrel assumption is a conservative projection to ensure a
working budget.
Question 17. In his testimony before the Senate Foreign Relations
Committee on September 24, 2003, Ambassador Bremer told us that he
hoped oil production would be at 3 million barrels per day by October
2004 and that, by 2005, this would provide for a $5 billion surplus for
Iraq to help fund its own reconstruction.
What will be Iraq's expenditures this year and next year?
Answer. Total expenditures in the revised budget for 2004 are $22.4
billion. The IIG is in the process of preparing its budget for 2005 and
should submit the budget for approval by the National Assembly by mid-
October. We expect that 2005 recurrent expenditures will be funded
exclusively by Iraqi revenue and will decrease from 2004 levels.
Capital and reconstruction expenditures should be largely covered by
donor assistance, although we expect some capital expenditures to be
financed by Iraqi revenue.
Question 18. According to State Department reports, the January
2005 parliamentary elections will require 8,000 polling stations, 300
regional offices, 150,000 staff, and 25,000 election monitors. 15
million Iraqis and approximately 100 political parties will need to be
registered. We have heard that the United Nations is only devoting 10
of its 35 employees in Iraq to the elections, though last spring it
recommended having 45 staff work on elections. Can you update us on the
progress in this area?
Answer. The UN has established a ceiling of 35 international
personnel allowed in Iraq countrywide. There are now approximately 30
international UN personnel in Iraq, including administrative,
electoral, security, humanitarian, and support staff for Special
Representative of the Secretary General Qazi. There are currently three
substantive electoral experts in Iraq. The UN is working to recruit
individuals to fill five additional positions by the end of the month.
We have urged the UN to increase the size of its team and speed up
deployment in order to assist the Independent Electoral Commission of
Iraq (IECI) in conducting elections, as well as to fulfill other vital
UN missions in Iraq. Meanwhile, we have allocated $40 million from
USAID to IFES (formerly called the International Federation for
Election Systems), an NGO specializing in electoral assistance, to
assist the IECI and the UN in the logistical preparations for the
elections. IFES currently has three employees on the ground in Iraq.
The IECI is now compiling a preliminary voting roll and drafting plans
and procedures for the elections, including the number and location of
polling places and requirements for poll workers and election monitors.
Question 19. How many polling stations have been identified?
Answer. The IECI will identify an appropriate number of polling
stations upon the completion of the voter registration process in mid-
December.
Voter registration will begin on November 1 and run through
mid-December. The registration database is being built on the
Public Distribution System (PDS) database, used by the oil-for-
food program, which is the most complete register of the Iraqi
adults that exists. These data have already been reviewed, and
those ineligible to vote (children and foreigners) were removed
from the list. The database now contains approximately 13.9
million potential voters, and more will be added during the
registration process.
Iraqis will have six weeks to verify the information on
their registration forms, which they will receive when they
pick up their rations at their local food ration center in
November. If necessary, registered voters may correct any
errors and return the forms to those centers when they pick up
their rations in December.
Individuals who do not appear in the food distribution
system, e.g. those who returned from overseas, may also
register at the food ration centers.
The IECI will then post the voter lists in January prior to
the elections at food ration centers. This will allow Iraqis
another opportunity to challenge and remedy any mistakes.
Question 20. The U.N. has said previously that 25,000 to 30,000
polling stations will be necessary with 600 polling centers--can you
clarify the discrepancy between State's figures and the UN figures?
Answer. The thinking of the IECI and the UN on the needed number of
polling stations continues to evolve. We understand their latest
estimate is approximately 40,000 polling stations, 9000 polling
centers, and 550 registration centers will be needed. Further work by
the IECI may revise this number yet again. We understand that the
number of polling stations will be determined based on the number of
voters, their geographical location, and the security situation.
Question 21. How many staff have been hired and trained?
Answer.
The Board of Commissioners of the IECI consists of nine
members, including seven voting members, and two non-voting
members. The two non-voting members are the Chief Electoral
Officer, and an international commissioner appointed by the
United Nations. The Board heads the Election Commission. The
Commissioners attended a three-week training course in Mexico,
arranged by the United Nations.
The responsibilities, of the Board of the IECI focus on
policy-making, regulating, and overseeing the electoral
process. Its administration is headed by the Chief Electoral
Officer. The Board hired 32 senior staff and administrators in
September. Senior staff members received training in Jordan,
and returned to Baghdad in mid-September.
IECI has already selected and appointed the IECI's senior
provincial office directors (22 in total to represent each of
the 18 provinces, and 4 additional directors for Baghdad). The
directors are receiving training in Amman, Jordan.
The IECI plans to continue to hire their staff for both
Baghdad and the provinces. The IECI will employ cascading
training approach, with an initial focus on ``training-the-
trainers'' of future IECI employees.
Question 22. What is the plan to register voters?
Answer.
Voter registration will begin on November 1 and run through
mid-December. The registration database is being built on the
Public Distribution System (PDS) database, used by the oil-for-
food program, which is the most complete register of the Iraqi
adults that exists. These data have already been reviewed, and
those ineligible to vote (children and foreigners) were removed
from the list. The database now contains approximately 13.9
million potential voters, and more will be added during the
registration process.
Iraqis will have six weeks to verify the information on
their registration forms, which they will receive when they
pick up their rations at their local food ration center in
November. If necessary, registered voters may correct any
errors and return the forms to those centers when they pick up
their rations in December.
Individuals who do not appear in the food distribution
system, e.g. those who returned from overseas, may also
register at the food ration centers.
The IECI will then post the voter lists in January prior to
the elections at food ration centers. This will, allow Iraqis
another opportunity to challenge and remedy any mistakes.
Question 23. A poll conducted in August by the International
Republican Institute shows that while the Iraqi people are cautiously
optimistic about the prospects for democracy in their country, they
have very little understanding of the political transition. For
example, 64% cannot identify in which month elections are scheduled to
take place and 75% incorrectly believe that the January election will
include a presidential vote.
What is being done to educate voters about the process?
Answer. The Independent Electoral Commission of Iraq (IECI) is
working closely with United Nations experts on the ground put the voter
registration system in place, design a public information campaign, and
complete election rules and procedures. The UN and IECI understand that
the effective educating of the voting public in Iraq is essential to
ensuring that the elections are legitimate and credible. A major
British-funded program of television ads is now underway.
Additionally, the USG is awarding program funds and grants to
organizations, such as the National Endowment for Democracy, the
International Foundation for Elections Systems (IFES), the National
Democratic Institute (NDI) and the International Republican Institute
(IRI) to provide a range of activities to support the electoral
process. This support includes voter education and assistance to Iraqi
organizations working to alert Iraqi citizens to and educate them about
the electoral process.
Question 24. How do you expect a typical voter will get information
about the political process as the election draws nearer?
Answer. The Independent Electoral Commission for Iraq (IECI) is
planning to launch a ``democracy advertising campaign'' soon. The
campaign will introduce the IECI to the Iraqi population, provide basic
election information, and encourage public participation in the
electoral process. To ensure the broadest-possible reach, the campaign
includes TV, radio, and newspaper spots. Educational posters will also
be included in a dozen Iraqi newspapers over a four-week period, and
there are plans for television ads on seven Iraqi and three pan-Arab
networks. Follow-on plans include three additional advertising waves to
carry through the January 2005 election date. USAID has awarded a
contract for voter education to an international NGO, which work with
Iraqi groups and networks and multiple media outlets to educate voters
about the electoral process. The USG has also provided $12.5 million in
funding to many local Iraqi civic groups, principally through the
National Endowment for Democracy, to promote civil society development
that includes grass-roots election awareness and education among Iraqi
voters. USAID also has provided approximately $8 million for voter
education programs.
DEBT FORGIVENESS
Question 25. What are other members of the Paris Club doing with
respect to forgiving debt owed to them by Iraq?
Answer. As noted above, discussions among Paris Club creditors on a
multilateral agreement to reduce Iraq's debt are ongoing. They aim to
reach agreement by end-2004. Several creditors have committed to reduce
the vast majority of Iraq's debt, while others have committed to
substantial debt reduction. The exact terms of the debt reduction are
subject to ongoing discussions among creditors and negotiations with
the Iraqis.
Question 26. What have been the results of the bilateral meetings
between the United States and Iraq and other creditor countries and
Iraq?
Answer. U.S. officials have kept in regular contact with Iraqi
officials responsible for the debt negotiations. The Iraqis have
explained Iraq's current economic situation, and we have advised the
Iraqis on Paris Club procedures and provided detailed information on
USG claims. Iraq's contacts with other creditors have focused on the
need for deep debt reduction and bilateral reconciliation of claims.
The final results of these meetings will not be known until a
multilateral debt agreement is finalized. We are confident that all
these contacts are facilitating a generous outcome for Iraq.
Question 27. With another donors' conference in Japan in October,
might this move, not encourage other countries to similarly use
reconstruction pledges to write off Iraqi debt?
Answer. Different creditor countries have different statutory
requirements for the budgeting of debt forgiveness. Since a debt
agreement has not yet been finalized, it is not possible to know how
other donors will appropriate funds and/or meet any specific
requirements. We are not aware of plans by any creditor to reduce
planned aid commitments to meet budgetary requirements with respect to
debt forgiveness.
Question 28. To what degree has Special Envoy Baker undertaken
official activity to press for debt relief in the last three months?
Answer. Since the G-8 commitment to debt reduction in 2004
``sufficient to ensure sustainability for Iraq'' and the beginning of
discussions on Iraqi debt in the Paris Club, the focus of our efforts
has shifted from high-level meetings to technical negotiations. We
periodically discuss progress on this front with Secretary Baker.
Questions 29, 30, and 31. The Transitional Administration Law was
not specifically endorsed in Security Council Resolution 1546. Is it
the legal opinion of the State Department that the TAL expired when
sovereignty was formally transferred to the Iraqi Interim Government?
Please explain the Department's legal reasoning.
What is the legal status of orders issued by the Coalition
Provisional Authority?
What sources of law are there in Iraq today?
What authority do the Interim Government and Interim
National Council have to issue new laws?
Answers. There is broad recognition within Iraq and throughout the
international community that Iraqis must continue a process of
political transformation to permanently remove the vestiges of Saddam
Hussein's decades of repression and tyranny. In this regard, United
Nations Security Council Resolution 1511, adopted October 16, 2003,
invited the Iraqi Governing Council to provide the Security Council
with a timetable and program for the drafting of a new constitution for
Iraq and for the holding of democratic elections under that
constitution. The Iraqi Governing Council developed a timetable and
program that were incorporated in the November 15th Agreement, signed
by the President of the Governing Council on its behalf and the
Coalition Provisional Authority. The Agreement laid out a timetable for
the restoration of full governing authority to the Iraqi people no
later than June 30, 2004. In addition, the Agreement called for the
adoption of a transitional law to govern Iraqi affairs until such time
as a permanent constitution could be drafted by elected representatives
of the Iraqi people and ratified.
The Law for the Administration for the State of Iraq for the
Transitional Period (TAL), which was issued by the Iraqi Governing
Council on March 8th, and the TAL Annex, which was adopted on June 1st
following extensive discussions with the Iraqi people facilitated by
the U.N. Secretary General's Special Adviser, Ambassador Lakhdar
alBrahimi, are designed to create the institutional and procedural
framework for this political transition.
The extensive consultations with the Iraqi people, led by
Ambassador Brahimi, pursued in connection with the establishment of the
Interim Government were designed to develop an approach to Iraq's
political transition that is acceptable to, and will be implemented by,
all segments of Iraqi society. United Nations Security Council
Resolution (UNSCR) 1546, adopted on June 8th endorsed the formation of
a sovereign Iraqi Interim Government, as presented on June 1st, and
further endorsed the timetable for Iraq's political transition to
democratic government contained in the TAL and its Annex.
We have every expectation that the framework for Iraq's political
transition reflected in the TAL and its Annex will continue to be fully
implemented by the Iraqi people. The interim and transitional
institutions that are created and will assume authority after June 30
find their basis in the TAL and its Annex and have been specifically
endorsed in UNSCR 1546. The political transition process reflected in
the TAL is the product of extensive coordination within Iraq and was
facilitated by the international community. Both the Iraqis and the
international community are actively working towards achieving the
TAL's goal of democratic elections by no later than January 31, 2005.
The TAL clearly addresses both the status of CPA orders and the
body of law that will be generally applicable following the June 28
transition. Article 26 of the TAL provides that ``[e]xcept as otherwise
provided in this Law, the laws in force in Iraq on 30 June 2004 shall
remain in effect unless and until rescinded or amended by the Iraqi
Transitional Government in accordance with this law. Article 26 further
provides that ``[t]he laws, regulations, orders, and directives issued
by the Coalition Provisional Authority pursuant to its authority under
international law shall remain in force until rescinded or amended by
legislation duly enacted and having the force of law.'' Finally, with
respect to the authority of the Iraqi Interim Government to issue new
laws, the TAL Annex provides that ``[t]he Council of Ministers, with
the unanimous approval of the Presidency, may issue orders with the
force of law that will remain in effect until rescinded or amended by
future Iraqi governments.'' The Interim National Council may veto
executive orders by a two-thirds majority vote of its members within 10
days of being informed of such orders that have been approved by the
Presidency Council.
Question 32. On September 15, UNSYG Kofi Annan told the BBC ``You
cannot have credible elections if the security conditions continue as
they are now.'' In fact, it appears that the security situation is
getting worse with many parts of the Sunni triangle now described as
``no-go'' areas.
Do you agree with Annan's assessment?
Answer. The current security situation in Iraq is undoubtedly
difficult, but it is premature to judge now that elections cannot be
held on schedule. Prime Minister Allawi and other Iraqi Interim
Government (IIG) officials have been clear that they are committed to
holding them by January 31, 2005 deadline laid out in the Transitional
Administrative Law (TAL) The USG and the Multi-National Forces-Iraq are
working with the IECI, the UN, and the IIG to ensure this goal is
achieved. We are engaged in diplomatic, military, and reconstruction
efforts to help the IIG reassert its control over all areas of the
country; these efforts will intensify as we approach elections.
Question 33. Does the administration have a plan to establish
control in the no-go areas before elections? Please describe.
Answer. The United States Government remains committed to assisting
the Iraqi people and Government to improve security throughout Iraq.
Establishing a stable Iraq, consolidating the legitimate authorities'
control in all locales, and working to provide safe and secure
elections are high priorities of the Multi-National Force-Iraq and the
Iraqi security forces. These goals also underscore the reasoning behind
the recent U.S. proposal for an increase in spending on security. In
order to meet the timeline of the political process described in the
Transitional Administrative Law and UN Security Council Resolution
1546, the Iraqi Interim Government (IIG) and Iraqi security forces are
working continually to secure Iraq before elections take place, and
making plans to deal with security during the election period both
through enforcement measures and political outreach. The Multi-National
Forces-Iraq and the U.S. Mission in Iraq will fully support the IIG's
efforts.
However, as you well know, the security situation in Iraq is in a
state of constant flux. In addition to the activities of the Department
of State, the Department of Defense is also heavily involved with Iraqi
security forces and officials in the pre-election security-planning
phase. For a more comprehensive view, I would respectfully recommend
that you also confer with the Department of Defense for their views on
election-related security planning.
Question 34. Southern Federal Region: Recent press reports speak of
preliminary efforts to establish a Federal entity in southern Iraq.
Please provide further information on the status of such efforts. What
is the position of the administration on the creation of a new Federal
entity in the South?
Answer. The issues of how Iraqis will choose to govern themselves
over the long term will be decided through the constitutional process.
The Transitional Administrative Law (TAL) is designed to govern until a
permanent constitution is drafted by the elected representatives of the
Iraqi people and ratified by means of a referendum. The TAL supports
the general principle that devolving power from the Iraqi central
government through a federal system will serve as a check against abuse
of power and best accommodate the diversity of the Iraqi people. The
TAL provides for the separation of powers among the federal and
regional governments, governorates, municipalities, and local
administrators and that the federal system should be based upon
geographic and historic realities and not origin, race, or ethnicity.
Article 53 C of the TAL allows (with the exception of Baghdad and
Kirkuk) that any group of no more than three governorates outside the
Kurdistan region has the right to form regional governments. The
formation of such federal entities may be proposed by the Iraqi Interim
Government (IIG) and will be considered by the elected National
Assembly. In addition to the approval of the elected National Assembly,
any legislation proposing the formation of federal entities must be
approved in a referendum of the people of the relevant governorates.
The United States Government supports the IIG and the political
process outlined in UNSCR 1546, culminating in the election of a
democratic Iraqi government under a new constitution.
Question 35. What are the goals of the Tokyo donors' conference?
Are we seeking additional commitments to Iraq? If so, why or
why not?
Answer. The third meeting of the Donors' Committee of the
International Reconstruction Fund Facility for Iraq (IRFFI)--the UN and
World Bank trust funds--will be held in Tokyo on October 13-14, 2004 at
the invitation of Japan as host and as chair of the Facility's Donors'
Committee. These IRFFI Donors' Committee meetings have not been
pledging conferences; rather they have focused on disbursement,
implementation, and coordination issues. Of course, any announcements
of new assistance would be welcome; but that is not the focus of this
meeting.
Our key objectives for the meeting are to provide the new sovereign
Iraqi Interim Government the opportunity to articulate Iraq's
reconstruction priorities, and to review the progress to date on
disbursements and project implementation by donors and by the the
United Nations and World Bank trust funds that comprise the IRFFI.
Question 36. How much of the pledged amounts from the Madrid
conference have been delivered?
How much of the pledged amounts have been spent?
Answer. Of the $13.5 billion pledged at Madrid over four years, the
World Bank and IMF pledged over $5.5 billion in lending and other donor
governments pledged $8 billion. The World Bank and IMF are now in
discussions with the IIG on their interest in accessing their lending
programs. Of the $8 billion pledged by other donors over 2004-2007, our
estimates are that over $1.3 billion has been disbursed so far.