[Senate Hearing 108-863]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
S. Hrg. 108-863
CURRENT AND FUTURE WORLDWIDE THREATS TO THE NATIONAL SECURITY OF THE
UNITED STATES
=======================================================================
HEARING
before the
COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES
UNITED STATES SENATE
ONE HUNDRED EIGHTH CONGRESS
SECOND SESSION
__________
MARCH 9, 2004
__________
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COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES
JOHN WARNER, Virginia, Chairman
JOHN McCAIN, Arizona CARL LEVIN, Michigan
JAMES M. INHOFE, Oklahoma EDWARD M. KENNEDY, Massachusetts
PAT ROBERTS, Kansas ROBERT C. BYRD, West Virginia
WAYNE ALLARD, Colorado JOSEPH I. LIEBERMAN, Connecticut
JEFF SESSIONS, Alabama JACK REED, Rhode Island
SUSAN M. COLLINS, Maine DANIEL K. AKAKA, Hawaii
JOHN ENSIGN, Nevada BILL NELSON, Florida
JAMES M. TALENT, Missouri E. BENJAMIN NELSON, Nebraska
SAXBY CHAMBLISS, Georgia MARK DAYTON, Minnesota
LINDSEY O. GRAHAM, South Carolina EVAN BAYH, Indiana
ELIZABETH DOLE, North Carolina HILLARY RODHAM CLINTON, New York
JOHN CORNYN, Texas MARK PRYOR, Arkansas
Judith A. Ansley, Staff Director
Richard D. DeBobes, Democratic Staff Director
(ii)
C O N T E N T S
__________
CHRONOLOGICAL LIST OF WITNESSES
Current and Future Worldwide Threats to the National Security of the
United States
march 9, 2004
Page
Tenet, Hon. George J., Director of Central Intelligence.......... 7
Jacoby, VADM Lowell E., USN, Director, Defense Intelligence
Agency......................................................... 28
(iii)
CURRENT AND FUTURE WORLDWIDE THREATS TO THE NATIONAL SECURITY OF THE
UNITED STATES
----------
TUESDAY, MARCH 9, 2004
U.S. Senate,
Committee on Armed Services,
Washington, DC.
The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 9:35 a.m. in room
SD-106, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Senator John Warner
(chairman) presiding.
Committee members present: Senators Warner, Inhofe,
Roberts, Allard, Sessions, Chambliss, Dole, Cornyn, Levin,
Kennedy, Lieberman, Reed, Akaka, Bill Nelson, E. Benjamin
Nelson, Dayton, Bayh, Clinton, and Pryor.
Committee staff members present: Judith A. Ansley, staff
director; and Leah C. Brewer, nominations and hearings clerk.
Majority staff members present: Charles W. Alsup,
professional staff member; Regina A. Dubey, research assistant;
Brian R. Green, professional staff member; Lynn F. Rusten,
professional staff member; and Diana G. Tabler, professional
staff member.
Minority staff members present: Richard D. DeBobes,
Democratic staff director; Evelyn N. Farkas, professional staff
member; Richard W. Fieldhouse, professional staff member;
Bridget W. Higgins, research assistant; Maren R. Leed,
professional staff member; Michael J. McCord, professional
staff member; and William G.P. Monahan, minority counsel.
Staff assistants present: Michael N. Berger, Nicholas W.
West, and Pendred K. Wilson.
Committee members' assistants present: Darren Dick,
assistant to Senator Roberts; Clyde A. Taylor IV, assistant to
Senator Chambliss; Meredith Moseley, assistant to Senator
Graham; Christine O. Hill, assistant to Senator Dole; Russell
J. Thomasson, assistant to Senator Cornyn; Sharon L. Waxman and
Mieke Y. Eoyang, assistants to Senator Kennedy; Frederick M.
Downey, assistant to Senator Lieberman; Elizabeth King,
assistant to Senator Reed; Davelyn Noelani Kalipi and Richard
Kessler, assistants to Senator Akaka; William K. Sutey,
assistant to Senator Bill Nelson; Eric Pierce, assistant to
Senator Ben Nelson; William Todd Houchins, assistant to Senator
Dayton; Todd Rosenblum, assistant to Senator Bayh; Andrew
Shapiro, assistant to Senator Clinton; and Terri Glaze,
assistant to Senator Pryor.
OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR JOHN WARNER, CHAIRMAN
Chairman Warner. Good morning. The Senate Armed Services
Committee meets today to receive the annual--we do this at
least once a year--testimony from the Director of Central
Intelligence (DCI), George Tenet, and the Director of the
Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA), Vice Admiral Jacoby. We
receive from them their forecast of the worldwide threats
directed towards our Nation here at home and abroad.
So I join with the committee in welcoming the witnesses
back before the committee, and I personally commend each of you
for your leadership.
There are few, if any, precedents for the challenges you
face in your positions in this post-September 11 world. In my
view, our country is more secure because of the vigilance and
efforts of the hardworking civilian and military professionals
who comprise the Intelligence Community which you proudly lead.
The circumstances of this hearing are compelling. In the
aftermath of September 11, our military forces, working hand-
in-hand with the Intelligence Community and coalition partners,
have successfully defeated brutally repressive regimes and
forces of terror in Iraq and in Afghanistan. This magnificent
military force, active, Reserve, National Guard, and civilian,
continues to prosecute an all-out global war to defeat
terrorism.
They depend--and I repeat, depend--on the intelligence that
you collectively and individually provide them. While there has
been much discussion in recent weeks about certain intelligence
failures, I think in fairness we should point out the many
intelligence successes. As a result of this Intelligence
Community, we have caught or killed 45 of the 55 most wanted in
Iraq, we have captured Saddam Hussein, and we continue to find
and eliminate key al Qaeda operatives. We have witnessed recent
revelations about nuclear proliferation in Libya and Iran, as
well as clandestine networks selling nuclear secrets
indiscriminately.
The U.S. Intelligence Community was key to these
revelations. Clearly, as a result our Nation, in my judgment,
is a safer country as we confront and stop these proliferation
activities, activities which could put weapons of mass
destruction (WMD) in the hands of terrorists. However,
dangerous threats remain. Much remains to be done to defeat the
forces of terrorism and tyranny in the world.
The successes we have witnessed over the past year would
not have been possible without the tireless, hardworking
commitment of our Intelligence Community. A number of planned
terrorist attacks have been deterred, disrupted, or defeated
because of sound intelligence work. The witnesses before us
today do not speak of those very often, as they should not. It
is in the best interests of continuing that strong intelligence
detection that not much be said. Such is the nature of the
intelligence business.
Best estimates and judgments are drawn from available and
often incomplete information. We ask intelligence analysts to
make hard calls. They do it with total commitment to freedom. I
am not suggesting we ignore the errors that are occasionally
made, but we must always keep in mind that we have an
extraordinarily capable intelligence system, the best in the
world, the envy of the world, and it is lead by dedicated,
hardworking public servants. We must not lose sight of it in
the current debate. Our forward-deployed forces and our
intelligence system that supports them are and will remain our
first line of defense.
In this same hearing last year, I directed a question to
Director Tenet, as I did to all of the witnesses that came
before this committee, and I asked what would the likelihood be
of finding caches of WMD in Iraq following the major military
operations. The Director's response was very straightforward,
based on the facts as he understood them at that time. The
Director said: ``I believe we will. I believe we will find
research and development (R&D). We will find stockpiles of
things he, Saddam, has not declared and weapons he has not
declared.''
In my view, this response was entirely consistent with the
intelligence we have been receiving in this country for over a
decade, that came from the many agencies of the U.S.
Intelligence Community, entirely consistent with the
intelligence of other nations, and entirely consistent with the
findings of the United Nations (U.N.). I see no evidence of
exaggeration or manipulation, Mr. Director, in your response.
Yours was a judgment based on many years of irrefutable facts,
including Iraq's possession and use of chemical and biological
weapons. This was confirmed by U.N. inspectors, confirmed by
the actual use of those weapons by Saddam Hussein in Iran and
against the Kurds, and confirmed by Iraq's development of
ballistic missiles that violated international agreement, and
confirmed by intelligence that suggested continued Iraqi
deployment and production of chemical and biological weapons.
Without the benefit of hindsight, members of this
committee, Members of the Senate, as well as past and present
administrations, reached the same conclusion: Saddam Hussein
possessed WMD. The Senate unanimously agreed in the Iraq
Liberation Act of 1998 that Saddam Hussein's continued
possession of WMD was a threat, a threat so dangerous that U.S.
policy would be a policy of regime change in Iraq.
This act, Public Law 105, stated: ``It should be the policy
of the United States to support efforts to remove the regime
headed by Saddam Hussein from power in Iraq and to promote the
emergence of a democratic government to replace that regime.''
Those steps have been taken and yesterday we witnessed the
dramatic signing of the transitional administrative document
that will serve Iraq for the indefinite future.
It is true that we have not found some of the stockpiles
which our best estimates indicated would be present in Iraq.
However, I point out that the work of the Iraq Survey Group
(ISG) is ongoing, and we look forward to General Dayton's and
Dr. Duelfer's interim report at the end of this month.
What we have found in the aftermath of the liberation of
Iraq is as follows: evidence of Saddam Hussein's intent to
pursue WMD programs on a large scale; actual ongoing chemical
and biological research programs; an active program to use the
deadly chemical ricin as a weapon, a program that was
interrupted only by the start of the military action in March;
operational ballistic missiles that were deployed in clear
violation of international agreements accepted following the
First Persian Gulf War; and evidence that Saddam Hussein was
attempting to reconstitute his fledgling nuclear program as
late as 2001.
This committee took the initiative to bring Dr. Kay to this
very room and have a public hearing because, under the
leadership of myself and the distinguished ranking member, we
look upon it as a function and a responsibility of our
oversight to bring forward all the facts irrespective of how
they may come. In testimony in January before this committee,
Dr. Kay, former Special Adviser to Director Tenet, told us
that, based on the intelligence available to the President, not
only U.S. intelligence but that of the U.N. and other nations,
the President could have reached no other conclusion: Iraq had
caches of chemical and biological weapons, had used them in the
past, and was likely to use them in the future.
As Dr. Kay stated in this very room: ``It was reasonable to
conclude that Iraq posed an imminent threat. What we learned
during the inspection made Iraq a more dangerous place
potentially than in fact we thought it was even before the
war.''
Dr. Kay also told us that he found absolutely no evidence
of any intelligence analysts being pressured to change or
exaggerate any intelligence conclusions. On the contrary, he
reminded us all that intelligence on the basic possession of
Iraq's WMD had been consistent since 1998 when U.N. inspectors
left Iraq. Dr. Kay and many others have reminded us that
intelligence assessments often differ from what is later
actually found on the ground. The important thing is when they
differ to understand why, and I am confident our two witnesses
will bring to light their views on that subject now.
Undoubtedly, the world is a safer place and Iraq is a
better place because of U.S. and coalition military actions. A
real and growing threat to the world has been eliminated. We
did the right thing to rid Iraq of this brutal regime. In the
weeks and months ahead, we will continue to go through a
process of reviewing prewar intelligence, what went wrong, what
worked well, what needs improvement, and what is being done.
The important work of our Intelligence Community must go
on. It is critical that we keep our Intelligence Community
focused on current and future threats. The members of this
committee must understand the nature of current and future
threats in order to carry out our responsibilities to the brave
men and women in uniform who defend this country. Even though
we tend to focus, quite properly, on current military
operations, we must not lose sight of the other nontraditional
threats that abound in this uncertain, complex world--the
proliferation of WMD and missile technologies, information
warfare, ethnic and religious conflict, and overall global
trends. Our security demands vigilance in these areas and our
military forces must be prepared to confront such threats.
We look forward to your frank assessments of the many wide-
ranging threats to our national security.
Senator Levin.
STATEMENT OF SENATOR CARL LEVIN
Senator Levin. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Let me first join
you in welcoming our witnesses to the committee this morning.
The confidence of the American people and the world
community in the assessments of our Intelligence Community
depends upon the credibility of those assessments. That
credibility has been badly damaged by the intelligence fiasco
relative to the presence of WMD in Iraq before the war. The
need to examine the intelligence that guided our Nation into
war with Iraq is essential to avoid future mistakes which could
weaken our Nation's security. It is essential that we establish
confidence in our intelligence agencies.
The Intelligence Community was so wrong about Iraq's WMD
that it understandably raises questions about what they say
about other looming issues. For example, what are the prospects
of a civil war in Iraq if there is no consensus within Iraq on
the entity to which sovereignty will be transferred on July 1
of this year? As members of the Armed Services Committee, we
may need to make critical judgments in that event, and we will
hopefully be soliciting the help of the Intelligence Community.
Owning up to, critically examining, and correcting our
failures are necessary first steps to assuring ourselves and
our allies that our intelligence is objective, of high quality,
and reliable.
The Intelligence Community told the Nation and the world
before the war that Saddam Hussein had in his possession
stockpiles of chemical and biological weapons, that he was
reconstituting his nuclear weapons program, that he had mobile
trailers for producing biological agents, that he had small
unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) intended to deliver biological
weapons, and so on. The Nation and the world were told that
Saddam was in actual possession of WMD and was producing more,
not just that he intended to get them, not just that he had a
program for WMD or that he was engaged in WMD-related program
activities, and not just that Saddam had not satisfactorily
explained what happened to the WMD that we know he had after
the Gulf War 10 years earlier.
No, Saddam's possession of stocks of WMD was what made the
threat so immediately ominous. Initiating a war on the basis of
faulty or exaggerated intelligence is a very serious matter.
That is just as true if one supported the war or not, and that
is just as true if Iraq ultimately turns out to be a stable
democracy, which we all hope and pray that it does.
Life and death decisions are based on intelligence. The
fact that intelligence assessments before the war were so
wildly off the mark should trouble all Americans. It will not
do to say, well, maybe the WMD disappeared across the border.
The 120 high- and medium-priority suspect sites of WMD are
still there to inspect. The mobile trailers are in our
possession. The UAVs are in our possession. We cannot and
should not delay critical self-assessment until every
possibility, no matter how remote, is excluded.
In terms of its assessments that Iraq was in actual
possession of WMD before the war, so far the Intelligence
Community is batting zero. Moreover, some of the public
pronouncements of the Intelligence Community before the war
were actually inconsistent with its own underlying classified
documents. Compare, if you will, the unclassified October 2002
white paper on Iraq's WMD programs and the classified October
2002 National Intelligence Estimate (NIE) on which the white
paper's key judgments were based.
For instance, in one paragraph in the now-declassified
portion of the NIE, take the judgment of the Intelligence
Community that Iraq is ``capable of quickly producing and
weaponizing a variety of such biological weapons agents,
including anthrax, for delivery by bombs, missiles, aerial
sprayers, and covert operators.'' However, in the unclassified
white paper issued at the same time the clause, ``including
potentially against the U.S. only,'' was added at the end of
the paragraph. That clause was not in the then-classified NIE
on which it was presumably based.
Another example. The then-classified NIE said, ``Baghdad
could make enough fissile material for a nuclear weapon by 2005
to 2007 if it obtains suitable centrifuge tubes this year and
has all the other materials and technological expertise
necessary to build production-scale uranium enrichment
facilities.'' Even that cautiously worded assessment was called
in that classified NIE a ``less likely scenario,'' and there
was even more caution added by a reference to Iraq's,
``inexperience in building and operating centrifuge facilities
to produce highly enriched uranium and its challenges in
procuring the necessary equipment and expertise.''
But the unclassified white paper issued by the Central
Intelligence Agency (CIA), provided to the public, sounded a
very different and a more ominous note. It said, ``Baghdad may
have acquired uranium enrichment capabilities that could
shorten substantially the amount of time necessary to make a
nuclear weapon.'' There is nothing in that public paper about
``less likely'' or ``inexperience'' or ``challenges.''
Exacerbating the CIA's inconsistencies between its public
and classified statements was the existence of an intelligence
assessment office in the Department of Defense (DOD) outside of
the Intelligence Community. According to press reports, that
office, called the Office of Special Plans, working for Under
Secretary of Defense for Policy Doug Feith, found an Iraq-al
Qaeda collaboration where the CIA did not. This office had its
own direct access into the National Security Council (NSC) and
the Office of the Vice President. Its analysis was reportedly
critical of the CIA for not finding collaboration between Iraq
and al Qaeda, and that seems to have affected what the CIA was
avoiding saying publicly compared to what it was saying in the
classified documents.
In its then-classified NIE assessment, the CIA had real
doubts that Saddam would supply WMD to terrorist surrogates.
The CIA talked about Saddam transferring WMD to terrorist
groups in its classified document as an ``extreme step'' which
he might take only if ``desperate.'' Listen to that caution and
the nuance in the CIA's then-classified assessment:
``Baghdad for now appears to be drawing a line short of
conducting terrorist attacks with conventional or chemical or
biological weapons against the United States, fearing that
exposure of Iraqi involvement would provide Washington a
stronger cause for making war. Iraq probably would attempt
clandestine attacks against the U.S. homeland if Baghdad feared
an attack that threatened the survival of the regime were
imminent or unavoidable or possibly for revenge. Such attacks,
more likely with biological than chemical agents, probably
would be carried out by Iraq's special forces or intelligence
operatives. Saddam, if sufficiently desperate, might decide
that only an organization such as al Qaeda could perpetrate the
type of terrorist attack that he would hope to conduct. In such
circumstances, he might decide that the extreme step of
assisting the Islamic terrorists in conducting a chemical or
biological weapons attack against the United States would be
his last chance to exact vengeance by taking a large number of
victims with him.''
But none of those then-classified judgments were included
in the CIA's public white paper. The CIA's doubts about Iraq's
collaboration with al Qaeda were buried in classification from
the public eye on the eve of our going to war.
How different the CIA's classified judgments sound from the
President's very public warnings to the American people that,
``Saddam would like nothing more than to use a terrorist
network to attack and to kill and leave no fingerprints
behind,'' and that, ``Each passing day could be the one on
which the Iraqi regime gives anthrax or VX nerve gas or some
day a nuclear weapon to a terrorist group.''
Why was the skepticism in the then-classified NIE about the
possibility of Saddam transferring WMD to terrorists left out
of the public white paper of the CIA? Was it because the
Pentagon's Office of Special Plans was putting on a full court
press for the existence of an Iraq-al Qaeda collaboration? Was
the administration listening to the Office of Special Plans
rather than the Intelligence Community?
We need to find the answers to these and many other
questions. This committee has a special responsibility to the
men and women of our Armed Forces to look at the prewar
intelligence because planning for military operations is based
on intelligence. Flawed intelligence can put our troops and our
Nation at risk.
Our credibility globally has taken a big hit because of
this massive intelligence failure. As a result, there is less
support from people and nations around the world for the United
States and for the war on terrorism. Serious consequences can
follow because we depend on other people and other nations to
provide us with valuable tips and information. We need their
cooperation fighting terrorism. When we face future
international security crises, we will undoubtedly seek the
support and cooperation of the international community based on
our Intelligence Community's assessment that there is a threat.
It will be harder to secure that cooperation if our
intelligence is not viewed as credible and objective.
For the sake of our future safety as a Nation, we simply
cannot accept intelligence being as far off the mark as it was
before the Iraq war.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Warner. Thank you, Senator Levin.
Director Tenet.
STATEMENT OF HON. GEORGE J. TENET, DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL
INTELLIGENCE
Mr. Tenet. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I am going to proceed
with our threat statement and then take questions.
Mr. Chairman, last year I described a national security
environment that was significantly more complex than at any
time during my tenure as DCI. The world I will discuss today is
equally, if not more, complicated and fraught with dangers for
the United States, but one that also holds great opportunity.
I begin with terrorism. The al Qaeda leadership structure
we charted after September 11 is seriously damaged, but the
group remains as committed as ever to attacking the U.S.
homeland. But as we continue to battle against al Qaeda, we
must overcome a movement, a global movement, infected by al
Qaeda's radical agenda. In this battle we are moving forward in
our knowledge of the enemy, his plans, capabilities, and
intentions, and what we have learned today continues to
validate my deepest concern that this enemy remains intent in
obtaining and using catastrophic weapons.
Military and intelligence operations by the United States
and its allies overseas have degraded the group. Local al Qaeda
cells are forced to make their own decisions because of the
central leadership's disarray. Al Qaeda depends on leaders who
not only direct terrorist attacks, but who carry out the day-
to-day tasks that support operations. Over the past 18 months
we have killed or captured key al Qaeda leaders in every
significant operational area--logistics, planning, finance, and
training--and have eroded the key pillars of the organization,
such as the leadership in Pakistani urban areas and operational
cells in the al Qaeda heartland of Saudi Arabia and Yemen.
The list of al Qaeda leaders and associates who will never
again threaten the American people includes: Khalid Shaykh
Muhammad, al Qaeda's operations chief and the mastermind of the
September 11 attacks; Hambali, the senior operational planner
in South Asia; Abu Zabayda, a senior logistics officer and
plotter; and many others.
We are creating large and growing gaps in the al Qaeda
hierarchy and unquestionably bringing these key operators to
ground disrupted plots that would otherwise have killed
Americans.
Meanwhile, al Qaeda central continues to lose operational
safe havens and Osama bin Laden has gone deep underground. Al
Qaeda's finances are also being squeezed, and we are receiving
a broad array of help from our coalition partners, who have
been central to our effort against al Qaeda. Since the May 12
bombings, the Saudi government has shown an important
commitment to fighting al Qaeda in the Kingdom and Saudi
officers have paid with their lives. Elsewhere in the Arab
world, we are valuable vital cooperation from Jordan, Morocco,
Egypt, Algeria, the United Arab Emirates (UAE), Oman, and
others. President Musharraf of Pakistan remains a courageous
and indispensable ally, who has become the target of assassins
for the help that he has provided us.
We have made notable strides, Mr. Chairman, but do not
misunderstand me. I am not suggesting al Qaeda is defeated. It
is not. We are still at war. This is a leading organization
that remains committed to attacking the United States, its
friends and allies.
Successive blows to al Qaeda's central leadership have
transformed the organization into a loose collection of
regional networks that operate more autonomously. The sites of
their attacks span the group's broad reach from Morocco, to
Kenya, to Turkey, to Indonesia.
We should not take the fact that these attacks occurred
abroad to mean that the threat to the U.S. homeland has waned
because al Qaeda and associated groups undertook these attacks
overseas. Detainees consistently talk about the importance the
group still attaches to striking the main enemy, the United
States.
Across the operational spectrum--air, maritime, special
weapons--we have time and again uncovered plots that are
chilling. On aircraft plots alone, we have uncovered new plans
to recruit pilots and to evade new security measures in
Southeast Asia, the Middle East, and Europe. Even catastrophic
attacks on the scale of September 11 remain within al Qaeda's
reach.
So far I have been talking about al Qaeda, but al Qaeda is
not the limit of the terrorist threat worldwide. Mr. Chairman,
what I want to say to you now may be the most important thing I
tell you today: The steady spread of Osama bin Laden's anti-
American sentiment through the wider Sunni extremist movement
and through the broad dissemination of al Qaeda's destructive
expertise ensures that a serious threat will remain for the
foreseeable future with or without al Qaeda in the picture.
Even as al Qaeda has been weakened, other extremist groups
within the movement have influence and have become the next
wave of the terrorist threat. Dozens of such groups exist. One
of the most immediate threats is from the smaller international
Sunni extremist groups who have benefited from al Qaeda links.
They include groups as diverse as the Zarqawi network and Ansar
al Islam in Iraq, the Libyan Islamic Fighting Group, and the
Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan.
These far-flung groups increasingly set the agenda and are
redefining the threat that we face. Beyond these groups are the
so-called foreign jihadists, individuals ready to fight
anywhere when they believe Muslim lands are under attack by
those they see as infidel invaders. For the growing number of
jihadists interested in attacking the United States, the
spectacular attack on the U.S. homeland remains the brass ring
that many strive for, with or without encouragement by al
Qaeda's central leadership.
Mr. Chairman, I have consistently talked about and warned
about al Qaeda's interest in chemical, biological,
radiological, and nuclear (CBRN) weapons. Acquiring these
remains a religious obligation in bin Laden's eyes, and al
Qaeda and more than two dozen terrorist groups are pursuing
CBRN material. Over the last year we have also seen an increase
in the threat of more sophisticated CBRN capability. For this
reason, we take very seriously the threat of a CBRN attack.
Extremists have widely disseminated assembly instructions for
an improvised chemical weapon using common materials that could
cause a large number of casualties in crowded enclosed areas.
Although gaps in our understanding remain, we see al
Qaeda's program to produce anthrax as one of the most immediate
terrorist CBRN threats we are likely to face. Al Qaeda
continues to pursue its strategic goal of obtaining a nuclear
capability. It remains interested in dirty bombs. Terrorist
documents contain accurate views of how such weapons would be
used.
I focused correctly on al Qaeda and related groups, but
other terrorist organizations also threaten American interests.
Lebanese Hezbollah cooperates with Palestinian groups in Israel
and the West Bank and appears to be increasing its support. It
is also working with Iran and surrogate groups in Iraq and
would likely react to an attack against it, Syria, or Iran with
attacks against the U.S. and Israeli targets worldwide. Iran
and Syria continue to support terrorist groups and their links
into Iraq have become problematic to our efforts there.
Mr. Chairman, with regard to Iraq, we are making
significant strides against the insurgency and terrorism, but
former regime elements and foreign jihadists continue to pose a
serious threat to Iraq's new institutions and to our own
forces. We witnessed the bloodiest single day in Iraq since the
war, which left more than 120 Iraqi civilians dead last week at
the hands of terrorists and more than 300 others wounded.
All 25 members of the Iraq Governing Council (IGC), at the
same time, on a positive note, signed the Transitional
Administrative Law on the 8th of March. Such delays, while
unfortunate--we need to remember that what the Iraqis are
trying to accomplish here is monumental. They are creating a
democracy from the ground up. This process will be difficult,
will witness delays and setbacks, and will be marked by
violence. Sovereignty will be returned to an interim government
by July 1, although the structure and mechanism for determining
this remain unresolved.
The emerging Iraqi leadership will face many pressing
issues, among them organizing national elections, integrating
the Sunni minority into the political mainstream, managing
Kurdish autonomy in a Federal structure, and determining the
role of Islam in the Iraqi state.
Saddam is in prison and the coalition has taken care of, as
you said, all but 10 of his 54 cronies, Mr. Chairman. But the
violence continues. The daily average number of attacks on
U.S.-led coalition forces has dropped from its November peak,
but is similar to that of last August. In the past 2 weeks
violence has been on the upswing. As we approach the transfer
of sovereignty on July 1, terrorists may try to complicate the
transfer and intimidate Iraqis who are working to make it
happen.
The insurgency consists of multiple groups with varying
motivations, but all with the same goal: driving the United
States and our coalition partners from Iraq. Intelligence has
given us a good understanding of the insurgency at the local
level and this information is behind many of the successful
raids you may have heard about. U.S. military and Intelligence
Community efforts to round up former regime figures have
disrupted some insurgent plans to carry out additional attacks.
But we know these insurgent cells are intentionally
decentralized to avoid easy penetration and to prevent the
rollup of whole networks. Arms, funding, and military
experience remain readily available.
Mr. Chairman, the situation as I have described it, both
our victories and our challenges, indicates we have damaged but
not yet defeated the insurgents. The security situation is
further complicated by the involvement of terrorists, including
Ansar al Islam and Zarqawi, and foreign jihadists coming into
Iraq to wage jihad. Their goal is clear. They intend to inspire
an Islamic extremist insurgency that would threaten coalition
forces and put a halt to the long-term process of building
democratic institutions and governance in Iraq. They hope for a
Taliban-like enclave in Iraq's Sunni heartland that would be a
jihadists' safe haven.
Ansar al Islam, an Iraqi Kurdish extremist group, is waging
a terrorist campaign against the coalition presence and
cooperative Iraqis in a bid to inspire jihad and create an
Islamic state. Some extremists even go further. In a recent
letter, terrorist planner Abu Musab al-Zarqawi outlined his
strategy to foster sectarian civil war in Iraq aimed at
inciting the Shia. The massive lethal attacks last week against
Shia worshippers in Baghdad and Karbala were consistent with
the plans of Zarqawi, but we have not conclusively identified
the perpetrators.
Stopping the foreign extremists from turning Iraq into the
most important jihad rests in part on preventing loosely
connected extremists from coalescing into a cohesive terrorist
organization. We are having some success. The coalition has
arrested key jihadist leaders and facilitators in Iraq,
including top leaders from Ansar al Islam, the al-Zarqawi
network, and other al Qaeda affiliates.
We are concerned, Mr. Chairman, that foreign jihadists and
the former regime elements might coalesce. At this point we
have seen few signs of such cooperation at the tactical or
local level. Ultimately the Iraqi people themselves must
provide the fundamental solutions. As you well know, the
insurgents are incessantly and violently targeting Iraqi police
and security forces, precisely because they fear the prospect
of Iraqis securing their own interests.
Success depends on broadening the role of local security
forces. This goes well beyond greater numbers. It means
continuing work already under way, fixing equipment shortages,
providing training, ensuring adequate pay, to build a force of
increasing quality and confidence that will support the Iraqi
people.
It is hard to overestimate the importance of greater
security for Iraqis, particularly as we turn to the momentous
political events slated for 2004. Iraqi Arabs and many Kurds
possess a strong Iraqi identity, forged over a tumultuous 80-
year history and especially during the nearly decade-long war
with Iran. Unfortunately, Saddam's divide-and-rule policy and
his favored treatment of the Sunni minority aggravated tensions
to the point where the key to governance in Iraq today is
managing these competing sectional interests.
The majority of Shia look forward to the end of Sunni
control, which began with the British creation of Iraq. The
Shia community nevertheless has internal tensions between the
moderate majority and the radical minority. The Kurds see many
opportunities to advance their long-term goals, returning to
the autonomy they enjoyed over the last 12 years and expanding
their power and territory. The minority Sunni fear Shia and
Kurdish ambitions. Such anxieties help animate Sunni support
for the insurgents. The Sunni community is still at a very
early state of establishing political structures to replace the
defeated Baath Party.
I should qualify what I have said, Mr. Chairman. No
society, and surely not Iraq's complex tapestry, is so simple
as to be captured in three or four categories--Kurds, Shia, and
Sunni. In reality, Iraqi society is filled with more cleavages
and more connections than a simple topology can suggest. We
seldom hear about the strong tribal alliances that have long
existed between the Sunni and the Shia or the religious
commonalities between the Sunni, Kurd, and Arab communities, or
the moderate secularism that spans Iraqi groups. We tend to
identify and stress the tensions that tear communities apart,
but opportunities also exist for these groups to work together
for common goals.
If we focus on events like the attacks last week in Baghdad
and Karbala, we should remember that the perpetrators are
seeking to incite intercommunal violence and that the affected
communities have instead replied by pulling together and
refusing to demonize each other.
The social and political interplay is further complicated
by Iran, especially in the south where Tehran pursues its own
interests and hopes to maximize its influence among the Shia
after the 1st of July. Tehran also runs humanitarian and
outreach programs that have probably enhanced its reputation
among Iraqi Shia, but many remain suspicious.
The most immediate political challenge for Iraqis is to
choose the transitional government that will rule their country
while they write their permanent constitution. The Shia cleric,
the Grand Ayatollah Sistani, has made this selection process
the centerpiece of his effort to ensure that Iraqis will decide
their own future and choose the first sovereign post-Saddam
government. Sistani favors direct elections as the way to
produce a legitimate accountable government. His religious
pronouncements show that above all else he wants Iraq to be
independent of foreign powers. Moreover, his praise of free
elections and his theology reflect in our reading a clear-cut
opposition to an Iranian-style theocracy. Once the issues
involved in the selection of a transitional government are
settled, Iraq's permanent constitution will take shape.
I want to briefly touch on the Sunnis and federalism and
Islam, Mr. Chairman, because I think it is important. The
Sunnis are at least a fifth of the population, inhabit the
country's strategic heartland, and comprise a sizable share of
Iraq's professional and middle class. The Sunnis are
disaffected as a deposed ruling minority, but some are
beginning to recognize that boycotting the emerging political
process will weaken their community.
Their political isolation may be breaking down in parts of
the Sunni triangle as some Sunni Arabs have begun to engage the
coalition and assume local leadership roles. In the last 3
months we have also seen the founding of national-level Sunni
umbrella organizations to deal with the coalition and IGC on
questions like Sunni participation in choosing the transitional
government. But there is a long way to go here.
The relationship between the political center and Iraq's
diverse ethnic and religious communities will frame the future
constitutional debate. To make a federal government stick,
Kurdish and Arab leaders will need to explain convincingly that
a federal structure benefits all Iraqis and not just the Kurds.
The Transitional Administrative Law makes Islam Iraq's official
creed, but protects religious freedom. It also creates a legal
system that is a mix of traditions, including Islamic law.
Security will be very important over the next year, Mr.
Chairman. I do not want to underestimate that. But
reconstruction and economic vitality and employment is also
important. Reconstruction progress and Iraq's own considerable
assets, its natural resources and its educated populace, should
enable the Iraqis to see important improvement in 2004 in their
infrastructure and quality of life. The recovery of Iraqi oil
production will help. Production is on track to approach 3
million barrels a day by the end of this year. Iraq has not
produced this much oil since before the Gulf War.
But much more needs to be done. Key public services such as
water, sewage, and transportation will have difficulty reaching
prewar levels by July and will not meet the higher target of
total Iraqi demand. Electric power capacity approaches prewar
levels, but still falls short of demand. Looting and sabotage
may make supplies unreliable.
Finally, unemployment and underemployment, which afflict
about half of the work force, will remain a key problem and a
potential breeding ground for popular discontent.
Mr. Chairman, in my proliferation section I summarize the
facts that Libya is taking steps toward strategic disarmament,
North Korea is trying to leverage its nuclear program into at
least a bargaining chip and also international legitimacy and
influence, and that Iran is exposing some programs while trying
to preserve others. I will not go through the Libyan case, Mr.
Chairman. This was an intelligence success in terms of our
engagement over the last many months. Libya is now talking to
the international organizations of the United Nations and we
will watch carefully whether it lives up to its obligations.
North Korea is trying to leverage its nuclear weapons
program into international legitimacy and bargaining power,
announcing its withdrawal from the Nonproliferation Treaty
(NPT) and openly proclaiming that it has a nuclear deterrent.
Since December 2002, Pyongyang has announced its withdrawal
from the NPT and expelled International Atomic Energy Agency
(IAEA) inspectors. Last year, Pyongyang claimed to have
finished reprocessing the 8,000 fuel rods that had been sealed
by the United States and North Korean technicians and stored
under IAEA monitoring since 1994.
The Intelligence Community judged in the mid-1990s that
North Korea had produced one, possibly two, nuclear weapons.
The 8,000 rods the North claims to have reprocessed into
plutonium metal would provide enough plutonium for several more
bombs. We also believe that Pyongyang is pursuing a production-
scale uranium enrichment program based on technology provided
by A.Q. Khan. This would give North Korea an alternative route
to a nuclear weapon. The North Koreans continue to deny that
they have a highly-enriched uranium (HEU) program and say their
offer of a nuclear freeze does not cover civilian use of
nuclear energy.
Iran is taking yet a different path, acknowledging work on
a covert nuclear fuel cycle while trying to preserve its WMD
option. The good news is that Tehran has acknowledged more than
a decade of covert nuclear activity and agreed to open itself
to an enhanced inspection regime. It for the first time
acknowledged many of its nuclear fuel cycle development
activities, including large-scale gas centrifuge uranium
enrichment efforts.
Iran claims its centrifuge program is designed to produce
low enriched uranium to support Iran's civil nuclear program.
This is permitted under the NPT. But here is the down side: The
same technology can be used to build a military program as
well. The difference between producing low enrichment uranium
and weapons-capable HEU is only a matter of time and intent,
not technology. As a result, it would be a significant
challenge for intelligence to confidently assess whether that
red line has been crossed.
Mr. Chairman, I go on to talk about the A.Q. Khan network.
You know that we have unravelled that. I want to just say for a
moment one other area that concerns us is Russian WMD materials
and technology remain vulnerable to theft or diversion. We are
also concerned by the continued eagerness of Russia's cash-
strapped defense, biotechnology, chemical, aerospace, and
nuclear industries to raise funds via exports and transfers,
which makes Russian expertise an attractive target for
countries and groups seeking WMD and missile-related
assistance.
Mr. Chairman, I think I will stop there. I talk about a lot
of other things--internal developments in Iran, the current
situation in Afghanistan, our understanding of the current
situation in Colombia and other places, and other transnational
issues. Since this is largely the same statement I issued when
I talked to the Senate Intelligence Committee in the open
session, I think we will go to questions and Reserve the rest
of the time for the members.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Tenet follows:]
Prepared Statement by Hon. George J. Tenet
dci's worldwide threat briefing--the worldwide threat 2004: challenges
in a changing global context
Good morning, Mr. Chairman, Mr. Vice Chairman, members of the
committee.
Mr. Chairman, last year I described a national security environment
that was significantly more complex than at any time during my tenure
as Director of Central Intelligence (DCI). The world I will discuss
today is equally, if not more, complicated and fraught with dangers for
United States interests, but one that also holds great opportunity for
positive change.
Terrorism
I'll begin today on terrorism, with a stark bottom-line:
The al Qaeda leadership structure we charted after
September 11 is seriously damaged--but the group remains as
committed as ever to attacking the U.S. homeland.
But as we continue the battle against al Qaeda, we
must overcome a movement--a global movement infected by al
Qaeda's radical agenda.
In this battle we are moving forward in our knowledge
of the enemy--his plans, capabilities, and intentions.
What we've learned continues to validate my deepest
concern: that this enemy remains intent on obtaining, and
using, catastrophic weapons.
Now let me tell you about the war we've waged against the al Qaeda
organization and its leadership.
Military and intelligence operations by the United
States and its allies overseas have degraded the group. Local
al Qaeda cells are forced to make their own decisions because
of the central leadership's disarray.
Al Qaeda depends on leaders who not only direct terrorist attacks
but who carry out the day-to-day tasks that support operations. Over
the past 18 months, we have killed or captured key al Qaeda leaders in
every significant operational area--logistics, planning, finance,
training--and have eroded the key pillars of the organization, such as
the leadership in Pakistani urban areas and operational cells in the al
Qaeda heartland of Saudi Arabia and Yemen.
The list of al Qaeda leaders and associates who will never again
threaten the American people includes:
Khalid Shaykh Muhammad, al Qaeda's operations chief
and the mastermind of the September 11 attacks.
Nashiri, the senior operational planner for the
Arabian Gulf area.
Abu Zubayda, a senior logistics officer and plotter.
Hasan Ghul, a senior facilitator who was sent to case
Iraq for an expanded al Qaeda presence there.
Harithi and al-Makki, the most senior plotters in
Yemen, who were involved in the bombing of the U.S.S. Cole.
Hambali, the senior operational planner in Southeast
Asia.
We are creating large and growing gaps in the al Qaeda hierarchy.
Unquestionably, bringing these key operators to ground disrupted
plots that would otherwise have killed Americans.
Meanwhile, al Qaeda central continues to lose operational
safehavens, and bin Ladin has gone deep underground. We are hunting him
in some of the most unfriendly regions on Earth. We follow every lead.
Al Qaeda's finances are also being squeezed. This is due in part to
takedowns of key moneymen in the past year, particularly the Persian
Gulf, Southwest Asia, and even Iraq.
We are receiving a broad array of help from our coalition partners,
who have been central to our effort against al Qaeda.
Since the May 12 bombings, the Saudi government has
shown an important commitment to fighting al Qaeda in the
Kingdom, and Saudi officers have paid with their lives.
Elsewhere in the Arab world, we're receiving valuable
cooperation from Jordan, Morocco, Egypt, Algeria, the United
Arab Emirates (UAE), Oman, and many others.
President Musharraf of Pakistan remains a courageous
and indispensable ally who has become the target of assassins
for the help he's given us.
Partners in Southeast Asia have been instrumental in
the roundup of key regional associates of al Qaeda.
Our European partners worked closely together to
unravel and disrupt a continent-wide network of terrorists
planning chemical, biological, and conventional attacks in
Europe.
So we have made notable strides. But do not misunderstand me. I am
not suggesting al Qaeda is defeated. It is not. We are still at war.
This is a learning organization that remains committed to attacking the
United States, its friends, and allies.
Successive blows to al Qaeda's central leadership have transformed
the organization into a loose collection of regional networks that
operate more autonomously. These regional components have demonstrated
their operational prowess in the past year.
The sites of their attacks span the group's broad
reach--Morocco, Kenya, Turkey, Jordan, Saudi Arabia, Kuwait,
Afghanistan, Pakistan, Indonesia.
Al Qaeda seeks to influence the regional networks with
operational training, consultations, and money. Khalid Shaykh
Muhammad sent Hambali $50,000 for operations in Southeast Asia.
You should not take the fact that these attacks occurred abroad to
mean the threat to the U.S. homeland has waned. As al Qaeda and
associated groups undertook these attacks overseas, detainees
consistently talk about the importance the group still attaches to
striking the main enemy: the United States. Across the operational
spectrum--air, maritime, special weapons--we have time and again
uncovered plots that are chilling.
On aircraft plots alone, we have uncovered new plans
to recruit pilots and to evade new security measures in
Southeast Asia, the Middle East, and Europe.
Even catastrophic attacks on the scale of September 11
remain within al Qaeda's reach. Make no mistake: these plots
are hatched abroad, but they target U.S. soil or that of our
allies.
So far, I have been talking only about al Qaeda. But al Qaeda is
not the limit of the terrorist threat worldwide. Al Qaeda has infected
others with its ideology, which depicts the United States as Islam's
greatest foe. Mr. Chairman, what I want to say to you now may be the
most important thing I tell you today.
The steady spread of Osama bin Ladin's anti-U.S. sentiment--
though the wider Sunni extremist movement and through the broad
dissemination of al Qaeda's destructive expertise--ensures that
a serious threat will remain for the foreseeable future . . .
with or without al Qaeda in the picture.
A decade ago, bin Ladin had a vision of rousing Islamic terrorists
worldwide to attack the United States. He created al Qaeda to
indoctrinate a worldwide movement in global jihad, with America as the
enemy--an enemy to be attacked with every means at hand.
In the minds of bin Laden and his cohorts, September
11 was the shining moment, their ``shot heard `round the
world','' and they want to capitalize on it.
So, even as al Qaeda has been weakened, other extremist groups
within the movement it influenced have become the next wave of the
terrorist threat. Dozens of such groups exist. Let me offer a few
thoughts on how to understand this challenge.
One of the most immediate threats is from smaller
international Sunni extremist groups who have benefited from al
Qaeda links. They include groups as diverse as the al-Zarqawi
network, the Ansar al-Islam in Iraq, the Libyan Islamic
Fighting Group, and the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan.
A second level of threat comes from small local
groups, with limited domestic agendas, that work with
international terrorist groups in their own countries. These
include the Salifiya Jihadia, a Moroccan network that carried
out the May 2003 Casablanca bombings, and similar groups
throughout Africa and Asia.
These far-flung groups increasingly set the agenda, and are
redefining the threat we face. They are not all creatures of bin Laden,
and so their fate is not tied to his. They have autonomous leadership,
they pick their own targets, they plan their own attacks.
Beyond these groups are the so-called ``foreign jihadists''--
individuals ready to fight anywhere they believe Muslim lands are under
attack by what they see as ``infidel invaders.'' They draw on broad
support networks, have wide appeal, and enjoy a growing sense of
support from Muslims who are not necessarily supporters of terrorism.
The foreign jihadists see Iraq as a golden opportunity.
Let me repeat: for the growing number of jihadists interested in
attacking the United States, a spectacular attack on the U.S. homeland
is the ``brass ring'' that many strive for--with or without
encouragement by al Qaeda's central leadership.
To detect and ultimately defeat these forces, we will continually
need to watch hotspots, present or potential battlegrounds, places
where these terrorist networks converge. Iraq is of course one major
focus of concern. Southeast Asia is another. Even Western Europe is an
area where terrorists recruit, train, and target.
To get the global job done, foreign governments will
need to improve bilateral, multilateral, and even inter-service
cooperation, and strengthen domestic counterterrorist
legislation and security practices.
Mr. Chairman, I have consistently warned this committee of al
Qaeda's interest in chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear
(CBRN) weapons. Acquiring these remains a ``religious obligation'' in
bin Laden's eyes, and al Qaeda and more than two dozen other terrorist
groups are pursuing CBRN materials.
We particularly see a heightened risk of poison
attacks. Contemplated delivery methods to date have been simple
but this may change as non-al Qaeda groups share information on
more sophisticated methods and tactics.
Over the last year, we've also seen an increase in the threat of
more sophisticated CBRN weapons. For this reason we take very seriously
the threat of a CBRN attack.
Extremists have widely disseminated assembly
instructions for an improvised chemical weapon using common
materials that could cause a large numbers of casualties in a
crowded, enclosed area.
Although gaps in our understanding remain, we see al
Qaeda's program to produce anthrax as one of the most immediate
terrorist CBRN threats we are likely to face.
Al Qaeda continues to pursue its strategic goal of
obtaining a nuclear capability. It remains interested in dirty
bombs. Terrorist documents contain accurate views of how such
weapons would be used.
I've focused, and rightly so, on al Qaeda and related groups. But
other terrorist organizations also threaten U.S. interests. Palestinian
terrorist groups in Israel, the West Bank, and Gaza remain a formidable
threat and continue to use terrorism to undermine prospects for peace.
Last year Palestinian terrorist groups conducted more
than 600 attacks, killing about 200 Israelis and foreigners,
including Americans.
Lebanese Hizballah cooperates with these groups and appears to be
increasing its support. It is also working with Iran and surrogate
groups in Iraq and would likely react to an attack against it, Syria,
or Iran with attacks against US and Israeli targets worldwide.
Iran and Syria continue to support terrorist groups, and their
links into Iraq have become problematic to our efforts there.
Although Islamic extremists comprise the most pressing threat to
U.S. interests, we cannot ignore nominally leftist groups in Latin
America and Europe. The Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC)
and the National Liberation Army (ELN), Colombia's second largest
leftist insurgent group, have shown a willingness to attack U.S.
targets. So has the Revolutionary People's Liberation Party/Front--a
Turkish group that has killed two U.S. citizens and targeted U.S.
interests in Turkey.
Finally, cyber vulnerabilities are another of our concerns, with
not only terrorists but foreign governments, hackers, crime groups, and
industrial spies attempting to obtain information from our computer
networks.
Iraq
Mr. Chairman, we are making significant strides against the
insurgency and terrorism, but former regime elements and foreign
jihadists continue to pose a serious threat to Iraq's new institutions
and to our own forces.
That said, we witnessed the bloodiest single day in
Iraq since the war, which left more than 120 Iraqi civilians
dead at the hands of terrorists and more that 300 others
wounded.
All 25 members of the Iraq Governing Council (IGC)
signed the Transitional Administrative Law on 8 March--after
the terrible Ashura attacks and a disagreement among Iraqis
held up the signing past the appointed day.
Such delays are unfortunate, but we need to remember that what the
Iraqis are trying to accomplish here is monumental--they are creating a
democracy from the ground up. That process will be difficult, will
witness delays and setbacks, and be marked by violence.
Sovereignty will be returned to an interim Iraqi
government by July 1, although the structure and mechanism for
determining this remain unresolved.
The emerging Iraqi leadership will face many pressing
issues, among them organizing national elections, integrating
the Sunni minority into the political mainstream, managing
Kurdish autonomy in a Federal structure, and determining the
role of Islam in the Iraqi state.
Meanwhile, Mr. Chairman, the important work of the Iraqi Survey
Group (ISG) and the hunt for Iraqi weapons of mass destruction (WMD)
continues. We must explore every avenue in our quest to understand
Iraq's programs out of concern for the possibility that materials,
weapons, or expertise might fall into the hands of insurgents, foreign
states, or terrorists. I talked about this at length last week.
Let me update you on the overall security picture. Saddam is in
prison, and the coalition has killed or apprehended all but 10 of his
54 key cronies. Iraqis are taking an increasing role in their own
defense, with many now serving in the various new police, military, and
security forces.
But the violence continues. The daily average number
of attacks on U.S. and coalition forces has dropped from its
November peak but is similar to that of last August.
In the past 2 weeks, violence has been on the upswing. As we
approach the transfer of sovereignty to Iraqis on July 1, terrorists
may want to complicate the transfer and intimidate Iraqis who are
working to make it happen.
The insurgency consists of multiple groups with varying motivations
but all with the same goal: driving the United States and our coalition
partners from Iraq. Saddam's capture was a psychological blow that took
some of the less-committed Bathists out of the fight, but a hard core
of former regime elements--Bath Party officials, military,
intelligence, and security officers--are still organizing and carrying
out attacks.
Intelligence has given us a good understanding of the
insurgency at the local level, and this information is behind
the host of successful raids you've read about in the papers.
U.S. military and Intelligence Community efforts to round up former
regime figures have disrupted some insurgent plans to carry out
additional anti-coalition attacks. But we know these insurgent cells
are intentionally decentralized to avoid easy penetration and to
prevent the roll-up of whole networks. Arms, funding, and military
experience remain readily available.
Mr. Chairman, the situation as I've described it--both our
victories and our challenges--indicates we have damaged, but not yet
defeated, the insurgents.
The security situation is further complicated by the involvement of
terrorists--including Ansar al-Islam and al-Zarqawi--and foreign
jihadists coming to Iraq to wage jihad. Their goal is clear. They
intend to inspire an Islamic extremist insurgency that would threaten
coalition forces and put a halt to the long-term process of building
democratic institutions and governance in Iraq. They hope for a
Taliban-like enclave in Iraq's Sunni heartland that could be a jihadist
safehaven.
Ansar al-Islam--an Iraqi Kurdish extremist group--is
waging a terrorist campaign against the coalition presence and
cooperative Iraqis in a bid to inspire jihad and create an
Islamic state.
Some extremists go even further. In a recent letter, terrorist
planner Abu Mus'ab al-Zarqawi outlined his strategy to foster sectarian
civil war in Iraq, aimed at inciting the Shia.
The massive lethal attacks last week against Shia
worshippers in Baghdad and Karbala were consistent with the
plans of al-Zarqawi and like-minded extremists--we have not,
however, conclusively identified the perpetrators.
Stopping the foreign extremists from turning Iraq into their most
important jihad yet rests in part on preventing loosely connected
extremists from coalescing into a cohesive terrorist organization.
We are having some success--the coalition has arrested
key jihadist leaders and facilitators in Iraq, including top
leaders from Ansar al-Islam, the al-Zarqawi network, and other
al Qaeda affiliates.
The October detention of Ansar al-Islam deputy leader
set back the group's ambition to establish itself as an
umbrella organization for jihadists in Iraq.
We're also concerned that foreign jihadists and former regime
elements might coalesce. This would link local knowledge and military
training with jihadist fervor and lethal tactics. At this point, we've
seen a few signs of such cooperation at the tactical or local level.
Ultimately, the Iraqi people themselves must provide the
fundamental solutions. As you well know, the insurgents are incessantly
and violently targeting Iraqi police and security forces precisely
because they fear the prospect of Iraqis securing their own interests.
Success depends on broadening the role of the local security forces.
This goes well beyond greater numbers. It means
continuing work already under way--fixing equipment shortages,
providing training, ensuring adequate pay--to build a force of
increasing quality and confidence that will have the support of
the Iraqi people.
It is hard to overestimate the importance of greater security for
Iraqis particularly as we turn to the momentous political events slated
for 2004.
The real test will begin soon after the transfer of
sovereignty, when we'll see the extent to which the new Iraqi
leaders embody concepts such as pluralism, compromise, and rule
of law.
Iraqi Arabs--and many Iraqi Kurds--possess a strong Iraqi identity,
forged over a tumultuous 80 year history and especially during the
nearly decade-long war with Iran. Unfortunately, Saddam's divide and
rule policy and his favored treatment of the Sunni minority aggravated
tensions to the point where the key to governance in Iraq today is
managing these competing sectional interests.
Here's a readout on where these groups stand:
The majority Shia look forward to the end of Sunni
control, which began with the British creation of Iraq. The
Shia community nevertheless has internal tensions, between the
moderate majority and a radical minority that wants a Shia-
dominated theocracy.
The Kurds see many opportunities to advance long held
goals: retaining the autonomy they enjoyed over the past 12
years and expanding their power and territory.
The minority Sunni fear Shia and Kurdish ambitions.
Such anxieties help animate Sunni support for the insurgents.
The Sunni community is still at a very early state of
establishing political structures to replace the defeated Baath
party.
I should qualify what I've just said: no society, and surely not
Iraq's complex tapestry, is so simple as to be captured in three or
four categories. Kurds. Shia. Sunni. In reality, Iraqi society is
filled with more cleavages, and more connections, than a simple
typology can suggest. We seldom hear about the strong tribal alliances
that have long existed between Sunni and Shia, or the religious
commonalities between the Sunni Kurd and Arab communities, or the
moderate secularism that spans Iraqi groups.
We tend to identify, and stress, the tensions that
rend communities apart, but opportunities also exist for these
group to work together for common ends.
If we focus on the events like the attacks last week
in Baghdad and Karbala, we should remember that the
perpetrators were seeking to incite inter-communal violence--
and that the affected communities have instead replied by
pulling together and refusing to demonize each other.
The social and political interplay is further complicated by Iran,
especially in the south, where Tehran pursues its own interests and
hopes to maximize its influence among Iraqi Shia after July 1.
Organizations supported by Iran--like the Supreme Council for the
Islamic Revolution in Iraq (SCIRI) and its Badr Organization militia--
have gained positions within the Iraqi police and control media outlets
in Basrah that tout a pro-Iran viewpoint.
Tehran also runs humanitarian and outreach programs
that have probably enhanced its reputation among Iraqi Shia,
but many remain suspicious.
The most immediate political challenge for the Iraqis is to choose
the transitional government that will rule their country while they
write their permanent constitution. The Shia cleric Grand Ayatollah
Muhammad Ali al-Sistani has made this selection process the centerpiece
of his effort to ensure that Iraqis will decide their own future and
choose the first sovereign post-Saddam government.
Sistani favors direct elections as the way to produce
a legitimate, accountable government. His religious
pronouncements show that, above all, he wants Iraq to be
independent of foreign powers. Moreover, his praise of free
elections and his theology reflect, in our reading, a clearcut
opposition to theocracy, Iran-style.
Once the issues involving the selection of an transitional
government are settled, Iraq's permanent constitution will begin to
take shape. Here the Iraqi government and the framers of the
constitution will have to address three urgent concerns: integrating
the Sunni minority into the political mainstream, managing Kurdish
autonomy in a Federal structure, and determining the role of Islam in
the Iraqi state.
The Sunni
Sunnis are at least a fifth of the population, inhabit the
country's strategic heartland, and comprise a sizable share of Iraq's
professional and middle classes. The Sunni are disaffected as a deposed
ruling minority, but some are beginning to recognize that boycotting
the emerging political process will weaken their community. Their
political isolation may be breaking down in parts of the Sunni
triangle, where some Sunni Arabs have begun to engage the coalition and
assume local leadership roles. In the past 3 months we have also seen
the founding of national-level Sunni umbrella organizations to deal
with the coalition and the IGC on questions like Sunni participation in
choosing the transitional government.
Federalism
The status of the Transitional Administrative Law is in flux, but
the way it deals with the relationship between the political center and
Iraq's diverse ethnic and religious communities will frame the future
constitutional debate. To make a Federal arrangement stick, Kurdish and
Arab Iraq leaders will need to explain convincingly that a Federal
structure benefits all Iraqis and not just the Kurds. Even so, a host
of difficult issues--control over oil and security being perhaps the
most significant--may provoke tension between Kurdish and central Iraqi
authorities.
Islam
The Transitional Administrative Law makes Islam Iraq's official
creed but protects religious freedom. It also creates an Iraqi legal
system that is a mix of traditions, including Islamic law--but as only
one legal element among many. This compromise is already under fire by
Sunni Islamists who want Islam to be the sole source of law.
I don't want to allow the important security and political stories
to crowd out others we should also be telling, including the often
neglected one about Iraq's sizable economic potential. It's true that
rebuilding will go on for years--the Saddam regime left in its wake a
devastated, antiquated, underfunded infrastructure. But reconstruction
progress and Iraq's own considerable assets--its natural resources and
its educated populace--should enable the Iraqis to see important
improvement in 2004 in their infrastructure and their quality of life.
Over the next few years, they'll open more hospitals
and build more roads than anyone born under Saddam has
witnessed.
The recovery of Iraqi oil production will help. Production is on
track to approach 3.0 million barrels per day by the end of this year.
Iraq hasn't produced this much oil since before the 1991 Gulf War. By
next year, revenues from oil exports should cover the cost of basic
government operations and contribute several billion dollars toward
reconstruction. It is essential, however, that the Iraq-Turkey pipeline
and other oil facilities be well protected from insurgent sabotage.
Much more needs to be done. Key public services such as water,
sewage, and transportation will have difficulty reaching prewar levels
by July and won't meet the higher target of total Iraqi demand.
Electric power capacity approaches prewar levels but
still falls short of peak demand. Looting and sabotage may make
supplies unreliable.
Finally, unemployment and underemployment, which
afflicts about a half of the workforce, will remain a key
problem and a potential breeding ground for popular discontent.
Proliferation
Mr. Chairman, I'll turn now to worldwide trends in proliferation.
This picture is changing before our eyes--changing at a rate I have not
seen since the end of the Cold War. Some of it is good news--I'll talk
about the Libya and AQ Khan breakthroughs, for example--and some of it
is disturbing. Some of it shows our years of work paying off, and some
of it shows the work ahead is harder.
We are watching countries of proliferation concern choose different
paths as they calculate the risks versus gains of pursuing WMD.
Libya is taking steps toward strategic disarmament.
North Korea is trying to leverage its nuclear program
into at least a bargaining chip and also international
legitimacy and influence.
Iran is exposing some programs while trying to
preserve others.
I'll start with Libya. For years Qadhafi had been chafing under
international pariah status. In March 2003, he made a strategic
decision and reached out through British intelligence with an offer to
abandon his pursuit of WMD.
That launched 9 months of delicate negotiations where we moved the
Libyans from a stated willingness to renounce WMD to an explicit and
public commitment to expose and dismantle their WMD programs. The
leverage was intelligence. Our picture of Libya's WMD programs allowed
CIA officers and their British colleagues to press the Libyans on the
right questions, to expose inconsistencies, and to convince them that
holding back was counterproductive. We repeatedly surprised them with
the depth of our knowledge.
For example, U.S. and British intelligence officers
secretly traveled to Libya and asked to inspect Libya's
ballistic missile programs. Libyan officials at first failed to
declare key facilities, but our intelligence convinced them to
disclose several dozen facilities, including their deployed
Scud B sites and their secret North Korean-assisted Scud C
production line.
When we were tipped to the imminent shipment of
centrifuge parts to Libya in October, we arranged to have the
cargo seized, showing the Libyans that we had penetrated their
most sensitive procurement network.
By the end of the December visit, the Libyans:
Admitted having a nuclear weapons program and having
bought uranium hexafluoride feed material for gas centrifuge
enrichment.
Admitted having nuclear weapon design documents.
Acknowledged having made about 25 tons of sulfur
mustard chemical weapons agent, aerial bombs for the mustard,
and small amounts of nerve agent.
From the very outset of negotiations, Qadhafi requested the
participation of international organizations to help certify Libyan
compliance. Tripoli has agreed to inspections by the International
Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) and the Organization for the Prohibition of
Chemical Weapons (OPCW) and to abide by the range limitations of the
Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR).
We have briefed information on Tripoli's programs to
various international monitoring organizations. IAEA and OPCW
officials have already followed up with visits to Libya.
Some discrepancies remain, but we will continue to
collect additional information and closely monitor Libya's
adherence to the commitments it has made.
In contrast to Libya, North Korea is trying to leverage its nuclear
weapons programs into international legitimacy and bargaining power,
announcing its withdrawal from the Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) and
openly proclaiming that it has a nuclear deterrent.
Since December 2002, Pyongyang has announced its withdrawal from
the NPT and expelled IAEA inspectors. Last year Pyongyang claimed to
have finished reprocessing the 8,000 fuel rods that had been sealed by
U.S. and North Korean technicians and stored under IAEA monitoring
since 1994.
The Intelligence Community judged in the mid-1990s
that North Korea had produced one, possibly two, nuclear
weapons. The 8000 rods the North claims to have processed into
plutonium metal would provide enough plutonium for several
more.
We also believe Pyongyang is pursuing a production-scale uranium
enrichment program based on technology provided by AQ Khan. This would
give North Korea an alternative route to nuclear weapons. The North
Koreans continue to deny they have an HEU program and say their offer
of a nuclear freeze doesn't cover the civilian use of nuclear energy.
Of course, we are concerned about more than just North Korea's
nuclear program. North Korea has longstanding chemical/biological
weapons and biological warfare capabilities and is enhancing its
biological weapons potential as it builds its legitimate biotechnology
infrastructure. Pyongyang is sending individuals abroad and is seeking
dual-use expertise and technology.
North Korea also continues to advance its missile programs. It is
nearly self-sufficient in ballistic missiles, and has continued
procurement of raw materials and components for its extensive ballistic
missile programs from various foreign sources. The North also has
demonstrated a willingness to sell complete systems and components that
have enabled other states to acquire longer-range capabilities and a
basis for domestic development efforts earlier than would otherwise
have been possible.
North Korea has maintained a unilateral long-range
missile launch moratorium since 1999, but could end that with
little or no warning. The Taepo Dong 2--capable of reaching the
United States with a nuclear weapon-sized payload--may be ready
for flight-testing.
Iran is taking yet a different path, acknowledging work on a covert
nuclear fuel cycle while trying to preserve its WMD options. I'll start
with the good news: Tehran acknowledged more than a decade of covert
nuclear activity and agreed to open itself to an enhanced inspection
regime. Iran for the first time acknowledged many of its nuclear fuel
cycle development activities--including a large-scale gas centrifuge
uranium enrichment effort. Iran claims its centrifuge program is
designed to produce low-enriched uranium, to support Iran's civil
nuclear power program. This is permitted under the NPT, but--and here's
the downside--the same technology can be used to build a military
program as well.
The difference between producing low-enriched uranium
and weapons-capable highly-enriched uranium is only a matter of
time and intent, not technology. As a result, it would be a
significant challenge for intelligence to confidently assess
whether that red line had been crossed.
Finally, Iran's missile program is both a regional threat and a
proliferation concern. Iran's ballistic missile inventory is among the
largest in the Middle East and includes the 1300-km range Shahab-3 mid-
range ballistic missile (MRBM) as well as a few hundred short-range
ballistic missiles (SRBMs). Iran has announced production of the
Shahab-3 and publicly acknowledged development of follow-on versions.
During 2003, Iran continued research and development (R&D) on its
longer-range ballistic missile programs, and publicly reiterated its
intention to develop space launch vehicles (SLVs)--and SLVs contain
most of the key building blocks for an Intercontinental Ballistic
Missile (ICBM). Iran could begin flight testing these systems in the
mid- to latter-part of the decade.
Iran also appears willing to supply missile-related
technology to countries of concern and publicly advertises its
artillery rockets and related technologies, including guidance
instruments and missile propellants.
Let me turn now to a different aspect of the evolving WMD threat. I
want to focus on how countries and groups are increasingly trying to
get the materials they need for WMD. I'll focus on two important
stories:
The roll-up of AQ Khan and his network, one of the
most significant counter-proliferation successes in years and
one in which intelligence led the way.
The difficulty of uncovering both proliferators
masquerading as legitimate businessmen and possible biological
or chemical weapons plants appearing to be legitimate ``dual-
use'' facilities.
As I pointed out last year, Mr. Chairman, WMD technologies are no
longer the sole province of nation-states. They might also come about
as a result of business decisions made by private entrepreneurs and
firms.
As you now know, those comments were my way of referring to AQ Khan
without mentioning his name in open session. Until recently, Khan,
popularly known as the ``father of the Pakistani bomb,'' was the most
dangerous WMD entrepreneur. For 25 years Khan directed Pakistan's
uranium enrichment program. He built an international network of
suppliers to support uranium enrichment efforts in Pakistan that also
supported similar efforts in other countries.
Khan and his network had been unique in being able to
offer one-stop shopping for enrichment technology and weapons
design information. With such assistance, a potentially wide
range of countries could leapfrog the slow, incremental stages
of other nuclear weapons development programs.
The actions taken against Khan's network--like the example of Libya
I laid out earlier--were largely the result of intelligence.
Intelligence discovered, pieced together, tracked, and
penetrated Khan's worldwide hidden network.
But every public success we enjoy can be used by people like Khan
to adjust, adapt, and evade. Proliferators hiding among legitimate
businesses, and countries hiding their WMD programs inside legitimate
dual-use industries, combine to make private entrepreneurs dealing in
lethal goods one of our most difficult intelligence challenges.
In support of these WMD programs, new procurement strategies
continue to hamper our ability to assess and warn on covert WMD
programs. Acquisitions for such programs aren't the work of secret
criminal networks that skirt international law. They're done by
businessmen, in the open, in what seems to be legal trade in high-
technology.
The dual-use challenge is especially applicable to countries hiding
biological and chemical warfare programs. With dual-use technology and
civilian industrial infrastructure, countries can develop biological
and chemical weapon capabilities. Biotechnology is especially dual-
edged: Medical programs and technology could easily support a weapons
program, because nearly every technology required for biological
weapons also has a legitimate application.
Now I'll comment briefly on some significant missile programs apart
from those I've already discussed.
China continues an aggressive missile modernization program that
will improve its ability to conduct a wide range of military options
against Taiwan supported by both cruise and ballistic missiles.
Expected technical improvements will give Beijing a more accurate and
lethal missile force. China is also moving on with its first generation
of mobile strategic missiles.
Although Beijing has taken steps to improve ballistic
missile related export controls, Chinese firms continue to be a
leading source of relevant technology and continue to work with
other countries on ballistic missile-related projects.
South Asian ballistic missile development continues apace. Both
India and Pakistan are pressing ahead with development and testing of
longer-range ballistic missiles and are inducting additional SRBMs into
missile units. Both countries are testing missiles that will enable
them to deliver nuclear warheads to greater distances.
Last year Syria continued to seek help from abroad to establish a
solid-propellant rocket motor development and production capability.
Syria's liquid-propellant ballistic missile program continued to depend
on essential foreign equipment and assistance, primarily from North
Korean entities. Syria is developing longer-range missile programs,
such as a Scud D and possibly other variants, with assistance from
North Korea and Iran.
Many countries remain interested in developing or acquiring land-
attack cruise missiles, which are almost always significantly more
accurate than ballistic missiles and complicate missile defense
systems. Unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) are also of growing concern.
To conclude my comments on proliferation, I'll turn briefly to
Syria's WMD programs and to the continued vulnerability of Russian WMD
materials.
Syria is an NPT signatory with full-scope IAEA safeguards and has a
nuclear research center at Dayr Al Hajar. Russia and Syria have
continued their long-standing agreements on cooperation regarding
nuclear energy, although specific assistance has not yet materialized.
Broader access to foreign expertise provides opportunities to expand
its indigenous capabilities and we are closely monitoring Syrian
nuclear intentions. Meanwhile, Damascus has an active chemical weapons
development and testing program that relies on foreign suppliers for
key controlled chemicals suitable for producing chemical weapons.
Finally, Russian WMD materials and technology remain vulnerable to
theft or diversion. We are also concerned by the continued eagerness of
Russia's cash-strapped defense, biotechnology, chemical, aerospace, and
nuclear industries to raise funds via exports and transfers--which
makes Russian expertise an attractive target for countries and groups
seeking WMD and missile-related assistance.
Pivotal States
I'm going to comment now on three countries we obviously pay a
great deal of attention to: North Korea, China, and Russia.
The North Korean regime continues to threaten a range of U.S.,
regional, and global security interests. As I've noted earlier,
Pyongyang is pursuing its nuclear weapons program and nuclear-capable
delivery systems. It continues to build its missile forces, which can
now reach all of South Korea and Japan, and to develop longer-range
missiles that could threaten the United States.
The North also exports complete ballistic missiles and production
capabilities, along with related components and expertise. It continues
to export narcotics and other contraband across the globe.
Moreover, the forward-deployed posture of North Korea's armed
forces remains a near-term threat to South Korea and to the 37,000 U.S.
troops stationed there. Recall that early last year as tensions over
the nuclear program were building, Pyongyang intercepted a U.S.
reconnaissance aircraft in international airspace.
Kim Jong Il continues to exert a tight grip on North Korea as
supreme leader. The regime's militarized, Soviet-style command economy
is failing to meet the population's food and economic needs. Indeed,
the economy has faltered to the point that Kim has permitted some new
economic initiatives, including more latitude for farmers' markets, but
these changes are a far cry from the systemic economic reform needed to
revitalize the economy. The accumulated effect of years of deprivation
and repression places significant stresses on North Korean society.
The Kim regime rules largely through fear,
intimidation, and indoctrination, using the country's large and
pervasive security apparatus, its system of camps for political
prisoners, and its unrelenting propaganda to maintain control.
Mr. Chairman, China continues to emerge as a great power and expand
its profile in regional and international politics--but Beijing has
cooperated with Washington on some key strategic issues.
The Chinese have cooperated in the war on terrorism
and have been willing to host and facilitate multilateral
dialogue on the North Korean nuclear problem--in contrast to
Beijing's more detached approach to that problem a decade ago.
Beijing is making progress in asserting its influence in East Asia.
Its activist diplomacy in the neighborhood is paying off, fueled in
large part by China's robust economy. China's growth continues to
outpace all others in the region, and its imports of goods from other
East Asian countries are soaring. As a result, Beijing is better
positioned to sell its neighbors on the idea that what is good for the
Chinese economy is good for Asia.
That said, China's neighbors still harbor suspicions
about Beijing's long-term intentions. They generally favor a
sustained U.S. military presence in the region as insurance
against potential Chinese aggression.
Our greatest concern remains China's military buildup, which
continues to accelerate. On Saturday, China's Minister of Finance
announced a new defense budget that is 11.6 percent larger than last
year's. China's announced annual defense budget has grown from some $7
billion 10 years ago to over $25 billion today. Moreover, we assess the
announced figure accounts for less than half of China's actual defense
spending.
Last year, Beijing reached new benchmarks in its production or
acquisition from Russia of missiles, submarines, other naval
combatants, and advanced fighter aircraft. China also is downsizing and
restructuring its military forces with an eye toward enhancing its
capabilities for the modern battlefield. All of these steps will over
time make China a formidable challenger if Beijing perceived that its
interests were being thwarted in the region.
We are closely monitoring the situation across the
Taiwan Strait in the period surrounding Taiwan's presidential
election next month.
Chinese leadership politics--especially the incomplete leadership
transition--will influence how Beijing deals with the Taiwan issue this
year and beyond. President and Communist Party leader Hu Jintao still
shares power with his predecessor in those positions, Jiang Zemin, who
retains the powerful chairmanship of the Party's Central Military
Commission.
In Russia, the trend I highlighted last year--President Putin's re-
centralization of power in the Kremlin--has become more pronounced,
especially over the past several months. We see this in the recent Duma
elections and the lopsided United Russia party victory engineered by
the Kremlin and in the Kremlin's domination of the Russian media.
Putin's reelection next week, nearly unopposed, and
the selection of a new government under technocratic Prime
Minister Fradkov will mark the culmination of this process.
Putin has nevertheless recorded some notable achievements. His
economic record--even discounting the continuing strength of high world
oil prices--is impressive, both in terms of gross domestic product
(GDP) growth and progress on market reforms. He has brought a sense of
stability to the Russian political scene after years of chaos, and he
restored Russians' pride in their country's place in the world.
That said, Putin now dominates the Duma, and the strong showing of
nationalist parties plus the shutout of liberal parties may bolster
trends toward limits on civil society, state interference in big
business, and greater assertiveness in the former Soviet Union. The
Kremlin's recent efforts to strengthen the state's role in the oil
sector could discourage investors and hamper energy cooperation with
the west.
He shows no signs of softening his tough stance on Russia's war in
Chechnya. Russian counterinsurgency operations have had some success.
Putin's prime innovation is the process of turning more authority over
to the Chechens under the new government of Akhmad Kadyrov, and
empowering his security forces to lead the counter-insurgency.
Although this strategy may succeed in lowering
Russia's profile in Chechnya, it is unlikely to lead to
resolution.
Moscow has already become more assertive in its approach to the
neighboring states of the former Soviet Union, such as Georgia,
Ukraine, and Moldova. Russian companies--primarily for commercial
motives, but in line with the Kremlin's agenda--are increasing their
stakes in neighboring countries, particularly in the energy sector.
The Kremlin's increasing assertiveness is partly grounded in its
improving military capabilities. Although still a fraction of their
former capabilities, Russian military forces are beginning to rebound
from the 1990s nadir. Training rates are up--including some high-
profile exercises--along with defense spending.
Even so, we see Moscow's aims as limited. Russia is using primarily
economic incentives and levers of ``soft'' power, like shared history
and culture, to rebuild lost power and influence. Putin has a stake in
relative stability on Russia's borders--not least to maintain positive
relations with the U.S. and Europeans.
Russian relations with the United States continue to contain
elements of both cooperation and competition. On balance, they remain
more cooperative than not, but the coming year will present serious
challenges. For example, Russia remains supportive of U.S. deployments
in Central Asia for Afghanistan--but is also wary of U.S. presence in
what Russia considers to be its own back yard.
Let me turn briefly to Afghanistan, where the Afghan people are on
their way to having their first legitimate, democratically elected
government in more than a generation.
The ratification of a new constitution at the Constitutional Loya
Jirga in January is a significant milepost. It provides the legal
framework and legitimacy for several initiatives, including elections,
scheduled for later this year.
Within the next 12 months, the country could have, for
the first time, a freely elected president and National
Assembly that are broadly representative, multi-ethnic, and
able to begin providing security and services.
Even if the date of elections slips--the Bonn Agreement requires a
June date--the central government is extending its writ and legitimate
political processes are developing nationwide through other means.
Regional ``warlords'' are disruptive but disunited--and appear to
realize the Bonn process and elections are the only way to avoid
relapsing into civil war.
Defense Minister Fahim Khan is cooperating with
President Karzai and seems able to keep his large body of
Panjshiri supporters in line in favor of Bonn and stability.
Meanwhile, the infusion of $2 billion in international aid has
propelled Afghan economic performance. The International Monetary Fund
(IMF) estimates GDP grew--from an admittedly low base--by 29 percent
last year. The completion of the Kabul to Kandahar road in December was
a success, but the international community will need to ensure that
funds are channeled toward projects that make the most impact and are
balanced among the regions and ethnic groups.
Building a national army is another long-term
international challenge. So far, almost 6,000 Afghan soldiers
have been trained by U.S., British, and French trainers. It
will take years to reach the goal of a 70,000-strong
ethnically-balanced force but with continued coalition and
international community support and assistance over the next 2
years, Afghanistan need not become either a ``security welfare
state,'' or, again, a breeding ground for terrorists and
extremism.
Last year's most worrisome events were the continued attacks by the
Afghan Transitional Authority's enemies--particularly the Taliban,
along with al Qaeda and followers of Afghan extremist Hikmatyar who
want to disrupt routine life and the reconstruction effort in the south
and east. This is still a problem, because none of these groups has
abandoned the ultimate goal of derailing the process by which
legitimate democratic government and the rule of law will be
established in Afghanistan.
I don't want to overstate the Taliban's strength. It is far from
having sufficient political and military might to challenge the Karzai
Government. But it is still able to interfere with the reconstruction
of the country by fomenting insecurity and thereby undermining public
confidence in Kabul.
Like other extremists bent on restoring the terrorist-
sponsored state that existed before the liberation of
Afghanistan, Taliban remnants remain intent on using any
available means to undermine President Karzai and his
government, to drive international aid organizations and their
workers from the areas that most need them, and to attack U.S.
and coalition forces.
For this reason the security situation in the south
and east is still tenuous, and Kabul will need considerable
assistance over at least the next year or two to stabilize the
security environment there.
In Iran, Mr. Chairman, the victory of hardliners in elections last
month dealt government-led reform a serious blow. Greater repression is
a likely result.
With the waning of top-down reform efforts, reformers
will probably turn to the grass roots--working with NGOs and
labor groups--to rebuild popular support and keep the flame
alive.
The strengthening of authoritarian rule will make
breaking out of old foreign policy patterns more difficult at a
time when Tehran faces a new geopolitical landscape in the
Middle East.
The concerns I voiced last year are unabated. The recent defeats
will have further alienated a youthful population anxious for change.
Abroad, Tehran faces an altered regional landscape in the destruction
of radical anti-Western regimes in Afghanistan and Iraq and growing
international concern about nuclear proliferation.
As has so often happened in Iran's history, Iran's
leaders appear likely to respond to these challenges in rigid
and unimaginative ways.
The current setback is the latest in a series of contests in which
authoritarian rule has prevailed over reformist challengers. The
reformists--President Khatami in particular--are in no small part to
blame. Their refusal to back bold promises with equally bold actions
exhausted their initially enthusiastic popular support.
When the new Majles convenes in June, the Iranian government will
be even more firmly controlled by the forces of authoritarianism. In
the recent election, clerical authorities disqualified more than 2,500
candidates, mostly reformists, and returned control of the legislature
to hardliners. The new Majles will focus on economic reform, with
little or no attention to political liberalization.
With the Majles securely behind the hardliners, we
expect to see many of the outlets for political dissent shut
down by the clerical regime.
The prospect of internal violence remains. Hardliners
may now resort to new heavy-handedness that produces public
outrage and protest. At least eight people were killed and 30
injured in elected-related violence last month.
Although greater repression is likely to be the most immediate
consequence, this will only further deepen the discontent with clerical
rule, which is now discredited and publicly criticized as never before.
In the past year several unprecedented open letters, including one
signed by nearly half the parliament, were published calling for an end
to the clergy's absolute rule.
Iran's recent history is studded with incidents of
serious civil unrest that erupted in response to the arrogance
of local officials--events like the 1999 student riots that
broke out when security forces attacked a dormitory.
Even so, the Iranian public does not appear eager to
take a challenge to the streets--in Tehran, apathy is the
prevailing mood, and regime intimidation has cowed the
populace. This mix keeps the regime secure for now.
The uncertainty surrounding Iran's internal politics comes as
Tehran adjusts to the regional changes of a post-Saddam Iraq. Because
Khamenei and his allies have kept close rein on foreign policy, we do
not expect the defeat of the reformists to lead to a sudden change in
Iranian policy. Tehran will continue to use multiple avenues--including
media influence, humanitarian and reconstruction aid, diplomatic
maneuvering, and clandestine activity--to advance its interests and
counter U.S. influence in Iraq.
We judge that Iran wants an Iraqi government that does
not threaten Tehran, is not a U.S. puppet, can maintain the
country's territorial integrity, and has a strong Shia
representation.
These interests have led Tehran to recognize the IGC
and work with other nascent Iraqi political, economic, and
security institutions.
In Indonesia, the world's most populous Muslim country, authorities
have arrested more than 100 Jemaah Islamiya (JI) suspects linked to the
terrorist attacks in Bali in October 2002 and the Jakarta Marriott
Hotel last year. However, coming presidential and legislative elections
appear to have blunted the government's efforts to root out JI.
Megawati remains the presidential frontrunner, but continuing
criticism of her leadership and the growing prospect that her party
will lose seats in the legislative election increase the likelihood of
a wide-open race. The secular-nationalist Golkar--the former ruling
party of Soeharto, now riding a wave of public nostalgia for his bygone
era--could overtake Megawati's party to win the plurality of
legislature seats. Most local polls suggest that the Islamic parties
are unlikely to improve their percentage of the vote.
Vocal religious extremists, however, are challenging Indonesia's
dominant moderate Muslim groups. A growing number of Indonesian Muslims
now advocate the adoption of Islamic law, and dozens of provincial and
district governments around the archipelago are taking advantage of the
devolution of authority since 1998 to begin enforcing elements of
Islamic civil law and customs.
Let me turn briefly to South Asia. When I commented on the
situation there last year, I warned that, despite a lessening of
tensions between India and Pakistan, we remained concerned a dramatic
provocation might spark another crisis.
This year I'm pleased to note that the normalization of relations
between India and Pakistan has made steady progress. Building on Prime
Minister Vajpayee's April 2003 ``hand of friendship'' initiative, the
leaders in New Delhi and Islamabad have begun to lay a promising
foundation for resolving their differences through peaceful dialogue.
Both countries have since made further progress in
restoring diplomatic, economic, transportation, and
communications links and--most importantly--both sides have
agreed to proceed with a ``composite'' dialogue on a range of
bilateral issues that include Kashmir.
Further progress will hinge largely on the extent to which each
side judges the other is sincere about improving India-Pakistan
relations. For example, India is watching carefully to see whether the
level of militant infiltration across the line of control (LOC)
increases this spring after the snows melt in the mountain passes.
In this hemisphere, of course, the situation in Haiti is very
fluid. The process of setting up an interim government and moving
toward new elections has just begun. Selection of a consensus prime
minister this week would be an important next step. What concerns me is
the possibility that the interim government, backed by international
forces, will have trouble establishing order. A humanitarian disaster
or mass migration remains possible. Anti Aristide rebels still exert de
facto control over many parts of the country and have yet to make good
on promises to lay down their arms. Those forces include armed gangs,
former Haitian Army officers, and members of irregular forces who
allegedly killed Aristide supporters during his exile.
A cycle of clashes and revenge killings could easily
be set off, given the large number of angry, well-armed people
on both sides. Improving security will require the difficult
task of disarming armed groups and augmenting and retraining a
national security force.
The interim government's nascent consensus could also
run aground if hardline Lavalas (pro-Aristide) or Democratic
Platform (anti-Aristide) elements break ranks and seek to exert
control.
In Colombia, President Uribe is making great strides militarily and
economically. His military is making steady progress against illegal
armed groups, particularly around Bogota; last year the Army decimated
several FARC military units. In the last 2 months, Colombian officials
have apprehended the two most senior FARC leaders ever captured.
Foreign and domestic investors are taking note: last
year, the growth rate of 3.5 percent was the highest in 5
years.
But some of Uribe's hardest work awaits him. The military has
successfully cleared much of the insurgent-held territory, but the next
stage of Uribe's ``clear-and-hold'' strategy is securing the gains thus
far. That entails building the state presence--schools, police
stations, medical clinics, roads, bridges, and social infrastructure--
where it has scarcely existed before.
Finally, we should bear in mind that Uribe's opponents will adjust
their strategies, as well. The FARC may increasingly seek to target
U.S. persons and interests in Colombia, particularly if key leaders are
killed, captured, or extradited to the United States. The FARC still
holds the three U.S. hostages it captured last year (February) and may
seek to capture additional U.S. citizens.
Drug gangs are also adapting, relocating coca
cultivation and production areas and attacking aerial
eradication missions. All of this translates into more money
and more resources for traffickers, insurgents, and
paramilitary forces.
In Sub-Saharan Africa, progress in continuing peace processes
requires further careful western cultivation and African regional
cooperation.
In Liberia, U.N. peacekeepers and the transitional
government face a daunting challenge to rein in armed factions,
including remnants of Charles Taylor's militias.
Sudan's chances for lasting peace are its best in
decades, with more advances possible in the short term, given
outside guarantees and incentives.
A fragile peace process in Burundi and struggling
transitional government in Congo (Kinshasa) have the potential
to end conflicts that so far have claimed a combined total of
over 3 million lives.
Tension between Ethiopia and Eritrea over their
disputed border is jeopardizing the peace accord brokered by
U.S. officials in 2000.
The Other Transnational Issues
Let me conclude my comments this morning by briefly considering
some important transnational concerns that touch on the war against
terrorism.
We're used to thinking of that fight as a sustained worldwide
effort to get the perpetrators and would-be perpetrator off the street.
This is an important preoccupation, and we will never lose sight of it.
But places that combine desperate social and economic circumstances
with a failure of government to police its own territory can often
provide nurturing environments for terrorist groups, and for insurgents
and criminals. The failure of governments to control their own
territory creates potential power vacuums that open opportunities for
those who hate.
We count approximately 50 countries that have such
``stateless zones.'' In half of these, terrorist groups are
thriving. Al Qaeda and extremists like the Taliban, operating
in the Afghanistan-Pakistan border area, are well-known
examples.
As the war on terrorism progresses, terrorists will be driven from
their safe havens to seek new hideouts where they can undertake
training, planning, and staging without interference from government
authorities. The prime candidates for new ``no man's lands'' are
remote, rugged regions where central governments have no consistent
reach and where socioeconomic problems are rife.
Many factors play into the struggle to eradicate stateless zones
and dry up the wellsprings of disaffection.
Population trends. More than half of the Middle East's
population is under the age of 22. ``Youth bulges,'' or
excessive numbers of unemployed young people, are historical
markers for increased risk of political violence and
recruitment into radical causes. The disproportionate rise of
young age cohorts will be particularly pronounced in Iraq,
followed by Syria, Kuwait, Iran, and Saudi Arabia.
Infectious disease. The HIV/AIDS pandemic remains a
global humanitarian crisis that also endangers social and
political stability. Although Africa currently has the greatest
number of HIV/AIDS cases--more than 29 million infected--the
disease is spreading rapidly. Last year, I warned about rising
infection rates in Russia, China, India, and the Caribbean. But
the virus is also gaining a foothold in the Middle East and
North Africa, where governments may be lulled into
overconfidence by the protective effects of social and cultural
conservatism.
Humanitarian need. Need will again outpace
international pledges for assistance. Sub-Saharan Africa and
such conflict-ravaged places like Chechnya, Tajikistan, and the
Palestinian Occupied Territories will compete for aid against
assistance to Iraq and Afghanistan. Only 40 percent of U.N.
funding requirements for 2003 had been met for the five most
needy countries in Africa.
Food insecurity. More than 840 million people are
undernourished worldwide, a number that had fallen in the first
half of the 1990s but is now on the increase. The U.S.
Department of Agriculture estimates the food aid needed to meet
annual recommended minimum nutrition levels at almost 18
million metric tons, far above the recent average of 11 million
tons donated per annum.
I'll take this opportunity to remind you, Mr. Chairman, of the
continued threat the global narcotics industry poses to the United
States.
As evident by the doubling of the Afghan opium crop in
2003, the narcotics industry is capable of moving quickly to
take advantage of opportunities presented by the absence of
effective government authority.
Although the linkages between the drug trade and
terrorism are generally limited on a global basis, trafficking
organizations in Afghanistan and Colombia pose significant
threats to stability in these countries and constitute an
important source of funding for terrorist activity by local
groups.
This combination of flexibility and ability to
undermine effective governmental institutions means that
dealing with the narcotics challenge requires a truly global
response.
That, Mr. Chairman, concludes my formal remarks. I welcome any
questions or comments you and the members may have for me.
Chairman Warner. Without objection, we will put the entire
statement into the record.
Admiral Jacoby.
STATEMENT OF VADM LOWELL E. JACOBY, USN, DIRECTOR, DEFENSE
INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
Admiral Jacoby. Thank you, Mr. Chairman and members of this
committee. I appreciate this committee's strong and sustained
support for Defense Intelligence and its men and women deployed
around the world. My statement for the record addresses a
number of challenges and threats that you asked me to focus on
in the letter of invitation. I would like to take just a few
minutes to highlight some of the pressing future threats and
developments over the last year.
Last year I testified that Defense Intelligence was at war
on a global scale. That war has intensified. DIA professionals,
active duty military, Reserves, and civilians are providing the
knowledge and skills essential to defeating enemies in Iraq,
Afghanistan, and the global war on terrorism.
In Iraq the security situation varies by region. The north
and the south remain comparatively quiet. Attacks in central
Iraq account for approximately 80 percent of the incidents, in
Sunni-dominated areas, particularly west of Baghdad, around
Mosul, and along the Baghdad-Tikrit corridor, which are the
homes for many of the former military and security members. I
believe that the former regime elements, led by Baath Party
remnants, are responsible for the majority of the anti-
coalition attacks.
That said, it appears that much of the Sunni population
remains focused on concerns relating to security, employment,
and the availability of goods and services. Those issue areas
become extremely important in that security situation that
Director Tenet is talking about.
Foreign fighters, to include members of the al Qaeda-
associated movement, are a continuing threat. They are
motivated by Arab nationalism, extremist religious ideology,
and opposition to U.S. policies and beliefs. They have
perpetrated some of the most significant attacks. For instance,
we believe al Qaeda and associated Sunni extremists were
responsible for the March 2 Karbala and Baghdad attacks. The
method of operation--simultaneous suicide bombings against
multiple targets--is an al Qaeda trademark.
The mid-January arrest of an al Qaeda-associated operative
in Iraq yielded a letter he was couriering from al-Zarqawi to
senior al Qaeda members. That letter clearly stated Zarqawi's
intention to conduct attacks against Shia targets in Iraq in
order to foment sectarian violence. He indicated that the next
4 months were the time to strike, prior to the planned
transition of power to the Iraqi authority. If left unchecked,
Iraq has the potential to serve as a training ground for the
next generation of terrorists.
Turning to Afghanistan, last spring, attacks by opposition
groups reached their highest level since the collapse of the
Taliban government in December 2001. Although activity has
subsided somewhat, attacks continue. The Taliban insurgency
that continues to target humanitarian assistance and
reconstruction organizations is a serious threat. At least 11
of these attacks have occurred this year and some of the
organizations have suspended operations. They play a key role
in bringing progress to this troubled nation.
Additionally, President Karzai remains critical to
stability in Afghanistan. As a Pashtun, he is the only
individual capable of maintaining the trust of that ethnic
group while maintaining the support of other minorities.
Notable progress has been achieved in the global war on
terrorism. We have shrunk operating environments for al Qaeda
and other terrorist groups, captured al Qaeda senior
coordinators, and also disrupted operations. Nevertheless, al
Qaeda remains the greatest terrorist threat to our homeland and
our overseas presence. Al Qaeda continues to demonstrate that
it is adaptable and capable. Mid-level operatives are filling
leadership voids. Many have demonstrated a capacity and
capability to carry out complex operations. Rather than the
hierarchical centralized organization that al Qaeda was in
2002, it has become a more broadly based Sunni extremist
network.
While al Qaeda planning has become more decentralized, it
has shifted to softer targets. They continue attacks and most
recently those attacks in Istanbul showed this soft target
orientation. Al Qaeda continues to enjoy considerable support
in the Islamic world.
Al Qaeda and other terrorist groups may be interested in
acquiring CBRN materials, and I would highlight that hijackings
and attacks by manportable missiles against civilian aircraft
remain a significant concern.
A number of factors virtually assure a terrorist threat for
years to come. Despite recently reforms, terrorist
organizations thrive in societies with poor or failing
economies, ineffective governments, and inadequate educational
systems. Demographic or youth bubbles further burden
governments and economies.
Let me explain what I mean by ``youth bubble.'' For
instance, if we look at the percentage of population under 15
years of age, 43 percent of Saudi Arabians, 41 percent of
Iraqis, 39 percent of Pakistanis, 34 percent of Egyptians, 33
percent of Algerians, and 29 percent of Iranians fall into this
under-15 age group.
I am also concerned over ungoverned space. These are areas
where governments do not or cannot exercise effective control.
Such spaces offer terrorist organizations sanctuary.
I remain concerned about the Islamic world. Many of our
partners successfully weathered domestic stresses during
Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF). However, challenges to their
stability and their continued support for the war on terrorism
remain. Islamic and Arab populations are increasingly opposed
to U.S. policies. The loss of a key leader could quickly change
government support for U.S. and coalition operations. For
instance, President Musharraf was recently the target of two
sophisticated assassination attempts. His support for the
global war on terrorism, Afghan policy, restrictions on
Kashmiri militants, and attempts to improve relations with
India are all important initiatives that have increased his
vulnerability.
Mr. Chairman, I believe I will stop at that point. Also, I
would just comment on two questions that I regularly receive.
One is with respect to the security situation in the Taiwan
Straits as Taiwan approaches their March 20 election,
presidential election. There are no movements by Chinese
military forces nor preparations for exercises to attempt to
influence events on Taiwan.
Just to conclude with questions about Haiti, the security
situation is slowly improving, as is the humanitarian
situation. At this point, sir, we see no preparations for
large-scale migrations out of Haiti.
Those are my comments.
[The prepared statement of Admiral Jacoby follows:]
Prepared Statement by VADM Lowell E. Jacoby, USN
introduction
Last year I testified that Defense Intelligence was at war on a
global scale. That war has intensified. Defense Intelligence is
providing intelligence essential to defeat our Nation's enemies in the
global war on terrorism, Iraq and Afghanistan. In addition, we are
intent on identifying emerging challenges to our homeland, allies, and
interests. Providing the highest quality defense-related intelligence
to our warfighters, defense planners and national security policymakers
is essential for the successful accomplishment of their tasks.
The events of the last several years and our successes are
transforming the strategic environment. Defense Intelligence must
identify those new opportunities and challenges to support our Nation's
security strategy. In addition to these daunting tasks, we are called
upon to ``know something about everything all the time.'' The potential
for surprise is an enduring reality, especially when we are
simultaneously engaged on several fronts. We must mitigate the impact
of surprise by devoting resources to broad situational awareness and
quickly generate needed intelligence on any security issue as
disturbing trends or opportunities are identified.
enable swift defeat of the enemy
Global Terrorism
During the last year, notable progress has been achieved in the
global war on terrorism. We have shrunk the favorable operating
environments for al Qaeda and other terrorist groups and captured
several al Qaeda senior operational coordinators and a significant
number of terrorists. We have disrupted several terrorist operations.
Nevertheless, al Qaeda remains the greatest terrorist threat to our
homeland. Al Qaeda expressed its intent to stage another wave of
attacks in the U.S. aircraft hijackings remain a concern.
Despite 25 months of sustained pressure, al Qaeda continues to
demonstrate it is an adaptable and capable threat. Their network has
directed numerous attacks since September 11, most recently in Istanbul
and Riyadh. Al Qaeda continues to enjoy considerable support and is
able to recruit terrorists. Capable but less experienced individuals
are replacing those captured.
Al Qaeda's planning has become more decentralized and has shifted
to softer targets. The network increasingly generates attacks in
alliance with like-minded groups like Jemaah Islamiyah (JI) in
Southeast Asia. The arrest of senior al Qaeda and JI leader Hambali
last summer eliminated a significant link between the two groups.
However, the al Qaeda/JI nexus will endure because the two groups have
a shared ideology and experience during the period of Soviet
involvement in Afghanistan. While al Qaeda does not control the daily
operations of JI or affiliated groups, congruence of broad goals
promise continued attacks against U.S. interests and our partners in
the global war on terrorism.
Al Qaeda and other terrorist groups remain interested in acquiring
chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear (CBRN) weapons. We
remain concerned about rogue scientists and the potential that state
actors are providing, or will provide, technological assistance to
terrorist organizations.
Terrorist use of man-portable air defense system (MANPAD) missiles
against civilian and military aircraft was underscored following the
attack last fall against a commercial cargo aircraft in Baghdad and the
failed attack in Mombassa in 2002. A MANPAD attack against civilian
aircraft would produce large number of casualties, international
publicity and a significant economic impact on civil aviation. These
systems are highly portable, easy to conceal, inexpensive, available in
the global weapons market and instruction manuals are on the Internet.
Commercial aircraft are not equipped with countermeasures and
commercial pilots are not trained in evasive measures. An attack could
occur with little or no warning. Terrorists may attempt to capitalize
on these vulnerabilities.
Iraq is the latest jihad for Sunni extremists. Iraq has the
potential to serve as a training ground for the next generation of
terrorists where novice recruits develop their skills, junior
operatives hone their organizational and planning capabilities, and
relations mature between individuals and groups as was the case during
the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan and extremist operations in the
Balkans.
Although not presently linked to attacks on the global war on
terrorism coalition, Lebanese Hizballah remains capable of terrorist
operations on a global scale. Hizballah has extensive and well-honed
capabilities and may have contingency plans in place for attacks in
Iraq. The group's global presence makes it a potential threat to our
interests worldwide.
The Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) remains the most
potent terrorist threat to U.S. interests in Colombia. During the past
year, the FARC conducted multiple attacks in Colombia and since early
2003 has held three U.S. citizens hostage. Its attack against a Bogota
bar, last fall, injured 3 Americans and 70 Colombians, killing 1. The
continued emphasis on urban terrorism, especially in Bogota, increases
the risk to U.S. citizens. At the same time, the FARC's perception that
U.S. support is the direct cause of the Colombian government's recent
successes, increases the likelihood the group will target U.S.
interests in 2004.
We are also increasingly concerned over ``ungoverned spaces,''
defined as geographic areas where governments do not exercise effective
control. Terrorist groups and narcotraffickers use these areas as
sanctuaries to train, plan and organize, relatively free from
interference. There are numerous ``ungoverned spaces'' around the world
such as the western provinces in Pakistan, portions of the southern
Philippines, Indonesian islands, Chechnya, rural areas in Burma,
several areas in Africa, and areas in South America. Ungoverned spaces
include densely populated cities where terrorists can congregate and
prepare for operations with relative impunity. I believe these areas
will play an increasingly important role in the global war on terrorism
as al Qaeda, its associated groups and other terrorist organizations
use these areas as bases for operations.
A number of factors combine to present a terrorist threat to the
United States for years to come. Despite recent reforms, Arab
populations on the whole live in societies that lack political and
economic freedoms, effective government and good educational systems.
Literacy and education levels were lower than in many other developing
regions. Especially in madrasas, teaching methods and religious
curriculum emphasizing rote learning produce students without skills
needed to compete for jobs and anti-Western in beliefs. At the national
level, their poorly educated workforces limit ability to compete in the
global economy. Not surprisingly, many Arab states suffer high
unemployment. ``Demographic bubbles'' which burden government services
and economies promise continued problems. These factors in combination
will feed Arab public sentiment which is increasingly opposed to U.S.
policies. Radical Islam has the potential to be a force in many areas
of the world for decades to come.
Iraq
The security situation in Iraq varies by region. The north, where
Kurds maintained control after the fall of the regime and have a
largely intact infrastructure is quiet. The south also remains
comparatively quiet. Moderate Shia clerics and the Shia population
support coalition efforts and oppose former regime elements (FREs).
However, the situation could become volatile. Shia backing for the
coalition is based largely on expectations that a political structure
based on an elected representative government serves their interests.
Insurgent attacks in central Iraq account for the vast majority of
all incidents. Anti-coalition activity centers in Sunni-dominated
areas, especially west of Baghdad, around Mosul and along the Baghdad-
Tikrit corridor--areas home to former regime military and security
members. Saddam's capture likely reduced the morale and effectiveness
of some resistance members. However, many FREs and party loyalists are
motivated by Arab and Iraqi nationalism and self-interest and will
continue the resistance, opposing the foreign presence and emerging new
order. That said, it appears much of the Sunni population has not
decided whether to back the coalition or support the opposition. The
key factor is whether stability can be established and whether viable
alternatives to the Baathists or Islamists emerge.
We believe FREs led by remnants of the Baath Party are responsible
for the majority of anti-coalition attacks. Their strategy appears to
be multi-faceted: attempting to undermine the coalition, creating
insecurity, attacking cooperating Iraqis and assassinating leading
figures, and driving out international organizations. The FREs have
adjusted to coalition tactics, and now employ more ``stand-off''
weapons, such as improvised explosive devices (IEDs), rocket-propelled
grenades (RPGs), and mortars.
The number of anti-coalition attacks has declined over the past
months from a high in November during Ramadan. Additionally, the
coalition has captured or killed 46 of the 55 most-wanted former regime
members. Efforts to capture the remaining senior former regime figures,
in particular, Izzat Ibrahim al-Duri, are supported almost daily by new
intelligence.
Foreign fighters, while fewer in numbers than the FREs, are a
threat. Fighters from numerous countries are reported to have entered
Iraq. They are motivated by Arab nationalism, extremist religious
ideology and/or resentment of U.S. policies and beliefs. Most are
assessed to be linked to groups that hope to gain notoriety and
increased support by conducting attacks in Iraq.
In addition to our other efforts in Iraq, supporting the search for
Captain Michael Scott Speicher remains a high priority. We continue
focused efforts to determine his status. These efforts will continue
until we have a full accounting.
Afghanistan
Attacks by Taliban and Hezb-e Islami Gulbuddin (HIG) since early
spring of last year, reached their highest levels since the collapse of
the Taliban government. The majority of the attacks are ineffective
rocket or bomb attacks. However, recent attacks show increasing
accuracy and sophistication. Violence against humanitarian assistance
and reconstruction personnel has led some organizations to suspend
operations. Continued reductions of United Nations (U.N.) activity may
negatively impact the Bonn Process. Upcoming political events such as
the June 2004 presidential elections may prompt increases in violence.
Afghanistan's new constitution was approved in early January. This
paves the way for a presidential election this summer and legislative
elections later this year. The show of support among Loya Jirga
delegates for President Hamid Karzai bodes well for his political
strength and chances in the presidential election.
Karzai's ability to use his growing political strength to encourage
compliance with his reform agenda may provide long term stability, but
could result in near term tensions. President Hamid Karzai remains
critical to stability in Afghanistan. As a Pashtun, he remains the only
individual capable of maintaining the trust of Afghanistan's largest
ethnic group (Pashtuns) and support of other ethnic minorities. A
Taliban insurgency that continues to target humanitarian assistance and
reconstruction efforts is a serious threat, potentially eroding
commitments to stability and progress in Afghanistan.
Pakistani assistance remains a key to a successful outcome.
Cultural, religious, and political considerations have limited the
central government's commitment to disrupting Taliban operations,
support and sanctuaries. However, Pakistan has been more active against
al Qaeda infrastructure. Pakistani military operations have contributed
to the disruption of al Qaeda sanctuaries, particularly in South
Waziristan.
reliable strategic warning across the full spectrum of potential
threats
Weapons of Mass Destruction and Missile Proliferation
The trend with respect to weapons of mass destruction (WMD) and
missiles remains troublesome. There is continuing terrorist interest in
acquiring and using WMD, especially biological, chemical, and
radiological weapons. North Korea's reactivation of the Yongbyon
nuclear facility and Iran's admission to the International Atomic
Energy Agency (IAEA) about years of covert nuclear activity reinforce
concerns. The recent Libyan disclosure and pledge to divest itself of
WMD and long range missiles programs and admit international inspectors
is a positive sign. Other states continue to develop biological and
chemical weapon capabilities. Numerous states continue to improve their
ballistic and cruise missiles, focusing on longer range, better
accuracy, deployment of new units and use of underground facilities.
Proliferation of WMD- and missile-related technologies continues and
new supply networks challenge U.S. counterproliferation efforts.
Nuclear Weapons
Russia's nuclear weapons stockpile continues to decline. DIA
believes the number of weapons in China, India, Pakistan, and North
Korea will grow. We are also concerned about Syrian interest in nuclear
technologies that could support a weapons program.
We believe North Korea has nuclear warheads from plutonium produced
prior to the 1994 Agreed Framework. After expelling IAEA personnel in
late 2002, North Korea reactivated facilities at Yongbyon and claims it
reprocessed the 8,000 spent fuel rods from the Yongbyon reactor, adding
plutonium for additional weapons. Pyongyang is expected to increase its
weapons inventory by the end of the decade through plutonium production
and a possible unlocated uranium enrichment capability. North Korea's
current proliferation activities are troubling. The potential for the
North to market nuclear weapons and technology is also troubling.
In 2003, Iran admitted to the IAEA that it had a covert uranium
enrichment program for many years, removing any doubt about the
military intent of their program. Tehran now claims it will halt
uranium enrichment activity, in exchange for nuclear technologies.
Faced with international pressure, Iran signed, but has not yet
ratified the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty's (NPT) Additional
Protocol, allowing for more intrusive IAEA inspections. However, we
remain concerned about Iran's ultimate nuclear intentions.
In South Asia, India and Pakistan have well-developed nuclear
infrastructures and small stockpiles of weapons. Pakistan recently
developed the capability to produce plutonium for potential weapons
use. Weapon stockpiles in India and Pakistan are expected to grow.
Chemical and Biological Weapons
Numerous states have chemical and biological warfare programs. Some
have produced and weaponized agents, while others are in research and
development (R&D) stages. Contributing to the threat is potential
development of new agents with toxicities exceeding those of
traditional agents, or with properties that could challenge existing
countermeasures. While we have no intelligence suggesting states are
planning to give terrorist groups these weapons, we remain concerned
about, and alert to, the possibility.
These weapons are easier to develop, hide, and deploy than nuclear
munitions. Supporting technologies are relatively inexpensive and
readily available because they have legitimate roles in medical,
pharmaceutical and agricultural industries.
Ballistic Missiles
In addition to Russia and China, the United States will likely face
intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) threats from North Korea.
Iran may have the capability to field an ICBM by 2015. Russia's force
will continue to be the most robust and lethal.
China is modernizing its ballistic missile forces and is fielding
increasingly accurate solid-fuel, road-mobile missiles that will
enhance survivability and provide Beijing flexibility. China is
improving its silo-based, liquid-propellant ICBMs and is testing a new
mobile, solid-propellant ICBM, the 8,000-km-range DF-31. It also is
developing programs for an extended-range version of the DF-31. The
number, reliability, survivability, and accuracy of Chinese strategic
missiles capable of hitting the United States will increase during the
next decade.
Based on a space launch vehicle program, we judge Iran will have
the technical capability to develop an ICBM. However, we do not know
whether Iran has decided to field such a missile. Tehran declared its
1,300-km Shahab-3 medium-range ballistic missile operational last
summer.
North Korea continues to develop its Taepo Dong 2 ICBM. This
missile could deliver a nuclear warhead to parts of the United States
in a two stage variant and target all of North America if a third stage
is added. Press reports indicate North Korea is preparing to field a
new ICBM, about the size and dimensions of the Russian SS-N-6 SLBM. If
this is true, such a missile could reach U.S. facilities in Okinawa,
Guam, and possibly Alaska. North Korea is the world's leading supplier
of missiles and related production technologies, selling to countries
in the Middle East and North Africa and to Pakistan.
Cruise Missiles
The numbers and capabilities of cruise missiles will increase,
fueled by maturation of land-attack and anti-ship cruise missile
programs in Europe, Russia and China; sales of complete systems; and
the spread of advanced dual-use technologies and materials. The threat
from today's anti-ship cruise missiles is challenging and will increase
with the introduction of more advanced guidance and propulsion
technologies. Proliferation of land attack cruise missiles (LACMs) will
also increase the threat to our forward based military forces and
provide area denial weapons against potential contingency operations.
Today, very few countries, to include Russia, possess LACMs. China
is expected to field its first dedicated LACM soon. China is developing
and procuring anti-ship cruise missiles capable of being launched from
aircraft, surface ships, submarines and land that will be more capable
of penetrating defenses.
In the next 10 years, we expect other countries to join Russia,
China, and France as major exporters in cruise missiles. India, in
partnership with Russia, will begin production of the PJ-10, an anti-
ship and land attack cruise missile, this year and may export the
system.
Proliferation
Russia, China, and North Korea support various WMD and missile
programs, especially in the Middle East and South Asia. Russian
entities support missile and civil nuclear programs in China, Iran, and
India, and to a lesser degree in Syria. Some of these nuclear
technologies could have weapons applications. Chinese companies remain
involved with nuclear and missile programs in Pakistan and Iran. In
some cases, entities from Russia and China are involved without the
knowledge of their governments. North Korea is the world's leading
supplier of missiles and related technologies. We also see evidence of
what is termed ``secondary proliferation,'' when countries who
previously imported weapons or weapons technology begin indigenous
production and export of those systems. The most disturbing example of
this trend is the linkage of North Korean, Libyan, and Iranian
enrichment programs to Pakistani technology.
Information Operations
The information operations (IO) threat consists of capabilities
such as electronic warfare, propaganda, denial and deception, and
computer network attack to affect human or automated decisionmaking
processes. Some of these target infrastructures such as U.S. logistics,
command, control, communications, computers, intelligence,
surveillance, and reconnaissance (C\4\ISR) and domestic economic
infrastructure. Several adversaries are pursuing IO focused on select
capabilities such as propaganda and denial and deception. Russia and
China have adopted more comprehensive approaches with multiple
capabilities. Chinese military theorists are developing IO doctrines,
targeting both western and regional nations that will pose a long-term
strategic threat to U.S. interests.
Many adversaries have demonstrated skill in misinformation and
disinformation campaigns that target the United States and third
parties to undermine U.S. interests. The threat to computer networks is
extremely dynamic, with growing capabilities that are easily
proliferated. Numerous distributed denial of service techniques, to
include viruses and worms, could be used to shut down or disrupt
computers in the lead up to or during a conflict. Most disturbing is
that the basic tools are readily available on the Internet and can be
customized by adversaries to fit their needs. We expect the IO threat
to grow.
General Technology Proliferation
The situation remains unchanged from my testimony last year.
Advances in information technology, biotechnology, communications,
materials, micro-manufacturing, and weapon development are having a
significant impact on the way militaries and terrorist groups organize,
plan, train, and fight. Globalization of ``R&D intensive''
capabilities, such as computer hardware and software, biotechnology and
nanotechnology, is allowing smaller militaries, groups, and even
individuals' access to capabilities previously limited to those of the
major powers. Integration, advancements and unanticipated applications
of emerging technologies make the future and, correspondingly, our
military strengths and vulnerabilities, extremely difficult to predict.
While DIA cannot identify with specificity, some aspects of our
military advantage will erode. Technological surprise is of great
concern and we are watching this area intensely.
Global Defense Spending
Non-U.S. global defense spending, which we reported last year
dropped 50 percent over the past decade, will likely increase during
the next 5 years. The improving global economy is allowing increased
funding at moderate rates. Defense spending will enable countries to
pursue selective force modernization.
Globalization
Globalization remains an overwhelming force that presents security
challenges. Terrorists, proliferators of illicit weapons and military
technology, narcotraffickers, and alien smugglers are making increasing
use of the world's financial, communication, and transportation
systems. Rapid change from transforming industries and infusion of
foreign products, media, and ideas is outstripping the ability of many
governments and societies to adjust politically, economically and
culturally. Portions of the population in many of these countries are
instigating a backlash against the West and the United States, in
particular. This backlash is one factor in extremist movements such as
al Qaeda in the Islamic world and political instability in a broad
range of countries. Our challenge is to develop collection and
analytical skills to track and intercept the threatening things and
people traveling around the world, and understand and predict
instability and the social backlash that threaten our citizens and
interests.
International Crime
Criminal groups in Western Europe, China, Colombia, Israel, Japan,
Mexico, Nigeria, and Russia are involved in illicit transfers of arms
and military technologies, narcotics trafficking, and alien smuggling.
We continue to identify links between terrorism and organized crime.
For example, the Afghan drug trade is a source of revenue and logistic
support for Taliban and other opposition groups. Elements of al Qaeda
traffic in opium and heroin. In addition, we are concerned that
criminal groups will use their established networks to traffic in WMD
and the terrorist movement.
Uneven Economic and Demographic Growth
Uneven economic and demographic growth will remain a source of
instability. The poorest countries are almost universally those with
the fastest population growth. High birth rates create demographic
momentum as large groups of young people reach child-bearing age. As a
result, much of the world population will remain below internationally
recognized poverty standards. This is a problem not only for the very
poor countries, but middle income ones as well. Middle Eastern, South
East Asian, and African states are experiencing a ``demographic
bubble'' (34 percent of Egyptians, 43 percent of Saudi Arabians, 42
percent of Afghans, 36 percent of Filipinos, 43 percent of Liberians
and 48 percent of Congolese (DROC) are less than 15 years of age).
Their economies and government services are not meeting the demands of
growing populations. Education systems, as I spoke to earlier in my
testimony, are a critical factor for development. Inadequate education
systems can mean countries and even regions are not capable of taking
advantage of the opportunities of the global economy. The gap between
the rich and the poor grows larger. Meanwhile, the communications
revolution gives the poor a clearer view of the world's wealth, fueling
resentment against their own governments and the developed world.
North Korea
Pyongyang's open pursuit of nuclear weapons and delivery systems
remains a serious challenge. Pyongyang considers its nuclear weapons
program critical to regime survival. North Korean media reports suggest
Kim Jong Il believes the speed and success of Operation Iraqi Freedom
(OIF) underscores the ineffectiveness of the North's conventional
forces and the value of nuclear weapons.
North Korea's approach with respect to nuclear weapons is assessed
to be designed to achieve the maximum concessions from the U.S. and
other regional powers to ensure its own political and economic
survival. While Kim Jong Il may be willing to abandon his nuclear
weapons program, turn over the existing plutonium stockpiles and accept
a vigorous inspection regime, we do not know the specific conditions
which the North would require to reach an agreement.
The North Korea People's Army remains capable of inflicting
hundreds of thousands of casualties and severe damage on the South.
North Korean missile forces can also attack Japan. Internally, the
regime in Pyongyang appears stable, but there are many unknowns. Kim
Jong Il's security services maintain tight control over the domestic
population.
North and South Korea cooperate in economic, transportation, and
social sectors, but the South has made little headway on security
issues. Without Seoul's assistance North Korea might be much less
stable.
China
Chinese leadership transition since 2002 has progressed smoothly.
The new leaders are unified in their focus on domestic stability and
economic growth, maintaining the same security priorities and calculus
as their predecessors. Former President Jiang Zemin retains control of
the armed forces as Central Military Commission Chairman, providing
continuity to Chinese military modernization and strategic direction.
China's leaders continue support for the global war on terrorism,
in part because they see opportunities for international cooperation
against domestic separatist problems--predominantly the ethnic-Uighur
communities in western China. Beijing's criticism of the U.S. presence
in Afghanistan and Central Asia and what they consider U.S.
unilateralism has been muted. However, Beijing likely fears a long-term
U.S. presence on its borders. The Chinese government has also limited
its criticism of coalition military operations in Iraq.
China is keenly interested in coalition military operations in
Afghanistan and Iraq and is using lessons from those operations to
guide People's Liberation Army (PLA) modernization and strategy.
Beijing was impressed with U.S. ground forces' performance during the
Iraq war. While several years will be needed to fully incorporate
lessons, China's military leaders are reevaluating some of their
military assumptions.
China continues to develop or import modern weapons aimed at
enabling it to fight and win wars on or near its periphery. Acquisition
priorities include surface combatants and submarines, air defense,
fourth-generation fighters, ballistic and anti-ship cruise missiles,
space and counter-space systems, and modern ground equipment. The PLA
is also cutting approximately 200,000 personnel to streamline the
force, reduce costs, and support modernization. While making progress,
the PLA continues to face significant technical and operational
challenges.
Domestic political events on Taiwan are the principal determinant
of short term stability in the Taiwan Straits. Beijing is carefully
monitoring developments in advance of Taipei's March 2004 presidential
elections and referendum. We see no indications of preparations for
large-scale military exercises to influence Taiwan voters. Most of
China's efforts appear to be diplomatic, oriented toward convincing the
United States to constrain Taiwan. China's leaders see last year's
enactment of Taiwan's referendum enabling legislation as a legal basis
for prospective independence. China's leaders also are concerned that
Taiwan President Chen Shui-bian would interpret re-election in 2004 as
a popular endorsement for Taiwanese independence. Beijing will not
tolerate Taiwanese independence and will use military force regardless
of the costs or risks.
Russia
After nearly a decade of declining activity, the Russian military
is beginning to exercise its forces in mission areas it believes are
essential for deterrence, global reach, and rapid reaction. Open source
reporting confirms that ground force exercise activity in 2003 doubled
that of 2002; training for use of nonstrategic nuclear forces
continues; and Russia desires to have the ability for its Navy and Air
Force to operate globally, as evidenced in their joint exercises in the
Indian and Pacific Oceans in 2003. Russian military spending has
increased in real terms in the past 4 years, in line with its improving
economy. Additionally, we expect modest increases in the procurement of
new weapons. Improvements will continue unless Russia suffers an
economic setback--especially a significant decrease in the price of
oil.
Moscow is attempting to reclaim great power status. Russian leaders
believe an improving military supports its foreign policies and conveys
the image of an active global power capable of asserting it national
interests. It also supports the leaders' domestic political position.
Additionally, Russia is improving its relations with some countries,
most notably France, China, and India, in pursuit of a ``multi-polar''
world and to enhance its arms sales.
Russian military leaders were surprised by OIF's speed,
effectiveness, and low casualties, but not by the operation's ultimate
success. Proponents of western-style military reforms believe the
results demonstrate the need for change in the Russian armed forces.
However, they face resistance from an entrenched bureaucracy and senior
leaders with vested interests in the status quo. OIF reinforced
previous Russian assessments of the need for precision strike
capabilities and improved intelligence, surveillance, and
reconnaissance (ISR) systems. Russian military leaders recognize the
need for more resources, but economic realities will prevent dramatic
increases in military expenditures.
Russian leaders see OIF as an embodiment of U.S. unilateralism and
believe U.S. actions have weakened the global war on terrorism
alliance. Despite these views, Russia voted in favor of several U.S.-
backed U.N. Security Council Resolutions. Moscow believes the United
Nations should have the lead in establishing an Iraqi government. They
will also work to ensure Russian commercial access to post-OIF Iraq and
repayment of some of their loans to the previous Iraqi regime.
President Putin and other Russian leaders reacted calmly to the
latest round of North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) enlargement
and are working to improve relations within NATO. However, many
maintain the traditional Russian fear of military encirclement, citing
potential of U.S. military rebasing and suspicions that Washington is
not interested in ratifying the adopted Conventional Armed Forces in
Europe Treaty or extending it to the Baltic States. They will oppose
Ukraine's, Georgia's, and Azerbaijan's efforts to join NATO.
The Chechen war continues after more than 4 years and is a drain on
the Russian military. Moscow rejects negotiations to end the war, but
has not been able to defeat the guerrillas. Approximately 65,000-75,000
Russian troops remain in Chechnya. Official casualties approach Soviet
losses in Afghanistan. However, Chechnya remains a minor issue for most
Russians and has not threatened President Putin politically.
Nevertheless, Chechen extremists remain capable of headline-grabbing
attacks in many areas of Russia.
Iran
Iran remains wary of the large U.S. force presence in Iraq.
However, fears of war between the U.S. and Iran have eased and most
Iranians are indifferent to the U.S. presence. Nonetheless, a
substantial minority strongly distrusts U.S. motives in the region.
Iranian attitudes will be shaped by Washington's ability to improve the
political and economic situation of ordinary Iraqis, especially the
Shia.
With the exception of naval forces, Iran's military modernization
has been stagnant. In reaction to OIF, Iran publicly announced
implementation of an asymmetric strategy emphasizing lightly armed but
numerous guerrilla forces. The only addition to Iran's air and air
defense inventory is a new Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) Air
Force squadron of Su-25 close air support aircraft. Iran's Navy, the
region's most capable, can temporarily disrupt maritime traffic through
the Strait of Hormuz using a layered force of Kilo class diesel
submarines, ship- and shore-based antiship cruise missiles and naval
mines.
On the domestic scene, the hope among Iranians that President
Khatami could institute change has faded. Conservatives retain control,
and reformists are not mounting a challenge to their authority.
Although Iran is stable for now, the regime must address social and
economic problems if it is to ease public frustration and the potential
for future unrest.
Israeli-Palestinian Violence
The Israeli-Palestinian conflict remains basically unchanged from
last year. It furthers anti-American sentiment, increasing the
likelihood of terrorism and increasing pressure on moderate Middle East
regimes. While Israeli-Palestinian violence continues, the intensity
and fatality levels decreased this past fall. Nevertheless, violence
could flare suddenly.
Periodic attacks along Israel's northern border could escalate,
drawing in Syria and Lebanon. In October, Israel retaliated for a
terrorist attack by striking a terrorist training camp in Syria.
Israeli leaders warned they would hold Syria responsible for future
terror attacks by groups it harbors or sponsors.
A U.S. diplomatic convoy entering the Gaza Strip in October 2003
was deliberately targeted with an improvised mine. DIA believes this
attack to be an isolated incident. We have no credible intelligence
that a major Palestinian terrorist group is currently targeting U.S.
facilities and persons.
know something about everything
Pressures in the Islamic World
The process of sorting through competing visions of what it means
to be a Muslim state in the modern era continues. As stated earlier in
my testimony, we are particularly concerned over the stability of many
of our Arab partners because of their poor economic conditions,
ineffective government institutions, and ``youth bulge.'' Arab public
sentiment is increasingly opposed to U.S. policies according to recent
polls, increasing pressures on governments who support the U.S. Support
for the war on terrorism is low, ranging from 56 percent in Kuwait to 2
percent among Jordanians and Palestinians. Support for America has
dropped in most of the Muslim world. Favorable ratings in Morocco
declined from 77 percent in 2000 to 27 percent in spring of last year
and in Jordan from 25 percent in 2002 to only 1 percent in May 2003.
The percentage of Saudis expressing confidence in the United States
dropped from 63 percent in May 2000 to 11 percent in October 2003. The
Israeli-Palestinian conflict, and Washington's perceived pro-Israeli
bias, was cited in some polls as a leading reason for anti-U.S.
sentiment. These conditions and increasing anti-U.S. sentiment provide
sustenance for radical political Islam at the expense of moderate
elements.
Many of our partners weathered stresses within their countries
during OIF because of the short duration of the conflict, acquiescence
to expression of moderate levels of anti-U.S. sentiments and protests,
and reliance on their strong military and security forces. Challenges
to stability and continued support for the war on terrorism remain.
Additionally, the assassination of a few key leaders could quickly
change support for pro-U.S. policies.
Pakistan
President Musharraf faces significant political and economic
challenges. He was recently the target of two sophisticated, well-
planned assassination attempts. His support for the global war on
terrorism, crackdown on indigenous Islamic extremists, Afghan policy,
restrictions on Kashmiri militants, and attempts to improve relations
with India have all increased his vulnerability. Popular hostility to
the U.S. is growing, driven in particular by Islamabad's support for
U.S. counterterrorism efforts. Opposition constrains his range of
options.
Musharraf's viability depends on continued support from his
military. He appears to retain the support of this core constituency.
However, the two recent attempts on Musharraf suggest insider
knowledge. He remains at high risk of assassination. If Musharraf were
assassinated or otherwise replaced, Pakistan's new leader would erode
pro-U.S. policies. The extent and pace of this erosion will depend on
how Musharraf departs and who replaces him.
Tension Between India and Pakistan
Since Prime Minister Vajpayee's ``hand of friendship'' speech last
spring and successful South Asia Association for Regional Cooperation
(SAARC) conference in Islamabad this January, India and Pakistan have
taken a series of steps to defuse tensions from the 2001/2002 crisis.
These include restoring high commissioners, resuming transportation
links, building people-to-people contacts, observing a cease-fire along
the Line of Control and pledging to engage in dialogue on all bilateral
issues including Kashmir. With the underlying causes of the Kashmir
dispute unresolved and continued but reduced cross border infiltration,
relations could rapidly deteriorate in the wake of another spectacular
terrorist attack or political assassination. Both sides retain large
forces close to the Line of Control in Kashmir and continue to develop
their WMD and missile programs. Pakistan views its WMD programs as its
only viable alternative to India's improving conventional capabilities.
Egypt, Jordan, Saudi Arabia
The Egyptian government remains in control of the country. Egypt's
multiple, overlapping security agencies effectively manage protests and
political dissent. Cairo seeks closer official cooperation and
consultation with Washington in promoting stability and security in
Iraq but is limited by public discontent over U.S. regional policies.
Cairo also is actively pushing the various Palestinian factions to
agree to a cease-fire and return to the negotiation table with Israel.
The Jordanian government remains stable, largely owing to the
loyalty of the military and security forces to a very popular King. The
government is accelerating political and economic reform in the face of
chronic economic and social pressures. King Abdallah has acknowledged
that terrorism remains a threat--citing the bombings of the U.N.
headquarters and the Jordanian embassy in Iraq last year. Jordan's
position has been steadfast in denouncing terrorism, and Jordanian
Foreign Minister Muasher has reiterated Jordan's commitment to
cooperate with all countries and multilateral efforts in the fight
against terrorism.
Despite recent terrorist attacks, the Saudi regime's control of
national resources, the security infrastructure, and international
support will enable the regime to survive. The backlash from last
year's bombings actually strengthened public support for the global war
on terrorism and prompted the government to seek increased
international counterterrorism cooperation with the United States and
other allies. At the same time, the Saudi public opposes U.S. policies
in the region.
Indonesia
President Megawati, who faces election this summer, has increased
political stability in Indonesia. Still, social and economic problems
persist and Islamic extremists continue to foster terrorism and
sectarian unrest. National unity remains a core preoccupation, with
major security operations containing, but not defeating secessionists.
Terrorist bombings in Bali in 2002 and last year in Jakarta
mobilized government efforts, leading to arrests and convictions of
many Jemaah Islamiyah figures. Indonesia's largely moderate Islamic
population rejects terrorism, but often is wary of U.S. policies in the
Middle-East. Jakarta's cooperation on counterterrorism will, to varying
degrees, continue. However, the government will avoid close
identification with the U.S. and treat Islamic militant figures with
caution through the elections. If President Megawati is re-elected, the
Indonesian government will likely strengthen its counterterrorism
cooperation.
Philippines
Like President Megawati in Indonesia, President Arroyo has
increased political stability in the Philippines and support for the
global war on terrorism. She is also standing for re-election in 2004.
The country suffers from an active communist insurgency and Muslim
separatist groups, some linked to al Qaeda. None, individually or
combined, can overthrow the government. At the same time, government
security forces are overextended and cannot deal effectively with the
problems. Arroyo survived a failed coup by junior officers protesting
corruption and pay inequity in the military in summer 2003. We do not
expect a repeat of this incident prior to the May 2004 elections,
despite the fact that coup rumors persist.
Philippine support for the war on terrorism will continue. U.S.
military operations in the Philippines are limited by their
constitution and political opposition. Law enforcement efforts have
actually been more successful than the military in capturing
terrorists. Manila has contributed a 100 member contingent to Iraq and
is willing to contribute more if funding issues are resolved. They are
looking to benefit from reconstruction contracts.
Liberia
Liberia is representative of many countries in Africa suffering
from widespread government corruption, illicit arms flow and
mercenaries. Liberia is on a path to recovery after 14 years of civil
war, owing to the ouster of regional troublemaker and former President
Charles Taylor, the signing of a comprehensive peace accord, the
intervention of U.N. peacekeepers and the installation of a National
Transition Government (NTGL). Even so, power struggles within the NTGL
and factional fighting in the interior will persist until the U.N.
deploys forces in other parts of Liberia to ensure demobilization and
disarmament of targeted groups.
other evolving trends
There are threats, both passive and active, to Defense
Intelligence's collection capabilities. Information is the life blood
of analysis and analysis is the foundation for knowledge. To ensure
information superiority we must understand and counter those threats.
The Counterintelligence Threat
Threats from foreign intelligence entities, both state and non-
state actors, represent a growing challenge as they become more complex
and elusive. These actors target a widening range of U.S. interests,
from military and intelligence plans, operations and capabilities, to
the growing threats to U.S. economic, technological, scientific and
industrial competencies. Adversaries and traditional allies alike
target U.S. capabilities.
Cover, Concealment, Camouflage, Denial, and Deception
Key target countries have increased cover, concealment, camouflage,
denial, and deception efforts to thwart U.S. technical intelligence,
surveillance, and reconnaissance and clandestine human intelligence
collection. Virtually every state that perceives itself threatened by
U.S. military power and intelligence is assessing the performance of
U.S. tactics, weapons and reconnaissance capabilities in OIF to develop
more effective countermeasures against U.S. high-technology warfare.
Underground Facilities
Use of underground facilities to protect and conceal WMD, ballistic
missiles, leadership, and other activities is expanding. Growing
numbers of underground facilities are especially notable among nations
with WMD programs. In 2003, we have observed more than a dozen new
military or regime-related underground facilities under construction.
Space and Space-Denial Capabilities
Adversaries recognize the importance of space and are improving
their access to space platforms. Worldwide, the availability of space
products and services is accelerating, fueled by proliferation of
advanced satellite technologies, including small satellite systems, and
increased cooperation among states and increased activity by consortia.
These developments provide unprecedented communications, reconnaissance
and targeting capabilities to our adversaries because most space
systems have military as well as civil applications.
closing thoughts
The U.S. faces an assortment of existing and developing challenges,
ranging from growing arsenals of nuclear armed ICBMs, to terrorists
potentially armed with WMD or IO weapons, to insurgents and extremists
attempting to destabilize our most important partners in the global war
on terrorism. At the same time, advances in technology and increasing
globalization have made our job of collection and analysis more
difficult. Further complicating our task is the fact that some of our
most productive and sensitive intelligence collection systems or their
capabilities have been compromised, allowing adversaries to develop
passive and active countermeasures.
My predecessors and I have testified that the Defense Intelligence
threat paradigm, which focused primarily on the military capabilities
of a small set of potential adversarial states no longer addresses the
challenges we face. Traditional concepts of security, threat,
deterrence, intelligence, warning, and superiority are outdated. We
must transform our people, organizations, and capabilities if we are to
meet these new conditions, just as our adversaries pursue new ways to
diminish our strengths.
As I testified last year, the intelligence transformation
initiatives--intended to improve our capability to provide warning,
increase the quality and relevance of our all-source analysis, better
facilitate effects-based campaigns, supply greater insights into
adversaries' intentions, enhance preparation of the intelligence and
operational battle-space and more effectively support homeland
defense--continue to be the centerpiece of my tenure as Director of
DIA. I am particularly enthusiastic about the possibilities of
achieving Persistent Surveillance and Horizontal Integration, and the
fielding of ``state of the practice'' information management tools and
capabilities within Defense Intelligence to improve our ability to
discover information and create knowledge, areas which I will highlight
in my budget testimony later in the year.
The Defense Intelligence community--composed of DIA, Service
intelligence, and the combatant command intelligence capabilities--is
working hard to refine the processes, techniques, and capabilities
necessary to deal with the current threat as well as new and emerging
security challenges and opportunities. As I said at the outset, our
global war continues and has intensified. With your continued support,
I am confident we will supply our warfighters, defense planners and
policymakers with the knowledge they need to successfully execute their
missions.
Chairman Warner. Thank you, Admiral.
We will now proceed to a round of 6 minutes per member.
Director Tenet, I felt you gave a very comprehensive and
pragmatic review of the situation facing Iraq in the 120 days
or less until the turnover of sovereignty to Iraq as scheduled
on July 1. As I look through your statement and study other
sources of information, I think we should receive from you your
best estimate as to what level of probability is it that
significant civil war, civil strife, could break out such that
the turnover of sovereignty just cannot be achieved on July 1?
Mr. Tenet. Sir, I think I would say at this moment that we
see the probability as low. We are very concerned about what
Zarqawi and some of the jihadists are trying to do in
attempting to foment sectarian violence between Sunnis and
Shias. The reaction to the Karbala and Baghdad bombings did not
go that way. People understood, or at least our judgment is
people understand, that the facts on the ground did not lead
people to demonize each community.
So at this moment in time, while we know the jihadists want
to create this kind of situation and perhaps what is left over
of the Baathist insurgent elements may want to do the same, the
political process that has emerged and the apparent intent of
all sectors of this community to participate in this process I
think mitigates it. We have to watch this very carefully,
however. Trends here change very quickly. Today I would say
there is low probability.
In my statement I said that there is the beginning of a
political exchange between elements in the Sunni community who
are organizing themselves in umbrella organizations. That is a
positive development. We need to see how far that develops and
we need to develop it much farther.
They need to believe that they have a stake in this, in an
ultimate outcome. The political process has to go hand in hand
with our ability to make security a better situation, along
with economic reconstruction and putting projects in the Sunni
heartland and employing young men who are standing on the
streets.
So we have a ways to go, and it is a question that we are
going to watch very carefully. But today I would say it is a
low probability, on the basis of everything we know.
Chairman Warner. On July 1, when sovereignty is handed
over, describe as best you can the structure of that government
that will receive it.
Mr. Tenet. Well, we do not know that with any precision at
this moment in time. It may be a Governing Council or an
expanded Governing Council, a broader range of notables. We do
not know the answer to that question today. That is a subject
that Ambassador Bremer and others are dealing with on the
ground. Clearly, the Transitional Administrative Law did not
address that question.
Chairman Warner. Do you wish to add anything further to
that?
Mr. Tenet. No, sir.
Chairman Warner. I think Ambassador Bremer and his team and
the coalition partners deserve a lot of credit for this
Transitional Administrative Law document that was created
against a background of a great deal of dissension. But I hope
that same leadership can prevail on structuring such a group,
presumably a continuation of the current IGC in some form, that
will have credibility within the overall Iraqi people. Do you
think that is achievable?
Mr. Tenet. I think that is what we have to strive for, sir,
particularly in terms of Sunni representation. That credibility
has to be present and I think that is what they are working on.
Chairman Warner. Let me turn to a subject at hand--and I
touched on it in my opening statement--and that is the clear
difference between what we are discovering by virtue of the WMD
program today, to the extent that has been achieved by the
ongoing work of the force we have over there, and we made it
clear that that work is far from complete. But I would like to
have you describe how you view your role in gathering the facts
and the intelligence, preparing the estimates, and how your
role differs from that of a policymaker, be it the President,
Secretary of State, Defense, or others, who take that
intelligence and then extrapolate it in such a way as to make
policy judgments. I find there is a clear difference in those
roles.
Mr. Tenet. Sir, our job is to portray our knowledge and to
make the best judgments we can about what we believe to be in
this context our judgments with regard to Iraq's WMD programs.
Our community gathers and puts together a community document.
It makes key judgments and findings and presents a broader
range of views in the document. Where dissent is created, we
portray that dissent.
In this instance, we obviously said--the key judgments have
been declassified--we said that we believed that they had
chemical and biological weapons. We believed his biological
weapons program had been energized. We believed he was
reconstituting his nuclear program. Most agencies, even the
Department of Energy (DOE), believed that, even though there
was a difference of opinion on the aluminum tubes.
We put this in context. We briefed this to the
policymakers. The policymakers' responsibility at that moment
is to make a determination of how they assess the risks, what
they believe to be their course of action, and we try to give
them the best judgments that we can. Clearly, their
responsibility is making a determination on how to judge they
urgency or the immediacy and what policy solutions they choose
to take. That is not our job.
Chairman Warner. Admiral, your function? Much the same, I
presume?
Admiral Jacoby. Yes, sir.
Chairman Warner. You provide your facts and findings and
assessments basically up through the military channel?
Admiral Jacoby. Sir, actually I join in the Intelligence
Community assessment process and we participate as an agency
that also includes our Service intelligence capabilities and
our theater intelligence capabilities in the process that
Director Tenet just described. I also have responsibilities for
providing direct military intelligence-related information and
support to our decisionmakers inside the Department.
Chairman Warner. That is the DOD?
Admiral Jacoby. Yes, sir. That focuses much more crisply on
specific information to support planning for or military
operations that may be under way.
Chairman Warner. Thank you very much.
Senator Levin.
Senator Levin. Thank you.
You have testified, Director Tenet, that there is a low
risk of civil war between now and July 1 in your judgment. If
there is no consensus on the entity to which sovereignty would
be transferred on July 1, do you believe that there is an
increased risk of civil strife at that time? Second, if there
is no consensus by July 1 on the entity to which sovereignty
would be transferred, do you think it might be wise to consider
delaying that transfer until there is such a consensus?
Mr. Tenet. At this moment I am just speculating. At this
moment I can only say that nothing I see today--I will
reiterate: low probability.
Senator Levin. Even if there is no consensus on July 1?
Mr. Tenet. Well, I was going to go to part two. Obviously,
between now and July 1 the factor that we have to consider is
the security environment, how well we are doing in terms of the
insurgents and the jihadists, whether for example this fellow
Zarqawi--in his letter he says March 1 is the kickoff date; we
have 4 months until this interim authority is transferred. We
have to work very hard to disrupt this.
So there are some indicators, Senator, that between now and
then--I believe that if you had an interim government or
somebody that you could transfer to that was broadly
representative and seen by the Iraqis as a legitimate group of
people, it will mitigate those kind of tendencies and help us
in the security environment.
Senator Levin. Now, my question: If there is no such
consensus on July 1, do you believe that that increases the
likelihood of civil strife?
Mr. Tenet. I simply cannot speculate today. I do not know.
Senator Levin. Thank you.
You and I and many others have talked about the issue of
Iraq seeking uranium from Africa. The CIA told the British in
September 2002 that it questioned the reliability of the
information about that story and urged them not to include it
in the British dossier. Then on October 1 the Intelligence
Community published its classified NIE, now partly
declassified, that included in its text something which is very
different from what you were telling the British. You said:
``Iraq also began vigorously trying to procure uranium ore,
yellowcake.''
Then in early October you personally called Deputy National
Security Adviser Hadley to urge removal of the reference to
Iraq trying to obtain uranium from Africa from the draft
Cincinnati speech of the President on October 7. It was
removed.
The CIA then sent two memos to Mr. Hadley on the same
subject. But on December 19 the State Department issued a fact
sheet referring again to Iraq's efforts to procure uranium from
Africa.
This is the question that I want to ask. On January 20,
President Bush sent a report to Congress. That report states,
and it is with his signature, that the Iraqi declaration failed
to deal with, ``its attempts to acquire uranium.'' So there it
appears in a formal message to Congress, January 20, under the
President's signature. I have asked you before; you did not
know the answer. Do you know now whether or not the CIA
approved that report?
Mr. Tenet. Two parts. No, we did not approve that report.
The second part is, it is also clear that we were wildly
inconsistent in other submissions about this issue.
Senator Levin. All right. The next question: On January 23
the White House issued a report titled, ``What Does Disarmament
Look Like.'' That report states also that: ``The declaration
ignores efforts to procure uranium from abroad.'' Did you
approve that language on January 20, or do you know?
Mr. Tenet. I do not know, sir.
Senator Levin. Thank you. Now, in August 2002 Mr. Feith
briefed you in a classified briefing about Iraq's relationship
to al Qaeda. That briefing was subsequently given to the NSC
and to the Office of the Vice President. When were you aware of
the fact that the briefing that you were given in August 2002
was then given to the Office of the Vice President?
Mr. Tenet. I did not know it at the time, sir. I think I
first learned about this at our hearing last week.
Senator Levin. So last week was the first time you ever
knew that the Feith office was briefing the Office of the Vice
President?
Mr. Tenet. I was unaware of it, sir.
Senator Levin. Then, what was your reaction to that
briefing?
Mr. Tenet. As I told you in our hearing last week, I spent
about 15 minutes with him. I said, thank you for the briefing,
and turned it over to our analysts, who then worked with their
analysts, and did not go any farther than that.
Senator Levin. Do you have any recollection as to whether
that briefing was accurate or not?
Mr. Tenet. I do not have a recollection, sir. I did not
spend a lot of time with it.
Senator Levin. Is it standard operating procedure for
intelligence analysis such as that to be presented at the NSC
and the Office of the Vice President without you being part of
the presentation? Is that typical?
Mr. Tenet. Well, my experience is that people come in and
may present those kinds of briefings on their views of
intelligence. But I have to tell you, Senator, I am the
President's chief intelligence officer. I have the definitive
view about these subjects.
Senator Levin. I know you feel that way.
Mr. Tenet. From my perspective, it is my view that
prevails.
Senator Levin. I am sure you do feel that way, but is that
a normal thing to happen, that there be a formal analysis
relative to intelligence that would be presented to the NSC
without you even knowing about it?
Mr. Tenet. I do not know. I have never been in that
situation. I do not know whether it qualified as analysis or
not. I just do not recall this piece of----
Senator Levin. You recall the briefing?
Mr. Tenet. Vaguely, yes, sir.
Senator Levin. Finally, did you ever discuss with the
Secretary of Defense or other administration officials whether
the DOD Policy Office run by Mr. Feith might be bypassing
normal Intelligence Community channels? Did you ever have any
conversation like that with the Secretary?
Mr. Tenet. I did not. I looked at my records, sir.
Senator Levin. Thank you.
My time is up.
Chairman Warner. I wish to say to Senator Levin and members
of the committee that we requested a copy of that briefing for
the committee. It is now in our possession, in our files,
available to any member to look at.
Senator Levin. Well, Mr. Chairman, just on that matter, I
did request that. It took a long time for Mr. Feith to come
forward with that briefing. It is a slightly different
briefing, I might say, than the one that was presented to the
DCI. I will just have to leave it at that. I will leave out,
because I am not allowed to say since that is still a
classified briefing, a very significant little omission in that
briefing as it was presented to Mr. Tenet compared to the
briefing that was sent to us and was presumably presented to
the Vice President's staff.
Thank you.
Chairman Warner. Senator Roberts.
Senator Roberts. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Admiral Jacoby, the National Defense Authorization Act for
Fiscal Year 2004 called for establishment of incentives for
information leading to the resolution of Captain Scott
Speicher's fate or his case. I understand that some within the
Defense Prisoners of War (POW) Missing in Action (MIA) Office
(DPMO) have some concern about this. I think this argument is
absurd.
As a matter of fact, if you go back over the actions of the
Intelligence Community for the last 5 or 6 years, we have had
to take the analytical capability, put it into law, and make
sure that the Intelligence Community does an assessment in
regard to those that we may leave behind. I would say, with all
due respect to DPMO, not the current people that serve there,
but people crawled out of train wrecks faster than people
responded to Captain Speicher. As far as this Senator is
concerned, their past policy is, if not egregious, almost
reprehensible.
So I would hope that you would keep us posted, as you have
been doing, and that these incentives will be provided to get
us the information we need. Would you care to just say yes?
Admiral Jacoby. Yes, sir, I will, and I also will assure
you, sir, as we have in previous briefings, that we have,
through the ISG efforts in Iraq, not missed any opportunities
in terms of following up information with the authorities that
General Dayton has at his disposal.
Senator Roberts. That effort is aggressive and ongoing?
Admiral Jacoby. It is both aggressive and ongoing, yes,
sir.
Senator Roberts. Mr. Chairman, I have an observation, and
if I go over time I apologize, but not very much. There has
been assertion after assertion that we need an independent
investigation of the prewar intelligence prior to OIF. Senator
Levin has summed up the obvious real concerns that we have on
the Intelligence Committee and this committee in his opening
statement.
The DCI and Admiral Jacoby spent 5 hours with us Thursday
in the Intelligence Committee, and on Friday spent 3 hours with
the House Intelligence Committee. Today you are going to spend
at least 4 hours with this committee and probably a lot more to
come, and that does not count all the hours you have already
spent.
Thursday you had 43 people in the committee room and we
about asphyxiated with all the people that we had in there, and
they represented the entire 14 agency heads of the Intelligence
Community.
Now, I know that there is another report coming from the
President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board (PFIAB). You
have the Kerr Review in regards to the DOD. You have the
Inspector General. You have the CIA taking a look at your
intelligence capabilities. You have the Intelligence Committees
in both the House and the Senate, you have the Appropriations
Committees in both the House and the Senate.
You have now an independent investigation headed up by
Senator Robb, a former colleague of ours who is eminently
qualified, and Judge Silverman. You have all four Services
taking a look at lessons learned on intelligence.
That is 14 either inquiries or probes or investigations.
You have many press partridges in the intelligence pear tree,
starring in the Washington version of ``Lord of the Links'' and
receiving awards from time to time. You have the House and
Senate investigations of the September 11 situation in the last
session. You have an independent investigation that should be
completed in July. You have virtually every armchair expert
with 20/20 hindsight and various conspiracies and axes to
grind. You have 100 Senators and 435 House Members, not to
mention all the individual groups who have a say in this.
Are we splitting the shingle? That is a Dodge City term
where if you hit the shingle about 17 times then you split it.
Is there anybody left down at Langley doing their job?
Mr. Tenet. Sir, I would say that we are spending a lot of
time on it. I know it is important. This is a community that
believes in oversight. With more than one, it gets difficult,
but we will work through it. Obviously, it takes us away from
our work, but it is an important issue and we will do the best
we can.
Senator Roberts. Well, let me recommend another target of
opportunity for us. I think the only thing lacking is an
independent commission to investigate all the independent
commissions and the investigations.
We on the Intelligence Committee--and it is through rather
troubled waters--working on a bipartisan basis, have 310 pages
of our report. We have interviewed over 200 analysts on WMD, on
the links to terrorism, on regional stability, on human rights.
We have added on prewar intelligence on postwar Iraq. We have
added on the quality of the Iraqi National Congress (INC)
intelligence that was provided; the much-discussed DOD
intelligence cell that has just been referred to; and then use
of the intelligence by all government officials. Note, I said
``all government officials,'' not just the Bush administration
but the Clinton administration and all government officials,
and that means Members of Congress, some of whom have been so
critical and so aggressive and so declarative in their
statements that it is hard to figure out how they made the same
kind of statements over about a year ago.
Then we are going to have our draft conclusions this week.
We are going to then go into redaction. Then we are going to be
talking with you to see if we cannot make that report public,
and I hope that we will have it done by April. Basically, I am
extremely hopeful that we can leapfrog the politics in an even-
numbered year, which is probably not possible under the
circumstances, but we are going to give it a hell of a go.
We have a meeting this afternoon on the budget. Now, in the
1990s we really cut the funding in regards to intelligence. We
got to a bathtub. Now, as you well know, we have an awful lot
of money spent on collection, not as much as we need on the
analytical side, in regards to human intelligence. Then you
have to rely on supplementals as opposed to the budget. That is
wrong.
So the House Intelligence Committee and the Senate
Intelligence Committee can make a determined effort to try to
fix that. So consequently, I think we bear part of that
responsibility in regard to our Nation's intelligence efforts
to safeguard our national security.
I am saying this on behalf of the young CIA employees and
officers that we met--Senator Warner, Senator Levin, Senator
Rockefeller, and myself--in Iraq, in Pakistan, in Afghanistan,
and they are second to none. So I am very hopeful that in our
effort to find the truth here and shine the light of truth into
darkness we do not do damage with regards to the esprit de
corps of the Intelligence Community. But we will get our work
done.
I thank you both for the job you are doing.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Warner. Thank you, Senator Roberts.
Senator Kennedy.
Senator Kennedy. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
Director Tenet, in your speech last month at Georgetown you
said the Intelligence Community never said the threat from Iraq
was imminent. You defended the CIA and talked about the
difficulty of obtaining accurate intelligence, but you clearly
put some distance between the intelligence you provided and the
way President Bush used it to justify the war.
The key issue is whether the threat was serious enough and
the intelligence good enough to go to war. The National
Security Advisor said we should not wait for ``the mushroom
cloud.'' The White House Press Office said the threat was
imminent. Vice President Cheney said he was convinced that
Saddam would be acquiring nuclear weapons fairly soon.
President Bush himself may not have used the word ``imminent,''
but he carefully chose strong and loaded words about the
threat, words the Intelligence Community never used.
To prepare the Nation to go to war against Iraq, President
Bush said Saddam was on the verge of acquiring nuclear
capability. He described it as a ``threat of unique urgency,''
``a unique and urgent threat.'' These are all quotes from his
speech in October in the White House Rose Garden, and on
November 20, 2002, before the North Atlantic Treaty
Organization (NATO). I will give you the citations. He
described it as a ``threat of unique urgency,'' ``a unique and
urgent threat,'' ``a grave threat,'' and spoke of a ``mushroom
cloud.''
Did you ever use those words to describe Iraq to the
President?
Mr. Tenet. Sir, I think that the way we described the
threat to the President was, and it is clear in our key
judgments in our NIE, we believed that Saddam Hussein, in
addition to the key judgments we made on expanding his chemical
and biological capability, we believed that he was continuing
his efforts to deceive us and build programs that might
constantly surprise us and threaten our interests.
Senator Kennedy. Did you ever tell him that he was
overstating the case? You see him every other morning. After he
made these statements, did you ever tell him, Mr. President,
you are overstating the case? Did you ever tell Condoleezza
Rice, or did you ever tell the Vice President that they were
overstating the case? If you did not, why not?
Mr. Tenet. Well, Senator, I do the intelligence. They then
take the intelligence and assess the risks and make a policy
judgment about what they think about it. I engage with them
every day. If there are areas where I think someone said
something they should not say, I talk to them about it. There
are instances, obviously, with regard to the State of the Union
speech, where I felt a responsibility to say something that the
President said should not have been in that speech.
But I will tell you that I have now worked on Iraq in
consecutive administrations and I have watched policymakers
take language from intelligence and translate it into language
where they do the risk calculus, they think about what the
policy implications are, and then talk about it in ways that we
may not necessarily talk about it.
Senator Kennedy. Well, when do you feel that they are
misrepresenting it? What is your responsibility? I mean, when
do you say no? You give them the intelligence. You indicated
here that they put the sense of urgency on it. That was the
quote. When you see this intelligence you provide being
misrepresented, misstated, by the highest authorities, when do
you say no?
You cannot have it both ways, can you, Mr. Tenet? You
cannot on the one hand just say, look, we never said that war
was imminent, and then have these superheated dialogues and
rhetoric which is the same as ``imminent'' and tell us here
before the committee that you have no obligation to correct it
or did not even try.
Mr. Tenet. Senator, I can tell you that I am not going to
sit here today and tell you what my interaction was and what I
did or what I did not do, except that you have to have the
confidence to know that when I believed that somebody was
misconstruing intelligence I said something about it. I do not
stand up in public and do it. I do my job the way I did it in
two administrations.
For policymakers, this is a tough row. Policymakers take
data, they interpret threat, they assess risk. They put urgency
behind it, and sometimes it does not uniquely comport with
every word of an intelligence estimate.
Senator Kennedy. Well, Director, I am not talking about
parsing words.
Mr. Tenet. No, sir, I understand that.
Senator Kennedy. We are talking about words that are
basically warmongering. There is a big distinction, I think.
These are semantically the same as an imminent threat. People
understood that. When you talk about a mushroom cloud, how much
more imminent a threat could there be? We are now seeing that
there was no immediate threat, and yet you hear the President,
the Vice President, and the Secretary of Defense using that
superheated rhetoric.
We have to ask, what is your responsibility? When do you
say that this is more than just my interpretation, this is
clearly going beyond the pale? Or do you not feel that way?
Mr. Tenet. Sir, I have a responsibility. I lived up to my
responsibilities. I talk to our policymakers. At the same
time--the context of what we were talking about here--the fact
that in one of our key judgments, whether right or wrong, we
felt and stated there was a lot that we did not know and we
constantly felt that we might be surprised by our lack of
access. There was a history they brought to us. There was use,
there was the relationship with the U.N.
At the end of the day, they made policy judgments and they
talk about things differently.
Senator Kennedy. But do you believe the administration then
misrepresented the facts to justify the war?
Mr. Tenet. No, sir, I do not.
Senator Kennedy. Why not?
Mr. Tenet. In policy judgments, sir, there are places where
I intervened and I clearly talked to you about the State of the
Union Address, or a couple of weeks ago after my Georgetown
speech I talked to the Vice President about the fact that the
mobile biological weapons vans, there was no consensus in our
Intelligence Community. I think I have done my job the same way
in two administrations.
Senator Kennedy. My time is up, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Warner. Thank you very much.
Senator Allard.
Senator Allard. Mr. Chairman, thank you.
No doubt we are in a political year, a presidential
election year. You can tell that from some of the rhetoric. But
I would just make the observation that I have observed rhetoric
that was much stronger, I think, out of Members of the Senate
than out of the President.
Mr. Tenet, I want to commend you on your professionalism. I
think you have done a good job in presenting the facts as a
general rule. I feel like you have been a true professional in
carrying on your duties. I just want to make that part of the
record.
I have heard you give testimony as a member of the
Intelligence Committee, which I no longer serve on, but also
here on the Armed Services Committee. There has been some
criticism about the collection of intelligence, so I want to
say this in a constructive session. I would like to know--and I
know you have had some real challenges with intelligence
because, for one thing, we are dealing with a closed society
and it is very difficult to get individuals in on the ground
that could provide us the information that we need to
supplement what we are getting through our high technology to
collect data.
What is it that we can do to help improve intelligence
gathering? Perhaps maybe you, Mr. Tenet, as well as Vice
Admiral Jacoby could comment on that.
Mr. Tenet. Sir, I think that we have laid out a vigorous
collection program over the last 6 or 7 years that I have been
Director. I would maintain my focus on continuing to rebuild
our human intelligence, continuing to focus on collection
capabilities that allow us to deal with deception and denial. I
think that the budget before you has a very strong emphasis in
precisely the areas that we need to continue to make steady
progress in, particularly in human intelligence and special
collection activities that allow us to defeat deception and
denial.
I know that we have had some significant increases in
intelligence spending over the last 4 years that have allowed
us to get back to a base that I think is healthy, and now we
have to make sure that we continue to move forward while
attracting the best people to our service, because at the end
of the day they are what makes this work. So keeping the eye on
the ball of rebuilding human and real close attack technical
capabilities is what this future is all about, and I think our
budget reflects that.
Senator Allard. Admiral Jacoby.
Admiral Jacoby. Senator, it is clear that we were working
in a situation where we had large gaps of information, whether
it was because of gaps in intelligence coverage or whether it
was because of gaps of human intelligence penetration into
decisionmaking and intentions. So I would ask that we look very
hard at our intelligence collection capabilities and try to
move from a period where we do reconnaissance where there are
gaps in coverage to a situation where we consider our
capabilities as a system of systems and look to achieve
persistence, which is the ability to linger on a problem long
enough to truly understand it.
Human intelligence plays a major role in that, and we need
to be thinking about how we integrate better, so that we do not
put the pressure on the analysts' assessments and analysis to
fill those gaps in coverage.
Senator Allard. Thank you both for your response.
In your testimony, Mr. Tenet, you characterized how much of
the proliferation occurs, and I would like to kind of change
the emphasis as to why that is happening. There are two sides
of the proliferation problem. There is the supply side, and
then there is the demand side. The successes that you have
described based on the intelligence penetration of the supply
chain and the President's proliferation security initiative
coordinates efforts to interdict illicit supply activities.
Could you give us your assessment as to what is fueling the
demand for ballistic missiles, and can we decrease this demand
cross the states of concern? Admiral Jacoby, maybe you would
have a comment on it.
Mr. Tenet. I think, Senator, one of the things--
proliferation begets proliferation. My possession of a
ballistic missile, particularly in a tough neighborhood,
immediately stimulates other countries immediately wanting to
have a similar kind of capability. The Iranians have a Shahab-
3. The Near East is a part of the world where ballistic missile
capability continues to grow. People acquire it.
The complicating piece of this in the proliferation arena,
but particularly in the nuclear arena, where we highlight a man
like A.Q. Khan, is that the nation-state used to be the sole
purveyor of technology and today networks of loosely affiliated
individuals, who may not have an affiliation formally with a
nation-state, are now providing technology and components and
the wherewithal and a one-stop shopping mechanism that has
complicated our life.
But the truth is, the more of it you see, the more other
countries want to acquire it and be in the position to have an
equal capability. Then it leads you to weaponization, it leads
you down a different path that causes so much concern. The
inherent problems with covering dual-use industries that are
compatible with chemical and biological industries and weapons
make the job a lot tougher.
So the continuum has to start at the front end. As you go
down the right-hand side of the ledger, interdiction is a very
important piece, but we have to work quite hard to stop these
networks and countries from giving up this technology.
Senator Allard. Admiral Jacoby.
Admiral Jacoby. Sir, I would agree totally with sort of
the, if you want to use the term, regional arms race, where it
is your neighbor's capabilities and an escalating kind of
situation. But we also need to be aware of the fact that
proliferation of WMD is a mechanism for gaining influence, too,
and that is a North Korea type scenario.
So we have both of those situations. I think we need to be
very precise in looking at the motivations, the factors behind
them, in trying to address those motivations and factors as we
go.
Senator Allard. Just one more question. What is the
prospect that North Korea, Iran, Syria, and others would follow
Libya's lead and volunteer to divest their ballistic missile
weapons?
Mr. Tenet. Low likelihood at this point, I would say, sir.
It is a good example, but I do not know that others will follow
their lead.
Senator Allard. Admiral Jacoby.
Admiral Jacoby. I agree totally, sir.
Senator Allard [presiding]. I see that the chairman has
left, so I am now going to temporarily chair the committee.
Senator Akaka is next.
Senator Akaka. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Chairman, I want to commend the CIA for the tremendous
job it did in ending Libya's WMD program and uncovering A.Q.
Khan's nuclear smuggling network. That was a great effort by
the CIA.
My question to you concerns the seriousness of the
Pakistani government in ending Khan's activities. You give
Prime Minister Musharraf good grades, and Pakistan has worked
pretty well with us. But, coming back to Khan's activities, I
know he has confessed and he has been pardoned. Did the
government impose any penalties on him? For example, does he
still own his million dollar homes? Also, have we been given
access to his interrogation reports, including his confession?
Mr. Tenet. Senator, let me just say that President
Musharraf has been very cooperative in this regard. I would
prefer to talk about some of those questions in closed session.
Senator Akaka. Thank you.
Director Tenet, a lot of questions have been raised about
the quality of our intelligence relating to Iraq's WMD and also
as to whether or not Iraq's WMD was an imminent threat. I do
not want to get into those questions. They have been pretty
well covered already. But I do want to ask you if the NIE on
Iraq produced in October 2002 was substantially different in
its conclusions from the Intelligence Community document
produced in the year 2000?
Mr. Tenet. Sir, we can provide for the record the evolution
of all of our judgments over the course of the last 10 years.
Off the top of my head, I just do not have an answer, but I
will provide that for the record. I think the committee may
have that, but we have been writing about Iraq for 10 years.
There were some things in this estimate and data that we
acquired that pushed us in some directions on specific things,
but I will provide that to you.
[The information referred to follows:]
Mr. Tenet did not respond in time for printing. When received,
answer will be retained in committee files.
Senator Akaka. News reports suggest that the Pakistani army
is engaged as never before in the search for Osama bin Laden
inside Pakistan. The Pakistani Intelligence Service has a long
history of operating with a different agenda than that declared
by the government. The Pakistani military has often been
reluctant to go into the tribal areas where we suspect
terrorists are hiding.
My question to you is, are you satisfied with the Pakistani
counterterrorism strategy and this latest effort to get Osama
bin Laden? If not, what causes you concern?
Mr. Tenet. Let me say this. I am very satisfied with what
the Pakistanis are doing in the counterterrorism strategy. I do
not think it is appropriate to talk about bin Laden or things
that have been in the media. We should not be talking about
those things, sir. We can talk about this in closed session,
but I do not think it is appropriate in open session.
But the Pakistani government and President Musharraf have
been a key ally against al Qaeda and the gains there have been
substantial in terms of our ability to accomplish some of the
objectives that I talked about in my statement.
Chairman Warner. Senator, may I interrupt to say that we
will have a closed session following this open session in room
SH-219.
Senator Akaka. Admiral Jacoby, I have some questions about
the situation in Iraq and Afghanistan that I hope you can
respond to briefly. Senator Levin has raised in the past
concerns about the weapons depot sites in Iraq. I wonder if you
could tell me, how secure do those sites remain? Have there
been any substantial thefts from them?
We have heard a lot about trends in violence in Iraq and
how most of those attacks have been concentrated in the Sunni
triangle. Can you tell us if there has been an increase or
decrease in the number of attacks in the southern part of Iraq?
Admiral Jacoby. Senator, let me take the second question
first. The situation in the south has been basically unchanged
over the last 3 or 4 months--quite stable, with very small
numbers of attacks. Frankly, what is happening in many areas of
the south is that the population is coming forward, identifying
troublemakers and problems before they have a chance to act,
and the coalition is able to take preemptive action against
them.
For the question about the weapons storage areas, sir, we
have a broad range of situations. We have some storage areas
that remain intact and are guarded. There are storage areas
that were looted prior to our arrival. I believe General
Abizaid has characterized, maybe even to this committee, the
large number of weapons storage areas, many of them in
dispersed areas and very poorly maintained by the Saddam
regime. These remain a major problem. Just the volume and the
dispersion of those weapons by itself is an issue, sir.
Senator Akaka. What about northern Iraq? In northern Iraq,
where the Kurds dominate, what is the situation? Has there been
an increase or decrease in violence against the Turkoman
minority?
Admiral Jacoby. Senator, there is nothing that is notable
in terms of trends. The situation in the north remains
basically stable and there have not been sort of targeted
attacks on portions of the population in that area.
Senator Akaka. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Warner. Thank you, Senator.
Senator Dole.
Senator Dole. Gentlemen, I appreciate the immense
challenges the Intelligence Community must overcome to provide
accurate and timely intelligence estimates. Our potential
enemies attempt to conceal their capabilities and deny the very
threats they pose to American interests. Your work, starting
with the collection of raw information, followed by its
analysis and fusion into a useful intelligence estimate, is
truly an art form. I commend the Intelligence Community for its
excellent work and recent successes. These actions can only
help make the world a safer place.
From your remarks I understand that intelligence
collection, which has always been difficult against closed and
highly secretive societies, is even more difficult and complex
now than at any time in the past. This is a primary factor
driving what you, Director Tenet, stated in your February 5
speech at Georgetown University: In the intelligence business
you are almost never completely wrong or completely right.
With respect to intelligence collection, does the
President's budget adequately resource the Intelligence
Community to maintain a broad situational awareness while also
quickly generating the needed intelligence on multiple security
issues?
Mr. Tenet. Yes, Senator Dole, I believe it does.
Senator Dole. Today we are here to receive testimony on
current and future threats to the national security of the
United States. Unfortunately, much of the current intelligence
debate surrounds our prewar intelligence on Iraq and whether we
were right or wrong. Director Tenet, I support your efforts as
well as the other inquiries which are examining what our
Intelligence Community told policymakers compared to what they
knew and did not know at the time.
The work of the ISG is essential towards this end. Given
the amount of work still ahead for the ISG, is it premature to
make absolute statements of how right or wrong our prewar
intelligence estimates were?
Mr. Tenet. I think it is too early to make judgments,
Senator Dole. I think if you look at the interim report that we
got in October, and particularly in the biological weapons area
where Dr. Kay talked about clandestine research facilities,
human testing facilities, things that were denied to the United
Nations, certainly in the missile area what we found--and I
said in my Georgetown speech, on missiles our estimate was
generally on target, and Dr. Kay confirmed that.
We have made less progress in the chemical area. That
surprises me. But I think that we are operating in an
environment where we have a good strategic approach. The
security environment is difficult. The Iraqis are going to have
to help us, and I think that Charlie Duelfer, my new special
assistant, will be coming forward at the end of the month and
he will make a determination about how much time we need.
But at this moment I would argue for patience to allow
these men and women to do their work. It is important for a
number of reasons. We want to know whether we were right or
wrong. We want to know what the disposition of these programs
were. We do need to understand whether there was any secondary
proliferation, which would be of great concern to us.
So some patience is required here, and I think the country
will be well served.
Senator Dole. Thank you.
Our intelligence agencies have been accused of dismissing
reports from Iraqi scientists, defectors, and other informants
who said Saddam Hussein's government did not possess
unconventional weapons. It is understandable that our agencies
must filter reports from human intelligence sources and
scrutinize those that lack sufficient credibility or originate
from sources with questionable motivations. Recently the
Intelligence Community was accused of dismissing some human
intelligence because it did not conform to widely held beliefs
within the administration and Intelligence Community that Iraq
had illicit weapons programs.
Were either of you under any pressure in any way to filter
intelligence prior to the war in Iraq?
Mr. Tenet. No, ma'am.
Senator Dole. Admiral Jacoby.
Admiral Jacoby. No, ma'am, I was not.
Senator Dole. Would you please clarify how our intelligence
agencies handled human intelligence reports?
Mr. Tenet. Well, Senator, in open session I will say that
we attempt to validate, corroborate, and seek other sources of
data, carefully evaluate what access the individual has in
question, and then try and test the proposition through other
collection means. So we never take anything at face value.
Over the course of time, just because somebody was accurate
last year does not mean they continue to be accurate. So the
vetting and constant testing of access and reliability is built
into how we do our work and our professional ethic.
Senator Dole. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Warner. Thank you very much, Senator.
Senator Lieberman.
Senator Lieberman. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Thank you, Director Tenet, Admiral Jacoby.
The questions that have been raised about the state of our
pre-Iraq war intelligence and what the administration did with
it are significant questions, but it does seem to me that it is
critically important for all of us, both parties, particularly
in this election year, not to let the pursuit of answers to
those questions distract us from the immediate pressing
challenges to our security that are occurring in Iraq, where
momentous judgments will be made, as you have testified to, in
the next several months, the exact same time period during
which the election campaign here will be held; that those
questions about prewar intelligence, important as they are, not
distract us from focusing on the kinds of current threats to
our security that you both have outlined in your testimony
before us today.
I want my questions to focus on those. You said, Mr. Tenet,
on page 5 of your prepared testimony, unclassified: ``Mr.
Chairman, I have consistently warned this committee about al
Qaeda's interest in CBRN weapons. Acquiring these remains a
religious obligation in bin Laden's eyes, and al Qaeda and more
than two dozen other terrorist groups are pursuing CBRN
materials. We particularly see a heightened risk of poison
attacks. Contemplated delivery methods to date have been
simple, but this may change as non-al Qaeda groups share
information on more sophisticated methods and tactics.''
That is very chilling stuff. I want to ask you first, where
are al Qaeda and these other groups pursuing this CBRN
capability?
Mr. Tenet. Senator, let me tell you, if you think about a
network of individuals who mix scientists, the technical know-
how, the search for material, you find that these networks
stretch from the Near East to Europe, and we find them in very
specific compartmented lines, low end to high end, with common
facilitators, training--low end, things they learned in
Afghanistan. We know that from chemical and biological manuals.
Then what we carefully try to look for is seepage of material,
access to scientists.
This network that I am talking about, whether I am talking
about anthrax or radiological materials, has all of these.
These networks have all of these elements. So the concern that
we have is high end, high impact capability. We know that this
group continues in its quest for spectacular attacks against
the United States or our allies, and the CBRN route obviously
provides you with that kind of high end.
They have technical expertise, they have money, and they
proceed apace in seeking to acquire this capability. We can
talk about it a little bit more in closed session, but this is
my highest worry. I am as worried about how much we know as how
much we do not see. So we are working quite diligently on this,
but this is I think a very difficult and important issue for
the future and our understanding and our action.
Senator Lieberman. Let me ask this question. In prefacing
it, I mention that last week General Abizaid appeared before
this committee and we asked him, someone on the committee asked
him, what are the major needs that he has, what are the
greatest lessons learned at this point from our involvement in
OIF. He said that they needed greater intelligence.
I would invite you to respond to this. As you face these
threats--you described the threat from al Qaeda and the more
than two dozen other terrorist groups seeking CBRN weapons--and
now having been--and I will allow you to correct me on this--
somewhat surprised by the revelation of the A.Q. Khan network,
which we found through Libyan cooperation with us----
Mr. Tenet. No.
Senator Lieberman. --do you feel that you have adequate
support and systems to penetrate the enemy here, both the
worldwide terrorist network and the terrorist insurgent enemy
that our troops and coalition partners are facing in Iraq? The
Pentagon comes before us with supplemental requests.
Mr. Tenet. I do too.
Senator Lieberman. You do too. So do you have what you need
to fill the gaps that we are finding in what we know about this
enemy?
Mr. Tenet. Senator, I would say--and part of this enemy, by
the way, this fellow Zarqawi, he is part of this enemy because
he is involved in low end poisons plotting and he is inside
Iraq. I would say that from our perspective, we have walled off
and protected terrorism, proliferation, and Iraq as major
pieces of our intelligence focus and effort. So the key thing
for me is sustaining and maintaining high-quality people to
take these assignments. But in those areas we have intense
focus and enormous resource allocation.
If you were to ask me what suffers from all that, well,
global coverage in other parts of the world probably will
suffer, because these are our highest priorities and on
terrorism we cannot afford to move anything but forward and
more aggressively constantly because of what we face. Success
begets an unknown and new people pop up, these networks that I
am talking to you about, particularly networks that are
springing up as you flatten the pyramid organization and
migrate networks throughout the world.
So we are still dealing with it. I see this same issue part
and parcel. You have Ansar al Islam, Zarqawi, terrorists. Jihad
in Iraq should not be separated from jihad in Iran and Kenya
and other places. It is all part of the same network.
So I think we would say the people and focus are there.
Sustainability, continuing to be able to operate and bring the
best people up there constantly, is a challenge for us. But we
are committed to it.
Senator Lieberman. So you have what you need for now?
Mr. Tenet. Sir, we will be back no doubt for a
supplemental. There is no doubt about that.
Senator Lieberman. Admiral Jacoby, I know my time is up,
but from a DIA point of view how would you respond to General
Abizaid's statement--I believe I am doing it justice--that
there is a need for improved intelligence to help him
successfully prosecute on behalf of the coalition?
Mr. Tenet. Sir, can I take a shot at that first?
Senator Lieberman. Sure.
Mr. Tenet. Look at the front end. When we first got on the
ground, what became key to us was our ability to penetrate and
operate in these local areas, and our military has exquisite
knowledge of these local areas. What we have done over time is
increase our understanding of organization, people, and
individuals. What General Abizaid needs is more human and
technical understanding of how these people operate, and we are
getting better all the time and it is just an insatiable
appetite, that is correct. We have to fill it.
Admiral Jacoby. Senator Lieberman, the other piece of it is
intelligence embedded in our military services. General
Abizaid's need right now is for people in his brigades and
divisions that have the cultural, language, whatever skills
that it takes to be able to penetrate at the local level,
understand intentions, dynamics, and plans for attacks on his
forces.
Sir, we are not where we need to be on the tactical level
with those kind of capabilities and so there is an issue there
for us to be able to rebuild back into our service structure
tactical human intelligence, tactical counterintelligence, some
of the other things that allow him to deal with those issues.
Senator Lieberman. Thank you both very much.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Warner. Thank you, Senator.
Senator Sessions.
Senator Sessions. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Tenet and Admiral Jacoby, we appreciate your service. I
recently had, Mr. Tenet, the opportunity to talk to a young
woman employed by the CIA who had volunteered to spend time in
Iraq. She tells me that 15 hours a day, 6 days a week, they are
working. I know Defense Intelligence is also--there is an
intense understanding that the gathering and assimilating and
understanding intelligence saves lives of American soldiers. It
can eliminate threats on our homeland by your people.
I want to say, I appreciate what they do. They are serving
America just as certainly as those who wear the uniform are
serving America. In the course of our complaints and second-
guessing and roarings about how we can do better, we ought not
to in any way forget the valuable contribution that the
personnel that you supervise are providing our country.
We also need to be appreciative of the fact that we have
gone further than most of us ever thought possible without
another homeland attack. That is a fact that is something to
celebrate. We know that any day something can happen. It
worries us all. I know it concerns you. But we have had that
success.
A number of things have been brought to my mind as to what
we can do better post-September 11 about our intelligence
agencies and work. Number one, I will ask the both of you
briefly: Is there better coordination between the agencies? Is
there better coordination, and have the changes that I
understood you were making that would allow the FBI, CIA, and
DIA and other agencies to share information more effectively,
are those working?
Mr. Tenet. Yes, sir. I think that the creation of the
Terrorist Threat Integration Center (TTIC) has proceeded apace.
We now have DIA, CIA, and FBI personnel and 14 integrated
databases sitting in one place. We have one institution that
has primary responsibility for the writing and identifying the
foreign and domestic threat. There is a seamless interaction in
the analytic piece with both the CIA and the FBI operators.
Is there still room for improvement? Yes, there is. Are we
in a much better place than we were 2 years ago? Absolutely. I
think that this TTIC and the new information architectures and
sharing architectures that we are bringing to bear and the
collaboration it is fostering analytically is a major
improvement over where we were a number of years ago.
Admiral Jacoby. Senator, from our standpoint, besides what
the Director talked to, the interaction between my agency with
the Department of Homeland Security (DHS), FBI, access
particularly to the National Security Agency's (NSA) data, and
our direct involvement with the U.S. Northern Command
(NORTHCOM) out in Colorado Springs as the defense component in
the security structure, all of those are new capabilities that
are in place and they are all growing and being strengthened.
Senator Sessions. One of the things, Mr. Tenet, I think
that we perhaps have not thought enough about is the
significance of Pakistan's decision when the President
challenged Pakistan and urged Pakistan to place its future with
peaceful nations and not terrorist nations. Their intelligence
network had been criticized as being too friendly to some of
these entities.
What is your evaluation, briefly, of the progress we made
in the war against terrorism by Pakistan's choosing to be
cooperative?
Mr. Tenet. I would say, Senator, that it is one of the
dramatic strategic shifts that have occurred since September 11
that have allowed us to be successful against a great number of
al Qaeda operatives. So you watch the ledger carefully and you
watch all of this, but, quite frankly, Pakistani cooperation
with us has been absolutely instrumental.
Senator Sessions. I think your agency deserves credit for
helping make that come about. With regard to A.Q. Khan and the
nuclear proliferation, we have talked about nuclear
proliferation for decades in this country. Now we find out that
in fact, while we were talking about it, we were proliferating
from Pakistan to North Korea to Libya to Iran to Iraq, and that
has ended, it appears.
Mr. Tenet. Sir, there is no evidence of A.Q. Khan's
relationship to the Iraqis.
Senator Sessions. Those connections have ended with this
renunciation by Pakistan and A.Q. Khan?
Mr. Tenet. Well, sir, without going into it in open
session, there is a lot more in terms of what we did to this
network around the world that gives us great comfort that we
have done a pretty good job here. There are still some things
we have to work on, but let me just leave it at that.
Senator Sessions. All right. I think we can conclude at
least that part of the network, if his confession is correct,
has been significant and that Libya has now renounced that. Do
you see significance in Iran's willingness to allow the U.N.
inspectors to come in on the nuclear question? Could you
evaluate that for us?
Mr. Tenet. As I said in my statement, there is good news
and bad news. The good news is that the Iranians maintain that
there is a low enrichment program there and nothing more. The
bad news is that they may also be attempting to conceal
something that is worrisome to us. To go from a low yield to a
higher yield of uranium enrichment, technically is not very
difficult, and from a red line perspective our understanding of
it may be difficult.
But look, disclosure is a good thing and we ought to work
with it, keep our eye on it, keep our eye on the data and see
where it takes us.
Senator Sessions. Well, all in all I think there have been
a number of things of significance that have been accomplished.
I think General Petraeus, our commander of the 101st Airborne
in Mosul, said recently that you cannot just put a stake in the
heart of terrorism. There is not one heart that you can stick
it in that is going to solve this problem once and for all. It
will be a long-term struggle and battle.
Thank you for what you do. I believe we have made progress.
I think there is more progress to be made.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Warner. Thank you, Senator.
Senator Clinton.
Senator Clinton. Thank you very much. I apologize, my voice
is terrible.
I thank both of you for your service. I think the real crux
of the questions comes down to, number one, our support for
your efforts, our understanding of their vitality to our well-
being, and yet at the same time legitimate questions about our
capacity and about the use of intelligence.
I have been troubled in the last couple of days by comments
coming from certain sources about whether or not the Iraqi
defectors were providing accurate information. Admiral Jacoby,
I understand from news reports that the DIA has concluded that
almost all the claims made by Iraqi defectors about Saddam
Hussein's alleged secret weapons were either useless or false.
What is your view of the intelligence on WMD provided by Iraqi
defectors?
Admiral Jacoby. Senator Clinton, we could go into detail in
closed session. In open session, I would tell you that that
news report does not accurately reflect reality. In our
opinion, there are some situations where the information has
been verified and corroborated through multiple sources. There
have been other situations where we believe that information
was either fabricated or embellished.
It is a situation that we have in other human intelligence
operations where the information spans a pretty broad range of
veracity and we need to go into the situation, very much like
we do in any human intelligence situation, with our eyes wide
open, looking to verify, confirm, and continue to do that even
as we work with various sources.
Senator Clinton. Do you know if any defectors with whom you
and your agency dealt with also were given an audience with and
worked with Assistant Secretary Feith's Office of Special
Plans?
Admiral Jacoby. Senator Clinton, I have no knowledge of
that.
Senator Clinton. You just do not know?
Admiral Jacoby. I just do not know, I am sorry, just to
make sure I am clear.
Senator Clinton. Director Tenet, this week on ``60
Minutes'' Ahmed Chalabi stated that he wants to come and
testify before the Senate Intelligence Committee in open
session. I, for one, think that is an invitation we ought to
accept. He accused U.S. intelligence of making bad use of the
defectors that he steered to us. Specifically, in referencing
U.S. intelligence Chalabi said, ``I mean the people, the
intelligence people, who are supposed to do a better job for
their country and their government did not do such a good
job.''
How do you respond to Mr. Chalabi's statement?
Mr. Tenet. Well, Mr. Chalabi is an interesting man. He has
an interesting history and I think hearing him would be
interesting. I guess I do not have much of a response to it,
Senator. We will just leave it at that.
Senator Clinton. Also on that program it was disclosed that
we, I guess meaning the United States Government, I assume
through the CIA, is continuing to pay the Iraqi Congress
$350,000 a month.
Mr. Tenet. We are not paying them.
Senator Clinton. Admiral, are you paying them?
Admiral Jacoby. Senator, you have me in a situation where
this would be best dealt with in closed session. I could give
you details.
Senator Clinton. Director Tenet, with respect to Zarqawi,
who I think you have rightly identified as one of our most
dangerous enemies currently, there was a recent report on NBC
News in June 2002 that reported U.S. officials say intelligence
had revealed that Zarqawi and members of al Qaeda had set up a
weapons lab in northern Iraq producing ricin and cyanide and
that the Pentagon quickly drafted plans to attack that camp
with cruise missiles and air strikes and sent it to the White
House, where, according to U.S. Government sources, the plan
was debated to death in the NSC.
Four months later, intelligence showed Zarqawi was planning
to use ricin in terrorist attacks in Europe. Again, the
Pentagon drew up a second strike plan and the White House again
killed it.
Did we miss an opportunity to get Zarqawi?
Mr. Tenet. I read the same newspaper report. I do not know
that Zarqawi was up there at the time, Senator. I do not know
that the report accurately reflects the give and take of the
decisionmaking at the time. So I will just leave it at that in
open session.
Senator Clinton. Also, with respect to this continuing
question about the quality of intelligence--and I do think
that, frankly, the people we should be talking to in closed,
open, or any session are the people who are the policymakers,
because I think you have made very clear what you have tried to
do with respect to providing intelligence. But I was struck by
a comment by Mr. Kay that was reported in the British newspaper
The Guardian last Wednesday. Mr. Kay said, it was time ``for
President Bush to come clean with the American people and admit
that he and his administration were wrong about the presence of
WMD.''
Dr. Kay went on to say that he was worried that our
intelligence would lose credibility, not only among our allies,
but I would assume among others as well, and concluded by
saying: ``The next time you have to go and shout there is fire
in a theater, people are going to doubt it.''
I do not think any of us on this committee doubt the
seriousness of the attacks we face and I am personally very
grateful and impressed with all the work that has gone on to
roll up networks and diminish their effectiveness. But it is a
legitimate point that Dr. Kay makes, that if we are going to be
waging an ongoing struggle against terrorism it is clear that
we have to rely on intelligence and we have to persuade others
of the intelligence.
Do you have a response to Dr. Kay's comment?
Mr. Tenet. Yes. I would say, Senator, first of all, whether
we are wrong or right is an important professional judgment for
us to reach. That is why we are going through all of this. I
would say that we are not--and I have said publicly--we are not
going to be all wrong or all right. We have to critically--and
we are and the committees are--assess every bit of intelligence
that we have collected, what our shortfalls were.
I tried to get up in a public statement at Georgetown and
basically say, here is my bottom line today, here is what I
think was good, here is what I think did not work so well, here
is where I think we are in all of these major issues. There is
no other community of people that take this as seriously as we
do. Our credibility matters. It matters on terrorism and
proliferation and other issues.
So open, honest debate, telling the truth, standing up when
we come to conclusions, is what we are about in this country.
Many of our allied services, quite frankly, saw this the same
way as we saw it. We were all playing off the same sheet music.
Well, that is just not good enough. In this society we have to
give people the confidence that we know what we are doing.
If we were in error, we have to be willing to stand up and
say so. The only thing I say is, I think that the men and women
on the ground in Baghdad who work at the ISG, who I visited 2
or 3 weeks ago, do not believe their job is done. They still
think they have a lot of work to do, and I think we need some
patience to find out the additional data that they will give
us, and we will report it honestly.
Senator Clinton. Thank you.
Chairman Warner. Thank you very much, Senator.
Senator Chambliss.
Senator Chambliss. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
I intended to really get into something else, but because
of the line of questioning of Senator Levin and Senator
Kennedy, Director Tenet, I want to make sure that we have
something perfectly clear in the record. As DCI, you are the
person responsible for providing the President of the United
States with the intelligence that has been gathered relative to
any threat to America; is that correct?
Mr. Tenet. Yes, sir, that is correct.
Senator Chambliss. You provide the President with a
briefing on a daily basis relative to the information that has
been gathered under your direction, the analysis of that
information, and the correctness or your best judgment as to
that information; is that correct?
Mr. Tenet. I do.
Senator Chambliss. Now, by comparison, you say you do this
on a daily basis, and this is George Tenet, the Director of the
CIA, giving that briefing; is that correct?
Mr. Tenet. That is correct, along with the briefer.
Senator Chambliss. By comparison, did you provide that same
type of daily briefing to President Clinton?
Mr. Tenet. No. The former president took his daily briefing
and read it and provided us extensive comments. He was a
reader. He took his daily briefing differently. Different
styles for different people. But he was very responsive to us
and wrote us a lot of questions and certainly was steeped in
what we wrote to him.
Senator Chambliss. By the same token, he received daily
briefings just the same as you are giving this President?
Mr. Tenet. Yes, sir.
Senator Chambliss. Just in a different form?
Mr. Tenet. Yes, sir.
Senator Chambliss. Now, in October 2002 a document called
the NIE, a declassified copy of which I hold in my hand, was
prepared by you or under your direction; is that correct?
Mr. Tenet. Yes, sir.
Senator Chambliss. At the time that document was prepared,
did you feel that all the statements in that document were true
and accurate?
Mr. Tenet. Sir, our community coordinated on this and our
community's best judgment was these were our best judgments.
This is what we believed to be true.
Senator Chambliss. Was there anything in that document that
was intended to be or was in your opinion misleading or
inaccurate?
Mr. Tenet. Well, no, sir. At the time we wrote the document
I thought we wrote an accurate document. We have since been
providing our oversight committees--we have gone back and shown
them places where we think we could have been more technically
correct. Obviously, now that we are on the ground in Baghdad
and finding things out, we are reevaluating the document from
that perspective as well.
Senator Chambliss. I do not want to read the whole
document, but I want to read the first sentence under ``Key
Judgments,'' which is the first paragraph: ``Iraq has continued
its weapons of mass destruction programs in defiance of U.N.
resolutions and restrictions. Baghdad has chemical and
biological weapons, as well as missiles with ranges in excess
of U.N. restrictions. If left unchecked, it will probably have
a nuclear weapon during this decade.''
On that same page, under the section of ``Nuclear
Weapons,'' this document says: ``If Baghdad acquires sufficient
weapons-grade fissile material from abroad, it could make a
nuclear weapon within a year.''
Again, at the time that document was prepared in October
2002 you felt like those facts were true and accurate; is that
right?
Mr. Tenet. Yes, sir.
Senator Chambliss. Intelligence is an ongoing process, is
it not? You gather something today, it may change down the
road. I think you adequately expressed that.
Was this the information that you, George Tenet, as
Director of the CIA, passed on to the President of the United
States on a regular daily basis?
Mr. Tenet. Yes, it was.
Senator Chambliss. Now, I want to move on to something
else. Following September 11--this I direct to both of you.
Following September 11 there were a number of deficiencies that
were pointed out to exist within the Intelligence Community.
Just highlighting a couple of these, there were problems in
gathering intelligence. We know we had some deficiencies on the
human side. We know that there was a lack of linguists to be
used in interpreting or immediately finding out what exactly
the messages were that we were intercepting.
We know there was a shortage of analysts, and both of you
know that I was primarily concerned with the problem regarding
information-sharing between our intelligence agencies.
Now, to each of you: In the period from September 11--or
leading up to September 11--to the time that we engaged in the
conflict in Iraq, what changes were made in your respective
agencies relative to these deficiencies in the Intelligence
Community, and how did that benefit you in providing
information relative to WMD in Iraq?
Mr. Tenet. Well, sir, in each of the areas, on the human
intelligence front I think we would say, without going very far
here, that we have made important strides in penetrating
terrorist organizations. I would say, with regard to linguists,
this is still a problem for the Intelligence Community. We all
have programs in place to recruit, train, and increase language
programs. This is a tough nut. We are still not where we need
to be on languages, although we are working quite hard at it.
In terms of a shortage of analysts, we are in better shape
today than we were 2 years ago, sir. But we still have--and it
is reflected in the President's budget request--a significant
augmentation of analysts over the next 5 years. We need more
people to do these jobs. On information-sharing, I would say,
as we described previously, we are in better shape than we
were. TTIC, information-sharing, integration with the FBI, as
Admiral Jacoby has said, all that is in better shape. There is
still a ways to go, to be sure, particularly with connectivity
with States and locals and pushing data out to the rest of the
country. That is a homeland security responsibility. But I
think in all of these areas we are in better shape.
Admiral Jacoby. Senator, I join the DCI on the human
intelligence comments. On linguists, we are for the first time
probably in DIA's history in a situation where we can hire
significant numbers of analysts. It is the beginning of the
turnover of the people coming to retirement age and growth and
so forth.
I am very heartened by not only the number of people that
we are attracting to the DIA, but the breadth of language
skills and depth of the language skills in some of what we call
the low density languages that are so important for the world
of today and the world of the future--young people who have
lived overseas, maybe studied overseas, and have near-native
skills. So I think we are in a situation here where we are
seeing a far quicker improvement than I might have anticipated.
Our analyst growth since September 11 basically has been in
the counterterrorism area. We took a view that we are in this
for the long haul and we are hiring and developing analysts
with that kind of view. We are right on track and I am very
heartened by the skills and capabilities that we have in people
that we brought on board as part of that program.
However, we have had very little growth except for specific
targeted growth in analytical skills and other areas. For
instance, you might know we targeted China for growth. Well,
there are other areas that you will see in our request to do
the same kind of targeting long-term, to focus growth in other
areas.
In the information-sharing area, things are significantly
improved, and I continue to push very hard personally and as
the head of Defense Intelligence for the application of modern
information management techniques that will allow us to work,
our analysts to work much better in that large mass of data
than the way we have information organized today.
So I would offer that as an area that needs to be folded
into the information-sharing discussion. It is a place where we
can leap forward very quickly, I believe.
Senator Chambliss. Mr. Chairman, I know my time has
expired, but if I could take 30 seconds just to say to these
gentlemen, and I said it in closed session the other day in the
Intelligence Committee: We criticize you all the time and that
is part of our job, to do oversight. But when you do something
right, we tend not to commend you. Based upon the work that you
have done in improving each of your respective agencies over
the last almost 2\1/2\ years now, I guess, since September 11,
as well as the work that you have done before, the job that you
did in providing intelligence, gathering intelligence,
analyzing it and putting boots on the ground to capture Saddam
Hussein, it shows how far our intelligence agencies have come.
I commend both of you for working very closely together, as I
know you did in that exercise, to make sure that your plan came
together exactly as it was devised.
So thank you for the job that you are doing.
Chairman Warner. Thank you very much, Senator.
Senator Reed.
Senator Reed. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Tenet, I want to pick up on a line of questioning the
chairman started and Senator Kennedy also amplified about your
role as you perceive it. Do you believe that when there is a
disagreement among intelligence agencies or analysts, which is
often the case, that the administration can pick whatever
opinion they think is most convenient and that you have no
public obligation to correct that view?
This is particularly, I think, interesting in the context
of many statements the Vice President made on ``Meet the
Press'' in March 2003: ``We believe he has in fact
reconstituted nuclear weapons.'' I do not know if that factual
conclusion had been reached by an intelligence agency. ``Meet
the Press'' in 2002: ``We do know with absolute certainty that
he is using his procurement system to acquire the equipment he
needs in order to enrich uranium, to build a nuclear weapon.
With absolute certainty.''
What is your role?
Mr. Tenet. Sir, my role is to report the intelligence, and
if I think a senior policymaker has strayed, assuming that I am
listening to everything that everybody says, which I do not do,
I will go in and talk to them about what we think, the
divisions of opinion, how this is more correctly stated, and
leave it at that. That is my job.
Senator Reed. So I presume you watch ``Meet the Press''?
Mr. Tenet. Well, I usually do not, sir.
Senator Reed. Well, Tim Russert is disappointed.
Did you correct the Vice President's statement privately?
Mr. Tenet. I do not know that I did in this instance. I do
not know that I listened to it or was made aware of it.
Senator Reed. So no one made you aware that the Vice
President of the United States said that with absolute
certainty we know that Iraq is reconstituting its weapons
procurement system at least; and then, right before military
operations, said as a fact they have reconstituted their
nuclear weapons?
You were not aware of that?
Mr. Tenet. Our NIE did say that he is reconstituting his
nuclear program.
Senator Reed. As a fact.
Mr. Tenet. We said in our ``Key Judgments'' that he is
reconstituting.
Senator Reed. Well, the opinion again of the State
Department Bureau of Intelligence Research (INR) in October
2002 was that this was not entirely factually confirmed. But
also, I think just that week it appeared that the IAEA had
concluded that they had not found any evidence, and they
apparently were on the ground.
Mr. Tenet. Our intelligence judgment on the reconstitution
question is all agencies except INR believed he was
reconstituting his nuclear weapons program. DOE, which did not
believe aluminum tubes were being used in this enrichment
effort, still believed he was reconstituting his nuclear
weapons program on the basis of his other procurements, the
assembly of scientists, other issues that are clearly spelled
out in the NIE.
So we did take the position in the NIE that he was
reconstituting.
Senator Reed. But you indicated that even if you took a
contrary view, you would not publicly say anything at all?
Mr. Tenet. Sir, I do not do my job that way. That is not
how I--I do not think a Director--I do my job the way I have
done it for 7 years, and if I am aware of something needs to be
corrected I go correct it.
Senator Reed. Can I return to the Cheney quote. It was:
``We believe he has in fact reconstituted nuclear weapons.''
Not ``a nuclear weapons program,'' not ``a program,'' but
``nuclear weapons.''
Mr. Tenet. No one said he had a nuclear weapon.
Senator Reed. Pardon?
Mr. Tenet. We did not say he had a nuclear weapon. We in
our NIE said we do not believe he has one. It would take him 5
to 7 years. If he had fissile material, we think he could get
there within several months to a year.
Senator Reed. But this says, ``We believe he has in fact
reconstituted nuclear weapons.'' You were unaware of that
statement, or you did not make any attempt to correct that
statement?
Mr. Tenet. Well, sir, I am told the Vice President may have
corrected that statement himself. I was not aware at the time,
no.
Senator Reed. When did he correct the statement?
Mr. Tenet. Well, apparently, I am told, he later said he
misspoke and he meant to say ``programs.'' I do not know that
personally.
Senator Reed. Mr. Tenet, again I am just troubled that
these statements would be made and that you have no
recollection of privately counseling the Vice President and
certainly no record publicly of doing it until much after the
fact, and it is troubling.
Let me turn to another topic. Having listened to your
presentation about the worldwide threats, it could be I think
concluded from your remarks that, while we are bogged down in
the Iraq, an agile, decentralized, and ruthless enemy plots
against us worldwide.
Mr. Tenet. Yes, an enemy that we are covering very well and
we have good knowledge of because we have maintained a very
healthy counterterrorism operation.
Senator Reed. There is no conflict in terms of resources or
personnel?
Mr. Tenet. The conflict, Senator, comes in other parts of
the world. As I said previously, Iraq and the worldwide war on
terrorism and proliferation are the highest priorities. There
are one or two others that I do not want to talk about in open
session. The sacrifice we are making to cover these is
occurring in global coverage in other places. But in terms of
our laser-like focus, we have not taken or diverted anything
from the war on terrorism.
Naturally, linguistic skills become an issue because it is
the same Arabists. The pool is limited. But our focus is very
important in both of those areas.
Senator Reed. So your focus is worldwide, but the thrust of
your comments were almost entirely dedicated to the situation
in Iraq, the stakes in Iraq. It seems again to me that you are
committing huge resources. You recognize the worldwide threat.
Mr. Tenet. Yes.
Senator Reed. But you are committing huge resources, both
political in terms of the administration and also logistical by
the CIA, to an area which does not fully counter this worldwide
threat.
Mr. Tenet. Well, I do not think that is true. I have an
Ansar al-Islam network and a Zarqawi network that are part of
this network. They are part of the war on terrorism inside
Iraq.
Senator Reed. When did they enter Iraq?
Mr. Tenet. Mr. Zarqawi was in Iraq well before hostilities,
where he had a couple of dozen Egyptian Islamic Jihad (EIJ)
operatives. The Ansar al-Islam was operating up in Kermal well
before the hostilities. So we have this network and his
organization, back and forth over borders, operating well
before we went into Iraq.
Senator Reed. Well, my time has expired, but it is I
think----
Chairman Warner. Senator Cornyn, before you speak I would
like to take a moment of your time. It has been my privilege to
serve on this committee for over 25 years. Prior thereto I
spent more than 5 years in the Department of the Navy and the
Navy Secretariat. I have dealt with every national security
adviser beginning with Secretary of State Kissinger, who
previously was the security adviser to President Nixon.
I can tell you, it has been my experience that Mr. Tenet
has performed his services consistent with his predecessors, be
they under Democratic administration or Republican
administration. It is a confidential relationship between the
DCI and the President and the Cabinet officers. I think when he
makes his statement, that is my job, that in my opinion is
consistent with his predecessors. It is a confidential
relationship.
He has stated very clearly that there are times when he
felt the necessity to express his views, which may well have
been at variance with the policymakers. But in the end he is
not their keeper.
Senator Cornyn.
Senator Cornyn. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Director Tenet, Admiral Jacoby, thank you for your service.
In reflecting back on the state of knowledge of the
Intelligence Community, back just months and maybe a couple of
years ago, certainly at a time when everyone agreed that Saddam
was a gathering threat to the security of this country in terms
of proliferation of WMD, the vice chairman of the Senate
Intelligence Committee, the current vice chairman, made this
comment. He said:
``Saddam's existing biological and chemical weapons
capabilities pose real threats to America today and tomorrow.
Saddam has used chemical weapons before, both against Iraq's
enemies and against his own people. He is working to develop
delivery systems like missiles and UAVs that could bring these
deadly weapons against U.S. forces and U.S. facilities in the
Mideast. He could make these weapons available to many
terrorist groups and third parties which have contact with his
government. Those groups in turn could bring those weapons into
the United States and unleash a devastating attack against our
citizens. I fear that greatly.''
That statement, made by the current vice chairman of the
Senate Intelligence Committee on October 10, 2002, would you
characterize that as the best judgment of the Intelligence
Community at the time, Director Tenet, Admiral?
Admiral Jacoby. Sir, I believe the best judgments of our
community are as stated in the NIE and I think pretty concisely
laid out there.
Senator Cornyn. Director Tenet?
Mr. Tenet. I think it comports with what we said in our
NIE.
Senator Cornyn. We all know that terrorism did not begin on
September 11, and there had been previous attacks against this
country, one of which was the bombing of the World Trade Center
in 1993. In 1994 there was an attempt made here in the United
States Congress to cut the intelligence budget by $1 billion,
in 1994, 1 year after the World Trade Center bombing. In 1995
there was another proposal made here in the United States
Senate to cut the intelligence budget by $1.5 billion.
Could you please characterize, Director Tenet, what kind of
impact cuts of that magnitude would have had on our ability to
conduct intelligence operations?
Mr. Tenet. Sir, depending upon whether they were enacted
and how the cuts were taken, obviously resources are important
to us. A billion dollars in our business in that time period
was a lot of money and probably would have been very hurtful.
Senator Cornyn. Admiral Jacoby.
Admiral Jacoby. Sir, we were in Defense Intelligence, and
now talking more broadly than just DIA, coming out of the early
90s peace dividend period, where a significant amount of
intelligence force structure was cut. So if we would have been
taking those kinds of cuts then in the mid-90s it would have
compounded the problem significantly.
Senator Cornyn. The specific proposal that was made in 1995
would have cut $300 million for each of the fiscal years 1996,
1997, 1998, 1999, and 2000. What I understand each of you two
gentlemen to be saying is it would not have been helpful. It
would have been hurtful to our country's ability to conduct
essential intelligence operations.
Mr. Tenet. We would agree with that, sir.
Senator Cornyn. Director Tenet, in your speech at
Georgetown you noted that, ``Unfortunately, you rarely hear a
patient, careful, or thoughtful discussion on intelligence
these days.'' Of course, that is even more true during the
presidential election season.
But in fact, do you agree that, as characterized earlier,
Saddam fully intended on reconstituting his WMD programs,
whatever it is they were?
Mr. Tenet. Sir, I think what our NIE said is we judge that
he is continuing his WMD programs in defiance of U.N.
resolutions and that he has chemical and biological weapons as
well as missiles with ranges in excess of U.N. restrictions,
and the judgments are clearly stated out. Those were the
judgments of our community in October 2002.
Senator Cornyn. When Dr. Kay testified before this
committee, I asked him about the risk of a willing seller
meeting a willing buyer of such weapons, whether they be large,
small, or otherwise, and asked him whether he considered that
to have been a real risk in terms of Saddam's activities, the
risk of proliferation. Dr. Kay said, ``Actually, I consider
that to be a bigger risk than''--interpolating here; he said
``the stockpiles.'' He said: ``Actually, I consider it a bigger
risk.'' That is why I paused on the preceding question. He
said, ``I consider that a bigger risk than the restart of his
program being successful.''
Admiral Jacoby, do you agree with Dr. Kay's statement in
that regard?
Admiral Jacoby. Sir, one of my major concerns, frankly, is
the proliferation of the knowledge base. The risk of having
scientists that worked on various programs available for
movement to other areas or for involvement in an extremist
network that has this sense of goals is a concern that we ought
to all have very clearly in mind.
Senator Cornyn. Director Tenet, would you comment, please?
Mr. Tenet. Obviously, secondary proliferation in this
context is something that worries us. I do not know that I
worry about it less than the existence of these weapons, but
obviously the transport of things over borders and the sale of
things to individuals, whether they be terrorists or other
people, would be of enormous concern as well.
Senator Cornyn. Thank you very much, gentlemen.
My time has expired. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Warner. Thank you very much, Senator.
Senator Pryor.
Senator Pryor. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
I want to join my colleagues, Director Tenet, in thanking
you for your public service. When I think of all that you have
on your plate, things going on in Iraq, Afghanistan, the global
war on terrorism, Haiti, Israel, Palestine, North Korea--we
could go down the list--it reminds me of an old saying in
Arkansas, that I feel like you have more poured out than you
can smooth over. You really do have a full plate, and we do
appreciate your public service.
Mr. Tenet, you filed a report, an inquiry to the FBI in
July 2003 regarding a leak by senior administration officials
over the revealing of the name of an undercover CIA agent. The
first question I have for you on that is, can you advise this
committee on the impact that that leak has had on morale in
your agency?
Mr. Tenet. Well, obviously, sir, our folks take their
standing and their classified status and their operational
status quite seriously. So it was a worrisome event.
Senator Pryor. Can you tell the committee today of the
impact that that leak has had on your agency in gathering
intelligence?
Mr. Tenet. Sir, I cannot make any dramatic judgments about
that. I think we are on our way with our work.
Senator Pryor. I know that you initiated an internal damage
assessment. Can you talk about that in open session?
Mr. Tenet. No, sir, I cannot.
Senator Pryor. Is that better held until a closed session?
Mr. Tenet. Yes.
Senator Pryor. I know that there is a grand jury
investigation led by U.S. Attorney Fitzgerald, and, if you can
say, has the CIA turned over all documents and granted all
interviews requested by the U.S. Attorney?
Mr. Tenet. I assume we have, sir, but I am not involved in
it. I believe we have.
Senator Pryor. You do not know of anything you have not
fully cooperated with?
Mr. Tenet. My General Counsel tells me that we have turned
over all documents that were required.
Senator Pryor. Great. Thank you.
I am sure you have noticed in the last few days that Mr.
Blix has been in the news again. This time he was, I guess you
can say, critical of Tony Blair and basically he, in trying to
frame this up, said that he felt like Prime Minister Blair
lacked critical thinking when it came to deciphering
intelligence and trying to make policy decisions. As I
understand it, there was not uniform intelligence-gathering
that there were WMD in Iraq, that there was some possibly--I
think you mentioned this in answer to some of the other
questions--that there were possibly some scientists and
defectors that had said that there were not WMD and there was
not an active program there.
But here is my question. In a sense, the prewar
intelligence and the events leading up to the war in Iraq
really pitted our intelligence against the inspectors that Hans
Blix had overseen. Now, knowing what you know and looking back
on it, having the perspective of a little bit of time that has
passed, were the inspectors right after all? Is it your view
that Saddam Hussein did not have an active WMD program?
Mr. Tenet. Well, I do not know that it pitted us against
the inspectors, Senator, since I think we were trying to help
the inspectors. But I do not have--I do not know that the
inspectors have concluded in some formal way that he did not
have weapons. I know that there was a report filed, but I also
know that the inspectors noted their concerns about
discrepancies with the data declaration that was provided and
their concerns they had going back to 1998. There were many
unresolved issues on the part of Saddam with regard to the U.N.
inspection.
So I am not aware that there is some formal piece of paper
out there that they have filed with us that said he did not
have any weapons.
Senator Pryor. That may be fair.
Let me jump countries if I can and ask about Afghanistan.
One of the things I am disturbed about--as I know other members
of this committee are--is the rapid increase in opium and poppy
production in Afghanistan. To me that seems to be not only
possibly a result of the lawlessness in Afghanistan, but also
it seems to be something that will lead to more lawlessness and
have a destabilizing effect on that country. I can see where it
would create a black market and also it would create drug lords
and foster organized crime there.
I would like to hear your thoughts on the ramifications of
the increased poppy production in Afghanistan.
Mr. Tenet. This opium production obviously has a major
impact in Europe where this heroin shows up. There is great
concern there. One of the things that everybody acknowledges is
that when the Karzai government extends its writ, is able to
move reconstruction out into the provinces, that obviously we
want to--our first priority, Senator, is obviously we are still
dealing with remnants of the Taliban and security, moving the
government and extending its writ. Obviously this is something
we are going to have to come to with Karzai in a unified
approach.
Maybe it is changing of crops, maybe it is other things we
are going to have to do. But it is something you are going to
have to deal with much more vigorously over the course of time.
Given the range of challenges he has at this moment--I am not
suggesting it is unimportant. I am suggesting we have to get
there in some methodical way where he can deal with it and we
can help him.
But it has to be his government taking it on, and that may
involve economic assistance to these areas. It obviously will
involve a bigger army than he has today. It obviously will
involve extending his writ to these places.
So we are making progress on all these fronts, but it is
not satisfactory to say, yes, we still have this problem and we
recognize that we have to get here with them.
Senator Pryor. Are you concerned that it will have a
destabilizing effect on Afghanistan?
Mr. Tenet. Sir, money, organized crime, you know what
happens in places. What we do not want is on the basis of this
production and money for alternative power centers to emerge or
warlords to be empowered at the expense of the central
government because of their involvement in this trade. So it is
something we have to worry about.
Senator Pryor. Mr. Chairman, that is all the time I have.
Thank you.
Chairman Warner. Thank you very much.
Senator Dayton.
Senator Dayton. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Director Tenet, Admiral, I have been consistently impressed
with your veracity in the information you presented to me in
both open and closed sessions. I thought that your information
prior to the commencement of the war was couched in
probabilities and a range of possibilities that I was concerned
in some instances were either dropped from further assertions
or expanded beyond the scope of what you had provided to us.
Apropos of that, you said in your speech at Georgetown that
we had no specific information on the types or quantities of
weapons--I think you were referring to biological weapons--
agents, or stockpiles at Baghdad's disposal. Yet, in February
2003 Secretary of State Powell in a speech to the United
Nations stated the administration's conservative estimate was
that Saddam possessed 100 to 500 tons of chemical weapons
agent. The President himself said in October 2002 in Cincinnati
that Iraq had a massive stockpile of biological weapons.
But neither your comment at Georgetown nor the NIE report
of October 2002 made that assertion of quantities stockpiled.
Mr. Tenet. I believe we posited the chemicals with the
precision that you posited it, and I do not believe we posited
or made a judgment on stockpiles of biological weapons.
Senator Dayton. You posited the stockpiles of chemical
weapons were of the amount that the Secretary stated at the
U.N.?
Mr. Tenet. I think I have just captured it correctly.
Senator Dayton. You referenced the President's State of the
Union Address, and the one clause there that caused such a
later dismay. But as I recall, that clarification or retraction
was not made until June of that year, 5 months after it was
uttered, and there were several reports that there was an
internal discussion that commenced even in March of that year
about the accuracy there, but it was not publicly acknowledged
by the White House until 5 months after the State of the Union.
Is that your recollection?
Mr. Tenet. I do not recall the timing. I know that I made a
public statement in I think July of that year. I am not
certain, but that is the time frame I made my public statement.
Senator Dayton. Six months afterwards.
Linkage has been asserted with al Qaeda going back to even
September 11. It was alluded in various references that were
made. It was one that I do not recall was ever asserted by you
or your agency, and in fact I think that al Qaeda leaders
reportedly told interrogators in Guantanamo that there was not
any partnership between bin Laden and Saddam. Yet that has been
an assertion that has continually been made.
Mr. Tenet. Sir, in testimony before this committee we
posited contacts, training, and safe haven as the issues that
we raised at the time when we published our paper. We testified
up here in October and November and then we published a paper
in January 2003. I believe in questioning either in this
committee or the Senate Intelligence Committee, we talked at
length about our concerns about Zarqawi, who we posited to be a
senior associate and collaborator of al Qaeda, documented his
reported role in the Foley assassination, his operations in
Baghdad in the summer of 2002. I think I said publicly in one
of these committees that we did not have command and control
between these individuals and the regime.
Senator Dayton. So when the President said in November 2002
that Saddam was ``dealing with'' al Qaeda, and at the U.N.
Secretary Powell said that there was ``a sinister nexus,''
between the Iraqi dictator and al Qaeda, and aboard the U.S.S.
Abraham Lincoln on May 1 the President called Saddam ``an
ally'' of al Qaeda, were those accurate reflections of the
information that you were providing?
Mr. Tenet. I think the information of concern at the time
went to contacts with Iraqi regime members going back to the
mid-1990s, training that had been provided by the Iraqi regime.
Senator Dayton. The President said that Saddam was dealing
with al Qaeda.
Mr. Tenet. Well, if they provided training, sir, that would
be dealing with.
Then the whole question of the safe haven and the fact that
these people could operate in Iraq--I think I said in testimony
before this committee it was inconceivable to me that Zarqawi
and two dozen FIJ operatives could be operating in Baghdad
without Iraq knowing, although I posited we did not know about
command, control, and sustenance. So the save haven argument.
Senator Dayton. In your speech at Georgetown you said that
your analysts never concluded that Iraq was ``an imminent
threat.'' Is that your composite assessment?
Mr. Tenet. Sir, we did not--we believed and stated, and as
I think the follow-on line in the Georgetown speech says, we
believed that Saddam was continuing his efforts to deceive and
build programs that might constantly surprise us.
Senator Dayton. Was he an imminent threat?
Mr. Tenet. We did not say that.
Senator Dayton. You did not say that. Yet I would certainly
assert that we were led to believe by others, I think the
American people were led to believe, the reason we went into
Iraq and started that engagement was because he constituted by
all available preponderance of evidence an imminent, urgent
threat to our national security. I do not fault you for that,
because I do not think you did make that assertion. But others
certainly did.
Can I just clarify one point that was made earlier by
Senator Cornyn. You have a budget that is obviously classified,
but with reference to the contemplated or conceptualized $1.5
billion, which Senator Cornyn acknowledged was a $300 million
reduction in the proposed budget or the increase in the budget
for each of 5 years, would 1 percent, if that is the
approximate number based on published reports, reduction in
your budget for each of the 5 years, would that ``gut'' your
agency and your intelligence-gathering capabilities?
Mr. Tenet. Sir, it comes from--I guess the perspective I
would have to bring is, tell me where you are taking it from?
What is my base?
Senator Dayton. As far as I know, that was not specified.
But hypothetically, would a 1-percent reduction in your budget
for each of 5 years ``gut'' your agency and its intelligence-
gathering capabilities?
Mr. Tenet. Let me say that in the mid-1990s it would not
have been helpful.
Senator Dayton. Would it have gutted, in that vernacular?
Mr. Tenet. Sir, obviously no $300 million cut is going to
gut your intelligence capability. But cumulatively----
Senator Dayton. Thank you.
Chairman Warner. Thank you very much, Senator.
Senator Bill Nelson.
Senator Bill Nelson. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Director, I have been in the middle passing messages
back and forth after my visit with President Assad in Syria
about my concerns with the jihadists going across the border
and killing our boys and girls. There was an offer there which
has been appropriately passed on to the respective people of
cooperation.
My question to you or to the Admiral would be: In your
professional judgment, do you think cooperation between Syria
and the United States could seal that border to any significant
degree and prevent jihadists from going across?
Admiral Jacoby. Senator Nelson, clearly it is a long,
porous border. That said, it is our view that Syria could do
far more than they are today to close off at least major
crossing points or put better inspection regimes in place and
significantly slow the movement.
Senator Bill Nelson. Thank you for your professional
opinion, and I would suggest that you pass that on, your
professional opinion, to the respective people in the
administration.
Now, I want to get back to something I was told that turned
out not to be complete information. Understand that my
questions are not adversarial. I am trying to be constructive,
because this should not happen in the future, where I was led
to believe one thing and made judgments upon that having to do
with national security questions. It has been hashed out.
Everything I am going to say has already been in the press.
The question of UAVs, the question that there was an
imminent threat to the interests of the United States of Saddam
putting them on ships in the Atlantic off the eastern seaboard,
the fact that it has been reported in several of the press
outlets that software had been accumulated of maps of the
eastern United States. I was told that in several briefings. I
cannot remember all the briefings, but usually they were in S-
407.
But I was not told that there was a dispute in the
Intelligence Community, and what I found out after the fact was
that Air Force intelligence, which would know more about UAVs
than other folks, totally disputed the veracity of that claim.
But that is not what I was told.
So it is a constructive question on my part to get both of
you to respond.
Mr. Tenet. Yes, sir. First of all, Air Force said in our
key judgments in the NIE with regard to this--we have two
phrases. You know them: ``An Iraqi procurement network
attempted to procure commercially available route planning
software,'' and it goes on and on. Then in the ``Key
Judgments'' it says: ``The Director of Intelligence,
Surveillance, Reconnaissance, Air Force, does not agree that
Iraq is developing UAVs primarily intended to be delivery
platforms for chemical and biological weapons. The small size
of the new UAVs strongly suggests a primary role of
reconnaissance, although a chemical, biological weapon delivery
is an inherent capability.''
That was the full judgment and you should have been told
that.
Senator Bill Nelson. What you just read in the NIE I have
subsequently found out was in the NIE. But that is not what I
and others were told in S-407. There was no statement that
there was a dispute in the Intelligence Community.
Admiral Jacoby. Senator, I do not know which briefings----
Senator Bill Nelson. Well, this would have been the
briefings prior to the vote on the resolution.
Admiral Jacoby. The discussion in the NIE--frankly, I
carried that water. Air Force, as you so properly
characterized, is the center of excellence for UAVs within DOD.
So there was quite a bit of discussion. I do not know that it
was a dispute so much as one of inherent capability versus
primary capability versus principle mission. But I thought that
it was laid out quite clearly both in the unclassified and the
classified version of the NIE.
Senator Bill Nelson. Well, we do not make recordings of
those briefings and so there is not going to be any way to
prove it. But I poked and probed. Again I tell you, Mr.
Director, that I am saying this in a constructive way, because
if one Senator thought that there was an imminent threat to the
interests of the United States with UAVs dropping WMD on
eastern seaboard cities and yet there was a dispute in the
Intelligence Community, we have to make clear in the future the
fact that there is a dispute in the Intelligence Community.
Mr. Tenet. Sir, I agree with that. There is no dispute
about that. I will also say to you that in the context of this
procurement and the individual involved, what we learned from
our penetration of that network, his previous affiliation,
where he worked--obviously I cannot do this in open session,
but I was really concerned about it. I did not do the S-407
briefing, I do not believe, but I was very concerned about this
case.
I believed it was appropriate to warn. You should have been
told that they did not believe, Air Force did not believe, it
was primarily intended, although they acknowledged the inherent
capability. There were another set of factors here that were
quite serious in my view at the time, but that does not
eliminate the importance of what you have said to us.
Senator Bill Nelson. Well, I have noticed as I have been
sharing my thoughts with you that there have been several
quizzical expressions on the faces of your staff there. I want
you to know that ever since this was made public in the
newspapers, where I could speak about it publicly I have been
railing on this, so there should be no surprise that this
Senator wants to make sure when there is a dispute in the
future--in my part of the country where I come from, we take a
person at their word. If there had been any question I would
have gone and gotten that NIE and looked at it. But that is
clearly not the impression that I had.
Mr. Tenet. Yes, sir.
Chairman Warner. Thank you, Senator.
Senator Levin.
Senator Levin. Just a couple questions, Mr. Chairman,
because I know you are trying to get to a closed session.
This has to do with an article that appeared last November
in The Weekly Standard.
Mr. Tenet. Yes, sir.
Senator Levin. We made reference to it before and you
indicated before that you were not familiar with it.
Mr. Tenet. Sir, I am not familiar with the article, but I
am familiar with the issue.
[The information referred to follows:]
[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
Senator Levin. Last November 24, The Weekly Standard
published excerpts from an alleged classified document that was
prepared by Under Secretary of Defense for Policy Feith that
was dated October 27, 2003, and sent to the Senate Intelligence
Committee. This article alleged an operational relationship
between Iraq and the al Qaeda organization. In the words of
this article by Stephen Hayes, ``The picture that emerges is
one of a history of collaboration between two of America's most
determined and dangerous enemies.''
Did the CIA, number one, agree with the contents of the
Feith document that was sent to the Intelligence Committee? Did
it have disagreements with that document?
Mr. Tenet. Senator, we did not clear on that document. My
understanding is we did not agree with the way the data was
characterized in that document.
Senator Levin. All right. Now, those disagreements that you
had with that document were not brought to the attention, as I
understand it, of the Intelligence Committee at that time; is
that correct?
Mr. Tenet. That is correct.
Senator Levin. The Vice President of the United States,
during an interview with The Rocky Mountain News on January 9,
when asked about the relationship between al Qaeda and Iraq,
said the following: ``One place you ought to look is an article
that Stephen Hayes did in The Weekly Standard here a few weeks
ago''--so now he is referring to the article in that Weekly
Standard--``because there it lays out in some detail, based on
an assessment that was done by the DOD and that was forwarded
to the Senate Intelligence Committee some weeks ago. That is
your best source of information.''
That is what the Vice President says about that document
that you had disagreements with. Have you told the Vice
President, hey, we have disagreements with that document that
you said was the best source of information? By the way, it is
a classified document. Putting that issue aside for the moment.
Mr. Tenet. I think what we did is we went back to the DOD,
who subsequently retracted the document and submitted a
correction to you, because of our concerns with what the
document said.
Senator Levin. I had asked for that document and it was
because of my request that it got to you. Then you said,
whoops, you have disagreements with that document; is that
correct?
Mr. Tenet. Yes, sir.
Senator Levin. Okay. Now, my question is this. Now you have
the Vice President of the United States saying that the
document that was quoted in The Weekly Standard was the best
source of information, and that is the document that contains a
whole bunch of conclusions that you disagree with. Have you
gone to the Vice President of the United States and said, you
said a document was the best source of information and it is
quoted allegedly in The Weekly Standard and, Mr. Vice
President, that is not the best source of information according
to us? Have you said that to him?
Mr. Tenet. I have not, sir. I learned about his quote last
night when I was preparing for this hearing. I was unaware that
he had said that and I will talk to him about it.
Senator Levin. I have to tell you here, we have now the
Vice President saying on National Public Radio (NPR) that the
vans are the conclusive evidence that there is a biological
weapons program. You at some point when you found out about
this----
Mr. Tenet. Yes, sir, I went and talked----
Senator Levin. --not contemporaneously, but at some later
point when it was pointed out to you, did you go back to the
Vice President?
Mr. Tenet. I did.
Senator Levin. But Mr. Director, when the Vice President is
making public statements, as he has done relative to the vans,
relative now to the question of the relationship between al
Qaeda and Saddam Hussein, it seems to me there has to be
someone in your office who is going to tell you that the Vice
President said something which just does not have our support.
Mr. Tenet. Sir, it is a fair point.
Senator Levin. You cannot just wait until we have a hearing
and then----
Mr. Tenet. Sir, it is a fair point.
Senator Levin. Mr. Chairman, I would ask that my letter to
the Vice President dated February 12 be made part of the
record.
Chairman Warner. Without objection.
[The information referred to follows:]
[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
Senator Levin. This letter asks the Vice President: What is
the basis for your statement relative to the vans, and what is
the basis for your statement relative to the article in The
Weekly Standard being, as he put it, ``the best source of
information`` relative to the al Qaeda relationship? We have
not received an answer except for a telephone call, which
frankly just said that you might be commenting on it or you
have commented on it. That is it, that is all we have gotten
from the Vice President, is a statement that you have made a
reference to it in a prior hearing.
Mr. Chairman, I would ask not only that this letter be made
part of the record, but, because this is such a critical issue
that the Vice President of the United States is commenting on,
that we as a committee ask, what is the basis for the
information? It was not the CIA. The CIA was saying: Hey, the
jury is out on the vans; there is no consensus on the vans. By
the way, your top weapons inspector said the consensus was they
were not part of a biological weapons program.
Mr. Tenet. That is not what he said in his interim report,
I do not believe.
Senator Levin. Not in his interim report. He said it was
undetermined in his interim report. But he recently said there
was a consensus that the vans were not part of a WMD program.
I am not arguing with you on that. You do not agree with
that. Your position is that there is divided opinion on that
issue.
Mr. Tenet. Right.
Senator Levin. We have the Vice President saying the vans
are part of a biological weapons program and that is conclusive
evidence to him that Saddam had a WMD program. So you have that
statement of the Vice President. Then you have a statement in
The Weekly Standard, relative to The Weekly Standard piece,
that he gives to The Rocky Mountain News, saying that The
Weekly Standard piece is the best source of information
relative to an al Qaeda-Iraq relationship, which the CIA does
not agree with.
We have to get answers, it seems to me, from the Vice
President, Mr. Chairman, on what is the source of those recent
statements. They are not prior to the war; these are recent
statements.
We know the source is not the CIA. The CIA finally learns
about them. It takes you too long to learn about these very
public statements, but nonetheless you learn about them at
hearings. We ask you questions and then you go back and you
correct the Vice President. But you have to have someone in
your shop that keeps track of these kind of public statements,
because that is what the public responds to.
Mr. Chairman, I would ask that we ask the Vice President if
he would give us the source of the statements that I have
referred to.
Chairman Warner. We will take the matter under advisement.
Senator Levin. Thank you. That is all.
Chairman Warner. This open session is now concluded. We
will retire to room SH-219 for a closed session.
[Questions for the record with answers supplied follow:]
Questions Submitted by Senator Elizabeth Dole
national security threats
1. Senator Dole. Director Tenet and Admiral Jacoby, Prime Minister
Tony Blair recently argued that the possibility of Islamic extremists
collaborating with countries that possess unconventional weapons in
order to carry out acts of terror justifies preemptive action. However,
he also acknowledged the possibility that Saddam would have changed his
ambitions or that terrorists might never have obtained unconventional
weapons in Iraq. The dilemma we are facing is a threat of which ``we
cannot be certain, but do we want to take the risk?'' The terrorist
attacks on September 11, 2001, demonstrated the mortal dangers posed by
terrorist threats left unchecked. The prime breeding grounds for
terrorism are located in ``ungoverned spaces'' and countries with
dictators sympathetic to their cause. Does the growing number of
terrorists striving to make a spectacular attack on the United States'
homeland pose a grave threat to our national security?
Director Tenet. [Deleted.]
Admiral Jacoby. Yes.
2. Senator Dole. Director Tenet and Admiral Jacoby, with respect to
our national security threats originating in the ``ungoverned spaces''
and countries with dictators sympathetic to terrorist causes, what is
the likelihood of non-military (diplomatic, economic, and information)
elements of power being effective in alleviating the threat?
Director Tenet. Several Central Intelligence Agency (CIA)-sponsored
global analysis efforts suggest that a variety of non-military
influences could help reduce U.S. vulnerability to threats originating
in ungoverned spaces and autocracies sympathetic to terrorist causes. A
task force of experts on governance and political instability led by
CIA has concluded that the most effective non-military actions include
state capacity building efforts, such as:
Helping countries build law enforcement capacities.
Helping a host government carry out a coordinated
political, judicial, administrative, diplomatic, and economic
plan to establish control over ungoverned areas.
Eroding support for terrorist or insurgent groups by
helping countries improve their standard of living through
education and other social services.
Improving and expanding lines of communication in
remote areas.
Encouraging conflict resolution efforts between the
central government and insurgent groups, and discouraging
states from sponsoring insurgencies in neighboring countries.
Supporting the creation of strong democratic
institutions with power sharing among groups, which discourages
the formation of stateless zones.
States possess a combination of regime and societal characteristics
that predispose them to support international terrorist groups,
according to a CIA-led analysis of state-terrorist group relationships.
Factors that make regimes more likely to support terrorists include
autocratic rulers adhering to an exclusionary ideology and a higher
than average percentage of a population under arms, according to our
statistical analysis of state supporters of terrorism between 1992 and
2002. These underlying risk factors do not guarantee that a country
will support terrorists, but they serve as warning signs in the same
way that being overweight, combined with smoking and leading a
sedentary lifestyle raises the risk of cardiovascular disease.
Policies aimed at altering these underlying characteristics and
raising risks and costs for the backers of terrorism offer the greatest
potential for stemming state support, according to nongovernmental
experts on instability and terrorism and our analysis of past cases.
The following other non-military countermeasures can help or forestall
terrorist support:
Imposing multilateral economic sanctions on--or
holding back economic aid to--countries known to support
terrorist groups.
A long-term diplomatic and economic strategy of
promoting durable, consolidated democracy, especially building
constraints on executive power in autocratic countries and
fostering economic and political ties to the west.
Diplomatic efforts that undercut relationships between
terrorists and harboring countries by diminishing the influence
of regime figures backing terrorists, while cooperating with
those who have motive and capability to act against terrorists.
Sensitizing countries to the notion that hosting
radical groups can undermine their regimes by sharing
information that exposes instances when terrorists violate the
policies of their hosts.
Admiral Jacoby. As I stated in my prepared testimony, the challenge
posed to us from radical Islam and terrorism is a long term phenomenon
based on the economic, political and demographic challenges faced by
many countries. Military remedies alone cannot alleviate these
problems.
Numerous successful examples can be cited in the use of non-
military elements of power. Good intelligence, diplomatic pressure and
economic sanctions played a role in compelling Libya to end its
assistance to terrorist groups and abandon its weapons of mass
destruction and ballistic missile programs. Economic assistance and
diplomatic engagement rewarded Pakistan for its support to the global
war on terrorism. Our support for Pakistan also serves as an inducement
for other nations to come forward with assistance for the global war on
terrorism.
3. Senator Dole. Admiral Jacoby, in your prepared remarks you
discussed how ``al Qaeda remains the greatest terrorist threat to our
homeland.'' Some of the concerns you illustrated were the threats of
terrorists using manportable air defense systems and established
criminal networks to assist them in the traffic of weapons of mass
destruction. Could you provide us with the likelihood of terrorists
trying to capitalize on these vulnerabilities and attempting an attack
against the American homeland during the next year?
Admiral Jacoby. The likelihood of terrorist groups taking advantage
of vulnerabilities to our civilian airliners from manportable air
defense systems (MANPADS) and to the homeland from weapons of mass
destruction is real. While I have no information on a specific and
immediate plan by terrorist groups to use either type of weapons in the
United States, the intent and capabilities of these groups and the open
nature of our society, lead me to no other conclusion.
4. Senator Dole. Admiral Jacoby, what is the greatest overall
threat to our homeland in light of other emerging threats such as
ballistic missiles capable of targeting nearly all of North America?
Admiral Jacoby. The greatest overall threat to our homeland is a
terrorist attack by al Qaeda or other like minded group using weapons
of mass destruction. While several countries, such as China and Russia,
possess greater destructive capabilities, only al Qaeda combines both
the intent and capability to use weapons of mass destruction in an
attack on our homeland. Additionally, al Qaeda is less concerned than
nation-states about military retaliation since they reside amongst
civilians of other countries or in ungoverned spaces.
positive changes
5. Senator Dole. Director Tenet, you have said that the world
today, compared with last year, ``is equally if not more, complicated
and fraught with danger for American interests.'' You also went on to
state that it ``also holds great opportunity for positive change.'' Can
you discuss the most significant opportunities for positive change
relative to American interests, and how well the Intelligence Community
is positioned to exploit or support them?
Director Tenet. The United States currently enjoys two broad
strategic opportunities for positive change relative to its interests.
On the geo-political level, the absence of armed conflict, and for the
most part armed competition, between any of the world's major powers
provides a unique historical opportunity for bilateral and multilateral
cooperation on a wide range of critical issues. What Secretary Powell
called ``An Age of Cooperation'' in his Foreign Affairs article early
this year has had a revolutionary impact on how the major powers have
tackled such thorny problems as global terrorism, proliferation--
specifically negotiations with Iran and North Korea--and the Middle
East.
The Intelligence Community provides intelligence
support on these issues and countries of concern for policy
initiatives and military operations undertaken as part of these
international collaborative efforts. It also monitors the
diplomatic, economic, military, and intelligence activities of
the other major powers.
On the geo-economic level, trends continue to favor expanding the
free trade system, creating regulatory transparency and combating
corruption. For example, although developing countries were vocal in
their complaints at the World Trade Organization (WTO) Ministerial in
Cancun last September, their desire for reform in the global trading
system--specifically in the reduction of agricultural subsidies for
developed country farmers--probably will make them eventually return to
the WTO negotiating table. Brazil probably wanted to be seen as an
effective host of the United Nations Conference on Trade Development
(UNCTAD) XI--depending on the outlook for a Doha framework agreement.
Brazil has a fundamental interest in maintaining the momentum of the
Doha talks, especially in convincing the United States, European Union,
and Japan to cease agricultural subsidies so that Brazil can increase
its export of agricultural products.
The Intelligence Community provides intelligence
support to U.S. trade negotiators and monitors foreign economic
trends and activities that could affect U.S. national
interests.
6. Senator Dole. Director Tenet and Admiral Jacoby, in your hearing
on Tuesday, February 24 before the Senate Select Committee on
Intelligence, both of you agreed with the statement that Americans are
safer today than 1 year ago. Yet, your assessments portray a situation
in which threats to Americans have not diminished and might have
increased from 1 year ago. Could you elaborate on why you feel
Americans are safer today while the threat to Americans has not
diminished and may have increased?
Director Tenet. [Deleted.]
Admiral Jacoby. Americans are safer today for several reasons.
First, our war on terrorism has achieved several notable
accomplishments. We have shrunk the favorable operating environments
for al Qaeda and other terrorist groups. We have captured or killed six
of the original top nine operatives and leaders of al Qaeda.
Interrogations of captured al Qaeda members have revealed considerable
details about their plans, methods, training, finances, and logistical
infrastructure. That information has enabled us to further attack the
terrorist network and foil ongoing plots. Second, we have improved our
security within the United States, presenting al Qaeda with a more
difficult target and operating environment. Third, many countries have
redoubled their efforts to root out al Qaeda and like minded terrorist
groups and increased their cooperation with us.
7. Senator Dole. Director Tenet and Admiral Jacoby, is a portion of
increased safety to Americans a direct result of the intelligence
communities' ongoing transformation and integration?
Director Tenet. Yes. United States interests at home and abroad
remain at risk of terrorist attack. However, significant progress has
been made to improve and transform our ability to protect Americans
from the scourge of international terrorism.
The establishment of the Department of Homeland Security (DHS), and
the incorporation of part of this Department within the Intelligence
Community, has significantly improved our ability to share information
with organizations responsible for protecting our borders, ports, and
other critical infrastructure. More significantly, the DHS is providing
for systematic communication with senior officials at the State, local,
and private sector levels as well as facilitating the exchange of
information across multiple levels of government.
The expansion of the FBI's Joint Terrorism Task Forces (JTTFs) and
the new FBI Office of Intelligence have also significantly enhanced the
communication of threat information to local law enforcement officials.
In addition, we are now better able to leverage information available
to State and local law enforcement officials to identify potential new
terrorist threats.
The establishment of the Terrorist Threat Integration Center (TTIC)
has enhanced our ability to integrate all information and analysis
available to the U.S. Government (USG) to provide a comprehensive
picture of terrorist threats to U.S. interests at home and abroad. This
multi-agency ``joint venture'' has access to information systems and
databases spanning the intelligence, law enforcement, homeland
security, diplomatic, and military communities. In fact, TTIC has
direct-access connectivity with 14--soon to be 24--separate USG
networks, enabling information sharing as never before in the Federal
government and beyond. While there is still a long way to go, great
progress has been made integrating USG terrorism analysis capabilities
in TTIC by virtue of the steady commitment of partner agencies
including the FBI, CIA, and the Departments of Defense (DOD), State,
and DHS.
Admiral Jacoby. Yes. The Intelligence and Law Enforcement
Communities have made progress in coordinating their activities and
sharing intelligence.
______
Questions Submitted by Senator Carl Levin
atta/al-ani prague meeting
8. Senator Levin. Director Tenet, do you believe it is likely that
September 11 hijacker Mohammed Atta and Iraqi Intelligence Service
officer Ahmed al-Ani met in Prague in April 2001, or do you believe it
is unlikely that the meeting took place?
Director Tenet. Although we cannot rule it out, we are increasing
skeptical that such a meeting occurred. The veracity of the single-
threaded reporting on which the original account of the meeting was
based has been questioned, and the Iraqi official with whom Atta was
alleged to have met has denied ever having met Atta.
We have been able to corroborate only two visits by Atta to the
Czech Republic: one in late 1994, when he passed through enroute to
Syria; the other in June 2000, when, according to detainee reporting,
he departed for the United States from Prague because he thought a non-
European Union (EU) member country would be less likely to keep
meticulous travel data.
In the absence of any credible information that the April 2001
meeting occurred, we assess that Atta would have been unlikely to
undertake the substantial risk of contacting any Iraqi official as late
as April 2001, with the plot already well along toward execution.
It is likewise hard to conceive of any single ingredient crucial to
the plot's success that could only be obtained from Iraq.
In our judgment, the 11 September plot was complex in its
orchestration but simple in its basic conception. We believe that the
factors vital to success of the plot were all easily within al Qaeda's
means without resort to Iraqi expertise: shrewd selection of
operatives, training in hijacking aircraft, a mastermind and pilots
well-versed in the procedures and behavior needed to blend in with U.S.
society, long experience in moving money to support operations, and the
openness and tolerance of U.S. society as well as the ready
availability of important information about targets, flight schools,
and airport and airline security practices.
cia clearance of uranium references
9. Senator Levin. Director Tenet, the following administration
statements made reference to Iraq's alleged attempts to acquire uranium
from Africa after you had a similar reference removed from a draft of
the President's October 7, 2002, Cincinnati speech. Did the CIA review
and clear the following statements, particularly with regard to the
African uranium allegations? Which of these statements were sent to the
CIA for review? (Please provide an unclassified answer, with a
classified annex if necessary.)
December 19, 2002: State Department Fact Sheet titled
``Illustrative Examples of Omissions From the Iraqi Declaration
to the United Nations Security Council'' that states Iraq's
Declaration ``ignores efforts to procure uranium from Niger.''
January 20, 2003: President Bush sent a report to
Congress that states the Iraqi declaration failed to deal with
Iraq's ``attempts to acquire uranium.''
January 23, 2003: White House issues the publication
``What Does Disarmament Look Like?'' that says the Iraqi
declaration ``ignores efforts to procure uranium from abroad.''
January 23, 2003: National Security Adviser
Condoleezza Rice published an Op-Ed in the New York Times
saying that Iraq's ``declaration fails to account for or
explain Iraq's efforts to get uranium from abroad.''
January 26, 2003: Secretary of State Colin Powell, in
a speech at the World Economic Forum in Davos, Switzerland,
asked ``Why is Iraq still trying to procure uranium?''
January 29, 2003: Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld
said on CNN that Iraq ``recently was discovered seeking
significant quantities of uranium from Africa.''
Director Tenet. While our records are not comprehensive, following
are the results of our research on this question:
December 19, 2002: State Department Fact Sheet titled
``Illustrative Examples of Omissions From the Iraqi Declaration to the
United Nations Security Council'' that states Iraq's Declaration
``ignores efforts to procure uranium from Niger.''
CIA did receive this Fact Sheet for comment. The Director of
the Office of Weapons Intelligence, Nonproliferation, and Arms
Control (WINPAC) in the Directorate of Intelligence recommended
that the draft's reference to Niger be changed to Africa, but
according to the State officer who drafted the fact sheet, the
comments were not obtained in time to correct the listing on
the State Department web site. The information was acted on in
time, however, to remove the Niger reference from Ambassador
Negroponte's statement to the U.N. Security Council on the same
day.
January 20, 2003: President Bush sent a report to Congress that
states the Iraqi declaration failed to deal with Iraq's ``attempts to
acquire uranium.''
We believe this refers to the 20 January document entitled
``Communications from the President of the United States
Transmitting a Report on Matters Relevant to the Authorization
for use of Military Force Against Iraq.'' We have not located
any record that we received this document for comment.
January 23, 2003: White House issues the publication ``What Does
Disarmament Look Like?'' that says the Iraqi declaration ``ignores
efforts to procure uranium from abroad.''
We received multiple versions of this document between
between 20 and 22 January 2003. The last version that we
reviewed included the statement, ``The declaration ignores
efforts to procure uranium from abroad.'' We have no record of
having objected to this statement.
January 23, 2003: National Security Adviser Condoleezza Rice
published an Op-Ed in the New York Times saying that Iraq's
``declaration fails to account for or explain Iraq's efforts to get
uranium from abroad.''
We have no record of reviewing this document.
January 26, 2003: Secretary of State Colin Powell, in a speech at
the World Economic Forum in Davos, Switzerland, asked, ``Why is Iraq
still trying to procure uranium?''
We have no record of reviewing this document.
January 29, 2003: Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld said on CNN
that Iraq ``recently was discovered seeking significant quantities of
uranium from Africa.''
We have no record of reviewing this statement.
inc defector debriefings
10. Senator Levin. Admiral Jacoby, once the Information Collection
Program of the Iraqi National Congress (INC) was transferred from the
State Department to the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA), who
conducted the debriefings of the INC-supplied defectors, and who
prepared the resulting reports or summaries?
Admiral Jacoby. [Deleted.]
11. Senator Levin. Admiral Jacoby, were they all Defense
Intelligence Agency (DIA) personnel working for DIA, or were there any
persons working for other agencies or offices?
Admiral Jacoby. [Deleted.]
12. Senator Levin. Admiral Jacoby, if the defector debriefings were
conducted or observed by personnel who were not working for DIA, what
agencies or offices were they from?
Admiral Jacoby. [Deleted.]
13. Senator Levin. Admiral Jacoby, how were the information reports
or summaries from the INC-supplied defector debriefings handled? Were
they all sent through normal intelligence channels, or were any sent
outside normal intelligence reporting channels? If any were sent
outside normal intelligence reporting channels, what channels were used
and to what offices or individuals were they sent?
Admiral Jacoby. [Deleted.]
feith office meetings with ghorbanifar
14. Senator Levin. Director Tenet, several news articles describe
secret meetings between DOD policy officials and Iranian nationals in
2001 and 2002, including Manucher Ghorbanifar who played a prominent
role in the Iran-Contra scandal. The articles state that Secretary of
State Powell discussed his concerns about the meetings with Secretary
of Defense Rumsfeld and National Security Adviser Rice. Did you ever
discuss with other administration officials either of those meetings,
or the issue of the DOD policy office run by Under Secretary of Defense
Doug Feith, particularly whether that office might be bypassing normal
Intelligence Community channels?
Director Tenet. [Deleted.]
15. Senator Levin. Director Tenet, is it correct that the CIA
believes Ghorbanifar is a fabricator, and neither credible nor
reliable?
Director Tenet. [Deleted.]
16. Senator Levin. Director Tenet, did you know of those meetings
with Ghorbanifar in advance and were you asked for and did you give
your approval of those meetings in your capacity as Director of Central
Intelligence?
Director Tenet. [Deleted.]
white paper omission of information from nie
17. Senator Levin. Director Tenet, in October 2002, the
Intelligence Community issued a White Paper on ``Iraq's Weapons of Mass
Destruction Programs.'' Its ``Key Judgments'' mirrored to a
considerable degree the Key Judgments from the classified October 1
National Intelligence Estimate (NIE) on ``Iraq's Continuing Programs
for Weapons of Mass Destruction,'' which were declassified on July 18,
2003.
However, the unclassified White Paper completely omitted the ``Key
Judgments'' from the NIE concerning Iraq's use of WMD, including the
judgments that Saddam appeared unlikely to conduct terrorist attacks
against the United States for fear of war, and was not likely to
provide WMD to terrorists unless he had already been attacked, his
forces could not carry out an attack, and he was ``sufficiently
desperate'' to take the ``extreme step'' of helping terrorists conduct
an attack for vengeance. Why did the White Paper leave out these
judgments?
Director Tenet. The question was answered on 7 October 2002 by then
DCI George J. Tenet, when he responded to the 4 October 2002
declassification request from the Senate Select Committee on
Intelligence. In our response, we ``made unclassified material
available to further the Senate's forthcoming open debate on a Joint
Resolution concerning Iraq.'' This letter was placed into the
Congressional Record on 9 October 2002 (page S10154) and has been
available in the media and on the internet.
As stated in that letter, ``As always, our declassification efforts
seek a balance between your need for unfettered debate and our need to
protect sources and methods. We have also been mindful of a shared
interest in not providing to Saddam a blueprint of our intelligence
capabilities and shortcomings, or with insight into our expectation of
how he will and will not act. The salience of such concerns is only
heightened by the possibility for hostilities between the U.S. and
Iraq. These are some of the reasons why we did not include our
classified judgments on Saddam's decisionmaking regarding the use of
weapons of mass destruction (WMD) in our recent unclassified paper on
Iraq's Weapons of Mass Destruction.''
The DCI's letter further noted that viewing the Senate request with
those concerns in mind, however, we declassified the following from the
paragraphs the committee requested. They are from pages 66 and 67 of
the NIE:
``Baghdad for now appears to be drawing a line short of
conducting terrorist attacks with conventional or CBW [chemical
or biological warfare] against the United States.
Should Saddam conclude that a U.S.-led attack could no longer
be deterred, he probably would become much less constrained in
adopting terrorist actions. Such terrorism might involve
conventional means, as with Iraq's unsuccessful attempt at a
terrorist offensive in 1991, or CBW.
Saddam might decide that the extreme step of assisting
Islamist terrorists in conducting a WMD attack against the
United States would be his last chance to exact vengeance by
taking a large number of victims with him.''
The letter also noted, regarding a 2 October 2002 closed hearing,
that we declassified the following dialogue:
``Senator Levin: If [Saddam] didn't feel threatened, is it
likely that he would initiate an attack using a weapon of mass
destruction?
Senior Intelligence Witness: My judgment would be that the
probability of him initiating an attack--let me put a time
frame on it--in the foreseeable future, given the conditions we
understand now, the likelihood I think would be low.
Senator Levin: Now if he did initiate an attack you've . . .
indicated he would probably attempt clandestine attacks against
us. . . But what about his use of weapons of mass destruction?
If we initiate an attack and he thought he was in extremis or
otherwise, what's the likelihood in response to our attack that
he would use chemical or biological weapons?
Senior Intelligence Witness: Pretty high, in my view.''
The letter further noted that ``in the above dialogue, the
witness's qualifications--`in the foreseeable future, given the
conditions we understand now'--were intended to underscore that the
likelihood of Saddam using WMD for blackmail, deterrence, or otherwise
grows as his arsenal builds.''
white paper statement not in nie
18. Senator Levin. Director Tenet, in the October 2002 unclassified
White Paper on ``Iraq's Weapons of Mass Destruction Programs'' there is
a paragraph that is almost the same as a paragraph from the now
declassified portions of the October 1, 2002 NIE on ``Iraq's Continuing
Programs for Weapons of Mass Destruction.'' The paragraph in the NIE
states:
``We judge Iraq has some lethal and incapacitating BW agents
and is capable of quickly producing and weaponizing a variety
of such agents, including anthrax, for delivery by bombs,
missiles, aerial sprayers, and covert operatives.''
However, the same paragraph in the unclassified White Paper
includes the following additional language at the end of the otherwise
identical paragraph: ``including potentially against the U.S.
homeland.'' This clause does not appear in the NIE. Why was this
additional language added to the unclassified White Paper when it did
not appear in the classified NIE, which was produced before the White
Paper?
Director Tenet. On 1 October 2002, the Intelligence Community (IC)
published the classified, 92 page NIE on ``Iraq's Continuing Programs
for Weapons of Mass Destruction,'' which had been requested by the
Senate Select Committee on Intelligence three weeks earlier.
On 4 October 2002, the IC published a separate unclassified paper,
``Iraq's Weapons of Mass Destruction Programs,'' which began work in
May 2002.
The unclassified paper incorporated a declassified version of a
portion of the Key Judgments from the classified NIE. Specifically, the
declassified version of the Key Judgments did not include our judgments
related to Saddam's thinking on weapons use, both because advertising
our limitations in understanding Saddam's thinking on the issue would
have been inappropriate at the time and because the unclassified paper
itself did not discuss the issue.
In mid-2003, we declassified the entire Key Judgments
from the NIE along with the paragraphs and INR alternative view
on the uranium ore issue.
The clause and judgment in question was contained the classified
NIE's Key Judgments, which stated, ``We judge has some lethal and
incapacitating BW agents and is capable quickly producing and
weaponizing a variety of such agents, including anthrax, for delivery
by bombs, missiles, aerial sprayers, and covert operatives;'' noted
Iraqi capabilities to ``attempt clandestine attacks against the U.S.
Homeland . . . more likely with biological than chemical agents--
probably . . . by special forces or intelligence operatives;'' and
indicated that ``the Iraqi Intelligence Service (IIS) probably would be
the primary means by which Iraq would attempt to conduct any CBW
attacks on the U.S. Homeland, although we had no specific intelligence
information that Saddam's regime had directed attacks against U.S.
territory.''
Consistent with the Key Judgments of the NIE, the Key
Judgments of the unclassified paper stated, ``Iraq has some
lethal and incapacitating BW agents and is capable of quickly
producing and weaponizing a variety of such agents, including
anthrax, for delivery by bombs, missiles, aerial sprayers, and
covert operatives, including potentially against the U.S.
Homeland.''
The statement and judgment in question also were reflected in the
NIE's Discussion and Annex C.
The BW discussion of the NIE stated that we assessed
that the IIS probably would be the primary means by which Iraq
would attempt to attack clandestinely the U.S. Homeland with
biological weapons; we had no specific intelligence that
Saddam's regime has directed attacks against U.S. territory;
and Baghdad had far less capability to wage a campaign of
violence and destruction on U.S. territory than it did in the
Middle East region.
Annex C devoted over two pages to discussing the
capabilities of the Iraqi Special Operations Forces and
Intelligence Service, and stated that the IIS probably would be
the primary means by which Iraq would attempt to attack the
U.S. Homeland and was capable of carrying out or sponsoring
such attacks.
The capabilities of covert operatives to use BW agents was
addressed in the NIE because it related to one of the issues Congress
requested--``the likelihood that Saddam Hussein would use weapons of
mass destruction against the United States, our allies and friends, or
our interests.'' Although, as the NIE stated, we had ``low confidence
in our ability to assess when Saddam would use WMD'' and ``whether
Saddam would engage in clandestine attacks against the U.S. Homeland,''
we provided our analytical thinking on the issue of use in the Key
Judgments and the NIE. Within these discussions, we included our
assessments on the capabilities of these operatives, ``including
potentially against the U.S. Homeland,'' as we did regarding our
assessments of the capabilities of UAVs.
At the time the NIE was written, declassifying our limitations in
understanding Saddam's thinking on use was not appropriate in light of
the potential for military operations involving U.S. troops. That said,
declassifying our judgment regarding capabilities--in this case, the
capability of covert intelligence operatives to deliver BW agents in
clandestine attacks against the U.S. Homeland--was consistent with the
declassification effort. Therefore, the phrase ``including potentially
against the U.S. Homeland'' was added to the ``covert operatives''
phrase in the unclassified Key Judgments to account for and remain
consistent with the capability, identified in the section of the Key
Judgments that was not being declassified.
differences between nie and white paper
19. Senator Levin. Director Tenet, one difference between the
October 1, 2002, NIE on ``Iraq's Continuing Programs for Weapons of
Mass Destruction'' and the October 2002 unclassified White Paper on
``Iraq's Weapons of Mass Destruction Programs'' is the lack of caveats
in the White Paper that were included in the NIE. For example, the Key
Judgments in the NIE often began with the phrase ``we judge'' or ``we
assess,'' whereas the comparable text in the White Paper omitted these
qualifications. Is there a difference between saying: ``Iraq has
continued its weapons of mass destruction programs'' and ``We judge
that Iraq has continued its weapons of mass destruction programs?''
Director Tenet. The ``white paper'' on Iraq's WMD programs was not
less qualified in its statements than the IC's classified papers. To
the contrary, it was clear to those working on both the NIE and the
unclassified white Paper that the two products would have to track as
closely as possible with each other, within the limitations of one
being a Top Secret document and the other being unclassified, and one
being an NIE produced by named agencies and the other not having such
attributions. Indeed, the reason it was decided to use an unclassified
version of the NIE's Key Judgments as the Key Judgments of the white
paper--even though the two papers had different origins, scope, and
drafters, and the organization of the main texts of the papers
differed--was to achieve this consistency.
The portion in question of the white paper was clearly labeled--in
large boldface, at the top of the first page the reader sees after
opening the cover--as ``Key Judgments.'' Thus, the sentences already
were prominently advertised as judgments--not facts. Different analysts
may have different views as to whether or not such words as ``we
judge'' and ``we assess'' convey a different nuance, but the decision
to avoid such language in the white paper was purely an issue of style,
related to the fact that use of the first person plural would have been
unsuitable for this type of product. NIEs are explicit, on the title
page and inside back cover, about who is issuing the document,
including which agencies participated and which NIOs supervised it. The
unclassified paper had no such attributions, and any ``we'' would be
without a referent--i.e., it would be an inappropriate style.
20. Senator Levin. Director Tenet, why were these caveats and
qualifiers left out of the unclassified White Paper when they were
included in the classified NIE?
Director Tenet. Caveats are not simply a matter of wording at the
beginning of sentences. Instead, they include qualifying comments
noting such things as the lack of confirmation of a report, a shortage
of reliable reporting, or the possibility of alternative explanations.
No such caveats in the NIE were deleted from otherwise comparable
judgments in the white paper. In some instances words differed or were
deleted because the NIE used more specific reporting or judgments that,
for classification reasons, were not used in the unclassified paper. In
some of those instances the unclassified paper might be said to be less
definitive than the NIE. For example, the NIE offered specific
numerical ranges for how many metric tons of CW agent Iraq possessed
and how much CW agent it had added in the previous year. The
unclassified paper used only the vaguer judgment that ``Saddam probably
has stocked a few hundred metric tons of CW agents.''
Similarly, interagency differences were reflected in language in
the unclassified paper that did not name specific agencies but made it
clear there was not unanimity on the points in question. This was
consistent with the general practice of not identifying dissents by
named agencies in unclassified community publications. The INR and DOE
dissents on aluminum tubes, for example, were reflected in the
corresponding parts of the unclassified paper (both Key Judgments and
main text) by saying that ``most intelligence specialists'' believe the
tubes were intended for a centrifuge enrichment program but
that``some'' others believe they were for a conventional weapons
program. This clearly was reflecting an assessment of intent, not
capability. All agencies agreed in the NIE that the ``aluminum tubes
could be used to build gas centrifuges for a uranium enrichment
program.''
21. Senator Levin. Director Tenet, did the Intelligence Community
intend to present these views as judgments or as statements of fact?
Director Tenet. Finally, CIA and the Intelligence Community do not
have an established product type known as ``white paper,'' even though
they publish a variety of unclassified assessments and reports. The
closest previous equivalent to the 2002 paper on Iraqi WMD was a paper
on the same subject published in 1998. The 1998 paper had a white cover
and no agency attributions and was commonly referred to as a ``white
paper.'' The 1998 paper, like the 2002 paper, avoided any use of the
first person plural ``we'' and thus did not have any phrases such as
``we judge'' or ``we assess.''
uavs
22. Senator Levin. Admiral Jacoby, prior to the war, elements of
the Intelligence Community portrayed a serious threat to the U.S.
homeland from small Iraqi unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) equipped with
biological warfare (BW) agents. The Air Force intelligence component
did not agree with this view, and explained in the NIE that it believed
Iraq's small UAVs were intended for reconnaissance, not for BW agent
delivery. Prior to the war, did DIA analysts believe that Iraq's small
UAVs posed a serious threat to the U.S. homeland, or that they were
intended for reconnaissance?
Admiral Jacoby. [Deleted.]
mobile trailers
23. Senator Levin. Admiral Jacoby, does DIA believe the two
trailers found in Iraq were ``conclusive evidence'' that Iraq ``did in
fact have'' WMD programs? Has DIA concluded that the trailers were
intended or used for producing BW agents?
Admiral Jacoby. [Deleted.]
24. Senator Levin. Admiral Jacoby, it has been reported that DIA
arranged for independent technical analysis of the mobile trailers.
Please explain the DIA role and the conclusions of the alternative
analysis teams, and when they reached them. Please submit all
alternative analysis documents and reports to the committee within 2
weeks of receiving this question.
Admiral Jacoby. [Deleted.]
dia concerns about dod policy offices
25. Senator Levin. Admiral Jacoby, did you have any conversations
or other communications with either Secretary Rumsfeld or Deputy
Secretary Wolfowitz in which you expressed any concerns about either
the Office of Special Plans (OSP) or the Policy Counterterrorism
Evaluation Group within the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense
for Policy? If so, what were your concerns and how were they addressed?
Admiral Jacoby. I have had no conversations or other communications
with either Secretary Rumsfeld or Deputy Secretary Wolfowitz concerning
the OSP or the Policy Counterterrorism Evaluation Group. I was unaware
of the OSP's activities with the exception of a briefing I attended at
Central Intelligence Agency headquarters in mid-August 2002 on a
potential connection between al Qaeda and the Iraqi regime. I am also
unaware of the activities of the Policy Counterterrorism Group. Your
question is the first time that I have heard of this particular group.
al qaeda and zarqawi
26. Senator Levin. Director Tenet and Admiral Jacoby, the letter
from Abu Musab al-Zarqawi to senior al Qaeda leadership that was seized
in January offers assistance to al Qaeda in its fight against the
United States and groups in Iraq. The letter indicates that while there
may be affinity between the groups based on mutual goals, there was not
much of a relationship, if any, between the two groups prior to January
2004. What is the assessment of the Intelligence Community was there a
relationship between al Qaeda and Zarqawi's group, Ansar al Islam,
prior to January, and if so, how would you characterize it?
Director Tenet. [Deleted.]
Admiral Jacoby. [Deleted.]
27. Senator Levin. Director Tenet, there appears to be some
confusion about some of the relationships between terrorist groups,
which people characterize in different ways. I am particularly
interested in your assessment of the relationship between three main
groups: al Qaeda, the Zarqawi network, and Ansar al-Islam.
Some people use membership in these groups almost interchangeably,
while others use more careful language. For example, Secretary Powell,
when talking about terrorists in Baghdad, mentioned only Zarqawi and
his network, but appeared to be implying that al Qaeda personnel also
were being offered safe haven. Secretary Rumsfeld and National Security
Advisor Rice were more explicit, saying in September 2002 that al Qaeda
``members,'' ``personnel,'' and ``operatives'' were in Baghdad. In your
testimony last year, you described Zarqawi as a ``close associate'' of
al Qaeda, but that you didn't, at that point, have any evidence that
Zarqawi was under the control of the Iraqi regime. What is Zarqawi's
relationship with al Qaeda? Is he a member, an associate, an al Qaeda
planner, or something else?
Director Tenet. [Deleted.]
28. Senator Levin. Director Tenet, what is the importance of the
distinction that you appeared to draw between being an associate and a
member?
Director Tenet. [Deleted.]
29. Senator Levin. Director Tenet, what is the relationship between
al Qaeda and Ansar al-Islam? Ansar al-Islam's activities in northern
Iraq were sometimes attributed to al Qaeda. Is that an appropriate
characterization of that relationship?
Director Tenet. [Deleted.]
30. Senator Levin. Director Tenet, what is the distinction between
al Qaeda's and Ansar al-Islam's activities?
Director Tenet. [Deleted.]
nonproliferation/threat reduction programs
31. Senator Levin. Director Tenet, in a speech last month at the
National Defense University, President Bush spoke on nonproliferation
and made recommendations for further work. One of the areas was the
expansion of the nonproliferation program established by former Senator
Sam Nunn and Senator Richard Lugar. President Bush said: ``I propose to
expand our efforts to keep weapons from the Cold War and other
dangerous materials out of the wrong hands.'' What in your view are the
primary unaddressed threats that the Nunn-Lugar cooperative threat
reduction and nonproliferation programs at the Departments of Defense
and Energy should be expanded to address?
Director Tenet. [Deleted.]
pre-war planning for post-saddam iraq
32. Senator Levin. Director Tenet, were there pre-war assessments
of whether there would be a long, costly, bloody occupation with
significant U.S. casualties after Saddam Hussein was removed from
power? If so, what were the conclusions and to whom were they sent?
Director Tenet. [Deleted.]
33. Senator Levin. Director Tenet, what was the Intelligence
Community's pre-war assessment about the likelihood that foreign
terrorists would conduct operations in Iraq during and in the aftermath
of major combat operations?
Director Tenet. [Deleted.]
34. Senator Levin. Director Tenet, in the January 2004 edition of
The Atlantic Monthly, James Fallows describes a 2-day exercise
conducted by the National Intelligence Council at the CIA concerning
post-Saddam Iraq. Please describe the exercise, including its
objectives and results, and with whom they were shared. He reports that
the DOD prohibited military officials from participating. Is that
correct?
Director Tenet. [Deleted.]
35. Senator Levin. Director Tenet, in that same article, Mr.
Fallows writes: ``In late May [2002] the CIA had begun what would
become a long series of war-game exercises, to think through the best-
and worst-case scenarios after the overthrow of Saddam Hussein.'' Could
you describe these exercises, including the objectives and results, and
with whom they were shared?
Director Tenet. [Deleted.]
36. Senator Levin. Director Tenet, Mr. Fallows reports that,
although there were DOD officials at the first of these May sessions,
they were told not to continue participating. Were there DOD or
military officials at the initial sessions, and did they continue to
participate?
Director Tenet. [Deleted.]
37. Senator Levin. Director Tenet, what was the role of the CIA in
the DOD post-conflict planning effort, if any?
Director Tenet. [Deleted.]
______
Questions Submitted by Senator Daniel K. Akaka
north korean missile developments
38. Senator Akaka. Admiral Jacoby, in your testimony you state that
North Korea is continuing to develop its Taepo Dong 2 intercontinental
missile and you also cite press reports suggesting that North Korea is
preparing to field an intermediate range missile that could reach
Okinawa or Guam. Have the North Koreans flight tested more than once
the Taepo Dong and is it your assessment that they are placing more
emphasis on an intermediate range missile than an intercontinental
ballistic missile?
Admiral Jacoby. North Korea has flight tested the Taepo Dong 1 only
once, in August 1998. Neither the Taepo Dong 2 Intercontinental
Ballistic Missile/Space Launch Vehicle nor the new Intermediate Range
Missile have been flight tested. It is unclear at this time if the
North Koreans are emphasizing one missile over the other.
cruise missile developments
39. Senator Akaka. Admiral Jacoby, I want you to know I share your
concern about the proliferation of cruise missile developments. I
chaired a hearing on this subject in June 2002 in the Governmental
Affairs Committee so it has been a problem I have seen long on the
horizon. I do not know if you have seen it yet, but the General
Accounting Office (GAO) recently issued a report to the House
Government Reform Committee titled, ``Improvements Needed to Better
Control Technology Exports for Cruise Missiles and Unmanned Aerial
Vehicles.'' This follows a January GAO report on problems in enforcing
post-shipment verification of critical United States exports to
countries of concern, especially China. We keep on identifying a
problem. We know which countries place the greatest barriers to
verification but little changes. I hope you share my frustration. How
do we improve both our pre- and post-shipment controls on critical
exports?
Admiral Jacoby. The question would be best addressed by the
organizations directly involved in pre-license checks (PLCs) and post-
shipment verifications (PSVs)--the Department of State, Department of
Commerce, and the Defense Technology Security Administration (DTSA).
Representatives from the two departments are involved in administering
the PLCs and PSVs and the DTSA generally recommends the controls that
are implemented as a condition for selling export controlled
commodities.
proliferating countries
40. Senator Akaka. Admiral Jacoby, you stated that, ``Chinese
companies remain involved with nuclear and missile programs in Pakistan
and Iran. In some cases, entities from Russia and China are involved
without the knowledge of their governments.'' Your statement suggests
that, in some cases, Russian and Chinese entities are involved with the
knowledge of their governments. The press have reported that Chinese
nuclear weapon blueprints have been found in Libya. Is there
information that the Chinese government continues to be involved in
Pakistan's nuclear weapons program despite its commitments under the
Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty?
Admiral Jacoby. [Deleted.]
iraq
41. Senator Akaka. Admiral Jacoby, in the hearing, I asked you
about the security of conventional weapons depots in Iraq left over
from the Iraqi military. I would appreciate it if you could give me a
classified response to my question concerning whether or not there have
been any substantial thefts from these sites. If so, what has been
taken and under what type of security were these sites when they were
robbed?
Admiral Jacoby. [Deleted.]
42. Senator Akaka. Admiral Jacoby, I also asked you about trends in
violence in Iraq. Could you provide me with a more detailed response,
including statistics, as to whether or not there has been an increase
or decrease in the number of attacks in the southern part of Iraq over
the last 4 months?
Admiral Jacoby. [Deleted.]
43. Senator Akaka. Admiral Jacoby, I also asked you about the
treatment in northern Iraq of the Turkoman minority and you indicated
that there had been no violence against them. I would like to ask this
question again in order that you might be able to review their
situation for the record.
Admiral Jacoby. [Deleted.]
44. Senator Akaka. Director Tenet, you mentioned that violence in
Iraq continues from ``multiple groups'' and that while the daily
average of attacks against U.S. forces and our allies has declined
compared to November, the number is similar to that in August. Admiral
Jacoby notes that Iraqi terrorists ``have adjusted to coalition
tactics.'' Would you say that there are more groups attacking our
forces and that they are more lethal or do you think there are fewer
groups having less impact?
Director Tenet. As of late June, the overall number of attacks
against the Coalition has been steady for the past 2 months but is
higher than any period last year. The number of groups changes on a
daily basis as additional groups form or as some merge together. Some
of the groups carrying out these attacks--primarily the Zarqawi
organization--have focused on high-visibility, high-casualty events
such as suicide and car-bombings. These limited number, high impact
attacks give the appearance of increased lethality, while the majority
of the attacks do not cause casualties or damage coalition equipment or
facilities.
45. Senator Akaka. Director Tenet, do you detect any change in the
intensity or frequency of the attacks?
Director Tenet. [Deleted].
46. Senator Akaka. Director Tenet, the Coalition Provisional
Authority (CPA) was instrumental in forming a number of municipal and
provincial councils. Are these councils viewed by Iraqis as legitimate
political leaders? If they are not, how do you think it will affect the
political transition in Iraq?
Director Tenet. [Deleted.]
47. Senator Akaka. Director Tenet, related to the legitimacy of the
political transition, are secular parties growing in influence in Iraq
or are Islamic parties becoming more influential?
Director Tenet. [Deleted.]
48. Senator Akaka. Director Tenet, you mention that oil production
is increasing and the need to protect facilities from insurgent
sabotage. I wonder if you could comment on the attacks on Iraqi
infrastructure, especially in the South. Are these increasing? If so,
does the increase indicate less stability in the South?
Director Tenet. While the insurgents have attacked the oil
infrastructure sporadically since last summer, attack levels over the
last couple of months are higher than last year and appear more focused
on the key components of the infrastructure. This sharper focus,
however, is not the result of a less stable Shia-dominated south.
Rather, insurgent groups are operating more effectively from areas they
have been in before.
islamic insurgents in thailand
49. Senator Akaka. Director Tenet, there seems to be an increase in
conflict along the Thai-Malaysian border by Islamic insurgents. How
serious are these attacks? Do you believe they are coming from
terrorist groups linked to al Qaeda?
Director Tenet. [Deleted.]
islamic insurgents in indonesia
50. Senator Akaka. Director Tenet, there are going to presidential
elections in Indonesia later this year. The Indonesian government has
been cooperating in the war on terrorism but Indonesia is a society
with a tradition of Islamic fundamentalism. Do you see an increase in
the number of Islamic terrorist groups operating in Indonesia and do
you believe that the government will find it easier or harder to
cooperate with the United States, during this election year, in the war
on terrorism?
Director Tenet. [Deleted.]
situation in pakistan
51. Senator Akaka. Director Tenet, I asked you how serious the
Pakistani government is about ending Khan's activities. You indicated
that you could respond in classified session to my questions concerning
whether or not the government has imposed any penalties on him. For
example, does he still own his million dollar homes? Also, have we been
given access to his interrogation reports including his confession?
Director Tenet. [Deleted].
other wmd networks
52. Senator Akaka. Director Tenet, could you describe your efforts
to roll up other networks of WMD private entrepreneurs such as that run
by Q.C. Chen, whose businesses the United States has sanctioned in the
past?
Director Tenet. [Deleted].
intelligence assessments of iraq
53. Senator Akaka. Director Tenet, I also asked you in open session
whether or not the NIE on Iraq produced in October 2002 was
substantially different in its conclusions than the Intelligence
Community document produced in 2000. You indicated that the CIA could
provide a detailed comparison of changes in assessments going back 10
years. I appreciate the offer but do not require that information at
this time. However, I would appreciate a detailed response to my
question as to whether or not conclusions by the Intelligence Community
in 2000 were substantially different from the NIE in October 2002 and,
if so, how?
Director Tenet. [Deleted.]
54. Senator Akaka. Director Tenet and Admiral Jacoby, last
September I asked Secretary Wolfowitz if our pre-war intelligence
assessments failed to predict the possibility of a guerrilla war in the
post-war environment. In his response he focused on the potential
disasters of refugees, starvation, the use of WMD, epidemics, and
destruction of the oil infrastructure that were averted or anticipated
in our pre-war planning but did not mention the intensity of attacks
from various groups. Do you think we adequately anticipated the level
and intensity of guerrilla attacks against Coalition Forces in the
post-war situation?
Director Tenet. [Deleted.]
Admiral Jacoby. [Deleted.]
searching for osama bin laden
55. Senator Akaka. Director Tenet, you indicated to me in open
session that you could provide a better response classified to my
question as to whether or not you are satisfied with the Pakistani
counterterrorism strategy in this latest effort to get Osama bin Laden
and, if not, what causes you concern?
Director Tenet. [Deleted].
[Whereupon, at 12:39 p.m., the committee adjourned.]