[Senate Hearing 108-855]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
S. Hrg. 108-855
THE REPORT OF THE SPECIAL ADVISOR TO THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL
INTELLIGENCE FOR STRATEGY REGARDING IRAQI WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION
PROGRAMS
=======================================================================
HEARING
before the
COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES
UNITED STATES SENATE
ONE HUNDRED EIGHTH CONGRESS
SECOND SESSION
__________
OCTOBER 6, 2004
__________
Printed for the use of the Committee on Armed Services
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COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES
JOHN WARNER, Virginia, Chairman
JOHN McCAIN, Arizona CARL LEVIN, Michigan
JAMES M. INHOFE, Oklahoma EDWARD M. KENNEDY, Massachusetts
PAT ROBERTS, Kansas ROBERT C. BYRD, West Virginia
WAYNE ALLARD, Colorado JOSEPH I. LIEBERMAN, Connecticut
JEFF SESSIONS, Alabama JACK REED, Rhode Island
SUSAN M. COLLINS, Maine DANIEL K. AKAKA, Hawaii
JOHN ENSIGN, Nevada BILL NELSON, Florida
JAMES M. TALENT, Missouri E. BENJAMIN NELSON, Nebraska
SAXBY CHAMBLISS, Georgia MARK DAYTON, Minnesota
LINDSEY O. GRAHAM, South Carolina EVAN BAYH, Indiana
ELIZABETH DOLE, North Carolina HILLARY RODHAM CLINTON, New York
JOHN CORNYN, Texas MARK PRYOR, Arkansas
Judith A. Ansley, Staff Director
Richard D. DeBobes, Democratic Staff Director
(ii)
C O N T E N T S
__________
CHRONOLOGICAL LIST OF WITNESSES
The Report of the Special Advisor to the Director of Central
Intelligence for Strategy Regarding Iraqi Weapons of Mass Destruction
Programs
october 6, 2004
Page
Duelfer, Charles A., Special Advisor to the Director of Central
Intelligence on Iraq's Weapons of Mass Destruction............. 6
McMenamin, Brig. Gen. Joseph J., USMC, Commander, Iraq Survey
Group.......................................................... 18
(iii)
THE REPORT OF THE SPECIAL ADVISOR TO THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL
INTELLIGENCE FOR STRATEGY REGARDING IRAQI WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION
PROGRAMS
----------
WEDNESDAY, OCTOBER 6, 2004
U.S. Senate,
Committee on Armed Services,
Washington, DC.
The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 2:44 p.m. in room
SH-216, Hart Senate Office Building, Senator John Warner
(chairman) presiding.
Committee members present: Senators Warner, McCain, Inhofe,
Allard, Sessions, Talent, Graham, Cornyn, Levin, Kennedy, Reed,
Akaka, Bill Nelson, E. Benjamin Nelson, Dayton, Clinton, and
Pryor.
Committee staff members present: Judith A. Ansley, staff
director; and Leah C. Brewer, nominations and hearings clerk.
Majority staff members present: Charles W. Alsup,
professional staff member; Regina A. Dubey, research assistant;
and Paula J. Philbin, professional staff member.
Minority staff members present: Richard D. DeBobes,
Democratic staff director; Madelyn R. Creedon, minority
counsel; Richard W. Fieldhouse, professional staff member; and
William G.P. Monahan, minority counsel.
Staff assistants present: Andrew W. Florell, Bridget E.
Ward, and Nicholas West.
Committee members' assistants present: Darren M. Dick,
assistant to Senator Roberts; Arch Galloway, assistant to
Senator Sessions; Lindsey R. Neas, assistant to Senator Talent;
Clyde A. Taylor IV, assistant to Senator Chambliss; Meredith
Moseley, assistant to Senator Graham; Russell J. Thomasson,
assistant to Senator Cornyn; Sharon L. Waxman and Mieke Y.
Eoyang, assistants to Senator Kennedy; Elizabeth King,
assistant to Senator Reed; Davelyn Noelani Kalipi, assistant to
Senator Akaka; William K. Sutey, assistant to Senator Bill
Nelson; Eric Pierce, assistant to Senator E. Benjamin Nelson;
Mark Phillip Jones, assistant to Senator Dayton; Andrew
Shapiro, assistant to Senator Clinton; and Terri Glaze,
assistant to Senator Pryor.
OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR JOHN WARNER, CHAIRMAN
Chairman Warner. The committee meets today to receive the
testimony from Charles A. Duelfer, the Special Advisor to the
Director of Central Intelligence (DCI) on Iraq's Weapons of
Mass Destruction (WMD), concerning his report on efforts to
determine the status of WMD and related programs in Iraq. Mr.
Duelfer is joined by Brigadier General Joseph P. McMenamin,
United States Marine Corps, Military Commander of the Iraqi
Survey Group (ISG).
This is the sixth time the committee has received testimony
from the top leaders of the ISG. Our committee views the work
of this group as a very important part of our overall policy,
objectives, and aims in Iraq.
We welcome both. We thank you for your service under
difficult and often personally dangerous conditions. When
Senator Stevens, Senator Hollings, and I met with Mr. Duelfer
and the ISG in Baghdad this past March, we witnessed first-hand
the damaged vehicles that you utilize in the daily operation of
your work and the consequent hazards that you face, not only
yourself but all of your team. America, indeed the world, is
indebted to you for this risky operation that you have
performed and are continuing, General, to perform.
The mission of the ISG has been to search for all facts--
and I repeat, all facts--relevant to the many issues involving
Iraqi WMD and related programs, their status in the past and
today, and what they might have been in the future. This very
complex, difficult mission will continue until all possible
leads are exhausted. Patience will continue to be required to
ensure that this mission is completed with a thorough
assessment of all facts.
I think we should step back a minute in history and
remember that the issue of Iraq's possession and use of WMD has
a long history. Iraq used chemical weapons against Iran during
the Iran-Iraq War and against their own people, the Kurds.
In 1991, following the first Gulf War, the United Nations
(U.N.) Security Council adopted Resolution 687, which stated
``Iraq shall unconditionally accept the destruction, removal,
or rendering harmless under international supervision all
chemical and biological weapons and stocks of agents and
related subsystems and components and all research,
development, support, and manufacturing facilities related
thereto, all ballistic missiles with a range greater than 150
kilometers and related major parts and repair and production
facilities.''
This was a clear statement of policy by the world community
confirming the existence of such weapons and programs.
What followed was 12 years of Iraqi obstruction and 12 of
the 17 additional U.N. Security Council resolutions demanding
Iraq compliance with its 1991 obligations to destroy its WMD
and capabilities. In other words, the U.N. had to repeatedly
try to enforce the purposes of Resolution 687 with subsequent
resolutions. There was no doubt about Iraq's capabilities and
intentions in this area in that period.
Now, in November 2002 U.N. Security Council Resolution 1441
recognized--I underline the word ``recognized''--and I quote
it, ``the threat Iraq's noncompliance with Council resolutions
and proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and long-range
missiles poses to international peace and security.''
Continuing, it said: ``The fact that Iraq has not provided
an accurate, full, final, and complete disclosure, as required
by Resolution 687 of all aspects of its programs to develop
weapons of mass destruction and ballistic missiles.''
We are still to this day seeking a full, final, and
complete disclosure of all the facts on this issue, and I
compliment both of you for your efforts to achieve that goal.
In this hearing today we will receive your assessment of what
has been accomplished, what conclusions have been reached
concerning Iraqi WMD programs, and what, in your professional
judgment, remains to be done by the ISG.
The findings of Mr. Duelfer and the ISG have been
significant. While the ISG has not found stockpiles of WMD, the
ISG and other coalition elements have developed a body of fact
that shows that Saddam Hussein had: first, the strategic
intention to continue to pursue WMD capabilities; and second,
created ambiguity about his WMD capabilities that he used to
extract concessions from the international community. He used
it as a bargaining tactic and as a strategic deterrent against
his neighbors and others.
He had ongoing WMD research programs. He also had a
capability for quickly reviving chemical weapons production, on
a large scale within months. Examples: mustard gas within 3 to
6 months and nerve agents within 2 years.
Furthermore, Saddam Hussein deceived U.N. inspectors for
over 12 years. Lastly, he systematically attempted to thwart
and undermine U.N. and other international sanctions.
These are important lessons we must apply to current and
future U.S. and international efforts to stop the scourge of
proliferation of such weapons elsewhere in the world.
It is clear from your statements, and Mr. Duelfer's
reports, that your conclusions differ from the prewar
assessments of our Intelligence Community, differ from the
assessments of the U.N., and differ from the assessments of
intelligence services of many other nations. That is a cause
for concern. The Intelligence Committee report on prewar
intelligence concerning WMD programs concluded that there were
shortcomings in the intelligence provided to the policymakers
and to Congress. Your report lends credence to the conclusions
of that committee. My understanding, I am a member of that
committee, is that you testified before that committee this
morning.
We must understand why and take corrective measures. Our
policymakers must be able to rely on the intelligence they are
provided and our battlefield commanders must have sound
intelligence. The lives of our men and women in uniform and
many others are dependent on that intelligence, as is the
security of our Nation.
As we speak, over 1,700 individuals, military and civilian,
are in Iraq and Qatar, continuing the search for facts about
Iraq's WMD programs. The ISG has had some of the best and the
brightest of our military and our Intelligence Community to
accomplish this task, and we thank them for their service.
Thank you, Mr. Duelfer, for the service that you have
provided to our Nation; and, General McMenamin, for the service
that you and the ISG are continuing to provide. We look forward
to your testimony.
[The prepared statement of Senator Warner follows:]
Prepared Statement by Senator John Warner
The committee meets today to receive testimony from Charles A.
Duelfer, the Special Advisor to the Director of Central Intelligence
Regarding Iraqi Weapons of Mass Destruction Programs concerning his
report on efforts to determine the status of weapons of mass
destruction and related programs in Iraq. Mr. Duelfer is joined by
Brigadier General Joseph J. McMenamin, USMC, Military Commander of the
Iraq Survey Group. This is the sixth time the Committee has received
testimony from the top leaders of the Iraq Survey Group.
We welcome Mr. Duelfer and General McMenamin today. We thank you
for your service under difficult, dangerous conditions. When Senator
Stevens, Senator Hollings and I met with Mr. Duelfer and the ISG in
Baghdad in March, the bullet-riddled vehicles outside your headquarters
were testament to the hazards you and your team endure on a daily
basis.
The mission of the Iraq Survey Group has been to search for all
facts relevant to the many issues involving Iraqi weapons of mass
destruction and related programs. This very complex, difficult mission
will continue on until all possible leads are exhausted. Patience will
continue to be required to ensure we complete a thorough assessment of
this important issue.
In this hearing today, we will receive your assessment of what has
been accomplished, what conclusions you have reached concerning Iraqi
WMD and programs, and what, in your professional judgment, remains to
be done by the Iraq Survey Group.
The findings of the Mr. Duelfer and the Iraq Survey Group have been
significant. While the ISG has not found stockpiles of WMD, the ISG and
other coalition elements have developed a body of fact that shows that
Saddam Hussein had:
the strategic intention to continue to pursue WMD
capabilities;
created ambiguity about his WMD capabilities that he
used to extract concessions on the international stage and as a
strategic deterrent;
ongoing WMD research programs;
a capability for quickly reviving chemical weapons
production on a large scale within months--mustard gas within
3-6 months and nerve agents within 2 years;
deceived U.N. inspectors for over 12 years; and
systematically attempted to thwart and undermine U.N.
and other international sanctions.
These are important lessons we must apply to current and future
U.S. and international efforts to stop the scourge of proliferation
around the world.
It is clear from your statements and Mr. Duelfer's report that your
conclusions differ from the pre-war assessments of our intelligence
community, differ from the assessments of the U.N., and differ from the
assessments of intelligence services of many other nations. That is
cause for concern. The Intelligence Committee report on pre-war
intelligence concerning WMD programs concluded that there were
shortcomings in the intelligence provided to the policymakers and to
Congress. Your report lends credence to those conclusions. We must
understand why and take corrective measures. Our policymakers must be
able to rely on the intelligence they are provided, and our battlefield
commanders must have sound intelligence. The lives of our men and women
in uniform depend on it, as does the security of our Nation.
As we speak, over 1,700 individuals--military and civilian--are in
Iraq and Qatar continuing the search for facts about Iraq's WMD
programs. The ISG has some of the best and the brightest of our
military and our Intelligence Community to accomplish this task, and we
thank them for their service.
We thank Mr. Duelfer for the service he has provided to our Nation
and General McMenamin for the service he and the ISG continue to
provide. We look forward to your testimony.
Senator Levin.
STATEMENT OF SENATOR CARL LEVIN
Senator Levin. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Let me first join
you in welcoming our witnesses, Mr. Duelfer and General
McMenamin. Thank you both for your presence and for your
service to this Nation.
The Iraq Survey Group began its mission in June 2003. Its
mission was very clear and it was stated to be the following by
the former DCI, George Tenet: ``Search for Iraq's weapons of
mass destruction.'' It has been 15 months since the ISG began
its work. The ISG, with some 1,750 employees and having made
visits to 1,200 suspect WMD sites, has not found WMD in Iraq,
nor evidence that Iraq had stockpiles of such weapons at the
start of the war.
It is important to emphasize that central fact because the
administration's case for going to war against Iraq rested on
the twin arguments that Saddam Hussein had existing stockpiles
of WMD and that he might give WMD to al Qaeda to attack us, as
al Qaeda had attacked us on September 11. So the fundamental
conclusion of the ISG effort means that the administration's
two major arguments for going to war against Iraq were
incorrect.
We did not go to war because Saddam had future intentions
to obtain WMD. The administration told the American people that
we had to attack Iraq because Iraq possessed stockpiles of WMD
and that they were allied with terrorists like al Qaeda, to
whom Iraq would like to give such weapons.
Here are just a few examples:
In August 2002, Vice President Cheney said, ``Simply
stated, there is no doubt that Saddam Hussein now has weapons
of mass destruction. There is no doubt he is amassing them to
use against our friends, our allies, and against us.''
President Bush asserted on September 26, 2002, that, ``The
Iraqi regime possesses biological and chemical weapons.'' One
day later he spoke of ``The stockpiles of anthrax that we know
he has or VX, the biological weapons which he possesses.''
In September 2003, Vice President Cheney described Iraq as
the ``geographic base of the terrorists who have had us under
assault now for many years, but most especially on September
11.''
On October 7, 2002, President Bush said: ``Iraq could
decide on any given day to provide a biological or chemical
weapon to a terrorist group or individual terrorists. Alliance
with terrorists could allow the Iraqi regime to attack America
without allowing any fingerprints.''
In his March 17, 2003, speech to the Nation on the eve of
the war, President Bush said, ``The danger is clear. Using
chemical, biological, or one day nuclear weapons obtained with
the help of Iraq, the terrorists could fulfill their stated
ambitions and kill thousands or hundreds of thousands of
innocent people in our country or any other.''
Now, these are just a few examples of many similar
statements made by senior administration officials before the
war. So today before we delve into a speculative discussion
about Saddam's possible future intentions with respect to WMD,
it is important to return to the starting point for the
administration's argument for going to war. Namely, that Saddam
possessed stockpiles of chemical and biological weapons and
might give them to terrorists to attack us.
We have heard many claims before the war about Iraq's
weapons and efforts to build more deadly weapons. The American
people were told about aluminum tubes that Vice President
Cheney said we knew with ``absolute certainty'' were intended
for nuclear weapons, and which Condoleezza Rice said were
``really only suitable for nuclear weapons programs.''
We were told about unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) in
Saddam Hussein's possession that were intended for delivering
biological weapons, including against the U.S. homeland. We
were told about Iraqi efforts to obtain uranium from Africa.
These allegations, like the assertions about Iraq having WMD
and their stockpiles, were all wrong, and that is what today's
report will state.
After the war started, the administration began an effort
to change the subject of the debate, from the actual presence
of WMD to WMD programs, then to WMD-related program activities,
and more recently to speculation about intentions. However,
that effort cannot obscure the historical fact and the critical
fact that is most critical to the American people, that, as
President Bush's Press Secretary acknowledged ``Iraq has
weapons of mass destruction. That is what the war was about and
is about.''
We welcome this report today. We commend both of you again
for making yourselves available today. We also want to thank
you for making this an unclassified report. Given the
importance of this issue, the public deserves to know as much
as possible about the details. We look forward to your
testimony.
Chairman Warner. Thank you, Senator Levin.
Mr. Duelfer.
STATEMENT OF CHARLES A. DUELFER, SPECIAL ADVISOR TO THE
DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE ON IRAQ'S WEAPONS OF MASS
DESTRUCTION
Mr. Duelfer. Senators, thank you very much for the
opportunity to appear here today.
Chairman Warner. You have an extensive prepared written
statement, which will be placed into the record in its
entirety. The same with you, General.
Mr. Duelfer. Okay, thank you.
I would also like to thank those of you who came out and
visited in Baghdad. That means a lot to the people doing this
work, to know that there are people who really are interested
in the work that goes on out there. I know it is a difficult
trip to make. It is not a safe trip to make but I welcome it. I
know that General McMenamin welcomes it and I think it is a
useful thing to do. You do get a sense of what goes on on the
ground. Thank you very much.
The relationship between Iraq and the rest of the world has
been complicated and dangerous for three decades, a dilemma
that has confounded the international community through much of
recent history. Three wars, devastating sanctions, and an
endless progression of intelligence crises have eroded or
ruined thousands of lives. The region and Iraq are both
complicated and unstable and obviously very dangerous. Weapons
of mass destruction have added to the uncertainty and risk
posed by an unpredictable and clearly aggressive regime in
Baghdad.
This report is not simply an accounting of the program
fragments that we have examined in the aftermath of the recent
war and the ongoing conflict. Nor is it my aim merely to
describe the status of a program at a single point in time. The
complexity and importance of the question deserve a more
synthetic approach in my opinion. Instead, the objective of
this report is to identify the dynamics of the regime's WMD
decisions over time. I want to identify the area under the
curve, not just a single point on a trend line that may be
going up or down. In other words, this problem deserves
calculus, not algebra. Thus, the report I have prepared
attempts to describe Iraqi WMD programs, not in isolation, but
in the context of the aims and objectives of the regime that
created and used them, which is not to say that I am not going
to look at the artifacts and what we did find at the given
point in time when we began work.
I have also insisted that the report include as much basic
data as reasonable and that it be unclassified. Since the
tragedy that has been Iraq has exacted such a huge cost for so
many for so long, I feel strongly that the data we have
accumulated be presented in as thorough a manner as possible to
enable others to draw their own conclusions. Certainly I have a
concept of the dynamics that underlay the course that Saddam
followed with WMD and this is conveyed in the report. Others,
including Iraqis themselves, may examine this and conclude
otherwise.
The report consists of six chapters and includes, at the
end, a timeline showing key events that bear on the Iraqi WMD
program. Aiming to introduce the reader to the Iraqi frame of
reference, the report begins with an analysis of the nature of
the regime and its aims in chapter one. As compared with most
countries, fathoming the intentions of the regime is made
easier in Iraq because it really boils down to understanding
one person, Saddam Hussein, who was the regime. The highly
personalized nature of the Iraqi dictatorship under Saddam,
with its multiplicity of security organs and unclear, often
overlapping lines of authority, progressively created a
governmental system of operating alien to those steeped in the
norms of western democracies.
An understanding of the workings of the Iraqi system of
governance is important so that evidence, or the lack of
evidence, can be evaluated within the frame of reference of
Baghdad and not the frame of reference of Washington, London,
or Canberra. For example, given the nature of Iraqi governance,
one should not look for much of an audit trail on WMD. Even
Saddam's most senior ministers did not want to be in a position
to tell him bad news or make recommendations from which he
would recoil. The most successful and long-lived advisors were
those who could anticipate his intentions. Hence, there was a
very powerful role for implicit guidance. This was particularly
the case for the most sensitive issues, such as actions related
to human rights or WMD.
This dynamic limits the evidence that one might expect to
find, that is, little documentation or senior advisors who
could honestly say that they had instructions on certain
matters. This of course makes it risky to draw conclusions
about the absence of evidence, a continuous problem that we
found in Iraq.
Further obfuscating the picture is the fact that Baghdad
had long experience in dealing with inspection by western
outsiders. From the experience of dealing with U.N. inspectors,
the Iraqis learned a great deal about what signatures we looked
for, and I point out I spent many years in that activity
myself. Iraqis generally knew a lot more about us than we did
about them. For various reasons, their ability and desire to
conceal their intentions and capabilities were quite good.
Beyond a discussion of how the regime operated, the report
also provides a sense of Saddam's goals, aspirations, and
political vision as a means to better understand his decisions
about WMD, their development, use, and destruction and role in
the future realization of his political-military aims for the
Iraqi nation.
We have tried to understand his objectives and how he
developed and used power. I point out that after the 1991 war
Saddam established as his prime objective, taking into account
survival of course, the termination of U.N. sanctions on Iraq
and he weighed all policy actions and steps for their impact on
this overarching objective.
Saddam committed the brightest minds and much national
treasure to developing WMD. Moreover, Saddam saw this
investment as having paid vital dividends. Senior Iraqis state
that only through the use of long-range ballistic missiles and
the extensive use of chemical weapons did Iraq avoid defeat in
the war with Iran, and there was a second, less obvious
instance where the regime attributes its survival to the
possession of WMD. In the run-up to the 1991 war, Iraq loaded,
dispersed, and Saddam pre-delegated the authority to use
biological and chemical weapons if the coalition proceeded to
Baghdad.
The regime and Saddam believed that the possession of WMD
deterred the United States from going to Baghdad in 1991.
Moreover, it has been clear, in my discussions with senior
Iraqis, that they clearly understand that they blundered in
invading Kuwait before completing their nuclear weapons
program. Had they waited, the outcome would have been quite
different.
Finally, Saddam also used chemical weapons for domestic
purposes, in the late 1980s against the Kurds and, as we
learned in our work at ISG, during the Shia uprisings
immediately after the 1991 war.
Again, in this first chapter, aspects of Saddam's
decisionmaking were examined by identification of several key
inflection points when Saddam made a choice affecting WMD.
Several such points have been identified and dissected to see
the dynamics of these decisions. This tool of using a timeline
and identifying key inflection points is also useful in
tracking his strategy and tactics toward the U.N. and the
sanctions imposed by the U.N. Security Council. Saddam's
personal direction of much of Iraq's relations with the U.N.
reflected his approach to influence and is described in some
detail in the report.
Overall, the hope is that not only will we see what Saddam
decided to do with WMD, but why. This may be instructive for
future policy considerations and certainly for future
intelligence considerations.
The second chapter of the report is an extensive analysis
of Iraq's financing and procurement, our bid to identify the
resources available to Baghdad and examine how they were
allocated. We made it a high priority to obtain complete
information from the Oil Ministry and the State Oil Marketing
Organization. These data were extremely valuable in obtaining
an understanding of how the regime operated in its priorities.
This is a way of bounding the problem in a sense. Because Iraq
had limited resources, that was one of the ways we could
delimit our analysis. It turned out to be quite instructive.
Our investigation makes clear that the top priority for
Saddam was to escape the economic stranglehold of the U.N.
sanctions. Sanctions limited his ambitions in many ways and
took an enormous toll on Iraqi society. The disintegration of
the middle class, civil infrastructure, the health system, and
the blight on the hope of young Iraqis were clear through the
1990s. The U.N. Security Council, in attempting to mitigate the
effects of sanctions on innocent Iraqis, created the Oil-for-
Food program. It is instructive that the regime rejected the
opportunity to export oil for civil goods until conditions were
so bad that they threatened the survival of the regime.
This chapter makes clear the range of steps the regime took
to erode support for and the efficacy of the U.N. sanctions
program. The steps the regime took to erode sanctions are
obvious in the analysis of how revenues, particularly those
derived from the Oil-for-Food program, were used. Over time
sanctions had steadily weakened, to the point where Iraq, in
roughly the 2000 to 2001 time frame, was confidently designing
missiles around components that could only be obtained outside
of sanctions. Moreover, illicit revenues grew to quite
substantial levels during this same period, and it is
instructive to see how and where the regime allocated these
funds.
Our investigation also makes quite clear how Baghdad
exploited the mechanism for executing the Oil-for-Food program
to give individuals and countries an economic stake in ending
sanctions. The regime followed a pattern that Saddam has
applied throughout his career of offering rewards and a
rationale for accepting them, successfully arguing its case
that the sanctions were harming the innocent and that the moral
choice was to elude and diminish them.
It is grossly obvious how successful the regime was. It is
also grossly obvious how the sanctions perverted not just the
national system of finance and economics, but to some extent
international markets and organizations. The procurement and
finance section notes that a sizable portion of the illicit
revenues generated under the Oil-for-Food program went to the
Military-Industrial Commission, that is the government-run
military-industrial establishment. The funding for this
organization, which had responsibility for many of the past WMD
programs, went from approximately $7.8 million in 1998 to $350
million in 2001. During this period of growing resource
availability, many military programs were carried out,
including many involving the willing export to Iraq of military
items prohibited by the Security Council. I would note that
some members of the Security Council participated in violating
those very same resolutions.
The remaining four chapters deal with the different types
of WMD programs which Iraq had previously worked. The first of
these, the delivery system chapter, describes the work Iraq had
been pursuing with respect to missiles and UAVs. Iraq continued
to work on missile delivery systems in the wake of the Gulf
War. Some missile activity was permitted in fact by the U.N.
resolutions.
Saddam drew a distinction, however, between long-range
missiles and other WMD, a distinction not drawn in the U.N.
resolutions. Iraq's missile development infrastructure
continued to develop under sanctions and included work on
propulsion, fuels, and even guidance systems. As more funding
became available following the implementation of the Oil-for-
Food program, Saddam directed more missile activities. In the
latter years, more foreign assistance was brought in, including
both technology and technical expertise.
While it is clear that Saddam wanted a long-range missile,
there was little work done on warheads. It is apparent that he
drew the line at that point, so long as sanctions remained.
However, while the development of ballistic missile delivery
systems is time-consuming, if and when Saddam decided to place
a nonconventional warhead on the missile this could be done
quite quickly. The chemical weapons and biological weapons
warheads put on Iraqi missiles in 1990 and 1991, for example,
were built in months.
A couple of points are of interest from the Iraqi missile
efforts. One is that they did not abide by the range limits set
in U.N. Security Council Resolution 686. The range capabilities
of the ballistic missiles they were developing exceeded the
stated limits. Iraq also used components from SA-2 surface-to-
air missile engines that they had been expressly prohibited
from doing. Iraq also produced fuel that was not declared. They
also tested UAVs in excess of the range limits.
Iraq missile developers became so confident that others
would violate the sanctions that they designed new missile
systems which depended upon the import of guidance systems,
which were prohibited by sanctions. Further, they drew upon
foreign expertise that was readily available for such areas as
propulsion, again in violation of the sanctions.
The next chapter is on nuclear programs and it reviews the
program up to the 1991 war and describes the activities of the
scientists and engineers following the war. The analysis shows
that despite Saddam's expressed desire to retain knowledge of
his nuclear team and his attempts to retain some key parts of
the program, during the course of the following 12 years Iraq's
ability to produce a weapon decayed steadily.
Sanctions and inspections lasted longer than Saddam
anticipated. The inspections were also much more intrusive than
expected. Therefore, retention of weapons material put at risk
his higher immediate objective of escaping sanctions.
Nevertheless, Saddam's son-in-law and chief weapons developing
manager, Hussein Kamal, directed that design information and
very limited physical material be hidden from inspectors. These
concealment efforts were successful until Hussein Kamal fled to
Jordan in 1995.
There were also efforts to retain the intellectual capital
of nuclear scientists by forbidding their departure from Iraq
and keeping them employed in government areas. However, over
time there was decay in the team. Unlike other WMD areas,
nuclear weapons development requires thousands of knowledgeable
scientists as well as a large physical plant. Even with the
intention of keeping these talented people employed, a natural
decay took place and the time it would take for Iraq to build a
nuclear weapon tended to increase for the duration of the
sanctions.
The Iraqi Atomic Energy Commission utilized the same people
on a range of projects during the 1990s and addressed technical
problems akin to those in nuclear weapons development. These
efforts, however, cannot be explicitly tied to an intention to
revive a nuclear weapons program.
Despite this decay, Saddam did not abandon his nuclear
ambitions. He made his view clear that nuclear weapons were the
right of any country that could build them. He was very
attentive to the growing Iranian threat, especially its
potential nuclear component, and he stated that he would do
whatever it took to offset the Iranian threat, clearly implying
matching Tehran's nuclear capabilities.
Saddam observed that India and Pakistan had slipped across
the nuclear weapons boundary quite successfully. Those around
Saddam seemed quite convinced that once sanctions were ended
and all other things being equal, Saddam would renew his
efforts in this field.
The chapters dealing with chemical weapons and biological
weapons tell somewhat different stories. In the chemical
weapons area, the Iraqis had long experience with production
and use of mustard and nerve agents. In Baghdad's view, these
weapons saved Iraq from defeat in the war with Iran and, in
combination with biological weapons capabilities, deterred the
United States from deposing the regime in 1991. Following the
Iran-Iraq War, Iraqi chemical weapons activity shifted from
production to research and development of more potent and
stabilized agents. In contrast to the nuclear field, chemical
weapons work requires not thousands of scientists, but
hundreds. The top expertise was developed among a few dozen
scientists and chemical production engineers.
Once inspections began in 1991, Iraq chose to yield most of
its weapons and bulk agent as well as the large facilities that
were widely known to exist. As in the other WMD areas, Saddam
sought to sustain the request knowledge base to restart the
program eventually and, to the extent it did not threaten the
Iraqi effort to get out from sanctions, he chose to sustain the
inherent capability to produce such weapons as circumstances
permitted in the future.
Over time and with the infusion of funding and resources
following acceptance of the Oil-for-Food program, Iraq
effectively shortened the time that would be required to
reestablish the chemical weapons production capacity. Some of
this was a natural collateral benefit of developing an
indigenous chemical production infrastructure. By 2003, Iraq
would have been able to produce mustard agent in a period of
months and nerve agent in less than 1 or 2 years. We have not
come across explicit guidance from Saddam on this point. Yet it
was an inherent consequence of his decision to develop a
domestic chemical production capacity.
Iraq denied it had offensive biological weapons programs to
inspectors in 1991 and secretly destroyed existing stocks of
weapons and agent in 1991 to 1992. Iraq decided to retain the
main biological weapons production facility, but under a guise
of using it to produce single-cell protein for animal feed.
These decisions were taken with Saddam's explicit approval.
Saddam clearly understood the nature of biological weapons. He
personally authorized their dispersal for use in 1991 against
coalition forces, Saudi Arabia, and Israel. He clearly took
steps to preserve this capability and was successful until
1995.
Preservation of Iraq's biological weapons capabilities was
simpler than any other WMD area because of the nature of the
material. First, the number of experts required is quite small,
perhaps a couple dozen. Then too, the infrastructure to produce
agent can be readily assembled from quite simple domestic
civilian plants. Moreover, little, if any, activity would be
necessary to keep this option on the shelf.
Some activity that might have been related to a biological
program has been examined closely, including work with a bio-
pesticide, bacillus thuringiensis. While this work could have
been related to advancing Iraqi anthrax knowledge, information
is inconclusive. This work could and certainly did sustain the
talent needed to restart a potential biological weapons
program. However, we can form no absolute conclusion whether
this work represented active efforts to develop further anthrax
programs. Given the developing infrastructure in Iraq in the
late 1990s and early 2000, such a reconstitution could be
accomplished quite quickly.
Other aspects of the Iraqi biological weapons program
remain cloudy. For example, it is still difficult to rule on
whether Iraq had a mobile biological weapons production effort
or made any attempts to work with smallpox as a weapon. We were
able to eliminate some of the questions and resolve some of the
questions which circulated about the mobile question earlier,
and I can deal with those in questioning.
What is clear is that Saddam retained his notions of the
use of force and had experience that demonstrated the utility
of WMD. He was making progress in eroding sanctions, a lot of
progress, and had it not been for the events of September 11,
2001, things would have taken a very different course for the
regime. Most senior members of the regime and scientists
assumed that the programs would begin in earnest when sanctions
ended, and sanctions were eroding.
A variety of questions about Iraqi WMD capabilities and
intentions remain unanswered even after extensive investigation
by ISG. For example, we cannot yet definitively say whether or
not WMD materials were transferred out of Iraq before the war.
Neither can we definitively answer some questions about
possible retained stocks, though, as I say, it is my judgment
that retained stocks do not exist.
Developments in the Iraqi Intelligence Services appear to
have been limited in scope, and I am referring here to some
laboratories which were discovered in late 2003 where the Iraqi
Intelligence Service was found conducting some work in chemical
and biological areas. But certainly these activities were not
declared to the U.N. What did they really represent and was
there a more extensive clandestine activity with another set of
technical experts? We cannot say yet for certain.
Opportunities to develop new information are decreasing.
However, I must mention that we just came into possession of a
large number of documents recently accumulated by coalition
forces. The number of these documents is approximately equal to
the total received since the end of the war and it will clearly
take many months to examine what has been found and provide an
initial summary of what they contain.
Then too, we continue to receive a continuous stream of
reports about hidden WMD locations. When such reports are
judged sufficiently credible, ISG conducts an investigation. In
fact, 2 weeks ago we had a source come to us with a partially
filled canister from an old--and I repeat and underline, old--
122 millimeter rocket round. These, like others recovered, are
from pre-1991 stocks and, despite these reports and finds, I
still do not expect that militarily significant WMD stocks are
hidden in Iraq.
A risk that has emerged since my previous report to
Congress is the connection of former regime chemical warfare
expertise with anti-coalition forces. The ISG has uncovered
evidence of such links and undertook a sizable effort to track
down and prevent any lash-up between foreign terrorists or
anti-coalition forces and either existing chemical weapons
stocks or expertise from the former regime that could be used
to produce such weapons. I believe we got ahead of this problem
through a series of raids throughout the spring and summer. I
am convinced that we successfully contained the problem before
it matured into a major threat.
Nevertheless, it points to the problem that the dangerous
expertise developed by the previous regime could be transferred
to other hands. Certainly there are anti-coalition and
terrorist elements seeking such capabilities.
It is my hope that this report will offer a generally
accurate picture of the evolution and disposition of WMD within
the former regime. I am quite aware that the Iraqis who
participated in these programs will be reading this report and
ultimately will comment upon it. I hope they learn from it and
do not find too many errors.
I have spent hours with many of the Iraqi participants,
both before the war as Deputy Chairman of the U.N. Special
Commission (UNSCOM) in the 1990s and after the war when many
were in custody. Many of these individuals are technocrats
caught in a rotten system. Some, on the other hand,
wholeheartedly participated in that system. In either case,
Saddam channeled some of the best and brightest Iraqi minds and
a substantial portion of Iraq's wealth toward his WMD programs.
It has of course been very difficult to discern the truth
from these participants, given the mix of motivations that
inescapably color the statements of those who remain in
custody. It is sometimes very difficult to recognize the truth.
This applies to Saddam himself, especially so. He was a
special case in all of this. We had the opportunity to debrief
him for months, but he naturally had limited incentives to be
candid or forthcoming at all. Nevertheless, many of his
statements were interesting and revealing. In the end, only he
knows many of the vital points. Even those closest to him had
mixed understandings of his objectives. In fact, there was
uncertainty among some of the closest advisors about WMD and
whether it even existed.
With that, Senator, I will end my remarks. Thank you.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Duelfer follows:]
Prepared Statement by Charles Duelfer
Thank you for inviting me to discuss my report with your committee.
The relationship between Iraq and the rest of the world has been
complicated and dangerous for three decades, a dilemma that has
confounded the international community through much of recent history.
Three wars, devastating sanctions, and an endless progression of
international crises have ended or ruined thousands of lives. The
region and Iraq are both complicated and unstable, and obviously very
dangerous. Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) have added to the
uncertainty and risk posed by an unpredictable and clearly aggressive
regime in Baghdad.
This report is not simply an accounting of the program fragments we
have examined in the aftermath of the recent war and ongoing conflict,
nor is it my aim merely to describe the status of a program at a single
point in time. The complexity and importance of this question deserves
a more synthetic approach, in my view. Instead, the objective of this
report is to identify the dynamics of the regime's WMD decisions over
time. I want to identify the area under a curve, not just a single
point on a trend line that may be going up or down. This problem
deserves calculus not algebra, and thus the report I have prepared
attempts to describe the Iraqi WMD programs not in isolation, but in
the context of the aims and objectives of the regime that created and
used them.
I have also insisted that the report include as much basic data as
reasonable and that it be unclassified. Since the tragedy that has been
Iraq has exacted such a huge cost for so many for so long, I feel
strongly that the data we have accumulated be presented in as thorough
a manner as possible to enable others to draw their own conclusions.
Certainly I have a concept of the dynamics that underlay the course
that Saddam followed with WMD and this is conveyed in the report.
Others, including Iraqis, may examine this and conclude otherwise.
structure
The report consists of six chapters and includes at the end a
timeline showing key events that bear on the Iraqi WMD program.
Aiming to introduce the reader to the Iraqi frame of reference, the
report begins with an analysis of the nature of the regime and its aims
in chapter one. As compared with most countries, fathoming the
intentions of the regime is made easier in Iraq, because it really
boils down to understanding one person--Saddam Hussein, who was the
regime. The highly personalized nature of the Iraqi dictatorship under
Saddam, with its multiplicity of security organs and unclear, often
overlapping lines of authority progressively created a governmental
system of operating alien to those steeped in the norms of western
democracies. An understanding of the workings of the Iraqi system of
governance is important, so that evidence--or lack of evidence--can be
evaluated within the frame of reference of Baghdad and not the frame of
reference of Washington, London, or Canberra.
For example, given the nature of Iraqi governance, one should not
look for much of an audit trail on WMD. Even Saddam's most senior
ministers did not want to be in a position to tell him bad news or make
recommendations from which he would recoil. The most successful and
long-lived advisors were those who could anticipate his intentions.
Hence, there was a very powerful role for implicit guidance. This was
particularly the case for the most sensitive issues--such as actions
that related to human rights and weapons of mass destruction. This
dynamic limits the evidence that one might expect to find, i.e. little
documentation and senior advisors who could honestly say they never had
instructions on certain matters. This, of course, makes it risky to
draw conclusions about the absence of evidence, a continuous problem in
Iraq.
Further obfuscating the picture is the fact that Baghdad had long
experience in dealing with inspection by western outsiders. From the
experience of dealing with U.N. inspectors the Iraqis learned a great
deal about what signatures we looked for. Iraqis generally knew a lot
more about us than we did about them. For various reasons, their
ability and desire to conceal their intentions and capabilities were
quite good.
Beyond a discussion of how the regime operated, the report also
provides a sense of Saddam's goals, aspirations and political vision,
as a means to better understand his decisions about WMD, their
development, use, destruction, and role in the future realization of
his political-military aims for the Iraqi nation. We have tried to
understand his objectives and how he developed and used power. After
the 1991 war, Saddam established as his prime objective (after
survival) the termination of U.N. sanctions on Iraq, and he weighed all
policy actions and steps for their impact on this overarching
objective.
Saddam committed the brightest minds and much national treasure to
developing WMD. Moreover, Saddam saw this investment as having paid
vital dividends. Senior Iraqis state that only through the use of long-
range ballistic missiles and the extensive use of chemical weapons did
Iraq avoid defeat in the war with Iran. There is also a second, less
obvious instance where the regime attributes its survival to possession
of WMD.
In the run-up to the 1991 war, Iraq loaded, dispersed and pre-
delegated the authority to use both biological and chemical weapons if
the coalition proceeded to Baghdad. The regime believes its possession
of WMD deterred the U.S. from going to Baghdad in 1991. Moreover, it
has been clear in my discussions with senior Iraqis that they clearly
understand that they blundered in invading Kuwait before completing
their nuclear weapons program. Had they waited, the outcome would have
been quite different.
Finally, Saddam also used chemical weapons for domestic purposes--
in the late 1980s against the Kurds and during the Shia uprisings after
the 1991 war.
In this chapter, aspects of Saddam's decisionmaking were examined
by the identification of several key inflection points, when Saddam
made a choice affecting WMD. Several such points have been identified
and dissected to see the dynamics of these decisions. These points
noted in the timeline attached to the end of the report, portions of
which are included at the end of individual chapters. The timeline is a
useful tool through which to retain the ability to assess Iraq's WMD
decisionmaking from Saddam's perspective and seeing WMD in that
context.
This tool was also useful in tracking his strategy and tactics
toward the United Nations and the sanctions imposed by the U.N.
Security Council. Saddam's personal direction of much of Iraq's
relations with the U.N. reflected his approach to influence and is
described in some detail--again illuminated through examination of key
decision points.
Overall, the hope is that not only will we see what Saddam decided
to do with WMD, but why. This may be instructive for future policy
considerations and certainly future intelligence considerations.
Chapter two is an extensive analysis of Iraq's financing and
procurement, a bid to identify the resources available to Baghdad and
examine how they were allocated. We made it a high priority to obtain
complete information from the Oil Ministry and State Oil Marketing
Organization. These data were extremely valuable in obtaining an
understanding of how the regime operated and its priorities.
Our investigation makes clear that a top priority for Saddam was to
escape the economic stranglehold of U.N. sanctions. Sanctions limited
his ambitions in many ways, and took an enormous toll on Iraqi society.
The disintegration of the middle class, civil infrastructure, the
health system, and the blight on the hope of young Iraqis were clear
through the 1990s. The U.N. Security Council, in attempting to mitigate
the effects of sanctions on innocent Iraqis created the Oil-for-Food
(OFF) Program. It is instructive that the regime rejected the
opportunity to export oil for civil goods until conditions were so bad
that they threatened the survival of the regime.
Chapter two makes clear the range of steps the regime took to erode
support for, and the efficacy of, the U.N. sanctions program. The steps
the regime took to erode sanctions are obvious in the analysis of how
revenues, particularly those derived from the Oil-for-Food program,
were used. Over time, sanctions had steadily weakened to the point
where Iraq, in 2000-2001 was confidently designing missiles around
components that could only be obtained outside sanctions. Moreover,
illicit revenues grew to quite substantial levels during the same
period and it is instructive to see how and where the regime allocated
these funds.
ISG's investigation also makes quite clear how Baghdad exploited
the mechanism for executing the Oil-for-Food program to give
individuals and countries an economic stake in ending sanctions. The
regime, following a pattern that Saddam has applied throughout his
career, offered rewards and a rationale for accepting them,
successfully arguing its case that the sanctions were harming the
innocent, and that the moral choice was to elude and diminish them. It
is grossly obvious how successful the regime was. It is also grossly
obvious how the sanctions perverted not just the national system of
finance and economics, but to some extent the international markets and
organizations.
The Procurement and Finance section notes that a sizeable portion
of the illicit revenues generated under the Oil-for-Food program went
to the Military Industrial Commission (the government-run military-
industrial establishment). The funding for this organization, which had
responsibility for many of the past WMD programs went from
approximately $7.8 million in 1998 to $350 million in 2001. During this
period of growing resource availability, many military programs were
carried out--including many involving the willing export to Iraq of
military items prohibited by the Security Council.
The remaining four chapters deal with the different types of WMD
programs which Iraq had previously worked. The first of these, the
Delivery System chapter, describes the work Iraq had been pursuing with
respect to both missiles and unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs).
Iraq continued to work on missile delivery systems in the wake of
the Gulf war. Saddam drew a distinction between long-range missiles and
WMD--a distinction not drawn in the U.N. resolutions. Iraq's missile
development infrastructure continued to develop under sanctions, and
included work on propulsion, fuels, and even guidance systems. As more
funding became available following the implementation of the OFF
program, Saddam directed more missile activities. In the later years,
more foreign assistance was brought in--including both technology and
technical expertise. While it is clear that Saddam wanted a long-range
missile, there was little work done on warheads. It is apparent that he
drew the line at that point--so long as sanctions remained. However,
while the development of ballistic missile delivery systems is time
consuming, if and when Saddam decided to place a non-conventional
warhead on the missile, this could be done very quickly. The CW and BW
warheads put on Iraqi missiles in 1990 and 1991, for example, were
built in months.
A couple of points are of interest from the Iraq missile efforts.
One is that they did not bide by the range limits set in U.N. Security
Council Resolution 687. The range capabilities of the ballistic
missiles they were developing exceeded the stated limits. Iraq also
used components from SA-2 engines that they had expressly been
prohibited. Iraq also produced fuel that was not declared. They also
tested UAVs in excess of the range limits.
Iraq missile developers became so confident that others would
violate the sanctions that they designed new missile systems which
depended upon the import of guidance systems. Further, they drew upon
the foreign expertise that was readily available for such areas as
propulsion.
The chapter on nuclear programs reviews the program up to the 1991
war and describes the activities of the scientists and engineers
following the war. The analysis shows that despite Saddam's expressed
desire to retain the knowledge of his nuclear team, and his attempts to
retain some key parts of the program, during the course of the
following 12 years Iraq's ability to produce a weapon decayed.
Sanctions and inspections lasted longer that Saddam anticipated.
The inspections were also more intrusive than expected. Therefore,
retention of weapons material put at risk his higher immediate
objective of escaping sanctions. Nevertheless, Saddam's son-in-law and
chief weapons development manager, Husayn Kamal, directed that design
information and very limited physical material be hidden from
inspectors. These concealment efforts were successful until Husayn
Kamal himself fled to Jordan in 1995.
There were also efforts to retain the intellectual capital of
nuclear scientists by forbidding their departure from Iraq and keeping
them employed in government areas. However, over time there was decay
in the team. Unlike the other WMD areas, nuclear weapons development
requires thousands of knowledgeable scientists as well as a large
physical plant. Even with the intention of keeping these talented
people employed, a natural decay took place and the time it would take
for Iraq to build a nuclear weapon tended to increase for the duration
of the sanctions. The Iraqi Atomic Energy Commission utilized the same
people in a range of projects during the 1990s and addressed technical
problems akin to those in nuclear weapons development. These efforts,
however, cannot be explicitly tied to an intention to revive a weapons
program.
Despite this decay, Saddam did not abandon his nuclear ambitions.
He made clear his view that nuclear weapons were the right of any
country that could build them. He was very attentive to the growing
Iranian threat--especially its potential nuclear component, and stated
that he would do whatever it took to offset the Iranian threat, clearly
implying matching Tehran's nuclear capabilities. Saddam observed that
India and Pakistan had slipped across the nuclear weapons boundary
quite successfully. Those around Saddam seemed quite convinced that
once sanctions were ended, and all other things being equal, Saddam
would renew his efforts in this field.
The chapters dealing with CW and BW tell somewhat different
stories. In the chemical weapons area, the Iraqis had long experience
with production and use of mustard and nerve agents. In Baghdad's view,
these weapons saved Iraq from defeat in the war with Iran and, in
combination with BW capabilities, helped deter the United States from
deposing the regime in 1991.
Following the Iran-Iraq war, Iraqi CW activity shifted from
production to research and development of more potent and stabilized
agents. In contrast to the nuclear field, CW work requires not
thousands of scientists, but hundreds. The top expertise was developed
among a few dozen scientists and chemical production engineers.
Once inspections began in 1991, Iraq chose to yield most of its
weapons and bulk agent as well as the large facilities that were widely
known to exist. As in the other WMD areas, Saddam sought to sustain the
requisite knowledge base to restart the program eventually and, to the
extent it did not threaten the Iraqi efforts to get out from sanctions,
to sustain the inherent capability to produce such weapons as
circumstances permitted in the future.
Over time, and with the infusion of funding and resources following
acceptance of the Oil-for-Food program, Iraq effectively shortened the
time that would be required to reestablish CW production capacity. Some
of this was a natural collateral benefit of developing an indigenous
chemical production infrastructure. By 2003, Iraq would have been able
to produce mustard agent in a period of months and nerve agent in less
than a year or two We have not come across explicit guidance from
Saddam on this point, yet it was an inherent consequence of his
decision to develop a domestic chemical production capacity.
Iraq denied it had offensive biological weapons programs to
inspectors in 1991, and secretly destroyed existing stocks of weapons
and agent in 1991-1992. Iraq decided to retain the main BW production
facility, but under guise of using it to produce single-cell protein
for animal feed. These decisions were taken with Saddam's explicit
approval. Saddam clearly understood the nature of biological weapons.
He personally authorized their dispersal for use in 1991 against
coalition forces, Saudi Arabia and Israel. He clearly took steps to
preserve this capability and was successful until 1995.
Preservation of Iraq's biological weapons capabilities was simpler
than any other WMD area because of the nature of the material. First,
the number of experts required is quite small, perhaps a couple dozen.
Then too, the infrastructure to produce agent can be readily assembled
from quite simple domestic civilian plants. Moreover, little, if any,
activity would be necessary to keep this option ``on the shelf''.
Some activity that might have been related to a biological program
has been examined closely, including work with a bio-pesticide,
bacillus thuringiensis. While this work could have been related to
advancing Iraqi anthrax knowledge, information is inconclusive. This
work could and certainly did sustain the talent needed to restart a BW
program; however, we can form no absolute conclusion on whether this
work represented active efforts to develop further anthrax programs or
not. Given the developing infrastructure in Iraq in the late 1990s and
early 2000s, such a reconstitution could be accomplished quite quickly.
Other aspects of the Iraq BW program remain cloudy. For example, it
is still difficult to rule on whether Iraq had a mobile BW production
effort or made any attempts to work with smallpox as a weapon.
What is clear is that Saddam retained his notions of the use of
force and had experience that demonstrated the utility of WMD. He was
making progress in eroding sanctions and, had it not been for the
events of September 11, 2001, things would have taken a different
course for the regime. Most senior members of the regime and scientists
assumed that the programs would begin in earnest when sanctions ended--
and sanctions were eroding.
A variety of questions about Iraqi WMD capabilities and intentions
remain unanswered, even after extensive investigation by ISG. For
example, we cannot yet definitively say whether or not WMD materials
were transferred out of Iraq before the war. Neither can we
definitively answer some questions about possible retained stocks.
Developments in the Iraqi Intelligence Services appear to be have been
limited in scope, but they were certainly never declared to the United
Nations. What did they really represent and was there a more extensive
clandestine activity with another set of technical experts? We cannot
say for certain.
Opportunities to develop new information are decreasing. However, I
must mention that we just came into possession of a large number of
documents recently accumulated by coalition forces. The number of these
documents is approximately equal to the total received since the end of
the war, and it will clearly take many months to examine what has been
found and provide an initial summary of what they contain.
Then, too, we continue to receive a continuing stream of reports
about hidden WMD locations. When such reports are judged sufficiently
credible, ISG conducts an investigation. In fact, just 2 weeks ago a
source provided a partially filled nerve agent container from a 122 mm
rocket. This, like others recovered, was from old pre-1991 stocks.
Despite these reports and finds, I still do not expect that militarily
significant WMD stocks are cached in Iraq.
A risk that has emerged since my previous status report to Congress
is the connection of former regime CW experts with anti-coalition
forces. ISG uncovered evidence of such links and undertook a sizeable
effort to track down and prevent any lash-up between foreign terrorists
or anti-coalition forces and either existing CW stocks or experts able
to produce such weapons indigenously. I believe we got ahead of this
problem through a series of raids throughout the spring and summer. I
am convinced we successfully contained a problem before it matured into
a major threat. Nevertheless, it points to the problem that the
dangerous expertise developed by the previous regime could be
transferred to other hands. Certainly there are anti-coalition and
terrorist elements seeking such capabilities.
It is my hope that this report will offer a generally accurate
picture of the evolution and disposition of WMD within the former
regime. I am quite aware that the Iraqis who participated in these
programs will be reading this report and ultimately will comment upon
it. I hope they learn from it and do not find too many errors.
I spent hours with many of the Iraqi participants--both before the
war as deputy chairman of UNSCOM in the 1990s and after the war when
many were in custody. Many of these individuals are technocrats caught
in a rotten system. Some wholeheartedly participated. In either case,
Saddam channeled some of the best and brightest Iraqi minds, and a
substantial portion of Iraq's wealth toward his WMD programs. It has,
of course, been very difficult to discern the truth from these
participants, given the mix of motivations that inescapably color the
statements of those who remain in custody. It is sometimes very
difficult to recognize the truth.
This applies especially to Saddam himself, who was a special case
in all of this. We had the opportunity to debrief him, but he naturally
had limited incentives to be candid or forthcoming at all.
Nevertheless, many of his statements were interesting and revealing. In
the end, only he knows many of the vital points. Even those closest to
him had mixed understandings of his objectives. In fact, there was
uncertainty among some of his closest advisors about WMD and whether it
even existed. It is ironic that when he had the weapons, they saved
him. When he did not have them, he was deposed.
Chairman Warner. Thank you very much.
General.
STATEMENT OF BRIG. GEN. JOSEPH J. McMENAMIN, USMC, COMMANDER,
IRAQ SURVEY GROUP
General McMenamin. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you very
much for the opportunity to discuss the activities of the ISG.
I have been in this position since June, when I replaced Major
General Keith Dayton. During these months, the ISG has remained
focused on searching for Iraq's WMD and associated WMD
programs, supporting the effort to defeat the insurgency in
Iraq and pursuing any additional leads concerning the fate of
U.S. Navy Captain Michael Scott Speicher. In addition, the ISG
has been supporting the Regime Crimes Liaison Office in its
efforts to assist the Iraqi Special Tribunal.
Since Major General Dayton left, three things have changed
that bear on the mission of the ISG. First, the U.S.
transferred sovereignty to the Interim Iraqi Government on 28
June 2004. While we did not anticipate any major changes to our
operating procedures, we did carefully consider the conduct of
post-transfer missions and have worked to incorporate coalition
combat units and the Iraqi Police Service whenever possible and
practical.
Second, the United States Central Command transferred
operational control of the ISG to the Multinational Force-Iraq.
This shift was undertaken in conjunction with the transfer of
sovereignty and occurred when all forces in Iraq were placed
under the command of the Commanding General, Multinational
Force-Iraq.
Third, there has been an increase in violence by former
regime elements, foreign fighters, and common criminals,
seeking to undermine and discredit the new Iraqi government.
While Mr. Duelfer discusses the ISG's substantive findings,
which are treated in detail in his comprehensive report, I
would like to touch briefly on the other missions. The Speicher
team exhausted all in-country leads regarding the fate of
Captain Speicher and departed the ISG in May. No new leads have
been developed since their departure. All data previously
collected with regard to the status of Captain Speicher is with
the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA), which is in the process
of writing an updated report. As stated during previous
testimony on this topic, the ISG will immediately pursue any
new leads or data generated in Iraq on the status of Captain
Speicher.
As for the counterterrorism mission, we are working at the
direction of the Multinational Force-Iraq to help neutralize
former regime elements involved in the insurgency, working
targeting and collection packages on Zarqawi cells, and
following closely any potential links between the terrorists
and chemical weapons.
Our main support to the Regime Crimes Liaison Office is
through the processing of documents in Qatar and Iraq and
assisting with interviews of high-value detainees. The Regime
Crimes Liaison Office funds their own activities. No
intelligence funds are used for this effort.
The ISG will continue to support the DCI's post-report
requirements on WMD and the counter-insurgency fight in Iraq.
The dedication, professionalism, and enthusiasm of all members
of the team have ensured that the missions assigned have been
carried out thoroughly and in a professional manner.
Mr. Chairman, thank you for inviting me to speak to the
committee today. I will finish this statement by thanking all
of you for your support for what we have undertaken in the ISG
and the continuing support you provide to the Americans,
Australians, and British, both military and civilian, who risk
their lives daily in this endeavor.
Thank you, sir.
[The prepared statement of General McMenamin follows:]
Prepared Statement by Brig. Gen. Joseph J. McMenamin, USMC
Thank you, Mr. Chairman, for the opportunity to meet with the
committee today. It is a pleasure to speak with all of you today about
the efforts of the great American, Australian, and British members of
the Iraq Survey Group (ISG).
I have been in position since June of this year when I replaced
Major General Keith Dayton. During these months, the ISG has remained
focused on searching for Iraq's weapons of mass destruction and
associated WMD programs, supporting the effort to defeat the insurgency
in Iraq and pursuing any additional leads concerning the fate of U.S.
Navy Captain Michael Scott Speicher. In addition, the ISG has been
supporting the Regime Crimes Liaison Office in its efforts to assist
the Iraqi Special Tribunal.
As the Special Advisor to the DCI on Iraq's Weapons of Mass
Destruction Programs, Mr. Duelfer will discuss the ISG's substantive
findings, which are treated in detail in his Comprehensive Report. My
job has been to lead the military and civilian personnel who implement
his collection and analytical guidance in a bid to uncover the truth
about Iraqi WMD. I am also personally responsible for a wide range of
other mission areas outside of Mr. Duelfer's responsibilities, as well
as the safety and security of ISG personnel throughout Iraq and all
personnel living at Camp Slayer.
Since Major General Dayton left three things have changed that bear
on the mission of the ISG. First, the U.S. transferred sovereignty to
the Interim Iraqi Government on 28 June 2004. While we did not
anticipate any major changes to our operating procedures, we did
carefully consider the conduct of post-transfer missions and have
worked to incorporate coalition combat units and the Iraqi Police
Service wherever possible and practical. Second, United States Central
Command transferred Operational Control of the ISG to Multi-National
Force Iraq. This shift was undertaken in conjunction with the transfer
of sovereignty and occurred when all forces in Iraq were placed under
the command of the Commanding General, MNF-I. Third, there has been
increasing violence by former regime elements, foreign fighters, and
common criminals seeking to undermine and discredit the new government.
The ISG currently consists of approximately 1,750 people, including
personnel from the United States, the United Kingdom, and Australia, of
whom approximately 750 work in Iraq. Except for a handful of logistics
personnel in Kuwait, the remaining 1,000 personnel work in Qatar. We
employ over 770 linguists from a wide variety of Arabic speaking
countries at our Qatar and Iraq locations. The United States contingent
continues to represent a strong multi-disciplinary, interagency team
with participation from the Defense Intelligence Agency, the National
Security Agency, the National Geospatial-lntelligence Agency, the
Central Intelligence Agency, all the armed services (to include active,
Guard, and Reserve components), and the Departments of Justice,
Treasury, and Energy. We expect our manning in Qatar to remain
constant, but anticipate that our numbers in Iraq will decrease as we
identify post Comprehensive Report requirements.
The ISG is still based out of Camp Slayer, Iraq, near the Baghdad
International Airport. We continue to conduct debriefings of the High
Value Detainees at Camp Cropper. Initially, there was some confusion as
to our ability to continue debriefings after the assumption of
sovereignty by Iraqi authorities. We quickly determined, however, that
we could conduct the debriefings under UNSCR 1546 and the letters
annexed to the resolution. The only detainees we cannot interview are
those who have been charged with crimes by the Interim Iraqi
Government. Our expertise with the HVDs has been invaluable to the
Regime Crimes Liaison Office and its support of the Iraqi Special
Tribunal. We maintain a very good relationship with MNF-I's Detainee
Operations and the Military Police assigned at Camp Cropper. This
relationship is an example of unity of effort by several commands for a
single purpose.
The ISG continues to operate the Combined Media Processing Center-
Main (CMPC-M) at Camp As Saliyah in Qatar. We also operate Combined
Media Processing Center-Baghdad (CMPC-B) with three satellite
locations. The numbers of personnel in Qatar have risen and we now have
hundreds of linguists, analysts, and administrators working to triage,
gist, and load the documents and other media into national databases.
We completed scanning the bulk of the initial captured material during
June, but we have recently acquired a large amount of additional
material from various locations that needs to be triaged and scanned.
Our document exploitation effort also supports the work of the Iraqi
Special Tribunal through the Regime Crimes Liaison Office (RCLO) and
the U.S. Department of Justice has established a cell located within
our Qatar operation to support the prosecution of regime officials. The
Department of Justice provides funding for all RCLO and DOJ support, no
intelligence funds are used to support these law enforcement
activities. To date 91 percent of the material translated or gisted has
related to the search for WMD, principally in the areas of procurement
and delivery systems. We have loaded close to 150,000 files into the
Harmony database, each of which consists of the original scanned
document, the meta-file describing the document, and a gist or full
translation.
Our location at Camp Slayer is the hub for conducting ISG
operations, analyzing the information gathered and providing command
and control for the ISG. While our structure continues to evolve, we
continue to maintain the organization of functional teams that conduct
analysis and identify requirements for the collectors. Once a
requirement is identified, an Operational Planning Team is formed from
internal and, as required, external units. A task organized team with
supporting units is built around analysts and subject matter experts,
interrogators/debriefers, linguists, document exploiters, a chemical
exploitation team and a Mobile Collection Team Commander. NOA provides
mapping support and NSA provides target coverage. These task organized
teams are led by and composed of coalition members and U.S.
intelligence organizations.
While Mr. Duelfer will address the ISO's substantive findings, let
me provide some information on the scope of work that went into
supporting the writing of the report as of 24 September. In recent
months the ISO has:
Executed 2,700 Missions
Visited 1,200 different WMD Sites (Some more than
once)
Published 4,000 Intelligence Information Reports
Conducted 4,100 Debriefings
Scanned and Processed over 40 Million Pages of
Documents
Processed 28,000 Digital Media Sources
Processed over 4 million Analog Media Sources
ISG was given commander's guidance from MNF-I in two areas related
to counterterrorism. The first was to assist in the defeat of Former
Regime Elements. The second part of the commander's guidance was to
assist in preventing a strategic surprise from Anti-Iraqi Forces using
WMD. Through 21 September, ISO has published 680 intelligence reports
supporting the counterterrorism/counterinsurgency mission. To reduce
the chance of former regime scientists from linking with Anti-Iraqi
Forces we developed contacts with the Iraq Ministry of Science and
Technology and continue to work with the American Embassy on the
scientist redirection program.
The Speicher team exhausted all in-country leads regarding the fate
of Captain Speicher and departed the ISO in May. No new leads have been
developed since their departure. All data previously collected with
regard to the status of Captain Speicher is with DIA which is in the
process of writing an update report. As stated during previous
testimony on this topic, the ISG will immediately pursue any new leads
or data generated in Iraq on the status of Captain Speicher.
In the area of security, we continue to make improvements in force
protection measures to protect our people, whether they are on the road
or in garrison. Although Camp Slayer has been attacked by both mortars
and rockets, thankfully there have not been any casualties. I can't say
enough about the support of the fine soldiers of the Pennsylvania and
Kansas Army National Guardsmen and Reserve Component on whom I rely on
heavily for force protection, escort missions and supporting camp
operations.
There continue to be many challenges facing the Iraq Survey Group.
We are currently developing a collection plan to gather information on
the intelligence gaps identified in the Comprehensive Report. We will
need to reevaluate the work load and processing time it will take to
triage, scan, and gist the additional documents recently turned over to
the ISG. We will need to balance our work load to ensure that MNF-I is
supported during the crucial periods between now and the Iraqi
elections. Both the Iraqi government and MNF-I are focused on
protection of key leaders and infrastructure, census taking, elections,
rebuilding, and a rising level of violence that the Iraqi government
needs to counter by establishing and training effective security
forces.
Mr. Chairman, thank you for inviting me to speak to the Committee
today. The dedication and enthusiasm of all members of the team have
ensured that the search for the truth about Iraq's weapons of mass
destruction has been carried out thoroughly and in a professional
manner. I will finish this statement by thanking all of you for your
support for what we have undertaken in the Iraq Survey Group and the
continuing support you provide to the Americans, Australians, and
British, both military and civilian, who risk their lives daily in this
endeavor.
Chairman Warner. Thank you very much, General.
We will proceed with a 6-minute round of questions.
Mr. Duelfer, you spent a good deal of your professional
career examining Iraq and you were at one time a weapons
inspector. Would you sketch that brief career or give us a
brief description?
Mr. Duelfer. I was chosen by Ambassador Ekeus to be his
deputy at the U.N. Special Commission on Iraq in 1993, and so I
was the deputy chairman of that U.N. organization for several
years. In fact, I was the acting chairman of it at the end,
when the UNSCOM ended and a new organization called the U.N.
Monitoring, Verification, and Inspection Commission, which was
headed by Dr. Hans Blix, began. That caused me to have a great
deal of contact with the Iraqis, spend a lot of time in Iraq,
and talk with the people involved in these programs.
Then the DCI asked me, in January, if I would take the
position as his Special Advisor on Iraq WMD, to succeed David
Kay.
Chairman Warner. We are fortunate you did.
My question will be very simple. It is asked frequently and
it is discussed frequently. Is it your professional judgment
that the world is better off with Saddam Hussein now in
custody, facing the rule of law?
Mr. Duelfer. In my opinion there was a risk of Saddam
Hussein being in charge of a country with that amount of
resources and with that amount of potential for both good and
evil. What Iraq was, under Saddam, and the potential of what it
could be, there was an enormous difference.
The trends I think are important. Our analysis in this
study was to not look at a single point in time, but to look at
dynamics and trends. He clearly had ambitions with respect to
WMD. He clearly had a strategy and tactic to get out of the
constraints of the U.N. sanctions. He was clearly making a
great deal of progress on that.
But for the intervention of the events of September 11, I
think the world would be in a very different position right
now.
Chairman Warner. In conclusion, the world is better off
with Saddam Hussein now in custody, facing the rule of law to
account for his crimes?
Mr. Duelfer. I am an analyst and I realize I am in a
political world right now, but I have to agree analytically,
the world is better off.
Chairman Warner. I thank you for that straightforward
response, and it is predicated on many years of dedicated
service.
Mr. Duelfer. Thank you.
Chairman Warner. Do you think that situation could have
been achieved without the intervention of the coalition forces
and the active use of military force in what appeared to be a
complete and utter breakdown of diplomacy to achieve the goals
that we have thus achieved, making the world better off?
Mr. Duelfer. The way that question is sometimes framed,
sir----
Chairman Warner. Why don't you reframe it in a manner with
which you are more comfortable. I will get to it if I feel
necessary and revise it. You go ahead.
Mr. Duelfer. It is clear that Saddam chose not to have
weapons at a point in time before the war.
Chairman Warner. Now, let us explain which war. You are
talking about the second one?
Mr. Duelfer. The most recent one.
Chairman Warner. That is correct.
Mr. Duelfer. When we look at the frame of reference that
Saddam saw around him, he saw U.N. sanctions, he saw forces
around him, he saw diplomatic isolation after September 11. He
saw his revenue streams dropping. He chose, at that point in
time, to allow U.N. inspectors in.
As an analyst, I looked at that and I asked were those
conditions sustainable? I find it hard to conclude that those
conditions were stable or sustainable. So while Saddam chose
not to have weapons at that point in time, the conditions which
caused him to make that decision were, A, not sustainable; and
B, extremely expensive, not just for the international
community, but for the Iraqis themselves.
Over the last decade, observing what happened to the
civilian infrastructure of Iraq under the sanctions is stark. I
mean, here is a country with enormous talent. The people are
educated, westward-leaning for the most part. They had a great
education system. Watching that decay under sanctions was not a
pleasant experience. There was an enormous price for that.
Those are some of the factors. Others will look at the data
and draw other conclusions, but my opinion is that the
conditions were not sustainable over any lengthy period of
time.
Chairman Warner. Had he lost his life by whatever means and
the assets that he then had under his control had fallen into
the hands of one or several of his children, particularly his
sons, they clearly presented an equally, if not greater, danger
to the world; am I not correct?
Mr. Duelfer. From the discussions of the top people around
Saddam--his ministers, military leaders--they were not fond of
Saddam's offspring, and these people had a high tolerance for
tough behavior. So I would have to agree with you that a
succession from Saddam to one of his offspring, while it is
hypothetical and it is hard to imagine exactly how that would
play out, was not a pleasant prospect.
Chairman Warner. Did you assess how many of the 17 U.N.
resolutions, that your facts clearly indicated, Saddam was
violating?
Mr. Duelfer. It was not our task explicitly to match up
what we found on the ground against what the U.N. was
requiring, although, because of my background, I certainly had
an interest in it. It was quite clear that many of the things
that we found were in clear violation of the U.N. requirements.
He had missiles which exceeded the range. There was a lot of
equipment which should have been declared. There were
laboratories which should have been declared. In each of the
weapons areas there were materials or things which were, to
some extent, in violation of the U.N. sanctions.
Chairman Warner. Let us go back to the U.N. Security
Council resolution and what you now know about the likelihood
of the absence of large stockpiles of prohibited WMD. Can you
explain why Saddam Hussein did not avail himself of the final
opportunity to demonstrate full and immediate compliance with
U.N. Security Council Resolution 1441, thereby having avoided
the use of force?
Mr. Duelfer. Senator, it is a question which many of us
have puzzled over. In fact, many very senior Iraqis have
puzzled over the same question. It really requires you to get
into Saddam's mind, and the answer is it is difficult to know
for certain. Certainly some of his senior advisors, foreign
affairs advisors, argued that, shortly after September 11, they
should have just very fully complied without hesitation,
without trying to negotiate.
But what they say is that Saddam always wanted to
negotiate. If he was going to accept inspectors coming in, he
wanted to get something for it. He wanted to get sanctions
lifted. He kept trying to bargain and barter, and he had not
realized the nature of the ground shift in the international
community. That was Saddam's intelligence failure. He did not
understand very quickly the radical change of the international
landscape.
One can understand that to a certain extent because in the
period leading up to September 11 there was a great deal of
sympathy for his regime. Baghdad was filled with businessmen.
The international fair that Baghdad runs was often filled with
lots of companies. They were making lots of transactions, in
full violation of the sanctions. The ministers around Saddam,
and Saddam himself, expressed the opinion that sanctions were
about to end through erosion, through their own collapse.
So the radical change in a sense that occurred in the
international community following September 11, took a while to
penetrate in his judgment.
Chairman Warner. Given that 1441 was clear, it seems to me
you could draw the conclusion that, his failure to avail
himself, to avoid that destruction, and to enable him to remain
in power shows a very irrational mind. Certainly, an irrational
mind that was a danger to the world.
Mr. Duelfer. Saddam is certainly dangerous. He certainly
demonstrated the ability to make monumental mistakes. I
remember a conversation I had with Tariq Aziz when I asked him:
why did you invade Kuwait before you had a nuclear weapon? He
more or less shrugged and pointed to the picture on the wall.
The picture on the wall, in virtually any room you were in in
Iraq, in those days was Saddam.
So he is very shrewd. He has an exquisite sense of what
motivates people, often at the basest level. But he is
enormously susceptible to making hugely dangerous decisions.
Chairman Warner. Thank you.
Senator Levin.
Senator Levin. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
On page 64 of your report you say that, ``The Iraq Survey
Group has not found evidence that Saddam Hussein possessed
weapons of mass destruction stocks prior to the war.'' Is that
correct?
Mr. Duelfer. That is correct.
Senator Levin. Now, in addition to that, what you are
telling us today is that, in addition to having no WMD stocks
before the war, for the reasons you gave Saddam chose not to
have those weapons. Is that correct?
Mr. Duelfer. That is correct.
Senator Levin. Those are stunning statements. Not only did
he not have WMD, but, for the reasons you gave, he chose not to
have WMD. That is 180 degrees different from what the
administration was saying prior to the war. They were saying
that he had stockpiles of WMD and indeed had an active effort
to acquire more and was a threat for that reason.
I just want to focus, not just on your speculation about
intentions, which I think anyone can speculate on and it is
fair enough to speculate on them, but in terms of the facts
that you found, which are what you were assigned to find, to
find the facts one way or another. Those particular facts it
seems to me are pretty stunning.
You also found, on page 7 as I read your report, that
``Iraq did not possess a nuclear device, nor had it tried to
reconstitute a capability to produce nuclear weapons after
1991.'' Did I read that correctly from your report?
Mr. Duelfer. Sir, I am sure you read it correctly. But if I
might respond a bit to your premise, you used the word
``speculation'' and again as an analyst I would say it is not
really speculation. What we were trying to do is derive
information from the people we had the opportunity to talk to
first-hand, including Saddam. So I just have to come back a
little bit on that, with all due respect.
Senator Levin. That is all right.
But now I want to get to your nuclear program statement.
You say that you found, as a matter of fact, that Iraq had not
tried to reconstitute a capability to produce nuclear weapons
after 1991. Therefore, it seems to me, you are saying that Iraq
had no active nuclear weapons reconstitution program before the
war. Is that correct?
Mr. Duelfer. What we said was that there was an attempt to
sustain the intellectual capability and to sustain some
elements of the program, particularly before 1995. But active
nuclear weapons program, no, we found no evidence, nor do we
judge that there was one.
Senator Levin. All right. Now, relative to the aluminum
tubes, your report says on page 21 that, ``Baghdad's interest
in high-strength, high-specification aluminum tubes is best
explained by its efforts to produce 81-millimeter rockets.'' Is
that correct?
Mr. Duelfer. That is correct. That is my judgment, that
those tubes were most likely destined for a rocket program.
Senator Levin. Although you uncovered inconsistencies that
raised questions about whether high-specification aluminum
tubes were really needed for such a rocket program, in your
words, ``These discrepancies are not sufficient to show a
nuclear end use was planned for the tubes.'' Is that your
judgment?
Mr. Duelfer. That is my judgment, recognizing that in Iraq
the types of logic that we apply here do not always apply
there.
Senator Levin. That is your best judgment?
Mr. Duelfer. Correct.
Senator Levin. Now, you also found, on page 7 in the
nuclear section, that ``The Iraq Survey Group has uncovered no
information to support allegations of Iraqi pursuit of uranium
from abroad in the post-Operation Desert Storm.'' In another
page you said that ``The Survey Group has not found evidence to
show that Iraq sought uranium from abroad after 1991.'' Is that
your judgment?
Mr. Duelfer. That is also what we found.
Senator Levin. Now, relative to the mobile biological
weapons production program, this is what you have stated in
your report, ``In spite of exhaustive investigation, the Survey
Group found no evidence that Iraq possessed or was developing
BW agent production systems mounted on road vehicles or railway
wagons.'' Is that your conclusion?
Mr. Duelfer. I am going to go a little longer on my
response to that because it is a more complicated question or
issue and the biology area is one where there is less certainty
possible. Part of that is due to the nature of the programs. If
you were to do sensitivity analysis about that, little facts
can make a big difference in that area.
On the mobile production systems question, there were two
trailers which were found in, I believe, May 2003. One found in
Irbil and one in Mosul. Those are clearly, in my judgment, for
the production of hydrogen. They have absolutely nothing to do
with any biological weapons.
A second question arose from reports, largely from one
individual, about a production facility which was mobile. These
were quite detailed reports, and to the extent we have been
able to investigate that, we believe two things: One, that much
of what this person said is incorrect. Some of what he did say
was correct, but the majority of the evidence which he was
pointing to as a mobile production facility was wrong.
However, this is one of those issues where I am not quite
comfortable in pronouncing that there was no mobile system in
Iraq. We believe we have done as much investigation as we can.
We have found no evidence. But I feel a little bit hesitant
about declaring flatly that there was no mobile production
facility. It is one of those cases where there may be some
uncertainty.
Senator Levin. Just in conclusion, though, the two trailers
that were captured in 2003 that were stated to be part of a
biological warfare program for the delivery of biological
warfare, manufacture of biological warfare, those particular
trailers you have found were, in fact, not part of a biological
warfare program, is that correct?
Mr. Duelfer. Correct.
Senator Levin. Because those are the two trailers that the
Vice President pointed to as definitively being the evidence of
the biological warfare program and the evidence of WMD. Those
were the very trailers that the Vice President said, ``This is
the definitive evidence that Saddam Hussein had a weapons of
mass destruction program.'' Now you are coming here today
relative to those two trailers and telling us that, in spite of
exhaustive investigation, you found no evidence that Iraq
possessed or was developing biological warfare agent production
systems mounted on road vehicles or railway wagons, and that
those particular trailers were designed and built exclusively
for the generation of hydrogen, which is a totally different
purpose. Is that correct? Those trailers, just focus on those
trailers.
Mr. Duelfer. The two trailers that were captured in Irbil
and Mosul are for the production of hydrogen. In my judgment,
my firm judgment, and the judgment of most of the people who
have looked at them, all of our experts, they have nothing to
do with biological weapons.
Senator Levin. Thank you for that testimony. It just
totally undercuts the statements which were made by the Vice
President. Thank you.
Chairman Warner. Were you able to give a full response to
that question? I want to make sure that the record has all of
your thinking on it.
Mr. Duelfer. The question of those two trailers is, to me,
separate and distinct from the question of whether Iraq had a
mobile biological weapons program. Our efforts to fathom that
possibility departed from a source who subsequently turned out
to be largely a fabricator. That does not mean there was not an
Iraqi mobile biological production capability. But we have not
found evidence of that.
Again, the biology area is an area where, because it takes
very few people, it takes very little in the way of resources,
it is one of the areas where I think there is some risk that we
might find new information that might change the content of
this report.
Chairman Warner. Very little area to conceal it, am I not
correct?
Mr. Duelfer. It takes very little area to conceal.
Chairman Warner. I thank you.
Senator McCain.
Senator McCain. Thank you, Mr. Duelfer, and thank you,
General, for your great work.
I have a follow-up. So therefore, knowing the history of
Saddam Hussein, his use of WMD, he had them in 1991, is there
any doubt in your mind that if Saddam Hussein were in power
today and there were no restrictions or sanctions placed on him
that he would be attempting to acquire WMD, Mr. Duelfer?
Mr. Duelfer. To me, I think that is quite clear. But more
importantly, it was quite clear to many of the senior advisors
around Saddam. He had an exquisite sense of the use of power
and influence. To him it was a continuous spectrum--oil,
military force----
Senator McCain. So there is no doubt in your mind, he is in
power today, the sanctions are gone, he would be pursuing them,
because that was his history?
Mr. Duelfer. He had two life experiences where they saved
him, which is I think why some of the prewar assessments were
colored. I mean, people would kind of look at it and say, why
would he not have these things.
Senator McCain. Okay, let me lead you through a couple of
questions here because we have only 6 minutes. There is the
belief purveyed by some that there was a status quo in Iraq
where basically the sanctions were in effect and things were
fairly normal, and so therefore we really had a choice between
the status quo and an attack on Saddam Hussein.
Is it not more likely, as you have stated in previous
testimony, the sanctions were being eroded and American
airplanes were being shot at. As you just mentioned,
businessmen all over Baghdad were thinking that it was a matter
of time before the sanctions were lifted; we have a burgeoning
scandal in the Oil-for-Food program, and there was not a status
quo? In other words, there was a steady deterioration of any
restraints, real or imagined, that Saddam Hussein may have
felt? Is that an accurate assessment of the situation in
Baghdad?
Mr. Duelfer. That is a very accurate assessment. We spent a
fair amount of time analyzing exactly that and trying to
understand the strategy and tactics which Iraq was using to
encourage the decay of sanctions.
Senator McCain. So we did not have a choice between
maintaining the status quo and attacking Saddam Hussein. We had
a situation which was rapidly deteriorating and eventually over
time, in the view of most experts, Saddam Hussein would have
been either relieved of or would have evaded these sanctions as
more and more business was done and less and less actions on
the part of the U.N. in enforcing those sanctions?
Mr. Duelfer. Sir, I think we detail, at great length,
exactly those sorts of conditions, but we allow for others to
draw their own conclusions. But my personal view is that the
sanctions were in free fall. They were eroding and there was a
lot of corruption. Were it not for September 11, I do not know
that they would exist today.
Senator McCain. There is also the belief in some circles
that this was an idea that was hatched either in the Department
of Defense or somewhere in the White House right after
September 11: Let us go attack Saddam Hussein, and we will
invent this WMD issue sort of as a pretext for it, and that
there was really a hidden agenda there.
Why, in your viewpoint, did every single intelligence
agency on Earth that I know of, the British, our friends the
French, the Germans, the Israelis, every single intelligence
agency believed, as our intelligence agency did, that Saddam
Hussein had WMD? How do you account for that?
Mr. Duelfer. Well, sir, that was not really my mandate.
However, I do have an opinion.
Senator McCain. I would appreciate your opinion.
Mr. Duelfer. I think there are a lot of factors involved in
that. One, as I mentioned before, Saddam had an experience
where these weapons were vital to him, so why would he not have
them? Sort of logically, why would he not?
Second, the United States had almost no contact with Iraq
over more than a decade. To me, I sometimes forget that because
I spent a lot of time there myself, but that was because I was
with the U.N. That means that the analysts who were forced to
make judgments about this were actually in a very poor
position. They did not have any ground truth. They spent a lot
of time looking at computer screens, but not a lot of time
talking to Iraqis, not a lot of time walking around Iraqi
plants and getting a feel for it.
For example, if someone associates a particular vehicle
with a chemical weapons program, as was done--there is
something called a Samarra Decon vehicle. If you spend much
time in Iraq you would realize the Iraqis could be selling ice
cream out of those vehicles. To associate a particular vehicle
with a particular program, it is that kind of a feel for the
ground that was rare in the United States.
Also, Saddam, as we learned from talking with him, was
deliberately ambiguous. He gave a speech, I remember it quite
well, in June 2000 where he said in essence: ``You cannot
expect Iraq to give up a rifle and live only with the sword if
its neighbors do not give up rifles and live with swords.'' He
wrote his speeches himself largely, by the way. Now, that is
kind of typical Saddamese, but it makes you think, well, he is
saying he is going to hang onto his WMD.
So we asked him what he meant by that. He said he had two
audiences in mind. This is a rare time when I think he actually
was candid. He said he had two audiences. One was the Iranian
threat, which for him was quite potent, palpable. The Iranian
threat was very palpable to him, and he did not want to be
second to Iran and he felt he had to deter them. So he wanted
to create the impression that he had more than he did.
Senator McCain. So every intelligence agency was fooled by
him?
Mr. Duelfer. Including to a certain extent the Iraqi
intelligence agency, because there were many Iraqis who were
not convinced that there either were or were not special
weapons within their arsenal.
Senator McCain. My time has expired, Mr. Chairman. I am
serving on the Weapons of Mass Destruction Commission. We need
to find out why we are all so wrong. But I think it is
important for everybody to keep in mind that it was every
intelligence agency on earth that came to the same conclusion,
and that is an important factor as we move forward with this
continuing ongoing national debate about whether we should have
attacked Iraq or not and whether there was sufficient
justification for doing so, and if so why.
I thank Mr. Duelfer. I appreciate your coming here at a
very sensitive political time. I appreciate your candor, and I
also understand that it is very inappropriate for you to get
into any of the domestic policies, politics, of this country. I
thank you. I thank you, too, General.
Chairman Warner. Thank you.
For the record, did you believe Saddam had WMD just prior
to the use of force?
Mr. Duelfer. My judgment was, I was at a think tank at the
time, that I expected there to be a small number of ballistic
missiles that would serve a function as a strategic reserve. I
believed that he would have retained the capability to produce
chemical or biological agents, but not have stocks.
I felt that at the time he was keeping his nuclear
expertise in four or five key facilities so that they would be
better positioned to restart that program. Like others, this
was an imperfect assessment. But that was basically from my
experience at the U.N. Special Commission, from the unanswered
questions.
But I must say that when they took the decision, in
February 2000, to begin discussions with the U.N. about
readmitting inspectors, to me that was a very key indicator
that there probably weren't large stocks there to be found.
Chairman Warner. Thank you.
Senator Kennedy.
Senator Kennedy. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
I join my colleagues in expressing great appreciation for
your service to our country. Let me just continue this thought,
Mr. Duelfer. What would you say, on a scale of 0 to 100, is the
likelihood that we will ever find the stockpiles of WMD that
the President spoke about prior to the war?
Mr. Duelfer. I think the prospects of finding, and I sound
like I am trying to create jargon here, a significant stockpile
is, I do not know, less than 5 percent.
Senator Kennedy. It is less than 5 percent. You have more
than 1,000 people on your staff now. Press reports indicate
that we have spent more than $900 million on the search for
WMD, and your testimony says that you just obtained large
numbers of documents that are approximately equal to the total
previously received since the end of the war, and that will
clearly take many months to examine.
But is this not a total waste of money? Why does the search
keep going on and on and on? Are we not at the point where we
have to admit the stockpiles do not exist and this has
obviously become a wild goose chase? The Bush administration
had hoped we would find something, anything to justify the war.
But instead, you basically nailed the door shut on any
justification for the war.
At the present time, David Kay told Congress that there are
approximately 130 known Iraqi ammunition storage points in
Iraq, some of which exceed 50 square miles in size, hold an
estimated 600,000 tons of artillery shells, rockets, aviation
bombs, and other ammunition. The real question is whether these
sites are adequately protected today or are they available to
the insurgents.
So, General McMenamin, can you assure us that all these
sites are tightly secured by U.S. forces and no weapons could
fall into the hands of the insurgents?
General McMenamin. Sir, I cannot assure you that will
happen. On the larger ones, we have security forces and
overhead imagery. There is an active program, ongoing to
destroy excess munitions around the country. On a regular
basis, we are destroying excess captured munitions to keep them
out of the hands of the insurgency.
As the Iraqi forces come on line in their security efforts,
they will be able to take over and protect those assets to
prevent them from falling into the wrong hands.
Senator Kennedy. My question is wouldn't the resources that
you are spending to find WMD, that evidently do not exist, be
better spent on weapons that do exist and that are threatening
American servicemen every single day?
Mr. Duelfer. Sir, if I might just respond a bit on that. My
task was not to find WMD. My task was to find the truth. I am
quite proud of the work that we have done to delineate the
program and to describe in detail, which anyone else can
examine, what we did find.
I am not suggesting that we should continue searching this.
I think the staffing and the requirements to continue resolving
these small remaining uncertainties is small. So you say wild
goose chase. We have had a couple people die and we have had
many people wounded. To tell them they have been involved in a
wild goose chase to me is--it is not really what we were doing.
We were meant to find what existed with respect to WMD. We were
not tasked to find weapons. We were tasked to find the truth of
the program, and that is what we tried to relate in this, and I
think it was a worthwhile endeavor.
Senator Kennedy. We all understand that anyone who is
wounded or dies in Iraq is a hero. They are there to serve, and
the political decisions are made to send them over there. For
all of us who have expressed concerns about this war, have the
highest regard and respect for them.
But the fact is we have had many distortions,
misrepresentations about the facts. The American people are
entitled to facts. John Adams says ``Facts are stubborn
things.'' We have seen distortions and misrepresentations about
what is absolutely there. It is fair enough to wonder whether
the $900 million that we are spending, that you say is a very
remote likelihood of finding WMD, should not be spent in other
areas to guard what David Kay said was necessary to guard if we
wanted to try to have an impact in terms of the Americans.
With all respect, Mr. Duelfer, we did not go to war because
of Saddam's intent or future capability to produce the WMD. We
were told that Saddam already had stockpiles of chemical and
biological weapons and that he could acquire a nuclear weapon
within a year, which he could then give to terrorists. That is
what we were told.
I understand from your testimony, that you mentioned out
here in response to Senator Levin, Iraq did not possess a
nuclear device, nor did it try to reconstitute a capability to
produce nuclear weapons after 1991. Your report talks about
Saddam's intent and future capability. That is not what the
American people were told. President Bush said on September 27,
``Saddam must be prevented from having the capacity to hurt us
with a nuclear weapon or to use the stockpiles of anthrax that
we know he has''--``that we know he has''--``VX, the biological
weapons which he possesses.''
Ten days later President Bush unequivocally stated: ``Iraq
possesses and produced chemical and biological weapons.'' He
continued on October 7, ``The evidence indicates that Iraq is
reconstituting its nuclear weapons. If the Iraq regime is able
to produce, buy, or steal, it could have a nuclear weapon.''
Secretary Rumsfeld said: ``With regards to weapons, we know
where they are. They are in the area around Tikrit, Baghdad,
east-west.'' That is what the Secretary of Defense is telling
the American people.
You have not been able to find them.
Mr. Duelfer. Sir, I have spent more time with the Iraqi
Secretary of Defense than the American Secretary of Defense.
Ask me about Iraqis.
Senator Kennedy. I want to thank you very much.
Mr. Duelfer. Thank you.
Chairman Warner. Thank you very much.
Have you had adequate time to respond to Senator Kennedy's
questions?
Mr. Duelfer. I think so, yes.
Chairman Warner. Fine. Thank you.
Senator Inhofe.
Senator Inhofe. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
It seems as if we are talking about the two assumptions
that took this administration into this war, I am very thankful
that we are in this war, having to do with people disavowing
that there is a connection between al Qaeda and Saddam Hussein.
I just think it is important to have in the record, Mr.
Chairman, some facts here. One was one of the reports that was
disclosed about a year ago, in terms of the connection, that a
highly classified 16-page defense document, memorandum has not
been refuted to this time.
It says that: ``The unavoidable conclusion, Saddam
Hussein's regime had been guilty as charged, tied for more than
a decade to Osama bin Laden and his al Qaeda network for the
purpose of waging attacks on their mutual foe, the United
States of America. Top Iraqi intelligence officials and other
trusted representatives of Saddam Hussein met repeatedly with
bin Laden and his subordinates. U.S. intelligence received
reports that Iraq provided safe havens, money, weapons, and
fraudulent Iraqi and Syrian passports to al Qaeda, and also
provided training in the manufacture and the use of
sophisticated explosives.'' We know about that. Mohamed Haikmot
Shakir facilitated the movement of two of the September 11,
2001, hijackers, Khalid Midhar and Nawak al-Hamsi, through the
passport control center and there were four meetings between
Mohamed Atta and intelligence officials of Iraq.
All of these things were drawing that connection, and I
think we have adequately covered the fact that WMD were
certainly expected to be there by every intelligence force,
including ours. Senator Kennedy mentioned Dr. Kay and I can
recall sitting next to Senator McCain when he was at this very
table asking some of these questions:
Saddam Hussein developed and used WMD? True. You are
talking about in the past? Yes, he used them against the
Iranians and the Kurds. If he were in power today, is there no
doubt that he would harbor ambitions to develop and use WMD?
Absolutely, no question about that. Then the questioning goes
on as to how much better off we are today.
I was going to run over the German intelligence reports,
the French, the Russians, the Israeli reports, but also our own
reports. When President Clinton was in office he said: ``I have
ordered a strong, sustained series of air strikes against Iraq.
They are designated to degrade Saddam's capacity to develop and
deliver weapons of mass destruction.'' There was no doubt in
anyone's mind that this was going on.
Now, I think probably the best question that has been asked
here, and it has been answered by you and it has been asked to
a number of witnesses so I will not ask it again, is are we
better off today? I think people are so quick to forget the
reports that we had about Saddam's bloody regime, about the
lining up the 8,000 people in the mass graves. Many people at
this table have actually looked down into these mass graves.
The lining up of 315 children and executing the 315 children;
the policy of cutting tongues out if anyone is suspected of
saying anything about the regime.
Mr. Chairman, you might remember this although you were not
on the trip, in 1991 we had the first freedom flight. Alexander
Haig and myself, and several others, went to Kuwait with Saud
al-Sabaq. He was the ambassador to the United States from
Kuwait. They did not even know the war was over there. This was
right after it was officially over.
I can recall the 7-year-old daughter of the ambassador. We
went to their palace, they were of the royal family, only to
find that Saddam Hussein had taken over that palace and used it
as a headquarters. I went up with this little girl to her
bedroom and there were body parts. They had used it as a
torture chamber. I saw a little boy there with his ear cut off
because he was caught with an American flag.
Now, I think anyone who is trying to use these two
arguments for political purposes is going to have to answer
that question and have to answer it in the positive, that we
are better off, or deny that we are better off than we would
have been if Saddam were still in power. So I think that is the
thing that we have to look at.
I know I have used almost all my time, but let me just ask
you a couple of questions, Mr. Duelfer. Thank you very much for
your service, both of you. Would you describe Iraq's strategy
and tactics to divide the Security Council and defeat
sanctions? Would it have made sense, in your view, to stake our
national security on the success of the U.N. sanctions regime?
Mr. Duelfer. I think it is pretty clear that the Iraqi
strategy and tactics to dividing the Security Council were
having a fair amount of success. I think that is clear in the
report when you see the amount of conventional military
equipment that was being sold to Iraq, being transported into
Iraq, in fact with the help of some Security Council members.
There is, in my mind, little doubt that the trend, again
prior to September 11, the constraints that the U.N. was able
to put around Iraq were collapsing.
Senator Inhofe. Thank you very much.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Warner. Thank you, Senator Inhofe.
Senator Reed.
Senator Reed. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Thank you, Mr. Duelfer and General. I did have the
opportunity to visit you and I appreciate the arduous
circumstances and the extraordinary commitment that you and
your colleagues have made to do your mission.
Mr. Duelfer, let me follow up on a question that the
chairman asked about your perception of the threat prior to the
invasion. I think you indicated that you thought there might be
some stockpiles, but I do not want to put words in your mouth.
The question I have: At that point did you think that
constituted an imminent threat to the United States and our
interests?
Mr. Duelfer. Bear in mind, I was not a member of the
Intelligence Community at that time. I was just me with my own
background.
Senator Reed. Given what we have learned, you might have
been in a better position.
Mr. Duelfer. It was my judgment that Iraq retained perhaps
a strategic reserve, in other words a deterrent, not an
offensive capability.
Senator Reed. Let me ask you another question which I think
is very interesting. You have had the opportunity to meet with
Saddam. Why did he accept U.N. inspectors into his country with
virtually unrestricted access? I think, as I recall, they
actually discovered some of these missiles that were out of
compliance and destroyed them?
Mr. Duelfer. First let me correct a point in your premise.
The way we debriefed Saddam was by one interlocutor who spent
his entire time. My interaction with him was always one step
removed.
Senator Reed. Thank you.
Mr. Duelfer. But the question why did he accept the
inspectors, I think to the best we understand from what he has
said, which is not always the truth, but from those around him,
was that he recognized the growing pressure. It was clear that
the military force buildup was taking place. His advisors
finally convinced him that, look, there has been a ground shift
of the support in the Security Council away from Iraq.
He was feeling isolation. Some of the revenues were tailing
off. He was, I think, getting advice also from some of his
friends on the Security Council who said: Look, the world has
changed; you have some problems here.
Senator Reed. That seems to be a pretty rational response
for somebody who we have kind of labeled as a lunatic or
delusional. That is just an aside.
The inspectors on the ground, and you have great experience
as a former inspector, were probably the best source of
intelligence and information. They could have significantly
increased our awareness of the true facts, difficult to get at,
I grant you. But yet they were prematurely removed, very
abruptly removed. In your judgment was that a wise decision?
Mr. Duelfer. First of all, I have enormous respect for the
inspectors. There is no substitute for having people on the
ground. That provides a lot of information. It provides a
deterrent.
But I would come back to the question of were those
conditions sustainable? Hans Blix and his people were on the
ground in an extraordinary set of circumstances. The United
States had deployed a lot of forces. There was a crisis in the
Security Council. So when I ask myself the question, were
inspections working, are you asking a question which is at one
point in time or is it over a continuum?
I find it hard to convince myself that the circumstances
which allowed the inspectors to be successful to the extent
that they were. I do not think those conditions were
sustainable.
Senator Reed. I think you raise the issue of the length of
sustainability. Certainly I would assume that you can see they
could have been sustained for several more months at least.
This coalition was a huge step, backing him down, forcing him
to admit that the situation had changed, that the U.N. was
going to crack down on him. Perhaps it would not have lasted
for 2 or 5 years indefinitely, but for 2 or 3 months to 6
months, to 7 months, at which time we could have learned a
great deal more about the very questions we are debating now:
Were those biological labs producing hydrogen or something
else? Was it a real nuclear program or was it sort of dormant?
Mr. Duelfer. I am not sure I can answer that question, sir.
Senator Reed. Mr. Duelfer, I respect you and I think that
is probably a good answer. But certainly those questions should
have been asked by our leadership.
Mr. Duelfer. That is the heart of a good discussion and
good debate, and I hope this report informs that discussion.
Senator Reed. Let me ask you another question as my time
allows. From what you said, this might be repeating your
response to Senator Levin, Saddam consciously and deliberately
ordered the destruction of virtually all of his WMD, chemical
and biological and termination at some point of the nuclear
program, which begs the question: If he was so intent on
reconstituting a program, if this was his unshakable idea, why
did he not simply hide small portions of this material?
Mr. Duelfer. He wanted to get out of sanctions. That was
his priority. On a noninterference basis with that objective,
he wanted to sustain, as we understand it from talking with him
and his advisors, the intellectual capabilities and some bits
and pieces of his programs that are hard to duplicate.
This is particularly the case in the early years of the
U.N. constraints, from 1991 to 1995, and particularly the
period of time during which his son-in-law, who was in charge
of developing and had some pride of creation of these programs,
was still around. But after he left in 1995, I think Saddam
concluded that this business with the sanctions was going on
longer than he expected. He did not anticipate the duration of
these. He had to take other decisions, to include getting rid
of some of the production capabilities and other things.
Senator Reed. It seems that the sanctions were working.
Mr. Duelfer. Again, if you look at it at a point in time
and I hate to say this but, it depends what you mean by
``working.'' The sanctions certainly were modifying Saddam's
behavior. They were also having an enormous effect on the
people in Iraq. Once Saddam elected to begin the Oil-for-Food
program because of the devastation on the Iraqi population and
because of the threats that caused to his own regime, it
provided all kinds of levers for him to manipulate his way out
of the sanctions.
So, again I come back to trying to avoid a static analysis
and try looking at a more dynamic analysis, what are the
trends, where is this headed. I apologize if I sound like I am
disappearing into jargon here, but to me I think that is a
distinction with a difference.
Senator Reed. Thank you. General, thank you.
My time has expired.
Chairman Warner. Thank you very much, Senator.
Senator Allard.
Senator Allard. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
I wonder, this is for both of you to comment on, if you
would describe the extent of the evidence that Saddam's regime
destroyed materials, documents, and equipment, and whether your
findings were accurately reflected in Saddam's 2002 report to
the U.N. Security Council?
Mr. Duelfer. Sir, our task was not to compare what we found
with the U.N. document, what was provided to the U.N. Likewise,
it was not to compare what we found with prewar intelligence
assessments. We had enough trouble just trying to determine
what it was that was on the ground.
However, in the process of doing that, it was quite clear
that we were finding things which were certainly at variance
with the U.N. resolutions. But we did not line up what we found
with what Iraq was declaring.
Senator Allard. But you did see enough evidence there that
raised suspicions about the accuracy of the 2002 report to the
U.N. Security Council?
Mr. Duelfer. There certainly were errors in that report.
Senator Allard. Errors did exist?
Mr. Duelfer. Errors did exist, yes.
Senator Allard. Similarly, did you uncover more evidence
that the regime engaged in additional destruction of WMD
evidence after hostilities began in 2003?
Mr. Duelfer. I think David Kay and I both have commented on
that. There was a lot of destruction at sites, the intentional
destruction of documentation, materials. It is difficult to
determine exactly what was removed and destroyed, but there
clearly was a concerted effort in certain areas to destroy
materials that would be helpful in our investigation now.
Senator Allard. Would you care to speculate on the
motivation for the destruction of those?
Mr. Duelfer. Iraq had, throughout its existence, a denial
and deception activity, for a multiplicity of reasons, one of
which was to conceal whatever they had with respect to WMD from
the U.N. inspectors, but also to protect the regime leadership
in many ways. So it could have been related to many different
things.
There were also records unrelated to WMD, but perhaps
related to atrocities, that they wanted to cover up.
Senator Allard. So you do think, in your mind, that there
were some WMD programs that they were trying to destroy
evidence of?
Mr. Duelfer. I have not said that, sir. I have said there
were active steps taken to destroy things and materials which
could be helpful to our investigation. I do not know what it
was that they were destroying evidence of, so I cannot make
that next step.
Senator Allard. I see.
Mr. Duelfer, your predecessor and certainly other recent
commissions and government reviews have all concluded that we
had poor human intelligence in Iraq to uncover or corroborate
WMD facts and assertions. In your opinion, how did we get into
that poor state?
Mr. Duelfer. It is not my responsibility. Nevertheless, I
do have opinions. Again, because we did not have relations with
Iraq we did not have access for a long period of time. That is
one factor.
Senator Allard. It was a closed society.
Mr. Duelfer. It was a very closed society.
Senator Allard. It was very difficult to get people in
there in the field to verify.
Mr. Duelfer. That is true. While the UNSCOM was operating
in Iraq, I take some pride in this, we had a great deal of
information about Iraq that we made public. Our reports to the
Security Council, which occurred four times a year, were quite
detailed. I think perhaps people assumed that was a pretty good
source of information. But again these are just my opinions and
I am not the best-positioned person to comment on that
question.
Senator Allard. On its face, Iraq is a closed society. They
agree to have inspectors come into their country and then all
of a sudden they kick them out. That raises suspicions about
what is going on in the country as far as WMD, does it not?
Mr. Duelfer. Certainly in December 1998 when Operation
Desert Fox took place and there was 4 days of bombing. The U.N.
Special Commission left Iraq. There was an enormous division in
the Security Council at that time because there was a
difference of opinion about whether that bombing should have
taken place. The Iraqis, certainly Iraqis I spoke with, were
actually quite satisfied and pleased. One individual I spoke
with, I remember, said: Well, gee, if we knew that that was all
you were going to do, meaning the 4 days of bombing, we would
have ended this earlier.
But from December 1998 until December 1999, the Security
Council was in complete disagreement over what to do with Iraq.
There was not a consensus. It took them a full year to arrive
at a new resolution. During that period of time, Iraq was
obviously free to do what it wanted. It was clear that there
was not a consensus on how to deal with Iraq and they would
draw their own conclusions from that.
Senator Allard. I understand from your remarks the degree
of uncertainty regarding involvement of the neighboring
countries in Iraq's potential transportation of WMD or
facilities. For example, we saw reports that Iraqi intelligence
services would replace border security guards while cargo
caravans crossed various border stations.
Do you want to elaborate on those assertions and facts?
Mr. Duelfer. Our investigations looked a lot at what took
place at some of the border points and surrounding the border
crossing points. This is described in some detail in our
report. Certainly there was a lot of activity related to the
transfer of prohibited conventional munitions. The Muhabarat,
the Iraqi Intelligence Service, was involved in that. They had
people at these border points. There was a lot of traffic back
and forth. There were reports about WMD-related materials
crossing the border.
But I still feel that we have not yet run down all the
leads that we can on that. I am not sure we will ever be able
to definitively answer that question, but I still think there
are some avenues of explanation which we can pursue.
Senator Allard. Are some of those papers in the volumes of
information you just acquired? Do you believe that they could
be there?
Mr. Duelfer. The documents, the customs documents, are not
replicated in the books, but the discussion about some of the
lines of inquiry we have had are included in that, including
the role of the Muhabarat, the Iraqi Intelligence Service.
Senator Allard. I see my time has expired, Mr. Chairman.
Senator Inhofe [presiding]. Thank you, Senator Allard.
Senator Nelson from Florida.
Senator Bill Nelson. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Duelfer, thank you for your public service. I visited
with your team over there about a year and a half ago. That is
a difficult place for you to operate in and I appreciate your
public service.
If you would, explain just a little more for the committee
the following quote from page 5 of your report: ``The analysis
shows that, despite Saddam's expressed desire to retain the
knowledge of his nuclear team and his attempts to retain some
key parts of the program, during the course of the following 12
years''--that is after the 1991 war--``the following 12 years,
Iraq's ability to produce a weapon decayed.''
Can you describe that to us? How did that ability decay?
Mr. Duelfer. The nature of a nuclear weapons program is
such that you need large teams of very well-educated, highly-
trained individuals. It is a complicated process. Despite
Saddam's desire to retain that intellectual capital, over time
those teams just decay. You just cannot sustain that.
The people working on the trigger mechanism, the people
working on enrichment, the people working on materials
sciences, and the people working on rotors for production of
enriched material--there was a wide range of talent and
expertise which just simply melted away, and that is what
happened.
Senator Bill Nelson. General, Scott Speicher is from my
State. He is from Jacksonville. You have made the statement
that the team that was there, which was doing a magnificent
job, departed this year in May.
General McMenamin. Yes, sir. Sir, they exhausted all in-
country leads. They ran to ground everything they could find
in-country, returned to the United States to work on their
report with the Intelligence Community prisoner of war-missing
in action (POW-MIA) cell. That report is with the Director of
DIA right now for his review, prior to going to the Department
of the Navy and SECNAV for his final assessment of the fate of
Captain Speicher.
Senator Bill Nelson. That is 5 months that they have been
here. Why is there not a report forthcoming?
General McMenamin. Sir, the last update I had, it was with
the Director of the DIA. Other than that, I have no idea why it
has not gone any further.
Senator Bill Nelson. What advice would you give to the
committee for us to give any kind of comfort to the family that
everything has been done and that the team has left Iraq?
General McMenamin. Sir, basically with the team leaving
Iraq, when they did their efforts to find the fate of Captain
Speicher, that did not stop our efforts to pursue other leads.
Any leads that we get in-country, we have individuals assigned
that will actually work those leads, whether it is working with
a unit in one of the different organizations, whether it is a
source from a human intelligence, or whether it is a walk-in to
any of our platforms.
We will continue to pursue any leads that come up in-
country or any leads that we get from the United States that
may prove credible enough that we can give the families some
hope and comfort.
Senator Bill Nelson. I know about some of those leads and
we have not been able to follow up on them.
General McMenamin. No, sir. It is extremely difficult to go
to parts and about parts of the country right now to follow up
on some of those.
Senator Bill Nelson. Because of the difficulty of us having
access as well as the explosiveness of the local population,
the threats, the intimidation, the retribution, all of that?
General McMenamin. Yes, sir, those are all parts. In
addition, some of the sources are bedouins who move around
quite frequently. They are extremely difficult to find. Some of
them still do not trust any type of centralized government,
just like they didn't before. But the leads that we get, we do
pursue. We sort through, just as on the WMD side, we sort
through scams and realities, to try to pursue the credible ones
to ensure that we can do what we are supposed to do.
Senator Bill Nelson. In the 1990s we found his aircraft.
The Iraqi government at that time, supposedly brought forth
Scott Speicher's flight suit. We found a lot of the parts of
the aircraft. Yet we found no other things, no identification
badges. We did not find his pistol. We did not find any of
this.
General McMenamin. Yes, sir.
Senator Bill Nelson. It is out there somewhere.
General McMenamin. Yes, sir. It involves tracking down
people somewhere in the country. Some are afraid to come
forward. They are there. It is just going to involve getting to
them and finding them and finding out what the answers are.
Senator Bill Nelson. What do you think I ought to tell the
family so that they have some assurance that this is going to
happen, given the fact that it took raising Cain by three
Senators in order to get this thing moving after about 8 years?
General McMenamin. Sir, the only thing I would be able to
tell the families is that we will not give up looking for him.
If that gives them false hope, it should not. As time goes on
and the situation stabilizes, it will give us better access to
people. Maybe people will be more forthcoming if their fears of
retribution by either the insurgency or the former regime
elements--but I would say that we will pursue the effort to the
best of our ability to find a good answer for the family.
Senator Bill Nelson. For your personal service, thank you
very much. My ``ought'' that I have is with others who I think
have dropped the ball. It is certainly not with you, it is not
with your predecessor. It is not with all of those very
courageous people who were part of that team that was sifting
through every piece of debris that they could find in those
prisons to get any shred of evidence.
It is with the lethargy and inertia in these gargantuan
organizations that suddenly let the fate of an American flyer,
who was walked away from suddenly, be lost in the bureaucracy.
That I cannot stand. I can tell you, I speak for Senator
Roberts as well.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Senator Sessions [presiding]. Thank you.
Senator Lindsey Graham.
Senator Graham. Thank you.
Mr. Duelfer, I have tried to put this whole issue in
context and see if we can reach some type of sensible
conclusions about what we are to draw from all this. Let us go
back. The starting point to me is the use of WMD by Saddam
Hussein. What kind of weapons are we talking about that he
used?
Mr. Duelfer. In the Iran-Iraq War, in the late 1980s, he
used chemical weapons, both aerial bombs and artillery rounds.
He used approximately 101,000 chemical munitions. They were
mustard rounds, largely in the case of 155-millimeter artillery
shells. There were 122-millimeter rockets with sarin. There
were also aerial bombs.
In the case of the domestic use in Halabja and other cities
as well in northern Iraq, it was really the same mix, but they
tended to be dropped from helicopters.
The third use was in 1991, and this is where the ISG
developed more new information. That is when the Shia were
rising up; again, they loaded helicopters with chemical
munitions and used it against the Shia.
Senator Graham. Were these weapons produced in-house or did
he buy this material from someone or do we know?
Mr. Duelfer. Certainly the weapons were manufactured in
Iraq. Some components of those weapons and precursors of the
agents that were acquired abroad.
Senator Graham. But the actual making of the chemical bombs
was done in Iraq, is that correct?
Mr. Duelfer. That is correct.
Senator Graham. So at one time he did have a chemical
capability within the country?
Mr. Duelfer. Absolutely. He had an enormous facility called
the Muthanna State Establishment. There is a long discussion of
that particular facility in one of the annexes of the report.
It is a huge facility. I think it is like 5 kilometers by 10
kilometers, with dozens of buildings. It is quite a huge place.
Senator Graham. Is 1981 the year that the Israelis bombed a
nuclear power plant?
Mr. Duelfer. That is correct. In June of that year they
bombed the Osirak reactor.
Senator Graham. Do you believe that was a wise decision on
their part?
Mr. Duelfer. After that activity, the Iraqis really went
full bore on a nuclear weapons program. I do not think I have a
judgment on that, frankly.
Senator Graham. The only reason I mention it is, was there
ever a time that Saddam Hussein was engaged in trying to
acquire a nuclear weapon?
Mr. Duelfer. Oh, he certainly was. He had a very elaborate
program. His top weapons designers freely admit that. They
discuss that. The head of the program, Jaffar Jaffar, will tell
you that. After being imprisoned, and only let out of prison if
he agreed to begin a program to run a nuclear weapons program,
he did that. That continued on until 1991.
Senator Graham. So what we know thus far from history is
that he had chemical weapons in-house, he used them on people
to survive, and that he was actively procuring nuclear weapons.
Now, was there ever any evidence that he transferred any
material to a third country?
Mr. Duelfer. We have not come across evidence that he
transferred WMD materials to a third country.
Senator Graham. Group or country, to anyone?
Mr. Duelfer. We have some reports that we are trying to run
down, as I mentioned earlier, of material moving out of Iraq
just prior to the war. But if your question means was he
sharing the wisdom and knowledge that he acquired about WMD, we
have not seen that. But neither has that been a particular
emphasis of our investigation.
Senator Graham. But you are still searching out the issue
of whether or not he may have moved some weapons material
before the war?
Mr. Duelfer. That is correct.
Senator Graham. How large a container would you need to
hold enough weapons anthrax to kill 100,000 people?
Mr. Duelfer. If you have dried anthrax and it is properly
distributed, it does not take much in terms of dried agent. But
you have to be able to deploy it. There are many scenarios that
you can spin out. If you put it in an aircraft, like an
agricultural type of aircraft, the amount of agent itself is
very small. It is something that could readily fit in a small
room. The device that you, or whatever mechanism you choose to
disperse this with, is another issue itself.
But your point I think is that it is a very small amount of
space in the biology area, and that is true. It is difficult to
find these things.
Senator Graham. Is it also fair to say that on paper there
were many weapons unaccounted for, biological and chemical
agents unaccounted for, given what we know he had before 1991
and the latest inspection efforts?
Mr. Duelfer. Your term ``unaccounted for'' is well-chosen
because there is much confusion on this point. The U.N. Special
Commission in particular but also the Monitoring, Verification,
and Inspection Commission reported that it was unable to verify
the disposition of certain weapons. That is different than
saying that they exist. So we were unable to account for them.
Senator Graham. Let us try it one other way. The Iraqi
government was unable to account for it.
Mr. Duelfer. Correct.
Senator Graham. So in conclusion, we have a very long
history of use of weapons, procuring of weapons and, on paper,
unaccounted-for weapons. I think what we need to learn from
this is that we were wrong, and as a country we need to find
out why we were wrong about some of our assessments. But as a
world I think we need to come to grips with the idea that
people like Saddam Hussein had too much opportunity to do too
many bad things too long, and we should learn from that, too.
Thank you.
Senator Sessions. Senator Ben Nelson.
Senator Ben Nelson. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
I express my appreciation for your service, as well as for
your being here today.
It is my understanding that the report that is being
released, Mr. Duelfer, will list companies that traded with
Iraq after U.N. sanctions were imposed against trade. But the
version to be made public will not include the names of U.S.
companies due to a prohibition in the Privacy Act; although the
full version to be received by U.S. Government officials,
including Members of Congress, will include those American
companies' names.
But the report will name French, Russian, Polish, and other
companies and officials that traded with Iraq. Some of the
trade may not have been illegal, though much of it, I think in
the words of the report, ``was clearly illegal.''
Is this accurate?
Mr. Duelfer. Sir, it was my view to put forward all the
data, names of people, companies, countries that were involved
in this, because I felt it was important for people to
understand that. Believe me, I had to argue on this.
However, with respect to the American names, lawyers have
told me that the Privacy Act prohibits publicly putting out
American companies' names. But they are included in the report,
which is an official document provided to American officials.
Senator Ben Nelson. I assume that you took their legal
advice, but you may not have shared that opinion; is that fair?
Mr. Duelfer. I am not a lawyer, so if someone tells me I am
going to go to jail for something I tend to listen carefully. I
mean, that is not what they told me, but they said: Look, this
is the law; this is as far as we can go.
Senator Ben Nelson. But isn't it interesting that we print
the names of petty criminals in the police blotter sections in
weekly newspapers across the country, but somehow the names of
these companies do not get in? Apparently the Privacy Act does
not relate to foreign companies? Was that ever discussed with
you or do you have any thoughts about that?
Mr. Duelfer. It evidently does not. I would point out also
that these data to which you are referring on oil vouchers and
so forth, that data is going to become public anyway. It is
part of many investigations which are ongoing. The U.N. has an
ongoing investigation. It is documents which we received from
the Iraqi government. So I think, as a practical matter, the
full disclosure of all this is going to happen. But we cannot
be a part of that.
Senator Ben Nelson. Now let us go to the unaccounted for
WMDs. You mentioned that your view going in was that you
thought there probably was a strategic reserve for defensive
purposes, not for offensive purposes. As you looked did you
also believe that there would be some capability of delivering
those WMD in a defensive posture?
Mr. Duelfer. Again, this is just my own opinion.
Senator Ben Nelson. I understand, it is your own view.
Mr. Duelfer. Beforehand I had thought that there would be
some small number of ballistic missiles, on the order of a
dozen or 15, with the capacity to be loaded with either
chemical or biological agents, and this would be something as a
deterrent, in a sense.
Senator Ben Nelson. Did you have any indication that would
have led you to believe that these existing stockpiles, small
or otherwise, that were not found might have been secreted to
Syria or some other place?
Mr. Duelfer. I had no wisdom on that when I formulated my
own opinions about what might remain. I was really drawing my
judgment on the residual uncertainties from my work at the
UNSCOM, from discussions with defectors when I was there, my
sense from discussions with Iraqis during the years I was at
UNSCOM, and the overall incentive structure that Saddam had.
Those were the factors that led to my judgment on that.
Senator Ben Nelson. But you had no belief, going in, that
you would find large stockpiles or large delivery capabilities,
as an assumption, as an expectation?
Mr. Duelfer. My thought was that Saddam, the Iraqi regime,
would have preserved the opportunity or the capability to
produce chemical agent and biological agent if a decision were
made to do that. But this is just me as an individual. That was
my judgment, that he would have retained the capacity to
produce in a strategic buildup period, to put it in our kind of
jargon.
Senator Ben Nelson. In your previous statement you said
that you saw the destruction, but you could not tell at what
point the destruction of any stockpiles might have occurred.
You also said, I think, that there was a deterioration just
inherent in not keeping a nuclear program going because of the
loss of staff and the loss of capabilities there.
Do you think there was also a loss of potential capability
in the ability to make WMD other than nuclear weapons if you
were not in the process of making them?
Mr. Duelfer. Less so in the other areas, because of the
nature of the systems. Let me go back to an earlier part of
your introduction to that last question. You said we were not
able to understand when these weapons were destroyed. We
investigated that pretty extensively through interviews and so
forth, and really what we found was most of the destruction was
done in 1991, at various points throughout 1991.
Senator Ben Nelson. So it was not just in advance of the
invasion?
Mr. Duelfer. No, not just in advance. I was talking about
some destruction of evidence and materials that might have
aided our investigation. I just want to make sure that there
was not a confusion on that point.
To your second point or question really, the decay in the
ability to produce chemical or biological weapons is different,
again because of the nature of the system. For biology, a small
number of people that is required. The physical plant required
is very small. So it would be easy for Saddam to conclude or
assume that he has that capability and it is on the shelf. I
said this in my testimony. Because he was able to do it in the
past, because the people are still there, because he can
produce indigenously, even if he has to start from scratch,
fermenters, spray dryers, tanks, and dispersal systems, that is
something which in his mind he would say: I can do that if I
want to and it will not take me long to do it.
Chemical is somewhat more difficult. It takes dozens of
people in terms of the engineers, production engineers, and the
chemists. It would be a bit more difficult depending upon the
type of weapons system that you wanted to use. If it is simple
dumb bombs, that is one thing. If it is missile warheads, that
is kind of another thing.
Interestingly, though, where he did choose to very openly
violate the resolution was in the ballistic missile area, and
that is an area where he tried to draw a distinction between
WMD and long-range ballistic missiles. But he also, I think,
understood this is a long-lead item. Building, indigenously
certainly, the types of missiles that he was building, the
Samoud II, took a lot of time. It was when he was in possession
of a substantial amount of wealth, largely derived from the
Oil-for-Food program, that he actually committed to those
production programs, particularly around 1999 and 2000.
Senator Ben Nelson. Thank you, and thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Senator Sessions. Thank you, Senator Nelson.
I, just in general, would share the thought that, looking
back over my comments at the time that we voted to go forward
and authorize military action in Iraq, I mentioned WMD very
little, but talked mostly about the consistent violation of
Saddam Hussein of the 16 U.N. resolutions. In a sense, he
violated his agreement for peace. He sued for peace when our
military was moving forward in Iraq and he sued for peace and
agreed to do a number of things, which he did not do.
As ``The Economist'' magazine in London said, in I thought
a very important editorial, the box was leaking. European
nations, Russia, France, Germany particularly, were trading
with him. The embargo was leaking. We were flying flights over
Iraq on a daily basis and being shot at by his people and
dropping bombs on him. We were at a point, as ``The Economist''
said, to either put up or shut up, to walk away or not.
I am absolutely convinced had we walked away from Iraq he
would have broken the embargo, utilized the vast oil reserves
he had to reconstitute a military that would have been a threat
to the world and reconstitute his chemical weapons system.
That is just my view. That is what I said at the time. That
is what I believe today. I know the CIA Director apparently,
according to Mr. Woodward, told the President it was a slam-
dunk that there were going to be WMD there. I do recall
Chairman Warner, at least four or maybe six times, asking
leading witnesses: If we undertake this war, are we going to
find WMD when it is over? Every one said yes, and one of those
was General Abizaid, I do recall.
So I just would say that people who talk about lying and
misrepresentation really need to be talking about were there
reporting errors and errors in analysis, which is why we are
passing, probably this very day, a bill to reform and
strengthen our Intelligence Community.
Mr. Duelfer, you were asked by Senator Graham--I thought
you were a bit reluctant to answer the plain question: How much
space does it take to have anthrax that could kill thousands of
people? Just how much would it be if it is properly handled?
Mr. Duelfer. It is a matter of square feet in terms of the
agent. It is something that it is a very small amount of agent.
Senator Sessions. Could you put enough in one fruit jar to
kill hundreds of people, if you know? Just yes or no, if you
know.
Mr. Duelfer. Again, the short answer, if you make the right
kind of material and you disperse it correctly and the
atmospheric conditions are right. I have listened to too many
biological weapons experts to be able to just give you a
straight yes or no answer. But it is a very small area, yes.
Senator Sessions. Yes, certainly it is, and it is hard to
find that if you have to look over a nation of 20 million
people; it might be there.
What about this report? I see that, I believe it is in
July, we moved out more than 1.7 tons of enriched uranium and
other radioactive materials from Iraq. What was that about?
Mr. Duelfer. This is material that had been part of the
Iraqi nuclear power plant production and had been under
safeguards. It is not related to weapons programs.
Senator Sessions. Is it convertible to a dirty bomb or
something of that nature?
Mr. Duelfer. This is the concern, yes.
Senator Sessions. So far as you know, now are there any
other remaining nuclear materials in Iraq?
Mr. Duelfer. None which have not been accounted for by the
International Atomic Energy Agency. I think we are pretty solid
on that. When you say nuclear, Iraq for one reason or another,
has these cesium lightning arresters all over the place. I have
no idea why they do, but there are little pieces of cesium all
over. So we have been trying to collect up as many of those as
possible. But they are not considered to be a major threat.
Senator Sessions. With regard to the discussion about
whether or not the aluminum tubes were part of a nuclear
reconstruction effort by Saddam Hussein, I would just recall
that we heard both views of that in our intelligence briefings
that we got and the Democratic nominees got if they attended.
Some said it was and some said it was not. I thought it was
connected to nuclear myself, based on the briefings. But it was
certainly clear to those of us who listened to the briefings
that some could interpret that differently.
Did you form any opinion concerning former weapons
inspector David Kay's comments that ``We know from some of the
interrogations of former Iraqi officials that a lot of material
went to Syria before the war, including some components of
Saddam's WMD program''?
Mr. Duelfer. I would agree with all that up until the last
point, because I do not believe we know that WMD-related
material left Iraq to go to Syria. There was a lot of material,
a lot of things, including a lot of money, which left Iraq and
went to Syria.
Senator Sessions. You deny it or you just personally are
not sure that was included in the things that went out of the
country?
Mr. Duelfer. We are unable so far to make a conclusion on
that. We have seen reports, but what I can tell you that I
believe we know is a lot of materials left Iraq and went to
Syria. There was certainly a lot of traffic across the border
points. We have a lot of data to support that, including people
discussing it. But whether in fact in any of these trucks there
was WMD-related materials, I cannot say.
Senator Sessions. I think probably what happened to us was
that we knew, and I guess you have confirmed in your own mind,
that he used weapons, that he used chemical weapons against his
own people and against the Iranians in the Iran War; is that
correct?
Mr. Duelfer. That is correct, yes.
Senator Sessions. You do not deny that he was developing a
nuclear weapon program when he was hit by the Israelis a number
of years ago?
Mr. Duelfer. No, he clearly had a nuclear weapons program.
He clearly had ambitions in all of these areas.
Senator Sessions. Do you believe he still harbored those
desires to achieve in those areas?
Mr. Duelfer. There is no doubt in my mind.
Senator Sessions. I guess, frankly, that the fact he had
had them previously, he had been given opportunities to
demonstrate how he got rid of them and he refused, I think that
may have allowed, caused some of our experts to reach
conclusions that we have not been able to establish at this
point to be accurate.
Senator Dayton.
Senator Dayton. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Thank you, gentlemen, for your candor and your persistence
here today.
The discrepancy between what we were told just prior to the
war beginning, in terms of Iraq's WMD stockpiles and the
absence thereof, is really to me staggering, and I want to just
put into the record the statement that Secretary of State Colin
Powell made before the U.N. on February 5, 2003. He stated:
``Our conservative estimate is that Iraq today has a stockpile
of between 100 and 500 tons of chemical weapons agent. That is
enough to fill 16,000 battlefield rockets.''
He also cited 18 trucks, mobile biological agent factories.
Your report indicates that there were none of these
supplies, as did Dr. Kay, on the battlefield, stashed away, or
anywhere physically to be found in Iraq.
On the nuclear weapons question, Vice President Cheney
stated on August 29, 2002: ``On the nuclear question, many of
us are convinced that Saddam will acquire such weapons fairly
soon.'' Just before the war began, he said on Meet the Press on
March 16, 2003: ``And we believe he has in fact reconstituted
nuclear weapons.''
Your report, your testimony today, says: ``The analysis
shows that, despite Saddam's expressed desire to retain the
knowledge of his nuclear team and his attempts to retain some
key parts of the program, in the course of the following 12
years after the Gulf War, Iraq's ability to produce a weapon
decayed.'' So he had less capability than he did in 1991 to
produce a nuclear weapon.
At the time when we were convinced to support the
resolution in October 2002 that the President requested and at
the time the President made the decision to commit American
forces to the war in Iraq, we were told that Iraq possessed
these magnitudes of WMD that constituted immediate and urgent
threats to the United States. Based on what you have learned
subsequent, would you say that assertion was correct?
Mr. Duelfer. Sir, I do not want to be evasive, but again it
was not our job to validate prewar intelligence.
Senator Dayton. Based on what I just said here, which is
the information we were given?
Mr. Duelfer. What we have found on the ground is at
substantial variation from what you have described the prewar
assessments were. I think that is quite clear.
Senator Dayton. I accept that. Thank you.
Based on your overall knowledge of other nations, and maybe
you do not have the expertise, either of you, to answer this,
how many other countries would you say at that time or at the
present time had WMD programs and weapons themselves greater in
number or development than Iraq? How many nations of the world?
Mr. Duelfer. Sir, I do not know. Ask me about Iraq and I
can drone on forever.
Senator Dayton. All right, fair enough.
You mentioned in the closing of your testimony, Mr.
Duelfer, something that was quite chilling. This summer, you
detected attempted or prospective links between foreign, you
say here, ``foreign terrorists or anti-coalition forces who
were attempting to either obtain chemical weapons stocks or the
experts in Iraq who were able to produce those weapons,'' and
that you thought you had been able to get ahead of this
problem, you said, through the raids this summer.
Do you still see that linkage or possible linkage as a
threat?
Mr. Duelfer. I do. I was a little bit reluctant to put much
more into the public report on that because it is an ongoing
force protection kind of an issue. The Army raided a facility
called the Al-Aboud Laboratory in an area of Baghdad which is
known as the ``chemical souk,'' and by chance they found a
person there who was working on some ricin.
So we quickly got involved in that. We quickly began to
debrief him and ferret out his contacts and work a link
analysis, et cetera. We pursued a series of raids pursuant to
that, and we put together a picture of a series of efforts and
a number of individuals who were trying to put chemical agent
of various sorts into munitions, including mortar rounds. We
think we have most of that particular activity, not under
control, but we understand it.
These individuals were anti-coalition people. They were not
people who we identified with foreign terrorists. But it has
certainly been the case that characters like Zarqawi have
expressed an interest in exactly this type of weapon. But I
think the resources of the ISG, the analysts and the ability to
react quickly allowed us to get ahead of this problem, and I am
quite proud of that.
Senator Dayton. I am glad you did, yes. Thank you for doing
so.
It strikes me that one of the pretexts for this war was to
prevent Saddam Hussein from dispersing his WMD to other forces,
and a terrible irony of the effort would be if in fact that had
not been occurring and did in fact occur as a result of our
intervention there. I appreciate your intervention to prevent
that.
May I ask, regarding the long-range ballistic missiles that
you cited, what are we talking about here in terms of the long
range?
Mr. Duelfer. The Al-Samoud, which was a weapon that he had
and he fired several in the war, had a range which exceeded 150
kilometers. I think it flight tested out to 180 kilometers. But
in addition, he had under development range extension programs
that, by adjusting the fuel, in the near term he could have
reached 250 kilometers. Saddam had asked the development of
much longer range missiles, including up to 600 kilometers. All
of this was within the capabilities of the Iraqi scientists and
engineers, aided and abetted by external assistance.
Senator Dayton. My time is up. May I just ask you to
respond briefly. How much longer do you think this
investigation needs to continue?
Mr. Duelfer. I am going to go back to Baghdad as soon as
possible, because it is safer there. I would anticipate some of
the residual issues can be pretty well addressed in the next
month or two. This is not dragging on. I know some of the
questions seem to say, why are we wasting all this money and
time on this.
Senator Dayton. Just asking.
Mr. Duelfer. In terms of subsequent reporting, what I would
see is a potential of perhaps addendums on little defined
issues. For example, was material shipped out of Iraq prior to
the war; a judgment on that.
Senator Dayton. Thank you again, both of you, for your
service.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Senator Sessions. Senator Dayton, thank you.
Senator Clinton, the vote has just started on final
passage, about 2 minutes or so. So if you would like to go now,
fine. I think Senator Warner will return after the vote.
Senator Clinton. I would prefer to go now if I could.
Senator Sessions. Good. You are recognized.
Senator Clinton. Thank you very much.
Mr. Duelfer and General, thank you both for your service,
and please express our appreciation to your predecessors and
all who served on the ISG. We have a deep understanding, based
on the work that you have done, of issues that are quite
difficult, and I thank you for that.
Mr. Duelfer, when was your report finished?
Mr. Duelfer. When it was in the printer, which was probably
2 or 3 days ago. It is dated the 30th. I think the last volume
of it actually trickled off the printer a couple days after
that.
Senator Clinton. Who have you or anyone on your behalf
briefed with respect to this report?
Mr. Duelfer. Briefed?
Senator Clinton. Or discussed, presented the report?
Mr. Duelfer. For my part, I have talked to people as this
has progressed, including up here; earlier this morning, the
Senate Select Committee on Intelligence. I have had meetings
with various people saying, where are things coming out, where
are they going along. But in terms of the final report, it has
not been briefed anywhere other than to Congress right now.
Senator Clinton. Have you had discussions with anyone at
the Pentagon over your findings?
Mr. Duelfer. I have not, no.
Senator Clinton. Has anyone, General, on your staff or on
behalf of the ISG briefed the report to anyone in the Pentagon?
General McMenamin. No, ma'am.
Senator Clinton. Have there been any briefings or any
discussions of any kind, broadly construed, with anyone at the
White House or the National Security Council?
Mr. Duelfer. I have had discussions with a staffer over
there, yes. Let me be careful. The report has been around and
circulated for declassification purposes. A lot of people had
to look at it for source protection reasons and for other
issues, to make sure it was proper that it all go out publicly.
Senator Clinton. So the report has been in circulation
within the government.
Mr. Duelfer. The report has been in the Intelligence
Community and, frankly, it has been all over town in bits and
pieces while people went through it to see if there was
material in it that should not be out in the public domain.
Senator Clinton. Mr. Duelfer, with respect to the ongoing
dispute about aluminum tubes, is it your testimony that finally
the dispute has been put to rest insofar as it is possible to
determine the use for the tubes?
Mr. Duelfer. I have the advantage of being able to just
make a call on this because the report goes out under my name.
This aluminum tube issue to me is just, to me it is rockets.
Senator Clinton. It is rockets?
Mr. Duelfer. It is rockets.
Senator Clinton. So if the National Security Advisor on
Sunday said of the tubes, ``People are still debating this,''
is it fair to assume that she has not been briefed or not aware
of the findings of the ISG?
Mr. Duelfer. There may be people debating it in various
places, but they debated it in front of me and I came to a
conclusion and that is what I put in this report. Again, this
is not an Intelligence Community report. I have the great
pleasure of not having to go through an interagency process on
this and made a call.
Senator Clinton. But you are representing the best judgment
of a thousand people who filtered information and evidence up
to you.
Let me ask, Mr. Duelfer, did you find any evidence that
Saddam Hussein either passed weapons or materials or
information to terrorist networks or that there was a real risk
of him doing so?
Mr. Duelfer. We found no evidence that he was passing WMD
material to terrorist groups, but that really was not a strong
focus of our work.
Senator Clinton. So there is no evidence in your report
that there was such a risk of him doing so?
Mr. Duelfer. We did not address that.
Senator Clinton. Is there any other source of information
other than the work of the ISG that would present evidence
sufficient for a statement such as that to be made that you are
aware of?
Mr. Duelfer. I am unaware of assessments on that, but I am
not sure I would be aware.
Senator Clinton. So if this morning President Bush said,
``There was a risk, a real risk, that Saddam Hussein would pass
weapons or materials or information to terrorist networks,'' he
could not be relying upon your exhaustive report for that
statement, could he?
Mr. Duelfer. He had the talent and the knowledge existed in
Iraq, so what Saddam did with it you again have to evaluate.
Senator Clinton. But he is not talking about passing on
talent. He is talking about weapons, materials, information.
Mr. Duelfer. The report describes what we found on the
ground, which was no stocks. There was a decision to sustain,
to the extent they could, the intellectual capital. I am trying
to say exactly what we have said here.
Senator Clinton. I appreciate that because I think you have
done a great service to your country, Mr. Duelfer. I sometimes
fear that we are trying to turn Washington, at least, into an
evidence-free zone. So the introduction of evidence and facts
upon which reasonable people, I hope, can reach conclusions is
a great service. We have seen too little of that. So I am very
appreciative of the professional way in which you have
proceeded in the fulfillment of your function.
Let me also ask you, Mr. Duelfer, as an experienced
inspector: The conclusions you reached about the decay of the
attempt to obtain nuclear weapons is of great interest, I
think, because we now are concerned about North Korea and Iran.
We obviously were surprised by both India and Pakistan. Those
states and perhaps even non-state actors who are attempting to
obtain nuclear weapons is the greatest threat we confront, and
that was certainly the case before Iraq and now indeed after.
Do you have any advice about the best way for the United
States to try to degrade and decay such capacity so that we can
be assured that proliferation will not pose a threat to us or
to others around the world?
Mr. Duelfer. The decay that occurred in the Iraqi program
was a function of the sanctions and the limits, the
extraordinary limits, put on this regime. We looked at some of
the activities of these scientists in areas where we thought
they might have been serving as a surrogate for nuclear-related
activities. For example, there was a development program of a
rail gun, which is an electromagnetic--it is like a magnetic
device for firing projectiles. We thought that that might be a
surrogate for development of nuclear expertise. We looked at a
series of projects like that, but we found that it was
inconclusive.
Drawing conclusions that would apply to a country like
North Korea, it is difficult, frankly, Senator, because they
are really so different. Iraq invaded another country and lost.
It was subject to an extraordinary set of U.N. regulations. It
fought a war with Iran. It has enormous natural resources. It
has a population which is energetic. They are great builders.
It is in a different region, where many would expect just
objectively to see Iraq as a country and its people really
should be the hub, but by virtue of the leadership the
difference between what is in Iraq and what could be is huge.
I do not know. It is difficult for me to draw lessons for
North Korea. But it is a very good question. Maybe others
smarter than I can do it.
Senator Clinton. Thank you so much, both of you.
Chairman Warner [presiding]. Thank you, Senator.
I thank the witnesses for their indulgence. We are now
voting on the intelligence bill, which is of utmost importance.
I had the last two amendments and I have voted, so I am going
to remain. There is at least one Senator on the committee who
desires to come back from the vote since that individual did
not have an opportunity to ask questions.
Would you like to take a 3-minute or a 4-minute stretch?
Mr. Duelfer. Sir, I am used to Baghdad. This is fine.
Chairman Warner. All right, that is fine. General, as a
former Marine myself, you just stay where you are.
General McMenamin. Okay, sir.
Chairman Warner. Thank you.
Gentlemen, I think we have had an excellent hearing. There
are many ways to judge the quality and content of a hearing.
Senator Pryor. Mr. Chairman, I am sorry. I am back. I have
been voting and I just got back.
Chairman Warner. Good. I am in the middle of a speech.
Senator Pryor. I will get out of your way then.
Chairman Warner. A number of colleagues have come up to me
on the floor and in the passageway and expressed tremendous
satisfaction with your testimony and the fact that you have
come and the work you have done. General, of course you are the
new boy on the block, but you are doing your job, too.
My question at this point is, and then I will yield to my
good friend here, is the record complete as to the future that
you estimate for the ISG? You have 1,750 people. I am looking
at your statement, General, and that is a considerable
investment of people and capital. The General points out in his
testimony we have a wide range of other mission areas outside
Mr. Duelfer's responsibility.
So I think it would be helpful if you were to describe the
force. The size is still 1,750. Do you contemplate to keep that
size? What are the missions, and over what period of time do
you hope to achieve those missions?
General McMenamin. Sir, out of that 1,750, about 1,000 of
them are down in Qatar running the Document Exploitation Center
(DOCEX). They are the ones that will handle this large influx
of material we just received. They will triage it, scan it, and
get it into the national databases. Out of that 1,000 down
there, about 700 of those are linguists, both CAT-1 and CAT-2
linguists, who do the scanning, the triage, and things like
that. So that is a large undertaking down there.
Up in Baghdad we have about 750 folks. That is broken out
between a small DOCEX effort that focuses more on some tactical
intelligence, taking care of things. We have an analytical base
that encompasses a WMD section, a counterinsurgency section,
and a political-military section that handles the high-value
detainees (HVDs) and Captain Speicher investigations. That is
supported by a small staff, a security element, and a human
intelligence element that works throughout Iraq.
Based on the various missions we have, the numbers may
change depending on the size and the questions that we need to
follow for Mr. Duelfer's post-report requirements. We are
looking at how we can better integrate and work with the
Multinational Force-Iraq's collection efforts also so we can
support over the next couple of months the requirements that
Mr. Duelfer identifies and also General Casey's requirements in
the battle against the counterinsurgency and the
counterterrorists, especially in these crucial months leading
up to our elections, their elections, and our inauguration.
Chairman Warner. That is a very clear statement. I thank
you.
You have indicated, Mr. Duelfer, that you are going to
return, is that correct?
Mr. Duelfer. That is correct.
Chairman Warner. You have not specified the duration of
this next chapter?
Mr. Duelfer. No, but it is a much diminished task and
requirement. The General and I have been discussing the
personnel requirements and so forth, but it is a very much
smaller activity that will be required.
Chairman Warner. What work do you deem essential to
complete this?
Mr. Duelfer. The criteria I put is I do not want to be
spending time and basically risking people's lives on things
which are historical curiosities. My criteria is something
which could materially affect the future. In other words, if we
are uncertain about the disposition of some fermenter tanks,
there remains the possibility that there is a biology
capability. So that is worth investigating to me.
Chairman Warner. Of course, there are the facts that will
be revealed from this very large tranche of new material which
is down in the document examination.
I have been recycling Senator Kennedy's question to you,
Mr. Duelfer, in which he asked you the likelihood that we will
ever find stockpiles of WMD in Iraq, and you said 5 percent. I
kept thinking, in reply to my earlier inquiry, you said that
biological weapons required very little space in which to
house, store, preserve, or otherwise keep a supply which could
be extremely detrimental to a great number of people. Am I
correct about that?
Mr. Duelfer. Absolutely correct.
Chairman Warner. So was that included in your 5 percent?
Are we referring to large caches of WMD in terms of chemical
primarily?
Mr. Duelfer. The way I understood Senator Kennedy's
question was large militarily significant stocks. The risk that
there is a concealed biological capability of some sort to
produce, that is the area where I am least confident, frankly.
But because we have had access to those people we believe were
involved in the previous biology program, that is where we draw
some confidence that we think we have run this as well as we
could. The most important analytical approach on biology is the
people, because there is a relatively small number. But by the
same token, it could be two or three people that you never even
heard of involved in this.
So sensitivity analysis on this whole endeavor would say
your weakest ground is in biology.
Chairman Warner. I thank you very much.
Now, Senator, we are delighted that you came back from the
vote. Take your time.
Senator Pryor. Thank you.
Chairman Warner. We appreciate very much your staying with
this hearing.
Senator Pryor. Thank you very much. I will try to stay
within my 6 minutes if at all possible.
I would like to join the chorus of voices here thanking
both of you for your public service. It is great service to
this country and even beyond our borders. We really appreciate
it.
If I may, Mr. Duelfer, I would like to start with you. I
read in this morning's ``Washington Post,'' it said, ``As head
of the ISG, he worked independent of the CIA.'' Is that true?
You worked independent of the CIA?
Mr. Duelfer. I am an independent voice. I report to the
DCI.
Senator Pryor. Okay. ``Independent of the CIA, and his
report was not vetted or changed by the agency.'' Is that true?
Mr. Duelfer. Other than for the declassification process,
which I described earlier. I controlled the content.
Senator Pryor. So they did not ask you to change it
materially, just in terms of the classification aspect?
Mr. Duelfer. Correct.
Senator Pryor. Did anyone else ask you, outside the CIA,
from another agency or the White House or anybody else, to
change your report?
Mr. Duelfer. No. I received thoughts, which I solicited
from people, because I think anybody who has a bright idea I am
not averse to hearing it. But no one tried to influence the
outcome. If they knew me, they would realize they would get the
opposite reaction, if anything.
Senator Pryor. Did you find any connection between Saddam
Hussein's regime and September 11? I just want to be very clear
on this because this has come up in numerous contexts.
Mr. Duelfer. We were not looking for that, but we found
none.
Senator Pryor. Also let me just be clear on this question,
because this again has come up in this committee and other
places: Is there any evidence that Saddam Hussein or his regime
passed WMD to al Qaeda?
Mr. Duelfer. We saw nothing.
Senator Pryor. Is there any evidence that he attempted to
do that or he was contemplating doing that?
Mr. Duelfer. We saw nothing.
Senator Pryor. As I understand your testimony from earlier
when we started in the very beginning, you talked about the
U.N. sanctions. I do not want to put words in your mouth, but
as I understand it, in your view they had a very limiting
effect on his ability to produce WMD?
Mr. Duelfer. Among the effects of the sanctions were to
constrain his ability to produce WMD, and that is twofold. One
is that there were some constraints, particularly in the early
years, about what he could import, but it also modified his
behavior because his prime objective was to get rid of those
sanctions.
Senator Pryor. So in that sense the sanctions had worked or
were working. But also what you found, as I understand it, is
individuals and companies from China, Russia, France, and other
countries were willingly evading U.N. sanctions?
Mr. Duelfer. I think the strength of the sanctions was
clearly decaying, particularly after 1997.
Senator Pryor. I think you mentioned they were in a free
fall?
Mr. Duelfer. I am a skydiver, so free fall is not
necessarily bad in my book.
Senator Pryor. Let me ask this. If those companies and
individuals in China, Russia, and France were trading with
Iraq, is it possible they could do that without their
government's knowing that?
Mr. Duelfer. Yes. We try to be very careful in discussing
when we know it was a company dealing with Iraq, when we know
it was a government dealing with Iraq, or when we know it was a
government-sponsored company dealing with Iraq. We saw evidence
of all.
Senator Pryor. Were these violations by these governments
and companies and individuals aiding Saddam Hussein's attempted
buildup of WMD? Were they aiding his WMD program?
Mr. Duelfer. They were certainly aiding his weapons
infrastructure. They were certainly aiding his long-range
ballistic missile capability. They were certainly aiding in the
sense that the domestic infrastructure was improving and that
would shorten a breakout capability should he decide on that.
But we did not see specific imports, for example related to
a biological program, dedicated to a biological program,
dedicated to a nuclear program, or dedicated to a chemical
program.
Senator Pryor. I see. Now I want to ask you a question that
I know you will get asked by the press, if you have not
already. It is possible that you already have been asked this
today. President Bush, when he was asked whether there were
chemical and biological weapons that existed in Iraq prior to
Operation Iraqi Freedom, said: ``Wait until Charlie gets back
with the final report.''
My first question is, are you Charlie?
Mr. Duelfer. If he says so.
Senator Pryor. The second question is, just so I understand
your testimony, you did not find evidence of chemical or
biological weapons at the dawn of Operation Iraqi Freedom?
Mr. Duelfer. We did not find stocks of either chemical or
biological weapons.
Senator Pryor. Is your report in any way inconsistent with
David Kay's findings?
Mr. Duelfer. No. In some cases we refined some of the
material he presented. We learned a bit more about some of the
things that he originally found. We were able to flesh out some
of the organizations. For example, he first found some of these
Muhabarat labs and I think we were able to get a better
understanding of what they were about.
Senator Pryor. In other words, you fleshed out his report?
Mr. Duelfer. His report was really a snapshot of what they
found. I think this is more of a synthetic picture of what was
going on.
Senator Pryor. Comprehensive view?
Mr. Duelfer. It is really not inconsistent with what he----
Senator Pryor. Okay. Let me ask about a scenario that
someone referred to a few moments ago, and you actually have it
in your written statement. Maybe I should ask General McMenamin
about this.
There is a scenario out there that I think we in Congress
are concerned about. What if insurgents team up with Saddam
Hussein-regime chemical weapons experts? What if they team up
and could cause quite a bit of damage there? Here is the
question I want to ask the General: Do we have, in your view,
sufficient resources on the ground in Iraq to prevent this?
General McMenamin. I would say, for the military
commanders, the intelligence effort that we have to try to
identify these people is sufficient at the moment. One of the
more successful programs that the embassy is running is the
scientist redirection program. We are working with the embassy
and the ministry of science and technology to actually employ
some of these former regime scientists either here in the
United States or in Iraq, which will also help the issue.
Senator Pryor. The answer to my question then is what? Do
we have sufficient resources on the ground?
General McMenamin. Yes, sir.
Senator Pryor. We do. Are we doing everything we can do to
make sure that scenario does not happen?
General McMenamin. Sir, any time we get any notification of
any type of chemical weapon, we send a team out. We interview
sources, we run down sources. We have run down everything from
epoxy glue to baby powder to crude schematic drawings of
missile systems that somebody took out of a book just so they
can get some money. So we investigate every potential lead.
Senator Pryor. Thank you.
Mr. Duelfer, I am really out of time, but let me ask you
one question.
Chairman Warner. Senator, you go ahead and take another
minute or two.
Senator Pryor. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Is this your final report? Are you planning on doing
another report?
Mr. Duelfer. This is a comprehensive report. I choose that
word carefully because I think, as I mentioned, there are a
couple little remaining issues where I think we can usefully
develop more information, and if we do and if it is beneficial
we will produce short addendums to this report.
Senator Pryor. I would like to follow up on Senator Lindsey
Graham's question a few moments ago as well. He mentioned the
unaccounted for WMD. You may not be able to say how much is
unaccounted for in this arena but I would like at some point to
get an answer to that. If you can say it here, I would like to
hear it.
In your opinion, what happened to the WMD that is
unaccounted for? What is your view of that?
Mr. Duelfer. The unaccounted for weapons really derive from
the weapons which Iraq declared it had but was not able to
verify the disposition thereof. There were 550 155-millimeter
artillery shells with mustard agent. They were not able to
account for those to the U.N. What happened to them? We may
never really know.
But as we find these residual chemical rounds, I think,
about 53 in the past several months we found, some of these
unaccounted for weapons may just turn up that way. They are not
a significant threat.
Senator Pryor. Let me just be clear on that. These weapons
that you found, the mustard gas, et cetera, are pre-1991?
Mr. Duelfer. They were produced before 1991, that is
correct.
Senator Pryor. This really is my last question because I am
indulging on the chairman's time here. If I can follow up with
Senator McCain's question, he says, basically we had two
choices in Iraq. We could either keep the status quo or we
could attack Saddam Hussein. I am not trying to be overly
simplistic, but I think that is essentially what he said.
But would you agree with me that actually we did have a
third option, and that is that we could have the world
rededicate ourselves to the sanctions? In other words, to use
your term, to stop the free fall, to plug the holes of the
leaky--and there has been a lot of analogies used today, but
the leaky vessel, whatever we called it earlier? Could we not
have done that and continued to thwart his ability to create
WMD?
Mr. Duelfer. Sir, I am really not in a position to answer
that question. Just one thing I would point to, though, is the
sanctions had a lot of effects far beyond addressing the Iraqi
WMD capability. When you see what happened to the Iraqi
country, particularly now that we are there, you have to take
that into account as well.
Senator Pryor. Mr. Chairman, that is all I have. Thank you.
Chairman Warner. Thank you very much, Senator, for your
participation.
What has become of the scientists who worked on
particularly the WMD, but biological programs as well? Do you
have an accounting for how many of them are around and what
they are doing? Is there some program to discourage them from
working with some other organization, terrorists, or leaving
the country and spreading their knowledge into hands which
would bring along an adverse situation?
Mr. Duelfer. Sir, we have a fair idea of where the
prominent ones are. Some of them are in jail. Some of them are
employed in Iraqi ministries. As General McMenamin mentioned,
there is a program that the United States is sponsoring to
employ some of these individuals.
Frankly, it has been my experience that most of these
people would rather pursue other lines of business, but they
want to pursue a line of business that allows them to earn an
income. Most of these people did not grow up thinking, gee,
when I grow up I want to make anthrax. They were kind of
channeled into that by a very odd regime.
But I think for the most part we know where most of the
biological specialists are and they are in Iraq.
Chairman Warner. You know what efforts have been made on
the nuclear programs in the former Soviet Union through the
Nunn-Lugar programs. We have expended a lot of the taxpayers'
funds to get a handle on where that material is and what is
being done to keep it out of the hands of third parties. Russia
has been extremely cooperative, I think, and we are continuing
to press forward.
Do we need a similar program here?
Mr. Duelfer. Sir, I think that there is a State Department
program along those lines. They have certainly come to us with
requests for who the key individuals are. We have provided that
information to them. But it is outside of the direct mandate of
the ISG.
General?
General McMenamin. Sir, our chem-bio unit, that does all
the field testing, has worked a very good relationship between
the embassy and the ministry of science and technology, and we
actually have a very open dialogue with them to identify
certain scientists who are either needed back here for the
Department of Homeland Security or can be of use in Iraq.
Chairman Warner. I thank you.
What has been your observation about the prisoners in
custody and to the extent that they have been forthcoming in
providing us any information that has been of value in your
work? I want to separate this, of course, from the situation
with the Abu Ghraib prison and the military situation. That is
slowly working its way through the judicial system of the
Department of the Army, and this committee is interested in
that as well.
But what they call the deck of cards, they are kept in
facilities where there is an entirely different type of
treatment being rendered.
Mr. Duelfer. That is correct. Frankly, I think some of them
have been very helpful. Some of them have not. It is my opinion
that very little purpose is served by detaining some of them.
Chairman Warner. You conveyed that to the appropriate
authorities, your judgment on that?
Mr. Duelfer. That is correct.
Chairman Warner. That is good. I think that is helpful. So
some of it has been fruitful from time to time?
Mr. Duelfer. Some of them have been very helpful, and in
fact I think it would be very interesting when some of them are
released for them to read this report and have a comment on it.
Chairman Warner. Lastly, you have been very helpful to the
committee in giving your perspectives on Iraq and the future of
Iraq, drawing on your many years of experience with the people.
I am going to speak for myself. It seems to me the greatest
hope for fulfilling the mission of giving the Iraqi people the
freedom that they deserve, and hopefully want, is through the
training of significant numbers of military, police,
paramilitary, border, and the like to secure their country.
We hosted Prime Minister Allawi, who is a very impressive
man, and I had the opportunity to directly ask him questions
along this line. The anticipation is that the numbers, which
are currently 60,000 to 65,000, could well go to 100,000 by the
time the elections are held in January.
But as you study that culture, do you feel that sufficient
numbers of people in Iraq will step forward, take on those
responsibilities of providing for their own security, and in
numbers which hopefully will enable our country to begin some
phasedown of its force structure? You see these tragic
situations where those lining up as recruits are the targets of
suicide bombers. Yet those lines seem to form the next day.
So I would be interested in your views on that, Mr.
Duelfer.
Mr. Duelfer. Sir, it is obviously unrelated to my report,
but I have spent a lot of time there. My sense is that what
they desire most is of course security. It does not take a
genius to figure that out. If they have a structure to step
into and they believe it is their structure, not a foreigner's
structure, and that that structure is fair and represents Iraq,
I think that will happen.
I had a lot of very candid conversations with many Iraqis,
even under Saddam. There are lots of discussions about the
different tribes, clans, the Shia, and the Sunni. Many of them
made the point to me, they said: Yes, over the last few decades
we have acquired our nationality. We are Iraqis first. The way
Saddam disbursed favor and so forth, he tended to reward groups
and so forth, and he fended off threats to himself that way.
But I think if there is a structure that is identified as
an Iraqi structure, that is seen as something which will
contribute to their future, that there is a true possibility
that that will happen.
Chairman Warner. I thank you very much.
Senator Levin. Thank you.
Senator Levin. Thank you.
Just a few questions, Mr. Duelfer. First on the UAV issue.
As I read your findings on page 42, it is that, ``Evidence
available to the Iraq Survey Group concerning the UAV programs
active at the onset of Operation Iraqi Freedom indicates these
systems were intended for reconnaissance and electronic
warfare.'' Does that accurately state your finding?
Mr. Duelfer. That reflects our assessment.
Senator Levin. Did you find any evidence in the documents
that you looked at that Iraq had UAVs capable of or were
intended to carry WMD?
Mr. Duelfer. In their possession, no.
Senator Levin. Relative to chemical weapons, on I believe
page 1 of the chemical section, your report says that, ``While
a small number of old abandoned chemical munitions have been
discovered, the Survey Group judges that Iraq unilaterally
destroyed its undeclared chemical weapons stockpile in 1991.''
Mr. Duelfer. Yes, that is correct.
Senator Levin. You also found that, relative to the sites,
the satellite photos of sites that were stated to be suspicious
chemical weapons storage sites prior to the war, on page 3 of
your report ``alternate plausible explanations for the
activities noted other than CW-related activities.'' Is that
accurate?
Mr. Duelfer. Yes. This is referring to Secretary Powell's
presentation to the U.N. Security Council, in particular the
site called Musa-Ib, and there was some imagery of that. What
we found on the ground was that what the Iraqis were doing
there was unrelated to chemical weapons.
Senator Levin. Senator Pryor asked you about any evidence
of a relationship to al Qaeda in the documents that you looked
at, and I gather you answered in the negative to that question.
How many documents did you look at? I do not know whether to
ask you, General, or who I look at for the answer to this,
because you had some data in your prepared statement about
numbers of documents, number of people. So whoever wants to
answer that question.
General McMenamin. Sir, we went through over 40 million
pages of documents.
Mr. Duelfer. I would hasten, we have also now acquired a
like number.
Senator Levin. So you have another 40 million more
documents to look at.
Mr. Duelfer. Another squillion, to put it in analytical
terms. I am sorry. A lot.
Senator Levin. A lot.
But at least in the 40 million you have gone through, there
was no such evidence, is that correct?
Mr. Duelfer. The approach that it has gone through is a
triage system. We have not put eyeballs on every page and
looked at that. But the process that we have gone through has
not yielded anything like that.
Senator Levin. Then just one other question. I am trying to
find out whether it was a conversation that you had or your
folks had about his major concern. Apparently in the report you
were quoted as saying that you were approached ``multiple times
during the late 1990s by senior Iraqis with the message that
Baghdad wanted a dialogue with the United States.''
Mr. Duelfer. Myself among others, that is true.
Senator Levin. ``That Iraq was in a position to be
Washington's best friend in the region?''
Mr. Duelfer. That is something that a senior Iraqi said to
me, that is true.
Senator Levin. What came of those probes?
Mr. Duelfer. Nothing. The policy was not to have a
dialogue, as I understand it, with Baghdad at the time. But
again, I was not part of those policy decisions. I just was the
recipient. They saw me as a convenient American to talk to.
Senator Levin. While we are waiting for the chairman, page
1 of the biological section says that ``Iraq would have faced
great difficulty in reestablishing an effective biological
warfare agent production capability and that any attempt to
create a new biological warfare program after 1996 would have
encountered a range of major hurdles. The years following
Operation Desert Storm brought a steady degradation of Iraq's
industrial base. New equipment and spare parts for existing
machinery became difficult and expensive to obtain. Standards
of maintenance declined. Staff could not receive training
abroad and foreign technical assistance was almost impossible
to get. Additionally, Iraq's infrastructure and public
utilities were crumbling.''
Is that an accurate reading of your page 1?
Mr. Duelfer. In the mid-1990s that is true. But with the
improvements in Iraq's domestic industrial circumstances as the
1990s proceeded, it became less of a hurdle. It also is
addressing a program on the scale that they had before the war,
which was a very substantial program. We are not really
addressing there the small types of terrorist type of concerns
that so often people talk about with respect to biological
weapons.
Senator Levin. Thank you.
Chairman Warner. Forgive me, I am trying to handle a matter
on the floor at the same time.
Senator Levin. I do not know if Senator Pryor had
concluded. I did not have the gavel.
Chairman Warner. Thank you. As I said, I thought we have
had a very good hearing, and I wanted to personally come back
and thank you for the service that you have rendered, each of
you, and continue to render. This committee would be very
anxious to receive such subsequent reports and opinions that
you might have, as we intend to continually monitor this
important subject.
Thank you very much. The hearing is adjourned.
[The complete Table of Contents of the ``Comprehensive
Report of the Special Advisor to the DCI on Iraq's WMD''
follows:]
[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
[Whereupon, at 5:48 p.m., the committee adjourned.]