[Senate Hearing 108-854]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
S. Hrg. 108-854
THE GLOBAL POSTURE REVIEW OF UNITED STATES MILITARY FORCES STATIONED
COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES
UNITED STATES SENATE
ONE HUNDRED EIGHTH CONGRESS
SEPTEMBER 23, 2004
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COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES
JOHN WARNER, Virginia, Chairman
JOHN McCAIN, Arizona CARL LEVIN, Michigan
JAMES M. INHOFE, Oklahoma EDWARD M. KENNEDY, Massachusetts
PAT ROBERTS, Kansas ROBERT C. BYRD, West Virginia
WAYNE ALLARD, Colorado JOSEPH I. LIEBERMAN, Connecticut
JEFF SESSIONS, Alabama JACK REED, Rhode Island
SUSAN M. COLLINS, Maine DANIEL K. AKAKA, Hawaii
JOHN ENSIGN, Nevada BILL NELSON, Florida
JAMES M. TALENT, Missouri E. BENJAMIN NELSON, Nebraska
SAXBY CHAMBLISS, Georgia MARK DAYTON, Minnesota
LINDSEY O. GRAHAM, South Carolina EVAN BAYH, Indiana
ELIZABETH DOLE, North Carolina HILLARY RODHAM CLINTON, New York
JOHN CORNYN, Texas MARK PRYOR, Arkansas
Judith A. Ansley, Staff Director
Richard D. DeBobes, Democratic Staff Director
C O N T E N T S
CHRONOLOGICAL LIST OF WITNESSES
The Global Posture Review of United States Military Forces Stationed
september 23, 2004
Rumsfeld, Hon. Donald H., U.S. Secretary of Defense.............. 6
Myers, Gen. Richard B., USAF, Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff.... 16
Jones, Gen. James L., Jr., USMC, Commander, United States
European Command and Supreme Allied Commander, Europe.......... 18
Fargo, Adm. Thomas B., USN, Commander, United States Pacific
LaPorte, Gen. Leon J., USA, Commander, United Nations Command,
Republic of Korea/United States Combined Forces Command,
Commander, United States Forces Korea.......................... 28
THE GLOBAL POSTURE REVIEW OF UNITED STATES MILITARY FORCES STATIONED
THURSDAY, SEPTEMBER 23, 2004
Committee on Armed Services,
The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 2:32 p.m. in room
SH-216, Hart Senate Office Building, Senator John Warner
Committee members present: Senators Warner, McCain, Inhofe,
Allard, Sessions, Collins, Ensign, Talent, Chambliss, Graham,
Dole, Cornyn, Levin, Kennedy, Lieberman, Reed, Bill Nelson, E.
Benjamin Nelson, Dayton, Bayh, Clinton, and Pryor.
Committee staff members present: Judith A. Ansley, staff
director; Leah C. Brewer, nominations and hearings clerk; and
Benjamin L. Rubin, receptionist.
Majority staff members present: Brian R. Green,
professional staff member; Ambrose R. Hock, professional staff
member; Gregory T. Kiley, professional staff member; Thomas L.
MacKenzie, professional staff member; Elaine A. McCusker,
professional staff member; Lucian L. Niemeyer, professional
staff member; Paula J. Philbin, professional staff member; and
Lynn F. Rusten, professional staff member.
Minority staff members present: Richard D. DeBobes,
Democratic staff director; Daniel J. Cox, Jr., professional
staff member; Evelyn N. Farkas, professional staff member;
Richard W. Fieldhouse, professional staff member; Maren R.
Leed, professional staff member; Michael J. McCord,
professional staff member; and William G.P. Monahan, minority
Staff assistants present: Alison E. Brill, Andrew W.
Florell, Catherine E. Sendak, and Nicholas W. West.
Committee members' assistants present: Christopher J. Paul,
assistant to Senator McCain; John A. Bonsell, assistant to
Senator Inhofe; Darren Dick, assistant to Senator Roberts;
Jayson Roehl, assistant to Senator Allard; Arch Galloway II,
assistant to Senator Sessions; D'Arcy Grisier, assistant to
Senator Ensign; Lindsey R. Neas, assistant to Senator Talent;
Clyde A. Taylor IV, assistant to Senator Chambliss; Meredith
Moseley, assistant to Senator Graham; Christine O. Hill,
assistant to Senator Dole; Sharon L. Waxman and Mieke Y.
Eoyang, assistants to Senator Kennedy; Elizabeth King,
assistant to Senator Reed; William K. Sutey, assistant to
Senator Bill Nelson; Eric Pierce, assistant to Senator E.
Benjamin Nelson; Rashid Hallaway, assistant to Senator Bayh;
Andrew Shapiro, assistant to Senator Clinton; and Terri Glaze,
assistant to Senator Pryor.
OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR JOHN WARNER, CHAIRMAN
Chairman Warner. The committee meets today to receive the
testimony on the Global Posture Review of the United States
military forces stationed overseas. We welcome our witnesses:
Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld; General Richard Myers,
Chairman of the Joint Chiefs; General James Jones, Commander of
the U.S. European Command and Supreme Allied Commander, Europe;
Admiral Thomas Fargo, Commander, U.S. Pacific Command; and
General Leon LaPorte, Commander of United States Forces, Korea.
We welcome each of you.
We are here this afternoon to receive this testimony on the
proposed changes to the U.S. global defense posture. One month
ago, August 16 I believe it was, President Bush announced a new
plan for deploying America's Armed Forces, and he stated:
``Over the coming decade, we will deploy a more agile and more
flexible force, which means that more of our troops will be
stationed and deployed from here at home.''
This plan is the result of the administration's
comprehensive 3-year review of America's global force posture--
the numbers, types, locations, and capabilities of U.S. forces
around the world. Extensive consultations with our allies and
our friends have taken place, and it was an integral and
important part of this plan.
The plan represents the most comprehensive restructuring of
U.S. military forces stationed overseas, currently numbering
approximately over 200,000, since the end of the Korean War. It
represents the final chapter, in my judgment, of this Nation's
efforts to transform our global defense posture away from the
outdated Cold War strategies and missions to better meet
today's and tomorrow's very complex, very different threats to
our Nation's security.
Mr. Secretary, I am pleased that you agreed to appear
before this committee on this important matter before Congress
adjourns. I along with Senator Levin and Senator McCain and
others thought it important that you appear here to discuss
this significant change in the U.S. overseas military basing
prior to this Congress adjourning.
Let me take a moment also, Mr. Secretary, to thank you and
General Myers--and you were joined yesterday by Ambassador
Negroponte, Deputy Secretary of State Armitage, and General
Abizaid in briefing I think I estimated at one time, almost
three-quarters of the Senate were in room S-407 of the Capitol.
It was a very far-ranging, in-depth discussion of those serious
issues confronting us today. There was ample opportunity for
questions and exchange of views from many of those Senators who
were present, and I think personally it was one of the better
meetings that we have had in some time.
Today we are returning again to this subject. I want to
also pause for a moment to pay tribute to the Prime Minister of
Iraq, Mr. Allawi. He is the head of the Interim Iraqi
Government, and I was privileged to join some others here just
moments ago to have a smaller meeting with him. He provided the
world with a powerful, moving speech of optimism about a nation
and a people yearning to be free.
Prime Minister Allawi acknowledged the challenges ahead,
but showed the determination of the Iraqi people to succeed.
They will, as he said, need our further help and they want our
help. They will, I hope, Mr. Secretary and others, they will
have our help. I think our President has made that very clear.
To those who feel things have not gone well in Iraq, Prime
Minister Allawi had the following reassuring words, and I quote
him: ``We are succeeding in Iraq and will take a giant step
forward with free and fair elections in January.''
The subject of this hearing, however, is the Global Posture
Review. In the course of your delivery of testimony, I hope the
witnesses will touch on at least some of these issues: How will
the proposed changes to the U.S. global force posture
strengthen--underline, ``strengthen''--our U.S. national
security? What will be the impact of the proposed force
structure changes on our ability to carry out contingency
operations in a more efficient and expeditious manner wherever
necessary on the globe? How will the proposed changes affect
U.S. relations, commitments, and treaty obligations with our
longstanding allies and our friends, and particularly some of
the new nations that have long wanted to break the bonds of the
Warsaw Pact and join the free world? Given that consultations
with other nations was an important part of this plan, what is
the status of the negotiations with our allies and friends
under this program?
Further, it is my understanding the changes recommended by
the review will result in the closure of significant numbers of
U.S. facilities overseas and the likely movement of 60,000 to
70,000 military personnel, together with their many family
members, from overseas locations to installations in the United
States within the next decade.
It is also my understanding that the review will in no way
cause a delay or be grounds for a delay in the Base Realignment
and Closure (BRAC) process. I personally feel very strongly
that we have in place a law which sets forth a timetable and I
believe it is imperative we stay on that timetable, and I hope,
Mr. Secretary, you can provide in your testimony today the
basis for us to continue on that timetable, because there are
some challenges before this committee as we work through the
final days of the conference with the other body and prepare a
report for action in both bodies and a national defense
authorization bill to be sent to the President prior to the
adjournment of this Congress.
Finally, this committee takes very seriously its solemn
responsibility to provide for the wellbeing of the men and
women of the U.S. Armed Forces. The President has stated that,
as a result of this restructuring, ``Our service members will
have more time on the home front, more predictable and fewer
moves over their career, our military spouses will have fewer
job changes, greater stability, more time for their children to
spend with their families at home.'' It is a very powerful and
reassuring statement to our men and women in the Armed Forces,
and I hope you will provide us with the facts which underlie
the integrity of that statement.
We ask a lot of our men and women in uniform and their
families, and if this plan leads to an increase in their
``quality of life,'' there is a compelling reason for us to
support the plan, in my personal view.
Again, we welcome you and look forward to your testimony.
I now seek the comments of my distinguished ranking member.
STATEMENT OF SENATOR CARL LEVIN
Senator Levin. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. I join
you in welcoming our witnesses this afternoon to discuss the
Department's global basing strategy, but also to discuss
current operations in Iraq and Afghanistan. I understand that
they have been informed that that would also be a subject that
members will be asking them about.
Secretary Rumsfeld, General Myers, General Jones, Admiral
Fargo, General LaPorte, it is good to have all of you here
today. As we meet today, hundreds of thousands of our men and
women in uniform are serving superbly in dangerous and
demanding conditions around the globe. Their courage is
inspiring and we are immensely proud of their service.
However, the situation in Iraq is far from encouraging and
appears to be worsening. American soldiers and marines continue
to die at the rate of one or two each day and sometimes more.
Considerably more are suffering devastating wounds. Casualties
among Iraqis are numbered in the scores on an almost daily
basis. American and other contractors are being taken hostage
and murdered in the most brutal fashion.
The lack of security is having a profound effect on
reconstruction and on the effort to establish a stable Iraqi
government. In fact, the administration has requested that
billions of dollars be shifted from reconstruction to security.
The security situation is now such that there are a number
of cities and towns in Iraq where the U.S. and coalition forces
do not go. In the absence of a presence on the ground in places
like Fallujah, which has been taken over by insurgents, the
U.S. military has resorted to air power to strike safe houses
and other places where intelligence indicates that the
insurgents are located, but which reportedly then results in
death and injuries to innocent Iraqi civilians as well. The
result is an even greater lack of support for U.S. and
coalition presence in Iraq and for the Interim Iraqi Government
which supports and relies upon our presence. Moreover,
assassinations, kidnappings, and beheadings are becoming more
and more frequent.
In that context, even Iraqis who would like to cooperate
with us are deterred from doing so and we are then denied the
intelligence that we need to fight the insurgency.
It is difficult to discern a strategy that is being
followed for Iraq. For instance, Marine General Jim Conway
publicly criticized the orders that he received with respect to
Fallujah after four U.S. security contractors were killed and
their bodies mutilated. First, he was ordered to go in and
clean out the insurgents, which went against the Marine Corps
strategy of engagement with the civilian population. Then,
after the Marines were halfway to securing the city and after
the loss of many marines, orders were reversed, to withdraw
from the city and turn over control of the city to a local
security force, which quickly lost control.
The chaos in Iraq puts scheduled Iraqi elections at risk.
The United Nations (U.N.) Special Representative for Iraq
reported to the Security Council on September 14 that, ``the
vicious cycle of violence,'' as he put it, ``and the lack of
security'' was undermining the world body's effort to assist in
elections set for January.
This is compounded by the fact that the administration has
so far been unable to convince any country to provide the
troops needed to protect the U.N. presence in Iraq.
Consequently, a scant 4 months before nationwide elections are
to be held, there are only 35 U.N. staff members in Iraq, far
short of the 200 required to support the election.
The U.S. Intelligence Community (IC) is worried by events
in Iraq. The July 2004 National Intelligence Estimate (NIE) on
Iraq reportedly sets out three possible scenarios for Iraq,
including a worst case of developments that could lead to civil
war and where in the best case security will remain tenuous.
This pessimistic estimate would appear to bear out the
assessment of former President George H.W. Bush and Brent
Scowcroft in the 1998 book, ``A World Transformed,'' concerning
the question of whether to march to Baghdad in the 1991 Gulf
War. They wrote that, ``To occupy Iraq would instantly shatter
our coalition, turning the whole Arab world against us. It
would have taken us way beyond the imprimatur of international
law bestowed by the resolution of the Security Council.'' They
wrote further that doing so would commit our soldiers to
``urban guerrilla war and plunge that part of the world into
even greater instability and destroy the credibility we were
working so hard to reestablish.''
If we insist that things are going just fine or if we
pretend, as the President incredibly enough put it yesterday,
that we are dealing with just a ``handful of people who are
willing to kill,'' we will be less willing to search for ways
to change the negative dynamic which has been unleashed in Iraq
and we will be less willing to look for ways to motivate Iraqi
factions and leaders and Islamic countries to become more
involved in and willing to take the risks necessary to build a
democratic nation in Iraq.
Surely, unless Iraqis want a democratic nation for
themselves as much as we want it for them, unless they suppress
the violent ones inside their own communities and the
terrorists who want to prevent the election in January from
happening, our presence would be more destabilizing than
We also meet today to discuss the Department's proposal to
reposition our forces with the goal of further enhancing our
capabilities. When the President announced the outline of these
changes a month ago, he stated that ``The new plan will help us
fight and win these wars of the 21st century,'' and it will
reduce the stress on our troops and our military families, and
that the taxpayers will save money.
These are laudable goals we all share and I certainly hope
all these assertions prove true. But to date the Department has
not shared the details that would allow us to tell whether they
are. I look forward today to getting some of those details. The
briefings we have gotten to date have explained what the
Department intends to do, but not provided enough information
about why, and have provided virtually no specific information
about the impact on our military capabilities that would result
from these moves.
I also hope and expect that we will be informed today on
the overarching military and national security strategies
underlying this plan, on the costs to implement this plan, and
on the implications for our military capability. For example, I
hope the Department can articulate how these proposals would
affect our ability to respond and carry out missions such as
the current ones in Afghanistan and Iraq should the need arise
in the future.
I look forward to hearing our witnesses today describe how
they believe that the relocation proposals will advance these
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Warner. Thank you, Senator Levin.
You will recall that when we discussed some weeks ago the
need for this hearing you were strongly urging we have this
hearing on this global strategy, and we did have the
opportunity--I realize you were otherwise engaged--yesterday to
hear from the Secretary and the Chairman and many others
extensively on the situation in Iraq.
STATEMENT OF HON. DONALD H. RUMSFELD, U.S. SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
Secretary Rumsfeld. Thank you, Mr. Chairman and members of
the committee. We appreciate this opportunity to discuss the
work of some 3-plus years to transform the Department of
Defense. I will abbreviate my remarks and ask that the full
statement be put in the record.
Chairman Warner. Without objection, the full statement of
all witnesses will be placed in today's record.
Secretary Rumsfeld. History is traced by major events. It
is important to learn from them, as we all know. As we look
back on the wars of the last few centuries, we can see some key
moments, turning points, and the statesmen and legislative
leaders who played roles in helping to make the world more
secure and helping freedom spread. I am not certain that our
work with this committee and Congress in carrying out the
vision for transforming our military is one of those
milestones, but it could prove to be so, and indeed it is
important that that be the case.
Today I will mention some of the elements of reform, even
revolution if you will, that fit under the somewhat pedestrian
term of ``transforming.'' General Jim Jones of the European
Command, Admiral Tom Fargo of the Pacific Command, and General
Leon LaPorte, Commander of U.S. Forces Korea, are here today
along with the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs, Dick Myers, to
discuss these proposals.
Rearranging our global posture is only part of our
considerably broader set of undertakings, essential to
transforming our military into a more agile and more efficient
It is said that Abraham Lincoln once equated reorganizing
the Army with bailing out the Potomac River with a teaspoon. He
was, I suppose, expressing the truth that change is not easy.
Yet, throughout our history Americans have shown a talent for
innovation and invention and the providence of finding the
right leaders for the right times. General Ulysses S. Grant
made skillful use of the rifle, the telegraph, and railroads to
help win the Civil War. After World War I, visionaries like
Billy Mitchell predicted the rise of air power as critical to
future battles and Generals Patton and Eisenhower's awareness
of the importance of the tank and armored warfare helped
prepare for World War II. In Afghanistan our forces utilized a
creative combination of cutting edge satellite technology and
old-time cavalry charges to liberate a country with a minimal
loss of life.
America today remains the world's preeminent military power
because our leaders have properly challenged assumptions and
the status quo, invested in and made use of new technologies,
and were willing to abandon old certainties and strategies when
freedom's defense required it.
The changes we propose to our defense strategies are not
precipitous. They are part of a broad strategy that, as this
committee knows, has been in the making and will be implemented
over the next 6, 7, or 8 years. This administration has
consulted extensively with our allies. We have sought the
advice of Congress.
But let me set out where we are at this point in the
journey. We have increased the size of the U.S. Army and we are
reorganizing it into more agile, lethal, deployable brigades
with enough protection, fire power, and logistics assets to
sustain themselves. We are retraining and restructuring the
active and Reserve components to achieve a more appropriate
distribution of skill sets, to improve the total force's
responsiveness to crisis, and so that individual reservists and
guardsmen will mobilize less often, for shorter periods of
time, and with somewhat more predictability. Already, the
Services have rebalanced some 10,000 military spaces both
within and between the active and Reserve components, and we
are projected to rebalance 20,000 more during 2004.
We are increasing the jointness between the Services. We
are improving communications and intelligence activities. We
have significantly expanded the capabilities and missions of
the Special Operations Forces. We have established new commands
and restructured old ones. We are working to maintain a regular
review of plans, challenging our own assumptions, and keeping
the plans fresh and relevant, as they must be in a fast-
Today we have tens of thousands of uniformed people doing
what are essentially non-military jobs. Yet we are calling up
Reserves to help deal with the global war on terror. We are
converting some of these jobs filled by the uniformed personnel
to positions supported by Department of Defense (DOD) civilians
or contractors. The Department has identified over 50,000
positions to begin conversion and we plan to carry out this
conversion at a rate of about 10,000 positions per year.
So when we talk about changes to our country's global
posture, it is important to look at these changes as part of
the broader transforming of our way of doing things, and one
cannot succeed without the other.
If our goal is to arrange the Department and our forces so
we are prepared for the challenges of the new century, the
newer enemies, and the increasingly lethal weapons we face, it
is clear that our existing arrangements are seriously obsolete.
We are still situated in large part as if little has changed
for the last 50 years, as if, for example, Germany is still
bracing for a Soviet tank invasion across the northern German
plain. In South Korea, our troops were virtually frozen in
place from where they were when the Korean War ended in 1953.
So we have developed a set of new concepts to govern the
way we will align ourselves in the coming years and decades. A
first notion is that our troops should be located in places
where they are wanted, where they are welcomed, and where they
are needed. In some cases, the presence and activities of our
forces grate on local populations and have become an irritant
for host governments. A good example is our massive
headquarters in some of the most valuable downtown real estate
in Seoul, Korea's capital city, long a sore point for many
In the last few years we have built new relationships with
countries that are central to the fight against extremists in
places such as Afghanistan, Pakistan, Uzbekistan, to offer a
few examples. We also have strong partnerships with the newly
liberated nations of Eastern Europe. We believe it makes sense
to try to work out arrangements with countries that are
interested in the presence of the U.S. and which are in closer
proximity to the regions of the world where our troops are more
likely to be needed in the future.
A second governing concept is that American troops should
be located in environments that are hospitable to their
movements. Because U.S. soldiers may be called to a variety of
locations to engage extremists on short notice, we need to be
able to deploy them to trouble spots quickly. They are for the
most part unlikely to be fighting where they are stationed.
They will have to move and they will have to be able to be
Yet, over time some host countries and/or their neighbors
have imposed restrictions on the movement and use of our
forces. So it makes sense to place a premium on developing more
flexible legal and support arrangements with our allies and
partners where we might choose to locate, to deploy, or to
exercise our troops.
Third, we need to be in places that allow our troops to be
usable and flexible. As the President has noted, the 1991 Gulf
War was a stunning victory, but it took 6 months of planning
and transport to summon our fleets and divisions and position
them for battle. In the future we cannot expect to have that
kind of time.
Because training and operational readiness are also
essential elements of deterrence, U.S. forces operating abroad
must have reasonably unrestricted access to ample training
areas. This includes access across the spectrum of land, sea,
and airspace. Host nations will need to guarantee unfettered
access to training areas and airspace free of encroachment and
Finally, we believe we should take advantage of advanced
capabilities that allow us to do more with less. In this
century, we are shifting away from a tendency to equate sheer
numbers of things--tanks, troops, bombs, et cetera, with
capability. We can, for example, attack multiple targets with
one sortie rather than requiring multiple sorties to attack one
target. The Navy's response time for surging combat ships has
been shortened to the point that we will likely not need a
full-time carrier strike group present in every critical
As a result of these new ways of thinking, we have
developed plans for a more flexible and effective force posture
for the 21st century. For example, main operating bases in
places like Germany, Italy, the U.K., Japan, and Korea will be
consolidated but retained. In Asia, our ideas build upon our
current ground, air, and naval access to overcome vast
distances while bringing additional naval and air capabilities
forward into the region.
In Europe, we seek lighter and more deployable ground
capabilities and strengthened Special Operations Forces, both
positioned to deploy more rapidly to other regions as required.
In the broader Middle East, we propose to maintain what we
call ``warm facilities'' for rotational forces and contingency
purposes, building on cooperation and access provided by host
nations during Operation Enduring Freedom and Operation Iraqi
Freedom. In Africa and the Western Hemisphere, we envision a
diverse array of smaller cooperative security locations for
contingency access. Of course, we welcome comments and
suggestions as these negotiations with potential host countries
One additional benefit to the proposed new arrangements is
that they will significantly improve the lives of military
families. Over the coming period of years, we plan to transfer
home to American soil up to 70,000 troops and some 100,000
family members and civilian employees. In addition, deployments
of the future should be somewhat shorter, families should
experience somewhat fewer permanent changes of station and thus
less disruption in their lives.
A word on the base realignment and closure, or BRAC,
process. The global posture decision process and BRAC are
tightly linked. Indeed, they depend on each other. They both
will be critical instruments for stability in the lives of
service members and their families and will help provide more
predictability in assignments and rotations.
The progress made to date on global posture enables DOD to
provide specific input on overseas changes for BRAC 2005. That
input will allow domestic implications of the Global Posture
Review with forces and personnel either returning to or moving
forward from U.S. territory to be accounted for as effectively
as possible within the BRAC decisionmaking process.
Finally, as was the case with previous BRAC rounds, the
U.S. will retain enough domestic infrastructure to provide for
difficult to reconstitute assets, to respond to surge needs,
and to accommodate significant force reconstitution as may be
necessary, including all forces based within or outside of the
Any initiative as complex as the proposed global posture
realignment will stimulate questions, especially in an election
year, I suppose. Some ask, for example, will reducing overall
force levels in Korea reduce our ability to come to its
defense. General LaPorte will comment on this in some detail,
but in fact our partnership with the Republic of Korea is a
good example of what we hope to accomplish. The Defense
Department has been investing in and making arrangements for
improved capabilities, such as long-range precision weaponry,
to be available on the Korean Peninsula. As a result, as we are
increasingly able to transfer some responsibilities to Korean
forces, we will be able to reduce U.S. troop levels. The
combined capabilities of the U.S. and the Republic of Korea
will make our defense of Korea stronger than before.
As in Western Europe, the situation in Korea is notably
different from what it was 50 years ago, back when South Korea
was an impoverished and virtually destroyed country. Today
South Korea is an economic powerhouse with a modern military
force of 600,000 troops and a gross domestic product (GDP) per
capita 18 times that of North Korea. Our proposed global force
posture initiative will make it clear that the U.S. and the
Republic of Korea are working together as partners, each
bringing important capabilities to our shared challenges.
Another question is, does realigning our posture send a
dangerous message to North Korea about our commitment to the
South? The answer is an emphatic no. We know that sheer numbers
of people are no longer appropriate measures of commitment or
of capability. As I have noted, our capabilities in defending
the Republic of Korea are increasing and they are not
One of the members of your committee, Senator Lieberman,
said it well in an interview a few weeks ago. He noted that:
``Kim Jong Il is not under any misconceptions. We have enormous
power at sea and in the air and on the ground in the Asian
Pacific region and on the Korean Peninsula, and if he tries to
take aggressive action against South Koreans he will pay a very
heavy price.'' The Senator is correct.
Should we have given earlier warning to our allies? In
fact, we have met with officials in foreign governments on a
variety of levels on all of these concepts. Secretary Powell
and I have spoken many times with our counterparts abroad, as
have our staffs. In fact, when we issued the Quadrennial
Defense Review, as required by Congress, in September 2001, one
of the chapters was on reinventing, reorienting the U.S.
military global posture. So this is nothing new.
Our foreign counterparts have appreciated that their input
was sought before key decisions were made. They understood our
global long-term view and the strategic rationale for
conducting the review at this time. Indeed, we have available
many very positive quotes from various foreign countries that
are affected by this.
Another question is, if we will be sending more troops home
from theaters in Europe will it weaken our ability to surge
quickly to trouble spots? Actually, the opposite is probably
closer to the truth. Presence is important, but forward
stationing does not mean optimal stationing. Forces in Europe,
for example, are only closer to the Middle East if they can
deploy rapidly to the south, not if they have to go north
first. If those same forces have to deploy to the north through
the Baltic or North Sea, then to the Atlantic, then to the
Mediterranean, then we can move roughly as fast from the United
We also know that our forces will need to move to the
fight, wherever it is. That means that command structures and
capabilities must be expeditionary. If there are legal or
political restrictions on the movement of our troops where they
are stationed, the difficulties in using them quickly multiply.
This week I had the privilege of participating in one of
our regular meetings in Washington with the combatant
commanders. They are impressive. Three of them are here.
Yesterday we spent 3 hours on the Hill with General Abizaid, as
you pointed out, and Ambassador Negroponte giving every Member
of the House and Senate an opportunity to talk about Iraq.
The individuals are impressive. They follow in the
footsteps of the visionary military leaders of the past. This
plan was undertaken with the benefit of their military advice.
One day future generations will look back at these combatant
commanders and the military leadership of our country with
gratitude for what they have accomplished in the last few years
in helping to transform the Department of Defense and also in
the struggle against global extremists. Our task is to see that
one day historians and generations will look back at what is
being done today and what is being accomplished and say that
our actions, this committee and the Department together, also
have helped to make the world more peaceful and our military
more formidable and our freedom more secure.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
[The prepared statement of Secretary Rumsfeld follows:]
Prepared Statement by Hon. Donald H. Rumsfeld
Mr. Chairman, members of the committee:
We thank you for the opportunity to discuss our work of some 3\1/2\
years to transform the Department of Defense.
History is traced by major events. It is important to learn from
them. As we look back now on the wars of the last few centuries, we see
the key moments, the turning points, and the statesmen and legislative
leaders who played critical roles in helping to make our world more
secure and allowing freedom to spread.
I am not certain that our work, together with this committee and
Congress, in carrying out the President's vision for transforming of
our military is one of those milestones.
But it could prove to be so.
I hope it is. Indeed, it is important that that be the case.
Today I will mention some of the elements of reform--even
revolution--that fit under the somewhat pedestrian term of
``transformation'' or ``transforming.'' We all can look back with some
satisfaction on how much has been achieved, and look forward with
encouragement, as we seek to do still more.
We meet as the brave men and women in uniform are defending the
American people against those who seek to terrorize and intimidate
civilized societies and to attack our freedoms. The folks in uniform
represent the best our country has to offer. They have not wavered in
meeting the tough challenges we face.
While I know the committee agrees that our responsibility is to
ensure that they have the tools they need to fight this war, and a
military structure that helps them win it, we need to do still more.
Rearranging our global posture, the subject of today's hearing, is
essential to our success. General Jim Jones, Admiral Thomas Fargo, and
General Leon LaPorte are here today with Chairman of the Joint Chiefs
of Staff, General Dick Myers, to discuss these important proposals.
It is important to note that rearranging our global posture is only
part of our considerably broader set of undertakings. What we are doing
is changing mindsets and perspectives.
Essential to this is transforming our military into a more agile,
more efficient force that is ready and able to combat the asymmetric
challenges of this new and uncertain time.
This is a sizable undertaking. It is said that Abraham Lincoln once
equated reorganizing the Army with ``bailing out the Potomac River with
a teaspoon.'' He was expressing the truth that change is not easy.
But history has long warned great nations of the perils of seeking
to defend themselves by using the successful tactics and strategies of
the last war. The French experienced this with the Maginot Line.
Throughout our history, Americans have shown a talent for
innovation and invention, and the providence of finding the right
leaders for the times. General Ulysses S. Grant made skillful use of
the rifle, the telegraph, and railroads to win the Civil War. At the
turn of the 20th century, President Theodore Roosevelt recognized the
potency of deterrence and used naval power to project American
After World War I, visionaries like Billy Mitchell predicted the
rise of air power as critical to future battles. Patton and
Eisenhower's awareness of the importance of the tank and armored
warfare helped to prepare for World War II.
In Afghanistan, our forces utilized a creative combination of
cutting edge satellite technology and old-time cavalry charges to
liberate that country with a minimal loss of life.
America today remains the world's preeminent military power because
our leaders have properly challenged assumptions and the status quo,
invested in and made use of new technologies, and abandoned old
certainties and strategies when freedom's defense required it. Ours are
the military forces that have been on the cutting edge of new ideas. So
we must be today.
Members of the committee, we do not propose changes to our defense
strategies lightly or precipitously. They are part of a broad strategy
that, as this committee knows, has been years in the making. These
proposals will take place over the next 6 to 8 years. There will be no
grand announcement. This administration has consulted extensively with
our allies--new and old--on a multitude of levels, every step of the
way. We have sought the advice of Congress. We recognize that no one
has a monopoly on wisdom.
The course we have charted is not novel or sudden. Key points were
designated by the President, before he was even elected.
In a 1999 speech at the Citadel, then-Governor Bush warned of the
rise of terrorism, the spread of missile technology, and the
proliferation of weapons of mass destruction--a ``world of terror and
missiles and madmen.''
Calling for a ``new spirit of innovation,'' he outlined ambitious
goals: ``to move beyond marginal improvements--to replace existing
programs with new technologies and strategies. Our forces in the next
century must be agile, lethal, readily deployable, and require a
minimum of logistical support. We must be able to project our power
over long distances, in days or weeks, rather than months.''
Mr. Chairman, I realize these goals are not new to you or to this
committee. We have been working on these changes together for a number
But let me set out where we are at this point of our journey:
We have increased the size of the U.S. Army and are
reorganizing it into more agile, lethal, and deployable
brigades--light enough to move quickly on short notice, but
also with enough protection, firepower, and logistics assets to
We are retraining and restructuring the active and
Reserve components to achieve a more appropriate distribution
of skill sets, to improve the total force's responsiveness to
crises, and so that individual reservists and guardsmen will
mobilize less often, for shorter periods of time, and with
somewhat more predictability. Already the services have
rebalanced some 10,000 military spaces both within and between
the active and Reserve components in 2003, and are projected to
rebalance 20,000 more during 2004.
We are increasing the jointness between the Services.
Instead of simply de-conflicting the armed services and members
of the Intelligence Community we are integrating them to
interact as seamlessly as possible.
We are improving communications and intelligence
activities. This includes, for example, the development of
Space-Based Radar (SBR) to monitor both fixed and mobile
targets deep behind enemy lines and over denied areas, in any
kind of weather. We also are at work on the Transformational
Communications Satellite (TSAT) to provide our joint warfighter
with unprecedented communication capability. To give you an
idea of the speed and situational awareness the TSAT will
provide, consider this: transmitting a Global Hawk image over a
current Milstar II, as we do today, takes over 12 minutes. With
TSAT it will take less than a second.
The Department is constructing three new state-of-the-
art guided missile destroyers to patrol the seas; 42 new F/A-18
fighter aircraft to guard the skies; and new C-17 strategic air
lifters, which will improve our ability to move forces quickly
over long distances.
We have significantly expanded the capabilities and
missions of Special Operations. SOCOM has moved from
exclusively a ``supporting'' command to both a ``supporting''
and a ``supported'' command, with the authority to plan and
execute missions in the global war on terror.
We have established new commands and restructured old
the Northern Command, dedicated to defending
the Joint Forces Command, to focus on
continuing transformation; and
the Strategic Command, responsible for early
warning of and defense against missile attack, and the
conduct of long-range attacks.
We are working with NATO in an effort to make the
Alliance more relevant and credible in this post-Cold War era,
shedding redundant headquarters and creating a new rapid
It used to be that operational and contingency plans
were developed, then placed on the shelf for years. We're
working to maintain a regular review of plans, challenging our
own assumptions and keeping the plans fresh and relevant.
The Department is changing its approach to
infrastructure and installations. When the administration
arrived, facilities were funded at a rate and level that
reflected an expectation that they would be replaced only every
175 to 200 years. Our goal was and remains to cut it down to a
more realistic recapitalization rate closer to 70 years.
We are making progress in changing the culture in the
Department and the military from one of ``risk avoidance'' to
one that rewards achievement and innovation.
Let me mention another example of an activity underway that on its
own may seem minor, but is crucial to the process of transforming.
Today we have tens of thousands of uniformed people doing what are
essentially non-military jobs. Yet we are calling up Reserves to help
deal with the global war on terror. The same benefit as we achieve with
an increase in military personnel is already coming from converting
some of these jobs filled by uniformed personnel to positions supported
by DOD civilians or contractors. The Department has identified over
50,000 positions to begin such conversion and plans to carry out this
conversion at a rate of about 10,000 positions per year. We are also
continuing to review thousands of other positions for possible
To support this, we are working with Congress and the unions to
improve our civilian personnel systems so we can fill these converted
positions expeditiously. This is an enormously complicated matter and
there is a great deal more work to be done. But when fully implemented,
the National Security Personnel System, should:
Expedite the hiring process for civilian employees;
Recognize and reward outstanding civilian individuals;
Make it easier to provide merit-based promotions and
Streamline the complex webs of rules and regulations
that currently frustrate efficient management of the
When we talk about changes to our country's global posture, it is
important to look at those changes--as part of the broader transforming
of our way of doing things. One cannot succeed without the other.
If our goal is to arrange the Department and our forces so we are
prepared for the challenges of this new century--the newer enemies and
the more lethal weapons--it is clear that our existing arrangements are
We have entered an era where enemies are in small cells scattered
across the globe. Yet America's forces continue to be arranged
essentially to fight large armies, navies, and air forces, and in
support of an approach--static deterrence--that does not apply to
enemies who have no territories to defend and no treaties to honor.
We are still situated in a large part as if little has changed for
the last 50 years--as if, for example, Germany is still bracing for a
Soviet tank invasion across its northern plain. In South Korea, our
troops were virtually frozen in place from where they were when the
Korean War ended in 1953.
So we have developed a set of new concepts to govern the way we
will align ourselves in the coming years and decades. Though this
should not be news to many on the committee since we have offered
extensive briefings to members and staffs, let me reiterate some of the
A first notion is that our troops should be located in places where
they are wanted, welcomed, and needed. In some cases, the presence and
activities of our forces grate on local populations and have become an
irritant for host governments. The best example is our massive
headquarters in some of the most valuable downtown real estate in
Seoul--Korea's capital city--long a sore point for many South Koreans.
Under our proposed changes, that headquarters will be moved to a
location well south of the capital.
In the last few years, we have built new relationships with
countries that are central to the fight against extremists--in places
such as Afghanistan, Pakistan, and Uzbekistan, to offer a few examples.
We also have strong partnerships with the newly-liberated nations of
Eastern Europe. We believe it makes sense to try to work out
arrangements with countries that are interested in the presence of the
U.S. and which are in closer proximity to the regions of the world
where our troops are more likely to be needed in the future.
A second governing concept is that American troops should be
located in environments that are hospitable to their movements. Because
U.S. soldiers may be called to a variety of locations to engage
extremists at short notice, we need to be able to deploy them to
trouble spots quickly. Yet over time, some host countries and or their
neighbors have imposed restrictions on the movement and use of our
forces. So it makes sense to place a premium on developing more
flexible legal and support arrangements with our allies and partners
where we might choose to locate, deploy, or exercise our troops.
Many of our current legal arrangements date back a half a century
or more. We need our international arrangements to be up-to-date--to
reflect the new realities and to permit operational flexibility. They
have to help, not hinder, the rapid deployment and employment of U.S.
and coalition forces worldwide in a crisis. These legal arrangements
should encourage responsibility and burdensharing among our partners
and ourselves, and be certain to provide the necessary legal
protections for U.S. personnel.
Third, we need to be in places that allow our troops to be usable
and flexible. As the President has noted, the 1991 Gulf War was a
stunning victory. But it took 6 months of planning and transport to
summon our fleets and divisions and position them for battle. In the
future, we cannot expect to have that kind of time.
Finally, we believe we should take advantage of advanced
capabilities that allow us to do more with less. The old reliance on
presence and mass reflects the last century's industrial-age thinking.
In this century, we are shifting away from the tendency to equate
sheer numbers of things--tanks, troops, bombs, etc.--with capability.
If a commander has a smart bomb that is so precise that it can do the
work of eight dumb bombs, for example, the fact that his inventory is
reduced from ten dumb bombs to five smart bombs does not mean his
capability has been reduced--indeed his capability has been
The ``old think'' approach needs to be modernized. In terms of
lethality, precision weapons have greatly expanded our capability,
while significantly reducing the number of weapons needed.
We can, for example, attack multiple targets in one sortie, rather
than requiring multiple sorties to attack one target. The Navy's
response time for surging combat ships has been shortened to the point
that we will likely not need a full-time carrier strike group presence
in every critical region.
As a result of these new ways of thinking, we have developed plans
for a more flexible and effective force posture for the 21st century.
For example, main operating bases in places like Germany, Italy, the
U.K., Japan, and Korea, will be consolidated, but retained. We hope to
rely on forward operating sites and locations, with rotational presence
and pre-positioned equipment, and to gain access to a broader range of
facilities with little or no permanent U.S. presence, but with periodic
service or contractor support.
In Asia, our ideas build upon our current ground, air, and naval
access to overcome vast distances, while bringing additional naval and
air capabilities forward into the region. We envision consolidating
facilities and headquarters in Japan and Korea, establishing nodes for
Special Operations Forces, and creating multiple access avenues for
In Europe, we seek lighter and more deployable ground capabilities
and strengthened Special Operations Forces--both positioned to deploy
more rapidly to other regions as necessary--and advanced training
In the broader Middle East, we propose to maintain what we call
``warm'' facilities for rotational forces and contingency purposes,
building on cooperation and access provided by host nations during
Operations Enduring Freedom and Iraqi Freedom.
In Africa and the Western Hemisphere, we envision a diverse array
of smaller cooperative security locations for contingency access.
Of course, we welcome comments and suggestions as negotiations with
potential host countries proceed.
One additional benefit to our proposed new arrangements is that
they will significantly improve the lives of U.S. military families.
This is important. Over the coming period of years, we plan to transfer
home, to American soil, up to 70,000 troops and some 100,000 family
members and civilian employees. In addition, deployments of the future
should be somewhat shorter, families should experience somewhat fewer
permanent changes of station, and thus less disruption in their lives.
BASE REALIGNMENT AND CLOSURE (BRAC)
The global posture decision process and Base Realignment and
Closure (BRAC) are tightly linked, indeed they depend on each other.
They are both key components of the President's transformation agenda,
and they both will be critical instruments for stability in the lives
of service members and their families. Together, they will help to
provide more predictability in assignments and rotations.
The progress made to date on global posture enables DOD to provide
specific input on overseas changes for BRAC 2005. That input will allow
domestic implications of the Global Posture Review--with forces and
personnel either returning to or moving forward from U.S. territory--to
be accounted for as effectively as possible within the BRAC
decisionmaking process. Finally, as was the case with previous BRAC
rounds, the U.S. will retain enough domestic infrastructure to provide
for difficult-to-reconstitute assets to respond to surge needs, and to
accommodate significant force reconstitution as necessary, including
all forces based within or outside the United States.
Any initiative as complex as the proposed global posture
realignment will stimulate questions--especially in an election year.
I appreciate this opportunity to address a few of the myths and
misconceptions that seem to be lingering out there about what is
For example, will reducing overall force levels in Korea reduce our
ability to come to its defense?
In fact, our partnership with the Republic of Korea is a good
example of what we hope to accomplish. The Defense Department has been
investing in and making arrangements for improved capabilities--such as
long range precision weaponry--to be available on the Korean peninsula.
As a result, as we are increasingly able to transfer responsibility to
Korean forces, we will be able to reduce U.S. troop levels. The
combined capabilities of the U.S. and the Republic of Korea will make
our defense of Korea stronger than before.
As in Western Europe, the situation in Korea is different from what
it was 50 years ago, back when South Korea was impoverished and
virtually destroyed. Today South Korea is an economic powerhouse, with
a modern military force of some 600,000, and a GDP per capita of 18
times that of North Korea. Our proposed global force posture
initiatives make it clear that the U.S. and the Republic of Korea are
working together as partners, each bringing important capabilities to
our shared challenges.
Has the administration prepared the public--and informed Congress--
about these changes?
As I mentioned, these concepts were outlined years ago--first in a
1999 speech before President Bush took office and then a number of
The Global Posture Review had its origins in the 2001 Report of the
Statutory Quadrennial Defense Review. On November 25, 2003, President
Bush announced that the U.S. would intensify consultations with
friends, allies, and partners overseas.
We have made significant progress during 2003-2004, and these
proposals have been shared frequently with the congressional
leadership, committee leadership and members, and with committee
I'm told that in the past 2 years the Department of State and this
Department have provided at least:
Four briefings to House committee staffs and one each
to members of the House Armed Services Committee and House
Appropriations Committee--Defense Subcommittee;
Four briefings to individual Senators;
Nine briefings to Senate committee staffs or members'
personal staffs; and
This year alone, I took part in five breakfast
meetings on the subject with Congressmen and Senators,
including one on April 29, 2004, with Chairman Warner and
Should we have given earlier warning to our allies?
In fact, we have met with officials in foreign governments on a
variety of levels on these concepts. Secretary Powell and I have spoken
many times with our counterparts abroad, as have our staffs.
The results of multiple consultations by Under Secretary of Defense
Feith, his State Department colleague Marc Grossman, and others at NATO
and in key European, Asian and other capitals helped to create
understanding and cooperation regarding our posture realignment.
Our foreign counterparts have appreciated that their input was
sought before key decisions were made and they understood our global,
long-term view and the strategic rationale for conducting the review at
Does realigning our posture send a dangerous message to North Korea
about our commitment to the South?
The answer is an emphatic ``no.'' We know that sheer numbers of
people are no longer appropriate measures of commitment or
capabilities. As I have noted earlier, our capabilities in defending
the Republic of Korea are increasing, not decreasing.
Senator Joe Lieberman said it well in an interview a few weeks ago.
He noted that: ``Kim Jong Il . . . is not under any misconceptions. We
have enormous power at sea, in the air, on the ground, in the Asian
Pacific region and on the Korean peninsula. If he tries to take
aggressive action against the South Koreans, he will pay a very, very
heavy price.'' The Senator is correct.
Will sending more troops home from theaters in Europe weaken our
ability to surge quickly to trouble spots?
Actually, the opposite is closer to the truth. Presence is
important, but forward stationing does not mean optimal stationing.
Forces in Europe, for example, are only closer to the Middle East if
they can deploy rapidly to the south. If those same forces have to
deploy to the north, through the Baltic and North Seas, then to the
Atlantic and Mediterranean, then we can move roughly as fast from the
United States. We do not expect our forces to fight where they are
stationed. We know that our forces will need to move to the fight,
wherever it is. That means that command structures and capabilities
must be expeditionary. We need well-developed transportation networks.
We need materiel and supplies along transportation routes.
So, if there are legal or political restrictions on the movement of
our troops where they are stationed, the difficulties in using them
Additionally, the more flexible arrangements we are seeking with
our allies will allow us to make changes as changes are needed. Area
commanders don't own forces. Our country does. We have no hesitation in
moving forces from one region to another as circumstances change and
require--and we do frequently.
Critics of these proposed moves seem trapped in the thinking of the
last century. In some ways, that is understandable. It is difficult to
part with thoughts that one has harbored for decades. But the world
changes and updated thinking is needed.
We owe an up-to-date defense posture to our troops in the field and
the generations that may be called to battle in the future.
This week, I had the privilege of participating in one of our
regular meetings in Washington with the combatant commanders, some of
whom are here today. They are impressive. They follow in the footsteps
of the visionary military leaders of the past. This plan was undertaken
with the benefit of their military advice.
One day future generations will look back at them with gratitude
for what they have accomplished in the last few years in the struggle
against global extremists.
Our task is to see that one day historians and generations will
look back at what is being done today, at what is being accomplished,
and say that our actions also helped to make the world more peaceful,
our military more formidable, and our freedom more secure.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Warner. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
STATEMENT OF GEN. RICHARD B. MYERS, USAF, CHAIRMAN, JOINT
CHIEFS OF STAFF
General Myers. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, Senator Levin,
members of the committee. Thank you for the opportunity to
discuss this important program with you.
First, I want to thank you for your dedication to
protecting our Nation against current and future threats, as
well as improving the quality of life of our service men and
women, priorities that I certainly share with you.
I firmly believe that this approach to our global defense
posture is in the best interest of both our national security
and our troops. This plan will leave us better positioned to
engage our allies and promote regional stability and better
positioned to prevail in combat when war cannot be prevented.
When I started my Air Force career nearly 40 years ago I
was stationed in Germany, flying F-4s. My squadronmates and I
spent many hours studying the enemy's weapons and tactics. We
knew exactly who the threat was, the Soviet Union and the
Warsaw Pact, and we knew exactly what our mission would be, to
defend Europe by ensuring air superiority and supporting the
massive North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) ground force.
As General Jones knows very well, our troops stationed in
Europe today have to deal with a lot more uncertainty. They
have to look beyond the Fulda Gap, beyond the long-established
war plans, to new missions in new places like Kosovo, Iraq,
Afghanistan, and the Horn of Africa.
Our Armed Forces have to fight a completely new kind of
war, the war on terrorism or against extremism. They have to be
ready for future threats that are still unknown.
So we are transforming our forces to better confront these
challenges and threats, and we must have a global posture that
is aligned with the key tenets of a transformed military. Those
are agility, flexibility, and speed.
We also have a unique opportunity right now, one that we
must seize. Because we won the Cold War, many of our former
adversaries, the same ones I studied as a lieutenant, have
become valued allies and partners. I travel to Eastern Europe
and Central Asia and meet with my counterparts and I can tell
you that they could not be more willing to engage with us. They
understand the value of freedom and democracy because it is in
many cases so newly won, and they are ready to join the
This global posture strategy engages these new allies in
very positive ways, allowing us to create effective new
The situation on the Korean Peninsula has also changed
dramatically. When I sat alert at Osan Air Base as a captain in
the 1970s, our F-4s were parked alongside Korean War-vintage F-
86s from the Korean Air Force, and the Republic of Korea's
economy, as the Secretary said, was on par of the world's
poorer nations. Now they have F-16s that can drop precision
bombs and their economy is ranked 11th in the world, ahead of
many European Union (EU) nations. They have a stable democracy
and a highly-capable military.
Our own military capabilities have also changed
dramatically: precision weapons, long-range strike
capabilities, networked command and control, our ability to get
to the fight more quickly, and, perhaps most importantly, our
ability to fight as an integrated, joint, and coalition team.
Yet, as Secretary Rumsfeld said, U.S. forces in Korea are
positioned exactly where we were at every base camp and station
when the armistice was signed 51 years ago. The calculus has
changed completely and this global posture strategy accounts
for that fact in Korea and across the globe.
We owe it to our troops to position them for success and at
the same time to support their families. Not so long ago, I
visited several spouse support groups in the First Armored
Division in Germany. I was extremely impressed by them and the
network they had built to take care of one another. Working
with the division's leadership, they were very energetic and
creative in dealing with family issues while the division was
deployed in Iraq.
But their challenges were even tougher because they were
overseas. It is much easier at home with immediate access to
extended families, friends, and other support networks and job
opportunities for family members.
As the Secretary said, the Joint Chiefs and combatant
commanders have been fully involved in these ongoing studies
and discussions over the last 3 years. We know it will take
time to implement and the end state is designed to flex and
adapt in a dynamic world. But we cannot wait any longer to move
forward with this important task. We owe it to our troops, our
allies, and to the American people.
I appreciate this opportunity to answer your questions and
I thank you for your continued strong support of our brave and
selfless men and women in uniform. Thank you.
Chairman Warner. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
STATEMENT OF GEN. JAMES L. JONES, JR., USMC, COMMANDER, UNITED
STATES EUROPEAN COMMAND AND SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER, EUROPE
General Jones. Mr. Chairman, Senator Levin, members of the
committee: I am pleased once again to appear before you to
discuss the strategic transformation proposals of the United
States and in particular the United States European Command. If
approved either in whole or in part, I am convinced that our
proposals will increase the strategic effect of our forces who
are assigned to operate on the European and African continents
and in their contiguous waters. We have an historical
opportunity, it seems to me, to adjust our basing and operating
concepts in such a way as to make them much more capable and
useful to our national, coalition, and alliance goals.
I believe it is important to state as emphatically as
possible that this effort should not be characterized as an
indication that the United States is demonstrating a lesser
interest in Europe or Africa, losing interest in leading or
participating as fully as we have in the past in NATO, or
withdrawing capability from our many bilateral relationships
and commitments throughout our expanding area of interest, or
that we now embrace diminished appreciation of the value of
forward basing. Nothing could be further from the truth.
On the contrary, we should affirm the clear opposite, which
is to say that transformation will better enable the United
States to strategically impact its 91-country area of
responsibility and its new challenges in a manner unprecedented
since the end of World War II. United States European Command's
(EUCOM) strategic transformation will create an agile and more
usable permanent force in theater, augmented by dedicated
expeditionary rotational forces, all operating aboard a family
of three new basing concepts, and anchored on radically
modernized prepositioned equipment locations on land and at
Mr. Chairman, I consider it an honor to be able to be a
part of this effort and I look forward to answering your
questions on this very important and exciting subject. Thank
[The prepared statement of General Jones follows:]
Prepared Statement by Gen. James L. Jones, USMC
Chairman Warner, Senator Levin, distinguished members of the
committee--It is my privilege to appear before you as Commander, United
States European Command (EUCOM), to discuss our strategic theater
transformation plans and to discuss the way forward for both EUCOM and
the NATO Alliance. On behalf of all the men and women in EUCOM and
their families, all of whom proudly serve this Nation, I want to thank
the committee members and staff for your unwavering support since my
assignment began in January 2003. During this time I have had several
opportunities to appear before you, to meet with members and staff in a
number of different venues, both here and in theater, and to share the
vision for the transformation of the 91 nation European and African
theater. Your insightful and candid appraisals of this important
endeavor have been instrumental in refining a plan that will enable us
to do our part to protect our democracy, contribute to the security of
our Nation, support the 26 nation NATO Alliance, and help improve
security and stability conditions within our area of responsibility.
Your dedication and efforts on our behalf are both recognized and
In 2001, the Secretary of Defense initiated a comprehensive,
strategy-based review of the U.S. global defense posture, and
subsequently directed all combatant commands to evaluate their
structure, organization and processes in order to gain transformational
efficiencies and develop new capabilities to meet emerging
requirements. The efforts we are undertaking to meet the objectives
laid out by the Secretary represent the most extensive adjustments to
the European theater in its history. The changes we are proposing
contain broad and far-reaching implications for our Nation, our allies,
and our military. As we embark upon this important endeavor, we must be
mindful of the unique leadership responsibilities we enjoy in the
community of nations, and we must ensure that the measures we undertake
will, in its end state, increase our strategic effectiveness. In a
world full of uncertainty and unpredictable threats, the United States
continues to be viewed as an influential leader in providing stability
and security. It is a responsibility this Nation has not merely
accepted, but has embraced for more than half a century. As we map a
course for the future we must remain cognizant of the key elements that
enabled us to be successful in the last century and be wise enough to
recognize the new security challenges we face. Our ability to be
successful in fighting the global war on terrorism and achieve a force
posture necessary to operate across the broad spectrum of potential
conflict requires innovative thought and comprehensive coordination at
all levels of our Government. I look forward to working with you and
your staff as we set about this important enterprise that will
ultimately establish the framework for a new capability for a new and
II. THE RATIONALE FOR CHANGE
EUCOM's greatest contribution to security and stability lies as
much in preventing conflict as it does in prevailing on the
battlefield. This is accomplished through influence, forward presence
and engaged leadership. It is sustained only through our enduring and
visible presence and commitment in our theater.
EUCOM's current structure is still centered based on a threat-
based, defensive, and static philosophy facing east. Happily, this
threat has passed, and the continuous flux of the security environment
since the end of the Cold War has rendered obsolete the foundation of
making threat-based changes to our strategic posture. Our
transformation vision, therefore, seeks to evolve to a capabilities-
based strategy that supports the full range of military operations
better suited to meet new challenges. The strategic and operational
environment and mission direction have changed radically, and EUCOM
must change as well.
The fall of the Berlin Wall marked a significant turning point in
the national strategy and in the utilization of the resources required
to support our theater security objectives. The United States has
periodically changed its overseas defense posture as strategic
circumstances themselves evolve. In the post-Cold War period, EUCOM
significantly reduced its force structure while simultaneously
increasing its stability and contingency operations. For example, EUCOM
force structure has been reduced from 315,000 troops and 1,421
installations to 112,000 troops and approximately 500 installations
concentrated in Western Europe since 1991.
The operational environment within EUCOM's area of responsibility
(AOR) continues to evolve in ways that were largely unforeseen and
difficult to predict just a few short years ago. The global war on
terrorism, expanding Theater Security Cooperation (TSC) requirements,
instability in Africa, Eastern Europe, the Caucasus, and NATO expansion
largely define recent changes and necessitate a transformational shift
in EUCOM's theater strategy for new challenges and realities in a new
century. In contrast to the Cold War-era monolithic threat and its
linear battlefield, EUCOM and NATO can expect to face global, multiple,
and asymmetric threats in the 21st century. The new security menace is
transnational, characterized by enemies without territory, without
borders, and without fixed bases. Today's security environment includes
threats such as the export and franchising of terrorism, eroding
control of weapons of mass destruction, narcotrafficking, unanticipated
and uncontrolled refugee flow, and illegal immigration. Many of these
threats are nurtured in misgoverned or even ungoverned regions as
terrorists and extremist organizations seek to find new havens from
which to operate.
We must change our posture to reflect the realities of the 21st
century (Figure 1). Our remaining forces, now at less than 40 percent
of our Cold War force, are not necessarily equipped or sited to
adequately address the emergence of an entirely new array of threats
and security requirements. EUCOM is transitioning east and south to
engage these emerging threats. In order for EUCOM to be better postured
to achieve national interests in theater, we must significantly change
the manner in which we execute our new missions in response to our new
challenges. The foundation of EUCOM's transformation should be
evaluated in the context of seeking to dramatically increase our
strategic effect, retain our historical leadership role in the NATO
Alliance, enhance our ability to develop our growing bilateral
relationship, and underscore the significant benefits of forward
III. THE STRATEGIC BASIS OF EUCOM'S TRANSFORMATION
EUCOM's theater transformation is based on the assumptions that the
Desires to maintain its current position as a nation
of global influence through leadership and the efficient and
effective application of informational, military, economic, and
Remains committed to its friends and allies through
global, regional and bilateral organizations and institutions,
and supports treaties and international agreements to which it
is a signatory
Pursues a global strategy, a cornerstone of which is
increased access and forward presence in key areas, which
contributes to the first line of defense for peace, stability,
Supports in-depth transformation of its Armed Forces
and basing structure to respond to 21st century asymmetrical
threats and challenges
Seeks ways to mitigate or offset obstacles posed by
21st century sovereignty realities through a re-orientation of
its land, maritime, air and space presence
Recognizes current U.S. basing within EUCOM may not
adequately support either the strategic changes attendant to an
expanded NATO Alliance, or the national requirements of a
rapidly changing AOR
Seeks to preserve those assets which have enduring
value to its missions, goals, and national interests
Continues to enhance and build defense relationships
enabling the United States, allies, and friends to respond
These assumptions, if agreed to, serve as the cornerstone which
underpins EUCOM's Theater Transformation Plan.
IV. EUCOM'S CRITICAL THEATER CAPABILITIES
EUCOM's success hinges on maintaining critical capabilities as both
a supported and a supporting combatant command. These capabilities
include: as much freedom of action as possible within our many
agreements with nations who host our forces; power projection; bases
for our operations; command, control, communications, computers, and
intelligence (C\4\I); alliances and coalition partners; theater based
and rotational forces; and facilities for joint and combined training
opportunities. EUCOM gains and maintains freedom of action and the
ability to build alliances and coalitions through its security
cooperation efforts and an effective interagency process.
Power projection platforms and associated bases must optimize our
limited strategic air and sea-lift, maximize available intra-theater
lift, leverage existing enduring bases, and well-maintained pre-
positioned equipment. EUCOM should preserve our critical capabilities
by maintaining select (Joint) Main Operating Bases where currently
located, and by establishing new (Joint) Forward Operating Sites and
(Joint) Cooperative Security Locations where needed. The temporary and
semi-permanent expeditionary installations established throughout the
AOR will provide essential facilities and equipment for expeditionary
forces in proximity to the areas of interest, crisis, or conflict and
will avoid saturation at key nodes and along lines of communication.
Where possible, (Joint) Propositioned Stocks will provide additional
means to rapidly project equipment to contingency response areas. By
design, the inherent agility of these expeditionary forces will enable
a more precise and rapid response, intervening into a crisis at its
inception, thereby reducing the potential for larger scale operations
requiring massive force. However, if a larger force is required in
theater or in an adjacent theater, EUCOM's basing plan is flexible
enough to allow for a rapid expansion of follow-on forces whenever
needed. This built-in scalability will provide the initial agility
necessary for EUCOM to effectively support a truly global strategy.
Lexicon: Transformation Assets
(Joint) Main Operating Base (JMOB)
By definition, this is an enduring strategic asset established in
friendly territory with permanently stationed combat forces, command
and control structures, and family support facilities. (J)MOBs serve as
the anchor points for throughput, training, engagement, and U.S.
commitment to NATO. (J)MOBS have: robust infrastructure; strategic
access; established command and control; ready access to training
areas; (Joint) Forward Operating Sites and (Joint) Cooperative Security
Location support capability; and enduring family support facilities. As
previously stated, these are already in existence.
(Joint) Forward Operating Site (JFOS)
An expandable host-nation ``warm site'' with a limited U.S.
military support presence and possibly prepositioned equipment. It can
host rotational forces and be a focus for bilateral and regional
training. These sites will be tailored to meet anticipated requirements
and can be used for an extended time period. Backup support by a (J)MOB
may be required.
(Joint) Cooperative Security Location (JCSL)
A host-nation facility with little or no permanent U.S. presence.
(J)CSLs will require periodic service through contractor and/or host
nation support. (J)CSLs provide contingency access and are a focal
point for security cooperation activities. They may contain
propositioned equipment. (J)CSLs are: rapidly scalable and located for
tactical use, expandable to become a JFOS, forward and expeditionary.
They will have no family support system.
(Joint) Preposition Site (JPS)
A secure site containing pre-positioned war reserve materiel
(combat, combat support, combat service support), tailored and
strategically positioned to enable rotational and expeditionary forces.
They may be collocated with a (J)MOB or (J)FOS. JPSs are usually
maintained by contractor support and may be sea based. They are an
important component to our transformation efforts.
``En Route'' Infrastructure (ERI)
A strategically located enduring asset with infrastructure that
provides the ability to rapidly expand, project and sustain military
power during times of crises or contingencies. ERI bases serve as
anchor points for throughput, training, engagement, and US commitment.
They may also be a (J)MOB or (J)FOS.
In addition to maintaining our traditional lines of communication
and access, we will seek new access to facilities, and routine freedom
of transit through nations of the east into the Black Sea, the
Caucasus, the Levant, and Africa in order to support current and future
operations. In the near-term, attention will focus on Poland, Romania,
Bulgaria, and Turkey, supporting similar near- to mid-term efforts in
the Caucasus states.
``En Route'' Infrastructure
A significant component of our ability to prosecute the war on
terrorism and maintain operational access is the En Route
Infrastructure Program. Operations Enduring Freedom (OEF) and Iraqi
Freedom (OIF) have highlighted the importance of our primary en route
bases in the United Kingdom, Germany, Spain, Portugal, Turkey, and
Italy. Enhancing their capabilities in the near- to mid-term is
essential to our continued ability to deploy and sustain U.S. forces.
EUCOM will develop new installations for engaging the many threats
we face today and that we will respond to in the future. Retention of
critical JMOBs will preserve existing infrastructure for the Joint
Reception, Staging and Onward Movement and Integration (JRSOI) Center
functions. Establishing JFOSs, CSLs, and JPSs in new countries will
allow the command to develop and mature host-nation support and
contractor agreements to support additional JRSOIs.
The ability to rapidly project military power during times of
crises or contingencies is the central and most enduring premise of the
concept of forward stationing of forces. The very presence of such
forces, either forward based or rotational and the military
capabilities they possess are powerful instruments of national
influence. A robust ``En Route'' Infrastructure combined with an array
of (Joint) Pre-positioned Sites throughout the EUCOM theater, will
enable the United States to have the strategic agility to operate
across the spectrum of conflict. Beyond strict military significance,
forward forces serve to strengthen U.S. diplomacy and foreign policy;
demonstrate U.S. commitment to the security of U.S. friends and allies;
demonstrate to potential challengers the resolve of the United States
to meet its commitments; and bolster regional security through our
theater security cooperation programs.
A key aspect of EUCOM's transformation plan is the reliance on
``rotational'' units as a significant portion of the forces in theater.
By design, the inherent agility of these expeditionary forces will
enable a more precise and rapid response, intervening in a crisis at
its inception, thereby reducing the potential for larger scale
operations requiring massive force. Further, rotational forces arrive
trained and ready to operate immediately within the theater. As a force
provider (supporting command), EUCOM can provide these rotational
forces quickly in support of other combatant commands.
This combination of permanently-based and rotational forces will
permit a full range of operational capability in areas and regions
within our area of responsibility that are increasingly important.
EUCOM's Service components will develop and execute effective plans to
integrate and employ a combination of permanently assigned forces and
rotational forces from continental United States (CONUS). The transfer
of heavy forces to CONUS in no way reflects a reduced commitment or
interest in our region, but rather a shift from conventional thinking
and a desire to adopt new methods to better protect our interests. The
decrease in overall numbers in the theater will be offset not only by
the retention of inherently expeditionary units such as airborne
brigades, aviation units, and naval forces, but also by the
introduction of our most modern transformed forces (e.g. Stryker
Brigade), providing the agility needed to operate effectively in
EUCOM's unpredictable and fluid international security environment.
The employment of rotational forces in the European theater is not
a new concept. The Navy and Marine Corps deployed Carrier Battle Groups
(CVBGs) and Amphibious Ready Groups/Marine Expeditionary Units (ARG/
MEUs) to the Mediterranean throughout the Cold War, and the new Fleet
Response Plan will continue the rotational presence of Carrier and
Expeditionary Strike Groups (CSG/ESGs). The Army has had tremendous
success with the use of rotational forces in support of operations in
Bosnia and Kosovo. The Air Force's transformation to the Expeditionary
Wing structure enabled rotational presence during operations in the
Balkans and in support of Operation Northern Watch (northern Iraq no-
fly zone enforcement). European Command's Theater Security Cooperation
engagement today is conducted with rotational forces in Africa and the
Caucasus. The efficacy of rotational forces is a tried and proven
concept. The linchpin to EUCOM's theater transformation is the
recognition that the continuing and expanded role of rotational forces
is essential to increasing our strategic effectiveness in an area of
responsibility that encompasses 91 countries in Europe and Africa.
Joint Force Command and Control
Reliance on rotational forward presence forces, new and enhanced
bilateral and multi-national agreements, our leadership role in a
transformed NATO, and the decisive execution of the global war on
terrorism has transformed EUCOM's command and control structure and
In accordance with Secretary of Defense Guidance, EUCOM has
established its Standing Joint Force Headquarters (SJFHQ) and the
European Plans and Operations Center (EPOC). It will rapidly achieve an
agile, proven command and control capability for joint and multi-
national forces within EUCOM through the execution of command and
control exercises. The EPOC will also be the cornerstone of the JCS-
funded exercise program in EUCOM and will ensure multi-echeloned
training of theater command and control headquarters.
Each component will be organized to participate and lead in the
command and control of joint and multi-national forces as a joint task
force (JTF) or a combined joint task force (CJTF) throughout the
theater. At end state, EUCOM will have the ability to establish six JTF
core headquarters. This represents a substantial increase from current
capabilities and more accurately matches potential command and control
headquarters requirements with emerging requirements, thus enabling
joint solutions to emerging or existing crises.
Transformation will also afford theater components opportunities to
leverage emerging technologies and doctrine and, in some cases, lead
transformational command and control for the Department of Defense.
Allies and coalition partners will experience similar gains as we
assist their transformation efforts.
V. EUCOM AND THE NATO ALLIANCE
NATO, which has been the fulcrum of transatlantic and inter-
European security since its inception, continues to transform in order
to remain the preeminent security alliance in the world. During the
recent NATO Summit in Istanbul, Turkey, the Alliance reaffirmed its new
global commitment to undertake the necessary measures to confront
present day threats. NATO's decision to expand the International
Security Assistance Force (ISAF) in Afghanistan, including the
establishment of several more Provincial Reconstruction Teams, and its
decision to assist the Interim Iraqi Government with the training of
its security forces, underscores the level of transition occurring in
the Alliance. Additionally, efforts to enhance the Mediterranean
Dialogue program and to offer cooperation to the Greater Middle East is
a testament to the desire of NATO to be fully engaged on issues that
will help shape our common future.
Further, as the Alliance deploys beyond its members' boundaries, I
believe that EUCOM can provide essential support with operationally
focused, all-source intelligence. In concert with our NATO partners,
EUCOM is standing up the NATO Intelligence Fusion Cell (NIFC), a
dedicated intelligence element comprised of U.S. and other NATO
personnel. This element will have a core of intelligence professionals
operating under common tactics, techniques, and procedures, enhancing
U.S. and NATO-nation intelligence interoperability. The NIFC will be
co-located with our EUCOM Joint Analysis Center in the United Kingdom.
As I stated during my testimony before this committee in March of
this year, the ongoing transformations in EUCOM and NATO are
inextricably linked to the challenges inherent in today's international
security environment. These simultaneous transformations are mutually
supporting and complementary, the synthesis of which produces an effect
greater than the sum of its parts. By its leadership and example, EUCOM
supports both the Alliance in its transformation, as well as NATO
member nations undergoing their own internal transformations.
A transformed posture in Europe--one that supports NATO's own
transformation goals--requires forward forces that are rapidly
deployable both within and beyond Europe. They must be able to perform
the full range of military operations and serve as a deterrent, as well
as a combat force. The NATO Response Force (NRF) is the
transformational vehicle for the Alliance. The expeditionary standards
and certification training serve to ensure the forces meet the desired
level of capability and interoperability. Our NATO allies have fully
embraced the NRF and we will achieve full operational capability early
next month. The Alliance continues to work with member nations to
ensure political decisions are made which will enable us to deploy the
NRF within the timeframes established at the Prague Summit in 2002.
These forces will train alongside other NATO forces to improve their
interoperability and serve as a model to enhance the capabilities of
EUCOM facilities and activities also play a vital role in NATO's
transformation. They provide both training opportunities and the power
projection platforms necessary for joint and combined operations. One
such example is the Joint and Combined Expeditionary Training Center at
Grafenwohr, Germany. This advanced training facility, along with other
high-capacity mobility and throughput infrastructure, i.e. Ramstein Air
Base, Germany, will have an increasingly important role in the
development of our allies' capabilities and our future European
NATO's recent expansion to include seven new nations has shifted
the Alliance's focus eastward. At the same time, long-term NATO member
nations have improved their individual and collective ability for
mutual defense and find themselves well ahead of the new member
nations. While NATO welcomes new member nations, the Alliance
recognizes that their military capabilities are not yet fully
interoperable with NATO forces and will require significant investment.
This is ongoing work.
Our new allies have offered extensive training opportunities and
areas, as well as fewer restrictions on maneuver. Encroachment
challenges at our current bases and training areas and the desire for
increased training with our new allies lead EUCOM to pursue further
Eastern European access. Increasing EUCOM's forward presence in Eastern
Europe through operating sites, training, and exercises will increase
security cooperation engagement, bolster these new members' military
capabilities and pave the way for greatly enhanced future contributions
to NATO. As these forces transform, they will become more expeditionary
and better able to respond to global requirements.
Additionally, EUCOM forces will be in a position to exercise and
maintain leadership roles in any new NATO force or command structure
developed in Eastern Europe. Although EUCOM will maintain strong
participation in established NATO countries through the recently
approved NATO command structure, an eastward move will concurrently
develop our constructive influence within the new NATO countries and
allow the United States and our NATO partners to meet the goals of the
Prague Summit more quickly.
VI. EUCOM'S THEATER SECURITY COOPERATION
EUCOM's Theater Security Cooperation (TSC) program forms the
centerpiece of our efforts to promote security and deter aggression.
The TSC program is indispensable in building relationships, enhancing
allied and coalition capabilities, and providing access to en route
infrastructure. This program will not only pave the way for our
transformation plan, it will also be enhanced as the benefits from that
transformation are realized.
Theater Security Cooperation builds and strengthens key
relationships that promote U.S. strategic interests. These
relationships involve interactions at multiple levels from heads of
state to students who engage in the many and varied training programs
provided by the U.S. and its allies. Capabilities for self-defense and
coalition operations are enhanced by TSC and OPTEMPO demands on U.S.
forces are reduced. Through the TSC, essential peacetime and
contingency access and ``en route'' infrastructure is provided and the
development of regional security organizations to prevent or mitigate
conflicts with minimal U.S. participation is accelerated.
A number of programs are provided under the TSC umbrella including:
bilateral and Partnership for Peace training events and exercises;
Joint Combined Exchange Training (JCET); the State Partnership Program
(SPP); and foreign assistance programs such as International Military
Education and Training (IMET), and Foreign Military Financing (FMF).
One extraordinarily successful example is the Georgia Train and
Equip Program (GTEP). This was a EUCOM executed program that trained
Georgian tactical units to conduct up to company-level operations that
were instrumental in enhancing Georgia's ability to protect its
sovereignty and stabilize the region. Similarly, the Pan Sahel
Initiative is an ongoing effort to assist four countries--Mali, Niger,
Chad, and Mauritania--in detecting and responding to the migration of
asymmetric threats across and within their extensive and poorly
controlled borders. Under this program, company-sized units are trained
and equipped as rapid reaction units, providing them the mobility,
communication, navigation, and individual soldier skills essential for
border security, internal defense, and counterterrorism efforts.
Similar TSC programs include: training assistance in Poland to the
OIF Polish Division rotations; training assistance to NATO ISAF
training preparation in the NATO Joint Warfare Center in Stavanger,
Norway; Exercise Bulwark '04 in Bulgaria featuring rotational forces
from CONUS, permanently assigned forces from EUCOM, and Bulgarian
forces in Novo Selo, Bulgaria; and the recently initiated Torgau
exercise series with Russia being conducted both in Russia and in
Germany. All of these programs are initiatives that require small
investments, but that yield enormous dividends in our effort to promote
peace, stability, and democracy. They are also an example of how
rotational forces can operate at the tactical level and produce a
Two current strategic initiatives that EUCOM continues to develop
and expand include ``Caspian Guard'' and the ``Gulf of Guinea Guard.''
These are two engagements that demonstrate a regional approach towards
establishing stability and security in relatively remote areas within
the theater susceptible to transnational threats.
Theater Security Cooperation programs have become critical enablers
of EUCOM's proposed theater transformation by building and maintaining
the key relationships that will allow us to establish new Forward
Operating Sites and Cooperative Security Locations. These new sites
will enable EUCOM to protect growing U.S. interests in areas of
increasing importance to regional security and economic opportunity,
while extending the global power and reach of U.S. forces. TSC
effectiveness is directly linked to an effective and focused forward
VII. THE TRANSFORMATION TIMELINE
The process of transforming EUCOM requires a comprehensive,
synchronized approach integrating many segments of our Government and
those of our allies and partners to achieve our theater goals. The
timeline and ability to implement our Strategic Theater Transformation
plan is based on a number of interlocking variables that must be
carefully considered, evaluated, and orchestrated in order to gain the
greatest benefit. How we do this is as important as what we do. The
underlying principles that guide our collective efforts should be the
eight assumptions--discussed earlier--that formed the basis for the
development of EUCOM's Strategic Theater Transformation plan.
The speed at which transformation will occur depends in large
measure on the bilateral and multilateral legal arrangements we have
with sovereign countries pertaining to our military personnel,
installations, and activities. These legal arrangements constitute the
formal framework for our military presence, access, and ability to
conduct actions that enhance our operational readiness. Although EUCOM
has worked extensively to identify existing installations that will be
maintained and those that will need to be established, the final
outcome will be predicated, in large measure, on renegotiating
longstanding agreements already in place with current allies and
negotiating new agreements with new allies or partners that share our
concerns for global security. The Department of Defense and the
Department of State have already conducted a series of consultations
and are proceeding with negotiations to ensure present and future
arrangements optimize our ability to train, deploy, and conduct
missions in support of our National Security Strategy.
Several key determinates beyond our direct control will influence
the transformation tempo in EUCOM. These include the Army's ability to
source and deploy ``rotational'' forces to the theater; identifying and
providing installations for units returning to CONUS; available funding
to support the plan to establish Joint Forward Operating Sites,
Cooperative Security Locations, and additional Joint Pre-positioned
Sites throughout the AOR; and the relationship between operational
imperatives within the theater and the support we provide to adjacent
While a decision has been made on the essential elements of the
plan, considerable efforts to negotiate, resource, and implement the
details of that plan remain. This is not a turn-key operation that can
be completed in a few short years. Rather, it is a deliberate,
methodical process that will require several years of investment and a
considerable degree of interaction on many levels within our Government
and with the governments of our allies. Congress is an integral part of
this process. We greatly appreciated the visits to EUCOM's theater by
members and staff of this committee to learn more about our
requirements and plans for the future.
We have historically unique opportunities before us. Our efforts
over the past year to develop new basing and operational concepts have
produced a consensus among our Services and our allies. If implemented,
this new direction will enable us to move our capabilities more fully
into the new century and away from some 20th century paradigms that are
no longer relevant. The physical and visible presence of the United
States military in the EUCOM theater is as important as it ever was,
however, its character stems from new and different reasons. The
security threats of the 21st century are no longer either linear or
predictable. They require a ``capabilities based'' strategy at the core
of our thinking with regard to transformation. Those who wish to draw
false conclusions with regard to our national commitment to Europe and
Africa will no doubt be increasingly vocal as we propose further
reductions in our troop and family numbers permanently based in Europe.
The response to such criticism is that the historical doctrine
suggesting that ``mass equals commitment'' is no longer as valid a
concept as it once was; what we now need is sufficiency and usability
in our new basing doctrines. Augmented forward presence (the
combination of permanently based, but increasingly expeditionary
forward forces augmented by sufficient and predictable rotational
forces) along with the war reserve material at Joint Pre-Positioned
Sites, and a robust ``En Route'' Infrastructure will form the nucleus
of our strategic presence across an expanding European-African theater.
Such capability, while currently lacking, is urgently necessary. Our
firm intent is to increase the strategic effect of our forward based
and rotational forces in such a way as to form the basis of a vastly
improved capability to respond to the new array of threats we face as a
Nation, as a member of future coalitions, and as a member of NATO.
Chairman Warner. Thank you, General Jones.
STATEMENT OF ADM. THOMAS B. FARGO, USN, COMMANDER, UNITED
STATES PACIFIC COMMAND
Admiral Fargo. Mr. Chairman, Senator Levin, and
distinguished members of the committee: Thank you for this
opportunity to address U.S. Pacific Command's (PACOM) planning
to strengthen our global and theater defense posture. Let me
add first my thanks for your outstanding support of our men and
women in the Armed Forces today.
Two and a half years ago, I testified before this committee
on our priorities for the PACOM. Two of these, reinforcing the
constants in Asian Pacific security and promoting the change
necessary for improving our defense posture, are key to our
larger global strategy. Together these priorities reinforce the
foundation of regional stability--our longstanding bilateral
alliances, our friendships both old and new, and the presence
of our forward-deployed combat forces--while optimizing
capabilities of the PACOM to tackle the challenges of the
evolving security environment.
The new threat context demands profound and enduring
improvements in the way we command, equip, employ, and station
our forces. Strengthening and rebalancing our security
relationships with Japan and South Korea are vital to stability
in northeast Asia. Each is working closely with us to secure
peace and effect enduring solutions to mutual challenges
associated with basing our forces while maintaining a strong
Our other Asian treaty allies, Australia, Thailand, and the
Philippines, along with good friends such as Singapore,
Malaysia, India, Indonesia, Mongolia, and many others, have
also worked side by side with us to advance efforts in the war
During my service in the Pacific over the past 5 years, the
pace of change has been stunning, certainly since the end of
the Cold War and also since September 11. Globalization has
added a dimension of speed to nearly every aspect of life.
Crises clearly affect more people faster. Cyber, biological,
and terrorist threats are present along with more traditional
concerns, like the Korean Peninsula, the potential for
miscalculation across the Taiwan Strait or in Kashmir, and a
host of transnational threats. I mentioned terrorism earlier,
but there is also proliferation and the trafficking of humans
and drugs. We require a changed approach to meet these complex
In Asia and the Pacific, the vibrant economies, burgeoning
populations, maturing democracies, and military modernization
only serve to add momentum to regional transformation and
increase the need for new security strategies.
In response to this changing environment, PACOM undertook
efforts with the direction of the Secretary and the Chairman to
operationalize our National Security Strategy in the PACOM's
area of responsibility and in support of other combatant
commanders worldwide. For the U.S. PACOM, those efforts
included updating our plans, strengthening command and control,
increasing capabilities for immediate employment, creating new
operational patterns and concepts, improving force posture, and
diversifying access and in-or-out logistics.
Forward and expeditionary ground, sea, and air forces have
enhanced our ability to immediately employ tailored power on
short notice in new ways and will do so more in the future. For
example, we are co-locating Stryker brigades with high-speed
vessels and C-17 airlifters in Hawaii and Alaska. We are
deploying rotational bomber elements to Guam. We are stationing
once again submarines in Guam. We have proposed homeporting an
additional carrier strike group forward in the Pacific.
Optimizing these immediately employable forces requires an
appropriate footprint with more reachback, less infrastructure,
and less burden on hosts. For instance, as part of the defense
policy review initiative we are working closely with our ally
Japan to reduce the overall number of U.S. troops there, remove
longstanding noise encroachment concerns, and adjust force
posture in Okinawa. As part of this process we will mature and
strengthen the U.S.-Japan security alliance while assuring an
enduring presence of critical forward forces and warfighting
In the future of the Republic of Korea-United States
alliance initiative, we are consolidating our footprint into
two enduring hubs south of the Han River, which leverages both
improved capabilities to enhance power projection, readiness,
and deterrence, both on the peninsula and regionally. The
United States will also redeploy troops from South Korea as
combined forces are modernized and the Republic of Korea
assumes a greater role in its own defense.
Finally, we are looking for access and logistics
prepositioning opportunities throughout the theater that allow
us to move forces quickly to the location of greatest need. A
network of cooperative security locations, places not bases,
will provide avenues of critical access for contingency
operations, expand Special Operations Force presence, and
continue through our security cooperation efforts to strengthen
the capacity of our allies and partners in the region.
Mr. Chairman and members of the committee, I am proud to
represent the men and women of the United States Pacific
Command, who work tirelessly on behalf of our Nation to put in
place credible, flexible, and ready forces to secure our
national interests at home and abroad.
I thank you for the opportunity to testify today and I look
forward to your questions.
Chairman Warner. Thank you very much, Admiral.
STATEMENT OF GEN. LEON J. LaPORTE, USA, COMMANDER, UNITED
NATIONS COMMAND, REPUBLIC OF KOREA/UNITED STATES COMBINED
FORCES COMMAND, COMMANDER, UNITED STATES FORCES KOREA
General LaPorte. Mr. Chairman, Senator Levin, and
distinguished members of the committee: I am honored for the
opportunity to appear before you today. Moreover, I am honored
at the opportunity to represent the soldiers, sailors, airmen,
and marines who serve our Nation in the Republic of Korea
I will briefly address how the new global defense posture
is strengthening our deterrence and readiness on the Korean
Peninsula through our enhance, shape, and align initiatives.
These initiatives are the result of nearly 2 years of close
consultation with our valued ally, the Republic of Korea. The
Mutual Defense Treaty between the Republic of Korea and the
United States of America, signed over a half century ago, is
the foundation for peace and stability on the Korean Peninsula.
The Republic of Korea-United States Combined Forces Command,
created as a result of this treaty, is the cornerstone of our
deterrence. This command is vigilant, well-trained, and ready
to fight, tonight, and win.
Today deterrence is achieved by an integrated team of
nearly 690,000 active duty troops and 3 million reservists from
the Republic of Korea, combined with some 34,000 forward
deployed United States military personnel on the Korean
Peninsula. This combined force can be rapidly reinforced when
needed from regional and strategic assets. Additionally, U.S.
forces on the Korean Peninsula are advantaged by extensive
reachback capabilities to resources resident in the Pacific
Command and the continental United States.
Historically, the metric of readiness has been the number
of troops on the ground. However, what is truly important is
the complementary deterrent and combat capabilities that each
nation contributes to the security of the peninsula. Over the
past several years there has been a tremendous improvement in
the interoperability of our combined forces. Concurrently, the
U.S. Armed Forces have transformed our capabilities in many
areas, including strategic deployability, command and control,
precision strike, and joint and combined operations.
These capabilities allow us to focus overmatching combat
power when and where we choose to defeat armed aggression.
United States forces can now be sized to provide tailored
capabilities that complement those of the Republic of Korea
ally, providing overwhelming strategic deterrence. Our regional
and strategic reinforcement capabilities allow us to defeat any
potential North Korean aggression.
The Combined Forces Command continues to adapt to the
changing security environment. This transformation is taking
place through three key initiatives: enhancing combined
capabilities, shaping combined Republic of Korea and United
States roles and missions, and aligning U.S. forces for the
The most visible of these are the capability enhancements
that we are now making throughout our combined forces
modernization programs, that include more than 340 United
States and Republic of Korea enhancements to greatly strengthen
our combined deterrence and readiness capabilities,
enhancements such as fielding the PAC-3 Patriot missile system,
coupled with the stationing of a Patriot brigade headquarters
and a second Patriot battalion with two additional Patriot
batteries to strengthen our theater missile defense. The
upgrade of our Apache helicopters to AH-64 Delta Longbows
increases the combat capability of that weapons system by 400
percent. F/A-18 E and F Super Hornets, either carrier or land-
based, provide precision strike capabilities day and night and
in all weather. The introduction of high-speed vessels and C-
17s facilitate rapid reinforcement of regionally positioned
United States forces, such as the Marine Expeditionary Force or
the Stryker brigade combat teams, by sea and by air.
Additionally, our investment in prepositioned sets of equipment
allows for rapid reinforcement.
The Republic of Korea Armed Forces are also enhancing their
capabilities with the addition of the Multiple Launch Rocket
System, the K-1 tank, the F-15 aircraft, the Aegis cruiser, and
the K-9 howitzer, just to name a few.
As a result of our combined combat capability enhancements,
the Republic of Korea-United States military committee agreed
to transfer several Combined Forces Command missions from the
United States forces to the Republic of Korea over the next 2
years. These mission transfers will shape the combined forces
to leverage each nation's specific strengths, allowing the
United States Forces Korea to tailor its capabilities on the
peninsula and in the region.
Consolidating the majority of the United States forces in
Korea into two enduring hubs is the final component of our
transformation. This effort consists first of consolidation of
forces and then their eventual relocation to the south, away
from the Seoul metropolitan area, creating a less intrusive
footprint and increasing the operational mission of our on-
peninsula stationed forces.
Close consultation for the past 18 months between the
United States and the Republic of Korea governments has brought
this initiative closer to reality, as demonstrated by recent
agreements detailing the specifics of consolidation and
The Republic of Korea's own national defense strategy
extends far beyond equipment modernization. In its 2004
National Security Strategy, President Hyun declared his
intention to promote a cooperative, self-reliant defensive
posture when the Republic of Korea will assume a leading role
in its national security. Minister of National Defense Yoon
recently announced to restructure the Republic of Korea armed
forces, including a 40,000-person reduction, which reinforces
our mutual confidence in our combined capability enhancements.
In conclusion, I want to reaffirm that the Combined Forces
Command is trained and ready to fight and win, tonight. We are
posturing the combined ROK-U.S. capabilities to deter and, if
necessary, defeat any potential North Korean aggression. Our
plan is on course to enhance the United States and Republic of
Korea capabilities, to shape combined roles and mission by
leveraging each alliance member's unique strengths, and while
aligning the force for sustainable long-term United States
military presence on the peninsula.
Your continued support of our transformation efforts will
ensure our sustained ability to protect the security of the
Republic of Korea and guarantee stability in Northeast Asia.
Thank you and I look forward to your questions.
Chairman Warner. Thank you very much, General.
Mr. Secretary, General Myers, and the combatant commanders,
I commend you on a very strong case, one of the most important
initiatives, Mr. Secretary, that you have undertaken in your
Mr. Secretary, I am going to ask one brief question and I
ask that you reply as briefly as you can because I wish to
reserve the chairman's time of 6 minutes to be utilized by me
as I see appropriate in the course of the subsequent questions.
My one question, Mr. Secretary: Should Congress adjust the
current BRAC schedule and constitute a delay, would that impair
the implementation of this program and delay the return to home
bases of our troops overseas?
Secretary Rumsfeld. It would be most unfortunate if there
were to be any delay in BRAC. It would indeed delay forces
being returned to the United States. The timing is fortuitous
and had we not initiated this global review of our posture
prior to a BRAC round, the BRAC round would be in the dark as
to what might happen prospectively. Because we have the
timing--we started 3 years ago to work on this--the timing is
excellent and they are linked together tightly.
Chairman Warner. Thank you. You might also in your
expansion for the record talk about the implications for the
negotiations with allies and other countries that are an
integral part of this. I thank the Secretary.
I will reserve the balance of my time.
Senator Levin. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Secretary, about a year ago in November 2003,
acccording to a New York Times article, the Central
Intelligence Agency (CIA) assessed at that time that the
situation in Iraq ``is creating a more fertile environment for
the anti-American insurgency'' and that the insurgency is
gaining strength. That was November 13, 2003. It seemed to be a
correct assessment at that time.
The President the other day gave his reaction to the
reported new intelligence assessment, and I am wondering what
is your reaction to that reported assessment?
Secretary Rumsfeld. I have read it. It is now a number of
months old. My recollection is a lot of the data was
accumulated in April and May. I have not read it recently, but
it took various approaches, worst case and medium case and best
case, as I recall.
I think what I would say about it is that I recall data in
there that pointed out that people did not like having foreign
forces in their country, in Iraq, and that comes as no great
surprise to me. I do not think many countries would like to
have foreign forces in their countries for a prolonged period.
I have forgotten whether it was in that particular
document, but my recollection is there was very strong support
for elections and there also was a reasonably good level of
support for having forces remain to assure that elections
A lot has happened since those months in April, May, and
June when that was prepared. First, the Iraqi Governing Council
is gone and the Interim Iraqi Government exists. There is a
prime minister, there are cabinet ministers. The U.N. helped
fashion that approach.
Second, they have recently had 1,000 people gather and
select a 100-person constituent assembly.
Both of those steps, as well as the leadership that has
been provided that the chairman mentioned with the prime
minister who was here today, I think are vivid demonstrations
to the Iraqi people about the seriousness of moving forward to
elections and being able to continue to develop the Iraqi
security forces and over time reduce the coalition forces,
which are clearly what the estimate indicated was desired by
the Iraqi people.
Senator Levin. Was your reaction that that estimate was too
Secretary Rumsfeld. I do not have a judgment on that. I
would not say it was too pessimistic. I think there were
various pieces of it that might prove over time to be too
pessimistic, possibly some pieces too optimistic.
Senator Levin. Would you say that security is better in
Iraq today than it was 3 months ago?
Secretary Rumsfeld. Clearly the incidents of violence are
up, if that is what you mean by security. But the other thing
that is up are the number of Iraqi security forces that are now
trained and equipped, and that is a good thing.
Senator Levin. But overall would you say the security
situation in Iraq is better today than 3 months ago?
Secretary Rumsfeld. First of all, it is hard to talk
about--I should also add, Mr. Chairman, I was not aware that
this was going to be on Iraq.
Senator Levin. I thought that was clarified with you. It
was our understanding----
Secretary Rumsfeld. Not to me, and I would have been happy
to have General Abizaid and Ambassador Negroponte join us here
Senator Levin. It was very clearly understood that Iraq
would be included in the subjects to be covered here today. I
am sorry that you were not informed. We were actually told
specifically that you were and you did have that understanding.
Secretary Rumsfeld. Well, I do not. I did not.
Let me go ahead and try to respond to this question,
because it is a fair question----
Chairman Warner. Let me address the procedure here.
Initially when we received a request from a number of
colleagues to have a hearing on this important subject, I began
to establish with you the hearing date. At that time it was the
consideration that we would cover some of Iraq and some of the
But then when we arranged--and I urged the leadership to
have you and General Abizaid and others up yesterday--it seemed
to me that fulfilled the Senate's important need to have the
opportunity to question you, and that took place extensively
yesterday. So we revised the hearing notice to write very
explicitly the hearing was for the purpose of receiving your
report on this subject.
Senator Levin. Mr. Chairman, there is clearly a
misunderstanding, because that was not transmitted to us as
being a private meeting yesterday as a substitute for a public
meeting today. In any event, if the Secretary----
Secretary Rumsfeld. I am happy to answer. I am happy to
The security situation has become--there is an increase in
violent incidents, no question about that. I think that is to
be expected. The intelligence has also suggested that, not just
in Iraq but in Afghanistan and possibly other parts of the
world. We have three elections coming up--ours, the Afghan
elections, and the Iraqi elections, and we have seen a spike,
somewhat of a spike, in Afghanistan as well.
There is no doubt but the people who are determined to not
have a free system in Afghanistan or a free system in Iraq are
doing things to try to prevent those free systems from being
achieved. I think that we should probably look forward to a
continued spike in activity between now and January when they
plan to have elections, as the prime minister said today.
Senator Levin. Do you think that the increase in those
attacks is evidence of desperation on the part of the
Secretary Rumsfeld. Oh, goodness, I cannot climb in their
minds. I would not say that myself. I basically rely on the
intelligence I get, and I think that there is a determination
on their part to--if you think of their targets they are trying
to assassinate government officials, they are trying to prevent
people from being recruited to join the security forces, they
are trying to disrupt important infrastructure, to make the
Iraqi people dissatisfied.
These are people who chop off people's heads. The kind of
system they want in that country and for this world is not a
system that anyone with any sense would want to have achieved.
Senator Levin. I think there is unanimity on that.
Relative to the security forces being trained and equipped,
there has been a very slow delivery of weapons, vehicles, and
communication devices. The figures that we have is that only
half of the required weapons have been delivered. In terms of
equipping Iraqi national security forces that we all want to be
equipped--we are talking here about Iraqi national forces--less
than a third of the vehicles have been supplied and less than a
fifth of the communication devices have been supplied.
I am wondering if either you or General Myers might tell us
why it is that we are behind where our deliveries were intended
to be at this point, as well as the recruiting and training
Secretary Rumsfeld. I would be happy to start and Dick
Myers can finish. We started in effect with a need for security
forces at the end of major combat operations. The numbers then
went up from zero to about 206,000, and in the 206,000 were
74,000 facility protection services that were not under our
control in any sense. They were part of the ministries. In
addition, there were people in that number that were not
trained fully, not equipped fully.
We now have a number of roughly 100,000 that are fully
equipped and fully trained. So one reason that this has taken
some time, obviously, is the fact that we have changed the
goal. You used percentages. When General Casey went in, we sent
in an assessment team to determine what numbers of police that
country ought to have, what numbers of army, what numbers of
border patrols. The original numbers that the Coalition
Provisional Authority (CPA) and the Iraqi Governing Council had
developed in my judgment proved to be too low. We raised those
numbers. So the percentage of accomplishment has dropped. That
is one reason.
A second reason is we have been basically functioning out
there with peacetime rules and one of the major contracts I am
told was challenged, which caused it to be delayed for some
period of a number of weeks under the normal procedures that we
I personally have a high degree of confidence in General
Casey and General Petraeus and the program they have in effect.
I think it is about right. The Iraqi government has generally
agreed, although they would prefer some more heavily mechanized
units than may be in the current program. They have a timetable
which is available on the web site for anyone to see as to what
we think it will evolve over time. They are looking for in
January, I believe, 145,000, up from the 100,000 today, and by
August of '05 up to 202,000 that will be fully trained and
Senator Levin. Thank you.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
General Myers. The only thing I would add to that is last
spring--and I think we have testified in front of the committee
on this before--it was decided, decided by those of us
involved, that we needed a more holistic approach to the
security forces. So the responsibility for training the police
and the border folks all came under the Department of Defense.
Since that time, of course, we have General Petraeus over
there. Equipment is now arriving at a fairly rapid rate. We
said it would take until September to get the contracts in
place and get the equipment started to move. It is moving
fairly well right now.
The one item I think that is before Congress is the $1.8
billion reprogramming--I think you mentioned it, Senator
Levin--to reprogram some of the reconstruction money into the
security sector because it is so important, and that is to meet
the new force levels that the Interim Iraqi Government has
decided it needs. They did it in consultation with us because
we have division commanders on the ground that make very
valuable inputs to this whole equation.
I think we are in pretty good shape right now. If we get
the $1.8 billion, if we can keep the contracts flowing, if we
get the contracting people over there that we need to get over
there, we will be okay.
Senator Levin. Thank you.
Chairman Warner. Senator Levin, if I could add, at our
luncheon meeting with the prime minister he specifically said,
Mr. Secretary, that he approached our Government and said that
he would want to increase substantially the number of
battalions to meet his projected security needs and that, while
you sent General Petraeus in with one level, when the Allawi
government took charge they decided to raise that very
Secretary Rumsfeld. That is under discussion now.
Chairman Warner. That is correct.
Secretary Rumsfeld. The other thing I would say, it is easy
to count numbers of people manned, it is easy to count
equipment, and it is easy to count number of weeks of training.
The tough stuff is the soft stuff. It is the chain of command,
it is the leadership structure, it is do you have generals and
colonels and noncommissioned officers and people in an
integrated, well-staffed capability that they can manage their
affairs. That--in the ministry of interior and in the ministry
of defense. Reality tells me that that is going to be the
toughest part of this puzzle, not simply buying trucks and
Chairman Warner. Thank you.
Senator McCain. I want to thank the witnesses.
Mr. Secretary, I was very pleased to hear your comments in
response to Senator Warner's question about the necessity of
BRAC. Would you recommend a veto if the defense bill came to
the President that had a 2-year delay in BRAC?
Secretary Rumsfeld. Oh, I certainly would. It would be a
terrible thing, Senator.
Senator McCain. Thank you very much.
Mr. Secretary, did you happen to see today's Reuters story,
``The United States and Japan have detected signs that North
Korea is preparing to launch a ballistic missile with a range
capable of hitting almost all of Japan''?
Secretary Rumsfeld. I did not see the Reuters story. I have
been told about that.
Senator McCain. The reason why I bring this up is at a time
of withdrawal of troops we obviously are seeing increasing
bellicosity and lack of cooperation on the part of the North
Koreans, who are unpredictable at best, which raises the whole
issue of personnel that I am extremely concerned about.
I think we all appreciate that we are going to be in Iraq
for a long period of time in significant numbers. We now, for
the first time in history, have the largest percentage on a
sustained basis of Guard and reservists as part of our Active-
Duty Forces, some 40 percent in Iraq. We are calling up people
on active duty who are members of the Individual Ready Reserve
(IRR), who thought that they would never ever be recalled to
active duty. We have a thing that some call a back-door draft
and that is a ``stop loss'' where people are being required to
remain on active duty past their enlisted time.
Meanwhile, there are units, such as the Second Brigade of
the Tenth Mountain Division, who have been home for 208 days
between more than year-long deployments in Iraq. The impact of
this, anecdotally, is very serious on recruiting and retention,
and now facts are emerging. The Guard recruiting fell 12
percent below their goals in the first three quarters of 2004.
The delayed entry program for the United States Army is well
below its goals for this year.
We have authorized an increase and so has the House in
active duty personnel. We have 30,000 individuals in addition
on active duty through various ways that we have all been made
aware of, 30,000 additional for some ``temporary'' time.
My point is, Mr. Secretary, that if something happens in
Korea--the Iranians are now thumbing their nose at the
International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) in their
Nonproliferation Treaty violations--that the strain on our
active duty, Guard, and Reserve Forces are incredible as we
speak, and there are very few people that I know who believe
that we can sustain the level of deployments that we are having
just to Iraq. Then we have a problem with Korea or with Iran or
another flashpoint in the world and it is clear, at least to
most observers, that we do not have sufficient personnel,
despite the efficiencies which you have so well and graphically
Now, I can only quote Colonel Rob Baker, commander of the
Second Brigade, First Armored Division, who knows something
about the personal costs of extended combat tours. After
spending 19 of the past 20 months deployed in Iraq and the
Middle East, he recently returned home and found himself unable
to pick out his youngest daughter in the ``welcome home''
Baker said: ``I know the strains that back to back
deployments can put on a great relationship and a great family.
There is a threshold beyond which people will say `I just
cannot give any more.' ''
Now, we are hearing, Mr. Secretary, that good and decent
and wonderful and brave and patriotic and sacrificing Americans
who are serving in the military are saying that they cannot
keep up this level of deployments. Much larger percentages of
military personnel than was in past conflicts are married, and
many of them with children.
Now, I am very concerned about the personnel situation in
the military, and I would be glad to hear from General Jones
and Admiral Fargo and General LaPorte as well.
Secretary Rumsfeld. Thank you, Senator. This is an
enormously important issue. It is true that there has been
modest use of the individual ready reservists and there very
likely will be somewhat additional use of individual ready
reservists. They all knew from the beginning when they signed
up, as I did, to be a reservist that for a period after you are
in the Selected Reserve you are available in the Individual
With respect to stop-loss, that is not new. It has been
used for decades, as I understand it, by the military, and it
is aimed at unit cohesion. It has not had a significant effect
to my understanding.
All of us are deeply sensitive to the things you are
raising and that is why we have something like 30 different
things going on to reduce stress on the force. We mentioned
some in my testimony: the movement of military jobs to civilian
jobs so that more military are available; the rebalancing of
the Guard and Reserve.
The fact is we have 1.4 million on active duty, we have
850,000 in the Selected Reserve, we have another 450,000 in the
Individual Ready Reserve, for a total of over 2.5 million
people, and we are only putting 250,000 in the U.S. Central
Command Area of Responsibility (CENTCOM AOR). So we have a lot
of people that have not been called up in the Reserves ever. We
have a lot of people who are not being used. What we need to do
is better manage the force.
To the extent, as you also indicated, we have increased the
total size of the force, we have had to under the President's
emergency authority so that we could meet our demands.
If we need to increase the size of the force, we need to
increase the size of the force, and I am all for it. It would
pain me to do it when we have so many portions of the force
that are not being properly used, and I would much prefer to
see us do that.
I am not knowledgeable about the numbers you used in
recruiting and retention, but when I talk to General Schoomaker
he tells me that his recruiting and retention numbers are
pretty good, quite good, except in one or two categories, and
that he does not at the moment see a particular problem.
Do you want to comment, Dick?
Senator McCain. I do not need General Myers' response. I
know it will be exactly the same as yours. I would like the
personal opinions--and I do not mean that as in any way a
criticism, General Myers. I would like the personal opinions of
the other combatant commanders if I could, since my time has
Chairman Warner. I think that I will grant from my time the
opportunity for General Myers to reply.
General Myers. I have a few numbers here that might help.
Retention of Reserve Forces: They have targeted ceilings for
loss. They are under those. They could be impacted, those
numbers could be impacted, by stop-loss. When they come back
and stop-loss is taken off that could change that.
The Army National Guard is the one area where the
recruiting is the tightest right now. They probably will not
make their goals this year. On the other hand, they are going
to be within 2 percent of their end strength. So there are lots
of numbers you could use to look at these things.
I think what Senator McCain said is very valid. What we
have to do is look out beyond what we know and try to predict
what our retention is going to be. This would be a very serious
matter if we wind up in a year or 2 and we do not have the kind
of force that we need, particularly in the Reserve component,
because they are not built overnight and they are so essential,
I think, to the way we do our military business in this country
and connect us to our citizenry.
Senator McCain. Mr. Chairman, before the other witnesses
respond, I did not mean it as any slight to General Myers. I
apologize, General Myers, if I did. I was interested in the
operational aspect of the commands, and I apologize. I always
value your opinion.
The chairman does not like me to practice, as I usually do,
running over the time allowed me rather significantly. I
apologize, General Myers.
Chairman Warner. We will now hear from the other combatant
Admiral Fargo. Mr. Chairman, Senator, this is something we
are watching very closely, looking at all of the metrics. It is
a concern. I think we are fortunate in the Pacific that the
naval forces and the air forces have largely been reconstituted
from their work in CENTCOM and so they are essentially full up.
We have used those forces in the Pacific to compensate for the
stress that we recognize is on the ground forces right now, and
that is the reason you have seen things such as the bomber
deployments to Guam, the rotation of the John C. Stennis into
the western Pacific. She will be backfilled by Abraham Lincoln
later on this year.
Senator McCain. I was asking about effects on retention and
Admiral Fargo. Yes, sir. The numbers right now remain high.
The retention certainly in all of the armed services in the
Pacific Command are above, well above, historical norm.
Senator McCain. Thank you.
General LaPorte. Senator, it is hard to dispute the
anecdotal comments of people who have had great separation. I
reflect back on the separation that the World War II generation
had in terms of family.
Senator McCain. Which happened to be a declared war.
General LaPorte. The issue of increasing the size of the
military I think is more an issue of increasing the
effectiveness of the military. That includes the size dimension
and we are growing the Army. But it also includes an issue of
increasing effectiveness relative to the organizational
structure, the capabilities, and the access of those
capabilities. Those are programs that I am convinced General
Schoomaker is working very diligently.
In terms of the impact on retention, in my command,
retention is extremely high. I will quote an example. We
instituted a policy where we asked soldiers to increase their
voluntary stay in the Republic of Korea. We called it the
assignment incentive program. We began that program on 15
March. Up to today, we have had 8,700 soldiers and airmen
voluntarily extend their tour of duty in Korea by 1 year and
2,000 of those extended for 2 years.
That is a volunteer willingness to accept personal
sacrifice. I think that is a pretty good indication of the
dedication of our young men and women.
Chairman Warner. Thank you.
General Jones. Senator, in the European theater
reenlistments and retention across the components appear to be
satisfactory. We do have, we have had for some time, a greater
reliance on Reserves and National Guards, to be absolutely
truthful. However, we do have some good news coming with the
situation in Macedonia being fairly well resolved, Bosnia is
now coming to a closure in terms of our reliance on large
numbers of U.S. troops, so I think that will help relieve some
of the strain.
The greatest impact with regard to Afghanistan and Iraq
with regard to European forces has been on the U.S. Army and
the U.S. Air Force. We have seen, obviously, two full Army
divisions committed in Iraq and we have other forces that are
training now, getting ready to take a rotation back into
One of the things that I think makes the retention picture
and the reenlistment picture good is that Congress and the
Department of Defense and the Services have worked together to
I think create family support programs and quality of life
programs that have really helped over the past 5 or 6 years,
have been instrumental--I am always tremendously impressed at
the support system that is available to the families, whether
it is in Germany or in the continental United States.
Having said that, obviously there are only so many people
in the force and if you use it at a cyclic rate you have to be
very careful because at some point you could overuse it, and I
think all of us are very sensitive to that.
Chairman Warner. Thank you very much.
General Myers. Mr. Chairman, one more comment, if it is
Chairman Warner. Yes.
General Myers. With respect to Korea in particular, but our
war plans in general, one of the things the Joint Chiefs of
Staff do as we deploy forces around the world, particularly to
the Central Command, is take a look at our ability to support
those other war plans that we know we might have to fill. We
look at this periodically to make sure we can do that.
With regard to the Korean war plan in particular, there
should be no doubt that we have the forces to respond to that
contingency if we need to do that. That is something that we
measure and we look at regularly.
Chairman Warner. Thank you very much.
I will charge those responses, add it to my time.
Senator Kennedy. Thank you very much.
Welcome, Mr. Secretary. Listening to Prime Minister Allawi
this morning and the Secretary brief to Congress yesterday, as
the chairman pointed out, it seems like we are operating in two
different worlds. Yesterday we heard from Secretary Rumsfeld
and others that the military never lost a battle and elections
are on schedule, and today we heard from Prime Minister Allawi
saying that we are succeeding in Iraq. Notwithstanding what the
administration says, the July National Intelligence Estimate
makes clear that, as bad as things are now, they could get
worse. As the press has reported, the intelligence estimate
paints a very different picture.
For example, the Washington Post said last Friday, the
intelligence estimate: ``Iraq's prospect for stability and
self-governance over the next 18 months were at best tenuous,
according to U.S. Government officials who had read the
report.'' The report identified serious problems in recruiting,
training an effective Iraqi army and police force, and
establishing a competent central government, rebuilding
Today the Congressional Quarterly said about the estimate:
``It forecasts three scenarios for Iraq, ranging from continued
violence at current levels to civil war.''
Now, I am bringing this up, Mr. Secretary, because I
listened to the report yesterday, then I went down and read the
NIE report, and I have quoted the public documents that are out
in the record now characterizing it.
The report also included some unclassified polling data
that was collected by the CPA, and the CIA obviously felt it
was valid enough to include as part of the intelligence
estimate, and it certainly rings an alarm bell about the lack
of support for our mission. I have an unclassified version of
that page and it shows that over 90 percent of the Iraqis view
us as occupiers, not liberators. It shows that nearly 50
percent of the Iraqis view insurgent attacks as an attempt to
liberate Iraq from U.S. occupation. It says that over 75
percent of Iraqis believe that insurgent attacks have increased
because Iraqis have lost confidence in the coalition, and the
number of Iraqis who want us to leave immediately has grown
dramatically--all in that chart--and support for the coalition
has declined dramatically.
Yet President Bush dismissed the ominous parts of the
estimate, saying the CIA was just ``guessing'' what conditions
might be like. Today he said he should have used a better word,
``estimate,'' not ``guess.''
The intelligence estimate is not the only alarming sign
that conditions in Iraq have gone from bad to worse. During
August, 900 American troops were killed or wounded. The numbers
keep going up, not down. The same month our forces were
attacked an average 70 times a day, far more than the previous
year. The Schlesinger report, which you commissioned, says that
senior leaders in the Department of Defense failed to see the
insurgency growing in Iraq last year.
We know that after heavy fighting our troops withdrew from
Fallujah, which has allowed the insurgents to regroup and
gather strength. Other cities in the Sunni Triangle remain
violent and dangerous.
Yet all we hear from the administration are rosy scenarios.
The reality is much worse and the administration failed to plan
for it. We seem to be closer to mission impossible rather than
mission accomplished. The failures so far have made our job and
the job of Prime Minister Allawi far more difficult.
So let me ask you, how do you explain the huge discrepancy
between what you say and what we see, and how can whatever
government is elected be seen as legitimate if large parts of
the population do not feel safe enough to vote?
Secretary Rumsfeld. First of all, I do not agree with your
premise that there is a wide disparity between what I say or
what General Abizaid said yesterday and what the prime minister
said or what the NIE said. Is the glass half empty or half
full? Is it dangerous? Yes. Are people being killed? Yes. Is it
a violent country? You bet. Were there 200 and some odd people
killed in Washington, D.C., last year? Yes. Were they on the
front page of every newspaper? Were they on the television
every night? No.
Now, first of all on the data in the classified material
you cited to----
Senator Kennedy. Just on this point, just on your point
Chairman Warner. Let us give the Secretary the opportunity.
Secretary Rumsfeld. Just a minute. This data is probably 4
or 5 months old, probably April, May, say May. So it is June,
July, August, September.
Number two, the data that you cited comes from three
cities--Baghdad, Basra, and Mosul. It does not come across the
Is the data probably right? Yes. Was it right then?
Probably. Is it true today? I do not know. Do polls swing
around depending on the circumstance? You bet.
Is this exactly what the terrorists want to have happen?
Yes. They want to have the people of the country lose heart.
They want to have the people of the country decide that the
terrorists and the extremists are going to win and that the
free Iraqi government and the coalition forces that are trying
to help that country are going to lose, and it is a test of
Now, I do not believe that you have heard from General
Myers or me or others, even General Abizaid, a rosy picture.
You cannot think it is a rosy picture when you see people
killed every day, and we understand that. I think it is a
Senator Kennedy. Let me point out, this is what the
President said, August 23: ``We are making progress on the
ground.'' August 24, the Vice President: ``We are moving in the
right direction in Iraq.'' September 14, Don Rumsfeld: ``I am
very encouraged about the situation in Iraq.''
I could continue to read these. I am also talking about the
growth of violence, and I am also saying that that poll was--I
am not pulling that poll out. That was in the NIE report, Mr.
Secretary. Evidently the CIA thought it was of at least some
Secretary Rumsfeld. It is.
Senator Kennedy. So we ought to include it in the report.
Secretary Rumsfeld. That is fine.
Senator Kennedy. The point that you cannot get away from is
the dramatic increase in violence. You might be able to dismiss
a poll, but we have this dramatic increase of violence.
Secretary Rumsfeld. I did not dismiss the poll, Senator.
Senator Kennedy. I am talking now about the violence.
Secretary Rumsfeld. I said it was probably accurate when it
Senator Kennedy. Okay. Let us put it in whatever
perspective you want.
Secretary Rumsfeld. Okay.
Senator Kennedy. Let us get to the dramatic increase in
violence. That is the violence has increased.
Secretary Rumsfeld. Yes.
Senator Kennedy. No two ways about it.
Secretary Rumsfeld. That is right, I said that.
Senator Kennedy. It has increased. It has increased and it
continues to increase.
Secretary Rumsfeld. General Abizaid said it yesterday in
the hearing you were attending. We all say that.
Senator Kennedy. Well, what is the plan? What is plan B
then? How are we going to get people out to vote with the
dramatic increase in violence in these places? How are we going
to expect that you are going to have a real election in
Fallujah when you have the dissidents and the insurgents
controlling it today? How are you going to have elections
Secretary Rumsfeld. Let me see if I can respond this way.
The situation in Iraq is notably different in different parts
of the country. It is not a single picture. It is quite
different. The prime minister today said that he believed that
in a large fraction of the total provinces elections could be
Now, when the elections are held in January it may be that
some of those provinces have higher levels of violence. But you
can--I believe he is right, the prime minister, that you will
be able to hold elections and that there will be elections in
January. As he said today, everyone said you could not go past
sovereignty. We did it. We passed it 2 days early. They said
you could not hold a conference of 1,000 people and pick 100
people for the constituent assembly. They did it.
They have met every single benchmark politically. They are
making progress. Now, they are making progress at a time when
the people, the extremists, are trying to chop people's heads
off. Does anyone think that is a good idea, to chop people's
heads off, to encourage that? I do not. I think it is a
But it may be--I should not even say this, because I just
do not know enough about it. This is something that the
ambassador is working on. But let us pretend hypothetically
that you get to election time in January and let us pretend
that it is roughly like it is or a little worse, which it could
be because you have to expect it to continue. They are not
happy the way it is going. They do not want a government
elected in that country. Badly they do not want that.
Let us say you tried to have an elections and you could
have it in three-quarters or four-fifths of the country, but
some places you could not because the violence was too great.
Well, so be it. Nothing is perfect in life. So you have an
election that is not quite perfect. Is it better than not
having an election? You bet.
Senator Kennedy. Are you planning to have more troops?
Secretary Rumsfeld. I do not have a plan for troops or more
Senator Kennedy. For the elections?
Secretary Rumsfeld. I know that General Abizaid has said
that it may be that he will want some more troops. He is
getting more troops every day. If you think about it, the Iraqi
forces are now the biggest part, almost the biggest part, the
second biggest part, of the coalition. We have 39,000 police
trained, equipped, and on duty. You have 14,000 border guards
trained, equipped, and on duty. You have 5,000 in the army
trained, equipped, and on duty. The national guard has 38,000.
The intervention force has 2,000. The special ops has 500.
That number will keep growing, so there will be more troops
by time of election. It will be somewhere between 110,000 and
140,000, I would guess, Iraqi troops, forces of various types.
Coalition forces, I do not know. Some forces have said they
will come in to help protect the U.N. Some countries are
considering whether they want to bring in forces to help with
the election. In the event General Abizaid decided he needs
more forces to assist in the elections, like he has for example
in Afghanistan, he will ask and he will get it.
Chairman Warner. Thank you very much, Senator.
I would like to take a minute of my time. I likewise was
concerned about the NIE and I asked the Department of State to
provide me with their comments, and I received the following,
which I will put into the record. This is dated September 8,
which presumably is quite current: ``Polls show that a large
majority of Iraqis have a positive outlook on their young
democracy and the elections that are to take place by January
2005. More than 77 percent of respondents feel that regular
fair elections would be the most important political right for
the Iraqi people. 58 percent feel that the democracy in Iraq is
likely to succeed.''
Also, in meeting with the prime minister, all of us studied
his distinguished biography. You talked about chopping off
heads. Saddam Hussein tried literally to chop his off one time
and he suffered a terrible injury, requiring over a year of
hospitalization. I mention that only because when you look into
the faces of the prime minister and the ministers that he had
with him today, every one of those men are operating as best
they can voluntarily, under extraordinary personal threats to
So I think they exhibit the will of the Iraqi people to
succeed under these difficult circumstances.
Senator Allard. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
I would like to get back onto the subject of your Global
Posture Review and kind of take us back to the very start. The
previous administration I understand had examined whether to
consider reordering their Global Posture, but had determined
that such an effort would be difficult. What motivated you, Mr.
Secretary, or the President, to consider reordering our global
posture, and explain to us why this is so important in today's
Secretary Rumsfeld. Senator, anyone who looked at where our
forces were left at the end of the Cold War had to know that
they were not where they ought to be.
Second, we have to be respectful of taxpayers' dollars.
Third, it seems to me that we have to be respectful of the
men and women who volunteer to serve in the military, and to
the extent we can reduce stress on the force by reducing the
number of permanent changes of station for people and create a
life that is somewhat better for the spouses, so they will not
have to change jobs so frequently, and for the kids that do not
have to get jerked out of high school, that we owed it to them.
Fourth, we have found that, as we have gone along, our
needs are different. We were planning to fight in place in
Korea and Europe. We are no longer planning to fight in place.
We know the odds are we are going to fight somewhere other than
where we are located. That means we simply must have the kind
of usability of our forces. We have to be able to get them out
of there and get them where they need to go and get them fast,
and not have a big debate with a neighboring country about
whether or not you can use rail across their country because
their sensitivities are bothered by something.
We also want people where they are wanted. Our forces--we
are going to have better recruiting and better retention if
they are in places where the people want them there.
Furthermore, it seems to me that the 21st century does not
call for the permanent deployment of heavy forces. We are going
to have to be agile, we are going to have to move fast, we are
going to have to be able to go where the problem is.
I would submit that no one on this committee asked
Secretary Cheney when he was being looked at for Secretary of
Defense about Iraq, and yet he ended up in a war in Iraq. No
one asked me about Afghanistan. If that does not tell you that
it is not possible to know where a threat is going to come
from--we are going to have to deal with capabilities that
enemies have that are increasingly lethal and dangerous, but
can come from any number of locations.
As a result, I just felt compelled to push this. The
President and I talked about it. It is an incredibly difficult
task. It is so complicated and so difficult to deal with so
many countries and so many committees of Congress. It is going
to cost some money, let there be no doubt.
So it is not something where you get up in the morning and
say, ``Gee, I think I would like to go change the force posture
of the United States of America.'' This is something we had to
do, and we are doing it.
Senator Allard. Mr. Secretary, when do you think you will
be able to implement the Global Posture Review? I would like to
hear comments from the other members on the panel here. Then
also, when do you anticipate the reorienting of our forces will
be completed? Again, I would like to have the full panel
respond to those two questions.
Secretary Rumsfeld. I can give you a short general answer
and it is that I do not know. What we have to do is we have a
theory as to where we prefer to be arranged and with what
countries and in what ways. We have other choices. We have
options. We will go to those first choices first, and if we can
get an arrangement that is satisfactory in terms of usability
and cost we will do it. If we cannot, we will go to our second
choice and work that out. We will call audibles as we go along.
It will play out probably over a period of 6 to 8 years, is
my best guess.
Senator Allard. Do any other members of the panel have any
comments on when we start implementation? Yes, General Jones?
General Jones. Senator, some of the elements of the plan
actually can already be considered to be under way. The Navy
and Air Force component headquarters have begun--we have begun
streamlining them. These are things that are important to do in
order to modernize our headquarters and transform them into
actual warfighting headquarters.
We have conducted exercises in Eastern Europe to test a
rotational concept. So we are doing a lot of things to get
ready for the majority of the work. We are negotiating--we are
talking to our allies and friends and making sure that they
understand the intent and how this is beneficial.
Also, in Europe this is extremely closely watched by our
allies because it also affects the transformational plans of
the North Atlantic Treaty Organization. We have many countries
that we work with on a regular basis, particularly the newer
members from the eastern part of Europe, who are very
interested in reducing the size of their armies, principally,
and transforming them into capabilities that are much more
usable and much more expeditionary. The United States Army in
Europe, which forms the bulk of our transformation, is really
the model that others are looking for to try to emulate.
This is going to take a long time. It is not something you
can rush into. But it is definitely something that we feel is
Senator Allard. Admiral?
Admiral Fargo. Senator, just as General Jones has said,
some of our efforts are already under way, and I think I
mentioned in my opening statement that we have already moved
two of the three submarines to Guam. We have rotational bomber
elements in Guam right now. The Stryker brigades are being
formed and trained and they will be in position early. We just
broke ground on C-17 facilities in Hawaii.
So this is the early, the leading edge of this. I think the
rest of it will occur probably over about a 10-year period. I
think that is a fair estimate of how long it will take to
conduct this complex and extensive change.
Senator Allard. I know my time has expired, but I just want
to follow up this question if the chairman will allow me. The
press has reported there will be 70,000 they think may be
returning back to the United States. Can you comment about that
figure that has been put out there, and if it is close to true,
what impact it may have on what facilities we already have in
Secretary Rumsfeld. I can comment on it. You have been
given a report from the Department on this that has a
classified attachment. The classified attachment will give you
the details in each country that is a theory, a first choice.
Chairman Warner. Excuse me. I have it here in my hand. I
was about to mention it. It is in the committee files that
arrived a few days ago and it gives an outline of those options
together with the figures and the locations.
Secretary Rumsfeld. But we have said broadly, Senator, that
70,000 is about the right number that would be moving from an
overseas post to a possession or a State of the United States,
plus another 100,000 dependents. If I am not mistaken, the
number of installations, meaning any kind of facility--a base,
a radar antenna, radio antenna, could be a storage facility--we
are going to go from something like 560 down to 360 outside of
the U.S. Think of the advantage from a force protection
Chairman Warner. Thank you, Mr. Secretary.
Senator Allard. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Warner. Thank you, Senator.
We now have Senator Lieberman.
Senator Lieberman. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Thank you, Mr. Secretary. Gentlemen, thanks for being here.
Mr. Secretary, I applaud you for going forward with the
Global Posture Review and committing to implementing it. In a
lot of ways it is long overdue. It makes sense as part of a
general transformation of our military.
I noted, I believe in response to Senator Allard, that you
said there is a lot of work to be done with many countries and
many committees of Congress. I wonder which was harder work?
You do not have to answer that question.
I wanted to ask you about what the fiscal implications of
this Global Posture Review will be, both short-term and longer-
term, insofar as you are able. In other words, I assume that in
the shorter-term there are some significant costs associated
with moving the personnel around, and I would like to hear
something about that. But then what about the longer-term? Are
there savings potentially involved here or not?
Secretary Rumsfeld. There are. If one thinks--I do not know
what the average cost of a permanent change of station is, but
if you think of the reduction in the total number of permanent
changes of stations and moving vans and dependents, 100,000
dependents back in the U.S., it is significant savings.
Now, the cost is greater than the savings during the
immediate period, which is always true. The same is true with
BRAC. We do not know the number because we do not know which of
the options we will end up landing on. But there has been a
wild guess and I think it is in the material that has been
given to you and I would rather not say it because I am sure it
will be wrong. But it is a very, very, very modest percentage
or percentage of a percentage of the Future Years Defense Plan.
Now, the Future Years Defense Plan is very big, so I am not
suggesting it is a small amount of money. It is in the
billions. But part of it will depend on how much other
countries will pay and part of it will depend on--the other
advantage, of course, is we will be filling bases that would
then not be BRAC'ed.
Senator Lieberman. Right.
Let me come back to another one of Senator Allard's
questions. The total number redeployed is 70,000. Obviously not
all, I presume, are coming back to the U.S. A number will be
Secretary Rumsfeld. The U.S. or U.S. possessions.
Senator Lieberman. Right.
Secretary Rumsfeld. That is a net number worldwide.
Senator Lieberman. So the net will not just be redeployed--
the 70,000 is a number that will go to U.S. or U.S.
possessions, not to other foreign countries?
Secretary Rumsfeld. Exactly. There will also be moves among
Senator Lieberman. Right.
Secretary Rumsfeld. But that is in addition to the 70,000.
Senator Lieberman. Okay. I appreciate that clarification.
In terms of calculating the cost and considering the
agility that, as you describe and have been committed to, that
we need in our military forces, is there a concern that we
should have that it will cost more in a time of crisis to
deploy forces from the U.S. as opposed to forward-deployed
positions around the world closer to potential crisis spots?
Secretary Rumsfeld. Let me say two things in that regard.
First, let me go back to the first question. We always have to
look at what it costs to do it. We also want to look at what
the costs would be if we did not do it. The cost if we did not
do it would be that we would continue for another 50 years
malarranged in the world, arranged for the last century, not
the current century, and have a considerably greater stress on
our force. That cost is significant.
I am sorry, I lost your----
Senator Lieberman. My question is, is there not a concern
that if we move that many net numbers back to the U.S.----
Secretary Rumsfeld. Yes, in terms of deployment.
Senator Lieberman. --that it will cost more to deploy them
in a crisis.
Secretary Rumsfeld. Our people do not think so. For
example, if you have to go from Germany up north and then
around into the Atlantic Ocean and then down into the
Mediterranean and then over to the Middle East, it is about the
same distance as from the United States.
Second, we do not know where we are going to have to use
these forces to fight and therefore you cannot know what the
cost would be unless you know where it is you are going to be
going. That is, as I have said, something that is difficult to
nail down at any given time.
Senator Lieberman. General LaPorte, I want to ask you a
question because I have a question about Korea, but I also want
to ask you a question because Senator Reed loves to hear you
speak because you are from Rhode Island. [Laughter.]
The question is this. There have been concerns, as the
Secretary and I think you may have said, about moving
approximately 12,500 of our troops out of South Korea when the
North Koreans, Kim Jong Il, seem to be in an aggressive,
certainly unpredictable, posture. I wonder to the extent you
are able to describe to us why we should not have those
concerns. In other words, what will we continue to have on the
ground in the region, that if there is some aggressive action,
hostile action by the North Koreans, that we should not worry
that we have 12,000 fewer boots on the ground there?
General LaPorte. Senator, that is a very fair question. In
Korea I often use a translator and Senator Reed thought I might
need a translator for this committee. [Laughter.]
There are tremendous capabilities resident on the Korean
Peninsula. As I mentioned, the Republic of Korea military is
over 600,000 strong. They are a very capable military, well-
led, well-equipped, highly motivated. We should never forget
In terms of the reduction of 12,500, the capabilities that
are resident in the region that are provided by Pacific
Command--there are seven United Nations bases, for example, in
Japan. Those bases have tremendous capabilities, rapid
reinforcement capabilities, to the peninsula, as well as our
strategic deployment capability.
So I am very confident that this reduction will not
increase risk. Kim Jong Il has always had a strategy of
provocation. For years that is what he does. He will continue
to do that regardless of the number of forces that are resident
on the peninsula.
Senator Lieberman. Let me be specific on this one. Moving
troops away from the demilitarized zone (DMZ) and Seoul south
50 miles, what are the plusses and minusses of doing that?
General LaPorte. The plusses are we could not be tactically
fixed by North Korea's artillery, first of all, because we
would be out of the range of the artillery and we would have
the operational agility to go where we need to go.
Second, it gives us better training opportunities. We went
to ground 50 years ago and we stayed there for 50 years. We are
used to being at the end of dusty trails. Today those camps are
surrounded by urban development and we have become an irritant
to the Korean people when we crank our helicopters, fire our
tanks. So we need to move to an area that is less intrusive and
gives us an opportunity to train better.
Senator Lieberman. So moving south is not only not a
diminishing of our capacity to stop a potential North Korean
move on the ground south, it actually puts us in a better
position to respond to it?
General LaPorte. That is correct, Senator.
Senator Lieberman. Thanks. Thank you all.
Chairman Warner. Thank you very much, Senator.
Senator Cornyn. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Secretary, I know I am not the only one who worries
that in a political season about the debate over our policy in
Iraq what impact the negativism and the doom and gloom that we
hear preached in some quarters has on our troops. So I think we
have a special responsibility, those of us who serve in public
office, to make sure that we do what we do responsibly.
But it does have an impact on people all across America as
well, because they wonder how much of this doom and gloom as
opposed to what we heard from Prime Minister Allawi this
morning about positive steps and progress in Iraq--what is the
truth. For example, yesterday afternoon I had a constituent of
mine call me from Lubbock, Texas, because he heard yesterday
that it is possible that the President would reinstate the
draft to handle the war in Iraq if reelected. This statement
followed on a charge last week that the President is planning a
surprise post-election callup of additional Guard and Reserve
Mr. Secretary, would you state for the record, are there
any plans for a post-election callup of additional Guard or
Reserve troops, and is there any plan to reinstate the draft?
Secretary Rumsfeld. Let me take the first one on the draft
and I will leave General Myers to talk about how we are
managing our force rotation.
I am not supposed to get in politics, but it is absolutely
false that anyone in this administration is considering
reinstating the draft. That is nonsense. We have 295 million
people in the United States of America. We need 1.4 million
people to serve in the Active Force. We are having no trouble
attracting and retaining the people we need. If we were
managing this force better--and it takes years to rearrange it
properly. It has been malorganized, malarranged as between the
active and the Reserve components, and we have too darn many
people in uniform doing civilian jobs. If we have to increase
the numbers above 1.4 million we can do it under the emergency
We are not having trouble maintaining a force of
volunteers. Every single person is a volunteer. We do not need
to use compulsion to get people to come into the armed
services. We have an ample number of talented, skillful,
courageous, dedicated young men and women willing to serve, and
it is false.
General Myers. On continued callup of the Reserve component
and the active duty, what we have done is try to build in as
much predictability as we can, both for Active Forces and for
our Reserve component forces. There will be more Guard and
Reserve callups in November, in December, in January, and for
as long as we need forces to provide to General Abizaid or any
of the other combatant commanders that are sitting here with
So yes, there will be. None of them have been delayed for
any reason. This is a process that has been consistent now for
about the last year. There were callups in September. There
will be some in October, there will be some in November. So
yes, it will continue on as we continue to feed forces to the
combatant commanders to do what they need to do.
But what we are really trying to do is get ahead of the
whole process so we can provide predictability, particularly
for the Reserve component, who have to in many cases leave
civilian jobs and their families not near military
installations and answer the call their country gives them. So
we are trying to do that.
Senator Cornyn. I appreciate that very much.
Let me just ask one more question and this time it is about
the subject upon which this hearing actually was convened, and
that is Global Posture Review. Of course, there have been some
questions about the interrelationship or the interdependence of
that process and BRAC. Obviously that is something we are
concerned about on a number of different levels.
But can you explain to me, Mr. Secretary--it is unclear to
me, if this Global Posture Review, which I understand has been
going on for 3 years or more, how it is that we will make sure
there are accommodations here in the United States on existing
military bases, how those two are going to dovetail in a way
that makes sense?
Secretary Rumsfeld. Yes, sir. It is really exactly this
way. We have decided that it makes sense to bring back to the
United States from all around the world, different places. We
know those numbers. We feed that number into the BRAC process
and it then becomes part of their deliberations as to where,
which bases they should go to and how it ought to be arranged.
Had we not done this work over the past 3 years, we would
not know what was going to have to come back and therefore
there would have been a question mark in the BRAC process. The
two are dovetailing perfectly and they link together tightly.
Senator Cornyn. Finally, I have heard it said that we are
not out of troops, we are out of balance, and I think that is a
thumbnail sketch for what you described earlier with regard to
the restructuring of our military, which I know is under way
and General Schoomaker and others are working on. But I will
say that we have already begun to see some evidence of that
restructuring with recent announcements of the placement of
modular brigades at Fort Hood and Fort Bliss. So this is a very
dynamic period of time we are in here, where I think we are
going to see a lot of change, but I think we are on the right
track and I appreciate your efforts.
Secretary Rumsfeld. Thank you.
Chairman Warner. Thank you very much, Senator.
Senator Reed. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
Thank you, Mr. Secretary, gentlemen. Mr. Secretary, the
Defense Science Board has reached a very startling conclusion:
inadequate total numbers of U.S. troops. They briefed you, and
also a lack of long-term endurance. They suggest some ways to
cope with this: to trade combat capabilities for stabilization
capabilities. That of course impacts mission performance if
there is a conventional conflict. Depend on others, like the
United Nations or other nations; that has been a dispiriting
process over the last several years.
Even if we do all these things, their conclusion is
extremely, I think, both provocative and startling: ``If
everything we recommend is implemented over the next 5 years,
but we continue our current foreign policy of military
expeditions every 2 years, we will begin two more stabilization
operations without sufficient preparation or resources.'' They
conclude by saying: ``Anything started wrong tends to continue
That brings us back to points that Senator McCain and
others have raised. Iran and North Korea are provocative. They
very well might cause us to take military action. One hopes
not. As you often say, there is also the surprises that we do
not even contemplate at this moment.
As a result I find it again puzzling why you have not
supported an authorized end strength increase, including those
soldiers, particularly marines, in the regular budget process,
obtaining the funds for them by looking at other programs
outside of the Army and the Marine Corps, because if we do not
do this I think we are running off the cliff, if you will.
Relying on supplemental appropriations is increasingly more
challenging. The Army, I am told, has an $8 billion requirement
for equipment resetting, $4.5 billion for maintenance, $1.3
billion for ammo, in addition to personnel costs.
But I think the major point, the one I think the Defense
Science Board concludes with, is that we have put ourselves in
a strategic position where we may not be able to respond to
obvious threats that we are seeing today.
Secretary Rumsfeld. Senator, let me comment and then I know
General Myers will want to comment. I thought the study was a
good one, the summer study of the Defense Science Board, and I
thought it was sufficiently interesting that I have had it
briefed to the Chiefs and I believe the combatant commanders
and others in the Department.
Second, you said we have not supported an increase in
strength. We have and we have an increase in strength under the
emergency authorities. We have not supported an end strength
increase, permanent end strength increase by statute, that is
correct. The reason for that very simply is we do not need to
do that and the Army prefers not to until they have a sense,
General Schoomaker, until he has a sense of how he is able to
transform the Army force from 33 brigades up to 43 and possibly
48. He believes--he does not know, but he believes that over a
period of 4 or 5 years doing that he may be able to do that
without a permanent increase in end strength because of the 20
or 30 other things we are doing, several of which I have
mentioned here today.
Believe me, if we need more end strength we will request
more end strength. We will either do it under the emergency
authority to start with or we will come before Congress. The
senior managers of the Department are doing I believe it is 35
or 40 different things to relieve stress on the force and it is
having a payoff already. We have been able to achieve things.
We also, under General Schoomaker's theory, are going to
move the spigot down on the rain barrel to be able to draw on
more of the 2.5 million men and women who have volunteered,
because we are only drawing on a very small fraction of them at
the present time.
Senator Reed. Mr. Chairman, we have had these discussions
for probably 2 years now. It is becoming increasingly clear
that your response is simply avoiding the obvious. If we have a
long-term commitment in Iraq and other places, if we have to be
prepared to react to North Korea and Iran, we cannot live
supplemental to supplemental, the Army cannot. The equipment
costs are piling up. We need an end strength because we have to
put the budget behind that, not in a supplemental emergency
capacity, but the money behind it, and that has to be done.
Your own Defense Science Board, individuals that you chose,
individuals that you respect, individuals you tasked to look at
this, have come back and said, not for the short run but the
long run--I mean, it is their conclusion--this is a long-term
problem of maintaining these forces.
Secretary Rumsfeld. It could be.
Senator Reed. Mr. Secretary, you continue to say it could
be. It is quite obvious.
Secretary Rumsfeld. Senator, I am not pulling this out of
thin air, my answers to you. What I am giving you is what the
Chiefs in the tank conclude, what the senior levels of the
Department have concluded. We would be happy to sit down and
walk through the entire process with you. It is complicated.
There are a lot of pieces to it.
Admittedly, there are uncertainties about whether--what can
actually be achieved with the new national security personnel
system. There are uncertainties as to how far down that rain
barrel we can get that spigot. But if we cannot get it far
enough because we just cannot manage better, then by golly you
are right, we will have to go to an increase in end strength.
Senator Reed. Mr. Secretary, a final question on this
point. Did the Defense Science Board consider the changes that
you are suggesting, modularity? Were they aware of them? Did
they consider them?
Secretary Rumsfeld. I do not know if they were briefed to
the extent of all the things we are doing in the Department. I
Senator Reed. So you had your experts study the issue of
manpower and they were not aware of what is going on in the
Secretary Rumsfeld. Knowing what is going on in the
Department is--it is a big Department, Senator, as you are well
aware. These are part-time people who come in and are given a
specific assignment and take a period and study it, and they do
a terrific job. To what extent they--if we gave them a quiz on
all the things that we are doing in the Department to reduce
stress on the force, I just am not in a position to answer your
Senator Reed. Mr. Chairman, may I ask General LaPorte a
question because again, I like the way he talks? [Laughter.]
Chairman Warner. If you wish to put a question to General
LaPorte, please feel free.
Senator Reed. General, your comments about the adequacy of
forces in Korea I presume are related to your current mission,
which is deterrence of a North Korean attack. Would those
comments change if you had to take military action to disarm
General LaPorte. I did not----
Senator Reed. Take military offensive action to disarm
North Korea; would your comments change with respect to the
adequacy of the personnel and equipment?
General LaPorte. That is a difficult question to answer----
Senator Reed. That is why I asked. I think that is the
Chairman Warner. Why do you not, General, give us a brief
response and then provide a more extensive response for the
General LaPorte. I will do that.
Disarming North Korea would require a significant amount of
capabilities, not just ground component but all our components.
We have significant capabilities to address that threat from
[The information referred to follows:]
Senator Reed. Thank you.
General Myers. Mr. Chairman, could I add something----
Chairman Warner. Yes, of course.
General Myers. --just to try to help understand what we are
talking about here. When we talk about numbers, numbers do not
equal capability. We are trying to build capability. The Army
plan is to build more units of maneuver, the brigade. That is a
very good thing to do. We do look at this, the Joint Chiefs do,
and we talk to the combatant commanders. We ask ourselves, do
we have enough forces, because it is a very serious issue. We
The Secretary has authorized the United States Army to go
30,000 above its authorized end strength to properly man it to
do the expansion in capability that it needs. That will take
them through early 2007, at which time they will see if they
need a bigger Army.
We are on a glide slope or on a ramp right now that is
about as fast as you could do if you authorized whatever number
you want to authorize. It takes you time to recruit them and
train them. But we are on a slope that is probably above
anything that could be authorized right now, and it will take
us until 2007 to figure out if this is enough: what does the
world look like?; is it as predicted by the Defense Science
Board, whatever it was?; every 2 years will we have to be
utilized in some sort of stability operation?; and we will
Capability does count. I think General LaPorte will tell
you that a couple years ago, just 3 years ago, we were very
worried about the artillery that sat in North Korea behind the
mountains, that could range in some cases all the way to Seoul,
South Korea. It was a very big problem and the way we were
going to solve it was a lot of counter-battery fire from
The Joint Direct Attack Munition global positioning system-
guided solves a lot of those problems. Now we can drop it all-
weather. These shoot-and-scoot systems the North Koreans have
now are very vulnerable to air power and other precision
artillery systems. It is almost--and that battle has changed
dramatically, I think General LaPorte would probably agree.
So as we talk about numbers, as we talk about this and
that, we have to remember we are talking capability in the end.
Chairman Warner. Thank you very much, General.
Thank you, Senator Reed.
Senator Chambliss. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Gentlemen, thank you for being here. To General Jones and
Admiral Fargo and General LaPorte, I would hope that you will
express to the men and women serving under you how much we
appreciate their service to our country.
Mr. Secretary, there has been some conversation in the
media over the last couple of days about the potential for the
reinstitution of the draft. I had my staff check and there
appears to be some legislation on the House side introduced by
Congressman Rangel and some legislation on the Senate side
introduced by Senator Hollings. As far as I know, neither one
of those pieces of legislation has moved one inch.
Is there any ongoing discussion at the Pentagon about the
potential for the reinstitution of the draft?
Secretary Rumsfeld. Not a word.
Chairman Warner. Senator, the Secretary had that question
earlier and gave us a rather Trumanesque response to it, and he
may well follow it up by letter. But I am sure that he might
add a word here.
Senator Chambliss. I appreciate that. I am sorry I missed
the first answer, but I am glad you got to answer it twice.
Also, Mr. Secretary, there has been some conversation here
earlier in the questioning relative to the status of the police
forces in Iraq, also the Armed Forces in Iraq, and there have
been some comments in the media about statements that have been
made relative to the size of both of those force structures and
whether or not the numbers that have been given are accurate.
I took the liberty of going to one of your Web sites today,
www.defendamerica.mil, and I pulled up two sheets, one of which
on page 22 at that Web site states ``Police Forces, Current
Status.'' This document gives the number of components that
have been authorized, the number on duty, the number in
training, the weapons they have, the vehicles, and so forth and
I look at page 23, it is titled ``Armed Forces, Current
Status.'' Again, with respect to the Iraqi Army it gives the
number authorized, the number on duty, the number in training,
the number trained, the weapons, vehicles, so forth and so on.
Is this public information that folks like me who do not
know much about how to use a computer can pick up as easy as I
picked this up today?
Secretary Rumsfeld. Yes, sir. It is readily available and
it ought not to be a mystery to anybody.
Senator Chambliss. When you give out numbers or the
Department gives out numbers relative to the size of the Iraqi
police forces or the size of the Iraqi Armed Forces, are these
the numbers that you use and do you consistently update these
Secretary Rumsfeld. We do. General Casey and General
Petraeus work with General Myers and the Joint Staff to update
them I believe every 2 weeks.
Senator Chambliss. Thank you. These appear to be data as of
September 13, 2004.
Mr. Chairman, I would ask unanimous consent to introduce
these two sheets of paper into the record.
Chairman Warner. Without objection.
[The information referred to follows:]
Senator Chambliss. Mr. Secretary, I noted your comment in
your written statement about restructuring the Reserve
components to achieve a more appropriate distribution of skills
and create an environment in which reservists and guardsmen
will mobilize less often, with more predictability. I want to
commend you for that approach, especially in your and the
Department's efforts to shift the reservists into career fields
that are heavily used in order to reduce the burden on certain
It is a fact that approximately 38 percent of our selected
reservists have not been mobilized at all since September 11,
2001. This does not appear to be an overuse of the Reserve.
However, the fact that many of our reservists have been
deployed for long periods of time while most of them have not
been deployed at all indicates to me that you are on the right
track, that we need more people in the high-demand career
Could you update us on how these rebalancing efforts are
going and how it will affect the ways in which the Guard and
Reserve are used in coming years?
Secretary Rumsfeld. Yes, sir. The Army has the biggest task
and it I believe has already accomplished somewhere between
10,000 and 20,000 of rebalancing between the active component
and the Reserve component. Is that about right?
General Myers. That is about right.
Secretary Rumsfeld. They are aiming, the Services generally
are aiming, at a number of about 10,000 a year over the coming
period, where they will be moving skill sets and balancing
between the active and the Reserve components so that the same
people do not get called up too frequently, and because we will
then have, after rebalancing, more people in the Active Force
who have those skill sets, that we now can reasonably predict
are going to be needed in the 21st century.
Senator Chambliss. Thank you.
General Jones, you made reference in your opening statement
to the need for strategic lift, both sealift and airlift, to
project power in the European theater and how this need will
grow and transform as EUCOM moves to more dispersed bases and
operating locations. How would you assess your current airlift
needs specifically and what limitations, if any, do you foresee
in both the inter- and intra-theater airlift in the coming
General Jones. Senator, as we transform the force, one of
the things that I like to point out is that we are transforming
it to become more strategically useful. One of the key elements
in making the force of the future effective is to balance the
force that we have forward deployed with the rotational forces
that will be required in various spots in order to maintain our
influence, take into account our alliance obligations, the
coalitions, the crises, and the like.
So to me one of the most important elements of
transformation is the fact that, while we will be able to
return a number of forces and their families to the United
States, the transformation of the Services, notably the Army in
particular, into more expeditionary forces means that we will
have a greater strategic effect across a broader area, not just
in Western Europe, where we have been for 50 years. In my
theater it is relatively straightforward to see that we will be
engaged at greater distances to the east and I believe that it
is fair to say that there are upcoming challenges in the
southern part of our area of responsibility, notably Africa,
that are going to consume much of our time.
I think one of the critical elements in achieving new
capabilities will also be found in the mobility and the correct
positioning of our prepositioned equipment, both at sea and on
land, and also ensuring that our strategic airlift and sealift
remains modern and adequate to do the job. This is not just
true in Europe; it is true in all of the other combatant
commanders' geographical areas of responsibility.
It is clear that the investment that we made in the C-17 is
having dramatic effects and this is really a capability that we
just simply could not do without. I believe that we will
continue to watch to make sure that that very increasingly
important component of our overall ability is sufficiently
resourced and modernized to make sure that it is the engine
that delivers the forces where we need them.
So on that score I am confident that we have thought that
through and it is an essential component of all of our
proposals to transform our capabilities.
Chairman Warner. Thank you very much, Senator.
Senator Ben Nelson. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Thank you, Mr. Secretary and gentlemen. I appreciate very
much your being here today. Mr. Secretary, as you look at the
transformation and capabilities, I think Senator Reed's
question about what kind of capabilities would be required in
South Korea, whether it is defensive or offensive, are you
making any distinctions between offensive and defensive
capabilities when we look at the total transformation,
reduction of troops, changing of locations of our commands in
the various parts of the world?
Secretary Rumsfeld. Senator, I think General LaPorte should
answer the question and I will be happy to yield to him. But
first let me just say, I think I need to emphasize this: It is
in the 21st century, I honestly believe it is a mistake to
count things and equate them with capability. It simply is not
Senator Ben Nelson. I agree with you.
Secretary Rumsfeld. Second--and this is not directly to
your question, but, Mr. Chairman, I have to say this--
deterrence depends on the perception. It is what is in a
person's mind. We have had discussions today about whether or
not the United States military is capable of fulfilling its
assigned missions. Let there be no doubt, the United States
military is capable of executing skillfully and swiftly its
assigned missions, and people ought not to go away in the world
with any different perception as a result of the kinds of
questions and discussions that have been taking place here
The chairman and the chiefs and the combatant commanders
address this on a continuing basis. They do a series of things
to determine how capabilities would be moved, how tasks would
be accomplished. They know what they are doing and they are
confident that the United States can fulfill its assigned
Senator Ben Nelson. Mr. Secretary, in that regard, I assume
that is one of the reasons why Strategic Command now has both
offensive and defensive capabilities across the board with the
military; is that a fair question?
Secretary Rumsfeld. No, it is not the reason. It was simply
a matter of command assignments that seemed to make sense to
the chairman and to the chiefs and me.
General LaPorte, you may want to respond on the other
General LaPorte. Sir, I would just add to what the
Secretary said. We are a combined force, a Republic of Korea-
U.S. force, and both nations have tremendous capabilities. Our
operational planning is across a wide spectrum of potential
scenarios. I would be glad to give you detailed briefings on
those, but it is a capability that I am looking for as a
commander, not some raw number, because there are more
intangibles relative to capabilities.
Senator Ben Nelson. I appreciate your answer. Thank you.
General Jones, I think NATO announced yesterday that they
are going to be expanding their training mission from 50
officers to perhaps 300 officers in Iraq, and this is to train
Iraqi security forces before the January election. I know that
it probably was not an easy task to get that increase in
What does this bring to NATO's Iraqi commitment right now
in terms of numbers?
General Jones. The overall estimate in terms of the troop
strength required to execute this mission is about a brigade,
roughly about 3,000 total, to do the force protection
requirements, to do the infrastructure, logistics, and the
So the piece that was in the newspaper pertained to the
trainers and I would say that that is a fairly soft number. The
real number is being developed virtually as we speak, now that
the North Atlantic Council (NAC) has spoken and said to proceed
with the concept of operations, and that will be developed
within the next few weeks.
Senator Ben Nelson. Some critics have said that NATO, much
like our Guard and Reserve units, is stretched too thin. Do you
think that is true or do you think that is false, about NATO?
General Jones. The answer to that question is that this is
an alliance of 26 sovereign nations. There are over two million
people, two million Europeans, wearing uniforms. The fraction
that is deployed is probably no more than about 60,000, maybe
What needs to happen in the alliance, as I have said before
this committee, is a transformation, and NATO is trying to do
that. The United States plays an important leadership role in
showing the way and in leading and supporting. NATO is trying
to make a serious contribution. It is making a serious
contribution in Afghanistan. It is wrapping up the Bosnian
deployment after a number of years. Kosovo is still very much a
commitment that takes about 18,000 troops.
We are still involved in providing security, backup
security, for the Greek Armed Forces in the Olympics. There is
an ongoing very successful naval expeditionary operation in the
Mediterranean that really constitutes NATO's primary
So the alliance is doing more. It is transitioning from a
static, reactive, linear posture that was required in the 20th
century and it is moving into answering the requirements of the
21st century. The NATO Response Force is probably the most
important transformational program that is ongoing. So I think
that as we become more usable and as nations transform and
their forces become more usable and more expeditionary, despite
the fact that their numbers will go down, their capabilities
will go up, and we are looking forward to that progress.
Senator Ben Nelson. So they are focused on capabilities
rather than pure numbers of equipment, personnel, et cetera; is
General Jones. That is correct. The problem is what they
have now is pure numbers and we are trying to change that
Senator Ben Nelson. Thank you.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
General Myers. Senator Nelson, let me just clarify one
thing. You asked the question about Strategic Command and
perhaps why we assigned certain missions, was it offense or
Senator Ben Nelson. No, I meant combining them so we had
the capacity to look at both aspects of the military.
General Myers. Sir, I think the reason that we wanted to
combine Space Command and Strategic Command and give them some
new missions was because of the perspective that both those
commands had before we merged them and the perspective they
would need afterwards, and that was the global perspective. So
every mission that they have been given has a huge global
component, and we thought we needed one of our unified commands
to be responsible for that. So that was more the issue than the
offense and defense.
Senator Ben Nelson. Thank you.
Chairman Warner. Thank you very much, Senator.
Senator Graham. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
This is for General Myers and General Jones. If it became
the policy of this country to announce that we would withdraw
from Iraq in 4 years or that would be our goal, what effect, if
any, do you think it would have on current operations, the
terrorism mentality, and our allies in Iraq who are fighting
General Myers. I think it would be playing into the hands
of folks like Zarqawi and the former regime elements that are
trying to keep progress in Iraq from happening. I think if we
announce our intentions to withdraw it would be detrimental. I
think we would see an increase in violence. If they thought
there was a goal line in sight, that is what they would march
So that is why we have said, I think, in front of the
committee consistently that, when asked on troop strength in
Iraq and Afghanistan, that we have maintained that it will be
what the combatant commander needs based on the situation on
Senator Graham. Do you agree with that, General Jones?
General Jones. Sir, I do. I think it is extremely important
to maybe look back on history. For instance, in Bosnia I think
the international community certainly wanted to solve that
problem quicker than we did, but it has taken over a decade and
we are coming to a conclusion.
I think it is very difficult to predict and not wise to
announce end states that you might not be able to deliver on.
Senator Graham. Mr. Secretary, it is very important to me
that we give an honest assessment about where we are going and
how can we get there in Iraq, and we will get to the
globalization effort here in a moment, not because I am
unsupportive. I am very supportive. But the likelihood of
violence, to me, is going to increase because of the elections
here and there.
Secretary Rumsfeld. I agree.
Senator Graham. You made a comment that I think needs to be
explored a bit. What is the likelihood in your opinion of
substantial parts of Iraq being ungovernable by January and
what can we do to change that dynamic beginning now?
Secretary Rumsfeld. I think that by January there will be
elections and that they will be successful elections, although
very likely imperfect elections. I think that you are right,
the level of violence may very well increase between now and
the Iraqi elections. I suspect that if there were areas--first
of all, the prime minister of Iraq and General Abizaid and
General Casey and the coalition partners all understand that
you cannot, over a sustained period of time, permit safe havens
and sanctuaries within a country that will allow the enemies of
that country to continue attacking it and destroying it. They
Senator Graham. Thank you.
Secretary Rumsfeld. If there were to be an area where the
extremists focused during the election period and an election
was not possible in that area at that time, so be it. You have
the rest of the election and you go on. Life is not perfect.
Senator Graham. Thank you.
To the globalization effort, General Jones, are the Germans
okay with the idea that we are going to be reducing our forces
in Germany, and by how much will we reduce our forces under
General Jones. There is in security circles general
agreement as to the validity and the necessity of implementing
this plan. The thing that makes the argument, the portion of
the argument that makes it compelling, is that this is not just
a troop reduction; this is genuine transformation, and that the
U.S. Army in Europe in particular, which is much of the German
preoccupation, is actually going to be transformed with the
advent of more expeditionary brigades, one Stryker brigade, and
Senator Graham. Are the Germans okay with the plan?
General Jones. To my understanding, at the Federal level
they are okay. Obviously there are some local mayors whose
economics differ a little bit on that, but at the national
level and at the military level I think we are fine.
Secretary Rumsfeld. Can I make two quick comments, please?
The German coordinator for U.S. relations said, ``This is
positive. Let us not make a crisis out of something that is in
reality a success story. It is an expression of the fact that
the Cold War is over and that Europe's division has been
Second, I have met with the Minister of Defense of Germany
on several occasions. He is doing exactly the same thing. He is
adjusting his force. He is reducing the number of locations,
and he is doing it in coordination with us.
Senator Graham. Thank you.
General, regarding Korea, is Taiwan okay with what we are
doing in Korea?
I am sorry, I cannot read his name. I apologize.
Chairman Warner. Do you mean to address that to the
Senator Graham. The General in charge of Korea. I did not
want to mispronounce your name.
General LaPorte. Admiral Fargo might be----
Chairman Warner. Admiral Fargo.
Senator Graham. I am sorry, I apologize.
Chairman Warner. He has of course jurisdiction primarily
Admiral Fargo. I think that when you look at the Pacific
you need to look at how we maintain a level signal----
Senator Graham. No, my question is, is Taiwan okay with
what you are trying to do.
Admiral Fargo. I have not asked Taiwan that question and
Senator Graham. Thank you.
Now, one word about what you are trying to do----
Chairman Warner. That is an important inquiry. I do not
want to have it too chopped up. Did you have adequate time to
understand the question and reply to it?
Senator Graham. He said he did not talk to Taiwan.
Admiral Fargo. I have not discussed that with Taiwan.
Chairman Warner. All right.
Senator Graham. Now, my concern is you are a reformer,
Secretary Rumsfeld, and I appreciate that and I think we need
it, and that is why I support BRAC, and you are trying to do
some things with the civilian aspects of the military, that I
think are long overdue.
I have a general concern. The fight is expanding and,
whether we like it or not, at least to me this signals that we
are coming home, and I see the fight expanding and it has many
tentacles in terms of the expansion. So I will go slow,
evaluate, but I am concerned about how it may affect some old
friends and it may be sending the wrong signal politically at
absolutely the right time because we are going to need old
One last comment. In terms of the force structure and
numbers and capability, all I can tell you is that over the
last 2 years I have seen more dispirited people than I thought
I would see in uniform in terms of the burden they are
carrying. When I went to Kuwait, getting ready to go into Iraq,
I had dinner with nine young South Carolinians, all of them
reservists, in a truck maintenance command, and all nine are
getting out. So I hope that does not continue to happen.
Secretary Rumsfeld. Let me just quickly answer your first
question. The Minister of Foreign Affairs of Italy, asked if
this implied a weaker U.S. commitment in the world, said:
``Absolutely not. The Cold War is a thing of the past.'' The
Foreign Minister said that ``Japan welcomes the review of the
U.S. military framework.'' South Korea said: ``The South Korean
government has been well aware of the plan.'' Australia said:
``We see this initiative as a positive.''
So I do not believe that anyone who gets up and takes a
fresh look at the world could honestly believe that it makes
sense to stay locked in the 20th century. We will be more
mobile, more agile, more lethal, and better able to live in the
world that you have properly described.
Senator Graham. Thank you.
Chairman Warner. Thank you, Mr. Secretary.
General Myers. Mr. Chairman, we have a list of those quotes
by different foreign officials, to include some press quotes.
Could we offer that for the record?
Chairman Warner. Without objection, you may insert at this
point into the record that important information.
[The information referred to follows:]
Chairman Warner. Senator Dayton.
Senator Dayton. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Gentlemen, I would like to join with the others in saluting
you and thanking you for your dedicated defense of our country
and your leadership. I support your plan to consolidate our
forces that are deployed worldwide. I look forward to the next
phase of your recommendation, which is their reassignment to
One of the ways we can, as Senator Graham said, reduce the
pressures on our Active Forces as well as our Reserves and our
National Guardsmen and women is to get the Iraqi forces to do
what the military and security forces of any country under any
form of government must do, which is to patrol their own
streets and establish law and order and provide it and
safeguard their highways and defend their borders.
Mr. Secretary, when you testified before this committee
last February 4, you stated that--this is a direct quote: ``We
have accelerated the training of Iraqi security forces, now
more than 200,000 strong.'' The figure that was referenced in
the documents provided then, actually I believe slightly before
then, and subsequent to that statement that I have seen,
confirmed that figure. Then to my knowledge, the first time it
was stated publicly, on September 14, 7 months later, is that
that number is down now to 105,000 that are trained, equipped,
and manned up, Iraqi security forces.
I am confused by what exactly this redefinition of what
constitutes ``security forces'' is. But that is a big
disparity, sir, from 206,000 down to 105,000.
Secretary Rumsfeld. Let me explain it as clearly as is
humanly possible. We said there were 206,000 security forces.
Since then we have subtracted 74,000 Facility Protection
Service people that are reporting to the various Iraqi
ministries and are now classifying them as security forces.
They obviously are providing security for facilities, but they
are not police, they are not border patrol, they are not army,
and they are not counterterrorism or National Guard activities.
So that is one difference.
The other difference is within the 206,000, as we said, was
a mixture of people that were trained and not trained. Now the
number we are using now is 100,000 today that are manned,
trained, and equipped. They have the equipment, they have the
appropriate training. There are more than that on duty, the
ones who are not fully trained and do not have full equipment.
That number is scheduled in January 2005 to be 145,000.
Senator Dayton. Thank you. Taking then that number, 100,000
that are now equipped and trained--and I do not know what the
current estimate is of the insurgency forces, say for example
under direct control of Zarqawi. If there are those numbers,
though--I have never seen a published report of the insurgent
strength estimated anywhere near approximately that number--why
are not those security forces of Iraq going after someone like
that, and if he is holed up somewhere like Fallujah, where he
is reputed to be, if the intelligence tells you and them where
he is, why are not 50,000 or 75,000 or whatever number it takes
going in there?
I can understand why our forces should be respecting
certain sites in that city or that country, but why are they
not doing what they should be doing to protect their own
country and stand up for it? I guess as a corollary to that, as
long as they know there are 138,000 of the best, the most
courageous fighting forces in the world, our own soldiers, in
there doing their work for them, what is to motivate them to
take those positions instead?
Secretary Rumsfeld. There are currently about 100,000 Iraqi
security forces, there are currently 138,000 U.S. forces and
about 23,000 coalition forces, for a total of 261,000. They are
all engaged in providing security in that country.
You say why are not the Iraqis doing anything? Well, the
Senator Dayton. I did not say ``anything,'' but I said why
are they not going after these pockets.
Secretary Rumsfeld. I will answer.
The Iraqis have had 721 Iraqi security forces killed in the
process of providing security in Iraq since May 1, 2003. They
have had 678 killed since September 1, 2003.
Senator Dayton. We have had over a thousand of ours.
Secretary Rumsfeld. Since the beginning.
Senator Dayton. 2003.
Secretary Rumsfeld. The comparable number is that since May
1, 2003 the United States has lost 670 and the Iraqi security
forces have lost 721. So they are not sitting in their barracks
with their fingers in their ear. They are out there doing
things. It is tough, and they are getting killed and they are
getting wounded and they are still standing in line to sign up
to join the army and the police and the border patrol, because
there are enough people in that country that want to secure the
liberation of that country.
Senator Dayton. If there is a pocket of resistance, again
in Fallujah--that is from reports I have read--that are
whatever number, a couple thousand, whatever the number, I do
not know, strong, and if that is where somebody like Zarqawi is
reputed to be holed up and operating from, then why are not
again whatever necessary troop strength of the Iraqi forces
going in there to wipe that force strength out there, the
insurgent strength out there?
Secretary Rumsfeld. The decision has been made to handle
Fallujah the way it has been handled by the Iraqi political
leadership in the country and the U.S. military leadership and
political leadership in the country. As I indicated earlier,
all of those individuals understand you cannot have a safe
haven in Fallujah or anywhere else in that country over a
sustained period of time.
Now, given the fact that they understand that, it suggests
to me that they will do something about that. The reason they
did not do it at the time they were cocked and ready to do it I
believe--and Dick, you might want to comment on this--at that
moment the U.N. representative, I believe it was Mr. Brahimi,
was in the process of putting together the government that
would transition away from the Iraqi Governing Council to the
Interim Iraqi Government, and the Governing Council that
existed at that time and Brahimi, as I recall, were strongly
opposed to doing anything at that moment.
Senator Dayton. What about this moment now, sir?
Secretary Rumsfeld. I think I will leave that to the
commanders on the ground, and I have already indicated to you
that they are fully aware you cannot leave a sanctuary in that
country, and that is exactly what Fallujah is today.
General Myers. Senator Dayton, let me just add. You focused
on a really bad person, Zarqawi, and let me just assure you in
this open hearing that we are doing all we can to take care of
that situation. As the Secretary said, we are going to leave
that up to the operational commanders on the ground.
I will tell you in the last 2 to 3 weeks we have killed a
handful, I think it is six, of his lieutenants. We continue to
go after that organization very hard. It is a very dangerous
organization and it is the one that we know in at least one
case was responsible for the beheading, probably in the other
cases as well. They have no respect for any human life--Muslim,
Christian, Jewish, whatever, man, woman, or child. This is a
very, very bad threat. We understand that and will take
Senator Dayton. My time has expired, Mr. Chairman. I
appreciate your response and I would just say, responding to my
colleague Senator Graham--and I understand the reservations
about citing a period of time of 4 years, but our colleague
Senator McCain, who has greater expertise than I, has cited a
possible period of time of U.S. force involvement there of 10
to 20 years.
I would just submit again that, in my view, as long as the
Iraqis know that the best fighting forces in the world, our
own, are going to be there doing the heavy lifting and the
dying and the leading and draining our own resources here, they
are going to--they may not entirely, but they are going to be
holding back from what any government, any country, has to do
with their own citizens, their own armed forces, which is
protect and defend their own country.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
General Myers. Senator Dayton, if we go back to April and
May when we had the uprising by Sadr's militia, at that time we
said the performance of the Iraqi security forces was certainly
uneven. Very few units performed well, but some did. Most did
not. One of the reasons they did not, a couple of the reasons,
is they did not have proper equipment at that point; they also
did not have the proper leadership.
If you look at the same uprising around al-Najaf this time,
it was just a flip-flop. In fact, the estimate from the
commanders in the field is that 70 percent of the Iraqi units
that participated performed very, very well. Some did not
perform well, but 70 percent did. So that situation is turning
We have to do our job, which our promise has been to
properly train and equip them. As the Secretary said earlier,
that is the easy part. It is the soft stuff, it is making sure
they have proper leadership and that leadership has a trail all
the way up to the national level. That still has to be
accomplished. That is not accomplished at this point. We are
working very hard to do that.
Senator Dayton. Thank you.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Warner. Thank you very much, Senator.
Senator Talent. I appreciate that, Mr. Chairman. Thank you
I would probably ask General Schoomaker this if he were
here, but since he is not, General Myers, let me ask you this.
Would you say that the Army of today across a broad spectrum of
requirements is more or less capable than the Army of 20 years
General Myers. No, I would not.
Senator Talent. It is substantially more capable, is it
General Myers. Absolutely.
Senator Talent. The Army of 20 years ago I think had 18
active divisions in it and the one today has 10 active
General Myers. Right.
Senator Talent. What I wanted to illustrate is something
General LaPorte said. It really is not a question of numbers,
except insofar as numbers tend to suggest capabilities. I chair
the Seapower Subcommittee and actually it was the Chief of
Naval Operations (CNO) who brought this to my mind. I was
having breakfast with him one day and he said: Look, would
anybody argue that the Navy of today is less capable than the
Navy of 20 years ago, when we had almost 600 ships? Because I
was harping on him about the numbers of ships. Mr. Chairman,
you know how strongly I feel about numbers of ships.
So it is not that numbers are irrelevant. It is just that
you have to consider it in terms of capabilities.
One other point I will just state for the record about the
history of end strength, Mr. Chairman. This is something some
of us have noticed, been noticing for a long time. We went from
18 to 14 to 12 in the base force of 1992, and then when I came
in in 1993 at the same time the Clinton administration came in
they reduced it to 10 active duty. You remember that, Mr.
I was very concerned about it at the time, not that the
Army would be incapable of performing a mission, because I
think our Army will perform any mission we ask them to perform,
but that in circumstances like this we might all be a little
bit less comfortable about how far out on the margin of risk we
I am very pleased that you have agreed, at least
temporarily, to an increase of 30,000, which would get us back
in terms of numbers to the equivalent of 21 active divisions. I
am just going to suggest that at a certain point when you can
calculate what you really think you are going to get from these
efficiencies, not what in theory you could get but what you
really think you are going to be able to get--what we are
learning about the needs, capabilities we need for civil
administration and the kind of thing we are doing in Iraq--that
maybe we have a hearing on the subject of what kind of end
strength we need.
I will just suggest, Mr. Chairman, with great respect that
it might be good to do it at a time other than 6 weeks before a
general election. I think I would have a little bit more
confidence in the tone of the hearing.
I did want to ask a couple of things, though, about the
posture of where our forces are going to be, which is what the
hearing I thought was about. Two points, and I will get the
questions out and then you can address them.
One of them is, I have been very intrigued with the CNO's
Sea Power 21 and Sea Basing concepts, the idea of being able to
in effect base at sea. Now, how does that figure in the
repositioning of forces, if you have thought it through to that
Number two, if we are going to pull back from the
traditional bases in places where we are no longer as wanted
and where it is harder to get force projected--and I think I
agree with that on strategic level--does this mean we rebase in
third world countries from which we think we can project power?
Are we confident enough in the stability of those countries to
be able to do that?
Maybe you just could address that. You probably have not
worked it out on a level of detail, but I would be interested
in hearing your thoughts on it, Mr. Secretary.
Secretary Rumsfeld. Just a couple of quick comments. With
respect to the Chief of Naval Operations plan, which I am very
much a supporter of--I think Admiral Fargo might be the best
one to answer this. I just realized you are an Admiral, are you
Senator Talent. Yes, I should maybe have referred this to
the man in the dark blue suit there. [Laughter.]
Secretary Rumsfeld. He has developed this surge capability
which significantly increases our capability around the world,
and he has done it by managing the way maintenance is done and
overhaul and repair and that whole cycle. He has shifted the
entire cycle. He has also done some forward basing.
With respect to the--and I will let Tom comment on that.
But with respect to rebasing in third world countries, let me
draw a distinction that you will find in these papers, which is
probably imperfect. But a base I think of as a fixed, permanent
place with families and a long life. We are doing two other
things, forward operating sites and forward operating
locations, and they are not bases. They are rotational
locations. We fall into the use of the word ``base'' and I
almost said ``rotation base.''
But they are places where we can train, they are places we
can exercise. They are locations we could deploy from if that
were desirable. In some cases there might be prepositioning. We
would have well-developed arrangements, cross-accessing
agreements. We would have status of forces agreements with
those countries, that we would know what we could do and what
we could not do out of those locations.
But in terms of the kinds of heavy division fixed bases we
have had in Germany, the answer is no, we are not thinking of
that in some of the other countries, and we would have much
lighter footprint and less investment.
Do you want to?
Admiral Fargo. Yes, sir, let me add to the Secretary's
comments. Certainly, with respect to the Pacific, sea basing
makes great sense for a couple reasons. The first is that
nobody's crystal ball is clear where we are going to have to
fight next. It is just impossible to predict. If we look to--as
we mentioned earlier in the hearing, if we looked a few years
back and tried to predict where we are at right now, we would
not have. If we try to look 4 or 5 or 10 or 20 years forward,
we probably would not have great success there. So being able
to sea base provides us a great deal of flexibility.
The second piece is that access is problematic and you do
not know whether you are going to have access in certain places
at certain periods of time. So the sea base once again provides
you great flexibility.
I think the third point is, to the extent that you can
sustain forces from the sea gives you huge advantage. So
partnering with not only the Marine Corps, but also the Army,
and standing up the joint program office which the Navy has for
the sea base I think is going to provide exactly what we need,
which are new operating concepts for the future.
Senator Talent. I agree. My time is up. I will just add
this comment. I agree, I really like the CNO's plan. However,
if we are going to reposition or keep forces somewhat lower on
the grounds that we can project faster, if we in essence have
force enhancers, then we must fund the force enhancers.
Let us not make the mistake we made in the 1990s, where we
cut the Army thinking that we would make each soldier more
lethal and less vulnerable, and then cut the modernization
programs that were going to make each soldier more lethal and
less vulnerable. We do not want to make that mistake again.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Warner. Thank you very much.
Senator Clinton. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Secretary, currently in the conference committee on the
defense authorization bill there is a provision concerning the
opportunity for Guard and Reserve members to access TRICARE in
order to have health insurance. We learned that about 20
percent of our Guard and Reserve members do not have health
Senator Graham and I along with Senator Daschle and others
introduced this legislation. We were successful in passing it
in the Senate. We continue to be told that the Department of
Defense opposes it. Could you explain your opposition to what I
see as a critical part of ensuring that the Guard and Reserve
members who are being called up on a continuing basis will
have, along with their families, access to health insurance
where they do not currently have it?
Secretary Rumsfeld. I would like to ask General Myers, who
is up to speed on this, to comment on it. But one of the things
I have discussed with Dr. Chu, the head of the Department of
Defense Personnel and Readiness Office, and with the Chairman,
is what I believe to be the need for us to look on a macro
basis at how we manage our force, the Active Force, the Guard,
and the Reserve.
What has taken place over recent years is that, for a
variety of reasons, incremental benefits have been added in
large measure to the Guard and the Reserve and the Retired
Force, less so to the Active Force. The cost of each person has
been incrementally changing, and we are getting to the point
where the cost of Guard and Reserve relative to the active is
something that needs to be addressed so that we can manage it
in a way that is proper from the standpoint of the taxpayers
and appropriate from the standpoint of the people we need to
volunteer to serve in the Armed Forces.
Rather than--my personal view is--and as I say, I want Dick
to answer this. But I think that what happens, each time there
is a new proposal here, then it is passed and then there is
another proposal that comes along to create some sort of equity
across the board, and the imbalance that is evolving is
something that I know this committee needs to address, just as
we need to address, and we want to do that together.
Dick, do you want to respond precisely on this point?
General Myers. Precisely, I do not know. But Senator
Clinton, I can respond. I think the Joint Chiefs of Staff are
worried about a couple of things. One is cost. This will not be
cheap and healthcare costs, as we know, have had a history of
going up in a way that is almost unpredictable.
There is an equity issue that is brought up as well. The
equity issue is, ``Gee, I am serving on active duty, I serve
365 days a year I get healthcare for me and my family; somebody
that serves part-time gets the same healthcare benefit,'' which
is one of the better and bigger benefits that the United States
military gets. So that is brought up from time to time.
Nobody is saying we do not need to change the way we
provide healthcare to the Reserve component. We found that out
in these massive callups, that indeed many reservists are not
ready for active duty. Any proposal that would ensure that
reservists on an annual basis get a physical paid for by the
United States Government would be a very good thing, because we
would then know what kind of force we have out there and we
would not have to reject people as they showed up at the
mobilization station because they are not healthy.
My understanding is DOD has a proposal, a counterproposal,
that would put in place another program to test for a while,
and I think it would be my view that we ought to proceed fairly
slowly here, mainly due to the cost. It is not an issue of
providing the right benefits to the Reserve component, but it
is a huge cost issue.
Senator Clinton. I know that it is a huge cost issue, but
we have heard a lot of discussion today about capability and
about needing to equip our men and women in uniform, and I for
one feel very strongly that it is clear we are going to
continue to rely on the Guard and Reserve, and when you have 20
percent without health insurance and then, I guess not
coincidentally, you have 20 percent who are found to be unready
when they are activated, that is a cost and it is a readiness
We are going to continue to press our point because we
think that the best investment we can make is in these men and
women that we are sending out and, given the way transformation
is proceeding and given the pressures on the existing force, it
certainly seems to me that it is no longer fair to exclude, if
not fail to help, those who are in the Guard and Reserve.
Secretary Rumsfeld, over the weekend I am sure you saw,
because there was a lot of publicity, about a number of very
distinguished Republican Senators, including Senators Lugar,
Hagel, McCain, Graham, and others, raising very serious
questions about our status in Iraq, using strong language:
Senator Lugar talking about incompetence in this
administration, the lack of planning is apparent; Senator Hagel
referencing his belief that no, we are not winning, and how did
we ever get into this situation.
When you look at the statements that have been made in the
past by you and others in the administration, it is very
difficult to track the predictions and the expectations that
were presented to this committee, to others in Congress, and
certainly to the American people with where we are today.
We now know from books that have been written with the full
cooperation of the administration that shortly after September
11 war plans were begun with respect to Iraq. That was not
information shared with Congress, nor with the American people.
In fact, as late as August 2002 the administration was still
saying there were absolutely no plans to go into Iraq, and we
know what happened then.
In a recent article reporting on the work of the Defense
Science Board and their concerns about our ability to maintain
ongoing stability operations, there is a paragraph that refers
to a widely reported phone call in which William Moody, a
senior Pentagon policy official, hinted with congressional
aides from both parties that a second Bush administration may
carry its preemptive war strategy to five or six other nations
beyond the current axis of evil.
Mr. Secretary, I respect and appreciate your long service
to this country, but if there are such plans, if there are such
discussions, do you not believe that Congress and the American
people ought to be informed?
Secretary Rumsfeld. Senator, let me take some of that in
pieces here. First of all, you said ``you and others'' have
made predictions. I tend not to make predictions. You have been
in a lot of committee hearings with me and I tend to be fairly
careful about what I say.
Second, there is no one I know who would characterize what
I have said about Iraq or Afghanistan or any other aspect of
the global war on terror as painting a rosy picture. I have not
painted a rosy picture. I do not believe it is a rosy picture.
I think it is a dirty, tough, ugly business, and I have said so
from the beginning.
Next, you raise the question of plans from books, you say.
The job of the Pentagon is to have plans. That is what we do.
There have been plans for Iraq for goodness knows how many
years, every administration. There have to be plans. There have
to be contingency plans. We owe that to the President. We owe
it to Congress. We owe it to the American people. That is what
When General LaPorte or Admiral Fargo or General Jones take
these tasks, they have the responsibility of going to the
shelf, looking to see what contingency plans there are, coming
in, making a recommendation to the Joint Chiefs: We think these
are appropriate or not appropriate, we need to freshen them up,
we need to change them, we need to add some excursions on
different things. There have been plans in the Department of
Defense ever since there has been a Department of Defense.
The kinds of things you read in books are either
misinformed, uninformed, or mischievous. One ought not to say:
Oh my goodness, were there plans? Of course there are plans.
That is what we do.
The quote about the Defense Science Board, I do not know
anything about it, but I can assure you that anyone at that
level would have no knowledge and would certainly not be
involved, and those decisions are decisions for a President. I
work with the President every day. I was with him this morning.
I have never heard anything like that out of his mouth, nor has
anyone heard anything like that out of my mouth.
So the fact that there are some staff people reporting that
somebody hinted at something is really not something one ought
to give credence to.
Chairman Warner. I understand you very clearly, Mr.
Thank you, Senator, for your questions.
Senator Inhofe. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
First of all, I hope that anyone who believes that there is
a problem with the progress that is taking place in Iraq today
was there listening to the Prime Minister this morning. He was
very outspoken. I would further say that I have been over there
quite a few times and as I observe the transition in
Afghanistan and the training of the Afghan troops from us to
the Afghans--and the Afghan National Army is now being trained
by the Afghans--I saw the pride on their faces as they were
training out there and I thought: That is a model for Iraq and
that is what is going to happen.
I agree with Prime Minister Allawi this morning when he
said that the press is not giving us a fair shake; we have
great successes. He expressed appreciation on behalf of the
I have two questions for General Jones and then one you may
have to answer for the record from each one of you because it
may take a little bit longer. First of all, General Jones, we
talked, now it has been years ago, about the subject that we
are addressing today and how significant it is that we
readdress this thing and start looking to the future, the cost
of sustaining families in Western Europe, the problems we are
having right now with the environmental restrictions that keep
us from adequately being able to train our young troops over
I took the time to go to some of the eastern countries. I
was in the Ukraine, I was in Bulgaria, I was in Romania. In
talking to the military leaders there, they want us there. They
are going to--they offered to billet us. They offered things
that the Europeans never did, the Western Europeans. It just
makes more sense to have shorter deployments and have them over
there where you can do it. Some time we should put--maybe you
have done this already--kind of a cost analysis of how much
money can be saved if we are able to make this transition.
Now, I see two problems--and I apologize for not being here
for your opening statements and I was told that you talked
about maybe 8 to 10 years before we can do this. The two
problems as I see it: They are very patient. They have great
training ranges. I watched them on the training ranges. But
they have to make their own realignment decisions and things,
and they cannot do that until we give them some indication as
to what new host countries might be out there. So that is one
of the concerns I have.
The other is two of the countries I just mentioned have
applications for entrance into the European Union. There are
some chapters and protocols on the environment that they would
have to either have exempt or be grandfathered in, and they do
not want to be held up in their opportunity as they see it to
get into the European Union--I do not see this as an
opportunity, but they do--by not being able to do this until
they have an indication as to whether or not they might be a
Now, so addressing those two, you Mr. Secretary or anyone
else, is there anyway or are you already negotiating with some
of those to the point where they can go ahead and make those
decisions, even though it may be 8 years before we fulfill this
transition? General Jones?
General Jones. Senator, we have been in close contact with
a number of countries. We have done site surveys. We have made
some recommendations as to how we might proceed with regard to
the types of presence that we might be able to implement in
Eastern Europe. These are very attractive to us, but we have
repeatedly said that these would be more on the order of
expeditionary type bases, not relocating, for example, Ramstein
and larger main operating bases.
But absolutely, without question we are very interested in
working with our Eastern European allies and friends who are
now part of the alliance and are working very closely with each
one of the Service components.
I think that the time frame for specifically identifying
where it is we would like to go will be fairly short. This is
all keyed to BRAC and so I think we are talking about months,
months and certainly not years. The implementation piece might
take a little bit longer because that is a little bit--that is
a little bit tougher. But I think the nations where we will
finally wind up establishing forward operating sites or
cooperative security locations will be identified fairly
Senator Inhofe. Well, okay, because they expressed that
concern over there.
General Jones. I am familiar with it.
Senator Inhofe. Of course, they want to continue on with
their application and the environmental provisions and chapters
and protocols would make a difference.
The second thing is, I know it is in its infancy right now,
but I have taken a great interest, tieing back to the successes
we are having in teaching the Afghans to train themselves,
using that same model of course in Iraq, and now getting down
potentially to the five African brigades. I know that you are
not in a position to be very specific about that. I want to
compliment General Wald. I have spent some time in the
countries where I believe might be the locations for these.
But the concept, as we put the squeeze in the Middle East--
and I have spent two trips down in Djibouti, recognizing that
the Horn is where they are all going to be going in, Mr.
Chairman, and going throughout Africa. I see this as something
that really needs to be expedited, we need to get into, because
I do not say ``if that happens,'' I say ``when that happens,''
I would like to have these brigades out there so that they
would be able to respond and we would not have to be sending
our troops over.
Would you like to make any comments about that?
General Jones. I think you hit on something that is
extremely important. We have some cooperative security
locations in Africa right now. We have five of them: one in
Senegal, Ghana, Gabon, and Uganda. We are proposing some
additional sites. We have done site surveys on many others so
that we have some flexibility, if you will, an inventory.
General Wald and his interest and leadership and your
interest also in visiting has stimulated the momentum to
develop this global peacekeeping operation initiative and to
help emerging forces help themselves. The whole region of the
pan-Sahel, for example, is being actively engaged and we are
seeing countries being able to secure their borders a little
bit better, and I think the support to the African security
proposals with helping Africans help themselves is the way to
go in the future.
Senator Inhofe. Again I compliment General Wald. I spent
quite a bit of time talking to him just last week on this, and
we want to be kept up.
I know my time has expired. Let me just ask a question for
the record so they can respond, if that is all right, Mr.
Chairman Warner. We will do that.
Senator Inhofe. With all the problems that we have over
there--and I think each one of you would want to answer in your
own area; General Myers, for example, our restrictions we have
right now, our lift assets, capability assets, refueling and
all of that--do you think we really need to get significantly
faster into some of these programs so that we can--like more C-
17s, so we could accommodate that? No one ever dreamed back
when our first bunch of C-17s came in what would happen in
Bosnia and Kosovo and Afghanistan and Iraq.
Also, I have been very proud back in the late 1990s of
General Jumper when he admitted that our modernization program
was not moving fast enough and the Sukhoi strike vehicles
actually were better than our F-15s and F-16s in certain areas.
So do you think it is desirable to try to move those
modernization programs on a little faster?
Lastly, General LaPorte, I have been very interested in the
Future Combat System and I know that we are doing as well as we
can right now, but I would like to have your assessment as to
when those are going to be fielded and is that going to be soon
I thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
[The information referred to follows:]
General LaPorte. In July 2004, the U.S. Army announced plans to
accelerate the delivery of selected components of the Future Combat
Systems. Although the Army has not published a specific unit
distribution plan, fielding to units is slated to begin in 2010.
In the interim, the transformation of the Eighth U.S. Army and the
remainder of United States Forces Korea will continue as planned. Our
ability to rapidly reinforce the Republic of Korea's armed forces, in
concert with the DOD Global Posture Review, will continue to provide
adequate deterrence, and if needed the ability to defeat any attack on
My assessment is that the Future Combat Systems' projected fielding
timelines are consistent with United States Forces Korea's currently
projected transformation planning, and will support our continued
General Jones. U.S. European Command (EUCOM) works closely with
U.S. Transportation Command (TRANSCOM) to ensure our theater strategic
lift requirements are known. How those requirements are met, and
accordingly the pace of aircraft modernization programs, is a
responsibility vested in the Service Chiefs and TRANSCOM.
EUCOM's Theater Transformation Plan is designed to mitigate the
need for strategic lift by having war reserve material at a number of
pre-positioned sites throughout the area of responsibility (AOR). The
pre-positioned equipment, in conjunction with en-route infrastructure
at the (Joint) Main Operating Bases, will provide the National Command
Authority the flexibility to respond to crises across the full spectrum
of conflict. Additionally, EUCOM's Theater Security Cooperation program
is intended to increase U.S. presence and secure access across a
broader portion of the EUCOM theater thereby increasing stability and
diminishing potential conflict.
EUCOM has and will continue to work closely with TRANSCOM to ensure
our strategic lift requirements are able to support the operational
concept which underpins our transformation initiative.
Chairman Warner. Thank you. We will take that for the
The chair observes that there are three members that have
not had the opportunity the witnesses are prepared to afford
them, but we will not go to a second round of questions. We
will keep the record open through tomorrow close of business
for purposes of submitting such other questions as my
colleagues may have. Thank you very much.
Senator Bill Nelson.
Senator Bill Nelson. Thank you, gentlemen, for your public
General LaPorte, it has been widely reported that in this
reorganization, realignment, that there is a recommendation or
a decision to reduce the number of our troops in South Korea by
12,000. What I would like is your judgment: What kind of signal
does that send to North Korea?
General LaPorte. Senator, first of all, we are an alliance.
We are a Republic of Korea-United States alliance. The Republic
of Korea forces number over 600,000 active, with the ability to
mobilize to 3 million forces. So the reduction of 12,000 in
terms of total numbers is based in those parameters.
But it is not the boots on the ground that is the critical
issue. It is the capabilities that the force has, both resident
to the peninsula, which is significant--in my opening statement
I talked about 150 systems enhancements that Congress has paid
for and are in the force and are coming into the force. The
Republic of Korea has a similar modernization program relative
to its capabilities.
We have significant regional reinforcement capabilities
from Hawaii, Guam, Japan, that can rapidly project forces to
the peninsula. Then we have our strategic deployment capability
and we have demonstrated repeatedly our ability to do that.
So I think we are sending a very strong message and a very
strong message of our increased commitment to the Republic of
Senator Bill Nelson. There is another interpretation of
that, particularly at this critical time where we have to be
successful in getting North Korea to understand that we cannot
allow them to be a nuclear power. Although I agree with you on
the repositioning of the forces further south, your enhanced
training capability, it seems like at this time that it is the
worst possible time to suggest that there might be a
diminution. Even though, as you say, it may not be true in
total force projection, nevertheless it is a signal and I worry
Thank you for your response.
Mr. Secretary, I am sad to say that we have a fourth
hurricane that is headed toward Florida, and we have been
visited by the others. I was just there and Pensacola got hit
pretty hard. Earlier Patrick Air Force Base had gotten hit by
Frances, which was the second hurricane, and that was about $33
million, and that was included in the President's supplemental
request that will be added to the Department of Homeland
Security bill. Just for example, it did not hit Patrick that
much. It did $125 million of damage to the Kennedy Space
But when we come to Pensacola Naval Air Station, it got hit
pretty bad. The preliminary figures are just for the Navy,
including Whiting Field, $850 million, and then when you take
the Air Force in the area--Eglin, Hurlbert, and some of the Air
Force at Pensacola--you are talking in terms of over a billion
dollars just of structural damage.
Now, of course they are looking to their Senator from
Florida to produce, but I need some help. Now let me just add
one other thing. There was this crazy rumor going around in the
last 2 days that we have had to stamp out, that, Homestead Air
Force Base that got hit pretty hard--well, of course it was
basically totally destroyed during Hurricane Andrew 12 years
ago--that therefore, since Pensacola got hit so bad, that it is
now a candidate to be closed.
Would you give me some security of knowing that for this
billion dollars on structural--this does not include
equipment--that we can get this going and get it going soon? I
might say, for the sailors and the airmen, they are up and
running. Pensacola is going to open on Monday for flight
training and they have already got the Air Force installations
in the area, that were not hit as bad, up and running. Your
Secretary Rumsfeld. Senator, I know Pensacola well. I went
through flight school there. I was stationed there as a flight
instructor and then an instructor of flight instructors, and I
was stationed at Whiting Field as well.
It has been very badly hit. The Navy in Florida in the
first hurricane had losses. The second hurricane had losses.
This one, as you pointed out, is big. When you total it all up,
I do not know where it will come out.
But I have not even heard the rumor that you have heard. I
do not know if you have, Dick?
General Myers. No, I have not heard that rumor.
Secretary Rumsfeld. So obviously----
Senator Bill Nelson. I think we have put it down.
Secretary Rumsfeld. Good.
Senator Bill Nelson. I mean, it is kind of silly. But how
Secretary Rumsfeld. I do not doubt for a minute but that
the President and the Office of Management and Budget (OMB)
will be talking to the various departments and agencies and
making a judgment as to how to manage, as they have during the
previous two situations, the various losses that have existed.
I have not been involved in that discussion, but it is a
pattern. It seems to me if one connects the dots one can assume
that that will take place with respect to the most recent one
Senator Bill Nelson. OMB is going to come to you because it
is the Department of Defense that is suffering these losses.
Secretary Rumsfeld. All I have seen is the first rough cut
and they said almost every building in the place was damaged.
Senator Bill Nelson. Would you be supportive of rebuilding?
Secretary Rumsfeld. Oh my goodness, absolutely.
Senator Bill Nelson. That is what I want to hear.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Warner. With that, thank you very much, Senator.
Senator Sessions. Mr. Secretary, I would like to bring us
back to the Global Posture Review, the purpose of this hearing,
and just say to you thank you. Early last year, January or
spring a year ago, 13 Senators, I know Chairman Warner and
Senator McCain and others, signed a letter I circulated calling
on you to review our force structure worldwide and expressing
the view that we were committed too strongly in areas that no
longer represent clear threats to us.
As a matter of fact, I think we have been slow to get
around to it. I know you had a war to fight and all of you
have. I am glad that you are moving forward with it. This is
great news, to bring 50,000, 60,000, however many thousands of
troops home to America to be with their families, to help
achieve what General Schoomaker desires, and that is a soldier
to be stationed in a base for up to 7 years before he has to
move again. Those are great things that are all a part of your
plan to transform our military, to make it more effective, more
efficient, and keep dollars at home.
As somebody said earlier, I hope some of those troops come
to Alabama. I do not know; they may not. But I would like it,
and certainly they will be paying taxes in the United States
and supporting the economies of the people in the United
States. So generally, I think we are all supportive of that.
General Jones, early this year I traveled with Senator Lott
to the NATO accession conference and we went through Germany
and met with Chancellor Schroeder and told him that we were
doing our BRAC in the United States and we were going to be
looking at Germany, and there were no hard feelings and it was
not pique that we were dealing with, but I did not think that
we were going to be able to maintain the number of soldiers
there that we have been. He smiled and said he fully understood
that and he was reviewing his force structure.
Earlier this year, Senator Chambliss and Senator Enzi and I
visited you in Europe and we visited 12 installations to deal
with this very issue of realignment. I was very impressed with
the depth of consideration you and your subordinate commanders
have given to this issue and how much care you have given it.
But I find it impossible to believe that we need this many
troops in Germany after World War II has been over 60 years.
But first, my question to you is, describe for us briefly
how much time and care you have given to it and describe for us
how our allies have been consulted all along this way? It is
not a unilateral act. Finally, is it not important that our
allies transform also so that we can mesh their capabilities
General Jones. Thank you, Senator. The time spent--this is
a project that started almost 3 years ago, I believe, Mr.
Secretary. Certainly I have been in my position now for 20
months and we picked up on that from the first day. We have
gone through a complete review, for example, of all of our
installations. Even in advance of execution, I think we were
able to reduce our military construction bill by about $300
million just last year because we identified facilities that in
a transformed European theater would no longer be useful.
So we have actually started. We are collapsing
headquarters. We are eliminating the duplications that we have
in theater. We are spending a lot of time thinking about where
the forces of the future might be best used. So EUCOM right now
is, for example, working on a post-transformation phase to try
to determine what might be the request that we would come in to
the Department of Defense and to the Joint Chiefs on to augment
the permanent based forces that we have left with rotational
forces in some of the emerging areas in Africa that will be
increasingly more important and much further to the east, where
in the Caspian, for example, we have interests that will be
emerging and will be part of our theater.
We will need strategically agile forces to be able to do
that. The value of transformation is that where they come from
does not matter as much any more. You do not have to have the
mountain of logistics. What we are trying to do is use the
``tooth'' portion of our forces in a more agile and usable way.
So I think this transformation will do that.
Allies have been consulted with openly, consistently, both
in the theater and from Washington.
Senator Sessions. You have personally done that?
General Jones. Personally.
Senator Sessions. Personally met with them?
General Jones. Personally.
Senator Sessions. Regularly?
General Jones. Regularly.
In my NATO assignment the word ``transformation'' is also
being used, and most of our allies are keying on our
experiences in transformation to shape their force as well.
There is not any country that I know of in the 26-member
alliance of NATO that is not watching what the U.S. Armed
Forces are doing closely.
One of the things that we have to guard against, of course,
is that it is not misinterpreted, that it is not interpreted as
a withdrawal from a very important area, 91 countries; that it
is not an indication that we are less interested or that we are
not going to support NATO as we have in the past. Those things
are being dealt with every day.
But for the people who understand the future military
transformation, both in the United States and in Europe, this
is work that has to be done. In Germany, at the national
leadership level there is support for this because, as you
pointed out, they are doing exactly the same thing. In their
own way, across the entire North Atlantic Treaty Organization
countries are doing the same type of thing.
So at the end of the day, if we do this right and we
develop the NATO Response Force and we get a U.S. basing
paradigm that is firmly anchored in the European and African
theater, but that is also able to be more usefully deployed
because where the forces come from will not matter nearly as
much, we are going to be able to do some very exciting things
in the future.
But I think the point that I am particularly excited about
is the fact that it is not just the U.S. transformation, that
there are parallel transformations in the 25 other countries
and also partner nations who are keying on this, the new
agility as well, and understanding that the paradigms of the
20th century no longer apply.
Senator Sessions. I think you are the right person to help
make that happen and I salute you for it. I know how carefully
you work at it.
General LaPorte, I have been to Korea twice and I know how
bad some of the conditions are there. If you bring those troops
back below the DMZ further, build new facilities, and
reconfigure them for more effective military responses, will we
not end up with a better quality life for the soldiers that are
General LaPorte. Absolutely, Senator.
Senator Sessions. My time is up, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Warner. Thank you very much.
Senator Bayh, you may well be the wrap-up. Mr. Secretary,
might I ask that you avail the opportunity for Senator Levin
and I to speak to you a few minutes at the conclusion of this
Secretary Rumsfeld. Yes, sir. There are a couple of things
I would like to say at the end. Thank you.
Chairman Warner. We will be glad to receive them.
Senator Bayh. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Let me first, gentlemen, say I admire your fortitude. It
has been a long hearing. Mr. Chairman, I hope this is a case of
saving the best for last. Maybe it is just the last for last.
But in any event, I do appreciate your time today and your
service to our country.
I apologize for having had to step out. We had some
important business before the Intelligence Committee. So if my
line of inquiry is redundant, I regret that.
But I would like to follow up on something that Senator
McCain raised in his questioning and Senator Nelson touched
upon just briefly, and that is the subject of both Iran and
North Korea. As you are well aware, there are ominous signs
from both. The Iranians seem to be hell-bent upon acquiring a
nuclear capability. They may play rope-a-dope with the global
community for a while, but it seems pretty clear they are
intent upon going forward.
North Korea, as has been mentioned, appears to be in the
process of scheduling tests for missiles capable of carrying a
nuclear warhead and as best as we can assess is already a
There do not appear to be any good options. Both apparently
seek nuclear weapons for strategic reasons that are unlikely to
be altered by either incentives to do the right thing or
disincentives to do the wrong thing or diplomacy. So I would
like to start my questions first, Mr. Secretary, to you. What
is your opinion about the consequences to the United States'
security of an Iran possessing a nuclear capability and/or a
Korea possessing the capability of delivering a nuclear device
to the continental United States, which does not exist today
but may very well in the years to come?
Secretary Rumsfeld. Senator, those are two problems,
needless to say, that people in Congress and the executive
branch worry through on a regular basis. It is increasingly a
more dangerous world. As we have gone through the past several
decades, 2 decades, 3 since I was Secretary of Defense the last
time, we have seen any number of countries become nuclear
The effect of that is that it is a more dangerous world. It
also highlights something terribly important and that is that
no country, no country, including the United States, has the
ability to deal with this terrible problem of proliferation of
these increasingly lethal technologies. It takes cooperation
among a lot of countries, and that is why the President
proposed the Proliferation Security Initiative.
But unless a lot of countries, important countries, come
together and impose on those countries that are doing what
North Korea is doing and doing what Iran is doing the kind of--
I do not want to use the word ``sanctions,'' but--persuasion,
that they clearly see it in their interests not to do something
Senator Bayh. Forgive me for interrupting, Mr. Secretary. I
did want to ask the uniformed officers a couple questions. But
I take it that this would not be a good development for the
United States' security interests, particularly since Iran we
have identified as the foremost state sponsor of terrorism in
the world and North Korea has an erratic regime, to say the
Secretary Rumsfeld. True.
Senator Bayh. Thank you.
Gentlemen, as the Secretary indicated, you are in the
business of planning and among the planning has to be planning
for worst case scenarios. Since this is about our global
posture and capabilities, if worst comes to worst--here is the
question I would like to ask you. If we were to decide that it
is unacceptable for our national security to have a North Korea
capable of delivering a nuclear device to this country or for
Iran to possess such weapons, and we had tried diplomacy, we
had tried sanctions, we had tried incentives, et cetera, but
none of those things had worked, if we concluded that this was
unacceptable to us, do we have the means to do something about
If we had to forcibly disarm North Korea, General LaPorte,
are we currently capable of doing that? Do you have the forces
necessary to accomplish such a thing, given our commitments in
Iraq, Afghanistan, and elsewhere?
General LaPorte. First of all, Senator, we are an alliance,
a military alliance, in Korea. So the Republic of Korea and the
United States stand shoulder to shoulder. The capabilities that
have been developed in this alliance just over the past 2\1/2\
years that I have been in command are very significant, from
our intelligence capabilities, command and control, to the
platforms associated with it.
These capabilities can be brought to bear in different
scenarios. So it is a very, very capable force that we have.
Secretary Rumsfeld. I think in an open hearing it is
preferable just simply to say that the United States and
through working with Congress has capabilities to protect and
defend the interests of the United States of America.
Senator Bayh. I am glad to hear that.
I am concerned, Mr. Secretary, that these are substantial
threats, and we are going to try a variety of other things. It
never ceases to amaze me why some other countries do not see it
as more in their interest and bring a greater sense of urgency
to restraining these developments. But, taking a hard-eyed look
at recent history, they just do not seem to be bringing the
necessary urgency to the table, and we may be faced with the
very difficult--I said there are no good options here.
We may be faced with the very difficult decision of: Are we
willing to accept a world in which those capabilities exist,
and if we are not, do we have the ability to do something about
it. I am delighted to hear your answer and in a different
setting perhaps we can hear some of the details. But it is
something that does concern me.
General Myers, I was going to ask you the same about Iran,
but I will not because you have been here a long time and there
was one other question I wanted to ask, unless you just felt
you needed to add something.
General Myers. I feel compelled to at least add something
to the debate. I do not disagree with your characterization of
Iran and North Korea. We know they are poorly led and not
taking care of their people right, and they are involved in all
sorts of things, missile proliferation in the case of Korea and
other things, counterfeiting and terrorism, in the case of
But my contribution would be, those are very serious
threats. As I would rank threats today, I would rank them below
the extremist threat that we have been dealing with. I think
that by far has to be dealt with.
Senator Bayh. I agree, that is a greater--that is more
General Myers. Perhaps long-lasting.
Senator Bayh. But weapons of mass destruction, of course,
is a threat, while maybe perhaps not as immediate, of a
different magnitude, and the possible nexus between Iran and
some of these groups is very well known.
General Myers. Proliferation is a serious, serious issue.
Senator Bayh. North Korea has been proven to be willing to
sell about anything to anybody for hard money.
General Myers. I do not disagree.
Senator Bayh. I just have one last question. Mr. Secretary,
this is for you again. I get asked by the press, from time to
time and from some others about Vietnam and Iraq and is this
another Vietnam, et cetera. I personally think it is not an apt
analogy for a variety of reasons.
But there is one aspect of it I wanted to get your answer
to since I am asked about it so often, and that is the term
``Vietnamization,'' which as you will recall back in that time
our hope had been that we were going to upgrade the capability
of the Vietnamese government through training their police
forces, their military, their intelligence, so that we could
gradually withdraw our own. Indeed, we did eventually withdraw,
but they were not able to sustain themselves for very long.
Why is the situation in Iraq going to be different?
Secretary Rumsfeld. I agree with you that the Vietnam
analogy is imperfect in a lot of ways. I guess you never know
what the future will hold, but clearly any time any country
occupies and frees a people from what was and points them in a
direction to what might be, there is a question mark. There was
a question mark on Japan, there was a question mark on Germany,
there was a question mark on Italy, whether they were ready for
Bosnia has been a question mark. People said they would be
out by Christmas of that year, as I recall, and here it is
what, 5, 10 years later. You cannot know with certain knowledge
what will happen because your goal is not to make it happen.
Your goal is to create an environment where the people of that
country can make it happen. We cannot do it for them. We have
to take the hand off the bicycle seat, and when you take your
hand off the bicycle seat they might fall.
I do not think they are going to. I think they have a good
crack at it. They have money, they have oil, they have water,
they have intelligent people, and they have lived in a rotten,
vicious dictatorship for decades. I believe the natural state
of man is to want to be free, and I think they are going to
But can we train up their security forces fast enough so
that they can create an environment that they can have
elections and that they can go forward and have the kind of
prosperity that will make people want to bet on their future? I
think we can. I think they can. But I know we cannot do it for
them. We can only create an environment that they can do it.
Senator Bayh. Thank you.
Chairman Warner. Thank you, Senator.
Mr. Secretary, we will give you such time as you desire,
but I would like to comment that we have had a very long
hearing. Twenty two of the 25 members of this committee have
availed themselves of the opportunity to participate in this
hearing. I think that you have been most responsive and I thank
you and your witnesses, and I believe that the program, which
was the primary consideration of this hearing will be
wholeheartedly adopted by Congress which will support the
President and yourself in this effort.
So I thank you.
Secretary Rumsfeld. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. I
have three quick things.
First of all, the global posture effort has been a 3-year
effort to come up with these proposals, and Andy Hoehn, who is
sitting back here next to Powell Moore, is the individual in
the Office of the Secretary of Defense who has been
masterminding it and has worked very closely with the combatant
commanders and with the Joint Chiefs and the Joint Staff and
has done a superb job.
Second, I doubt if Admiral Fargo will be back before this
committee. He is making plans for, I believe, November to go
into private life. He is a superb naval officer. In fact, he is
a superb military officer.
Senator Levin. I have been trying to interpret that smile
on his face all day long. [Laughter.]
Secretary Rumsfeld. He has done for this country in his
most recent assignment, when I have had the privilege to work
with him, an absolutely superb job and we are all deeply
grateful to him.
Chairman Warner. May I associate myself with those remarks.
I rather imagine our first contact you were an ensign or a
lieutenant junior grade, would that be correct?
Admiral Fargo. That is correct, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Warner. Thank you.
Senator Levin. Thank you, Admiral.
Chairman Warner. And your family, Admiral, very much.
Admiral Fargo. It has been my pleasure to serve.
Secretary Rumsfeld. Last, we came to talk about force
posture and we end up talking about Iraq a lot and it bothers
me in this sense. I think it is a mistake to look at Iraq and
Afghanistan through a soda straw. They are part of something
much bigger, much broader, and much more dangerous. The
aggregation of extremists and people who are determined to
reorder the world and attack the state system through
terrorizing people--we call it a global war on terror, but in
fact terror is simply the weapon of choice. It is a struggle in
this globe between extremists and people who believe in freedom
and want to live lives their own way and refuse to be
There is no way to make a separate peace and to the extent
we do not understand that this is a test of wills, to the
extent that we do not understand it is going to take a long
time, to the extent that we do not understand that it is not
going to be ugly and messy and that people are going to die, we
are making a big mistake.
It is a serious business and General Myers is exactly on
the mark. What bothers me is when heads get chopped off I see
people saying, ``oh my goodness, why did you not stop them from
chopping off that head,'' instead of saying, ``when heads get
chopped off, think of the people who are doing that, what kind
of people are they?'' What does it say about the kind of world
we would be living in if we followed the counsel of people who
say toss it in, it is not worth the pain, it is not worth the
losses, it is not worth the money?
It is worth it. All you have to do is sit, imagine yourself
with a Taliban rule in country after country, with soccer
stadiums where they go out and have public executions. That is
not the kind of world we want.
Looking at it in pieces misunderstands it, it seems to me.
So I hope that we will, to the extent we have hearings, that we
have hearings on the big problem and we talk about the big
problem and not think we are addressing it in a useful way if
we deal only with little pieces.
Chairman Warner. May I say that yesterday, thanks to your
office, I had the opportunity--Senator Levin was unavailable--
to spend almost an hour with General Abizaid and he showed me a
detailed briefing on precisely the subject that you mentioned.
I indicated to him, and perhaps the Secretary can arrange for
our committee to be briefed on that very point that he raised,
and he has it graphically and statistically and factually
supported in great detail, but nevertheless in a classified
Secretary Rumsfeld. Happy to do it.
Chairman Warner. We will do that. I recognize that we do
our best here, but as you well know, I have served under seven
chairmen in this committee and the freedom to ask questions has
always been accorded to our membership.
Secretary Rumsfeld. Absolutely.
Chairman Warner. I recognize that had we done it in a more
structured framework perhaps we could have conveyed from this
hearing an equally stronger message. But I agree with you, but
I would just close with my own observation, and that is as we
witness these frantic, unbelievable atrocities, whether it is
in Afghanistan or Iraq or the Chechens, what they went through,
these same people are trying to come across our borders and
inflict such harm in this country, and thank God we have men
and women of the Armed Forces beyond our shores who are taking
the risk and giving their lives and limbs, with the support of
their families, to prevent that from happening.
I thank you, Mr. Secretary. Again, I have known many
secretaries, served under three. It is a lonely, though, and
often thankless job. I commend you, sir. Thank you.
Senator Levin. Could I have a word?
Chairman Warner. He is going to come to the desk.
Senator Levin. I know, but I just wanted to comment on his
comment. It is obviously a heartfelt comment. I do not think
anyone agrees with you in terms of your characterization of the
people who carry out atrocities.
Secretary Rumsfeld. You mean you do not think anyone
Senator Levin. Disagrees.
Secretary Rumsfeld. I thought you said ``agrees.''
Senator Levin. I hope I said ``disagrees.''
Chairman Warner. It has been a long day and he has had a
Senator Levin. I hope I said ``disagrees,'' but if not
Chairman Warner. The record will reflect that.
Senator Levin. I think in your comment, though, here
something else comes through which is not healthy, and that is
a suggestion that people who might have proposals for trying to
change a negative dynamic which exists in Iraq somehow or other
are playing into the hands of our enemies. The enemies are
clear, and I hope you are not suggesting that.
Secretary Rumsfeld. I am not.
Senator Levin. I hope, General, you did not suggest that
General Myers. By what, sir?
Senator Levin. Suggesting that people that have other
proposals for dealing with an enemy are not playing into the
hands of the enemy.
General Myers. No, no, sir.
Senator Levin. What bothers me, Secretary Rumsfeld, is that
when you say that throwing in the towel is not acceptable, that
is not the only alternative.
Secretary Rumsfeld. Of course not.
Senator Levin. When you hold that up as being the
alternative to continuing to do what we are doing, it seems to
me you are looking through a straw, you are narrowing a vision.
We have to look for options to try to change a dynamic which is
not a good dynamic there. That does not mean cut and run and
that does not mean that somehow or other people want to just
throw in the towel.
But there are ways hopefully of avoiding, if nothing else,
throwing fuel onto that fire. There are ways of hopefully
giving incentives, perhaps pressuring the people of Iraq into
recognizing that what you describe is a horrendous,
unacceptable future and that they have to want a nation as much
as we do. They have to act to control the violent ones inside
their midst. We cannot do it for them. We can help them, but we
cannot take on this responsibility by ourselves.
If they do not want, we will call it ``democracy,''
although it is more complicated than that, if they do not want
democracy at least as much as we do, they are not going to get
it. They have to want it as much. A lot of them are dying for
it, by the way, and I do not want to in any way minimize the
courage of those people in Iraq who are putting their lives on
the line to try to create a nation. I do not want to minimize
But it is going to take a massive effort on the part of
Iraqi leaders in all of their groupings to put an end to the
terrorists in their midst.
Secretary Rumsfeld. Exactly right.
Senator Levin. There may be ways that we can promote their
doing so. By the way, there is something else here at play. We
have to look for ways, we have to be open to ideas, to try to
find paths to getting other Islamic countries to recognize that
they have a stake in Iraq becoming a democratic nation. So far,
in my judgment, because of the way we proceeded--and you are
not going to agree with that part, but nonetheless--and so far
we have not attracted Islamic countries to send in some troops
and some police to help create a nation.
It seems to me we all ought to be together on at least an
effort to try to persuade, cajole, entice, and/or use carrots
and sticks to get other nations to come in and take some risks
to create that nation. We are taking risks there, big risks,
and creating a nation there is a useful goal. I could not agree
with you more. The people who commit these atrocities are as
horrendous individuals as I have ever seen or ever heard of
probably except for the even more massive murders when we think
of Hitler and World War II. But nonetheless, I cannot think of
anything much more despicable than what we see on Al-Jazeera.
But I would just urge you not to suggest in your words when
you hold out the horrors that are right there that alternatives
to try to address this problem and to reduce this negative
dynamic and to bring in much more forcefully Islamic nations
into that effort to create a nation, and to try to bring the
Iraqi people to take risks more than already have--and I
emphasize because I know that there are a lot who are dying
there to create a nation--more than already have, that when
people suggest alternative courses or alternative emphasis that
somehow or other they are playing into the hands of the enemy.
That is the one thing I would hope that you would avoid.
Secretary Rumsfeld. I did not even suggest that.
Let me just say a couple of things. Number one, I agree
completely that the Iraqis have to do this. Number two, we have
worked from the beginning of this effort in the United Nations
to get other Islamic countries to come into that. The Iraqis
have resisted it. They did not want Turks in there helping and
they have resisted other countries. They have their own
reasons. It is a complicated part of the world. But we have
been very much in the mode of trying to get Islamic countries
to join that effort.
I would say one other thing we have to do, and that is to
get more people like Karzai and Allawi and Musharraf leading
the moderate cause in the world against those extremists. Those
men are all subject to death threats. They all have prices on
their heads. They all have enormous courage. They all have
tremendous leadership skills. They are beginning to form a
pattern in that part of the world.
Think of that. Think of the courage of Musharraf in his
country to do what he is doing. Think of Karzai and think of
Allawi. We have examples popping up in that part of the world
where there were not examples of that type of leadership, and
that is a pretty exciting thing.
Chairman Warner. We thank you, Mr. Secretary, and we thank
each of your colleagues and we wish you well. We are adjourned.
[Questions for the record with answers supplied follow:]
Questions Submitted by Senator John McCain
CONSULTATION VICE COORDINATION WITH THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE
1. Senator McCain. Secretary Rumsfeld, I am impressed with the
number of consultations that the Department of Defense has had with the
Department of State in 20 countries and the ambassadorial-level
consultations that have been conducted in 30 countries on 5 continents.
However, if the plan is based on cultivating long-lasting relationships
with numerous countries, should not the Department of State be the
leader in their development instead of the Department of Defense?
Secretary Rumsfeld. Department of Defense expertise was central to
the drafting of an effective and flexible plan for our global defense
posture, and the Department of State was and remains a full player in
the broader review process of our posture changes. Secretary Powell and
senior officials from both departments have all been fully engaged in
the comprehensive diplomatic consultations that have accompanied the
public announcement of our posture changes. Both departments fulfill
critical needs in talks with our allies and partners.
2. Senator McCain. Secretary Rumsfeld, I am concerned about the
level of coordination that you have had with the Department of State in
the development of your Global Force Posture. How does the Global Force
Posture fit within the context of the larger political and economic
policies and foreign policies we are pursuing in both Europe and Asia?
Secretary Rumsfeld. The Departments of Defense and State have
maintained exceptionally close coordination during the global posture
review process, regularly participating together in interagency
discussions of the proposals and in consultations with allies and
Congress on our plans. Without exception, consultations in foreign
capitals and on Capitol Hill have included representatives from both
departments. The Department of State's appreciation for how posture
changes should fit into our broader policy goals in Europe, Asia, and
other regions was critical to shaping and strengthening the plan as it
SAVINGS FROM GLOBAL FORCE STRUCTURE
3. Senator McCain. Secretary Rumsfeld, your September 17, 2004
Global Force Posture report states that it will make ``our alliances
more affordable and sustainable.'' What savings are you expecting to
achieve from reducing foreign basing by 35 percent?
Secretary Rumsfeld. Eliminating excess infrastructure overseas will
result in cost savings over time, as the United States will lower its
overall overhead and maintenance costs as a result of fewer bases,
facilities, and installations. Relying relatively more on a rotational
presence of U.S. forces, instead of permanently stationed forces with
their families and a bigger overall U.S. ``footprint'' in host nations,
will help us to make our alliances sustainable by keeping them
4. Senator McCain. Secretary Rumsfeld, the changes you are
proposing contain broad and far-reaching implications for our Nation,
our allies, and our military. How will the committees with jurisdiction
be able to oversee and affect the implementation of this 6 to 8 year
realignment effort when you are asking us to bless the entire plan at
Secretary Rumsfeld. Although our current plan provides a clear way
forward for global posture changes, our posture will continue to evolve
over time. As stated in our September report, Congress is a full
partner in our process to strengthen our global posture, and will
AVAILABLE STRATEGIC AIRLIFT AND SEALIFT
5. Senator McCain. General Myers, your proposed Global Force
Posture is based on the assumption that you can deploy forces rapidly
from the Continental United States (CONUS) to anywhere in the world. Do
you have the high speed sealift, at-sea connectors, and strategic
airlift, today, that will allow us to deploy from CONUS faster than
from our current forward-deployed locations?
General Myers. Under the Global Force Posture, in most scenarios we
can deploy forces rapidly from the CONUS. Using our existing and
programmed strategic lift capabilities, we can move CONUS-based forces
several days faster than we move forward-based forces today. This is
because our strategic sealift assets are home-ported in CONUS close to
our heavy maneuver forces. Conversely, heavy maneuver forces that are
forward based today require sealift to transit from CONUS, pick up
those forces at their forward location, and then transport them to area
of operations--requiring more time than a direct movement from CONUS.
With regard to high-speed sealift, the DOD has not yet fielded a
high-speed sealift capability; however, the Navy and Army will field
intra-theater high-speed vessels beginning fiscal year 2011. Further,
the Navy currently has additional R&D funding in the POM for strategic
highspeed sealift development and the Air Force continues its
programmed acquisition of the C-17 airlifter. These programs are
essential to our National Security Strategy force-planning construct
and the Strategic Planning Guidance (SPG) 10-30-30 planning goal.
6. Senator McCain. General Myers, the Global Force Posture will
replace forward presence with periodic exercises. How will we maintain
our level of engagement with reduced familiarity and personal contact
with our allies?
General Myers. One of the goals of the global posture strategy is
to promote the expansion of allied roles by encouraging new
partnerships. A key ingredient to maintaining and increasing U.S. level
of engagement lies in the combatant commander's ability to improve
their existing theater unique Theater Security Cooperation (TSC)
programs by cultivating new as well as standing relationships. The
COCOM's ability to place U.S. forces in strategic locations, allows the
U.S. to influence regional security ultimately preventing war.
Global posture strategies will incorporate assured readiness
through efficient global force management practices. In the recent
past, the U.S. has been very successful in developing coalition
relationships through rotational presence in exercises such as:
Immediate Response, Cobra Gold, Ulchi-Focus Lens, and Bright Star
exercises. Expanding on these bilateral and multilateral exercises,
combatant commanders will continue to build upon the interoperability
between U.S. and allied forces and help spur allied transformation
initiatives. These exercises will also test our ability to project
forces, exercise the defense transportation systems, and evaluate our
en route infrastructure's ability to receive, stage, and integrate U.S.
forces in various environments. There is no realistic simulation for
Our new global posture strategy will not only increase coalition
warfighting skills aimed at deterrence, it will also allow for U.S.
forces to influence and access areas where we can better battle
ideological terrorist underpinnings. In short, our new strategy implies
realigning forces, not necessarily withdrawing them.
PERCEPTION AND TIMING FOR U.S. TROOP REDUCTIONS IN EUROPE
7. Senator McCain. General Jones, Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF) has
strained some of our relations with European allies. I am concerned
about the timing for the implementation of the Global Force Posture. Is
this the best time to start realigning our posture in Europe?
General Jones. Yes, it is imperative that we begin to realign our
force posture across our theater to more accurately reflect today's
security environment. The fundamental objective of our plan is to
increase United States European Command's strategic effect through a
fundamental realignment of basing concepts, access, and force
In no way does our posture realignment signal a reduced commitment
or interest in our theater. Moreover, our European allies understand
the rationale for changing our footprint. We have communicated with our
alliance partners on many levels the need to adopt new methods to
better protect our collective interests in today's international
security environment to include the realignment of our forces and bases
in theater. We simply cannot afford to remain in a defensive posture
that is no longer relevant. Transforming the theater will strengthen
our commitment to the NATO alliance and serve as a model upon which our
allies can base their own transformation. This mutually beneficial
arrangement can increase the ability of the alliance and partner
nations to respond to security challenges well into the century.
The timing of our realignment is critical as well. In the Secretary
of Defense's September 2004 Report to Congress; the ``Global defense
posture changes will have direct implications for the forthcoming round
of Base Realignment and Closure (BRAC).'' It is my belief that BRAC and
global posture transformation are interdependent processes, and that
this is an optimum time to begin implementation of our proposed plan.
When completed, our realigned posture will improve our ability to meet
our alliance commitments and global responsibilities.
As we proceed, we will retain the flexibility to adjust the scope
and breadth of our transformation as strategic circumstances dictate.
We will work closely with Congress to ensure that you remain full
partners in this important endeavor.
PERCEPTION AND TIMING FOR U.S. TROOP REALIGNMENT IN THE U.S. PACIFIC
8. Senator McCain. Admiral Fargo, the Global Force Posture is a
demonstrable shift of focus from Europe to the Pacific, which may well
be warranted. What signal will the realignment of forces within your
theater send to China and our allies in Asia?
Admiral Fargo. Thank you, Senator, for the opportunity to comment
on this extremely important matter.
In Asia and the Pacific, vibrant economies, burgeoning populations,
maturing democracies, and military modernization only serve to add
momentum to regional transformation and increase the need for new
In response to this changing environment, Pacific Command undertook
efforts, with the direction of the Secretary of Defense, to
operationalize our national security strategy and strengthen both our
global and theater defense posture.
I believe that China, as well as our friends and allies in the Asia
Pacific region, will interpret the realignment of our forces as a
signal of our enduring commitment to peace and stability in the region.
The realignment of our forces is intended to enhance our capability to
respond to contingencies, to long-standing security commitments in the
region, and to defeat terrorism and other transnational threats.
We must continue to assure our friends and allies, and dissuade and
deter potential adversaries. Overall, the realignment of forces should
signal to our friends and others that the U.S. has long-term interests
in the Asia-Pacific region and is adjusting our force structure to
reflect those enduring interests.
PERCEPTION AND TIMING FOR U.S. FORCES-KOREA TROOP REDUCTIONS IN ASIA
9. Senator McCain. General LaPorte, for over 50 years U.S. forces
have maintained a stalemate on the Demilitarized Zone (DMZ). What
signal do you think we will be sending to Asia as a whole with the
troop reductions you have planned?
General LaPorte. The reduction of American troops from Korea should
not be viewed as a lessening of our commitment to the Republic of Korea
or Asia, in actuality the converse is true. The enhance, shape and
align transformation plan of the United States Forces Korea (USFK) is
congruent with the Defense Department's new Global Posture Review,
which leverages our improved capabilities to increase our readiness and
deterrence, while supporting an enduring United States military
presence in the Republic of Korea and Northeast Asia. This message has
been clearly explained to America's allies and friends in Asia, who
have expressed their appreciation for our improved efforts at
maintaining stability in the region while considering their unique
In Korea, our planned enhancements, realignments, and troop
reductions are intended to strengthen our combined defense of the
Republic of Korea while creating a less intrusive military footprint.
No longer is the number of troops on the ground an appropriate metric
for measuring U.S. combat capability and American commitment. The
reduction of troops from the United States Forces Korea is
representative of a combined transformation of capabilities. This
transformation empowers Republic of Korea forces with missions and
tasks that they are both willing and capable of performing, while
simultaneously unencumbering U.S. forces to enable strategic
flexibility for both within the Pacific region and globally.
10. Senator McCain. General LaPorte, I understand that the Army is
announcing this afternoon that the 3,700 person 2nd Brigade Combat Team
of the 2nd Infantry Division will be temporarily relocated from Korea
to Fort Carson, Colorado, upon their return from OIF in the fall of
2005. How will this announcement be perceived by Seoul after their
government has requested a 2-year delay in force reductions on the
General LaPorte. Troop reduction consultations between the United
States and the Republic of Korea have been ongoing since early June of
this year. The deployment announcement of the 2nd Brigade Combat Team,
like other troop reduction announcements that are forthcoming,
represents the harmony of our ROK-U.S. joint consultation efforts.
Specifically, on August 20, 2004, at the conclusion of the 11th
meeting of the Future of the Republic of Korea-United States Alliance
Policy Initiative (commonly called FOTA), Richard Lawless, Deputy Under
Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs for Asia and
Pacific and his negotiating counterpart Dr. Ahn Kwang-Chan, Deputy
Minister of Defense (MND) for Policy held a joint press session in
Seoul, where, among other items, they announced the deployment of the
2nd Brigade Combat Team (BCT) of the 2nd Infantry Division to Iraq.
During this joint press session, Dr. Ahn indicated that the 2nd BCT
would not be returning to Korea as its deployment was a portion of
USFK's permanent troop reductions.
On October 4, the ROK MND and U.S. DOD concluded USFK troop
reduction consultations, publicly announcing on 6 October a 5-year
reduction plan that includes a USFK reduction of 5,000 troops in 2004,
3,000 troops in 2005, 2,000 troops in 2006, and 2,500 troops between
2007 and 2008. The duration of this reduction plan is in harmony with
the modernization plans of the ROK military, and has been well received
by the ROK government.
Question Submitted by Senator Susan Collins
MILITARY CAPABILITIES STANDARDS
11. Senator Collins. Secretary Rumsfeld, in your testimony you
state that ``sheer numbers of people are no longer appropriate measures
of commitment or capabilities.'' One of the six principal strategic
considerations in the Global Posture Review states that ``effective
military capabilities, not numbers of personnel and platforms, are what
create decisive military effects and will enable the United States to
execute its security commitments globally.'' While I understand your
point, Iraq demonstrates that numbers do matter. As I'm sure you will
recall, General Eric Shinseki, then the Army Chief of Staff, warned
prior to the war that it might take several hundred thousand troops to
secure post-war Iraq. Had General Shinseki's advice been heeded, would
we currently be dealing with the level of insurgency we see now?
Secretary Rumsfeld. While numbers do matter, applying the correct
capabilities to the problem remains the most appropriate response. I
believe we have the appropriately-sized multi-national force, which in
concert with expanding capabilities demonstrated by the growing Iraqi
security forces, will continue to be the right force for executing the
military component of an effective counterinsurgency.
The current level of insurgency is a combination of several
factors--fighters comprised from former regime elements, religious
extremists, and others, each of whom also receives support from the
criminal elements present in the country. These groups have exhibited
the capability to organize and execute operations against coalition
forces, Iraqi security forces, and most recently against Iraqi
civilians. Some operations indicate a small level of cooperation among
the various groups, although they are more likely due to convenience
rather than shared ideological aims.
Effective counterinsurgency, however, requires more than a military
response. In fact, the military component should be a supporting arm to
the more pressing lines of operation such as economic development,
infrastructure enhancement, and the development and sustainment of good
governance and a strong judicial system. General Casey and Ambassador
Negroponte have correctly identified these elements--in support of the
Iraqi Interim Government's aims--to continue to reduce the level of the
insurgency by progress in creating jobs, supporting the electoral
process, and improving the infrastructure while conducting security
operations to eliminate the hard-line insurgents and retain control of
key areas of the country.
To achieve these aims requires us to continue to support the
efforts of the Multi-National Forces-Iraq, our country team, and the
efforts of our coalition partners to provide the overt backing to the
Iraqi Interim Government and create irreversible positive momentum. The
capabilities we provide--security forces, money, expertise, diplomatic
initiatives, and others--provide a synergistic effect that is greater
than the single factor of number of soldiers on the ground.
Questions Submitted by Senator Carl Levin
12. Senator Levin. Secretary Rumsfeld, at the Department of Defense
briefing on April 12, 2004, General Sanchez, with General Abizaid at
his side, said ``the mission of U.S. forces is to kill or capture
Muqtada al-Sadr.'' Is killing or capturing Sadr still the mission? If
not, when did it change and why?
Secretary Rumsfeld. A number of things have happened regarding
Muqtada al Sadr since Lieutenant General Sanchez made the statement to
which you refer. The most important is that subsequent to the August
2004 confrontation in Najaf between U.S. forces and militiamen loyal to
al Sadr, al Sadr and his lieutenants have entered the Iraqi political
process and have largely ceased their former violent activities. Al
Sadr's connection to the murder of Grand Ayatollah Al Khoie and other
crimes are in the jurisdiction of the Iraqi Interim Government.
13. Senator Levin. Secretary Rumsfeld, what is your strategy for
dealing with Sadr's Mahdi army and other militias?
Secretary Rumsfeld. Our strategy is to attempt to disband all Iraqi
militias and to bring the constituencies they represent in the Iraqi
political process. Our preference is to do this through negotiation
where possible. But if any militia engages in hostile action towards
U.S. and coalition forces we are prepared to forcibly disarm them.
14. Senator Levin. Secretary Rumsfeld, is there an Iraqi veto on
Secretary Rumsfeld. No. U.S. and coalition forces that comprise the
Multinational Force-Iraq (MNF-I) are in Iraq at the invitation of the
Interim Iraqi Government, and operate under the provisions of United
Nations Security Council Resolution (UNSCR) 1546. UNSCR 1546 provides a
unified command authority for MNF-I, under which Iraqi forces serve as
equal partners alongside forces from more than 30 nations. Although
MNF-I commanders work in close consultation with the Interim Government
through participation in organs such as the Ministerial Committee for
National Security, Iraqi leaders do not have a veto over the actions of
coalition forces in Iraq.
15. Senator Levin. Secretary Rumsfeld, is the U.S. troop strength
and funding sufficient to stabilize Afghanistan and allow elections to
proceed, to reverse the drug trade, and to capture Osama bin Laden, and
if so, why haven't we done any of these things?
Secretary Rumsfeld. U.S. troop strength is sufficient to accomplish
the U.S. strategic goals in Afghanistan. The U.S. has helped the Afghan
government prepare a comprehensive presidential election security plan
involving U.S., coalition, and Afghan security forces. U.S. efforts to
counter the Afghan drug trade are underway: the U.S. approach is that
counternarcotics in Afghanistan is a law-enforcement mission for which
the military can play a supporting role. However, a successful
counternarcotics program is a long-term enterprise, requiring a
concerted effort in a number of areas over time. The U.S. supports the
U.K. as the international lead for Afghan counternarcotics. Efforts to
capture Osama Bin Laden continue.
MILITARY TACTICS IN IRAQ
16. Senator Levin. General Myers, earlier this week, Iraqi
terrorists beheaded yet another American citizen in Iraq. Upwards of
250 Iraqis have been reported killed in the last few days in suicide
attacks, car bombings, roadside ambushes, and kidnapings. Meanwhile,
the U.S. has made airstrikes against Fallujah, which evidently have not
caused the terrorists to stop their attacks, but have reportedly
resulted in dozens more Iraqi civilian deaths. U.S. officials assert
that most of the Iraqis being killed in airstrikes are terrorists--many
Iraqis appear to believe otherwise. It seems to me that our military
tactics are not working in Iraq--and in fact it seems as though these
airstrikes, while they may kill a few bona-fide terrorists, also cause
more Iraqis to hate the U.S., and result in more of them being drawn in
to the fight against us. Don't you agree that such attacks may be
counter-productive and may be producing more support for the
insurgency, and perhaps creating more terrorists and insurgents than we
General Myers. Recent airstrikes in Fallujah have all been against
credible terrorist targets. In each, collateral damage was mitigated
through precise planning based on confirmed intelligence and the use of
precision-guided munitions. Analysis of potential collateral damage is
part of pre-strike approval process and commanders consider planning
aspects such as timing and type of munitions to minimize potential for
civilian casualties. All means available are used to prevent collateral
Military operations are a viable and effective mechanism for
dismantling the Zarqawi network. These strikes are surgical in nature.
While it is possible that individuals located nearby may have been
injured, it is Zarqawi and his fighters that place the people of
Fallujah at risk by hiding among them. Information on civilian
casualties should be carefully scrutinized for accuracy. Some stories
of civilian casualties are prefabricated and part of a Zarqawi
propaganda campaign. Intelligence from previous strikes have concluded
the following techniques are used by Zarqawi associates to misrepresent
Ambulances taking supposed civilian casualties to the
hospital several hours after the attack has occurred.
Blood displayed for effect and in a manner
inconsistent with the number of casualties described or known.
Using civilians as human shields to include capturing
civilians against their will when under attack.
In one recent strike (September 28), Fallujah hospital
officials reported casualties before a coalition strike
occurred. Although witnesses reported coalition forces had
fired rockets into the city, coalition forces only fired
In an October 8 strike on a Zarqawi safe house,
hospital officials reported mass casualties from a coalition
strike, including claims that a wedding party was being held at
the location. However, prior to the operation, no activity
related to such a gathering was observed or noted by
intelligence collection. After the strike, no personnel related
to any rescue attempts for a wedding party was observed or
These precision air strikes have not only been effective in
dismantling the Zarqawi network, these airstrikes and other MNF-I
operations have disrupted the Zarqawi network, thus limiting Zarqawi's
tactics of intimidation, death, and destruction in Fallujah. Regarding
public support, the overwhelming majority of Fallujah's citizens have
been repulsed by the atrocities that Zarqawi and other extremists have
made commonplace in Iraq. The foreign militants are thought to produce
the car bombs that now explode around Iraq several times a day, and
Zarqawi's organization has asserted responsibility for the slaying of
several Westerners, some of which were shown in videos posted on the
internet. In his most heinous crime, Zarqawi claimed credit for the
September 30 car bombing of more than 34 children at a ribbon-cutting
ceremony in Baghdad for a sewage treatment facility. Recent
negotiations in Fallujah between the Iraqi Interim Government and local
leaders indicate the desire for stability and security in Fallujah. The
citizens of Fallujah are tired of terrorism and the pain Zarqawi has
inflicted on the city.
WAR ON TERROR
17. Senator Levin. Secretary Rumsfeld, in your global war on
terrorism memo of October 16, 2003, that was leaked to the press, you
asked ``Are we capturing, killing, or deterring and dissuading more
terrorists every day than the madrassas and the radical clerics are
recruiting, training, and deploying against us?'' Given the level of
violence and the number of attacks against coalition forces and
ordinary Iraqis today, how would you answer your own question?
Secretary Rumsfeld. We and our Iraqi allies are winning. Coalition
and Iraqi forces are seeking out the enemy and taking the fight to
them. We are also working to mitigate the effects of those enemy
attacks that our offensive operations do not stop. A new Iraq is taking
shape and it offers the Iraqi people a more hopeful future than they
have known in the past 35 years; the Iraqi people want to move forward
into that hopeful future, not return to their terrifying past. The
majority of Iraqis support the new Iraq and recruiting for the Iraqi
security forces remains strong. I think many potential or past
insurgents have been deterred or dissuaded and we see evidence that the
enemy's recruiting within Iraq has become much more difficult.
INTERNATIONAL TROOPS IN IRAQ
18. Senator Levin. General Myers, high level military officers have
told me that national governments are placing severe restrictions on
the international troops deployed to Iraq. What is the nature of these
General Myers. Several countries have imposed restrictions on the
types of tasks their forces in Iraq can perform. In many cases,
limitations were required in order to get parliamentary/legislative
approval for the commitment of forces. In other cases, there are legal
limits on the types of tasks a particular nation can perform. Most of
the restrictions center on the ability to conduct offensively oriented
missions such as raids, ambushes, and attacks outside of assigned
19. Senator Levin. General Myers, do restrictions placed on
international troops in Iraq limit their usefulness?
General Myers. Requirements to gain national level authority for
cordon and search missions, raids and counterterror operations have
limited force effectiveness and complicated command and control. Simply
put, the operational constraints placed on some forces make it
difficult to deal effectively with the security challenges we face.
20. Senator Levin. General Myers, have you made any effort with
your coalition counterparts to remove these restrictions?
General Myers. In April 2004, I sent personal letters to 23 of my
multinational force counterparts asking each of them to review the
rules of engagement they were operating under. In particular, I asked
them to approve the use of force (including deadly force) to prevent
interference with the mission to establish a safe and secure
environment in Iraq as well as the use of force against military and/or
para-military forces declared hostile by the multinational forces in
Iraq. I also asked that the ability to conduct these operations not be
contingent on prior approval from national authorities. While some
countries modified their rules of engagement, most responded that they
were unable to for political or legal reasons.
21. Senator Levin. Secretary Rumsfeld, do you agree with U.N.
Secretary-General Annan's statement that under the current security
conditions in Iraq it is difficult to conduct credible elections?
Secretary Rumsfeld. I agree that it will be difficult logistically
to conduct elections in an environment in which Baathist and al Qaeda
terrorists are willing to commit horrifying atrocities in order to
prevent Iraqis from expressing freedom on political expression and
selecting a representative government. But we do not have to look any
further than the terrorists' own words to see that they feel any
election in Iraq would be credible. In the letter written by Abu Musab
al-Zarqawi to his al Qaeda associates in Afghanistan, which we captured
January 2004, Zarqawi wrote that democracy would be suffocating to his
murderous campaign in Iraq. The terrorists fear that Iraqis will regain
a sense of ownership of their country after years of Saddam's tyranny,
and will be more willing to fight back. Thus, it is quite likely that
we will actually see a surge in attacks as the terrorists attempt to
derail the electoral process in Iraq.
But just because something is difficult does not mean it is not
worth doing. On the contrary, I believe that the terrorist campaign of
violence and intimidation is a sign of how strategically significant
holding elections will be, and why we are on the right track in Iraq.
STRATEGIC LIFT REQUIREMENTS
22. Senator Levin. General Myers, what impact does the proposed
global force structure have on our strategic lift requirements?
General Myers. We are currently in the middle of a mobility
capabilities study that will help us determine the mobility
capabilities that we need to support the defense strategy. This study
is designed to look at the entire defense transportation system from
the point-of-origin to the foxhole and to help determine not only our
strategic lift needs but also what we need to support the forces within
the theater. The study is projected to report out in March 2005.
23. Senator Levin. General Myers, how many additional, or how many
less, airlift aircraft and sealift ships will be necessary to support
the proposed global force structure?
General Myers. We are currently in the middle of a mobility
capabilities study that will help us determine the mobility
capabilities that we need to support the defense strategy. This study,
which is focused on 2012, is due to report out in March 2005. It will
address the impacts of the Global Force Posture and will help us
determine what we need to transport our forces.
BUDGET CONTROL OVER CERTAIN INTELLIGENCE AGENCIES
24. Senator Levin. Secretary Rumsfeld, the Senate Committee on
Governmental Affairs recently completed marking up a bill on reforming
the Intelligence Community. The bill would make a number of reforms,
including creating a new ``National Intelligence Program'', and adding
substantial authority to the position of National Intelligence Director
to control funds and personnel (civilian and military) within that
program. Included in the National Intelligence Program would be all of
the funding for the National Security Agency, the National Geospatial-
Intelligence Agency, and the National Reconnaissance Office. Do you
believe that a new National Intelligence Director should have budget
control of all funding of these agencies?
Secretary Rumsfeld. Since the August 17 hearing, the President has
issued Executive Order 13355, ``Strengthened Management of the
Intelligence Community,'' which expands the authority of the Director
of Central Intelligence over reprogramming of intelligence funds. On
September 8, the White House announced that the President supports
providing this expanded authority to a newly created National
IMPACT ON DEPLOYMENT TIMES
25. Senator Levin. General Myers, one of the key questions with
respect to these proposals is how they impact our ability to support
operations in the U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM) region where the
chances of instability leading to the use of the military are the
highest. Please provide, in both classified and unclassified form, the
Department's analysis of this issue, including how long it took to
deploy our forces, people, and equipment, from Germany to the CENTCOM
region for Operation Iraqi Freedom, along with your analysis of how
long it would take to deploy those same forces from the United States
in a comparable scenario.
General Myers. [Deleted.]
RELIEF FOR NEAR-TERM STRESS ON THE FORCE
26. Senator Levin. General Myers, today our entire active Army, and
a significant portion of the National Guard and Reserve, is tied up
with our deployments to Iraq and Afghanistan. Does this plan do
anything to improve our ability to support these current force levels
if we are forced to do so for years to come?
General Myers. The Integrated Global Presence and Basing Strategy
(IGPBS) are not designed to increase force levels. However, it will
facilitate more effective use of the force to respond rapidly globally.
As we restation the force to meet expeditionary demands, we will
facilitate more time in the United States for families and fewer moves
for our service members. Over the next decade IGPBS will result in the
closure of hundreds of U.S. facilities overseas. This will in turn
bring home up to 70,000 uniformed personnel and nearly 100,000 family
members and civilian employees. Service members will have more time on
the home front and fewer moves over a career. Military spouses will
experience fewer job changes and have greater stability for their
There are several other initiatives underway within the Department
of Defense to relieve stress on the force, and thereby improve our
ability to support operational demands, by making more of the current
force available for deployments and high demand activities. These
include, but are not limited to, military-to-civilian conversions,
rebalancing of the Reserve components, and Army modularity.
The Department is converting 20,070 military positions to civilian
or contractor positions in fiscal years 2004 and 2005. These
conversions occur in positions where the work is not deemed inherently
military in nature. This makes more military personnel available to the
Service Chiefs for more critical military tasks. The Department is
studying the feasibility of expanding this initiative in fiscal year
2006 and beyond.
Rebalancing of the force is an ongoing activity within the
Department. We are currently assessing our force structure and
rebalancing within the Reserve components and between the active and
Reserve components. The purpose is to move forces from low demand to
high demand specialties thereby improving readiness and deployability.
From fiscal year 2003 to 2009, approximately 58,000 positions will be
rebalanced in this manner. These rebalancing efforts will shift forces
to critical specialties such as civil affairs, psychological
operations, military police, Special Forces, and Intelligence while
divesting Cold War structure to enable the global war on terrorism
The Army is shifting from a division-based force to a modular
combat brigade centric construct. In doing so, the Army will increase
its operational capability from its current 33 brigade force to a 43
brigade force with the flexibility to add additional brigades if
required. This effort began in fiscal year 2004 and is scheduled for
completion in fiscal year 2010. By adding 10 (or more) additional
active brigades, the Army will increase the rotation base of units
available for deployment and further reduce the burden on active and
Military-to-civilian conversions, rebalancing of the force, Army
modularity, IGPBS, all combined, have a significant positive impact on
the force. They greatly increase warfighting capabilities where gaps
currently exist, and increase the rotational base of units available
for deployment. The net result is a reduction in the OPTEMPO on active
and Reserve component soldiers, more time in the United States for
families, and fewer moves for servicemembers.
COST OF THE PROPOSALS TO REALIGN OUR FORCES
27. Senator Levin. Secretary Rumsfeld, please provide your analysis
of the likely cost of these proposals to realign our forces over the
next 5 years, to include a description of the elements that will affect
costs and savings such as relocation costs, military construction costs
here in the U.S., the impact on military pay and benefits such as
permanent change of station and family separation payments, the impact
on prepositioning and logistic operations, and the impact on our
Secretary Rumsfeld. The changes to global posture under
consideration are focused on positioning U.S. forces to better meet
21st century challenges--and particularly to conduct the global war on
terrorism--while helping to ease the burden of the post-September 11
operational tempo on our Armed Forces. The new posture will base and
deploy U.S. forces and prepositioned stocks to enhance global
Cost estimates are continually being refined as implementation
plans develop. The range of current estimates is $9 billion to $12
billion in net costs for all projected posture changes through fiscal
Many of the force realignments under consideration fall within the
scope of the BRAC process. The estimate for such ``BRAC-related'' moves
is $5 billion to $6 billion in net costs. This estimate includes
relocation and construction costs in the United States, changes to
military housing allowances, as well as savings from closing overseas
facilities. As precise locations are identified--and plans mature--more
detailed cost assessments will be prepared.
IMPACT ON TROOP ROTATION PLANS AND FAMILY SEPARATION
28. Senator Levin. General Myers, please provide the Department's
analysis of the impact of these proposals on troop rotation plans and
of the extent to which it will increase or decrease family separation.
General Myers. One of the key aspects of the DOD force deployment
goal for global sourcing, to include Operations Iraqi Freedom and
Enduring Freedom, is the dwell time concept. Dwell time ensures the
members of the military deployed to any contingency operation spend an
equal amount of time at home station as they do while deployed. The
goal for dwell time is, at a minimum, a 1:1 ratio (e.g., one day at
home station for each day deployed). Whenever possible, forces are
chosen to deploy based upon longest home station dwell time. This goal
is a result of DOD analysis of recent troop rotations.
29. Senator Levin. Secretary Rumsfeld, I have a number of concerns
about the intelligence reorganization bill being marked up in the
Senate Committee on Governmental Affairs this week. Please provide your
views on this bill.
Secretary Rumsfeld. I support the position put forward by the
KOREA--REDUCTIONS WITHOUT NORTH KOREAN CONCESSIONS
30. Senator Levin. Secretary Rumsfeld, why are we proceeding with
withdrawing troops from the DMZ and reducing the total number of U.S.
forces in South Korea without seeking some sort of concession from
North Korea, including, for example, a withdrawal of North Korean
troops from their side of the DMZ?
Secretary Rumsfeld. Our realignment of troops in Korea is long
overdue. For more than a decade, ROK forces have had the overwhelmingly
predominant role of securing the DMZ, while we have maintained only a
small force actually on the DMZ in the vicinity of Panmunjom. The
mission of that small security force is now being transferred to the
The realignment of the U.S. Second Infantry Division into areas
further south not only recognizes the ROK's predominant role in their
defense, but also allows us to consolidate our forces and leverage
their increasing capabilities.
These increasing capabilities, of both the ROK and U.S. forces, is
what allows us to confidently redeploy a portion of the U.S. troop
presence with no decrease in the deterrent and defense posture of our
combined force. Indeed, when the realignment and our capability
enhancements are fully examined, there is a net increase in our overall
deterrent and defensive capabilities.
The leadership in North Korea understands this.
STATIONING FORCES IN CENTCOM REGION
31. Senator Levin. Secretary Rumsfeld, is it your intention at this
time to permanently station combat forces in the CENTCOM area of
Secretary Rumsfeld. Our intention is to provide presence without
permanence in the CENTCOM AOR. We will have a robust network of
headquarters to oversee a rotational presence of our rapidly deployable
forces so that we can continue to assure our allies and deter
aggression in this critical region. We will rely increasingly on
forward operating sites and host-nation cooperative security locations
to enable us to have rapid access into various parts of the region
without impinging on local sensitivities via a large military
LEGAL AND POLITICAL RESTRICTIONS IN BASING COUNTRIES
32. Senator Levin. Secretary Rumsfeld, your testimony states that
an absence of legal and political restrictions is a factor on where we
want to station our troops. It is easy for nations to indicate up front
that they intend to be agreeable to letting us stage from their
countries to conduct military operations. But when a specific
contingency arises in the future, aren't you going to have to go back
to those host countries and get specific approval for that specific
Secretary Rumsfeld. It is vital to have comprehensive legal and
logistical arrangements in place, prior to a contingency arising, with
a broad range of friends and allies so that we have maximum flexibility
to pursue operations globally--so that the absence of support from a
single ally does not hinder our ability to prosecute a contingency
33. Senator Levin. Secretary Rumsfeld, is this plan optimized for
Secretary Rumsfeld. This plan provides us the flexibility to
prosecute the full range of military operations globally.
34. Senator Levin. Secretary Rumsfeld, your testimony describes the
need to transform our forces to meet asymmetric challenges and states a
desire to shift from having our forces arranged to fight large armies,
navies, or air forces to one that can respond to small enemy cells. Is
this plan built around the assumption that we need to shift the focus
of our military to increase its ability to conduct smaller scale
operations against terrorists or guerilla movements, and that we can
and should de-emphasize our capability to conduct larger scale military
operations against nation-states?
Secretary Rumsfeld. This plan is built around the assumption that
we must continue to transform our military capabilities to be able to
meet the full range of challenges that may confront us, both large
scale and small scale, and both traditional and non-traditional. Our
overseas posture will emphasize rapidly deployable early-entry
capabilities in forward locations, with heavier follow-on forces
concentrated in the United States, from where they will have global
U.S. ABILITY TO HANDLE ANOTHER CONFLICT
35. Senator Levin. Secretary Rumsfeld, the war in Iraq and the
continuing, unresolved conflict in Afghanistan are putting enormous
stress on the U.S. military, especially the Army. Prior to these wars,
our military strategy was based on being able to counter an unforeseen
conflict, such as one started by North Korea. How would the U.S.
respond to such an unforeseen conflict and where would we get the extra
troops to support such a third war?
Secretary Rumsfeld. Our current defense strategy calls for the
ability to conduct two nearly simultaneous overlapping campaigns to
swiftly defeat aggression and deny an adversary's strategic objectives.
If the Armed Forces were required to do this while still engaged in
operations in Iraq and Afghanistan, current forces in place would
remain and we would globally source capabilities to the second conflict
as appropriate. In your example, we are already in the process of
realigning our forces on the Korean Peninsula to better posture
ourselves to support the Republic of Korea in the event of North Korean
aggression. The capabilities we would employ would depend on the nature
of the North Korean aggression and the needs of the Republic of Korea,
consistent with our treaty obligations.
36. Senator Levin. Secretary Rumsfeld, how would we make more
troops available in time without sacrificing our current efforts in
Iraq and Afghanistan?
Secretary Rumsfeld. The Department of Defense has several strategic
initiatives underway that will address this issue. First, the
Department is in the process of transitioning the force management
process from a regional to a global system. Global Force Management
(GFM) will ensure the Secretary of Defense is presented allocation
recommendations to support combatant commander requirements in terms of
force availability and associated risk. GFM will also prioritize
combatant commander requirements to ensure ongoing operations are
sourced to the required levels while offering mitigation options to
counter assumed risk. In short, GFM will ensure OIF and OEF are sourced
to the level required by the combatant commander.
Second, the Department is instituting myriad OIF/OEF lessons
learned initiatives to reduce stress on the force. This includes
military-to-civilian conversion, active component/Reserve component
(AC/RC) realignment, force structure adjustments, and transformation
initiatives in the U.S. Army that will increase the number of combat
brigades from 33 to 43. These initiatives--once implemented--will
combine to reduce stress on the force to ensure current operations can
be sustained without adversely affecting long-term readiness.
Finally, DOD is in the process of assessing U.S. military presence
and missions around the world. The Integrated Global Presence and
Basing Strategy will realign the global posture to address the current
geo-strategic environment. The end result will be the rebasing of
approximately 60,000 U.S. servicemembers from overseas to the
continental United States. This realignment will ensure more of the
force is trained and ready to support rotational requirements--to
include OIF and OEF.
37. Senator Levin. Secretary Rumsfeld, given current end-strength,
how long do you believe the Marine Corps and Army can sustain current
rotation schedules in Iraq before both Services are severely damaged?
Secretary Rumsfeld. The DOD force deployment goals for Operations
Iraqi Freedom and Enduring Freedom were developed to ensure the U.S.
Army and U.S. Marine Corps can maintain the current rotation schedules.
Additionally, the Joint Staff and U.S. Central Command continue to plan
for future deployments in order to make certain the Services can
provide anticipated force levels without degradation to recruitment,
training, and readiness. This planning is conducted collaboratively
with the Services.
Questions Submitted by Senator Bill Nelson
LOCATIONS OF NUCLEAR-POWERED AIRCRAFT CARRIERS
38. Senator Bill Nelson. Admiral Fargo, in your discussions with
the Japanese government regarding the Global Posture Review, did you
raise the issue of the permanent stationing of a nuclear-powered
aircraft carrier in Japan and has a firm decision been made yet? If
not, what is the status of negotiations or discussions with the
Japanese government or military regarding this issue?
Admiral Fargo. Thank you, Senator, for your interest in this
sensitive issue. Replacement of the Kitty Hawk (CV-63) has been a
separate item outside of our posture review discussions with the
government of Japan (GOJ). The final decision on Kitty Hawk's
replacement has not been made but we hope to replace her with one of
our most advanced, most capable carriers. Such a replacement would
maximize the ability to meet future security concerns, communicate a
strong deterrent to would-be aggressors, and demonstrate our indelible
commitment to the alliance and the defense of Japan. As with other
force posture decisions, a change would be managed in full consultation
with the GOJ.
39. Senator Bill Nelson. Secretary Rumsfeld, since arriving in the
U.S. Senate, I have consistently argued that the Nation needed to
reduce its strategic risk in the stationing of aircraft carriers on the
Atlantic coast by committing to no fewer than two bases capable of
home-porting nuclear aircraft carriers. The Navy has resisted
congressional pressure on this issue as far back as the 1980s, while at
the same time it established a second Pacific coast nuclear carrier
base in San Diego, California. I find this an interesting contrast in
strategic purpose and programs between the two coasts and over the
security of the carrier fleet. From a strategic perspective, why would
we need two nuclear carrier bases on the Pacific coast and not on the
Secretary Rumsfeld. The Navy currently has two east coast carrier
home ports to meet U.S. strategic objectives, one conventional and one
nuclear capable with the future retirement of U.S. conventional
carriers, the DOD is evaluating and considering the potential of having
two east coast nuclear capable carrier home ports.
40. Senator Bill Nelson. Secretary Rumsfeld, on March 2, 2004, in a
question for the record, I asked Secretary England if the Navy had
performed any analysis of the current strategic conditions, force
protection, and risk relative to the establishment of a second base on
the Atlantic coast for nuclear-powered aircraft carriers. In his
response he stated this was underway as part of the U.S. military's
Global Posture Review. Has this review identified a requirement for
strategic dispersion of the east coast nuclear aircraft carrier fleet?
Secretary Rumsfeld. There are proposed moves in the Global Defense
Posture Report to Congress that address moving the relocation of
aircraft carriers and carrier assets. However, the dispersion of
aircraft carriers within CONUS was not a subject of the report. Any
relocation determination of CONUS carriers will be dependent on
recommendations from the upcoming BRAC process.
U.S. RELATIONS WITH SYRIA
41. Senator Bill Nelson. Secretary Rumsfeld, the Washington Post
reported on Monday, September 20 that a U.S. delegation, led by William
Burns, Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern Affairs, met with
Syrian officials to discuss efforts to stabilize Syria's 450-mile
border with Iraq. I returned from the region in January 2004, and
Secretary Powell and Ambassadors in the region all impressed upon me
that this issue--Arab fighters flooding Iraq across the Syrian border--
should be our paramount security concern. What military engagement is
possible with Syria on the border issue?
Secretary Rumsfeld. An interagency U.S. delegation headed by State
Department Assistant Secretary for Near East Affairs William Burns and
Assistant Secretary of Defense Peter Rodman met in Damascus with Syrian
leaders on September 11. The purpose of the visit was to convey a blunt
message to President Asad regarding Syrian behavior in Iraq. We told
President Asad that U.S.-Syrian relations would face further
deterioration should Syria continue to undermine stability in Iraq. If
Syria wanted to avoid a crisis in our relations, Syria would have to
prevent the movement of jihadis and insurgents to and from Syria, and
clamp down on insurgents organizing in and operating out of Syria.
President Asad assured us that it was his intention to do so, but said
he required assistance. Our current military engagement with Syria on
border security is really a test. We are working with the Syrians and
the Iraqis to establish patrolling mechanisms and intelligence sharing
on border-related issues. Of course, border security is just a symptom
of the larger problem: that former Iraqi regime elements have been
operating without constraint from Syria. We are watching Syrian actions
closely, and will continue to do so in the coming weeks, to ensure that
the effort is sustained.
42. Senator Bill Nelson. Secretary Rumsfeld, what in your view are
the prospects for cooperation given Syria's behavior in the past?
Secretary Rumsfeld. Syria remains an authoritarian government that
administers a robust clandestine WMD program, and is a state sponsor of
terrorism and occupies its neighbor, Lebanon. For the past 1\1/2\
years, elements within key institutions in Syria have been making great
efforts to undermine the stability of Iraq. Syrian cooperation with
Iraq and the U.S. would be a welcome change in Syrian policy.
[Whereupon, at 6:17 p.m., the committee adjourned.]