[Senate Hearing 108-853]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
S. Hrg. 108-853
TRANSITION TO SOVEREIGNTY IN IRAQ: U.S.
POLICY, ONGOING MILITARY OPERATIONS, AND STATUS OF U.S. ARMED FORCES
=======================================================================
HEARING
before the
COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES
UNITED STATES SENATE
ONE HUNDRED EIGHTH CONGRESS
SECOND SESSION
__________
JUNE 25, 2004
__________
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COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES
JOHN WARNER, Virginia, Chairman
JOHN McCAIN, Arizona CARL LEVIN, Michigan
JAMES M. INHOFE, Oklahoma EDWARD M. KENNEDY, Massachusetts
PAT ROBERTS, Kansas ROBERT C. BYRD, West Virginia
WAYNE ALLARD, Colorado JOSEPH I. LIEBERMAN, Connecticut
JEFF SESSIONS, Alabama JACK REED, Rhode Island
SUSAN M. COLLINS, Maine DANIEL K. AKAKA, Hawaii
JOHN ENSIGN, Nevada BILL NELSON, Florida
JAMES M. TALENT, Missouri E. BENJAMIN NELSON, Nebraska
SAXBY CHAMBLISS, Georgia MARK DAYTON, Minnesota
LINDSEY O. GRAHAM, South Carolina EVAN BAYH, Indiana
ELIZABETH DOLE, North Carolina HILLARY RODHAM CLINTON, New York
JOHN CORNYN, Texas MARK PRYOR, Arkansas
Judith A. Ansley, Staff Director
Richard D. DeBobes, Democratic Staff Director
(ii)
C O N T E N T S
__________
CHRONOLOGICAL LIST OF WITNESSES
Transition to Sovereignty in Iraq: U.S. Policy, Ongoing Military
Operations, and Status of U.S. Armed Forces
june 25, 2004
Page
Wolfowitz, Hon. Paul D., Deputy Secretary of Defense............. 6
Armitage, Hon. Richard L., Deputy Secretary of State............. 17
Myers, Gen. Richard B., USAF, Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff.... 21
(iii)
TRANSITION TO SOVEREIGNTY IN IRAQ: U.S.
POLICY, ONGOING MILITARY OPERATIONS, AND STATUS OF U.S. ARMED FORCES
----------
FRIDAY, JUNE 25, 2004
U.S. Senate,
Committee on Armed Services,
Washington, DC.
The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 9:33 a.m., in
room SD-106, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Senator John
Warner (chairman) presiding.
Committee members present: Senators Warner, McCain,
Roberts, Allard, Sessions, Talent, Dole, Levin, Kennedy,
Lieberman, Reed, Akaka, E. Benjamin Nelson, Dayton, Bayh,
Clinton, and Pryor.
Committee staff member present: Judith A. Ansley, staff
director.
Majority staff members present: Charles W. Alsup,
professional staff member; Ambrose R. Hock, professional staff
member; Thomas L. MacKenzie, professional staff member; Elaine
A. McCusker, professional staff member; Paula J. Philbin,
professional staff member; Lynn F. Rusten, professional staff
member; and Scott W. Stucky, general counsel.
Minority staff members present: Richard D. DeBobes,
Democratic staff director; Daniel J. Cox, Jr., professional
staff member; Richard W. Fieldhouse, professional staff member;
Gerald J. Leeling, minority counsel; Peter K. Levine, minority
counsel; and William G.P. Monahan, minority counsel.
Staff assistants present: Michael N. Berger, Alison E.
Brill, and Nicholas W. West.
Committee members' assistants present: Christopher J. Paul,
assistant to Senator McCain; Darren M. Dick, assistant to
Senator Roberts; Lindsey R. Neas, assistant to Senator Talent;
Christine O. Hill, assistant to Senator Dole; Sharon L. Waxman
and Mieke Y. Eoyang, assistants to Senator Kennedy; Erik Raven,
assistant to Senator Byrd; Frederick M. Downey, assistant to
Senator Lieberman; Elizabeth King, assistant to Senator Reed;
Davelyn Noelani Kalipi and Richard Kessler, assistants to
Senator Akaka; Eric Pierce, assistant to Senator Ben Nelson;
Rashid Hallaway, assistant to Senator Bayh; Andrew Shapiro,
assistant to Senator Clinton; and Terri Glaze, assistant to
Senator Pryor.
OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR JOHN WARNER, CHAIRMAN
Chairman Warner. The committee meets today to receive
testimony on the transition to sovereignty in Iraq, now just
days away. We welcome our witnesses. Deputy Secretary of
Defense, Paul Wolfowitz; Deputy Secretary of State, Paul
Armitage; and General Richard Myers are witnesses who are well
qualified in their experience to discuss this topic, as they
have been intimately involved in it now from the very
beginning.
Secretary Wolfowitz, in addition, has just returned days
ago from his most recent trip to the region. You have made your
own assessment of this transition. In 5 days the sovereignty of
Iraq will pass to an interim Iraq government as Iraq continues
its path to elections and a hopeful democratic future. The past
few months have been very challenging, how well we all know
from the continuing evolving violence against the military
forces, against the new Iraqi government, and against innocent
civilians, their own people.
We are reminded that Iraq remains a very dangerous place.
In addition, we have witnessed evidence of abusive misconduct
by a very small number of our troops involved in detention
facilities. Our committee will continue to look into these
incidents and work with the Department to ensure that
corrective measures are taken. We cannot allow the misguided
actions of the few to tarnish the honorable efforts and
achievements of the vast majority of our service persons in
Iraq and around the world. We are ever mindful of the risks our
troops face every day and the sacrifices made by their families
that support them, and indeed, the communities that support
them.
The recent brutal murders of innocent civilians, including
Americans and other foreign nationals in Iraq and Saudi Arabia,
remind us and remind the world of the cruel, depraved nature of
those who oppose us in the global war on terrorism. Those who
have been removed from power in Iraq and Afghanistan are
seeking to delay their inevitable defeat and prevent others
from realizing their hopes for freedom and democracy. We mourn
every loss of life, every loss of limb, and salute those who
serve with courage in the cause of freedom with the support of
their families and with our support.
The timing and importance of this hearing cannot be
overstated. We are at a critical juncture for coalition efforts
in Iraq. The passage 2 weeks ago of a new U.N. Security Council
Resolution 1546 provides the appropriate means to continue our
support for efforts to stabilize and democratize Iraq and to
encourage increased participation by the rest of the
international community. It is in support of this extremely
important endeavor, as part of this resolution, the United
Nations (U.N.) and the new interim government of Iraq, have
requested the continued presence of a U.S.-led, multinational
force to assist in establishing security and stability in Iraq
so that a democratic political process can continue.
Progress made by our Armed Forces, together with our
coalition partners, presents an opportunity to fully defeat
violence and terror in Iraq, as the Nation's previous ruler
perpetrated violence and terror on his population, his
neighbors, and was a threat to the world. The cycle of violence
that has gripped this part of the world must end if we are to
win the global war on terrorism and make America and the world
a safer place. Any deviation, any hesitation from our current
course will only embolden those who are intent on fomenting
instability and anarchy and terrorism.
We have achieved extraordinary successes in a relatively
short period of time. Saddam Hussein and the threat he posed
are gone. A new Iraqi government will assume power.
Infrastructure and institutions are being rebuilt. The future
is hopeful for the Iraqi people. People are encouraged. This
morning, the polls show the Iraqi people reposing confidence in
this new government. We must continue to send a strong message
of resolve to the people of Iraq, to our troops, to our
coalition partners, and to the rest of the world that we will
stay the course and get the job done.
Continued U.S. commitment to Iraq after the June 30
transition is of enormous importance to the Iraqi people and to
the region. A free democratic Iraq means defeat for the forces
of terrorism and instability in Iraq. Clearly, the recent
violence is related to the imminent transfer of sovereignty.
Those who fear democracy are trying to delay its arrival. Those
who incite terror realize their days are numbered. Opponents of
a free democratic Iraq are desperate and will become even more
desperate in the days ahead. We will stay the course.
The President's action is a brave and a consistent one. He
has determined we will succeed. We will, and we must. I applaud
President Bush for his consistent efforts, efforts that began
in September 2002 at the U.N. to build and expand the coalition
of nations who have the courage and conviction to fight terror
in order to make the region and the world a better place and a
safer place.
Many countries shared in the effort to liberate Iraq. More
are participating in rebuilding Iraq and assisting in building
a democratic institution. Currently, 38 nations are involved in
this endeavor. We all hope more will join. This is critically
important work that deserves the support of all responsible
members of the international community. The entire world will
benefit from a success and freedom in that region. We will
suffer in the world if we fail to establish our goals.
I welcome the increased participation of the U.N. in the
political transition process and the re-establishment of a U.N.
assistance mission in Iraq, and we share the President's desire
as he leaves our shores today to go abroad to join those in
Turkey at a North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO)
conference, and to carry with him the message of the Prime
Minister of Iraq that he needs help, his people need help. I am
encouraged by the initial response of some of the NATO members.
We have many questions that lie ahead. How will
multinational force operations be coordinated with Iraq's
security forces and the interim Iraqi government after June 30?
What will be the status of U.S. and coalition forces in a
sovereign Iraq, and how can those forces be protected from
unwarranted or unjustified litigation under the forthcoming
Iraqi law? What steps remain in the process leading to
elections of a permanent Iraqi government? What will be the
status of ongoing reconstruction activities? What progress has
been made in training, equipping, mentoring, and fielding
effective Iraqi security forces? When will they be ready to
assume primary responsibility for the internal and external
defense of their own nation? What role will U.S. forces play in
the detention of prisoners after the transfer of sovereignty,
most importantly including the custody and interrogation of the
high interest prisoners, such as Saddam Hussein?
Consequently, this hearing today is a full opportunity for
this committee with those probably best qualified to give us
answers and give the Nation and the world the positions of this
country. I hope our witnesses can provide insights into these
issues.
Lasting peace and security in Iraq will be achieved when we
establish the conditions for a democratic, economically viable
nation. The first steps to democracy have been taken and a new
government is preparing to assume the responsibilities and
challenges of freedom and democracy. This new interim Iraqi
government will need the continued support and commitment of
the United States Congress, the American people, and the
international community. Their success will stand as a beacon
of hope to others and a turning point in the war against
terrorism and violence.
Senator Levin.
STATEMENT OF SENATOR CARL LEVIN
Senator Levin. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thank you for
calling this important hearing. Over the last few weeks, we
have seen movement in Iraq on political matters with the
formation of the interim Iraqi government and the planned
transfer of full sovereignty next week. Although late in
coming, there is finally a real diplomatic effort on the part
of the administration to obtain input and support of the broad
international community, as reflected in the unanimous vote for
the U.N. Security Council Resolution. Now we need a major
administration effort to enlist Muslim countries and to enlist
NATO to provide needed troops, police, and security personnel.
We have recently seen major setbacks in the security
situation in Iraq, including political assassinations of Iraqi
government officials and car bombings and other attacks, which
have produced casualties among U.S. and coalition soldiers, and
killed scores and seriously injured hundreds of ordinary Iraqi
civilians and security personnel.
The U.S. effort in Iraq is truly a race against time, a
race to establish a significant level of security that will
allow the political process to go forward with the convening of
the national conference in July and the elections of a national
assembly in December. It is a race against time because the
United States appears to be losing the war for the hearts and
minds of the Iraqi people. According to press reports, a recent
poll conducted by the Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA),
but not released to the public, indicated that an overwhelming
92 percent of Iraqis view the coalition forces as occupiers,
and only 2 percent as liberators. In fact, 55 percent of the
Iraqi people said that would feel safer if U.S. troops left
immediately.
At the same time, it is interesting to note and
discouraging to note that 81 percent of the Iraqis polled said
that they had an improved opinion of Muqtada Sadr and 64
percent said the actions of his militia have made Iraq more
unified. While their opinion of Sadr is improving, their
opinions of Americans are certainly not. Fifty-four percent of
Iraqis believe that all Americans act like those who
perpetrated the abuses at Abu Ghraib. We have a problem.
There are still more questions than answers concerning Abu
Ghraib, and the larger issue concerning the methods of
interrogation and the treatment of detainees in Iraq,
Afghanistan, and Guantanamo Bay. Every day there are more
revelations that appear to involve senior U.S. Government
officials in decisions to disregard tenets of the Geneva
Conventions. This has adverse effects on the future well being
of our troops and on our ability to establish security and
stability in Iraq. It makes it more difficult to attract allies
to help us wage a comprehensive political, economic, and
military campaign against the conditions and forces that breed
terrorism throughout the world.
There are a large number of unresolved issues surrounding
the ending of the occupation and the evolving relationship with
a newly sovereign Iraqi government. Chief among those are
issues concerning the operation of the multinational force and
its relationship with Iraqi security forces. The letters from
Secretary Powell and Prime Minister Allawi annexed to U.N.
Security Council Resolution 1546 agree that unity of command
will be achieved through coordination in the Iraqi Ministerial
Committee for National Security and other coordinating bodies
at national, regional, and local levels. We need to understand
how these coordinating mechanisms will operate in practice.
The letter from Secretary Powell states that the,
``Multinational Force must continue to function under a
framework that affords the force and its personnel the status
that they need to accomplish their mission and in which the
contributing states have responsibility for exercising
jurisdiction over their personnel.'' He further states that
``the existing framework governing these matters is sufficient
for these purposes.'' Our witnesses today will hopefully
describe specifically how U.S. soldiers and contractors will be
assured legal protections as they perform their missions in
Iraq.
We need to reverse the view of Iraqis of the allied forces
as occupiers. That means that the interim Iraqi government must
have real decisionmaking power and must also be able to direct
reconstruction resources to projects that have immediate effect
on the daily lives of Iraqis. The ordinary Iraqi must see the
interim government as an entity that has a positive impact on
his or her life, and as an entity that merits support. Then
Iraqis will see the insurgents as a threat to their own well
being rather than as a force against the occupier.
Only an Iraqi government which commands popular support can
defeat the ongoing insurgents. With support comes intelligence
that enables successful action against the insurgents. With
successful action comes security and further legitimacy for the
government. The challenge for the United States is to support
that process in a way that enhances the Iraqi government's
legitimacy and promotes that security. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Warner. Thank you very much. Gentlemen, we are
underway.
Secretary Wolfowitz.
STATEMENT OF HON. PAUL D. WOLFOWITZ, DEPUTY SECRETARY OF
DEFENSE
Secretary Wolfowitz. Mr. Chairman, I have given you a
fairly lengthy written statement, which I would be happy to put
in the record.
Chairman Warner. Statements of all witnesses will be placed
in the record.
Secretary Wolfowitz. I would just like to make a few,
hopefully brief, comments basically about the trip that I just
came back from. I went to Iraq with, among other people, our
Vice Chief of Staff of the Army, General George Casey, and I
want to say I appreciate the very speedy action that you and
your committee took in considering to nominate General Casey to
be the commander of multinational force Iraq. He is an
outstanding officer and a lot is going to ride on his shoulders
going forward. So I thank the committee for its speedy action.
The purpose of my trip was twofold, in part, as always, to
visit our magnificent troops. I did get to visit all five
American divisions as well as a British division and talked
with the Polish commander. One cannot help but over and over
again be impressed by the skill and the resourcefulness and the
intelligence, and most of all the courage of our men and women
who are in the front lines. I want to express my appreciation
and admiration for them and what they have done.
I think also this is a good occasion, since the CPA will be
out of business in just a few more days, to express
appreciation for the sacrifice that so many civilians and
military have contributed to that effort, also risking their
lives, and unfortunately in a number of cases, sacrificing
their lives for an enormously important cause.
I would also particularly like to pay tribute to the
courage of the journalists who cover this war who 34 of them
have given their lives. This is a dangerous theater. It is
dangerous just to be there. It is particularly dangerous to be
up there on the front lines, but our troops' morale is
fantastic. They believe and know that they are doing an
important job and they believe that they are succeeding.
The second purpose of this visit was to lead a
multinational team, including General Casey; the deputy chief
of mission of our new embassy that will be stood up in Iraq,
Ambassador Jim Jeffrey, my counterpart in the U.K.; and a
representative of the Polish government, for extensive
discussions with Prime Minister Allawi and his new national
security team, the Defense Minister, the Interior Minister, and
the National Security Advisor, to discuss his plans for Iraq's
security strategy, how to defeat, what he calls correctly, this
evil enemy, and his plans for standing up Iraqi security forces
that can win this fight. In the long run, the key to success
here is not American troops--it is Iraqi police; it is Iraqi
National Guard; it is Iraqi Army; it is Iraqis ready to stand
up and fight for their own country. In fact, by our own count I
might mention that more than 400 Iraqis have already died in
the line of duty alongside our forces fighting that enemy.
Our impression overall was very positive. Prime Minister
Allawi is a forceful, thoughtful man who clearly conveyed a
sense of strength and determination. That I think is what he is
conveying to the Iraqi people on a daily basis. He understands
that the security problem is the biggest problem facing the
Iraqi people and he is determined first and foremost to be able
to solve that. That is the key in turn to moving forward to
elections, which is the next important step in Iraq's political
process.
A recurrent theme in our discussions was the importance of
the Iraqi army as a symbol of national strength. The Prime
Minister has made no secret of his disagreement with the
earlier decision to disband the army. I would not be surprised
if, at least in some symbolic way, he reverses that.
More importantly, substantively what he wants to do and
what his plan envisions is bringing back significant numbers of
officers from the old Iraqi army. It is a process that we had
started, but I think that will very much accelerate under his
plan.
The general tenor of our discussions was to explain to him
and his national security team the efforts that are already
underway on the American side, on the coalition side, an effort
that has now been consolidated, as I think you know, under a
three-star U.S. Commander, Lieutenant General Dave Petraeus.
Our goal is to build Iraqi's security capacity as rapidly as
possible. We were, I will admit, going in a bit concerned that
perhaps the Prime Minister would have a totally different plan
and try to change course 90 degrees or 180 degrees. As General
Petraeus himself has said, this is a super tanker, not a speed
boat. It cannot turn on a dime.
I am happy to report that the Prime Minister's plans mesh
quite well with what is already underway, but take it in a
somewhat different direction in line with his own ideas about
the structure of the Armed Forces, and ultimately it will be
more ambitious. In that regard, however, we emphasize that our
plan already commits most of the resources under the U.S.
supplemental appropriation that were dedicated to security
forces, some $3.2 billion of the $18.6 billion, as I think you
know, were allocated to security. After an initial slow start,
a great deal of equipment is now arriving for all levels of
Iraqi security forces under that appropriation.
Prime Minister Allawi understands very clearly the
importance of prioritization, that you do first things first
and second things second, and if there are things that you
would like to do that you cannot afford, you make sure they are
lowest on your priority list. We also agreed that if we need
additional resources, there are, for one thing, the
possibilities of finding some within the Iraqi budget. It is
worth pointing out that Iraq has already committed, and this is
a significant figure, $20 billion of its own resources. That is
a pretty impressive number--$20 billion of Iraqi resources have
already gone into funding the government and funding
reconstruction, including 350,000 teachers, 100,000 doctors,
more than 2,000 schools, almost 250 hospitals, over $1 billion
in improving the electricity infrastructure. This is all from
Iraqi funds, and there is more coming in, additional billions,
of course, from oil revenues, and of course that is one the
major targets of the enemy is to try to reduce oil production.
But as substantial as those numbers sound, they have to go
a very long way, so I think both of us believe that one of the
first places to go for help in training and equipping Iraqi
security forces is to the international community, including
starting with NATO at the summit coming up in Istanbul. Prime
Minister Allawi has written to the NATO Secretary General
soliciting NATO support in a number of areas, including
military contributions to providing additional forces,
particularly for U.N. security, but importantly, for training
and equipping Iraqi security forces.
In my statement, I outline the priorities he assigns to the
various Iraqi forces, the Iraqi intervention force, the Iraqi
special operations force, and the Iraqi National Guard, which
is based on what we had started to develop as the Iraqi civil
defense corps. I do not know whether it is the Arabic
translation or whether it is just the words themselves, but the
Iraqis explained to us that civil defense corps sounds to
people like the fire department. It is really more like a
branch of the army.
But it is not just a change of name. It will be organized
into a brigade and division structure with 18 national guard
brigades, which provides 1 for each province, and 6 divisions.
They would also like to put a corps structure on top of that,
but I think they were persuaded that that is something that can
wait.
We do not think the resource requirements for these
headquarters will be enormous, because we are not talking about
expeditionary headquarters of the type that we would deploy,
but resources have got to be taken into account. From the Prime
Minster's point of view, it is an enormously important
opportunity to bring back clean officers from the old army. I
emphasize that problem that he will face of how to vet out the
bad ones from that barrel, but he is determined to move ahead,
and he has the skill and wisdom to do so.
As I indicated and as Senator Levin alluded to in his
statement, the Iraqis are eager to get additional international
contributions, with the exception that they believe neighboring
states should not do so because of the political issues that
raises. We and they are focused in particular on getting
additional international contributions to support the U.N.'s
activities in Iraq. We think that is one mission that more
countries can and should be able to contribute to.
I would like to close--I started by commenting on the
courage of the Americans who were participating in this
effort--it is important to close with a comment about the
courage of the Iraqis. The Prime Minister himself is an
incredibly brave man. He was attacked in 1979, outside his
apartment in London, by one of Saddam's agents. He was alerted
just in time to get his head out of the way of the ax, but he
was nearly chopped in two. He spent a year in the hospital. His
wife was permanently institutionalized from the nervous
breakdown she suffered as a result.
We met with the President of Iraq, a remarkable man named
Ghazi Al-Yawar. Some of you had the opportunity to meet with
him when he was in Washington a couple of weeks ago. He is a
leading figure in the Shammar tribe, which is one of the
largest tribes in Iraq, a tribe by the way that is a mixture of
Shia and Sunni, which is apparently a not unknown Iraqi
phenomenon. His predecessor was assassinated with a car bomb
just a month before, just about 2 months ago when Sheikh Ghazi
became the President of the interim Governing Council, because
his predecessor was murdered.
We met with the Deputy Prime Minister, a man named Barham
Salih, who many of us have known for a long time. He was back
in 2002 the target of an assassination attempt by al Qaeda-
associated killers who had apparent connections to Iraqi
intelligence.
We visited the Marines in Fallujah and met a young marine
private first class who had been wounded in action and whose
life had been saved by the heroism of five Iraqi civil defense
corps members who put their own lives in danger to rescue that
marine.
I could go on, but most movingly of all, we met this very
dynamic, impressive young Iraqi Kurdish woman who was our
interpreter in Mosul. Her sister was assassinated just a few
weeks ago because she was working for the Americans. My
military assistant, who knew her from when he was with the
101st Division up north, asked her, ``why do you keep doing
this?'' She said, ``because my father told me, `you must never
retreat in the face of evil'.''
These people are staring evil in the face. They know what
their enemies want to do. They are standing up with enormous
courage. They are counting on our support and our help, but
they are prepared to face death in the face because they
understand what the stakes are. This enemy has one and only one
skill and that is killing and destroying mostly innocent
people. That is its strength, but I think it is also its
weakness, because the overwhelming majority of Iraqis want
peace and security and the opportunity to build a new Iraq that
this enemy is trying to frustrate.
That, Mr. Chairman, is why I am convinced that they can
step up to this job. They will step up to this job. The plan
that the President laid out a few weeks ago, moving first to a
sovereign government on July 1, is a plan that leads to Iraqi
self government and Iraqi self defense, which is the key to
victory in this incredibly important fight.
I thank the committee for the support you continue to give
our troops. They are enormously appreciative of the kind of
help they get from back here. They deserve every bit of it, and
I express my thanks and gratitude.
[The prepared statement of Secretary Wolfowitz follows:]
Prepared Statement by Hon. Paul D. Wolfowitz
Mr. Chairman, Senator, members of the committee, I am happy to be
here today to testify on the recent progress in the transition to Iraqi
sovereignty and my talks last week with Prime Minister Allawi and his
national security team.
As President Bush noted recently, the selection of the Iraqi
interim government ``brings us one step closer to realizing the dream
of millions of Iraqis: a fully sovereign nation with a representative
government that protects their rights and serves their needs.''
The transition to Iraqi sovereignty represents the culmination of
the more than a year-long partnership between the Iraqi people and the
coalition forces serving in Iraq, working together to create a secure
environment in which freedom and prosperity can grow. Whether from
Australia or El Salvador, Poland or the Philippines, we owe a sincere
debt of gratitude to the roughly 23,000 men and women from our 32
coalition partners.
Of course, our prayers continue to be with all of our people
currently serving in Iraq. I returned last week from a 4\1/2\ day trip
that took us to northern, central western and southern Iraq, visiting
all five American divisions as well as the British and Polish division
commanders in Iraq. In temperatures consistently above 100 degrees, I
saw firsthand the tremendous work our brave young Americans are doing,
and with every trip I make to Iraq I am consistently amazed at the
leaps in progress they are achieving.
They are making America--and the world--more secure by helping the
Iraqi people to plant the seeds of peaceful, representative government
in the heart of the Middle East--a potentially watershed moment in the
global war on terror. Whether members of active duty, Reserve, or
National Guard units, or civilians working with the CPA or one of many
nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) active in Iraq, these heroes
embody the best ideals of our Nation. They serve so that others may be
free and Americans can be secure, and we thank them all for the
sacrifices they endure.
Finally, on behalf of these brave Americans, let me express thanks
to Congress and the members of this committee for the bipartisan
support you give our Armed Forces. The $25 billion supplemental you
approved unanimously will ensure that our forces continue to have the
resources necessary to complete their missions in Iraq and Afghanistan.
You have signaled to the world, both to our allies and to our enemies,
America's commitment to see this new struggle against tyranny and
barbarism through to the end.
Additionally, I would like to personally thank the members of this
committee for your support of the Commander's Emergency Response
Program and the Train and Equip authorities to help U.S. military
forces secure and stabilize Iraq and Afghanistan, enhance the ability
of these countries' military and security forces to combat terrorism
and support U.S. and coalition military operations. Both provisions are
extremely vital tools as we work to rebuild Iraq and provide security
for our troops. The Department will continue to work with the members
to increase the train and equip authority to the President's requested
amount of $500 million in fiscal year 2005.
OUR STRATEGY IN IRAQ
Speaking at the United States Air Force Academy Graduation Ceremony
3 weeks ago, President Bush outlined the strategy for helping Iraqis
achieve a fully constitutional government, one that enables Iraq to
preserve its territorial integrity, reject weapons of mass destruction
and terrorism, and live peacefully with its neighbors. The strategy
involves five interdependent phases to build Iraqi capacity and
transfer responsibilities from the coalition to Iraq rapidly--but not
recklessly.
Transferring Authority to a Sovereign Iraq
The first phase of the President's plan will become effective on
June 30 when the CPA transfers authority to the Interim Iraqi
Government--a body that will consist of a president, two deputy
presidents, a prime minister, and 26 ministries, and will be
responsible for day-to-day governing of Iraqi state affairs and will
work as a full partner in providing security to Iraq. On July 1, U.S.
Embassy Iraq will open for business as a full partner in helping to
bring democracy, prosperity, and security to Iraq.
When Iraq becomes sovereign on June 30, our engagement will
naturally change. But our commitment will not. During this stage, our
focus will rest on shaping and supporting Iraq's political transition
and particularly on setting the stage for national elections.
Security
Security is the foundation for victory in Iraq--the foundation on
which all other successes in Iraq are built. As President Bush noted,
we are again at war against philosophies of death and tyranny. In Iraq,
the forces presently trying to derail Iraq's progress towards democracy
include the killers who used to work in Saddam's fascist intelligence
services and the Fedayeen Saddam, al Qaeda-inspired foreign terrorists,
and the gangs that follow Muqtada al-Sadr. Accordingly, a critical step
in the strategy is to help Iraqis fashion the stability and security on
which representative government depends.
Since the beginning of our mission in Iraq, a principal goal has
been to encourage and enable Iraqis to defend, guard and police Iraq
for themselves. It is far better that Iraqis--who have a native
knowledge of everything from city neighborhoods and regional accents to
religious sensitivities and even local license plates--deal with
problems unique to Iraq. Allowing them to take the lead in securing
Iraq is a major key to victory over the enemies of a free Iraq.
Although there are currently over 200,000 Iraqi security forces on
duty or in training, Iraq's security forces are still a work in
progress. They require training, equipment, leadership and team-
building to be able to handle continuing threats--internal and
external--on their own. We have accelerated our efforts to recruit,
train, equip, and, most importantly, mentor Iraqi security forces.
However, U.S. and other international forces will remain indispensable
to preserving security while Iraqi forces build their strength. This is
recognized in U.N. Security Council Resolution 1546, which reaffirms
the authorization for multinational force-Iraq.
U.S. forces in Iraq will remain under U.S. command and will have
clear rules of engagement. U.S. commanders, however, will coordinate
security efforts closely with their Iraqi counterparts. These troops
will be maintained at the level required to do the job, as our
commanders in Iraq constantly reassess the numbers of troops they need.
As we have often said, and as the President reiterated in his recent
address to the Nation, if our commanders on the ground ask for more
troops, they will get more troops.
Rebuilding Iraq's Infrastructure
The third step in the President's plan for victory in Iraq involves
rebuilding Iraq's civil infrastructure-deeply damaged by decades of
Saddam's neglect and the ravages of three wars Saddam brought upon his
people. At present, 16 ministries which will address such programs--to
include Health, Education and Public Works and Municipalities--have
been handed over to Iraqis who are running these ministries with full
authority. We will continue to work with Iraqis to build on what has
already been achieved in areas such as healthcare and education.
Enlisting International Support
Investment in Iraq's success is not just an American investment, it
is one that must be shared by the international community. The fourth
step in the President's plan involves enlisting additional
international support for Iraq's transition to democracy. The U.N. will
play a critical role in that process. In the last couple of weeks, the
U.N. Security Council unanimously passed Resolution 1546, endorsing the
transition timetable adopted by Iraqis and encouraging other U.N.
members to add their support. The international community at large will
continue to play a key role in helping Iraq stand on its own feet
through such actions as economic assistance, debt relief, and continued
military support.
Continue Building on Iraq's Capacity for Self-Government
The fifth step in the President's plan involves nurturing Iraq's
capacity for representative self-government that will lead to a
constitutional government by the end of 2005. The interim government
will serve until representatives to a transitional government are
elected, no later than the end of January 2005--the first free
elections held in Iraqi history.
By the end of 2005, Iraqis are scheduled to vote on a new
constitution that will protect the rights of all Iraqi citizens
regardless of their religion or ethnicity. This is the historic point
when Iraq will have the necessary legitimacy for durable self-rule.
During this process Iraqis will decide for themselves the exact
structure of their permanent government and the provisions of their
Iraqi constitution.
As important as clarity about these five phases of our strategy is,
it is equally important that we maintain the ability to adjust to
rapidly evolving conditions in Iraq. For history has demonstrated that
even the best laid plans for post-war reconstruction can go awry if not
matched to the realities on the ground. For example, in World War II
post-war planning for the reconstruction of Germany began 3 years
before the end of the war. Before the German surrender, the Joint
Chiefs of Staffs blueprint for the occupation of Germany, JSC 1067,
specified tough programs to ``prevent Germany from ever again becoming
a threat to the peace of the world.'' No sooner did military and
civilian officials arrive in devastated Germany after the war than they
began to realize this plan was wholly inadequate. All of the programs
specified in JCS 1067, the result of 3 years worth of planning, either
failed or were aborted. Eventually, more than 2 years after Victory in
Europe (VE) day, JCS 1067 was replaced altogether by JCS 1779, which
stressed the goal of a ``stable and productive Germany.''
That history demonstrates that the key to post-war reconstruction
lies not in impressive looking paperwork devised thousands of miles
away from the frontline, but flexibility when planning meets reality.
In reconstruction, as in war, plans are at best the basis for future
changes. Whereas it took the United States more than 2 years to alter
its plans after World War II, in less than 15 months this coalition has
repeatedly demonstrated that it can be flexible when necessary, and it
has done so in the face of an evil enemy that continues to kill and
destroy.
Examples of this flexibility include:
Creating a new type of indigenous force (the Iraqi
Civil Defense Corps) to fill the gap between the Iraqi police
service and an army oriented to external defense;
Requesting a large supplemental when the requirements
for Iraqi reconstruction became clear;
Responding to Iraqi demands for a more rapid
resumption of sovereignty by developing the idea of a
transitional government that could take power before a
permanent constitution is ratified;
Dropping the ``caucus plan'' for selecting the
transitional government, when it turned out to be unpopular
with Iraqis, and substituting a two-step process involving an
interim government that will take power before legislative
elections;
Revising the mechanisms for implementing the de-
Baathification policy to address complaints that the appeals
process was not working as intended, and to respond to the
Sunni minority's fears of marginalization.
Although the reconstruction plans first envisioned in the summer of
2002, and submitted by the CPA to Congress last July have undergone
substantial changes, it has been the coalition's ability to adapt to
rapidly changing circumstances that has brought us now to the transfer
of sovereignty, and the beginning of representative government in Iraq.
THE IRAQI INTERIM GOVERNMENT
The first phase of the President's plan takes effect on June 30,
when the CPA will cease to exist, transferring all governmental
authority to the Iraqi interim government. This interim government was
formed through a process of wide-ranging consultation with Iraqis,
including political leaders, religious and tribal leaders, and civic
associations. The process was led by Ambassador Lakhdar Brahirni,
Special Adviser on Iraq to the Secretary General of the United Nations,
working in consultation with the CPA and the Iraqi Governing Council.
The Iraqi interim government consists of a President, two Deputy
Presidents, and a Prime Minister leading a Council of Ministers. The
new government will also include an interim national council and a
judicial authority. The interim national council will be chosen by a
national conference, to be held in July, involving at least a thousand
Iraqis from across Iraq, and representing every province in the
country, as well as various political parties, tribal leaders, trade
and professional unions, universities, and religious leaders.
The composition of the Iraqi interim government is as follows:
President of Iraq--Sheikh Ghazi Ajil Al-Yawar
Deputy President of Iraq--Dr. Ibrahim Jaafari
Deputy President of Iraq--Dr. Rowsch Shaways
Prime Minister of Iraq--Dr. Ayad Allawi
Deputy Prime Minister--Dr. Barham Salih
Minister of Agriculture--Dr. Sawsan Ali Magid Al-Sharifi
Minister of Communications--Dr. Mohammad Ali Al-Hakim
Minister of Culture--Mr. Mufeed Mohammed Jawad al-Jaza'iri
Minister of Defense--Mr. Hazem Sha'alan
Minister of Displacement and Migration--Ms. Pascale Isho Warda
Minister of Education--Professor Saini Al-Mudhaffar
Minister of Electricity--Dr. Aiham Al-Sammarae
Minister of Environment--Professor Mishkat Moumin
Minister of Finance--Dr. Adel Abdul Mahdi
Minister of Foreign Affairs--Mr. Hoshyar Mahmood Mohammed
Zebari
Minister of Health--Dr. Ala'adin Alwan
Minister of Higher Education--Dr. Taher Khalaf Jabur Al-Bakaa
Minister of Housing and Construction--Dr. Omar Al-Farouq Salim
Al-Damluji
Minister of Human Rights--Dr. Bakhtiar Amin
Minister of Industry and Minerals--Dr. Hajem Al-Hasssani
Minister of Interior--Mr. Falah al-Nakib
Minister of Justice--Dr. Malik Dohan Al-Hassan
Minister of Labor and Social Affairs--Ms. Leyla Abdul Latif
Minister of Public Works--Ms. Nasreen Mustapha Berwari
Minister of Oil--Mr. Thamir Abbas Ghadban
Minister of Planning--Dr. Mehdi Al-Hafidh
Minister of Science and Technology--Dr. Rashad Mandan Omar
Minister of State for Provinces--Judge Wa'il Abdul al-Latif
Minister of State for Women--Ms. Narmin Othman
Minister of State--Dr. Kasim Daoud
Minister of State--Dr. Mamu Farham Othman
Minister of State--Mr. Adnan al-Janabi
Minister of Trade--Mr. Mohammed Mostafa al-Jibouri
Minister of Transportation--Mr. Louay Hatem Sultan Al-Erris
Minister of Water Resources--Dr. Abdul Latif Jamal Rashid
Minister of Youth and Sports--Mr. Ali Fa'iq Al-Ghabban
This is a remarkable group of individuals. They reflect a wide
array of talents and backgrounds, and they are all committed to serving
the interests of the Iraqi people and paving away for the first free
elections in Iraqi history. They are doing so in full knowledge that
they are risking their lives. I hope that the members of this committee
will join me in pledging our full support, and our prayers, to the
interim government as they prepare to assume ultimate authority in Iraq
in less than 3 weeks.
The Iraqi interim government will operate under the legal framework
established by the Transitional Administrative Law (TAL) and the TAL
Annex. The President and the two Deputy Presidents will form a
presidency of the State that represents the sovereignty of Iraq and
oversees the higher affairs of the country. The presidency will have
ceremonial functions and must unanimously approve orders issued by the
Council of Ministers before they can become law.
The Prime Minister will have day-to-day responsibility for the
management of the government. Iraq's ministers, who will oversee the
ministries, will report to the Prime Minister. The government will be
responsible for improving security, promoting economic development, and
for the important process of preparing for democratic elections in
January 2005. The Council of Ministers, with the unanimous approval of
the presidency, may issue orders or decrees with the force of law. The
interim national council can veto these orders or decrees by a two-
thirds majority vote.
As noted above, the national conference will choose an interim
national council of 100 members. The interim national council will
oversee the government and will have other substantive powers specified
in the TAL Annex. It will be able to hear the views of citizens, advise
and question the government on policy, form committees and veto orders
or decrees from the Council of Ministers by a two-thirds majority vote.
It will also have the authority to appoint replacements to the
presidency in the event that a member of the presidency dies or
resigns, and it will have the right to approve the 2005 Iraqi national
budget.
As set out in the Transitional Administrative Law, the judicial
authority is independent of the executive branch of government. The
Federal judicial branch will include a Federal Supreme Court, a Court
of Cassation, Courts of Appeal and the Central Criminal Court of Iraq.
In addition, there will be a Higher Juridical Council that will
supervise the Federal judiciary and administer the budget.
Some have argued that the Iraqi interim government will be a puppet
of the United States, or will have only limited sovereignty. This is,
quite simply, false, and ignores the fully sovereign powers of the
interim government. For example, the Iraqi interim government that
takes power on June 30 will have the power to conclude agreements in
the areas of diplomatic relations and economic reconstruction,
including Iraq's sovereign debt.
At the same time, the Iraqi people desire to limit the powers of an
unelected government. After 30 years of living under Saddam's tyranny,
it is perfectly understandable that the Iraqi people would seek to
limit the power of a government that is not yet fully accountable to
the Iraqi electorate. And given our nation's history of resistance to
taxation without representation, Americans should easily understand why
Iraqis want the interim government's authority to be limited.
Consequently, the Iraqi interim government will not be able to
amend the TAL or to form agreements which permanently alter the destiny
of Iraq. The Iraqi people have made clear that only an elected
government should have such powers. The interim government will operate
under rules defined in the TAL, which provides a historic bill of
rights for the Iraqi people and a roadmap to a permanent constitution
in 2005.
THE IRAQI INTERIM GOVERNMENT AND THE MULTINATIONAL FORCE (MNF)
Although this progress on the political track is impressive, the
ability of the Iraqi people to achieve their aspirations will be
heavily influence by the security situation in Iraq. As recent events
have demonstrated, continuing attacks by insurgents, including members
of Saddam's security services, foreign fighters and terrorists, and
illegal militias challenge all those who are working for a better Iraq.
This is why both the new Prime Minister and Foreign Minister have
publicly requested that the U.S.-led multinational forces remain in
Iraq to help the Iraqi people complete their political transition and
permit the U.N. and the international community to work to facilitate
Iraq's reconstruction. In a statement this week, Prime Minister Allawi
said:
We are deeply grateful for the sacrifices that the forces of
friendly countries have made to help liberate us from one of
the most abusive tyrants of modem times. . . .
Until our forces are fully capable, we will continue to need
support from our friends in the Multi-National Force--Iraq. We
appreciate the understanding and contributions of the
international community, and we hope that additional
international support will be forthcoming in response to U.N.
Security Council Resolution 1546.
Similarly, addressing the U.N. Security Council earlier this month
as that body was considering what became Resolution 1546, Foreign
Minister Hoshyar Zebari said:
[Since April] last year we have been working very hard to re-
establish Iraq's security, military, and police forces.
However, we have yet to reach the stage of being able to
maintain our own security and therefore the people of Iraq need
and request the assistance of multinational forces to work
closely with Iraqi forces to stabilize the situation. I stress
that any premature departure of international troops would lead
to chaos and the real possibility of a civil war in Iraq. This
would cause a humanitarian crisis and provide a foothold for
terrorists to launch their evil campaign in our country and
beyond our borders. The continued presence of the multinational
force will help preserve Iraq's unity, prevent regional
intervention in our affairs and protect our borders at this
critical stage of our reconstruction.
The Iraqi Armed Forces will be a principal partner of the
multinational force. The Iraqi National Guard--built on the present
Civil Defense Corps--will be part of the Iraqi Army, which will be
responsible to the Iraqi Ministry of Defense. The objectives and
functions of the multinational force after the transfer of sovereignty
will remain as it has been, except that it will now coordinate with the
sovereign Iraqi government through agreed consultative mechanisms.
We will need to develop an effective and cooperative security
partnership between the multinational force and the sovereign
government of Iraq. The commander of the multinational force will work
in partnership with the sovereign Government of Iraq in helping to
provide security while recognizing and respecting its sovereignty. To
that end, multinational force commanders will, at the invitation of the
Iraqi Prime Minister, participate in discussions of the Ministerial
Committee for National Security on the broad framework of security
policy. The Iraqi security forces will be responsible to the
appropriate Iraqi ministers. The multinational force will coordinate
with them at all levels--national, regional, and local--in order to
maintain unity of command of military operations in which Iraqi forces
are engaged with the multinational force.
While the Iraqi Government may withhold their forces from specific
multinational force operations, units committed to joint operations.
with the MNF will act under unified command. Iraqi leaders and the MNF
will keep each other informed of their respective activities, consult
regularly to ensure the effective allocation and use of personnel,
resources and facilities, will share intelligence, and will refer
issues up the respective chains of command where necessary. This will
be a partnership--where both sides will bring their views to the table
and agreements will be reached through mutual consent.
We were able to fill in many details of this partnership during our
talks last week with Prime Minister Allawi and his national security
team. Those talks enabled us to gain insight into the new Iraqi
government's strategy to defeat its enemies as it prepares to assume
sovereign authority and as our role changes from that of an occupying
power responsible for maintaining security to helping the Iraqis defend
themselves. We met with Prime Minister Allawi and his team for about 8
hours over the course of 3 days. The meetings were very cordial and
productive. Based on Lieutenant General Petraeus' ongoing work with the
Iraqis, as well as on last week's discussions, we achieved consensus on
a way ahead, which was reflected in Prime Minister Allawi's statement
this past Sunday of Iraq's national security strategy.
A key element of these talks was the delineation of several
mechanisms for the coordination of operations between Iraqi security
forces and the multinational force. The Iraqis proposed the creation of
a Joint Operating Center to coordinate operations at the national
level. It will fill the gap between the Joint Coordinating Centers,
which function at the regional and local levels, and the Ministerial
Committee for National Security, which would deal with political-
military issues at the strategic level. Participants in this body will
include representatives of the Prime Minister, the Ministers of Defense
and the Interior, the multinational force Commander and the Chief of
the Office of Security Transition.
The Iraqis also agreed that the Iraq Survey Group (ISG) will
continue to operate as part of the multinational force authorized by
UNSCRs 1511 and 1546, although they will want increased input and
coordination in the ISG's activities.
We also agreed to establish a Joint Committee on Detainees. We
agreed that representation in this committee should include
representatives from the Iraqi government, the multinational force, and
ambassadors from contributing countries.
The Iraqis also requested help in creating a command center in the
Prime Minister's office. We agreed that we could re-allocate resources
already committed to creating command centers at the Ministries of
Defense and the Interior, and at the joint headquarters and could begin
work quickly. General Sanchez noted that once the Iraqis have
identified appropriate officers, we can embed them at lower-level
multinational force headquarters. These embedded officers could be
connected to the Prime Minister's command center to provide situational
awareness before lower-level Iraqi headquarters were up. and running.
IRAQI SECURITY FORCES
Of course, the long-term key to success in Iraq requires building
indigenous Iraqi capacity and transitioning responsibilities from the
coalition to Iraq. Nowhere is this more vital than in our efforts to
build capable Iraqi security forces to achieve stability. Our plan
was--and is--for Iraqi forces to develop strength, capability, and
experience with the help of the multinational force, with the MNF
playing a crucial supporting role until the Iraqis can stand on their
own.
Current plans call for:
Iraqi Army: 27 battalions (35,000 soldiers) trained
and on duty by October. Most of their equipment is planned to
be on hand by that time with vehicles continuing to be
delivered through March 2005.
Iraqi National Guard: 45 battalions (40,000 soldiers)
by September, with possible additional battalions beyond.
Equipment is arriving rapidly, and the 45 battalions should be
equipped by September.
Iraqi Police Service: 90,000 policemen, which is the
current number on duty, fully trained by June 2005. Equipment
is flowing in, and they are planned to be fully equipped by
September.
Iraqi Border Patrol: 20,000 by July, to be fully
equipped by September.
Facility Protection Service: There are currently
74,000 on duty, with the final number to be determined by the
Iraqi Ministry of the Interior. These forces might also be
fully equipped by September.
During our meetings with Prime Minster Allawi, the Prime Minister
conveyed a clear sense of priorities for the different elements of the
Iraqi security forces. The first priority will be the Iraqi
Intervention Force (previously called the Iraqi National Task Force).
This force's main mission will be to defeat enemy forces in urban
areas, and will have a troop strength of 6,600 troops organized into
three brigades.
The second priority will be an Iraq Special Operations Force,
consisting of a 764-troop Iraqi Counter Terrorist Force, similar to our
special weapons and tactics (SWAT) teams, and a supporting Commando
Battalion, similar to a Ranger Battalion, comprised of 828 troops.
The third priority will be the creation of an Iraqi National Guard,
based on the current Iraqi Civil Defense Corps (ICDC), as part of the
Iraq Army. While the planned size of the force will remain initially at
45 battalions, a command structure of 6 division headquarters and 18
brigade headquarters would be added. This would create an all-Iraqi
chain of command for the ICDC battalions, through brigade and division
headquarters, to the Army Chief of Staff and Defense Minister, and
finally all the way up to the Prime Minister.
The areas of operation of the six divisions could be aligned with
the AOs of the multinational force's six major subordinate commands.
This would facilitate coordination between Iraqi and international
forces at the regional level.
The fourth priority is the continued development of two divisions
of the Regular Army. While the current mission statement of the regular
army emphasizes defense against external conventional attack, the new
government wants to be able to use it against the internal enemy, the
real current threat to Iraq's security. Additionally, although the
Iraqis had considered adding two more divisions, they agreed that this
is a lower priority that can be deferred to a later date.
LESSONS LEARNED
The spike in combat activity we witnessed in Iraq, and the mixed
performance of Iraqi security forces we saw in response, have provided
further lessons we can apply to increase the impact of what we are
doing to recruit, train, equip and, most importantly, mentor Iraqi
security forces.
The first lesson is the need for stronger leaders in the security
forces. We will build on the leaders whose units fought, and we will
replace those whose units did not. We will integrate Iraqi officers
with coalition forces and we will embed coalition officers with the
Iraqi security forces. This arrangement provides liaison, which
produces mutual confidence, and it also helps us develop Iraqi
leadership. Similarly, we need police liaisons and specialized trainers
to get down to police stations around the country to provide confidence
and set the example.
Second, the Iraqi security forces need more and better equipment.
We had not planned for them to be fully equipped at this point, and
many police and ICDC units were outgunned in recent action. We are
reexamining the equipment requirements. We have also incurred some
delays in equipping the Iraqi security forces. Part of the delay has
been caused by challenges in the contracting process, and those
problems finally seem to be fixed. We need to make up for lost time,
but any further delay is unacceptable.
Third, it is clear that the members of the security forces, most of
whom are Iraqi patriots, need an Iraqi rallying point. They need to
understand they report to an Iraqi chain of command, and that at the
top of that chain of command is a lawfully constituted Iraqi
government. The chain of command is being put in place now. A defense
minister has been named, along with a commander in chief of the armed
forces and a chief of staff. A new interior minister has also taken
office. The rest of the chain needs to be filled, but Iraqis in the
security forces can see today that there are Iraqis at the top.
The greatest factor in the mixed performance of the security forces
was an intangible: fear. The enemies of a democratic future for Iraq
have so terrorized the cities of central Iraq that many members of the
security forces doubt that they or their families can be protected from
the retribution that may follow their participation in operations
alongside the coalition. Until Iraqis are convinced that Saddam's
regime has been permanently and irreversibly removed, and until a long
and ghastly part of their history is put to rest and overcome, that
fear will remain. Convincing them of this truth--that Saddam and the
Saddamists are finished--will continue to require investments of our
time and our resources and our precious men and women in uniform, to
continue to build trust among the Iraqi people. That is why it is so
important in this time of stress to show that our commitment to their
freedom is rock-solid.
This is also why it is inadvisable to set a hard deadline for the
multinational force's mandate in Iraq. Such a deadline would risk
creating the impression amongst the great majority of moderate Iraqis
who hope for a new Iraq that we were not committed to the long-term
stability of Iraq. It would encourage the terrorists and murderers from
Saddam's intelligence services to wait us out so that they could
unleash a wave of violence in order to regain political power and begin
their tyranny over the Iraqi people anew. Creating artificial deadlines
for withdrawal will only serve to undermine our current mission in
Iraq. It will put at risk the significant gains already made by the
Iraqi people in the rebuilding of their nation, and will endanger the
lives of American soldiers.
THE ROLE OF NATO AND THE U.N.
Contrary to assertions that we are in Iraq with a coalition that is
just window dressing for unilateralism, the coalition's mission to
liberate and reconstruct Iraq has been an international effort from the
start. This includes heavy NATO participation, as 16 of our NATO allies
currently have more than 19,000 troops deployed in support of Operation
Iraqi Freedom's stability operations. Appropriately, British and Polish
representatives participated in our meetings with Iraq's national
security leaders.
Similarly, this administration has made a significant effort to
involve the United Nations in the reconstruction of Iraq. The
Coalition's ongoing efforts in Iraq have repeatedly received the
endorsement of the U.N. U.N. Security Council Resolution 1483--passed
May 22, 2003--supported the formation of the CPA and an Iraqi Interim
Administration. UNSCR 1500--passed August 14, 2003-- recognized the
establishment of the Governing Council. UNSCR 1511--passed October 16,
2003--authorizes a multinational force under unified command. All three
of these resolutions were unanimously endorsed by the U.N. Security
Council.
The administration has worked, closely with the U.N. Secretary
General throughout the past year. Before his tragic murder by
terrorists, U.N. envoy Sergio Viera de Mello was instrumental in
establishing the Iraqi Governing Council. The new U.N. envoy, Lakdar
Brahimi, has been invaluable in facilitating the creation of the Iraqi
interim government. Since the tragic bombing of the U.N. Headquarters
in Baghdad last August--which Zarqawi boasts was his doing and which
was clearly aimed at driving out the U.N.--security for the U.N. has
been a major challenge. However, the U.N. representative for Security
Coordination's Office has been in Baghdad since mid-January, and a U.N.
Election Commission headed by Carina Perelli has been in Iraq since
April.
On May 24, the U.S. and U.K. submitted a draft U.N. Security
Council Resolution that defines U.S. and international responsibilities
in Iraq. This resolution was passed unanimously on June 8 as UNSCR
1546. We look forward to the U.N. providing election expertise and
assistance in preparation for the election of the Iraqi transitional
government by January 2005. We have also proposed a specific allotment
of international forces falling under the unified command of the
multinational force whose sole mission would be the protection of U.N.
personnel and facilities in Iraq. This would permit the U.N. to expand
their presence and activities within Iraq, something this
administration has supported since Iraq's liberation over a year ago.
We look forward to the continued participation of these
international organizations in Iraq after the transition to Iraqi
sovereignty. Many allies support an increased role by NATO in Iraq.
Several have called for the passing of a new U.N. Security Council
Resolution authorizing a NATO force presence, functional tasking, such
as election support, ordnance disposal, the protection of U.N.
personnel, or assisting in the equipping of Iraqi security forces.
CONCLUSION
My recent travels through Iraq, from my visit to Basra in the far
south to Lake Dokan in Northern Iraq, as well our meetings with Prime
Minister Allawi and his team, have convinced me that the Iraqi interim
government is comprised of leaders who understand the magnitude of the
task laid before them, but also recognize the necessity of compromise
and sacrifice required to achieve a free and prosperous Iraq. More
importantly, accompanying this realization of the hardships to come is
an unflinching optimism on the part of the Iraqi people. In his
statement Sunday, Dr. Allawi declared:
The enemy we are fighting is truly evil. They have nothing to
offer the Iraqi people except death and. destruction and the
slaughter of innocents. Having suffered under tyranny for so
many years, the Iraqi people are determined to establish a
democratic government that provides freedom and equal rights
for all its citizens. We are prepared to fight and, if
necessary, die for that cause. We are confident that we will
prevail.
One Iraqi, identified only as Omar, reflected recently on the
assassination of the President of the Iraqi Governing Council, Izzedine
Salim, on his Web site: ``Are we sad?'' he wrote in his Web log. ``Yes
of course, but we're absolutely not discouraged because we know our
enemies and we decided to go in this battle to the end. . . . I've
tasted freedom, my friends, and I'd rather die fighting to preserve my
freedom before I find myself trapped in another nightmare of blood and
oppression.''
Like Omar, brave young Americans in Iraq are committed as well and
we are as a Nation. We remain cautiously optimistic, despite the daily
death and violence caused by the evil enemy Prime Minister Allawi
described. Our own history attests to the fact that democracy can be a
hard-won prize. But we also know that the goal is worth the fight.
Chairman Warner. Thank you, Mr. Secretary. I am pleased to
advise you that General Casey, who appeared before this
committee in that very seat yesterday was confirmed by the
Senate last night.
Secretary Wolfowitz. That is very nice news. Thank you.
Chairman Warner. I also advised my colleagues that the
leadership, bipartisan leadership agreed to let this committee
go to conference immediately.
Secretary Armitage.
STATEMENT OF HON. RICHARD L. ARMITAGE, DEPUTY SECRETARY OF
STATE
Secretary Armitage. Mr. Chairman, Mr. Levin, thank you for
the opportunity this morning. At one point in my professional
life I spent a good deal of time before this committee, so it
is nice to be home. But having had that experience in the past,
I realize that your patience is in inverse proportion to my
opening statement, so I am here to try to answer questions that
you have. That is my job and I'll look forward to the
opportunity.
[The prepared statement of Secretary Armitage follows:]
Prepared Statement by Hon. Richard L. Armitage
Mr. Chairman, Senator Levin, members of the committee, it is always
an honor to engage with you in a dialogue about the foreign policy
challenges and opportunities facing our Nation. The transition to
sovereignty and democracy in Iraq is the pivotal opportunity and
challenge for our Nation at the moment, so I especially appreciate the
chance to discuss this subject with you today.
In 5 days, the world will witness an historic moment for the Iraqi
people emerging from three decades of brutal dictatorship. The Iraqi
interim government, led by Prime Minister Ayad Allawi, will assume full
sovereign authority over Iraq and the Coalition Provisional Authority
will dissolve. The Department of State will assume the lead in managing
and representing U.S. foreign policy interests to a sovereign Iraqi
government. Our first Ambassador to the new Iraq, John Negroponte, is
eminently qualified for this task. We have selected a very capable
Deputy Chief of Mission in Jim Jeffrey, who is leading our mission
advance team in Baghdad.
Nearly all of the 140 State Department 1-year tour positions for
the Mission in Baghdad have been filled, and of this number, 35 are
already in Iraq, joining 135 other United States Government (USG)
personnel who are assisting the U.S. Mission in a temporary capacity.
Over 70 others are in process, including many who are enroute to
Baghdad. There will also be some 50 personnel on teams in many of the
provinces. A number of Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA) staff will
stay on for a period to ensure continuity of operations. Combined with
personnel from other U.S. Government agencies, the U.S. Mission will
total approximately 1,600 people under Chief of Mission authority:
approximately 1,000 Americans and 600 Iraqis. The Embassy will also
have as many as 400 military personnel at the Embassy under MNF-I
command. Our security upgrades for our temporary chancery are
proceeding on schedule and will be ready by July 1. We have also chosen
a site for a permanent embassy.
Of course, the Department of Defense (DOD) will also continue to
support a sizable force in Iraq after June 30. An Interagency
Transition Planning Team, headed by Ambassador Frank Ricciardone and
General Mick Kicklighter, have worked tirelessly to ensure that our two
agencies are fully coordinated in achieving U.S. objectives and have
successfully reached agreement on how our roles, missions, resources,
responsibilities, and authorities will complement and support each
other. Last week, Deputy Secretary Wolfowitz and I signed two Memoranda
of Agreement between our respective agencies on the provision of
security and support for the U.S. Mission. We count this as a major
step forward in preparation for the opening of the U.S. Mission. Our
security preparations continue; we have 51 Diplomatic Security staff in
Iraq implementing measures to protect our staff, plus a Marine Security
Guard detachment of 14. A total of 45 Diplomatic Security personnel
will permanently serve the mission.
As for funding the U.S. Mission, we have $477 million to stand up
and operate the U.S. mission for the remainder of fiscal year 2004.
This funding is available from CPA's fourth quarter operating budget,
the 1 percent transfer of Iraq Relief and Reconstruction Funds (IRRF)
available under the law, and the funding directly appropriated to the
Department of State from the fiscal year 2003 supplemental
appropriation. We are working with CPA and DOD to develop fiscal year
2005 requirements. Our rough estimate of fiscal year 2005 operating
costs for the new mission amount to approximately $1 billion, excluding
the capital facility costs for a new embassy compound and the Program
Contracting Office (PCO). The largest cost components are logistics
support and security contracts that are being managed by DOD. DOD will
continue to cover these logistics support and security costs in fiscal
year 2005 until Ambassador Negroponte and his team have time to assess
the actual needs and provide an estimate we can include in a 2005
supplemental request. Until supplemental funds are provided, the
Department plans to meet the remaining operating requirements through
funds requested by the Department in the fiscal year 2005 budget, as
well as any funds carried over from the fourth quarter of fiscal year
2004.
Ultimately, our success in Iraq will be the most persuasive proof
of our good intentions. Even in light of shifting events on the ground,
our objective remains constant and unchanged: we must succeed in
helping Iraq to become a stable and successful independent state with a
democratic, representative government and the seeds for a strong
economy. As the press is fond of pointing out, we face huge challenges
in achieving that objective. But we have come a long way, and we are
committed to continuing, in partnership with the Iraqi government, to
make progress on the political, economic, and security fronts. So allow
me to turn now to the ``way ahead''. . .
The United States and coalition countries have spent more than a
year preparing Iraq for this transition by helping Iraqis build
institutions for a functioning, democratic political system not just at
the national level, but also at the provincial and local levels and
define the political transition process that will lead them a new
constitution and formation of a new government based on that
constitution. First, we have provided the training, advice, equipment,
and facilities to help establish and strengthen local, regional, and
national governing institutions. Indeed, as of our last count, there
are 18 governorate councils, 111 district councils, 296 city and sub-
district councils, and 695 neighborhood councils. Over 13,000 democracy
dialogue activities have taken place nationwide, educating Iraqis about
democratic principles and the political transition. At the national
level, as CPA has announced, all of Iraq's ministries have now been
turned over to Iraqis. We will continue to offer to Iraq some 160
liaison officers to Iraqi Ministries after the transition.
For the three decades before liberation, government institutions
existed only to serve the whims and preserve the power of Saddam and
his cohorts. Today, Iraqis now have the opportunity to establish
responsible public administration nationwide. They are seizing this
opportunity. Our commitment to strengthening Iraqi public institutions
will not end when we hand power to the new government next week.
Iraq has adopted clearly defined principles and targets for the
national government in the Transitional Administrative Law (TAL), which
will be the governing framework after June 30 and we would expect it to
remain in force until a constitutionally-based, elected government
takes office. On June 1, the Governing Council, in its last act before
dissolving itself, adopted the Annex to the TAL that reflected the
results of the extensive consultations by U.N. Special Advisor Lakhdar
Brahimi with Iraqis from across Iraq's diverse society.
Based on these documents, the Iraqi interim government, led by
Prime Minister (PM) Ayad Allawi and President Ghazi al-Yawar, is in
place and has already begun to demonstrate leadership and strength. We
believe that the Iraqi interim government is particularly notable for
its competence, experience, and diversity--professional,
geographically, and politically. Let me note, for example, that nearly
two-thirds of the cabinet ministers have doctorates, and that a
preponderance of ministers have not served previously as ministers or
members of the Iraqi Governing Council. All Iraqi Ministries have now
been turned over and are being run by their respective Iraqi Ministers.
PM Allawi will also be able to draw on the wisdom and advice of a
national council that will be selected at a national conference in
Baghdad next month. This council will serve an important advisory
function; will be a forum to promote national dialog and consensus;
and, will have the authority of oversee the implementation of laws, as
well as the power to veto executive orders by a two-thirds majority.
Even though the IIG will not assume full power until next
Wednesday, Mr. Allawi, President Yawer and the IIG have already been
hard at work, demonstrating their leadership by tackling difficult
issues. We consulted closely with him during the past month, including
during negotiations for Security Council Resolution 1546 and on post-
transition security arrangements. He has staked out firm positions on
security and detainee issues, and at times has been critical of us.
This is positive, setting the stage for a constructive partnership
between our two countries as Iraq enters the next phase of its
transition. President Yawar led Iraq's delegation to the G-8 Sea Island
Summit, meeting foreign leaders, including President Bush, for the
first time. We welcome these important developments.
The State Department has been working hard to live up to our side
of the partnership. We worked assiduously with PM Allawi and the Iraqi
interim government, our Security Council partners and our friends and
allies to secure a resolution that supports the newly-formed named
government and paves the way to the June 30 transition and beyond. UNSC
resolution 1546 endorses the affiliation of the sovereign Iraqi interim
government and its assumption of full responsibility and authority on
June 30, endorses the timetable for Iraq's political transition,
recognizes the dissolution of the CPA, establishes a framework for
continuing security operations, encourages international support for
security and reconstruction, and defines a robust U.N. role in Iraq,
particularly by assisting in preparations for elections. The resolution
was adopted unanimously, and we think it represents a renewed
international consensus on the way forward in Iraq.
Mr. Allawi's government will face enormous challenges. As he has
described, ensuring Iraq's security by confronting violent elements,
preparing for elections, promoting Iraq's reconstruction, and economic
development will be his government's top priorities. None of these
tasks will be easy.
On elections, the U.N. election team dispatched to Iraq has already
done tremendous work in laying the groundwork. Based on a nationwide
nomination process, an Independent Election Commission of nonpartisan
Iraqis was established--on schedule. The U.N., Iraqis, and the CPA
worked together closely to make the nomination and selection process as
inclusive and transparent as possible. Six hundred thousand nomination
forms were distributed throughout the country. Over a thousand
nominations were received. U.N. elections experts reviewed the
nominations carefully and interviewed the most promising candidates.
The final slate was approved without change by the Iraqi Governing
Council.
This commission will soon turn to the task of enacting the
regulations governing elections and political parties that are
fundamental to these preparations. Among its other duties are
developing and maintaining voter rolls, registering candidates and
political parties, accrediting observers, and certifying the results.
Iraqi elections will be a complex undertaking and the Independent
Election Committee will need the strong support of the international
community and the expertise of the U.N. to meet the January 2005
deadline.
Security will continue to be the seminal challenge for the
sovereign Iraqi government. Without a secure environment in Iraq,
progress in other areas, economic development and elections, will be
extremely difficult--as the events of recent months has shown. PM
Allawi has taken an aggressive stand on security, committing the Iraqi
interim government to develop as quickly as possible the capacity of
Iraqi security forces to confront violent extremists. To this end, he
has begun to organize command structures of his security services,
establish special anti-insurgent force, and form a ministerial
committee to guide Iraq's security policy. He has promised: ``Our
capabilities will enable us to take necessary action against forces of
evil.''
Until that is possible, Iraqi authorities have been clear--Iraq
needs and welcomes the continued efforts by the multinational force to
ensure security in Iraq. PM Allawi has reiterated the Iraqi
government's view in his letter to the U.N. Security Council. The
United States is committed to establishing an effective and cooperative
partnership with Iraq as well as the coordination mechanisms between
the MNF and the Iraqi interim government to reach agreement on the full
range of fundamental security and policy issues, including policy on
sensitive offensive operations. This will be one of Ambassador
Negroponte's first priorities.
We are also working with the Iraqi government on the disposition of
detainees currently held by the multinational force. As a matter of
principle, we believe the Iraqi government should assume responsibility
for Iraqi prisoners held on Iraqi soil and we want them to be able to
move forward on their efforts to bring the criminals of the former
regime to justice. However, as Iraqi President al-Yawar noted, Iraq
must ensure that it has the capacity to assume custody of detainees who
continue to present criminal and security threats. We will continue to
work with the IIG to address that issue in a way that is consistent
with our mutual security concerns and allows Iraqis to pursue justice.
To promote the long-term effectiveness of Iraqi security forces, we
will continue to recruit and train forces to eventually take
responsibility for security. After June 30, support for the organizing,
equipping, and training of Iraqi security forces will be under DOD
authority, with the policy guidance of the Chief of Mission. I, would
like to express our confidence in Lieutenant General David Petraeus,
who will be leading the effort to train and equip the Iraqi security
forces. He has already demonstrated, in his command of the 101st
Airborne, a high degree of success and skill in this environment, and
we look forward to working with him.
As for the economy, CPA has reported progress towards the goal of a
healthy, prosperous economy. Wheat production in the fertile central-
south region is up by 60 percent. We have a 30-day buffer of food
stocks in country. Oil production has begun to recover from the recent
attacks. Roughly 1.3 million barrels were produced on June 23. We
estimate that oil production in June will average roughly 2 million
barrels per day and the new Minister of Oil is aiming to boost
production further, to 2.8 million barrels per day, by the end of 2004.
More than 5 million children are back in school, many of them
vaccinated for the first time. Iraq has a stable, unified currency for
the first time since 1991, and an independent Central Bank for the
first time in its history. Finally, the new Iraqi government and the
U.S. are focused on the key goal of new job creation. As our assistance
program continues to grow on the ground and expand, we expect to be
able to report the creation of many new jobs created as a direct result
of our reconstruction efforts in Iraq.
A major part of the solution to Iraq's economic problems will come
from the private sector. Iraq has already begun taking steps during
CPA's tenure to create a welcoming environment for business. The
Foreign Investment Law and Companies Law provide a progressive,
equitable, and streamlined regulatory structure for commercial ventures
to contribute to rebuilding Iraq. Unleashing the spirit of Iraqi and
international entrepreneurship in Iraq will help accelerate
reconstruction and provide critically needed jobs and expertise to
Iraqis. In February 2004, Iraq was granted observer status to the World
Trade Organization. This will facilitate Iraq's reintegration into the
regional and global economies, which the U.S. stands ready to assist on
multiple levels, including working closely with the IIG and our global
partners to address the substantial debt burden left behind by Saddam's
misrule.
Next week Ambassador Negroponte will take the reins of a large
Embassy, with a highly experienced Deputy Chief of Mission and an eager
country team. There will be more than 130,000 U.S. troops in the
country, working alongside the forces of at least 32 other nations,
including Iraq. When the Ambassador calls on the Iraqi leadership, he
will meet with the Prime Minister and President of a sovereign nation.
There will be much to accomplish, of course. The country will still
be immersed in all the uncertainty of a dramatic transition: a large
national conference will be convened, elections will be held; a
constitution will be drafted; and economic reconstruction will
continue. The difficulty of these tasks will be compounded by the
somber reality we face on the security front: violent extremists,
including foreign terrorists affiliated with the al Qaeda network, will
seek to inflict senseless brutality in an effort to derail Iraq's
recovery. Our commitment to a strategy of success will continue
unabated, and we will continue to define success as a democratic and
prosperous Iraq, at peace within itself and with its neighbors. I
appreciate the support this committee already has given the Department
of State in reaching for that success, and I look forward to discussing
our strategy with you today.
Senator Levin. That is a great witness.
Chairman Warner. Thank you for that very well informed
opening statement. [Laughter.]
All right, General. Pick up the ball.
STATEMENT OF GEN. RICHARD B. MYERS, USAF, CHAIRMAN, JOINT
CHIEFS OF STAFF
General Myers. Mr. Chairman, I am going to be kind of in
the middle between these two gentlemen over on the right. Thank
you, Mr. Chairman, Senator Levin, and members of the committee
for your continuing support of our men and women in uniform,
particularly at this critical time, including your efforts
leading to the passage of the 2005 Defense Authorization Bill.
We thank you very much.
In my view, this is an historic moment. Iraq becomes a
fully sovereign nation next week, an important milestone on a
clear path towards democracy and freedom. We are very
encouraged by Prime Minister Allawi's words and his actions. As
Secretary Wolfowitz said, he is committed to an effective
partnership between Iraqi's security forces and the
multinational forces and has forcefully and publicly expressed
his gratitude to the coalition for their sacrifices to help
liberate the people of Iraq. Mr. Allawi wants the coalition to
stay and help. The Iraqi government wants the coalition to stay
and help, and they understand that we are going to be partners
in the effort to promote security in Iraq and allow for a
freely elected government.
The new interim government has been very aggressive in
establishing the organizations and the processes required to
make that partnership work effectively. Under U.N. Security
Council Resolutions 1511 and 1546, the coalition has the
authority and the protection we need to stay and carry out this
important phase of our mission. This clearly is a pivotal
moment for Iraq, and I believe the violent extremists who want
Iraq to fail understand that very well.
I am sure you all remember the Zarqawi letter that we
picked up in January. In it, he said that the insurgents were
frustrated, that they were failing in this race against time,
and that they would have to resort to even more brutal and
destructive measures to stop the march of freedom. The violence
of the last few months shows that the insurgents are afraid
their time is running out. They know that they have a lot to
lose.
I expect the increased violence against the coalition and
against Iraqi citizens will continue past the June 30 transfer
of sovereignty. But despite these challenges, I believe that we
are on the right path helping Iraqis become fully capable of
providing for their own security. With the help of the
coalition, Iraqi security forces are becoming better equipped,
better trained, and better led. Next week they will have
absolutely no doubt they are fighting for their own country.
That is an enormous step forward.
Our vision for Iraq's future remains fixed. The dedication
and professionalism of our service men and women remains fixed.
The resolve of the American people and that of our allies must
also remain fixed. That resolve is key to our success and key
to the morale of our fighting men and women. Your steadfast
support has been and is also very crucial, so I thank you again
for your continued support. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Warner. Thank you very much, General. The
colleagues will now proceed to our first round of 6 minutes
each, and may I most respectfully ask the colleagues the
following. I went back to look at some of the records of our
previous hearings and in certain instances where questions are
asked by Senators, the witnesses simply have not been given the
opportunity to fully respond to the question. As such, the
record becomes of less value to those who look to these
proceedings for answers. So I urge all Senators in propounding
their questions to respect the right of the witness to have a
reasonable amount of time in which to answer the question.
I will start off with you, Secretary Wolfowitz. I thought
your opening statement and your trip indicated what I perceive
as a ray of optimism. All of us are agreed on one thing, and
that is as soon and the sooner the Iraqi government-to-be and
the Iraqi people swing behind their own cause to seek freedom,
it's for the better.
Now, we focus so much on the violence in the streets as
occasioned by weapons and fighting. But there is another
violence out there, and that is the violence coming largely
from beyond the borders of Iraq in the form of the media
distorting the actual gains that have been made, distorting the
views of the people who seek to have freedom. What are we
doing, particularly as this new government takes over, to help
the government maintain a freedom of the press, but at the same
time get their story out such that their new leadership can be
better understood by the people and by the world? The gains
that are being made by the courage of many, not just the
soldiers and the coalition forces, but some of the Iraqi
people, most of the Iraqi people can be recognized? The sooner
that comes to play the sooner we can expect to see a downturn
in this violence.
Secretary Wolfowitz. It is a critically important question,
and everyone recognizes that this battle is in no small measure
an information battle. The enemy is actually very skilled at
shaping the story, getting its story out, and running lies
faster than the truth, and that is part of the challenge here.
But the very fact of an Iraqi government assuming
sovereignty is a huge step forward in this battle, because we
will no longer be burdened with the considerable weighty label
of being an occupying power. That has hurt us badly. It is one
of the factors contributing to some of those statistics that
Senator Levin quoted at the beginning. Iraqis wanted to be
liberated. They did not want to be occupied, and that label
hurts us.
We will also be helped by the fact that Iraqis will be up
in the--you can already see it. The fact that the Prime
Minister is the spokesman is a huge step forward. The fact that
the Prime Minister is a man that goes and visits sites where
the enemy has sabotaged oil or goes into the----
Chairman Warner. I agree on that, but what are we doing to
implement the delivery of that message in a free and open way
to those people? Time and time again in our hearings we have
emphasized the need to help facilitate the distribution, the
accurate facts, not just the distortions that come from abroad.
Secretary Wolfowitz. Senator, we are working on it. We are
providing resources to them to enable them to stand up to this
TV network, Al-Iraqia, which seems to have a pretty good
viewership. I think, again, it is going to be an improvement
the more the Iraqis shape the content of it, because they know
much better what kind of messages to get out.
We have Al-Hura, and Secretary Armitage can talk about
that. One last thing before I turn it over to him. Robert
Kaplan had a column in the Wall Street Journal recently, I will
be happy to put it in the record, where he comments on the fact
that we are fighting an information-age war with industrial-age
information procedures. I am struck, and this committee has
seen it on any number of issues that you look into. We have a
system that moves information very slowly up to the top,
sometimes for good reasons of protecting the rights of people
who might be accused, sometimes just because we are very
careful, but the enemy is not.
Chairman Warner. All right. Let me proceed. Basically the
same question to you, Mr. Secretary. You must recognize the
importance, the force multiplier of getting a good, positive
message out and inspiring the Iraqi people into greater measure
of courage.
Also, Ambassador Bremer, who has done a tough job as well
as anyone can do it, stepped down. What will be the differences
between the evolution of Bremer going down, retiring, and
Negroponte stepping up as the new Ambassador? How will it be
different, and how have you designed this new charter and
embassy to meet this increasing challenge of the insurgency in
the streets?
Secretary Armitage. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. As Paul
indicated, the first thing and the most important thing we are
going to do is be less visible, and that is already started.
That less visibility, I hate to quote polls, but the dreadful
polls that Senator Levin correctly quoted are offset today by
the polls that show 68 to 73 percent of the Iraqi people have a
favorable opinion of this interim government. The word is
starting to get out, and I think it is more credible in Iraq
because they are words that are coming out of Iraqi mouths.
When John Negroponte arrives 1 July in Baghdad, he is not
going to be Jerry Bremer 2. He is going to be an Ambassador and
will be the first American Ambassador to a free Iraq. He will
join 49 other embassies who have Ambassadors. Now, he will be
an Ambassador with a lot of money in his pocket, thanks to the
U.S. Congress and the generosity of the American people. He
will have a very good and close relationship with General
George Casey, so he will be an Ambassador that has a lot of
swag, but he will be an Ambassador. It is an important concept,
and that is the first point we are trying to get out to the
Iraqi people. CPA is over; we are in.
In our stuffing for the new embassy, sir, we have budgeted
for 34 people to be involved with the press, as press training,
press advising. Obviously U.S. Agency for International
Development (USAID) will have a rather major role in continuing
press training. There will be upgrades necessary for some of
the broadcast systems of Iraq. We have our own, as Paul
indicated, with Al-Hura, and Al-Iraqia is doing fairly well
these days. So that part of that corner has been turned, but it
has been turned more because Iraqis are talking and we are not.
General Myers. Chairman, on the security part, what we are
doing specifically is we are going to replace Mark Kimmitt, who
has been the spokesman along with Dan Senor on the security
side and generally on CPA issues. On the security side, we are
going to replace General Kimmitt with another General, but his
role is not to be out in front of the press. As Secretary
Armitage said, we want Iraqis speaking, so his role will be
more in mentorship and in making sure that the message gets out
to U.S. troops that needs to get out internally and back here
to the States, but not in a very public way. So we are going to
keep the same apparatus, but we are going to put a different
face on that apparatus.
Chairman Warner. Thank you. While it is not the traditional
status of forces agreement that we had hoped for protection of
our troops from any prosecution for their action, you mentioned
in your opening statement that in your professional judgement
the current structure and framework is adequate to fully
protect our forces.
General Myers. Mr. Chairman, I do, through a multiplicity
of means, if you will. First of all, the U.N. Security Council
Resolution recently passed is one of those guarantees. The CPA
Order 17, which is being staffed finally and will be in effect,
will have effect throughout this interim government, is also
one of those means, and so we feel that our forces are
protected.
Chairman Warner. That is reassuring. Second, General Casey
was here yesterday. Quite appropriately in response to an
important question he said any planner would be looking at the
ability to augment our force level if the on-scene commanders
were to send back the message ``we need more forces.'' His
message is very clear, but it has nevertheless reverberated out
there and been sort of viewed by some as the first call for
additional force structure. Can you address what Casey stated,
the accuracy of it, and your own posture with regard to the
adequacy of the current force level in the face of increasing
and perhaps better coordinated violence and what the future
portends?
General Myers. My understanding of General Casey's comment
is that he was describing a prudent planning process that any
of us would go through to make sure that we could respond if
the field commanders engaged in a serious effort wanted more
forces to prosecute that effort. I must say that goes on
continuously. We have to look around corners. If we do not look
around corners then we cannot respond to the needs of our
combatant commanders.
Chairman Warner. That is accurate and that is prudent. As
you and I know from our experiences, that should and always is
being done in operations of this nature. But it is now being
translated as the first indication of perhaps a call for
additional forces.
General Myers. I have not talked to General Casey about
this, but in my latest conversations with General Abizaid,
there is no indication that he needs more forces for the kind
of conflict we are seeing right now.
Let me try to describe this. This is not traditional
warfare where you can count numbers as capability. There is a
conventional element of this. We saw that yesterday as a matter
of fact where there were some conventional-like attacks, but
small. Predominantly what is the most effective attack for the
terrorist are terror-type attacks where individuals attack the
infrastructure, where individuals who want to commit suicide
take a vehicle-borne improvised explosive device next to police
stations or governors' offices or the marketplace and then blow
them up.
More forces are not necessarily going to help in that case.
I think that what we see here is this thought that we are in
some sort of conventional war when we are in probably the
epitome of what would be asymmetric warfare. So the 141,000
forces that the U.S. has in there, the 22,000 coalition forces,
to this point General Abizaid and his commanders think are
adequate to this task. The other part of that, of course, is we
have a large Iraqi force structure that continues to get better
in their training, equipping, and leadership.
Secretary Wolfowitz. Mr. Chairman, let me also emphasize
what General Myers said about the flexibility to respond,
because we know the enemy is really targeting the coming weeks
and months. They are targeting the new government as it stands
up. Zarqawi has openly, in a typically overheated rhetoric,
threatened Allawi personally. We know they would like nothing
more than to shape the minds of Iraqis and Americans that this
new government is a failure, and we know they are going to try
to do everything that they can to destabilize the country
leading to elections at the end of this year.
So this is not something you can plan precisely against
because you are dealing with a thinking, very active, evil
enemy; therefore, we do need the flexibility that General Casey
and General Myers alluded to be able to apply more forces if we
need more forces.
Chairman Warner. Thank you very much. Senator Levin.
Senator Levin. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. General Myers,
General Casey testified that the CPA order, which provides
immunity from the Iraqi legal process for our troops, must be
amended to extend beyond June 30. I have two questions. One, do
you agree? Two, would any amendment or any order of the CPA be
binding on the new sovereign government?
General Myers. Senator Levin, my understanding is that the
order is being restaffed and that will be finished either today
or tomorrow.
Secretary Armitage. The order is finished today. It has
gone out to Baghdad, sir. They want to obviously make sure that
the new government sees it and is not in opposition to it.
There have been discussions continually about it, but they will
not sign off on it. That is not what their role will be.
Senator Levin. Would the new sovereign government have the
power to rescind that order?
Secretary Armitage. The new sovereign government in effect
would, if they are sovereign, they could ask us to leave, and
we would have to leave. But the combination of the CPA Order 17
as amended and U.N. Security Council Resolution 1546 is felt by
all to give us sufficient protections.
Senator Levin. My question though is, would the new
sovereign government have the power to rescind that order?
General Myers. My understanding is that----
Senator Levin. Let me just get Secretary Armitage's quick
answer on that.
General Myers. Okay.
Secretary Armitage. I want to think about it. I want to get
the right answer rather than the quick answer.
Senator Levin. Alright. Well, since we have 6 minutes, give
us your thoughts perhaps later after you have had a chance to
think about it.
Chairman Warner. Excuse me. General Myers did wish to----
General Myers. I have--my understanding----
Senator Levin. Sure.
General Myers. My understanding of this issue is that the
CPA orders cannot be repealed or modified until Iraq's
permanent government is in place to enact legislation, so they
stay effective through that period.
Senator Levin. So during this 6-month period, or whatever
the period is before the elections are held and there is an
elected government, what you are saying is that we have a legal
opinion that the interim government cannot rescind that order.
Is that your understanding?
General Myers. Yes, sir. That is my understanding.
Senator Levin. Thank you. Would you provide that opinion
for the record?
General Myers. Yes, sir.
[The information referred to follows:]
The Iraqi interim government has the authority to amend CPA orders
that only relate to appointments, the use of the Iraqi Armed Forces,
and approval of certain international agreements. Outside of these
three areas, CPA orders cannot be amended until elections are held and
the Iraqi Transitional Government is in place. After elections, CPA
orders may be amended consistent with Article 26 of the Transitional
Administrative Law.
Senator Levin. Thank you. Secretary Armitage, have we
specifically asked Muslim nations to provide troops and police?
Secretary Armitage. Or police?
Senator Levin. Troops or police.
Secretary Armitage. We have had discussions with Bangladesh
and Pakistan about this, as has the interim government of Iraq
with at least Pakistan. We have begun discussions with 13 other
nations, some of whom are Muslim, about providing security for
the U.N. facilities, which was discussed in U.N. Security
Council Resolution 1546. Prime Minister Allawi said to your
colleagues the other day when Senator Daschle's delegation
visited him that he would be working with the neighbors. He
thinks it may be about time to try to introduce them.
Senator Levin. Thank you. Secretary Wolfowitz, or anybody,
what is the status of the indictment against Sadr? Also, have
the officials of the interim government invited Sadr to
participate in the national congress? Does that indictment
still stand?
Secretary Wolfowitz. It definitely still stands. I do not
know about your second question.
Secretary Armitage. I do not either, but even Prime
Minister Allawi, I think, in the conversation with Mr. Daschle,
said that Sadr had to face jurisprudence.
Senator Levin. Had not been invited to participate in the--
--
Secretary Armitage. I do not know the answer to the second
part. I was responding to the first part.
Senator Levin. Okay. Apparently Prime Minister Allawi has
indicated that the government is considering the imposition of
a state of emergency that could include a curfew and a ban on
public demonstrations. But just talking about the curfew, since
we presumably would have to enforce it, have we talked to him
about that and do we support the imposition of a curfew?
Secretary Wolfowitz. Actually we have the power to impose
curfews as we see them as necessity in particular places. This
is an example of exactly the kind of thing that this
consultative mechanism is designed to work out common policy
on. We have been doing this for 2\1/2\ years really in
Afghanistan with Karzai. He sometimes wants to do things that
we think are imprudent. We tell him frequently; if you do it,
you better have the capability to do it yourself, because we
are not obligated to enforce things that we do not think are
appropriate.
Senator Levin. Is that true with Allawi too?
Secretary Wolfowitz. That, I think it is even--let me put
it this way. We have better-developed mechanisms already with
Allawi than we have after 2 years in Afghanistan. It will work
well. We have common purposes. He is not talking about blanket
national martial law procedures with extreme measures. He is
basically talking about giving Iraqi police and Iraqi forces
the authorities that we already have under Resolution 1546.
Senator Levin. Did we discuss that issue specifically with
Allawi as to what--before his statement was made about imposing
a curfew, do you know?
Secretary Wolfowitz. It did not come up in our talks.
Senator Levin. Secretary Wolfowitz, you have cited both
here, and I believe recently at the House Armed Services
Committee, as evidence of cooperation between Iraq and al
Qaeda, evidence in a sealed indictment of Osama bin Laden in
1998. Why do you continue to cite that as evidence of a
relationship?
Secretary Wolfowitz. It is one of many pieces of evidence
that suggest that there was contact of some significance
between these two organizations.
Senator Levin. But you are aware of the fact that that
indictment has been modified to include that statement?
Secretary Wolfowitz. I am also aware that the cooperating
witness who provided the basis for that indictment was
reinterviewed as recently as a year ago and reaffirmed the
story, and he is a man who is described even by Richard Clarke
as one of the keys to our understanding of al Qaeda.
Senator Levin. To my question though, are you aware that
the indictment has been modified to exclude that reference?
Secretary Wolfowitz. The subsequent open indictment of bin
Laden did not include that. That is right, after the 1998
embassy bombings.
Senator Levin. My question is why do you continue then to
cite an indictment which has been modified to exclude the
reference that you continue to make?
Secretary Wolfowitz. Because I believe that was a statement
made by an important source on al Qaeda that was considered
sufficiently credible and valid to be included in a very
serious Federal proceeding.
Senator Levin. My time is up. Thank you.
Chairman Warner. Senator McCain.
Senator McCain. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I thank the
witnesses for being here today and I do think we have some good
news in this poll that the Iraqi people are now strongly
supporting their new leadership. This provides us with an
opportunity, a window of opportunity, and I wonder if the
witnesses agree that the next few months are absolutely
critical in this whole scenario. Would you agree, Secretary
Armitage?
Secretary Armitage. Of course, Senator.
Senator McCain. Secretary Armitage, we are also in a
situation, including the events yesterday, of a degree of
sophistication and level of, if you want to call it, terrorist
attacks, which are quite remarkable, both in their efficiency
and in their number of casualties. Would you agree?
Secretary Armitage. Yes, I do.
Senator McCain. So we are not where we had envisioned we
would be after our significant military victory, right?
Secretary Armitage. That is correct, Senator.
Senator McCain. What went wrong?
Secretary Armitage. We have spoken to this. One, we
underestimated the enemy and we did not destroy him in our
initial attack. He melted away, and we are seeing him again.
That is number one. Number two, we did not reckon correctly the
extent to which Iraq had become a criminal society under the
attempts to evade sanctions and everything else that had
happened, particularly in the last 12 years.
Number three, we underestimated the degree to which this
enemy had a central nervous system. The attacks the other day
show that it does have a central nervous system.
Senator McCain. Do you agree that we did not have
sufficient troops?
Secretary Armitage. No, I do not, Senator.
Senator McCain. You do not agree? I wonder why not.
Secretary Armitage. I am in a department who defers to the
military judgement on what is ``sufficient troops.'' Any views
of this that we had during the run-up to the war were expressed
fully and we felt we got our full say.
Senator McCain. Which was?
Secretary Armitage. Which was we want to make sure we had
sufficient force and sufficient points of entry to defeat this
enemy, and we were convinced that we did.
Senator McCain. We had a sufficient number of troops,
Secretary Wolfowitz?
Secretary Wolfowitz. With respect to the issue that
Secretary Armitage correctly identified, which is this enemy
did not surrender on April 9, Saddam continued to fight until
he was captured; Zarqawi continues to fight until this day; the
killers that supported his regime for 35 years continue to
fight. There was no surrender. There has not been yet.
Senator McCain. So we did not--it is interesting that--I
asked about the troop question to you.
Secretary Wolfowitz. I am trying to answer it.
Senator McCain. It is interesting. Things did not turn out
as we had anticipated they would, yet we did not do anything
wrong. That is very interesting.
Secretary Wolfowitz. Senator, I----
Senator McCain. Go ahead.
Secretary Wolfowitz. Let me say three points. Number one, I
do not believe and our commanders do not believe that more
troops would have enabled us to find these people where they
were hiding. The problem has been finding them. They are very
good at hiding. That has been the problem.
Number two, there has been a concern, and part of our
problem is this appearance of an occupation force, that a much
bigger force would have----
Senator McCain. So, which brings us to----
Secretary Wolfowitz. Third, if I can agree with you for a
moment, it probably is the case that if we had had more
American troops down in the Najaf Karbala area over the last
period of time we are talking about, 6 or 8 months, Mr. Sadr
might not have gotten out of control the way he did. So that is
one place where it might have made a difference.
Senator McCain. Which brings us to Fallujah. We agreed that
somehow after announcing that we would go in and attack and
capture those individuals who killed and dismembered the bodies
of four American citizens. We then made an agreement with the
militias there that they would control Fallujah, and they would
turn over the perpetrators of that crime, other terrorists, and
significant weapons. Has any of that happened?
Secretary Wolfowitz. Virtually none of that has happened.
What we have achieved is a certain degree of calm in Fallujah,
which may help in the rest of the country. There is some
indication that there are beginning to be some splits within
Fallujah, particularly between Iraqis and foreigners, and some
degree of Iraqis turning on the foreigners. There is a
considerable concern that Fallujah might--this is on the
negative side--be a place where the enemy is hiding. We talked
about this with the Prime Minister. We are all agreed that the
current status quo in Fallujah is not acceptable, and Fallujah
is not a model for the rest of the country, so we need to move
forward on that. I do not know, General Myers, if you want to--
--
General Myers. I absolutely agree with that. We have not
made any of the conditions that we initially set that you
outlined, Senator McCain. We have had in the last several days
to go after foreign fighters in Falluja with 500-pound bombs;
we think in both cases successfully.
Senator McCain. If I could just interrupt there, the reason
for not going into Fallujah was to prevent civilian casualties.
Now we are dropping 500-pound bombs.
General Myers. But these were very precise, and the
collateral damage was essentially zero upon site exploitation.
We are very careful how we do that. If I can go back to your
original question that Secretary Armitage answered, part of the
thinking that went into the plan for the original combat in
Iraq was that we wanted--we made the decision. You could have
gone several different ways, but we made the decision that we
wanted this to be as humane as a combat operation as war could
be. That was a decision we made.
So certain factors are emphasized over others if you are
going to do that. One of them was speed and precision and to
let regular Iraqi divisions, while destroying equipment and
some of their people, if they melted away, then let them melt
away, because they were conscripts after all.
So if there is a blame here, it was making some assumptions
on how the Iraqi people would react to that. I would submit we
were probably too gracious in our victory in hindsight. The
philosophy going in was that we were going to liberate Iraq,
not conquer Iraq. Clearly things started to change as those
former regime elements--and I still maintain a very small
segment of the population plus the foreign fighters can have a
disproportionate impact because of the methods they use where
they do not care about the loss of innocent life. So that is
where we have evolved to.
Senator McCain. Well, I may have to leave some of this to
the historians, but it is interesting that very little mistakes
were made, and yet we find over 100 people killed and wounded
in coordinated attacks all over Iraq. Clearly some of this is
being orchestrated out of Fallujah. As Secretary Armitage said,
this is a central nervous system, but we did not make any
mistakes. My time is expired.
Chairman Warner. Thank you very much, Senator McCain.
Senator Kennedy.
Senator Kennedy. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Secretary
Wolfowitz, I appreciate your comments about the courage of the
Iraqi leaders. I am one of those who had the chance to meet
President Yawar when he was over here, and he is an impressive
figure. When we see the determination of those individuals to
try and lead the country, it does impress all of us.
Let me just go back and review the bidding about where we
are and then ask a couple of specific questions. Following up
with Senator McCain, we have had 844 Americans pay the ultimate
price; 5,270 soldiers have been wounded; we have lost 25 in my
own State of Massachusetts, war costing us about $4,700,000,000
every month.
We have the kind of pressures that are put on in a
particular unit, Military Police (MPs), a group from
Massachusetts, New Hampshire, and Maine. They were mobilized 5
December 2002, sent to Iraq in April 2003 for 6 months. They
were extended once, extended again. Thought they were going for
6 months, going to 18 months. Eventually they hope to come back
in August, demobilize in October.
The uncertainty of how long these troops, American troops
are going to be over there, given not only the American troops
themselves, the regular Army, but the Reserve and the Guard, is
a matter of great concern. Given that we have had the U.N.
Resolutions, we have the new sovereignty coming up at the end
of June, we have elections for the interim government that is
going to establish the constitution, ratification nationwide of
the constitution, elections following that, American families
want to know what the impact of all this is going to be on
their servicemen and women, on their children.
I remember when you were here at the time of your hearing
before our committee on confirmation. This is your quote. When
you were asked about the guidelines should apply to future
military action, you said, ``I think it has to be something
where we have a strategy for success, that we have a way of
achieving our goals and completing the mission, and not ending
up in something that is an unending commitment with no way
out.''
Now, you are asked this week to the Armed Services
Committee about what is going to be the indication at the end.
You say there is an end--the end is when the Iraqis are
governing their own country. Well, when are we going to know
success? Are we going to know success when there are elections?
Are we going to know that there is a success when we--
reconstruction have construction? How much security is going to
be success? How are the American people going to know when
there is success? Or are we going to just wait until a
President says: We have success now and we are going to start
rotating out? How do we know that? How do we know we are not
just ending up with an unending commitment with no way out?
Secretary Wolfowitz. I do not think it is an unending
commitment with no way out, but I do not think you can predict
these things any more than you can predict the timetable for
success in Germany at the end of World War II or the timetable
for success in Korea at the end of that war. Of course, the
biggest problem here is that the war has not ended, the enemy
has not given up.
Part of success is going to be when that enemy is either
defeated, or some of them may just decide actually in a formal
or semi-formal way to come in and join the new Iraq. But I
think there is a clear path to success because there are so
many Iraqis who do want to stand up for their country. By the
tens of thousands they are prepared to risk their lives to
defend their country.
Senator Kennedy. I want to give you----
Secretary Wolfowitz. I think the most important milestone
here is going to be, particularly with respect to those
families of service men and women, when the Iraqis are in the
front line, and Iraqis, if casualties still have to be taken,
are taking the bulk of the casualties. That will be a huge
milestone.
Senator Kennedy. Well, this is what we want to know. We
have 90 percent of the troops and 95 percent of the killed and
wounded, what are the benchmarks? You are back there, you have
children that are over there, what are the benchmarks? What
should the American people want to benchmark this? How do they
know that the plan is successful? How do they know it is not
deteriorating? We have to have some benchmarks that are out
there rather than the general kind of comments. They want some
benchmarks to know.
They knew in World War II; they knew after D-Day. Sure,
they had the Battle of the Bulge, but they were moving ahead on
it. They knew certainly in the battle against Japan. They
understood that, Korea more complicated and Vietnam so. But
people had an understanding of what the benchmarks were. They
knew in the Second World War with the progress in North Africa
and what happened in Western Europe. The American people want
to know, Mr. Secretary, what are the benchmarks? What are the
things that they can watch on television, read in the
newspaper, and say, look, that is real progress, that is going
to mean my son or daughter is going to come on home?
Secretary Wolfowitz. I think the kind of benchmark I
mentioned in the beginning of Iraqis who are courageous enough
like these five civil defense corps soldiers to rescue an
American who is wounded. More and more they are going to see
capable Iraqi security forces taking on more and more demanding
missions.
But let us also keep some historical perspective. The
Marshall Plan, as we all know, was initiated in 1948, a full 3
years after the end of World War II. It was a kind of Hail Mary
pass to rescue Europe from what looked like a totally failing,
collapsing situation. You can ask for benchmarks. We are
working on benchmarks. The President laid out five clear
benchmarks a couple of weeks ago, namely one that we are about
to achieve, which is the standing up of a sovereign government;
the second, standing up of Iraqi security forces; the third,
progress on reconstruction; the fourth, introduction of
international forces through the U.N. Resolution; and finally,
elections at the end of this year and the beginning of next
year. Those are pretty important benchmarks. If we can achieve
all of them in the next 6 months, we will be doing very well.
Senator Kennedy. My time is up. Some would think that we
have already got a Marshall Plan over in Iraq now with the
amount of economic aid and reconstruction that we have
provided.
Secretary Wolfowitz. A great deal is happening, Senator.
Chairman Warner. Thank you very much, Senator Kennedy.
Senator Roberts.
Senator Roberts. Gentlemen, thank you for being here this
morning. Thank you for your perseverance and your service. I am
going to be repetitive today. I think the most crucial
ingredient with regard to our effort in Iraq is our resolve,
theirs, and more especially, ours. Over the past several
months, that resolve has been tested, and we have seen an
increase only in the number and severity of such challenges,
more especially with the full offensive that we see today.
Now, we have the deadline for sovereignty only 5 days away.
It is absolutely critical that the administration and
especially those of us in Congress make it clear to the
American people exactly what the transfer means with regard to
our continued presence. I know you all mentioned. Members of
this committee are extremely concerned about the information
and the battle for the proper kind of information in that part
of the world, in that part of the region, and more especially,
in Iraq. I am concerned about it in this country.
This really dates me, but in the 1940s, there was a song
that my dad and mom enjoyed. It was called, ``Accentuate the
Positive, Eliminate the Negative, and Don't Mess with Mr. In-
Between.'' It seems to me that we have too many in this country
who are accentuating the negative and eliminating the positive
and making sure the U.S. is not in between, and I do not think
that is possible at this particular time. So with the
challenges to our resolve, no doubt some will point to the
transfer of sovereignty, as Senator Kennedy has just indicated,
as a justification for an exit from Iraq.
What would be the specific implications of such an exit?
Explain to the country exactly the down side of an early exit
and what could happen in regards to our national security and
then also in regard to the region.
Secretary Wolfowitz. I think a precipitous exit like that
would be an enormous victory for terrorism and for terrorists.
It would turn Iraq into a base and a sanctuary from which they
could proceed to attack Saudi Arabia, which is already under
attack, and attack in Europe and the United States. They
understand that this is the fight, they are putting everything
they can in trying to defeat us and----
Senator Roberts. So this is a global effort?
Secretary Wolfowitz. It is absolutely connected to a global
effort, yes, sir.
Senator Kennedy. Would the Senator just yield, since he
mentioned my name?
Senator Roberts. Yes, I would be happy to the yield to the
distinguished Senator.
Senator Kennedy. I did not suggest a cut-and-run policy. I
asked about benchmarks, and I do not want to be associated with
the remarks about what would happen if we just pulled out our
troops. That was clearly not my statement. That would be a
distortion, a misrepresentation of my position. I know the
Senator did not mean that, but I want the record to reflect
that.
Senator Roberts. I thank the Senator for his contribution,
saved me 30 seconds. Who are these guys? Let's use the Butch
Cassidy, Sundance Kid question. Secretary Armitage, you said a
central nervous system. I just heard on the news this morning
that Muqtada al-Sadr and his army are laying down the arms
against the coalition forces and saying we are going to rise up
against the Sunni extremists.
We have those still loyal to the former regime. We have the
foreign fighters. We have the extremists. What level of
coordination among these divergent groups are you seeing? Who
are these guys now?
Secretary Armitage. I do not think anyone in this
administration yet can tell you with a great deal of accuracy
who they are and how many they are.
Senator Roberts. Well, I have some concerns about that
because as chairman of the Intelligence Committee----
Secretary Armitage. Well, I was raising it with you, sir--
--
Senator Roberts. Okay, I am sorry. I am not giving you an
opportunity.
Secretary Armitage. I am not raising it with you because
you sit on another committee, and you understand what I am
saying. I said one of our mistakes was that we did not
understand there was a central nervous system. Well, clearly
there is. How many are former regime elements and how many are
Zarqawi and his evildoers, I cannot say. I do not think any of
my colleagues can say. We do not know. How many are disaffected
youth who, either make a little money or just for the pure
excitement of it get in on the game, I cannot tell you.
Senator Roberts. Well, I hope we can. We have 1,000 people
now stood up in the Iraqi intelligence operation, 5,000 people
with a new Iraqi intervention force. If we do not have the
proper intelligence--and, yes, I am the chairman of the
Intelligence Committee--it worries me that we will not only
have the ability to really predict and protect not only our
troops but also be successful. We found Saddam by finally
getting down to the clans and the families. My hope is that
when we go through the vetting, the training, and the equipment
in regards to the Iraqis, they will still have that kind of
capability. Do we see any real progress in that area?
Secretary Armitage. My view, Senator, and Paul would
probably want to make a comment, is that we are making a bet
here. The bet is that Iraqis are going to fight more
enthusiastically for Iraq than they fight for occupiers. That
is a bet we are all buying into, and I buy it. I think they are
because they do know how to fight. We are seeing some changes,
and others can talk about it, in regards to Iraqis helping us,
giving us information, things of that nature. Hence you have a
precision strike in Fallujah, in a particular place in
Fallujah. Things in that regard are going to turn out a little
better than we might suspect.
Senator Roberts. I hope that is the case. There are certain
countries----
Secretary Armitage. However, I think----
Senator Roberts. I have one more question and very limited
time. There are certain countries in the region that would like
to see our efforts in Iraq fail, namely Iran. You know these
folks. As we transfer the sovereignty to the Iraqis, what are
the most significant concerns you have in this regard? What
would happen in the region if in fact we were not successful? I
have asked that of the Secretary, but in your travels, more
especially in regards to those who would like to see us fail,
what are your most significant concerns?
Secretary Armitage. The biggest concern is that Iranian
money will buy mullahs in the south of Iraq and use that money
to be able to thwart us. The best news in this regard is that
the leading Shia cleric in Iraq, Ali Sistani, does not seem to
have any affection for Iranian-style theocracy.
Senator Roberts. My time is up, Mr. Chairman. I thank the
panel, and persevere, gentlemen.
Chairman Warner. Thank you very much, Senator Roberts. Did
each of the witnesses feel they had adequate time?
Secretary Armitage. I am sure the question will come around
again.
Chairman Warner. Senator Lieberman.
Senator Lieberman. Thanks, Mr. Chairman, thanks to the
witnesses. Thanks for what you have done over the last couple
of years to bring us to where we are today. It has been a long,
tough slog, to use a familiar word. But I do think today, 25
June, 5 days from the transfer of authority, there is a lot for
the American people to be proud of and a lot for the Iraqis and
the Iraqi people to be proud of and optimistic about. The fact
is we have lost American lives; we have spent a lot of our own
treasure. It is important to remember that it is not for
conquest; it is not for imperial, colonial plunder. It is for
security and for a principle that has driven American history
from the beginning, which is freedom and democracy.
Saddam Hussein, a brutal dictator who possessed weapons of
mass destruction, used them, supported terrorism, responded to
wrongdoing by his people. I have seen this with my own eyes in
the films that many of us have seen, cut off their heads, their
tongues, their hands. Saddam Hussein is gone and in jail. In
place is an interim Iraqi government not yet elected, but broad
enough to, by the latest public opinion polling in Iraq, enjoy
the support of two-thirds of the Iraqi people in a very
difficult security context. So we have come some way, and they
are going to take over on June 30.
Then it is going to be a different kind of battle. After
Saddam was gone, this did become a different kind of battle. It
became the major battleground of the war against terrorism,
because the foreign fighters swarmed in there and joined with
the Saddam loyalists. Now you have not these jihadists or some
Iraqis against America, but you have jihadists and Saddam
loyalists against an Iraqi government, as you said, Secretary
Armitage. That is the choice for the Iraqi people. Do they want
to go forward with self government and a better life for
themselves, or do they want to yield to these forces? Do we,
who will bring back, if you can imagine it, a government that
is going to be part Saddam Hussein and part Taliban, because
that is what the enemy fighters are all about here.
We have done something difficult. I could be critical of
things that were not done, I have been critical of things that
were not done or could have been done a lot better. But we are
in a tough situation. We have made some extraordinary progress.
Those who have given their lives have given them for a noble
cause, a cause as critical to American security as most any I
can think of that we fought over the centuries.
I want to ask about the central nervous system that you
referred to. Is it your opinion, Secretary Armitage, that there
is a coordination to the best of our knowledge between the
Saddam loyalists, the people who fell back, and the foreign
fighters?
Secretary Armitage. I am not sure I am totally competent to
give you a complete answer. We have seen some intelligence that
indicates that they do hook up. There is a central nervous
system to the Zarqawi network. I found rather remarkable
yesterday the timing of the car bombs in several different
locations, which indicates to me a certain degree of command
and control. Now, I do not think it is the command and control
that we traditionally think about in our own military, but
someone is giving general orders and other people are following
them. That is fairly clear.
As my colleagues have stated up here that as we move
forward to June 30, these fellows who attacked yesterday are
going to reload and try again. As we move toward the elections
in December and January, they are really going to exercise
themselves.
Senator Lieberman. I agree. The point I draw from this is
that there is clearly a lot of controversy in one of the
exchanges between Secretary Wolfowitz and I believe it was
Senator Levin about the extent of cooperation between the
Saddam Hussein regime and al Qaeda earlier. It seems to me that
the foreign fighters, including Zarqawi, who is allied with al
Qaeda, and the Saddam remnants are growing increasingly clear.
I want to go to another topic, because those poll numbers
about the interim Iraqi government are very encouraging. The
most important thing we can do to solidify them is not only
maintain the security, but also in some ways it is just as
important to maintain the civilian reconstruction, making sure
that the Iraqis get jobs, that the electricity is on, that the
water is flowing.
Last year, Congress approved an $18.6 billion
reconstruction aid package. According to the CPA, only about
$3.7 billion of that package had been spent as of June 1. I
know CPA is under the DOD, so I want to ask Secretary
Wolfowitz, what slowed the expenditure of those funds and
delayed the 2,300 projects the money was planned to support?
Then, Secretary Armitage, as the State Department now takes
over on July 1, what plans do you have to accelerate the
implementation of that reconstruction money?
Secretary Wolfowitz. Senator Lieberman, I think the basic
answer comes down to the rather elaborate and necessary
procedures that we build into the contracting process to make
sure that there is fair and open competition. It produces what
the program managers call an ``S'' curve, where you do not get
very much done for a while and then suddenly the dam starts to
break. My understanding is the dam is starting to break, and
those numbers are going to grow very rapidly. We want to make
sure they do not grow so rapidly that Ambassador Negroponte has
nothing left to work with when he gets there. That is a
consideration.
One thing that has been done, it is called the ``Seven
Cities Project,'' is to allocate a certain amount from the
supplemental to smaller scale projects that can be implemented
by our division commanders in seven key cities, including
Baghdad. That is showing some real results on the ground, even
in difficult places like Sadr City.
Secretary Armitage. Senator, in preparation for this
hearing, I have later numbers. They are not much better, but
obligated out of the $18.4 or $18.6 billion is $5.29 billion,
which is about 29 percent of the 2004 Iraqi Relief and
Reconstruction Fund (IRRF) money. It is a little better than
what you suggested, but your point is dead on.
Admiral Nash came back last week, who has been running this
at CPA, and I think he came up and saw some of the staff of
this committee and others. He did indicate that the ramp is
quite a bit steeper now, and he thought we would be moving up
rather rapidly. What we have done to make this change is
through consultations with primarily the Appropriations
Committee staffs. I have met with Chairman Kolbe in the House
about trying to put together something we are calling an Iraqi
Reconstruction Management Office under the Ambassador. We are
putting a 10-day time period on any changes that we want from
the time the Ambassador wants to reallocate money and put it
toward a project. The turnaround for our entire bureaucracy is
10 days. I am the belly button in charge, so you will have
somebody to point to.
Also, it will push the process along. When John Negroponte
gets out there, we figure he will have between $8 billion and
$9 billion that is not obligated. We know he is going to have
some different opinions from the present CPA opinions. We are
working out procedures with Appropriations Committee staff to
change the way we make revisions to the 2207 report, which is
required each quarter.
Senator Lieberman. That is very encouraging, particularly
to know that you are assuming a personal responsibility. If I
can put it this way in response to the metaphor you used,
Secretary Armitage, I have always considered you to be one
tough, impressive belly button. [Laughter]
Secretary Armitage. Well, a big belly button.
General Myers. Mr. Chairman?
Chairman Warner. Yes, General.
General Myers. I would like to talk about the threat for
just a minute. My views might be slightly different than others
expressed in this room today, if I could just talk about the
threat that we are seeing. We have no intelligence that shows
the linkage between these various groups. We look for it. We
simply do not have it. You can deduce, because you had many
attacks yesterday, it all occurred almost simultaneous some of
them in Mosul, and throughout Iraq, attacks that appear to be
coordinated. You can just look at it and say, well, there has
to be some coordination.
The level of coordination, though, is unknown, and I ask
about this all the time, because this is crucial to
understanding the threat we are fighting. One of the things you
have to keep in mind that while the former regime elements and
Zarqawi may have the same near-term goals of ridding Iraq of
the coalition, their long-term goals could not be more
different. It is hard for me to believe, but this is what we
need intelligence to tell us--there is very close cooperation
between those two groups because they have two very different
visions of the future. One is Sunni extremism, going back to
7th century califate, and the other is the Baathist party,
coming back to life in Iraq.
I have not seen any evidence other than what we see with
our eyes in terms of actions, whether it is a central nervous
system or some other method of coordination. It is a critical
question, and frankly, the Intelligence Community, as far as I
know, will not give you an answer, because they cannot give me
an answer.
Senator Lieberman. Mr. Chairman, if I may real briefly----
Chairman Warner. Yes, please pursue that.
Senator Lieberman.--just to respond and say that I
appreciate what you have said that there is not clear evidence
showing a linkage. I would just raise this question, though
these are different groups with different aims, might this not
be a case where the enemy of my enemy is my friend? In other
words, they have a common purpose, which is to stop the Iraqi
self-government from occurring, to weaken us to defeat us in
some sense, to get us to retreat, and therefore to win a battle
in the larger war that both of them are involved in. That might
bring them together temporarily until they have to deal with
who is going to control Iraq.
Chairman Warner. Secretary Armitage, did you want to
comment on the General's statement?
Secretary Armitage. I gave you my opinion that it seems to
me there was some sophistication in the attacks that led me to
believe--I have been around a little bit--that there is more of
a central nervous system. I do not argue with General Myers.
You asked for my opinion and I gave it to you, sir.
General Myers. I would say that is how it looks, and I
would say that near-term aims could be similar, the enemy of my
friend and so forth, but I think long term they are not
compatible. We need to know a lot more. I guess that is what I
am saying, and I am not comfortable standing here----
Chairman Warner. This question of coordination or lack
thereof is a central issue, and I hope that we do not conclude
this hearing on a note--although we may have respectful
different perspectives on it. If that is the case, so be it.
Senator Allard.
Secretary Wolfowitz. Mr. Chairman, I would just say there
may be more than one central nervous system, and there may be a
loose coordination between them. Zarqawi clearly coordinates an
organization of some size, and clearly the old regime people
have been coordinating with each other for years. That is why
we see some patterns in certain things the enemy does.
The question that has been raised here is, how much do they
coordinate with one another. That is hardly something they open
up to us very much. The basic point is their immediate aim,
which is the overriding one, which is to defeat us, just as we
and Stalin had enormously different visions of the future in
World War II. It did not prevent us from understanding first
things first. I am afraid for this enemy, we are the first
thing to get out of there.
Chairman Warner. All right. Thank you very much, gentlemen.
Senator Allard.
Senator Allard. Mr. Chairman, thank you. I want to reflect
back a little bit. When Saddam Hussein went into the Persian
Gulf conflict, we set him back. Things kind of stagnated, and
then when we decided to take action. It has been about a year
and 3 months or so now, going into Iraq with a full force. A
lot of good things have happened. In my view things are better
off now than they were before we went into Iraq and that
actually things were deteriorating in Iraq just before we went
in.
I am wondering if the panel could talk about that a little
bit. I had a lot of questions about the insurgency and
obviously we have pretty well discussed that. I also wondered
if the panel would talk a little bit about the demographics.
There have been TV shows written about the large number of
young males in Saudi Arabia, for example, that are unemployed.
Do we have that same demographics in Iraq or not, and what is
driving that demographics? I wonder if we could have some
discussion on both of those questions, starting first of all
with the first question. How are we today compared to what it
was when we first went in? Then give us some good facts, and
also what has happened. Then the second question would be the
demographics question.
Secretary Armitage. I will try real quickly. These are
rather unsatisfactory to me, this first answer I am going to
give you. Those who have are better off, and those who do not
have are obviously not. The haves right now, in terms of Iraq:
more people have access to water, more people have access to
phones, more people have access to hospitals now than was the
case under the Saddam regime, particularly if you are a Shia.
So there are all those indicators. There is more electricity
going forward.
Now I say that is an unsatisfactory answer because power
generation, et cetera, are good targets for the enemy. So what
is true today could be false temporarily tomorrow. On almost
every measure in that regard we are much better off. It is the
security, however, which the Iraqi people point to every single
day as their overriding concern and their fear when their sons
and their daughters leave their home of whether they will
return or not.
You can have a lot of measurements with people being better
off, but if we cannot get the handle on security, and I think
we all agree, we are not going to be able to say to the Iraqi
people, you are better off overall.
Second, on the demographics, there is a lot of, not
controversy, but disagreement or misunderstanding of the
unemployment in Iraq. It is quite high. There are a lot of
young men, particularly former Army young men, who are out of
work right now. The estimates are between 28 percent to as high
as 60 percent of the working population is unemployed, which I
disregard. CPA is telling us 28 to 30 percent are unemployed,
which is unacceptable.
Senator Allard. Secretary Wolfowitz.
Secretary Wolfowitz. I agree. Secretary Armitage stated it
quite clearly. It might be saying that that word ``insurgency''
sort of implies this is something that rose up after we got
there, whereas we are to an astonishing degree dealing with
people who just did not surrender on 9 April and continue to
fight. But let me hasten to say, part of their strength comes
from the fact that they have a lot of money. They can hire
those unemployed young men, and there are unfortunately large
numbers.
That is why we believe that in addition to going after the
several thousand--I would be misleading you to suggest we have
an idea of a number, but it is in the thousands, we do not
think it is in the tens of thousands. So the real hard core
killers are a decided minority of this country, but they have
money and they can hire people to take shots at us. That is a
significant part of the problem.
Senator Allard. Do they get paid more----
Secretary Wolfowitz. The third area, if I might just say in
terms of this satisfaction and how it affects security, is
that, and we see it in towns and cities where we are able to
get reconstruction work going, the population gets more faith
about what we are there to do and more willingness to share
intelligence and information with us. It is that 40, 50 percent
of the population that might be considered fence-sitters who
are absolutely critical to win over.
Secretary Armitage. Senator Allard, if I could, as you
would say, revise and extend my remarks. I just want to add
something. Perhaps the most significant indicator of how we are
better off in Iraq is the quality and the caliber of the people
that are participating in the IIG and the courage that they
have. Two former members of the Iraqi governing council (IGC)
were killed. No one turned away; no one dropped out of the
game. Now the IIG, under tremendous and personal attacks, is
standing up there. That has to say something about Iraqi
courage and resilience. We can point to the fact that there are
people of courage like that, men and women in Iraq, as a sign
we are better off.
Senator Allard. General Myers?
General Myers. I would say only that, as has already been
discussed in the committee, that June 30 will probably be the
best thing we can do for security in Iraq. When Iraqis feel
that, and as the polls show, they have a legitimate government
that is sovereign, and that they can fight for Iraq, and that
there is no confusion, no cloud, about this being an
occupation.
I would also say that this all goes hand-in-hand. As the
other witnesses have already said, you cannot progress in
security alone. You have to have the economic piece, the
political piece, which is the June 30 piece, the nearest part
that we can look forward to. Then you have to have the security
piece, and they all have to march forward together.
Senator Allard. The other thing I want to drive there on
the demographics, we have apparently a large population of
males that are uneducated, unemployed in Iraq. Is there not a
role for some of our allies or even countries like France and
Germany, for example, who have fairly large Muslim populations,
to get those men in an educational program so they can get some
vocational training or goals? Is there not a role there for
that, or is this something everybody is ignoring? Are we trying
to address that population?
It seems to me like they are the ones of fighting age. They
are the ones with spare time. They are the ones that we seem to
be competing for as far as this insurgency issue is concerned.
Secretary Armitage. I can give you a partially satisfactory
answer. I have the figures that we would cite as the number of
Iraqis we employ in the various projects, and actually they are
quite impressive. But not having been out myself for about 3 or
4 months, I am not confident that I really have my hands around
it, but I will provide those for the record.
In terms of our allies, as you recall, about $13 billion
was pledged at the donors conference and about $1 billion of
that has been disbursed. Some of it is, in fact, the great
majority of it is in projects that employ people. I do not,
however, know specifically whether they are vocational training
programs that any of our foreign friends have undertaken. I
will provide it for the record, Senator Allard.
[The information referred to follows:]
Senator Allard. Thank you.
Chairman Warner. Thank you very much, Senator.
Senator Reed.
Senator Reed. Secretary Wolfowitz, in your recent
discussions with Prime Minister Allawi, did you discuss his
proposal for martial law?
Secretary Wolfowitz. We did not discuss it specifically.
No, Senator.
Senator Reed. That would be an item of intense interest,
since he has announced that his intentions--in fact, the
reports today in the press suggest that plans are being
undertaken for types of increased national security provisions
or some other euphemism. You did not discuss that at all with
him?
Secretary Wolfowitz. We did not discuss it specifically
unless my memory is failing me here. Let me be clear. We talked
a lot about the need for close consultation on a range of
sensitive military issues, including our offensive operations.
A declaration of martial law by him would clearly be such a
policy consideration that would require consultation with the
mechanisms that Ambassador Negroponte will be running when he
is there.
Let me be clear, because I said this earlier, he was not
talking about, as I understand it, declaring martial law on a
national level. He talked about special measures in specific
areas where there are problems, measures like curfews, which we
already have the authority to impose. It is giving Iraqi
security forces in those areas the kind of authority that
coalition forces have already. It is obviously something that
will be a subject of the coordination of the Iraqi Government.
Senator Reed. Do you have a position whether martial law,
limited as you described it, would be necessary at this time,
based upon your extensive experience and personal travels?
Secretary Wolfowitz. It would depend on the location, and
the circumstances in the location, and what is meant by martial
law, Senator.
Senator Reed. Well, I would presume curfews, check points,
eliminating free assembly, eliminating political opponents who
might be contrary to the----
Secretary Wolfowitz. Well, that is not martial law, and
that is out of bounds, the thing you just mentioned. What I
believe, and I think I am going on press reports here, was
mentioned were curfews, limitations on assembly, and searching
houses. Those happen to be all things that our troops do as
appropriate in specific locations. We are dealing with an
extremely dangerous security situation. You realize that. The
enemy is taking extreme measures to destabilize civil order.
Such measures as curfews, searching houses, and establishing
check points are measures that have to be taken in particular
areas. We are doing it ourselves already.
Senator Reed. Well, one of the issues that was raised in
this whole discussion of martial law is the capacity of the
Iraqi security forces to do it themselves. I notice that they
are not ready yet for employment. It would invariably draw in
United States forces, either in a supporting role or even in a
primary role. Is that your conclusion too?
Secretary Wolfowitz. We retain control over our forces.
They retain control over theirs. The purpose of consulting is
where we may undertake actions that affect them or vice versa.
We have been doing this for a long time in Afghanistan with
President Karzai. He at times wants to do things, which might
be perfectly within his prerogative to do. We will tell him: If
you can do it with your own forces and your own capability, you
are entitled to do that, but we are under no obligation to
enforce something that you simply decide you want to do.
The same thing would happen in Iraq. If Prime Minister
Allawi decides that it is appropriate to have martial law in
some area and we think not, it is going to be up to him with
his own forces to be able to enforce that.
Senator Reed. Well, Mr. Secretary, I think listening to all
of you gentlemen this morning, I am confused about the
strategy. The strategy seems to let the Iraqis do it and to put
an Iraqi face on this, yet they do not have the capability to
do it alone. This suggestion that they can carve out a piece of
the country, put the security forces in, even if we disapprove,
is not reflective of the situation on the ground. What you are
describing is also perhaps a potential for strategic paralysis,
where they want to do something, but we do not want to do
something.
The poster for that is, of course, Fallujah. Mr. Secretary,
you were here several weeks ago reading an impassioned letter
for a young marine that said, this is the next Belleau Woods;
we are going to finish it today. Of course, a few days later we
turned it over to someone who looked remarkably like Saddam
Hussein as the General to control it. You have indicated today
that is still a situation that is out of control. There just
does not seem to be a strategy that is going to work.
Secretary Wolfowitz. Senator Reed, the strategy is clear,
which is not to change things overnight. You cannot change
situations like this overnight but rather build their capacity
over time and as rapidly as possible. The important thing,
Secretary Armitage referred to it a few minutes ago, we have
incredibly courageous Iraqi leaders who are determined to
succeed, who have indicated in all manner of ways that they are
committed to a free Iraq, a democratic Iraq, but also
understand the nature of the enemy that they are confronting
and their own lives are on the line in doing this.
It is the nature of coalition warfare. This is a coalition
between the multinational force and the Iraqis. You have to
come to some compromise about at least some coordination of
policy, and we are in agreement that the Fallujah situation
needs to be changed. We did not change our approach to Fallujah
because the Iraqis vetoed what we might do. We changed our
approach to Fallujah because after consulting with Iraqis, it
was concluded that the effects of continuing with large-scale
military operations in Fallujah would be sufficiently negative
in the rest of the country. It was better to go with this
compromise to see what results it would produce and then
proceed from there.
Secretary Armitage. Senator Reed, if I may, the context of
the Fallujah decision is important. We were trying to stand up
and assist the efforts of Lakhdar Brahimi to get an interim
government. The Fallujah activity and the heavy military
involvement by the United States was very much interfering with
our ability to put together what is a pretty impressive interim
government of Iraq, sir.
Senator Reed. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Warner. Thank you very much, Senator Reed.
Senator Sessions.
Senator Sessions. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I believe we
have had a valuable hearing this morning. I would just like to
ask one thing about somethings the media, Congress, and
commentators say, and what kind of impact that might have on
our success, our troops, and the potential success for the
people of Iraq.
One of the things that has concerned me, we have had a
number of hearings with regard to the terrible abuses that
occurred in Abu Ghraib prison, but the evidence, the policy
directives, the memorandums, the commands that we have seen
that were sent to those guards indicate clearly they were not
told to do any of these things. It exceeded any powers they may
have had and they were in violation. They are being prosecuted,
General Myers, as you have indicated earlier, and they are
being disciplined for that.
Secretary Wolfowitz, is it not true that we need to be
careful that when we make criticisms of our military, our
government, and the policies that we have, we need to found
those on true facts? We do not need to exaggerate the problems
we have? We had a real problem. We certainly do not need to
exaggerate it. How does that impact our success potential in
Iraq?
Secretary Wolfowitz. Well, as we said earlier, we are in no
small measure in an information war, and the enemy is very good
at spreading lies. We have to be very careful, especially when
we are talking about something like this, to make sure that we
have our facts right. It is a great strength of this country,
and I felt it was appreciated in Iraq. Unlike not only the
previous government in Iraq, but also most governments that
they are familiar with, we do not condone abuse. We do not
tolerate abuse. We, in fact, expose it when it happens, and we
punish it. That they are noticing is a very different way of
proceeding.
It is also important, without minimizing the abuses or our
horror at the abuses, not to loosely characterize things that
were done--that were not done.
Senator Sessions. Well, I know it complicates the lives and
the works of our people and could even put them at risk. We had
recently seven prisoners who had been prisoners under Saddam
Hussein who did nothing more than deal in currency apparently
at some point, American currency, in the course of their
business. Many of them were in Abu Ghraib, and they had their
hands chopped off. When asked about the abuse by Americans in
the prison system at the press conference I attended, one of
the Iraqis who had lost his hand, said that it is not American
policy. They have criticized it. They are conducting
investigations, and they are punishing people who did wrong.
That is a lot different from Saddam Hussein, who wanted a
video, and we saw the video. He wanted a video to make sure
that he personally saw these punishments being carried out. So
it is a big change that has occurred in Iraq, and I want to
make that point.
One of the things that strikes me and that we have said
here earlier as so important is the courage of the leaders of
Iraq. Prime Minister Allawi appeared recently when that
horrible bombing attack occurred that killed 13 people waiting
in line to sign up to be policemen in Iraq to fight terrorism.
Within hours, or within an hour, he was on the scene right
there and made these comments, which I thought was important.
He said, ``it's a cowardly attack aimed at the stability of
Iraq, aimed at the people of Iraq.'' Allawi said, sweat
glistening from his forehead, ``The government of Iraq is
determined to go ahead and confront the enemy. Justice will
prevail.''
To me, that is the kind of thing we have to have. I believe
he also responded to the attack on the oil pipeline. Secretary
Armitage, do you have any thoughts about this kind of event,
and how important it is?
Secretary Armitage. Well it goes hand in glove with what I
was suggesting about decreasing our visibility. When our two
excellent spokesmen, General Kimmitt, and Mr. Senor, would make
that same announcement, it does not carry near the import of a
Prime Minister standing out there, as you suggest, with sweat
on his brow, saying this is against Iraqis; this is against us.
This is not about occupiers; you are killing us.
It also says something by the way that the 13 people who
were killed as you mentioned in an explosion were trying to
sign up in what is probably the most dangerous occupation in
Iraq these days and that is to become a policeman. Why? Clearly
because the police ultimately are going to be what provides
local and neighborhood security, what then provides security
for a whole city, which provides security for a whole district,
and the terrorists know that. That is why they are targeting
these guys.
Secretary Wolfowitz. Senator Sessions, there is a
connection between the two things you commented on. One was the
horrors of the old regime and the other is the courage of
people in standing up to build a new Iraq. One of the things
that inspires their courage is the recognition of how horrible
the past was and what a horrible future the terrorists and
their Saddamist allies would like to bring Iraq back to.
I said it earlier, the terrorists' great strength is their
ability to kill and destroy in horrible ways, but it is also
their great weakness. They offer no positive vision for the
country. I go back to what that father of that impressive young
interpreter I mentioned in my opening comments, whose sister
was assassinated by the enemy because she was working with us.
When asked, ``why do you still work with us after that?'' She
said, ``my father told me you mustn't retreat in the face of
evil.'' The Iraqis understand the evil of the past. It causes a
lot of problems. It is in some ways a tortured country. But it
also produces a great deal of courage to stand up in the face
of it.
Senator Sessions. Well, I thank all of you for the work and
the commitment you have given to this. I do believe that we are
at a point where we have to be there. We have to be strong,
where they have to know that they have our support and that we
are not going to cut and run. Then I think they will step up
and they are going to continue to step up, and I am pleased to
see people signing up to be policemen even though they are
being targeted. That is also a very good indication. Thank you,
Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Warner. Senator, we thank you for bringing back
some of those historical benchmarks as we look at today's
problems.
Senator Ben Nelson.
Senator Ben Nelson. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thank you
all for your service, your commitment, and for being here with
us today. We appreciate it. For some time now, I have been an
advocate and a proponent in particular for more NATO
involvement, and I know that you all share the interest in
internationalizing on a greater basis the effort in Iraq. Last
month I sent Secretary Powell a letter stating this and
suggested that for the U.S. Government, for the administration,
to be asking for NATO's support may not be putting the best
foot forward, particularly as it related to the President
speaking to President Chirac most recently.
I have felt and I continue to feel that the best proponent
for that NATO involvement, the best petitioner would be Prime
Minister Allawi. I understand the President is taking the Prime
Minister's letter to NATO right now to ask for that support.
Once again, if we are going to take the training wheels off, we
need to talk about sovereignty. In this sense, I am more
interested in that they appear to be the petitioner rather than
the puppet. I wonder how we believe we are going to get the
right kind of result? How are we going to get a ``yes'' when we
have been getting in some cases polite and in some cases a
little less polite ``no's'' so far? I would leave it up to
either Secretary Armitage or Secretary Wolfowitz to respond.
Secretary Armitage. Senator Nelson, I will give it a go.
The Prime Minister's letter was to NATO Secretary General Jaap
de Hoop Scheffer which puts him right in the spot that you were
suggesting to Secretary Powell: go to NATO and let NATO and the
Secretary General bring this forward. In my understanding that
is the discussion that the Secretary General wants to have. We
are obviously going to support it.
[The information referred to follows:]
Senator Ben Nelson. But we are a fairly expensive courier
too, are we not?
Secretary Armitage. Well, we are couriers, but the
President is going to be there anyway, so he will speak up.
Both Paul and I have spoken in Brussels to the North Atlantic
Council (NAC) about these matters, not putting ourselves in the
position of being the--we wanted to just have the discussion
about what the equities were in Iraq. If we are successful, and
that is a democratic country, you have just changed the Middle
East in a way that was unfathomable 4 years ago, and trying to
get NATO friends interested in this. I believe they are. We
have had several discussions with the Secretary General. He is
going to carry the water at Istanbul, but we are certainly not
going to shy away from supporting him fully. We have made our
views known on this.
Senator Ben Nelson. Mr. Secretary?
Secretary Wolfowitz. It is worth pointing out that 15 of
the 33 coalition partners are NATO allies. Some 18,000 NATO
troops are serving alongside us in Iraq today, not as NATO but
in their national capacities and quite heroically. Some 100
coalition soldiers have lost their lives in this fight already
to date.
NATO's capacity has been whittled down enormously over the
last 10 years. We are finding that our allies are stretched
pretty thin just to support what they are already committed to
in Afghanistan. We are working with them; we are hoping for
more; we are hoping particularly that some who have not
contributed yet, like the French and the Germans, might be able
to contribute to the U.N. protection mission in Iraq.
Senator Ben Nelson. We are looking for that in some
capacity, training security forces rather than providing
operational forces.
Secretary Wolfowitz. That is exactly what I wanted to say.
The Prime Minister later emphasized that our NATO allies have a
lot of capacity to train and equip Iraqi forces. That could be
a very helpful contribution that does not put additional strain
on their own forces.
Senator Ben Nelson. But on the basis of perception versus
reality, it just struck me that you cannot be partially
sovereign any more than you are sort of unique. It would have
been better for Prime Minister Allawi to go and become the
petitioner and make his presence known in that request.
Secretary Armitage. My understanding is Foreign Minister
Zebari is going to fulfill that role at Istanbul.
Senator Ben Nelson. He is not taking the letter apparently.
Secretary Armitage. Pardon me?
Senator Ben Nelson. But he is not carrying the letter.
Secretary Armitage. The letter has been sent. Every NATO
member has it. We have it, but he is going to fulfill that
role. There is a question about whether the Prime Minister at
this crucial time of turnover should be out of the country. I
would argue no, saying that is why he is not there.
Secretary Wolfowitz. Senator Nelson, I do not think we are
the ones carrying the letter. My understanding is the letter
went on Monday by whatever courier system from the Prime
Minister directly to the Secretary General.
Senator Ben Nelson. All right, thank you. My other question
is, as we--and I understand the analogy about a bet, but I hope
we are not into gamble du jour as we move forward. We look at
Fallujah; we expected a laying down of the arms, that we would
be liberators, not occupiers, that the number of troops that we
took to accomplish our mission were based on certain
assumptions. We may not have secured the ammunition dumps. I
know it is a very difficult task, but we did not do that. Now
we are facing Improvised Explosive Devices (IED). We did not
keep the peace in order to win the peace because law and order
broke down at certain points.
Do we have a backup just in case the security efforts that
we expect to get from the Iraqi people fighting for themselves
does not materialize the way we believe and hope and maybe bet
that they will?
Secretary Wolfowitz. Senator, you always have to be
prepared to adjust and especially adjust the schedule. We
acknowledge that it has been slower, partly because of our own
procedures on our side getting some equipment in the hands of
Iraqi forces, for example. We will meet that schedule. If we do
not, we just have to be prepared to be a little more patient.
The ultimate goal is an Iraq that is governed by Iraqis and
defended by Iraqis. That is really the only formula for
success. It has worked in many other places over the last 50
years; it can work there.
Secretary Armitage. If I may, Senator Nelson, it is
interesting to note that even with the horror of the beheadings
and the terrible tragedies there, some of our coalition
partners have actually extended their mandates with
overwhelming votes in their Parliaments, the Italians, and the
Dutch, for instance.
Secretary Wolfowitz. The Koreans.
Secretary Armitage. The Koreans went ahead in the face of
this. I apologize for even using the betting terminology. I did
not mean to be so frivolous, but we are making the assumption,
a good assumption, that Iraqis will fight for Iraq with more
enthusiasm than they fight for what is seen as an occupying
power.
Senator Ben Nelson. Thank you. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Warner. Senator Dayton.
Senator Dayton. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I agree with the
sentiments that have been expressed by my colleagues on both
sides of the aisle here. It is imperative that we succeed in
Iraq both in reality and in national and international
perception. I am concerned. This parallels some of the other
questions that have been asked, but I want to go into it again,
because our troops have been heroically performing there for
over a year. They have won the victories that the President
initially said were the primary reasons for this war. They
toppled Saddam Hussein's regime; they eliminated or captured
him, his sons, and most of his henchman; they determined
conclusively that there are no weapons of mass destruction that
threaten our national security.
It seems to me that now our mission and therefore the
preconditions for our success in Iraq have been expanded. The
President said it in his speech at the War College last month.
``Our agenda is freedom and independence, security and
prosperity for the Iraqi people.'' How long is it realistically
going to take before we could imagine that we would see Iraq
achieve that level of progress? Either Secretary Wolfowitz or
Secretary Armitage. This is more policy than military.
Secretary Wolfowitz. It is important to keep some
historical perspective here. First of all, we were absolutely
clear from the beginning that we had to win the peace as well
as win the war. We are still fighting the war. I would not say
the majority of Saddam's henchmen have been defeated.
Unfortunately, they are a significant part of the enemy that we
are facing and they are still out there. Saddam himself did not
surrender until he was captured, and his close associate,
Ibrahim al-Duri, has not surrendered yet. He is probably
funding terrorism.
Senator Dayton. Top henchmen, I stand corrected.
Secretary Wolfowitz. No, it is actually some of the more
junior ones who are the real professional killers like the
members of this muhabarrat unit called the M-14. It is a so-
called anti-terrorism unit--excuse me, it is George Orwell at
work. They specialize in kidnappings, hijackings, bombings, and
assassinations, and they are still doing bombings and
associations.
The enemy is still out there. It is an evil enemy. The
Iraqi people know what an evil enemy it is, and they know what
evils it did in the past. The key to winning here is building
Iraqi capacity. We hope we can do it faster than in Germany at
the end of World War II, but I mentioned earlier it was not
until 1948 that we came in with a Marshall Plan because we saw
Europe going down the tubes. It has been decades in Korea, and
I hope it is not decades in Iraq.
Patience is important here particularly because--and it is
a kind of paradox--the more patient we are, the less we will
have to wait, the more people are convinced that we are not
leaving. I welcome Senator Kennedy's comment earlier; I hope
everyone on the enemy side and our side in Iraq understands
Americans are not cutting and running. The Iraqis are not
cutting and running. The sooner everybody understands that, the
sooner at least the less hard core enemy will say, ``okay, I
give up,'' especially if this government can find ways to peel
off the less evildoers and bring them back into society.
Senator Dayton. Mr. Secretary, I do not know anybody here
who is talking about cutting and running, and I really----
Secretary Wolfowitz. I did not say----
Senator Dayton.--every time these question are raised, sir,
we are put, those of us who ask----
Secretary Wolfowitz. Senator Dayton----
Senator Dayton. Let me make my comment, please. We are put
in this situation, and words are used by either colleagues or
the administration that we lack resolve, that we are cutting
and running, that we are going to be defeated. I am saying our
forces, our troops, heroically won the victories they were sent
for. There are 140,000 of them over there now. Their families
are back in Minnesota and other States, and, sir, they are not
patient. I do not think it is realistic to expect them to be
patient.
I have talked to a lot of the men and women who have served
over there back in Minnesota, and they are proud of what they
did. No one is complaining about being there really in the
bottom of the corps, but they are not patient to come home.
They should not have to be, sir. These are matters of policy.
That is why I really am offended when we ask the challenging
questions here and even more by some of our colleagues who were
accused of not supporting our troops. I support our troops. I
want to bring them home safely as soon as possible with their
victory secure. I know you do too, but I want to----
Secretary Wolfowitz. Senator, I am impatient----
Senator Dayton. I am not done. We have a responsibility to
the American people and especially to the families of those who
are serving over there and to those who are serving over
themselves to be straight with them about what we have put them
in there for at this point now and when we expect to have them
come home.
I will give you a chance to respond, sir--I am sorry.
Senator Clinton asked General Casey how long he thought we were
going to be keeping this current force level of 140,000 is what
he identified. He said, as the chairman pointed out, for
planning purposes, they are talking about keeping that force
level there through February 2007. That is a long time from
now. Is that what we really have gotten ourselves into here,
that kind of force strength for that period of time?
Secretary Wolfowitz. Senator Dayton, first of all, I share
your impatience to win this thing. We are very impatient when
it comes to things like building up Iraqi security forces
because that is how we are going to win. I only meant, and
believe me, I was welcoming the fact that nobody that I hear in
responsible positions is talking about cutting and running. It
is very important that that message is clear to all Iraqis.
What General Casey talked about is a planning assumption,
which is to say, you figure out how you will manage, if that is
the way things turn out. It is not a prediction. I think anyone
would be kind of foolish to make predictions. I do not think
General Casey was. Bosnia, which was a much simpler situation,
turned out to be longer than it was predicted initially. We
have made steady progress there. It is 8 years later, and we
are about to finally end that mission. Korea and Europe, which
were really high stakes missions like this one, have lasted a
long time.
I am most impatient, though, sir, not at the numbers issue
but at getting Iraqis in the front lines so that they are the
ones that are doing the fighting. If our troops are there, at
least they can be there in relative safety in a supporting
role. That is really what we are working for. That is General
Abizaid's strategy as we could lay it out for you in a
classified session. It has to put us in the supporting role and
Iraqis in the front role.
It is working in some places. It is working up in Mosul. It
seems to be working down in Basra. We would like to see it
working all over the country.
Senator Dayton. My time is up. Let me just clarify one
point if I may. I met with some Iraqi citizens in Minnesota
last weekend, half of whom are now American citizens and others
here illegally. They said that a couple of them had been in
Iraq just recently, one of them in particular in Baghdad in the
last several weeks. He said that the electricity situation in
Baghdad is now typically 8 hours on, 16 hours off, and
sometimes it's worse than that. Is that accurate?
Secretary Wolfowitz. I cannot speak to precise numbers. The
sabotage levels are very high, and that produces a lot of
shortages. Actually the production is up. It is now
considerably up over what it was pre-war. Demand is also up.
When you fly over Baghdad, you see every roof just covered with
satellite dishes, and people are buying air conditioners that
never had them before. The supply is growing but the demand is
going up.
Senator Dayton. My question, Mr. Secretary, is that an
accurate statement, the conditions in Baghdad?
Secretary Wolfowitz. I would have to check. I do not think
it is that bad, but there are a lot of blackouts.
Chairman Warner. Perhaps you can provide that response for
the record if you do not have it accurately.
Secretary Wolfowitz. General Myers----
General Myers. Well, I do not have it accurately, but I
think that there has been terrific sabotage against
transformers and power lines in recent days. Prior to that, we
had produced more electricity than Iraq has ever seen in its
history. Now the ability to distribute is impacted by the
attacks in the infrastructure. We have mitigation efforts
underway right now to mitigate that.
Senator Dayton. We all know, having been there in the
summer, if that is close to the situation, whatever the
circumstances, I realize those sabotages are going on--
refrigeration, air conditioning, and running water, and the
population--that is one of the reasons they are not happy.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Warner. Thank you very much, Senator. I want to
make sure on the issue of bringing the troops back each of the
witnesses had adequate opportunity to reply to Senator Dayton's
question.
Secretary Armitage. If I may, bringing the troops back will
be a function of security. Let me defer to my colleagues, but
this is the Armed Services Committee. It is fair also to
commend, in addition to the 140,000 heroic troops who serve,
the hundreds of diplomats who serve, and by the way, do not
carry guns, and have served and will continue to serve these.
They are your citizens as well, and they are our sons and
daughters as well. I know this is not a committee that normally
talks about diplomats, but I represent them now. I appreciate
the opportunity to put that in.
Chairman Warner. Thank you, Secretary.
Senator Dayton. We appreciate their courage.
Chairman Warner. Just a minute, Senator Dayton. Let's just
let the panel finish.
General Myers. Mr. Chairman and Senator Dayton, I would
just add that we are going to do prudent, worst-case planning,
which may have been what General Casey referred to; I did not
hear his comments. But we are going to continue to do that so
we can continue to source and provide the kind of
predictability that some units have not had. We have to do
that. Nobody is predicting the force levels right now. General
Abizaid has said he needs several months after the interim
government stands up, and then he is going to take a look at
where we are.
Senator Dayton. I want to be very clear. General Casey said
this was planning; he did not make a prediction.
General Myers. Good, and----
Senator Dayton. Secretary, about the diplomats and others
who are performing heroically as well. Thank you.
Secretary Armitage. We are going to be there for a lot
longer than 2007. Our planning is way out there.
Chairman Warner. All right. Thank you very much, gentlemen.
Now we will go to Senator Akaka.
Senator Akaka. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. Secretary
Wolfowitz, this past Tuesday at a House Armed Services
Committee hearing, you were asked about mistakes made in Iraq.
In your answer you mentioned that you believed a mistake was
made by not having the funding flexibility to field Iraqi
security forces faster, and it has taken too long to get
equipment, but it is finally arriving. You stated, ``If we had
been a little less fussy about competitive contracting and a
little more eager to get guns and radios in the hands of Iraqi
police, it could have been done faster.''
I must tell you that statement troubles me. Congress has
appropriated billions of dollars in support of DOD's efforts in
Iraq. The real problem is inconsistent administrative oversight
and a lack of systematic controls on the part of the
Department. My question is, can you please explain further what
you meant when you stated, if we had been a little less fussy
about the competitive contracting?
Secretary Wolfowitz. I do not think I really mean that we
should have been less fussy. We have very elaborate procedures
for letting contracts. For example, one critical contract that
was for equipping Iraqi security forces was awarded. It took
some time to award it because of all the procedures that we
have to go through to do a request for proposal and all of the
things that go with it. Then it was appealed. When it was
appealed--fussy is the wrong word--the lawyers told us, ``You
cannot now go and use Iraqi funds to purchase the same things
because that would be seen as going around the appeals
process.'' So we added another couple of months before that was
resolved.
When you talk to our commanders, they say the money that we
get through commander's emergency reserve program that comes
straight to us is bid competitively. It is bid at a local
level; it is bid without all of the large contracting apparatus
that seems to grow as you go up the food chain. They get very
good value for the money, and it is done competitively. So we
should be fussy about how money is spent, particularly American
taxpayer money. Sometimes procedures are cumbersome and are
oriented more toward peacetime economic development programs
and do not recognize that in war time these kinds of projects
are every bit as important as tank ammunition. We find a way to
do those things more expeditiously. That is really all I meant,
Senator.
Senator Akaka. In my questioning of hearings, I have been
almost exclusively asking about contractors. I am concerned
about contracting.
Secretary Wolfowitz. You are right to be.
Senator Akaka. I also have a follow-up question on
contracting practices in Iraq. The recent prison abuse scandal
has highlighted that there are many private contractors working
in Iraq. Can you tell me, is the Department administering some
sort of tracking mechanism of all of these contractor
personnel? If so, who in the Department is responsible for
maintaining and tracking both American-contracted employees as
well as contracted employees from other countries?
Secretary Wolfowitz. There are many different categories of
contractors. Let me try my understanding, and General Myers or
Secretary Armitage might have a different view. Contractors
that work for the U.S. military we have certain
responsibilities for, both for their conduct and for their
protection. There are a large number of other contractors that
work in Iraq. They are there basically on their own under
obligations of Iraqi law. They are largely responsible for
their own security. There is, I guess you might say, a middle
ground where there are contractors that are in that latter
category, but they are executing important reconstruction
projects, many of them in fact funded out of our
congressionally appropriated supplemental. Their security is a
matter in the first instance of their responsibility, but it is
a matter of concern for us. Our military commanders try to
establish communications with those contractors so that in
emergencies we can hopefully back them up. Obviously the
tragedy that happened with the four Blackwater contractors in
Fallujah is an example of where we were not able to help them,
unfortunately.
General Myers, do you want to add to that?
General Myers. No. I think going forward after June 30 that
the immunity that will be afforded to the U.S. Armed Forces
will also be afforded to contractors that are working for the
United States Government, as well as foreign liaison personnel,
and so they are going to be protected as long as they are
performing the duties they were contracted to perform. They
will continue to have the right, the inherent right of self
defense, all the contractors that are performing in Iraq.
It is also true that the multinational force will have the
authority post-June 30 to protect contractors. It will be up to
the Commander of the multinational force, General Casey, now
that he has been confirmed, and the contractors to work out
where that will occur.
Senator Akaka. Thank you for your responses. My time has
expired, but let me say that I have been particularly concerned
about the line of command and the way in which the contractors
come under that line. We will be talking about that later.
Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Warner. We thank you very much, Senator Akaka.
Senator Bayh.
Senator Bayh. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and gentlemen, thank
you. These hearings are important, but so are your other
responsibilities. I am well aware that it takes some time to
prepare for these things, so your trial by ordeal is about
concluded.
I have three questions. First, I would like to touch upon
the stakes in the struggle in which we are engaged and the
consequences to our Nation's security if we are ultimately not
successful; second, how we hope to win; and finally, what
contributions toward our success we can expect from the Iraqis
in the near term.
First, as you are well aware, there were differences of
opinion about embanking upon this course of action, but we are
there now. I would like for you in particular, to get your
opinions about two things. First, if we were to withdraw
precipitously, would those who are adverse to the interests of
the United States of America in all likelihood after a period
of violence seize control of Iraq. That is number one.
Second, have these people articulated any positive agenda
for that country? Do they have political demands or are they
simply opposed to the democracy and freedom we are attempting
to create there? So that is another way of saying is there any
alternative to a struggle to try and suppress them. They have
no positive agenda that they are pursuing in the political
process? So, number one, are adversaries likely to seize
control of the country if we do not persevere? Second, do they
have any positive agendas or any grounds for negotiation, or is
this simply a struggle that we must persevere in and ultimately
succeed?
Secretary Wolfowitz. You used the word precipitously, and
that is the key. Ultimately and hopefully sooner rather than
later, we hope in fact we can significantly reduce our presence
and our role. But it has to be keyed not to a particular date,
but rather it has to be keyed to the building of Iraqi
capacity.
It is remarkable the extent to which this enemy offers no
positive vision at all. We have a group of death worshippers on
the one hand. Mr. Zarqawi and his people believe in blowing
themselves up so they can blow up other people. We have the
killers from the old regime who have been doing that sort of
torture and chopping off of hands and cutting out of tongues
that Senator Sessions referred to earlier for several decades.
I will say it again. That is why so many Iraqis are
prepared to stand up and fight for what they call, very often
the phrase seems to be a ``new Iraq.'' It means a free Iraq. It
means things that we Americans will like, but for them it is a
new Iraq. It is the newness that is important, and it has to be
their country. Our great strategic advantage is that the enemy
offers nothing.
Senator Bayh. It seems to me we are involved here as a test
of the perseverance and the staying power of the American
public. The reason for my question is--I anticipated your
answer--it seems to me that there is no positive agenda on the
part of our adversaries. In fact they would be hostile to the
interests of the United States of America. It is important for
the American people to be aware of that, because that will
obviously factor into their support for the cause upon which we
have embarked. General?
General Myers. If I may, you asked what the stakes are, and
the stakes go far beyond Iraq. Iraq is very important, and it
has all the potential that Secretary Armitage said. But this
goes back to a question that was asked earlier where we showed
U.S. resolve in 1983 in Beirut in a certain manner. We did it
later on in Somalia. We did it after the U.S.S. Cole attack. We
did it after Khobar Towers. This adversary is an extremist
movement--their aim is to go back to the 7th century and
establish Caliphate for Muslim nations. That is a threat that
is a very extreme threat that is bigger than Iraq, but Iraq is
a crucial battleground for them. What they are counting on is
the same sort of reaction they saw in 1983, the same sort of
reaction they have seen every time we have been tested.
It goes to the question that Senator Sessions talked about,
which is the test of wills and resolve. This is clearly a test
of wills, it is clearly a test of our patience. It is
absolutely essential to our national security. As the military
advisor to the President and NSC, do not think there has been a
greater threat to our national security than this type of
extremism through a few perpetrators. On September 11, 2001, it
was 19 individuals that brought down the World Trade Center,
killed 3,000 individuals, hit the Pentagon, and killed several
hundred more.
Senator Bayh. It is important for the American people to
know what the stakes are, both on the up side, as Secretary
Armitage mentioned, spreading democracy, but also on the down
side if we are ultimately not successful.
General Myers. Could not be higher in my opinion.
Secretary Armitage. If you will allow me.
Senator Bayh. Yes, and then I do want to get to my second
question. Please go ahead.
Secretary Armitage. What has happened in the last couple of
weeks in the Middle East is rather amazing. You have had the
Arab League and the Organization of Islamic Countries (OIR)
come out and put a forward-looking, very positive view of the
new Iraqi Government. Now, why do I underline this? That
government is not yet democratic, but the whole aim of that
government is to get a democracy in the Middle East by December
or January 2005. You put that together with what came out of
the G-8 in terms of what is now being called modernization in
the greater Middle East, which is another word for reform. You
have some real movement that could be thwarted in the Middle
East in general if we do not follow through and if we are not
successful.
Senator Bayh. Thank you. My second and now final question
has to do with how do we win. We have established here that our
adversaries are not engaged in the political process. They
reject civil society, they have a view they would like to
impose akin to the Dark Ages, and it seems to me unlikely that
at least in the foreseeable future we will be able to kill them
all. So how do we ultimately win this?
Here is the point that I would like to get to. Ultimately
it is the Iraqi people themselves that need to reject these
extreme elements and themselves make the conditions within
which they flourish no longer existent in that society. Things
are fairly good in the north with some exceptions; they are
fairly good in the south. So am I correct in saying what we are
really talking about here is the Sunni part of the country?
Which gets to my question, what will it take to enlist the
Sunnis in the cause of building a democratic, stable Iraq? As
mentioned by some of my colleagues, what are the benchmarks
that we are seeking to establish? How will we know that we are
making progress with the Sunnis and the Sunnis themselves
reject these sorts of extremist elements in their own midst? I
am assuming without the Sunnis ultimately coming on board it is
going to be very difficult to establish the kind of security
given the symmetry here that we are going to need for democracy
to be successful.
Secretary Armitage. You are dead right. They have to have
them on board. One of the things that has been accomplished by
the Iraqi interim government (IIG) that really helped calm part
of the Sunni population down was the number of Sunnis who
participate on the IIG. You saw one of them, the President, who
happens to be a leading tribal sheikh as well. So the first
element of bringing them on board is to make sure they
understand that they have a future in the new Iraq and they
would not be disenfranchised. That is number one.
Number two, they have to see that some Sunnis do hold
positions of legitimate and real power, which they see. Number
three, we have to do a better job, and one of the mistakes that
I have testified with Paul about that we made is we did not
empower the tribal sheikhs to a higher degree earlier on. We
have to continue that. Number four, we have to continue to
bring down the unemployment in the Sunni areas, which our
military commanders, I think, are doing a fantastic job by use
of the CERP funds. So all the elements are there, and they are
coming together. Now, will they, Senator? I do not know. I
think so.
Secretary Wolfowitz. I would add, Saddam practiced almost
equal opportunity oppression. He killed enormous numbers of
Sunnis as well. Part of our problem throughout the country and
particularly in Sunni areas is people do not like to be
occupied. Amirasunni, out near Fallujah, who was a Sunni, said
to General Matti's, ``In my heart, I want you to leave
tomorrow. In my head I know I need you for a while longer.''
I met up in Mosul with this very courageous governor who on
April 9, when they were under attack from the enemy, stood his
ground through the night in the government house. While the
police were unreliable, the civil defense corps people and the
facilities protection service people stood their ground. They
were able to fight off the enemy knowing that we were there to
help if needed, but they did not need us. It is a wonderful
story, and this man is a Sunni Arab.
Having them have their own government, their own country,
and getting us out of this situation of making them an occupied
country will help particularly--it will help with everyone, but
particularly with the Sunni Arabs.
Senator Bayh. The last thing I would say, and Mr. Chairman,
thank you for your forbearance. General, since I am on, as
Senator Roberts, Warner, and others are, the Intelligence and
Armed Services Committees--I would assume that another
indicator will be the intelligence flow that we are getting. It
will enable us to conduct some of these pinpoint strikes in
Fallujah and places like that and the extent to which Sunnis
and others are saying: look, here is where the bad guys are, we
do not want them in our midst anymore, help us eradicate them.
General Myers. That is absolutely essential and absolutely
has to be part of it, Senator. You are right. That is what
General Casey will work on very hard, because we have already
started with his predecessor. That is how do we share
information. We have to be able to move information around very
quickly in this type of threat environment. There are some
structural things that need to be done as well. We have to be
willing to share, and they have to be willing to share. So far,
the Iraqis have been very willing to share information with us,
and we need more of that type of help absolutely.
Senator Bayh. Thank you very much.
Chairman Warner. Thank you very much, Senator. Particularly
that last question goes to the heart of what we are trying to
work with.
Senator Pryor.
Senator Pryor. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Secretary
Wolfowitz, I would like to focus if I could for a minute on Mr.
Zarqawi. I would like to ask if he is or is not al Qaeda? The
reason I am asking this is because in today's New York Times it
says, ``intelligence officials say it is not clear if Mr.
Zarqawi is an associate or a rival of Mr. bin Laden.'' Then it
goes on to talk about he has shown a propensity to target
Shiite Muslims, whereas apparently Osama bin Laden is trying to
unify the Muslim world. I would like to get your thoughts on is
he or is he not al Qaeda.
Secretary Wolfowitz. The relationship between him and bin
Laden is murky. He was running a terrorist training camp in
Afghanistan under the Taliban when bin Laden was in charge. He
seems to have an association that goes back some ways. That is
why we talk about him as associated though rather than--he
obviously shows a streak of independence. He is not just an
anti-Iraqi terrorist. He is done terrorist actions in Jordan.
In fact, he was involved in the millennium plot in Jordan back
in the year 2000. He has been involved, we are pretty certain
about this, in plots in Georgia in the former Soviet Union, in
London, in Paris. This is a worldwide terrorist with probably
his own ambitions. The important point is he is a killer.
Senator Pryor. He is on the loose in Iraq.
Secretary Wolfowitz. Yes.
Senator Pryor. Now, I understand that we are in an open
session here, and I am sensitive to that. If you cannot
comment, I would like to follow up in a different forum, but
did we have a chance to take Zarqawi out of the equation in the
early days of the campaign in Iraq, maybe even before we
started the war phase in Iraq?
Secretary Wolfowitz. There are some legends maybe if we had
a chance we could have gotten him in August 2002. I do not
think that is true. There was a major strike on the facility in
northeastern Iraq with which he was associated at the beginning
of the war. A considerable number of this Ansar al-Islam group,
which again is separated but affiliated, separate from either
Zarqawi or al Qaeda. Alot of them were killed and some
importance intelligence was collected, but we do not think Mr.
Zarqawi was there at the time.
Senator Pryor. General Myers, do you agree with that?
General Myers. Yes. I do not think we have enough
information to make that judgement. We know he was affiliated
to some degree with Ansar al-Islam who had this enclave in
northeastern Iraq, but his exact whereabouts when and where, we
were never certain of that.
Senator Pryor. That is fair enough. Secretary Armitage,
recently you were quoted as saying ``the U.N. Security Council
Resolution will make it very clear that this is a fully
sovereign Iraqi Government. We will only be in Iraq under U.N.
mandate with the invitation of the Government of Iraq. They
have invited us in, they can invite us out. That seems to me to
be pretty sovereign.''
I would like to follow up with an answer that you gave to
Senator Levin's question early on in this hearing.
Specifically, in response to Senator Levin's question, are you
saying that the interim government has no authority to ask us
to leave Iraq?
Secretary Armitage. I said quite the contrary. I said the
interim government, as a matter of fact, could ask us to leave
Iraq, and we would leave.
Senator Pryor. Okay. Now, I am sorry, General Myers maybe
said that the previous--or the current iteration of government
there kind of binds the interim government. I do not know all
the legal issues there, but is there a difference of opinion
between State and Defense on this question?
Secretary Wolfowitz. No, there is no difference of opinion.
What General Myers was referring to was the fact that the
legislation that is a product of the CPA continues in force
under this sovereign government. There are certain procedures
under which it can introduce its own decrees and change things,
particularly with respect to things like negotiating agreements
with foreign countries. That comes in when there is an elected
government in January.
The basic point of sovereignty which Secretary Armitage
referred to is it has the fact. Let's also say very clearly
they have said now more times than I can count, we need you,
please stay, and it is a fairly theoretical discussion right
now.
Senator Bayh. But it may be theoretical, but just let me
ask the question. If they ask us to leave, will we leave?
Secretary Wolfowitz. We have made that clear repeatedly.
Senator Bayh. That we will leave if asked. Do we have a
plan for that? Do we have a plan for withdrawal in the event
that they do ask us to leave?
Secretary Wolfowitz. We do not think they are going to ask
us to leave, Senator Pryor.
Senator Pryor. But that is not my question. Do we have a
plan?
Secretary Wolfowitz. If we thought it was a realistic
possibility, we would develop a plan. If it were to happen, we
would develop a plan.
Senator Pryor. So as we currently sit here, we do not have
a plan. I know they have not asked us yet, but I am just
asking. Have we done any planning for that eventuality?
Secretary Wolfowitz. No, I do not think so.
Senator Pryor. Last thing I wanted to ask about, and I know
Senator Clinton would like to ask, so I am going to try to make
this brief, there has been a lot of discussion in the media at
least about Chalabi and what is going on there. I am not sure
that we have had a chance in this committee to really hear in
the last couple of weeks because we have been so tied up on the
floor with Defense Authorization. Mr. Secretary, if you would
like to offer any comments on Chalabi, I just thought you may
want to have a chance to do that right now.
Secretary Wolfowitz. I am not sure what kind of comment you
are looking for.
Senator Pryor. Well----
Secretary Wolfowitz. I mean, there are intelligence issues
that are frankly the purview of another committee and would
require a closed session. He is one of many Iraqi opposition
figures with whom we have worked over many years. In fact, Mr.
Allawi is another. The Deputy Prime Minister, Barham Salih, is
yet another. Contrary to what I continue to read in the
newspapers, we do not have favorites. We very much believe in
the Iraqi people picking their own leaders, and that means you
cannot have favorites.
Senator Bayh. Secretary Armitage, any comments on Mr.
Chalabi?
Secretary Armitage. The Department of State's relationship
with Mr. Chalabi has been well documented. It was quite rocky.
I have no new information on him.
Senator Bayh. Thank you.
Chairman Warner. Thank you very much, Senator.
Senator Dole.
Senator Dole. Thank you, gentlemen, for your tremendous
service to our country. Secretary Wolfowitz, I find it
ludicrous that anyone would suggest that no relationship
existed between Saddam Hussein and terrorists. Senator
Lieberman stated the case very succinctly by saying that the
war in Iraq is the central battleground in the war on terror.
Yet polls show evidence that Americans are not making this
connection. The media has made an obsession about denying al
Qaeda had any link to Iraq.
You have made references to several other terrorist groups
including Abou Ibrahim and his professional killer group that
was harbored by Saddam and making bombs today to kill
Americans. Iraq was one of the five states on the original
patterns of global terrorism list compiled by the State
Department, as I understand, in 1979, which cited Saddam as a
major sponsor of various terrorist groups, including the PLO,
Hamas, and the Abou Nidal organization. Would you not agree
that Iraq was a breeding ground for terror under Saddam
Hussein?
Secretary Wolfowitz. I think it was, yes, Senator Dole.
Senator Dole. Do you not agree that the removal of Saddam
Hussein and his evil regime was a positive step in the overall
war on terror?
Secretary Wolfowitz. I absolutely think it was, and it has
a step though that we have to finish winning that fight. We
have to finish winning the peace in Iraq.
Senator Dole. A marine officer in a Washington Times
article was quoted as follows, ``the problem is that there's no
identification (ID) system, so it is not out of the ordinary
for a target to either not have an ID or to have several IDs
with different names. Terrorists could easily be moving from
town to town using several different names and appearances.''
Secretary Armitage, do you know if the Iraqi Government has
a plan to implement any form of registration or identification
program? General Myers, how are our multinational forces able
to identify friend from foe, or identify Iraqi forces from
civilians or from insurgents?
Secretary Armitage. Senator Dole, there have been
discussions with the new government about a national ID that
may even have a chip embedded in it. The discussions have not
progressed to my knowledge far enough along to be able to talk
what the cost would be and how we would go about this. But we
have to find some way to register people.
Senator Dole. General Myers?
General Myers. In terms of identifying the enemy from
innocent civilians, it is very difficult in Iraq because the
enemy hides amongst the civilians and will put civilians in
front of their formations very often. So the way they identify
them is those who have the guns, those who are firing back,
they have the inherent right of self defense, of course. Then
when we have very good intelligence and precise intelligence,
then we can go precisely after them, whether it is U.S. forces
or our coalition friends and partners.
But it is a difficult job in Iraq just because they are not
adhering to any tenet of the Geneva Convention at this point.
They are all dressed like everybody else.
Senator Dole. Secretary Wolfowitz, were you about to answer
on that question?
Secretary Wolfowitz. Well, I just wanted to say we
discussed that subject specifically with Prime Minister Allawi
when I was in Iraq. He believes what we are calling biometric
IDs of some form would be very helpful in improving the
security situation and so do our commanders, by the way.
I do not mean to interrupt your questions, but could I say
something? It is important in looking at this overall issue of
the relationship between the Iraqi regime and terrorists of
various kinds. You correctly point out there are various kinds.
In fact, Abou Ibrahim, who you mentioned, is a recognized
Palestinian explosives expert who has been in Iraq for the
better part of the last couple decades. His organization called
the 15 May organization is basically just a branch of the Iraqi
intelligence. This year, coalition forces conducted a raid in
the vicinity of Mosul that disrupted a bomb-making shop that is
attributed to his work.
It has been a killer regime that works with killers of
various kinds. The question I wanted to put in perspective is,
what is the standard of proof? We seem at times to be going
back to the idea that fighting terrorism is a law enforcement
operation. Until you can prove involvement beyond a reasonable
doubt, you should not do anything. I would go back to what we
heard repeatedly and still hear sometimes from the 9/11
Commission about the need to connect the dots here. The fact
that there was ambiguous information before September 11 that
in hindsight most of us wish we might have done Operation
Enduring Freedom in Afghanistan 3 years earlier instead of in
2001.
It is a very difficult subject, and there is enormous
uncertainty. Intelligence is not legal proof; it presents
contradictory facts. You have to assess them, you have to weigh
them; and then you have to attach probabilities to them. But
for me, and for many other people, the level of tolerance that
we could have for states supporting terrorism in the way that
Saddam was supporting terrorism just changed dramatically when
we saw what terrorists could do to us on September 11.
Senator Dole. Thank you very much. Let me say too that I
respect your apology to the media regarding comments made about
their coverage. However, your comments were taken out of
context, and I can relate to your frustration because press
coverage of the war has been skewed. For example, the coverage
of the 9/11 Commission, in my view, has been outrageous.
Now, building on what Senator Sessions mentioned while I
was presiding, between May 4 and yesterday, The Washington Post
ran 399 stories about Abu Ghraib and the New York Times ran 437
stories during the same period. However, the documentary
highlighting atrocities under Saddam Hussein in that same
prison received little or no coverage by the mainstream media.
Can you speak to the significance of that documentary, the Don
North documentary?
Secretary Wolfowitz. This is the one that talks about the
seven Iraqis who had their hands cut off?
Senator Dole. That is right.
Secretary Wolfowitz. I have not seen it. I have heard about
it. I have met the seven Iraqi businessmen who were picked up
in the mid-1990s. Saddam wanted to be able to blame the state
of his economy on somebody else, and he said it was because
these people were engaged in black market currency activities.
They had their right arms amputated, all seven of them.
Fortunately through some American benefactors, they were taken
to Texas and recently had artificial limbs provided.
The shocking thing is that kind of cruelty, that kind of
brutality was mild in Saddam's era. Senator Lieberman, Senator
Sessions, and Senator Santorum the other day--again, I did not
see it; I have read about it; although it is hard to read about
it, there has been almost no mention of it anywhere in the
press--gave a press conference in which I understand they
showed a 4 or 5 minute video that showed the various kinds of
things that the Fedayeen Saddam did to their own people if they
were suspected of not carrying out their missions, one man
having his arms broken, somebody having his tongue cut out. You
can read about it. It is hideous enough to read it without
seeing it. It seems to me that it introduces a kind of
distortion when there is virtually no coverage of that. This is
not to say that we hold ourselves to that standard, absolutely
not. What took place in Abu Ghraib, as the Secretary of Defense
has said, is a body blow. We are investigating it, we are going
to discipline people and punish people appropriately.
Unless you really understand just how horrible the old Iraq
was, the American people are going to have trouble
understanding the incredible courage with which so many Iraqis
are stepping forward to create and defend a new Iraq. That is
what gives me great hope.
Senator Dole. Thank you very much. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Warner. Thank you, Senator.
Senator Clinton.
Senator Clinton. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and I apologize
for not being able to get here earlier. I thank each of our
witnesses for once again appearing before this committee.
Secretary Wolfowitz, on several occasions, I and others
have raised predictions and comments you made before the action
commenced in Iraq. Just as an example, on February 19, 2003, on
National Public Radio, you said, ``We're not talking about the
occupation of Iraq, we are talking about the liberation of
Iraq. Therefore, when that regime is removed, we will find the
Iraqi population basically welcoming us as liberators.'' In
your speech before the Veterans of Foreign Wars (VFW) in March
2003, you said, ``The Iraqi people understand what this crisis
is about. Like the people of France in the 1940s, they view us
as their hoped-for liberator. They know America will not come
as a conqueror.''
It is not only comments from you, but others in the
administration, such as Vice President Cheney on Meet the
Press, March 16, 2003, ``The read we get on the people of Iraq
is there is no question but that they want to get rid of Saddam
Hussein and will welcome us as liberators when we come to do
that.''
Were those statements by you and others in the
administration based on intelligence, CIA intelligence, or
other intelligence agency analysis?
Secretary Wolfowitz. Senator Clinton, the Iraqi people in
overwhelming numbers did welcome us as liberators. Just if you
go back and read the headlines from any American newspaper on
April 9, April 10, of people cheering us in the streets of
Baghdad and all over the country. They were dying for
liberation but two things happened. Saddam and his people did
not quit on April 9. They continue to fight. We acquired this
very burdensome label of being an occupying power. They wanted
to be liberated, not occupied, and that is why what is going to
happen on July 1 is so important. They will be a free country;
they will have their own government. We will not be the
occupiers; we will be supporting that government.
You were not here when we talked about it. I was struck
during the course of 4 days in Iraq at how many Iraqis we
encountered who were ready to risk their lives for this new
Iraq. We met a young marine private first class in Fallujah
whose life had been saved by five Iraqi civil defense corps
members who had put their own lives at risk to rescue him. We
met with the Prime Minister, Prime Minister Allawi, who was
almost chopped to death with an ax by one of Saddam's murderers
in 1979, who is still the number one target of Mr. Zarqawi, and
whose life is in danger of Iraq; and the President in Iraq,
Ghazi Al-Yawar, his predecessor was assassinated in a car bomb
just a couple of months ago.
This one particularly moving example, which I will repeat
because you were not here, a young Iraqi interpreter was
working with our military up in Mosul whose sister was murdered
a few weeks ago because she was working with us. When the
general who was with me who knew her from before asked her why
she continued to put her life in danger this way, she said,
``Because my father told me we mustn't retreat in the face of
evil.''
We are confronting an evil enemy. The Iraqi people are
confronting an evil enemy. Those people in overwhelming numbers
still want to be liberated from that enemy. It was the mayor of
a town near Fallujah that said to General Mattis, in my heart I
want you to leave right now, but in my head I know we need you
for a while longer. That's the dilemma of this situation that
it is both our vulnerability and our great strength that we are
facing an enemy that is tenacious, that kills very effectively,
that has no scruples about killing innocents. That is also our
strength because the overwhelming majority of Iraqis do not
want that.
Senator Clinton. Well, Mr. Secretary, based on that
description, in retrospect, could we have avoided certain of
the unfavorable consequences that you have just described if we
had had more force in the beginning?
Secretary Wolfowitz. Senator Clinton, the notion that we
would be better off with 300,000 troops is wrong. More
importantly our commanders, General Franks and General Abizaid,
emphatically think it is wrong. There were a lot of people, and
I happen to have been one of them, who were pushing General
Franks. It was in the November time frame of 2001, saying, do
you not need more troops in Afghanistan? He was pushing back
and saying, I do not want to make the same mistake the Soviet
Union made, and he was right. The reason we have been as
successful as we have in Afghanistan is we have kept our
military presence.
Senator Clinton. But I am not asking you about Afghanistan,
Mr. Secretary.
Secretary Wolfowitz. I am about to say the same thing
applies in Iraq. General Abizaid will consistently tell people
publicly and privately he does not want to increase the weight
of the American footprint on the Iraqi people. It would have
been much better if we could have been in there from the
beginning in support of an Iraqi government rather than as an
occupying power. 300,000 troops, which no commander has ever
remotely come close to asking for, would in fact have created
more problems than it would have solved.
There is no reason to think that we would have had any
better luck catching these people where they hide if there was
a heavy American presence--a heavier American presence. It was
pretty heavy. What we need is better intelligence. One of the
keys to better intelligence is more Iraqis on the front lines
fighting with us, and that is what we are moving toward.
Senator Clinton. At some point, Mr. Secretary, will there
be any kind of after-action review by the civilian leadership
in the Pentagon with respect to this mission? Certainly, those
of us who heard General Shinseki, who at the time was the Army
Chief of Staff, testify based on his best knowledge and
experience the numbers that were needed have to conclude there
was at least a debate within the professional military. Now,
how that debate was determined obviously we have a regime of
civilian leadership is obviously clear.
To dismiss out of hand testimony we heard with our own ears
and testimony that was very compelling and led to the public
embarrassment of a distinguished soldier is a little bit
difficult for us to accept.
Secretary Wolfowitz. I am sorry, I do not think to disagree
with someone should be publicly embarrassing. General Shinseki
was in fact disagreeing with all of his colleagues on the Joint
Chiefs of Staff and the Combatant Commander, General Franks. Is
that not right, General Myers?
General Myers. Actually, we did not--as we discussed about
troop strength with then the Commander General Franks, which we
did many times during the planning, during conflict, for post-
conflict, and then later on with General Abizaid, the issue of
more troops never came before, never was brought up in our
deliberations. Nobody said you need more. General Franks
proposed what he thought was right. We had discussions and
talked about it. Then we provided our military advice to the
Secretary and the Deputy Secretary, but there was never a push
inside the Joint Chiefs of Staff for more forces.
Senator Clinton. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Warner. Thank you, Senator. You raise that
question which is continually raised about General Shinseki's
figure. My own independent research on that reveals that I am
not questioning the integrity of that fine officer, but I
cannot find any trace of the Joint Staff ever discussing a
figure of the magnitude that he mentioned right from that seat
you are in, Secretary Armitage, nor in the Army in its
deliberations, a figure of that nature. If I am wrong, let
somebody show me the documents that support that anywhere in
that building that figure was discussed and carefully thought
through.
I want to turn to this very important letter that the Prime
Minister of Iraq sent to the Secretary General of NATO and talk
a little bit about NATO, gentlemen. If I may say with the
greatest respect, it was some 36 years ago that I walked in the
Pentagon, roughly--exactly, as a matter of fact--February 1969
in the Navy Secretariat and got my introduction to that
magnificent organization referred to with the greatest respect,
the North Atlantic Treaty Organization.
It has unquestionably been the bulwark against the Cold War
and today I have grave concerns. I pick up on your statement. I
copied it down, Secretary Wolfowitz. NATO's capacity has been
whittled down over the years, and we all recognize that. Yet
here is this Prime Minister looking to NATO as he should,
because the image of NATO today is resting on its glorious
past, which I cannot find today. I say that--harsh as it may
be.
For example, in my most recent trip here a couple of weeks
ago into Afghanistan and then into Iraq--as a matter of fact,
Senator, it was one year ago tomorrow that you and I made the
first trip of any Senators into Iraq. My good friend and
colleague, we have traveled together many times. But in
Afghanistan, I was particularly interested in the work being
done by NATO, and it has been hailed.
I found two points that concern me greatly. I talked to the
senior officers, and they were very candid in their responses.
Number one, the NATO forces actively working in Afghanistan
today, largely on reconstruction, each country impores what
they call national caveats on their forces. Those caveats read
like when we used to send our children to school: ``Dear
teachers, we cannot have this for lunch, and Johnny must be
home by supper.'' Forget it. I looked through these caveats,
and in large measure they said, the contribution of some of the
forces, not all, by the member nations, we are not going to get
engaged in the heavy lifting over in Afghanistan if the going
gets tough. If anybody wants to dispute me, do so.
We cannot constitute a force structure around NATO if we
are going to have on the commander's desk independent sets of
orders for the various components that go in to make the
overall NATO force.
The growth of the drug industry in Afghanistan is
exponential. Someone estimated 60 percent, if such a figure can
be worked out, of the gross national product of Afghanistan now
is derivative of the illegal drug trade, much of it in those
areas in which NATO is trying to perform some of its
reconstruction. There is a projection for more NATO troops to
come in, and each of the quadrants to be part of their area of
responsibility (AOR). Yet I cannot find any clear evidence that
the member countries of NATO are really in that planning stage
to put those forces into place to result in the composite
picture of NATO's role in Afghanistan.
Now they are called upon to do another mission, and it is
interesting. If you read it, ``at this critical juncture in our
history, we need the urgent help of the international community
and especially NATO in the crucial areas of training inside
Iraq.'' That is not training them back in Brussels. That is not
training them back in whatever they might have as the areas
down in the training areas of Germany. That said inside, to me,
that is quite a bit of infrastructure, quite a bit of troop
commitment.
Now, the combination of the national caveats--and I have
watched the financial figures over the years--the United States
has kept up its commitment financially, roughly a quarter of
the total NATO budget. These other nations have scaled down.
Now, take me on, tell me I am wrong, because I see NATO moving
down a path to that immortal phrase that I sat in the hearing
room of the Armed Services Committee and heard made by Shy
Meyer of the United States Army when he said, ``we are a hollow
Army.'' NATO will become a hollow force unless some very strong
actions and determination take place by its member nations and
take place very quickly.
How can we expect NATO to perform this mission, given the
current status of its inability to live up to commitments in
Afghanistan? How can they take on this additional mission in
Iraq?
Secretary Wolfowitz. I am afraid I share your concerns. My
colleagues may want to comment also. To give credit where it is
due, there are quite a few NATO allies, and maybe it is not
surprising that some of the newer ones that are up there on the
front lines with us in Afghanistan fighting by all the tough
rules of engagement that we have ourselves, like the Romanian
special forces, who I think have done a great job.
There is the problem that you mentioned of rules of
engagement. There are terrific deficiencies in capability and a
certain lack of political will. I am a great believer in NATO.
It is remarkable if you think about how this alliance has stuck
together over half a century when people said an alliance of
democratic countries cannot possibly compete with basically an
empire run from the center. We not only competed, but we also
beat them. There is a lot of strength and viability in the
common values that we share together.
I worry a little bit though that maybe some in Europe think
that they can wall themselves off from the threat that in fact
threatens all of us. You mentioned the drug trade out of
Afghanistan. That is a much more direct threat to Europe than
it is to the United States, although it is a threat to the
stability of the new government in Afghanistan, and therefore,
we all have a stake in it. You cannot segment out different
aspects of this fight against global terrorism or think that
somehow, to use Winston Churchill's immortal phrase, to think
that if you feed the crocodile, he will eat you last.
Chairman Warner. I want to come back to this letter. What
is the reality and the capability of NATO to move in? Secretary
Armitage?
Secretary Armitage. I want to take you on, if I may. We all
have the concern about the hollowing out of NATO. We have to
balance by an acknowledgment that 36 years ago when you became
the Secretary of the Navy, the thought of NATO working out of
area was nowhere. It just was not possible. That was not even
on anybody's mind 15 years ago. They have taken the political
step of working out of area. What they have not done is taken
the funding step of bulking up their defense vote in such way
that will allow them to have the capabilities to continually do
that.
Having said that, if NATO as an organization at Istanbul or
after can take on the general mission, then this will give a
lot of political cover to countries that do participate. That
is significant. I cannot speak to who is more capable on the
technical assistance side, which is not a heavy troop
involvement, or who might have equipment lying around that
would be applicable to the Iraqi forces. That will all be
discussed at Istanbul.
Chairman Warner. Alright.
Secretary Wolfowitz. That is an important correction
Secretary Armitage mentioned. There has been some very dramatic
changes in NATO's willingness to take on those
responsibilities. What the Prime Minister----
Chairman Warner. On paper, Mr. Secretary.
Secretary Wolfowitz. Well, right. What the Prime Minister
is asking for there is not a huge hurdle to clear, and I hope
in Istanbul in fact that they will get a significant positive
response.
Chairman Warner. It tends to be words, words, words,
panoply sessions, all the trappings, and yet I do not see the
hard facts, boots on the ground of trainers to go in there and
do it under the NATO flag, not just member nations. Yes,
General?
General Myers. Mr. Chairman, the only thing I would add
here is on national caveats, very serious business. You could
have used the example in Kosovo. It was on our St. Patrick's
Day, when we had some disturbances and certain countries could
not respond. The commander thought they could, but at the
moment of crisis they could not.
Chairman Warner. Because of national caveats?
General Myers. Absolutely. It put other forces in great
danger, and it put the people or sites that they were trying to
protect in great danger. The national caveats piece is
something NATO is going to have to wrestle with, because when
they have a political will to do a mission, they have to follow
up with the wherewithal for the commanders to perform this
mission. The commander of the multinational brigade in Iraq,
the Polish commander, when I visited with him several months
ago, most of his force structure comes from NATO countries. He
has Ministers of Defense and Chiefs of Defense on the phone
with him telling him what he can and cannot do with those
forces. That is not the way to be successful in the kind of
security situation we find ourselves in in Iraq, in
Afghanistan, or in Kosovo.
Chairman Warner. Well, I want to refer to General Joulwan,
who is an extraordinary valued advisor to our President,
Secretary of Defense, yourself, and to Congress. Mine do not
emanate--in any way reflect his views, but I know he is
concerned about these national caveats. I do not think you have
to deal with it, you darn well just have to end it.
To another subject, and that is, this committee has
indicated it will continue. Mr. Secretary, we are not on any
vendetta. We are simply doing our oversight in this question of
the prisoner issues, particularly in Iraq. Look, we were told
the Fay report would be issued to this committee. The Secretary
indicated through his spokesman that this committee would
promptly receive the Fay report. We now learn that that is
going to be delayed while a new layer is brought in. General
Kerns becomes the acting overseer of this. He is a very fine
man. I have known him, extremely capable individual. Another
officer of a higher rank other than Fay is to be brought in to
do some work.
All of these perturbations and so forth is lost when we
stop to think. Day after day these articles come out in the
paper, just today, about the problems over there. Congress, in
my judgement, must be given the tools, the reports with which
to do its proper oversight. We should have had a Chapter 1, Fay
part 1, and acknowledge more was to come. Why don't you outline
the accuracy of what I said? This intelligence piece of what
took place, did not take place, in that prison structure is the
road map to tell the administration and frankly Congress, those
of us that are interested in it, where we go next to try and
determine what went wrong and how to see it never happens
again.
Can you describe to me what is the status of the Fay
report? It was to have been in the hands of Congress, early
projections, by now. Could it not be indicated Fay report part
1, then a sequential report to follow, performed by another
three-star, unnamed at the moment, who will come in? Give us
some clarification here.
Secretary Wolfowitz. Frankly, Mr. Chairman, I share your
frustration, both because you are frustrated, which frustrates
me, but also because we are trying----
Chairman Warner. We want to do a concrete and a fair and
objective job.
Secretary Wolfowitz. You want to get the facts, and we want
to get the facts. This delays the process. Just so we are
clear, and I think I am clear about this now. What happened
was, the Fay report was commissioned. It is an investigation
and it is an investigation with potential criminal consequences
that was commissioned by Lieutenant General Sanchez to report
to him for action as a commander. When the view was General
Sanchez's conduct has to be investigated also, then it is
obvious you need somebody else in charge of the investigation.
That is why General Kern was appointed.
The question that you referred to about whether--and you I
talked about this also privately. Fay cannot continue the
investigating part of it. Apparently, the Army has decided to
appoint Lieutenant General Tony Jones, who is now at Fort
Monroe, Virginia, as the new head of the Fay investigation. He
is currently the Deputy Commanding General and Chief of Staff
of U.S. Army Training and Document Command (TRADOC) at Fort
Monroe.
I will get a briefing from the Army, and if it is
appropriate get it to answer your question as to whether there
is not some way to provide interim conclusions or interim
results. What I have been told so far by lawyers is that is
virtually impossible in a situation where people are
investigating guilt and innocence of individuals. I share your
concern, and I am going to try and see if we can not do better.
Chairman Warner. Well, I will accept that answer I have
said steadfastly in the face of criticism as to how the Taguba
report was handled. I asked for that report. You gave me what
you had, and you had to supplement it. Our procedures are
scrutinized, as they should be, but the Department has been
very cooperative with this committee as it regards our needs.
Now, other documents have come into the committee. We had the
start of an important hearing yesterday, which will have to be
continued, on the International Red Cross and their
documentation as to what took place. We are going to have
subsequent hearings on that. There are briefings at the moment.
I have made my point. I accept your response, and I take it
as continuing the cooperation that we have had so that we can
just have the facts, maybe not the conclusions. We are not
looking for the final conclusions until this whole picture is
looked at, but the interim steps, rather than just read it day
after day in the paper as it dribbles out. We do not know the
accuracy of those reports.
All right, Senator Levin, and then I have a question to
follow.
Senator Levin. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. First, relative to
the NATO issue, I visited NATO, met with ambassadors to NATO
urging that they respond and that they take a role in Iraq.
First of all, I sensed that they needed a request from an Iraqi
Government. They have that now. Second, though, I also must
tell you that I sensed some of the reluctance results from the
kind of unilateral approach that the United States has taken to
world challenges and minimizing the importance of coalitions. I
still sense that feeling in NATO. We have made some progress
now with the U.N., but that feeling sure existed at the U.N.
because of the approach we took to issues and the rhetoric that
was used relative to old Europe, to Germany, and to the United
Nations prior to the attack on Iraq. So to some extent, the
reluctance here represents chickens coming home to roost in my
book.
But nonetheless, that is gone, that is past. I must tell
you, everybody on this committee totally supports the effort to
get NATO involved, at least in training inside of Iraq. It is
critically important. It will hopefully then lead to some
Muslim nations coming in also. In any event, it is important.
There is a consensus here that supports this effort to get NATO
involved. I hope the President succeeds in getting them
involved. It would be very important.
I want to just go back to an issue though, Secretary
Wolfowitz, that we talked about earlier this morning, because I
am troubled by your answer. On the issue of the Iraq/al Qaeda
connection, I am not talking here generally about terrorism,
which I happen to agree with you there is obviously a lot of
countries that have supported terrorism, including Syria, Iran,
and Iraq. I am talking about the allegations before the war
that there was a connection between al Qaeda and Iraq. The
focus on that allegation became a big part of the rhetoric
prior to the war, and I just want to pursue what you are now
saying rather than going back. I want to talk about what you
are now saying relative to that connection, because I am
troubled by it. I want to be direct with you about it.
This is what you said the other day at the House of
Representatives. ``The issue is Saddam Hussein's contacts with
al Qaeda and support for al Qaeda. If you go and look at the
sealed indictment that was issued against Osama bin Laden in
February 1998,'' and then you said, ``this is not me, this is
the United States Justice Department during the Clinton
administration,'' said--now, you are referring to this
indictment--``said that in 1992 and 1993, Saddam and al Qaeda
came to an understanding not to attack one another and to
provide mutual support.''
You are relying heavily on a U.S. Justice Department
indictment. It has been modified. They have dropped that
allegation. It has been superseded by five other indictments on
the same subject which left out that statement. Yet you
continue to cite the indictment itself as evidence. Then when I
asked you about that this morning, you went back to a source,
which had been previously relied on by the U.S. Attorney. That
source is no longer relied on by the U.S. Attorney as a source.
For you to continue to cite an indictment when that
indictment has been superseded and modified to drop this
reference to the relationship between al Qaeda and Saddam, is
disingenuous and is misleading. I would ask you, are you aware
of the fact that that indictment that you referred to, that
U.S. Government document has been superseded and modified to
remove that reference to any understanding between al Qaeda and
Saddam? Are you aware of the fact it was superseded?
Secretary Wolfowitz. Senator Levin, the point is that what
that cooperating witness said, and which was then sworn to as
part of the indictment, is consistent with a whole body of
evidence which Director Tenet referred to in his letter, I do
not know if it was to you or Senator Bayh on the Intelligence
Committee, outlining the various kinds of cooperation we had
seen over the previous decade between Iraq and al Qaeda. This
is not the only piece of evidence pointing to some agreement in
the early 1990s that they would not attack one another anymore.
There is other evidence suggesting they talked about mutual
cooperation.
I happen to cite that because it is--I mean, if we want to
go through an intelligence assessment and put out all the
pieces of information that are there, I would be happy to do
so. The basic point, which I said earlier, to Senator Dole, is
I do not think this is something where you can prove things
beyond a reasonable doubt. You have fragments of evidence. Some
of them point one way, some of them point another way, but
ultimately a policy maker, and particularly the President of
the United States, has to decide how much risk he is prepared
to run based on the different possibilities.
This is not a subject on which I think there is perfect
clarity either way. I do not think the bar should be set that
until we have proof beyond a reasonable doubt that Saddam
Hussein was involved in September 11, that until then we should
not worry about the possibility he may have been a source of
support for terrorists.
Secretary Powell talked about very precisely his
connections with Abu Musab al-Zarqawi that we saw in 2002.
Everything we have seen in Iraq since the liberation of that
country has demonstrated that there were these connections
between Zarqawi and the old regime. Unfortunately, they have
gotten closer.
Senator Levin. Mr. Secretary, you can talk about fragments
of evidence and talk about other subjects, but I am talking
about the specific subject that you rely on again, which is an
indictment. Now, you can go through other fragments and argue
them if you want to, but that is not the issue. The issue is
that you rely again, and you did it in front of this committee,
upon a U.S. Government sealed indictment that you----
Secretary Wolfowitz. Which was unsealed, of course.
Senator Levin. Now unsealed, which no longer makes the
statement that you say that it made.
Secretary Wolfowitz. There were subsequent indictments
that--I do not know why they----
Senator Levin. I am telling you. It superseded the first
one. Are you aware of the fact that the subsequent indictments
superseded the one that you cite? Are you aware of that fact?
Secretary Wolfowitz. Sir, I am not a lawyer. I do not know
what supersede means.
Senator Levin. Modified, eliminated, reduced, took the
place of, got rid of.
Secretary Wolfowitz. I know----
Senator Levin. Are you aware of that? It is a very direct
question.
Secretary Wolfowitz. I am aware that the subsequent
indictment connected to the embassy bombings in East Africa did
not mention that.
Senator Levin. Okay. Then you should not be citing, it
seems to me, as recently as a few days ago, as the clear
evidence for some relationship which is highly disputed and
which the CIA, by the way, had very severe doubts about.
Nonetheless, you should not be citing that indictment. Again,
you talk about a U.S. Government document to support a
conclusion, and that document no longer exists. It has been
superseded, and yet you still cite it. What troubles me----
Secretary Wolfowitz. Senator Levin, are you saying----
Senator Levin. Let me finish now. What troubles me is that
that pattern of exaggeration is what has created part of the
problem here. We are all together on succeeding now in Iraq.
There is not a difference on that. People can raise straw men
about cutting and running. Nobody is talking about cutting and
running. No one is talking about Saddam being a monster, he was
a monster. We are talking about evidence that existed relative
to the relationship which was used as the basis since al Qaeda
attacked this country on September 11. That alleged
relationship between Saddam and al Qaeda was used as the basis
for attacking Iraq. When you still cite as evidence something
which is not in existence anymore, because it has been
superseded, it troubles me. It is that pattern of exaggeration,
which, it seems to me, has been a consistent problem for this
administration and was a problem relative to the assessment of
intelligence.
Secretary Wolfowitz. Senator Levin, it is not exaggeration.
If anything, it is understatement. If we had a closed hearing
and we could go through all the----
Senator Levin. On that indictment? I just want to focus
on----
Secretary Wolfowitz. Can I finish answering?
Senator Levin. I do not want to go into the whole subject.
I want to talk about your reliance on an indictment, and your
reference to it and reliance on it.
Secretary Wolfowitz. Senator, can I answer the question?
Senator Levin. Of course you can, but I wish you would
address my question.
Secretary Wolfowitz. You said this was the whole reason we
went to war. It is not----
Senator Levin. No, I said it was a focus for our going to
war. That was the principal reason for our going to war was the
relationship between al Qaeda----
Secretary Wolfowitz. That is not true. Our reason for going
to war was to enforce U.N. Security Council Resolution 1441,
which had nothing to do with this issue. In fact, we conceded a
great deal of our position when we went to the United Nations.
The President of the United States went to the United Nations
in September. He had three concerns. One was weapons of mass
destruction, the second was terrorism, and the third was the
abuse of the Iraqi people.
We came down to Resolution 1441, which said if he meets
this last and final chance to come clean on his weapons of mass
destruction then we will implicitly work the other issues by
other means. The standard of Resolution 1441 was not imminent
threat; it was not large stockpiles of weapons. It was come
clean and tell--declare everything you have and do not obstruct
the inspectors. David Kay has been very clear. Though he says
our intelligence was wrong, he also says Saddam Hussein was in
clear violation of Resolution 1441. That was the reason we went
to war, Senator Levin.
Senator Levin. Thank you. I have one question for Secretary
Armitage and then I am done. There has been a lot in the press
recently about the subject which the chairman raised, which had
to do with the prison issue. The Office of Legal Counsel (OLC)
of the Department of Justice (DOJ) in early 2002 said that the
President had the power to determine that the Geneva
Conventions did not apply to the conflict in Afghanistan.
According to the reports, Secretary Armitage, the State
Department legal adviser took issue with this determination,
arguing that it was contrary to the official position of the
United States, ``the U.N. and all other states that have
considered this issue.'' Secretary Powell wrote a memorandum to
Judge Gonzalez in which he stated that the OLC's approach
would, ``reverse over a century of U.S. policy and practice in
supporting the Geneva Conventions and undermine protections of
the law of war for our troops, both in the specific conflict
and in general.''
An article in yesterday's Washington Post indicates the
civilian attorneys in the DOD sided with the OLC on this issue,
while the military lawyers in the DOD sided with the State
Department. The Washington Post also reported that after this
dispute, ``senior civilians at the Pentagon no longer sought to
include the State Department or the Joint Staff in
deliberations about the precise protections afforded to
detainees by the Geneva Conventions.''
My question is Secretary Armitage, is it true that the
State Department objected to the conclusions of the Department
of Justice and the White House Counsel's office about the
applicability of the Geneva Conventions to the war in
Afghanistan?
Secretary Armitage. It is true we had a different opinion,
and we expressed it.
Senator Levin. Thank you. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Warner. Just two quick wrap-up items, gentlemen.
You have been most patient, and we have had an excellent
hearing. Yesterday my long-time friend and great colleague,
Senator McCain, asked a question to General Casey, and it was
asked again this morning: What went wrong? General Casey gave
his best response. Each of you have given your responses today.
A few nights ago I had the distinct privilege of attending
a dinner and speaking on behalf of General Tommy Franks. I
remember with great clarity how the DOD, Mr. Secretary, was
forthcoming as that whole plan was put into place with regard
to military operations, General Myers, and how we were going to
go about it.
A key part of that operation was the pre-positioning of the
Fourth Infantry Division (ID) in the Mediterranean. On jump-off
day, they were to come down through Turkey and go into the
northern regions so that the enemy was taken on from the north
and the south. All of a sudden, Turkey said no. That was the
end of it. We had to take those forces and go all the way
around down through the Persian Gulf up into where they finally
came into country in the south when the fighting had been
largely completed in that operation.
Had they come down through the north, they would have gone
through that area called the Sunni triangle, from which so much
of the insurrection against our forces, primarily subsequent to
the major operations, has taken place. Had that plan of the
military been completed as envisioned and structured, I ask
you, General Myers, would not some of this insurrection, if not
a great deal of it, been taken out because of the movement of
our forces, particularly the heavy mechanized forces down
through there, so that part of Iraq could have seen the
determination of the coalition, its weight and its might and
its conviction? Had that not been stopped, might we not have
experienced some of this, what happened and why did it happen,
and these tough answers that we have to face today? Do you
share my view?
General Myers. Well, Mr. Chairman, your description of the
issue is exactly right on. What I cannot predict was what would
have happened. It is probably, as you say, it would have helped
somewhat with the current situation, because that was the plan
for the Fourth Infantry Division. It is a very powerful
division. But I do not know that we will ever know.
Secretary Wolfowitz. Mr. Chairman, if I could respectfully
either disagree or just say the somewhat is a very small
somewhat, because think about Saddam Hussein hiding in his
spider hole and what it took to find that man. We did not need
a big mechanized division to do it. We needed skilled
interrogators pursuing from one place to another--we needed
intelligence.
Actually what would have made a bigger difference than
another American division in there faster would have been a
whole division of free Iraqi forces, if we would have been able
to train them. This is important, because one reason to think
that Iraqi security forces can do well once they are trained
and equipped properly is they speak the language; they know the
terrain; they will get intelligence in a way that our forces
cannot do.
Chairman Warner. But repeatedly our officers, Casey
yesterday, General Myers today, are asking, what happened?
Well, somebody ought to mention that they planned this
operation very carefully and that was an integral part, that
strike from the north.
Secretary Wolfowitz. You are absolutely right about that.
Chairman Warner. The Fourth ID went on to heroically fight
in the subsequent insurrection, so there was not any question
about their ability. But had they come down through that area,
we might have lessened that problem.
Secretary Wolfowitz. Lessened for sure, but how much I
guess is what is the issue.
Chairman Warner. Secretary Armitage, I will wrap up with
you, and first a personal thing. I know that you canceled part
of your vacation to come and attend this important hearing
today, for which I, on behalf of all of the committee and the
Senate, thank you. You really carry a tremendous load in
supporting the Secretary, one of the most extraordinary men to
be Secretary of State. We commend you, sir, for your public
service.
But let us wrap up by your describing again the process
that will evolve after June 30, the sequence of the
constitution being developed, the elections. In your best
judgement, is that going to remain on schedule?
Secretary Armitage. Yes. There are several things moving at
once. The interim government from July 1 to the end of December
or January is responsible for preparing and running the day-to-
day government. They are running the ministries, all of them,
and preparing for elections, which we would like at the end of
the year, no later than January.
Simultaneously, the U.N. will be helping to prepare the
electoral process, the registering process, et cetera. This
month of July, there is a preparatory commission being put
together that will form a national conference of about 1,000
people, 1,000 notables in Iraq, and out of those 1,000 people
will be developed an interim national council of 100 notables.
Those people will give advice to the interim government. They
have some duties. I have some here. They can monitor the
implementation of the laws, they can approve the 2005 Iraqi
national budget. They have the authority to veto executive
orders by a two-thirds majority vote. Should something happen
to the Presidency, they can appoint replacements to the
Presidency Council.
Assuming elections in December or January 2005, you will
have a national assembly of 275 people, which will be
responsible for choosing a President and a Prime Minister, who
will then put together a government. That government's major
duty is to develop a constitution, which will be placed before
the Iraqi people for a referendum to which there will be a
fully elected government in Iraq following that new
constitution. That is the process. It is ambitious. The U.N.
thinks we can get there. We are going to do our best to try to
make the security atmosphere one that is conducive to hold in
these elections.
Chairman Warner. Do you anticipate the U.N. will increase
its presence in country and begin to pick up a heavy part of
this responsibility to implement this plan?
Secretary Armitage. They will pick up a part of the
responsibility. There is a great reluctance--an understandable
reluctance on the part of the U.N. after--the loss of Sergio de
Mello to have a heavy presence there. One of the elements of
U.N. Security Council Resolution 1546 makes it very clear that
the U.N. is encouraged to take this vital role. We are going to
be responsible for assisting the U.N. to include convoying and
providing fixed point protection.
To the extent we are doing that and other forces from other
nations are not doing it, that will detract from our overall
ability to conduct security sweeps, et cetera. But I think the
definition of the word, how much heavy lifting they are going
to do, is one that I would quarrel with. They will do some
lifting, but the security situation is what is going to be
determinate for them whether they increase the number of people
in country.
Chairman Warner. That security situation is going to be
largely dependent on the coalition forces in indeterminate
numbers remaining there while the internal Iraqi structure of
its army and other security is built up, am I not correct? When
you sort of said over here in reply to some question a minute
or two ago, it is going to be a long time, we are looking over
that entire period that you just outlined now for security
forces to be in place.
Secretary Armitage. Well, I suspect so. I cannot give any
numbers. I do not think Paul could either.
Chairman Warner. I am not asking for the numbers. I thank
you.
Secretary Armitage. Thank you.
Chairman Warner. I have raised the question of the Fourth
ID because so often, in every hearing someone talks about the
force structure and the level of force structure. Just remember
that weeks before we started a whole Army division was
eliminated for an indeterminate period of time from that
operation. Thank you very much, gentlemen.
Secretary Wolfowitz. It was still successful.
Chairman Warner. You have discharged your duties.
Secretary Wolfowitz. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
General Myers. Thank you, sir.
[Questions for the record with answers supplied follow:]
Questions Submitted by Senator John McCain
Fallujah as a Sanctuary
1. Senator McCain. Secretary Wolfowitz, the events in Fallujah are
a clear example of where our actions did not back up our rhetoric. This
is a dangerous precedent to be setting in the middle of an insurgency.
In my view, turning over Falluja to insurgents and Iraqi forces under
the command of ex-Baathists seems to be a mistake. Is Falluja being
used as a base of insurgency? If so, are we planning to follow the
Falluja model in other Iraqi cities, should we face similar uprisings?
Secretary Wolfowitz. Falluja is one of the strongholds for Iraqi
insurgents and foreign fighters. What happened in Falluja is not being
used as a model or a template in other Iraqi cities. The decisions made
in Falluja at the time last April were made with the best information
available, and predicated on the fact that eventually Iraqis will have
to take responsibility for their own security. Clearly with the benefit
of hindsight, Falluja was not ready for that. While we have learned the
tactical and strategic lessons of Falluja, we are not using what
happened in Falluja in April as the model for dealing with other
unsettled cities. Each tactical situation is different, because the
populations, tribes, sects, and ethnic groups vary in size and
importance throughout the country of Iraq, and each has its own
history, culture, and pertinent background to take into account when
devising tactical solutions to security problems.
ABU GHRAIB INTERNATIONAL COMMITTEE OF THE RED CROSS (ICRC) REPORTS
2. Senator McCain. Secretary Wolfowitz, the Pentagon has
consistently said that it cannot share ICRC reports with Congress
because that would violate the Red Cross' longstanding policy of
confidentiality. I understand, however, that the ICRC has said that its
official position is that it has no problem with the administration
sharing any or all of these reports, so long as they are provided in
some confidential manner. If the Red Cross has no such objection, why
has the Pentagon used this as an excuse?
Secretary Wolfowitz. First, I note that communications between the
ICRC and the United States (or any other party to the Geneva
Conventions) are confidential. Neither the ICRC nor the U.S. Government
discloses publicly the details or nature of the communications. ICRC is
a neutral organization and notes with concern any characterization of
its activities in the media or by government officials about ICRC
activities that may tend to support or oppose a particular point of
view. The Department of Defense (DOD) is working with the ICRC and
Congress to make available ICRC communications within specific
constraints agreed upon by the U.S. Government and the ICRC.
TROOP STRENGTH
3. Senator McCain. Secretary Wolfowitz, there were some in DOD and
Congress that believed that more troops would be required not only to
win the war in Iraq, but to win the peace as well. The Pentagon's view
is that the commanders on the ground will let us know if they need more
troops. I believe that this is something that the civilian leadership
needs to determine, based on events and necessity on the ground. Do you
agree?
Secretary Wolfowitz. I agree. However, based upon events and
necessity on the ground, the civilian leadership has determined that
more troops are not required at this time. Our commanders in the field
have repeatedly said that what they need is more intelligence and more
Iraqi forces, not more American forces. Without actionable
intelligence, our troops merely become targets, and Iraqi forces are
capable of going into places such as mosques and conducting border
control more effectively than U.S. forces. More troops and a more
intrusive American presence would merely strengthen the perception
amongst Iraqis of being occupied and given extremists such as Muqtada
al-Sadr more followers. It is for this reason that the commander of the
First Marine Division, Major General Jim Mattis, told me that he sent
15,000 of his troops home last summer, because he did not want what he
called the ``reverberations of a heavy foot print.''
METRIC FOR INSURGENCY
4. Senator McCain. Secretary Wolfowitz, as we approach the date for
the transition it appears conditions in Iraq are worsening rather than
improving. What metrics are you using to determine progress in Iraq
with respect to the insurgency?
Secretary Wolfowitz. There is no simple metric. If we see more
attacks from anti-Iraqi forces, this may mean they are stronger, or it
may be a spike in violence aimed to coincide with an Iraqi or American
political event. If we capture or kill more of the enemy, it may mean
that our operations and intelligence are becoming more effective, or it
may mean there are more terrorists to capture and kill. Also, a mass
casualty terrorist attack is not a good measure, as stable states such
as Turkey or Israel routinely suffer such attacks, and they may in fact
mark the terrorists' desperation akin to that expressed in Zarqawi's
letter that was intercepted last February.
Given that the Iraqi people are the key to defeating the anti-Iraqi
insurgents, the number of Iraqi forces trained and equipped, as well as
Iraqi crime rates, are indices that will suggest progress. Also, our
``goalposts'' measure progress in the political and economic fields,
not just security. Economic growth/activity and improvement in
essential services will contribute to security by investing Iraqi
people with sense of ownership of their nation's future.
POROUS BORDERS
5. Senator McCain. Secretary Wolfowitz, I am disturbed that the
Iraqi borders are so porous that insurgents are receiving
reinforcements and supplies freely. What efforts are you pursuing to
strengthen the borders?
Secretary Wolfowitz. The DOD shares your concern regarding Iraq's
border are working with the Iraqi interim government (IIG) to improve
the quantity, training, and equipment of the Iraqi Department of Border
Enforcement (DBE). There are 11,350 border police serving in Iraq, of
which 10,348 have completed training. The DBE falls under the Ministry
of Interior, whose forces also include the Iraqi Police Service and
Facilities Protection Service. Together with these forces, the DBE has
received the following:
6,800 vehicles
14,000 radios
101,000 weapons
46,000 pieces of body armor
Also, we are supporting the IIG's efforts to persuade its neighbors
to strengthen border control from their sides of the international
boundary.
However, it should be kept in mind that no effort will be 100
percent effective at sealing Iraq's borders. Even under Saddam
Hussein's totalitarian police state, Iraq was not able to prevent
smugglers from operating with near impunity across Iraq's mountainous
borders. Even a country as wealthy and stable as the United States is
unable to prevent widespread illegal border crossings.
INTERNATIONAL SUPPORT
6. Senator McCain. Secretary Wolfowitz, given that more troops are
required on the ground, what expectation do you have that the North
American Treaty Organization (NATO), the United Nations (U.N.), or
other allies will provide stabilization forces to augment American and
Iraqi troops in Iraq and Afghanistan?
Secretary Wolfowitz. Although it is not a given that more non-Iraqi
troops are required on the ground, this administration continues to
call on all nations to contribute forces to the multinational force-
Iraq mandated in U.N. Security Council Resolution 1546. However, most
countries that have the logistical capability to deploy forces are
already overstretched in other missions across the globe, and can not
be relied upon to augment our forces in either Iraq or Afghanistan.
However, there are potential causes for optimism, such as NATO
contributions to Provincial Reconstruction Teams in Afghanistan and the
organization's agreement to help train and equip Iraqi police forces.
Also, several Muslim nations have expressed interest in forming an all-
Islamic force to help protect the U.N.'s mission in Iraq.
IRAQ ELECTORAL SYSTEM
7. Senator McCain. Secretary Armitage, there is a debate about the
form that the Iraqi election system will take. The U.N. apparently
advocates a proportional representation system, which would put the
emphasis on centrally-run party politics. I am concerned that, in a
system that relies on centrally controlled party lists, regional
leaders would be excluded, and authentic local leaders would be
marginalized. That is why I believe a constituency-based system, in
which individual candidates run for elected office on ballots in local
districts, makes more sense. What is the administration's position on
this?
Secretary Armitage. The basic outline of an electoral system for
Iraq's first free elections, scheduled for no later than January 2005,
was established by agreement of U.N. elections experts, the Iraqi
Governing Council and the Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA). The
conduct of the elections is now the responsibility of the Independent
Electoral Commission of Iraq. The single-district electoral system was
recommended by electoral experts as the system best suited to provide
for genuine, credible and inclusive elections within the time frame
prescribed in the Transitional Administrative Law (TAL).
Election experts noted a number of important advantages in the
single-district system, including the ability to conduct elections
without having first to go through the politically sensitive process of
drawing voting districts. Experts also noted that the single-district
system facilitates voting by Iraqis who were forced into exile by the
Saddam regime and simplifies voter registration efforts.
To promote a process that ensures that all groups are effectively
represented in the election, the Department of State is providing
funding through the National Endowment for Democracy (NED) to the
International Republican Institute and the National Democratic
Institute. These training programs are aimed at helping moderate
candidates, parties and regional and local leaders with limited
exposure and political experience to compete successfully. The NED has
also received funding to support the efforts of civic groups to conduct
outreach and mobilize public participation in the elections, and the
U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) is funding voter
education and election monitoring programs to ensure that the process
is as inclusive and transparent as possible.
IRANIAN SUPPORT
8. Senator McCain. Secretary Armitage, there are media reports of
Iranian support of the insurgency in Iraq. Can you give me your
assessment of Iranian influence in Iraq?
Secretary Armitage. The Iranian Government has offered positive
public support of the Iraqi interim government. However, we are
concerned that Iran may be taking action to gain influence in Iraq and
undermine Iraqi efforts at self-determination. While sympathetic to the
majority Shia community in Iraq, it is very difficult to assess the
extent of Iranian contacts and relationships with different groups in
Iraq and whether they constitute active support.
The U.S. opposes any outside influence that seeks to disrupt the
new Iraqi government and has repeatedly advised the Iranian Government
we will not tolerate the destabilization of Iraq by outside powers.
9. Senator McCain. Secretary Armitage, do we have evidence that the
Iranian government is supporting insurgents in Iraq?
Secretary Armitage. It is difficult to assess the extent of Iranian
contacts and relationships with different groups in Iraq and whether
they include active support to Iraqi insurgents or foreign fighters
attacking coalition forces or the Iraqi interim government. We are
troubled by reports that Iran encouraged and actively supported the
upsurge in violence by Sadr's al-Mahdi Army Forces in Najaf. The United
States has repeatedly advised the Iranian government that it will not
tolerate the destabilization of Iraq by outside powers.
STRAIGHT TALK AND FOLLOW THROUGHS
10. Senator McCain. Secretary Armitage, I am concerned about a lack
of follow-through on our promises in Iraq. We announced that we would
arrest Moqtada al-Sadr, and yet he continues to preach openly. We
promised to enter Falluja and capture the killers of the American
contractors, and then we withdrew from the city and put authority in
the hands of ex-Baathists. Do these empty threats not embolden the
insurgents in Iraq?
Secretary Armitage. As part of our overall strategy to defeat the
insurgency in Iraq, we have worked closely with the Iraqi Governing
Council, other political, religious and civil leaders in Iraq and Iraqi
security forces to address threats to Iraq's security and stability.
Following the transfer of governing authority to the IIG, Embassy
Baghdad and the multinational force will coordinate closely with the
IIG in a shared effort to end terrorism in Iraq and provide the
stability necessary to move the political process forward.
We have been encouraged by the fact that there are continued signs
that most Iraqis do not support Sadr and reject his calls for
lawlessness. We are committed to bringing to justice those who have
blood on their hands in Iraq, including those who killed the four
American contractors in Fallujah. We supported the establishment of the
Fallujah Brigade in May, endorsed by Iraqi leadership, in order to stem
the insurgency and locate the perpetrators. Though we have noticed a
decrease in insurgents' offensive activity, the results have been
mixed. We will continue to work with the Iraqi leadership and, as
necessary, adjust our approach.
INSURGENCY VERSUS TERROR CAMPAIGN
11. Senator McCain. Secretary Armitage, many critics have pointed
to a recent CPA-sponsored poll showing that 92 percent of Iraqis see
the coalition forces as occupiers, as opposed to 2 percent who now see
us as liberators almost 15 months after the fall of Baghdad. Some have
pointed to this figure as evidence that we have failed to win the
``hearts and minds'' of the Iraqi people, and blame the ongoing
violence in Iraq on this supposed failure. But last October, Newsweek
reported that more and more evidence suggests that the terror attacks
in Iraq were planned well before the war even began. On April 29, the
New York Times reported that most of the sophisticated guerrilla
attacks in Fallujah were being organized and carried out by members of
Saddam Hussein's secret service, ``who planned for the insurgency even
before the fall of Baghdad.'' In your opinion, do you ascribe the
violence in Iraq more to a popular uprising emerging from our
reconstruction policies, or as part of a calculated campaign by Saddam
Hussein's security apparatus?
Secretary Armitage. The insurgency in Iraq does not represent a
single network or movement. Various groups have taken up arms against
coalition forces, each with their own motives. Some elements are former
regime members fighting to return to the past while others are foreign
fighters who have crossed into Iraq. Groups like Sadr's Jayshal-Mahdi
Army are fighting because they believe the CPA and later the Iraqi
government can be challenged or cowed by violence. They all share one
thing in common--the desire to disrupt Iraq's democratic progress and
reconstruction for their own ends. Regardless of who planned insurgent
actions or when, the response is the same: coalition and Iraqi forces
must stop the violence and secure the country.
ABU MUSAB AL-ZARQAWI, IRAQ, AND THE GLOBAL WAR ON TERROR
12. Senator McCain. Secretary Armitage, we are all understandably
horrified at the images of the carnage created by the June 24, 2004
bombings in Iraq. News reports indicate that the terrorist organization
led by Abu Musab al-Zarqawi has claimed responsibility for these
attacks. We, of course, know Mr. Zarqawi as the murderer who
barbarously beheaded American Nicholas Berg in Iraq last month. Now,
Zarqawi has threatened to kill the incoming Prime Minister of the Iraqi
interim government, Ayad Allawi. Some have argued that Iraq was not a
part of the war on terror until we invaded and destabilized it;
Zarqawi's network would not have posed a serious threat to us; and this
invasion has instead empowered him and enabled him to become as
dangerous as Osama Bin Laden was at the time of the September 11
attacks. For example, the French Foreign Minister Dominique de Villepin
claimed that ``Terrorism did not exist in Iraq before [the war]. Today,
it is one of the world's principal source of world terrorism.'' Has the
war in Iraq been a distraction from the global war on terror? Or more
specifically, have we created in Mr. Zarqawi precisely the kind of
threat we set out to defeat after September 11?
Secretary Armitage. Well before the war in Iraq began, Iraq was
listed as a state sponsor of terror. Saddam Hussein's regime pursued,
possessed and used weapons of mass destruction. It provided a safe
haven for terrorists and material assistance to terrorist groups.
President Bush has made clear that the war in Iraq was an integral part
of the global war on terror. At his speech in Fort Lewis, Washington on
June 18, he said,
``Saddam Hussein's regime posed a threat to the American
people, and people around the world. Iraq was a country in
which millions of people lived in fear, and many thousands
disappeared into mass graves. This was a regime that tortured
children in front of their parents. This was a regime that
invaded its neighbors. This is a regime that used chemical
weapons before. It had used weapon not only against countries
in its neighborhood, but against its own citizens. This is a
regime which gave cash rewards to families of suicide bombers.
This is a regime that sheltered terrorist groups. This is a
regime that hated America.''
Abu Musab al-Zarqawi was not created by the war in Iraq. Zarqawi's
acts of terror predate Operation Iraqi Freedom. He was convicted in
absentia in Jordan for masterminding the assassination of American
diplomat Laurence Foley in Amman in October 2002. Throughout 2002,
Zarqawi worked in Iraq in cooperation with Ansar al-Islam in an effort
to develop chemical weapons for use in terror operations. He lived in
Afghanistan from June 2000 until late 2001 where it is believed he
conducted terrorist training in affiliation with al Qaeda. Zarqawi's
connection with other extremist and terrorist organizations goes back
well into the 1990s. He was imprisoned in Jordan from 1992-1997 for
plotting to overthrow the monarchy and replace it with an Islamic
state. We and the Iraqi interim government are working to bring Zarqawi
to justice for his crimes against Iraqi and American victims.
WITHDRAWAL DATE VERSUS EXIT STRATEGY
13. Senator McCain. Secretary Armitage, what conditions do we need
to achieve on the ground in Iraq in order for the reconstruction
mission to be considered a success, and for us to be able to withdraw
our forces as a result of victory rather than because of a deadline?
Secretary Armitage. Our goal is to see the Iraqi people in charge
of a free and independent, secure and prosperous Iraq. This will be
possible when the Iraqi people have established themselves as the
primary defenders of the stability and security that democratic
governance requires, when their infrastructure has been developed to
enable economic independence and a better quality of life, and they
have demonstrated the capacity to hold free elections.
DEMOCRACY BUILDING
14. Senator McCain. Secretary Armitage, I think everybody on this
committee, even those who opposed the war and currently disagree with
administration policy in Iraq, would agree that it is in our long-term
interests to promote democracy in the Middle East. Democracies do not
seek to develop weapons of mass destruction, they do not breed
extremism or overtly support terrorism, and they do not launch
genocidal campaigns designed to wipe out their own ethnic minorities. I
think that for whatever setbacks we endure on the security front in
Iraq, I believe that it is still a noble goal that we are pursuing
there, and one that is clearly in our interests. Consequently, one of
the key measures of success in Iraq is whether we can actually help
them on the path to becoming the Arab world's first democracy. One goal
of our reconstruction mission should be the successful election of a
Transitional National Assembly by this January, and of a permanent
Iraqi Government in December 2005. This is obviously an enormous
undertaking, and in order to get to elections we must help to set the
right pre-conditions in Iraqi society, or else their first election may
be their last. What indicators can we use to determine whether or not
we are being successful in preparing Iraq to become a democracy?
Secretary Armitage. The Iraqi people already have shown many
indicators of success. During the CPA period, the creation of the TAL,
the emergence of democratically selected local councils, new media
outlets and public dialogue, and increasing civil society activities of
women and ethnic minorities all indicate progress toward a society that
respects pluralism and the role of law. The Bill of Rights included in
the TAL is a comprehensive declaration of fundamental rights and
freedoms that has no equal in the region. Since the naming of the IIG
on June 1, its members have made clear their dedication to the
principles laid out in the TAL and the Annex. They have spoken publicly
about their commitment to the timelines and the political processes
outlined in the TAL, and have backed up their words with actions.
Finally, the institutions that support a transition toward democracy
have been named and are beginning their work. The members of
Independent Election Commission of Iraq (IECI) are setting up the
administration for Iraq's first genuinely sovereign and representative
elections in January 2005. The national conference is scheduled to
convene on August 15 to begin a process of national dialogue that will
help facilitate a unified agenda around which the elections can take
place. Activities of the Ministry of Human Rights and preparations
under the Iraqi Special Tribunal also indicate Iraqis' commitments to
the democratic rule of law.
15. Senator McCain. Secretary Armitage, how would you rate the
Iraqi's progress in some of these key sectors?
Secretary Armitage. A key element of U.S. democracy assistance is
to help Iraqis learn to make decisions at the grassroots level, rather
than depend on the central government to make them. The devolution of
power from the capital down to the smaller cities, towns, villages and
neighborhoods is giving Iraqis a sense of responsibility for their own
affairs, something they have not had for many decades. New local
councils, parent-teacher associations, NGOs, human rights
organizations, and environmental societies are giving people a voice in
their own affairs and a say in how they are governed. Iraqis have shown
they support these projects, participating actively, assuming
leadership roles, often matching funds and providing services.
According to USAID figures, more than 80 percent of Iraq's adult
population have been engaged--either directly or indirectly--in U.S.
funded projects aimed at promoting democracy. Local advisory councils
have been formed in 16 governorates, 78 districts, 192 city and
subdistricts, and 392 neighborhoods.
U.S. assistance has also provided the local councils with small
budgets to spend on projects such as fixing schools, traffic controls,
or public health. Councils also advise the CPA about the area's needs.
Nearly 700 local, city, and State councils have been established, and
more than 2,000 community projects have been completed or are underway
throughout the country. As a result, more than three-quarters of the
population, either directly or indirectly, have been engaged in
democracy at the local level. Now Iraqis are beginning to devise
solutions to problems in their communities, build skills in community
decisionmaking, and learn how to resolve or lessen conflicts
peacefully--all hallmarks of a democracy.
16. Senator McCain. Secretary Armitage, are you confident that
Iraqis will be able to sustain this progress after the transition to
Iraqi sovereignty the week of June 27?
Secretary Armitage. I have every confidence that the Iraqis are
committed to democracy and to making it work in Iraq. Such government
institutions as the Ministry of Human Rights and the Independent
Electoral Commission, an independent judicial system and tribunal, and
elections scheduled to be held by January to elect a sovereign and
representative national assembly suggest that the infrastructure to
guide and safeguard a democratic transition is in place. As the
evidence indicates, the Iraqi people have already shown their own
dedication to and enthusiasm for democracy.
______
Questions Submitted by Senator Hillary Rodham Clinton
ADDITIONAL TROOPS
17. Senator Clinton. Secretary Wolfowitz and General Myers, in your
testimony, you stated that there was no internal debate on the Joint
Staff over whether additional troops would be needed for the invasion
of Iraq. Was there any debate over the number of troops that would be
needed for stabilization operations following the initial invasion?
Secretary Wolfowitz and General Myers. Yes, as part of the
``wargaming'' that occurs when we analyze our force requirements,
numerous options and positions are presented to address the combatant
commander's needs. There was a considerable effort dedicated to this
subject, and we are confident that the force levels remain consistent
with the requirement.
18. Senator Clinton. Secretary Wolfowitz and General Myers, what
staff work was done, if any, by the Office of Secretary of Defense, the
Joint Chiefs of Staff, or CENTCOM to determine the required level of
troops necessary to stabilize Iraq?
Secretary Wolfowitz and General Myers. We will continue our ongoing
effort to ``right size'' the force in Iraq. With Central Command, we
continue to assess where, and if, we can we will reduce the number of
forces we have in theater. As conditions warrant, we be able to reduce
the presence of U.S. and coalition forces, but these reductions will be
based on conditions or reduced threat and an increase in the
capabilities of the Iraqi security forces.
19. Senator Clinton. Secretary Wolfowitz and General Myers, was
there any internal debate in the DOD over the level of troops that
would be needed to stabilize Iraq?
Secretary Wolfowitz and General Myers. As part of our assessments,
we developed and considered options for troops levels. However, the
combatant commander on the ground gets the overriding vote. His
assessments on what he needs to secure Iraq were on the mark. We think
his assessments to move toward stabilizing Iraq appears are correct,
and finally, his process to downsize requirements based on threat and
existing conditions in Iraq are prudent.
20. Senator Clinton. Secretary Wolfowitz and General Myers, did
anyone within the DOD, including the Office of the Secretary of Defense
and the Joint Staff, recommend additional troops for stabilization
operations before the invasion of Iraq?
Secretary Wolfowitz and General Myers. We considered many force-
level options on how to source troops in Iraq. However, the final vote,
with the heaviest ``weight'' was given to the combatant commander.
21. Senator Clinton. Secretary Wolfowitz and General Myers, did
other U.S. Government agencies recommend to the DOD that additional
troops would be necessary for stabilization operations?
Secretary Wolfowitz and General Myers. The combatant commander
determined the levels of forces required for post combat stabilization
operations. He was resourced at the levels requested in a process that
involved broad interagency oversight and involvement. As circumstances
on the ground in Iraq have changed force levels have been adjusted
accordingly.
DOD SUPPORT FOR A LARGER ARMY
22. Senator Clinton. Secretary Wolfowitz and General Myers, CNN
reported on June 24, 2004 that as many as 6,500 members of the
Individual Ready Reserve (IRR) could possibly be activated for service
in Iraq. We continue to stretch our Army but the DOD states there's no
need for an increase in end strength. However, the strain on our forces
is obvious.
Consider the following:
We are making exhaustive use of the Reserve
components;
We are deploying 3,600 soldiers from the Republic of
Korea to Iraq (some soldiers separated from their families for
over 24 months);
We are making use of training units from the National
Training Center and the ceremonial Old Guard;
We are activating the IRR soldiers;
We have issued stop-loss orders for over 2 years,
extending soldiers beyond their contractual enlistment or
retirement;
The Balkan deployments rotations consist of 100
percent Reserve component; and
We are seeing reduced personnel in school and
headquarters assignments to support the deployments.
The Senate Authorization bill includes authorization for 20,000
more troops in the Army. In light of all these factors, will the DOD
support a larger army?
Secretary Wolfowitz and General Myers. Several initiatives are
underway within the DOD to relieve stress on the force by making more
of our current force available for deployments and high demand
activities. These include, but are not limited to, military-to-civilian
conversions, rebalancing of the Reserve components, and Army
Modularity.
The Department is converting 20,070 military positions to civilian
or contractor positions in fiscal years 2004 and 2005. These
conversions will occur in positions where the work is not deemed
inherently military in nature. This will in turn make more military
personnel (end strength) available to the Service Chiefs for more
critical military tasks. The Department is studying the feasibility of
expanding this initiative in fiscal year 2006 and beyond.
Rebalancing of the force is an ongoing activity within the
department. The Department is currently assessing its force structure
and rebalancing within the Reserve components and between the Active
and Reserve components with the expressed purpose of moving forces from
low demand to high demand specialties and improving readiness and
deployability. A total of approximately 100,000 spaces will be
rebalanced in fiscal year 2003 to 2009. These rebalancing efforts will
shift forces to critical specialties such as Civil Affairs,
Psychological Operations, Military Police, Special Forces, and
Intelligence while divesting cold war structure to enable the global
war on terrorism capability.
The Army is shifting from a division based force structure to a
modular combat brigade centric organization. In doing so, the Army will
increase its operational capability from its current 33 brigade force
to a 43 brigade force with the flexibility to add an additional 5-7
brigades if required. This effort begins in fiscal year 2004 and is
scheduled for completion in fiscal year 2010. By adding 10 (or more)
additional Active brigades, the Army will increase the rotation base of
units available for deployment and further reduce the burden on Active
and Reserve soldiers.
Military-to-Civilian conversions, rebalancing of the force, and
Army modularity will have a significant impact on the force and greatly
increase warfighting capabilities where gaps currently exist. The
impact will be 20,000 additional troops for the operational force, an
additional 58,000 positions in high demand specialties, and an increase
in the rotation base of units available for deployment which will
reduce the burden on Active and Reserve soldiers. Until these
initiatives have the opportunity to impact the force, it is not prudent
to implement the most expensive option to the taxpayer, a permanent end
strength increase.
[Whereupon, at 12:56 p.m., the committee adjourned.]