[Senate Hearing 108-1014]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
S. Hrg. 108-1014
THE STATE OF MARITIME SECURITY
=======================================================================
HEARING
BEFORE THE
COMMITTEE ON COMMERCE,
SCIENCE, AND TRANSPORTATION
UNITED STATES SENATE
ONE HUNDRED EIGHTH CONGRESS
SECOND SESSION
__________
MARCH 24, 2004
__________
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Transportation
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SENATE COMMITTEE ON COMMERCE, SCIENCE, AND TRANSPORTATION
ONE HUNDRED EIGHTH CONGRESS
SECOND SESSION
JOHN McCAIN, Arizona, Chairman
TED STEVENS, Alaska ERNEST F. HOLLINGS, South
CONRAD BURNS, Montana Carolina, Ranking
TRENT LOTT, Mississippi DANIEL K. INOUYE, Hawaii
KAY BAILEY HUTCHISON, Texas JOHN D. ROCKEFELLER IV, West
OLYMPIA J. SNOWE, Maine Virginia
SAM BROWNBACK, Kansas JOHN F. KERRY, Massachusetts
GORDON H. SMITH, Oregon JOHN B. BREAUX, Louisiana
PETER G. FITZGERALD, Illinois BYRON L. DORGAN, North Dakota
JOHN ENSIGN, Nevada RON WYDEN, Oregon
GEORGE ALLEN, Virginia BARBARA BOXER, California
JOHN E. SUNUNU, New Hampshire BILL NELSON, Florida
MARIA CANTWELL, Washington
FRANK R. LAUTENBERG, New Jersey
Jeanne Bumpus, Republican Staff Director and General Counsel
Robert W. Chamberlin, Republican Chief Counsel
Kevin D. Kayes, Democratic Staff Director and Chief Counsel
Gregg Elias, Democratic General Counsel
C O N T E N T S
----------
Page
Hearing held on March 24, 2004................................... 1
Statement of Senator Boxer....................................... 12
Prepared statement........................................... 12
Statement of Senator Breaux...................................... 6
Statement of Senator Hollings.................................... 3
Prepared statement........................................... 5
Statement of Senator Hutchison................................... 11
Statement of Senator Lautenberg.................................. 9
Statement of Senator McCain...................................... 1
Prepared statement........................................... 2
Statement of Senator Nelson...................................... 44
Statement of Senator Snowe....................................... 8
Witnesses
Bonner, Hon. Robert C., Commissioner, U.S. Customs and Border
Protection..................................................... 17
Carafano, Dr. James Jay, Senior Research Fellow, Defense and
Homeland Security, The Heritage Foundation..................... 64
Prepared statement........................................... 66
Collins, Hon. Thomas H., Commandant, U.S. Coast Guard............ 14
Koch, Christopher, President and CEO, World Shipping Council..... 49
Prepared statement........................................... 51
LaGrange, Gary P., Executive Director and CEO, Board of
Commissioners, Port of New Orleans............................. 59
Prepared statement........................................... 61
Mitre, Mike, Director, Coast Port Security, Longshore Division,
International Longshore and Warehouse Union (ILWU)............. 74
Prepared statement........................................... 79
Stone, Rear Admiral David M., Acting Administrator,
Transportation Security Administration......................... 19
Prepared statement of Admiral Thomas H. Collins, Commandant,
U.S. Coast Guard; Robert C. Bonner, Commissioner, Customs
and Border Protection, Admiral David M. Stone, Acting
Administrator, Transportation Security Administration,
Department of Homeland Security............................ 21
Appendix
Lott, Hon. Trent, U.S. Senator from Mississippi, prepared
statement...................................................... 97
Response to written questions submitted to Rear Admiral David
Stone (Ret.) by:
Hon. Ernest F. Hollings...................................... 97
Hon. Frank R. Lautenberg..................................... 98
Written questions submitted to Hon. Thomas H. Collins and
responses by the United States Coast Guard..................... 100
Response to written questions submitted by Hon. Ernest F.
Hollings to Gary P. LaGrange................................... 108
THE STATE OF MARITIME SECURITY
----------
WEDNESDAY, MARCH 24, 2004
U.S. Senate,
Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation,
Washington, DC.
The Committee met, pursuant to notice, at 9:30 a.m. in room
SR-253, Russell Senate Office Building, Hon. John McCain,
Chairman of the Committee, presiding.
OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. JOHN McCAIN,
U.S. SENATOR FROM ARIZONA
The Chairman. Good morning. The Committee meets today to
consider the state of maritime security in the United States
and around the world, specifically efforts related to vessel,
port, and cargo security and personnel with access to vessels
and cargo at maritime facilities. The Committee hopes to learn
what's been done to improve maritime security over the two and
a half years since the terrorist attacks on New York and
Washington.
I commend Secretary Ridge and all the employees of the
Department of Homeland Security who have taken on the
monumental task of securing our homeland while managing the
largest government reorganization in history. It's clear the
Department has made significant strides and established the
foundation for a layered approach to transportation security in
the year and a half since the Homeland Security Act of 2002 and
the Maritime Transportation Security Act were signed into law.
Yet their task is far from complete. No comprehensive
maritime security plan exists. I'm concerned that a lack of
resources and the demands of the reorganization have inhibited
the Department's focus on its security mission.
The three witnesses from DHS here today directly oversee
the agencies most involved in maritime security, the Coast
Guard, Customs and Border Protection, and the Transportation
Security Administration. These agencies spent millions of
dollars on numerous and in some cases overlapping or
duplicative pilot programs--projects, tests, initiatives, and
programs aimed at improving maritime security, with
questionable results.
For example, over 5,700 companies have signed up for the
Customs Trade Partnership Against Terrorism, known as C-TPAT.
While this would seem like a great success, many of those in
the maritime industry associated with the program to increase
supply chain security have started to openly question the value
of this voluntary approach. Some participants continue to
strongly adhere to the program's goals out of a sense of
responsibility, while others, driven by their bottom line, are
moving away from the program and are only meeting those
requirements in law, the regulation.
The lack of coordination and absence of established
standards and goals have led to confusion for the maritime
industry as to what must be done to improve security, and whom
to go to with security questions. This type of confusion will
lead to less cooperation from industry and ultimately to lax
security.
The agencies represented here today must strive harder to
improve coordination efforts. I was amazed to learn that it has
only been in the last several weeks that the Coast Guard and
Customs and Border Protection have reached an agreement to
share manifest and vessel information reported to the two
agencies by those involved in maritime transportation. I hope
our government witnesses can shed some light on efforts to
improve coordination and complete memorandums of agreement that
define each agency's role and responsibilities.
I bring this to question the Department about this and
believe that little effort has been put into completing these
agreements, which not only better define agency roles, but also
serve to direct and state local governments in the private
sector when they try to get answers to security questions.
Further, we're going to hear from maritime industry
representatives today who are concerned about future security
costs. As I stated at yesterday's hearings examining the state
of rail security, only modest resources have been dedicated to
maritime and land security over the past two and a half years
compared to the investments made to secure the airways. I
believe one reason for this discrepancy is a lack of focus on
maritime security on a comprehensive plan that sets standards
and clearly identifies what efforts and costs are public versus
private responsibilities.
If the layered approach to homeland security envisioned by
DHS and its strategic plan is to work, it's imperative that all
parties, both public and private, have a clear understanding of
their roles and responsibilities.
I want to welcome all of our witnesses. I look forward to
their statements regarding the current state of maritime
security and hearing their recommendations pertaining to the
needs that are still outstanding.
[The prepared statement of Senator McCain follows:]
Prepared Statement of Hon. John McCain, U.S. Senator from Arizona
The Committee meets today to consider the state of maritime
security in the United States and around the world; specifically
efforts related to vessel, port, and cargo security, and personnel with
access to vessels and cargo .at maritime facilities. The Committee
hopes to learn what has been done to improve maritime security over the
two and half years since the terrorist attacks on New York and
Washington.
I commend Secretary Ridge and all the employees of the Department
of Homeland Security who have taken on the monumental task of securing
our homeland while managing the largest government reorganization in
history. It is clear the Department has made significant strides and
established the foundation for a layered approach to transportation
security in the year and a half since the Homeland Security Act of 2002
and the Maritime Transportation Security Act were signed into law, yet
their task is far from complete.
No comprehensive maritime security plan exists, and I am concerned
that a lack of resources and the demands of the reorganization have
inhibited the Department's focus on its security mission. The three
witnesses from DHS here today directly oversee the agencies most
involved in maritime security: the Coast Guard, Customs and Border
Protection, and the Transportation Security Administration. These
agencies spent millions of dollars on numerous, and in some cases
overlapping or duplicative, pilot projects, tests, initiatives, and
programs aimed at improving maritime security with questionable
results.
For example, over 5,700 companies have signed up for the Customs
Trade Partnership Against Terrorism, known as C-TPAT. While this would
seem like a great success, many of those in the maritime industry
associated with the program to increase supply chain security have
started to openly question the value of this voluntary approach. Some
participants continue to strongly adhere to the program's goals out of
a sense of responsibility, while others, driven by their bottom line,
are moving away from the program and are only meeting those
requirements in law or regulation.
The lack of coordination and absence of established standards and
goals have lead to confusion for the maritime industry as to what must
be done to improve security and whom to go to with security questions.
This type of confusion will lead to less cooperation from industry and
ultimately to lax security. The agencies represented here today must
strive harder to improve coordination efforts. I was amazed to learn
that it has only been in the last several weeks that the Coast Guard
and Customs and Border Protection have reached an agreement to share
manifest and vessel information reported to the two agencies by those
involved in maritime transportation.
I hope our government witnesses can shed some light on efforts to
improve coordination and complete Memorandums of Agreement that define
each agency's role and responsibilities. I have previously questioned
the Department about this and believe that little effort has been put
into completing these agreements which not only better define agency
roles, but also serve to direct state and local governments and the
private sector when they try to get answers to security questions.
Further, we are going to hear from maritime industry
representatives today who are concerned about future security costs. As
I stated at yesterday's hearing examining the state of rail security,
only modest resources have been dedicated to maritime and land security
over the past two and a half years compared to the investments made to
secure the airways. I believe one reason for this discrepancy, is the
lack of focus in maritime security on a comprehensive plan that sets
standards, and clearly identifies what efforts and costs are public
versus private responsibilities. If the layered approach to homeland
security envisioned by DHS in its Strategic Plan is to work, it is
imperative that all parties, both public and private, have a clear
understanding of their roles and responsibilities.
I want to welcome all of our witnesses. I look forward to their
statements regarding the current state of maritime security, and
hearing their recommendations pertaining to the needs still
outstanding.
The Chairman. Senator Hollings, welcome back.
STATEMENT OF HON. ERNEST F. HOLLINGS,
U.S. SENATOR FROM SOUTH CAROLINA
Senator Hollings. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. Let me
welcome Admiral Collins and our Commissioner of Customs, Mr.
Bonner. Let me do a little taking of stock, because, you know,
the Committee itself, right after 9/11, went into an intermural
on airport and airline security. We finally got that through
and we took up and unanimously reported out a port security
authorization, and within that authorization we provided
monies. Specifically, Mr. Bonner, we put in a $15 million
container fee, approximately $700 million overall, that would
take care of at least the 55 major ports.
That's just a start. As Admiral Collins knows, the Coast
Guard has estimated a total port cost of $7.4 billion. We had
to make a start, and we made a good start. There was a
unanimous vote in the U.S. Senate. It went over to the House
side and into a dogfall of a year's wrangle.
Number one, they said that this was a tax, a tax, a tax. I
finally got the House parliamentarian to rule that it was not a
tax, it was a user fee. Then they went into a wrangle about,
``Well, wait a minute, this affects revenues under the
Constitution. It ought to derive in the House of
Representatives.'' I said, ``Fine, let's get the conference
agreement and get the money and you folks just introduce it and
we'll take it ipso facto right on the Senate side.'' No, no,
they didn't want to do that.
As of now, we have no money. Can you imagine that? 9/11/
2001, 9/11/2002, that's two and a half years, and we're still
wrangling. We finally agreed to ask the President to report on
how he would fund the port security program. You know that's 15
months ago and we have yet to hear from the White House. We've
heard from the White House otherwise. They've opposed it at
every stand. I'm telling you right now, we put a small amount
and two supplementals into the Homeland Security bill. I was
able to get in $450 million, and that $450 million should be
compared to the $7.4 billion that Admiral Collins says it would
take for the ports.
But be that as it may, we offered an amendment in the 2004
budget resolution, of a billion dollars. We unanimously adopted
the budget resolution. The White House demanded that we drop it
in conference and it was dropped in conference, so we got
nothing there.
Then again, we were trying our best, Admiral, you remember
the money we received from the emergency supplementals in order
to get these towers. We credit our friend, Senator John
Breaux--he said we ought to have these transponders, to throw
the ball to ships coming in. But we had no towers to throw the
ball, or signal. And so we put in 50, and they cut it back, I
think, to 24, if it--and you've done your best to control your
budget, Admiral Collins. We're not fussing at you. I'm just
trying to bring the Committee up to par here on just exactly
what's been done. So we did that.
Now, in the 2004 budget, they finally requested some $46
million, but, you know, we still don't have the towers. We hope
to get the transponders in there, and I think by the end of the
year, Admiral Collins, you attest to the fact that the ships
will be ready under Senator Breaux's initiative.
But what happens is that as of this morning, just 2 weeks
ago--we always talked about Osama coming in there at Mombasa,
the port of Kenya, and going to Nairobi and to Dar es Salaam
and Tanzania and blowing up the two embassies. Well, they came
into the port of Ashdod, in Southern Israel, just 2 weeks ago.
They were trying to hit, as best we can tell, a chemical
facility, and targeted it, but they were intercepted. Ten of
them were killed, 20 were wounded there as they infiltrated the
port there in Ashdod. But Lloyd's of London tells us that Osama
owns ten vessels, and he has an interest in ten more.
And the best we can, after two and a half years of
wrangling, and everything else like that, the Congress has been
acting, but we have yet to get any more than a recommendation
of $46 million for 55 major ports and 361 ports overall.
So I commend you, too. You all have been working, and we've
been in the hearings with you. You've been responding the best
you can. And, Mr. Chairman, I appreciate your indulgence, but I
think we ought to take stock and see just exactly where we are
when--we're all talking, ``We're in there, we're doing this,
we're doing that,'' and everything else, 9/11.
On rail security, they have not even taken up your bill and
my bill that we reported out of this Committee. We can't even
get rail security debated on the floor of the Congress. And
they blew them up in Spain. On port security, we can't get any
money. We passed the authorization, we asked the White House to
give us their plan; 15 months later, they have no plan.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
The Chairman. Thank you, Senator Hollings.
I mentioned, at the hearing yesterday, which you were
unable to be here because of the funeral of your----
Senator Hollings. Yes.
The Chairman.--your friend in South Carolina, that it would
be my intention, with your agreement, that we would mark up
another rail security bill, in light of additional information
that----
Senator Hollings. That would be terrific, Mr.----
The Chairman. Fine.
Senator Hollings.--Chairman. I appreciate your leadership
on that----
The Chairman. Fine.
Senator Hollings.--because that's the only way we're going
to get it done.
[The prepared statement of Senator Hollings follows:]
Prepared Statement of Hon. Ernest F. Hollings,
U.S. Senator from South Carolina
Mr. Chairman, I would like to thank you for convening this hearing
today to allow this Committee to consider port security and examine
where we are some year and a half after the enactment of the Maritime
Transportation and Security Act of2002. While you don't have to much
coastal water near you in Arizona, you have allowed us coastal members
more than adequate opportunity to consider whether we have taken
adequate measures to protect our ports and the people and citizens the
live around and near them. However, port security is an issue that is
much more than an issue that impacts just the people living on our
coast. It impacts our whole economy and the health and strength of this
Nation because of the importance of the maritime trade.
Almost all of the overseas retail goods that are sold here in the
stores and the malls and the retail outlets comes from overseas
destinations. U.S. manufacturers also rely on the maritime
transportation system, for instance in my state of South Carolina, the
car manufacturer BMW, gets many of the components that they put into
their car from overseas ports. Most of our petroleum product comes
overseas in tankers, as well as many of the chemicals and other bulk
commodities we use. If our system of port security fails, I can assure
that all of the industries that rely on it will also suffer tremendous
losses, as will our Nation as whole, so port security really is an
issue that impacts every citizen in the United States, whether they
know it or not.
In my opinion we have been able to take some steps forward to
better secure our ports and our system of maritime security, but we
have a long, long way to go, and I do not feel that this Administration
has dedicated the resources really to address this issue in a
comprehensive fashion. Less than two weeks ago, in the Israeli port of
Ashdod in Southern Israel, two suicide bombers allegedly with ties to
the terrorist organization Hamas, infiltrated the port of Ashdod,
killing ten and wounding twenty, according to press reports there is
speculation that the suicide bombers had targeted chemical facilities
within the port, including the chemical agent bromine. Currently,
Israeli authorities are investigating how the terrorist got into the
country, including whether they secreted themselves in marine
containers in order to gain access. Prior to the incident in Israel,
Al-Qaeda operatives had used small boats to blow up the USS Cole, and a
commercial oil tanker. We also know that Al-Qaeda terrorist networks
used Al-Qaeda owned and controlled vessels to smuggle in terrorists and
explosives used in the attacks on the U.S. embassies in Kenya and
Tanzania, and that Al-Qaeda owns a fleet of merchant vessels.
So this is a very real threat that we are talking about, and I have
concerns that we are not currently positioned to prevent an attack
utilizing means of access through maritime transportation or through
our maritime system. I can tell you, that in the event that something
does happen, we do not have a plan to reopen U.S. ports to commerce,
without admitting that we will do so with very real risks that the same
event could occur again. I can also tell you that in the event that we
have to close our ports for any length of time, we will cause
catastrophic economic impacts. For instance, when we had a labor-
management impasse on the West Coast resulting in a closure of the
ports, it is estimated that it cost the economy 1 to 2 billion dollars
a day in revenues. I can assure that, closure of U.S. ports for any
period of time would resonate throughout our entire economy.
While have taken some steps forward in the implementation of the
Federal security planning requirements, there are many questions left,
as to whether the security plans will be aggressive and effective tools
to deter terrorism, or whether we have shell plans. My sense is that we
will receive the minimum level of security necessary to ensure Federal
compliance absent real resources that are dedicated to security
enhancements. Otherwise, the ports will spend money on what they
traditionally spend money, and that is making sure that they can move
cargo as effectively as possible. I feel that the resources issues must
be addressed, and I will be introducing legislation to ensure that, one
way or the other, that we have funds in place that will be used to
enhance port security.
When we passed the MTSA, the Senate took the position that it
should be paid for through user fees, and ultimately the House opposed
our position, and supported by the industry, who claimed that it would
be funded through the government. Well, the Administration, until this
year, when they proposed $46 million to be funded, has proposed
nothing. Repeatedly, I have offered amendments that have been defeated
on party-line votes, to increase the funds allocated for Federal port
security programs. Something has to be done to rectify funding
shortfall, or someday, we will all be sitting around here pointing
fingers at each other.
I'll give you just one example of the problem. In the MTSA, we
required all vessels to carry transponders in order to broadcast
crucial shipping information and to allow governments to track the
movements of these ships. Actually, it was Senator John Breaux, who led
the charge on this particular issue. This will allow us to tracks ships
to make sure they are not heading into the Golden Gate Bridge, or aimed
to hit a nuclear reactor at Indian Point on the Hudson River. Every
ship will have this equipment by the end of the year, but the
Administration has in the past two years proposed $5 million dollars,
not nearly enough to even start the system. This indefensible, this
should be a crucial part of our system of port security defense.
The Chairman. Fine. Get it out before the Committee, before
this next recess, and, if necessary, exercise the amending
process in order to get this issue addressed.
Thank you, Senator Hollings.
Senator Breaux?
STATEMENT OF HON. JOHN B. BREAUX,
U.S. SENATOR FROM LOUISIANA
Senator Breaux. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman, again,
for following up with this hearing with the one yesterday on
rail security.
Over in the Hart Building right now, we are having some
very high level and highly televised hearings on what happened
on 9/11 and why we weren't better prepared, while we're having
a hearing here today to find out how to get prepared so it
doesn't happen again. This is where it really starts. They're
looking at why we didn't do what we should have done when we
should have done it, when today, I mean, we're really looking
at what we need to do to prepare ourselves to make sure it
doesn't happen again so there's not going to be another hearing
sometime in the future to analyze why we weren't better
prepared when a ship blew up in one of our ports and destroyed
the lives of innocent individuals. So this is where we solve
the problems, and they're over there looking at the mistakes
and what happened.
This is very, very serious. I mean, we've done a good job,
I think, on airline security. We've spent four and a half
billion dollars, we've got locks on the cockpit door; you have
to go through metal detectors; and professional Federal
inspectors in the airports. It's a whole new system with regard
to aviation. But I fear that, in the area of rail security and
in the area of port security, we're not nearly there yet. And
if I were a terrorist, as I said yesterday--I mean, you can't
think like they do, but you would assume that if they're going
to attack another target, it's going to be the weakest target,
not the strongest. And I think that when you look at weak
targets, targets that are open for terrorist activities, you've
got to look at the ports as one--and the rails--as one area
that could have some very serious problems.
If you think about it, I mean, we had these hearings with
the Chairman at that time, Senator Hollings, and we had
hearings in Charleston, we had hearings in New Orleans, we had
hearings in Houston, we had hearings on the East Coast, the
West Coast, and I was really struck by the total lack of
preparation because we had never considered, I guess, how
vulnerable our ports are. If you think about a container ship
as an example, they could have as many 3,000 containers on one
ship, and each container carrying up to 60,000 pounds in each
container, whatever they wanted to put into it.
And if you think about a ship with 3,000 containers being
in a port that is located next to an LNG facility, which is
located next to a chemical plant in the middle of a city, which
we have in this country, you can imagine what one container
filled with explosives could do to a city and a community if it
was containing explosives and it was detonated. We've seen what
a 35 foot vessel can do to a military naval ship. It blew a
hole in it and killed innocent men and women, who were
unsuspecting. And that was a 35 foot little boat that blew a
hole in the USS Cole.
So this is a very, very serious problem. We've not done
enough. Senator Hollings has said that. Money is the big
problem, not your determination, Mr. Bonner and Admiral
Collins; you all have done a terrific job, and will continue to
do so.
We have, today, the Chairman--President of the Port of New
Orleans, Gary LaGrange, who is up here. We invited him. It has
been a port since about the 1700s down there. A ship sank in
the port just a couple of days ago, stopped traffic for 4 days,
just an innocent accident. And when you stop that, I mean, you
stop commerce throughout the middle part of the United States
of America. And that was, you know, not a terrorist activity,
but it shows you what can happen.
The AIS system, the Automatic Identification System, is not
in place, we said it should be, to track those vessels, where
they are at every point in time. We know where every airplane
is at every point in time, but we don't know where every ship
is, and we've got some real holes in this system. And hopefully
this hearing will be helpful in trying to fill the holes.
Thank you.
The Chairman. Senator Snowe?
STATEMENT OF HON. OLYMPIA J. SNOWE,
U.S. SENATOR FROM MAINE
Senator Snowe. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And thank you for
holding this hearing this morning.
I want to welcome our witnesses, Admiral Collins, the
Commandant of the Coast Guard, and Mr. Bonner and Admiral
Stone. I thank you for being here, because obviously this is a
key priority and a cornerstone of ensuring the integrity of our
borders, and that is, of course, to secure the maritime
transportation system.
As Chair of the Ocean, Fisheries, and Coast Guard
Subcommittee, I certainly think that we have to do everything
that we can to ensure that we are protecting our borders, in
terms of what happens to the ships and the contents of those
ships that come to this country. And some of the key port
security priorities is to advance the acceleration of the
Deepwater funding, which will provide the Coast Guard with
updated capitalization, in terms of the assets.
And I'm concerned with also ensuring that ports, based on
the Port Security Assessment Plan, have the adequate resources
to implement those plans. That's another area for discussion
here this morning. And also, making sure that staffing levels
for the Container Security Initiative are high enough to ensure
that the weapons of mass destruction never reach our shores.
Mr. Chairman, given the fact that only around 5 percent of
the 6 million containers that come to this country from
overseas are inspected each year, only 12 percent of all
containers, whether it's air, land, or sea--and 95 percent of
trade from outside North America comes into the United States
by sea--it's absolutely vital that we focus on the security of
our ports as a first line of defense.
Interestingly enough, there was a RAND report that was
issued in August of 2003, and it stated that the maritime
sector, and specifically the container transport sector, remain
wide open to the terrorist threat, and the system is perceived
to be poorly defended against misuse and terrorism due to its
global and open nature.
So I think that is a stark assessment and characterization
of where we stand today with respect to port security. I know
the Coast Guard, the Bureau of Customs and Border Protection,
and other Homeland Security agencies have made great progress
in protecting our Nation against catastrophic terrorist
attacks, but, as we, you know, know, we have a long ways to go
in this process.
Last year at this hearing, I expressed concerns about the
fact that Customs personnel were not equipped with personal
radiation detectors. That now is not the case; everyone is
equipped, as I understand it, with those detection systems, and
that is very important, because that is central to our ability
of protecting the maritime system from infiltration by weapons
of mass destruction.
I do believe that we have to accelerate the Coast Guard
Deepwater Project. The Coast Guard has been debilitated by
degrading assets, and I'm concerned about the Administration's
timeline for the 22-year project for the upgrade of the Coast
Guard vessels. I think we have to accelerate that. In fact, I
included a report last year in the Homeland Security Act that,
in fact, underscored the necessity of accelerating that
project, and that, in fact, that we would reap the gains and
benefits of doing so. I do not believe that we can wait any
longer to acquire the necessary assets for the Coast Guard.
We're facing an ever-present danger, and the Coast Guard is
facing extraordinary burdens in ensuring the security of our
ports, and they need this capitalization and modernization of
their assets sooner, rather than later, Mr. Chairman. And I
hope that we're going to be able to turn that timeline around.
Second, it's funding. I know that's been indicated here
this morning. Again, in order for the Coast Guard and others to
comply with the mandates of the Maritime Transportation
Security Act, I'm very troubled, again, that the Administration
has requested $46 million in port security grants for Fiscal
Year 2005, which represents a 63 percent cut, down from $150
million in Fiscal Year 2003, and $125 million in Fiscal Year
2004. That is a dramatic reduction at a time, I might note,
ironically and coincidentally, that the Coast Guard has even
indicated that it will take $5.4 billion on enhanced security
grants over the next 10 years to comply with the mandates
required under the Maritime Transportation Security Act. So
clearly there is an enormous gap and discrepancy between our
needs and that which is being requested by the Administration.
So, obviously, the funding is inadequate. I think we need
to fight for additional increases in appropriations. And,
finally, Mr. Chairman, we can't wait, or afford to wait, until
the dangerous cargo is already in our port. I've been a strong
supporter of the Containment Security Initiative. I think it's
going a long ways to shoring up what comes into this country
and securing--to make sure that those containers that might be
identified as a high-risk threat do not enter this country.
But, again, five-person teams deployed to the 17 CSI megaports
is not adequate to do the job. Again, according to the CSI
statistics, a five-person team in Singapore, which sent more
than 400,000 containers to the United States from March 2003 to
January 2004, reviewed only 63 percent of the cargo container's
manifest. Obviously, that means that 160,000 container's
manifests were not even reviewed to determine whether or not
there was any risky cargo involved.
So we obviously have made strides, but we have a long ways
to go, and I think we have to adopt a must-do attitude sooner,
rather than later, Mr. Chairman, on all these fronts.
Thank you.
The Chairman. Senator Lautenberg?
STATEMENT OF HON. FRANK R. LAUTENBERG,
U.S. SENATOR FROM NEW JERSEY
Senator Lautenberg. Thanks, Mr. Chairman, for continuing to
review the security concerns we have in our surface
transportation as well as the ports that we're looking a little
more closely at today.
When you think about it, and think about how quiet it seems
in the port areas, it looks like we're kind of playing the
``out of sight, out of mind'' game here, not providing the
resources that we need, and looking at departments that I think
function very well in government--the Coast Guard, with its
enormously expanding responsibility all the time. We always
find, Admiral Collins, different things for the Coast Guard to
do, even as we cut back on resources. It has been a phenomenon
that has been unpleasant to witness. I have great respect for
the agency. And Customs people, I see them; they work very hard
to do their job. And the volume of entries into the country, at
airports and cruise ships, et cetera, is enormous.
When you look at it, if a terrorist organization is looking
for a point of relatively easy penetration, just think about
it, 55,000 ports of call are made each year. And where do these
ships come from? They come from places that we know are not
really necessarily friendly to the United States, and are
usually fairly quickly accessible to those who would like to do
us damage. So the task of securing our ports is enormous, but
it won't go away by cutting back on the resources applied.
Recently, an official from the FBI testified before
Congress that the agency has gathered intelligence suggesting
that ports are a key vulnerability in our homeland defense.
And, again, to be repetitive, terrorists know that, as well as
we know it. Counterterrorism experts worry that terrorists
could smuggle themselves, traditional weapons, nuclear,
chemical or biological weapons into the country in these
containers.
Robert Jacksta, Executive Director of the U.S. Customs and
Border Patrol, testified last year that we inspected just 5.4
percent of the containers that arrived at our ports of entry.
And despite that testimony, the Bush Administration's Fiscal
Year 2005 budget proposes no Federal funds to help increase the
number of containers being screened. Furthermore, Coast Guard
officials have said, as we have heard from Senator Collins and
Senator Hollings, that it will--Senator Snowe, rather, and
Senator Hollings--will cost $1.4 billion in the first year, and
$7.4 billion over the next 10 years, just to make the basic
necessary physical security improvements in our ports. But the
President, again, as we heard from Senator Hollings, is only
asking for $46 million. That's the funding for this task in
2005. It's outrageous. But the President didn't mind using a
seaport background, when he did some photographs for
advertising, to suggest that he's concerned about a terrorist
infiltration there.
It appears that the Administration expects port authorities
and facility operators to comply with new security regulations
with very little Federal assistance. Port security in my state
is a major problem. The Port of New York and New Jersey is one
of the biggest container ports in the world, handling over 16
million tons of ocean-borne cargo each year.
Hazardous materials move in and out of the port, through
pipelines and over roads and freight line--and freight rail
lines. And much of our vital surface transportation
infrastructure in Newark Liberty International Airport are
within a mile of the port. You can see from one to the other
very clearly. Millions of people live near these facilities,
which are vulnerable to terrorist attack. So it's easy to
imagine what's at stake for New Jersey and New York and the
Nation if the port's attacked.
Mr. Chairman, port security, one of those areas that makes
me disappointed with the Administrations' homeland security
effort, they don't put their money where their mouths are. The
needs are out there. And rather than starting to address them,
the Administration forces the good people at DHS to play budget
games. And we need them to have the resources they need to help
secure our country against terrorism.
Last summer, we saw cross-training of air marshals and
Customs employees. Yesterday, it was cross-training bomb-
sniffing dogs. We've had requests to shift money from port
security to pay for aviation security, where I think we are
doing a pretty good job. But all we want is the security that
comes with knowing our government is doing what it can to make
our country safer from terrorism. That means we have to address
the vulnerabilities that we know are there, particularly in our
ports.
And, Mr. Chairman, I hope that this hearing will foster the
attention and action that we need with regard to what we can do
to secure our ports, and I greatly respect the fact that you're
doing--following up yesterday's hearing with this one.
Thank you.
The Chairman. Thank you very much, Senator Lautenberg.
Senator Hutchison?
STATEMENT OF HON. KAY BAILEY HUTCHISON,
U.S. SENATOR FROM TEXAS
Senator Hutchison. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Chairman, I do appreciate your and Senator Breaux's and
Senator Hollings' leadership in calling this hearing, along
with Senator Snowe, who's the Chairman of the Subcommittee,
because this is an area that I am very concerned that we have
not put enough emphasis on in the past. You look at what
happened in California, when there was a labor dispute that
caused about, estimated, a billion-dollars-a-day in disruption
to the economy, so you look at a disaster of some kind, and you
are looking at the economic consequences that could be a huge
impact on our fragile economic recovery. In addition, in my
home state of Texas we have the largest chemical complex in
America, the second largest in the world, sitting right on the
port. So the kind of damage that could be done with a
disruption in our system would be untold in terms of both lives
and economic impact.
I believe it is time that we add to the Maritime
Transportation Security Act that, frankly, our Committee took
the lead on--and we were able to pass and have signed by the
President, and it did a lot for port security--but I think we
need to now add a second layer on that, and I am going to
propose legislation in the near future, and look forward to
having your input, because I want to do what we need to do to
shore up the maritime container security, which will be the
focus of my legislation.
It will do, first, the development of a national
transportation security strategy to require the Department of
Homeland Security to develop an overarching strategy designed
to integrate the efforts of the Coast Guard as it develops its
entire national security plan.
Second, to develop a container integrity initiative to
build upon the Customs and Border Protection ``smart box''
concept, requiring, within 2 years, 50 percent of all
containers coming into the United States to be in smart boxes.
Number three, start a point-of-origin security enhancement
initiative. Building, again, upon the Customs and Border
Protection Container Security Initiative, we would
substantially increase the number of U.S. Customs Service
inspectors at foreign ports, just what Senator Snowe mentioned
earlier needs to be addressed. I would have these inspectors
phased in over a period of 2 years, so that we could have a
real presence at the point of origin. If we don't have some
capability to determine what is in those sealed-up containers
at the point of origin, we will not have enough control when
they get to our ports.
So I would welcome your input. I don't want to do something
that would disrupt our trade and commerce. On the other hand,
nothing could disrupt our trade and commerce more than a
disaster at one of our major ports.
So, Mr. Chairman, I look forward to working with you and
all the leaders in this effort to now take the next step in
container security.
Thank you.
The Chairman. Thank you.
Senator Boxer?
STATEMENT OF HON. BARBARA BOXER,
U.S. SENATOR FROM CALIFORNIA
Senator Boxer. Thanks.
Mr. Chairman, I just want to take a minute to thank you and
Senator Hollings, because I think Senator Breaux is right,
everybody's over at the 9/11 hearing because of what happened;
we're trying to do the work of making sure nothing else happens
like that.
And yesterday, we had a great hearing--Senator Hollings, we
missed you very much--on rail security, and I had a real
problem with one of the Administration witnesses because I
couldn't get a straight answer to a question, which was simply,
``Where are you getting the money to do all these things that
you want to do?'' And they said they're taking it from other--
from existing funds. Well, we never could get to the bottom of
where they're taking the money from.
The bottom line is, if we're going to do this right, we'd
better face the facts that we have to fund it some way. Whether
it's a canine patrol or whether it's a high-tech way, like this
Kevlar here, which I brought to show you, pass around--if we
had containers made of Kevlar, they would be blast resistant,
and we wouldn't cause damage. These are the things we have the
ability to do.
I would like to put my statement in the record and conclude
with a few points.
[The prepared statement of Senator Boxer follows:]
Prepared Statement of Hon. Barbara Boxer, U.S. Senator from California
Good morning. Mr. Chairman, I appreciate you holding this hearing
today.
Two and a half years ago, the United States was caught unprepared
when it came to aviation security. The results were devastating.
Since then, we have greatly improved our aviation security, and we
have begun to improve our port security. We have a long way to go in
both of these areas.
And clearly after the terrorist attack in Madrid, we must also
address the vulnerability of our rail systems.
I was disturbed to read a quote by the Department of Homeland
Security's Under Secretary for Border & Transportation Security Asa
Hutchinson. He said that ``it's very important that we do not simply
react to an incident that happens anywhere in the world'' and that the
Administration was NOT seeking more funding for train security. The
Under Secretary said, ``An aircraft can be used as a weapon. A train
cannot be hurled through the air in the same fashion.''
I believe that the terrorist attack in Madrid was a tragedy and I
believe we act--even if the train cannot be hurled into the air.
In October 2001, this Committee passed a rail security bill. We
knew that the United States must not be caught off guard when it comes
to our passenger and freight rail systems.
However, the bill never became law.
This is extremely unfortunate when you look at the massive rail
system in this country (charts: passenger and freight rail systems).
I am a co-sponsor of Senator Hollings's rail security bill
introduced earlier this month. And, I am introducing legislation that
will authorize funding for more police, canine dogs, and surveillance
equipment on Amtrak and local transit systems.
I am also sending a letter to GAO asking for a study of the
Department of Homeland Security's threat assessment of both the
passenger and freight systems.
Both a threat assessment and Federal funding for everyday security
measures are vitally important to our country, including California.
California has the second highest Amtrak ridership in the country.
I look forward to hearing from the witnesses.
It is vitally important that we ensure that our Nation's entire
transportation system is secure. And, it's our job to do that so thank
you Mr. Chairman for this hearing.
Senator Boxer. And 40 percent of all the goods imported
into the United States come through California. Senator
Hutchison was so right in pointing out what happened when we
had a strike, and how important it was to settle that strike,
and the damage, the economic damage, that was done. Imagine if
these ports were destroyed, God forbid.
So here's what we've got. The major cargo ports are Los
Angeles, Long Beach, and Oakland. Other major ports are San
Diego, San Francisco, and Stockton. I know so many of you know
all these places, you've been to all these places. There are 12
major commercial harbors in California, and numerous other
smaller ports that take the overload. I've been to Crescent
City, down to San Diego. They need us. The Coast Guard is
extraordinary, and the Coast Guard is stalwart. And you ask the
Coast Guard, ``Do you need anything else?'' ``Oh, we'll make
do.''
Well, I think we need to look at the GAO study. I guess
Senator Lautenberg may have mentioned the number--$4.5 billion
over the next 10 years is what GAO says is needed. And the
Administration's asking for $42 million in this year's budget?
I think, you know, we're in a Committee that's a can-do
Committee, and this is an area that we must do.
I want to work with everyone. Congresswoman Millender-
McDonald, from the L.A. area, has a very important bill that
would call for major grants. We need to find a mechanism to pay
for this. And we did have it, Senator Hollings, and then we
couldn't get the bill--we got the bill through, but we didn't
have a funding source.
Yesterday, I was on a TV program, on FOX, and the reporter
said to me, ``Well, don't you think we ought to do away with
the gasoline tax? That'll bring down the price of gas.'' I
said, ``Yes, if you don't want to build roads. Yes, if you
don't want to have transit systems.'' So, you know, we just
have to be smart about this.
And I hope that, together, we can work across party lines--
this is a great Committee to do that--so we can make sure that
we're taking advantage of technology, that we have a funding
source, that we avoid a 9/11 at our ports and our rail systems.
Thank you.
The Chairman. Thank you very much, Senator Boxer.
Our first panel is Admiral Thomas H. Collins, Commandant of
the U.S. Coast Guard, the Honorable Robert C. Bonner,
Commissioner of U.S. Customs and Border Protection, and Rear
Admiral David M. Stone, who's the acting Administrator of the
Transportation Security Administration.
And we'd like to begin with you, Admiral Collins. Welcome.
STATEMENT OF HON. THOMAS H. COLLINS, COMMANDANT, U.S. COAST
GUARD
Admiral Collins. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, distinguished
Members of the Committee, my pleasure to be with you today, and
along with my Department colleagues, Commissioner Bonner and
Admiral Stone, to update you on our Department's efforts to
enhance maritime security, and the impact of those efforts on
maritime commerce, and measures that we're taking.
The recent tragedy in Madrid clearly reminds us of the
urgency of Homeland Security mission. We share the sense of
urgency expressed by Senator Breaux.
Since 9/11, Secretary Ridge and all components within the
Department, we've worked very, very hard to achieve the
Department's strategic goals of awareness, prevention,
protection, response, and recovery. And as part of that effort,
we have developed a supporting maritime homeland security
strategy consisting of four elements. And if I could indulge
you just a minute, I will put up a chart that depicts the four
categories--areas of interest, if you will--that dovetails with
the Department's awareness, prevention, protection, response,
and recovery strategies, all designed to mitigate maritime
risk. That's what this is about.
Four major components, as you can see. One is to enhance
what we call maritime domain awareness. That's to have
visibility of threats and risks and things coming at us in the
maritime. It starts there if you're going to make wise
decisions about preventing things from happening. Building and
administering an effective domestic and international security
regime, it's increasing our operational presence and leveraging
partnerships with state and local entities for success, and
improving our response and recovery posture.
And listed under--detailed under each one of those major
goals is all the individual--a partial listing, I might say, of
the individual action items that we are taking, that we are
investing in, that we're spending our collective energies in to
move those goals along.
We are progressively and aggressively, each of our
agencies, pursuing initiatives to support these strategy
elements. And, again, all to mitigate risk.
The core of the maritime domain awareness effort centers on
the development and employment of accurate information,
intelligence, in targeting of vessels, cargo, crews, and
passengers long before they reach a U.S. port. We want to
understand the threat before it gets to Port Elizabeth. We want
to understand the threat before it gets to L.A./Long Beach.
For example, the Coast Guard has made vessel notice of
arrival reporting requirements much, much more rigorous, has
instituted extensive screening procedures collaboratively with
Customs and Border Protection and the Office of Naval
Intelligence, and is incorporating provisions for electronic
submission of information. Customs, in turn, has requested
earlier and more comprehensive cargo manifest information. All
three of our agencies work collaboratively to fuse intelligence
together to gain the clearest picture of risks.
The second element involves both domestic and international
efforts to develop a new security framework, a security culture
in the maritime--new standards of security, new processes, new
procedures. It includes initiatives related to the
implementation of the Maritime Transportation Security Act of
2002, the IMO--International Ship and Port Security Code
Regulations that have been promulgated, as well as improving
supply chain security and identity-security processes.
We published MTSA final rules in October of last year, the
largest rulemaking in our history. These rules were jointly
developed--jointed developed, collaboratively developed--
between the Coast Guard, Transportation Security
Administration, and Customs and Border Patrol. We are on
schedule to implement the rule, effective 1 July of this year.
And efforts also include, in terms of the security regime goal,
very successful Container Security Initiative led by
Commissioner Bonner. I'm sure you're going to have a few words
on that, momentarily.
Our collective efforts to increase--in the third area--
increase our operational presence in our ports and coastal
zones focuses not only on adding more people, boats, and ships
to our security effort, but making the employment of those
resources more effective through the application of technology,
information sharing, and intelligence support.
Several examples. Customs and Border Protection is
employing nonintrusive inspection technology to screen
shipments. Coast Guard is aggressively enforcing and exercising
domestic and international security standards, equipping
helicopters with airborne use-of-force capability and vertical
insertion capability, adding boats and patrol cutters, and
developing special safety and security teams to secure our
ports, waterways, and/or vessels in the face of increasing
risk. TSA, in coordination with the Coast Guard, is working
with cruise-line operators to identify technology solutions for
screening passengers and their belongings.
We are also aggressively working to improve our response
capability and readiness to respond to security incidents that
do occur in the over 26,000 miles of navigable waterways and
over 361 ports. We will soon deploy the first segments of our
Rescue 21, the Coast Guard's maritime 9/11 command, control,
and communications system. We've also worked, within the
Department and through the Department, to refine our Nation's
emergency response plans and incident management systems. These
will materially improve our overall response efforts. I know my
colleagues this morning will add more descriptors on some of
these action items that populate our overall strategy.
I should note that an essential feature of the overall
Department's security strategy is pursuit of a layered defense
approach, one that has been alluded to by the distinguished
Members of this Committee this morning, but one that seeks to
reach beyond our borders, in partnership with other agencies
and nations, to mitigate risk of the homeland.
Please, the next graphic.
I think this is a pretty good graphic that depicts how
these various initiatives fold into a reaching-out type of
approach well beyond our ports. You can see that there are a
number of these initiatives, sorted by--geographically, if you
will, in terms of a layered perspective that extends from our
ports through coastal approaches, through open ocean, all the
way to foreign ports. This is a comprehensive approach to deal
with truly a global security challenge, because it is a global
system that we're dealing with.
[The graphic referred to follows:]
Coast Guard's efforts for the Deepwater system is part of
this layered defense. Senator Snowe mentioned that earlier in
her comments. It is very, very important for us to have the
presence, the operational presence, and the MDA, the maritime
domain awareness, through this layered defense in the maritime.
Indispensable for us to develop a network-centered approach to
our systems, and that's what it's all about. It's a major
priority within our budget.
You can see, Mr. Chairman, that we--the Department has a
very full range of, I think, well thought-out and coordinated
initiatives that will increasingly, as we work on all of these
items, increasingly secure our Nation's ports, waterways, and
infrastructure. These three agencies that are sitting here are
committed to these efforts, committed to working together and
develop many interagency working groups that are addressing
things like cargo security standards, port security assessment,
international port security assessment, and the development of
associated plans in a family-of-plans construct. We're under
one roof now. We have great, intensive communication and
cooperation amongst us, and I think there are a lot of great
things we've done, and more coming.
Thank you for your attention, Mr. Chairman. I'll be glad to
answer any questions at the appropriate time.
The Chairman. Thank you, Admiral.
Commissioner Bonner, welcome.
STATEMENT OF HON. ROBERT C. BONNER, COMMISSIONER, U.S. CUSTOMS
AND BORDER PROTECTION
Mr. Bonner. Yes, thank you, Mr. Chairman and Senator
Hollings and Members of the Committee. I want to thank you for
this opportunity to testify regarding maritime and port
security, and the progress that U.S. Customs and Border
Protection has made since we last discussed this, back in
September. I'm particularly pleased to be here with my
colleagues, Admiral Collins and Admiral Stone.
I think I can report to this Committee that, with much of
our government's terrorist prevention capabilities now under
one roof--that is to say, within one department of government--
and that department under the great leadership of Secretary
Ridge, our country is better able to deal with the terrorist
threat than we were before the Department of Homeland Security
was created.
There are--three of the principal operational agencies of
the Department are represented by the three of us that are
sitting at this table before you. Customs and Border Protection
is one of those operational agencies of the Department of
Homeland Security that was created just a little over a year
ago by essentially merging four different entities or agencies
from three different departments and putting them into one
agency, one agency for our borders.
The priority mission of our agency, of Customs and Border
Protection, as a unified border agency, is nothing less than
detecting and preventing terrorists and terrorist weapons from
entering our country. That is, as we've discussed, we have twin
goals here. One is to secure America's borders, to be sure; but
to do it in a way that does not stifle the flow of legitimate
trade, commerce, and people.
And those goals don't have to be mutually exclusive. We
can, and we are, accomplishing them through the use of and
obtaining advance information, through risk-targeting systems,
through detection technologies, and by extended border
strategies, like the Container Security Initiative.
In the maritime environment, we are, of course, concerned
that cargo coming into our seaports could be exploited by al
Qaeda, and al Qaeda-associated terrorist organizations. And
clearly this is something of great concern to us and the
Administration.
The use of containers to smuggle terrorists or terrorist
weapons is, of course, by no means farfetched. Just last week,
as reported in the Israeli newspapers, two Palestinian
extremists detonated two suicide bombs in the Israeli port of
Ashdod, killing 10 people and wounding 18 others. And, at
first, the security officers in Israel were at a loss to
explain how these suicide bombers were able to get into the
port area, because they had. It now looks as though they
infiltrated the port by concealing themselves in a cargo
container.
This attack highlights two significant lessons on port
security, it seems to me. The first one is the threat to our
ports lies outside, and it lies in having unknown, essentially
never before seen shipments arrive at our U.S. seaports. And it
also is the lesson that we should conduct security screenings
and inspections of high risk cargo at the earliest opportunity,
before these cargo shipments and these containers arrive at
U.S. seaports.
As the border agency for our country, Customs and Border
Protection has a great responsibility, because every one of the
eight to nine million sea cargo containers that arrive at our
seaports annually have to be presented to and cleared through
U.S. Customs and Border Protection. And CBP has the authority
to search any and every container without cause or suspicion.
Moreover, Customs and Border Protection could deny a carrier
permission to unload or unload a container at U.S. seaports.
And based upon that authority, has authority, essentially, to
order no-load orders at foreign ports to prevent high risk or
unknown cargo from being loaded onboard overseas onto a ship
headed for the United States. And I can assure you and this
Committee that Customs and Border Protection--by the way, I
have used the no-load authority, and certainly would use it if
there were any specific intelligence about any container
anyplace in the world that was headed for the United States.
And we've used that authority also to gain compliance with our
24-hour rule requirements.
Let me just say a couple of other things, and then I'll
conclude, about our efforts.
One is the Container Security Initiative, which was
mentioned by Senator Snowe. Customs and Border Protection is
targeting and, with our foreign counterparts, screening
targeted containers, those that pose a potential risk for
concealment of terrorist weapons before they're loaded onboard
vessels destined for the United States.
And I've just put up a chart here on the board which
indicates that, to date, foreign nations representing 38
foreign seaports that ship directly to the United States have
agreed to participate in the Container Security Initiative. And
teams of Customs and Border Protection inspectors and targeters
have been already deployed to 18 foreign seaports to target and
screen containers destined for the United States for potential
terrorist weapons.
By the end of 2004, I expect to have CBP officers operating
in over 30, or perhaps as many as 32, foreign seaports. Now,
these are hubs, strategic megaports that ship 80 percent or
more of all containers to the United States, and through which
containers originating in high-risk countries of North Africa,
the Middle East, and South Asia ship and pass through or
transship their containers.
The other initiative has been--that I want to mention is
the Customs Trade Partnership Against Terrorism. The Chairman,
Senator McCain, raised that. CBP has partnered, as you know,
Mr. Chairman, with the private sector, with the trade
community, to implement security standards and best practices
that protect the entire supply chain against exploitation from
terrorists, literally from the foreign manufacturers' loading
docks to our ports of entry. And there are over 5,900
companies, C-TPAT members, that have joined C-TPAT, including
many, many major U.S. importers. In fact, U.S. importers,
alone, represent 40 percent of all of the cargo that's shipped
to the United States.
So they've agreed to implement security standards. And it's
not just a matter of saying they're going to implement them. We
are now rolling out, at Customs and Border Protection, supply
chain security specialists, who literally are validating that
the promises and commitments of C-TPAT members and their
foreign vendors have been complied with.
And through C-TPAT, we continue to ask more from our
partners, and continue to raise the bar. In January of this
year, for example, five C-TPAT partners--these are major U.S.
importers--agreed to enhance their supply chain security by
using smart containers with an electronic container-security
device that lets Customs and Border Protection inspectors know
if that container has been tampered with. We'll continue to
work with our partners, with TSA, with the Coast Guard, with
the Department, and the Border and Transportation Security
Directorate of the Department with respect to the question of
how and whether to apply the smart box beyond C-TPAT, and what
the standard should be.
In addition, by the way, we've done a lot at our own U.S.
seaports--I know Senator Hollings knows this--in terms of
deployment of large-scale X-ray imaging equipment. We've gone
from--throughout the country, at our ports of entry, from 45 on
9/11; we now have 145 of the large, whole-container X-ray
screening equipments at our ports of entry. This includes our
land borders, as well as our seaports.
We have deployed, very quickly, radiological and nuclear
detection equipment. We've acquired and deployed over 9,500
personal radiation detectors. And, Senator Snowe, you're right,
every CBP inspector on the front line is equipped with,
trained, and wears a personal radiation detector device.
We have deployed 325 radiation isotope identifiers to our
ports of entry, and trained people to use them. These identify
the nature of the material that's being--emitting radiation,
whether it's U-235 or whether it's an innocent source. And
we've deployed over 248 radiation portal monitors, highly
sensitive portal monitors, including, by the way, not just at
the northern border now, but for our first seaport, which is
the Port of New York/New Jersey, that we deployed. Actually,
just a couple of days ago I announced that we had deployed, as
an additional layer, these sophisticated detection devices.
Let me just conclude, Mr. Chairman, by saying we have made
some great strides. Clearly, we have a ways to go here, but
we've made some great strides, and I appreciate the opportunity
to point out a few of those to this Committee. Pleased to
answer any questions after my colleague here, Admiral Stone,
makes his statement.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
The Chairman. Thank you, Commissioner.
Admiral Stone?
STATEMENT OF REAR ADMIRAL DAVID M. STONE,
ACTING ADMINISTRATOR, TRANSPORTATION SECURITY ADMINISTRATION
Admiral Stone. Well, thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Chairman, Senator Hollings, and distinguished Members
of the Committee, it is an honor to appear on behalf of TSA
this morning to discuss maritime security. And I sincerely
apologize for my late arrival.
As my colleagues have stated, Department of Homeland
Security agencies are working closely together to maximize
government resources, ensure consistency among agency
initiatives and programs, and avoid potential overlap in
carrying out our maritime security mission.
The Coast Guard, as the lead Federal agent for maritime
security, has been tasked with developing the Maritime
Transportation Security Plan. The Transportation Security
Administration and U.S. Customs and Border Protection are
assisting the Coast Guard in the development of this plan,
which will be a component of the National Transportation
System, Security Plan, and a subset of the larger National
Critical Infrastructure Protection Plan.
TSA has developed a Web-based, no-cost maritime
vulnerability self-assessment tool that is assisting port,
vessel, and facility owners in completing vulnerability
assessments required by the Maritime Transportation Security
Act. TSA has implemented a synergy project designed to examine
the feasibility of implementing a cost-effective, functional,
and secure system to screen and transfer passenger baggage from
seaport to airport, and reduce congestion at airport security
checkpoints caused by the influx of large numbers of passengers
disembarking from cruise ships. We are currently testing this
program in Miami.
TSA will soon begin the prototype phase of the
transportation worker identification credential. The prototype
will test the feasibility of bringing greater uniformity to
procedures for granting access to those who work in the most
sensitive and secure areas of our national transportation
system.
TSA personnel are also assisting the Coast Guard in
developing the policies and procedures that will be used for
their international port security program, and, to that end,
have provided the Coast Guard with examples and lessons learned
from the Foreign Airport Audit Program.
Key TSA Federal security directors from around the country,
as well as headquarters, serve on the Coast Guard Area Maritime
Security Advisory Committees. Working together under the
leadership of the Border and Transportation Security
Directorate, we are developing a more comprehensive framework
for securing the maritime cargo supply chain. This initiative
will also assist in meeting Maritime Transportation Security
Act requirements for secure systems of transportation,
emphasizing the intermodal aspects of maritime cargo
transportation.
We are reviewing cargo programs, analytical tools, and
other relevant resources in order to identify remaining supply
chain vulnerabilities. The Department expects that the results
of Operation Safe Commerce will also help shape this framework.
In closing, I would like to thank you, Mr. Chairman, for
your strong support, and that of the Committee Members, and I
look forward to answering your questions.
[The joint prepared statement of Admiral Collins, Mr.
Bonner, and Admiral Stone follows:]
Prepared Statement of Admiral Thomas H. Collins, Commandant, U.S. Coast
Guard; Robert C. Bonner, Commissioner, Customs and Border Protection,
Admiral David M. Stone, Acting Administrator, Transportation Security
Administration, Department of Homeland Security
Good morning, Mr. Chairman and distinguished Members of the
Committee. It is our pleasure to be here today to update you on the
Department's efforts to enhance maritime security, the impact of those
efforts on maritime commerce, and the additional measures that may be
needed to further enhance maritime transportation security.
Prior to the attacks of September 11, 2001, the primary focus
within the maritime domain had been on safety, the environment, and
vessel traffic management. Most national and international efforts
revolved around the safe and efficient movement of waterborne commerce
the interdiction of narcotics and illegal migrant, and trade
compliance. However, after September 11, 2001, we have acted upon the
realization that the maritime sector is one of the most valuable and
vulnerable components of our national transportation system. The
challenge is significant:
Over 95 percent of overseas trade enters through U.S.
seaports;
Our seaports account for 2 billion tons and $800 billion of
domestic and international freight each year;
Each year approximately 9 million sea containers enter the
U.S. via our seaports;
26,000 miles of commercially navigable waterways serving 361
U.S. ports;
Seaborne shipment of approximately 3.3 billion barrels of
oil each year;
6 million cruise ship passengers travel each year from U.S.
ports;
Ferry systems transport 180 million passengers annually;
Waterways support 110,000 commercial fishing vessels,
contributing $111 billion to state economies;
78 million Americans engaged in recreational boating;
Some 8,100 foreign vessels making 50,000 U.S. port calls
each year; and
Domestic and international trade is expected to double in
next 20 years.
While this Committee certainly needs no reminder, it is plainly
evident that a terrorist incident against our marine transportation
system would have a disastrous impact on global shipping, international
trade, and the world economy in addition to the strategic military
value of many ports and waterways.
The world's oceans are global thoroughfares. A cooperative
international approach involving partnerships of nations, navies, coast
guards, law enforcement agencies, and commercial shipping interests is
essential--with all parties acting collaboratively to confront broadly
defined threats to our common and interdependent maritime security. The
Department of Homeland Security (DHS) recently marked its first
anniversary and we are happy to report that operating with other
Federal agencies sharing a common DHS mission perspective provides new
benefits to our Nation's security daily.
We are committed to working with our partner agencies as one team
engaged in one fight, and truly believe having one Department
responsible for homeland security has made America more secure today.
Events in Haiti over the past several weeks provide a recent example of
the leaps forward we are taking with regard to interagency cooperation.
Under the direction of the Secretary of Homeland Security, the Homeland
Security Task Force Southeast was stood-up as part of OPERATION ABLE
SENTRY. The Coast Guard (CG) led task force was comprised of many
agencies chartered to plan, prepare, and conduct migrant interdiction
operations in the vicinity of Haiti due to the escalation of violence
in that country and the threat of a mass exodus of undocumented
migrants. Within the first days of interdiction operations, the task
force demonstrated impressive agility and synergy:
CG cutters, with Citizenship and Immigration Service (CIS)
asylum pre-screening officers and interpreters aboard,
interdicted 18 Haitian vessels with 1,076 undocumented
migrants;
CG and Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) aircraft
patrolled the skies throughout the operating area; and CG, ICE,
and Customs and Border Protection (CBP) conducted coordinated
patrols off the Florida coast;
CG and ICE conducted a coordinated boarding of a boat
suspected of being hijacked off the coast of Miami; and
Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) also deployed
three Information and Planning Specialists to the task force in
support of contingency planning.
With our Federal Government's Awareness, Prevention, Protection,
Response and Recovery capabilities now under one roof, in one
department, the level of communication and cooperation among the sister
agencies of CG, TSA, ICE and CBP is stronger than ever. CBP, TSA and CG
are working together to support efforts to implement the Maritime
Transportation Security Act (MTSA) through interagency working groups
addressing cargo security standards, port security assessments,
international port security and the development of the National
Maritime Security Plan.
Maritime Strategy for Homeland Security
Since 9/11, Secretary Ridge and all DHS components have worked hard
to achieve DHS's strategic goals of Awareness, Prevention, Protection,
Response and Recovery. These strategy elements guide all that we do and
likewise represent key pillars of the maritime homeland security
strategy:
Given its unique blend of authorities, capabilities, competencies
and partnerships (domestic and international), the CG has been charged
with taking the lead on the development and implementation of a
comprehensive Maritime Strategy for Homeland Security. The CG's
Maritime Strategy for Homeland Security supports both the President's
National Security Strategy of the United States of America and the
National Strategy for Homeland Security and is responsive to near-term
needs while maintaining a strategic outlook on the threats and
opportunities of the future. The maritime strategy is built upon a
layered defense; a time-proven means to enhance security in U.S. ports
and waterways while concurrently facilitating the smooth flow of
commerce. The collective result of our efforts is aimed at managing and
reducing maritime security risks.
DHS is developing a National Transportation System Security Plan
(NTSSP), designed to provide overall operational planning guidance on
transportation security. The Transportation Security Administration
(TSA), working with the Department of Transportation (DOT) and other
Federal agencies, is coordinating the DRS's efforts on this initiative.
The goals of the NTSSP are to reduce the risk of terrorism to the
Nation's critical transportation infrastructure and operations and the
people who use them. It will ensure that modal security plans are
integrated into an effective concept of operations for management of
the transportation sector's security and minimize the catastrophic
consequences of any successful terrorist act. The NTSSP will be
consistent with the Information Analysis and Infrastructure Protection
(IAIP) Directorate's Critical Infrastructure Protection Plan. As the
lead agency for maritime security, the CG is responsible for developing
the National Maritime Transportation Security Plan (NMTSP), which will
harmonize with the NTSSP and critical infrastructure protection plans
and support our maritime strategy.
Below is an update on the Department's recent accomplishments in
pursuit of each element of the maritime strategy with a particular
focus on the joint and individual efforts of the CG, TSA and CBP.
Awareness--Enhance Maritime Domain Awareness (MDA)
The core of our MDA efforts revolve around the development and
employment of accurate information, intelligence, and targeting of
vessels, cargo, crews and passengers--and extending this well beyond
our traditional maritime boundaries. All DHS components are working
hard to effectively provide a layered defense through collaborative
efforts with our international partners to counter and manage security
risks long before they reach a U.S. port--when effectively deploying
countermeasures becomes more difficult.
The goal is to know the difference between friend and foe, so that
legitimate commerce can move through our coastal and port areas
unimpeded while we interdict contraband cargo and illegal activities of
all types at sea before it becomes a threat on our shores. The key to
achieving this comprehensive domain awareness is our ability as a
department to obtain, synthesize and analyze the context around the
movement of goods and people. We are taking an interagency approach,
leveraging information technology, multiple information sources and
actively involving of the private sector. Our ability to achieve better
MDA will allow us to better focus our protection and response efforts
on those trade transactions, individuals, and activities of interest. A
synopsis of our collective efforts is provided below:
The CG is leading the interagency and joint Service effort
to develop a comprehensive national MDA plan and system
architecture.
As directed by MTSA, the CG established an International
Port Security Program (IPSP) that is currently working in
concert with CBP, TSA and other Federal agencies to identify
foreign ports identified by the Secretary as posing a potential
security risk to international maritime transportation. TSA and
CBP have provided extensive assistance in developing this
program by sharing lessons learned and best practices from
TSA's Civil Aviation Security Liaison Officer (CASLO) program
and CBP's Container Security Initiative. The IPSP will begin
visiting selected foreign ports in July 2004 to measure the
degree of rigor with which foreign countries are administering
the International Maritime Organization's (IMO) International
Ship & Port Facility Security Code (ISPS).
The CG is researching technologies and systems that are able
to track vessels entering, departing or transiting U.S. waters
and track vessels bound for the U.S. from overseas locations.
The CG is currently working with IMO to develop functional and
technical requirements for long-range tracking out to 2,000
nautical miles (approximate distance from shore a vessel owner
must transmit their 96-hour notice of arrival, based on typical
speed of advance). The U.S. will discuss and attempt to forward
an amendment that has been proposed to IMO for this initiative
in committee meetings over the next two months.
The CG is establishing a network for receiving and
distributing Automatic Identification System (AIS) reports
(position, course, speed, cargo, etc.) from ships using
existing Vessel Traffic Services in nine of our Nation's ports,
waterways, and coastal areas. This initiative will progress to
the other strategically significant U.S. seaports, and
ultimately extend to nationwide coverage.
The CG Intelligence Coordination Center, co-located with the
Office of Naval Intelligence at the National Maritime
Intelligence Center in Suitland, Maryland, established
COASTWATCH. Through this process, notice of arrival reports
from the National Vessel Movement Center are analyzed using law
enforcement and intelligence information and vessels of
interest are identified so that Coast Guard and other agencies
can appropriately respond to board those vessels before they
reach port, if necessary. The Coast Guard and CBP have
exchanged personnel to enhance data sharing between the CG
Intelligence Coordination Center's COASTWATCH (which gathers
and analyzes information on ship notice of arrival reports on
vessels, people, and certain dangerous cargoes approaching U.S.
ports) and CBP's National Targeting Center (cargo tracking)
process.
CBP's National Targeting Center (NTC) is a 24x7 operation
that supports the enforcement and regulatory missions of
various agencies through a network of liaisons, which includes
the TSA, CG, Department of Energy, and members of the
intelligence community. CBP Officers and Field Analysis
Specialists that are experts in passenger and cargo targeting
for air, sea. and land operations in the inbound and outbound
environments primarily staff NTC. The NTC staff develops
tactical targets from raw intelligence in support of the CBP
mission to detect and prevent terrorists and terrorist weapons
from entering the United States. NTC also supports CBP field
elements, including Container Security Initiative personnel
stationed in countries throughout the world, with additional
research assets for passenger and cargo examinations. NTC
personnel are also currently engaged in the support of
intradepartmental and interagency anti-terrorist operations,
while simultaneously providing support to CBP targeting
programs, policies, and initiatives. One example of CBP's
commitment to collaborative targeting efforts is the Food and
Drug Administration Prior Notice Center located at the NTC and
operational since December 11, 2003. There, CBP and Food and
Drug Administration personnel conduct joint targeting on a
round the clock basis in support of the Bio-Terrorism Act.
CBP is conducting national targeting and using automated
targeting tools to screen advance information and other data to
identify high-risk shipments. As a key component of the DHS
maritime security strategy, CBP's Automated Targeting System
(ATS) serves as the premier tool for performing transactional
risk assessments and evaluating potential national security
risks posed by sea. air, truck, and rail cargo.
CG is using a risk management system to identify High
Interest Vessels for follow-up security hoardings and when
necessary, due to risk, vessel escorts and positive control
hoardings to ensure the safety of vessels during their transit
into U.S. ports.
In partnership with the Chief of Naval Operations (CNO), the
CG is establishing interagency prototype joint harbor
operations centers in select Navy homeports improving both port
security and force protection capabilities. Such prototypes
have already been completed in San Diego, California and
Hampton Roads, Virginia.
TSA will soon begin the prototype phase in developing the
Transportation Worker Identification Credential (TWIC), aimed
at mitigating the threat of attacks to the national
transportation infrastructure. The TWIC prototype and
supporting measures will test the feasibility of bringing
uniformity and consistency to the process of granting access to
transportation workers entrusted to work in the most sensitive
and secure areas of our national transportation system. The
President's FY 2005 request includes spending authority to
begin implementing the TWIC concept within parameters that will
be defined by the Administration after completion of the
prototype assessment.
Complementing the TWIC, the CG will continue aggressive
implementation of a Merchant Mariner Documentation (MMD) Task
Force plan, which ensures positive identity of merchant
mariners sailing on U.S. flag vessels and performs appropriate
security/background screening. In 2004, the CG will provide for
additional personnel support at Regional Examination Centers,
centralized security screening and electronic fingerprinting
capability.
The CG has established additional Maritime Intelligence
Fusion Centers on the east and west coasts for both military
intelligence and law enforcement sensitive information. In
addition, the CG established subordinate Field Intelligence
Support Teams (FISTs) in key ports. These teams are actively
engaged in Intel collection and first order analysis in
coordination with federal, state, and local enforcement and
Intel agencies. They are ``joint'' in the broadest sense
providing a critical top-down and bottom-up information and
intelligence.
Aside from the important initiatives above, we are seeing
consistent and steady improvements in our ability to integrate and
correlate information in the field such that we can effectively
respond. For example, on March 13, 2004 the Coast Guard Pacific Area
Maritime Intelligence Fusion Center advised CG Marine Safety Office
(MSO)/Group Los Angeles/Long Beach that a 728-foot foreign flagged
motor vessel with a cargo of crude oil was due into Los Angeles but
failed to properly file an Advance Notice of Arrival. The MSO/Group
responded and conducted a positive control boarding alongside ICE
personnel while the vessel was at anchor. The crew was detained onboard
due to improper visas. While we have much more work to do, our maritime
domain awareness is improving every day.
Prevention--Create and Oversee Maritime Security Regime
This element of our strategy focuses on both domestic and
international efforts and includes initiatives related to MTSA
implementation, IMO regulations such as the ISPS Code, as well as
improving supply chain security and identity security processes. Recent
accomplishments and future plans include:
CBP is expanding the Container Security Initiative (CSI).
This is an effort by CBP to secure ocean-borne container
traffic by placing CBP officials alongside host government
Customs officers to ensure that potentially high-risk shipments
are identified and inspected at foreign ports before they are
placed on vessels destined for the United States. This program
will be expanded to 14 additional foreign ports based on
volume, location and strategic concerns, which will bring the
total number of operational CSI ports to 31. Once implemented,
nearly 80 percent of all cargo containers headed for the United
States will be prescreened before they depart from abroad.
In December 2003, DHS promulgated final regulations
implementing the Trade Act of 2002, requiring advance,
electronic manifest information for all modes of
transportation. This information will augment that received and
analyzed already at the National Targeting Center.
For vessel operations CBP is receiving complete cargo
declaration information for all container vessels and non-
approved break bulk shipments 24-hours prior to loading the
vessel at the foreign port. With the implementation of the
Trade Act, CBP now requires this cargo information in an
electronic format via the Sea Automated Manifest System
(AMS). On March 4, 2004 all container vessels must submit
their cargo declaration information to CBP electronically.
The Trade Act also provides for all modes of
transportation, inbound and outbound, to require cargo
information electronically and in advance of arrival. On
May 13, 2004 programming changes will be completed for the
Air AMS application and a schedule for training and
implementation was published in the Federal Register on
March 1, 2004.
The outbound cargo electronic information is awaiting
the publication of the Bureau of the Census final
regulations before implementation can begin. The
regulations are expected to become effective in late 2004
or early 2005. For the outbound portion of the Trade Act, a
rolling implementation is not being considered. CBP is
developing implementation guidelines that are being
coordinated with outreach to the trade community.
As a direct and immediate response to the terrorist events
of 9/11, CBP challenged the trade community to cooperatively
design a new approach to supply chain security that would
strengthen U.S. borders against acts of terrorism while
continuing to facilitate the legitimate flow of compliant
cargo, conveyances and persons. The result was an innovative
government/private sector partnership program--the Customs-
Trade Partnership Against Terrorism (C-TPAT). C-TPAT is a
cooperative endeavor covering all sectors of the international
supply chain. The program calls upon the trade community to
systematically establish procedures to enhance their existing
security practices and those of their business partners
involved in their supply chains. Currently, over 5,900 members
of the international community have demonstrated their
commitment to security by partnering with CBP through the C-
TPAT program.
DHS, DOT and the Department of Justice are working with
business interests, the largest U.S. container load centers and
the maritime industry to implement Operation Safe Commerce
(OSC), an effort to develop and share best practices for the
safe and expeditious movement of containerized cargo. The goal
of OSC is to serve as a test bed to examine methods to increase
end-to-end supply chain security, protect the global supply
chain, and facilitate the flow of commerce.
Under a BTS-led effort, TSA along with CBP and the CG are
developing a more comprehensive framework for securing the
maritime cargo supply chain. This initiative will also assist
in meeting MTSA requirements for ``Secure Systems of
Transportation (SST),'' by incorporating a systems-based
approach to cargo transportation (i.e., point of origin to
point of destination). Agencies are reviewing cargo programs,
analytic tools, and other relevant resources within the
department in order to identify remaining supply chain
vulnerabilities. The Department expects that the results of
Operation Safe Commerce will also help shape this framework.
Another part of this BTS-lead effort is CBP's recent
partnership with five C-TPAT importers to initiative the
development of improved security standards and performance
criteria for the future maritime container--or ``Smart Box''.
The Smart Box being tested through C-TPAT consists of the
application and activation of an electronic Container Security
Device (CSD), as well as the application of a mechanical seal
meeting the ISO 17712 high security bolt seal standards. To
date, approximately 215 containers meeting the criteria have
been imported into the U.S. from various trade lanes. This
first phase of the Smart Box initiative is designed to collect
and analyze data relative to the performance of the technology
being utilized and to help the Department develop more rigorous
container security as part of meeting MTSA ``Secure Systems of
Transportation''. Other efforts through TSA, the Science and
Technology Directorate and Operation Safe commerce will also
inform this process, which will result in the development of
specific performance standards for cargo containers.
The CG established Area Maritime Security Committees (AMSC),
which assist in the development of Area Maritime Security Plans
nationwide, as required by the MTSA. AMSCs will enhance
maritime situational awareness and ensure integrated maritime
prevention and response operations among the entire maritime
community. CBP and TSA have designated representatives assigned
to the Area Maritime Security Committees to assist CG Captains
of the Port in addressing cargo security issues.
The CG has completed Port Security Assessments (PSA) at 16
of the 55 most significant military and economic ports in the
U.S. and will complete the assessments of all 55 strategic
ports by the end of calendar year 2004.
Final CG MTSA implementation Rules, drafted in cooperation
with TSA, CBP and the Maritime Administration (MARAD), were
published in October 2003 and security plans from approximately
9,500 vessels and 3,500 facilities were due on December 31,
2003. To date, approximately 97 percent have been received. The
CG will continue to aggressively pursue 100 percent compliance,
and has instituted a phased implementation of penalties to
ensure that all regulated facilities have implemented approved
security plans by the July 1, 2004 deadline.
The Coast Guard is actively involved with MARAD in the
development of maritime security competency standards and
security training curricula under Section 109 of MTSA.
The CG has met with nearly 60 countries representing the
vast majority of all shippers to the U.S., reinforcing a
commitment to the ISPS code. For vessels subject to MTSA, the
Safety of Life at Sea (SOLAS) amendments and the ISPS Code, the
CG is implementing strong Port State Control measures to
aggressively ensure foreign vessels have approved plans and
have implemented adequate security standards. The measures
include tracking performance of all owners, operators, flag
administrations, recognized security organizations, charterers,
and port facilities. Noncompliance will subject the vessel to a
range of control measures, which could include denial of entry
into port or significant delay. This aggressive Port State
Control regime will be coupled with the CG's inter-agency IPSP,
comprised of representatives from the Department of State,
Department of Defense, CBP, TSA, and MARAD, that will assess
both the effectiveness of anti-terrorism measures in foreign
ports and the foreign flag administration's implementation of
the SOLAS amendments and the ISPS Code.
Protection--Increase Operational Presence/Enhance Deterrence
Our collective efforts to increase operational presence in ports
and coastal zones will continue to build upon the layered security
posture established by the maritime security strategy. These efforts
focus not only on adding more people, boats and ships to force
structures but making the employment of those resources more effective
through the application of technology, information sharing and
intelligence support. Recent accomplishments and future plans include:
CG's Deepwater Program: A multi-year, performance-based
acquisition that will replace or modernize 90 Coast Guard
cutters, 200 fixed wing aircraft and multi-mission helicopters
and the communications equipment, sensors, and logistics
systems required to maintain and operate them. Deepwater will
greatly improve the Coast Guard's maritime presence starting at
America's ports, waterways, and coasts and extending seaward to
wherever the Coast Guard needs to be present or to take
appropriate maritime action. Deepwater provides the capability
to identify, interdict, board, and where warranted seize
vessels or people engaged in illegal/terrorist activity at sea
or on the ports, waterways, or coast of America. In FY04, the
Deepwater Program:
Commences urgent re-engining of Coast Guard's fleet of
short-range helicopters to ensure safe and reliable
operations;
Accelerates the development of the Fast Response
Cutter;
Begins construction of the first National Security
Cutter (frigate-size vessel about 425 feet long);
Acquires an additional Maritime Patrol Aircraft (MPA);
Completes design and shipboard integration of Vertical
Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (VUAV);
Commences conceptual development of the Offshore
Patrol Cutter; and Delivers 4 Short Range Prosecutors
(cutter small boats) for use on the 123' Patrol Boat.
CBP is employing Non-Intrusive Inspection (NII) technology
to screen shipments rapidly for anomalies. Deploying NII
technology to our land borders and seaports has increased CBP's
ability to detect conventional explosives, nuclear, weapons,
and other terrorist weapons. N1I equipment includes large scale
X-ray or gamma-ray imaging systems, portal radiation monitors,
and a mixture of portable and handheld technologies to include
personal radiation detection devices that greatly reduce the
need for costly, time-consuming physical inspection of
containers and vehicles.
DHS's priority undertaking is preventing weapons of mass
destruction from entering this country. The DHS goal is to
screen 100 percent of all arriving containers, trucks, trains,
cars, mailbags and express consignment packages with radiation
detection equipment. To achieve this goal, CBP has developed a
comprehensive risk management strategy for the deployment of
radiation portal monitors (RPM) throughout the country.
As of March 16, 2004, two hundred forty-seven RPMs have been
deployed. The vast majority of the deployed RPMs are at
International Mail Branches, Express Consignment Courier
facilities and along major Northern Border ports of entry.
Presently, CBP has begun deployment to our seaports. CBP has
also deployed a large number of handheld radiation detection
technologies. Currently, CBP has 321 radiation isotope
identifier devices and over 9,418 personal radiation detectors
to the field.
Prior to the attacks of 9/11, the CG had committed less than
2 percent of its assets to active port security duty.
Immediately after 9/11, the CG surged nearly 60 percent of its
assets in immediate support of port security. Since then, the
CG has rebalanced asset deployments to provide roughly 28
percent of its assets in coverage of port security--a
significant and steady increase in operational presence.
CG Maritime Safety & Security Teams (MSSTs) provide
immediately deployable multiple boat, law enforcement
capability that can be sustained over an extended period. Teams
are equipped to deploy (via land or air) to any location within
12 hours of notification. To date, eight of thirteen MSSTs have
been commissioned and the remainder will be operational by the
end of CY 2004.
CG is equipping helicopters with Airborne Use of Force (AUF)
and Vertical Insertion (VI) capability. This will enhance the
Coast Guard's ability to secure our oceans, ports, waterways,
and coastal areas against illegal drug, migrant, and terrorist
activity by providing capability to fire warning shots and
disabling fire and rapidly/covertly deploying boarding teams
aboard vessels at sea. The Coast Guard currently has 8-armed
MH-68 helicopters operating out of Jacksonville, FL and will
equip four HH-60J armed helicopters by April 2004.
TSA in coordination with the CG is working with cruise line
operators to identify technology solutions for screening
passengers and their belongings for potential threats. TSA is
also developing methods for inspecting passengers and vehicles
utilizing established ferry transportation systems. Detection
technologies and methods must be able to find threats without
unduly impacting the flow of passengers and/or vehicles.
TSA has implemented a Synergy Project designed to create a
cost effective, functional, and secure system to screen and
transfer passenger baggage from a seaport to an airport,
thereby reducing the congestion at airport security checkpoints
caused by the influx of large numbers of passengers
disembarking from cruise ships. This program is currently
underway at the Ports of Miami and Vancouver.
Responding to threat assessments in and in support of the
Maritime Homeland Security Strategy, CG Stations Boston and
Washington, D.C. were created in Fiscal Year 2004.
Response and Recovery--Improve Response and Recovery Posture
Understanding the challenge of defending 26,000 miles of navigable
waterways and 361 ports against every conceivable threat at every
possible time, we are also aggressively working to improve our response
capabilities and readiness. While the above increases in operational
presence necessarily augment our collective response posture,
additional accomplishments and future plans include:
The Secretary announced on March 1, 2004 the approval of the
National Incident Management System (NIMS). It is the Nation's
first standardized management approach that will provide a
consistent nationwide template to enable federal, state, local,
and tribal governments as well as private sector organizations
to work together effectively to prepare for, prevent, respond
to, and recover from a terrorist attack or other major
disaster. NIMS will ensure that all of our Nation's responders
are working in support of ``one plan, one team, one fight.''
For the first time, there will be standardized procedures for
responding to emergencies across the Nation. A NIMS Integration
Center will also be established to identify and share best
practices on preparedness with state and local authorities,
provide consistent training to first responders across the
country, and conduct exercises involving many different
localities.
Continue deployment of Rescue 21--the CG's maritime 911
command, control and communications system in our ports,
waterways, and coastal areas. Nationwide implementation
continues during 2004. This system provides Federal, state and
local first responders with interoperable maritime
communications capability, greater area coverage, enhanced
system reliability, voice recorder replay functionality, and
direction finding capability. Rescue 21 represents a quantum
leap forward communications technology.
TSA is coordinating with CG, CBP, MARAD and other DOT modal
administrations on setting national standards and policies for
transportation security and is working with these agencies and
the Office of Domestic Preparedness to coordinate the recovery
of the transportation system in the event of a transportation
security incident. For example, TSA is working with MARAD to
study the impacts and lessons learned from the recent four-day
closing of the Mississippi River caused when a barge sank from
hitting the Greenville Bridge linking Mississippi and Arkansas.
DHS agencies routinely lead or participate in national
intermodal terrorism exercises, such as Operation Heartland,
United Defense and TOPOFF2, designed to enhance our ability to
prevent, mitigate, and respond to potential transportation
security incidents.
DHS's response and recovery organization will be tested and further
strengthened at the upcoming ``California Spill of National
Significance 2004'' exercise (CAL SONS 04), scheduled for April 20-24.
CAL SONS 04 is a CG-sponsored full-scale national exercise that will
pose two major marine incidents off the coast of Southern California
and require a coordinated response by local, State and Federal
agencies, the government of Mexico, industry partners and volunteer
organizations. CAL SONS 04 will be guided by the Initial National
Response Plan and National Oil and Hazardous Substance Pollution
Contingency Plan and will involve the broad range of response and
recovery functions, including rescue, mobilization of people and
resources, multi., level incident management, tactical operations and
testing of industry and agency contingency plans. The CG's National
Strike Teams, which have been trained for Chemical, Biological and
Radiological responses and were .instrumental in the response and
recovery operations at the recent Ricin incident in the Senate Office
Building, will also be deployed.
In summary, DHS is taking a comprehensive approach to the needs of
maritime security. It cannot start and end at our maritime borders.
Rather, it will take an integrated and coordinated approach that
stretches from ports such as Miami and Los Angeles to Singapore and
Rotterdam.
Service to the Public--Effect on Commerce
fu addition to Awareness, Prevention, Protection, Response and
Recovery a sixth strategic goal of the Department of Homeland Security
is Service. In this, we will strive to serve the public effectively by
facilitating lawful trade, travel and immigration.
The Department is sensitive to the impact that increased security
may have on commerce. The wide variety of security measures implemented
to date has had no significant adverse impacts on the flow of maritime
commerce. That said, we note that the cost to industry to comply with
MTSA regulations is estimated to be $1.5 billion in the first year and
$7.3 billion over the next 10 years. While we clearly understand that
the cost of these security regulations to the maritime industry is not
insignificant, a terrorist incident against our marine transportation
system would have a devastating and long-lasting impact on global
shipping, international trade, and the world economy. Based on a recent
unscheduled port security closure incident, a maritime terrorist act
was estimated to cost up to $2 billion per day in economic loss to the
United States.
The Department understands there will be short-term costs,
particularly for many smaller ports or companies with less existing
security. Nonetheless, as the industry owns the infrastructure that is
being protected, and benefits from that ownership, they should rightly
be involved in protecting their infrastructure. We are engaged with the
maritime industry to provide information on any available Federal
funding. Thus far, the Department has awarded or made available a total
of nearly $500 million in port security grants over two years. There is
also a shared cost burden by the government. The Department of Homeland
Security, and its associated agencies, has spent hundreds of millions
of dollars to improve our capability to protect the Marine
Transportation System. However, the cost of securing America cannot be
left exclusively to the American taxpayer.
In addition, we are continuously seeking out technology and
procedural changes that will make our efforts not only more effective
and efficient but also less onerous on the vast majority of maritime
stakeholders who pose no threat to maritime security. As an example,
the CG is incorporating an option in the 96-hour vessel notice of
arrival (NOA) requirements to permit electronic submission of
information. This e-NOA submission method will allow for importation of
data into the CG's National Vessel Movement Center (NVMC) database, the
Ship Arrival Notification System (SANS), eliminating all but minimal
manual data entry. This will significantly enhance the processing and
identification of security and safety risks posed by vessels entering
our ports and move information to the field much more rapidly. By
merging CBP and CG vessel and people information requirements into the
e-NOA, the reporting burden on the maritime industry will be reduced.
When the e-NOA system is fully developed, vessel owners and operators
will have the option to use the e-NOA to satisfy CBP's Advance
Passenger Information Service (APIS) requirements as well as the CG's
NOA requirements.
The security requirements of the MTSA were developed with the full
cooperation of the private sector. We have developed the security
regulations to be performance-based, providing the majority of owners
and operators with the flexibility to implement the most cost-effective
operational controls, rather than more costly physical improvement
alternatives. By establishing consistent national and international
security requirements we will also be helping businesses by leveling
the playing field. Consistency helps business--consistency amongst
companies, states and countries. The Department will be vigilant in its
Maritime Homeland Security mission and will remain sensitive to the
impact of security measures on maritime commerce.
Conclusion
Our maritime security is first and foremost about awareness--
gathering and synthesizing large amounts of information and specific
data from many disparate sources to gain knowledge of the entire
domain. Maritime Domain Awareness and the knowledge it imparts will
allow maritime law enforcement and regulatory agencies to respond with
measured and appropriate action to meet any threat. However, it will
require the continued growth and development of strong partnerships not
the least of which is among the CG, TSA, ICE and CBP, state and local
agencies and our collective maritime stakeholders. No single maritime
stakeholder whether it is government, industry, or private sector can
do this alone. We must continue to work together to improve security.
Tills is never more important than now in our collective national
imperative to defend our Nation and win the war against terrorism.
The men and women of DHS have accomplished a great deal in the past
year and we are each very proud of them. In the end, no amount of
planning or strategizing is worth the paper it is written on without
the dedicated effort of committed men and women who wake up every day
with the safety and security of their nation on their minds. Thank you
for the opportunity to testify before you today. We will be happy to
answer any questions you may have.
The Chairman. Thank you very much.
Admiral Collins or members of the panel, has a
vulnerability assessment of our Nation's maritime
transportation system been completed?
Admiral Collins. The Port Security Assessment Initiative,
Mr. Chairman, is underway. We've completed it in over 16 of our
55 major ports. There's three more that have just been started
in the last month. And as we briefed in previous hearings and
reports to both the House and Senate, we're on schedule to
complete those by the end of this calendar year. That was the
original timeline. We're still on that timeline to do those
vulnerability assessments. And they become very, very important
to the area maritime security committees in over 40
jurisdictions around the country as we build and refine our
port--overarching port security plans, Mr. Chairman.
The Chairman. Admiral, I know you're aware that the
responsibility for oversight of maritime security grants has
been transferred to the Grants Policy and Oversight Office, an
office that I understand, for the last year, has been staffed
by one full-time employee. Is that sufficient attention to this
issue?
Admiral Collins. Mr. Chairman, I don't know the staffing
profile of that particular office. I know the intent here in
the consolidation is to get some efficiency focus to facilitate
the application of grants, sort of a one-stop shopping for
states and localities. They can go to the Department--exactly
how--I don't--I don't have the staffing profile, and we can
provide that for the record.
The Chairman. Well, check into it. If it's true, you've not
only got one stop, you've got one person.
[Laughter.]
The Chairman. Do you have adequate funding, Admiral, to
meet the requirements being placed on the Coast Guard?
Admiral Collins. One of the--Mr. Chairman, obviously one of
the big funding line items in our 2005 budget is over a hundred
million dollars and over 700 people to implement the terms and
conditions of the Maritime Transportation Security Act in the
regulation that we promulgated last October. It's the first
opportunity we've had to go on budget for this initiative. That
will, in fact, give us the wherewithal to implement this
particular regulation, to oversee it, to ensure compliance, to
review the plans, to oversee the exercises, and all those types
of things.
The Chairman. Admiral, this is a very tough question. And I
understand that you may not--you may have difficulty answering
it, and I appreciate that, because it's very difficult. But do
you have adequate funding to meet the requirements that are
being placed on the Coast Guard?
Admiral Collins. Yes, sir. I think the--yes, sir, we're
pleased with the support----
The Chairman. Admiral Breaux says no.
Admiral Collins. We have, of course, our 2005 budget is a 9
percent increase, a pretty substantial increase in these--in
this particular budget times. We're appreciative of the support
that we've received within the Administration for that. Over
the last 3 years, our operating expense budget, between 2002/
2003 and 2004/2005 has gone up 51 percent. That's a substantial
increase by--in anyone's estimation. So we're very, very
pleased that we've been able to increase our force structure
accordingly. And we're making progress, Mr. Chairman. It's the
right direction.
The Chairman. It's a very excellent political answer,
Admiral. And I understand the difficulty associated with the
answer. We'd like to hear more about specific needs and
specific requirements.
You and your staff are to be commended for spearheading the
U.S. effort to establish international standards for maritime
security and the international ship and port facility security
code. We know all about that. But tell me, what happens to
ships that are calling on the United States who have failed to
meet those requirements on July 1?
Admiral Collins. There is a number of intervention
strategies that are possible, that go all the way from denial
of entry to additional inspection requirements and delayed
departure and a whole host of things. We, in fact, have a
matrix developed of all those intervention strategies under our
Port State Control hat is the term of art that we----
The Chairman. You would anticipate that there may be ships
which have not met the criterion?
Admiral Collins. The way that we're going to deal with
that, Mr. Chairman, is that, of course, every--under the terms
of the ISPS code that 108 nations have signed up for, is that
each flag state will issue security certificates to their
vessels that certify, from the flag-state perspective, that
they, in fact, compliance with the standards in this new
international code. We will--our plans are--and effective 1
July--we're already doing interim inspections now--but 1 July,
every foreign vessel coming to the United States will be--would
be boarded, will be inspected to ensure compliance with
international standards, 100 percent. And then we'll do that at
least on a annual basis; and, in the interim, we'll do a 20
percent--review 20 percent of that population through the
course of the year. So we're going to do a very, very
aggressive Port State Control examination process to certify
that they're meeting those standards, and we have,
incidentally, developed fairly rigorous training programs for
our inspectors, both for facility inspection, vessel
inspection, and port inspection functions.
The Chairman. Gentlemen, we need more memorandums of
agreement between your agencies, and I hope that you will make
progress in that area.
Senator Hollings?
Senator Hollings. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
Admiral Collins, let get back to this chart here. Do you
mind taking that down so we can see it?
Now, looking right at the chart you have submitted to the
Committee, reduce maritime security risks, this is the
responsibility of the Coast Guard, right?
Admiral Collins. Yes, sir.
Senator Hollings. And if something wrong happened at a
particular port such as a terrorist activity, the first person
to be looked upon for either blame or commendation, depending
on what happened, would be the captain of the port----
Admiral collins. That's----
Senator Hollings.--right?
Admiral Collins.--that's the Federal Maritime Security
Coordinator, as defined in the----
Senator Hollings. Well, the captain of the port, under law,
is responsible. Now, these young officers are out there, and I
see them, and I talk to them, and everything else, and I'm
concerned about whether or not they are getting enough support
from you?
Now, go to the first section, put a dollar mark by that.
It's entitled ``Enhanced Maritime Domain Awareness.'' How many
billions of dollars is that?
Admiral Collins. They--we are--it depends which one item
you're talking about, of course----
Senator Hollings. I'm talking about the first red section,
``Enhanced Maritime Domain Awareness.''
Admiral Collins. That is--I can give you a breakdown of the
money spent over the last----
Senator Hollings. Well, just generally speaking, a ballpark
figure.
Admiral Collins. Well, there's the $24 million, of course,
that was appropriated last year for----
Senator Hollings. You can perform all of that for $24
million?
Admiral Collins. No, that's for one element of that,
Senator. That's for the----
Senator Hollings. Yes, give me----
Admiral Collins.--start of the--the start of the------
Senator Hollings: Well, you see what I'm getting at. I want
to put a dollar mark on each of the four. Now, under the first
of the four, what dollar mark would you put?
Admiral Collins. I'll be glad to break that down and
provide that for the record, Senator. There has been a
considerable amount of money spent out of our base and out of--
--
Senator Hollings. And generally speaking----
Admiral Collins.--appropriations.
Senator Hollings.--your needs, you know what you need. You
couldn't remember, perhaps, the exact figure, but you have a
ballpark figure in mind. How much for the first?
Admiral Collins. There are a number of--both capital funds
and operating-expense funds, and I would be--I would have to
tabulate that for you, Senator. I don't have the number off the
top of my head.
Senator Hollings. And what about the second? You don't have
a number for the second?----
Admiral Collins. I--well, I----
Senator Hollings.--``Build and Administer Domestic and
International Security Regime.''
Admiral Collins. The MTSA implementation, in terms of the
budget request in 2005, it's $100 million issue, and that's in
our 2005 budget.
Senator Hollings. And so 100 million would take care of
number 2.
Admiral Collins. Not the entire--that it'll take care of
the oversight in the compliance of the--in the terms and
conditions of MTSA.
Senator Hollings. Well, number 2--I'm just looking at your
chart--is--$100 million your figure on that one?
Admiral Collins. It is--$100 million, Senator, is----
Senator Hollings. You know, I'm always askance at all this
chart nonsense. Man, I've been through it. I've got 38 years of
charts.
[Laughter.]
Senator Hollings. Now, give me the money. I'm trying to get
down--it's a very simple question. The distinguished Chairman
was more than polite in asking, and you've got no idea about 1,
2, 3, or 4, do you? Do you have an amount to give to the
Committee?
Admiral Collins. I'd be glad to provide that to the
Committee.
Senator Hollings. For each one of those----
Admiral Collins. Absolutely. Yes, sir.
Senator Hollings. And when you provide all of that, did you
ask for that, of the Administration?
Admiral Collins. There is a good portion of these
elements----
Senator Hollings. No, don't give me ``a good portion.'' Did
you request that amount? These are simple questions and simple
answers.
Admiral Collins. The--we requested the money, for example,
for the MTSA----
Senator Hollings. No, no. Did you request the money for the
entirety of this?
Admiral Collins. They're all--these are----
Senator Hollings. For one year. You can't do it all in a
year. I mean, I'm trying to be----
Admiral Collins. The port---the port-----
Senator Hollings.--reasonable and practical, just like you.
Admiral Collins. The portion that we can build out and
schedule in 2005 is included in our budget, yes, sir.
Senator Hollings. Well, for how much?
Admiral Collins. Our overall home security portion of our
budget is about 48 percent of our old entire base. And, again,
I--I'll be glad to detail these, itemize these initiatives, and
also show you the money that has been spent over the last 2
years----
Senator Hollings. Yes, but I'm trying to get the
authorization. This is an authorizing Committee, and we're at
fault if we don't get you the authorization for the funds
needed. All I can get out of you this morning, is charts and
conversation, I would like an amount. I want to know how much--
I know the $7.4 billion, because you've given me that amount--
--
Admiral Collins. Sir, the----
Senator Hollings.--your predecessor, incidentally, Admiral
Loy.
Admiral Collins. The $7.4 billion is the impact on the
private sector of the MTSA regulation.
Senator Hollings. Yes.
Admiral Collins. In other words, it's--that is not
necessarily special program----
Senator Hollings. I'm still getting conversation. Do you
have any amounts in mind?
Admiral Collins. Yes, sir, and I'll be glad to provide that
detail for the record.
Senator Hollings. All right, sir. They are--because we know
that--you know--you have $43 million. And if you have $86
million, that would be 100 percent increase. I mean, come on.
The percentages mean nothing to this Committee. We've got to
get going and get this job done.
With respect to the language, now, with--you say ``one
roof'' and ``layered'' and ``fused'' and ``comprehensive'' and
all. Where's the place to go for intelligence on port security?
Is it your office or--where is that office? I know that Customs
has an intelligence endeavor. The Coast Guard's an intelligence
endeavor. The homeland security crowd has its intelligence--the
FBI--the FAA--everyone has intelligence--where is the office,
the one-stop shopping for intelligence on port threats?
Admiral Collins. For our Department, it's the Under
Secretary at IAIP, sir, that is the node--Information Analysis
and Infrastructure Protection--which is the informational node
for our entire Department for not only maritime security, but
the security across the board. We plug into that information
intelligence fusion node, as does other elements in the
Department. Our particular part of the equation, we have a
maritime--National Maritime Intelligence Center that's co-
located with Office of Naval Intelligence, in Suitland,
Maryland, that oversees the screening, and so forth, arrivals
of ships coming inbound to the United States, vet that
information through multiple national data bases in a
coordinated way through FBI, CIA, and other national data
bases, and with the targeting center at Customs, sharing that
information collaboratively, and coming with the joint risk
assessment on how to approach inbound ships, containers, and so
forth, into our country.
Senator Hollings. If you'd indulge me one more question----
The Chairman. I'd be pleased to indulge you.
Senator Hollings. LNG containers. You know, right after 9/
11, we were very disturbed by liquified natural gas. In fact,
General Dynamics manufactures the containers in Charleston. And
one ship contains enough liquified natural gas from Algeria to
power 30,000 homes for one year. If they could ignite it, they
said, it would be just like an atom bomb in the Port of Boston.
I take it you're not going to allow one of those during our
convention.
Admiral Collins. No, sir, and I--there's a--also, just a
comment, there's a--in terms of the technology in the--what
happened----
Senator Hollings. Where are they coming in now? Do you----
Admiral Collins. Sir, they're coming in from multiple
places. They're--ones going into Boston are from Trinidad and
Tobago.
Senator Hollings. So they are coming in from--coming into
Boston now.
Admiral Collins. Yes, sir. And they're coming into Trinidad
and Tobago. That's a loop from Trinidad and Tobago into Boston.
We have a very, very strong oversight--security oversight
program for that transit, including--we have been down in
Trinidad and Tobago, we've inspected their facility down there
from security, we've coordinated with the companies involved,
we board every ship offshore, we provide escorts, we provide
sea marshals on those vessels, layered defense, even air
coverage all the way in and out of Boston. So I think we have
been very, very detailed, very, very rigorous in dealing with
that risk. And, of course, LNG comes into other parts of our
country, as well--into the Chesapeake Bay, into Port Arthur.
There is multiple applications in for LNG deepwater ports. And
so----
Senator Hollings. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
The Chairman. Senator Snowe?
Senator Snowe. Thank you.
Admiral Collins, I wanted to go back to the Deepwater
Program, because I do think it's essential to the Coast Guard
major responsibility, in this instance, in enhancing port
security and bolstering the maritime domain awareness. And I'm
very concerned about the timelines that have been proposed and
that we're adhering to, much to my objections, frankly.
As I said earlier, I did include, in the Homeland Security
Act, a study that indicated that we could save more than $4
billion over the life of the program if we accelerated it by 10
years, and that's not even including the under-estimation, in
my opinion--and I think I'm on track in saying this--of
maintaining the current assets, whether it's, you know, the
aircraft or the vessels, because, as I understand, they're
deteriorating even more rapidly--the costs are greater to
sustain their readiness--and also the mandates under the law
for enforcing maritime security.
So my first question is, Why aren't we pursuing a different
timeline? Are you going to be able to perform your
responsibilities with the existing assets?
Admiral Collins. Well----
Senator Snowe. It deeply troubles me, as you know. And I--
you know, I'm going to just keep insisting on this----
Admiral Collins. I share your--excuse me.
Senator Snowe. Go ahead.
Admiral Collins. I share your concern, Senator. The current
readiness status of our fleet, both air and surface, is my
number-one concern, as the head of the Coast Guard. We are--we
have a rapidly deteriorating readiness position because of the
aging--some of our ships are eligible for social security,
literally. They're older ships, and we're using them hard, in
the national interest. So they are deteriorating in front of
our eyes. And the conundrum that I'm faced with is that
Deepwater has two basic pots of money in it. One is to maintain
and enhance the capabilities of the legacy systems, or the
existing system; one is to buy the replacement. But I'm
stealing from the replacement money to keep the Band-aids on
the--and so----
Senator Snowe. Yes.
Admiral Collins.--it's a problem.
Senator Snowe. Well, that's a serious situation, then. I
mean, the bottom line is, Can you perform your mandate
regarding homeland security missions with your current assets,
either now or into the future?
Admiral Collins. I think----
Senator Snowe. I mean, let's look into the next 5 years.
Admiral Collins. I don't think so. I think the timeline has
to be addressed, and I think the 2005 budget--appreciative of
the Administration's support that we've got in the 2005
budget--it increases that plus-up that we received in 2004,
with the help of this Committee and others, that have acted to
plus-up almost $200 million for Deepwater, and so it
accommodates that, plus a modest increase. So it is showing a
commitment to this requirement.
I think that, over the multi-year basis, we're going to
have to rethink this timeline because of the--two things--
because of the readiness condition, the material condition of
the fleet, and, second, the Nation needs this capability now--
that this brings a network-centric system to the maritime for
this layered defense posture.
Just a couple of statistics on the material condition of
our fleet. I had 670--over 670 unscheduled maintenance days for
my major cutters. That's four of my major cutters, in a fleet
of 12, that I was not able to lose--use last year because of
unscheduled maintenance. That reflects their age and failing
systems. Our 110-foot patrol boat is the workhorse of our
fleet--does all our coastal search and rescue, our law
enforcement, our interdiction of migrants, and so forth--
suffered 20 hull breaches--yes, that's water coming into the
hull--and required emergency dry-docking. Why? They're beyond
their planned service life. The current schedule in Deepwater
for the replacement of that asset is not until 2018. I can't
wait to 2018 to replace this asset.
Some are graphic examples of the current readiness posture,
and why, looking at that multi-year plan and restructuring that
multi-year plan is very, very important.
Senator Snowe. Well, it sounds like we have to do this on
an emergency basis, because it's going to take some time,
obviously, just to replace the existing assets. I mean, this it
not something that's going to happen overnight. But that's a
dramatic situation that we're talking about, and it is going to
encumber your ability to do what you need to do to protect, you
know, our maritime domain awareness and pushing this threat out
to sea----
Admiral Collins. Sure.
Senator Snowe.--so that it doesn't reach our ports.
Well, does everybody understand that?
Admiral Collins. I mean, it all comes down to budget
priorities and----
Senator Snowe. Wow, it's----
Admiral Collins.--and so forth.
Senator Snowe. I think this is a----
Admiral Collins. As we know----
Senator Snowe.--major priority.
Admiral Collins. I am an advocate for a strong support of
the integrated deepwater system.
Senator Snowe. Well, I think that, obviously, we do have a
urgent situation on our hands, you know, and it basically is
undercutting your ability to do what you need to do, and I
think that needs to be on the record. I think it has to be
underscored, it has to be reinforced--we'll get everything on
the table here--that these investments need to be made. And I
think it's just--you know, your comments here this morning is
illustrative of what we're facing. I mean, we can continue to
ask you to do everything you need to do, but if you can't do
it, you simply can't do it. Six hundred and seventy days? I
mean, I hesitate to think about how much the costs are involved
that takes away from the future modernization program. Do you
have any estimate, currently?
Admiral Collins. Based on the current condition and the
couple of data points that we have, that we could be, over the
next 10 years, spending between 500 million to a billion
dollars more on maintenance for our ships because of their
current state. And, again, every dollar we spend is a dollar
away from the modernization part.
So it's sort of this downward spiral phenomenon you get
yourself into, and I--you know, if you talk to other service
chiefs, whether it's the Navy, the Army--they're very familiar
with this issue of current readiness and condition of the
current assets, versus modernization and how to balance--do a
balancing act on that, maintain the current operational
capability and then get ahead with modernization.
But we're--I think we're reaching a critical stage. Again,
we have some very, very old assets. If you compare our fleet
with major navy fleets of the world, we are right down at the
bottom, in terms of the oldest fleets in the world. And so this
is a--I do have--again, I do have the sense of urgency, because
I feel that it's my responsibility to ensure that our men and
women, who we put in harm's way every day, need to have the
best equipment possible. And to do so, I would be irresponsible
not to take any other position.
Senator Snowe. I appreciate that, Admiral Collins.
Thank you.
The Chairman. Senator Breaux?
Senator Breaux. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
I'm sure Mr. Bonner and Mr. Stone are feeling neglected up
there at the witness table, and just wished they were engaging
in these questions that Admiral Collins is bearing the brunt
of.
The thing--now, the chart's gone, but, I mean, on that
reduced maritime security risk, I mean, I'm sort of like
Senator Hollings, I'd--you know, the charts are great, and
they're pretty, and they're multicolored now, and how we have
them under the computer systems we get, but what is really
lacking on all of this is--there are two things, at least.
Senator Hollings pointed out that it's lacking about how much
it's going to cost and where the money's going to come from.
The second thing that I think is really missing is, What date
goes right after each one of those? I mean, you know, it's a
wonderful chart, but if the date is 2020 or 2030 or 2040, it
doesn't give anybody much comfort. If it's within this year or
next year or the next Fiscal Year, that's one thing.
Which leads me to the point of the questions I want to ask
about the situation in the Port of New Orleans. And the Port
Director, Gary LaGrange will be with us. But with regard to the
automatic identification system, the requirement is that all
the ships have the AIS equipment onboard so they can transpond
to a central terminal to locate where all ships are at all
times. That system is not in place in New Orleans, is it?
Admiral Collins. It's not finalized. It will--all our nine
VTSs will be fully equipped and up and running by the end of
this calendar year.
Senator Breaux. Was the system in place the night and the
morning of the ship crash that occurred in the mouth of the
Mississippi River?
Admiral Collins. I don't believe the AIS--I'd have to get
back to you. That's----
Senator Breaux. The answer is, it was not. The AIS system
was not operating. And the purpose of that system, obviously,
is to track ships because of potential terrorist activity
onboard one of these vessels, or because--also just monitoring
the navigation, from a safety standpoint. In your opinion, had
that system been in effect, would we have had better
information about the locations of those ships?
Admiral Collins. I'd have to wait for the results of the
investigation, which is ongoing right now.
Senator Breaux. Well, that's not the question. My question
was very careful. I mean, would--had that system been in place,
would you have had better information on the location of the
two vessels?
Admiral Collins. I think that system provides you a margin
of information--improved margin of information wherever you
would put it in. And I----
Senator Breaux. If the system had been operating, you would
have had an identification and location on the ships in the
Mississippi River.
Admiral Collins. Absolutely. It gives you better visibility
of the--of vessels. And clearly that's, you know, why we have
been aggressive trying to push this system--AIS base VTSs. We
think that's the way to go.
Senator Breaux. Is the reason it is not in place in New
Orleans and other ports around the country because of
technology is not available, or is it because of the costs that
we do not have the money to pay for?
Admiral Collins. I think it's a cost and schedule issue
that it boils down to, and we're building it out as fast as
cost and schedule allow. And, again, the game plan is to have
it all--all the nine VTSs, Senator, by the end of this calendar
year, is the current schedule.
Senator Breaux. This goes back to the Chairman's question
and then Senator Hollings question. My information is that you
requested $1 million in the budget for the AIS system last
year, and this year it's five million. That is woefully
inadequate to accomplish what you're saying that you'd like to
have done, isn't it? You can't do it with----
Admiral Collins. It really----
Senator Breaux.--for $5 million.
Admiral Collins.--it really stretches it out, Senator. One
of the----
Senator Breaux. It does.
Admiral Collins.--one of the things we're looking for, for
your information, in terms--to try to moderate the cost
challenge is to look at existing structures in which to place--
this is having AIS coverage beyond the immediate ports, beyond
the VTSs. So we're looking at things like NOAA buoys and
offshore platforms--you've very familiar with how many offshore
platforms are in the Gulf--but to use those as structures by
which to place AIS equipment.
Senator Breaux. I understand that. But the problem is that
you are not able to request sufficient funds in order to do
these types of things. I mean, $1 million to do an AIS system
nationwide is really not even close to getting it started. And
this year, it's $5 million. Now, I think had that AIS system,
in the--maybe the Coast Guard inquiry on the cause of that
accident will reveal more information--but had that system been
in place, clearly the central control system would have known
where those ships were, what--the movement and what direction
they were going in, and possibly could have avoided a very
tragic accident. I mean, I can't say that. I mean, it's a
tragedy for the families and for everything. But had that
system been in effect, we would have had a great deal more
information in order to warn the ships of an impending
collision--which occurred and shut down a port for 4 days, not
even to mention the tragic loss of life.
So, anyway, we don't have enough money to do what we should
be doing. I mean, that's--I think that's pretty clear,
particularly in this area.
Mr. Bonner, it seems to me--and we've had these
discussions--that it's much more difficult to inspect 3,000
containers on a ship when it arrives in port. It's much better
to try and inspect the containers when they are loaded on the
ship in the foreign port. And you say we now have about 38
ports around the world that are coordinating. I mean, I'd like
to know a little bit more about that. Are you able, or is our
government, to go in and say, ``Look, you're going to have to
have an inspection system that tells us what's being put on
these vessels, or we're not going to allow you to call on our
ports. It's just that simple?'' And I guarantee you, with
everything we're importing into this country, other countries
would put it into effect lickety-split, because they're not
going to be able to say, ``We're not going to ship to the
United States.'' What's the status of all that?
Mr. Bonner. Well, first of all, there are--they're
countries that represent 38 foreign ports that have agreed to
implement the Container Security Initiative.
Senator Breaux. Is that our----
Mr. Bonner. We----
Senator Breaux.--is that our Container Security----
Mr. Bonner. It's our----
Senator Breaux.--Initiative?
Mr. Bonner.--Container Security Initiative. And it means,
Senator Breaux, that they've agreed that they will--first of
all, we will have targeters there. We will be using, and are
using, our automated targeting system to identify, based upon
strategic intelligence--not just specific intelligence, but
strategic intelligence--as well as anomaly analysis, the
containers that pose, in our judgment, a potential threat for
terrorist exploitation. The host nation that--joint CSI agrees
that when we then, based upon our targeting and any
information, additional information, they can give us--and, by
the way, being there, our targeters being there, there is an
exchange of information that takes place with the host nation
customs authorities--but if we say, ``Look, we're concerned
about this container or this group of containers,'' because of
where they're coming from and other things that go into our
targeting rules, we request them to actually do the minimum
security inspection. And the minimum security inspection is
running that container through the large-scale X-ray imaging
machines--so to be in CSI, you've got to have at least one of
these machines at your foreign seaports--and run it for
radiation detection. Now, obviously, if there is a concern
then, it gets a physical inspection, but relatively few do. So
we select out--that's the agreement, that's what CSI is. And we
have deployed that now to 18 foreign seaports where we have
Customs and Border Protection inspectors, targeters, working
with the host nation to identify high-risk containers and see
that they're screened overseas before they're loaded onboard
vessels headed for the U.S.
And 18 foreign seaports, by the way--we just--the first
foreign seaport was just 18 months ago, so we've deployed one
every month since September of 2002. And we're continuing. I
mean, we're not stopping with those 18. As I indicated, we're
going to expand this. I believe we'll hit over 30 by the end of
the--at least 28 to 30 by the end of the Fiscal Year, and
another four by the end of the year, and to expand it out.
So this gives us a system in place, with respect to many of
the major ports of the world--the megaports, the hub ports that
ship most of the containers to the United States. And, by the
way, these are also placed in areas where--you know, nothing
comes directly from Karachi to the United States. I can tell
you that right now. It comes through Singapore, or it comes
through Hong Kong. And we have CSI there. So it's a hub using
targeting and target analysis and information to identify high-
risk containers, and then doing it there.
Now, we're ramping this up. We've--you know, there's no
question that we've made good progress, but we have ways to go.
We probably need to increase, to some extent, the numbers of
targeters that are working in particular countries, like
Singapore, because of volume, but we've made good progress so
far in expanding the Container Security Initiative. And it has
been well received and widely accepted by every--virtually
every country that we've approached to join in with us with the
Container Security Initiative.
Senator Breaux. Thank you.
The Chairman. Senator Lautenberg?
Senator Lautenberg. Admiral Collins, we all are very fond
of the Coast Guard, the work that it does, and the relationship
that we have within the coastal states particularly to the
Coast Guard, the number of functions that it performs. But yet,
in response to the Chairman's inquiry about whether or not you
have enough funds, you were more than gracious, I think, with
the Administration by saying, ``Don't worry about it, we've got
plenty.''
But if I look at the GAO report that recently came out, in
March of this year. The total Coast Guard resource hours have
increased substantially, 39 percent, over pre-September 11
levels in Fiscal Year 2003; but, not unexpectedly, homeland
security is the greatest beneficiary of the increased hours, as
more vessels devoted to homeland security have been added to
the fleet. Conversely, the resource hours for most non-homeland
security programs have decreased as many more resources are now
generally devoted to protecting the Nation's ports and
waterways.
For example, resource hours for several programs that the
Coast Guard has traditionally conducted, such as living marine
resources, search and rescue, declined by 26 and 22 percent,
respectively. And if we look at the various categories of
activity--illegal drug interdiction, down 44 percent. And this
morning, there was a drug bust of 29,000 pounds of cocaine off
the West Coast, so there still are plenty of drugs out there,
we know that.
How do you square, Admiral, this minimal increase in
funding with all of these activities that you are responsible
for? It's terrific to see the enhancement of the security
concerns being attended to, but these other functions are
important functions, traditional Coast Guard functions. What
happens with them?
Admiral Collins. Clearly, homeland security and the
security of our ports and waterways is priority number one. You
know, the Secretary believes that, I believe that, I think
Commissioner Bonner and Administrator Stone believes that. And
that--because the consequences are very, very substantial. So
we have to maintain, I think, an aggressive posture. Most of
our budget plus-ups over the last couple of years have been
devoted to building up our--to be just confident--the Coast
Guard to be just as confident in the homeland security part of
our business as we are traditionally in search and rescue and
servicing aids to navigation and breaking ice and so forth. I
think if you look at our performance in all those missions,
along with activity levels, that--activity levels give you one
perspective. Look at our performance and outcomes, and I think
you'll see, in all the non-homeland-security areas, that we've
met every standard, we've exceeded every performance goal in
those particular non-homeland-security missions, if you will.
We have not backed off our search and rescue standards one bit.
We're meeting our search and rescue standards. We saved over--
--
Senator Lautenberg. Was that a bloated budget that you had
before that we should have----
Admiral Collins. I think----
Senator Lautenberg.--reduced the----
Admiral Collins.--I think that you'll see ups and downs of
those numbers in any given year, based upon the risks that
we're dealing with in that year. Our whole allocation of our
cutters and our boats and our people is all risk based. You
know, we're allocating resources day in, day out to the
greatest risk at the time.
Senator Lautenberg. Well, how about something like the
foreign fish enforcement, the living marine resources? These
things don't have an immediate response to attention, but they
will--in years ahead, suddenly we'll find ourselves with--over-
swamped foreign fishing fleets that rape the bottom of our
oceans and leave nothing there for us to harvest. I think,
honestly, you're--I would have normally said ``you're a good
soldier,'' but you're not a soldier. The fact is that you are
certainly loyal to those who make the decisions, but we know
how seriously the Coast Guard takes its responsibility. And you
can't make the case that we can constantly do more with less,
unless we want to change the mission of the Coast Guard
altogether and say Coast Guard is another part of the
intelligence or anti-terrorism organization, and leave the
nautical part to something else.
Admiral Collins. Part of the--Senator, part of the
challenge of this thing, again, is to manage to the greatest
risk at the time. I mean, understanding that we're not
optimally resourced for every one of our missions
simultaneously, and so to mobilize our--to be multi-mission, in
terms of our resource, multi-task capability we embed in every
one of our resources. They can surge to those issues, and we've
done that, and I think we've done that very, very effectively,
and that's a good story. The second is to be--to grow. And I
think if you look at our budgets over the last 3 years, we are
growing. We've added--our workforce has grown by over 12
percent, our budget's been increased by the Administration----
Senator Lautenberg. But it has been absorbed by functions.
Admiral Collins. It----
Senator Lautenberg. More than absorbed. And when you say
that the American Coast Guard is near the bottom of the list
with the kind of equipment that we need to do our job, it's
distressing to hear that, and that has to come from some pot of
resource that is being used otherwise.
And, Mr. Chairman, the conclusion is that we cannot
maintain all of the functions that we need to maintain, those
that take care of now and those that take care of the future,
without supplying the resources.
And I'll conclude with this very quick question for Admiral
Stone. Mr. Bonner, I don't mean to leave you out, as Senator
Breaux said before, but the fact of the matter is, I have a
question for you about the radiation detection, because that's
like the second line of defense. The first line of defense is
what we do at those ports of embarkation, and how do we control
it, and can we effectively stop those ships from coming here if
those ports look like they're particularly dangerous places for
us? Is that----
Mr. Bonner. Well, first of all, you know, one thing that I
think is not often recognized, but if we had a specific concern
from intelligence that we received from IAIP through the intel
community about a specific container that posed a terrorist
threat, we have information, under the 24-hour rule, of all
containers, wherever they're moving, if they're heading for the
United States, before they leave foreign ports, Senator--before
they leave the foreign ports, 24 hours before they're loaded
onto our vessels to leave. So we literally can instruct the
carrier to ``do not load that container'' until we are
satisfied that it doesn't pose a threat.
Now, if we're at a CSI port, we obviously are in a position
to make sure we do the security screening, because we have--
we're there, and we also have the commitment from the host
nation to work with us to get it done.
But we have some means here to prevent a container that
poses a risk, if we have the intelligence, to prevent it from
going onboard. And then, at CSI ports, it's beyond just the
intelligence; it's the strategic intelligence, if you will,
that there are a group of containers that were--we have
sufficient concerns about that we want them to be inspected
before they're loaded onboard----
Senator Lautenberg. Yes, but referring to Senator Breaux's
earlier question, could we assign a different status to those
ports that we expect problems coming from--could we simply
embargo that port and say the only ports that are going to be
allowable are those--you described some as hub-ports--can we do
that if we choose to do that? Or----
Mr. Bonner. I actually think we're--in essence, as we
expand out the Container Security Initiative and the standards
that Senator Breaux was referring to, where we've got a much
broader coverage, then you have the possibility of simply
saying, let's say, at level orange, or where there's a higher
threat level, that all containers, if they're moving to the
United States, have to move through those ports. But you don't
want to do this, in my opinion, until you have----
Senator Lautenberg. Commerce----
Mr. Bonner.--much broader coverage of the Container
Security Initiative than we have with just 18 ports. But, yes,
I think that would be a direction. And, ultimately, of course,
the Coast Guard, under MTSA, will be certifying the security at
the foreign ports themselves that are shipping containers to
the U.S. and so----
Senator Lautenberg. So we're working from the beginning--
before it begins----
Mr. Chairman, I wanted to say to Admiral Stone that we've
been more than perplexed, frustrated, et cetera, about the
slowness of DHS's--slowest--terribly late response to our
inquiries in this Committee, and I want to leave you with a
question.
If you could provide us with some identification of the
directorate's resources that are devoted to port security
tasks, and those that have been assigned to rail security. And
I wonder if you could just tell us how long it might take to
get that information.
Admiral Stone. Yes, sir. Would you--you'd like that from
the Department perspective, or just TSA-specific, or the
overall Department?
Senator Lautenberg. No, from the Department's perspective.
Admiral Stone. Yes, sir. I'll go to work on that
immediately and get that to you as soon as possible.
Senator Lautenberg. But we won't need a year for that.
Admiral Stone. No, sir.
Senator Lautenberg. OK. Thanks very much.
Senator Breaux. [presiding]. Senator Nelson, any questions?
STATEMENT OF HON. BILL NELSON,
U.S. SENATOR FROM FLORIDA
Senator Nelson. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Mr. Chairman, I
always knew you wanted to be Chairman of the Commerce Committee
before you retired.
[Laughter.]
Senator Breaux. Now I'm leaving.
[Laughter.]
Senator Nelson. Admiral, you have a big job. And it's a big
job to comply with the law that says all of these ports have to
be ready to meet the standards for port security by July 1. And
the fact is that a lot of the foreign ports that do business
with the United States, especially the 14 deepwater ports that
almost half of the Florida commerce originates from, will not
be able to comply by July 1. How are ports in the Caribbean and
Central America, such as Puerto Cortez, Honduras, 350 miles
south of Cancun, going to be compliant, according to the law,
by July 1?
Now, tell us what in the world you are going to do. You
have my full support, but I just don't know how you can get ten
pounds of potatoes in a five-pound sack.
Admiral Collins. It is--Senator, you've hit the nail on the
head. That particular part of the regulation is--it's going to
be a challenge.
Just to echo your concern, I went down and visited, in
Costa Rica, about 3 weeks ago, and several other countries. The
reason for my trip was basically building counter-drug
agreements, bilateral agreements, with those countries. But I
did use the occasion to talk about the MTSA and the ISPS code
and how they were going to be meeting core standards. When I
visited Costa Rica, that wasn't even on their scope, and there
were not--didn't have any overt act--they do now, by the way. I
talked to the president of Costa Rica, and they are moving on
sharply.
We're going to have to work closely with each one of those
countries through regional groups and affiliations, and slug
through those issues.
For Florida, there are already regulations in the book.
There's a special reporting requirement into the ports in
Florida for any vessel coming from the Caribbean, and we're
going to have to scrutinize it. We're going to have to pay
special attention to every one of those vessels coming in.
That's, I guess, the short of it, is that we're going to
have scrutinize each one of those vessels. We're going to have
to look at all--if there's a--for instance, Costa Rica
doesn't--it's not a flag state, but it--but there are third-
party vessels, Panama flag or whatever, that call in this port,
pick up the pineapples or whatever it's carrying en route to
the United States. So the fact that it takes on cargo from a
port not--they're not even a signatory to the ISPS code. So
they're not a signatory to the ISPS code, so we're going to
have to look at alternative security plans, help them along,
have very close oversight, scrutinize them from a risk
perspective, and take intervention measures for each and every
occasion until we bring that, you know, ``tide rising, all
ships'' type of phenomenon, we bring them up, from a standards
perspective.
Senator Nelson. Well, let me suggest to you what's going to
happen. We're only talking about three and a half months from
right now. When it dawns on everybody that commerce is going to
grind to a halt because you are either going to wave off a ship
coming from a port that has not complied with the security
requirements, or you're going to impound the cargo until it's
inspected, to be released, commerce is going to grind to a
halt. And that is going to cause an outcry. And the pressure is
going to be on you to release and ease up on your security
requirements under the law. How are you going to deal with that
pressure?
Admiral Collins. Carefully, Senator. No, you're absolutely
right. No to be flippant about this. It's absolutely a
challenge. We're going to have a lot of pressure on that. And
one of the reasons we're working in the interagency process
with the State Department and others, so that we will have--and
coming--developing what we call an intervention matrix of Port
State Control. What control actions will we take if this vessel
meets--doesn't meet this issue, doesn't meet that issue, and so
forth?
But I think for smaller infractions, you don't--you know,
for smaller infractions of the code, you don't ignore them--you
hold them accountable, but you don't deny--you may not deny
entry. It doesn't call for denying entry, it doesn't call for
detainment; it calls for having corrective action before the
next port of call, or whatever. It depends on what the serious
nature of that infraction is. So we'll have a menu--menu of the
Port State Control--the most severe of which would be detaining
or denial of entry, but that would have to be for a higher-risk
issue.
But our intent was to fully hold these ships accountable,
and owners accountable. As you know, for safety, we publish a
bad-guys list for classification societies, for ship owners,
for ship operators, and so forth. And based upon past
performance on safety and environment issues, you get on this
list or don't get on the list. And if you're on the list as a,
what we call a priority one, we are all over you on the
inspection regime every time you come in. We're going to do the
same--and it's, by the way, produced incredibly good results,
in terms of driving substandard ships, from a safety
perspective, out of the U.S. trade--we're going to do the same
thing on security.
There's going to be a report card on every vessel. We're
going to publish that worldwide. We're going to exchange that
information worldwide, so there'll be security accountability,
safety accountability, and marine environmental protection
accountability for every ship that comes in. So it's a strong
oversight inspection regime from a Port State Control to ensure
we--and this is about managing risk, and we're going to try to
identify risks, sort the risks, and act appropriately. Denial
of entry is the last resort, of course. But if the risk is high
enough, then you deny entry if the vessel is not complying.
Senator Nelson. Well, I want to suggest, also what's going
to happen is that there are those, such as myself, that have
been raising Cain about increasing the amount of money
appropriated for port security in this country. I mean, what
we've been addressing is the port security in these other
countries. I assume a port like Rotterdam's got enough
financial resources that they're going to be compliant. But you
get into some of these--like this port in Honduras and other
Caribbean nations, they're not going to be compliant. And yet
here in our own country, I have been raising Cain that we're
not putting enough money into our port security.
Now, you know, the National Port Council wants something
like $5 to $7 billion more. I've been trying to get $2 billion
more. And I can't get any support out of the White House for
that. As a matter of fact, there is, in the budget submitted by
the President in this coming year, it's $46 million. Now, they
say it's $1.9 billion, but a huge part of that is actually for
you, which--you have to do a lot of other things, other than
port security, such as interdiction on the high seas, search
and rescue, and so forth.
Admiral Collins. Yes, sir. There's basically--this approach
that we're taking with this regulation is shared responsibility
for this rollout, and shared financial responsibility. The
Federal Government is certainly underwriting a major part of
our operational presence, maritime domain awareness, and all
these other things we're doing, to the tune of the dollars that
you mentioned. Commissioner Bonner's work force, my workforce
is paid by Federal dollars. We're involved in the security
business. That's a Federal investment in the security of our
maritime. The figures that have been quoted earlier about the--
initially $1.5 and $7.3 billion over 10 years, that's the cost
estimated of this regulation, obviously, to state, local,
private sector, in meeting the terms and the standards of the
regulation. There is almost $500 million that's already been,
in terms of grants, distributed to ports, based on their
application. As you noted, there are 46 million dedicated funds
within the 2005 budget.
But I might add that there's also the ability for ports to
apply to ODP within the Department for a larger pot of money.
The total amount of grant money available in 2005 through the
Department, close to 3.5--I think it's 3.4--billion that'll be
administered through the central processing and grant
application to ODP, with the Coast Guard and others still the
expert witness, if you will, on maritime applications. So a
dedicated 46, plus the ability to apply for that larger pot
through general application to ODP.
Senator Nelson. Well, if I may be clairvoyant, my job, of
getting additional money for American port security, is going
to be a lot easier come July 1 because of the outcry that's
going to occur, and that outcry will be translated into
legislative action because of Members of Congress suddenly
hearing about this problem. And not all of the Members of
Congress have districts that are on the coast of the United
States.
A final question. I have the three largest cruise ports in
my state. Now, I know you all have already addressed, here, the
issue of security, the metal detectors, and so forth. But I can
tell you, from having talked to constituents and others that
have recently come on and off of a cruise, that there is not
much checking of the luggage, and particularly not so with
regard to the kinds of plastic explosives that could be put in
luggage and create the same kind of effect that occurred in
Spain on the railroad cars. So this is just another little
headache that you're going to have to address.
Admiral Collins. The cruise--clearly, the--and you're
referring to Port Everglades and obviously the Fort Lauderdale
area and Miami and so forth, that every Friday that's a pretty
busy--those are pretty busy ports as they change out----
Senator Nelson. Miami, Everglades, and Canaveral.
Admiral Collins. Yes, sir. And, of course, that was the one
segment of the maritime industry that, before 9/11, had
comprehensive security plans, by the way--past history of
Achille Lauro and other issues that--that was the one part that
had more robust--that did have a security regime, and the
only--really the only part of the industry that had that type
of a security regime. And right at 9/11, of course, we elevated
the security condition, and there has been 100 percent
screening of baggage and people since 9/11 for the cruise
industry.
We're also working with TSA to see what kind of technology
enhancements and procedural enhancements, based upon their
expertise in screening, needs to be imported----
Senator Nelson. OK, now, on that 100 percent screening, is
that just for metal, or is that for all kinds of explosives?
Admiral Collins. I don't know the answer to that--I might--
maybe----
Senator Nelson. I will tell you the answer.
Admiral Collins. Maybe Administrator----
Senator Nelson. I'll tell you the answer.
Admiral Collins.--Stone would have----
Admiral Stone. I'll partner with Admiral Collins, sir, and
make sure we get you a comprehensive answer on----
Senator Nelson. OK.
Admiral Stone--whether it's just metal or----
Senator Nelson. That's what I'm saying, you're not
screening for----
Admiral Stone. Yes, sir.
Senator Nelson.--plastic explosives. And it's an accident
waiting to happen.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Senator Breaux. Are you not X-raying luggage that comes
onboard cruise ships? I mean, I've visited the cruise ship
terminal, and we looked at what you all were doing, and----
Admiral Collins. It has been a lot--the sophistication of
the equipment at--on the marine terminal is not on the par as
the sophistication at the airports.
Senator Nelson. That's correct.
Admiral Collins. And that's the observation that the
Senator is making.
Senator Breaux. So you could detect if they brought a
pistol onboard, but not if they brought plastic explosives.
Ugh.
Admiral Collins. I'll confirm that, but I'm sure the
Senator is correct----
Senator Breaux. That's not too comforting.
Admiral Collins. The overall level of sophistication and
investment in equipment has not been the same.
Senator Breaux. That's like when they took my little red
Swiss army knife, about this long, away from me when I went
into the Superdome Stadium in New Orleans, but if I could have
walked in with plastic explosives, they never would have caught
it, but they sure caught that one-inch little red knife. I
don't know what I could have done with that.
All right, let me--so you said 145 container screeners now,
Mr. Bonner? What are--can you tell us, what are the container
screeners picking up? I mean, can they pick up anhydrous
ammonia being loaded in a container? That wouldn't really show
up----
Mr. Bonner. Well----
Senator Breaux.--would it? I mean, I don't want to get
into----
Mr. Bonner. They can----
Senator Breaux.--something you don't want to talk about,
but----
Mr. Bonner. They scan--go ahead, Senator.
Senator Breaux. I mean, what do you--what are you picking
up in container screeners that you now have utilized, 145 of
them?
Mr. Bonner. The main thing we're picking up are illegal
drugs, but we--but it has the capability--the X-ray screening
machine, and we use this on a targeted--risk-targeted basis,
but it has the capability of picking up lead-shielded
materials. It has the capability of detecting an anomaly. If
you had a certain--by the way, we're getting advance
information on what's supposed to be in these containers, so if
it says ``ladies apparel,'' and it doesn't look like ladies
apparel, that's anomaly in itself. So it gives us an extra
measure of detection without doing, essentially, a physical
inspection of every container we think poses a potential risk,
for certain kinds of things. I mean, it doesn't--you know,
that's why you have a layered detection strategy, because it--
you know, it wouldn't detect against every possible, let's say,
weapon, particularly if it were relatively small and wasn't--
didn't contrast, let's say, with the density of----
Senator Breaux. It's a----
Mr. Bonner.--in the background of what's in the----
Senator Breaux.--it's a huge----
Mr. Bonner.--what's in the container.
Senator Breaux. Yes, it's a huge problem. I think we've
made some real progress with these container screeners, and--
but like Senator Nelson was talking about, there are some
things that may not even show up on these screeners. I don't
want to talk about it too much in the public; it may give
people ideas about what they can bring in. But, I mean,
obviously this is a concern I hope you all are trying to
address.
Mr. Bonner. Well, we are, and there are layers to this. And
one of the things is--if you're talking about just explosive
materials--of course, is that we have some other technologies.
One is canines that we have trained. As you know, we've had an
excellent canine program at Customs--now it's Customs and
Border Protection--with respect to dogs that sniff out drugs
and even cash. But we've trained, and are training, more
canines that are capable of detecting both potential chemical
weapons, as well as explosive materials with respect to cars or
vehicles or containers that may be crossing our borders. So----
We also have itemizers and some other materials, where we
can take swabs of containers or shipments, and run them, and
very quickly identify whether they have explosive materials in
them.
Now, all of this, by the way, is based upon managing risk
and targeting containers or shipments or vehicles that pose a
potential risk, and identifying that either in advance or at--
when a person or thing presents itself at our ports of entries
into the United States.
Senator Breaux. Well, we want to thank you. We've kept you
all here a long time. There have been a number of requests from
Members about information that we need to have forwarded. Mr.
Stone and Admiral Collins, you both have had requests, and I
would hope that you would be able to promptly respond to those
Members' requests as quickly as you can. And we thank you very
much for being with us.
I'd like to welcome up the next panel. We have, Mr. Chris
Koch, who is President and CEO of the World Shipping Council;
Mr. Gary LaGrange, who is the Executive Director and CEO of the
Port of New Orleans; Dr. James Carafano, who is Senior Research
Fellow for Defense and Homeland Security at the Heritage
Foundation; and Mr. Mike Mitre, who is Director of Coast Port
Security, with the Longshore Division of the International
Longshoremen and Harbor--and Warehouse Union. We're delighted
to have all of you with us and are pleased to receive your
testimony.
Mr. Koch, we have you listed first. Welcome back to the
Committee.
STATEMENT OF CHRISTOPHER KOCH, PRESIDENT AND CEO, WORLD
SHIPPING COUNCIL
Mr. Koch. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
We appreciate the Committee's looking into maritime
security, because it is so important, because so much maritime
commerce is moved by this country--about 200,000 importers a
year are moving their goods through maritime commerce. There
are a comparable number of exporters, all using this industry.
So your oversight is very appreciated.
Just to give you a little framework here, we're talking
about $750 billion worth of goods being moved in and out of
U.S. ports from international commerce. About two thirds of
that is moved by the liner industry in containers. That's about
$1.4 billion worth of cargo a day going through U.S. ports.
That keeps retailers' and grocers' shelves filled, but it also
provides markets for U.S. exporters, and keeps factories
supplied with the components they need.
There are various facets of how the government is trying to
deal with maritime security, and let me just try to identify
them very quickly.
The first is ships. As Admiral Collins described, by July 1
all ships arriving at U.S. ports will have to be compliant with
the ISPS code. In surveying our members, our expectation is
that all our members' ships will be compliant by July 1.
Senator Breaux. I'm sorry to interrupt you. Is that the AIS
system?
Mr. Koch. AIS is one component of the ISPS code. So all the
ships will have that equipment on it, although, as has been
discussed earlier, the Coast Guard has yet to be fully equipped
to receive AIS transmissions at all ports across the country.
As to ports, the ISPS code also requires, by July 1, that
all port facilities have compliant security plans. It's our
understanding that all U.S. container terminals should be ready
by that period of time, but, as also discussed earlier, we do
expect problems in some foreign ports, that not all foreign
ports will be compliant by July 1.
One of the unanswered questions we hope to work with
Customs and Coast Guard on is: After a compliant vessel has
called at a port that is not compliant, what happens to it? And
what happens to the cargo that originates at a noncompliant
port when it arrives in the U.S.? There aren't crystal clear
answers on that. We know we're not suspending trade with those
countries on July 1, and it's going to be an iterative process.
They're going to put pressure on the industry to keep pressure
on these foreign ports. We understand that, too. But we'll need
to work through how that's going to be handled.
There's also a people security piece to this, which we
recognize. TSA is developing a transport worker identification
card for shore-based maritime employees, and other transport
modes. As to seafarers, the U.S. Government's cleaned up its
seafarer list. As to foreign seafarers, they've suspended the
use of crew list visas. Now every seafarer has to get an
individual visa. Vessels are also providing the government
advanced notice of all crew members 96 hours before the vessel
even arrives at U.S. ports, so all crew members are screened
through the various intelligence and information systems that
the government has.
The final piece of this is really the cargo security. And
from the liner industry perspective, that's the more
complicated piece of it, particularly containerized cargo.
There's a lot of cargo, about seven million containers a year
coming into U.S. ports. If we inspect every container, we
obviously have gridlock for commerce. So, as discussed earlier,
the strategy here is that you screen 100 percent of all
containers through the Automated Manifest System, or the
Automated Targeting System, using the 24-hour rule. You deploy
radiation portal screening, so you can screen 100 percent of
all containers for radiation, and we understand the objective
is to have that in place by the end of the year. And then you
physically inspect everything that the Automated Targeting
System says should be inspected. And that's a key component of
this strategy----getting the Automated Targeting System to be
more robust and more effective, because it's the lynchpin in
the strategy. You want to inspect everything that gets kicked
out by ATS.
And then, finally, very importantly, is the CSI initiative.
What we would like to point out is that the Coast Guard had the
advantage of dealing with the IMO, an existing international
organization which can create international rules for ships and
ports.
Commissioner Bonner didn't have the advantage of an
international organization that sets cargo security rules, so
Customs has had to create this through the bilateral agreements
forming the CSI network. And in diplomatic terms, they've done
a great job. They've got 38 ports signed up: 18 are
operational. And it's obviously a work in progress, but a very
essential part of the strategy. So the strategy is good.
There's a lot of hard work going on, at both government and
industry levels, to make it work. A lot of people should get a
lot of credit for where they are. But the challenges now are to
keep going, because we're still at the foundational level--
making ATS more robust, making sure the equipment is there to
inspect not only U.S. ports, but at foreign ports, and to
encourage international cooperation. We should not fall into
the trap of thinking we can solve all problems in the U.S. and
that, everything's going to be done here. This is international
trade, and we need international cooperation and international
standards with our trading partners if we're really going to
get our hands around this.
So there are a lot of issues, including good contingency
planning, which we discuss a little bit in our submitted
testimony. But we think the government's at least on the right
track. It's a question now of keep going and keeping focused on
dealing with what increasingly become more difficult parts of
the challenge.
Thank you.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Koch follows:]
Prepared Statement of Christopher Koch, President and CEO,
World Shipping Council
Introduction
Mr. Chairman, I would like to thank the Committee for the
opportunity to comment on the state of maritime security enhancements.
My name is Christopher Koch, and I am the President and CEO of the
World Shipping Council (WSC). The Council is a non-profit association
of thirty companies that operate forty-four international shipping
lines. WSC's members include the full spectrum of vessel-operating
ocean common carriers, offering containerized, roll-on/roll-off, car
carrier, and other international cargo transportation services. WSC's
members carry approximately ninety-three percent of the United States'
imports and exports transported by the international ocean liner
shipping industry.
International commerce is a huge and economically vital part of our
economy, and liner shipping is an essential facilitator of that trade.
In 2002, approximately 202,800 U.S. importers received goods from more
than 178,200 foreign exporters via liner shipping. The combined value
of U.S. exports and imports of goods moved by international waterborne
trade in 2002 was approximately $728.4 billion. Close to $500 billion,
or two-thirds of that, was containerized cargo carried on liner
vessels. On average, roughly $1.4 billion worth of goods are moved
through U.S. ports by the liner shipping industry each day.
The Council has strongly supported the various efforts of the
government to enhance maritime security, and it will continue to do so.
Whether it has been the Coast Guard's efforts as the lead agency for
vessel and port security, or Customs and Border Protection's efforts as
lead agency for cargo security, the Council has fully supported the
government's strategies in both domestic regulation and in
international fora.
Enhancing maritime security, while maintaining the efficient flow
of commerce, is a very large, complex and multi-faceted task, and this
Committee's oversight of that effort is very appropriate. In my remarks
this morning, I would like to address several different components of
the overall maritime security objective, including enhanced ship
security, port facility security, personnel security, and cargo
security.
I. Ship Security
The Maritime Transportation Security Act instructs the Coast Guard
to establish regulations requiring all vessels calling at U.S. ports to
have vessel security plans. With an upcoming July 1 effective date, all
vessels arriving at U.S. ports will have to be fully compliant with the
new International Ship and Port Facility Security (ISPS) Code and the
amendments to the International Convention for the Safety of Life at
Sea (SOLAS). The Coast Guard deserves considerable credit for
simultaneously and successfully partnering with domestic and
international industry stakeholders, the International Maritime
Organization and other governments, other Federal agencies and the U.S.
Congress to accomplish this. The Coast Guard's approach to the
implementation of the ISPS Code and SOLAS amendments, not only
faithfully implements this new international regime that the Coast
Guard played a key role in creating, but it enhances maritime security
through the use of a consistent, uniform international approach for an
industry, which operates within the jurisdictions of all the maritime
trading nations of the world.
Vessels that are not compliant with the Code by the July 1
effective date will be denied entry to U.S. ports. The Coast Guard
regulations will ensure that every vessel has an approved security
plan, designated and trained personnel responsible for defined security
actions and communications, procedures for communicating with ports and
other vessels, procedures for monitoring and controlling physical
security and access to the vessel, and the installation of Automated
Identification Systems transponders.
While a substantial amount of work is being done to be compliant by
July 1, our Member lines' representatives have identified no
significant problems regarding lines' expectations that their vessels
will be compliant by that time.
We would note that the new rules require most ships to have AIS
transponders installed and operational by July 1,\1\ but that Coast
Guard receiving stations will not be operational by that time in a
number of U.S. port regions, especially along the Atlantic and Gulf
coasts. We believe that the Coast Guard should be given the resources
to make a nationwide AIS system fully operational as soon as possible.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ All vessels larger than 50,000 gross tons are required to
comply by July 1,2004. Vessels less than 50,000gt but larger than 300
gt must comply not later than the first safety survey, but not later
than December 31.
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Finally, we note that while these vessel security plans will
improve internal vessel security and preparedness as intended, they may
be of little defense against an organized, external terrorist attack of
a merchant vessel, such as the attacks on the Limburg or the U.S.S.
Cole.
II. Port Security
The regulations established by the Coast Guard to implement the
requirements of the Maritime Transportation Security Act and the ISPS
Code also require port facilities to be compliant by July 1st. As with
vessel security plans, compliance with these requirements may involve
considerable effort, but, as with vessels, we are unaware of any U.S.
container terminal that does not plan on being compliant by that date.
It would appear likely, however, that not all foreign port
facilities will be compliant on July 1. This may be of particular
concern in some developing countries. It seems clear that the U.S. will
not stop trade with such countries in July; however, the issue is: How
will ISPS compliant vessels be treated by the U.S. Coast Guard and
other nations' maritime authorities when they arrive after having
called during their voyage at a foreign port facility that does not
have an ISPS compliant facility security plan? Vessels calling between
such ports and the cargo on those vessels are caught in the middle. It
is not yet clear what a vessel can expect in these situations.
Similarly, it is currently unclear what consequences shippers
should expect for their cargo that passes through noncompliant
facilities. For example, it is possible that Customs' Automated
Targeting System may assign a higher security risk to cargo containers
transiting through non-ISPS Code compliant facilities, and thus make it
more likely such containers will be held up for inspection. While the
government may be highly reluctant to stop trade with such countries,
we expect it is likely to undertake measures designed to impose
pressure on such ports and governments to comply, and those
consequences may become more substantial as time passes and the
government becomes less tolerant of foreign ports that are not
compliant with the Code. In short, while we fully recognize that the
U.S. and other ISPS Code compliant nations are likely to take actions
that will affect carriers and shippers that move cargo through a non-
compliant foreign port facility, and that such actions are likely to be
designed to ensure, inter alia, that all parties strongly support
efforts by all port facilities to become compliant as soon as possible,
it is unclear at present how these situations will be addressed.
III. Personnel Security
The Transportation Security Administration is developing a
Transport Worker Identification Card for all domestic transport workers
in each transportation mode, which will require government background
checks and biometric identifiers. This system will apply to shore-
based, domestic maritime workers. It is unclear when this system will
become operational, but several pilot projects are underway.
Regarding U.S. and foreign seafarers, the government has undertaken
a number of changes.
First, it reviewed all U.S. seafarers and revoked the licenses of a
number of persons who raised security questions.
Second, for foreign seafarers, effective last August, the use of
crew list visas has been terminated. Each seafarer is required to
obtain an individual visa from a U.S. embassy or consulate, and undergo
a personal interview. If a seafarer does not have an individual visa,
he will be unable to sign on or off the vessel in the U.S. or obtain
shore privileges in the U.S., and the vessel operator may incur
additional costs of posting guards at the vessel gangway.
Third, today information on all crew members is transmitted
electronically to the Coast Guard 96 hours in advance of a vessel's
arrival in a U.S. port, and is provided separately to Customs and
Border Protection (CBP) and is screened through government information
systems. Both agencies and the industry agree that there should be a
``single window'' for the advance electronic filing of such information
that can be shared among government agencies. One of the positive
manifestations of effective coordination within the new Department of
Homeland Security is the recent agreement by the CBP and Coast Guard
that the Coast Guard's electronic notice or arrival (e-NOA) system will
soon be an acceptable ``single window'' system for this purpose and
will be used by both agencies, thus eliminating duplicative filing
requirements. We would like to commend Undersecretary Hutchinson, the
Coast Guard and Customs and Border Protection for their continued
efforts in this regard.
IV. Cargo Security
One of the most complex challenges is the enhancement of cargo
security, especially containerized cargo. The vast majority of liner
cargo is containerized--that is, it is carried in sealed metal
containers from point of origin to destination. These containers come
in standard sizes (typically 20', 40', and 45' in length) and may
include various specialized technologies, such as refrigeration units
for chilled and frozen foods, or internal hanger systems for carrying
garments. Over 20 million TEUs (twenty foot equivalents) of
containerized cargo are imported or exported through U.S. ports per
year. Containers serve, in essence, as a packing crate and in-transit
warehouse for virtually every type of general cargo moving in
international commerce.
Physically inspecting every container is not practicable. Commerce
would be severely disrupted.
A. Cargo Screening and the Automated Targeting System
As a result, Customs has developed and implemented a strategy to
enhance the security of containerized cargo by:
Requiring carriers to provide the agency with advance cargo
manifest information for every container imported into the U.S.
(or stowed aboard a vessel that calls at a U.S. port even
though the cargo may be destined for a foreign country), 24
hours before vessel loading in a foreign port,
Analyzing such information via the agency's Automated
Targeting System (ATS),
Inspecting any container about which ATS raised significant
questions, and
Developing close cooperative working relationships with the
governments of our trading partners through the Container
Security Initiative.
The ATS is thus a central feature in determining which containers
get inspected and in the working relationships that Customs is
establishing with other Federal agencies and with other trading
nations' Customs administrations.
It is noteworthy that with international liner shipping, unlike the
other transportation modes, the government strategy is to perform cargo
security screening before the cargo is even loaded onto the
transportation conveyance coming to the U.S. The ``24 Hour Rule'' has
been implemented without major incident, and Customs has worked closely
and cooperatively with industry to address those issues that have
arisen. The Rule's importance is obvious to the security strategy
described, and ocean carriers have supported Customs' strategic
initiative and the Rule.
Today ATS is populated with carriers' cargo manifest or bill of
lading data, and it utilizes other government data. A significant
pending question is whether the current 14 cargo manifest data elements
are sufficient for the security task at hand. Earlier this year the
complexities of this issue became obvious in the context of Customs'
Trade Act cargo documentation regulations. Customs amended the cargo
manifest regulations' regarding who the carrier should name as the
``shipper'' on its bills of lading that are filed with the agency, out
of a desire to capture information about the identity of an importer's
``foreign vendor, supplier, manufacturer, or other similar party''.
This particular approach to obtaining such information presented
serious problems.\2\
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\2\ For a complete explanation of all the issues created by this
proposal, the Council's petition that was submitted to Customs on
February 2 can be found on the Council's website.
www.worldshipping.org.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The agency recognized the problem that the regulations created,
suspended enforcement of that portion of the regulations, and announced
that it would work with the industry to review these issues. In short,
it acted in a most professional and responsible manner. What remain to
be addressed, however, are some hard issues. While it appears clear
that information about importers' ``vendors, suppliers, and
manufacturers'' is not appropriately obtained by trying to change who
should appear as a ``shipper'' on a transportation contract--a bill of
lading, it is not so readily apparent how such information is best
obtained by Customs if it is to be used in the ATS for security
screening before vessel loading in a foreign port.
Because this is an important issue that is likely to be addressed
this year, I would like to offer some preliminary observations.
One should start by recalling the terms of the law. Section 343 of
the Trade Act requires:
``In general, the requirement to provide particular information
shall be imposed on the party most likely to have direct
knowledge of that information. Where requiring information from
the party with direct knowledge of that information is not
practicable, the regulation shall take into account how, under
ordinary commercial practices, information is acquired by the
party on which the requirement is imposed, and whether and how
such party is able to verify the information.''
In short, the information of interest--an importer's vendors,
suppliers or manufacturers--is clearly information within the ``direct
knowledge'' of the importer, not the carrier. In fact, the importer
today provides this information to Customs in an existing Customs data
system in the merchandise entry process. The difficulty is that this
information is not currently filed before vessel loading in time to be
useful to ATS.
When Customs wanted carriers' manifest information earlier than the
formerly required time of vessel arrival at the U.S. port, the
government established the 24 Hour Rule and required carriers to change
their systems and processes to comply. The same logic might be applied
by requiring shippers to provide Customs with their data before vessel
loading. Although importers may not relish the idea of doing so, such a
process is used for U.S. export cargo.
The threshold issue is whether Customs needs the information about
an importer's suppliers and vendors before vessel loading in order for
ATS to become more effective. There is in fact an over-arching and
broader question that underlies this issue and the effort to make ATS
as effective a cargo security screening system as possible, namely:
What information does the government need, from whom, when, filed into
what information system? Clarity and agreement on this difficult but
fundamental question will be important to understanding what gaps
exist, what the objectives are, and how we can all determine how best
to make the continued progress.
The Trade Act regulations make it appear probable that shippers are
going to be involved in measures to provide the government and the ATS
more advance information about their cargo shipments before vessel
loading. It is also apparent that carriers should not be made into
conduits for transmitting to the government information they don't
know, cannot verify, and could be penalized for if inaccurate.
In addition to the language of the Trade Act, which indicates
carriers should not be the parties filing this kind of information,
there are other aspects of this issue that all sectors of the industry
will need to consider. First, there is the issue of confidentiality. Do
shippers want their supplier and vendor lists given to carriers, and
filed in the public manifest system? Second, early carrier manifest
filing requirements are becoming more prevalent with Customs
administrations around the world. For example, Panama will soon be
implementing an advance cargo manifest filing system very similar to
U.S. Customs' system for every container transiting the Canal,
regardless of whether Panama is the cargo's origin or destination. The
measures taken here in the U.S. on this issue could easily become a
precedent for other nations. Do shippers want their supplier and vendor
lists broadly distributed via carrier manifests? Third, would such
requirements apply to foreign-to-foreign cargo shipments that move on
ships that call U.S. ports or are relayed in bond through U.S. ports?
Because it is highly unlikely, for example, that a European importer of
Latin American goods is going to supply the U.S. government with a list
of its vendors and suppliers just because the ship calls at the Port of
Miami, such a measure applied to such goods could have a substantial
effect on vessel deployments, vessel calls at U.S. ports, and other
service related issues.
In short, Customs has addressed the immediate problem that existed
in the drafting of the existing Trade Act regulations, but the agency
and the industry have yet to determine how the underlying issues will
be addressed.
B. Container Inspections
Today, Customs uses the ATS system to screen 100 percent of all
containers before they are loaded aboard a vessel bound for the U.S. It
then has the ability to inspect, via physical de-vanning of a container
or use of Non-Intrusive Inspection technology (gamma ray or X-ray),
every container that raises a security question. As Customs has refined
ATS, ocean container inspection rates have increased, from less than 2
percent before September 11 to 5.4 percent according to the most recent
reports. That means that Customs is now inspecting almost 400,000 ocean
containers a year. We expect container inspections are likely to
continue to increase. We believe that a numerical objective, however,
should not be the goal. The goal should be to inspect 100 percent of
all containers that ATS says warrant inspection, plus some random
process designed to monitor and verify the selectivity techniques being
used.
How many of these inspections will be performed at U.S. ports and
how many at CSI foreign ports of loading we cannot tell at this time.
Finally regarding container inspections, Customs has stated that
its goal is to establish radiation-screening portals that will perform
radiation screening on 100 percent of all containers transiting U.S.
ports. The implementation of this will be challenging, including
addressing the screening of containers that are loaded onto on-dock
rail cars and do not pass through the terminal gate, but the goal is
clear and appears logical. We also note that some foreign ports are
undertaking similar measures to protect international commerce and that
the Port of Rotterdam is implementing a similar radiation screening
system.
C. Container Security Initiative
I began my testimony by discussing the Coast Guard's implementation
of the new vessel and port facility security plan requirements, which
the agency was instrumental in creating at the International Maritime
Organization. The Coast Guard's strategy and its execution, as well as
its communication and efforts working with the industry, have been
excellent.
Customs, however, has not had the benefit of a comparable
international regulatory organization to work with, so Commissioner
Bonner and his organization have worked with Customs administrations in
other trading nations to develop the Container Security Initiative--a
set of bilateral agreements designed to foster closer cooperation and
more effective security screening of international commerce. It is also
significant that the Department of Homeland Security has reached an
agreement with the European Commission that can promote trans-Atlantic
cooperation and coordination of container security initiatives in
conformity with the CSI approach and objective. We welcome this
development. The importance of CSI should not be underestimated.
Protecting international trade requires international cooperation, and
the Council hopes that all participating governments will implement
these CSI agreements effectively and cooperatively. Of the 38 CSI
ports, 18 are currently operational.
CBP deserves a lot of credit for where it has taken this
initiative, and while we recognize that many details of CSI have not
been spelled out, we would urge the Committee to consider that the
program is still in its developmental stage. Ocean carriers are fully
supportive of these initiatives. In the event governments need to
respond to a terrorist event in this industry, it seems likely that
trade would be irreparably harmed if CSI agreements are not operational
and well implemented
D. Technology and ``Smart'' Containers
As discussed earlier, technology is being improved and deployed
more extensively to enhance container security through non-intrusive
container inspection technologies and through radiation detection.
Government and industry also continue to examine technology that
may be appropriate for application to containers themselves. Operation
Safe Commerce continues to fund projects reviewing such possibilities.
Customs and the Department of Energy continue to review these issues,
as do technology manufacturers, shippers and carriers.
The objective of this exercise is generally stated to be to make
sure that containers are effectively sealed and that one can reliably
detect if they have been tampered with in transit.
The ``sealing'' portion of this exercise does not really involve
sophisticated technology. It requires shippers to seal a container
immediately upon securely stuffing the box with a high security seal.
Electronic seals (e-seals) do not provide any more security in this
regard than a high security manual seal, but they may have a role in
enabling a more efficient way to verify seal integrity.
Consideration of e-seals usually involves the application of Radio
Frequency Identification (RFID) technology, and in fact many of the
products and platforms being marketed as enhancing container security
also rely on that technology. Recent announcements by the Department of
Defense and major retailers concerning the usage of RFID tags on
products have also spurred significant interest in the technology.
It is important to keep in mind, however, that no international
standard exist today for the application of RFID-based e-seals or for
active, read/write RFID tags. Nor has a clear and appropriate
delineation been drawn between the possible usage of RFID technology to
address container security requirements and the possible usage of that
technology to address supply chain management objectives. These are not
trivial issues. The issues, the challenges, and the requirements
involved in addressing the two are not the same. The purposes and the
use are not the same. The technology, operational and information
implications are different. A failure to clearly distinguish between
security requirements and commercial supply chain management objectives
will create confusion; will impede progress on these issues; and may in
fact create significant security vulnerabilities.
There is also the issue of selection of frequency or frequency
bandwidth. It simply would make no sense to select a radio frequency
for RFID platforms that is not publicly available in all major trading
nations. And it would be of little value to the government and industry
if the frequency that is eventually selected were deficient in terms of
operational characteristics, such as requiring line of site to be read,
producing false positives, etc.
The WSC is actively participating in International Standardization
Organization (ISO) working groups tasked with developing standards for
RFID e-seals and tags, and has submitted several papers to the ISO
identifying user requirements for e-seals and a proposed framework for
the optional usage of RFID e-seals and tags.
We have also presented this framework to CBP in response to its
Request For Information (RFI) for ``Smart and Secure Containers''. We
commend CBP for having reached out to affected parties to solicit their
input in this first stage of what we hope will be a comprehensive and
coordinated analysis of the issues involved in trying to identify
technology's role in enhancing container security.
One of the more important and difficult issues in this regard is
understanding and analyzing the information infrastructure and systems
issues necessary to support a technology, whether it be RFID, wireless
or satellite based, including:
What information is generated, who is authorized to generate
it, and is that information necessary for security purposes?
Who collects the information?
What supporting infrastructure the technology requires,
where must it be located, and who operates it?
Who has access to the information?
What is done with the information?
What actions are to be taken, by whom, with respect to the
information?
What are the costs of the technology and its use, and who
incurs them?
How does the technology affect the operations of shippers,
carriers, and the relevant government agencies?
The deployment of any such technology would involve many
international supply chains, international operating systems, the need
for cooperation in other national jurisdictions, and substantial costs.
Consequently, it is essential that government and industry analyze all
the issues to be sure that appropriate and clearly understood
requirements are being defined and met, and that the requirements and
technology are not going to be replaced and the necessary capital
wasted in efforts to implement technology that is really not the best
approach to the issue.
Finally, there is the issue of how ``sensors'' might be applied to
containers. Clarity will be needed on what should be sensed, and where.
For example, is sensing more appropriately done at the port of loading
through centrally operated sensing devices (as is done for radiation
detection as discussed earlier) rather than equipping the world's 16
plus million sea containers with individual sensors, which might be
disabled by a terrorist loading the container?
For devices installed on containers, there is also the issue of
what kind of reading and information infrastructure is needed for these
devices to work.
For example, some question RFID-based technology platforms for
container security application because of their dependence on an array
of ground based readers at multiple yet-to-be defined points in many
facilities, in many different countries, controlled by many different
parties. Increasingly such RFID skeptics are considering whether
satellite and/or wireless technologies may be a potentially superior
way than RFID-based technology to address security requirements as they
are developed. We do not yet know the answer, but these issues need to
be addressed before decisions are made on the deployment of
technologies, which will have significant cost and operational
implications for customs administrations, shippers, carriers, and
terminal operators around the world.
In this regard, Undersecretary Hutchinson recently announced a
significant and important change in the Department of Homeland
Security. Responsibility for the issues of smart and secure container
technology and systems has been moved from the Transportation Security
Administration to the Border and Transportation Security Directorate,
with Customs having a major role in implementation and with TSA having
an advisory role. The BTS Directorate has also announced that it will
soon be establishing a new consultative process with the industry to
help consider and address the issues involved. It is not entirely clear
at this time how the ongoing ``smart'' container analysis within
Customs and within Operation Safe Commerce will be integrated into this
process, but it presumably will be. We look forward to working with
BTS, Customs and TSA on these issues and such a process.
E. Customs Trade Partnership Against Terrorism (C-TPAT)
Secure container loading is the starting point, and arguably the
single, most important point, in the container security process. It is
also the most difficult to address because it involves millions of
containers being loaded and sealed at tens of thousands of different
locations in every country in the world. An ocean carrier is like the
postman; it receives a sealed container for transportation with all the
necessary cargo documentation regarding the shipper, the consignee, and
the cargo, but it has no first hand knowledge of what has been loaded
inside. Unless the carrier is aware of information that arouses its
suspicion about a particular container, it has little choice but to
trust what shipping documents state is in the container and that the
loading process was secure.
The Customs Trade Partnership Against Terrorism (C-TPAT) program is
one way to try to effect improvements in this regard, but this is a
substantial challenge. We expect that the Bureau of Customs and Border
Protection (CBP or Customs) will continue to try to expand the
voluntary C-TPAT program into an initiative that includes manufactures
and suppliers outside the United States, and that it will continue its
efforts to validate compliance.
F. Export Cargo Regulation
Later this year, the Census Bureau is expected to issue new
regulations requiring U.S. exporters to file an electronic Shipper's
Export Declaration (SED) for export vessel cargo directly to the
government via the Automated Export System (AES) no later than 24 hours
prior to vessel departure. Once those regulations are in place, a
carrier may not load export cargo without first receiving from the U.S.
exporter either the electronic SED filing confirmation number or an
appropriate exemption statement. There are expected to be several
exemptions from the advance SED export cargo filing requirement
depending on the value of the shipment, the size and nature of the U.S.
exporter, and possibly also the types of cargo.
G. Imported Food Security
The United States imports approximately $50 billion worth of food
products per year. The Public Health Security and Bioterrorism
Preparedness and Response Act of 2002 requires food facility
registration and requires that prior notification of certain imported
food be provided to the U.S. Food and Drug Administration (FDA) before
its arrival in the United States. The implementing regulations require
facilities throughout the world that produce or hold FDA-regulated food
products shipped to the United States to register with the FDA and have
a U.S. agent. Second, they require every FDA regulated food shipment to
file detailed information about the product prior to its arrival in the
United States, and they identify carriers as the parties through whom
the government will stop cargo that is not compliant with the new
rules.
This is a complicated and extensive new regulatory system that is
being developed, and we would like to commend Customs and Border
Protection for their extensive efforts to assist FDA in making these
new regulations as workable as possible.
V. Contingency Planning
The Department of Homeland Security is now one year old, and is
dealing with a very substantial number of issues. One of the issues
that we hope will be high on the list of priorities for the Department
is the unpleasant topic of contingency planning, or how would trade be
allowed to continue in the event of a terrorist attack on the industry?
The issue first requires clear, agreed and practiced role definition
within and among the various U.S. government agencies. Second, it
requires clear understandings and practiced scenarios with the
governments of our trading partners who presumably will have just as
significant an interest and need to address the continuation of
commerce as the U.S. government. Third, the implementation of any
response scenario would also involve substantial activity by the
private sector--importers, exporters, carriers, brokers, terminal
operators, and others. Having some kind of dialogue and road map of
expectations and requirements would be very helpful to the private
sector. The World Shipping Council's members are fully prepared to
support and participate in any such endeavors.
VI. Conclusion
Mr. Chairman, the above is a brief description of the major
security enhancement initiatives as they affect international liner
shipping. While liner shipping is the largest component of our maritime
commerce, it is important to recognize that there are many other
maritime sectors that are not addressed herein, including the passenger
cruise industry, the bulk and tanker shipping sector, the inland
waterway industry, break-bulk cargo, and small vessels calling at small
facilities. Each sector has its separate and distinct security
challenges.
In the liner shipping sector, enhancing the security of America's
commerce has, in many respects, brought carriers, shippers,
intermediaries and government closer together in addressing a common
threat and dilemma. Simply hoping you are not the victim cannot be the
approach, because a successful terrorist attack would make us all
victims. It would affect every supply chain, every carrier, every port,
and every nation's trade and economy.
While trade and commerce, like many aspects of our society, remain
vulnerable to premeditated criminal, terrorist activity, significant
progress has been made in the last year to enhance the protection of
international trade from the risk of terrorist attack. But this is a
work in progress that must continue. Each of the initiatives discussed
above, involving ships, port facilities, people, cargo security, cargo
screening, inspection, and risk assessment capabilities is an important
part of a multi-layered effort to enhance the security of international
commerce. It is a complex and multi-faceted security infrastructure
that is being built, but we now live in a world where it must be built,
and all sectors of industry and all trading nations must work together
to help create it.
We should also recognize that the security infrastructure we are
trying to build to prevent terrorists from using or attacking
international maritime trade needs to be robust enough to function as
the security infrastructure that will be used to keep trade flowing in
response to a transportation security incident.
The security infrastructure thus must not only be effective in
design, but all the players' roles and responsibilities in that system
should be clear. Ambiguity in the face of difficult questions is quite
understandable, but it neither advances effective security, nor helps
government or industry understand what it needs to do to adapt to meet
these evolving needs.
We are making substantial progress in enhancing the security of
international trade. The system is certainly more secure now than it
was two years ago. It will be even more secure next year. We fully
recognize that it is a difficult challenge, and that industry and
government must work closely together to meet the challenge. There are
no good alternatives to open, constructive dialogue and the joint
development of effective solutions to shared challenges. We would like
to state for the record that the agencies responsible for maritime
security, particularly the Coast Guard and Customs and Border
Protection, have consistently worked closely with the industry in these
efforts. The international liner shipping industry fully understands
and supports working as closely as possible with the government to make
commerce more secure in a way that is sustainable and does not unduly
impede trade.
Senator Breaux. Thank you, Mr. Koch.
Mr. Gary LaGrange, Gary, welcome, glad to have you here.
STATEMENT OF GARY P. LaGRANGE, EXECUTIVE
DIRECTOR AND CEO, BOARD OF COMMISSIONERS,
PORT OF NEW ORLEANS
Mr. LaGrange. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, it's a pleasure,
indeed, and to all the other Members of the Committee.
And, Senator Nelson, I assure you, in Louisiana, at the
Port of New Orleans, we share the same sentiments with you
about Cortez and Limon and all of the other many Central
American and Caribbean ports.
My first day on the job at the Port of New Orleans as CEO
was September 10, 2001, and I can assure you that, on that day,
when I showed up in New Orleans to take the job, security--port
security, in particular--wasn't on the top 20 list of anything
that we needed to accomplish. Since that time, all of our lives
have changed in many respects and in many ways.
Senator Breaux, I was fortunate enough to sit in and to
testify at a Committee hearing that you had at the Port of New
Orleans early on in this venture. And since that time, I do
have to admit much has happened. But not enough has happened,
and that's for the simple reason that adequate wherewithal has
not been provided, and we basically have been playing
centerfield on one leg as best we can, and I think that's true
from the top all the way down to the bottom.
The implementation aspects of things that we have--have
occurred not so much from a Federal level, where we've received
approximately $8 million in the first two rounds out of a need
for $60 million identified in our vulnerability assessment; an
assessment, which, by the way, was ongoing at the time of 9/11,
copycatting the Florida Ports Council, if you will, who had
done an excellent job in taking a leadership role of what to do
and what to identify.
Where it has happened and where it has occurred is really
in providing more of a coordinated role, more of a vigilant
role, more of a role of being acknowledged and aware of what's
going on around you. There have been a number of agencies, a
number of groups that have been formed, which we participate in
on a weekly basis. The United States Coast Guard Area Maritime
Security Executive Committee, the Region 1 Area Security
Initiative membership, the FBI Joint Anti-Terrorism Task Force
membership, all of those groups meet at least on a twice-a-
month basis, and we're actively involved with our 90-plus
harbor policemen and our security department, and working in a
coordinated vein with them.
As I said, much has happened; however, not enough has
happened. The $8 million that we have received from the Federal
level is tantamount to receiving a tube of toothpaste, but no
toothbrush. Basically, we have a situation where we've had four
perimeter gates, as an example, to our new uptown docks and our
new container terminal that's just been completed at a cost of
$120 million, and those four gates, which were partially funded
are absolutely meaningless to us at this point, because we, in
essence, got the funds that we needed for approximately one
third of each gate. One third of each gate just simply doesn't
serve the purpose that we need.
Much of our activities are self-funded. Twenty-five percent
of the Port of New Orleans budget now is dedicated strictly to
maritime safety and security, anti-terrorism efforts. We've
sent officers to anti-terrorism school in Georgia. They've come
back. We've created an anti-terrorism division, which is
performing quite well, within the port. But all of that is not
without--it's not free. Five and a half million dollars a year
has been added to our budget from an operational standpoint
alone, as well as another million to a million and a half in
operational expenses for equipment and so on and so forth on an
annual basis.
Where does the money come from? It's not coming from the
Federal Government. It comes from our ability to build future
infrastructure that we need to placate the original meaning and
idea of a port, to facilitate commerce and the movement of
commerce. And in doing that, it's a significant part, much like
Florida, at the Port of New Orleans, which is at the mouth of
the Mississippi River, it serves 32 states. Sixty-two percent
of the consumer-spending public in the United States is
represented via the Mississippi River and its tributaries.
Along with that, 62 percent of all grain exported out of the
United States goes through the Port of New Orleans, and 19
percent of all petrochemical products that come into the United
States come into the Port of New Orleans, on the import side.
Senator as you have mentioned and alluded to earlier, on
Mardi Gras weekend, on February 21, Saturday morning, 6 a.m.,
in a fog-shrouded Mississippi River, there was a collision with
a container ship coming in and an oil fuel supply boat on the
outbound side. The supply boat cut across the bow,
unfortunately, of the container vessel, immediately sank; and,
unfortunately, five lives were lost in that collision.
That is something that possibly could have been prevented.
I, for one, believe that it could have, with the completion of
the VTS. That VTS system is in progress, and it's being
completed, and only two radar sites remain to be completed with
it; and, of course, all of affiliated tests that go hand-in-
glove with it.
In the Mississippi River, over 5,000 ships a year come in
to the river, and there are over 400,000 barge movements, which
go hand-in-glove to placate the inland ports at Pittsburg and
Louisville and Chicago and St. Louis and Memphis and Tulsa.
All of that said, 2 days after the river reopened,
Secretary Ridge was in the Port of New Orleans office
commemorating the first anniversary of him becoming Secretary
of Homeland Security. And the question begged by the
Secretary--that was only a small 140-foot vessel; what if it
was a 3,000-passenger Conquest-size cruise ship instead? What
would the ramifications have been? Or, better yet, as we gazed
out of my office at the Crescent City Connection, the bridge
that connects--goes over the river in downtown New Orleans--
what if some bird shows up and decides to bring these bridges
down? What happens to the movement of commerce into inner-
America, mid-America and up into the Northeast? Those are
questions that are yet today unanswered, and I'm not sure that
we really want the answer.
As I said, it's an integral role. We feel as though New
Orleans is in an integral position. But so is every other port.
The port director from Long Beach, California, just mentioned
to me yesterday at a meeting, two private airplanes collided
over the entrance to the Long Beach Harbor. Thank God it didn't
stop traffic. Thank God it didn't stop the waterways and the
movement of commerce. But at any given port anywhere--your port
in Miami, Everglades, Canaveral, Tampa, any other them--you
close that harbor, and you've shut off a significant amount of
commerce to a lot of people.
Senator Nelson. [presiding]. The Skyline Bridge----
Mr. LaGrange. Yes, sir.
Senator Nelson.--over the mouth, coming into the Port of
Tampa.
Mr. LaGrange. Exactly. How well we recall.
[The prepared statement of Mr. LaGrange follows:]
Prepared Statement of Gary P. LaGrange, Executive Director and CEO,
Board of Commissioners, Port of New Orleans
I want to thank Chairman McCain and Senator Hollings for calling
this hearing and continuing to shed light on the issues of port
security. I also would like to thank Senator John Breaux for his
tireless support of the Port of New Orleans and the maritime industry
throughout the United States. We will deeply miss Senator Breaux's
advice and counsel when he leaves the Senate at the end of this year.
Since reporting to the Committee two years ago, the Port of New
Orleans, along with many other U.S. ports, has made significant port
security enhancements. The Port has accomplished all previously
enumerated goals and objectives that could be undertaken
administratively by its staff. The following security enhancement and/
or regulatory compliance requirements have been completed:
Increased Security to Heightened MARSEC/National Alert
Levels
Federal Grant Application Initiatives
Federal Grant Project Award Management
Port Vulnerability Assessment
Harbor Police Department Anti-Terrorism WMD Manual
Increased Cruise Terminal and Waterside Security
U.S. Coast Guard Area Maritime Security Executive Committee
Membership
Region One Urban Area Security Initiative Membership
FBI Joint Anti-Terrorism Task Force Membership
Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) ``Operation Check
Down'' Initiatives
MTSA Facility Security Plan
Metal Detection Equipment Enhancements
The Port has completed or is in the process of completing necessary
infrastructure enhancements with funding assistance made available by
the Federal Government. The Port has dutifully absorbed all personnel,
operations and maintenance costs related to security improvements,
including overtime for heightened level alert periods. The impact of
increased security costs on port authorities is significant and must be
addressed. It is the primary reason that Federal funding assistance
must not only be continued, but increased to meet the level of funding
needed to address security concerns demonstrated by the Port
Vulnerability Assessments completed by ports throughout the United
States and submitted to the U.S. Coast Guard. These assessments
document U.S. ports' numerous areas of weakness and, consequently,
their susceptibility to criminal and terrorist activities. The
preparation, distribution and review of these assessments, albeit as
protected SSI (Security Sensitive Information) documents, may actually
result in increased port vulnerability, if the steps required to
mitigate identified weaknesses are not taken within a ``reasonable''
period of time. Therefore, Congress and the Bush Administration should
act immediately to provide funding at levels sufficient to enable port
authorities to meet the increased financial burden associated with
increased security costs as well as the mandates of the Maritime
Transportation Security Administration which become applicable on July
1, 2004.
As stated, during the past two years, the Port of New Orleans has
accomplished many of the goals listed in its previous report. To date,
the Port has applied for more than $33 million in Federal grant
funding. The following awards have been received
TSA I Upriver Gate Access $3.5 million Project ongoing
TSA I Cruise Terminal $184,450 Project
Fencing completed
TSA II Cruise Terminal $600,000 Project ongoing
Lighting/Monitoring
TSA II Signs, barricades, $50,000 Project ongoing
barriers
TSA II Metal detectors $15,000 Project
completed
DHS Upriver Perimeter $3.4 million Project ongoing
Enhancements
DOJ/Tech. Video $52,000 Project
Teleconferencing completed
DOJ/COPS Hiring Grant $212,351 3 Officers over
3 years
DOJ/COPS Overtime Grant $37,500 Req. -0- Award
TSA II 8 Projects $5.5 mil. Req. -0- Award
The Port of New Orleans anticipates contributing matching funding
for these projects totaling approximately $1.2 million. (This is in
addition to an annual Safety and Security Division operating budget of
$ 5.5 million and a capital equipment budget of $275,000.) The Port
intends to apply for additional funding through the Round III Federal
grant initiative. However, the President's proposed Fiscal Year 2005
budget of $46 million for port grant funding is not sufficient to meet
port security funding requirements. It is worth noting, that this
figure represents a significant reduction in available grant funding
because infrastructure improvements or new construction projects, which
were included in previous rounds, are now listed as ``ineligible'' in
the Round III guidelines. Nearly $5.4 million in security enhancements
were not funded in the Port's previous grant application. This amount
alone comprises eight percent of the President's proposed budget. None
of the grant projects included in Round III attempts to address the
prohibitive costs of providing infrastructure improvements and
associated equipment, maintenance and staffing costs (as opposed to
installation or replacement enhancements) which result directly from
elevated security requirements.
The American Association of Port Authorities estimates that $400
million in funding is called for in FY `05. The latest U.S. Coast Guard
forecast estimates the cost for total MTSA compliance to be $1.125
billion for the first year and $5.4 billion over the next 10 years.
Numerous administrative or procedural MTSA mandates must also be
addressed and clarified. The most glaring example is the TWIC
(Transportation Worker Identification Card) concept for ports.
Information concerning the status of the TWIC initiative is all too
often illusive, sketchy and most of all inconsistent. The Port of New
Orleans, like many ports, has deferred initiating a card access project
because the ``start-up'' (staffing for processing, distribution,
enforcement and administration); equipment; and software costs are
extremely high and this is without the assistance of a paid consultant.
A recent article in the Winter, 2004, Port Illustrated discusses the
TWIC pilot program in Wilmington, Delaware. The pilot program began in
July, 2003, and is scheduled to run for 15 months, extending beyond the
July, 2004, MTSA compliance deadline, and leaving ports without firm
guidelines. To date, no directives or guidelines which address the need
or requirement for a biometric component of TWIC have been issued. As a
result, ports will be forced to purchase more expensive card access
systems which will be able to accommodate features which, ultimately,
may not even be required.
The Port of New Orleans will submit a grant application for all
eligible unfunded security initiatives, ranging from training and
exercises to communication system upgrades and patrol vessels used to
supplement Coast Guard patrols and response. The price tag for these
initiatives is currently being estimated at approximately $50 million
dollars.
Port executives remain committed to securing additional funding for
security initiatives from both self-generated revenues and Federal
funding sources. Now, more than ever, port executives truly understand
that the safety and security of our Nation's waterways will forever be
a paramount component of port operations.
The vessel collision that occurred at the mouth of the Mississippi
River on February 21 of this year provides a poignant example of the
potential economic havoc that could be visited upon this Nation by a
terrorist act. In this unfortunate incident, the sinking of a
relatively small vessel in the busy Southwest Pass resulted in a four-
day closure of the main international shipping channel into the
Mississippi River and the delay of 158 ocean-going vessels. The closure
was absolutely necessary to conduct search and rescue and recovery
operations followed by removal of the vessel. Our thoughts go out the
families of the five seamen who lost their lives.
After removal of the sunken vessel, the backlog of ship traffic was
cleared and shipping returned to normal within three and a half days.
Estimates are that this incident caused approximately $17 million in
direct losses and $68 million in overall negative economic impacts. Not
only were ships delayed, but three container cargo ships and three
cruise vessels had to be diverted to other ports. Thousands of
passengers were bussed to other Gulf Coast ports which were ill-
equipped to handle them on such short notice. The cruise lines incurred
thousands of dollars in ground transportation costs and reimbursements
to passengers for the loss of their vacations.
With more than 5,000 ocean-going vessel calls on the Mississippi
River annually, the importance of this waterway system to the Nation's
economy is readily apparent. The nation's economy would experience
severe consequences from a prolonged closure of the Mississippi River
to deep draft navigation. In 2002, the ports of the Lower Mississippi
River from the Gulf of Mexico to Baton Rouge handled 227 million tons
of foreign waterborne commerce valued at nearly $40 billion and
representing 18.1 percent of the Nation's international waterborne
commerce. American producers exported 27 percent of total U.S. exports
out of lower Mississippi River ports.
Included in this total are agricultural products from 17 midwestern
states exported from the 10 grain elevators located on the lower
Mississippi River, making up more than 62 percent of total U.S. Grain
Exports. More than 92 million tons of petroleum and petroleum products
are imported to Louisiana facilities on the Mississippi River system,
comprising nearly 16 percent of all U.S. waterborne imports of
petroleum and related products.
This collision and its consequences clearly demonstrates the need
for the timely completion of all elements of the of the Vessel Traffic
Service (VTS) on the lower Mississippi River to facilitate safe and
secure vessel operations. Ports and industries along the lower
Mississippi are poised to reap the considerable benefits of the new
state-of-the-art VTS being implemented by the U.S. Coast Guard. All
facets of the maritime community have been involved in this
unprecedented multi-year cooperative venture with the Coast Guard. The
system, for the most part, is up and running on a test basis out of the
Coast Guard's Vessel Traffic Center on the river front in New Orleans.
Two more radar sites must be installed and the system must be subjected
to formal testing procedures, involving both the computer simulation
and real world tests with a large number of vessels on the waterway
equipped with VTS transponders.
VTS New Orleans will enhance both safety and security of the
largest port complex in the world. The Coast Guard will be able to
identify and track the movements of all ocean-going vessels and most
other commercial vessels moving on the lower Mississippi. Tracking will
begin prior to a ship's entrance to the river and will extend up river
beyond the limit of deep draft navigation at Baton Rouge. Mariners will
be given a powerful new tool to assist safe navigation in the busiest
waterway in the Nation. Existing radar only provides a very limited
view of the river and is particularly hampered by the river's twists
and turns. Mariners depend on extensive use of radio communication with
other vessels to determine navigation conditions, but radio
communication, as seen in the recent vessel collision, is not always
reliable. VTS will provide a detailed, real-time picture of vessel
movements on the waterway, including vessel identification, as well as
provide a method for communicating waterway conditions and special
alerts to all mariners. VTS will not be blinded by bends in the river
or by fog or darkness.
We have to thank the Coast Guard for its perseverance in bringing
VTS to our ports and waterways, and Louisiana Senator John Breaux for
his tireless championing of VTS, especially for his insistence on
expediting VTS carriage requirements for vessels. A final notable
attribute of VTS is that as currently programmed it comes at no cost to
the Port. The Port's emergency response vessel, which assists the U.S.
Guard and responds to every level of waterway emergency and service, is
scheduled to be have the system installed at no cost to the Board.
In conclusion, now is not the time for Congress to lose its zeal in
the war against terrorism on the domestic front. Extending the deadline
for compliance with security measures without providing necessary
additional funding is not the answer. The nation's ports, like its
airports, simply cannot by themselves bear the financial burden of
added security costs, especially during these volatile economic times.
From the beginning of this regulatory process, port executives have
pleaded that no security mandates be issued without the proper funding.
The mandates are here. Please ensure that adequate funding is too.
Senator Nelson. Thank you, Mr. LaGrange.
Mr. LaGrange. Thank you, sir.
Senator Nelson. Dr. Carafano?
STATEMENT OF DR. JAMES JAY CARAFANO,
SENIOR RESEARCH FELLOW, DEFENSE AND HOMELAND SECURITY, THE
HERITAGE FOUNDATION
Dr. Carafano. Thank you. I have a lengthy statement, which
I've submitted for the record, which I'd just like to briefly
summarize.
The Heritage perspective of our research agenda is to
always look at the strategic problem, because we think this is
going to be a long, protracted war. And I actually think we
could take a lesson from the Cold War here. You need the same
kind of strategy, and it's got to have three parts, and you
have to have offense and defense--one, because, you know,
you've got to take the initiative; two, the bad guys are always
going to get through, so you have to deal with the leakers.
But, at the same time, you have to continue to grow the
economy. And so if you have a strategy that doesn't promote
economic growth, then you have a failed strategy, because
that's what enables you to endure and win in a protracted
conflict while you ride the other guy into history. And the
third is, you have to protect civil liberties and privacy at
the same time, because that's the foundation of stability of
the country. And, in essence, that's what you're fighting for.
And our agenda says, basically, our research looks at it,
and if you don't have a solution, a security solution that does
all three--security, economic growth, and protect civil
liberties and privacy--then you have the wrong answer. Go back
and start over.
And so with that in mind, what I tried to do was to briefly
look at the different efforts in the maritime security area, up
against the national security strategy, and look and see where
there were questions, concerns, or problems that I wanted to
highlight to the Committee.
Before I do that--by definition, these are negative kind of
comments, because I'm looking for gaps and holes. And I don't
want to belittle or neglect the great work that DHS has done. I
think they've made remarkable progress in the last year. I
think the guys on the ground are terrific. I mean, in all the
ports I've been to--I was in Miami recently, and I walked the
line at the cruise-ship terminal with a young Coast Guard
officer, and every place you went, every person that we talked
to, no matter what their badge was, no matter what patch they
had on their shoulder, he knew every one of those guys by their
first name. And it's clear that on that pier, those people are
working together and cooperating and are concerned about
security.
And I'd also--I think--don't think we can neglect the great
work that this Committee has done. I think the MTSA act has
been a great foundation for establishing a homeland security
program.
I'd just like to very briefly highlight some of the points
that I identify in the testimony. One of the components in the
MTSA act was a requirement for--within the Department of
Transportation, to examine and certify a means of providing
secure commerce and transport. That doesn't necessarily mean
regulatory means. It could be alternatives to the structure
that we have with CSI and C-TPAT and these other things. And
that's not to say that they're bad, but I think that we ought
to have something in the Department that's looking at
alternative ways for--to secure intermodal transportation.
First of all, it's going to take years for the whole CSI
system to be put in place. And even then, we don't really know
if it's going to work. Second is, you know, we're not--there's
no--we have no confidence that regulatory systems are going to
keep up with economic and technological developments. Other
people could come up with better, faster, and cheaper ways to
do this. And, third, I think we really have to think about the
day that something catastrophic does happen, because we'll do
exactly what we did with the airlines; we'll close every port
in the United States down, and commerce will grind to halt. And
if we don't have plans and programs and public/private plans in
place to figure out how we can get Wal-Mart goods going again,
not just to get the economy rolling, but to get people the
confidence that this Nation is still going on, then we're going
to have a problem. So I do think that we need to look at
alternatives for secure intermodal security that the private
sector could propose, that DHS could validate, and that could
either be used or put on the shelf for times of emergency.
Another area that we need to look at is law enforcement.
How can we buildup law enforcement capacity in the maritime
domain? And just one issue I'd like to point out very quickly
is some great initiatives in the Coast Guard. Sea marshal
program, great initiative. Also, if you look at their Maritime
Security Office, they've done a lot more, in terms of using
their investigators for counterterrorism and security issues.
But, in either case, they have human capital programs. There
aren't development programs, there aren't ways to grow and
maintain these people. And there's no plan on how they really
integrate with the other law enforcement activities in DHS. You
know, for example, for a maritime security officer--
investigative officer, you have to be in place 20 months. But
you don't have to be an investigator for 20 months; you could
be a safety officer for 19 months, and an investigator for one.
Only 5 percent of the investigators do a follow-on assignment,
so all the expertise that they gain is really lost. So I do
think that there is work to be done, in terms of looking at the
law enforcement capacity that we have available in the maritime
realm, and how we could expand that.
Another area is unity of effort at the ports. The port
captain, the port authority director, and the Customs
enforcement person all have clear responsibilities. In most of
these ports, they all have different command posts, so I'm not
really sure how we have unity of effort. I'm not really sure we
have a plan that really looks at, Do we need to bring these
guys into one command post? Do we need to have redundant
command posts? Do we need to have virtual command posts? And
have we really looked at how we could enhance that?
And the final point I'd just like to make is on
organization. I mean, when we created Department of Defense,
what became the Department of Defense in 1947, I mean,
everybody knew we weren't going to get it right. You know, we
went back in 1949, and we passed a law that kind of cleaned up
the bill--the Department a bit. We missed some of the hard
issues, like jointness. And it only took us 50 years to get it
right after that. I think everybody should have an expectation
that we need to go back at some point and rethink the
Department of Homeland Security and see if we really have it
right. And I think the area of maritime security is clearly one
that should be looked at.
I mean, one of the issues that I've found is, one of the
reasons why I think the pieces all don't quite come together,
is, we don't really have a true national maritime security
strategy. And you need a national strategy to really help you
make the hard choices. Do I need to put more money into the
port security grants, or is that money better spent on
Deepwater? And I don't think it's--unless we have that, that we
really can move forward in a very proactive and systematic way.
And to the question of--we have TSA, we have ICE, we have
Coast Guard and Department of Defense. All potentially have a
big role here. Do we really have the roles and missions right?
Do we really have somebody who we can put our finger on and
just say, ``You're in charge of making this happen?'' That's a
tough thing, but I think that eventually that's an issue we
need to go back and revisit.
Thank you.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Carafano follows:]
Prepared Statement of Dr. James Jay Carafano, Senior Research Fellow,
The Heritage Foundation
Mr. Chairman and other distinguished Members, I am honored to
testify before the Committee today.\1\ Appraising the status of
national efforts to enhance maritime security is a vitally important
task. In my testimony, I would like to assess the progress that has
been made in each of the areas related to implementing the national
homeland security strategy, examine organizational issues that will
affect the long-term development of a national maritime security
regime, and reconsider the need for standards and metrics to evaluate
preparedness and guide future efforts and investments.
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\1\ The Heritage Foundation is a public policy, research, and
educational organization operating under Section 501(C)(3). It is
privately supported, and receives no funds from any government at any
level, nor does it perform any government or other contract work. The
Heritage Foundation is the most broadly supported think tank in the
United States. During 2003, it had more than 200,000 individual,
foundation, and corporate supporters representing every state in the
U.S. Its 2003 income came from the following sources:
Individuals 52%
Foundations 19%
Corporations 8%
Investment Income 18%
Publication Sales and Other 3%
The top five corporate givers provided The Heritage Foundation with
5 percent of its 2003 income. The Heritage Foundation's books are
audited annually by the national accounting firm of Deloitte & Touche.
A list of major donors is available from The Heritage Foundation upon
request. Members of The Heritage Foundation staff testify as
individuals discussing their own independent research. The views
expressed are their own, and do not reflect an institutional position
for The Heritage Foundation or its board of trustees.
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The Challenge--Consequences, Size, and Scope
There are three reasons why the subject of maritime security
requires national attention.
First, the importance and vulnerability of the maritime
domain cannot be overestimated. As you well know, 95 percent of
U.S. overseas trade traffics the maritime domain. In addition,
many major population centers and critical infrastructure are
in proximity to U.S. ports or accessible by waterways. Maritime
security also has a critical national security dimension.\2\
The economic, physical, and psychological damage that might
result from a significant terrorist attack targeting maritime
commerce or exploiting America's vulnerability to strikes from
the sea \3\ is difficult to estimate. The September 11
terrorist attack on New York incurred well over $100 billion in
losses to the U.S. economy alone.\4\ Given the Nation's
overwhelming dependence on ocean-going commerce, a similar
sudden, unexpected attack in the maritime domain might easily
exceed these costs. The United States lacks sufficient means to
respond to maritime attacks with catastrophic consequences.
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\2\ The overwhelming bulk of American military power is still moved
around the world by ship. Most military supplies and hardware move
through only 17 seaports. Only four of these ports are designated
specifically for the shipment of arms, ammunition, and military units
through DOD-owned facilities. For an overview of the military's
reliance on ports and associated security risks, see U.S. General
Accounting Office, ``Combating Terrorism: Preliminary Observations on
Weaknesses in Force Protection for DOD Deployments Through Domestic
Seaports,'' GAO-02-955TNI, July 23, 2002. See also U.S. General
Accounting Office, ``Combating Terrorism: Actions Needed to Improve
Force Protection for DOD Deployments Through Domestic Seaports,'' GAO-
03-15, October 2002, pp. 5-10.
\3\ For a discussion of threats, see James Jay Carafano, ``Budgets
and Threats: An Analysis of Strategic Priorities for Maritime
Security,'' Heritage Foundation Lecture No. 791, June 16, 2003, at
www.heritage.org/Research/HomelandDefense/HL791.cfm.
\4\ Estimates of the damage wrought by the 9/11 attack vary
depending on the criteria used. Insurance Information Institute set the
initial cost at $40 billion. Insurance Information Institute,
Catastrophes-Insurance Issues-Part 1 of 2, January 9, 2002, np. A study
by the Federal Reserve Bank of New York put the cost at $33-36 billion.
The Federal Reserve Bank's estimate included only immediate earning
loses, property damage, and clean-up and restoration costs through June
2002 and did not cover long-term productivity and tax revenue losses.
Jason Bram, et al., ``Measuring the Effects of the September 11 Attack
on New York City,'' FRBNY Economic Policy Review, Vol. 8, No.
2(November 2002), p. 5. The City of New York Comptroller set the total
economic impact on the city at between $82.8 and $94 billion.
Comptroller, City of New York, One Year Later: The Fiscal Impact of 9/
11 on New York City (New York: City of New York, September 4, 2002), p.
1. The U.S. General Accounting Office reported that it believed the
most accurate assessment places the total direct and indirect costs at
$83 billion. U.S. General Accounting Office, Impact of Terrorist
Attacks on the World Trade Center, GAO-02-7000R, May 29, 2002, p. 2. In
addition, Wilbur Smith Associates estimated the long-term costs of the
9/11 attacks resulting from reduced commercial aviation range from
$68.3 to 90.2 billion. Wilbur Smith Associates, ``The Economic Impact
of Civil Aviation on the U.S. Economy--Update 2000,'' (2002).
Second, the size of the maritime security challenge is as
daunting as the terrible consequences of a serious attack. The
figures often cited are well-rehearsed: maritime security
involves hundreds of ports, thousands of miles of coastline,
tens-of-thousands of commercial and private craft, and millions
of shipping containers. Even these figures, however, do not
describe the magnitude of the maritime domain, which is truly
global in nature, encompassing every ocean and the peoples and
property of many nations.\5\ Current initiatives, even when
fully implemented, may be inadequate to address the global
challenges of maritime security.
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\5\ See, for example, Daniel Y. Coulter, ``Globalization of
Maritime Commerce: The Rise of Hub Ports,'' Globalization and Maritime
Power, ed. Sam. J. Tangredi (Washington, D.C.: National Defense
University Press, 2002), pp. 133-142.
Third, maritime security is truly a complex strategic
problem encompassing a physical domain, land-based critical
infrastructure, intermodal means of transportation, and
international supply chains that covey goods, services, and
passengers. The National Strategy for Homeland Security, issued
by the Bush Administration in July 2002, identified six
critical mission areas. These areas were established to focus
Federal efforts on the strategy's objectives of preventing
terrorist attacks, reducing America's vulnerabilities to
terrorism, and minimizing the damage and recovering from
attacks that do occur. The components of maritime security cut
across each of these functions.\6\ Only a strategic solution
can provide the comprehensive regime required to address such a
complex strategic problem. The United States still lacks such
an adequate, overarching approach to the challenges of maritime
security.
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\6\ White House, National Strategy for Homeland Security, 2002, pp.
15-46.
While these challenges are indeed daunting, I would like to start
off by commending Secretary Ridge and the entire Department of Homeland
Security (DHS) on the work that has been done over the last year in the
area of maritime security. The war on terrorism is likely to be a long,
protracted conflict, and the DHS has the difficult task of being on
watch right now against possible terrorist threats and building a
robust homeland security system that must stand for decades. While the
Nation's current maritime security regime is inadequate to meet long-
term U.S. strategic needs, it represents a significant improvement over
the pre-9/11 state of preparedness. The DHS has achieved a lot given
the short time frame of its existence and the magnitude of the task it
faces. Likewise, Congress has performed yeoman's service as well. The
Maritime Security Act (MTSA) of 2002 produced major changes in the
Nation's approach to maritime security and, I believe, provided much of
the legislative foundation required to implement robust national
programs. But, there is more work to be accomplished. Rather than
dwelling on what has been done well, I believe it is more important to
focus on what can be done better.
A Strategic Assessment
One of the most important actions taken by President Bush's
administration in the wake of the September 11 attacks on New York City
and Washington was establishing a national homeland security strategy.
In turn, the strategy defined the six critical missions required to
protect U.S. citizens from transnational terrorism. I would like to
review each in turn, highlighting where cautions or questions are in
order.
Intelligence and Early Warning. The first critical mission area is
intelligence and early warning. It includes activities related to
detecting terrorists and disseminating threat information and warning.
It is widely recognized that promoting intelligence sharing across the
public and private sectors is the greatest challenge in this critical
mission area. Effective intelligence sharing is a prerequisite for
exploiting the full potential of national capabilities to respond to
potential terrorist threats.\7\ The emerging national maritime system
certainly faces this challenge. However, intelligence and early warning
in the maritime domain faces an additional obstacle. The United States
lacks adequate situational awareness of activities in U.S. coastal
waters and waterways.
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\7\ Among the recent initiatives by the DHS to improve information
sharing is the announcement of the establishment of the Homeland
Security Information Network (HSIN). HSIN will link states,
territories, and major urban areas to the Homeland Security Operations
Center through the Joint Regional Information Exchange System (JRIES).
Initially, the system will be limited to sensitive-but-unclassified
information, but in the future it is intended to carry secret
information to the state level. A collaborative tool such as HSIN is
essential for effective information sharing. Extending HSIN to major
ports within the United States as a priority might significantly speed
efforts to enhance public-private information sharing in the maritime
domain. For a discussion of major challenges in intelligence sharing
see, James Jay Carafano, ``The Homeland Security Budget Request for FY
2005: Assessments and Proposals,'' Heritage Foundation Backgrounder No.
1731, March 5, 2004, at www.heritage.org/Research/Homeland
Defense/bg1731.cfm.
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While the U.S. Coast Guard recognized the critical importance of
maritime domain awareness even before the 9/11 attacks,\8\ current
plans for enhancing domain have matured little. For example, the Vessel
Traffic Service (VTS) was established in 1972 to improve navigation
safety by organizing the flow of commercial maritime traffic. There are
10 VTS areas scattered throughout the United States. These provide
limited coverage of the maritime domain. In 1996, Congress required the
Coast Guard to reassess future VTS requirements. This initiative
resulted in the development of the Ports and Waterways Safety System
(PAWSS), which is now in the process of being employed. MTSA requires
most large commercial craft and vessels on international voyages to
have Automatic Identification System (AIS) tracking devices that will
be monitored by PAWSS. PAWSS-VTS is intended to automatically collect,
process, and disseminate information on the movement and location of
ships in ports and on waterways using a network of radars and onboard
ship transponders.
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\8\ Bruce B. Stubbs, ``The Coast Guard and Maritime Security,''
Joint Force Quarterly, No. 26 (Autumn 2000), pp. 95-99.
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Unlike the U.S. air traffic control system, PAWSS-VTS will never be
able to provide a complete picture of traffic in the maritime domain.
PAWSS-VTS faces three major drawbacks. First, it will not be a national
system. According to a report by the General Accounting Office, as
currently envisioned, ``for the foreseeable future, the system will be
available in less than half of the 25 busiest U.S. ports.'' \9\ Second,
PAWSS-VTS was intended to support maritime safety and environmental
protection missions, and has been pressed into service to support
homeland security responsibilities. In this regard, PAWSS-VTS will be
inadequate to meet emerging security threats. It will, for example, be
of virtually no use in providing early warning of small boat threats
such as the craft used to attack the USS Cole in October 2000 or large
commercial vessels that might be hijacked or converted into covert
weapons carriers. Third, PAWSS-VTS does not provide coverage ``between
the ports.'' Terrorists could well mimic tactics of drug smugglers and
employ non-commercial vehicles such as small, fast, private boats with
concealed compartments capable of storing 30-70 kilograms of
material.\10\
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\9\ U.S. General Accounting Office, ``Maritime Security: Progress
Made in Implementing Maritime Transportation Security Act, But Concerns
Remain,'' GAO-03-1155T, September 9, 2003, p. 7.
\10\ Measuring the Deterrent Effect of Enforcement Operations on
Drug Smuggling, p. 1.
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Currently, the DHS has only two, very expensive and unattractive
options for significantly expanding maritime domain awareness. It can
direct additional investments in the land-based equipment and other
infrastructures required to expand PAWSS-VTS and require additional
craft to carry AIS tracking equipment, or it can rely on the surface
and aviation assets of the U.S. armed forces (including the Coast Guard
and the U.S. Navy) to cover the large remaining gaps. Neither option
appears particularly cost-effective nor sufficiently useful or flexible
to ensure preparedness in a protracted conflict against an
unpredictable foe.
Proposals to create a maritime-NORAD, might offer the basis for
developing more practical alternatives.\11\ Such an approach would
probably require three elements to produce more promising alternatives
to the long-term challenge of enhancing maritime domain awareness: (1)
joint cooperation between the Department of Defense (DOD) and the DHS
both in research and development and operational monitoring of U.S.
waters, (2) close cooperation of the United States' northern and
southern neighbors, (3) new and innovative technical solutions.
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\11\ James Jay Carafano, ``Shaping the Future of Northern
Command,'' CSBA Backgrounder, April 29, 2003, at www.csbaonline.org/
4Publications/Archive/B.20030429.NORTHCOM/B.200
30429.NORTHCOM.pdf.
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Border and Transportation Security. Protecting border and
transportation systems includes managing the border and ports of entry,
ensuring aviation and maritime security, and developing guidelines and
programs for protecting national transportation systems. The key
principle guiding Federal investments in this area should be ensuring
the adoption of a layered security system: a combination of effective,
mutually supporting initiatives that simultaneously provide useful
counterterrorism measures, protect civil liberties, and do not encumber
the flow of travel and commerce.
Unlike many strategic challenges, overall, adequacy of resources
for implementing new initiatives is not the most significant challenge
in this critical mission area. Funding for the DHS role in one layer of
the maritime component of border and transportation security, however,
is an issue of major concern. In particular, the appropriation for the
U.S. Coast Guard's Integrated Deepwater acquisition program--long-term
modernization effort to recapitalize the service's fleet of cutters,
aircraft, sensors, and command and control--is inadequate.
The Coast Guard's fleet is old, expensive to operate and maintain,
and poorly suited for some homeland security missions.\12\ Deepwater
was to be funded at $330 million (in 1998 dollars) in the first year
and $530 million (in constant dollars) per year in the following
budgets, but no annual budget before FY 2004 matched the required rate
of investment. Meanwhile, the Coast Guard's increased operational tempo
and expanded mission requirements since 9/11 have been wearing out the
fleet faster than anticipated, putting the modernization program even
farther behind schedule.
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\12\ Ronald O'Rourke, ``Homeland Security: Coast Guard Operations--
Background and Issues for Congress,'' Congressional Research Service,
RS21125, November 22, 2002, p. CTS-2, and Independent Assessment of the
United States Coast Guard, ``Integrated Deepwater System,'' Acquisition
Solutions Issue Brief, July 14, 2001, p. 6.
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In the Administration's FY 2005 budget, Deepwater would receive
$678 million, an increase of $10 million.\13\ This level of funding is
totally inadequate to support rapidly building up an essential
component of the Nation's homeland security system. Dramatically
increasing the budget for Deepwater would not only establish the
capabilities needed for a long-term security system sooner, but also
garner significant savings (perhaps as much as $4 billion) in lower
procurement costs.\14\ Reducing life-cycle expenses by retiring older
and less capable systems would realize additional savings.
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\13\ U.S. Department of Homeland Security, ``Budget in Brief: FY
2005,'' February 2004, p. 33.
\14\ See the recommendations for the costs and benefits on
accelerating the Deepwater program in U.S. Coast Guard, ``Report to
Congress on the Feasibility of Accelerating the Integrated Deepwater
System,'' at govt-aff.senate.gov/presslinks/031203cgreport.pdf.
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While funding should be expanded there are aspects of the Deepwater
program that should perhaps be revisited in light of how the U.S.
maritime security structure has evolved since September 11. Among the
issues that might be reconsidered is whether coordination of
requirements and leveraging of research and development between the
Coast Guard and the U.S. Navy's littoral combat ship (LCS) program is
adequate and properly synchronized.\15\ Likewise, both programs should
be assessed to see if they provide an adequate set of capabilities to
respond to the small boat threat. Currently, the United States simply
lacks an adequate capability to deal with an attack similar to the
strike on the USS Cole (In particular, it is unclear if they have
sufficiently exploited emerging non-lethal technologies that might be
available). Additionally, it is not clear that short-range unmanned
aerial vehicle (UAV) and manned aviation requirements of the Navy,
Coast Guard, and Immigration and Customs Enforcement Air and Maritime
Operations have been adequately rationalized.\16\
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\15\ For issues related to LCS development, see Robert O. Work,
``Naval Transformation and the Littoral Combat Ship,'' Center for
Strategic and Budgetary Assessments, February 2004, pp. 129-153, at
www.csbaonline.org/4Publications/Archive/R.20040218.LCS/
R.20040218.LCS.pdf.
\16\ Bruce B. Stubbs, ``Fitting In,'' GovExec.Com, October 1, 2003,
at www.govexec.com/features/0903hs/HS0903s2.htm.
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Another issue that might be addressed is the requirement for
Deepwater systems to provide security on the waterside of the ports.
Most security plans acknowledge that security on the landside of port
facilities is the responsibility of the port. There is often, however,
an assumption that security of the water around the port should be the
responsibility of the U.S. Coast Guard. While the Coast Guard has
traditionally had responsibility for protecting defense-related port
facilities, particularly during times of war, it is not clear that
service assets should be the primary responders to security incidents
in proximity to the ports. Over the long term, it might be more
effective if close-in security needs are met by local port authorities
\17\ and Deepwater assets were focused to an even greater degree on
extending depth and redundancy in the U.S. maritime security zone.
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\17\ One alternative, for example, might be build-up state naval
guard forces to fulfill this role. See James Jay Carafano, ``Citizen-
Soldiers and Homeland Security: A Strategic Assessment,'' The Lexington
Institute, March 2004, pp. 20-21.
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In contrast to funding for Deepwater, other initiatives in the
border and transportation area are programmed to receive significant
additional funding. However, of concern here is whether, even with
adequate funding, they will provide the redundancy and overlapping
security required for an effective layered defense system. Of principal
concern are the initiatives intended to secure the supply chain that
crosses the maritime domain including the CSI--Container Security
Initiative (a program designed to target high-risk cargo for additional
screening); CTPAT--the Customs-Trade Partnership Against Terrorism (an
initiative for encouraging the private sector to enhance supply-chain
security); ACE--the Automated Commercial Environment (which will
facilitate Customs oversight of lawful international commerce by
streamlining data entry and information exchange between Customs and
the trade community and facilitate cargo inspections and clearances);
the inspection teams and technologies employed in domestic and foreign
ports to screen high-risk cargo; and the shipping and port security
measures mandated in MTSA and the International Maritime Organization's
International Shipping and Port Security Standards (ISPS). While all
these initiatives are worthwhile, each addresses only a portion of the
challenge of providing security of maritime commerce and interdicting
terrorist threats before they reach their intended targets. We will
only know if they actually provide comprehensive security once they are
all up and running in concert and appropriate metrics are developed to
measure their effectiveness. This effort will take years and in the end
may not prove effective. Nor is it clear these initiatives will be
flexible enough to keep with the rapid changes demands and
technological innovations of the 21st century marketplace.
It may not be strategically prudent to pursue the current
combination of measures alone. Layered security, after all requires not
placing all the eggs in ``one security basket.'' The MTSA required the
Secretary of Transportation to establish a program to evaluate and
certify secure systems of intermodal transportation. It did not direct
that these programs would have to necessarily be conceived or
implemented by the Federal Government. In order to reduce risk, as well
as exploit the capacity of the marketplace to create innovative and
effective solutions, the DHS might consider establishing mechanisms to
allow the private sector to develop and implement its own alternatives
to the CSI/CTPAT regime.
Domestic Counterterrorism. This mission area comprises law
enforcement efforts--principally by the FBI and U.S. Immigration and
Customs Enforcement (ICE)--to identify, thwart, and prosecute
terrorists. The guiding principle for enhancing this critical mission
area should be adopting programs that expand the capacity to conduct
counterterrorism operations without impinging on civil liberties or
detracting from other law enforcement priorities.
The addition of the U.S. Coast Guard to the DHS provides another
additional tool for expanding the Nation's capacity to conduct domestic
counterterrorism in the maritime domain. Several initiatives are
noteworthy. Since 9/11, many of the local investigation and inspections
arms of the Coast Guard's Marine Safety Offices have significantly
shifted their focus to supporting domestic counterterrorism efforts. In
addition, the Coast Guard created the sea marshals program to create a
cadre of specially trained law enforcement officers to escort high-risk
vessels into port.
While the Coast Guard law enforcement initiatives are a positive
effort, there is little sign that the service is creating a
comprehensive human capital plan, including the leader development
training and education that are needed to fully exploit the potential
of these programs. Likewise, it is not clear that Coast Guard and ICE
law enforcements programs are being developed in tandem to create the
objective law enforcement corps needed for maritime security. In fact,
it is not apparent that the DHS has defined its long-term strategic
needs in this area and that they dovetail with other ongoing Federal
and state efforts to expand the national capacity to conduct domestic
counterterrorism.
Defending Against Catastrophic Threats. This critical mission area
includes developing better sensors and procedures to detect smuggled
nuclear, radiological, chemical, and biological weapons; improve
decontamination and medical responses to such weapons; and harness
scientific knowledge and tools for counterterrorism efforts. The
guiding principle for investments in this mission area must be to focus
funding on developing new means to prevent, respond to, and mitigate
the unprecedented dangers posed by catastrophic threats.
The DHS Science and Technology Directorate is to be commended for
developing mission portfolios to address the most critical technology
needs for the DHS.\18\ On the other hand, it is unclear whether the DHS
portfolios, which has not yet been publicly released, adequately
reflect the needs of maritime security. Nor has the directorate forged
a relationship with the science and technology community in the DOD
that can conduct the joint development and acquisition of major
programs that might benefit both the defense and homeland security
community.
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\18\ James Jay Carafano, ``Strategy and Security in the Information
Age: Grading Progress in America's War on Terrorism,'' Heritage
Foundation Lecture No. 824, March 14, 2004, at www.heritage.org/
Research/HomelandDefense/hl824.cfm.
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In addition, greater consolidation of research and development
efforts in regards to supply-chain security is required. For example,
the Administration proposes to phase out Operation Safe Commerce in FY
2005. Launched in November 2002, the program was in-tended to use pilot
projects in the ports of Seattle-Tacoma, Los Angeles-Long Beach, and
New York-New Jersey to test technologies and practices, including cargo
tracking, anti-tampering ``Smart Containers,'' information protection,
and real-time data reporting.\19\ However, it has shown only limited
results, and the research and development effort could be performed
better and more efficiently under a development program in the DHS
Science and Technology Directorate.
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\19\ Alex Fryer, ``Port-Security Project Endangered Murray
Claims,'' Seattle Times, February 12, 2004, at
seattletimes.nwsource.com/html/localnews/2001856193_homeland12m.html.
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As the DHS consolidates these programs in the directorate it should
reevaluate whether they are consistent with the department's research
priorities. It is not clear, for example, that ``Smart Containers'' are
a worthwhile program for Federal research. Any solution to implement
smart containers should come from the private sector, which is in a
better position to evaluate the utility of added security information
as measured against the added cost. The DHS effort in this area might
be more profitably focused on leveraging the security that might be
provided by new commercial products and practices rather than
developing and mandating standards and technologies to the marketplace.
Protecting Critical Infrastructure and Key Assets. This critical
mission area includes national efforts to secure public and private
entities. Since virtually all of the Nation's critical maritime
infrastructure and key assets are not federally owned, developing
programs to ensure responsible, efficient, and cost-effective
cooperation between the public and private sectors should be the
principle guiding investments in this area.
Making the challenges of critical infrastructure protection in the
maritime domain particularly pressing is that U.S. ports must comply
with new security provisions detailed in MTSA and ISPS. However, in
developing a funding strategy to improve port security, the
Administration should not become overly ``port-centric.'' Addressing
all the critical infrastructure concerns at U.S. ports could well
require many billions of dollars.\20\ On the other hand, the DHS
awarded only $245 million in port grants in FY 2003 (albeit the largest
amount of any year to date). According to an unpublished analysis by
Dr. Joe Bouchard, implementing MTSA at current funding levels (about
$50 million a year) would take 112-162 years.
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\20\ In August 2000, the Interagency Commission on Crime and
Security in U.S. Seaports estimated that the costs to upgrade security
infrastructure at the Nation's 361 ports ranged from $10 million to $50
million per port. Congress funded $93 million for security improvements
with the passage of the Maritime Security and Transportation Act (MTSA)
in 2002 but received grant applications for as much as $697 million in
the first year of the program alone. U.S. General Accounting Office,
``Transportation Security: Post-September 11th Initiatives and Long-
Term Challenges,'' GAO-03-616T, April 1, 2003, pp. 5 and 16. The Coast
Guard has estimated that it will require at least $1.4 billion in the
first year and $6 billion over 10 years for private port facilities to
meet the baseline security mandates required by the MTSA. Other
estimates of total cost range from $5.8 to $7.8 billion. James Jay
Carafano, ``Budgets and Threats: An Analysis of Strategic Priorities
for Maritime Security,'' Heritage Foundation Lecture No. 791, June 16,
2003, at www.heritage.org/Research/HomelandDefense/HL791.cfm.
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Yet, the current restraint in Federal funding may be very
appropriate. Addressing the considerable vulnerabilities of maritime
infrastructure does not necessarily require a dramatic infusion of
Federal dollars. For example, effective intelligence and early warning,
domestic counterterrorism, and border and transportation security
programs can help to reduce risks to critical infrastructure by
limiting the opportunities for terrorists to reach U.S. ports. With
limited resources available in the Federal homeland security budget, it
is not apparent why a multi-billion-dollar port security initiative
would be a superior strategic choice to a more balanced maritime
security program.
In addition, the overwhelming preponderance of maritime
infrastructure is in private hands. It is not clear that full-federal
funding would be either appropriate or sustainable. Excessive funding
would more likely create a condition of dependency with security
declining as soon as the infusion of Federal dollars ended. Initiatives
that enable and encourage the private sector to take a more expansive
and proactive role should be central to any protection program.
Federal port grants should used sparingly, as a tool to promote
appropriate public-private sector solutions. More important than simply
spending more money to help facilitate the development of maritime
security programs, the Federal Government should help create a
predictable business environment with (1) multi-year authorizations so
that states, local governments, and the private sector would have a
clear grasp of what funds will be available over the long term; (2)
national performance standards so that they know what the Federal
Government expects state and local governments and the private sector
to contribute to critical infrastructure protection; and (3) a clear
system of national priorities so that the preponderance of Federal
investments support the most critical strategic needs.
Emergency Preparedness and Response. This critical mission area
includes preparing for, responding to, and mitigating the effects of
terrorist attacks. The overarching principle that must guide funding is
that Federal resources should be used to assist in creating a true
national preparedness system, not merely to supplement the needs of
state and local governments.
Currently, the major challenges affecting an effective response to
a maritime incident are the same as those affecting other types of
domestic emergencies: interagency coordination, organization and
communications, and convergence.\21\ Establishing unity of effort is
central to addressing all of these concerns.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\21\ These are described in James Jay Carafano, ``Homeland Security
and the Trouble with Training,'' CSBA Backgrounder, October 3, 2002, at
www.csbaonline.org/4Publications/Archive/B.20021003.Homeland_Security_/
B.20021003.Homeland_Security_htm.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The Coast Guard should be commended for its announcement in January
2004 to consolidate all its regional activities under sector commands,
so that captains of the port will have all the assets available to
support maritime security under their control. This initiative,
however, does not ensure proper unity of effort at the port. In many
ports, the Coast Guard, ICE, and port authorities, each with critical
specific duties and authorities in regard to port security, have their
command posts in different facilities, undercutting efforts to ensure
effective integration of their efforts in times of crisis. The DHS
should review the requirements for command and control at the ports and
determine the needs for unified command posts, redundant command
facilities, and virtually integrated command posts to ensure unity of
effort for emergency response.
It may also be worth reviewing whether national plans are adequate
to deal with the consequences of catastrophic or multiple attacks on
geographically disparate maritime targets.\22\ For example, in the
immediate aftermath of the 9/11 attacks, the Federal Aviation
Administration halted all civilian aviation. In the aftermath of a
maritime attack, similar concerns might call a halt to U.S. maritime
traffic. In this event, mechanisms to rapidly reestablish confidence in
the supply chain and resume the flow of commerce in order to minimize
economic disruption and restore public confidence will be vital. If
adequate public/private sector plans do not exist to address such
contingencies, they must be rapidly developed.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\22\ For more discussion on multiple and catastrophic attack
scenarios see the discussion on emergency response in James Jay
Carafano, ``Budgets and Threats: An Analysis of Strategic Priorities
for Maritime Security'' Heritage Foundation Lecture No. 791, June 16,
2003, at www.heritage.org/Research/HomelandDefense/HL791.cfm.
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Organizational Issues
While the issues raised in each of the critical mission areas
deserve attention, together they still do not address the core issue of
how well the Nation is doing in preparing a maritime security system
that will protect us during a protracted conflict against threats that
will surely change and evolve to test the defenses we throw up to
frustrate them.
We will not be able to depend on the terrorists to provide us
measures of success. The fact that al-Qaeda operatives took five to
seven years to plan and execute the September 11 terrorist strikes is a
cause for concern. It could well be a half-dozen years before the DHS
faces its first great test.
For now our metrics of success must rely on measuring our capacity
to implement strategy. The first task should be revisit the basic
organization and missions of the DHS. Here a lesson from the Cold War
is instructive. The National Security of Act of 1947 created what
became the Department of Defense and the Central Intelligence Agency,
the Nation's two premier weapons for defending against the Russian
bear. Yet, it soon became apparent that in the enabling legislation
neither organization had been crafted perfectly to match the Nation's
emerging strategy of containment. Two years later it was necessary for
the Congress to revisit the organization and missions of the
departments. At the same time, some of the most difficult and obvious
challenges, such as how to promote jointness (operations involving more
than one of the military services), were ignored. As a result,
organizations and practices became institutionalized, and it took over
40 years to resolve some of the obstacles to effective operations.\23\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\23\ For example, see David Jablonsky, ``Eisenhower and the Origins
of Unified Command,'' Joint Force Quarterly, Vol. 23 (Autumn/Winter
1999-2000), pp. 24-31. See also Shepherd, ``Evolution of Security
Agencies and Departments,'' pp. 161-165, and William W. Epley, Roles
and Missions of the United States Army: Basic Documents with
Annotations and Bibliography (Washington, D.C.: Center of Military
History, 1993), pp. 299-310. Additional major revisions were made by
the Goldwater-Nichols Defense Reorganization Act of 1986. See also
James R. Locher III, Victory on the Potomac (College Station: Texas A&M
University Press, 2002).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Congress can help the DHS avoid a similar fate if it begins now to
assess how well the department is organized to implement the emerging
national strategic priorities. One area that should be addressed is
assigning responsibility for directing national maritime strategy.
Clearly, emerging strategic requirements call for an integrated system
of layered security initiatives. Yet, there is no single over arching
strategic concepts that defines how ongoing initiatives will be forged
into a coherent system or makes the hard choices for prioritizing
scarce resources. In part, the lack of unifying maritime strategy is
understandable--four major organizations play prominent roles (DOD, and
within the DHS, the Coast Guard, ICE, and the TSA--Transportation
Security Agency) and arguably their roles and missions overlap.
Congress might profitably look at the prospects for consolidating
missions, assigning one entity within the DHS the role of providing
overall strategic planning and operational control of maritime security
and responsibility for coordinating with DOD. At the same time,
Congress might revisit the regulatory functions of the components in
the DHS to see if the Departments of Transportation or Commerce might
more appropriately perform them, allowing the DHS to focus more of its
resources on homeland security. Finally, a crosswalk needs to be
performed between the performance metrics established by each agency
for measuring progress to ensure that they are integrated and
complimentary.
Another area that deserves further attention is an examination of
how we will train the next generation of leaders that will be
responsible for implementing the future national maritime security
system. Currently, the Nation lacks an overall homeland security
training and education strategy. Training is not only essential to
prepare leaders for the difficult and complex decisions they will face
in a crisis, but also to evaluate readiness, determine the
effectiveness of programs, and identify needed improvements. Meanwhile,
education is critical in preparing leaders to respond to long-term
challenges.
The advanced degree program offered by the DHS through the U.S.
Naval Post-Graduate School is one admirable initiative, but it is not
enough. Other professional development opportunities for emerging
senior leaders are also needed. The Massachusetts Institute of
Technology, for example, conducts a program called Seminar XXI for the
Federal Government. Seminar XXI provides a year-long series of lectures
and workshops for mid-grade professionals on international affairs. A
similar program targeted on homeland security might be equally useful.
In the same manner, the national community might benefit from the
establishment of a national homeland security university modeled on the
military's war college system.
Finally, any national leader development effort will have to
include a plethora of state and local leaders and private sector
leaders. The nation's network of junior colleges, which have become the
hub of continuing adult education throughout the country, may provide
the best venue for offering appropriate leader development
opportunities.
Congress might consider guiding the DHS training and education
effort by creating mandatory training, education, and experience
requirements similar to the provisions established in the Goldwater-
Nichols Act to foster jointness among the military services.
Over the long term, the capacity of the national maritime security
system to exploit the initiatives currently being put in place will be
more dependent on the quality of the decisions made by its leaders and
the programs they implement than on the structure of the system itself.
The nation would be well served if we gave equal attention to both
sides of the equation.
I, again, thank the Committee for the opportunity to testify on
this vital subject and I look forward to your comments and questions.
Senator Nelson. Thank you.
Mr. Mitre?
STATEMENT OF MIKE MITRE, DIRECTOR, COAST PORT
SECURITY, LONGSHORE DIVISION, INTERNATIONAL LONGSHORE AND
WAREHOUSE UNION (ILWU)
Mr. Mitre. Good morning. I would like to thank the
Chairman, the Ranking Member and the Members of this Committee.
My name's Mike Mitre, and I've been a member of the ILWU
for almost 30 years. I've worked on and around the terminals
for about 29 years, and my specialty is container terminals.
I'm a crane driver, and I used to be a foreman running what
they call the ``dock and ship'' on the terminals.
I'd like to thank everyone for allowing us to speak here
today. Some of my constituents are really excited by the fact
that, hey, we finally had a--got a chance in Washington to get
up and say our piece and say what we really feel is happening
with security within some of the marine terminals on the West
Coast, and especially because we live and work within L.A./Long
Beach, which is the largest two ports in the country. And with
12 million containers, that's where the numbers are. That's the
numbers game, and that's where they're coming.
Most of my remarks will be aimed at practices that occur
there. I'd like to also thank the International Longshoremen's
Association and the teamsters for their assistance in a
combined that we put together in trying to attack some of the
tougher issues regarding port security.
First of all, I'd like to say that we really appreciate the
commitment that Congress, and this Committee in particular,
have made to the goal of protecting our ports, but, more
importantly, to protecting our port workers, which is our
members, and they're the guys that work there. The men and
women that are--they're our first line of defense. We handle
containers when they come off the ship. And if something should
happen, it's our workers that are going to get hammered first,
and most of our families live and work, themselves, within five
miles of the port. And if we're talking any kind of a
radiological device--in fact, if you have any kind of modern
explosives, our families would probably impacted just as well
as our workers would, too. So we really appreciate the strides
that everyone's made.
We also really appreciate the Coast Guard. If anyone has
worked closer with the unions in the ports, there isn't anyone
closer than the Coast Guard. The Coast Guard in L.A./Long
Beach, in Oakland, in San Diego, in Seattle/Tacoma, on the
Columbia River--the Coast Guard's done a great job. They've
helped more, and I think we have a closer relationship than we
ever have.
On the day of 9/11, the Coast Guard was the one that
reacted first. And within 2 hours, they put together a
stakeholder group of 200 people. So the Coast Guard, I think,
has to give--be given kudos.
Every day, we unload thousands of containers from vessels
that call from all over the globe, and they're filled with
things from everywhere, loaded by everybody. Most of them do
not undergo an inspection before they're loaded on a truck or a
rail car bound for all points east to the interior of the
United States.
Consider the recent suicide-bombing in Israel. In Ashdod,
port workers and their infrastructure were clearly targeted.
This is the very same type and level of an incident that could
very--it could very well happen here. And, you know, we've been
afraid of it since 9/11. And in the Port of L.A./Long Beach,
we're really, you know, thinking this could happen. It's
coming.
Some of my comments are going to center around some of the
security procedures that we do within the port, and also some
of them that have been discontinued, and we feel should have
never been discontinued, and should be recontinued.
For many years, protocols such as the inspection of loaded
container seals and the verification of empty containers were a
given. These were done at nearly every facility by marine
clerical workers and longshoremen employed there. Container-
seal inspections are critical. And they're critical because you
simply can't inspect every container. The integrity of the
seal, that it hasn't been tampered with and that the seal
number matches up with the container number on the cargo
manifest, are two related procedures that can be done in a
matter of seconds, and they can be done during the process of
checking the container being offloaded from an arriving vessel.
It's quick, it's easy, and it's effective. Discharge procedures
accomplished as this container is being unloaded from a vessel
of the dock, they're still done by a marine clerk located in
the very same place as when the seal checks used to be done,
yet these seal checks have been discontinued by the terminal
operators that run the terminals in the West Coast.
The problem that we have is, a lot of the different
terminal operators have gone so far as to officially inform us,
in writing, that it's their feeling that, because of oncoming
technologies, that we no longer have to seal container--check
the seals on containers; because of incoming technologies, we
no longer have to worry about checking empty containers coming
into the port. And you have to realize that if we have 12
million empty--12 million loaded containers coming in from
Asia, there's going to be at least 7, 8, 9 million empties
being cycled back to Asia. If these empties are allowed to come
into the port uninspected through our terminals, it's--you're
having an open invitation for something to happen.
The new MTSA regs require that seal checks are being done.
But the problem is, the terminal operators are now going to
interpret that these seal checks are only going to require them
to check the seals at the terminal's in-gates, but not at the
vessels, where the majority of all containerized cargo is
offloaded. Why would we check the seals of this relatively
small number of export cargo going through the in-gates, but
ignore the seals on the enormous quantity of our inbound
imports coming from Asia?
The empty-container inspections, like I said, ones that
were--it was an inspection that was once unilaterally done
throughout the port--has been discontinued since 9/11. This is
perhaps one of the most threatening of all the traditional
practices that we no longer do. The ability for a trucker to
introduce an empty container at a marine terminal in-gate, with
the knowledge that it will not be inspected as a matter of
policy, is not right. And it really is no different than
boarding an aircraft and being searched, yet being allowed to
carry on a piece of luggage without it ever being opened. The
only difference is, in this case you have the knowledge
beforehand that whatever you want to smuggle inside a terminal
will not be searched as long as it's inside this empty
container.
Many empty containers also are cycled back to the United
States, especially refrigerated ones, and they have been acting
as an ideal conduit for the smuggling of people and aliens
trying to come back into this country. There are presently
terminals in Hawaii--specifically, the Horizon facility--that
require all empty containers to be opened and searched. And
then they have to have a seal affixed, clearly marking it as an
empty. For us to do no less is asking for trouble.
If you knew that you could drive a 40-foot container onto a
terminal in the largest port of the country without it being
opened, don't you think that others may also have this same
knowledge? Empty-container programs should be part and parcel
of the new facility security plans. Their exemption presents a
clear and present danger to not only our workers and to the
community, but it also presents a danger to the marine
terminals and our port transportation infrastructure.
The implementation of the new TWIC card, called the
Transportation Worker Identity Card, is a process that the ILWU
has participated in. We're concerned that all aspects of--all
true aspects of port security are important. Along with TSA and
the port authorities, ILWU and the related stakeholders have
embarked on a concurrent effort helping to create and prototype
a successful terminal access ID concentrating on the importance
of individual recognition. We must have a better way to
identify our port workers, our clerical workers, our vendors,
subcontractors, even management personnel coming onto the
terminals so that we all know who everybody is, and that an ID
just can't be shuffled back and forth from one person to the
other.
Senators, expensive and technological advancements will
eventually take their place in the seaport security
environment. Examples of this, like the new radiologic portals,
and especially the VACIS gamma ray inspection machines, are
excellent examples of 21st century technology. The problem is,
is that they have to be well thought out. These radiologic
portals, they're a great idea, and they are part and parcel of
a good, basic terminal strategy. But the very fact that they
want to locate these things at the out-gates of the terminal
presents a problem. Most containers coming off the ships are
going to sit in the terminal between 5 days and 2 to 3 weeks.
Why would we expose not only our port workers, but the
community, to a radiologic problem or an accident? And instead
of siting these radiologic detectors at the out-gates, why not
pull them close to the ship, so when these containers come off
the ship, they can immediately go through them, and, therefore,
ensure the security of the people that work there and the
people that live close to the ports?
It is still the sensible, inexpensive, and logical
approaches to port security, and especially practices like
container-seal inspections, empty-container verification, and
other things like this, that will provide a basic and solid
foundation under which to build a proper security
infrastructure. Couple this with an accurate port ID system
that really works, and you have the basics on which to build
this no-nonsense marine terminal security system.
Cargo security cannot be allowed to denigrate into a catch-
all for new and developing technologies at the expense of the
traditional practices that were developed over many, many years
inside the ports. These were practices that really worked, they
accurately addressed real problems, and they were relatively
less commerce-inhibiting than others that were not, and they
were tried and true methods.
Many new technologies surrounding cargo security are still
developmental, and some aren't even fully ready, yet many
terminal operators have decided already to abandon some of the
most traditional--more traditional techniques in favor of
waiting for some of these newer technological advancements to
come online. We all understand that these new technologies will
eventually replace many of the inspection and verification
protocols that are now done in person; but until we come to
that point, we must make a commitment to continue to do what is
logical, what is practical, and has worked for us for so long.
Probably the most important part of my testimony here today
is to talk about the funding. Funding must be made available.
It will have to come from Congress so that our Coast Guard
assets can properly assume the role designated to them as the
primary landside and terminal enforcement agency. The
traditional waterside role that the Coast Guard has always
assumed must now include sufficient funding that is going to
require additional manning, training, and enforcement to make
sure that they can accomplish acceptable levels of marine
terminal container security. Funding is essentially, and not
only for these needs, and not only for the Coast Guard, but,
just as important, it is going to be very necessary for the
answers that will lead us to the infrastructure and port
security solutions nationwide, that we're going to allow us to
move cargo and keep commerce moving in the event of a terrorist
attack.
Properly applied, this type of funding should address both
the port security and the infrastructure solutions necessary to
ensure that the flow of cargo is not interrupted. Properly
appropriated, these funds will help to not only develop and
increase port security, but also to design an underdeveloped
security infrastructure necessary to move cargo in volume in
the years to come.
The major problem on the West Coast is this. You have three
load centers. L.A./Long Beach is the largest one. You have
Oakland and Seattle/Tacoma. If there's a terrorist attack or
any kind of a terrorist security incident, we simply do not
have the alternatives where we can move cargo. The major cargo
island in L.A./Long Beach houses five of the largest mega-
terminals in the world. Each one of these is capable of moving
up to 5,000 gate moves a day. And to give you some idea of what
that is, Rotterdam, at their largest terminal, moves about 850
gate moves a day. Each of ours on this island can move up to
5,000 a day. Right now, we're averaging between 1,800 and 2,600
a day. The numbers game, once again, shows how big L.A./Long
Beach is, and then, in relation to a smaller bit, to Oakland
and Seattle/Tacoma.
This cargo island is connected to the mainland by two
bridges. If either of these bridges were to go down--and I just
heard this same kind of a thing from my colleague from New
Orleans--we're done. You could bring cargo flow to a grinding
halt.
You know, not wishing to touch on something that could be a
little touchy, you know, we had a problem last year, a small
labor dispute on the West Coast. We had a 10-day lockout. And
I'm not making light of the situation. But the problem is this.
In just those 10 days, look what happened. If one of these
bridges was to be taken out, we could be looking up to 3 to 6
months, possibly even a year, of an interruption of commerce.
And 92 percent of all the commerce coming into this country is
waterborne. Of the commerce coming into the West Coast, 65
percent comes into L.A./Long Beach alone. And one incident, one
incident, could bring this to a screeching halt.
So I would hope, if nothing else today when I'm talking to
you, that everyone would understand that, on the West Coast, it
is the major cargo import receiver for this country. It has now
obviated the need of the Panama Canal through the intermodal
rail. Intermodal rail connections are able to take cargo
throughout the country even faster than a ship going through
the canal and going to an East Coast port, in most cases. And
because of that, and with only three small load centers, any
one of these centers goes down, and we have a big problem.
So I would really hope that by making this point of how
important these load centers are, we can appreciate the fact
that funding must be made available to look for alternatives in
cargo movement, in cargo flow, and alternatives how to unload
these ships in case of a terrorist security incident.
Thank you.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Mitre follows:]
Prepared Statement of Mike Mitre, International Longshore and Warehouse
Union (ILWU)
Chairman McCain, Ranking Member Hollings and members of the
Committee, my name is Mike Mitre. I am a member of the International
Longshore and Warehouse Union (ILWU), which since 1934 has been chosen
by thousands of West Coast port and dock workers to represent us in all
matters related to our employment. For the past two years, I have
served as the union representative regarding port security and have had
opportunities to work with the Coast Guard, TSA, Customs, and other
stakeholders in an effort to effectively secure our ports from acts of
terrorism. We commend these agencies for their hard work and commitment
to the national security of the United States. In particular, the ILWU
commends the Coast Guard for developing comprehensive port security
regulations in a very short time frame. We appreciate the hard work and
dedication of the Captain's of the Ports, coast guard personnel, TSA,
and Customs personnel. I also want to commend other labor organizations
that have worked on a common agenda to protect our ports including the
International Longshoremen's Association, the International Brotherhood
of Teamsters, and the Transportation Trades Department, AFL-CIO.
As co-chair of the International Longshore and Warehouse Union
Legislative Committee, I have developed a number of policy statements
with respect to the security of our ports on behalf of our members and
communicated our position to members of Congress and key staff. We
appreciate the commitment that Congress and this Committee in
particular, has made to the goal of protecting both our ports and ILWU
dockworkers from the threat of international terrorism.
Mr. Chairman, thank you for holding this important hearing. We are
at a critical time in the history of this country. The threat of a
terrorist attack against the marine transportation system is a new
reality. On March 14, 2004, suicide bombers at the Ashdod Port in
Israel killed 10 people and wounded another 16. It appears that all the
victims were workers. It is certainly in the interest of American port
workers to secure our ports. Every day we unload thousands of
containers from ships calling from virtually every point on the globe,
each filled with unknown items packed by unknown people throughout the
world. Few of these containers or vessels are screened or inspected
before being unloaded by longshoremen. Many of the containers do not go
through any type of a security screening process before being loaded on
a truck or railcar bound for the interior of the United States. Many of
our families, friends, and coworkers live in different seaport
communities such as San Pedro and Oakland, California, Portland,
Oregon, Seattle, Washington, and Honolulu, Hawaii. While I would like
nothing better than to be able to tell them that all the stakeholders
within the marine transportation system are doing everything possible
to keep them safe and secure from terrorism, this may not exactly be
the case.
My testimony today will focus on specific measures that, if
implemented, will provide more meaningful security for our port marine
terminals and our communities. Marine terminal operators along the west
coast continue to refuse, despite repeated encouragement and demands
from the ILWU, to implement adequate port security measures to protect
our port workers, communities and the Nation as a whole from possible
terrorist attacks. Even more shocking and inexplicable is the reality
that some terminal operators have reduced or abandoned some of the most
basic port security measures following the September 11th and the
terrorist attack against our American people.
On March 15, 2004, the ILWU wrote to Coast Guard Admiral Hereth to
urge the Coast Guard to take effective action to compel these
employers, the marine terminal operators, to immediately implement and
maintain adequate security measures in accordance with the Maritime
Transportation Security Act (MTSA) and the applicable and related Coast
Guard regulations issued on July 1, 2003 and October 22, 2003.
Since September 11, 2001, the ILWU has made repeated overtures to
these same employers to develop and institute, without delay, practices
and procedures designed to increase the level of security to at least
that which existed on September 11th, 2001. The Union's requests for
Employer action to increase port security is documented in various
proposals and letters to the employers, samples of which are attached
to this testimony marked Attachment 1.
Many of these companies have actually reduced security by, among
other things, discontinuing the practice of inspecting the integrity of
container seals upon entering marine terminal facilities. The second
attachment to the testimony are copies of some of the letters
documenting our Employers' discontinuation of the regular inspection of
container seals and inspection of ``empty'' containers shortly before
and after September 11, 2001. The Employers' insistence, over Union
objection, to stop inspecting container seals at certain West Coast
marine terminal facilities is especially disconcerting given that the
Coast Guard regulations in 105.265(b)(4) specifically mandate that
terminal operators and owners ``check seals and other methods used to
prevent tampering upon entering the facility and upon storage within
the facility''.
While we have urged our Employers to initiate adequate port
security measures regardless of specific governmental mandates, the
Union has especially pressed for the PMA Employers' immediate full
compliance with Coast Guard Regulations 105.265, ``Security Measures
for Handling Cargo'', which plainly constitute the core security
provisions for marine terminal facilities; where the majority of ILWU
port workers are employed.
With respect to the specific security measures mandated in Coast
Guard regulation 105.265, ``Security Measures for Handling Cargo'', our
information, daily work experience, and observations disclose that the
PMA Employers have failed to implement the following security measures
listed in that provision:
105.265(a)(5)--``Identify Cargo That is Accepted for
Temporary Storage in a Restricted Area While Awaiting Loading
for Pickup''--Most if not all port facility operators/owners
have, after September 11, 2001, and also after the December 31,
2003 filing of security plans, continued the standard practice
of mixing cargo and containers designated for loading on
different ships and trucks scheduled for different time periods
and also mixing them with other cargo and containers not yet
designated for a particular loading or pickup. Moreover, few,
if any, facilities have ``restricted areas'' for temporary
storage of cargo.
105.265(a)(6)--``Restrict the Entry of Cargo to The Facility
That Does Not Have a Confirmed Date for Loading as
Appropriate''--No facility operator/owner, as far as we know,
has instituted any restrictions on the entry of cargo that
lacks a confirmed date for loading, let alone conduct any
determination of ``appropriateness'' for receipt of such cargo
since September 11, 2001, and since the December 31, 2003
filing of security plans. In fact, many facility operators/
owners continue to use what they call ``dummy bookings'' to
document the regular receipt of cargo that lacks a designation
or confirmed date for loading onto ships. In addition, most, if
not all, marine terminal facilities continue the standard
practice of allowing cargo to first enter the facility and only
after entry determine the existence of appropriate
documentation and designation for loading. Many facility
operators/owners also continue the practice of storing on site,
without restriction for several days, cargo with inadequate
documentation and unknown designation for loading.
105.265(a)(9)--``Create, Update, and Maintain a Continuous
Inventory of All Dangerous Goods and Hazardous Substances From
Receipt to Delivery Within the Facility Giving the Location of
Those Dangerous Goods and Hazardous Substances.''--This
critical security measure has simply not been implemented at
any facilities where ILWU members work since September 11, 2001
and continuing after the December 31, 2003 filing of security
plans. In nearly all marine terminal facilities, hazardous
material cargo is randomly integrated with other types of
cargo, including even food products throughout the terminals.
Also, as noted, it is standard practice for marine terminals to
receive and store for a certain period of time containers of
unknown contents pending receipt and verification of complete
documentation.
105.265(b)(1)--``Unless Unsafe To Do So, Routinely Check
Cargo, Cargo Transport Units and Cargo Storage Areas Within the
Facility Prior to and During Cargo Handling Operations for
Evidence of Tampering.''--Few if any West Coast Marine
Terminals have instituted any practices or procedures to
``routinely check'' cargo, containers and the storage areas for
possible tampering within these facilities following September
11, 2001 and even since the December 31, 2003 filing of
security plans. In those port facilities where some checking is
performed, such as for example, at Terminal-6 in Portland,
Oregon, the security guards merely drive through the facility
in a perfunctory manner no differently than they did before
September 11, 2001.
105.265(b)(2)--``Check That Cargo, Containers, or Other
Cargo Transport Units Entering the Facility Match the Delivery
Note or Equivalent Cargo Documentation.''--While this practice
was commonly followed in the West Coast ports ten or more years
ago, the industry trend starting before September 11, 2001 and
continuing to the present is the elimination of requiring that
cargo and containers match the delivery documentation before
entry into marine terminal facilities. Neither the terrorist
attacks of September 11, 2001, the issuance of the Coast Guard
interim regulations of July 1, 2003, nor the filing of facility
security plans as of December 31, 2003, have changed this
regressive trend.
105.265(b)(3)--``Screen Vehicles''.--The screening of
vehicles before entering marine terminal facilities is done in
some West Coast ports, but not all.
105.265(b)(4)--``Check Seals and Other Methods Used to
Prevent Tampering Upon Entering the Facility and Upon Storage
Within the Facility.''--As noted, most marine terminals on the
West Coast have not instituted any procedures for the checking
of seals and other methods to prevent tampering either upon a
container entering a facility or upon its storage within the
facility. Indeed, some marine terminal operators have actually
discontinued this practice in years before and in months after
September 11, 2001. That most marine terminal operators do not
routinely check and verify the integrity of seals on most
containers is reflected by the one limited exception where such
checks are more commonly done with respect to cargo and
containers subject to USDA regulations. Moreover, most marine
terminal operators fail to have adequate procedures for
monitoring pilferage and other tampering of containers and
cargo as reflected in the common practice of the terminal
operators and the carriers splitting the cost of any such
losses based on their failure to know the time and location
where such tampering occurred.
Mr. Chairman, I cannot emphasize enough the importance of checking
the outside seal of containers upon entry into the facility by rail or
truck and especially, upon entry by sea. A broken seal would
immediately alert the port facility that the container may have been
with tampered and needs to be carefully inspected. A systematic check
of container seals also provides authorities with a record as to the
parties responsible for placing the seal on any container that may be
the means of a terrorist act.
The Coast Guard regulations do not contain references regarding the
need to develop a program to inspect and seal ``empty'' containers.
There should be little disagreement over the need for an inspection or
verification protocol concerning these containers. The fact that marine
terminal operators routinely conducted ``empty'' inspections in the
past as a regular part of their security program to verify the absence
of harmful contents and to detect and deter possible terrorist attacks
only adds to the viability of this procedure. The ILWU urges the Coast
Guard to strongly consider creating a mandate regarding the inspection
of empty containers. If there was ever to be an attack from anyone
using an ``empty'' container to transport and stage explosives or
chemical or biological agents, this would be the ideal manner in which
to accomplish it. The level and manner of intelligence gathering and
the sophistication of technique used by various terrorist organizations
should leave nothing to chance.
It is the Union's view that the Coast Guard regulations in general,
and the MTSA in particular, as well as basic common sense and good
faith concern for the security of the ports and the country necessarily
require that all maritime companies initiate comprehensive and adequate
port security measures without delay, notwithstanding the technical
final compliance date of July 1, 2004 as set out in 105.115(b) of the
Coast Guard regulations. Terminal operators that fail to implement
necessary security measures in the interim preceding the July 1, 2004
deadline is contrary to the stated intent and objective of the MTSA and
the Coast Guard regulations.
Indeed, Section 70103(c)(7) of the MTSA mandates that the Secretary
of Homeland Security, who has delegated such responsibility to the
Coast Guard, ``shall require each owner or operator of a vessel or
facility located within or adjacent to waters subject to the
jurisdiction of the United States to implement any necessary interim
security measures, including cargo security programs, to deter to the
maximum extent practicable a transportation security incident until the
security plan for that vessel or facility operator is approved.'' Under
these clear statutory and regulatory mandates, there is no legitimate
reason or excuse for any vessel or facility operator/owner not to
implement the provisions of the Regulations and of their security plans
after submission to the Coast Guard on December 31, 2003, and pending
review and approval by the Coast Guard by July 1, 2004. Any good faith
approach to port security would demand no less. To be sure, would-be
terrorists will not wait for the passing of a technical future deadline
to attack our ports; nor should port Employers wait to adequately
protect our port facilities from such potential attacks.
Common sense would indicate that waiting until July 1, 2004, in
which to institute necessary port security measures actually could
heighten the risk of potential terrorism during this waiting period. I
understand that our employers are concerned about the cost of port
security measures. The ILWU is mindful of their concerns and we
understand that it may be cost prohibitive and impractical to subject
every container to a thorough and complete inspection. However, every
container that enters our ports can and should be subjected to a
security check. When there is a conflict between efficiency in the
maritime transportation system versus additional security measures that
will enhance the security of the system and our port communities, we
believe that security should prevail.
The ILWU has worked closely with TSA in developing the TWIC ID,
envisioned as a nation wide transportation worker ID security program.
The prototype phase now underway in the ports has already actively
involved many ILWU members, an indication of the realization by the
most average worker just how serious security has become. It is also an
indication of the degree of commitment the ILWU has exhibited. Only
through a dedicated and unified effort by all stakeholders will true
port security be achieved.
Finally, we ask the Congress and the Administration to fully fund
port security. It is critical that when the facility security plans are
finalized that money is available for optimum security rather minimal
security. We applaud the members of this committee, and particularly
Senator Hollings, for efforts to secure the necessary funding. If a
terrorist attack occurred in a major port, the lives of our workers,
families, and community would be lost. The national economy would be
badly shaken. It is incumbent on the Congress to provide the necessary
funding to meet longshore labor and other port workers security
objectives.
On behalf of the members of the International Longshore and
Warehouse Union, I thank you for the opportunity to testify today. I
would be pleased to answer your questions.
______
Attachment 1
ILWU Proposal For Special CLRC Minutes Re Waterfront Security--
September 20, 2001
The CLRC met to begin assessing waterfront security issues in light
of the terrorist attacks inflicted on the United States on September
11, 2001. The Coast Parties condemn these terrorist acts and will not
be deterred from performing the work that is so vital to the nation's
interest. Accordingly, the CLRC agreed to the following:
(1) The Union and the Employers pledge to work together to assess
the safety of waterfront personnel and the security of
operations covered by the PCL&CA with respect to the threat of
terrorist attacks.
(2) The Union and the Employers. through the CLRC, will jointly
develop any programs and initiatives that they deem appropriate
in response to the threat of terrorist attacks affecting
waterfront personnel and operations covered by the PCL&CA.
(3) The Employers will promptly notify the Union of any developments
and initiatives, including any actual or proposed government
mandates that could affect waterfront security or operations
covered by the PCL&CA.
(4) The CLRC will have Waterfront Security as a standing item of its
regular meetings= agenda until such time as it deems
appropriate.
(5) The CLRC instructs all Joint Port Labor Relations Committee to
review Waterfront Security as a standing item of their regular
meetings--agenda and to report promptly to the CLRC any
problems or proposals for its review and action.
The CLRC agreed to send copies of these minutes to all JPLRC's by
facsimile today.
______
August 28, 2002
Joseph Miniace,
President and CEO,
Pacific Maritime Association,
San Francisco, CA.
Re: Letter of Understanding on Port Security
Dear Mr. Miniace:
The Parties agree that the Pacific Coast longshore industry must
expand port security measures to address the new threats of terrorism
arising from the tragic events of September 11, 2001. The Parties
recognize that though many port security provisions may eventually be
mandated by law, the Coast Parties must act responsibly and
proactively, utilizing their expertise in port operations, to have in
place immediate security measures for the protection of port workers
and 'communities. Accordingly, this will confirm that the Parties have
agreed to implement under the Pacific Coast Longshore and Clerks
Agreement (PCL&CA) the following port security measures and to work
together to lobby the Federal Government to adopt laws and regulations
that are consistent with these provisions:
(1) Any work and functions covered by section 1 of the PCL&CA that
are to be performed as part of any port security measures that
may be mandated by law or regulation shall be performed by ILWU
bargaining unit members.
(2) The Union and the Employers pledge to work together in good
faith to assess and address the safety of waterfront personnel
and the security of operations covered by the PCL&CA with
respect to the threat of terrorist attacks. The Union and
Employers also agree to work together in good faith in
implementing any security procedures that may be required by
law.
(3) The. Union and the Employers, through the CLRC and the JPLRC's,
will Jointly develop a security plan for each port area as well
as security plans for each marine facility covered by the
PCL&CA These plans shall, among other things, contain
procedures for:
(a) the identification, assessment, prevention and response to
security breaches, emergencies, hazards to health and
safety, and threatened and actual terrorist acts;
(b) notifying waterfront personnel of emergencies and hazards, for
evacuating and otherwise protecting personnel from such
dangers, and for determining that personnel may be returned
to the area without danger to their health and safety;
(8) Any conflicting law or regulation shall supersede any
contractual provision regarding port security and related
health and safety issues; however, these contractual provisions
may expand any legal obligations in this area unless
specifically prohibited by law or regulation.
Please confirm your agreement by signing below.
Yours truly,
James Spinosa,
International President.
Understanding Confirmed:
Joseph Miniace,
President and CEO
Pacific Maritime Association
______
Attachment 2
Eagle Marine Services, Ltd.
3/4/02
ILWU Local 52
Seattle, WA
Attn: John Daquisto
John,
As was discussed last week we have discontinued the checking of
seals containers loading to our on dock rail and the inspection of
empty containers discharging from on dock rail. We do not interpret
this as a change in method of operation and therefore section 15.12
does not apply. We refer to section 1.21 which addresses the employers
right to determine what work will be performed.
If either of these duties are to be performed in the future will
done in accordance with the PCCCD.
Regards,
Kelly Garber,
Operations Manager, GGN.
______
Seattle
January 15, 2002
Scott Godfrey, President
Labor Relations Committee
ILWU Local 52
Seattle, WA
Dear Committee Members,
This letter is intended to inform you of some procedural changes
that will be taking place at the in-gate Terminal 18, related to the
processing and receiving of export full and empty containers. Within
the next few weeks, pedestals and cameras will be installed in the
lanes. As a result, the in-gate clerks will be moved into a ``kitchen/
tower'' situation where they will no longer be in the lanes, but will
be stationed in the gate house building. The cameras will allow the
clerk to see all four sides of the container from inside the building
and the pedestal monitors will be used to display the yard location to
the trucker. Tickets will no longer be given to the trucker.
As previously stated above, the hardware will be installed within
the next few weeks but we don't expect to implement the new procedures
for a couple of months. Please be advised that we have consulted with
the appropriate regulatory agencies and a camera inspection of export
containers is allowed by a marine terminal as long as all four sides of
the container are visible. If you have any questions regarding this
letter please let us know, as we would be happy to meet with your
committee upon request to discuss these changes.
Sincerely,
Graham C. Hunter,
Ops/Labor Mgr.,
SSAT, T-18.
Scott Munger--PMA
Sandra Starkey--PMA
Lee MacGregor--SSAT
Steve Hanses--SSAT
______
SSA--Terminal 18--Seattle
To: Dennis/Bob
From: Lee
CC: Graham/Steve
Date: 02/15/01
Re: Gate one change
Please be advised that is has been decided by SSAT Terminal 18 that
inspections of export containers arriving on trucker's own equipment
are no longer required. Therefore, as of Tuesday, 2/20/01, the number
of mechanics working the full in lanes will be reduced, with the
remaining mechanic's focus being to inspect line owned chassis and the
associated containers being received.
Please instruct your clerks that they are not to leave their booth
to inspect export loads that are on trucker's own equipment. They are
to receive all information from the drivers (same as today) for
processing and they will only need to leave their booths for CY moves
if a mechanic is available. Even though mechanics will be present to
inspect CY moves, if the clerk has finished the transaction and a
mechanic has not arrived, the clerks are to process the truck without
the inspection. This also means that seal number/license number
verification is not required for these types of moves.
Please note, all renter boats will need inspections and seal
verification, regardless of what type of chassis being received.
Thank you for your cooperation.
Lee
______
Marine Terminals Corporation
San Pedro, CA, May 2, 2003
Mike Zuliani
President, ILWU Marine Clerks, Local 63
San Pedro, CA
Re: New Method of Operation at WBCT, SP 126
Mike:
Please be advised that effective Monday, May 12, the West Basin
Container Terminal (SP 126) will be eliminating seal number
verification and empty inspections on all equipment entering the
terminal. The seal number will be obtained from the truck driver and
received by the Marine Tower Clerk via the existing gate audio systems.
This new method of operation will reduce the daily number of marine
clerks employed by approximately four.
Please feel free to contact me if you have any questions or
concerns.
Sincerely
Sean Lindsay,
General Manager, Labor Relations,
Marine Terminals Corporation.
Adrian Diaz--VP Local 63
Mark Wheeler--WBCT
Robert Owens--MTC
Dave Adano--MTC
Walter Romanowski--MTC
Tim Kennedy--PMA
Senator Breaux. [presiding]. Thank you very much. I
apologize for having to go back and forth, we had a vote on the
Senate floor. And I'm sorry for the interruption. Thank you
very much for being with us.
Let me start. Mr. Koch, one of the concepts was, to make
sure that the cargo that's coming into the United States is
safe and secure. After it's in the port, it's very difficult to
do that. It's certainly more difficult to do it on a ship in
port than it would be to do it when that ship is located in a
foreign port, on its way to the United States. And you heard,
the Admiral and Mr. Bonner talk about how 38 foreign ports now
have adequate inspection-type facilities that we would approve
in order for them to be able to ship their products to the
United States. And I guess the question is, Suppose we just
said, ``Look, you're not going to ship to the United States
unless and until you have an approved port''--what would that
do to your folks?
Mr. Koch. I think it's the question of the criteria,
Senator, which is--are we talking about being compliant with
the ISPS code?
Senator Breaux. Yes, it would have to be something that the
United States would say, ``Look, if you want your ship to call
on the Port of New Orleans or the Port of Long Beach or on
Baltimore or whatever, you have to have that ship originate in
a port that has an approved inspection system on products that
are coming to the United States.''
Mr. Koch. Well----
Senator Breaux. ''Until you have it, we're not going to let
you do it.``
Mr. Koch. What I think is important is to draw a
distinction between ISPS code and CSI, which is the set of
agreements that Commissioner Bonner was talking about, where
they put the U.S. Customs people in the foreign ports, have to
have the VACIS inspection equipment, and have the information
sharing arrangement with the foreign customs authority and
where after, let's say, a container is identified by ATS as
having a question, U.S. Customs asks Dutch Customs, ``We want
you to look at that.'' Because that's separate and----
Senator Breaux. Yes, what would happen?
Mr. Koch.--beyond the required----
Senator Breaux. What would happen if we said you couldn't
come to the U.S. until you have that system in place?
Mr. Koch. I think you have to give people a lot of lead
time to put it in place. While there are 38 ports on that list,
only 18 are currently operational. And it's the kind of
strategy that we'd have to sit down with our trading partners
and really work through to make sure that we give people enough
time that trade is not brought to a halt, and people can plan
and know what is expected of them and get it in place in time.
Senator Breaux. I take it that we're moving to put these
systems in place in the larger ports. I'm not so much worried
about a ship with a loaded container of explosives coming in
from Rotterdam or from Singapore as I am coming in from some
small, third-world country, or a Caribbean island, where
someone has transported some device to that island to stick on
a rusty bucket to come into the Port of Miami or the Port of
New Orleans or any of those ports. Many of those ports will
never have any kind of a system in place. I mean, they're
barely operational. And yet they're loading vessels that are
much larger than the one that blew up the USS Cole. Seems to me
that--obviously, if I was a terrorist trying to load a ship
coming to the United States to do grave damage, I wouldn't load
it in Singapore or Rotterdam; I'd do it in some little third-
world country, where I'd buy off everybody in the port and load
the ship, and ship it on to the United States. I mean, how do
we address that? I mean, can we address that?
Mr. Koch. The potential vectors are so numerous, it makes
your head hurt. I mean, I think we have to realize that there
are al Qaeda cells in Hamburg, in Spain, in a lot of places, so
you can't just assume something coming through Rotterdam is
automatically safe because it's coming through Rotterdam. I
think you have to use the kind of more sophisticated screening
that ATS is supposed to be, which is--you want to know as much
as you can about that box, so you can make as intelligent a
risk assessment decision as you can.
Senator Breaux. I take it the answer is yes, but can you
elaborate perhaps on how the industry is working with the ports
to try to facilitate this--I mean, this is not anybody's sole
responsibility. It's not Congress' sole responsibility, it's
not the shipping companies' sole responsibility, it's not the
longshoremen's sole responsibility by themselves, it's not the
port by themselves. It has got to be a coordinated effort, or
it will never work. So how are the folks that you deal with
working with the ports and with the government to help make
this work?
Mr. Koch. Well, we're trying to support the government on
every initiative that we can, whether it's Coast Guard, whether
it's Customs, whoever it is. We try to sit down with them and
work through these issues. We've supported the 24-hour rule,
we've supported the ISPS code. We're supporting the Coast Guard
and its implementation, working through it with them; working
with Customs, for example, on these ATS questions, ``What
information do you want, from whom, when? Let's get agreement
on what it is you're trying to build.'' Then we can define what
the gaps are between what we want to have, what we presently
have, and then we can sit down and figure out, OK, there's this
option or there's this option, and try to work through with
them.
I would observe that I think what this security challenge
has done is, it has brought labor, carriers, shippers, and
third parties actually closer together, because we all
recognize there's a common challenge here. We all want to work
with the government in every way we can. A lot of this is
beyond our ability simply to come up with solutions. If it
doesn't work for the government, it doesn't work, because
they're the ultimate assessor of what ships get inspected and
what cargo gets inspected, as is appropriate. So I think we
view ourselves as partners, working with government in any way
we can on this, and there's no--as you point out, there's no
silver bullet; it's taking every piece, whether it's ship,
port, cargo, people, and working on all of them simultaneously,
and it's a huge challenge.
Senator Breaux. Yes.
Mr. LaGrange, you talked about coming to the Port of New
Orleans on 9/10, and then the tragic events of 9/11 the next
day. Not only in the Port of New Orleans, but in the other
major ports around the country, what would you say is different
today from what it was on that awful day of 9/11, in terms of
security?
I mean, when we had our hearings, quite frankly, I was
amazed and appalled at the lack of security in the ports with
regard to protective zones around ships in the port and what
have you. Going back to the Cole, a little 35-foot boat pulled
alongside of a military naval vessel and almost blew it to
pieces and sunk it. And yet I saw, in some ports, the only
security was a 25-foot fiberglass bass boat that would pull
around and point out where the ``Do Not Dock'' signs are, and
it really wasn't much of anything. I mean, that wasn't going to
stop anybody intent on blowing up a vessel.
You and I know that in the Port of Houston, New Orleans,
Baltimore, and in so many other ports, the port sometimes has,
a chemical plant, an LNG facility, an oil and gas refinery,
located right in the middle of a city.
What is different today, in reality, in the Port of New
Orleans or any of the other ports, that was not there on 9/11,
in terms of security?
Mr. LaGrange. Just yesterday, here in Washington, the
American Association of Port Authorities Legislative Planning
Council met in--over 150 corporate members, the major ports,
all of the players in the country--and unanimously, again,
adopted a resolution supporting $400 million in annual requests
needed, and we feel as though for quite some time.
What's difference is, as an example, to use an analogy, the
week after 9/11 we were rushed to a scene where a guy in a
kayak with a red box on the front of his kayak, in the
Mississippi River, had violated the safety zone of the Grandeur
of the Seas, Royal Caribbean's cruise line that calls on the
port. As it turned out, it was a guy in a kayak heading to the
Gulf of Mexico from Minnesota, and that was his lunch box up on
the hull of the kayak.
Senator Breaux. You all should have picked him just on
basic principles of not being----
[Laughter.]
Mr. LaGrange. That never would--he never would have been
accosted, he never would have been stopped, there wouldn't have
been a safety zone on that cruise ship the week before. And
that's just a small analogy.
I think where a lot of the problems are happening now--much
is happening, but, as I said, not enough has happened, earlier.
We just have so many resources and so much wherewithal, and
unfunded mandates or partially funded mandates seem to be the
order of the day, and we just simply can't stop the order of
facilitating commerce for security. The Admiral alluded to,
many times, a balance, and that's basically what we're trying
to do, balance everything to still make it work and happen.
Senator Breaux. How is the Port of New Orleans security
plan progressing?
Mr. LaGrange. Oh, it's--well. It's been accepted. It's not
implemented, but it's been accepted by the Coast Guard. It's
one of the few that he mentioned earlier. We feel really proud
about that. And lion's share of that was part and parcel
following the Florida's Ports Council, and starting early on.
Senator Breaux. So, you have devised a plan, for the Port
of New Orleans that meets the Federal requirements of what they
would like to see a plan consist of. But you haven't
implemented it, and part of that's financial.
Mr. LaGrange. Exactly. Eight million of $60 million in
needs would be 100 percent implementation at this point in
time. The $60 million would.
Senator Breaux. Do you know if the ports have attempted to
raise additional funds in some fashion in order to help
implement the plan? Or are the ports saying, ``Look, we just
need more Federal money, and we're not going to do anything
until we get money from Washington?'' Have the ports, in
general, tried to add more money to their own budgets in this
area, do they get the states to help, or the port authorities
to help, or do they try generating funds locally to help meet
this requirement?
Mr. LaGrange. Right. That movement has started. We're doing
it in New Orleans on a public/private basis, working with our
tenants. We're a land mart port, and the stevedores actually
operate our terminals, for the most part, with one or two
exceptions. But there is some very casual talk going on--in the
fact of--in the case of South Carolina, it has been a little
more than casual--the opportunity of looking at some fee, maybe
not called a security fee, but some fee that could be imposed
at each port individually, dependent on what that port's needs
may be. Just recently, in the airport in New Jersey, I noticed
on my ticket a $15, I think it was, surcharge for security, a
point in case. And our question, at the LPC with the APA is, if
airport can do it, maybe we should be thinking about doing it,
particularly at the cruise line terminals. The other--how it
would be implemented at the other level, I'm just really not
sure yet, but we are beginning very casual conversations and
talks about it, looking at the reality of how slow this is
going to take to get it at the Federal level.
Senator Breaux. Just out of curiosity, when a cruise ship
comes in, and the passengers disembark and get back on the
vessel, the inspections that are done of those movements and
the loading of those ships, is under the jurisdiction of the
port or is it the Coast Guard?
Mr. LaGrange. Customs, for the most part.
Senator Breaux. Customs, for the most part.
Mr. LaGrange. Yes, Customs, for the most part. And there is
100 percent screening of every luggage. But, again--that
message was made very poignant and very clear earlier--it's a
metal detection only.
Senator Breaux. Yes, Senator Nelson correctly pointed that
out. I visited the Port of Miami, and saw that every single
suitcase onboard that huge ship of 3,000 passengers went
through a metal detector, but nothing else. So, if I was a
terrorist, I wouldn't ship anything metal. They'd get my little
pocketknife again, but they're not going to get the plastic
bomb.
Dr. Carafano, I did not get to hear your testimony. I've
looked through your statement though. We tried to talk
yesterday about the type of transportation security risk we
have in this country. It seems like we spent four and a half
billion dollars, approximately, on airline security, and I
don't know what else we can do on airline security that we
haven't already done. We haven't come anywhere close to that,
in terms of both rail security or port security. If I were a
terrorist planning where to attack the United States, I
certainly would not go to an airline. I would go to something
else that has fewer implemented security measures. That would
be either railroads or ports and all their vulnerabilities.
Are ports more vulnerable than airlines, in your opinion?
Mr. Carafano. Yes, Senator, of course they are. The real
question is, How do you deal with that vulnerability? You know,
I'd just like to make two points real quick on that. Virtually
all of this infrastructure is in the private sector, and
security is part of the cost of doing business. And do believe,
at the end of the day, it's going to be--most of the security
costs are going to fall, properly, on the private sector to pay
for this.
And, now, is there a proper role for the Federal
Government? Sure there is. Does the Federal Government have a
role in improving critical infrastructure protection?
Absolutely. And there are things it should be doing. But I
think we have to look at what's an investment in that area, as
opposed to how can it really contribute to improving security
in the maritime domain. You know, we look at the numbers for
critical infrastructure protection, and they're enormous
because of the vulnerabilities are absolutely enormous.
Senator Breaux. Mr. LaGrange mentioned a user fee at the
New Jersey Airport. I guess, at the terminal for the airlines.
The money's got to come from somewhere. And it's either going
to be in terms of a user fee for the people who use the ports,
or it's going to come from the taxpayers, who may not directly
use the port at all. What would your recommendation be if the
ports needed additional funding? I mean, do you have any
recommendation----
Mr. Carafano. I think----
Senator Breaux.--about it?
Mr. Carafano. Primarily for critical infrastructure
protection, I would look for solutions that are based on good,
solid business models that--if a port can compete economically,
it has to do safety things, it has to do environmental things,
and it has to do security things. So I think, in the long term,
those kinds of solutions will be most sustainable.
I think in the critical infrastructure protection area, the
thing that the Federal Government could do best is to provide
consistency to the business model. I mean, we should--I think
we should go to multi-year funding for these grants, so people
have a clear understanding of how much money is really coming
down the pipeline, ``What can I really count on?'' And then we
ought to be very clear, in terms of what our national
performance standards are, what we expect state and local
governments to do, and we ought to be very clear about what our
priorities are and who's going to get this money. And that way,
people can approach this with a sense of, ``Now I know what
assistance I'm going to get.''
I really think where we can make our bigger bang for the
buck is in domain awareness and increasing counterterrorism
operations--you know, finding this stuff before it gets to the
port, because the things are so vast. So, for example, I think
the biggest bang we could get for our buck would be rapidly
increasing funding for Deepwater. I mean, Deepwater cuts across
every single mission area in the maritime domain. We know that
if we spend a lot more, we're going to get a lot--we're going
to get much more capability, and we know exactly what we're
going to get for our money, as opposed to when we just buy
another fence or a light or a rent-a-cop. And we know we're
actually----
Senator Breaux. All right.
Mr. Carafano.--we know we're actually going to create $4
billion, which can then be plowed back into the maritime
security role.
Senator Breaux. The Deepwater Program is a real success,
and is going to be a success. I know that we are using vessels
from the Coast Guard for patrol boats that are going to be very
important to this effort. We are extending their length from
110 feet to 123 feet for some of the patrol boats, and some of
the larger vessels, three and four-hundred-foot cutters are all
going to be very important in the whole scheme of things. This
is something we need to continue. And I think this Committee is
going to insist that the Deepwater Program be adequately
funded, because of its importance.
With regard to the private money that is being spent by the
ports to provide some of their security measures, ports have to
be competitive, and I would imagine that there would be some
that would say, ``All right, if I'm up in New Jersey, I'm not
going to do all of this, because the Port of Houston may not do
it.'' So then nobody does it. Is there a way to ensure that
there's consistency here? Is the Federal Government saying,
``All right, ports, you've got to all do the following
things,'' so that one port in one part of the country will not
do it because it'll make him noncompetitive with other ports.
Therefore, nothing gets done. Any thoughts about how we could
address that?
Mr. Carafano. You know, I think--well, the answer is--I
mean, I think we need to say, ``You need to do this.'' But in
terms of standards, ``You need to provide this kind of
security,'' and then I think we need to leave it up to the
ports to determine the best way to do that.
I actually think that ISPS and MTSA provide a good
foundation for that. I think what's important is the funding,
for example, for the Coast Guard, to make sure that--and, I
think, grant funding to complete an assessment, is extremely
important. I think it's in funding for the Coast Guard, so
they're going back and they're doing assessments and audits and
inspections to make sure that people are compliant with the
standards.
And I think the Admiral had it right. I mean, I think--
well, first of all, when we say, ``Who's providing good
security, and who isn't,'' they're going to be more economic
competitive, and they're going to get more business. So, in the
end of the day, I think a business model will solve that.
And I also think that, you know, if people recognize that
they're--I mean, I think in a large sense, the private sector
story is, that there is value in security. And Target, for
example, recently has created their own brand-new computer
system to audit their supply chain. And they did this because
they realize that there's money to be made in security. It
provides better visibility, it reduces pilferage. And, at the
end of the day, if something really happens, the economic loss
to all of us is going to be terrible. I mean, there is, I
think--I don't think we acknowledge it quite often, but there
is money to be made in security, and I think the private sector
will respond if the standard----
Senator Breaux. Oh, there's money to be made in providing
the security. I'm worried about the people who have to pay for
it. I told them yesterday, I want to go into the dog business,
because they're going to be buying a lot of them.
[Laughter.]
Senator Breaux. The dogs to sniff out everything in the
world, and that's going to be a heck of a business to be in.
But, if the Port of New Orleans as an example, provides
first-class security facilities and is the most secure port in
the world, and the Port of Houston decides, ``We're not going
to do that.'' Then a ship has to decide whether they're going
to call at the Port of New Orleans, which is the safest, but,
by far, the most expensive port----
Mr. Carafano. Right.
Senator Breaux.--they're going to lose business to the Port
of Houston. There ought to be some kind of a national standard
so that all the ports have to play by the same rules. If one
wants to be the most secure port in the world, and the one in
the next state over says, ``Well, we'll cut it in half, and
we'll cut our rates in half,'' the shippers are going to go use
the other port that is the cheapest, but maybe not quite as
secure.
Mr. Carafano. Well, I do think that MTSA and ISPS provide a
good foundation for that. And I also think that, you know, for
example, if you were Target of the--and I go back to the point
I made earlier about allowing the private sector to identify
and have validated and certified their means of providing a
secure supply chain--if you go to the Target of the world and
say, ``Look, we don't care what happens''--but if, for example,
you've determined--or we agree that the Port of Houston is a
secure port, and that we can depend on this. So if something
goes off in New York, there's no way that we're going to stop
stuff in the Port of Houston unless we know for a fact there's
a bomb in Houston. Then Target may very well say, ``Well, you
know something? It makes good economic sense for me to make a
deal to move my stuff through Houston, because I know I'll
always be able to get through.'' And I think that, at the end
of the day, those factors will become the real driver to--
because we need security that's sustained for--you know, we
know now it took five to 7 years to plan and execute the 9/11
attack. That fact that there hasn't been an attack is
irrelevant. The next attack may come five, ten, fifteen years
from now.
Senator Breaux. Yes.
Mr. Carafano. We need a physically responsible system
that's going to get us ten or fifteen, twenty years in the
future.
Senator Breaux. Well----
Mr. Carafano. I think Federal funding's not going to do
that.
Senator Breaux. Mike, how do you pronounce your last name?
I'm sorry.
Mr. Mitre. Mitre.
Senator Breaux. Mitre, OK. I noticed, in some of our
hearings right after 9/11, that there was a lack of restriction
and easy access to ports. I mean, people just drove in and
drove out with very little checking. There were tourists, in
the old days, walking around the port, looking at the port,
looking at the big ships. That cannot be allowed today. Things
have changed, and people are going to be restricted. I think
you spoke about the question that if you're in a port today,
you ought to be there for a reason, and it ought to be
verifiable. How is that being handled? If some people don't
want to be restricted in their activities, is it working all
right now? There are many more requirements regarding access to
ports and who's there and what your business is. How is that
being handled by the workers themselves? Is that an acceptable
system, by requiring more identification, and reasons for being
in a port?
Mr. Mitre. Well, I think--especially since 9/11, I think
there has been a new--almost like a renaissance, a new rebirth,
of awareness, the fact that we do need security.
One of the problems with the ports is, they were designed
not to be secure. We didn't used to have fences. We could
drive----
Senator Breaux. Sure.
Mr. Mitre.--right up to the ship. So we had always less.
And fences and other things are kind of--I don't want to say
Band-aids, but are things that have been added on. They weren't
built in as part of the infrastructure. The problem is, with
what you're talking about now, is this, we used to have a
mentality, ``No, we don't want an ID, we don't want''--but, you
know, really, going back to the Vietnam War, we used to have to
have--for probably 6, 7 years, we had a port security card.
Everyone had to have one. And, you know, there was no problem,
because people understood. But, at that time, we hadn't had an
incident domestically. Now that we've had an incident
domestically, our workforce is very much--very, very much more
aware. And it's not a problem.
To get on a terminal, you have to have either the company
picture ID or your driver's license to get on, and everyone's
checked. If you don't have it, you don't come on, and you don't
work. And I think we have, now, more self-reporting things
about--because we have a number of them--we can call the Coast
Guard--that if a terminal isn't asking, we have our own guys
calling the Coast Guard saying, ``Hey, we have a problem.
They're not even asking us for our ID anymore.'' And for us to
switch around the mentality from not wanting it----
Senator Breaux. Right.
Mr. Mitre.--to that, that kind of answers the question, in
and of itself, I think.
Senator Breaux. Well, I'm glad to hear that. I was
particularly interested in your comments about the empty
containers. Does anyone have a comment on that? Mr. Mitre
talked about, the empty containers not being checked and
certified. I mean, if I wanted to load something, I'd go find
an empty container I know is not going to be checked, and put
whatever I want in the empty container and backload it to
somewhere else.
Mr. LaGrange. At the Port of New Orleans, in particular--I
think a lot of the ports are addressing that--we're performing
a study right now, called the ``steel wheel shuttle,'' which
will relocate the empties to an outer, more rural, sparsely
populated location. It's kind of like putting a Band Aid on
something, if you will. But with the resources and funds
available, we'll utilize a smaller shallow draft port with good
rail access to do that, where the empties could either be
railed or barged to that site. But, in the interim, you still
have the issue that Mr. Mitre alluded to, you still have the
box at that point, and the dangerous point is when it gets off
the ship or when it's ready to put on the ship. So that's not
the final solution, either.
Senator if I may, I just wanted to add one comment that,
for a long time, the Ports Association has been on record,
unlike the airports and others, as feeling as though a
significant contribution is already being made by the ports to
the Federal budget. Customs being one perfect example. So, in
terms of your user-fee question a little earlier, I want you to
know it's a sensitive issue with all ports. It's not as though
we're not trying to solve the solution, but we feel as though
we don't have, even at the other infrastructure level, any of
those programs in place at other entities like ours.
Senator Breaux. Thank you.
Can anybody answer this question: When a container box is
sealed in a foreign port destined for New Orleans, who seals it
over there? Is it the government, or is it the company that
does that? Does the shipper seal it himself, or is there a
Coast Guard equivalent that says, ``Well, we're looking at this
box, and this is what's in there, and I'm sealing it?''
Mr. Koch. The government generally not involved with
sealing the box. The time the seal should be applied to the box
is by the person stuffing that container, the shipper at
origin. That's the time that the seal should be put on. That's
the time most seals are put on.
Senator Breaux. OK, well, how do we find boxes that have
illegal commodities in it? I mean----
Mr. Koch. Well----
Senator Breaux.--if you've just got a crooked sealer over
there that is in cooperation with whoever's trying to ship
drugs, or whatever----
Mr. Koch. That certainly can happen. Or seals can be
tampered with, or containers could be tampered with. Sometimes
a seal isn't put on at stuffing, but the truck driver will
carry it, because they know, ``I'm going to go down, I'm going
to hit local Customs. Local Customs is going to open the box
and look inside of it, so I won't put the seal on until I'm
finished with local Customs.'' In some countries, local Customs
pops the seals on every single container, and then re-puts a
new seal on. This is an area that requires attention. The World
Shipping Council, together with the NIT League and together
with the Mass Retail Association, put together a comprehensive
seal-verification proposal that we submitted to the government
in September.
Senator Breaux. I think that's a key point in the shipping
process. If each box has to have a seal, you could have someone
certify that this is what's in the box. You've got to put a
foolproof system if, in fact, that person is doing their job.
Mr. Koch. Well, it's one indicator. It's not foolproof,
because, as you point out, Senator, you could have somebody
stuffing the box, who has bad intent, and then put a good seal
on it.
Senator Breaux. Oh, I understand. But, I mean, if you had
the right person sealing every box, you would be certifying
that that box doesn't have a bomb or anything else in it. But
it's always a problem making sure it's an honest person doing
it.
Mr. Koch. Which is what the C-TPAT Program is trying to get
at, which is, they're trying to identify those importers who
will take the steps to go to their foreign manufacturing
places, require that a high-security seal be put on at
stuffing, and then track it through with their vendors all the
way through.
Senator Breaux. I mean, if we had absolute faith at that
point in the process, we wouldn't need all 145 container
screeners that screen every box that comes through every port.
This is a huge expense.
Mr. Mitre, do you have any comments on these seals?
Mr. Mitre. Yes, you know--yes, I do--you know, one of the
things that I think is absolutely necessary to remember is, one
of our points about checking the integrity of the seal here is
exactly for the reasons that have been made. It's a very quick
way to do it. You can see if the seal's been tampered with. And
one of the things we always used to do is, the clerk that was
down there used to have a list of what the numbers were on the
seal. That number will match up with the manifest list. He
didn't have to write it down. He could just see it. Someone
else putting another seal on it, a dummy seal, that immediately
gets it right there. And that was always a very, very important
thing. Very important.
The other point, besides that one, is the fact that--let's
say, for example, someone was to cut a seal off somewhere to
get into the interior of the container, whether they put
explosives in it or to steal something, whatever it is, for
contraband, or whatever. We used the recognition of having a
seal or not as an indication of something's wrong. And, for
example, we have empty lanes at the terminals. Empties don't
have seals on them. They should, but they don't. The other day,
a container was going through with a seal on it, through an
empty lane. And someone just said, ``Hey, wait a minute. Why's
that thing's got the seal there?'' Because, at that one place,
he--that's not part of the job, but the guy just happened to
spot it. They go, ``Hey, take that thing over there and open up
the doors. Let's see what's going on here.'' And they got--I
guess one of the Customs guys--and they got it over to the
side, and it was full of flat screen TVs. The point is, is that
seals, in and of themselves, are a quick, but it's an efficient
way to see if something's wrong. And that's why we've made such
a point of saying coming off the vessel--we're not asking them
to take this huge half-hour thing, but it takes about 30
seconds to check this seal and to check the integrity of it.
And I think that's why it's--that's very important.
Senator Breaux. The seals are not matched up with the
manifest when they come off a ship?
Mr. Koch. Carrier systems should have it manifested, and
the seal number should be there. I think the objective we all
agree on, I think, if a seal-verification process is in place,
and that seal's been checked before it's loaded on the ship,
then that should be all that's needed, because it's not going
to be tampered with on the ship. Terrorists are not likely to
go messing with a container once it's on a ship. Or at least
the risk of that is extremely low. So we think if a seal
verification's been done properly at the foreign port, you
shouldn't need to do it when it's taken off the ship here.
Senator Breaux. Well, these are all interesting points, and
I think all of this has been very helpful. We heard from the
Chairman and the Ranking Member. We are making a new effort on
legislation to get something going here. In order to guarantee
the ports have the means needed to implement the desired
security systems. We could have the same degree of security at
the ports as we do at the airports, which are much better than
before 9/11.
So I think you all have been very, very helpful, and your
suggestions have been very, very important. And with that, the
Committee will stand adjourned until further call of the Chair.
[Whereupon, at 12:29 p.m., the hearing was adjourned.]
A P P E N D I X
Prepared Statement of Hon. Trent Lott, U.S. Senator from Mississippi
I want to thank the Chairman for holding today's hearing, and thank
all the witnesses for appearing before the Committee to discuss this
important subject. I worked closely with the Committee on the Maritime
Transportation Security Act of 2002, and I have followed the Department
of Homeland Security's implementation of the Act's provisions. In
general, I am pleased with the efforts to date, but I see that there is
still much work to be done.
The Department of Homeland Security is working on a number of
initiatives to take advantage of the co-location of the various
agencies under one roof. For instance, Customs and Immigration
personnel are being cross-trained to handle each others' duties. This
will help airports, such as Jackson International Airport in Jackson,
Mississippi, to acquire an immigration screening capability with its
current Customs workforce without additional personnel. I encourage the
Department to expedite programs such as this.
This co-location also provides an opportunity for the Department to
eliminate some of the redundant efforts of these agencies to perform
the same missions when they were housed in separate departments. For
instance, during the 1980s, the Coast Guard and Customs Service both
developed capabilities to intercept drug smugglers on sea and in the
air. I recommend the Department consider whether to eliminate this
duplication and assign each of these two missions to one or the other
agency. From my perspective, it seems to me that the Coast Guard's
ingrained ship and boat operating, maintaining, and personnel training
system is naturally superior to Customs', and that the Customs Service
aircraft fleet is more specialized for the air intercept mission than
the Coast Guard's aircraft fleet.
I also want to support Senator Snowe's statements advocating an
increase in the Coast Guard's Deepwater program funding. It was clear
to me at the beginning of this program that the Coast Guard's cutter
and aircraft fleets were all reaching the end of their service lives
simultaneously and would need replacement during the same 10-15 year
period. I understood that the Coast Guard's proposed funding profile
was based more on what OMB felt comfortable with than on what was
needed to ensure that the Coast Guard's operational capability was
maintained, so the time line was stretched out past 20 years. However,
as we have recently seen, the equipment is not waiting for the funding
to show up before it fails. The Coast Guard is losing operational
capability under the current funding profile, and indications are that
it will get worse. The Congress should fund the Deepwater program at
least at the $1.1M level in FY05 so that replacement cutter and
aircraft can be expedited.
On the subject of port security, a great deal of attention has been
paid to improving security at our Nation's largest seaports, and
rightly so. However, while maritime-based attacks on ports such as Los
Angeles or New York would clearly have major consequences for this
nation, the hardening of those ports is proceeding at a much faster
pace than for smaller ports. As others have noted, terrorists look for
vulnerabilities as well as for effect. We also need to ensure that
smaller ports with particularly sensitive vulnerabilities are hardened.
For instance, Pascagoula, Mississippi has a Navy homeport, a major
shipyard that builds Navy combatants, an oil refinery, and a natural
gas pipeline.
Thank you all for your attention to our nations' security.
______
Response to Written Questions Submitted by Hon. Ernest F. Hollings to
(Ret.) Rear Admiral David Stone
Question 1. Admiral Stone, your agency gave out the first three
rounds port security grounds, and in my opinion consistent with the
authorizing law. TSA set up a process to require each Coast Guard
Captain of the Port to rank all grant applications in the district,
after that the Maritime Administration's regional director worked with
the Coast Guard to come up with a regional recommendation for ranking
all of the grant applications. Grants were then forwarded to TSA where
two panels comprised of officials from Coast Guard, TSA, and MARAD gave
a final ranking and award. Grants were intended to help ensure
compliance with Federal security plans, and prior to the adoption of
plans to address Coast Guard identified security concerns. Recently,
Secretary Ridge announced that he was shifting all grants the Office of
Domestic Preparedness. Are we dumbing down the process, what was wrong
with the approach that had been taken?
Answer. The responsibility of securing our Nation's ports is a
shared one. The Department of Homeland Security (DHS), the Department
of Transportation (DOT), and other Federal agencies are working
together to enhance security in partnership with the public and private
entities that own and operate the Nation's ports. With the exception of
the Office of Domestic Preparedness (ODP) administering the grants, the
selection process will not be materially different. TSA, Coast Guard,
and the Maritime Administration will continue to provide the necessary
operational expertise for the grant programs as required by ODP. These
functions include assisting with determination of eligibility and
evaluation criteria, solicitation and application review procedures,
selection recommendations, and post award technical monitoring. TSA
will also continue to leverage existing transportation expertise by
working with industry stakeholders, Coast Guard, and DOT modal
administrations to assist ODP in ensuring that competitive Federal
security grants are awarded to most eligible applications for the
reduction or elimination of identified security vulnerabilities at
ports.
Additional information. The Office of Domestic Preparedness has
become the Office of State and Local Government Coordination and
Preparedness.
Question 2. It is my understanding that your agency is working on a
risk based analysis of intermodal cargo shipments, to facilitate
targeting of cargo for purposes of inspection. It is my understanding
that GAO also testified critically, that the Customs targeting system
was not being adequately tested. Have TSA and Customs sat down together
and critically reviewed each others methodologies? Would not that be
the right thing to do?
Answer. We agree that interagency coordination will yield a more
robust information analysis and risk assessment approach for the
Department. The Border and Transportation Security Directorate is
addressing risk assessment issues mentioned above through a multi-
agency working group that includes TSA, CBP, USCG, and DOT. This
working group is looking at vulnerabilities and security measures
across the supply chain. Risk assessment is but one aspect of this
review. BTS also has established an Office of Screening Coordination
(OSC) that will be reviewing the various existing and proposed
methodologies and overall domain awareness and risk assessment tools
within DHS agencies that could be interlinked to provide more
comprehensive assets to target cargo, vessels, and passengers more
effectively. The Office of Screening Coordination will be conducting
its review in the cargo analytical arena with the cooperation and
participation of CBP, USCG, ICE, DOD, and DOT. OSC will review CBP's
Automated Targeting System--Cargo and other targeting and domain
awareness initiatives envisioned or under way TSA, USCG, and the
National Maritime Information Center. The goal is to leverage all
existing risk assessment tools within the Department.
Question 3. How much Federal funding provided by Congress for port
security grants remains to be allocated?
Answer. For Fiscal Year 2004, $50 million in Congressionally
appropriated port security grant funds remain to be allocated.
Applications for this remaining money have been both solicited and
received and are currently going through the multi-level, multi-agency
review process. It is estimated that grants for the remaining funds
will be awarded in the fall of 2004.
______
Response to Written Questions Submitted by Hon. Frank R. Lautenberg to
Rear Admiral David M. Stone (Ret.)
Question 1. If your Federal budget for port security functions were
doubled, in what ways would you use it to improve security?
Answer. DHS has designated the United States Coast Guard (USCG) as
the leading operational agency for maritime security issues. Other DHS
agencies, including the Border and Transportation Security Directorate,
Customs and Border Protection, and TSA, have been delegated lead and
supporting roles by the Secretary for various sections of the Maritime
Transportation Security Act. As the leading operational agency, USCG
utilizes the resources and expertise of TSA, Customs and Border
Protection (CBP), and other Federal agencies (Department of
Transportation's MARAD, as an example) as part of a team to complement
USCG actions within the overall maritime security regime. Whatever the
budget level for port security functions, TSA would continue to carry
out its mission in maritime security and continue to support the USCG
in its lead role.
Question 2. What is your intention for the use of the $17 million
appropriation for OSC? Do you intend to share the results of Operation
Safe Commerce with organizations like World Customs Organization, the
International Standards Organization or the International Maritime
Organization in order to help create an international container
security standard?
Answer. DHS anticipates that the Request for Applications for the
$17 million appropriated in Fiscal Year 2004 for Operation Safe
Commerce (OSC) is on track to be released later this summer, with final
award anticipated in the fall. These grants are now administered by the
Office of State and Local Government Coordination and Preparedness
(formerly known as the Office of Domestic Preparedness) within DHS.
This funding will be used to build on current OSC pilot projects, and
may include other supply chains. The expenditure of the remaining funds
will be fully coordinated within the Department and Congress to ensure
that the cargo security efforts through OSC are integrated into broader
departmental initiatives to secure the cargo supply chain.
Results from the projects will be used to recommend container
supply chain best practices and standards for use by commercial
maritime shippers. Results will be shared with all relevant
stakeholders, including World Customs Organization, the International
Standards Organization and the International Maritime Organization.
Question 3. Are there any plans to expand Operation Safe Commerce
to the auto, bulk or break bulk shipping trades?
Answer. As previously stated in Question 2 above, the remaining $17
million in Operation Safe Commerce (OSC) funds will be used to build on
current OSC pilot projects and may include other supply chains.
Question 4. What are the goals of TSA and CBP for the Operation
Safe Commerce program and how do you believe it can contribute to
securing international commerce entering the U.S.?
Answer. It is important to note that the goals for this program
support the Department's goals for cargo and supply chain security. One
departmental goal is to ensure effective cargo security from point of
origin to final destination. In order to ensure that international and
domestic approaches to cargo security are coordinated and policies are
consistent, under BTS leadership, a working group consisting of
personnel from TSA, CBP, USCG and Science & Technology has been meeting
regularly. The working group is conducting a gap analysis on existing
cargo security and intelligence programs, coordinating existing
containerized cargo security programs and R&D efforts to identify
synergies, and coordinating existing DHS component activities in the
containerized cargo security environment.
The working group's efforts at coordination include applying
lessons learned from Operation Safe Commerce as well as leveraging
existing CBP programs like the Container Security Initiative (CSI) and
the Customs-Trade Partnership Against Terrorism (C-TPAT).
Question 5. How far along is the Department in setting
specifications for a ``smart container''? Do any effective technologies
exist that can be applied at reasonable cost today?
Answer. Through the BTS-lead working group described above, the
Department is determining appropriate minimum standards for container
security. This assessment will be complete this fall. This assessment
includes a review of available technologies to determine what may be
required within the short term (12 months) to enhance container
security. As mentioned above this group is looking at the results of
OSC and other programs designed to evaluate technologies and best
business practices to improve container security while avoiding
disruption of the flow of cargo. In addition to OSC, CBP is currently
engaged with Customs Trade Partnership Against Terrorism (C-TPAT)
members in established trade lanes to test Container Security Device
(CSD) technology in order to develop standards for a ``smart
container''. Data relative to such technology is assessed upon arrival
in the United States and is ongoing. In FY03, DHS initiated the
Homeland Security Advance Research Project Assessment (HSARPA) Advance
Container Security Device Program with the objective of developing the
next-generation shipping container security devices with multiple
sensing modalities, ``smart'' condition monitoring, automated alerting,
and advanced communications. HSARPA is conducting this development
effort in cooperation with CBP, including the Smart Box Initiative and
the efforts of the Applied Technology Division. HSARPA is also
conducting this development effort in cooperation with the
Transportation Security Administration's Operation Safe Commerce (OSC).
The cost of technology is a major factor when assessing the
viability of a certain product. The effectiveness of such technology,
however, cannot be gauged without applying it to ``real world'' testing
i.e., applying it to containers in established trade lanes. In order to
determine if effective technology exists today that is technologically
and operationally viable and can be applied at a reasonable cost,
comprehensive testing must be conducted
Question 6. If Operation Safe Commerce was supposed to guide TSA
and CBP in creating international standards why is it that CBP
announced standards prior to getting results from Operation Safe
Commerce?
Answer. The Department is still in the process of setting standards
for cargo containers and to meet the MTSA requirements for performance
standards in this area. DHS will consider the results of the OSC test
bed in the development of these standards. In addition, within the
context of the Container Security Initiative, CBP has identified
several characteristics of a so-called ``smart container''. The
Department supports CBP efforts to implement voluntary measures, but is
still working to determine whether these criteria would be acceptable
for an enforceable Departmental standard in support of MTSA
requirements. Through a DHS advisory committee, we have engaged
industry in a comprehensive discussion of minimum standards. We expect
to issue formal standards later this year, with the results of OSC and
other relevant programs considered as appropriate.
Question 7. Is CBP involved in guiding Operation Safe Commerce?
How?
Answer. Yes. CBP plays an integral role in this grant program by
providing input and lessons learned from existing CBP programs like the
Container Security Initiative (CSI) and the Customs-Trade Partnership
Against Terrorism (C-TPAT). CBP is an active participant in the OSC
Executive Steering Committee, and CBP field staff are also involved as
requested to assist with testing and operational issues associated with
the program.
______
Written Questions Submitted to Hon. Thomas H. Collins and Responses by
the United States Coast Guard
Intelligence Programs Within DHS
Question 1. Why are four separate agencies, three of which are in
the Department of Homeland Security (Coast Guard, Customs, and TSA),
developing distinct intelligence programs?
Answer. DHS component agencies, by virtue of fielding front line
officers (CBP inspectors, ICE agents, USCG personnel, TSA screeners,
etc.), each have an organic capacity to collect and generate
information and intelligence, and each, by virtue of having mission
specific operations, need to be able to analyze and disseminate that
intelligence to its field personnel. At the same time, it is absolutely
critical that that information and intelligence be provided to and
analyzed at a higher level within DHS, and shared with other components
of the department that did not generate it. For that reason, each of
these agencies fields a collection and analysis capability that
supports its specific mission, but also engages in robust information
sharing with both IA and other members of the intelligence community.
Information Sharing
Question 2. What are you doing to make sure intelligence is being
shared among DHS, the Navy, and the rest of the intelligence community?
Answer. The Coast Guard took an early role within DHS to ensure
that intelligence products were accurate and available to the DHS
Information Analysis and Infrastructure Protection (IAIP) Directorate
and throughout the entire Federal Government. The Coast Guard Command
Center is co-located with the National Response Center (NRC) sharing
threat information and reports of suspicious activities from the
maritime industry and other maritime stakeholders. The Coast Guard has
been functioning as the Information Sharing and Analysis Center for the
maritime industry in accordance with PDD 63 since February 2003.
Additionally, the Coast Guard and Navy continue to build an
effective joint intelligence partnership to enhance maritime domain
awareness. The Coast Guard's Intelligence Coordination Center is co-
located with the Office of Naval Intelligence, which comprise the
National Maritime Intelligence Center (NMIC).
The Coast Guard has also provided access to its intelligence
databases, advice to other agencies and DHS components developing
intelligence-shared architectures, and exchanged intelligence analysts
and liaison officers with other agencies and components active in the
maritime arena. These liaison officers work with the following
organizations: Terrorist Threat Integration Center, Defense
Intelligence Agency, Federal Bureau of Investigation, Border and
Transportation Security, U.S. Navy, IAIP, National Security Agency,
Central Intelligence Agency, National Drug Intelligence Center, El Paso
Intelligence Center, and Joint Intelligence Task Force for Combating
Terrorism.
The Coast Guard and Border and Transportation Security (BTS) have
also exchanged personnel to enhance data sharing between the CG
Intelligence Coordination Center's COASTWATCH (which analyzes
information from notice of arrival reports on vessels, people, and
certain dangerous cargoes approaching U.S. ports) and BTS' National
Targeting Center (cargo tracking process). While both systems are
closely related, the Coast Guard's COASTWATCH and the Border and
Transportation Service's National Targeting Center (NTC) have developed
complementary roles in the area of targeting and tracking cargo,
vessels, and people. This effort is enhanced by the exchange of BTS and
CG personnel to eliminate duplication of efforts and ensure free flow
of information such that the centers act nearly as one entity. The
focus and expertise of the two efforts are however, separate
functions--one based on a cargo targeting and tracking processes and
one based on vessels and people from a law enforcement and intelligence
perspective. The Coast Guard and BTS will continue developing practices
and policies to improve the capability and capacity of these two
systems.
Impediments
Question 3. Are there specific impediments that restrict the
ability of the Department of Navy to cooperate with respect to
commercial and domestic information and data?
Answer. While the Coast Guard cannot respond directly to the
question for the Department of Navy, there is a well-established
relationship between the Coast Guard and the Navy for sharing
intelligence information specifically for maritime homeland security
and maritime homeland defense. This cooperation is most visible at the
National Maritime Intelligence Center where the Coast Guard
Intelligence Coordination Center is co-located with the Office of Naval
Intelligence.
The Intelligence Community components of the Coast Guard and Navy
are governed by intelligence oversight laws and policies, which allow
for the lawful collection, retention and dissemination of intelligence
information while protecting the privacy rights of United States
persons.
Support from Intelligence Agencies
Question 4. Are you receiving adequate support and information from
the Intelligence Agencies? When you receive a specific warning from the
Intelligence Community, how do you disseminate that data down to state
and local maritime/port officials?
Answer. Yes, the Coast Guard has received excellent support from
the Director of Central Intelligence, Intelligence Community Management
Staff, and other Community members on a broad spectrum of issues.
Coast Guard participation in sharing intelligence at the state and
local levels is facilitated through the DHS Information Analysis and
Infrastructure Protection (IAIP) Directorate. IAIP makes the decision
as to what information is shared at various levels of government. DHS
promulgates Sensitive Homeland Security Information to facilitate
sharing information with our local partners.
The Coast Guard, in coordination with IAIP, uses a variety of
methods to share intelligence information with state and local
officials:
Under the Maritime Transportation Security Act, the Coast
Guard disseminates intelligence information to state and local
officials through Area Maritime Security Committees.
Coast Guard Field Intelligence Support Teams (FISTs) and
Coast Guard Investigative Service (CGIS) Special Agents work
closely with state and local law enforcement officials to share
intelligence information.
In close coordination with IAIP, the Coast Guard rapidly
disseminates terrorist threat warning information to the
maritime industry.
Some of the coordination between the Coast Guard and state
and local governments is formally recognized through various
memorandums of understanding, but most are accomplished via
numerous working relationships.
Coordinated Security Efforts in Huntington
Question 5. [West Virginia officials believe that the Coast Guard,
TSA, and others involved in port security have a bias for coastal
ports. These questions related to the Administration's efforts to
protect inland ports. The Port of Huntington is the seventh largest
port in terms of tonnage handled in the country. Over 50 percent of the
cargo processed at the port is hazardous material. I have a series of
questions relating to this port.]
The Marine Safety Office (MSO) in Huntington, West Virginia is
responsible for over 300 miles of navigable waterways. Within the MSO
Huntington there are 3 state jurisdiction boundaries and upwards of 18
county jurisdictional boundaries. What steps can be taken to make sure
the security efforts are coordinated, and that responders are aware and
positioned to respond to a maritime terrorist incident?
Answer. The Coast Guard's Port, Waterway and Coastal Security
(PWCS) mission is to deter, detect, prevent and respond to attacks
against U.S. territory, population, and critical maritime
infrastructure throughout the entire Marine Transportation System
(MTS). This mission is accomplished through interagency,
intergovernmental, and public/private sector cooperative efforts.
As the lead Federal entity for maritime security, the Coast Guard
accomplishes its mission in part through Area Maritime Security
Committees (AMSC). These committees, which are required by the Maritime
Transportation Security Act of 2002 (MTSA), include representatives of
law enforcement agencies, intelligence agencies, first responders,
vessel and facility owners/operators, as well as Federal, state and
local agency representatives. The AMSCs, under the leadership of the
Coast Guard Captains of the Port/Federal Maritime Security Coordinators
(COTPs/FMSCs) provide a framework to communicate threats, identify
risks, and coordinate resources to mitigate threats and vulnerabilities
at the regional level. Such a committee has been established for the
Huntington region.
The COTP/FMSC in Huntington, like other field commanders throughout
the nation, is partnering with the state Joint Task Forces, sharing DHS
information bulletins, and working with local law enforcement and
emergency response agencies to establish procedures for responding to
security threats. These procedures are being proven through exercises
and drills. Additionally, the AMS Committees on the inland and western
rivers have created ``River Watch,'' a volunteer network to increase
awareness and detection capabilities.
Coordination on Different Jurisdiction
Question 6. How do your agencies coordinate security efforts in
large multi-jurisdictional areas such as this? And, are we investing in
technology that will allow us to maximize resources to protect,
prevent, and respond to incidents that could result in a catastrophic
loss?
Answer. The Department of Homeland Security's mission to deter,
detect, prevent and respond to attacks against U.S. territory,
population, and critical maritime infrastructure is accomplished
through interagency, intergovernmental, and public/private sector
cooperative efforts.
As the lead Federal entity for maritime security, the Coast Guard
accomplishes its mission in part through Area Maritime Security
Committees (AMSC). These committees, which are required by the Maritime
Transportation Security Act of 2002 (MTSA), include representatives of
law enforcement agencies, intelligence agencies, first responders,
vessel and facility owners/operators, as well as Federal, state and
local agency representatives. The AMSCs, under the leadership of the
Coast Guard Captains of the Port/Federal Maritime Security Coordinators
(COTP's/FMSC's) provide a framework to communicate threats, identify
risks, and coordinate resources to mitigate threats and vulnerabilities
at the regional level.
To coordinate security efforts in large areas, many COTP/FMSC have
established multiple AMSCs to address more specific issues. In those
COTP/FMSC areas of responsibility that encompass several geographically
separate areas, or when one AMSC has a significantly large membership,
COTPs/FMSCs have formed an executive steering committee to oversee the
multiple AMSCs. Those geographically separate AMSCs, in turn, may be
viewed as subcommittees of the parent AMS Committee.
The U.S. Coast Guard is pursuing a number of initiatives for new
technologies that will allow us to detect, prevent and respond to
incidents including:
Nationwide implementation of the Automatic Identification
System (AIS) and requiring the installation of AIS equipment on
towing vessels in compliance with MTSA requirements;
Technologies to allow the automatic tracking of barges;
Enhancing our information systems to integrate results of
the Port Security Assessments (PSA) with other security
information from the Coast Guard, other Federal, state and
local agencies and the regulated maritime community.
Efforts to Secure Huntington, WV
Question 7. What have your agencies done in particular to safeguard
inland ports like Huntington? What additional resources--equipment,
personnel--have you deployed to Huntington and other inland ports? Have
you started developing security plans to address some of the unique
characteristics of inland navigation, which possess different security
challenges from coastal operations?
Answer. Due to the Coast Guard's multi-mission nature, resources
provided to the Coast Guard assist in the performance of all missions.
Since 9/11/01, the Coast Guard has added 19 FTP and assigned dozens of
Title 10 recalled reservists (current number is 77) toward safeguarding
inland river ports, including Huntington. Six new boats have also been
located on the inland river, including one in the Huntington, WV.
Additionally, in March of 2003, using Title 10 personnel, the Coast
Guard established the Inland Rivers Vessel Movement Center to attain
awareness of barges carrying Certain Dangerous Cargoes on the inland
rivers.
The Area Maritime Security Committee (AMSC), led by the Federal
Maritime Security Coordinator (FMSC)/Captain of the Port (COTP), has
developed an Area Maritime Security (AMS) Plan for the Port of
Huntington. The AMS Plan will greatly enhance the capabilities of the
Coast Guard, and other Federal, state and local authorities with
securing the Marine Transportation System.
Grant Funding for Inland Ports
Question 8. What percentage of port security grants has gone to
inland ports?
Answer. The Transportation Security Administration (TSA) reported
that applicants on the inland waterway system received 55 grants
totaling $14.7 million through the first three rounds of Port Security
Grants. This represents 3.3 percent of the $445.9 million awarded to
date.
Resources for the Ohio River Valley
Question 9. Admiral Collins, you are aware, I'm sure, that there is
a small Coast Guard detachment in Huntington, West Virginia. The
personnel at this duty station oversee inland waterway safety on the
Ohio and Kanawha Rivers, but also have some responsibility for ensuring
the riverside security of chemical plants and power plants that dot
both of those rivers in West Virginia. Are you satisfied that the Coast
Guard has sufficient manpower and technological capabilities at this
location to adequately protect the lives and health of the residents of
the Ohio River Valley?
Answer. Due to our Service's multi-mission nature, resources
provided to the Coast Guard assist in the performance of all missions.
The President's FY2005 Budget Request includes sufficient resources to
perform Coast Guard operations and activities within the Ohio River
Valley in FY2005. The Coast Guard continuously evaluates resource
requirements and will address any gaps in the Ohio River Valley, as
well as throughout the entire Coast Guard.
Staffing Levels
Question 10. Let's pretend that there are no financial constraints
on the Coast Guard or Congress. Given risk assessments you have seen,
or in the exercise of normal prudence, how would you change staffing
levels or the availability of vessels or other materiel at places like
Huntington, where the Coast Guard presence is relatively small?
Answer. The FY 2005 Budget supports the Coast Guard resource needs
in FY2005 to conduct the full spectrum of Coast Guard missions in
Huntington and throughout the Nation and world.
However, the Western River region is one of the highest priorities
for consideration of establishing a future Maritime Safety and Security
Team (MSST). Within the Western Rivers region, there are six cities
that we believe require a greater security posture due to their
population and/or throughputs of certain dangerous cargoes. Theses
cities are Huntington, Cincinnati, Louisville, Paducah, St. Louis, and
Memphis. The Coast Guard's preference would be to centrally locate a
MSST to leverage command, training, administrative, and facility
efficiencies and deploy detachments as needed to cover as many as six
areas concurrently. However this concept of operations would require
this MSST to be larger than the standard teams that have been
established to date.
PSRAT to Evaluate Huntington
Question 11. When is the Coast Guard going to use the Port Security
Risk Assessment Tool to re-evaluate the Port of Huntington Tri-State?
Answer. The Huntington Captain of the Port Zone received a Coast
Guard sponsored Port Security Assessment (PSA) in September 2003. As
part of the PSA, subject matter experts from the Port Security
Assessment Team reviewed the local Port Security Risk Assessment Tool
(PS-RAT) scores for facilities covered by the assessment. Based on
their expertise and field observations, the assessment team validated
the local PS-RAT content and suggested changes, additions, and
deletions to reflect PSA findings.
Local Coast Guard port officials routinely update their PS-RAT
information and scores to adjust to changes in the threat,
consequences, or vulnerabilities related to an asset or activity in
their area of responsibility. Coast Guard Marine Safety Office
Huntington most recently updated their PS-RAT and re-scored assets in
mid April 2004.
Huntington, WV Area Maritime Security Plan
Question 12. The Port of Huntington Tri-State would seem to be a
perfect opportunity for the Coast Guard to develop a prototype for area
maritime security plans--the area is filled with hazardous materials
and chemical facilities, the river system spans a great distance
connecting to many states, and coordination and monitoring for both
security and contingency response is complicated. I would appreciate it
if you would evaluate the possibility of prototyping a system for
inland waterway security management.
Answer. The Coast Guard's internal timeline for implementation of
the Maritime Transportation Security Act of 2002 (MTSA) called for all
Captains of the Port/Federal Maritime Security Coordinators (COTP/FMSC)
to prepare an Area Maritime Security Plan and submit it to the
respective District Office for approval by 1 April 2004. The COTP/FMSC
for the Port of Huntington met this deadline.
While each port is unique, the Port of Huntington was the first of
several inland waterways ports to receive a Port Security Assessment
(PSA) under the Coast Guard's domestic PSA program outlined in the
MTSA. As such, the Port of Huntington served as a baseline for
assessing inland port security and identifying ways to minimize
security risks and improve the overall security posture at U.S. inland
ports. Using the PSA as a foundation, the Coast Guard is taking a
systems approach that ties in multiple COTP zones with similar key
assets and vulnerabilities to improve security on the inland river
system.
Status of AIS
Question 13. The MTSA requires all vessels arriving in U.S. waters
to be equipped with transponders to allow the Coast Guard to track
their movements by the end of this year (currently oil tankers and
cruise ships are carrying them). Last year your budget only requested
$1 million dollars for the installation of towers and equipment to
monitor shipping. I was able to get you an additional $23 million, but
again here we are with another request of only $5 million. Why is it
that we can track small aircraft, big aircraft, anywhere in this
country. Yet when an oil tanker comes into downtown Charleston, we have
no means of tracking this ship?
Answer. The Coast Guard has commenced developing a nationwide
Automatic Identification System (AIS) to provide tracking of vessels
required to carry the AIS transponders in our ports and waterways.
Through the Ports and Waterways Safety System (PAWSS) project we
currently have, or will have by the end of 2004, full AIS capability at
9 designated Vessel Tracking System ports:
New York
Houston/Galveston
San Francisco
Puget Sound (Seattle-Tacoma)
Prince William Sound (Valdez)
St. Mary's River (Sault Ste. Marie, MI)
Berwick Bay (Louisiana)
Lower Mississippi River (New Orleans)
Los Angeles-Long Beach
In addition, the Coast Guard is already operating basic (primarily
receive-only) AIS installations in the following locations:
Miami and Florida Keys
Long Island Sound (Groton, CT)
Hampton Roads (Norfolk, VA)
By the end of 2004, the Coast Guard intends to have established
initial AIS capability (primarily receive-only) at additional locations
nationwide. These sites will be determined based on a variety of
criteria, including the expected density of AIS-equipped vessels in the
area, existing command and control capability to put the data to use,
compatibility and support for the more extensive and capable system
currently in the planning stages, and coordination with other needs and
assessments.
Requirements for the nationwide AIS project are being developed as
we continue to adhere to the Coast Guard's major acquisition process.
By adhering to the major acquisition process, the Coast Guard will
ensure the proper project planning, analysis and cost estimating is
performed as required by the Federal Acquisition Regulations. The
intent for the nationwide AIS project will be to use and build upon the
initial AIS capability currently being developed and deployed to create
a fully integrated nationwide system providing real-time vessel
tracking information to compliment other inputs in the development of
Maritime Domain Awareness (MDA). The FY05 Budget request of $4 million
is adequate because it's the minimum funding level necessary to proceed
with the acquisition process in the concept development phase and would
include limited AIS deployment capability. The FY05 budget request was
based on the strategy to implement as many ports with AIS as possible
with funding provided in FY04. Because of the critical nature of a
nationwide system, we deemed the best way to proceed long term was
through the major acquisition process.
Cost of National AIS System
Question 14. How much, ballpark, would a national system cost?
Answer. The Coast Guard is currently developing an implementation
plan for the nationwide Automatic Identification System (AIS)
consistent with Coast Guard and Department of Homeland Security
requirements associated with major systems acquisitions. Once the
Acquisition Project Baseline is developed, a total project cost
estimate will be known and we will be able to provide a more accurate
estimate of the cost for the number of additional ports that will be
outfitted with AIS technology.
Based on its experience to date with Ports and Waterways Safety
System (PAWSS) installations, the Coast Guard has found that port
geography and vessel congestion are the primary drivers behind AIS
infrastructure costs. Additionally, as the Coast Guard expands its AIS
infrastructure outside of VTS/PAWSS ports, other factors such as
availability of electrical power, communication links, tower
availability, and real property will impact the design and ultimately
the cost of a nationwide AIS network. Site surveys are needed in order
to determine the precise AIS infrastructure required to meet Coast
Guard requirements in any particular area.
Because of the differences in installations, the Coast Guard cannot
accurately determine the cost of a nationwide AIS system, but a
ballpark estimate of acquisition costs range from $62 million to $165
million with a life cycle cost range of $155 million to $675 million.
The Capital Investment Plan includes $81 million over five years for
AIS, including $4 million in 2005. It also includes $37 million for the
final stages of the Ports and Waterways Safety Systems (PAWSS)
deployment. The large ranges are reflective of the uncertainties in
system requirements and uncertainty over whether the nationwide AIS
system will be able to reuse existing or planned Coast Guard
infrastructure. The low end of the cost ranges assumes available
infrastructure will be used with incremental increases in support costs
and no use of satellite systems. The high end assumes some new towers
and sites will be required with associated new support costs and the
use of some satellite systems (moving AIS from a national to a more
international operating picture). In addition, the highest life cycle
cost is based on a commercially built and owned system that provides
AIS information to the Coast Guard as a service.
Status of Long-Range Tracking System for Vessels
Question 15. Additionally, we authorized the development of a long
range tracking system using satellites to allow the Coast Guard to poll
movements to track vessels as they enter into our EEZ, or areas of
particular sensitivity. Where are we in this program?
Answer. Long-range tracking of vessels is a critical component of
Maritime Domain Awareness. The Coast Guard is pursuing a wide variety
of means to track cooperative and potentially non-cooperative vessels
calling on, or operating near, the United States. We have submitted a
proposal to the International Maritime Organization (IMO) that will
require ships to report their positions and other information, which
will enable the Coast Guard to conduct an assessment of the risk posed
by a vessel. While not ``ruling out'' any system, use of an Automatic
Identification System (AIS)-based system would leverage existing/future
carriage requirements and mesh with existing systems.
In addition to our efforts through the IMO, we are also pursuing a
wide variety of methods to track vessels, such as long-range radar
systems, acquisition of information on vessel positions and intentions
through other sources, and cooperative arrangements with the maritime
industry. Existing capabilities within the government domain will be
integrated into a final solution.
Fraudulent MMDs
Question 16. It is my understanding that in the last couple of
years the Coast Guard has rooted out widespread fraud in the issuance
of documents to foreign seamen, specifically on Panamanian seamen. I
also understand that a recent investigation indicated a lesser degree
of fraud in the issuance of U.S. mariner's licenses. Please elaborate
on this investigation, and what steps you have taken to rectify the
issue?
Answer. During the last several years, the International Maritime
Organization (IMO) has noted that many credentials carried by seafarers
of certain countries, notably Panama and Philippines, are fraudulent,
counterfeit, or altered. The IMO has taken steps to encourage these and
other governments to provide better security to the credentialing
process to ensure that credentials issued are legitimate and more
resistant to counterfeiting or altering. In addition, the IMO requested
the International Labor Organization (ILO) to revise its 1958
Convention on Seafarers' Identity Cards, with a view to using up-to-
date technology for making these documents more useful in confirming
mariners' identities. The ILO adopted a new convention in June 2003 and
is in the final stages of developing its standard for the biometric
information it intends to use in support of the Convention's goals.
On the domestic front, in December 2002, the U.S. Coast Guard and
Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) initiated OPERATION DRYDOCK, a
joint criminal and counterterrorism investigation into national
security threats and document fraud associated with U.S. merchant
mariner credentials. The Coast Guard and FBI were assisted in this
investigation by other components of the Department of Homeland
Security, the Department of Justice, Department of Defense, and U.S.
Intelligence Community. Approximately 220,000 active mariner records
(of which, approximately 95,000 are licenses and 125,000 are merchant
mariner documents (MMDs)) were reviewed to uncover possible criminal
activity, application fraud and terrorist links. This investigation
focused on discrepancies between the information in the merchant
mariner credential application and information contained in law
enforcement and public records.
The investigation revealed nine individuals that held Merchant
Mariner Credentials who have suspected associations with terrorist
groups. In addition to these nine individuals, the Coast Guard
identified thousands of cases of possible fraud or other problems,
including mariners with active arrest warrants. In response to this
information:
The Coast Guard is suspending and revoking unauthorized
credentials;
U.S. Attorneys are pursuing criminal charges where
warranted;
Approximately a dozen people have been arrested because of
active arrest warrants that were uncovered as a result of
Operation Drydock; and
The Coast Guard, FBI and the U.S. Navy worked together to
screen mariners serving on Military Sealift Command ships
carrying troops and material during the war in Iraq. As a
result, more than a dozen mariners were removed from service
aboard those vessels.
In addition to the OPERATION DRYDOCK investigation of those holding
current credentials, in February 2003, the Coast Guard enhanced the
security of the credential program by requiring more direct contact
with all mariners to verify identification, strengthened the process
for conducting criminal background checks for applicants seeking new
MMDs, and began issuing MMDs on more tamper-resistant cards. The new
MMDs incorporate improvements for increased security including features
to deter counterfeiting, such as micro-printing and serial numbers
directly connected to a single mariner.
The Coast Guard is fully utilizing its current authority to access
public and government databases for the purpose of gathering background
information to determine whether an applicant for, or holder of, a
merchant mariner's document is a safe and suitable person to be issued
such a document or to be employed on a vessel under the authority of
such a document. The Coast Guard National Maritime Center currently
uses a number of databases to screen mariners seeking credentials,
including: public databases, the Coast Guard Marine Information for
Safety and Law Enforcement (MISLE) system, the National Crime
Information Center (NCIC), which includes FBI terrorism watch list
information, the National Driver Register (NDR), and others.
As these initiatives progress, the Coast Guard is continuing its
efforts to enhance the security of issuing all credentials to mariners
operating in the U.S. marine transportation system. Thanks to strong
Congressional support in the Fiscal Year 2003 supplemental
appropriations, the Coast Guard has been able to implement a very
robust screening process and more tamper-resistant card as part of the
MMD program. Support of the Coast Guard's Fiscal Year 2005 budget
request, which includes $8M and 12 FTP specifically for this effort,
will enable the Coast Guard to continue its efforts to enhance the
security of mariner credentials in Fiscal Year 2005 and beyond to
ensure that credentials are never issued to those who pose a threat to
national security or marine safety.
Press Reports
Question 17. Admiral Collins, in the summer of 2002, there were a
number of press reports about possible infiltration of potential
terrorist operatives through containers. I believe the press
allegations indicated a number of ports. I specifically recall Savannah
and Long Beach. Are you at liberty to reveal the merits of these
allegations?
Answer. The National Maritime Intelligence Center (NMIC), a Coast
Guard Intelligence Coordination Center (ICC) and Office of Naval
Intelligence (ONI) joint command, examined those press reports and
concluded that the feasibility of the smuggling information discussed
was unlikely and there were no tangential indicators (e.g., stowaway
records from the two U.S. ports) to support the reports. However, the
Coast Guard, working with its DHS, DOD and industry partners, will
continue to monitor this avenue for potential terrorist entry.
Interagency Coordination on Maritime Domain Awareness
Question 18. Admiral Collins, I have heard statements recently
about the evaluation of a program to increase our awareness of maritime
transportation. I believe the Secretary of Navy was also quoted
similarly as endorsing the concept of a maritime NORAD. I think that
this is extremely promising. However, I am concerned about the
cooperation of the various agencies that collect data on commercial
shipping, and last time you testified I asked all of you to try to work
together on this issue. Are you all working together to make sure that
you have the right information, the right analysts, and the right
monitoring equipment to get the best information?
Answer. Yes, the Coast Guard recently organized a National Maritime
Domain Awareness (MDA) Summit, cosponsored by the Department of
Homeland Security and Department of Defense, and chaired by Admiral Loy
and Assistant Secretary McHale. The Summit was intended to bring
together the senior leaders of all agencies that have a stake in
Maritime Domain Awareness to ensure they are working together.
Participants agreed on the need to establish a Senior Steering Group to
unify efforts and develop a comprehensive national MDA plan and
architecture based on the following guiding principles:
Build coalitions and partnerships
Develop and share technology
Develop standards and requirements
Integrate and share information
Drive cost effectiveness
Key Issues in Port Security Report
Question 19. Admiral Collins, in conference on the MTSA, the Senate
conferees took the position that port security costs had to be paid
for, and in the absence of a commitment of funding by the
Administration, and proposed a fee on users of the system. Ultimately,
the Senate relented in the face of opposition by the House, however, we
required the Administration to file a report within 6 months to explain
what they proposed to pay in the way of port security costs, both for
ports and for a variety of Federal port security programs. That report
is 9 months overdue--when can we expect that report?
Answer. The Resources to Address Key Issues in Port Security report
was written jointly by the Coast Guard, Transportation Security
Administration and Immigration and Customs Enforcement. The report has
been written and is currently in the clearance process within the
Administration.
NMTSP
Question 20. Admiral Collins, the MTSA mandates a national plan to
allow us to reopen ports to commerce in the aftermath of a terrorist
attack, where is that plan?
Answer. The Coast Guard's timeline for development of the National
Maritime Transportation Security Plan (NMTSP) spans two years with
development of the interim plan by the end of calendar year 2004 and
the final plan by the end of calendar year 2005. In addition to working
in close concert with the Transportation Security Administration, the
Coast Guard intends vigorous engagement with the National Maritime
Security Advisory Committee in the planning effort involving recovery
of U.S. ports.
______
Response to Written Questions Submitted by Hon. Ernest F. Hollings to
Gary P. LaGrange
Question 1. What would it mean to the U.S. economy if the
Mississippi River was shut down for any length of time?
Answer. The vessel collision at the mouth of the Mississippi River
on February 21, 2004 is a poignant example of the economic havoc that
could be visited upon this Nation by a terrorist act. In this
unfortunate incident, a relatively small sunken vessel in this busy
waterway channel caused 158 ocean going vessels to be delayed during
the four-day closure of the main international shipping channel into
the Mississippi River. The closure was absolutely necessary to conduct
search and rescue and recovery operations followed by removal of the
vessel.
After removal of the vessel, the backlog of ship traffic was
cleared and shipping returned to normal within three-and-a-half days.
Estimates are that this incident caused approximately $17 million
in direct losses and $68 million in overall economic impacts. Not only
were ships delayed but three container cargo ships and three passenger
vessels were diverted to other ports. Thousands of passengers were
bussed to other Gulf Coast ports which were ill-equipped to handle them
on short notice. The cruise lines incurred thousands of dollars in
ground transportation costs and reimbursements to passengers for the
loss of their vacations.
With more than 5,000 ocean-going vessel calls annually, it should
be readily apparent how important this waterway system is to the
Nation's economy.
The Nation's economy would experience severe consequences from a
prolonged closure of the Mississippi River to deep draft navigation.
The Lower Mississippi River port system from the Gulf of Mexico to
Baton Rouge handled $227 million tons of foreign waterborne commerce in
2002, valued at nearly $40 billion and representing 18.1 percent on the
Nation's international waterborne commerce. American producers exported
27 percent of the total U.S. exports out of lower Mississippi River
Ports.
Agricultural products from 17 mid-western states are exported out
of the 10 lower Mississippi River Grain Elevators, representing more
than 62 percent of total U.S. grain exports.
More than 92 million tons of petroleum and energy related
commodities are shipped on the Mississippi River system from Louisiana
representing nearly 16 percent of all waterborne import petroleum
products.
Question 2. What have you received in Federal funds to help you
comply with your Federal mandate and what did you use the funds for?
Answer. The Port of New Orleans has received approximately
$8,000,000 in Federal grant funding. The funding has been used
primarily for infrastructure enhancements; fencing, lighting,
monitoring and gate access technology. Specifically, the cruise
terminal fencing has been improved, and the lighting and camera project
is underway. The upriver terminal facility projects will provide
enhanced fencing, lighting, gate access technology, and new monitoring
equipment. Funds were also received for a video teleconferencing system
to enhance emergency coordination activities.
Question 3. What are some of the unique challenges in securing the
Port of New Orleans?
Answer. The Port is difficult to secure because it runs directly
parallel to the city's residential neighborhoods, the central business
district, and major tourist attractions. Virtually all of the mandated
access control requirements, especially those during elevated alert
levels, have a significant potential to adversely affect port and/or
city business, especially as it relates to traffic delays. Methods to
curtail the affects are possible, but staff intensive. We have no
vessel dedicated to river or canal patrol. The emergency response
vessel has been providing some security inspections and patrols;
however, the added use has taken it's toll on the vessel in the form of
increased repairs. Our landlord/tenant status has required more
guidance from the regulatory officials, which slows the plan
preparation process.
Question 4. What are some of the unique challenges that you face as
a river port with respect to security obligations?
Answer. The number of ships that pass through our port each year
(6,000) adds to the ``vulnerability.'' The diversity of the types of
vessels calling on our port requires that security personnel be more
adept at understanding and applying the Federal regulations.
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