    [Senate Hearing 108-1006]
    [From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]

                                                          S. Hrg. 108-1006

                          NASA'S FUTURE SPACE MISSION

    =======================================================================

                                     HEARING

                                   BEFORE THE

                             COMMITTEE ON COMMERCE,
                          SCIENCE, AND TRANSPORTATION
                              UNITED STATES SENATE

                          ONE HUNDRED EIGHTH CONGRESS

                                 SECOND SESSION

                                   __________

                                JANUARY 28, 2004

                                   __________

        Printed for the use of the Committee on Commerce, Science, and
                                 Transportation

    [GRAPHIC NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]

                       U.S. GOVERNMENT PUBLISHING OFFICE
    20-706 PDF                WASHINGTON : 2016
    _______________________________________________________________________________________

    For sale by the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Publishing Office,
    http://bookstore.gpo.gov. For more information, contact the GPO Customer Contact Center,
    U.S. Government Publishing Office. Phone 202-512-1800, or 866-512-1800 (toll-free).
    E-mail, gpo@custhelp.com.

           SENATE COMMITTEE ON COMMERCE, SCIENCE, AND TRANSPORTATION

                          ONE HUNDRED EIGHTH CONGRESS

                                 SECOND SESSION

                         JOHN McCAIN, Arizona, Chairman
    TED STEVENS, Alaska                  ERNEST F. HOLLINGS, South
    CONRAD BURNS, Montana                    Carolina, Ranking
    TRENT LOTT, Mississippi              DANIEL K. INOUYE, Hawaii
    KAY BAILEY HUTCHISON, Texas          JOHN D. ROCKEFELLER IV, West
    OLYMPIA J. SNOWE, Maine                  Virginia
    SAM BROWNBACK, Kansas                JOHN F. KERRY, Massachusetts
    GORDON H. SMITH, Oregon              JOHN B. BREAUX, Louisiana
    PETER G. FITZGERALD, Illinois        BYRON L. DORGAN, North Dakota
    JOHN ENSIGN, Nevada                  RON WYDEN, Oregon
    GEORGE ALLEN, Virginia               BARBARA BOXER, California
    JOHN E. SUNUNU, New Hampshire        BILL NELSON, Florida
                                         MARIA CANTWELL, Washington
                                         FRANK R. LAUTENBERG, New Jersey
          Jeanne Bumpus, Republican Staff Director and General Counsel
                 Robert W. Chamberlin, Republican Chief Counsel
          Kevin D. Kayes, Democratic Staff Director and Chief Counsel
                    Gregg Elias, Democratic General Counsel

                                C O N T E N T S

                                  ----------
                                                                       Page
    Hearing held on January 28, 2004.................................     1
    Statement of Senator Allen.......................................     5
        Prepared statement...........................................     6
    Statement of Senator Breaux......................................     5
    Statement of Senator Brownback...................................     3
    Statement of Senator Dorgan......................................    31
    Statement of Senator Ensign......................................    34
    Statement of Senator Hutchison...................................     4
    Statement of Senator Lautenberg..................................     7
        Prepared statement...........................................     7
    Statement of Senator McCain......................................     1
    Statement of Senator Nelson......................................     3
    Statement of Senator Smith.......................................    36
    Statement of Senator Sununu......................................     9
    Statement of Senator Wyden.......................................     2

                                   Witnesses

    Friedman, Louis D., Executive Director, The Planetary Society....    39
        Prepared statement...........................................    41
    Lane, Neal, University Professor, Department of Physics and
      Astronomy, James A. Baker III Institute for Public Policy, Rice
      University.....................................................    43
        Prepared statement...........................................    45
    McCurdy, Dr. Howard E., Professor of Public Affairs, American
      University.....................................................    51
        Prepared statement...........................................    53
    O'Keefe, Hon. Sean, Administrator, National Aeronautics and Space
      Administration.................................................     9
        Prepared statement...........................................    13
    Tumlinson, Rick N., Founder, Space Frontier Foundation...........    57
        Prepared statement...........................................    60

                                    Appendix

    Article dated January 2004 entitled ``A Renewed Spirit of
      Discovery'' by President George W. Bush........................    83
    Mars Society Statement on Bush Space Initiative..................    78
    Remarks by the President on U.S. Space Policy....................    95
    Response to written questions submitted to Hon. Sean O'Keefe by:
        Hon. Frank R. Lautenberg.....................................   108
        Hon. John McCain.............................................   101
    Response to written questions submitted by Hon. John McCain to:
        Dr. Louis D. Friedman........................................   108
        Neal Lane....................................................   111
    Response to written questions submitted to Dr. Howard E. McCurdy
      by:
        Hon. Frank R. Lautenberg.....................................   115
        Hon. John McCain.............................................   113
    Schmitt, Hon. Harrison H., Chairman, Interlune-Intermars
      Initiative, Inc., prepared statement...........................    75
    Slides accompanying letter entitled ``Strategy Based on Long-Term
      Affordability''................................................    98
    Statement dated January 27, 2004 entitled ``Don't Desert Hubble''
      by Robert Zubrin...............................................   101

                          NASA'S FUTURE SPACE MISSION

                                  ----------

                          WEDNESDAY, JANUARY 28, 2004

                                           U.S. Senate,
            Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation,
                                                        Washington, DC.
        The Committee met, pursuant to notice, at 9:30 a.m. in room
    SR-253, Russell Senate Office Building, Hon. John McCain,
    Chairman of the Committee, presiding.

                OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. JOHN McCAIN,
                       U.S. SENATOR FROM ARIZONA

        The Chairman. Good morning. On January 14, 2004, the
    President announced a new vision for the Nation's space
    exploration program, a vision that gives NASA a new focus and
    clear objectives, which the Columbia Accident Investigation
    Board concluded were sorely lacking. The man tasked with
    implementing this new vision is NASA Administrator Sean
    O'Keefe. I can think of few people more qualified to try to do
    this.
        I welcome Administrator O'Keefe, and congratulate him on
    NASA's recent accomplishments, including the success of the
    robotic rovers on Mars, the collection of comet dust from Comet
    Wild 2 that will be returned to Earth for analysis, and the
    receipt of new images of deep space from the Spitzer Space
    Telescope.
        While he's more qualified than most any that I've ever
    known, particularly considering his experience as Deputy
    Director of the Office of Management and Budget, I'm very
    curious to hear how Administrator O'Keefe thinks we can
    implement the President's proposal with the very limited
    resources that have been proposed.
        Two days ago, the Congressional Budget Office estimated
    that the deficit in Fiscal Year 2004 would reach $477 billion.
    It's been reported that the President's new proposal could cost
    between $170 billion and $600 billion. Needless to say, the $12
    billion that the Administration has suggested to be spent over
    the next 5 years falls far, far short of what might be required
    to actually return to the Moon and reach for Mars and beyond.
        We must acknowledge that space exploration, particularly
    manned exploration, is costly. We have existing obligations
    relating to the safe operation of the shuttles and the
    International Space Station. I think the American public is
    justifiably apprehensive about starting another major space
    initiative, for fear that they will learn later that it will
    require far more sacrifice or taxpayer dollars than originally
    discussed or estimated.
        As I mentioned during Administrator O'Keefe's confirmation
    hearing, a vision without a strategy is just an illusion. The
    country is not interested in, nor can it afford, another space
    illusion. Therefore, I look forward to hearing from
    Administration O'Keefe, along with our other witnesses today,
    about the strategy that they believe will make the
    Administration's vision a reality.
        Senator Wyden?

                     STATEMENT OF HON. RON WYDEN,
                        U.S. SENATOR FROM OREGON

        Senator Wyden. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
        I want to welcome the Administrator, as well, today and
    thank him for his service.
        I'd just like to make two points, very briefly, Mr.
    Chairman. The last time the Administrator was here, I asked
    that the agency initiate a cost-benefit analysis to look at the
    matter of manned spaceflight. And, if anything, the
    developments of the last few weeks have, I think, increased the
    need for just such an analysis. If anything, if you look at the
    plans that have been announced recently by the President, it is
    clear that they focus even more extensively on human
    spaceflight. And so, Mr. Administrator, the first question that
    I'll ask you is to get into this question, the cost
    effectiveness of manned spaceflight. Because it's very clear
    that, given the ambitions of the President and the budgetary
    realities, it's important that we get a sharper and more
    focused sense of what can be done through manned spaceflight
    and what can be done through other operations.
        The other area that I'm going to ask you about, Mr.
    Administrator, is, I have to tell you, I was extremely
    disappointed to learn that the agency collected personal data
    on more than ten million Northwest Airline passengers in 2001,
    and retained that data for years, without informing the
    passengers that the agency had this personal information. In
    2003, Northwest had more than 500,000 passengers travel in and
    out of Portland International Airport, so I can only imagine
    how many of my constituents had their personal information
    simply handed over to the agency.
        I have legislation right now, the Citizens Protection and
    Federal Data bases Act, which aims to correct the careless
    collection and dissemination of private personal information by
    Federal agencies. My understanding is that the agency has now
    asked Northwest to hand over the information. The airline has
    agreed. But I'd like to know, prior to that, what steps were
    taken to protect the more than ten million individuals that
    were caught up in that data base.
        So those two areas, I'll be exploring with you specifically
    this morning.
        Mr. Chairman, again, I thank you for the hearing. And this
    is an important time for the agency. Mr. O'Keefe has always
    been extremely responsive to our inquiries, and I look forward
    to discussing these issues with him this morning.
        The Chairman. Thank you, Senator Wyden.
        I'd like to remind my colleagues that we have votes
    starting at 11:40, and we have another panel, as well as
    questions for Administrator O'Keefe.
        Senator Brownback?

                   STATEMENT OF HON. SAM BROWNBACK,
                        U.S. SENATOR FROM KANSAS

        Senator Brownback. Thanks, Mr. Chairman, and thanks for
    holding the hearing.
        And congratulations, Mr. Administrator. We've had you up
    here for a number of hearings over the past year, and they
    haven't generally been a very joyous occasion. I just came from
    the office, and they're shooting back pictures from your second
    rover that's on Mars now, and it's just amazing photography.
    Going two for two in a place that's difficult to get one to
    land is an extraordinary feat, so congratulations to you and
    the agency.
        And I want to thank you for listening to Congress,
    particularly Members in the Senate, about articulating a vision
    and getting us out of low-space orbit and a manned program. A
    number of us have met with you over a period of time. And I
    remember a particular meeting, with the Vice President, where a
    number of us were saying we need a vision, and we need it
    articulated by the Administration. And you've put that forward,
    and I appreciate you laying that out. I think it's a bold
    vision, I think it's aggressive.
        What I also like is your pay-for strategy that you put--
    where it's basically redirecting current funds with some
    additional, but not a great deal of additional, funds. I think
    it does both break us out of low-space orbit, where we've been
    stuck for the last 20-plus years in the manned program, and
    sets a bold, yet achievable, vision. And it causes us, as a
    society, to lean forward and lean into it and not say, we're
    going to wait on the Europeans to go to the Moon, or, we're
    going to wait on the Chinese to go to the Moon, we're going to
    let somebody else lead in this, because it's too dangerous,
    it's too expensive. No, it's none of that.
        You're saying, we're going to lead forth. And if others
    want to join us, we want them there. But that's the right way,
    and that's the place for this country to be. And it's that kind
    of vision that encourages a 13-year-old in Pittsburg, Kansas,
    to dream great dreams important to the future of this society.
    So I'm glad you've put it forward.
        I want to ask you some specific questions about making sure
    we stay on target with this one, and not sliding off like we
    have sometimes in the past when these have been articulated.
        Welcome back.
        Mr. O'Keefe. Thank you, sir.
        The Chairman. Senator Nelson?

                    STATEMENT OF HON. BILL NELSON,
                       U.S. SENATOR FROM FLORIDA

        Senator Nelson. Senator Breaux just said he really thinks
    that rover is wandering around in the Mohave Desert. Like those
    who said we never went to the Moon.
        [Laughter.]
        Senator Nelson. Mr. Chairman, you can't do spaceflight on
    the cheap. And I just don't think that a billion-dollar
    increase over 5 years--that's $200 million a year--is going to
    do it. And I would love for you to explain, on the
    reprogramming of the $11 billion over that 5 years, how you can
    do that.
        I think my other concern is that I would not like to see
    repeated the period of time between 1975 and 1981, when we were
    down and not flying with humans. When Apollo-Soyuz last flew,
    and the space shuttle was supposed to fly 3 years later, it
    wasn't until 1981, a total of 6 years that we were down. And my
    concern, in what you've outlined and what the President
    outlined in the speech over at NASA Headquarters, is that you
    phase out the space shuttle by 2010, and then if we don't fly
    this new vehicle until four, five, 6 years later, that means
    that our only human access to space is that we've got to rely
    on Russian rockets and European rockets. I don't think that's
    good for the country. So rather than having a hiatus, I would
    love to have you comment as to how we might have an overlap,
    where we would keep the space shuttle flying until such time as
    the other vehicle is already tested and ready to fly.
        And then the other thing that I would say, Mr. Chairman,
    is, a project of this magnitude, it can only be led by the
    President or the Vice President. And I was one of the
    cheerleaders that was there when the President made his
    announcement. But 6 days later, when he had the opportunity to
    put some juice behind it, and the prestige of his office, he
    did not mention it in the State of the Union speech. And so if
    we do not have the full weight of the President behind it, I'm
    afraid it's going to fizzle, and it's going to make it very
    difficult for us, up here, to get the votes to sustain a
    program such as this.
        And thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        The Chairman. Thank you.
        Again, I would request that my colleagues keep your opening
    statements brief, as we have another panel, and votes beginning
    at 11:40, as I understand.
        Senator Hutchison?

                STATEMENT OF HON. KAY BAILEY HUTCHISON,
                        U.S. SENATOR FROM TEXAS

        Senator Hutchison. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, for holding
    this hearing.
        I just want to say thank you, Administrator O'Keefe. I have
    been one that has pressed you about a vision for NASA since you
    took office, from the day you had your nomination hearing to
    become the NASA Administrator, I have felt that we have drifted
    since our early successes in space. Our successes in space
    cannot be refuted. We dominate the skies, we have received
    tremendous benefits for our defense and our national security,
    and the benefits for quality of life and the industries that
    have been spurred are unquestionable.
        I love the vision of the President. Many of us encouraged
    him, the Vice President, and yourself to do. I do think that
    follow-through and follow-up is going to be important.
        In closing, the only thing that I would say, because I want
    to be brief, and I certainly want to look at the details of the
    budget. We want to make sure we do this right, not only for
    safety, but for making sure that we don't waste the effort and
    the money. So I hope that we will go forward, realistically
    have a budget that will do the job right. I will be very
    anxious to see where you're going to take money from, $11
    billion will be taken away from other programs, because, of
    course, I hope that we would make sure that the programs that
    are going to support man on the Moon, and getting there, that
    the programs themselves would be kept and solidified as we are
    making this major commitment.
        So I thank you for forcing the vision. Now let's work
    together to implement that vision in the right way.
        Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        The Chairman. Senator Breaux?

                   STATEMENT OF HON. JOHN B. BREAUX,
                      U.S. SENATOR FROM LOUISIANA

        Senator Breaux. Would you like me to be brief, Mr.
    Chairman?
        [Laughter.]
        Senator Hutchison. He only says that before I speak, Mr.
    Breaux.
        [Laughter.]
        Senator Breaux. Well, thank you very much, and thank you
    for having the hearing.
        I think that it's an indication of the interest this
    Committee has and the Senate has in the subject matter that Mr.
    O'Keefe brings to the table that we have a good turnout of
    Members, and it shows a real interest in the program.
        I'm concerned, Administrator O'Keefe, about what I would
    term the uncertainty of where we are. And I think you're
    hearing that from many of the opening comments.
        The last time you and I visited, we were talking about an
    OSP, which was the orbital space plane. Since that time, I
    understand that that is no longer there; we're now talking
    about the CEV, or the crew exploration vehicle. So we've made
    some changes in direction. We're now talking about going back
    to the Moon. We've already been there, but we're going back.
    And we now have two unmanned vehicles on the planet Mars. We're
    talking about reprogramming $11 billion. There's a lot of
    uncertainty as what's going to be cut and where the money's
    going to come from to raise the necessary funds to do these
    very adventurous programs.
        I supported, very strongly, the concept of increasing and
    expanding space exploration. I think we, down on Earth, get a
    great deal of benefit from those activities, and they're
    extremely important. But what I think we're looking for today
    is a clearer path as to how we get from here to there. There's
    been a lot of changes, a lot of personnel changes, a lot of
    project changes. And I think what Congress wants to know, that
    we, indeed, not only are on the right path to get to the Mars,
    but we're, indeed--here on Earth, we are on the right path to
    be able to accomplish those goals. And that's what we're
    looking for.
        Thank you.
        The Chairman. Senator Allen?

                    STATEMENT OF HON. GEORGE ALLEN,
                       U.S. SENATOR FROM VIRGINIA

        Senator Allen. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        And thank you, Administrator O'Keefe, for being here. It's
    always a pleasure to have you here, and I commend you and your
    entire team for the historic achievements on the Mars
    exploration. It's fascinating to me and to all here on Earth.
        On this day in history, January 28, 1986, it may have been
    mentioned, about an hour or so from now, we had the tragic
    explosion of the Challenger. And NASA is beginning more
    journeys. Obviously, the Columbia tragedy is one that propels
    you all. And this has lifted the spirits of everyone, the Mars
    exploration.
        The President has proposed to go forward with his space
    exploration program, which is a very unique national asset. I
    think after listening to Senators Breaux and Hutchison and
    others, the key to the strategic plan is that it is executed
    with proper preparation, with constraints on spending, making
    sure that there's not just a logic, but obviously your
    essential leadership is needed in the first, let's say, 5 years
    of this new strategic plan.
        I do think space exploration makes good sense for us in a
    variety of ways--in knowledge, in innovation, in discovery.
        I want to make sure--and you've heard me say this before,
    Mr. Chairman, and this whole Committee--that you remember the
    aeronautics aspect of NASA. As you move forward, I want to be
    assured that this new initiative does not have a negative
    impact on the aeronautics research and development budget.
        The vision, as I understand it, calls for a billion-dollar
    increase over the next 5 years. It also calls for reprogramming
    of the existing $11 billion within NASA to cover these costs. I
    do see, from this budget here, though, the strategy based on
    long-term affordability, and I would like to see the numbers
    behind it. But it appears that, for at least the next three,
    maybe four, years, the aeronautics and other science activities
    would actually decrease until FY, maybe, 2008.
        Now, aeronautical advancements are absolutely essential for
    our national security. You see it in every military action. We
    saw it in Iraq, on how important that is. The research and
    development budgets have been cut from $920 million, in 1998,
    to just over $500 million, in 2003. At the same time, our
    friends in Europe are, of course, developing a long-term plan
    to achieve global leadership in civil aviation. So for the sake
    of civil aviation, also our national security, I want to make
    sure, as you go forward with this new strategic plan, as we go
    through the details of it, that we do not forget aeronautics,
    which are so essential to our country through our security. I
    look forward to your remarks.
        And I'd like to put my statement into the record, Mr.
    Chairman.
        Thank you.
        The Chairman. Without objection.
        [The prepared statement of Senator Allen follows:]

      Prepared Statement of Hon. George Allen, U.S. Senator from Virginia
        Thank you Mr. Chairman.
        Administrator O'Keefe, I want to thank you for appearing before the
    Committee today and congratulate you and the rest of the men and women
    at NASA for the recent historic achievements in the Mars exploration
    mission. The work taking place on both rover missions--``Spirit'' and
    ``Opportunity''--is truly fascinating.
        As NASA begins to journey forward after the Columbia tragedy, I
    believe a new focus and vision on Space Exploration is a salutary goal
    for the Columbia crew and their legacy.
        Everyone can agree that NASA's Space Exploration program is a
    unique and treasured national asset. It is far and away one of the best
    examples of American ingenuity and innovation holding tremendous
    promise for future generations. The President's Exploration Vision
    outlined earlier this month--I believe--is a step in the right
    direction as virtually every aspect of NASA depends on the success of
    the Space Flight Program.
        As it has in the past, I am confident that the success of the Space
    program will continue to expand our knowledge base, revolutionize our
    understanding of the universe and produce technological advances that
    benefit all mankind.
        I generally view the space program as a means to a greater end.
    That end being the research, innovation, exploration, and the discovery
    that occurs in space. As we examine NASA and the President's new vision
    we ought to ensure the Exploration Vision includes a continued focus on
    aeronautic related research.
        I am concerned as NASA moves forward implementing this new
    initiative that it may have a negative impact on NASA's aeronautics
    research and development budget. I understand the Vision calls for a $1
    billion increase over 5 years for NASA's overall budget; however it
    also calls for $11 billion to be ``reprogrammed'' within NASA to cover
    these costs.
        In addition, I see from the projected budget provided by NASA that
    aeronautics and other science related funding will be decreasing over
    the next five years.
        The aeronautics industry contributes $343 billion to our economy
    and employs 4.2 million Americans. Yet NASA's aeronautics R&D program
    has steadily declined in the last decade from $920 million in 1998 to
    just over $500 million in 2003. During this time our European friends
    are developing a long-term plan to achieve global leadership in civil
    aviation.
        I have previously raised similar concerns about aeronautics and
    using other advancements in technology (specifically in the areas of
    robotics) that could potentially minimize risks associated with Human
    Space flight and overall spending.
        I do not disagree that we must strive towards new discoveries and
    explore our galaxy, but we should pay due attention and consideration
    to the technology and innovation that provides for our unrivaled
    military and civil aviation success.
        Administrator O'Keefe, I appreciate you appearance before the
    Committee today and I am hopeful you can comment on NASA's plans to
    stay focused on aeronautics related R&D and how that may be
    incorporated into the new Exploration Vision.
        Thank you Mr. Chairman. I look forward to the testimony.

        The Chairman. Senator Lautenberg?
        Congratulations, on behalf of all of us, on your recent
    marriage.

                STATEMENT OF HON. FRANK R. LAUTENBERG,
                      U.S. SENATOR FROM NEW JERSEY

        Senator Lautenberg. Hear, hear. I've been to the Moon.
        [Laughter.]
        Senator Lautenberg. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. And
    thanks for the good wishes. I hope that my marriage lasts as
    long as this trip is going to take to get us to Mars.
        [Laughter.]
        Senator Lautenberg. I hope that I last that long.
        [Laughter.]
        Senator Lautenberg. Mr. Chairman, thank you for holding
    this hearing this morning. And I'll try to be brief. I'd ask
    the consent that my full statement be included in the record.
        The Chairman. Without objection.
        Senator Lautenberg. I thank you.
        [The prepared statement of Senator Lautenberg follows:]

                Prepared Statement of Hon. Frank R. Lautenberg,
                          U.S. Senator from New Jersey
        Mr. Chairman,

        Thank you for holding this hearing on President Bush's proposal to
    reinvigorate the space program by sending astronauts to the Moon and to
    Mars.
        The administration estimates that such a mission would cost 170
    billion dollars. The proposal is so sketchy on details, I doubt that
    estimate is anywhere near accurate.
        But even if it is, and we go to Mars, we better hope there's gold
    there to pay for the trip; we're not going to find the money to pay for
    it here. Not when this administration's tax cuts have helped turn a
    ten-year surplus projected at 5.6 trillion dollars into a 3.5 trillion
    dollar deficit--right as the first cohort of Baby Boomers gets ready to
    retire.
        The President has a habit of announcing grandiose programs and
    reaping the positive publicity but then not following through with the
    necessary funding. Maybe we should call the mission to Mars ``No Planet
    Left Behind.''
        I wonder if the President wants to send former Treasury Secretary
    Paul O'Neill on the manned mission to Mars. I say this because one of
    the very real obstacles we face is that while it may be feasible to get
    people to Mars, we don't have the propulsion technology to bring them
    back.
        I hate to sound completely cynical but it's hard to avoid thinking
    that announcing this ``mission'' is nothing more than a ploy to divert
    the public's attention away from the administration's failed economic
    policies.
        Last month, the economy created 1,000 jobs. At that rate, it would
    take nearly 249 years just to get back the private sector jobs that
    have disappeared under President Bush's ``stewardship'' of the economy.
    Meanwhile, 43 million Americans don't have health insurance.
        Having said all that, I am not unalterably opposed to all space
    exploration. I am as excited as the next person about the images and
    data we are receiving from our Rovers ``Spirit' and ``Opportunity,''
    which underscores the point I would like to make: there is much we can
    continue to learn from the unmanned exploration of space.
        We don't need to incur the extraordinary risks and costs associated
    with manned exploration of space to learn more about the universe and
    our place in it.
        Whatever we decide to do, we can't be for it and for tax cuts,
    too--not on the heels of the Space Shuttle Columbia accident.
        When taxes are cut too much, and revenue streams dry up, and budget
    deficits spiral out of control--which is what's happening now--the
    government becomes constrained in what it can do. Frankly, the
    President's proposal strikes me as frivolous at best.
        I look forward to hearing from our witnesses about how we could
    possible reconcile our current budget woes with the astronomical cost--
    pardon the pun--of sending humans back to the Moon and then on to Mars.
        Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

        Senator Lautenberg. There's an estimate out there, by the
    Administration, that this mission might cost $170 billion. And
    the talk about a human presence on Mars, I find interesting;
    but, frankly, I also find it to be challenging, and challenging
    because we're seeing so much by the way of technological
    development that surprises us all. And talking to some friends
    in medicine, talking about how much more accurate, how much
    more reliable it is do brain surgery with instruments going
    into the head and the scalp and--I have that interest because I
    had a ski accident last year, and thank goodness the guy
    didn't--wasn't nervous, who did this thing--I don't think,
    anyway; you'll have to make that judgment.
        [Laughter.]
        Senator Lautenberg. But the fact of the matter is that
    we've found that areas around the heart are better tended to
    electronically and mechanically than human intervention, and I
    really wonder, Mr. O'Keefe--and I salute you and all the people
    there who tried so hard. And I know the heartbreak that the
    agency's been through, and that they have done the best that
    they could. And perhaps we could even do better, was it
    financed at a higher level. But right now we're looking at a
    $5.6 trillion reduction in surplus into a $3.5 trillion
    deficit, and on the eve of the baby-boomers getting ready to
    retire. And I wonder what the President's mission is here, when
    we talk about the kind of expense that it would take to move
    people back up into space, to get them to Mars, a stop along
    the way on the Moon, and when there's so much by way of current
    domestic need. Last month, the economy created a thousand jobs.
    At that rate, it would take nearly 250 years just to get back
    to the private sector job level that we had before. Forty-three
    million Americans without health insurance.
        So I'm not unalterably opposed to space exploration. I'm
    excited as the next person about the images that we're getting
    back from the Moon. And I salute, again, the agency for the
    work that it did with the rovers up there.
        But the question is, can we afford to do this, and is it
    really necessary? I don't know whether the question about
    whether a human presence is really essential to get the
    information we want, or whether it can be done electronically
    and scientifically.
        So, Mr. Chairman, I look forward to hearing, from our
    witnesses, how we can possibly reconcile our current budget
    woes with the costs that it's going to require of sending
    humans back to the Moon and then on to Mars. And I thank you,
    Mr. Chairman.
        And I thank you, Mr. O'Keefe, for being here and the work
    that you do.
        The Chairman. Thank you, sir.
        Senator Sununu?

                   STATEMENT OF HON. JOHN E. SUNUNU,
                    U.S. SENATOR FROM NEW HAMPSHIRE

        Senator Sununu. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Welcome, Administrator O'Keefe. You've had a lot of quality
    face time on TV lately. You and your staff are to be
    congratulated. And I certainly join others in wishing you luck
    in the coming weeks for the science expeditions on Mars.
        Thank you.
        The Chairman. Thank you.
        The Chairman. Senator Stevens?
        Senator Stevens. I have no formal statement. I'm glad to
    see our friend, Sean O'Keefe here. We swore in, the other day,
    the new comptroller of NASA, and we discussed the President's
    program at that time, Mr. Chairman.
        The Chairman. Thank you.
        Welcome, Mr. O'Keefe.

        STATEMENT OF HON. SEAN O'KEEFE, ADMINISTRATOR, NATIONAL
                  AERONAUTICS AND SPACE ADMINISTRATION

        Mr. O'Keefe. Mr. Chairman, thank you very much. I
    appreciate the opportunity to be here. I'll submit the
    statement, for the record, and quickly summarize. As I
    understand, the Committee has indulged to permit a showing of a
    short video here.
        Excuse me, is my microphone not on?
        The Chairman. A little closer, I think.
        Mr. O'Keefe. A little closer? Does that work?
        The Chairman. That's better.
        Mr. O'Keefe. Excuse me.
        If I could, I'll submit the statement for the record,
    briefly summarize.
        The Chairman. Without objection.
        Mr. O'Keefe. And I understand the Committee's indulgence is
    to have a video here, we've got available here in just a
    moment.
        First and foremost, the Columbia Accident Investigation
    Board has, as all the Members recall, very specifically called
    out the requirement, that there be established a statement and
    a clear understanding of a vision, a strategy and a direction
    for the space exploration endeavor. And that was one of the
    very fundamental aspects of their findings of what they
    believed was not only necessary, but also its absence in the
    recent past as being a fundamental factor that led to the
    conditions under which the accident occurred--that, having been
    produced on August 26. A few months before that, we began an
    interagency process that we have discussed at this Committee on
    several occasions, as well as others around the Congress; have
    requested the input, and have received it from several Members;
    and very much appreciate the time and effort and energy that
    has been taken to help shape this objective. The administrative
    work of pulling together all those internal interagency efforts
    was conducted over the course of that time, and the President
    announced, on January 14, the vision that has been called for
    by the Accident Investigation Board, by several Members of
    Congress, by any other external commentary that could be
    offered.
        The vision forms the basis of a new space exploration
    policy. It is a Presidential directive. It is established as
    the direction that vitiates all prior effort that would have
    governed the space policy direction. ``A Renewed Spirit of
    Discovery'' is its title.
        The policy is the product, again, of that extensive
    interagency process, as well as solicitation and view of
    various Members and others in the community. The fundamental
    goals of the exploration policy is to advance U.S. scientific
    and economic interest through a robust space exploration
    program; to implement and sustain an affordable human and
    robotic program--it is a very carefully crafted combination of
    both; a return to the Moon by the end of the next decade, in
    preparation for human exploration beyond; promotion of
    international and commercial participation and exploration to
    further that scientific, security, and economic interest, as
    well.
        The fundamental elements of that, that the President
    described in great detail on January 14, and I will quickly
    summarize here, is, first and foremost, the direction from him
    to return the space shuttle to flight. Our objectives are to
    follow the recommendations of the Accident Investigation
    Board--we have embraced that report; we will comply with it in
    its entirety--and assure that, when we return to flight, we
    have determined that we are fit to fly in accordance with those
    recommendations. And so as soon as practical, that event will
    occur.
        The purpose of that return to flight and the necessity to
    continue operating the space shuttle for the foreseeable future
    in this decade is to complete the International Space Station.
    It is the only research platform for the purpose of fully
    understanding the effects on long-duration human spaceflight.
    And so understanding what those physiological and human effects
    are, and how to conquer them properly for future exploration
    objectives that are called for in the President's vision and
    strategy statement, are a necessity that we will continue to
    perform on the International Space Station.
        We've agreed, with our other 15 partners from around the
    globe, and have consulted with them extensively, on the means
    by which we will complete that assembly sequence over the
    course of the next several years, with the objective of
    retiring the shuttle after the assembly of the station is
    complete, at the end of the decade.
        Next is a movement and a direction very specifically toward
    a crew exploration vehicle. And, again--Senator Breaux referred
    specifically to this point--this is an objective of building on
    the capacity of the orbital space plane and the capabilities
    that we investigated over the course of the past year, and
    developing, then, instead, a capability that takes it the next
    step beyond that, beyond low-Earth orbit; whereas, the orbital
    space plane was specifically an objective of taxi between here
    and station, not designed to go beyond that objective. So, in
    that context, what the President's called for is an exploration
    vehicle that can progress beyond low-Earth orbit, return to the
    Moon, Mars, and beyond, for the purpose of those objectives.
        Under the name and title of ``Project Constellation,'' we
    will proceed ahead with the development of that exploration
    vehicle, provide crew transport for exploration missions beyond
    low-Earth orbit.
        In addition, lunar exploration objectives are underway.
    We'll be pursuing, in a robotic form for the balance of this
    decade, to begin those efforts; and, again, with the objective
    of looking toward the middle of the next decade for a return to
    the Moon, as well.
        Exploration of Mars, I believe we've seen that illustrated
    in grand fashion here in recent days; and so to build and
    develop more on the basis of that particular success, and to
    inform the investigation necessary, based on the science, to
    pursue those destinations in the future, is what he has called
    for in his vision statement, as well.
        To help derive the view of what other efforts are necessary
    to implement this strategy--because, again, this was an
    interagency process of public servants within the
    Administration who developed the options for the President's
    consideration--he chose the strategy he announced on January
    14, but it was primarily derived from the work of this
    interagency process, internal to the Administration, in
    addition to the inputs that we've received from Members of
    Congress and elsewhere.
        But to formalize that a bit more and fully understand what
    other implementation strategies we may pursue, other factors,
    from a more broader, external basis, the President asked former
    Secretary of the Air Force, Pete Aldridge, to chair a
    Commission to look at implementation strategies of this vision.
    This is a specific set of objectives that is articulated in the
    President's directive. In turn, how do we go about implementing
    it best? And his task, over the course of the next 4 months,
    will be to gather those thoughts from a broader external set of
    inputs in order to factor, as we move ahead with the
    President's program--it will be announced and laid out on
    February 3, as part of the President's budget submission--the
    approaches that we need to take in the years ahead in order to
    achieve this particular objective.
        In the immediate time after the President's speech, the
    next day, we announced a reorganization of the agency to
    establish an Exploration Systems Enterprise to look at the task
    of accomplishing the President's objectives as a system of
    systems. It is not a singular program, it is not a singular set
    of objectives; it is a range of capabilities that can be
    employed, informed by what we receive, I think, from the
    continuing efforts of the various program engagements that
    we'll see in the President's budget, as well as that which is
    offered to us by this external panel, in order to move ahead on
    a broader range. And, as a consequence, the Exploration Systems
    Enterprise will have the primary responsibility for the
    development of the crew exploration vehicle, under the term
    Project Constellation, and, in turn, also coordinate the
    Project Prometheus efforts for power generation and propulsion
    capabilities beyond low-Earth orbit.
        We've also established an aeronautics enterprise, very
    specifically titled as ``An Aeronautics Enterprise,'' with the
    objective of assuring that it not get lost in the equation,
    because it's an essential piece of what we do and how we're
    organized. And so, as a consequence, there is a very clear
    focus on that objective, as well.
        The vision, as you'll see, I think, when the President's
    budget comes out next week--and I would hope that Members would
    examine that budget before making determinations of its overall
    efficacy or utility; it will be out next week, and the full
    detail will be available--is, in our judgment, an affordable
    effort, both short term, as well as long term. The request, to
    be released on the 2nd, is fiscally responsible, it fits in the
    context of the overall statement the President has made on what
    drove his budget considerations for the 2005 submission, to
    achieve half of the deficit projection within the next 5 years,
    as well as to maintain spending in the coming year to less than
    4 percent. We are within that amount, and, over the course of
    the 5 years, are also projected, within the overall budget
    projection, to be in that context, as well. And more on that,
    again, after next week, as you see the detail that's relayed
    very specifically.
        As an immediate example of the illustration of how this
    strategy will be carried out, I would submit that the Spirit
    and Opportunity experiences we've had here in the last 3 weeks
    are an illustration of how that robotic capability can be a
    precursor to future exploration agenda. And it is about
    exploration. That is the primary focus of what the President's
    guidance and directive has stated to us, in terms of what the
    focus needs to be and its context needs to be considered in.
        And with that, Mr. Chairman, I'd like to, if you would
    indulge, play a short video that gives you a sense of the--a
    combination of things. This is an animation of what occurs as
    the Mars exploration rovers are approaching the planet, as well
    as the splicing in of real scenes of the landing sequence, as
    well as some images from both the Spirit and Opportunity
    landing sites that were established.
        And, if you will, Mr. Chairman, I'll play that at this
    time.
        [Video presentation.]
        Mr. O'Keefe. Mr. Chairman, these are precisely the kinds of
    precursor robotic missions we will continue with a lot in the
    future in order to advance, before the human exploration
    endeavor is engaged in. But it is an integral interrelated kind
    of activity.
        We are, as Senator Allen referred to, extremely mindful of
    the risks that are attendant to this exploration endeavor.
    Today is the 18th anniversary of the loss of Challenger. And,
    too, we'll announce, this afternoon, the naming of the site
    that Opportunity landed at as the Challenger Memorial Station.
        Yesterday, the anniversary of the Apollo 1 fire, mindful,
    again, of the risks of exploration that we continue to pursue,
    the plains and the number of ridge lines at the Spirit site,
    the three highest peaks are named for Grissom, Chaffee, and
    White, those who we lost on that fateful day.
        And as we continue on, through this very, very difficult
    weekend ahead of us, to recognize and to commemorate the lives,
    and celebrate the lives, of seven extraordinary people aboard
    Columbia, I think more will be recognized on precisely their
    contributions, as well. But that is part of what helped
    motivate this change in the vision. The Columbia Accident
    Investigation Board's call for exactly this kind of a
    statement, I think, is the legacy of Columbia and those who
    followed--or those who preceded, and we intend to honor that
    legacy with the best of our ability.
        Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        [The prepared statement of Administrator O'Keefe follows:]

       Prepared Statement of Hon. Sean O'Keefe, Administrator, National
                  Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA)
        Mr. Chairman and Members of the Committee, thank you for this
    opportunity to appear today to discuss the President's vision for U.S.
    Space Exploration and NASA's plans for implementing this vision. On
    January 14, the President visited NASA Headquarters and announced his
    vision for U.S. Space Exploration. In his address, the President
    presented a vision that is bold and forward-thinking yet practical and
    responsible--one that explores answers to longstanding questions of
    importance to science and society, and will develop revolutionary
    technologies and capabilities for the future, while maintaining good
    stewardship of taxpayer dollars.
        The vision forms the basis of the new U.S. space exploration
    policy, ``A Renewed Spirit of Discovery,'' a copy of which is appended
    to this testimony. This policy is the product of months of extensive
    and careful deliberations. The importance of these deliberations
    increased with the findings of the Columbia Accident Investigation
    Board, which emphasized the importance of setting clear, long-term
    goals for the Nation's human space flight program. Inputs from Members
    of this Committee and other Members of Congress informed the
    Administration's deliberations. Many others contributed their ideas for
    the future of the space program. These deliberations also formed the
    basis for formulating the President's FY 2005 Budget request for NASA,
    which will be released on February 2. A commission will advise on
    specific issues for implementation of the policy's goals within four
    months of its first meeting.
        Today, I will walk you through the goals set forth in the policy,
    the major steps to implementing the new policy, the implications of
    this directive for NASA's programs and resources, and what the Nation's
    future in exploration and discovery will look like in the coming years.
    Vision Goals
        The fundamental goal of the new U.S. space exploration policy is to
    advance U.S. scientific, security, and economic interests through a
    robust space exploration program. In support of this goal, NASA will:

       Implement a sustained and affordable human and robotic
            program to explore the solar system and beyond;

       Extend human presence across the solar system, starting with
            a human return to the Moon by the year 2020, in preparation for
            human exploration of Mars and other destinations;

       Develop the innovative technologies, knowledge, and
            infrastructures both to explore and to support decisions about
            the destinations for human exploration; and

       Promote international and commercial participation in
            exploration to further U.S. scientific, security, and economic
            interests.
    Implementation
        To achieve these goals, NASA will plan and implement an integrated,
    long-term robotic and human exploration program structured with
    measurable milestones and executed on the basis of available resources,
    accumulated experience, and technology readiness. The policy envisions
    the following major implementation elements:

            SpaceShuttle--NASA will return the Space Shuttle to flight as
            soon as practical, according to the recommendations of the
            Columbia Accident Investigation Board. The focus of the Space
            Shuttle will be finishing assembly of the International Space
            Station (ISS). With its job done, the Space Shuttle will be
            retired when assembly of the ISS is complete, planned for the
            end of the decade.

            International Space Station--NASA plans to complete assembly of
            the ISS, including those U.S. components that support U.S.
            space exploration goals and those planned by foreign partners,
            by the end of the decade. U.S. research activities aboard the
            ISS will be focused to support the new exploration goals, with
            the emphasis on understanding how the space environment affects
            astronaut health and capabilities and developing
            countermeasures.

            New Space Transportation Capabilities--NASA will initiate
            Project Constellation to develop a new Crew Exploration Vehicle
            (CEV) to provide crew transport for exploration missions beyond
            low Earth orbit. NASA plans to develop the CEV in a step-by-
            step approach, with an initial unpiloted test flight as early
            as 2008, followed by tests of progressively more capable
            designs that provide an operational human-rated capability no
            later than 2014.

            As we begin the process of retiring the Space Shuttle from
            service, NASA will separate to the maximum practical extent
            crew and cargo transportation for both ISS and exploration
            missions. NASA will acquire ISS crew transport as required and
            cargo transportation as soon as practical and affordable. NASA
            envisions that commercial and/or foreign capabilities will
            provide these services. The CEV may supplement these ISS
            capabilities, but its design will be driven by exploration
            requirements.

            Lunar Exploration--NASA will undertake lunar exploration and
            demonstration activities to enable sustained human and robotic
            exploration of Mars and other destinations in the solar system.
            Starting no later than 2008, NASA plans to launch the first in
            a series of robotic missions to the Moon to prepare for and
            support human exploration activities. The policy envisions the
            first human expedition to the lunar surface as early as 2015
            but no later than 2020. These robotic and human missions will
            further science and demonstrate new approaches, technologies,
            and systems, including the use of space resources, to support
            sustained human exploration to Mars and other destinations.

            Exploration of Mars--NASA will enhance the ongoing search for
            water and evidence of life on Mars by pursuing technologies
            this decade for advanced science missions to Mars in the next
            decade. Also starting next decade, NASA will launch the first
            in a dedicated series of robotic missions to Mars to
            demonstrate capabilities that will greatly enhance robotic
            capabilities and enable future human exploration of Mars. NASA
            will conduct human expeditions to Mars and other destinations
            beyond Earth orbit on the basis of available resources,
            accumulated experience, and technology readiness.

            And Destinations Beyond--Over the next two decades, NASA will
            conduct an increasingly capable campaign of robotic exploration
            across the solar system. The stunning images we have received
            from Mars are just the beginning. NASA will launch advanced
            space telescope searches for Earth-like planets and habitable
            environments around other stars. NASA will explore Jupiter's
            moons, the asteroids, and other solar system bodies to search
            for evidence of life, understand the history of the solar
            system, and search for resources.

        To advise on issues for achieving these goals, the President will
    form a commission of private and public sector experts. Former
    Undersecretary of Defense and Secretary of the Air Force, Pete
    Aldridge, will be the Chair of the Commission. This commission will
    issue its report within four months of its first meeting.
    NASA Program Changes
        To successfully execute the exploration vision, NASA will focus its
    organization, create new offices, align ongoing programs, experiment
    with new ways of doing business, and tap the great innovative and
    creative talents of our Nation.
        Immediately following the President's speech, I announced the
    creation of the Exploration Systems Enterprise, which will have
    responsibility for developing the Crew Exploration Vehicle and other
    exploration systems and technologies. Retired U.S. Navy Rear Admiral
    Craig Steidle, former manager of the Defense Department's Joint Strike
    Fighter Program, is heading this new organization. Relevant programs of
    the Aerospace Technology, Space Science, and Space Flight enterprises
    are being transferred to the Exploration Systems Enterprise. The
    Aerospace Technology Enterprise has been renamed the Aeronautics
    Enterprise to reflect its new focus.
        As human explorers prepare to join their robotic counterparts,
    coordination and integration will increase. The Exploration Systems
    Enterprise will work closely with the Space Science Enterprise to use
    the Moon to demonstrate new approaches, technologies, and systems to
    support sustained human exploration. NASA's Space Science Enterprise
    will have responsibility for implementing robotic testbeds on the Moon
    and Mars and will also demonstrate other key exploration technologies--
    such as advanced power, propulsion, and communications-in missions to
    Mars and Jupiter's moons. NASA's Space Science Enterprise will
    eventually integrate human capabilities into the exploration of Mars
    and other destinations.
        Many other elements of the NASA organization will be focused to
    support this new direction. NASA's Biological and Physical Research
    Enterprise will put much greater emphasis on bioastronautics research
    to enable human exploration of other worlds. NASA's Office of the Space
    Architect will be responsible for integrating the exploration
    activities of NASA's different Enterprises and for maintaining
    exploration roadmaps and coordinating high-level requirements.
        As we move outward into the solar system, NASA will look for
    innovative ideas from the private sector and academia to support
    activities in Earth orbit and future exploration activities. Many of
    the technical challenges that NASA will face in the coming years will
    require innovative solutions. In addition to tapping creative thinking
    within the NASA organization, NASA will leverage the ideas and
    expertise resident in the Nation's universities and industry.
        In his speech, the President directed NASA to invite other nations
    to share in the challenges and opportunities of this new era of
    exploration and discovery. Building on NASA's long history and
    extensive and close ties with the space and research agencies of other
    nations, we will actively seek international partners in executing
    future exploration activities.
        NASA will also invigorate its workforce, focus its facilities, and
    revitalize its field centers. As exploration activities get underway,
    NASA anticipates planning, reviews, and changes to align and improve
    its infrastructure. In order to achieve the exploration vision, we will
    be making decisions on how to best implement new programs. While some
    of these necessary actions will not be easy, they are essential to the
    overall effort before us. I urge you to consider the full context of
    what we will be proposing rather than any isolated, specific action.
    Such a perspective will allow us to move forward in implementing the
    vision.
    Budget Resources
        The exploration vision for solar system exploration is affordable
    in both the short-term and the long-term. The President's FY 2005
    Budget request for NASA, to be released on February 2nd, will be
    fiscally responsible and consistent with the Administration's goal of
    cutting the budget deficit in half within the next five years. NASA's
    FY 2005 Budget will increase by $1 billion over five years when
    compared with the President's 2004 plan, an increase of around five
    percent per year over the next three years and approximately one
    percent for the following two years. Although the budget increases are
    modest, NASA will be able to carry out a robust exploration program. In
    addition to the new funding, the vision will be supported by $11
    billion in reprogrammed funds over the next five years, the majority of
    which will come from human space flight related programs. In the next
    decade, retiring the Space Shuttle will free up over $4 billion per
    year, enabling full-scale development and operation of human missions
    to the Moon.
        The budget strategy supporting the vision will not require large
    balloon payments by future Congresses and Administrations. Unlike prior
    major civil space initiatives, the approach is intentionally flexible,
    with investments in sustainable exploration approaches to maintain
    affordability.
    The Nation's Future in Exploration and Discovery
        As we embark on this new chapter of exploration, we are mindful of
    the risk attendant on that quest. And as we gather today, on this the
    18th anniversary of the Challenger tragedy, it serves as a stark
    reminder of the price we pay for human exploration. It has been the
    case through human history. This painful reminder serves as a clarion
    call to redouble our efforts to undertake this new chapter in
    exploration in the safest manner humanly possible. As a testament to
    the courage of the Challenger crew, and their contribution to human
    exploration, we will designate the landing site of the Opportunity
    rover on Mars as the Challenger Memorial Station.
        As the President stated in his. speech, we are embarking on a
    journey, not a race. We begin this journey knowing that many years of
    hard work and sustained effort will be required, yet we can look
    forward to achieving concrete results in the near term. The vision
    makes the needed decisions to secure long-term U.S. space leadership.
    It provides an exciting set of major milestones with human and robotic
    missions. It pursues compelling science and cutting edge technologies.
    It invites new ideas and innovations for accomplishing the vision. And
    it will provide the opportunity for new generations of Americans to
    explore, innovate, discover and enrich our Nation in ways unimaginable
    today. The President's challenging vision provides unique opportunities
    for engaging students across the country, ''as only NASA can,'' to
    enter careers in science, engineering, technology and math. I sincerely
    appreciate the forum that the Committee provided today, and I look
    forward to responding to your questions.

        The Chairman. Well, thank you very much. It's good to have
    you back again, Mr. O'Keefe.
        In your written testimony, you stated that NASA will be
    making decisions on how to best implement new programs, some of
    which, quote, ``will not be easy,'' unquote. Tell us the ones
    that are not going to be easy.
        Mr. O'Keefe. First and foremost, the crew exploration
    vehicle, under Project Constellation, that we will establish--
    an advancement or an evolution, if you will, of the orbital
    space plane approach--its objectives will require the capacity
    to carry humans beyond low-Earth orbit. It's been awhile since
    we've done that properly, and the technology has changed
    dramatically. That's going to take an awful lot of work. And,
    again, the Exploration Systems Enterprise is being focused upon
    that very objective.
        Similarly, the approach that we've talked about in the
    past, Project Prometheus, of developing power generation and
    propulsion capabilities, is not something we've done before. We
    have to find a breakthrough for that in order to inform these
    missions in a way that would be more contemporary, faster than
    what we typically do now. It takes 7 months to get to Mars.
    That's not a tolerable period of time for continuing those
    kinds of exploration missions.
        Finally, I think the one that's going to be extremely
    difficult to work through, and is going to augur in favor of
    continuing operations of International Space Station for the
    foreseeable future, is to understand the human effects, human
    endurance challenges of long-duration spaceflight. It will be a
    primary vehicle and platform for the United States in order to
    focus on that research and scientific inquiry. Our partners
    will continue to look at a range of scientific endeavors, but
    ours will be focused primarily on that which it takes to
    proceed with expeditionary long-endurance spaceflight missions.
    Those are the ones that I believe are the near-term immediate
    kinds of challenges, and we'll continue along on others, as
    well.
        The Chairman. The underlying question that all of us have
    is the cost estimates and the budgetary plans. When we look
    back at the past cost of NASA programs, there has been one
    constant, and that is the costs have exceeded the initial
    estimates. What assurance do we have that these budgetary
    projections, in light of a very ambitious schedule and goals,
    can be met? What's different?
        Mr. O'Keefe. Sure. Well, I think you put your finger on a
    point that we spent a lot of time working through.
        First and foremost, it is the nature of development
    programs that cost estimating is extremely vague. It's very
    difficult to do when you're developing something that's never
    been done before, or hasn't been tried or tested elsewhere,
    and, as a consequence, it means we really have to build in, a
    very prudent level of reserves and accommodation of what those
    costs will entail. And the Committee has done a very important
    effort, for the International Space Station. For example,
    really forcing the kind of fiscal discipline that's in evidence
    now as a cost estimate for the completion of the International
    Space Station that, over the course of the last 2 years, is
    very much a major systems integration effort that is an
    illustration of the kinds of things we have to do consistently
    in the future. We now have that experience of doing it
    properly. The Committee has really contributed heavily to the
    task of forcing that fiscal discipline, and I think we've
    arrived at that point.
        In addition, I think the future is--if I could take issue
    just a bit with one element of your commentary--it is not an
    aggressive schedule. It is one that is very prudently laid out
    that intends to transition, transform, the objectives over
    time. And the reason it is fiscally prudent, in the judgment of
    the Administration--and what you'll see next week is the
    evidence, in detail, of it--is, again, the completion of the
    individual steps--return to flight, bring the shuttle back into
    operational service, complete the International Space Station,
    retire the shuttle, and then move on more aggressively, at that
    point, toward the continued effort of the rest of the
    components of the vision.
        Meanwhile, there are a number of factors that are built
    into this, over the course of this next 5 years, which will
    incrementally, and step by step, move our way through that set
    of exploration goals the President's outlined, and establish
    the baseline for its pursuit.
        The Chairman. Senator Nelson?
        Thank you.
        Senator Nelson. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        The President made a terrific proposal that I had the
    privilege of being there and supporting, publicly and
    privately. This program is not going anywhere unless it has the
    full support of the White House. Why didn't the President
    mention it, 6 days later, in his State of the Union speech?
        Mr. O'Keefe. This program has the complete and full, 100
    percent support of the President, the Vice President, the
    Administration, all the way through. He made an extensive
    speech that--again, I was just delighted you were there for,
    Senator--it was a very extended discussion of exactly his
    objectives. The Presidential directive that follows this,
    that's posted on everybody's website, is the most comprehensive
    in space policy in anyone's memory. I've only been around here
    a couple of years associated with this agenda, but those who
    have been following it longer would attest to the fact, this is
    the most comprehensive space policy statement in a long, long
    time.
        The State of the Union Address is not a tick-list of things
    that have been discussed previously, it is not a inventory of
    all other matters. And so, as a consequence, I would not have
    expected, given the mere 5 days before the delivery of that
    address, that he would have reiterated it, given the
    comprehensive nature of that speech.
        There is not a question in my mind that the President's
    fully behind this, and what you'll see, on Monday, when the
    President's budget arrives, is a endorsement of this directive,
    with the resources necessary to carry it out.
        Senator Nelson. I accept your answer, and I certainly hope
    you're right.
        Tell us about--there was a lot of anticipation that there
    was going to be suggested 5 percent increases in the NASA
    budget. That was the talk for some 2 weeks prior to the
    President's announcement. And yet what was announced, a billion
    dollars over 5 years, that's $200 million a year, that's just a
    little over a 1 percent increase per year. How do you reconcile
    the two?
        Mr. O'Keefe. Again, when the budget comes out next week,
    what you'll see in evidence is a very clear expression of the
    resources necessary to carry out this statement, the
    Presidential directive, this strategy. And the percentage
    increases, year by year, are from the baseline of what the
    Congress enacted in Fiscal Year 2004, just a few days ago. And
    so what's contained in that is a specific endorsement of the
    specific programs necessary to carry out this directive, that--
    the percentages are what they are based on--once you see the
    detail, make a determination, as to whether you think they're
    adequate or not, at that time.
        Senator Nelson. Well, for those of us who are going to have
    to carry the water for you up here, I'm certainly looking
    forward to seeing that.
        Tell me about the hiatus. 2010, stop the shuttle, and then
    the new vehicle isn't ready for some number of years. As I
    expressed in my opening comments, isn't that a very vulnerable
    position for the country, to have to rely on Russian and
    European rockets? And isn't that a dismantling of this
    experienced core of NASA employees that would, of necessity, be
    dismantled? And isn't that bring up the fearful refrains from
    what we experienced 20 years ago?
        Mr. O'Keefe. Sure. Well, two points, Senator. I appreciate
    the point, because it is a--it's an issue of timing and
    sequencing that's far out in the future, but one we really need
    to be mindful of what its implications could be.
        First and foremost, today we are engaged in spaceflight
    activities with our Russian partners. Right now. Over the
    course of this past year, we have not flown a human in space,
    other than on a Russian capability. The depth of this
    partnership, if there was any doubt about it, has been
    demonstrated very impressively over the course of this last
    year. Our Russian, European, Canadians, and Japanese partners
    have done a absolutely astonishing job of stepping up at
    exactly when we needed it most, at a time of crisis and
    challenge in which we could not have maintained the
    International Space Station or a human presence in space. And
    now we see the third year of a continuous human presence, as a
    consequence of a collaborative partner arrangement that is
    working, and working very impressively.
        That said, your point is well taken. I mean, the objective
    is to complete the International Space Station in the assembly
    complete configuration that the international partners will
    help configure and determine exactly what that will look like
    by the end of this decade. At the time in which the shuttle's
    cargo lift capacity is completed for that important mission,
    that's the stage in which the shuttle will retire.
        Concurrently, developing the--under Project Constellation--
    a exploration vehicle system, the approach will be to, as soon
    as we can deliver that capability, to have that capable of
    beyond-low-Earth orbit exploration, as well as potentially that
    which is required for taxi between here and International Space
    Station well on the way. This shouldn't be a huge lift in that
    regard.
        That said, we don't want to develop a success-oriented
    strategy. So there's a Catch 22 here to the extent that we end
    up with a capability that--what we explored and evolved under
    the orbital space plane approach was that a very aggressive
    program would yield that capability by the end of the decade.
    This is going to be a requirement beyond low-Earth orbit, and
    we want to get it right. We're going to use a page from plenty
    of successful acquisition experiences of a spiral development
    approach to launch different components in sequence as early as
    2008, to begin the first of those spiral development component
    launches, unmanned, to test that capability to assure that we
    can get to a Project Constellation exploration vehicle
    capability. And, in doing so, that will drive the date, as
    opposed to any artificial date we may put on the wall.
        We're trying to be as realistic as possible, to say that
    we're trying to drive in technology that hasn't been used for
    this kind of a mission, ever, to go beyond low-Earth orbit, and
    to not develop a success-driven strategy that is doomed to
    requiring a success at every spiral development phase. So, to
    the extent there's a gap, that will occur after the next
    decade, and we'll have to work out what those challenges are at
    that time. But it is one that we are currently managing. We'll
    have to work our way through whatever else may materialize, but
    that's not something we're anticipating, at this moment, as
    being a challenge in the next 7 years.
        Senator Nelson. You see my concerns.
        Mr. O'Keefe. Yes, sir.
        Senator Nelson. And the reprogramming concerns, as well.
        Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        The Chairman. Thank you.
        Senator Brownback?
        Senator Brownback. Thanks, Mr. Chairman.
        Administrator, I want to follow this series of questions
    about the retirement of the shuttle program and your relying on
    reprogramming of that money, much of it, to launch into the
    next phase, next initiative. And I think that's wise to do.
        Do you have to use the shuttle to finish the International
    Space Station? Or could you, because there has been such a
    successful partnership with the Russians and the European space
    agencies, or--I've had a number of commercial sector people
    come up here, saying, ``You know, we'd like more of this
    action, ourselves''--could you feasibly take more missions up,
    with lower payload, and be able to complete the ISS in an
    earlier fashion, and retire shuttle sooner?
        Mr. O'Keefe. We've looked at every permutation of this,
    and, again, the station was designed, and the components and
    modules developed, in order to fit in the cargo bay. It becomes
    the optimum vehicle for completion of International Space
    Station. So this is the most efficient cost-effective way to do
    that.
        The components and modules are stacking up at the Kennedy
    Space Center right now. It's quite a display. And the testing
    and integration work that's necessary in order to load, into
    cargo bay, those capabilities for the next, roughly 25 to 30
    flights, will be required in order to complete station. That's
    been optimally configured for shuttle flights to the ISS. And
    any other combination would be a very inefficient, extremely
    difficult way to redesign that whole effort now, and would take
    more time. Our objective is to get to the completion of station
    as soon as we can, and have it fully operational for the
    purposes for which it was originally designed, in addition to
    the refocused research agenda we're now on.
        So the determination is, that is the best way to conclude,
    and that's the direction that the President has instructed us
    to proceed in.
        Senator Brownback. I understand that, and I appreciate it.
    I just wonder if there is a way to do this with the partners
    because of the growing costs of the shuttle, the costs of
    running the shuttle fleet, and the projection of retiring it. I
    may pursue that some more with you.
        On a second area----
        Mr. O'Keefe. I'd really enjoy the opportunity to do that,
    because the lift capacity they have is nowhere near what we can
    do on shuttle, but we can pursue that much further with you,
    yes, sir.
        Senator Brownback. You indicated, in your comments, that
    you were going to engage the commercial sector, as well, in
    going to the Moon. Would you elaborate a little bit more on
    that?
        Mr. O'Keefe. Well, it's the objective again, we haven't
    done this in 35 years, and a lot of technology development has
    occurred in that time. So one thing we're certain of is, the
    notion of resurrecting the way we did it 35 years ago is not an
    option, that's not something we're planning to do. We know how
    to do that, and it required brute force to leave the Earth and
    go that route.
        So, instead, the approach will be to look at, again, a
    range of alternatives, some of which may be commercially
    driven, that, again--and I think the illumination on those
    options will come from the Aldridge Commission, in terms of
    implementation strategies and the best way they may view for us
    to do that, the combination of members on that Commission. To
    solicit the range of different commercial alternatives, as well
    as international partnering arrangements, a set of options on a
    wide range of fronts of how to implement this best is what
    we're looking to them to help us understand a little better.
        Meanwhile, we're also going to be looking at all the
    commercial ideas that have been introduced and discussed, and
    trying to bring those together to see how that may meet the
    goals and objectives we'll look into over the next few years.
        Senator Brownback. I certainly want to encourage that,
    because, to the degree that we can tap into the commercial
    sector, and the financing through the commercial sector, or
    even military issues, as well, we get into a lot bigger pots of
    funds to be able to do this, and other impetus to move us on
    forward. And it strikes me that those are out there, they're
    very interested, they are intrigued. They're, in some cases,
    pretty well financed; in other cases, could be. And I think
    it's going to be a key way we develop, because that's typically
    how we have developed. If government will open the pathway, you
    get Lewis & Clark out there, but not far behind are just waves
    of settlers coming through on their own dime to do this, and
    that's going to be key for us to do.
        I want to say, in a final comment here, in your showing
    your video--I hope you show that a lot--I could feel the energy
    and the excitement of that, not only just what happened there,
    but that I'm a part of a nation that does something like this
    and that's willing to venture forth and to do it. And I say
    that selfishly, because, as a Member in this body, to encourage
    and to yearn people forward is an extraordinarily valuable
    intangible.
        And I had a conversation on Sunday, with a guy I served, as
    a White House fellow who was a commander on a aircraft carrier,
    recently near Afghanistan. The reason he went to the Naval
    Academy was because of astronauts on the Moon. And he remembers
    saying, as a 12-year-old, to his dad, ``I want to go--I want to
    be an astronaut.'' And his dad said, ``Well, most of these guys
    went to the Naval Academy; that's where you have to go.'' And
    he said, ``OK.'' He went to the Naval Academy.
        Now, he hasn't gotten to the Moon, and he's not going to
    make it in the public sector; maybe in the private sector
    someday. But he's served his country as a commander of an
    aircraft carrier and as a dedicated American. And here was a
    vision sown that was harvested in a great way by this Nation.
        And that's what this is. It is expensive. It does take
    funds from some other areas. But what value is that intangible
    vision by us sowing that into young kids that are 13, 14 years
    old, that you say, ``Well, if you want to do that, you're going
    to have to study a lot harder.'' Or we sow it around the world,
    and how much more do we attract brainpower into the United
    States by sowing that into the finest minds around the world?
        These are intangibles that are of extraordinary value, and
    I commend you for them.
        Thank you.
        Mr. O'Keefe. Thank you, Senator.
        The Chairman. Senator Wyden?
        Senator Wyden. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Mr. Administrator, for me, other than the safety issues,
    the single biggest issue is the question of what you can
    accomplish, manned versus unmanned, in terms of the agency's
    work. That's why I thought you all deserved a lot of credit
    last fall when you committed to this comprehensive cost-benefit
    analysis with respect to manned spaceflight.
        Now we're in the situation where the President is going
    forward with a program that involves even more human
    spaceflight, and yet we don't have that cost-benefit analysis
    in our hand. When can we expect to get that so that we can give
    this project the thoughtful analysis it deserves?
        Mr. O'Keefe. Yes, sir. No, thank you. It was a very
    important suggestion and recommendation that you made. We have
    operated on that. We should have the results of that available
    in about 3 week's time. And so, as the budget comes out,
    shortly thereafter we'll see the comprehensive model of a cost-
    benefit analysis ready to go. It has been a real important
    effort, and I thank you for introducing the idea, because it
    really has helped contribute to shifting the way we're looking
    at this, in many ways.
        What you'll see after next week, when you see the detail of
    the budget coming out, is a real--a much more balanced
    combination of robotic and human capabilities than I think you
    may be referring to here. It is intended as, part of the
    stepping-stone approach, the kinds of things we're doing on
    Mars right now, to really inform the nature of the scientific
    inquiry and the exploration inquiry of where we'd go, with a
    range of robotic missions. That's how the lunar return will be
    conducted; many robotic capabilities before that.
        But there's a place for human requirements. One of the
    things that has come out, preliminarily, in this cost-benefit
    analysis approach is--for example, for this mission on Mars,
    for any one of the rovers, over the course of 90 to 120 days of
    scientific experimentation, a most expansive interpretation of
    the full volume of science we could hope to yield, short of the
    imagery or the actual geological content, what we're going to
    end up with is something equivalent to about one day's work if
    a human were doing it. We've got to program every single move
    24 hours in advance. And as a matter of fact, we saw it
    illustrated on the Spirit expedition, that if you don't get it
    exactly right, it will do as a computer does, that all of us
    are familiar with that ever used a laptop, the whole thing will
    freeze up and shut down on you until they understand what it is
    you're trying to tell them.
        So it takes time, and it takes a more exhaustive kind of
    approach to this. So if we're willing to tolerate a lot more
    time and a lot more money by the time you get done with it, the
    combination of human versus robotic capabilities turn out to be
    very close. But we'll show you that as part of the cost-benefit
    analysis. And, again, can I thank you again for prompting the
    inquiry which we pursued.
        Senator Wyden. Well, I appreciate your getting it to us
    quickly, because I can only tell you it can only build
    credibility----
        Mr. O'Keefe. Sure.
        Senator Wyden.--for any kind of effort to go to Mars, to
    have that kind of rigorous cost-benefit analysis. Because I
    think, otherwise, the country says, ``Well, look, the Congress
    is just ducking the big financial questions.''
        Mr. O'Keefe. Yes, sir.
        Senator Wyden. And, obviously, we don't want to have that
    as we try to strike the good balance between manned and
    unmanned in the days ahead.
        Let me also ask you about this question of the agency
    collecting the personal data on more than ten million Northwest
    Airlines passengers. Apparently, this data was retained for
    years without the agency informing the passengers of their
    personal information. What can you tell us so as to ensure
    hundreds of thousands of constituents I have, for example, that
    that information wasn't shared or misused? And we've seen some
    e-mail to the--on this issue that would indicate that the
    agency's concerned that it was misused.
        Mr. O'Keefe. Yes, sir. No, I thank you for the question.
    And we've--since the coverage of this here in the last few
    days, I've really intensively looked into the detail of it.
        After September 11, 2001, NASA and Northwest Airlines met
    to consider possible collaboration to increase aviation
    security. In December 2001, NASA requested this data from
    Northwest Airlines to analyze to see if there were trend
    patterns that could be devised or derived from the information.
    We have treated the information--it was about a three-month
    slice of passenger data--as very, very classified information.
    So, as a matter of fact, it was our biggest challenge, as I
    understand it, was even attempting to access the 18 disks of
    file, because they wrote it in a code that was not accessible
    to anyone at NASA. And, as a result, it is not transferrable or
    easily disseminated, as a result of that. It was vaulted,
    controlled. No one accessed it, other than the analysts.
        We determined that we couldn't, after a year, download more
    than a day or two worth of information of any relevance and so,
    therefore, advised Northwest that there was little more that we
    could do with this, and returned all the data to them. So it
    was not disseminated, not released, and, to my understanding of
    this, was not available in--beyond the scope of what the
    analysts of NASA-Ames were engaged in.
        Senator Wyden. So this e-mail that we've seen--the
    September 23 e-mail from one of your staff, to Jay Dombrowski,
    that says the agency wanted to avoid creating the appearance
    that the agency is violating people's privacy--that simply was
    a concern, but you've found no evidence that the agency
    violated anybody's privacy or that the information was shared
    with anyone.
        Mr. O'Keefe. To the best of the information we have
    available right now, that's exactly right; there is--it was not
    disseminated beyond that, and everything we've heard is--and
    we've been able to investigate on this, would suggest that it
    was contained very, very carefully.
        That said, Senator, this raises an important question, in
    the wake of September 11, so many people were looking for ways
    to try to protect ourselves from terrorists who would otherwise
    like to use commercial capabilities to kill us, and they were
    reaching out in lots of different directions to do that. I've
    been very committed to assuring that our folks understand that
    this really needs to, then, be mindful of the privacy rules and
    the Privacy Act and the implications, thereof; that we've
    really got to more conscious of that as we work through this.
        But, in no way, shape, or form should we deter anybody in
    our agency from thinking proactively, aggressively, on how do
    we use the technologies we have to conquer this challenge
    against us that people would like to use? This is a delicate
    question, but it's one that--I want to be sure that, in our
    quest to assure privacy, which we must do as a matter of law,
    that we also not discourage anyone from thinking actively, How
    do we use these technologies that--in this case, didn't work,
    didn't help----
        Senator Wyden. My time----
        Mr. O'Keefe.--to really go forward?
        Senator Wyden.--is up. My time is up.
        I would only ask that you all try to lay out some rules----
        Mr. O'Keefe: Yes, sir.
        Senator Wyden.--for using these data bases. And I
    appreciate your comment.
        Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Mr. O'Keefe. Thank you, Senator.
        The Chairman. I just want to add, it's great thinking, sir,
    but you've got to keep the privacy of the Americans foremost.
        Mr. O'Keefe. Absolutely. Absolutely. And we've done our
    best to preserve that.
        The Chairman. Senator Hutchison?
        Senator Hutchison. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        I am very pleased that the President stressed that he was
    keeping the commitment on the International Space Station and
    our commitment to our international partners. And I was glad
    you stressed the phenomenal job our international partners have
    done in helping us through this crisis.
        My question is, As we are looking toward the long-term
    future, which we all, I think, appreciate, in the short term
    what is the commitment to continuing the medical research, to
    developing and enhancing the medical research that is being
    done in the Space Station so that we don't, sort of, put that
    aside? Because when we do go back to our manned spacecraft,
    clearly that's going to be a major part of what we tell the
    American people we want to achieve for quality of life and the
    ability to do those experiments that cannot be done on Earth,
    no matter what kind of gravity you try to emulate from space.
        Mr. O'Keefe. Well, thank you, Senator. I think the short
    answer is, our commitment to life sciences physiological
    research is more focused now than ever before, as a consequence
    of the President's statement and his direction to us. Because
    the primary objective we seek to derive off the International
    Space Station now is a clear understanding of the challenges of
    long-duration spaceflight expeditionary missions, which are
    very much akin to the kinds of things we're doing on station
    right now. Mike Foale and Sasha Kaleri are aboard the station
    right now, as Expedition 8. They're going to be there for the
    better part of six and a half months. And, as a consequence,
    what we learn about that experience, and the life-sciences
    research they're engaged in, and will continue to in the years
    ahead, is going to be the primary focus of what we do. So the
    medical-derived kind of benefits that come from that for the
    human effects on astronauts, as well as that which can affect
    all of us here on Earth, as a result of what they find, is
    going to be a real direct benefit of it and is more intensified
    now. What you'll see in the budget is an enhanced position for
    that quality of research than ever before. We're really going
    to refocus everything else we're doing toward that objective.
        Senator Hutchison. NASA has a great university consortium
    where you have carefully gone through the different medical
    schools and what their area of expertise is. I would just hope
    that you would start highlighting the things that are done in
    space. We all know the study of how human bodies react in space
    is important for putting people on the Moon for a longer period
    of time or----
        Mr. O'Keefe. Sure.
        Senator Hutchison.--or staying in space. But the medical
    research that might result in a significant improvement in the
    treatment of osteoporosis or breast cancer, those kinds of
    things, I would hope you could start shipping out to the
    research institutions what you've gotten from space, and let's
    start seeing the results, because I think that will--just like
    these wonderful pictures will build momentum and excitement, I
    think that also will build momentum and excitement for the
    continuation of the major financial commitment we're making to
    space.
        Mr. O'Keefe. Senator, I couldn't agree more. On January 14,
    the President very specifically outlined the effects on MRIs,
    CAT scans, cataract detection, all these different things that
    have derived from this research that we've conducted for the
    pursuit of space exploration, and we will continue to do much
    more of that, and directed by him. So we clearly will enhance
    our efforts to move in that direction.
        Thank you.
        Senator Hutchison. Let me just ask you, in the very near
    interim we were going to do our next shuttle, I think you had
    said, in September. Now that date is a little bit off. Do you
    have a date that you can say would be feasible for us to do the
    next shuttle and also make sure, of course, that all of the
    safety considerations from the Accident Investigation Board are
    met?
        Mr. O'Keefe. No, we're still targeting that early fall,
    September/October timeframe. There's a window of about 30 days
    there, which meet the conditions that are necessary to comply
    fully with the Accident Investigation Board recommendations and
    our imposition of procedures, which is, it's got to be a
    daylight launch and it's got to occur in a way that we see
    every element and second of the flight as it proceeds during--
    until the main-engine cutoff. So, as a consequence, there are a
    number of different factors we've got to continue to monitor.
    And the return-to-flight task group that we've assembled of 25
    experts, from management backgrounds, engineering, technical
    skills, et cetera, have been helping us work through each of
    the options to implement those set of recommendations, and
    there are no showstoppers we're seeing for that timeframe.
        That said, I am not going to be reticent, for a second, to
    delay that if there's anything that gets in the way of doing
    this in a way that assures that we're fit to fly. I'm not going
    to be driven by a calendar or a date. And that's the general
    frame that we're looking at. But I think it's critically
    important that we be looking at a milestone, not a calendar, to
    drive that set of objectives.
        Senator Hutchison. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        I just hope so much that we can start seeing the new
    medical research results. We all know the old results, and
    they've been fabulous.
        Mr. O'Keefe. Sure.
        Senator Hutchison. And I just think it would build
    excitement if we can bring out more of the new results to show
    why we are continuing, to the American people.
        Mr. O'Keefe. Stand by. I think with the President's
    direction on this focus on life sciences in the future, it's
    impossible to predict what's going to happen, but I think we're
    going to see some really profound changes on that front, as a
    consequence of really concentrating on human effects, long-
    duration spaceflight, physiological consequence, that will have
    derived advantages for the medical community, to be sure.
        Senator Hutchison. It'll be very exciting.
        Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Senator Stevens. Mr. Chairman----
        Mr. O'Keefe. Thank you, Senator.
        Senator Stevens.--if I could just ask just one question----
        The Chairman. Senator?
        Senator Stevens.--to highlight Senator Brownback's
    statement. How many hits did you have on your websites after
    those landings on Mars?
        Mr. O'Keefe. Thank you, Senator. In the last 27 days, we've
    had four billion hits--billion hits--to the NASA Website. All
    of last year was 2.8 billion. That was four times the amount of
    any other year. So in a span of 27 days, we've already exceeded
    the annual highest level we'd ever had, and last year was a
    pretty active year. It was amazing. The overwhelming interest
    is just phenomenal.
        Thank you, Senator.
        The Chairman. Senator Breaux?
        Senator Breaux. No wonder the computers on Mars crashed.
        [Laughter.]
        Senator Breaux. Got an overload problem.
        Administrator O'Keefe: It's true.
        Senator Breaux. Two points, the first one being, on the
    vehicle that we're talking about being the next-generation
    vehicle, we went through this process, probably before your
    time, with the X-33, the Venture Star plane that was out on the
    table, withdrawn, dropped. And then we had the orbital space
    plane, OSP, that was out there; companies started looking at
    it, got excited, you know, got geared up, and that's gone. And
    now we have the CEV, which is the crew exploration vehicle.
        I would hope that we decide on what we want to do. I mean,
    the direction, again, is what I'm concerned about. We start, we
    stop, we change, and that's got to be very difficult for the
    private sector to become involved into the plan and put
    together consortiums to make these things work.
        So can you tell us, if you know, Mr. O'Keefe, where are we
    on this third plane that I'm hearing about? I mean, do we have
    a concept? Do we have more than a concept? Do we have enough to
    say to companies, ``Go out there and start looking at how to
    design, test, and build this vehicle?'' Where are we on that?
        Mr. O'Keefe. Yes, sir. No, there is a little bit of a
    difference in the example you just used that I'd like to point
    out, just for a second.
        The X-33, as I understand it, back in the mid to late
    1990s, was a first attempt, or maybe a second or third attempt,
    at trying to achieve a horizontal launch, a capacity to fly off
    a runway and achieve low-Earth--beyond-low-Earth orbit or in-
    low-Earth orbit from that kind of stationary position. It
    required, in the words of several industry folks that I've
    talked to, at least two inventions and at least one suspension
    of the law of physics in order to do this. And, as a
    consequence, we don't know how to do that yet.
        This is not dependent upon that. Matter of fact, if
    anything, the whole approach the President's program is
    dependent on that has been really a--it was a dogged issue that
    we worked through all the way through the six-month interagency
    process--was that there be nothing here based on the use of an
    element called ``unobtainium'' or anything else. This is
    something we've got to have the capacity to do, and it's a
    stretch; it's an aggressive application of today's technology,
    but not something that requires a miracle for an invention.
        So what you see in the Project Constellation exploration
    vehicle is a logical extension of the work we did on orbital
    space plane. In so many ways, there's an awful lot common
    between the two. The difference is that its objective, its
    goal, is to go beyond low-Earth orbit; whereas, the orbital
    space plane would have permitted a lot of different designs in
    order to simply achieve low-Earth orbit to and from
    International Space Station----
        Senator Breaux. How would----
        Mr. O'Keefe.--250, 300 miles up.
        Senator Breaux. Excuse me for interrupting, but how would
    the CEV be launched?
        Mr. O'Keefe. The same way that the orbital space plane, off
    of an expendable rocket. That's the intent.
        Senator Breaux. Do we have that rocket capacity now?
        Mr. O'Keefe. That's the issue we're going to need to
    continue to work, and it was the same one we were working on
    OSP. And I think it really is going to depend on what
    combination of capabilities do you put on a Project
    Constellation exploration vehicle, in terms of longer-duration
    spaceflight that may require more lift? And that's something
    we're going to need to look at.
        Senator Breaux. When will NASA be ready to say to industry
    who will be involved in developing and building this ship,
    ``Here's what we want you to do''?
        Mr. O'Keefe. Pretty quick. I think the objective was--on
    OSP--was to look at them responding to a proposal here, during
    the course of this calendar year, and aggressively, if we could
    have awarded something by August. We're going to need to spend
    the next 6 months with them and everybody else--commercial
    ideas, the whole bit--trying to put together a set of baseline
    requirements, which, again, are derivatives from the OSP. We're
    not starting with a clean sheet of paper; this is a direct
    extension of what's involved there. And I suspect that many of
    the same designs that the industry was looking at will have
    great applications here, as well.
        And so, as a consequence, we're going to do this
    collaboratively with them in order to find what are the best
    approaches to this, and solicit other commercial ideas that may
    exist out there.
        Senator Breaux. OK.
        The second point I would ask about is the concern about the
    start-stop-stop-start, and the continuity of the work force. I
    mean, we, down, as you know quite well, in Michoud, in New
    Orleans, have this huge facility with thousands of employees,
    and my real concern, as I look at the President's plan, that
    we'll probably have as much as a five-year gap after the
    shuttle is completed its work and the time when we start with
    this new CEV vehicle that is now only in the very minute
    planning stages. What do we do to keep the continuity of the
    work force? I'm really concerned. These folks have--if they
    lose the work, they're gone. You have to restart, re-stop. I
    mean, how do we address that continuity of service that we--is
    so necessary to get what you need to accomplish?
        Mr. O'Keefe. Yes, sir. No, it is a critical factor that we
    really need to work the details of, that have got a few years
    out. That's not to say we're not going to start right now
    trying to sort through what those consequences are.
        At least for the next 4 years, you're looking at production
    of the external tank, et cetera, that are necessary to fly a
    shuttle. There are a number of different options that we'll
    look at, shuttle-derived approaches, for lift capability for
    the Project Constellation exploration vehicle. That's not yet
    determined, and we're looking for creative ideas from the
    industry to do that.
        I'm not convinced there's going to be a gap or a hiatus
    there. Because, again, part of what is--in the dialogue with
    Senator Nelson a little bit earlier--what we're pursuing is an
    acquisition strategy of a spiral development, of which the
    first spiral of the Project Constellation exploration vehicle,
    unmanned, will be launched as early as 2008 and a little bit
    later this decade. Potentially, we could see a lot of
    aggressive, heel-toe kind of transition occurring, depending on
    how we do this, and we're going to have to factor that in when
    we make determinations of the right way to do this.
        So, a lot is not yet determined, in terms of what the
    transition looks like five and 6 years down the road. We're
    really concentrating on this coming year in order to position
    ourselves to make sure that the answers for that transition, 5
    and 6 years down the road, are sound.
        Senator Breaux. OK. Well, I'm glad you're looking at it,
    because it's obviously very, very crucial to keep that supply
    of the workforce there----
        Mr. O'Keefe. Yes, sir.
        Senator Breaux.--doing something. They're not just going to
    be able to sit for a gap of several years.
        Thank you very much.
        Mr. O'Keefe. No, thank you, Senator. Again, I think to look
    at the Project Constellation vehicle as a natural extension,
    not a new things, from what OSP work did. That was a lot of
    valuable time spent to do that. It worked out exceptionally
    well. We learned a lot from that experience, and we're just
    naturally evolving it to a more expansive effort that has a
    mission objective beyond low-Earth orbit. It draws on the very
    same kind of capabilities, no doubt about it.
        Senator Brownback [presiding]. Thanks.
        Senator Allen's next.
        Senator Allen. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Administrator O'Keefe, it is always a pleasure to listen to
    you, and I think your leadership, enthusiasm, and adherence to
    sound fiscal policies gives us some confidence--gives me a
    great deal of confidence in your ability----
        Mr. O'Keefe. Thank you, sir.
        Senator Allen.--as you go through these--you formulate the
    strategic plan--but then also as you answer very probative and
    logical questions from my colleagues--how you will adapt as you
    learn more, the steps in the strategic plan are sequential, you
    meet each goal and, from there, take on the next step of that
    long-range goal. And it is important to have a mission and a
    goal, as opposed to just floating around like loose seaweed in
    the tide. You actually have certain missions, and I think that
    is important. You know, you're going downfield. That's
    important.
        The workforce issues that Senator Breaux brought up
    generally with NASA are very important. I've been one that's--I
    mean, I am going to ask you questions on aeronautics, but you
    also look at the fewer and fewer engineers with aeronautical
    engineering degrees, and we see that in a lot of areas in our
    country. That can be made up, from time to time, by bringing in
    people from other countries, which is great, and you all have
    done it, and that's to be commended. However, just like Senator
    Breaux said, though, is, if you curtail any of these areas,
    it's not as if you just snap your fingers and all of a sudden
    there are aeronautical engineers or those who have the
    capabilities, and it also slows down your implementation as
    you're trying to get those folks up to speed working as a
    productive team.
        And, clearly, as you saw the celebrations there, you didn't
    know what each was doing, but there were certain teams that had
    certain aspects or components of those landings that, ``All
    right, great, the balloons or the air bags have deployed.
    That's what we were supposed to get done. Now that it's landed,
    great, that's wonderful. Let's see if it opens.'' Each one has
    a certain responsibility, and you do work as a team.
        Now, insofar as your aerospace technology enterprise,
    aeronautics enterprise, and so forth, Lee Forsgren forwarded me
    and other Members of the Committee, your January 15 letter to
    Senator McCain. And in reading through it--and I'm going to ask
    you to put some more meat on the bones, if you could--
    theoretically, it all sounds very, very good. I like that the
    aeronautics enterprise is going to emphasize the importance of
    aeronautics research and related technologies for our country's
    civil and defense interests; they'll perform research, develop
    and validate innovative high-payoff aeronautics and related
    technologies that'll enhance our security, through
    partnerships, obviously, with the Department of Defense, the
    FAA; and work in partnership with industry and also academia to
    get this transfer, the same sort of things that Senator
    Hutchison was talking about--more in the space exploration, but
    having the applicability to real-life, real present concerns we
    have, whether it's in medical sciences or other.
        Now, my concern with this is, will this reorganization of
    the aerospace technology enterprise--what will be the impact of
    that on the aeronautics budget? And do you see the new
    aeronautics enterprise participating in this new vision? There
    is some carryover from aeronautics, obviously, into space
    exploration, as well.
        So those are two questions. First, what will this
    initiative have as an impact on the aeronautics budget? And how
    will they be involved in the overall new vision?
        Mr. O'Keefe. Yes, sir. First and foremost, I want to thank
    you for raising the workforce challenges that we're facing, and
    to thank the Senate for enacting and passing on S. 610, Senator
    Voinovich's bill that--right before everybody went out of
    session in December; it's in the House now; they're due to call
    it up pretty quickly--I'm advised here, this week--that gives
    us the kinds of tools necessary to recruit/retain the kinds of
    skill mixes you're talking about. We've got a professional
    opportunity here. Matter of fact, I'm just told now that S. 610
    is on the House floor right now. So, you know, this is a year
    and a half in the making. Thank you very much for passing it.
    It was a critical piece of legislation that we've really been
    wrestling with in order to get the kind of tools necessary to
    recruit and retain the workforce capabilities that are there.
    So it is a major achievement; and if we get it enacted, the
    President will sign it rapidly. I can see that coming right
    away.
        In terms of the aerospace and aeronautics enterprise
    approach, it is no accident that the day after the President's
    vision announcement, we specifically looked at establishing an
    aeronautics enterprise to make sure that concentration and
    focus dominantly resides within what we do in the agency.
    Because so much of what we're engaged in, as you very
    accurately stated, is applied to a range of different
    capabilities in the space exploration activity, as well as the
    civil aeronautics kind of applications we're engaged in.
        Airspace management, continued efforts. Matter of fact, in
    another 3 weeks we've got a demonstration of the hypersonic X-
    43 that will be followed through, in terms of what our
    aeronautics efforts are producing now. And the objective will
    be to, again, use the materials research, the aeronautic
    engineering capabilities there--at Langley, at Ames, at the
    Glenn Research Center, the very prominent aeronautics centers
    that we have within that community--to continue to contribute,
    not only to this set of vision objectives for U.S. space
    exploration the President's enunciated, but also to our
    fundamental requirements for aeronautics, which is part of our
    name.
        Finally, putting the NASA Engineering and Safety Center at
    Langley is not there by accident. That's the center that really
    has the highest concentration of aerospace engineering
    expertise, from materials research and a range of different
    capabilities that is necessary to examine trends, patterns, et
    cetera, on a wide range of aeronautic, as well as spaceflight,
    capabilities, that every center, every program has the
    opportunity now to draw from that expertise that's resident
    right there. It is very consciously established at that
    location, and very specifically there for the purpose of, not
    only retaining those capabilities, but using them to solve, not
    only aeronautics challenges, but the range of space exploration
    issues that we're looking at across the board. It's going to
    have a very cohesive role, I think, in the larger NASA program
    objectives that we've articulated.
        Senator Allen. Well, Mr. Chairman, I'll be looking forward
    to working with you--I know the budget will be coming out--and
    seeing how it works.
        Mr. O'Keefe. Yes, sir.
        Senator Allen. You also should be looking for a letter from
    Senator Dodd and myself, not just to you, but to everyone from
    Defense to FAA, TSA, NOAA, and others, insofar as aeronautics.
    Because I think the vast--I know the acting chairman, Senator
    Brownback, and others really recognize the importance of our
    preeminence in aeronautics, and we cannot lose that
    preeminence, for our security as well as for jobs here in this
    country.
        Mr. O'Keefe. Yes, sir. Thank you.
        Senator Allen. And I look forward to continue to work with
    you, Mr. Administrator.
        Mr. O'Keefe. Thank you, Senator.
        Senator Brownback. Senator Dorgan?

                  STATEMENT OF HON. BYRON L. DORGAN,
                     U.S. SENATOR FROM NORTH DAKOTA

        Senator Dorgan. Mr. O'Keefe----
        Mr. O'Keefe. How are you, sir?
        Senator Dorgan.--first of all, let me congratulate NASA on
    the recent successes. I think it's breathtaking to watch what
    is happening with the landings on Mars.
        Second, let me say that when you were nominated by the
    President, I didn't have the foggiest idea whether you would do
    well or do poorly, but I must tell you that I'm very pleased
    that I supported your nomination. I think you, personally, have
    done an excellent job under some very difficult circumstances.
        Mr. O'Keefe. Thank you, sir.
        Senator Dorgan. I'm sure you could probably point out where
    you might have done better, but, at least as an observer, I
    think you've provided strong leadership at a time when it's
    needed, and I wanted to say that to you, because I did support
    your nomination and am pleased I did so.
        Mr. O'Keefe. Thank you, Senator.
        Senator Dorgan. I also believe that when a nation stops
    exploring, it stops progressing. So I believe that exploration,
    and I believe the mission of NASA, is important.
        But I do want to ask about the President's proposals. You
    indicated that they were developed through interagency task
    forces and so on. Was there any other outreach, any other
    inquiry by NASA with experts around the country about what do
    they think we should be looking at 10, 20, and 40 years from
    now?
        Mr. O'Keefe. Yes, sir. The interagency process we conducted
    internally also drew on the opportunity to meet with various
    Members of Congress, who had very specific goals and objectives
    they thought should be enunciated, as well as the very helpful
    hearings that this Committee and your counterpart Committee in
    the House conducted to really examine what are the alternative
    views of what the vision and strategy objectives should be. We
    heard it, we listened, understood that, and also went out and
    solicited other views, as well.
        But not to leave it at that, one of the things that the
    President was particularly focused to assure that some of the
    helpful suggestions that Members offered and that a commission
    be set up for the purpose of assuring that we solicit more
    broadly what those implementation strategies are. And Senator
    Brownback and others were very instrumental in advancing that
    particular objective. We heard that. The President was struck
    by that notion of saying, ``Let's assemble a commission.'' Pete
    Aldridge and the Commission that will be charged here in the
    very short number of days ahead to begin looking at
    implementation strategies--how do we look at commercial,
    international participation, a range of other factors,
    workforce issues that Senator Allen raised, others that need to
    be factored in as we move forward to accomplish this
    objective--that's what this Commission will be doing--we'll be
    supporting it, participating in it--that is due to provide its
    findings here by this summer.
        So we're working this real-time, and moving ahead with the
    strategy and the program the President will unveil on Monday as
    part of the President's budget program, and be informed by the
    views that come externally, as well, from the Aldridge
    Commission.
        Senator Dorgan. And while I said I support space
    exploration and believe it's important--I believe a country
    needs to continue exploring--it is expensive, costly. And I
    don't want to be a wise guy, but I must say, we've been
    promised the moon before, particularly in fiscal policy. We, as
    you know from the announcement this week, have a $477 billion
    deficit this year, but it's really $630 billion, because the
    477 counts the Social Security Trust Fund. So we have the
    largest deficit in human history. It's a very significant
    problem.
        And so the question, I think, for all of us is not just the
    goal, but how do we pay for this? How much is it going to cost?
    And I've observed that, at least in the initial portion, you're
    talking about reprogramming $11 billion, I believe, in the 5
    years, from the current NASA budget, or current NASA expected
    appropriations.
        Can you tell me--my expectation was, from previous
    testimony, that we were pretty tight. I mean, we've seen budget
    cuts in NASA. And so how do we reprogram $11 billion without
    substantially affecting many other critical things that NASA
    said it needs to do? Can you talk us through that fiscal policy
    or the----
        Mr. O'Keefe. Yes, sir.
        Senator Dorgan.--I guess, the financing issue?
        Mr. O'Keefe. Well, thank you, Senator, for a very important
    question.
        As a general budget strategy, let me assure you that the
    President's budget, when it arrives here next week, will follow
    through on the commitment he made, and has articulated as a
    discretionary spending increase of less than 4 percent, with
    the objective, as well, over the next 5 years, of driving down
    the deficit projection to half of what it is today. So that's
    the overarching economic policy. And the program that we are
    engaged in, and that he has directed us to follow through, is
    part of that plan. We are a component of it.
        The specific aspect that's in your packet, I believe--just
    to turn it into a eye chart for you--is, in this specific five-
    year plan, the numbers that will be supported in the
    President's budget that we'll see in great detail next week
    supports a transition or a transformation, if you will, more
    toward the exploration missions that he's directed; and then,
    in the out years, assumes not more than the rate of inflation
    for an increase beyond that.
        So we've really put this through the sanity check to assure
    that we're not passing a balloon note off into the next decade,
    and, instead, looking at what it will require in that
    transition. So all the elements of the plan were developed very
    specifically to conduct the transition and an ultimate
    transformation of capabilities to move more in the direction of
    the exploration missions he's directed. And it fits within the
    parameters of the overall economic strategy I talked about at
    the very beginning.
        Senator Dorgan. Yes. I want to talk with you more about
    that at some other time.
        But I might say that the two landings on Mars demonstrate
    the incredible value of unmanned space exploration, as well.
        Mr. O'Keefe. Yes, sir.
        Senator Dorgan. I mean, there's much to be gleaned from
    that.
        And I would also just, finally, like to say this. I hope,
    while I complimented you, and my colleagues, I'm sure, have the
    same feelings about your stewardship, I hope you will pass our
    compliments along to the men and women of NASA. When I saw that
    film--I mean, I wasn't in the room, and you were, when they
    discovered that they had landed Spirit successfully on the
    surface of Mars--it is an extraordinary technical achievement.
    I mean, almost one that's hard for us to fathom because we're
    not scientists. But I hope you will relay our congratulations
    to the men and women who work for NASA, as well.
        Mr. O'Keefe. Oh, thank you, sir. It was a heart-stopping
    experiencing on both occasions, particularly when you see the
    animation of that thing bouncing. I mean, that was enough to
    stop you cold all the way through this. It's an amazing feat,
    and one that is just staggering to grip the fact that this is a
    hundred million miles away, and we're communicating with these
    two capabilities that are just absolutely extraordinary, and we
    dared not dream it would have been this successful.
        Senator Dorgan. And especially following such a devastating
    tragedy that I'm sure affected, personally, everyone who works
    for NASA. To have this success was really critically important.
    But it describes, again, how unmanned space exploration can be
    very helpful to us, and it describes the technical capability
    and the spirit of the folks that work for NASA.
        Mr. O'Keefe. Thank you, Senator. Appreciate it very much.
    I'll pass that along.
        Senator Brownback. I want to add my support to those
    comments, too. Gave me a lot more feeling of security in the
    air bags in my car----
        [Laughter.]
        Senator Brownback.--when I saw that taking place.
        Senator Ensign?
        Mr. O'Keefe. It's the same technology. That's the thing.
    It's the very same idea.

                    STATEMENT OF HON. JOHN ENSIGN,
                        U.S. SENATOR FROM NEVADA

        Senator Ensign. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Just as a little background, so you know where I come from,
    personally, when I was in high school, I was one of those kids
    who wanted to be an astronaut and wanted to go to the Air Force
    Academy; and ended up being an alternate to the Air Force
    Academy, so didn't pursue that. But always been fascinated with
    space, loved the work the Hubble Space Telescope has done,
    followed NASA's accomplishments. I can't tell you how many of
    the launches of the space shuttle that I watched. I remember,
    as a kid, watching all of the Apollo. So it's been a real
    fascination for me, personally, over the years.
        Now, having said that, in the last several years--and I
    think that the Space Station has been a big part of this--I've
    become more concerned about what NASA is doing. The Space
    Station, you know, original budget was projected to be
    somewhere around $8 billion. My numbers are correct, somewhere
    in there?
        Mr. O'Keefe. Yes, OK, the history of this is tough to
    trace.
        Senator Ensign. Yes.
        Mr. O'Keefe. In the course of the last couple of years I've
    been there, it is a firm number, and we know where it's going;
    but what it originally started at, it's been devolved several
    times and redesigned, and I can hardly even figure out what the
    original idea was anymore.
        Senator Ensign. I understand some of the politics in
    working with some of the other countries, and dumbing down some
    of our science and various things that we've had to do, and
    budgetary things. And the problems that happened with the Space
    Station, illustrate, not necessarily that it was the
    scientists' fault, or, part of it Congress' fault, performing
    budget cuts, I've--actually have one of the Nevadans that works
    on this--I used to ride on the airplane with him, talking about
    it all the time. We used to come back here, and he was hired to
    evaluate the problems with it.
        The bottom line is that the projections are usually here,
    on big government programs. And certainly this is one of those.
    The reality is the numbers are usually, to use a scientific
    term, a quantum amount above whatever the initial projections
    are. And especially when you're talking about vision things,
    because you have no idea what the costs are going to be, and we
    have no idea what other kinds of outside influences that
    Congress may go through at the time to affect that, and that's
    what happened with the Space Station over the years.
        When you introduce humans into spaceflight, we know that
    the cost dramatically goes up. There was a comment about, if
    people were on Mars today, the benefits that we would have--
    well, they wouldn't be able to smell it, they wouldn't be able
    to touch it, they wouldn't be able to feel it, and their eyes
    aren't as good as what the robot's eyes are. And I guess the
    point that I'm making is that, you know, as a country, I think
    that we do have to reevaluate the idea of putting people in
    these projects, because of the enormous cost. I believe in
    continuing space exploration, but I think we have to take a
    very hard look at the cost benefit of having people in space.
    Does it really benefit us as a species--even our curiosity,
    does it really benefit us that much, going forward, compared to
    the huge, huge difference in cost that it's going to take to
    get people there, along with the risks?
        And speaking of the risks, people will die in space
    exploration; there's no way to stop it, there are risks
    involved; we saw that last year--well, when that happens, then
    we reevaluate budgets, we put things on hold, we stop. If one
    of those rovers went up there and it crashed, well, it would be
    a scientific setback, but it wouldn't be a tragedy where the
    whole country would be saying, ``Put an end to the space
    program.'' And I just want to put that out as a cautionary
    look, as you are going forward.
        I appreciate the President's vision for this, but, you
    know, not to be a naysayer, but I think that some people have
    to raise the voices and ask the tough questions. What is the
    benefit of putting man as part of this? So I guess that that
    would be my question for you, Are you all weighing that huge
    cost that it's going to take to put men in, versus the benefit?
        Mr. O'Keefe. Absolutely. No, thank you, Senator. It's a
    very important question, and one that I think really has to be
    wrestled with, not just once or trying to be definitive in one
    circumstance, but every single day we've got to put it through
    the sanity check that we are designing missions and approaches
    that can only be accomplished by human involvement. And if we
    can't, then we really ought to be doing it more robotically.
    And I think that's the approach, the balance you'll see in the
    President's program here.
        Let me just give you a couple of data points, though, of
    what's involved. We've talked a little bit--with Senator Wyden
    a little bit earlier--of a cost-benefit analysis approach----
        Senator Ensign. Can I interrupt you, just real quick?
        Mr. O'Keefe. Yes, sir.
        Senator Ensign. You said that ``only'' could be
    accomplished best by robots, it's only what could be
    accomplished with humans that you would have humans involved
    with.
        Mr. O'Keefe. Indeed, because there's a cognitive capacity
    that we can't build into a robot, hard as we might try. It's
    also some efficiencies that go with this. The cost-benefit
    analysis that, again, Senator Wyden prompted us to think about
    and that we'll have available here in a few weeks, really goes
    through, which is--again, if you look at this Mars mission, on
    just one of them, rover--Spirit or Opportunity, either one--the
    overall scientific package over the 90 to 120 days it's going
    to be really engaged in the scientific pursuit--geological
    robotic capabilities, and so forth--could be accomplished by a
    human being in 1 day. OK? It's just--there's mobility, capacity
    to move around, do things, make judgments at the time.
        We get 2 week's worth of time, probably, on Spirit that
    we're going to spend working out the mechanical challenges of a
    computer glitch, to be just real blunt about it, that occurred
    on Spirit last week. That's the kind of thing that could, I
    don't know, arguably be settled very rapidly with someone there
    looking at it. It really takes a different condition.
        That said, we can't put anybody there. We don't have the
    capacity to put someone on that planet right now. They couldn't
    stand the physiological consequence of taking the trip, much
    less being there. We don't know how to do that yet.
        But there are a whole range of things that we could
    accomplish differently, and could do it more efficiently, and
    could only accomplish with human beings if that were the case.
        Hubble is the perfect example of this. John Grunsfeld,
    sitting right here, is the chief scientist of NASA. He's been
    to Hubble twice. And the only reason why that capability
    continues to operate today is the servicing missions that were
    conducted by human beings. And, indeed, as good an astronomer
    as he is, as good a scientist as he is, as good an astronaut as
    he is, his primary qualification for the task, given the fact
    that all the controls on the Hubble are on the left side, is,
    he's a southpaw. His capacity to be able to use a catcher's
    mitt to make adjustments on this turned out to be one of the
    greatest attributes going. We don't have an autonomous robotic
    capacity to do that.
        And, as a consequence--looking at the risk that we took for
    him and his colleagues to go there in the past, are now
    determined to be higher than we should have ever accepted,
    given what we know from the Columbia Accident Investigation
    Board report and all the recommendations it levied for us to
    fly safely in the future. And, as a consequence, those kinds of
    missions, even though they can only be done by a human to do
    this properly, are the kinds of things we've got to dispense
    with and we're making the choice about because of the risk
    involved. Those are the kind of gut checks we have to make, but
    also compare it to the cases where, when we have the capacity,
    discern very carefully when you can only bring human capacity
    to bear to get the outcome you're looking for.
        Thank you----
        Senator Brownback. Senator Smith?
        Mr. O'Keefe.--Senator. It's a very important set of
    questions, and one we take very seriously, and I appreciate
    your inquiry to it.

                  STATEMENT OF HON. GORDON H. SMITH,
                        U.S. SENATOR FROM OREGON

        Senator Smith. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Mr. O'Keefe, I believe my colleague from Oregon, Senator
    Wyden, may have already touched upon this issue. You should
    know, both of us have been inundated by concerned Oregonians,
    who have wondered if their privacy has been violated, and it
    has to do with the data-mining project that NASA undertook
    after 9/11. I think it's understandable to Americans that all
    government agencies are trying to figure out, ``How can we
    help?'' And yet many are wondering if the airlines they rode
    on--Northwest in particular, JetBlue another--cooperated in a
    way that compromised privacy of individuals. In fact, I
    understand that JetBlue is subject to some class-action
    lawsuit. And I wonder if you have some thoughts about that.
        But I wonder what steps, having undertaken this, NASA can
    give, in terms of assurance that it took steps to protect
    privacy, and I'm wondering what you learned--having protected
    privacy, what then did you learn about protecting national
    security in airline travel? Frankly, I had never realized you
    were in airline travel security, but--this was all new to my
    constituents, but it hit the press and created a firestorm.
        Mr. O'Keefe. Yes, thank you, Senator.
        This was an incident that, again, we are very conscious of,
    the Privacy Act and its implications. And once the data was
    released to NASA by Northwest Airlines, I'm advised that there
    are two things that really mitigated against any real
    proliferation of the information.
        The first one was the security procedures we used. They
    were 18 disks that contained the information over a three-month
    span, and it was vaulted, as in put in a deep, dark safe, when
    it was used. There were a very specific number of folks who
    were working on it--very small number--who were working on the
    analysis. And it leads to the second issue, that--basically
    conquered the reason why we couldn't really contribute much is
    that the data compression that Northwest Airline uses for its
    information--we could only extract, from that 3 months of data,
    2 days worth after a year worth of trying to redesign the
    information just to download it. And it yielded nothing.
        So, as a consequence, just the technique they were using at
    Northwest--and other airlines, I suspect--for how they used the
    information is not easily transferrable to anybody, and it sure
    wasn't to NASA.
        We were asked to get into this because we are engaged in a
    number of airspace management approaches, various, again, high-
    computation kind of analysis efforts that have gone on, and
    there were those who thought there may be some way that we
    could help in this case. Turned out we couldn't. We turned over
    all the data back to Northwest Airlines. It was not distributed
    beyond the very limited number of analysts who were engaged in
    it, and it proved to be something that was way too hard a climb
    because of the nature of the data that was compressed in the
    first place.
        The privacy issues are terribly important, and it's ones
    that we want to remind our folks of constantly. That said, I
    want to be able to assure and encourage our people to think
    about how we apply our technology toward the kind of activities
    that would thwart anybody from wanting to use a commercial
    airline against any of us in the future.
        Senator Smith. Well, I appreciate you speaking of it. I
    know that my constituents are supporters of NASA. So am I. But
    we're concerned about this. And what I take from your answer
    and also from your office's response to my letter----
        Mr. O'Keefe. Yes, sir.
        Senator Smith.--to you about this. I appreciate the
    response that no privacy was violated in a way that resulted in
    damages to citizens. Obviously, that awaits a jury to say
    whether any airline is liable, but, at least from your
    perspective, no damages were inflicted upon individuals by the
    loss of their privacy.
        Mr. O'Keefe. Yes, sir. That's the information I have, and
    it's--that's based on the investigation we conducted to see how
    far this went. That's the findings that our folks have come
    back with, in terms of what the containment of the information
    was in the first place. We're very mindful of that.
        In this post-9/11 world, we're all learning different ways
    that we've got to protect information like this.
        Senator Smith. Well, I appreciate that very much.
        And I also want to second the comments of many of my
    colleagues, who are curious about this, the manned projects to
    the Moon again, and to Mars, wanting to be supportive, also
    needing to balance budgets on Earth, and wanting to know what
    is the value that we can glean from actually undertaking the
    risk and the cost of putting human beings up there. Is there a
    cost-benefit relationship that we can defend to our people? And
    if there is, I think America is an exploring nation and wants
    to know more of what's out there. But those are the questions
    we need to have asked. And I think you're telling us today,
    you're prepared to answer them in the near future.
        Mr. O'Keefe. Yes, sir. Thank you very much, Senator. That's
    exactly it. And the President's budget, I think, will address
    many of those issues, and in the context of his overall
    economic policy, which is well within the context of this.
        Senator Brownback. Thank you.
        And thank you, Administrator. You've been very candid and
    thoughtful with your comments. It's been a delightful hearing,
    you can get a real sense of feel of the people up here.
        I would add, I'm delighted to see the President shooting to
    cut the budget deficit in half in 5 years, and reprioritize,
    because to me that's compassionate conservative ideology.
    There's enough money in the budget; it's just not programmed in
    the right places.
        I think we ought to shoot to balance the budget in seven,
    which is a target we've moved toward in the past, and something
    I think that we ought to engage again, and yet still do things
    like what you're directing to do, and show the people that when
    you get nearly a $2 trillion budget, there are enough funds
    there to do things, it just frequently is not in the right
    places where you want it, and priorities change, and you need
    to shift money around. And that's the tough work of governing,
    that we're going to need to show that we actually can and will
    do things like that, and you don't need to raise taxes, and you
    need to keep the economy robust by keeping taxes low to get
    these things done.
        So we've got our job cut out for us, as well. You've laid
    out a great vision for us, and you've been very candid in your
    thoughts. I do encourage you to meet with Members privately, as
    I know you do, because a lot of people continue to have other
    thoughts and comments.
        Thank you for your presentation today.
        Mr. O'Keefe. Thank you, Senator.
        Thank you very much. And your summary comment, I want to
    associate myself with exactly. That's precisely where the
    President's going, and that's precisely what this program
    incorporates, and it does show those tradeoffs, and stays
    within the fiscal discipline that he's imposed on all of us.
    And so I'm extremely heartened by this direction, and I
    appreciate the reception of the Committee, as well, to hear it
    out.
        Thank you, sir.
        Senator Brownback. Thank you.
        We'll now have a second panel--Dr. Louis Friedman,
    Executive Director of The Planetary Society; the Honorable Neal
    Lane, University Professor, Senior Fellow of the Baker
    Institute at Rice University; Dr. Howard McCurdy--he's
    Professor, Department of Public Administration, American
    University; and Mr. Richard Tumlinson, Founder of Space
    Frontier Foundation.
        If we could have, gentlemen, all of you at the table, we'll
    get going as quickly as you're there.
        Gentlemen, I'm sorry we dragged on a bit, but, as you can
    tell, there's a lot of interest, we had a lot of Member
    participation. And it's a good-news story, instead of the bad-
    news story we've generally had.
        Dr. Friedman, let's start with your testimony.
        We will include each of your full written statements into
    the record as if presented. I would encourage you to summarize,
    as best as possible, on the key points, to make sure that we
    get really what is the heart thrust of what you're after.
        Dr. Friedman?

        STATEMENT OF LOUIS D, FRIEDMAN, EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR, THE
                           PLANETARY SOCIETY

        Dr. Friedman. Thank you, Mr. Chairman and other Members of
    the Committee. It's a pleasure to be back here. I used to work
    on the staff of this Committee, and it's always a pleasure to
    come back.
        Senator Brownback. Welcome.
        Dr. Friedman. Thank you for the opportunity to comment on
    the national space policy directive issued 2 weeks ago by
    President Bush. Both its title, ``Renewed Spirit of
    Discovery,'' and its stated goal to extend human presence
    across the solar system, capture a spirit that we, at The
    Planetary Society, have long advocated. The new policy
    directive states clearly that the human space program will no
    longer flounder without a compelling goal, and will finally set
    its sights on other worlds. Understanding and extending life
    beyond Earth is the only purpose that justifies the cost and
    risk of human spaceflight. Restoring exploration as the raison
    d'etre of the space program is a welcome development to those
    of us motivated by science and exploration.
        The goal and vision are terrific. Setting goals, providing
    a broad vision is the President's job and that of you and your
    colleagues. The challenge in question now is implementation.
    Other space visions have turned out to be counterproductive in
    advancing space exploration, even those with noble aims--the
    shuttle, the Space Station, and the 1989 Moon-Mars initiative,
    for example. A great deal of public, political, and
    international constituency building will be required.
        The welcome first steps in this new policy include retiring
    the shuttle quickly after completing assembly of the
    International Space Station; separating crew and cargo, not
    just in launch vehicles, but for transportation to the
    International Space Station and for launching exploration
    missions beyond low-Earth orbit; building a new crew vehicle
    that would provide crew transportation for missions beyond low-
    Earth orbit; and conducting robotic exploration across the
    solar system for scientific purposes and to support human
    exploration. This is particularly welcome, for the policy is
    not limited to the Moon and Mars; it supports science even to
    understand the history of the solar system. We have previously
    advocated all of these steps.
        Funds for vehicles and human missions beyond Earth orbit
    are not yet allocated. The projected NASA budget may be
    inadequate for dealing with all the technical challenges for
    conducting human missions on the Moon and sending them on to
    Mars. But ways to lessen the cost of human exploration of Mars,
    including from international partnerships, should be learnt
    during this period.
        The Planetary Society urges that a robotic Mars outpost be
    set up for--at a potential human landing site for placing
    robotic infrastructure that can increase reliability and
    safety, and lower costs for human missions. A Mars outpost is
    an appropriate goal for the international robotics Mars
    programs in the next decade.
        Cost is determined by requirements. The technical steps
    cited above, the Mars outpost, they can reduce the costs of
    sending humans to Mars. Conversely, Martian exploration will be
    more expensive if it includes extensive lunar objectives,
    prohibitively so if they include developing permanent lunar
    bases or open-ended exploration for speculative lunar
    resources.
        Much rhetoric, and even some of the official statements
    accompanying the directive, have been confused or misleading on
    this subject. One even called for launching spacecraft from the
    Moon into the Solar System. There's probably no more expensive
    way that could be devised to reach Mars.
        Fortunately, the President's policy itself does not call
    for these things. It says only that we should use lunar
    exploration activities to further science, develop and test new
    approaches, technologies, and systems, and including the use of
    lunar and other space resources--an emphasis--to support
    sustained human exploration to Mars and other destinations.
        The costs for any proposed use of lunar resources should be
    estimated and compared with alternatives. The topic must be
    subject to economic analysis before any commitment to such a
    program is made.
        While the United States and Russia have been to the Moon
    many times, it is a target of international interest. Europe
    has a mission to the Moon right now. Japan, India, and China
    all have missions in development underway. International
    cooperation is supported in the policy directive, and we urge
    that the United States, with other space-faring nations,
    cooperate and coordinate their robotic lunar missions. This
    could pave the way for international human crews and missions
    to the Moon and to Mars that would lower the cost in the long
    run.
        The Planetary Society co-founder, Carl Sagan, wrote,
    ``There's plenty of housework to be done here on Earth, and our
    commitment to it must be steadfast, but we are the kind of
    species that requires a frontier for fundamental biological
    reasons. Every time humanity stretches itself and turns a new
    corner, it receives a jolt of productive vitality that can
    carry it for centuries. There is a new world next door, and we
    know how to get there.''
        Only at Mars will we begin to learn whether humankind is
    limited to a single planet. Only at Mars will humans be able to
    investigate the key questions about life. These are the great
    human purposes for which we send humans to space.
        The lure of Mars was dramatically revealed by the enormous
    public interest and excitement that attended the landings of
    the Mars rovers this past month, and which we saw graphic
    evidence of this morning, the presence of five robot emissaries
    from Planet Earth now exploring that other world. Imagine if
    those robots were us.
        Thank you.
        [The prepared statement of Dr. Friedman follows:]

         Prepared Statement of Louis D. Friedman, Executive Director,
                             The Planetary Society
        Chairman McCain, Senator Hollings, and Members of the Committee:

        Thank you for the opportunity to comment on the National Space
    Policy Directive issued two weeks ago by President Bush. Both its
    title, ``A Renewed Spirit of Discovery,'' and its stated goal to
    ``extend human presence across the solar system,'' capture a spirit
    that we at The Planetary Society have long advocated. The new Policy
    Directive states clearly that the human space program will no longer
    flounder without a compelling goal, and will finally set its sights on
    other worlds. Understanding and extending life beyond Earth is the only
    purpose that justifies the cost and risk of human space flight.
        In the past much has been made of ``manned'' vs. ``unmanned''
    programs--creating a sense of animosity between the human and robotic
    aspects of exploration. This is absurd--exploration requires
    sophisticated robots, no matter where the humans are, and, as humans,
    we are not satisfied with robots being our emissaries forever--
    especially when asking for popular support from a taxpaying public. We
    welcome the Policy Directive's up-front statement that the goal of the
    American space program is to ``Implement a sustained and affordable
    human and robotic program to explore the solar system and beyond''
    (emphasis, mine).
        Restoring exploration as the raison d'etre of the space program is
    a welcome development to those of us motivated by science and
    exploration.
        The goal and vision are terrific. Setting goals and providing a
    broad vision are the President's job, and that of you and your
    colleagues. The challenge and question now is its implementation. Other
    space visions have turned out to be counter-productive to advancing
    space exploration, even with some noble aims: the shuttle, the space
    station, the 1989 ``Moon-Mars Initiative,'' for example. A great deal
    of public, political and international constituency building will be
    required.
        Cost and rationale are key to the constituency building, and these
    have not yet been adequately explained. Unfortunately, the
    Administration space policy study was conducted in secret; now there
    should be a period of public interaction. There is adequate time for
    this--the Administration's proposed first steps in the new policy are
    overdue and needed in any case to save our human space program.
        Those welcome first steps in the implementation include:

       Retire the shuttle quickly after completing assembly of the
            International Space Station--2010 is mentioned as a target
            year. Redirecting the U.S. role in the space station to focus
            ``on supporting the space exploration goal;''

       Separating crew and cargo, not just in launch vehicles but
            for ``transportation to the International Space Station and for
            launching exploration missions beyond low Earth orbit;''

       Building a new crew vehicle that would ``provide crew
            transportation for missions beyond low Earth orbit.'' Previous
            Orbital Space Plane requirements did not mention such missions.

       ``Conduct robotic exploration across the solar system for
            scientific purposes and to support human exploration.'' This is
            particularly welcome--the policy is not limited to the moon and
            Mars, and supports science, even ``to understand the history of
            the solar system.''

        The Planetary Society has previously advocated all of these.
        These are the first steps--the ones that have to be funded and
    carried out in the five-year budget projections that the President will
    submit to Congress in a few days. We believe they are affordable and
    reasonable, and that worthy programs in space science would need not be
    cut to permit their accomplishment.
        The questions and concerns about the Policy Directive are longer-
    term, beyond the five-year period. There are many open technical
    questions: the launch vehicles to be used for human flights to the Moon
    and Mars, the on-orbit assembly and propulsion requirements, the design
    of the interplanetary crew vehicle and dealing with weightless flight
    and the dangers of high radiation levels, setting up Mars
    infrastructure support robotically, and the crew activity planning for
    Mars exploration. The program set out in the Policy Directive allow
    proper time for answering these questions, while at the same time
    accomplishing the first steps to redirect the program.
        Funds for vehicles and human missions beyond Earth orbit are not
    yet allocated. The projected NASA budget may be inadequate for dealing
    with all the technical challenges and conducting human missions on the
    Moon or sending humans to Mars. But, ways to lessen the cost of human
    exploration of Mars, including from international partnerships, should
    also be learnt during this period. The Planetary Society urges that a
    Mars Outpost be set up robotically at a potential human landing site
    for emplacing robotic infrastructure that can increase reliability and
    safety and lower cost for the human mission. A Mars Outpost is an
    appropriate goal for international robotic Mars programs in the next
    decade.
        Cost is determined by requirements. The technical steps cited
    above, and the emplacement of a robotic Mars Outpost, can reduce the
    cost of sending the humans to Mars. Conversely, Martian exploration
    will be more expensive if it includes extensive lunar objectives,
    prohibitively so if they include developing permanent lunar bases or
    open-ended exploration for speculative lunar resources.
        Much rhetoric and even some of the official statements accompanying
    the Directive have been confused or misleading on this subject. One
    even called for launching spacecraft from the Moon into the solar
    system. There is probably no more expensive way that could be devised
    to reach Mars.
        Fortunately, the President's policy itself does not call for these
    things. It says only that we should ``Undertake lunar exploration
    activities to enable sustained human and robotic exploration of Mars
    and more distant destinations in the solar system'' and ``Use lunar
    exploration activities to further science, and to develop and test new
    approaches, technologies, and systems, including use of lunar and other
    space resources, to support sustained human space exploration to Mars
    and other destinations.'' The underlined phrases clearly specify that
    lunar activities should be directed to enable Mars exploration, and not
    be an end in and of themselves.
        Use of lunar resources for supporting exploration beyond the moon
    is proposed in a White House Fact Sheet that accompanied the release of
    the Policy Directive. The costs for any proposed use (e.g., extracting
    oxygen from lunar rocks) must be estimated and compared with
    alternatives (e.g., bringing the oxygen from Earth.) The topic must be
    subject to economic analysis before any commitment to such a program is
    made.
        Twelve Americans have walked on the moon (15 more have flown around
    it) and some 70 robotic spacecraft have been there--we must carefully
    consider what we already have done there before planning new missions.
    The moon, as stated in the Policy Directive, shall only be ``to prepare
    for and support future human exploration activities.'' We cannot afford
    to get bogged down on the Moon as we have in Earth orbit the past three
    decades.
        While the United States and Russia have been to the Moon many
    times, it is a target of international interest. Currently:

       The European Space Agency has a mission, SMART-1, on the way
            to the Moon

       Japan is developing two lunar missions: Lunar A, which may
            launch in the next year, and SELENE, now scheduled for 2006.

       India is developing a mission, Chadrayan-1, for a 2008
            launch

       There are reports from China they will conduct robotic lunar
            orbiter and landing missions in this decade, and perhaps that
            they have a 2020 human landing mission goal.

        International cooperation is supported in the Policy Directive, and
    there is a need to build international partnerships for the grand goal
    of humans to Mars. Working with international partners can help us
    greatly to lower the cost of realizing our objectives at the Moon and
    in achieving the required set of missions faster. The Planetary Society
    urges the United States and other space-faring nations to cooperate and
    coordinate their robotic lunar missions. This could pave the way for an
    international human crewed mission to the Moon and be a solid step in
    building the team for the Martian expeditions.
        Engineers can work out the details of interim technical milestones
    for a human mission to Mars. Various national and international studies
    have considered interim human destinations near Earth and at points
    where Sun and Earth gravity produce dynamical stability, or at
    asteroids, which provide interesting targets in their own right. These
    steps might also be investigated as interim milestones for human flight
    to Mars.
        The Planetary Society cofounder, Carl Sagan wrote, ``There's plenty
    of housework to be done here on Earth and our commitment to it must be
    steadfast. But we're the kind of species that needs a frontier--for
    fundamental biological reasons. Every time humanity stretches itself
    and turns a new corner, it receives a jolt of productive vitality that
    can carry it for centuries. There is a new world next door. And we know
    how to get there.''
        Only at Mars will we begin to learn whether humankind is limited to
    a single planet; only at Mars will humans be able to investigate the
    questions of other life. These are the great human purposes for which
    we send humans to space. The lure of Mars is dramatically revealed by
    the enormous public interest and excitement that attended the landings
    of Mars rovers this past month and the presence of five robot
    emissaries from planet Earth now explorating that alien world. Imagine
    if those robots were us.

        Senator Brownback. Very good, and a very provocative
    statement.
        Dr. Lane?

             STATEMENT OF NEAL LANE, UNIVERSITY PROFESSOR,

             DEPARTMENT OF PHYSICS AND ASTRONOMY, JAMES A.

         BAKER III INSTITUTE FOR PUBLIC POLICY, RICE UNIVERSITY

        Dr. Lane. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. When I was in
    government, it was always a great pleasure to appear before
    this Committee, as it is today. It gives me an opportunity to
    thank you and the Members of the Committee for your strong
    support for science, for research, for education, and for
    space. It's my pleasure now to work with Senator Hutchison, in
    Texas. She's doing a wonderful job to emphasize the importance
    of science, research, and education in Texas.
        I also am very appreciative of the chance to join this
    distinguished panel here to talk about the President's space
    plan. President Bush has outlined a space plan with three
    goals--complete the Space Station, build a new human
    spacecraft, and return Americans to the Moon by the year 2020.
        So it's important to ask, I think, Are these the right
    goals? Is the plan, including the budget, likely to accomplish
    these goals? Well, I believe the Administration has three
    goals. And I would add a fourth, to strengthen NASA's world-
    class science and science education programs, including robotic
    exploration of space. These could provide a bold vision for the
    U.S. space effort.
        Science has been much the heart and soul of NASA. The
    images and knowledge we've obtained from the Hubble Space
    Telescope and many other space-based telescopes have stunned
    astronomers, who are accustomed to spectacular images and
    discoveries.
        NASA's planetary science missions have given us closeup
    images of even far-off planets and their satellites, asteroids,
    comets. And now the Spirit and Opportunity rovers soon will be
    strolling on the surface of Mars, sniffing around, looking for
    water, and making history.
        NASA's programs to study our sun, its magnetic field, the
    solar wind of radiation that comes our way and creates the
    beautiful Aurora over Alaska and our northern states, provides
    important space weather forecasts that help us avoid the
    disruptions of communication that also result from solar
    activity.
        NASA's satellite observations of Earth help us understand
    changes in land use, climate change, and weather prediction,
    and help protect us from natural disasters.
        NASA also supports world-class laboratory research in its
    centers and its universities all across the Nation. This
    includes the unique experiments on the Space Station of the
    effects of zero gravity on human physiology.
        Science must remain one of the highest priorities for the
    agency, in my view; and unless science is one of the principal
    goals of the new space initiative, then science will be
    relegated to the status of always in need of protection, as
    opposed to being enhanced. That would be a mistake.
        So with science included, we have the makings of a bold
    vision, but a vision cannot simply be a dream. In order to be
    credible, it really must be achievable. So let's look at each
    of these goals.
        Should we complete the Space Station? Without question, we
    should complete the Space Station, honoring our commitment to
    our international partners, as well as conducting the
    experiments and gaining experience that will be needed for
    trips out of Earth's orbit.
        Should we build a new human spacecraft? Well, clearly it is
    essential that we modernize our fleet of human spacecraft. The
    space shuttle has been an extraordinary vehicle, but it is
    expensive to operate, and it still uses old technology. An
    important element of President Clinton's 1994 national space
    policy was to upgrade the shuttle, and design and build a new
    vehicle to replace it. The shuttle upgrade should continue, and
    it's time to get on with building a new vehicle.
        Should we return humans to the Moon? Well, I think we
    should go back to the Moon, perhaps even spend some time on the
    Moon. The question is, when and how? When it is of sufficiently
    high priority for the American people to spend the money. And
    how, through expanded international cooperation, not only with
    our traditional partners in space, but with new partners, such
    as China or India, Brazil perhaps, and maybe others.
        Should we enhance the NASA science programs? I've already
    spoke to this. I think without a rich portfolio of scientific
    research in centers and universities, and without robotic
    missions to launch new telescopes to monitor the health of the
    Earth and explore the surfaces of planets and satellites, our
    much more costly human spaceflight missions will be little more
    than precarious adventures.
        Finally, is the budget adequate? Well, I think the
    President has described a bold plan. But he's not yet provided
    the architecture or the means. The 5 percent a year growth the
    President promises in the NASA budget certainly comes as a
    relief to an agency that has had many years of budget
    disappointment and has had to cut back important projects and
    programs. But the plan the President has described likely will
    cost much more than that, I think even in the early years.
    Thus, it is important for the Administration to lay out the
    estimated total costs and provide a roadmap to show the
    American people where we're going and what is it going to cost
    to get there.
        Mr. Chairman, in my written testimony I raise a number of
    specific concerns by way of posing questions about all of these
    issues, but I will not repeat those here today.
        So, in conclusion, I would support a real increase in the
    NASA budget if the science programs, including robotic
    exploration of space, was strengthened and if the White House
    and the Congress--and let me emphasize, if the White House and
    the Congress--will support the necessary reorganization within
    NASA that will be required to begin the development of a plan
    to return humans on the Moon and beyond. It's not easy to
    reorganize an agency, and the Administrator is going to need
    all the help you can possibly give.
        Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        [The prepared statement of Dr. Lane follows:]

     Prepared Statement of Neal Lane, University Professor, Department of
    Physics and Astronomy, James A. Baker III Institute for Public Policy,
                                Rice University
        Mr. Chairman and members of the Committee: Thank you for this
    opportunity to testify on the future of space exploration, especially
    the policy implications of President Bush's proposal, outlined in his
    speech to the Nation on January 14, 2004, to return astronauts to the
    moon and expand human space exploration to Mars.
        My direct involvement with matters of space policy was the time I
    served in the Clinton Administration, in the White House, as Assistant
    to the President for Science and Technology (the President's Science
    Advisor) and Director of the Office of Science and Technology Policy
    (from 1998-2001). Prior to that I was Director of the National Science
    Foundation (from 1993-1998), an agency that focuses both on research
    and on education. I am now at Rice University, where my position is
    University Professor, with appointments in the Department of Physics
    and Astronomy and as Senior Fellow of the James A. Baker III Institute
    for Public Policy, which includes space policy and other science and
    technology policy areas within the scope of its activities. Mr. George
    Abbey, former Director of the Johnson Space Center, is also a Senior
    Fellow of the Institute. The Rice Baker Institute has hosted an
    international summit on space policy and several other space events
    including workshops on space commerce. I also serve on the American
    Academy of Arts and Sciences Committee on International Security
    Studies, which is examining international rules on the use of space and
    implication of possible changes in the U.S. policy toward military uses
    of space.
    The Vision of President John F. Kennedy
        Rice University is where President John F. Kennedy gave his address
    on Sept. 12, 1962, in which he spoke these now famous words:

            ``We choose to go to the moon. We choose to go to the moon in
            this decade and do the other things, not because they are easy,
            but because they are hard, because that goal will serve to
            organize and measure the best of our energies and skills,
            because that challenge is one that we are willing to accept,
            one we are unwilling to postpone, and one which we intend to
            win. . . .''

        The political situation in the world, forty years ago, was very
    different than it is today. The U.S. and USSR were in a face-off and on
    the brink of a nuclear holocaust. Sputnik, launched by the USSR in
    1957, stunned the free world. On May 25, 1961, President Kennedy
    announced to a joint session of Congress that we would take Americans
    to the moon and safely return them to Earth by the end of the decade.
    Indeed, that mission was accomplished in just over eight years, at a
    cost of about $25 billion (1960 dollars), which is approximately $125
    billion of today's dollars. This was an extraordinary accomplishment
    for NASA and the Nation. It launched the U.S. into the leadership
    position it enjoys today. Boys and girls visiting Challenger centers at
    the Houston Museum of Natural Science and other centers around the
    world, are still excited by the stories of the Moon landing and the
    vision of humans going back to the Moon and on to Mars.
        Today, the USSR no longer exists. Russia is our partner in space
    exploration, and the hostile threats to our Nation no longer come from
    a single powerful nation.
        It is ironic that on November 14, 2001, at Rice University, nearly
    four decades after President Kennedy's speech, Russian President Putin
    gave a speech in which he said: ``We have (for) a long time been
    cooperating in (the) space exploration field. And the creation, the
    establishment of the International Space Station is 85 percent percent
    (a) bilateral Russian-American project.''
    The U.S. Human Space Flight Program
        The U.S. human space flight program--from John Glenn's heroic
    Mercury flight in February of 1962 to the Gemini missions and Apollo
    moon landings to the development of the Space Shuttle program and
    construction, with Russia and other international partners, of the
    International Space Station--has been one of America's greatest stories
    of adventure and discovery. Once again this country showed the world
    that the American pioneering spirit and passion for exploration can
    cause people and nations to do extraordinary things. The benefits are
    not only in gaining a better understanding of how humans can live in
    space, but the engineering and technological advances that provide
    totally unanticipated benefits for people, our economy, and the Earth's
    environment.
        Human exploration of space is not without risk to the courageous
    men and women who make the journey. Along with the triumphs of our
    human space program we have suffered great tragedies--Apollo 1,
    Challenger, and more recently, Columbia, where astronauts gave their
    lives for the Nation. We must do everything possible to make sure our
    astronauts and their partners from other nations are as safe as they
    can possibly be in space and that the irreducible risks are made clear
    to them and to the public.
    Scientific Accomplishments
        As exciting as human space flight may be, the U.S. civilian space
    program is very much about scientific exploration and discovery, using
    robotic means. NASA has often carried out unmanned space science
    missions in cooperation with international partners; but it has played
    the leading role in many of the most important ones.
        The robotic studies of our solar system have produced a revolution
    in scientific understanding of our sun, planets, asteroids, comets and
    of the Earth's immediate environment. Spectacular discoveries,
    including photographic images of the moon (Ranger, Surveyor, Lunar
    Orbiter, Clementine); Mars (Mariner, Viking, Mars Observer, Mars Global
    Surveyor, Mars Pathfinder, Mars Exploration Rovers Spirit and
    Opportunity); Venus (Mariner, Pioneer, Magellan); Mercury (Mariner);
    outer planets (Pioneer, Voyager, Galileo, Cassini); asteroids
    (Clementine, NEAR), comets (Stardust). Other missions are giving us new
    knowledge about the Sun (SOHO, Ulysses, HESSI, TRACE), its radiation
    and solar wind (Genesis, GEOTAIL, Polar) and the ``space weather''
    problems it can cause on Earth and the plasma environment nearby
    (Cluster, IMAGE, WIND); and the Earth's upper atmosphere (TIMED).
    Voyager 1 and 2 (now 26 years old) are probing the outer reaches of the
    solar system.
        Joining the successes of these past and ongoing studies of the
    solar system is an extraordinary record of research and discovery in
    astronomy and astrophysics. An array of NASA space-based astronomical
    telescopes (Hubble, Compton, Chandra, ACE, GALEX, HETE-2, IMAGE, RXTE,
    SAMPEX, Spitzer, SWAS, WMAP, XMM Newton), several built and operated in
    cooperation with the European Space Agency and nations around the
    world, complement ground based telescopes (e.g., the Keck telescope and
    Gemini telescopes and others supported by the National Science
    Foundation). NASA, with its partners, has over 20 telescopes under
    development and an even larger number under study. In addition to
    building and operating these space-based observatories, NASA is a major
    supporter, along with the National Science Foundation, of basic
    research in astronomy and astrophysics at major universities all around
    the country.
        Closer to home is NASA's Earth Science Enterprise, which launched
    its flagship Terra in December of 1999, and operates (or has scheduled
    launch dates for) over thirty Earth observation satellites, many in
    cooperation with other agencies and countries, to provide images and
    data on many aspects of the Earth's atmosphere, ocean and land. These
    include observations of: atmospheric temperature, moisture content,
    clouds, precipitation (Aqua), aerosol cloud properties (CALIPSO),
    absorption and re-emission of solar radiation by the Earth (ERBS),
    imaging and sounding data to help weather forecasting (GOES-L and M),
    soil moisture and freeze line (HYDROS), atmospheric carbon dioxide
    (OCO), global ocean currents (TOPEX/Poseidon), and other missions that
    provide information useful in understanding climate change and
    improving weather prediction.
        In addition to the high-profile science research activities in
    Astronomy and Planetary and Earth Science, NASA supports important
    research in the biological and physical sciences, including research
    related to the National Nanotechnology Initiative.
        One area of the life sciences that is particularly important for
    human space flight and that requires humans to live in space is
    studying the long term effects of zero gravity on the human body. We
    will not be able to make journeys to Mars, or even to stay for awhile
    on the moon, until we understand how humans respond and can insure
    their continued health. NASA has formed an excellent partnership to
    implement that research with the National Space Biomedical Research
    Institute (NSBRI) that brings together a number of the Nation's finest
    life science research institutions, under the leadership of the Baylor
    College of Medicine, to further our understanding of the effects of
    space travel on the human body.
        Science is at the heart of NASA and the U.S. effort in space
    exploration and discovery. Any considerations of a change in national
    space policy should insure the continued health of NASA's science
    programs. But, before we talk about changes in space policy, it is
    important to reflect on where we have been.
    U.S. National Space Policy
        President Clinton established a National Space Policy early in his
    Administration that emphasized the construction of the International
    Space Station, the first component of which (Zarya) was placed into
    orbit in November of 1998, followed by the first U.S. component
    (Unity), delivered by the Shuttle, in December of that year. The
    Clinton Administration also worked to provide funding for NASA to make
    an ``end of the decade'' decision on a replacement for the Space
    Shuttle, to continue robotic explorations of Mars, and to support a
    robust program of Astronomy, Space, and Earth Sciences. With regard to
    the Space Station, President Clinton made the decision that Russia
    would become a key partner, so that we could take advantage of their
    enormous experience in space, including the MIR space station, and
    Russia's technical skills. It is a partnership that has had its `ups'
    and `downs', largely because of the economic situation in Russia, but
    today it is clear that we would not have the Space Station had it not
    been for this vital partnership.
    President Bush's Plan to Return to the Moon and Beyond
        President Bush, in his speech of January 14, described a bold plan
    that will take humans back to the moon by 2020, with the expectation
    that humans would then go on to Mars, sometime in the distant future.
    In particular, the President described three goals:

      (1)  ``complete the International Space Station by 2010'';

      (2)  ``develop and test a new spacecraft by 2008 and to conduct the
            first manned mission no later than 2014'';

      (3)  ``return to the moon by 2020, as the launching point for
            missions beyond.''

        The President said that the first part of this program would be
    funded by adding $1 billion to the NASA budget, spread out over five
    years, and reallocating $11 billion from within the NASA budget during
    the same timeframe. These amounts are within the annual 5 percent
    increase the President plans to make to the NASA base budget
    (approximately $15 billion), starting in FY 2005. The President has
    named a new Commission, chaired by former Secretary of the Air Force
    Pete Aldrich, to advise him on implementation of the new vision.
        President Bush has laid out a bold vision for the human space
    program and a rough time frame for making progress. The American people
    need a vision in order to share in the excitement and support the costs
    of the national space effort. NASA also needs a destination, compass
    heading, and time frame for human exploration of space so that it can
    plan and manage effectively as well as log its progress. Such a vision,
    however, has to be achievable to be credible, so it is important to be
    aware of all that is involved in accomplishing the President's goals,
    if those are the right goals for the country.
        There are two overarching questions one might ask: Are these the
    right goals? Is the plan--including the budget--likely to accomplish
    these goals?
        I will briefly comment on the three goals, add a fourth ``science''
    goal that, in my opinion, is at least as important as the others, and
    suggest a number of questions that I hope the Commission,
    Administration, and Congress will consider carefully.
    International Space Station
        The goal to complete the International Space Station is not only
    appropriate but, in my view, absolutely essential. Our commitments to
    international partners must be met if we are to maintain any
    credibility in space cooperation. We are not always viewed as a
    reliable partner in such endeavors and often our political will is
    questionable. While there was criticism by some members of Congress of
    President Clinton's decision to bring in the Russians as a key partner
    in building the Station, clearly it was very important to do so. Not
    only did Russia provide outstanding technical expertise and hardware
    and unprecedented experience with humans in a space environment (on
    space station MIR), Russia was also able to respond quickly to our need
    to bring back those stranded on the Station by the grounding of the
    Shuttle fleet, following the tragic Columbia accident, and to continue
    a rotation of crews so the Station can remain in operation. A second
    reason to complete the Space Station is to continue to gain experience
    with humans in space and to develop new technologies and systems that,
    along with the planned Shuttle upgrades, will be needed in developing a
    new Crew Exploration Vehicle and moving beyond low earth orbit. But,
    the Space Station is not finished and still presents many challenges.
    Our intentions, our commitment and our priorities must be clear.
        Is our commitment to complete the Space Station simply tending to
    unfinished business, or do we still consider the Space Station and the
    scientific experiments we will do there among our highest priorities in
    human space exploration? What is our commitment beyond the construction
    of the Station--are we simply leaving it to our international partners
    to operate, while we move on to more exciting things?
    New Spacecraft--The Crew Exploration Vehicle
        The Space Shuttle has performed far better than its early critics
    predicted. That is because an enormous amount of human attention is
    given to keeping the Shuttles flying and the talent and skills of our
    astronauts. While I was in the White House, I had the privilege of
    visiting Johnson Space Center and observing a Shuttle Commander and
    Pilot going through mind-boggling malfunction scenarios on the Shuttle
    simulator. I came away very conscious of how good these men and women
    are, but also with a better appreciation of the complexity of the
    Shuttle, which still relies on old technology, and the very real risks
    to flying it. The Shuttle technical upgrades, begun in the previous
    Administration, are very important and should be carefully considered
    by NASA and the Commission as various options are examined. These
    upgrades have been planned not only to improve the safety and
    reliability of the Shuttle but also to develop new technologies and
    systems for future spacecraft and missions beyond Earth's orbit. Future
    upgrades could include replacing solid-fuel by liquid-fuel boosters,
    which (flown without the Shuttle) could be important for lunar or Mars
    missions.
        The design of the Crew Exploration Vehicle (CEV) appears to be a
    work in progress, the intended outcome of the ``spiral approach''
    described by the NASA Administrator. Whatever may be the detailed
    design, we will need a heavy-lift capability for humans and cargo.
    Today, the Shuttle is our heavy-lift vehicle and can carry 60,000 lbs,
    currently the largest payload of any of the world's vehicles. It also
    has the capability to return heavy cargo to earth, a unique capability
    that will be greatly needed by the year 2010. Many favor the idea of a
    human spacecraft, e.g., the CEV, being launched on an expendable launch
    vehicle (ELV). We have no such human-rated rocket today. The CEV
    presents many challenges.
        How will NASA insure that safety of the astronauts remains the top
    priority for the human space flight program during a time of
    substantial realignment of programs, reallocation of funds, and
    reorganization of personnel, and properly implement the recommendations
    of the Columbia Accident Investigation Board, chaired by Admiral
    Gehman? Does NASA plan to carry out the planned Shuttle upgrades and,
    if not all of them, which ones and on what schedule? What is NASA's
    future plan for providing heavy-lift (down-mass as well as up-mass)
    capability? What are the arguments in favor of the plan to abandon the
    Shuttle four or more years before a new human spaceflight capability is
    in place and what are the risks? What are the arguments for and
    against, and tradeoffs in capability and cost, of choosing an entirely
    new spacecraft architecture as opposed to an architecture that makes
    use of a modernized Shuttle?
    Return to the Moon--and Beyond
        Should we go back to the moon? My answer is yes! The question is
    when and how? Returning to the moon must be of sufficiently high
    priority for the Nation to justify the expenditure of the large amounts
    of money required, rather than using the funds to meet other vital
    national needs in many areas that impact the quality of life of people
    living on Earth--education, economy, energy, health, environment,
    security. Moreover, the most important ``how'' question is the extent
    to which this will be an international effort involving not only our
    traditional partners in space (countries of Europe, Japan, Canada and
    other nations that are contributing to the International Space
    Station), but also new space partners like China, India and Brazil. The
    window of opportunity to use cooperation in space to avoid conflicts in
    the future may not be open long; and this is an opportunity that must
    not be missed.
        The NASA Administrator, in his comments to the press, emphasized
    that this is ``very much going to be a U.S.--led endeavor . . . to
    achieve this set of American, U.S. exploration objectives.'' But,
    international cooperation, including Russia being placed on the
    critical path, has been vital to the success of the U.S. space effort.
        There are many obstacles to international cooperation, including:
    export controls (which have seriously damaged our commercial satellite
    industry); the effects of the Iran Nonproliferation Act of 2000 on
    U.S.-Russia cooperation; and denied access to foreign students,
    scientists, and engineers, whom we need today in order to advance our
    programs in space and other technical areas. This need will only grow
    in the future. Without question, the U.S. must protect its citizens
    from attack by terrorists or other hostile forces. But, this must be
    done in such a way that does not damage the Nation's technical
    capability.
        There is also reason for other nations to question U.S. policy on
    the future use of space, given statements made by high-level U.S.
    government leaders and in military strategy documents about the need to
    prepare for increased military activities in space. The American
    Academy of Sciences Committee on International Strategic Studies is
    carrying out a study of the technological, commercial, and political
    implications of U.S. policy in space, and of rules and principles for
    protecting a long-term balance of commercial, military, and scientific
    activities in space. I encourage the Administration and Congress to
    invite information on this important study as it may impact your
    decisions on future space policy.
        How will the Administration insure that other nations--Russia, our
    European and Asian partners, perhaps China and India--are seriously
    engaged in the planning and realization of the President's vision,
    indeed that they are able to share that vision? How will the U.S.
    assure the rest of the world that we continue to hold the view that
    space should be used for peaceful purposes?
    Scientific Research and Education
        Mr. Chairman, I would add a fourth goal that I consider to be at
    least as important to our space policy as the President's goals:

            Insure that the United States remains the world's leader in
            scientific and engineering research and in educating young
            people for careers in science, engineering and technology.

        Unless the Nation has a deep understanding of physical and
    biological nature--on and off our planet--we will not be successful in
    exploring space frontiers with robots or humans. Unless we attract more
    young people to science and engineering, and give them a solid
    education, we won't be able to do the science or the exploration.
        Perhaps the greatest challenge for our space program is finding the
    talented people--scientists, engineers and other technical
    professionals--who will be needed to accomplish a bold space agenda for
    the Nation. Careers in science and engineering are not as attractive to
    young people as they once were; and we are having a harder time
    attracting and retaining talented individuals from abroad. Universities
    where scientific and engineering research is strong are particularly
    important in addressing this technical workforce issue. I believe
    history has shown that the continued Federal investment in university
    research and graduate education is money well spent.
        NASA emphasizes that the Administration's new program is primarily
    not about science, but about human exploration. But, science has been
    one of the most important successes of the U.S. space program. New
    scientific knowledge as well as revolutionary technologies have been
    the tangible products of the Nation's investments in space and are key
    to NASA's accomplishment and well-deserved reputation for excellence
    throughout the world. It is vital to NASA's future that the science not
    be given lower priority in the new program. There are many important
    scientific facilities and robotic missions already planned and others
    not yet conceived. These unmanned missions are by far the most cost
    effective way to do science. My concern is that money needed for human
    space exploration will erode the science budgets, especially given the
    need for substantial reallocations of money within the NASA budget. The
    words science and exploration are easily confused in most people's
    minds. The rationales for the Shuttle and the International Space
    Station were never primarily about science, but I don't believe that
    message ever got through to the public.
        There are examples where human exploration of space and science go
    hand-in-hand. Study of the effects of zero gravity on human physiology
    is one obvious example. Also, humans in space can be called upon to do
    things that otherwise would be very difficult, e.g., the successful
    repair and upgrade missions to the Hubble Space Telescope. It is
    disappointing that a decision has been made to terminate the enormously
    successful Hubble Space Telescope, and a planned servicing mission has
    been cancelled. I believe this decision ought to be reconsidered.
        I would ask the following questions:

            How will NASA and the Administration insure that the
            exploration goals of the moon-moon proposal do not cut into the
            science goals for NASA programs and those of other agencies? If
            NASA science missions are to be directed toward the goals of
            the moon-Mars proposal, does that mean that missions given
            higher priority by the science community will have lower
            priority by NASA? How was the Hubble cancellation decision
            arrived at and what was the rationale for that decision? How
            will NASA help the public to better understand the differences
            and connections between human space exploration and science and
            the rationales and best approaches for doing both? How will
            NASA strengthen its partnership with universities to support
            academic research and help recruit more scientists and
            engineers?
    The Budget
        Turning now to the second of the two overarching questions I posed
    earlier: Is the plan--including the budget--likely to accomplish these
    goals?
        The President has proposed 5 percent increases each year for the
    next five years. Given the size of the current and future projected
    deficits, proposing a modest growth budget is understandable. Indeed,
    following many years of disappointing budgets, 5 percent is good news
    for NASA. But, I believe the expectations raised by the President in
    his speech, far exceed the proposed budget for this ambitious program,
    even for the early stages of the plan. What the President has proposed
    implies a major reorganization, even change in culture, of NASA and its
    centers.
        The history of our space program has shown that coordination of
    activities across NASA centers and with industry remains very
    challenging. Significant reallocation of resources is met with strong
    resistance, often with the help of friends in Congress. Reorganization
    of NASA is probably long overdue. Furthermore, the NASA budget,
    especially the science budget, is severely earmarked in ways that
    usually do not address the agency's top priorities and certainly limit
    the management flexibility of the Administrator. It will be impossible
    for the NASA Administrator and his NASA colleagues to make the
    necessary changes unless the White House and Congress support them
    fully.
        But, even with the best intentions and dedicated hard work of the
    Administrator and his talented NASA team, these budgets will appear to
    most of America, including the U.S. space industry, and to the world as
    `business as usual'. Unless the U.S. space plan is realistic, unless
    the Administration matches its rhetoric with estimated overall costs
    and an adequate budget, a false promise could do harm to our space
    efforts, dash the expectations of girls and boys who decide to become
    scientists and engineers in order to be a part of an exciting future in
    space, and seriously damage our credibility as the world's leader in
    space exploration and science.
        I strongly urge the Administration and Congress to work together to
    look at several out-year budget scenarios and compare the objectives
    and milestones--for human exploration and for science--under each. It
    may well be that the Nation has the capacity, given sufficient funding,
    to make progress at a much faster pace than the plan has proposed,
    especially with serious international engagement and cooperation and
    making use of decades of NASA's experience, R&D, and promising new
    technologies and systems ready to be employed. It may be that the risks
    of terminating the Shuttle program before having an alternative means
    to put humans in space are too great to justify this step. There are
    likely to be scientific opportunities on the horizon that are so
    compelling that they will warrant additional funding. Thus, developing
    accurate cost estimates and corresponding objectives and milestones for
    various phases of the initiative along with a transparent set of agency
    priorities is essential. There are several questions one might ask:

            What are the estimated total costs of completing the
            construction of the Space Station and annual operating costs
            beyond that; the development, testing and commissioning of the
            new Crew Exploration Vehicle; robotic missions in preparation
            for a return to the moon; and the first human return to the
            moon and back? How will the $11 billion be reallocated within
            NASA's budget? What changes will be made to the rest of NASA's
            programs, especially the science programs, and with what levels
            of funding? What are the estimated costs of funding Russian or
            other non-U.S. flights to the Space Station after the Shuttle
            is phased out?
    Conclusion
        Mr. Chairman, I believe that the three goals outlined in the
    current Administration's space plan are ambitious and worthy of serious
    consideration. And, as I have indicated, I would add a very important
    fourth goal: to strengthen NASA's science program. However, the
    architecture of the President's plan and overall cost have not been
    provided; and the five-year budget proposed to begin to accomplish
    these goals, in my opinion, is unrealistic. Hence, the Administration's
    commitment rings hollow, inviting cynical criticism of the seriousness
    of the plan from our international space partners and from the American
    public as well. It is disappointing that two weeks after the
    President's speech on space, none of the words ``space'',
    ``exploration'', or ``science'' appeared in the President's state of
    the union message.
        The nation needs to be clear about why we have humans in space. We
    need a renewed vision and serious plan for space, especially as our
    Shuttle fleet continues to age and as we complete the International
    Space Station. But, that vision must be more than a dream. The
    President has provided a part of a vision; but he has not provided the
    architecture or the means.
        I would support real increases in the NASA budget, perhaps even
    larger than 5 percent per year. But along with that growth, NASA must
    be held accountable for the major reorganization that will be required
    and protection of its scientific programs, that are so important to the
    future of the Nation. And the White House and the Congress will need to
    support the efforts of the NASA Administrator to do those things.
        Therefore, Mr. Chairman, I commend this Committee for holding these
    hearings, listening to a wide range of views, and working with NASA,
    the Administration and other in Congress to insure that we do not miss
    this window of opportunity to move the Nation into a bold new direction
    for space science and human exploration of space.
        Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

        Senator Brownback. Thank you, Dr. Lane.
        Dr. McCurdy, welcome.

        STATEMENT OF DR. HOWARD E. McCURDY, PROFESSOR OF PUBLIC
                      AFFAIRS, AMERICAN UNIVERSITY

        Dr. McCurdy. Mr. Chairman, thank you for the opportunity to
    come before the Committee and share my insights into NASA, as
    an institution.
        If this initiative is taken seriously, it will have a
    transforming effect on NASA, as an institution. To put that in
    context, think of the situation that existed in May 1961, when
    President John F. Kennedy set out the goal of landing humans on
    the Moon, returning them safely to Earth, and doing that by the
    end of the decade. At that time, there wasn't anybody in NASA
    who knew how to do it. NASA lacked the capacity to manage large
    projects. They didn't have the necessary technology. They
    didn't have the infrastructure. They didn't have the personnel.
    And yet, 8 years later, Americans returned safely from the
    Moon. In a similar sense, this event challenges NASA in deep
    and profound ways.
        Can it be done? Well, in theory, yes. Think of the Apollo
    objective in this way. The Apollo objective had not just one
    objective, but two. The first was to accomplish the technical
    objective of taking humans to the Moon and returning them
    safely. But the Administration and the Congress also imposed a
    second requirement, that it be done within 8 years, a severe
    schedule constraint that led to all sorts of technological
    advances and decisions within the space program.
        Now, in a similar way, this objective asks NASA to do two
    things. It asks NASA to send humans and robots to the Moon and
    Mars, not on a schedule this time, but within severe cost
    constraints; in essence, to do it for about what the agency
    receives today in its annual budget. In the 1960s, NASA was
    able to accomplish the twin goals of reliability and schedule.
    And now it's being asked to accomplish the twin goals of
    reliability and cost.
        Is NASA, as presently constituted, capable of doing this?
    In my opinion, it is not; at least not on the human spaceflight
    side. This will be a transformational event for NASA if it
    carries it out. NASA has suffered terribly over the past 30
    years from the drift that's been imposed on the human
    spaceflight program. And you can also learn, by examining the
    work of the Columbia Accident Investigation Board, that there
    are difficulties within NASA's human spaceflight culture. It's
    not the same agency that existed in the 1960s. So these are
    things that will have to change in order for NASA to be able to
    do it.
        Do the seeds of this reform exist within NASA? Well, I
    think they do, historically, but there's no guarantee that
    they're likely to grow and flower, in two areas in particular.
    First, there is still the memory of the Apollo years and the
    techniques that were used at that time. And, second, great
    advances have been made in the robotics programs over the last
    30 years. We're not just going to learn, from the robotics
    program, how to fly machines; but we're going to learn, from
    the robotics program, how to manage programs that are low cost.
        Consider this. The current Spirit/Opportunity Mission Mars
    is costing one-fifth of what we spent to send two Viking
    landers to the surface of the planet in 1976. Great advances in
    technology have been made, but also great advances in
    organization.
        So I would suggest to the Congress, if you're asking the
    question, ``What can you do to help NASA make this
    transformation,'' that as much as possible, you learn from that
    experience and impose it on NASA. I'll give you a couple ideas,
    and there's more in my written testimony.
        One, make cost a goal. Make it a goal in the same sense
    that President Kennedy made schedule a goal in the 1960s. We
    know, from the robotics program, that when NASA has such goals,
    it can hold to them and accomplish them. That's been proven
    with Spirit, with Opportunity, with Pathfinder, near-Earth
    asteroid rendevous, and other areas, as well.
        Second, restore NASA's in-house technical capability. This
    may mean much more extensive in-house construction of
    spacecraft. Frankly, good scientists and engineers don't stay
    sharp by monitoring government contracts; they stay sharp by
    working on the hardware itself.
        I'd also suggest that you look to the robotics programs,
    and also to areas in private industry where industrialists and
    government employees have developed very small teams that are
    able to complete complex projects under severe cost
    constraints. It's not necessary to recreate Project Apollo.
    Project Apollo worked because NASA imported, from the U.S. Air
    Force, techniques known as systems management. In the same way,
    if it's going to make these new initiatives work, they will
    need to import, from industry and from their own robotics and
    space science areas, low-cost techniques that have been
    developing over the past 10 to 20 years. There is an experience
    base there.
        So can NASA do it with its present organization and
    institution? I think not. But does history give us confidence
    that it could transform itself in such a way that this would be
    possible? And I think that's true. If, 20 or 30 years from now,
    humans stand on Mars, and robots with them, NASA will no more
    resemble the institution that exists today than the NASA of
    1969 resembled the NASA of 1961.
        Thank you.
        [The prepared statement of Dr. McCurdy follows:]

       Prepared Statement of Dr. Howard E. McCurdy, Professor of Public
                          Affairs, American University
        I am not here to give my personal views on the desirability of
    undertaking the space flight initiatives set out in the president's
    speech on January 14, 2004, refocusing the purpose of the Nation's
    human space flight activities. Rather, I will comment on whether the
    National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) as presently
    constituted is capable of carrying out that initiative.
        In my judgment, based on eighteen years of studying NASA's
    organizational practices, it is not. The practices associated with
    human flight over the past decades have left NASA ill-prepared to
    undertake a focused exploration program, especially one that addressess
    the cost constraints imposed by the president's directive. Yet this
    need not cause despair. NASA employees have overcome similar
    difficulties in the past and Congress can encourage them to do so again
    in the future.
        In essence, my message is one of cautious optimism. Accomplishment
    of the mission is not possible with the NASA that exists today, but the
    fact that the agency has transformed itself in the past encourages us
    to believe that transformation can occur again.
    Why NASA is Not Prepared
        For thirty-four years, a succession of leaders in the field of
    space exploration have called upon public officials to give NASA
    purpose and direction. As a science and engineering organization,
    relying upon project management techniques, NASA works best when the
    people implementing national space policy have a clear vision of their
    ultimate objective, the time available to accomplish those objectives,
    and the various constraints such as cost under which they must operate.
        From 1961 through the landings on the Moon, the human space flight
    program operated under such mandates. The purpose and timetable
    established in President John F. Kennedy's May 25, 1961, speech
    provided focus for America's civil space effort and imposed discipline
    on the new space agency.
        As Americans prepared for the lunar landings, NASA officials and
    other government leaders proposed to extend Kennedy's vision. Much like
    the current initiative, they called for a post-Apollo space effort
    focused on the moon and Mars, bolstered by an energetic space science
    program. The report of the Space Task Group was presented in September,
    1969, followed in later years by a succession of reports calling for
    much the same thing. In March, 1970, President Richard Nixon rejected
    the report of the Space Task Group, thereby initiating three decades of
    drift in which leaders of NASA's human space flight program were
    obliged to operate without long-term focus and direction.
        In response, leaders of the space community adopted an incremental
    approach to human flight. They pursued elements of their long-range
    vision in succession, one at a time, without reference to an
    overarching goal. First they sought to complete a reusable space
    shuttle, originally conceived as a means of transferring people to and
    from an Earth-orbiting space station. Then they started work on the
    space station. As the date for declaring the space station ``core
    complete'' approached, NASA officials requested permission to pursue
    the next logical step in their long-remembered but never-approved long
    range plan.
        Thirty years of incremental drift have had a dysfunctional effect
    on NASA's human space flight effort. Without a long-term goal to
    provide purpose for new human flight initiatives, NASA officials and
    their supporters have been obliged to create broad political coalitions
    as a means for getting new initiatives approved. The programs emerging
    from these coalitions have contained so many objectives that NASA
    officials have accomplished few of their specific goals.
        The NASA space shuttle, for example, was designed among its many
    objectives to carry people to and from an Earth orbiting space station,
    transport the components of that station to space, serve as a ``space
    truck'' for commercial payloads (some carrying upper stage rockets
    attached to payloads headed for geosynchronous orbit), deliver military
    reconnaissance satellites, deliver and repair (and possibly return)
    space telescopes, and serve as a short-duration micro-gravity research
    laboratory. The shuttle fleet had to be reusable, capable of launch up
    to 50 times per year, and cut the cost of launch operations to about
    $10 million per mission.
        As members of the Columbia accident investigation board observed,
    the existence of so many conflicting objectives severely compromised
    NASA's ability to build a safe and reliable vehicle. ``The increased
    complexity of a Shuttle designed to be all things to all people,''
    board members wrote, ``created inherently greater risks than if more
    realistic technical goals had been set at the start.'' The most serious
    mistake that NASA officials made in developing the vehicle dealt not
    with the design of any particular component, ``but rather with the
    premise of the vehicle itself.'' (CAIB report, p. 23)
        NASA officials undertook a similar approach to the design of the
    International Space Station. They appealed to astronomers, people
    interested in space science, advocates of a return to the Moon,
    commercial interests hoping to manufacture micro-gravity products,
    communication satellite companies, international partners, and the U.S.
    military. Early space station designs included hangers for satellite
    repair, micro-gravity research laboratories, mounts for observational
    instruments, pallets for scientific instruments, and two large keels
    within which large spacecraft bound for deep space missions could be
    prepared. Further confounding these objectives, NASA officials
    estimated that they could develop such a multi-functional facility for
    only $8.8 billion.
        Space station advocates learned that the political coalitions
    necessary to win approval for such initiatives were much easier to
    construct than the actual facilities. While attractive for building
    political support, the various station functions proved technically
    incompatible and impossible to develop within the proposed cost. As a
    consequence, NASA officials spent the entire ten years set for
    construction of the station (1984-1994), as well as the $8.8 billion
    cost estimate, redesigning the facility and reducing its scope.
        For thirty-four years, officials in the human space flight
    community have urged political leaders to adopt long-range space goals.
    Yet NASA officials during this period grew accustomed to the practices
    necessary to operate in an objective-free atmosphere. The effect of
    this cultural shift was readily apparent in the agency's response to
    President George H. W. Bush's 1989 proposal for a human Space
    Exploration Initiative focused on the Moon and Mars. Following the
    proposal, White House officials directed NASA to prepare an enabling
    plan. The study that agency leaders produced disappointment. To people
    outside NASA, the study seemed more like an exercise designed to
    protect existing agency programs and restore the health of ailing field
    centers than an opportunity to renew the long-term vision of space.
        NASA officials treated the Space Exploration Initiative as a
    healing balm, an ointment applied to the institutional members as a
    means to get well again. If NASA officials take a similar approach to
    the current Mars initiative, with its severe cost constraints, it will
    produce a similar result. The initiative will certainly die.
        During the period of institutional drift, NASA underwent additional
    changes that similarly compromised its capability to carry out complex
    human space flight activities in a reliable way. These alterations are
    well documented in the reports of the presidential commission that
    investigated the space shuttle Challenger accident and the Columbia
    Accident Investigation Board. Briefly stated, the reports concluded
    that NASA's organizational culture had changed in detrimental ways. The
    agency had gone from an institution capable of meeting its goals to one
    in which human space flight officials struggled to achieve reliability,
    cost and schedule objectives which the agency operated.
        Cultures consist of the assumptions that people make as they go
    about their work. As a illustration of how much the NASA human space
    flight culture has changed, consider the follow point. NASA officials
    and their contractors in the early decades of space flight operated
    under the assumption that the agency would not launch a spacecraft
    until its designers could prove that they were ready to fly. In both
    the Challenger and Columbia accidents, NASA officials required
    concerned individuals to prove that spacecraft were not ready to fly
    (or land) in spite of visible safety concerns.
        Organizational practices such as these take root over many decades.
    Similarly, reforms require many years to become imbedded in the minds
    and habits of agency employees. Organization cultures take a long time
    to change. They deteriorate slowly and they revive themselves only
    after lengthy adjustment periods.
    Hope From History
        Confrontations with reality need not be a source of despair. In
    fact, the first step toward institutional recovery consists of
    acknowledging the situation as it exists. NASA's human space flight
    effort has existed without focus and discipline for more than thirty
    years, leaving a legacy that will be difficult to change. Yet this is
    not impossible. It has happened before and it can happen again.
        In the Spring of 1961, when President Kennedy challenged Americans
    to race to the Moon, NASA was totally unprepared to carry out the
    mandate. Congress had created NASA three years earlier by melding the
    research laboratories within the National Advisory Committee for
    Aeronautics (NACA) with agencies like the Jet Propulsion Laboratory and
    the Army Ballistic Missile Agency (ABMA). People from component
    agencies had great technical skill, but absolutely no experience
    managing activities on the scale of Project Apollo. They were
    accustomed to managing small research projects, not large-scale
    operations. The institutional habits of people who had inhabited the
    forty-three year old NACA were well set, as were the practices of
    employees working within the ABMA under Wernher von Braun's rocket
    team.
        NASA officials at that time did not understand how to manage large
    programs. They did not have enough people; they did not have enough
    money. Existing field centers were independent and uncooperative. The
    United States lacked the technology to fly to the Moon. No American
    astronaut had ever flown in orbit, much less engaged in rendezvous and
    docking. No one knew how to get to the Moon and back. Leading
    strategies such as Earth Orbit Rendezvous and Direct Ascent were either
    technically infeasible or impossible to complete by the decade's end.
    When he made the suggestion that the agency concentrate all of its
    resources on accomplishing the lunar goal, NASA's head of human space
    flight was fired for what was then viewed as intemperate remarks.
        Yet eight years Americans returned safely from the Moon. During
    those eight years, NASA reorganized itself twice, forcing the leaders
    of previously independent field centers to submit to a central
    coordinating office in Washington, D.C. To oversee Project Apollo, NASA
    officials imported management experts from the Air Force ballistic
    missile program, the primary repository of people who understood large-
    scale systems management. NASA employees and their contractors
    perfected new technologies, such as hydrogen-fueled rockets and orbital
    rendezvous. They revised organizational procedures after the loss of
    three astronauts in a space capsule fire during a launch center ground
    test, a critical exercise in institutional learning. Like the current
    Administrator, the person who oversaw NASA during this period was an
    expert in management and finance. Neither an astronaut nor an engineer,
    James Webb was a budget director and President of the American Society
    for Public Administration.
        President Kennedy's May, 1961, speech was a transforming event. It
    transformed NASA from an agency of technical experts into an
    institution capable of implementing extraordinarily complex space
    flight activities. The lessons learned through human space flight
    quickly spilled over onto the space science side, where individuals
    carried out the great planetary and space telescope missions of the
    decades that followed.
        Recently, NASA has transformed its space science activities. Space
    scientists have not suffered through the same drift that afflicts human
    space flight activities. Space science missions have been focused;
    objectives more apparent. Technology advances in areas such as imaging
    and automation have occurred. New management techniques have been
    perfected, some significantly different than the large-scale systems
    management practices that propelled the success (and the cost) of
    Project Apollo.
        Consider this fact as an illustration of the transformations
    occurring in space science. Stated in the inflation adjusted value of
    today's dollars, the 1976 Viking mission to Mars cost $4 billion. For
    that sum, NASA successfully placed two landers on the surface of Mars.
    The Mars Exploration Rovers that arrived this January, 2004, are
    carrying out their missions for $820 million. Even acknowledging that
    funds for Project Viking also purchased two orbiters (total cost in
    today's dollars about $800 million), the difference is dramatic. NASA
    space scientists have learned how to fly for a fraction of the cost of
    previous endeavors, using technologies that have advanced enormously.
        In searching for the means to mobilize an aggressive exploration
    program on Mars, NASA officials can turn to themselves for the
    necessary experience. The lessons exist within the agency, both today
    and historically. The Apollo flights to the Moon cost $25 billion in
    the currency of the time. That translates into a total cost of
    approximately $175 billion today. During the 1960s, NASA officials were
    told to achieve reliable space flight in a crash program with an
    impossibly tight schedule. For the current initiative, government
    leaders propose to loosen the schedule and the milestones associated
    with it, but to operate under severe cost constraints. In practical
    terms, NASA officials are being asked to fly reliably to the Moon and
    beyond for a fraction of the cost of Project Apollo.
        On its face, the task may seem impossible. Nonetheless, NASA
    officials have encountered similar challenges in the past and
    prevailed. They overcame analogous difficulties in the 1960s and they
    have achieved low-cost innovations in their robotics and space science
    programs.
    Lessons for the Future
        Although NASA employees are allowed a great deal of technical
    discretion in carrying out space flight programs, they do not operate
    in a vacuum. They respond to the nature of national space policy and
    the guidance they receive from Congress and the White House. The
    transformation of NASA's human space flight activities will require a
    number of important changes, ones that can be encouraged by congress
    and the executive. In general, transformation will require NASA to
    become more like the agency that sent Americans to the Moon and robots
    to Mars and less like the agency that fumbled the development of the
    space shuttle, International Space Station, and Space Exploration
    Initiative. It will require the installation of cost discipline, the
    resurrection of a culture of reliability, the restoration of discipline
    and focus, and the merging of robotic and human capabilities. These
    will be major changes, wide in scope and particular in detail.
        To encourage the transformation of NASA, members of Congress might
    consider the following practices.

      1.  Be very clear about goals. Mission ambiguity and wiggleroom are
            the enemies of discipline and focus within NASA. For example,
            the mission as contained in the presidential directive does not
            seem to include a lunar base as an intermediate step to Mars.
            The moon is to be used only insofar as it contributes to the
            exploration of Mars, as a test bed or proving ground for deep
            space technologies. Additionally, the purpose of the program is
            not to land humans on Mars. Rather, the purpose as expressed
            thus far is the exploration of Mars using humans and robots.
            Experience tells us that the optimal mix of robotic and human
            flight technology is likely to change significantly as the
            mission evolves, discouraging a definition that presupposes a
            specific role for humans in advance.

      2.  Make cost constraint a mission goal. During Project Apollo,
            meeting the ``end of the decade'' deadline imposed an objective
            as important to the definition of mission success as landing
            astronauts on the Moon and bringing them safely home. The
            deadline repeatedly served to focus attention on necessary
            tasks; it strongly influenced technical decisions such as the
            one to engage in ``all up'' testing of the Saturn V. In NASA's
            robotic and satellite programs, cost constraint has risen as a
            mission goal to a place commensurate with science objectives.
            NASA employees have repeatedly demonstrated that they can
            achieve multiple objectives--reliability plus cost or schedule
            goals--so long as those objectives are clearly stated.

      3.  Restore in-house technically capability to the human space flight
            program. NASA's secret weapon for completing Project Apollo
            arose from a combination of strong in-house technical
            capability with systems management techniques imported from
            outside. Many people agree that NASA has lost too much of its
            in-house technical capability, especially for human space
            flight. Agency employees who spend most of their time
            monitoring contracts cannot maintain the technical edge
            necessary to explore Mars. To produce outstanding results, they
            need to work with flight hardware. This has been demonstrated
            repeatedly in both the human and robotic flight programs, most
            recently within the Mars exploration effort. Successful
            missions, such as Pathfinder, have been led by persons with
            extensive ``hands on'' knowledge of spacecraft components.
            Experience suggests that 30 percent of the work (and money)
            associated with the program should be retained in-house.

      4.  Insist that NASA keep the program as simple as possible. When
            complexity rises, so do overall costs--often exponentially.
            Complexity can arise from demands for international cooperation
            or the desire to spread work among many field centers. These
            demands are often irrelevant to mission objectives. Complexity
            can also result from the extensive use of formal systems
            management techniques. While these techniques are useful for
            promoting reliability, they are being supplanted in government
            and industry by leaner project teams whose members utilize less
            complicated forms of management. These management reforms, used
            on Project Pathfinder, the Near Earth Asteroid Rendezvous
            mission, and the Mars Exploration Rovers, allow project leaders
            to meet technically challenging mission goals while severely
            restraining mission cost.

      5.  Reward NASA officials when they make tough decisions. The
            restoration of focus and discipline will require difficult
            choices affecting existing installations and future programs.
            The recent history of human space flight suggests that agency
            officials may be reluctant to undertake needed change.
            Obstacles to change, moreover, may be more difficult to
            surmount than ones encountered in the past. The people managing
            Project Apollo built an organization from the ground up,
            expanding NASA's budget five-fold and its internal workforce by
            a factor of three. Proprietors of the current mission must work
            with an agency that will not be allowed to grow. If they sense
            that they are being punished for hard decisions, they may be
            reluctant to undertake needed change.

        When planning for Project Apollo got underway in 1961, many of the
    participants had strong views about the mission. Some wanted to build
    orbiting space stations, and suggested that the expedition leave from a
    rendezvous point in low-Earth orbit. Others wanted to build enormous
    rockets, and recommended a strategy called direct ascent. Different
    centers wanted to be involved in different ways. An engineer from
    NASA's Langley Research Center tried to explain that America could not
    reach the moon by the end of the decade unless it utilized a spacecraft
    that remained in lunar orbit while two astronauts piloted another
    vehicle to the surface of the moon.
        At first, the idea seemed preposterous. The United States had not
    conducted a successful rendezvous in Earth orbit, much less one around
    the Moon. More significantly, the idea upset the plans of people with
    different agendas. The engineer persisted. ``Do we want to get to the
    Moon or not,'' he asked. The question silenced critics. The discipline
    of the mission forced people to forgo vested interests and work toward
    their common goal.
        In a similar fashion, vested interests must fall if people in the
    space community seriously pursue this new goal. If they do, this new
    objective will be a transforming event, just as other great objectives
    were before it. If and when the United States completes the missions
    set out this year, the agency that does the work will bear little
    resemblance to the agency that exists today--just as the institution
    that landed humans on the Moon in 1969 hardly resembled the agency that
    received President John F. Kennedy's famous challenge in May, 1961.
        Dr. Howard McCurdy is professor of public affairs and chair of the
    public administration department at American University in Washington,
    D.C. An expert on space policy, he recently authored Faster, Better,
    Cheaper, a critical analysis of cost-cutting initiatives in the U.S.
    space program. An earlier study of NASA's organizational culture,
    Inside NASA, won the 1994 Henry Adams prize for that year's best
    history on the Federal Government. He has also written Space and the
    American Imagination and co-edited Spaceflight and the Myth of
    Presidential Leadership. His work appears in scholarly journals such as
    Public Administration Review and Space Policy. He is often consulted by
    the media on public policy issues and has appeared on national news
    outlets such as the Jim Lehrer News Hour, National Public Radio, and
    NBC Nightly News. Professor McCurdy received his bachelor's and
    master's degree from the University of Washington and his doctorate
    from Cornell University.

        Senator Brownback. I hope it's not 20 or 30 years before we
    have people standing on Mars, that it's much sooner than that.
        Thank you very much, Dr. McCurdy, for your testimony.
        Mr. Tumlinson? Welcome back.

               STATEMENT OF RICK N. TUMLINSON, FOUNDER,
                       SPACE FRONTIER FOUNDATION

        Mr. Tumlinson. Thank you. Senator Brownback, Senator
    Hutchison, underappreciated staffers----
        [Laughter.]
        Mr. Tumlinson.--I am really thrilled to be back here.
        [Laughter.]
        Mr. Tumlinson. A few months ago, I sat in this room. I made
    one prediction, that sometime this year an American would fly
    in space, they wouldn't be a government employee, and they
    wouldn't do it on a government vehicle. I'm happy to say that
    the same day that America was looking backward at the Wright
    Brothers' demonstration, famed aircraft designer, Bert Rutan,
    broke the sound barrier with his prototype rocket vehicle. That
    prediction is on track, and I stick by it, at this point.
        At the same time, I continued a call that we had been
    making for many years in the Space Frontier movement, that we
    return to the Moon, that we scuttle the Shuttle, that we move
    away from the Space Station, and that we set our sights on
    Mars, with the goals of permanent human settlement.
        For many years, by the way, the Space Frontier Foundation
    has been holding Return to the Moon conferences. Our fifth will
    be this summer. I wish the Senator from Nevada were here,
    because it's going to be in beautiful downtown Las Vegas,
    which, by the way, is a city that couldn't have been created by
    robots.
        I want to agree with the last speaker, that, as currently
    constituted--by the way, I should say, strangely I was invited
    to the President's remarks. I sat about 20 feet away from him
    while he made the announcement, and I looked in my fellow
    Texan's eyes, and I studied him for the entire speech. I
    believe that he believes what he was saying. I believe that he
    was sincere about it. What I have difficulty with is how we
    will realize it. And I agree with the last speaker, that NASA,
    as currently constituted, cannot pull this off.
        Forget the Moon, forget Mars, forget the space frontier out
    there. The greatest frontier facing NASA right now is itself.
    NASA is caught in a self-perpetuating loop of cultural
    traditions, inefficiencies, and systems that maximize waste and
    cost.
        I want to give you an example. This is a carabiner. It's a
    little device that mountain climbers use around the world every
    day. They hang from them, they trust their lives to them.
    Astronauts also use these same devices to tether themselves to
    the Space Station. Now, you can go to REI or sporting goods
    shops and buy this device for about $20. NASA, on the other
    hand, pays roughly somewhere over a thousand dollars for this
    same object right now.
        Now, why is that? It's not a case of some company ripping
    off NASA; it is a system of cost-plus rewards; it is a system
    of paperwork, rather than products; it is a not-invented-here
    mentality and a distrust of the private sector to provide such
    goods. The person who sells this to NASA has to create a stack
    of paper that takes weeks and weeks to fill out, that goes all
    the way back to the smelting and the origin of the metals that
    are put in this.
        Now, the maximum load that is probably put on this device
    in space is around 50 pounds possibly, maximum a couple of
    hundred pounds. The REI version of this is rated at 6,500
    pounds. This is the kind of thinking that has to change, or we
    will not be able to return to the Moon and go on to Mars for
    the budget or timescale that we're talking about.
        We have to also move away from this distrust of the private
    sector that is out there, the mounds of paperwork that are
    required, the sorts of flaming hoops that the private sector is
    required to jump through, and the mindset that the private
    sector exists to serve as contractors for the government,
    rather than being a coequal partner in the opening of space.
        If we are to return to the Moon and move on to Mars, and
    make it permanent, and not make it a flag and footsteps
    mission, it has to be an economically viable exercise. It can
    only be economically viable if profits and rewards are returned
    to our society. And those can only be realized by maximizing
    the creation of goods and services, and those are traditionally
    carried out in our society by the private sector.
        We have to have an integral relationship with the private
    sector from day one; not only an exit strategy that says NASA
    is moving to the Moon to learn to go to Mars, and the moving
    out--which can be shown by, let's say, leasing facilities on
    the Moon, rather than building them and owning them--because,
    by the way, being on the Moon, and operating a building on the
    Moon, and driving trucks to and from the Moon, will be as
    boring as it is driving to and from LEO eventually. NASA has to
    move on to Mars and keep going, where there are--and, by the
    way, Mars has a lot more exciting vistas than the Moon will
    provide. I'm not saying we're going to end up with a great
    civilization on the Moon. The civilization will occur on Mars
    and the worlds in between. Industry, the growth, the
    experimentation, the learning will occur on the Moon, and then
    we will move on.
        I want to see NASA focus--by the way, one of the first
    places that we can get involved with the private sector is,
    shall we say, the entrance strategy, wherein the private sector
    is involved from day one in these plans, the private sector is
    involved in carrying astronauts from Earth to space. NASA's
    mission used to begin in the Earth and then go into space. No,
    NASA's mission now begins in space and goes to space. The idea
    that somehow the crew exploration vehicle is a new thing, as
    opposed to a magic wand waved over the orbital space plane, and
    turned it from a two-door into a station-wagon, is really the
    kind of thinking we're dealing with. They're going to go back
    and roll out the same projects they had before.
        I want to see change. I want to see dramatic change occur.
    I want to see NASA do prizes, let's say, early data
    acquisition. If ``prizes'' is not a good word, let's call them
    contingency contracts. Put out $50 million for a photo map of
    the South Pole of the Moon, which is probably where we're going
    to put our facility, and offer a two-year time limit and see if
    a private company can do something in that time, and return
    those images. We'll save a lot of money, we'll mobilize a lot
    of private-sector activities, and we'll create a lot of
    excitement out there in the world, competitive excitement.
        I want to see this all happen. And if we're going to
    inspire and create our excitement in our children, we have to
    quit going in circles; we have to go somewhere. We have to go
    fast, we have to go hard. We don't have to spend our time
    developing the absolutely highest tech, most expensive machine
    to get there. We've got to use what we've got. We've got to
    live off the land. Put the urgency and danger and joy of
    discovery together, and people will pay attention and support
    the program. Explore. Shine a light into a lava tube on the
    Moon. Dig for water in the Aitken Basin, and show us how to
    turn it into rocket propellent. Launch rockets off of the Moon.
    Go to Mars. Show the live camera shot from the helmet of the
    first woman to look into the Valles Marineris live on Earth.
    You want to see excitement that beats what we just saw with
    these robots? Let's do that.
        And, for good measure, don't deny that people will die--
    given the anniversaries we're dealing with, that's a relevant
    point--or act surprised when it's going to happen. Let's make
    that risk a part of the message. Drop the obsessive lip service
    about safety, and let's actually do something about making
    things safe. Let's assure that NASA and our people in space are
    doing their best to be safe and adopting serious procedures to
    avoid death. But let's say, up front, that people will die on
    this quest. We know it's going to happen. Let's be aware of it
    and make it a part of it.
        And once we're back on the Moon, let's not stop. It's just
    as boring, as I said, for NASA to be operating buildings there
    as it is to orbit the Earth round and round. Keep them going,
    moving ahead. The Lewis & Clark function, and I appreciate you
    saying that earlier. Let's send them over the hill, tell us
    what's there, but the settlers and shopkeepers move in after
    them and continue expanding the bubble of human life beyond the
    Earth. That is an exciting agenda, and that is an agenda that I
    think we can achieve and sustain.
        Thank you.
        [The prepared statement of Mr. Tumlinson follows:]

               Prepared Statement of Rick N. Tumlinson, Founder,
                         The Space Frontier Foundation
        Mr. Chairman, members of the Committee,

        Just a few months ago I sat in this same room, calling for the
    United States to return to the Moon, as I and many in the space
    frontier movement have been doing for over twenty years. We in the
    Space Frontier Foundation have been calling for NASA to retire (or
    scuttle) the space shuttles, get out of Earth to LEO human and payload
    transport, and open the space station to commercial activities. We have
    also been calling for this Nation to redefine the relationship between
    the government and private sector space activities, so that a new
    partnership might be created which would lead to a vital and growing
    human frontier in space stretching from the Earth to the Moon and
    beyond.
        A few weeks ago, I was privileged (and somewhat surprised, given my
    long history of criticism of our national space program) to be invited
    by the White House to attend the President's announcement that this
    Nation would indeed be returning to the Moon. As you can imagine I was
    pleased to hear that our message had been heard.
        Ladies and gentlemen, I sat just a few feet from the President as
    he made his historic announcement, just as some of you did. And I
    looked into the man's eyes as deeply as I could during the whole
    speech. I believe he means what he is saying. I believe he truly wants
    us to begin opening space to the American people, to establish this
    Nation permanently on the Moon and from their to catapult ourselves to
    the planet Mars and beyond.
        I am not so naive as to be unaware of the political aspects of his
    announcement, dropped into the middle of the primary season of the
    opposing party, nor the positive note it adds to his own candidacy for
    re-election. But I am also aware of the downside of making such an
    announcement in a campaign year, especially at time when many who
    oppose his policies will be automatically pre-disposed to attack the
    ideas he spoke of, simply because they came from his mouth. Just as if,
    were he to say the sky is blue, his opponents would immediately argue
    that it is not. So to be honest, there is both an up and a down side to
    his timing. In fact, a part of me wishes he would have waited until
    after the elections, as I do not wish to see the Democratic party make
    a knee jerk reaction that rejects the core concepts of his proposal.
        The fact that this plan is designed to begin with small incremental
    down payments that grow like the balloon payment on a home mortgage in
    the years after he leaves office also does not go unnoticed. But I can
    attribute this to the desire to make the idea a bit easier to swallow
    now, and is based on his confidence that our national economy will be
    able to handle such costs when the bill comes due. Even with major
    growth in our national space budget, the numbers spoken of are much
    smaller than the relative cost of our first push to the Moon was to our
    over all GDP.
        I think the timeline is too slow--after all we went to the Moon
    from an almost standing start, developing three or four new launchers
    (if you count the LEM) and did it all in 7 years over 35 years ago.
    Let's get some challenge in there! It will help to focus and drive our
    space program. Also, I believe International partnering should not be
    based on State Dept. motives, but who can do the best work in a given
    area at the best price. International deals are done every second in
    the private sector on just such a basis.
        Finally, the real private sector MUST be involved early on, not as
    a show, not as an after thought. If the Moon base is to turn into a
    settlement or community, it has to be designed to do so from day one.
    For example, as I discuss below, after the scouting and base camp
    phase, it would be good to see something along the line of NASA
    offering to rent X square feet of the buildings for X number of years
    or some such scheme that builds in the idea that NASA is not trying to
    yet again take on more facilities and overhead, but is just passing
    through on the way to Mars.
        However, overall, I am supportive of the concept as outlined in his
    speech.
        The Moon, Mars and the asteroids that float between the worlds of
    our solar system do indeed represent the future of humanity. It would
    be pure ignorant hubris to declare that we should not expand our
    species and the domain of life beyond this Earth, much like the
    declarations of a serf in medievil Europe proclaiming that the world
    ends just beyond the boundaries of his own village. Similarly, there is
    the short term thinking that leads to the conclusion that somehow
    science and the advancement of knowledge will somehow be damaged by the
    growth of human activities in space. As if the exploration and
    settlement of this new world where we sit today somehow held back the
    march of scientific progress, rather than driving our advancements and
    understanding of ourselves and the universe forward at a pace unknown
    before our ancestors struck out into the unknown. We are truly just at
    the bare beginnings of the story of humanity and the life forms of the
    Earth. And we stand poised to take bold steps outwards--if we can do so
    wisely, economically, and for the right reasons. Those reasons are as
    wide and varied as those who look at the Moon and stars at night and
    feel their calling. Many speakers have laid out the possibilities, from
    Dr. Paul Spudis, who sang of the possibilities offered by the Moon, to
    Dr. Rober Zubrin, who waxes poetic about the vast vistas available to
    us on the planet Mars, Dr Gerard O'Neill, my mentor, who created a
    vision of humanity spreading out in colonies of glass and steel in the
    space between worlds.
        All of these visions can be made real. All of the benefits to us
    these men have spoken of are real, as are a thousand more they could no
    more imagine than those who first came to this new world could imagine
    that the land they were exploring for gold and glory would give the
    world the Bill of Rights, the Constitution, and an ongoing revolution
    in thought, science and medicine that has completely transformed our
    human civilization.
        And therein lies the big question. Does the President's proposal
    leads to the Real opening of the frontier--by which I mean the
    expansion of the human domain beyond the Earth? Not outposts, not
    stations, not laboratories, but economically viable and growing
    communities of human beings that can eventually become new branches of
    our civilization. For if that is not the end point of this exercise,
    then, as some in our science community have said repeatedly, we should
    send robots instead. Also, if this endeavor is to be led by and for the
    government, and the above is its litmus test for success, it will fail.
    Government's do not open frontiers. People do--with the assistance of
    their governments, and sometimes in spite of those same governments.
        To succeed Every possible way to produce value (Include scientific
    value as well as economic) must be combined. If those two elements are
    then put into an equation, and the end result is positive or can be
    projected to turn positive we have a winner. If not, we have a negative
    cash/value flow and a loser. (NOTE--None of these elements was
    considered or kept on the table for ISS!)
        --Put giant KISS! (Keep It Simple Stupid!) posters everywhere, in
    all centers and offices. Give rewards for designs and ideas that go
    that way instead of the high tech, over specialized direction. For
    example, Rutan trumpets the fact that his flyers are the lowest
    technology, most off the shelf he could build, and where possible,
    units and structures are duplicated (look at the shapes etc. of his
    carrier and sub-orbital elements--cast in the same molds). Learn the
    lesson and apply it to the Moon. If a Home Depot bolt will work, use
    it. If you can go with voltages, air pressures etc. that make things
    simpler, then do it. Save high tech for later . . .
        --Rather than designing the habs etc. themselves, NASA should stay
    Lewis and Clark--like and focus on such things as scouting expeditions,
    and an early base camp that is designed to be expandable. Then put out
    a call to the non-space community for facilities that are low cost,
    robust, low maintenance and modular or expandable on a larger scale.
    NASA and other agencies could then sign ten or fifteen year leases,
    indicating (in the case of NASA) they are not planning on squatting
    down on the Moon but are moving on. (not ISS redux on the Moon.)
        --So some NASA guy will look out there and say ``we can't find any
    firms engaged in the right kinds of activities or willing to partner
    with us.'' Duh. Talk about self-fulfilling prophecy. Of course not. You
    killed them all over the last thirty years, or trashed their ideas and
    killed off their investors, or supported your aerospace friends to the
    point you drove them out of business.
        The private sector has been so burned for so long by NASA in the
    past that they must be coaxed back into space. Sponsor events and
    meetings with people in the military, business and commercial research/
    transport/life support communities and listen to them. Oil platforms,
    private diving bells and Navy subs, Hilton Hotels, airlines, all have
    lessons that can be transferred to this effort. The private sector has
    done a fair job of turning this New World into a permanent and
    expanding frontier. I bet they can help a little on the next one.
    The International Space Station
        As we move forward to the Moon, the International Space Station
    should be transformed into a multi-faceted nexus for both government
    and private sector activities. Some of these activities will be in
    support of the Lunar effort, and some will not, but all will contribute
    to the development of a vibrant human presence in LEO.
        In his speech the President said:

            ``Our first goal is to complete the International Space Station
            by 2010. . .finish what we have started.''

        Let me make a few important points:

        --Almost all the original goals laid out for the space station have
    already been abandoned. It needs to be redefined and the program
    totally reformed or this will not happen.
        --We are not in charge of the station. We have partners who are
    using it for their own purposes, and interestingly, many of those
    partners are moving quickly towards private sector dominance of their
    activities and areas on station--as should we.
        --As the agency is cutting back its level of participation, there
    will be other orbital facilities, including the first space hotel
    modules, if entrepreneurs such as the self-funded Bob Bigelow in Nevada
    are to be believed (and given his wealth, determination and the
    realistic basis of his plans as revealed so far I do believe him.)
    other firms are looking at modules that might attach at first to the
    ISS and then through a ``budding'' process become independent free
    flying facilities themselves. Remember, the Chinese will also be flying
    their own facility by that time. This all means that a community can be
    developed that will create an economics of scale, a mutual
    interdependence and back up capability in case of disasters and
    accidents. (See my 1995 Testimony to the House Space Subcommittee on
    the idea of ``Alpha Town'' the first community in orbit.)
        I used to be in favor of what I called an International Space
    Station Authority. This would have been a mechanism to wrest control
    from NASA and hand it to a more commercial friendly entity that would
    be less likely to play favorites when it came to which companies would
    provide services, establish the rule of law, set safety standards etc.
        As a great military strategist once said that the commander who
    cannot change his tactics based on changes on the field of battle is
    doomed to lose. Thus I have dropped the ISSA concept, since NASA is
    planning to divest its majority ownership one way or the other in the
    coming years.
        The future I see for the facility would be one wherein NASA's role
    would become that of a tenant, who's main focus is the preparation and
    experimentation it needs to plan missions to Mars. I would like to see
    the U.S. Government set up a management structure for the U.S. portion
    that would allocate NASA what it needs, and also open the rest of our
    ISS elements up to private sector use. This could mean anything from
    university operated labs and experiments to commercial research. Also,
    the new charter would allow and encourage the attachment of new
    modules, probably completely commercially owned and operated that could
    house experiments, and even accommodations for commercial guests such
    as future Dennis Titos (who I had the honor of signing up to fly into
    space a few years ago). Another commercial activity would be a
    construction shack and factory operated by commercial astronauts based
    on Dennis Wingo's on orbit assembly concepts. These space workers would
    be engaged in activities such as on-orbit construction of large space
    telescopes, antenna arrays, large space probes and even the ships to
    travel to Mars.
        One major idea would be to have the Hubble space telescope moved by
    an orbital tug to an orbit above the ISS, so that it could be lowered
    to the facility for astronaut EVAs to service it. The Hubble is far too
    valuable a resource to throw away, and NASA plans to do so are
    expensive, limited in vision and reveal a complete lack of
    understanding of the frontier ethic of keeping things low cost by re-
    using and re-cycling whenever possible.
    Space Transportation
        The President said:

            ``Our second goal . . . to develop and test a new spacecraft,
            the Crew Exploration Vehicle, by 2008, and to conduct the first
            manned mission no later than 2014 . . .''

        --I can see the SEV becoming the new OSP/X-33/NASP/X-38/etc.--a
    cash draining, show killing tech project. NO NO NO! if every element in
    the transportation part of the equation isn't low cost, robust and re-
    usable or designed to become so ASAP, then let's quit now and go home
    as this project is DOA.
        --By the time NASA speaks of pulling out of its major role on ISS,
    there will probably be other players in the Earth to LEO transportation
    arena, so the support of ISS will not be a limited sum game. There may
    well be a wide array of possible Earth to Leo transportation
    alternatives. The private sector firms that make up what I call the
    Alternative or Alt.Space transportation firms will be well on their way
    to becoming full fledged orbital access providers--if the government
    can provide the regulatory and investment incentives they so
    desperately need if they are incentivised to cross from largely being
    sub-orbital or small payload orbital companies into the orbital game by
    prizes and multiple source pay for delivery services.
        --NASA must get out of the Earth to LEO business entirely. An
    astronaut's mission used to start on the Earth's surface. This will no
    longer be true. They will be able to ride into space on private
    vehicles, and NASA can save its time and funds working on the next
    leap--between planets. I know some think there will be an all-in-one
    vehicle developed for transit from Earth surface to these other worlds,
    but such a concept is ridiculous, short sighted and probably the most
    expensive way such movement can be accomplished. If one reads the
    President's policy carefully, and from a frontier perspective, the call
    for a crew Exploration Vehicle can be read as meaning a transporter
    that lives in space, and goes to and from destinations there, without
    returning to Earth itself. (A model that makes far more sense than
    carrying all of the hardware one would need for transits in and out of
    our atmosphere.)
        --The Near Frontier transportation system will need a re-fueling
    capability that can circumvent the incredibly high costs of bringing
    propellant up from the Earth's surface, and a port for flights to and
    from the Moon and eventually Mars. Paul Spudis and others have
    advocated mining Lunar elements at the poles of the Moon and using them
    to create ``space gas'' that can then be shipped down the gravity well
    and used to re-fuel all kinds of space craft, and satellites. I
    understand one might not wish to have a space ``gas station'' in close
    proximity to inhabited facilities, but it can be developed and
    constructed using ISS astronauts. The NASA institutional side of the
    facility could contract out services from the commercial team if needed
    for fueling their Mars ships.
        --I am also concerned that projects like the planned nuclear
    Prometheus vehicle and other high tech space-to-space elements will
    pace and slow down the program. This must not be allowed to happen.
    Stay simple at first. Get the first rope across the ravine, then work
    up to the foot bridge and then go for the super highway. Start
    development early though, so your needs intersect with your
    capabilities down the road. . .so to speak.
        As I discussed last fall, there is a growing alternative space
    movement there in America. Whatever NASA does or does not do, this
    community, which is investing tens of millions to develop new space
    vehicles and orbital facilities, will open the space frontier in its
    own way. While America turned its eye to the past at Kittyhawk this
    December, famed aircraft designer Burt Rutan's sub-orbital rocket ship
    broke the sound barrier in Mojave, California. Few noticed, and fewer
    understand what this means. But as I also noted in my previous
    testimony, the goal of flying the first non-government rocketship into
    space is on track to be realized before the end of this year. Elon
    Musk's SpaceX will be flying small payloads into orbit at a
    dramatically lower cost per pound than current government vendors
    within the same time frame, and at least a half dozen other firms are
    on track to cross the finish lines in this alternative space race.
        I mention this to let you know that there really are potential
    commercial partners out there beyond the current NASA contractors. The
    door to space is about to be blown wide open.
    The Moon
        The President said:

            ``Our third goal is to return to the Moon by 2020.''

        Most of the comments I would make on this third element of his plan
    are contained in the following OpEd.
    Return to the Moon--For the Right Reasons, in the Right Way (from an
            editorial in Space News)

            ``We do this and the other things not because they are easy,
            but because they are hard . . .''

        President John F. Kennedy--from his speech announcing Apollo.

        Any discussion of a permanent return to the Moon (RTM) must be
    centered on two over riding questions: ``Why?'' and ``How?'' The
    answers to each of those questions are interrelated and one affects the
    other. If we go for the wrong reasons we will fail. If we go for the
    right reasons and do it the wrong way, we will fail. And if we don't go
    at all, then we will have failed in a way that will send ripples down
    through the ages.
        There are many different answers to ``Why?'' They include: far side
    observatories to seek life on other worlds; studies of Earth's history
    by studying the Moon's surface and geology; near side Earth observation
    telescopes (Triana on the Moon); searching for platinum class metals in
    asteroids buried in the surface; giant solar arrays beaming power to
    communications satellites and solar sail transports; isolated
    laboratories to try new and dangerous schemes; taking the high ground
    militarily; driving the creation of new technologies; and of course,
    backing up the biosphere and human civilization in case of catastrophe
    and expanding the domain of life and humanity.
        There are also a few more subtle reasons we go:

        We go to force the re-structuring of our national space
    activities.--NASA's human spaceflight program today is like an old ex-
    athlete who won the Olympics a long time ago. It is bloated,
    inflexible, self-indulgent, and lives on re-runs of its better days. It
    is neither inspiring nor useful. In fact, it is harmful, as without a
    mandate to move out to the Far Frontier of the Moon and beyond, NASA
    has squatted down in LEO and claimed it as its own, blocking any who
    might try to do anything useful on its ``turf.'' We can let it slowly
    die, or we can trim the fat and get it into shape by making it get out
    of the doorway to space, back into the arena, and forcing it to run
    again--this time with a team-mate called private enterprise--to whom it
    can hand the baton at the right moment.
        We go to inspire.--The most important thing we got out of Apollo
    was inspiration. It was a star of hope in the darkness of the Cold War.
    It was the reason I am in this field, and the same goes for many of you
    reading this. The internet, telecom, the incredible advances in
    medicine and science, these breakthroughs are coming from organizations
    whose founders and investors were often born and raised during the
    Apollo program, and while its legacy was still fresh. If one looks at
    the numbers of engineers and science students graduated in the U.S.,
    there is a clear correlation, and right now those numbers are falling,
    fast.
        We go to prepare for even greater things.--We cannot throw
    expendable humans at Mars without knowing what happens to a spacesuit
    in a high radiation, high temperature differential, dirty, vacuum after
    its been worn and sweated in for six weeks. We need to learn how to
    operate off planet, how to build for permanence and how to live off the
    land in space. Also, those who advocate a direct drive to Mars ignore a
    major historical fact--the colonies in North America could not have
    survived without the ports of England and Europe. The development of a
    strong Earth-LEO-Moon infrastructure, dominated by commercial
    enterprises, is a necessity, if humans-to Mars is not to be another
    unsustainable flags and foot prints fiasco or perennial taxpayer funded
    government housing project.
        The ``How?'' of returning to the Moon partially determines the
    ``Why?'' For example, if the timeline is too long, the budget too
    large, the end goal too amorphous, and the whole project is run by the
    usual suspects in the usual way, the end result will be an uninspiring,
    over budget dead end like the International Space Station (ISS). To
    make a Return to the Moon permanent, inspiring, economical and
    beneficial to the taxpayers who pay for it all, we must do the right
    things.
    The Greatest Frontier
        All of these ideas, for a new and revitalized ISS, for a return to
    the Moon, the establishment of the first space settlements, and the
    dream of expanding life beyond Earth, will not be achievable if we do
    the wrong things, proceed in the wrong manner, and aim at the wrong
    goals.
        First, we must ignore the whining of those who say they need a lot
    more money and time. We went from a standing start to standing on the
    Moon in under ten years--forty years ago! Keep in mind, when Kennedy
    asked the NASA of that time if it could be done, they told him no, and
    then they went and did it when ordered to.
        Next, we must restructure NASA, as the agency in its current form
    cannot handle the job. The center-based structure of today must be
    ended and several non-relevant centers closed or handed over to other
    agencies. Activities such as aeronautics and Earth studies must be
    handed off to the FAA and NOAA. Planetary robotic exploration should be
    given to JPL and the National Science Foundation (NSF).
        NASA must shed operational activities such as LEO transport and
    running the space station. The Orbital Space Plane should be canceled--
    now. Prizes, multiple source contracts, investment and tax incentives
    must be put in place to encourage the new Alt.Space firms to take over
    human transport to space, and drive the traditional aerospace giants to
    modernize or get out of the field. The space station should be
    mothballed, handed to our partners or be taken over by a quasi-
    commercial Space Station Authority as a destination for commercial and
    university users. ISS and other NASA pet projects must not be grafted
    onto a moon project simply because they exist. If they really support
    it they are in, if not, they are out.
        What is left should be divided into two parts. The first should be
    a lean mean human exploration machine that focuses on the Lewis and
    Clark function and acquiring or creating the lowest tech tools possible
    to travel and explore beyond the Earth. The second should be an agency
    like the old National Advisory Committee for Aeronautics from which
    NASA was created. Its job would be to push the envelope of space
    technologies and systems in support of our space industries.
        The new NASA would then be one of several players in any RTM
    project along with DOD, DARPA, NOAA, NSF, universities, and most
    importantly, the commercial sector. NASA will support planetary
    transportation systems development, scouting, surveying and pitching
    the first base camp, then others take over as the agency focuses on
    developing systems for Mars exploration--it's next destination.
        For the Moon Base to survive and prosper, it must be built in the
    right spot, it must be robust, easy to operate at low cost, as self
    sufficient as possible and be easy to expand. The International Space
    Station is failing because it is in the wrong place, too delicate, too
    expensive to operate, and produces nothing of great value--scientific
    or commercial. To pay for the Moon Base we must combine a wide variety
    of income producing activities and services, such as those listed
    above. BUT, the people building the habitats after the first phase,
    operating the telescopes, and running the facility itself should NOT be
    government employees. The long term Lunar facilities should be designed
    and built by private firms in response to a short list of needs put out
    by the partners, with the U.S. government leasing those it needs. Long
    term management of the base should be in the form of a Moon Base
    Authority to promote new activities, manage infrastructure, oversee
    safety, and enforce the law.
    Tied to the Earth with Red Tape
        Forget the Moon, forget Mars. The greatest frontier NASA has to
    face is itself. From timid bureaucracies to over burdening regulations
    and procurement rules to outright ``Not Invented Here'' turf oriented
    jealousies, NASA'S culture must be changed, and this mandate must come
    from outside of the agency, and even from beyond the scope of the new
    commission being formed as we speak to look into how to accomplish
    these goals. Without dramatic, near--term and permanent changes the
    President's initiative will fail. And I am very afraid that the
    discussion now underway is nowhere near strong enough nor has it
    reached deeply enough to force logical people to make the hard choices
    needed.
        For example, at a level above the agency, we must modify the overly
    burdensome Federal Acquisition Regulations or throw them out completely
    in favor of fee for service and delivery business style operations.
    Along the way the incredible piles of paperwork NASA uses to certify
    and manage each piece of hardware should be pared to a minimum. The
    space community is rife with examples of NASA loading potential
    providers down with paperwork. Sometimes even the simplest sounding
    deal is drowned in paper. Safety and quality needs to be assured
    certainly, but at some point it gets ridiculous.
        This story came to me from Bill Haynes, a former Air Force test
    pilot.
        ``(Consider) the carabiners astronauts use to tether themselves
    during EVA. The best climber's carabiner at REI costs $19.00.
        I found the manufacturer of NASA's carabiners, and he said he
    charges $1,095.00 each. When I told him about REI's, he said sure, he
    could probably sell his for a $100 or so, except that NASA requires a
    ``pedigree'' all the way from the mine for every ounce of aluminum in
    his, his welders and machinists each have to be re-certified every six
    months and the paperwork stack that accompanies each carabiner is
    inches high.
        That might make sense for say, the turbine buckets in the Space
    Shuttle Main Engines. It makes absolutely no sense for those carabiners
    that will never encounter more than about a fifty lb. load in space.
        The REI carabiners are rated at 6,500 lbs.''
        This approach to the business of space will not get us to the Moon
    again.
    New Approaches
        Every possible way to produce value (Include scientific value as
    well as economic) must be combined and every way to reduce costs must
    be found. If those two elements are then put into an equation, and the
    end result is positive or can be projected to turn positive we have a
    winner. If not, we have a negative cash/value flow and a loser. (NOTE--
    None of these elements was considered or kept on the table for ISS!)
        --Put giant KISS! (Keep It Simple Stupid!) posters everywhere, in
    all centers and offices. Give rewards for designs and ideas that go
    that way instead of the high tech, over specialized direction. For
    example, Rutan trumpets the fact that his flyers are the lowest
    technology, most off the shelf he could build, and where possible,
    units and structures are duplicated (look at the shapes etc. of his
    carrier and sub-orbital elements--cast in the same molds). Learn the
    lesson and apply it to the Moon. If a Home Depot bolt will work, use
    it. If you can go with voltages, air pressures etc. that make things
    simpler, then do it. Save high tech for later . . .
        --Rather than designing the habs etc. themselves, NASA should stay
    Lewis and Clark--like and focus on such things as scouting expeditions,
    and an early base camp that is designed to be expandable. Then put out
    a call to the non-space community for facilities that are low cost,
    robust, low maintenance and modular or expandable on a larger scale.
    NASA and other agencies could then sign ten or fifteen year leases,
    indicating (in the case of NASA) they are not planning on squatting
    down on the Moon but are moving on. (not ISS redux on the Moon.)
        --NASA should offer to buy data wherever possible. Prizes should be
    offered for milestons that can be reasonably offered to the private
    sector. Or if the word ``prizes'' is unpalatable, let's call them
    ``contingency contracts''. For example, within the next year or so a
    short term, let's say 2 year ``contingency contract'' of around $80
    million could be offered for high resolution images of the potentail
    base camp site at the Lunar south pole. If it is won, we get our
    information scheap and spur several new firms into action. If not,
    there is still plenty of time for NASA to launch its own probes.
        --So some NASA guy will look out there and say ``we can't find any
    firms engaged in the right kinds of activities or willing to partner
    with us.'' Talk about self-fulfilling prophecy. Of course not. NASA
    killed them all over the last thirty years, or trashed their ideas and
    killed off their investors, or supported thier aerospace friends to the
    point you drove them out of business.
        The private sector has been so burned for so long by NASA in the
    past that they must be coaxed back into space. Sponsor events and
    meetings with people in the military, business and commercial research/
    transport/life support communities and listen to them. Oil platforms,
    private diving bells and Navy subs, Hilton Hotels, airlines, all have
    lessons that can be transferred to this effort. The private sector has
    done a fair job of turning this New World into a permanent and
    expanding frontier. I bet they can help a little on the next one.
        I was heartened to see the inclusion of language in the President's
    policy that indicated an awareness of these needed changes, but I m
    still concerned that bureaucratic inertia will swallow any new and
    radically different ideas (or what those of us outside of the agency
    might call ``common sense'').
        The idea of an outside commission to lay the groundwork for this
    push outwards is a good idea. But it needs to be vested with real
    authority, and be comprised of space experts, business leaders and
    ``out of the box'' thinkers. Unfortunately I am concerned the deck is
    already being stacked the wrong way, even if it is not being done so
    consciously.
        The leadership of the commission for example, must be free of all
    ties to those who stand to benefit from its deliberations, nor should
    they have that appearance. This is not to question the integrity of
    anyone who might volunteer their time to do this important work, but to
    avoid any questions whatsoever about the validity of their findings and
    plans. I am hopeful that such considerations are going into the
    selection process, and any such issues are being rectified.
        If the right people are assembled for this work, and given the
    mandate that appears in the president's speech--namely to open the
    space frontier, then I am confident thatlogic, history and common sense
    will prevail in their plans. I hope the White House, this body and NASA
    in particular pay attention, interact with them and move on their
    recommendations. I would also hope that the commission be empaneled to
    revisit this new space agenda on a regular basis.
    Conclusion
        In conclusion, I think we have before us an exciting and powerful
    vision. We need not empty the coffers of our Nation to make it happen,
    and in fact will create enourmous new wealth, in the form of both
    economic and scientific wealth. If we can employ the power and genius
    of free enterprise we can transform our moribound space program into
    something incredible. But the people in this room, in this building and
    in this town must lead this time, and not be led, by lobbiests and
    Center Directors, party bickering and pork barrel politics. Let's get
    back to exploring. Let's let loose our reborn Lewis and Clarks to blaze
    the way for new generations and let's make sure everyone, especially
    those at NASA know they are spending our money to clear the way so we
    can follow. The space program will then get all the support it needs.
        For if we want to inspire and create excitement in our children We
    must go somewhere! Go fast, go hard, and don't wait around developing
    the absolutely highest tech most expensive machine to get there. Use
    what you've got and go! Live off the land. Put the urgency of danger
    and joy of discovery together and people will pay attention. Explore!
    Shine alight into a new lava tube on the moon . . . Dig for that water
    in the Aikin basin, show the blast off of the first mission to Mars,
    launched from the Moon . . . the pale blue marble of Earth in the
    distance. Feed that helmet camera shot of the Valles Marinaris to the
    world. And cover it live, good or bad, success or failure, life or
    death . . .
        For good measure, don't deny that people will die, or act surprised
    when it happens--make that risk part of the message . . . drop the
    obsessive lip service about safety and focus on being safe . . . assure
    that NASA and our people in space are doing their best to be safe,
    adopt serious procedures to do avoid death . . . but say up front that
    people will die on this quest.
        And once we are back to the Moon DONT STOP . . . it will be just as
    boring for NASA to be landlord on the Moon as in LEO. Show some
    learning. Get there, scout, set up the beginnings of the base. As
    others move in (universities, institutes, commercial users) the agency
    can go off in a nearby crater and begin developing its planetary
    surface exploration capabilities, then move on to Mars, where the
    vistas are larger and the opportunities for long term excitement
    abound. But don't squat down again. MOVE.

        Senator Brownback. Thank you, Mr. Tumlinson. Appreciate the
    panel very much.
        A couple of questions, then I'll turn to my colleague from
    Texas.
        Dr. Friedman, are we in another space race now? You cite
    several other countries with planned missions to Moon. Do you
    believe we're in another space race, that we can be left behind
    if we don't engage these sort of activities and strategies that
    you've outlined?
        Dr. Friedman. Sometimes, when I'm glib, the only space race
    I describe is the humans-versus-robots space race, that I think
    we're both evolving--I mean, this in a serious way--that we're
    both evolving technologically, and it's--probably the main
    reason I support human spaceflight is because I think it's part
    of our human evolution to go to other worlds.
        I don't think we're in a space race with other countries. I
    think the ability--the need for the United States to prove
    itself, technologically, as a dominant space player is not
    necessary, as it was in the 1960s, when we undertook Project
    Apollo. If anything, the challenge before us is to learn to
    cooperate with other countries and to work with the great
    buildup that's going on in Europe, which is now conducting two
    planetary--which has now conducted two planetary missions
    successfully, and has a long-range plan also for the Moon and
    Mars; Japan, which is doing two missions to the Moon and has
    talked about building a robotic infrastructure on the Moon; and
    China, who is obviously an emerging space power; and other
    countries, as has been cited, are developing rocket capability
    to go to space.
        The challenge is, is to work with these countries. It's a--
    it will help us immeasurable, as it has in so many commercial
    industries to be working internationally.
        Senator Brownback. Dr. Friedman, if I could, because my
    time's going to be very limited here. What you described to me
    is a space race that--whether we choose to enter it or not is
    probably the question. I mean, we need to cooperate, clearly,
    with other countries, but if we don't engage a new vision for
    NASA--if we say it's too risky, it's too costly--other people,
    other countries are going to the Moon and beyond, is that
    correct?
        Dr. Friedman. I accept that. That's correct, Senator. Yes,
    I think that's--it's a very good point--that the space race is
    not the one of competitiveness of trying to prove our
    greatness, but the space race is the one that's inherent in our
    civilization to try and prove ourselves.
        Senator Brownback. Whether we enter it at all, or whether--
    --
        Dr. Friedman. Correct.
        Senator Brownback.--we decide that's just too risky or too
    expensive, we're not going to go there. Others are.
        Dr. Friedman. I think that the reasons for going there are
    more than just that others are; it's really about what we say
    about ourselves, as well.
        Senator Brownback. Well, I agree with that.
        Dr. Lane and Dr. McCurdy, you both talked about
    reorganizing, or a transformational experience at NASA. I guess
    really all three of the other panelists. What are the biggest
    impediments that Congress can be positively involved in in this
    transformational experience that NASA will need to be--need to
    happen? Where should we focus our light or our energies to see
    that this NASA transformation takes place?
        Dr. Lane. Well, Mr. Chairman, my experience has been that
    previous Administrators have made the significant attempts to
    realign NASA, reorganize NASA, reallocate the funds to make the
    whole better than it is, remove some of the waste that my
    colleague just referred to a few minutes ago. But when you make
    those changes, and talk about reallocation, it implies a change
    of money and people; jobs, then, are at stake. And with centers
    all over the country immediately coming to the defense of their
    employees and their position in the state, understandably,
    phone calls get made. And certainly----
        Senator Brownback. So you're saying we're really going to
    have to pull NASA in, focus it on fewer areas, and we're going
    to have to get the extraneous spending under control?
        Dr. Lane. My view is that it will require focus, and focus
    is going to be more than parsing out a complicated plan to the
    same units, same people, in the same locations.
        And I would also add that each time Congress earmarks
    NASA's budget, it is not necessarily a bad project, I'm not
    suggesting, but it's not necessarily a priority project for
    NASA. It removes some of the flexibility that the Administrator
    has to reallocate funds, to reorganize.
        So there are several things Congress can do, but what I
    said in my testimony was, the White House and Congress really
    needs to get behind the Administrator. When you're satisfied
    with the Administrator's plan, get behind the Administrator and
    prevent these end runs that will undo the best intentions,
    which I'm sure he has.
        Senator Brownback. Dr. McCurdy, anything on this?
        Dr. McCurdy. Focus on cost. When Jim Webb, the NASA
    Administrator, came before this Committee in 1961, he predicted
    that we could go to the Moon for about $20 billion. The cost of
    Project Apollo through Apollo 11 was $21 billion. Focus on
    cost. Focus on total program cost. Don't let this policy become
    a Lourdes for NASA, a place where the field centers and
    existing programs go to get well. That's what I'd suggest.
        Senator Brownback. Mr. Tumlinson, I want your thought on an
    offer of a $50 million reward--kind of like what we did in Iraq
    in getting Saddam Hussein, but this timer to engage the private
    sector with a reward for whoever can get a post set up, I
    guess, on the south pole of the Moon. And you think that we
    could by dangling a certain amount of an accomplishment fee out
    there get and engage sufficient private sector capital to get
    these things accomplished?
        Mr. Tumlinson. Yes. And the examples are out there. My
    organizations funds--offered a prize at one point for small
    rocketry. We had a lot of people respond.
        I'm founding trustee of a thing called the X Prize that has
    stirred rocket competition around the world, one of the
    rockets--Burt Rutan's vehicle--which is being funded, by the
    way, by Paul Allen, of Microsoft. They're going to spend about
    $35 million to win a $10 million prize.
        So the idea of prizes--and, again, if we--you know, we can
    go into NASA-speak, or whatever--contingency contracts, they do
    inspire innovation. There's a long history of that, all the way
    back to the British Navy, working on a better timekeeper for
    its ships, put out a prize, a very famous book written about
    that.
        So these things do work. I'm not talking about putting a
    base up for $50 million, by the way. I'm talking about
    returning high-resolution photographs, something--the idea of
    orbiting satellites or probes or that type of thing is--the
    private sector has shown that. They launch communications
    satellites all the time. There are companies that have that
    kind of an interest, and that's a number that might inspire
    them. People smarter than I can probably work out the exact,
    sort of, relevant price for that. But I think it will inspire
    people and get people--you know, there's nothing like a race.
    Americans love a race and a competition, and I think that's a
    way to get people involved and lower costs.
        Senator Brownback. Well, my view of this is that we need to
    tap into the private sector capacities, abilities, and capital
    to be able to----
        Mr. Tumlinson. Absolutely.
        Senator Brownback.--do some of the things that we want to
    do. And it's not enough to just be able to compete for
    resources at the public sector, which is going to have a lot of
    different pushes and political interests.
        But if you can tap into that, and if there's a way of being
    able to do that, I hope you or a group of other people that are
    thinking about this will get to Pete Aldridge's Commission to
    put in some very specific sort of thoughts about what portions
    of these missions could be done by the private sector if
    there's a contingency contract or something of that nature. We
    would see what sort of capital we could tap into and what we
    can put off to the side on our budget, while we focus on
    something that can't be, right now, done through the private
    sector. I hope you'll put forward specific ideas on that.
        Mr. Tumlinson. Yes, a couple of points I'd like to make
    there is, we have to end this antagonistic relationship between
    NASA and the private sector.
        While I'm at it, I'm going to plug a friend's book, called
    Lost in Space: The Fall of NASA, and the Dream of a New Space
    Age, by Greg Klerkx. Please read this book. It talks about how
    these situations have come up in the past, how that antagonism
    has grown, and where we are right now with the alternative
    space movement, versus the space agency, and where we could
    possibly go in the future.
        For example, on the Moon, why not have Hilton provide the
    housing? You know, why not have the food provided by commercial
    food providers. Or, it may not be politically PC to talk about,
    but the services being provided to the troops in Iraq on their
    bases are being provided, basically, commercially. You know, a
    cheeseburger is a cheeseburger; it doesn't have to be designed
    by NASA scientists. So I think we could work at those kind of
    situations. But NASA has to learn that the private sector can
    be a partner, and learn how to work with them and not talk down
    to them, not try and dominate.
        NASA should focus on science, should focus on exploration.
    There will be no private companies that are going go try to do
    landers on Mars. That's an appropriate role for the space
    agency. But these other types of activities, space
    transportation, in particular, from Earth to LEO, running the
    Space Station, et cetera, let the private sector step in. It's
    time.
        Dr. McCurdy. Senator, look to Antarctica as a model of
    private-public cooperation.
        Senator Brownback. That's a good thought.
        Senator Hutchison?
        Senator Hutchison. Well, thank you very much. I appreciate
    having the second panel, because I think you all have been
    refreshing and very candid; and, in many instances, what you've
    said will lead us to do some other things.
        I would like to ask Dr. Lane a couple of questions. Of
    course, I do know Dr. Lane, and appreciate so much the role
    that he has taken advising me on scientific projects and things
    that we can do to highlight better. And I was pleased, in your
    testimony, that you mentioned the National Space Biomedical
    Research Institute, that it's headed by Baylor College of
    Medicine, in Houston, Texas, and that's a good repository for
    the information that's coming down through NASA and the Johnson
    Space Center. But it has about 15 other medical schools and
    universities all over the country, and I think it is a way that
    we can do something that you suggested as the fourth goal, and
    that is to assure that we continue to try to be in the
    forefront, as a country, in science and engineering, and also
    to assure that we encourage young people to come into science.
        My question is, What more do you think we should be doing
    to achieve that fourth goal as we are now going to refocus on
    space exploration? What can we do, both in assuring that we
    keep the engineering and science component--which I did ask the
    Administrator if he was going to maintain the ongoing
    commitment there, and he said yes--but also, what should we be
    doing to bring younger people into the excitement of the
    engineering and research jobs and careers that we want them to
    pursue?
        Dr. Lane. Thank you, Senator. I think the most important
    thing that Congress can do is to look carefully at the plan
    when it comes out initially in the President's budget, and then
    in continued interactions with NASA, to see, in fact, if what
    I've suggested should be a fourth goal really is, because I,
    with respect, did not hear that in the Administrator's comments
    and his presentation. I did hear a number of enterprises
    emphasized in connection with the President's announcement. I
    did not hear science being placed up quite so high on that
    list.
        The reason I think it's so important, and particularly the
    university support, is because that's really where many of the
    young people are making their final decisions, if you like, or
    a final decision in their educational process what their career
    is going to be. That's where students who think they're going
    to be scientists and engineers have second thoughts and do
    something else.
        If there's something exciting that attracts them, if they
    have an opportunity to engage in research that's as exciting as
    what we've seen here today, that can capture a young mind.
    That's precisely the kind of thing that can build a cohort of
    young scientists and engineers, in our states and in our
    nation, to work on projects like space exploration. But they'll
    be attracted by those few years in the university when they
    have a chance to get a taste of research.
        So I think NASA's research programs, at the university
    level, are particularly important. And to the extent that you
    can look at those and look at the way those are cooperative
    with agencies like the National Science Foundation and other
    agencies so that you build a much larger impact that each
    agency on its own, I think there's a chance to do much more,
    even with the same amount of money.
        So I urge you, please look carefully at what the plan is
    that gets rolled out, and then stay with it along the way to
    see whether science is more important than I think I heard in
    the Administrator's comments this morning.
        Senator Hutchison. Did you hear--I want to hear from you,
    but let me ask you this--is there a large amount of interaction
    and cooperation between the National Science Foundation and its
    projects, and NASA?
        Dr. Lane. I think there certainly is good cooperation. I
    don't know how to scale it. I don't have numbers in mind. But,
    as you know, Senator, NSF takes responsibility for most of the
    ground-based observation, the telescopes that are mounted right
    here on solid Earth; and NASA, for the space-based telescopes.
    But both agencies support an enormous amount of research in
    universities by theoretical and experimental astronomers and
    astrophysicists, and I know the agencies interact so that each
    agency understands, in detail, the program of the other agency.
        I'm not worried about wasteful duplication, somehow, of
    support of effort; I'm more interested in coordination, to make
    sure things don't fall through a crack.
        Senator Hutchison. Well, just to pursue that, I was just
    wondering if there were a function that NSF could provide from
    the NASA part of that space research, since they do so much in
    university research grants and programs. Could they take that
    as a function, not to duplicate what NASA's doing, but to maybe
    take that responsibility for that goal and make, you know,
    their mandate perhaps even more relevant than, in some
    instances, maybe it is?
        Dr. Lane. I think it would be very useful for both agencies
    to clarify, for the science community, their respective roles
    in--and the work they do together--in astronomy, astrophysics,
    space-related research, because I think in just doing that,
    both agencies will see some opportunities for supporting the
    university activity that perhaps not being supported right now.
        Both agencies have a long history of supporting university
    research. So NASA put together some of the first----
        Senator Hutchison. But NSF is a different type. It's more
    peer-review based, grant-request based, which is different, I
    think, from NASA, which is why I----
        Dr. Lane. Both agencies use peer review. They do use it
    somewhat differently, and I think--along with other science
    agencies--it would be useful to--everybody could improve their
    system of peer review, and I do--I'm a believer in peer review.
    I think, with all of its blemishes, it is the best way to
    assure that the best science and engineering research gets
    supported.
        But different agencies do it differently, and I think
    there's an opportunity for all of them to learn from one
    another and to improve the way all agencies are supporting
    science. So I would definitely encourage those kinds of
    discussions and perhaps hearings on the subject.
        Senator Hutchison. Dr. Friedman, did you have something to
    add?
        Dr. Friedman. I was just going to add, your question about
    motivating young people, that we should get that video that we
    saw this morning out. That's a tremendous motivation. We have a
    lot of experience with that. And NASA, to their credit, on this
    very mission, has an educational experiment with a DVD and a
    sundial up there, that were produced for other technical
    purposes, but they--we've been engaging students with it in a
    very cooperative, privately funded educational activity with
    NASA.
        Senator Hutchison. Any others to add to that?
        Dr. McCurdy. Well, my generation was raised on Buck Rogers,
    Collier's magazines, and Tomorrowland at Disney World. The new
    generation is interested in space to the same degree, but for
    different reasons. And I think the Administration has tapped
    into that with the mixing of robotic and human capabilities.
    Kids are really interested in robots, electronics, virtual
    reality. And so, to the extent that that mix continues in the
    program, I think it will attract the young generation to want
    to be scientists and engineers and support it--support the
    space program in the same way that us, here, in our generation,
    are supporting it now.
        Senator Hutchison. Yes, Mr. Tumlinson?
        Mr. Tumlinson. Yes, two quick points on that issue. One is,
    I agree with everything that's been said, and the idea that you
    could grow up, and actually be somebody exploring Mars yourself
    someday is very exciting.
        Regarding the NSF/NASA relationship, to me one of the
    exciting things about the Moon is that it doesn't have to be an
    all-NASA project. And I'm not just talking about the commercial
    sector. Why not have NSS--NSF-grant winning universities
    operating far side observatories, as opposed to NASA, those
    types of things, and bring in, shall we say, more slices of the
    government pie there to supplement the kind of budgets they
    have?
        Senator Hutchison. Well, let me just add one more thought.
    Recently, I was listening to Dr. Malcolm Gillis, who is the
    head of your institution, Dr. Lane, he remarked that when Dr.
    Richard Smalley and his partner were--it was announced that
    they were awarded the Nobel prize for nanotechnology research,
    they were teaching freshman chemistry. And I thought, in
    addition to what you have said, to have our stars in the field,
    the astronauts or other scientific stars, to reach out and
    teach freshman or high school students would also be very
    exciting. I can't even imagine what a freshman would think
    when, the day that they are taking their freshman chemistry
    class, their professor is awarded the Nobel prize.
        Dr. Lane. I think they'd think, ``Is my homework still
    going to be due at the end of the period?''
        [Laughter.]
        Senator Hutchison. You're probably right. Just to take away
    all the magic.
        Mr. Tumlinson. Senator Hutchison, real quick, you mentioned
    nanotechnology. We've talked a lot about the inspiration for
    education. There's a great picture of the late Dr. Gerard
    O'Neil, who was a major space advocate, working with a mass
    driver device that he was working on that was going to be used
    to deliver payloads off the Moon. In the picture, is one of his
    young proteges working with him. The kid's name was Dr. Eric
    Drexler. He created the nano movement and the name and the
    entire concept. He was inspired by space. I just wanted to
    bring up that little note.
        Senator Hutchison. Well, it's very important.
        And I would say, to Dr. Lane, in addition to homework, I do
    think that probably those young people are making up the
    scientists of the future because they are so inspired.
        Well, we do have a vote on, and that's why Senator
    Brownback has left, but thank you very much. This was very
    helpful and, I think, will be part of our oversight of NASA as
    we move into a very exciting era.
        Thank you. We are adjourned.
        [Whereupon, at 12:10 p.m., the hearing was adjourned.]

                                A P P E N D I X

      Prepared Statement of Hon. Harrison H. Schmitt, Chairman, Interlune-
                           Intermars Initiative, Inc.

                             Two Paths to the Moon

                        Harrison H. Schmitt i
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------

        \i\ Harrison H. Schmitt landed on the Moon on Apollo 17, served in
    the U.S. Senate, and is currently Adjunct Professor of Engineering at
    Wisconsin-Madison and Chairman of Interlune-Intermars Initiative, Inc.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Summary
        Left unstated in the President's challenge to NASA and the Congress
    is an implicit challenge to the private sector of the United States to
    join in our re-invigorated migration into deep space. That sector of
    American life, particularly the entrepreneurial and investment risk-
    takers among us, should move forward in parallel with NASA's new
    efforts, protecting this unique foundation of American freedom. If
    private enterprise is to participate as more than useful and necessary
    contractors to NASA, then systematic business initiatives must be
    launched that will equal or exceed the technological and financial pace
    of publicly funded space efforts.
        In the tradition of public-private parallelism, private space-
    related initiatives not only can benefit from the research and
    technology development funded by NASA, but they can supplement,
    support, and, if necessary, pick up the baton of space settlement if
    not carried forward by government. The financial, environmental, and
    national security carrot at the end of a long stick is access to low
    cost lunar helium-3 fusion power.
        A private, lunar resource-oriented enterprise will take a different
    technical path back to the Moon than that taken by NASA. This dichotomy
    of approaches will be best for all concerned. More conceptional options
    will be explored, more engineering approaches examined, and more
    opportunities for beneficial outcomes created. For example, to provide
    competitive returns on investment in its lunar endeavors, the private
    sector will want heavier payload capability and lower cost in Earth to
    the Moon launch systems than will NASA. Further, its spacecraft will be
    specialized for the tasks of landing reliably and precisely at known
    resource-rich locations on the Moon rather than serving two or more
    masters.
        A private lunar initiative will not and should not be immune to
    appropriate regulatory oversight by cognizant agencies of government.
    Similarly, such and initiative must follow existing space law, as
    established by U.S. statute and the Outer Space Treaty of 1967 to which
    the U.S. is a party. Specifically, in the case of the Outer Space
    Treaty, the private sector and the U.S. Government have a mutual
    interest in interpretations that encourage both explorers and
    entrepreneurs.
        The entrepreneurial private sector has an obligation to support a
    return to the Moon to stay, as now articulated by President Bush. We
    also have an obligation to follow our own path to get there in order to
    be additive to the overall goals of settling the Solar System and
    improving lives for those who remain on Earth. Once humans permanently
    inhabit the Moon, only the migration of human families out of Africa
    150,000 years ago and of other families successfully seeking freedom in
    the New World 550 years ago will have had comparable survival and
    philosophical impact.
                                 Full Testimony
        President George W. Bush has challenged NASA to once again
    ``explore space and extend a human presence across our solar system.''
    Those who believe in the future and in freedom embrace this vision of
    permanence in space for Americans and for humankind. His new initiative
    places the President squarely in support of the movement of
    civilization into the solar system and ``into the cosmos.'' If
    sustained by Congress and future President's, American leadership of
    this expansion of the ecological reach of our species will be
    accompanied by the transfer of human freedom, first to the Moon, then
    to Mars, and, ultimately, beyond.
        Left unstated in the President's challenge to NASA and the Congress
    is an implicit challenge to the private sector of the United States to
    join in our re-invigorated migration into deep space. That sector of
    American life, particularly the entrepreneurial and investment risk-
    takers among us, should move forward in parallel with NASA's new
    efforts, protecting this unique foundation of American freedom. If
    private enterprise is to participate as more than useful and necessary
    contractors to NASA, then systematic business initiatives must be
    launched that will equal or exceed the technological and financial pace
    of publicly funded space efforts.
        America has a tradition of parallel commercial and public
    technological initiatives, ranging from transportation to agriculture
    to communication to medicine. The development of private trading
    routes, turnpikes, canals, and railroads joined with the Army's Corps
    of Discovery, military expeditions and the Corps of Topographical
    Engineers, and the Corps of Engineers to open the American frontier.
    Scientific research and technological innovations arising from the Land
    Grant College and University system have supported American farmers and
    associated agricultural businesses. Commercial aircraft and ground
    transportation industries grew in concert, respectively, with the
    research activities of the National Advisory Committee on Aeronautics
    and the construction of the Interstate Highway system. Satellite
    communications, the first venture into space related business by
    private investors, was catalyzed by NASA's pioneering experiments and
    demonstrations in the late 1950s and throughout the 1960s. The
    explosion in the quality of health care and in longevity since the
    1930s has come in association with research breakthroughs by both the
    private sector and the National Institutes of Health. Many other
    beneficial and synergistic examples of parallelism between private and
    public institutions can be cited. The combined efforts of such
    institutions clearly have been far more productive then either would
    have been acting alone.
        In that tradition of public-private parallelism, private space-
    related initiatives not only can benefit from the research and
    technology development funded by NASA, but they can supplement,
    support, and, if necessary, pick up the baton of space settlement if
    not carried forward by government. The financial, environmental, and
    national security carrot at the end of a long stick is access to low
    cost lunar helium-3 fusion power. As we reach toward the Moon and its
    resources, the development of fusion technologies will open new
    business opportunities in medical diagnostics and treatment, weapons
    detection, nuclear waste elimination, and clean electrical power
    generation. Longer term, ancillary businesses will be possible because
    of low cost access to space resulting from the demands of lunar
    resource acquisition. These additional business opportunities include
    providing services to the government related to lunar and planetary
    exploration and science, national defense, and long term, on-call
    protection from asteroids and comets. Space and lunar tourism also will
    be enabled by the existence of such capabilities in the private sector.
        A private, lunar resource-oriented enterprise will take a different
    technical path back to the Moon than that taken by NASA, although
    cooperative research and technology development projects would be
    helpful to both. This dichotomy of approaches will be best for all
    concerned. More conceptional options will be explored, more engineering
    approaches examined, and more opportunities for beneficial outcomes
    created. Indeed, successful commercial applications of fusion and space
    technologies to human needs and desires will underpin the private
    enterprise approach in contrast to the policy driven foundation of
    NASA's approach.
        To provide competitive returns on investment in its lunar
    endeavors, the private sector will want heavier payload capability and
    lower cost in Earth to the Moon launch systems than will NASA. Its
    spacecraft will be specialized for the tasks of landing reliably and
    precisely at known resource rich locations on the Moon rather than
    serving two or more masters, such as, the International Space Station
    and a Lunar Base. The private initiative will concentrate on lunar
    surface vehicles and work facilities that provide reliable, low cost
    resource recovery in addition to general mobility and habitat. It also
    will require highly mobile and low maintenance space suits that are at
    least half the weight and four times the mobility of Apollo suits and
    that have the glove dexterity of the human hand. All vehicles,
    facilities, and space suits will be designed for indefinite operational
    life rather than mission life, including embedded diagnostics,
    anticipatory component replacement, and ease of maintenance and
    refurbishment. Any required automated precursor missions to gather
    additional resource development information will use low cost, data
    specific approaches rather than attempt to meet broad, higher cost
    scientific objectives.
        Management structures for a private initiative will follow proven
    corporate approaches and the best business practices of comparable,
    high technology enterprises. These structures would be modified, as
    appropriate, by the many lessons learned from Apollo relative to work
    in the complex and unforgiving environment of deep space. The Board of
    Directors and senior management will deal with programmatic issues
    involving planning, investors, conceptual approach, financial control,
    marketing and sales, governmental interfaces, public affairs, and the
    spin-off of ancillary businesses. Under this protective umbrella,
    responsibility to meet technical objectives will be delegated to
    centers of excellence. A system of independent technical oversight will
    exist to assess the centers' readiness to proceed past designated
    programmatic milestones.
        To minimize the amount of required inter-center coordination (and
    competition), centers will specialize, respectively, in Earth launch
    systems, spacecraft and flight operations, lunar resource extraction
    and processing, lunar surface support facilities, and fusion power
    systems. Centers of excellence will have internal design teams working
    in parallel with the implementing contractors, providing managers with
    two sources of information and opinion related to design and
    configuration control issues. Quality control and assurance will be
    managed as an internal responsibility of all employees and not a
    centralized function of corporate headquarters. Critically, personnel
    management for the corporation will be charged with the need to
    maintain center organizations peopled largely by workers in their 20s
    and managers in their 30s.
        From early in its history, operational control of lunar surface
    operations will be placed on the lunar surface. Resource marketing and
    sales will be managed at corporate headquarters on Earth until such
    time as that function can reasonably be transferred to the Moon as
    well. To minimize cost and capitalize on experience for its lunar
    surface operations, a private initiative will hire and support
    employees who wish to be settlers. With the first landing, the
    initiative's intent will be that employees stay on the Moon
    permanently. All support functions, including medical treatment and
    rest and recuperation, will be provided on the Moon, not by a trip back
    to Earth. A clear constraint on the design and operation of launch
    vehicles and spacecraft will be that there can be no Space Shuttle-like
    stand-downs in the case of accidents. Rather, confidence in all
    hardware must be such that the next planned launch can proceed
    essentially on schedule.
        A private lunar initiative will not and should not be immune to
    appropriate regulatory oversight by cognizant agencies of government.
    Similarly, such and initiative must follow existing space law, as
    established by U.S. statute and the Outer Space Treaty of 1967 to which
    the U.S. is a party. Specifically, in the case of the Outer Space
    Treaty, the private sector and the U.S. Government have a mutual
    interest in interpretations that encourage both explorers and
    entrepreneurs. As with research and technology development of critical
    enabling engineering approaches, it would be highly beneficial to have
    a private-federal partnership in articulating an enabling legal
    environment for deep space. An example of enabling legal cooperation
    would be an extension of private property rights from near-earth space
    to the Moon, Mars, Asteroids, and deep space in general, without a
    claim of national sovereignty as prohibited by the Outer Space Treaty.
        The entrepreneurial private sector has an obligation to support a
    return to the Moon to stay, as now articulated by President Bush. We
    also have an obligation to follow our own path to get there in order to
    be additive to the overall goals of settling the Solar System and
    improving lives for those who remain on Earth. Once humans permanently
    inhabit the Moon, only the migration of human families out of Africa
    150,000 years ago and of other families successfully seeking freedom in
    the New World 550 years ago will have had comparable survival and
    philosophical impact.
                                     ______

    Mars Society Statement on Bush Space Initiative
    January 24, 2004

        On January 23, 2004, the following statement concerning the new
    Bush space policy was ratified by the Steering Committee of the Mars
    Society. The vote was 19 in favor, 3 abstentions, none opposed, and 5
    not voting.
    Bush Speech Opens Door
    The Future is Up to Us

    Statement of the Steering Committee of the Mars Society
    January 23, 2004

        On January 14, President George Bush gave a speech at NASA
    headquarters outlining a new strategic orientation for the American
    space agency. While some of the initial ideas for implementing the new
    space policy can and should be substantially improved upon, the policy
    overall clearly represents a significant and long-overdue step in the
    right direction for the American space program. The Steering Committee
    of the Mars Society therefore welcomes the new policy as presented in
    Presidential Directive entitled ``A Renewed Spirit of Discovery,'' and
    strongly urges Congress to provide the funds requested for the initial
    steps requested for the program over the next Fiscal Year.
        Our analysis of the important strengths and required areas for
    improvement of the new policy is presented below.
    Analysis
        As stated, the new Bush space policy offers both opportunities and
    pitfalls to those interested in furthering human exploration and
    expansion into space in general, and Mars in particular. While not
    representing the start of an actual Moon/Mars program, since nearly all
    serious spending for hardware systems other than the crew capsule is
    deferred to administrations coming into office in 2009 or beyond, it
    does in fact clear the ground for the initiation of such a program
    should the 2009 administration be so inclined. It also provides a
    certain amount of free energy that, if handled properly in the 2004-
    2008 period, could be used to help insure the emergence of a powerful
    human exploration initiative within the time frame of the 2009
    administration.
        In his speech, Bush redefined the purpose of the American space
    program as the ``establishment of a human presence throughout the solar
    system.'' This statement may seem to some like a mere rhetorical
    flourish, but it actually has important concrete programmatic
    significance, as it legitimizes NASA spending supporting technology
    development for human exploration of the Moon and Mars. Such spending
    was forbidden under the previous order of things, and for the past ten
    years technologists seeking funding for important human Moon/Mars
    exploration technologies had to justify them by arguing their value for
    other established programs, such as the JPL-led robotic exploration
    program or the ISS. This has made it impossible to obtain adequate
    funding for many technologies, such as planetary in-situ resource
    utilization (ISRU), and has led to disasters such as the promising JSC-
    led Transhab inflatable habitation program, which was derailed when the
    discovery that planetary exploration technology work was being done
    under ISS cover led to cancellation by congressional staff. It is for
    this reason that the Mars Society has had since its Founding Convention
    in 1998 campaigned for the establishment of a NASA line item for the
    support of human exploration technology development, so that such
    activity could take place openly. Bush's initiative fully accomplishes
    this objective, with healthy initial program funding. For this reason,
    if no other, Bush's move must be seen as an extremely positive
    development.
        The new policy will also create a program organization at NASA
    headquarters, called Code T, which will significantly raise the level
    of NASA efforts to develop efficient plans for human planetary
    exploration. This is also a welcome development.
        In addition, the Bush policy also provides a basis for including
    human exploration research requirements within the design of robotic
    planetary missions. In the late nineties, representatives of the human
    exploration missions office at JSC attempted to utilize flight
    opportunities aboard the JPL-led robotic Mars exploration landers, but
    as the JSC researchers had neither a mandate nor money, they had
    neither force nor funds to back up their requests, and were dealt with
    accordingly. Under the new space policy, both a mandate and funds
    should be available to support human exploration related research and
    technology flight experiments aboard robotic lunar and planetary
    spacecraft. This could allow such payloads to either fly as paying
    customers aboard the JPL/Code S sponsored science spacecraft, or
    alternatively, support the funding of human exploration program
    controlled robotic landers whose primary mission would be to provide
    engineering data for the human exploration program, with other science
    payloads carried on a space available basis.
        The Bush policy also identifies where the funds required to support
    a true human exploration initiative will come from, to wit the
    redirection of the existing Space Shuttle and ISS budgets. Currently,
    the Shuttle budget runs about $4 billion per year, while the ISS budget
    is between one and two billion. This total of $5-$6 billion per year is
    more than sufficient to get humans to both the Moon and Mars within ten
    years of actual program start. Thus the initiative can be done within
    the existing NASA budget of about $16 billion per year in 2004 dollars,
    a level found supportable by presidents and congressional majorities of
    both political parties for the past four presidential terms. Thus the
    financial basis for the program is clear, and is not a budget buster or
    in any way fantastical.
        In his speech, the President invited all nations to join with the
    United States in pursuing the proposed program. We welcome this
    statement, as we fully agree that the exploration and settlement of the
    solar system is a great goal that can help bring humanity together, one
    that is worthy of, and requires, the mobilization of the best talents
    of all the peoples of the Earth.
        For various political and diplomatic reasons, the Bush policy
    delays the phase out of the Shuttle and ISS until2010, thereby delaying
    substantial human exploration program start until about that time. Thus
    the choice on whether or not to really start a Moon or Mars human
    exploration program, and what its pace or objectives should be, is
    effectively being placed in the hands of the 2009 administration.
        The merit of this decision is debatable. A key point however, is
    that the 2009 administration will have a choice. By making clear that
    the fundamental purpose of the human spaceflight program is to allow
    humans to FLY ACROSS SPACE (the Apollo era vision) to explore other
    worlds, rather than to allow humans to EXPERIENCE SPACE (the Shuttle
    era vision), the Bush policy (should it be sustained by either his
    reelection or the concurrence on this issue of an alternative 2005
    administration) effectively precludes the commitment ofNASA to a second
    generation Shuttle (``Shuttle 2'') as its next major program. As
    recently as a few months ago, substantial factions within space policy
    circles in both congress and NASA projected such a Shuttle 2 program as
    the agency's next major project after ISS. Had that occurred the future
    would have looked like this: the present decade would be consumed with
    returning the Shuttle to flight and building ISS. The next decade would
    be devoted to extending the life of Shuttle and developing Shuttle 2.
    The 2020s would then be a repeat of the 1980s, attempting to make
    Shuttle 2 operational, leading to a decision in 2030 on the next major
    project, which probably would have been ISS-2. Thankfully, this
    ``Groundhog Day'' scenario for perpetual stagnation in space has now
    been foreclosed on.
        The decision to punt the responsibility for implementation, and
    thus the control, of the program to the 2009 administration promises to
    make the next five years an extremely interesting time for space
    advocates. In his speech, Mr. Bush defined human expansion into the
    solar system as NASA's goal, and posed the idea of a lunar base
    initiated by 2020 as the strategy by which this objective might be
    approached. That is one plan, but the next five years will see other
    plans put forward for consideration by the political class as efficient
    means by which the desired overall goal can be achieved with maximum
    speed, reliability, and at minimum cost. The great debate on what our
    strategy for reaching the Moon and the planets should be has thus not
    been closed by Bush's speech, but opened.
        The victory in this healthy battle of ideas will go to those people
    who convince the players, not merely of today, but of2009 and beyond,
    of the merit of their concepts. The Mars Society welcomes this
    challenge, and will seek to actively participate in this discussion to
    contribute its technical expertise and to convey an understanding to
    the political class, the technical community, the press, and the public
    that within the context of the new space policy, that the near-term
    human exploration ofMars is feasible, affordable, and truly worthy of
    the efforts and risks required.
        In transitioning from one kind of space program to another, every
    effort should be made to prevent unnecessary collateral damage to
    valuable parts of the old program. The decision announced by NASA
    headquarters late last week to abandon the planned Shuttle mission to
    upgrade and reboost the Hubble Space Telescope (HST) is an example of
    the kind of mistake that needs to be avoided. The Cosmic Origins
    Spectrograph and Widefield Camera 3 designed to bring the HST to its
    full potential have already been built and tested, and promise an
    enormous scientific return upon delivery to orbit. If the Bush plan
    were to stand down the Shuttle immediately, and save the $24 billion
    required to operate it through 2010 so as to initiate the Moon/Mars
    program with substantial funding immediately, that would be one thing.
    But given the decision to return the Shuttle to flight, canceling the
    Hubble upgrade would only save about $200 million, or 1 percent of the
    Shuttle program's budget, while destroying about 90 percent of its
    scientific value. This is extremely foolish.
        Safety arguments won't wash either; if the Shuttle is safe enough
    to fly to the ISS, its safe enough to perform its mission to Hubble.
    Indeed, while Shuttle missions to the Hubble may lack the on-orbit
    safe-haven of the ISS, the low-inclination of Hubble flights enables
    launch aborts to warm tropical waters, where crew survival chances are
    much better than in the frigid north Atlantic abort sites required by
    ISS launches. Moreover, it is difficult to understand how an agency
    which is too risk adverse to undertake a Shuttle mission to Hubble
    could possibly be serious in considering a mission to the Moon or Mars.
        The cancellation ofthe Hubble mission can thus only be described as
    a serious mistake, apparently committed in the name of the desire to
    appear ``decisive'' in breaking from the old paradigm in favor of the
    new. In addition to the harm done to astronomy, it would be a very bad
    thing for the infant new space policy to begin its life with a such a
    distasteful record. Under no circumstances should the alleged impending
    availability of the James Webb Space Telescope be accepted as a
    rationale for abandoning Hubble, either. That would be to repeat the
    mistake NASA made in abandoning the Saturn V for the supposedly
    superior Shuttle, or Skylab for the ISSerrors which set back the space
    program by decades of time of tens of billions of dollars. IfNASA's
    leadership will not see reason on this issue, Congress should take
    forceful action to reverse this very bad decision.
    Technological Issues
        The right way to do a program whose objectives encompass both a
    permanent lunar base and the human exploration ofMars is to design a
    set of transportation hardware that can accomplish human Mars missions,
    a modified modular subset of which can be used to support lunar
    activities. Approaching the problem in this way can save a great deal
    of time and money, as only one hardware set needs to be developed
    instead of two. It also maximizes the value of the Moon as a testing
    ground for Mars, since under this approach to Moon missions will be
    done using the Mars hardware, and serve directly to shake it out.
    Provided this is the approach adopted, a program initiated in 2009
    could easily achieve piloted lunar landing by 2015 and launch the first
    human Mars expedition by 2018. The build up of a permanent lunar base
    and continued Mars missions could then occur simultaneously. Since it
    is only possible to launch to Mars every other year in any case, the
    implications of a running concurrent programs are simply that the lunar
    program launch rate would be reduced somewhat during Mars launch years.
    Concurrent launch programs would also serve to minimize launch costs by
    maximizing the rate of production of the booster production lines, as
    the cost of running a launch vehicle manufacturing facility increases
    only marginally with a higher production rate. To use a mundane
    analogy, it takes very little extra labor to cook two steaks instead of
    one, provided you cook them both at the same time. In the production of
    launch vehicles this kitchen parable holds even more force, as labor
    costs overwhelmingly dominate those of materials.
        Within the context of such a well-planned Moon/Mars program, there
    are certain technologies that are essential. We address only two of the
    most critical, heavy lift boosters and ISRU.
    Heavy Lift Boosters
        The key technical instrumentality required to make lunar bases and
    Mars missions feasible is a heavy lift vehicle with a hydrogen/oxygen
    upper stage capable of throwing payloads in the 50-tonne class on
    Trans-lunar or Trans-Mars injection. This is the capability
    demonstrated during the 1960s by the Saturn V. Once such a vehicle is
    available, roundtrip Lunar missions or one-way delivery of habitations
    and other heavy payloads to the lunar surface can be readily
    accomplished with a single launch. Piloted Mars missions can also be
    accomplished using multiple discrete Trans-Mars launches of such a
    system, with no on-orbit assembly, as shown by the Mars Direct plan
    (Zubrin and Baker, 1990), the Stanford Mission plan (Lusignan, et al
    1992), or the JSC Design Reference Mission 3 (Weaver et al, 1994).
        Such Saturn V class launch systems can be readily created at this
    point either by converting the Shuttle launch stack through elimination
    of the orbiter and its replacement with a LOx/H2
    upper stage, or the creation of new, all-liquid propulsion booster
    systems. The Mars Society was recently shown plans by one major
    aerospace company for evolving its existing line of medium lift
    boosters to create a family of modular heavy lift boosters with
    payloads ranging through quarter, half, and full Saturn V capabilities.
    Based on this company's experience with previous successful launch
    vehicle developments, the entire development program to create the
    whole family of boosters could be accomplished in five years with a
    development cost of about $4 billion. The recurring launch cost for the
    Saturn V class system design was $300 million per launch, or less than
    $1000/lb for payload delivery to LEO. The methods of creating such
    booster families are obvious to experienced launch vehicle engineers,
    and we have no doubt that this company's competitors have plans for
    creating similar hardware sets with comparable development costs and
    schedules.
        The claims by certain pundits opposed to any exploration initiative
    that a new heavy lift booster would cost tens of billions to develop
    can thus readily be shown to have no basis in fact. Such heavy lift
    vehicles would also have many applications outside of the human
    exploration program.
    ISRU
        Both lunar bases and Mars expeditions are strongly benefited
    through the use of in-situ resource utilization (ISRU) techniques for
    the production of return propellant, human consumables, and vehicle
    fuels and oxygen for use in extended missions on a planetary surface.
    The mission mass savings for either lunar bases or Mars missions
    resulting from ISRU has been demonstrated in numerous studies, and
    significantly exceeds that offered by advanced propulsion concepts with
    much higher development and recurring system costs.
        Effective ISRU require both chemical processing systems and
    reliable sources of power, for which space nuclear systems offer the
    greatest promise. We therefore strongly commend the administration for
    its Prometheus project to create such space nuclear systems. However we
    note that up until now, the sole applications considered by NASA for
    its space nuclear power systems have been spacecraft power and nuclear
    electric propulsion (NEP). Without dismissing the important value ofNEP
    for outer solar system robotic missions and other missions involving
    large velocity changes undertaken across extended time frames, we note
    that the size ofNEP units required to supply propulsion for human
    exploration missions are on the order of 10,000 kilowatts. In contrast,
    when used to produce chemical propellants on planetary surfaces, the
    required reactor size to support human exploration is reduced to about
    100 kilowatts. This is because a much smaller reactor stationed on a
    planetary surface making propellant can emit energy over a long period
    of time prior to flight, store it as chemical propellant, which then
    can release the energy as fast as it is needed under flight conditions.
    The mission mass leverages achieved by such ISRU supported chemical
    propulsion options are greater than those offered by NEP, while for
    inner solar system missions, the flight times are less (two orders of
    magnitude less for Lunar applications). In addition, the ISRU-supported
    chemical systems can be used not only for orbital transfer, but for
    planetary ascent.
        Thus while space nuclear power is enabling for ISRU, it is ISRU
    that greatly reduces the cost, and increases the value of space nuclear
    power in supporting human exploration. The two technologies should thus
    be pursued in parallel, and an appropriate fraction of the Prometheus
    budget applied towards bringing ISRU applications of space nuclear
    power to flight status, and to support robotic missions demonstrating
    such technology on the Moon and Mars.
        Furthermore, requirements should be written into the Prometheus
    program to insure that the power systems developed are compatible for
    operation on the surface of the Moon and Mars, since their use on the
    planetary surface to produce propellants and consumables represents by
    far the most advantageous method of employing them to support near-term
    human space exploration, and their power is needed on the surface to
    support base operations in any case.
        Both ISRU technology and heavy lift booster development should thus
    be central priorities of the Code T effort over the immediate period.
        Other systems should be developed with similar concern for maximum
    commonality of hardware and technology across lunar and Mars mission
    applications.
    Political Implications
        The train of events set in motion by the new space policy will
    create a decision point circa 2009 that will offer three alternatives
    for future action. These are;

      (a) The 2009 administration could choose to abort the Moon/Mars
            program altogether, and simply use the Crew Exploration Vehicle
            (CEV) as a capsule launched atop expendables as a way of
            continuing to visit the ISS. This would lead to a Mir-type
            extended ISS program, conducted at lower cost than possible
            using Shuttle launches, but with no discernable purpose. This
            would result in stagnation in space for however long such a
            programmatic decision prevailed, and probable retrogression on
            heavy lift, ISRU, and other programs necessary for human
            exploration.

      (b) The 2009 administration could decide to proceed in accordance
            with idea of building a lunar base, starting 2020, without
            concern for the Mars mission except to make claims that lunar
            experience will no doubt be useful later when others
            contemplate going to Mars. This would result in the development
            of mostly incompatible lunar program hardware (except the
            booster), making it necessary to start developing an entire new
            hardware set circa 2030, or possibly 2040, given the budgetary
            entanglements such a stand-alone lunar program would create,
            making it likely that the first Mars landing would not occur
            before the middle of the 21st Century. Alternatively, given the
            limited interest provided by repeated dead-end Lunar
            expeditions, the program could simply expire.

      (c) The 2009 administration could decide to launch a humans to Mars
            program, with the objective of reaching Mars within ten years,
            with expeditions to the Moon using a modified subset of the
            Mars flight hardware beginning around program year 7. Because
            only one hardware set would need to be developed instead of
            two, and because in aerospace cost equals people times time,
            this represents a much lower cost approach to achieving the
            goals set forth in the new space policy than alternative (b).
            Moreover, it is the only approach that will result in human
            explorers walking on Mars within the working lifetime of any
            adult today.

        It is therefore imperative that everyone who wishes to see the
    human exploration of Mars become a reality do everything he or she can
    to fight for the bold course represented by option C. In the labs and
    engineering organizations, in the press, in the classroom and the
    committee room, in the Arctic and in the desert, in the halls of
    congress, and in every venue of public opinion ranging from books and
    technical papers to Internet newsgroups and late night talk radio, each
    will need to play their part.
        A door has been opened, and a battle of ideas that will determine
    the shape of the human future for many years to come has now been truly
    joined. Where it will lead is up to us. Contending visions that two
    weeks ago were mere hypothetical debates among space activists have now
    entered the center of political discourse. We welcome the challenge.
    For as reason is our witness and courage is our guide, we shall
    prevail.
                                     ______

                         A Renewed Spirit of Discovery
               The President's Vision for U.S. Space Exploration
    [GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]

                                      ______

                 Remarks by the President on U.S. Space Policy

    [GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
                                     ______

                   Strategy Based on Long-Term Affordability
    [GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]

                                   __________

                              Don't Desert Hubble

                        Robert Zubrin--January 27, 2004

        Last week, NASA Administrator Sean O'Keefe announced that he had
    decided to cancel all future Space Shuttle missions to the Hubble Space
    Telescope, including SM4, the nearly-ready-to-go flight that would have
    installed the new Cosmic Origins Spectrograph and Widefield Camera 3
    instruments. This decision was announced in conjunction with an overall
    policy shift by the Bush administration to phase out the Shuttle and
    International Space Station (ISS) commitments by 2010, thereby clearing
    the way to redeploy their budgets towards supporting human exploration
    of the Moon and Mars. While the general redirection of NASA's human
    spaceflight program from Earth orbital activities towards planetary
    exploration was a valuable and long-overdue step, canceling the Hubble
    upgrade mission was a huge mistake.
        The Hubble Space Telescope has been the most scientifically
    productive spacecraft in history. Through Hubble, we have observed
    directly the planetary cometary impacts that drive the evolution of
    life, witnessed the birth of stars that make all life possible, and
    measured the size and age of the universe itself. The astronaut
    missions that have made this possible stand as epic achievements in the
    chronicles of humanity's search for truth.
        Now we have a chance to push further. The Cosmic Origins
    Spectrograph and Widefield Camera 3 designed to bring the Hubble to its
    full potential have already been built and tested at a cost of $167
    million, and promise an enormous scientific return upon delivery to
    orbit. With the help of these instruments, Hubble would be able probe
    deeper into space and time, helping to reveal the processes that
    governed the origin of the universe and that will determine its
    ultimate fate. How can the decision abort such a program possibly be
    justified?
        Certainly not on the basis of cost. If the Bush plan were to stand
    down the Shuttle immediately, and save the $24 billion required to
    operate it through 2010 so as to initiate the Moon/Mars program this
    year with substantial funding, that would be one thing. But given the
    decision to return the Shuttle to flight, canceling the Hubble upgrade
    would only save a pittance. It takes about $4 billion per year to
    maintain the standing army of engineers and technicians that support
    the Shuttle program, but it only costs an additional $100 million or so
    to fly five Shuttles in a given year instead of four. Thus the
    additional cost to the taxpayer to fly both SM4 and a subsequent flight
    a few years later to replace the Hubble's batteries and gyros and
    reboost it to a higher orbit where it could be functional well into the
    next decade would only be about $200 million, or less than one percent
    of the Shuttle program's budget over its remaining life. From a
    financial point of view, the decision to abandon the Hubble upgrade
    while continuing Shuttle flights amounts to throwing out the baby while
    keeping the bathwater.
        Safety arguments won't wash either; if the Shuttle is safe enough
    to fly to the ISS, it is safe enough to perform its mission to Hubble.
    It is true then when flying to the ISS, the crew has a safe-haven on
    orbit, which is not available to Hubble flights. However Hubble
    missions leave the Cape flying east-southeast, while launches to ISS go
    northeast. Thus in the event of a launch abort, Hubble missions can
    ditch in warm tropical waters while ISS flights must come down in the
    frigid North Atlantic, where the crew's chances for survival would be
    much less. Thus, while no true quantitative engineering analysis has
    been done to establish whether and to what extent Shuttle flights to
    ISS are more or less risky than Hubble missions, there is good reason
    to believe that, if anything, it is the latter that offer greater
    safety.
        Furthermore, consider this: Under the new space policy, the
    President intends to ask Congress to spend billions of dollars to
    develop technology to enable human Moon and Mars missions. Yet Congress
    has just spent $167 million to develop the instruments for SM4, only to
    be told by the NASA Administrator that he is now afraid to fly the
    Shuttle to deliver them. If such behavior is accepted, what guarantee
    can lawmakers have that after they spend billions to develop manned
    Moon or Mars exploration hardware, a future NASA administrator might
    not also get cold feet? It is difficult to understand how an agency
    which is too risk-adverse to undertake a Shuttle mission to Hubble
    could possibly be serious in considering a piloted mission to the Moon
    or Mars.
        The decision to cancel the Hubble mission thus completely
    undermines the President's call for human planetary exploration. Unless
    we are willing to accept risks equal to, and in fact significantly
    greater, than those required to upgrade the space telescope, human
    explorers are not going to the Moon, Mars, or anywhere else. And if we
    are not going to engage in human interplanetary travel, then the
    primary rationale for the Space Station program--learning about the
    effects of long-duration spaceflight on human physiology must be
    brought into question as well.
        The desertion of Hubble is an offense against science and
    civilization. It represents a departure from the pioneer spirit, and
    its ratification as policy would preclude any possibility of a human
    future in space. It is an inexcusable decision, and it needs to be
    reversed.
        Dr. Robert Zubrin is President of the Mars Society and author of
    the books The Case for Mars (1996), Entering Space (1999), and Mars on
    Earth (2003).
                                     ______

        Response to Written Questions Submitted by Hon. John McCain to
                               Hon. Sean O'Keefe
        Question 1. President Bush announced the establishment of the
    Commission on the Implementation of U.S. Space Exploration Policy to
    advise NASA on the long-term implementation of his plan. The President
    stated that the Commission would consist of ``public and private sector
    experts.''
        Can you elaborate on the role that Mr. Pete Aldridge, who, as I
    noted in my opening statement, sits on the Board of Lockheed Martin,
    will have as Chairman of the Commission in determining private sector
    involvement, including that of Lockheed Martin, in the implementation
    of the President's proposal?
        Answer. The Commission's charter and membership were established by
    the President by means of an Executive Order, and the Commission will
    report to the President. NASA's role is limited to providing
    administrative support and expert advice as requested by the
    Commission. Questions on the role of specific Commissioners would be
    appropriate for the White House or the Commission itself.

        Question 2. The amount that the President proposes be spent over
    the next five years on his new space initiative is $12 billion, with $1
    billion in new spending and $11 billion to come from reallocating funds
    from existing programs. What criteria will be used to determine the
    programs that will be cut, and the amounts of these cuts?
        Answer. The new Vision for Space Exploration is designed to fund a
    robust program of space exploration while maintaining fiscal
    responsibility, consistent with the Administration's goal of cutting
    the budget deficit in half within the next five years. NASA's FY 2005
    Budget will increase by $1 billion over five years when compared with
    the President's 2004 plan. In addition to the new funding, the vision
    will be supported by $11 billion in reprogrammed funds over the next
    five years.
        The majority of the $11 billion reallocation, $8 billion over five
    years, comes from human space flight-related programs. These include:

            Discontinue Space Launch Initiative ($5.9 billion over five
            years)--The vision puts emphasis on enabling the exploration of
            other worlds, including necessary transportation systems. The
            vehicles that would have been developed under the Space Launch
            Initiative were focused on improving the transport of crew and
            cargo to and from the Space Station. These activities are
            discontinued in favor of Project Constellation, which will
            develop a crew exploration vehicle to enable human exploration
            missions beyond low Earth orbit.

            Space Shuttle Retirement ($1.5 billion over five years)--The
            vision sets a goal of completing Space Station deployment,
            planned for the end of the decade. With its Space Station
            deployment job finished, NASA will retire the Space Shuttle to
            enable safer approaches to crew transport and to redirect
            resources towards exploration goals. The five-year projection
            in the FY 2005 budget assumes savings from Space Shuttle
            retirement beginning in FY 2008.

            Space Station Research Redirection ($1.2 billion over five
            years)--The vision refocuses the Space Station on research to
            enable human exploration of other worlds. NASA has set a goal
            of finishing this research by 2016. The budget eliminates some
            Space Station research not tied to exploration needs and
            redirects resources towards research areas required for
            exploration.

        Other reductions ($3 billion over five years) come from lower
    priority programs that are not elements of the vision. These include:

            New Start Deferrals and Level Spending ($2.7 billion over five
            years)--The FY 2005 budget defers the start of new flight
            projects, such as the Global Precipitation Mission, Solar
            Terrestrial Probes, and Beyond Einstein, by one or two years.
            The budget also sustains spending levels at current rates in
            related Earth Science and Space Science program areas.

            Reduce Space Technology and Defer New Facilities ($300 million
            over five years)--The budget adjusts space technology funding,
            aligns remaining space technology activities with exploration
            needs, and defers construction starts of new facilities until
            exploration needs can be incorporated in facilities planning.

        The table below summarizes the reductions that make up the $11
    billion redirection.

        Question 2a. How will NASA ensure that these funding cuts will not
    adversely impact NASA's overall mission, including the safety of the
    shuttles and the International Space Station?
        Answer. The FY 2005 budget and associated five-year budget
    projection help ensure Space Station and Space Shuttle safety and
    mission success while also planning for Space Shuttle retirement when
    its role in Space Station deployment is complete, planned for the end
    of the decade.
        The FY 2005 budget provides $4.3 billion for the Space Shuttle, a 9
    percent increase above FY 2004. The budget also provides an increase of
    $700 million for the Space Shuttle through FY 2007, including $200
    million in FY 2005 for return-to-flight activities. The budget assumes
    savings from Space Shuttle only when Shuttle retirement draws near and
    Shuttle activities would begin to phase out, beginning in FY 2008.
        The FY 2005 budget provides $1.9 billion for the Space Station, a
    24 percent increase above FY 2004, primarily due to $140 million for
    new Station crew and cargo services, and $100 million for forward
    funding of Station reserves to compensate for a $200 million
    appropriations cut in FY 2004.

        Question 3. The General Accounting Office (GAO) recently reported
    that NASA is having difficulty meeting its own financial management
    goals. In light of GAO's findings regarding financial management
    controls at NASA, should we be concerned about NASA's ability to manage
    new programs?
        Answer. Improving NASA's financial management is a high priority. A
    major part of this undertaking was the implementation of an agency-wide
    Integrated Financial Management system, and the retiring of 72
    disparate and incompatible accounting systems. We now have financial
    visibility across the agency with the push of a button. This effort was
    necessary to better manage our existing programs, and will help us
    manage and meet the New Vision for Space Exploration.
    Background
        GAO and OMB have called for agencies to improve their financial
    management in part by using integrated off-the-shelf enterprise
    software. The deployment of our new integrated financial management
    system is proceeding on schedule, as well as within scope and cost
    parameters described in our April 2003 report to Congress on the
    Integrated Financial Management system. We have been careful to
    incorporate the most recent recommendations from the GAO, and have been
    fully operational agency-wide on the new system since the beginning of
    the current fiscal year (October 2003).
        NASA faced the extraordinary challenge of bringing this new system
    online while attempting to meet an accelerated timeline in producing
    its annual financial statements. When considering the alternative
    implementation strategies, we considered two basic options: (1) bring
    on the new system and produce our financial statements using the old
    legacy systems, or (2) bring on the new system in time to have it
    produce the statements. The first approach required two Herculean
    efforts, while the second required one. Since producing financial
    statements under the disparate legacy systems was already a challenge
    that relied a great deal on painstaking manual reconciliations, we
    decided on the latter strategy, which was admittedly aggressive. In the
    end, it proved to be too much to accomplish in a single year.
    Nevertheless, we are online with a unified system and are in a better
    position not only to meet the new requirements to produce quarterly
    statements, but also meet the challenges set forth by the President.
        Our delay in delivering this information resulted in a disclaimer
    from our auditors for FY 2003. Frankly, this disclaimed opinion
    accurately reflected the sheer magnitude and complexity of the agency-
    wide conversion process to our new financial system. For example, the
    phased conversion process required the audit to be performed on both
    the legacy systems and the new system using a ``cross walk'' for
    reconciliations. This complexity and the volume of accounting data that
    had to be converted created a significant delay in delivering our
    financial statements and related financial information to our auditors
    (they were delivered on December 10).
        By June 2003, we had deployed this single integrated system in all
    of our Centers, allowing us to retire approximately 72 separate and
    incompatible accounting systems across the Agency and ``clean'' up
    about 12 years of financial data (several million entries). Our focus
    now is on stabilizing this new system under full operational
    conditions, learning how to optimize it capabilities, perfecting the
    training of our several thousand users, and fixing remaining ``bugs''
    which could only be identified under fully operational conditions.
        For 2004, given the recent conversion to our new system, we are
    managing our audit as a full-blown project rather than as a regular
    process, assigning to the task to a dedicated team of both accountants
    and system experts reporting directly to the Deputy Administrator and
    the Agency CFO. Additionally, we have converted the entire agency to a
    full cost accounting environment to better track and analyze the costs
    of individual projects and programs. This innovation led to NASA
    receiving an honorable mention at the President's Quality Award
    ceremony recognizing best practices in budget and performance
    integration.

        Question 4. As part of the Administration's roll out of the new
    program, Senate staffers were briefed on the plan by staff from the
    National Security Council. Are there any national security or military
    components to the new space program?
        Answer. The fundamental goal of the Vision for Space Exploration is
    ``to advance U.S. scientific, security, and economic interests through
    a robust space exploration program.'' The vision does not have any
    specific national security or military components, and the President's
    budget submission for NASA for FY05 does not contain any such new
    vision-related initiatives. NASA and the Department of Defense
    routinely consult at senior levels and cooperate to meet common
    requirements, and these practices will continue as we implement the
    Vision for Space Exploration.

        Question 4a. If so, will the Department of Defense contribute
    funding to this new program?
        Answer. No DoD contributions to the Vision for Space Exploration
    have been identified or sought. DoD and the commercial sector may
    develop future Earth-to-orbit launch systems, with NASA as a capability
    purchaser rather than a developer, unless NASA has a unique requirement
    that cannot be satisfied by those sources.

        Question 5. In your written testimony you state, ``the budget
    strategy will not require large balloon payments by future Congresses
    and Administrations.'' Considering our experience with the
    International Space Station, what assurances can you give us that
    enormous cost overruns that require these balloon-type payments won't
    happen again?
        Answer. The pacing and phasing of the activities laid out in the
    NASA budget strategy are fiscally responsible and, by design, will not
    require any large balloon payments. With regard to past ISS overruns,
    we have instituted many management reforms that have worked well to get
    spending under control. We will apply these lessons learned to future
    activities encompassed by the Vision for Space Exploration.
        NASA is adopting an approach to vehicle and systems development
    based on the Defense Department's ``spiral development'' model. This
    approach emphasizes the use of existing technologies and the
    incremental demonstration of performance. By focusing research and test
    programs on rapid deployment of technologies that can be evolved, NASA
    will ensure that it is focused on the capabilities that are most
    critical to exploration. NASA's exploration programs will also employ
    management techniques such as earned value management, which will
    ensure that costs are allocated based on strict planning geared towards
    the President's priorities. Through the combination of these techniques
    and a commitment to managing requirements within budget guidelines,
    NASA will make the hard choices needed to realize the Vision for Space
    Exploration without the need for large balloon-type payments.

        Question 6. The President's space proposal calls for completing the
    International Space Station (ISS) by 2010 and terminating Shuttle
    operation in 2010. What are NASA's plans for servicing the ISS
    operations after 2010 and before 2014 when the President proposes to
    have the Crew Exploration Vehicle available?
        Answer. Based upon President Bush's directive to phase out the
    Shuttle once the ISS assembly is complete, planned for the end of the
    decade, NASA is re-assessing the ISS final configuration, logistics,
    maintenance, and utilization upmass and downmass requirements in
    coordination with the International Partners. This re-assessment
    includes both pressurized and unpressurized cargo and will revisit
    research requirements in light of the Vision for Space Exploration. The
    ISS Program, with the International Partners, will develop a plan for
    meeting the revised cargo requirements through existing vehicles, those
    approved for development by our Partners, and through the potential
    purchase of commercial supply and return services. Current and planned
    international partner vehicles include Russian Soyuz and Progress
    vehicles, the European Automated Transfer Vehicle, and the Japanese H-
    II Transfer Vehicle. Commercial cargo transport services will also be
    considered. Use of the new Crew Exploration Vehicle may also be
    examined.

        Question 7. The overall projected budget for the new space proposal
    is $12 billion for the next five years, which includes the design,
    development and operation of the Crew Exploration Vehicle. The total
    cost for the Orbital Space Plane (OSP) now on the drawing boards had
    been estimated at more than $15 billion. Can you explain how NASA can
    afford to implement a comprehensive Moon-Mars space program for less
    than the cost of the OSP--a vehicle intended exclusively to service the
    International Space Station?
        Answer. Implementing the Vision for Space Exploration is a multi-
    decade endeavor. Where the OSP had been proposed to be completing
    development within the horizon of the President's budget, only the
    first five years of the exploration vision are covered by the budget.
    In order to leverage its investment in the OSP Program, NASA will
    conduct a full review of OSP's management and technology with an eye
    towards applying the past work of the Orbital Space Plane Program to
    Crew Exploration Vehicle (CEV) development. The CEV will be designed
    for simplicity and robustness. NASA has made great strides in bringing
    its programs' costs under control. The International Space Station, for
    example, has implemented management reforms that have moved the program
    onto sound financial footing. The CEV will be developed at a deliberate
    pace, one step at a time, learning and improving with a first test
    flight before the end of the decade and the first crewed mission
    targeted for 2014. Most of the large-scale development for the CEV will
    be conducted using funding freed up by the retirement of the Shuttle,
    planned for the end of the decade.
        For the CEV and other exploration systems, NASA is adopting an
    approach to vehicle and systems development based on the Defense
    Department's ``spiral development'' model. This approach emphasizes the
    use of existing technologies and the incremental demonstration of
    performance. By focusing research and test programs on rapid deployment
    of technologies that can be evolved, NASA will ensure that it is
    focused on the capabilities that are most critical to exploration.
    NASA's exploration programs will also employ management techniques such
    as earned value management, which will ensure that costs are allocated
    based on strict planning geared towards the President's priorities.

        Question 8. The most recent Interim Report of the Return to Flight
    Task Group states that ``Detailed plans for many of the recommendations
    have not been forthcoming. NASA has not been timely in some of their
    responses to Task Group requests for information.'' Given the need for
    a safe and timely return to flight, such reports of questionable
    cooperation from NASA are disconcerting.
        Please comment on NASA's cooperation with information requests from
    the Return to Flight Task Group.
        Answer. NASA intends to cooperate fully and openly with the Return
    to Flight Task Group. Nearly all of the technical information requests
    from the Return to Flight Task Group have been fulfilled. Many requests
    for information were in the areas of management, organizational, and
    cultural changes. These critical areas under consideration by NASA have
    been deliberately debated and scrutinized within NASA to make certain
    that there are no unintended consequences of our proposed actions.
        NASA officials met with members of the Task Group during a fact-
    finding meeting in late February. During the meeting, NASA provided
    updates on several products and responded to many of the Task Group's
    actions. Public discussion and recommendations are expected during the
    Task Group's upcoming plenary meeting on April 24-25.

        Question 9. Could you please explain your rationale for canceling
    the servicing mission for the Hubble Space Telescope:
        Answer. The difficult decision to forego a Space Shuttle mission
    dedicated to the fifth on-orbit servicing of the Hubble Space Telescope
    (HST) was arrived at only after a thorough consideration of the report
    from the Columbia Accident Investigation Board, potential risks and
    safety concerns for the astronauts, and the current and expected health
    of the telescope. The primary driver for this decision was safety, not
    budget.
        If NASA had decided to pursue the fifth servicing mission, at a
    minimum our plan to satisfy CAIB recommendation 6.4-1 (regarding TPS
    Inspection and Repair Capabilities) would require:

       Development of an autonomous repair capability (i.e., one
            independent of the International Space Station) using an
            instrumented boom ``carried'' by the Shuttle Remote Manipulator
            System to inspect for damage on flight day two to the Thermal
            Protection System and Reinforced Carbon-Carbon wing leading
            edge.

       A second orbiter and crew ready, on the launch pad, in the
            event of a problem preventing the safe return of the SM 4
            orbiter.

       A rescue capability requiring the free-flight exchange of
            personnel between the two orbital vehicles and an understanding
            of the problems on the first vehicle such that risking
            additional personnel on the rescue vehicle would be justified.

        In addition, the new inspection and ``second Shuttle'' technologies
    and procedures would be developed for a one-time use for HST servicing.
    This is because Hubble's unique orbital inclination (28 degrees) is not
    compatible with that of the International Space Station (ISS, which
    orbits at a 51-degree inclination); the new launch/mission safety
    procedures assume Shuttle access to ISS.
        The return-to-flight manifest has not been firmly established yet;
    however, for planning purposes, it was decided that the earliest SM-4
    could be manifested was mid-2006; 2007 represented a more likely
    scenario.
        HST is operating normally and will continue to function until age
    and natural wear take their inevitable toll on its components; current
    predictions estimate that the observatory will continue to operate
    until 2007-08. Since the likely launch date and the predicted end of
    HST science operations are so close, there is a significant possibility
    that the observatory will no longer be operational at the time of the
    mission.
        NASA is aggressively looking for innovative ways to extend the
    science lifetime of Hubble as far as possible. There is enough HST data
    (already existing and yet to come) to keep researchers busy for years
    to come. We are planning a robotic mission to de-orbit the observatory
    safely once it can no longer conduct world-class science.

        Question 10. Your testimony claims that $4 billion will be freed up
    for the President's new space initiative by retiring the Space Shuttle.
    Based on the CAIB report's description of how previous transfers from
    the Space Shuttle account led to cost pressures that contributed to the
    Columbia accident, how do you intend to ensure the shuttles' safety
    while making these cuts?
        Answer. We are applying the lessons learned from the CAIB into the
    return to flight plan for the Space Shuttle and are committed to flying
    safely until the Shuttle is retired. The FY 2005 President's request
    adds approximately $690 million more to the Space Shuttle budget
    through FY 2007 compared to the FY 2004 President's budget request and
    covers the critical years of the International Space Station assembly.
    Reductions in the Shuttle budget start only in FY 2008, as hardware
    production is phased-down.

        Question 11. Public response to the President's announcement has
    been lukewarm. A Time/CNN poll reports that about 62 percent of
    Americans disapprove of the President's plan. The Associated Press poll
    reports that 55 percent say they would prefer spending funds on other
    programs. Why do you think the public has not been more enthusiastic?
        Answer. Polling data over time indicate broad public support for
    space exploration. Given the recent timing of the President's
    announcement, many mistaken notions about the cost and goals of the
    program are still widespread. The extraordinary public fascination with
    the results of the current Mars Exploration Rover missions attests
    that, when results are visible and long-range plans become present
    realities of discovery and exploration, the public is enthusiastic,
    supportive, and inspired.

        Question 12. The Orbital Space Plane (OSP) was intended to serve as
    a ``lifeboat'' for astronauts, and be attached to the International
    Space Station (ISS). The President has proposed that the Crew
    Exploration Vehicle (CEV) be able to transport crew to the ISS.

        (a) Will the CEV also have the capacity to serve as a ``lifeboat''
    for astronauts?
        Answer. The CEV program is a new initiative focused on a different
    set of requirements than the OSP program. The CEV will be developed for
    missions beyond low Earth orbit. It may be able to perform some crew
    transfer functions that the OSP would have performed, but the emphasis
    in CEV design will be centered on exploration. Decisions will be made
    so that the CEV design assures the safety of human crews and the
    sustainability of future exploration.

        Question 12b. Will NASA initiate a new procurement process for the
    CEV or will NASA continue with a revised OSP process?
        Answer. NASA will initiate a new procurement process. NASA is
    committed to making full and open competition a hallmark of the CEV
    program. By the end of the summer of 2004, the Office of Exploration
    Systems will define Level 1 requirements for the CEV program in
    preparation for the issuance of an RFP for concept development in the
    fall of 2004.

        Question 13. Part of the President's plan called for going to the
    Moon. We landed on the Moon 35 years ago. How much of the technology
    that was used during the Apollo missions will be used for the return
    mission?
        Answer. We will seek to use all past exploration experience as we
    move forward to implement the new Vision for Space Exploration. There
    has been significant technology development since we first landed on
    the Moon 35 years ago. However, at this early stage of program
    development it is too early to quantify what, if any, of the past
    technologies used during the Apollo missions would be used for future
    missions.

        Question 14. You have chosen retired U.S. Navy Rear Admiral Craig
    Steidle to head the new Exploration Systems Enterprise. RADM Steidle
    was the former manager of the Defense Department's Joint Strike Fighter
    program. Do you envision that the CEV will be developed using the
    competitive prototype approach used to award a contract for the Joint
    Strike Fighter?
        Answer. NASA's Office of Exploration Systems will utilize a number
    of the best practices that were developed in the Joint Strike Fighter
    program as well as other Defense Department initiatives. Among those
    are the spiral development approach to program phasing, which
    emphasizes incremental evolution based on demonstrated systems
    performance, and the formulation of acquisition strategies that
    maximize full and open competition between private sector teams.

        Question 15. In your written testimony, you have stated that NASA
    ``will be making decisions on how to best implement new programs,''
    some of which ``will not be easy.'' Could you please describe what some
    of these decisions are?
        Answer. To implement the new exploration vision, a number of key
    NASA program and institutional realignments will have to be undertaken.
    Examples include:

       Space Station Research--Refocusing plans for research aboard
            the Space Station, as well as other Biological and Physical
            Research, to understand factors affecting astronaut health on
            long-duration voyages into deep space and to other worlds and
            develop appropriate countermeasures, life support, and other
            systems.

       Space Transportation--Transitioning from the Orbital Space
            Plane (OSP) and Next Generation Launch Technology (NGLT)
            programs to the Crew Exploration Vehicle (Project
            Constellation).

       Space Technology Research--Realigning technology development
            in the Mission and Science Measurement program theme to support
            future exploration system needs.

        Question 16. The James Webb Space Telescope (JWST) is a proposed
    orbiting infrared observatory that is expected to replace the Hubble
    Space Telescope (HST) at the end of the decade. How will the
    President's new space agenda affect plans to develop the James Webb
    Space Telescope?
        Answer. The James Webb Space Telescope continues to be a priority
    for NASA, and it dovetails well with the President's new space agenda.
    As the cornerstone mission for NASA's Astronomical Search for Origins
    science theme in the next decade, JWST will search for extrasolar
    planets, some of which may boast habitable environments. This effort
    supports the Renewed Spirit of Discovery: The President's Vision for
    U.S. Space Exploration, which calls for the implementation of a human
    and robotic program to explore the solar system and beyond. JWST is
    also the number one priority for the astronomical community, as noted
    in the National Academy of Sciences' Decadal Survey released last year.
                                     ______

    Response to Written Questions Submitted by Hon. Frank R. Lautenberg to
                               Hon. Sean O'Keefe
        Question 1. You mentioned in your testimony that NASA will comply
    with the Columbia Accident Investigation Board's recommendations prior
    to returning to flight. Does NASA have a plan for complying with all of
    the CAIB's recommendations? If so, how long will it take to implement,
    and at what cost?
        Answer. On September 8, 2003, NASA submitted to the Committee a
    copy of the Agency's preliminary Implementation Plan for Return to
    Flight and beyond. Updates to the Plan have been provided to the
    Committee on October 15, 2003, November 20, 2003, and most recently on
    January 30, 2004. This Plan addresses NASA implementation strategy for
    complying with each of the 29 CAIB recommendations and will be
    periodically updated as progress is made or as issues arise. All
    updates to the Plan are provided to the Committee.
        The plan lists preliminary schedule and cost estimates for
    implementing each CAIB recommendation. These estimates will be revised
    as NASA refines all of the activities necessary to respond to the
    recommendations. Because these activities are in various stages of
    maturity, cost estimates represent only those activities that have been
    approved for implementation and funded by the Space Shuttle Program.
    NASA intends to implement all of the recommendations categorized as
    ``Return to Flight'' prior to resuming operations of the Space Shuttle.

        Question 2. Did the Administration consult with space officials
    from foreign governments before developing the new space proposal? Did
    you meet with any representatives from China, the European Space
    Commission, Japan, or any other country with a developed space program
    or our foreign partners for the purpose of gaining assistance with
    developing the President's proposal?
        Answer. Key foreign governments with space programs, including the
    International Space Station partners, China, and India, as well as
    close allies such as Australia, the United Kingdom, and Israel, were
    notified in advance of the President's announcement. NASA maintains
    extensive contacts with foreign space agencies and has followed up the
    President's announcement with additional briefings. The vision
    specifies a role for international cooperation in exploration, which
    NASA will pursue.
                                     ______

        Response to Written Questions Submitted by Hon. John McCain to
                               Dr. Louis Friedman
        Question 1. In your written testimony, you expressed great much
    enthusiasm about the potential benefits that could be achieved from
    having an outpost on Mars.

        (a) What benefits do believe can be achieved from an outpost on
    Mars?
        Answer. A Mars Outpost can be a meaningful goal for robotic
    exploration--a focus for disparate scientific and technical objectives.
    Geologic, geochemical, atmospheric, environmental measurements, in-situ
    resource utilization pilot development, navigation aids (beacons) and
    communications infrastructure can all be set up as part of the Mars
    Outpost. The robotic program is served by each of these, and
    preparations are begun for the humans.
        It would be a publicly exciting project-development and monitoring
    of the martian outpost. People, especially children, around the world
    could watch (and ultimately even interact on computers with) the
    landing site development on Mars-from a few simple robots to a base for
    human operations.
        Human mission costs would be lowered and more reliable because of
    the infrastructure and robotic preparations. By the time humans
    actually landed there a lot of the cost and support would be borne.

        (b) Does this enthusiasm extend to an outpost on the Moon as
    proposed by the President?
        Answer. The Moon has been explored a lot, with robot spacecraft and
    with humans, and there is no compelling question for humans there (the
    questions of life, or of our evolution as a multi planet species). A
    lunar outpost as an goal might be seen publicly as for dubious or
    trivial purpose. The image of playing golf on the Moon might be what it
    recreates. That is one reason the Apollo program ended. However if an
    outpost on the Moon was a prototype or preparation for the Martian
    outpost, a temporary practice area, that might be valid, both
    technically and with the public, because it would be an engineering
    step-as was Gemini to Apollo.

        Question 2. It has been reported that the President's proposal will
    cost between $170 billion and $600 billion. Yet the President has only
    proposed providing $12 billion over the next 5 years.

        (a) Do you agree with the reported cost estimates?
        Answer. I have little basis for an independent cost estimate. I do
    not know where this range has come from, or what assumptions went into
    it. The President's proposal is in one sense open-ended; even though it
    has specific objectives along the way, which can be costed. But,
    extending human presence into the solar system is not something that
    admits a total cost estimate. I agree that the five year cost estimate
    should include only those specific programs that have been approved for
    starting down the path of sending humans to Mars--and have no reason to
    disagree with the $12 billion estimate for that. Later programs,
    including the sending of humans to the Moon and Mars will be costed by
    building on the experience and accomplishments of the earlier steps. As
    a guess, I would say the incremental decision necessary by the Congress
    for sending humans to Mars should be in the range of $50 billion to
    within a factor of two ($25-95 billion.)

        (b) Do you believe that $12 billion is sufficient funding to start
    the new programs proposed by the President and still meet the goals he
    has laid out for travel to the Moon and Mars?
        Answer. Again, I have no basis for independent cost analysis. But,
    I believe it is reasonable, and the proper way to begin. The five-year
    programs involve a major redirection for NASA; it is better to do that
    with a limited budget, than with an open-ended one. That will help
    force the changes. Hopefully, after that the experience and
    accomplishments will make the next steps affordable.

        (c) Are you aware on any factors that could significantly increase
    the cost of this proposal that are not currently being considered?
        Answer. There are many. Chief among them are bad management, lack
    of focus on the goal of sending humans to Mars and/or introduction of
    spurious additional objectives that detour the program. This can happen
    for example when the program is made to serve scientific, technological
    or geographical or other political constituencies with new objectives
    not otherwise serving the main goal. Others have said that the current
    NASA organization is not up to this task and will inflate the costs
    either to increase funding or to resist changes. I agree that changes
    in NASA will have to be made but I would not assert that they cannot be
    made.

        Question 3. Can you expand on your written statements regarding the
    ways international collaboration on the Moon-Mars mission may benefit
    the United States space exploration program?

        (a) What lessons should we apply from on our experience with the
    International Space Station to an international partnership for our
    further exploration of space?
        Answer. The space station was enabled and saved by international
    cooperation. Until 1994 (when at that point despite a decade of program
    existence it was still only a paper concept) it had neither the
    political support or technical robustness to be developed. When the
    Russians were brought in, hardware and accomplishments in the program
    began to proceed rapidly--even with some enormous practical problems.
    Currently we rely on international cooperation for maintenance and
    access to the space station.
        International cooperation increase the political base of big
    projects and provides a wider range of assets for their success. It can
    reduce costs, although in some cases that is offset by increased
    complexity. The main benefit is being able to achieve more, and provide
    more options for the success of complex projects.
        In the case of the new space policy other countries might be able
    to do particular precursor missions, add to technical developments and
    contribute specific systems and sub-systems for the many parts of the
    Moon and Mars programs. Additionally a broad international public
    interest will provide resiliency to the program as well as expanding
    the public educational and scientific benefits.

        Question 4. You have advocated the establishment of robotic Mars
    outposts as a strategy for avoiding the personnel risk and increased
    costs associated with human exploration of Mars.

        (a) How will these robotic outposts on Mars reduce cost?
        Answer. Robotic Mars Outposts will set up infrastructure like
    navigation beacons, communications systems, and in-situ resource
    utilization for future human missions. They will also provide extensive
    surveys of the eventual landing areas for humans, preparing them and
    making the exploration tasks more efficient.

        (b) Do you think the establishment of outposts on the Moon is an
    essential step to a successful mission to Mars?
        Answer. No, I do not think a lunar outpost is necessary for a
    successful Mars mission. The moon is very different, and has few of the
    characteristics that can really help prepare for Mars missions. One
    important exception that might mitigate this assertion is the value of
    practicing various engineering and human work activities at a closer
    location. I have always thought this could be done more cheaply on
    Earth, but I admit that there may be some argument for doing such
    practice activity on the Moon. NASA should study it, but they should
    consider the cost and the effect on the overall Mars mission plans when
    they do so. If lunar activities do make sense, it certainly would not
    be in the form of permanent presence on the Moon--that would bog us
    down on the Moon and delay any Mars mission planning.
        If we conduct Moon missions as a preparation for Mars missions,
    they should be temporary and limited.

        Question 5. At a hearing last year on Lunar Exploration, the
    Committee heard testimony that the Moon could be used as a resource for
    solar power, or for mining the isotope Helium-3. What are your thoughts
    on these proposals?
        Answer. The answer has three parts: (1) resources for Earthly use,
    (2) resources for lunar use and (3) resources for Martian use. But even
    before considering those separately, let us note that solar power has
    been found to very uneconomical on Earth. Imagine the lunar cost-it
    would be enormous. And, fusion power has not even be invented yet for
    Earthly applications, so finding a fuel source for it (even if were
    cheap) is no basis for a program decision.
        I cannot imagine a day when lunar resources would have any Earthly
    use as an energy source. Costs of transporting things to the Moon to
    create incredibly hard-to-manufacture devices there to then transport
    as energy back to the Earth seems obviously much more expensive
    compared to finding Earthly alternatives.
        Making energy on the Moon for lunar use might be economically
    feasible depending on what the economic justification is for having
    power on the Moon in the first place. Science fiction scenarios of
    lunar cities could economically employ lunar power sources, I suppose;
    but what economic rationale would there be for the lunar city? For all
    applications I can conceive it would be far more economical to bring a
    few nuclear reactors to the Moon, than to try to bring the material
    necessary to make a lunar manufacturing plant.
        Using lunar resources for Martian exploration is as impractical as
    using it for Earthly applications. In addition to having to bring
    everything to the Moon to extract and then manufacture resources, you
    now would have to bring it out of the lunar gravity to send it to Mars.
    Mars has easily accessible oxygen and other molecules for fuel
    production--the Moon does not. Mars, with high likelihood, has water
    that is reasonably accessible. The Moon does not (any isolated patches
    of ice will certainly be located in hard to reach places, and of very
    low density of water molecules). So it will always be easier to solve
    Martian resource use with a combination of Earth and Mars resources
    than trying to extract anything out of the Moon.

        Question 6. In your written testimony, you state that a permanent
    lunar base could make the Martian exploration program ``prohibitively''
    more expensive. Yet as proposed by the President, a going back to the
    lunar surface is integral step to the to development and testing of new
    approaches, systems, and technologies for Mars exploration. What are
    your thoughts on the cost versus the benefits of going back to the
    lunar surface?
        Answer. Cost vs. benefit should certainly be studied. I stated in
    answers to earlier questions my concerns and skepticism about lunar
    activities in support of Mars missions. While some lunar activities
    might help, constructing a permanent lunar presence or developing a
    lunar outpost for hypothetical use of lunar resources would add
    enormous additional and unnecessary costs and schedule to sending
    humans to Mars.
                                     ______

        Response to Written Questions Submitted by Hon. John McCain to
                                   Neal Lane
        Question 1. In your testimony, you outline the many contributions
    to space science made by NASA. In particular, you highlight the value
    of NASA's space-based astronomical telescopes. There have been reports
    of NASA discontinuing service missions to and phasing out the Hubble
    Space Telescope to preserve funds for the new Moon-Mars mission. What
    do you think is the long-term impact of such funding strategies on
    space science?
        Answer. There are many important scientific facilities and robotic
    missions already planned and others not yet conceived. These unmanned
    missions are by far the most cost effective way to do science. My
    concern is not only that money needed for human space exploration would
    erode the science budgets, especially given the need for substantial
    reallocations of money within the NASA budget, but also the fact that
    science and exploration are easily confused in most people's minds. It
    is disappointing that a decision has been made to terminate the
    enormously successful Hubble Space Telescope, and a planned servicing
    mission has been cancelled. NASA's space science can not only provide
    the information needed for missions proposed in the next few decade,
    but it also can be a valuable source of information to help lead the
    country and the world into new ventures in the future. Canceling highly
    successful programs, such as the Hubble Space Telescope, might seem to
    help with current budget problems, but in the long run, NASA and the
    astronomy community will miss out on important scientific discoveries.
    It is precisely this kind of tradeoff between science and human
    spaceflight that I warned the Committee about in my testimony. The
    decision does not bode well for the future of NASA and the space
    program.

        Question 2. How do you think universities will be impacted by the
    shift in funding priorities at NASA in order to cover the costs of the
    Moon-Mars mission? Will it lead to an increase in Congressional
    earmarking as universities fight over a smaller pot of money?
        Answer. I believe that NASA has been given an ambitious spaceflight
    agenda and high expectations without the necessary commitment to fund
    it. Recognizing that science has been the heart and soul of NASA, I am
    confident that the agency will attempt to protect science while moving
    forward with this bold plan, but science should be enhanced not
    protected. Moreover, as realistic cost estimates are developed and
    corresponding budget requests made to the Administration and Congress,
    NASA science will suffer. Science will not be able to compete with the
    momentum of an ambitious human spaceflight agenda that will demand that
    schedules are met and contracts honored. There will be new
    opportunities for research related to the goals of the human
    spaceflight program, in particular the long-term effects of zero-
    gravity and other conditions of living in space on human beings.
    However, most NASA-supported researchers do not work in the area of
    human physiology and psychology. There will also be important work to
    be done in engineering and technological development.
        With regard to earmarking, the trend already is toward more, not
    less. As funds get tight and NASA begins to reallocate funds among
    fields, cutting some programs expanding others, more earmarking is
    inevitable. I stated in my testimony that in order for NASA to stand
    any chance of being successful with the new goals the President has
    outlined, the Administrator must be given the opportunity to truly
    manage the agency, look for efficiencies, streamline programs and
    responsibilities, and fund those projects that enhance its mission--
    science, human spaceflight, and aeronautics--without having the
    constraints of excessive earmarked spending and interference with
    administrative decisions.

        Question 3. In your testimony, you stated ``Any considerations of a
    change in national space policy should insure the continued health of
    NASA's space science programs.'' Do you think the Moon-Mars mission as
    currently presented accomplishes this goal?
        Answer. The Moon-Mars mission, as proposed by President Bush,
    continues many of NASA's successful scientific endeavors including its
    robotic exploration and research, research in human physiology in a
    space environment, and the development of newer, more sophisticated
    nuclear power and propulsion systems. NASA has always supported a broad
    spectrum of fundamental space-related science activities. That has
    contributed to the international reputation for high standards of
    scientific excellence that NASA has garnered throughout its history.
    Its science programs have not only been the foundation of the agency--
    its solid underpinning--they have also contributed to its human
    spaceflight programs by providing knowledge that makes going into space
    rewarding and the technology that makes human spaceflight possible. In
    order for NASA to continue to be successful, science should be included
    among the highest-priority goals of the agency. Otherwise, science
    falls in the category of ``to be protected'' rather than ``to be
    enhanced''. Science is the heart and soul of NASA. If NASA science is
    allowed to weaken, then the agency is weakened as well.

        Question 4. You discussed the importance of the United States
    achieving a balance between promoting international collaboration in
    space exploration and protecting U.S. citizens against terrorist
    activities.

        (a) What do you see as potential threats of international
    collaboration in space exploration?
        Answer. As with every other activity, of course it is important to
    assure that those who visit our country and with whom we collaborate on
    space research, developing new technologies, and conducting spaceflight
    are friends, not enemies, but I would emphasize that scientists have
    had a long successful history of international collaborations. During
    WWII, the U.S. brought the best and brightest minds together,
    regardless of their nationalities, to help develop technology needed to
    win the war. During the cold war, Russian scientists were invited to
    visit this country and our scientists visited the Soviet Union.
    Continuing this openness to people of all nations who wish to come to
    the U.S. to study and work, has allowed this country to become the
    technological and economic giant of the world. Promoting a free
    international exchange between researchers and technical professionals
    can only improve the work done by NASA and U.S. scientists and
    engineers. Had we not chosen to involve Russia on the critical path in
    the construction of the International Space Station, we would not have
    been able to continue to support the Station following the Columbia
    tragedy. Many of the brightest and most capable scientists and
    engineers are born in other countries, obtain their degrees in foreign
    institutions, even make their discoveries outside our borders.
    Moreover, the U.S. does not make all the important technological
    breakthroughs. The cumbersome process used by the State Department to
    license the export of space technologies has seriously damaged the
    ability of our space industry (particularly the satellite industry) to
    compete. This export control process will make cooperation in space
    very difficult in the future. We harm ourselves by isolating America
    from this international pool of talent, ideas, and technological
    capability. Following 9/11, the fear of terrorism is understandable and
    caution is warranted. However, allowing fear to shut down much of our
    space industry and cut off interactions between scientists, engineers
    and other talented individuals will seriously damage our nation--in
    space and in everything else we believe is important to our future.

        (b) How do you think the U.S. can simultaneously guard against
    these threats while encouraging maximum collaboration with other
    nations?
        Answer. The U.S. can encourage maximal international collaborations
    by keeping open and honest relationships between researchers and by
    allowing scientists to interact on a regular basis. NASA and other
    agencies involved in scientific research can work with the State
    Department to help streamline the visa process. The U.S. isn't the only
    nation interested in the exploring the universe and capable of
    performing the research and developing the necessary technologies. By
    opening up to ideas from other nations in the pursuit of these goals,
    we can achieve them faster and cheaper. When we isolate ourselves we
    become a target, but when we include other nations together we promote
    a spirit of cooperation and leave terrorists without a message.

        Question 5. How will this new mission affect NASA programs not
    directly related to space exploration, such as Earth Science and
    Aeronautics enterprises?
        Answer. With NASA focusing on space exploration and related
    research, many of its important astronomy and earth science research
    will find themselves crippled with cutbacks necessary to fund human
    space exploration. Already, NASA has announced plans to discontinue
    servicing the Hubble Space Telescope, which in its 14 years of
    existence, has expanded our understanding of star birth, star death,
    and galaxy evolution, and has helped move black holes from theory to
    fact. Other programs, such as NASA's Earth Science Enterprise, that
    provides important data on aspects of the earth's atmosphere, oceans,
    and land, could also be in jeopardy. These successful programs are
    vital not only to the future direction of space exploration and
    research, but programs like the Earth Science Enterprise is key to
    helping understand climate change and weather prediction two problems
    we have here on planet Earth. Although I am excited about the
    implementation of a direction for NASA's human space flight, I'm also
    concerned that it might harm these and other research project, which
    are also worthwhile. NASA science must be one of its highest-priority
    goals. Otherwise it is always in jeopardy of being cut when the budget
    gets tight. When the President of the United States leaves science out
    of his new vision, the message is ``do the science on the side!'' That
    would be very damaging to NASA and the U.S. space program.
                                     ______

        Response to Written Questions Submitted by Hon. John McCain to
                             Dr. Howard E. McCurdy
        Question 1. In your written testimony, you reference the cost
    overruns for the development and operation of the International Space
    Station.

        (a) Do you see the possibility of similar cost overruns in the new
    space proposal?
        Answer. Without a fundamental change in the way the human space
    flight program is managed, the cost of the new space endeavor could be
    astronomical. The Apollo flights to the moon, in today's dollars, cost
    $150 billion. The moon-Mars initiative is far more ambitious. Yet it
    need not cost a great deal. Administration officials have set the
    incremental cost of undertaking the initiative over the next sixteen
    years at $42 billion (in real year dollars)--the difference between the
    overall NASA budget with the new initiative and the budget without it.
    Sixteen years is sufficient time for NASA officials to develop low-cost
    methods and technologies--or discover that they cannot do so.
        The last two human space flight initiatives--the space shuttle and
    International Space Station--began as cost-reduction efforts. The space
    shuttle was conceived as a means to cut the cost of space access ``by a
    factor of ten.'' Yet the people who actually built the space shuttle
    received so many conflicting objectives that they could securely ignore
    the cost reduction goal. The people who conceived the original space
    station deliberately set its price low in an effort to impost cost
    discipline on NASA field centers and their contractors. In the internal
    struggle that followed, officials at NASA headquarters lost control of
    the project to people who ran the program in the traditional, high-cost
    way. Without substantial changes in the human flight program, that
    history will occur again.

        (b) Do you have any recommendations on how such cost overruns could
    be avoided in the future?
        Answer. NASA executives have achieved substantial cost savings
    without overruns in their robotic space activities. They have done this
    by setting firm (and realistic) cost goals and communicating the
    importance of those goals to project workers. Those workers in turn
    have elevated the importance of meeting cost targets to a level
    commensurate with scientific objectives. Workers who fail to meet cost
    targets have seen their projects terminated. The overall result has
    been a firm commitment to the technologies and management improvements
    necessary to complete cost-controlled undertakings.
        To repeat this process on the moon-Mars initiative, Congress would
    need to set firm cost targets for elements within the endeavor, such as
    the development of the crew exploration vehicle. Congress might also
    encourage NASA to use an important technique from the robotic science
    effort. Project advocates are forced to compete to get their projects
    approved--and there are far more losers than winners. Competition
    between robotic and human elements might spur innovation in both. It
    would be a radical move, but Congress might consider combining robotic
    and human projects at one center. Before President Kennedy launched the
    moon race, Congress had intended to merge robotic and human flight
    efforts at what became the Goddard Space Flight Center in Maryland.
    Together, competition and firm cost targets would give the United
    States a fighting chance to carry out the new proposal at a reasonable
    cost.

        Question 2. While Administrator O'Keefe has done much to refocus on
    safety at NASA, it is clear that much remains to be done to change the
    institutional thinking and culture at NASA in order to continue its
    current missions, more or less, take on new ones.

        (a) Have you seen any significant evidence of this much needed
    change at NASA?
        Answer. Cultural change is a long-term process that requires top-
    level leadership, new symbols and language, the recruitment of new
    personnel, extensive training, and fresh programmatic challenges.
    Administrator O'Keefe recognizes the need for cultural change in the
    human space flight program and has begun the process. While I have not
    studied the reforms in sufficient detail to render a specific judgment,
    I can assure you that cultural change in the human space flight program
    is unlikely without a fresh programmatic challenge such as that offered
    by the moon-Mars initiative.

        (b) What recommendations would you make regarding such change?
        Answer. One of the best reasons for undertaking the moon-Mars
    initiative is that it promises to transform NASA.

        Question 3. In your written testimony, you stated that ``NASA has
    lost too much of its in-house technical capacity.'' How do you think
    this loss will impact NASA's ability to produce a successful Moon-Mars
    mission? What should NASA do to increase its ``in-house technical
    capacity?''
        Answer. The history of recent Mars exploration, from Pathfinder
    (built in-house) to Mars Climate Orbiter (contractor controlled),
    supports the importance of strong in-house technical capability. Hollow
    government organizations, without substantial in-house expertise,
    typically lack the technical authority necessary to restrain cost
    growth and promote innovation. The best way to enhance NASA's in-house
    technical capability would be to insist that major systems, such as the
    crew exploration vehicle, be assembled and tested in-house at NASA
    facilities. Contractors will continue to make substantial contributions
    as suppliers of scientific instruments and subsystems, but the assembly
    and testing process should be done under the direction of small,
    cohesive, technically-competent NASA teams. The only exception to this
    rule would be a case in which a contractor received the whole
    responsibility for a particular mission, as occurred in the development
    of the Near Earth Asteroid Rendezvous (NEAR) spacecraft, which was
    build at and flown from the Applied Physics Laboratory in Laurel,
    Maryland. In general, excessive distribution of work to contractors
    increases overall costs and creates a hollow NASA that lacks the
    capacity for smart technical work.

        Question 4. What are your thoughts on the American public's
    lukewarm reaction to the President's proposal?
        Answer. Public interest in the Spirit and Opportunity landings was
    exceptionally high. The Spirit landing was the top news story that week
    (exceeding public interest in Brittany Spear's wedding which was number
    two!). Future interest in robotic and human exploration of the inner
    solar system will be similarly intense, if accompanied by the same
    technological advances and cost improvements that have characterized
    robotic flight. Public apprehension arises from the recent history of
    human space flight and the understandable fear that human elements will
    cost too much. Informed people rightly suspect that the tradition of
    cost largess will overwhelm the promise of low-cost innovation.

        Question 5. In your written testimony you explain how both the
    Shuttle and the ISS programs could not meet requirements because they
    were designed to be all things to all people. How do we prevent
    missions, such as a lunar outpost or robotic explorers on Mars, from
    being overburdened with too many requirements and suffering from a lack
    of focus?
        Answer. In the first space exploration initiative (1989), the goal
    of a lunar base was offered as an objective co-equal to the exploration
    of Mars. Elaborate lunar facilities, such as the proposal for a lunar
    construction crane, helped drive cost estimates for the overall program
    past the $400 billion mark. A similar result might be avoided by
    keeping the focus on Mars, with the moon serving only as a test bed or
    proving ground on an as-needed basis.

        Question 6. NASA has announced a new Exploration Systems
    Enterprise. Do you think this is a step in the right direction for
    transforming NASA to meet its new mission?
        Answer. The creation of a strong systems engineering group at NASA
    headquarters during the 1960s helped the first Americans reach the
    moon. Space historian Stephen B. Johnson called the Apollo systems
    engineering group under the leadership of General Samuel C. Phillips
    the ``secret of Apollo.'' The Exploration Systems Enterprise is an
    essential first step for the new endeavor. However, it is equally
    important that NASA improve upon traditional systems management
    techniques in order to restrain spending. The Apollo systems
    engineering group coordinated the very large number of subsystems
    managers and contractors whose presence made the lunar expeditions
    possible, but those same participants made the overall program
    extraordinarily complex and expensive. The Exploration Systems
    Enterprise for the moon-Mars initiative faces a different challenge--
    keeping program relationships simple and costs low.
                                     ______

     Response to Written Question Submitted by Hon. Frank R. Lautenberg to
                             Dr. Howard E. McCurdy
        Question. How much do you believe the President's proposal will
    ultimately cost the American taxpayers? Is this a realistic estimate?
        Answer. I estimate that the president's proposal will cost $42
    billion over what the government would otherwise spend on NASA space
    activities if the proposal was not approved. That covers Fiscal Years
    2005 through 2020 and includes adjustments for inflation. (In constant
    2005 dollars the sum would be about $36 billion.)
        By 2015 or thereabouts, we should know whether we will be able to
    undertake the next steps in the exploration agenda at a realistic and
    reasonable cost. I do not think those steps can be accomplished using
    Apollo-style technology or management. Project Apollo, in today's
    dollars, cost about $150 billion. Accomplishment of the new vision will
    require technological and managerial innovations that depart
    significantly from the practices used during the Apollo years.

                                      [all]