[Senate Hearing 108-1004]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
S. Hrg. 108-1004
LESSONS LEARNED FROM SECURITY
AT PAST OLYMPIC GAMES
=======================================================================
HEARING
BEFORE THE
SUBCOMMITTEE ON COMPETITION, FOREIGN COMMERCE, AND INFRASTRUCTURE
OF THE
COMMITTEE ON COMMERCE,
SCIENCE, AND TRANSPORTATION
UNITED STATES SENATE
ONE HUNDRED EIGHTH CONGRESS
SECOND SESSION
__________
MAY 4, 2004
__________
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SENATE COMMITTEE ON COMMERCE, SCIENCE, AND TRANSPORTATION
ONE HUNDRED EIGHTH CONGRESS
SECOND SESSION
JOHN McCAIN, Arizona, Chairman
TED STEVENS, Alaska ERNEST F. HOLLINGS, South
CONRAD BURNS, Montana Carolina, Ranking
TRENT LOTT, Mississippi DANIEL K. INOUYE, Hawaii
KAY BAILEY HUTCHISON, Texas JOHN D. ROCKEFELLER IV, West
OLYMPIA J. SNOWE, Maine Virginia
SAM BROWNBACK, Kansas JOHN F. KERRY, Massachusetts
GORDON H. SMITH, Oregon JOHN B. BREAUX, Louisiana
PETER G. FITZGERALD, Illinois BYRON L. DORGAN, North Dakota
JOHN ENSIGN, Nevada RON WYDEN, Oregon
GEORGE ALLEN, Virginia BARBARA BOXER, California
JOHN E. SUNUNU, New Hampshire BILL NELSON, Florida
MARIA CANTWELL, Washington
FRANK R. LAUTENBERG, New Jersey
Jeanne Bumpus, Republican Staff Director and General Counsel
Robert W. Chamberlin, Republican Chief Counsel
Kevin D. Kayes, Democratic Staff Director and Chief Counsel
Gregg Elias, Democratic General Counsel
--------
SUBCOMMITTEE ON COMPETITION, FOREIGN COMMERCE, AND INFRASTRUCTURE
GORDON H. SMITH, Oregon, Chairman
CONRAD BURNS, Montana BYRON L. DORGAN, North Dakota,
SAM BROWNBACK, Kansas Ranking
PETER G. FITZGERALD, Illinois BARBARA BOXER, California
JOHN ENSIGN, Nevada BILL NELSON, Florida
JOHN E. SUNUNU, New Hampshire MARIA CANTWELL, Washington
FRANK R. LAUTENBERG, New Jersey
C O N T E N T S
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Page
Hearing held on May 4, 2004...................................... 1
Statement of Senator Smith....................................... 1
Prepared statement........................................... 2
Witnesses
Camillo, Mark, Director, Homeland Security, Washington Operations
Offices, Lockheed Martin Corporation........................... 13
Prepared statement........................................... 16
Lewis, Carl, U.S. Olympic Athlete in Track and Field............. 28
Prepared statement........................................... 29
Lopez, Steven, U.S. Olympic Athlete in Taekwondo................. 26
Prepared statement........................................... 27
Maples, David G., Johnson, Maples, and Associates................ 19
Prepared statement........................................... 22
Romney, Hon. Mitt, Governor, The Commonwealth of Massachusetts... 3
Prepared statement........................................... 5
LESSONS LEARNED FROM SECURITY
AT PAST OLYMPIC GAMES
----------
TUESDAY, MAY 4, 2004
U.S. Senate,
Subcommittee on Competition, Foreign Commerce, and
Infrastructure,
Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation,
Washington, DC.
The Subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 2:30 p.m. in
room SR-253, Russell Senate Office Building, Hon. Gordon Smith,
Chairman of the Subcommittee, presiding.
OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. GORDON SMITH,
U.S. SENATOR FROM OREGON
Senator Smith. Good afternoon, ladies and gentlemen. I'll
call to order this subcommittee hearing, Commerce Committee.
This is the Competition, Foreign Commerce, and Infrastructure
Subcommittee. And today, our topic is Olympic security.
I thank the witnesses for being here today. The purpose of
today's hearing is to learn more about the lessons of past
Olympic Games with respect to security, so that we can ensure
that future Olympic Games will be safer still.
Today's hearing will examine the evolution of Olympic
security over the past 30 years, the advancement of
technological and operational security tactics employed by
domestic and foreign Olympic organizing officials to secure the
Games as well as the cost and effectiveness of all of their
measures. We'll also hear from two Olympians to get their
perspective about how security has evolved over the years and
how it affects the athletes who participate in the Games.
The Olympic security changed forever as a result of the
tragic events of 1972's Summer Olympic Games in Munich,
Germany. On September 5, 1972, eight Palestinian terrorists
broken into the apartments of the Olympic Village housing, of
the Israeli athletes, and took nine hostages. In the end, five
of the eight terrorists and all nine of the hostages and a
German police officer were dead. Since the Munich Games, no
major Olympic security incident occurred until 1996, in the
Olympic Games of Atlanta, Georgia. Notwithstanding the
heightened security in the wake of the World Trade Center and
the Oklahoma City bombings, on July 27, 1996, a pipe bomb
filled with nails and screws exploded in a crowd at Olympic
Centennial Park, killing one person, and injuring more than one
hundred.
I suppose most ominous is that in a post-9/11 world,
security for events of this magnitude becomes all the more
important. But, in fact, security became a primary concern
after 9/11 for the organizers of the 2002 Salt Lake Winter
Olympic Games. In preparation for the Salt Lake Games, a
consortium of 60 Federal and state law enforcement agencies
crafted a $310 million security plan that included the
deployment of 12,000 security personnel. As a result, no major
security incidents occurred in the Salt Lake Games.
While it's true that there exist global security concerns
heading into this summer's Olympic Games in Athens, I'm
confident that the Greek officials are working in conjunction
with security officials from around the world to ensure that
the athletes and spectators who attend the Greek games will be
well protected. It is a great credit to the Greek government
that they have budgeted $1.2 billion for security. They have
reached out to our Nation for lessons learned, as well as to
the North Atlantic Treaty Alliance to provide military support
for the security of our athletes and our spectators.
Again, I want to thank the witnesses for being here, and
I'd like to remind Members that immediately following today's
hearing, should they come, we will also have a closed
classified briefing with Federal officials on the security
preparations and operational issues relating to the 2004 Summer
Olympic Games in Athens, Greece.
Prepared Statement of Hon. Gordon H. Smith, U.S. Senator from Oregon
I thank the witnesses for being here today. The purpose of today's
hearing is to learn more about the lessons of past Olympic Games with
respect to security so that we can ensure that future Olympic Games
will be even safer.
Today's hearing will examine the evolution of Olympic security over
the past 30 years, the advancement of technological and operational
security tactics employed by domestic and foreign Olympic organizing
officials to secure the Games, as well as the cost and effectiveness of
such measures.
We will also hear from two Olympians to get their perspective about
how security has evolved over the year and how it affects the athletes
who participate in the Games.
Olympic security changed forever as a result of the tragic events
of the 1972 Summer Olympic Games in Munich, Germany. On September 5,
1972, eight Palestinian terrorists broke into apartments in the Olympic
village housing Israel athletes and took nine hostages. In the end,
five of the eight terrorists, all nine of the hostages, and a German
police officer were dead.
Since the Munich Games no major Olympic security incident occurred
until the 1996 Olympic Games in Atlanta, Georgia. Notwithstanding the
heightened security in the wake of the World Trade Center and Oklahoma
City bombings, on July 27, 1996, a pipe bomb filled with nails and
screws exploded in a crowded Olympic Centennial Park killing one person
and injuring more than 100.
Following the attacks of September 11, 2001, security became the
primary concern for the organizers of the 2002 Salt Lake Winter Olympic
Games following the attacks of September 11, 2001. In preparation for
Salt Lake Games, a consortium of federal and state law enforcement
agencies crafted a $310 million security plan that included the
deployment of 12,000 security personnel. As a result, no major security
incidents occurred during the Salt Lake Games.
While it is true that there exist global security concerns heading
into this summer's Olympic Games in Athens, I am confident that the
Greek officials are working in conjunction with security officials from
around the world to ensure that the athletes and spectators who attend
the Games will be well protected.
Again, I would like to thank the witnesses for being here, and I
would remind members that immediately following today's hearing we will
conduct a closed classified briefing with federal officials on the
security preparations and operational issues related to the 2004 Summer
Olympic Games in Athens, Greece.
Senator Smith. It's a great privilege for this Committee to
have as our first witness the Honorable Mitt Romney, Governor
of the Commonwealth of Massachusetts. In one of his earlier
roles--in fact, his immediate role prior to becoming Governor--
Governor Romney was the president of the Salt Lake City
Organizing Committee and was ultimately responsible for a
spectacular success in Salt Lake without a security lapse. And,
Governor, we thank you for coming, and we invite your testimony
now.
STATEMENT OF HON. MITT ROMNEY, GOVERNOR,
THE COMMONWEALTH OF MASSACHUSETTS
Governor Romney. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. It's an honor to
be here, and an honor to also be in attendance with noted
Olympians and those that helped organize the entire effort in
the United States, the United States Olympic Committee. Their
work and contribution to the world of sport and to our Nation
and our heritage is something of which I think we're all
appreciative.
I appreciate this chance to address you, as well. I have
prepared some comments that I hope might be part of the record,
and be read into the record at some point, but----
Senator Smith. We'll include them fully, and invite any
part of them you wish to give.
Governor Romney. Fine. Let me, then, just run through a
couple of things that I thought might be of interest to this
Committee.
First, and let me say this in foremost manner, the
Olympics, at least in my view, is greater than a sporting
event. It means more than just sport. It is sport, but, through
sport and through the Olympians, we see some of the great
qualities of the human character. We see loyalty, we see
passion, pride, determination, perseverance. Hosting an Olympic
Games, seeing the Olympics on the world stage, is something
which betters our Nation, betters our athletes, betters our
kids, and improves the world. It's a demonstration of peace, a
demonstration of some of the greatest qualities of the human
spirit, and, therefore, every effort to assure that the
Olympics are safe and that they proceed is an effort, I think,
very well worth undertaking.
Second, I'd note that security is a huge portion of putting
on the Olympics. As a matter of fact, it was our largest single
budget item. While we did not spend the full amount that was
appropriated for Olympic security--that was, of course, largely
a Federal Government and state government effort--the amount of
money that's spent on security today is greater than the amount
spent for venues, spent for information technology, or spent
for employees.
Another point. The Olympics, of course, is a target of
international terrorism, and we know that by virtue of the fact
that it has been twice attacked, as you mentioned, both in
Munich and in Atlanta. We have learned from our failures, and
the failures have taught us things that we can do to improve
the level of security, not only for Olympics, but for other
national special-security events, and potentially for homeland
security on the most broad basis.
In Munich, for instance, we saw perhaps the demonstration
of what not to do on almost every dimension, everything from
the lack of coordination between the security agencies, the
lack of coordination between the organizer and the security
agencies, the lack of preparation and drills prior to the
Games. All of the elements really that were seen in the Olympic
security effort in Munich demonstrate the worst demonstrated
practice.
In Atlanta, there was a great deal of improvement. Atlanta
had a very strong security program. Many agencies worked very
hard to secure the Games. But a lesson that came out loud and
clear for us as we prepared for our Games in Salt Lake from
the--and, in part, in our discussions with organizers in
Atlanta--was that there needed to be a higher degree of
coordination among the various Federal, state, and local
agencies, that there needed to be a more central command
structure, that plans needed to be integrated between the
different agencies, and that the gaps between agencies were
severe enough that there was the potential for those that would
attack us to find those holes, those spaces between the various
agencies. That was, in large measure, corrected by the time
Salt Lake City came around. Thanks to Presidential Decision
Directive 62 and the establishment of a Utah Olympic Public
Safety Command, we had a unified structure.
Another point. At least from my perspective, there are four
phases of an effective Olympic security program. And generally
we only think of three. One phase is the prevention phase.
That's where the intelligence is, the embedding of personnel,
the wire-taps, the surveillance, and so forth. Another phase is
protection of assets. That's magnetometers and barriers and the
like. Another phase is response--SWAT teams, officers willing
to move in quickly, fire teams, rescue teams, a detection of
biological agents in the air, and so forth. And then the final
phase is the consequence management, which FEMA manages quite
effectively.
Of those four phases, one is typically underinvested in and
underappreciated, and it happens to be, at least in my view,
the most important, and that is prevention. We spent a lot of
time thinking about barriers, magnetometers, and detection
equipment. We spent a lot of time thinking about how we can
quickly move in, and have great communications between the
first responders in the event of an incident. We, likewise,
effectively consider consequence management and where vaccines
might be needed in the case of a biological attack and the
like. But very little discussion, effort, funding, and focus is
addressed to prevention. And if I were assessing the safety of
a national special-security event like an Olympic Games or like
a national convention, it would be that area, the intelligence
area and the prevention area, that I would want to devote most
of my attention.
Finally, let me just note that from my written testimony, I
have put together a checklist of how, if I were asked to
evaluate the effectiveness of a security program for an event
like an Olympics, what questions I would ask. And I'll just
read them off here, because I think they're important.
First, is there an integrated and coordinated security plan
that's been adopted by every entity, public and private, with a
clear delineation of roles each will be playing during the
Games? So is there a single, unified plan?
Two, is there a clear chain of command for security and
safety? Do we know who's in charge? Vice President Gore was
reported to have asked, in Atlanta, ``Who's in charge of the
security program?'' and the answer was, ``Well, that depends.''
That's the wrong answer.
Number three, is there an aggressive intelligence
operation, and will the information gathered from it be
provided to all the parties that need to know it?
Number four, have exercises been conducted with all the
participants?
Number five, has the process for communications in the
event of an incident been agreed to by all the parties?
Number six, have security precautions been put in place for
all large gatherings around the time of the Games, not just the
Olympic venues themselves?
Number seven, is there real-time public health monitoring
and response planning? Has it been tested?
And, finally, have all security precautions been taken at
the Olympic venues, in the transportation system, and at the
Olympic Village, including background checks of everyone who is
working in the Games?
Now, my guess is we could easily come up with a list of a
hundred tests, but those are the categories of areas that I
would find most interesting and most revealing about the
preparation of an Olympic site, perhaps also the most revealing
about the preparation for any type of national special-security
event.
With that, Mr. Chairman, I'd be happy to respond to any
questions that you might have.
[The prepared statement of Governor Romney follows:]
Prepared Statement of Hon. Mitt Romney, Governor,
The Commonwealth of Massachusetts
Chairman Smith, Senator Dorgan, Members of the Committee,
Thank you for inviting me to talk with you today about the unique
security and public safety experience we had in Salt Lake as we
prepared for and hosted the 2002 Winter Olympic Games. It's an practice
for the management of each Olympics to pass on to succeeding Games
their ``lessons learned''--both successes and mistakes. Although
security and safety planning and implementation varies greatly from
country to country depending on the structure of law enforcement, there
are operational lessons that we learned in Salt Lake from those who
came before us and there are pragmatic lessons that we have endeavored
to pass on to those who come after. I appreciate the opportunity to
share some of those with you today.
I am going to limit my comments today to a number of broad
principles that were critical to our security planning and
implementation. Mark Camillo, who led the Federal public safety
planning effort in his role as lead for the U.S. Secret Service and can
more appropriately address the operational aspects of the Salt Lake
security and public safety plan.
First, a quick review of primary lessons we incorporated into our
planning in Salt Lake from the Games that came before us. There have
been several extremely thorough reports written on the terrorist attack
at the Munich Games, each of which helped inform our approach to
Olympic security. The lack of basic security measures and cooperation
between the Organizing Committee and law enforcement was stunning by
today's standards. This allowed the terrorists easy access to their
targets at the Olympic Village and meant that, once the hostages were
taken, there was no set crisis-management procedure to fall back on. In
part due to the lack of planning for a security crisis, the person who
negotiated with the terrorists, at their request, was the head of the
organizing committee--my counterpart. For the first critical
communications with the terrorists, an untrained chief executive
negotiated for the lives of athletes. Today, it seems incomprehensible
that this ever happened. Although there were many hard lessons learned
from the tragedy of Munich, and the repercussions of that attack are
felt to this day, there are two I want to focus on here.
First, communication and coordination between law enforcement and
the organizing committee are essential. Although it is often difficult
to maintain a true public/private partnership--particularly between law
enforcement and the private sector--when you are securing the Olympics
Games, it is critical. The relationship must be seamless and the two
must work as one team--practicing together, clarifying roles and
responsibilities, and communicating constantly.
In Salt Lake, the organizing committee worked hand-in-glove with
federal, state and local public safety from day one. The teams that
designed the venues, laid out locations of everything from tickets
booths to parking lots to seats and trailers met regularly with law
enforcement and took their input every step of the way. Our goal was to
design security into our Games, instead of just putting a security
overlay on the venues when they were done. Putting together a public
safety plan that could anticipate and prevent attacks at ten different
venues, the Village, Opening and Closing Ceremonies and our downtown
Olympic Square was a painstakingly detailed effort. It required
thinking through potential terrorist scenarios and devising workable
procedures to prevent them in all types of weather and crowd
conditions. Finally, these procedures had to be coordinated with all
the other Games plans. After all, it's easy to secure a venue if you
simply shut down the roads--but then how do we get the people in,
particularly when vehicles are the most commonly used terrorist weapon?
Transportation and public safety have to work hand-in-glove--and many
times there are no easy solutions. There are always concerns about
securing the athletes in transit, and concerns about limiting vehicle
access to any Olympic venue. Every road closure, every decision about
which route buses would take, where the athletes would be dropped off
and where the spectators would park and ride was made in close
consultation with law enforcement. During the Games, a video feed from
our transportation center of all the major roads and interstates fed
directly into the Public Safety Command Center--and law enforcement sat
side-by-side with the transportation operators to ensure that response
and monitoring were smooth.
We faced many barriers in achieving this level of integration and
coordination between law enforcement and the private sector, primarily
because we have too many unnecessary firewalls that prevent real
coordination between government and private companies. We were
fortunate in Salt Lake that all the senior participants from Secret
Service, FBI, FEMA and DOD were willing to break new ground and take
the risk of letting the organizing committee into the day-to-day
planning. That effort paid off and the seamlessness of our coordination
was one of our greatest successes in Salt Lake.
The second lesson we took to heart from Munich was to take every
precaution when securing locations where large numbers of athletes
would gather--especially the Olympic Village. I won't detail all the
steps we took in securing the Village. However, our deterrents included
double-fencing the perimeter, judicious use of cameras, motion
detectors, screening people and goods through magnetometers twice
before letting them in, and an inner, even more secure location that
only the athletes could access. High-threat delegations, such as the
Israelis, were given the most secure locations within the village and
were allowed to bring their own security. Drills were run repeatedly on
how to deal with an attack on the village--any scenario that can be
dreamed up was planned for and rehearsed. Again, securing the Village
was a joint project from day one between law enforcement and the
organizing committee.
One of the major lessons we learned from the Los Angeles Games was
the need to do background checks on all employees and volunteers. This
can be quite difficult unless the process is begun well in advance.
Those who were in Los Angeles told us that, because many background
checks weren't completed before the Games began, convicted felons were
holding critical posts--even security posts--at Games time. I heard
from the public safety leadership in LA that they had more problems
during their Games with crimes committed by volunteers and employees
who turned out to have records than they did from any other source. So,
we started the screening process early and anyone who didn't pass a
background check couldn't work or volunteer for our Games. That meant
that we had to have over 40,000 background checks performed--and for
those who would have Olympic Village access, the check was quite
intensive.
From Nagano, we learned a lesson that became even more valuable to
us after 9/11. You may remember that the flu hit that region of Japan
during the Nagano Games, and had a devastating impact on both the
athletes and those attending the Games. Nagano was a relatively small
geographic area, with tens of thousands of people from all over the
world tightly gathered for several weeks--with bad weather on top of
it. We learned how critical it is to put in place a public health
operation that can immediately spot an outbreak and move to contain it.
In a confined geographic area, sickness can spread like wildfire.
Working with CDC, FEMA, Department of Energy, and DOD, Utah and the
Salt Lake Organizing Committee (SLOC) prepared a state-of-the-art
public health monitoring and response plan and created the in-state
capability to rapidly analyze biological and chemical samples. We
received constant reports not only from Olympic areas, but non-Olympic
locations as well. We also had environmental monitors that tested the
air in key locations. Our biggest concern may have been a possible
biological or chemical terrorist attack, but it was Nagano that brought
home to us the importance of quick identification, reaction,
containment and treatment in the crowded Olympic environment.
But it was the lessons learned from Atlanta that had the most
impact on security and public safety preparations for Salt Lake.
Other witnesses here today will be able to talk in more detail
about security and public safety planning in Atlanta. The after-action
reports we received from Atlanta, and the lessons that were passed on
to us by the public safety community, indicated that many of the
problems in Atlanta reflected how slow we were as a nation to begin to
recognize that terrorism was becoming a security issue inside the
United States. When Atlanta began preparing for the 1996 Games, there
had not been a successful foreign terrorist attack on U.S. soil. Then,
in 1993, the first World Trade Center bombing happened, and most of us
heard of Osama Bin Laden for the first time. Not long thereafter,
Timothy McVeigh stunned us all by his brutal attack on innocent people
in Oklahoma City. Meanwhile, in Japan, terrorists used Sarin gas in the
subways--showing how easy it was to wreak havoc and death in what had
previously been regarded as a safe urban area. The reports we received
indicated that with each new incident, the planners would develop ways
to prevent and respond to these types of attacks. However, the planning
effort faced an incredible obstacle due to the dozens and dozens of
federal, state and local law enforcement and public safety entities
involved in Games security and safety--with no clear command and
control structure for Games planning. There was relatively clear
understanding of who was in charge after an incident occurred--but
there was no structure establishing who was in charge of planning for
Games safety and preventing a terrorist incident from happening.
And that was the crux of the problem. In the United States, we have
a unique public safety structure. It evolved from our desire as a
country to make sure that power is always retained at the most local
level of government possible and that we never create the all-powerful
law enforcement arms that viciously rule in other countries. But, in
meeting this admirable goal, we sometimes sacrifice coordination--one
of the key ``lessons learned'' from Munich. In Atlanta, where there
were over 50 different public safety agencies--federal, state and local
all ``in charge'' of securing a piece of the Games, the attempt to
voluntarily pull everyone together to develop a coordinated plan
apparently didn't work. We were told afterwards that, about a year out
from the Games, Vice President Gore came to Atlanta for a security
briefing and asked a straight-forward question--``Who's in charge''.
The answer back was ``it depends''. Not a good answer. Accurate, but
when you are holding the largest peacetime event in history and
terrorism has begun to rear its ugly head in your country, you want
someone who can tell you that they are responsible for the overall
effort. In Atlanta, no one was. So the primary lesson from Atlanta was
that coordination among government agencies was just as critical, if
not more critical, than coordination between government and the
organizing committee.
With one year to go, the Federal Government began to infuse massive
resources into Atlanta--over 14,000 troops were sent in. Federal law
enforcement agents came in by the hundreds. They hardened the Olympic
Villages, increased security on the athlete transportation system, and
put multiple layers of security on most of the sports venues and
Opening and Closing Ceremonies. But, the Olympics is more than just
sport--it is the gathering of world in celebration of peace and the
human spirit at festivals, concerts, art shows and more. And one of the
major celebration points, Centennial Olympic Park, became the target of
a bomber. Another bitter lesson--sports and the athletes are not the
only targets of terrorists--sometimes it can be the celebration itself
that becomes the target.
Both of these lessons would have enormous impact on our planning in
Salt Lake.
Following Atlanta, the White House decided to create a structure
that would clarify who was in charge and make someone accountable for
ensuring that a coordinated security and safety plan was put in place.
President Clinton issued Presidential Decision Directive 62 which set
out a hierarchy for all so-called ``National Special Security Events.''
It put the U.S. Secret Service in charge of planning and operational
security, the FBI in charge of intelligence and the immediate response
to a terrorist incident, and FEMA in charge of handling the
consequences of an event with mass casualties. Even more important to
SLOC, in terms of getting work done on a day-to-day basis, this meant
there were just three easily-accessible individuals in charge of making
sure that everything came together in their areas of responsibility.
On the state level, Utah also put in place a structure that would
produce a coordinated and integrated public safety plan and--just as
importantly, put someone in charge. The Utah Olympic Public Safety
Command (UOPSC) was created by the state legislature in 1998 with the
authority to plan and direct the Olympic security and public safety
efforts of various state and local police agencies in a unified way. At
Games time, all of the personnel would work as part of a unified
Olympic command--under direction of the Olympic Public Safety Commander
and not under the command of individual sheriffs and police chiefs.
Both of these structures, the Federal NSSE designation and the Utah
Olympic Public Safety Command, were new and I will admit we faced
difficulties over the years as these new reporting relationships were
evolved and refined. However, by the beginning of 2001, both structures
were working extremely well and most if not all of the problems had
been resolved. These structures ensured that our final public safety
plan truly was coordinated and integrated at every level--federal,
state, local and the organizing committee. One of the greatest lessons
that we pass on to future Games is this model for creating a
coordinated effort--even in the unique structure of U.S. law
enforcement and public safety.
We took the second lesson of Atlanta--that all large gatherings
could be the target of terrorist attacks--to heart as well. First, we
decided in consultation with the Secret Service that rather than
spreading our Olympic celebrations, concerts and medals presentations
around the city, we would create one multi-block area which would hold
all the events and create a single site to secure. Admittedly, Salt
Lake Olympic Square was an enormous site--stretching over eight city
blocks. But, it is easier to secure a single perimeter and have limited
points of entry for nagging and bagging the public than it is to
duplicate this effort in multiple sites. And, it allowed us to truly
concentrate our resources where they could be most effective.
We revisited this lesson from Atlanta in the weeks after 9/11. In
addition to events held by the Organizing Committee, there were many
events being held by the State, Salt Lake City, and others--some
expected to draw thousands of attendees. Each event was reviewed by the
Federal Government and for those where there was some concern that the
event could be an attractive target, the event was either cancelled or
a more robust security plan was put in place. We recognized the reality
that you can never harden every target--to do that you would literally
have to shut down the state. However, we also decided that there was no
reason for us to create additional targets by having more events than
we could secure appropriately.
Another lesson we learned in Salt Lake that we have passed on to
future Games is the importance of having a very clear communications
plan--both before and during the Games. Obviously, the media is going
to ask questions about the security plan for a Games and, just as
obviously, the people answering need to be aware that there answers may
be read or heard by those looking to plan an attack. This was initially
a problem for us in Salt Lake. We had dozens of local public safety
officials involved in planning for the Games, and the media soon
learned that they could go to these individuals and often get dramatic
or sensational answers to their questions. It was one of my greatest
frustrations. Particularly when it was televised on national TV which
venues were the safest and what the vulnerabilities were of other
venues. The public safety community was unable to reach agreement on
how much should be made public and who should talk until just months
before the Games. Honestly, the horrible events of September 11
probably did more to convince some of our officials that communications
during a crisis should be handled by the leadership of the public
safety organization than any of the theoretical conversations we had
earlier.
In my opinion, the most important lesson we learned in Salt Lake,
and the one that I repeat whenever I get the opportunity, is the
critical nature of intelligence in preventing an attack. Most Games
focus on two security aspects--preventing an attack by hardening the
venues and transportation system and ensuring that the resources are in
place to respond to an attack. In Salt Lake, there was also tremendous
emphasis put on gathering information from all levels and sources and
sharing that information between federal, state and local officials.
While I can't speak in this setting to the different methods employed
by the federal, state and local governments to gather intelligence, I
can tell you that it was a highly coordinated and aggressive effort.
Jurisdictional issues didn't appear to come into play; instead, each
level of government used its people in every way appropriate to gather
information--then all levels of government shared in the data once it
was analyzed.
Why do I think this was so important? As I said earlier, it is
impossible to harden every target--even the Olympic venues. Remember
that many of our venues were literally mountains--mountains which could
easily receive several feet of snowfall in a night and where the
temperatures dropped below zero after dark and the winds could reach
storm force. We couldn't put fencing all over those mountains; cameras
and other equipment aren't reliable in that cold; and there aren't
enough people to stand perimeter duty over hundreds of square miles in
the freezing cold twenty-four hours a day. So, the Secret Service
designed an effective effort--using the latest technology and
surveillance methods and some very hardy agents. But, in the end, our
best offense was to know about a possible attack on a venue like that
before it happened. Good intelligence, effectively shared and utilized,
was critical.
The final lesson learned from Salt Lake that I want to focus on is
the importance of putting the security and safety team in place as far
out as possible, and then exercise, exercise, exercise. In Salt Lake,
we had our final team from the Secret Service, FBI, FEMA, DOD and SLOC
in place over a year out. This team had to manage as one unit during
the Games, and they spent over a year meeting and talking daily until
working together became second nature. That broke down many of the
usual barriers to a truly integrated operational effort.
We also held exercise for all levels of personnel involved--from
the local cop on the street to the senior management at SLOC. And we
didn't hold one or two exercises--we held dozens. And with each we
learned. I remember clearly one of the first I participated in where,
instead of letting the venue manager and the law enforcement lead at
the venue make the decisions, I ordered the evacuation of the building
because of smoke--theoretically sending hundreds of people into an area
where a car had just exploded. Lesson learned--let the operational
decisions be made by those on the ground. And with each exercise, we
all learned--and we fixed the problems we found and then went looking
for more. We tell all future Games to start exercising early and to
make sure that they conduct their exercises in conjunction with the
government agencies that they will be working with during the Games.
It's the only way to make sure that when the real thing starts, you're
ready.
Mr. Chairman, all of these lessons have been passed on to Greece,
Turin, and China. In some cases, the problems we addressed are uniquely
American--in others, they are applicable to any country hosting an
Olympics and trying to ensure that the Games are safe from terrorist
attack. I would urge you as you look into security and safety planning
for those Games, that you ask the following questions:
Is there an integrated and coordinated security plan that
has been adopted by every entity--public and private--with a
role to play in securing the Games?
Is there a clear chain of command for security and safety?
Is there an aggressive intelligence operation and will the
information be shared with those on the ground that need to
know it?
Have exercises been conducted with all participants?
Has the process for communications during an incident been
agreed to?
Have security precautions been put in place for all large
gatherings around the time of the Games--and not just the
Olympic venues?
Is there a real-time public health monitoring and response
plan? Has it been tested?
Have all security precautions been taken at the Olympic
venues, in the transportation system, and at the Olympic
Village, including background checks of everyone working in the
Games?
Clearly, the upcoming Games in Greece will have a different level
of coordination and communications challenges from those we faced due
to the assistance that is being provided by other countries to the
security effort. Therefore, understanding the steps that have been
taken to ensure that all security and safety related operations are
well-integrated and closely coordinated is all the more important.
I'd like to close with a personal comment. During the three years
that I served as CEO of the Salt Lake Organizing Committee, I was asked
many times whether or not it made sense to continue holding the
Olympics, considering the increased security risks and the enormous
expense of hosting the Games. My answer then, as now, is that it is
more important than ever that the Games continue and that the United
States play a major role in the continuation of the Olympic movement.
For the athletes, the Olympic Games represent the culmination of
years of effort and sacrifice. But for the rest of us, the Olympics are
about far more than sport. Sport is merely the stage on which the
athletes perform--and in them we see the qualities of the human spirit
that inspire us all. The Games reaffirm that, no matter what country or
culture, the human spirit can triumph and achieve through hard work,
dedication, persistence, loyalty and commitment. In this time when the
children of our Nation and our world need real heroes, real role-
models, the Olympics provides those heroes.
In Salt Lake, hundreds of millions of dollars were spent by the
federal, state and local governments and SLOC to secure the Games.
Literally thousands of people--cops, soldiers, firemen, Federal agents,
public health workers, and volunteers--put in hundreds of thousands of
hours in harsh weather and cold to keep the Games safe. Was that
investment worth it? Absolutely. Because the Olympics also carries the
dreams we have of a world at peace--the world we are trying to create
for our grandchildren and those who come after. It is dream shared by
all nations who send their finest to compete in the Olympics. And it is
a dream we saw and felt on February 8, 2002 when, in spite of the
threat of terrorism, every nation invited to our Games still sent their
Olympic team and the athletes of the world marched together into
opening ceremonies. Now, more than ever, the Olympic athletes are
lights of inspiration and hope in our world--we cannot let terrorists
put out that light.
I look forward to answering any questions you may have.
Senator Smith. Governor, you said if you were asked, that's
what you would share. Have you been asked?
Governor Romney. I've not been asked to assess the
readiness of the Games in Athens. I certainly am asked whether
we're ready in Boston for the Democratic National Convention
coming our way. And you can be sure that these are the same
questions which I have already asked and which the state and
local authorities, together with the Federal authorities, I
think, are pretty well on track to answer affirmatively.
Something which happened with Presidential Decision
Directive 62 was that the Secret Service, prior to our Games,
was put in charge of planning for a national special-security
event. And in the person of Mark Camillo, who you'll be hearing
from in a moment, we found a person highly capable in bringing
together all of the agencies--the intelligence agencies, the
prevention agencies, the protection agencies. All of these
folks came together and worked together on a very
collaborative, unified basis. Having an agency in charge, with
a person responsible, made an enormous difference for us. And
if I were to attribute our success in having an effective
security program at the Games to any one thing, it would be
that centralized command and centralized responsibility, where
everyone knew who was in charge of putting the plan together,
and got buy-in among the various agencies that were involved.
Senator Smith. The checklist you shared with us, was it
developed before the Salt Lake Games, or was it just the
lessons you took away from the Salt Lake Games?
Governor Romney. It's the lessons I'd take away from the
Salt Lake Games. We went into the Games with those things very
much in mind, and each of those areas were covered to a certain
degree. I think, as time went on, we recognized that
intelligence should play a more and more important role in the
work that we were doing to secure the Games. And given the
nature of a public hearing, I'm not at liberty to describe the
intelligence effort that was carried out. But the intelligence
effort was virtually under the management of the FBI, and they
did a superb job of bringing together teams of personnel across
the Nation, and carrying out the kind of in-depth, well-in-
advance intelligence work that you'd hope would precede an
event of that nature. And that is the real deterrent for
terrorist activity, is finding the bad guys before they attack.
And the concrete barriers and the perimeters, those are
important, as well; but we recognize that no number of concrete
barriers, no number of perimeter personnel, no number of mag-
and-bag checks will prevent a determined terrorist that decides
to attack a particular area. But if intelligence work has been
done effectively, we can find those people and keep them away
from the event.
Senator Smith. Governor, as you can imagine, even holding
this hearing, for which--the Commerce Committee has
jurisdiction over the U.S. Olympic Committee--but in holding
this hearing, there are a lot of people nervous about us even
discussing this in the open. But it is certainly our hope that
by shedding a little light and, where necessary, creating a
little heat, that we can do our responsibility, in terms of
oversight.
And you may have already heard, there are some athletes--
even Mark Spitz--who have openly expressed concern about
security in Athens. Do you have reason to allay those concerns
and fears from what you have seen? Based on your procedures,
are procedures going ahead that ought to give athletes and
spectators some confidence?
Governor Romney. Well, I know that following 9/11, we had a
number of athletes around the world that were very concerned
about coming to the United States. And we, then, invited the
security directors of the respective Olympic committees of
various countries to come in and meet with the Secret Service
and meet with our own planning team, and we took them through
what our preparations had been. Following that review, the
athletes said, ``OK, we're comfortable with what you've done.''
And prior to that review, of course there was some concern.
So I wouldn't be surprised that some athletes who had not seen
the full extent of the preparations would have concern, and
that may well be a valid and appropriate state of mind.
Hopefully, after they've had the chance to review the
provisions that have been taken in preparation for the Games,
they'd have a much higher degree of confidence and sense of
security.
I would note that in our own preparations we placed a great
deal of attention on protecting the athletes--in the village,
in their transportation, and then at the venue itself, where
they competed. We were relatively highly confident that
athletes were safe in the village, in transportation and in the
venue. Where our concerns grew is when the athlete left the
village on their own, or perhaps their event was over and they
decided just to mingle with the population-at-large or go to a
celebration site or a concert site. In those places, the level
of security could not, by definition, reach as high a level as
we had in the village itself. So we literally had a system that
gave us a very high degree of confidence that the athletes
themselves would be secure. And, of course, there's no such
thing as a hundred-percent guarantee in the world of security,
but the athletes came as close to that as I think we thought
was humanly possible.
Senator Smith. I think you mentioned, Governor, that your
budget for security was in excess of $300 million, but you did
not spend all of that. Is that the accurate number?
Governor Romney. Actually, the number is one I'll look to
the GAO to actually prepare for us, because the bulk of the
spending for security was spent by the Federal Government, and
they did not write us a check. They, instead, provided security
resources. So, for instance, we had an air CAP, a military
aircraft, in the air to assure that no aircraft would come into
the Salt Lake City area during key times that was on an
inappropriate mission. We had military personnel that were
searching vehicles and doing checks on bomb presence. We had
Secret Service personnel throughout Salt Lake City. Literally
thousands of Federal agents moved into Salt Lake City, FBI
agents and Forest agents, and so forth--Forest Service agents.
These individuals were being paid for by their respective
agencies and departments, and the funding came from Congress.
So none of that money actually came through our books.
Senator Smith. So you don't fully know exactly what would
be the total cost. Maybe it can't even be calculated----
Governor Romney. That's right. I----
Senator Smith.--in terms of man hours.
Governor Romney.--I think that's really true. So, for
instance, we know that the Federal Government pays a pretty
modest stipend to the members of the National Guard. What is
the true cost of a National Guardsman being there? Their
uniform, their housing, their equipment, their radios, and so
forth--it probably exceeds even the amount that is spent by the
Department of Defense. So I think it's fair to say that we know
that figure was in the hundreds of millions of dollars. Our
estimate is in excess of $300 million was spent for the
security for our Games, and some estimates place it as high as
a half a billion dollars.
Senator Smith. Well, assuming the high number of a half a
billion dollars, certainly the Greeks are commended for
budgeting $1.2 billion for security. And who knows how that
will fully be calculated, in terms of its implementation,
because they have reached out to NATO. There'll be lots of
European and American forces there to be helpful. And yet I
think even--well your point is, even with all the money that's
there--and clearly the money is there to provide security--
there's no such thing in life as a hundred-percent guarantee.
Governor Romney. I think that's absolutely right. And each
individual makes the assessment of whether they're going to
participate in an event or participate in a lifestyle when they
recognize that there is risk involved. These athletes, what
they do day to day in some of their sports is so scary to me, I
can't imagine doing it. Those that go off the ski jump, can you
imagine doing something like that?
Senator Smith. I've done men's aerials before, but never on
purpose.
[Laughter.]
Governor Romney. So, you know, people will assess, you
know, the risks that they will take in their life, but I think
they--what they expect from organizers, and from a country
hosting something like an Olympics, is that everything that's
humanly possible to be done has been done to provide for their
safety. And what they don't want to hear about is that efforts
were uncoordinated, that intelligence wasn't shared, that there
were gaps in the security program, that measures weren't taken
that could have been taken. That's what I think people have a
right to expect, is that government will provide a safety net
which has no flaws and no major seams or gaps. And I think we
came close to achieving that in Salt Lake City. I hope we did.
And I hope that the folks organizing the Games in Athens are
doing that. But it's clear that they're spending the money.
They're asking for help.
The person who helped organize our security effort in Salt
Lake City is also working in Athens to help organize their
effort. He knows how it worked in Salt Lake. He can certainly
take lessons learned and apply them in Athens. And I would look
to people like him and others to make that assessment: Is
everything in place that can be in place to provide for the
safety of athletes and spectators?
Senator Smith. And if the answer is yes, your encouragement
to our athletes is, ``Focus on athletic success. Don't worry
about your personal security.''
Governor Romney. You know, every athlete has to make their
own assessment as to what's right for them. My estimation is
that the athletes will be the safest individuals that one could
possibly imagine at an Olympic event, and if they ever expect
to compete, they recognize that there will be security risks.
But if the organizers are ready, and they've spent the money,
as they have in Athens, and the plan is complete, then I'd
focus on the toughest challenge they'll have, and that's
beating the rest of the world.
Senator Smith. Governor, thank you for your time, but, even
more, for your expertise and your history in this great issue.
We're mindful you've got other things to do, and we appreciate
that you would share your history with the U.S. Senate.
Thank you, Governor.
Governor Romney. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Senator Smith. We'll call, now, our next panel. It consists
of Mr. Mark Camillo, the Director of Homeland Security,
Washington Operations, of the Lockheed Martin Corporation; Mr.
David Maples, Johnson, Maples, and Associates, of Atlanta,
Georgia; Mr. Steven Lopez, a U.S. Olympic Athlete in
Taekwondo--we appreciate this great athlete being with us; and,
also, the world-renowned Carl Lewis, U.S. Olympic Athlete in
Track and Field, perhaps our most decorated athlete in recent
history. Gentlemen, we thank you all for your time.
And, Mr. Camillo, we'll start with you. The Governor spoke
of you and all the great work you did in Salt Lake, and I hope
you can tell us what you're contributing to what's going to
happen in Athens.
STATEMENT OF MARK CAMILLO, DIRECTOR,
HOMELAND SECURITY, WASHINGTON OPERATIONS OFFICES,
LOCKHEED MARTIN CORPORATION
Mr. Camillo. Good afternoon, Mr. Chairman. It's a delight
to be here, and I hope what I offer to you in the next 5
minutes or so is of value.
I am currently serving at Lockheed Martin in a capacity of
concentrating on homeland security, but of particular interest,
I believe, to the panel, is my role before I retired from the
Secret Service. And one of those roles was, particularly, the
Winter Olympic Coordinator for the 2002 Salt Lake Winter
Olympics. And I'd like to underscore some things that Governor
Romney mentioned, because it would be in my best interest to
leave some of the things he said where they are. He captured
the feeling that we left with there.
I'm going to touch on six different areas. And, in the
theme of this hearing, sir, I would like to put a corresponding
lesson learned for the Committee to consider.
The areas that I intend to go over will be--leadership
roles, is the first, followed by partnerships, operational
security, human resources, the theater of operation, and
military support. And this is all in the context of the 2002
Winter Olympics in Salt Lake City and the nine counties in
Utah.
A general note for the group is, I would highly encourage
you to go to school on previous events; and if there's an
opportunity for Olympic planners to go visit and get a feel for
the energy that surrounds actual Olympic Games, that they
should do it. We did it. We went to Sydney, Australia, Nagano,
Japan, and we also went on to give after-action briefings for
the Italians and others who are going to be hosting Games in
the future.
The leadership roles, as you might wonder--again, it was
mentioned why the Secret Service was there, in addition to
protecting the President and other world leaders. The decision
directive that Governor Romney mentioned, Presidential Decision
Directive 62, put the Secret Service in a leadership role for
operational security at the Federal level. That, in addition to
the FBI's leadership role in crisis response and intelligence,
and FEMA's leadership role, in consequence, gave you the trio,
if you will.
My lesson learned there, to offer, is, if you have a Class
A or an extraordinary event, it's in your best interest to put
together an extraordinary team that has the complementary
skills and the institutional experience to tackle the event.
And I qualify that by adding my next point, and that would
be partnerships. Because although the Federal team that I just
mentioned would be what would be considered a national special-
security-event package, it can't be complete unless it's
integrated with the other components, particularly the state
and local public safety officials and others, such as the
military support, and certainly the Salt Lake Organizing
Committee.
We learned, in Utah, that partnerships were critical. And
the ultimate responsibility of the Games, in our view, there
was the Salt Lake Organizing Committee. The glue that held all
these partnerships together consisted mainly of trust and
mutual respect. And that was our theme. We know that the
Organizing Committee never left sight of what it needed to do
to encourage communication and cooperation. Anytime we had an
opportunity, there would be a meeting scheduled, organized by
the Organizing Committee. Conference phone calls were done. And
we found that any rumors or concerns could be quickly put to
rest, allowing more time to move collectively forward.
There were committees formulated. Governor Romney mentioned
the Utah Olympic Public Safety Command. It was an extraordinary
gathering of approximately 20 public safety officials of the
state, local, and Federal. But, also, the Organizing Committee
was there at the table, which was, again, another example of
promoting partnerships by key public safety stakeholders.
And, of course, the lesson learned there is, forming
partnerships at all the levels is what needs to happen to
really promote communication. And it does reduce suspicion and
distrust.
The operational security portion of this, sir, is what I
would view as one of the cornerstones to the whole operation.
It was mentioned: prevention and preparedness. And I couldn't
emphasize more what Governor Romney mentioned, particularly
having a very pronounced prevention and preparedness theme to
the security operations around the official venues. The core
components would include physical security, hazardous materials
detection, as well as explosive-ordnance detection, and access
control. And, as long as when you were working in partnership
with organizations such as the host committee--in this case,
Salt Lake Organizing Committee--our planners worked closely
with their planners so that opportunities to put security
features in a site--in this case, a venue--was done early
enough so that they were done efficiently and not in an
obtrusive way. So with all security components in place before
the gates opened, the venues were virtually transformed into an
operationally clean, secure environment. And this is, in
essence, a filter for preventing acts of terrorism and
criminality for that part.
The lesson learned, of course, is to have a robust
prevention-preparedness capability at the official venues in
order to dramatically reduce any chances of terrorism.
The fourth item of our six is human resources. With a very
limited number of law enforcement officers available in Utah at
the time, and a projected need of approximately twice the size
of the officer strength in the state, it was very clear that
the Federal Government would have to come and work in concert
with the state and local to create a comprehensive plan. And
what we ultimately did there was secure the ten competition
venues and selected non-competition venues with Federal
officers.
We were faced with challenges such as different job
classifications. We brought officers from five different
Federal departments, consisting of 13 different agencies,
together. Some were officers, some were agencies--different job
classifications. We had Interior Department National Park
Service rangers coming in from Wyoming. We had DEA agents from
Miami. We had to find ways so that we could match their
requisite skills and their interests and their abilities to the
different security posts. And we did that. And that really
helped. It kept the morale up.
We had pre-advanced learning CDs that were sent out to get
them ready. We had cold weather gear already designed and
issued when they got there. There was a lot of things we did to
make sure that they were happy, well fed, and rested, and eager
to work.
The fifth item out of six, sir, is the theater of
operation. We had nine counties, so it was a tremendously large
area that we had to work in. And the Organizing Committee
maintained an official list, sir. And this is something that
has to be adhered to. One of the things we found is that there
will be a lot of cultural events and activities that will pop
up around an Olympic event. The charter of the Olympic security
at the Federal level is working primarily--when it comes to
operational security--would be the operational security at the
respective venues. So before those in outlying areas decide to
host a cultural event or an event of Olympic significance, I
would strongly encourage them to look at the existing security
resources and public safety resources, because when it comes
down to the end, when we're matching resources with dollars and
actual people to come in and do these jobs, there might not be
enough to go around. And, let's face it, when we are looking
for potential terrorism acts, it's a mass gathering of
significant events that draws attention that's what they're
interested in.
The last item, sir, is military support. We know that the
military is generally perceived as a quick fix when you have an
extraordinary--or a size event that exceeds anything you've
ever seen. But we do know, and we did learn, that the military
can support, in limited ways, based on law and based on
availability. So we found that working closely and early with
the military, and distinguishing the regular military forces,
under Title 10, versus the National Guard Forces, in Title 32,
was very beneficial.
My lesson learned to show you there, sir, is that they are
valuable, but they do have restrictions. And it's imperative to
have a commanding officer of a Joint Task Force onsite early to
make decisions; otherwise, you might not see the Olympic
support when you need it.
And having said that, sir, I hope my comments and my
lessons learned that I shared were of value, and I applaud what
you're doing here, and I'd be happy to answer any questions.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Camillo follows:]
Prepared Statement of Mark Camillo, Director, Homeland Security,
Washington Operations Offices, Lockheed Martin Corporation
Good afternoon Mr. Chairman, I am Mark Camillo, currently serving
as a Director in the Washington Operations Offices of Lockheed Martin
Corporation, working in the area of Homeland Security, here in the
National Capitol Region. Although my exposure to advanced technologies,
systems and services since joining Lockheed Martin have added to the
depth of my knowledge relative to public safety and security, one of my
previous assignments while serving in the U.S. Secret Service will
hopefully be of particular value to this hearing.
From 1999 through 2002, I served as the Secret Service Winter
Olympic Coordinator for the 2002 Salt Lake Winter Olympics. This
assignment entailed the designing, planning and implementing of the
Federal operational security plan for the Games.
Protecting Olympic games was not viewed as a new idea as the
security plan was being contemplated for Salt Lake. Protocols and
traditions passed on from previous Olympic security planners lent
credence to studying after action reports from previous games and
visiting/interacting with Olympic security officials who were either
preparing or actually executing their plan. Hence, traveling to observe
an actual Olympic event was extremely beneficial.
Leadership Roles
You might wonder what actual role the agency responsible for
protecting the President and other key Government Officials had for the
Salt Lake Games. The Secret Service had a significant role in the
security operations of the Games, due a Presidential Decision Directive
executed in 1998, which put the Secret Service in the lead Federal role
for operational security at National Special Security Events (NSSE).
When any event is designated a NSSE, the Service is joined by the FBI,
who has the crisis response lead, and FEMA, who has the consequence
lead.
LESSON LEARNED: Have a team selected with complementary skills and the
institutional experience to tackle an event of this proportion.
Partnerships
Although the Federal team mentioned in the NSSE ``package'' sounds
complete, they become integrated components, after joining the state
and local public safety planners, who have an equally vested interest
in a safe and successful event.
We learned in Utah that partnerships were also critical with the
Salt Lake Organizing Committee (SLOC), who had the ultimate
responsibility for the Games, and other key planners such as the
Military and others in the public and private sector. The glue that
held all these partnerships together consisted mainly of trust and
mutual respect.
Although Federal and State efforts to create sanctioned gatherings
were largely successful, SLOC never lost sight of the value of
communication and went to great efforts to ensure that all those who
represented the key entities had ample opportunities to communicate,
whether it was at a weekly scheduled meeting or a daily conference
phone call. What we found was that rumors or concerns could be quickly
put to rest, allowing more time to move collectively forward.
Many committees were formulated. Some were in a steering capacity,
and some were in a working capacity. The most prominent one was the
Utah Olympic Public Safety Command. A State legislated entity that had
representation from all the counties affected by the Games.
Additionally, key Federal partners were participants, as well as a
representative from SLOC. Again, another example of promoting
partnerships with all key public safety stakeholders.
LESSON LEARNED: Forming partnerships at all levels and providing the
opportunity to communicate reduced suspicion and distrust.
Operational Security
What might be viewed as a new approach to securing the 2002 Winter
Olympics was the inclusion of a very pronounced prevention and
preparedness theme to the security operations in and around the
official venues. Core components including physical infrastructure,
HAZMAT/Explosive Ordinance Detection and access control were weaved
into the general design plan of the venues. SLOC understood and worked
in unison with the security planners to place security elements where
they provided most value. The security planners in turn, studied
existing site plans developed by SLOC in the early stages to find ways
to introduce security elements into the venues in the least obtrusive
way. With all security components operational before the gates opened,
the venues were transformed into ``operationally clean security
environments'' that provided in essence a filter for preventing acts of
terrorism or criminality within the site.
LESSON LEARNED: Having a robust prevention and preparedness capability
at the official venues dramatically reduced the chances of terrorism or
criminality disrupting the event.
Human Resources
With a very limited number of state law enforcement personnel
available, and a projected requirement of approximately twice the size
of the state law enforcement workforce for overall public safety, a
decision was made to turn to Federal agencies for assistance. We were
faced with challenges such as different job classifications (Officer
vs. Agent) and commissioned authority. Also, equally challenging was
drawing from all over the United States, which potentially meant
assigning a Deputy U.S. Marshal from Miami to a security post on the
side of a mountain, or placing a U.S. Park Ranger from Wyoming at a
checkpoint in an ice skating venue. The solution to this problem was
identifying representatives from each agency who worked in advance with
the Olympic planners to match skills and interests with Olympic
security assignments. Consequently, Federal officers who had skills and
abilities conducive to the alpine venues were assigned accordingly.
Distance learning CDs were developed and forwarded to pre-selected
officers to prepare them for their assignments. Cold weather gear was
also procured and issued once Officers arrived for duty. This also
added to boosting morale since most assignments lasted on average of
three weeks.
LESSON LEARNED: Once security posts are identified, matching officers
who have the requisite skills, experiences and providing equipment
greatly increases job performance and satisfaction.
Theater of Operation
What distinguished the Olympic activity across the nine Utah
counties was whether an event was an official venue or possibly a
related event of a cultural significance that would also draw a mass
gathering of participants and/or spectators. When determining the
status of a venue, SLOC maintained an official venue list. This
consisted of the ten competition venues and approximately four other
venues that were critical to the functioning of the Games. When
determining the resources needed for the Olympic security plan, the
funding required was matched to the official Olympic venues.
Consequently, there were no surplus resources for discretionary usage.
With valid concerns raised by those local authorities who's ``Olympic
events'' could be viewed as possible terrorist targets, last minute
efforts were made to find resources that would provide an enhancement
to their respective security plans.
LESSON LEARNED: Review all events either in proximity to the official
venues or in the region and determine as early as possible if existing
security resources can adequately secure the event. Public officials
must weigh the potential consequences of a lack of adequate security
when encouraging the hosting of an Olympic related event.
Military Support
The use of the Military seems at face value like an obvious
solution when there is a large requirement for personnel or equipment.
Requests made to the Defense Department would presumably be met with an
enthusiastic response to assist in the Olympic Mission. This, however,
was not the case. Reviews of U.S. Military personnel and equipment in
previous U.S. hosted Olympics revealed support that in retrospect could
not be justified. The Salt Lake Winter Olympics was armed with a
supporting team of Military professionals primarily from both the U.S.
Joint Forces Command (JFCOM) and the Utah National Guard (UNG).
Legislation provided tight controls over what could be provided. In
some cases, specialized support was provided in areas like air space
security, but generally speaking, the greatest areas of support
provided for operational security were in the areas of equipment
assistance and explosives detection support. Both of which became
critical to the enhancement efforts set in motion after the attacks of
September 11th. While the Title 10 forces (JFCOM) had strict rules
prohibiting their involvement in law enforcement functions, the Title
32 Forces (UNG) had more flexibility in the area of law enforcement
support. The flow of military communication and support increased
significantly when a Joint Task Force--Olympics was ultimately
established.
LESSON LEARNED: The military can provide valuable support, but has
restrictions on the types of duties they can perform. Having a command
level officer with decision-making authority on site is imperative if
there is any expectation that military support will be provided.
Military and civilian planners should jointly review requests before
assistance is authorized.
In closing, I hope my comments and the six noted lessons learned
provided value to the hearing.
I applaud the Committee's efforts to bring to light past security
practices that might be useful for future Olympic games.
I would be happy to answer any questions.
Thank you.
Senator Smith. Thank you, Mark. And I'm aware you're no
longer with the Secret Service. Is that correct?
Mr. Camillo. Yes, sir. Recently retired.
Senator Smith. But are you mindful of--the lessons you've
learned, that they have been sought out in Greece, and that
they're being implemented? Do you have any such knowledge?
Mr. Camillo. I can tell you that there is a transfer of
institutional knowledge that had occurred. I can tell you that
there were officials from Greece that were onsite in Utah. That
is a tradition. It's a protocol, and they adhered to it. And I
do know, I believe, that there are elements within the Federal
Government that are working as a conduit to make sure that that
information, as Governor Romney mentioned, has been passed, to
help them. Although a Summer Games is different than a Winter
Games, so there are some nuances that they won't be able to
take complete advantage of.
Senator Smith. I only mention that because we will hear in
detail, specifics, what is being done, between our Nation and
Greece, in preparation for these Games, and lessons learned,
but I do want--I don't want to lay the impression that a lot of
work is being left undone, because it is being done.
But one of the things you hear of, over here in our media,
is, much of the construction work that needs to be completed is
still undone in Greece, and I wonder if you have any concern
about stadiums uncompleted and things yet to be done, cement to
dry as athletes are lining up. What kind of problems does that
present, in terms of security? Is that of concern to you?
Mr. Camillo. Well, as I mentioned in my comments, sir, the
earlier that security features can be weaved into the plan of
the event, the less intrusive they will be, the more efficient
they will likely be. So if it has to come in late, it's
recognized generally as a retrofit. Now, I certainly can't
comment on if that that happens to be the case with the Greek
Games, but I will say that if the security planners can partner
with the architects of the event early on and get the security
features on the blueprints at the design level, that is when
you'll have a clean, efficient plan.
We, in Utah, were facing one venue that was coming up late
for construction, but it was the Medals Plaza. We had complete
faith that it would be done on time, and it was done on time.
And, fortunately, we stayed on target with the blueprints and
were able to achieve that security plan toward the end of our
planning effort.
Senator Smith. It's interesting to note that even in
Atlanta, where the security was wonderful, that there was this
one explosion at a soft target. Did you try to minimize soft
targets in Salt Lake?
Mr. Camillo. The soft target that I recognized that term to
be occurring, some were outside of the recognized secure zones.
In the case of Atlanta, I understand that that occurred in an
area that was not a part of the secure zones.
Senator Smith. That's correct.
Mr. Camillo. I do know that the state and local public
safety departments have the responsibility to cover an area out
and around the official venues. That's why it is so critical to
give them the ability to develop a strength in their plan
around the official venues. If the state and locals would have
to secure the official venues and all the outlying areas
adjacent to or in between the official venues, it would be an
almost impossible task.
Senator Smith. Thank you very much, Mr. Camillo. We
appreciate your time and your testimony here today.
Mr. Camillo. You're welcome.
Senator Smith. David Maples, former FBI agent, and also
intimately involved with these preparations, and we thank you
for your presence and invite your testimony.
STATEMENT OF DAVID G. MAPLES,
JOHNSON, MAPLES, AND ASSOCIATES
Mr. Maples. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
I do appreciate your invitation to appear before you and
discuss Olympic security measures taken by organizing
committees and public officials on behalf of those who have
attended or participated in past Olympics.
I have listened to Governor Romney and Mark, and I heartily
concur with all the recommendations that they have set forth
and the lessons that they have learned. So I think I would like
to take my 5 minutes and maybe put a historical perspective of
the development of security during the Summer Games and the
recent events.
My view is that there are many factors that govern or
influence security planning and operational security measures
taken by Olympic Games host nations that cause each one to be
unique. National customs and culture, governmental structure,
applicable laws, jurisdictional authorities, available assets,
and world events play a large role in the approach to, the
scope of, and the final operational structure given to any
Olympic security program.
As you mentioned, Mr. Chairman, prior to 1972, Olympic
security was more a regulatory policing in nature than one of
secure screening and preparation to respond to worst case
scenarios, as we know the preparation to be today. The attack
on the athletes in Munich precipitated changes that affected
security planning in more ways than just having stronger
perimeter controls in the village and the venues.
The 1996 Olympic Games in Montreal lost money and caused
heavy public debt, as all well know. Moscow was already
committed to host the Games in 1980, but only two cities bid
for the 1984 Games, and Los Angeles won those by default. Los
Angeles citizens were not willing to chance having to shoulder
Olympic debt costs, and the IOC was forced to award the
financial liability of the Games to a private organizing group,
which was unprecedented.
Certainly for Olympic Games held in the United States, I
believe that these events set the stage for the organization of
security and the expenditure of funds and assets supporting
security for those in subsequent Games because it set a
relationship for years to come between public safety, the
government, and the Organizing Committee, which I believe that
Salt Lake undertook to modify to advantage.
Also, in a historical sense, the makeup of organizing
committees varied greatly from host to host. In many countries,
the governments from those countries are integrally involved in
the organization of the Games through the Organizing Committee
itself, and that generally is reflected by increased
integration of government security forces in the overall
security plan. And I believe that's the case in Athens.
World events and the fact that Olympic Security Games--
excuse me--the Olympic Games have increased in size and the
number of countries participating, have caused each succeeding
Olympic security program to consider protection from, and
response to, threats not previously considered in Olympic
Games. More technology, more personnel, more assets and
logistics, more expense, and more need for national and
international support and cooperation has been the trend in
Olympic security, and necessarily so. Now host nations direct
their most sophisticated public safety assets to support
security efforts for the Olympic Games, and the international
cooperation and support is critical to the host. Integration of
medical, mass care, shelter, and emergency-management
capabilities into security considerations is now necessary.
During recent Olympic Games, the security apparatus, in its
final form, however conformed, has represented virtually all
services that the public safety community of that locality is
capable of providing. Providing security coverage for the
Olympic Games is complex, and it is ever-escalating for the
responsible officials.
And I might add, Mr. Chairman, that my first Olympics was
1984 in Los Angeles. And, like other planners, we decided that
we should view Games prior to those for their experience and
what we might do. The previous Games, in Atlanta, was 1932. The
security at the 1932 Games in Atlanta consisted, as we
understood, of a squadron of motorcycle officers for traffic
control, and a cowboy on horseback to ride around the Olympic
Village to shoo the autograph-seekers away.
[Laughter.]
Mr. Maples. I think that our involvement in security,
either unfortunately or necessity, has increased through the
years to the case now where you've mentioned that Athens will
probably be spending in excess of $1 billion for security, and
employing not only all their national assets, but assets of
other nations, as well.
In addition to what Governor Romney and Mr. Camillo
mentioned, there are just a couple of lessons learned that I
would like to mention to you, sir. One is that it is absolutely
imperative to obtain the intelligence and distribute it to
users who need to have that information at the Games. We all
know that collecting intelligence is one thing, distributing
intelligence is another problem. And the distribution is the
most difficult side of that equation, I do believe.
Another thing is that public safety officials have to be
very flexible, because the Organizing Committee is constantly
changing what it's doing, what its plans are, even what venues
will be employed, sometimes even going so far as to what towns
will be hosting specific events. It's imperative that public
safety be brought in on the front end and that senior officials
from government have the necessary interest and involvement
from the very beginning--and I believe that means four to 5
years ahead of the Games--in order to keep the public safety
abreast of what is an ever-changing situation around them from
the organizers.
I believe that the government officials should have, at
least in the United States, probably a greater say in how the
accreditation is run. Accreditation is the--of course, the
badge that allows athletes and other members of the Olympic
family and official guests and necessary support people into
the venues. That is a system that is administered by the
International Olympic Committee, sometimes without very much
input from law enforcement or public safety. And I believe that
public safety officials should be more involved in that
particular process.
As Mr. Camillo mentioned, integrating military in security,
because of our different historical roles, can be problematic.
And setting up the system for that integration on the front end
of planning, rather than, as he mentioned making a quick fix
out of it, I believe is imperative.
And the last thing that I would mention, Mr. Chairman, is
that I believe that for public safety officials to obtain
information from the national Olympic committees regarding
their delegation's specific needs and VIPs that they have
attending that would affect governmental security forces,
should be made available probably more quickly that it is now,
recognizing that in many cases the national Olympic committees
themselves don't know who will be attending until the last
minute. But I think that a mechanism for increasing that flow
of information would be something necessary for future Games.
So I appreciate the opportunity to speak to you, sir, and
I'd answer any questions.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Maples follows:]
Prepared Statement of David G. Maples, Johnson, Maples, and Associates
Chairman Smith, Members of the Committee:
I appreciate the invitation to appear before you to discuss
security measures taken by organizing committees and public officials
on behalf of those who attended or participated in past Olympic Games,
and how lessons learned from these past events may serve to ensure
better security for future Olympic Games.
Given the enormity of the Games, including the extraordinary number
of nations that participate, and its worldwide audience, the Olympic
Games present a tempting target for a wide variety of disruptive
activities, from simple demonstrations to violent acts of terrorism.
Of course, the goal of the host country is to provide a secure
environment for the staging of the Olympic Games. The success of this
endeavor is critical to the presentation of the world's largest and
most widely viewed sporting event.
There are factors, such as applicable laws, governmental structure,
jurisdictional authority, available assets and culture, that govern or
influence planning and ultimately the security measures taken by
federal, state and local level officials of any host nation.
Additionally, the International Olympic Committee (IOC) is an
international non-government, non-profit organization that owns all
rights to the Olympic Games and dictates specific rules under which the
Games are organized and presented. It is also the umbrella organization
of the Olympic Movement which includes the National Olympic Committees,
International Sports Federations, and various other organizations and
institutions recognized by the IOC as well as the host city organizing
committee.
The makeup of past organizing committees has varied greatly, from
including direct government representation to that of being solely
private, as is done in the U.S. During the course of its planning, the
organizing committee makes many decisions, such as venue selection,
venue design, policies regarding admission to events or access to
athlete housing and training sites, pre-event protection of property
and assets, Olympic family housing, accreditation, and use of private
security, that impact security planning measures. The host country
government structure and its representation, or lack thereof, in the
organizing committee affects the degree of authority and participation
government security forces exercise inside properties and facilities
owned, contracted to or used by the Olympic family.
Government Olympic security efforts are focused on issues of public
safety. In general terms, preparations are divided into topics of
Intelligence, Investigation, Physical Security, Emergency Response to
Incidents, and Mitigation of Incidents. Due to unique jurisdictional,
legislative and budgetary issues as well as widely different
capabilities, all agencies recognize that planning and operational
execution requires an immense amount of interagency communication and
cooperation.
The tragic incident during the 1972 Olympic Games in Munich,
Germany certainly changed the world's view of the standard of security
necessary for the Games. The subsequent expectations of the IOC,
athletes, delegations and spectators for extraordinary security at
Olympic Games have been met by successively increased government
commitment to security and expenditures. In recent years, as terrorist
activity has increased, and the methods used to strike have become more
sophisticated, efforts to protect the Games have become more complex
and expensive.
I would like to briefly illustrate this to you using examples of
four recent summer Olympic Games.
Los Angeles--1984
When Tehran, the only other city bidding for the 1984 Olympic
Games, withdrew, Los Angeles was awarded the Games by the IOC, but the
issue of financing became an obstacle to the city signing a contract.
In an unprecedented move by the IOC, the financial liability for the
Games was removed from the City of Los Angeles and placed on a private
organizing committee. The Los Angeles Olympic Organizing Committee
(LAOOC) was the first private committee, without official ties to
government, to organize and operate the Olympic Games. As such, LAOOC's
philosophy was to be as economic as possible while still presenting a
complete Olympics. The presentation of the Games was financed by the
private sector, without government subsidies or taxpayer contributions,
but the costs of protecting the Games greatly exceeded agencies normal
operating budgets.
This greatly impacted federal, state and local organizations that
had a duty to provide for the public safety. Use of as many existing
facilities as possible spread the core of the Games over seven southern
California counties, with preliminary soccer events in Massachusetts
and Maryland. By and large, LAOOC did not request specific security
services from government and therefore was not obligated to pay for
them. Only a small portion of local governments' security costs were
financially assumed by LAOOC.
Before the Organizing Committee was actively involved in security
planning for the Games, the Los Angeles Police Department, the Los
Angeles County Sheriff's Department, and the FBI took the lead and
coordinated security planning. The cornerstone of the planning, which
continued through the Games, was the recognition of jurisdictional
autonomy. Sixteen topics formed the basis for the security planning
structure. They were Accreditation, Air Support, Bombs/Explosive
Devices, Communications, Community Relations, Crime Prevention,
Criminal Justice, Dignitary Protection, Emergency Response,
Intelligence, International Entry, In Transit Security, Olympic Village
Security, Traffic Control, Training, Transportation and Venue/Vital
Point Security.
The Federal Government supplemented local law enforcement agencies
with approximately $50 million of logistical support equipment that
they needed to provide adequate security for the Games, including
communications equipment, helicopters, intrusion detection systems for
the villages and miscellaneous medical equipment.
The security department of LAOOC, which had no law enforcement
authority, took the responsibility for protecting property and assets
belonging to LAOOC, providing accreditation control at the villages,
venues and training sites, providing security for IOC officials, and
protecting special interest areas such as press and broadcast zones and
accreditation, illegal substance control and computer centers.
Recognizing that many more agencies had need for Olympic related
intelligence than were involved in intelligence collection, the FBI
hosted a center that received information from national, state and
local agencies, and distributed pertinent information to agencies and
organizations with protection responsibilities.
In all, some 7,000 law enforcement officers were committed to the
Games, with substantial Federal assets poised to respond to breaches of
security, mass medical emergencies or threats that were beyond the
capacity of local or state agencies.
The Los Angeles Olympics established the public safety-organizing
committee relationship that has in large measure carried through
subsequent Olympic Games hosted in the United States.
Seoul--1988
The presentation of the XXIVth Olympiad was fully supported and
directed by the Republic of Korea Government. The Seoul Olympic
Organizing Committee (SLOOC) was formed in 1981.
The organizational structure of security for the Olympic Games was
divided into two parts. The SLOOC had a security department that was
responsible for overall coordination between the SLOOC Games Operations
Division and the government security. It had planning responsibility in
areas of opening and closing ceremonies, 34 competition venues, 72
practice sites, the cultural events and the Olympic torch relay.
The government security operation was headed by the Committee for
Security Measures. This was the policy making body for security for the
Games and was chaired by the Director of the Agency for National
Security Planning (NSP) with members from 12 government agencies.
Day to day planning and operations for security of the Games
focused at the Security Coordination and Control Headquarters which was
responsible for overall planning, coordination and control of security
operations for the Olympic Games. It was headed by a deputy director in
the NSP with assistant directors for NSP affairs, Korean National
Police affairs and military affairs.
There were nine security divisions to address major security
topics. They were Planning, Counterterrorism, Technical Support,
Intelligence, Venue Protection, Personnel and VIP Security, Athletes
Village Protection, Traffic Coordination and Training.
Physical security duties for the various sites and functions were
assigned either to the Korean National Police or Korean military units.
The Korean National Police committed over 47,000 officers to Olympic
security and the military committed over 42,000 personnel.
Before and during the Olympic Games, there were approximately
42,000 U.S. military personnel assigned in the Republic of Korea. The
U.S. military Olympic security responsibilities related primarily to
the protection of U.S. military personnel and property. It was
proactive in training and exercise with the Korean military.
The 1988 Games underscored the necessity for cooperation and mutual
support in the international community of law enforcement, not only in
training matters, but in the execution of the security itself. For
example, air travel was, and will continue to be, a primary means of
transport to an Olympic host country. In a time before the high level
of screening that is in place today, not only did the host country have
stringent security, but obtained the cooperation of other airports that
formed the feeder system to Seoul to participate in the security
envelope.
Barcelona--1992
The makeup of the Barcelona Organizing Committee (COOB'92)
reflected the active participation of the Spanish Government in the
planning and operation of the 1992 Games. COOB'92 was composed of
representatives from Spain's Olympic Committee, Barcelona City Council,
Generalitat of Catalonia and the Spanish Government. The mayor of
Barcelona was the president of COOB'92.
COOB'92 formed a security department to identify and resolve
organizing committee security issues during the planning phase to
develop COOB'92's portion of the Master Security Plan and to implement
COOB'92 security responsibilities during the Games.
Spain constituted the Higher Commission for Olympic Security in
June, 1987 with the Secretary of State for Security as chairman and
charged with the responsibility of directing, planning, preparing and
implementing security operations. In 1988 a security model was adopted
that integrated public and private resources under the authority of the
Commission for Olympic Security and integrated the efforts of the
National Police, the Guardia Civil, the Mossos d'Esquadra (Catalan
Police), the Barcelona City Police, other local police forces, the
Army, the Navy and the Air Force.
The administrative instrument was the Olympic Security Master Plan
which consisted of 86 security project areas from national issues, such
as intelligence, frontier security and control of territorial waters to
Games specific issues, such as Olympic village security, accreditation
and information security. Security and emergency response capabilities
to address specific risks, such as power supply, water supply,
telecommunications, dangerous materials, transportation systems were
assigned to the Catelonian government and Department of Public Safety.
Due to the locations of the venues, training sites, athletes'
village and official hotels, the National Police had responsibility for
about 80 percent of the Olympic facilities security. The Guardia Civil
had jurisdiction at the airports, the port of Barcelona, four venues
and essential public services such as water, fuel and electric
supplies, broadcast stations, telephone relay points and transportation
services.
Mossos d'Esquadra protected two competition venues and took part in
crime prevention activities.
Barcelona City Police took charge of traffic and street public
safety issues.
The Army supported the Guardia Civil and COOB'92. The Air Force
provided protection of the air space and the Navy provided security of
water competition areas and territorial waters.
One aspect of the Barcelona Games was the use of cruise ships in
the port for housing of guests of the corporate sponsors. Extensive sea
side as well as port side security measures were taken to protect the
15 large ships.
Approximately 25,000 law enforcement personnel and numerous support
personnel were committed to security of the Barcelona Games.
Atlanta--1996
The Olympic Games trended toward being larger and more complex each
four years. The Atlanta organizing committee promoted their Games as
being larger than Los Angeles and Barcelona combined. However, Atlanta
had far fewer law enforcement assets than either Los Angeles or
Barcelona.
Because of the similarity of local government structures in the
U.S. in 1993, Atlanta adopted the Los Angeles Olympic Security planning
model, and the security planning topics were virtually the same. A
concern from the beginning was the shortfall between the generally
agreed number of security personnel needed for Games the size of
Atlanta (approximately 30,000) and the number calculated to be
available (approximately 8,000). Ultimately a combination of state,
local, federal, military, private security and volunteers were used to
staff the security functions.
Other public safety services were part of security operations which
included expansion of trauma capabilities at local hospitals,
coordination with area hospitals, coordination with public health
services and the American Red Cross. The security plan included the
integration of law enforcement, medical, mass care, shelter, fire and
emergency management into a consolidated response capability. This
planning was a critical factor in the organized response to the pipe
bomb that was detonated in Centennial Park, killing one person and
injuring approximately 110.
Many Federal assets were temporarily located in Atlanta for the
Games, including capabilities to respond to conventional explosives,
chemical or biological threats and hostage situations.
Closing
The Olympic Movement tries to contribute to a peaceful better world
through sport and to generate mutual understanding through a spirit of
friendship and fair play. As our world becomes more complex, the
challenges faced by security forces that have the responsibility to
preserve an environment that allows participants and spectators alike
to gather at the Olympic Games in the spirit of the Games, continue to
escalate.
When Los Angeles hosted the 1932 Olympic Games security consisted
of police motorcycle officers to direct traffic near the stadium and a
horseback officer to patrol around the athletes' housing. Athens
estimates its Olympic Games security costs will be $800 million, plus
the support of security forces from several other countries. Security
forces must prepare to prevent or respond to threats unimagined to
previous Games.
Senator Smith. Thank you very much, Mr. Maples.
You offer a unique historical perspective, in that you have
been a party to the security of both U.S.-sponsored Olympic
Games and foreign-----
Mr. Maples. Yes, sir.
Senator Smith.--sponsored Olympic Games. And I wonder if
you have seen a qualitative difference, in terms of security,
one versus the other, or if you would say that, in a post-9/11
environment, frankly, that qualitative difference would shrink
out of national pride, and certainly the budgets are being
reflected, in terms of history. Do you see such a difference?
And do you have much fear about such differences?
Mr. Maples. I think the approach can be quite different. I
think the final result is more nearly the same. For instance,
some countries equate Olympic security essentially to national
security, as was the case in Seoul, 1988. The government was
intimately involved in not only the security preparations, but
the organizing of the Games themselves. In Barcelona, that
involvement by the government was there, but to a lesser
extent. And, of course, in the United States we look at it as
essentially a private event, supported by the government as
essary.
But to specifically answer the question, I think even
though the approaches are very different, the final result is
very nearly the same, in terms of security--physical security
for the venues, security that we don't see behind the scenes
that is there to respond to any incidents that may happen.
Senator Smith. I think people take some comfort in that you
don't see a qualitative difference; you see a national--sort of
a national pride on the line, so every effort is taken. And I
hope our athletes take some comfort in that, too.
We'll now hear from our two great athletes. First, Steven
Lopez, an Olympic Gold Medalist in Sydney--and then we'll let
Carl Lewis bat cleanup.
[Laughter.]
Senator Smith. Steven?
STATEMENT OF STEVEN LOPEZ,
U.S. OLYMPIC ATHLETE IN TAEKWONDO
Mr. Lopez. Well, good afternoon, Mr. Chairman.
Senator Smith. Thank you for being here.
Mr. Lopez. Oh, it's my pleasure. It's an honor for me to be
asked to be here.
My name is Steven Lopez. I'm the 2000 Olympic Gold Medalist
in the sport Taekwondo, and I'm currently pursuing winning
another gold medal at the 2004 Olympic Games, in Athens, which
will begin a hundred days from tomorrow.
Taekwondo is an ancient martial art. It's evolved over the
centuries to become a modern day sport, which involves
athleticism with mental discipline. And it's been a part of my
life--it's a way of life for me. It's integrity, perseverance,
self control, and the indomitable spirit. And, at its core, at
its foundation, there's a strict moral and ethical code that
stresses loyalty to God, country, family, and to all mankind.
I was invited here today to speak--by the United States
Olympic Committee--to speak on my point of view regarding
security issues in Athens. And ever since 9/11, you can't help
but think about security--every time you board a plane, every
time I travel overseas to a competition in a foreign country;
but I still board that plane, and I still travel overseas to
wherever I need to do. And, in the same respect, I feel that we
should be able to pursue our dreams of representing our country
at the Olympic Games, at the greatest competition in the world.
It's my responsibility--I feel it's my duty--to be an
ambassador every time I go overseas and compete, and especially
at the Olympic Games. That's what I'm in control of. I'm in
control of my preparation. I'm in control of being in the best
shape of my life, both mentally and physically. And, in the
same respect that I'm confident and have faith in my
preparation and in my job, I am very confident in those whose
job it is to make sure that there's a secure and safe Olympic
Games in Athens--the International Olympic Committee, the
United States Olympic Committee, and the organizers of the
Olympic Games.
Every time I do compete, it's stressful enough to be out
there and think about who I'm going to be competing against,
especially in my sport of Taekwondo, where in a split second,
you know, you could get, you know, hit or hurt. But that's my
concern. And I have confidence in those whose hands it is the
responsibility to ensure safety.
There have been some comments made, and statements made,
that the answer to the security issues or concerns is by not
attending the Athens Games at all. And that, to me, would be a
detriment to our country. It would be--the Olympics is more
than just the biggest competition in the world; it's the
purest--I think, the purest--it brings the world together. It's
pure, and the greatest sporting event of all mankind. And my
greatest memory, and my greatest moment of my life, was to be
on the first-place podium representing my country with a hand
over my heart watching my flag being raised as thousands heard
my national anthem being played. And there's nothing I want
more in life to be able to go back in 2004 and listen to that
anthem once again.
And I just thank you for giving me the opportunity to speak
on the security issues, on the perspective of an athlete, and I
welcome any questions that you have for me, Mr. Chairman.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Lopez follows:]
Prepared Statement of Steven Lopez, U.S. Olympic Athlete in Taekwondo
Good afternoon Mr. Chairman and Members of the Committee.
My name is Steven Lopez and I am a 2000 Gold Medalist in Taekwondo
and hope to replicate that accomplishment at the 2004 Olympic Games in
Athens which will begin 100 days from tomorrow.
Taekwondo is an ancient martial art sport, a variation of which
dates back to 50 B.C. Over the centuries and millennia Taekwondo, which
is similar to karate, has evolved into a modern day sport that blends
athleticism with mental discipline. While fundamentally an athletic
endeavor whose purpose is self-defense, its practice emphasizes the
necessity of developing mental discipline and emotional equanimity, and
a sense of responsibility for one self and for others. Further, at its
foundation is a strict moral and ethical code that stresses loyalty to
God, country and family, and respect for all mankind.
I have been engaged in the sport since I was five years old. At the
current age of 25 that is eighty percent of my life. Although my God,
my family, my friends and my education have always taken precedence,
dedication to the requirements and principles of Taekwondo have guided
me for most of my life and have required that I learn to sharpen my
focus to matters which I can control, and leave to others what I
cannot.
I was invited here apparently to discuss security concerns in
Athens and measures to ensure athlete safety. Frankly, these are
matters that fall into the category of those that are beyond my
knowledge and control, and about which I lack the experience and
competency to address authoritatively. I am not concerned about
security. My focus is and will continue to be on preparation for my
competition, and to representing my countrymen in a manner that will
reflect favorably upon them. Security is the last thing that I am
worrying about. Instead, I am trusting the United States Olympic
Committee, the organizers of the Athens Games, and perhaps U.S.
Government authorities to address these matters.
I read a newspaper article last week where a former Olympian
speculated that there is a high probability that the U.S. team, or
perhaps some of its members, will eventually withdraw from the 2004
Olympic Games out of concern for security. In all due respect, the high
probability is that this individual doesn't know the athletes who will
make up the 2004 Olympic Team and has forgotten what motivates them. I
and my fellow athletes have prepared much too long to forfeit the honor
of participating in the greatest athletic competition in the world. The
Olympic Games are not merely an athletic competition, but rather, a
unique lifetime experience that we are fortunate to have the
opportunity to be invited to participate in. Please don't ask me
whether I plan to go to Athens. Rather, ask me what can I do to bring
honor and glory to the United States, and to my countrymen whose
support and encouragement will enable me to represent them this Summer.
Thank you for your time and for your attention.
Senator Smith. Steven, thank you for your words, but more
for your courage and incredible attitude. And I just want you
to know that we, on this Committee and Congress, and I know on
United States Olympic Committee, are anxious to do everything
possible to make sure that your personal security is provided
for so you can focus on your athletic success, because we want
to see that, as well, and hear that national anthem, and see
you on that top tier.
Mr. Lopez. Thank you.
Senator Smith. Thank you, and all the best to you.
Mr. Lopez. Thank you.
Senator Smith. Carl Lewis. Needs no introduction.
STATEMENT OF CARL LEWIS,
U.S. OLYMPIC ATHLETE IN TRACK AND FIELD
Mr. Lewis. Well, first of all, thank you, Mr. Chairman, for
giving me this opportunity to speak. And, in the words of Track
and Field, I'm the anchor leg.
[Laughter.]
Mr. Lewis. This is a very, very important time; this is a
very critical issue we're talking about. And I, myself, have
had the privilege to--and the honor, actually--to represent my
country to five Olympic teams, four Olympic Games, and--from
Los Angeles all the way until Atlanta, in 1996. And through all
of these Games, security was a very important part of it. But,
unfortunately, now we live in a world where security is even
more important.
You know, as a former Olympic athlete, I am, by no means,
an expert on security matters, and I'm not here to pull out a
crystal ball and try to predict what will happen, or what can
happen, in Athens. I'm simply here to encourage you to do the
right thing, to support the most advanced, complete security
possible that we can have.
And, as a former athlete, I know how to prepare for
competition. To be successful when the athlete trains, and to
prepare for competition, he or she needs to focus entirely on
his competition, and give his undivided attention to training
and preparation for every single event, as we just heard. An
athlete cannot be distracted by any factors or diversions. And
my message and plea to all of you today is simple. As members
of the U.S. Government, please do everything within your power
to ensure the greatest level of security that's available to
all of the Olympians in Athens. And if that means more
resources, I hope they'll be provided. And if that means more
briefings and international collaboration, I hope that'll take
place.
I also have a message to the athletes who are in the midst
of their training for Athens. Stay completely focused on your
training, and rest assured that you will be competing in an
environment that has the highest level of security ever
provided for any athletic competition.
And to help raise comfort for all of these athletes, let's
consider the following issues. Well over $1.2 billion will be
spent on security in Athens, which is nearly four times the
amount that was spent in Sydney just 4 years ago. And also, for
the first time ever, the U.S. Government is able to provide
athletes protection for the first time. And also, the U.S.
Government has been in close contact and working with other
countries and the Greek Government in a joint security program,
and this program will be obviously a very, very international
effort.
In my experiences competing in four Olympic Games, I've
always been impressed with the level of security provided for
the athletes by the host nation. I never felt threatened or
concerned with security, and that allowed me to focus on
competition. And I'm both confident and hopeful that despite
the new security concerns in Athens, that the extensive and
well-coordinated security programs that will be in operation
will provide all athletes a high level of confidence and will
allow them to focus exclusively on what they came here to do--
compete on the fields of play, and connect with new friends
from around the world.
I know and I'm aware of all those who think that sending
U.S. athletes to Athens is an unnecessary risk. Mr. Chairman
and Members of the Committee that would be listening, as a
member of the U.S. Olympic Team that will not be able to--that
did not compete in the 1980 Moscow Olympic Games, I urge and
ensure you that the absent will not stand a message that the--
I'm sorry--being a member of the 1980 Olympic Team, I urge and
ensure that the absence of some clear, present danger will
never change that course of action. And our athletes have been
training so much of their lives for this very special moment,
so let's not take it away from them. And I remember, also, in
looking at so many athletes at the end of their careers, in
1980, who had to understand that they would never have that
chance again.
The beauty of sports and, in fact, the very foundation of
this Olympic movement is that sport transcends all borders and
political strife. Regardless of the conflicts of the world and
various difficult international relations, we have a powerful
and beautiful common interest, the competition of sports. And
it is my hope that this Olympics will be the best ever, and
that, with your continued support, athletes from all over the
world, whatever they do, will be at their best and compete
without any distractions.
Thank you, and I appreciate the opportunity to be here. And
if you have any questions, I'd be happy to answer.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Lewis follows:]
Prepared Statement of Carl Lewis, U.S. Olympic Athlete in Track and
Field
Thank you, Mr. Chairman and members of the Subcommittee for this
opportunity to speak on the important matter of Olympic Security. The
timing and the subject matter of this hearing are critical, and I
applaud you for recognizing its importance.
I have had the privilege and honor to represent my country on five
U.S. Olympic teams and to compete in four summer Olympics: Los Angeles
(1984), Seoul (1988), Barcelona (1992) and Atlanta (1996). In each of
these games, security has been an important consideration and
unfortunately, it is even more so now in the world we live in today.
As an Olympic athlete, I am by no means an expert on security
matters. What I am is an athlete who knows how to prepare for
competition. To be successful, when an athlete trains and prepares for
competition, he or she needs to focus his or her complete and undivided
attention on training and preparing for competition. An athlete cannot
be distracted by any other factors or diversions. My message and plea
to you today is simple: as members of the U.S. Government please do
everything within your power to ensure that the greatest level of
security is available for the Olympics in Athens.
I also have a message to the athletes who are in the midst of their
training for Athens: stay completely focused on your training and rest
assured that you will be competing in an environment that has the
highest level of security ever provided to an athletic competition. To
help raise your comfort level as athletes, consider the following:
Well over $1.2 billion dollars will be spent for security at
Athens--which is nearly four times what was spent protecting
the Sydney Games four years ago;
For the first time ever, the U.S. Government is able to
provide its own protection for U.S. athletes; and
The U.S. Government has been in close contact and working
collaboratively for years with the Greek and other governments
on a joint security program--this will be an international
effort.
In my experience of competing in four Summer Olympic Games, I have
always been impressed with the level of security provided athletes by
the host nation. I have never felt threatened or concerned with
security, and that has allowed me to focus on competition. I am
confident that despite the new security concerns about Athens, the
extensive and well-coordinated security programs that will be in
operation will provide all athletes a high level of confidence and will
allow them to focus exclusively on what they came to do--compete on the
fields of play and connect with new friends from around the world.
I am aware of those who think that sending U.S. athletes to Athens
is an unnecessary risk. Mr. Chairman and members of the Committee, as a
member of the U.S. Olympic Team that was not able to compete in the
1980 Summer Olympic Games in Moscow, I urge you to ensure, that absent
some clear and present risk, we never take that course of action again.
Our athletes have been training for much of their lives for this very
special moment. Let's not take that away from them.
The beauty of sports, and in fact, the very foundation of the
Olympic movement is that sport transcends all borders and political
strife. Regardless of the conflicts of the world and the various
difficulties in international relations, we have a powerful and
beautiful common interest: the competition of sports. It is my hope
that this Olympics will be the best ever and that with your continued
support, athletes are able to do what they do best--compete, without
any distractions.
I appreciate the opportunity to be able to present my views and
speak on this important matter.
Senator Smith. Thank you, Carl.
I think as I sum up your testimony and restate it, you're
saying, to the athletes of our current team, go to Athens.
Mr. Lewis. Oh, one hundred percent.
Senator Smith. Would you also share with them anything that
you did, Carl--or you, Steven, did in Sydney--about your
personal security? I mean, were there moments where you would
say, ``Hey, don't do this, don't go there,'' or, ``Just focus
on your sport, and that'll keep you where you ought to be and
away from where you ought not to be''?
Mr. Lewis. Well, I'll take that first. The first thing that
I did was, I communicated with the Olympic Committee. If we had
to leave the village or go to a different venue, they
understood where I was going, they knew what I was doing, so
that there was a communication. But most of the time, I did
utilize the facilities. I stayed within the village confines,
which I think is very important, and enabled them to protect
me. Because if you don't communicate, then they're unable to do
that with you.
Mr. Lopez. Much of the same as Carl said, in Sydney, just 4
years ago, I felt--I mean, the security was almost overwhelming
in--I mean, just all the security they had to go through to
even enter the Olympic Village. Anytime you wanted a family
member, you had to give them a passport, and, 3 days before,
you had to do all these things. But when you're an athlete,
you're not really concerned about seeing monuments or buildings
or much of the city. What you're concerned about is doing your
job, which is competing. And you have everything--the Olympic
Village is a city in itself, and--but if you do go outside of
the village, we did have security with us. We did communicate
to our head-of-team, or whoever was in charge of us, that we
were going to be going to that location.
And heading to 2004, I feel even more confident, just
because there's going to be three times as much security. I
think, in Sydney, there was around 15,000 security personnel,
and there's going to be around 45,000 personnel this time. And,
as an athlete, I feel very secure. I feel very confident that
the International Olympic Committee, the United States Olympic
Committee, and all the organizers will do everything possible
to ensure a safe Olympic Games. And my main goal, my only
priority, is to bring home another gold medal for the United
States.
Senator Smith. And we want that very much for you.
And, Carl, I was very intrigued by your reference to the
1980 Olympics. And as someone who's very much involved in
politics, along with my colleagues on the Hill, you know, that
was a troubled time, in the cold war, in which politics got in
the way of sport. And it does seem to me that the world was the
poorer for the way that all played out, and not just in
Afghanistan, with Russia, but because we didn't go, and we
didn't come together as a world community to maybe put aside
politics for a while and do a lot of healing that often can
happen at Olympics.
And I think my only closing comments are that it's
important that we go--do all we can to be safe, but important
that we go, now more than ever, so that the politics of those
who would visit us with terror don't win. We have heard that
many times, in many other circumstances, ``Go about your life
as you would, or those who would threaten us win by our change
in course.''
So each of you who have contributed to this hearing today,
we thank you. And the politics of this place are to go, and
let's do all we can to secure Athens, and do our part to help
the Greek community, and let's take a lot of gold medals. But
let's do a lot of healing in the world through the Olympic
Games, where we can see the humanity of every person there, and
not have, at the forefront, our political differences, but our
common humanity, through sport.
Thank you, gentlemen, for being here. And, with that, this
hearing is adjourned.
[Whereupon, at 3:31 p.m., the hearing was adjourned.]