[Senate Hearing 108-176]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE APPROPRIATIONS FOR FISCAL YEAR 2004
----------
WEDNESDAY, MARCH 19, 2003
U.S. Senate,
Subcommittee of the Committee on Appropriations,
Washington, DC.
The subcommittee met at 10:05 a.m., in room SD-192, Dirksen
Senate Office Building, Hon. Ted Stevens (chairman) presiding.
Present: Senators Stevens, Domenici, Shelby, Hutchison,
Inouye, Leahy, and Dorgan.
DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
Department of the Army
STATEMENTS OF:
HON. THOMAS E. WHITE, SECRETARY OF THE ARMY
GENERAL ERIC K. SHINSEKI, CHIEF OF STAFF, UNITED STATES ARMY
OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR TED STEVENS
Senator Stevens. We just received word that Senator Inouye
is stuck in traffic, as many of us have been this week, and he
asked us to proceed without him, so I am pleased to have a
chance to hear testimony from the Secretary of the Army and the
Army Chief of Staff for the fiscal year 2004 budget request. We
welcome you, General Shinseki.
General Shinseki. Thank you, Sir.
Senator Stevens. I am informed that this may be your last
time to come before us.
General Shinseki. Very likely.
Senator Stevens. Or at least this year will be your last
time.
General Shinseki. Yes, sir.
Senator Stevens. With what is going down in Iraq we may see
you again, but I do want to tell you it is just such a short
time ago you came for the first time, General, and we have
enjoyed very much, all of us, the chance to be with you and to
have your vision on transformation of the Army, and we have
done our best to pursue that. I am certain that Senator Inouye
will have some statements when he comes, but I want to thank
you on behalf of our committee for all your cooperation with
us.
And Mr. Secretary, nice to have you back with us again.
Mr. White. Thank you, sir.
Senator Stevens. We now find ourselves conducting a global
war on terrorism, and quite close to war in Iraq, and we are
obviously very much in need of a strong, modern, prepared
military. It is important to us today, more important,
probably, than it has been in many, many years to be sure that
you have the resources that you need, and that we support the
President and your men and women as they respond to the
Commander in Chief's directions and commands.
We have people from the Army deployed all over the world
now. I am told that the Army has 262,000 soldiers now deployed
somewhere in the world outside of our country.
General Shinseki. That is correct.
Senator Stevens. The Guard and Reserve now, under the total
force concept, share this burden, with 139,000 Reservists and
Guardsmen mobilized and on active duty. There are many issues
that we face this year, there is no question about it, but we
want to pursue today, if possible, the direction that we should
go on Army Transformation.
I think you have demonstrated to the Congress and the
people of this country that the Transformation concept is not
just simply a new weapons platform, but a new doctrine and
organizational concept for the Army, and it is a whole new way
of life for the Army and new way to fight and win wars. You
have managed to shake up the industry and the military
bureaucracy with your concepts, and Transformation has
shattered the old paradigm of business as usual in the miliary,
so we congratulate you.
I think Congress must continue its commitment to this Army
Transformation and continue the commitment we made to our
soldiers in 1999, when you first brought us this new concept of
Transformation, so it is the intention of this committee, at
least for this chairman and I am certain Senator Inouye, to
urge this committee to give you our full support to make
certain that this goal is totally accomplished. We look forward
to hearing your plans today not only on transformation, but to
further strengthen the entire Army.
I will put the balance of my comments in the record so that
I do not prolong this, but I do thank each of you for visiting
with me and my staff yesterday to make certain we had
coordination of our concepts and our resolve to be certain that
the Army of today and tomorrow will be the best that it can be.
[The statement follows:]
Prepared Statement of Senator Ted Stevens
This morning the subcommittee will receive testimony from
the Secretary of the Army and the Army Chief of Staff on their
fiscal year 2004 budget request.
General Shinseki, welcome to you. Unfortunately, this will
be your last time testifying before the committee as the Chief
of Staff.
It seems like a very short time ago when you first
testified before this committee and introduced us to your
vision of transformation for the Army.
The Army is well on its way towards the future.
Transformation is a success. You have proven your critics
wrong.
Much has happened since our first meeting. As we find
ourselves conducting a global war on terrorism, preparing for a
possible war to disarm Iraq, America is reminded of the need
for a strong, modern, prepared military.
It is as important today as it ever was to have a military
who has the resources it needs and the support of the President
and the entire country.
The United States Army is deployed all over the globe.
Today, the Army has over 262,000 soldiers deployed or forward
stationed.
The Guard and Reserve are also sharing in this burden with
more than 139,000 reservists and guardsmen mobilized and on
active duty.
While there are many important issues facing the Army, one
of the most critical decisions Congress will make this year
will be the direction we go on Army transformation.
You have demonstrated to the Congress, and the country,
that the transformation concept is not simply a new weapons
platform, but a new doctrine and organizational concept for the
Army. It is a whole new way for the Army to fight and win wars.
You have managed to shake up industry and the military
bureaucracy with your concepts. Transformation has shattered
the old paradigm of ``business as usual''.
Congress must continue its commitment to Army
transformation and continue the commitment we made to our
soldiers in 1999 when you introduced the concept of
transformation.
It is the intention of this committee to give you the
resolve and support to see your goal through.
I look forward to learning of your plans to not only
continue transformation, but to further strengthen it, and the
entire Army.
This committee will continue to adamantly support your plan
to deploy 6 Stryker brigades. In fact, I will seek your insight
momentarily on how this committee can best protect that plan.
In addition, I would welcome any comments you might have on
current funding requirements for the Army for fiscal year 2004,
and your views on the scope and timing of any needed
supplemental appropriations for this fiscal year.
Let me now turn to our mutual friend, and partner, the
distinguished ranking member of the subcommittee, Senator
Inouye.
Senator Stevens. Senator Leahy, you are first.
Senator Leahy. Mr. Chairman, are we going to questions now,
or are these just----
Senator Stevens. Opening statements, if you have them.
STATEMENT OF SENATOR PATRICK J. LEAHY
Senator Leahy. No. I will put an opening statement in the
record.
I would just tell you, Mr. Chairman, what I had said to
Secretary White and General Shinseki here earlier, right before
this started, that no matter how anybody feels one way or the
other on war, at least we can take comfort in the fact that our
people, our troops in the field are the best-trained, best-
equipped in the world, and as I told both the Secretary and the
General, what I have been saying to families in Vermont who
have either members of their family who are already deployed or
being called up to be deployed, take comfort in the fact that
our people are so well-led, so well-trained, and so well-
equipped.
And as the General pointed out to me, that is not something
you do overnight. It requires years and years of preparation
and Mr. Chairman, you and Senator Inouye and this committee
have done a lot of that to make sure we bought a lot of
equipment we hope we will never have to use, but when we have
to use it, at least it is there, and so I compliment you both.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I will put my whole statement in
the record.
[The statement follows:]
Prepared Statement of Senator Patrick J. Leahy
I would like to welcome back General Shinseki and Secretary
White to the Subcommittee. As U.S. forces are poised to enter
Iraq, it is good to know that they have such competent,
steadfast leadership back at the Pentagon. We face many
challenges in the days and weeks ahead. The men and women of
the U.S. Army and the entire armed forces are ready for any
eventuality. I look forward to the question and answer period.
Senator Stevens. My great friend from Hawaii, do you have
an opening statement, Senator?
STATEMENT OF SENATOR DANIEL K. INOUYE
Senator Inouye. Mr. Chairman, I thank you very much. I have
the excuse that half of this city has, the traffic, but before
I proceed, sir, I would like to, as a citizen of the United
States, commend and thank the Secretary and General Shinseki
for the service they have rendered us at this time in our
history by preparing our men and women so that they are in full
readiness upon the command of our Commander in Chief. I think
this is very important, and for that we will be eternally
grateful.
Mr. Chairman, I have a prepared statement here, but since
time may be of the essence, may I put this in the record, sir?
Senator Stevens. Without objection, it will be put in the
record as though read.
[The statement follows:]
Prepared Statement of Senator Daniel K. Inouye
Secretary White, General Shinseki, I would like to welcome
you once again, as we consider the fiscal year 2004 Defense
appropriations request for the Army. General Shinseki, since
this will probably be your last appearance before this
committee as Chief of Staff of the Army, I would like to take
this opportunity to recognize your invaluable contributions to
the U.S. Army.
General Shinseki assumed his duties as the 34th Chief of
Staff of the U.S. Army on June 22, 1999. Just three months
later, he announced his plans to transform the Army into a
force that could better meet future defense requirements to be
both rapidly deployable and lethal.
During your tenure, General, you institutionalized
transformation and with it brought about a fundamental cultural
and technological shift in the U.S. Army--a difficult challenge
for an institution as large, diverse, and steeped in history
and tradition as the United States Army.
Four years after assuming your duties as Chief of Staff of
the Army, the term ``transformation'' not only encompasses
plans and programs for building the Army's future force, but
the term is now synonymous with the efforts of the entire
Department of Defense as it seeks to enhance its capabilities
to fight and win wars in the 21st century.
Congratulations General on a long and decorated career, and
thank you for your service to the Army and to the country.
Although you are retiring this June, this committee hopes and
plans to continue to call on you for your counsel.
Gentlemen, since our last hearing, the Army continues to
play a critical role in the global war on terrorism, while at
the same time transforming its forces for the 21st century.
Our Nation's soldiers are busy--mobilization of the Army
Reserve and Guard has reached 210,000 with forces deployed
around the world to combat terrorism, to honor our commitments
in Bosnia, Kosovo, the Sinai, and Saudi Arabia, and to prepare
for a potential war with Iraq. Gentlemen, we need you to tell
us how long we will be able to sustain these deployments and
mobilizations, and whether you have sufficient forces to meet
these requirements.
I look forward to hearing about these issues and how the
Army's fiscal year 2004 budget request supports the Army's
current and future missions.
Senator Stevens. Senator Shelby.
STATEMENT OF SENATOR RICHARD C. SHELBY
Senator Shelby. Mr. Chairman, thank you for calling this
hearing. Secretary White, I want to commend you for your
service both as a soldier and as a Secretary, and General
Shinseki, we know what you mean to the Army. We know what you
mean to the Nation, and I appreciate that very much. I look
forward to both of your testimony here today, especially on the
eve of the impending conflict.
Senator Stevens. Senator Dorgan.
STATEMENT OF SENATOR BYRON L. DORGAN
Senator Dorgan. Mr. Chairman, let me thank the Secretary
for being here, and let me thank General Shinseki, and General
Shinseki, I know that you are slated to retire, and let me echo
the words of my colleagues in thanking you for your service.
Senator Stevens. Thank you very much, and I would ask that
you both turn on your mikes, as I have just turned mine on, and
I am reminded sitting here of the times that Senator Stennis
talked to us about changing the Army and about trying to work
the Guard and Reserve into the total force. I think he would be
delighted if he were here with us today because if there were
any pioneer in, really, modernization of the Army, it was
Senator Stennis.
I do again thank you very much for the hard work you have
put into making this Army as good as it is, and as good as the
world will see it is in the near days. Please proceed with your
statements, whoever wishes to go first. Mr. Secretary.
STATEMENT OF SECRETARY WHITE
Mr. White. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and with your
permission I will submit a statement for the record and keep my
opening remarks short.
Senator Inouye, Mr. Chairman, I am grateful for the
opportunity to talk with you today about the United States
Army. Our priorities remain the same as they were a year ago,
win the global war on terrorism, and transform the Army to
prepare it for future wars.
First and foremost, I wish to thank this committee for your
continued support for the Army. The fiscal year 2003 budget has
allowed us to make significant improvements in many key areas.
We have structured our budget request for fiscal year 2004 in
the same fashion as fiscal year 2003, based on our top
priorities of People, Readiness, and Transformation.
On the people front, thanks to your support we are making
significant strides, and this does include a fully funded pay
raise for all soldiers, targeted pay raises in selective cases,
significantly reduced soldier out-of-pocket expenses for
housing, and an accelerated Residential Communities Initiative
(RCI) to improve on-post quarters for our families.
This year, we are examining options, under an initiative
called personnel transformation, to shift away from our
individual replacement system to a unit manning approach that
will enhance cohesion and combat readiness of our formations
while improving the predictability of assignment patterns for
Army families.
As you know, we have had over 30,000 National Guard and
Reserve soldiers on active duty consistently since September 11
of 2001, some 18 months now, and as of today, we have activated
over 151,000 soldiers for current and potential future Federal
operations in addition to over 2,700 soldiers currently
activated for State service. These Reserve Component soldiers
are performing magnificently on a ``One Army'' basis, and we
appreciate the tremendous support they have received from their
employers as well as the American public. We recognize the
unique sacrifices made by these citizen soldiers as they step
up to do their duty as citizens and patriots.
On the readiness front, the Army is ready for any
additional operations we are ordered to perform in the future,
and our great soldiers are successfully meeting our many
current obligations around the world. With your help in fiscal
year 2003 and again in our fiscal year 2004 budget request, we
gave priority to funding training requirements for the force,
significantly improved our spare parts availability,
accelerated fielding of soldier support systems and unit
communications equipment to make our units as ready as
possible. Having said that, our operations tempo (OPTEMPO) has
never been higher in my nearly 40 years of experience with the
Army. We are indeed an Army that is on the move.
While we have fully funded normal OPTEMPO and training,
including the full complement of pre-9/11 missions such as
Bosnia and Kosovo, the Sinai, and Korea, we have many other
obligations as we pursue the global war on terrorism as part of
the joint force. Post-9/11 missions of the past 18 months
include Operations Noble Eagle here at home, Enduring Freedom
in Afghanistan, as well as operations in the Philippines and
elsewhere. Finally, we have a significant flow of Army forces
into the Persian Gulf in support of potential future operations
to ensure the disarmament of Iraq.
Given this level of activity, it should come as no surprise
that supplemental funding in fiscal year 2003 will be required.
We are working hard to balance our readiness imperative for
realistic training with our obligation to be good stewards of
the environment. That balance is reflected in the Department of
Defense's Range Preservation Initiative that we ask your
support for. It is essential for us to maintain the balance
between the use of military lands for their uniquely military
purposes and the need for environmental protection and species
preservation.
The readiness of our soldiers going into harm's way depends
upon that balance, so we ask for your help with this important
initiative. We are transforming our Army even as we execute
combat operations and prepare for future contingencies. This
simultaneity is not only a necessity, it is an imperative. We
are transforming the business side of the Army as well as the
operational force, and we are transforming within the joint
context, not merely in a service-centric manner.
We have held steady to the azimuth established by the Chief
of the Army, General Shinseki, all the way back in 1999, and in
my personal opinion, one of the reasons we have been successful
in that Transformation is the courage he showed in laying that
marker down and then not deviating from that azimuth, and you
have supported that azimuth consistently since he spoke of it.
In fiscal year 2004, we request funding for our fourth
Stryker Brigade to be fielded at Fort Polk, Louisiana, the
Second Armored Cavalry Regiment, and we remain fully committed
to fielding six Stryker Brigades on our established time line.
We remain focused on the Objective Force with the restructured
Comanche armed reconnaissance helicopter program. We are
postured to successfully meet acquisition Milestone B in May
for the Future Combat System (FCS). FCS includes the non-line
of sight (NLOS) variant and the initial fielding increment
which will meet the cannon requirement previously addressed by
the Crusader program. We remain on a glide path to field the
first Objective Force units in fiscal year 2008 with an initial
operational capability (IOC) in 2010.
On the business side of the Army, we fully solicit your
support for the Department of Defense (DOD) transformation
package, which will greatly streamline our operations and give
us the flexibility to manage the Department in the most
efficient manner. In the same vein, our business transformation
initiatives are designed to achieve greater value for the
taxpayer dollar.
Our Residential Communities Initiative to privatize family
housing continues to be an enormous success. By fiscal year
2007, the Army will have established partnerships to bring
every set of family quarters up to standard. I cannot think of
a better thing to do for a married Army. We are able to do this
because with an investment of $620 million we have attracted
over $7 billion in private capital. This is a tremendous value
for the taxpayer, and we believe a model of how better business
practices can help us with noncore functions such as housing.
We are seeking to apply the same model of public-private
partnership to the challenge of on-base utilities, for example,
by consolidating all installation management under one command,
and by centralizing the Army-wide contracting, for contracts
over $500,000, in our Army Contracting Agency. We are seeking
to regionalize utilities contracting, achieving economies of
scale that were not possible with our previous business
management structures. Private capital will be required to fix
the utilities infrastructure on our bases, and we are setting
the conditions to attract it just as we have with family
housing.
Finally, we are conducting what we call our Third Wave
Initiative, which seeks to eliminate or transfer all noncore
functions currently consuming Army people and dollars. Rest
assured, as we progress this initiative, we will pursue this
business initiative in full consultation with the Congress.
Now, finally the matter of risk. Balancing the risk
associated with near-term modernization and mid-term
transformation has required us to make some tough choices. We
have had to terminate or restructure numerous current force
modernization programs to generate the capital to fund
transformation. In a nutshell, our fiscal year 2004 budget
submission funds people, readiness, and transformation at the
expense of some of our infrastructure accounts and current
force modernization. We made these judgments only after a
careful balancing of both operational risk and the risk of not
transforming to provide the capabilities the Army needs to meet
the obligations of our near-and mid-term strategy.
In conclusion, I wish to return to those who I mentioned
first in my remarks, our soldiers. Their performance in
Afghanistan speaks volumes. In the dead of winter, a landlocked
country, toughest terrain imaginable, the collapse of the
Taliban put Al Qaeda on the run and they are still running. It
has been my privilege to visit them in Afghanistan, see our
soldiers in Kuwait and Bosnia and Kosovo, all around our
country. You could never meet a finer group of young Americans.
They are flat out, in my 40 years, the best soldiers I have
ever seen, and we are all very, very proud of them. Rest
assured they stand ready, along with our sister services, to
accomplish any task ordered by our Commander in Chief.
PREPARED STATEMENT
Thank you, Mr. Chairman, very much for the opportunity to
discuss the fiscal year 2004 budget submission. I look forward
to your questions.
[The statement follows:]
Prepared Statement of Honorable Thomas E. White and General Eric K.
Shinseki
Mr. Chairman and distinguished members of the Committee, thank you
for this opportunity to report to you today on the Posture of the
United States Army.
America's armed forces are the most powerful in the world. And
America's Army remains the most respected landpower to our friends and
allies and the most feared ground force to those who would threaten the
interests of the United States.
Since before the birth of the Nation, American Soldiers have
instilled hope in a noble dream of liberty. They have remained on point
for the Nation through nine wars, and the intervals of peace in the
years between--defending the Constitution and preserving freedom.
Magnificent in their selfless service, long in their sense of duty, and
deep in their commitment to honor, Soldiers have kept the United States
the land of the free and the home of the brave. This is our legacy. Our
Soldiers who serve today preserve it.
In October 1999, we unveiled our vision for the future--``Soldiers,
on point for the Nation, transforming this, the most respected army in
the world, into a strategically responsive force that is dominant
across the full spectrum of operations.'' The attacks against our
Nation on September 11, 2001, and the ensuing war on terrorism validate
The Army's Vision--People, Readiness, Transformation--and our efforts
to change quickly into a more responsive, deployable, agile, versatile,
lethal, survivable, and sustainable force.
While helping to fight the Global War on Terrorism, The Army is in
the midst of a profound transformation. Readiness remains our constant
imperative--today, tomorrow, and the day after. Transformation,
therefore, advances on three broad axes: perpetuating The Army's legacy
by maintaining today's readiness and dominance; bridging the
operational gap with an Interim Force of Stryker Brigade Combat Teams;
and fielding the Objective Force to fight and win conflicts in the
years beyond this decade.
As they have throughout The Army's 227-year history, Soldiers
remain the centerpiece of our formations. Versatile and decisive across
the full spectrum of joint missions, land forces have demonstrated time
and again the quality of their precision in joint operations. Our
responsibility is to provide Soldiers with the critical capabilities
needed for the tough missions we send them on.
After three and a half years of undiminished support from the
Administration and the Congress, and the incredible dedication of
Soldiers and Department of the Army civilians, we have begun to deliver
The Army Vision. With continued strong support, we will win the war
against global terrorism, meet our obligations to our friends and
allies, remain ready to prevail over the unpredictable, and transform
ourselves for decisive victories on future battlefields.
We have achieved sustainable momentum in Army Transformation; the
framework is in place to see the Objective Force fielded, this decade.
the army--at war and transforming
The United States is at war, and The Army serves the Nation by
defending the Constitution and our way of life. It is our nonnegotiable
contract with the American people--to fight and win our Nation's wars,
decisively.
In the weeks immediately following the attacks of September 11,
2001, Special Operations Forces (SOF) infiltrated Afghanistan,
penetrated Al Qaida and Taliban strongholds, and leveraged all
available long-range, joint fires, enabling the Northern Alliance to
begin dismantling the Taliban. By January 2002, U.S. and Allied
conventional force reinforcements began to set the stage for Operation
Anaconda, where Soldiers, demonstrating courage and determination under
the most challenging conditions, defeated Al Qaida at altitude on the
escarpments overlooking the Shah-e-kot Valley.
Today, more than 198,000 Soldiers remain deployed and forward
stationed in 120 countries around the globe, conducting operations and
training with our friends and allies. Decisively engaged in the joint
and combined fight against global terrorism, Soldiers are serving with
distinction--at home and abroad. Soldiers from both the Active and the
Reserve Component have remained ``on point'' for the Nation in the
Balkans for seven years, in Saudi Arabia and Kuwait for 12 years, in
the Sinai for 21 years, and in Korea and Europe for over 50 years. At
the publication of the Army Posture Statement, there were more than
110,000 Reserve Component Soldiers mobilized for active federal service
in support of Operation Noble Eagle and Operation Enduring Freedom.
Even as we transform, Soldiers will remain ready to answer the calls of
the Nation to defeat well-trained, determined, and dangerous
adversaries who miscalculate in taking on the best led, the best-
equipped, and the best-trained army in the world.
At war and transforming, The Army is accelerating change to harness
the power of new technologies, different organizations, and revitalized
leader development initiatives to remain at the head of the line. To
accomplish this, Army Transformation advances along three major axes
towards attainment of the Objective Force. We selectively recapitalize
and modernize today's capabilities to extend our overmatch in staying
ready to defend our homeland, keep the peace in areas important to the
Nation, and win the war against global terrorism. Stryker Brigade
Combat Teams--our Interim Force--will bridge the current operational
gap between our rapidly-deployable light forces and our later-arriving
heavy forces, paving the way for the arrival of the Objective Force. By
2010, The Army's Objective Force--organized, equipped, and trained for
ground dominance, cyber-warfare, and space exploitation--will provide
the Nation the capabilities it must have to remain the global leader,
the strongest economy in the world, and the most respected and feared
military force, by our friends and allies and our enemies,
respectively.
The surprise attacks against our Nation and Operation Enduring
Freedom, in response to those attacks, validated The Army Vision and
provided momentum to our efforts to transform ourselves into an
instrument of national power that provides full spectrum operational
capabilities that are strategically responsive and capable of decisive
victory. In a little over three years, we have begun to realize The
Army Vision--People, Readiness, and Transformation.
The transforming Army is enriching as a profession and nurturing to
families whose sacrifice has borne the readiness of the force for the
past 10 years. Our Well-Being initiatives are our commitment to reverse
this trend by giving our people the opportunity to become self-reliant;
setting them up for personal growth and success; aggressively investing
in family housing; and revitalizing Single-Soldier living space in our
barracks. Our manning initiatives have filled our line divisions and
other early deploying units to dampen the internal turbulence of
partially filled formations and help put a measure of predictability
back into the lives of our families.
The Army has carefully balanced the risk between remaining ready
for today's challenges and preparing for future crises. With unwavering
support from the Administration, the Congress, our Soldiers, and
Department of the Army Civilians, The Army has made unprecedented
progress in its efforts to transform.
We will achieve Initial Operating Capability (IOC) for the first
Stryker Brigade Combat Team (SBCT) this summer and demonstrate the
increased responsiveness, deployability, agility, versatility,
lethality, survivability, and sustainability that SBCTs provide to
Combatant Commanders. In a little over three years from initial concept
to fielded capability, the SBCTs will allow us to glimpse the potential
for acquisition reform in paving the way for delivery of the Objective
Force.
We have constructed the framework for achieving the Objective Force
this decade: a Transformation Campaign Plan with Roadmap; the Objective
Force White Paper; the Operational and Organizational plans for the
Objective Force Unit of Action; and the Operational Requirements
Document for the Future Combat System of Systems.
Additionally, The Army is poised to fill ground maneuver's most
critical battlefield deficiency--armed aerial reconnaissance--with
Comanche, a capable, survivable, and sustainable aircraft that is a
cornerstone of the Objective Force.
All along the way, we have tested our concepts in wargames and
experiments, checked and rechecked our azimuth to the Objective Force
weekly and monthly, and look forward to a successful Future Combat
System Milestone B Defense Acquisition Board decision in May of this
year.
However, we cannot accelerate Army Transformation without
transforming the way The Army does business--from transformation of
logistics and acquisition to personnel and installation transformation.
Revolutionizing Army business management practices achieves the best
value for taxpayers' dollars; conserves limited resources for
investment in People, Readiness, and Transformation; enhances
management of personnel systems, installations and contracting; and
augments our potential to accelerate arrival of the Objective Force.
Changing The Army is first about changing the way we think, and better
business practices represent practical application of common sense
initiatives that best serve The Army and our Nation.
We are proud of our progress. We are grateful for the strong
Congressional support that has helped put The Army on its approach
march to the Objective Force. The Army 2003 Posture Statement describes
our tremendous progress in Transformation--an orchestrated campaign,
synchronized with OSD and Joint Transformation, to achieve the
Objective Force and keep America's Army the dominant landpower in the
world.
strategic environment--the requirement to transform
During the last two decades of the 20th Century, information-age
technologies dramatically changed the political, economic, and military
landscapes. Desert Shield, Desert Storm, and operations in Kuwait,
Bosnia, and Kosovo illustrated the requirement for transforming our
forces to meet the evolving, strategic requirements of our Nation.
Survivable and extremely lethal, our heavy forces effectively met the
requirements for which they were designed; yet, they were slow to
deploy and difficult to sustain. Conversely, our light forces were
rapidly deployable, but they lacked the protection, lethality, and
tactical mobility that we seek across the spectrum of military
operations. We were successful in winning the Cold War and, as a
result, smaller than we had been in 40 years. The Army no longer had
the luxury of specialized forces built to confront a single and
narrowly defined threat like the Warsaw Pact countries.
Today's challenges are more complex; threats are elusive and
unpredictable. The fight against international terrorism has
overshadowed, but not eliminated, other potential crises. Tension
between India and Pakistan persists; stability between China and Taiwan
is tenuous; and concern over North Korea escalates. Threats of
transnational terrorism and the proliferation of weapons of mass
destruction (WMD)--often financed by organized crime, illicit drug
transactions, trafficking in women and children, and the sale of arms--
further complicate the security environment. Geopolitical trends such
as scarce resources, youth population-spike in underdeveloped
countries, aging populations in developed countries, and the growth of
mega-cities, among others, presage a future strategic environment of
diverse and widely distributed threats.
Fully appreciating the internal and external difficulties that
profound change engenders, we assessed the operational challenges of
the new century against the capabilities of our Cold War Army,
recognized the opportunity to leverage the inherent combat power of the
technological revolution, and set a clear path ahead--The Army Vision.
The 2002 National Security Strategy (NSS) reaffirms our military's
highest priority--defending the United States. To do this effectively,
we assure our allies and friends; dissuade future military competition;
deter threats against U.S. interests, allies, and friends; and
decisively defeat any adversary, if deterrence fails. The NSS directs
the military to transform to a capabilities-based force ready to
respond to unpredictable adversaries and security crises. The Objective
Force meets these NSS requirements, and Army Transformation will
enhance our ability to conduct rapid and precise operations, achieve
decisive results at the time and place of our choosing, and safeguard
the Nation's ability to exercise our right of self-defense through
preemption, when required.
The 2001 Quadrennial Defense Review describes a capabilities-based
approach to defense planning that provides broader military options
across the operational spectrum, from pre- to post-conflict operations.
The force-sizing construct--1-4-2-1--takes into account the number,
scope and simultaneity of tasks assigned the military: it sizes the
force for defense of the U.S. homeland (1), forward deterrence in four
critical regions (4), the conduct of simultaneous warfighting missions
in two regions (2)--while preserving the President's option to call for
decisive victory in one of those conflicts (1)--and participation in
multiple, smaller contingency operations.
the army--serving today, balancing risk, managing transformation
Soldiers are the most precise and responsive means to strike and
then control enemy centers of gravity on the ground--where people live,
work, and govern. American Soldiers are disciplined, professional, and
trained for success in diverse missions; they are the foundation of a
flexible force that accomplishes its missions in the non-linear
battlespace by integrating new, innovative technologies and techniques
with current systems and doctrine. Our people adapt under the harshest
conditions, whether in the deserts of Kuwait and the Sinai, the
mountains and rice paddies of Korea, or the tropics of the Democratic
Republic of Timor-Leste.
These demanding commitments mean we must nurture a balance between
current and near-term readiness and our Transformation to meet future
challenges. The Army has accepted reasonable operational risk in the
mid-term in order to fund our Transformation to the Objective Force. To
avoid unacceptable risk, we are monitoring closely the current
operational situation as we support the Combatant Commanders in the war
against terror, conduct homeland defense, and prosecute the long-term
effort to defeat transnational threats. We have designed and
implemented the Strategic Readiness System (SRS) to provide a
precision, predictive tool with which to monitor The Army and make
appropriate adjustments to preserve current readiness. Our surge
capacity in the industrial base further reduces current risk by keeping
production lines warm and responsive. And our first Stryker Brigade
Combat Team will provide the Combatant Commanders with a new capability
to further mitigate operational risk--even as we transform to the
Objective Force.
realizing the army vision--people, readiness, and transformation
In 1999, The Army announced its vision to transform into a more
strategically responsive force, dominant across the full spectrum of
military operations. The Army Vision addresses three essential
components: People, Readiness, and Transformation. Soldiers are the
heart of The Army, the centerpiece of our formations, and the
foundation of our combat power. Readiness remains our overarching
imperative; it is the means by which we execute our nonnegotiable
contract with the American people--to fight and win our Nation's wars,
decisively. To preserve readiness while rapidly changing,
Transformation advances on three major axes: preserving our Army legacy
by maintaining readiness and dominance today; bridging the operational
gap with Stryker Brigades--the Interim Force; and fielding the
Objective Force this decade to keep The Army dominant in the years
beyond this decade.
Realizing The Army Vision requires the concerted effort of the
entire Army, across all components--from warfighting to institutional
support organizations. The Army published its Transformation Campaign
Plan in April 2001 to synchronize and guide this complex undertaking.
The November 2001 Objective Force White Paper describes the advanced
capabilities and core technologies needed to build the Objective Force.
The Army's June 2002 Army Transformation Roadmap defines Transformation
as a continuous process--with specific waypoints--that increases our
contributions to the Joint Force while achieving the six Department of
Defense (DOD) critical operational goals. The result will be a more
strategically responsive and full spectrum dominant force capable of
prompt and sustained land combat operations as a member of the joint
force.
In support of the emerging joint operational concepts and
architectures, The Army--as the major landpower component--continues to
develop ground concepts for a full spectrum, and multidimensional
force. These concepts are producing a Joint Force that presents
potential enemies with multiple dilemmas across the operational
dimensions--complicating their plans, dividing their focus, and
increasing their chances of miscalculation.
In future joint operations, Objective Force units will be capable
of directing major operations and decisive land campaigns with Army
headquarters. Objective Force headquarters at all levels will provide
the Joint Force Commander (JFC) with seamless, joint battle command and
decision superiority. The modularity and scalability of our Objective
Force formations will provide an unprecedented degree of flexibility
and adaptability to the Combatant Commander--providing the right force
at the right time for decisive outcomes.
people--our most valuable resource
The Army Vision begins and ends talking about people. People are
central to everything else we do in The Army. Platforms and
organizations do not defend this Nation; people do. Units do not train,
stay ready, grow and develop leadership--they do not sacrifice and take
risks on behalf of the Nation. People do. Institutions do not
transform; people do. People remain the engine behind all of our
magnificent moments as an Army, and the well-being of our people--the
human dimension of our Transformation--is inextricably linked to Army
readiness.
In our Vision, we recommitted ourselves to doing two things well
each and every day--training Soldiers and civilians and growing them
into competent, confident, disciplined, and adaptive leaders who
succeed in situations of great uncertainty. We are dedicated to
preparing our Soldiers to lead joint formations, to enabling our
headquarters to command and control joint forces, and to providing to
those joint formations the capabilities only The Army can bring to the
fight: the ability to control terrain and populations.
Manning the Force
The objective of our manning strategy is to ensure we have the
right people in the right places to fully capitalize on their
warfighting expertise--this is The Army's commitment to the Nation,
Army leaders, Soldiers, and our families. Correctly manning our units
is vital to assuring that we fulfill our missions as a strategic
element of national policy; it enhances predictability for our people;
and it ensures that leaders have the people necessary to perform their
assigned tasks. In fiscal year 2000, we implemented a strategy to man
our forces to 100 percent of authorized strength, starting with
divisional combat units. The program expanded in fiscal year 2001 and
fiscal year 2002 to include early deploying units. In fiscal year 2002,
we maintained our manning goals and continued to fill our Divisions,
Armored Cavalry Regiments, and selected Early Deploying Units to 100
percent in the aggregate, with a 93 to 95 percent skill and grade-band
match. We remain on target to accomplish our long-term goal of filling
all Army units to 100 percent of authorized strength.
Recruiting and Retaining the Force
In 1999, The Army missed its recruiting goals for the Active
Component (AC) by about 6,300 inductees, and for the Reserve Component
by some 10,000. Our recruiting situation was simply unacceptable, and
we committed ourselves to decisive steps and reversed that trend.
In fiscal year 2002, The Active Component achieved 100 percent of
its goal in recruiting and retention--for the third consecutive year.
The Army exceeded its AC 79,500 enlisted accession target in fiscal
year 2002 and exceeded our aggregate fiscal year 2002 retention
objective of 56,800 Soldiers in all three categories by 1,437. We are
poised to make the fiscal year 2003 accession target of 73,800, and we
expect to meet our Active Component fiscal year 2003 retention target
of 57,000. The fiscal year 2004 accession target is set at 71,500.
The Army Reserve has met mission for the last two years, and its
recruiting force is well structured to meet fiscal year 2004
challenges. The Army Reserve continues to maintain a strong Selected
Reserve strength posture at 205,484 as of January 17, 2003--over 100.2
percent of the fiscal year 2003 End Strength Objective. Overcoming many
recruiting and retention challenges in fiscal year 2002, the Army
National Guard (ARNG) exceeded endstrength mission, accessions were
104.5 percent of goal, and we exceeded reenlistment objectives.
To ensure that we continue to recruit and retain sufficient
numbers, we are monitoring the current environment--the global war on
terrorism (GWOT) and frequent deployments--to determine impact on
morale, unit cohesiveness, combat effectiveness, and support of Well-
Being programs that draw quality people to The Army. We continue to
examine innovative recruiting and retention initiatives. The challenges
we face in fiscal year 2003 and 2004 are two-fold: increase recruiter
productivity and recruiting resources necessary to maintain recruiting
momentum when the economy becomes more robust. Resourcing recruiting
pays dividends well beyond accessions in the year of execution. For
example, Army advertising in fiscal year 2002 influenced not only
fiscal year 2002 accessions, but also potential recruits who will be
faced with enlistment decisions in fiscal year 2003 and beyond.
reserve component full-time support (fts)
Today, more than 50 percent of our Soldiers are in the Reserve
Component (RC). The GWOT and Homeland Defense are significant
undertakings that demand a high level of resourcing. The RC has been
key to our success in these operations. To ensure The Army's RC
continues to meet ever-increasing demands with trained and ready units,
The Army plans to increase Full-Time Support authorizations 2 percent
each year through fiscal year 2012, increasing the FTS from the current
level of 69,915 to a level of 83,046. The Army recognizes additional
Full-Time Support authorizations as the number one priority of the Army
National Guard and Army Reserve leadership.
civilian component
As a comprehensive effort to consolidate, streamline, and more
effectively manage the force, The Army has begun an initiative to
transform our civilian personnel system. High quality, well-trained
civilians are absolutely essential to the readiness of our force and
our ability to sustain operations today and in the future. Recruiting,
training, and retaining a highly skilled, dedicated civilian workforce
is critical in meeting our obligations to the Combatant Commanders and
the Nation. Aggressive transformation of our civilian force--in which
projections through fiscal year 2005 indicate a 16 percent annual
turnover due to retirements and other losses--will ensure we continue
to meet those obligations.
As of fiscal year 2002, The Army employed 277,786 civilian
personnel. To forecast future civilian workforce needs with precision,
we developed the Civilian Forecasting System, a sophisticated
projection model that predicts future civilian personnel requirements
under various scenarios. The Army is working closely with the Office of
the Secretary of Defense (OSD) and other federal agencies to
demonstrate the power of this system so they can fully leverage its
capabilities, as well.
The Civilian Personnel Management System XXI (CPMS XXI) has
identified the reforms necessary to hire, train, and grow a civilian
component that supports the transforming Army. To achieve this, we have
redefined the way civilians are hired, retained, and managed. Mandatory
experiential assignments will become the vehicle by which we develop
future leaders. CPMS XXI fully responds to current mandates in the
President's Management Agenda and incorporates the results of the Army
Training and Leader Development Panels. For example, two initiatives
for recruiting well-trained civilians are:
--The Army Civilian Training, Education, and Development System--a
centrally managed program that accesses and trains civilian
interns and grows a resource pool of personnel who can accede
to senior professional positions.
--The DOD Appropriations Act for fiscal year 2002 and fiscal year
2003 provided Direct Hire Authority for critical, hard-to-fill
medical health care occupations and enabled the reduction in
average fill-time for these positions to 29 days.
army well-being
The readiness of The Army is inextricably linked to the well-being
of our people, and Army Well-Being is the human dimension of our
Transformation. Well-Being responds to the physical, material, mental,
and spiritual needs of all Army people--Soldiers, civilians, retirees,
veterans, and their families. We recognize the fundamental relationship
between Well-Being programs and institutional outcomes such as
readiness, retention, and recruiting. To support mission preparedness
as well as individual aspirations, Well-Being integrates policies,
programs, and human resource issues into a holistic, systematic
framework that provides a path to personal growth and success and gives
our people the opportunity to become self-reliant. We recruit Soldiers,
but we retain families--Well-Being programs help make The Army the
right place to raise a family. And when our families are cared for,
Soldiers can better focus on their mission--training, fighting, and
winning our Nation's wars, decisively.
Soldiers appreciate the Nation's devotion to them, and they are
grateful for the country's recognition of their service and sacrifices.
Recent improvements to the Montgomery GI Bill, Tricare for Life,
Tricare Reform, Retired Pay Reform, the 4.1 percent general pay
increase, and additional pay increases in 2003, are all important to
Soldiers and their families. These initiatives have helped The Army
respond to the well-being needs of our people. Army voluntary education
programs improve our combat readiness by expanding Soldier skills,
knowledge, and aptitudes to produce confident, competent leaders. Other
Well-Being initiatives include:
--Spouse Employment Summit.--The Army is developing partnerships with
the private sector to enhance employment opportunities for Army
spouses and provide improved job portability for them.
--Spouse Orientation and Leader Development (SOLD).--SOLD connects
Army spouses and enhances their opportunity to serve as valued
leaders who contribute to the readiness and future of The Army
and our Nation.
--Army University Access Online.--Army offers Soldiers access to a
variety of on-line, post-secondary programs and related
educational services. www.Army.com is a comprehensive web-
portal widely accessible to Soldiers, including those in
Afghanistan, Bosnia, and Kuwait.
--In-State Tuition.--To level the playing field for access to
education opportunities, The Army is working to encourage
states to grant in-state status for military personnel and
families at public colleges and universities in their Soldier's
state of legal residence and state of assignment.
--High School Senior Stabilization.--This policy enhances
predictability by allowing families to request stabilization at
their sponsor's current duty location if they have a child who
will graduate from high school during that year.
--Secondary Education Transition Study (SETS) Memorandum of Agreement
(MOA).--Facilitated by The Army, this agreement among
participating school superintendents is their commitment to
partner and improve high school transitions for DOD children.
Currently, over 110 school superintendents have signed the SETS
MOA.
leader development--training soldiers and civilians, and growing
leaders
The Army is a profession--the Profession of Arms. Conducting
decisive ground combat operations in defense of the United States and
its interests is a core competency of this profession. The development
of each member of The Army is the foundation of lifelong devotion to
duty--while in uniform and upon returning to the civilian sector.
By its nature, our profession is extraordinarily complex and
dangerous. The American people entrust The Army with the sacred
responsibility to apply lethal force in defense of U.S interests. As
such, the Profession of Arms must remain firmly grounded in
constitutional values and must constantly change and grow to preserve
its competitive advantage in an evolving strategic environment. At all
levels, our leaders--military and civilian--must apply their
professional knowledge in increasingly varied and unique situations
that are characteristic of today's strategic environment. Ultimately,
we must grow professional Army leaders who provide wise and discerning
military judgments founded on long experience and proven professional
expertise. This capacity is developed only through a lifetime of
education and dedicated service--in peace and in war.
Soldiers serve the Nation with the full realization that their duty
may require them to make the supreme sacrifice for others among their
ranks. Soldiers fighting the war on terrorism today, those who will
fight our future wars, and those who have fought in our past wars are
professional warfighters and a precious national asset. To ensure we
remain the greatest landpower in the world defending the greatest
country in the world, The Army and the Nation rely upon their unique
and hard-earned experiences and skills. To develop the operational
skills required to defend the Nation, training must remain our number
one priority.
The evolving strategic environment, the gravity of our
responsibilities, and the broad range of tasks The Army performs
require us to review and periodically update the way we educate, train,
and grow professional warfighters. The Army's strategic
responsibilities to the Nation and Combatant Commanders now embrace a
wider range of missions. Those missions present our leaders with even
greater challenges than previously experienced. Therefore, leader
development is the lifeblood of the profession. It is the deliberate,
progressive, and continuous process that trains and grows Soldiers and
civilians into competent, confident, self-aware, and decisive leaders
prepared for the challenges of the 21st Century in combined arms,
joint, multinational, and interagency operations.
In June 2000, we convened the Army Training and Leader Development
Panel (ATLDP). The ATLDP's purpose is to identify skill sets required
of Objective Force Soldier and civilian leaders. Further, ATLDP
assesses the ability of current training and leader development systems
and policies to enhance these required skills. In May 2001, The Army
Training and Leader Development Panel Phase I (Officer Study)
identified seven strategic imperatives and generated 89
recommendations. With those, we validated the requirement to transform
our Officer Education System (OES)--from the Officer Basic Course
through the Command and General Staff Officer Course. Additionally, the
panel reconfirmed the value of Joint Professional Military Education II
(JPME II) in preparing our leaders for joint assignments. The most
significant product of the officer ATLDP is our OES Transformation.
ATLDP Phase I (Officer Study) identified three high-payoff
institutional training and education initiatives for lieutenants,
captains, and majors. The first of these is the Basic Officer Leader
Course (BOLC). BOLC will provide a tough, standardized, graduate-level,
small-unit leadership experience for newly commissioned officers. The
second of these initiatives is the Combined Arms Staff Course for staff
officers, and the Combined Arms Battle Command Course for company
commanders. Both courses will capitalize on advanced distributed
learning and intensive resident training methods. The third initiative,
Intermediate Level Education (ILE), will provide all majors with the
same common core of operational instruction, and it will provide
additional educational opportunities that are tailored to the officer's
specific career field, branch, or functional area. Beyond ILE, Army
officers continue to attend Joint or Senior Service Colleges to develop
leader skills and knowledge appropriate to the operational and
strategic levels of the profession.
Completed in May 2002, the ATLDP Phase II (NCO Study) resulted in
78 findings and recommendations extending across six imperatives--Army
culture, NCO Education Systems (NCOES), training, systems approach to
training, training and leader development model, and lifelong learning.
Among others, the ATLDP Phase II recommended building new training and
leader development tools for NCOs to replace current methods, as
required. The ATLDP Phase III (Warrant Officer Study) culminated with
63 recommendations extending across four crucial imperatives.
Recommendations included clarifying the warrant officer's unique role
in The Army and improving the Warrant Officer Education System to
ensure timely training and promotion. The Civilian Training and Leader
Development Panel (Phase IV) study results are complete, and we are
forming the Implementation Process Action Team (I-PAT). I-PAT will
identify actions The Army must take to increase the professional
development of our civilian workforce. At the senior leader level, The
Army initiated the Army Strategic Leadership Course (ASLC). The program
is aimed at teaching principles of strategic leadership, with emphasis
on visioning, campaign planning, leading change, and Transformation. To
date, we have completed twelve of the foundation courses and three
alumni courses, training the majority of The Army's general officers.
readiness--winning our nation's wars
Homeland Security (HLS)
Defending our Nation--abroad and at home--against foreign and
domestic threats is fundamental to The Army's legacy, and our
warfighting focus provides capabilities relevant to HLS requirements.
HLS missions range from traditional warfighting competencies that
defeat external threats to the non-combat tasks associated with
supporting civil authorities in domestic contingencies. Operation Noble
Eagle mobilized over 16,000 Army National Guard Soldiers to protect
critical infrastructure. These Soldiers assisted the Department of
Transportation in securing our Nation's airports while also playing a
vital role in securing our Nation's borders. The Army is moving forward
to provide one Civil Support Team to each state, as required by the
National Defense Authorization Act for fiscal year 2003. The Civil
Support Teams support Incident Commanders and identify Chemical,
Biological, Radiological, Nuclear, and Explosive (CBRNE) agents and
substances, assess current and projected consequences, advise on
response measures, and assist with appropriate requests for additional
support. To date, OSD has certified 30 of 32 teams, and The Army is
working to establish additional teams. Collectively, the certified
teams have performed 890 operational missions since September 11, 2001.
The Army remains committed to HLS, dedicating Active Component (AC) and
Reserve Component (RC) staffs to focus on training, doctrine, planning,
and execution of DOD missions in support of civil authorities.
Missile Defense
Robust Missile Defense is a vital warfighting requirement that
protects both our homeland and our deployed forces. Missile Defense
includes far more than a reactive capability to shoot down missiles in
their reentry phase. Missile Defense requires a coherent system of
sensors; battle command; weapons systems; and active, passive,
proactive, and reactive operational concepts, all aimed at destroying
enemy missiles--not only during their reentry phases. Missile Defense
must also be able to destroy enemy missiles on the ground, before they
launch or during their boost phase once launched. Missile Defense is
inherently a joint capability to which The Army is a major contributor.
The Army is deploying and employing Ground Mobile Defense assets to
contribute to this warfighting capability, accelerating the fielding of
the Patriot Advanced Capability 3 (PAC3) system, and developing
directed energy weapons that will bring new defense measures to The
Army and the Nation. We are postured to assume control of the Medium
Extended Air Defense System (MEADS) program in fiscal year 2003 and
intend to begin fielding by fiscal year 2012.
MEADS is a transformational program of Objective Force quality and
a significant improvement on Patriot's capabilities. It will be more
mobile and more deployable (C-130 capable) than Patriot and cover a
360-degree radius to Patriot's 120 degrees. It will be effective
against low radar, cross section cruise missile targets; and require
only 30 percent of Patriot's manpower. And MEADS will be more accurate
and more sustainable than Patriot.
Chemical Demilitarization
In Section 1412 of Public Law 99-145, Congress directed the DOD to
destroy the United States' chemical weapons stockpile. In turn, the
Secretary of Defense delegated management of all chemical munitions
disposal to the Department of the Army. On November 29, 2000, the
Johnston Atoll Chemical Agent Disposal System, using incineration-based
technology, completely destroyed the last stockpiles stored at the
Atoll, and closure operations began in January 2001. The Tooele
Chemical Agent Disposal Facility has incinerated 44 percent of the
chemical agents and 81 percent of the munitions stored there. Disposal
operations at these two sites destroyed 30 percent of the total U.S.
chemical weapons stockpiles. Construction of incineration facilities at
Anniston, Alabama; Umatilla, Oregon; and Pine Bluff, Arkansas, is
complete. Systemization activities are on-going at Aberdeen, Anniston,
Umatilla, and Pine Bluff. The plan to accelerate the disposal of bulk
agents using a neutralization process at Aberdeen, Maryland, and
Newport, Indiana, has been approved. Anniston and Aberdeen are
scheduled to start destruction in second quarter fiscal year 2003, and
Newport is scheduled to begin in first quarter fiscal year 2004.
To comply with treaty agreements and the Congressional mandate, we
must complete the destruction of these weapons by 2007. The treaty
allows for a one time, five-year extension to this deadline. With
continued funding and minimal schedule changes, we will safely destroy
the U.S. stockpile of lethal chemical agents and munitions at eight
existing CONUS sites.
Training the Force
In October 2002, The Army released Field Manual (FM) 7-0, Training
the Force. Synchronized with other field manuals and publications being
updated to respond to changes in Army, joint, multinational, and
interagency operations, FM 7-0 is the capstone doctrinal manual for
Army training and leader development. It provides the developmental
methodology for training and growing competent, confident Soldiers, and
it addresses both current and future Objective Force training
requirements.
We are transforming the way we fight future wars, and The Army is
participating fully in a DOD-sponsored program to transform how forces
train to fight. This effort involves four major initiatives: building
upon existing service interoperability training; linking component and
joint command staff planning and execution; enhancing existing joint
training exercises to address joint interoperability; and studying the
requirement for dedicated joint training environments for functional
warfighting and complex joint tasks. The Army is scheduled to host the
first joint National Training Center (NTC) event at Fort Irwin,
California, in May 2003. During June 2003, the U.S. Army Forces Command
will execute the second joint NTC event--JCS exercise Roving Sands.
During the late 1990s, funding for the recapitalization and
modernization of The Army's Combat Training Centers was reduced,
eroding their capability to support their critical missions.
Additionally, the Multiple Integrated Laser Engagement System equipment
and current force instrumentation systems have become difficult to
maintain. The Army's Combat Training Center modernization program will
ensure that our premier training areas (NTC at Fort Irwin, Combat
Maneuver Training Center in Germany, the Joint Readiness Training
Center (JRTC) at Fort Polk, and the Deep Attack Center of Excellence
near Gila Bend, Arizona) are modernized to provide high quality,
realistic, full-spectrum joint training. To address these problems, The
Army will invest nearly $700 million over the next six years to
modernize these training centers.
OPTEMPO
In accordance with Congressional directives, The Army developed a
new methodology to prepare budget requests that accurately reflect
Operations and Maintenance requirements. In the report submitted in
July 2002, The Army outlined updated processes that ensure consistency
in reporting of tank miles and reflect requirements and execution with
more precision. Management controls initiated in fiscal year 2001 to
prevent migration of OPTEMPO funds to other areas were highly
successful and remain in effect.
The Army's combined arms training strategy determines the
resourcing requirements to maintain the combat readiness of our forces.
For the Active Component, The Army requires 800 ground OPTEMPO miles
per year for the M1 Abrams tank and corresponding training support; the
Active Component flying hour program requires an average of 14.5 live
flying hours per aircrew each month. Both Army National Guard and the
Army Reserve aircrew training strategies require 9.0 hours per crew
each month. The ARNG ground OPTEMPO requirement is a composite average
of 174 miles in fiscal year 2004, and the Army Reserve (USAR) ground
OPTEMPO requirement is 200 tank-equivalent miles in fiscal year 2004.
While this describes The Army's training strategy, actual execution
levels from unit to unit have varied depending upon factors such as on-
going operations, safety of flight messages, and adequate manning of
combat formations. To this end, The Army has fully funded its AC ground
OPTEMPO requirement, while its AC flying program is funded to its
historical execution level of 13.1 flying hours. The RC air and ground
OPTEMPO are similarly funded to their execution levels, rather than
their requirement. Although The Army has not always been able to
execute the training strategy, we have taken steps to have all units
execute the prescribed training strategy in fiscal year 2003, fiscal
year 2004, and beyond.
Force Protection and Anti-terrorism
Force protection consists of those actions to prevent or mitigate
hostile actions against Department of Defense personnel and includes
family members, resources, facilities, and critical information. In the
war on terrorism, the area of operations extends from Afghanistan to
the East Coast and across the United States. Naturally, Force
Protection and Antiterrorism measures have increased across Army
installations in the Continental United States (CONUS) and overseas.
Findings from the Cole Commission, the Downing Report on the Khobar
Towers bombing, and Army directives to restrict access to installations
have all led to thorough assessments by the Department of the Army
Inspector General, the Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations, and
commanders. Our efforts focus on improved force protection policy and
doctrine; more rigorous training and exercises; improved threat
reporting and coordination with national intelligence and law
enforcement agencies; enhanced detection and deterrence capabilities
for Chemical, Biological, Radiological, Nuclear, and Explosive (CBRNE)
threats; increased capabilities and protection for access control; and
expanded assessments of Major Commands (MACOM) and installation force
protection programs. Both operational and installation environments
rely upon secure, networked information infrastructure to execute daily
enterprise-wide processes and decision-making, so the parameters of
force protection include contemporary and evolving cyber threats, as
well.
The Army's Information Systems Security Program (ISSP) secures The
Army's portion of the Global Information Grid, secures the digitized
force, and supports information superiority and network security
defense-in-depth initiatives. ISSP provides the capability to detect
system intrusions and alterations and react to information warfare
attacks in a measured and coordinated manner. To the greatest extent
possible, it protects warfighters' secure communications--from the
sustaining base to the foxhole.
Soldiers, Active and Reserve, are heavily engaged in force
protection and anti-terrorism missions. Soldiers guard military
installations, nuclear power plants, dams and power generation
facilities; tunnels, bridges, and rail stations; and emergency
operations centers. During the 2002 Winter Olympics in Salt Lake City,
Utah, nearly 1,500 ARNG Soldiers provided security, and Soldiers
guarded key infrastructure sites during Super Bowl XXXVII in January
2003. Over 12,500 Reserve Component Soldiers are currently mobilized
for Operation Noble Eagle to fulfill Force Protection requirements, and
in February 2003, over 8,000 Army National Guard Soldiers will support
Air Force security requirements--a requirement that could reach 9,500
Soldiers. Security of detention facilities and detainees at Guantanamo
Bay Detention--a long-term detainee mission--requires approximately
1,500 Army personnel, 50 percent of whom are Military Police. Army
Reserve Internment and Resettlement battalions on 6-month rotations
impact military police availability to CONUS Force Protection
requirements.
Sustainment
The Army is revolutionizing its logistics process. One initiative,
the Single Stock Fund (SSF), redirected more than $540 million worth of
secondary items from stocks to satisfy customer demands between May
2000--SSF inception--and November 2002. During that same period, we
redistributed more than $218 million worth of secondary items from the
authorized stockage levels to meet higher priority readiness
requirements. By extending national visibility of stockage locations
and capitalizing inventories into the Army Working Capital Fund, we
reduced customer wait time by an average of 18.5 percent. The SSF will
continue to reduce inventory requirements and generate even more
savings for The Army by creating greater flexibility for the management
of inventories.
Another initiative, the National Maintenance Program (NMP),
enhances weapon system readiness, reliability, and availability rates
by bringing Army Class IX repair parts to a single national standard.
Ultimately, increased reliability will reduce overall weapon system
Operating and Support cost. Additionally, the NMP centralizes the
management and control of Army maintenance activities for components
and end items. NMP will produce appropriately sized Army maintenance
capacity that still meets total maintenance requirements.
Strategic Readiness Reporting
The National Defense Authorization Act for fiscal year 1999
requires the Secretary of Defense to implement a comprehensive
readiness reporting system that objectively measures readiness to
support the NSS. The Army's Strategic Readiness System (SRS) responds
to and provides a baseline in achieving this critical initiative.
SRS is a precision readiness measurement tool that provides Army
leadership with accurate, objective, predictive, and actionable
readiness information to dramatically enhance resource management
toward one end--strategic readiness to defend the United States. The
Army Scorecard--a product of SRS--will integrate readiness data from
the business arena and the operating, generating, and sustaining forces
of both the Active and Reserve Component. Army Scorecard methodology
focuses on four critical areas: People--investing in Soldiers and their
families; Readiness--maintaining the support capability to the
Combatant Commanders' operational requirements; Transformation--
transforming The Army into the Objective Force; and application of
sound business practices.
SRS markedly improves how we measure readiness. It gathers timely
information with precision and expands the scope of the data
considered. We are further developing this system to leverage leading
indicators and predict trends--solving problems that affect readiness
before they become problems, from well-being to weapons platforms. SRS
will help enable The Army preserve readiness to support Combatant
Commanders, invest in Soldiers and their families, identify and adopt
sound business practices, and transform The Army to the Objective
Force.
Installations
Army installations are our Nation's power projection platforms, and
they provide critical training support to The Army and other members of
the joint team. Additionally, Soldiers, families, and civilians live
and work on Army installations. The quality of our infrastructure
directly affects the readiness of The Army and the well-being of our
Soldiers, families, and civilians.
The Army has traditionally accepted substantial risk in
infrastructure to maintain its current warfighting readiness. However,
a decade of chronic under funding has led to a condition in which over
50 percent of our facilities and infrastructure are in such poor
condition that commanders rated them as ``adversely affecting mission
requirements.'' Our facilities maintenance must improve. Over the past
two years, with the help of the Administration and Congress, The Army
has begun to rectify this situation with significant increases in
funding and innovative business practices. These efforts have been
dramatically successful as we continue to correct a problem that was 10
years in the making. Thus, in an effort to prevent future degradation
of our facilities, The Army has increased its funding for facilities
sustainment to 93 percent of requirement beginning in fiscal year 2004.
Transformation of Installation Management (TIM)
Recognizing the requirement to enhance support to commanders, the
Secretary of the Army directed the reorganization of The Army's
management structure. On October 1, 2002, The Army placed the
management of Army installations under the Installation Management
Agency (IMA). IMA is a new field-operating agency of the Assistant
Chief of Staff for Installation Management (ACSIM). Its mission is to
provide equitable, efficient, and effective management of Army
installations worldwide to support readiness; enable the well-being of
Soldiers, civilians and family members; improve infrastructure; and
preserve the environment. This new management approach eliminates the
migration of base operations funds to other operational accounts below
the HQDA level. It also enables the development of multi-functional
installations to support evolving force structure and Army
Transformation needs. The Army is poised to capitalize on opportunities
TIM gives us to provide excellence in installations.
Two programs that significantly increase the well-being of our
Soldiers and their families are the Barracks and the Family Housing
programs. The Army established the Barracks Upgrade Program (BUP) in
the late 1990's to improve single Soldiers' housing conditions. Through
2002, we have upgraded or funded-for-upgrade 70 percent of our
permanent party barracks to Soldier suites that consist of two single
bedrooms with a shared bath and common area. The Army will continue the
BUP until all permanent party barracks achieve this standard.
With the strong support of Congress, The Army established the
Residential Communities Initiative (RCI) for our families. This program
capitalizes on commercial expertise and private capital to perform a
non-core function for The Army--family housing management. The program
provides greater value to The Army by eliminating the housing deficit
at our first eleven sites, while leveraging a $209 million Army
investment into $4.1 billion of initial private development. The Army's
privatization program began with four pilot projects and will expand to
18 active projects by the end of fiscal year 2003. Pending OSD and
Congressional approval, 28 projects are planned through 2006 that will
impact over 72,000 housing units or 80 percent of Army Family Housing
in the United States. By the end of 2007, we will have the programs and
projects in place to meet the OSD goal of eliminating inadequate family
housing. We will accomplish this goal through RCI and increased Army
investment in family housing Military Construction (MILCON) at non-
privatized installations. The Reserve Component (RC) enhances RCI
through real property exchange authority that is only available to the
RC. This legislative authority allows the exchange of RC owned property
with public or private entities and has a tremendous potential to
improve future Reserve Component infrastructure at no governmental
cost.
The Army has also aggressively reduced its financial burden and
physical footprint by disposing of 34 percent of its facilities from a
1990 high of 116 billion square feet. The Army anticipates that the
Congressional fiscal year 2005 Base Realignment and Closure (BRAC)
authority will permit additional appropriate reductions. BRAC will
enable The Army to dispose of excess infrastructure and realign the
remaining facilities with the requirements of the transforming Army and
the Objective Force. BRAC will also allow The Army to re-allocate
resources from closed or realigned installations to other high priority
requirements.
The Army continues to improve its utilities infrastructure by
divesting itself of non-core utility systems' operation and maintenance
through privatization. As of December 2002, we had privatized 64 of the
351 systems in the program, and we have an additional 104 presently
under negotiation.
As part of our Army Knowledge Management (AKM)--described later in
more detail--we are modernizing our Installation Information
Infrastructure--infostructure--to support a network centric, knowledge-
based Army. The Installation Information Infrastructure Modernization
Program (I\3\MP) executes a multi-year, $3.2 billion program for
upgrades to optical fiber and copper cable, installation of advanced
digital equipment, and upgrades to Defense Global Information Grid
gateways. This program will ensure worldwide, high-speed data
connectivity at Army installations. To date, we have completed 22 of 95
CONUS installations and initiated upgrades at four installations
outside of the continental United States (OCONUS). We plan to complete
I\3\MP in 2009.
Transformation--Changing the Way we Fight
The Army is fundamentally changing the way we fight and creating a
force more responsive to the strategic requirements of the Nation. We
are building a joint precision maneuver capability that can enter a
theater at the time and place of our choosing, maneuver at will to gain
positional advantage, deliver precise joint fires and, if necessary,
close with and destroy the enemy.
The Objective Force is an army designed from the bottom up around a
single, networked, integrated C\4\ISR architecture that will link us to
joint, interagency, and multi-national forces. It will be a rapidly
deployable, mounted formation, seamlessly integrated into the joint
force and capable of delivering decisive victory across the spectrum of
military operations. Consolidated, streamlined branches and military
operational specialties comprised of professional warfighters will be
poised to transition rapidly from disaster relief to high-end
warfighting operations.
The Objective Force and its Future Combat System of Systems will
leverage and deliver with precision the combat power of joint and
strategic assets. It is a capabilities-based force that rapidly
responds to the requirements of the strategic environment in which our
Soldiers will be the most strategically relevant and decisively capable
landpower--no matter the mission, no matter the threats, no matter the
risks.
In the final analysis, The Army's combat power does not wear tracks
or wheels--it wears boots. No platform or weapon system can match a
Soldier's situational curiosity and awareness. It is the Soldiers'
ability to discern and to think, their ingenuity and resourcefulness,
their endurance and perseverance, and their plain grit that make them
the most reliable precision weapon in our inventory. Soldiers remain
the centerpiece of our formations.
To help guide our Transformation efforts, The Army leverages
lessons-learned from extensive experimentation and wargaming. We are
working to harness the power of knowledge, the benefits of science and
technology, and innovative business solutions to transform both the
Operational and Institutional Army into the Objective Force. The Army's
annual Title 10 Wargames provide critical insights for developing the
Objective Force. Likewise, results from joint experiments--Millennium
Challenge 2002 and other service Title 10 Wargames like Global
Engagement, Navy Global, and Expeditionary Warrior, to name a few--also
inform these efforts.
The Army is fully committed to joint experimentation as a means to
examine and assess Objective Force contributions to the strategic,
operational, and tactical levels of joint warfare. The Army has
established a joint/Army Concept Development and Experimentation (CD&E)
Task Force to ensure that Army CD&E efforts are synchronized with joint
CD&E. This task force makes certain that joint experiment lessons-
learned inform the design and development of the Objective Force. This
year, The Army's Title 10 Wargame--co-hosted by Commander, Joint Forces
Command--will focus on the Joint Force that will fight the next battle.
Linked to Joint Forces Command's Pinnacle Impact 03 experiment, it will
be conducted within the context of a future 1-4-2-1 global scenario and
the emerging Joint Operations Concept. The Army is committed to these
efforts, and in this budget we have nearly doubled last year's funding
of these exercises.
Joint, interagency, multinational, and Army warfighting experiments
provide invaluable opportunities for The Army to experiment with
innovative approaches to warfighting and to test new tactics,
techniques, procedures, organizations, processes, and technology. In
Millennium Challenge 2002, the largest joint experiment in U.S.
history, The Army demonstrated four vital capabilities it brings to the
joint fight: the ability to attain and maintain information superiority
(knowledge); the ability to conduct decisive maneuver to enable
dominant joint maneuver; the ability to defeat the opposition in an
anti-access environment through rapid entry and employment
capabilities; and the ability to support and sustain rapid combat power
efficiently by reducing the operational and tactical logistics
footprint
To evaluate the effectiveness of the Stryker Brigade Combat Team
(SBCT) concepts for battalion and company operations in a Joint Force,
The Army employed a SBCT unit during Millennium Challenge. Less than
four weeks after Stryker vehicles were delivered to the first unit at
Fort Lewis, the unit demonstrated rapid air and sealift deployability
and integrated into the exercise well. Additionally, when given a
mission on short notice to support a Marine Corps unit in ground
operations, the SBCT unit demonstrated its agility and versatility.
Balancing Risk as we Manage Change
Balancing risk is integral to Army Transformation. To maintain
current readiness while we transform, we are managing operational risk:
risk in current readiness for near-term conflicts with future risk--the
ability to develop new capabilities and operational concepts that will
dissuade or defeat mid- to long-term military challenges. The Army has
accepted risk in selective modernization and recapitalization, and we
continue to assess these risks as we balance current readiness, the
well-being of our people, Transformation, the war on terrorism, and new
operational commitments. Since 1999, The Army has terminated 29
programs and restructured 20 others for a total savings of $12.8
billion. These funds were reallocated to resource the Stryker Brigades
and essential Objective Force research and development.
In Program Budget 2004 and its associated Five-Year Defense Plan
(FYDP), The Army has generated an additional $22 billion of savings by
terminating 24 additional systems and reducing or restructuring 24
other systems. To accelerate achieving the Objective Force capabilities
and mitigating operational risk, The Army reinvested these savings in
the development of transformational capabilities in these and other
programs:
--Future Combat System--$13.5 billion
--Precision Munitions--$3.2 billion
--Sensors and Communications--$2.3 billion
--Science and Technology--$1.1 billion
--Missile and Air Defense--$1.1 billion.
The operational risk associated with the decreased funding for
certain current programs is acceptable as long as we field Stryker
Brigades on schedule and accelerate the fielding of the Objective Force
for arrival, this decade. We will continue to reassess the risk
associated with system reductions and related organizational changes
against operational requirements and the strategic environment.
An Information Enabled Army
Achieving the full spectrum dominance of the Objective Force
requires changing the way we fight. Changing the way we fight requires
a holistic transformation of Logistics, Personnel, Installation
Management, Acquisition, Aviation, business practices--every aspect of
The Army must transform. The Objective Force requires innovative
changes and out-of-the-box ingenuity in the way we take care of our
people and manage the information and material that enhances their
readiness and answers their needs--both personal and professional, at
home and in the short sword warfight at foxhole level. Simply put, we
cannot achieve the Objective Force capabilities without leveraging the
full potential of the technological advances that our Nation's
industrial base and science and technology communities are developing.
The Army has consolidated management of Information Technologies (IT)
into a single effort--Army Knowledge Management (AKM). AKM capitalizes
on IT resources unique to our Nation and harnesses them for
Transformation, for The Army, and for the Combatant Commanders.
Information management is critical to achieving The Army Vision,
and Army Knowledge Management supports Transformation through the
development and implementation of a network-centric, knowledge-based
Army architecture interoperable with the joint system. AKM will
accelerate the Detect-Decide-Deliver planning processes and enable
warfighters to see the adversary first--before our forces are detected;
understand the Common Relevant Operating Picture first; act against
adversaries first; and finish the warfight with decisive victories--see
first, understand first, act first, finish decisively. AKM will provide
knowledge at the point of decision for all leaders--from the factory to
the foxhole.
Enabling collaborative mission planning and execution among widely
dispersed locations around the globe, Army Knowledge Management will
provide a rapid and seamless flow and exchange of actionable
information and knowledge. The Network-centric operations that AKM
enables will decrease our logistic footprint and enhance sustainability
of the Objective Force through multi-nodal distribution networks--
reaching forward to the theater and back to installations. Advanced
information technologies will dramatically enhance Battle Command.
Command, Control, Communications, and Computer (C\4\) decision tools
seamlessly linked to Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance
(ISR) assets produce a radically improved Common Relevant Operating
Picture (CROP) and enable Battle Command.
AKM will dramatically enhance the warfighter's ability to
distribute, process, fuse, and correlate unprecedented amounts of
actionable data into information--securely, reliably, and quickly
enough to enable leaders to synchronize and mass effects for decisive
results. Network-centric operations enable information awareness,
information access, and information delivery.
The Army Knowledge Enterprise (AKE) construct describes The Army's
process to enable improved strategic and tactical information
distribution and collaboration. In short, AKE leverages the ingenuity
and resourcefulness of our people in shaping the environment to achieve
dominance and helps leaders achieve decision superiority and mission
efficiencies.
Integration and refinement of existing Army networks is the first
step in achieving a network-centric, information-enabled force that
creates efficiencies and provides secure, reliable, actionable
information communications. To this end, The Army activated the Network
Enterprise Technology Command (NETCOM). NETCOM is The Army's single
authority assigned to operate, manage, and defend The Army's
information infrastructure. NETCOM has assumed technical control of all
Army networks--Active, Guard, and Reserve. This new policy allows
NETCOM to evaluate any system, application, or piece of equipment that
touches The Army Networks. NETCOM will improve the capacity,
performance, and security of our networks at every level.
Among others, one tangible product of NETCOM is the consolidation
and removal of redundant servers across The Army. This example of
better business practice will harvest significant savings in
resources--both dollars and managers--while increasing the
effectiveness of the network. Since the first quarter fiscal year 2002,
we have reduced the number of servers Army-wide by 16 percent--311 in
the National Capitol Region alone.
Army Knowledge Online (AKO) begins to allow The Army to
decentralize the management of information. AKO is The Army's secure,
web-based, internet service that leverages The Army's intellectual
capital to better organize, train, equip, and maintain our force. It
gives our people a means to collaborate, to improve their situational
awareness, and to access their personnel data. Already, hard-copy
processes that formerly took days and weeks can now be accomplished
almost instantly--from pay to personnel actions to assignments, to name
a few. And AKO is just an early glimpse of the potential capabilities
of a Network-centric, knowledge based organization that harnesses the
potential of the global infostructure.
operational army
The Objective Force
The Army is actively engaged in global operations supporting
Combatant Commanders today, but it is our obligation to prepare for the
future, as well. The Objective Force is The Army's future full-spectrum
force that will be organized, manned, equipped and trained to be more
strategically responsive, deployable, agile, versatile, lethal,
survivable and sustainable than we are today--across the full spectrum
of military operations as an integral member of a cohesive joint team.
The Nation will continue to face adaptive, asymmetric threats that
capitalize on the power of information. To dominate and maintain
superiority over these emerging challenges, The Army is changing the
way we fight--a paradigm shift more significant than the 20th Century's
introduction of the tank and the helicopter. The Army is changing from
sequential and linear operations to distributed and simultaneous
operations. The Objective Force--characterized by networks of people
enabled with systems that provide actionable information and decision
superiority--will dissuade, deter or decisively defeat our adversaries
anytime, anyplace, and anywhere.
The Objective Force will consist of command structures scaled to
meet Joint Force Commander requirements and modular combined-arms units
tailored according to each situation. Objective Force integrated,
mobile, air-ground teams will conduct mounted and dismounted operations
and employ both manned and unmanned platforms to achieve decisive
victories. Capable of forcible entry and operations in austere
environments to address the spectrum of military operations--from
humanitarian assistance to warfighting--the Objective Force will
conduct simultaneous combat and stability operations and master
transitions between phases of operations. It will be an offensively
oriented, multi-dimensional force enabled by advanced information
technologies that give Soldiers real-time intelligence and actionable
information.
The Objective Force will arrive in theater combat capable--
deployment will be synonymous with employment. The Objective Force will
be strategically responsive and rapidly deployable on the U.S Air Force
family of inter-theater and intra-theater aircraft. An Objective Force
Unit of Action (UA) will deploy on approximately one-third the number
of aircraft required to deploy a heavy brigade combat team today. It
will be operationally deployable and capable of operational maneuver
over strategic distances by air, land, or sea. Soldiers will overcome
anti-access and area denial strategies and environments through
precision maneuver and decision superiority.
Equipped with new systems designed to meet the needs of The Army's
future fighting formations, the Objective Force will be a networked
system of systems. This system of systems includes Soldiers equipped
with the Land Warrior system; a family of 18 integrated, synchronized,
manned and unmanned Future Combat Systems (FCS); and critical
complementary systems such as the Comanche and the Future Tactical
Truck System. The components of the FCS are being synchronously
developed and fielded as a complete family to achieve the warfighting
capabilities the Nation requires to defeat adaptive, asymmetric
conventional and unconventional adversaries.
Soldiers are the centerpiece of The Army's formation--not
equipment. And Soldiers of the Objective Force will leverage dominant
knowledge to gain decision superiority over any adversary. They will
seamlessly integrate Objective Force capabilities with the capabilities
of joint forces, Special Operations Forces, other federal agencies, and
multinational forces. The Objective Force Soldiers will enable the
United States to achieve its national security goals in a crisis,
rather than simply inflict punitive strikes on an adversary. Employing
FCS capabilities in formations called Units of Action (UA) and Units of
Employment (UE), Objective Force Soldiers will provide campaign quality
staying power--that means precision fire and maneuver to control
terrain, people, and resources, without having to resort to
indiscriminate collateral damage. The Land Warrior system will
integrate individual Soldiers in the network while providing them
increased protection and lethality. And FCS will give Soldiers the
capability to destroy any adversary in any weather and environment with
smaller calibers, greater precision, more devastating target effects,
and at longer-ranges than available today.
Joint C\4\ISR--a network-centric information architecture nested
within the Global Information Grid--will connect the Objective Force's
system of systems. Capitalizing on the synergistic power of the
information network enterprise, every Objective Force Soldier and
platform will be capable of sensing and engaging the enemy while
maintaining situational awareness of friendly forces. Advanced
information technologies and C\4\ISR decision tools and assets will
enhance the Common Relevant Operating Picture (CROP). The Objective
Force will identify, locate, and engage critical targets with lethal or
non-lethal affects and assess battle damage on those targets. The joint
C\4\ISR linkages will enable the attack of targets with whatever joint
or Army assets are available for immediate employment, whether the
force is in contact or out of contact. Similarly, enhanced situational
awareness will facilitate multi-layered active and passive defense
measures--including both offensive and defensive counter air against
air and non-air breathing, manned and unmanned aerial vehicles.
The CROP and Network centric operations will enhance sustainability
of the Objective Force through multi-nodal distribution networks that
reach forward to the area of operations or reach back to the Home
Station Operations Center. Increased reliability through equipment
design and commonality among the FCS family of systems will enhance
sustainability while reducing logistics demands. Advanced technologies
will enable robust Objective Force operations while shrinking the
logistics footprint and lift requirements of deployed forces.
The FCS is a transformational approach to meeting this Nation's
requirements for the Objective Force. We designed and will field the
FCS family in a carefully balanced manner to avoid optimizing a
component at the expense of sub-optimizing the overarching capabilities
of Objective and joint forces. The acquisition and requirements
development processes are being updated to accommodate the Department
of Defense's (DOD) direction to field a networked system of systems
rapidly through spiral development and an open architecture that allows
maturing technological insertions as they occur.
The Army embraces the ongoing DOD and Joint Staff Capabilities and
Acquisition processes reform efforts to achieve revolutionary
capabilities in the fielding of a new generation of equipment. This
collaborative DOD and JCS effort enables The Army to design new
information-age capable organizations holistically, use evolutionary
acquisition strategies to equip those organizations, and see the
Objective Force fielded before the end of this decade.
Science and Technology--Moving Toward the Transformed Army
Preempting our adversaries' technological surprises over the past
three years, Army Science and Technology investments are already
providing America's Army with sustained overmatch in all materiel
systems. And The Army has increased and focused its Science and
Technology (S&T) investments. We are demonstrating the enabling joint
interoperable technologies essential for Objective Force capabilities
and accelerating their arrival. Our S&T program is pursuing a wide
spectrum of technologies for unmanned air and ground systems that will
expand the range of joint warfighting capabilities, reduce risk to
Soldiers, and reduce the logistics footprint of the force. Realizing
the full potential of unmanned systems requires technological
development in sensors that improve navigation and mission performance,
in intelligent systems for semi-autonomous or autonomous operation, in
networked communications for manned-unmanned teaming, and in human-
robotic interfaces, among many others.
The Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA) and Army
partnership contracted for a Lead Systems Integrator (LSI) to
accelerate the transition of FCS to the System Development and
Demonstration (SDD) Phase, with a Milestone B decision in May 2003. The
Army is on track to achieve first unit equipped in 2008 and an initial
operating capability of one Objective Force Unit of Action (UA) in
2010. To accelerate development and in partnership DARPA, the focus on
key transformation technologies for the FCS has been narrowed to the
systems with the most promise. Our highest priority S&T efforts remain
technological advances for the Future Combat System (FCS).
The Army will field FCS as a family of systems built on information
age technologies embedded in manned and unmanned air and ground
platforms. Integral to joint fires, the family of systems will
integrate long-range air- and ground-based sensors with long-range
cannon and missile precision munitions. The family of systems will also
provide increased joint capabilities to conduct battle command,
reconnaissance, mounted combat operations, dismounted combat
operations, medical treatment and evacuation, and maintenance and
recovery. To provide decisive lethality, FCS will employ networked,
precision and loitering attack munitions fired from modular, easily
transportable containers. Finally, FCS will leverage embedded, real-
time interactive, virtual, distributed, collaborative, joint
simulations for training and mission rehearsal.
Enabling the Objective Force Soldier
Eighteen systems, both manned and unmanned; the Objective Force
Soldier; and C\4\ISR, together, comprise the Future Combat System.
Manned and unmanned reconnaissance capabilities are part of the FCS
Family of Systems' interdependent networked air- and ground-based
maneuver, maneuver support, and sustainment systems.
There are 10 Unmanned Systems: Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAV)
Classes 1, 2, 3, and 4; Unmanned Ground Vehicles (UGV)--the
Multifunction Utility/Logistics and Equipment (MULE), the Armed Robotic
Vehicle (ARV), and the Small (manpackable) Unmanned Ground Vehicle
(MUGV); Unattended Ground Sensors (UGS); and Unattended Munitions--the
Non-Line-of-Sight (NLOS) Launch System (LS) and Intelligent Munitions
Systems (IMS).
There are eight manned systems: the Infantry Carrier Vehicle (ICV);
Command and Control Vehicle (C\2\V); Reconnaissance and Surveillance
Vehicle (RSV); Line-of-Sight, Beyond-Line-of-Sight Mounted Combat
System (LOS/BLOS MCS); NLOS-Mortar; Medical Vehicle (MV); the FCS
Recovery and Maintenance Vehicle (FRMV); and the Non-Line-of-Sight
(NLOS) Cannon.
Decisive warfighting is about fires and maneuver: fires enable
maneuver, and maneuver enables fires. Joint and organic close,
supporting, indirect fires destroy the enemy, suppress the enemy's
capabilities, protect our forces and enable ground units to maneuver.
The ICV, the Unattended Munitions NLOS-LS, IMS, C\2\V, MCS, NLOS-
Mortar, and NLOS Cannon are important elements of the FCS that will
enable the Objective Force to conduct distributed and simultaneous
joint combat operations. With joint fires, the NLOS cannon is critical
to support and protect our land forces in hostile environments. NLOS-LS
NetFires is a platform-independent family of missiles with precision
attack and loitering capability. Both Precision Guided Mortar Munitions
and Excalibur precision cannon munitions will enhance organic maneuver
fires. A new, joint fire support, battle command and fire support
architecture will allow rapid engagement of targets by any Army or
joint asset.
For over 227 years, Soldiers have remained the centerpiece of our
formations. The Land Warrior program--another key S&T initiative--
responds to this legacy and enhances our Soldiers combat power
generation capability. The Land Warrior program will develop a
lightweight, low observable, enhanced-armor protection, fighting
ensemble for the individual Objective Force Soldier. Through networked
connectivity to the FCS-equipped, maneuver Unit of Action, Land Warrior
Soldiers will enable revolutionary lethality, mobility, survivability,
and sustainability for the individual warfighter while reducing
logistics demands.
Future Combat Systems are networked in the joint C\4\ISR
architecture--including networked communications, networked options,
sensors, battle command systems, training, and both manned and unmanned
reconnaissance and surveillance capabilities. These networked systems
will dramatically enhance situational awareness and understanding and
operational level synchronization well beyond today's standards.
Improved C\4\ISR capabilities will enable network-centric Objective
Force operations. The results of the investments will allow leaders to
capitalize on sensor and processing technology to see, understand, and
shape the battlespace before the enemy can react--increasing combat
force effectiveness and survivability. The S&T program will develop and
demonstrate real-time, continuous situational understanding by
integrating data from manned and unmanned air- and ground-based
sensors.
S&T investments in military logistics are an important enabler for
the Objective Force. We are placing our emphasis on sustainment's big
drivers--fuel, ammunition, maintenance, and water--to dramatically
reduce our logistics footprint and lift requirements in these areas.
Key technologies include on-board water generation, real-time logistics
command and control processes and distribution management, enhanced
multi-purpose munitions and packaging, efficient propulsion and power
technologies, real-time diagnostics and prognostics, and Micro-Electro
Mechanical Systems (MEMS).
Transformational Systems
Several transformational systems were under development prior to
announcement of The Army Vision in October 1999. The Army has completed
an extensive analysis to identify those systems that complement FCS and
the Objective Force system of systems.
The Comanche Helicopter is the centerpiece of the Aviation
Modernization Plan (AMP) and represents the first new system to reach
Initial Operational Capability (IOC) within The Army's Objective Force.
Comanche is our armed reconnaissance platform with attack capabilities.
It will leverage the situational awareness and situational curiosity of
a scout augmented with revolutionary, state-of-the-art Intelligence,
Surveillance, and Reconnaissance (ISR) technologies. Comanche supports
vertical and horizontal maneuver as an integral part of network centric
operations and extends human eyes and decision-making beyond the ground
maneuver force. Utilizing stealth technologies, it will network with
all joint C\4\ISR and joint weapons systems. Comanche will leverage
maximum effect of future standoff precision weapon systems such as the
Common Missile and allow us to maneuver ground formations based upon
full knowledge of the situation. Augmented with armed or unarmed
Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAVs), Comanche will fill ground maneuver's
most critical battlefield deficiency--armed aerial reconnaissance--with
a capable, survivable, and sustainable aircraft. The Comanche program
is already well on its way to giving The Army a capability pivotal to
transforming the way we will fight.
Several other transformational systems will empower the Objective
Force with the knowledge dominance and battle command to provide
decision superiority across the spectrum of operations. The Warfighter
Information Network-Tactical (WIN-T) System, Medium Extended Air
Defense System (MEADS), the Joint Tactical Radio System (JTRS), and The
Army Airborne Command and Control System (A\2\C\2\S) will enable
Objective Force joint C\4\ISR capabilities. These programs will provide
the tactical enterprise level networks that will ensure seamless,
secure, digital connectivity between the Objective, Interim, and
today's forces. The Distributed Common Ground System-Army (DCGS-A)
architecture provides Army network-centric ISR connectivity from
national agencies to joint systems to Objective Force Units of Action
as part of the integrated Department of Defense DCGS architecture.
DCGS-A will enable interoperable tasking, processing, and exploitation
capabilities. The Aerial Common Sensor brings improved signal
intelligence collection and precision geolocation capabilities, as well
as imagery intelligence (IMINT) and measurement and signals (MASINT)
sensor packages. Another system, Prophet, uses communications
intelligence to depict the battlespace and further enhance situational
awareness. These C\4\ISR systems greatly enhance the Objective Force's
ability to gain actionable information superiority and decision
dominance over all adversaries and expand the range of options for the
joint force Combatant Commanders.
Transformational systems will provide the Objective Force with
strategic and tactical maneuver capabilities. The Theater Support
Vessel will support rapid intra-theater lift requirements, provide the
capability to conduct operational maneuver and repositioning, and
enable units to conduct enroute mission planning and rehearsal. The
Future Tactical Truck System will have commonality with FCS and will
support the Objective Force by enabling command, control, and
transportation of cargo, equipment, and personnel. And the Tactical
Electric Power (TEP) generators will provide power to Objective Force
units where fixed power grids are not available.
Transformational systems provide the Objective Force with other
important capabilities, as well. Chemical, Biological, Radiological,
Nuclear and Explosive (CBRNE) effects systems support the Objective
Force across the spectrum of military operations and improve
capabilities to conduct Homeland Security activities. Engineer, civil
affairs, and psychological operations vehicles will enable mobility and
enhance civil affairs and PSYOPs capabilities. The Up-Armored High
Mobility Multi-purpose Wheeled Vehicle (HMMWV) will improve Objective
Force Soldier survivability and lethality. The Multi-Mission Radar will
provide the capability to detect and track aircraft, artillery, and
other projectiles, then queue appropriate weapons systems and airspace
synchronization systems. The High Mobility Artillery Rocket System
(HIMARS) is a lighter weight, more deployable multiple rocket launcher
capability that will integrate into the joint fires network.
Bridging the Capabilities Gap--Stryker Brigade Combat Teams
Announcing our intent to field an Interim Force in October 1999,
The Army responded to a capabilities gap between its lethal,
survivable, but slow-to-deploy heavy forces and its rapidly deployable
light forces that lack the protection, lethality, and tactical mobility
that we seek. Just two-and-a-half years later in 2002, The Army began
fielding the first Stryker Brigade Combat Team to bridge that gap. In
2003--less than four years after the announcement--we are on track to
achieve IOC with the first SBCT at Fort Lewis, Washington. Stryker
Brigades will provide the Combatant Commander vastly increased
operational and tactical flexibility to execute fast-paced,
distributed, non-contiguous operations.
Stryker Brigade Combat Teams respond to Combatant Commander
requirements across the spectrum of military operations. Optimized for
combat in complex and urban terrain, the Stryker Brigades will be
decisive in other major combat operations, as well. The SBCT
Reconnaissance, Surveillance, and Target Acquisition (RSTA) Squadron
provides both organic human intelligence capabilities and UAVs embedded
at the brigade level. Its military intelligence and signal companies--
working through a digitally enabled battle command bridge--leverage
theater and national assets to create an information-enabled force.
SBCTs will use this enhanced joint C\4\ISR capability to revolutionize
combat paradigms from ``make contact, develop the situation, maneuver
the forces'' to ``understand the situation, maneuver the forces, make
contact at the time and place of your own choosing, and finish
decisively.''
Moreover, leveraging platform commonality, enhancing logistics
practices and enablers, and reorganizing logistics formations, the SBCT
is vastly more deployable and sustainable than our heavy forces, while
significantly increasing combat power generating capabilities.
Augmented for sustained operations, the SBCT requires 37 percent fewer
CSS personnel than a digitized heavy brigade. While capitalizing on
these advantages, developing and available technologies allow us to
mass effects--rather than massing formations--and create a robust,
reliable capability to conduct operational maneuver over strategic
distances.
Finally, SBCTs provide an invaluable means of spearheading
Transformation. The SBCT trains junior officers and noncommissioned
officers--tomorrow's commanders and command sergeants major--in the
tactics, techniques, and procedures that will inform employment of the
Objective Force.
The Army has resourced six Stryker Brigade Combat Teams to
contribute to fulfilling the 1-4-2-1 defense construct and national
security requirements; however, at this time, the Secretary of Defense
has only authorized the procurement of the first four brigades. The
Army will provide the Secretary of Defense with a plan for Stryker
Brigades 5 and 6.
Fielding of the SBCTs affects the entire Army: Active and Reserve
Components; heavy and light forces; CONUS and OCONUS. And current
fielding timelines will enhance the Nation's ability to fight and win
the GWOT and conduct major combat operations. The transformation of
four Active Component brigades to SBCTs provides a rotational base with
three of the SBCTs focused on the Pacific theater. One of the two SBCTs
fielded at Fort Lewis will be forward-based in Europe not later than
2007. The Stryker Cavalry Regiment will support the XVIII Airborne
Corps' critical need for robust, armed reconnaissance. The conversion
of a Reserve Component brigade to an SBCT will enhance our strategic
reserve and support the GWOT, Smaller Scale Contingencies, and Homeland
Defense missions. Additionally, SBCT stationing provides rapid,
strategic responsiveness through power projection platforms capable of
supporting four critical regions described in the 1-4-2-1 defense
construct. The first SBCT will attain Initial Operational Capability in
the summer of 2003.
Preserving The Army's Legacy
Today's force guarantees The Army's near-term warfighting readiness
to fight and win our Nation's wars, decisively. Because The Army
bypassed a procurement generation, The Army's Combat Support and Combat
Service Support systems now exceed their 20-year expected life cycle,
and 75 percent of our critical combat systems exceed their expected
half-life cycle. To maintain operational readiness while preserving
resources for Transformation, The Army is recapitalizing and
selectively modernizing a portion of the current force. The
modernization program addresses the critical issue of AC and RC
interoperability and serves as a bridge to mesh these two components
seamlessly. In general, The Army increased funding for programs that
are clearly transformational and support the Defense transformation
goals, sustained funding for high priority systems that will transition
to the Objective Force, and reduced funding for systems not essential
to Army Transformation. The Army remains committed to its 17-system
recapitalization program, but we have reduced the prioritized
recapitalization program from three-and-one-third divisions to two
divisions.
Army Special Operations Forces are an indispensable part of The
Army and will continue to provide unique capabilities to the Joint
Force and Land Component Commanders. In response to the increasing
requirement for Special Operations Forces in support of joint campaign
plans, The Army has validated and resourced growth in its SOF
structure. The recent initiatives will transfer 1,788 manpower spaces
to Major Force Program-11 beginning in fiscal year 2003. Since the
commencement of Army Special Operations Forces operations in support of
the GWOT, the U.S. Army has provided over $1.4 billion in new equipment
to enhance Special Operations Forces firepower, communications, and
ground and air mobility.
The Army will remain the largest user of space-based capabilities
among the Services. Army space assets are providing tangible support to
the war on terrorism and Operation Enduring Freedom--they ensure Army
and Joint Force Commanders optimize communications, satellite
intelligence, global positioning system, imagery, weather, missile
warning, and other space-based capabilities in every aspect of planning
and operations. We are working diligently with the joint and
interagency space community to ensure that Army and joint space systems
continue to provide their essential capabilities now and for the
Objective Force.
Aviation Transformation and Restructuring
Aviation Transformation further demonstrates The Army's hard
choices in balancing risk to resource Transformation. Our interim
plan--now in progress--lowers operating and sustainment costs while
posturing aviation for arrival of the Objective Force by 2010. Apache
modernization is an integral part of the Army Aviation Transformation
Plan. The AH-64D Longbow heavy attack team will enhance domination of
the maneuver battlespace and provide the ground commander with a
versatile, long-range weapon system against a range of fixed and moving
targets. The UH-60 Blackhawk continues to be the assault workhorse of
Army Aviation, executing over 40 percent of The Army's annual flying
hours. We are extending the life of the UH-60 while providing it with
capabilities required of the future battlespace. Similarly, The Army is
fully committed to the CH-47F Chinook program. Its heavy-lift
capability is invaluable to transforming The Army. As we restructure
and standardize attack and lift formations across the force, we will
also adjust the stationing and alignment of Reserve Component aviation
units to mitigate the near-term risk.
Army National Guard Aviation comprises almost 50 percent of The
Army's aviation force and is one of the Nation's most valuable assets
both for wartime and for peacetime missions. Essential for successful
execution of the Nation's military strategy, the ARNG currently has
aviation units deployed in Afghanistan, Kuwait, Bosnia, Europe, and
Saudi Arabia, as well as Central and South America.
Army National Guard Restructuring Initiative (ARNGRI)
ARNGRI seeks to transform a sizeable portion of ARNG combat
structure into more deployable, flexible fighting forces to support
Army requirements at home and abroad. ARNGRI will introduce two new
organizations into the force structure: Mobile Light Brigades and
Multi-Functional Divisions. These organizations will provide full
spectrum capabilities in support of Combatant Commanders. The Mobile
Light Brigades will operate as a subordinate unit to the Multi-
Functional Divisions, which will also contain two combat support/combat
service support brigades and be capable of supporting either major
combat or homeland security operations.
Army Reserve Transformation Initiatives
By providing responsive force generating capability and technically
trained individuals, the USAR facilitates our capability to conduct
extended campaigns in multiple theaters and to sustain joint
operations. Army Reserve initiatives ensure the USAR is missioned,
organized, and equipped to provide interoperability across the full
spectrum of military operations. Transformational organizations include
experimentation forces and information operations, joint augmentation,
network security, and interagency units.
The Readiness Command Restructuring initiative and Federal Reserve
Restructuring Initiative will help the USAR fulfill these new mission
requirements. These initiatives lend greater flexibility to efforts
that enhance responsiveness to America's foreign and domestic
protection needs. Regional Readiness Commands will focus on individual
and unit readiness, leader development, training and growth which will
demand a new personnel system that achieves holistic life-cycle
management for Army Reserve Soldiers.
institutional army
Transforming the Way we do Business
We have made great strides in revolutionizing our business
management practices by starting at the very top. Last year, we
realigned our headquarters by reorganizing and realigning
responsibilities of the Secretariat and the Army Staff--streamlining
coordination, tasking, and decision-making--resulting in a more
responsive and efficient organization. This initiative allowed us to
eliminate unnecessary functions and redistribute 585 manpower spaces to
accomplish core competencies.
As previously discussed, The Army has addressed the management of
its installations, personnel systems, and contracting in its
Transformation of Installation Management (TIM). We are aggressively
pursuing efforts to outsource non-core functions. The Army will reap
substantial dividends in efficiency and effectiveness through these
strategic realignments of human and physical capital.
Personnel Transformation
The Secretary of the Army's key management initiative is personnel
transformation. Its goal is to modernize and integrate human resource
programs, policies, processes, and systems into a multi-component force
that includes civilians and contractors. We will evaluate our processes
and implement the most efficient program, policies, and organizations
to support the Objective Force.
The centerpiece of Personnel Transformation is a comprehensive
effort focused on a potential Army-wide implementation of unit manning
and unit rotation. We are aggressively examining the feasibility of a
unit manning and rotation system that would better support the new
national defense strategy, improve cohesion and combat readiness within
the operational Army, provide highly cohesive well-trained units to
Combatant Commanders, and improve well-being for families by providing
greater stability and predictability in assignments. The Army currently
uses unit rotations in support of operational missions in the Balkans,
Sinai, and Afghanistan. The Army is studying the use of unit rotations
for other locations and in the war on terrorism. Units would know of
these rotations well in advance, providing families with greater
predictability and enabling focused preparation, both of which
contribute to increased combat readiness of the unit.
Unit manning seeks to synchronize the life cycle of a unit with the
life cycle of the Soldier within that unit. All Soldiers and leaders
would be stabilized, resulting in a significant increase in cohesion
and combat readiness over our present individual replacement system.
Such a system has significant second and third order effects across the
force--training and leader development, recruiting and retention, unit
readiness levels, and total Army endstrength, among others. All of
these are being studied intensively, and we anticipate senior Army
leadership decisions on unit manning and unit rotation in July 2003.
Third Wave
Because we operate in an environment in which there are increasing
demands for military capabilities--the Secretary of the Army's Third
Wave initiative seeks to ensure that we are achieving the best value
possible for our taxpayers' dollars.
There are three phases to the Third Wave process. First, we
determined what activities were core or non-core to The Army's mission.
In the second phase, we are validating the breakout between core and
non-core functions by determining if any non-core functions should be
exempted. This phase has an anticipated completion date of mid- to late
February 2003. Upon completion, The Army leadership will notify
Congress of the results of this phase. In the third phase, key Army
leaders will assess appropriate plans to execute non-core functions,
select the best means to proceed, and develop implementation plans. At
this time, we do not know how many of the 214,000 jobs identified as
potentially non-core functions in Phase I will be included in
implementation plans. Although implementation plans will target
execution in fiscal years 2005-2009, some implementation plans may be
delayed beyond that period.
The implementation of competitive sourcing of non-core functions
will adhere to OMB Circular A-76 and related statutory provisions.
Exceptions to the requirement for public-private competition are
limited, such as where 10 or fewer civilian employees perform the
function or where legal restrictions against using the A-76 process
apply to the function. To lower costs for taxpayers and improve program
performance to citizens, OMB has undertaken major revisions to the
processes and practices in OMB Circular A-76 to improve the public-
private competition process.
Acquisition Transformation
The Army is leading the way in acquisition reform within DOD's
broad transformation of defense acquisition policies and procedures.
The Army's FCS program may prove to be the largest DOD acquisition
effort that fully embraces the concepts of evolutionary acquisition and
spiral development--leveraging the potential of rapid advancement
within individual technologies by allowing for changes within programs
as technologies mature.
The FCS program is evolutionary in its design and incorporates
periodic blocked improvements within its 19 systems--the Objective
Force Soldier and 18 manned and unmanned systems. Within these 19
systems are 540 spirally developing technologies. The Army's use of a
Lead System Integrator (LSI) enables a ``best of the best'' approach to
selection from competing industry efforts. Our unprecedented
partnership with DARPA ensures the FCS effort leverages that agency's
DOD-wide perspective and resources to produce the best capability and
value for the Joint Force.
The Army continues to revise its acquisition policies and
applicable regulatory guidance. On October 3, 2001, The Army approved
an acquisition reorganization that transferred control of all
acquisition program management to the Army Acquisition Executive (AAE)
and eliminated duplication of effort in two major Army commands.
Effective October 2002, twelve Program Executive Officers (PEO) report
to the Army Acquisition Executive, and their subordinate PEOs assumed
management of all Army acquisition programs, regardless of Acquisition
Category. The plan ensures that there is only one chain of authority
for acquisition programs within The Army. In addition, the plan clearly
holds Program Managers responsible and accountable for the life cycle
management of their assigned programs.
We have also transformed the way we conduct business through the
organization of the Army Contracting Agency (ACA) that realigns our
previously decentralized installation and information technology
contracting processes into one organization. Responsible for all
contracts over $500,000 and tasked to eliminate redundant contracts,
ACA leverages Army-wide requirements to achieve economies of scale. ACA
supports Army Transformation efforts by aligning all base support
contracting into a single organization that best supports installation
management transformation. All of these initiatives use information
technology to leverage enterprise-wide buying capabilities.
Additionally, ACA will act as the single coordinating element and form
the base from which to deploy contingency-contracting, operational
support to the warfighting commands. The Army Contracting Agency and
other contracting activities will continue to support small business
awards in the outstanding manner it did in fiscal year 2002.
Logistics Transformation
We cannot transform The Army without a transformation in logistics.
We must incorporate the logistician's view into the design of our
systems even before we begin to build platforms. Collaboration between
the acquisition and logistics communities will give the Objective Force
the rapid deployability and sustainability we demand--by design--
without compromising warfighting capability.
Designing the right logistics architecture--systems, business
processes, enterprise, for example--is fundamental to success. The
Army's Logistics Transformation will focus on creating an overarching
corporate logistics enterprise that employs industries' best business
practices. Within this enterprise, The Army established three principal
goals for Logistics Transformation: enhance strategic mobility and
deployability; optimize the logistics footprint; and reduce the cost of
logistics support without reducing readiness or warfighting capability.
The Army's mobility and deployability goals for the Objective Force
are to deploy a combat brigade within 96 hours after lift off, a
division on the ground in 120 hours, and a five-division corps in
theater in 30 days. To achieve this strategic responsiveness, the Army
Strategic Mobility Program (ASMP) serves as a catalyst to bring about
force projection changes both in The Army's and in our Sister Services'
lift programs. Platforms like the Intra-Theater Support Vessel (TSV)
and Inter-Theater Shallow Draft High Speed Sealift (SDHSS) provide
transformational capabilities for operational and strategic maneuver
and sustainment of Army formations.
Because strategic air and sealift cannot meet deployment
requirements, Army Prepositioned Stocks (APS) ashore and afloat
continue to be a critical component of Army power projection. The Army
is currently participating in a joint-led Worldwide Prepositioning
Study to determine if location, mix, and capabilities in existing
stocks of combat, combat support, and combat service support require
adjustments to meet the Defense Strategy more effectively.
The Objective Force requires The Army to optimize its logistics
footprint to produce a smaller, more agile, responsive, and flexible
sustainment organization. To achieve this goal, we will leverage
technology and innovative sustainment concepts. The Army is already
developing and integrating key enablers to provide a transformed,
corporate logistics enterprise. Some of these enablers include embedded
diagnostics and prognostics, tactical logistics data digitization
(TLDD), serial number tracking, and the Global Combat Service Support--
Army (GCSS-A) system that utilizes a commercial Enterprise Resource
Planning (ERP) solution. The ERP approach changes The Army's logistics
automation systems strategy from one of custom code development for
unique Army requirements to adoption of a commercial off-the-shelf
(COTS) product.
The selective use of the Logistics Civil Augmentation Program
(LOGCAP) to augment military logistics force structure provides
commanders with the flexibility to reallocate manpower, resources, and
materiel by adding contractors to the equation of logistics support. In
addition to providing services and some supply support, these
contractors can quickly deploy to establish base camps, receive and
process Soldiers as they begin arriving in theater, and reverse the
process when Soldiers go home.
Current initiatives that help reduce costs without reducing
readiness or warfighting capability include the National Maintenance
Program and the Single Stock Fund (SSF). As previously discussed,
programs provide two basic building blocks for a revolutionary change
in logistics business practices.
Advanced Medical Technology
Congress designated The Army as the lead agent for DOD vaccine,
drug, and development programs for medical countermeasures to
battlefield threats. This includes vaccines against naturally occurring
infectious diseases of military significance, combat casualty care,
military operational medicine, and telemedicine research. The program
also funds Food and Drug Administration requirements for technology
transition to advanced development.
The medical force provides the requisite medical intervention and
care for the Joint Force deployed around the globe. With its Medical
Reengineering Initiative (MRI), The Army Medical Department has
transformed 28 percent of its Corps, and echelon above Corps, force
structure to an organizational structure that promotes scalability
through easily tailored, capabilities-based packages. These packages
result in improved tactical mobility, reduced footprint, and increased
modularity for flexible task organization. MRI supports both the
current forces and the Stryker Brigades, and is the bridge to the
Objective Medical Force. We have implemented innovative strategies make
the most efficient use of our budget. Medical modernization, which
includes the acquisition of current medical equipment and technology,
is partially funded within MRI units.
Business Initiatives Council
In June 2001, the Secretary of Defense established the Department
of Defense Business Initiatives Council (DOD BIC). The DOD BIC's goal
is to improve business operations and processes by identifying and
implementing initiatives that expand capabilities, improve efficiency
and effectiveness, and create resource savings in time, money, or
manpower.
The Army has aggressively explored ways to improve its internal
business practices, and has established The Army BIC, under the
leadership of the Secretary and the G-8. Effective November 13, 2002,
the Secretary of the Army has approved a total of 35 initiatives under
The Army BIC. Subsequently, The Army submitted a number of the
initiatives through the formal DOD BIC process for implementation
across the Services and other DOD activities. The BIC process has
helped to create a culture of innovation and inter-service cooperation.
The superb level of cooperation across the military departments, the
Joint Staff and OSD has made this possible.
a commitment to the future
With the continued strong support of the Administration, the
Congress, our Soldiers, and our Department of the Army civilians, and
the greatest industrial base and science and technology communities in
the world, The Army will field the Objective Force--this decade.
By 2010, we will have fielded the first operationally capable
Objective Force unit equipped with the Future Combat Systems. Our
Stryker Brigade Combat Teams will be providing to Combatant Commanders
capabilities not currently available--enhanced strategic responsiveness
and the ability to operate in a distributed, non-linear battlespace.
Through selective recapitalization and modernization of systems that
enable our Soldiers to preserve our legacy today, we will have
sustained a decisive-win capability at a high state of readiness as an
integral part of the Joint Force. And we will have significantly
improved the well-being of our people and sustainment of Army
infrastructure.
We remain committed to our legacy--preserving America's freedoms.
In peace and in war, The Army's Soldiers serve the Nation with
unmatched courage, indomitable will, pride, and plain grit--as they
have for over 227 years. Soldiers will continue to fight and win the
Nation's wars, decisively--it is our sacred duty and our non-negotiable
contract with the American people.
[Clerk's Note.--The United States Army Posture Statement, 2003, can
be found on the world wide web at: www.army.mil.]
Senator Stevens. General, do you have any statements to
make?
STATEMENT OF GENERAL ERIC K. SHINSEKI
General Shinseki. Just a short opening statement if you do
not mind, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Chairman, Senator Inouye, distinguished members of the
committee, it is an honor to be back here before the committee
and, along with Secretary White, to report to you on the
posture and the readiness of the Army and in many ways what we
will report on this morning is what we have been about for the
last 3\1/2\ years. It is your support, and the generosity of
your time and attention and the generosity of your support that
has put us in the situation we are in today.
It is also a great privilege for me to sit here with
Secretary Tom White. In a very short period of time Secretary
White has provided us tremendous focus, leadership, and
guidance and gotten momentum in achieving what we described
3\1/2\ years ago as the Army Vision, and he and I have served
side-by-side in other lives, so it is great to be sitting here
together in final testimony with him.
As the Secretary has indicated and as the chairman has
noted, soldiers are serving magnificently today as members of
the joint team and, you know, just the Army alone, as remarked
by the chairman, 262,000 of our soldiers are forward-stationed,
forward-deployed in operations today, 151,000 of our Reserve
Component mobilized in support of operations. They are fighting
this war against terrorism. They are honing and fine-tuning
their combat skills as they await orders for potentially
another major operation, and they are poised to respond to
still other contingencies in regions of the world that our
country has declared important.
The Army is ready. That is the purpose of the Secretary's
and my appearance here today. We are the best Army in the world
because of our soldiers, not the biggest, but the best. Their
determination and their commitment are as firm as I have seen
in all my years of service. They are immensely proud to serve
this Nation. They will take any objective, and they will
accomplish any mission we assign them.
We would like to project the same kind of confidence in
their competence, and the same statement of readiness not just
today, but into the future, and to do so, we declared 3\1/2\
years ago that we would field a more responsive, a more
deployable, a more agile and versatile, certainly more lethal
force than we have today in survivable formation, but a lot
more sustainable than even the Army that we have today.
We knew then that there was a war in our future, and we
said so. We just did not know when, where, or against whom.
Though we did not anticipate exactly this scenario, where we
are fighting a global war on terrorism in Afghanistan, standing
by for another major operation, and looking with a little bit
of concern at Northeast Asia, the relative predictability of
the Cold War had already, even 3\1/2\ years ago, given way to a
continuing chaos of unpredictability, and voices inside and
outside the Army and voices in this committee encouraged us to
be bold, to take some steps and begin the process of change,
and with your support we have come a long way towards
transforming our formations to be more capable of handling
future crises.
As the Secretary has indicated, there is always inherent
risk any time any institution undertakes not just change, but
fundamental and comprehensive change, as the Army declared it
would 3\1/2\ years ago. To mitigate that risk, the Army
structured its transformation on three broad, mutually
supporting axes, and I will describe then as near-term, mid-
term, and long-term responsibilities.
In the near term, we preserved the readiness of today's
legacy fighting force. In the mid-term, we are fielding six
Stryker Brigade Combat Teams (SBCT) to give us much-needed
operational capabilities, even as we design our future
Objective Force, and it is on that third and final long-term
axes that we are developing future concepts and technologies
that will provide consistent capability overmatched throughout
the middle of the next century, and that is the intent of the
Army.
Our Future Combat System Milestone B Defense Acquisition
Board decision, the first acquisition milestone for the Future
Combat System that is scheduled for May of 2003, just a few
months from now, puts us on a path to begin fielding our future
Objective Force by fiscal year 2008. That is a significant and
an important milestone.
As Secretary White notes, balancing these requirements
between all three priorities, near-term, mid-term, and long-
term requires some difficult choices, and the Army has had to
make them, carefully weighing the operational demands of
today's missions while preparing for the future. Your support
remains vital to our continued success in managing that risk,
and the Army's fiscal year 2004 budget strikes that essential
balance to maintain readiness throughout the Program Objective
Memorandum (POM) and the years beyond.
We are already seeing dividends from our investments in
future readiness, technologies that are coming online early
because we invested aggressively early. Superior body armor
today, robots in caves and antitank warheads on unmanned aerial
vehicles today, unprecedented Blue Force tracking capabilities
today, and last summer, during the largest joint exercise in
our history, Millennium Challenge 2002, with the help of the
Air Force we air-delivered a Stryker platoon onto a dirt strip
out in the National Training Center in California. Just 3 years
after the Army described that requirement for an interim force,
we demonstrated the increased strategic, operational, and
tactical versatility that Stryker Brigade Combat Teams will
provide to combatant commanders.
This summer, the first SBCT, the first Stryker unit will
join us in the war on terrorism, so it is not just about
capabilities that we intend to begin fielding in fiscal year
2008. It is about better capabilities that we are fielding even
today for our soldiers.
People remain the centerpiece of our formations. The
Secretary has said it in his proud statement about our
soldiers, and I echo it here. They are the centerpiece of our
formations, and their well-being is inextricably linked to Army
readiness. Your help with pay raises, health care, retirement
benefits, housing, and other well-being programs allow us to
take better care of our people. Soldiers, our civilians, our
retirees, and our veterans and their families all appreciate
the support more than I can say, that they have received out of
the Congress.
Mr. Chairman, for almost 4 years now I have had the
privilege of working with members of this committee. You have
supported the Army and helped us do what was best for the
national security. I am grateful for your steady and bipartisan
leadership, and most importantly for your unwavering devotion
to our soldiers. You have kept us the most respected land force
in the world today, and that will continue into the future.
Mr. Chairman, thank you for this opportunity to make those
remarks, and I look forward to your questions.
Senator Stevens. Thank you very much, General. I am going
to defer my questions until later to allow other Members to ask
questions, but I do have one statement to start off with.
FIFTH AND SIXTH STRYKER BRIGADES
I joined, or rather my good friend and cochairman here
joined me in sending a letter to Secretary Wolfowitz about the
way the Department plans to handle the fifth and sixth Stryker
Brigades. The fiscal year 2003 Defense Appropriations Act
directed the Army and the Department of Defense to fund six
Stryker Brigades, and we felt that was the direction. The
President signed that bill, and now I understand that there is
some indication that the Office of the Secretary of Defense
would terminate, or change the deployment of the fifth and
sixth Stryker Brigades. Can you tell us, Mr. Secretary, what is
the situation with regard to those two brigades?
Mr. White. Mr. Chairman, the Secretary has directed us to
conduct a study of brigades five and six that is aimed at
determining whether the structure as it is currently proposed
for those brigades is optimal, whether there are other things
that we could add, other capabilities that would be appropriate
to add like, say, aviation.
In addition to that, he has asked us to study the
stationing of brigades five and six, which as you pointed out
are currently in Hawaii, and then the Pennsylvania Army
National Guard. We will complete the study in the near future.
In the meantime, the money for brigades five and six has stayed
in the program. It is where we programmed it, and it is where
the Secretary has agreed to leave it, and we will get the study
done as quickly as we can.
Senator Stevens. Well, I hope our letter is responded to
sometime soon, and it is my judgment that if the Army wants
more Stryker Brigades, they should request more funds. We
funded those on the basis that they would be deployed to Hawaii
and the Pennsylvania National Guard, and unless that law is
changed, we expect that direction to be complied with.
Senator Inouye.
Senator Inouye. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. I am
glad you brought up the question of the Stryker Brigade.
GLOBAL WAR ON TERRORISM
I would like to ask a general question on the budget. If my
calculation is correct, the Army is spending approximately $700
million per month to fight the global war on terrorism, is that
correct?
Mr. White. Yes, sir, it is.
Senator Inouye. Now, where does this money come from,
because there is no item for fighting global terrorism.
Mr. White. Right now, Senator, we are cash-flowing, as we
call it, principally in the military personnel accounts for the
additional mobilization and in the operations and maintenance
account's third and fourth quarter money to pay these
additional costs above the budget in the early part of the
fiscal year.
Senator Inouye. So we are using monies that were intended
for some other purpose?
Mr. White. That is correct.
Senator Inouye. In addition, there is not anything in the
budget that I can see that faces reality, which all of us have
assumed that sometime in this fiscal year we would be in Iraq.
How are we going to cope with that?
SUPPLEMENTAL APPROPRIATION
Mr. White. Senator, I believe it is the intent of the
Department or the President to request a supplemental to cover
the funds for the war on terrorism.
Senator Inouye. The next question is, when will the
supplemental reach us?
Mr. White. Sir, to use an expression by the Secretary of
Defense, it is above my pay grade. We have had our discussions
with the Office of Secretary of Defense. I know they have had
deliberations with the Office of Management and Budget, but as
we discussed yesterday, the supplemental has not yet been
submitted.
Senator Inouye. I can assure you, sir, that we are looking
forward to receiving that, because in a situation of this
nature, it would be an understatement to say that to keep the
troops ready is an urgency.
Mr. White. Yes, sir.
Senator Inouye. And with the funds as they come in, in
driblets, it will not help the situation.
Senator Stevens. Would the Senator yield?
Senator Inouye. Yes. I would be very happy to.
Senator Stevens. I might state to the Senator and the
committee that I had a discussion last night with Mitch
Daniels, an informal conversation, and I am informed we should
get that supplemental early next week, and it will contain not
only monies for defense, but homeland defense, and some moneys
to start planning for the post-conflict era in Iraq.
Senator Inouye. Well, I thank you very much. His pay level
is higher than mine.
Senator Stevens. Not so.
END STRENGTH
Senator Inouye. General Shinseki, you have been quoted many
times saying that the Army does not have the required end
strength to meet current and future military obligations. Can
you elaborate on this?
General Shinseki. Yes, sir. I have testified, Senator, for
3\1/2\ years now that the mission profile that the Army was
carrying even 3 years ago was larger than the inventory of
formations we had, and I suggested that end strength was a
concern. 3\1/2\ years ago we were not recruiting as well as we
wanted, and so we had to go fix that first. The last 3 years we
have made our recruiting targets. Our retention has always been
very good.
The missions in the last 3 years have gone up. End strength
continues to be a concern, and it is revealed, I think, in the
amount of routine mobilization of the Reserve Component that we
see day to day. Many of those missions used to be carried by
Active Component formations, so these are some of the
manifestations of what my concerns were.
Secretary White has asked us--even as we made our concerns
public--has asked that the Army take a look at itself, and this
is what is sort of caught up in the Third Wave discussions, to
make sure that even as we talked about end strength, that the
Army had done the right things about ensuring that soldiers
were in soldiers' positions, and so we are doing that, and the
results of that study are forthcoming.
I will review them and provide my advice to the Secretary,
but I think all things considered, when this operation, this
crisis is over, we need to take a good hard look at right-
sizing the Army, right-mixing the Army between Active and
Reserve Component, and even as some of the combatant commanders
are already beginning to describe, right-stationing the Army,
and I think all of this is important to take up now.
RECRUITING
Senator Inouye. That leads me to the next question. How are
we doing in recruiting?
General Shinseki. Our recruiting for the last 3 years has
just continued to get better. In the Active Component, last
year I could have told you very early in the recruiting year
that we would make our recruiting targets. We were doing that
well.
I can do the same thing again this year in active
recruiting, but for the first time here this month, in the
Reserve Component recruiting, both the National Guard and the
Army Reserve missed their monthly targets. That happens from
time to time. We look at a year-long objective that we go
after, but our attention was caught by the fact here last month
that both Reserve Components missed by a margin their monthly
targets.
Some of that is driven by the fact that our Active
Component soldiers who normally leave the Active Component and
are available to transition into Reserve Component formations,
right now, because of the standby for potential operations in
Southwest Asia, we have stop-loss personnel decisions in place,
so the flow of Active Component soldiers out of active units
available for Reserve Component units, that has very much
diminished, and that is part of what is at work here, but
recruiting for the last 3 years, Senator, has been very, very
strong, retention even better.
SOLDIER DEPLOYMENT
Senator Inouye. To give the citizens who may read the
transcript a better idea of personnel problems, how many
troops, men and women, Reserve and Active, are now overseas in
places like Bosnia, Afghanistan, Korea, et cetera, and Kuwait?
General Shinseki. Well, overseas, both forward stationed
and forward-deployed, the number is 262,000 today. That number
changes day to day as we begin to look at potential operations
in Southwest Asia.
Senator Inouye. That leaves how many here?
General Shinseki. Well, that 262,000 is a combination of
Active and Reserve Component. The Active Component formations,
I can give you a more finite number, but the Active Component
formations are not totally deployed, but much of the Active
Component is on standby, prepared for deployment, so if those
orders are executed, a good portion of the active force will be
overseas.
Senator Inouye. I have always maintained what some would
consider a rather naive concept, that the best way to avoid war
would be to be prepared for war. In order to be prepared for
war, we need proper personnel and proper equipment. It is no
secret that the Navy has 12 carrier battle groups. One carrier
is always for training purposes. One carrier is always in
transit. That leaves 10. Six are now in the gulf area, in the
Mediterranean, the Red Sea, or the Persian Gulf itself, and one
more is in transit. That is nine, and I believe one more
carrier group is going to go to that area. That leaves two for
the rest of the world.
I recall it was not too long ago when we were sitting here
and we were told that we were ready for two-and-a-half wars. Is
that concept still being discussed?
General Shinseki. Senator, I think the two-and-a-half major
combat operation discussion, it has now been translated into a
strategy that talks about homeland defense, four critical areas
of the world that we have to continue to focus on, two
potential major combat operations, one of which can be a major
operation that requires decisive force. That is the sizing
construct around which we organize our discussions, and like
the Navy, we have a good portion of our Active Component force
focused on this major operation.
Senator Inouye. I will wait for my second round, but before
I do, I would like to thank you, sir, for the service you have
rendered to this country throughout your youth and at the
present time. It has been a magnificent service record, and
personally I hate to see you go, but such is the nature of this
business.
General Shinseki. Sir, it is.
Senator Inouye. And I am always grateful to you and to the
Secretary for having prepared our men and women so that they
can carry out the missions they are ordered to carry out.
General Shinseki. Thank you very much, sir.
Senator Stevens. Senator Shelby.
Senator Shelby. Thank you.
General Shinseki, your statement a few minutes ago was
rather profound and reassuring. You said, the Army is ready,
and I believe you. I believe the Army is ready.
SPACE AND MISSILE DEFENSE COMMAND
Having said that, I want to focus just for a minute on the
Space and Missile Defense Command (SMDC) and the missions there
of space, missile defense, computer network operations for the
Army, additionally SMDC is the Army component to STRATCOM with
emerging missions including space, global strike, global
C4ISR, global integrated missile defense, global
information operations.
You mentioned the important work the Army is doing to
develop directed energy programs in your testimony. Would you
discuss the success of the tactical high-energy laser program,
the challenges that remain in developing and fielding a mobile
tactical high energy laser (MTHEL) program system and the
funding the Army plans to commit to MTHEL in fiscal year 2004?
Do you want to tackle--which one of you?
Mr. White. Let me start out, and then the Chief can add----
Senator Shelby. That is a mouthful, I know.
Mr. White. Oh, I think it is a tremendously successful
program.
Senator Shelby. It is.
Mr. White. We have had successful engagements of both
rockets----
Senator Shelby. That is right.
Mr. White [continuing]. And now artillery shells----
Senator Shelby. That is right.
Mr. White [continuing]. Which is extraordinary. This is a
joint program with Israel, as you know, progressing forward,
and we have provided over $500 million of funding in our 2004-
2009 POM to support this, so we will continue to push the
development of it. All of us think it has tremendous potential.
Senator Stevens. Will the Senator yield for just a second?
Senator Shelby. I will be glad to yield, Mr. Chairman.
Senator Stevens. Senator Domenici has to go to the floor.
He has been called to the floor. Would you mind yielding just a
moment to him?
Senator Shelby. I will yield to the Senator, absolutely.
Senator Domenici. I gave my questions to the chairman to
ask, Senator Shelby, so he will do that, he will ask my
questions. Before I left I wanted to join, Chief, in telling
you that it has been a great pleasure to get to know you and to
know of your record, and obviously to know of your record is to
know you. That is the way it seems to me, and I congratulate
you for what you have done for our country. It is a marvelous
record. It is too bad that all great things come to an end, but
that is the way it is.
I also want to thank you, because of the special help you
have given me at Walter Reed Army Medical Center. It has been
rather wonderful care for some of the problems I have had. I
personally want to thank you for asking about those illnesses
as I had them, and thank you for your assistance.
General Shinseki. You are quite welcome, sir.
Senator Domenici. And good luck.
General Shinseki. Thank you, sir.
Senator Stevens. Senator Shelby, thank you very much.
Senator Shelby. Thank you.
Both of you, I believe, are aware that I have expressed
concern about the Army's support for the Space and Missile
Defense Command. I am pleased that the response, Mr.
Secretary--from you and the General--I have received from the
Army, has been so strongly supportive.
Despite SMDC's current space, missile defense, and computer
network operations missions, and its emerging missions as the
Army component of STRATCOM in the area of global strike, global
integrated missile defense, and global information operations,
some of us are concerned that the Army has not made sufficient
investments in technology development.
We realize, Mr. Secretary, you tried a lot to support some
of these missions in recent years. I have heard some say that
the Army has lost its focus, but I told them I am not sure
about that, because I am aware of what you are doing, and we do
need more institutional support and funding for the core
technology program. How would you respond to this, the budget
request in this area?
Mr. White. Well, I think it reflects the fact that our
component command, SMDC, is tremendously important not only to
the Army, but to the country. The work with the Ballistic
Missile Defense Agency, where we do a whole bunch of different
tasks, the mid-course capability that is being established at
Fort Greely, Kwajalein, all the rest of it that you are very
familiar with, the component of the Strategic Command, we have
fundamental interest in space operations as an Army. They are
tremendously important to us.
So I think that the contribution that SMDC makes across, as
you pointed out, a significant range of important aspects to us
is very, very important, and so I am an avid supporter of the
Space and Missile Defense Command.
General Shinseki. May I just add, Senator, that both the
Secretary and I take a very keen interest in Space and Missile
Defense Command's contributions here, but you know, the Army
has a longstanding history in missile work, I mean, one that
goes beyond most recollections.
What we have suggested to General Cosumano and the rest of
the Army that deals in the doctrine and conceptual thinking is
that if we talk about missile defense as a series of catchers'
mitts trying to deal with someone else's initiative, it is
essentially a defensive-oriented strategy, and we needed to
think more holistically, more broadly about this, as we do with
all of our other war-fighting concepts, that you have to have
an offensive as well as a defensive piece.
This is important, but we needed to think about all the
capabilities that allow us to deal with threats on someone
else's soil that can project capabilities against the homeland,
and when you do that, of course, you get into the mid-course
business and the boost phase, but you also talk about
capabilities to forcibly enter someone else's territory and, in
fact, take down those capabilities, as opposed to continuously
react to someone else's actions, so we have included Space and
Missile Defense Command into this larger discussion of
capabilities.
Senator Shelby. Thank you.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I will wait another round.
Senator Stevens. Thank you. Senator Leahy.
Senator Leahy. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and I will join
with my colleagues, General, in wishing you the very best in
your next career. You can certainly look with pride on this
career.
AGING HELICOPTER INVENTORY
Yesterday's Wall Street Journal had an article on the
military's aging helicopter inventory, and Mr. Chairman, if I
could submit that Wall Street Journal article for the record.
Mr. Chairman.
Senator Stevens. Pardon me?
Senator Leahy. If I could submit that Wall Street Article
for the record, please?
Senator Stevens. Yes.
[The information follows:]
[From the Wall Street Journal, Mar. 18, 2003]
Fresh Troops . . . Old Choppers
u.s. military labors to keep aging helicopters airworthy; hazards of
desert landings
(By Anne Marie Squeo, J. Lynn Lunsford and Nicholas Kulish)
ON A RECENT episode of the television show ``The West Wing,'' the
Pentagon's top military commander ordered two Comanche reconnaissance
helicopters dispatched to rescue three Marines taken hostage.
When he heard about the fictional deployment, Maj. Gen. John
Caldwell, head of the Army's acquisition programs, burst out laughing.
``Those would be the only two we have,'' he said.
For more than a decade, ambitious plans to replace the U.S.
military's aging helicopter fleet have been sidelined by funding
constraints and developmental problems. The imposing-looking Comanche,
which is supposed to have the ability to fly sideways and backward at
more than 85 miles an hour, is the fruit of a $48 billion program that
began in 1983 but isn't expected to become part of the U.S. arsenal
until 2009 at the earliest. And the V-22 Osprey, a hybrid aircraft that
takes off and lands like a helicopter but cruises like an airplane at
more than twice the speed of a conventional helicopter, has been
grounded for much of the past two years after a string of fatal
crashes. The V-22 was recently grounded again because of hydraulic-
system problems, and top Pentagon officials say they are prepared to
finally end the $46 billion program if it doesn't get on track soon.
So as they assemble for a potential conflict with Iraq, U.S. forces
are relying on helicopters that in some cases are older than the troops
they will carry. For example, massive twin-rotored CH-47 Chinook
helicopters, which can carry dozens of servicemen or hoist heavy loads
beneath them, remain the workhorse heavy-lifter for the Army, even
though they were originally delivered before 1975. Most of them have
been remanufactured by Boeing Co. and are scheduled for further updates
that could enable them to keep flying for another 35 years, military
planners say.
----------------------------------------------------------------
Gray Around the Rotor
The helicopters the U.S. military plans to use during a war with
Iraq are showing their age. A sampling:
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Helicopter Primary task Avg. age
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
CH-47D Chinook................................. Carrying troops; hoisting loads..................... \1\ 15
OH-58D Kiowa Warrior........................... Light scout/reconnaissance.......................... 12
Black Hawk..................................... Troop carrier....................................... 15
Cobra \2\...................................... Attack, primarily during Vietnam.................... 10
UH-1N Huey..................................... Carrying troops..................................... 27
AH-64 A/D Apache............................... Attack.............................................. 9
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ Average age after refurbishment. Nearly all of the 300 CH-47D Chinooks in use by the military were
originally delivered before 1975.
\2\ Now retired by Army; Marines using newer versions.
Source: WSJ reporting
----------------------------------------------------------------
For the most part, the Vietnam-era Bell Huey helicopters, which
flew en masse to drop troops into the jungles, have been replaced with
larger and more capable Black Hawks. But two-thirds of the Black Hawk
fleet now exceeds 15 years of age. Apache attack helicopters, developed
in the 1980s, are the Army's newest choppers, but they haven't
altogether replaced their Vietnam War predecessor, the Cobra.
The average life span of a military helicopter is 20 years,
compared with about 30 years for a commercial one. But the
circumstances these aircraft fly in, including brutal weather and
difficult terrain such as the deserts of Iraq and the jagged mountains
of Afghanistan, take a severe toll.
Because of the lack of funds to buy new helicopters, an ambitious
remanufacturing program is under way aimed at improving performance and
staving off safety problems, military officials say. The aircraft are
stripped down, then their metal airframes are treated for corrosion,
engines and rotors are rebuilt, and their cockpits are loaded with new
digital electronics and radar.
Manufacturers such as United Technologies Corp.'s Sikorsky Aircraft
unit, which builds and refurbishes about 65 Black Hawks a year, have
scrambled since the Gulf War in 1991 to upgrade and modify their craft
to withstand tough desert conditions.
All told, the U.S. military is spending billions of dollars to
update its older copters. But military officials say they are still
concerned on the eve of a potential conflict about the relative health
of the fleet. There remains ``a severe aircraft-aging problem in the
helicopter fleet, causing serious safety and readiness issues,'' says
Loren Thompson, executive director of the Washington-based Lexington
Institute, a military think tank.
Maj. Gen. Joseph Bergantz, program executive director for Army
Aviation, says: ``Because of the aging, more things are starting to
fail. Our readiness rates are lower now and are getting lower over the
years.''
Still, Gen. Bergantz and other military officials insist that only
a small percentage of helicopter accidents are attributable to
equipment failures. A recent Black Hawk crash in upstate New York that
killed 11 soldiers is being investigated.
In a war with Iraq, Apaches and Cobras would be expected to take
out Iraqi ground troops that might attempt to head off U.S. forces
moving in from Kuwait. Black Hawks and Hueys would be the main vehicles
to swiftly ferry platoons of soldiers and marines into fighting
position.
The other services often use similar aircraft, outfitted for their
special needs. The Air Force and Navy, for example, plan to use the V-
22, but in a more limited way than the Marines--if the V-22 isn't
scrapped.
For helicopters operating in the desert, one of the most insidious
threats is sand. Not only do sandstorms kick up without notice, but an
improper approach to landing can envelop a chopper in a dust cloud that
can instantly disorient a pilot.
Maintenance crews are working overtime to undo the damage done to
copters by the desert. After a few hours of operation, many of the most
delicate parts of the jet engines that power helicopters can become
coated with glass, from sand ingested into the compressor sections.
Since the Gulf War, the helicopter manufacturers have developed new
intake filters that better strain the air sucked into the engines. They
also have developed a clear tape that is applied to the leading edges
of rotor blades to cut down on the sandblasting damage caused by the
rotors whirling through dust clouds.
For now, to minimize the risk that a combination of aging aircraft
and tough climactic conditions will result in fatal mishaps, Marine
pilots have been drilling at their high-desert base near Twentynine
Palms, Calif., and near their temporary headquarters in the Middle
East. One Cobra pilot with the call sign ``Weasel'' says, ``there's a
lot more emphasis'' at present on repeatedly practicing takeoffs and
landings to get a feel for conditions and how their choppers respond.
At their base near Iraq, the 3rd Marine Airwing of the 1st Marine
Expeditionary Force are reminded daily of the odds. Beneath the flight
schedule hung on the wall in the mess hall, a posting declares, ``In
the Gulf War, 18 aircraft were destroyed. Only 3 were a result of
direct enemy action.'' The squadron's commanding officer made it even
clearer in a briefing last week for his pilots. ``The enemy ain't going
to kill you, probably. It's going to be these landings,'' he said.
The 3rd Marine Aircraft Wing's safety officer, Maj. Bruce Laughlin,
says in the 1991 Gulf War more than a third of Marine helicopter
mishaps--from minor equipment damage to fatalities--were a result of
brownout conditions or other weather-related visibility problems. He
says in Afghanistan--where he flew 75 hours in Cobras made by Textron
Inc.'s Bell Helicopter, of Forth Worth, Texas--the numbers followed a
similar trend.
Senator Leahy. This talked about how our helicopter fleet
is aging. There is one thing I would point out. We added funds
in the budget so that the 101st is slated to equip many of its
Black Hawk helicopters with the Health and Usage Monitoring
System (HUMS), the integrated mechanical diagnostic health and
usage monitoring system. I have to read out the actual words
for it, but this basically does continuous diagnostics on all
of our helicopters. If they are so equipped, they come back,
you can instantly download which helicopters are ready to go,
which ones have problems, and so forth. Does the Army plan to
move forward with this technology, either in the fleet they
have now or in subsequent fleets?
General Shinseki. I think philosophically the answer to the
question is, absolutely yes, that having this ability to
trouble-shoot our equipment without having to do it with purely
manual labor is the way we intend to go, both with our
investments in future systems, and where we can to insert those
capabilities into our current inventory.
Some of that inventory is not conducive to applying----
Senator Leahy. I understand.
General Shinseki [continuing]. The new technologies, but
where we can, that is very much in our interest.
Senator Leahy. I would also think in a wartime situation,
where you do not have a great deal of time to do diagnostics,
when the helicopters come back, for the field commander to at
least be able to say, number 1, 5, and 12 are ready to go, but
this one is not, and be able to know it instantly, would be
awfully helpful to you.
General Shinseki. Right.
Mr. White. Let me add, Senator, if you do not mind----
Senator Leahy. Yes, Mr. Secretary.
Mr. White. We laid out several years ago an aviation
modernization program that will result in a reduction in the
overall size of the fleet by about 1,000 helicopters, but will
wash out of the fleet all the Cobras, the Vietnam-era aircraft,
the Cobras first, which are going now, and Hueys by fiscal year
2004. I think the picture in the Wall Street Journal article
was of a Marine Corps twin-engined Huey.
Senator Leahy. It was.
Mr. White. In the meantime, we are investing in all of our
primary helicopters Apache Longbow, Black Hawk, both newer
aircraft and conversions and then, of course, conversions of
our Chinook fleet. However, even with that modernization,
though, we do not meet our standard of having the average fleet
life of helicopters below the half-life of the aircraft, below
10 years. The only fleet we make that in is Apache, and we are
above that in Black Hawk, and we are above that in Chinook, and
that is why the funding of the modernization lines on all those
aircraft are so important, because obviously we are flying them
right now.
Senator Leahy. I agree with that, but keep an eye on the
HUMS.
Mr. White. I will do that.
Senator Leahy. I have a parochial interest, but I also have
just an interest in thinking it is probably going to save us a
lot of money in the future, and I realize retrofitting is one
issue. As you modernize fleets, it is another.
SOLDIER EQUIPMENT
We also have, when the United States (U.S.) Special Forces
and the 101st and 82nd went to Afghanistan they were given an
advanced combat helmet. I have talked to the troops. I have
actually got E-mails. They said they like the--it is lighter
weight, added protection and so on. One soldier apparently took
a couple of AK-47 rounds in the head during Operation Anaconda
and kept on fighting, so it is pretty impressive, impressive
for the equipment, also pretty impressive for the soldier,
too----
General Shinseki. Absolutely.
Senator Leahy [continuing]. Under a circumstance like that.
Are these going to be done in other--I mean, are we going
to continue to get this helmet out to the troops.
General Shinseki. Yes, sir.
Senator Leahy. Do you need more money? Do you need more
money, General? Here is your chance. Do you need more money in
this budget for that?
General Shinseki. Senator, 2 years ago we did something we
should have done probably a long time ago, and you know, in our
programs we talk about systems, whether they are tank or
aviation. We declared a system for soldier equipment, and
instead of buying individual pieces, we talked about the entire
ensemble a soldier deploys to combat with, whether it is
uniforms, whether it is ballistic protection for the chest and
the head, and by the way, they have ballistic protection for
the body as well, and it works as well as that helmet you
describe.
I ran into a youngster here a few weeks ago who was
carrying around the plate he was wearing and wanted to show me,
this thing had hit about an inch off the margin and I asked him
what he thought. He said, make it a little bit bigger, it will
be fine.
What we have been able to do, because we focused on
equipping the solder as a system--and assume that our
environment is sort of out there in the outdoors. If it is hot,
we wanted equipment that would aerate him or her, if it was
wet, keep them dry, if it was cold, keep them warm, and
whatever we gave them had to give them better protection than
the uniform they wore.
As a result, we are fielding to the units going into
Afghanistan, the 82nd and following that the 101st, but Ranger
Regiment as well, a new kit that does a lot of the things you
describe, and so for about $12 million a brigade formation we
are doing that, and we will continue to do that, and more money
will help us to go faster.
Senator Leahy. Including the helmet?
General Shinseki. The helmet is part of that.
LAND MINES
Senator Leahy. General, let me ask you one question, too.
Last September, the General Accounting Office (GAO) issued a
report--they did quite an intensive investigation. You and I
have discussed some of this before, and they did their
investigation based on DOD data, the effectiveness of land
mines in the first gulf war.
The GAO found no evidence, none, that our mines, either
antipersonnel or antitank mines, had any positive military
effect. They did say, and I have heard this from commanders in
the field, they impeded the mobility of our own forces. About
2,000 of our self-destruct mines did not self-destruct as
advertised, and the Department, which commented on this report,
did not disagree.
Current U.S. land mine policy calls for the elimination of
antipersonnel mines, including self-destructing mines, outside
of Korea by fiscal year 2003. Do you have any plans to use
antipersonnel mines--I am talking about other than man the
loop. I have no problem with man-the-loop antipersonnel mines,
but do you have plans to use antipersonnel mines in the war
with Iraq?
The reason I ask is, I know that Great Britain, Spain, and
Australia, who are there with us, have banned these from their
own arsenals.
General Shinseki. Senator, when you say, antipersonnel
mines without manning the loop, you are talking about what we
refer to as the dumb mines, once laid they are----
Senator Leahy. Including, apparently, these 2,000 of our
so-called self-destruct mines did not, so they are kind of
dumb, too.
General Shinseki. Yes. Well, the performance of the self-
destruct mines, of course, it is not perfection, but there is a
very high confidence factor in their ability to be destroyed or
to self-destruct.
Senator Leahy. But it is not a man the loop. I mean,
Claymore has man the loop, but these do not.
General Shinseki. Well, the mines that are laid out there
that can be destroyed would have a man in the loop in terms of
setting the amount of time they are there, whether it is 4
hours, 15 hours, or days, or self-destruct on command, as
opposed to the mines that you and I are familiar with, having
been laid in Korea, and they are essentially there until
removed.
I do not know what plans commanders have for the employment
of mines on operations. It is something that commanders reserve
for those situations in which they have to make that decision,
but those decisions are made at a significantly high level on
whether or not the authority to dispose of and employ mines,
but there are a set of circumstances in which a commander's
formations are at risk, and it has to be protected flanks, or
they find a force that is a significant threat that they want
to fix and expose for attack by other service joint fires.
There are situations in which mines are useful, and I am sure
that commanders have that decision set in their consideration.
I am not aware that there are any dumb mines that will be
employed. In fact, I am confident that there are not.
Senator Stevens. Thank you very much.
I have failed to note that we have a new staff director,
gentlemen, Sid Ashworth, a former Army civilian who has a son
in OCS, Officers Candidate School now, and I believe she is the
first woman to ever head a staff of a defense appropriations
subcommittee in the Congress, so we are pleased to have one of
your former members of your Army with us.
General Shinseki. Thank you. Of course, the chairman and I
did not miss the fact that you had a new staff director, Mr.
Chairman.
Senator Stevens. Senator Dorgan.
Senator Dorgan. Mr. Chairman, let me wish Sid well and
welcome her to her new position.
FUTURE REQUIREMENTS COSTS
General Shinseki, you have used some candor recently in
testimony that turned out to be painful for you and refreshing
for some of us, and I do not want to get you in trouble today,
but I do want to ask some questions about costs.
This subcommittee appropriated about $365 billion for
funding for this fiscal year, and that will increase when we
receive the supplemental, so this subcommittee wants to
appropriate, I think everyone on this subcommittee, we want to
appropriate sufficient money to meet the needs of the men and
women who serve this country. In order to do that, we need to
try to have some understanding of what future requirements are.
Now, this budget that we are having a hearing on today is
for fiscal year 2004, beginning October 1, and the supplemental
that we will receive apparently in a week or so will be to
cover costs for this fiscal year, fiscal year 2003. Is the
budget that we are discussing now a so-called, ``peacetime
budget,'' which does not include the costs of a potential
occupation of Iraq? I guess that is my first question.
General Shinseki. That is correct. It is a budget that does
not carry any funding for the contingencies we are now dealing
with, either Afghanistan or in Iraq.
Senator Dorgan. I understand. Does it carry funding for the
war against terrorism? There was a previous question asked of
the Secretary about the cost of the war against terrorism, and
that apparently is being funded out of other accounts, so we
will make that up in the supplemental, but with respect to
October 1 and beyond, in the coming fiscal year, does the
budget request that we are now considering include money for
the war on terrorism?
General Shinseki. It does not.
Mr. White. No.
Senator Dorgan. So what I am trying to understand is this.
We are having a hearing to try to think through what will our
obligation be beginning October 1, 2003, for fiscal year 2004.
In order to understand that, we need to understand what all of
the costs and obligations will be. We know for a certainty
this, that we will continue the war on terrorism. That is a
certainty.
We know for a near certainty, I suspect, that we will have
some costs and responsibilities with respect to Afghanistan,
and we know for a near certainty that we will have
responsibilities and costs with respect to Iraq, and if what
happens at the end of the week is what we expect will happen,
my guess is that will be some kind of an occupation force for a
period of time.
Those are three areas all of which we have some reason to
want to quantify as a subcommittee in order to evaluate what
our obligation might be for fiscal year 2004, beginning October
1. Can you help us with any three of those areas, not with
respect to the supplemental. I am talking about with respect to
the new fiscal year budget and the appropriation request that
we are going to want to be considering.
General Shinseki. I can only apologize Senator, that when
the fiscal year 2004 budget was put together the data that you
are asking about was not refined enough to be able to be
included in it, and any potential discussion about what the
operation--an operation in Iraq or any follow-on probably is
undefined at this point, and I think once commanders understand
what that mission will require and state then what it will take
to do that, those numbers will become clearer, but I do not
think either the Secretary or I are able to provide any more
clarity on it today, with respect to Iraq.
Senator Dorgan. Well, that is certainly true with respect
to Iraq, but it is not likely true with respect to Afghanistan
and the war on terrorism. Can you address at least those two,
and then let me come back to Iraq?
Mr. White. The Afghanistan operation and the war on
terrorism, because we have been conducting it for 18 months,
assuming that, the rough cut number that--and I think this came
up in front of previous committees--that we asked for for the
non-Iraq tasks was about $6 billion for fiscal year 2003, and
we got a part of that covered in the omnibus spending bill for
fiscal year 2003, which provided, I think, $10 billion, six of
which went to defense and about, a little under $2 billion came
to the Army, so that partially covers that increment, but that
is roughly what that is.
Senator Stevens. Would the Senator yield to me?
Senator Dorgan. I would be happy to yield.
Senator Stevens. Realizing this question would come up, I
asked the Congressional Research Service (CRS) to give us a
memo to review how the United States has budgeted for wars in
the past, and I have just received that, a copy of that.
Based on an examination of the previous CRS reviews of
funding for wars and other major military operations, it
appears, with one possible exception, that Presidents have not
requested and Congress has not provided funding for wars in
advance of the start of the operations. Rather, administrations
have requested fundings after the operations have begun, and
Congress has subsequently appropriated monies to meet
specifically documented budget requirements.
That one exception was in the case of President Johnson,
but the discussion I had last evening was, we will get a
request once these new operations have commenced.
We do intend to cover the war against terrorism and the
balance of this year as far as the supplemental is concerned in
a document we should receive next week.
Senator Dorgan. Well, you make a fair point, and the point
I was trying to make is that with respect to the war on
terrorism, and Afghanistan, that, the cost of that I assume
will be built in routinely for the coming fiscal year budgets
for the appropriations requirements.
Senator Stevens. To the contrary. They will be built into
supplementals that are associated with it, and we have funded
Afghanistan on a supplemental basis. We are funding now the
ongoing, continued operations of the Department of Defense in
terms of structural requirements of the Army and other
agencies.
Senator Dorgan. I do not understand that, because at least
with respect to those hostilities that are over with respect to
Afghanistan, those are longer-term recurring obligations, and
we just as well plan for them, but I accept the point you make
how it has been done previously, and I accept the point on
Iraq. Hostilities have not yet begun there.
At some point I assume planning has been underway for an
occupying force and we will be alerted to what the costs are.
General Shinseki, you were candid before another committee, and
I will not ask you questions about that now, because I
understand that created quite a furor inside the Department of
Defense, but I would just say, as one member of the Committee,
we are going to fund what is required to be funded to support
our military, but I would also think it would be helpful for us
to be involved in some of those discussions. I do not think it
is detrimental to have those numbers out there as the planning
ensues, but let me ask one additional question.
ACTIVE COMPONENT (AC)/RESERVE COMPONENT (RC) MIX
We have a lot of men and women of the Guard and Reserve who
have been called up, citizen-soldiers. They have left their
jobs and their families, and they are serving this country
admirably. When you talked about end strength earlier, I
believe you were responding to a question from Senator Inouye.
I think one of the questions for this Congress perhaps, and you
especially, is what kind of call-ups and deployments are
required, to the best that you could estimate, in the next
several years as we begin contemplating occupying forces here
and there?
Do you need an increase in end strength? Do you intend to
continue to rely more heavily on call-ups of Guard and Reserve,
because all of that I think plays a role in the longer-term
discussions about what kind of permanent funding is necessary
and what size of an Army do we need? Can you respond to that?
General Shinseki. As I have testified before, Senator, I
think end strength of the Army is an issue, and the fact that
even before the build-up for a potential Iraq, we were carrying
something on the order of 20,000 to 30,000 Reserve Component
soldiers routinely mobilized for Sinai, for Bosnia, and
missions of the sort, and imposing a requirement, intensity of
OPTEMPO on the Reserve Component, and suggesting that there is
an issue here about taking some of those day-to-day missions
off the Reserve Component and sort of preserving them for these
large emergencies that we have to deal with.
That is all part of the discussion, the study that the
Secretary has us focused on, but I do think in the final set of
study outputs, the end strength of the Army is smaller than the
mission set we are asked to carry. Now, you can reduce the
missions, you can increase the Army end strength to be able to
accommodate, but some place in there, adjustments will be
required.
Mr. White. The other dimension of this, if I might,
Senator, the other dimension, as the Chief said, is the Active
Component-Reserve Component mix of units. There are some
Reserve Component units, military police (MP) units, for
example, that have been constantly mobilized and appear to be
in high demand, and so if that is the case, you ask yourself,
why don't you have them in the Active Component if you are
constantly mobilizing Reserve Components, so one of the things
that Dr. Chu is running a study on that we are all actively
participating in is, is the balance between AC and RC correct
not only in the quantity of units, but in types as well.
Senator Dorgan. Well, I think that is a very important
question, and I hope you will keep us informed of this study,
because I am not asking on behalf of people who do not want to
serve. They are members of the Guard and Reserve. They
understand deployments. Many of them have been deployed a
number of times, but I think the longer-term question is,
should in some of these circumstances there be active duty end
strength increases.
Let me make one final point relative to something the
chairman said. It is my belief that the war against terrorism,
unlike other classic wars where we have had battles that occur
and then recede, and there are surrenders and agreements and so
on, the war against terrorism, I think, will be with us for a
long, long time. It is my expectation that 5 and 10 years from
now we will talk about the cost of continuing to pursue the war
against terrorism.
For that reason, I think we would be wise at least to think
through the proposition of that piece being a part of what we
decide and what we plan for the strength of our Armed Services
to be in order to meet those obligations, rather than to do
that on a supplemental basis year after year.
That is the point I was trying to make, Mr. Chairman.
SPECIAL OPERATIONS COMMAND (SOCOM)
Senator Stevens. If the Senator would yield, the committee
just went down to the Special Forces Command and visited them
in Tampa. There has been a reorganization of the military for
that purpose, and we expect to see funding through that
organization for most of the contingencies that relate to the
war on terrorism. That used to be a support command. It is now
an operational command and will have units of its command in
several other commands throughout the country.
You are right, I think we are on that course now, but so
far the war on terrorism has been funded through supplementals,
and I think when we get--this is an overview of the overall
budget of the Army. When we get the individual components here,
you will see how that is starting to work into the projections,
but I do not think we have a full funding yet for the war on
terrorism in the fiscal year 2004 budget.
General Shinseki. Mr. Chairman, may I just add to your
observation here? In the fiscal year 2004 budget, the Army in
support of our Special Operations Forces in SOCOM are adding
something in the order of, I think, 1,800 additional personnel
spaces. We put an additional $1.1 billion out of Army resources
into Special Operations Command.
Our entire fiscal year 2004 CH-47 production line of 16
aircraft are being provided to Special Operations Command to
replace and to augment the capabilities they have, so the
Army's production of CH-47s next year are all going to SOCOM.
We are taking a year sort of a break before we can get----
Senator Dorgan. As a final point, General, if later this
week your soldiers are ordered to military action, you know
that the prayers of all Americans go with them as you and the
Secretary and others issue those orders.
General Shinseki. We certainly know that.
Senator Dorgan. Thank you very much.
Mr. White. Thank you.
Senator Stevens. Thank you, Senator. Senator Hutchison.
STATEMENT OF SENATOR HUTCHISON
Senator Hutchison. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
First I want to say that my loss is your gain with Sid
Ashworth, and she did a wonderful job on military construction,
and I love my replacement, but I sure always will miss her, and
I am very pleased that you did promote her.
I also want to say, the first time I met General Shinseki
was on a runway in Bosnia, and you were really overseeing the
beginning of the ramp-up there, and the first time I went into
Bosnia was with Senator Stevens and Senator Inouye, and we were
in helmets and flak jackets, and they were shooting at us from
the hills, so we very much feel that you have served our
country so well, and I do wish you well, and I want to say I
think you have done a terrific job.
General Shinseki. Thank you, Senator.
Senator Hutchison. And I also want to say, Secretary White,
I really enjoyed working with you, and you have been honest and
straight up with me in all of our dealings, and I appreciate
your service very much.
Mr. White. Thank you.
TRAINING CENTERS
Senator Hutchison. As you know, I am chairman of the
Military Construction Subcommittee, and we have talked about
looking at the foreign bases, and as I have visited many
foreign bases with my colleagues here I have found training
constraints, I have found artillery range constraints, air
constraints, and as a matter of fact, in Germany, for instance,
Grafenwoehr, one of the premier training areas in Germany, only
has 18,000 acres.
And yet I look at the capabilities that our own bases in
America provide, I look at the National Training Center in
California, which has almost 500,000 acres, Fort Bliss has a
million acres, and I just want to ask you, are you looking for
new training locations in other places in Europe? Are you
looking at bringing some of the training capabilities home to
America? Are you looking at Fort Bliss in particular as a
reinvigorated maneuver training area? What are you looking at
to try to, in your transformation, make sure that we are not
looking at these continued training constraints?
General Shinseki. Well, Senator, we are doing all of the
above. Even Grafenwoehr today is not the Grafenwoehr Secretary
White and I trained in many years ago, and we have augmented
the capabilities there because of that very small footprint.
We are trying to stay in touch with our combatant
commanders here. They have been asked to take a look at their
regions and decide what Army capabilities they need forward and
where should they be located, and so we are working with
General Jones and General LaPorte and Admiral Fargo.
We have suggested a long-term strategy is helpful. To
answer the questions about where do we see our interests, the
advantage for forward presence has a very remarkable effect
because of our ability to engage other armies, so there is a
return there, but what do the combatant commanders need
forward, and then we will decide.
What is not needed forward we will bring back to the
continental United States and position them where their ability
to do the things that armies have to do--they have to train
wherever they go, and they have to train aggressively. They
have to be able to deploy from wherever they are stationed, and
then do the best that we can to take care of those soldiers and
families in terms of their lifestyle, and we are doing all
those things.
As one of those youngsters that grew up in the Dona Ana
Desert there at Fort Bliss, I know it pretty well. It is a
wonderful training area.
DOMESTIC AND FOREIGN BASES
Senator Hutchison. Well, my question is, are you looking at
the timing, not only of our fiscal year 2004 budget so that we
are preparing, but secondly for the fiscal year 2005 Base
Realignment and Closure (BRAC)? Are we going to know what the
needs are going to be of our domestic bases in regard to the
foreign bases before we start shutting down or retooling bases
here?
Mr. White. Well, I think you have to. That is why Secretary
Rumsfeld is pushing the combatant commanders hard to bring in
their recommendations on what the posture of the force should
be in their regions, and why we on the Title X side will then,
and in concert with the combatant commanders, will line up the
investments that we intend to make and realign the force, which
is obviously inclusive of the BRAC initiative back here in the
continental United States, and we do not have much time, in my
opinion, to figure that out.
Senator Hutchison. Well, we certainly do not with the
fiscal year 2004 budget, because we do not want to be putting
one dime in an overseas base that is not going to be long term.
Mr. White. Right.
Senator Hutchison. And we do want to be putting our dimes
in our bases here, and I want to say, I appreciate your
emphasis on installation management. I think that is a very
good sign, because particularly as we begin to look at closing
bases we want to make sure that the ones that are going to be
ongoing are well maintained, and we are seeing money go away
from that into operations, and I know there is always a strain
on the budget, but I think your emphasis there is well put, but
I have been pushing now for 2 years to find out what your long-
term strategies are in the foreign bases, and we have a report
that was due April of last year that still has not come in. I
do understand, however, that there is a new emphasis----
General Shinseki. There is.
Mr. White. There is.
Senator Hutchison [continuing]. And that it is being pushed
now, which I think is good.
RESERVE COMPONENT RECRUITING
A second area that I just wanted to talk about, again, in
talking to so many of the Guard and Reserve units, I am
concerned, not in a time of war, because our troops will always
be there giving in a time of war. The cause is there.
But even back when we were not in a war, I was beginning to
see a little fraying at the edges with family problems and
employer problems with our Guard and Reserve because of the
OPTEMPO, so my question is, are you seeing this? You had a
little bit in your written testimony, General Shinseki, but I
would just ask if you are seeing a problem in recruitment of
Guard and Reserves, and with the heavy reliance that we have on
them because of the drawing down of our troop strength, are we
really looking ahead to make sure that we are in the right
configuration?
General Shinseki. We are looking ahead, Senator, and I
think if there is a time when we can get to a good set of
metrics that says here is what happens to you in a large
mobilization, both this mobilization for a potential Iraq, the
mobilization associated with Afghanistan, the global war on
terrorism, we are going to get some pretty good answers out of
this, so yes, we are looking at that.
I, too, have heard anecdotally and in spot cases concerns
about what the tempo has meant to Guard and Reserve soldiers
and families. There is, I think, a double effect here, and we
have worked very hard with employers to suggest to them that
the service of these military members is important, and we
intend to look after them, but I have heard some of these
comments. I am sure there is more out there than I have heard,
and we are paying attention.
As I indicated, for the first time we saw a drop in a
monthly recruiting target, and so we are focused.
Senator Hutchison. I just hope you will anticipate way
ahead of a crisis point. I am not worried about getting through
this this time, but I am talking about 2 years from now.
Mr. White. Right.
Senator Hutchison. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Senator Stevens. Thank you very much.
Senator Shelby.
AVIATION TRAINING
Senator Shelby. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I will try to be
as quick as I can. The Army Aviation Training Center, General
and Mr. Secretary, has developed, as you know, a new training
aviation strategy called Flight School XXI.
General Shinseki. Yes, sir.
Senator Shelby. The program regime focuses on increased
training for aviators in their so-called go-to-war aircraft.
Phase 1 of aviation training, the TH-67 training helicopter is
shortened by 20 weeks here. Phase 2 of the training in the
aviators' advanced aircrafts of choice has increased in length,
it is my understanding.
General Shinseki. That is correct.
Senator Shelby. This training includes a significant
increase in time spent in training simulators. Sixty-eight
million dollars in the fiscal year 2003 budget remain unfunded,
seriously unfunded, $68 million in fiscal year 2003, $147
million in unfunded requirements in fiscal year 2004, and
between fiscal year 2004 and fiscal year 2009 the Army faces a
Flight School XXI funding shortfall of approximately $1
billion.
Flight School XXI obviously is of particular concern here.
What are your thoughts on that, General?
Senator Stevens. General, let me interrupt. I have been
called to a meeting on a matter close to my heart and my State,
so Senator Inouye has some additional questions. Do you have
some additional questions, Senator?
Senator Hutchison. No.
Senator Stevens. Senator Inouye, will you chair the balance
of the hearing?
Senator Inouye. Yes.
Senator Stevens. Thank you very much.
Senator Shelby. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Go ahead, General.
What are your thoughts on that? I know it is a shortfall. You
have got an important program.
General Shinseki. In the fiscal year 2003 budget we are
looking at Flight School XXI, and we continue to adjust the
budget to meet the needs here, but as you indicated, we have
taken a 32-week phase 1, two-phase aviation training, taken a
32-week program and shortened it to 20 and given more time in
high-performance aircraft.
Senator Shelby. Where you need it, right?
General Shinseki. Where they are needed, and that means
that aviators are getting to units much better-prepared to
participate in unit-level training.
Senator Shelby. So that is the program the way you have
devised it, is it not?
General Shinseki. That is correct.
Mr. White. Yes.
General Shinseki. That is correct, and that is the way it
is, and as in all new initiatives, you are not able to fully
fund it initially, and so we continue to look at the
adjustments during the budget year. It is in the program as
well.
Senator Shelby. I want to help you fund it everywhere I can
up here with Senator Stevens and Senator Inouye.
General Shinseki. Sir, I appreciate the help. It is an
important program for our aviation community.
Senator Shelby. Mr. Secretary, do you have any comments on
that?
Mr. White. No. I am a Fort Rucker graduate, and I
absolutely agree with the direction, more hours in go-to-war
aircraft.
Senator Shelby. Sure.
Mr. White. Simulation is healthy, produces a better-trained
aviator to go to the force, and I think that is what we all
want.
LOGISTICS TRANSFORMATION
Senator Shelby. Thank you. I have one more concern, Army
logistics transformation. Under the current acquisition
process, as I understand it, the Army provides requirements to
an original equipment manufacturer (OEM) who designs the
system, provides initial provisioning, and hands it off to the
Government for life cycle support. This as-delivered model then
drives the Government's spares, manning, and maintenance
requirements for that system.
Once the hand-off occurs, it is my understanding that no
Government agency conducts a methodical and continued analysis
of the fielded system over time to support what we call an as-
sustained model, the results of which could provide invaluable
information to the customer and could save huge amounts of
operations and maintenance dollars. Better system sustainment
measures--that is, metrics--are needed to improved the Army's
acquisition and logistics systems.
For example, I have been told that the AH-64 transmission
was engineered for 2,500 hours of use, but the actual average
useful life is about 2,000 hours. This difference affects
operations at the lowest levels in terms of budgeting, spares
storage and manning. It affects the institutional Army in terms
of materiel buys and extended depot lines. The program managers
(PM) and program executive officers are affected in that they
now may have a big engineering problem.
Given the focus here, what is the Army's plan to develop a
weapons system sustainment model containing robust metrics to
accurately reflect the true cost of life cycle systems
sustainment and force readiness? I know that is a mouthful, Mr.
Secretary, but both of you understand it well.
Mr. White. Sure.
General Shinseki. Senator, you have described where the
Army has come----
Senator Shelby. Right.
General Shinseki [continuing]. Over the last 3 years. Three
years ago, our logistics community sat here and acquisition
community sat here.
Senator Shelby. Absolutely.
General Shinseki. Today the Army G-4, our logistics
officer, now sits with the acquisition community, and when we
talk about design of a system, it is the life cycle interest,
it is not just the design up front and the fielding. It is, how
do we think this is going to result in sustainment costs and
retirement costs at the back end of any weapons system, so that
is a first major piece.
General Paul Kern is our logistics war-fighter at Army
Materiel Command, a terrific commander who was missioned to do
this logistics transformation initiative, and he has pulled
that together in rather significant ways.
Senator Shelby. This could save the Army, all of us a lot
of money in the long run.
Mr. White. No question.
General Shinseki. Absolutely.
Senator Shelby. I know that is what you are----
General Shinseki. Absolutely.
Senator Shelby. But you have got to do the metrics here.
Mr. White. That is right.
General Shinseki. And he is in the process of putting
together the metrics for the whole system. When you look at the
nose cone on an attack helicopter, the Target Acquisition and
Designation Sight (TAD) Pilot Night Vision System (PNVS) nose
cone, probably the most expensive piece on the air frame, and
if you continue, it continues to have problems and you continue
to replace it, well, that is one approach to it.
Another approach is, you take it, you redesign it so you
are not replacing it quite as often, and it reduces the number
of mechanics and number of inventory parts that you have to
hold, so all of this is a broad-gauged, a very refreshing
approach that General Kern is after and I think in the long
run, there are going to be huge dividends to be paid.
Senator Shelby. Well, like the name, life cycle is
important.
General Shinseki. Absolutely.
Mr. White. That is right, and we should as a separate
matter, because you have a strong interest here, get General
Kern in to talk about logistics transformation, because it
affects the research and development (R&D) command, as you and
I have talked about----
Senator Shelby. Absolutely.
Mr. White [continuing]. How the logistics operators
interface not only with the theater support commands on one
end, but with PMs, Program Management Officer (PMOs), and we
will come and give you a separate discussion on that.
General Shinseki. Tied to the depots.
Senator Shelby. We will follow up on that, but I knew this
was what you are doing. We have got to go another step, I
believe, and maybe you are in that process.
Mr. White. We are.
General Shinseki. We are.
Senator Shelby. Thank you. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Senator Inouye. Thank you very much.
STATUS OF FORCES
Mr. Secretary, the recently released 2002 active duty
status of forces survey of the Army was issued and showed a
satisfaction rating of 59 percent. Now, this is much better
than what it was 3 years ago. I will not go into detail, but
could you submit to the committee your analysis on whether this
is good or bad?
Mr. White. I will do that.
[The information follows:]
Status of Forces
The Army continually tracks soldier satisfaction with quality of
life and job satisfaction matters. The satisfaction level with the
military way of life--59 percent, as reported by the Office of the
Secretary of Defense July 2002 Status of Forces Survey--is good for
soldiers, their family members, and the Army. The Army's own survey for
Active Component soldiers yields similar results. The level of soldier
satisfaction with the quality of Army life increased from 48 percent in
1999 to 59 percent in 2002.
FORCE PROTECTION
Senator Inouye. General Shinseki, looking over the fiscal
year 2004 budget, it appears that the Army will be called upon
to increase its force protection requirements. For example, you
will be providing force protection for the Air Force.
General Shinseki. That is correct.
Senator Inouye. Now, how will that affect your end strength
requirements?
General Shinseki. We have agreed to provide, and I think
today the number is about 8,500 National Guard soldiers who are
providing security for Air Force bases, because their air
police have deployed overseas. To the degree that that is a
number today, we are prepared to accommodate that, and the
dollars for that are provided for the Air Force.
If the Air Force, following this operation, decides they
are going to increase their air police, whether it is Reserve
Component or Active, their inventory, it may not have an impact
on us, but suffice it to say I think in all of these operations
it is not a precise business, and having capabilities that you
can draw on is important, and I think this is a good
demonstration that the end strength business, when you need it,
you need to have the capability on short notice to stand it up,
because there are no other alternatives.
The Air Force requested, we met on this, and we are very
happy to be able to help them for this short period.
Senator Inouye. With this program will the Guard and
Reserve have their own force protection to meet their own
requirements?
General Shinseki. They do. Under the homeland security, all
of us have raised the force protection levels around all of our
installations to include in the local communities where Guard
and Army Reserve units reside.
AVIATION MODERNIZATION
Senator Inouye. General, your Transformation program relies
very heavily upon aviation modernization, and the centerpiece
is the Comanche. Are you satisfied with its progress?
General Shinseki. It is. I will defer to the Secretary for
some of the policy decisions made, because we have just
recently restructured the program, and I think he is eminently
qualified to describe it, but the Army's requirement for the
Comanche is 819 systems.
As a result of an acquisition board decision we have the
first 650 of that recognized for the armed reconnaissance
helicopter. Yet to be determined is the attack version of the
Comanche, and that will come out in further studies, but we
have certainly sustained the requirement for this, and the
Comanche is a key element of our Future Combat System networked
capabilities.
Mr. White. Senator, we just went through a Defense
Acquisition Board cycle on Comanche. We rebaselined the
aircraft, we focused it squarely on the armed scout version for
its initial three blocks of fielding. That is our most critical
need.
The Kiowa has got to be replaced. We restructured the
arrangement with the contractors, Boeing and Sikorsky in this
case, and we brought in outside consultants to look at it, a
group led by General Larry Watts, former Chief of the Air
Force, so I am confident that the program is focused correctly
and now, after 20 years, we have to deliver this aircraft. We
need it, and so the 2004-2009 POM includes 73 of these
aircraft. I think the first one for test purposes is 2007, but
we need to get on with this thing. We will not rebaseline this
program again.
Senator Inouye. Some have suggested that the fixed wing
would do a better job than these helicopters. Do you have any
response to that?
General Shinseki. Senator, for the kind of requirements
that a land force needs in close combat, an armed
reconnaissance helicopter is important, and just where it has
to go to operate and what it has to accomplish, and in
conjunction with unmanned systems, but there is a requirement
for a manned cockpit some place in the loop here. It is about
situational curiosity and situational judgment that a manned
cockpit makes a difference, and for the kind of operations that
ground forces are involved in, an armed reconnaissance
helicopter and an attack platform is key to our operations. It
gets into the close combat support for ground formations.
OPERATIONS IN IRAQ
Senator Inouye. If I may, I would like to make a
clarification. When I asked the question on volunteerism and
the Iraq war, I did not want to suggest that our military can
predict into the future. After all, in a war, there are at
least two sides. We know what we plan to do and what sort of
responses we will have, but at this moment, for example we do
not know what is going to happen to Saddam Hussein--is he going
to walk, or is he going to do some fighting, and if so, where
will the fighting be?
And we read reports in the last 24 hours of his instruction
to his generals to employ chemical and biological weapons
systems, and so all of this would obviously have an impact upon
the cost of war. I realize that it is not possible for the
military or for anyone here to make any specific requirement or
predictions. What I think my colleague wanted to note was that
it would be helpful to us in looking forward as to what the
costs may be to have some idea of what it would mean in
addition to our daily work, that is all.
ADDITIONAL COMMITTEE QUESTIONS
And so I would like to--and I speak for other members of
the committee--submit to both of you questions in writing and
requests for your response.
General Shinseki. Certainly.
Mr. White. Yes, sir.
[The following questions were not asked at the hearing, but
were submitted to the Department for response subsequent to the
hearing:]
Questions Submitted to General Eric K. Shinseki
Questions Submitted by Senator Ted Stevens
legacy force modernization
Question. General Shinseki, the Army budget proposes to terminate
Abrams and Bradley modernization after fielding of modern versions of
each vehicle to only two divisions. This leaves the 3rd Armored Cavalry
Regiment, part of the Counterattack Corps, with Abrams and Bradley
vehicles that are more than 10 years old. Do you believe the Army is
taking excessive risk in not funding the modernization of the Legacy
Force?
Answer. We continue to examine options for the modernization of the
Counterattack Corps, 3rd Armored Cavalry Regiment included, in order to
maintain the Corps as a strategic hedge for the future. In the
meantime, we are gaining irreversible momentum towards transformation
to the Objective Force. We continue to evaluate the risk in both the
near term and long term and will propose corrective action if
appropriate.
fcs fielding schedule
Question. General Shinseki, given the risk associated with the
Future Combat Systems (FCS), how confident are you that FCS will remain
on schedule and achieve first unit equipped by 2008, and initial
operating capability by 2010?
Answer. We are very confident that we will achieve FCS Increment I
initial operational capability by 2010 and full operational capability
by 2012. FCS-equipped units of action will provide Army and Joint force
commanders with a significant capability that will grow to full
objective capabilities through spiraling and fielding of subsequent
increments. There will be two increments of significantly different
capabilities between 2010 and 2018. Increment I will be fielded in 2010
to 2018, and in 2018, we begin fielding Increment II. Increment I FCS-
equipped units of action will possess the core capabilities needed to
execute the ``how-to-fight'' operational concept.
fcs/objective force role
Question. General Shinseki, what gaps do you feel FCS, or the
Objective Force could be filling in the current conflict in Iraq, if it
were fielded today?
Answer. The potential conflict in Iraq reinforces our efforts to
provide our soldiers and commanders with the best combination of
equipment, training, leaders, technologies, and organizations that
together will assure that we can apply decisive and overmatching
capabilities against any opponent. I am confident that our current
forces will be quite successful in the event of hostilities in Iraq;
however, there are a number of ways--at the strategic, operational, and
tactical level--that the Army's Objective Force could be even more
effective.
The ability of the Objective Force, employing enhanced lift
capabilities, to deploy using multiple unimproved entry points to
overcome anti-access measures or political boundaries, would have
reduced problems in staging for operations. For instance, the rerouting
of the 4th Infantry Division, caused by the unavailability of friendly
ports near the northern border of Iraq, would have been unnecessary.
The increased deployability and modularity of Objective Force units,
coupled with development of advanced air/sea lift platforms not
dependent on improved air/sea ports will significantly reduce Army
deployment and employment timelines greatly increasing the Joint force
commander's flexibility and options. This will increase the chances of
achieving operational surprise or preemption. Objective Force units
will be able to begin operations immediately on arrival, requiring
minimal reception, staging, onward movement, and integration. Moreover,
projected reductions in sustainment requirements and reliance on
strategic-to-tactical battlefield distribution will eliminate the heavy
logistical infrastructures that could hamper operations and constrain
responsiveness. Overall, these improvements could strengthen the
strategic and operational speed, agility, and power of the Joint force.
The Objective Force will allow our combatant commanders to conduct
operational maneuver from strategic distances.
The Objective Force will conduct simultaneous and distributed
operations across the entire Joint operations area. Commanders will
have the ability to conduct continuous operations with minimal
operational pauses, controlling an operational tempo that overwhelms
the enemy's capability to respond. Finally, the Objective Force will
directly attack enemy decisive points and centers of gravity through
air-ground maneuver and fires to extend the reach of the Joint force
commander and expose any part of the enemy force to destruction,
dislocation, or disintegration.
The Objective Force headquarters above brigade will be organized,
designed, trained, and equipped to fulfill command and control
functions as the Joint task force, Joint force land component
commander, or Army forces headquarters with minimal augmentation,
provided by the standing Joint force headquarters and Joint interagency
coordination group ``plugs.'' These headquarters will possess the
inherent capability to interact effectively with multi-national forces,
other agencies, and non-governmental and private volunteer
organizations. This would be a vast improvement over our current
operations in support of U.S. Central Command, where our headquarters
elements required over 2,100 augmentees.
The Objective Force will also resolve the Army's lack of
standardized hardware and software in its current communications
architecture and systems. The Army's Objective Force design will
integrate seamless Joint command, control, communications, computers,
intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (C\4\ISR) systems with
linkages to current forces, Stryker Brigade Combat Teams, other
agencies, and a knowledge-based C\4\ISR architecture as the means for
achieving situational awareness and battle command--the art and science
of applying leadership and decision making to achieve mission success.
This allows for automated spectrum and information dissemination
management, continuous situational awareness, real-time synchronization
of fires and maneuver, and the ability to effectively develop the
situation out of contact. The Objective Force will provide our
commanders with information-enabled forces capable of distributed and
simultaneous operations.
Lessons learned and current operations reinforce that maneuver
forces require a range of fire support that can provide close, all
weather, responsive, and accurate fires. The Objective Force possesses
enhanced lethality through networked fires encompassing Joint fires and
organic capabilities for line-of-sight, beyond line-of-sight, and non-
line-of-sight fires, deliverable in any conditions of terrain, weather,
or time. Joint sensor-to-shooter links can rapidly bring lethal effects
on enemy targets. The Objective Force takes the next step by harnessing
all-source fires, attack aviation, and intelligence, surveillance, and
reconnaissance systems to deny the enemy freedom of action, support
friendly maneuver, and destroy enemy forces and high-value targets.
The Joint interoperability provided by the Army's Objective Force
will better complement and enable the capabilities of each of America's
Armed Services. The Objective Force will provide unparalleled agility
and versatility by conducting operational maneuver from strategic
distances and by allowing the combatant commander to open multiple
fronts. The tailorable command and control headquarters and combined
arms formations of the Objective Force, with their enhanced
deployability and reduced logistical footprint, will leverage America's
strategic reach to address any mission or contingency. In short, the
Army's Objective Force will hasten the achievement of the combatant
commander's joint operational objectives throughout the course of
future campaigns using a combination of speed, power, and knowledge,
ensuring decisive victory.
______
Questions Submitted by Senator Thad Cochran
reconstituting deployed forces
Question. General Shinseki, today we have a large number of forces
forward deployed in preparation for a possible war with Iraq, while we
simultaneously pursue elements of terror globally. Do you believe we
will be able to reconstitute our deployed forces in an orderly manner
for a sustained war against terror while meeting our many other
commitments around the globe?
Answer. We are confident that we can balance unit reconstitution
with our global commitments. Army forces will be an integral component
of coalition efforts in post-conflict Iraq to provide a more secure and
stable environment that will enable the Office of Reconstruction and
Humanitarian Assistance to transition the governance of Iraq to an
interim Iraqi administration. Despite these continuing commitments in
Iraq and elsewhere in support of the global war on terrorism and other
directed missions, the Army will undertake a disciplined, orderly
reconstitution of those forces involved in combat. We will use our
experience with reconstitution after returning forces from Operation
Desert Storm, Bosnia, and elsewhere to inform and refine our efforts.
The Army, in coordination with the Office of Secretary of Defense, the
Joint Staff, Central Command, and other regional and functional
combatant commanders will determine the priority and timeline for unit
reconstitution.
reserve component pay consolidation
Question. I understand the Office of Secretary of Defense would
like to consolidate the Active, National Guard, and Reserve Military
Pay Accounts into one Account that would be managed by the Active
Component. Do you think we can make a significant change like this
without jeopardizing the integrity of the Guard and Reserve Military
Pay Accounts?
Answer. Yes, pending the necessary legislative changes, and
coordination of accounting processes and related systems. The Reserve
and National Guard components will continue to have oversight of their
programs without jeopardizing the integrity of their pay accounts.
advanced army rapid emplaced bridge
Question. Last year, you provided the Subcommittee a response for
the record concerning favorable progress being made on the Advanced
Army Rapidly Emplaced Bridge that is also known as the Composite Army
Bridge. For the record, could you provide an update of your assessment
of this important program?
Answer. The Advanced Army Rapidly Emplaced Bridge program continues
to be a success for the Army. The Rapidly Emplaced Bridging System is
an interim system designed to support the Stryker Brigade Combat Teams
(SBCT), which provides tactical bridge support across gaps of up to 13
meters. Current funding levels in the Program Objective Memorandum will
purchase the Army acquisition objective of 40 bridges to support the
SBCTs and provide an interim solution for the Objective Force.
______
Questions Submitted by Senator Pete V. Domenici
white sands/mthel
Question. The Army and our Israeli partners continue to make
progress on the Mobile Tactical High Energy Laser (MTHEL) program. I
was very pleased to see that the Army has given strong support to the
program in the President's fiscal year 2004 budget request. And I would
like to take this opportunity to thank the Army for its sound
management of this program.
Now that the Army has committed to pursuing MTHEL as its solution
to rocket and artillery threats, can you update us on the status of
negotiations with Israel over how to define the system's requirements?
Has the Army reached agreement with Israel over how to share funding of
the program?
Answer. The U.S. Army, in conjunction with the Israeli Ministry of
Defense and Israeli Air Force, is working to define Israeli MTHEL
requirements for a combat-effective laser system that can be realized
within the cost, schedule, risk, and disclosure constraints of the
MTHEL program. The Army supports the pre-Milestone B development and
delivery of at least one chemical-based MTHEL prototype for the
knowledge and understanding we will glean from the process as we work
to define the directed energy component of our Objective Force enhanced
area air defense system. However, our long-term focus for directed
energy is on the development of solid-state laser technology. While
this requirement process is iterative in nature and complicated by the
diversity of operational and technical requirements, satisfactory
progress is being made. The common operational requirements document
should be completed and sent to the Israeli Ministry of Defense for
validation and use within their acquisition process within the next
several weeks.
The U.S. Army and the Israeli Ministry of Defense have not entered
into a formal agreement on how to share funding for the MTHEL program.
Since Israel's involvement in MTHEL will be via a foreign military
sales (FMS) agreement, the FMS laws under USC Title 22, prohibit the
MTHEL program from being a formal ``cost-sharing'' or ``cooperative''
program. This is a change from the Tactical High Energy Laser (THEL)
advanced concept technology demonstration (ACTD) memorandum of
agreement (MOA) which was governed by USC Title 10 and allows
cooperative research and development efforts and formal cost-sharing
agreements. However, the Army's intent is to make funding contributions
to the MTHEL FMS case as provided for under Title 22. Furthermore, the
Army's intent is for the contributions to equal the FMS funds provided
by the Government of Israel.
The MTHEL program will be conducted under Amendment 6 to the THEL
ACTD MOA. The Defense Security Cooperation Agency general counsel has
crafted the language in Amendment 6 to ensure it complies with FMS laws
under USC Title 22. Authority to begin formal negotiations on Amendment
6 with the Government of Israel will be granted as soon as the
Department of Defense approves the MTHEL summary statement of intent.
Again, Amendment 6 does not state a cost-sharing arrangement for MTHEL.
In order to comply with USC Title 22, Amendment 6 states that Article 5
(cost-sharing) of the THEL ACTD MOA does not apply, and further states
that costs will be apportioned, not shared, in a manner to be
established in the FMS cases.
white sands/helstf
Question. The Army continues to do a good job managing the High
Energy Systems Test Facility (HELSTF) at White Sands Missile Range.
HELSTF is the only facility of its kind in the world where state-of-
the-art laser testing and evaluation is conducted. Army, Navy and Air
Force laser programs continue to make significant strides because of
this testing capability. But in order to maintain this progress it is
important that the facility's assets be available for testing as
scheduled.
In the last two appropriations cycles combined, Congress has
designated over $12 million for the Navy to do megawatt laser tests for
cruise missile defense. Unfortunately, the megawatt MIRACL laser has
not been available to meet the Navy's needs.
Can you update us on the status of the MIRACL laser?
Answer. The Mid Infrared Advanced Chemical Laser (MIRACL) is
undergoing recertification of its subsystems. This recertification is a
critical part of a site-wide program to enable the HELSTF to continue
to provide world-class support to the directed energy weapons
development programs of all the Services. The MIRACL device itself, its
optical train, and the Sea-Lite beam director are in good condition and
ready for use. The pressure vessels and associated piping systems that
supply reactant gases to the laser are being inspected to insure that
they can be used safely. This inspection will be completed by mid-May.
All activity required to enable the safe and effective operation of the
MIRACL will be completed by July 1, 2003.
Question. Does the Army have a plan to bring this laser back on
line so the Navy can move to its next phase of testing?
Answer. The MIRACL will be exercised on July 1, 2003, in a ``burn-
in'' test to demonstrate that the MIRACL can be operated safely and
effectively. This test will be conducted at a power level in excess of
one megawatt of output power. This power level is adequate to meet the
Navy's test requirements. The test preparations have already started,
and the Army is confident the system will be available to the Navy in
mid July after it is refueled.
______
Questions Submitted by Senator Daniel K. Inouye
training ranges
Question. Given the current state of the Army's existing training
ranges and training centers and the anticipated demands of the Stryker
Brigade Combat Teams and the proposed Objective Force, are you
satisfied those ranges and training centers can meet the needs of the
transformed Army? Does the proposed fiscal year 2004 budget fully fund
the identified needed upgrades?
Answer. The Army has a solid range modernization program in place
that fully supports the training requirements of the Stryker Brigade
Combat Teams (SBCT). Ranges are under construction, in design, or in
the Army program that support the transformation of the six SBCTs. We
have 11 range projects for which the construction contracts will be
awarded in fiscal year 2003. We have an additional 10 projects that are
contained in the fiscal year 2004 President's Budget. Other projects
are programmed for fiscal year 2005. This range modernization effort
includes a significant improvement to our training infrastructure in
Alaska and Hawaii. These locations previously had not been modernized
to the extent of ranges on our installations in the continental United
States. We are correcting that situation.
We do, however, have shortfalls in our ability to operate these and
other ranges Army wide. In fiscal year 2004, our range operations
shortfall to fund our critical requirements is $5.1 million, Operations
and Maintenance, Army (OMA); $1 million, Operations and Maintenance,
Army Reserve (OMAR); and $2.4 million, Operations and Maintenance, Army
National Guard (OMNG).
Our Integrated Training Area Management program, that is an
integral part of range operations, is similarly under-funded in fiscal
year 2004. The shortfalls are $6.9 million, OMA; $0.3 million, OMAR;
and $7.7 million, OMNG.
With regard to our Objective Force ranges, we are still in the
early stages of defining standard range requirements based on the
operational capability of the Future Combat Systems (FCS). Our
definition of those range requirements, combined with stationing plans,
will determine the specific range requirements for the Objective Force.
We intend to capitalize on programmed ranges wherever possible by
adding capability to programmed range modernization projects where
Objective Force units will be stationed.
Question. Are you satisfied with the current locations and manning
of the existing national-level training centers?
Answer. Although we are satisfied with both the current locations
and manning levels at all of our combat training centers (CTCs), we
must continually reevaluate how we replicate and incorporate
operational lessons learned, technological advances, and asymmetric
threats into the training program ensuring that our soldiers and units
are trained to the highest possible standard against emerging threats
and that our CTCs remain as the Army's premier collective training
opportunities.
Based upon lessons learned from previous and current operations,
the Army is pursuing development of a ``deep-attack'' training
capability for Army attack aviation units that would offer the same
degree of realism and standards that the Army provides ground maneuver
units at CTCs. Our intent is to include the deep operations assets of
all Services. For aviation units in United States Army Europe, the Army
conducts an annual deep attack exercise into Poland. For aviation units
in the continental United States, the Army is looking at conducting
exercises at either the National Training Center (NTC) in Fort Irwin,
California, or at the Western Army Aviation Training Site (WAATS) in
Marana, Arizona.
A proof-of-principle exercise was conducted at NTC in April 2002,
and one is planned this year at WAATS. The exercise at WAATS will
integrate live, virtual, and constructive training capabilities. Live
forces will use the multi-service training areas in the greater WAATS
area to include ranges managed by Luke Air Force Base, Marine Corps Air
Station Yuma, and the Yuma Proving Grounds. Simulations will be
generated from Fort Hood, Texas. A corps commander will serve as the
exercise director and will provide the effects coordination cell as a
player at the operational level. Depending upon the availability of
headquarters, options are being explored to establish an Air Force air
operations center to control the air war. Live forces will include an
aviation brigade headquarters, an attack helicopter battalion, a
general support aviation company and a Multiple Launch Rocket System
battalion. Potential Air Force assets include attack aircraft from Luke
Air Force Base. All live assets that are not available will be
incorporated through simulations. Based on the outcome of this exercise
and of the exercise previously conducted at NTC, the permanent training
location in the United States will be determined.
Question. Given the need for joint training opportunities, and
considering the work that the Joint Forces Command is doing in this
area, do you see any major changes to the tactics, techniques, and
procedures at the Army's national training centers? If so, what changes
do you anticipate?
Answer. The overriding principle governing training at Army major
training centers is ``train as we fight.'' To this end, the Army
requires forces participating in training at major training centers to
perform the tasks they will during operations, with the equipment they
must use during operations, under the conditions they will face during
operations, to the standard required for mission success, and with the
other organizations they must operate. We have worked diligently to
replicate these operational requirements at each Army maneuver combat
training center and believe we have been successful for our targeted
training audience--brigade headquarters and battalion-level units. To
the extent that these units operate with and accept services from other
Services, we strive to integrate in training these requirements for
interoperability tactics, techniques, and procedures. For example, each
maneuver combat training center incorporates Air Force and/or Navy or
Marine Corps close air support. When warfighting doctrine evolves, or
when we discover through operational lessons learned that we need
different emphasis in our training on interoperability tasks,
conditions, standards, or participants, the Army aggressively seeks to
update training at our major training centers. A good example is our
initiative to adjust training conditions at centers to better replicate
contemporary operational environments.
The Army welcomes the work being done by the Joint Forces Command
to ensure there are adequate venues for forces to train on joint and
interoperability tasks and that such training offers proper realism.
This emphasis will undoubtedly improve the realism and rigor of
interoperability training conducted at Army major training centers.
______
Questions Submitted to Thomas E. White
Question Submitted by Senator Ted Stevens
industrial base
Question. Secretary White, the decision not to modernize the
Counterattack Corps affects not only the Army, but the industrial base
as well. What steps do you plan to take to mitigate the adverse impact
on the industrial base as a result of the lack of modernization funding
in the fiscal year 2004 Army budget?
Answer. Army Transformation required cancellation of certain
programs to fund a variety of transformational initiatives to achieve
greater war fighting capability over the long term. We assessed the
risks to the industrial base from these program cancellations and,
where we judged necessary, we have taken steps to mitigate adverse
impacts. We saw two major risks to the industrial base as a result of
the decision to not modernize the Counterattack Corps. Both of these
risks involved maintaining viable armor system production capabilities
at two production facilities: the Lima Army Tank Plant in Ohio and the
United Defense combat vehicle production facility in York,
Pennsylvania.
The first risk involves the General Dynamics' combat vehicle
fabrication capability at the Lima Army Tank Plant. We judged that risk
as unacceptable since Lima initially had an insufficient workload to
remain viable as a production facility for the fabrication of the
Marine Corps' Advanced Amphibious Assault Vehicle and the Army's FCS
ground vehicles. To mitigate this risk, the Army has restructured some
programs and now has sufficient work to sustain Lima in active
production until these new programs are brought into production.
The second risk involved maintaining the United Defense's combat
vehicle production facility in Pennsylvania. We recognize that this
facility would also be a likely candidate to manufacture FCS ground
vehicles in the future. We expect that the production facilities in
Pennsylvania will remain viable and open through calendar year 2004
because of a continuation of their current fiscal year 2003 Bradley
upgrade work. With this expectation and acceptance of risk, we did not
program fiscal year 2004 funding for Bradley upgrades to protect that
portion of the industrial base.
While we cannot guarantee additional work from support for fielded
systems, foreign sales, and reprocessing vehicles from operations in
Iraq, the Army is looking hard at workload projections after calendar
year 2004 and identifying fiscal year 2005 options which might be
needed to protect any United Defense combat vehicle fabrication
capability determined essential for future production. Those options
will consider United Defense work on development of manned FCS non-line
of sight gun system, unmanned ground systems, foreign sales, and other
new non-traditional business. All of the other industrial base risks
from not funding the Counterattack Corps are judged acceptable.
We expect fiscal year 2003 funding and other work to keep essential
skills active through the end of calendar year 2004, given that final
vehicle deliveries are scheduled for June 2005. The program funding for
system sustainment and technical support will transition in fiscal year
2006 from procurement to the Operation and Maintenance, Army account.
We believe United Defense's engineering staff and the Army's own in-
house staff will be able to sustain the vehicles made by United
Defense.
The shortage of Bradley upgrade funding is manageable, but there
are two key issues we must address. The first issue is how we will fund
the required technical support to the fielded fleet. For fiscal year
2003, the Army will have to fund the technical support from operations
and maintenance accounts. That will present a problem for us because we
will be addressing not only peacetime requirements but also operational
requirements associated with the global war on terrorism and operations
in Iraq. Obviously, we will finance the highest priority operational
requirements first and defer those which are lower priority. A second
issue is whether key suppliers will abandon the supplier network as we
reduce requirements. This is a continuing problem, and we will do more
tradeoff analysis to support decisions, for example, to either
stockpile components or find alternate suppliers.
______
Questions Submitted by Senator Thad Cochran
unmanned aerial vehicles
Question. Unmanned Aerial Vehicles are proving to be extremely
valuable to our operations. Are we moving fast enough to procure UAV
systems that you believe are necessary to perform your missions?
Answer. The Army is proud to achieve the goal of bringing the first
Department of Defense UAV program into full-rate production in fiscal
year 2003 in the Shadow 200 Tactical UAV. The Army is meeting
deliveries associated with the fiscal year 2003 full-rate production
contract and is on schedule to complete the procurement of 41 systems
by fiscal year 2008 to meet the Army acquisition objective. We are
actively fielding the Shadow UAV systems and their soldiers to the
Army's divisions and Stryker Brigade Combat Teams. The Army is also
stationing several additional Hunter UAV units at the corps level and
as recently as November 2002, stationed its second Hunter company with
the XVIII Airborne Corps. By the end of this year, a third Hunter
company will be stationed with the V Corps in Germany. We anticipate
that Army UAVs will experience a high operational tempo as a key system
in any operations in Iraq.
Enlisted soldiers trained at Fort Huachuca, Arizona, operate our
UAVs. We approach UAV system acquisition as a total package to include
training, logistics, system design and performance, science and
technology transition, and life-cycle support. The Army budget for UAVs
ranges as part of the DOD UAV budget from about 17 percent in fiscal
year 2003 to an average of about 9 percent in fiscal year 2005-fiscal
year 2009, demonstrating a highly efficient and productive use of DOD
funds for UAVs. Use and demand for UAVs from combatant commanders,
trainers, and soldiers continues to remain high on all counts.
Question. Is the Army taking advantage of UAV work being undertaken
by the other Services, such as the Navy's work on Fire Scout, which is
based on a small, commercially available helicopter?
Answer. The Navy's Fire Scout program is in the research and
development phase of program maturity. Senior Army personnel have
observed the demonstration flights and are encouraged by the system
developments being undertaken this year, such as conversion of the
rotor system. The Army is considering various rotor wing technologies
to fill UAV roles. Programs ranging from the Defense Advanced Research
Programs Agency A-160 Hummingbird and the unmanned combat armed
rotorcraft programs, the Fire Scout, and the U.S. Coast Guard Eagle Eye
tilt rotor system are some of the potential candidates.
To further support inter-Service cooperation, the UAV program
office is developing a cooperative development memorandum of
understanding with the Navy and Air Force to share UAV program
information. The prime contractor for the Fire Scout, Northrop-Grumman,
is also the prime for the Global Hawk and the Army Hunter UAV system.
As the Army is actively converting the Hunter ground control stations
to the Army's standard production one-system ground control station in
fiscal year 2003 and fiscal year 2004, a similar conversion for the
Fire Scout should be affordable and feasible. AAI is the prime
contractor for the Army's TUAV Shadow system, which entered full rate
production in fiscal year 2003, and is the prime contractor for the
USMC Pioneer Improvement Program.
oil cleaning/filtering systems
Question. It is my understanding that the Army changes oil in the
engines of tanks, personnel carriers and helicopters at fixed
intervals. There are documented cases of large-scale diesel equipment
with over 1,000,000 miles of use on unchanged, but filtered, oil. Some
state National Guard units and state transportation agencies have
started to adopt this filter technology. Can you comment on the
applications in the Army that might benefit from an oil cleaning and
filtering system by Gulf Coast Filters of Gulfport, Mississippi, that
reduces and may completely eliminate the need for oil changes?
Answer. Gulf Coast Filters, Inc., has briefed the Army on their
bypass filter system, and we are conducting a study at Camp Shelby on
30 five-ton trucks belonging to the Mississippi National Guard. Gulf
Coast has briefed that their system can reduce services by five fold
and reduce maintenance failure by supplementing the primary filter and
using a finer filtration capability. This fine filtration will reduce
larger physical contaminants such as debris and dirt, but does not
detect or reduce other contaminants such as fuel, coolant, and water,
nor will it determine the status of the specified physical property of
the oil such as viscosity and additives.
Bypass filters do not detect the source of contamination or wear
metals caught in the filter. The Army oil change policy eliminates the
requirement for frequent oil changing based on hours/miles/calendar
days as specified by many technical manuals and lubrication orders. The
Army is interested in lubricants and what happens to them in extra
filtration systems such as Gulf Coast Filters. We are monitoring the
test at Camp Shelby to capture field data to continue our analysis.
______
Questions Submitted by Senator Arlen Specter
fcs vehicles
Question. Secretary White, the Army's FCS acquisition concept calls
for competitive and complementary production capabilities of the two
U.S. ground vehicle producers--General Dynamics and United Defense.
Both companies are needed to meet the Army's schedule for fielding the
manned ground variants of the Future Combat System (FCS).
Preservation of United Defense to produce these vehicles is
dependent upon whether or not fiscal year 2004 funding is provided to
it. Currently, no production funding is requested for combat vehicles
produced by UDLP. Without such funding, United Defense's production
facilities will shut down two years before FCS low-rate initial
production begins.
According to recent press reports, the Under Secretary of Defense
for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics was quoted as saying, ``We
must be able to protect at least two competent, cost-effective
competitors on every weapon system we have. It's our job to ensure our
industrial base supports that kind of philosophy.''
Given this situation, how does the Army intend to ensure that
United Defense is maintained as a competent, cost-effective competitor
to General Dynamics as well as a co-producer of the FCS manned ground
variants, given that almost none of the fiscal year 2004 budget request
for combat vehicles will go to United Defense and the same is true in
the out years?
Answer. Army Transformation required cancellation of certain
programs to fund a variety of transformational initiatives to achieve
greater war fighting capability over the long term. We assessed the
risks to the industrial base from these program cancellations and,
where we judged necessary, we have taken steps to mitigate adverse
impacts. We saw two major risks to the industrial base as a result of
the decision to not modernize the Counterattack Corps. Both of these
risks involved maintaining viable armor system production capabilities
at two production facilities: the Lima Army Tank Plant at Lima, Ohio,
and the United Defense combat vehicle production facility at York,
Pennsylvania.
The first risk involves the General Dynamics' combat vehicle
fabrication capability at the Lima Army Tank Plant. We judged that risk
as unacceptable since Lima initially had an insufficient workload to
remain viable as a production facility for the fabrication of the
Marine Corps' Advanced Amphibious Assault Vehicle and the Army's FCS
ground vehicles. To mitigate this risk, the Army has restructured some
programs and now has sufficient work to sustain Lima in active
production until these new programs are brought into production.
The second risk involved maintaining the United Defense's combat
vehicle production facility in Pennsylvania. We recognize that this
facility would also be a likely candidate to manufacture FCS ground
vehicles in the future. We expect that the production facilities in
Pennsylvania will remain viable and open through calendar year 2004
because of a continuation of their current fiscal year 2003 Bradley
upgrade work. With this expectation and acceptance of risk, we did not
program fiscal year 2004 funding for Bradley upgrades to protect that
portion of the industrial base.
While we cannot guarantee additional work from support for fielded
systems, foreign sales, and reprocessing vehicles from operations in
Iraq, the Army is looking hard at workload projections after calendar
year 2004 and identifying fiscal year 2005 options which might be
needed to protect any United Defense combat vehicle fabrication
capability determined essential for future production. Those options
will consider United Defense work on development of manned FCS non-line
of sight gun system, unmanned ground systems, foreign sales, and other
new non-traditional business. All of the other industrial base risks
from not funding the Counterattack Corps are judged acceptable.
Question. If the Army intends to let United Defense shutter its
combat vehicle manufacturing plant, how does it propose to cost-
effectively support/upgrade the many vehicles manufactured by United
Defense--Bradley Fighting Vehicles, tank recovery vehicles, self-
propelled howitzers--that are forecast to be in the inventory for many
years to come?
Answer. We do not expect that United Defense will close its combat
vehicle manufacturing plant. We expect fiscal year 2003 funding and
other work to keep essential skills active through the end of calendar
year 2004, given that final vehicle deliveries are scheduled for June
2005.
The program funding for Bradley system sustainment and technical
support will transition in fiscal year 2006 from procurement to the
Operation and Maintenance, Army account. We believe United Defense's
engineering staff and the Army's own in-house staff will be able to
sustain the vehicles made by United Defense.
The shortage of Bradley upgrade funding is manageable, but there
are two key issues we must address. The first issue is how we will fund
the required technical support to the fielded fleet. For fiscal year
2003, the Army will have to fund the technical support from operations
and maintenance accounts. That will present a problem for us because we
will be addressing not only peacetime requirements but operational
requirements associated with the global war on terrorism and operations
in Iraq. Obviously, we will finance the highest priority operational
requirements first and defer those which are lower priority. A second
issue is whether key suppliers will abandon the supplier network as we
reduce requirements. This is a continuing problem, and we will do more
tradeoff analysis to support decisions, for example, to either
stockpile components or find alternate suppliers.
Question. Doesn't it make sense to preserve United Defense's combat
vehicle manufacturing capabilities when doing so would simultaneously
meet equipment modernization requirements of the Army National Guard or
maintain previously planned upgrades to an additional division of the
heavy counterattack force?
Answer. The Army recognizes the industrial base capability and
contributions of both United Defense and government-owned depot
facilities. In respect to United Defense, the Army recognizes the
potential contribution that they could make in support of FCS
production, projected to begin in the fiscal year 2007 timeframe. The
Army leadership is currently considering a 3rd Armored Cavalry Regiment
modernization strategy that encompasses both the Abrams Tank and
Bradley Fighting Vehicles and intends to provide requested information
to Congress as soon as possible. As a total force, the Army will
continue to support Congressional funding focused on Army National
Guard heavy force modernization.
Question. Secretary White, in the Army's fiscal year 2004 Posture
Statement, General Shinseki and yourself noted: ``In general, the Army
increased funding for programs that are clearly transformational and
support the Defense transformational goals, sustained funding for high
priority systems that will transition to the Objective Force, and
reduced funding for systems not essential to Army Transformation. The
operational risk associated with the decreased funding for certain
current programs is acceptable as long as we field Stryker Brigades on
schedule and accelerate the fielding of the Objective Force for arrival
this decade.''
Given the Army's job to preserve competition in the industrial base
and the risk to the FCS program costs if it is not, is the risk to the
armored vehicle sector acceptable as long as the Army fields Stryker
Brigades on schedule and accelerates the initial fielding of the
Objective Force?
Answer. The Army judges the risk acceptable. I have asked the Army
to look hard at those workload projections for current producers and
identify alternatives which might be needed to protect any combat
vehicle fabrication capability we determine essential for future
production. Those options will consider United Defense work on
development of manned FCS non-line of sight gun system, unmanned ground
systems, foreign sales, and other new non-traditional business. All of
the other industrial base risks from not funding the Counterattack
Corps are judged acceptable.
army heritage and education center
Question. Secretary White, in 2000 the Army leadership made a
commitment to staff the Army Heritage and Education Center at Carlisle
Barracks with 79 people when it was completed. In light of that
commitment, the Cumberland County Commissioners granted 54 acres of
land for the project and the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania provided $10
million. At present, the facility is suffering because it is
understaffed.
What are the Army's plans for staffing the Army Heritage and
Education Center?
Answer. The Army Heritage and Education Center (AHEC) will move
into their new facility in the spring/summer of fiscal year 2004. There
is still much work to be done in the meantime. AHEC is hiring 21 new
employees this year that will bring them up to 54. AHEC has funding for
54 this year and fiscal year 2004. A U.S. Army Manpower Analysis Agency
study recommended they hire 18 additional employees for fiscal year
2004, which will give them 72. The study also recommend AHEC add two
more positions in fiscal year 2005 and another five in fiscal year
2006, which would bring AHEC to their recommended total of 79 staff
members.
______
Questions Submitted by Senator Pete V. Domenici
white sands/third wave outsourcing plan
Question. Mr. Secretary, I have reviewed your testimony regarding
the Army's Third Wave initiative. And I strongly agree with your
objective of seeking the best value for our taxpayers' dollar. We all
want that. But I do have some questions about the process the Army has
put in place to implement competitive outsourcing.
First, it seems to me that determining what jobs are core and what
jobs are non-core is a very difficult thing. Clearly, certain routine
maintenance duties are not fundamental to the Army's warfighting
mission. But other activities that are not part of the warfighting
mission per se have a very close relationship to how the warfighter
performs.
For example, many of the engineers and skilled DOD personnel in the
test and evaluation field provide critical performance data about the
systems used on the battlefield. To me, this is clearly connected to
warfighting.
Would you provide your assessment of where test and evaluation
activities fit into the Third Wave proposal?
Answer. The test and evaluation function is exempt from the A-76
competitive sourcing process. Congress has, in fact, in Section 802 of
Public Law 96-107, 10 U.S. Code, Section 114, note, barred the use of
A-76 procedures in connection with the obligation or expenditure of
research, development, test or evaluation funds, except for the
operation or support of installations or equipment used for research
and development (including maintenance support of laboratories,
operation and maintenance of test ranges, and maintenance of test
aircraft and ships). OMB Circular A-76 incorporates this statutory
restriction. These restrictions do not foreclose alternatives to the A-
76 process, and such alternatives may merit further consideration in
these functional areas. The Department will not pursue those
alternatives, however, without consulting with Congress and seeking
enabling legislation where appropriate. At this stage, the decision-
making is still pre-decisional with regard to the test and evaluation
function with regard to alternatives to A-76.
Question. Has the Army completed its study of non-core functions
that are to be exempted from outsourcing? If not, when will these
exemptions be determined?
Answer. The Army recently completed the exemption phase of its
study of non-core functions that are to be exempted from outsourcing.
The Assistant Secretary of the Army for Manpower and Reserve Affairs
made 24 exemption decisions. The exemption decisions will be provided
to the Defense oversight committees as soon as those meetings can be
scheduled.
Question. The issue of security is also very important. It is my
understanding that security personnel and firefighters are exempted
from the Third Wave plan by law. Can you confirm that guards and fire
personnel will remain within DOD?
Answer. Yes, security guards and firefighters are exempted from the
Third Wave plan by law. Title 10, U.S. Code, Section 2465, generally
requires government employees to perform security guard and firefighter
functions at installations located in the United States unless the
installation becomes a contractor-operated facility. The issue of
adequate force protection, since 9/11, is a paramount concern. We
appreciate the limited Congressional relief mitigating somewhat the
restrictions of title 10, U.S. Code, Section 2465. Section 332 of the
Bob Stump National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2003,
Public Law 107-314, provides a basis in some circumstances for
arranging for performance by local municipalities of increased
security-guard functions since September 11, 2001. The Department will
comply with these statutes unless Congress provides further relief.
______
Questions Submitted by Senator Tom Harkin
iowa army ammunition plant
Question. The Iowa Army Ammunition Plant (IAAP) is currently
undergoing cleanup as a Superfund site due mostly to contamination by
high explosives from the ammunition. Secretary White, would the Defense
Department proposals for changes to CERCLA and other environmental laws
remove IAAP from the Superfund program? If not, please explain why IAAP
would not be covered by the exemption. If so, please explain why it
would be beneficial to IAAP and the surrounding community for the site
to be removed from CERCLA protections.
Answer. The Defense Department proposals for Readiness and Range
Preservation would not remove IAAP from the Superfund program. DOD's
Resource Conservation and Recovery Act (RCRA), and Comprehensive
Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liabilities Act (CERCLA)
legislative proposals clarify when RCRA and CERCLA apply at military
ranges. IAAP is addressing contamination from ammunition assembling
operations, which is distinct from military range activities.
Question. The Army is currently conducting health studies of the
workers and former workers at the IAAP site, alongside similar DOE
studies of former workers at the nuclear weapons facility at the site.
Please update me on the status of the studies, of the contracting
the work, and of release of appropriated funds.
Answer. In response to 2000 and 2001 legislation, DOD is
identifying past and current IAAP DOD workers and notifying them of
possible exposures. The workers have been provided DOD guidance to
facilitate discussions with appropriate officials and health care
providers. As directed, a health study of the IAAP workers has been
developed. The U.S. Army Center for Health Promotion and Preventive
Medicine (USACHPPM) has contracted with the College of Public Health at
the University of Iowa (UI) to perform the study. As part of Phase I of
the DOD study, UI has identified over 38,000 current and former IAAP
workers. The health study protocol has received Human Subjects
Institutional Review Board (IRB) approval from UI. In January 2003,
USACHPPM received the revised health study protocol from UI. As part of
USACHPPM's contract approval process, USACHPPM reviewed UI's health
study protocol to ensure it is ethically and scientifically sound, and
that the research complies with the Health Insurance Portability and
Accountability Act (HIPAA). USACHPPM also arranged for peer review of
the health study protocol by the Armed Forces Epidemiology Board and
the DOE Central Beryllium IRB Committee. The final recommendations of
the peer review groups are expected by the end of April 2003. USACHPPM
will then share the recommendations with UI, and incorporate changes
with the UI researchers. An additional $1 million of Congressional
funds for fiscal year 2003 has been received by USACHPPM. Modifications
to the existing contract are underway to incorporate this additional
funding.
Question. Congress directed that testing of workers for chronic
beryllium disease be part of this study. Please update me on the status
of and plans for conducting this testing.
Answer. The DOD IAAP study will contain a complete exposure health
history. Testing for chronic beryllium disease is complex and is under
evaluation through additional expert peer review. Specific beryllium
testing will be performed pending the recommendations of this expert
review.
rock island arsenal
Question. Industrial Mobilization Capacity (IMC, formerly UPC)
funds are critical to the arsenals to pay for capacity that is
maintained for national wartime requirements, not for current
contracts, and thus to keep overhead rates reasonable. Last year
Congress approved full funding of IMC, including $14.8 million for Rock
Island Arsenal. Section 8109 of the Defense Appropriations bill did cut
the working capital funds by 8 percent, but with the proviso ``that
these reductions shall be applied proportionally to each budget
activity, activity group, and subactivity group and each program,
project, and activity within each appropriation account.'' Yet I
understand that based on this cut, IMC funding for each of the arsenals
was cut by more than 50 percent.
Were the reductions in Section 8109 applied proportionally to each
budget activity, activity group, and subactivity group and each
program, project, and activity within each appropriation account? If
not, please explain how the distribution of the cuts meets
Congressional direction.
Answer. Section 8109 of the conference report reduced the amount of
the budget request by $400 million ``to reduce cost growth in
information technology development.'' The report allocated $148.6
million of the decrement to Defense Working Capital Fund (DWCF) and
this reduction was enacted.
The DWCF appropriation of $1,784.956 million was reduced by $148.6
million. After protecting the Defense Commissary Agency ($969 million),
the remaining reduction was spread to all activities. The Army's
portion of the DWCF funding request was $316 million, which consisted
of $89 million for war reserves, $100 million for spare parts
augmentation, and $127 million for IMC funding. Army's share of the
reduction was $67 million.
It wasn't feasible for the Army to apply the reduction to the war
reserves or to the spares augmentation. The war reserve funds had
already been obligated, and the Army was already experiencing
shortfalls in spares funding. The Army's only viable alternative was to
take the reduction in the IMC requirement. The funding reduction was
allocated pro rata to the IMC requirements of the eight ordnance and
five depot maintenance activities.
Question. Does the Army have any plans to restore the IMC funding
for fiscal year 2003?
Answer. The fiscal year 2003 DWCF included full funding for the IMC
requirement, which was $119.7 million for the ordnance activities and
$7.3 million for the depot maintenance activities. The DWCF
appropriation was decremented $148 million, in the conference report
(H.R. 107-732) for the Fiscal Year 2003 Defense Appropriations Act
(Public Law 107-248, Title V). The Army's share, $67 million, was
applied to the IMC funding. Given the competing demands for limited
funds, it is unlikely the Army will be able to restore the reduction.
The losses from this reduction could be recovered in future
appropriations; otherwise, the loss will be recovered in the ordnance
and depot maintenance customer rates for fiscal year 2005.
Question. Can you ensure us that if Congress approves funding for
IMC in fiscal year 2004, it will actually be used for that purpose?
Answer. If Congress appropriates money to the Army Working Capital
Fund in fiscal year 2004 for IMC, that money will be used for that
purpose.
ground services industrial enterprise (gsie) plan
Question. In recent weeks the arsenals have been moving to
implement the GSIE plan to rationalize their workload and make them
more efficient, while keeping them as part of the federal organic base.
Yet at the same time they have been buffeted by a RAND study that
reportedly recommended formation of a government corporation, by Third
Wave plans for privatization, and of course by rumors about the
impending base closure round. I am concerned that the GSIE initiative
will not be given time to work before some other privatization or
reorganization plan is approved. Do you plan to give the arsenals time
to implement the GSIE plan without making other major changes that
could interfere with that effort?
Answer. Formation of the Ground Systems Industrial Enterprise has
been approved, and the Army leadership will be updated regularly on the
progress toward operating efficiently without the need for subsidies.
We are also responding to the Office of the Secretary of Defense on
this. We do not anticipate that any action will be taken to change the
GSIE operating structure before the Army has had a chance to assess the
progress towards this objective.
high mobility trailers and waste
Question. One of the programs I have followed with great interest
is the purchase of high mobility trailers for the humvees. After many
years, these trailers have supposedly been fixed. How many of these
trailers are now in use in the field? How many humvees have been
modified to pull them?
Answer. The High Mobility Trailer has been renamed the Light
Tactical Trailer. Approximately 5,200 trailers have been fielded to
date, and over 10,500 humvees have been modified to pull them.
Question. Have there been any problems with the trailers that are
in use?
Answer. No. They are operating quite well, as we expected.
Question. What are your current plans for purchase of additional
trailers that I understand are still needed?
Answer. The Army plans to procure 5,094 trailers beginning in
fiscal year 2004 through fiscal year 2009. In fiscal year 2004, we plan
to procure 576 for $9.5 million; in fiscal year 2005, 713 for $11.1
million; in fiscal year 2006, 550 for $8.7 million; in fiscal year
2007, 1,510 for $22.1 million; in fiscal year 2008, 888 for $13.7
million; and in fiscal year 2009, 857 for $13.5 million. The contract
will be a competitive, firm fixed-price contract. The fiscal year 2004
contract is scheduled for award in March 2004.
SUBCOMMITTEE RECESS
Senator Inouye. And I would like to thank you on behalf of
all of us for your appearance this morning, and thank you for
your testimony, and General Shinseki, I think everyone here
expressed the sentiment that I would say is felt by the Senate.
We thank you for your service, sir.
General Shinseki. Thank you, Senator. Obviously, without
saying, the service in this position has been the high point of
anyone's service in uniform, but along with that, working with
the members of this committee and patriots in the Congress on
other committees has certainly been a very special privilege
for this soldier, and I thank you all for your support.
Senator Inouye. In a few weeks I hope to travel to Hawaii,
where we will have the 60th anniversary of the formation of my
combat team, the one that I served in, made up of Japanese
Americans, and I can assure you that the men in the regiment
are very proud of you, sir.
General Shinseki. Thank you, sir.
Senator Inouye. Our next hearing of the Defense
Subcommittee is scheduled for Wednesday, March 26, at 10 a.m.
in Dirksen 192. With that, the hearing is recessed. Thank you
very much.
Mr. White. Thank you, sir.
[Whereupon, at 11:43 a.m., Wednesday, March 19, the
subcommittee was recessed, to reconvene at 10 a.m., Wednesday,
March 26.]