[Senate Hearing 108-158]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
DEPARTMENTS OF COMMERCE, JUSTICE, AND STATE, THE JUDICIARY, AND RELATED
AGENCIES APPROPRIATIONS FOR FISCAL YEAR 2004
----------
THURSDAY, MARCH 6, 2003
U.S. Senate,
Subcommittee of the Committee on Appropriations,
Washington, DC.
The subcommittee met at 9:58 a.m., in room SD-192, Dirksen
Senate Office Building, Hon. Judd Gregg (chairman) presiding.
Present: Senators Gregg, Stevens, Hollings, Leahy, and
Kohl.
DEPARTMENT OF STATE
Office of the Secretary
STATEMENT OF HON. COLIN L. POWELL, SECRETARY OF STATE
opening statement of senator judd gregg
Senator Gregg. Let me begin by thanking Secretary Powell
for taking the time to appear before the Subcommittee on
Commerce, State, Justice of the Appropriations Committee, which
has the jurisdiction over the State Department appropriations.
I offered the Secretary the opportunity of taking a pass on
this hearing, given the situation in which we find ourselves
right now relative to diplomatic activity. But he was still
generous enough to be willing to take some time to come up
here, which I do greatly appreciate. And I know Senator
Hollings also appreciates his commitment to the process, the
appropriations process.
We have said to the Secretary that we will get him out of
here on a prompt time frame, certainly no later than 11:30,
hopefully even earlier. So we are going to forego opening
statements on our part, turn to the Secretary and have his
opening statement. And we do have a vote at 10:30. So we may
stagger the questioning here. But then we will go to questions.
Mr. Secretary.
opening statement of secretary powell
Secretary Powell. Well, thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
It is a great pleasure to be back before the committee. I do
thank you, also, for giving me a hall pass, if I had needed one
today. It is a busy time for us in the diplomatic community. I
will be heading up to New York this afternoon to work with my
colleagues at the United Nations. But I really did want to be
here because it is also an important part of my job to make
sure that I present to the Congress our budget request and then
appear to testify for that budget request, because the quality
of our diplomacy depends on whether or not we get the support
we need for the wonderful men and women of the State Department
and for the facilities and other items that we need to make
sure we can do our job in the most effective way.
I do have a prepared statement for the record, which I
would offer, Mr. Chairman. And I would summarize that very
briefly.
Senator Gregg. That will be put in the record.
Secretary Powell. I am pleased to appear before you to
testify in support of the President's International Affairs
Budget for fiscal year 2004. The funding request for 2004 for
the Department of State, USAID, and other foreign affairs
agencies is, overall, $28.5 billion. I have given you a great
deal of detail on this request in my written statement. And I
hope you will find it useful, as you go through your
deliberations.
The President's budget will allow the United States to
target security and economic assistance to sustain key
countries supporting us in the war on terrorism and helping us
to stem the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. The
budget will help us launch the Millennium Challenge Account, a
new partnership generating support that will go to countries
that rule justly, invest in their people, and encourage
economic freedom.
It will also strengthen the United States and global
commitment to fighting HIV/AIDS and alleviating human
hardships. It will allow us to combat illegal drugs in the
Andean Region of South America, as well as bolster democracy in
one of that region's most important countries, Colombia.
Finally, it will reinforce America's world-class diplomatic
force, focusing on the people, places, and tools needed to
promote our foreign policies around the world.
I am particularly proud of that last goal, Mr. Chairman,
because, as you know, for the past 2 years I have concentrated
on each aspect of my responsibilities, as foreign policy
advisor to the President and Chairman and CEO of the Department
of State. What you need in a large organization is to have the
very best people come in and, once they are in, to take care of
them.
So we are asking for your full support of our Diplomatic
Readiness Initiative. For 2 years, we have been hiring for the
first time in years. We will hire, with this budget request,
399 more professionals to help the President carry out the
Nation's foreign policy. This hiring will bring us to the
1,100-plus new Foreign and Civil Service officers we set out to
hire when I first came into the job 2-plus years ago.
I thank this committee and I thank the Congress for the
support that it has provided, not only for our Diplomatic
Readiness Initiative, but also for our overall operating
accounts over the last several years.
Second, I promised to bring state-of-the-art communications
capability to the Department, because people who cannot
communicate rapidly and effectively in today's globalizing
world cannot carry out our foreign policy. We are doing very
well in that regard in both unclassified and classified
communications capability, including desktop access to the
Internet for every man and woman in the Department. We are
moving rapidly. We are almost there. The $157 million budget
request before you will put us there.
Finally, with respect to my CEO role, I wanted to sweep the
slate clean and completely revamp the way we construct our
Embassies and other overseas buildings, as well as improve on
the manner in which we secure our men and women who occupy
those facilities. That last task is a long-term, almost never-
ending one, particularly in this time of heightened terrorist
activities. But we are well on the way to implementing both the
construction and security tasks in a better way, in a less
expensive way, and in a way that subsequent CEOs of the
Department can continue and improve upon.
I am very happy at the work we have done in Embassy
construction and security over the past few years under the
leadership of General Williams, who you all have come to know.
I need your continued support for the $1.5 billion for Embassy
security and construction and the $646 million in D&CP funding
for worldwide security upgrades.
Mr. Chairman, as the principal foreign policy advisor to
the President, I have budget priorities on that side of my
portfolio, as well. So let me highlight a few of our key
foreign policy priorities before I stop and take your
questions.
I might note that one of the successes of our foreign
policy was the Moscow Treaty, which reduced significantly the
number of strategic offensive weapons held by the United States
and the Russian Federation. That treaty is now on the Senate
floor. I hope that it will be acted on promptly. I encourage
your support for this treaty. With a little bit of luck and
with my fingers crossed, it might even be voted on today, when
remaining amendments, proposed amendments, have been dealt
with.
The fiscal year 2004 budget proposes several initiatives to
advance U.S. national security interests and preserve American
leadership. The fiscal year 2004 Foreign Operations budget that
funds programs for the Department of State, USAID, and other
foreign agencies is $18.8 billion. Today, our number one
priority is to fight and win the global war on terrorism. The
budget furthers this goal by providing economic, military, and
democracy assistance to key foreign partners and allies,
including $4.7 billion to those countries that have joined us
in the war on terrorism.
Of this amount, the President's budget provides $657
million for Afghanistan, $460 million for Jordan, $395 million
for Pakistan, $255 million for Turkey, $136 million for
Indonesia, and $87 million for the Philippines. In Afghanistan,
the funding will be used to fulfill our commitment to rebuild
Afghanistan's road network. In addition, it will help establish
security in the country through the creation of a national
military, as well as a national police force. Our assistance
will establish broad-based and accountable governance
throughout democratic institutions in Afghanistan by fostering
an active civil society.
I am very pleased at what we have been able to do in
Afghanistan over the last 1\1/2\ years. Some ask whether the
glass is half empty or half full. Well, there is still a long
way to go in Afghanistan. But, we should be very proud of what
we have been able to accomplish. President Karzai was here
earlier this week, and we had good discussions with him.
When you consider we came from nothing, from zero, from
nothing, from a ruined country to a country that now has a
representative form of government--they have spoken out for the
leader that they want to have as their president. They are
getting ready for an election next year. A constitution is well
underway. Roads are under construction. Two million refugees
have returned. Two million people that have been living in
other lands, in Iran, in Pakistan, have voted with their feet
for this new country and for the leadership that it is under.
They are also counting on our full support to rebuild that
country. I think we should be very proud of what we have done.
I also want to emphasize our efforts to decrease threats
posed by terrorist groups, rogue states, and other nonstate
actors with regards to weapons of mass destruction and related
technology. To achieve this goal, we must strengthen
partnerships with countries that share our views in dealing
with the threat of terrorism and in resolving regional
conflicts. The fiscal year 2004 budget requests support for the
Nonproliferation and Disarmament Fund. The budget also
increases funding for overseas Export Controls and Border
Security and supports additional funding for Science Centers
and Bio-Chem Redirection Programs.
Funding increases requested for these programs will help us
prevent weapons of mass destruction from falling into the hands
of terrorist groups or states by preventing their movement
across borders and destroying or safeguarding known quantities
of weapons or source material.
The fiscal year 2004 budget also promotes international
peace and prosperity by launching the most innovative approach
to foreign assistance in more than 40 years. The new Millennium
Challenge Account, an independent Government corporation funded
at $1.3 billion, will redefine development aid. As President
Bush told African leaders meeting in Mauritius earlier this
year, this aid will go to those nations that encourage economic
freedom, root out corruption, put in place the rule of law,
respect the rights of their people, and have made a firm
commitment to democracy.
Moreover, the President's budget request offers hope and a
helping hand to countries facing health catastrophes, poverty
and despair, and humanitarian disasters. The budget includes
more than $1 billion to meet the needs of refugees and
internally displaced peoples.
The fiscal year 2004 budget also provides more than $1.3
billion to combat the global HIV/AIDS epidemic, the worst
crisis facing this world. The President's total budget for HIV/
AIDS is over $2 billion, which includes the first year's
funding for the new emergency plan for HIV/AIDS relief
announced by the President in his State of the Union address.
This funding will target 14 of the hardest hit countries,
especially in Africa and the Caribbean.
The budget also includes almost $500 million for Colombia.
This funding will support Colombian President Uribe's unified
campaign against terrorists and the drug trade that fuels their
activities. The aim is to secure democracy, extend security,
and restore economic prosperity to Colombia, and prevent the
narco-terrorists from spreading instability to the broader
Andean Region.
Accomplishing these goals requires more than simply funding
for Colombia. Therefore, our total Andean Counterdrug
Initiative is $731 million. Critical components of this effort
include resumption of the Airbridge Denial Program to stop
internal and cross-border aerial trafficking in illicit drugs,
stepped up eradication and alternative development efforts, and
technical assistance to strengthen Colombia's police and
judicial institutions.
Mr. Chairman, members of the committee, to advance
America's interests around the world, we need the dollars in
the President's budget for fiscal year 2004. We need the
dollars under both of my hats, as principal foreign policy
advisor to the President, as well as CEO of the Department of
State.
prepared statement
With that, Mr. Chairman, I will stop and be as responsive
as I can to your questions.
[The statement follows:]
Prepared Statement of Colin L. Powell
Mr. Chairman, members of the subcommittee, I am pleased to appear
before you to testify in support of the President's International
Affairs Budget for fiscal year 2004. Funding requested for fiscal year
2004 for the Department of State, USAID, and other foreign affairs
agencies is $28.5 billion.
The President's Budget will allow the United States to:
--Target security and economic assistance to sustain key countries
supporting us in the war on terrorism and helping us to stem
the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction;
--Launch the Millennium Challenge Account--a new partnership
generating support to countries that rule justly, invest in
their people, and encourage economic freedom;
--Strengthen the U.S. and global commitment to fighting HIV/AIDS and
alleviating humanitarian hardships;
--Combat illegal drugs in the Andean Region of South America, as well
as bolster democracy in one of that region's most important
countries, Colombia; and
--Reinforce America's world-class diplomatic force, focusing on the
people, places, and tools needed to promote our foreign
policies around the world.
I am particularly proud of the last bullet, Mr. Chairman, because
for the past two years I have concentrated on each of my jobs--primary
foreign policy advisor to the President and Chief Executive Officer of
the State Department.
Under my CEO hat, we have been reinforcing our diplomatic force for
two years and we will continue in fiscal year 2004. We will hire 399
more professionals to help the President carry out the nation's foreign
policy. This hiring will bring us to the 1,100-plus new foreign and
civil service officers we set out to hire over the first three years to
bring the Department's personnel back in line with its diplomatic
workload. Moreover, completion of these hires will allow us the
flexibility to train and educate all of our officers as they should be
trained and educated. So I am proud of that accomplishment and want to
thank you for helping me bring it about.
In addition, I promised to bring state-of-the-art communications
capability to the Department--because people who can't communicate
rapidly and effectively in today's globalizing world can't carry out
our foreign policy. We are approaching our goal in that regard as well.
In both unclassified and classified communications capability,
including desk-top access to the Internet for every man and woman at
State, we are there by the end of 2003. The budget before you will
sustain these gains and continue our information technology
modernization effort. Finally, with respect to my CEO role, I wanted to
sweep the slate clean and completely revamp the way we construct our
embassies and other overseas buildings, as well as improve the way we
secure our men and women who occupy them. As you well know, that last
task is a long-term, almost never-ending one, particularly in this time
of heightened terrorist activities. But we are well on the way to
implementing both the construction and the security tasks in a better
way, in a less expensive way, and in a way that subsequent CEOs can
continue and improve on.
Mr. Chairman, since this subcommittee's oversight responsibilities
are primarily concerned with my CEO hat, let me give you key details
with respect to these three main priorities, as well as tell you about
other initiatives under my CEO hat:
the ceo responsibilities: state department and related agencies
The President's fiscal year 2004 discretionary request for the
Department of State and Related Agencies is $8.497 billion. The
requested funding will allow us to:
--Continue initiatives to recruit, hire, train, and deploy the right
work force. The budget request includes $97 million to complete
the Diplomatic Readiness Initiative by hiring 399 additional
foreign affairs professionals. Foreign policy is carried out
through our people, and rebuilding America's diplomatic
readiness in staffing will ensure that the Department can
respond to crises and emerging foreign policy priorities. This
is the third year of funding for this initiative, which will
provide a total of 1,158 new staff for the Department of State.
--Continue to put information technology in the service of diplomacy.
The budget request includes $157 million to sustain the
investments made over the last two years to provide classified
connectivity to every post that requires it and to expand
desktop access to the Internet for State Department employees.
Combined with $114 million in estimated Expedited Passport
Fees, a total of $271 million will be available for information
technology investments, including beginning a major
initiative--SMART--that will overhaul the outdated systems for
cables, messaging, information sharing, and document archiving.
--Continue to upgrade and enhance our security worldwide. The budget
request includes $646.7 million for programs to enhance the
security of our diplomatic facilities and personnel serving
abroad and for hiring 85 additional security and support
professionals to sustain the Department's Worldwide Security
Upgrades program.
--Continue to upgrade the security of our overseas facilities. The
budget request includes $1.514 billion to fund major security-
related construction projects and address the major physical
security and rehabilitation needs of embassies and consulates
around the world. The request includes $761.4 million for
construction of secure embassy compounds in seven countries and
$128.3 million for construction of a new embassy building in
Berlin.
--The budget also supports management improvements to the overseas
buildings program and the Overseas Building Operations (OBO)
long-range plan. The budget proposes a Capital Security Cost
Sharing Program that allocates the capital costs of new
overseas facilities to all U.S. Government agencies on the
basis of the number of their authorized overseas positions.
This program will serve two vital purposes: (1) to accelerate
construction of new embassy compounds and (2) to encourage
Federal agencies to evaluate their overseas positions more
carefully. In doing so, it will further the President's
Management Agenda initiative to rightsize the official American
presence abroad. The modest surcharge to the cost of stationing
an American employee overseas will not undermine vital overseas
work, but it will encourage more efficient management of
personnel and taxpayer funds.
--Continue to enhance the Border Security Program. The budget request
includes $736 million in Machine Readable Visa (MRV) fee
revenues for continuous improvements in consular systems,
processes, and programs in order to protect U.S. borders
against the illegal entry of individuals who would do us harm.
--Meet our obligations to international organizations. Fulfilling
U.S. commitments is vital to building coalitions and gaining
support for U.S. interests and policies in the war against
terrorism and the spread of weapons of mass destruction. The
budget request includes $1 billion to fund U.S. assessments to
44 international organizations, including $71.4 million to
support renewed U.S. membership in the United Nations
Educational, Scientific, and Cultural Organization (UNESCO).
--Support obligations to international peacekeeping activities. The
budget request includes $550.2 million to pay projected U.N.
peacekeeping assessments. These peacekeeping activities ensure
continued American leadership in shaping the international
community's response to developments that threaten
international peace and stability.
Continue to eliminate support for terrorists and thus deny them
safe haven through our ongoing public diplomacy activities, our
educational and cultural exchange programs, and international
broadcasting. The budget request includes $296.9 million for public
diplomacy, including information and cultural programs carried out by
overseas missions and supported by public diplomacy personnel in our
regional and functional bureaus. These resources are used to engage,
inform, and influence foreign publics and broaden dialogue between
American citizens and institutions and their counterparts abroad.
The budget request also includes $345.3 million for educational and
cultural exchange programs that build mutual understanding and develop
friendly relations between America and the peoples of the world. These
activities establish the trust, confidence, and international
cooperation with other countries that sustain and advance the full
range of American national interests.
The budget request includes $100 million for education and cultural
exchanges for States of the Former Soviet Union and Central and Eastern
Europe, which were previously funded under the FREEDOM Support Act and
Support for East European Democracy (SEED) accounts.
As a member of the Broadcasting Board of Governors, I want to take
this opportunity to highlight to you the BBG's pending budget request
for $563.5 million. Funding will advance international broadcasting
efforts to support the war on terrorism, including initiation of the
Middle East Television Network.
Mr. Chairman, I know that your committee staff will go over this
statement with a fine-tooth comb and I know too that they prefer an
account-by-account laydown. So here it is:
Diplomatic and Consular Programs (D&CP)
The fiscal year 2004 request for D&CP, the State Department's chief
operating account, totals $4.164 billion.
D&CP supports the diplomatic activities and programs that
constitute the first line of offense against threats to the security
and prosperity of the American people. Together with Machine Readable
Visa and other fees, the account funds the operating expenses and
infrastructure necessary for carrying out U.S. foreign policy in more
than 260 locations around the world.
The fiscal year 2004 D&CP request provides $3.517 billion for
ongoing operations--a net increase of $269 million over the fiscal year
2003 level. Increased funding will enable the State Department to
advance national interests effectively through improved diplomatic
readiness, particularly in human resources.
The request completes the Department's three-year Diplomatic
Readiness Initiative to put the right people with the right skills in
the right place at the right time. New D&CP funding in fiscal year 2004
of $97 million will allow the addition of 399 professionals, providing
a total of 1,158 new staff from fiscal year 2002 through fiscal year
2004.
The fiscal year 2004 D&CP request also provides $646.7 million for
Worldwide Security Upgrades--an increase of $97.3 million over last
year. This total includes $504.6 million to continue worldwide security
programs for guard protection, physical security equipment and
technical support, information and system security, and security
personnel and training. It also includes $43.4 million to expand the
perimeter security enhancement program for 232 posts and $98.7 million
for improvements in domestic and overseas protection programs,
including 85 additional agents and other security professionals.
Capital Investment Fund (CIF)
The fiscal year 2004 request provides $157 million for the CIF to
assure that the investments made in fiscal year 2002 and fiscal year
2003 keep pace with increased demand from users for functionality and
speed.
Requested funding includes $15 million for the State Messaging and
Archive Retrieval Toolset (SMART). The SMART initiative will replace
outdated systems for cables and messages with a unified system that
adds information sharing and document archiving.
Embassy Security, Construction, and Maintenance (ESCM)
The fiscal year 2004 request for ESCM is $1.514 billion. This
total--an increase of $259.1 million over the fiscal year 2003 level--
reflects the Administration's continuing commitment to protect U.S.
Government personnel serving abroad, improve the security posture of
facilities overseas, and address serious deficiencies in the State
Department's overseas infrastructure.
For the ongoing ESCM budget, the Administration is requesting
$524.7 million. This budget includes maintenance and repairs at
overseas posts, facility rehabilitation projects, construction
security, renovation of the Harry S Truman Building, all activities
associated with leasing overseas properties, and management of the
overseas buildings program.
For Worldwide Security Construction, the Administration is
requesting $761.4 million for the next tranche of security-driven
construction projects to replace high-risk facilities. Funding will
support the construction of secure embassies in seven countries--
Algeria, Burma, Ghana, Indonesia, Panama, Serbia, and Togo. In
addition, the requested funding will provide new on-compound buildings
for USAID in Ghana, Jamaica, and Nigeria.
The ESCM request includes $100 million to strengthen compound
security at vulnerable posts.
The request also includes $128.3 million to construct the new U.S.
embassy building in Berlin.
Educational and Cultural Exchange Programs (ECE)
The fiscal year 2004 request of $345.3 million for ECE maintains
funding for exchanges at the fiscal year 2003 level of $244 million and
adds $100 million for projects for Eastern Europe and the States of the
Former Soviet Union previously funded from Foreign Operations
appropriations.
Authorized by the Mutual Educational and Cultural Exchange Act of
1961 (Fulbright-Hays Act), as amended, exchanges are strategic
activities that build mutual understanding and develop friendly
relations between the United States and other countries. They establish
the trust, confidence, and international cooperation necessary to
sustain and advance the full range of U.S. national interests.
The request provides $141 million for Academic Programs. These
include the J. William Fulbright Educational Exchange Program for
exchange of students, scholars, and teachers and the Hubert H. Humphrey
Fellowship Program for academic study and internships in the United
States for mid-career professionals from developing countries.
The request also provides $73 million for Professional and Cultural
Exchanges. These include the International Visitor Program, which
supports travel to the United States by current and emerging leaders to
obtain firsthand knowledge of American politics and values, and the
Citizen Exchange Program, which partners with U.S. non-profit
organizations to support professional, cultural, and grassroots
community exchanges.
This request provides $100 million for exchanges funded in the past
from the FREEDOM Support Act (FSA) and Support for East European
Democracy (SEED) accounts.
This request also provides $31 million for exchanges support. This
is a straight-line projection of the fiscal year 2003 level.
Contributions to International Organizations (CIO)
The fiscal year 2004 request for CIO of $1.010 billion provides
funding for U.S. assessed contributions, consistent with U.S. statutory
restrictions, to 44 international organizations to further U.S.
economic, political, social, and cultural interests.
The request recognizes U.S. international obligations and reflects
the President's commitment to maintain the financial stability of the
United Nations and other international organizations that include the
World Health Organization, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, the
International Atomic Energy Agency, and the Organization for Economic
Cooperation and Development.
The budget request provides $71.4 million to support renewed U.S.
membership in the United Nations Educational, Scientific, and Cultural
Organization (UNESCO). UNESCO contributes to peace and security in the
world by promoting collaboration among nations through education,
science, culture and communication and by furthering intercultural
understanding and universal respect for justice, rule of law, human
rights, and fundamental freedoms, notably a free press.
Membership in international organizations benefits the United
States by building coalitions and pursuing multilateral programs that
advance U.S. interests. These include promoting economic growth through
market economies; settling disputes peacefully; encouraging non-
proliferation, nuclear safeguards, arms control, and disarmament;
adopting international standards to facilitate international trade,
telecommunications, transportation, environmental protection, and
scientific exchange; and strengthening international cooperation in
agriculture and health.
Contributions for International Peacekeeping Activities (CIPA)
The administration is requesting $550.2 million for CIPA in fiscal
year 2004. This funding level will allow the United States to pay its
share of assessed U.N. peacekeeping budgets, fulfilling U.S.
commitments and avoiding increased U.N. arrears.
The U.N. peacekeeping appropriation serves U.S. interests in
Europe, Africa and the Middle East, where U.N. peacekeeping missions
assist in ending conflicts, restoring peace and strengthening regional
stability.
U.N. peacekeeping missions leverage U.S. political, military and
financial assets through the authority of the U.N. Security Council and
the participation of other states that provide funds and peacekeepers
for conflicts around the world.
Broadcasting Board of Governors (BBG)
The fiscal year 2004 budget request for the BBG totals $563.5
million.
The overall request provides $525.2 million for U.S. Government
non-military international broadcasting operations through the
International Broadcasting Operations (IBO) account. This account funds
operations of the Voice of America (VOA), Radio Free Europe/Radio
Liberty (RFE/RL), Radio Free Asia (RFA), and all related program
delivery and support activities.
The IBO request includes funding to advance broadcasting efforts
related to the war on terrorism. The request includes $30 million to
initiate the Middle East Television Network--a new Arabic-language
satellite TV network that, once operational, will have the potential to
reach vast audiences in the Middle East. The request also includes
funding to double VOA Indonesian radio programming, significantly
increase television programming in Indonesia, and expand BBG audience
development efforts.
The IBO request reflects the shifting of priorities away from the
predominantly Cold War focus on Central and Eastern Europe to
broadcasting in the Middle East and Central Asia. Funds are being
redirected to programs in these regions through the elimination of
broadcasting to countries in the former Eastern Bloc that have
demonstrated significant advances in democracy and press freedoms and
are new or soon-to-be NATO and European Union Members.
The IBO request also reflects anticipated efficiencies that achieve
a five-percent reduction in funding for administration and management
in fiscal year 2004.
The fiscal year 2004 request also provides $26.9 million through
Broadcasting to Cuba (OCB) for continuing Radio Marti and TV Marti
operations, including salary and inflation increases, to support
current schedules.
The fiscal year 2004 request further provides $11.4 million for
Broadcasting Capital Improvements to maintain the BBG's worldwide
transmission network. The request includes $2.9 million to maintain and
improve security of U.S. broadcasting transmission facilities overseas.
That finishes the State and Related Agencies part of the
President's Budget. But before I stop and take your questions, let me
give you an overview of the rest of our budget for fiscal year 2004,
the Foreign Affairs part. You are all members of the larger
Appropriations Committee and, in that capacity, I hope that you will
strongly support this part of our budget also.
foreign policy advisor responsibilities: funding america's diplomacy
around the world
The fiscal year 2004 budget proposes several initiatives to advance
U.S. national security interests and preserve American leadership. The
fiscal year 2004 Foreign Operations budget that funds programs for the
Department of State, USAID and other foreign affairs agencies is $18.8
billion. Today, our number one priority is to fight and win the global
war on terrorism. The budget furthers this goal by providing economic,
military, and democracy assistance to key foreign partners and allies,
including $4.7 billion to countries that have joined us in the war on
terrorism.
The budget also promotes international peace and prosperity by
launching the most innovative approach to U.S. foreign assistance in
more than forty years. The new Millennium Challenge Account (MCA), an
independent government corporation funded at $1.3 billion will redefine
``aid''. As President Bush told African leaders meeting in Mauritius
recently, this aid will go to ``nations that encourage economic
freedom, root out corruption, and respect the rights of their people.''
Moreover, this budget offers hope and a helping hand to countries
facing health catastrophes, poverty and despair, and humanitarian
disasters. It provides $1.345 billion to combat the global HIV/AIDS
epidemic, more than $1 billion to meet the needs of refugees and
internally displaced peoples, $200 million in emergency food assistance
to support dire famine needs, and $100 million for an emerging crises
fund to allow swift responses to complex foreign crises. Mr. Chairman,
let me give you some details.
The United States is successfully prosecuting the global war on
terrorism on a number of fronts. We are providing extensive assistance
to states on the front lines of the anti-terror struggle. Working with
our international partners bilaterally and through multilateral
organizations, we have frozen more than $110 million in terrorist
assets, launched new initiatives to secure global networks of commerce
and communication, and significantly increased the cooperation of our
law enforcement and intelligence communities. Afghanistan is no longer
a haven for al-Qaeda. We are now working with the Afghan Authority,
other governments, international organizations, and NGOs to rebuild
Afghanistan. Around the world we are combating the unholy alliance of
drug traffickers and terrorists who threaten the internal stability of
countries. We are leading the international effort to prevent weapons
of mass destruction from falling into the hands of those who would do
harm to us and others. At the same time, we are rejuvenating and
expanding our public diplomacy efforts worldwide.
Assistance to Frontline States
The fiscal year 2004 International Affairs budget provides
approximately $4.7 billion in assistance to the Frontline States, which
have joined with us in the war on terrorism. This funding will provide
crucial assistance to enable these countries to strengthen their
economies, internal counter-terrorism capabilities and border controls.
Of this amount, the President's Budget provides $657 million for
Afghanistan, $460 million for Jordan, $395 million for Pakistan, $255
million for Turkey, $136 million for Indonesia, and $87 million for the
Philippines. In Afghanistan, the funding will be used to fulfill our
commitment to rebuild Afghanistan's road network; establish security
through a national military and national police force, including
counter-terrorism and counter-narcotics components; establish broad-
based and accountable governance through democratic institutions and an
active civil society; ensure a peace dividend for the Afghan people
through economic reconstruction; and provide humanitarian assistance to
sustain returning refugees and displaced persons. United States
assistance will continue to be coordinated with the Afghan government,
the United Nations, and other international donors.
The State Department's Anti-Terrorism Assistance (ATA) program will
continue to provide frontline states a full complement of training
courses, such as a course on how to conduct a post-terrorist attack
investigation or how to respond to a WMD event. The budget will also
fund additional equipment grants to sustain the skills and capabilities
acquired in the ATA courses. It will support as well in-country
training programs in Afghanistan, Pakistan, and Indonesia.
Central Asia and Freedom Support Act Nations
In fiscal year 2004, over $157 million in Freedom Support Act (FSA)
funding will go to assistance programs in the Central Asian states. The
fiscal year 2004 budget continues to focus FSA funds to programs in
Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan, recognizing that Central Asia is
of strategic importance to U.S. foreign policy objectives. The fiscal
year 2004 assistance level for Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan is
30 percent above 2003. Assistance to these countries has almost doubled
from pre-September 11th levels. These funds will support civil society
development, small business promotion, conflict reduction, and economic
reform in the region. These efforts are designed to promote economic
development and strengthen the rule of law in order to reduce the
appeal of extremist movements and stem the flow of illegal drugs that
finance terrorist activities.
Funding levels and country distributions for the FSA nations
reflect shifting priorities in the region. For example, after more than
10 years of high levels of assistance, it is time to begin the process
of graduating countries in this region from economic assistance, as we
have done with countries in Eastern Europe that have made sufficient
progress in the transition to market-based democracies. U.S. economic
assistance to Russia and Ukraine will begin phasing down in fiscal year
2004, a decrease of 32 percent from 2003, moving these countries
towards graduation.
Combating Illegal Drugs and Stemming Narco-terrorism
The President's request for $731 million for the Andean Counterdrug
Initiative includes $463 million for Colombia. An additional $110
million in military assistance to Colombia will support Colombian
President Uribe's unified campaign against terrorists and the drug
trade that fuels their activities. The aim is to secure democracy,
extend security, and restore economic prosperity to Colombia and
prevent the narco-terrorists from spreading instability to the broader
Andean region. Critical components of this effort include resumption of
the Airbridge Denial program to stop internal and cross-border aerial
trafficking in illicit drugs, stepped up eradication and alternative
development efforts, and technical assistance to strengthen Colombia's
police and judicial institutions.
Halting Access of Rogue States and Terrorists to Weapons of Mass
Destruction
Decreasing the threats posed by terrorist groups, rogue states, and
other non-state actors requires halting the spread of weapons of mass
destruction (WMD) and related technology. To achieve this goal, we must
strengthen partnerships with countries that share our views in dealing
with the threat of terrorism and resolving regional conflicts.
The fiscal year 2004 budget requests $35 million for the
Nonproliferation and Disarmament Fund (NDF), more than double the
fiscal year 2003 request, increases funding for overseas Export
Controls and Border Security (EXBS) to $40 million, and supports
additional funding for Science Centers and Bio-Chem Redirection
Programs.
Funding increases requested for the NDF and EXBS programs seek to
prevent weapons of mass destruction from falling into the hands of
terrorist groups or states by preventing their movement across borders
and destroying or safeguarding known quantities of weapons or source
material. The Science Centers and Bio-Chem Redirection programs support
the same goals by engaging former Soviet weapons scientists and
engineers in peaceful scientific activities, providing them an
alternative to marketing their skills to states or groups of concern.
Millennium Challenge Account
The fiscal year 2004 Budget request of $1.3 billion for the new
Millennium Challenge Account (MCA) as a government corporation fulfills
the President's March 2002 pledge to create a new bilateral assistance
program, markedly different from existing models. This budget is a huge
step towards the President's commitment of $5 billion in annual funding
for the MCA by 2006, a 50 percent increase in core development
assistance.
The MCA supplement U.S. commitments to humanitarian assistance and
existing development aid programs funded and implemented by USAID. It
will assist developing countries that make sound policy decisions and
demonstrate solid performance on economic growth and reducing poverty.
--MCA funds will go only to selected developing countries that
demonstrate a commitment to sound policies--based on clear,
concrete and objective criteria. To become eligible for MCA
resources, countries must demonstrate their commitment to
economic opportunity, investing in people, and good governance.
--Resources will be available through agreements with recipient
countries that specify a limited number of clear measurable
goals, activities, and benchmarks, and financial accountability
standards.
The MCA will be administered by a new government corporation
designed to support innovative strategies and to ensure accountability
for measurable results. The corporation will be supervised by a Board
of Directors composed of Cabinet level officials and chaired by the
Secretary of State. Personnel will be drawn from a variety of
government agencies and non-government institutions and serve limited-
term appointments.
In fiscal year 2004, countries eligible to borrow from the
International Development Association (IDA), and which have per capita
incomes below $1,435, (the historical IDA cutoff) will be considered.
In 2005, all countries with incomes below $1,435 will be considered. In
2006, all countries with incomes up to $2,975 (the current World Bank
cutoff for lower middle income countries) will be eligible.
The selection process will use 16 indicators to assess national
performance--these indicators being relative to governing justly,
investing in people, and encouraging economic freedom. These indicators
were chosen because of the quality and objectivity of their data,
country coverage, public availability, and correlation with growth and
poverty reduction. The results of a review of the indicators will be
used by the MCA Board of Directors to make a final recommendation to
the President on a list of MCA countries.
The U.S.-Middle East Partnership Initiative
The President's Budget includes $145 million for the Middle East
Partnership Initiative (MEPI). This initiative gives us a framework and
funding for working with the Arab world to expand educational and
economic opportunities, empower women, and strengthen civil society and
the rule of law. The peoples and governments of the Middle East face
daunting human challenges. Their economies are stagnant and unable to
provide jobs for millions of young people entering the workplace each
year. Too many of their governments appear closed and unresponsive to
the needs of their citizens. And their schools are not equipping
students to succeed in today's globalizing world. With the programs of
the MEPI, we will work with Arab governments, groups, and individuals
to bridge the jobs gap with economic reform, business investment, and
private sector development; close the freedom gap with projects to
strengthen civil society, expand political participation, and lift the
voices of women; and bridge the knowledge gap with better schools and
more opportunities for higher education. The U.S.-Middle East
Partnership Initiative is an investment in a more stable, peaceful,
prosperous, and democratic Arab world.
Fighting the Global AIDS Pandemic
The fiscal year 2004 budget continues the Administration's
commitment to combat HIV/AIDS and to help bring care and treatment to
infected people overseas. The HIV/AIDS pandemic has killed 23 million
of the 63 million people it has infected to date, and left 14 million
orphans worldwide. President Bush has made fighting this pandemic a
priority of U.S. foreign policy.
The President believes the global community can--and must--do more
to halt the advance of the pandemic, and that the United States should
lead by example. Thus, the President's fiscal year 2004 budget request
signals a further, massive increase in resources to combat the HIV/AIDs
pandemic. As described in the State of the Union, the President is
committing to provide a total of $15 billion over the next five years
to turn the tide in the war on HIV/AIDs, beginning with $2.0 billion in
the fiscal year 2004 budget request and rising thereafter. These funds
will be targeted on the hardest hit countries, especially Africa and
the Caribbean with the objective of achieving dramatic on-the-ground
results. This new dramatic commitment is reflected in the
Administration's $2.0 billion fiscal year 2004 budget request, which
includes:
--State Department--$450 million;
--USAID--$895 million, including $100 million for the Global Fund and
$150 million for the International Mother & Child HIV
Prevention; and
--HHS/CDC/NIH--$690 million, including $100 million for the Global
Fund and $150 million for the International Mother & Child HIV
Prevention.
In order to ensure accountability for results, the President has
asked me to establish at State a new Special Coordinator for
International HIV/AIDS Assistance. The Special Coordinator will work
for me and be responsible for coordinating all international HIV/AIDS
programs and efforts of the agencies that implement them.
Hunger, Famine, and Other Emergencies
Food Aid.--Historically the United States has been the largest
donor of assistance for victims of protracted and emergency food
crises. In 2003, discretionary funding for food aid increased from $864
million to $1.19 billion. That level will be enhanced significantly in
2004 with two new initiatives: a Famine Fund and an emerging crises
fund to address complex emergencies.
--Famine Fund.--The fiscal year 2004 budget includes a new $200
million fund with flexible authorities to provide emergency
food, grants or support to meet dire needs on a case-by-case
basis. This commitment reflects more than a 15 percent increase
in U.S. food assistance.
--Emerging Crises Fund.--The budget also requests $100 million for a
new account that will allow the Administration to respond
swiftly and effectively to prevent or resolve unforeseen
complex foreign crises. This account will provide a mechanism
for the President to support actions to advance American
interests, including to prevent or respond to foreign
territorial disputes, armed ethnic and civil conflicts that
pose threats to regional and international peace and acts of
ethnic cleansing, mass killing and genocide.
summary
Mr. Chairman, members of the committee, to advance America's
interests around the world we need the dollars in the President's
Budget for fiscal year 2004. We need the dollars under both of my
hats--CEO and principal foreign policy advisor. The times we live in
are troubled to be sure, but I believe there is every bit as much
opportunity in the days ahead as there is danger. American leadership
is essential to dealing with both the danger and the opportunity. With
regard to the Department of State, the President's fiscal year 2004
budget is crucial to the exercise of that leadership.
Thank you and I will be pleased to answer your questions.
REMARKS OF SENATOR GREGG
Senator Gregg. Thank you, Mr. Secretary, for that
statement.
Let me begin by saying that we have enjoyed working with
you and your Department. I know that Senator Hollings, who I
succeeded as chair here, has aggressively pursued many of the
initiatives which you have outlined in his original remarks.
And I intend to continue Senator Hollings' processes there,
initiatives in the area, for example, of gearing up the
Diplomatic Corps. We will certainly be funding that.
One of my other concerns is the Consular Affairs area. We
have to not only gear up and give the Consular Affairs folks
status, but we also have to give them decent working places, so
that when people come into our Embassies, they feel comfortable
and not as though they are being treated as second class
individuals. They should have a nice atmosphere. And I think
that this will help the visa process, also.
And I also am concerned about protecting our people
overseas, not only the Foreign Service Officers and Consular
Affairs folks, but their families, especially at places where
they naturally congregate, such as American schools. As you
know, we put $15 million into the budget to address that. And
we are looking for other ideas that the Department may have in
that area specifically.
I want to congratulate General Williams for his efforts. I
believe that after a number of years of out-of-control costs,
driven in large part by a need to respond to very serious
security issues at our Embassies, the issue is being
aggressively and effectively addressed by General Williams.
I would say this, however: I am concerned that we are
building fortresses that have no architectural identity with
the communities that they are in. And I hope that in obtaining
security that we will not leave behind the importance of having
American presence that does not look like a fortress, that our
buildings start to take on some architectural identity with the
countries that they are in. I think I would like to get into
that issue, but not at this time.
What I would like to address now is a couple more larger
issues which are current to the period. Let me read you a
couple quotes from Osama bin Laden. In a Time magazine article
on the issue of weapons of mass destruction, Osama bin Laden
stated, ``Acquiring weapons for the defense of Muslims is a
religious duty. If I have indeed acquired these weapons, then I
thank God for enabling me to do so. And if I seek to acquire
these weapons, I am carrying out a duty. It would be a sin for
Muslims not to try to possess weapons that would prevent
infidels from inflicting harm on Muslims.''
He went on to say in another quote, ``We, with Allah's
help, call on every Muslim who believes in Allah and wishes to
be rewarded to comply with Allah's orders to kill the Americans
and to plunder their money wherever and whenever they find it.
The ruling to kill the Americans and their allies, civilians
and military, is an individual duty of every Muslim who can do
it in any country which it is possible to do it in.''
What, today, is to stop Saddam Hussein from delivering to
this criminal individual, who has already participated in the
murder of thousands of Americans, those weapons of mass
destruction?
SADDAM HUSSEIN AND WEAPONS
Secretary Powell. Nothing is prepared to stop him today, if
he chooses to do so. We want to take away his option of doing
so by disarming the Iraqi regime and Saddam Hussein. The
chilling words you just read, Mr. Chairman, are from somebody
who is committed to strike us again and again and again; let
there be no doubt about it, he will use airplanes filled with
fuel. He will use car bombs. As he said in those quotations, if
he had weapons of mass destruction, he would use them.
Should there be a doubt in anyone's mind that if Osama bin
Laden or other terrorists like Osama bin Laden had access to
chemical or biological or nuclear weapons, they would use them?
If there was a doubt in anyone's mind, that doubt should have
been erased on 9/11. That is why after 9/11 we realized the
nature of the conflict we were now in. We had to deal with the
Taliban in Afghanistan. We had to break up al-Qaeda. You saw
the recent arrest over the weekend of the gentleman who was the
brains of the organization that struck us on 9/11. We have to
go after not only these individuals, but also the potential
sources of their weaponry.
That is why we redoubled our effort in making it clear to
the United Nations that we could no longer allow its
resolutions to be ignored with respect to Iraq, a known
developer of weapons of mass destruction. That is why the
moment we find ourselves in now is a critical moment, where we
are being tested and where the Security Council, the United
Nations, and the international community are being tested. Are
we going to allow an individual, such as Saddam Hussein, to
continue to develop these weapons of mass destruction or
deceive us into believing that he is not, when we know he is,
because it is too hard to face the consequences of dealing with
the truth, and face a situation some years from now when Osama
bin Laden has accomplished the goal he laid out in those
statements, and he has such a weapon, and he got it from Iraq?
We must go after these countries, these rogue nations, that
proliferate and are led by leaders who would strike us and who
have shown in the past they will strike their own neighbors,
strike their own people, do anything to stay in power and
pursue their own agenda. That is the argument I will be taking
to the United Nations this afternoon. This is the time to deal
with this kind of threat, not after we have seen thousands of
people die as a result of the use of one of these horrible
weapons. We cannot allow ourselves to be deterred by false
claims that ``It is all okay. He is complying,'' when he is not
complying but merely deceiving the international community and
trying to keep us from doing what we said we would be prepared
to do last October--excuse me--November, when we passed
Resolution 1441.
Senator Gregg. Thank you. And I want to congratulate you
and the President for pursuing that policy, because I think it
should be obvious to all people, whether we wish to admit it or
not, that we are dealing with a fundamentally evil individual,
not only in Saddam Hussein, but in Osama bin Laden, obviously,
and that the coalescence or the convergence of those two forces
represents a clear, present, and immediate threat to the United
States.
My time is up, and I yield to the ranking member.
VICTORY IN IRAQ
Senator Hollings. Mr. Secretary, I support you, support
your budget. I have some questions about Colombia and General
Williams, the Embassy there at Berlin.
This cost sharing proposal and the funding request for
USAID buildings--the Foreign Operations Subcommittee ranking
member Senator Leahy will be back momentarily--but I cannot get
any money back from him. So we have opposed our State
Department budget funding buildings under another
subcommittees' jurisdiction.
Having said that, I am reading here, I am listening to our
President before the American Enterprise Institute, of a regime
change. I am hearing you yesterday afternoon. And then I am
reading yesterday morning, and I quote, ``General Meyers also
said disarming Iraq would define victory, not capturing or
killing President Saddam Hussein.'' Is General Meyers correct?
Secretary Powell. All of the statements that you made
reference to and the positions you made reference to are
correct.
Senator Hollings. Well, that means then you believe we have
to remove Saddam Hussein, is that not right?
Secretary Powell. Well, in 1998, the previous
administration and the Congress believed that the only way----
Senator Hollings. I am not questioning that.
Secretary Powell. No, no. I just need----
Senator Hollings. I have read----
Secretary Powell. Yes, I am going to come to our position.
But the Congress and the administration at that time, in the
face of the intransigence of Saddam Hussein, his unwillingness
to disarm as a result of previous U.N. resolutions, made a
judgment that we could not solve this problem with that regime
in place. So regime change in 1998 became the policy of
President Clinton's administration. It was to some extent, I
think to a large extent, endorsed by the Congress in laws that
were passed at that time.
When we came into office, we worked to see if there was
some other way of disarming Saddam Hussein. We modified and
strengthened the sanctions policies, so that it was not hurting
the Iraqi people. We worked with our friends and allies to see
if there was some way to disarm him. We finally got to the
point where Resolution 1441 was passed. Resolution 1441 passed
unanimously. It has as its goal the disarmament of Iraq.
However, what we have seen since 1441 was passed is that
Saddam Hussein has still not made that strategic choice to
disarm and allow the inspectors to verify that he is disarming.
So we are reaching the point that was reached by others in
1998, such that it appears the only way perhaps to get him to
disarm is to remove the regime and disarm that nation of its
weapons of mass destruction.
But even at this late date, it is possible to find a
peaceful solution, if Saddam Hussein and the Iraqi regime would
do what it has been asked to do by the international community
for all these many years. But we do not take off the table, of
course, the option of forcible removal of the regime. We have a
large number of American troops that are assembled there to do
that.
But it is the disarmament that is the principal objective.
I think that is the point that General Meyers was trying to
make, when he said the regime will be removed. But whatever
happens to Saddam Hussein, whether he goes into exile or into
irrelevance, we will have a better situation in Iraq when those
weapons of mass destruction are gone.
REMOVING SADDAM HUSSEIN
Senator Hollings. Well, you and I would agree in a second
that if you removed all the weapons of mass destruction in the
next hour, you would still have to remove Saddam. You could not
just pick up and then leave with General Meyers and say, ``The
job is done.'' I mean, that fellow would start building bombs
all over again. So I guess you and I agree that removing Saddam
Hussein is the mission.
You used the expression ``better way, less expensive way,''
in order to remove him. I was never worried for the last 10, 12
years about any imminent threat from Saddam. We have what you
and I know as the AMLR, the best force, Israel, right there.
They do not have the luxury of calling up and getting a meeting
with the United Nations or asking for monitors. They have to
act in self-defense. And so if there is any imminent threat
really, they would knock it out by 10:30 or 11:00 o'clock this
morning, I can tell you that.
Knowing that, and you used the expression in your major
testimony there about ``a better way, a less expensive way.''
Rather than starting a war and all of these other things to
remove him, Mossad would know where he is. Why not get a hit
team and get rid of him? Why start a war in order to do it?
Secretary Powell. Because I am not sure anybody really
knows where he is. It is easy to say. It is much more difficult
to do. I cannot tell you what Mossad or any other intelligence
agency knows or does not know. This is a man who has spent the
last 30 years putting in place a security system that has as
its sole purpose to keep him in place. The suggestion that if
there was imminent danger, everybody would know where it is and
could hit it by 10:30 this morning, I think, is not quite the
case.
His capabilities are well dispersed. They are hidden. They
are not easy to find. He has had decades of experience in
hiding his activities and diverting the attention of those who
are looking for his prohibited activities.
Senator Hollings. Well, the 3,000 missiles in this same
story that are precision guided, are they guided against
Saddam?
Secretary Powell. I do not know of any way to guide against
a particular individual.
Senator Hollings. Are those military targets alone? Is that
your answer, just the 3,000 missiles?
Secretary Powell. No. My answer is that I do not discuss
targeting that might be conducted by our military authorities.
In the old days, I used to.
Senator Hollings. You were the chairman.
Secretary Powell. But now I do not. I think it is unwise to
do.
Senator Hollings. But you know where they are guided. You
can discuss them. I mean, we have to get the guy. You have to
hit the palaces, as well as the command and control. You know
what I mean. Hit a few Scud sites. In fact, if you have any
good precision guided ones, why not tell the inspectors and let
them take them up?
Secretary Powell. The inspectors do not view as their role
to be part of the U.S. targeting system. If we keep saying all
we have to do is hit the palaces, I can assure you that the
place Saddam Hussein will not be in is one of his palaces.
Senator Hollings. And you do not think----
Secretary Powell. I do not think he is as targetable as it
is often suggested. He is a survivor. He is aware of our
capability. I am sure he is doing everything he can to assure
his personal survival.
Senator Hollings. Being a survivor, there would be nothing
wrong, if we knew to hit him. In other words, when we hit that
automobile full of terrorists down in Yemen, we announced
publicly--I would not have announced it, but they did, and said
terrorists. In a terrorism war, terrorist open season, they are
combatants. And we can hit them anywhere we can find them.
So I take it there would be nothing wrong with trying to
hit Saddam with one of those missiles; would there be?
Secretary Powell. If we were in armed conflict, which we
may well find ourselves in, then----
Senator Hollings. As I understand it, excuse me, but we are
in armed conflict. The President announced, said, ``We are in a
terrorism war.'' And in a terrorism war, terrorists are
combatants. And therefore, you can kill them. That is how he
justified killing those people down there in Yemen.
So we have described Saddam in every way possible,
including as a terrorist. So you could go ahead and hit him,
could you not?
Secretary Powell. I, frankly, do not want to talk about
targeting, who might be targeted, or who might not be targeted
at an open hearing like this, Senator.
Senator Hollings. Well, you can see what I am getting at.
You do not want to level Baghdad to get him. I mean, how do we
get to victory, according to General Meyers----
Secretary Powell. We have no intention of--we are not going
to level Baghdad.
DEFINING VICTORY IN IRAQ
Senator Hollings. I agree; we are not going to level
Baghdad. So what is going to define victory, other than getting
him?
Secretary Powell. Defining victory will be a disarmed Iraq.
If it is done peacefully, with no invasion and no military
action required, it would be an Iraqi regime that has foresworn
these weapons of mass destruction and done so in a way that
there is reason to believe them. It is hard to imagine
believing them right now. If there is a military conflict, it
will require a change in that regime, because they have
demonstrated they will not change otherwise, and the disarming
of the country's weapons of mass destruction, putting in place
a better government for the people of Iraq.
This has been a terrible government for 30 years. It has
squandered the wealth of the nation on weapons of mass
destruction. It is all about the survival of one individual and
his cohorts in this one regime. The people of Iraq will be a
lot better off when their weapons of mass destruction are no
longer cause for the rest of the world to be concerned about.
If it takes the removal of the regime to do it, because we
cannot find a peaceful way, then that is what we are prepared
to do.
Senator Hollings. Senator Kohl, I recognize you. And I am
going to leave to vote, too. And the chairman is coming back,
and----
Senator Leahy. I believe that I was really here first.
Senator Hollings. You were here first? Excuse me then. Very
good. Excuse me, Senator Leahy. But the distinguished Secretary
has to leave no later than 11:30.
Senator Leahy. Thank you, Senator Hollings. I understand we
were doing the early bird rule.
CURRENT SITUATION IN IRAQ
And I am sorry that I had to step out earlier, Mr.
Secretary. We have one of these judicial confirmation matters
that come up periodically on the floor of the Senate. And I was
involved in that. So I had to drop by.
I understand you are going to the United Nations. I am glad
you could take the time to come here. I appreciate that all the
years I have known you, both in the military and now in this,
you have always been responsive to consulting with the
Congress. I think it has helped your cause, but it has
certainly helped our understanding. And I do appreciate that.
I also appreciate the money that you have helped get in the
bill for food aid to starving people in Sub-Saharan Africa. For
that, some of us have been fighting for this for years.
Now having said that, let me ask you this: A question I get
in hundreds of letters, sometimes thousands of e-mails from my
little State of Vermont, is ``How has it come to this?'' They
are speaking of Iraq, of course.
When my wife and I go home on weekends, I go in the grocery
store. I get asked this question from everybody from the people
stocking the shelves to customers. I get to my house in
Vermont. People are calling, asking me the same question.
In the immediate aftermath of September 11, we had hundreds
of thousands of Germans in Berlin marching in support of the
United States. We had Le Monde in France declaring ``We're all
Americans.'' We had unprecedented international cooperation in
our war against al-Qaeda, including the use of force in
Afghanistan. Now we have deep divisions within the Security
Council. Some of our closest allies raise serious questions
about our effort to launch a war immediately.
Saddam Hussein is one of the world's worst tyrants. He is a
war criminal. He is a despicable, dangerous despot. There is no
question that in a war crimes tribunal he could be convicted of
heinous crimes. The United States is a country that stands for
freedom, democracy, and human rights. We stand for making the
world a safer place.
But if that case is so clear, why are Russia, China,
Germany, France, and a dozen other nations saying we are making
a grave mistake by not giving the U.N. inspectors more time?
Turkey, which is swimming in debt, turns down our offer of
billions of dollars. We are threatening to go to war without a
Security Council resolution. We are causing deep divisions
among ourselves and within NATO. I have visited with NATO
leaders, and the United Nations. How did it come to this?
Secretary Powell. One of the reasons we are here is
because----
Senator Leahy. What do I say to Vermonters? What do I say
to Vermonters who ask me that question?
HISTORY REGARDING REGIME CHANGE IN IRAQ
Secretary Powell. We are here because the international
community has refused to deal with this tyrant, who has all the
traits and attributes that you mentioned earlier. He is a
dictator. He has more than oppressed his own people; he has
allowed rape and murder and all kinds of terrible crimes to
occur within his country.
He is not the only one in the world like that. What makes
him different is he also has been developing weapons of mass
destruction; there is no question about it. He has had the
intent to do so, and he has developed them. He has used them in
a way that no other modern leader has used such weapons,
against his neighbors and against his people.
The international community made a judgment, beginning back
in 1991, that this was unacceptable and that he had to be
disarmed. He had to give up these weapons. For 11 years, the
international community kept passing resolutions and did
nothing about it.
This administration came into office determined to do
something about it, to see whether that behavior could be
changed. We came into office with a strong position from the
previous administration that this regime had to be changed, if
it would not change itself. We worked with the United Nations
to get them to realize the simple reality that this was a
dangerous regime and that something had to be done.
What really brought it into focus was 9/11, when it became
clear, as you heard from Senator Gregg earlier, that we have
people out there who would do anything to get their hands on
the kinds of weapons that Saddam Hussein is developing. Now
some argue back, ``Yes, but you cannot prove that kind of a
nexus between al-Qaeda and Saddam Hussein. Yes, you have some
evidence, but it is not good enough proof.''
Well, we do not want to wait around until the proof is
ready for a court of law, to say, ``But we have already seen
chemical or biological weapons made in Iraq show up somewhere
in New York or in Vermont.'' So we believe this was the time to
deal with this. We got the United Nations to agree with a 15-0
vote in the Security Council in early November. All members
agreed that Saddam Hussein was guilty. He was in material
breach, stayed in material breach. This is the time for the
Iraqi regime to change, immediately, unconditionally, right
now. Inspectors will help verify the disarmament. If Saddam
Hussein did not disarm this time, there would be serious
consequences. Everybody who voted for that knew what that
meant. It meant that if the Iraqi regime did not comply, there
would be a war.
There were some at that time who were already beginning to
say, ``Well, good. We have bought some time and then we will
buy some more time and some more time. Then this whole thing
will go away.''
STATUS OF ALLY SUPPORT
Senator Leahy. Is that what our allies are doing? Is that
what Germany is doing? Is that what France is doing? Is that
what China is doing? Is that what----
Secretary Powell. Yes. It is what some of our allies are
doing. But some of our allies, like the United Kingdom, Spain,
Italy, Portugal, the newly emerging nations of Eastern Europe,
and Australia, are standing up with us and standing up
strongly.
We have most of these European nations standing up
strongly, even in the face of public opinion that is in the
other direction. The new Turkish government, not fully
installed yet, went to their parliament and asked and lost just
by a couple of votes. As you heard yesterday, Mr. Erdogan and
Turkish general staff leaders said, ``We have to go back to our
parliament, because it is the right thing to do to support
America.''
Senator Leahy. I do not want to make any problem there,
but, as the administration tells us, they have not yet come to
the appropriators. We are going to have to come up with that
$10 billion to back up your bet.
Secretary Powell. Which $10 billion is that, sir?
AID TO TURKEY
Senator Leahy. Well, you are not offering $10 billion or $5
billion or some number of billions of dollars in aid extra aid
to Turkey?
Secretary Powell. The Turkish aid package was $6 billion in
grant aid, which could be leveraged up through loans to a
higher amount. But it was $6 billion. And----
Senator Leahy. No direct----
Secretary Powell [continuing]. We were quite aware----
Senator Leahy. No direct amounts?
Secretary Powell. Yes.
Senator Leahy. There will be no direct amounts?
Secretary Powell. No. I am not sure. It is a $6 billion
amount, some of which is direct, but some of it could be used
to leverage loans in order to have more impact on the economy.
Senator Leahy. I do not want to make your negotiations more
difficult, but I would suggest that the administration come up
here and talk to both Republicans and Democrats on the
Appropriations Committee and make sure that the votes are there
to support the package that is being promised, and that you are
not taking this money from other prior, equally critical needs
that both you and I support in the foreign aid bill; because so
far, we have not been told where that money is going to come
from or how it is going to be used.
There is North Korea, which we all agree poses a major
threat. I have heard statements made, I happen to agree with
them, that the last thing in the world we want them doing is
exporting their rockets or their missiles.
We spent a fortune to track the shipment of missiles from
North Korea to Yemen. We show our ability to stop the ship
carrying it on the open seas. And then we say, ``Oops. Sorry
about that. Go ahead and take the missiles anyway.''
And I am wondering if, when people see that, when they see
officials of the administration referring to our allies as
``old Europe,'' as though they have not faced war and as though
they do not have a lot of people who are still alive who have
lived through war on their soil. Those same officials suggest
the United Nations could be irrelevant, at the same time the
President's fiscal year budget says the United Nations serves
U.S. interests by helping end conflicts, restoring peace, and
strengthen regional stability.
I mean, which is it? If the United Nations does not go
along with everything we ask, do they become irrelevant? Are we
helped by calling countries in Europe ``old Europe'' in a
dismissive fashion?
RELEVANCE OF THE UNITED NATIONS
Secretary Powell. Well, first of all, with respect to the
United Nations, if we thought it was irrelevant, the President
would not have gone there on the 12th of September. But at the
same time, the United Nations is in danger of becoming
irrelevant if it passes resolution after resolution that are
totally ignored by a country in a situation where that country
continues to develop weapons of mass destruction.
If the United Nations Security Council fails to deal with
this issue, certainly there is a degree of irrelevance then in
the Council's actions on this particular issue. The United
Nations is a body that we support. We have done a lot of work
in the last several years, in the previous administration and
this administration, to clear up our arrears, to rejoin UNESCO,
and take a number of other actions that show we understand the
purpose of international organizations. We want to be
multilateral with respect to our efforts.
Europe is not of a single mind on the issue of Iraq. I can
list more countries that are supportive of our position than
those that are against our position. The fact of the matter is
that European public opinion is not supportive of our position.
But I think the anxiety that exists within the international
community would be gone in a heartbeat if Saddam Hussein would
do what he is supposed to do; or, in the aftermath of a
successful military operation, people will see that we are
doing the correct thing in removing this dangerous threat from
the region and from the world.
With respect to Yemen and North Korea, we are deeply
concerned about North Korean proliferation and have been for a
long time. In the case of those particular Scuds, when we
determined that they were not heading to a terrorist
organization or a rogue state, but a nation that we have close
relations with, and the Scuds were part of a contract that had
previously been entered into, and we had assurances from the
Government of Yemen that the contract was now concluded with
this last shipment and we would not have to be worried about
any further sales from North Korea, it seemed the prudent thing
to do. I think it was the prudent thing to do, to let the
shipment continue to its owner, a friend of ours, with
assurances that that was the end of it and that they were
discharging any further contractual arrangements they might
have had or entered into with North Korea.
Senator Leahy. Other Senators are back now. And I will go
and vote. But two things: One, I hope their new assurances are
more accurate than their old assurances.
Secretary Powell. We did not have old assurances that they
would not purchase. We have new ones.
Senator Leahy. And secondly, if we are going to continue to
be offering money and aid to other countries, come on up here
and make sure that the Congress will actually back up that
money.
Thank you.
Senator Gregg. Senator Kohl.
STATUS OF OTHER ARAB NATIONS
Senator Kohl. I thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Secretary, President Bush has said that ``a new regime
in Iraq would serve as a dramatic and inspiring example of
freedom for other nations in the region.'' My question to you
is: How are other Arab states reacting to our aspirations for
Iraq to be a model democracy, given that our Arab partners in
the region are currently not ruled by democratic regimes? What
sort of message are we sending to the current governments,
particularly at a time when we are relying on some of them for
support in our war effort? Are we not implicitly saying, ``You
are next, and, if necessary, by force''?
Secretary Powell. No. Our friends and I stay in very close
touch with them and spoke to several of them this morning, they
know that we have no intention of forcing the overthrow of
their regime or leadership, either overtly or covertly. But
they also know, because the President has said this on a number
of occasions, and I have said it on a number of occasions, that
we think that democracy is not something that is just
exclusively for Western nations. Democracy should be able to
thrive in Arab nations, as well.
I think what we will be seeing in the years ahead is that,
as each Arab nation moves further into the 21st Century, they
will see the benefits of opening their society up to great
opportunity for women, educating their children for the kinds
of jobs that will be needed to be performed in those societies
in the 21st Century, removing state controls on the economy,
diversifying their economy, and having more representative
forms of government.
We do not shy away from making this case to our friends in
the region. Now, they press back. They have their own culture,
their own history, and their own traditions. They have been
nations far longer than the United States of America. So we
enter into a spirit of dialogue with them. We think each of
them will have to find their own way into the future, of
course. We hope that we can be of assistance to them. We are.
The Middle East Partnership Initiative that I launched not
too long ago will try to help them with their education of
young people for the 21st Century by helping to build up a
civil society. We have fascinating debates and discussions with
our Arab friends. We believe that we should say to them what we
believe with respect to the power of a democracy to help
transform and better their societies.
POST-SADDAM IRAQ
Senator Kohl. Would it not follow that we then go in and
disarm Iraq so that they are no longer a threat to us and let
them set up their own society and do it in a way that most fits
their own needs and aspirations, much as it is true in Saudi
Arabia and so on?
Secretary Powell. I think we would have an opportunity
here, however, to shape this in a way that we can convince them
that the best way to set up their new society is on the basis
of openness, on the basis of representative government, and on
the basis of pulling the diverse elements of the Iraqi
population into a form of government that respects each of
those diverse elements and yet keeps it together as a nation.
So I think we have an important role to play.
We will not ignore their history, traditions, and culture.
We could not, even if we wanted to. It's 24 million people. But
at the same time, we have some experience over the last 50 to
60 years of going into countries that have not experienced that
kind of representative government before and getting them to
see the benefit of it and leaving them far better off than when
we went in.
Senator Kohl. So this might be something akin, not exactly
like, but akin to what we did in Japan after the war?
Secretary Powell. I do not think it is going to be akin to
any of the models of the past. I do not think it is like Japan
or--we are not going to have a MacArthur there for 7 years or 8
years or a four power arrangement, as we had in Germany. I
think each one of these is unique.
Afghanistan was unique, where we were able to put in place
an Afghan government rather quickly. There were people standing
there, leaders ready to lead and lead in the right direction.
We were able to support them.
There are other models--East Timor, Cambodia, Bosnia, and
Kosovo. We are studying all of these models to see what would
fit best in Iraq. But our overall principle is: If a military
operation is required, obviously then a military commander has
to be in charge and would be in charge in the immediate
aftermath of the conflict for some period of time. We want that
period of time to be as short as possible.
As we transition to a civilian administration, we will
bring in international organizations to help with the
rebuilding and to help with the funding of the whole exercise,
bring in responsible Iraqi leaders to create their own
government, work with both people who have been outside and
inside of Iraq, and work with the traditional leaders within
Iraq to put in place a government that does not commit itself
to weapons of mass destruction and threaten its neighbors, as
the current government has for the last 30 years.
SAUDI ARABIA AND 9/11 TERRORISTS
Senator Kohl. Last question: Fifteen out of the nineteen
terrorists on 9/11 were Saudi Arabian in their origins. If we
are going after countries and obviously not willing to abide
terrorists or those who sponsor them, where does Saudi Arabia
fit it?
Secretary Powell. Saudi Arabia has been a friend of the
United States for many years and still remains one. We are
troubled that so many came from Saudi Arabia, and they are
troubled that so many came from their country. We are working
with them to put in place a better visa system so we know
exactly who is coming into the United States. We are also
working with them on searching out sources of financing for
terrorist organizations. They have been very cooperative in
that regard. They realize they have a problem within Saudi
Arabia if they are serving as a place of gestation for these
kinds of individuals.
It is not only a threat to the United States. I think we
are persuading them that it is a threat to Saudi Arabia as
well.
MADRASAS
Senator Kohl. But do they not have schools that educate the
young that----
Secretary Powell. They have schools that I do not think
have been organized and are being run in a way that is
consistent with what their educational needs are for the 21st
Century. Too often, these schools have been educating
youngsters in a way that would lead some of these youngsters
into this kind of activity. That is also a subject of
discussion with the Saudis.
They have also been funding those kinds of schools in other
parts of the world. We are now seeing some of the consequences
of that and taking it up with the Saudis. In fact, as part of
our effort with Pakistan, Pakistan is trying to redo its
educational system, so that the schools exist not as a hotbed
of extremism, but as a place where youngsters get an education
so that they can contribute to Pakistan and not become a
problem for Pakistan or for the world.
Senator Kohl. Thank you, Mr. Secretary.
ISLAMIC CENTER IN TURKEY
Senator Gregg. Mr. Secretary, I just wanted to follow up on
Senator Kohl's comments a little bit. First, I would note that
this committee, under the leadership of Senator Hollings, set
up the Center for Muslim Western Dialogue in Turkey, the basic
purpose of which is to try to educate folks in the Muslim world
about advantages of democracy. And we are continuing to fund
that aggressively.
And if the Department has other ideas in this area, we
would be interested in them. These are the types of initiatives
we would like to pursue. I think Senator Hollings has set out a
good course here for us to follow in this committee. We would
like to increase the effort in that area. So I guess we are
asking for ideas.
ROLE FOR FRANCE AND GERMANY
Secondly, is the issue of post-Saddam Iraq. France has had
a very significant commercial relationship with Iraq, which
they have continued during the period of Saddam Hussein's
leadership and have taken advantage of that criminal regime
through commercial activity. I am just wondering: What is the
proper role for France, and even Germany, in a post-Saddam
Iraq?
Secretary Powell. Well, I think it remains to be seen. I
think that once a new government is in place, it will be up to
that government to determine how they will use their economic
resources, their oil, their principal source of revenue, and
who they will enter into various economic arrangements with. It
is not for the United States to dictate the future of Iraq. It
is for us, if we have to have a military operation, to hold in
trust for the people of Iraq their wealth in the form of their
oil. It will all be used for the benefit of the people of Iraq.
But it would seem to me that the people of Iraq, now having
been liberated, might glance around and see who helped and
participated in that liberation, and who did not.
FRENCH ROLE IN THE CONGO
Senator Gregg. On a tangential issue, we have spent
approximately $800 million of American taxpayer money in the
Democratic Republic of the Congo relative to the U.N.
peacekeeping mission there, which is primarily being pursued
under the auspices of France as the lead country and as the
designer of the policy to some degree. And one has to wonder:
With the lack of cooperation France is giving us on what we
consider to be a major national strategic issue, our national
defense and our right to protect ourselves from weapons of mass
destruction, to what extent is it appropriate for taxpayers to
continue to support the French position in the Congo?
Secretary Powell. I think we have to be very careful if we
are having a particular problem with one of our friends in one
area, not to see if we can ``get even'' in another area, where
it does not serve our interest to get even. In the case of the
Congo, I think the money that we are using and the efforts of
the French have started to have a result and pay off.
For example, Germany, even though we have a major dispute
with them over the issue of Iraq, Germany has troops in
Afghanistan standing alongside of ours. They have troops in the
Balkans. We are cooperating with the Germans in a number of
areas. They are working with us in the global war on terrorism.
So we can have strong and serious disagreements. I can
assure you that these disagreements are fought out with emotion
and heat in the various conference rooms that I spend a lot of
my time in, but that does not mean that they are suddenly no
longer our friends or that the place is a hotbed of anti-
Americanism. We are having a dispute over policy. That dispute
over policy should not necessarily result in the end of
friendships that have served us well for long, long periods of
time.
Now there may be areas where we have to question whether or
not we ought to be cooperating with them, because if they took
this attitude here and that same attitude translates somewhere
else, then they could affect our equity there. So I do not say
that we should not look at all we are doing. But, I think any
suggestion of ``Let us get even with them somewhere else'' in a
way that hurts us is not necessarily the right policy.
RENOVATION OF U.N. BUILDING IN NEW YORK
Senator Gregg. On one item which is coming at us, which is
a big issue financially, is the request by the United Nations
to build a new building in New York. I mentioned this to you
earlier, $1.6 billion for a new building. Now, the
reconstruction of the World Trade Center, which envisions the
largest building in the world on that site, along with a
variety of other memorials, is estimated to be less than $400
million. The building of the Beijing Embassy, which is going to
be the most expensive undertaking we have ever pursued as a
foreign construction project, is projected to cost less than
$500 million.
The United Nations is asking for something that exceeds the
cost of the World Trade Center reconstruction by over $1
billion. This, on the face of it, seems to be excessive. Now
maybe it is not. But we would like to get some ideas about
this, since the taxpayers of America are likely to bear the
biggest burden of this cost.
Secretary Powell. Yes. The number I have been hearing is $1
billion. But it is nevertheless a significant number. There are
other buildings besides just the U.N. building itself that are
involved. There are various partnerships that have been entered
into with the City of New York. This is a very complex project,
made more complex by the fact that the intent is to rebuild and
renovate, not just start from a piece of ground. I think that
very prospect adds a lot to the cost of this project.
It is a historic place. It is a landmark in New York. The
rebuilding of that landmark is expensive, but I cannot sit here
and justify the cost. I am not saying the costs are wrong. It
is just that I am not in a position to tell you I know enough
about the costing of that project to defend it.
Senator Gregg. Well, before we get assessed with an
arrearage from the United Nations for not participating fully
in that, I think we are going to have to have some real----
Secretary Powell. I think the request is for----
Senator Gregg. Maybe we should ask General Williams to be
in charge of that.
Secretary Powell. Well, General Williams and I have spoken
about it. He is looking at the project, just as a matter of
interest for me, because sooner or later we will be asked to
come up with an interest-free loan to help pay for the
building.
Senator Gregg. Senator Hollings.
COMPENSATION FOR IRANIAN HOSTAGES
Senator Hollings. I appreciate your answer, Mr. Secretary,
about the French, because I fought with them in World War II.
They are outstanding fighters. We have the French and the
Germans and the Turks with us in Afghanistan. And I hope this
afternoon you can convince them to rejoin us.
I have always been concerned about Iranian hostages. On May
22, 2002 you said a plan for compensation would soon be
submitted. Can we count on getting that plan from you?
Secretary Powell. I will have to research with my staff,
sir, and give you an answer for the record.
Senator Hollings. Yes. Because we have your letter, and you
stated that on May 22, 2002 that a comprehensive plan for
compensation would be forthcoming.
Secretary Powell. Yes. I will try to find out. Obviously,
it has not been forthcoming. So I will try to find out the
status of it and get an answer for you.
Senator Hollings. Very good.
Secretary Powell. I may have it now. I do not know.
Senator Gregg. Maybe it just arrived.
Senator Hollings. It just arrived.
Secretary Powell. Yes. It is out of my office.
I know where it is. I will go ask the Director of this
Office of Management and Budget why it is still there.
Senator Hollings. Yes. Well, you have quite a task. And we
appreciate it very much.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
And thank you, Mr. Secretary.
Secretary Powell. Thank you, Senator.
Senator Gregg. Senator Kohl, do you have any additional
questions?
SITUATION IN NORTH KOREA
Senator Kohl. Just one.
Mr. Secretary, I and others have been very concerned about
reports that the United States is prepared to live with a
nuclear North Korea and that we intend to shift our focus on
preventing the North Koreans from exporting nuclear weapons to
other countries. I agree that we need to do all we can to
prevent North Korea from exporting weapons of mass destruction;
but I believe that we should not back down from our efforts to
forestall North Korea from developing nuclear weapons in the
first place.
So in that area, why have we decided, or have we decided,
not to talk to them directly? Is this not the best way to get
to the bottom of it while at the same time encouraging other
countries to be a part of the effort?
Secretary Powell. Well, first of all, I read that report. I
do not know of any basis for the report, that we have decided
to live with a nuclearized North Korea.
The position of the United States is: We do not want to see
nuclear weapons in the Korean Peninsula. It is also the
position of China. It is also the position of Japan and South
Korea. In fact, South Korea entered into an agreement with
North Korea a little over 10 years ago that guaranteed a non-
nuclear Korean Peninsula, yet another agreement that North
Korea has violated.
We are working with all of our friends in the region to see
that North Korea does not become nuclearized or even more
nuclearized than it may be, because our intelligence suggests
they may have one or two nuclear weapons. Some say they do have
one or two nuclear weapons. We will not know until we actually
find a way to confirm that.
So we are working hard to see that they do not move any
further. Our concern right now would be if they started up the
reprocessing facility. They have been acting in provocative
ways. They have been trying to get our attention. We are not
unmindful of these efforts on their part to get our attention.
But we are making it clear to the North Koreans that we do
want to talk, but we want to talk in a multilateral forum. Why
do we want to do that? Because it is not just a problem between
the United States and the DPRK. That is the way they want to
see it. It is a problem with the DPRK and the international
community and with the DPRK and the International Atomic Energy
Agency, which has condemned them for breaking the seals and
moving in the direction to restart the reactor. It is a problem
between the DPRK and South Korea for violating their agreement
with South Korea. It is a problem between the DPRK and Japan,
China, Russia, and many other nations.
Therefore, we are looking for a multilateral way to deal
with this problem. Now, every time I pick up the paper in the
morning, it says a quick solution is, ``Why do you not just
call them up and go talk to them?'' Well, that is what happened
some years ago when we came up with the Agreed Framework. The
Agreed Framework served a useful purpose in capping the
Yongbyon facility so that it was not producing any more
fissionable material. I give credit to the Agreed Framework for
having done that for eight years.
But at the same time, the potential for developing
fissionable material was left in place at Yongbyon by the
Agreed Framework. As the ink was drying on the Agreed Framework
and a number of other assurances that the North Koreans gave
us, they had started work on another form of enrichment,
enriched uranium, to produce the material needed for nuclear
weapons.
While we thought we had them, you know, in one jug with a
cork in the jug, even though the jug was left there to be
uncorked, they were working on another jug. We found out about
it last year. We did the right thing; we called them to
account.
We said, ``We know you are doing this. This is in violation
of all the commitments you have made over the years to the
South Koreans and to the international community. It is in
violation of the Agreed Framework, the basic intent of the
Agreed Framework.''
Their response was, ``Yes, we did it. Now come talk to us,
and we will see what kind of framework we can come up with this
time.''
Well, what we are saying is: This time it has to be solved
for good. It will only be solved for good if it involves all of
the nations who are in the region. North Korea has tried to,
through its provocative steps over the last several months, get
the attention of the world on this issue and get the attention
directed toward us. The attention should be directed toward the
North Koreans. They are the ones who have people who are
starving. Not one person will be saved by enriched uranium or
by more plutonium coming out. They have blown the opportunity
they had to get enormous assistance from Japan by their
actions.
We have a number of diplomatic initiatives underway, some
of them very, very quietly underway, to see if we cannot get a
multilateral dialogue started. We are looking for a peaceful
solution to this problem. We are committed to a non-nuclear
Korean Peninsula.
Senator Kohl. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Senator Gregg. Thank you, Mr. Secretary. I appreciate you
taking the time.
Well, we have been joined by the chairman of the full
committee. So obviously we defer to the chairman of the full
committee for any questions he may have.
SENATOR STEVENS' REMARKS
Senator Stevens. No questions for my good friend. I am
happy to have a chance to be here and to tell the world what a
great job I think you are doing, Mr. Secretary.
Secretary Powell. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Senator Stevens. I look forward to working with you in any
way possible.
Secretary Powell. Thank you, sir. I was up at Elmendorf the
other day. It looked great up there.
Senator Stevens. Well, the next time we will arrange a site
trip around the State, maybe do a little marine research.
Secretary Powell. Yes, sir. I know the kind you have in
mind. I look forward to it.
ADDITIONAL COMMITTEE QUESTIONS
Senator Gregg. Mr. Secretary, we will let you get up to the
United Nations. And thank you again for what you are doing for
the country.
Secretary Powell. Thank you for your courtesy, Mr.
Chairman.
[The following questions were not asked at the hearing, but
were submitted to the Department for response subsequent to the
hearing:]
Questions Submitted by Senator Judd Gregg
diplomatic readiness initiative
Question. Could you walk us through the methodology State used to
arrive at the numbers for the Diplomatic Readiness Initiative? What
internal review process took place to determine where additional
personnel were needed? Why, during this internal review process, wasn't
the Department also able to identify posts that were overstaffed for
right-sizing? If such a review took place, why has the Department been
unable to tell the Committee where exactly the new FSOs will be placed?
Answer. The Diplomatic Readiness Initiative (DRI) addresses many of
our core needs, some of which are determined by our Overseas Staffing
Model (OSM) and training requirements. The Overseas Staffing Model is
the primary tool for determining baseline overseas staffing needs. It
provides an objective, flexible tool to measure what resources are
needed to meet the President's and the Secretary's foreign policy
priorities and objectives. The OSM quantifies what we need to achieve
the International Affairs Strategic Goals, to meet legislative
mandates, and to fulfill our responsibilities to support the full USG
presence overseas. This model, made up of seven components (``core
program,'' consular, public diplomacy, etc.), identifies the staffing
requirements at overseas posts based on specific categories and
criteria and provides a comparative assessment of posts. It evaluates
each post using workload indicators and host country factors. The OSM
serves as a baseline and specific staffing decisions are made through
the budget and planning process. The OSM showed in 2001 that we had
needs expressed as 386 positions overseas that were not being met. The
DRI request for 1,158 positions covered this shortfall.
In addition, we determined we needed to be able to meet other needs
without straining our workforce. In order to have people in training
and to avoid staffing gaps when transfers and crises occur we need
enough people in the system. The remaining DRI positions are to cover
establishment of long-term training positions (such as for languages)
or detailee positions--to which employees are assigned--as well as to
increase our base level of employees. While we need more people to meet
crisis response and emerging priority needs, we do not have people in
positions designated as ``waiting'' for that crisis to occur; rather,
we planned to use new DRI positions to meet those policy, program, or
infrastructure support needs identified by the Department during our
budget and financial plan cycle. The increases to overall staffing
would reduce the strain when employees were sent to short term training
(such as under our new mandatory leadership and management training
initiative) or when they needed to be reassigned to higher priorities.
The DRI therefore is about flexibility and preparedness rather than
specific position-by-position detailed needs. This is also partly due
to the nature of the Foreign Service system of ``people in motion''
rotating between positions as well as the inherent unpredictability of
foreign affairs.
The Department's senior leadership makes final decisions on the
Department's staffing requirements, hiring plans, and position
allocation based on emerging priorities, funding potential, Overseas
Staffing Model projections as well as the Senior reviews led by the
Deputy Secretary. This ensures that staffing decisions are made in
support of mission requirements. The strong linkage between strategic
priorities and resource decisions--with senior management involvement--
ensures the Department's ability to meet our mission. The exact
allocation of the new positions created in fiscal year 2004 will depend
on the results of those decisions.
While the OSM identified that overseas staffing was below what is
required, this does not mean that we have not identified places where
staff can be reallocated. ``Rightsizing'' is an ongoing process. The
Department continually reviews changing priorities and emerging issues
and reallocates positions among regions or between functions so that
higher priority needs are met. During the 1990's, as the Department
downsized its employment, the necessity to reallocate scarce resources
in line with priorities became paramount. Oftentimes, people were
pulled to address new issues while old ones still existed. In our
strategic planning and budgeting process we require missions to assess
how they could meet their new needs within existing resources.
Now, thanks to increased hiring, posts and regional bureaus have
been able to move resources to meet the priority counterterrorism
mission while still continuing to staff other critical requirements. As
we have added positions overseas in the last few years, we have
increased infrastructure across the board so that posts are not as thin
as they had been, but more positions have gone to posts in the Middle
East and South Asia.
personnel placement decisions
Question. Have the events of September 11, 2001 impacted personnel
placement decisions? In other words, has the list of posts slated to
receive personnel increases changed in light of September 11?
Answer. Post September 11 the Department immediately reprioritized
and moved people and resources to meet the emerging counter terrorism
mission. New positions were established based on the new needs being
identified, particularly in the consular area. These needs are likely
to become permanent needs that will have to be regularized and will
need to be treated as a baseline requirement.
We have had to use some of the Diplomatic Readiness Initiative
(DRI) positions to cover new consular needs in the wake of 9/11 when
the workload went up even as MRV fee revenues--which have funded many
consular position increases--went down. We have also had increased visa
processing requirements that have increased workload while we have also
worked to ensure that we have fully trained commissioned Foreign
Service Officers in all positions. In the short run we have had to meet
these new requirements within our current workforce. These requirements
will need to be met continuously, but the original DRI did not envision
these changes.
Baghdad is being staffed now by TDY employees from other embassies
and the Department. The staffing gaps left behind may be acceptable in
the short run, but for the longer term they must be filled. In
addition, we must account for the Washington backup of these new
programs, such as the new office supporting the reconstruction of
Afghanistan.
Even though we had to use some DRI positions for these unexpected
contingencies, we still need the personnel complement foreseen by DRI
to make training and future crisis response possible.
consular officers
Question. Mr. Secretary, your budget request includes an increase
of $28 million to hire an additional 68 Consular Officers. Why was this
not included as part of the Diplomatic Hiring Initiative request?
Answer. The Diplomatic Readiness Initiative (DRI) request was
introduced as a three-year plan by Secretary of State Powell in 2001 to
fill gaps created by underhiring in relation to workload in the 1990's.
The DRI addresses many of our core needs, some of which are determined
by our Overseas Staffing Model and training requirements. However, some
personnel requirements are assessed and resources requested separately
such as security, IT, and consular, which tend to have specific needs
due to outside events. The DRI request did not take into account the
additional requirements that would follow from the events of September
11th. Currently, the Department is assessing future personnel needs
taking into account the long-term needs of the Department, to include
the implications following the events of September 11th.
The 68 CA positions that are referenced in the question represent
new positions not originally contemplated in the DRI. These positions
will be used to replace temporary consular associates with full-time
consular officers. This is a critical element in the Department's'
efforts to support homeland security initiatives.
Additionally, Consular positions have traditionally been funded
through the MRV fees collected by the Department. Post September 11,
travel has decreased and therefore so has MRV income. This means that
we need to request appropriated funds for these additional personnel
requirements.
right-sizing
Question. What progress has the Department made towards right-
sizing? Can you tell me where, for example, the Department has actually
decreased the number of U.S. personnel stationed at a post? Could you
have your staff transmit a list of the Department's right-sizing
``success stories?''
How do you reconcile the DRI with the concept of rightsizing? How
does the Department justify bringing on 1,158 new FSOs when it has yet
to maximize its existing human capital by carrying out its commitment
to right-size overseas posts?
Answer. The Department of State and the Office of Management and
Budget (OMB) agree with the General Accounting Office's definition of
rightsizing:
``Rightsizing [is] aligning the number and location of staff
assigned overseas with foreign policy priorities and security and other
constraints. Rightsizing may result in the addition or reduction of
staff, or a change in the mix of staff at a given embassy or
consulate.''
The Department uses a variety of tools to rightsize its overseas
presence, as described below. Our rightsizing is one component of the
broader President's Management Agenda (PMA) rightsizing initiative, led
by OMB, which looks at all agencies with overseas staffing. We are
working closely with OMB to ensure the success of the overall PMA
initiative.
Diplomatic Readiness Initiative.--The DRI is an integral part of
State's rightsizing, i.e., it addresses fundamental staffing needs to
reverse the trend of the early 1990s when we hired under attrition. We
need these positions to fill unmet needs overseas and to provide for
enough personnel to respond to crises and go to training without
leaving staffing gaps.
Overseas Staffing Model.--The OSM is our workforce planning tool
that assists management in allocation of resources, including those
needed to support the USG diplomatic platform. The OSM provides an
objective, flexible tool to measure what resources are needed to meet
the President's and the Secretary's foreign policy priorities and
objectives.
Strategic Planning and Human Resource Allocation Processes.--The
Mission Performance Planning (MPP) process integrates strategic human
capital planning elements into the planning process with the
categorization of staffing and funding resources by strategic goals, as
required by the Government Performance and Results Act (GPRA). This
enables each mission's senior management to assess the commitment of
human resources across the strategic goals, and also assists State
regional bureaus to better distribute State Operations and Foreign
Operations funding across the strategic goals.
Regionalization.--The Department of State has long made extensive
use of regional offices to help us meet the needs of difficult or
dangerous posts. Regional centers exist in the United States (e.g.,
Charleston, South Carolina; Fort Lauderdale, Florida; Portsmouth, New
Hampshire), at major overseas hubs (e.g., Frankfurt, Bangkok), and at
smaller sub-hubs on an ad hoc basis (e.g., Dakar, Hong Kong). Regional
support provided from these centers allows the Department to accomplish
a variety of complementary goals, including improving the overall
efficiency of our global operations, supporting specific posts which
could not otherwise operate effectively, and reducing the burden of
workload, and thus staffing, at many of our most dangerous or difficult
overseas posts. The Department is constantly reassessing the specific
needs of particular posts and adjusting regional support accordingly.
In addition, the Department has underway a number of initiatives
designed to apply the benefits of continuing technological improvements
to rightsizing. One prominent example: By the end of this fiscal year,
the Department will complete the transfer of significant financial
management support operations from Paris, France to Charleston, South
Carolina, as a result reducing 109 positions in Paris.
This action was made possible by improvements in our financial
management systems software. We now have one overseas accounting system
that replaces the two former legacy systems that complies with Federal
Managers' Financial Integrity Act (FMFIA) requirements and facilitates
the compilation and reporting of data for the Department's financial
statements. With further enhancements, posts in Europe, Africa, the
Near East and South Asia will be able to communicate and conduct
certain financial operations electronically, with ``real time'' access
to financial systems. These management actions reduced the need to
maintain overseas staff at the Financial Service Center in Paris to
support these posts and reinforced the decision to consolidate many
financial operations in Charleston.
Post Openings and Closings.--Rightsizing affects not merely the
size of U.S. posts but also their distribution. Perhaps the best
illustration of the Department's ongoing rightsizing efforts is the
near-constant activity to open, close and relocate overseas diplomatic
posts. Since 1990, we have opened 52 new posts (29 embassies, 23
consulates, consulates general, branch offices, etc.) and closed 43 (11
embassies, 32 consulates, etc.).
embassy construction
Question. Mr. Secretary, what impact has 9/11 had on the way the
Office of Overseas Buildings Operations approaches designing and
building embassies abroad? Do you think the lessons of 9/11 were that
we need to build more heavily fortified embassies? Or, do you believe
that 9/11 demonstrated that we simply cannot build buildings that are
100 percent secure and must therefore look to mitigate the threat in
other ways (such as better deterrence and prevention)?
Answer. The watershed event that reshaped the mission of the Bureau
of Overseas Buildings Operations was the August 1998 bombings of our
embassies in Dar Es Salaam, Tanzania, and Nairobi, Kenya. The events of
9/11 served to reinforce the continuing threat and therefore the urgent
need to accelerate the construction of new facilities that can satisfy
the Department's stringent security requirements and protect our
diplomatic personnel by providing secure, safe, and functional office
and residential environments. We appreciate the support the Congress
and this Committee have given to our efforts.
soft targets
Question. Mr. Secretary, does the possibility of further and
perhaps more ambitious attacks against post housing, churches
frequented by Americans, and American Schools concern you as much as it
does me?
I would not suggest that we should shift resources away from the
security of our official buildings in favor of enhancing security at
non-official locations. However, we must do more to assure the safety
of overseas personnel outside the embassy walls. Above all, we must
assure the safety of our children in their schools overseas.
What do you believe is the State Department's proper role in this
area? What level of responsibility should State bear for the security
of non-official locales? Based on the risk and threat assessments that
have, presumably, been conducted on these non-official locales, do you
believe they/we are prepared? When can we expect the $15 million
provided in the fiscal year 2003 Conference Report to start being
distributed? Do you believe additional funds are necessary to protect
U.S. personnel and their families in ``soft target'' environments?
Answer. The possibility of attacks against soft targets overseas
most certainly concerns me. However, there exist many more soft targets
overseas where Americans gather than the U.S. government could ever
possibly protect. I believe we must pursue a dual strategy. First,
identify those soft targets that are readily identified with, and in
some way connected to, U.S. Diplomatic facilities abroad. Housing for
our employees overseas and schools supported by our missions certainly
fit in this category, and it is appropriate that Congress has provided
funding to mitigate security vulnerabilities in those areas. We should
recognize, though, that in the latter case, a great many other children
attend as well, American and non-American. Normal security costs should
be borne by all that attend and be reflected in tuition costs. Our role
for the schools should be to provide security advice and counsel, and
to provide grants for high priority security upgrades such as window
films, emergency public address systems, and communications with
Embassies and local police and security.
To ensure that the $15 million provided in the fiscal year 2003
Conference Report, as well as the additional $10 million in the
Supplemental, is distributed wisely, the Department has a working group
with officers from the bureaus of Overseas Buildings Operations,
Diplomatic Security, and the Office of Overseas Schools. We expect that
funding may be provided to some schools prior to the end of the fiscal
year, and continue over a 3-year period.
For the many, many other possible soft targets, I believe our
continuing responsibility, and a role that we fulfill very well, is to
provide timely and accurate advice that fits the local situation. We
fulfill this responsibility every day with Consular information
bulletins, Overseas Security Advisory Counsel (OSAC) local country
counsels, Regional Security Officer briefings, and other outreach
programs.
Question. How has the Consular Affairs mission changed in the
aftermath of 9/11? Would you agree that the mission your consular
officers perform is vital to our national security? What are the pros
and cons of the Department's tradition of requiring new Foreign Service
Officers to serve their first tour in Consular Affairs? Do you think
this policy has contributed to creating a culture at State where CA
officers are second class citizens? Do you agree that Consular Affairs
is a sufficiently important component of the Department's mission that
it should be staffed by career FSOs, rather than by novices?
In my visits to U.S. embassies abroad, I have noted that it is
often the Consular Affairs sections where conditions are the worst
(most crowded, etc.). In my view, there is a direct link between the
quality of CA workspace and the productivity and efficiency of our
consular officers. Would you agree with this? What are you doing to
change this situation?
Answer. The work of Consular Affairs is a vital element of our
country's overall plan to protect our national security. As part of our
border security program, we have made significant changes in the wake
of 9/11. We have expanded our automated lookout system to include more
information shared with us by other government agencies and increased
the number and type of special clearances required for applicants of
particular concern. Our automated system now requires that we collect
additional information on all visa applicants. And we are limiting the
circumstances in which a personal appearance can be waived for visa
applicants. All of these changes require additional personnel, and we
have created additional positions to help meet this workload.
The Department's traditional policy of requiring all junior
officers to serve a tour in a consular assignment abroad has benefits
for both the officer and the Department. The officer has an early
opportunity to develop management skills, demonstrate leadership, and
hone interpersonal and foreign language skills. For the Department, the
Junior Officer's consular tour can be a chance to see how the officer
performs in a difficult situation, dealing with both American and
Foreign Service National (FSN) colleagues as well as with often
demanding host country nationals. The officer's performance in the
consular tour is a vital factor in determining whether the officer
should be tenured in the Foreign Service.
Junior Foreign Service Officers (FSOs) have gone through a rigorous
examination process to arrive at this point. In addition to the
consular training at the Foreign Service Institute, which has recently
been expanded, they bring a wealth of academic and real world
experience to their jobs. They are dedicated and motivated
professionals who take their role in protecting homeland security
seriously. Our junior officers are closely supervised by more senior
career consular officers. At posts staffed by only a single consular
officer, the Deputy Chief of Mission takes on the supervisory role and
an experienced regional consular officer visits the posts regularly to
provide management oversight and advice for the consular function.
The consular cone is one of five career tracks for Foreign Service
generalists. All Foreign Service generalists have the opportunity to
serve in positions out of cone to broaden their experience and to
compete for positions such as Deputy Chief of Mission.
It has often been difficult for the physical facilities in our
consular sections abroad to keep pace with the increasing numbers of
personnel, both Foreign Service Officers and Foreign Service Nationals,
required by the visa process, which has become even more complex in the
post 9/11 world. The employees engaged in this vital work deserve
working conditions that are secure, safe, and adequate for the job.
Our Bureau of Overseas Buildings Operations (OBO) has embarked upon
an ambitious building program to complete new embassies on time and
within budget. The Bureau of Consular Affairs works closely with the
designers and planners at OBO to ensure that consular sections in new
embassy buildings are adequate to permit an efficient and effective
consular operation. CA and OBO continue to work together to refine the
standards for consular sections now being designed. OBO and CA also
work collaboratively in the rehab of facilities to permit consular
sections to be rehabbed along with other parts of the buildings. In
order to react more quickly to fluctuations in consular workload, OBO
is also looking at acquiring commercial space for consular sections. In
the fiscal year 2003 appropriation, Congress directed OBO to undertake
a 3-year Consular Workspace Improvement Initiative, earmarking up to $8
million of OBO funds for this purpose. CA has worked closely with OBO
to prioritize these projects.
Question. Mr. Secretary, protecting information at our posts
overseas is costly. If we had the technological capability to store
information in the United States, rather than at post, wouldn't this be
worth looking into? Would you agree such a technology could reduce the
number of overseas personnel required to assure the security of
information, and thus result in cost-savings?
Answer. For the past two years, the Department of State has been
exploring the technological capability to store information in the
United States rather than at our overseas posts.
We are also studying the implementation of the High Assurance
Virtual Wide Area Network (HA VWAN) which will provide classified
connectivity to critical threat posts and to posts that have
environments with weak physical, administrative or technical security
controls. This program would reduce classified holdings. A pilot on
this technology will commence in Summer 2003.
But at the core of my Information Technology priorities is to
replace the current 60-year-old ``cable'' technology used by the
Department and other Foreign Affairs Agencies with a new system. This
new technology called SMART (State Messaging and Archive Retrieval Tool
Set) will provide centralized storage in the United States of all
document types (currently cables, memorandum, informal messages and
notices).
It will give our diplomats access to more information and minimize
the holdings at a post because posts will access data from a server in
the United States. We expect to deploy SMART in fiscal year 2005.
While SMART will provide some reduction in classified holdings, we
will need to continue to ensure the protection of the information and
equipment that remains at post.
However, we cannot guarantee, at this time, that there will be a
reduction in the number of overseas personnel required to maintain,
operate and ensure the integrity of our information stored overseas.
Existing Marine Security Guard requirements would not be affected.
Our Information Specialists safeguard and are responsible for the
classified network infrastructure including encryption, COMSEC, and
other classified network components that must be maintained and
protected.
The mandated duties of our Information Systems Security Officers
(ISSOs) will not decrease significantly. While compliance and reporting
requirements have increased in recent years, posts are not yet staffed
properly to meet those new requirements. A restructuring of the duties
of Information Specialists at overseas posts would enable the
Department to better meet these reporting responsibilities.
Question. I understand that the estimated cost of renovating the
U.N. headquarters complex in New York City is $1.6 billion. Mr.
Secretary, the design for the World Trade Center site (encompassing a
museum, and opera house, a mall, and five office buildings, one of
which will be the tallest building in the world) is expected to cost
only $350 million. How is it possible, then, that the cost of
renovating the U.N. headquarters is $1.6 billion?
A reasonable person would expect that security of the new World
Trade Center site would be as robust as any building complex in New
York City. The cost of the new U.S. embassy compound in Beijing, China
is expected to be $438 million. Surely the cost of security at the U.N.
complex in New York City will not exceed our security costs in China by
$1.2 billion. Can you explain this?
Answer. As the design phase of the U.N. Capital Master Plan
progresses, the Department remains in regular contact with U.N.
secretariat officials to monitor closely the cost estimates and
assumptions of the project to ensure that they are realistic and
reasonable. Also, the General Accounting Office has just completed an
updated study on the project--including the issue of cost estimates--
and we urge you to examine the conclusions of that report when it is
released shortly.
The cost components of the U.N. Capital Master Plan, as currently
estimated, are as follows:
--Baseline cost: $1.05 billion, including rental of swing space; and
--``Scope options,'' related to additional security, energy
efficiency, and system contingencies: $150 million, assuming
all were to be included in the final design.
--In addition, as part of the overall plan, the U.N. Development
Corporation--a public benefit corporation of the State and City
of New York--has proposed to construct a new office building
just south of the existing U.N. compound which would be used as
swing space during the renovation of the existing U.N.
facilities (permitting all staff to relocate and allowing the
renovation work to proceed all at once, thus reducing costs)
and ultimately to consolidate U.N. staff currently housed in
several rental buildings off the U.N. compound, with no added
costs to the United Nations.
Security is a vital component of both the Beijing Embassy compound
as well as the U.N. headquarters facilities. However, security elements
do not represent the majority of the cost factors for either project.
It is very difficult to compare these two projects, as they serve
considerably different purposes. For the Beijing compound, our Office
of Overseas Building Operations is working with a budget of $434
million and is designing facilities to accommodate 846 staff as well as
consular operations. The U.N. headquarters complex will continue to
accommodate the needs of 191 U.N. member states and approximately 4,700
U.N. staff. The existing U.N. facilities do not conform to current
safety, fire, and building codes and do not meet U.N. technical or
security requirements.
The Department is not involved in the redevelopment of the World
Trade Center (WTC) site and would refer you to the New York City
Economic Development Corporation for the actual figures relating to
that redevelopment project. We understand, however, that the total
costs for the redevelopment will be significantly higher than the $350
million figure, which we understand may only represent an estimate for
the cost of the World Trade Center Memorial (as distinct from the
facilities cited in your question).
Question. The fiscal year 2007 State Department Appropriations Bill
required the Secretary of State to notify Congress 15 days before the
United States votes in the U.N. Security Council to establish or expand
a peacekeeping mission. Mr. Secretary, since we have to fund these
missions, do you believe Congress should have a more formal role in the
decisions leading up to the Security Council votes? Wouldn't this
lessen the need for Members of Congress to place ``holds'' in order to
effect change in these missions?
Answer. Pursuant to legislation, the Administration provides
monthly briefings to Appropriations and Authorization Committee staffs
on current and prospective peacekeeping missions and information
related to expenditures from the Contributions to International
Peacekeeping Activities (CIPA) appropriation. The Administration also
provides formal Congressional notifications for proposed votes in the
U.N. Security Council for new or expanded missions. We believe
information provided provides sufficient information to permit the
Appropriations Committees to exercise its Constitutionally-required
responsibilities.
Question. At the hearing, I raised the point that the American
taxpayers have contributed more than $800 million to the U.N.
peacekeeping mission to the Democratic Republic of the Congo. This
mission is very important to France, and the United States has
cooperated with the mission in every way. The Iraq resolution was
important to the United States, and yet French negotiators took every
opportunity to undermine U.S. efforts towards that end.
Mr. Secretary, you indicated in your testimony that we should not
break ties with our allies in one area merely because we are in
disagreement with them in another area. Do you not support the concept
of issue-linkage? Would you agree that issue-linkage is one of our most
important diplomatic tools?
If, in the case of the Congo peacekeeping mission, you believed
that continued U.S. participation was vital to U.S. national interests,
could you give me other examples of where the United States employed
issue-linkage to try to elicit greater cooperation from the French (and
Germans) in the U.N. Security Council negotiations over an Iraq
resolution?
Answer. The United States supported establishment and continuation
of the U.N. peacekeeping mission in the Democratic Republic of the
Congo, and requested funding to pay for our portion of U.N.
peacekeeping assessments, because we believed, and continue to believe,
that MONUC can contribute to restoration of stability in this critical
African nation, which can help remove this destabilizing factor in
Central Africa. You are correct that support to MONUC was an issue of
high importance to France, but it is also an issue of high importance
to the United States.
As I have said publicly, France's intransigence in the United
Nations Security Council on a resolution to follow UNSCR 1441 has
consequences for our future relationship. There will be issues of
special importance to France where we will seek to get their attention,
but we should not fail to act on issues of manifest interest to the
United States.
______
Questions Submitted by Senator Pete V. Domenici
Question. Late last congress, I joined with Senators Biden and
Lugar in sponsoring the ``Nuclear and Radiological Threat Reduction
Act.'' This legislation would authorize the Secretary of State to take
specific steps to prevent the use of dirty bombs as a terrorist weapon.
It is my understanding that this bill is likely to be introduced again
this Congress.
Also in the 107th Congress, the Senate passed my legislation
authorizing the National Nuclear Security Administration to take the
lead in the Department of Energy's strategy for combating radiological
terrorism. Enhanced technology, mitigation systems and international
cooperative efforts are a few of the mechanisms prescribed by my bill
to better safeguard nuclear materials that are being sought by
terrorists.
In addition, my bill, which is now law, calls for greater
coordination between all Federal departments and agencies with
responsibilities for nonproliferation.
Given the significant roles of both the State and Energy
Departments in addressing issues of nonproliferation, I believe there
is opportunity for tremendous synergy between them in addressing the
problem of nuclear terrorism.
Would you offer your thoughts about how the Department of State and
the Department of Energy can more effectively coordinate efforts so as
to maximize our progress on this issue?
Answer. In combating radiological terrorism, coordination between
the Department of State, NNSA and other agencies has improved regarding
the detection of illicit nuclear and radioactive materials. Working
with NNSA, the Department of State has taken the lead with NNSA/Second
Line of Defense (SLD) in organizing an inter-agency effort by the
Department of Homeland Security, State, Energy and the Department of
Defense to develop a strategy for assisting key countries overseas in
their detection of illicit nuclear materials. NNSA/Second Line of
Defense assisted greatly in the drafting of an USG interagency
strategic plan for provision of radiation detection equipment, which
provides an action plan and performance measures to guide our efforts
on this key anti-terrorism/nonproliferation initiative.
State and NNSA are also executing a joint plan for maintaining,
repairing and replacing radiation detection equipment the USG has
provided to foreign countries in recent years. In 2002-2003, this
program, using SLD assets, was very successful in performing required
maintenance and re-training in several countries where equipment has
been in active use for some time.
Yet much remains to be accomplished in terms of denying terrorists
access to high-risk radioactive sources. With your help, NNSA has made
a good start on securing these sources. As you have stated, there is
indeed an opportunity for tremendous synergy between the Department of
State and NNSA.
We believe that a diplomatic solution is the key to a meaningful
long-term solution. The security of radioactive sources depends on
convincing states to change the fundamental ways that they manage and
secure sources. Governments must agree, and be committed, to secure
high-risk radioactive sources and keep them secure throughout their
life cycle. The Department of State has a history of engaging foreign
governments at the highest levels to secure these types of commitments.
More broadly, we are using the Nonproliferation and Disarmament
Fund (NDF) to tackle tough, urgent and often unanticipated problems on
a worldwide basis. We expect that NDF in the future could be used to
help countries develop infrastructures to secure radioactive sources
and track dangerous materials, including through the NDF's existing
``Tracker'' automated software system that helps governments strengthen
control over sensitive exports. We hope that requested fiscal year 2004
increases in NDF funding will support the Department's Dangerous
Materials Initiative (DMI) to secure radioactive materials, pathogens
and sensitive precursors. DMI aims for synergies among U.S. Government
agencies and programs and also with international partners.
We believe that an ongoing dialogue between NNSA and the Department
of State, along with other relevant agencies, is necessary so that
technical and diplomatic efforts can be combined to ensure that high-
risk radioactive sources are secured over the long term.
russia and iran's nuclear program
Question. I remain concerned about Iran's drive to obtain a nuclear
capability. Despite its claims to the contrary, Iran's construction of
new nuclear facilities along with announced plans to mine uranium point
to its growing ambition to advance a nuclear weapons program.
Russia's technical assistance to Iran's nuclear program has been a
source of frustration for the United States. It has hastened Iran's
efforts while slowing development of the new strategic partnership
between Russia and the United States.
It is my understanding that State Department officials were
recently in Moscow to discuss arms control issues in general and the
Iranian nuclear matter specifically.
Can you report on the substance of those discussions? Do the
Russians share our concerns about the prospects of a nuclear-armed
Iran? Have they indicated a willingness to consider terminating their
support of the Iranian program?
Answer. We raise the subject of ending Russian nuclear cooperation
with Iran at every opportunity with senior Russian officials.
In these meetings, the Russians have professed to share our concern
about the prospects of a nuclear-armed Iran. And recent revelations
about the extent of the Iranian program to develop nuclear weapons have
been very useful in making clear to Moscow that Tehran is indeed
pursuing this objective.
We appear to be making some progress in our discussions in curbing
Russia's nuclear cooperation with Iran. The Russians have agreed to
some measures that mitigate the nonproliferation risks of their
cooperation--such as providing fuel for the lifetime of the Bushehr
reactor as well as taking back all the spent fuel to obviate any
rationale for Iran to develop fuel cycle facilities.
Much remains to be done, however. We continue to press the Russians
to agree to end all their nuclear cooperation with Iran and more
effectively prevent Russian entities from cooperating in other
sensitive areas such as missile technology.
antiterrorism training
Question. Mr. Secretary, I have just joined with Congressman Steve
Pearce and Senator Bingaman in a letter to you to urge that the
Department reinstate two anti-terrorism training programs at the New
Mexico Institute of Mining and Technology in Socorro, New Mexico. At
the end of last year, the State Department notified New Mexico Tech the
Hostage Negotiation course was being relocated to Louisiana State
University, which is a partner with New Mexico Tech in the ATA
programs. Then this past January, New Mexico Tech was notified by the
State Department that the Rural Border Patrol Operations program was
being terminated and moved elsewhere. This is a mistake. The community
of Socorro and the university have operated very successful ATA
programs for the State Department. Both have invested significantly in
facilities to accommodate these programs, and they have been very well
received by the foreign dignitaries and officials receiving this
training. The decision to relocate these programs will significantly
impact the local economy. These programs follow successful New Mexico
Tech training for the nation's first responders as one of four training
partners in the Office of Domestic Preparedness and the National
Consortium on Domestic Preparedness for the Department of Justice. I
see no valid reason why these programs should be relocated, nor were
explanations give to New Mexico Tech for this change.
(A) Mr. Secretary, I understand that the State Department official
that recently ordered the relocation of the Rural Border Patrol
Operations course did not have the authority to do so. I am now told
that this decision has been put on hold, but that the intention is
still to move forward with this proposal through regular channels. Will
you please take a look at the attached letter and investigate this
matter for me? I would urge you to keep the Rural Border Patrol
Operations Course right where it has been successfully run for the past
several years--at New Mexico Tech in Socorro, New Mexico.
(B) Will you please also investigate the decision that was made to
relocate the Hostage Negotiation course to Louisiana State University?
While the universities work very closely on these programs, they each
have unique capabilities which they bring to the anti-terrorism
assistance programs.
Congress of the United States,
Washington, DC, March 3, 2003.
The Honorable Colin L. Powell,
Department of State, 2201 C Street, N.W., Washington, DC 20520.
Dear Secretary Powell: We write regarding the Antiterrorism
Assistance (ATA) training program involving Louisiana State University
(LSU) and New Mexico Tech (NMT). We are deeply concerned about the
Department of State's (DoS) decision to terminate the Rural Border
Patrol Operations training program at NMT. Our concerns are further
heightened by the fact that the Hostage Negotiations program at NMT was
terminated last year.
Until the end of 2002, NMT successfully conducted both courses
under a cooperative agreement between ATA and LSU and a subcontract
between LSU and NMT. Before year end, LSU (at the direction of ATA)
notified NMT that Hostage Negotiations training would relocate to LSU
effective January 2003. At the time, NMT was led to believe that the
loss of the Hostage Negotiations training program would be offset by
increased activity in the Rural Border Patrol Operations course,
thereby resulting in a program neutral change. However, NMT funding for
both training programs has dwindled from approximately $1.7 million in
fiscal year 2001 to an estimated $900,000 for fiscal year 2003.
Obviously, the decision recently announced to relocate the Rural Border
Patrol Operations course will eliminate any chance for a program
neutral change and will instead have a significant negative financial
impact on NMT.
We are aware of the limited resources available to carry out this
and other ATA activities during these critical times. Thus, it is
imperative that our best resources are marshaled to provide important
training to our allies in foreign countries. We believe the ATA
training made available to these countries is important to their
security and critical to our country as the front line of defense to
antiterrorism activities. It is therefore incomprehensible to us that
decisions have been made to terminate this important program at NMT,
especially after NMT's success and contributions to the ATA program
were formally recognized in the letter from ATA directing the training
to be relocated.
The principal reason given by the DoS for its relocation of the
Rural Border Patrol Operations course was economic. ATA believes they
can achieve a measure of cost savings by consolidating training at
another location. It is important to note, however, that more dramatic
savings can more likely be realized by consolidating additional
training at NMT. We believe that the decision to terminate training at
NMT will not represent the greatest cost savings and ignores other
factors that impact on the economy and the overall quality of life of
our citizens.
It is also important for us to point out the considerable
investment in the ATA training program that has been made by both the
community of Socorro and NMT. These investments were made as a
commitment to a long-term, productive relationship with the ATA
program. First, NMT funded construction of a ``state-of-the-art'' small
arms range to provide first class support for the program. Second,
local businesses contributed to the success of the program by investing
in expansion of their facilities to accommodate students, faculty and
ATA representatives. Third, NMT provides an exclusive training area,
which consists of 3,137 acres, for the Rural Border Patrol Operations
training program at no cost to the ATA program.
In light of the above, we affirm our desire to continue the
successful ATA programs already established by NMT in Socorro, NM, and
for the DoS to fully use the existing infrastructure and prior
investments made to support these important programs. To re-establish
this program at DOE training facilities in Albuquerque may require
substantial investment of scarce funds and may require entry to a
military installation where, due to heightened security restrictions,
guaranteed access by foreign nationals could be limited, as was ATA
student access to facilities on some military installations immediately
following September 11th.
The Department of State should take immediate action to accomplish
the following actions:
--Reverse the decision to relocate the Rural Border Patrol Operations
training away from NMT.
--Reestablish Hostage Negotiation (or a comparable training course)
at NMT.
--Use the unique facilities of NMT to support a Large Scale Terrorist
Bombing course or similar training program.
--Relocate the office of the ATA New Mexico representative from
Albuquerque to Socorro, NM.
These actions would help realize actual cost savings in the ATA
program and permit full utilization of existing (and proven) high
quality training facilities at NMT, thus eliminating costs associated
with duplicating such facilities at new training locations.
We greatly appreciate your attention to this time sensitive request
and look forward to your swift response. Should you have any questions,
please feel free to contact Ricardo Bernal of Rep. Steve Pearce's staff
at (202) 225-2365.
Sincerely,
Stevan Pearce,
Member of Congress.
Pete Domenici,
United States Senator.
Jeff Bingaman,
United States Senator.
Answer. The Department has not made a final decision to relocate
the Rural Border Patrol Operations course from New Mexico Tech. The
Hostage Negotiations course was moved to Louisiana State University so
that it could be co-located with the Advanced Crisis Response Team
(SWAT) course that is taught there, where specialized facilities are
available. Both courses end in a capstone joint exercise involving
hostage negotiation and hostage rescue.
New Mexico Tech has a sub-grant of a cooperative agreement between
Louisiana State University and the Bureau of Diplomatic Security that
is renewable each year. Diplomatic Security regularly reviews these
agreements and compares costs for providing courses among various
service providers. Recently, as a matter of fact, a course that was
once taught in Washington state was relocated to a New Mexico facility.
We would be happy to provide you or your staff with a detailed
briefing on the consideration of this matter prior to any final
decision.
Question. Would you please tell the Subcommittee the Department's
plans to fund the International Law Enforcement Academies in fiscal
year 2003 under the omnibus appropriations bill?
Are there sufficient funds to adequately support the operation of
the ILEAs for the remainder of the fiscal year? If not, what
adjustments does the Department plan to make in ILEA operating plans?
Answer. The Department plans to continue to support the work of the
established ILEAs in Bangkok, Budapest, Gaborone and Roswell. The level
of funding will be approximately $3.5 million each for Bangkok,
Budapest and Gaborone and $5 million for Roswell. In addition, $2
million will provide initial funding for the development of the newest
ILEA for Latin America. Existing funds can adequately support the
current level of operations at all the ILEAs. No adjustments are
necessary.
Question. The conferees endorsed Senate and House report language
regarding ILEA, and stated the expectation that the Administration
provide sufficient funding to complete the Roswell Center where there
is a building currently under construction. Can you please tell me what
the status of that project is, and when it is expected to be completed?
Answer. The Department has $3.5 million available for the
construction of a new building at the Roswell facility. The New Mexico
Institute of Mining and Technology has been instructed to present a
proposal including detailed information and specifications, as required
by statute for any building project, for review and approval. This type
of building project typically takes 12 to 18 months to complete.
Question. Under the President's fiscal year 2004 budget requests
for International Law Enforcement and Narcotics Control, what are the
Department's plans to fund each of the ILEA programs? Would you please
provide the Subcommittee with the details on the proposed ILEA training
for the upcoming fiscal year?
Answer. The level of funding will be approximately $2.9 million
each for Bangkok, $3.2 million for Budapest, $2.7 million for Gaborone,
$5 million for Roswell and $3.3 million for San Jose. This funding will
allow for continuing operations--at a reduced training tempo in the
regional academies--based on fiscal year 2003 spending levels. No new
initiatives are possible without additional funding.
______
Questions Submitted by Senator Ben Nighthorse Campbell
Question. Last October, I wrote to the Department, along with
several colleagues from the Helsinki Commission, concerning Ukrainian
President Kuchma's approval of the transfer to Iraq of the Kolchuga
[COL-chew-ga] radar system.
Have efforts been made to investigate possible financial benefit on
the part of President Kuchma or his associates in connection with the
Kolchuga affair?
Has the Ukrainian government given indications of cooperating in
resolving the problem of transfers of military equipment to rogue
states such as Iraq?
Answer. Although we remain convinced that President Kuchma
authorized the transfer of Kolchuga to Iraq, we do not know if the
transfer actually occurred. We are not aware of any violations of U.S.
law in connection with payments President Kuchma or any other Ukrainian
official might have received in connection with any transfer of the
Kolchuga system to Iraq.
The Kolchuga incident exposed serious weaknesses in Ukraine's arms
export control system. The United States is working jointly with
several other governments in a cooperative effort to strengthen
Ukraine's export control system, enforcement, and oversight of defense
industries and transshippers. We continue to engage the Government of
Ukraine on these issues and are intensifying our diplomacy. As a result
of our diplomatic efforts and pressure, the Ukrainian government has
undertaken a number of preliminary structural reforms in the arms
export industry that enhance nonproliferation. The Ukrainian parliament
(Rada) also recently passed a new export control law that could
contribute to stronger safeguards. We will be working with the
Government of Ukraine to support effective implementation of its export
control law and regulations in addition to pushing for continued
structural reform.
Question. We have seen disturbing reports that Belarus, Bulgaria,
Bosnian Serbs and Serbia have also been actively involved with arms
trade to Iraq. I am particularly disturbed over Belarus under
Lukashenka--the last dictator in Europe and will soon introduce the
Belarus Democracy Act in the Senate.
How serious do you regard the problem of arms transfers to Iraq
from other OSCE countries of the Former Soviet Union and Eastern
Europe?
While I understand some progress has been made in shutting off a
notorious Serbian connection, are we making satisfactory progress with
these other suppliers?
Is the United States pursuing the issue of arms transfers within
the OSCE framework?
Answer. U.S. strategy to halt military assistance and gray arms
transfers from Eastern and Central Europe and Eurasia to Saddam
Hussein's Iraq and other state sponsors of terrorism has been a quiet,
but significant, success for U.S. national security. Since July 2001,
the United States has invested substantial diplomatic and intelligence
resources in implementing nonproliferation strategies for states in
this region, including for each of the NATO invitees. Relying on the
tools of coordinated diplomacy, information sharing, interdiction, and
coordinated assistance, our efforts to strengthen border security and
encourage responsible export control policies in Eastern and Central
Europe and Eurasia have worked remarkably well.
Our cooperation with Serbia and Montenegro and Bulgaria in
particular mirrors the very successful nonproliferation strategies
pursued in Eastern Europe and the Balkans. The fruitful partnerships
that developed as a result of this strategy proved invaluable to our
efforts in Operation Iraqi Freedom and continue to play a significant
role in the global war on terrorism.
We are beginning to implement a synthesized approach to border
security and nonproliferation cooperation in the Balkans, with support
from many in Congress. The Department also continues to execute an
effective small arms and light weapons destruction program. This
program has destroyed 230,000 surplus weapons and several tons of
ammunition in Albania, Bulgaria, and Serbia and Montenegro, and will
destroy similar amounts in Bulgaria and Romania this year. Our
diplomatic efforts have also resulted in virtually all Eastern and
Central European governments vetting proposed arms sales and transfers
with the USG. The United States has sought to use the OSCE to reinforce
our work on conventional arms transfers in order fora, and to cement
principles and good practices associated with arms transfers among the
members of OSCE states. This effort dates back to agreement in 1993 on
Principles Governing Conventional Arms Transfers, but became more
focused at the 1999 Istanbul OSCE Summit with the OSCE Document on
Small Arms and Light Weapons. The specific measures contained in the
Document on Small Arms and Light Weapons go beyond the earlier
statement of general principles--firmly based on U.S. principles and
practices--and provide a concrete basis for U.S. efforts to encourage
institute good practices among our OSCE partners in this regard.
We are at an important point in implementing this strategy. We have
begun to steer Eastern Europe away from the arms markets and military
cooperation of the past toward productive areas for the future. These
positive changes will contribute not only to our efforts to cut off
supply lines to terrorists, but also to our goal of supporting further
integration into western security and defense institutions. We will
continue to work within the effective framework of bilateral and
multilateral relationships, including the Wassenaar Arrangement, NATO,
and the G-8, to ensure the sustained improvement in arms transfer
policies in all OSCE countries.
Question. Mr. Secretary, despite our frustration and disappointment
with President Kuchma and his associates in Ukraine, it is important
that we continue to assist those elements of Ukrainian society striving
for democracy, rule of law and Euro-Atlantic integration.
Cuts in Voice of America and Radio Liberty programming to Ukraine
have been proposed. Isn't this a premature move, given the poor
environment for independent media there especially in the run-up to
next year's presidential elections?
Answer. We share your views on the critical importance of
developing a strong civil society in Ukraine, and on the important
contributions made by Voice of America and especially Radio Free
Europe/Radio Liberty (RFE/RL). In the interest of seeing a free and
fair 2004 presidential election in Ukraine, in which all major
candidates have access to the media, the role of the Ukrainian service
of RFE/RL is especially vital. This is a central goal of U.S. policy
towards Ukraine.
In March, Under Secretary Beers sent a letter to the Chairman of
the Board of Broadcast Governors (BBG) expressing our concerns about
rumored reductions in staffing and operational funding for RFE/RL's
Ukrainian language service. We also briefed the BBG on the results of
our Ukraine policy review, which called for greater support for
independent media in Ukraine. The Chairman, Mr. Tomlinson, assured us
that no reductions for RFE/RL were contemplated.
Question. As Co-Chairman of the Helsinki Commission, I recently
introduced a bipartisan resolution (S. Con. Res. 7) concerning anti-
Semitism and related violence in the OSCE region.
What actions is the Department taking to ensure that our friends
are doing everything possible to confront such attacks, prosecute and
publicly denounce such violence?
The Porto OSCE ministerial called for a meeting focused
specifically on anti-Semitism, a subject high on the Helsinki
Commission agenda. Is that meeting on track to take place?
Answer. The Department of State is concerned about the increase in
anti-Semitic violence in the OSCE region. We have made combating anti-
Semitism a priority for our diplomacy throughout the region and
especially at the OSCE.
The OSCE Parliamentary Assembly led the way on this issue by
issuing a statement at the Berlin summer session last July highlighting
the need for vigilance and governmental attention to the problem of
anti-Semitic activities.
Our success at the Ministerial meeting in Porto in scheduling an
OSCE meeting on anti-Semitism is in large part a result of the work
done on this issue by the Parliamentary Assembly.
Through the OSCE Permanent Council and on a bilateral basis we
raise incidents of anti-Semitic violence or policies with the
governments concerned.
The OSCE meeting on anti-Semitism scheduled for June 2003, will be
a forum to discuss best practices in the fight against anti-Semitic
violence and tendencies in societies. The U.S. delegation, to include
prominent governmental officials and private individuals, will be
robust and will reflect the importance we place on this conference.
Question. Mr. Secretary there have been reports in the media
suggesting that the United States is allowing, if not encouraging,
other countries to torture individuals suspected of involvement in
terrorism. In his State of the Union Address, the President described
the horrific forms of torture employed by the Hussein regime and
concluded, ``if this is not evil, then evil has no meaning.'' Can you
clarify what the U.S. policy is with respect to torture in the war
against terrorism?
Answer. The United States condemns and prohibits torture. The
President recently reaffirmed this to the United Nations High
Commissioner for Human Rights. The Department of Defense General
Counsel has further advised in a letter on the subject addressed to
Human Rights Watch that:
--(1) When questioning enemy combatants, U.S. personnel are required
to follow this policy and applicable U.S. laws prohibiting
torture.
--(2) With respect to the transfer of detained enemy combatants to
other countries for continued detention, U.S. Government
instructions are to seek and obtain appropriate assurances that
such enemy combatants are not tortured.
--(3) U.S. Government personnel are instructed to report allegations
of mistreatment of or injuries to detained enemy combatants,
and to investigate any such reports.
--(4) U.S. Government officials investigate any known reports of
mistreatment or injuries to detainees.
The United States does not condone torture and is committed to
protecting human rights as well as protecting the people of the United
States and other countries against terrorism of global reach.
Question. A year ago I asked you what action might be taken against
OSCE countries like Turkmenistan who flagrantly violate their human
rights commitments. I understand that the situation has only
deteriorated further over the past year. What is the Department doing
to address these developments?
Answer. The human rights situation has continued to deteriorate in
Turkmenistan, particularly since the November 2002 attack against
President Niyazov's motorcade. The United States is deeply concerned
about the human rights situation in Turkmenistan, and we have embarked
on a number of bilateral and multilateral initiatives to address the
problems there.
We have raised our human rights concerns directly with President
Niyazov and other senior officials in Turkmenistan on a number of
occasions, as well as the Turkmen Ambassador in Washington. In those
conversations, we especially discussed the conduct of the Turkmenistan
Government during its investigation of the November incident. We have
also encouraged other countries to raise the matter with the Government
of Turkmenistan.
We have also vigorously pursued multilateral efforts to improve
Turkmenistan's human rights record. In December 2002, the United States
joined other OSCE member states to invoke the rarely used ``Moscow
Mechanism,'' requiring the Government of Turkmenistan to reply in
writing to a request for information on the whereabouts and conditions
of those arrested. Ashgabat failed to respond adequately, thereby
bringing into motion the second stage of the Moscow Mechanism--the
sending of a fact-finding team to Ashgabat to report on the situation.
Under its OSCE commitments, the Government of Turkmenistan is obliged
to accept a visit by the team and must appoint one member to the team.
Despite this obligation, the Government of Turkmenistan did not
cooperate, and the OSCE team had to investigate the matter without
assistance.
On March 13, 2003, the OSCE Moscow Mechanism Rapporteur submitted
his report on abuses in Turkmenistan following the November attack on
President Niyazov. The report condemned the attack itself, catalogued a
range of grave human rights abuses following the attack, and publicly
called on Turkmenistan to make reforms and work with the OSCE to
address the problems. Turkmenistan has rejected the findings of the
report.
The United States also co-sponsored an April 2003 United Nations
Human Rights Commission resolution condemning Turkmenistan for a range
of human rights abuses including torture and political and religious
repression. In particular, the resolution cited abuses in the crackdown
following the November incident. We hope this resolution will encourage
reforms in Turkmenistan and enhance U.N. engagement on this issue.
The United States is committed to sustained diplomatic engagement
with Turkmenistan to press for fundamental political, economic, and
societal reforms, and to push Turkmenistan to develop a healthy respect
for human rights in accord with its U.N. and OSCE obligations. The
development of such reforms is inextricably tied to security,
stability, and prosperity in Turkmenistan. Understanding that
significant political change will take time, we have increased our
assistance programs that promote democratic freedoms, including human
rights, civil society and rule of law.
______
Questions Submitted by Senator Ernest F. Hollings
cost sharing initiative
Question. Is the program voluntary or mandatory?
Answer. The Administration's Security Capital Cost Sharing Program
will be mandatory for all agencies under Chief of Mission authority. As
envisioned, agencies, including the Department of State and ICASS, will
be required to pay on a per capita basis for each authorized overseas
position. It is an Administration initiative that is part of the
President's Management agenda. It aligns costs with the overseas
assignment process and is a significant right-sizing initiative. It is
also consistent with the OPAP recommendations. This approach is
reflected in the Foreign Affairs Authorization Bills now being
considered by both the Senate and House.
Question. How are you going to guarantee that other agencies will
reimburse the Department through the Cost Sharing Program?
Answer. The legislation now being considered (S. 925 and H.R. 1950)
would authorize State to collect the amounts due automatically through
the Intra-Governmental Payment and Collection System, which is the same
way GSA collects rent for domestic buildings. Payment and collection
would not be contingent on a particular cost sharing appropriation to
an agency.
Question. What specifically is the $120 million for?
Answer. All cost sharing funds will be used solely for the
construction of secure, safe, and functional New Embassy Compounds
(NEC), in accordance with the Long-Range Overseas Buildings Plan. The
fiscal year 2004 funds will help fund the NEC's identified in the
President's fiscal year 2004 Budget. The $120 million includes State's
cost share of $64 million and $56 million for other agencies' cost
share. The actual transfer of funds from agencies will begin in fiscal
year 2005 and will be fully phased in by fiscal year 2009.
Question. You propose to phase the program in over 5 years. Does
this mean that DOS shoulders the expense for the next 5 years?
Answer. Under this program, State will not have to shoulder all the
expense for the next 5 years. State has traditionally provided 100
percent of the capital cost of New Embassy Compounds (NEC), and even
when the Cost Sharing Program is fully phased in, the Department will
be responsible for about two-thirds of the total budget based on its
overseas positions. The 5-year phase-in period will allow other
agencies time to rationalize their overseas presence, deciding either
to increase their budgets for overseas activities or reduce the numbers
of their least essential personnel overseas. The Department of State
would also be making the same judgments about its own staffing in light
of the larger financial consequences of maintaining positions overseas.
The Administration believes that the 5-year phase-in is a practical
accommodation to account for a significant change in the Government's
approach to funding the construction of approximately 150 New Embassy
Compounds over the next 12 to 14 years.
Question. Would you provide the Committee with a breakout of DOS
costs and costs of participating agencies for each of the next 5 years?
Answer. The breakout of Department of State costs and costs of
participating agencies currently available are based on data collected
almost two years ago. The Department has recently collected fresh data
and is now computing new cost figures. As soon as they are available,
we will make them available to the committee. We anticipate they will
be ready in late June.
usaid facilities
Question. Why did State decide to request additional funding for
USAID facilities through CJS, when Congress has consistently not
supported this approach?
Answer. The Department of State and the Administration are strongly
committed to ensuring that USAID is also provided with secure, safe,
and functional facilities. The Secure Embassy Construction and
Counterterrorism Act of 1999 requires all agencies, and therefore USAID
as well, to be located on the embassy compound. This also allows for
economies of scale resulting from concurrent construction. We are eager
to work with the Congress to achieve this legislated mandate.
Previous budget submissions have requested full funding from the
Commerce, Justice, State, and Judiciary Subcommittees and from the
Foreign Operations Subcommittees in different years, and neither
subcommittee has been willing to fund USAID buildings. The fiscal year
2004 budget request places the ``catch up'' projects that should have
accompanied the already funded New Embassy Compounds (NECs) in the
Foreign Operations budget request. USAID facilities that will accompany
the proposed NECs are included in the CJS budget request.
The Administration's proposed Security Capital Cost Sharing Program
should render the USAID facilities funding issue moot since USAID, like
other agencies, will pay into the program for the space they need.
berlin/frankfurt facilities
Question. What steps are you taking to ensure that the facility
will remain safe in light of the fact that you will not know who owns
property inches away from the embassy wall?
Answer. The new embassy in Berlin will be built to withstand
catastrophic and progressive collapse from blast, and is being designed
with buffer spaces between the building and the contiguous buildings.
Additionally, our design features non-office space such as elevator
shafts and mechanical rooms located along the space contiguous with
adjacent buildings, to the maximum extent feasible.
Question. Will you know who purchases the condominiums next door?
Answer. Our security and intelligence units keep in close contact
with German security and intelligence services, as well as building
owners and landlords. It is in all of our interests to provide safety
and security for not only our facility, but for the Germans and German
facilities close to ours. The German authorities and the owners of the
adjacent buildings appreciate our concerns and we foresee a very high
level of cooperation to address this issue.
Question. If you are capable of building a structure within inches
of private property without any knowledge of who owns that property,
then do we truly need the 100-foot setback requirement?
Answer. The location of our new Embassy in Berlin is a unique
opportunity to build a chancery on a historic and prestigious site. It
is not without security challenges, but both the Department and German
authorities are working to provide an adequate level of security. While
the site does have contiguous buildings, we are working to mitigate the
threat from the buildings using both physical and procedural methods.
It should also be noted that we are working with the Germans to ensure
that uninspected vehicles on the roads around the chancery are kept at
a distance of no less than 82 feet. The chancery will be built
stronger, to the same level of protection as if it had 100 feet of
setback.
While certain waivers will be signed for this particular chancery
building, the normal requirement for 100 feet of setback has allowed
the Department to construct safe and secure facilities in many
countries in the world that may not provide the same level of
cooperation or have the same capabilities as the German government.
Congress wisely included a waiver process in the Secure Embassy
Construction and Counterterrorism Act, and that process will be used
only when appropriate. The 100-foot requirement is still valid.
Question. What steps are you taking to secure the property where
the subway runs?
Answer. The subway does not run under the building. It does run
under the Pariser Platz in front of the chancery. There is an emergency
escape tunnel from the subway with an exit in the street approximately
60 feet in front of the embassy, which would open into an area where
the public has free pedestrian circulation. We do not consider the
subway a vulnerability.
Question. Given the current climate and anti-American sentiment in
Germany because of the potential war with Iraq, do you still feel as
certain about maintaining the security of the facility today as you did
one year ago?
Answer. While there were differences in our positions over Iraq,
the Germans provided excellent security for our existing facilities
throughout this period of heightened threat. I have no doubt that they
will continue to honor their security responsibilities and provide us
with excellent services and support. The decision to build on Pariser
Platz was taken only after careful consideration, with the condition
that security issues be adequately addressed. We continue to move
toward that goal.
Question. When will you actually sign the waiver for the security
requirements?
Answer. The waiver will be signed when the Department is assured
that security issues have been adequately addressed.
evaluating the hiring initiative
Question. Since the whole notion of the 1,158-position Hiring
Initiative was to meet DOS's high priority needs, why are the 68
additional positions needed for Consular Activities not absorbed in the
Hiring Initiative?
Answer. The Diplomatic Readiness Initiative (DRI) request was
introduced as a three-year plan by Secretary of State Powell in 2001 to
fill gaps created by underhiring in relation to workload in the 1990's.
The DRI addresses many of our core needs, some of which are determined
by our Overseas Staffing Model and training requirements. However, some
personnel requirements are assessed and resources requested separately
such as security, IT, and consular which tend to have specific needs
due to outside events.
It did not take into account the additional requirements that would
follow from the events of September 11th. Currently, the Department is
assessing future personnel needs taking into account the long-term
needs of the Department, to include the implications following the
events of September 11th.
The 68 CA positions that are referenced in the question represent
new positions not originally contemplated in the DRI. These positions
will be used to replace temporary consular associates with full-time
consular officers. This is a critical element in the Department's'
efforts to support homeland security initiatives.
Additionally, Consular positions have traditionally been funded
through the MRV fees collected by the Department. Post September 11,
travel has decreased and therefore so has MRV income. This means that
we need to request appropriated funds for these additional personnel
requirements.
Question. Does the Department support, as you stated in the letter
of May 22, 2002, a comprehensive plan for compensation?
Answer. Yes. We have stated on many occasions that we favor a
comprehensive approach to compensation for U.S. victims of
international terrorism. We sympathize greatly with suffering endured
by U.S. victims of terrorism and their families, including the 1979
Tehran hostages. We support a comprehensive program that allows them to
receive quick payments in their time of need.
The current ad hoc, piecemeal legislative approach, however, which
depends on the vagaries of litigation, does not work. It is not fair
and equitable, as it has provided some victims or categories of victims
with compensation and has left others with nothing.
Deputy Secretary Armitage's letter to Congress, dated June 12,
2002, laid out the Administration's principles for a comprehensive
plan. The letter stated that such a plan should provide compensation on
par with that for death or injury to public safety officers killed in
the line of duty in a quick, streamlined and simple claims process,
without regard to income. It stated further that such a comprehensive
plan should preserve the President's ability to conduct foreign policy
by not using blocked assets to fund victims compensation.
Question. Since you have drafted something, perhaps you would like
to share with the committee exactly what you propose to do to
compensate the original 52 hostages?
Answer. First, some background on this issue is helpful. This is
not the first time that Congress or the President has considered the
question of compensation for the 1979 hostages. In 1980, Congress
passed the Hostage Relief Act, which provided compensation with respect
to the hostages' tax liabilities and other benefits in 1980. After the
Algiers Accords were entered into in 1981, which waived the hostages'
claims in order to secure their release from captivity, and after
extensive hearings were held in both houses of Congress on the Accords
as a whole and on this waiver in particular, the President established
a special commission to make recommendations to the Congress as to how
the hostages should be compensated for their ordeal.
The President's Commission issued its Final Report and
Recommendations on Hostage Compensation in 1981. It recommended that
the hostages receive a certain amount of compensation and other
benefits. In 1986, the Victims of Terrorism Compensation Act was passed
and enacted into law. Section 802 and 803 of that act provided for
additional compensation and benefits to the hostages. I understand that
all of the hostages received compensation according to the directives
of that act.
Deputy Secretary Armitage's letter to Congress of June 12, 2002,
outlined the Administration's principles for a comprehensive
compensation plan. Because the plan is designed to address compensation
for all U.S. victims of international terrorism, it does not single out
any particular group or category, such as the 1979 hostages.
Question. When can we expect to see such a proposal?
When was the proposal submitted to OMB? What steps are you taking
to the proposal released from OMB?
Answer. The submission of a proposal and its timing depend on OMB.
We have been working with OMB for some time to develop such a proposal.
In November 2001, we sent a draft proposal to OMB that could be
circulated for inter-agency review. Our discussions with OMB ultimately
resulted in the letter that Deputy Secretary Armitage sent to Congress
last June. Following my oral testimony in March, I sent a letter to
then-OMB Director, Mitch Daniels, urging that OMB complete its review
of our draft proposal as soon as possible. We have been in further
discussions about this with OMB and the White House. We have made
progress, and I am hopeful that these discussions will result in a
proposal that is worked out between the Administration and Congress
soon.
Question. To date, how much funding has the Department of State
expended on defending Iran--a known terrorist state--in court against
American citizens?
Answer. None. We have made appearances in proceedings in U.S. court
to protect the interests of the United States. Unfortunately,
plaintiffs' lawyers have sometimes mischaracterized our actions. In the
Roeder v. Iran case in the U.S. District Court for the District of
Columbia, Judge Sullivan noted in his decision,
``Plaintiffs consistently mischaracterize the nature of the
interest asserted by the United States. The United States is not
seeking to vindicate Iran's interests, but rather its own commitment
under a binding international agreement, and its ever-present interest
in the enforcement of its laws.''
Judge Sullivan recognized that we had appeared in the litigation to
protect U.S. interests in light of our obligations in the Algiers
Accords.
I would also like to address certain statements made by Senator
Harkin concerning the Algiers Accords in recent congressional hearings.
He suggested that the Algiers Accords should not have any binding
effect, asserting that they were never a treaty ratified by the Senate
and because they resulted from blackmail.
After the Algiers Accords were signed, and after the hostages were
released, Congress had extensive hearings on the Accords in both
houses. Former Deputy Secretary Warren Christopher, who was the lead
negotiator for the United States, recounted in his testimony how he had
reported to the then-Senate Foreign Relations Committee ``on nearly a
daily basis'' concerning the ongoing negotiations. As reflected in the
hearings, the Accords and the negotiators received overwhelming
bipartisan support and praise. For example, the Chairman of the House
Foreign Affairs Committee, Rep. Zablocki, stated, ``The agreements
preserved the honor of the United States and secured the safe release
of the hostages.'' The Chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations
Committee, Senator Percy, also stated, ``President Reagan has
determined that Presidential authority did exist and does exist to
implement these agreements and it is in the best interests of the
United States of America that we honor them. I applaud this decision by
President Reagan and Secretary Haig.'' And the Supreme Court noted
Congress' approval of the Algiers Accords in its decision in Dames &
Moore.
Upholding U.S. obligations in the Algiers Accords is in the
interests of the United States, and it is those interests that the
United States has sought to protect by appearing in court in these
cases.
Question. What other terrorist states or organizations has the
Department of State defended in court?
How much has been expended on those cases?
Answer. None.
dolphin-safe tuna
Question. With all due respect, doesn't NMFS have greater
scientific expertise than the Department of State to make this decision
as to whether the science supports changing the standard?
Answer. Yes. The Department of Commerce in general, and the
National Marine Fisheries Service in particular, has both the capacity
and the statutory responsibility to evaluate the scientific evidence
bearing on the issue of dolphin-safe tuna fishing. We understand that
the decision was made on this basis.
Question. Despite the clear science-based standard in the statute,
isn't it true that the Department of State believes that keeping Mexico
and other countries at the table in the international treaty on the
tuna fishery in the Eastern Tropical Pacific is an important factor in
deciding whether to change the U.S. law? Wasn't this view expressed to
the Department of Commerce?
Answer. At the end of 2002, the Secretary of Commerce had the
responsibility under the law in question to determine whether the purse
seine tuna fishery in the Eastern Pacific Ocean is having a significant
adverse impact on any of the depleted dolphin stocks in that region. As
you know, he found that the fishery is not having such an impact.
In advance of that finding, I wrote to Secretary Evans to describe
what the Department of State saw as a wide range of views of various
scientific organizations that were examining this issue and urged him
to weigh all the competing evidence carefully, as he certainly did.
The United States has a strong interest in maintaining the
International Dolphin Conservation Program, which has reduced dolphin
mortality in this fishery by 98 percent. However, the statutory
criteria on which the Secretary of Commerce made his finding relate
solely to the issue of whether the fishery is having a significant
adverse impact on dolphin stocks. The Department of State has not
argued otherwise.
Question. There have been serious concerns raised with respect to
the failure of certain member countries to comply with the
international agreement to reduce dolphin mortalities in the Eastern
Tropical Pacific. As a result of these concerns, the fiscal year 2003
Omnibus Appropriations bill includes language calling for a report to
Congress on compliance with the international agreement, and also
provides $750,000 of the budget for the Bureau of Oceans and
International Environmental and Scientific Affairs only for negotiating
measures to strengthen the IDCP. I hope you are taking our message
seriously.
Answer. The Department of State is aware of the concerns that some
have raised with respect to the implementation of the international
dolphin conservation program. Since the initial implementation of the
program, we have stressed to all participants the need for the highest
standards of compliance with the provisions of the agreement and have
worked to achieve this result in a number of ways. However, more can
and should be done. We will continue to work with the Department of
Commerce, Congress and affected U.S. constituent groups to pursue
effective implementation of this program.
______
Questions Submitted by Senator Barbara A. Mikulski
Question. Mr. Secretary, thank you for pursuing the Diplomatic
Readiness Initiative to fill staffing gaps in the Foreign Service and
Civil Service. Fiscal year 2004 will be the third and final year of the
Diplomatic Readiness Initiative.
The State Department authorization act (Public Law 107-228, at Sec.
301) requires that you submit to the Congress a comprehensive workforce
plan for the Department for fiscal years 2003 through 2007. We look
forward to receiving this workforce plan, which is due 180 days after
enactment of the Act. The world has changed considerably since the
Diplomatic Readiness Initiative targets were set two years ago, and we
expect changes in the State Department to be reflected in the workforce
plan.
Are Diplomatic Readiness Initiative targets still adequate to fill
the current and anticipated open positions at our diplomatic missions
and consular posts?
Will there be a sufficient number of Foreign Service personnel so
they can receive needed training without leaving positions unfilled?
Do you anticipate personnel shortfalls or unmet skills needs, which
would be identified in the workforce plan? Do you anticipate the need
to shift personnel, or problems in recruitment and retention, that the
subcommittee should be prepared to consider?
Answer. As mentioned, the Diplomatic Readiness Initiative (DRI)
program was intended to ``right-size'' the State Department staff
following a long period of under hiring in the mid-1990's. Events since
the initial DRI (developed in 2001) could support increases. We
anticipate that the next iteration of the Overseas Staffing Model will
take some of these events into consideration and we will also be
reviewing results of our analysis of the Domestic Staffing Model
results.
DRI was designed to help make it possible to plan for crises and to
have enough people to be able to reprioritize quickly within existing
resources; without enough people in the system, those who leave to
cover a crisis would leave major staffing gaps.
But for some of these new issues, they cease being crisis
requirements and become baseline requirements--such as an embassy in
Kabul and the increased consular workload.
We have had to use some of the DRI positions to cover new consular
needs in the wake of 9/11 when the workload went up even as MRV fees--
which have funded many consular position increases--went down. We have
also had increased visa processing requirements that have increased
workload while we have also striven to ensure that we have fully
trained commissioned Foreign Service Officers in all positions. In the
short run we have had to meet these new requirements within our current
workforce. These requirements will need to be met continuously, but the
original DRI did not envision these changes.
Even though we had to use some DRI positions for these unexpected
contingencies, we still need the personnel complement foreseen by DRI
to make training and future crisis response possible.
Question. A June 2002 General Accounting Office report on
Diplomatic Readiness at Hardship Posts, stated, ``According to State
officials and Foreign Service employees, the incentive provided by
differential (hardship) pay for overseas service has been diminished by
rules governing locality pay . . .. State has not analyzed the effect
that this difference has had since 1994 on the number of Foreign
Service employees who bid on overseas assignments, including hardship
posts. However, State Department officials, the American Foreign
Service Association, and many officers with whom we met said that this
gap penalizes overseas employees and that if it continues to grow, it
will inevitably keep employees from choosing an overseas career in the
Foreign Service . . .. We estimate that by 2006 and 2010, the
differential pay incentives from the 15 percent and 20 percent
differential posts, respectively, will be less than the locality pay
for Washington, D.C., assuming that the locality pay rate continues to
increase at about 1 percent per year.''
Do you believe the gap identified as a problem by GAO will result
in difficulty filling positions at hardship posts? If so, how can this
problem be addressed?
Answer. While our employees always step up to do what is needed, we
do believe that the overseas pay gap (now nearly 13 percent as
Washington, DC locality pay rose in 2003) has created serious morale
problems, causing employees to question our commitment to them as we
ask them to do ever more difficult and dangerous work overseas.
The hardship incentive--post ``differential''--is intended to both
compensate employees for difficult conditions as well as to provide an
incentive for service. It is not intended to make up for lost salary.
Hardship incentives to do not count as salary for the purposes of
annuity calculations or retirement fund contributions.
We believe that this inequity between overseas and domestic
salaries will make it harder for us to staff overseas posts--especially
hardship posts, but all posts. At nearly a quarter of our posts, even
including allowances such as hardship pay, salary is less than
Washington salaries.
Unlike the CIA, we do not currently have the legal authority to pay
employees overseas at the Washington, DC pay level. In addition, the
cost of doing so cannot be managed without additional appropriations.
We are working with the Administration on a solution to this inequity
and workforce management problem.
Question. At the time of the bombings of our embassies in east
Africa, about 88 percent of our embassies did not meet the Department's
basic safety standards (according to the Overseas Presence Advisory
Panel report).
After five years of a ten or eleven year plan to protect our posts
and missions abroad, what percentage now meets the Department's basis
safety standards?
Also, because of the changing nature of international terrorism, do
you believe additional funds are necessary to protect U.S. personnel
and their families in ``soft target'' environments such as
international schools attended by our children, churches and places of
entertainment frequented by American families, and even our housing
complexes?
Answer. In the immediate period after the embassy bombings,
Congressional funding and Department effort was focused on providing
immediate improvements to our existing facilities using the Emergency
Security Appropriation. These efforts provided necessary and timely
upgrades to our facilities, and were instrumental in protecting our
people in such places as Karachi from a car bomb attack. However, this
effort could not provide substantial improvements such as blast
resistant buildings and improvements in setback for most of our
buildings.
Since early 2001, the Department has embarked on a truly ambitious
new building program. Since then, new embassy facilities have been
constructed in Kampala, Doha, Dar Es Salaam, Tunis, and Abu Dhabi.
Three new embassies will be finished in 2003, including Zagreb,
Nairobi, and Istanbul. The 88 percent figure relates to 142 of the 163
``Inman'' era embassies that were not up to standard, leaving 21 (12
percent) that were up to standard. Adding these 8 new embassies, the
percentage rises to nearly 18 percent. With 2004 plans for another 8
embassies, this figure will continue to improve.
As to the question of soft targets, I believe funding can and is
being provided to improve the security at overseas schools and for our
housing. However, the school program is just commencing, and it is
unclear how much funding will be appropriate. The Department will also
continue to provide timely and appropriate security advice and guidance
to businesses and religious groups overseas to enhance their ability to
protect themselves.
subcommittee recess
Senator Gregg. The subcommittee will stand in recess.
[Whereupon, at 11:04 a.m., Thursday, March 6, the
subcommittee was recessed, to reconvene subject to the call of
the Chair.]