[Joint House and Senate Hearing, 108 Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
FIFTEEN YEARS AFTER TIANANMEN:
IS DEMOCRACY IN CHINA'S FUTURE?
=======================================================================
HEARING
before the
CONGRESSIONAL-EXECUTIVE COMMISSION ON CHINA
ONE HUNDRED EIGHTH CONGRESS
SECOND SESSION
__________
JUNE 3, 2004
__________
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CONGRESSIONAL-EXECUTIVE COMMISSION ON CHINA
LEGISLATIVE BRANCH COMMISSIONERS
House
Senate
JIM LEACH, Iowa, Chairman CHUCK HAGEL, Nebraska, Co-Chairman
DOUG BEREUTER, Nebraska CRAIG THOMAS, Wyoming
DAVID DREIER, California SAM BROWNBACK, Kansas
FRANK WOLF, Virginia PAT ROBERTS, Kansas
JOE PITTS, Pennsylvania GORDON SMITH, Oregon
SANDER LEVIN, Michigan MAX BAUCUS, Montana
MARCY KAPTUR, Ohio CARL LEVIN, Michigan
SHERROD BROWN, Ohio DIANNE FEINSTEIN, California
DAVID WU, Oregon BYRON DORGAN, North Dakota
EXECUTIVE BRANCH COMMISSIONERS
PAULA DOBRIANSKY, Department of State
GRANT ALDONAS, Department of Commerce
LORNE CRANER, Department of State
JAMES KELLY, Department of State
STEPHEN J. LAW, Department of Labor
John Foarde, Staff Director
David Dorman, Deputy Staff Director
(ii)
C O N T E N T S
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Page
STATEMENTS
Opening statement of Hon. Chuck Hagel, a U.S. Senator from
Nebraska, Co-Chairman, Congressional-Executive Commission on
China.......................................................... 1
Schriver, Randall, Deputy Assistant Secretary of State, East
Asian and Pacific Affairs, U.S. Department of State,
Washington, DC................................................. 3
Wang, Youcai, former student leader during the 1989 democracy
meovement, Somerville, MA...................................... 16
Lu, Jinghua, former Beijing Workers Autonomous Federation leader,
vice president, Chinese Alliance for Democracy, New York, NY... 18
Hom, Sharon, executive director, Human Rights in China, and
professor of law emeritus, City University of New York School
of Law, New York, NY........................................... 19
Nathan, Andrew J., Ph.D., Class of 1919 Professor and chair,
Department of Political Science, Columbia University, New York,
NY.............................................................
APPENDIX
Prepared Statements
Schriver, Randall G.............................................. 30
Wang, Youcai..................................................... 32
Hom, Sharon...................................................... 33
Nathan, Andrew J................................................. 36
Leach, Hon. James A.............................................. 37
Hagel, Hon. Chuck................................................ 47
Pitts, Hon. Joseph R............................................. 48
Submission for the Record
China's Changing of the Guard: Authoritarian Resilience,
submitted by Andrew J. Nathan.................................. 49
FIFTEEN YEARS AFTER TIANANMEN:
IS DEMOCRACY IN CHINA'S FUTURE?
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THURSDAY, JUNE 3, 2004
Congressional-Executive
Commission on China,
Washington, DC.
The hearing was convened, pursuant to notice, at 10 a.m.,
in room SD-419, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Representative
Jim Leach (Chairman of the Commission) presiding.
Also present: Senator Chuck Hagel, Representative Sander M.
Levin, and Representative Joseph R. Pitts.
OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. CHUCK HAGEL, A U.S. SENATOR FROM
NEBRASKA, CO-CHAIRMAN, CONGRESSIONAL-EXECUTIVE COMMISSION ON
CHINA
Senator Hagel [presiding]. Good morning. Congressman Leach
and our House colleagues are presently voting, I think, and
they will be here after they vote. But since we had scheduled a
hearing at 10, we wanted to stay on course. So, Congressman
Leach has asked me to preside until he returns. The Co-chairman
of this Commission rarely gets any areas of responsibility, so
I jumped at the chance, of course, to open the hearing.
Fifteen years ago, the People's Liberation Army cleared
Tiananmen Square of the peaceful demonstrators who had held it
for several weeks. The shocking sounds and images of unarmed
students and workers gunned down by Chinese troops remain vivid
in our minds. The demonstration was crushed that awful day, but
the optimism and possibilities represented by those fighting
for a future democratic China were not. We meet today to
remember their voices, and assess China's progress in meeting
their goals.
I am especially pleased that this Commission will hear
today from two leaders of the 1989 democracy movement, Mr. Wang
Youcai and Ms. Lu Jinghua. These individuals have never given
up the struggle for their country's democratic future, and
their insights and sacrifice will greatly inform today's
proceedings.
Mr. Chairman, I congratulate you for holding today's
hearing. China today faces important choices for its political
future. These choices will affect the lives and welfare of all
Chinese citizens, but China's size and growing importance
guarantee that these same choices will reverberate around the
globe in ways that we can only dimly predict and understand
today. China's future is also important to America's future. It
is in our interest to work broadly and deeply with the Chinese
Government using all the bridges and opportunities available to
us to help shape and ensure a democratic future for China.
China is a much-changed and much-changing place. The
results of two decades of market reforms are visible nearly
everywhere. The cold, gray Beijing airport where I first saw
China on New Year's Day in 1983 has long been replaced with a
state-of-the-art facility. The skylines of China's major cities
have changed dramatically. These are the most prominent symbols
of China's new wealth, but the economic reforms that generated
these changes have also fundamentally altered the dynamics that
will define China's future.
The economic realities of building a modern nation while
feeding, clothing, and employing 1.3 billion people have begun
to drive China in directions that, I believe, some within the
Communist Party have not wanted to go. The twin demands of
political stability and continued economic progress have
spurred legal reforms that someday may be the leading edge of
constraints on the arbitrary exercise of state power. Elections
at the village level are now commonplace in China, and limited
experiments like these continue at other levels of government.
Shanghai is experimenting with public legislative hearings, and
the term ``human rights'' was recently added to China's own
constitution.
While these changes are important, the gap between forward-
looking economic freedoms and a backward-looking political
system remains significant. The Communist Party continues to
crush any person or movement it perceives as challenging its
hold on power. But there are leaders now within China that
comprehend the necessity for change, and understand that
inflexibility, secretiveness, and a lack of democratic
oversight now pose the greatest challenges to continued
development. President Hu Jintao and Premier Wen Jiabao have
demonstrated, albeit unevenly, that they may be two such
leaders, but they will need to gather considerable reformist
courage to drive continued change. Not overnight, but in ways
that Chinese society, culture, infrastructure, and institutions
may be prepared for, and willing to accept.
With no voice in their own political future, the
frustration of China's citizens is growing. The political
scientist Murray Scot Tanner cites police figures in the
current issue of National Interest showing the number and size
of protests in China growing rapidly in the 1990s. It is
extraordinary that China's ruling party came to power in a
peasant revolution, representing the working class, but now
faces waves of both worker and rural protests. China's citizens
are fed up with corruption, a social and economic ill that
China's student demonstrators both recognized and offered a
democratic solution for in 1989.
The United States wants to work with China to build a more
open and participatory society. David M. Lampton wrote in the
fall 2003 issue of National Interest that ``Americans must
balance the impulse to treat China as it is with the foresight
to recognize China for what it may become.'' China will not
match the United States on every issue. Political change is
complex and imperfect, and it will be up to the Chinese people
to determine where their country goes and how it gets there.
But China's leaders must take the first steps, and the United
States must be ready to assist.
This morning we have two panels that will offer testimony
and opportunity for questions and answers, which we very much
appreciate.
On our first panel is Randy Schriver, who is the Deputy
Assistant Secretary of State for East Asia and Pacific Affairs
at the State Department.
Mr. Schriver, we appreciate you being here this morning and
look forward to your testimony. Please proceed.
STATEMENT OF RANDALL G. SCHRIVER, DEPUTY ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF
STATE, EAST ASIAN AND PACIFIC AFFAIRS, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF
STATE, WASHINGTON, DC
Mr. Schriver. Mr. Chairman, thank you. I appreciate the
opportunity to appear before the Commission today on this, the
15th
anniversary of the Tiananmen Square crackdown.
Mr. Chairman, I will summarize my comments, but have a
longer statement I would like to have included in the record.
Senator Hagel. Mr. Schriver, your full statement will be
included in the record, as will all witnesses' statements.
Thank you.
Mr. Schriver. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Anniversaries, of course, are a good time to look back and
reflect, but also to look forward and examine trend lines and
to think about our actions and what we may be able to do to
affect the trend lines.
The tragedy of Tiananmen which occurred 15 years ago still
resonates today. This is a tragedy that former Ambassador Jim
Lilley described in his recent book, ``China Hands,'' quoting a
Chinese professor, that this was an event ``when even the
heavens were saddened.''
It still casts a long shadow over China today. You see it
as the Chinese authorities exercise great scrutiny when people
gather in groups larger than three or more in the Square.
You see it in the heartbreak of Tiananmen mothers who are
asking for an accounting of their children who have been
missing since 1989, and for these efforts, get detained by the
Chinese authorities.
So, 15 years on, it does continue to cast a shadow and it
is time for China to reexamine these events. It would be a
reconsideration and an examination that is long overdue. When
it does come, we are very confident that this will be to
China's benefit.
While China today, Mr. Chairman, as you noted, is vastly
different, it is more confident, influential, and prosperous
than it was 15 years ago, Tiananmen will not become real
history in the sense of becoming part of the past until its
leaders address those events with honesty and with candor.
Former Party Secretary and Premier Zhao Ziyang famously
observed at the time of those events that perhaps he arrived at
Tiananmen Square in May, 1989 at a point that was ``too late''
to affect the outcome of those events. But it is certainly not
too late for leaders of today, some of whom were actually with
Zhao on that fateful day, to take steps to come to terms with
the past and to help move China forward in a better direction.
As President Bush said in a speech to the National
Endowment for Democracy on 17 May, there will come a day when
``China's leaders will discover that freedom is indivisible,
that social and religious freedom is also essential to national
greatness and national dignity.''
For our part, we do continue to engage the Chinese
leadership and the public directly on issues that were key and
implicitly part of the foundation of the popular protests in
Tiananmen 15 years ago.
If I could just briefly summarize some of the things the
administration has done in the past year alone. U.S. officials
in Washington, China, Geneva, and elsewhere publicly and
privately
highlight the need for improved human rights conditions.
We have called for the release of prisoners of conscience,
and in recent days protested detentions of those like HIV-AIDS
activist Hu Jia who seek to hold Chinese authorities
accountable for their actions.
We have engaged in a wide-ranging bilateral human rights
with China. We were optimistic over a year ago in 2002 when we
felt as though that dialog was starting to yield some promising
results.
Regrettably, the Chinese have failed to move forward with
many of their promises from that dialog. This had a great
impact on our decision to introduce a resolution to the U.N.
Commission on Human Rights in Geneva this year to highlight our
continuing concerns on human rights.
We have a resident legal advisor in China who works to
promote the rule of law. We work in China with NGO's and
Chinese entities to reform the judicial system, to improve
transparency in governance, to protect worker and women's
rights, to promote best practices, and to strengthen civil
society.
We continue to promote China's compliance with
international labor standards through, among other methods, the
Partnership to Eliminate Sweat Shops Program.
My written statement elaborates on some of these very
important projects, and I would be happy to speak to them at
greater length during the question period.
As I said in my statement before the Commission last year,
we will continue to call on China to make the right choices. As
long as we continue to have concerns about human rights and
religious freedom, as long as China is either unable or
unwilling to address them, we cannot realize the full potential
of this bilateral relationship.
I would also like to say just a few words about America's
engagement with China outside the area of human rights and
democracy. Our relationship with a rapidly changing and dynamic
China is, as Secretary Powell often says, too complex for a
single sound bite, bumper sticker, or slogan. But we are
committed to building the kind of relationship with China that
will promote a broad range of U.S. interests.
Right now, examining our current relationship, we are
working on a wide variety of issues, including North Korea,
counter-
terrorism, trade, and nonproliferation, where we do have very
frank discussions and we do have an opportunity to advance an
important agenda that supports U.S. national interests.
Of course, a few comments about America's interest in our
relationships with Taiwan and Hong Kong would be appropriate
before I close.
First, with respect to Taiwan, the administration welcomed
the responsible and constructive tone struck by President Chen
Shui-bian in his May 20 inaugural address. We hope this message
will be greeted positively in Beijing and that the PRC will
take this as a basis for dialog, and which can lead to a
peaceful dialog between the two sides so they can resolve their
outstanding differences.
I would also note that, despite some very harsh rhetoric in
Beijing's 17 May statement, particularly some very unhelpful
comments and harmful comments related to the potential for the
use of force, there were also constructive elements in
Beijing's statement. So, we do hope that there is something for
the two sides from which to build.
As the President has said numerous times, our ``one China''
policy is unchanged and we will continue to honor our
commitments and obligations under the Taiwan Relations Act, as
well as the U.S.-China joint communiques.
In the final analysis, the Taiwan issue is for the two
sides to settle in a way that is acceptable to each, without
the use of force and without attempts to impose unilaterally
changes to the status quo.
As for Hong Kong, we are supportive of the principle
expressed many times by the Chinese themselves, that the people
of Hong Kong should govern Hong Kong. We have been very clear
about our view. Our longstanding policy is that Hong Kong
should move in the direction of greater democratization and
universal suffrage.
Though the Chinese have also reaffirmed this, as recently
as April this year, the Standing Committee of the National
People's Congress in Beijing has made decisions that will
inhibit the pace of democratization. Beijing and the Hong Kong
government should take steps to ensure sustained movement
toward a government that truly represents the people of Hong
Kong. Ultimately, the pace and scope of political evolution in
Hong Kong should be determined by the people of Hong Kong
themselves.
To close and to get back to the theme of today's hearing, I
would wrap up by quoting Secretary Powell when he spoke at the
Bush Presidential Library in College Station, TX, last
November. This is a statement that, of course, remains very
true today.
Secretary Powell said, ``Only by allowing the Chinese
people to think, speak, assemble, and worship very, very
freely, only then will China fully unleash the talents of its
citizens and reach its full potential as a member of the
international community. For our part, America hopes to work
with China to help the Chinese people achieve their dreams,
their hopes, their aspirations for a better life for their
children.''
By dealing with the aspirations of those who assembled in
Tiananmen 15 years ago, China can begin to realize the
potential about which the Secretary spoke.
Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. I look forward to your
comments and questions.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Schriver appears in the
appendix.]
Chairman Leach. Thank you, Mr. Schriver.
Let me apologize, that on the House side we do have a vote
that is under way, so that has caused a bit of delay. But we
thank you for your thoughtful statement.
Let me just put things somewhat in context. We are here not
to celebrate but, to acknowledge one of history's great cries
for democracy, the Tiananmen Square incident, and ask the
question of whether the echoes of that cry are still being
heard, and are they being heard principally outside China or
inside China, and what kinds of evolution is occurring on the
democratic side within that great society?
My sense is that, at a freedom of speech level within the
family, within maybe office space in universities and other
kinds of communities, that there is a little more freedom of
speech, but public dissent is virtually non-existent.
Have you sensed any strides on the democratic side, on
this, the fifteenth anniversary of Tiananmen, and does the
State Department assess that sort of thing?
Mr. Schriver. I think if you look at the period from 1989
until today, unquestionably there have been progress and
developments that we view positively in China. I think you have
noted some, and Senator Hagel, in his opening statement, noted
some.
The problem from our point of view, is the pace and scope
of this change is not happening rapidly enough, and in some key
areas has not really evolved at all. I think you touched on
probably the most prominent of those, the ability to voice your
dissent on government policies to the authorities. There has
not been very much progress in that area.
So, broadly speaking, things in China are getting better.
The sort of objective standard of man-on-the-street quality of
life, things are better, but certainly not moving at a pace and
scope that we would be comfortable with and we think would be
better for China and for its people.
We, of course, note a lot of the areas of concern in our
Human Rights Report and in the resolution we offered in Geneva.
So in certain key areas, the progress is just not where it
should be.
Chairman Leach [presiding]. Well, I have a bit of an
aberrational perspective. That is, I think people misunderstand
American society, and possibly misunderstand Chinese history in
the sense that we are a society that had developed separation
of powers.
We are also a society that quadruplicated that system with
the separation of powers at the state, the county, and the city
levels. So, we have always had a tension between, as well as
within, levels of government and we have a decentralized
democracy.
China also has a great tradition of decentralization in the
struggle to have a central authority, in some ways, but
historically, the parts have been dominant relative to the
center.
This is a tradition that is good to draw upon rather than
bad to draw upon. If you combine decentralization with
democracy, you have a prescription for incredible vitality.
I raise this in the sense that you have kind of two
examples, and a third that is not really an example, but it is
a model of decentralization authority in China, one being Hong
Kong, another being Taiwan, both very different, and then a
third nation-state, which is Singapore, which is heavily
Chinese.
But it is interesting to me that in Taiwan democracy is
working, in Singapore democracy is working, in Hong Kong, a
quasi-democracy is under way, and aspirations for a fuller
democracy are clearly in place. All three of these places are
doing incredibly well, and these are models for Chinese
society, it seems to me, that stand out.
Now, I raise them in the context, both as models, but also
as sticking points. Hong Kong is obviously a sticking point for
Beijing decisionmaking, and it has been a bit imperfect to
date. It almost seems as if they are fearful of more democracy,
fearful that the model might work.
In Taiwan, where you have democracy, one is apprehensive
that miscalculations can occur. Here, I want to compliment the
administration in particular on what I consider to be a very
thoughtful
articulation of views, both reflecting the history of American
involvement on the cross-Strait relations issues, but also
underscoring our concern that miscalculations can occur. I am
personally very apprehensive about irrational acts and
irrational statements and miscalculations that could lead to
astonishingly difficult moments in the cross-Strait
circumstance.
So, what I would principally like to ask is how you assess
Beijing's reaction to President Chen's statement in the sense
of, are there responses the U.S. Government has received, and
are we advocating confidence-building kinds of measures that
can follow on to both of these speeches, both the May 17
Chinese speech and President Chen's speech, in ways that can be
constructive?
Mr. Schriver. Thank you, sir.
Well, in terms of Beijing's reaction to the inaugural, of
course, they preempted it somewhat by releasing a statement
three days prior to the inaugural which had, unfortunately,
some very harsh rhetoric. But there were, as I noted in my
statement, some constructive elements there.
For our part, what we are attempting to do in our
respective dialogs with Beijing and with the Taiwan authorities
is to try to highlight the fact that each side has made some
compromises in terms of just the rhetoric in these two
statements, as well as laid the potential foundation and basis
for dialog. There is a great deal of work that the two sides
would have to do to make that bridge to actually get to the
point where they can sit down at the same table.
But we think both sides have taken constructive steps, and
for our part, again, in our dialog with Beijing and with the
Taiwan authorities, we try to highlight that and encourage them
to take advantage of this opportunity, and advantage of the
fact that we think the trend lines are moving modestly, but
moving in the right direction.
Mr. Chairman, I would be remiss if I did not note your own
constructive role in this with your participation at the
inaugural and the important messages that you conveyed in
Taipei.
It is things like that visit and other efforts at dialog
with the Taiwan authorities where we hope to be as clear as
possible about our policy, and as clear as possible about the
direction we hope the two sides will move. I think the
foundation may be there, but there is an awful lot of work that
remains for the two sides.
Chairman Leach. Well, thank you.
Mr. Chairman, I would just wish to seek unanimous consent
to place a statement that I gave to the Library of Congress a
couple of weeks ago, and a statement that I intended to open
with today, in the record.
Senator Hagel. Well, Mr. Chairman, I would move that that
unanimous consent request be approved, and would formally hand
the gavel back to you, so you do not need my permission any
more on these things.
So, Mr. Chairman, here is the gavel.
[The prepared statements of Representative Leach appear in
the appendix.]
Senator Hagel. Now, may I ask a question?
Chairman Leach [presiding]. Senator Hagel, you are
recognized for as long as you see fit.
Senator Hagel. Thank you, sir. Thank you, sir. It does not
happen often in this business.
Thank you, Mr. Schriver, for coming before us and for the
good work that you and your colleagues are doing. I would add
my endorsement to your comments regarding Chairman Leach's
presence in Taiwan at the inauguration, and the instructive and
important contributions that he made in what he had to say, and
the relationships that he further developed there.
So, I acknowledge that and thank Chairman Leach for what he
continues to do in regard to development of our very critical
relationships in that part of the world.
A general question. What impact do you believe we have had,
the U.S. Government, on human rights in China since 1989? As
you have developed some of the projects, programs,
accomplishments and changes in your testimony, and in response
to Chairman Leach's questions, generally, have we been helpful
and effective? Realizing it is imperfect, but address that in
maybe a more general universe.
Mr. Schriver. Yes, sir.
Senator Hagel. Thank you.
Mr. Schriver. I think it is, of course, challenging to
speak with great specificity because there are a number of
factors that would impact the pace of change in China, but I
think our programs have been effective in a number of areas.
Capitalizing on China's interest in modernizing its economy
and becoming a part of the global economy, its interest in
joining the World Trade Organization, we have had many programs
and efforts designed to help China meet its obligations,
understand rule of law, and particularly in areas related to
commercial law. I think there is spill-over and residual
effects on human freedoms in that area.
We have had a number of efforts under this rule of law
program to train judges, to train lawyers, and although the
ultimate impact to fully understand it may be, in fact, years
from now, I think we are starting to see the signs that this is
having an impact on how the Chinese conduct themselves in the
legal area and in the area of judicial reform.
So, I think as a general point, we are having a positive
impact. It is, of course, easier when you have willing
participants on the Chinese side, and that is why I think we
have had greater progress in commercial law and in trade areas.
But even in the areas that are more contentious, I think we
have had a positive impact.
These are not static programs and it is not a static
situation. We do seek to learn and evaluate the success or
limitations of our programs and try to fine tune them so that
we can have the right kind of impact that we want.
Senator Hagel. Thank you.
How would you rate U.S. bilateral talks, dialog with China
on human rights with other countries' efforts in this regard
with China?
Mr. Schriver. It is improving. I would have to very much
praise the efforts of my colleague in our Democracy, Human
Rights and Labor Bureau, Assistant Secretary Lorne Craner, who
has made this a central part of his effort to address China,
and that is to reach out to colleagues in the EU, and others,
who have dialog with the Chinese in the area of human rights.
It is important to find out where they are having success,
where they are meeting limitations, and understand what is
working and not working from each other's perspectives. There
are also very tangible ways, things like exchanging prisoner
lists and data that perhaps other countries have that we do not
have.
Again, praising my colleague Mr. Craner, this has been a
central part of his effort to address the human rights
situation in China, and I think this has vastly improved.
Senator Hagel. Thank you.
You noted this, I believe, in your testimony, but just to
review a point and then to get to the question. China's
National People's Congress issued a series of decisions in
April of this year regarding the possibilities for universal
suffrage in Hong Kong.
Here is the question. How do you interpret what appears to
be China's harder line regarding Hong Kong?
Mr. Schriver. It is something I always do with great
trepidation, try to identify the precise rationale or thinking
behind these moves by the Chinese. I suspect it emanates from
some very fundamental discomfort with democracy, and they
perhaps might look at the experience on Taiwan to inform
themselves of that. And it also relates to their attempt to
balance stability and economic progress with political
evolution.
I think they are coming down on the wrong side as they make
these decisions, and ultimately they may not achieve the
stability they hope for as people in Hong Kong start to read
these actions for themselves and see them as inhibiting the
pace of political evolution.
So, we think the key is not to challenge Chinese
sovereignty or to question the Basic Law or the system of one
country, two systems, because the foundation for success is
there if all of this is faithfully implemented.
The challenge is to meet the aspirations and the
expectations of the people of Hong Kong, and that is why, in
the statement, I said that should be the ultimate determiner of
the pace and scope of change in Hong Kong, the desires,
aspirations, and expectations of the people themselves. If
Beijing makes decisions that meet those aspirations, I think
that is a better recipe for the stability that they desire.
Senator Hagel. Following in that same vein, a larger
internal political question. Recent stories in our newspapers
have focused on the possibility of a significant internal
struggle going on within the Chinese Government, the new
leadership under President Hu and Premier Wen versus the former
president, President Jiang, and other leaders of his
administration.
First, do you believe there is an internal struggle going
on, and how is that affecting or not affecting what we are
talking about here today? Thank you.
Mr. Schriver. Thank you, Senator.
Again, it is an opaque situation for us on the outside, and
difficult to make very precise observations. I think, at a
minimum, there probably is some competition.
Perhaps you could imagine a spectrum on which on the one
side would be sort of normal bureaucratic competition you might
find in any government, allies of one camp or another vying for
power and influence, and perhaps on the other side of the
spectrum would be much more sort of adversarial competition
between two ideological camps, and perhaps the truth lies
somewhere on that spectrum. It is hard to say.
But there is ample evidence that there is some competition
under way between Jiang Zemin, his followers, and those of the
next generation of leadership. How it impacts decisions and
policies coming out of Beijing, again, very difficult to say. I
think it, at a minimum, makes it more difficult for the new
leadership to be political risk-takers, to think creatively and
to be forward-looking on sensitive issues like Hong Kong and
Taiwan, and human rights domestically in China.
So, perhaps this new generation of leaders are, in fact,
the ones who will ultimately make enlightened decisions and
choices about these kinds of things, but I think the current
competition, or struggle, whatever phrase you want to use,
probably does place limitations on them right now.
Senator Hagel. Thank you.
You mentioned China's entry into the WTO, the United
States' efforts over the years to help bring that about. I
happen to support that effort and agree with that action.
The question is what role should there be, if you believe
there should be one, for U.S. companies, commercial interests,
to help promote human rights development?
Where is that line? Is it all woven into the same fabric?
Is it part of that responsibility, as you have noted, the WTO
entry, and to your answer regarding overall human rights
efforts, that we have helped achieve?
Mr. Schriver. Yes, sir, I think there is a role. In fact,
of course, there are certain legal requirements that U.S.
companies must meet, and implicit in that would be their
requirement to have programs to make sure that there are
certain standards in the labor that they use, and in their
practices in China.
But I think it is in U.S. companies' interests to have a
China that is essentially moving forward in the area of human
rights, and in particular in areas like labor standards, health
and safety standards.
Companies can play a role just by demonstrating best
practices through training and through more formal programs at
a pace and scope that China is comfortable with, but I think it
is a very important contribution to the landscape in China and
how things will change.
Senator Hagel. Do you think our U.S. business interests are
doing enough in this area?
Mr. Schriver. Well, I think it is a challenge for them to
be really leaning forward far, because they have to operate in
a difficult environment in China. But I do think that, for the
most part, U.S. companies are doing the right thing and playing
a constructive role.
Senator Hagel. Mr. Schriver, thank you.
Mr. Chairman, thank you.
Chairman Leach. Well, thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Levin.
Representative Levin. Thank you. I am sorry I missed your
testimony. We had a vote in the House.
Sir, let me just ask you a couple of questions. I think we
expect you to be somewhat cautious in your answers. Our
relationship with China is an important and not very easy one,
so your being diplomatic is perhaps understandable. But I think
it is useful for us to try to be as specific and to the point
as we can within your responsibilities.
When we worked on China PNTR, the basic notion was that we
needed to combine engagement and pressure. Today's hearing, in
a sense, is a test of that approach. So let me just follow up
Senator Hagel's question about Hong Kong and what our reaction
was when the Chinese Government essentially said to the people
of Hong Kong, ``You are not going to select the chief executive
and there is not going to be the promised, or planned, or
prospective election legislatively.'' What did the U.S.
Government say, formally, and who said it?
Mr. Schriver. Yes, sir. We did a variety of things,
publicly and privately. We expressed views to representatives
in Beijing, in Washington, and to the Hong Kong authorities
directly.
But publicly, I would actually have to check the record. I
think it was a White House statement. But certainly there would
have been State Department support for that, and certainly
speaking from the podium, our spokesman, I know, has addressed
this through questions many times.
We think it was a decision, though, within China's right,
as laid out in the Basic Law, as the sovereign, to have a say
in these matters. We think it is was a decision that was
unhelpful and, ultimately, counterproductive.
As I said, if China is seeking to balance economic
prosperity and stability with the political evolution, we think
they are coming down on the wrong side with these decisions.
Hong Kong is one of the most sophisticated, modern,
cosmopolitan cities in the world. Clearly, Hong Kong residents
are ready for greater political participation and freedom, and
clearly they have aspirations and expectations that the Chinese
have helped create that now China is not meeting.
So, this is not a recipe, we think, for the things that
even China wants, the stability that they profess to want. We
think that there will be a negative reaction among the people
of Hong Kong to these decisions. We have made that known
publicly and we have expressed that in our representations in
the capital in Beijing.
Representative Levin. And so you said it is what China
wants, you are referring more broadly. Why was the action taken
by the Chinese Government if it is clearly not what the people
of Hong Kong wanted?
Mr. Schriver. Well, sir, again, being an opaque system, it
is always hard to state with great specificity the rationale
behind these decisions, but one could probably guess that it
has a couple of motivations. Clearly, China has a profound
discomfort with democracy, and perhaps that is informed by the
experience they see unfolding in Taiwan, perhaps it is informed
by some of their own history, and so they are determined to
have a very firm grip on the pace and scope of democratization
there.
But, also, there appears to be some calculation that this
is a move that will enhance stability at the cost of political
evolution. We think that calculation is wrong.
Representative Levin. Stability where?
Mr. Schriver. In Hong Kong.
Representative Levin. In Hong Kong or the rest of China?
Mr. Schriver. Well, I think if they----
Representative Levin. It is not Hong Kong's stability that
is in question, is it? You said you think they think that
democracy in Hong Kong would destabilize Hong Kong or
destabilize China outside of Hong Kong?
Mr. Schriver. Again, sir, all this is speculative on the
Chinese rationale. But I think they were unnerved by 500,000
people taking to the street last July 1, and then another very
large protest over the winter, to the extent that they became
uncomfortable with the pace of change in Hong Kong and the
prospects for stability in Hong Kong. So, I think their
decisions were motivated by trying to seek stability both in
Hong Kong and in China.
Representative Levin. I think that is too diplomatic. In
this sense, I do not think democracy is a challenge to
stability in Hong Kong.
Mr. Schriver. I agree with you.
Representative Levin. I mean, 500,000 people in the
streets? There were 500,000 people in the streets of Washington
a few months ago.
Mr. Schriver. I agree completely with you. I was trying to
take a guess at what might be motivating the Chinese, and I
think they do come down on the wrong side of this calculation.
Representative Levin. All right. Then one other question,
Senator Hagel. I am sorry, Mr. Leach, I missed your questions.
He asked you about the role of the business community and
about human rights standards and international labor standards.
They are becoming more and more an issue as China competes.
We all know that China is more and more a competitive force
in this world--by the way, it is in terms of energy purchases--
as a reflection of their economic growth, which has been
pronounced. So as they compete, more and more it raises the
issue of whether they are going to, over time, and in not too
long a time, begin to comply with recognized standards, both
human rights standards and with internationally recognized
labor standards.
On page 4, when you discuss that we are also promoting
China's compliance with international labor standards, you
refer to the Partnership to Eliminate Sweatshops Program. But I
think everybody would acknowledge that that is, at best, one
way to address it and it is not going to have, in the immediate
future or foreseeable future, likely, a major impact.
So let me ask you this. When people in China raise
questions about the failure of entities to meet China's own
stated provisions, or where someone tries to group together
within a factory when there are layoffs or when there is a
failure to pay and those people are put in prison, which has
happened, what is our policy? What is our program? What do we
do?
Mr. Schriver. Well, obviously, we take a very negative view
of that. We are attempting, in a variety of ways, to address
that. It will be addressed in a very senior dialog between our
Secretary of Labor and Chinese counterparts, but it is also
addressed through the programs that I have mentioned in the
written statement.
But I think it is important to take a look at the lay of
the land in China and to see that the evolution is very uneven,
and in some parts of China they are having greater success at
improving standards and conditions than others.
Representative Levin. What conditions? You refer to
``conditions'' meaning what?
Mr. Schriver. Safety, worker rights.
Representative Levin. Worker rights. Do you think in some
places, if I might ask you, and then I will finish, workers
have more ability to protest than in others?
Mr. Schriver. I think workers have had a better track
record of success in attaining those rights. I think virtually
anywhere in China, if you attempt to organize and approach your
employer or approach authorities as part of an organized group,
that is still regarded as a threat the authorities and they do
not allow it.
But I think workers have attained rights at an uneven pace
around China. And I think, particularly, this relates to the
previous question, where there is a strong influence of
American and Western companies, they have done better.
Representative Levin. You might supply for the record how
you think worker rights differ depending on who owns the
entity, because there is going to be increased pressure here as
we expand trade with China that we not compete with them based
on the suppression of workers.
I understand and hope I realize the complexity. I do not
say it is simple. They have immense pressures in terms of added
employment. But I do not think it helps to kind of sugar-coat
what really is going on in terms of their becoming increasingly
anything close to a free labor market there and the ability of
workers to stand up for themselves. If that continues, there is
going to be increased difficulty in our economic relationship
with China. More and more, they are shipping goods here.
In fact, I read about, in Texas, some entrepreneurs,
Americans, are opening up a dealership to sell automobiles made
in China and shipped here, and they are going to sell them for
$8,000 or $9,000, apparently. It is not clear what the quality
is. But the more that flow goes back and forth, and I am in
favor of flows going back and forth, there is going to be
concern about the basis for competition and the extent to which
there are any standards at all abided by China in that
competition. It is going to come not only from American
workers, it is going to come from workers in Mexico, it is
going to come from workers in other parts of Latin America, it
is going to come from workers in other parts of Asia.
The Vietnamese and the Cambodians are very concerned about
competition in apparel and textiles from China. We have taken
steps to try to help, for example, Cambodia, move away from a
Communist command economy toward a free society economically.
If we just take no position or essentially say it is
irrelevant, what China does, it is going to increasingly
complexify our relationships and the support in this country
and other countries for a free flow of goods. So, I think there
is a need to be very direct and clear about this, and for there
to be an active role for the U.S. Government.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Leach. Thank you very much. I have taken note of a
new verb, complexify. I like it a lot.
Representative Levin. It is used in Michigan all the time.
Chairman Leach. All right.
Mr. Pitts.
Representative Pitts. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Again, thank
you for holding this important hearing today.
Mr. Schriver, China will host the Olympics in 2008. Could
you explore how this event could be used to bring improvements,
lasting improvements, to the human rights situation in China,
please?
Mr. Schriver. Thank you, sir. It is an excellent question,
because I think there is an opportunity for this very effect
that you mentioned in the question.
Clearly, Chinese authorities understand that there will be
a major spotlight on China as the Olympics approach, and of
course during the event itself, so they will want to put the
best face forward to the international community.
I would presume that would not include sustaining a lot of
their current practices which are repressive to individuals and
to organizations. So, as they prepare to host the Games, we
would hope there is a debate going on among the leadership in
Beijing about this very issue, how they might put the best face
of China forward for the international community to see, and
how human rights would be included in that. To get into
specific measures, it is a little difficult. But I think we
have seen historical examples of this. As a model, I think many
people point to the 1988 Games in Seoul as having a very
positive impact on the political environment there. So, this is
an opportunity for China, and we hope that they seize it.
Representative Pitts. Thank you.
With regard to U.S.-Chinese discussions on North Korea,
what changes do you believe will or will not occur in relation
to the Chinese Government practice of forcibly returning North
Korean refugees in China to North Korea? There are highly
disturbing reports of the North Korean government's torturing,
killing many who are returned to North Korea by the Chinese
officials.
Mr. Schriver. Yes, sir. We have not gotten a satisfactory
response from the Chinese on this issue, despite having raised
it in a variety of fora and on many occasions, the senior-most
levels included.
Our view is that the Chinese should do a number of things.
They should allow international relief organizations into the
area to provide support to the people who come across the
border. They should allow, as they have committed to in an
international convention, the United Nations High Commissioner
for Refugees access to this area to evaluate the individuals
and their particular cases as to how they should be handled.
And they should, of course, stop the most troubling
practice, which is to forcibly return people to North Korea
against their will. Again, I wish I could say that our
representations have had an impact, but to date it has been
unsatisfactory.
Representative Pitts. In your statement, you said,
``regrettably, the Chinese failed to move forward with their
promises''--this is
regarding the human rights dialog--``especially those relating
to visits by the U.N. Special Rapporteurs for Torture and
Religious Intolerance, the U.N. Working Group on Arbitrary
Detention, and the U.S. Commission on International Religious
Freedom. We ended up introducing a resolution at the U.N. on
human rights in Geneva this year.''
What indications are there that the Chinese Government will
allow visits, sooner rather than later, of the U.N. rapporteurs
or the U.N. officials?
Mr. Schriver. Well, the impact of our decision to do this
resolution has been, from the Chinese perspective, very
negative. They, of course, halted our bilateral dialog on human
rights and they have indicated that they will not move forward
in areas that we have previously addressed in these bilateral
discussions. However, we are aware that they have some ongoing
discussions with these individuals and these organizations
independent of our bilateral dialog, so perhaps there is room
for progress even if our dialog is suspended.
On the particular individuals you mentioned, I am not aware
that we should be optimistic for a visit in the near future. I
am not aware that the Chinese have moved forward with any plans
to host these visits.
Representative Pitts. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I will
submit my opening statement for the record.
[The prepared statement of Representative Pitts appears in
the appendix.]
Chairman Leach. Thank you very much, Mr. Pitts. Without
objection, that statement will be placed in the record.
We want to thank you very much, Mr. Schriver, for your
participation and your good public service.
Mr. Schriver. Thank you, sir.
Chairman Leach. Our second panel is composed of Mr. Wang
Youcai. Mr. Wang was a student leader during the 1989 Democracy
Movement. He was imprisoned repeatedly for his pro-democracy
activities. In March 2004, after years of prodding by the State
Department, the Congress, this Commission, foreign governments,
and private human rights groups, the government released him on
medical parole and allowed him to travel to the United States
for treatment. He now lives in Somerville, MA. This hearing
will be his first appearance on Capitol Hill.
Joining Mr. Wang will be Ms. Lu Jinghua, a former
government worker. Lu Jinghua was among the few women active in
the Beijing Workers Autonomous Federation during the Tiananmen
Square protest. After the military crackdown, she was on the
government's Most Wanted list, one of only four women of 40
dissidents on that list. She escaped from China in 1989, and
now lives in New York City where she markets real estate. Ms.
Lu currently serves as vice president of the Chinese Alliance
for Democracy, an association of Chinese-born political
activists who live overseas.
Our third speaker will be Dr. Andrew J. Nathan. Dr. Nathan
is the Class of 1919 Professor and Chair of the Department of
Political Science at Columbia University. His published works
include ``China's Transition;'' ``China's New Rulers, The
Secret Files;'' and ``The Tiananmen Papers.'' Dr. Nathan's
teaching and research interests include Chinese politics and
foreign policy, the comparative study of political
participation and political culture, and human rights.
Fourth, we have Ms. Sharon Hom. Ms. Hom is executive
director of Human Rights in China and professor of law emeritus
at the City University of New York School of Law. She sits on
the advisory board of Human Rights Watch Asia, and the
Committees on Asian Affairs and International Human Rights of
the Bar Association of the city of New York. Her writings and
research have focused on Chinese legal studies, international
women's and human rights, and critical legal theory.
If there is no objection, we will begin in the order of
introductions, and we will begin with Mr. Wang.
STATEMENT OF WANG YOUCAI, FORMER STUDENT LEADER DURING THE 1989
DEMOCRACY MOVEMENT, SOMERVILLE, MA
Mr. Wang. Mr. Chairman, members of the Commission, first, I
want to express my appreciation to the Commission for all of
your help in getting me released from prison. I am very glad to
be here today to share my experiences and express my opinions
about China's future democracy. In order not to waste your
time, I will summarize the following points.
First, it is very important that democratic people and
democratic governments help promote a successful transition
from a dictatorship to a constitutional democracy in China.
The American people and the American government can play a
great role in promoting China's democracy. It can be done in
two ways. On the one hand, the American government can exert
pressure on the Chinese authorities on the issue of human
rights and democracy. On the other hand, the executive branch
of the U.S. Government and Members of the U.S. Congress should
increase contacts with members of the Chinese Government, the
National People's Congress [NPC], and the Chinese Communist
Party [CCP].
The American people can assist in building a civil society
in China, particularly in supporting the Chinese opposition
movement and strengthening the China Democracy Party. Such
contacts with the American government and people, as well as
with members of the European Union, will make it more difficult
for the Chinese Government to crack down on efforts to build an
opposition party in China and will help China build a
constitutional democracy.
Second, it is also very important that the efforts to
promote democracy come from within China. This can be done in a
number of ways, such as promoting research and setting up
information centers in China on the development of democratic
societies and multiparty political systems. Overseas
foundations and academic institutions can help to support
colleagues in China in these activities.
Third, for those working to develop democratic institutions
in China, it is important that the people who oppose
constitutional democracy in China be condemned, and that the
people who support and work for democracy in China be
recognized.
It is also important to help those trying to
institutionalize civil society and strengthen the democratic
forces in China. Of course, it is most important to isolate and
condemn the people who promote the dictatorship in the CCP,
while at the same time avoiding sharp conflicts in the
furthering of democracy.
Fourth, as Chinese citizens fight for their civil and
political rights, they should learn how to organize themselves
in non-governmental organizations, which bring about
pluralization of society and institutionalize legal and
democratic procedures and the rule of law, so that Chinese
society will be compatible with democratic changes.
Fifth, as an opposition party, the China Democracy Party
focuses on grassroots election practices, encourages
associations for peasants, workers, intellectuals, and private
entrepreneurs, and CDP candidates to participate in elections,
and work to carry out fair elections from the grass roots to
higher political levels.
In this respect, international help and pressure is
especially needed. With the improvement in election procedures,
China is definitely taking a step in the right direction toward
constitutional democracy.
While this kind of transition will proceed slowly at the
beginning, as experience accumulates it will proceed more
quickly. Unless China makes the transition from a dictatorship
to a liberal democracy with electoral procedures, non-
governmental organizations, a new constitution that will truly
protect human rights, limitations on government power with
checks and balances, and a federal system in the near future,
the Chinese people may pay an intolerable price in attempts to
overthrow the CCP regime.
Such a happening will be very dangerous to the people of
the
entire world, as well as to China. Therefore, I hope the
American government will help and support the growth of a
reasonable opposition party so that China can follow a path
similar to that of South Korea or Taiwan. As the China
Democracy Party is strengthened, it can help to introduce
modern liberal democracy in China.
Sixth, because China is such a big country with a huge
population, the continuation of a political dictatorship will
be dangerous not only for the Chinese people, but for the
entire world. If China can become a liberal democracy, the
present political map of the world will be greatly changed. It
will also be beneficial to the United States.
Furthermore, the disruption of a political transition can
be relatively low if the transition is gradual and kept under
control. Such a transition is possible because many Chinese
people are sympathetic to the promotion of a peaceful
transition in China.
Seventh, I hope that the American people and the American
government will provide more help to make Chinese democracy a
reality. The Commission can play an important role in China's
transition from a dictatorship to a constitutional democracy.
Thank you very much.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Wang appears in the
appendix.]
Chairman Leach. Well, thank you very much, Mr. Wang.
Ms. Lu.
STATEMENT OF LU JINGHUA, FORMER BEIJING WORKERS AUTONOMOUS
FEDERATION LEADER, VICE PRESIDENT, CHINESE ALLIANCE FOR
DEMOCRACY, NEW YORK, NY
Ms. Lu. My name is Lu Jinghua. On this occasion,
commemorating the 15th university of the June 4 Tiananmen
incident, as a participant as an active worker in the movement
for workers autonomy in China, I am very honored to be able to
express some of my reflections.
Fifteen years ago, the Chinese workers were facing a
tremendous situation where many were out of jobs, and also the
government officials' corruption was very harmful. Therefore,
we organized a movement, the so-called Freedom Workers
Confederation Movement. The federation was formally organized
and established 15 years ago in Tiananmen Square. Allow me to
point out, this federation was the first workers' union
organized by workers since the founding of the People's
Republic in 1949.
The current situation now is that workers have no right to
organize workers' unions by their own organizations. Now, in
mainland China, the workers work for basically three kinds of
enterprises. One is a state-owned enterprise, second, the
private enterprise, and also foreign investment organized
enterprises.
Two years ago in the province of Liaoning, in the city of
Liaoyang, of the many workers working in a factory, 60 percent
were out of a job. Some workers' wages had not been paid for
more than a year and a half. Some workers went to the municipal
government offices to launch a protest demonstration. Their
demand was simply for the government to punish those corrupt
officials, and also to give the workers a basic guarantee and
security of their living expenses. Numerous times, the workers
went to the municipal People's Congress and went to the city
government to express their frustration and views, but there
was no response or solution.
Two years ago, more than 5,000 workers demonstrated in
front of the city government building. Among the 5,000 workers,
there were two leaders. Their names are Yao Fuxing and Xiao
Yunliang. Yao Fuxing, on the morning of March 17, 2002, after
he left his home, was arrested by plainclothes public security
officers. On May 9, 2003, the court sentenced him to jail for
seven years, charging him with engaging in subversive
activities against the state. His political rights have been
deprived for three years.
The other leader, Xiao Yunliang, was also sentenced for
four years and deprived of his political rights for two years
on the charge of engaging in subversive activities against the
state.
So, I have now briefed you about the most significant
recent events concerning workers in the state-owned
enterprises. Now let me change the subject to those workers who
work for private enterprises. Workers in the private sector
often work overtime and also work in shameful conditions, the
so-called sweatshops. Also, their wages frequently are not
being paid on time. The only thing the workers can do is simply
be patient and endure.
Why is it that workers have to suffer this condition? It is
because the workers cannot organize their own union in China.
From the outside world, we look at the Chinese economic
situation and it has great momentum. Many enterprises have been
privatized. Also, foreign-owned enterprises will also enter
into China, but the power and the wealth is still in the hands
of those owners. Therefore, the Chinese workers do not enjoy
their own rightful power in their own hands. In the past 20 or
30 years, the Chinese worker was supposed to be the leader of
the social classes in China. However, in reality workers as a
class have degenerated into one of the weakest and most
disadvantaged groups in society.
Thank you.
Chairman Leach. Well, thank you very much, Ms. Lu.
Ms. Hom.
STATEMENT OF SHARON HOM, EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR, HUMAN RIGHTS IN
CHINA, AND PROFESSOR OF LAW EMERITUS, CITY UNIVERSITY OF NEW
YORK SCHOOL OF LAW, NEW YORK, NY
Ms. Hom. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I would like to submit my
written statement into the record and use my oral speaking time
to pick up on selected points. If appropriate, I would like to
also address some of the questions and concerns that have
already been raised by the members this morning.
Chairman Leach. Without objection, your full statement will
be placed in the record, and any expanded statement of the
prior witnesses will be placed in the record. The full
statement of Dr. Nathan will be placed in the record.
Ms. Hom. Mr. Chairman and members of the Commission, on
behalf of Human Rights in China [HRIC], thank you for this
opportunity to make this statement. It is really an honor to
testify today alongside of the activists and leaders from the
1989 movement, and of course my wonderful colleague, Professor
Nathan.
HRIC is an international NGO founded by Chinese scientists
and scholars in March 1989. Our mission is to promote
universally recognized human rights and advance the
institutional protection of those rights in China. Through our
advocacy on behalf of over 2,000 political prisoners over the
last 15 years, in collaboration and partnership with the U.S.
Government and the international community, and our research
and education, we work to measure, monitor, and promote human
rights.
Our work is informed and inspired by our fundamental belief
that democracy is both possible and inevitable in China.
Fifteen years ago, the Chinese Government ordered the
unthinkable, the use of military force by the People's
Liberation Army on the people, and crushed a peaceful protest
movement. It is believed that more than 2,000 people died in
various Chinese cities on June 3 and 4 and the days following.
The Tiananmen Mothers have documented at least 182 victims,
including three who died at the Square. Following June 4, more
than 500 people were imprisoned and an
unknown number were executed. Some 130 people, at least, are
believed to remain in prison for crimes connected with the 1989
protest. However, the total accurate number of dead, wounded,
imprisoned, and executed remains unknown. Fifteen years later,
why is this still the case? First, the Chinese Government,
despite internal debates, refuses to engage in a public
reassessment, despite calls for it. However, Chinese history
demonstrates that a reassessment is possible. For example, the
Anti-Rightist Campaign and the Cultural Revolution.
Second, China's pervasive legal, regulatory, security, and
police control over sensitive political issues and events
ensures that the cost of writing, publishing, or investigating
June 4th will be high and include facing criminal charges of
endangering state security or leaking state secrets, with
subsequent imprisonment.
Third, China's growing economic power and international
role has contributed to the sidelining of human rights by the
international community when they conflict with trade,
military, or other geopolitical interests and priorities.
Fourth, the opportunistic invocation of the post-9/11 war
against terrorism by the Chinese Government has allowed it to
crack down on peaceful assertions of religious and cultural
identity in the name of fighting terrorism. Today, the ``No
Deaths in the Square'' proclamation and the label of
counterrevolutionary rebellion remains a bloody stain on the
legitimacy of any official claims to progress. Over the past 15
years, the Tiananmen Mothers, and more recently by Dr. Jiang
Yanyong, along with HRIC and many other groups and individuals,
have repeatedly called for an independent investigation.
Yet, the statement by Chinese Premier Wen Jiabao this past
March, ``We must concentrate all our time, energy and efforts
on the development of our country . . . if China could have
another 20 to 50 years of stability, our country would surely
emerge stronger than ever before.''
This assertion of the primacy of stability, i.e., stability
as synonymous with the survival of the supremacy of the Party,
is a sobering echo of the statement 15 years ago about the
necessity to ``kill 200,000 for 20 years of stability.''
I wanted to reference Congressman Leach's question about
the evolution of democracy and refer you to the open letter to
Chinese compatriots that the Tiananmen Mothers have issued, and
we have issued and translated on their behalf, and is available
on our website.
That is, one very different development of this petition
from previous letters is that this letter is an open call not
only to the international community and the Chinese Government,
it is a call to the Chinese people themselves, directly. It is
a powerful call to the people themselves.
Second, it is a clear rejection of the invocation of
economic progress as a rationale for political repression.
Third, it names the 1989 crackdown for what it was, a crime
against the Chinese people and a crime against humanity, and in
violation of Chinese law and international law.
Is democracy in China's future? Yes, but it is interrelated
with the promotion of human rights and a rule of law that is
transparent, fair, in a judiciary and process independent of
the Party.
Although there have been improvements, the human rights
situation, as documented by the World Bank, UNDP, Chinese
researchers themselves, human rights NGOs, including HRIC,
reported by this Commission in your very excellent report and
the excellent U.S. State Department country reports, that the
human rights situation has deteriorated seriously and is marked
by growing social inequalities and poverty, massive
unemployment, environmental degradation of a crisis dimension,
severe restrictions on freedom of expression, crackdowns on
ethnic minorities, religious groups, independent political
parties or unions, independent media, and the use of torture
and treatment of prisoners, arbitrary detentions, and arrests.
Lawyers taking on cases that are politically sensitive may find
themselves intimidated, or themselves the target of repression.
I should also note for the record, apropos of the last
exchange, that Mr. Van Boven, the special rapporteur on
torture, is scheduled to make his mission to China, which
coincides with the first day of the EU-China Human Rights
Seminar.
Today, 15 years after Tiananmen, facing severe labor and
social unrest, China is not more stable, nor can it claim
sustainable progress and equitable economic development. True
social stability requires as fundamental conditions protections
of human rights, democracy, and rule of law. The order that is
maintained in the absence of these conditions is, in fact, just
social repression and control. Chinese democracy will require a
vibrant civil society, not a limited, non-critical realm where
any views contrary to the Party are silenced. Whatever
direction the Chinese leadership takes, the Chinese Government
cannot legitimately continue to claim that it alone can define
democracy, even socialist democracy, as only what it will
allow, or that progress will be measured predominantly by the
interests of economic and political elites, or that elections
such as for Hong Kong's LegCo, will be permitted, but only if
the results are what it approves.
Yet, democracy is inevitable because the aspirations,
hopes, and the willingness to struggle are still powerfully
present and alive, against all odds, in China.
Despite the brutal invocation of military violence, despite
a
pervasive and powerful Chinese propaganda, police, and security
apparatus, despite China's growing economic power that China
manipulates to undermine scrutiny of its human rights record,
and a privileged and powerful Chinese elite that is bought off
by economic and political benefits of supporting the present
policy,
despite all this, courageous Chinese, the Tiananmen Mothers,
journalists, intellectuals, peasants, workers, students,
Internet activists, religious practitioners, lawyers, artists,
and poets continue to write, speak and organize mass
demonstrations, form independent political parties, independent
unions, petition the government, and to appeal to international
fora.
We support these human rights activists and we think that
one way by supporting them is to remember the past and not
allow the Chinese authorities' control over information and
censorship to result in historical amnesia. The Chinese
Government certainly has not forgotten and its recent actions
in suppressing and rounding up people reflects a government
that is profoundly still fearful and distrustful of its own
people.
Let me close with a few recommendations directed at the
Commission and the U.S. Government, and that picks up on some
of the comments.
As part of the bilateral and the multilateral processes,
including the U.N. and the WTO, the U.S. Government should
continue to exert its influence by raising human rights issues.
But in terms of U.S. policies on China, first, in terms of
bilaterals, compared to the EU-China bilateral, which has
publicly announced benchmarks and will issue a formal
assessment of it by the end of 2004, we urge the U.S.
Government to consider doing similarly.
Second, in the other bilaterals, NGO actors, including
human rights actors, are invited to be observers, most
recently, in the EU-China human rights dialog, and we were
invited as well in December. We urge the United States to press
for the inclusion of NGO voices in these bilateral processes.
Third, in terms of the spillover of rule of law in
commercial areas, we think this is premature--and we have
actually had some reports and assessments of it and they are
all available on our website. I reference it in the testimony
and it is available--because of the same problems in
implementing rule of law, transparency, accountability,
independent decisionmaking in the commercial area are the same
areas that are relevant to human rights and democracy, and it
is not making progress in either area.
Fourth, the question about the role of U.S. business and
WTO. There is a convergence here that is really important that
the U.S. Government could exploit, and that is the convergence
in China now on the part of Chinese leaders and the business
community and interest in corporate social responsibility,
reflected in recent conferences and upcoming conferences in
China and China's participation in the U.N. Global Compact,
which will be meeting in China this year.
We would urge the U.S. Government to explore what the role
of U.S. business could be, to put that in the perspective of
international business community and codes, including the OECD
Guidelines and the recent U.N. guidelines on business.
On the Olympics, it is not only an opportunity for China to
demonstrate that it is becoming a good global citizen, but I
think it is an opportunity for the U.S. Government and U.S.
business to explore much greater creative synergies about how
to ensure several things. First, that U.S. business is not
complicit in human rights violations such as rounding up
dissidents, cleaning up migrant workers, et cetera. Second, on
the positive side, that the U.S. Government has a role in
assessing whether there are relevant U.S. laws regulating U.S.
actors in three key sectors that the Olympics preparations
invoke between now and 2008, telecommunications, the building
of a security system for the border control and for
protection of the Games, and for the actual site construction.
U.S. companies and law firms have been bidding for and have
secured contracts on these Olympics-related projects.
With respect to your technical assistance programs and
exchange initiatives that the State Department and other parts
of the U.S. Government have supported, we urge you to build in
a human rights assessment and concrete benchmarks for these
programs. We echo Wang Youcai, and, of course, Lu Jinghua's
calls for greater support for bulding civil society in China.
Finally, in negotiations on behalf of individual political
prisoner cases, we also want to respectfully suggest that
exiling dissident voices is not a sign of progress and does not
contribute to the systemic reforms necessary for the
advancement of democracy and human rights. Individual political
prisoners should be released without conditions on their
peaceful exercise of their rights and be allowed to remain
within their own country. That would be the true litmus test
for democracy in China. Thank you.
[The prepared statement of Ms. Hom appears in the
appendix.]
Chairman Leach. Thank you, Ms. Hom.
Dr. Nathan.
STATEMENT OF ANDREW J. NATHAN, PH.D., CLASS OF 1919 PROFESSOR
AND CHAIR, THE DEPARTMENT OF POLITICAL SCIENCE, COLUMBIA
UNIVERSITY, NEW YORK CITY, NY
Mr. Nathan. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thanks for the
opportunity to testify today. I am going to keep it very short
because I have a cold, and my voice will give out.
You will hear a bit of the other side of the coin from me,
because although many people do expect democratization, and we
have been expecting democratization, what I am going to suggest
is that, up until now, the regime has proven resilient. I call
it a resilient authoritarianism.
The reasons for that, are several. Some of them are
achievements made by the regime in the economic area and
foreign policy area, which have increased its prestige among
the Chinese people.
Then there are limited reforms that the regime has
undertaken in the area of building institutions for citizens to
make demands and complaints. But these changes are not reforms
aimed at
democratization, but they rather encourage individuals to make
complaints about specific local-level agencies or officials
without challenging the system.
The Party has co-opted the middle class, the entrepreneur
class. Then, finally, the Party leadership itself has
maintained its unity and its grip on power and it has continued
to make effective use of repression. So, these are some of the
reasons why I think the regime today appears to be quite strong
in its grip on power.
The question has arisen in these hearings, and frequently
comes up, whether there have been improvements in human rights
in China since Tiananmen. My response to that is that, in the
core area that we are interested in when we usually raise that
question, civil and political rights, there has not been any
improvement. People still do not have the right to organize to
speak politically or to challenge the regime in any way.
So, coming to my conclusion, I am not predicting that
democratization will not happen. It may happen sometime in the
future. But I would open up the possibility that it is not
inevitable. China has established what is, for the time being,
apparently, a strong developmental authoritarian regime which
is repressive, and yet has widespread popular support, and
support from its own middle class.
I do not mean by those analytic comments to counsel that
the U.S. Government or private actors do nothing. I think we
should be active. I am on the board of Sharon Hom's
organization and I support all of the recommendations that she
made.
Thank you very much.
[The prepared statement of Dr. Nathan appears in the
appendix.]
Chairman Leach. Well, thank you all very much. I
particularly appreciate the perspectives of Ms. Hom and Dr.
Nathan. But I think, on behalf of our colleagues, we want to
express my extraordinary appreciation for the people who have
actually made observations and have been placed in jail.
That is something that, as Members of Congress, we do not
do. Now and again, people say, a Member of Congress made a
courageous vote. I do not think such ``courage'' exists,
because there is no down side to a vote. There is a huge down
side to the steps being taken by some people within China.
May I ask that the two that have come most recently from
China that have lived there, do you have a sense that the
country has a living memory of Tiananmen Square? Is this an
event that people think about and talk about as a society or is
this incident all in the past tense for the Chinese people?
Mr. Wang. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Your question is whether
the Chinese people still talk about the Tiananmen Square
incident or not. So far as I know, currently in China people,
privately, still very much talk about the Tiananmen massacre.
Also, they still have a vivid memory about a whole series of
events. However, the government still strongly exercises
control. Therefore, the media are not able to really open this
question.
Chairman Leach. Ms. Lu.
Ms. Lu. Our sense is that on the Tiananmen events, they
have people to join them and they watch them. The people know
how the Chinese Government treated our friends and co-workers.
So, we would like for China to be changed and we hope in the
future China will be changed, with democracy and freedom for
all people. We also remember 1989, 15 years ago, and what
happened then. But we are really weak. For the Chinese
Government, they will be strong and they will crush all the
people who dissent. That is, right now, what is happening.
Chairman Leach. I was recently in East Asia, and among the
stops I made was in Singapore. It was interesting to me that in
Singapore, where the government has from time to time
imperfectly cracked down on the free press, it has now made an
experiment in a small park.
It put a ``Speaker's Corner'' in this park that is very
much designed to be an analogy to Hyde Park in London. People
have liked it. They like the idea that they can go and express
their views of government policy and social conditions. Do you
think it would be helpful, in the Chinese circumstance, to take
Tiananmen Square and erect in corners of it ladders that could
serve as political soap boxes? Would that be an interesting
testament to the past, and a different kind of future?
Mr. Wang. Mr. Chairman, I think for the time being, it will
be very difficult. If somebody dared to do so, their activity
will definitely be suppressed or repressed. Yet many people are
still devoting their life to promoting China democracy. And
many of them are suffering in prison.
However, if you talk about looking forward to the future, I
think there are chances for China to be a democracy because
people still talk about democracy, and also talk about
establishing a civil society, and talk about civil rights
issues.
So, in a nutshell, we Chinese are in the international
community now. The Chinese people are more aware of what is
going on around the world now, and privately they are still
talking about democracy in China. So, in the future, I think
there are definite opportunities China will become a
democratized nation.
Chairman Leach. Ms. Lu.
Ms. Lu. Mr. Chairman, you mentioned this issue. I think for
the time being it is still a dream or a fantasy. Under the
circumstances, politically, it is still not possible. However,
the Chinese authorities still are taking into consideration the
opinion of the international community, so the Chinese
authorities have to modify their policies in view of
international opinion.
Chairman Leach. Well, thank you very much.
Let me ask a final question to Dr. Nathan and Ms. Hom. As
was referenced earlier, in February, Dr. Jiang Yanyong
delivered a letter to China's leaders calling for reassessment
of the Tiananmen Square issue. When the Premier was asked about
it at a press conference he did not acknowledge receipt of the
letter, but he seemed to describe the Tiananmen incident in
slightly more mild terms than his predecessors.
Do you think this is a beginning of a reassessment of
Tiananmen in Communist Party circles or is this a circumstance
where people are reading too much into a milder response?
Mr. Nathan. The person who handled the crackdown in 1989
for the then-Premier Li Peng, was a man named Luo Gan. Luo Gan
is now one of the nine members of the Politburo Standing
Committee. Li Peng himself has retired from office, but he is
still very active. Jiang Zemin, who came to power through the
Tiananmen incident, continues as the chairman of the Central
Military Commission, and has four or five close associates on
the Politburo Standing Committee.
For that set of reasons, there is no chance, in my view,
that the regime will reevaluate Tiananmen in the near future.
There is also a second consideration which came up in the first
panel, which is that if the regime is this hard-line on
democracy in Hong Kong because it fears the impact of
democratization in Hong Kong upon its own control in the
mainland, how much more allergic will it be to reopening the
issue of Tiananmen?
So, I do not think that Premier Wen meant to signal any
soft line on the part of the government. He, himself, was
alluded to before as an official who came to Tiananmen Square
with Zhao Ziyang in 1989. He was then Zhao Ziyang's chief aide.
His personal views on Tiananmen probably contain some
reservation toward the crackdown, but that is very different
from a policy that the Party might adopt.
Chairman Leach. Ms. Hom.
Ms. Hom. I think the question of how to read the tone and
the words is almost like reading tea leaves, and it is a very
difficult exercise.
I should just add, by way of a biographic footnote, Mr.
Chairman, I am Hong Kong Chinese by birth, so I am more than a
little bit alarmed by the developments in my former--I was a
British subject, and now I am a U.S. citizen. I also spent
about 18 years living, working, and doing legal training in
China, so my comments, apropos the rule of law and the
initiatives and the training, really come from very much of a
respect for the complexity and the difficulty of building the
infrastructure in country.
And why I am now retired and doing the work that I do with
Human Rights in China is because I believe we have hit the
ceiling in terms of what can be done in terms of exchange work,
and that we need the pressure from the outside and the
international community. We need now to push the Chinese
Government, because the ``H'' word, ``human rights'' is not a
word that even the exchange programs want to raise or fund
explicitly, but we can raise it as human rights activists.
The second thing is that I think the question about tone--
this is not to answer the question, but to say, here is another
indication. Human Rights in China, our organization, has on our
board many people whom you might be familiar with, who are
leaders and were on the Most Wanted list, such as Wang Dan. Our
co-chair is Fang Lizhi. The president of our organization is
Liu Qing, who served 11 years in a Chinese prison.
We have been referred to in the past, quite publicly, in
U.N. records and other public records as ``enemies,'' as an
``enemy organization,'' in very strong, apoplectic ways. Most
recently, in the decision with respect to the lawyer Zhang
Enchong, we were referred to over a dozen times in the court
decision, our full name, and we were not then followed by a
description of us an ``enemy, hostile organization.'' We were
simply described, in the legal language of the law, as a
``foreign entity.'' ``Haiwai de zuzhi.'' So we read that as not
great progress, because many of our staff and board--including
Dr. Nathan--still cannot get visas into China. But we do think
that that does indicate a slight improvement, in terms of tone,
toward us.
The other thing I just wanted to add, if I may, is that the
question where Dr. Nathan and I might have a slightly different
read, in terms of the support for the policies of this present
Chinese administration, the middle class, as strong and
powerful as it is, is only a minority. China cannot be stable
without dealing with the other 96 percent of the population
when we are talking about 1.3 billion people.
The second thing is, we have to very carefully approach any
assertions that this is popular sentiment or that this is what
people think, one, because the nature of gathering information
is different. Polling is not what happens there, and
information on public sentiment is very dangerous and
expressing those opinions is also very dangerous. That must be
viewed, any public sentiment or polls, within the context of
the government's very strict control of information and
censorship of dissident views. Thank you.
Chairman Leach. Well, thank you.
Just let me say in conclusion, we all recognize that when
you are dealing with another society there are limits to what
you can do. Certainly in terms of force, it is an option off
the table, so there is no such a thing as a desire for forceful
intervention in Chinese affairs. But there is a desire to
express one's views and to suggest the kinds of things that
would make relations better between peoples and within
societies.
In that context, to borrow from an American speech, I think
we all have a dream that maybe some day there will be ladders
in Tiananmen Square, and soap boxes, and that would be a
wonderful symbol for Chinese society, as well as, I think, a
benchmark for bettering relations in the world.
Mr. Levin.
Representative Levin. Thank you. This has been a useful
hearing. Your questions, I think, have covered much, maybe all,
of the useful territory.
So let me just say, you are right, Mr. Chairman, that force
is not something that should be even discussed, and that makes
it all the more important that we use other means to try to
help effectuate change.
Whether Dr. Nathan is right or wrong exactly in terms of
his analysis, and I think he is probably more right than wrong
I do think--and Ms. Hom, this picks up what you had to say and
what our two witnesses who were there more recently have been
saying--that is, that if people talk about the inevitability of
democracy in China, it may slow down efforts to promote it. I
mean, if something is inevitable, just stand by and let it
happen.
I think the hearing today sends a very clear message, and
that is, we really should not rely on inevitability. If we are
going to increasingly develop a sound relationship with China
in all respects, we have an interest in trying to promote human
rights and democracy in China. If we do not, it will be bad for
the people of China and it will be bad for our relationship.
So, Mr. Chairman, I am glad we have held this hearing. I
know that today we are preparing to leave town and a lot of
people are doing lots of other things, but I know that our
staff will circulate the testimony so that all of the members
who were not able to get here today will be able to gain the
benefit of reading it.
Thank you very much.
Chairman Leach. Thank you, Mr. Levin.
Let me thank all of you for your thoughtful testimony. We
are very appreciative. We are also very respectful of the
courage that has been demonstrated in the lives and activities
of our panel.
Thank you very much.
[Whereupon, at 11:54 a.m. the hearing was concluded.]
A P P E N D I X
=======================================================================
Prepared Statements
----------
Prepared Statement of Randall G. Schriver
JUNE 3, 2004
Mr. Chairman, thank you. I appreciate the opportunity to appear
before the Commission today on this, the 15th anniversary of the
Tiananmen Square crackdown.
Anniversaries are a good time to look back and reflect on what has
happened in a relationship in the intervening years. And it is a good
time to look forward as well, to examine where we are going and how we
can get there in a way that best meets our national interest and
enhances peace and prosperity in the region and the world.
The tragedy of Tiananmen 15 years ago still casts a long shadow in
China today.
You see it in the continuing scrutiny of people gathered in groups
of three or more by a very noticeable security presence in the Square.
You experience it in the continuing heartbreak of the mothers of
Tiananmen victims who ask the government for an accounting of their
children who have been missing since 1989--and get detained for their
efforts.
You hear about it in conversations about the impact Tiananmen has
had on the inability of Beijing to find creative ways to increase
popular participation in national governance.
It remains an event, as former Ambassador to China Jim Lilley wrote
in his recent book ``China Hands,'' quoting a Chinese professor, ``when
even the Heavens were saddened.''
Fifteen years on, China needs to reexamine Tiananmen. This
reconsideration is long overdue. When it does come, I believe it will
usher in a period of ferment and serious discussion about whither
China's government, a discussion that will be similar in tone and as
far-reaching and significant as the verdict on Mao Zedong which ended
the Cultural Revolution more than a quarter century ago.
So while China today is a vastly different, vastly more confident,
vastly more influential, and vastly more prosperous nation than it was
15 years ago, Tiananmen--as an epochal event in China's modern history
and in the memory of those who lived through it--continues to resonate.
Tiananmen will not become ``history'' in the sense of becoming a part
of the past until the present leadership deals--with honesty and
candor--with the tragedy of 1989. Former Party Secretary and Premier
Zhao Ziyang may have gone to Tiananmen Square, in his words, ``too
late'' in May 1989 to influence the ultimate course of events, but it
is not too late for those in power today, some of whom were with Zhao
on that fateful day, to take the steps necessary to come to terms with
the past and begin to move forward to a better future for China.
For our part, we continue to engage the Chinese leadership and
public on key issues that were implicitly part of the foundation of the
popular protest in Tiananmen: the right of people to participate in
government decisions that affect their lives, to have a say in who
leads them, to live in a nation governed by law and not men, to speak
and write freely, to worship and believe in a manner of their choosing,
and to be given a fair and impartial trial with legal representation.
Our commitment to engage China on these issues in the years since
Tiananmen is well reflected in the State Department's May 17 report to
Congress on ``Supporting Human Rights and Democracy: The U.S. Record
2003-2004.'' As the President said in a speech the same day to the
National Endowment for Democracy, there will come a day when ``China's
leaders will discover that freedom is indivisible--that social and
religious freedom is also essential to national greatness and national
dignity. Eventually, men and women who are allowed to control their own
wealth will insist on controlling their own lives and their own
country.''
My hope is that will translate into a China whose future greatness
will be predicated on its commitment to extending and strengthening the
rights of its people.
Let me briefly summarize what the Administration has done in the
past year alone to encourage the advance of these rights:
U.S. officials--in Washington, China, Geneva, and elsewhere--
publicly and privately highlighted the need for improvements in
human rights conditions, called for the release of prisoners of
conscience, and, in recent days, protested detentions of those,
like HIV/AIDS activist Hu Jia, who have sought to hold the Chinese
authorities accountable for the treatment of those who live with
this dread disease.
We have engaged in a wide-ranging bilateral Human Rights
Dialogue with China, which yielded some promising commitments in
2002. Regrettably the Chinese failed to move forward with their
promises, especially those relating to visits by the U.N. Special
Rapporteurs for Torture and Religious Intolerance, the U.N. Working
Group on Arbitrary Detention and the U.S. Commission on
International Religious Freedom, and we ended up introducing a
resolution at the U.N. Commission on Human Rights in Geneva this
year. We are hopeful that we can restart soon--and see results
from--the kind of high-level dialog that will move China toward
reforms that will make a resolution in Geneva in 2005 unnecessary.
We have a Resident Legal Advisor in China who organizes events
promoting the rule of law and who speaks regularly about fairness
in criminal procedures and about the importance of training a new
generation of judges and lawyers who will mete out justice
impartially.
We are working in China with NGOs and Chinese entities to
reform the judicial system, improve transparency in governance,
protect worker and women's rights, promote best practices and
combat corruption, and strengthen civil society.
Let me elaborate a bit more on these projects. In September, we
sponsored a seminar attended by more than 150 Chinese judges,
prosecutors and defense attorneys on problems of criminal defense. The
U.S. Embassy also awards small grants to members of China's NGO
movement in support of democratic values and in 2003, the U.S. funded
13 projects with diverse purposes, including teaching U.S. law at a
Chinese university and supporting environmental and health care
advocacy NGOs. This coming year, we will fund capacity building
projects for NGOs in Shanghai, social security rights for the rural
aged, labor rights protection for migrant workers and NGO-mediated
public participation in environmental governance.
We are also promoting China's compliance with international labor
standards. Through the Partnership to Eliminate Sweatshops Program, a
State Department project designed specifically to address unacceptable
working conditions in manufacturing facilities that produce for the
U.S. market, we are funding the work of four non-governmental
organizations in China. These groups will develop programs to build
local capacity to ensure compliance with labor standards, promote labor
rights awareness in the Chinese business community, and develop
advanced training materials which are suitable for use in individual
factories.
These are wide-ranging strategies, programs and commitments and
they grow out of our awareness, as the President said to the National
Endowment for Democracy, that the calling of our country is to advance
freedom, our duty is to support the allies of freedom and liberty
everywhere, and our obligation is to help others create the Kind of
society that protects the rights of the individual.
As I said in my statement before the Commission on July 24 last
year, we will continue to call for China to make the right choices and
to understand clearly that issues affecting the dignity of men and
women will not go away. As long as we continue to have concerns about
human rights and religious freedom, and as long as China is unable or
unwilling to address them, we will not realize the full flowering of
the U.S.-China relationship.
I'd also like to say a few words about America's engagement with
China in other areas apart from human rights and democracy, important
as those matters are and how they define who we are as a people and the
values we share.
Our relationship with a rapidly changing and dynamic China is, as
the Secretary has said, too complex to contain in a single sound bite.
But we are committed to building the kind of relationship that will
promote a broad range of U.S. interests. The Administration has
welcomed the emergence of a strong, peaceful, and prosperous China
which rises up to meet the challenge of its global responsibilities,
whether at the United Nations, in the World Trade Organization, in
meetings of the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation group or as a part of
a non-proliferation group like the Nuclear Suppliers Group.
For the most part, on a wide variety of issues, including North
Korea and counterterrorism, trade and non-proliferation, we have had
the kind of discussion that advances a common agenda based on mutual
interests. Rather than go over those matters again, I would be pleased
to discuss them further in response to questions you might have.
However, a few comments about America's interest in and
relationship with Taiwan and Hong Kong would be appropriate before I
close.
First, Taiwan. The Administration welcomed the responsible and
constructive tone struck by President Chen Shui-bian in his May 20
inaugural address. We hope that his message--especially on Taiwan's
willingness to engage across-the-board on cross-Strait issues, not
excluding any possible formula for creating an environment based on
``peaceful development and freedom of choice''--will be greeted
positively by the PRC and taken as a basis for dialog, which can lead
to the peaceful resolution of outstanding differences. I also note that
despite some harsh rhetoric in
China's May 17 statement on Taiwan--particularly the harmful references
to the potential for the use of force--there may be some constructive
elements on which the two sides can build.
As the President has said numerous times, we will continue to honor
our obligations under the three U.S.-PRC communiques and the Taiwan
Relations Act; there has been no change to our ``one China'' policy. It
is also our intent, as Assistant Secretary James Kelly said at an April
27 hearing of the House International Relations Committee, to support
and enhance the policy of seven Presidents to maintain peace and
stability in the Western Pacific while helping to ensure Taiwan's
prosperity and security. But, again, in the final analysis, the Taiwan
issue is for people on both sides of the Strait to resolve in a way
acceptable to each, without the use of force and without seeking to
impose unilateral changes in the status quo.
As for Hong Kong, we are supportive of the principle, as expressed
many times by the Chinese themselves, that the people of Hong Kong
should govern Hong Kong. The United States has been very clear: our
longstanding policy is that Hong Kong should move toward greater
democratization and universal suffrage. The Chinese also have
reaffirmed this, most recently by Premier Wen Jiabao in his European
sojourn last month. However, on April 26 this year, the Standing
Committee of National People's Congress in Beijing stated that there
would--for the time being--not be any changes in the electoral methods
to select the Chief Executive in 2007 and the Legislative Council in
2008, a move that inhibits the pace of democratization.
Beijing and the Hong Kong Government should take steps to ensure
sustained movement toward a government that truly represents the people
of Hong Kong.
Ultimately the pace and scope of political evolution in Hong Kong
should be determined by the people of Hong Kong themselves. It is
important that China understand our strong interest in the preservation
of Hong Kong's current freedoms, as well as our interest in the
continued democratization of Hong Kong as called for in the Basic Law.
U.S.-China relations will suffer if the cause of freedom and democracy
suffers in Hong Kong. None of us--in Hong Kong, in Beijing, in
Washington or elsewhere--would benefit from such an outcome. We will be
very clear, I assure you, of what we expect.
To get back to the theme of today's hearing, let me close my
statement this morning with an observation that Secretary Powell made
at the Bush Presidential Library in College Station, Texas, on November
5 last year. It remains true today.
``Only by allowing the Chinese people to think, speak, assemble and
worship very, very freely, only then will China fully unleash the
talents of its citizens and reach its full potential as a member of the
international community. . . . For our part, America hopes to work with
China to help the Chinese people achieve their dreams, their hopes,
their aspirations for a better life for their children.''
By dealing with the aspirations of those who assembled in Tiananmen
fifteen years ago, I am confident that China can begin to realize the
potential the Secretary talked about. In the process, it can meet the
highest hopes of Chinese--and Americans--for a better world.
Thank you very much. I look forward to your comments and questions.
______
Prepared Statement of Wang Youcai
JUNE 3, 2004
First, I want to express my appreciation to the Committee for all
your help in getting me released from prison. I am very glad to be here
today to share my experiences and express my opinions about China's
future democracy. In order not to waste your time, I will summarize the
following points.
1. It is very important that democratic people and democratic
governments help promote a successful transition from dictatorship to
constitutional democracy in China. The American people and American
government can play a great role in promoting China's democracy. It can
be done in two ways. On the one hand, the American government can exert
pressure on the Chinese authorities on the issue of human rights; on
the other hand, the executive branch of the U.S. Government and members
of the U.S. Congress should increase contacts with members of the
Chinese government, the National People's Congress and the Chinese
Communist Party. The American people can assist in building a civil
society in China, particularly in supporting the Chinese opposition
movement and the China Democracy Party. Contacts with the American
government and people as well as with members of the European Union
will make it more difficult for the Chinese government to crack down on
efforts to build an opposition party in China and will help China build
a constitutional democracy.
2. It is also very important that the efforts to promote democracy
come from within China. This can be done in a number of ways, such as
promoting research and setting up information centers in China on the
development of democratic societies and multiparty political systems.
Overseas foundations and academic institutions can help to support
colleagues in China in these activities.
3. For those working to develop democratic institutions to China,
it is important that the people who oppose constitutional democracy in
China be condemned, and that the people, who support and work for
democracy, in China be recognized. It is also important to help those
trying to institutionalize civil society and strengthen the democratic
forces in China. Of course, it is most important to isolate and condemn
the people who promote dictatorship in the CCP while at the same time,
avoiding sharp conflicts in the furthering of democracy.
4. As Chinese citizens fight for their civil and political rights,
they should learn how to organize themselves in non-governmental
organizations, which bring about the pluralization of society, and
institutionalize democratic procedures and the rule of law so that
Chinese society will be compatible with democratic changes.
5. As an opposition party, the China Democracy Party (CDP) focuses
on grassroots election practices, encourages associations for peasants,
workers, intellectuals, and private entrepreneurs and CDP candidates to
participate in elections, and work to carry out fair elections from the
grass-roots to higher political levels. In this respect, international
help and pressure is especially needed. With the improvement in
election procedures, China is definitely taking a step in the right
direction toward a constitutional democracy. While this kind of
transition will proceed slowly at the beginning, as experience
accumulates, it will proceed more quickly. Unless China makes the
transition from dictatorship to liberal democracy with
institutionalized electoral procedures, non-governmental organizations,
a new constitution that will truly protect human rights, limitations on
government power with checks and balances, and a Federal system in the
near future, the Chinese people may pay an intolerable price in
attempts to overthrow the CCP regime. Such a happening will be very
dangerous to the people of the entire world as well as to China.
Therefore, I hope the American government will help and support the
growth of a reasonable opposition party so that China can follow a path
similar to that of South Korea or Taiwan. As the China Democracy Party
is strengthened, it can help to introduce modern liberal democracy in
China.
6. Because China is such a big country with a huge population, the
continuation of the political dictatorship will be dangerous not only
for the Chinese people, but for the entire world. If China can become a
liberal democracy, the present political map of the world will be
greatly changed. This will also be beneficial to the United States.
Furthermore, the disruption of a political transition can be relatively
low if the transition is gradual and is kept under control. Such a
transition is possible
because many Chinese people are sympathetic to the promotion of a
peaceful transition in China.
7. I hope that the American people and the American government will
provide more help to make Chinese democracy a reality. The Committee
can play an important role in China's transition from a dictatorship to
a constitutional democracy.
Thank you very much.
______
Prepared Statement of Sharon Hom
JUNE 3, 2004
Mr. Chairman, members of the Commission, on behalf of Human Rights
in China (HRIC), thank you for this opportunity to make this statement.
It is also an honor to testify today alongside of activists and leaders
from the 1989 Democracy Movement.
HRIC is an international, non-governmental organization founded by
Chinese scientists and scholars in March 1989. Our mission is to
promote universally recognized human rights and advance the
institutional protection of these rights as one of the fundamental
parameters of China's social and political transformation. Through our
advocacy on behalf of over 2,000 political prisoners over the past 15
years, our research and education, HRIC aims to measure, monitor, and
promote the implementation of human rights in China. Our work is
informed and inspired by our fundamental belief that democracy is both
possible--and inevitable--in China.
TIANANMEN 1989
Fifteen years ago, the Chinese government ordered the violent use
of military force to suppress a peaceful protest movement.\1\ Over a
period of 2 months in the spring of 1989, in China's major cities,
students, workers, and activists called for democratic reforms and the
end to escalating official corruption and abuses. The center of the
protest movement was Tiananmen Square in Beijing, where tens of
thousands of students camped out to press their demands, and where more
than one million people marched carrying banners and shouting slogans.
On the night of June 3, 1989, the government ordered the People's
Liberation Army (PLA) to clear the Square and restore order. PLA troops
moved into Beijing and clashed with civilians trying to block their way
to Tiananmen Square. In the early hours of June 4th, the troops moved
into the Square and opened fire on unarmed students and civilians in
the surrounding area.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ See Tiananmen: The Once and Future China, China Rights Forum,
No.2, 2004.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
It is believed that more than 2,000 people died in various Chinese
cities on June 3rd and 4th and the days immediately following. The
Tiananmen Mothers have documented the names of at least 182 victims,
including three who died at Tiananmen Square. Following June 4th, more
than 500 people were imprisoned in Beijing's No. 2 prison alone, and an
unknown number were imprisoned in other Chinese cities. An additional
unknown number were executed. Some 130 people are believed to remain in
prison serving long terms for crimes connected with the 1989 protests.
However, the total accurate number of dead, wounded, imprisoned and
executed remains unknown.
Fifteen years later, why is this is still the case?
First, the Chinese government, despite whatever internal debates
are going on, refuses to engage in a public reassessment of the
crackdown. However, Chinese history demonstrates that an assessment is
also possible, e.g. the Anti-Rightist Campaign and after the Cultural
Revolution. Second, China's pervasive legal, regulatory, security and
police control over ``sensitive'' political issues and events ensures
that the costs of writing, publishing, or investigating June 4th events
will be high--and include facing endangering State security or leaking
State secrets criminal charges, and imprisonment.\2\ Third, China's
growing economic power and role has contributed to the sidelining of
human rights by the international community when they conflict with
trade, military, or other geo-political interests and priorities.
Fourth, the opportunistic invocation of the post-September 11 war
against terrorism by the Chinese government has allowed it to crackdown
on peaceful assertions of religious and cultural identity in the name
of fighting terrorism.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\2\ For identification of some individuals sentenced to prison
terms of 15 years to life for activities related to 1989 Democracy
Movement, See In Custody: People imprisoned for Counter-
revolutionary and State security crimes, China Rights Forum, No. 2,
2003, pp.88-91.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Today--the ``No Deaths in the Square'' proclamation in the People's
Daily on September 19, 1989 and the label of counterrevolutionary
rebellion on the 1989 Democracy Movement remains--a bloody stain on the
legitimacy of any official claims to progress.
FIFTEEN YEARS LATER
Over the past 15 years, the Tiananmen Mothers, along with HRIC and
many other groups and individuals, have repeatedly called for an
independent investigation into the June 4th crack-down, a thorough
official accounting of the dead, injured and disappeared, appropriate
redress and compensation for surviving victims and families of the
dead, and accountability on the part of the officials who ordered the
crackdown.
Dr. Jiang Yanyong who had spoken out during the SARS crisis last
year, once again came forward and called for an official reassessment
of the 1989 Democracy Movement and the June 4th crack-down. In reply to
a question posed by a foreign journalist during the NPC and CPPCC
sessions in this past March, Chinese Premier Wen Jiabao stated: ``We
must concentrate all our time, energy and efforts on the development of
our country . . . If China could have another 20 to 50 years of
stability, our country would surely emerge stronger than ever before.''
This assertion of the primacy of stability--that is, stability as
synonymous with the survival of the supremacy of the Party at all
costs--is a sobering echo of the statement attributed to Deng Xiaoping
15 years ago about the necessity to: ``Kill 200,000 for 20 years of
stability.''
In their open letter to Chinese compatriots inside and outside
China, the Tiananmen Mothers ask:
``Is this to say that if no one had been killed, we would not
have today's political stability? If no one had been killed, we
would not have today's economic miracle? If no one had been
killed, we would not enjoy the status today and in the future
of a world power? Over the past 15 years, nearly every leader
in the Party and the government, almost without exception, has
defended the suppression in 1989 with the ``enormous
accomplishments'' of the subsequent years. In that case, we
must now in equally clear and unequivocal terms tell these
leaders: The massacre that took place in the Chinese capital in
1989 was a crime against the people, and a crime against
humanity. This massacre not only seriously violated the
Constitution of this country and the international obligations
of a sovereign state, but also transformed a habitual disdain
for human and civil rights into an unprecedented act of
violence against humanity.'' \3\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\3\ Open letter from the Tiananmen Mothers letter, available on the
HRIC website
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IS DEMOCRACY IN CHINA'S FUTURE?
The future of democracy in China is interrelated to the promotion
of human rights and a rule of law that is transparent, fair, and a
judiciary and process independent of the Party. Although there have
been areas of improvement--increased average living standards, access
to information, greater government participation in the international
human rights regime--the human rights situation is generally worsening
in other respects for the vast majority of China's people.
As well documented by the World Bank, UNDP, Chinese researchers,\4\
human rights NGOs, including HRIC, and reported by this Commission and
the U.S. State Department country reports on China, the human rights
situation has overall deteriorated seriously and is marked by growing
social inequalities and poverty;\5\ massive unemployment; and
environmental degradation reaching crisis dimensions;
severe restrictions on freedom of expression, including crack-downs on
ethnic minorities, religious groups (Falun Gong, underground churches),
independent political parties or unions, independent media; use of
torture and mistreatment of prisoners, arbitrary detentions and
arrests. Lawyers taking on cases that are politically sensitive may
find themselves intimidated or themselves the target of prosecution.\6\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\4\ Chinese Academy of Social Sciences report released February 26,
2004.
\5\ Official numbers pace those living at absolute poverty at 30
million, while the World Bank estimates the number to be between 100-
150 million persons.
\6\ According to the officials at the All China lawyers
Association, more than 100 defense attorneys have been arrested for the
on the alleged charge of making false statements in court. For example,
Xu Jian was arrested in 1999 and sentenced to 4 years imprisonment in
2000 for ``incitement to overthrow State power'' because he had
provided legal counselling to the workers at his office and via its
hotline. Zheng Enchong provided legal advice and assistance to several
hundred Shanghai families affected by redevelopment projects. He was
sentenced to three years in prison on October 28, 2003 for ``illegally
providing State secrets to entities outside China.'' On December 18,
2003, the appeals court denied Zheng Enchong's appeal and affirmed the
sentence, sending a chilling message to Chinese lawyers.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Today, 15 years after Tiananmen, facing increasing labor and social
unrest, China is not more stable nor can it claim sustainable progress
in equitable economic development. True social stability requires as
fundamental conditions--protection of human rights, democracy, and a
rule of law. The order that is maintained in the absence of these
conditions is in fact just social repression and control.
DEMOCRACY IS INEVITABLE IN CHINA
Chinese democracy can only develop and be realized within a vibrant
civil society, not a limited ``non-critical realm'' where any views
contrary to the Party are silenced. Whatever direction the current
ideological debates within China's leadership takes about political
reforms (or not), the Chinese government can not legitimately claim
that it alone can define democracy, even ``socialist democracy,'' as
only what it will allow; or that progress is measured predominantly by
the interests of economic and political elites; or that elections, such
as for Hong Kong's LegCo, will be permitted but only if the results are
what it approves.\7\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\7\ LegCo: Hong Kong's 60-seat Legislative Council. Elections will
take place in September, with the number of directly elected seats
increased to 30.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Yet democracy is inevitable because the aspirations, hopes, and the
willingness to struggle for a more open and democratic China are still
powerfully present and alive--against all odds. Despite the brutal
invocation of military violence in 1989 to crush the democracy
movement; a pervasive and powerful Chinese propaganda, police, and
security apparatus; China's growing global economic power (that China
manipulates to undermine scrutiny and accountability for its human
rights record); and a privileged and powerful Chinese elite bought off
by economic and political benefits of supporting the present policies;
despite all this--courageous Chinese--the Tiananmen Mothers,
journalists, intellectuals, peasants, workers, students, Internet
activists, religious practitioners, lawyers, artists, and poets,
continue to write, to speak out, to organize mass demonstrations, form
independent political parties, independent unions, to petition the
government, and to appeal to international fora for redress and
support.
We can support these human rights and democracy activists, these
ordinary citizens claiming justice and freedom, by remembering the
past, by not allowing the Chinese authorities' control over information
and censorship to result in historical amnesia. Like the call from the
Tiananmen Mothers, the names of those who were killed, the sacrifices
made must not be forgotten.\8\ The Chinese government certainly has not
forgotten and its actions in suppressing independent voices reflect a
government still fearful and distrustful of its own people. In an
effort to head off anniversary memorials and possible demonstrations,
the Chinese authorities have cutoff phone lines, put under house arrest
and close surveillance leading activists and intellectuals, including
Liu Xiaobo, Ren Wanding, AIDS activist Hu Jia, and Tiananmen Mothers
leaders Ding Zilin, Zhang Xianling, and Yin Min.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\8\ The June 4th Memorial Global Coalition, of which HRIC is a
member, is organizing a candlelight vigil on June 4th in front of the
Chinese Consulate in New York City from 7-10 p.m. For full details of
June 4th memorial activities taking place around the world, please
visit the Web site of the June 4th Memorial Global Coalition: http://
www.global64.com/. To support the Tiananmen Mothers, see the Fill the
Square Petition at HRIC's website
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
RECOMMENDATIONS
As part of its bilateral process with China and as part of
multilateral processes such as the U.N. and the WTO, the U.S.
Government should:
continue to exert its influence with China by raising human
rights issues and cases,
support more coherent and rational implementation of
international obligations, including trade obligations as they
impact on human rights,
in any technical assistance or exchange initiatives, build in
a human rights assessment, and
continue its critical support for civil society and democracy
groups inside and outside China.
In the negotiations on behalf of individual political prisoner
case, we also respectfully suggest that exiling dissident voices is not
a sign of progress and does not contribute to the systemic reforms
necessary for the advancement of democracy and human rights. Individual
political prisoners should be released without conditions on their
peaceful exercise of their rights, and be allowed to remain within
their own country. That would be the true litmus test for democracy in
China.
Thank you.
______
Prepared Statement of Andrew J. Nathan
JUNE 3, 2004
Thank you for the opportunity to testify on the impact of Tiananmen
on China's future.
Regime theory holds that authoritarian regimes are inherently
fragile because of weak legitimacy, over-reliance on coercion, over-
centralization of decisionmaking, and the predominance of personal
power over institutional norms. This authoritarian regime, however, has
proven resilient.
After the Tiananmen crisis in June 1989, many observers thought the
Chinese communist regime would collapse. Instead, it brought inflation
under control, restarted economic growth, expanded foreign trade, and
increased its absorption of foreign direct investment. It restored
normal relations with the G-7 countries that had imposed sanctions,
resumed the exchange of summits with the United States, presided over
the retrocession of Hong Kong to Chinese sovereignty, and won the right
to hold the 2008 Olympics in Beijing. It arrested or exiled political
dissidents, crushed the fledgling China Democratic Party, and seems to
have largely suppressed Falungong.
We have not seen fundamental improvements in civil and political
rights since 1989. Human rights is a multidimensional phenomenon. Some
human rights in China have improved thanks to the growth of the
economy--for example, fewer people are living in poverty. Some human
rights have retrogressed due to the breakdown of socialist
institutions--for example, subsidized medical care is no longer
available in the rural areas. But in the area of civil and political
rights which most people think of when they think of human rights,
there has been essentially no change since 1989. The regime continues
to deny people the right to organize politically, and decisively
crushes any political or religious movement that challenges its hold on
power.
In my judgment, the Chinese government is not engaged in a gradual
process of political reform intended to bring about democracy. Rather,
the political reforms that we see--the use of village elections,
greater roles for the local and national people's congresses, wider
leeway for media reporting, the administrative litigation system--are
aimed at improving the Party's legitimacy without allowing any
opposition to take shape.
The causes of authoritarian resilience are complex. They include:
Economic growth and constantly rising standards of living.
Achievements in the foreign policy realm which give the
government prestige among the people.
Building of channels of demand- and complaint-making for the
population, such as the courts, media, local elections, media, and
letters-and-visits departments, which give people the feeling that
there are ways to seek relief from administrative injustices. These
institutions encourage individual rather than group-based inputs,
and they focus complaints against specific local level agencies or
officials, without making possible attacks on the regime. Thus they
enable citizens to pursue grievances in ways that present no threat
to the regime as a whole.
A constant and visible campaign against corruption, which has
sent the signal that the Party as an institution opposes
corruption.
Increasingly norm-bound succession politics and increased use
of meritocratic as contrasted to factional considerations in the
promotion of political elites.
The Party has coopted elites by offering Party membership to
able persons in all walks of life and by granting informal
property-rights protection to private entrepreneurs. It has thus
successfully constructed an alliance between the Party and the
class of rising entrepreneurs, pre-empting middle-class pressure
which elsewhere has contributed to democratization.
Maintenance of unity on core policy issues within the Party
elite, so there is no sign of a serious split that would trigger a
protest movement.
Resolute repression of opposition activity has sent the signal
that such activity is futile. There is no organized alternative to
the regime thanks to the success of political repression.
While these developments do not guarantee that the regime can solve
all the challenges that face it, they caution against arguing too
hastily that it cannot adapt and survive. In contrast with the Soviet
and Eastern European ruling groups in the late 1980s and early 1990s,
the new Chinese leaders do not feel that their model of rule has
failed. To be sure, since the Mao period the Chinese Communist regime
has changed greatly. It has abandoned utopian ideology and charismatic
styles of leadership, empowered a technocratic elite, introduced
bureaucratic regularization, complexity, and specialization, and
reduced control over private speech and action. But it has been able to
do all these things without triggering a transition to democracy.
Although such a transition might still lie somewhere in the future,
the experience of the past two decades suggests that it is not
inevitable. Under conditions that elsewhere have led to democratic
transition, China has made a transition instead from totalitarianism to
a developmental authoritarian regime, one that has widespread popular
legitimacy among its own people, that has gained the support of its own
middle class, and that for now appears stable.
______
Prepared Statement of Hon. James A. Leach, U.S. Representative From
Iowa, Chairman, Congressional-Executive Commission on China
JUNE 3, 2004
Decentralized Democracy: A Model for China\1\
In any discussion of the prospect of democratization of China we
must begin with the basics.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ This statement was also presented at the Library of Congress
Symposium held on May 6, 2004.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
At the root of the basics are theories of revolution, theories of
the individual, theories of economics, and questions of the
adaptability of abstract systems to the culture and heritage of people
in varying circumstances.
Here a footnote is in order. Whether our intervention in Iraq is
proper or counterproductive, the legitimacy as well as the challenge of
imposing democracy in a hostile environment is under review here and
abroad. Last week the head of a Baghdad psychological institution
visited my office and, in response to questions I posed, noted that the
majority of Iraqis want a strong leader, but one they would have a hand
in choosing; and a credible legislature, also based on citizen input;
but they increasingly object to the word ``democracy'' because it is
foreign derived. They want, like Americans, to be citizens with
democratic rights and the power to control their government, but they
aspire to establish a government compatible with their own unique
social and religious heritage.
If one assumes that abstract systems of government must fit
historical frameworks and the accident of social challenges at given
points in time, what is so interesting about China today is that the
communist model, which convulsed the country for such an important part
of the 20th Century, is so alien to China's heritage. While the
radicalism implicit in Marxism-Leninism may have been useful in
galvanizing nationalist sentiment as the Chinese people faced Japanese
aggression during the Second World War, few theories either of
revolution or governmental management have been more troubling for
those who have experimented with them.
It is my thesis that just as Americans would be wise to learn from
older elements of Chinese civilization, particularly as we contend with
modern problems of family break-down and urban violence, the Chinese
might want to review the possibility that the decentralized American
model of democratic government fits their society better than it fits
smaller, more homogenous countries, including those in Europe.
To bolster my thesis, I would like to dwell for a moment on the
fundamentals of the American system.
While communism is based on historical, particularly economic,
determinism with a presumptive vanguard leading a class struggle,
American revolutionary philosophy is premised on the empowerment of
individuals endowed by a Creator with inalienable rights.
Because Americans have a general aversion to radical thought and
radical change--what Tocqueville described as a cultural penchant for
moderation--we have a tendency to overlook one of the profoundest of
political facts: that our philosophy not only provides the most
adventuresome and humane model of political and economic organization
in history, but it is also a more radical revolutionary model than that
provided by Marxism-Leninism.
In contrast with Marxism-Leninism, Jeffersonian democracy
postulates change from the bottom up, not top down, and affirms an
everlasting right of the people to revolt against governments which
don't protect individual rights.
In a Jeffersonian context it is revolutionary to assume that
governments derive their power and legitimacy from--and only from--the
consent of the governed. It is counterrevolutionary to hold that rights
are artificial things granted and thus removable by law, one's own or
anyone else's.
I stress for a moment that the Jeffersonian model is more
revolutionary than that provided by Marxist or extremist Muslim dogma
because the hallmark of the right to revolt in natural rights theory is
the establishment of constitutional democracies capable of channeling
change without coercion. While during the Cultural Revolution Mao
Zedong rationalized punitive acts by advancing a theory of permanent
revolution, it is in individual rights centered systems that the
permanence of revolution is ensconced. In an evolutionary way, ideas,
people and movements are continually engaged because the right to
revolt implicit in such documents as the Declaration of Independence
and the Rights of Man provides a doctrine of empowerment to the people
rather than to elitist leaders claiming the divine mantle of God,
mandate of Heaven or the power to ride and interpret a crest of
historical forces.
By contrast, totalitarian creeds from fascism to communism may be
rooted in an effort to revolt against an existent government, but once
power is usurped from prior authorities the right of individuals to
establish a basis for future revolutionary or evolutionary change
ceases. Such theories of revolution which call for change at the top
and then deny further changes become rationalizations for oppression
rather than emancipation.
America's founders were moral as well as political philosophers.
They understood Locke's admonition that man was prone to excess and
that, in fact, nothing was more dangerous than a good Prince.
Inevitably some decisions of such a Prince would be mistaken and
invariably a good Prince will be succeeded by a less good one who would
have the benefit of accumulated, unchecked confidence and power.
Accordingly, the founders embraced Montesquieu's separation-of-powers
doctrine and established a limited, constitutional republic.
Likewise, in contrast with the Marxist foundation of socialism,
Jeffersonian democracy embraced Lockean property concepts. Emphasis was
placed on individual rights and private property, rather than social
obligations defined by others and government ownership of the means of
production.
Unlike Marx, who believed that religion was the ``opiate of the
people,'' our country's founders held that ethical values, derived from
religion, anteceded and
anchored political institutions. It is the class struggle implications
of Marxism--the exhortation to hate thy fellow citizen instead of love
thine enemy--that stands in stark contrast with the demand of tolerance
built into our Bill of Rights.
From the American perspective, the real opiate of the 20th Century
would appear to be intolerance, the instinct of hatred which becomes
manifest in the individual and unleashed in society when governments
fail to provide safeguards for individual rights and fail to erect
civilizing institutions adaptable to change and accountable to the
people.
In America, process is our most important product. A great deal of
emphasis is placed on the ``how'' rather than the ``what'' of policy,
on the assumption that the public will not like all laws; therefore, to
have respect for the law, people must have respect for the way a law is
made. Otto von Bismarck joked that the public shouldn't be allowed to
watch too closely either law or sausages being made, but the fact is
that, if anything, openness is America's secret sauce. It is no
accident that the first protections we established in our Bill of
Rights were freedom of expression and freedom of the press so that
public officials could be held accountable.
As Jefferson, Locke's philosophical godson, observed: ``The basis
of our government being the opinion of the people, the very first
object should be to keep that right; and were it left to me to decide
whether to have a government without newspapers or newspapers without a
government, I should not hesitate to prefer the latter.''
In America, we developed a system of separation of powers at the
national level and purposeful tension between the Executive,
Legislative, and Judicial branches; and then we decentralized power by
quadruplicating the same separation-of-power arrangements at the state,
county, and city levels. We established a system of courts,
legislatures, and executive offices where there would not only be
separations and tensions within but between levels of government. We
have even been experimenting since the 1960s with skipping
jurisdictions and providing federal funds
directly to community groups operating poverty programs outside the
formal framework of government institutions and, despite constitutional
fences between secular and religious institutions, we have in recent
years emphasized the utilization of faith-based organizations to
administer government programs. Contracting out government functions,
even those related to war, is becoming common.
I stress these decentralized tensions because all societies have
problems of accountability, of reconciling freedom with equality of
opportunity. In America, the greed of a few is evident in periodic
corporate excesses and, now and again, comes into play in politics. But
while corporate scandals sometimes involve large sums of money,
American political scandals are generally quite cheap. The egregious
sums of money that slosh through the political system are manipulated
by interest groups to advance the electoral ambitions of candidates,
but they cannot be used to enrich the candidate himself. The
decentralization of power in America has by and large kept government
accountable to the people and allowed an incentive market system to
operate with a minimum of conflicts of interest.
Self-interest may not seem to be an attractive underpinning of
moral philosophy, but history is demonstrating that a private incentive
system effectively complements a political system based on individual
rights, and vice-versa. As Mandeville in his 18th Century satire of
capitalism, the poem Fable of the Bees, so poignantly noted: ``these
are the blessings of the state, their crimes conspire to make us
great.''
I stress the issue of corruption because it is so morally and
economically debilitating in any society. One of my favorite quotes at
the time of the Tiananmen Square demonstrations came from a BBC
interview with a student demonstrator. The interviewer asked the
student what he and his fellow demonstrators hoped to achieve.
``Democracy,'' the student said. He was then asked what ``democracy''
meant to him. ``No more corruption,'' he responded. He didn't define
democracy as the right to vote or freedom of speech. Instead, he
defined its effect: the power of people to constrain corruption.
The problem of all citizens is to devise techniques to ensure that
government becomes an honest broker of vested interests and, at the
same time, helps lighten the load for those unable to help themselves.
In the context of China, the economic reforms Deng Xiaoping
initiated in the late 1970s have produced certain regional and other
inequities, but also unprecedented economic dynamism.
To harness this economic growth, China in the past quarter century,
particularly the last decade, has undertaken a massive effort to revise
its legal system. A new constitution was adopted in 1982 and it has
already been amended four times. The Chinese government has enacted
numerous laws laying out and formalizing the structure of the state,
and creating comprehensive criminal, civil, and administrative
procedures. In addition, the government has adopted commercial laws and
regulations at every level, many specifically drafted to bring, or give
the appearance of bringing, the country into compliance with the
obligations of WTO membership.
In international affairs, China has begun to wield influence in the
Security Council and to assert its authority as a regional power,
laying the groundwork for an expanded involvement on the Korean
peninsula and in Southeast Asia, as well as the oil-rich but
undeveloped Central Asian republics. But problems loom ahead that may
yet undo some or all of the progress that has been made.
Widespread factory closures and lay-offs in the state-owned
sector of the economy have left behind many unemployed workers,
while urban and rural evictions to make way for new construction
have created large groups of angry displaced residents, many of
whom flock to Beijing to complain.
Although widely publicized, many of the new laws have proven
difficult or impossible to implement. In the area of international
trade, the Chinese intellectual property regime is still more
symbol than reality. In commercial and civil law, judgments are
often difficult to enforce. Labor laws related to health and
safety, overtime and payment of overdue wages, and laws forbidding
the levy of illegal fees are most often honored in the breach.
Despite much anti-corruption legislation and the establishment
of multiple overlapping supervisory institutions, most citizens
have lost confidence in the honesty of Communist Party and
government officials.
Environmental abuse has created threats to health and
prosperity, including severe air pollution, imminent insufficiency
of drinking water, and the irreversible loss of natural resources.
An underfunded public health system cannot offer ordinary care
and is dangerously incapable of coping with the sudden health
crises in a globalized world.
China's policy of seeking to press Beijing's norms on Hong
Kong and greater
authority over Taiwan are unacceptable to the populations
concerned, while the ``autonomy'' guaranteed by China's
nationalities laws is undercut by harsh state security policies.
As the 21st century advances, the impact of these and other
problems may lead to the Communist Party's loss of any legitimacy it
ever had. This loss in turn might precipitate the worst nightmare for
China's leaders: widespread unrest, possibly social and political
chaos.
Many in China are already aware of the growing gap between the
winners and the losers in the new economy. The Party has recently
invited some of the winners--the entrepreneurs, developers,
professionals, and financiers--to join the Party as ``socialist
builders.'' The jury is still out whether these new members can save
the Party from irrelevance in a changing economy. To persuade
prospective members that Party membership will mean real influence on
policy and leadership, the Party has also been experimenting with
``inner-Party democracy,'' with a goal of producing a higher general
quality of leadership and perhaps greater accountability.
The losers, however, seem to have become alienated from the Party.
Farmers have organized themselves to resist unjust local government
decisions, and evicted residents have adopted radical tactics to draw
the state's attention to their complaints. The Chinese leadership in
Beijing increasingly betrays a siege mentality in the face of the
misery and anger that petitioners bring with them to the capital.
In this context, the question is pondered in and outside China
whether democracy can help the Chinese people resolve such enormous
problems. Chinese political theory still depends on the borrowed
Leninist model. In conformity with that model, China claims to have
implemented ``democratic centralism,'' in which `the individual should
be subordinated to the organization; the minority should be
subordinated to the majority; the lower-level organ should be
subordinated to the higher-level organ; the local authority should be
subordinated to the central authority.'' The so-called ``democratic''
part of the model is defined as the ``mass line,'' which allows some
upward movement of ideas from the people to the central leadership, but
functions most powerfully in campaigns to publicize and enforce the
center's decisions on the people. In a state built on this model, the
individual is effectively reduced to a cipher, present only to be
controlled, and the government remains more a source of, rather than
cure for, social problems.
The cure will depend on a simpler idea of decentralized democracy:
one that gives each individual a public voice; one that provides for
every individual's participation in the choice of officials and
policies; and, just as important, one that empowers each individual
openly to criticize the results and to change them.
For basic democracy to work anywhere, citizens need a free flow of
information, so that, for example, public health crises such as HIV/
AIDS or SARS can come to light without delay; so those injured by state
officials or policies can safely speak out and organize to oppose them;
and so that those harmed by corrupt or incompetent officials can blow
the whistle and initiate procedures to remove them without fear of
retribution.
But in a huge country like China democracy can facilitate the
resolution of actual and potential crises only if the government
listens to its citizens and implements on a decentralized basis the
solutions they demand.
Democracy in any country means the legal empowerment of every
individual. To try to get help from the State, the losers in the new
economy now take advantage of China's extensive system of xinfang,
meaning ``Letters and Petitions.'' The xinfang system is based on the
establishment of special offices at every level of Chinese government.
The offices are staffed by people with the duty to receive and resolve
the questions brought before them. This system has deep roots both in
early Chinese philosophy and in the history of China's imperial
governments.
In explaining how Heaven legitimizes a new ruler, the Warring
States philosopher Mencius quotes from an early classic, The Book of
Documents:
``Heaven sees with the eyes of its people.
Heaven hears with the ears of its people.''
Emperors attentive to Mencius' warning devised ways to remain
legitimate by being open to the views and complaints of the populace. A
colorful Tang dynasty practice involved the ligui, or ``Report
Coffers,'' set out around the court in the four cardinal directions. In
these coffers citizens placed requests for help, complaints of
injustice, and criticisms of various kinds.
To an American eye xinfang resembles a constituent services system.
In China, however, the catch is that nobody really has to pay heed to
the petitions that come in. In Iowa, by contrast, a constituent who
contacts a Congressman's office and is ignored, or receives rude,
dismissive treatment will make his or her displeasure known with a vote
at the next election.
The rising exasperation and desperation of petitioners in Beijing
and the provincial capitals that have been reported in recent years
reveals a populace ready for a more responsive government, one which
provides legal and political ways to insist rights not be trampled.
The capacity of citizens to insist on rectifying wrongs is a
missing element of the current Chinese system. While the creation of
structures to answer this demand is up to the Chinese people, it is
instructive that xinfang petitioners are increasingly focusing on
opening up the National People's Congress and asking that it encourage
elections at all levels. The National People's Congress has sponsored a
few pilot election projects at the lowest levels of political
organization, but it is difficult to assess their value because there
have been, to date, so few projects.
This past March, just before the annual meeting of the National
People's Congress, China's state news agency asked readers which issue
they thought should take priority on the NPC agenda. More than 80
percent of those responding said ``corruption.'' This high level of
concern about corruption may reflect the shocking news that 13 top
provincial officials were convicted of corruption, some cases involving
amounts of money that in Chinese terms appear astronomically large. To
get an idea of the significance of those cases, consider how Americans
would react to the news that the governors or lieutenant governors of
half of our states were felled by corruption scandals in a single year.
This is one reason why most Chinese view the problem as more systemic
than aberrational, and the attempts at accountability more superficial
than comprehensive.
Corruption was an important question to the magistrates of the Qin
and Han dynasties, China's first unified imperial systems. One
magistrate's grave from 188 B.C. contained a handbook of key cases
distributed to local magistrates to instruct their handling of
particular problems, including official misuse of public money,
property, and servants.
Recognizing that widespread corruption might undermine its
legitimacy, the Communist Party in the aftermath of the 1949
Revolution, established a number of top-down mechanisms to fight, or
give the appearance it was fighting, the problem. The first such
mechanism was the ``Control Commission,'' established in 1950. Other
bodies were created in subsequent years, such as the Central
Disciplinary Inspection Commission, the Ministry of Supervision, the
Ministry of Inspection, and the Procuracy. Many of these organizations
have branches at all governmental levels. But even with a dizzying
multiplicity of these supervisory agencies, little seems to slow the
flourishing corruption ``industry.''
Each instance of corruption has its injured party: the residents
forced off their land to increase the wealth of an urban developer; the
honest taxpayers who must take up the slack when corrupt officials help
their children's companies evade the value-added tax; the honest
bidders on public contracts who lose opportunities to well-connected
bidders; the villages whose hard-earned school fees are diverted to pay
for fancy lunches for bigwigs.
In some cases, the injured party has the power to strike back. In
one recent case, a high Bank of China official made suspect loans to a
wealthy property developer and his wife for a lucrative Shanghai
development project. Some of the loans were made from the Bank's Hong
Kong branch. They came to light under the Special Administrative
Region's Transparency rules and a Hong Kong investigation ensued.
Investors on the Hong Kong Stock Exchange could rely on Hong Kong's
laws to rectify malfeasance. The banker was fired, expelled from the
Party, and sentenced to 12 years in prison for corruption. The
developer's wife was arrested but a Hong Kong investigation into the
financial dealings of the developer himself hit a dead end in Shanghai.
The mainland Chinese people whose homes were razed to make room for the
development financed by the fraudulent loans were unable to hold any of
the three accountable under Chinese law. Indeed, some of the homeowners
who made their way to Beijing to complain were themselves punished as
troublemakers.
The lesson here is that even the existence of laws cannot prevent
or even result in the punishment of corruption if they can be trumped
by a veiled ``party in interest.'' Another lesson is that lack of
transparency in the banking and securities industries may well be a
``glass ceiling'' that prevents China from participating more widely in
the world's capital markets. Already, some journalists report that
interest in Chinese IPO's has cooled, as investors realize that a gulf
exists between the due diligence available in China and that practiced
elsewhere.
And, ironically, Chinese anti-corruption laws have been misused by
a vengeful local government to punish a progressive South China
newspaper for its exposes. The Southern Metropolitan Daily, published
in Guangzhou, reported in 2003 a student's death in the harsh ``Custody
and Repatriation'' system. Its articles on the case ultimately resulted
in the State Council's decision to abolish the system. The newspaper
also played a role in publicizing the threat of SARS, which local
officials evidently sought to cover up to avoid hurting the local
economy. Southern Metropolitan Daily also reported on the avian flu
threat in 2003. But this year local government officials found an
excuse to prosecute the editors involved, using the anti-corruption
laws to attack the newspaper's allocation of bonus money. As a result
of these prosecutions, the independent voice of the Southern
Metropolitan Daily has been curtailed.
From this type of case, we learn that it is not enough to pass laws
and rules to control corruption from the top. Even the best laws
require the power of an informed and active citizenry able to hold
officials accountable with the sanction of the ballot box.
China is large and diverse with a multi-century tradition of
decentralized provincial autonomy and, at various points in its
history, a reliance on magistrate-scholars. It is this decentralized
magistrate-scholar tradition coupled with expanded democratic rights
that authorities in Beijing might be advised to think through as they
deal with various tensions in internal citizen relations.
Hong Kong is a case in point. America as well as China has an
enormous vested interest in the success of the ``one country, two
systems'' model in Hong Kong. From a Congressional perspective, it
would appear self-evident that advancing constitutional reform--
including universal suffrage--would contribute to the city's political
stability and economic prosperity.
The people of Hong Kong made plain their aspirations for greater
democratic autonomy, aspirations fully within the framework of the
``one country, two systems'' formula, when they so impressively
demonstrated on July 1 last year. In the aftermath of those peaceful
demonstrations, the Hong Kong government appeared to listen to the
people and withdrew controversial national security legislation pending
additional consultations with the populace of the city. The people of
Hong Kong again showed their keen interest in participatory democracy
when they turned out in record numbers for District Council elections
last November.
Regrettably, however, recent decisions by Beijing setting limits on
constitutional development in Hong Kong, appear to be inconsistent with
the ``high degree of autonomy'' promised by the central authorities in
the 1982 Joint Declaration and the Basic Law.
Whether the 21st Century is peaceful and whether it is prosperous
will depend on whether the world's most populous country can live with
itself and become open to the world in a fair and respectful manner.
Hong Kong is central to that possibility. As such, it deserves our
greatest attention, respect, and good will.
Hong Kong is important unto itself; it is also a model for others.
What happens there is watched particularly closely by the Taiwanese. In
a globalist world where peoples everywhere are seeking a sense of
community to serve as a buttress against political and economic forces
beyond the control of individuals and their families, it is next to
impossible to reconcile political systems based on unlike institutions
and attitudes. Mutual respect for differences is the key to peace and
prosperity in a world in which history suggests conflict has been a
generational norm.
With reference to Taiwan, last month marked the 25th Anniversary of
the enactment of the Taiwan Relations Act (TRA). As one who was a
proponent of the Act, I am proud of a small provision I authored
relating to human rights and democratization. And as a lead member of
what came to be know in the 1970s and 1980s in Taiwan as the
Congressional ``Gang of Four,'' a small band of Senators and House
Members (which also included Senators Kennedy and Pell and
Representative Solarz) who advocated greater democratization on the
island, I came to know many of the current leaders of Taiwan. It is
with the greatest respect that I observed the courage and sacrifices of
those who challenged their government to open up to democracy. It is
therefore with the humility of a legislator who never had to face, as
they did, the prospect of imprisonment for holding views different than
that of authorities in power that I am obligated to underscore a
message of restraint for Taiwanese leaders today.
But first let me stress that the vibrant multi-party system and
opportunity-oriented economy that has developed over the past 25 years
on Taiwan is a prototype for the world of progressive political and
economic change.
The miracle of Taiwan's peaceful democratic transition is of great
significance not only to its 23 million citizens, but also to the
billion residents of the Chinese mainland who now have the chance to
review another model of governance and social organization of a people
with a similar cultural heritage.
The government and citizens of the United States have an enormous
vested interest in peaceful relations between Taipei and Beijing. All
Americans strongly identify with Taiwan's democratic journey and we
join in celebrating the fact that the people of Taiwan now enjoy such a
full measure of human freedom.
More broadly, we are acutely conscious that the 20th Century was
the bloodiest century in world history. It was marred by wars, ethnic
hatreds, clashes of ideology, and desire for conquest. Compounding
these antagonisms has been the prideful miscalculation of various
parties. Hence it is in the vital interests of potential antagonists in
the world, particularly those on each side of the Taiwan Strait, to
recognize that caution must be the watchword in today's turbulent
times. Political pride and philosophical passion must not blind peoples
to the necessity of rational restraint. Peaceful solutions to political
differences are the only reasonable framework of future discourse
between the mainland and the people of Taiwan.
Here, it is critical to review the history both of the breakthrough
in U.S.-China relations that occurred during the Nixon Administration
and the philosophical aspects of American history which relate to
issues of a nature similar to mainland-Taiwan divisions today. First,
with regard to U.S. recognition of China, which was formally ensconced
in a carefully negotiated communique and two subsequent understandings,
the U.S. accepted a ``One China'' framework for our relations with the
most populous country in the world. The three Executive Branch
communiques were complemented by the Taiwan Relations Act, which
establishes a commitment of the United States that no change in the
status of Taiwan be coercively accomplished through the use of force.
The American heritage is that consent of the governed is the
principal basis of governmental legitimacy, but from the beginning of
the republic we have accepted the notion there are many sovereign
states that do not share our philosophical value systems. Accordingly,
we chose to formally recognize the government in Beijing as the
effective government of the Chinese people even though, like Moscow at
the time, that government was philosophically modeled in a way we found
inappropriate.
Ironically, while anti-communist, the party of Chiang Kai-shek on
Taiwan had certain organizational attributes similar to the Communist
Party on the mainland. And in one circumstance of philosophical
consistency, both the Kuomintang of Chiang Kai-shek and the Communist
Party of Mao Zedong claimed to be the
governing party of all of China, including Taiwan. Hence, the Nixon
``one China'' approach did not contradict the nationalistic positions
of the Kuomintang or the Chinese Communist Party.
The dilemma which comes to be accentuated with the passage of time
is the question of whether Taiwan can legally seek today de jure
independence on the basis of a referendum of the people. Here, there
are contrasting models in American philosophy and history as well as
security concerns for all parties to a potential rupture that must be
prudently thought through.
Philosophically, Americans respect Jeffersonian revolutionary
approaches. We also respect Lincolnesque concerns for national unity.
Jeffersonian radicalism dictates one way of looking at Taiwan;
Lincolnesque concerns that a house divided can not ultimately stand
lead to another conclusion. It is in this context that America
delivered a split judgment. The three communiques affirmed ``one
China'' and the Taiwan Relations Act affirmed de facto, but not de
jure, relations with a government of a non-state, one which was
authoritarian in the 1970s but strongly democratic today. But from the
perspective of the American government, there should be no doubt of the
consistency of American policy. Under this President, as each of his
predecessors--Presidents Nixon, Ford, Carter, Reagan, Bush, and
Clinton--the governing American position is the acknowledgment of the
Chinese position that there is but one China of which Taiwan is a part.
For U.S. or Taiwanese leaders to assert any other position would create
an earthquake in world affairs.
The issue of Taiwan is unique but anything except abstract. It is
conceivable that missteps of political judgment could, more readily
than many suppose, lead to World War III. More likely, misjudgments
could precipitate a civil war as irrational, although of a vastly
different kind, as the Taiping Rebellion of the 1850s. While it may be
natural for many Taiwanese-Americans and many, but perhaps not a
majority of Taiwanese on the island, to advocate irrevocably breaking
off all ties with the mainland, there should be no misunderstanding the
consequences of such a decision. It would lead to a war and the death
of millions.
The precepts of ``self-determination'' and ``independence'' may in
most political and historical contexts be conceptually almost
synonymous. But these two precepts are juxtaposed on one place on the
planet. Taiwan can have de facto self-determination--meaning the
ability of a people to maintain a government accountable to its
populace--only if it does not attempt to be recognized with de jure
sovereignty by the international community. To be precise, the
Taiwanese people can have self-determination as long as they do not
seek independence; if they assert independence, their capacity for
self-determination will collapse. Hence, for the sake of peace and
security for peoples of the island and the broader Asia-Pacific region,
there is no credible option except to emphasize restraint.
While clarity of national identity is psychologically attractive,
security for the Taiwanese people comes best with political ambiguity.
There is simply nothing to be gained by steps toward independence if
such steps precipitate a catastrophic and unwinnable conflict between
the mainland and the island.
Care has to be taken that all parties concerned fully comprehend
the latent and deepening dangers across the Taiwan Strait. The last
thing any of us want is a replay of ``The Guns of August,'' with Taipei
becoming a 21st century Sarajevo. Taipei's leadership must understand
that while it may be true that Beijing's priorities today generally
relate to economic development, there is no peaceful prospect of
sundering the mainland's ``one China'' claim. Any unilateral attempt by
either side to change the status quo across the Taiwan Strait is
fraught with danger of the highest order.
As we make it clear to China that the U.S. is steadfastly committed
to ensuring that the status of Taiwan not be altered by force, we also
have an obligation not to entice Taiwan through ill-chosen rhetoric of
``ours'' or ``theirs'' into a sovereignty clash with China. Substantial
Taiwanese self-determination can be maintained only if sovereign
nationalist identity is not trumpeted.
Together with our historic ``One China'' policy, the Taiwan
Relations Act has to date made an enduring contribution to peace and
stability in the Taiwan Strait. It provides a sturdy framework to help
ensure Taiwan's security. There should be no doubt that Congress stands
with the Administration in a common determination to fulfill
obligations under the TRA. But these obligations presuppose that
Taiwanese leaders must understand and mainland resolve the stakes at
issue and refrain from capricious actions that invite conflict or make
constructive dialogue impossible.
Beijing also has implicit obligations to the international order.
Yet it is amazing how so-called realists in government circles in so
many capitals underestimate the ``soft power'' of people-to-people and
cultural relations.
While recent years have witnessed a new maturity and sophistication
in Chinese foreign policy, more nuanced and pragmatic policy approaches
have not generally been applied to Taiwan.
For instance, instead of seeking to isolate Taiwan, isn't it in
Beijing's interest to be magnanimous toward the people of the island?
If advocacy of independence is off the table, shouldn't Beijing
cease its objections to the foreign travel of Taiwanese leaders?
Shouldn't it shepherd Taiwanese membership in international
organizations that do not imply sovereignty--such as helping Taiwan
gain observer status in the World Health Organization?
Rather than setting deadlines for unification or continuing a
counterproductive military buildup, wouldn't Beijing be well-advised to
emphasize culture and economics in its relations with Taipei?
Wouldn't the granting of scholarships to Taiwanese students yield
greater dividends than misdirected investments in threatening missile
systems?
Wouldn't it be reasonable to assume that Taiwanese attitudes toward
the mainland would improve if Beijing's leaders made air transport
between the island and the mainland easier?
And wouldn't it be reasonable to assume that the attitudes on the
mainland would become less polarized if the Taiwanese promoted tourism
and education exchanges with mainland residents?
Shouldn't each side barrage the other with cultural exchanges--
painting, poetry, dance, drama?
And, on the military front, wouldn't it be in both side's interests
to upgrade communications, widen professional exchanges, and engage in
confidence building measures to reduce the likelihood of accidental
conflict?
In all human circumstances, wars in particular, there are
analogies, although seldom exactly replicable conditions. I began this
too-long speech with an aside about attitudes toward democracy in Iraq.
A follow-on analogy may be in order. This President's father
masterfully led the international community in the liberation of
Kuwait. American diplomacy, however, that preceded Saddam Hussein's
decision to invade is open to question. In her one meeting with Saddam,
the American ambassador did not have the presence of mind to warn of
the consequences of military action, in part because few in Washington
or the region thought Saddam's saber rattling to be more than show.
Likewise, a high profile Congressional delegation that visited Saddam
apparently also missed the big picture. At the risk of presumption and
perhaps over-statement, America today is watching 'the build-up of
polarizing attitudes on both sides of the Taiwan Strait that demands
attention and review by all parties, including the United States.
Whether prospects of conflict are 50 percent or only 5 percent, they
are too high.
The greatest geo-strategic irony in world affairs is that the U.S.
and China have a commonality of interest and are working well together
to resolve or at least constrain challenges associated with North Korea
where the economics and politics of an isolated, rogue regime have
deteriorated to the point of potential implosion. But it is Taiwan
where economics and politics have conjoined to take more progressive
strides than any place on earth over the past generation that the
greatest prospect of conflict may exist in Asia. In this circumstance
common sense would indicate that the U.S. has an obligation not to egg
Taiwan on in unrealistic independence ambitions and China has an
obligation not to commence a series of steps that could escalate
tension and lead in a domino decision-making fashion to unavoidable
conflict.
Nonetheless, we must recognize that mainland Chinese society is
changing far more rapidly than most Americans realize. While the
political system largely protects status quo power arrangements, the
ability of individual citizens to discuss and criticize governmental
policies within family, school, and workplace environments increases
with each passing year. And in the field of economics, the late Deng
Xiaoping underscored China's pragmatism with his cat and mice metaphor.
To some degree, that pragmatism has been extended to Communist
Party ideology. The class basis of social leadership has been
broadened. The Party is now told it represents the advanced forces of
production, culture, and the fundamental interests of the vast majority
of the people, and as a consequence entrepreneurs and citizens of
accomplishment are being encouraged to seek Party membership.
But just as red-painted cats aren't very cagey in the marketplace,
so gray coats aren't very invigorating in government. Competitive
decentralized politics best fits competitive, free markets.
Perhaps the only revolutionary leader held in high esteem in both
Beijing and Taipei is Sun Yat-sen. His principal contribution to
Chinese political thought is the precept of a three-stage, guided
evolution to political democracy. His modern day disciples are
frustrated that they are stultified in a second stage, the so-called
period of ``democratic tutelage,'' a time marked in today's China by a
freeing up of commerce but not politics. These citizens assume that the
country is now capable of moving rapidly to the third stage, full
democracy, and that there is simply an incompatibility of China's free
markets with its authoritarian political system.
From an American perspective, the assumption is that China's
economic and social system cannot develop to its fullest unless the
rule of law and its associated rights--including freedom of speech and
of the press, due process for disputes over contractual obligations,
and a judiciary that efficiently and fairly adjudicates disputes--are
made central tenets of Chinese life.
Instability is simply too easily unleashed in society when
governments fail to provide safeguards for individual rights and fail
to erect political institutions adaptable to change and accountable to
the people.
Let me conclude with one of my favorite anecdotes about a Chinese
leader. A little over a generation ago a group of French journalists
interviewed Zhou Enlai and at the end of their discussion asked him
what he thought was the meaning of the French Revolution. He hesitated
and then said, ``It is too early to tell.''
With Zhou's restraint in mind, it may be too early to tell the
exact ramifications of a quarter century of economic reform in China.
But it is certain that the ramifications are deep and profound and
whether political change will occur this week, next year, or next
decade, change is inevitable. The only question is whether that change
will be principally for the good.
From a Chinese perspective, Zhou may have been right to reserve
judgment. It is too early to assess the meaning of the French
Revolution in an Asian context. Thirty years ago, many western educated
Asians were Franco-Jeffersonian democrats. Jefferson's emphasis on
individual rights--life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness--and the
revolutionary French call for liberte, egalite, fraternite appeared to
be compelling universalist notions vastly preferable to Marxist jargon.
Today, however, Asian intellectuals accept the market economy and
recognize the coercive nature or, at best, irrelevance of Marxism. But
they look at the interventionist nature of contemporary American
foreign policy in the Middle East and the violence of American culture
at home and many have concluded that unconstrained power and
unmitigated freedom can sometimes produce negative consequences. They
believe that rights should be tempered by a concomitant emphasis on
responsibilities and that a cohesive society requires a greater neo-
Confucian family and, by implication, governmental discipline.
So while the future of the Chinese-American relationship may
primarily relate to the direction of change in China, it also relates
to the direction of change in American governance and culture. America
sees issues between our countries reflected in the balance of trade, in
the sharing of global obligations, in the defusing of tensions in
countries like North Korea, in Chinese belligerency, or lack thereof,
in relations with its neighbors. But, at the same time, China is
apprehensive about the possible development of an American enemy-
oriented mindset and about the potential dissolution of traditional
American family values. They would like us to become more Confucian as
we would wish them to become more Jeffersonian.
In the years since the tragedy at Tiananmen Square, pundits at
several points have declared U.S.-China relations to be at a
confrontational crossroads. Each time, the leadership of both countries
chose to exercise restraint and find ways to pragmatically address the
issues of concern. These action-reaction incidents suggest Beijing's
leadership is prepared to moderate decisions based on overriding
economic and other pragmatic priorities and that Washington is prepared
to maintain its focus on the long-term and endeavor to build a
cooperative, mutually beneficial framework for Sino-American relations,
one that welcomes greater Chinese participation in the rules-based
international system, and encourages progress by China toward a more
open, accountable, and democratic political system.
Finally, a note about the consequences of a possible advancement of
decentralized democracy in China. Such would enhance what used to be
quaintly described in America as ``domestic tranquility'' by making
internal decision-making more accountable to and thus more acceptable
by the people. It would also make the prospect of conflict with other
countries, particularly the United States, less likely. But great power
differences of judgment and interests would continue. History suggests
that democracies are less prone to go to war with each other, but
governments reliant on citizen input can from time to time accentuate a
populist hardening of differences, which in a U.S.-China context could
include issues as diverse as trade policy, family planning, and the
muscularity of power projection. Democracy implies a political
process--preferable to all others--but it is not a guarantor of good
judgment. What it provides, however, is a shortened feedback mechanism
to ensure policy adjustments when policy mistakes are made.
The nature of politics is that pride plays a disproportionately
large role relative to its role in other human enterprises. The human
factor--foibles in particular--can never be underestimated in
governmental decision-making. As two obscure 19th century Italian
political theorists--Vito and Paretto--noted: whatever the political
system, at critical times a few at the top have the authority to make
decisions for a nation. In times like these, leaders, no matter how
democratic and well intended (or the reverse), can make mistakes that
carry monumental consequences. It is in this sobering context that the
most important bilateral relationship of the 21st Century will be
between China and the United States. If that relationship is ill-
managed, the likelihood of conflict and economic trauma will be great.
But if the relationship is managed well, the benefits in terms of
economic prosperity and world peace will be commensurate.
______
Prepared Statement of Hon. Chuck Hagel, U.S. Senator From Nebraska,
Co-Chairman, Congressional-Executive Commission on China
JUNE 3, 2004
Washington, DC.--Fifteen years ago the People's Liberation Army
cleared Tiananmen Square of the peaceful demonstrators who had held it
for several weeks. The shocking sounds and images of unarmed students
and workers gunned down by Chinese troops remain vivid in our minds.
The demonstration was crushed that awful day, but the optimism and
possibilities represented by those fighting for a future democratic
China were not. We meet today to remember their voices, and assess
China's progress in meeting their goals.
I am especially pleased that this Commission will hear today from
two leaders of the 1989 democracy movement, Mr. Wang Youcai and Ms. Lu
Jinghua. These individuals have never given up the struggle for their
country's democratic future, and their insights and sacrifice will
greatly inform today's proceedings.
Mr. Chairman, I congratulate you for holding today's hearing. China
today faces important choices for its political future. These choices
will affect the lives and welfare of all Chinese citizens, but China's
size and growing importance guarantee that these same choices will
reverberate around the globe in ways that we can only dimly predict and
understand today. China's future is also important to America's future.
It is in our interest to work broadly and deeply with the Chinese
government using all the bridges and opportunities available to us to
help shape and ensure a democratic future for China.
China is a much-changed and much-changing place. The results of two
decades of market reforms are visible nearly everywhere. The cold, gray
Beijing airport where I first saw China on New Year's Day in 1983 has
long been replaced with a state-of-the-art facility. The skylines of
China's major cities have changed dramatically. These are the most
prominent symbols of China's new wealth, but the economic reforms that
generated these changes have also fundamentally altered the dynamics
that will define China's future.
The economic realities of building a modern nation while feeding,
clothing and employing 1.3 billion people have begun to drive China in
directions that, I believe, some within the Communist Party have not
wanted to go. The twin demands of political stability and continued
economic progress have spurred legal reforms that someday may be the
leading edge of constraints on the arbitrary exercise of State power.
Elections at the village level are now commonplace in China, and
limited experiments like these continue at other levels of government.
Shanghai is experimenting with public legislative hearings, and the
term ``human rights'' was recently added to China's own constitution.
While these changes are important, the gap between forward-looking
economic freedoms and a backward-looking political system remains
significant. The Communist Party continues to crush any person or
movement it perceives as challenging its hold on power. But there are
leaders now within China that comprehend the necessity for change, and
understand that inflexibility, secretiveness and a lack of democratic
oversight now pose the greatest challenges to continued development.
President Hu Jintao and Premier Wen Jiabao have demonstrated, albeit
unevenly, that they may be two such leaders, but they will need to
gather considerable reformist courage to drive continued change. Not
overnight, but in ways that Chinese society, culture, infrastructure
and institutions may be prepared for, and willing to accept.
With no voice in their own political future, the frustration of
China's citizens is growing. The political scientist Murray Scot Tanner
cites police figures in the current issue of National Interest showing
the number and size of protests in China growing rapidly in the 1990s.
It is extraordinary that China's ruling party came to power in a
peasant revolution, representing the working class, but now faces waves
of both worker and rural protests. China's citizens are fed up with
corruption, a social and economic ill that China's student
demonstrators both recognized and offered a democratic solution for in
1989.
The United States wants to work with China to build a more open and
participatory society. David M. Lampton wrote in the Fall 2003 issue of
National Interest that ``Americans must balance the impulse to treat
China as it is with the foresight to recognize China for what it may
become.'' China will not match the United States on every issue.
Political change is complex and imperfect, and it will be up to the
Chinese people to determine where their country goes and how it gets
there. But China's leaders must take the first steps, and the United
States must be ready to assist.
Thank you.
______
Prepared Statement of Hon. Joseph R. Pitts, a U.S. Representative From
Pennsylvania
JUNE 3, 2004
Mr. Chairman, thank you for holding this important hearing on ``15
Years After Tiananmen: Is Democracy China's Future? '' Today we
remember and stand with those who fought for and those who continue to
work for freedom and democracy in China. The depth of courage and
strength shown during the Tiananmen Square events 15 years ago remains
as we continue to meet with and receive reports of democracy and
religious leaders beaten, arrested, imprisoned, and tortured for their
beliefs.
The repression of basic rights by Chinese officials, particularly
related to freedom of speech and freedom of conscience, reflect the
intense battle within Chinese society between those who wish to live in
freedom and those who wish to exert extreme control over the society
and individuals, their actions, speech, and even their thoughts. Yet,
accounts clearly reveal that the Chinese people desire laws that
protect their freedom, whether it be the freedom to move around the
country, freedom to think and verbalize views differing from those of
the Central Party, freedom to practice their religion without
interference or freedom to creatively explore economic opportunities.
As the U.S. Government implements our on-going dialog with the
Chinese government on democracy, human rights, and other vital issues,
we must continue to clearly and strongly reflect our support for the
Chinese people to practice their fundamental rights. Our commitments
and priorities must also be reflected in the programs we support in
relation to democracy and civil society in China. I would like to
commend Assistant Secretary Craner and State Department personnel in
the Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights and Labor for their determination
and commitment to pressing these ideals regarding China. I would also
like to commend Mr. John Kamm and others who, through creative dialog
and relationships, have been key to effective work in the release of
prisoners and progress on human rights issues. It is through the work
of men and women in our government, in business, in NGOs, and in
academia that positive progress is being made in China.
Mr. Chairman, this Commission was established to ensure that the
Congress and the U.S. Government had a high profile vehicle through
which to continue raising concerns about human rights issues in China.
The myriad reports we all receive on human rights violations in China
underscore the importance of addressing these violations and abuses in
deliberate, practical ways. Hearings such as today's are vital in
continuing to keep the spotlight on political, religious, labor,
democracy, civil society, women's and many other human rights issue in
China. I would like to urge that the Commission hold more hearings to
spotlight these issues. In addition, we must continue to highlight
important activities of the Commission, such as the building of the
prisoner data base by Commission staff.
Mr. Chairman, the Chinese people deserve to live in a nation in
which their government protects their rights. Thank you for holding
today's hearing--I look forward to hearing from today's distinguished
witnesses.
Submission for the Record
----------
China's Changing of the Guard
Authoritarian Resilience
BY ANDREW J. NATHAN
Andrew J. Nathan is Class of 1919 Professor of Political Science at
Columbia University. He is co-editor with Perry Link of The Tiananmen
Papers (2001) and co-author with Bruce Gilley of China's New Rulers:
The Secret Files (2002).
After the Tiananmen crisis in June, 1989, many observers thought
that the rule of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) would collapse.
Instead, the regime brought inflation under control, restarted economic
growth, expanded foreign trade, and increased its absorption of foreign
direct investment. It restored normal relations with the G-7 countries
that had imposed sanctions, resumed the exchange of summits with the
United States, presided over the retrocession of Hong Kong to Chinese
sovereignty, and won the right to hold the 2008 Olympics in Beijing. It
arrested or exiled political dissidents, crushed the fledgling China
Democratic Party, and seems to have largely suppressed the Falun Gong
spiritual movement.
Many China specialists and democracy theorists--myself among them--
expected the regime to fall to democratization's ``third wave.''
1 Instead, the regime has reconsolidated itself.2
Regime theory holds that authoritarian systems are inherently fragile
because of weak legitimacy, overreliance on coercion,
overcentralization of decision making, and the predominance of personal
power over institutional norms. This particular authoritarian system,
however, has proven resilient.
The causes of its resilience are complex. But many of them can be
summed up in the concept of institutionalization--understood either in
the currently fashionable sense of behavior that is constrained by
formal and informal rules, or in the older sense summarized by Samuel
P. Huntington as consisting of the adaptability, complexity, autonomy,
and coherence of state organizations.3 This article focuses
on four aspects of the CCP regime's institutionalization: (1) the
increasingly norm-bound nature of its succession politics; (2) the
increase in meritocratic as opposed to factional considerations in the
promotion of political elites; (3) the differentiation and functional
specialization of institutions within the regime; and (4) the
establishment of institutions for political participation and appeal
that strengthen the CCP's legitimacy among the public at large. While
these developments do not guarantee that the regime will be able to
solve all the challenges that it faces, they do caution against too-
hasty arguments that it cannot adapt and survive.
NORM-BOUND SUCCESSION POLITICS
As this article is published, the Chinese regime is in the middle
of a historic demonstration of institutional stability: its peaceful,
orderly transition from the so-called third generation of leadership,
headed by Jiang Zemin, to the fourth, headed by Hu Jintao. Few
authoritarian regimes--be they communist, fascist, corporatist, or
personalist--have managed to conduct orderly, peaceful, timely, and
stable successions. Instead, the moment of transfer has almost always
been a moment of crisis--breaking out ahead of or behind the nominal
schedule, involving purges or arrests, factionalism, sometimes
violence, and opening the door to the chaotic intrusion into the
political process of the masses or the military. China's current
succession displays attributes of institutionalization unusual in the
history of authoritarianism and unprecedented in the history of the
PRC. It is the most orderly, peaceful, deliberate, and rule-bound
succession in the history of modern China outside of the recent
institutionalization of electoral democracy in Taiwan.4
Hu Jintao, the new general secretary of the CCP as of the Sixteenth
Party Congress in November 2002, has held the position of successor-
apparent for ten years. Four of the other eight top-ranking
appointments (Wu Bangguo, Wen Jiabao, Zeng Qinghong, and Luo Gan) had
been decided a year or two in advance. The remaining four members of
the Politburo Standing Committee (PBSC) were simply elevated from the
outgoing Politburo. Barring a major crisis, the transition will
continue to an orderly conclusion in March 2003, leading to the
election of Hu Jintao as state president and chairman of the Central
Military Commission, Wu Bangguo as chair of the National People's
Congress (NPC), and Wen Jiabao as premier. Outgoing officials President
Jiang Zemin, NPC Chair Li Peng, and Premier Zhu Rongji will leave their
state offices, having already left their Party offices in the fall, and
will cease to have any direct role in politics.
It takes some historical perspective to appreciate this outcome for
the achievement that it is. During the Mao years, Party congresses and
National People's Congresses seldom met, and when they did it was
rarely on schedule. There have never before been effective terms of
office or age limits for persons holding the rank of ``central
leader''; Mao and Deng each exercised supreme authority until the end
of his life. Nor has there ever been an orderly assumption of office by
a designated successor: Mao purged Liu Shaoqi, the president of the
PRC, by having Red Guards seize him and put him in prison, where he
died. Mao's officially designated successor, Lin Biao, allegedly tried
to seize power from Mao, was discovered, and died in a plane crash
while fleeing. Mao appointed Hua Guofeng as his successor simply by
stating that Hua was his choice. Hua was removed from office at Deng
Xiaoping's behest before Hua's term of office was over. Deng removed
from power both of his own chosen successors, Hu Yaobang and Zhao
Ziyang. Deng and the other elders overrode the Politburo in 1989 to
impose Jiang Zemin as successor to the Party leadership.
Measured against these historical precedents, the current
succession displays many firsts, all indicative of
institutionalization:
Jiang Zemin survived his full allotted time in office. He was
installed as general secretary in 1989, and was reelected in 1992
and 1997, serving two-and-a-half terms (he assumed the Central
Military Commission chairmanship in 1989 and the state presidency
in 1992). His patron, Deng, did not remove him from office
(although Deng considered doing so in 1992). Although Jiang was
called to the top post in Beijing over the heads of Li Peng and Li
Ruihuan, and had at times adversarial relations with both of them,
neither tried to replace him. In consolidating his authority, Jiang
engineered the fall from power of Yang Shangkun in 1992 and Qiao
Shi in 1997, but neither of these men tried to unseat him.
Jiang did not stay in office past the time when, according to
the rules, he should have left office. In 1997, the Politburo
established by consensus a new, informal rule that senior leaders
should not be reappointed to another term after they reach the age
of 70. When this rule was established, Jiang was 71, but he had
himself declared a one-time exception to it, promising to retire in
2002. This promise, along with the fact that he would be 76 in
2002, were the main reasons why no serious consideration was given
to his remaining in office, even though there was much speculation
in the international press that he was trying to stay. The age-70
rule will also make it necessary for Jiang to retire from the post
of Central Military Commission chairman, a post for which there
have never been either term or age limits, and to which the 1997
decision did not explicitly apply. Jiang's third post, the state
presidency, is limited by the Constitution to two terms, which he
has already served.
Jiang Zemin was the first leader in the history of the
People's Republic of China (PRC) not to select his own successor.
Mao chose several successors for himself (Liu Shaoqi, Lin Biao, and
Hua Guofeng). So did Deng (Hu Yaobang, Zhao Ziyang, and Jiang
Zemin). By contrast, Deng Xiaoping made Hu Jintao the PBSC's
youngest member in 1992, and for the entire ten years of Hu's
incumbency as informal successor designate, Jiang Zemin did not
challenge Hu's position. The incoming premier, Wen Jiabao, was
recommended by Zhu Rongji over Jiang's choices, Wu Bangguo and Li
Changchun.
The retired elders (consisting after 1997 of Wan Li, Qiao Shi,
Song Ping, Liu Huaqing, and several others) did not attempt to
intervene in the succession or, indeed, in any decision. The right
of three earlier elders (Deng Xiaoping, Chen Yun, and Li Xiannian)
to intervene had been established by a secret Politburo resolution
in 1987 and was reinforced by Deng's chairmanship of the Central
Military Commission. This right was exercised to decisive effect
during the 1989 Tiananmen crisis.5 In 1997, Deng
Xiaoping, the last of the three elders, died. A new group of elders
was created by the retirements of Qiao Shi and others from the
PBSC. The 1987 Politburo resolution was not renewed for them, nor
did any of them sit on the CMC. These new elders received intra-
Party documents and occasionally expressed their views,6
but they did not attend Politburo meetings or exercise any
decision-making power.
The military exercised no influence over the succession.
Although some senior military officers spoke in favor of Jiang's
staying on in the position of CMC chair, they were ignored. They
expressed no views on any other issue relating to the transfer of
power. The succession of uniformed officers within the CMC echoes
that in the civilian hierarchy: Senior officers associated with
Jiang Zemin and over the age of 70--Fu Quanyou and Yu Yongbo--have
retired, to be replaced by a younger generation of officers.
Following a tradition set in place in 1997, no uniformed officer
was elected to the PBSC; the military representatives in Party
Center were seated in the Politburo.
The selection of the new Politburo was made by consensus
within the old Politburo. The process was, to be sure, dominated by
the senior members, and each of them tried and succeeded in placing
associates in the successor body. But these factional
considerations were played out within limits imposed by the need
for a leadership consensus. None of the top leaders--Jiang, Li
Peng, or Zhu Rongji--was powerful enough to force a nominee on his
colleagues against their wills.
Never before in PRC history has there been a succession whose
arrangements were fixed this far in advance, remained so stable to the
end, and whose results so unambiguously transferred power from one
generation of leaders to another. It is not that factions no longer
exist, but that their powers are now in a state of mutual balance and
that they have all learned a thing or two from the PRC's history.
Political factions today have neither the power nor, perhaps more
importantly, the will to upset rules that have been painfully arrived
at. The absence of anyone with supreme power to upset these rules helps
make them self-reinforcing.
MERITOCRACY MODIFIES FACTIONALISM
Factional considerations played a role in the succession process.
But they were constrained by a twenty-year process of meritocratic
winnowing that limited the list of candidates who could be considered
in the final jockeying for position. Certainly, except for the period
of the Cultural Revolution (1966-76), there have always been both
meritocratic and factional elements in promotions within the Chinese
party-state. But until now, even at the most meritocratic times, the
major criteria for promotion at the top were the ability to shift with
changing political lines and personal loyalty to the top leader--first
Mao Zedong, then Deng Xiaoping. While those among the new leading group
are ideologically alert and politically savvy, and have mostly allied
themselves with one senior leader or another, they rose to the top
predominantly because of administrative skill, technical knowledge,
educational background, and Party, rather than personal loyalty.
Political factions today have neither the power nor the will to
upset rules that have been painfully arrived at. The absence of anyone
with supreme power to upset these rules helps make them self-
reinforcing.
The start of this process was Deng Xiaoping's 1980 instruction to
senior Party leaders to undertake a ``four-way transformation'' (sihua)
of the cadre corps by finding and promoting cadres around the age of 40
who were ``revolutionary, younger, more educated, and more technically
specialized'' (geminghua, nianqinghua, zhishihua, zhuanyehua). In this
way, Hu Jintao was promoted several levels by the CCP first secretary
of Gansu Province, where he was then working; Wu Bangguo was promoted
to party secretary of Shanghai's science and technology commission; and
Wen Jiabao became deputy head of the provincial geology bureau in
Gansu. The story was more or less the same for each member of the new
Politburo.
In 1983, the CCP's Organization Department created a list of the
most promising cadres of the ``four transformations'' generation, which
it turned to whenever it needed to recommend a younger cadre for a post
carrying ministerial rank. Hu Jintao was selected from this list to
become Party secretary of Guizhou, Wen Jiabao to become deputy head of
the powerful Central Party Office, and so on. The same cadre
rejuvenation policy led Deng to order that someone younger than 50 be
appointed to the Fourteenth Politburo Standing Committee in 1992. That
choice fell upon Hu Jintao, so that his current accession to the
position of General Secretary marks the orderly working out of the same
process set in motion 20 years earlier.
Five of the nine members of today's new PBSC were members or
alternate members of the Central Committee in 1982. This indicates the
deliberateness and regularity of the succession process. The need to
select PBSC members from the relatively small pool of candidates who
survived the twenty-year selection process constrained the way in which
factionalism worked between 2000 and 2002. Jiang Zemin could make the
case for Zeng Qinghong or Zeng Peiyan, Li Peng for Luo Gan, and Zhu
Rongji for Wen Jiabao, only on the basis of each person's excellent
performance over the course of two decades in technically and
administratively challenging jobs, and not because of symbolic
importance (for example, Mao's promotion of Chen Yonggui) or
ideological correctness (Mao's promotion of the so-called Gang of
Four).
A norm of staff neutrality has become to some degree accepted at
high levels within the Party Center, the State Council, and the Central
Military Commission, so that the careers of rising stars have been
relatively unperturbed by factional turmoil at the top. When Zhao
Ziyang was purged in 1989, a few of his associates were
immediately purged, but most of them were gradually moved into
secondary bureaucratic posts over the course of the next couple of
years. Some even continued to advance in their careers. Wen Jiabao, for
example, served eight consecutive years as director of the powerful
Party Central Office under three different general secretaries (Hu
Yaobang, Zhao Ziyang, and Jiang Zemin). In contrast to the old spoils-
like practices in which a leader's purge led quickly to the rooting-out
of his followers several levels down the political system, the new
system limits the damage that factional strife does to the orderly
careers of the rising generation of leaders.
The product of this less factionalized, more regularized process is
a competent leadership group that has high morale; that is politically
balanced in representing different factions in the Party; that lacks
one or two dominant figures, and is thus structurally constrained to
make decisions collectively; and that is probably as collegial as any
political leadership can be, because all the members came to the top
through the same process, which they all view as having been broadly
fair.7
Whether this event sets the template for future successions remains
uncertain, but the chances of that happening are increased insofar as
the current succession entrenches--as it does--rules that have elite
support (for example, the age-70 rule), historical depth (the rules
governing the meritocratic promotion system), and structural
reinforcement from the informal political structure of balanced
factional power.
INSTITUTIONAL DIFFERENTIATION WITHIN THE REGIME
At the high point of political reform in 1987, Zhao Ziyang proposed
the ``separation of Party and government'' and the ``separation of
Party and enterprise.'' With Zhao's fall from power in 1989, these
ideas were abandoned. Yet in the intervening 14 years, much of what he
proposed has happened by evolution, as the separation of
responsibilities and spheres of authority--which Max Weber saw as
definitive characteristics of the modern state--has gradually
increased. What belongs to a given agency to handle is usually handled
by that agency not only without interference, but with a growing sense
that interference would be illegitimate.
One group of specialists, located in the Party Center, manages
ideology, mobilization, and propaganda (in the outgoing regime, it
included people like Jiang Zemin, Li Ruihuan, Hu Jintao, and Zeng
Qinghong). Another group, located in the State Council, makes economic
policy (including Premier Zhu Rongji, vice-premiers Wen Jiabao and Wu
Bangguo, most State Council members, and most provincial governors and
Party secretaries). Provincial-level governors and Party secretaries
have an increasingly wide scope to set local policy in such areas as
education, health, welfare, the environment, foreign investment, and
economic development. Many large state enterprises have now been
removed from state ownership or placed under joint state-private
ownership. Enterprise-management decisions are made on predominantly
economic rather than political bases. State Council members,
provincial-level officials, and enterprise managers are selected
increasingly for their policy-relevant expertise. And economic policy
makers at all levels suffer less and less frequently from intervention
by the ideology-and-mobilization specialists.
The NPC has become progressively more autonomous, initiating
legislation and actively reviewing and altering the proposals for
legislation presented to it.8 The police and courts remain
highly politicized, but in the case of the courts, at least, a norm of
judicial independence has been declared (in the 1994 Judges' Law and
elsewhere) and judges are applying it more often in economic and
criminal cases that are not sensitive enough to draw interference from
Party authorities.
The military is still a ``Party army,'' but it has also become
smaller, more technically competent, and more professional. The
officers being promoted to the CMC in the current succession are, as a
group, distinguished more for their professional accomplishments and
less for their political loyalties than was the case with previous CMC
cohorts.9 Calls have come, apparently from the younger
members of the officer corps, to make the army a nonpartisan national
force without the obligation to defend a particular ruling party. And
although the incoming leader, Hu Jintao, has rejected these calls, the
fact that they were voiced at all is a sign of a growing professional
ethos within military ranks.10
All Chinese media are owned (at least formally, and for the most
part actually) by Party and state agencies. But the media have become
more commercialized and therefore less politicized. A handful of
important outlets remain under variously direct control by the Party's
propaganda department--for instance, People's Daily, the New China News
Agency, China Central Television, provincial-level Party newspapers,
the army newspaper, and so on. But to some extent, these media--and
even more so, other newspapers, magazines, and radio or television
stations around the country--fight for market share by covering movie
and pop stars, sports, and scandals. In the political domain, they
often push the envelope of what the regime considers off-limits by
investigating stories about local corruption and abuses of power.
To be sure, the Chinese regime is still a party-state, in which the
Party penetrates all other institutions and makes policy for all realms
of action. And it is still a centralized, unitary system in which power
at lower levels derives from grants by the center. But neither the top
leader nor the central Party organs interfere as much in the work of
other agencies as was the case under Mao and (less so) Deng.
Ideological considerations have only marginal, if any, influence on
most policy decisions. And staff members are promoted increasingly on
the basis of their professional expertise in a relevant area.
All of this is partly to say, as has often been said before, that
the regime is pragmatic. But behind the attitude of pragmatism lie
increased institutional complexity, autonomy, and coherence--attributes
that according to Huntington's theory should equip the regime to adapt
more successfully to the challenges it faces.
INPUT INSTITUTIONS AND POLITICAL LEGITIMACY
One of the puzzles of the post-Tiananmen period has been the
regime's apparent ability to rehabilitate its legitimacy (defined as
the public's belief that the regime is lawful and should be obeyed)
from the low point of 1989, when vast, nationwide prodemocracy
demonstrations revealed the disaffection of a large segment of the
urban population.
General theories of authoritarian regimes, along with empirical
impressions of the current situation in China, might lead one to expect
that the regime would now be decidedly low on legitimacy: Although
authoritarian regimes often enjoy high legitimacy when they come to
power, that legitimacy usually deteriorates for want of democratic
procedures to cultivate ongoing consent. In the case of contemporary
China, the regime's ideology is bankrupt. The transition from a
socialist to a quasimarket economy has created a great deal of social
unrest. And the regime relies heavily on coercion to repress political
and religious dissent.
Direct evidence about attitudes, however, shows the contrary. In a
1993 nationwide random-sample survey conducted by Tianjian Shi, 94. One
percent of respondents agreed or strongly agreed with the statement
that, ``We should trust and obey the government, for in the last
analysis it serves our interests.'' A 2002 survey by Shi found high
percentages of respondents who answered similarly regarding both the
central and local governments.11 There is much other
evidence from both quantitative and qualitative studies to suggest that
expressions of dissatisfaction, including widely reported worker and
peasant demonstrations, are usually directed at lower-level
authorities, while the regime as a whole continues to enjoy high levels
of acceptance.
A number of explanations can be offered for this pattern. Among
them:
Most people's living standards have risen during two decades
of economic growth.
The Party has coopted elites by offering Party membership to
able persons from all walks of life and by granting the informal
protection of property rights to private entrepreneurs. This new
direction in Party policy has been given ideological grounding in
Jiang Zemin's theory of the ``Three Represents,'' which says that
the Party should represent advanced productive forces, advanced
culture, and the basic interests of all the Chinese working
people--that is, that it should stand for the middle classes as
much as or more than the workers and peasants.
The Chinese display relatively high interpersonal trust, an
attitude that precedes and fosters regime legitimacy.12
The Chinese population favors stability and fears political
disorder. By pointing to the example of postcommunist chaos in
Russia, the CCP has persuaded most Chinese, including
intellectuals--from whom criticism might be particularly expected--
that political reform is dangerous to their welfare.
Thanks to the success of political repression, there is no
organized alternative to the regime.
Coercive repression--in 1989 and after--may itself have
generated legitimacy by persuading the public that the regime's
grip on power is unshakeable. Effective repression may generate
only resigned obedience at first, but to maintain cognitive
consonance, citizens who have no choice but to obey a regime may
come to evaluate its performance and responsiveness (themselves
components of legitimacy) relatively highly.13 In
seeking psychological coherence, citizens may
convince themselves that their acceptance of the regime is
voluntary--precisely because of, not despite, the fact that they
have no alternative.
All these explanations may have value. Here, though, I would like
to develop another explanation, more directly related to this essay's
theme of institutionalization: The regime has developed a series of
input institutions (that is, institutions that people can use to
apprise the state of their concerns) that allow Chinese to believe that
they have some influence on policy decisions and personnel choices at
the local level.
The most thorough account of these institutions is Tianjian Shi's
Political Participation in Beijing, which, although researched before
1989, describes institutions that are still in place. According to Shi,
Chinese participate at the local and work-unit levels in a variety of
ways. These include voting, assisting candidates in local-level
elections, and lobbying unit leaders. Participation is frequent, and
activism is correlated with a sense of political efficacy (defined as
an individual's belief that he or she is capable of having some effect
on the political system). Shi's argument is supported by the work of
Melanie Manion, who has shown that in localities with competitive
village elections, leaders' policy positions are closer to those of
their constituents than in villages with noncompetitive
voting.14
In addition to the institutions discussed by Shi and Manion, there
are at least four other sets of input institutions that may help to
create regime legitimacy at the mass level:
The Administrative Litigation Act of 1989 allows citizens to
sue government agencies for alleged violations of government
policy. According to Minxin Pei, the number of suits stood in 1999
at 98,600. The success rate (determined by court victories plus
favorable settlements) has ranged from 27 percent to around 40
percent. In at least one province, government financial support is
now offered through a legal aid program to enable poor citizens to
take advantage of the program.15
Party and government agencies maintain offices for citizen
complaints--letters-and-visits departments (xinfangju)--which can
be delivered in person or by letter. Little research has been done
on this process, but the offices are common and their ability to
deal with individual citizen complaints may be considerable.
As people's congresses at all levels have grown more
independent--along with people's political consultative
conferences, United Front structures that meet at each level just
prior to the meeting of the people's congress--they have become an
increasingly important channel by which citizen complaints may be
aired through representatives.
As the mass media have become more independent and market
driven, so too have they increasingly positioned themselves as
tribunes of the people, exposing complaints against wrong-doing by
local-level officials.
These channels of demand- and complaint-making have two common
features. One is that they encourage individual rather than group-based
inputs, the latter of which are viewed as threatening by the regime.
The other is that they focus complaints against specific local-level
agencies or officials, diffusing possible aggression against the
Chinese party-state generally. Accordingly, they enable citizens to
pursue grievances without creating the potential to threaten the regime
as a whole.
AN AUTHORITARIAN TRANSITION?
Despite the institutionalization of orderly succession processes,
meritocratic promotions, bureaucratic differentiation, and channels of
mass participation and appeal, the regime still faces massive
challenges to its survival. This essay does not attempt to predict
whether the regime will surmount them. What we can say on available
evidence is that the regime is not supine, weak, or bereft of policy
options. In contrast with the Soviet and Eastern European ruling groups
in the late 1980s and early 1990s, the new Chinese leaders do not feel
that they are at the end of history. The policy-statement excerpts
contained in their investigation reports show that these leaders think
they can solve China's problems.16 They intend to fight
corruption; reform the state-owned enterprises; ameliorate the lot of
the peasants; improve the environment; comply with World Trade
Organization rules while using transitional privileges to ease China's
entry into full compliance; suppress political opposition; meet the
challenge of U.S. containment; and, above all, stay in power and direct
China's modernization. The argument that democratization, freedom, and
human rights would lead to a truer kind of stability--as convincing as
it may be to the democrats of the world--holds no appeal for these men.
The theoretical implications of China's authoritarian resilience
are complex. For the last half-century, scholars have debated whether
totalitarian regimes can adapt to modernity. The implications of the
Chinese case for this discussion are two: First, in order to adapt and
survive, the regime has had to do many of the things predicted by
Talcott Parsons and those who elaborated his theory: The regime has had
to (1) abandon utopian ideology and charismatic styles of leadership;
(2) empower a technocratic elite; (3) introduce bureaucratic
regularization, complexity, and specialization; and (4) reduce control
over private speech and action. Second, contrary to the Parsonian
prediction, these adaptations have not led to regime change. In Richard
Lowenthal's terms, the regime has moved ``from utopia to development.''
17 But the Party has been able to do all these things
without triggering a transition to democracy.
Although such a transition might still lie somewhere in the future,
the experience of the past two decades suggests that it is not
inevitable. Under conditions that elsewhere have led to democratic
transition, China has made a transition instead from totalitarianism to
a classic authoritarian regime, and one that appears increasingly
stable.
Of course, neither society-centered nor actor-centered theories of
democratic transition predict any particular outcome to be inevitable
in any particular time frame. The Chinese case may, accordingly, merely
reinforce the lesson that the outcome depends on politicians and their
will to power. Alternatively, it may end up reminding us that
democratic transition can take a long time. But it may also suggest a
more disturbing possibility: that authoritarianism is a viable regime
form even under conditions of advanced modernization and integration
with the global economy.
NOTES
1 As an example, see the multi-author symposium on
Chinese democracy in Journal of Democracy 9 (January 1998).
2 In other words, to adapt a concept from democratic
consolidation theory, the CCP has once again made itself the only game
in town and is in the process of carrying out a successful transfer of
power.
3 Samuel P. Huntington, Political Order in Changing
Societies (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1968), 12-24.
4 The factual base for this discussion is contained in
Andrew J. Nathan and Bruce Gilley, China's New Rulers: The Secret Files
(New York: New York Review Books, 2002), and is summarized in two
articles in the New York Review of Books, 26 September and 10 October
2002. These publications are in turn based on Zong Hairen, Disidai (The
Fourth Generation) (Carle Place, N.Y.: Mirror Books, 2002). Zong
Hairen's account of the new generation of Chinese leaders is based on
material contained in internal investigation reports on candidates for
the new Politburo compiled by the Chinese Communist Party's
Organization Department.
5 The Tiananmen Papers: The Chinese Leadership's
Decision to Use Force Against Their Own People--In Their Own Words,
Zhang Liang, comp., Andrew J. Nathan and Perry Link, eds. (New York:
PublicAffairs Books, 2001), 102, n. 1, and passim.
6 Zong Hairen, Zhu Rongji zai 1999 (Zhu Rongji in 1999)
(Carle Place, N.Y.: Mingjing Chubanshe, 2001); English translation
edited by Andrew J. Nathan in Chinese Law and Government (January-
February and March-April 2002).
7 Like any meritocratic process, of course, this one had
elements of contingency. Hu Jintao's career is a good example, in
particular his 1992 selection from among four candidates as the
representative of the Fourth Generation to join the PBSC.
8 Michael Dowdle, ``The Constitutional Development and
Operations of the National People's Congress,'' Columbia Journal of
Asian Law 12 (Spring 1997): 1-125.
9 Disidai, ch. 11.
10 Disidai, ch. 1.
11 The 1993 survey was conducted for the project on
``Political Culture and Political Participation in Mainland China,
Taiwan, and Hong Kong.'' The 2002 survey was conducted for the project
on ``East Asia Barometer: Comparative Survey of Democratization and
Value Changes.'' Data courtesy of Tianjian Shi.
12 Ronald Inglehart, Modernization and
Postmodernization: Cultural, Economic, and Political Change in 43
Societies (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1997), 173, n. 2.
Also Tianjian Shi, ``Cultural Impacts on Political Trust: A Comparison
of Mainland China and Taiwan,'' Comparative Politics 33 (July 2001):
401-19.
13 On components of legitimacy, see M. Stephen
Weatherford, ``Measuring Political Legitimacy,'' American Political
Science Review 86 (March 1992): 149-66. The relationship I am proposing
between successful coercion and legitimacy is hypothetical; so far as I
know it has not been empirically established.
14 Tianjian Shi, Political Participation in Beijing
(Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1997); Melanie Manion, ``The
Electoral Connection in the Chinese Countryside,'' American Political
Science Review 90 (December 1996): 736-48.
15 Minxin Pei, ``Citizens v. Mandarins: Administrative
Litigation in China,'' China Quarterly (December 1997): 832-62, and
personal communication. On legal aid, see Disidai, ch. 7; the province
is Guangdong.
16 See Andrew J. Nathan and Bruce Gilley, New Rulers,
chs. 7, 8.
17 Talcott Parsons, The Social System (New York: Free
Press, 1951), 525-35; Richard Lowenthal, ``Development vs. Utopia in
Communist Policy,'' in Chalmers Johnson, ed., Change in Communist
Systems (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1970), 33116.