[Joint House and Senate Hearing, 108 Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
TO SERVE THE PEOPLE: NGOs AND THE DEVELOPMENT OF CIVIL SOCIETY IN CHINA
=======================================================================
ROUNDTABLE
before the
CONGRESSIONAL-EXECUTIVE COMMISSION ON CHINA
ONE HUNDRED EIGHTH CONGRESS
FIRST SESSION
__________
MARCH 24, 2003
__________
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CONGRESSIONAL-EXECUTIVE COMMISSION ON CHINA
LEGISLATIVE BRANCH COMMISSIONERS
House Senate
JIM LEACH, Iowa, Chairman CHUCK HAGEL, Nebraska, Co-Chairman
DOUG BEREUTER, Nebraska CRAIG THOMAS, Wyoming
DAVID DREIER, California SAM BROWNBACK, Kansas
FRANK WOLF, Virginia PAT ROBERTS, Kansas
JOE PITTS, Pennsylvania GORDON SMITH, Oregon
SANDER LEVIN, Michigan* MAX BAUCUS, Montana
MARCY KAPTUR, Ohio* CARL LEVIN, Michigan
SHERROD BROWN, Ohio* DIANNE FEINSTEIN, California
JIM DAVIS, Florida* BYRON DORGAN, North Dakota
EXECUTIVE BRANCH COMMISSIONERS
PAULA DOBRIANSKY, Department of State*
GRANT ALDONAS, Department of Commerce*
D. CAMERON FINDLAY, Department of Labor*
LORNE CRANER, Department of State*
JAMES KELLY, Department of State*
John Foarde, Staff Director
David Dorman, Deputy Staff Director
* Appointed in the 107th Congress; not yet formally appointed in
the 108th Congress.
(ii)
C O N T E N T S
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Page
STATEMENTS
Hamrin, Carol Lee, Chinese affairs consultant and research
professor, George Mason University, Clifton, VA................ 2
Ma, Qiusha, assistant professor of East Asian Studies, Oberlin
College; research associate, the Mandel Center for Nonprofit
Organizations, Case Western Reserve University, Oberlin, OH.... 5
Simon, Karla W., professor of law, and co-director, the Center
for International Social Development, Catholic University of
America, Washington, DC........................................ 7
Yuan, Nancy, vice president, the Asia Foundation, Washington, DC. 10
APPENDIX
Prepared Statements
Ma, Qiusha....................................................... 28
Simon, Karla W................................................... 36
Yuan, Nancy...................................................... 38
TO SERVE THE PEOPLE: NGOs AND THE DEVELOPMENT OF CIVIL SOCIETY IN CHINA
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MONDAY, MARCH 24, 2003
Congressional-Executive
Commission on China,
Washington, DC.
The roundtable was convened, pursuant to notice, at 3 p.m.,
in room 2255, Rayburn House Office Building, John Foarde [staff
director] presiding.
Also present: David Dorman, deputy staff director; Mike
Castellano, office of Representative Sander Levin; Tiffany
McCullen, representing Grant Aldonas, Department of Commerce;
Andrea Yaffe, office of Senator Carl Levin; Lary Brown,
specialist on labor issues; Steve Marshall, senior advisor;
Susan Weld, general counsel; and Andrea Worden, senior counsel.
Mr. Foarde. Good afternoon, everyone. Why don't we get
started.
Let me welcome you on behalf of the Congressional-Executive
Commission on China, particularly, Chairman Jim Leach and Co-
Chairman Senator Chuck Hagel.
We are meeting today in a very difficult time for our
country and for the world. And I know that all of the members
of our Commission support our fighting men and women abroad and
are praying for them and their families in this difficult time.
Also, I would like to introduce our new deputy staff
director for the CECC staff. He is my old friend and fellow
language student, Dave Dorman, who has been hired by Senator
Hagel to be the staff director for the Senate and gets the
title of deputy staff director for this Congress. David's first
day is today and his first of many issues roundtables is today.
David, welcome.
Mr. Dorman. Thanks very much.
Mr. Foarde. I would also like to remind you that there are
two additional issues roundtables in the next 2 weeks.
Normally, we try to have these every other week, but with the
Easter recess coming up in very short order, we decided to pack
the front part of April a little heavier. On Tuesday, April 1--
note that is a Tuesday, rather than a Monday--we are having a
roundtable on ``Lawyers Without Law in China,'' beginning at
2:30 p.m., in this room. Also on Monday, April 7, we will have
a roundtable on ``Tibet and the Future of the Tibetan
Language''--also at 2:30 p.m. in this room.
Our topic for today is ``NGOs [non-governmental
organizations] in China and the Development of Civil Society.''
A question that many of us, and as I see the faces of many
friends in the room, many friends here in Washington care a
great deal about. We are fortunate to have with us an
extraordinarily distinguished panel of experts. I will
introduce them in more detail before they speak, but let me
just say that Carol Lee Hamrin, Ma Qiusha, Karla Simon, and
Nancy Yuan are here with us today.
So, let us begin. I am really pleased to introduce an old
friend and former State Department colleague, Carol Hamrin.
Carol is a Chinese affairs consultant and also research
professor at George Mason University where she works with the
Institute for Conflict Analysis and Resolution, and the Center
for Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation.
Carol's current research interests include the development
of the non-profit and non-governmental sector in China,
cultural change, human rights and religious policy, and
indigenous resources for conflict management.
Carol, please.
STATEMENT OF CAROL LEE HAMRIN, CHINESE AFFAIRS CONSULTANT AND
RESEARCH PROFESSOR, GEORGE MASON UNIVERSITY, FAIRFAX, VA
Ms. Hamrin. Well, I have the honor of starting today. The
topic I have been asked to speak on is faith-based
organizations in China and the possible role they may play in
civil society.
I want to emphasize the growing importance of these
organizations, both domestic and foreign faith-based non-profit
organizations [NPOs], which have been relatively invisible
groups, and I think deserve more careful attention. I want to
make first some careful distinctions between two kinds of
organizations.
One is religious organizations that promote traditional
activities of worship and prayer, religious sacraments,
teaching the laity, training clergy, proselytizing, and
publication of sacred texts and other religious materials. This
is what we normally think of as a faith-based organization.
This is a tightly controlled sector in China, as we all know.
Distinct from that is what I am going to focus on in my
comments today, and that is faith-based non-profit
organizations. These are non-profits that have faith-based
motivations, and hiring policies, and funding sources, but do
not do religious work, narrowly defined as in the other group.
They offer social services in other sectors--not the religious
sector--like education, health, and charitable work under the
supervision of education, health, or civil affairs authorities,
not religious affairs authorities.
I would say before I continue, though, that both types are
important for us to consider as part of China's growing civil
society. They are voluntary organizations. They operate at the
grassroots or popular level. Many are national or at least
inter-provincial in scope. They have a growing autonomy and
operation. We can come back and discuss that later. Both types
actually do provide sources of
social capital, ideas, values, and networks that help people
work
together on a voluntary basis. This is voluntary association
for mutual assistance and other purposes.
As I began to do some reading in the body of research on
civil society development and democratic political reform in
Asia, Africa, and Latin America, people are finding that there
is a complex interaction between educated elites and grassroots
organizations, including religious organizations. In fact, some
would claim that faith-based organizations are the catalyst
behind forming modern voluntary associations that transcend the
traditional ties of kinship in local community to form a more
modern civil society. So, I think it is worth our attention to
look at both and the role they may play.
In this brief few minutes that I've got, I want to focus on
giving you a few examples of domestic and international faith-
based NPOs working in China, and then talk about some policy
implications.
I would start with the Amity Foundation, which was one of
the very first government organized NGOs [GONGOs] to be formed
in China. It has operated since the early 1980s. Some people
think it is independent, but actually, it is registered under
the United Front Work Department, just like churches and other
religious organizations. It has been a channel for outside
funding and services from mainline Protestant religious
organizations, many of them in Europe and Hong Kong, and some
in North America.
They began with teaching English just in eastern China.
They are based in Nanjing, but expanded to social welfare and
health work, and now to rural development in southwest China.
They really developed a lot of experience and expertise, as
well as a budget of $7.5 million last year. They have a good
reputation in China among the other NPOs, and have really been
one of the
pioneers in China.
Another more recently organized counterpart is the Beifang
Jinde Social Service Center in Hebei Province, which is the
first domestic Catholic NGO. And I think it has come much later
just because of the political problems in the relationship with
the Vatican.
What is very important for us to notice, but hard for us to
notice, is the smaller-scale, often unregistered local social
service agencies that have just sprung up spontaneously all
over China, by individuals, congregations, and religious
associations of various kinds. Just to mention a few, there is
a youth club that operates, virtually, on the Internet and by
e-mail, in Ningbo, affiliated with the Catholic diocese there.
Another is in Wenzhou, Zhejiang called the Salt and Light
Christian Fellowship. It's business people that are providing
flood relief and community service.
From my research, I can see that most domestic Buddhist,
Taoist, and Islamic humanitarian work has kind of grown in
tandem with domestic and foreign pilgrimages to special holy
sites. This kind of religious tourism provides funds for
development in these areas, sometimes just small scale welfare
projects, but even universities and hospitals are developing
out of this.
The government response to such grassroots development is,
basically, to kind of play catch-up ball, granting legitimacy
to them ex post facto in order to get access to the resources
and try to find some means of supervision over these
developments. So, I've just learned that the official
Protestant organization has set up a new social service
department to encourage and provide guidance to such local
initiatives. They mention specifically the need to generate
domestic funds--instead of just foreign funds--specifically,
from rich churches in coastal areas. So, the commercial factor
is there at work.
International faith-based NGOs are doing important work in
China. Most denominational groups work directly with their
counterparts. For example, the Mennonites and Amity are
implementing a Canadian Government aid project in rural areas
in China. The Islamic Development Bank works through provincial
Islamic Associations to fund schools, primarily.
The non-denominational, but still faith-based organizations
tend to partner directly with government officials, usually at
the local level, in non-religious sectors as I mentioned. I can
give more
examples of that in the question and answer period if you want.
I would just mention that this kind of work really expanded
after the late 1990s, starting with the floods of 1998, the
historic floods in central China. Many of these large
organizations, like World Vision International, which is one of
the largest international relief agencies, began to work in
China at that time, and have since really expanded their
operations. United Board for Christian Higher Education in Asia
is another such organization working in rural areas, helping
rural women.
On top of this effort, flood relief, or disaster relief,
earthquakes and such, the government's new policy to develop
western China to try to address the regional disparities has
focused on attracting international resources, whether
governmental or business or non-governmental. This has led
these international organizations,
including faith-based ones, to develop micro-loan projects and
holistic community development projects all over northwest and
southwest China, including significant work in Muslim, Tibetan,
and other ethnic minority villages. These include Buddhist and
Islamic organizations, as well as Christian organizations.
I will leave for discussion a point that I want to make,
that there has been significant impact from these outside
organizations working in China with new ideas and new ways of
operating. The modeling effect, in particular, has really
started to change the way local officials are working with
society and their own NGOs. This trend is going to accelerate
in this decade.
Policy implications include, first, pay attention to what
is going on at the grassroots in China and to social and
cultural bilateral relations, not just to political and
economic relations. I commend the Commission for doing just
that.
Second, do no harm. Recognize that the role of the Federal
Government is limited in this arena. Change does not come
overnight. It will be driven from the inside, and the outside
actors will be primarily non-governmental or even business
through corporate social responsibility [CSR] and so forth.
Third, I would just recommend the Commission pay attention
to and even check on whether there is a ``level playing field''
in the use of taxpayer money for the support of civil society,
rule of law, and democratization in China. I think there may be
inadvertent exclusion or discrimination in programming to the
detriment of faith-based U.S. NGOs that might support Chinese
faith-based NGOs.
In all the conferences on NGOs so far in China funded from
outside, there is no mention of faith-based NGOs and their
work. They are off the radar screen for Chinese and American
organizers and sponsors, despite the central role of these
faith-based organizations in our own civil society. Even the
modeling of inclusion in such things as conferences, as well as
projects, would in and of itself promote Chinese officials to
take a different, more positive attitude toward the role of
religious organizations in Chinese society.
Mr. Foarde. Carol, thank you very much.
Let's continue with Professor Ma Qiusha, who is assistant
professor of East Asian Studies at Oberlin College and research
associate at the Mandel Center for Non-Profit Organizations at
Case Western Reserve University. An expert on Chinese NGOs and
civil society, Professor Ma's publications include, among
others, ``Defining Chinese Non-Governmental Organizations,
Autonomy and Citizen Participation.''
Welcome, Professor Ma. Thank you very much for sharing your
expertise with us this afternoon.
STATEMENT OF MA QIUSHA, ASSISTANT PROFESSOR OF EAST ASIAN
STUDIES, OBERLIN COLLEGE; RESEARCH ASSOCIATE, THE MANDEL CENTER
FOR NONPROFIT ORGANIZATIONS, CASE WESTERN RESERVE UNIVERSITY,
OBERLIN, OH
Ms. Ma. My focus today is on the definition,
classification, and the terminology of Chinese NGOs. Before I
go into detail, I would like to make a very general summary
based on my years of research on Chinese NGOs because time is
so short.
As you can see, the first two pages of my statement are a
very general argument. Basically, I would like to argue if it
is possible under China's one-party state for non-governmental
organizations to sustain and play an important role in China.
My answer is yes.
On the government side, I would like to argue that during
the past two decades the Chinese Government has played an
important and crucial role in promoting NGOs in China, although
it is only in certain areas. On the other hand, the condition
of the Chinese Government's policy to promote NGOs is that the
Chinese Government believes the state has the ultimate control
over NGOs.
On the NGOs side, I would like to say that these
organizations are non-governmental organizations, although they
are still quite close to the state. They are the most important
instruments for the people to participate in public affairs, to
develop their personal interests and to get their voices heard.
On the other hand, the development is unbalanced and in the
very preliminary stages.
So having said that, I would like to first go directly to
the classification of Chinese NGOs to answer the question, What
are Chinese NGOs? I would like you to see chart 1 and chart 2.
Let's start with chart 2. Chart 2 is, in fact, a chart
about American NGOs. I would like you to see how the U.S. non-
profit sector is classified in chart 2, compared with the
Chinese classification in chart 1. The difference we can see
here is, in the U.S. classification, there are two types of
NGOs. One is membership organizations. Basically, they serve
members' interests. The second and bigger category is Public
Service.
For China, on the one hand, there are social organizations.
On the other hand there is a newly created legal status called
non-governmental, non-commercial enterprises, ``minban feiqiye
danwei.''
First, what is the difference between the U.S.
classification and the Chinese classification? In the U.S.
classification, foundations and funding intermediaries are
classified as public service. So are the churches. On the
Chinese side, those foundations are classified with membership
associations as social organizations.
Also, religious groups are not under either side. That
means, according to the official classification, that religious
groups are not NGOs. They are not managed and registered with
the Ministry of Civil Affairs, but rather under another
official agency.
Before the Communist Party came to power, China had many,
many private associations and institutions, such as private
schools and hospitals. After 1949, first, the majority of civil
associations were suppressed; and second, all the private
service providers were nationalized, following the Soviet
Union's model.
Therefore, during that period in China there were no true
private or non-governmental organizations of any type. However,
social organizations continue to exist and some old social
organizations, such as the Red Cross and other professional
associations, remain. Although eventually they were
nationalized, on paper they were still called social
organizations.
Since 1950, the Chinese Government has issued three
official documents regulating NGOs, in 1950, 1988-1989, and
most recently in 1998. So, during these three rounds of
documents, the first two documents only have social
organizations. Thus, any type of organization that is either on
paper or actually exists is non-
governmental, is classified as a social organization.
However after the reforms, the government did realize the
importance of using non-governmental organizations. Social
service
providers, or professional service providers are under three
major promotions. The first time was in the early 1980s. The
Chinese Government called for ``shehui liliang banxue,''
generating social
resources for education. The second time was in early 1990, the
government had a slogan called ``da shehui, xiao zhengfu''
small government, big society. In the late 1990s, the
government called for ``shehui fuli shehui ban'' social welfare
provided by the society.
Under these slogans, non-governmental social and
professional service providers surged rapidly, and since the
government had no legal term to register them, it was a big
mess. A lot of these organizations registered as for-profit.
Therefore, in 1998, the government created a new term called
``non-governmental, non-commercial
enterprises'' for these non-governmental service providers.
I would like to compare the Chinese definition of NGOs with
the Western definition. In the handout you see the very popular
Western definitions of NGOs contain five features. On the other
hand, the Chinese definitions really address: (1) not funded by
the government; (2) these organizations should not run for
profit; and (3) they are voluntary. So, there is no emphasis on
non-governmental and no emphasis on self-governance.
There are three differences between the Western definition
of civil society and the Chinese definition of civil society.
First, civil associations, especially political civil
associations, are the core of civil society in the Western
sense. However, the Chinese definition of civil society does
not include this.
Second, civil society theoretically or ideologically, in
fact, citizenship, civil rights, representation, and the rule
of law. However, Chinese civil society does not emphasize these
aspects.
Third, in the West, civil society represents democracy and
sometimes confrontation between state and society. However, the
Chinese definition of civil society emphasizes constructive and
mutually dependent relations between the society and the state.
Finally, the NGO terminology. There are currently six
Chinese terms that are the equivalent of the English word, NGO.
Most confusing are ``people's organizations'' and ``mass
organizations.'' These organizations are high profile, well
established, and highly government controlled. However, many
Westerners use them to represent Chinese NGOs. Therefore, they
neglect more grassroot or community-based NGOs.
I would like to discuss this more in the question and
answer session.
[The prepared statement of Ms. Ma appears in the appendix.]
Mr. Foarde. Perfect. Let's do that.
Our next speaker is Karla Simon, professor of law and co-
director of the Center for International Social Development at
the Catholic University of America. Professor Simon is also the
co-founder of the International Center for Not for Profit Law,
and editor and chief of the ``International Journal for Civil
Society Law,'' and has published widely on these topics. She
has also done extensive work on the legal framework for civil
society organizations in China.
Karla, welcome. Thanks for coming this afternoon.
STATEMENT OF KARLA W. SIMON, PROFESSOR OF LAW AND CO-DIRECTOR,
THE CENTER FOR INTERNATIONAL SOCIAL DEVELOPMENT, CATHOLIC
UNIVERSITY OF AMERICA, WASHINGTON, DC
Ms. Simon. Thank you, John. Thanks to the Commission for
inviting me. I would like to say, I am a law professor. So,
some of this terminology may be a little bit difficult. So,
what I am going to do is start by referring to my written
statement. And let me just add for those who don't have copies
of it, if you give me your card, I can e-mail it to you.
I talk about--the topic is ``Creating an Enabling Legal
Environment for Chinese NPOs, non-profit organizations.'' And
when I talk about an enabling legal environment, I want people
to think about these four different things that really need to
exist in order for such an enabling legal environment to exist.
And then we can talk about how the Chinese legal environment
for NPOs measures against this.
The first is that there should be supportive legal
framework legislation, which is the legislation relating to the
establishment, governance and oversight of NPOs. Second, there
should be supportive legislation regulating NPO-state
relations, allowing partnerships between state entities and
NPOs to be established. And this is the crucial point, both
with respect to service provision and with
respect to policy development. There should be supportive tax
legislation permitting various forms of tax relief for NPOs and
their
donors, thus creating an environment in which NPOs and the
business sector can work together for the good of society.
Finally, there needs to be other necessary legislation that
would assist the NPO sector in its operations. For example,
there should be good fundraising legislation.
In the work that I have done in China--and I have also
worked in many other transition countries and developing
countries--it is very clear that the non-profit sector, the NPO
sector, is one that really does create problems for the state.
It creates problems for the state because, as both Carol and
Qiusha have said, it is very easy to attract resources from
outside the country into the not-for-profit sector for purposes
of service delivery, for purposes of carrying on other
activities.
Second, by virtue of the fact that the non-profit sector
does provide services frequently to parts of the society that
are poor and under-represented, that means that the civil
society or non-profit organizations really have access to the
people, and thus to political power. So, the combination of the
two things, the economic resources coming from outside and
frequently from inside--and certainly as I'll suggest, China
has been very thoughtful in thinking this through--the economic
resources with the access to the people, and therefore, to
political power makes a state that is insecure about its own
position, and particularly a state transitioning from socialism
very fretful--shall we say--about anything that may encourage
the non-profit sector.
But, I think China is not alone. When one looks at some of
the other transition countries, Russia, in Central and Eastern
Europe, if you look at other countries in Asia, if you look at
countries in Latin America, in Africa, you see the same
phenomenon. So, China is not alone in treating the non-profit
sector with both suspicion and fear.
On the other hand, one of the things that my research
indicates is that China has been really smart about what it has
been doing in terms of trying to attract the resources,
particularly, of overseas Chinese, into the development of the
social agenda that the state has. Carol mentioned the fact that
there has been this development in the West. That's actually
been happening for some period of time. One of the first big
major NGOs that--I mean NGOs in the sense that they are very
closely related to government--has been working in China is the
Foundation for Underdeveloped Regions.
So, beginning in the 1980s, when there was a loosening of
some of the strictures that were placed on semi-governmental
organizations--if we can use that term--through the new
regulations that were adopted at that time, in 1988 and 1989,
there was a real attempt to create structures along side the
state that would be attractive in particular to overseas
Chinese, for purposes of bringing in money from the overseas
Chinese so that it could be harnessed for the development
projects that the state really wanted to see happen.
So, it is true that the regulatory mechanism began to open
up in the late 1980s and then again in the late 1990s. But in
large part, I think it was in trying to find ways that would
make the resources coming in from overseas Chinese more
available. It was also directed to creating an environment in
which the people of China would feel that they could make
contributions to these organizations. A very good example of
that is Project Hope of the China Youth Development Foundation,
which obviously, does incredible fundraising throughout the
country and brings resources from local Chinese into projects
that deal with poor children.
In my work in China, I have been able to see a variety of
different stages. One of the things that becomes very clear to
me is that the brilliance of the Chinese Government in thinking
these things through and in actually responding to needs that
occur is now finally being aided and abetted by an openness to
outside technical assistance.
Before 1998, none of the technical assistance, none of the
discussions, none of this was open. In the first years, when I
started working in China, everything was done quietly and all
meetings were held at the Ministry of Civil Affairs, and when
Chinese
delegations came to the United States, they were very small
meetings and there was never any openness. But, beginning in
1999--and this is after the 1998 regulations were published--
with a
conference that was funded by the Asia Foundation, there was
openness.
My view of this is that the Chinese Government finally
thought that it was in a position to actually take account of
things in an open fashion. The Chinese Government sent the
acting head of the NGO bureau to speak in the United States at
a conference, openly. The paper was published. There have been,
subsequent to that, several conferences held. One of the points
that I make in my paper is that these issues of creating a
legal enabling environment are going to be the subject of four
conferences within the year beginning in November 2003. Four
big conferences, two of which are paid for 100 percent by the
Chinese Government.
So, in my view what is happening is that there is a
progressive move toward trying to create a more open and
supportive legal enabling environment. However, China isn't
there yet. In my view, one of the reasons why there is so much
openness to the outside--I am involved right now in a
translation project to make all sorts of legislation from all
around the world available in Chinese. There are many things
that they haven't been able to think through.
I suggest some of these objectives in the end of my written
statement. First, the state should move away from overt control
of NPOs and their activities and toward membership and
fiduciary government structures, with continuing government
oversight.
Second, more mechanisms should be provided within the law
for transparency: Good internal reporting, record keeping and
accounting rules, buttressed by the development of the
governance norms previously mentioned.
Third, there should be clear accountability, but not
control mechanisms. This is the hardest thing for the
government. There should be accountability mechanisms to the
state for funds received and for programs implemented. And
there should be accountability to the public. There needs to be
more openness about what NPOs are doing, and the way in which
they actually carry out their
programs. There should be more thought given to a clearer tax
exemption regime, as well as creating tax incentives for the
working population through workplace giving, and to
rationalizing the existing incentives for entrepreneurs and
business, which are really quite good, but they are not
terribly rational.
Finally, there should be better regulation of fundraising
and asset management by NPOs. That should be strengthened
because at the present time there is an effort to move some of
the state
assets into the non-state sector, and there needs to be some
clarity about how that is going to happen.
When I spoke in 1999 at the Asia Foundation conference, I
said at that time that the government was still viewing NPOs as
children to be taken by the hand. However, the NPOs regard
themselves, essentially, as teenagers. At the present time--
since 1999, the government, I think, is beginning to understand
that perhaps they are growing up, but there is a long way that
they need to go to have that happen.
[The prepared statement of Ms. Simon appears in the
appendix.]
Mr. Foarde. Thank you very much.
Our next panelist is Nancy Yuan. Nancy is vice president
and director of the Washington office of the Asia Foundation.
She works directly with the Foundation's China programs in law
reform, U.S. relations and exchanges, and speaks regularly on
these issues, issues relating to the rule of law and the
development of civil society in China. Since 1979, the Asia
Foundation has been supporting a wide range of programs in
China, focused on law reform, civil
society development, and U.S.-China relations.
Nancy, welcome. Thanks for coming.
STATEMENT OF NANCY YUAN, VICE PRESIDENT, THE ASIA FOUNDATION,
WASHINGTON, DC
Ms. Yuan. Thank you, and thank the Commission very much for
inviting me to speak at this session. I am very pleased to do
so. One of the benefits, I think, of being the last panelist to
speak is that I can say much less than I had intended with
regard to a number of these issues.
I think in looking over the broader context of how non-
governmental organizations have developed over the course of
time in China, we need to take a slightly broader perspective
in looking over social-economic developments, and why the
Chinese Government feels that the non-governmental sector is of
benefit in China's overall economic development.
I think the advent of economic reform and globalization has
led to a wide variety of demands on the Chinese Government
which they are not able to meet. The Chinese Government, like
many other governments around the world these days, has budget
deficits. They are downsizing the bureaucracy. Decentralization
is taking place on a very large scale. As a result, the kinds
of services that people are used to are in decline with reform
of state-owned enterprises, and services related to farmers and
the countryside, there are many services that the government
can no longer deliver and they find it of benefit to allow the
activities of non-governmental organizations to continue
because they provide services, often in the health and
education area, pilot projects for elder care, and a wide
variety of other areas that the government is no longer, in
some ways, able to deliver. In some respects, the collaboration
between government and non-government organization makes the
line a little bit blurred, in fact, in terms of who is actually
delivering services and who is responsible for that delivery.
As a donor organization in China--as John mentioned--donors
who are involved in development in China tend to use standard
criteria to look for potential partnerships to Chinese
organizations, that is, independence from the government,
representation of their constituents and participatory
decisionmaking. Chinese non-governmental organizations aren't
necessarily that far along in terms of their own independence,
and as Carol said, many of them are informal organizations,
sometimes family associations, sometimes just groups of people
in villages that get together and see a need. So, they are not
organized under Western criteria with a board, a mandate, and a
budgetary process in the way that most organizations in the
West are.
That creates a dilemma for donors as we look at
organizations that we may want to partner with. What it
requires is an on-the-ground knowledge of exactly who these
organizations are, whether or not they can be accountable or
responsible for the programs that they deliver, and in fact, if
they are delivering the services that they say they are going
to deliver. There is a healthy skepticism, I think, among
donors in addition to wanting to be supportive of the non-
governmental sector, in general.
I have been asked to talk about both what international
organizations and donors are doing in China, as well as what
they might consider doing in the future. The non-governmental
sector has developed very quickly over the course of time. The
China Development Brief--which many of you may be familiar
with--looks at non-governmental activity in China. They
concluded that China is receiving well over $100 million each
year in project funding directly from, or channeled through 500
international NGOs and foundations. It is an enormous amount of
money. If you look at gifts-in-kind, which includes books and
equipment and other kinds of donations, that adds substantially
to the total.
There are also large numbers of organizations according to
the China Development Brief. Seven-hundred different types of
grant making foundations, advocacy groups, humanitarian
organizations and faith-based organizations that are providing
assistance to NGOs in China.
The Asia Foundation has been providing assistance over a
long period of time to non-governmental organizations and has
now turned its attention to groups like the China NPO Network,
which acts as a clearinghouse for Chinese NGOs, providing a
monthly NGO forum, which they do with Foundation support, that
brings together officials, business, and NGO leaders to talk
about legislative issues, collaboration and problems that NGOs
face in China.
One of their most recent efforts is to look at self-
regulation and what that means in terms of standards and ethics
for the non-profit community. The Tsinghua University NPO
Center has also received a lot of attention with regard to
their research on regulatory issues facing NGOs, as Karla
mentioned in the conference the Foundation supported.
In addition to international donor organizations, which I
will come to in a minute, multinational corporations have also
supported civil society development in the spirit of corporate
social responsibility. These include companies like Nike,
Adidas, Reebok, Levi Strauss, Microsoft, Ford Motor Co.,
General Motors, and the U.S.-China Business Council, which
support a wide range of activities in health and education,
rule of law, poverty alleviation, and sometimes in policy
research as well. So, it is true that there is a fairly
substantial commitment from the private sector to civil society
development in China.
What more can we do to support the non-governmental sector?
International organizations can play a significant role in
strengthening human resources capacity, in program development,
in providing opportunities for conferences, networking and
exchanges, and while donors should not overestimate the ability
of NGOs to work in sensitive or political areas, the efforts of
NGOs to operate more independently and push the envelope in
some fields are
worthy of support.
In addition to strategic planning, looking at program
implementation, which are sort of the jazzy things for
international organizations to support, one thing we should be
looking at is the
operational aspects of how NGOs really work. How do they
account for their funds? How do they do budgets? How do they
decide what their mandate is going to be? Those kinds of nuts
and bolts activities will enable them to better report to
donors, to be sustainable over time in attracting other
funding, as well as to comply with international ethical
standards. International organizations can help to improve the
enabling environment for NGOs, as Karla said, this includes
providing support for NGO law and improving the overall
regulatory environment, as well as support for research and
interaction with like-minded organizations.
There are quite a number of university-based research
centers for the non-profit sector. Fudan University has a new
one. Tsinghua University, of course. There are two different
organizations, centers at Beida, Peking University. And there
is one in Guangdong University, and at Zhongshan University,
where there is research going on in the not-for-profit sector.
Important for you to know as members of the staff of the
Commission, all of these have international donor support. None
of it is American. Which brings me to my last point.
In terms of official assistance to Chinese NGOs, the U.S.
Government has lagged behind other donors. We've seen this in
the case of rule of law efforts previously, but this is also
the case in terms of official assistance to the non-profit
sector. The only two American organizations with a resident
presence and a long track record of supporting civil society
organizations in China are the Ford Foundation and the Asia
Foundation. Faith-based organizations have had a long history,
as well as other foundations, but they are not all present in
China, in terms of being resident in China, and their
activities are sporadic depending upon their focus.
There is a marked absence of American groups working
consistently on the ground to develop the capacity of Chinese
organizations. On the other hand, other international donors,
namely the European Union, Canadian International Development
Agency [CIDA], and Australia Aid [AusAid] each provide more
than a half a million dollars a year in multi-year grants to
support civil society development in China. These donors, among
others, have a commitment, not only to the civil society
sector, but they also provide funding as well as attention--and
by attention, I mean they have dedicated staff in the embassies
who follow civil society development.
Official U.S. assistance to the civil society groups, as I
said, has been limited. If the U.S. wants to support the
positive trend toward NGO development, funding should be
provided to knowledgeable groups to do so.
Thank you.
[The prepared statement of Ms. Yuan appears in the
appendix.]
Mr. Foarde. Thank you very much, Nancy.
Four excellent presentations and lots of food for thought.
We will go directly to our question and answer session.
Exercising the prerogative of the chair, I would like to
begin with a question to Professor Ma, if you would please. I
am very interested in the link between existing Chinese NGOs
and government organizations at the national, provincial, and
local level. How strong, in your view, are those continuing
links? And what types are they? Are they financial? Or in terms
of policy guidance? In terms of personnel? How do those links
work? I take it that for some NGOs, those links are more
tenuous than for others. And I would like your views on all of
those questions, if you would, please.
Ms. Ma. There are high profile NGOs. In fact, we call them
GONGOs. They have close relations with the government.
Basically, like in the term, they are people's organizations,
and the mass organizations. At the national level, there are 19
of them, and nationwide 200 of them. These organizations still
get full funding from the government. Also the personnel get
all the fringe benefits of civil servants--this treatment is
equal to that of government
employees.
Other organizations founded by the government in the 1980s,
like many foundations--the so called non-governmental
organizations. Now the government has pushed them to what they
call a financially self-sufficient, self-governing, and self-
recruiting status. These GONGOs use a Chinese saying ``pigu zhi
hui naodai,'' meaning that wherever one sits determines what
one thinks. The government right now has a policy called
``sannian duannai,'' meaning wean in 3 years. So these
organizations right now have to find a way to survive, to
sustain themselves. Therefore, they are beginning to think
differently than the government's perspective.
However, personnel-wise, there is a very complicated policy
for the people who work at NGOs. For example, if you came to
work in these organizations before a certain number of years,
you will continue to receive your pension, your free
healthcare, and your government subsidized housing. However, if
you are a new employee, everything starts new. You work on a
contract. Most NGOs do not provide a pension plan, healthcare,
or insurance. So, there is a wide range of autonomy or
closeness with the government. I should say for those like the
All China Women's Federation and All China Federation of Trade
Unions, these organizations will continue to be fully funded
and very closely under the government's control. However, other
organizations such as the trade unions, previously official
industrial management agencies, will eventually leave
government and serve their constituents more.
Mr. Foarde. Very interesting. Carol, do you have a thought
on that, because I have a minute or so.
Ms. Hamrin. I just wanted to add something to that. I think
that in the section that Professor Ma has called the People's
Organizations, these eight big organizations, that is where the
religious organizations also fit in. The point being that the
Party controlled all of society through overtly Party-
controlled organizations, like trade unions, and women, and
youth. There was secret party control over organizations such
as religions, which really shouldn't be run by the Party.
But it's the same kind of setup--very vertical control from
the Party, to the government, to these social organizations.
That has been changing. The dynamic there has been changing, in
that even those tightly controlled organizations are spawning
their own NGOs. Like the Communist Youth League setting up the
Youth Foundation, which has done this Project Hope effort, and
is part of the China NPO Network.
As they are forced to seek other sources of funding, other
than government funding, which they are being told they have to
do, then they gain autonomy. They have to start pleasing
donors, not just the government and so forth. So, the market
dynamic is what is driving greater autonomy, even though it is
still very differentiated. But the dynamic is the same.
Operating even under these really tightly controlled
organizations.
Mr. Foarde. Thank you. A good point. Let me go on to my
friend and colleague, Dave Dorman, for a question or two if you
have one. Please go ahead.
Mr. Dorman. Thanks, John. As John pointed out before, this
is my first day on the job. I, frankly, can't think of a better
way to spend my first day than to participate in a roundtable
on a topic as important as this one, in front of a panel like
this. Listening to you share your knowledge, your research, and
your learning on this topic has been invaluable. And I thank
you for that.
This is a question for anyone who would choose to address
it. I wanted to start with a quote from Professor Ma, which I
found very interesting. I saw nods of agreement, so I think
there was a consensus on this. Professor Ma stated that NGOs
are the most important vehicle for individuals in China to
express their views. That suggests to me that there may,
perhaps, be a difference in the ability of individuals to
express their views through NGOs, as opposed to individually or
through other means. Is that, in fact, the case? Does your
research show that?
Ms. Ma. You want to know, besides NGOs, are there other
mechanisms that people can use to express themselves?
Mr. Dorman. Is an individual's ability to express
themselves through an NGO somehow freer than other means? In
other words, as opposed to speaking individually? Are these
NGOs set apart somehow remarkably?
Ms. Ma. Yes, especially the autonomous NGOs. They can
express their opinions, or deliver their opinions to the
government. For example, there is an NGO for big companies.
These organizations are very interesting. The organization,
itself, is independent. However, all of their members are
large, state-owned companies.
After the state gave them more independence, these
companies developed different interests, other than the state's
general economic policy. However, individually, they cannot
tell the prime minister, ``I disagree with your opinion.'' As
an organization, they can organize and invite experts to come
and discuss very important economic policies, and then prepare
a report for the State Council to show we think this way, and
your requirement is unreasonable. And the state will, somewhat,
adjust to their opinions.
Ms. Simon. I think that's true everywhere in the world. I
think that individual voices may have some power, but certainly
voices in association have more power.
One of the interesting things that has happened in the
regulations is that previously in China, prior to 1998, the
only way to set up an NGO was top-down. The state determined
that it was something that needed to be done, and that was
really the only way that citizens could participate in
activities.
Now, clearly if you had an idea, you could go to your local
party boss and say, well, I want to do this. But, it was much
more difficult. In the 1998 regulations, for the first time,
they recognized that citizen action to come together to form an
association is appropriate. Now, they require 50, and having
written a couple of books about what is good practice in the
area, 50 individuals is far too many, but there is a greater
awareness of the notion that citizens should be able to come
together for citizen action, albeit not public advocacy, but at
least for a variety of different kinds of citizen
activities.
Mr. Foarde. Let's give Nancy a chance to make a point.
Ms. Yuan. I think it also depends on what area of interest
you are talking about. For instance, a program that the
Foundation has done that relates to migrant women workers, the
problems of migrant women workers in Guangdong Province are
substantial. And people know that the factory conditions are
bad. They know their health services are bad. They know because
they are illegal migrants, they don't have any legal rights in
those areas. They don't have rights to housing. There are a
wide variety of problems.
So, I think the non-profit groups that work with them
inevitably have to work with government. And the government
sees it in its interest to listen to what these women say
through these non-governmental organizations. Otherwise what
ends up happening is, you end up with instability, which is
definitely what the Chinese Government doesn't want.
So, if it's in the interest of the government, I think, in
terms of the environment, in terms of health policy, in terms
of broader issues, I think certainly NGOs have a voice. If your
question is leading to whether or not that leads to say, worker
associations, or labor associations, or those kinds of things,
I think those things are probably not on the table in terms of
whether or not you have an individual voice that will make a
difference.
Ms. Hamrin. However, I would add that this is something
that develops in stages. What's happening in China right now is
that for the first time, people can organize voluntarily around
personal interests and express their creative side and their
organizational side. Right now it has to be fairly non-
political. But that's new for China. In the past, any private
personal interests were considered bourgeois. And you couldn't
join the local bird-watching club, or anything.
So, the explosion of associations of all kinds that are
voluntary is just a major liberation for individuals and
community groups in China. Studies of development of civil
society and democratization elsewhere in the world would
suggest that this trains people. It helps people learn how you
work together, how to organize, how to make your voice heard,
how to get to the media, and how to raise funds. Then that
develops into advocacy.
Sometimes just when the government steps into your
business, then you are forced to defend yourself. Other times
when you decide it's time to go stop the Three Gorges Dam. So,
it's a step in development.
Mr. Dorman. Thank you very much.
Mr. Foarde. Very interesting. I would like to go on and
recognize a colleague who represents one of our Commission
members, Senator Carl Levin. Her name is Andrea Yaffe. Andrea,
do you have a question or two? If you do, speak right into the
microphone.
Ms. Yaffe. Thank you for coming to speak today. Dr. Hamrin,
I think you spoke a little about this, but I am wondering from
the others, what kind of role Congress or the executive branch
can provide in encouraging the further development of NGOs or
the legal framework that you spoke about? Professor Simon.
Ms. Simon. Well, I think Nancy made some suggestions. One
of the problems that exists is that there is not adequate
funding for civil society development in China. And as Nancy
suggested, the United States is basically not a player at all,
at the present time. Now, there are a variety of reasons for
this as we know historically. But, I think it is time that the
United States recognizes that it is in its best interest to
begin funding in this particular area.
Nancy has some suggestions about the kinds of things that
should be done, using U.S. intermediary organizations, for
example. But, it is sort of embarrassing when one goes to China
and does all of this work in China, and everybody else's
government is paying for things, and our government is not. So,
I would definitely recommend that it happen.
Ms. Hamrin. Could I just add a thought on the funding
issue. When I was still in the State Department in the early
1990s and we were talking about a civil society initiative and
rule of law initiative, many in Congress and in the media did
not want to fund anything in China, unless it was truly non-
governmental, truly independent, completely independent.
I think at that time we were kind of ignoring the fact that
civil society has these other attributes of being voluntary,
being grassroots and so forth, that are important for us to
take into account when we are deciding those things. Also, I
think that at that time we were influenced by civil society
analyses, from Europe's experience after the fall of Communism,
where we viewed civil society in opposition to the state, and,
you know, civil society is going to rise up and overthrow the
state. That was our paradigm.
But, that has changed enormously in research, thinking, and
writing about civil society. And I think Lester Salomon at
Johns Hopkins is one who has made the point that government
funding of NGOs is huge in America, and even more so in other
countries. So, you've got business, NGO, and government
partnerships going all of the time in civil societies in the
West. So, why is that a bad thing in China or other countries?
So, I think we are coming closer together, the Chinese
learning more about the importance of civil society and
autonomy, but the rest of us realizing, well, it isn't totally
black and white either.
Ms. Ma. May I add something?
Mr. Foarde. Yes, please. Go ahead.
Ms. Ma. Because I am the one who grew up in China and
experienced the Cultural Revolution and early stages of
democratic
movements--I've seen it from a Chinese perspective and I'm a
historian--so, from a Chinese historical perspective. I think
it is crucial for the U.S. Government or policymakers to
realize that we have to understand Chinese civil society and
Chinese NGOs, as well as their relations with the state and the
government, under China's historical and cultural
circumstances.
That is, China has its own deep-rooted concept, which is
rather different from the Western concept of civil society.
They do not see the government and society as opponents or
separate, but, the two as a unit. Also in China, there is a
different concept of citizenship. In America, if you ask any
person about citizenship, the first thing you will hear is
``What my rights as a citizen are.'' For a Chinese citizen, the
first thing is your responsibility for being a good person,
following the government, doing things for society.
So this is a difference. There are many things. China may
never reach the stage that the state and society as Western
countries. So, that's why I introduced the Chinese concept of
civil society, which is constructive, mutually dependent
relations. Thus, if the U.S. Government does not grow out of
the mentality of seeing civil society only in terms of human
rights, then it will not be a positive player in promoting a
Chinese civil society.
I think this is very crucial. First you have to see the
whole landscape. The human rights record is only part of the
Chinese reality. Another part is the monumental change in the
grassroots of communities. I visited communities where they
said, ``Now that we have the right to vote on, `Do we build a
fence around our neighbor, or should we plant trees?' And `What
do we do during the summer?' `What kind of program we can
organize for our children.' '' These were all government
controlled in the past. So, these kinds of things are really
developing the concept in the people's minds, of what is a
civil society, what are human rights. That is why I think that
is very important.
Mr. Foarde. Thank you. Very useful. Also representing one
of our Commission members, Under Secretary of Commerce Grant
Aldonas, is Tiffany McCullen. Tiff.
Ms. McCullen. Thank you, John. I would like to thank the
panelists for providing us with so much useful information
today. I have a question if Professor Simon might want to
start, and the other panelists would like to answer, I would
appreciate that.
Noting that the regulations governing Chinese NGOs are
supposed to be revised soon, do you think it will change the
management of foreign NGOs in the areas of taxes, hiring
procedures, legal status, or their ability to open branch
offices in other areas?
Ms. Simon. Well, a couple of things are happening. When
they promulgated the new regulations, there were three, in
1998. They did not promulgate regulations in the area of
foundations or in the area of foreign organizations. They had
drafts of each of these. They took them off the table.
Let me just say about foundations. There has been some
activity in that area. They had a conference in that area in
December and there--as I was talking about other forms of
fiduciary obligation, I think there is going to be some
progress. There is nothing that has come forward anytime
recently that I know of that anybody even thinks that there is
a draft with respect to foreign organizations.
In large part, that is because the regulations that they
had originally promulgated were ones that distinguished foreign
organizations from domestic organizations, and the legal
experts throughout the government say, ``Well you can't do that
now, because of our obligations under WTO. We have to have a
`level playing field' between the domestic organizations and
the foreign organizations.''
That called a false stop to the attempt to get the
regulations out. And where they are on that, I've been trying
to find out, and I literally have no idea. So, it is very hard
to answer your question. It is something that I am quite
interested in as well, and I haven't been able to get any
answer from anybody. And, I know a lot of knowledgeable people
there, and nobody seems to know.
So, I suspect that what they are trying to do is do
something that won't over-regulate the foreign organizations,
will permit foreign organizations to set up branches, but that
is some ways down the road.
Ms. McCullen. OK. Thank you.
Ms. Ma. My most recent e-mail communications with Chinese
officials indicate they are trying to give foreign NGOs an
equal status with Chinese NGOs. Previously, there was no law
for foreign NGOs. The foreign NGOs, in fact, have to follow
basically every Chinese regulation used for Chinese NGOs, plus
something else. So, right now it's sort of like an unofficial
channel--they said the new regulation will treat all current
foreign NGOs exactly as Chinese NGOs. That's what I heard
recently.
Ms. McCullen. Thank you.
Mr. Foarde. Our practice at these roundtables has been to
invite our own CECC staff colleague who is most responsible for
the issue being discussed to ask a few questions, and so I am
delighted to call on our friend and colleague, Andrea Worden,
who was the chief instigator of this particular event, and did
all of the heavy lifting. Andrea.
Ms. Worden. Thank you, John. Thank you all for coming. It
was fascinating to listen to each of your presentations. You
all seem to be in agreement that we need to understand civil
society differently with respect to China, compared with how we
might understand the concept in the United States, or in
Western and Eastern Europe. That is, civil society does not
include a confrontational relationship with the state. But, I
am curious about political limits, if you will, of NGOs
functioning in China.
For example, we are all aware of Wan Yanhai, the AIDs
activist and leader of an HIV/AIDs NGO, who was detained last
summer for about a month and then released. I am curious if you
all might address this question of the political limits of
activism in NGO civil society. Are you aware of any other NGO
activists who have been detained, or imprisoned, or if any NGOs
have been de-registered for political reasons? I address this
question to all of you.
Ms. Hamrin. One of the problems with the very vague legal
and regulatory environment is that it leaves a lot of
discretionary power in the hands of government officials. And,
they can sort of arbitrarily decide what is permitted and what
isn't on a case by case basis. Sometimes it's purely a matter
of what is happening around the world or in China.
For example, the National People's Congress, or the Party
Congress is going to be held, and so someone who published
embarrassing information at that time is in trouble, but they
might not have had trouble if they have done it the year
before, or a couple of months later. It is so arbitrary. And
that is one of the things that is really hampering the
development of this whole sector, because you are always
playing guessing games and playing ping-pong politics. You
know, graze-ball politics. You want to hit it on the edge of
the table and press the envelope, but stay on the table.
So, that is one of the reasons that I think the NGO
community is very insecure. They are being told they should
provide more social services. The government is just heaving
off its responsibilities to social forces, but not providing
the environment they need to really survive and succeed. How
can you raise funds to do what the government tells you you now
should do? It's really a mess.
Ms. Yuan. It is really a mess. I think for organizations
that work in China, one of the most important things you have
to do is to listen to your partners. People who work in this
area and have to live with these political dynamics really know
how much risk they want to take at any given time. Sometimes
they move a little bit forward, and sometimes they pull back.
I think as you talk to people who either pursue lawsuits or
are engaged in some kind of activity that could be sensitive
related to labor or the environment, they have a tendency to
know when the time is going to be right, or it is not going to
be right. And if they miscalculate, they are the ones who are
going to suffer. So, I think there is just so much that we as
foreigners can push. But at the same time, I think there are
some very courageous people who are going to be out there and
they are going to get their hand slapped.
Ms. Simon. I have been impressed at the openness in the
four that I was talking about, of people being willing to
criticize the government's policies with respect to NGOs. It
was really quite astonishing to sit in this conference in
November where I made a lot of the same points that I made here
and Chinese lawyers and civil society activists were getting up
and making the same points. They were saying, as Professor
Simon said, we should do this. Very openly. Very strongly. So,
I think it just depends on, as Nancy says, what the issue is.
One of the things that is also true is that, former
government officials who are now in the private sector working
for NGOs, or working for universities are very strong critics
of the government's policy--Yan Mingfu, for example. People
like that who have credibility are out there criticizing the
government for what it is doing in this area, and not paying
attention to the freedoms that are necessary. There is even
going to be a freedom of association seminar at Beida in May.
Ms. Ma. I agree with Nancy and all the panelists. The
timing and the issue is very crucial. In certain times, for
example, the anniversary of Liu Si [June 4] that is definitely
a taboo. It is not just the timing, but timing is an important
factor, because it was the time that Canada issued him an
award. It is also the same time China has the CCP's Central
Committee meeting.
Also, the issue is crucial. For example, for a while the
Ford Foundation was in trouble because the Ford Foundation made
a statement about a sensitive issue. So, there are certain
issues you
cannot touch.
Fortunately, most Chinese NGO leaders--fortunately and
unfortunately--know the rules of the game. They grew up in that
environment. They know not to touch the grenade. They know
where the wrong button is.
When I interviewed these people, they said there are just
so many things we can do. For example, an activist for the
Chinese environment, when I interviewed him, said that when he
founded the Friends of Nature, his first intent was to
influence government environmental policy. Later, he thought,
if that is our mission, we will accomplish nothing. Therefore,
we decided we wouldn't do that. Then we switched to education,
educating children, and educating the public, to be more aware
of the environment. Therefore, they do accomplish a lot in that
area.
Unfortunately, it is too practical of Chinese. So there is
not great achievement of them in the political and policymaking
area.
Mr. Foarde. Thank you very much. I would like to go on to
our friend and colleague, Steve Marshall, senior advisor with
the Commission staff. Steve, do you have a question for the
panel?
Mr. Marshall. I found all of this extremely fascinating,
and there are some recurrent themes that keep coming up over
and over again: Paradox, contradiction, differentiation--I will
try to break away from that, even though it fascinates me so
much.
Dr. Hamrin, you specifically mentioned western regions,
which also interest me a lot, Tibet, Xinjiang, areas that are
very poor, very much in need of outside support in just about
every area. Yet, these are the most politically sensitive areas
as well, where any support, for example, from the U.S.
Government, might raise eyebrows. Can you suggest to us how we
could put a positive foot forward in terms of helping local
people, but not cause anyone trouble or risk in doing so?
Ms. Hamrin. The sensitive issue there is the independence
of Tibet. Independence advocates, when they mention Tibet,
usually are talking about a different entity than the
autonomous region of Tibet today. They are talking about the
former kingdom of Tibet which took in large areas of five
provinces, current provinces of China. I think many Americans
aren't fully aware of that.
So, there are many organizations working with Tibetan
areas, both in Tibet and in these other provinces of Tibet. I
found it quite amazing how much is actually going on in terms
of anti-poverty work, health, education and so forth. These are
considered non-political, and they are considered anti-poverty.
The officials that you end up dealing with are people whose job
it is to get something
accomplished in these areas, and it seems that there is a lot
more that can be done.
Now, whether the U.S. Government can do something on that
front, it's work for non-governmental organizations to do,
primarily. I don't fully understand the funding connections
between government and non-governmental organizations, but it
does seem to me that when we put together our policies,
bilateral political policies with China, when we decide on our
Tibet policy, that we have to take into account all of these
things that are going on that we normally are not aware of and
factor that in. And make sure that whatever policies we have
are not going to pull the rug out from under those efforts.
Mr. Marshall. What if you add religion into the mix,
whether it is in Xinjiang or Tibet? That would, of course, make
things a bit more sensitive, but by rights that should be non-
political. Would you agree with that?
Ms. Hamrin. As I understand it, U.S. Government policy has
never been to officially promote independence of Tibet
politically, but has been exactly based on human rights
concerns. We want to see that the culture of these areas,
including Tibet, is preserved, and that means religious culture
for almost all of these ethnic
minority areas: Tibetan Buddhist, or Muslim, or there are some
Christian minority groups as well. So, you can't distinguish
between culture and religion.
One of the reasons that our religious freedom policy is so
sensitive in China, is that Chinese think of religion as the
ethnic
minority group's religion. And so, it touches on their worry
about separatism in those areas. So, it seems to me that the
international religious freedom and human rights policy that we
have, in general, should be very front and center to our policy
in talking about these areas, that we could make a distinction
between that and promoting independence or separatism. Usually,
we don't make that very clear.
Mr. Marshall. Thank you.
Mr. Foarde. I would recognize our friend and colleague,
Lary Brown, who is our specialist on labor issues. Lary, do you
have a question or two for the panel?
Mr. Brown. I do. Both Professor Hamrin and Ms. Yuan made a
passing reference to the impact of U.S. companies, corporate
social responsibility programs on the NGO sector. I was
wondering if either of you or the other panelist would care to
elaborate on what you think the impact of the money U.S.
companies are spending on CSR is having on the development of
NGOs and civil society in China, and in particular, whether you
think it is going to have a substantial impact?
Ms. Yuan. The support is not usually given to develop civil
society in China. It is usually given for a program that
advances some particular interest that the company happens to
be interested in. I think, indirectly, it supports civil
society. Usually, it is given directly to a Chinese NGO, or it
is given to an intermediary organization like the Asia
Foundation to work with the Chinese NGO.
It's to do something very specific with funding, so they
have to do the project, plan for the project and report on the
project afterward to show how they've used the funding. That in
and of itself is developing the capacity of the organization.
But, I would not say that it is necessarily directly to support
civil society development.
Now, whether or not it has a broader impact is very hard to
tell at this stage. I would say that in theory it does--
whatever the project is, it does something good at the time.
That they deliver the service or whatever it happens to be and
it is a good project, whether it has broader implications for a
trend or movement in any way depends on whether or not it is
going to be a one-off project, or it is part of a series of
projects.
It depends on what the goal or objective was for the
project to begin with, whether it had a broader goal, such as
improving the rights of women in China, or if it was to help
these particular women in this particular factory to improve
their air quality. So, it really depends on the circumstance.
That said, I think it is all to the good. Anything that
companies want to do in this area, I think, helps the
environment showing that American companies care about Chinese
organizations, that they care about the Chinese people, and
that they actually want to improve the environment in which
they do business.
Ms. Hamrin. I've just started to look into this area a
little bit, so I don't know enough about it yet. But, I did see
some statistics that show American and Japanese monies going
into China are heavily weighted toward educational scholarships
and fellowships, and areas that would then help provide good
future employees like the IT [information technology] companies
putting money into IT departments in universities and so forth.
I was with a foundation executive in January, in Beijing
and Shanghai, and we met with committees in both Chambers of
Commerce, American Chambers of Commerce, to talk about this
issue, and I was fascinated. It seems to me that there is some
new thinking going on there. That they want to do things
differently, not just these ad hoc, goodwill sorts of efforts,
but they really are beginning to see that they could do more
and have a bigger impact. This executive I was with gave a
speech in Shanghai at their monthly luncheon and was suggesting
there was a lot more that they could pass on, besides funding,
like their expertise in so many areas, how to run an NGO, how
to do accounting or auditing. They were very interested in
cooperating with that kind of training effort in the NGO
community. So, I think they are just starting, and there are
going to be two events going on, one in Beijing and one in
Shanghai in May in this area.
So, I believe the Department of Commerce is going to be
involved. I think perhaps the DRL [Democracy, Human Rights, and
Labor] at the State Department is involved.
Ms. Simon. Yes, I have the agenda for the Beijing
conference with me. I can give it to you.
Mr. Brown. Thank you.
Mr. Foarde. Our time is getting very short here. So, I
would give the last set of questions to Andrea Worden, if you
want. And then, perhaps, each of the panelists would say a
final word before we adjourn. So, Andrea, you have 5 minutes
for questions, and then we will get a final statement from
everyone.
Ms. Worden. I think each of you has addressed the issue of
funding; that funding for NGOs in China is inadequate. Besides
international funding, and Chinese Government funding for NGOs,
where do Chinese NGOs get their funding? Is there a sense of
philanthropy in China; are there individual donors? How does
that all work?
Ms. Ma. In terms of state funding, there is a very
interesting twist to understanding what the meaning of NGO is.
Both the Chinese Government, as well as Chinese NGOs, whenever
they emphasize the autonomous nature of NGOs, they will say
there is no government funding. So, in this case, that means
that the Chinese Government does not fund real NGOs. This is a
big problem for Chinese NGOs.
However, international funding is crucial for the
grassroots and the real NGOs. The real key is here. I recently
studied Yunnan NGOS, and I also visited many NGOs in other
areas. Lots of NGOs emphasize that their biggest problem and
difficulty is funding. However, none of the Yunnan NGOs said
they have a problem of funding, because international NGOs want
to give money to Chinese NGOs. As Nancy said, they need to find
the right partner.
Right now, Yunnan NGOs' development is under that kind of
culture. They understand international grants distribution
organizations. They need a good partner. They need a good
project. As long as you have good projects, you can get
international funding. Right now there is $100 million dollars
from private resources internationally that go to China. There
are a lot of independent NGOs that are almost 100 percent
funded by international sources, which is not healthy. However,
that is the only way they can get money.
Ms. Simon. I think that the law in China, the donations law
and the tax law really do encourage donations by entrepreneurs,
and there is a lot of money coming in from locally based
entrepreneurs. In my experience, projects that are extremely
worthwhile--I mean, Project Hope did have a scandal. But, back
when Project Hope was really a good project, a lot of just
ordinary Chinese people contributed.
There was recently an article in China Daily, which members
of the Tenth National Peoples' Congress-Chinese People's
Political Consultative Conference talked about these issues.
So, I mean this is becoming a big deal, and people are becoming
more and more aware of the fact that it is important to have
legislation and also that it is part of the social system that
people do it.
Ms. Hamrin. For the most part, there hasn't been domestic
fund raising until very recently, and it is still very
difficult. Even the donations law which says that you can
donate to charity doesn't actually say that charities can raise
funds. Can you go ask, or is that illegal? Do you have to wait
until somebody sends you a check? There are all kinds of little
glitches like that that catch you up. And, there hasn't been
much tax benefit for giving. It's something like maybe 30
percent for individuals, but only 3 percent for corporate
donors. So, it is small. There are a lot of glitches in trying
to make it actually function.
But, I also think that there are only a certain limited
number of national large GONGOs, trusted groups that are really
allowed to do this kind of nationwide fundraising. So a lot of
the philanthropy that has come into China has been through
overseas Chinese, global networks of all kinds, including
faith-based networks where
people are following traditional channels of philanthropy and
giving to their hometowns and their schools and so forth. So,
there is a lot of that.
Hong Kong has been a major channel of funding for NGOs. It
is a base for many of the international NGOs operating in
China. And it has been a real big model to show the Chinese
what can be done in this area.
Mr. Foarde. Let us draw this to a close by giving each
panelist about a minute to make a final comment if you would
like to. And maybe we will start with Nancy Yuan, if you would.
I can come back to you, if you like.
Ms. Yuan. Two seconds.
Mr. Foarde. OK.
Ms. Yuan. I wanted to thank you all for doing this. I think
it is a very useful activity to be able to get these ideas all
on the table, get it on the record and have an opportunity to
clarify some of these issues. I think there is a lot of
misunderstanding about the development of civil society and
NGOs in China, and I think that this is very helpful. Thank
you.
Mr. Foarde. Carol.
Ms. Hamrin. I would just say that when we look at the
picture in China, if we look from the top-down, we see a lot of
abuses, where the government is restricting the development of
civil society, restricting religion and so forth. And that is
part of the truth.
But, if we look at the bottom of society and look bottom-
up, we suddenly discover all kinds of things going on as people
push back. So, we've got to have both parts of the picture when
we are looking at policy, and we need to keep in mind our
social and cultural relations with China, which are not
governmental, but which the government is duty-bound to try to
promote or defend.
Mr. Foarde. Karla.
Ms. Simon. I would also like to thank the Commission for
doing this. I think it is extremely important and we do need to
clear out a lot of the cobwebs in our thinking about these
issues.
But, I think also there is just a tremendous amount of
really hopeful stuff happening. The government is going one
step forward, two steps back consistently in this area as well
as in others. But, there is just no connection between working
there 10 years ago and working there now. It is just completely
different. Much more open. Much more willing to engage.
And I think that that message is a message that the members
of our government and the Members of the Congress really need
to know. The American people don't know it yet, but hopefully
Members of Congress can find out and that would, I think,
change some of the attitudes about funding for China.
Mr. Foarde. Professor Ma.
Ms. Ma. Yes, I think the period from 1995, when the World
Conference on Women was held in Beijing, to 1998, the most
recent Chinese Government regulation, should be considered as
the turning point in Chinese NGO development. Right now, I
suggest, as Karla said, a lot of really positive things are
happening. The U.S. Government and Congress should seize the
opportunity to be an
active and positive player, and I think Chinese people--from
the Chinese NGOs perspective, they like not just money--they
call donations blood transfusions, rather, they like the
technical help, the theoretical training, capacity training,
those kinds of new perspectives, which not only work in the
U.S. and other developed countries, but it is very effective in
developing countries.
Mr. Foarde. Thanks to all four of our panelists, and on
behalf of the Chairman and Co-Chairman of Congressional-
Executive Commission on China, Congressman Jim Leach, and
Senator Chuck Hagel and all of the members of the CECC, thanks
to the panelists, to the staff panel, and to all of those who
attended, particularly those who waited the extra half hour
because of our evacuation glitch. Thank you for coming. We look
forward to seeing you next Tuesday afternoon at 2:30 in this
room for another issues roundtable. Thank you.
[Whereupon, at 4:40 p.m. the roundtable was concluded.]
A P P E N D I X
=======================================================================
Prepared Statements
----------
Prepared Statement of Qiusha Ma
march 24, 2003
Nongovernmental and Nonprofit Organizations and the Evolution of
Chinese Civil Society
1. general summary
What are Chinese NGOs? Is it possible that, under China's one-party
state, nongovernmental organizations can sustain and play important
economic, social, and political functions? My answer is Yes. The last
two decades have witnessed the dramatic increase of Chinese NGOs in
number, size and influence. Barely extant before, these new
organizations carry out many social, economic, and cultural tasks
previously controlled or neglected by the government, from establishing
centers for abused women and abandoned children, to organizing
community recycling programs. These institutions are by far the most
powerful instruments through which Chinese people participate in public
affairs, develop personal interests, and make their voices heard; they
indicate a more active and engaged citizenry than ever before. The
development of NGOs in the past twenty-odd years is a key step in the
evolution of a civil society in China.
Given China's current political condition and her historical
background, its development of NGOs is very unbalanced and still in the
preliminary stage. This is reflected in the uneven growth of NGOs in
different regions and subjects. Though NGOs and civil associations are
very active in economic development, poverty alleviation in poor
regions, and community building, others in politics, religion and
advocacy play an insignificant role in the overall rise of NGOs. Their
involvement in
policymaking is also very limited.
Under China's current political system, without the government's
approval and encouragement, the upsurge of nongovernmental
organizations would be impossible. Since the opening of China in 1978,
the government's policy toward NGOs has
generally been positive. Understanding the political consequences of
NGOs, the government is still convinced that NGOs, with the support of
the general public, private sector, and international nonprofit sector,
can provide much needed social and professional services, as well as
intermediary mechanisms for economic and social transformations. By
legalizing and promoting NGOs, especially those related to the economic
and social development, the government has played a crucial and
positive role in NGO growth in China.
However, during these years, the official attitude toward NGOs has
been inconsistent and self-contradicting, volleying between
encouragement and restraint. A requirement of the government's
promotion of NGOs is its belief that the State has ultimate, especially
political, control over NGOs. The Chinese Communist Party (CCP) and the
government's concern about the political risk of promoting NGOs has
been intensified during different periods and as related to different
issues, and the government has not hesitated to suppress these
organizations or their activities if it believes they form a threat to
national interests and security. All NGOs have to follow political
principles in order to legally exist. In this sense, all NGOs, no
matter how grassroots or self-reliant, do not enjoy complete autonomy.
Yet, we must recognize the significant gap between the rhetoric of the
party-state's intention and what actually can be enforced by the
government. In reality, the NGOs in China enjoy much greater autonomy
than may appear on paper.
In the following sections, this article will discuss China's
official NGO classification, definition and terminology, based on
Chinese official documentation, the author's interviews of Chinese
officials, NGO leaders and scholars, as well as English and Chinese NGO
literature.
2. the official classification of chinese ngos
What are the Chinese NGOs according to China's legal documents and
official policy? Many western as well as Chinese studies of
nongovernmental organizations in China have taken the term ``social
organization'' to be equivalent to the western term ``NGO'' or ``NPO''
without recognizing that Chinese ``social organizations'' constitute
only part of the full range of the country's NGOs. This is largely
because until most recently the Chinese government itself used ``social
organization'' as a unified term for organizations that are NGOs in the
Western sense and refused giving legal status as NGOs to a vast number
of private not for profit service providers such as non-state-run
schools, hospitals or other professional institutions. In a recent
study of Chinese NGO law, the authors still state: ``NGOs are usually
defined as `social organizations' '' \1\ (Xin and Zhang, 1999, 91).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ Xin Chunying and Zhang Ye, ``China,'' in Thomas Silk, ed.,
Philanthropy and Law in Asia. (San Francisco, CA: Jossey-Bass
Publishers, 1999), p. 91.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Not until 1998, were a great proportion of private nonprofit
organizations in China excluded from the official classification of
non-governmentally run organizations. The latest Chinese government
regulatory documents, issued in 1998, provide by far the most
comprehensive system in PRC history, covering a highly diverse
nongovernmental sector; they are the key documents establishing the
Chinese definition of NGOs.\2\ According to the new official
classifications, NGOs include two
general categories: social organizations (SOs, shehui tuanti, or
shetuan), and nongovernmental and noncommercial enterprises (NGNCEs,
minban feiqiye danwei). (See Chart 1.) \3\ Under these two general
categories, Chinese NGOs are officially
divided into different types according to either their organizational
forms or professional missions. The SOs are academic, professional or
trade associations, federations and foundations, while the NGNCEs are
divided into ten general types:
education, health care, cultural, science/ technology, sports, social
welfare, intermediary services, employment service, legal service and
others.\4\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\2\ These documents are: ``Regulations of Registrations of Social
Organizations (SO)''; ``Temporary Regulations of Non-governmental and
Non-commercial Enterprises (NGNCE, minban feiqiye danwei)''; and ``The
Temporary Regulations of Non-commercial Enterprises (shiye danwei).''
According to the author's interview with an official in the Bureau of
Nongovernmental Organizations, 2001, Beijing, China, a revised document
on regulation of the foundations and a new executive document on
foreign NGOs in China are forthcoming.
\3\ The NGNCEs are income-making institutions that do not produce
products but provide services. The 1998 Regulations for the
nongovernmental and noncommercial enterprises clearly stipulates that
the NGNCEs must be established with non-state funds, and engage in not
for profit social services.
\4\ The Ministry of Civil Affairs, ``The Provisional Measurements
of Registration of Nongovernmental and Nonprofit Enterprises.'' Dec.
1999.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Since the establishment of the People's Republic of China, the
government has, in 1950, 1988-1989, and 1998, issued three rounds of
documents regarding the classification, registration and regulation of
organizations outside of the government system. The first two rounds
classified all types of associations and institutions that are
nongovernmental into a single category: social organizations. In the
early 1950s, the government--following the Soviet Union model--
nationalized all private schools, hospitals, charitable organizations
and other service providers. From then on until the dawn of the reforms
in 1978, no private nonprofit service providers existed in China.
Therefore, before the reforms, social organizations were basically
membership associations. Then, starting in the mid-1980s, the
government founded a number of ``nongovernmental'' foundations and
charitable organizations to generate international and Chinese private
money for certain public causes. As there was no existing category for
this type of organizations, they were, and still are up today,
officially classified as social organizations, even though they are not
membership
entities.
The term NGNCE was created by the government in 1998 to provide
legal status and unify the official management of rapidly growing
private nonprofit service institutions. After the opening reforms of
1978, there was a pluralization of cultural, social, and economic
interests, which created large-scale needs that the government was no
longer able to deliver. It has since become clear that state-owned
schools, nursing homes, healthcare and social welfare providers, as
well as research institutes no longer suffice. With the state's
permission and encouragement, all kinds of non-state-owned or private
social and professional institutions emerged to fill the gap.
Chart 1: China's Official Classification of NGOs
Under China's current dual registration system, all private
organizations have to have a supervising government body in order to
register with the Ministry of Civil Affairs (MOCA). Chinese NGOs call
these bodies ``mothers-in-law.'' Both social organizations and NGNCEs
are required to register with MOCA and its local branches. According to
the 2001 official statistics, 136,841 social organizations of all
levels registered nationwide. Although officials at MOCA estimate that
there are about 700,000 NGNCEs in China, in 2000, only 20,000 were
registered with MOCA.\5\ As many private providers and institutions
have difficulty finding appropriate bodies to serve as their mothers-
in-law, they have to either register as for-profit enterprises under
the bureau of industry and trade, or as non-corporate organizations. It
was due to this inadequate classification system that the government
created the NGNCE category in 1998. This classification is similar to
the category of ``public service'' in the United States. (See Chart 2.)
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\5\ Guojia tongjiju ed. (national bureau of statistics), Zhongguo
minzheng tongji nianjian (China's civil affairs statistical yearbook)
(Beijing: China Statistics Publishing House, 2001). Also, private
interviews with MOCA officials, Beijing, 2001.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Chart 2: Anatomy of the Nonprofit Sector\6\
3. defining ngos and civil society in china
The term ``NGO'' is widely used to refer to various types of
organizations outside of State systems, including advocacy
organizations, nonprofit service-providing institutions, religious
groups and social welfare organizations. Lester Salamon and Helmut K.
Anheier, two leading authorities on international NGOs, list the key
features of NGOs as follows: they are formal, private, non-profit-
distributing, self-governing, and voluntary.\7\ This set of
characteristics includes the most important and generally recognized
features that distinguish the private nonprofit sector from the
governmental and the for-profit private sectors. Within different
cultures and political systems, the meaning of the term ``NGO'' varies.
In Western Europe, for example, an NGO often refers to a nonprofit
advocacy or service organization that is
active internationally. In East European countries and republics of the
former
Soviet Union, NGO tends to designate all charitable and nonprofit
organizations.\8\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\6\ This chart is taken from Lester M. Salamon ``Scope and
Structure: The Anatomy of America's Nonprofit Sector,'' in J. Steven
Ott, The Nature of the Nonprofit Sector (Boulder, CO: Westview Press,
2001), p. 24.
\7\ Lester M. Salamon, & Helmut K. Anheier, ``In search of the
nonprofit sector I: the question of definitions,'' Voluntas, 3.2
(1992): 134.
\8\ Julie Fisher, Nongovernment: NGOs and the Political Development
of the Third World, (West Hartford, CT: Kumarian Press, 1998), p. 5.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
What are the nongovernment and nonprofit organizations in China
today, and how does the Chinese government define them? This question
is the very first step toward our understanding of Chinese NGOs, and
two major aspects need to be clarified. As the next section will
further explain, according to the 1998 official regulatory documents of
the NGOs, the Chinese government classifies all institutions into two
general categories: social organizations and nongovernmental and
noncommercial enterprises (NGNCE). In ``The regulations of
registrations of social organizations''(1998), the government offered a
definition of social organizations. ``Social organizations,'' it
states, ``are nonprofit organizations that are voluntarily founded by
Chinese citizens for their common will and operated according to their
charters.'' \9\ Another official document in the same year announced
that, ``nongovernmental and noncommercial enterprises are social
entities engaging in nonprofit
social service activities, and they are founded by for-profit or
nonprofit enterprises, social organizations, other social forces or
individual citizens, using non state-owned property or funds.'' \10\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\9\ Zhonghua renmin gongheguo guowuyuan (the State Council of the
People's Republic of China), ``Shehui tuanti dengji guanli tiaoli''
(the regulations of registrations of social organizations), People's
Daily. Oct. 26, 1998. p. 3.
\10\ Zhonghua renmin gongheguo guowuyuan (the State Council of the
People's Republic of China), ``Minban feiqiye danwei dengji guanli
zhanxing tiaoli (the temporary regulations of non-governmental and non-
commercial enterprises. People's Daily. Oct. 26, 1998. 3.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Comparing the Western and Chinese NGO definitions, the most obvious
distinction is that the Chinese official definition of NGOs does not
mention self-governance, a key criteria of Western nongovernmental
organizations. Still, we should give the Chinese government credit in
their effort to catch up with the international standard in their
governance of NGOs. First of all, for a long time, the government did
not know what the definition of social organizations should be. Thus,
instead of giving a clear definition, the 1989 official regulation only
listed all types of associations and institutions that the government
recognized as ``social organizations.'' \11\ The 1998 documents, for
the first time, provided not only a clear description of the meaning of
``social organizations,'' but also created a new legal status--NGNCEs--
for private service providers. Second, even though the Chinese official
definition of NGOs did not include self-governance, the Ministry of
Civil Affairs (MOCA), since the 1990s, has been pushing the ``three
selves of polity'': financially self-sufficient, self-governing, and
self-recruiting (sanzi zhengce).\12\ Yet, one must recognize the gap
between ``talking the talking'' and ``walking the walking.'' As
mentioned earlier, how much autonomy Chinese NGOs enjoy is still the
most controversial issue.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\11\ Private interviews with a former director of the Division of
Social Organizations at MOCA, Beijing, 1996.
\12\ Private interview with the vice director of the Division of
Social Organizations at the MOCA, Beijing, 1996.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
In the time span of several hundred years, many philosophers and
thinkers have left their marks on civil society, and the debates
continues today over the definition, meaning and function of civil
society. The conceptual evolution of civil society in the West has left
a great profusion of interpretations and models. This concept today is
used, in a simplified form, to indicate people's expression of their
opinions and interests, usually via civic associations, and the
mechanisms that enable them to participate or influence policymaking.
In their study of Chinese civil society, Gordon White, Jude Howell, and
Shang Xiaoyang define civil society in general as
An intermediate associational realm situated between the
State on the one side and the basic building blocks of society
on the other (individuals, families, and firms), populated by
social organizations which are separate, and enjoy some degree
of autonomy from, the state and are formed voluntarily by
members of society to protect or extend their interests or
values. . . . The political conception, which derives mostly
from the Anglo-American liberal tradition of political theory,
equates `civil society' with `political society' in the sense
of a particular set of institutionalized relationships between
State and society based on the principles of citizenship, civil
rights, representation, and the rule of law.\13\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\13\ Gordon White, Jude Howell, & Shang Xiaoyang, In Search of
Civil Society: Market Reform and Social Change in Contemporary China.
(Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1996), pp. 3-4.
Contrastingly, Deng Zhenglai and Jing Yuejin, two leading Chinese
scholars of civil society, describe a Chinese civil society as ``a
private sphere where members of society engage in economic and social
activities voluntarily and autonomously, according to the rule of
contract. It is also a nongovernmental public sphere where people
participate political and governing activities.'' \14\ The concept of
civil society in the West has a long history of representing democracy
and the confrontation or even antagonism between the State and society.
However, it is widely agreed among Chinese scholars who participated in
debates during the 1990s on building a Chinese civil society that the
relationship between the State and (civil) society in China should be
constructively and mutually interactive.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\14\ Deng Zhenglai and Jing Yuejin, ``Jiangou Zhongguo de shimin
shehui'' (build a Chinese civil society), in Deng Zhenglai, Guojia yu
shehui (the state and society) (Chengdu, China: Sichuan People's
Publishing House, 1997), pp. 1-22.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
4. chinese equivalents of nongovernmental organization
Table: Chinese Terminology of NGOs
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Examples of
English Term Chinese Term Organizations
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Social Organizations............ Shehui tuanti..... A general term for
member-serving
associations and
foundations.
People's Organizations* (19 at Renmin tuanti..... ``The eight big
the national level). organizations,''
such as: All
China Federation
of Trade Unions,
Chinese People's
Friendship
Association, All-
China Federation
of Returned
Overseas Chinese.
Mass organizations*............. Qunzhong zuzhi.... All-China
Federation of
Trade Unions,
Chinese Communist
Youth League, All-
China Women's
Federation.
Folk Organizations.............. Minjian zuzhi..... All-China General
Chamber of
Industry and
Commerce, China
international
Chambers of
Commerce.
Nongovernmental Organization Fei zhengfu zuzhi. Usually referred
(NGOs). to as foreign
NGOs, but some
Chinese NGOs
adopt this term.
Nonprofit Organization (NPOs)... Fei yingli zuzhi.. New term for
Chinese SOs and
NGNCEs.
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Shehui tuanti or shetuan (social organization) is the most commonly
adopted term for organizations outside the state. In classical Chinese,
``she,'' ``hui,'' and ``tuan'' all mean associations or groups. The
term ``social organization'' predated the establishment of the PRC, and
some scholars believe that the earliest forms of Chinese social
organizations can be traced back to the Spring-Autumn period (770-476
B.C.). However, the term refers primarily to modern forms of private
associations that first appeared at the beginning of the 20th century.
Since 1949, the PRC government has continued to use this term, and
three of its regulatory documents on this subject (1950, 1989 and 1998)
all use the term shehui tuanti for entities that outside the State
system.
Whereas ``social organization'' is adopted by the government as a
general term for organizations outside of the state, the remaining four
terms are also used officially, but more specifically. Renmin tuanti
(people's organizations) appeared in the 1954 and 1982 Constitutions
and other government documents. Though Qunzhong zuzhi (mass
organizations) has never been used in any legal or official regulatory
documents, it has been used officially on many occasions. Only a small
number of prominent organizations have ever been classified as either
``people's organizations'' or ``mass organizations.'' The so-called
``eight big organizations'' (ba da tuanti) are all people's
organizations, and some of them are also mass organizations.\15\ The
two terms are not exclusive, and the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) uses
them according to its political agenda. The All-China Federation of
Trade Unions (ACFTU), the Chinese Communist Youth League (CCYL) and the
All-China Women's Federation (ACWF) are mass organizations in
structure, but they are also referred to as people's organizations to
indicate their prestigious status. These two types of organizations,
although are also categorized as social organizations, do not register
with MOCA, nor are they under MOCA's supervision.\16\
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\15\ The eight organizations are All-China Federation of Trade
Unions, the China Communist Youth League, All-China Women's Federation,
China Federation of Literature and Art, China Association of Science
and Technology, China Writers Association, China Law Association, and
All-China Journalists Association. The first three organizations were
established during the revolution period and have been the most loyal
to the CCP ever since; others were also close to the CCP before 1949.
\16\ The people's organizations and mass organizations are under
the direct management of the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist
Party. Currently, there are 19 of them. See, ZJBWB.
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The questions here are: what are the meanings of these two terms?
Why are they still in use today? Why do we need to know about those two
types of organizations? Chiefly because they help us understand the way
the Chinese government employs social organizations as tools of
political struggles. The people's organizations and mass organizations
have significant political implications and historical backgrounds,
although no official documents have ever defined them. One must turn to
China's contemporary history and the CCP's political vocabulary. The
term ``people's organization'' was created by the Nationalist Party
(Guomindang) in the 1920s and is still used in Taiwan today. After
1949, the PRC government accepted the term, but employed it, especially
in the early period of the PRC, to refer to organizations that
participated in the First Chinese People's Political Consultative
Conference (CPPCC) in September 1949, a month before the establishment
of the PRC.\17\ In fact, the CCP organized quite a few organizations
around that time to unify various political forces joining the
revolutionary cause. They have been China's most influential
organizations ever since, and are the backbone of the United Front
represented by the CPPCC.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\17\ ``The Temporary Regulation of Registration of Social
Organizations'' (1950) clearly classified these organizations as
people's organizations.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
In contemporary CCP political vocabulary, the word ``people'' is
the opposite of the word ``enemy'' or ``CCP's enemy,'' and its meaning
changes from one political period to another, depending on the specific
targets of the revolution. For instance, during the anti-Japanese War
(1937-45), the landlord class was included in the category of
``people,'' while during the land reform movement (late-1940s to early-
1950s), they shifted to ``enemy.'' Shortly before the establishment of
the PRC, Mao Zedong published an important article, ``The Dictatorship
of the People's Democracy'' (1949). ``Who are the `people?' '' Mao
asked. ``At the present stage in China, they are the working class, the
peasant class, the petty bourgeoisie, and national bourgeoisie. Under
the leadership of the working class and the Communist Party, these
classes united together to form their own State and elect their own
government [so as to] carry out a dictatorship over the lackeys of
imperialism--the landlord class, the bureaucratic capitalist class, and
the Kuomintang [Guomindang] reactionaries.'' Mao continued, ``The
democratic system is to be carried out within the ranks of the people,
giving them freedom of speech, assembly, and association.''
Consequently, the Chinese (and all organizations as well) are divided
into: leading classes, the United Front (classes that are the CCP's
allies), and the enemy.
The CCP wanted to enlist ``people's organizations'' in the fight
against the Guomindang, and support from non-CCP organizations helped
convince the Nation that the CCP truly represented the people. As a
reward and to ensure future support, the CCP offered many political
privileges to the organizations, including exemption from registering
with the government.\18\ Since this term carries substantial political
weight, very few organizations have obtained this title later on. When
organizations do use this title, their missions are usually related to
the United Front. For instance, during the early 1950s, the former
chambers of commerce and other merchant and entrepreneurial
associations were joined in the All-China Federation of Industry &
Commerce (ACFIC). The ACFIC is a ``people's organization;'' its
purpose, as stated in its charter, is to strengthen the United Front.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\18\ ``The 1950 Regulations'' particularly stated that all people's
organizations did not need to register with the government. This
practice has continued even though the new regulatory document (1989)
has no such item.
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The term ``mass organizations'' also carries significant political
implications. The word ``qunzhong'' means ``groups of individuals'' or
``the majority.'' But in the CCP's political vocabulary, the word
conveys several specific meanings. First, it is used to distinguish
people as either non-party members (qunzhong) or CCP members (dangyuan)
and thus directly affects people's political status and their daily
lives. Whether one is a dangyuan or a qunzhong has significant
consequences in matters such as academic or job opportunities, and in
how one is treated politically as well as socially. Second, in the
CCP's ideology, the masses and the Party are two essential elements in
a ``union of contradiction.'' The CCP recognizes the masses as the
foundation of its rule, the object of its service, and defines its own
actions as the ``cause of the masses,'' ``mass movement,'' or ``mass
struggle.'' At the same time, the Party requires the masses to follow
its lead as the head of the revolutionary cause.
Accordingly, the political meaning of ``mass organization'' is
twofold. On the one hand, it indicates the position of mass
organizations in the CCP's political system. The CCP defines itself as
``the vanguard of the working class'' and ``the core force of the mass
movement,'' with mass organizations on the periphery around the Party.
Since the Party represents the people's interests, these organizations
should follow the Party's leadership. It does not allow mass
organizations to challenge its authority. The political struggle
between the ACFTU's leaders and the CCP during the 1950s over the
independence of trade unions set a clear example for other mass
organizations on the periphery around the Party. By 1949, Chinese
industrial workers had experienced thirty years of autonomous union
actions, so Chinese workers in major cities understood the meaning of
solidarity and unionization. Many unions were non-Communist
organizations. This tradition was the first casualty of the CCP's
policy toward the mass organizations after 1949.\19\ Union leaders who
made assertions about the workers' unique interests and the unions'
independence were criticized as ``anti-party'' and ``anti-people,'' and
many were punished severely by the Party.\20\
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\19\ Alan Liu, Mass Politics in the People's Republic: State and
Society in Contemporary China, (Boulder, CO: Westview Press), p. 91.
\20\ Wang Yongxi, ed., Zhongguo gonghui shi (A history of the
Chinese Trade Unions) (Beijing: Publishing House of History of Chinese
Communist Party, 1992), pp. 345-379.
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On the other hand, the CCP relies on mass organizations to reach
out to different groups of people; this was true during the
revolutionary period and is still the case today. These organizations
provide a bridge between the CCP and the people. Before 1949, many mass
organizations were grass-roots organizations fighting directly for
their members' interests. After 1949, the CCP became the ruling party,
and workers unions, women's federations and youth leagues became
governmental organizations entirely dependent on and closely controlled
by the government. The interests of their members have been ignored,
or, in the CCP's phraseology, individuals obey the State and Party's
interests, and their duties switched to that of propagating Communist
ideology, assisting the Party, and recruiting CCP supporters. The
government has entrusted them with important administrative functions
and has accorded them the privileged status of government agencies.
In short, the term ``people's organization'' implies a mission for
the United Front, and the term ``mass organization'' indicates a close
but subordinate relationship with the Party. From a historical
perspective, these classifications reveal the CCP's notion of non-party
organizations and its changing agenda in different periods. Although
the conditions of nongovernmental organizations have altered
tremendously since the 1980s, the official policy toward these two
types of organizations remains almost unchanged. In order to downsize,
in recent years the government has pushed previously government-funded
organizations to become self-sufficient. However, the people's and mass
organizations are too important to the CCP's political power to grant
them independence. Instead, the government continues to furnish them
with financial and personnel support.\21\ This situation has created a
major dilemma for the government in its effort to apply a uniform
regulatory and managerial policy to all social organizations. This is
also an important reason for the reluctance to formulate a clear social
organization law (shetuan fa).\22\
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\21\ In the past two decades, the real value of government funds to
these organizations has fallen considerably due to serious inflation.
Thus, they are under strong pressure to seek other financial resources.
Like all social organizations (except the foundations), these
organizations also are allowed to run for-profit businesses to
supplement their incomes. But government funds are still their major
revenue. For example, the Youth League is a fully funded government
organization, but the government allows it two for-profit enterprises
with 1,150 employees.
\22\ Interviews with a participant in drawing up a ``social
organization law,'' 1996, Beijing, and an official in the Bureau of the
nongovernmental organizations, MOCA, 2001.
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Two other terms for nongovernmental organizations, minjian zuzhi
and feizhengfu zuzhi, too, have their own origins and political
connotations. In Chinese, minjian means `` As a rather old Chinese
term, minjian zuzhi is an antonym of ``governmental organization''
(guanban or zhengfu zuzhi) and highlights the very nature of self-
organizing. In the early 1950s, nine religious organizations (minjian
zongjiao tuanti) and their branches nationwide were identified as
``anti-revolutionary secret societies'' and officially banned. As a
conspicuous political event, the dismissal of the minjian zuzhi sounded
a clear signal, and eventually ``minjian zuzhi'' vanished in China.
From then until the 1980s, this term was only used to refer to foreign
nongovernmental organizations that functioned as very important
channels between China and the outside world. Not until the 1990s was
the term minjian zuzhi revived. In 1999, the governmental agency in
charge of all national NGOs under MOCA was renamed Minjian Zuzhi
Guanliju (literally translated as, the Managing Bureau of Popular
Organizations, though its official name is the Bureau of the Management
of NGOs).\23\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\23\ The original name of the agency was the Division of Social
Organizations. It was not just renamed; the rank of new agency was also
escalated from a division (chu) to bureau (ju).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The term fei zhengfu zuzhi is not authentic to the Chinese language
but is a transliteration from English ``nongovernmental
organizations.'' When China hosted the 1995 Fourth World Women's
Conference (WWC) in Beijing, the Nongovernmental Forum made this term
well known to the Chinese. To prepare Chinese women's organizations to
understand the meaning and practice of fei zhengfu zuzhi, the All-China
Women's Federations launched a campaign to train women leaders at all
levels. Over 8,000 workshops and seminars nationwide trained 1,910,000
women leaders and activists, most of whom learned the term fei zhengfu
zuzhi for the first time.\24\ Since then, ``fei zhengfu zuzhi'' , and
later, ``fei yingli zuzhi'' (nonprofit organizations) have become
formal terms in the Chinese political vocabulary.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\24\ Ibid.
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Foreign NGOs are commonly called fei zhengfu zuzhi; Chinese social
organizations, however, are reluctant to call themselves fei zhengfu
zuzhi. In Chinese, the word ``fei'' means ``not,'' but also ``wrong''
or even ``anti.'' For example, during the May Fourth Movement (1919),
the Chinese name for the ``Great Federation of Anti-Religion Movement''
used fei for ``anti.'' The same held for the ``Federation of Anti-
Christianity.'' \25\ Instead of choosing fei zhengfu to indicate their
nature, many new Chinese NGOs prefer to use NPOs (nonprofit
organizations.)
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\25\ The Chinese names for these organizations were ``fei zongjiao
da tongmeng'' and ``fei jidujiao tongmeng.''
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5. conclusion
In summary, since the late 1980s, the government has undertaken
substantial measures to improve the legal and political environment for
the growth of NGOs and to strengthen governmental control over them at
the same time. The promulgation of a series of regulatory documents
since 1998 indeed has provided a much clearer and unified status to
most organizations outside of the State system. However, these efforts
are not without obstacles and costs. While new organizations are
seeking more autonomy, many well-established social organizations are
reluctant to change. People's organizations and mass organizations
stand to lose political power, privilege, and security with a
fundamental change in the status quo. At present, the government is
rethinking the roles and statuses of these two types of organizations,
which number 200 nationwide.\26\ However, these political bodies are
too important to the CCP's power to let them become independent.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\26\ There are two hundred of these types of organizations
nationwide, including 19 national organizations fully funded by the
government. Several of them were organized after the 1980s; the most
well known are the Soong Ching Ling Foundation and the China Federation
of Handicapped People. See, ZJBWB (1996).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The confusion and inconsistency in the classification of social
organizations is reflected in the uncertainty of the government's
policy towards NGOs as a whole. This reveals problems more profound
than the clarification of categories or social organizations
terminology. The government faces a great challenge in letting
organizations become autonomous in financial and managerial matters and
takes the political risk of losing control entirely. Without a
comprehensive and long-term policy, how can the government define the
term ``social organization,'' change the status quo of the people's
organizations and mass organizations, or offer Chinese social
organizations the rights that international NGOs enjoy? The future
roles of the Chinese organizations remain in doubt.
______
Prepared Statement of Karla W. Simon
march 24, 2003
Creating an Enabling Legal Environment for Chinese NPOs
An ``enabling legal environment'' for the non-government, not-for-
profit (NPO)
sector--also known as civil society--in any country consists of the
following:
Supportive ``legal framework'' legislation--the
legislation relating to the
establishment, governance, and oversight of NPOs;
Supportive legislation regulating NPO-state
relations, allowing partnerships between State entities and
NPOs to be established (both with respect to service provision
and policy development);
Supportive tax legislation, permitting various forms
of tax relief for NPOs and their donors, thus creating an
environment in which NPOs and the business sector can work
together for the good of society; and
Other necessary legislation affecting NPOs and their
operations (e.g., fund raising legislation).
Most developing and transition countries have struggled with the
issues involved in creating such an enabling legal environment, in
large part because they are fearful of the consequences of creating a
truly independent NPO sector, with economic resources as well as access
to the people by virtue of meeting important social needs (in other
words, possible political access coupled with economic resources).
Thus, China has not been alone in dealing with NPOs out of suspicion
and fear.
Yet the Chinese government has been very clever in seeking step-by-
step to create a more open and supportive legal environment for NPOs.
Since the late 1980s the government has had in place policies to
encourage certain types of NPOs to come into being. Although these
organizations have at times been affiliated with the Chinese Communist
Party (CCP) structures, such as the All China Youth Federation and the
All China Women's Federation, many of them have also been independent
of the CCP, if not the state. In fact, in the 1980s the government made
a clear decision to encourage certain semi-independent organizations to
come into being, by adopting regulations that permit both associations
(social organizations) and foundations to be formed, albeit with rather
stringent government control and oversight.
The types of organizations that were created in those years (top-
down, rather than bottom-up) include the various foundations for the
poor and for struggling communities (such as a Foundation for
Underdeveloped Regions, the China Charity Federation, the China Youth
Development Foundation) as well as such organizations as the Amity
Foundation, a Chinese Christian organizations that supports rural
development, one of the few organizations that can claim a sort of
independence from the state. These various foundations and federations
were perceived from the outset as a means to attract donations from
overseas as well as PRC-based Chinese to help the State implement
programs it perceived to be necessary; for example, to raise funds to
help victims of the Yangtze floods (China Charity Federation) or to
develop resources to support school children in poor communities
(Project Hope of the China Youth Development Foundation). While not
true NPOs or civil society organizations because of their linkage to
the State and their top-down creation, many staff members who work for
these entities nonetheless have become powerful spokespersons for the
creation of more independent entities, which might grow away from state
control.
Most recently the government has begun to experiment with
regulations that permit more autonomy for NPOs. While the 1998
regulations on associations (social organizations) and non-state, non-
commercial institutions have continued the dual oversight structure
present in the 1980's regulations, they at the same time show that the
government and the CPC are beginning to be aware of the need to free
such organizations from overly stringent types of controls. The 1998
association regulations permit, for example, 50 citizens to come
together to form an association--something that was never allowed in
the past, when top-down creation of organizations was the norm. In
addition, more has been made about ``self-management'' by NPOs,
something that received little emphasis in the past. And, perhaps most
significant in terms of the evolution in government/CPC thinking,
recent discussions of possible new foundation regulations suggest that
the state and the CPC are moving in the direction of freeing such
entities from invasive government oversight by recognizing more Western
forms of fiduciary responsibility.
A further sign that the government has an interest in a more
enabling legal framework for NPOs can be seen in the adoption of laws
that allow better tax incentives for charitable giving. This goes hand-
in-hand with the awareness that China's increasing private wealth (made
possible under Deng Xiaoping Theory) should be better harnessed to
contribute to social and economic development. At present, the
Donations Law and the Income Tax Law permit deductions of up to 30
percent of net income for individual entrepreneurs and up to 3 percent
for corporate donors--both domestic and China-based foreign donors.
More recently, members of the 10th National Committee of the Chinese
People's Political Consultative Congress (CPPCC), were quoted in China
Daily as being in favor of more broadly based incentives for charitable
giving. In addition, the government is aware that it must create more a
more appropriate tax exemption regime for NPOs.
There is also more openness to input from other countries about the
way in which the legal system can be more enabling for NPOs; this is
true despite the ``Falun Gong setback'' in 1999.\1\ In 2003-2004 the
government will have organized or participated in four conferences or
workshops to discuss various aspects of NPO regulation and governance
(two in fall 2003 and two in spring 2004), and the International
Society for Third Sector Research (ISTR) plans to hold its Asia Region
meeting in Beijing in October 2004. After publicly opening up to
foreign technical assistance in this area in 1999 at Asia Foundation
and Ford Foundation/UNDP sponsored conferences (there had been a great
deal of pre-1999 technical assistance, but it was never discussed in
public fora), the government seems to have become increasingly aware of
the need to develop a legal framework that will give more freedom to
NPOs. In fact the two events held in the latter half of 2003 were paid
for solely with government funds and involved significant non-Chinese
participation.
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\1\ Falun Gong scared the Chinese government--it is a non-
government organization that operates outside the normal regulatory
structure. Thus, government attitudes toward Falun Gong briefly
affected thinking about how government should deal with NPOs and civil
society more generally.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
What this all will lead to is not clear. It may all be ``eye-
wash,'' but I doubt it. The government knows full well that it must
relinquish controls and create more independent civil society partners
if it is going to survive. The social and economic problems China
currently faces cannot be solved by government alone--but how fast or
slowly the changes occur will depend on many factors that have nothing
at all to do with technical legal reform efforts. Nevertheless legal
reform is necessary, because without it many organizations will remain
in a legal twilight, described in a recent US Embassy-Beijing briefing
paper--to avoid the strictures surrounding registration and oversight
as an NPO (association, social organization) many register as
``corporations'' under current law. While this has been tolerated for
organizations that are not particularly sensitive from a political
standpoint, such organizations are still subject to corporate tax and
may face other difficulties.
Recent developments suggest that the government has become aware
that legislation is needed, not just regulations, which have a more
temporary character and are not tied into the proposed new Civil Code.
But the underlying theoretical issues remain: how should the legal
reforms take account of increasingly troublesome social and economic
realities; how should they reflect the need to modernize Chinese
society, to make it more fully participatory? Certain objectives are
clear:
1. The State should move away from overt ``control'' of NPOs
and their activities and toward membership and fiduciary
governance structures, with
continuing government oversight;
2. More mechanisms should be provided within the law for
transparency (good internal reporting, recordkeeping, and
accounting rules) buttressed by the development of the
governance norms previously mentioned;
3. There should be clearer accountability (not ``control'')
mechanisms--to the State for funds received and programs
implemented; and to the public and beneficiaries as well,
because they should have ultimate oversight of these issues;
4. There should be more thought given to a clearer tax
exemption regime for NPOs as well as to creating tax incentives
for the working population (through workplace giving) and
rationalizing the existing incentives for entrepreneurs and
businesses; and
5. Regulation of fund raising and asset management by NPOs
should be strengthened, so as to protect the public and the
non-state assets devoted to its welfare.
In addition to these crucial aspects of the written law, it is also
essential that the laws (or the current regulations) be applied in a
fashion that supports rather than stifles civil society. Naturally that
involves a change in mind-set for many government bureaucrats--
principally those in the NGO Bureau of the Ministry of Civil Affairs--
but recent experience suggests that such a change is occurring. In the
first place, government personnel from all over China came together in
November 2002--in a public setting for the first time--to discuss the
issues I am raising here today. Second, the government is earnestly
seeking to train its personnel so as to engender more supportive
attitudes among them. Younger staff members of the NGO Bureau of the
Ministry of Civil Affairs have attended trainings in the United States
and other countries, which expose them to ways of looking at civil
society that are more open than what they see at home. Third, the new
upper echelons of the Ministry, both in Beijing and the provinces, seem
determined to learn about how they can work more closely with more
independent NPOs--they are seeking training and access to more
information about how this is accomplished in other countries.
Writing in 1996, one of the chief American scholars on civil
society in China, Dr. Richard Estes of the University of Pennsylvania
noted as follows:
Chinese legislative authorities simply have not had
sufficient time, nor have they accumulated sufficient
administrative experience, in knowing how to frame an
integrated [set of laws] that effectively deals with the
various roles, functions, tax status, accountability
procedures, and similar issues [for] a rapidly developing,
quasi-independent, social sector.
In the intervening years, administrative practice has become much
more developed, and knowledge of the ways in which the laws and
oversight of other countries address NPO legal issues has increased
immeasurably. In July 1999, at the Asia Foundation sponsored conference
in Beijing, with government officials (from MOCA as well as other
oversight agencies), legal academics, and NPO leaders in the audience,
I suggested that the regulations and regulators view Chinese NPOs as
little children that need to be led by the hand. NPOs, on the other
hand, view themselves at least as teenagers and want to be allowed to
do things on their own. It may still be that the view of NPOs as
children--and possibly unruly children at that--remains. But my sense
is that the government is slowly coming to the realization that the NPO
sector is in fact growing up. And it is my hope that the next few years
will be ones in which the essential issues--both of the law and of its
application--are addressed so that the legal environment for China's
civil society can become truly enabling.
______
Prepared Statement of Nancy Yuan
march 24, 2003
background
China has become Asia's fastest rising economic power. Two decades
of economic liberalization and now entry into the WTO, have resulted in
improved economic indicators, a growing trend toward legal reform, and
an expanding influence throughout Asia. Economic growth and reform has
also had a significant impact on China's domestic social and political
development, creating more opportunity and prosperity, but at the same
time, daunting challenges.
Large scale unemployment as a result of State owned enterprise
reform, and rural unrest among farmers as a result of falling prices
and rising corruption by local
officials, has led to well publicized demonstrations in some parts of
China. Without adequate social safety nets, unemployed workers are left
without basic health care, education or housing, all formerly provided
by their employer. Income disparity has widened sharply between China's
coastal areas and the western provinces, accentuating the gap between
the rich and the poor. The official estimate shows that between 1990
and the end of 1999, household income of the wealthiest 20 percent in
China increased 4.2 times more than that of the lowest 20 percent.
Other problems include environmental degradation and pollution, public
health issues such as HIV/AIDS, and corruption among officials.
While there are some signs of democratic progress, albeit small, in
the election of village committees, experiments with township elections
and even public hearings in provincial and municipal legislatures in
selected areas, fundamental political reform is not truly on the table.
It is true however, that while economic progress has not necessarily
led to more democracy per se, there is a developing rights
consciousness among Chinese citizens, and a better awareness among
government officials that they must be more responsive to the rights
and material needs of the people. While circumstances vary across
China, given the size of the country and the differences between
regions, it is clear that the government must address these problems,
or risk instability and chaos.
current state of china's ngos
One of the most significant developments in China over the past two
decades has been the emergence of civil society organizations. In 1949,
when the Chinese Communist Party came to power, all independent civil
society groups were eliminated, and all remaining social organizations
were brought under the Party's control. China's rapid economic reforms
have led to a fundamental change in the relationship between the party
and the state. The population is weary of ideological campaigns, and
there is an increasing gap between the party and the functions of
state, as well as between the State and the general population. China's
modernization and economic liberalization combined with a growing, more
educated middle class, and serious income disparity between the coastal
and interior provinces, have led to citizen demands for more services,
less corruption and more accountability in government. As such, China
has gradually moved toward a more pluralistic society, with increased
decentralization of authority and services managed by lower levels of
government, and recognition of the rule of law, including the rights of
the individual to protection under the law. These developments have
left space for other actors, thus laying the basis and need for civil
society organizations.
There are many reasons why the Chinese government has come to see
some benefit in the development of a civil society sector in China. As
Nick Young, editor of China Development Brief, notes in an August 2001
special report on China's NGOs, ``government faces a daunting mix of
service gaps, increased demand and fiscal constraints.'' The CCP places
the highest priority on national cohesion and stability, and while
still nervous about the unharnessed power of civil society, it has
still come to the conclusion that civil society organizations can
contribute toward this goal.
There are many types of nongovernment organizations (NGOs), with
few completely independent or structured under laws as defined in
Western countries. Progress in legal regulation of NGOs in China has
been uneven and the application and enforcement are often guided by
political imperatives, such as the restrictive rules that were passed
post-Tiananmen in 1990, and most recently, enforcement of more
restrictive regulations because of concerns over the Falun Gong. Donors
engaged in development efforts in China tend to look for NGOs that are
independent of government, representative of their constituents and
participatory in their decision making as qualifications for
partnership. While these concerns are pertinent to China's situation,
no single definition is sufficient in characterizing the current State
of China's NGOs. Chinese NGOs cannot yet be defined as an ``independent
sector,'' but should be seen in the broader socio-economic development
perspective of China's changing social and political dynamics.
Under Chinese law, laws and regulations exist to govern application
and registration processes, and guide the scope of activities of NGOs.
These require NGOs to register with the Ministry of Civil Affairs or
its provincial or municipal affiliate. This supervisory role of
government over NGOs encourages a close link to government. However,
because of the lack of enforcement and underdevelopment of the legal
system, some NGOs have bypassed this rule and instead registered with
the Bureau of Industry and Commerce as enterprises, so they do not fall
under the same reporting rules or supervisory standards. Today, in
Beijing alone, there are dozens of NGOs that have registered as for-
profit commercial entities or claim to be second tier organizations
under a government agency. These groups are playing an increasingly
important function, which is sometimes different from those
organizations involved in humanitarian activities. These include groups
such as the China Non-Profit Organization (NPO) Network, which acts as
an umbrella group that serves the nongovernmental sector; environmental
groups such as Global Village Beijing which raises awareness of
environmental issues; or Rural Women Knowing All, affiliated with Rural
Women Knowing All Magazine and Rural Women's Training School, which
provides education for rural women in both economic subjects and legal
education.
Over the last decade, there has been a transformation of
traditional mass based government sponsored organizations, such as the
All China Youth Federation and All China Women's Federation, from party
instruments to organizations that increasingly represent the interests
of their constituents. In addition, the space created by the economic
reforms of the 1980s allowed the development of more players. While
these organizations have traditionally had an affiliation with
government in order to operate, and despite the fact that they must
register with the government agency, many have become more independent,
both in program and funding, and are more active in representing the
needs and interests of their constituents through active programs that
address issues of their local communities. Even the largest national
organizations, such as the China Charity Federation and Poverty
Reduction Foundation have ties to the government. These government
organized NGOs (GONGOs) are becoming more independent in management and
fundraising. These are often supported through local ``donations,''
indigenous philanthropy through community, and even overseas Chinese
resources. Because of their ability to deliver services at the local
level, there is a growing recognition of their positive role in
society. Nongovernmental organizations are seen as filling gaps left by
government budget shortfalls, providing social and other welfare
services at local levels, such as elder care, education, and health
care services. On occasion, organizations come together to collaborate,
particularly in service delivery to the poor and disadvantaged.
Regardless of the status or affiliation of the organization,
nongovernmental groups nonetheless perform an important, and
potentially critical function in the context of a changing Chinese
society.
the role of international organizations
The nongovernmental sector in China has evolved quickly. Through
technology and globalization, they have been able to make contacts with
many international NGOs, either those working in the same field, or
those looking to provide financial and technical support. This includes
a wide range of donors, private foundations, private corporations
operating in China and other like minded NGOs. China Development Brief
concluded that China is receiving well over $100 million each year in
project funding directly from or channeled through over 500
international NGOs and foundations. Gifts in kind, such as hundreds of
thousands of books and equipment, add substantially to that total. As
of 2000, there were at least 700 grant making foundations, 70 advocacy
groups, 200 humanitarian organizations and 150 faith based charitable
groups, all foreign, operating in China.
Over the course of China's history, international organizations
have played a supporting role in the development of social
organizations and civil society in China. After normalization of
relations between the U.S. and China in 1979, American foundations with
historical links to China returned to support Chinese institutions.
These included the Rockefeller Foundation, China Medical Board and the
Lingnan Foundation, the Luce Foundation , the Ford Foundation and The
Asia Foundation. Faith based organizations also reestablished
relationships, such as the United Board for Christian Higher Education
in Asia, and other church based or denominational organizations, such
as the Mennonites and Maryknoll Brothers.
The Asia Foundation began supporting nongovernmental entities over
two
decades ago, supporting the development of human resources, program and
research activities and building capacity through grants. This included
early grants to social organizations and NGOs such as Rural Women
Knowing All, as well as recent efforts to encourage linkages between
NGOs in China. The China NPO Network
conducts a monthly NGO forum with Foundation support, which brings
together officials, business and NGO leaders to discuss legislative
issues, and to promote collaboration between organizations. Recently,
the NPO Network has worked with other organizations, including foreign
NGOs, on understanding standards for NGO self-regulation. The Tsinghua
University NPO Center is another organization that has recently
received considerable attention for its research on regulatory issues
facing NGOs. The Foundation has provided support for the first
international conference on the non-profit sector and development at
Tsinghua University in 1999, as well as their research on professional
associations. The Foundation has, with other organizations, provided
input on NGO law and registration issues based upon its active role in
the Asia Pacific Philanthropy Consortium, a regional group which
promotes Asian philanthropic giving and better understanding of legal
and regulatory frameworks governing NGOs in Asia.
In addition to international nonprofit groups and foundations,
multinational corporations have made major investments in China's civil
society organizations in the spirit of corporate social responsibility.
These include companies such as Nike, Adidas, Reebok, Levi Strauss,
Microsoft, The Ford Motor Company, General Motors, Microsoft, and the
U.S. China Business Council, among others. Companies support a wide
range of activities from health and education programs, to rule of law
efforts, poverty alleviation projects and policy research.
Another role that Chinese NGOs can play relates to cross-straits
relations. With common language, culture and single State systems,
organizations in Taiwan and Mainland China have many similar concerns
and have collaborated on activities. These include research activities
on economic development, disaster relief and
humanitarian aid, and exchange programs. The Asia Foundation in Taiwan
has funded several delegations of academics, NGO leaders and
legislative officials from Taiwan to China to discuss issues including
NGO legislation, internal governance and fundraising strategies.
what more can international organizations and donors do?
International organizations can continue to play a significant role
in strengthening civil society organizations, and building capacity in
human resources, organization and program development. China's economic
growth and reform will likely
accelerate in the coming years, leading to increased pressure on
government
resources, with more and more responsibility for social welfare
devolved to lower levels of government. Chinese NGOs have taken
advantage of the space available for independent action by providing
needed services at local levels, filling gaps in education, health,
eldercare, legal aid and education, and many other areas. Future
support will continue to be necessary for Chinese NGOs to begin to
develop the
capacity to sustain their activities, conduct programs that meet the
needs of the population that they serve and eventually, act as
advocates for the causes they
represent.
International organizations and donors can also continue to help
try to improve the environment in which NGOs operate, opening up more
space and providing more opportunities for expansion into different
fields. This includes support for changes in the NGO law and the
overall registration process, as well as support for research and
networking with like-minded organizations both in and outside of China.
For instance, university centers focused on civil society research and
development have proliferated in recent years. All receive
international support. These
include Fudan University's new Social Development and NGO Research
Center (funded by the Himalayan Foundation in Taiwan), three NGO
research institutions at Beijing University, the Research Center for
Volunteerism and Welfare (funded by UNDP), The Non-Profit Law Research
Centre (funded by the Ford Foundation and Oxfam) housed in the Law
School, and the Center for Civil Society Studies, housed in the
Institute of Political Development and Governance. Zhongshan University
also has a new Center for the Study of NGOs, housed in the Zhongshan
University Research Institute for Guangdong Development. It is a joint
venture with the
Chinese University of Hong Kong.
International support for the development of China's
nongovernmental sector is important to its future. In addition to a
friendly regulatory environment under the law, other areas require
support. The recent scandal related to Project Hope China has given
donors pause. How do donors determine the credibility and financial
accountability of Chinese nongovernmental organizations? Donors must be
assured through due diligence that the organizations that they fund are
genuine in their mission and delivery of services while at the same
time, Chinese organizations will have to ensure that funds and programs
are managed responsibly. In order for this to happen, international
assistance can, and should, not only support strategic planning and
program implementation, but also the operational aspects of
nongovernmental organization management in China. Chinese NGOs need
training to raise and account for their funds, commit to transparency
in all aspects of operations,
report to donors and comply with international standards. This
increased and recognized role of NGOs creates an opportunity for reform
that will improve the environment for NGOs through clearer legal
status, more transparency and accountability in their operations, and
progress toward a more meaningful independent sector in China.
In the category of assistance to China's NGOs, U.S. Government
assistance has lagged behind other donors. The only American
organizations with a resident presence and long track record in
supporting civil society organizations have been the Ford Foundation
and The Asia Foundation. There is a marked absence of American groups
working on the ground to develop the capacity of local organizations.
Official American assistance programs for civil society groups in China
has been extremely limited. The European Union, the World Bank, UNDP,
Canadian International Development Agency (CIDA) and Australia's aid
program (AusAid) provide levels of funding from half a million to
several million dollars for civil society development in China. These
donors, among others, have made a commitment to support and advance the
growth of China's civil society organizations, not only in the
significant amount of funding they provide, but also in the attention
they give to their programs, by setting up small grant funds to be
given directly to NGOs (not through government agencies) and
designating specific staff to focus on civil society developments. If
the U.S. wants to support the positive trend of NGO development in
China, funds should be provided to knowledgeable groups who can help
build the capacity of Chinese organizations.
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