[Joint House and Senate Hearing, 108 Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
SPACE SHUTTLE COLUMBIA
=======================================================================
JOINT HEARING
BEFORE THE
SUBCOMMITTEE ON SPACE AND AERONAUTICS
COMMITTEE ON SCIENCE
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
AND THE
COMMITTEE ON COMMERCE, SCIENCE, AND TRANSPORTATION
U.S. SENATE
ONE HUNDRED EIGHTH CONGRESS
FIRST SESSION
__________
FEBRUARY 12, 2003
__________
Serial No. 108-2
__________
Printed for the use of the House Committee on Science and Senate
Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation
Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.house.gov/science
______
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COMMITTEE ON SCIENCE
HON. SHERWOOD L. BOEHLERT, New York, Chairman
LAMAR S. SMITH, Texas RALPH M. HALL, Texas
CURT WELDON, Pennsylvania BART GORDON, Tennessee
DANA ROHRABACHER, California JERRY F. COSTELLO, Illinois
JOE BARTON, Texas EDDIE BERNICE JOHNSON, Texas
KEN CALVERT, California LYNN C. WOOLSEY, California
NICK SMITH, Michigan NICK LAMPSON, Texas
ROSCOE G. BARTLETT, Maryland JOHN B. LARSON, Connecticut
VERNON J. EHLERS, Michigan MARK UDALL, Colorado
GIL GUTKNECHT, Minnesota DAVID WU, Oregon
GEORGE R. NETHERCUTT, JR., MICHAEL M. HONDA, California
Washington CHRIS BELL, Texas
FRANK D. LUCAS, Oklahoma BRAD MILLER, North Carolina
JUDY BIGGERT, Illinois LINCOLN DAVIS, Tennessee
WAYNE T. GILCHREST, Maryland SHEILA JACKSON LEE, Texas
W. TODD AKIN, Missouri ZOE LOFGREN, California
TIMOTHY V. JOHNSON, Illinois BRAD SHERMAN, California
MELISSA A. HART, Pennsylvania BRIAN BAIRD, Washington
JOHN SULLIVAN, Oklahoma DENNIS MOORE, Kansas
J. RANDY FORBES, Virginia ANTHONY D. WEINER, New York
PHIL GINGREY, Georgia JIM MATHESON, Utah
ROB BISHOP, Utah DENNIS A. CARDOZA, California
MICHAEL C. BURGESS, Texas VACANCY
JO BONNER, Alabama VACANCY
TOM FEENEY, Florida VACANCY
VACANCY
------
Subcommittee on Space and Aeronautics
DANA ROHRABACHER, California, Chairman
LAMAR S. SMITH, Texas BART GORDON, Tennessee
CURT WELDON, Pennsylvania JOHN B. LARSON, Connecticut
JOE BARTON, Texas CHRIS BELL, Texas
KEN CALVERT, California NICK LAMPSON, Texas
ROSCOE G. BARTLETT, Maryland MARK UDALL, Colorado
GEORGE R. NETHERCUTT, JR., DAVID WU, Oregon
Washington EDDIE BERNICE JOHNSON, Texas
FRANK D. LUCAS, Oklahoma SHEILA JACKSON LEE, Texas
JOHN SULLIVAN, Oklahoma BRAD SHERMAN, California
J. RANDY FORBES, Virginia DENNIS MOORE, Kansas
ROB BISHOP, Utah ANTHONY D. WEINER, New York
MICHAEL BURGESS, Texas VACANCY
JO BONNER, Alabama RALPH M. HALL, Texas
TOM FEENEY, Florida
SHERWOOD L. BOEHLERT, New York
BILL ADKINS Subcommittee Staff Director
ED FEDDEMAN Professional Staff Member
RUBEN VAN MITCHELL Professional Staff Member
KEN MONROE, Professional Staff Member
CHRIS SHANK Professional Staff Member
RICHARD OBERMANN Democratic Professional Staff Member
TOM HAMMOND Staff Assistant
U.S. SENATE
COMMITTEE ON COMMERCE, SCIENCE, AND TRANSPORTATION
HON. JOHN MCCAIN, Arizona, Chairperson
TED STEVENS, Alaska ERNEST F. HOLLINGS, South Carolina
CONRAD BURNS, Montana DANIEL K. INOUYE, Hawaii
TRENT LOTT, Mississippi JOHN D. ROCKEFELLER IV, West
KAY BAILEY HUTCHISON, Texas Virginia
OLYMPIA J. SNOWE, Maine JOHN F. KERRY, Massachusetts
SAM BROWNBACK, Kansas JOHN B. BREAUX, Louisiana
GORDON SMITH, Oregon BYRON L. DORGAN, North Dakota
PETER G. FITZGERALD, Illinois RON WYDEN, Oregon
JOHN ENSIGN, Nevada BARBARA BOXER, California
GEORGE ALLEN, Virginia BILL NELSON, Florida
JOHN O. SUNUNU, New Hampshire MARIA CANTWELL, Washington
FRANK LAUTENBERG, New Jersey
FLOYD DESCHAMPS, Republican Senior Professional Staff
KEN LA SALA, Republican Professional Staff
JEAN TOAL EISEN, Democratic Senior Professional Staff
C O N T E N T S
February 12, 2003
Page
Opening Statements
Statement by the Hon. John McCain, U.S. Senator from the State of
Arizona; Chairman, Committee on Commerce, Science, and
Technology, U.S. Senate........................................ 1
Statement by the Hon. Sherwood L. Boehlert, Representative from
the State of New York; Chairman, Committee on Science, U.S.
House of Representatives....................................... 2
Written Statement............................................ 3
Statement by the Hon. Ernest O. Hollings, U.S. Senator from the
State of South Carolina........................................ 4
Written Statement............................................ 6
Statement by Representative Ralph M. Hall, Ranking Minority
Member, Committee on Science, U.S. House of Representatives.... 61
Written Statement............................................ 62
Statement by the Hon. Ted Stevens, U.S. Senator from the State of
Alaska......................................................... 63
Prepared Statement the Hon. Frank R. Lautenberg, U.S. Senator
from the State of New Jersey................................... 6
Prepared Statement by Representative Sheila Jackson Lee, Member,
Committee on Science, U.S. House of Representatives............ 7
Prepared Statement by Representative Zoe Lofgren, Member,
Committee on Science, U.S. House of Representatives............ 8
Witness
Sean O'Keefe, Administrator, National Aeronautics and Space
Administration; accompanied by Frederick D. Gregory, Deputy
Administrator, and William F. Readdy, Associate Administrator
for Space Flight
Oral Statement............................................... 9
Written Statement............................................ 19
Discussion
Effects of Budget Decisions on Shuttle Program................. 64
Changes Needed to Assure an Independent Investigation.......... 65
Contractor Incentives and Obligations.......................... 66
NASA's Budget Request to OMB................................... 70
Crew Escape Systems............................................ 71
Questioning NASA's Goals and Objectives........................ 73
History of Tile Damage and Loss................................ 76
Reiterating the Need for an Independent Investigation Board.... 80
ASAP's Safety Concerns......................................... 81
Questioning an Aging System.................................... 82
Suggesting a Presidential Commission........................... 84
ISS Contingency Planning....................................... 87
Role of Automation and Robotics................................ 90
Crew Escape Systems............................................ 93
Replacing the Space Shuttle Orbiter............................ 110
NASA Workforce Legislation..................................... 111
Manned vs. Unmanned Spacecraft................................. 112
Thermal Tile Adhesive.......................................... 113
Debris Assessment and Need for Imagery......................... 115
Re-evaluating NASA's Mission................................... 129
Lessons From the Challenger Investigation...................... 139
Appendix 1: Answers to Post-Hearing Questions
Responses by the National Aeronautics and Space Administration
(NASA) 148
Appendix 2: Additional Material for the Record
National Aeronautics and Space Administration Charter of the
Aerospace Safety Advisory Panel, signed and dated May 1, 2003.. 160
SPACE SHUTTLE COLUMBIA
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FEBRUARY 12, 2003
Subcommittee on Space and Aeronautics,
House of Representatives,
Committee on Science,
Joint with U.S. Senate,
Committee on Commerce, Science,
and Transportation,
Washington, DC.
The Committees met, pursuant to notice, at 9:35 a.m. in
Room SR-325, Russell Senate Office Building, Hon. John McCain,
Chairman of the Senate Committee, presiding.
OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. JOHN McCAIN, U.S. SENATOR FROM
ARIZONA
Chairman McCain. Good morning. I welcome my colleagues from
the House Science Committee and Administrator O'Keefe.
To keep this hearing to a reasonable length, I appreciate
my colleagues' indulgence in limiting opening statements only
to those of the chairmen and Ranking Members of the Senate
Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation and the
House Science Committee.
Following Administrator O'Keefe's statement, all Members
will be recognized for four minutes to ask questions. We will
alternate between Senators and House Members for questions,
which is the normal procedure in joint hearings of this nature.
On February 1st, the Nation suffered a devastating loss. As
the Space Shuttle Columbia descended from orbit, it broke
apart. Debris from the accident is still being collected by
government agencies and volunteers with the hope that this
evidence will help determine the cause of the accident.
The Space Shuttle crew was a remarkable team of
professionals. They were and will always be role models for all
Americans. Their dedicated service and sacrifice to promote
scientific research not only for our country, but for the
world, will never be forgotten. They paid the ultimate price in
pursuit of not only their dreams, but the dreams of nations.
For that, we will be forever grateful.
As we look to the future of the space program, we can pay
tribute to our fallen heroes by diligently carrying out our
responsibilities as legislators. In today's hearing, we hope to
examine what went wrong on February 1st, the status of the
investigation, and how we can ensure that an accident like this
will never happen again.
This will be the first of a series of hearings on NASA and
our space program. While today we're focusing on the Columbia,
the accident also has focused our attention on the broader
policy issues that perhaps we have neglected for too long. In
subsequent hearings we will address the role of manned and
unmanned space exploration, the costs and benefits of
continuing the shuttle program, and our investment in the
International Space Station and the effectiveness of NASA
management. More fundamentally, we must examine the goals of
our space program.
I firmly believe that manned space exploration should
continue. Its nature, however, should be and will be examined.
We also must examine the extent to which Congress and the
Administration may have neglected the Shuttle's safety program.
A comprehensive examination necessitates a review of our own
actions and those of the Administration to determine if the
Shuttle program was underfunded or managed in a manner that
compromised safety.
I applaud Administrator Sean O'Keefe and NASA for their
openness and availability. This has been an extraordinarily
trying time for everyone in the agency. The Administrator and
other officials have conducted themselves in a manner worthy of
an agency that is not only a national brain trust, but is
entrusted with realizing the dreams of all humanity. Many have
noted the vast improvement of the release of information, as
compared to the Challenger tragedy of 1986.
I would like to assure the families of the brave men and
women who died aboard the Columbia and the dedicated employees
of NASA that we will do everything in our power to identify the
cause of this tragedy and remedy it.
I thank Administrator O'Keefe and his team for appearing
before us today, and I look forward to the testimony.
STATEMENT OF HON. SHERWOOD L. BOEHLERT, U.S. REPRESENTATIVE
FROM NEW YORK
Chairman Boehlert. We usually open hearings by talking
about what a pleasure it is to be here today. But, of course,
that is not the case. I'm reminded of what Lyndon Johnson said
when he appeared before Congress after the Kennedy
assassination. He said, ``All I have, I gladly would have given
not to be standing before you today.'' I'm sure that is the way
we all feel with the tragic loss of the Columbia crew so fresh
in our minds and in our hearts.
But we owe it to those astronauts and their families and to
the American public to work as hard as humanly possible to
determine the cause of the Shuttle's breakup and to rigorously
pursue all the policy questions the accident brings to a head.
I view this hearing as a start of a very long conversation
we will all be having about the Columbia incident and its
ramifications. I think that it's very appropriate that we start
that conversation on a bicameral basis, and I want to thank
Senator McCain for being so willing to make this a Joint
Hearing. The House and the Senate and NASA are going to have to
cooperate as we each review the accident and the human space
flight program, and our joint work today should send a clear
signal that we can and will do just that.
We will also be coordinating with the Columbia Accident
Investigation Board headed by Admiral Gehman. I've spoken to
Admiral Gehman, and I am impressed with the Admiral's
determination to be independent and deliberate, vowing to be
swayed neither by outside pressures or artificial deadlines.
And I appreciate the swiftness with which Administrator O'Keefe
activated the board.
That said, the more I've read the board's charter, the more
I've become convinced that it must be rewritten. The words of
the charter simply do not guarantee the independence and
latitude that both the Administrator and the Admiral have
sincerely promised. The charter's words need to match
everyone's intent now to avoid any problems later. I also
continue to believe that several more members should be added
to the board to ensure that it has the appropriate breadth of
experience and expertise.
We will be working closely with the board as the Science
Committee proceeds with its own bipartisan investigation, which
will focus on the many policy questions raised by the accident.
We're going to have to raise some tough and basic questions
that have gone unanswered for too long.
What are the true risks of flying the Shuttle, especially
if it's going to remain in service for another 10 to 15 years?
What are the true costs of continuing the Shuttle program at
specific levels of risk? And what are the advantages of
investing in the Shuttle, as compared to investing in other
NASA programs, other R&D programs, and, indeed, other
government programs, in general?
But we can't begin to deal with those overarching issues
until we have a better sense of what happened to the Columbia
and why, and it's obviously too soon to expect to know that.
No one should expect any revelations at today's hearing. We
are here today to get a status report. We ought to avoid
pronouncements today that we may later come to regret.
I'm reminded of an interview I once read with an executive
of the utility that owned Three Mile Island at the time of the
accident there. He was asked, ``What was the worst thing you
did in handling the accident?'' He answered immediately. He
said, ``We just didn't have the presence of mind to say, `I
don't know.' ''
I would advise Administrator O'Keefe, who has responded
magnificently in this time of crisis, don't hesitate to say,
``I don't know.'' You're still in search of elusive answers.
Despite the best of intentions, NASA has at times already
put out misleading information because it didn't check the
facts. For example, information indicating that environmental
rules could have contributed to the accident have so far turned
out to be entirely spurious, but it's taken NASA a long time to
clarify its statements.
Today is a chance to put facts into the record, facts that
will help chart NASA's future. If we are to find the facts and
honor the memory of the Columbia crew, we have to approach our
task in a true spirit of exploration, with open and probing
minds, without preconceived notions or foregone conclusions.
That should be our goal today.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
[The prepared statement of Chairman Boehlert follows:]
Prepared Statement of Chairman Sherwood L. Boehlert
We usually open hearings by talking about what a pleasure it is to
be here. But of course today that is not the case. I'm reminded of what
Lyndon Johnson said when he appeared before Congress after the Kennedy
assassination: ``All I have, I gladly would have given, not to be
standing before you today.'' I'm sure that is the way we all feel, with
the tragic loss of the Columbia crew so fresh in our minds and in our
hearts.
But we owe it to those astronauts and their families, and to the
American public, to work as hard as is humanly possible to determine
the cause of the Shuttle's breakup and to rigorously pursue all the
policy questions the accident brings to a head.
I view this hearing as the start of a very long conversation we
will all be having about the Columbia incident and its ramifications. I
think that it's very appropriate that we start that conversation on a
bicameral basis, and I want to thank Senator McCain for being so open
to making this a joint hearing. The House and the Senate and NASA are
going to have to cooperate as we each review the accident and the Human
Space Flight program, and our joint work today should send a clear
signal that we can and will do just that.
We will also all be coordinating with the Columbia Accident
Investigation Board, headed by Admiral Gehman. I spoke to Admiral
Gehman earlier this week, as did our Committee staff on a bipartisan
basis. I am impressed with the Admiral's determination to be
independent and deliberate, vowing to be swayed neither by outside
pressures or artificial deadlines. That's the right attitude, and we
will be watching to ensure that it guides the Board's proceedings.
We will be working with Admiral Gehman as the Science Committee
proceeds with its own bipartisan investigation, which will focus on the
many policy questions raised by the accident. In the end, we must have
a full appraisal and open debate about the true risks of flying the
Shuttle, the true costs of continuing the Shuttle program at specific
levels of risk, and the comparative advantages of investing in the
Shuttle as opposed to other NASA programs, or indeed as opposed to
other R&D programs or government programs, in general.
But we can't begin to deal with those overarching issues until we
have a better sense of what happened to the Columbia and why, and it's
obviously too soon to expect to know that. No one should expect any
revelations at today's hearing. We are here today to get a status
report.
We all ought to avoid pronouncements today that we may later come
to regret. I'm reminded of an interview I once read with an executive
of the utility that owned Three Mile Island at the time of the accident
there. He was asked, ``What was the worst thing you did in handling the
accident?'' He answered immediately. He said, ``We just didn't have the
presence of mind to say, 'I don't know.''' I would advise Administrator
O'Keefe, who has responded magnificently in this time of crisis: don't
hesitate to say, ``I don't know.''
Despite the best of intentions, NASA has already sometimes put out
misleading information because it didn't check the facts. For example,
information indicating that environmental rules could have contributed
to the accident has so far turned out to be entirely spurious. But it's
taken NASA a long time to clarify its statements.
One reason I believe that today's hearing can be useful is that
with so much information is already floating around from so many
sources, it's important that Congress and NASA have an opportunity to
create a clear record of where things stand at this point.
It's especially important today that we get a clear sense of how
NASA will handle the investigation and what contingency plans are in
place should the Shuttle be grounded for an extended period of time.
I'm sure we will also examine how NASA had been viewing the long-range
safety of the Shuttle prior to the accident and how this may already
have changed.
All of us are still mourning the loss of the Columbia crew, but we
must now turn to planning the future. And we can do that only in a true
spirit of exploration--with a full and open examination of all the
facts, without preconceived notions or foregone conclusions. That
process starts today. Thank you.
Chairman McCain. Senator Hollings.
STATEMENT OF HON. ERNEST O. HOLLINGS, U.S. SENATOR FROM SOUTH
CAROLINA
Senator Hollings. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman, for
calling this meeting. We welcome our colleagues from the House
side and my old friend, Administrator O'Keefe. We're glad to
have you with us.
Chairman Boehlert, I got the message, ``Let's don't jump to
conclusions.'' I'm reading in the morning paper a similar
message--Admiral Gehman said that ``the investigation with
solid evidence thus far hard to come by.'' On the contrary, we
have a lot of solid evidence that we've come by, and I sort of
discern some kind of eery avoidance here of what really
happened.
Here is the hard evidence. NASA's had a long history of
problems with the Shuttle's heat tiles. We know that the
Columbia's VERY first mission, many of the tiles flew off.
That's 22 years ago. In 1994, a study entitled the Risk
Management for the Tiles of the Space Shuttle, by Stanford and
Carnegie Mellon University, found that 15 percent of the
Shuttle's tiles account for 85 percent of the risk. And that
was confirmed by a 1997 study by the National Academy of
Sciences.
Then a study by the Johnson Space Center in March of 2000
found that the leading edges of the wing, quote, ``pose the
highest risk for critical failure,'' end quote. And then during
the launch of the Columbia on January the 16th, we have video
evidence of debris striking the Shuttle orbiter 81 seconds
after launch, potentially causing a gash in the left wing of
some 30 inches long, seven inches wide, and over two-and-a-half
inches thick. And then 18 minutes from landing, the Shuttle was
pitching and yawing due to drag on the left wing.
And, of course, this morning's paper says that as it was
coming down, and I'm quoting the Mission Control, ``FYI,'' for
your information, ``I've just lost four separate temperature
transducers on the left side of the vehicle, hydraulic return
temperatures,'' he calmly reported.
Again quoting, eight minutes before all communications was
lost, Mr. Kling noticed the loss of data from temperature
gauges on the left wing on the spacecraft as he monitored the
Shuttle's descent into the atmosphere. A few moments later, Mr.
Kling reported drag on the spaceship, but controllers expressed
no alarm.
And, finally, the elevons, the picture that showed the
elevons, tried to counteract that drag in engine thrusters to
help it gain control, because a minute before the explosion,
the U.S. Air Force captured that picture of the Shuttle showing
a bulge of deformity along the front edge of the left wing.
Right on down the list.
Mr. Administrator, I would think, in the testimony, we all
agree that we don't want to jump to conclusions. We all agree
to be very thorough and leave no stone unturned, but we do have
a rebuttable presumption here that the damage to the left wing
at the time of liftoff was the cause. And let's rebut it. Let's
find something. But don't all of a sudden be discovering debris
all around and all of these other things that pant one way and
say we have no idea what happened.
I have been in these investigations before, and we knew
exactly what happened at the Challenger. Allen McDonald said he
was in the control room. They had warned not to take it off. It
was going to cause a catastrophe. And he said one gentlemen
said, ``There she goes.'' Another one said, ``Like a piece of
cake.'' Then he said it exploded, and everyone in the room knew
why. We spent years investigating to find out the same thing
that we knew immediately at the time of explosion.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
[The prepared statement of Senator Hollings follows:]
Prepared Statement of Senator Ernest O. Hollings
I would like to begin by offering my condolences to the family
members of the Space Shuttle Columbia crew of mission STS-107. These
heroes gave their lives in the advancement of science and all Americans
should be overwhelmed by their sacrifice. The Columbia crew was on a
special mission to conduct scientific research in outer space. As a
strong supporter of scientific research, I'm grateful to all the men
and women of NASA who undertake such endeavors to advance scientific
knowledge.
Welcome Administrator O'Keefe. You are here today to provide my
distinguished colleagues and I with answers of how this tragedy was
allowed to happen. There is a question as to whether this committee has
consistently provided NASA with the funds it has requested for the
Space Shuttle program. We want to get to the bottom of this accident so
that we can ensure that it does not happen again.
Now I know that the NASA engineers have developed this ``fault
tree'' to identify all the possible causes of this tragic event.
Branches are continually added, but nothing is eliminated.
Investigators are exploring every lead, but the facts of the matter
are:
We have video evidence of debris striking the Shuttle
orbiter 81 seconds after launch. Engineers estimated the
damaged tile area in the left wing to be 30 inches long by 7
inches wide, yet there was no concern for the tiles failing
upon re-entry into the Earth's atmosphere.
NASA's had a long history of problems with the heat
tiles. These problems date back to 1981 when the first Columbia
launch came back with lost or damaged tiles.
NASA has recognized the tile problem. Numerous
studies have been conducted. In 1990 a study found that 15
percent of the Shuttle's tiles account for 85 percent of its
risks and recommended that improving maintenance procedures
could reduce the probability of tile related Shuttle accidents
by 70 percent.
Less than 18 minutes from landing, the Shuttle was
pitching and yawing due to drag on the left wing. Its elevons
tried to counteract the drag and engine thrusters had fired to
gain control.
It is clear that we have a rebuttable presumption to go forward
with the investigation to focus the examination on how the tiles failed
causing the catastrophic failure.
Chairman McCain. Thank you, Senator Hollings.
Congressman Hall hasn't arrived yet, so we will proceed to
Mr. O'Keefe, the Administrator of the National Aeronautics and
Space Administration. He's accompanied by Mr. Frederick D.
Gregory, who is the Deputy Administrator, and Mr. William
Reedy, the Associate Administrator for Space Flight. If you'd
like to join--or they can remain where they are.
And, again, I want to thank you for the extreme willingness
on your part to share all information that you have with not
only Members of Congress, but with the American people.
Please proceed, Mr. O'Keefe, and I hope you understand that
we're interested in as thorough a briefing as possible, as are
Americans who are viewing this hearing today.
Thank you.
[The prepared statement of Senator Lautenberg follows:]
Prepared Statement of Senator Frank R. Lautenberg
Mr. Chairman,
Today's hearing on the Space Shuttle Columbia disaster and the
hearings likely to follow in the weeks and months ahead will bring
additional pain to that which we already feel while in a period of
mourning for seven brave, exceptional human beings in the prime of
life. The hearings will also bring pain because, frankly, indications
are that some earlier warnings might have raised questions about
whether or not presumption of risk was insufficiently reviewed.
The Space Shuttle Columbia disaster forces us to ask difficult
questions. The Federal Government has spent more than $60 billion on
the Space Shuttle program, the International Space Station, and the X-
33/VentureStar Space Plane (which advocates believed would replace the
Shuttle). Our fleet of Shuttles is grounded at least until we determine
what caused the Columbia accident and fix it; the three-person crew of
the Space Station spends 80 percent of their time on maintenance; and
the Bush Administration has canceled the Space Plane project. As a
result of that cancellation, we now intend to continue using Shuttles
at least until 2012, and possibly beyond 2020. Some of the technology
on the Shuttles is 30 years old. We never intended to use them this
long.
I want to make it clear that I feel that the Shuttle astronauts
made a major contribution to our effort to assess the value to
humankind of research in space, and I grieve over their deaths. The
desire to reach for the stars is as old as human history and the
ambitions embodied in our manned space program are noble ones. But we
have had two fatal accidents in 113 Shuttle missions. Many people have
become inured to the dangers inherent in sending people into space and
bringing them back safely. But the fact is, it's a high-risk venture.
Some risk is unavoidable--that's what makes our astronauts such brave
individuals. But are we willing to divert precious resources available
for other essential research and experimentation planned or in place to
reduce the risks of manned space exploration to the point where they
become acceptable?
Because of the downturn in the economy that started in March 2001,
the September 11th terrorist attacks, and the tax cuts enacted that
year, we are facing federal budget deficits ``as far as the eye can
see.'' And now the Administration proposes to reduce federal revenues
even more. How can we guarantee that we can spend what it takes to make
the space effort safer and successful? If we make the investment
necessary, what benefits will we reap from continued Shuttle
operations? What are the ``opportunity costs'' of such an investment?
In other words, what other national priorities will suffer in the
battle for scarce funds? Our manned space exploration program has been
long on ambition but increasingly short on the hard-headed assessments
needed to answer these fundamental questions.
Manned space exploration isn't cheap. If we try to do it on the
cheap, we put safety--and people's lives--at risk. I'm sure we will
hear in testimony today and in the future that safety has never been
compromised. But NASA has always had problems overseeing its
contractors. And the National Research Council has concluded that the
contract to manage the Shuttle program awarded to United Space Alliance
in 1996 contained financial incentives for investments in efficiency,
but not for investments in modernization and safety improvements.
Much of today's hearing and the hearings to come will focus on
technical matters--possible causes of the Columbia accident, possible
safety improvements. I am interested to know, for instance, what
steps--if any--NASA took to ensure Columbia's safe re-entry after
determining that debris--presumably foam insulation from the fuel
tank--hit and may have damaged the left win during lift-off. I am also
interested in learning from NASA Administrator Sean O'Keefe what
additional safety precautions might have been assured with greater
funding. And I want to know what safety upgrades, if any, were made
after the Columbia space flights scheduled for August 2000 and March
2002 were postponed.
In the course of today's hearing and future hearings, we will also
scrutinize NASA's relationship with its contractors. We will also
review Congress's relationship with NASA. We will analyze
Administration budget requests for NASA past and present.
I hope our investigation will be more about fixing problems than
fixing blame--although determining accountability obviously is
important. But beyond such immediate concerns, I hope we will address
the harder question about whether the benefits outweigh the risks when
we send people into space at this time and in the current fashion when
unmanned missions can almost entirely match the quality of human
participation.
[The prepared statement of Ms. Jackson Lee follows:]
Prepared Statement of Representative Sheila Jackson Lee
Mr. Chairman,
Thank you for calling this hearing and bringing us all together to
speak and learn about the Columbia tragedy. This is a tough time for
all of us from the Houston community, but especially for the team at
Johnson Space Center. To the world those astronauts were valiant
heroes; to us they were also friends, neighbors, and family--or as the
Houston Chronicle proclaimed them, ``The Heroes Next Door.'' I am
impressed by the diligence, progress, and openness of the NASA
investigators that we have all been getting to know through the press.
Those investigators have a difficult job ahead, and it is essential
that that job be done well. We must find all the available facts, and
we must not jump to hasty conclusions. It seems that the data is
pouring in, in the form of video, computer analysis and collection of
debris. I am concerned by reports of loose foam or ice that may have
damaged the left wing during liftoff, especially since this may have
been a problem in a past mission. I want to know what was done to keep
such chunks from detaching and striking our multi-billion dollar
Shuttle, entrusted with the lives of 7 Americans.
However, we cannot be myopic and disregard or short-change other
evidence and explanations. The inquiries must be methodical and
objective. The team must leave no room for suspicion of cover-up or
sloppiness. The families of the seven valiant crew members that lost
loved ones deserve to know why this tragedy happened, as do the
American people. Most importantly, we owe it to our brave future
astronauts to show them our commitment to their safety.
I am pleased that after we Democrats in the Science Committee sent
a letter to the President expressing our concerns about the
independence of the investigatory board, that the hearing and make-up
of the board were changed. However, I feel there is still room for
improvement. I recommend the inclusion of Nobel Laureates,
academicians, and depending on their interests--perhaps family members
of lost crew. It is important that the team is weighted toward bright
people, who are not employees of NASA, and who do not have close
personal ties to NASA or the Administrator.
The conclusions we all reach must not only be in the form of,
``Part A broke, and part B got too hot.'' We must discern what were the
factors that led to those parts being included in a vehicle entrusted
with seven lives and such an important mission. What were the quality
assurance protocols? Were corners cut?
Furthermore, this investigation needs to be expeditious. We have
three Space Shuttles with critical missions already planned. We also
have the International Space Station, with three astronauts high up
above us waiting to hear their own futures. Thankfully, we have
partnered with our Russian allies and others and ensured that we have
the means to get those astronauts home, even though we may need to
ground our own fleet for some time. However, we cannot continually
place American lives in the hands of another nation for long. Nor can
we risk losing the use of the International Space Station that we have
been working so hard, and investing so much, to achieve.
[The prepared statement of Ms. Lofgren follows:]
Prepared Statement of Representative Zoe Lofgren
I'd like to thank Congressman Boehlert and Senator McCain for
convening this hearing. Over the next few months, we will be asking
some tough questions related to the breakup and loss of the Columbia,
and the future of the United States space program. But first, our
country has paused to reflect on the heroism of the seven astronauts
who gave their lives so that the dreams of humans reaching for the
stars can live forever. My thoughts go out to the families of our
fallen, and to the extended NASA family.
I am pleased the NASA Administrator Sean O'Keefe has joined us here
today. I look forward to hearing from and working with you and the
dedicated and hard working members of the NASA employee family, as we
seek answers to our concerns about the future of the United States
space program. I trust that you will ask us for help, keep us informed
and be prepared to make your recommendations to this committee that
will help us be able to move our space program forward. I firmly
believe this committee must focus on asking the difficult questions
that relate to how we are best able to resume our quest to explore
space.
This committee must work in a nonpartisan manner and should not
waste any time in trying to assess blame or create excuses for things
that should have been done to help prevent this immense tragedy and
loss. To do so would be a waste of time and money and, more
importantly, would dishonor the sacrifices made of the brave Columbia
crew and devalue the efforts being made by all who seek to ensure that
this never happens again.
I believe that our pursuit of answers to this tragedy would best be
served by the appointment of a truly independent board of inquiry, much
like President Reagan appointed after the Challenger disaster. Until
that happens, Mr. O'Keefe, I am pleased that you accepted some of the
recommendations contained in a letter sent to the President last week
by 16 Democratic members of the House Science Committee. I am sure many
of our Republican colleagues would have joined us in expressing our
concerns about the composition of the review board, and I am confident
they would have echoed our concerns. Without these changes, I believe
the results of this work would have been viewed with great skepticism
and certainly would have suffered without the added, independent
expertise of the new members of the board. Just as Columbia's crew went
into space seeking to expand our knowledge of space, we must do all in
our power to ensure that our investigations will answer more questions
than they create.
Mr. Chairman, I am committed to sending humans into space. We are
explorers by nature, and I believe we must explore our own planet and
those beyond. I believe these hearings need to focus not only on
investigating the policy concerns that led to the Shuttle tragedy, but
where we go from here in the exploration of space.
Has NASA shifted monies to the ISS and away from the
Shuttle program?
Are we going to develop the next generation of space
vehicle, and should we pursue a single-stage-to-orbit program?
Should we also develop the use of expendable rockets
to ferry equipment and personnel to the International Space
Station?
Are we prepared to fund this program--as I think we
should--in the current budget climate?
With this in mind, I believe this committee can best honor the
memory of Columbia's crew by conducting an honest examination of the
role, if any, of recent budget cuts played in this disaster. Should we
take this opportunity to acknowledge that the Space Shuttle has never
lived up to its dreams of being a cost effective way of traveling to
space? Or are we better served by pursuing a new generation of space
vehicles, one that can take advantage of the tremendous advances in our
knowledge and our technologies than those present in the remaining
Shuttle fleet?
STATEMENT OF SEAN O'KEEFE, ADMINISTRATOR, NATIONAL AERONAUTICS
AND SPACE ADMINISTRATION; ACCOMPANIED BY FREDERICK D. GREGORY,
DEPUTY ADMINISTRATOR, AND WILLIAM O. READDY, ASSOCIATE
ADMINISTRATOR FOR SPACE FLIGHT
Mr. O'Keefe. Good morning. Thank you, Mr. Chairman,
Chairman Boehlert.
I appreciate the opportunity to appear before this hearing
of the Senate Commerce, Science, and Transportation Committee
and the House Science Subcommittee on Space and Aeronautics to
discuss the tragic loss of the courageous crew of the Space
Shuttle Columbia----
Chairman McCain. Could you pull the microphone a little
closer?
Mr. O'Keefe. --the ongoing investigation into this tragedy
and the implications of the loss of Columbia to the Nation's
space exploration efforts.
This morning, 11 days after the accident, our work
continues to honor the solemn pledge we made to the astronauts'
families and to the American people, that we'll find out what
caused the loss of the Columbia and its crew, correct what
problems we find, and do our utmost to make sure this never
happens again.
We welcome the Joint Committee's interest in working with
NASA to determine how we can learn from this tragic accident so
that we continue advancing the Nation's research and
exploration objectives in space while at the same time striving
to ensure that we make human space flight as safe as possible.
Throughout NASA's 45 years of serving the public interest,
Congress has been our partner helping us achieve the goals
outlined in NASA's congressionally authorized charter. This
charter compels NASA to explore, use, and enable the
development of space for human enterprise; advance scientific
knowledge and understanding of the Earth, the solar system, and
the universe; and use the environment of space for research;
research, develop, verify, and transfer advanced aeronautics,
space, and related technologies.
With the support of Congress, NASA has amassed a record of
significant achievements that have tangibly improved the lives
of all Americans. And when we have erred, you have helped us
right our course.
This morning, you'll be asking tough questions, and that's
as it should be. Believe me, none of the questions that you
will ask can be any tougher than those we're asking of
ourselves. I can assure you, however, that whatever
determinations are reached regarding the cause of the accident,
you'll find that complacency is not one of them.
An ethos of safety is evident throughout the agency. For
example, last year we temporarily halted Shuttle flight
operations when tiny cracks of less than two inches were
discovered in metal liners used to direct the fuel flow inside
the propellent lines on two separate orbiters. We did not fly
again until that problem was corrected. In a signal of our
continuing commitment to rewarding such diligence, we also made
it a point to praise a very young examiner, a fellow named
David Strait, the young contract employee who had actually
discovered the cracks.
Other flight decisions made throughout the year were made
with the goal of operational safety being paramount. And from
working with the dedicated employees who keep the Shuttle
flying safely, I know they have the utmost regard for the
enormity of that duty.
This week, at NASA centers throughout the country and in
the field, with the support of more than 2,000 people from more
than 20 federal agencies, state and local organizations, the
important work of data analysis and recovery operations is
continuing. We should all be extremely proud of the work that's
being conducted by these dedicated public servants.
President Bush observed last week, ``The people of NASA are
being tested once again. In your grief, you are responding as
your friends would have wished, with focus, professionalism,
and unbroken faith in the mission of this agency. Captain Brown
was correct, America's space program will go on.'' We intend to
maintain that professionalism he referred to until we reach
conclusion and beyond.
This morning, to help frame our discussion, I'd like to
review for you the significant actions NASA has taken since the
morning of the accident in accord with our contingency plan. In
addition to articulating notification of first-response
procedures defining the roles and responsibility of mishap
response and Mishap Investigation Teams, the plan specifies
selections of persons outside of NASA to head an independent,
seasoned, accident investigation team. Now, while we did not
foresee this tragedy, our response has unfolded as we had
planned and prepared for in that contingency plan that we had
hoped to never have to activate.
This plan was one of many positive outcomes from the
terrible loss of the Space Shuttle Challenger 17 years ago. So
we developed the plan shortly after that and have updated it
before every flight. And a contingency was simulated for this
very event just three months ago.
When we first became aware of the problems with STS-107, I
was waiting at the Space Shuttle landing strip at the Kennedy
Space Center, Cape Canaveral, on Saturday morning, February the
1st. At 8:59 a.m. eastern time, we lost communication with the
Columbia. At 9:16, the countdown arrival clock reached zero,
and there was no signal or sign of the Columbia. Captain Bill
Readdy, our Associate Administrator for Space Flight and a
former astronaut, declared a space flight contingency and
activated the recovery control center at the Kennedy Space
Center. At that point, Bill Readdy and I departed the landing
strip and headed to the launch control center.
We arrived at the launch control center 13 minutes later.
At 9:29 a.m., we activated the contingency action plan for
space flight operations. Through the White House situation
room, we notified the President as well as other senior staff
of the loss of communications. In addition, Members of Congress
and the Government of Israel were notified. Homeland Security
Secretary Tom Ridge and the National Security Council were also
made aware of the situation and were present there in the
situation room that morning.
Secretary Ridge then began assessing the possibility that
this situation was terrorism related. Shortly after, he made
the determination it was highly unlikely terrorism was
involved. Secretary Ridge then announced that the Federal
Emergency Management Agency would be the lead federal agency
for the recovery effort on the ground.
Meanwhile, the family members of the Columbia astronauts
were escorted from the landing strip to the astronauts' crew
quarters. Later that morning, at about 11:30, we met with the
families at the crew quarters at Kennedy Space Center to
express our condolences, offer any and all support we could
give, and assure them that we would offer that support
throughout this entire ordeal, and stated our commitment to
find the cause of the accident, fix the problems we find, and
continue the work that their loved ones had started.
Data at all the NASA sites and contractors were impounded
at 10 a.m., and the headquarters action team in Washington,
D.C., was activated with NASA personnel moving immediately to
their duty stations. By 10:30, an hour after the contingency
plan had been activated, the mishap response team convened to
assess the preliminary data and focus on the location of the
crew compartment through the Rescue Coordination Center at
Langley Air Force Base in Virginia. The rapid response team was
activated for deployment to Barksdale Air Force Base in
Louisiana that day.
The process of initiating the Columbia Accident
Investigation Board began about 10:30 a.m. on Saturday,
February 1st, one hour after the contingency plan was
activated. I placed a call to the NASA deputy administrator,
Fred Gregory, also a former astronaut, who was at NASA
headquarters in Washington. Mr. Gregory then began calling the
Columbia Accident Investigation Board members, which are
specified by position in the contingency action plan.
At 1:15 that afternoon, I made a brief televised statement
expressing our national regrets for the tragic accident and
informed the public about the appointment of the Columbia
Accident Investigation Board.
The Accident Investigation Board was formally activated
during the NASA Mishap Investigation Team teleconference, which
occurred at 5 p.m. that afternoon, Saturday, February the 1st,
less than eight hours after the event.
By 6 p.m., during a teleconference with the White House
situation room, we briefed officials from the Department of
Homeland Security, the Federal Emergency Management Agency, the
Department of Defense, the FBI, and the Federal Aviation
Administration about the current status of the accident
investigation.
At 6:40 that evening, staff members of the National
Transportation Safety Board departed Washington and traveled to
Barksdale Air Force Base in Louisiana to assist as part of the
Mishap Investigation Team, that day. They were later made
available to the Columbia Accident Investigation Board.
On Sunday, February the 2nd, the Accident Investigation
Board, chaired by retired United States Navy Admiral Hal
Gehman, held its first meeting at Barksdale Air Force Base in
Louisiana, less than 30 hours after the accident. We also began
the practice of twice-daily briefings at headquarters in
Washington and at the Johnson Space Center in Houston.
Membership of the Columbia Accident Investigation Board
consists of persons selected for their positions in heading
civil and military offices with responsibility for aerospace
safety, accident investigations, and related skills. Many have
been chief investigators on major accidents. And between them,
board members have the experience of some 50 major
investigations to draw upon. Quite simply, the people who are
now on the board are some of the best in the world at what they
do, and they were activated immediately. You have our assurance
that this distinguished board will be able to act with genuine
independence.
When the board assembled, it modified its charter to
eliminate any reference to NASA directing the administration of
the investigation. The framework that was contained in the
contingency plan was modified and will continue to be to ensure
the independence of this board. NASA accepted the changes to
the charter without objection, as I will continue to do in the
future, as well, for any changes they propose.
Further, the NASA Inspector General Robert Cobb is an
observer on the Columbia Accident Investigation Board, having
arrived on Monday, February the 3rd. He will help assure the
independence of the board, as he reports both to the President
and to the Congress under the terms of the Inspector General
Act.
There are additional details about the Columbia Accident
Investigation Board and its activities that are, I think,
important to note. The board has taken over hardware and
software releases of NASA so that we cannot alter anything
unless the board approves. We've already begun to honor
document requests from the board, as we have all along, and
have also supplied additional documents to the board which were
not requested, but we believe might be helpful in their work as
we move along. And, finally, the board has instructed NASA to
conduct a fault-tree analysis that it intends to independently
validate, to look at all the possible causes that could have
occurred and to examine those in a very methodical way, which
they will then, in turn, independently validate.
On Sunday, the NASA Mishap Investigation Team was on the
ground and working with local officials in Texas and Louisiana.
The State of Texas activated 800 members of the Texas National
Guard to assist with the retrieval of debris, and I am
eternally grateful to Governor Rick Perry for his immediate
response within hours of our request.
By Tuesday, there were nearly 200 NASA and NASA contractor
personnel working recovery operations in Texas, Louisiana,
Arizona, and California. They were part of the more than 2,000
people from Federal Emergency Management Agency, the
Environmental Protection Agency, the FBI, the Department of
Defense, Department of Transportation, the U.S. Forest Service,
Texas National Guard, Louisiana National Guard, and state and
local authorities working to locate, document, and collect
debris.
By Wednesday, the astronauts' remains were transferred to
Dover Air Force Base in Delaware. At Dover, NASA Deputy
Administrator Fred Gregory, and former astronaut, and
ceremonial honor guard were present to pay our respect to the
seven fallen astronauts.
Throughout the week, we were able to make steady progress
in our efforts to recover debris from the accident. We have,
thus far, recovered upwards of 12,000 elements of debris. The
search effort, as you know from our press conferences, is a
large, complex, and ongoing effort with hundreds of square
miles with challenging weather and terrain conditions. And,
indeed, the graphic that's up now is that 500-mile swath from
Dallas/Fort Worth area to just south of Shreveport, Louisiana,
in and around the Lufkin, Texas, area.
We're very grateful that no one was injured on the ground
as a result of flying debris from the accident, and we're
working with our agency partners to assure recovery operations
remain safe as we continue this effort.
Throughout the course of this activity, I've also briefed
the President and the Vice President on a near-daily basis to
advise and apprise them of all the progress we're making, as
well as the cooperation of all of the federal agencies, who
have been extremely participating in this effort.
The Federal Emergency Management Agency command post was
set up in Lufkin, Texas, on Saturday, the 1st of February, and
has been operating nonstop since then. Debris collection
activities began at Barksdale Air Force Base on Sunday,
February the 2nd.
Yesterday, we began transporting debris on trucks to the
Kennedy Space Center where they'll be assembled and analyzed as
part of the comprehensive accident investigation directed by
the Gehman board.
I visited Texas and Louisiana this past Saturday to get my
own assessment of the operation, but, more importantly, to
personally thank the volunteers, in addition to all the
federal, state, and local public servants, who have been
working so tirelessly to support the debris recovery effort.
Let me touch briefly on the Space Shuttle fleet as it is
today. Discovery is continuing to undergo major inspections and
upgrades, which will be completed by April of 2004. Atlantis is
currently assembled and stacked in a Vehicle Assembly Building
at the Kennedy Space Center for STS-114, the next mission due
to have, or planned to have, been flown. The Endeavour, the
third of the orbiters, is in the Orbiter Processing Facility
and being prepared for STS-115, which was scheduled a couple of
months later.
The next Shuttle mission, STS-114, was to have been to the
International Space Station in March, that mission commanded by
Colonel Eileen Collins, United States Air Force. And I met with
her on Friday to further advise that the mission is on hold
until we understand the causes of the Columbia accident and are
able to resolve any issues identified.
At this time, we don't know how long it will be before we
can resume Shuttle flights. We will only know when the Columbia
Accident Investigation Board concludes its work and presents
its findings to all of us.
Columbia was the first orbiter in the Shuttle fleet, having
flown 28 successful missions, or just over a quarter of its
certified life of a hundred flights. In February 2001, a little
over a year ago, Columbia completed a major scheduled 18-month
overhaul and update of its systems, a process we call ``Orbiter
Major Modifications.'' The STS-107 mission was Columbia's
second flight following that major overhaul. A successful
servicing mission that had been conducted, the first one, was
to the Hubble Space Telescope in March of 2002. So this was the
second flight after it had been nearly completely rebuilt.
Prior to the loss of Columbia and her crew, the projected
Shuttle flight rate was five per year, starting in 2004, and
funding is requested for that flight rate in the budget the
President just submitted last week. The flight rate will be
adjusted as needed, of course, once we determine when we can
return to flight safely.
The crew of the International Space Station is, of course,
deeply saddened by the loss of Columbia and her crew, as are
all of our partners and people around the world. I spoke with
International Space Station crew members, Ken Bowersox, the
commander, United States Navy, Don Pettit, who is our science
officer aboard, and Nikolai Budarin, who is a cosmonaut
engineer, on Sunday, February the 2nd for the first time in our
discussions, to inform them of the accident and how we're
proceeding. Despite the tragedy, the crew is continuing its
busy schedule of work.
The day after the loss of STS-107, our Russian partners
conducted a successful planned launch of an unmanned,
autonomous Progress resupply vehicle to the station. The
provisions carried on Progress 10P should provide the crew
sufficient supplies to maintain normal operations through June
2003, through this summer. Progress resupply flights to the
International Space Station by our Russian partners will
continue as scheduled. The next flight is scheduled for June
2003.
We're working with Rosaviakosmos, the Russian Aviation and
Space Agency officials, to determine what we might want to
place on that flight to make sure we have the best use of the
space available. In addition, a regularly scheduled Soyuz crew
transport vehicle exchange is planned already for the launch in
April 2003, as it had been prior to February 1st.
Study teams formed almost immediately after the accident to
assess the impact on the International Space Station. These
teams are focused on how we will, first, sustain the station,
second, continue to assemble the station, as it is not yet
complete, and, third, to maximize the utilization of this
unique research platform.
We have kept our International Space Station partners
informed of our recovery efforts. Further, we have met with our
international partners just last week, and continue to each
day, to plan future meetings in the weeks ahead to develop an
International Space Station partner plan.
We can maintain a permanent crew on the International Space
Station as long as it is necessary, with support from Soyuz and
Progress flights. The International Space Station is stable and
has sufficient propellent to maintain its orbit for at least a
year without support from the Space Shuttle.
But the nearer-term issue for crew support beyond June is
water. The International Space Station cannot support a crew of
three after June with the currently planned support in
progress. As a consequence, we're discussing with our
international partners the possibility of changing the April
Soyuz flight from a taxi mission to a crew exchange mission, as
well as the feasibility of adding Progress resupply flights.
But I want to really emphasize that there are no decisions that
have been made, and all options are being examined at present.
I talked to the Expedition 6 crew that Captain Bowersix
commands, now in orbit, and they've expressed determination and
desire to do whatever is necessary to continue the research and
deal with any changes in crew rotation schedule that may be
necessary.
As we look forward to determine our nation's best course of
action in responding to the Columbia accident, I'd like to
point out that NASA developed an Integrated Space
Transportation Plan, which was submitted by the President to
the Congress in November as an amendment to the fiscal year
2003 budget. So three months ago, that plan was presented at
that time. The Integrated Space Transportation Plan could help
us address many of the near-term issues we're facing, even
though it was developed prior to the loss of Columbia.
The plan reflects the tight coupling required across the
Space Station, Space Shuttle, and the Space Launch Initiatives.
It is intended to ensure that necessary access to the
International Space Station can be supported for the
foreseeable future. It consists of three major program
elements--the Space Shuttle, the Orbital Space Plane, and the
Next-Generation Launch Technology.
This new plan makes investments to extend Shuttle's
operational life for continued safe operations. The Orbital
Space Plane is designed to provide a crew transfer capability
as early as possible to assure access to and from the
International Space Station. And the Next-Generation Launch
Technology program funds next-generation Reusable Launch
Vehicle technology in areas such as propulsion, structures, and
operation. This initiative will focus on the Orbital Space
Plane and the Next-Generation Launch Technology, including
third-generation Reusable Launch Vehicle efforts.
Now, the 2003 budget amendment that the President submitted
last November, in 2002, also proposed adding funds to
International Space Station reserves to assure that we could
successfully reach the milestone of U.S. core configuration and
maintain progress on the long lead items for enhanced research
aboard space station and the continued buildout of that
remarkable research laboratory platform.
Space flight is a means to an end at NASA. That end is
research, exploration, discovery, and inspiration. The crew of
STS-107 were engaged in a wide array of scientific research
that could be conducted nowhere else but in space and had
significant potential benefits for the public. Columbia's crew
took great pride in their research aimed at fighting cancer,
improving crop yields, developing fire-suppression techniques,
building earthquake-resistant buildings, and understanding the
effects of dust storms on weather. As was recorded by the
media, Columbia had a cargo of human ingenuity.
The crew of International Space Station is also conducting
research now that cannot be conducted anywhere else. Thus far,
more than 60 experiments spanning such scientific disciplines
as human physiology, genetics, plant biology, Earth
observations, physics, and cell biology have been conducted on
the International Space Station. From these experiments,
scientists are learning better methods of drug testing and
about dynamic models of human diseases, the physics of
fundamental processes in manufacturing, antibiotic synthesis,
and changes in Earth climate, vegetation and crops.
The International Space Station is the centerpiece
initiative of human space flight at NASA. Our objectives in
this regard are very clear. First, we will keep on-orbit
International Space Stations crews safe. Second, we intend to
keep the International Space Station continuously occupied in
order to assure the reliability of the station itself. And,
third, we intend to return to assembly--as soon as we're able,
to return the Shuttle fleet to safe operations and complete the
research goals for ourselves and for our international
partners.
To accomplish these aims, we need to create a long-term
crew-return capability to complement and augment the Soyuz
vehicles now provided by our partners. We intend to build that
new return capability to create a new crew-transfer system that
will allow us to rotate crews on the International Space
Station independent from the Space Shuttle.
We also firmly believe that extending the operational life
of the remaining Shuttle fleet is a good investment, because it
will help maximize the science return from the International
Space Station.
We designed our Integrated Space Transportation Plan to
ensure that we have coordinated resources to exploit the unique
research environment of space and the International Space
Station in the near-, mid-, and long-term. We thought the plan
was a good one when we proposed it, and we believe that it's
not only valid today, but even more compelling to pursue. While
we believe that this plan is a good one, we will re-examine it
as necessary in light of the investigative findings of
Columbia.
Just over a week ago, although it seemed more like a
lifetime, the President spoke so eloquently and powerfully at
the Johnson Space Center memorial service in Houston, Texas. He
said, ``The cause of exploration and discovery is not an option
we choose; it is a desire written in the human heart. We're all
part of a creation which seeks to understand all creation. We
find the best among us, send them forth into unmapped darkness,
and pray they will return. They go in peace for all mankind,
and all mankind is in their debt.''
The noble purposes described in the President's words frame
all that we do and how we do it. These purposes drive our
mission goals, which are to understand and protect our home
planet, to explore the universe and search for life, and to
inspire the next generation of explorers as only NASA can.
And even while our nonstop work to recover from this
terrible tragedy and to continue safe operations on the
International Space Station will be our chief focus in the days
and weeks and months ahead, the American people should know we
will also press ahead with other activities to achieve these
important goals.
This centennial flight year, we are launching the Mars
exploration rovers, the Mars spacecraft, the space infrared
telescope facility, and a number of Earth science spacecraft
and instruments, as well as continuing our work to help improve
aviation security on behalf of our homeland defense. In these
activities and in all that we do at NASA, we strive for
unmatched excellence. When it comes to human space exploration,
those margins are razor thin, and we know we're graded on an
extremely harsh curve. For us, 96 percent to 99 percent is not
an ``A.'' One-hundred percent is the minimum passing garde.
Now, despite this harsh truth, we know the lesson from this
terrible accident is not to turn our backs on exploration
because it is hard or risky. John Shedd once said about the age
of ocean exploration, ``A ship in safe harbor is safe, but that
is not what ships are built for.''
Human history teaches us that in exploration, after
accidents like this occur, we learn from them and further
reduce risks, although we must honestly admit that risk can
never be eliminated.
President John F. Kennedy observed once, some 41 years ago,
speaking of our fledgling space program at that time, ``All
great and honorable actions are accompanied with great
difficulties, and both must be enterprised and overcome with
answerable courage.''
The immediate task before our agency is clear. We'll find
the problem that caused the loss of Columbia and its crew,
we'll fix it, and then we'll return to flight operations that
are as safe as humanly possible in pursuit of knowledge. We
have no preconceptions about what caused the failure or what it
will take to make it so that it will never happen again. We
have an independent Accident Investigation Board of truly
outstanding and eminently quality individuals, and they, and
only they alone, will determine the cause of the accident and
its remedy, no matter where it leads. We're ready and willing
to support the addition of any experts that Admiral Gehman
deems necessary to the effective conduct of the board's
investigations.
Part of my job as Administrator is to remind folks of what
NASA does and what we are capable of doing. It's a
responsibility I take very, very seriously. And, at the same
time, I am saddened beyond words at the loss of seven
outstanding men and women of STS-107. I'm also very proud and
humbled by the focus, dedication, and professionalism of the
NASA family and all those throughout the country who are
assisting in this challenging recovery effort.
Today, February the 12th, is also the birthday of President
Lincoln. And some of his words, spoken for an entirely
different purpose, have come to mind this past week. ``It is
rather for us to be here dedicated to the great task remaining
before us, that from these honored dead we take increase
devotion to that cause for which they gave the last full
measure of devotion.''
We have an opportunity here and now to learn from this loss
and renew the boundless spirit of exploration present at NASA's
beginning. We will do this by being accountable to the American
people for our failings and, we hope, credible and compelling
in pursuit of research, exploration, and inspiration for future
generations.
And, finally, during the 16-day STS-107 mission, we had no
indication that would suggest a compromise to flight safety.
The time it has taken me to present this testimony is about the
same amount of time that transpired between when mission
control first noticed anomalies in temperature measurements and
the accident.
(Pause.)
I just paused for a few seconds. That's the same amount of
time that transpired from mission control's last communication
with the crew and our loss of signal with the heroic Columbia
astronauts.
May Good bless the crew of STS-107.
Chairman McCain, Chairman Boehlert, thank you all very much
for you attention.
[The prepared statement of Mr. O'Keefe follows:]
Prepared Statement of Sean O'Keefe
Good morning. I appreciate the opportunity to appear before this
hearing of the Senate Commerce, Science and Transportation Committee
and the House Science Subcommittee on Space and Aeronautics to discuss
the tragic loss of the courageous crew of the Space Shuttle Columbia,
the ongoing investigation into this tragedy, and the implications of
the loss of Columbia to the Nation's space exploration efforts.
This morning, eleven days after the accident, our work continues to
honor the solemn pledge we've made to the astronauts' families and to
the American people that we will find out what caused the loss of the
Columbia and its crew, correct what problems we find, and do our utmost
to make sure this never happens again.
We welcome the Committee's interest in working with NASA to help
determine how we can learn from this tragic accident so that we may
continue advancing the Nation's research and exploration objectives in
space while at the same time striving to ensure we make manned
spaceflight as safe as humanly possible.
Throughout NASA's forty-five years of serving the public interest,
Congress has been our partner, helping us achieve the goals outlined in
NASA's congressionally authorized charter. This charter compels NASA
to:
Explore, use, and enable the development of space for
human enterprise.
Advance scientific knowledge and understanding of the
Earth, the Solar System, and the Universe and use the
environment of space for research.
Research, develop, verify, and transfer advanced
aeronautics, space, and related technologies.
With the support of Congress, NASA has amassed a record of
significant achievements that have tangibly improved the lives of all
Americans. When we have erred, you have helped us right our course.
This morning you will be asking us tough questions. That's as it
should be. Believe me, none of the questions you will ask can be any
tougher than those we are asking of ourselves.
I can assure you, however, that whatever determinations are reached
regarding the cause of the accident, you will find that complacency is
not one of them. Last year we temporarily halted Shuttle flight
operations when tiny cracks were discovered in metal liners used to
direct the fuel flow inside propellant lines on two different orbiters.
We did not fly again until that problem was corrected. To signal our
continued commitment to rewarding such diligence, we also made a point
to praise David Strait, the young contractor employee who discovered
the cracks. Other flight decisions made throughout the year were made
with the goal of operational safety being paramount. And from working
with the dedicated employees who keep the Shuttle flying safely I know
they have the utmost regard for the enormity of their duty.
This week, at NASA Centers throughout the country and in the field,
with the support of more than 2000 people from more than 20 federal,
state and local organizations, the important work of data analysis and
recovery operations is continuing. I am extremely proud of the work
that is being conducted by these dedicated public servants. As
President Bush said last week, ``The people of NASA are being tested
once again. In your grief, you are responding as your friends would
have wished--with focus, professionalism, and unbroken faith in the
mission of this agency. Captain Dave Brown was correct: America's space
program will go on.''
This morning, to help frame our discussion, I would like to review
for you the significant actions NASA has taken since the morning of the
accident in accord with our contingency plan. In addition to
articulating notification or first response procedures, defining the
roles and responsibilities of mishap response and mishap investigation
teams, the plan specifies selection of persons outside of NASA to head
an independent, seasoned accident investigation team.
While we did not foresee this terrible tragedy, our response has
unfolded as we had planned and prepared for that contingency plan. This
plan was one of the many positive outcomes from the terrible loss of
the Space Shuttle Challenger seventeen years ago. The plan is updated
before every flight and a contingency was simulated just three months
ago.
First Response: Saturday February 1, 2003
When we first became aware of the a problem with STS-107, I was
waiting at the Space Shuttle Landing Strip at the Kennedy Space Center
on Saturday, February 1. At 8:59 a.m. eastern time, we lost
communications with the Columbia.
At 9:16 a.m. the countdown arrival clock reached zero and there was
no sign of the Columbia. Captain Bill Readdy, our Associate
Administrator for Space Flight, declared a spaceflight contingency and
activated the Recovery Control Center at the Kennedy Space Center. At
that point, Bill Readdy and I departed the landing strip and headed to
the Launch Control Center.
We arrived at the Launch Control Center thirteen minutes later, at
9:29 a.m., and we activated the Contingency Action Plan for Space
Flight Operations. Through the White House Situation Room, we notified
the President as well as other senior staff of the loss of
communication. In addition, Members of Congress and the Government of
Israel were notified. Homeland Security Secretary Tom Ridge and the
National Security Council were also made aware of the situation.
Secretary Ridge then began assessing the possibility that this
situation was terrorism-related. Shortly after, he made a determination
that it was highly unlikely terrorism was involved.
Secretary Ridge then announced that the Federal Emergency
Management Agency would be the lead federal agency for the recovery
effort.
Meanwhile, the family members of the Columbia astronauts were
escorted from the landing strip to the astronauts' crew quarters. Later
that morning, at about 11:30 a.m., I met with the families at the crew
quarters at Kennedy Space Center to express my condolences, offering
any and all support we could give, and stated our commitment to find
the cause of the accident, fix any problems we may find, and continue
the work that their loved ones had started.
Data at all NASA sites and contractors were impounded at 10:00 a.m.
and the Headquarters Action Center in Washington, D.C. was activated
with NASA personnel moving immediately to their duty stations.
By 10:30 a.m., the NASA Mishap Response Team convened to assess the
preliminary data and focus on the location of the crew compartment
through the Rescue Coordination Center at Langley Air Force Base in
Virginia. The Rapid Response Team was activated for deployment to
Barksdale AFB in Louisiana.
Columbia Accident Investigation Board
The process of initiating the Columbia Accident Investigation Board
began about 10:30 a.m. on Saturday, February 1, when I placed a call to
NASA Deputy Administrator Fred Gregory, who was at NASA Headquarters in
Washington. Mr. Gregory then began calling Columbia Accident
Investigation Board members currently listed in our contingency plan.
At 1:15 p.m., I made a brief televised statement expressing our
``deepest national regrets'' for the tragic accident and informed the
public about the appointment of the Columbia Accident Investigation
Board.
I verbally activated the Columbia Accident Investigation Board
during the NASA Mishap Investigation Team teleconference, which
occurred at 5:00 p.m.
By 6:00 p.m. during a teleconference with the White House Situation
Room, we briefed officials from the Department of Homeland Security,
the Federal Emergency Management Agency, the Department of Defense, the
FBI, and the Federal Aviation Administration about the current status
of the accident investigation.
At 6:40 p.m. staff members of the National Transportation Safety
Board departed Washington and traveled to Barksdale Air Force Base in
Louisiana to assist as part of the Mishap Investigation Team. They were
later made available to the Columbia Accident Investigation Board.
On Sunday, February 2, the Columbia Accident Investigation Board,
headed by retired U.S. Navy Admiral Hal Gehman, held its first meeting
at Barksdale AFB, less than 30 hours after the accident. We also began
the practice of twice daily briefings at Headquarters in Washington and
at the Johnson Space Center in Houston.
Membership in the Columbia Accident Investigation Board consists of
persons selected for their positions in heading civil and military
offices with responsibilities for aerospace safety accident
investigations and related skills. Many have been chief investigators
on major accidents and between them the Columbia Accident Investigation
Board members have the experience of some 50 major investigations to
draw upon.
Quite simply, the people who are now on the Board are some of the
best in the world at what they do.
You have our assurance that this distinguished Board will be able
to act with genuine independence. When the Board assembled, it modified
its Charter to eliminate any reference to NASA directing the
administration of the investigation. NASA accepted the changes to the
Charter without objection. Further, the NASA Inspector General, Robert
Cobb is an observer on the Columbia Accident Investigation Board and he
will help assure the independence of the Board as he reports to the
President and Congress.
There are some additional details about the Columbia Accident
Investigation Board and its activities that are worth noting. The Board
has taken over hardware and software releases of NASA so that NASA
cannot alter anything unless the Board approves. NASA has already begun
to honor document requests from the Board, and has also supplied
additional documents to the Board which were not requested that we
believe may be helpful to their work. And finally,. the Board has
instructed NASA to conduct fault tree analysis that it intends to
independently validate.
Recovery Operations
On Sunday, the NASA Mishap Investigation Team was on the ground and
working with local officials in Texas and Louisiana. The State of Texas
activated 800 members of the Texas National Guard to assist with the
retrieval of debris.
By Tuesday, there were nearly 200 NASA and NASA contractor
personnel working recovery operations in Texas, Louisiana, Arizona, and
California. They were part of the more than 2000 people from Federal
Emergency Management Agency, Environmental Protection Agency, Federal
Bureau of Investigation, Department of Defense, Department of
Transportation, U.S. Forest Service, Texas National Guard, and state
and local authorities working to locate, document, and collect debris.
By Wednesday, the astronauts' remains were transported to Dover Air
Force Base in Delaware. At Dover, NASA Deputy Administrator Fred
Gregory and a ceremonial honor guard were present to pay our respects
to the seven fallen astronauts.
Throughout the week, we were able to make steady progress in our
effort to recover debris from the accident. We have thus far recovered
upwards of 12,000 elements of debris. The search effort, as you know
from our press conferences, is a large, complex and ongoing effort over
hundreds of square miles with challenging weather and terrain
conditions. We are very grateful that no one was injured on the ground
as a result of flying debris from the accident and we are working with
our agency partners to ensure recovery operations remain safe.
The Federal Emergency Management Agency command post was set up in
Lufkin, Texas on Saturday, February 1, and has been operating non-stop
since then. Debris collection activities began at Barksdale Air Force
Base on Sunday, February 2. Yesterday, we began transporting debris on
trucks to the Kennedy Space Center where they will be assembled and
analyzed as part of the comprehensive accident investigation directed
by the Gehman Board. I visited Texas and Louisiana this past Saturday
to get my own assessment of the operation and to personally thank the
many volunteers who have worked so tirelessly to support the debris
recovery effort.
Space Shuttle Status
Let me touch briefly on the Space Shuttle fleet as it is today.
Discovery is continuing to undergo major inspections and upgrades which
will be completed by April of 2004. Atlantis is currently assembled and
stacked in the Vehicle Assembly Building at the Kennedy Space Center
for STS-114. The Endeavour is in the Orbiter Processing Facility and
being prepared for STS-115.
The next Shuttle mission, STS-114, was to have been to the
International Space Station in March. That mission, commanded by Col.
Eileen Collins, U.S. Air Force, is on hold until we understand the
causes of the Columbia accident and are able to resolve any issues
identified. At this time we don't know how long it will be before we
can resume Shuttle flights. We will only know when the Columbia
Accident Investigation Board concludes its work and presents its
findings.
Columbia was the first Orbiter in the Shuttle fleet, having flown
28 successful missions or just over a quarter of its certified life of
100 flights. In February 2001, less than a year ago, Columbia completed
a major scheduled eighteen month overhaul and update of its systems, a
process we call Orbiter Major Modifications (OMM).
The STS-107 mission was Columbia's second flight following OMM and
a successful servicing mission to the Rubble Space Telescope in March
2002.
Prior to the loss of Columbia and her crew, the projected Shuttle
flight rate was five flights per year starting in FY 2004, and we have
requested funding for that flight rate in this budget. The flight rate
will be adjusted as needed once we determine when we can return to
flight.
International Space Station Status
The crew of the International Space Station is of course deeply
saddened by the loss of Columbia and her crew--as are all of our
partners and people around the world. I spoke with International Space
Station crew members Ken Bowersox, Don Pettit, and Nikolai Budarin on
Saturday, February 1st to inform them of the accident and how we are
proceeding. Despite this tragedy, the crew is continuing its busy
schedule of work.
The day after the loss of STS-107, our Russian partners conducted a
successful launch of an unmanned, autonomous Progress resupply vehicle
to the Station. The provisions carried on Progress 10P should provide
the crew sufficient supplies to maintain normal operations through June
2003.
Progress resupply flights to the International Space Station by our
Russian partner will continue as scheduled. The next Progress flight is
scheduled for June 8, 2003. We are working with the Russian Aviation
and Space Agency officials to determine what we want to place on the
flight to make sure we make the best use of the space available. In
addition, a regularly scheduled Soyuz crew transport vehicle exchange
is already planned for launch in April 2003.
Study teams formed almost immediately after the accident to assess
the impact on the International Space Station. These teams are focused
on how we will 1) sustain the Station, 2) continue to assemble the
Station, and 3) maximize the utilization of this unique research
platform. We have kept our International Space Station partners
informed of our recovery efforts. Further, we met with our
international partners last week and plan future meetings in the weeks
ahead to develop an International Space Station partner plan.
We can maintain a permanent crew on the International Space Station
as long as is necessary with support from Soyuz and Progress flights.
The International Space Station is stable and has sufficient propellant
to maintain its orbit for at least a year without support from the
Space Shuttle. A nearer, term issue for crew support beyond June is
water. The International Space Station cannot support a crew of three
after June with the currently planned support from Progress. As a
consequence, we are discussing with our international partners the
possibility of changing the April Soyuz flight from a taxi mission to a
crew exchange mission as well as the feasibility of adding Progress
resupply flights.
I should emphasize however, that no decisions have been made and we
are examining all options. I have talked to the Expedition Six crew now
on-orbit and they have expressed determination and desire to do
whatever is necessary to continue their research and deal with any
changes in the crew rotation schedule that may be necessary.
Integrated Space Transportation Plan
As we look forward to determine our nation's best course of action
in response to the Columbia accident, it is worth noting NASA's
Integrated Space Transportation Plan (ISTP), which was submitted by the
President to Congress in November as an amendment to the Fiscal Year
2003 federal budget. The Integrated Space Transportation Plan can help
us address many of the near-term issues we are facing, even though it
was developed prior to the loss of Columbia.
The Integrated Space Transportation Plan reflects the tight
coupling required across the Space Station, Space Shuttle, and Space
Launch Initiatives efforts. It is intended to ensure that necessary
access to the International Space Station can be supported for the
foreseeable future. It consists of three major programs: the Space
Shuttle, the Orbital Space Plane, and Next Generation Launch
Technology.
The new plan makes investments to extend Shuttle's
operational life for continued safe operations.
The Orbital Space Plane is designed to provide a crew
transfer capability as early as possible to assure access to
and from the International Space Station.
The Next Generation Launch Technology Program funds
next generation reusable launch vehicle technology developments
in areas such as propulsion, structures, and operations.
The SLI will focus on the Orbital Space Plane and
Next Generation Launch Technology, including Third Generation
RLV efforts.
The FY 2003 budget amendment also proposed adding funds to
International Space Station reserves to assure that we could
successfully reach the milestone of U.S. core complete and maintain
progress on long-lead items for enhanced research aboard the Space
Station.
Science and Research Objectives
Space flight is a means to an end and at NASA that end is research,
exploration, discovery and inspiration.
The crew of STS-107 were engaged in a wide array of scientific
research that could be conducted nowhere else but in space, and had
significant potential benefits for the public. Columbia's crew took
great pride in their research aimed at fighting cancer, improving crop
yields, developing fire-suppression techniques, building earthquake-
resistant buildings, and understanding the effects of dust storms on
weather. As was written in the press, ``Columbia had a cargo of human
ingenuity.''
The crew of the International Space Station is also conducting
research now that can be conducted nowhere else. Thus far, more than
sixty experiments spanning across such scientific disciplines as human
physiology, genetics, plant biology, Earth observations, physics, and
cell biology have been conducted on the International Space Station.
From these experiments scientists are learning better methods of drug
testing, and about dynamic models of human diseases, the physics of
fundamental processes in manufacturing, antibiotic synthesis, and
changes in Earth climate, vegetation, and crops.
The International Space Station is the centerpiece initiative of
human space flight at NASA. Our objectives in this regard are very
clear. First, we will keep our on-orbit International Space Station
crew safe. Second, we intend to keep the International Space Station
continuously occupied in order to assure the reliability of the
International Space Station itself. Third, we intend to return to
assembly as soon as we are able to return the Shuttle fleet to safe
operations, and complete the research goals set for ourselves and our
international partners.
To accomplish these aims, we need to create a long-term crew return
capability to complement and augment the Soyuz vehicles now provided by
our Russian partners. We intend to build on that new return capability
to create a crew transfer system that will allow us to rotate crews on
the International Space Station independently from the Space Shuttle.
We also firmly believe that extending the operational life of the
remaining Shuttle fleet is a good investment because it will help
maximize the science return from the International Space Station.
We designed our Integrated Space Transportation Plan (ISTP) to
ensure that we had the coordinated resources to exploit the unique
research environment of space and the International Space Station in
the near-, mid-, and long-term.
We thought the plan was a good one when we proposed it and we
believe that it is not only valid today but even more compelling to
pursue. While we believe the ISTP is a good plan, we will re-examine it
if necessary in light of investigation findings on Columbia.
Moving Forward
Just over a week ago--although it seems more like a lifetime--the
President spoke eloquently and powerfully at the Johnson Space Center
in Houston, Texas. He said:
``The cause of exploration and discovery is not an option we
choose; it is a desire written in the human heart. We are that
part of creation which seeks to understand all creation. We
find the best among us, send them forth into unmapped darkness,
and pray they will return. They go in peace for all mankind,
and all mankind is in their debt.''
The noble purposes described in President Bush's words frames all
that we do and how we do it. These purposes drive our mission goals,
which are:
To understand and protect our home planet; To explore the
Universe and search for life; and, To inspire the next
generation of explorers as only NASA can.
And even while our nonstop work to recover from this terrible
tragedy and to continue safe operations on the International Space
Station will be our chief focus in the days ahead, the American people
should know that we will also press ahead with our other activities to
achieve these important goals.
This Centennial of Flight year we will be launching the Mars
Exploration Rovers, the Mars Express spacecraft, the Space InfraRed
Telescope Facility, and a number of Earth Science spacecraft and
instruments, as well as continuing our work to help improve aviation
security on behalf of our Homeland Defense.
In these activities and in all we do at NASA, we strive for
unmatched excellence. And when it comes to human space exploration,
where margins are razor thin, we know we are graded on a very harsh
curve. For us, ninety-six percent to ninety-nine percent is not an
``A.'' One hundred percent is the minimum passing grade.
Despite this harsh truth, we know the lesson from this terrible
accident is not to turn our backs on exploration simply because it is
hard or risky. As John Shedd wrote about the age of ocean exploration,
``A ship in harbor is safe, but that is not what ships are built for.''
Human history teaches us that in exploration, after accidents like this
occur, we can learn from them and further reduce risk, although we must
honestly admit that risks can never be eliminated. And as President
John F. Kennedy said some 41 years ago, speaking about our fledgling
space program, ``All great and honorable actions are accompanied with
great difficulties, and both must be enterprised and overcome with
answerable courage.''
The immediate task before the Agency is clear. We will find the
problem that caused the loss of Columbia and its crew, we will fix it,
and we will return to flight operations that are as safe as humanly
possible in pursuit of knowledge. We have no preconceptions about what
the cause of failure was or what it will take to make sure it never
happens again. We have an independent accident investigation board of
truly outstanding and eminently qualified individuals and they, and
they alone, will determine the cause of the accident and its remedy--no
matter where it leads.
We are ready and willing to support the addition of any experts
that Admiral Gehman deems necessary to the effective conduct of the
Board's investigations.
Part of my job as Administrator is to remind everyone of what NASA
does and what we are capable of doing. It's a responsibility I take
very seriously. At the same time that I am saddened beyond words for
the loss of the seven outstanding men and women of STS-107, I am also
very proud and humbled by the focus, dedication and professionalism of
the NASA family and all those throughout the country who are assisting
us in the recovery effort.
Today, February 12, is also the birthday of President Lincoln. And
some of his words, spoken for a very different purpose, have come to be
in my mind this past week:
``It is rather for us to be here dedicated to the great task
remaining before us--that from these honored dead we take
increased devotion to that cause for which they gave the last
full measure of devotion.''
We have an opportunity here and now to learn from this loss, and
renew the boundless spirit of exploration present at NASA's beginning.
We will do this by being accountable to the American people for our
failings and, we hope, credible and compelling in pursuit of research,
exploration, and inspiration for future generations.
Finally, during the 16-day STS-107 mission we had no indications
that would suggest a compromise to flight safety. The time it took me
to present this testimony is about the same amount of time that
transpired between when Mission Control first noticed anomalies in
temperature measurements and the accident.
I just paused for a few seconds. That's the same amount of time
that transpired from Mission Control's last communication with the crew
and our loss of signal with the heroic Columbia astronauts.
May God bless the crew of STS-107.
Chairman Boehlert. Thank you very much, Mr. Administrator.
The Chair recognizes the Ranking Member of the House
Science Committee, the gentleman from Texas, Mr. Hall.
STATEMENT OF HON. RALPH M. HALL, U.S. REPRESENTATIVE FROM TEXAS
Representative Hall. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thank
you, Chairman McCain, and I thank this group.
Mr. O'Keefe, I thank you, your Deputy and your Associate
Administrator for Space Flight and those valiant people who sit
behind you there that contribute so much day in and day out.
We're grateful to you.
And I speak for Bart Gordon, who is the Ranking Member of
the Space Subcommittee, who has the same respect I have for the
leadership. And this is a day and time when we should be
neither Republicans nor Democrats, but Americans. And I think
it's a day in time when we come together.
And, Mr. Administrator, you did a great job that Monday,
that fateful Monday, in Houston. Thank you for that.
I think, certainly, that this one of the most painful
hearings that I've ever had the duty to try to get prepared
for. It's less than two weeks now since the Shuttle broke apart
in the sky up over my home in my area in Texas. I'm saddened
every time I think of these seven brave astronauts and the
grief-stricken families that they left behind. I knew three of
them very well.
And the young lady from India, who had accomplished so much
and came so far, came to my district on more than one occasion,
had a great sense of humor, was really great for the program.
In one of her speeches to one of the classes in Canton, in
Vanzant, Texas, one of the students said, ``We have a hard time
pronouncing your name.'' She said, ``That's all right. I have a
hard time pronouncing yours.''
(Laughter.)
Representative Hall. She had a way with youngsters and was
very helpful.
I know that there are a lot of questions about what went
wrong, and I'm going to shorten my speech here because we have
so many others that really should be heard from and we have
questions that we have to ask you.
There has also been a lot of speculation as to what or who
may be to blame for the accident. The reality is that it
doesn't appear that anyone yet knows what caused the accident,
although the NASA Administrator may have some information in
the progress of the investigation to share with us here today.
And you've done that, and I thank you. And I think the
questions will elicit more information and will be helpful to
us.
So it might be some time before we'll be clear on what
factors have contributed to the accident. Thus, it's important
that we have a thorough and, I want to stress, independent, as
Mr. Gordon has stressed, investigation of the accident so that
the American people can be assured that everything's on top of
the table. And I know that's what everybody in this room wants.
Anything less would be a disservice to the courageous men and
women who died on the Columbia.
Our nation is grieving. We're mournful at this time. And
the families are in mourning. But time lessens and sometimes
heals that. But that same time is going to bolster the need for
an independent investigation, and that's what we're looking
for. And, Mr. Administrator, I understand that you've pledged
to do that, and we thank you for that.
I think we need to take a very close look at what can be
done to improve Shuttle crew survivability. As a long-time
Member of this committee, I've always had problems cutting the
NASA budget, because not having the knowledge that you men
have, not having the exposure of life or death that so many of
you have, I didn't know how to cut it or how to recommend
cutting it without endangering someone. So we've had to call on
the Administrator to do that. We had to call on Dan Goldin to
do that. He did it, and, I think, did it in a good manner. We
call on you, Mr. O'Keefe, to give us that same type leadership,
and we pledge our support to you as we seek out causation and
how to keep it from ever happening again.
NASA's talking about spending upwards of $9 to $13 billion,
by its own estimates, over the next decade to develop a still-
to-be-defined Orbital Space Plane. That's long-range planning.
We have to have that, and we have to have some short-range
decisions.
I think we need to examine whether some of that money would
be better spent on developing crew escape systems for the
existing Shuttle fleet and on completing a simply, reliable
U.S. crew rescue vehicle for the International Space Station,
and doing both of these things as soon as possible.
With that, Mr. Chairman, I'd like unanimous consent to put
my full speech in the record, and I yield back the time.
Thank you.
Chairman McCain. Without objection.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Hall follows:]
Prepared Statement of Representative Ralph M. Hall
This is one of the most painful hearings that I have had to prepare
for in all my years in Congress. It is now less than two weeks since
the Space Shuttle Columbia broke apart in the sky over my home state of
Texas. I'm saddened every time I think of those seven brave astronauts
and the grief-stricken families and friends that they left behind. They
made the ultimate sacrifice for the cause of space exploration, and we
shall miss them dearly.
When the STS-107 mission was launched into orbit in mid-January, I
was looking forward to what we would learn from it. As many of you
know, it was a mission dedicated to research. As a result, it was a
mission that offered the promise of improving the lives of our citizens
back here on Earth. That is the vision I have long had for our space
program: learning things in space that can be used for the benefit of
all Americans. It is what the International Space Station should be
about if this nation will step up and honor our long-standing
commitments to complete the project. And it is what the astronauts of
STS-107 were trying to accomplish on their ill-fated mission.
I know that there are many questions about what went wrong. There
has also been a lot of speculation as to what or who may be to blame
for the accident. The reality is that it doesn't appear that anyone yet
knows what caused the accident, although the NASA Administrator may
have some information on the progress of the investigation to share
with us today. So it's likely to be some time before we can be clear on
what factor, may have contributed to the accident. It thus is important
that we have a thorough, independent investigation of the accident so
that the American people can be assured that nothing is being hidden.
Anything less would be a disservice to the courageous men and women who
died on Columbia.
Whatever the specific cause of the Columbia accident, we in
Congress need to take a hard look at where we go from here. NASA's
latest proposal doesn't envision having an alternative means of
launching crews into space for another decade or more. And in any
event, NASA seems to lie committed to flying the Shuttle to the Space
Station throughout the lifetime of the Station. A decade or more is a
long time. If, God forbid, there is another accident sometime during
that decade, will we be able to look back and say we had done all we
could to improve the crew's chances of survival? I hope so.
For example, the Aerospace Safety Advisory Panel's March 2002
report found that 17 years after the Challenger accident the Shuttle
program still is facing a situation where:
``there is no in-flight crew escape system for the Orbiter
other than for abort below 20,000 feet during a controlled
glide''
and it recommended that NASA:
``complete the ongoing studies of crew escape design options
and implement an improved system as soon as possible.''
I think we need to take a close look at what could be done to
improve Shuttle crew survivability. NASA is talking about spending
upwards of $9 to $13 billion by its own estimates over the next decade
to develop a still-to-be-defined Orbital Space Plane. I think we need
to examine whether some of that money would be better spent on
developing crew escape systems for the existing Shuttle fleet and on
completing a simple, reliable U.S. crew rescue vehicle for the
International Space Station--and doing both of those things as soon as
possible. I don't think the brave men and women who serve in our
nation's space program should be needlessly put into harm's way any
longer than necessary if there are practical remedies available.
Thank you, and I yield back the balance of my time.
Chairman McCain. Senator Stevens has to return quickly to
chair the conference concerning the Omnibus Appropriations
bill, which all of us eagerly await the result of his work, and
so he'd like to make a brief statement.
Senator Stevens.
STATEMENT OF HON. TED STEVENS, U.S. SENATOR FROM ALASKA
Senator Stevens. Mr. Chairman, I thank you, and I do have
to return to that conference. I have come because the gentleman
that's before you I consider to be one of the closest friends I
have in the world. I think members should know who he is.
He came to Washington as a White House fellow. He worked
for the Department of Navy, and then he became a Senate
employee and became the chief of staff of the Defense
Appropriations Subcommittee. He went from there to become the
Comptroller of the Department of Defense, the Secretary of the
Navy. He subsequently became a professor at Syracuse
University, then a deputy director of the Office of Management
Budget, and is now the administrator of NASA.
I know of no one who has committed himself to good
government and conducted himself in the finest of our
traditions than Sean O'Keefe. He is a man of integrity, of
complete honest and openness in all he does. I would back him,
as I know he would me, with my life. And I urge you to listen
to Sean O'Keefe today. He'll tell you the truth.
Thank you very much.
Mr. O'Keefe. Thank you, Senator.
Chairman McCain. Thank you very much, Senator Stevens.
Discussion
Effects of Budget Decisions on Shuttle Program
Thank you, Mr. O'Keefe, for your presentation.
Look, one of the issues that is going to be talked about a
lot today by a lot of the members is the issue as to whether
the NASA's budget was, ``starved,'' cut to the bone. There will
be allegations that certain recommendations were made by
certain people.
For example, the Aerospace Safety Advisory Panel annual
report for 2001 stated, ``The current and proposed budget are
not sufficient to improve or even maintain the safety risk
level of operating the Space Shuttle.'' I've seen a lot of
rhetoric in the media, and you have too, that you were
``starved.'' That was not my experience, as Chairman and
Ranking Member of the Commerce Committee, but I think it's very
important that you take that issue head on and immediately.
Mr. O'Keefe. Yes, sir. No, I fully agree. There is no
question, this is a concern that we continue to have, as well,
and to assure that all of the facts that are laid out on that
particular matter. As it pertains the views of the ASAP and the
advisory committee, as well, their reports, I think, reiterate
consistently their view that the future concerns about Space
Shuttle operations and safety considerations were the matter
they were most focused on. As a consequence, their continued
effort that I see in the report before us always is that they
quote specifically, ``It's important to stress that the panel
believes that safety has not yet been compromised. NASA and its
contractors maintain excellent safety practices and processes,
as well as an appropriate level of safety consciousness. This
has been--contributed to significant flight achievements in the
defined requirements for operating, and an acceptable level of
risk are always met.''
So their concerns were always presented in the context of
future approaches. And, as a matter of fact, if we call up
slide number 35, that will cover that particular question, as
well. Their focus was always on the future operations as well
as future efforts that were to be engaged in.
At the present time, in terms of current operations and
activities they certified as recently as a year ago, they felt
that the current operations were concentrated on very
specifically to assure flight safety as a primary paramount
objective.
Chairman McCain. I think you're going to be confronted with
some numbers in further questioning, and I hope you will have
responses to that, as well.
At a Commerce Committee September 6th, 2001, hearing on
Shuttle safety, William Readdy, then Deputy Associate
Administrator of the Office of Space Flight, acknowledged the
challenges NASA was facing to maintain Shuttle safety in light
of budgetary constraints, but, nevertheless, stated, ``The
safety of the Space Shuttle has also been dramatically improved
by reducing risk by more than a factor of five.'' Later in his
testimony, he said, quote, ``The Space Shuttle is the safest,
most capable and reliable transportation system in the world.''
Mr. Blomberg, the former chief of NASA's Aerospace Safety
Advisory Panel, testifying before the House Science Committee
in April 2002 on behalf of the advisory panel, stated that,
quote, ``In all the years of my involvement, I have never been
as concerned for Space Shuttle safety as I am right now. The
concern is not for the present flight or the next or perhaps
the one after that. In fact, one of the roots of my concern is
that nobody will know for sure when the safety margins have
been eroded too far. All of my instincts, however, suggest that
the current approach is planting the seeds for future danger.''
How do we reconcile those two statements by two highly
regarded individuals who are within the bureaucracy of NASA?
Mr. O'Keefe. Yes, sir. Well, just to clarify the record on
that, Bill Readdy, of course, is the Associate Administrator
for Space Flight. Richard Blomberg was a independent external
member of and a chairman of the advisory panel for safety, so
he was not a full-time NASA employee in that regard. He was
representing a panel view.
Reconciling that is--I think if you trace the history just
a little bit, the plan that had existed until this past
November contemplated the retirement of the Space Shuttle fleet
as early as the middle of this decade, certainly no later than
2012, so it altered over the course of several years from about
'95 forward, the best I can tell, over the history of this.
Based on the recommendations of that advisory panel on
safety, as well as the testimony and comments made at several
different committee hearings, as well, we went back and really
looked seriously at the question of what it would take in order
to maintain Shuttle operations for a sustained period of time,
what kind of continued upgrades would be necessary,
modifications necessary, in order to assure safe flight
operations, and on the basis of that, as recently as last
summer, went through that planning effort, which ultimately
yielded the amendment that was sent forward by the President on
November 13th of last year to propose a specific change in the
funding profile for Shuttle, which envisioned a maintenance of
that asset for a sustained period of time, though next decade.
So the focus of these concerns, which were all exactly as
you stated, Mr. Chairman, in context of future concern, were
the things we were very mindful of, took heed of, made
adjustments to, and specifically put in plan in order to assure
that we covered those kinds of concerns in the future and
addressed those.
As it pertained to current flight operations, again there
was no indication that I knew of that raised concerns along the
way of current flight operations. If anything, the diligence
that I see among the entire folk in NASA, in the community, is
very much that of a culture that's dedicated to assuring safe
flight operations, or else the launch doesn't occur. And that
is the mindset and ethos we continue to encourage and will
continue to encourage in the future.
Changes Needed to Assure an Independent Investigation
Chairman Boehlert. Mr. O'Keefe, as I mentioned in my
opening statement, I remain concerned about language throughout
the charter of the Columbia Accident Investigation Board. The
language would appear to indicate that everything the board
does is subject to NASA approval, and that, to me, raises some
fundamental questions about the independence of the board. And
we all want the board to be independent, and not just in name,
but in fact.
Are you willing to re-examine that charter and remove some
of the language that raises these questions and make
adjustments in other places?
Mr. O'Keefe. Yes, sir. We'll continue to work with Admiral
Gehman to assure whatever he needs in order to guarantee the
independence and objectivity of that board. We will absolutely
work with him, without objection.
Chairman Boehlert. I mean, just to give you an example, the
independent board will conduct activities in accordance with
the provisions of applicable NASA policies and procedures. And
then it goes on to say, ``The interim scheduled board
activities, interim board reports, and the submission of final
board report, in coordination with the NASA Administrator.'' I
would think that they would have independence, they could
schedule their meetings and determine the type of report they
want to submit. Of course they will submit the report to you.
But the report should come also to the--the final report--not
just to the NASA administrator, but to the President, the
Congress, and the American people. So I think that charter has
to be revisited, and very promptly.
We've already had conversations with each other, and I have
had with Admiral Gehman, and both have assured me that
additional members from outside the community, so to speak, and
experts in different fields, will be added to the board. I
think that's very important.
It's essential that we maintain the independent nature of
the board.
Mr. O'Keefe. I fully concur, Mr. Chairman. And, as a matter
of fact, I think in Admiral Gehman's press conference
yesterday, he was very explicit that all of the factors he
needed in order to maintain independence and to be an objective
investigator in this particular case, for all of his board
members, was what the present condition required.
Having said that, if, on examination, the latest change
that was made to the charter at his request, we made it, if he
wants further changes they'll be made, as well, anything that
it takes in order to guarantee their independence, because we
will be guided by their findings. And, as I've reiterated
publicly as well as to you, sir, and to him, that about the
only thing that will be unique about the reporting requirement
is that he'll be putting an address that says NASA on it, on
the envelope, sending it to us. But that report will be made
public concurrent with its receipt. So he will be reporting to
the President, to the Congress, to the American people, to all
of us simultaneously.
Contractor Incentives and Obligations
Chairman Boehlert. Well, I was comforted by my conversation
with Admiral Gehman, because he is insisting on independence,
and he has also indicated, obviously, he'll have to have a
liaison with NASA and use some of your resources, but the
staffing will be independent of NASA, and I think that's
essential.
Obviously, we're all going to be spending a lot of time
looking at Shuttle contracts even though there's no indication
at this point that they are a problem. How comfortable are you
that the incentives in the current contracts captured the
proper balance between efficiency and safety? And then, as a
follow-on, do the contracts have clauses that will ensure that
the contractors have to, must, cooperate with fully with the
Gehman investigation?
Mr. O'Keefe. Yes, sir. On the first part, the emphasis on
safety in the current Space Flight Operations Contract that we
have very much emphasizes the safety parameters. And, indeed,
they have tremendous incentives to do better each and every
time. And as a consequence of that, there are a series of
weighted factors in the guidelines that heavily look at the
metrics of any difficulties or problems on orbit or at launch
or any other time. As they drive those factors down, they're
given a specific incentive to do better in each of those cases.
So they've got a powerful motivation to want to move in that
direction.
In doing so, I think the approach also yields some
efficiencies. But that's a secondary matter, at most. And so,
as a result, there are real advantages and real emphasis on the
safety considerations that are currently built into that
contract framework.
As it pertains to their cooperation with the Gehman Board,
positively we will advise them, and have, that we fully expect
everyone to be cooperative with that board. We have absolutely
nothing to hide. There is no evidence or no fact that we can
think of out there, short of national security information or
some private proprietary issue that some individual may want to
assert, that would preclude us from making any information
available. And so everyone within the contractor community
should feel the same as we do.
Chairman Boehlert. But is there something more than a moral
obligation or a desire? Is there something that binds them,
commits them, to cooperate fully with the Gehman investigation
board?
Mr. O'Keefe. I will take you up on your opening statement
that, on that contract clause, I don't know, but I'll find out.
[The information follows:]
Chairman Boehlert. Thank you very much.
Mr. O'Keefe. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman McCain. Senator Hollings.
NASA's Budget Request to OMB
Senator Hollings. Right to the point with respect to costs,
and I'm sure you don't have, Mr. O'Keefe, the actual figures
with you, but on the shortchanging of the space program, we had
a report yesterday in the New York Times stating that we cut
the space program $800 million. I've been checking it
overnight. At my check, it's $700 million.
Be that as it may, what's the truth? That's what we want.
Last week I asked Mitch Daniels, Director of the Office of
Management and Budget, to furnish the Budget Committee the
figures of what was requested by NASA. I want you to furnish
the figures that were requested by NASA of OMB for the last 10
years. And not just this Administration, but the past
Administrations so we can see the trend line and exactly how we
financed it.
Yes, we all are trying to find out the cause. But, in the
meantime, as you try to piece together the retrieved parts and
everything else like that, I don't know how long that'll take,
a year or months, whatever it is, we all want to see the space
program continue. And for this senator, I don't want it to
continue with upgrades.
I've heard enough about these upgrades. We've lost 14
astronauts and $5 billion in hardware with upgrades, and we had
a new reusable launch vehicle. We had a spaceship that was
cancelled the year before last. Then we had a Reusable Launch
Vehicle, and that was cancelled last November, just a couple of
months ago. And you said we were going to use these vehicles,
Shuttles, until 2020. Are you willing to use one of these
Shuttles with all of the tiles flying off? And after all of
these losses, you'd still want to use them until 2020 and not
get new technology, Mr. Administrator?
Mr. O'Keefe. Yes, sir. No, thank you. As I understand the
history here, the effort during the course of the '90's was in
anticipation of a retirement of Shuttle concurrent with the
introduction of a new Reusable Launch Vehicle. That was
envisioned to be the X-33, as I understand it. Based on a
variety of technical issues, which were based on the assumption
that a series of unconquerable engineering and laws of physics
challenges would be overcome, ultimately that--two-plus years
ago, the choice was made to cancel that program and to continue
with Shuttle operations.
What we proposed a year ago and is not a cancellation of
any RLV effort, Reusable Launch Vehicle, instead it's a
selection, if you will, of looking at the Integrated Space
Transportation Plan.
What's included in the November amendment that the
President sent forward for the 2003 budget is a selection
specifically of an Orbital Space Plane option which, frankly,
is not a technology leap. It is the capability of putting
aboard an Expendable Launch Vehicle, a orbital space system,
space plane, that would be launched in a conventional manner
using an Expendable Launch Vehicle.
The next generation beyond that is what we focus on our
Next-Generation Launch Technology. So we've tried to narrow and
focus a lot more the Space Launch Initiative efforts in order
to get some near-term gain to supplement, to complement, the
Space Shuttle and to provide that dynamic as well as flexible
return system and transfer system to the International Space
System and also to pursue the development of a Reusable Launch
Vehicle that may be, hopefully, the product of breakthroughs
that were not possible that forced the motivation or the
cancellation a few years ago of the X-33.
So we're trying to do both of those concurrently, but to
get some near-term capability, and, in the meantime, use
Shuttle in the future as a cargo lift, heavy lift capacity,
which is what it was really designed to do in the first place,
rather than a crew transfer capability. So we're trying to
balance both ends of that to utilize capabilities for their
best purposes as we move along.
Senator Hollings. We've got to find out what you think we
ought to Appropriate. We all want to continue space
exploration, but we just don't want to waste time waiting on
the results, on the one hand, and trying to find out what we
already know. Let's get on and get your best advice on how we
should proceed to get going on this thing, and not just with
upgrades.
Mr. O'Keefe. Yes, sir. No, the----
Chairman Boehlert. Thank you very much, Senator.
Mr. Hall.
Crew Escape Systems
Representative Hall. Mr. O'Keefe, you heard my opening
statement. And I'm, quite frankly, disappointed that 17 years
after the Challenger accident so little attention has been
given to developing crew escape systems for our astronauts,
whether they're flying on the Shuttle or whether they're in the
space station. I know you share that.
I share with you the disappointment and the blame--I've
been here 23 years, so it's a partnership for us, and that's
what it is, that's what it'll continue to be, but especially
since NASA has indicated that the Shuttle is going to fly for
another decade and a half, and maybe, probably, longer than
that, and in light of a media report, I think on February the
5th, that NASA's most recent effort in that regard was a $5
million so-called ``study'' in 2001.
To put that study in context, the amount expended on that
study of potential a Shuttle crew escape system amounted to
just a little bit more than one-tenth of one percent of a
single year's budget. That doesn't strike me as being very
aggressive in your effort to look for ways to improve the odds
of survival for astronauts in the event of a Shuttle accident.
That leads me to say that I have no doubt that it's going
to be challenging to develop practical crew escape systems for
the Shuttle, but NASA is in the business of performing
miracles, NASA is in the business of meeting challenges, and we
call on you to do that.
I'm very afraid that a clue as to why NASA has not done
more is found elsewhere in that article, namely, and I quote,
``The proposed fixes were also seen as prohibitively expensive
additions to an already aging and financially strapped Shuttle
fleet.'' We've seen a similar situation with regard to
developing a Crew Rescue Vehicle for the International Space
Station.
So, as you know, NASA decided to cancel the ongoing
development of U.S. Crew Rescue Vehicles, just a demonstration
vehicle, we thought was nearing its flight test. And now we're
dependent on the Russians for their Crew Rescue Vehicles until
the end of this decade.
So, in the meantime, I guess my question to you is, Did you
explicitly consider investing in the development of Space
Shuttle crew escape systems when you revised the Integrated
Space Transportation Plan that you announced last November?
Mr. O'Keefe. Yes, sir. We're continuing to look at what we
would use as enhancements, if you will, of the Space Shuttle as
part of that November amendment that was submitted last
November, and we're getting together here, had planned to all
along, to identify that priority set of what will emphasize the
highest safety margin improvements that could be yielded from
different modifications of the orbiter system.
But with regard to the specific crew escape efforts, recall
that since Challenger there have been a number of operational
changes made. There is an egress system that was put into place
right after the Challenger accident that was part of the Rogers
Commission recommendations--that ultimately stemmed from it, I
should say--that we put in to place that now still exist to
this day.
Once launched, though, there is a number of different
approaches that have been proposed, examined, reviewed, and all
of which added significant amounts of weight, I'm advised, to
the overall effort, and so, as a consequence, were viewed to be
technically infeasible.
What we have instituted, though, is, again, a series of
abort procedures. And, as recently as the December launch of
the STS-113, on a perfectly clear night at Cape Canaveral in
Florida, where everything was nominal, everything was ready to
go, all the systems were completely operational, we scrubbed
the launch because the alternate abort site at Zaragossa,
Spain, the weather continued to be marginal. So we take every
precaution in this process in order to assure that, all the way
through assent, that every possible opportunity is there as
much as possible.
But, again, the idea of an escape system was looked at,
examined very thoroughly, and the conclusion was that the
weight factor would almost be prohibitive in terms of its
technical clarification.
So we'll continue to look at that. We'll go back and look
at it again, you bet. In light of this circumstance, we really
do need to focus entirely on what all the alternatives are, and
I guarantee you, sir, we'll make that part of our effort
underway now as part of this November amendment that is before
the Congress to consider for the 2003 program, that we'll
factor that into the equation and proceed as appropriate.
Representative Hall. Even on a local level, city councils
rarely ever fix a bad bridge or a bad turn in the road until a
teenager gets killed, and then it's too late. It seems to me
that we launched the vehicle without any ability to dock. We
lost the vehicle because we didn't have telescopic ability to
inspect. We have three birds left. I just urge caution. And I
thank you for your time.
I yield back my time.
Mr. O'Keefe. Thank you, Congressman. I appreciate it very
much.
Chairman McCain. Senator Brownback.
Questioning NASA's Goals and Objectives
Senator Brownback. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. And,
Mr. O'Keefe, thank you very much for coming in front of our
Joint Committees here and your great leadership at NASA in a
very difficult and trying and challenging time.
We all grieve the loss of human life that's happened to
NASA. And at this particular point, I'm chairing a subcommittee
in the Senate that'll be dealing with this, and I want to work
with you and your agency as we lay out the future of manned
space flight in the United States.
I want to ask you about the broad objectives and broad
program objectives that we're talking about right now. It seems
to me that the space program is really at a critical juncture
and that the totality of the space program is. And it's got to
decide amongst a couple of competing options. One is to
maintain the current set of programs and current missions. The
second one that you read a lot about in the newspaper and
people speculate is to dramatically reduce manned space flight,
go into more robotics and different types of vehicles,
questioning about the safety and to try to be more safe. And
the third, a number of people are saying that our vision is too
small in space currently right now, that we need new
initiatives, we need to go back to the Moon, we need to go to
Mars. And we're at this tremendous fork-in-the-road decision of
which path to take.
It's certainly my intent in the Subcommittee to look
closely at where NASA has been and where you are today and
where we plan to go into the future. And, most importantly, we
need to discuss, as well, the financial situation, the terms of
how we get NASA where it needs to be. I'm glad to see that, in
the Appropriations Committee, we're putting in an additional
$414 million over the President's request.
The goal is to reflect an accurate and effective
determination for the future of NASA, and I would simply like
to ask you, What have you done recently--and I realize you're
dealing with the tragedy mostly now, but--to look at this need
for a review of the mission of NASA amongst these three policy
objectives, have you had a chance to start contemplating some
of that? And I hope you'll be open to working openly with the
Congress as we look at this fork in the road we're in right
now.
Mr. O'Keefe. Yes, sir. Of course, Senator, I'd be delighted
to work with you and any other Members of Congress to sort
through really what is the proper role and objective of NASA in
our pursuit of exploration objectives, always.
We have, indeed, had an opportunity prior to February 1st
to really think seriously about what is the strategy and the
focus of how we concentrate on what we do best, and do that
only in a way that guarantees and assures that we--to offer to
folks that we can actually deliver on and have a capability to
look at longer-term exploration objectives. And I think that's
contained in the strategic planning documents that were all
forwarded, along with the budget that was submitted by the
President just last Monday.
Prior to that, in all the efforts we put into it, was to
think seriously about the very kind of questions you've raised,
and, again, to narrowly focus on the kinds of exploration and
discovery objectives we think we do exceptionally well. And,
for those that are done by others or can be pursued elsewhere,
to leave that to folks who have expertise or capabilities that
would otherwise have to be duplicated by us.
What it leads to, I think, is a stepping-stone approach, an
exploration strategy, if you will, that assumes that we start
off with a series of robotic capabilities, and moves forward
then, thereafter, toward other exploration objectives that may
or may not involve human involvement.
The best example that we've seen played before us in the
last several years is the Hubble Space Telescope. There was a
$2 billion capability that, when launched in 1992, in fairly
short order was deemed to be, as a marvelous robotic capacity,
a capability that was in need of an eye examination, if you
will, a lense correction. And it was, at that time, determined
to be a $2 billion piece of space junk. A year later, we were
able to send a Shuttle flight with astronomers and other
engineering capability that was resonant among the astronauts
there to make that correction. That could not have been done
remotely.
And so the human intervention that was necessary to adjust
that, and all the servicing missions we've done since that
time, have yielded the kind of astronomy breakthroughs and
discovery, just in this past year, that we never dreamed
imaginable. So that combination, that heel-toe kind of approach
towards a strategy that utilizes robotic capabilities, much
like we're going to do here in the coming months when we send
the Mars explorers in May and June of this year intended for
landing in January of '04, is to then consider all the efforts
we've got to do to prepare for, then, the follow-on kinds of
exploration objectives.
But, again, the reiteration of the first commitment to you,
positively we'll continue to work together and refine this
strategy to assure that we do it with least risk, but the
greatest opportunity for exploration and discovery potential.
Senator Brownback. Thank you. And I look forward to working
with you on that design of where we----
Chairman McCain. The gentleman's time has expired.
Mr. O'Keefe. Thank you, Senator.
Chairman Boehlert. Mr. Rohrabacher.
Representative Rohrabacher. Thank you very much.
First and foremost, I'd like to associate myself with the
remarks and the concerns of Chairman Boehlert about the basic
nature and the importance of the integrity of this commission's
investigation and our oversight of that commission's work.
Second of all, I would like to just note that, at the
memorial service down in Texas I was touched particularly by
the people of Texas, and especially by the children of Texas,
who, as we went to this memorial service, they came out on the
streets and roads and waved little American flags and had
little signs up to encourage us, and it was very encouraging
for our country. So we recognize that there was a special bond
between the children of America and our astronauts.
And today we're building, and we're going to make sure that
we build a better future for our children. And if there's going
to be a better future for our children, we've got to have a
viable space program that will keep them in the forefront of
this great human endeavor of going into space and pioneering
space.
So let me--I have a few thoughts, and I'll have a few
questions for you. The hardworking and patriotic people of NASA
have always understood and appreciated the risks with space
exploration, especially manned missions. Unfortunately, in the
past 17 years, we have been reminded of the dangers of human
space flight with the destruction of the Space Shuttle
Challenger in 1996--or '86, I should say --and now the
Columbia.
Seventeen years ago, we took a step backwards for a few
moments to take a look at that tragedy and pinpoint to our
satisfaction what caused it and then correct those causes, at
least the technical causes of the loss.
Today, I am confident that Admiral Gehman and his
commission will get to the truths that will help us understand
Columbia's fatal accident. However, many questions need to be
addressed that transcend the immediate technical and managerial
problems of this tragedy.
We're going to hear a lot about the technical end of it,
but there's a lot of other questions that go way beyond that.
The lack of long-term goals or a unifying vision for America's
space effort, for example, needs to be addressed to fully
understand this tragedy. This failing, I believe, weaken the
efforts that would have been taken to replace the Shuttle
system long before age became a factor. And we will find out, I
believe, that age was, indeed, a factor.
Perhaps Mr. Hollings, or Senator Hollings, is right,
perhaps it's simple what we're looking at. Perhaps it was the
tiles and--in terms of a simple answer; and a more complex
answer might be facing--it might be age. But this tragedy and
this investigation, nonetheless, gives us an opportunity to
revisit the fundamentals and make recommendations that will
chart America's future space endeavors.
NASA's leadership has faced, and will continue to face, the
challenge of exercising responsible stewardship with limited
resources while providing a coherent blueprint of what can be
accomplished and how it can be accomplished. But hopefully,
forward-looking strategies will lead us to incremental advances
that will then permit us to achieve long-term objectives. A new
propulsion system might be a good start, as well as, perhaps, a
look at robotics and remote control on the part of NASA, a new
commitment on that end. But before we move forward, we must
fully understand why these seven people perished.
My question to you today is, the age factor, Was this
Shuttle's age, a 30-year-old system, a major factor in this
tragedy we're investigating today?
Chairman Boehlert. Administrator O'Keefe.
Mr. O'Keefe. Well, thank you, Congressman. And, again, I
associate myself entirely with your observation that ultimately
the investigation will be what guides us to that conclusion.
And if that is a factor, you bet, that's exactly what we'll
operate on.
Having said that, it is worth noting two really important
factors on this. The Columbia, indeed, is the oldest, or was
the oldest, of the four orbiters. It was delivered in late
1970's. Its first flight was in 1981. It was half the age of
the average bomber aircraft that flew in Afghanistan just a
year ago that prosecuted that very important effort that we
were engaged in there.
So the air frame condition on this--each time we go through
this orbiter major modification I referred to in the opening
statement--is essentially the equivalent of the same kind of
effort the military, the Defense Department, goes through of
tear-down of every single element of the capability of the
orbiter itself, its structural integrity inspected and examined
very carefully, then rebuilt to modernize it to contemporary
capability. That particular effort had just been conducted, an
18-month tear-down of the Shuttle Columbia, and delivered early
last year in advance of the March flight that went to Hubble,
that did the servicing mission. STS-109 was the first flight of
Columbia after that particular Orbiter Major Modification
effort, which, again, is patterned very much after the depot
kind of approach that's taken at all of the Defense Department-
related assets, only even more exhaustively to conduct the
upgrades. This was the second flight after that particular
tear-down.
So the age factor, again, you're exactly right, the
investigation may yet prove or may demonstrate to us that there
was a contributor there. But in terms of our efforts to assure
that not be a factor, again, it appears to be every element of
diligence could be done to assure that, there was a previous
flight that operated just perfectly, no difficulty whatsoever
on Columbia, no structural defects upon return. And upon every
single orbiter flight return, we examine all of the elements of
the Shuttles themselves, the orbiters themselves, and we move
it through the Orbiter Processing Facility to assure that any
damage, any structural problems, anything are detected. And
there was absolutely nothing wrong with the Columbia that we
could detect in that regard. So when it flew on its second
flight, it was in the same shape it was when it left the
Orbiter Major Modification program just a year before.
History of Tile Damage and Loss
Chairman McCain. Senator Breaux.
Senator Breaux. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. O'Keefe, thank you. I want to also congratulate you on
the method in which you've handled this tragedy and the
openness that I think we've seen from NASA in how you are
approaching the investigation, both internally and with the
external investigation, as well.
Let me ask, do we have any idea of how many times the
insulating tiles have come off a Shuttle during launch and how
many tiles have actually come off during the history of the
Shuttle launches?
Mr. O'Keefe. To the best of my recollection, sir, in our
efforts there, it's no more than a half a dozen times that was
specifically related to it. After each flight, there is always,
again, as I mentioned just a moment ago to Congressman
Rohrabacher, an assessment summary that's conducted to look at
each element of the orbiter when it returns. There's also an
inspection of the external tank, which, as you're aware, when
it reaches the upper atmosphere, it disintegrates. The two
Solid Rocket Boosters, once expended, drop back into the
ocean----
Senator Breaux. Well, but on the tiles themselves.
Mr. O'Keefe. I'm sorry.
Senator Breaux. How many times have the tiles come off, and
how many tiles have come off during the history of the Shuttle
launches?
Mr. O'Keefe. Yes, sir. At each flight, there's typically a
ding or a scratch or whatever else from all the various efforts
that occur as they are re-entering, as well as on ascent. I'll
provide, for the record, a full summary of all of the times on
each flight that a tile has been missing or lost or whatever
else. But it was never considered to be significant, in terms
of its safety-of-flight consideration that we've examined on
the orbiters when we moved it through the Orbiter Processing
Facility to look at the condition of the orbiters after each
flight. But we'll submit that for the record, sir.
[The information follows:]
Senator Breaux. If engineers on this particular case had
determined that insulating tiles had, in fact, departed the
Shuttle at some point and that it was in an area that was
important and very key, could the angle of attack on the re-
entry of the Shuttle have been adjusted to deflect the heat?
Mr. O'Keefe. That's a potential maneuvering capability.
But, again, there are more than 4,000 sensors aboard each
Shuttle orbiter, and if there were any indication that there
were any abnormalities as a consequence of tile loss or
whatever else, they likely would have shown up during that 16-
day orbiting mission.
More importantly, during the course of that time, recall
that in each orbit you're looking at a sunset and a sunrise
every 90 minutes, which means every 16 times a day, the
temperature variation on an orbiter or a Shuttle flight varies
by as much as three to four hundred degrees, plus--200 degrees
during the sunlight, and minus about 150-plus during the
darkness period of that 90-degree rotation--or 90-minute
rotation each time it orbits. So that wide range of temperature
variation, if there had been exposure, almost certainly would
have shown up on one of those 4,000 sensors that are aboard the
Shuttle orbiter to have given us an indication.
The fact of the matter remains, there were no abnormalities
that would suggest that problem until 8:53 the morning of
Saturday, February the 1st.
Senator Breaux. But is there no way that these sensors or
any other methodology would have determined if any of the tiles
had departed the Shuttle during the actual mission, before it
returned to Earth?
Mr. O'Keefe. We don't think so. Every effort that were made
on previous flights to examine any structural damage or change
or whatever else using any kind of visual capabilities were
either inconclusive or not of the level of granularity that
really gave us that much detail. And, again, all the supporting
data would have also suggested if there were problems on it.
Again, the reality remains, over that 16-day mission--and,
again, the investigation may find some data that we're not
aware of right now, because everything was locked down within a
half an hour after the incident. If there's something else that
emerges to suggest to the contrary, we're going to get to the
bottom of it. But all the information we have now and after the
flight and after the examination of it, suggests no
abnormalities that would have pointed in that direction at all.
Senator Breaux. What degree of certainty----
Chairman McCain. The gentleman's time has expired.
Chairman Boehlert. Mr. Gordon.
Reiterating the Need for an Independent Investigation Board
Representative Gordon. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And
welcome, Mr. O'Keefe. I'm glad you joined us today.
Before I move to discuss other issues, I just want to
stress my concern that the investigation of the Columbia Space
Shuttle accident ultimately must be perceived as objective and
independent if Congress, the President, and the American
taxpayers are going to reach a consensus on how to move forward
with our space program. It's no reflection on you or the
Admiral, but that's not going to be possible if there are
lingering questions regarding the independence of the board.
As you know, I've raised this question for several days
now. And having checked with your office this week and the NASA
Web site this morning, there seems to be a clear disconnect
from your statements about the board's independence and the
rules you're laying down for the board.
Let me quote just a few examples of your rules, as Mr.
Boehlert had earlier. The current board not only includes NASA
employees, but you also require it to be staffed by NASA
employees who will help write the board's final report, which
goes to you. You require that the board must, and I quote,
``schedule board activities, interim board reports, and submit
the final board report in coordination with the NASA
administrator in accordance with the applicable NASA
policies.''
Now, Mr. O'Keefe, I am afraid this will not pass anybody's
smell test of independence. So please, let us move forward in a
concrete way and put this bipartisan concern behind us.
ASAP's Safety Concerns
Now, let me turn to another issue that is troubling. As you
know, there have been numerous warning flags regarding the
health of the Shuttle program in recent years. Just a few
examples. April 2002, Richard Blomberg, head of the independent
Aerospace Safety Advisory Panel, issued a blunt warning when he
testified before this House Subcommittee. And I quote, ``In all
the years of my involvement, I have never been as concerned for
the Space Shuttle safety as I am now.''
A month earlier, the Aerospace Safety Advisory Panel gave
you a report that stated, and I quote, ``The current and
proposed budgets are not sufficient to improve or even maintain
the safety risk level of operations for the Space Shuttle.''
Yet in spite of these warnings, you sent over a NASA budget
request that cut the budget for Shuttle upgrades by $500
million, even while finding a billion dollars for new
initiatives.
Because of my concern, I asked Fred Gregory, who was then
the NASA Associate Administration for Space Flight, the
following question at this same April 2002 hearing. ``Mr.
Gregory, how would you support the space station in the event
you lost a Shuttle and the rest of the fleet was grounded for
some period of time?'' Mr. Gregory responded, ``There would be
no way to do that.''
Now, I assumed that such an admission would have kicked off
an intense effort to develop a contingency plan for supporting
the space station. However, at your press briefing Monday, you
indicated that over the next few weeks NASA would be working
with the space station international partners to come up with a
plan. You reiterated that earlier today.
Given the fact that you've had numerous warnings and you
knew the Shuttle was grounded for two-and-a-half years after
the loss of Challenger, I would assume Mr. Gregory's admission
nearly a year ago would have been a wake-up call.
So my questions are, Did NASA prepare a contingency plan
for the space station last year? If so, what was in the plan,
and why do you now believe that you need to redo it? And,
finally, if you didn't have a plan, why not?
Mr. O'Keefe. Yes, sir. We did prepare a contingency plan. I
guess I've outlined a number of those options. You've
acknowledged that you heard those as part of presentation and
the testimony. We'll continue to look at those alternatives
using Soyuz as well as Progress vehicles, and we're also
hopeful of an expeditious conclusion that would tell us what
occurred on Shuttle Columbia that would give us an opportunity
to return to flight expeditiously.
All those factors are in play. Those are all part of that
contingency plan. I think the specific reference in this case
from the testimony you cite, was no way to get back with
Shuttle immediately given the safety considerations that we
will always ground the fleet under those circumstances.
I fully concur on your opening comments, too, as it
pertains to charter revisions, to the extent they are
necessary. As I pledged to Chairman Boehlert, we will make
those changes in any way that Admiral Gehman feels he has to
have in order to guarantee that independence.
I have no difficult whatsoever understanding his
requirements for independence, and he has reiterated those, and
I intend to comply exactly with that approach.
Chairman McCain. Senator Fitzgerald.
Questioning an Aging System
Senator Fitzgerald. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. O'Keefe, the day after the Columbia accident, I
happened to be having a town hall meeting in Champaign,
Illinois, and I asked--there were about two, maybe two-hundred-
fifty, people in the room--I asked them whether they thought we
should continue with manned exploration of space, and I
explained to them that it could cost us billions of dollars and
years to make ourselves able to continue going forward in
space.
To my surprise, I'd say about four-fifths of the people in
that room wanted us to go back and continue human exploration
of space. And my state of Illinois has very little in the way
of spending that it benefits from. We're not Florida or Texas.
And I want the space program to continue.
And I wondered if you had a gut impression at this point--
and I know it's early, but it seems to me we can go in one of
two directions. We could spend billions of dollars and perhaps
years trying to patch up and fix whatever may be wrong with the
Shuttle program, but you're basically dealing with a 30-year-
old design. My understanding is there are some 1.2 million
checks that have to be done by hundreds of people before a
single Shuttle flight can take off. It's extraordinarily
complex.
My question is, Do we go forward and spend that time and
that money reinforcing the Shuttle program, or would we be
better off not diverting the resources to reinforcing this 30-
year-old Shuttle program, and, instead, try and proceed with a
new vehicle and focus all our effort on that?
Mr. O'Keefe. Well, thank you, Senator. The factors, I
think, that lead to the complexity of the Shuttle and the
amount of checking that goes on there certainly is driven by
the technology, no doubt about that, the number of moving parts
on that asset. But I would submit that any asset we have that
we would use, for the purpose of a Reusable Launch Vehicle
capability to launch, would also require an awful lot of
checks, as well, because of the absolute dedication, the
unwavering commitment to safety, that we always pursue.
Every time we launch a Shuttle flight, no matter what that
asset would be, it would require, I think, a review of all the
systems checks. And the ethos that we have within the agency
and all that are part of the community is that if there's a
single thing that is wrong or that appears to be wrong in the
judgment of any individual, there is a process set up to stop
the launch.
Two weeks in advance, there's a Flight Readiness Review
that runs to ground every issue involved in that. If there's
any residual issues all the way up to the moment of launch, we
don't do that. I don't envision that changing. Even if we had a
system today that was brand new, I think that same ethos would
have to dominate, because we really are committed to that
objective to minimize the risk. We'll never drive the risk out
of it completely. And so I think that same approach would be
employed no matter what assets or capabilities.
Having said all that, if the investigation leads us to
conclude that there is anything structurally deficient about
the continued safe operations of the Shuttle system, we
positively will take that as a very strong element of the
investigation findings and make judgments accordingly that may
lead us in the kinds of directions you're talking about.
In the interim, again, our approach is, as I discussed with
Congressman Rohrabacher, we tear down this system about every
eight to ten flights, essentially rebuild it as new, and it
goes through that 18- to 24-month Orbiter Major Modification
Program. And so every time that asset goes up there, it is as
safe as we know how to make it.
We'll never drive the risk out entirely, but we're trying
to manage it down to the lowest possible level and assure that
anything that appears even vaguely awry is beaten to parade
rest before we let the flight take off, and during orbit, as
well.
Chairman Boehlert. The gentleman's time has expired.
Mr. Calvert.
Representative Calvert. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Thank you, Mr. O'Keefe, for attending today. And certainly
my sympathies to the family and to the NASA family that's
certainly still grieving over this loss.
I think all of us here today share one thing, and that's
that we desire an independent assessment, unbiased and with the
highest integrity, to ensure that future astronauts, NASA, this
Congress, and the country have confidence in its ultimate
result. Certainly you're off to a good start, and I certainly
appreciate that, and I know that we do and the country does.
But as Chairman Boehlert has indicated, it may be necessary
that changes be made to make sure we maintain that confidence.
And I'm thankful that you're open-minded to that.
It's reported that we have a certain amount of money
appropriated, I believe about $50 million, for NASA to complete
this investigation. Is that funding adequate to pursue, in your
mind, to the levels that we're discussing?
Mr. O'Keefe. I don't know, sir. As I understand it, that's
part of the current appropriations conference deliberations.
I've read the same press accounts you have. I have no other
knowledge of what you and your colleagues may have in mind for
that Omnibus Appropriations bill provision, and so I can't make
an assessment of that. And I don't know what the cost of this
will be, other than to say that whatever it costs, that's what
we ought to spend in order to be sure that we reach the answers
to what caused this accident.
Representative Calvert. Obviously, NASA is not the only
agency that's going to be involved in this investigation. Are
you receiving cooperation from other agencies, full
cooperation?
Mr. O'Keefe. Yes, sir. It's overwhelming. There is no
hesitancy, there is no confusion of how that process works.
I've just been amazed to see how forward-leaning 20 different
Federal agencies, state and local law enforcement officials
from Texas and Louisiana, have been in helping us work through
what is a real nightmarish circumstance in a way that's
professional, aboveboard, and fully cooperative. No hesitation
on that point at all.
Representative Calvert. And that also would apply to the
contractors that are involved in this program?
Mr. O'Keefe. Yes, sir, absolutely.
Representative Calvert. I know I've read the press quotes.
You mentioned, just as of yesterday, that you had no favorite
theories of what occurred, and I understand that. However, as
we move forward in this Congress, I guess that what Mr.
Rohrabacher and others have indicated, do you believe, because
of the age of the Shuttle, there is any systemic problem that
may be there? And what's our alternatives if, in fact, that's
the case?
Mr. O'Keefe. Again, none that I'm aware of. And, again, we
go through an exhaustive process to assure that that the
safety-of-flight operation is adhered each and every time. This
is not a one-shot deal. It's every--every time it comes back,
the orbiters return, we do a careful inspection, we go through
a very exhaustive review of everything, and we do not roll it
out immediately. There's an orbiter processing facility effort
that goes on for the better part of three months as we move it
through an exhaustive examination. And then when it gets out to
the launch pad, typically it's there for the better part of 30
days in order to make sure that every single thing checks out.
So if there's something systemically wrong, we will be
guided by the Gehman board's view of that and we'll correct it.
But based on our assessment right now and everything we've
done, it sure doesn't look like a systemic failure. But if it
is, we positively will correct that before we launch ever
again.
Representative Calvert. Thank you.
Mr. O'Keefe. Thank you, sir.
Representative Calvert. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman McCain. Senator Dorgan.
Suggesting a Presidential Commission
Senator Dorgan. Mr. O'Keefe, thank you for being here
today. I think most of us feel that a nation that doesn't
explore is a nation that's standing still, and this space
program must continue exploring the frontiers of space.
I want to ask you a question, and I don't want you to think
the origin of my question poses any distrust for you or the men
and women of NASA. I have great admiration for your leadership
and also for the men and women of NASA. But as we attempt to
find out what happened with this tragedy, it seems to me that
in almost any circumstance of this type, an agency can't very
effectively investigate itself. I feel there ought to be a
Presidential Commission empaneled. I would ask the question,
Have you had a chance to visit with President Bush about the
prospect of that? And can it be done enveloping reconfiguring
the kind of commission that you have now created?
Mr. O'Keefe. Yes, sir. Oh, yes, indeed, we have visited on
the question, to the President as well as the Vice President
and all the senior staff on the issue. And I guess the approach
that--history is a guide in these cases.
In the Challenger accident, it was five days after the
accident that President Reagan announced the intent to appoint
a commission. It was the better part of 10 days to two weeks
before they assembled. It was probably the better end of three
to four weeks before they were fully prepared to engage and
really start taking testimony and doing the things that were
necessary. And they still, nonetheless, produced a set of
findings and recommendations by June of 1986. So roughly six
months after the accident they were able to reach some
conclusions.
In this circumstance, given the development of this
contingency plan that we've put together as a lesson learned
from Challenger, and there was an awful lot that we learned out
of that event, that really informed us about how we ought to go
ahead and look at ourselves and how we do business. And what it
called for as part of that contingency plan was to identify, by
positions, the kinds of people that ought to be activated, who
are non-NASA individuals and experts, and mobilize them right
away.
And so as a consequence, what we defaulted in favor of in
this case was speed. We had an opportunity then to have all the
members except one, who was a NASA center director of a non-
space-flight center, who has no involvement with space flight
at all, who was appointed to that particular board. Everybody
else is removed from it, and we're moving ahead in that regard
as independent as we can possibly make that.
Senator Dorgan. Can I make the point that I think you did
exactly the right thing, because you don't want time to elapse.
You took action and did the right thing. I'm asking, I guess,
as we go along, whether a presidential commission can now
envelope, reconfigure the commission that you have started.
I really do think that a year from now, three, five years
from now, the question people will ask is, Could NASA really
have investigated itself? Again, I don't say that with any
distrust at all. I think you've got a great organization. But I
really do hope, as we go along here, we're finding a way to
perhaps have a Presidential Commission. We don't want to
duplicate different investigations, but I think this could be
done in the right way and will resolve these questions of
independence.
Mr. O'Keefe. Yes, sir.
Senator Dorgan. So let me wish you well, and please extend,
on behalf of all of us in the Congress, our thoughts and
prayers to the men and women of NASA.
Mr. O'Keefe. Thank you, Senator. We're committed to exactly
the same objective. We want to find the answers, and we want it
to be credible. I mean, there's no question about that at all.
So whatever it's going to take in order to do that, that's what
we are committed to doing.
And the process, again, is not investigating ourselves.
This is an independent group of folks who have no, baggage to
carry as it pertains to, NASA biases. Admiral Gehman came from
a distinguished naval career that had no involvement whatsoever
with NASA, and yet, at the same time, I think he's had a lot of
experience, as all the other members did, of better than 50
different investigations into accident situations.
So this is not a group of NASA investigating itself. This
is going to be an independent group that's going to reach some
conclusions, and we want to make sure that's as credible as we
can possibly make it, because that's going to turn on--I think
the trust and confidence of the American people depend upon
that. Your point is exactly right. I associate myself with that
sentiment, as well.
Chairman Boehlert. Mr. Lampson.
Representative Lampson. I want to thank you, Mr. O'Keefe,
for coming to Capitol Hill to testify today. As the member of
Congress who represents the Johnson Space Center, I would also
like to thank you and your NASA team for the support and
encouragement that you've provided to the space center
community in Houston during this very difficult time.
I'm somewhat of a reluctant participant in this hearing.
Today is the 11th day since the tragic loss of Space Shuttle
Columbia. There's so much that we do not yet know and perhaps
some things that we may never know.
It's my understanding that there were no Congressional
hearings on the Challenger investigation in 1986 until after
the Rogers Commission completed their report four months later.
And while I know we're operating under different circumstances,
with three astronauts orbiting the Earth in the International
Space Station, I do question the merits of having this hearing
so soon after the Columbia Shuttle accident.
I believe Congress needs to allow the investigation to move
forward and to let the accident investigation board members do
their work. Hopefully we will complement your efforts and not
impede the process.
That being said, I firmly believe that the Administration
needs to move forward with a truly independent investigation
similar to what President Reagan appointed in 1986 after the
Challenger accident.
I think NASA made a good first step by revising the board's
charter last week, but I still believe, as my colleagues have
stated, that NASA's external investigation team is too closely
tied to the agency.
As NASA Administrator, the board's charter allows you to
appoint the team members, to staff the board with NASA
employees, and to receive the final report. In order for this
review to have credibility, I believe it needs to have team
members who are truly independent and who report to the White
House and Congress.
Also, seeing all the cameras and the media presence in this
hearing room today begs the question, Where was all this
attention to our human space flight programs before February
1st? While I applaud the renewed interest, I regret that it
takes the loss of seven fine astronauts for our space program
to make the front page of the newspaper or the top story on the
evening news.
And while it may seem routine, the work that is being done
by NASA in outer space is far from routine. We're doing so many
great things in space that benefit us right here on Earth. My
hope is that somehow this terrible tragedy will spur the
Administration to develop an interest in a real, truly robust
space program.
And I'd like to call for a new space race for the 21st
century. This space race is not against the old Cold War enemy
or an emerging power in the East, but rather our new space race
needs to be against ourselves for our own future.
ISS Contingency Planning
And let me ask two things, Mr. O'Keefe. First, a copy of
the contingency plan for the International Space Station that
you referred to a few minutes ago, could you possibly get that
to us within the next week or so? We would appreciate it.
[The information follows:]
Copies of the following documents have been provided to the
Committee:
And then let me ask, in 1999, when problems with the
experimental X-33 Reusable Launch Vehicle demonstrator made it
clear the Space Shuttle would have to be relied on for many
more years, perhaps until 2020, the Clinton Administration's
OMB sensibly increased the Shuttle upgrades budget
significantly. However, in 2001, the Bush Administration's OMB,
of which you were deputy director, simultaneously cancelled X-
33 program and cut the Space Shuttle safety upgrades budget.
How can that possibly have made sense, and can you tell us why
you did that?
Mr. O'Keefe. Again, I'd have to go back and take a look at
when NASA cancelled the X-33 program and exactly what was
leading to that particular case. But if I can get slide 16,
please? The history over the course of time, as I understand
it, was a span that you'll see on this particular slide that
was for Shuttle funding over the course of that time. The
increase that you see occurred, again, as part of the fiscal
year '03 budget proposal that we made, and '04, that was just
submitted to the Congress last Monday.
[The information follows:]
So my reading of the data and the information is that
there's an awful lot that contributed to this particular change
in funding profile over this span of time, but it was primarily
driven by a concurrent, I think, focus on safety improvements
and kind of concentrating on all of the factors that would lead
to safe-flight operations, and, concurrently, efficiencies that
drove down the cost of guaranteeing those particular safe-
flight operations through the '90's.
And the most significant increase that's occurred is part
of the fiscal year '03 budget amendment the President submitted
last November, and the fiscal year '04 budget was submitted
last Monday. So those are the primary increases that I've been
able to examine, but I'd certainly be prepared to submit all
that for the record for your consideration, sir.
Representative Lampson. Thank you.
Chairman McCain. Senator Allen.
Mr. O'Keefe. One other comment, if I could, Senator, is
just to reiterate again that the Gehman Commission will report
to all of us. He's going to report to the President, to
Congress, to all the American people as soon as they reach
findings. I have no intention whatsoever of putting any value
added to their findings. As soon as the ink is dry, it will be
released by Hal Gehman. There is no other approach that I can
think of that would be a more appropriate way to handle this so
we can move on with finding what the solution is to the
problem, get the answers to it, and make the corrections
necessary to get back to flying safety.
Representative Lampson. Thank you.
Chairman McCain. Senator Allen.
Role of Automation and Robotics
Senator Allen. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you, Mr.
O'Keefe, for being here.
I want to associate myself with some of the thoughts and
philosophy stated in the beginning by our chairman, Senator
McCain. And I want to focus on the long-term goals of NASA,
broader goals.
If anything good can come out of this tragedy, I think it
would be the reinvigorated focus on the mission, primary
mission, of NASA, which ought to be scientific research that
has benefit for people here on Earth. And I think such sensible
strategic planning would be a salutary goal and part of the
legacy of the tragic loss of these brave men and women. And I
know that of paramount concern to you and all the people in
NASA is safety, safety for humans primarily.
Previously, before this tragedy, I know you're on record as
supporting refurbished or upgraded Shuttles so they can remain
operational for the next 10 to 20 years. I think, in examining
the broader goals of NASA, it would be helpful if we'd have
some consideration of what is going to be the next orbiter.
There are so many questions that we have to determine, and this
is just the beginning of this examination. Once we get into our
committees in the House and Senate, we'll get in greater
detail.
But my question is specific on automation and robotics, and
how can robotics and automation and advances in technology, how
can that make it safer? It is less costly, but it's also safer
for human life. And so is NASA considering an entirely new
space plane orbiter or downsizing the manned space flight?
Depending on which option is chosen, how will that shape our
efforts, our efforts also as the $30 billion, of course, that
we've already invested in this space station, the International
Space Station, as an investment? But where are we in embracing
some of these advancements in automation and robotics? And in
the strategic planning, will it effect the continued
dangerously underfunding of aeronautics, which I think have
tangible benefits to us militarily as well as in the commercial
markets?
So I'd like your thoughts on these key paths that we need
to go down and decide which ones we're going to go down in the
future.
Mr. O'Keefe. Thank you, Senator. It is, in my judgment, not
an issue of either/or, robotics or human space flight. It's how
do you do it compatibly? How do you find the appropriate role
for robotic capabilities that set, in advance, the kind of
knowledge base that you need in order to then support, when
necessary, and in circumstances where human intervention and
human involvement then becomes very critical.
Again, the Hubble Telescope is the classic example. It's a
marvelous piece of machinery that didn't work, and the only way
it could be adjusted was to have human involvement in order to
make those adjustments on each of the respective servicing
missions that have gone on. And now it is rewriting the
astronomy books. It is a classic example of how that
compatibility between robotics and the use of human space
flight intervention, when necessary, can advance the knowledge
base dramatically.
But we have to really focus on the risk management side of
this and assure that we always use those robotic capabilities,
I think, as you've suggested, as a way to fully beat down any
of the manageable risk that we see before involving a human
space flight capability for that reason, as well as being
careful about when you utilize the human involvement dimension
to this. That's part of the reason, and a lot of the reason,
why the Mars program that we're pursuing for the Mars landers
that are planned for later this year and arriving in January of
'04 is to advance that knowledge base, understanding fully
what's going on in order to then fully support what could be,
down the road, a human--a mission that could support that case,
if deemed appropriate, necessary, and supported by the research
and the science opportunities that could be yielded.
So the strategy you've talked about and the approach that
you're alluding to is precisely the direction we're trying to
develop now, and have been for some time, as a means to
complement those capabilities and always use the robotic
capacity up front as the means to inform those judgments.
Chairman Boehlert. The gentleman's time has expired.
Mr. Lucas.
Representative Lucas. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Administrator, down at the Smithsonian, they have a
piece of your old equipment hanging for all the world to see,
the X-15 from the 1960's, which is a symbol of a debate and a
decision by the generation ahead of you and I that, in the
spirit of satisfying the common need of the United States
Congress and the American people for immediate gratification,
it was better to strap men and women and equipment on ballistic
missiles than it was to focus on creating space planes.
Your comments today--you point out about the potential
future for an Orbital Space Plane and the Reusable Launch
Vehicles--with reasonable budget and reasonable focus, how far
down the road are we talking about before we have functioning
replacement systems like that?
Mr. O'Keefe. Well, the budget before the Congress as part
of the amended fiscal year '03 proposal the President made last
November, would contemplate a technology demonstrator of the
Orbital Space Plane as early as fiscal year '06, flight testing
and so forth to occur as soon as next summer that would lead up
to that technology demonstrator. Then, from there to developing
as we've now completed the essential baseline requirements, if
you will, look for competing approaches--not a technology
demonstrator, but an operational vehicle--that would accomplish
the objectives of both rescue and return capacity as well as
transfer to the International Space Station. It would be
online, we would hope, as early as the end of this decade, and
we're kind of moving in that direction to try to establish
that.
This would be a complementary capability to the Space
Shuttle and use the Space Shuttle primarily as a cargo
capacity, heavy-lift ability, rather than trying to make a
vehicle that's all things to all requirements. This would be a
crew transfer capability that would be maneuverable, flexible,
and responsive to those kinds of circumstances where needed
most.
Representative Lucas. Booster, slash, plane, or a two-stage
plane, Administrator?
Mr. O'Keefe. It is initially planned as a capability
mounted atop an Expendable Launch Vehicle. And that technology
demonstrator will be that initial capability that we will
utilize at that time.
Representative Lucas. Along that line, since it's obvious
that, with that amount of effort required and the need, as
you've pointed out so succinctly, to keep the workhorse, the
old Shuttle, up and going, could you address for a moment some
of the discussion we've had on the committee for some time
about the effect on the reduction in the number of people who--
full-time employees who support the Shuttle over the last
decade--literally, what, one-third less people still making, if
not the same number, but even a greater number of safety
checks?
Mr. O'Keefe. Absolutely. I think the history appears to
suggest--and, again, we'll be guided a lot by the review that
the investigation board will go through in terms of looking at
the systemic causes of what may have been there. So their
charter is very broad, and their scope is rather extensive. But
it would appear as though that the--exactly as you've
suggested, the history is that while cost reductions and
efficiencies were gained over the course of that period, as
previously described on a slide, there were also improvements
in the safety margins as well as the reduction of incidents
prior to launch, on-orbit incidents, you name it, there were--
all the trends were moving in a direction that proved or
demonstrated greater efficiency in addition to slide 18, if you
will, that would prove the capabilities, I think, that have
significantly improved over the span, both decreasing incidents
and increasing efficiencies.
But, again, all that is, is based on the data and the
information we see over this particular trend line. We're going
to be guided by what the systemic causes are that the
investigation board may come back and look at for this
information and say that may or may not have been a
contributing factor to it. And we'll be guided by their view.
Representative Lucas. Thank you, Administrator.
Mr. O'Keefe. Thank you, sir.
Chairman McCain. Senator Boxer.
Senator Boxer. Thank you very much.
Mr. O'Keefe, I want to join my colleagues in sending my
condolences to the families and also my feelings of condolence,
as well, to NASA. In California, we're the birthplace of the
Shuttle program. We hold a very special place in our heart for
the heroes who conduct these flights. And it's in this spirit
that I ask my questions.
Crew Escape Systems
In the year 2000, your safety panel made a very clear
recommendation. I ask unanimous consent that I place this page
in the record. I trust, without objection, that will be done.
[The information referred to follows:]
Senator Boxer. This is a quote, ``The Presidential
Commission on the Shuttle Challenger Accident addressed crew
escape in their report and recommended that NASA make all
efforts to provide a crew escape system. NASA responded by
initiating crew escape studies.'' This is in this safety panel.
Then it says, ``Over the lifetime of the Space Shuttle, the
reliable post-launch crew escape system will provide the
largest potential improvement in crew safety. NASA has
completed or has underway a number of studies that also suggest
such a system is feasible.'' And then they say, ``The time is
past due for the implementation of a more capable crew escape
system.''
Now, Mr. O'Keefe, after that report was filed, members of
the safety panel were fired. And I ask unanimous consent to put
in the record the New York Times story entitled NASA Dismissed
Advisors Who Warned About Safety.
Mr. Chairman, will you put that in the record for me? Mr.
Chairman? Mr. Chairman?
Chairman Boehlert. Without objection.
Senator Boxer. Thank you.
[The information referred to follows:]
Senator Boxer. And after that report and after the people
were fired, four board members were fired, two consultants were
fired, one board member quit because he was upset at the
firings. That left you two people. You changed the charter of
the panel.
And I ask unanimous consent that the new charter and the
old charter be placed in the record.
Chairman Boehlert. Without objection.
[The information referred to follows: the old charter,
dated April 29, 1999; the new charter, dated May 1, 2001.
Please see Appendix 2: Additional Material for the Record for
the charter dated May 1, 2003.]
Senator Boxer. And, in essence, without going through the
bureaucratic talk in here, the new charter, Mr. O'Keefe, gives
you much more power--the NASA Administrator, not you
personally; in this case, you personally--more power to
essentially veto who they choose as chair of the panel.
So I put all these pieces together, Mr. Chairman, and I
have concern. I see a report that clearly doesn't mince words
here that time is past due for the implementation of a more
capable crew escape system. I see members being fired. I then
see a new charter where now there's less independence of the
safety panel.
I want to know how you feel about this array of facts.
First of all, do you agree that the time is past due for the
implementation of a more capable crew escape system? And if you
do, why haven't we seen more done about it? Number two, why do
you think those folks were fired? And, number three, would
agree, in light of your, I believe, very sincere comments that
safety is a priority, that you would go back to the old charter
where the panel could choose its own leader and not have the
NASA administrator veto it?
Mr. O'Keefe. Well, thank you, Senator.
On the first issue, as it pertains to crew escape, again
there were a series of very important recommendations that came
from the Rogers Commission or outgrowths of the post-Challenger
experience--that changed operational procedures as it pertained
to crew escape and capabilities that were recommended therein.
And prior to launch, there is a complete safety regime that's
in place that didn't exist prior to the Challenger, because of
their recommendations. It's a very significant change.
Having said that, my understanding is that the analysis
that went on a couple or three years ago following that
particular set of reports of the options all led to a series of
technical modifications to the Shuttle which have increased its
weight dramatically, its operations, its maneuverability, and
so, therefore, were deemed to be a marginal improvement in
safety that could be attained, if at all, and yet dramatically
increased weight, which would have compromised the safety of
on-orbit capabilities.
Senator Boxer. So you didn't agree with this recommendation
of the----
Chairman McCain. And the gentlewoman's time is expired.
Mr. O'Keefe. No, I----
Senator Boxer. Well, Mr. Chairman, I'm just trying to see--
--
Chairman McCain. No, I'm sorry, the gentlewoman's time has
expired.
Senator Boxer. I know that you're sorry.
Chairman McCain. Go ahead. We'll recognize the next----
Senator Boxer. I know that you're sorry. Thank you.
Mr. O'Keefe. I'm sorry, Senator.
No, it is--my agreement, notwithstanding or not, I, again,
am not fully aware of all of the parameters of it. I'm advised
that's what led the folks to conclude two or three years ago.
Having said that, we are going to look at anything that the
investigative board comes back with and says, ``These are the
changes that must be made in order to guarantee safe flight
operations.'' If it contains that particular set of questions,
which, by the way, were primarily pertaining to, as I
understand it, ascent requirements, not descent capabilities,
that, in turn, those kinds of requirements be factored in and
that we make the changes appropriate to do so.
To your second point as it pertains to the safety panel
board composition, its charter, and so forth, that occurred
prior to my tenure. I don't know exactly what the circumstances
were, short of the press accounts and the folklore or legend
that may have gone into who did what to who when. Nonetheless,
I do understand that, in '97, based on a report from the
Inspector General at that time, offered as how a cadre of panel
members with long-term experience and in-depth NASA knowledge
is important. But to be most effective, this group must be
routinely infused with the fresh perspective of new, diverse
members. So, as a consequence, the Inspector General's
position, as I understand it, was acted upon by my predecessor.
Suggestions were made as to the charter to limit the
duration of the tenure to two terms, I believe, of six years
each. We'll certainly go back and re-examine that. If it's the
desire on the part of the panel members to look at a different
tenure period of time that they think enhances their wisdom and
understanding of the safety issues, I am all ears on that.
The prior chairman introduced himself to me within 30 days
of my arrival at NASA as the outgoing chairman. So I don't know
how they arrived at who was going to become the chairman and
who would be the next chairperson, but the current chair is the
individual that was anointed and appointed, I guess by me, but
with the concurrence of the board prior to that time. I made no
objection to it. And the only individual who is new to the
board is one individual who was added to it during the course
of my tenure. No one else has been released.
So I've really been trying to look at what the composition
of the panel is, and assure its advisory status, that's the
strongest we can possibly make it, and changes made prior to
that we'll certainly go back and revisit to assure that if they
have different views that would enhance or strengthen their
position, that's what we want to hear. We want to make sure
that safety of operation is adhered to at all times.
Chairman Boehlert. Thank you very much.
Mr. Udall.
Chairman McCain. Could I just say, I want to apologize to
all members for enforcing the time limits. We do have such a
large number of questioners, and our members have been very
patient, and I appreciate that.
Chairman Boehlert. Mr. Udall.
Representative Udall. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
I, too, want to thank Mr. O'Keefe for taking his time to
join us today. And I found your testimony insightful,
enlightening, and, in fact, quite moving, and I want to thank
you for your leadership.
Mr. O'Keefe. Thank you.
Representative Udall. I know you're beginning to think
you're in an echo chamber, but I did also want to associate
myself with the remarks of our Chairman on the House side and
the Ranking Member and others, who have urged you to create as
independent a commission as possible and that we'll all be well
served when those results are announced.
Mr. O'Keefe. Yes, sir.
Representative Udall. In my experience in my previous
career as an outdoor educator and someone who was very involved
in the climbing and mountaineering communities, we found that
when we had accidents, that independent entities that had no
fiduciary relationship or other relationship with those
involved could make quite accurate and objective determinations
of what occurred. So I want to lend my voice to those of others
here.
Mr. O'Keefe. Yes, sir.
Representative Udall. I did also want to acknowledge the
tremendous sacrifice and the bravery of our astronauts and send
my condolences to the family members and friends of the brave
astronauts. We in Colorado have a proud history of involvement
with NASA. In fact, Kalpana Chawla was one of the members of
the crew, and she was a graduate of the University of Colorado,
so we feel that loss very deeply in Colorado.
Mr. Chairman, if I might, I'd like to include in the record
an article from the New York Times on Monday, February 10th,
that talks about all the tremendous benefits that have been
generated by the space program. I know there are some----
Chairman Boehlert. Without objection, so ordered.
Representative Udall. Thank you.
[The information referred to follows:]
Replacing the Space Shuttle Orbiter
Representative Udall. There have been debates and
discussions and comments that the astronauts were involved in
minor science projects while they were orbiting the Earth. And
I think if you look into the record, in fact, what's resulted
from our space program is truly remarkable, and day in and day
out we see the results of those advancements here on Earth.
If I could, I'd like to focus a little bit on the Space
Shuttle orbiter and whether we ought to replace it. Have you
gotten to the point where you have an opinion in that regard
about the replacement of the Space Shuttle orbiter?
Mr. O'Keefe. Yes, sir. The Integrated Space Transportation
Plan we're currently working with was devised over the course
of last year and culminating in the November 13th, 2002,
amendment that the President submitted to the 2003 budget that
the Congress is still deliberating on at this time. It's
reinforced in the 2004 budget submission the President made
last Monday, which is to look at all the elements of how these
particular systems support each other.
I think, for a long time, all the trends seemed to suggest
that every one of these were looked at as individual,
standalone programs. But there's a great interrelationship
between them. And the requirement for Space Shuttle
capabilities, both in terms of crew transfer, which is how we
typically have rotated the crews aboard the International Space
Station, as well as the launch of cargo assets--in other words,
all of the new pieces that are being installed on International
Space Station to build out that laboratory that can't be
duplicated here on Earth--is a capability we've really got to
look at in relationship to each other and to consider a crew
transfer and rescue return capacity that can be introduced more
aggressively than we presently have.
So the combination of both Shuttle and how we maintain its
cargo lift capacity for capabilities to continue to not only
support, but finish building, the International Space Station,
the capability to transfer crew in order to rotate the
expedition crews that we've seen now in our--here we are in our
third year of permanent presence onboard that system--as well
as the Orbital Space Plane that would provide that capability,
all three of those dimensions and the Next-Generation Launch
Technologies to ultimately replace the cargo capacity is our
focus in that amendment, as well as in the present budget
before the Congress right now.
Representative Udall. Mr. Chairman, I don't know where my
time is, but what is the status of the orbiter----
Chairman McCain. Your time has expired.
Senator Wyden.
Senator Wyden. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Administrator O'Keefe, when I chaired your confirmation
hearings, I found you to be honest and candid, and we're going
to need an awful lot of that in the days ahead, and we
appreciate your being here.
NASA Workforce Legislation
My first question deals with the huge brain-drain situation
at NASA. It seems to me that you all are hemorrhaging talent in
key areas, like electrical engineering. And I think this has
implications both for the short-term and the long-term.
The February 1st date, for example, on that date, you all
were being pushed to, in effect, use more outside contractors
and fewer people within the agency, and so some, of course, are
saying that when we have a chance to study this, it's going to
back ``the people.''
So I'd like you to comment on the brain-drain problem, both
from the short-term and the long-term, and what's being done to
address it.
Mr. O'Keefe. Thank you, Senator.
Indeed, that is a concern that, as we've discussed
previously, as well as we've talked about in various hearings,
over the course of the last dozen years or so, we've seen a
very clear trend in the direction of an aging workforce that
are capable, very strong professionals, but it is, nonetheless,
a very mature workforce. We've got three times as many
scientists and engineers that are over 60 as we have under 30.
And so the consequence of that set of decisions made in years
gone by of bringing in additional talent at gradations, there's
no way to instantly grow longevity as well as experience base.
What we submitted last June to the Congress was a series of
legislative initiatives specifically focused on strategic
management of human capital, as has been advised by the General
Accounting Office. Dave Walker, as the Comptroller General, has
consistently talked about this. So we forwarded this series of
legislative provisions. They have been sent to the Congress,
they're in the appropriate committees of jurisdiction, and are
under consideration to try to deal with what those tools would
be that we could use for the purpose of not only retaining for
the near-term period the kinds of capabilities and talent we
have today, but also recruiting talent with some experience
base with a variety of walks and backgrounds, as well as
bringing in new graduate students and doctoral students who
would replace that roughly 60 percent of the workforce that is
of scientific and technical background. You're exactly right,
it's a concern, and we want to act on it.
Senator Wyden. I want to ask----
Mr. O'Keefe. We look for to the Congress' early enactment
of all those provisions to move us along that way.
Senator Wyden. I want to ask one other quick question. I
think when we get to the bottom of this, I think we're going to
see that we've got to address this issue, and I just pray that
this tragic loss hasn't been due to some human error.
Manned vs. Unmanned Spacecraft
The second question I had deals with manned versus unmanned
space flight. I think that manned flights represent the
aspirations and hopes of so many Americans, but I will tell
you, I personally believe we're going to need to do more in the
unmanned area. I think it is going to be an imperative in the
days ahead. And I'd like your judgment as to how to make that
call.
For example, I'm attracted to the argument that when you're
talking about the space station a few hundred miles, you know,
up, that wouldn't be as high a priority as really looking to
distant worlds. But I'd be curious how you'd go about tackling
this question and making the tough calls with respect to manned
versus unmanned space flight. I want to see the manned
expeditions go forward, but I do think we're going to have to
have a bigger role for unmanned expeditions in the days ahead,
and I'd like to hear you tell us how you'd go about making
those calls.
Mr. O'Keefe. Sure, thank you, Senator. I think you've hit
the nail right on the head.
The strategy we've tried to employ here, again, is not an
either/or, but very much a combination of how do you best
employ the robotic capabilities that we have to advance our
knowledge base and understand what the challenges will be in
order to assure the greatest probability of safety of flight
operations when and if called upon to engage humans in that
science and research set of objectives.
So the approach that we've devised, for example, in the
case of the Mars landers that are planned, and explorers that
are planned, for later this year, due to arrive there in early
'04, is to continue to build that knowledge base understanding
the challenges and difficulties we will work with.
And the inhibitors on exploration much beyond where we are
today typically are human related, to be sure, but it's partly
technology related. The first one is that our limitations on
capacity for propulsion, speed, to get anywhere is currently
restricted by the same laws of physics we've been living with
for 40 years. And so as a result, until we develop a new space
propulsion capacity to dramatically reduce the time as well as
the capacity to get anywhere, we're going to be really
restricted, in terms of the capabilities we have in that
regard.
The second is how to assure that humans survive the
experience. And as it stands now, the exposure that we see and
that we're learning on International Space Station as a
consequence of long duration spaceflight are the debilitating
effects on human beings of space travel and space exploration.
We're looking to conquer those. Part of the budget proposal you
have before you as part of the '04 submission that the
President just made is an intensive effort to look at human
factors. And only then, after we've conquered those kinds of
challenges of degradation, of muscle mass, bone mass, radiation
effects, all those things, should we venture much beyond where
we have the capacity to do today, which is a very important
pursuit of science and research aboard station and other
objectives.
So the whole strategy here is to lay this out in a way that
informs the knowledge base by robotic capabilities, follow
along to the extent necessary and when human intervention gives
us the opportunity to expand that knowledge base, and make sure
they can only do it when there's a safety-of-flight capability
that we can assure.
Senator Wyden. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. O'Keefe. Thank you, Senator. I appreciate it very much.
Chairman Boehlert. Mr. Weldon.
Representative Weldon. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Administrator O'Keefe, thank you for coming. And I have the
highest confidence in your leadership, as I do in Admiral
Gehman's leadership, who did an outstanding job in
investigating the USS Cole.
Thermal Tile Adhesive
I have a very specific series of questions that you may not
be able to answer here, but I would like a thorough response
for the record, relative to one aspect of the operations of the
Shuttle, and it deals with the tiles.
The tiles are glued to the Shuttle by a special adhesive.
That adhesive has, as it's primary component, urea. The urea
that's produced is produced around the world, and much of it's
for agriculture and industrial purposes. But the specific urea
that NASA has used for the glue for the tiles was produced by
one plant, and that one plant was in Fort Saskatchewan,
Alberta, Canada. And the reason why that plant was selected was
because none of the U.S. manufacturers were able to meet the
very stringent requirements that NASA had established for the
urea, for the glue for the tiles.
About five years ago, that plant was acquired by another
Canadian firm that does business in Cuba. And because of that,
they were concerned about the implications of Helms-Burton
legislation, and so they no longer supplied NASA the urea for
the glue for the tiles.
The U.S. manufacturer of the adhesive that used that
specific urea was very concerned at the time about finding a
new source of urea that would meet the very specific, tough
requirements that NASA had for the glue to hold the tiles on.
And I would say there are millions of tons of urea consumed in
the U.S. every year. But only a very, very small portion of it
would be used specifically by NASA for the glue for the tiles.
And, as I said before, up until that takeover five years ago,
it was from one plant in Canada that had a separate mechanism
for producing that urea that U.S. manufacturers did not, or
perhaps could not, achieve the same quality standards that NASA
required.
So what my concern is, whether or not we found an equally
reliable supplier of urea. And, for the record, I'd like you to
give us that information relative to the specifics of NASA
specifications.
Thank you.
Mr. O'Keefe. Yes, sir. No, I don't know. I really am not
aware of the nuances there, but I positively will provide that
for the record.
Representative Weldon. Thank you.
[The information follows:]
Mr. O'Keefe. Thank you, sir.
Representative Weldon. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Senator Brownback. Senator Snowe.
Senator Snowe. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And welcome, Mr.
O'Keefe. I know this a very trying time for you and the NASA
family and most certainly the families of the astronauts. And
it just reminds us how fortunate we are as a nation to have
been blessed with men and women like these astronauts who are
willing to take risks for this country.
Debris Assessment and Need for Imagery
I'm trying to get at the picture of how NASA approaches
certain decisions--what is minimized, what is discounted. We
know that for 12 days, from the time that you all learned of
the debris that hit the Shuttle and then the Shuttle was
scheduled to land, no action was taken other than doing some
computer model simulations to predict damage and to rely on
past experiences where Shuttles had returned safely, even
though there had been several Stanford studies in 1990 and 1994
that had already warned of some potential damage that a single
piece of debris could have had on the tiles.
Could you tell me as to why no request was made for
military telescope imaging? We know that a camera was not
working at the time of orbit that really could have shown the
damage that was done on the underside of the Shuttle. Why
wasn't that requested at some point in time during the flight
to do a greater examination of this type of damage, rather than
relying on computer modeling when you really didn't know what
had happened, rather than doing the modeling on something that
you knew had happened?
Mr. O'Keefe. Thank you, Senator.
The investigative process, and certainly the Gehman Board,
if they come to find we should have done something else,
positively we'll be, you know, guided by that particular
finding. Nonetheless, the approach that was taken here is, this
is a piece of foam material that was about a foot and a half by
six inches of which there have been incidents like this before.
And, as I mentioned earlier, there are cases where after the
flight, there's a full examination of every square inch, every
single element of the orbiter when it comes back, to see what
the damage effect was. It was determined, in previous cases of
comparable circumstance, not to have been a safety-of-flight
consideration.
Again, the circumstances here were, it came off of the
external tank as the entire Shuttle orbiter system was
traveling at 3600 miles an hour. The piece came off, dropped
roughly 40 feet at a rate of something like 50 miles an hour,
so it's the functional equivalent, as one astronaut described
to me, of a Styrofoam cooler blowing off of a pickup truck
ahead of you on a highway. And every incident we'd seen before
that, every model we ran, every analysis that had been done on
every prior case demonstrated no significant damage in that
circumstance.
Of the 4,000 sensors aboard the Shuttle orbiter, none of
them indicated any anomalies during that 16-day flight. And
given the wide variation of heat of several hundred degrees
that was experienced 16 times a day, if there was any
penetration, any damage that could have been evident, the
assumption was those sensors would have picked it up.
Nonetheless, if the Gehman Board finds that we really erred
by not examining this in yet another direction, based on all
the historical evidence, we positively will run that finding to
ground and make corrective actions as necessary.
Senator Snowe. But wasn't this piece of debris the largest
documented piece ever to hit the Shuttle?
Mr. O'Keefe. Not to my knowledge, but I will correct that
for the record if that proves to be in error. I don't know
whether that's true or not, but I certainly will provide that
for the record.
[The information follows:]
Senator Snowe. I guess----
Senator Brownback. The time of the senator is up. I'm
sorry.
Senator Snowe. Thank you.
Chairman Boehlert. Mr. Wu.
Representative Wu. Thank you for being with us during a
very difficult time, Mr. O'Keefe.
During my colleagues' questions, I took the liberty of
drawing up a little diagram to illustrate my inquiry to you.
It's not a PowerPoint presentation; it's just felt tip pen on a
piece of paper. Across the bottom here, cuts in your budget.
And going up, risk. And the red line is the typical hockey puck
kind of curve that some of us in high tech like to see in
financial returns, but we don't like to see in this kind of
context.
And earlier, I heard you say that you are pounding out as
much of the risk as possible before each and every Shuttle
launch. But we also have a history of delayed improvements,
perhaps delayed in future generations of crafts which may be
safer. And I am concerned that the tragic loss of seven
astronauts tells us that we are somewhere out on this leg of
the curve and not somewhere here, you know, in the flatter
portion.
It's our job to try to set policies which maintain
reasonable safety, a job which we share with you. You are a
very good team player. You should be. But in response to
specific congressional inquiry, I think that you are free to
answer those inquiries.
And I want to make this a standing congressional inquiry,
if you will, that whatever the optimal budget is, as we are
adjusting that budget, can you work with us to find that
inflection point? I'm concerned that we have gone past that
inflection point in risk where the risk has become unacceptably
high.
It is always going to be inherently risky to put human
beings in space. I'm a strong supporter of human space
exploration. But I want to invite you to work with us to find
some reasonable point in here where we are not expending
exceptional resources, or unnecessarily expending resources,
but we are doing everything reasonable to keep humans safe in
space.
Mr. O'Keefe. Sure. No, absolutely, Congressman. I'm
delighted to work with you to try to find what that breakpoint
is. And, again, my appreciation--slide 18 again, please--is
that over the course of time, we've seen a reduction in cost of
activities, there has, at the same time, been an improvement in
efficiencies as well as the reduction of in-flight anomalies,
technical scrubs have dropped by a lot, all of the basic
factors that would drive you to conclude that, as your chart
suggests, as you reduce resources, you should see an
enhancement of risk. If anything, what appears to suggest here
is a case where efficiencies have been attained and risk has
been reduced.
So the extent there are differences of view about that over
the course of this past decade of whether or not that is the
contributing factor to it, we really are looking forward to
trying to determine how to correct that. And if we've crossed
that threshold I think you've so eloquently alluded to, we
really ought to figure out exactly where we make those
adjustments as necessary.
But the trends are the things that I think we need to
analyze here, as well as just the basic theory, that you've
advanced, which is a sound one.
Representative Wu. Well, this is why I drew it in this way,
because if you have effectively reduced cost and reduced risk,
you've shifted this curve to the left or to the right, up or
down, or diagonally, but the curve is still here----
Mr. O'Keefe. Yes, sir.
Representative Wu.--if you make these assumptions that such
a point could be statistically determined. And I just want to
invite you, as this curve shifts, as policy shifts, to help us
look for this curve. You and I have been in this discussion
before----
Mr. O'Keefe. Yes, sir.
Representative Wu.--about the worthiness of human space
flight. And I want to remind you of our conversation that Lewis
and Clark went west 200 years ago. They got an Appropriation of
$2,500. They spent $38,000, and that caused President Jefferson
a lot of heartache. But that turned out to be a pretty good
deal for America in the long-term.
And I would just encourage you to aggressively ask for what
you need and to keep the explorers safe out there.
Senator Brownback. The gentleman's time has expired.
Representative Wu. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Boehlert. Thank you, Mr. Wu.
Senator Burns.
Senator Burns. We need you on Appropriations.
(Laughter.)
Senator Burns. Mr. O'Keefe, I wish we were meeting under
different circumstances, but we are not. And my question is a
general question, because I was pretty close to the
negotiations of the International Space Station and the
agreement that we signed with Russia.
And at that time, I asked a question that we really didn't
pursue for some reason or other. I think it would help this
committee if--as you know, we look at programs and the
infrastructure that it takes to carry those programs out. At
the time we built the orbiter, was there any estimates of--what
every program goes through is, there is a point diminishing
returns whenever upgrades are not sufficient to carry out the
mission, and I'm wondering if any estimates early on this
program were made by engineers of at what point do we come to a
point of diminishing returns. And if we could look at that and
then--and I know programs change and missions change, and if
history tells us anything, we should be looking at those kind
of things in order to change the way Congress should be
shouldering its responsibility.
Mr. O'Keefe. Yes, sir.
Senator Burns. And I would just ask if there were--any
research could be done in your records of when do we reach that
point, did we reach that point, and what was--and as programs
change, what is being dictated in the future if this equipment
is going to be asked to do things maybe it was never intended
to do.
I'm not going to go over the past, because I've been
intimately involved with it. And no other program stimulates
the curiosity or the interest in our sciences and our
mathematics in our schools like this particular agency of the
United States Government. And so I deem it very, very
important.
But if we could have a history and see the things that we
can do, and then you do what you do best, we may have to call
on our older end of the engineers, so to speak, to make those
determinations, but I think it would help us a lot if we could
reach back there and look at history, take a look at what
happened, and then make some decisions to enable you. We don't
want to see this happen again, but we know that this will
happen. Accidents will happen, especially in the area of going
into the unknown.
And I thank you for being here today and some explanations
we've reached today. I'm looking for history, something that we
base policy on into the future, upon your recommendations.
Mr. O'Keefe. Well, thank you, Senator. I'd be delighted to
provide that. We'll go through that consideration. There is no
question that as it pertains to current flight operations, and
I want to reiterate, we have a culture that is just obsessing
over not letting anything go until it's all exactly right. If
the investigation board found that systemically we have failed
in that quest, that's precisely what we'll be guided by, as
well.
But your point is very well taken. I think we've got to
really be thinking seriously about where is that stage where we
really make those decisions, and I think we'll provide that,
for sure. I'll work through that analysis and provide it for
the record, as well.
[The information follows:]
Senator Burns. Thank you for your leadership, and I
appreciate your cooperation.
Chairman Boehlert. The time of the Senator has expired.
Mr. O'Keefe. Thank you, Senator. I appreciate it very much.
Chairman Boehlert. Thank you very much. We're going to take
a brief five-minute break. Five minutes only. And then we're
right back. And when we come back, Mr. Nethercutt starts the
questioning.
[Recess.]
Chairman Boehlert. The Committee will resume.
The Chair recognizes Mr. Nethercutt.
Representative Nethercutt. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. O'Keefe, I want to welcome you, sir. Over here.
(Laughter.)
Representative Nethercutt. I know, I moved.
I appreciate your being here, and I appreciate the
sensitivity with which you and the entire NASA team reacted to
this terrible tragedy. I certainly was touched by Senator
Stevens' remarks and agree with him with respect to your
integrity and your qualifications.
Mr. O'Keefe. Thank you, Congressman.
Representative Nethercutt. Thank you.
The crew that we lost touched my Eastern Washington
District. Michael Anderson was a proud product of our
community, and Ron Dittemore certainly is, too. And so it
touched our community very deeply. But in that respect, we're
respectful of all that they have done and, in the case of the
NASA team, will continue to do.
This was a science-driven crew. They spent 16 days in space
and were 16 minutes from landing. And in the process, with the
space research double module, we're doing tremendous numbers of
experiments, as I understand it. And with the loss of the
Columbia, the question comes, what data might we have been able
to collect with respect to their 16 days of scientific research
efforts? And maybe that's my question, basically, is what were
we able to retain and preserve with respect to their scientific
research legacy?
Mr. O'Keefe. Yes, sir. No question, it was an extraordinary
mission. It was intensively science focused. You've
characterized it exactly right. Over 16 days, a lot of the data
and returns from many of those experiments were relayed back,
and so the scientific community has the benefit of that
information. But, to be sure, the physical laboratory as well
as the physical experimentation that was aboard STS-107 is lost
for all eternity. There's no question there.
But let me provide for you for the record a rundown of the
kind of data and information we have gotten back, categorized
by the kind of areas. But it was a phenomenal trove of
information that I think will yet prove to be very enlightening
information as research continues on a range of biomedical as
well as physical sciences research and material research
activities in the future.
[The information follows:]
Representative Nethercutt. Let me ask you if there is any
support that NASA will offer to the principal investigators who
lost scientific capability as well. Have you been able to
assess that yet or make any judgments about the principal
investigators and what losses might have been sustained as the
Columbia was lost?
Mr. O'Keefe. Yes, sir. There are a number of folks who had
based a lot of experimentation, their entire dissertations were
riding on this, so years of research activity has really been
set back dramatically as a result of that. That's
inconsequential, though, by comparison to the loss of lives, to
be sure, but it is something we need to be extremely mindful
of.
There was to have been a get together this past week, I
think, with the biological and physical research components of
our agency with all the principal investigators that had a
stake, if you will, in the STS-107 experiment and research
regime. We are certainly intent on trying to reconvene that
session to find out what may be remedial for their efforts as
we work through this, in terms of the kind of information we
might look to in future flights. But we will work that. I
assure you, that's something that's prominent on our minds, as
well.
Representative Nethercutt. Is your commitment lessened or
diminished at all to scientific research and the value of
station and the efforts that were undertaken by this crew?
Mr. O'Keefe. No one iota. As a matter of fact, the families
of the STS-107 crew, the most stoic, courageous people you
would ever want to meet, within two hours of this activity were
already saying, ``You know, you cannot give up on this set of
objectives. They dedicated their lives to this. That's what
they were committed to doing. You cannot move away from it.''
It had been an inspirational group, and that, in and of itself,
has been sufficient cause in my mind to not step back from our
commitments in this regard one inch.
I appreciate it, Congressman. Thank you.
Representative Nethercutt. Thank you.
Senator Brownback. The time of the Member has expired.
And if I could ask the people operating the door if you
could keep that door closed as much as possible, there is some
beautiful singing going on outside, but we don't need it in the
room.
Now, I have the only astronaut that's serving currently in
the United States Senate, Senator Nelson, from Florida.
Senator Nelson. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. O'Keefe, prior to you arriving at NASA, the Space
Shuttle budget was whacked by some $1.4 billion. Basically,
part of that over a nine-year period, this says. And, by the
way, it's not the easiest to find this out, because prior to
your arrival back in the early '90's, everything was lumped in
together into a human space flight account--the Space Shuttle,
the kinds of new technologies, plus the station. But when you
break it out, what you find is that the Congress whacked part
of it, about $600 million, out of the Space Shuttle, and then
NASA itself whacked another $750 million.
Putting those two together, you can see the years. And this
is prior to you arriving, in '02. That year, the Congress had
added some $45 million, and NASA had whacked $70 million to the
Space Shuttle.
So this will be an ongoing dialogue that we will have. But
the question is, What is your opinion, prior to your arrival,
as you look back, what had happened over that nine-year period?
Sometimes the Congress would take the money out or just reduce
it. Sometimes NASA would basically reprogram the money and take
it out the Space Shuttle and put it elsewhere. Does that
compromise safety?
Mr. O'Keefe. Well, sir, I don't know the audit trail,
clearly, as well as you've obviously researched this. But this
particular, I think, matches with what you've projected here,
which is the funding history. And the convergence of two
events--and, again, I've got to really look at this in much
greater detail to see the individual year changes that have
occurred and so forth--but the trends seem to connote two
things.
The first one is that at the same time that efficiencies
were being yielded and different ways of going about business
that are more risk management and more what I would call
quality-assurance-related approaches that raises and improves
the risk-management probabilities, at the same time also
yielded some cost reductions along the way by not having an
intensive group of individuals involved in the activity. And so
all the indicators over this same span of time seem to
suggest--but, again, we've got to back and really look at this
very, very carefully--would seem to suggest that there were
improvements in incidents prior to launch, incidents on orbit,
all of the trend lines that we use to measure the efficiency
and performance of the space flight operations program seem to
be moving in that kind of a trend line.
That said, we're going to be guided by what the Gehman
Board looks at as systemic causes. If this appears to have been
a contributing factor, we will be right back here looking at
what those fixes need to be to work on that.
Senator Nelson. And we will carry on a continuing dialogue
on this. I can tell you, there are people at NASA and in the
astronaut office that feel like that safety has been
compromised over the last 10 years as a result of the Space
Shuttle budget being raided. And that's something that we've
got to be concerned about.
One other item----
Mr. O'Keefe. We're happy to hear those comments and any
other views from anybody inside to external to the agency.
It'll come to ground truth and find the answers to what
happened in this case, absolutely, Senator.
Senator Nelson. Might you comment on the fact that if
that----
Senator Brownback. I'm sorry, the time of the Senator has
expired. We're having to stay on very tight time frames.
Chairman Boehlert. The Chair recognizes Mr. Weiner.
Representative Weiner. Thank you. Welcome.
I fear in your statement you have articulated, I guess, a
strawman that some of my colleagues in their questions have
knocked down. And when you said that we ought not turn our
backs on exploration and that the research that was done on the
Shuttle was valuable in cancer treatment, crop yield, and fire
suppression, and dust storms. But it is a fact that all of that
research could have, should have, and would have been done on
the space station had it been completed. And, in fact, the
Shuttle has, more often than not, not been a research vehicle,
but a delivery vehicle supporting other platforms for science,
whether it be satellites or telescopes or the space station.
One of the many things that made the Columbia mission
noteworthy was the fact that it was a pure science mission.
Apparently only 11 of the last 46 Shuttles have been able to
say that. It got to be so frustrating that in the 106th
Congress there was actually language put into the Appropriation
bill that this Shuttle should contain more research.
You know, Shuttle astronauts, I fear to say, have become,
more often than not, very high skilled, often brilliant,
undeniably courageous cargo carriers. And to demonstrate this
point, I don't have a graphic, but you do, and I'd ask you to
put up number 20.
Under something marked ``safety indicators'' is a chart
that said launches more than ever cargo capacity up as much as
100 percent. Cargo capacity being an indicator of safety leads
me to the inescapable conclusion that having more cargo means
fewer flights, means safer human beings. This should not be how
we measure whether someone is safe or not, because, frankly, as
we learned within, I guess, 48 hours after this horrible
accident, an unmanned vehicle went up and brought cargo to the
space station.
And also, on chart number 18, the same chart that has the
reduction of in-flight anomalies, monthly mishap frequencies,
technical scrubs, brags about the increase in lift capacity to
the Space Shuttle. It seems that we're mixing the need to keep
people safe, which is something that I think you have
articulated several times here today, with this ever-growing
notion that the Space Shuttle is the only way should develop or
the only way, the only means we should use to carry cargo.
We want science to be done in space. Over and over again,
we, in Congress, have been asked the question, because our
colleagues put it to us, ``Do you want to continue the space
station funding?'' We all say yes. I say yes. But we have to be
careful not to confuse what the Shuttle has been as a science
mission. It has been a UPS truck for Space Shuttle supplies.
And I'm not sure that if you believe that increasing cargo is a
way to make people safer than having a manned cargo carrier is
the right way to go at all. And if you'd just address that,
particularly chart number 20, if you could.
Mr. O'Keefe. Sure. Thank you, sir.
Cargo, in the term you've used here, means assembly and
science, both. In the last four years, many of the Space
Shuttle flights, and I think you've pointed out the history
precisely right, that we have dedicated the use of Shuttle for
the purpose of bringing up large sections of the International
Space Station for on-orbit assembly.
This is an engineering marvel we're building in space. You
know, there's no other way to do this. There's no way to launch
the completed International Space Station in one fell swoop or
one piece, so each of it's been assembled on orbit. And by no
means are these UPS truck drivers.
Representative Weiner. No, the question, if you'll just
understand, the question is not that. It is if you can bring
food, if you can bring clothing, why can't you bring Space
Shuttle?
Mr. O'Keefe. I'm sorry, I didn't get to the answer fast
enough. I apologize.
Representative Weiner. I'm sorry, I'm----
Mr. O'Keefe. The Progress vehicle that went up the Sunday
after the accident did, in fact, contain groceries, logistics
supplies, those kinds of things. That's not typically what we
put aboard Shuttle. There are some of those things that are
there, but mostly those are carried by those unmanned
autonomous capabilities that are brought in to sustain the
typical consumable requirements.
Others are put aboard Shuttle, too, like water and a few
other things, but typically what is, is the cargo section
includes the components, the modules of the International Space
Station that couldn't get there any other way, or the science.
And as we see in this particular case of the STS-107 as well as
on every one of the Shuttle flights, the science
experimentation going up-mass to the International Space
Station to bring those scientific experiments to there, there's
no other way to do that. There's no way to put them aboard
autonomous unmanned vehicles at this juncture that would do
anything other than provide basic logistics requirements.
So I get your point. You're exactly right. We're trying to
maximize the yield of what can be, as we call it, up-mass to
the International Space Station or in any other orbit pattern,
but, at the same time, also minimize the risk to the
individuals so that really the human involvement is minimized
to the point where it's actually necessary.
Senator Brownback. The time has expired. Thank you very
much.
We now have the Senator from the host state for the Johnson
Space Center, state of Texas, Senator Hutchison.
Senator Hutchison. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
And I will just say, Mr. O'Keefe, I know how devastated you
are. I've never seen a sadder face than yours in the last few
weeks in all the pictures, and I think that you have handled
the immediate aftermath very well, and I appreciate that.
Mr. O'Keefe. Thank you, Senator.
Senator Hutchison. I also want to say I appreciate Mr.
Rohrabacher's mention of the Texas residents who never expected
anything like this but have been so supportive of NASA
throughout East Texas looking for the debris, and consider
themselves, sort of, deputies in the investigation, and I'm
very proud of my home state, and especially the NASA people and
the NASA family. I grew up in the area. I have known the NASA
family since the announcement that NASA would come to Johnson,
and have known the close-knit nature of that community. And I
appreciate all of them, as well.
I want to talk about some of the experiments that have been
successful and have made a difference in our lives really, from
the National Science Biomedical Research Institute, which is
not the old, past successes of space research, but the newer
ones. They have developed portable infrared sensors to
determine blood and tissue chemistry noninvasively, which could
help us in intensive care units and ambulances be able to test
people quickly and determine hemorrhaging or other maladies;
developed a biosensor for microbes and toxins that has an
application in the bioterrorism field for early detection and
treatment, could be used by military searching caves in
Afghanistan or by weapons inspectors; helped further
development of a focused ultrasound system for hemorrhage
control and for destroying unwanted tissues or tumors that
could one day allow bloodless surgery.
Right there on the Columbia, they dealt--dealing with
combustion, they created the weakest flame ever seen in a
laboratory environment, about one/two-hundredth that of a
match, which would be significant since soot contributes to
60,000 premature deaths each year in the United States.
My question is this. We do have a future in medical
research. Your own board of scientists came back to you and
said that is a future for manned space research. The question
is: If the Space Shuttle is grounded for a year or six months,
what would be the impact on research, or do you foresee
something even further down the road for the use of the
Shuttle? And, secondly, if the space station is not serviced by
the Shuttle regularly for a long period of time, what would the
capability be to continue the use of those microgravity
conditions? Or do any of our international partners have a
vehicle capable of servicing, including assembly, the station?
Mr. O'Keefe. Thank you, Senator.
If I could, just on the front, associate myself with your
comments about the folks from East Texas. Unbelievable support.
And folks like C.G. Macklin, who is the city manager of Lufkin,
Texas, Captain Paul Davis, from the Department of Public Safety
down there, unbelievable people who have stepped up in a way
that is just truly heroic, and we are grateful to them. They
have never been associated with the NASA family, and yet here
they are contributing in a way that really is remarkable, and
we are eternally grateful to them for their assistance as we've
moved through this very difficult time in working through the
challenges there.
The impact on station, to be sure, is a real difficult
circumstance, given the fact that the next flight that was due
in March would have been a crew rotation for Expedition 6 to be
replaced by Expedition 7. To the extent that we are able to get
answers to the current challenges that are underway that the
investigative board is looking to. If we can get back to flight
and resume flight operations, there should be no diminution of
that support to station.
To the extent that that doesn't happen and the best
scenario is not realized, we do have the capability on the
Soyuz flights, which is the twice-a-year rotation of the
emergency egress capsule. Three cosmonauts were due to be sent
up--cosmonauts and astronauts--were due to go up in April.
We're looking at what that crew configuration is, consulting
with our International Space Station partners to determine the
best way to configure the crew to use it potentially as a
rotation capability for the folks that are aboard International
Space Station now. Ken Bowersox, Don Pettit, and Nikolai
Budarin potentially have the opportunity to come back aboard
that particular Soyuz return vehicle and send a replacement
crew up. We're looking at what those options may call for.
In terms of the long-term sustainment of the International
Space Station for science, there's no question, between now and
June there is an ample trove of science aboard the station
right now that Ken Bowersox assures me, and, more important,
Don Pettit, who is the science officer, says has got him
occupied every single day and won't be a limiting factor
between now and the time the summer rolls around.
Beyond that, there's no question, it would end up likely be
a sustaining capability, because, in pursuit of the earlier
commentary we just had, and conversation, there is a--the up-
mass, or the capability to be able to lift the science
experimentation in the mid-deck lockers and so forth that are
aboard the Shuttle typically are what bring the scientific
experimentation return or rotation for the International Space
Station to that laboratory condition, and that would not be
feasible to do. You can't get all that aboard a resupply
vehicle like Progress, which is unmanned and for logistics and
basic consumables. For everything you take out of it, it's that
much less sustaining capability we have for the human beings
aboard, and the humans are going to be the primary focus of our
intentions. So, therefore, we would see a limitation and a
diminution of the science focus that would be aboard.
But, for right now, it is positively stationed today as it
was yesterday and will continue through the balance of this
time as the most capable laboratory condition we have, and we
are maximizing the science, and that sustains for several
months to come. We'll have to make adjustments beyond that, if
this goes beyond that period of time.
Chairman Boehlert. The Senator's time has expired.
Mr. Etheridge.
Mr. O'Keefe. Thank you, Senator. I appreciate it very much.
Chairman Boehlert. Mr. Etheridge.
Representative Etheridge. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
And, Mr. O'Keefe, thank you for being here. And let me also
associate myself with expressing condolences to the families
and others, and also with the concerns that many of my
colleagues have expressed today to make sure this study is
independent. I think that needs to be done for the confidence
of this Congress and for the American people for the future of
the program, which I strongly support and think it's important
to continue.
And let me say the people of North Carolina share with you
greatly, because we will celebrate the 100th anniversary of
flight this year in two of the four celebrations in this
country. So we have a deep commitment to space and to flight.
I was in school on Monday, right after the Saturday
terrible disaster. Children were concerned, obviously, as they
always are. You mentioned earlier, someone did, and I think
it's appropriate to cover it, because this is a great teaching
tool, not disasters, but space flight.
In the 1960's, President Kennedy said we're going to put a
man on the Moon before the end of this decade. We didn't know
we could do it. We didn't know how to do it. But it spawned the
growth of scientists and engineers that you talked about that
were getting ready to age out. Don't you think it's about time
we had another grand plan and decide we're going to put a man
on Mars or some great planet? That may be above your pay grade,
but someone needs to say it so we get another generation of
excited young people to decide they want to get involved.
I know the scientists we have in NASA, which is a very
small, elite, capable group are there because they were
excited. But we need a bigger core.
Very quickly, because I have one more question I want to
get to you. That is, beyond that--and I hope you'll speak to
that--on March of this year or last year, the independent
Aerospace Safety Advisory Panel reported to you that, simply
stated, the panel believed that the repeated postponement of
safety upgrades, restoring aging infrastructure, and the
failure to look far enough ahead to anticipate and correct
shortfalls and critical skills and logistical availability will
inevitably increase the risk of operating the Space Shuttle.
However, since then, I understand that NASA has cancelled
planned upgrade projects, shifted funding for upgrading further
out in time, and has indicated that it needed to do more
studies of what the upgrades should be and how they would be
undertaken.
Can you tell us if that's true, and, if so, why and how
that will help improve safety?
Mr. O'Keefe. Yes, sir. To your first question on big goals,
you bet, the approach that the President, I think, has advanced
as a part of our plan that as a part of the strategic plan and
all the objectives therein is to develop those enabling
technologies that would then permit the establishment of those
big goals to be attainable.
And the two major limitations that I think we have got to
beat down and be very, very thorough in our efforts to explore
the technology opportunities to conquer is the ability get
anywhere in a period of time and speed that would inform the
research agenda and also assure that humans, when they go, can
survive the experience for the full duration of that flight.
And as it stands right now, based on our current
technology, just to get to the edges of this solar system would
take us 15 years. That's an unacceptable period of time it
would take. And assuming that any of the scientists, the
principal investigators, the research focus, are still
interested by the time someone would arrive there is one of our
biggest problems, because things change an awful lot in the
span of a decade and a half.
So our first objective, which you see dominantly in last
year's budget and this year's budget, is how to beat and how to
conquer the in-space propulsion power generation requirements
we have.
The second dimension of that is to look very carefully at
how we can assure that humans survive the experience. And,
again, the degradation we see of the five expedition crews who
have been aboard International Space Station for sustained
periods of four to six months or longer is typically a
physiological challenge, and we've got to figure out how to
conquer that, because the amount of time it would take to
roundtrip to anywhere that seems to be of curiosity that would
be informed by research and scientific objectives, and we've
got to be sure that the folks can survive that experience.
So that and the radiation effects, all those things, an
intensive amount of effort that you see in the budget proposal
before you, is concentrated on trying to conquer those kinds of
limitations and understand what it would take to assure a safe
roundtrip activity in that regard.
As it pertains to the second point you raised of upgrades,
what we have proposed in the budget amendment that came forward
last November 13th of 2002 was a direct consequence of
recommendations from both the General Accounting Office, the
Safety Advisory Panel, all the different external groups that
we have had reviewing what we do, have suggested that the
longer-term Shuttle requirements, to the extent we want to
sustain that capability, require that we look at modernizing
and upgrading those capabilities each and every time, as we do
in the Orbiter Major Modification Program. What's in the
proposal for fiscal year '03 that the Congress is still
deliberating on now and for the '04 program that the President
just submitted a week ago is a very specific plan that would
provide for those increases necessary to sustain this
capability through the next decade, primarily for lift capacity
of those requirements, as well as crew transfer capabilities to
and from International Space Station and elsewhere. That's as
maneuverable as we can make it.
Chairman Boehlert. The gentleman's time is expired.
Mr. O'Keefe. I appreciate it very much.
Chairman Boehlert. Mr. Smith.
Re-evaluating NASA's Mission
Representative Smith. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
I don't have any question beyond those that have already
been asked, but I do have a statement I'd like to make and then
I'd welcome Mr. O'Keefe's comments when I finish.
Mr. Chairman, I have long supported our efforts to learn
more about the universe around us. In fact, I've always thought
that a great rallying cry would be ``one percent for space.''
That is, we should commit one percent of our national budget,
or about double what we now spend, on scientific discoveries
beyond the bounds of Earth.
The Columbia disaster, though, has made me question not our
financial commitment, but the nature of our space initiatives.
Perhaps we should re-evaluate some of our missions.
Launching astronauts into an inherently dangerous
environment is always risky. Such efforts should be made only
when the results justify the sacrifices. That may mean NASA
undertakes fewer manned missions and more unmanned ones.
From what I read and hear, astronauts on the space station
spend most of their time on maintenance and conducting
experiments that could be performed by mechanical means. Of
course, human judgment sometimes is indispensable, so there
always will be a need for manned missions. But robotics should
be employed more often. They can achieve our scientific goals
more cheaply and with less risk to astronauts' lives. In other
words, can we justify decades of repetitious yet demonstrably
lethal roundtrip Shuttle flights to a space station that has
not met expectations?
It's tempting to aim farther, at an inhabited outpost on
Mars, for example. However, that endeavor could be one hundred
times or maybe one thousand times more dangerous than a Shuttle
flight. And through the video eyes of a Martian rover, we've
seen what the planet already looks like up close.
Nor are prospects great for exploring our cosmic
neighborhood, considering the distances involved. Our fastest
spacecraft can travel a hundred times faster than a bullet. Yet
even at that incredible speed, such vehicles would take 100,000
years to reach the nearest stars.
There is a way to reach across the expansive space, seize
the public's imagination, and learn more about ourselves and
the cosmos, and that is to search for signs of life elsewhere
in the universe. A new generation of telescopes launched into
space would be able to identify life on worlds orbiting nearby
stars. Other types of telescopes could detect radio or light
signals from distant civilizations.
Discovering the probable existence of life ``out there''
would cause more excitement than any news event in the history
of humankind. It would certainly be a showstopper. And the
possibility of extraterrestrial life, a show-starter for our
next major space program. Searching for something more than
microbes, for planets like the Earth, and for other sentient
life forms could lift our faces again to the heavens with hope
and expectation.
Shuttle flights using new space planes would service these
telescopes. No doubt, such operations will often require the
good judgment and capable skills of astronauts. And astronauts
who have gone before, such as those aboard the Columbia, will
have laid a foundation from which we can push off seeking to
discern the secrets of the universe.
Mr. O'Keefe, I'd like for you to respond to the idea, if
not my specifics, then the general idea of reframing the
mission that we have in mind. And if you have other
suggestions, I'd be happy to hear them. I mentioned one for
seizing that public's imagination and yet I'm learning more
about the universe, and I'd be happy for you to respond to
those suggestions.
Mr. O'Keefe. Yes, sir. Well, no, I thank you for the very
thoughtful commentary. And those are, I think, the same kind of
issues we're wrestling with, in terms of what our appropriate
strategy should be.
It's not an either/or proposition; it's a capability in
which you build on the robotic unmanned, non-human intervention
of capabilities that you can deploy and then utilize human
requirements when necessary.
Again, the best example I've come across in my short one
year of tenure at NASA is the Hubble Space Telescope. It is
just a remarkable instrument today. It's something that is
rewriting the astronomy books. Folks are just marveling at the
capacity and the imagery that's coming back from the
information from the Hubble Telescope is not only the new
imagery that we're getting, but it's also informing the
archival data that was collected in the last few years that
suddenly now makes more sense because of the information we're
getting today that now puts that in a different context and
makes it more spectacular.
The reality is, that fantastic instrument would never have
worked had we not had the capacity to launch a Space Shuttle
and send folks to the Hubble Space Telescope to make the
adjustments to correct the problems, which was, again, roundly
considered to be space trash 10 years ago. This same instrument
that was roundly, you know, dismissed as a mistake, has turned
into a marvelous piece of machinery.
Representative Smith. I just think we need more instruments
just like that, but a bigger program and a more expensive----
I know my time is up. Maybe we can discuss this further
later one.
Mr. O'Keefe. Yes, sir. But I hasten to add, as well, that
what you see before you in the current configuration of
International Space Station is the same kind of example. This
is a work in progress. We are six flights away from still
achieving what is a core configuration. It had been planned to
be resumed by this time next year, is where we'd be in that
configuration, to build the scientific laboratories around it.
But, at present, we're still looking at an amazing laboratory
condition that is, in contrast to your characterization, sir,
with all due respect, they are spending a lot more time on the
science on these--and, matter of fact, the last two
expeditions, Peggy Whitson just returned as the first science
officer aboard, as we have transitioned from this engineering
phase to one that's more intensively focused on the science.
It does take a lot, at least two folks to maintain it. No
question about it. But it is--as we are able to build the crew
capacity and focus on the scientific objectives, once we have
reached a configuration that would permit that full use of the
laboratory, it's going to be, I think, the same result that we
saw out of Hubble in the long-term, which is going to yield the
kinds of breakthroughs that we never dared imagine.
As humans, we are impatient. We want to see it now. And
yet, at the same time, I think the persistence that we're
trying to exert is to say, and the perseverance, is to make
sure that we have that capability so that those kinds of
revelations, like what we see today coming from our Hubble in
our stick-to-it-iveness over this past decade yields the return
we'd hope for. And it is today, and it will tomorrow, if we
keep this up.
Chairman Boehlert. Thank you very much, Mr. O'Keefe.
Mr. O'Keefe. Thank you, sir. I appreciate it.
Chairman Boehlert. You will note, and you're a frequent
witness our panel, the House members are particularly skilled
at time management, because we operate under different rules.
And so they've developed the knack for asking--using all their
time to ask their question, and then obviously we'll give you
the opportunity to respond, because no question should go
unresponded to. But we're going to stick, as much as possible,
to the time limitations in the interest of all concerns.
The Chair now recognizes another skilled practitioner of
the art of questioning, Ms. Jackson Lee.
Representative Jackson Lee. Mr. Chairman, what an
introduction.
(Laughter.)
Representative Jackson Lee. Let me thank the Chairman and
the Chairman of the Senate Committee for this opportunity.
And, to Mr. O'Keefe, you have shown the proudness and
wisdom that we have seen over the last two weeks, compounded,
of course, or matched, with your compassion and love for the
NASA family. My sympathy to the extended family, and
specifically to the families of the astronaut, Columbia seven.
A local newspaper called them ``Astronauts, The Heroes Next
Door.'' And I do want to announce to you, and we're very
pleased, that now almost 80 members of Congress in H.R. 525
have joined us to give them the Congressional Gold Medal, which
is the highest civilian honor. And we look forward to NASA
supporting us. We believe that we can move this legislation
quickly. We are going to call on our Senate colleagues in that,
and we are very grateful to Republicans and Democrats who have
signed onto this legislation very quickly.
I think the important message that I'd like to convey in my
brief time is that the Shuttle will fly again, and that the
challenge should be, for lack of a better term, that it flies
sooner rather than later, sooner than two-and-a-half years,
sooner than three years.
You've heard this before, so let me focus on it again. I
think it is extremely important that we have the Admiral's
committee expanded, and I think it you need to consider the
likes of a Nobel laureate, an academic, some industry engineers
should be considered, some advocates of aviation. And, I
believe, after 9/11, depending on their desires, family members
or representatives should be considered to be part of this
committee, because our job is to instill confidence in the
employees, in the families, in the astronauts, not necessarily
in that order, and the American people and this Congress.
And I'm reminded of the Rogers Commission that had a
subsection, the Silent Safety Program. And I assume if I was to
read that, it would again comment on the issue of safety.
Let me bring these points to you and tell you what I'd like
to hear, whether it be in writing or you'll be able to say it
now. I want actual dots, a road map, to lead me from --or to
the conclusion, whether it be a conclusion that is not popular,
that budgeting did not interfere with the safety of this
program. I want an actual--we don't want to be presumptive, we
don't want to speculate, and we don't want to be afraid of
saying ``mistakes.''
I want to be able to understand about the frozen foam that
fell under the underbelly and then hit the left leaning wing,
and how we can speculate that that didn't count, when we had a
report in 1994 from Stanford and Carnegie that suggested 15
percent of the tiles could count for 85 percent of the damage.
And I understand an engineer in 1997, most recently, said that
he thought debris falling might have an impact. And as we all
know, this goes on its belly, and, therefore, it's possible for
debris to hit while it was enroute or while it was in space. So
I'd like the direct lines to that.
I'd like to also say that an orbiter Shuttle is excellent,
but I'm very interested in payload. I think it is a valuable
part of what we do, and I would not want to just have a vehicle
that transported human beings, because I want research to be
able to be done, because we're saving lives. And if you can
comment on that idea, because I understand that we're pushing
forward with the research on the orbiter, I am certainly
excited about that, but I want to make sure we can carry a good
payload so that that research, that vital research, can be
done.
If you can comment on the fact of the icicle that fell, I
call it that, and why we could suggest, or should suggest, that
that was not a problem, and that you will instruct, or however
the instructions are, to this commission, the committee headed
by Admiral Gehman, that he will leave no stone unturned and
that we'll be able to track or follow his tracks.
Budget cuts that did occur did not have an impact. An aging
vehicle did or did not have an impact, 30 some years old.
[The information follows:]
Chairman Boehlert. The gentlelady's time has expired,
proving the point.
Representative Jackson Lee. And I thank the distinguished
Chairman.
Chairman Boehlert. Mr. O'Keefe, you have.
Representative Jackson Lee. I had come to an end of my
sentence. If the----
Chairman Boehlert. Well, thank you very much.
Representative Jackson Lee. If he----
Chairman Boehlert. Mr. Administrator----
Representative Jackson Lee.--could comment briefly, I would
appreciate it.
Chairman Boehlert.--you'll have the opportunity to respond,
by all means. We would not----
Representative Jackson Lee. Thank you very much, Mr.
Chairman.
Chairman Boehlert.--cut off----
Mr. O'Keefe. Thank you. Very probing questions, no
question, all of which I think we should find the answers to,
we must find the answers to, to understand exactly what
happened to the Columbia. And the investigative board, when
they come to conclusion on each of those points, we positively
will be guided by it.
But let me offer the following observations. Everything
we've seen on the budget and the resource profile for Shuttle
would suggest that concurrent with improvements in
efficiencies, there were also improvements in performance. And
to the extent that doesn't bear out, to the extent there are
systemic problems that the investigative board concludes led to
this tragedy, that's the kind of thing we'll have to fix, too.
And their charter is broad enough to cover that range of
issues. We're not just looking for a technical finding of what
happened on this one flight. Anything else they want to
observe, they are free to do so, and we'll be guided by their
view.
The operational problems, again, I really want to avoid any
favorite theory of what it is that could have contributed to
this. We have closed off no branch in this fault-tree analysis,
if you will. We want to make sure that everything is analyzed,
every possible thing that could have contributed to this, to
include the foam pulling off the External Tank, whatever. All
of those are theories that, again, are current. They're
certainly plausible, and we're going to be guided by the
investigative board's conclusions of what their ultimate
contribution was in these kind of cases. So I really want to be
sure we're not shutting off any of those avenues, but, at the
same time, not pursuing one we think is more likely or
favorable or not.
In my limited experience with dealing with crisis
circumstances or management of situations where you're
responding to incidents, typically one of the variables that
occurs, not always, but many, many times, the initial evidence
proves to be not nearly as illuminating as it was when it first
came out. And so rather than tracing or chasing what turns out
to be a blind alley, and, therefore, foreclosing and letting
the trail go cold on all kinds of other options, we're trying
to maintain an even-keel approach of being sure that we not go
out and favor one favored approach versus another, and to let
all the evidence, let the facts speak for what ultimately
occurred in this case. So we're avoiding that.
And I, too, am looking forward to the assessment of the
investigative board's conclusions about how that particular
item--whether it was the contributor or not. And that's what
I'll be guided by as we move along.
Lastly, your observation that you asked the science
content. Absolutely, we have to really maximize that. That's
the--the risk that we deal with each day, those seven heroic
folks who went aboard the Columbia were making a contribution
to, ultimately, the science and research objectives. We have to
have a equally intensive and disciplined approach about what we
would ask them to risk their lives for, and be equally serious
about it for every one of those cases in which we ask folks to
venture off to do these things.
And so we've got to be as disciplined as they are in their
training of assuring that the science and the research yield we
think could come from this meets that same test and standard.
And that's what we're about, that's what I think we're
attempting to do on International Space Station. We're trying
to build that capacity to yield those kinds of breakthroughs
that would never be possible were it not for that facility that
can't be duplicated here on Earth. So we continue in that
pursuit. We are completely in agreement on that, really,
imperative to be that serious about it. And I thank you for
your observations.
Chairman Boehlert. Thank you very much, Mr. Administrator.
Representative Jackson Lee. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Boehlert. Mr. Feeney.
Representative Feeney. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and for
Chairman McCain and the Senate for their hospitality today.
Mr. O'Keefe, it's great to talk to you. I know it's been a
very difficult weeks for you and your staff, and I would wonder
if you could comment on a couple of thoughts that I had.
Number one, within about 15 minutes of the Columbia's
failure to land on time at Kennedy Space Center, there was a
contingency plan put into place, and I'd like to know what, if
any, steps you took upon assuming the control of the
administration at NASA with respect to reviewing, familiarizing
yourself with the contingency plan and what you found.
And, secondly, I was struck by the portion of your
testimony when you spoke. I think you used the phrase ``the
ethos of safety at NASA,'' and I think you included the
contractors who work for NASA, as well.
Not long ago, you and I sat as we hoped for a liftoff. We
didn't get one that day. But in the audience, a young man was
introduced by the name of David Strait. I wasn't familiar with
his name. I thought, by the reception he got from the people
there that day, he must be a rock star or a TV star. I don't
watch much TV or listen to much music, either.
But I wonder if you could comment on the fact that the
people involved in this program are passionate about it, what
your view of their professionalism is, and what we can do as we
go through this very difficult process of the investigation,
the fix of the problem, and hopefully creating a new vision of
space to enhance that esprit de corps during some tough times.
Mr. O'Keefe. Thank you, Congressman.
The issue of the contingency plan, no question, this was
something that occupied my interest from the first hour that I
was privileged to be in the capacity as administrator at NASA.
On the first day I walked into the office, I asked folks to
please take off the shelf whatever it is, whatever that plan
is, of how we would respond to a disaster like Challenger. And
I asked that that meeting occur within an hour of when I
requested it so that nobody would have to feel like they have
to run off and make something up, that they'd just pull off the
shelf what was there. And we sat down and reviewed that plan,
and it clearly is of the origin from the Challenger
circumstance, no question, an awful lot of the contingency
planning efforts that went into it. And I reviewed it in great
detail, to assure myself that I would have some working
familiarity with it.
Then I asked our senior leadership folks to then benchmark
it against the only other community I know of that is as
equally obsessed with safety as NASA is, which is the nuclear
reactors community, the naval reactors community, the legacy of
Hyman Rickover and all the folks who have, over 40-plus years,
have operated safely over 125 billion miles, they say, of safe
operations of nuclear reactors.
So we imposed upon Admiral Skip Bowman, who is the head of
naval reactors today, who is Rickover's successor several times
removed now, to benchmark, help us benchmark, relative to the
approach of what they use as their contingency planning
efforts. Over the course of the next six months, we were able
to compare notes, if you will, upgrade our plan, he upgraded
his based on the way we do business, too. We both benefitted by
the exercise. The contingency plan was updated and republished
in September of 2002. We ran a simulation of it in November,
secure in the confidence we'd never have to use it. But,
nonetheless, it was organized that way.
And specifically, all the folks who were to be on the
Independent Investigation Board, named, identified by position,
were notified so that everybody understood the procedure. All
the folks internally were exercised on the activity. And we
were confident we'd never have to really worry about using
something like this.
On the day it occurred, at 9:29, Bill Readdy had it with
him, as did all the senior officials at Kennedy, opened up the
first page, and we went to item one on that contingency plan.
And it was the saddest moment I can ever recall, to be followed
by the most tragic moment I've ever experienced in my life,
which was to face the families of these crew members, but to
tell them and to reassure them that we are working through this
as diligently as we know how to find what caused this, what are
the answers, how are we going to fix this, and assure that we
pursue the same dream that their spouses, loved ones, fathers
and mothers wanted to see pursued.
And so this plan is as good as we know how to put it
together. It is that legacy. It has been really worked as smart
as we know how.
And the safety ethos, if I can get to slide 23 real quick,
to be sure, the example you cited, the fellow you talked about,
David Strait, notice on the lefthand of this chart, there's--
you can barely even see it--there's a hairline facture of no
more than about an inch and a half that was enough to ground
the entire orbiter fleet for four months until we knew what was
the source of that problem. How did it happen? It isn't
supposed to have shown up in anything. We stopped all flight
operations, made the repair area to it that you see on the
right over the course of that time, after they had run many,
many simulations of this to figure out what the right answer
was. And yet there's a bead weld right above it that was there
without any consequence since the day this orbiter was first
put together. And this effect was made on all four of those
Shuttle flights.
So even something as minuscule as that that David Strait,
with 20-20 vision, noticed as he just went through his routine
business, like they all do, of inspecting the orbiter, every
square inch of it after every flight, noticed that seemingly
innocuous problem, and that was enough to ground that fleet for
four months.
Chairman Boehlert. The gentleman's time has expired.
Ms. Lofgren.
Representative Lofgren. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I'd like
to thank you, as well as Senator McCain, for convening this
hearing. Over the next few months, I think all of us will be
asking tough questions related to the loss of the Columbia, as
well as the future of the space program.
But it's appropriate that first our country has paused to
reflect on the heroism of the seven astronauts who gave their
lives so that the dreams of humans reaching for the stars could
live forever. And my thoughts and prayers are with the families
of those we lost, as well as to the extended NASA family. And I
know from my own experience that part of our NASA family at
home, at NASA-Ames, is very much grieving with the rest of the
country over this loss.
You know, I also believe that this committee is going to
focus on asking difficult questions that relate to how we're
best able to resume our quest to explore space, and that's
really the best way to honor those who were lost, to ask those
tough questions and to find answers.
Clearly, we're not going to find the answer to the specific
technical issues relative to the Columbia. We've got technical
people to do that. But it is appropriate for us to examine our
own actions and to question each other about the policies and
whether those policies had any impact on the risk that was
inherent in this flight.
Clearly, at least into the foreseeable future, space flight
will be risky. And we know that the percentage of odds right
now is--although initially we thought that the use of these
vehicles would have a risk of one in one-hundred-thousand, it's
down to now one in fifty-seven if you just look at the records.
And so we need to--I'm a believer in human space travel, but we
need to make sure that we're doing our part to minimize the
risks.
Now, I was late for this hearing, and I wish to apologize.
It's been a big science day. We spent all morning on stem cell
research in the Judiciary Committee, and I have hopes that
science will do better in the Science Committee than science
did in the Judiciary Committee today.
But one of the questions I have for you, Administrator, is;
as we look at what we should do to make sure that the risks are
minimized, were there any safety upgrade proposals ever made to
you, either as Administrator or in your prior life over at the
OMB, that you did not support? And if so, what were those
recommendations, and why did you reach the conclusion that you
did?
Mr. O'Keefe. Not that I'm aware of, but I certainly will
review the history of both of my capacities in the course of
this Administration and ascertain the dates of when there were
any deferrals or anything else of any upgrades that would be
categorized as exclusively focused on safety. So, to my
knowledge, we have not done so.
The only issues I'm aware of is an Electric Auxiliary Power
Unit upgrade that had been planned that was determined to be
technically deficient and wasn't--you know, so, in other words,
no amount of money we threw at it was going to yield its
performance in the manner in which it would contribute to not
only efficiency but also safety characterization--that was
deferred. And we're now re-examining to figure out how we can
pick that up or continue it in the future that would yield the
performance requirements we know of.
But we will go back, and I will submit for the record any
other changes that were made during the course of-- well, since
Inauguration Day 2001, and if there are any changes that have
occurred in that time, we'll certainly report those.
[The information follows:]
Representative Lofgren. So you'll go back and review the
record and take a look at your--obviously, hindsight's 20-20;
we're all doing that in terms of our own activities --what you
recommended both at OMB and in your role as NASA Administrator.
And I know my time----
Mr. O'Keefe. I'll do my best.
Representative Lofgren. Thank you very much. And my time is
up, Mr. Chairman. I appreciate it very much.
Chairman Boehlert. Thank you very much.
The Chair recognizes the Senator from Washington.
Lessons From the Challenger Investigation
Senator Cantwell. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And thank you,
Mr. O'Keefe, for your diligence today. I've been to several
meetings since I first checked in here this morning, and I
think you've had a total of a five-minute break. So thank you
for your diligence in answering these questions.
I don't think any of my colleagues have asked specifically
about the lessons learned from the Challenger inquiry. And I
don't know if, in this current configuration of the Columbia
inquiry, you think that we have a sufficient independent
scientist on this review team.
Mr. O'Keefe. Yes, Senator, very specifically, the
contingency review plan and the activation of an investigative
board is a direct outgrowth and a direct education from the
Challenger accident. So what we put in motion on the day of the
accident was something that was a lesson learned from
Challenger. It was part of the Rogers Commission
recommendations of how we would proceed in various cases, and
this is an outgrowth of one of their concerns, which is how to
get ahead of these cases as quickly as possible.
The investigative board was appointed the same day as the
accident. So, as a result, that was a very clear result of the
lesson learned that came from that.
So an awful lot of what we attempted to do here is to build
on that experience and assure that we have a result, in this
case, that is driven by our interest in absolute dedication to
finding the answers to what caused the terrible tragedy, find
the solutions to it, the fixes, and get about the business of
getting back to safe flight to support the folks aboard
International Space Station.
Senator Cantwell. So who is that independent scientist,
then, on----
Mr. O'Keefe. Oh, I'm sorry. The independent--there is--I
spoke as recently as last night to Admiral Hal Gehman, who is
the chairman of the current board, who has five different folks
he has in mind, I'm told, who are physicists, scientists,
etcetera, that he is considering to propose for addition on the
board. I have advised him whoever he wants to put on that board
that will expand his expertise, that will improve the
independence of the board, help its objectivity, we will do it
without qualification and without hesitation.
Senator Cantwell. Well, I am struck, reading last night and
this morning, the Feynman minority report to that report that I
think finally got in as an appendix in which Mr. Feynman was
very critical of discrepancies between engineers and managers
as the probability of failure. So you had engineers having
studies and analysis saying that maybe the risk is a lot higher
than what the high-level managers thought. The criteria used
for flight-readiness reviews often developed a gradual
decreasing strictness, ``If the Shuttle had flown with it
before, chances are it worked before, so let's just--let's not
think about the variations that might happen.''
The Feynman Report even said NASA might have exaggerated
the reliability of product, that there were variations in
models, that NASA was more of a top-down system in testing the
entire system instead of testing the individual properties and
limitations of the material within the Shuttle to the degree
that I think the report was quite critical of NASA, in the
sense of maybe even coming to Congress and catering to us in
the public relations expectations that were there by the
public, instead of relying back on this basic engineering
information.
So I guess my concern is, is that the panel, as I see it
now, doesn't have that Feynman voice, and I think what we
really do want to do here is make sure that we are not engaged
in that PR battle, but understanding how we really do build the
NASA systems of the future----
Mr. O'Keefe. Right.
Senator Cantwell.--with more reliability and predictability
based on those materials.
And so I'd be very interested in how those recommendations
were actually implemented, because I have a feeling we might
find the same circumstances are true here. We're going to find
out that there is some material property limitations that were
discovered in some report written by some engineer that
somewhere along the way got translated into ``not as big a
risk'' and, thereby, the disaster that we've all been dealing
with. So I appreciate your attention.
Mr. O'Keefe. Well, thank you, Senator.
That may be. And if the investigative board comes back and
points to the systemic problems that we have, we positively
will take that as a firm recommendation and go fix it.
What I can advise, though, in my one year experience, with
no prior experience with NASA at all--this is my first year at
it--and reading the Challenger, the Rogers Commission Report, I
was a Senate Appropriations Committee staff member on the day
Challenger blew up, read the report thereafter, and that's my
only association with that up until a year ago, is--what I see
is a different agency than what existed 17 years ago, in that
sense.
One of the observations they made, Feynman's view, I think,
was exactly right, he pointed to the difficulty of that chain
of command and how it gets altered. This whole process I've
witnessed, and I'm advised I'm the first Administrator to have
attended what is called a Flight Readiness Review two weeks
before a launch, it resembles a room like this, with everyone
that you could possibly imagine associated with this activity,
all of which are empowered to raise their hand during the
course of a full day, sometimes two-day, review of every single
technical issue. And if they disagree with the way it was
presented, they disagree with the conclusion, they immediately
raised their hand, and the issue was then put to the side to go
work the conclusion of it. That didn't exist prior to
Challenger. It was all done by telephonic tag-up occasionally.
This is a in-the-room, everybody there associated with the
activity.
There was a big difference at that time, where schedule
drove everything. They were looking to get to a flight rate of
20, 30 flights a year. We're operating on a five- to six-
flight-a-year approach.
And as we discussed with Congressman Feeney a minute ago,
and I appreciate your bringing this out, we stopped flight
operations for four months over a hairline fracture found on
not the orbiter that was scheduled to go up, but one that's in
an Orbiter Processing Facility. Everything ended. The engineer,
the inspector, that noticed that, that stopped operations cold
for four solid months.
The disjointed chain of command, that doesn't--I don't see
it. We have astronauts, former astronauts, who are in
capacities as high as the Deputy Administrator, the Associate
Administrator for Space Flight, the Associate Administrator for
Safety and Mission Assurance, all three are former astronauts.
That didn't exist prior to Challenger. None of those positions
included anybody with that kind of background.
And all the way through this process, every single one of
those managers are empowered, are expected, there's a
responsibility that each of them feel they have, to stand up
and be counted and stop all the operations until there is any
issue that has been left unresolved, beaten to ground truth.
So what I've seen--and, again, from an objective opinion, I
think, until a year ago, and now I'm steeped in it, there's no
doubt about it--but until that time, unfamiliar with it other
than what I read in the Challenger Rogers Commission Report, as
well--would tell me this is a different place than it was then.
All that said, we will be guided by what the Gehman Board
comes back and tells us was the problem here. And if it was
systemic problem, we're going to fix it. If it was a technical
problem, we're going to fix that, too. There is nothing I can
imagine that's not on the table, and I have no bias against any
finding they could possibly come up with that wouldn't
otherwise contribute to the solution in this particular case.
We are going to act on that without reservation.
Chairman Boehlert. Thank you very much.
Senator Cantwell. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Boehlert. Mr. Moore.
Representative Moore. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you,
Mr. O'Keefe, for staying.
Yesterday, in the Washington Post, it was reported, I
believe, that you said that--you defended the way you set up
the accident investigation board, arguing that you proceeded
the way you did so that it could launch an investigation
immediately with members who were already well briefed on
Shuttle operations. I guess my question is, Mr. O'Keefe, how
important it is that we launch an investigation immediately, or
should we take a more slow and diligent approach, as I think
you said to Ms. Sheila Jackson Lee recently? I'm just--I'm
asking what kind of investigation do we need here? What's, in
your opinion, the best approach?
Mr. O'Keefe. Yes, sir, thank you.
I believe what I tried to say--and if I was inarticulate, I
apologize--was to say we developed a contingency plan to
activate an investigative board so that they could act
immediately, get on with the task immediately. They are not--
and if I said this, I am in error, and I need to correct the
record--they are not conversant in Shuttle operations.
There is only one member of the group who is even vaguely
familiar with NASA operations. The rest of them have had no
experience with NASA at all. The chairman of board is Hal
Gehman, a United States Navy admiral, retired, who never had
any association with NASA. I don't even think he ever attended
a launch before. All of the other members of the board are from
the FAA, the Department of Transportation, the United States
Navy, the United States Air Force, all folks dealing with
safety, mission assurance, flight certification, etcetera. I
don't know if any of them have even toured a NASA facility.
They spent the past week in Shreveport, Louisiana, and have
now, just now, this past Friday, arrived at Johnson Space
Center, and went through the simulation of what a re-entry is
like, astronaut simulations they do. None of them have ever
been through that before.
So Admiral Gehman has advised me that part of what he's
done this past week is get up to speed on what he calls
``Shuttle 101,'' just to understand what the lingo means and
what the acronyms are. They are, nonetheless, were available up
and running and talking to each other as early as seven-and-a-
half hours after the accident. On Saturday afternoon, at 5
p.m., they were already identified and ready to go.
So at least we picked up the time that gave them the
opportunity to then become more familiar with the processes,
the evidence, the facts, the data, so that they could get about
the business of investigating as quickly as possible before the
trails go cold.
That's the approach that--you know, certainly, there's no
one-size-fits-all approach to this, but it certainly was one of
the most effective ways to get moving.
Slide 33, if you would, at least this is what happened two
days after the event. That's the folks that got there, and
they're talking to FEMA, you know, managers on site, you know,
it at least gave us an opportunity to get moving, as opposed to
sitting around thinking about who should we pick, when should
they go.
Representative Moore. In terms of a realistic time frame,
then, what might Congress and the American people expect us
to--when you see this investigation really getting underway,
and I know you can't predict what results we're going to find.
I assume you can't predict what results we're going to find.
But what time frame are we looking at, Mr. O'Keefe?
Mr. O'Keefe. Well, the guys that's right on the other side
of the fellow with the FEMA jacket on, right ahead of him, is
Admiral Hal Gehman, and he can answer that question better than
I can.
Representative Moore. All right.
Mr. O'Keefe. I wouldn't even presume to suggest when he's
going to finish. And he has--there's no amount of time that's
necessary that we think is appropriate to go out and find out
what happened here. We're going to be guided by he and his
board's view of exactly what occurred, and there is no time
limit on that.
Representative Moore. Very well, thank you.
Mr. O'Keefe. Thank you. I appreciate it very much.
Chairman Boehlert. Thank you very much, Mr. Moore.
Mr. Administrator, I want to thank you very much. Before we
wrap up, I just want to touch on a couple of more points. I
want to bring clarity to a very important issue.
I think it should be self evident that the Congress is
committed to the proposition, on a bipartisan, bicameral basis,
that we need to strengthen the evidence supporting the
assertion that the Columbia Accident Investigation Board is
truly independent. Now, I know the message has been sent, and I
think it's been received, and I know it's been heard, and I
want some assurance that it will be heeded. So I'd like you to
visit that a little bit more and comment.
I carefully listened to you as you said you'll consult with
Admiral Gehman, but I hope you're hearing what Congress is
saying. We are the ones, and others, too, insisting that we get
some clarity to this issue. So can you address that a little
bit more for me?
Mr. O'Keefe. Yes, sir. No, I appreciate your patience on
it, and I do not mean to equivocate in any way, shape, or form.
I share exactly the same objective, I think, as all Members
here do, which is to determine what are the answers to this
tragedy, what are the facts that led to it, and ultimately find
out how we go about fixing it and getting back to safe flight.
And in that pursuit, I will not just consult with Admiral
Gehman, I will advise. As soon as this hearing is concluded, I
will give him a call back and say my clear understanding from
the Members of this Joint Committee is that there are aspects
of the charter that need further revision. Let's examine what
those might be. And, to his satisfaction, we will make a
change----
Chairman Boehlert. Well, let me give you an easy one right
off the bat. I mean, number 10, provide a final written report
to the NASA Administrator not later than 60 days. First of all,
the 60-day time frame----
Mr. O'Keefe. Sure.
Chairman Boehlert.--is totally unrealistic. But the report
will come to the President, to the Congress, to the American
people, and to the NASA administrator simultaneously.
Mr. O'Keefe. Yes, sir.
Chairman Boehlert. All right.
Mr. O'Keefe. I'll make that an alteration and suggest to
him that that's exactly--and we'll go ahead and make that
charter change, because, again, I've stated that.
There's a letter, too, that I--that's part of the record,
as well--on the 60-day issue, that, when I commissioned the
panel in the very first place, said, ``Our contingency plan
contemplated 60 days, but you take whatever time you think you
need, Mr. Chairman, Admiral, to come to conclusion on this.''
I'll reiterate that. We will eviscerate the 60-day. It has no
bearing. It was intended as part of the continency plan
originally, but not envisioned to be used. So to the extent
that there is any amount of time he needs, that's what he's
got. I don't intend to impose anything different on him.
Chairman Boehlert. Well, that's the easiest one.
Mr. O'Keefe. Sure.
Chairman Boehlert. We have, you know, some others that----
Mr. O'Keefe. Well, actually, we'll revise whatever is
necessary.
Chairman Boehlert. We want to deal with it clearly so that
it's clear in our own minds that they're truly independent.
Mr. O'Keefe. Yes, sir.
Chairman Boehlert. And if they decide they want to go down
a certain path or they want to hire a certain expert, they
don't have to march over to NASA headquarters to get approval.
Mr. O'Keefe. Yes, sir.
Chairman Boehlert. The admiral and the Columbia Accident
Investigation Board have the authority to proceed as they deem
best----
Mr. O'Keefe. Yes, sir.
Chairman Boehlert.--to get us the answers we are all
demanding. And that's critically important.
Mr. O'Keefe. Yes, sir, I concur. I appreciate it. Thank
you.
Chairman Boehlert. Well, I think, as we come to the end,
we've done several things today. First and foremost, the
current status report. And obviously, this is a very dynamic
situation, so events almost change hour by hour, let alone day
by day. And so that was very important.
And we've started what I have characterized in my opening
remarks as the national conversation, which we have to start,
people talking to each other, not through each other, over
each, around each other--directly.
We have affirmed the commitment to the concept of an
independent board, and we've had agreement on the need for
charter changes. I think that is very important.
Now, this is not the beginning of the end; it's the end of
the beginning. And we always want instant analysis of immediate
findings, and that's understandable. But experience tells us we
learn the most from in-depth examination of more complete data.
So now we are in the fact-assembling phase, and all of us
with responsibility in this very important assignment--the
Congress, NASA, the Columbia Accident Investigation Board--are
all going about the business of assembling the facts. Then all
of us will have this database to look at and take care and
caution as we go forward with our special responsibilities.
Obviously, NASA and the Accident Investigation Board will
be focusing more on the technical aspects. Obviously, there's a
need on the part of the Congress to focus more on policy as we
chart the course for the future. That does not mean they are
mutually exclusive. We'll be looking at each other.
I have been very pleased with the response I've had from
Admiral Gehman in assuring us that Congress will be very much
involved in all of the proceedings. I have been very pleased
with the cooperation we've received from Administrator O'Keefe
and his team. And I have been just impressed beyond any ability
to adequately explain at the total commitment I find on the
part of every single person involved in this procedure to get
the facts. And let us be guided by the facts as we fulfill our
important responsibilities.
Mr. Administrator, thank you.
The hearing is closed.
[Whereupon, at 1:30 p.m., the hearing was adjourned.]
Appendix 1:
----------
Answers to Post-Hearing Questions
Responses by the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA)
Questions submitted by Chairman John McCain
Q1. In a Wall Street Journal article dated February 11, 2003, a
fundamental question of ``What is the next step for manned space flight
after the Shuttle?'' was discussed. The article also talked about
NASA's four alternatives for replacing the Shuttle program, three of
which would be limited to servicing the International Space Station.
The fourth option would develop a space craft that takes off like an
airplane without the help of unmanned boosters. This could allow for
servicing of the Station along with a number of other options such as a
mission to Mars.
Q1a. Do you believe that we are short-changing ourselves by proceeding
with a vehicle that can only service the Space Station?
A1a. No. The Orbital Space Plane (OSP) is only one element of the
Integrated Space Transportation Plan (ISTP), which provides the roadmap
for NASA's future investments in space transportation. The principal
benefits of the OSP include: (1) providing assured access to the
International Space Station (ISS), (2) meeting the U.S. ISS crew rescue
responsibilities, (3) improving the overall crew safety, and (4)
providing a bridge for crewed space flight on future launch vehicles.
The OSP Level 1 requirements are focused on meeting the first three
benefits based upon the Agency's near-term needs. But by addressing the
crewed segment, OSP would also provide a crucial building block for
future human space flight vehicles under the ISTP. The ISTP will
continue to evolve consistent with NASA's strategic objectives.
Q1b. While there were technical difficulties in the X-33 program which
led to its eventual cancellation, were the difficulties insurmountable
if the Nation had made a conscious decision to pursue a manned space
craft for exploration beyond the Space Station and the moon? What were
the technical barriers to the X-33 program?
A1b. The X-33 was intended to demonstrate, in flight, the technologies
needed for a full-size, single-stage-to-orbit Reusable Launch Vehicle.
As a technology demonstrator, it required dramatic breakthroughs in
multiple technologies, including the development of composite liquid
hydrogen (LH2) tanks that were an integral structural part
of the overall vehicle. Achieving single-stage-to-orbit, X-33 was also
founded upon the principle that the commercial market would continue to
grow. The X-33 program had reached the end of the time period specified
in the cooperative agreement between NASA and Lockheed Martin. When
faced with the decision of providing additional funding to continue the
X-33 vehicle after the failure of the LH2 tanks, the Agency
decided the X-33 would have to compete for funding with all other
reusable space transportation system development efforts under the SLI
program. This decision was communicated to Lockheed Martin prior to the
completion of the original cooperative agreement, which ended on March
31, 2001. The X-33 proposal was not selected for award under the SLI
NRA 8-30 Cycle I competition (May 2001).
There are multiple vehicle configurations that would be considered
if the Nation made a conscious decision to pursue a manned spacecraft
for exploration beyond the Space Station. Unless dramatic progress is
made in the technologies necessary to achieve single-stage-to-orbit, it
is likely that the final configuration would be different than the X-33
design.
Q1c. The Wall Street Journal article also implied that if we shifted
to capsules launched on expendable launch vehicles, it would be an
admission that the Shuttle program never really made much sense. Do you
agree with that implication?
A1c. No. The unique capabilities of the Space Shuttle have enabled a
broad range of missions that would not have been accomplished without
it, including the Hubble Space Telescope deployment as well as repair
and maintenance missions, satellite servicing, and construction of the
ISS. The Space Shuttle remains the Nation's primary means of
transporting crew and cargo to the ISS.
Q1d. Many are calling your space plane concept a step backwards
because it is half disposable and not fully reusable. What's your
response to these claims?
A1d. OSP does not replace the Reusable Launch Vehicle (RLV). The RLV
architectures always consisted of NASA Unique Systems (renamed OSP) and
booster systems. The OSP represents a step forward for the Agency,
offering the following benefits: (1) providing assured access to the
ISS, (2) meeting the U.S. ISS crew rescue responsibilities, (3)
improving the overall crew safety, and (4) providing a bridge for
crewed space flight on future launch vehicles. The Next Generation
Launch Technology program continues technology work on future launch
systems, paced to address key issues that are still open, including
requirements definition, level of DOD cooperation, and technical
maturity. We believe this approach will provide a more resilient bridge
to providing a future launch system while assuring access to space
during a future transition from the Shuttle.
Q2. If the Shuttle orbiters had lived up to their original design
intent of one launch per week, they would have exceeded their design
limits of 100 flights. Space Shuttle Discovery has flown the most
missions of all orbiters at 30.
Q2a. Do you still believe the orbiters are capable of 100 flights per
their original design?
Q2b. If not, how can we tell if any of them are capable of more than
30 flights?
A2a&b. It is important to note that the 100-flight design limit refers
to the Space Shuttle orbiter airframes. NASA has not altered the
expectation that the orbiter' airframes are capable of being flown at
least 100 times with the specified maintenance and periodic upgrades to
eliminate obsolescence issues associated with other Shuttle sub-
systems. The Shuttle is subjected to rigorous inspection and
maintenance following each flight. Each orbiter also undergoes a major
overhaul every three to five years. NASA is implementing a Shuttle
Service Life Extension Program to assure that the appropriate
investments are made so that Shuttle can fly safely at least through
the middle of the next decade.
Q3. In a Boeing impact analysis of ascent debris, six different
scenarios in which tiles are lost from various parts of the wing were
examined. It is my understanding this report was used to determine if
NASA would proceed with Columbia's re-entry. After reviewing the
analysis results, only four of the six scenarios contained thermal
prediction results of ``No Issue.'' The other two scenarios, which
involve analysis of the lower wing area and the main landing gear door,
has no results.
Q3a. Can you explain why the thermal predictions under these scenarios
were not summarized?
A3a. On January 23, 2003, Cases 5 and 6 were not complete prior to
preparation of charts that were to be used during management reviews
the following day. Case 5 was completed late in the evening and the
results were discussed at the January 24, Space Shuttle Vehicle
Engineering Office (SSVEO) tag up and at the STS-107 Mission Management
Team (MMT) in addition to Cases 1 through 4. An action was taken from
the MMT to follow up with the Case 6 results. The Case 6 results were
discussed at the January 27, 2003 SSVEO tag up and the STS-107 MMT.
Q3b. Has NASA or Boeing since analyzed those scenarios and, if so,
what are the results?
A3b. At the SSVEO tag up and the STS-107 MMT conference on January 24,
2003, the results for Case 5 were discussed and it was reported that
the surface temperature of the analyzed areas could reach
430+F, which posed no risk for entry. At the SSVEO tag up
and the STS-107 MMT conference on January 27, 2003, the results for
Case 6 were discussed and it was reported that the surface temperature
of the analyzed areas could reach 705+F, which could result
in a localized ``soft spot'' in the area, but posed no safety of flight
issue. This area would require post-flight inspections and repairs. The
analysis did not identify any potential burn through of the structure
for any of these cases.
Q4. Did NASA sacrifice funding for Shuttle safety in order to pay for
cost overruns on the space station? If not, has the cost overruns on
the Station program prevented increased funding for the Shuttle
upgrades?
A4. No Space Shuttle safety upgrades funding has been used to
supplement the International Space Station budget.
Q5. The Columbia Accident Investigation Board, which is currently
charged with investigating the Columbia accident, was created by NASA
and reports to NASA, leading to criticism that it is not an independent
body.
Q5a. Why is this approach better than having the White House set up a
blue-ribbon panel that is clearly independent of NASA, as was done
after the 1986 Challenger accident?
A5a. Prior to Challenger, NASA had no contingency plan for conducting
accident investigations; as a result, there was a delay before the
Challenger investigative panel was put into place. One of the lessons
learned was to have a standing panel of experts from outside the Agency
to be available immediately to conduct an external investigation.
NASA's goal is to find the cause of the accident, to fix it, and to
return to flight. We will support any approach that the Gehman Board,
Congress, and the Administration feel best accomplishes this goal.
Since all but one of the members are from organizations external to
NASA, the Board is not under the control of the Agency and can
therefore conduct an independent investigation. Furthermore, we have
received very helpful advice and counsel from Members of Congress that
the Board's charter should include revisions to strengthen the
independence of the investigation, and to enable it to be as thorough
as possible. NASA has been responsive to these suggestions, and has
moved expeditiously to make appropriate changes to the original
charter.
Q5b. Are there problems with having the Board staffed by NASA and
subject to NASA disclosure rules?
A5b. The NASA employees initially assigned as staff to the Board
primarily provide administrative support and have been phased out over
the past month. A Task Force Team comprised of NASA employees has been
created by the Board as a conduit to obtain information and data that
the Board requests from NASA in the form that the Board wants. There
have been modifications to the Gehman charter to strengthen the
independence of the Columbia Accident Investigation Board (CAIB). These
changes have satisfied Admiral Gehman regarding questions of
independence of the Board.
Q5c. Do you have any plans for increasing the membership of the Board?
A5c. Admiral Gehman, not NASA, has already determined the need for
additional Board members. Additional appointments to the Board include
Dr. Sheila Widnall, Dr. Douglas Osheroff, Dr. Sally Ride, and Dr. John
Logsdon. Admiral Gehman has the authority to augment the Board with
whatever additional members and resources he deems necessary.
Q6. Recent news reports have charged that changes in NASA's budgeting
accounts in the mid-1990s forced the Space Shuttle program to compete
with the International Space Station and the X-33 program for funding.
How did the need to fund the Space Station and the experimental space
plane affect NASA's budgeting for long-term use of the Space Shuttle?
A6. Beginning in FY 1990, in an effort to better utilize precious
resources, restructured its budget to align the Space Shuttle and Space
Station programs under a single Human Space Flight appropriations
account. This action allowed the Space Flight Programs the necessary
flexibility to incorporate efficiencies by combining functions common
to both program. Some of these activities included crew training and
mission control functions.
Q7. In 2001, NASA announced that it had a $218 million shortfall in
its budget for Space Shuttle operations. To solve this problem, NASA
proposed canceling or delaying Space Shuttle safety upgrades, and
delaying major upgrades of the Space Shuttles Discovery and Endeavour.
What affect did this shortfall and subsequent actions by NASA have on
Space Shuttle safety?
A7. In the FY 2002 Operating Plan, the Space Shuttle program cancelled
or deferred several upgrades because of cost growth or technical
immaturity. In the Operating Plan, reviewed by Congress, the funding
made available as a result of these actions was then applied to Space
Shuttle operations to accommodate operations cost growth. These actions
did not affect safety.
Q8. A February 3, 2003, article in the New York Times alleges that
NASA removed five of the nine members of the Aerospace Safety Advisory
Committee, who warned that work on long-term Shuttle safety ``had
deteriorated.'' According to the report, NASA claimed that it had
changed the charter of the group. Could you please explain NASA's
rationale for changing the charter of this committee and what factors
led to this change?
A8. Based on the recommendations of the Shuttle Independent Assessment
Team (SIAT) and the Inspector General, in April 2002, NASA requested
that several ASAP Members and Consultants step down from their
positions to make room for new members with a different and more
current skill mix. The Agency deemed this necessary to better reflect
the current demands of its programs. All of those asked to step down
had served on the Panel for at least six years--the normal term of a
panel member. The average tenure of those asked to step down was 12
years.
Q9. There has been some discussion as to whether or not the re-entry
path for the Columbia could have been altered to reduce the heat build-
up in certain parts of the orbiter. Could Columbia's re-entry path have
been altered to reduce heat to the left wing?
A9. The CAIB is attempting to determine the cause of the Columbia
accident. While we still do not know what caused the accident, it is
unlikely that the thermal profile could have been significantly
reduced. The re-entry path is already optimized to minimize heating.
Q10. The public has asked why the astronauts were unable to eject from
the Columbia as it broke apart. In 2001, NASA spent $5 million to study
crew escape systems, such as ejections seats and a detachable cockpit
that could fly away as an escape pod and float down with parachutes.
What were the results of this study, and are such escape systems
practicable?
A10. NASA has continued to study crew escape systems, including systems
during re-entry. Over the past several years, a series of studies on
the subject were commissioned as a part of NASA's Shuttle upgrades
analysis.
Various concepts for crew escape systems have been considered
against critical operating parameters. Some considerations which limit
potential crew escape systems include: vehicle structure, weight,
operational use, and thermal environment.
It is highly unlikely that any of the proposed crew escape concepts
NASA has considered would have allowed the crew to safely escape in the
dynamic environment we believe the Space Shuttle Columbia experienced.
They were far too high and going far too fast for the existing escape
system.
Currently, the astronauts wear parachutes and have a pole
deployable from the crew hatch that allows the crew to bail out in
level, sub-sonic flight at 25,000 feet or below.
Q11. Last December, RAND completed a study looking at possible
privatization scenarios for the Shuttle program. The FY 2004 budget
appears to indicate that NASA intends to pursue privatization
alternatives. Has this tragic accident changed your view of expanding
Shuttle privatization?
A11. The operational work of the Space Shuttle program has always been
primarily performed by a contractor workforce. However, the Government
has provided insight, oversight and technical expertise.
As of this date, NASA has exercised a 2-year extension option to
the current SFOC contract, which carries the contract through October
2004. NASA's FY 2004 budget does not provide for ``privatization
alternatives,'' but rather assumes continued exploration of
alternatives for competitive sourcing of Space Shuttle, flight
operations. Further examination of Shuttle competitive sourcing options
is being held in abeyance until the Gehman Board recommendations are
received and assessed. It would be premature for NASA to propose any
detailed plans for Shuttle competitive sourcing prior to receipt of the
Columbia Accident Investigation Board conclusions.
Q12. Based on your plans prior to the loss of the Columbia orbiter, I
understand that NASA was planning to fly that orbiter in November to
support continued construction of the International Space Station
(ISS). Attainment of ``core complete'' was projected for around
February 2004. Because of the Shuttle fleet's major modifications
schedule, I understand that only three orbiters would have been
available at any given point in time. For example, Discovery is now
undergoing major modifications and is not scheduled for a mission until
July 2004.
Q12a. In light of recent events, do you envision any major changes to
the Shuttle modifications and ISS assembly schedule when flights
resume?
A12a. It is premature for NASA to predict any potential changes to
Shuttle vehicle or modification schedule. We will wait until the Gehman
Board has completed its investigation, found the cause of the accident
and provided its findings. Although NASA can meet both ISS assembly and
other agency science priorities with the three remaining Orbiters, the
schedule for these missions is under review.
Q13. In his testimony before the Commerce Committee on September 6,
2001, William Readdy, the then-Deputy Associate Administrator of the
Office of Space Flight, stated that ``[e]very single Space Shuttle
employee is empowered to call a `time out' if they believe that there
may be a potential threat to safety.''
Q13a. Could you please describe process for a Space Shuttle employee
to call a ``time out?''
Q13b. Does this ability apply to only NASA employees or also include
contractors?
A13a,b. United Space Alliance has a formal Time-Out Policy (E-02-18)
signed by the Vice President, Safety Quality & Mission Assurance, that
encourages and actively supports the safety practice of calling a
``time out'' when anyone is unsure or uncomfortable with any situation.
The term ``time out'' is used by United Space Alliance for its
employees. However, policies are in place for all employees, whether
civil service or contractors to stop any activity that they feel is
unsafe. This safety awareness behavior is highly encouraged and
rewarded at all levels.
Q13c. Could a ``time out'' be applied to a landing operation?
A13c. ``Time out'' is a term that is used in the ground processing of
the Space Shuttle vehicle. During mission operations, all technical
issues are documented and processed through the Mission Management
Team. However, there are corollary policies in place for all phases of
the Shuttle's mission that allow employees to raise safety issues.
Q13d. Did any NASA employee or contractor attempt to call a ``time
out'' before or during the Columbia mission?
A13d. No ``time out'' was called during the Columbia mission. During
the mission, following examination of launch film showing a debris hit
on the orbiter, a variety of potential safety issues were raised,
discussed, and reviewed through the normal agency process. Based on
these reviews, the MMT judged that there was not a safety of flight
issue. The Gehman Board is reviewing all documentation related to the
processing, pre-launch, and launch activities for the STS-107 mission.
Questions submitted by Senator Frank R. Lautenberg
Q1. John Macidull, a member of the presidential commission that
investigated the Challenger disaster, has raised questions as to why
NASA managers did not prepare alternative strategies for Columbia's re-
entry, in response to the damage which occurred at liftoff.
After you saw the video footage of the liftoff, did you suspect
the loss of heat shield tiles, and did you consider alternate plans to
assure a safe re-entry?
A1.
Based on our analysis during the Columbia's mission,
we did not believe that there was a critical threat to the
Shuttle's safety posed by the foam impact.
Each Shuttle mission entry profile is optimized for
the best re-entry approach. It is unlikely that the thermal
profile could have been significantly reduced.
Had we been aware that there was a critical problem
during the Columbia's mission, we would have used all means at
our disposal to resolve the problem and return the crew safely
to Earth.
Q2. We've learned that at the same time the Space Shuttle Program was
being asked to undertake additional flights to support the
International Space Station, its budget was, being reduced. You were
being asked to do more with less. If your funding had not been reduced,
are there additional safety upgrades you would have performed?
A2.
NASA proposed, and received, funding for those
upgrades we considered to be the highest priority, and which
provided the greatest return in terms of safety improvements
for the Shuttle. We did this within the framework of the
President's budgets and Agency priorities.
NASA's FY 2003 budget amendment increased outyear
funding for the Space Shuttle program. This increase provides
for an additional flight in support of the ISS and funding for
the Shuttle Service Life Extension Program (SLEP). The
amendment increases funding for upgrading the Space Shuttle
system by approximately $660 million for the FY 2004-2008
timeframe. The budget amendment recognized that the Space
Shuttle would be the workhorse for Space Station transport
through at least the middle of the next decade.
Q3. The Columbia flights scheduled for August 2000 and March 2002,
were both delayed due to last minute safety concerns about the tiles
and insulation. What changes were made after those delays to improve
the safety of the Columbia? Were any safety upgrades made on the
Shuttle during that period?
A3.
Neither STS-93 nor STS-109--the two previous missions
of Columbia (OV-102)--experienced delays due to problems with
the orbiter's thermal protection system (tiles and insulation).
STS-93 Delays:
The launch of STS-93 was delayed twice due to
ISS manifest problems first to December 3, 1998 and
then to January 21, 1999.
The launch date was moved seven more times due
to delays in the readiness of the Chandra satellite and
the inertial upper stage booster.
The launch count down for STS-93 was aborted
twice, first for a concern with hydrogen concentrations
in the aft of the Orbiter; the second time was due to
trans-oceanic abort landing site weather issues.
STS-93 launched on July 23, 1999.
No launch delays were caused by issues with the
Orbiter's thermal protection system.
No new hardware or upgrade was required prior to
launch.
Between STS-93 and STS-109 Columbia underwent its
scheduled year-long structural inspection, major maintenance
and modification. During this time a number of upgrades were
installed to combat obsolescence and improve safety including:
Multifunction Electronic Display System or
``glass cockpit''
Micrometeoroid protection on wing leading edge
and payload bay radiator doors
Device Driver Units--improved avionics
Complete wiring inspection and repair
Main Propulsion System upgrade of helium check
valve and hydrogen fill and drain line
STS-109 Delays:
STS-109 was originally scheduled for launch on
November 1, 2001.
The launch date was rescheduled three times due
to ISS manifest priorities and in delays in the OV-102
wiring inspections.
Two further delays were caused by problems with
Hubble Space Telescope support hardware.
The STS-109 Flight Readiness Review established
a new launch date of February 28, 2002.
The launch was delayed by one day due to
predicted weather at KSC. STS-109 was launched on March
1, 2002.
No launch delays were caused by issues with the
Orbiter's thermal protection system.
Q4. It appears that each time NASA requested additional funding for
safety upgrades, Congress appropriated these funds. So, tell me, why
didn't NASA request whatever funding was needed for all possible safety
improvements?
A4.
NASA proposed, and received, funding for those
upgrades we considered to be the highest priority, and which
provided the greatest return in terms of safety improvements
for the Shuttle. We did this within the framework of the
President's budgets and Agency priorities.
In the FY 2002 Operating Plan, the Space Shuttle
program cancelled or deferred several upgrades because of cost
growth or technical immaturity. In the Operating Plan, reviewed
by Congress, the funding made available as a result of these
actions was then applied to Space Shuttle operations to
accommodate operations cost growth. These actions did not
affect safety.
NASA's FY 2003 budget amendment increased outyear
funding for the Space Shuttle program. This increase provides
for an additional flight in support of the ISS and funding for
the Shuttle Service Life Extension Program (SLEP). The
amendment increases funding for upgrading the Space Shuttle
system by approximately $660 million for the FY 2004-2008
timeframe. The budget amendment recognized that the Space
Shuttle would be the workhorse for International Space Station
transport through at least the middle of the next decade. SLEP
will be coordinated with NASA's other space transportation
investments through the Agency's Integrated Space
Transportation Plan and will make prioritized investments in
the Shuttle system to ensure that the Shuttle can fly safely
through at least the middle of the next decade.
The President's budget for FY 2004 reflects our
commitment to the SLEP investment process, including upgrades,
necessary to safely operate the Shuttle through at least the
middle of the next decade.
Questions submitted by Senator Bill Nelson
Q1. If Columbia was indeed damaged during ascent, and this had been
known by folks on the ground, what could NASA or USA have done, if
anything, to ensure the safe return of Columbia's crew, such as
changing the re-entry profile or launching a rescue mission with
another orbiter?
A1.
NASA was unaware of any potential problems during
ascent. It was only after film and video review the day
following the launch that NASA became aware of potential damage
to the Shuttle's tiles from debris.
NASA has tried to develop procedures to allow on-
orbit tile repairs in the past. With our current capabilities,
it is not technically feasible to do so. Currently, we have no
way to reach the underside of the orbiter without significant
risk to the crew and Orbiter. We will be revisiting this
problem in the near future.
The orbiter did not have sufficient fuel to
rendezvous with the ISS, nor did it have the required hardware
to do so.
Columbia did not have sufficient consumables to
sustain the crew on orbit for more than an additional four
days. The time required to prepare another orbiter for launch
and train the crew for the mission would not have allowed us to
launch in time to rescue the Columbia's crew.
We do not have any procedures in place that could
accomplish an on-orbit transfer of crew between vehicles
without compatible docking mechanisms.
The re-entry profile for each mission is already
optimized for landing with the minimum heating.
However, had we been aware that there was a critical
problem during the Columbia's mission, we would have used all
means at our disposal to resolve the problem and return the
crew safely to Earth.
Q2. Please explain NASA's basic goals for human space flight prior to
February 1. What changes have occurred in this plan, so far, since the
tragic events of February 1?
A2.
NASA's basic human space flight goals are unchanged
since we articulated them in our Strategic Plan. Our first
priority is, and will continue to be to ensure the safety of
the public, our employees, and our high value assets such as
the Shuttle.
Space flight, both human and robotic, is the
fundamental enabling capability for NASA's mission: to
understand and protect our home planet, to explore the universe
and search for life, and to inspire the next generation of
explorers.
Our Space Flight Enterprise goals enable this mission
by:
Ensuring the provision of space access and
improving it by increasing safety, reliability, and
affordability;
Extending the duration and boundaries of human
space flight to create new opportunities for
exploration and discovery; and
Enabling revolutionary capabilities through new
technology.
Q3. How did NASA respond, specifically, to concerns expressed over the
past several years by the Aerospace Safety Advisory Panel and others
that the Shuttle program was under stress due to funding and workforce
constraints? Please list dates of policy changes along with any changes
in funding or workforce.
A3.
To respond adequately to this question, one needs to examine the
actions that led to the downsizing of the NASA and contractor
workforce.
In August 1994, the Associate Administrator for Space Flight
initiated a Shuttle Functional Workforce Review to identify the minimum
workforce necessary to safely fly seven Shuttle flights per year and to
establish a baseline and implementation plan to optimize the Shuttle
workforce while ensuring safety.
Also in March 1994, the findings of the Space Shuttle Management
Independent Review Team, under the chairmanship of Dr. Christopher
Kraft, recommended that NASA consolidate all program operations under a
single business entity, such as a single prime contractor.
The fundamental premise of this recommendation was:
-- Separation of the operations functions from the development
activities within the program by moving the government from an
oversight role to an insight role.
-- Elevation of the NASA-contractor interface to the program
level to disengage NASA daily operations activities and empower
the contractor to assume this responsibility.
-- Development of a contract structure to incentivize the
contractor to reduce operations costs by implementing
efficiencies while maintaining safety of flight and mission
success.
The findings of both the Shuttle Functional Workforce Review and
the Space Shuttle Management Independent Review Team were incorporated
into NASA's Zero Base Review. The objective of the Zero Base Review was
to examine the NASA-wide organization and management structure,
requirements and functional interfaces with a view toward moving
through restructuring the reductions anticipated in NASA's out-year
budget.
To respond to the reductions in the out year budget, NASA offered
incentives for retirements and early-out opportunities across the
Agency. In addition, the Space Flight Operations Contract with United
Space Alliance, (a joint venture between Rockwell International (now
Boeing) and Lockheed Martin Corporation) was initiated in October 1996
and was designed to begin a transition of Space Shuttle operations that
could eventually lead to privatization. Consolidation of contracts and
moving day-to-day routine Shuttle operations to the contractor while
maintaining insight/oversight allowed NASA to reduce the civil service
workforce and subsequently reduce cost. A review was conducted by the
ASAP in the 1996/97 time frame to assess any safety impact on the
initial transition to the Space Flight Operations Contract. The Panel
determined that safety would not be compromised, however, they would
continue to monitor the transition process. Whenever there were any
indications of workforce stress observed by NASA management or
anticipated gaps in skills, management responded by providing the
resources necessary to ensure continued safe operations of the Shuttle.
Contractor and civil service staffing reductions continued in 1998
and 1999, mostly through attrition. In 1998 NASA's Associate
Administrator for Safety and Mission Assurance verified that the
staffing reduction process used by United Space Alliance (USA) the
prime contractor for Space Shuttle operations, did not compromise
safety. Also, a subgroup of the Aerospace Safety Advisory Panel (ASAP)
observed the review by the Risk Assessment Team and provided
concurrence with the Team's findings.
In the FY 2000 (CY 99) budget process the Office of Space Flight
(OSF) was provided relief from the downsizing. Also, in 1999 the Agency
conducted a NASA-wide Core Capability Assessment, a center-by-center
analysis to identify workforce and infrastructure requirements. One of
the objectives of the review was to help chart a strategy that would
provide the OSF Centers with the requisite flexibility to attract and
retain the critical skills necessary to ensure safe mission and program
success.
The ASAP Report (published in February 2000) noted that the effects
of the hiring freeze and downsizing had produced critical skills
deficits in some areas and growing workforce pressures. The Panel
applauded NASA's rehiring efforts but recommended that the Agency
should continue to aggressively address workforce issues.
The aging of our workforce placed a strong emphasis on entry level
recruiting. It naturally follows that many of NASA's critical specialty
and program vacancies were filled from within and then these newly
created vacancies were filled with fresh outs. Therefore, while the
ability to hire allowed us to fill many critical needs, new hires did
not often go directly to critical vacancies but rather to replace
employees who had moved internally to where we needed them the most.
Over the past several years, the workforce hiring in the Space
Shuttle program has helped to address critical hiring needs. While new
hires addressed needs in understaffed critical skilled areas, workload
levels have also increased. Due to the reduced number of experienced
Science and Engineering (S&E) personnel in the current pipeline, we
have to maintain the current level of program support and we have to
ensure that our new S&E hires receive the proper skill training to meet
future program needs. Given our S&E retirement eligible pool, a
competitive job market for technical skilled personnel and a reduced
pool of S&E graduates, we will have to enhance current recruitment and
retention strategies.
From an Agency perspective, NASA uses a number of tools and
flexibilities to recruit and retain critically needed skills. For
example, the Agency offers starting salaries above the minimum rate,
when necessary, and offers recruitment bonuses and retention
allowances, when appropriate. NASA has also established a National
Recruitment Initiative to develop Agency-wide recruitment strategies to
attract and hire a highly technical S&E workforce. In addition, NASA
will continue to use programs, such as the Presidential Management
Intern Program, the Co-operative Education Program, and the Federal
Career Intern Program as sources for entry level hires. The Agency may
also repay student loans to attract or retain employees in critical
positions.
The GAO reviewed NASA's use of Human Capital in early CY 2000 and
determined that the actions NASA was taking were sufficient to sustain
a quality workforce.
It was noted in the 2001 ASAP Report that although workforce
concerns continued to be a focus of the Panel, they saw no safety
shortfall attributable to workforce issues.
NASA has continued to provide updates to the GAO regarding progress
in the workforce efforts. As part of the FY 2003 budget process, NASA
conducted a Strategic Resources Review. This review highlighted several
areas for transforming current business operations.
In addition, consistent with the President's Management Agenda
initiative on Strategic Management of Human Capital and to support
Agency SRR activities and decisions, the Office of Human Resources and
Education's Functional Leadership Plan, dated May 2000 (which was
developed after consultation with the Enterprises), is now being
revised to reflect a more comprehensive, agile Agency-wide human
capital strategic plan. As decisions are made, the Agency will address
each change using the plan as a framework.
Our attention to workforce issues is focused on the future as well
as the present. Recognizing that veteran space flight program employees
will be retiring in the coming years, we have been aggressively taking
action to attract and retain a high performing workforce to replace
them.
We have a complement of skilled and dedicated civil servants and
contractors who are fully able to perform the work required to ensure
the continued safety and viability of our space program.
Q4. LWhat strategy should guide operation of the International Space
Station while the Space Shuttle system is grounded? Should permanent
occupancy of the space station be suspended until the Shuttle system is
operating again, or should the space station partners rely on Russian
Soyuz and Progress spacecraft to bring crews and cargo to space
station?
A4.
The ISS continues to function well and the Expedition
6 crew continues to perform science and routine ISS
maintenance.
It is important to keep the ISS crewed. Without
routine maintenance by an onboard crew, reactivating ISS after
re-crewing becomes increasingly more complicated. There is also
some risk associated with a de-crewed ISS. System failures are
best handled by the on-orbit crew and some failures require
crew interaction to resolve. Crewing also continues the on-
going science activities.
There are no threats to the ISS or the crew in the
near-term and we are working options with our International
Partners to be able to sustain both until we return to flight.
The crew can remain on the ISS through at least June 2003 with
the logistics delivered on the Progress that docked February 4.
We are evaluating options for the continued crewing and
operations of the ISS beyond this time period.
Under the current planning with our International
Partners, the Expedition 6 crew of three will return on Soyuz
5S, which is currently docked to ISS as the emergency return
vehicle, in late April or early May and will be replaced by a
crew of two on Soyuz 6S, the replacement rescue vehicle. The
planned three Progress cargo spacecraft in 2003 will be
increased to four and the four Progress in 2004 will be
increased to five to provide sufficient logistics to sustain
the crew. With these changes and the continued rotation of a
two person crews on future Soyuz replacement missions, plans
are in place to keep the ISS continuously crewed through 2004.
In the unlikely event that de-crewing is required,
the ISS can be configured and de-crewed--as a contingency
procedure. The ISS can remain without a crew for an extended
period of time while maintaining altitude with unassisted
Progress re-boost. Progresses routinely dock to and re-boost
the ISS without crew interaction.
Q5. If the decision is made to rely on Russian Soyuz and Progress
spacecraft beyond those that Russia already has agreed to provide at no
cost to the other partners, who will pay for them. How do these plans
take into account the requirements of the Iran Nonproliferation Act
(P.L. 106-178), which prohibit NASA from making payments to Russia, in
cash or in kind, in connection with the space station program unless
the President certifies to Congress that Russia is not proliferating
nuclear or missile technologies to Iran?
A5.
NASA has met with the Russians and our other
International Partners and has briefed them on the status of
the ISS and the Columbia investigation. The maintenance of the
ISS is a Partnership issue and will be resolved in this
cooperative framework.
Russia is capable and willing to provide one
additional Progress in both 2003 and 2004 to sustain the ISS
crew. However, Russia has indicated that doing so will require
additional partner funding. The International Partners are
working together in an attempt to resolve this issue.
Any arrangements reached with the Russians or any
other Partner will be in compliance with existing U.S. law and
policy.
Q6. The Columbia tragedy and the subsequent grounding of the orbiters
may have a significant impact on the core capabilities supporting the
Space Shuttle and the ISS through the loss of key personnel with unique
technical expertise by corporate layoffs as well as with the loss of
unique assets such as the orbiter and research modules. What immediate
impact will the Columbia tragedy have on NASA's workforce or field
centers? How does NASA recover from this loss? How do these critical
assets, both human and hardware, get replaced once you have identified
the cause, fix the problem and get back to flying again? Is it possible
to estimate what impact it will have on future workforce needs?
A6.
NASA has established a program to help all NASA, NASA
contractors and NASA grantees and their families to cope with
any consequences of this disaster through its Employee
Assistance Programs. NASA has placed counselors, expert in
trauma and critical incident stress management in the field to
help workers directly. NASA will continue to monitor this issue
and do everything possible to minimize the possibility of PTSD.
We do not anticipate any reductions in the work force
as a result of the Columbia accident at this time.
The Space Shuttle workforce is deeply dedicated and
committed to flying the Space Shuttle safely. Currently, many
of our highly skilled employees, both civil service and
contractor, are supporting the efforts of the Gehman Board.
Others are performing their regular duties and will continue to
do so until the cause of the accident is determined and any
recommendations from the Board are implemented.
Although we do not know exactly how long it will be
until we return to flight, there have been several extended
periods of time between Space Shuttle launches in the twenty-
two years of Space Shuttle operations. After the Challenger
accident, the Space Shuttle workforce was dedicated to
implementing improved processes and procedures that greatly
enhanced the way the Shuttle vehicle was prepared, tested and
validated for flight.
Also, after the Challenger accident and during the
1990s there were several technical issues causing a ``stand
down'' of the Shuttle program lasting six or more months.
During those extended periods of time, the workforce kept their
skills well honed by participating in simulations and extensive
training in addition to performing many activities to catch up
on a backlog of activities, such as facility maintenance.
Question submitted by Senator John B. Breaux
Q1. Given the expended period of time that is expected before another
Shuttle flight is undertaken, what steps are you taking to ensure the
Shuttle technical base and manpower doesn't suffer during this down
time so that we aren't behind the eight ball when we start up again?
A1. The Space Shuttle workforce is deeply dedicated and committed to
flying the Space Shuttle safely. Currently, many of our highly skilled
employees, both civil service and contractor, are supporting the
efforts of the Gehman Board. Others are performing their regular duties
and will continue to do so until the cause of the accident is
determined and any recommendations from the Board are implemented.
Although we do not know exactly how long it will be until we return
to flight, there have been several extended periods of time between
Space Shuttle launches in the twenty-two years of Space Shuttle
operations. After the Challenger accident, the Space Shuttle workforce
was dedicated to implementing improved processes and procedures that
greatly enhanced the way the Shuttle vehicle was prepared, tested and
validated for flight.
Also, after the Challenger accident and during the 1990s there were
several technical issues causing a ``stand down'' of the Shuttle
program lasting six or more months. During those extended periods of
time, the workforce kept their skills well honed by participating in
simulations and extensive training in addition to performing many
activities to catch up on a backlog of activities, such as facility
maintenance.
Appendix 2:
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Additional Material for the Record