[House Hearing, 108 Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
DRUGS AND SECURITY IN A POST-SEPTEMBER 11 WORLD: COORDINATING THE
COUNTERNARCOTICS MISSION AT THE DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY
=======================================================================
JOINT HEARING
before the
SUBCOMMITTEE ON CRIMINAL JUSTICE,
DRUG POLICY AND HUMAN RESOURCES
of the
COMMITTEE ON GOVERNMENT REFORM
and the
SUBCOMMITTEE ON INFRASTRUCTURE
AND BORDER SECURITY
of the
COMMITTEE ON HOMELAND SECURITY
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
ONE HUNDRED EIGHTH CONGRESS
SECOND SESSION
__________
JULY 22, 2004
__________
Serial No. 108-285
Committee on Government Reform
Serial No. 108-54
Committee on Homeland Security
__________
Printed for the use of the Committees on Government Reform and Homeland
Security
Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.gpo.gov/congress/house
http://www.house.gov/reform
______
U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE
99-655 WASHINGTON : 2005
_____________________________________________________________________________
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COMMITTEE ON GOVERNMENT REFORM
TOM DAVIS, Virginia, Chairman
DAN BURTON, Indiana HENRY A. WAXMAN, California
CHRISTOPHER SHAYS, Connecticut TOM LANTOS, California
ILEANA ROS-LEHTINEN, Florida MAJOR R. OWENS, New York
JOHN M. McHUGH, New York EDOLPHUS TOWNS, New York
JOHN L. MICA, Florida PAUL E. KANJORSKI, Pennsylvania
MARK E. SOUDER, Indiana CAROLYN B. MALONEY, New York
STEVEN C. LaTOURETTE, Ohio ELIJAH E. CUMMINGS, Maryland
DOUG OSE, California DENNIS J. KUCINICH, Ohio
RON LEWIS, Kentucky DANNY K. DAVIS, Illinois
JO ANN DAVIS, Virginia JOHN F. TIERNEY, Massachusetts
TODD RUSSELL PLATTS, Pennsylvania WM. LACY CLAY, Missouri
CHRIS CANNON, Utah DIANE E. WATSON, California
ADAM H. PUTNAM, Florida STEPHEN F. LYNCH, Massachusetts
EDWARD L. SCHROCK, Virginia CHRIS VAN HOLLEN, Maryland
JOHN J. DUNCAN, Jr., Tennessee LINDA T. SANCHEZ, California
NATHAN DEAL, Georgia C.A. ``DUTCH'' RUPPERSBERGER,
CANDICE S. MILLER, Michigan Maryland
TIM MURPHY, Pennsylvania ELEANOR HOLMES NORTON, District of
MICHAEL R. TURNER, Ohio Columbia
JOHN R. CARTER, Texas JIM COOPER, Tennessee
MARSHA BLACKBURN, Tennessee BETTY McCOLLUM, Minnesota
PATRICK J. TIBERI, Ohio ------
KATHERINE HARRIS, Florida BERNARD SANDERS, Vermont
(Independent)
Melissa Wojciak, Staff Director
David Marin, Deputy Staff Director/Communications Director
Rob Borden, Parliamentarian
Teresa Austin, Chief Clerk
Phil Barnett, Minority Chief of Staff/Chief Counsel
Subcommittee on Criminal Justice, Drug Policy and Human Resources
MARK E. SOUDER, Indiana, Chairman
NATHAN DEAL, Georgia ELIJAH E. CUMMINGS, Maryland
JOHN M. McHUGH, New York DANNY K. DAVIS, Illinois
JOHN L. MICA, Florida WM. LACY CLAY, Missouri
DOUG OSE, California LINDA T. SANCHEZ, California
JO ANN DAVIS, Virginia C.A. ``DUTCH'' RUPPERSBERGER,
JOHN R. CARTER, Texas Maryland
MARSHA BLACKBURN, Tennessee ELEANOR HOLMES NORTON, District of
PATRICK J. TIBERI, Ohio Columbia
BETTY McCOLLUM, Minnesota
Ex Officio
TOM DAVIS, Virginia HENRY A. WAXMAN, California
J. Marc Wheat, Staff Director
Nicholas Coleman, Professional Staff Member and Counsel
Malia Holst, Clerk
Tony Haywood, Minority Counsel
SELECT COMMITTEE ON HOMELAND SECURITY
Christopher Cox, California, Chairman
Jennifer Dunn, Washington Jim Turner, Texas, Ranking Member
C.W. Bill Young, Florida Bennie G. Thompson, MississPpi
Don Young, Alaska Loretta Sanchez, California
F. James Sensenbrenner, Jr., Edward J. Markey, Massachusetts
Wisconsin Norman D. Dicks, Washington
W.J. (Billy) Tauzin, Louisiana Barney Frank, Massachusetts
David Dreier, California Jane Harman, California
Duncan Hunter, California Benjamin L. Cardin, Maryland
Harold Rogers, Kentucky Louise McIntosh Slaughter, New
Sherwood Boehlert, New York York
Lamar S. Smith, Texas Peter A. DeFazio, Oregon
Curt Weldon, Pennsylvania Nita M. Lowey, New York
Christopher Shays, Connecticut Robert E. Andrews, New Jersey
Porter J. Goss, Florida Eleanor Holmes Norton, District of
Dave Camp, Michigan Columbia
Lincoln Diaz-Balart, Florida Zoe Lofgren, California
Bob Goodlatte, Virginia Karen McCarthy, Missouri
Ernest J. Istook, Jr., Oklahoma Sheila Jackson-Lee, Texas
Peter T. King, New York Bill Pascrell, Jr., New Jersey
John Linder, Georgia Donna M. Christensen, U.S. Virgin
John B. Shadegg, Arizona Islands
Mark E. Souder, Indiana Bob Etheridge, North Carolina
Mac Thornberry, Texas Ken Lucas, Kentucky
Jim Gibbons, Nevada James R. Langevin, Rhode Island
Kay Granger, Texas Kendrick B. Meek, Florida
Pete Sessions, Texas VACANCY
John E. Sweeney, New York
John Gannon, Chief of Staff
Stephen DeVine, Deputy Staff Director and General Counsel
ThomasDilenge, Chief Counsel and Policy Director
David H. Schanzer, Democrat Staff Director
Mark T. Magee, Democrat Deputy Staff Director
Michael S. Twinchek, Chief Clerk
C O N T E N T S
----------
Page
Hearing held on July 22, 2004.................................... 1
Statement of:
Bonner, Robert, Commissioner, U.S. Customs and Border
Protection, Department of Homeland Security; Admiral Thomas
H. Collins, Commandant, U.S. Coast Guard, Department of
Homeland Security; Michael J. Garcia, Assistant Secretary,
U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement, Department of
Homeland Security; and Roger Mackin, Counternarcotics
Officer, Department of Homeland Security................... 15
Letters, statements, etc., submitted for the record by:
Barton, Hon. Joe, a Representative in Congress from the State
of Texas, prepared statement of............................ 99
Bonner, Robert, Commissioner, U.S. Customs and Border
Protection, Department of Homeland Security, prepared
statement of............................................... 18
Camp, Hon. Dave, a Representative in Congress from the State
of Michigan, prepared statement of......................... 13
Collins, Admiral Thomas H., Commandant, U.S. Coast Guard,
Department of Homeland Security, prepared statement of..... 28
Cummings, Hon. Elijah E., a Representative in Congress from
the State of Maryland, prepared statement of............... 10
Garcia, Michael J., Assistant Secretary, U.S. Immigration and
Customs Enforcement, Department of Homeland Security,
prepared statement of...................................... 38
Jackson-Lee, Hon. Sheila, a Representative in Congress from
the State of Texas, prepared statement of.................. 82
Mackin, Roger, Counternarcotics Officer, Department of
Homeland Security, prepared statement of................... 51
Souder, Hon. Mark E., a Representative in Congress from the
State of Indiana, prepared statement of.................... 4
Turner, Hon. Michael R., a Representative in Congress from
the State of Ohio, prepared statement of................... 97
DRUGS AND SECURITY IN A POST-SEPTEMBER 11 WORLD: COORDINATING THE
COUNTERNARCOTICS MISSION AT THE DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY
----------
THURSDAY, JULY 22, 2004
House of Representatives, Subcommittee on Criminal
Justice, Drug Policy and Human Resources,
Committee on Government Reform, joint with the
Subcommittee on Infrastructure and Border
Security, Select Committee on Homeland
Security,
Washington, DC.
The subcommittees met, pursuant to notice, at 2:12 p.m., in
room 2247, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Mark Souder
(chairman of the Subcommittee on Criminal Justice, Drug Policy
and Human Resources) presiding.
Present: Representatives Souder, Dunn, Cummings, Sanchez,
Norton, Camp, Christensen, and Jackson-Lee.
Staff present from the Subcommittee on Criminal Justice,
Drug Policy and Human Resources: J. Marc Wheat, staff director
and chief counsel; Nicholas Coleman, professional staff member
and counsel; David Thomasson, congressional fellow; Malia
Hotst, clerk; Tony Haywood, minority counsel; and Teresa
Coufal, minority assistant clerk.
Staff present from the Subcommittee on Infrastructure and
Border Security: Mandy Bowers, policy coordinator; Patricia
DeMarco, counsel; Winsome Packer and Chau Donovan, professional
staff members; Joseph Windrem, deputy clerk; Allen Thompson,
minority professional staff member; and Sue Ramanathan,
minority professional staff member and counsel.
Mr. Souder. Good afternoon. Today's hearing addresses a
vitally important topic for Congress and the Nation, the
counternarcotics mission at the Department of Homeland
Security. Specifically, we are here to discuss how well the
Department is fulfilling its counternarcotics mission, what
level of material and personnel support it is providing to
anti-drug operations, and what steps it is taking to improve
coordination and cooperation between its own counternarcotics
agencies. I would first like to thank Chairman Dave Camp, of
the Select Committee on Homeland Security's Subcommittee on
Infrastructure and Border Security, for agreeing to hold this
as a joint hearing between our two subcommittees. I sit on
Chairman Camp's subcommittee, and I have appreciated the strong
leadership he has provided on border security and drug
interdiction issues.
In the aftermath of September 11, we have focused special
attention on preventing and responding terrorists attacks on
our country, and rightly so. We should never forget the
terrible toll that drug abuse continues to take on America as
well. According to the Centers for Disease Control, every year
about 20,000 American lives are lost as a direct consequence of
illegal drug use. The Office of National Drug Control Policy
estimates that the annual economic cost of drug abuse to the
United States--in lost productivity, health care costs, and
wasted lives--is now well over the $150 billion mark.
The Department of Homeland Security is an absolutely
crucial player in our efforts to reduce this terrible scourge.
When Congress created the Department in 2002, it combined some
of the most important anti-drug trafficking agencies in the
Federal Government, including the U.S. Coast Guard, the Border
Patrol, and the former Customs Service. Although there are
certainly other Federal agencies with a vital role in our fight
against drug trafficking, DHS is largely responsible for
manning the ``front lines'' in this mission. The Customs
inspectors and Border Patrol agents at U.S. Customs and Border
Protection [CBP]; the special agent investigators and the Air
and Marine personnel at U.S. Immigration and Customs
Enforcement [ICE], and the Coast Guard personnel patrolling the
waters, represent our Nation's first line of defense against
the drug traffickers.
To ensure that these agencies would not neglect their
counternarcotics role in the new Department, Congress
specifically provided that the primary mission of DHS included
the responsibility to ``monitor connections between illegal
drug trafficking and terrorism, coordinate efforts to sever
such connections, and otherwise contribute to efforts to
interdict illegal drug trafficking.'' In accordance with this
congressional mandate, the men and women of these agencies have
worked hard to fulfill their counternarcotics roles. And there
is clear evidence that the Bush administration's overall anti-
drug strategy, including rigorous interdiction and enforcement,
as well as treatment and prevention strategies, is working.
Drug use, particularly among young people, is on the decline
again after rising significantly during the 1990's.
Several issues have arisen, however, that need to be
addressed to ensure that DHS remains on track in the struggle
against drug trafficking. In particular, Congress and the
administration need to work together to ensure that the
structures and procedures at the new Department reflect the
importance of counternarcotics. No one doubts that the
individuals currently serving at the Department have a strong
personnel commitment to stopping drug trafficking. Indeed, two
of its top officials, Under Secretary Asa Hutchinson and
Commissioner Robert Bonner, who is testifying here today, are
both former Administrators of DEA, the Drug Enforcement
Administration. But we need to make sure that, over the long
term, the Department is institutionally committed to drug
interdiction. There are at least three major problems that I
believe need to be resolved.
First, the status and responsibilities of the
Counternarcotics Officer at DHS need to be better defined.
Congress created this position in 2002, directing the
Counternarcotics Officer to assist the Secretary to coordinate
policy and operations within the Department with respect to
drug interdiction; to track and sever connections between
illegal drug trafficking and terrorism; and to ensure the
adequacy of resources within the Department for drug
interdiction. Regrettably, the current statutory provision does
not clearly define how this Officer is to fulfill those duties,
nor does it give him adequate status or resources to fulfill
them. Raising the profile of the Counternarcotics Officer, and
assigning specific responsibilities and permanent staff to him,
would go a long way toward rectifying this problem.
Second, the new personnel management systems being
developed by the Department may not be giving sufficient
attention to key missions, including stopping drug trafficking.
In February 2004, DHS and the Office of Personnel Management
issued draft regulations for a new personnel management system
for most of the Department employees. The regulations, which
would govern employee performance review as well as pay scales,
are quite extensive and detailed, occupying nearly forty pages
of the Federal Register. A computer word search, however,
revealed that the words, ``drugs,'' ``narcotics,'' and
``interdiction'' were not even mentioned once, even in the
discussion of the DHS mission. The Department's personnel
management system must, of course, be flexible and take into
account not only differences in agency cultures, but also
differences in locations and roles. At a minimum, however, DHS
should include criteria related to counternarcotics activity in
its employee appraisal system for relevant enforcement
personnel.
Finally, it is clear that more work needs to be done
improving the level of communication, coordination, and
cooperation between the various agencies within DHS on
counternarcotics work. For example, at present there are three
entities within DHS that have substantial air and/or marine
operations--the Coast Guard, the Office of Air and Marine
Operations [AMO] at ICE, and the Border Patrol. These three
entities, however, do not communicate with each other on a
systematic basis about their flights or marine operations, even
when they overlap with respect to mission and to geographic
area. This has created a significant problem of duplication of
effort and a safety issue for the pilots and the boat operators
involved. Additional issues of intelligence sharing,
coordinated investigations, and operation deconfliction must
also be addressed if DHS is to maximize its effectiveness
against the drug cartels.
This hearing will give us an opportunity to examine these
problems and their potential solutions. Again, I thank Chairman
Camp for agreeing to co-host this hearing, and for the
assistance that he and his staff provided us in preparing for
it. I would also like to thank our four witnesses, who are
responsible for implementing DHS counternarcotics policies, for
taking the time out of their busy schedules to join us here
today. We welcome Commissioner Robert Bonner, head of U.S.
Customs and Border Patrol; Admiral Thomas Collins, Commandant
of the U.S. Coast Guard; Assistant Secretary Michael Garcia,
head of the U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement; and Mr.
Roger Mackin, the Counternarcotics Officer at DHS. I thank
everyone for coming, and I look forward to your testimony.
[The prepared statement of Hon. Mark E. Souder follows:]
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Mr. Souder. I now yield to Mr. Cummings.
Mr. Cummings. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman, and I am
certainly pleased to join you and our colleagues from the
Government Reform Subcommittee on Criminal Justice, Drug Policy
and Human Resources and the Homeland Security Subcommittee on
Infrastructure and Border Protection in welcoming our
distinguished panel of witnesses from the Department of
Homeland Security.
I thank all of you gentlemen for what you do everyday to
make our Nation a safer place to live, and to help us fulfill
our vision of what this Nation ought to be, as a matter of
fact, what the world ought to be like, and the employees that
you oversee who work diligently every day to protect Americans
from a multitude of safety and security threats. We appreciate
their service to our Nation and I know we all welcome this
opportunity to hear their perspectives on how DHS agencies are
succeeding in fighting a coordinated, effective war on drugs
and what can be done to build on the successes that have been
achieved in this area.
The terrorist attacks on September 11, 2001, had a profound
impact on all Americans. The harm inflicted on America that
dreadful day cannot be quantified by the death toll from the
World Trade Center and the Pentagon or by any other narrow,
numerical measure. America was changed that day and we continue
to this day to struggle in our efforts to adapt to a post-
September 11 world in which Americans are constantly reminded
of the threat of future terrorist attacks.
Less visible, less dramatic, and less shocking to the
national conscience, but equally profound, however, is the toll
inflicted everyday upon American cities and towns by the
consumption of harmful illegal drugs and by the collateral
social and economic consequences of the drug trade. I have
often said about the neighborhood that I live in in the inner-
city of Baltimore that we have terrorists standing on our
corners and they are fueled by drugs.
As Chairman Souder has stated, illegal drug consumption
claims 20,000 American lives each year. Thousands more
Americans go to jail or prison for drug-related crimes, or
become a victim of drug-related violence or property crime. In
my own city of Baltimore, it is not unusual for us to have
upwards near 300 deaths by gun, and there would be even more if
we did not have one of the greatest shock trauma units in the
world. And so I am very familiar with what the chairman is
talking about. And by the way, most of those deaths that I
talked about and those injuries that ended up being taken care
of at our shock trauma unit are drug-related, somewhere between
80 and 85 percent. An estimated $150 billion in economic
productivity is lost annually due to drugs. And yet these
statistics do not begin to capture the concentrated, cumulative
impact on the quality of life, and the quality of life
prospects for Americans trapped in neighborhoods crippled by
addiction, poverty, and the range of related social ills.
Our response to September 11 was to take the fight to the
terrorists militarily and to take steps to insulate our people
and infrastructure from threats to our national security at
home. The latter involved creating a new cabinet-level
department out of existing agencies with wide-ranging
functions. Three key border agencies whose functions and assets
were transferred to the Department of Homeland Security had
long supplied the majority of our front-line soldiers in the
war on drugs. This was only natural given that drugs and
various means of inflicting terror enter by the same means--
across our borders and through ports of entry around this
country.
At the same time, the September 11 attacks gave rise to a
heightened recognition of the extent to which drug proceeds are
the lifeblood of criminal and terrorist organizations that
threaten U.S. security. This recognition is reflected in the
Homeland Security Department's mission statement, codified in
the authorizing statute, which directs the Secretary to explore
links between terrorists and drug trafficking organizations and
other pursue drug interdiction.
The drugs and terror nexus is a compelling reason to
address the drug threat, but as I have noted, drugs represent a
substantial and constant threat to the Nation's security on
their own. Chairman Souder and I have shared this view that we
must be wary of allowing the threat of singular catastrophic
events to detract from efforts to stop the daily onslaught of
illegal drugs that gradually and quietly turn lives to waste
and communities into war zones.
That is why I was happy in joining Chairman Souder in
sponsoring a provision in the Homeland Security Act of 2002
that created within the Department of Homeland Security the
position of Counternarcotics Officer, or CNO. It is was our
purpose in proposing the CNO provision to create a high level
position within DHS that would maintain a high profile and
priority for counternarcotics missions and ensure that DHS drug
interdiction, investigation, and enforcement efforts would
definitely be coordinated with each other and with those of
other Federal agencies so as to maximize the efficiency and
effectiveness of the combined effort.
Two years later, the Homeland Security Department is up and
running. Today provides us with a valuable opportunity to
evaluate how the Department's drug mission is being
coordinated. The subcommittees have questions related to the
effectiveness of the Counternarcotics Officer position and
whether it ought to be augmented to achieve the effect we
intended, whether DHS assets that contribute to interdiction
missions are allocated optimally within the Department, and
whether the emphasis on preventing catastrophic acts of
terrorism is preventing DHS from obtaining intelligence that
could make drug interdiction efforts more effective.
Finally, Commissioner Bonner, Assistant Secretary Garcia,
Admiral Collins, and Mr. Mackin are well positioned to provide
an informed perspective on these particular issues, and more
generally on what more can and should be done to ensure that
the war on drugs and the war on terrorism both can be fought
with maximum vigor, efficiency, and effectiveness.
I look forward to your testimony, and I want to thank you,
Mr. Chairman, for your vigilance in trying to constantly make
sure that we have a balance as we fight the war on terror but
making sure that we take care of home too.
With that, Mr. Chairman, I yield back.
[The prepared statement of Hon. Elijah E. Cummings
follows:]
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T9655.005
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T9655.006
Mr. Souder. Thank you. I would now like to yield to
Chairman Camp, and I again thank him for his leadership in
these areas.
Mr. Camp. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I want to thank our
witnesses for being here. We have a distinguished panel. And in
an effort to move things along, I will just give a brief
statement and put my full statement in the record.
Obviously, the purpose of today's joint hearing is to
examine the level of cooperation and coordination with the
Department of Homeland Security as it relates to the
counternarcotics mission. The Subcommittee on Infrastructure
and Border Security has held eight hearings looking into the
ability of the various agencies within DHS to conduct effective
border security, with the focus being preventing terrorists and
terrorist weapons from entering the United States. And while
terrorism will remain one of the most significant threats to
the United States for the foreseeable future, drug trafficking
and the use of illicit drugs continues to plague American
society.
This hearing is an important opportunity for Congress to
stress that while striving to protect the United States from
terrorists, DHS must maintain the ability of the legacy
agencies to accomplish traditional missions. The counter-drug
mission is especially important as the assets and tools used by
DHS personnel for counter-terrorism are generally the same as
those used for counternarcotics. The allocation of resources,
the policy direction, and the training cannot sacrifice one
mission for another. When Inspectors at a point of entry search
a container, or Border Patrol agents track smugglers, or a
Coast Guard cutter intercepts a fast boat, they generally do
not know if they are going to find illegal aliens, drugs,
weapons of mass destruction, or some other type of contraband.
All DHS personnel with inspection, enforcement, and
investigative responsibilities must have the skills, resources,
and support necessary to effectively meet all of their
responsibilities.
I look forward to hearing from our witnesses on how DHS is
accomplishing these crucial challenges, any recommendations for
improvement, and, most importantly, how the counternarcotics
mission is, and will continue to be, a priority for the
Department. I want to thank you for being here today, and look
forward to your testimony. Thank you.
[The prepared statement of Hon. Dave Camp follows:]
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T9655.007
Mr. Souder. Thank you. Ms. Sanchez, do you have any opening
statement?
Ms. Sanchez. I do, and I will try to make my opening
statement brief as well. I want to thank the chairman and the
ranking member for calling this important hearing today. Too
many of our communities in the United States are plagued with
drugs and the social ills that come with narcotics use. Drug
trafficking in our country continues to take a terrible toll in
America. According to the Centers for Disease Control, every
year about 200,000 American lives are lost as a direct
consequence of illegal drugs.
I am very much looking forward to hearing from the
witnesses who will hopefully shed some light on how effectively
counternarcotics goals are being pursued under the new Homeland
Security Bureau. I am particularly interested in knowing what
has been the impact of the reorganization on the
counternarcotics mission as measured by drug seizures and
arrests; to what extent do DHS agencies perceive or approach
the counter-drug and counter-terrorism missions as competing or
complimentary; and how well do all of the DHS components
communicate and coordinate activities within agencies. This is
especially important to me because I keep hearing that
coordination and communication problems in some instances are
keeping DHS personnel from doing their jobs effectively and
efficiently.
Last, I would just like to point out to Commissioner Bonner
that there are several outstanding meeting requests from
Members of Congress on a number of DHS issues, and my
colleagues and I want to bring your immediate attention to
those requests. I am hopeful that in the future you will take
the time to make yourself more accessible to Members of
Congress.
Again, I look forward to the testimony, and I thank the
chairman.
Mr. Souder. I thank the distinguished Member both of this
subcommittee and as ranking member of the Border Subcommittee
for her active participation in both.
We are also joined by the Vice-Chairman of the full
committee. Congresswoman Dunn, do you have any opening
statement?
Ms. Dunn. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. I have no
opening statement. I want to thank you gentlemen for appearing
before us today and I am hopeful that you can create a
perspective that will let us know whether we are doing enough
for you, if we should shift our emphasis, just how we can be
more useful in solving some of these problems. Thank you.
Mr. Souder. Thank you. Ms. Norton, do you have any opening
statement?
Ms. Norton. Yes, Mr. Chairman. I appreciate this hearing,
the joint hearing because what it does is to emphasize a fact
that perhaps was not as much the case before September 11, and
that is that the narcotics trade and national security are now
indelibly linked. There is no way to think about one without
the other when you consider what we have learned in our own
committee hearings in this subcommittee on the increasing
funding of terrorism from narcotics. If anything, this gives an
escalated reason to attack the drug trade. We have already had
lots of reasons when you consider the domestic implications and
extraordinary damage of the drug trade here on individual
lives. Now, the drug trade is involved with the life of the
Nation with security itself.
The emphasis for me in this hearing, which is why the joint
hearing interests me, is, of course, on whether or not, this
by-word that we always use, ``coordination'' is, in fact,
occurring and whether we can make it occur someplace in
Government as vital as this. And for me, coordination really
means focus. It means somehow everybody is looking at the same
thing even though their missions may differ in some material
respects.
So I want to know, at the bottom line, whether what should
be an increased attack on the narcotics trade is being felt
because of this new national security interest that we now have
in the narcotics trade. I, like the chairman and the ranking
member, I am absolutely fascinated to see what has happened to
the CNO position, Counternarcotics Officer position. When you
create a new position like this it is difficult enough to find
your way. But I do not see how there is any hope of
coordination if that position is not, in fact, central to it.
We have to look at that position first and then go from there,
scatter out from there.
So I appreciate, again, your work, Mr. Chairman, in
focusing us today on this very important new position and this
very important new mission of those who have been in the work
of attacking the narcotics trade and the damage it does to our
country. Thank you.
Mr. Souder. Thank you very much.
Before proceeding, I would first like to go over a couple
of procedural matters. I first ask unanimous consent that all
Members have 5 legislative days to submit written statements
and questions for the hearing record, and that any answers to
written questions provided by the witnesses also be included in
the record. Without objection, so ordered.
Second, I ask unanimous consent that all Members present be
permitted to participate in the hearing.
Now as the witnesses know, the standard procedure of the
Government Reform Oversight is to ask our witnesses to testify
under oath. So if you would each stand and raise your right
hands.
[Witnesses sworn.]
Mr. Souder. Let the record that each of the witnesses
responded in the affirmative.
Thank you again for your patience in getting started, and
for your many years of leadership in all your different posts
throughout the Government.
We will start with Mr. Bonner.
STATEMENTS OF ROBERT BONNER, COMMISSIONER, U.S. CUSTOMS AND
BORDER PROTECTION, DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY; ADMIRAL
THOMAS H. COLLINS, COMMANDANT, U.S. COAST GUARD, DEPARTMENT OF
HOMELAND SECURITY; MICHAEL J. GARCIA, ASSISTANT SECRETARY, U.S.
IMMIGRATION AND CUSTOMS ENFORCEMENT, DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND
SECURITY; AND ROGER MACKIN, COUNTERNARCOTICS OFFICER,
DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY
Mr. Bonner. Thank you, Chairman Souder and Chairman Camp,
and other distinguished members of the subcommittee. I am very
pleased to join with my colleagues here from the Department of
Homeland Security to discuss, in particular, U.S. Customs and
Border Protection's role in our Nation's drug interdiction and
drug enforcement efforts.
It was over 16 months ago, Mr. Chairman, in fact, March 1,
2003, that all U.S. Government agencies with significant border
responsibilities were unified into one frontline border agency
to create U.S. Customs and Border Protect within the Department
of Homeland Security.
This merger I think, as the members of the committee know,
essentially was a merger of a large part of Customs, in fact,
all of Customs with the exception of our Office of
Investigation, which were the U.S. Customs Special Agents, and
the air and marine interdiction assets, but with the exception
of that, all of Customs essentially was merged with the Border
Patrol, all of the frontline Immigration inspectors, as well as
all of the Agriculture inspectors to form what Secretary Ridge
has called ``One Face at the Border,'' or one agency to manage,
secure, and control our borders.
With that merger, by the way, which is the largest actual
merger of people and functions taking place within the
Department of Homeland Security, Customs and Border Protection
became the single unified agency charged with managing,
securing, and controlling our borders, all the ports of entry,
and the points in between. This reorganization of our border
agencies into one agency, by the way, in my judgment makes us
better prepared and better able to protect our Nation from all
external threats, not just terrorists and terrorist weapons,
but also illegal drugs and from those who attempt to smuggle
illegal drugs across our borders.
I want to just assure every member of both committees that
Customs and Border Protection is totally committed to its drug
interdiction and drug enforcement role at and near our Nation's
borders. While Custom and Border Protection's priority mission
is to prevent terrorists and terrorist weapons from entering
the United States, we retain the traditional enforcement and
interdiction missions of our predecessor agencies, and that
includes most certainly preventing the entry of illegal drugs
across our borders and apprehending those who would attempt to
smuggle them into the United States.
Let me also say that our missions against terrorism and our
mission against drug smuggling are complementary. They are not
mutually exclusive missions. One does not come at the expense
of the other. Rather, Customs and Border Protection's
initiatives to prevent terrorists and terrorist weapons from
entering the United States have actually enabled us to be more
effective in seizing illegal drugs and those who attempt to
smuggle them across our borders.
There is no better testament to the fact that we have not
lost our focus, we have not slackened our efforts than looking
at the drug seizures and the arrest rates at our borders over
the last year to 16 months. Last year alone, Customs and Border
Protection seized 2.3 million pounds of illegal drugs, that is
over 1 million kilograms, at and near our borders. That is an
average of 6,300 pounds, a little over 3,000 kilograms, each
and every day of the year that are being seized by Customs and
Border Protection. Of that total, almost 1 million pounds of
those illegal drugs were seized by CBP at our ports of entry,
mainly at our land border with Mexico, but also including JFK
and Miami Airports and other ports of entry into our country,
and 1.3 million pounds of that total was seized between the
ports of entry by the Border Patrol, which, as you noted,
Chairman Souder, is now part of Customs and Border Protection.
While last year was a record-breaking year for seizures, we
are keeping pace this year and when annualized out I believe
that our total seizures may well exceed last year's total, at
least marginally. Let me just say, with respect to drug
arrests, that last year Customs and Border Protection, this is
both Border Patrol Agents and CBP Officers at the ports of
entry, arrested 14,000 people for smuggling illegal drugs into
the United States. And we are on pace to at least meet or
exceed that this year.
Today, Customs and Border Protection has 30,000 uniformed
personnel to protect our borders. That is, about 19,000
inspectors or Customs and Border Protection Officers at the
ports of entry, and approximately 11,000 Border Patrol Agents.
And since September 11, by the way, we have added more
detection technology at our borders and we are getting far more
advanced information about people and cargo shipments that are
arriving in our country or to our country significantly before
they arrive. That is improving our ability to target for all
threats--terrorists threat, drug threat, and any other threat.
We have tripled the number of large-scale, whole container,
whole truck x-ray scanning machines. Before September 11 we had
45 of those machines. We now have 151. We have doubled the
number of drug seizures using large-scale Non-Intrusive
Inspection [NII] x-ray machines from about 225,000 pounds to
over 442,000 pounds of illegal drugs.
This sustained border enforcement presence, supported by
Border Patrol interior checkpoints--and we have checkpoints
interior of the border literally from California, from the
Pacific Ocean at San Clemente, all the way to Texas--allow us
to add a level of interdiction capability. In fact, by the way,
about half of the Border Patrol's drug seizures take place at
or near the interior checkpoints of the Border Patrol.
So nearly everything Customs and Border Protection has
done, and continues to do, to make our country more secure from
terrorists also helps us make the country more secure from drug
smuggling and illegal drugs. And our strategies against
terrorism and drug trafficking work together hand-in-glove.
So, with that brief statement, let me thank both the Chairs
here and the committee for this opportunity to make a brief
statement, and I will be happy to answer any questions the
committee members may have.
Thank you.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Bonner follows:]
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Mr. Souder. Thank you.
Admiral Collins.
Admiral Collins. Good afternoon, Chairmen, both chairmen,
and distinguished members. I add my comments to Rob Bonner's, I
am very, very pleased to be here in this panel to discuss this
incredibly important issue. And as my colleagues do, the Coast
Guard takes extremely seriously Congress' charge to the
Department of Homeland Security to protect America's borders
against illegal activity, including drugs.
Our maritime strategy combatting illegal drugs is based on
flexible, intelligence-driven operations, a focus on
international engagement, leveraging technology, and very, very
strong strategic partnerships. We have deployed significant
resources and have committed tremendous organizational energy
to this strategy, and we are getting results.
So far this fiscal year, the Coast Guard has seized over
148,000 pounds, or 68 metric tons, of cocaine in the maritime,
valued at almost $5 billion. And we have set a record for the
number of arrests at sea, we have set a record for the number
of interdiction events, and we have set a record for the number
of arrests at sea. All of these are annual records this year
with 2 months to go.
We have effectively doubled the productivity per aircraft
and cutter hour allocated, productivity in terms of seizures.
That success is a direct result of a number of focused efforts.
We have effectively doubled the number of our armed aviation
assets through a change in tactical deployment and doctrine. We
have aggressively employed forward operating locations for our
maritime patrol aircraft. We have maintained robust force
structure to Joint Interagency Task Force-South, headquartered
in Key West. And we have successfully leveraged technology,
intelligence, and international coalitions.
Our success is also made possible by the many strategic
partnerships within the new Department. We attained a high
level of performance, from my view, by improved coordination
through planning, intelligence sharing, and joint operations,
No. 1, with our DoD partners through joint monitoring and
detection operations, and with our international partners
through the development of, and we are very proud of this, 26
very strong, active bilateral and regional maritime and law
enforcement agreements throughout the Caribbean and South
America.
Mr. Mackin, in his joint role as the Narcotics Officer and
USIC, has been a great catalyst for these partnering efforts,
in invigorating our CD intelligence focus, sharpening our
collective strategic emphasis. And as noted in his written
statement, our efforts in the counter-drugs fight offer other
important benefits to the Nation. The counter-terrorism and
counter-drug missions are mutually supportive and reinforcing
regarding the ability to detect, monitor, and interdict.
We are also actively involved in interdepartment,
interagency planning and operational processes. In addition to
our operational assets, that is our ships and our planes, the
Coast Guard has over 500 law enforcement personnel assigned
around the world involved in interagency efforts to combat
illegal drugs. Coast Guard personnel serve on many teams,
including the DHS operations and planning staffs, Joint
Interagency Task Force-South and West, we have over 20 people
in JIATF-South, DEA's El Paso Intelligence Center, the Panama
Express initiative, the Organized Crime Drug Enforcement Task
Force Fusion Center, and in ICE's Air and Marine Operations
Center, and at ICE's headquarters, just to name a few. I am
particularly proud of these partnering efforts and how they are
yielding impressive results.
But there is more to be done operationally. From my
perspective, although we are focused on coordination here
today, the key to further success in the maritime part of this
interdiction is not only effective partnering, but it is more
importantly about capability and and capacity. For the Coast
Guard this includes, for example, additional surveillance
packages for our six new C-130J maritime patrol aircraft, they
do not have them now; augmenting the number of flight hours on
our existing C-130's, we can get more flight hours if we
augment them; equipping all our helicopters with airborne Use
of Force, which is a key enabler for go-fast; and funding our
overall modernization program, it is the centerpiece of our
efforts to get more effective at sea. Collectively, from my
perspective, these are the clear performance enablers. The
President addresses capacity and capability improvements in the
fiscal year 2005 budget request, for which I ask for your
continued support, and particularly our modernization efforts,
which will deliver the capability and the capacity for us to
get, continue, and build on these impressive record-breaking
results that we have had this year.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I would be glad to answer any
questions you might have later in the day.
[The prepared statement of Admiral Collins follows:]
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Mr. Souder. Thank you.
Mr. Garcia.
Mr. Garcia. Thank you, Chairman Souder, Chairman Camp,
members of the committees. It is a pleasure to be with you here
today to discuss how U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement,
or ICE as we call it, is working with our partner agencies
within DHS in the fight against narcotics smuggling. My
testimony today will focus on the counternarcotics mission of
ICE, the authorities and assets we bring to this effort, and
how we are working with other agencies to coordinate this
mission, a mission that is tied directly to our homeland
security. And I think that was a theme that was hit on in many
of the statements here today.
The mission of homeland security is to address
vulnerabilities that expose our borders to infiltration, our
financial systems to exploitation and that weaken our national
security. And smuggling is a direct threat to our border
security. Organizations that exploit our borders to bring in
narcotics could, for the right amount of money, employ those
methods to bring in components for weapons of mass destruction.
Smugglers that prey on individuals seeking to come to America
for economic opportunity could use the same routes and methods
and exploit those border vulnerabilities to bring terrorists
into our country.
ICE seeks to use its extensive resources and authorities,
working with our partners within DHS and other Federal, State,
and local law enforcement agencies, to close those
vulnerabilities and protect our homeland. Let me give you one
example.
Last November, ICE agents, building upon truly terrific
work done by Customs and Border Protection inspectors at JFK
Airport in New York, targeted 19 airport workers--baggage and
cargo handlers and their supervisors--with unrestricted access
to international cargo and passenger flights. Working closely
with CBP and other Federal and local agencies, this
investigation alone netted 400 kilograms of cocaine and
hundreds of pounds of marijuana, mostly from Guyana and
Jamaica. Twenty-five defendants were charged, including 21
airport employees. This case illustrates how a conspiracy among
airport employees to smuggle drugs into the United States
compromised our border security. It is apparent how a similar
criminal conspiracy could create a vulnerability that could
potentially be exploited by terrorists.
With the creation of ICE, we have built upon the U.S.
Customs Service counternarcotics program with its extensive
border authority, smuggling, and financial crimes expertise,
and the Air and Marine assets, and merged them with the
Immigration Enforcement authorities of the Immigration and
Naturalization Service. Immigration enforcement authorities are
a powerful tool that our agents use to attack and dismantle
smuggling organizations, whether they smuggle people or drugs,
and to bring additional Federal charges against targets or
potential informants in ongoing drug smuggling investigations.
In fact, in this fiscal year, ICE has effectively used our
Title 8, our immigration authority in more than 138 of its
narcotics investigations.
Another key component of ICE's approach to counternarcotics
is the use of our extensive financial crimes expertise. ICE
targets money service businesses, bulk cash smuggling, and
trade based money laundering, such as the black market peso
exchange, which are used to launder narcotics proceeds. Since
July 2003, ICE and CBP have collectively seized more than $40
million before it could be illegally exported, and ICE has
arrested more than 133 individuals.
Our Office of Intelligence maintains an effective and
powerful focus on drug interdiction as part of the larger
counter-smuggling effort. ICE's Tactical Intelligence Center
[TIC] is a center that produces the kind of intelligence that
has put interdiction assets right on top of smugglers with
multi-ton loads of drugs. In fiscal year 2004 to date, the TIC
has provided intelligence that has resulted in the interdiction
of 50 tons of cocaine, 34 tons seized and 16 tons sunk, burned,
or otherwise destroyed.
One of the key responders to TIC information is ICE's Air
and Marine Operations unit, or AMO. AMO assets allow us to
cover a much wider range of territory, extending our borders to
include source, transit, and arrival zones for narcotics
smugglers, and in many cases stop the smugglers before they can
even get to the United States. In Operation HALCON, for
example, our AMO pilots are working in close partnership with
Mexican law enforcement officials to interdict smuggling
operations that attempt to penetrate the U.S. border. This
initiative in the arrival zone, along with operations in
Bahamas and in transit zones, and Air Bridge Denial in the
source zone, follow a successful defense in depth strategy.
A recent Operation Bahamas interdiction led to the seizure
of 1,000 kilograms of cocaine. Acting on information provided
by the DEA to AMO and the Coast Guard, AMO was able to pursue
two go-fast vessels off the coast of the Bahamas, eventually
using disabling fire to stop them. This operation led to the
arrest of six individuals, the seizure of both vessels, and the
cargo of cocaine.
Interagency cooperation and coordination is key to the
counternarcotics mission. One recent example of how we are
working together happened just a few weeks ago. CBP officers
assigned to the Port of Entry in San Ysidro, California,
discovered a false compartment in an SUV containing 61
kilograms of cocaine. ICE special agents, with the assistance
of airborne surveillance provided by AMO, and in coordination
with the DEA, initiated a controlled delivery to a residence in
California where ICE agents arrested the recipient of the
drugs, seized an additional 44 kilograms of cocaine, as well as
two more vehicles outfitted with false compartments. Following
successful completion of this delivery, ICE and DEA actively
shared information in a joint effort to determine any further
investigative action.
In sum, narcotics smuggling poses a threat to our Nation,
both as a direct result of the horrific effects on our society
of the drug trade and as a national security issue. At ICE we
approach it as a traditional law enforcement mission, one by
law we are required to continue, and as a homeland security
mission, a border integrity issue.
I would like to thank you, Chairman Souder, Chairman Camp,
and the members of these committees for the opportunity to
testify before you today. I look forward to answering any of
your questions.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Garcia follows:]
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Mr. Souder. Thank you.
Mr. Mackin.
Mr. Mackin. Chairman Souder, Chairman Camp, distinguished
members of the Government Reform and the Homeland Security
Subcommittees, it is a distinct privilege to appear before you
today and testify as the Counternarcotics Officer of the
Department of Homeland Security and as the U.S. Interdiction
Coordinator, a position I have held since March of last year.
Chairman Souder, the importance of the position you created
for a senior level official within the Department of Homeland
Security to coordinate counternarcotics matters cannot be
overstated. In the face of very real terrorist threats and the
Department's responsibility to secure our Nation from them, the
position has helped keep the Department dedicated to what I
call its other mission, which is to interdict the entry of
illegal drugs into the United States and to track and sever
connections between illegal drug trafficking and terrorism. The
President, Secretary Ridge, and I are grateful for your
continuing efforts and steadfast leadership in the prosecution
of this critical mission. Thank you for you unwavering support
to the Department of Homeland Security, its mission, and
personnel.
While simultaneously addressing the increased terrorist
threat, the Department remains strong in its commitment to
improve and expand its counter-drug interdiction capabilities
and those of our allies against the drug threat. Enhancement to
our border security and increased intelligence in the transit
zone are yielding greater results for the counter-drug mission.
For example, drug seizure rates for this year are significantly
higher than for the same period last year and are on pace for a
record year. The Department continues to assess the current
drug threat carefully and to adjust its plans for the optimal
application of interdiction resources.
I would like to note, as my colleagues have already said
several times, countering terrorism and drug interdiction are
synergistic. The Department is aware of linkages and potential
linkages between terrorist organizations, narcotics
trafficking, weapons smuggling, and alien smuggling networks.
Fortunately, countering terrorism and countering narcotics are
synergistic rather than competing. An action or capability
focused on one of the threats simultaneously strengthens our
security against the other. The strong posture that the
Department of Homeland Security maintains against drugs
directly strengthens our Nation's security against all border
threats, especially since terrorists can readily piggyback
already established drug smuggling pathways and systems to
threaten our homeland. As President Bush has stated, ``If these
methods are good enough for hunting criminals, they're even
more important for hunting terrorists.''
No one, not this Congress, the American public, nor drug
traffickers should misinterpret the Department of Homeland
Security's focus on terrorism as a weakening of its resolve
against illegal drugs. We have strengthened our commitment as
we have intensified our overall presence along America's
border, in the transit zone, and abroad.
My office, working with the Secretary and DHS components,
is focused on improving the preparedness of DHS organizations
on the border, its ships at sea, and forward deployed maritime
patrol aircraft. These multipurpose resources greatly enhance
the ability of our Nation to engage a terrorist cell or a drug
trafficking organization attempting to smuggle people and
contraband into the United States. The best example of the
value of our counter-drug posture is the highly successful
Joint Interagency Task Force-South, which is directed by a
Coast Guard officer and vectors a huge amount of DHS resources
on a daily basis against smuggling threats. This element, the
JIATF-South, was created well before September 11 to manage the
detection and monitoring of suspect drug related maritime and
air smuggling efforts. After September 11, it became a potent
resource to defend against approaches from the south by
aggressive terrorist organizations. Hence, our Nation is now
more secure because of our earlier development of a joint
counter-drug law enforcement and military interdiction
structure to secure our southern approaches first against the
narcotics threat and now against the terrorist threat.
I can assure you that Secretary Ridge, the Deputy
Secretary, the Under Secretaries, and the rest of the DHS
leadership team fully appreciate the dimension of the illicit
drug threat and its impact on the U.S. populace. To demonstrate
this, let me mention just three of a list of DHS' aggressive
counter-drug activities. More are in my written testimony.
We have expanded the counter-drug use of maritime patrol
aircraft. Responding to JIATF-South's request for increased
counter-drug P-3 flight hours from DHS, I immediately
recommended, with Secretary Ridge's support, that DHS seek to
triple the number of P-3 hours provided to JIATF-South each
month for counter-drug use in fiscal year 2005.
Now regarding the important Tethered Aerostat Radar System,
in my role as the U.S. Interdiction Coordinator, and with a
special focus on DHS, my office spent considerable time working
to ensure the continued operation of the TARS. And at our
urging, DoD has recommended rebuilding the system to full
operational capability.
And last year at the October USIC Summit Conference, I
urged the interdiction community to look for ways to raise the
number of interdiction successes per month. As a result,
cocaine interdiction in the transit zone is higher for the
first half of 2004. We now have achieved 152 metric tons of
cocaine seizures. This is higher than ever before achieved in
any 6 month period.
In conclusion, these achievements, which are just a few of
a long list, demonstrate the commitment of the Department of
Homeland Security since its creation in March 2003 and when I
was honored with the opportunity to serve. I would like to
thank the chairmen and the members of the subcommittees for
this opportunity to report to you, and for the support you have
provided the Department. Like you and all the distinguished
members of these subcommittees, the Department of Homeland
Security recognizes both the direct and indirect threats that
illicit drug trafficking poses to our national security and our
Nation. The Department remains committed to using our skills,
resources, capabilities, and superb personnel to continue to
disrupt, deter, and destroy the organizations
that attempt to steal the lives of our children with the lure
of illicit drugs.
I thank you for your continued support, and will be happy
to answer any questions.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Mackin follows:]
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Mr. Souder. Thank you. Chairman Camp is going to start the
questioning.
Mr. Camp. Thank you. I want to thank all of you for your
testimony. I have a question that I would like each of you to
take a shot at answering, and that is, how has the coordination
and sharing of counter-drug intelligence between the various
agencies improved since the creation of the Department of
Homeland Security? Mr. Bonner, if you want to go first, since
you are on the left.
Mr. Bonner. I probably have the easiest job here, I think,
in answering that question because, first of all, as a border
interdiction agency, the coordination, if you think about it,
is essentially transacting seizures of illegal drugs and seeing
that there is appropriate followup investigations from those
seizures. We have a very close cooperative relationship with
ICE in terms of seizures that take place at the ports of entry
along the Mexican border. These are the former Customs Special
Agents, essentially. That relationship has existed for years
and it is a very effective relationship that gets the followup
investigations where that can be done in the form of controlled
deliveries, and, by the way, Assistant Secretary Garcia
illustrated a quintessential type of controlled delivery, the
kind of partnership--CBP makes the seizure, hidden compartment,
SUV, San Ysidro, we contact the ICE Special Agents. There is a
followup controlled delivery up to Los Angeles which leads to
more arrests, more drug seizures, which leads to more
intelligence to make us do a better job of interdicting at the
border.
And on the other hand, this is outside the Department but
certainly with the assistance of Mr. Mackin, we have a historic
relationship between the Border Patrol, which seizes a vast
quantity of illegal drugs at and near the border, and the DEA.
Essentially, it is a very similar relationship. They also seize
a vast quantity of illegal drugs coming across our border. They
make apprehensions, for investigative purposes, those cases are
turned over to the Drug Enforcement Administration. That
relationship, by the way, continues. It is not broken. It is
working very well, in my judgment, from everything I know.
So in that sense, in terms of our interaction, it is
primarily our interaction. Customs and Border Protection is a
border agency, with our two prime investigative agencies for
followup investigative work, and that is ICE and the Drug
Enforcement Administration.
Mr. Camp. And obviously a large part of that is finding
patterns and linking those individual cases to potential larger
smuggling rings. Is that being done, and who handles that?
Mr. Bonner. That is being done, and certainly we are always
looking at the trends in terms of the patterns of drug
smuggling, how drugs are being smuggled in. A lot of that
information, by the way, is self-generated because we are the
border agency, we know how heroin is being smuggled into JFK
and Miami. I could talk to you and give you chapter and verse.
So, we are using that kind of information to improve our
success rate in terms of interdictions and seizures at the
border. At the same time, we get the investigative feedback
loop, and that is to get information from both DEA and ICE as
to things that we need to be looking for as a result of
intelligence or information that has resulted from the arrest
and information that is developed from interrogation of drug
trafficking organizations and people that belong to them.
So I actually think, if anything, it has been improved
under the Department of Homeland Security. I certainly would
say I do not see in any way at this juncture that there has
been any degradation of the kinds of cooperative relationships
we need to have to function. Having that said, I would like to
have more information, more intelligence, both tactical and
specifically, about who, what, and when is going to cross the
border in terms of illegal drugs. We have a voracious appetite
for that. That is an area, by the way, I know, working with Mr.
Mackin and my colleagues here, we are looking at some ways we
might actually improve our interdiction rates and our
interdiction successes beyond some pretty impressive statistics
or figures that have been occurring in the last year or two,
both from Customs and Border Protection, Coast Guard, and the
other agencies.
Mr. Camp. Admiral Collins.
Admiral Collins. I would have to say a very positive
response to your question. I think the information flow, the
coordination----
Mr. Camp. I know we are running out of time on my time, so
if each of you could just answer quickly, then the chairman
will not have to use his gavel.
Admiral Collins. I think it has improved. There are many,
many integrating mechanisms that move information back and
forth. We have liaison officers in respective staffs that move
this information. I think it is a very positive development.
Mr. Camp. Thank you.
Mr. Garcia. Quickly, on a theme that goes to the heart of
your question I think, Mr. Chairman, looking at combining
intelligence against drug smuggling organizations and now
looking at alien smuggling organizations, and the money that
fuel both, I think we can do a more effective job now that we
are combined.
Mr. Camp. Thank you.
Mr. Mackin. Mr. Camp, intelligence is my middle name. I had
a career in the CIA as an operations officer and I brought this
to this task. We are attacking the outbound flow of currency
through what is called the black market pesos exchange attack,
it is headed by ICE, I have organized it, bringing the
Department of Justice, Treasury, and DHS together to do that.
We are instrumental in the planning of the OCDETF Drug Fusion
Center, planning and structuring it. We are helping, as Mr.
Bonner said, we are helping to create a border interdiction
support center for the whole southwest border, to aggregate
together all the intelligence, make more sense out of it, and
feed it back to the operators. We have been supporting the
Panama Express Operation with both people, technical support,
and money. And finally, I spend a lot of my time working with
our Mexican colleagues to get them to share, to respond more to
our direction and to share information back with us. I am just
back from a Lateral Interdiction Working Group that I chaired
yesterday in Key West on this subject.
Mr. Camp. Thank you. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Souder. Thank you. Mr. Cummings.
Mr. Cummings. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. Mr.
Mackin, you have two titles, is that right?
Mr. Mackin. Yes, sir.
Mr. Cummings. You are the DHS Counternarcotics Officer and
the U.S. Interdiction Coordinator. And as the Counternarcotics
Officer, you have no staff, is that right?
Mr. Mackin. I have aggregated a staff. I started with
nothing and spent quite a bit of time doing that, sir.
Mr. Cummings. Say that again.
Mr. Mackin. Initially, I was a singleton, and I walked
around and shook hands and got contributions and so forth and I
got some FTE. And yes, I have a staff now.
Mr. Cummings. OK. How many people on your staff?
Mr. Mackin. I have nine FTEs and about eleven detailees to
my staff, sir.
Mr. Cummings. And do you receive a salary from DHS?
Mr. Mackin. Sir, I am detailed from the Drug Czar's office.
Mr. Cummings. So then the Drug Czar pays your salary?
Mr. Mackin. He pays my salary, yes, sir.
Mr. Cummings. Now how does that affect your ability to
carry out your statutory duties as the CNO?
Mr. Mackin. The ONDCP relationship?
Mr. Cummings. Yes, sir.
Mr. Mackin. It gives me access--I am the Intelligence
Officer for the Drug Czar, and so I have a tremendous flow of
counter-drug intelligence that I access daily as a result. And
so I carry that to DHS. So there is a definite advantage to it.
Mr. Cummings. When you came into this office, first of all,
you had a pretty good idea what your role would be.
Mr. Mackin. I could envision it from my perspective. But as
I watched DHS become DHS, it was, OK, I had to learn who the
players were and had to convince them by virtue of personality
and background that I was worth dealing with. I mean, you can
understand that.
Mr. Cummings. I can understand.
Mr. Mackin. They were very busy doing their jobs and I had
to knock on their door and say, ``I am here to help.''
Mr. Cummings. I understand. How do you feel that you have
been treated? I just want to go where you just were leading me,
maybe you were not leading me, but I am going down there
anyway. So you were sort of like an outsider kind of guy?
Mr. Mackin. Well, these gentlemen have great corporate
enterprises to manage, and I come along and I am the
Counternarcotics Officer and they are looking at it and saying
this guy is going to tell me how to do my business. So,
naturally, there is some trepidation on their part as I knock
on their door. But I have been received very, very well, sir.
Mr. Cummings. Good. Now you said you had a vision of what
you thought your job should be. First of all, the reason I am
asking you these questions is because Congressman Souder and I
spent a lot of time creating your position.
Mr. Mackin. Yes, sir.
Mr. Cummings. And I am curious as to how it is working out.
That is where I am going. You got me?
Mr. Mackin. Yes, sir.
Mr. Cummings. Because I do not want you to think I am
trying to do anything but do what I just said.
Mr. Mackin. As far as the interface on an operational
basis, it is going very, very well. My vision is based on years
of experience in the CIA working against a drug target, and I
did a lot of paramilitary work as well, and I learned that you
have to have collaboration, you have to have teamwork of all
the people that can play. If they work separately, you will not
get there. And that is particularly true against the drug
trafficking threat. They are people who are a lot more clever
at times than we are and they do not have any rules to go by,
and they have more cash to work with. So we have to work as a
team. And I walked in saying I have to help DHS to collaborate
within and between DHS and the other organizations. The other
thing is we have to have superb intelligence. In any endeavor,
any human endeavor, you have to understand what you are up
against or what your path is. And I have spent a lot of time
trying to help improve that. And third, you have to focus. You
cannot do it all. So collectively, are we putting our resources
where they will get the greatest return. Those are the three
precepts that I work by.
I have gotten excellent support from Secretary Ridge. Let
me note that the first time that I briefed Secretary Ridge on
the drug threat and he noted that, it was in the testimony
here, that we are losing about 20,000 people a year directly to
drugs, he stopped me for a moment and he said, ``That is over
six Twin Tower events a year.'' ``Yes, sir, it is.'' He got it.
The Deputy Secretaries that we have understand it very well,
all the Under Secretaries are quite aware. And I have spent my
time trying to educate them, for those that were not already
familiar, to that subject, and I think I have had some success,
sir.
Mr. Cummings. So you had a full understanding then when I
said that when you go to someplace like the inner-city of
Baltimore, you have terrorists right on the street corners?
Mr. Mackin. Yes, sir. Sir, we have foreign criminal
organizations working throughout the country that deliver those
drugs to your cities, and that bothers me a lot. We have enough
criminals inside our own country without the foreign criminal
organizations coming in. And that shows me how easy it is for
terrorists to get here. So we are working very hard and I think
there are indications of success of the synergism working the
counternarcotics enterprise and terrorism. We are getting
stronger.
Mr. Cummings. You understand what our concern was. I know
that there have been numerous questions already, we worried
tremendously when Homeland Security was developed that emphasis
would be taken off of the drug problems right here in this
country and that--I did not realize my time ran out. I just
want to ask this one question, Mr. Chairman--that so much
attention would be shifted. And we understand the shift, we
really do. But at the same time, to that lady who cannot come
out of her door on Madison Avenue in Baltimore because she is
afraid, she cannot even go to church because she is afraid that
she is going to be mugged, or the person who goes to bed at
night unable to sleep because they are afraid somebody is going
to break in the window and try to rob them to get money for the
next fix, or people who go to funerals two or three times,
maybe four times a year for relatives and people they know who
have been killed on the streets, they see what happened on
September 11 and they kind of say, OK, that was a major deal,
we hope it never happens again, but what they are more afraid
of is what they see everyday. And so I am glad you have that
perspective.
Mr. Mackin. It is a terrible tragedy, sir. I will be frank.
I do not think the Nation realizes it has a drug problem. I
know that there are very concerned people here, hugely
concerned people here, and all the people we have in the field
that suffer and sometimes die at risk, they are aware of it.
But, by-in-large, I do not think our country is. As a result,
there is too much passivity to it. You have terrible things
going on in Baltimore, but there are a lot of people who live
in comfortable neighborhoods that do not experience that and so
they are not aware of it, and thus they do not vector concern
about it.
Mr. Cummings. Thank you very much.
Mr. Souder. Thank you. I have questions for each one of
you, and I am sure we will have at least a second round because
some of these are pretty critical regarding your departments.
But I want to followup on Mr. Cummings' questions with Mr.
Mackin.
First of all, let me just say flat out that regardless of
how it was worked in transition, and as you know, I was very
supportive of you getting this position, when Mr. Cummings and
I worked with the Speaker to create this, we did not view your
position as a detailee. Period. And while there are useful
things to be gained, as long as you are a detailee, you will be
treated like a detailee.
Second, are you aware that your staff are technically
employed by Secretary Ridge and you cannot hire or fire your
staff without the chief of staff's approval?
Mr. Mackin. No, sir. But I have people on my staff who
could do that, if they had to.
Mr. Souder. You would have to go to Secretary Ridge because
they are not directly under your employee.
Mr. Mackin. I did not realize that, sir. Let me point out
that most of the people, as you say, people look at me as a
detailee, most of the people do not know that I actually get
paid by ONDCP.
Mr. Souder. The problem is that the Department of Homeland
Security is supposed to be invested in narcotics. We know ONDCP
is invested in narcotics. The question is, is the Department of
Homeland Security invested in narcotics? The administration
resisted this proposal in this Department. It was put in the
bill over their objections by the House and the Senate and they
need to follow what the intention of Congress was in this
position. What funds do you directly receive from DHS, and who
gives them to you? Do you have a budget for your department
with flexibility?
Mr. Mackin. Well, the FTEs that I have, sir----
Mr. Souder. Beyond even that, what kind of budget do you
have in your department?
Mr. Mackin. I do not have one, sir.
Mr. Souder. Do you believe that, given the fact that you do
not have direct control over your employees, your salary is
paid by ONDCP, and that you do not have a regular budget, do
you believe that you can accomplish the missions?
Mr. Mackin. Well, unfortunately, I have had to spend quite
a bit of time concerned about office space, getting people,
getting the administrative support, travel money, and so forth.
It is forthcoming. I have not had any travel turned down. DHS
pays the freight. But it is just that, yes, you do walk in sort
of with hat in hand looking for help rather than being, say, an
official member.
Mr. Souder. I know what difficulties there are. And as I
made clear in my opening statement, look, this is not about
individuals. We are very fortunate in the mix of individuals we
have as far as counternarcotics missions. That will not always
be true. And furthermore, we are not always going to have the
respite period we have had here for an extended period where we
have not had an active terrorist attack since September 11
which could divert all kinds of resources unless we have
structural protections to make sure there is adequate resources
for the DHS to accomplish multiple missions.
Furthermore, I want to make clear, the reason you are in
your slot is we all agree, anybody who works with narcotics,
that intelligence is absolutely critical. But intelligence is
not the only thing here. Let me just say as a Member who has
followed this issue since I have been a Member, and before that
as a staff, I find the increasing proliferation of intelligence
proposals confusing and almost impossible to understand. Now
here we are on the day when the 9/11 Commission report is being
issued, the 9/11 Commission, like internally in Congress,
understands there needs to be a coordination and
centralization, your major proposals are that we need another
center down at EPIC. The question is, does DEA agree with that?
Mr. Mackin. Yes, sir.
Mr. Souder. Well, it is a little mixed. OCDETF is trying to
do these drug fusion centers. What we want to know--on the
ground, we have a Riverside Center, we have the JIATFs, we have
EPIC, we have the Intelligence Interpretation Center in
Johnstown, we have RIS for local law enforcement, we have this
proliferation. It is going to be a little difficult to convince
some of us that there is a shortage of intelligence centers.
Now if there are new centers, if each agency--in effect, what
you are proposing here now is DHS needs an intelligence center,
that this proliferation of intelligence centers may be
necessary. But it is going to be a little bit of a hard sell
when I believe the general public and Members of Congress are
looking at how do we coordinate and consolidate intelligence
centers, not how do we add intelligence centers.
That is just kind of an initial reaction. Because when I
was recently down on the Southwest border, and I want to make
sure I get this into the record, two things: One is, there was
a highly mixed opinion about the functions of the intelligence
center and how we are going to work this through, and I have
heard that directly.
The other thing is the Southwest border is, without a
doubt, our No. 1 transit zone for illegal narcotics. It also,
at least at this point, looks like our most vulnerable. Those
of us who live more North are very concerned about the northern
border long term, but there we have better controls and are
working aggressively with the Canadians to improve where those
holes are in the northern border and legal holes. But the
Southwest border is also very vulnerable on terrorism. Now when
we had all the chief people in the sector of New Mexico, El
Paso, and Arizona and asked them whether they had heard from
the Counternarcotics Office, every single one testified under
oath, No. In fact, only one had ever heard of you. And they are
the people on the Southwest border.
Now part of the question is your job was not just to create
another intelligence center, or to go in a meeting with Mr.
Ridge. Your job is to get out, and I know it is hard because
there is line authority and your staff, but to keep the
counternarcotics message in front of all of their divisions.
Your assignment, created by Congress, is to make sure that,
particularly in the area like the Southwest border, that they
at least know there is a Counternarcotics Office. It was just
astounding, under oath.
Mr. Mackin. Sir, if I had not been paying attention to it,
how did I propose the Border Interdiction Support Center that
will fill a need that is not filled right now? It is all
stovepiped along the border. It has been that way for 15 years
and I am trying to help make that change so that it becomes a
coherent activity and maybe we can improve our efficiency.
Mr. Souder. I am anxious to talk about how we integrate
EPIC, how we integrate the other centers, and how we improve
intelligence. You are absolutely right on TARS. My
understanding is the bill we are about to vote on in Congress
reduces TARS again in the budget. We have to be more aggressive
here.
Mr. Mackin. It is a shame, sir.
Mr. Souder. Yes, shame on Congress as well. And part of our
proposal is how to get TARS under your division so that we have
in the Department of Homeland Security not only an intelligence
center, but actually intelligence to work with. Because if the
military is not committed to helping keep the intelligence at
an adequate level, what good does it do to make more
intelligence centers if we do not have the intelligence. And we
have gaps in our system if we do not have the TARS up. That is
just a plain truth, and you pointed that out. But intelligence,
as I am trying to point out here, is only part of the problem
in the Southwest border.
Mr. Mackin. I agree, sir. I am hoping that the aggregation
of the intelligence would improve the performance of the
operators. I spent most of my time as a paramilitary operator,
I am not an intelligence puke, but I know the value of it. You
have to know what you are doing. Now with Panama Express
working the transit zone, we have more intelligence than we can
exploit because, as Admiral Collins said, we do not have the
capabilities to exploit. I cannot do magic in that aspect. But
I assure you that I understand operations.
Mr. Souder. Thank you. Ms. Sanchez.
Ms. Sanchez. Thank you. My question is for Commissioner
Bonner, and I understand that this is not going to relate
necessarily directly to the topic at hand, but it deals with
some of the frustrations that I and some of my colleagues have
had with DHS and the various agencies that are grouped under
that in terms of getting accurate information and finding out
who is accountable for certain things. There have been a number
of requests made to meet with you specifically related to the
issue of the immigration sweeps that are being conducted in
Southern California and elsewhere that do not appear to have
much reasoning behind them as they relate to what we all think
should be DHS' primary goal, which is catching terrorists and
counter-terrorism efforts.
I do not think there is a person in this room that would
not agree that Federal resources are very scare and that what
is important is how are those resources being used, and who is
making the decision of where those resources will be committed.
The sweeps that we have seen in the Southern California region
I imagine, and maybe you can correct me if I am wrong, probably
have a very minimal impact in dealing with the immigration
problem, but they have had a very successful impact in terms of
scaring not just illegal immigrants, but legal immigrants in
California to the point where they are afraid to send their
children to school, or go to the doctor's office for doctor
appointments, or go to work so that they can support their
families, and I am talking legal residents as well.
So while I have you here, I would like to ask you, what
purpose do you think those raids serve? And concretely, can you
give me any answers to what they have accomplished? Whether or
not those raids will continue? Because we have met with Mr.
Garcia from ICE the other morning, Under Secretary Hutchinson,
we do not get a clear answer as to whether those will continue.
How the sweeps can be justified as not being based on ethnic
profiling or racial profiling? And whether or not ICE is not,
in fact, the agency who should be conducting those interior
enforcement operations? I know 5 minutes is scant time to try
to answer those question, but go ahead and give it a try.
Mr. Bonner. Let me take a stab at it anyway. First of all,
in terms of Border Patrol Agents, they are part of Customs and
Border Protection, so they ultimately are reporting to me and I
am responsible. Second, let me say, I do not want to get into a
debate as to sweeps, but let me just say that the Border Patrol
actions or activities that took place in Southern California,
in Corona and Ontario, in particular, I would not call them
``sweeps.'' They were intelligence-driven. They were not simply
randomly going up to areas and communities.
Ms. Sanchez. I have a followup question on that point.
Mr. Bonner. Could I complete my answer though, because this
gets directly to your question, and that is that the primary
responsibility within the Department of Homeland Security for
purely interior immigration enforcement is ICE, is Mr. Garcia,
not me. With that said, and I understand Under Secretary
Hutchinson may have spoken to you or others, so I thought that
there actually had been some conversation on this subject.
Ms. Sanchez. Conversation, not a lot of information.
Mr. Bonner. Well, I am trying to give you some anyway on
it. What I am telling you is that the Border Patrol, as part of
Customs and Border Protection, its primary responsibility is
controlling the border. Now we are going to do everything we
need to do to control the border, and that is not just taking
enforcement actions at the physical border itself. So some
actions that are going to be taken by the Border Patrol, have
been and will continue to be taken, are not going to be just at
the borderline itself. That would not make a lot of sense,
because then you could say once somebody actually gets past the
physical border itself they are home free. Well, that is not
the case. And so we are going to control the border and that
means we are going to be taking actions that are relevant to
controlling the border. And certainly any place where people
that have illegally entered the United States may be transiting
or moving through is certainly a Border Patrol responsibility.
And last let me say, that with respect to what is a purely
interior enforcement activity, and I have tried to define that
for you, that requires approval from Border Patrol
headquarters. I have made that directive. I have made it clear.
Now if Mr. Garcia comes to me and he says, ``You know,
Commissioner Bonner, I need your help for some interior
immigration enforcement activity,'' and I have the resources to
help ICE do that, of course I will. But our primary
responsibility is going to be controlling the border and
getting better control of the borders of our country, which we
have always needed to do but it is absolutely essential in the
post-September 11 environment because of the potential of
terrorist penetration of our borders, and that includes not
just the Canadian border, but the Mexican border.
Ms. Sanchez. I have a brief followup question, if I may be
permitted, Mr. Chairman, with respect to the intelligence. We
have heard that these sweeps were, in fact, intelligence-driven
based on requests from local law enforcement agencies who
provided intelligence that supposedly was the basis of these
sweeps or roving patrols or whatever you choose to call them.
In fact, Congressman Baca spoke with the Ontario police
department because that was cited as the source given for the
intelligence, and they have responded in writing that they
never sent intelligence or requests for those types of sweeps
that were conducted in those areas. So fundamentally, the
question I have is, this intelligence that was supposedly based
on local law enforcement request, apparently, according to
them, was never requested by them.
Mr. Bonner. Look, all I can tell you is what I understand.
My understanding is it was information or intelligence-driven,
intelligence-using, in the broadest sense. And as a former
Administrator of DEA, and frankly, in my current capacity, I
have never disclosed sources to anybody. So I am not going to
disclose sources here or get into who gave the information or
who did not give the information. It is my understanding there
was some actionable information that the Border Patrol was
relying on.
Ms. Sanchez. I thank the chairman for his indulgence.
Mr. Souder. Thank you. Congresswoman Dunn, do you have any
questions?
Ms. Dunn. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. Yes, I do have
a question. I am very relieved to hear from your testimony that
the counter-terrorism mission is shoring up your work in doing
counternarcotics work. There was some early concern I recall
soon after the beginning of the Department over a year ago that
legacy responsibilities might be neglected as you take on a
whole lot of new responsibilities that are very important in
making sure that terrorists do not get into our Nation.
I represent a district that is adjacent to a major seaport
on the West coast. It also has a border with Canada, a 120 mile
maritime border, and then a number of miles of land border. In
the last few years since September 11, and with the capture of
Ahmed Rassum, who was trying to get into the United States and
complete that famous bombing at LAX, there is a conjoining of
the problems that we have with the northern border and what is
happening down further South. But more often, when we think of
terrorism and drug enforcement, we think of the southern
border.
I would like to hear what you have to say about how you
cooperate among yourselves, what is the level, how many
meetings do you have, how do you transmit information. And then
also with the Canadian government, I would like to know whether
you believe that we are moving along in a positive way in
dealing with the Canadian government as we do both the anti-
drug and the counter-terrorism responsibilities.
Mr. Bonner. Let me just say one thing, and I will try to be
brief on this. One of the main mechanisms that we have to
coordinate, particularly on the northern border--and let me say
parenthetically, there are some significant amounts of illegal
drugs that are coming across from Canada into the United
States. This is primarily high potency THC content, but there
is significant seizures that we are making at or near the
Canadian border. But the mechanism for coordination at the
northern border actually is a very good one. It is the IBETS,
or Integrated Border Enforcement Teams, and the IBETS are made
up of not only Customs and Border Protection through the Border
Patrol, but ICE, DEA, as well as the RCMP, and the Canadian
Border Security Agency. There are 14 of these along the
northern border. There is one actually that started in British
Columbia in the State of Washington. But there are now 14 of
them that string the entire northern border. They work very
effectively to exchange information and also to coordinate
joint anti-smuggling interdiction and enforcement actions. And
as I say, all of the U.S. Government agencies of note here
participate in this with the Canadians. It is a very effective
coordination mechanism that is specifically, for the most part,
dealing with smuggling issues, and a lot of that is drug
smuggling.
Mr. Garcia. Just to followup quickly, if I might, on that
very point. I actually was in Washington State fairly recently
and had an opportunity to visit the facility. I walked through
it and I saw Canadian officials sitting there working side-by-
side with American analysts, U.S. law enforcement, looking at
data, analyzing it, looking at trends. In fact, they were I
think working on an alien smuggling case particularly when I
went through there and were communicating that information with
a Border Patrol team that had actually seen some of the actual
activity of this organization on the border very recently near
where this facility was located. So I got to see really first-
hand how the organization Rob is describing works, and I was
really struck by the fact that we had Canadian counterparts
sitting there side-by-side with access to their information and
their systems, sharing it with us. I thought that was very much
of progress, especially given the risk you cite, the Rassum
case, I remember it well, as I know Commissioner Bonner does,
and the very real threat that posed to national security.
Ms. Dunn. And what about among yourselves, how do you share
information, how do you work together?
Admiral Collins. It is done at the tactical level,
operational level, and the strategic level. At the Washington
level, for example, there is a weekly operations policy meeting
within BTS, the Coast Guard attends that, we compare notes at
the strategic level on how we move forward. There is
coordination at the field level as well. A great example of
that I think is in Florida, it is just terrific cooperation,
which is one of the most threat-ridden vectors, if you will, in
our country from whether it is migrants, whether it is drugs,
or whatever. There is terrific planning, coordination. It
happens all the time. On the air side particularly, the air
folks from ICE and the air folks from the Coast Guard do
scheduling meetings, they work collaboratively together to
schedule deployments. And it played out very, very positively
in the last Haitian crisis, for example, on the migrant side.
But it also applies on the drug side. So I think there has been
very, very positive, cooperative action. And every week there
is multiple cases that happen where it is ICE participation,
Border Patrol participation, Coast Guard participation that is
yielding great results, whether it is a migrant interdiction or
a drug interdiction.
Mr. Bonner. Could I put a quick word in for the
Interdiction Committee which meets in Washington on a monthly
basis? It is something I chair, but Mr. Mackin has been a
tremendous participant in it. He basically helps suggest the
agenda for it. But this is a pretty high level, Washington
level meeting, which is essentially the Interdiction Committee,
and it has the high level Coast Guard representatives, ICE,
DEA, Roger Mackin, me, I chair these meetings. We meet monthly
and we do exchange information about what is going on at a
pretty high level and discuss issues such as what strategy
improvements could we make in terms of, let us say, a Mexico
strategy to do a better job interdicting drugs that are moving
up through Mexico.
Ms. Dunn. Yes?
Mr. Mackin. Well, first, I have personal interaction with
these gentlemen and with some of their superiors on a weekly to
monthly basis depending on the nature of the relationship. But
more than that, they have been very generous in providing
liaison officers to my staff. And so as issues come up perhaps
discussing shortages of resource at certain areas, we will
convene a meeting and these will be representing those
organizations in carrying the information back, or if I have
questions I get immediate response through them. Each of these
organizations has one or more people on my staff. It has been
very helpful.
We attend the staff meetings, by-in-large, on a weekly
basis, and that gives venue to talk about issues that we have
worked in a our daily activities. I might say to Admiral
Collins, were you aware of such and such, or he will say that
to me, and then it often triggers actions for our staffs to
convey information and develop ideas and solve problems.
Ms. Dunn. Thank you.
Mr. Souder. Thank you. I want to make sure the record shows
that Ms. Christensen and Ms. Sheila Jackson-Lee have both
joined the hearing, and they are both on the Homeland Security
Committee.
We have three votes on, of which we have roughly about 7
minutes in this first vote, then two 5 minutes. Are all of you
able to stay if we get back here in 20 minutes or so, so we can
continue the questioning?
And is it OK if we go vote, or would you rather start your
questioning?
Ms. Norton. I think if only 7 minutes, I will defer.
Mr. Souder. OK. With that, the subcommittee stands in
recess.
[Recess.]
Mr. Souder. The subcommittee will come to order.
I now yield to Ms. Norton for her questions.
Ms. Norton. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. The witnesses have at
least comforted me in their testimony, because I believe all of
them testified to increased confiscations and seizures. And
since I can only judge this in some respects by the bottom
line, I appreciate that is happening.
I suppose Mr. Bonner's testimony leads to this question,
because I appreciate the way in which your testimony at Page 7
indicated where improvements need to be. It is very good to see
witnesses testify about what they have done, that is clearly
what you are supposed to do and what everybody always does, but
also about what you are trying to do.
My question really goes to whether or not there has been
any change in the methodology. Commissioner Bonner talks about
``cold'' hits because you are aware of their methods for
concealing, and of course cold hits amount to something close
to random along with a little sense, yes, it is called
intelligence, of how they operate. But Mr. Bonner's testimony
at Page 7 does understand that we are in a new world where the
kind of intelligence we are applying to terrorism ought to be
applied to narcoterrorism as well. You say that you do get
actionable intelligence, but ``would greatly benefit, and drug
interdiction would increase nationally, if the flow of
potential actionable information and intelligence from
investigative and intelligence agencies to CBP were greater.''
That is what I want to ask you about.
Since the new connections have been set up through the
Department of Homeland Security, is there any reliance on
intelligence, as that word is used, as opposed to the old way
of interdicting narcotics through ``cold'' hits, random hits?
What I am looking for is whether or not it is true that when
one is looking for WMDs one might find drugs, or when one is
looking for drugs one might find WMDs. In the ports, for
example, you could conceal all kinds of things, all kinds of
bioterrorism and so forth, and if they have not already
discovered this, then they certainly are going to discover that
not only can we make money through narcoterrorism, these folks
will be looking for drugs, we will not put any drugs in here,
we will put some WMDs, so they will not even bother with this.
What I am trying to ask, therefore, is whether your own work in
narcotics detection has truly penetrated the kind of
intelligence we are doing I understand routinely now for
terrorism?
Mr. Bonner. Thank you, Ms. Norton. Let me say that you are
right, that part of what you do at the border in terms of
interdicting and intercepting drugs and people smuggling them
is you do look at patterns and trends. We also, of course, are
aided by drug-sniffing canines at our land borders and our
international airports. We are aided by other kinds of
detection equipment. But one of the things we are doing, too,
with respect to let us say the terrorist threat, is we are
taking a look at and getting advance information on all cargo
shipments coming into the United States, through all modes, by
the way, commercial trucks, sea containers, it does not matter.
And part of what we are doing is using strategic intelligence
to try to figure out better who and what to look for and what
to look at for all threats.
One quick example: part of that is anomaly analysis. An
anomaly analysis is something that is out of the ordinary. That
could be a terrorist weapon, it could be drugs, it could be
something else. A quick example: not too long ago we had a
shipment of cargo that was coming into a West Coast seaport
that was manifested by advance manifest information as frozen
trout and it was being shipped actually to another location
through a U.S. seaport on the West Coast. There was an anomaly
there. One is, it is a little unusual that frozen trout is
coming from Asia that ultimately was going to Central America.
It was anomalous. But second, there were some other anomalies
about it, and that was it was not being shipped in a
refrigerated container. So, OK, we definitely are going to look
in that container. Now it was not a weapon of mass destruction.
It was not illegal drugs. It was a cache of a large amount of
automatic weapons that was going to Central America. But I am
just saying this same methodology, the same approach that is
helpful in terms of selecting out the let us say cargo
shipments that we are going to x-ray scan and that sort of
thing is helpful for the illegal drug threat.
But beyond that, I would just echo what Mr. Mackin said,
and that is, that we can do better. The more intelligence or
information we get at the border, let us say the land border
with Mexico, if we have enough, we can double the number of
seizures at the Mexican border. That is not the ``be all and
end all'' of a counter-drug strategy. But it is part of a
strategy to seize as much of the illegal drugs produced as far
back into the supply chain as we can, along with going after
the drug money, along with going after and removing the major
traffickers, the key players and organizations. But Mr. Mackin
has suggested in his testimony, and I fully agree with it, that
we ought to be looking at, maybe under the EPIC umbrella, but
doing a better job of collating information, intelligence,
whatever you want to call it, particularly for our border with
Mexico, so that we are increasing our prospects, our
visibility, and can increase what are some petty impressive
drug seizures now, but even beyond, exponentially beyond what
we are doing right now.
Ms. Norton. Does the cross-training help the interchange of
methodologies here, the cross-training of your personnel at the
border?
Mr. Bonner. Yes, it does. For example, when ``One Face at
the Border'' is combining Agriculture inspectors with Customs
inspectors and Immigration inspectors now as one CBP inspection
work force, one of the things Agriculture inspectors, they have
x-ray machines at most of the international airports and they
are looking for organic material, they are mainly looking for
fruits for med flies and that sort of thing, that is important,
but we have trained them also to be looking for illegal drugs
which are also organic material, cocaine and heroin. So we are
getting synergies, too, by creating one unified border agency
that is looking at all the missions and working more
effectively and more efficiently toward all of the missions of
Customs and Border Protection, at least the border agency, and
that includes the interception of illegal drugs, which is a
very important part of our overall mission.
Ms. Norton. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Souder. Thank you. I want to pursue Ms. Norton's line
of questioning for just a minute. Obviously, as you get the
Vacasas and the x-ray equipment, that is something that can
have a joint function. But to some degree, some of these things
are mutually exclusive. At the border, if a bomb dog is
checking a car, it is not a drug dog, and when you are looking
at San Ysidro, El Paso, Laredo, these huge areas where we have
so much traffic going across, just a minute delay causes
absolute chaos because of long lines. And so not everything is
able to be done jointly. But as we get more equipment, and
probably the No. 1 important things are the actual training of
your agents, in other words, they look at the vehicles, they
look at the equipment, they look at the anomalies in the bills
of lading, in the invoices, and to the degree that they are
trained. Now one of the things that we are trying to address,
and I mentioned it in my opening statement, is we are very
concerned that narcotics does not seem to be in the long-term
measurement. Now the people who have been trained in this area
and who have worked with this long-term have already picked
that up, and you have many experienced agents. The question is,
what is being done in the Department of Homeland Security for
people who are coming on board, for new people who are coming
in, for some of the people maybe in Department of Agriculture
who have not historically looked at narcotics, to train them,
and how does the Department see that as being part of the
review? Initially, as I am sure you are all aware, if we ever
get a Homeland Security authorizing bill through, we are
certainly looking at that and have huge bipartisan support of
adding that, with the caveat of cooperation. We are not looking
to see if we have this in this sub-agency, and we have this in
this, cooperation should be part of that, too, but we want to
see that as part of the personnel training evaluation.
Mr. Bonner. We are cross-training all of our inspectional
work force for the multitude of missions, it is not just one,
but that certainly includes the anti-narcotic mission and
detection. We are putting heavy emphasis, Chairman Souder, on
essentially what I call targeting skills, and that is using
advance information to target against threats.
We actually learned what we are doing in the anti-terrorism
area to better target essentially by virtue of things that were
being done by legacy U.S. Customs through passenger analysis
units at JFK, at Miami, and other international airports, and
through what we call manifest review units, which are at all of
our major seaports and our international airports for air
cargo. The principles that we have taken for identifying
terrorist risks are actually drawn from things that
particularly legacy U.S. Customs was doing very, very well in
terms of thinking about how do you, given the limited amount of
time you have, how do you select what--what vehicles, what
people, what cargo--we need to spend extra time with in
secondary and do a fuller inspection, and making sure that we
have the right array of technology and equipment to do that.
But most of this technology and equipment, we are still working
on canines, by the way, to get a canine that can detect both
bombs and illegal drugs.
Mr. Souder. That would be great.
Mr. Bonner. We are working on that at Front Royal right
now. But nonetheless, most of this stuff really is overlapping
and I think it does overall improve our effectiveness against
the drug threat.
Mr. Souder. Do any of you have a response to the fact that
we did a word search and could not find ``narcotics'' or
``drugs'' or anything in the evaluation proposals?
Mr. Bonner. Which proposals?
Mr. Souder. The proposed personnel manuals for the
Department that is 40 pages and had nothing----
Mr. Bonner. The Human Resources design.
Mr. Souder. Yes. Because, basically, anybody who has been
in any Government agency or in the private sector knows that is
the bottom line for a lot of employees. Am I being measured by
something?
Mr. Bonner. I do not know the answer to that.
Mr. Souder. OK. I want to ask a couple of technical
questions. If you want to get back, I am not looking for long
answers, but I want to make sure that I have some understanding
and that we understand on the record.
Let me move first to Mr. Garcia. In the air and marine
operations, you provide aerial support. The ICE pilots and
aviation enforcement officers could lend aviation expertise to
ongoing drug smuggling investigations. Have you converted all
of your aviation personnel to 18.11 agent job series to enhance
their anti-smuggling investigation capability, and if not, why
not?
Mr. Garcia. Currently, Chairman Souder, we are looking--let
me just step back a little bit. Our Marine officers, our folks
in AMO, go through the same 18.11 training course at FLETC that
our special agents in the Office of Investigation do. What I
have before me now is a proposal to convert the hundred-some-
odd Marine Enforcement Officers from their series as Marine
Enforcement Officers to 18.11. I am looking at it. I think
there is a lot of merit to that proposal. I was actually out
with Marine Enforcement Officers in Miami not too long ago and
they were telling me about a stop they made where the drugs
were thrown overboard or whatever contraband they had, by the
time they caught the boat, nothing on it, but the people on the
boat were actually re-entering felons after deportation, which
is a serious charge and they had turned them over to
authorities, and how efficient it would be to have them with
not only Customs but Immigration enforcement as we are training
all of our agents. And I think there is much merit to that.
The key issue for me, obviously, is coordination of those
investigative resources with our Office of Investigations and
looking at the plan for doing that so we are not going at
cross-purposes, and you can see the merit in that. So I think
it is a proposal that has much merit, and I am considering it
right now.
Mr. Souder. Thank you. Commissioner Bonner, a similar type
question. It has come to our attention that you plan to create
a new employee classification for the inspectors at ports of
entry called 18.95 classification. Apparently, this will give
the inspectors the authority to do investigations, including
controlled deliveries after they make seizures. How are you
going to ensure that this does not decrease the willingness of
inspectors to call in ICE special agents to do this work?
Mr. Bonner. First of all, I am not contemplating doing
that. Next week we are going to convert all legacy Customs and
Immigration inspectors to Customs and Border Protection
Officers and they will have a new classification series. But we
are doing that to unify and integrate the agency. At the
current time, I contemplate we continue our historic relations
with the special agents now at ICE for followup controlled
deliveries from drug cases. And as I said in my earlier
testimony, the Border Patrol actually has a relationship with
DEA in terms of followup investigations. So we are an
interdicting agency, we do not do followup investigation. We
interdict the drugs and we make arrests of the people that are
involved in smuggling them. But I do not contemplate at this
time any change in terms of having CBP Officers do controlled
deliveries. I am looking for Mr. Garcia's agents to do that for
port of entry seizures, and DEA to do it with respect to
between the ports of entry.
Mr. Souder. When you and Mr. Garcia debate changes like you
are debating in either of these that have a big impact on
narcotics, do you discuss this with Mr. Mackin and alert him
before so he can get a counternarcotics officer opinion?
Mr. Bonner. Well, I would but I am not even discussing. I
have not had any internal discussions in Customs and Border
Protection at headquarters. If there is anything that we might
talk about at some point, it would be what I call the bag and
tag cases, which are cases that do not have any followup
investigative potential because you cannot do a controlled
delivery and the magnitude of the case does not warrant a
criminal investigation. It is, basically, we have a truck
driver and we have drugs, and we want to make sure that where a
prosecution can occur, a prosecution occurs. But right now, ICE
is handling that. And at least for the foreseeable future,
until Mr. Garcia says he wants to do it some other way, that is
the way it is going to be done. At some point I might talk to
Mr. Garcia about whether there is a more efficient way to do
some things, but I can tell you right now, in terms of followup
investigations and controlled deliveries, that is a 18.11
investigative agency function, and that is either ICE or DEA.
It is not CBP.
Mr. Souder. OK. My question was broader than that, but let
me ask this specific to Mr. Garcia. On the 18.11, do you
discuss with Mr. Mackin--I mean, the point here is that beyond
whether you are individually committed, what he is supposed to
be is a watchdog in the agency, that when there is a policy
change that could affect counternarcotics, that he at least
knows your internally debating it, not that he is informed at a
meeting that it is done, because he is supposed to be making
sure that function is not threatened, and, in fact, is
expanded. That does not mean he is going to disagree. But it is
an awkward position because we deliberately did not put him
into a line control over your agencies because you know your
subparts of the agency. But we need to know that he is in the
middle of the decision process to at least watch that.
Mr. Bonner. OK. But the premise is, you take my point
here----
Mr. Souder. Right. You are not changing, I understand that.
Mr. Bonner. I think it would be a bad idea to have CBP
Officers doing controlled----
Mr. Souder. Right. On 18.65 I got the point. But it would
be if you make other decisions related to narcotics. And in the
18.11 decision, here is one that you said is moving forward. I
just wondered whether his office has been consulted in that
process.
Mr. Garcia. Chairman Souder, a very good point. I am not
sure, to be frank, on the 18.11 issue, with the hundred or so
marine officers, if our offices have spoken. I have not spoken
to Mr. Mackin. I can tell you that he is very much involved in
discussions we have on our policy, on our working
relationships, on MOUs or MOAs on arrangements we have both
within the Department and outside the Department that I know he
is personally involved in, and I thank him for that effort.
Mr. Souder. Thank you. And let me pursue one other matter
here, and this is for Commissioner Bonner, Admiral Collins, and
Secretary Garcia. In the ICE, AMO, Border Patrol, Coast Guard,
each of you have air and marine assets that they also have
overlapping missions, particularly with respect to drug
smuggling. It is part of all your missions. I am going to give
you the series of four questions and then would like each of
you to explain how you see your unique mission as far as air
and water, what do you think the other two agencies' air and
marine missions are and how they differ from your mission, and
how you think we can make this more efficient. And we also
understand the Department has commissioned a study by an
outside consultant of air and marine programs.
I would like to hear each of your reactions to this because
this is, to some degree, where the rubber meets the road: How
do we sort this through, how do you view each other, and how do
we resolve this. Because drugs are not the only mission and it
is not the only reason you have air and marine divisions, but
to some degree it is a primary part of it.
Ms. Jackson-Lee. Mr. Chairman, could I ask you to yield
just for a moment?
Mr. Souder. Yes. Do you want to do a statement?
Ms. Jackson-Lee. Yes. If you would, I have a security
briefing going and I came back--gentlemen, if you would indulge
me--to support this hearing and to support what you are doing.
I very much want to associate myself with the purpose of this
hearing. We have travelled together and I hope the gentlemen
understand this is not a critique that is without purpose or
recognition of the good service that you do. I think in the
backdrop of the September 11 report today that talks about
collaboration and being able to singularly determine or have
governance over the intelligence, it is equally important to
recognize that smuggling drugs, aliens, or arms are, frankly,
the same threat against terrorism or the same threat of
terrorism. In addition, we know that narco terrorist
organizations include the revolutionary armed forces of
Colombia, the Islamic radical groups, and others.
I would encourage this hearing to move forward on the idea
of a singular person that coordinates and has standing in the
Homeland Security Department. I hope that we will have an
opportunity to work on this together, Mr. Chairman. I would
just say to the fine witnesses, with whom I work with as the
ranking member on the Immigration Claims Committee, we can be
enhanced and better for it when we find a stronger voice inside
the Homeland Security that coordinates some of these actions
dealing with the smuggling of drugs, aliens, or arms, which
will continue and will continue to be the fuel of terrorist
acts around the world.
Let me also ask unanimous consent to submit my entire
statement into the record. And I would appreciate being able to
submit the questions of the ranking member of the full
committee, Mr. Turner, into the record as well. Both of us are
off to a briefing and I apologize for having to depart. I thank
the chairman for his indulgence and well as the chairman and
the ranking member, Mr. Cummings, for this great work on this
matter.
[The prepared statement of Hon. Sheila Jackson-Lee
follows:]
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Mr. Souder. Thank you very much. Without objection, the
full statement will be inserted in the record, and the
questions from you and Mr. Turner. I thank the gentlelady for
her leadership and constant concern on the narcotics issue. It
has been bipartisan and it is very important that we continue
to do that.
Ms. Jackson-Lee. Thank you.
Mr. Souder. How about we go in the reverse direction. Mr.
Garcia, do you want to start on these?
Mr. Garcia. Yes. Chairman Souder, you are asking a question
that gets to core competencies of what these various divisions
do. I will perhaps speak on AMO and let the other gentlemen
take a shot at giving their first description of their own
programs.
I think if you look at the AMO core competencies, you look
at three different categories. You look at an air and marine
law enforcement capability, and we were just talking about that
with the 18.11, the training at FLETC and the investigative
course work. You look at the tremendous equipment they have,
the infrared cameras, for example, and I have seen them, I have
been with the Air and Marine and had demonstrations, an ability
to monitor, for example, a controlled delivery, to testify in
court about a deal that was done and who was present and what
happened and to present evidence as witnesses. A tremendous law
enforcement capability. In my experience as a prosecutor and
working in law enforcement in various agencies, it is a very
unique and impressive capability.
You have air and marine interdiction, detection, tracking,
interception, marine vessels and aircraft engaged in smuggling
illegal drugs, people, contraband, as the Congresswoman was
just mentioning. We see that across smuggling organizational
lines now and they do that within certain lanes and parameters,
working with their counterparts represented here at the table.
And air space security mission is the third mission. We see
that most starkly here in the National Capital Region where AMO
is responsible for maintaining that security zone. They have
done that work in Olympics in Atlanta and in Salt Lake City,
and at other special events like Presidential inaugurations.
So I would divide it into those three we call core
competencies of law enforcement interdiction and air space
security as an AMO mission.
Mr. Souder. Admiral Collins.
Admiral Collins. We have quite a substantial air arm, as
you know, Mr. Chairman, over 211 major aircraft, rotary wing an
fixed wing, C-130 is the heart of our fixed wing fleet, and we
have several classes of helicopters, and we also have a medium
endurance jet. They service all our wide range of missions,
from requirement for surveillance for fish, migrants, drugs,
and other things as far flung as the Bering Sea and the deep
Caribbean and the Western Pacific. So our venue is very, very
wide. It goes all the way to China and back, all the way to
Guam and back. It provides surveillance capabilities, strategic
lift capability, I think we are the primary strategic lift with
our C-130's for the Department, so moving rapid response teams,
security teams and so forth from FEMA, from us, from others is
through the C-130's. They also are equipped with fairly
significant surveillance equipment. Of course, the other unique
part about our air arm is they are the primary rescue and
recovery of vehicles for our search and rescue mission and I
think the world's preeminent search and rescue organization. We
save over 4,000 to 5,000 lives a year in the United States
through this. And you have to look at the aircraft types. Some
very different capabilities embedded in our aircraft than you
will find in other aircraft. So it is not just to say they have
a fleet. We have a fleet, it is a fleet with a particular set
of competencies, a certain set of capabilities, reach, and a
whole host of other things that are built in to service the
particular mission set that we have.
There is very, very I think close collaboration on the use
of those fleets. There is no duplication when it comes to use
of aircraft for the counter-drug mission. We can use every
single aircraft hour we can get. It is the long pole in the
tent, Mr. Chairman, in terms of servicing the counter-drug
mission. And we are doing that collaboratively. The integrating
mechanism for the two fleets is JIATF-South, quite frankly, in
terms of that southern vector, integrating these resources,
applying them to the best part of the mission. Clearly, ICE's
aircraft are very, very focused and very, very productive into
air bridge denial, but they are also involved in our at-sea in
surveillance, as we are. But we need both of those
competencies, both of those capabilities to do the job, and
they are coordinated, again, through that integrating
mechanism.
We are also looking at enterprise-wide systems in the
Department. What I mean by that is how we acquire them, which
ones we acquire, how we vet the requirement. We have an
organizational entity called the Air Council that is looking at
these issues, logistics, mission assignment, and a whole host
of other things to acquire and support aircraft. That is
actively looking at these things as we speak.
There is a Commodity Council on how we buy particular
equipment, and can we leverage economies of scale. There is an
example where the Border Patrol has bought off a small boat
contract, we have over 1,800 small boats in the Coast Guard
around the country. We have an existing contract with a very,
very capable boat company, it happens to be from a company
called Safe Boat in Puget Sound, that the Border Patrol has
bought off.
So we are looking at are there synergies, whether it is
procurement, whether it is maintenance, whether it is
deployment, in how do we integrate these things together. And
we have a lot of things in motion to look very, very aggressive
like that. I think it is a very positive development and I
think we will find efficiencies both in deployment,
maintenance, and everything else across the Department as we
manage these in a non-redundant but complimentary way. And that
is the focus, integrated operations.
Mr. Souder. Mr. Bonner.
Mr. Bonner. Well, it is an excellent question. Let me just
say I am in the unusual position of having seen, as
Commissioner of Customs, to have overseen the very fine work of
AMO, which was the air and marine interdiction division which
was part of our Office of Investigation at legacy Customs. So I
am very familiar with the good work that is done by the air and
marine assets that are now over in ICE. It was kind of like
ships passing in the night because, as a result of this
reorganization, of course, the Border Patrol became part of
Customs and Border Protection and the Border Patrol has air
assets and it has a few small what I would call brown water
assets that are important at the St. Lawrence and other
locations.
There are 116 Border Patrol aircraft in the Border Patrol
fleet, about 78 or 80 of those are rotors. These tend to be
very tactically, operationally driven use of air assets that is
directly related to the border control mission, which is both
the interception of illegal people that are illegally coming
into the United States, and the interception of illegal drugs
that are moving across the border, particularly the Mexican
border, into the United States. They are, by the way, far and
away the most efficient use of air assets in terms of per hour
air time of any of the air assets of the Federal Government,
and I include DEA, and I am very familiar with DEA's air
assets. But by that I mean, for every air hour flown by a
Border Patrol aircraft, there are three apprehensions that are
directly related to that aircraft, on average, and a
significant amount of illegal drugs that have moved across our
borders. In fact, when you think of the drive-throughs, and
this is illegal drugs down in Arizona and other places, but I
mean loads that are literally being driven through the border,
the only way the Border Patrol actually can successfully
interdict is to have air assets that can follow and get onto
those vehicles.
So Border Patrol uses its assets. I think the Commandant is
right that there are some unique assets that are specifically
related to this mission. But let me add that we put together,
actually under the Border and Transportation Security Division
of the Department, the Arizona Border Control Initiative. This
is something we started about mid-March. It is led by the
Border Patrol but it is multi-agency. The ICE participates in
it in a number of different ways but part of it is adding to
the 14 helicopters that we have deployed in essentially the
Arizona sector, this is the Tucson sector that we are trying to
take control over right now, the air and marine assets. We have
coordinated that. They have contributed significant assets
including the use of Blackhawks to assist moving teams of
Border Patrol agents so apprehensions can be made, and this is
both illegal migration but it is also drug smuggling. So we are
coordinating on it.
But on the other hand, I would say that, sort of looking at
it from the point of view of trying to control the physical
border, these air assets that Border Patrol has are incredibly
important. The one thing we do not have at Border Patrol is we
do not have assets that can go and interdict what I would call
well beyond the border. These are the Air and Marine, former
Customs air and marine P-3s, the Cessna Citations that over-fly
Mexico as part of Operation HALCON, very successful, by the
way. So from Border Patrol's point of view, we are not out
there in terms of the Caribbean and the East Pacific and over
Mexico. That is Air and Marine, because it has extended border
assets to do interdiction work, and that is the Coast Guard,
which has some significant assets that are out there doing
interdiction work. So we do not really overlap with that area,
that theater in terms of Border Patrol assets. I hope that is
helpful.
Mr. Souder. Thank you. Let me make a brief comment and then
I am going to yield to Chairman Camp for anything he wants to
cover here. You also, by each kind of defining who you were,
kind of defined some of your differences. I think it is
important as we move forward to continue to work to resolve
this. As we have looked at some amendments in the Homeland
Security bill, and as I wound up talking and trying to work
through kind of the difficulties of having so many authorizers
and how we work through this process, and getting support of
Mr. Sensenbrenner and talking to Don Young, who have very
strong opinions about the Department of Homeland Security
Select Committee but at the same time understand that there are
multi tasks, that we are going to have to figure out how we
integrate the tasks that are clearly homeland security-related
and the other tasks in the Department which may or may not be
homeland security related.
The Coast Guard is a classic example of that because
fisheries and search and rescue are really more dominant in the
mission than homeland security and narcotics have been. It is
not that they are not important, and port security, for
example, is a huge part of that. But there is no question that
when I have been briefed at the different regional places that
the bulk of the Coast Guard points are going to have, depending
on the location--for example, on Lake Michigan and in the mid-
West, you are going to have one set; if it is in Alaska, you
are going to have another set; if it is on the Texas-East
Coast, you are going to have another set. But you have multi
task missions that we have to sort out and most of those, with
the exception certainly of the Caribbean, most of the Coast
Guard missions tend to be more toward the border. And I will
let you rebut that point or add to it in a minute. Whereas in
the Border Patrol, clearly, while there might be some
fungibility inland, as you have clearly stated, you are pretty
much, in addition, to interdict right at the border--on the Rio
Grande with the boats--you are pretty much an addition and a
discouragement. And the goal is immigration, which is a
terrorist function potentially as well as an immigration
function, and a narcotics function. But the usual thing, and
this is what has been our continual discussion about Shadow
Wolves, is whether we should have a similar thing on the North
border. And the AMO division of the Department of Homeland
Security has historically had tasks that do not fit the box. In
other words, they go both directions. They go this way from the
border, and they go this way from the border. Certainly, by the
way, I just want to say for the record, Mr. Bonner, I agree
with you that the Border Patrol cannot be like a picket fence,
only that you have to have some back checkpoints like up in New
York State or in Arizona or in California and have to have the
ability to enforce it, otherwise once they get through it will
take so long to follow through.
Now with that concept I think in the Department of Homeland
Security, if we are going to keep our narcotics function, that
one way to address this, as long as there is adequate funding
in the Department that we need to battle for, is that there are
going to be some units that do not fit the traditional function
that may even have narcotics and contraband as a primary
function as opposed homeland security. I want to get your
reactions.
Admiral Collins, you have been chomping at the bit.
Admiral Collins. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I would just like
to add just a little bit on the helicopter capability, in
particular, about the range and the reach of those. Yes, we
have helicopter stations in the Great Lakes, in Alaska, along
the coastal regions, and certainly they have search and rescue
responsibility in the coastal arena. But those same
helicopters, those air stations provide deployers to all our
ships. Most of our ships are helicopter-equipped ships, they
have a helicopter deck, they deploy to the Caribbean, they
deploy to the Western Pacific, they deploy to the Bering Sea,
they carry helicopters. Helicopters give them reach, give them
surveillance capability for law enforcement, particularly for
counter-drugs.
We also have I think incredible capability. It has turned
around the seizure rate for us. That is the reason why. And if
you plot it, you plot it over time and you see huge spike in
the growth of our seizure rate, it has everything to do with
those airborne capabilities. Use of force from helicopters, the
HITRON squadron based out of Jacksonville, eight helicopters
that have machine gun and laser-guided sniper rifle capability
that can stop go-fast. We have all our arrests at sea, a great
deal of our seizures are a result of that activity. They are
the arrestees that go to Panama Express. They are the arrestees
that give us all our information. They are the arrestees that
give us the indictment and extradition out of Colombia. This is
the enabler for the drug war. And our next step is to embed
that capability organically in every helicopter in the U.S.
Coast Guard so it is not just the HITRON helicopters. We will
have security zone enforcement, vessel escorts in and out of
ports, and a whole hosts of other things. So it is both
homeland security, law enforcement, and counter-drug effort of
great import to this Nation. And we have special dispensation
with the Justice Department to use Use of Force in domestic
airspace.
So I think it is a potent force for our country and the one
that we can offer. So I just wanted to add that clarity to the
reach and the focus of that fleet.
Mr. Souder. I will let each comment. Mr. Garcia, then Mr.
Mackin.
Mr. Garcia. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. You make very good
points in terms of where are we, where does that border end.
And it has to be somewhat fluid because we have to treat it as
the most effective way that we can address the threat that we
have all been talking about here today. It is difficult when
you are looking at it that way, as the border is fluid and our
response must be, and how do you put a particular asset in a
particular box. Some judgment has to be exercised, a call has
to be made, and then you have to show flexibility in how you
use the asset, in how Air and Marine, or the Coast Guard, or
Commissioner Bonner's assets work with the other assets, how we
support each other, and Commissioner Bonner gave the example in
Arizona. We always look for efficiencies. Admiral Collins
mentioned procurement, we also have purchased off the Safe Boat
contract as well, how do we save money, how do we order, how do
we procure materials for these units, and always looking at can
we do it more efficiently. BTS I know right now has a group
going that is looking at the air assets particularly, and where
they are, how are we using them, and is that the best structure
for it.
I know there has been interest here and in other places in
Congress about the same issues. And we balance that also with
the fact that we have gone through a period of tremendous
reorganization and upheaval already. People are being asked to
do really incredibly difficult and important work out there and
they want to know with some certainty where they are and what
they are doing in the mission.
So, we would never say we do not want to change, because
change can be a very good thing. But we balance that against
the fact that we have gone through many changes in the last 16
months or 18 months or so. I can assure you that analysis is
constantly going on at every level I just described. And I can
say that, having worked with the people here at the table, they
are also committed to looking at those assets and using them in
the most efficient way and considering them as national assets
in doing the work that you describe.
Mr. Souder. Mr. Mackin.
Mr. Mackin. Mr. Souder, just a brief comment to endorse
Admiral Collins' discussion of the Use of Force helicopters.
They are integral. He has done a marvelous thing in creating
them and sustaining them and now he is embarking on doing that
for all of the helicopters. That will greatly increase the
interdiction capability of our forces both in Caribbean and the
Eastern Pacific. And so I applaud that. And in thoughts for the
future, any aid that you can give him to move that faster is
certainly appropriate. Thank you.
Mr. Souder. Thank you.
Mr. Bonner. Just a very short comment, and that is that
looking at it from the perspective let us say of the land
border, and particularly Mexico where most illegal drugs, at
least the vast majority, are coming through, I think it is a
truism, Mr. Chairman, to say that smuggling is smuggling is
smuggling, and it does not really matter whether it is people
being smuggled, whether it is drugs, or whether it is
terrorists. The reality is you need air assets to be effective,
to have the mobility that we need to be able to track down,
intercept, and interdict.
Mr. Souder. Thank you. Chairman Camp.
Mr. Camp. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I just have a couple of
mission-specific questions. Mr. Garcia, the Office of Air and
Marine Operations is expanding their presence on the northern
border and also in our own National Capital Region. And with
slightly over 1,000 people, how have these activities impacted
AMO's ability to provide counternarcotics support to ICE and
Customs and Border Protection?
Mr. Garcia. You are correct, we are increasing the presence
on the northern border. Everybody has realized that risk. We
discussed the Rassum case earlier, a particular example of the
risk. To date, Mr. Chairman, as we have increased the presence,
it has been very gradual. In fact, I visited the station that
we are building up in Washington, I know there is one scheduled
in upstate New York that is actually going forward there, we
have detailed personnel in, we are in the process of hiring,
and have hired for those stations particularly. So in
discussing that very issue with Air and Marine, they have not
seen a decrease either in their effectiveness on the Southwest
border or in their ability to support other Federal agencies
such as CBP.
Mr. Camp. Admiral Collins, the Coast Guard has an increased
U.S. presence in U.S. ports, which is a new mission, basically,
in many ways. How has this impacted the Coast Guard's ability
to conduct surveillance and search for narcotics vessels?
Admiral Collins. It is not a new mission. We have had the
mission since 1790. We were created as a law enforcement
agency, by the way, by Alexander Hamilton. So it is not a new
mission. It is sort of taken off the back burner. We had 45,000
people dedicated to port security during World War II, which is
bigger than the entire U.S. Coast Guard today. So we have had
that, it has just ebbed and flowed. It is taken from the back
burner and put on the front burner and the flames are turned up
a little bit now.
You are right in saying that we have had to allocate
resources to greater surveillance, both from a boat perspective
and air perspective, in the ports of the United States,
particularly during Orange condition. When that happens, we
have pulled assets, clearly, there is less deploying
helicopters with our ships, there is less fixed wing support
deep in the Caribbean. And so it has had a resource impact.
That is why I mentioned in my opening statement, Mr. Chairman,
Chairmen, that it was a capability capacity thing to us was the
key issues in terms of servicing the wide range of missions
that the Nation needs.
What is the good news is that we are capable of flexing
back and forth very, very quickly and to mobilizing the surge
into the highest risk at the time. And the other good news is
we have doubled the effectiveness of the existing assets. Let
me give just a couple of statistics. During the 1992 to 1996
timeframe, we allocated 73,000 air hours to the drug mission
and had an average seizure rate of 6 percent overall, overall,
6 percent. In the year 2002 to 2003, we allocated 72,000 air
hours to the drug mission and we have an average seizure rate
of 13 percent. We have more than doubled the productivity of
those aircraft. And that has a lot to do with using acute
intelligence, international partnerships and coalitions,
bilateral agreements with over 26 nations in the Caribbean and
South America, and a host of other initiatives that we have put
together to leverage the heck out of those assets.
Could we do more if we had more assets? Absolutely. In the
go-fast war, for example, we can document that during the last
12 months that we forego about 55 tons of cocaine. We had hard
intelligence and we had go-fast, but we did not have the
surface asset or the HITRON helicopter to prosecute the
intelligence. So we have intelligence-rich environment getting
better, and better, and better at it in the interagency. We do
not have the force structure capacity to handle all the
intelligence.
Mr. Camp. Commissioner Bonner, with the money flow in terms
of drug trafficking, CRS has a report that in the Caribbean
alone they estimate $3.3 billion is traced to the illegal drug
industry. What programs does DHS have in place to track and
disrupt that money flow, which is significant?
Mr. Bonner. It is significant. Again, this is a coordinated
effort. But from the CBP end of it, we have not only inbound
authority, we have outbound authority to essentially search and
question people going outbound or vehicles going outbound. And
so we do seize a fair amount, I do not have the data right in
front of me now, of outbound cash, most of which is drug money.
This is money going across the Port of Laredo out to Mexico,
and sometimes money going out to Canada and elsewhere that is
mainly drug-related.
But we do coordinate on this overall issue of how do you do
this more effectively with ICE and with the special agents in
ICE who have considerable, formidable expertise in terms of
money laundering and drug money laundering. So we work in
combination. Sometimes, by the way, ICE will suggest to us
where we might be looking for outbound drug money, this is
intelligence-cueing and that sort of thing, and we coordinate
with them. Well, I do not want to go into another situation I
was talking to Mr. Mackin about on the public record. But in
any event, this is an important part of our responsibility in
terms of seizing outbound currency and cash. Part of that, too,
is sometimes homeland security-related because we have seized a
very significant amount of outbound cash going to the Middle
East, much of which was generated by drug trafficking activity.
I am not saying it was going to terrorists, but I am saying
that just by doing some targeting of outbound money that is
leaving the United States either through our international
airports or through our land border, it is an important part of
how we view our overall responsibility and use of authorities
to get after drug money laundering.
Mr. Camp. Yes, Mr. Mackin.
Mr. Mackin. Mr. Camp, I would like to point out that I
spend quite a bit of my time working the outbound money issue
with Mexico and with Colombia, I am working with my ICE
colleagues who are experts in that area. I am helping to work
with our Mexican colleagues there about investigating the leads
that we can harvest in the United States and get them to help,
because often the money is identifiable only after it gets down
there you discover it has arrived, you did not know which car
was bringing it over. So we are trying to work to improve their
capability to work these issues with both ICE and with DEA. And
with Colombia, the black market pesos exchange is a serious
problem there and we have worked with them to develop a program
where we can identify--I have to be careful how far I get into
this--information that the Colombians can use to go after both
businessmen and traffickers that are using this black market
pesos exchange to their advantage.
Mr. Garcia. Mr. Chairman, I think there is a success story
in the paper today. Working in Colombia actually, we seized
with a unit we work with down there 78 properties, the
Colombians seized millions of dollars in value, showing that we
are tracing the money into the source countries. So, progress
on that front. In fact, using some of the new tools under the
Patriot Act, the unlicensed money brokers, the bulk cash
smuggling, authorities that have really made us a lot more
effective in the money laundering area, and using our money
laundering coordination center to deconflict and look at
intelligence information on a money laundering front. So, an
incredibly important part of what we all do here.
Mr. Camp. Thank you. Thank you very much for your testimony
today. It was a very good hearing. I appreciate your being here
and all that you had to say. Thanks a lot, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Souder. Thank you. Congresswoman Kelly from the Banking
Committee is just forming a financial terrorism working group
with a number of us who are on committees from Homeland
Security to Financial Services to Judiciary, and we are putting
together a group of people who have been tracking this, because
in Congress you all get hauled up for all kinds of things, so
many kinds of committees, and we need to be talking more too.
I have some additional written questions. It would be
helpful if we can get answers in writing and we do not have to
use up so much time. I very much appreciate your taking a long
time this afternoon to do this. So maybe we can do it with
written followup and we will not have to take so much of your
time in the future.
I appreciate all your leadership and long-time commitment.
It is a very difficult time to try to figure out how to
coordinate all these things and where the priorities are, and
you need to keep working aggressively at it. As you are well
aware, I am very concerned about the counternarcotics, what the
role of Mr. Mackin is in the agency in a structural way, not
him personally but his position; that we figure out how to work
out the Air and Marine; we figure out how we are going deal
with the challenges on the norther border as well as the
southern border; how we make sure that if we get in a period
where we have 3 months of sustained Orange that we do not lose
the narcotics war by having everything pulled in tight and that
we have some units that are still able to support DEA and some
of the other narcotics agents who have that as their primary
mission.
So we will look forward to continuing to work together. We
appreciate your work.
And with that, the subcommittee stands adjourned.
[Whereupon, at 5:03 p.m., the subcommittee was adjourned,
to reconvene at the call of the Chair.]
[The prepared statements of Hon. Michael R. Turner and Hon.
Joe Barton, and additional information submitted for the
hearing record follows:]
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