    [House Hearing, 108 Congress]
    [From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]

           HOMELAND SECURITY: MONITORING NUCLEAR POWER PLANT SECURITY

    =======================================================================

                                    HEARING

                                   before the

                       SUBCOMMITTEE ON NATIONAL SECURITY,
                       EMERGING THREATS AND INTERNATIONAL
                                   RELATIONS

                                     of the

                                  COMMITTEE ON
                               GOVERNMENT REFORM

                            HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

                          ONE HUNDRED EIGHTH CONGRESS

                                 SECOND SESSION

                                   __________

                               SEPTEMBER 14, 2004

                                   __________

                               Serial No. 108-265

                                   __________

           Printed for the use of the Committee on Government Reform

      Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.gpo.gov/congress/house
                          http://www.house.gov/reform

                                     ______

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                         COMMITTEE ON GOVERNMENT REFORM

                         TOM DAVIS, Virginia, Chairman
    DAN BURTON, Indiana                  HENRY A. WAXMAN, California
    CHRISTOPHER SHAYS, Connecticut       TOM LANTOS, California
    ILEANA ROS-LEHTINEN, Florida         MAJOR R. OWENS, New York
    JOHN M. McHUGH, New York             EDOLPHUS TOWNS, New York
    JOHN L. MICA, Florida                PAUL E. KANJORSKI, Pennsylvania
    MARK E. SOUDER, Indiana              CAROLYN B. MALONEY, New York
    STEVEN C. LaTOURETTE, Ohio           ELIJAH E. CUMMINGS, Maryland
    DOUG OSE, California                 DENNIS J. KUCINICH, Ohio
    RON LEWIS, Kentucky                  DANNY K. DAVIS, Illinois
    TODD RUSSELL PLATTS, Pennsylvania    JOHN F. TIERNEY, Massachusetts
    CHRIS CANNON, Utah                   WM. LACY CLAY, Missouri
    ADAM H. PUTNAM, Florida              DIANE E. WATSON, California
    EDWARD L. SCHROCK, Virginia          STEPHEN F. LYNCH, Massachusetts
    JOHN J. DUNCAN, Jr., Tennessee       CHRIS VAN HOLLEN, Maryland
    NATHAN DEAL, Georgia                 LINDA T. SANCHEZ, California
    CANDICE S. MILLER, Michigan          C.A. ``DUTCH'' RUPPERSBERGER,
    TIM MURPHY, Pennsylvania                 Maryland
    MICHAEL R. TURNER, Ohio              ELEANOR HOLMES NORTON, District of
    JOHN R. CARTER, Texas                    Columbia
    MARSHA BLACKBURN, Tennessee          JIM COOPER, Tennessee
    PATRICK J. TIBERI, Ohio              BETTY McCOLLUM, Minnesota
    KATHERINE HARRIS, Florida                        ------
    ------ ------                        BERNARD SANDERS, Vermont
                                             (Independent)

                        Melissa Wojciak, Staff Director
           David Marin, Deputy Staff Director/Communications Director
                          Rob Borden, Parliamentarian
                           Teresa Austin, Chief Clerk
              Phil Barnett, Minority Chief of Staff/Chief Counsel

     Subcommittee on National Security, Emerging Threats and International
                                   Relations

                    CHRISTOPHER SHAYS, Connecticut, Chairman

    MICHAEL R. TURNER, Ohio
    DAN BURTON, Indiana                  DENNIS J. KUCINICH, Ohio
    STEVEN C. LaTOURETTE, Ohio           TOM LANTOS, California
    RON LEWIS, Kentucky                  BERNARD SANDERS, Vermont
    TODD RUSSELL PLATTS, Pennsylvania    STEPHEN F. LYNCH, Massachusetts
    ADAM H. PUTNAM, Florida              CAROLYN B. MALONEY, New York
    EDWARD L. SCHROCK, Virginia          LINDA T. SANCHEZ, California
    JOHN J. DUNCAN, Jr., Tennessee       C.A. ``DUTCH'' RUPPERSBERGER,
    TIM MURPHY, Pennsylvania                 Maryland
    KATHERINE HARRIS, Florida            JOHN F. TIERNEY, Massachusetts
                                         DIANE E. WATSON, California

                                   Ex Officio

    TOM DAVIS, Virginia                  HENRY A. WAXMAN, California
                Lawrence J. Halloran, Staff Director and Counsel
                      J. Vincent Chase, Chief Investigator
                            Robert A. Briggs, Clerk
                 Andrew Su, Minority Professional Staff Member

                                C O N T E N T S

                                  ----------
                                                                       Page
    Hearing held on September 14, 2004...............................     1
    Statement of:
        Matthiessen, Alex, Director, Hudson Riverkeeper, Garrison,
          NY; David Lochbaum, Union of Concerned Scientists,
          Washington, DC; and Marvin Fertel, vice president and chief
          nuclear officer, Nuclear Energy Institute, Washington, DC..   115
        Reyes, Luis, Executive Director of Operations, Nuclear
          Regulatory Commission, accompanied by Roy P. Zimmerman,
          Director, Office of Nuclear Security and Incidence
          Response, Nuclear Regulatory Commission....................    32
        Wells, Jim, Director, Natural Resources and Environment,
          Government Accountability Office, accompanied by Raymond H.
          Smith, Jr. Assistant Director; and Kenneth E. Lightner,
          Jr., Senior Analyst........................................    73
    Letters, statements, etc., submitted for the record by:
        Fertel, Marvin, vice president and chief nuclear officer,
          Nuclear Energy Institute, Washington, DC, prepared
          statement of...............................................   149
        Kucinich, Hon. Dennis J., a Representative in Congress from
          the State of Ohio:
            Letter dated August 18, 2004.............................    30
            Letter dated August 19, 2004.............................    22
            Prepared statement of....................................     4
        Lochbaum, David, Union of Concerned Scientists, Washington,
          DC, prepared statement of..................................   141
        Maloney, Hon. Carolyn B., a Representative in Congress from
          the State of New York, prepared statement of...............    13
        Matthiessen, Alex, Director, Hudson Riverkeeper, Garrison,
          NY, prepared statement of..................................   119
        Reyes, Luis, Executive Director of Operations, Nuclear
          Regulatory Commission, prepared statement of...............    35
        Shays, Hon. Christopher, a Representative in Congress from
          the State of Connecticut, prepared statement of............    19
        Wells, Jim, Director, Natural Resources and Environment,
          Government Accountability Office, prepared statement of....    77
        Zimmerman, Roy P., Director, Office of Nuclear Security and
          Incidence Response, Nuclear Regulatory Commission:
            Information concerning force-on-force exercises..........   110
            Information concerning licensee employees................   108

           HOMELAND SECURITY: MONITORING NUCLEAR POWER PLANT SECURITY

                                  ----------

                          TUESDAY, SEPTEMBER 14, 2004

                      House of Representatives,
    Subcommittee on National Security, Emerging Threats
                           and International Relations,
                                Committee on Government Reform,
                                                        Washington, DC.
        The subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 10:05 a.m., in
    room 2247, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Christopher
    Shays (chairman of the subcommittee) presiding.
        Present: Representatives Shays, Platts, Duncan, Kucinich,
    Sanders, Maloney, Ruppersberger, Tierney, and Watson.
        Staff present: Lawrence Halloran, staff director and
    counsel; J. Vincent Chase, chief investigator; Robert A.
    Briggs, clerk; Andrew Su, minority professional staff member;
    and Jean Gosa, minority assistant clerk.
        Mr. Shays. A quorum being present, the Subcommittee on
    National Security, Emerging Threats and International Relations
    entitled Homeland Security: Monitoring Nuclear Power Plant
    Security is called to order.
        I have a statement. I am going to catch my breath, and I am
    going to ask the ranking member to start, and then I will make
    my opening statement.
        Mr. Kucinich. I want to thank the chairman, as always, for
    his diligence in matters of security in calling these hearings
    and indicate my appreciation for the attention that you pay to
    these matters.
        Good morning to the Chair and members of the subcommittee
    and to our witnesses here today. I welcome this opportunity to
    discuss nuclear security in open session. As both Congress and
    the public have been stymied for far too long and getting
    truthful answers to many questions we have about nuclear safety
    and security.
        Three years ago, two incidents shook the faith of the
    American people in our security. The first, of course, was the
    tragic attack on our country by terrorists on September 11.
        The other less-known incident was the hidden problem going
    on at the Davis-Besse nuclear reactor in Ohio. These are the
    facts.
        In February 2001 the Nuclear Regulatory Commission began
    investigating an aging mechanism that often caused cracking in
    reactors. As a result of these findings in late 2001, the NRC
    determined that the Davis-Besse plant was at risk and should
    shut down by December 31, 2001. FirstEnergy, the plant owner,
    resisted the order, claiming it should stay open without
    incident until March 2002. FirstEnergy argued that a shutdown
    would cause an unnecessary financial burden.
        Rather than following its own safety procedures and
    shutting down Davis-Besse, the NRC relented and allowed the
    plant to operate until February 2002. After the Davis-Besse
    plant had been shut down, workers repairing one of five cracked
    control rod nozzles discovered extensive damage to the reactor
    vessel head. The workers found a large corroded hole the size
    of a football in the reactor vessel head next to one of the
    nozzles. The GAO concluded in a scathing report on May 2004
    that the risk estimate used by the NRC to decide whether the
    plant needed to be shut down was flawed.
        The NRC severely underestimated the risk Davis-Besse posed,
    even exceeding risk levels generally considered acceptable by
    the Agency. The GAO report shows that the NRC was ill-equipped,
    ill-informed, and far too slow to react. The NRC's reaction to
    Davis-Besse was inadequate, irresponsible and left the public
    at great risk.
        The NRC later reported that the plant might have been as
    close as 60 days to bursting its rust, damaged lid.
    Fortunately, the health of tens of thousands of Ohio residents
    was not harmed, but this was a disaster waiting to happen.
    Let's talk about security.
        So, Mr. Chairman, it's very difficult for me to sit here
    today and to listen without objectivity as the NRC and the
    nuclear industry lobbyists tell us how much has been spent, how
    much security has improved in the last 3 years. The facts and
    independent experts tell us differently.
        For example, we know that one security firm, Wackenhut,
    provides nearly half of the guard forces at our Nation's
    nuclear sites. Yet, as was documented by the Department of
    Energy's Inspector General, the report in January of this year
    questions surround Wackenhut's competency and objectivity to
    fulfill this crucial mission. The DOE Inspector General found
    that in simulation attack drills, Wackenhut attackers told the
    Wackenhut guard defenders the buildings that were being
    attacked, the targets at those buildings and whether a
    diversionary tactic would be used.
        The IG also noted an industry-funded study found that as
    many as 50 percent of the guard forces in a New York plant did
    not meet physical fitness requirements, guards reported for
    duty drunk, worked 70 to 80 hours per week and were allowed to
    repeat weapons qualifying tests until they passed them.
        In spite of this poor record, and obvious conflict of
    interest, the commercial industry still decided to hire
    Wackenhut to provide the attack teams in force-on-force drills
    at NRC commercial sites. This could be called a case of the fox
    guarding the hen house and anyone with a shred of common
    sense--it's a poor decision. It undermined public trust and
    raises serious questions on who is making the decisions at the
    NRC. Understandably, the NRC has decided that the less it says
    the better. It has polled public security information from its
    Web site. It has restricted public access by public interest
    groups to information by requiring none disclosure forms or
    thorough reclassification, even if the information was
    previously unclassified.
        Mr. Chairman, I would like to submit two documents for the
    record. The first is a letter from Public Citizen to the NRC
    dated August 19th; and the second is a Freedom of Information
    Act request submitted by a coalition of public interest groups
    dated August 18th. Both documents question the rational behind
    the NRC's announcement in August 2004 that ``certain security
    information formally included in the reactor oversight process
    will no longer be publicly available and will no longer be
    updated in the NRC's Web site.''
        The same information, including performance indicators and
    physical inspection information, was available on the NRC Web
    site after September 11. It was temporarily pulled from the Web
    site for review and returned to it after it was deemed to have
    no value to potential terrorists.
        What has changed to make this information unacceptable for
    public review? Since the NRC won't hold public hearings, it's
    up to this subcommittee to find out. Mr. Chairman, we all know
    that these nuclear plants are decades old and they are
    decaying. Yet despite the billions of dollars spent to upgrade
    security at these nuclear plants, the NRC clearly has a long
    ways to go before it can restore public trust in its position.
    I have to wonder if an incident such as if this happened at
    Davis-Besse in Ohio happened today, whether the NRC would tell
    us about it. The NRC should work to allay public fears about
    public safety not to foster them. I really look forward to
    hearing your testimony. Thank you.
        [The prepared statement of Hon. Dennis J. Kucinich
    follows:]

    [GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T8358.001

    [GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T8358.002

    [GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T8358.003

    [GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T8358.004

    [GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T8358.005

    [GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T8358.006

        Mr. Shays. Thank you, gentlemen. At this time the Chair
    would recognize Mr. Turner.
        Mr. Turner. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Mr. Chairman, I want to thank you for your leadership in
    reviewing the issues of our terrorist attack preparedness, both
    at our nuclear weapons facilities and our power plants; in your
    efforts in reviewing our terrorist attack preparedness both of
    in our nuclear weapons facilities and our power plants; and
    your efforts in reviewing terrorist attack preparedness of
    making America's families safer.
        The security of nuclear facilities--both weapons facilities
    and power plants, is an issue this committee has examined
    through several hearings. In dealing with the security of
    nuclear weapons facilities, the subcommittee has learned that
    DOE needs to update its designed basis threat to meet the
    current security situation, including upgrading equipment,
    training and its security force.
        Our nuclear power plants, though they don't contain
    weapons, are just as important to protect. They are designed
    and built to withstand many natural disasters. But we must make
    sure as a Nation that we do all we can to protect these energy
    sources from foreseeable attack.
        In earlier hearings, we found that DOE has not developed as
    strong a relationship with DOD in regard to the sharing of
    resources and information. I look forward from hearing from our
    witnesses today concerning issues of coordinations of their
    efforts with DOD and other Federal agencies, and whether they
    are taking all available steps and precautions to ensure that
    the proper equipment is available to secure these nuclear power
    plants.
        Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Mr. Shays. I thank the gentleman.
        The Chair would recognize Carolyn Maloney.
        Mrs. Maloney. Thank you.
        Well, first of all, Chairman Shays, I want like to thank
    you for your consistent oversight on terrorism and ways to make
    our country safer. I think you have really done an outstanding
    job. I thank you on behalf of my constituents.
        I would like to welcome all of our witnesses, particularly
    Mr. Alex Matthiessen, director of the Hudson Riverkeeper from
    the State of New York.
        The purpose of this hearing is to discuss how adequate are
    the security measures recommended by the Nuclear Regulatory
    Commission to protect power plants from terrorist attacks. We
    know that since September 11, there have been some positive
    steps, but 3 years later, many still have serious and well-
    founded concerns about the safety of our nuclear power plants.
    Required preparations for attacks are specified in the
    classified design basis threat, the DBT. And a new DBT for
    nuclear plants is set to be implemented by the end of next
    month by updating requirements are welcomed. There are several
    concerns about the thoroughness and implementation of the DBT.
        One of the greatest concerns is that these new security
    requirements do not include an analysis on the impact of an
    attack similar to the one on the World Trade Center. The NRC
    has announced that this review is underway, but no analysis has
    been completed. This is 3 years later, and I want to know why.
        I absolutely do not understand why it has not been done
    when we know that after the September 11 attacks and after the
    9/11 Commission reported, that on the list of initial targets
    proposed by al Qaeda leaders, included planes attacking and
    flying into nuclear power plants. Khalid Shaikh Mohammed
    recommended that, and that's spelled out in the 9/11 Commission
    report.
        I would like to hear from our witnesses on the status this
    analysis. It's a very serious threat to our country. Not only
    does this plan not include the threat of an aviation attack.
    The GAO found that it will take several more years before the
    NRC will have assurances that the plants are protected against
    the terrorist threats--included in the new DBT--and they will
    not have detailed knowledge about security at individual
    facilities to insure that these plants provide the protections
    included in the DBT.
        My understanding, based on the submitted testimony of the
    GAO, that this is caused because the NRC's review of the new
    security plans has been rushed largely superficial and because
    the NRC reviewers are not visiting the plants to obtain details
    about the plants and view how they work with the plants
    facilities.
        Additionally, I am told it will take up to 3 years for the
    NRC to test implementation of all the new plans through the
    force-on-force exercises. And I would like to hear more from
    the witnesses on these shortcomings.
        Regarding the force-on-force exercises, I am interested to
    hear from the NRC and the Nuclear Energy Institute on the
    implementation of these exercises.
        Earlier this year NEI chose Wackenhut security to provide
    the attack teams in the force-on-force drills at NRC commercial
    sites. And we just heard from Mr. Kucinich, an outline of many
    of the problems there. They did provide security at Indian
    Point No. 2 nuclear power plant, which is less than 35 miles
    from the district that I represent.
        The utility Interenergy, that had recently acquired the
    plant, hired a consultant to conduct a probe of security at the
    facility and found Wackenhut lacking dramatically. I have a
    list of problems they had. Only 19 percent of the security
    officers stated that they could adequately defend the plant.
    And I would like to place all of them in the record.
        But they have not improved from there, and Interenergy
    subsequently terminated Wackenhut's contract as a result of
    their findings. I would like to put the findings in the record
    to save time----
        Additionally, Wackenhut provides security for close to half
    of all of the nuclear power plants now. And by allowing them to
    provide the attack teams on a company with a troubling record
    will be basically having Wackenhut police themselves--and I
    refer again to the testimony of Mr. Kucinich--where they were
    telling them where they were going to attack and etc.
        So I think that this is worse than the so-called fox
    guarding the hen house that Mr. Kucinich referenced. It is not
    an apparent conflict of interest, but a blatant conflict of
    interest. And they definitely should not be the ones doing the
    attack.
        Finally, the testimony submitted by GAO states, and it was
    very, very troubling, ``the NRC does not plan to make
    improvement to their inspection program that GAO previously
    recommended and still believes is absolutely necessary. So
    first of all, I want to know why they are not going to make the
    improvements that GAO recommended. For example, NRC is not
    following up to verify that all violations of security
    requirements are corrected.''
        And I would like an explanation from the NRC on this
    important question, and why they do not plan to follow some of
    the recommendations that the GAO believes is so necessary. So I
    thank the chairman for this oversight hearing. It's important
    and I yield back the balance of my time.
        [The prepared statement of Hon. Carolyn B. Maloney
    follows:]

    [GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T8358.007

    [GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T8358.008

        Mr. Shays. I thank the gentlelady.
        At this time the Chair would recognize John Duncan from
    Tennessee.
        Mr. Duncan. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        I remember a few days after the original and horrible
    events of September 11, I was eating dinner and meeting with
    several Members of the House. And Congressman Callahan, who at
    that point was a senior member of the Appropriations Committee,
    estimated that we would spend--he said over $1\1/2\ trillion
    over the next 5 years on security measures. I thought then that
    his estimate was extremely high. No one challenged him on it.
        But I know that just a couple of months ago, Federal
    Express--just one company--said they spent an extra $200
    million on security that they wouldn't have spent.
        After the last hearing on this subject, I sent letters to
    five Department of Energy laboratories and BWXTY 12 just to ask
    them how much their security measures had increased. I got back
    these responses. And a 40 percent increase in security spending
    on Oak Ridge National Laboratory, a 51 percent increase at the
    Savannah River National Laboratory, 50 percent increases at
    Argon and a separate 50 percent increase at BWXTY-12.
        In addition, we checked with the Tennessee Valley
    Authority, and their security spending has gone up by 60
    percent since September 11, and that doesn't count $30 million
    extra that they spent after some Nuclear Regulatory Commission
    ordered some special measures after April 2003.
        Security is very, very important, and I don't know if
    Congressman Callahan was way off on his $1\1/2\ trillion, but
    there are always companies, there are all kinds of security
    companies now that have gotten into this market and are doing
    everything they can to sensationalize and scandalize these
    matters and exaggerate the problem so that they can make more
    money.
        And I am not saying not do anything with regard to
    security. But if you stop to think about it, if we do--if
    Congressman Callahan was anywhere close to being right--that's
    $1 trillion or $1\1/2\ trillion that we are not spending on
    schools, medical research, highways to cut down on the deaths
    on our Nation's highways, or many, many other good things,
    whether you might like libraries, national parks or whatever.
        And I think back to former Governor Gilmore of Virginia,
    who was the chairman of the Commission on Terrorism that the
    President appointed. After his Commission studied the issue of
    terrorism, he sent this in a cover letter with their reporting,
    and Governor Gilmore said there will never be 100 percent
    guarantee of security for our people, the economy and our
    society. We must resist the urge to seek total security. It is
    not achievable and drains our attention from those things that
    can be accomplished.
        I just think that we have to make sure that we take serious
    steps about security, but we also have to make sure that we
    don't give terrorists undeserved victories by going totally
    ridiculously overboard on this and that we don't do it simply
    because there's some companies out here that want to make some
    more money.
        So, with that, I think it's good to keep holding these
    hearings to make sure that we do have a reasonable and rational
    response to some of these problems.
        Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Mr. Shays. I thank the gentleman.
        At this time the Chair would recognize Mr. Ruppersberger
    from Maryland.
        Mr. Ruppersberger. First, Chairman Shays, I agree with Mrs.
    Maloney that you have done an excellent job as leader this
    committee and brings a lot of problems as it relates to
    national security to the attention of this committee. I just
    hope that as a body of Congress we can hope implement some of
    the issues that we have learned in these hearings.
        The issue of security with respect to nuclear plants, we
    know that it's very, very important. Our intelligence shows
    that al Qaeda clearly has made our nuclear plants a target and
    that was also confirmed in the 9/11 Commission. Now, one of my
    areas of concern is, first, the issue of privatization and how
    we manage privatization. I don't have an issue with
    privatization. It works sometimes. Other times, it is not
    necessary when we deal with government.
        If you are going to privatize, whether it's Wackenhut's
    name has been mentioned today or anyone else. If we are going
    to pay to have someone other than government deal with the
    issue, we want efficiency and we want accountability.
        It seems to me that part of the NRC's responsibility is to
    hold all privatization, such as Wackenhut, accountable for
    performance. You read in here that people are coming to work
    intoxicated or they are not prepared or they don't have the
    physical standards, that concerns me. That's our fault too as
    the government or NRC because we have not held them liable.
        Now, one of my concerns is the issue of consistency in
    national policies and the regulation of nuclear power plants.
    This seems to be some conflict between the NRC regulatory
    abilities versus the privatized operations of the nuclear and
    commercial entities themselves.
        The security standards have already been changed, for
    example. We have a new design-based threat. DBT formula, which
    should be a good thing. The required force-on-force exercises
    have been increased to once every 3 years instead of every 8
    years. That's a good thing. The NRC has also issued more orders
    regarding augmenting barricades, security forces, patrols and
    restrict plant access.
        The Nuclear Energy Institute has claimed an increase of $16
    million per site toward security. Despite these changes,
    however, the reality of lapses in the security provided by and
    controlled through private industry remains.
        And I believe it will take real partnerships to resolve
    many of the critical changes we face in protecting nuclear
    sites. We must work toward resolving this situation without
    putting undue cost pressure upon the industry itself. I believe
    we as the government need to do better and working with the
    nuclear industry regarding threats and intelligence
    information. We need a true working partnership that provides a
    more thorough examination of how information is classified by
    NRC.
        We must not compromise secure security for public
    disclosure, but there must remain a balance for the industry to
    help keep industries secure these nuclear sites.
        Thank you.
        Mr. Shays. I thank the gentleman.
        At this time, Ambassador Watson, you have the floor.
        Ms. Watson. I just want to emphasize our role, Mr.
    Chairman, as the overseers, and I think that oversight has been
    lagging in the last session. I thank you for bringing to our
    attention this subject matter, but we are failing in our
    responsibility if we don't call in our witnesses, raise the
    right questions, and be sure they are performing in a
    responsible way. So thank you so very much.
        I think that our national security depends on the
    protection of our nuclear power plants, and what I have heard
    thus far in other hearings, tells us we have a lot to be
    worried about. So I hope that we will get new information in
    this hearing that will be helpful.
        Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Mr. Shays. I thank the gentlelady and appreciate her
    comments as well as all of the other Members.
        I would like to put my statement on the record as well and
    say that 3 years ago, the vulnerability of high-value
    structures to low-tech attack was seared in our national
    memory. Images of the collapsing Twin Towers and a smoldering
    hole in the Pentagon forced an assessment of safeguards and
    vulnerabilities at other critical facilities, including nuclear
    power plants.
        That assessment prompted some immediate steps by the
    Nuclear Regulatory Commission, the NRC, to strengthen security
    at the Nation's 65 reactor sites. Last year, we heard testimony
    from the NRC, the Government Accountability Office, GAO and
    others describing post-September 11 efforts to update security
    policies and practices to meet a dynamic new threat
    environment. But much of that testimony raised as many
    questions as were answered about the rigor of the NRC
    regulatory process, the realism of emergency response planning,
    the willingness of reactor operators to meet new security
    mandates and the pace of needed change.
        So we asked the GAO to monitor implementation of nuclear
    counterterrorism enhancements, including some recommended in
    earlier GAO reviews. Their initial findings depict a lengthy
    process that risk becoming more theoretical than actual. A new
    protection standard--or design basis threat--was not issued
    until April 2003. A rushed review of facility plans
    implementing the DBT could be completed next month. But that
    has been formulaic, wholly paper exercise. The NRC will not
    have complete, site-specific data, from force-on-force
    exercises to validate upgraded security plants for 3 more
    years. Even then, there may be no reasonable assurance plants
    are adequately protected.
        Suddenly--I think I am even one of them--the new DBT
    understates the true level of risk, meaning that security
    plants will have to be modified and tested again. Despite
    persistent efforts by reactor operators and regulators to
    minimize the risks of containment breach or spent fuel
    sabotage, surrounding communities and those further down wind,
    take little comfort from a cosy indulgent regulatory process
    that looks and acts very much like business as usual.
        Findings of security violations, illicit promises of,
    correction, but little NRC followup. Emergency response plans
    may not be current. Lessons learned are not shared. And a
    proposal to hire an attacking force from the same company used
    to protect several plants raises legitimate concerns about the
    integrity of future mandatory force-on-force exercises. There
    is no question nuclear power plants remain of abiding interest
    to terrorists.
        However, real questions remain. How and when the
    seriousness of that threat will be fully reflected in the
    substance and speed of critical countermeasures.
        As we continue to pursue these questions, the subcommittee
    sincerely appreciates the experience and expertise brought to
    the discussion by all our witnesses. We look forward to their
    testimony.
        Taking care of some general business, I ask unanimous
    consent that all members of the subcommittee be permitted to
    place an opening statement in the record and that the record
    remain open for 3 days for that purpose.
        Without objection, so ordered.
        I ask further unanimous consent that all witnesses be
    permitted to include their written statements in the record and
    without objection, so ordered.
        [The prepared statement of Hon. Christopher Shays follows:]

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        Mr. Kucinich. Mr. Chairman.
        Mr. Shays. Yes.
        Mr. Kucinich. These are the letters I would ask to be
    entered into the record.
        Mr. Shays. This is from the Union of Concerned Scientists
    without objection dated August 19th. We will add that to the
    record.
        [The information referred to follows:]

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        Mr. Kucinich. There is a letter right behind the it.
        Mr. Shays. There is a letter right behind it. Let's get
    that one.
        Mr. Shays. And then a letter from Public Citizen dated
    August 18th. Both will be put in the record and without
    objection so ordered.
        [The information referred to follows:]

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        Mr. Shays. We have and we are grateful to have our first
    panel, Mr. Luis Reyes, executive director of operations of the
    Nuclear Regulatory Commission and Mr. Roy P. Zimmerman,
    director, Office of Nuclear Security and Incidence Response,
    Nuclear Regulatory Commission.
        What we are going to do is we are going to have them make
    their statements. We will go through a 5-minute round of
    questioning. We are then going to have the GAO make their
    statement, ask them questions and then do a second round to our
    first panel separately afterwards. We appreciate our first
    panel being willing to do it. It's to everyone's advantage to
    have that kind of dialog, and that makes me feel good that you
    recognize that and I appreciate it.
        So with that, we would ask you to stand and swear you in as
    we swear all our witnesses.
        [Witnesses sworn.]
        Mr. Shays. Note for the record our witnesses are responding
    in the affirmative. Is there anyone I should have asked in your
    staff that may need to respond? If so, it may make sense for me
    to swear them in.
        Mr. Reyes. No, Roy and myself are the ones doing the
    testimony.
        Mr. Shays. OK. That's fine. That's great.
        With that, Mr. Reyes, you have the floor and am happy to
    have with your statement.

      STATEMENTS OF LUIS REYES, EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR OF OPERATIONS,
    NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION, ACCOMPANIED BY ROY P. ZIMMERMAN,
     DIRECTOR, OFFICE OF NUCLEAR SECURITY AND INCIDENCE RESPONSE,
                     NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

        Mr. Reyes. Thank you.
        Mr. Chairman, members of the subcommittee, it is indeed a
    pleasure to appear before you today to discuss some of the
    efforts by the Nuclear Regulatory Commission.
        Mr. Shays. I am going to have you move that mic a little
    more in direct line with you.
        Mr. Reyes. OK. Is that any better?
        Mr. Shays. Yes. Just turn it this way. Thank you.
        Mr. Reyes. To the efforts by the Nuclear Regulatory
    Commission and its licensees with respect to security at
    nuclear power plants. The NRC has greatly enhanced requirements
    of licensees at nuclear power plants and conducted
    vulnerability assessments and identified mitigation strategies
    in order to improve security and evaluate potential threats.
    Nuclear power plants have maintained a strong safety and
    security measures and were designed to withstand catastrophic
    events including fire, flood, earthquakes and tornados.
        Security at nuclear facilities across the country has long
    been the subject of NRC regulatory oversight, dating back to
    the 1970's. And nuclear power plants have been required to
    implement security problems that are capable of defending
    against violent assault by well-armed, well-trained
    adversaries.
        Nuclear power facilities have likely been among the best
    protected commercial facilities in the Nation prior to
    September 11, 2001 and remain so today. However, the September
    11th terrorist attacks on the United States brought to light a
    new and more immediate threat to our country.
        To cope with these changes in the threat environment, the
    NRC undertook a reassessment of its safeguards and security
    programs to identify from actions, and long-term enhancements
    that will raise the level of security at the nuclear facilities
    across the country.
        Since the terrorist attacks, the NRC has ordered as
    licensee to take specific actions to security at their
    facilities and to amend the protection of the nuclear materials
    they possess. We believe that this comprehensive act also
    effectively addressed major congressional concerns about the
    adequacy of security in the new threat environment. We
    recognize though that security would be further enhanced in the
    five legislative proposals that the Commission has submitted to
    Congress which are appended to our testimony are promptly
    enacted.
        My full statement submitted for the record provides a
    summary of the numerous post-September 11 actions and
    enhancement to raise the level of security at nuclear
    facilities.
        This includes a series of orders through all nuclear power
    licensees beginning in February 2002 to formally incorporate
    specific compensatory measures into the search safeguards and
    security programs. This enhancement of security included
    increased security patrols, augmented security forces,
    additional security posts, increased vehicle span of distances
    and improved coordination with law enforcement.
        In the months since those orders were issued, there has
    been coordination with the regulated industry and
    representatives of the Federal, State and local government
    agencies that would be called upon to support the licensees
    response to a potential terrorist attack.
        Also, following the September 11, 2001 attacks, the NRC
    began a reassessment of the design basis threat [DBT]. As a
    result, the threat characteristic set forth in NRC regulations
    were supplemented by orders issued to power reactors and to
    certain field cycle facilities.
        The NRC's currently reviewing licensee revised security
    plants for nuclear power plants and certain nuclear fuel
    facilities. Nearly 2,000 plants in all, and expects that all
    the plants will be reviewed, revised as appropriate and
    approved, and with few exceptions implemented by October 29,
    2004 deadline imposed by the Commission's April 29, 2003
    orders.
        Additionally, the NRC has completed an extensive set of
    vulnerability assessments and identified mitigation strategies
    for NRC license activities involving radioactive materials and
    nuclear facilities. These efforts have continued to affirm the
    robustness of the effectiveness of these facilities, the
    effectiveness of redundant systems and defense of design
    principles and the value of effective programs for operator
    training and emergency preparedness.
        We have continued to improve our security performance
    evaluation program, that is our force-on-force evaluations.
        In February 2004 the NRC began a transition force-on-force
    program incorporating lessons learned during the pilot. The
    transition program uses the characteristics of the DBT as
    enhanced as supplemented by our orders to prepare for
    resumption of the full security performance assessment program
    in November 2004.
        In conclusion, my full statement also includes
    prescriptions of NRC's revised base line inspection program,
    the status of security plan reviews, emergency preparedness and
    sharing of information with our stakeholders.
        I appreciate the opportunity to appear before you today.
    And I look forward to answering any questions you may have.
        [The prepared statement of Mr. Reyes follows:]

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        Mr. Shays. You may go to the next witness.
        Mr. Turner [presiding]. I'm sorry.
        Mr. Zimmerman.
        Mr. Zimmerman. I have no opening statement. Thank you.
        Mr. Turner. We will go to a 5-minute round of questions
    from the members of the committee.
        I know many of the members of the committee are going to
    have questions concerning the design basis threat, their
    concern of its insufficiency. The concern of force-on-force
    exercises and their lack of reliable training and
    effectiveness, also issues concerning equipment and training.
        But I am very interested in the relationship between DOD
    and the protection of our nuclear power plants. In some of the
    information that we have indicates that power plants are not
    required as part of their design basis threat to take into
    consideration attacks by a foreign power or even perhaps the
    type of terrorist organizations that we see with al Qaeda, with
    the airborne threat.
        Could you talk a little bit about the NRC's coordination
    with the DOD and how and where that occurs? Both in the level
    of communication, exercises, onsite equipment and response?
        Mr. Reyes. OK. Prior to September 11th, the NRC has always
    had intelligence analysts. Subsequent to September 11th those
    intelligence analysts--even though they are NRC employees--are
    collocated with the intelligence agencies. So we have changed
    not only the analysis of intelligence information the way we
    did it before, but now we have collocated with the intelligence
    community. And what that has provided is a more direct feedback
    for us--but we now provide the intelligence community,
    information we didn't provide it before. We have required our
    licensees to report to us activities that may observe around
    their facilities that may have some bearing on the national
    intelligence information.
        Now, in terms of the design basis threat, we have worked
    very closely with DOE and DOD in terms of the intelligence to
    determine our design basis threat. As somebody stated, we do
    not have in the NRC regulatory oversight weapons plans that
    have nuclear weapons or plants that have nuclear weapons
    components. So our design basis threat takes that into account
    and we feel is similar to DOE facilities that are similar to
    ours. So we think that the design basis threat is similar now.
        Now, I couldn't bring all of the pictures because security
    information. It's limited to the public. But some of the
    pictures here provide some of the features that the plants
    have. They compare to similar facilities with DOE and DOD. What
    you don't see here today is technology to detect intrusion and
    some of the programs that they have the facilities to make sure
    that the individuals that have access to the facility have
    security clearance----
        Mr. Turner. I am going to interrupt you. Because we have a
    limited time period for the answers. I appreciate your giving
    us information concerning intelligence gathering and
    information with respect to detection.
        Mr. Reyes. OK.
        Mr. Turner. But obviously my question and my interest
    concerns the ability to actually defend these facilities.
    Intelligence is only an element that gives you an understanding
    of what you are defending against or when defense is necessary.
    And detection certainly is way too late. So if you could please
    describe with respect to the Department of Defense, NORTHCOM,
    where are you drawing the line between the facilities
    responsibilities, the DOD's responsibilities and how are those
    actually being coordinated in a meaningful way that actually
    transcends into defense.
        Mr. Reyes. Let me have Mr. Zimmerman give you the details
    of our interface with NORTHCOM.
        Mr. Zimmerman. Thank you let me provide you with some of
    the specifics. With regard to NORAD, we have interactions with
    NORAD on a daily basis. We provide them information associated
    with the status of our facilities. They know which facilities
    are operating, which ones are shut down, which facilities may
    be with selected equipment out of service. We have run
    exercises with NORAD, where we have Amalgam Virgo or Amalgam
    Amigo are examples, for example, of actual interactions we have
    had with them on the phone, as well as with licensees.
        There is also, have been calls that NORAD has had directly
    with our licensees, but we have set up a protocol that happens
    very quickly. If there's an anomalous situation in the air that
    involves NORAD, NRC and the licensee on a three-way phone
    call--and we have been practicing that with our licensees--we
    have been involved in many exercises with the Federal
    Government and DOD primarily in the lead. We have been involved
    with the TOPOFF exercises that have occurred. We are involved
    with TOPOFF planning for next year. We have been involved in
    Forward Challenge, we have been involved with UDO 4.
        We are actively involved in and are interacting both with
    NORTHCOM with regard to their ability to respond with quick
    response forces. They have been out to the sites. We have taken
    them onsite tours. And they have had an opportunity to walk the
    facilities share their thoughts with us.
        So we view that we have a very strong relationship with
    NORAD, with NORTHCOM and we plan on making it stronger through
    an effort we call integrated response planning. And that deals
    with recognizing that the design basis threat we view as what
    is reasonable for private guard force, where the Federal
    Government needs to come in promptly. DOD is an active player
    in that effort of integrated response.
        Mr. Turner. Mr. Kucinich.
        Mr. Kucinich. Thank you very much, Mr. Turner.
        Mr. Zimmerman, one of the things the NRC points to on their
    Web page is a way that increased security is extending the
    perimeter of their facilities. Despite this, there have been
    two incursions into nuclear facilities in the last 2 months.
    One occurred at Beaver Valley in Pennsylvania and the other
    occurred at Pilgrim. If NRC had indeed extended the perimeter,
    ostensibly to catch terrorists before they get on the site, how
    were these individuals able to get out into plant sites?
        Mr. Zimmerman. I think context is very important in this
    regard. Without talking to the specific details--I am not sure
    I recall the specific details--the area that we are talking
    about at these facilities is what is called the owner-
    controlled area. This is the area of property that is owned by
    the licensee, but in many cases is far removed from where the
    protected area where the vital equipment is located. At some
    plants, it's miles away from where the actual facility
    equipment is located. What we have done subsequent to September
    11 is require that licensees conduct surveillance out in their
    owner-controlled area to be able to identify the possibility of
    surveillance taking place on their site or as well as any
    plant, preplanning for an attack.
        We also called for licensees to mix up those patrols so
    they don't always roll around at 4, you know, hour on the hour.
    They mix it up to try to keep any potential surveillance, you
    know, at bay. We get daily reports that are made from the
    licensees into my office that address the many instances where
    individual sightseers are taking pictures of the sites, where
    the film is confiscated, explain to the individuals the
    sensitive nature of the equipment that they are trying to take
    pictures of.
        There are close working relationships with the local law
    enforcement and the FBI to run license plates to look for any
    information in the background of these individuals. It's a very
    aggressive program--and addressing one of the other concerns
    that was raised earlier, we share this information across the
    industry so that if there is some information that somebody
    sped away quickly from a particular location, that information
    is put on a protected Web server so all sites have access to it
    and can be on the lookout for a similar vehicle.
        Mr. Kucinich. I have a number of questions here, Mr.
    Chairman, that will probably require--you are going to have a
    second round of questioning? I know my time isn't up.
        Mr. Shays [presiding]. I would be happy to yield to my
    colleague some of my time. We would like to go just a 5-minute
    round with this, and then they are going to come back after GAO
    has testified.
        Mr. Kucinich. Well, before----
        Mr. Shays. Why don't we go through this. Why don't we----
        Mr. Kucinich. My 5 minutes hasn't expired.
        Mr. Shays. OK.
        Mr. Kucinich. I want to, as a personal matter ask you a
    question.
        Mr. Zimmerman. Surely.
        Mr. Kucinich. What do you think about the failure of your
    own agency to provide information to the public about a hole in
    the head of a reactor vessel. Is that a security matter that
    you have any concern with, or is that somebody else's job?
        Mr. Zimmerman. To be candid, it is not in the realm of
    responsibilities that I have. I think better justice could be
    done to answering your questions in a different setting,
    perhaps with different individuals that are closer.
        Mr. Kucinich. You really don't know anything about that, is
    that what you are saying?
        Mr. Zimmerman. No, I am not saying that at all.
        Mr. Kucinich. Do you know anything about it at all?
        Mr. Zimmerman. Yes.
        Mr. Kucinich. What are you aware about it?
        Mr. Zimmerman. I am aware of the fact that there was
    degradation in the vessel head that was late in being
    identified, through a non-destructive examination. I am aware
    of the fact that the NRC followed the degradation closely and
    had identified a period of time that it was felt that it was
    reasonable for that facility to continue to operate based on
    the information that was available to them.
        Mr. Kucinich. Mr. Chairman, I just want to point something
    out. And I don't think this is tangential. We have a witness in
    front of us whose job deals with nuclear security. I would
    submit that there is a lack of communication within the NRC on
    issues of security that he just made a statement that defies
    belief of anyone who claims that they followed this. So I am
    just going to take his initial statement that he is really not
    responsible for this. And the gentleman is showing a lack of
    comprehensive understanding of what the NRC's failings were on
    this--and I am not going to attribute that to his problem--I am
    going to attribute it to the responsibilities of the people who
    had the first obligation to let the public know--should have
    also let him know, since he is dealing with nuclear security.
        So I think one of the things the committee has already been
    able to determine here is that you don't have the kind of
    communication within the NRC that would protect the public
    interest with respect to security lapses of a mechanical kind,
    physical kind, inside. So the security problems can come
    outside, but they can also come inside.
        Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Mr. Turner [presiding]. Mrs. Maloney.
        Mrs. Maloney. What have you done to protect our plants from
    the possibility of a plane flying in?
        Mr. Reyes. Yes, we have----
        Mrs. Maloney. We have read in the 9/11 Commission said that
    was one of their plots. So how are we protecting ourselves from
    that?
        Mr. Reyes. The NRC has done a vulnerability assessment.
    That includes a wide variety of aircraft. It includes smaller
    aircraft, all the way to a large commercial aircraft loaded
    with fuel--an analysis of a limited number of plants that are
    typical in the design of the power plants in the United States.
    What that analysis has shown is there is a very low probability
    that the crash of such a large aircraft into the facility would
    cause both damage to the core and a significant radiation
    release that will impact the health of the public.
        And the reason being is that prior to September 11th, these
    plants have severe accident procedures--they were procedures
    that were mitigated or strategies that were to cope with events
    that could not be foreseen by the design. Our analysis has
    identified that more had to be done--and in fact the mitigative
    strategies have been enhanced to cope with such an attack. Now
    that will be the back end once the attack occurs.
        At the front end, I think Mr. Zimmerman talked about our
    relationship with NORTHCOM and NORAD and the exercises and
    direct communication from NORAD to the control room in the
    power plant to advise them if there is a pending attack.
        Mrs. Maloney. Do we have any planes in the air that would
    shoot down another plane coming? I mean, we never anticipated
    that a plane would knock down the Towers. So the main thing is
    to prevent it from coming in in the first place. So what do we
    have? Are you working with the--you understand the security to
    basically shoot down a plane if it ever got into the area?
        Mr. Reyes. Yes, our work has been with NORAD who had the
    responsibility to intercede the aircraft.
        Mrs. Maloney. Now, in the prepared testimony of the GAO,
    they say that the NRC does not plan to make improvement to the
    inspection program that the GAO previously recommended and
    still believes that it is not necessary. For example NRC is not
    following up to verify that all the violations of security
    requirements have been corrected. Can you explain that? That's
    a direct quote from the GAO report that they are very disturbed
    that you are not correcting the items that they pointed out to
    you. Why not?
        Mr. Reyes. The GAO report relates to our followup of the
    corrective action--the NRC both on the safety and security
    site. And we don't think distinguish them--they work together--
    puts their effort on the violations of biggest or higher
    significance. Now, what we do is we put--confirm all the
    corrective actions for violations of higher level, and for low
    level violations we do it in a sample basis. Now that doesn't
    mean we don't know what was done.
        What it means is for security specialists to confirm
    whether that minor violation or violation of low risk was not
    corrected. But we have an NRC office in every power plant. We
    have inspectors there, and we are aware of the corrective
    action on small, low-risk violations. But we follow all
    significant violations with subject matter experts, whether
    security or safety.
        On the lower level, we do a sampling process. It's a matter
    of resources.
        Mrs. Maloney. So, then, you are not following up to verify
    that the violations of security requirements have been
    corrected for ``smaller violations?''
        Mr. Reyes. On a sampling basis we do.
        Mrs. Maloney. But you are just correcting the larger
    violations. Can you give me an example of a smaller violation
    that you are not correcting?
        Mr. Reyes. Well, they corrected it. We just don't confirm
    specifically that it is corrected. I will have Mr. Zimmerman
    maybe give an example of a minor violation.
        Mr. Zimmerman. A minor violation could be an isolated case
    where an individual had a lapse and didn't record information
    within a certain period on a tour or potentially may not have
    logged it at all. We would view that as a violation. By
    understanding a licensee's program, they have a corrective
    action program that they are required to have. Their quality
    assurance organization will pursue that, determine whether it
    is an isolated case.
        We also during our review--if we see something that
    indicates it is potentially larger and has programmatic aspects
    to it--we would continue to follow that trail. But if we see
    that as an isolated case, the corrective action would be taken
    by the licensee. And then as Mr. Reyes said, we do come back
    for the lower significance items and do a sampling check to see
    if we have confidence in the thoroughness of the review of the
    utility.
        Mrs. Maloney. My time is up. Thank you.
        Mr. Turner. Mr. Platts.
        Mr. Platts. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I appreciate your
    testimony here today. And I question our focus, I know, is
    about protecting our facilities from the terrorist threats. And
    I would like to at least put on your radar an issue that kind
    of relates that if there is an attack and our response and
    attentions come to my attention in my local community, I would
    go right up against the Susquehanna River where Three Mile
    Island is--and certainly as a high school student, remember
    1979 very well--living a few miles from the plant.
        The issue that has been raised to me is if there would be
    an attack how we would respond to the attack, specifically for
    children in day care, preschools, nursery schools, and believed
    by some of my constituents that NRC's oversight, along with
    FEMA, is not insuring that our NRC regulations are being fully
    complied by facilities regarding those preschool child care
    centers, and the State plans that are in place. My
    understanding of NRC is your responsibility is really to
    improve the State plans for evacuation if there is an attack or
    if there is an incident of whatever kind that requires an
    evacuation that NRC looks to the State and approves the State
    plans?
        Mr. Reyes. FEMA, the Federal Emergency Management Agency
    does that.
        But if I could address briefly your concern. If there is an
    attack at a nuclear power plant--regardless of whether it is
    ground, waterborne or air--right away, there is a declaration
    of high level emergency. What that does is automatically gives
    the local government, the counties and the State, mobilizing
    their emergency plan.
        And the typical arrangement--and I don't know the one in
    Pennsylvania specifically--the typical arrangement is that when
    that is declared, the local government already has prearranged
    decisionmaking on evacuating children, senior citizens. So the
    fact that the facility was attacked without any consequences--
    yet in terms of release of radiation and all of that--because
    you declare a high level emergency, you are already as a
    precautionary measure, very conservative, rolling and the
    offsite government agencies are already moving.
        Mr. Platts. The concern is that--and then that process, for
    it to work, those plants need to be thorough and that the FEMA
    reviews the plans.
        Mr. Reyes. Right.
        Mr. Platts. Based on their finding and you issue a license
    that yes they have a plan in place.
        Mr. Reyes. Correct.
        Mr. Platts. Is that perhaps with some facilities in
    Pennsylvania and perhaps elsewhere around the country that
    those plans are not as thoroughly guarding these preschool age
    children even though the regs require them to, to accomplish
    those children as well.
        Mr. Reyes. Yes, it is FEMA that has to do the assessment.
    And they monitor the exercises and the plant and the fact that
    it gets performed adequately. I just couldn't----
        Mr. Platts. So NRC basically takes the decision of FEMA and
    just ratifies that decision that FEMA says, yes, they are in
    compliance, their State plan, their local plan, therefore the
    license is issued?
        Mr. Reyes. Yes, it's called reasonable assurance. FEMA
    sends out a report, and a certification that they have
    reasonable assurance that the offsite emergency preparedness
    actions, the plans and the actions that they will take by
    observing the execution of the plan and the exercises, etc. is
    adequate. And we take that certification of reasonable
    assurance and accept it.
        Mr. Platts. Thank you. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Mr. Turner. Ms. Watson.
        Ms. Watson. According to the GAO, NRC is not taking
    advantage of opportunities to improve the effectiveness of
    force-on-force exercises and security oversight in general by
    implementing the recommendations.
        And I did hear you mention, you have gone so far with a
    lack of resources. I would like to elaborate on that and tell
    us how is nuclear power plant inspection information shared
    with the NRC regional offices and nuclear power plants. So you
    can answer collectively.
        The other concern that I have is that several months ago,
    we heard about traditional procedures and traditional ways of
    calculating how an attack would take place on our nuclear
    plants. I had problems with traditional. Because I think
    whatever enemy out there we are facing is being very creative.
    And if we have a traditional procedure or formula that we use
    on the ground, what about that comes from the air or over
    water? So you might want to address that as well.
        Mr. Reyes. OK. I would be glad to do that. Let me talk
    first about the information sharing. All the findings, all the
    violations, whether they are high or low or of significance,
    regarding security, are reviewed by a panel which is composed
    of a representative from all of our four regional offices and
    our headquarters offices.
        And that's to make sure that in fact they are properly
    being categorized in terms of their significance and therefore
    which ones we need to do followup corrective action in detail
    and which ones we do a sampling process. That information is
    shared because there's representatives from each one of the
    regional office and the program office. So those individuals
    share that within their own group.
        Then we also have very frequent meetings with the
    industry--it's called a security working group--where we share
    all the issues that we have identified with them, and the
    security working group from the industry then shares that with
    their counterparts.
        We also have prepared a protected Web page that has those
    kindS of information. Not only do we share that with the
    licensees, but it gets shared with local governments and other
    interested parties that do have the appropriate clearance to
    have that information. So we do have a very aggressive way to
    share the information.
        Now, we haven't adopted every recommendation that GAO has
    submitted. We haven't dismissed them; we are considering them,
    but we feel there is a very aggressive way that this
    information is being shared.
        Ms. Watson. When you said lack of resources, would you
    elaborate, please?
        Mr. Reyes. We feel we have adequate resources, but what you
    want to do is you want to put your resources where the more
    significance is. So Mr. Zimmerman provided you an example of
    where a patrol officer had an oversight to log in as they
    conducted the patrol around the facility, and they have to log
    in exactly where they were and where they are not going. That
    would be a relatively low violation of our requirements, and we
    necessarily wouldn't put the resources there. If we were to
    find a more significant problem regarding training of the
    officers or the weapons not being in good working order or
    something like that, we will put very detailed followup on the
    more significance, because they do have the more significant
    potential to affect security. So there's a matter of grading
    where our resources go to; they go to the most significant
    findings.
        Ms. Watson. I am really troubled by the fact that we are
    fighting an enemy of unknown proportion. It could be an
    American--I will always remember Oklahoma--or it could be
    someone who has merged into our society. They have a very
    different mindset than we do. And I'm wondering if there is any
    activity going on that tries to get into that mindset, because
    I think the September 11 attack was planned a decade in
    advance. And certainly we know by the training, the time it
    took to train those who flew the planes--and they went in and
    said we don't want to learn how to take off or land; that
    should have rung a bell. And they paid in cash. But apparently
    they were more interested in getting that money than in picking
    up the clues. And I am finding out there have been clues along
    the way and we haven't done a good job in connecting the dots.
        So I am wondering if we have a think tank that might be
    looking at the creative ways that people, you know, watching us
    in an open society might do us great harm through our nuclear
    plants. Pand, finally, how does this fit into homeland
    security? How does the NRC, what role do you play in terms of
    homeland security?
        Mr. Reyes. OK. Let me talk about--the concerns you had
    about the potential adversaries and the modes and the planning
    all goes into the intelligence community. What we do is we take
    that information, and, for example, when we consider the design
    basis threat and when we do our exercises, we assume that all
    that information in terms of what we call coordinated attacks--
    and we assume they are coming from the ground, from the air,
    from the water, and that they have an insider that they have.
    So all that is considered in both the design basis threat and
    the exercises we actually conduct. So also, we don't go out
    there to try to do intelligence work. We are the beneficiaries.
    And by having our intelligence analyst physically present in
    that community, we get that information and we factor that into
    our activities.
        Now, let me have Mr. Zimmerman explain to you how we work
    with DHS, because we are an active participant in that effort.
        Mr. Zimmerman. One of the things that we do with the
    Department of Homeland Security is we try to maximize our time
    that we spend in their operation. And I will explain that.
    There may not be a particular issue that is necessarily in our
    sector, but we will try to send people to their operations
    center, even if there is an issue that they are pursuing that
    is unrelated to the nuclear sector, just so that we can get
    comfortable, get a chance to meet people, understand what their
    protocols are. And we basically have a relatively large number
    of people that we are sending down there and getting badged
    ahead of time, so that if the bell does ring in our sector, we
    have working relationships established. And if we are in a
    reactive situation, we know where our desk is, we know what our
    responsibilities are.
        And when we do our exercises now, we have requested of DHS,
    and they have been very supportive, to try a continuous
    improvement to make our exercises more realistic, where we want
    them to play in our exercises now that they have been stood up.
    So we want to send people to them, understand what issues they
    would have in this emergency situation during this drill, and
    raise those issues directly to us in real time in the exercises
    so that we can practice and learn how we can improve our
    overall response to the Federal Government.
        Ms. Watson. I will just finish up with this. I think
    intelligence has failed to provide all of us with the
    information that we need to prevent--not respond to an
    emergency, to prevent. And I would hope that the NRC would
    definitely be looking at strategies, procedures, to prevent a
    nuclear kind of emergency, because once there is a nuclear
    attack we are done.
        Mr. Zimmerman. May I respond?
        Mr. Turner. Actually, we need to move on. Mr. Tierney.
        Mr. Tierney. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        You rely on private companies for the securities of the
    individual plants. Right?
        Mr. Zimmerman. That's correct.
        Mr. Tierney. All right. So we have 65 plant sites, 103
    nuclear reactors in 31 States.
        Mr. Zimmerman. Correct.
        Mr. Tierney. And you sort of delegate that responsibility
    to private companies, and then rely on their report to you as
    to whether or not they are complying with the various standards
    that you set.
        Mr. Reyes. No. We have direct observation of their
    activities.
        Mr. Tierney. About once every 3 years, right?
        Mr. Reyes. No, no. That's incorrect.
        Mr. Tierney. OK.
        Mr. Reyes. See, the inspection program--and I think this
    is--the GAO auditors are in the process of doing that effort,
    and they haven't been able to visit the facilities. So we have
    a security inspection program that looks at everything, from
    training to performance of the detection system, implementation
    of the program for access to individuals, communications. The
    portion as far as exercise is on top of all that I just told
    you, and that is the final task on the dynamics. That's where
    we actually simulate adversaries, and they actually come in and
    jump over the fence and actually have access to--and we
    simulate the attack. But that's only the culmination of a large
    number of inspection hours by a lot of subject matter experts
    in security that come in unannounced at all times of the day or
    night to check each one of the elements.
        Mr. Tierney. Let me interrupt if we can because are limited
    in time here. So you are saying that your agency determines the
    standards for training, and then you go down and you observe
    and make sure that training is in fact occurring and being met
    and that people are passing those criteria.
        Mr. Reyes. That's correct.
        Mr. Tierney. And that's no matter what the turnover there.
        Mr. Reyes. Correct.
        Mr. Tierney. And then you are telling me that you are also
    keeping an eye on how much overtime is involved, how many hours
    these people are working on each shift on a regular basis?
        Mr. Reyes. We have requirements for that. We review the
    records and we interview individuals.
        Mr. Tierney. Did you want to add something?
        Mr. Reyes. What he was going to tell you is our inspection
    program has increased by a factor of five.
        Mr. Zimmerman. Since 2000. The amount of hours that we
    spend onsite--this is separate from force on force--is we have
    gone up fivefold in the amount of inspection hours that we are
    currently spending onsite. The design basis threat that we
    issued in April 2003 is quite similar to the interim
    compensatory measures that we put in place in February 2002.
    Our inspectors have already gone out and verified that probably
    80 percent of what is in the revised 2002 DBT is already in
    place.
        Mr. Tierney. Are you subcontracting any of this evaluation
    work?
        Mr. Reyes. No.
        Mr. Zimmerman. It's being done through our regional
    offices.
        Mr. Tierney. And when you do the force on force, are you
    subcontracting any of that attack force work out?
        Mr. Reyes. No. The NRC reviews the training for the
    adversaries, the NRC decides on the scenario, and the NRC is
    there in large numbers to observe the force on force. And we
    are the ones who determine whether the performance is
    acceptable or not. See, this is a big difference between DOE
    and NRC. DOE operates and regulates itself. We have a private
    licensee, but we are the ones who do the oversight and we are
    the ones who determine the adequacy.
        Mr. Tierney. But it is not your personnel that are actually
    doing the force on force. You hire somebody to do that, then
    oversee them?
        Mr. Reyes. The adversaries are not NRC employees. The
    people monitoring them and doing the independent assessment
    are.
        Mr. Zimmerman. We hire contractors that are experts in this
    area. They are joined at the hip with the adversary team; they
    are in the field with the adversary team as they are trying to
    make their approach on the facility. They are involved in the
    preparation aspect indicating, based on what we have been able
    to determine, this is how I would attack the facility, so this
    is how you will attack.
        The decision on how the attack is made is made by the NRC
    contractor, not by the contractor that's going to carry out the
    actual attack. But our contractors will go with them.
        Mr. Tierney. So we no longer have Wackenhut watching
    Wackenhut.
        Mr. Reyes. It never has been. We don't know the
    misunderstanding, but it never has been.
        Mr. Zimmerman. We do the full assessment. Wackenhut will
    pull the trigger, but we will have somebody there to make sure
    that person is taking the appropriate action of what he or she
    has been instructed to do based on us laying out what the
    scenario will be, and then being with them in the field while
    they carry it out.
        Mr. Tierney. We can maybe revisit that again later. Tell
    me, if you would, about spent fuel storage security and why we
    should feel comfortable with the way things are going there.
        Mr. Reyes. There is two kinds of storage of spent fuel. One
    is what we call the pools or the wet pool. And those are inside
    all the protected area of the facility, and all the security
    features that you have for the reactor, you basically have for
    the wet pools. The dry cast storage could be either inside the
    protected area or could be sitting by itself within a protected
    area. And that also has security features to it. The dry cast
    storage is more robust in terms of attacks and all that. So we
    feel very secure that it is--the security is adequate.
        Mr. Tierney. Thank you.
        Mr. Turner. Mr. Sanders.
        Mr. Sanders. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
        As you know, gentlemen--and thank you very much for being
    with us. As you know, we have a nuclear power plant in Vernon,
    right at the southern edge of Vermont and right near the
    Massachusetts border. Recently there was a scare, as you know,
    when two spent fuel rods appeared to be missing, and they were
    relocated sometime later. But that raised anxiety in an area
    where anxiety is already fairly high.
        Let me just ask you just a couple of questions. It seems to
    me--and I don't want to disappoint any of my colleagues or
    you--that the truth of the matter is there is not an enormous
    amount of faith in the U.S. Government; that people do not
    believe everything that you say or I say or anyone else says.
    And when it comes to nuclear power and the potential danger,
    clearly people are very, very concerned as to whether or not
    the U.S. Government is in fact protecting them.
        As I understand it, earlier in August the NRC announced
    that a substantial amount of site-specific security information
    would be taken off of its Web site. Now, I can understand that
    we do not want to tell al Qaeda all of the methods that we have
    to defend nuclear power plants. But the bottom line is that
    when people, at least in the past, could critique, could say it
    is not enough, now they have virtually nothing. So if I'm
    living in Vernon, Vermont or Brodova, Vermont, how do I know
    that the kind of security--I don't need to know every detail,
    people understand that. But what kind of reassurance do people
    have that security is appropriate when they now go to the Web
    site and they get far less information than they used to? And
    as I understand it, you took that information off kind of
    privately, without a lot of public discussion as to whether
    that was a good idea.
        Mr. Reyes. Prior to September 11th and today, our strategic
    plan has safety security and openness as one of the goals. And
    we have learned since September 11th, through our feedback with
    the intelligence community, that there are people out there
    that want to do us harm. And information that we openly share
    with everybody as one of our strategic goals could be harm to
    the Nation. So what we had to do is, we had to do some soul-
    searching and find out what information should we pull out of
    the public. And we took out information that could assist
    somebody in doing us harm.
        What we are going to do is--the remaining of the
    information regarding the safety of the facility, all that
    information is still there. What we are going to do is we are
    going to summarize that security information we have and
    present it in a summary fashion without giving details that
    somebody can harm us.
        Mr. Sanders. We don't have a lot of time. And I think
    everybody understands that we do not want to give enemies
    information. But on the other hand, I would ask you to keep in
    mind, given the fact that people do not necessarily have a lot
    of confidence, that they do want to know that they are being
    protected. They want the opportunity to critique when they feel
    that security is not appropriate. And I fear very much that is
    not the situation.
        Now, I understand that there was several FOIA requests made
    before this policy went into effect; in other words, regarding
    the nature of security. What does the NRC plan to do with those
    FOIA requests?
        Mr. Reyes. Well, we are going to have to process them under
    the new guidelines, because regardless of how you put the
    information in the public, the details, we now know our
    intelligence colleagues are telling us do not put detailed
    information out that can assist people to do us harm.
        Mr. Sanders. Let me go to another area. And forgive me, we
    just have to move fast because there's not a lot of time. I'm
    picking up at a point that Mr. Tierney raised a moment ago; and
    that is, NRC, as I understand it, has repeatedly stated that
    they believe release of radioactive fuel as a result of a
    terrorist attack on a spent fuel pool is unlikely. NRC
    officials have made that point over and over again, and they
    said that as recently as last week.
        So what I want to know is why you think that way? Are you
    taking additional steps to fortify the many spent fuel pools
    around the country, rather than simply dismissing the prospect
    of a breach of security there?
        Mr. Reyes. We have done analysis of airplane crashes into
    the spent fuel pools. Now, it's been a limited number of
    details in terms of which ones we have done that, and those are
    the conclusions you stated. We are now moving forward to doing
    further studies to make sure that we have done a thorough
    review in any one of the layouts. The configuration of the
    pools are different in different plants, and so we are now
    continuing the analysis to make sure that the results we have
    are representative of the total population.
        Mr. Sanders. Am I correct in remembering, though, that
    there are some knowledgeable people who disagree with some of
    the conclusions that you have reached about the safety of those
    facilities in terms of a plane attack?
        Mr. Reyes. There's always people who disagree.
        Mr. Sanders. I'm not talking about fringy people; but I'm
    talking about intelligent people.
        Mr. Reyes. Yeah, there's always intelligent people that
    disagree with us.
        Mr. Sanders. All right. What about the potential of an air
    attack? I understand that there is no longer a no-fly zone in
    effect over our Nation's nuclear reactors. And my question is,
    why you think that is good policy? And why does the NRC think
    it's such an insubstantial threat, especially in light of the
    fact that al Qaeda clearly considered nuclear reactors an
    attractive target?
        Mr. Reyes. After September 11th, we met with the FAA and we
    tried to get their insights and their determination on what
    should be the airspace around nuclear power plants determined
    to be. The FAA determination was that for nuclear power plants
    and other critical infrastructure, that it was not advisable in
    their mind to put no-fly zones. What they did determine was for
    nuclear power plants to put what they call a notice to airmen,
    which basically is a notice that goes to all pilots about
    limiting their flying around these facilities. But we are just
    following, after the meeting with the FAA, what they determined
    to be the most wise.
        Mr. Sanders. But do you think that makes sense? On the
    surface it doesn't make a lot of sense to me, given what we saw
    about September 11 and the use of airplanes as missiles.
        Mr. Reyes. The rationale of the FAA was that there's other
    critical infrastructure, just like nuclear power plants. And if
    they were to put no-fly zones over all these facilities and the
    infrastructure, you basically stop commerce because you have so
    many no-fly zones across the national--chemical plants,
    pesticides.
        Mr. Sanders. Frankly, a nuclear power plant is different
    than many other infrastructures and facilities. We don't think
    we should have universal no-fly zones, but I would suggest that
    maybe we may want to do a little bit of thinking about that
    one.
        Mr. Reyes. And we met with the FAA and we tried to convey
    that.
        Mr. Sanders. I mean, you met with the FAA. You are the
    experts on nuclear dangers; they are not. They have other
    interests as well. And we need to rely on somebody to protect
    us.
        Mr. Turner. Mr. Sanders, we need to move on.
        Mr. Sanders. Thank you.
        Mr. Turner. Chairman Shays.
        Mr. Shays. I thank you. We are going to have a second
    opportunity to question these witnesses. We do thank them,
    because that's a better way for them to make their arguments
    and for us to understand the challenges.
        The bottom line, it's been 3 years since September 11th,
    and 2 years of it was the intelligence community giving us a
    postulated threat. You have worked the last year on a design
    basis threat, and now that's coming into place. And what's
    concerning me is there appears to be 3 years before you really
    test at every facility, and so it's going to be like 6 years
    from September 11th.
        I want to ask, are you aware of the memo, which was
    classified, from the Deputy Secretary of Energy to DOE
    facilities strengthening the DBT and ordering safeguards beyond
    those called for by the initial post-September 11 standard?
        Mr. Reyes. We work closely with DOE, and we know exactly
    what their DBT is and where the directions are heading. We are
    required by the Commission to brief them every 6 months on the
    intelligence, and so they can reassess the DBT. We are
    scheduled to do that November 16th of this year. At that time,
    we will brief them not only with the intelligence information
    we have, but with all the DOE--DBT changes that they are
    considering or perhaps they have implemented by the time we
    meet with the Commission.
        Mr. Shays. When we met with DOE officials and we toured
    certain facilities, they came back to us and said that they
    were going to strengthen their design basis threat. We have the
    postulated threat up here, we have the Department of Energy
    with their DBT here, and we see you lower down on the design
    basis threat, that you don't have as strong a standard as what
    we see happening for the DOE facilities. That's my reading of
    it. And I would like to know, do you anticipate strengthening
    your design basis threat based on----
        Mr. Reyes. We will share that information with the
    Commission. It's a policy decision by the commissioners whether
    to increase or not increase the DBT. And, but we have a process
    to do that, and November 16th is our next presentation to the
    Commission to consider that.
        Mr. Shays. One of the biggest criticisms that GAO has is
    that they say the NRC's review of the plants, which are not
    available to the general public for security reasons, has
    primarily been a paper review and is not detailed enough for
    NRC to determine if the plans would protect the facility
    against the threat presented in the DBT. How do you respond to
    that?
        Mr. Reyes. The security plans are--they have, but at a
    pretty high level. And what you see here, what you have at the
    station, then, is what we call implementing procedures, the
    strategies of how those individuals will respond to an attack,
    where are they located, how will the firing lines, etc., is an
    implementing procedure. And the reason you want to have it that
    way is, let's assume that the legislative proposal that we
    highlighted to you gets approved and we now can give them
    better weapons. Then the strategy at the time may change.
        Mr. Shays. Well, now that we don't have the assault weapon
    ban, are you now able to get--no, I'm serious. Are you
    prohibited from giving them assault weapons?
        Mr. Reyes. Under State law--see, this, under the State law
    they cannot have automatic weapons.
        Mr. Shays. Under every State or in some States, or in every
    State?
        Mr. Zimmerman. Some States have changed.
        Mr. Reyes. Recently. Very recently.
        Mr. Shays. See, the logic of the assault weapon ban is that
    we want the law enforcement folks and the security people to
    have every advantage possible. We don't want the bad folks to
    have weapons that our people don't have.
        Mr. Reyes. We agree.
        Mr. Shays. I mean, the government's got it screwed up here.
        Mr. Zimmerman. The legislation that we proposed would allow
    the security officers to use automatic weapons. Right now they
    are using semi-automatic weapons.
        Mr. Shays. I want you to use whatever the hell you need to
    do the job. You know, our job in government is to make sure
    it's never a fair fight. We want our military people to always
    have the best.
        Mr. Zimmerman. I couldn't agree with you more.
        Mr. Tierney. Would the gentleman yield on that for 1
    second? The problem is these are not military people and these
    aren't public forces on that. The question I would have is, who
    is doing the background check on these individuals? Who are
    they? How well trained are they? And how confident can we be
    that they can be entrusted with this kind of weaponry and are
    going to do the job that we might normally expect of our own
    forces?
        Mr. Zimmerman. The background checks on the security
    officers is extremely aggressive. They are viewed to be in
    what's called a ``critical group'' because of recognizing that
    if they were the insider, what damage they would be able to
    cause. So there is a significant background check and
    behavioral observation that takes place. The vast majority of
    these individuals are prior military or law enforcement.
        But the answer to your question, there is a very
    significant and appropriate background check being done.
        Mr. Tierney. By the NRC?
        Mr. Zimmerman. Well, no. We work through the FBI. We pass
    the information to various agencies that have a variety of data
    bases that you are aware of, and those names are provided to
    those data bases. We are a passthrough.
        Mr. Reyes. Similar to a clearance, the fingerprinting and
    review will be done by the FBI. It's not the licensee if that's
    what you're asking.
        Mr. Shays. Let me claim my time again. But I do think the
    gentleman is right on target. My biggest fear is the person who
    does have the weapon on the inside. I think one individual like
    that could practically accomplish whatever task they want. And
    so I think that is a key factor the gentleman has identified.
        The bottom line is you are going to be looking at whether
    to revise your new design basis threat. How long would that
    take, though, if you then decided to do that?
        Mr. Reyes. Once we present that to the Commission,
    typically within a few weeks they make a decision one way or
    the other. So then if they were to make a change, we will have
    to implement it through orders or some mechanism like that.
        Mr. Shays. So how long would that take before it actually
    were met in the field.
        Mr. Reyes. It depends on the size of the increase. If you
    are talking about the number of adversaries----
        Mr. Shays. Just give me a sense. Are we talking a year
    more?
        Mr. Reyes. That should be in months we can issue the
    orders, and then the implementation will take a little bit
    longer, depending on the magnitude.
        Mr. Shays. A little bit longer means what? A year?
        Mr. Reyes. My guess would be a year.
        Mr. Shays. No, no. See, that isn't a little bit longer. I
    don't feel like there is an intensity level at NRC, I honestly
    don't. But we will get to that later. I think we need to get to
    the next.
        Ms. Watson. Is this just a followup, or can it wait when
    they come back to us?
        Mr. Turner. This panel is going to be returning after panel
    two. Will you be able to stay for----
        Ms. Watson. Yeah. It was just pertinent to----
        Mr. Shays. I would be happy to.
        Ms. Watson. I was just going to say what is really
    bothering me at this moment is that I represent a State that
    has a very porous border, and there are people coming across
    the Mexican border into the United States that are going to be
    able to buy automatic assault weapons in their corner sporting
    goods store because the ban has evaporated. And I understand
    that there is a constant movement across our border, our
    southern border into the United States, where these people can
    go in with fictitious names and somebody else's ID and pick up
    one of these assault weapons. This will impact on you greatly,
    and so I just throw that out.
        Mr. Turner. Perhaps when they return that's an issue they
    can address at that time, if that's OK.
        Ms. Watson. That's fine. So just keep that in mind, my
    concern.
        Mr. Turner. What I understand is that panel one is going to
    remain while panel two testifies, and then return to us for
    additional questions after we have heard the testimony of Mr.
    Jim Wells. So we will excuse you at this point, with the
    understanding that you are going to be remaining.
        Mr. Shays. And we thank you for that. That will be helpful.
        Mr. Turner. And then we will call forward panel two, which
    is Mr. Jim Wells, Director, National Resources and Environment
    Government Accountability Office, who will be accompanied by
    Mr. Raymond H. Smith, Jr., Assistant Director, and Mr. Kenneth
    E. Lightner, Jr., Senior Analyst.
        Gentlemen, we do swear in our witnesses for the hearing. If
    you would please stand and raise your right arm.
        [Witnesses sworn.]
        Mr. Turner. Please note for the record that the witnesses
    responded in the affirmative.
        Mr. Turner. We welcome you, Mr. Wells, and look forward to
    your testimony.

        STATEMENT OF JIM WELLS, DIRECTOR, NATURAL RESOURCES AND
     ENVIRONMENT, GOVERNMENT ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, ACCOMPANIED BY
       RAYMOND H. SMITH, JR. ASSISTANT DIRECTOR; AND KENNETH E.
                     LIGHTNER, JR., SENIOR ANALYST

        Mr. Wells. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. We are pleased to be
    here today to discuss NRC's efforts to improve security at the
    Nation's 104 commercial nuclear power plants. Today, it's 3
    years after the Twin Towers and Pentagon attacks, and we are
    discussing what NRC has done, where they are, and what's left
    to do. To NRC's credit they responded immediately, advising the
    plants to go to the highest levels of security, and they issued
    about 60 advisories and orders.
        As an auditor, I am going to stop here and let them take
    credit for what they've done. They have, in fact, done a lot of
    things, and there is no doubt that security has been enhanced.
    But what we get paid to do as auditors is to bring forth
    concerns, and that's what I will do today.
        While we applaud these efforts, the question is today: Has
    it been enough? It will take several more years for NRC to make
    an independent determination that each plant has taken
    responsibile, reasonable, and appropriate steps to provide
    protection.
        The first step that NRC chose was to create new security
    plans to implement their new DBT. While the original plan was
    envisioned to take 2 years, the commissioners decided to use an
    industry-developed template with yes-and-no answers to speed up
    the process. And, Mr. Tierney, they did hire contractors to
    help review the plans, and they wanted to get it done in 6
    months.
        Now, we have some concerns about how the NRC is doing this
    first step. Not that this first step is wrong, it's just the
    process they chose to use.
        First, NRC's review has been rushed, and is largely a paper
    review, in our opinion. NRC reviewers are generally not
    visiting the plants to obtain details. However, we have learned
    that they are recently beginning to visit some of the plants
    and ask some questions relating to their plans. We understand
    they may have visited about approximately 4 or 5 of the 65
    facilities and the 100 plants that are under consideration.
        The plans themselves, and we have reviewed 12 of those
    plans, do not detail defensive positions at the site, how the
    defenders would be deployed to respond to that attack, or how
    long the deployment would take. In addition, NRC is not
    requesting the documents and the studies supporting the plan;
    so, in our opinion, as a result, NRC today as they are
    reviewing these plans, even though when they are approved they
    still will not have a lot of detailed knowledge about the
    actual security at the individual facilities prior to the
    approval of those plans.
        Second, as it clearly has already been pointed out, it will
    take up to 3 years for the NRC to test these plans through
    force-on-force exercises at each facility. Moreover, NRC is
    considering action that could potentially compromise the
    integrity of these exercises. And I refer, as members of the
    subcommittee have already raised, the consideration of using a
    private company, Wackenhut, that is a company that the nuclear
    industry has selected, a company that clearly has had problems
    in the past at Oak Ridge--and, I might add, that NRC was doing
    oversight when these problems did happen--and a company that
    provides guards for about half the facilities to be tested. We
    understand Wackenhut is currently under contract with about 50
    percent of the nuclear facilities.
        This relationship with the industry also raises questions
    about the force's independence. And that's just a question that
    needs to continue to be asked in terms of due diligence by the
    NRC in terms of assuring that whatever contractor is used, that
    there is independence.
        We note that the NRC's DBT is similar to DOE, as you have
    stated, Mr. Chairman and Mr. Shays. As you know, in April 2004,
    DOE officials told this subcommittee that they would have to
    rethink its threat assessment that they were using. DOE, we
    understand, completed that review last Tuesday and
    substantially increased their DBT.
        If the NRC, when they consult with their commissioners,
    decides to revisit or revise the DBT, NRC will clearly need
    more time. How much time I think is a good question, that's
    already been asked of the NRC.
        Also, funding the cost of any additional protection that
    may be required could also be a fairly significant issue for
    the industry. NRC has already clearly publicly stated that the
    current DBT that they are being required to defend against is
    the largest reasonable threat against which a regulated private
    guard force should be expected to defend under existing law.
    Also, potential vulnerabilities of additional assaults are on
    the horizon and currently are being addressed outside of the
    existing DBT. Any change in any of these approaches could place
    additional requirements on the plants. And I speak here about
    the airborne nature over the nuclear power plants.
        In conclusion, can the public be assured that NRC's efforts
    will protect the plants against attack? Our answer to you today
    is not yet. It will still be some time before NRC can provide
    the public with full assurances that what has been done is
    enough. Some of these enhancements are still being put in
    place, and they remain to be tested.
        Ms. Maloney and Congresswoman Watson, you have raised
    questions about NRC not agreeing to do some of our
    recommendations. Yes, we still disagree. Maybe it's an issue of
    substantial versus minor. We've found, others have found,
    sleeping guards, guards that have falsified records; access has
    been granted to individuals in highly secured areas that had no
    business being there. We are not sure that's minor.
        While NRC may initially disagree with some of the things
    that we raise about trying to improve, it's questions like this
    raised by this subcommittee that may help the NRC in terms of
    seeing the light and moving forward and making some substantial
    improvements.
        We have a lot more audit work to do, Mr. Chairman. You have
    asked us to do a lot of things, including an assessment of the
    DBT and a lot of concern about the vulnerabilities, and is the
    current DBT actually going to do anything to help protect the
    actual vulnerabilities that exist. So we still owe you a report
    a year from now or early next year, if we can finish it, on how
    NRC defines the threat faced by the nuclear power plants. We
    believe, based on what we have seen today--understanding that
    we are still preliminarily still doing our audit, we have not
    completed our work, and, in fairness to the NRC, have not given
    them an opportunity to comment or react to what we have seen
    today--that it's important that NRC act quickly and take a
    strong leadership role in establishing a worthy adversary team
    for these upcoming exercises.
        I can't overemphasize how important these exercises are to
    test what's being put in place. These improvements are
    expensive, and we want to make sure that they are actually
    doing what they are intended to do and can in fact defend the
    plants. Perhaps NRC needs to consider establishing priorities
    for the facilities to be tested.
        Quite frankly, we have seen a common general approach that
    they take. They tend to look at plants in general, generically.
    But clearly when you come to vulnerabilities and you come to
    assessment of threats, you need to look much more closely and
    individually at plants and perhaps prioritize where you put
    your attention first. They need to carefully analyze test
    results if they detect any shortcomings in the facility's
    security, and, perhaps most importantly, be willing to require
    additional security improvements as warranted or as discovered.
        Mr. Chairman, this testimony, or the statement, provides
    our preliminary reviews. We'll be happy to respond to any
    questions you may have. Thank you.
        Mr. Turner. Thank you, Mr. Wells.
        [The prepared statement of Mr. Wells follows:]

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        Mr. Turner. One of the statements in your written
    testimony, it says NRC has already stated that the current
    design basis threat is the largest reasonable threat against
    which a regulated private guard force should be expected to
    defend under existing law.
        Now, we have been looking at, in addition to power plants,
    nuclear weapons facilities, and it has seemed to me that
    perhaps we are going about this backward. The design basis
    threats are being defined as a result of the resources that are
    available rather than the actual threat that exists. The
    statement that you have here in your testimony seems to
    indicate that the design basis threat is not a full evaluation
    of what the actual attack method or threat could be to a
    nuclear power plant, but is instead a review of what resources
    they have and what maximum capability that they would have to
    respond. Could you speak about that for a moment?
        Mr. Wells. Yes, sir. NRC in their own words have
    characterized their responsibility as a regulator which
    presents challenges, and they have used the word ``balance.''
    They have a lot of concern for balance in terms of what should
    be required, what can be regulated. And they also have a
    responsibility to maintain a viable industry to deliver
    electricity to this country. Clearly, that involves choices and
    decisions.
        Our observation, having conducted several audits and
    continuing with our work, is that the NRC, as a regulator, has
    placed a lot of faith in what the licensees tell them. They
    also have to provide some trust level to the licensee. We have
    seen examples in doing our Davis-Besse work where that may not
    have been as valid as they should have been.
        So I think the question being asked today and the question
    that continually needs to be asked: What do you expect of the
    regulator?
        Mr. Turner. The paragraph that I'm referring to goes on to
    say that, also, certain potential vulnerabilities such as
    airborne assaults are currently being addressed outside of the
    DBT.
        Now, what it has seemed to me in reviewing the materials,
    that there is certainly--the responsibility for it is assigned
    outside of the design basis threat, but I'm not confident that
    it's currently being really addressed. Do you see any efforts
    that, outside the design basis threat, that there is
    coordination, that there is sufficient effort to actually
    respond to the threats that are beyond the box that they are
    currently dealing with with the design basis threat of the
    private guard force?
        Mr. Wells. Congressman Turner, NRC has given us access to
    the design basis threat. We are well aware of what the design
    basis threat, what is contained in the design basis threat. We
    are dealing with safeguarded security information that prevents
    me from actually discussing in terms of what is actually in the
    plan or not in the plan. We have asked them what they are doing
    in terms of considering airspace over the nuclear power plants.
    They have responded to us that they have contracted for, paid
    for, and have the results of a fairly significant study that
    they have done. They indicate it's classified. I cannot get
    into that today.
        Mr. Turner. I'm not asking about any information for you to
    disclose. I'm asking about the issue of coordination. It seems
    to me that the initial statement that we have in your written
    testimony is the design basis threat is a box that is based
    upon a private guard force and that they are not necessarily
    going beyond that.
        Then the next statement in the testimony is that with
    respect to airborne assaults and certainly, I would think,
    other issues that go outside of that box and what the private
    guard force would be able to do, which would require
    coordination with the DOD, we have also discussed NORTHCOM and
    NORAD. Do you see any evidence that coordination is effectively
    occurring, or is it just, as you relate, to other reviews, just
    a paper coordination going on?
        Mr. Wells. Let me respond that, as I said earlier, we are
    still conducting our work, we are still asking questions. I
    don't have a conclusion or a reaction for you. Factually, we
    are aware--as NRC stated this morning, they are talking to the
    FAA. We are aware that the nuclear industry themselves is on
    public record saying that is a defense that they don't believe
    is their responsibility, that is a national responsibility.
        So we will continue looking at and assessing the
    requirements that are in the DBT or not in the DBT. That is
    something we haven't done yet.
        Mr. Turner. One real quick followup question. In the
    testimony that we heard before, it was dismissed as to whether
    or not aircraft attacking these facilities are of any danger.
    That doesn't seem reasonable to me. What is your opinion of
    that?
        Mr. Wells. We had several words in our statement that was
    sent to the NRC for classification purposes, and those
    sentences and words were removed from the statement because of
    the security concern. They do have information on the study
    that they have conducted.
        Mr. Turner. It is an area that you are concerned with then
    also?
        Mr. Wells. Absolutely. We will continue our assessment of
    the vulnerability versus the design basis threat that's being
    put up against it.
        Mr. Turner. Thank you, Mr. Wells.
        Mr. Kucinich.
        Mr. Shays. Would the gentleman yield for a second?
        Mr. Kucinich. Sure.
        Mr. Shays. This is the statement you were going to give
    today?
        Mr. Wells. That's correct.
        Mr. Shays. Were there a lot of things taken out of your
    statement?
        Mr. Wells. No, there was not. There was a few word
    adjustments. We sent the entire statement, from my opening
    statement to the end of my statement, for classification review
    because we have a public obligation----
        Mr. Shays. I think that makes sense. That's not the issue.
    I just was curious if there was just one area.
        Mr. Wells. The area involved the airborne attack issue.
        Mr. Shays. OK. Thank you.
        Mr. Turner. Mr. Kucinich.
        Mr. Kucinich. Thank you.
        Mr. Wells, as Secretary of Energy, Secretary Abraham
    recently announced the formation of an elite specialized
    military-type team that would be used to test security at DOE
    facilities. Do you believe the NRC should follow suit and turn
    this function from what you have described as sleeping
    intoxicated guards into a government function?
        Mr. Wells. Unfortunately, I haven't done the audit work to
    support a conclusion to give you a straight answer. I know
    that's something that this chairman has asked us to continue to
    do and report on the end of this year, and we are continuing.
        Mr. Kucinich. Well, you have done the audit work on one
    part of the equation.
        Mr. Wells. Yes, we have, but not on the design basis
    threat. But clearly we are aware that there are different types
    of facilities. There is nuclear material. We are aware that the
    DOE has different classifications of types of material and
    different guard force versus private guard force. There are
    different issues between the agencies that could account for
    some differences between what's required. We just don't know
    how valid that fact is until we actually have a chance to look
    at it.
        Mr. Kucinich. I want to go over some territory here. You
    stated in your testimony that the October 2004 deadline for
    implementing the DBT is on schedule, but that this is based
    only on a paper review, and that the NRC cannot determine if
    the plans would actually protect the facility against the
    threat presented in the DBT.
        Mr. Wells. That's correct, sir.
        Mr. Kucinich. Is that correct?
        Mr. Wells. That's correct. We know that they are 85 percent
    complete with approving those or looking at those plants. But
    even when they are 100 percent approved, we still take our
    position that they only got what they got.
        Mr. Kucinich. Well, so then should the NRC be more involved
    in the oversight over the DBT implementation process?
        Mr. Wells. Absolutely. They have acknowledged to us that
    this is a first step, and they have step two and step three and
    step four. We just know it's going to take additional time
    before they can reach that assurance to the public that
    everything that has been put in place will work.
        Mr. Kucinich. And what kind of improvements has GAO
    recommended to be implemented in the NRC inspection program,
    and, why if they have, has the NRC resisted in making those
    changes?
        Mr. Lightner. There are two open points from our report
    from last September that NRC has not taken action on. I believe
    they have been discussed earlier. But the one has to do with
    followup on security violations that were noted. Particularly
    we're concerned with something called noncited violations which
    are followed up by NRC only as part of a sampling process. And
    as stated earlier, I believe our difference with them is over
    what is significant and what isn't.
        NRC cites these as noncited violations primarily because
    they have occurred less than two times in the prior year. I
    believe our concern is that even if they occur once, and they
    are significant, such as falsifying records related to guards'
    checkpoints or a sleeping guard, that they are significant and
    should be followed up on in every case to make sure that this
    doesn't happen in the future.
        Mr. Kucinich. So you then challenge the underlying
    assumption which the NRC has about what's significant?
        Mr. Wells. That's correct.
        Mr. Kucinich. And let's go a little bit deeper into this.
    Are you saying that their assumptions contain within them
    potential threats to the security of nuclear power plants?
        Mr. Wells. Noncited violations, if a guard is sleeping or
    unauthorized individuals are allowed access in secured areas,
    falls directly in security. I don't know how else to say that.
        Mr. Kucinich. So is that a yes?
        Mr. Wells. It certainly raises concern. Yes.
        Mr. Kucinich. Thank you.
        Mr. Turner. Ms. Watson.
        Ms. Watson. I'm going to quote from some information in
    your report, and you can tell me if it's accurate or not. And
    it says, for example, the plans do not detail defensive
    positions at this site, how the defenders would deploy to
    respond to an attack, or how long the deployment would take. In
    addition, NRC is not requesting and the facilities are
    generally not submitting for review the documents and studies
    supporting the draft security plans.
        Can you comment on that?
        Mr. Wells. The best way to comment would be to describe a
    plan; a plan is approximately 150 pages long for a single
    plant; 80 to 85 percent of the information is a template in
    which the licensee responds and checks a box yes or no.
        An example is the requirement that lighting be sufficient
    so that guards can see someone at night? The licensee would
    respond, yes, we have lighting.
        I know I'm oversimplifying this a little bit, but I'm
    giving you the implication of the template nature of the plan
    that's developed. Basically, what the licensee is doing is
    certifying to or committing to the NRC that, when they get out
    there to look, with all the details, they will find that the
    licensee is committing that they will have something in place
    that will meet all the template requirements that NRC is
    imposing.
        That's the nature of the plan that we've looked at. It does
    not describe where the guard tower is, the location of the
    guard tower. It does not describe that. It just says we have
    guard towers.
        Ms. Watson. Yeah, but they might be in New York City, you
    know. I'm not comfortable with where we are now, and I
    definitely am not comfortable with my constituents' security.
    And within the State we do have nuclear power plants.
        Are you, as an agency that goes in and accounts for
    resources and so on, satisfied that we are where we need to be
    at this time, this point in time?
        Mr. Wells. In regard to the Nuclear Regulatory Commission?
        Ms. Watson. Yes.
        Mr. Wells. We have issued two reports. We are going on our
    third report. And in each of those reports we have surfaced
    concerns and made recommendations that we suggest could improve
    government operations and regulatory issues with the NRC. So we
    are doing what we can to raise these issues and to recommend
    fixes.
        Ms. Watson. But are you satisfied with where the NRC is?
    This is September 2004. Are you satisfied, September 2004, that
    we are where we should be?
        Mr. Wells. NRC needs to be given a lot of credit. They have
    done a lot of things as quickly as they possibly can under
    their requirements. I have to be careful in answering that
    personally, I would always like things to be done faster. And I
    agree with the chairman to say that 14 months to design the
    DBT, allowing another year to put it in place, seems like an
    awful long time. But we are dealing with a regulatory agency
    that has public concerns; they are facing lawsuits about
    whether they do rulemaking, whether they do orders.
        I understand the challenge they have. Personally, I would
    hope that the intensity level, as the chairman referred to,
    perhaps could be moved forward. I encourage the NRC to ask the
    DOE why they were able to do a revision to their DBT so
    quickly. And in lessons learned, if there is something DOE did
    that the NRC could use, I would suggest that they pay attention
    and try that.
        Ms. Watson. And let me just say that I heard the word
    ``resources,'' but I didn't hear the elaboration. Are they
    lacking the resources to work in a more speedy fashion?
        Mr. Wells. Clearly, the NRC has gotten a mandate and a
    mission to be a regulatory agency that is a commission that's
    funded by the industry. So there has always been this fine line
    between, we have an obligation to require our regulators to
    regulate an industry and how to go about doing that. There has
    always been resource constraints and issues involved with the
    NRC in terms of how much resources they have to effectively get
    the job one. And it's a very tough balance that they face.
        Ms. Watson. See, that kind of gives us a hint as to what we
    as policymakers, hello, who have the oversight, should be
    doing. And we, working with industries, nongovernmental, you
    know, ought to realize that they are not going to move unless
    they have the resources necessary.
        So thank you for your statement. And I will yield back the
    balance of my time.
        Mr. Turner. Mr. Chairman.
        Mr. Shays. Thank you.
        I think you are being very fair to the NRC. I mean, you
    said they responded quickly and decisively to the September 11,
    2001 terrorist attacks, and multiple steps to enhance security
    at commercial and nuclear plants. It gives, to me, more
    credibility when you point out some of what they aren't doing.
        I do think there is some value in looking at parallels
    between what DOE is doing. What I'm getting a feeling of--and I
    would love you to explain this concept of orders versus
    rulemaking. The Secretary of Energy can basically say, damn it,
    just do it. And, you know, admittedly bureaucracies take a
    while, but doesn't the NRC have the capability to say let's do
    it? No more 2 years, no more whatever, just get the job done
    and do it quickly. Do they not have that capability?
        Mr. Wells. Mr. Chairman, I'm not a lawyer, but I believe
    that they do have wide discretion in orders that they can
    issue, advisories that they can issue. There is a line between
    what's voluntary implementation by the industry and what's
    required of the industry. However, I do know that they are
    facing several lawsuits challenging the right to issue just-do-
    it orders.
        Mr. Shays. By these companies?
        Mr. Wells. By public interest groups.
        Mr. Shays. Well, by public interest groups that are unhappy
    that they are not moving quickly. Are the companies taking
    challenges to the----
        Mr. Wells. I'm not sure who the----
        Mr. Shays. Well, I mean, with all due respect, I mean, I
    might be one of those people going after the NRC as well if
    they are not moving quickly. I mean, we are really talking 6
    years from September 11th to when the design basis threat is
    going to be shown at least in one experience at each plant. So
    your basic point to us is that this is pretty much a paper
    review today. Do you stand by that?
        Mr. Wells. I do. Step one has been a paper review.
        Mr. Shays. I mean, there isn't any real-life stuff going on
    to make sure it's happening yet.
        Mr. Wells. We have been recently made aware that they
    visited four or five places to ask some questions about what
    was actually in the document.
        Mr. Shays. Well, we have 65 places they could visit, and
    they have gone to four or five places?
        Mr. Wells. That's correct.
        Mr. Shays. So, I mean, we are not even talking about the
    efforts to break the integrity of the plant and those
    exercises; we are just talking the NRC just going there and
    checking it out firsthand.
        Mr. Wells. That's correct.
        Mr. Shays [presiding]. OK. So they are going to rely on the
    force-on-force, but they haven't started that yet.
        Now, what I think is pretty stunning is your statement on
    page 13, where you talk about instances of security guards
    sleeping on duty and security officers falsifying logs to show
    that it's been checked--had checked vital areas and barriers
    when he was actually in a part of the plant, for example--were
    treated as non-cited violations. The whole issue of non-cited
    violations that was raised by my colleague, who gets to decide
    whether they are noncited violations?
        Mr. Wells. The NRC.
        Mr. Shays. Now, what would be the logic for making them
    noncited? Tell me the logic. What would be their argument?
        Mr. Lightner. In a NRC letter responding to our last
    report, they wrote to us, ``the use of noncited violation
    contributes to an environment that fosters licensee's self-
    identification and correction of problems, an important
    organizational behavior that NRC encourages.''
        It's our understanding that this is the philosophy that
    they have and that they want the licensee to identify and
    correct the problems that----
        Mr. Shays. So you think if they make them cited, they won't
    do it? They won't share it? I'm missing the logic.
        Mr. Lightner. I believe it's a difference in philosophy
    between maybe NRC and the GAO.
        Mr. Shays. Well, we'll have them explain the philosophy.
        Mr. Lightner. Based on these statements and their response
    to our report, I believe they believe that it's the
    responsibility of the licensee--they would like the licensee to
    find as many problems as they can and correct them. And we
    wouldn't disagree that's a good thing for them to be the people
    onsite to find and correct them.
        Mr. Shays. So what I'm reading in that is if they cite
    them, they will be less inclined to share them and disclose
    them?
        Mr. Lightner. No, I don't think so. I think they just want
    them to be aware of the problems and correct them. Our view is
    that's fine, except we believe a regulator should be aware of
    what the problems are and be right on top of the correction and
    followup on those to make sure they do the job.
        Mr. Shays. So we basically have a grade; it's either cited
    or non-cited. It's either a pass/fail? I don't mean pass/fail,
    I mean, a cited violation evidently is significant.
        Mr. Wells. It is significant, and they would do followup
    and they would verify in fact that it's been corrected. If it's
    a noncited violation, they would trust and have faith that the
    contractor has said I fixed it, and then the NRC would not
    necessarily do a followup to verify. They may do some sampling
    a year so later to see if it was.
        Mr. Shays. Is that because the commercial enterprise was
    the one to find the----
        Mr. Wells. It could go either way. The NRC could find it or
    the licensee could find it, and it could both be noncited. Part
    of it has to do with NRC's regulatory philosophy that they are
    to provide oversight, not necessarily to be there on a day-in/
    day-out basis critiquing the operation of the nuclear power
    plant. There is a reliance on the operators to do a good job
    and fix things as they find them.
        Mr. Shays. Right. Are they prevented if it's a noncited
    violation from verifying that it's been fixed?
        Mr. Wells. They are not prevented. If it happened to fall
    in their sample and they went out and looked and found that it
    was not corrected, I assume that there would be consequences to
    the licensee for not fixing it, or to the licensee who might
    have said, yeah, we did fix it, but they didn't.
        Mr. Shays. Well, it seems to me, as you said, this
    classification tends to minimize the seriousness of the
    problem, which it certainly does. Non-cited violations do not
    require a written response from the licensee and do not require
    NRC inspectors to verify that the problem has been corrected.
        Mr. Wells. That's correct.
        Mr. Shays. But it's really two parts. They don't even have
    to do a written response.
        Mr. Wells. No. That's correct.
        Mr. Shays. I find that very surprising. I mean, really
    surprising. The NRC used non-cited violations extensively for
    serious problems, thereby allowing the licensee to correct the
    problem on their own without NRC verification of the
    correction.
        So your point to us, which I think is serious, is that
    these are serious violations there also. And you stand by that?
        Mr. Wells. I do.
        Mr. Shays. Consequently, NRC may not be fully aware of the
    quality of security at a site, and the lack of followup and
    verification reduces assurances that needed improvements have
    been made.
        I just would totally accept that as logical.
        Let me just ask you, could someone find out how much time I
    have for the vote? Just check the TV.
        That tells me that licensees are commercial
    enterprises,correct? And I have nothing against commercial
    enterprise. I happen to believe in it. That's one reason I am a
    Republican.
        Mr. Wells. That's correct.
        Mr. Shays. But what I don't quite understand--am I to infer
    that they, in a sense, compete, that they view themselves as
    competitors and not sharing information? I mean, lessons
    learned is what I deeply care about. Are they sharing
    information with their competitors about screw-ups they have
    done in their own plants?
        Mr. Wells. That would be an excellent question to ask the
    industry folks that are on the third panel. We at GAO haven't
    done any specific work to look at sharing of information, but
    there is a lot of proprietary information out there. No
    question about it.
        Mr. Shays. OK. Well, I believe you have done a helpful job.
    I sense that you are using your words in a measured way, which
    makes me think that we need to pay more attention to them than
    we may be. Is there anything you want to put on the record? Is
    there anything that we should have asked that we didn't that
    you wish we had asked?
        Mr. Wells. I think the continuing oversight by the Congress
    of the Nuclear Regulatory Agency is something that is
    important. They have a very important responsibility that's
    greatly increased since September 11, 2001, and I think the
    public deserves a lot more openness about where we are and
    what's happening. And I understand the security needs, but I
    also, you know, am sensitive to even as auditors going into an
    agency, a regulatory agency like the NRC, that sometimes I
    don't feel like we are getting as much cooperation in terms of
    trying to improve government operations as opposed to only
    trying to minimize how they answer our questions.
        Mr. Shays. Yes.
        Mr. Wells. So I would hope that we and the future
    Commissioners of the NRC can work something out from an
    operating procedure because we are in this together to try to
    find out a better way to regulate a commercial nuclear industry
    that doesn't share a lot of concern about what may happen in
    the future from terrorist attacks. So we are there to help, and
    I am looking forward to that improved operation and working
    relationship.
        Mr. Shays. Well, I think that you have earned that right to
    expect that.
        Thank you.
        Mr. Wells. Thanks, Mr. Chairman.
        Mr. Shays. That is a very measured report. I appreciate
    that.
        I guess I am the chairman now for a second. I would just
    say to our first panel, you will be the first that we will call
    back as soon as we get back from voting. You really have about
    20 minutes, if anybody wants to go downstairs and get something
    to eat. I think that it will probably have three more votes. I
    don't think we will keep you here that long. So I thank you all
    very much.
        We stand in recess.
        [Recess.]
        Mr. Shays. We are back to order.
        Both witnesses have been sworn in, and we sincerely
    appreciate you all waiting.
        We do have some questions we would like to ask you based on
    the GAO's report. I would say to you that in my judgment, when
    you get into these issues of nuclear security and so on, you
    can really make things pretty sensationalized because the
    consequences can be quite significant. I view the GAO as
    someone who took no cheap shots, just came out with some
    concerns. I would like you to address them.
        I need to have you explain to me, if you would, Mr. Reyes,
    why we are not seeing cited complaints and a written response
    to them as discussed in the report by the GAO.
        Mr. Reyes. The NRC requirements on violations, whether they
    are safety or security, is a graded approach.
        Mr. Shays. Are what? I'm sorry.
        Mr. Reyes. Graded approach. In other words, for more
    significant violations, the licensee is required to provide an
    original response if appropriate.
        For the noncited violations, which are the violations of
    lesser significance, we do not require them to send us a
    document. What we do require them is to put in their corrective
    action program. They have a program that is required by their
    quality assurance program to note any deviation or any
    violation of any requirement and to track the corrective action
    into full implementation.
        Now, for significant violations, we do follow with NRC
    inspectors to confirm that all of those actions were taken and
    that they are effective. For the minor significant violations--
    we call them noncited violations--we do it on a sampling
    process.
        Now, that doesn't mean that we don't know what's being
    done. See, I think there's a misconception that for those
    violations that we don't do a complete detailed followup we
    don't know what's been done. See, at every power plant in the
    country, the NRC has an office and has inspectors that live in
    the community and work there every day and interface with all
    of the employees at that station. So we do know, in general
    terms, what those that we didn't sample, the corrective actions
    were and what is being done. But we didn't send any specialist.
    We call them----
        Mr. Shays. I should have known that, but you are saying you
    actually have someone onsite?
        Mr. Reyes. We have more--there are two NRC inspectors at
    each fuel--nuclear power plant and the field officers NRC----
        Mr. Shays. I knew they were there. I didn't know they were
    specific onsite.
        Mr. Reyes [continuing]. Physically onsite on the facility.
    They live on the community. They have unfettered access to any
    part of the nuclear power plant.
        Mr. Shays. So they don't have any operational
    responsibility. They can just walk wherever the hell they want.
        Mr. Reyes. Exactly right. At any time of day and night.
        Mr. Shays. That sounds like an interesting job.
        Mr. Reyes. I used to be one when I earned an honest living,
    and I loved it.
        Mr. Shays. It doesn't sound like an honest living.
        Mr. Reyes. It was. It was protecting public health and
    safety. But, at the same time, you have hands on and the real
    activity that was going on in a facility.
        Mr. Shays. How do you avoid not developing such a personal
    relationship that you kind of close your eyes?
        Mr. Reyes. Very good question. We have a policy that we
    require them--first of all, there be two of. And the maximum
    time they can stay at one facility is 7 years, and we force
    them to rotate from one facility to another.
        Then we have requirements from the supervisors from the
    regional offices to visit them at least quarterly to make sure
    there is--we call them objectivity reviews to make sure that in
    fact they are not being either unfair one way or the other. You
    can go either way.
        Mr. Shays. OK. It is a strange terminology to call it minor
    significant violation, which is what you said. It sounds like
    you have three gradations here. But if it's significant, why is
    it minor? And if it is minor, why is it significant?
        Mr. Reyes. Maybe the terms are confusing. What we do, this
    panel that we referred to earlier, which is representative from
    all of the field offices and the headquarters program office,
    has guidelines in terms of the significance of the violation,
    and we--one of the categories, the lowest category, is called
    noncited violations, and I believe that's the one that GAO was
    referring to.
        Mr. Shays. Right.
        Mr. Reyes. That we don't specifically follow through by
    sending inspectors to check every one of them. We do it in a
    sample approach.
        Mr. Shays. Is someone who is falsifying papers, is that a
    significant violation?
        Mr. Reyes. I am going to have to defer----
        Mr. Shays. Yes, talk to me a little bit about how you
    decide what is a cite, what isn't----
        Mr. Zimmerman. Good question.
        Mr. Shays [continuing]. And who decides.
        Mr. Reyes. We decide.
        Mr. Zimmerman. It comes back to the panel that we talked
    about.
        Mr. Reyes. NRC panel.
        Mr. Zimmerman. NRC panel made up of representatives from
    each region and from our headquarters in Rockville. And what we
    look at, is it an isolated case or does it permeate the
    organization?
        Mr. Shays. Right.
        Mr. Zimmerman. That's one of those factors that can help
    determine the significance of the item. How long has this been
    going on? Is this the first time it's been done? Or through our
    investigations--we have investigators. When we have a concern
    that potentially could be problematic in nature, we could use
    our investigators to come out and get additional information.
        But the length of duration, what could have happened with
    the fact that this record of this door was not checked. If the
    door is alarmed and this was a belt and suspenders and the
    individual didn't check the door, but there is no reason to
    suspect the door all of a sudden isn't working properly, does
    it work well afterward and before? And you check it afterwards,
    and it is still working, and it doesn't have a history of
    problems, a reasonable person could likely say that door
    probably would have worked, the belt and suspenders weren't
    there, but the door was still secure, as was the vital--those
    types of dialogs back and forth weighing the significance of
    this item is what this panel does.
        A comment I didn't make in our earlier session of this is
    there was dialog that you had with GAO. Well, maybe this is a
    difference of opinion between what is a minor violation----
        Mr. Shays. Right.
        Mr. Zimmerman [continuing]. And what significance is.
        One of the things we are planning on looking at, because we
    have a review going on of what we call our significance
    determination process, which really is the hierarchy document,
    and we are piloting that activity right now. And it's
    possible--I don't know what the results will be, but it's
    possible that we may change some of our thoughts with regard to
    where that break point is between something being minor and
    something being more significant. That's an activity that we
    started in the July timeframe.
        Mr. Shays. Let me yield such time as he may consume--not
    yield, let me give him the floor.
        Mr. Tierney. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        I would almost like to ask you a broad question. I would
    say that to the end I am still a little concerned with your
    force-on-force aspect and the finding that Wackenhut had
    knowledge that stand-by personnel had been used in test
    performances in the past. It seems that people were sort of
    trailing other people just to get the idea of where they might
    go and some of the information that would have been held inside
    and was not. Tell me why we shouldn't be concerned about that?
        Mr. Reyes. Let me give you the three major points; and
    then, if you need more details, I know Mr. Zimmerman has a lot
    of details.
        But I think you need to remember, and I made that point
    earlier, DOE operates and regulates itself. In the case of the
    nuclear industry, commercial nuclear industry, we are the ones
    who do the oversight for those facilities. So when you bring
    the adversaries to do the force on force in this case you are
    talking about--is employees of this Wackenhut corporation. We,
    the NRC, review that in fact those individuals did the right
    thing. So we are the ones who are accepting their credentials
    and are they ready to do the test. We, the NRC, determine what
    the venue is that will be. And we are there in large numbers in
    the preparation and conduct of the test, and--as it is the NRC
    who decides whether the performance was acceptable or not.
        Mr. Tierney. But still, apparently, someone still got the
    heads-up of how it was going to be done, what the attack would
    look like and be prepared for it.
        Mr. Reyes. But that is the Department of Energy example
    from the IG findings, and we are aware of those IG findings,
    and we have already trained our inspectors to look for those
    kinds of issues.
        Mr. Zimmerman. I think in the earlier session we talked
    about what we do every 3 years, where we will be with the
    adversary----
        Mr. Tierney. Check that.
        Mr. Zimmerman. I will get back to you. Check the miles
    front and afterwards and all the things we do, the sensitivity
    we have toward it. Then we have the annual exercise that the
    licensee does, and I believe that we plan on observing those,
    but I want to make that distinction between those two different
    types.
        The understanding that I have been given is at Y-12 it was
    not the DOE standard force on force where this occurred. It
    wasn't like our 3-year exercise. It was the off-year activity
    being done by the site, so that it had less oversight, less
    controls. It doesn't make it right, doesn't make it right. But
    I wanted to clarify for you that if in your mind you are
    looking at it and saying that equates to the NRC's 3-year force
    on force, I am trying to clarify that is not the----
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        [GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T8358.039

        Mr. Tierney. I understand that. That we don't do those for
    every 3 years leads me to believe we ought to be concerned less
    about the annual periodic checks, that those don't occur
    either.
        I am real concerned about these private enterprises
    policing themselves even if they aren't monitored by the NRC.
    It is like the fox watching the chicken coop here. I have a
    real problem with them doing the training and them deciding
    what the hours are going to be and them deciding what the force
    on force is going to be, even if they have your supervision----
        Mr. Zimmerman. They don't decide.
        Mr. Tierney [continuing]. Your decisionmaking. There are
    examples of that information getting out and not being done
    right, and it is troublesome.
        Mr. Zimmerman. I understand the perception. They are not
    deciding anything. They are not deciding what path they are
    going to take. This is scripted by the NRC saying this is the
    path that you are going to take. The people doing it are our
    contractors.
        Mr. Tierney. That's every 3 years.
        Mr. Zimmerman. Every 3 years.
        Mr. Tierney. The annual ones--which I would imagine are
    just as important--that is not the case.
        Mr. Zimmerman. And the benefit of having a contract
    organization such as Wackenhut organization in place is that if
    I am one of the individuals who was selected to be on the
    composite adversary force I am going to learn an awful lot. Now
    I am going to take it back to my site and enhance the
    performance of those annual exercises, and I am going to bring
    back best practices associated with where I have been.
        Mr. Tierney. I am not sure I buy that, Mr. Zimmerman. But,
    you know, I hear what you are saying, and I respect your
    opinion on that. But I am not sure I buy it.
        Mr. Zimmerman. Let me add one in closure----
        Mr. Tierney. Sure.
        Mr. Zimmerman [continuing]. That will make you feel a
    little bit better. If it turns out the NRC is not satisfied
    with the performance of this group, we are going to do it
    ourselves. The Commission has told us that.
        Mr. Tierney. But that is every 3 years.
        Mr. Reyes. He means the whole concept. The Commission is
    trying this approach right now. He is talking about the whole
    concept of Wackenhut supplying the adversaries. The Commission
    hasn't ruled out that we will have this--that this is the only
    way to go. We are doing this. The Commission can change their
    mind and say, no, we are going to do it differently.
        Mr. Zimmerman. The first use of this composite adversary
    force is occurring this week. This week is the first time it
    will be used in force on force. It will be on strength. If it
    doesn't meet our standards, then they will hear about it and
    the industry will hear about it. If there is the need for
    course corrections, they will be made.
        Mr. Tierney. I have serious concerns on that. I would be
    interested if you would report to this committee what you find
    after that goes on and give us some detail on that.
        Mr. Zimmerman. I will do that.
        [The information referred to follows:]

        [GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T8358.040

        Mr. Tierney. I would greatly appreciate that. That is one
    of the overriding concerns that I have, is that we are really
    not in charge of every aspect of who is in there providing
    security.
        I don't want to use up too much of the time here.
        Mr. Shays. I would just have a question--the gentleman
    yields the question.
        Mr. Tierney. Now you have heard other people testifying
    here this morning. What do you think are the serious concerns
    that they raised and what is your response to those most
    serious concerns?
        Mr. Reyes. GAO audits are not complete, and they haven't
    visited the facilities. We are concerned that you are giving
    the impression that all they do is a paper review. We tried to
    bring some pictures.
        Mr. Tierney. Correct me if I am wrong. You haven't visited
    all the facilities either?
        Mr. Shays. I have to show you the pictures. The pictures to
    me were confusing.
        Mr. Reyes. OK. We cannot show you----
        Mr. Shays. I don't understand why I should be impressed
    with someone who has a gun and a helmet on. Why would I feel
    good about this?
        Mr. Reyes. The physical barrier?
        Mr. Shays. Yes.
        Mr. Reyes. See the physical barrier, the pop-up barrier?
        Mr. Shays. Yes.
        Mr. Reyes. When GAO says that all that is going on is
    paper--we are trying to say there are physical changes at these
    facilities in the field. Now we couldn't bring pictures of
    everything.
        Mr. Shays. OK. Tell me this----
        Mr. Tierney. I think the concern was that you determined
    that those physical things were through a paper review in all
    but about four to six instances.
        Mr. Shays. And, again, if the gentleman would yield just
    for a second. So this is the barrier.
        Mr. Zimmerman. A barrier.
        Mr. Reyes. Yes. A pop-up barrier.
        Mr. Zimmerman. It rolls down and pops up.
        Mr. Shays. All right. I am not impressed.
        Mr. Reyes. But that is not a paper issue. I mean, there are
    physical barriers there.
        Mr. Shays. What does this tell me?
        Mr. Reyes. You say that--bullet resistance.
        Mr. Zimmerman. Up. There you go.
        Mr. Reyes. That is a strategic point to show the
    adversary--I can't go into details but made out of
    bulletproof----
        Mr. Shays. It is totally bulletproof.
        Mr. Reyes. Yes, sir.
        Mr. Shays. That is helpful. I didn't know that.
        Now this one.
        Mr. Zimmerman. Same thing.
        Mr. Reyes. Same thing. That is another strategic point. And
    we can't tell you how many officers.
        Mr. Shays. What brings down something like this? It would
    have to be a grenade launch or a rocket?
        Mr. Reyes. You would have to have a sizable weapon.
        Mr. Shay. OK.
        Mr. Reyes. So our only point was trying to make that there
    are physical changes there. We couldn't bring you all the
    pictures. We really invite the committee or any of the staff on
    the committee to go and visit. Because in this forum we can't
    go into the details. But it's more than paper. We were
    surprised that they are characterizing it as that.
        Mr. Shays. Is the gentleman also going to get into the
    issue, I hope?
        Mr. Tierney. Just jump in.
        Mr. Shays. No, I just wonder if you were going to pursue
    your questioning on the quality of the people.
        Mr. Tierney. I don't know if you are going to bring that up
    or not. I am concerned and interested--I don't know whether I
    am the only one concerned about the quality of the people that
    are actually in there as security personnel. You know, the
    background check. Who is going the background check? How in
    depth it is. Who does their training? Who observes the
    performance on the job? Who determines whether or not they are
    properly proficient in weapons? Who determines that they are
    showing up on time, doctoring records, doing all those things?
        Mr. Reyes. The background checks are all done by the Feds.
    In other words, the FBI processes the fingerprints.
        Mr. Tierney. So anytime Wackenhut or anybody else wants to
    hire somebody they have to check them through the FBI?
        Mr. Reyes. Yes, sir. Yes, sir. The psychological test is
    done by a contractor to the facility, but it's a doctor with
    his own credentials to go through that.
        Now we are the ultimate who reviews that. Our inspection is
    called access controls. Contrary to what you heard here from
    GAO, we conduct those all the time and they are being conducted
    as we speak. So we are there where the rubber meets the road
    doing those inspections.
        Mr. Zimmerman. Background checks are more rigorous and more
    frequent than it is for other individuals that have vital area
    access because of the fact that these individuals are armed.
        Mr. Reyes. Yes, the armed individuals receive a more
    thorough review.
        Mr. Tierney. Do you have any of the concerns raised by the
    Department of Energy or the GAO?
        Mr. Reyes. The recommendations, you mean?
        Mr. Tierney. Yes.
        Mr. Reyes. We take them seriously. We have endorsed some of
    them. We have implemented some of them. Others we are still
    considering. We just haven't gotten to them and haven't ruled
    them out.
        Mr. Tierney. Thank you.
        Mr. Shays. Thank you.
        I would just like to ask, and do this real quick because I
    want to get to the next panel, but I think you have been very
    responsive. I don't get a sense there are consequences if bad
    things happen. So make me feel good about consequences.
        First off, anyone who was inebriate, drunk, they are fired,
    right?
        Mr. Reyes. Yes, sir.
        Mr. Shays. OK. And then there is the question as to how
    that would have happened. So you don't want a written
    explanation from--why wouldn't there be at least a written
    explanation?
        Mr. Reyes. There is an aside. We know that the individual
    was fired. Typically, it was by the supervisor observation
    program. The supervisors of these individuals are trained to
    observe behavior. So the way it is found out is typically we
    have a report that a supervisor requests it for cause, testing
    of an individual.
        We know an individual is no longer aware, and we are aware
    of the corrective actions we are taking over all of the
    facility. We may not send an inspector just to review that in
    detail. Our inspectors onsite are aware that this individual is
    not coming back, and they are in discussion with the other
    security guards, and that's why we have the inspector at the
    plant who has access to all 1,000 employees. They know and they
    ask, do you know what happened, and make sure that word gets
    out that is not tolerated. We do have indirect means to
    confirming it. I think there is a misnomer on----
        Mr. Shays. Wait. If you have people onsite, it seems to me
    you are able to check it the next day. That's why I am
    beginning to think, if you have people onsite, they are aware
    of the citations, correct?
        Mr. Reyes. Yes.
        Mr. Shays. Don't they write you a note and say this has
    been corrected?
        Mr. Reyes. If we go and follow it, they do. But we have a
    very prescribed inspection program that includes safety and
    security. And we want them to go in the control room and we
    want them to check the safety pumps. It is just a matter of
    make sure you are putting your resources where the highest
    safety and significance matter is.
        Mr. Shays. I would think that the people onsite would be
    asked to verify any citation, every criticism in the plant. I
    would think that's what they need to do. And I would think they
    need to write a report on everyone. I mean, it just seems like
    a no-brainer. They are there.
        Mr. Reyes. They are busy. And they write a report. And the
    most significant ones, they are aware of the other ones.
        Mr. Shays. How difficult is it to followup on a complaint
    and check it out? They could do it in an hour or two, couldn't
    they?
        Mr. Reyes. Well, it typically takes more than that.
        Mr. Shays. Better they do it than no one do it.
        Mr. Reyes. But we do it, sir, on a sample basis. We do.
        Mr. Shays. I am going to have that explained to me later. I
    am impressed you have people onsite. I am not impressed that
    they are not following up on cited complaints or noncited
    complaints.
        Anything else you want to put on the record that you would
    like to--yes.
        Mr. Zimmerman. I just want to make a comment--I guess maybe
    two comments, maybe one on legislation. But the comment I want
    to make is that I got the sense from reviewing the hearing from
    last year and from sitting here today that a number of the
    members of the committee have a concern that we don't worry
    enough, that we are complacent, why aren't we laying awake at
    night?
        And I want to tell you that we are laying awake at night,
    that we are very concerned, that this agency is about
    continuous improvement and that we are constantly looking and
    working very long hours in an effort to get out in front of
    those that mean to do us harm.
        So there's a very--I am very proud of the staff at the NRC,
    and we are very much focused, again, on trying to search for
    continuous improvement, and we are not lackadaisical. We are--I
    am not saying that we are, but, again----
        Mr. Shays. I think you have judged us fairly well in terms
    of our concern.
        I have a feeling that the way we set up DOE, we have those
    who promote and those who are looking to be the inspectors and
    to do security. And I feel for some reason we still don't have
    that separation with NRC. I don't know why we don't.
        Mr. Zimmerman. That's why I am raising it. I am trying to,
    in words at least, say it--and then through everything that we
    have tried to do in our explanation. Because we are not sure
    that our issues have stuck.
        Mr. Shays. I think you are going to have a hard time
    convincing us in that area. By setting up a separate
    organization, there will be some natural tensions that I don't
    think exist within the NRC, and so I think you are going to
    have some real skepticism on our part about that. And so I
    understand that you have divided responsibilities. That's the
    challenge.
        Mr. Reyes. I just want to thank the committee for inviting
    us here. We are looking forward to coming back and keeping you
    updated on the action we are taking. We do want to ask your
    support on the legislative request that we have in front of
    Congress. It is of the most importance, that those laws are
    passed so we can protect our nuclear power plants better.
        Thank you very much.
        Mr. Shays. Hold on 1 second. OK. I want to put it on the
    record. I would like you to just ask this question or make this
    point and have you react to it.
        Mr. Halloran. This is the point that I think you made
    before, in terms of the zeal of the regulatory effort. DOE is
    an operator of sites, NRC is a regulator, so you are
    necessarily one step removed from turning the knobs and----
        Mr. Reyes. We are.
        Mr. Halloran [continuing]. And putting up the fences. So
    that dictates some different operational structures and ways to
    get things done, doesn't necessarily demand a lesser intensity
    level, but I think it does require a different approach.
        Mr. Shays. See, I think he gave a better answer than you
    did. He made a better defense of your case, I think. I wanted
    to put it on the record. I am making an assumption. I made a
    parallel in which I am being challenged, and that is that the
    parallel isn't the same--that you are a regular. I guess, I
    also view you as promoters of the industry. I do feel that way.
    So, at any rate----
        Anything else to put on the record?
        Mr. Reyes. No. We want to reinforce the legislative request
    that we have then. We really need those legislative
    enhancements.
        Thank you very much.
        Mr. Shays. Don't be offended I said he did a better job. He
    is a really bright guy.
        Mr. Reyes. No, we are not.
        Mr. Shays. Thank you for waiting, and I appreciate your
    willingness to fit into our needs. Thank you very much.
        Mr. Reyes. Thank you.
        Mr. Shays. I will call on our last panel--thank you for
    being here.
        Mr. Alex Matthiessen, director, Hudson Riverkeeper,
    Garrison, NY; Mr. David Lochbaum, the Union of Concerned
    Scientists, based in Washington, DC; and Mr. Marvin Fertel,
    vice president and chief nuclear officer at Nuclear Energy
    Institute.
        With that, if you would--thank you for standing.
        [Witnesses sworn.]
        Mr. Shays. I would note for the record our witnesses
    responded in the affirmative.
        Mr. Fertel, you were a dead giveaway in the audience
    because any time the Commission made a comment that you liked
    you smiled broadly, and I thought--you would not be a good
    poker player, sir.
        Mr. Fertel. I am just too straight.
        Mr. Shays. OK. Well, that's a good answer.
        All right. Mr. Matthiessen, we will start with you; and we
    will just go right down the line. Thank you very much.
        Mr. Matthiessen. Terrific.
        Mr. Shays. Nice to have you all here.

     STATEMENTS OF ALEX MATTHIESSEN, DIRECTOR, HUDSON RIVERKEEPER,
     GARRISON, NY; DAVID LOCHBAUM, UNION OF CONCERNED SCIENTISTS,
      WASHINGTON, DC; AND MARVIN FERTEL, VICE PRESIDENT AND CHIEF
       NUCLEAR OFFICER, NUCLEAR ENERGY INSTITUTE, WASHINGTON, DC

        Mr. Matthiessen. Thank you for having me, Chairman Shays,
    members of the subcommittee. Thank you for the opportunity to
    once again testify on safety and security at Indian Point; and
    thank you, Congressman Shays, for your leadership to date on
    this issue.
        I also want to say I was very encouraged by the line of
    questioning, questions that we heard from members of the
    subcommittee today.
        Riverkeeper is not and has never been an anti-nuclear
    organization. Our campaign aims only to minimize the risks
    associated with the Indian Point nuclear facility and by
    necessity aid in the reform of those Federal and State agencies
    and policies governing the plant.
        Three years after September 11, Indian Point still is
    unprepared to repel an attack from the air, land or water or a
    combination thereof. While improvements have been made at the
    margins, there remain gaping holes in Indian Point security. On
    the ground, current guards tell us that in some areas security
    at the plant is worse than it was before September 11, 2001.
    The spent fuel pools remain largely unprotected.
        Mr. Shays. Let me just say something to you. When you make
    a comment like that, this is a comment that you are saying
    under oath. So this is not casual comments, correct?
        Mr. Matthiessen. No.
        OK. This is based on conversations that I have had with a
    current security guard at the plant, and he is relaying, in
    turn, comments that he has gotten from other guards.
        Many of the best-trained and most-experienced guards have
    been fired or have quit. This is according to the guard's
    report that we have heard only a week and a half or 2 weeks
    ago--morale is low, and guards say they feel no obligation to
    stay on their posts in event of an attack. A chilled
    environment exists at the plant, and Entergy management is
    apparently still telling security personnel to alter incident
    reports.
        There are no specific defenses against an aerial attack at
    Indian Point--no no-fly zone, no combat patrols, no anti-
    aircraft missiles, nothing.
        From the water, there is no physical barrier to prevent a
    tanker or a speedboat loaded with explosives from plowing into
    the cooling water intakes.
        With regard to the NRC's force-on-force security drills,
    they are a joke--but not a funny one. The NRC drills are
    designed to allow nuclear systems to game the system. Everyone
    knows that if real conditions were used and no limits put on
    well-trained mock attackers, the plans would fail nearly every
    time.
        Again, I have details reported by POGO and other groups as
    well as the guards themselves.
        A head-in-the-sand mindset has a fever grip on the NRC and
    FEMA, which has refused to accept the new threat level and
    revamp organizations accordingly. The NRC and FEMA are captive
    to the industry they regulate, and the Department of Homeland
    Security has failed to assert itself. As a result, these
    agencies have little credibility with the American people,
    which in turn undermines public safety.
        Allow me to identify just three of many problems plaguing
    the NRC:
        First, the NRC resists the need to consider terrorism in
    administrative proceedings, and yet they routinely invoke
    terrorism to justify a new wave of policies designed to thwart
    the public's right and need to scrutinize the industry.
        Second, the NRC's new design base threat level is set too
    low. David Lochbaum will cover this in detail, but allow me to
    add that there remains a considerable gap between the level of
    defense plant operators are expected to provide and what the
    U.S. military is prepared to deploy.
        Finally, the NRC continues to enact policies that allow it
    and the nuclear industry to operate in increasing secrecy and
    with reduced transparency and public participation. I assure
    you--and I know you know this--that the less the public is able
    to see the more dangerous this industry will become.
        Now moving into recommendations. The best way to truly
    minimize the public health and safety risks at Indian Point is
    to close the plant and secure the onsite spent fuel. However,
    so long as Indian Point is still operating, there are numerous
    ways to better protect the plant. I will highlight those three
    or four measures that I think are the most urgent and readily
    achievable.
        First, we must secure the plant against aerial or
    waterborne attacks, which we can do with relatively inexpensive
    passive technologies. Installing a Beamhenge system, a line of
    steel beams set vertically in deep concrete foundations
    connected by a web of high-strength cables, wires and netting,
    would effectively shield the facility's vital components and
    structures. Beamhenge is essentially the nuclear grade
    equivalent of the fences erected around golf driving ranges.
    Dunlop barriers, inflated cylinders of rubber-coated textile
    linked together or anchored to a mooring buoy, should be
    installed in the Hudson River in front of Indian Point to help
    protect the plant's cooling water structures. Already in place
    at several Navy bases, Dunlop barriers are used to thwart small
    boat terrorist attacks.
        Second, we must establish a temporary no-fly zone over
    Indian Point, combined with combat air patrols, at least until
    the passive defense systems are in place.
        Third, Congress must direct the NRC to deal more
    aggressively with the highly vulnerable spent fuel stored at
    nuclear reactor sites. The best way to do that is to install
    hardened onsite storage systems, or HOSS, which is designed to
    contain isolated radiation and repel terrorist attacks.
        Finally, Congress must direct the NRC and FEMA to revamp
    their policies and regulations governing nuclear plant security
    and emergency preparedness.
        I have a whole laundry list of specifics there, but I will
    wait until the Q&A--if I have the opportunity to list those--in
    the interest of time.
        In general, though, I think it would be good for Congress
    to consider appointing a task force made up of governmental and
    nongovernmental stakeholders to do a top-to-bottom review of
    the NRC and FEMA's oversight of this industry.
        In conclusion, little has changed since September 11
    regarding the level of security at Indian Point. Federal
    agencies remain in a state of denial regarding the security
    threat facing nuclear facilities. Congress needs to ask the NRC
    and the industry--and I am paraphrasing the gentleman who was
    from the NRC who was here just a minute ago--if you are so
    concerned and laying awake at night, why aren't you concerned
    about deploying the most obvious and inexpensive security
    measures at our most vulnerable and high-risk nuclear plants?
        Whether they admit it or not, I believe the answer is quite
    simple. The industry and the NRC don't want to draw public
    attention to the intrinsic danger of nuclear power and the
    naked vulnerability of these facilities to terrorist attack,
    especially at a time when the industry is hoping to build a
    whole new generation of nuclear energy plants.
        The Federal Government's current approach to nuclear plant
    security and emergency preparedness is leading us down a path
    that could--God forbid--result in a far more terrifying attack
    than what we experienced that horrible day 3 years ago. We have
    received the warning signs regarding the possibility of and our
    vulnerability to a terrorist attack on a U.S. nuclear power
    plant, much as the government had received warnings about the
    September 11 attacks. Let's not give a future 9/11 Commission
    the opportunity to say we knew a nuclear attack on a power
    plant was possible and we did too little to stop it or to
    minimize the impacts.
        Thank you very much for giving me the opportunity to share
    my views today.
        Mr. Shays. Thank you, Mr. Matthiessen.
        [The prepared statement of Mr. Matthiessen follows:]

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        Mr. Shays. Mr. Lochbaum.
        Mr. Lochbaum. Thank you Mr. Chairman. I appreciate this
    opportunity to present our views on nuclear power plant
    security.
        Today's open hearing demonstrates that nuclear plant
    security issues can be responsibly discussed in public, a fact
    lost upon the Nuclear Regulatory Commission. The NRC
    essentially closed its doors to the public on this important
    topic since September 11. That's unacceptable, and we urge the
    Congress to compel the NRC to follow its lead by including the
    public in policy discussions.
        Mr. Shays. That's a very interesting point. It has never
    occurred to me that it's being used. The irony is it is being
    used as an excuse not to have the dialog when we need the
    dialog even more.
        Mr. Lochbaum. But it is also forcing groups like ours to go
    to other avenues since they have closed our doors, and the
    media and other outlets are the way we find our voice since
    they have closed our voice. They would probably prefer that
    they had those comments in house than seeing them in headlines.
        Mr. Shays. Good point.
        Mr. Lochbaum. A successful attack on a nuclear power plant
    would be one of the worst disasters in American history. That
    this threat is real is revealed by two simple facts. First, the
    nuclear industry urged this Congress to renew Price-Anderson
    Federal liability protection for nuclear power plants. If an
    attack could not cause catastrophic harm, owners could get
    private insurance coverage.
        Second, the nuclear industry claims to have spent more than
    $1 billion upgrading security since September 11. No one has
    enough money to spend on pseudo threats.
        After September 11, the industry issued orders requiring
    plants to take steps to make facilities less vulnerable to
    attack.
        The NRC also revamped its oversight process. The steps we
    liked most among them are frequency of NRC-evaluated force-on-
    force security test was increased to once every 3 years from
    once every 8 years, the number of design basis threat
    adversaries was increased, and many of the unrealistic
    limitations on their weapons and tactics were lessened or
    removed.
        Minimum standards have been established for training and
    qualifications of security force personnel, and working hour
    limits for security force personnel were mandated by the NRC.
        Despite these steps taken, nuclear power plants remain
    vulnerable to attack by land, sea and by air. The American
    public cannot honestly be assured that all reasonable measures
    to protect them have been taken until the following 10 steps
    are taken:
        The two-person rule and/or expanded in-plant use of
    security monitoring cameras needs to be done to better control
    vital access to areas.
        The evaluation process for proposed procedure revisions and
    hardware modifications must formally verify whether protection
    against sabotage is affected by the planned changes.
        The NRC must not allow the same company to provide both the
    attackers and the defenders in force-on-force security tests.
        The NRC must increase its design basis threat level to a
    realistic level comparable to that established by the DOE after
    September 11.
        The NRC must either require background checks for nuclear
    plant workers with access to sensitive plant information or to
    prevent these workers from accessing that information.
        The NRC must require water barriers around intake
    structures at nuclear power plants.
        The NRC must require protection against aircraft hazards
    similar to the process it used to protect the plants against
    fire hazards.
        The Federal Government's ability to withstand or respond an
    attack designed above the design basis threat level must be
    periodically demonstrated.
        The NRC must require adequate protection for spent fuel by
    requiring owners to transfer fuel discharged from the reactor
    more than 5 years ago into dry casks which are emplaced within
    earth berms and other protective devices.
        And last--or, actually, first--the NRC must reengage the
    public in security policy discussions.
        I would like to highlight two of those recommendations. The
    others are detailed further in my written testimony.
        Right now, spent fuel at nuclear power plants is not as
    safe or as secure as it should be. Many plants have five to
    eight times as much spent fuel as fuel in the reactor. There
    are fewer barriers that attackers must penetrate in order to
    successfully damage spent fuel. And, correspondingly, there are
    fewer barriers protecting the public from the radioactivity
    released from damaged fuel.
        At most plants, the spent fuel pools are filled to
    overflowing. Spent fuel is then loaded into dry casks and
    placed out on open air lots out back. In fact, the current
    scheme of spent fuel storage could hardly be made less safe or
    less secure. By maintaining the spent fuel pools at or near
    full capacity, the risk is kept as high as it possibly can get.
    Transferring spent fuel into dry casks merely adds the
    additional risk of spent fuel out in the backyard.
        The responsible thing to do would be to minimize the
    inventory in spent pool fuels by transferring fuel discharged
    from the reactor more than 5 years ago into dry casks, which
    are then placed in earthen walls or other protective devices.
    The risk reduction by emptying the spent pool would more than
    offset the increased risk from dry cask storage resulting in
    overall tangible reduction in the risk profile at each plant
    site.
        The second recommendation I will highlight involves access
    to sensitive information. As this subcommittee has discussed,
    the NRC's imposed restrictions as recently as August 4th on the
    public's access to information after September 11. But there is
    a huge loophole. The access authorization upgrades mandated by
    the NRC after September 11 only apply to nuclear plant workers
    who get unrestricted access. There are literally thousands of
    nuclear plant workers with ready access to sensitive plant
    information that do not get unescorted access and therefore are
    not subject to background checks. Our enemies can get those
    jobs and obtain blueprint calculations, risk assessment hazards
    and analysis and upcoming equipment outage schedules useful in
    planning an attack.
        The NRC has to plug this loophole. It makes little sense to
    restrict public access to information while allowing the
    equivalent of uncontrolled drive-through service at the plants
    themselves.
        Before I close, I would like to take a moment to defend the
    NRC from the chairman's concerns about the 6-year security
    upgrade schedule. That's actually the NRC's express lane. You
    should see their pace at resolving safety issues. By
    comparison, 6 years is the blink of an eye.
        Mr. Chairman, I sincerely thank you for holding this open
    hearing and for listening to the public perspectives on this
    important issue.
        Mr. Shays. Thank you.
        [The prepared statement of Mr. Lochbaum follows:]

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        Mr. Shays. Mr. Fertel.
        Mr. Fertel. Thank you, Chairman Shays.
        Given the importance of security at our nuclear plants
    today, I generally speak with the chief officers that operate
    those plants weekly, and I find I am getting to know a lot of
    the security managers personally. During the past 3 years, the
    industry has carried out unprecedented, unequalled efforts to
    review and improve our security; and I think during the
    discussion today the term business as usual, the lack of
    intensity and not exchanging lessons learned was used. I can
    only say that it's anything but business as usual. It's pretty
    intense, and we are exchanging lessons learned almost weekly.
    So I think there is a lot going on that I wish maybe we could
    share more with Dave and his colleagues.
        I would like to start by emphasizing the importance of
    nuclear power to our Nation. Our Nation's 103 reactors safely
    and cleanly produce enough electricity to power one in every
    five homes and businesses in the United States. Many regions
    are heavily dependent on nuclear energy. For example, in the
    chairman's State of Connecticut, electricity from nuclear
    provides 50 percent of the power in that State; and these
    plants also provide an additional benefit of stabilizing the
    electricity grid.
        I would like to emphasize three major points today
    regarding the security of our nuclear power plants:
        First, nuclear power plants were the most secure industrial
    facilities in the United States before September 11th and
    against terrorist attacks, and they are even more secure today.
        Second, power plants can serve as a model of industrial
    security in America. Our plants are far more secure than any
    other sector of our Nation's infrastructure and have been
    recognized as such by several independent organizations and
    security experts.
        Third, while the industry is fully committed to protecting
    its employees, the public and its assets, our companies have
    maximized the level of protection they can reasonably provide
    to these facilities.
        Although we coordinate extensively with government entities
    on security matters, continued emphasis on integrated response
    planning is necessary; and there are important legal and policy
    limitations to further increasing the security requirements
    that the operators of the plant have to satisfy.
        As you know, nuclear power plants were built to be robust
    and secure. A nuclear reactor is secured by several feet of
    concrete walls and an internal barrier of steel reinforced
    concrete. They were built to contain the effects of a reactor
    accident and also to withstand natural accidents such as
    hurricanes, earthquakes, fires and floods.
        Even before the September 11th attacks, every nuclear plant
    was protected by a strategy that included protective
    perimeters, physical barriers, sophisticated access
    authorization technology and a professional, well-armed
    security force. We conduct background checks on all of our
    employees and strictly control access to our plants.
        After September 11th, the industry--in response to orders
    issued by the NRC--enhanced security at our plants
    significantly. Each nuclear power plant is scheduled to meet
    the requirements of the most recent NRC security orders by the
    October 29th deadline.
        Over the past 3 years, we have expanded our security force
    by 60 percent, from 5,000 to 8,000 security officers at the 64
    sites. During that time, the industry has spent about $1
    billion to increase the security force and to significantly
    enhance physical protection at the plant. About two-thirds of
    that or more is physical protection. So there are things
    happening at the plants.
        My written testimony provides details regarding these
    improvements. However, some of them are considered safeguard
    information and thus not available to the public.
        As part of the new security requirements, each plant will
    conduct multiple--and I repeat--multiple force-on-force
    exercises every year. The NRC formally evaluates each plant's
    force-on-force exercise at least once every 3 years, as you
    have heard before.
        In these exercises, the NRC evaluates the execution of the
    security strategy, the performance of the plant security force
    and strategy, the performance of the plant security force and
    the performance of the independently trained adversary force
    used in the mock attacks.
        I am looking forward to questions on why we hired
    Wackenhut, which I am sure we will get. We can talk about that.
    We think it is the right thing to do. We think it will enhance
    security at the plants.
        Given the September 11th attacks, we also significantly
    increased our cooperation and coordination with State and local
    law enforcement. We have worked closely with the NRC, the
    Department of Homeland Security and other Federal, State and
    local authorities, with the goal of building a seamless
    security for our plants.
        However, additional emphasis on integrated response
    planning is needed; and there are important legal implications
    to us doing certain things that we don't have the authority to
    do, that we need help from the governmental entities to do.
        Mr. Matthiessen's testimony provides results from a new
    report by Riverkeeper on the consequences of possible terrific
    attack on the Indian Point nuclear power plant in New York. I
    just want to take a minute to discuss that report.
        The industry always welcomes meaningful technical analysis
    of our nuclear facilities. However, this Riverkeeper report is
    more of the Hollywood equivalent of merging plots of ``The
    Perfect Storm,'' ``The Day After Tomorrow'' and ``Independence
    Day'' and trying to sell it to the public as a realistic
    scenario. Simply, the likelihood of the accident sequence in
    this report leading to a release of radiation is so incredibly
    low that it is not credible.
        With your permission, Mr. Chairman, I would like to include
    in the record an analysis of the Riverkeeper report recently
    prepared by leading technical experts. Thank you.
        Mr. Kucinich [presiding]. Thank you very much.
        [The prepared statement of Mr. Fertel follows:]

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        Mr. Kucinich. I would like to begin with some questions of
    Mr. Lochbaum. The industry claims to have spent $1 billion
    since September 11 upgrading nuclear plant security. What does
    that claim tell you?
        Mr. Lochbaum. Well, I think it speaks to how unprepared we
    were on September 11th, because that's money that wasn't spent
    until afterward. And I also think it reminds me of the billion
    dollars that was spent fixing safety problems at Millstone or
    the hundreds of millions of dollars that were spent fixing
    problems at the Davis-Besse plant.
        Mr. Kucinich. I think they spent about $600 million there
    and about $1 billion at Indian Point to restore plants to a
    safe level. So how many billions will it take to increase
    security, in your estimation, to adequate levels?
        Mr. Lochbaum. I don't think it's a question of money. I
    don't think there's that much money left to be spent. I think
    it's more of an attitude question that this subcommittee has
    explored. I think it's more of a focus and just getting serious
    about it, more so than the dollar amount, that is preventing it
    so far. I think the fact that they have been able to do as much
    as they have behind closed doors is the biggest barrier to
    getting it done right.
        Mr. Kucinich. And, in your thinking about this, have you
    thought about some alternatives to this such as solar, wind?
    Has the NRC and, to your understanding, or the industry spent
    any money for security at these facilities?
        Mr. Lochbaum. Well, if you look at the $1 billion that the
    industry has spent on upgrading nuclear power plant security
    and compare that to the amount that's been spent upgrading at
    wind farms or other renewable technology, if it's been $100, it
    would probably high.
        Mr. Kucinich. Would these wind farms be less of a target?
        Mr. Lochbaum. There's no real hazard there, so there's no
    real need to provide $1 billion of security to something that
    is not a hazard to the American people.
        But the real question is--and it is something beyond me to
    answer--but is it really worth spending $1 billion protecting
    Americans or is it better to spend the $1 billion more
    productively in providing an energy technology that doesn't
    provide that risk to ourselves?
        Mr. Kucinich. Well, you make a series of recommendations in
    your testimony how to improve physical security at nuclear
    plants. Do you want to offer to this committee what
    recommendations you think should be implemented first?
        Mr. Lochbaum. If I had one to pick from, it would be the
    spent fuel pool issue, in reducing the threat from spent fuel.
    Right now, from both a safety standpoint and a security
    standpoint, we are doing that wrong.
        Mr. Kucinich. Let me ask you something. Why this issue of
    the transfer of the cask?
        Mr. Lochbaum. Right.
        Mr. Kucinich. Why has this transfer of spent fuel into dry
    cask not been done before now?
        Mr. Lochbaum. We started doing it in 1986 in this country.
    At that time, the casks that we were using could only be used
    for storage, not for transport. So there was a reluctance to
    transfer things into dry cask that would then have to be
    handled twice. Nowadays, the casks that we have can be used for
    storage and transport. You are going to have to put it in the
    cask eventually. Why not do it now where it improves safety, it
    improves the security, and it doesn't affect the cost that
    much?
        Mr. Kucinich. Thank you, just have another question for Mr.
    Fertel.
        Mr. Shays [presiding]. You may have as much time as you
    want.
        Mr. Kucinich. Earlier you heard it brought into the
    discussion, the situation at Davis-Besse. Would you
    characterize--are you familiar with it?
        Mr. Fertel. Yes, I am.
        Mr. Kucinich. Would you say the events surrounding Davis-
    Besse are an exception or the rule in the nuclear industry?
        Mr. Fertel. I would say they were the exception, and it was
    an unacceptable exception.
        Going back to questions asked by this committee about
    lessons learned, following the Davis-Besse event there was a
    significant lesson learned in our industry resulting in a major
    materials initiative to make sure that we are looking at
    materials degradation everywhere in the plant in a much more
    systemic and integrated way.
        It's been a very painful lesson for FirstEnergy. It's been
    a very painful lesson for FirstEnergy, and it's been a very
    painful lesson for people like yourself, I am sure. It's
    actually turned out, for the rest of our industry, something
    that has focused us much better looking at materials issues. We
    were spending almost $60 million a year looking at materials
    issues, so it wasn't something being ignored.
        Mr. Kucinich. So you have learned something from what has
    happened.
        Mr. Fertel. Yes, sir.
        Mr. Kucinich. In the end, you think it will result in more
    sensitivity from these other plants and in the long run there
    is good that might come from it.
        Mr. Fertel. There is good that's come already, sir, as far
    as a much better technical look at this, a much stronger and
    integrated look at the analyses, the inspections that you need
    to do, and clearly a much better awareness at every plant of
    the importance and the safety culture aspects related to it.
    So, yes, sir.
        Mr. Kucinich. Just a final question which you are
    anticipating. What about these force-on-force exercises? I
    mean, shouldn't they contain an element of surprise?
        Mr. Fertel. Well, yes, sir.
        Mr. Kucinich. Are you surprised that they did?
        Mr. Fertel. Again, I think people have talked about the DOE
    exercise a lot. And let's talk about the new requirements NRC
    has put in for force-on-force exercises and deal with that and
    let me talk about the Wackenhut issue, since everybody else has
    mentioned it so far today.
        Mr. Kucinich. OK.
        Mr. Fertel. We used to do force-on-force exercises at
    nuclear power plants every 7 years. NRC now will come in and
    they will evaluate them at least once every 3 years, but that's
    just part of the story. They have established standards for
    what the training needs to be for not only the people that
    protect the plant but for the adversaries, the qualifications
    for not only the people that protect the plant but the
    adversaries.
        We are going to be doing multiple force-on-force exercises,
    in addition to normal training and gun firing and things like
    that--real force-on-force exercises, every plant every year. I
    can't tell you how many, which is silly to me, but it is
    safeguards, and I don't know why. I think that's a silly thing.
        When we in the industry looked at this, we said, the way we
    should do this, the same model for training operators. We
    should go to a systemic approach to training, which is a very
    rigorous way to do it. Make sure we have the discipline in our
    system for security activity just like we do for operator
    training. That's what we are doing.
        We also looked at and we said, the way these force-on-force
    exercises are done--and, Mr. Turner, I think said that, at DOE,
    the Secretary had formed a special adversary group. Those are
    DOE people. They are not outsiders. OK.
        When the U.S. Army does their war games, they use the U.S.
    Army. OK. They don't bring the Russians in. You know, they
    don't bring in other bad guys. They do it professionally.
        Mr. Kucinich. From what I understand, if I may, they don't
    describe information ahead of time as to----
        Mr. Fertel. I will get the information. The information
    that is described ahead of time in force-on-force exercises
    now.
        You do need to know when they are going to do it at the
    site. Because, while you are doing an exercise, there's real
    guys with real guns protecting the site. So people need to know
    that you are going to do an exercise at that site. That's
    known.
        Outside of that, they don't know. They don't go--I don't
    know what happened at the Y-12 facility. It's the first I heard
    of it, because I don't follow the DOE stuff where they said
    what facility they were going to attack.
        But, as Luis Reyes said, this scenario that they do on the
    attack and the way NRC is doing this is being developed by NRC.
    They decide what the attack is, whether it's to go for spent
    fuel. The adversaries know that. They get help from an insider.
    The defensive guys don't know this.
        Mr. Kucinich. So Wackenhut then, the guy wouldn't cheat at
    mock drills at NRC facilities, but we have something on the
    record that suggests that at DOE facilities it might be a
    little different.
        Mr. Fertel. I don't know whether Wackenhut would cheat at
    anything. I think human beings cheat. Human beings make
    mistakes, and human beings do things they shouldn't.
        Mr. Kucinich. Well----
        Mr. Fertel. The people that we have running this CAF team,
    OK, the people that are doing this Composite Adversary Force,
    the three top people that are running that basically are all
    Special Forces, OK? They never worked for the industry before.
    The project manager has 10 years as a Ranger. One of the team
    leaders was a team leader for the Delta Force. The other team
    leader is a special ops guy who ran a whole bunch of guys that
    did all types of things like snipers and everything else. These
    guys want to win, OK? They are out there to do the best job
    they can and to win.
        On our side--and I think this gets lost in almost every
    discussion about nuclear energy. I think it's important. I
    certainly feel as passionately about this, Congressman, as you
    do about your Davis-Besse experience. I know a lot of people
    that work at the plants. I find it insulting personally when
    their integrity is challenged all the time, OK?
        I think David Lochbaum offers a lot of positive things that
    have helped us in a number of areas of safety, and I may agree
    with some insecurity issues, some of which are being dealt
    with. That's helpful. But the people at the plants who work
    there--but who do you think gets killed first if terrorists
    attack and win? They do. OK? Who do you think gets hurt if
    something happens at a plant and something happens offsite?
    Their family, their friends and their neighbors. So the
    implication that they don't care I think is actually really
    wrong.
        Now that doesn't mean you don't make mistakes. It doesn't
    mean you can't do things better. I think that's one of the
    things we really want to do. We talked about sleeping guards
    and so forth and what happens with energy. What happened at
    sites where that happened is they fired them.
        Mr. Kucinich. When you said the implication they don't
    care, who are you speaking of?
        Mr. Fertel. Well, I mean, that's the way most of the
    discussion has gone, to be honest. You know, well, if NRC isn't
    doing this, the plants wouldn't; and, gee, the guys at the
    plants don't care unless David Lochbaum or Alex Matthiessen are
    involved.
        I am not saying they shouldn't be involved. All I am saying
    is that the people that work at those plants care as much about
    safety and security as anybody who sits up here talking with us
    or talking to you. I think we need to understand that.
        Mr. Kucinich. I don't know that there is anybody on this
    committee that would dispute that.
        Mr. Fertel. I am glad to hear that.
        Mr. Kucinich. Except, you know, for one qualification. And
    that is that you know and I know that all of these people who
    care so much about doing the right job for themselves, their
    co-workers, their family or community, there's a few people
    that make the decision. Now, granted, my experience is greatly
    informed by something in my own backyard. I understand that.
        Mr. Fertel. I understand that.
        Mr. Kucinich. When we know that photos in this hole in the
    reactor head were kept out of the file deliberately, when we
    know this thing wasn't reported, when we know when the NRC had
    full information they didn't move forward to act on it, I know
    that, too. So I am not using that to impugn the whole industry.
        I have given you an opportunity to acquit the industry, and
    you did. But, you know, I am saying that when you have one
    problem like that, because we are talking about nuclear power
    plants, it requires the utmost in terms of accountability, and
    that's what this committee is about.
        I want to thank the gentleman and thank the Chair for his
    indulgence. Thank you.
        Mr. Shays. I am going to, at this time, turn to the
    professional staff to ask some questions.
        Mr. Chase. Thanks.
        Mr. Fertel, a quick question. NRC says that it's going to
    take 3 years to implement and to test the new security plans.
    You are saying that there will be force-on-force exercises
    every year. What goes into developing these force-on-force
    exercises, having seen a number of them. The question I have
    is, has any thought been given to prioritizing these force-on-
    force exercises? There are a number of plants that are in the
    more densely populated areas. Indian Point is one example. Has
    any thought been given in terms of prioritizing where and when
    we should do these exercises?
        Mr. Fertel. First of all, NRC is making all those
    decisions. The plants have no idea until a set period before
    the exercise that the planning can be done. So if I'm at the
    end of next year, I don't know now, I'll know within a few
    weeks because they've got to do planning.
        There has been some of what you've asked for already done.
    Because NRC has been doing a pilot and a transitional force-on-
    force exercise program for the last 2 years; and over the
    latter part of this year, it's been testing the new design
    basis threat as part of it. Even though you don't have
    everything necessarily in place, you knew what you were going
    to do and you were able to test it. And what they have chosen--
    for instance, Indian Point. Indian Point has already had both a
    force-on-force and an integrated response and an emergency
    planning exercise.
        So I think the NRC has attempted to do some of that.
        My understanding--and, again, I'm giving you kind of an
    arm's length because they make the decision--is that there is
    probably about 30 sites that haven't gone through the force-on-
    force, and those are the ones that haven't gone through the
    transitional period in the last year and a half or two. Those
    are the ones that they would pick from for the first year
    starting November of this year, and I think they will
    prioritize their--based upon looking at factors like where the
    site is, when was the last time they actually exercised, and
    things like that. So, to some degree, it's being done already.
        Mr. Chase. But a concern could be that the force-on-force
    exercises that were done or have been done to date are under
    the old DBT, not under the new DBT.
        Mr. Fertel. Some were.
        Mr. Chase. So what I'm asking is, under the new DBT, we
    know that it's stronger, supposedly stronger. Have they given
    any thought to prioritizing?
        Mr. Fertel. They haven't shared that with us. And to be
    honest, they don't want to share it with us because they don't
    want to give the sites much lead time in knowing what's going
    on.
        Now, again, starting in November, starting actually later
    this year, every site will start doing their own force-on-force
    exercises as part of what they have to do, and it's more than
    one a year per site, absent NRC. And, as I think Roy Zimmerman
    said, they will probably have their residents and others
    observing lots of those. And my guess is they could do that,
    because every site, whether it's an Indian Point site or it's
    North Anna, will be doing them as part of their normal routine
    annual training that they're going to have to do. But I don't
    have an explicit answer to your question because NRC controls
    that.
        Mr. Chase. Do either of the other witnesses want to
    comment? OK.
        Mr. Matthiessen, I'm curious. On what basis do you conclude
    the NRC-revised DBT is too low?
        Mr. Matthiessen. Well, on what basis do I--well, just
    because the DOE is requiring greater DBT and also because I
    think in a post September 11 world we have to be thinking in
    terms of the most sophisticated, multi-directional suicidal
    attacks. And from what I know--and I obviously can't repeat it
    here--the NRC has only bumped up its DBT marginally, and I
    think there really needs to be a much more serious level.
        Mr. Shays. Let me just ask you, though. I mean, basically,
    why would you be in a position to know what the DBT was?
        Mr. Matthiessen. Why would I be in a position to know what
    it is?
        Mr. Shays. It's not public.
        Mr. Matthiessen. Well, I don't know specifically what it
    is. I have an indication or a sense of what it is.
        Mr. Shays. So it's admittedly third-hand concerns.
        Mr. Matthiessen. It is. But I take it on pretty good----
        Mr. Shays. You all tend to get your information fairly
    accurately, but I was just curious.
        Mr. Matthiessen. I would just love to make a comment in
    response to Mr. Fertel, if I could. I just want to mention that
    he mentioned the force-on-force drill at Indian Point and the
    emergency planning exercises that were done earlier this
    summer. I would just suggest that if those are any indication
    of what the rest of the industry can look forward to, then I
    think we are in trouble, and I think that the public should be
    very, very concerned.
        In the case of the emergency planning exercise that was
    done, the NRC, in what looked like a PR move more than a
    serious test of emergency planning, did conduct a terrorist
    mock attack on the plant. But, unfortunately, the test didn't
    involve any release of radiation whatsoever. So as far as I was
    concerned, they might as well have been testing the security or
    emergency planning around a Wal-Mart. I mean, the whole point
    of doing these emergency plans is because nuclear reactors are
    a special case, they contain materials that are very, very
    dangerous, and what we need to think about is a worst-case
    scenario, and a worst-case scenario does involve the release of
    radiation.
        And, likewise, for the force-on-force test, again, they
    tend to get advance notice, way in advance. The operators, from
    what we've heard again from security guards inside the plant,
    spent a lot of time and money beefing up security to abnormal
    levels in anticipation of the actual day. The attacks happen in
    day light over prescribed routes. From what we understand, the
    mock terrorists were not trained at terrorist levels and not
    equipped with the kind of weaponry that terrorists would likely
    have.
        So, again, I think that the integrity of these exercises is
    not what it needs to be if we are serious about truly testing
    the ability of these plants to repel a terrorist attack and to
    evacuate and protect people in the event of a terrorist attack.
        Mr. Shays. If you could just respond to that last point.
        Mr. Fertel. Just on the force-on-force at Indian Point, I
    was not there, so I can't verify; and I don't think Alex was
    there, either. But I do know that one of the reasons I heard
    that they do do night exercises as part of force-on-force, it's
    pretty routine. I think at Indian Point they made a conscious
    decision because of the terrain and the danger that they were
    not going to do it as part of this pilot program when they were
    doing it, and I understand that was a very conscious decision
    to avoid personnel injury at the point. But night exercises are
    part of force-on-force.
        Coming up November 1st, when these orders are effective,
    all the adversaries will have to meet the standards both for
    their capability and their fitness that the NRC has set. And
    that's pretty good standards. And, again, that's a major
    improvement over before September 11, to be honest, and as will
    the defenders. So I would expect, Alex, that you will see--I
    can only go by what you said on Indian Point, but you will see
    improved force-on-force at Indian Point as they start their
    exercises.
        Mr. Matthiessen. I hope so, but we may not see the results
    for another 3 years.
        Can I just ask a question of Mr. Fertel?
        Mr. Shays. No.
        Mr. Matthiessen. Sorry.
        Mr. Shays. That's all right. You can ask us a question if
    you would like. What's the question you would like us to ask
    him?
        Mr. Matthiessen. Well, I would just like to ask why--what
    is the industry and the NRC's response for not instituting what
    we see as pretty straightforward measures that wouldn't even
    cost the industry that much that would add an enormous measure
    as far as we have been led to believe.
        Mr. Shays. Such as?
        Mr. Matthiessen. A couple of the passive systems, barriers
    that I mentioned in my testimony, the Dunlop barriers and the
    Beamhenge, these are ways that you would really--you'd go a
    long way toward protecting these facilities and----
        Mr. Shays. We will make sure that we have a dialog about
    that.
        Mr. Matthiessen. OK.
        Mr. Chase. Mr. Fertel, how optimistic are you that the
    industry--according to GAO and the NRC, they are saying that
    the implementation of the security plans are going to take
    place by the end of October of this year. How confident are you
    that's going to actually happen?
        Mr. Fertel. As of 2 weeks ago, everybody was on schedule to
    be able to meet the requirements of the orders by October 29th.
    There's some issues where people may not have the picture that
    the chairman liked of the bullet-resistant enclosure that
    protects the officers. There are some plants that may have some
    problems in getting deliveries of some of those and will have
    to take other actions, and that's mainly because our soldiers
    in Iraq and our Defense Department and the DOE are getting
    priority. There's only two sources of steel for those,
    apparently; and our guys get bumped a bit on that. But,
    otherwise, we are going to be ready on October 29th.
        Mr. Chase. And, last, Mr. Matthiessen, would you share with
    us your thoughts or give us the status on the--if you can
    recall. The concerns regarding evacuation plans in New York and
    Connecticut.
        Mr. Matthiessen. I mean, again, what concerns me so much is
    that the FEMA used to have a policy of requiring certification
    of the plans by the four counties that surround the plant as
    well as the State. But a couple years ago, after the Witt
    report came out and showed pretty conclusively that this plan
    couldn't work in the event of a terrorist attack on the plant,
    especially--or, sorry, a radioactive release, especially in the
    case of a fast-breaking release, these counties became very
    uncomfortable and became convinced that it really wasn't
    possible to evacuate or even shelter people in place of a level
    that would be satisfactory, and so they withdrew that
    certification, as did the State emergency management office.
        And the FEMA came out, as you probably know, last August
    and just rubber-stamped the emergency plan without any
    evidence--not providing any evidence--this shouldn't be
    safeguards information, most of it anyway--without any evidence
    or analysis upon which they base that conclusion. And, of
    course, the NRC came out and rubber-stamped it a half an hour
    later, on a Friday in late July. And this is kind of typical of
    these agencies.
        And, again, I think you don't have to be a James Lee Witt
    that, given the road congestion, given the population
    densities, there is just no way that you could realistically
    evacuate that area or shelter people in place.
        Second, I do want to make a comment on the----
        Mr. Shays. I'm sorry, I need to interrupt you.
        Mr. Matthiessen. I'm sorry.
        Mr. Shays. I have a need to be sitting at a desk at 2 in
    order to not lose my place in another committee hearing. So, if
    that's all right, let me just go on and ask.
        What I'm wrestling with, Mr. Lochbaum, is--first of all,
    Mr. Fertel, what I'm the wrestling with is that I think the
    industry needs to do a better job, as much as you point out it
    was one of the most secure industries before September 11,
    because I think that we are going to have to have a very
    significant debate about the future of nuclear energy. And I
    wrestle as an environmentalist with the fact that, if I want to
    get at greenhouse gases, is there a role that nuclear energy
    has to play.
        Right now, Millstone's one, two, and three are about 50
    percent of Connecticut's--based on your testimony, and it used
    to be more when we had the Yankee plant plus one, two, and
    three--you know, we were oversubscribed. But tell me how you
    sort out, Mr. Lochbaum. Do you think nuclear energy simply
    can't be expanded at all?
        Mr. Lochbaum. I guess we view nuclear energy as providing
    the bridge to the future, with renewable energy technologies
    and improved energy efficiency being that future. But that
    future is, quite frankly, not here today. So we think that the
    safe operation of existing plants, until the--as they reach in
    their normal lifetimes they get replaced by better technologies
    of the 21st century technologies would be our druthers.
        Mr. Shays. This spent fuel is a huge concern to me. And,
    you know, I see them at the facility on the Hudson River, you
    know, saw the pool where they are at and so on. And they were
    in the contained area, I believe, is my recall. But we just are
    collecting more and more of this. Mr. Fertel, how do you
    wrestle with that?
        Mr. Fertel. Well, I think Congress clearly has a good role
    to play in moving the ball forward on Yucca Mountain, funding
    it appropriately, providing the oversight to DOE to make sure
    they do it appropriately and dealing with the issues around it
    will move that ball forward. I think, in the interim, clearly
    you're going to try and do everything you can and are doing
    everything to manage it safely from a security standpoint, NRC
    has issued advisories to the plants on what they can do to
    improve security.
        Mr. Shays. Let me ask you this. How is it that we have been
    able to increase production when we haven't added a plant in 30
    years?
        Mr. Fertel. Well, we actually have added a lot of plants in
    the last 30 years. We just haven't ordered a plant in that
    period.
        Mr. Shays. We haven't what?
        Mr. Fertel. We haven't ordered a new one, but we've added
    about 50 plants since 1980. But the way we have increased it in
    the decade----
        Mr. Shays. We've had 50 plants since 1980?
        Mr. Fertel. Yeah.
        Mr. Shays. How many have we had since 1990?
        Mr. Fertel. As far as real plants, concrete and steel? Two,
    I think.
        Mr. Shays. OK.
        Mr. Fertel. But we have added the equivalent of 19 since
    1990 in improving output from the plants, operating them
    better, doing a thing that we call uprates, where you can
    either improve the turbine or you can improve something on the
    reactor, on the reactor side to get more power out of it. And
    we have added two plants. So we've added about 19,000 megawatts
    since 1990 in kilowatt hours out.
        Mr. Shays. Do you all want to quickly speak to this issue
    of citations and whether they have to respond in writing or so
    on? I mean, is this of concern? Or are we more concerned than
    we should be?
        Mr. Lochbaum. As Mr. Reyes said, it's consistent with how
    they deal with safety issues. So it's the same approach. I also
    go back to what Mr. Zimmerman said. They are piloting the new
    significance determination process.
        Mr. Shays. And that's a good thing.
        Mr. Lochbaum. Well, it depends on how it comes out. It's a
    trial run now. But that could--depending on how that outcome
    is, could go further to better defining that line between what
    gets reported and what gets followed up, what the plant owners
    do and what the NRC does. I'm comfortable with that. If there
    is a better way of doing it, I'm open to that. But I bought
    into the process and I'm comfortable with it the way it is.
        Mr. Fertel. I think an aspect that maybe could help your
    comfort level--because you clearly weren't comfortable with it,
    listening to the discussion, is that I think the impression
    when they say they are doing a sample makes it sound like, oh,
    my God, they're just choosing a few. When they're doing the
    sample, they are doing a sample in security, they are doing a
    sample in safety, they are doing samples in other areas. And
    what they are looking for, in all honesty, is to see if there
    is any sort of a systemic breakdown in the corrective action
    program that the plant uses. And if they see a breakdown, well,
    then it's a whole other ball game for the NRC to come in and
    basically do major inspections. So they want your processes to
    work; and, if they work, they are comfortable.
        Mr. Shays. OK. I am going to adjourn.
        Actually, there is one other question. If staff's waiting
    for me--I am going out that door and I'm hustling. I have a
    better feeling of knowing the NRC is present every day. Are we
    underutilizing those folks? If you don't know, that's another
    issue.
        Mr. Lochbaum. We were concerned that--several years ago,
    the NRC changed its policy, like in 1997, 1998. They used to
    have more NRC resident inspectors, more people onsite. As part
    of a budget-cutting move, they removed some of the people from
    that onsite presence. That contributed to the problem that
    Davis-Besse--that Representative Kucinich is concerned about.
        Mr. Shays. But it seems to me that they could be doing
    followup. I mean, evidently, they have prescribed things they
    should do.
        Mr. Lochbaum. It's hard when there's so few of them. If
    they went back to the levels they had 5, 6 years ago, they
    could do more because there were more people there.
        Mr. Shays. Well, if you have two and you add one more,
    that's three. That's a 50 percent increase. Maybe even that
    would be beneficial.
        Mr. Lochbaum. It couldn't hurt.
        Mr. Shays. I'm sorry. I have a feeling there's some other
    things we could say, but it's been a long day, and it's been a
    very helpful day, and I appreciate all your contribution. So,
    we are going to call this hearing closed. Thank you.
        [Whereupon, at 2:07 p.m., the subcommittee was adjourned.]