    [House Hearing, 108 Congress]
    [From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]

             PUBLIC SAFETY INTEROPERABILITY: LOOK WHO'S TALKING NOW

    =======================================================================

                                    HEARING

                                   before the

                       SUBCOMMITTEE ON NATIONAL SECURITY,
                       EMERGING THREATS AND INTERNATIONAL
                                   RELATIONS

                                     of the

                                  COMMITTEE ON
                               GOVERNMENT REFORM

                            HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

                          ONE HUNDRED EIGHTH CONGRESS

                                 SECOND SESSION

                                   __________

                                 JULY 20, 2004

                                   __________

                               Serial No. 108-257

                                   __________

           Printed for the use of the Committee on Government Reform

      Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.gpo.gov/congress/house
                          http://www.house.gov/reform

                                     ______

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                         COMMITTEE ON GOVERNMENT REFORM

                         TOM DAVIS, Virginia, Chairman
    DAN BURTON, Indiana                  HENRY A. WAXMAN, California
    CHRISTOPHER SHAYS, Connecticut       TOM LANTOS, California
    ILEANA ROS-LEHTINEN, Florida         MAJOR R. OWENS, New York
    JOHN M. McHUGH, New York             EDOLPHUS TOWNS, New York
    JOHN L. MICA, Florida                PAUL E. KANJORSKI, Pennsylvania
    MARK E. SOUDER, Indiana              CAROLYN B. MALONEY, New York
    STEVEN C. LaTOURETTE, Ohio           ELIJAH E. CUMMINGS, Maryland
    DOUG OSE, California                 DENNIS J. KUCINICH, Ohio
    RON LEWIS, Kentucky                  DANNY K. DAVIS, Illinois
    JO ANN DAVIS, Virginia               JOHN F. TIERNEY, Massachusetts
    TODD RUSSELL PLATTS, Pennsylvania    WM. LACY CLAY, Missouri
    CHRIS CANNON, Utah                   DIANE E. WATSON, California
    ADAM H. PUTNAM, Florida              STEPHEN F. LYNCH, Massachusetts
    EDWARD L. SCHROCK, Virginia          CHRIS VAN HOLLEN, Maryland
    JOHN J. DUNCAN, Jr., Tennessee       LINDA T. SANCHEZ, California
    NATHAN DEAL, Georgia                 C.A. ``DUTCH'' RUPPERSBERGER,
    CANDICE S. MILLER, Michigan              Maryland
    TIM MURPHY, Pennsylvania             ELEANOR HOLMES NORTON, District of
    MICHAEL R. TURNER, Ohio                  Columbia
    JOHN R. CARTER, Texas                JIM COOPER, Tennessee
    MARSHA BLACKBURN, Tennessee          BETTY McCOLLUM, Minnesota
    PATRICK J. TIBERI, Ohio                          ------
    KATHERINE HARRIS, Florida            BERNARD SANDERS, Vermont
                                             (Independent)

                        Melissa Wojciak, Staff Director
           David Marin, Deputy Staff Director/Communications Director
                          Rob Borden, Parliamentarian
                           Teresa Austin, Chief Clerk
              Phil Barnett, Minority Chief of Staff/Chief Counsel

     Subcommittee on National Security, Emerging Threats and International
                                   Relations

                    CHRISTOPHER SHAYS, Connecticut, Chairman

    MICHAEL R. TURNER, Ohio
    DAN BURTON, Indiana                  DENNIS J. KUCINICH, Ohio
    STEVEN C. LaTOURETTE, Ohio           TOM LANTOS, California
    RON LEWIS, Kentucky                  BERNARD SANDERS, Vermont
    TODD RUSSELL PLATTS, Pennsylvania    STEPHEN F. LYNCH, Massachusetts
    ADAM H. PUTNAM, Florida              CAROLYN B. MALONEY, New York
    EDWARD L. SCHROCK, Virginia          LINDA T. SANCHEZ, California
    JOHN J. DUNCAN, Jr., Tennessee       C.A. ``DUTCH'' RUPPERSBERGER,
    TIM MURPHY, Pennsylvania                 Maryland
    KATHERINE HARRIS, Florida            JOHN F. TIERNEY, Massachusetts
                                         DIANE E. WATSON, California

                                   Ex Officio

    TOM DAVIS, Virginia                  HENRY A. WAXMAN, California
                Lawrence J. Halloran, Staff Director and Counsel
                            Robert A. Briggs, Clerk
                 Andrew Su, Minority Professional Staff Member

                                C O N T E N T S

                                  ----------
                                                                       Page
    Hearing held on July 20, 2004....................................     1
    Statement of:
        Jenkins, William O., Jr., Director, Homeland Security and
          Justice Issues, U.S. Government Accountability Office;
          David G. Boyd, Director, SAFECOM Program Office, Science
          and Technology Directorate, Department of Homeland
          Security; John B. Muleta, esq., Chief, Wireless
          Telecommunications Bureau, Federal Communications
          Commission; Stephen T. Devine, chairperson, Missouri State
          Interoperability Executive Committee, patrol frequency
          coordinator, communications division, Missouri State
          Highway Patrol General Headquarters; and Glen S. Nash,
          senior telecommunications engineer, State of California,
          Department of General Services.............................    10
        Thomas, Hanford C., Director, statewide wireless network
          project, New York State Office for Technology; William J.
          Gardner, supervisor, Suffolk County Police Department,
          Technical Services Section, Suffolk County, Long Island,
          NY; and Professor Glenn P. Corbett, John Jay College of
          Criminal Justice...........................................   110
    Letters, statements, etc., submitted for the record by:
        Boyd, David G., Director, SAFECOM Program Office, Science and
          Technology Directorate, Department of Homeland Security,
          prepared statement of......................................    44
        Corbett, Professor Glenn P.m, John Jay College of Criminal
          Justice, prepared statement of.............................   143
        Devine, Stephen T., chairperson, Missouri State
          Interoperability Executive Committee, patrol frequency
          coordinator, communications division, Missouri State
          Highway Patrol General Headquarters, prepared statement of.    77
        Gardner, William J., supervisor, Suffolk County Police
          Department, Technical Services Section, Suffolk County,
          Long Island, NY, prepared statement of.....................   135
        Jenkins, William O., Jr., Director, Homeland Security and
          Justice Issues, U.S. Government Accountability Office,
          prepared statement of......................................    13
        Kucinich, Hon. Dennis J., a Representative in Congress from
          the State of Ohio, prepared statement of...................   153
        Muleta, John B., esq., Chief, Wireless Telecommunications
          Bureau, Federal Communications Commission, prepared
          statement of...............................................    60
        Nash, Glen S., senior telecommunications engineer, State of
          California, Department of General Services, prepared
          statement of...............................................    86
        Shays, Hon. Christopher, a Representative in Congress from
          the State of Connecticut, prepared statement of............     3
        Thomas, Hanford C., Director, statewide wireless network
          project, New York State Office for Technology, prepared
          statement of...............................................   114

             PUBLIC SAFETY INTEROPERABILITY: LOOK WHO'S TALKING NOW

                                  ----------

                             TUESDAY, JULY 20, 2004

                      House of Representatives,
    Subcommittee on National Security, Emerging Threats
                           and International Relations,
                                Committee on Government Reform,
                                                        Washington, DC.
        The subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 11 a.m., in
    room 2154, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Christopher
    Shays (chairman of the subcommittee) presiding.
        Present: Representatives Shays, Kucinich, Turner, Maloney,
    Ruppersberger, Tierney, and Watson.
        Staff present: Lawrence Halloran, staff director and
    counsel; R. Nicholas Palarino, senior policy advisor; Robert A.
    Briggs, clerk; Grace Washbourne, full committee professional
    staff member; Andrew Su, minority professional staff member;
    and Cecelia Morton, minority office manager.
        Mr. Shays. A quorum being present, the Subcommittee on
    National Security, Emerging Threats and International Relations
    hearing entitled, ``Public Safety Interoperability: Look Who's
    Talking Now,'' is called to order.
        The terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001 exposed
    dangerous gaps and failures in essential communication systems.
    Cell phone networks collapsed. First responders using
    incompatible radios could not relay vital information. The New
    York Stock Exchange shut down, but the Federal Reserve System
    and the Nation's banking network continued to operate.
        Why? Because standardization, technical interconnectivity
    and redundancy at banks protected that critical communication
    infrastructure. Almost 3 years later, the critical
    telecommunications networks first responders bank on every day
    to save lives remain fragmented and vulnerable. Despite
    significant expenditures and some progress, public safety and
    emergency response communications still lack the bandwidth and
    connectivity needed to sustain essential capabilities in a
    major crisis.
        So today we revisit the status of Federal efforts to
    improve first responder interoperability. As we will hear in
    testimony, forging links between more than 44,000 State and
    local agencies and over 100 Federal programs and offices poses
    daunting challenges. The lack of interoperability accurately
    reflects a lack of intergovernmental consensus on the urgency,
    feasibility and affordability of communication upgrades.
        Uncoordinated planning and funding cycles seem to keep the
    consensus beyond reach. Disjointed Federal grant programs do
    little to guide State and local programs toward effective short
    or long term solutions, and the push for interoperability
    further complicates the already intense competition between
    public and commercial users for choice radio frequency spectrum
    bands.
        A recent decision by the Federal Communications Commission
    to clear interference from the 800 megahertz public safety
    bands should help improve the performance of critical systems.
    But crowded spectrum is only one aspect of the problem. Another
    serious impediment is the lack of standardized information on
    the capabilities of current systems. Without broadly accepted
    technology and performance standards against which to measure
    progress, it is difficult to determine where we are, and all
    but impossible to know if we're getting anywhere.
        After our hearing on these issues last November, we asked
    the Government Accountability Office, newly named but still
    GAO, to examine current Federal efforts to foster
    interoperability. The report issued today finds
    intergovernmental corroboration lacking and calls for
    standards, benchmarks and funding discipline to focus the
    currently rudderless process.
        All the technical and regulatory jargon should not be
    allowed to obscure the central fact that lives are at stake.
    Selfless work on these issues by Monica Gabrielle, Sally
    Regenhard, Beverly Eckert, Mary Fetchet and so many other
    September 11 family members reminds us of our solemn obligation
    to speak with one urgent voice to avoid future tragedies.
        We appreciate the time, expertise and dedication of all our
    witnesses who bring to us a very important discussion, and we
    look forward to each and every one of their testimony.
        [The prepared statement of Hon. Christopher Shays follows:]

        [GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T8118.001

        [GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T8118.002

        Mr. Shays. At this time, the Chair would recognize the
    gentlelady, the very effective lady from New York, Carolyn
    Maloney.
        Mrs. Maloney. Thank you very much, Chairman Shays, and for
    your continued work on public safety and interoperability
    specifically. Your commitment to our Nation's first responders
    is evident, not only by the number of hearings, the report you
    requested on this subject, but also the legislation that you
    sponsored with me in May, the 9/11 Can You Hear Me Now Act,
    H.R. 4386.
        Today we will have the opportunity to discuss the current
    state of interoperability in New York's metropolitan area, and
    we will have the opportunity to hear from Dr. Glenn Corbett,
    who is a professor at John Jay College of Criminal Justice in
    New York City and a constituent that I'm proud to represent.
    He, along with the Skyscraper Safety Campaign, provided some of
    the technical assistance in developing the 9/11 Can You Hear Me
    Now legislation.
        I introduced the legislation and the Act because the
    current state of first responder communications in New York
    City is not anywhere near what it needs to be. While there have
    been a number of improvements since September 11, nearly 3
    years later the New York City Fire Department still lacks the
    basic infrastructure to communicate effectively and true
    interoperability simply does not exist.
        At the same time, we all know that New York continues to be
    a top terrorist target, and the protection of New York City
    must be a national responsibility. The lack of a fully
    functional communication system for the New York Fire
    Department is not only a threat to our firefighters' and New
    York residents' lives, but to all who visit the city.
        The legislation that Chairman Shays and I introduced would
    mandate the Department of Homeland Security to provide a fully
    functional communication system to the New York Fire Department
    within 1 year of its passage. This communication system would
    include four components: radios, dispatch system, critical
    information dispatch system and a supplemental communications
    device for individual firefighters. This communications system
    would be required to work in all buildings and in all parts of
    the city, something that unbelievably does not happen now, and
    tragically did not happen on September 11.
        The proposed legislation requires coordination with the
    city of New York and their planned upgrades of the emergency
    September 11 system and any interoperability initiatives with
    other public safety communications systems. If this system in
    New York was developed, it could be a model for large cities
    across the country, cities that are frequently mentioned as
    under the greatest threat of a terrorist attack.
        Beyond doing whatever it takes to prevent future attacks,
    one of our greatest fears is that we will not have taken the
    lessons from September 11 and be prepared for the future. We
    know that there were terrible communications failures on
    September 11. According to an independent report by McKinsey
    and Co., it may have cost upwards of 100 firefighters their
    lives on September 11, and obviously many other independent
    residents and workers that were in the buildings.
        I can tell you that when I arrived at the Ground Zero
    central command on September 11 and asked what it was that was
    needed, they said, get us radios, we don't have any radios that
    work. Bill Young, at my request, and others, flew down radios
    that could work on the work site the next day.
        The time to act is now. We need to do absolutely everything
    to ensure that we invest in the infrastructure and technology
    necessary for our first responders to communicate during every
    disaster. And that is why I'm also a co-sponsor of H.R. 440,
    The CONNECT First Responders Act. This legislation will
    significantly enhance the Federal Government's effort to
    achieve this critical objective by creating, first of all, and
    fully authorizing, the Office of Wireless Public Safety
    Interoperability Communications within the Department of
    Homeland Security. And giving this office the authority and
    annual budget to work with Federal, State, and local
    stakeholder to develop and implement a national strategy to
    achieve interoperability.
        Second, establishing a new grant program dedicated to
    achieving communications interoperability nationwide. We need
    both of these acts to be passed and brought into law, because
    we need to do absolutely everything to protect our citizens
    from any future attack. It is obviously 101 to say that we need
    to have a radio system that works. We did not have one on
    September 11. We still do not have one.
        I hope we hear some answers today from our distinguished
    panelists. Thank you all for being here, and thank you, Mr.
    Corbett, for coming, too.
        Mr. Shays. I thank the gentlelady.
        At this time the Chair would recognize Mr. Turner.
        Mr. Turner. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I want to thank you
    for holding this hearing, and for your continued effort to make
    certain that our country's response to the terrorist threat is
    appropriate. The need for communication interoperability took
    center stage following the terror attacks in New York and
    Washington, DC. That event showcased the difficulty of first
    responders even in the same community to communicate with one
    another.
        The inability to communicate becomes an even larger issue
    as you look at Federal and State agencies working together.
    This subcommittee, under the chairman's leadership, held a
    field hearing in Stamford, CT, where Mrs. Maloney was present.
    And there it was clear that the issue for agencies to talk to
    one another was very important in the issue of responding to a
    terrorist threat. My community, Dayton, OH, held a weapons of
    mass destruction attack exercise prior to September 11th. And
    there the inability to communicate was identified as a major
    hurdle in providing a coordinated response.
        The Federal Government has a very important role to play in
    ensuring that communication interoperability exists among
    Federal, State and local agencies. However, it is important
    that the Federal Government does not operate in a vacuum,
    ignoring the lessons and advice of local first responders.
    Local and State governments should be active participants in
    any effort to ensure seamless communication.
        And we thank the chairman for his continued effort in not
    only looking for a solution but continuing to focus on this
    process as we move forward.
        Mr. Shays. I thank the gentleman.
        Mr. Ruppersberger. I too thank you, Mr. Chairman, for your
    leadership in the critical homeland security priority. Both
    Republican and Democratic leadership of this committee have
    committed to keeping this issue on the congressional radar
    screen. I think it is entirely necessary and appropriate.
        Until now, my background has been local leadership. Along
    with many of my colleagues on this committee and throughout the
    House, I am concerned about the needs of local first
    responders, our front line soldiers in the war on terrorism. We
    learned many expensive lessons on that tragic September day
    almost 3 years ago. One of the most correctable was the need
    for first responders to be able to communicate.
        Terrorist attacks and all other hazards requiring police
    and firefighters to respond do not know county, city, State or
    even regional boundaries. So when an event occurs and people
    run into danger to save innocent lives, they should be able to
    talk to one another. It doesn't get any more basic than that.
        This revelation is not new. Yet we are almost 3 years later
    in trying to decide how this should work. There are three
    fundamentals to determine regarding interoperability: what are
    localities doing now; what sort of national standards should we
    set to transcend inherent jurisdictions and boundaries; and how
    will we pay for this technology. We need a national status
    report that shows us what is happening at the local level.
    Progress requires a clear and accurate picture of what is
    happening in each State, how local elected and local first
    responders have been involved in the development of State plans
    and how much of that effort has focused on the big issues of
    interoperability.
        At a time when we have incredible spending levels to fight
    the war on terrorism abroad, as I believe we should, I think we
    need an equal commitment to prioritize Homeland Security needs.
    Our first responders, our hometown troops, need our help, and I
    look forward to working with my colleagues on both sides of the
    aisle to move this issue forward.
        Mr. Shays. Mr. Tierney.
        Mr. Tierney. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I just want to join
    my colleagues here in acknowledging the extent of this
    particular problem and knowing that since the events of
    September 11th, we have exposed what's been a longstanding and
    complex problem with our public safety agencies.
        Even the 9/11 Commission's recent report indicates that
    many lives possibly could have been saved had we had the system
    in place. It goes back, of course, to the Oklahoma City
    bombing, where after that study showed that the first
    responders had to use runners to carry messages from one
    command center to another because the responding agencies used
    different emergency radio channels, different frequencies and
    different radio systems.
        In order to achieve communications interoperability, which
    is probably the highest priority issue for our public safety
    community, we have to a lot more than we are currently doing
    right now. The April report from GAO reported that project
    SAFECOM had made very little progress. The most recent report
    indicates that there is still a great distance to go. It cited
    a lack of consistent executive commitment and support and an
    inadequate level of interagency collaboration.
        So 8 years after the final report and detailed
    recommendations to improve interoperability from the Federal
    Government's Public Safety Wireless Advisory Committee, and
    over 2 years after the initiation of Project SAFECOM, it
    doesn't seem that we've made much progress on this front.
    Secretary Ridge has stated that there are immediate steps the
    Departments can take while we focus on long range integrated
    solutions. We agree with that.
        The Department of Homeland Security should be providing
    dedicated annual funding for both short term and long term
    enhancements to State and local interoperable communications
    systems. The administration has to address the disjointed
    Federal approach to interoperability by clearly assigning
    principal responsibility for communications interoperability to
    one office in the Federal Government.
        Along with Mrs. Maloney and others, we've introduced
    Connecting the Operations of National Networks of Emergency
    Communications Technologies for First Responders Act, the so-
    called CONNECT for First Responders Act, that should address
    most of these issues. The act would replace the ineffective
    interagency group, at least as the GAO says it is, known as
    Project SAFECOM, that currently oversees the Federal
    interoperability efforts with a unified office within the
    Department of Homeland Security. It would provide this office
    with a dedicated annual budget, charge it with working with
    Federal, State and local stakeholder to develop and implement a
    national strategy to achieve interoperability. That should
    provide us, at least head us in the right direction.
        Without a robust, consistent budget and the necessary
    authority, I think our efforts are going to continue to fail in
    this area. So this legislation would substantially increase the
    role of the new office in accelerating and implementing
    nationwide interoperable communications. It would authorize $50
    million for fiscal year 2005 for the administration of the
    office. That would be more than double the $22 million that the
    administration has requested for SAFECOM in fiscal year 2005.
        The bill would establish a new Department of Homeland
    Security grant program dedicated to achieving communication
    interoperability nationwide, funding both immediate and long
    term solutions for our communications needs. Like the
    Assistance to Firefighters grant program, the bill authorizes
    the Secretary to make direct grants to local governments and
    public safety agencies, but also authorizes grants to State
    governments.
        I for one, and I think others joining me, continue to be
    disappointed that this administration insists on adding an
    extra level of bureaucracy by putting these matters through the
    States instead of down to the local communities. The Fire Act,
    the COPS grant with the grants directly to the local
    communities in my estimation has worked far more effectively
    than the process that we now see, working on Department of
    Homeland Security grants.
        We know that achieving nationwide interoperability will
    require a significant financial commitment to all levels of
    government. Previous estimates for upgrading communications
    systems nationwide have ranged as high as $18 billion.
    Recently, the private sector estimated that approximately $350
    million is necessary to implement a comprehensive patching
    system throughout the country.
        The bill would authorize $5 billion over 5 years for the
    grant program, starting at $500 million for fiscal year 2005
    and increasing funding by $250 million per year. The reason we
    increase the authorization level each year in the bill is in
    order to first facilitate the immediate acquisition of short
    term communications equipment to link existing communications
    infrastructure and second, to initiate the development of
    comprehensive interoperable communication plans prior to more
    extensive equipment purchase in the latter years of the
    program.
        Purchasing and implementing new technologies, such as
    patching or switching systems, will only provide us with a
    short term solution to a critical problem. Ultimately, we would
    like to see all communication systems sharing open
    architectures and standard technologies, so that different
    radio systems made by different manufacturers can communicate
    on demand. The bill indicates our belief that we can achieve
    this goal in cooperation, not competition, with the private
    sector radio systems manufacturers.
        I'd like to close with one last concern, and that is that
    in Cambridge, Massachusetts, we've had a number of individuals
    connected with MIT and other institutions up there who actually
    have an open system on the internet with security provided that
    the military has been using now for some time as a pilot
    program. That program was offered to the Department of Homeland
    Security for pilot programs and I can't tell you exactly what
    the delay was in that, but it took months and months before we
    could get anybody's attention.
        My fear is that there was more of an attitude of looking to
    see if a larger contract worth far many more dollars could be
    given to a larger contractor than to go with a system that in
    order to have been performing well with the military would cost
    far less and be implemented in a more expeditious manner. So I
    hope that the Department of Homeland Security is really looking
    to do this the right way, do it as economically and soundly as
    possible, and not let the political or the prior connections
    with other companies get in the way of getting this job done as
    soon as possible and in the best way possible.
        I yield back.
        Mr. Shays. Thank you.
        Mr. Turner [assuming Chair]. I ask unanimous consent that
    all members of the subcommittee be permitted to place any
    opening statement in the record, and that the record remain
    open for 3 days for that purpose. Without objection, so
    ordered.
        Further, I ask unanimous consent that all witnesses be
    permitted to include their written statements in the record.
    And without objection, so ordered.
        Today, I would like to introduce our first panel of
    witnesses. We have Mr. William Jenkins, Jr., Director, Homeland
    Security and Justice Issues, U.S. Government Accountability
    Office. We have Dr. David Boyd, Program Manager, SAFECOM, U.S.
    Department of Homeland Security; Mr. John Muleta, Chief,
    Wireless Telecommunications Bureau, Federal Communications
    Commission; Mr. Stephen Devine, patrol frequency coordinator,
    Communications Division, Missouri State Highway Patrol General
    Headquarters; and Mr. Glen Nash, Telecommunications Division,
    California Department of General Services.
        Gentlemen, we do swear in our witnesses for this
    subcommittee. Would you please stand and raise your right
    hands.
        [Witnesses sworn.]
        Mr. Turner. Note for the record that the witnesses
    responded in the affirmative.
        Before we proceed, we have a comment from our chairman.
        Mr. Shays. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I just wanted to say
    that we really have an outstanding panel before us. As I was
    walking in, I want to just emphasize the fact that we're very
    fortunate to have all five of you here. Obviously having the
    Government Accountability Office here, the GAO here to set the
    stage is helpful. To have both the Department of Homeland
    Security and the Federal Communications Commission folks in the
    same room talking together is vital.
        I particularly want to say to Stephen Devine and Glen Nash,
    I know as State officials, that you have become national
    experts on this issue. You've devoted a number of years to
    trying to work this out. So while you're from Missouri and
    while you're from California, you really are carrying the
    weight for all the States. We wanted to get the best and we
    were told the two of you are. So we thank you both for being
    here.
        Mr. Turner. Thank you.
        Gentlemen, we're going to ask, because of the size of the
    panel, that each of you try to limit your comments to the 5
    minutes that are allocated. You can see the lights in front of
    you that will be counting down for you. We will begin with Mr.
    Jenkins.

       STATEMENTS OF WILLIAM O. JENKINS, JR., DIRECTOR, HOMELAND
      SECURITY AND JUSTICE ISSUES, U.S. GOVERNMENT ACCOUNTABILITY
       OFFICE; DAVID G. BOYD, DIRECTOR, SAFECOM PROGRAM OFFICE,
      SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY DIRECTORATE, DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND
            SECURITY; JOHN B. MULETA, ESQ., CHIEF, WIRELESS
     TELECOMMUNICATIONS BUREAU, FEDERAL COMMUNICATIONS COMMISSION;
    STEPHEN T. DEVINE, CHAIRPERSON, MISSOURI STATE INTEROPERABILITY
          EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE, PATROL FREQUENCY COORDINATOR,
    COMMUNICATIONS DIVISION, MISSOURI STATE HIGHWAY PATROL GENERAL
       HEADQUARTERS; AND GLEN S. NASH, SENIOR TELECOMMUNICATIONS
     ENGINEER, STATE OF CALIFORNIA, DEPARTMENT OF GENERAL SERVICES

        Mr. Jenkins. Mr. Chairman and members of the subcommittee,
    I appreciate the opportunity to be here today to discuss our
    work on wireless interoperable communications for first
    responders.
        In November 2003 testimony before this subcommittee, we
    outlined three challenges in achieving interoperable
    communications that remain the principal challenges today. They
    are, one, clearly defining and identifying the problem; two,
    establishing performance goals, requirements and standards; and
    three, defining governmental roles in addressing the problem.
        This morning I'd like to highlight some key points from our
    report being released today that focuses on these challenges
    and the extent to which Federal grants support interoperable
    communications improvements. First, with regard to problem
    definition, the current status of interoperable communications
    capabilities nationwide, including the scope and severity of
    any shortcomings, has not yet been determined. To assess those
    capabilities, a set of requirements is needed that can be used
    to assess what is compared to what should be.
        In April 2004, SAFECOM issued a document designed to serve
    as a set of requirements. SAFECOM expects to complete a
    baseline assessment of current interoperable capabilities by
    July 2005, but is still refining its methodology for developing
    that baseline.
        Second, with regard to intergovernmental roles, Federal,
    State and local governments all have important roles in
    assessing interoperability requirements, identifying gaps in
    the current ability to meet those requirements and developing
    and implementing comprehensive plans for closing those gaps.
    The Federal Government can provide the leadership, focus and
    long-term commitment needed. It can take leadership in
    developing a national architecture for interoperability, a
    national data base for interoperable frequencies, a national
    standard nomenclature for those frequencies and supporting
    State efforts to develop and implement Statewide interoperable
    communication plans.
        SAFECOM was established as the Federal umbrella program for
    coordinating all Federal initiatives and projects on public
    safety interoperable communications. According to SAFECOM,
    there are more than 100 Federal agencies and programs involved
    in public safety issues. SAFECOM's ability to provide the
    needed Federal leadership and coordination has been hampered by
    its dependence upon other Federal agencies for funding and
    cooperation. DHS has recently created the Office of
    Interoperability and Compatibility to be fully established by
    November 2004, and which will include SAFECOM. But the office's
    structure, funding and authority are still being developed.
        With broad input from local governments and first
    responders, States can serve as the focal points for statewide
    interoperability planning and implementation. The FCC has
    recognized the States' importance by providing the States
    authority to administer the interoperability channels within
    the 700 megahertz spectrum. Some States are working to develop
    statewide plans, but there is no established structure or
    funding for supporting such efforts. Nor is there any guidance
    for States on what should be included in such plans.
        And of course, such plans would need to encompass cross-
    State interoperability issues. New York, Philadelphia and
    Cincinnati are examples of metropolitan areas that cross State
    boundaries and where cross-State communications must be
    encompassed in any regional or State interoperability plan.
        Third, the fragmented Federal grant structure for first
    responders does not effectively support statewide
    interoperability planning. SAFECOM has developed recommended
    grant guidance for all Federal grants whose moneys could be
    used to improve interoperability. The guidance has been
    incorporated in part in some grants, but SAFECOM cannot require
    that consistent guidance be included in all Federal grants for
    first responders.
        Moreover, the structure of some grants does not support
    long-term planning efforts, because for example, the grants do
    not require any interoperable communications plan prior to
    receiving funds. Or, the grants may also include a 1 or 2 year
    performance period that may encourage a focus on equipment
    purchases rather than comprehensive planning to guide those
    purchases.
        Finally, Federal and State governments lack a coordinated
    grant review process to ensure that funds allocated to local
    governments are used for communication projects that complement
    each other and add to overall statewide and national
    interoperable capacity. One result is that grants could be
    approved for bordering jurisdictions that propose conflicting
    interoperable solutions. We recognize that SAFECOM has made
    progress in bringing leadership and focus to the Federal
    Government's interoperability efforts and many State and local
    officials are working diligently to assess and approve
    interoperable communications.
        However, as we said last November, the fundamental barrier
    to effectively addressing wireless interoperability problems
    has been and remains the lack of effective, collaborative,
    interdisciplinary and intergovernmental cooperation and
    planning. Our report includes recommendations to the Secretary
    of DHS and the Director of OMB for enhancing Federal
    coordination and providing assistance and encouragement to
    States to establish statewide interoperable planning bodies
    that draw on the experience and perspectives of local first
    responders.
        That concludes my statement, Mr. Chairman, and I'd be happy
    to answer any questions you or other members of the committee
    may have.
        [Note.--The GAO report entitled, ``Homeland Security,
    Federal Leadership and Intergovernmental Cooperation Required
    to Achieve First Responder Interoperable Communications,'' may
    be found in subcommittee files.]
        [The prepared statement of Mr. Jenkins follows:]

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        Mr. Turner. Thank you.
        Dr. Boyd.
        Dr. Boyd. Good morning, and thank you, Mr. Chairman and
    members of the committee for the invitation to speak to you
    today.
        Whether fighting a fire or responding to a terrorist
    attack, emergency responders need coordination, communication
    and the ability to share vital information and equipment among
    a wide variety of public safety and security agencies.
    Unfortunately, the reality today is that agencies too often
    cannot communicate by radio because their equipment is
    incompatible or the frequencies they are assigned are
    different. They operate on 10 different frequency bands and run
    communications systems which are often 30 years old in an era
    with the technology life cycle of only 18 to 24 months.
        Earlier this year, the Secretary of Homeland Security asked
    the Directorate of Science and Technology within DHS to lead
    the planning and implementation of a program office to
    significantly improve the coordination and management of the
    Department's interoperability programs for equipment and
    training as well as for communications, so we can make it
    possible for firefighters, police officers, and other emergency
    personnel to better communicate and share equipment during a
    major disaster. This office will reduce unnecessary duplication
    in programs and spending and assure consistency across Federal
    activities related to research and development, testing and
    evaluation standards, technical assistance, training and grant
    funding related to interoperability.
        Since DHS assumed responsibility for SAFECOM 13 months ago,
    5 principals have been put in place by SAFECOM to drive this
    new office. First, emergency response providers and homeland
    security practitioners who own, operate and maintain more than
    90 percent of the Nation's wireless public safety
    infrastructure must be integrated into the program from its
    beginning to ensure the solutions we create actually meet their
    needs.
        Second, coordination of existing Federal programs is
    essential to reduce unnecessary duplication of effort, permit
    the most efficient use of Federal resources and allow us to
    leverage the investments that many public safety agencies have
    already made. Third, properly designed non-proprietary open
    architecture standards are required to maximize competition
    across industry, encourage technology innovation, reduce costs
    and help to ensure compatibility among public safety and
    Homeland Security agencies.
        Fourth, compliance with the National Incident Management
    System, the National Response Plan and relevant Homeland
    Security Presidential directives will provide a consistent,
    nationwide approach for agencies at all levels of government to
    work well together to prepare for, prevent, respond to and
    recover from major incidents. And finally, outreach efforts
    will emphasize the need for interoperability and provide tools
    for its implementation to practitioners and policymakers at all
    levels of government. We will model the operations of this
    office after the successful SAFECOM program. As a public safety
    practitioner driven program, SAFECOM is working with existing
    Federal communications initiatives and key public safety
    stakeholders to address the need to develop better technologies
    and processes for the cross-jurisdictional and cross-
    disciplinary coordination of existing systems and future
    networks.
        SAFECOM developed the first national grant guidance already
    incorporated into grant programs of the community oriented
    policing services, Federal Emergency Management Agency and the
    Office for Domestic Preparedness to direct Federal programs
    funding public safety communications equipment in State and
    local agencies. In January of this year, the major associations
    representing the police chiefs, fire chiefs, sheriffs, mayors,
    cities, counties and public safety communications officers
    observed in a joint letter that with the advent of SAFECOM,
    public safety, and State and local governments finally have
    both a voice in public safety discussions at the Federal level
    and confidence that the Federal Government is coordinating its
    resources.
        In April, SAFECOM published the first national statement of
    requirements for wireless public safety communications and
    interoperability which constitutes the first national
    definition of what interoperability must accomplish. It will
    drive the development and creation of interface standards that
    will satisfy public safety practitioner needs, offer industry a
    resource for understanding user needs, guide the development of
    new technologies and serve as a guide in developing SAFECOM
    research, development, test and evaluation programs.
        Within a month of its posting, over 5,000 copies of the
    statement of requirements were downloaded, and manufacturers
    have begun to show us how they were mapping the capabilities of
    their equipment, especially new designs, to these requirements.
    We established a Federal interagency coordination council to
    bring together all the Federal players who provide grants to
    States and localities, operate communications systems that need
    to be interoperable or that have regulatory functions touching
    on interoperability. We've engaged in discussions with the FCC
    and recently agreed to form a task force to allow continuous
    interaction between the new interoperability office and FCC
    staff.
        The Nation must continue to pursue the current,
    comprehensive strategy that takes into account technical and
    cultural issues associated with improving communications and
    interoperability. In doing so, it addresses research,
    development, testing and evaluation, procurement planning,
    spectrum management, standards, training, and technical
    assistance. The approach recognizes the challenges associated
    with incorporating legacy equipment and practices, given the
    constantly changing nature of technology.
        It is imperative that this new Office of Interoperability,
    with its partners, work toward a world where lives and property
    are never lost because public safety agencies are unable to
    communicate or lack compatible equipment and training
    resources.
        Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I'd be happy to answer any
    questions.
        [The prepared statement of Dr. Boyd follows:]

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        Mr. Turner. Thank you.
        Mr. Muleta.
        Mr. Muleta. Good morning, Mr. Chairman and members of the
    subcommittee. I want to thank you for this opportunity to
    appear before you on behalf of FCC to discuss our work in
    facilitating interoperability between the Nation's public
    safety communication systems.
        As an initial matter, I commend your decision to request
    GAO to study the critical issues related to public safety
    interoperability and its importance to homeland security. Our
    staff at the FCC is committed to participating in the
    initiatives of other interested stakeholders designed to
    identify, assess and analyze interoperability successes and
    challenges. I look forward to hearing this committee's views
    regarding the findings and the recommendations of the report.
        The FCC's experience working with public safety entities
    and stakeholders is expansive and far-reaching. Today there are
    more than 40,000 spectrum licenses designated for public safety
    systems under the Communications Act. The FCC has a unique role
    of providing spectrum that State and local governments use as
    an integral part of these systems. Under the leadership of
    Chairman Powell, the Commission has intensified its efforts in
    this area and designated homeland security and public safety
    issues as one of the Commission's six core strategic
    objectives.
        As September 11th vividly demonstrated, the ability of
    public safety systems to communicate seamlessly at incident
    sites with minimal onsite coordination is critical to saving
    lives and property. The FCC is therefore committed to use all
    of its resources to promote and enhance the interoperability of
    the thousands of public safety systems that make up the
    critical part of our Nation's homeland security network.
        Our experience indicates that a holistic approach is the
    best method for fostering interoperability. Achieving
    interoperability requires focus on more than spectrum,
    technology and equipment issues. It also requires a focus on
    the organizational and the personal coordination and
    communication necessary to make it available in the times of
    our greatest needs. For its part, the Commission directs its
    efforts toward providing additional spectrum for public safety
    systems, nurturing technological developments enhancing
    interoperability, and providing its expertise and input to
    interagency efforts such as SAFECOM to improve our homeland
    security.
        It is important that despite all its efforts, there are
    limits to what the FCC can do. The FCC is only one stakeholder
    in the process, and many of the challenges facing
    interoperability are a result of the disparate governmental
    interests, local, State and Federal, that individually operate
    portions of our national public safety system. Each of these
    interests has different capabilities in terms of funding and
    technological sophistication, making it difficult to develop
    and deploy interoperability strategies uniformly throughout the
    country.
        Regardless of these problems, we at the FCC continue to
    advance policies that enable all of the stakeholders to do
    their best in maintaining a strong and viable national public
    safety system.
        In terms of additional spectrum for public safety, the
    Commission currently has designated throughout the country
    approximately 97 megahertz of spectrum for public safety use.
    The Commission has also designated certain channels on these
    public safety bands specifically for interoperability, and a
    public safety licensee may use these designated frequencies
    only if it uses equipment that permits inter-system
    interoperability. The frequencies that have so-called use
    designations include 2.6 megahertz in the 700 megahertz band, 5
    channels in the 800 megahertz band, 5 channels in the 150
    megahertz band, which is a VHF band, and 4 channels in the 450
    megahertz band, which is the UHF band.
        In addition, and very importantly, starting next January
    the Commission will require newly certified public safety
    mobile radio units to have the capacity to transmit and receive
    on the nationwide public safety interoperability calling
    channel in the UHF and VHF bands in which they operate.
        In the last few years, the Commission has made two
    additional spectrum allocations that illustrate the importance
    placed on ensuring public safety entities have additional
    interoperable spectrum to carry out their critical missions.
    First, consistent with the Balanced Budget Act of 1997, the FCC
    identified and allocated 24 megahertz in the 700 megahertz band
    for public safety use. In particular, we also dedicated 2.6
    megahertz of the spectrum for interoperability purposes.
        Given the central role the States provide in managing
    emergency communications and consistent also with the GAO's
    findings, the FCC also concluded that States are well suited
    for administering the interoperability spectrum, and that State
    level administration would promote safety of life and property
    through seamless and coordinated communications on the 700
    megahertz interoperability spectrum.
        Second, the FCC designated 50 additional megahertz of
    spectrum at 4.9 gigahertz for public safety users in response
    to requests from public safety community for additional
    spectrum for broad band data communications. The 4.9 gigahertz
    band also fosters interoperability by providing a new
    regulatory framework in which traditional public safety
    entities can pursue strategic relationships with others, such
    as critical infrastructure entities, for the completion of
    their mission.
        In addition to using its resources to identify additional
    spectrum, the FCC has also provided innovative licensing
    methods, creative planning methods that encourage better
    coordination, and advocated new technologies in order to
    promote the effective, interoperable use of public safety
    spectrum. Foremost, the Commission adopted the regional
    planning approach spectrum management as an alternative to the
    traditional first in the door approach to spectrum licensing
    and management in the public safety context.
        The Commission has also developed new rules permitting two
    types of spectrum sharing in order to promote interoperability.
    First, the FCC's rules specifically provide for shared use of
    radio stations where public safety licensees may share their
    facilities on a non-profit cost shared basis with other public
    safety organizations that use it as end users. This rule has
    now been expanded to also include Federal Government users.
        A second type of sharing is unique to the 700 megahertz
    public safety spectrum. In this spectrum band, State and local
    public safety licensees may construct and operate joint
    facilities with the Federal Government.
        In terms of coordination, the FCC recognizes interagency
    coordination as an essential factor in developing effective
    interoperability. In 1999, the FCC organized a public safety
    National Coordination Committee as a Federal advisory
    committee, and asked it to recommend technical and operational
    standards that provide for interoperability in the 700
    megahertz public safety band. The NCC, which finished its
    charter last year, also worked with the Telecommunications
    Industry Association, an accredited open standards developer,
    to develop interoperability technical standards that are open
    and non-proprietary, that are lowering costs and increasing the
    rate of adoption by public safety licensees.
        The Commission staff also routinely confers and does
    outreach with critical organizations, including the Association
    of Public Safety Commissions Office, the National Public Safety
    Telecommunications Council, the International Association of
    Fire Chiefs and the International Association of Chiefs of
    Police, some of whose representatives are here today. Moreover,
    the staff is closely working with the Department of Homeland
    Security SAFECOM, as we both share the common goal of improving
    public safety communications interoperability.
        We are continuing our collaborative efforts to develop a
    strong working relationship both formally and informally. Dr.
    Boyd and I are also continuing to work together at a personal
    level to promote and ensure effective coordination regarding
    homeland security and public safety communications initiatives.
        In addition to our regular meetings, we recently committed
    to establish an informal working group comprised of
    representatives of our respective staffs to meet and share
    information on a regular basis on issues of interoperability.
        I'd like to thank you again for the opportunity to testify
    in front of you on this important issue affecting our homeland
    security, and I'll be glad to answer any additional questions.
        [The prepared statement of Mr. Muleta follows:]

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        Mr. Turner. Thank you.
        Mr. Devine.
        Mr. Devine. Good morning, Mr. Chairman and members of the
    committee. Thank you for providing me the opportunity to share
    my thoughts today on this important topic.
        In Missouri, I am involved in public safety communications,
    regional planning initiatives. I serve as the local APCO
    advisor, and I chair the Missouri Statewide Interoperability
    Executive Committee.
        The Missouri State Interoperability Executive Committee,
    with its participation from across the State, has made great
    strides in developing a locally integrated interoperability
    environment within Missouri. My most important duty is working
    for the Highway Patrol, or actually outside of my official job
    description. My description as patrol frequency coordinator has
    gradually evolved into an overall public safety communications
    resource for police, fire and EMS and local government concerns
    in Missouri sponsored by the State.
        These duties identify me as the initial contact and
    resource for all public safety communications issues, such as
    homeland security grant process and interoperable
    communications issues, State interoperability executive
    committee advocacy, regional planning, promoting a dialog for
    operational and technical interoperability solutions, frequency
    coordination, FCC regulatory topics and other issues, including
    updates, seminars and training.
        Prior to my appointment to this position at the State
    level, no one entity or person provided these services to
    Missouri's public safety community. This caused a lack of
    dialog that impaired each community's ability to serve its
    constituents. It is effective for interoperable guidance and
    administration to come from the State level of government in
    many instances, which has responsibilities throughout the
    State, not just in portions of it.
        Today I'd like to briefly discuss two particular
    communications outreach and planning mechanisms beneficial to
    public safety at the regional level, and how interaction with
    both the FCC and the Department of Homeland Security can
    improve the overall interoperable potential in each State. I
    generally look toward the Department of Homeland security
    through Project SAFECOM to promote training, implementation,
    direction and the encouragement of a consistent communications
    dialog at the local level and to the FCC to cerate the enabling
    regulatory environment that will public safety to best utilize
    its assigned resources and promote interoperability for its end
    users.
        The first mechanism is the mandatory development and
    expansion of Statewide Interoperability Executive Committees.
    Within the NCC committee, the FCC supported but did not mandate
    the creation of an SIEC in each State. The NCC has since
    recommended that SIECs be mandated by the FCC and expanded to
    include the administration of all interoperability spectrum,
    not just that of 700 megahertz.
        The expanded role of the mandated SIEC would allow the
    conclusions identified in the NCC to improve interoperability
    in other public safety bands. NCC recommendations on SIEC
    expansion and other interoperability issues are currently
    pending FCC action.
        In concern with SIEC development, the Federal Government,
    with support from the Department of Homeland Security, shall
    provide the States spectrum management training. This is
    consistent with conclusions reached in the recent MTIA report
    that indicates a lack of spectrum planning resource at the
    State level. MTIA previously provided a spectrum management
    program to States, but it is no longer offered. In many areas,
    receiving this training will initiate SIEC interoperable
    development in States and promote a dialog within States as
    well.
        The second issue crucial to the furthering of
    interoperability is the promotion of common national
    interoperable parameters and conditions that enable continuity
    and positively impact communications within the first responder
    community. These recommendations are all included in the NCC
    recommendations under FCC Docket No. 96-86. They are the
    development of statewide interoperability plans, the
    institution of standardized interoperability channel
    nomenclature, the requirement of standardized technical
    interoperable parameters and the utilization of standard
    incident management or incident command systems.
        The end result has public safety, after an implementation
    period, using managed nationwide interoperability channels from
    all public safety bands with common technical parameters and
    common channel names within a standardized operating
    environment. How these channels are used in each State is then
    documented and made available to other States and Federal users
    in the form of State interoperability plans to promote an
    interoperability dialog across the country which currently does
    not exist.
        The establishment of Federal, State and local
    communications planning and implementation dialog needs
    improvement. One method would be to establish an interoperable
    dialog between the Federal Government and State and local
    entities through memoranda of understanding. An MOU could be
    created between Federal users in each State outlining
    acceptable parameters for use between the parties and then
    allowing the States to distribute the parameters to the local
    communities. The State would then disseminate the MOU
    information and its conditions to local users through a new
    MOU. This method of sharing and interoperability for all users
    is outside the FCC's current rules in some spectrum, but it
    will allow more effective interoperable resources to the local
    user.
        States should also communicate with each other in the form
    of biannually published State interoperability plans created by
    their SIEC via Web access, such as Denver University's CAPRAD
    data base, which is being utilized as a planning tool within
    the 700 megahertz regional planning initiative.
        I recommend continued Federal dialog and outreach between
    DHS and planning groups, such as NIPSTICK and other State SIEC
    groups to help regional and local users become more aware of
    their needs and abilities regarding interoperability. At a time
    when significant grant moneys are being distributed to the
    local community, there is an opportunity for the Federal
    Government to require the standardization of certain
    communications parameters at the local level, in the
    implementation of interoperability resources as a condition to
    the grantor.
        The State of Missouri has used the Missouri SIEC as a
    resource to review grant funding and make recommendations
    regarding applications. The result is local users better
    equipped to expand their potential interoperability.
        Public safety communications at the local level has no
    required, structured, centralized management mechanism with a
    focus on interoperability. A suggested method of improving
    discussion between Federal, State and local users would be for
    Federal entities to use a State SIEC as a point of contact
    within each State. State contacts could then communicate with
    each other to achieve regional needs.
        In conclusion, interoperability in the public safety
    community starts and ends at the local level. Currently, the
    freedom offered to State and local agencies to implement new
    regulatory decisions in any fashion they deem appropriate often
    inhibits the very interoperability we seek due to each agency's
    interpretation of how those regulatory decisions should be
    implemented. Pushing good, positive rules into the local
    community, in the absence of followup, structure and
    enforceable guidelines, can inhibit interoperable
    communications. Supporting the communications needs of local,
    county, State and Federal users cannot be accomplished without
    an ongoing public safety interoperability dialog, resulting
    from a program in each State.
        Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I'm available for any questions.
        [The prepared statement of Mr. Devine follows:]

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        Mr. Turner. Thank you.
        Mr. Nash.
        Mr. Nash. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. My name is Glen Nash. I
    am a senior telecommunications engineer working for the State
    of California, Department of General Services, where I have
    over 30 years experience in the design, installation and
    maintenance of public safety communications systems.
        I am a past president of the Association of Public Safety
    Communications Officials International, also known as APCO. I
    served as the Chair of the Technology Subcommittee of the FCC's
    Public Safety National Coordination Committee, served on the
    joint FCC/NTIA Public Safety Wireless Advisory Committee,
    served on the National Task Force on Interoperability, and have
    otherwise been very active on matters related to
    interoperability between and amongst public safety agencies. I
    am here today representing the State of California and as a
    general spokesman for the public safety community.
        Communications, and in particular radio communications, is
    a vital tool used by public safety agencies to exercise command
    and control of emergent events in the community. Those events
    range in scale from routine traffic stops by police agencies
    and calls to EMS agencies for medical assistance to large
    disasters such as the wildland fires experienced each year in
    California and in other States and the events our country
    experienced on September 11, 2001. Public safety radio is the
    mechanism by which operational commanders and government
    officials gather information about the event, deploy forces to
    respond to the event and direct the actions of our Nation's
    first responders. It also serves as a lifeline in protecting
    the safety of those first responders. Without effective
    communications, our Nation's police, fire and EMS personnel
    cannot perform their primary duties of protecting the American
    public's life and property.
        While the term interoperability has received significant
    interest since the events of September 11th, it is neither a
    new issue nor something that the public safety community has
    not been addressing for many years. Things are far from
    perfect, and there certainly are many ways that
    interoperability can be improved across the country. But let us
    not ignore the successes.
        In California, we have implemented mutual aid systems for
    many years. These have included the California Law Enforcement
    Mutual Aid Radio System, commonly called CLEMARS, in which the
    State contributed and licensed radio channels statewide that
    can be used by any law enforcement agency. All that a local
    agency need do is sign a standardized agreement regarding use
    of those channels, then program those channels into their
    mobile and portable radios. Upon doing so, they are able to
    talk with personnel from virtually any other law enforcement
    agency that has similarly joined its system.
        This system has been in existence since the early 1960's.
    And I am proud to say most, if not all law enforcement agencies
    in California are participants. Is the CLEMARS system perfect?
    No, it still suffers from technology problems related to the
    fact that the public safety agencies are spread across multiple
    frequencies that are mutually incompatible with one another and
    from training issues, both of which I will discuss in a moment.
    Also, it provides only one channel in each major band, which
    obviously would be inadequate in anything resembling a very
    large event.
        While we are working to resolve some of these limiting
    issues, the solutions will require the expenditure of time,
    effort and public tax dollars that are vitally needed in many
    other areas.
        Another success story can be found in the fire community.
    As many of you are aware, California suffers from several large
    wildland fires each year. Besides the obvious devastation
    caused by these fires, the effort required to fight these fires
    is tremendous. A single agency may deploy a thousand or more
    firefighters along with hundreds of pieces of apparatus,
    aircraft and logistical support from local, State and Federal
    agencies. The State, in conjunction with representatives of
    local fire agencies and representatives of the U.S. Forest
    Service and Bureau of Land Management, have developed a
    communications plan known as FIRESCOPE that lays out procedures
    for communicating with all these resources. The plan calls for
    the integration of frequencies licensed to the State and local
    agencies, along with frequencies controlled by the Federal
    agencies, and the integration of both the frequencies and the
    equipment from the National Interagency Fire Center to create
    an overall communications system that supports the efforts
    directed toward controlling the wildland fire. While this
    system has enjoyed great success, it too is being challenged by
    technological and training issues.
        I would like to mention two other efforts underway in
    California because they are being driven by local agencies
    coming together to develop a communications plan that addresses
    their response to events that occur within a more localized
    region. Those efforts are the Los Angeles Tactical
    Communications Systems and the Bay Area Tactical Communications
    System. In both of these efforts, command personnel from the
    local agencies are coming together to discuss the operational
    issues that must be resolved so that they can work together as
    a team on an event; to catalog the capabilities and limitations
    of their communications systems; and to develop plans that can
    be readily implemented when the need arises.
        These events, by the way, do not need to be large scale
    events. They could include a pursuit that moves from one
    jurisdiction to another or the automatic response of the
    nearest fire unit to a call rather than the unit within whose
    jurisdiction the call originates. If I were to characterize
    these events, I would have to say they can happen at any time
    and any place, often without warning. They start out as local
    response events and grow into something larger.
        I mentioned before that there were technological and
    training issues that limit public safety agencies and personnel
    at the State and local levels from implementing the ideal
    solution. What are some of those issues?
        First and foremost is an issue related to the radio
    spectrum. Local, State and Federal agencies operate across five
    major frequency bands. Each of these bands is mutually
    incompatible with the others. In some cases, individual
    agencies were able to select the band they used based upon
    operational advantages. But more often than not, the frequency
    band was determined by what was available at the time they
    built their system. In many regions of the country all the
    agencies have built their systems on frequencies that come from
    the same frequency band, thus they have an inherent ability to
    create interoperability, assuming that channels can be
    identified.
        There is a major problem with the interoperability spectrum
    created in the 700 megahertz band. Don't get me wrong, the 2.6
    megahertz of spectrum is a tremendous asset that will be useful
    in the future. But realize also that no radio currently in use
    by any public safety agency in America is capable of operating
    on those interoperability channels.
        Mr. Turner. Mr. Nash, your written statement will be
    entered into the record. Do you have any other comments you
    want to sum up at this point?
        Mr. Nash. No, that's fine. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        [The prepared statement of Mr. Nash follows:]

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        Mr. Turner. Thank you so much.
        I want to go then to a series of rounds of 5 minutes of
    questions from members of the committee. I'd like to start with
    a question really to all of you that you can respond to.
        In listening to the opportunities and also the definitions
    of the problem and how you each have been, and the agencies
    have been working this issue, there does appear to be a
    distinction between the issue of equipment, what equipment
    needs to be put in place, and processes or systems. We've heard
    the term legacy systems and legacy practices.
        And in part, you have an equipment issue and in part you
    have a management issue. I'd like for you to talk about the
    management issue aspects of that. You certainly have issues
    such as, Mr. Nash, you mentioned the issues of culture of
    command and control. You have structural, local, State and
    Federal. That seems almost to be a greater impediment than the
    issues of just equipment.
        So you've approached this issue. Could you talk a moment
    about the issue of the practices, the management versus the
    equipment aspect?
        Mr. Jenkins. Well, I think that the equipment, from our
    perspective, follows the management. It's not the lead issue.
    It's the issue of what, after you've decided what you need,
    after you've decided what the gaps are, the equipment is the
    alternative solution. You're looking at what the alternatives
    are and how that equipment helps meet those particular
    requirements.
        But the equipment itself is a means to an end. It's not the
    end. And the really important part is being able to establish
    what the needs are and then what the gaps are. And those needs
    themselves follow from a command incident structure defining
    who's going to be in charge, who needs to share what
    information with whom under what circumstances in what kind of
    event. If that's not laid out, if that foundation is not laid
    out, the equipment issue is almost irrelevant. Because even if
    you have the right equipment, as we've said, one of the reasons
    we're suggesting a common nomenclature is, even if you have the
    right equipment, if I call it red channel two and you call it
    purple dot channel five, we don't realize that we can talk to
    each other, because we use different names.
        So these issues of being able to agree on what the
    nomenclature is, everybody knows, having these data bases that
    people will know, those are very important issues and they
    really are sort of external, if you will, to the equipment
    itself. And the reason that we're suggesting that the States be
    the mechanism is exactly what Mr. Devine said and others have
    said, is that to the extent to which local governments have
    developed their own, and local first responders developed their
    own systems, they've tended to develop them for their own needs
    and not looked across jurisdictions, looked on a regional
    basis. And the States are a mechanism that allow you to do
    that, that allows you to look beyond individual jurisdiction
    and how does it fit together.
        On a day to day basis, if I'm just responding to an
    automobile accident or something, this may not be much of an
    issue. But if you're dealing with a much larger event, like a
    wildfire that goes across multiple jurisdictions or a plane
    crash, or September 11th, then these issues that cross
    jurisdictions become very important in being able to look at
    them and have a mechanism in place, an incident command
    structure for how we're going to deal with that.
        So in our view, the management issues are fundamental and
    have to be addressed before you get to the equipment issues.
        Mr. Turner. Dr. Boyd.
        Dr. Boyd. We would agree that the human factors, which
    includes more than just management issues, has to do with all
    the cultural relationships at the local level; turf issues
    involving who's going to control the system, who gets to decide
    when you get to get on a channel other issues, have to be a
    first and key component of that. We think all of this needs to
    be approached through what we call a governance approach.
        And that governance approach needs to be one that begins at
    the lowest level and works up, so that the localities who own,
    operate and maintain the vast majority of the equipment and
    have the vast majority of the money and the vast majority of
    the people have a real incentive to be part of larger, county-
    wide, State-wide systems. It has to be more than just going
    through the motions, just saying, you can come in and come to a
    meeting with me. planners have to listen to those users at the
    local level first. They're the people who are going to respond,
    they have most of the people--even when the State level is
    considered. So you have to start with a structure that builds
    from the bottom up in order to build a serious State-wide plan
    that everybody really wants to sign onto.
        Mr. Tierney made a reference to an $18 billion figure mark
    that came out a study some years ago by PSWAC. That study now
    is very old, and it only looked at land mobile radio systems,
    that is, the equipment that goes into a car and the equipment
    an officer carries. It covered none of the infrastructure. It
    covered none of the new towers, none of the new repeaters, none
    of the other things that would need to go with it.
        So one of the things you also have to understand is that
    another part of the problem really is a funding issue, because
    the local communities are going to have to come up with the
    money. They have to make a decision that they're going to help
    pay for some of this, which means that whatever strategy you
    develop has to be one that takes into account legacy equipment.
    We can't leave it out, even as we try to move in a coordinated
    direction to get to modern systems, because communities cannot
    afford to abandon these older systems.
        So the human management piece is first and foremost. The
    technology piece then follows almost naturally. But you can't
    lose track of either of them. You can't lose track of the
    fundamental costs of decisions that may be made at a higher
    level that don't meet the immediate needs of the first
    responder in their locality. They have to be part of however
    you design the national or the State structures.
        Mr. Turner. Mr. Muleta.
        Mr. Muleta. My colleagues here have explained the
    situation. I think the FCC, we have since the late 1980's been
    working on promoting interoperability while being cognizant of
    the fact that there is a lot of sort of local involvement in
    trying to not overly mandate a solution that might be over-
    inclusive or under-inclusive. So what we've developed is a
    system in which we are asking States and the representatives to
    participate through these, like the National Coordination
    Committee to develop interoperability in effect allowing the
    local folks to opt into solutions that we're providing.
        So we think that's the right approach, and I support the
    statements that all my colleagues here have made.
        Mr. Turner. Mr. Devine.
        Mr. Devine. I think planning can't be underestimated. Often
    people talk about a national interoperability plan, and indeed,
    we have one. We have 50 individual plans that are stuck in
    somebody's drawer some place that we don't communicate across
    State lines or even in many areas within those States.
        In Missouri, I've got Kansas City and St. Louis who don't
    agree on much. I don't really need for them to do the same
    thing, I just need to identify with what each of them do that
    there is some commonality between them. They don't necessarily
    have to do everything the same, there just has to be some
    continuity. I think that dialog at that human level, as Dr.
    Boyd indicated, the planning level, is what promotes that.
    They're more than willing to share what they're doing. And the
    disparities are one thing. But to find that common thread that
    when people from St. Louis have to go to Kansas City, it's
    probably a drastic incident and there will be some commonality
    there.
        So it's all about local planning and getting them involved,
    not as much changing what people do but finding out what they
    do, identifying it, laying it all out on the table and finding
    where the common threads are.
        Mr. Turner. Mr. Nash.
        Mr. Nash. I totally agree with those comments. We've often
    talked about interoperability really as being a system of
    systems. And we take the local systems, we integrate them
    together, through a county-wide or State-wide overlay system
    that brings them together. You can then integrate that into a
    nationwide system. I think one of the things we need to keep in
    mind is that we're not looking for the ability of the officer
    on the street to talk to the firefighter on the end of the
    hose. That kind of communication usually is, quite frankly, in
    appropriate.
        We do need to have a way for commanders to integrate and
    talk amongst themselves. And just as a good example, again, of
    something that happened just recently, the funeral of President
    Reagan in the Ventura area brought a lot of people and a lot of
    resource requirements to a very small community. But they
    developed a plan, they worked it out, they had some ideas in
    place. And it wasn't a matter that everybody talked directly
    with each other. But they all had an agreement that they would
    communicate with each other.
        And there was a system of systems there with different
    agencies operating on different systems, performing their part
    of the job and doing it very effectively and for some very good
    reasons. For example, the Secret Service and the FBI would not
    want to be integrated directly with locals, for security
    reasons. So there are some very valid reasons why we need to be
    thinking about a system of systems that allow us to communicate
    at the levels at which it's appropriate to communicate.
        Mr. Turner. Mr. Tierney.
        Mr. Tierney. Thank you all for your testimony here.
        Dr. Boyd, I understand that within the Department of
    Homeland Security now there is the Office of Interoperability
    and Coordination, but it seems tom e that the mission and the
    structure of it may not be completely defined. There's also
    SAFECOM, there's the Office of Domestic Preparedness and the
    Office of State and Local Coordination and Preparedness. Of
    those groups, who's in charge of this interoperability aspect?
        Dr. Boyd. The Secretary has indicated two things. One is,
    at the executive level, that SAFECOM is in charge of
    accomplishing its three fundamental missions, which are a
    national architecture, a standards process and the coordination
    of Federal activities. So direction from OMB has gone in the
    passback to every agency to include that common grant guidance.
        With the creation of the Office of Interoperability and
    Compatibility, the Secretary has made clear that
    interoperability management and interoperability standards will
    be the responsibility of the new office. To that end, we work
    directly with the Office of Domestic Preparedness, with the
    State and local government coordination office and in fact,
    with all of the activities within the Department.
        Mr. Tierney. Do you have a target date for completing your
    work?
        Dr. Boyd. Let me break that into two parts. Our target date
    for when the office is fully operational is not later than the
    end of this fiscal year. The reason I put you off on the other
    is that interoperability is something that's going to take a
    very long time to accomplish correctly nationally. So I don't
    want to provide an end date for that. In fact, one of my
    favorite stories is to point out that when I was first
    commissioned as second lieutenant in the U.S. Army--and I won't
    say how long ago that was, but it was quite a while--the
    Department of Defense had really decided that DOD was going to
    become interoperable. I retired from the U.S. Army after a full
    career 12 years ago, and DOD is today almost interoperable.
    That's a single department, with four Federal agencies, funded
    essentially by one committee. And still, more than 40 years
    later, they're not fully interoperable.
        So this is going to take a while. We don't intend to take
    40 plus years. We think we can do it a lot faster than that.
    But it's not going to happen in one or 2 or 3 years either.
        Mr. Tierney. I wouldn't expect it to happen as rapidly as
    that, but I'm certainly discouraged to hear that it may take as
    long as you think.
        Let me ask you, your first date was that for the target
    date of actually collecting the data? Do you have a date where
    you figure that you're going to get all the data you need to
    start working with?
        Dr. Boyd. We expect to release the RFP, the solicitation to
    bring on board the research activity that will actually do the
    baseline research this month. So I would expect we would have
    an award before the end of this fiscal year. We'll have the
    report back probably mid to late fiscal year next, in 2005.
        Mr. Tierney. Mr. Jenkins, what does GAO think about that
    scenario and that process? Does that seem to be moving
    reasonably on a good timeframe?
        Mr. Jenkins. It's difficult for us to make an assessment of
    that. Part of the reason is what Mr. Boyd said, the real
    functions of this office, what its funding is going to be, what
    its authority is going to be, what its structure are going to
    be is still being developed. So whether or not they can do what
    Dr. Boyd says and do it within a particular timeframe depends
    very much on how that office is structured, what its authority
    is, what its funding is. Those are all open questions at the
    moment.
        Mr. Tierney. Mr. Boyd, what do you think about that?
        Dr. Boyd. That's part of why I broke it into two parts: the
    when we'll have the office stood up rather than when we would
    complete the mission. We had a meeting just this week with the
    Assistant Secretary for Science and Technology so that we can
    lay those dates out. We have put in a mark for 2006--we're
    little late for the 2005 process, because the decision to
    create the office was made later--so now we're dependent for
    how much we're going to be able to do in 2005 on what happens
    in the final appropriation this year.
        Mr. Tierney. Thank you. Thank you all for your testimony.
        Mr. Shays [resuming Chair]. First, if you gentlemen would
    like to take your coats off, feel free. I'm serious.
        What I'd like to do, Mr. Tierney, do you have other
    questions you'd like to ask?
        Mr. Tierney. No.
        Mr. Shays. OK. What I'd like to do is ask the professional
    staff, Grace Washbourne, to ask a few questions, then I have
    questions of my own.
        Ms. Washbourne. Thank you, Mr. Shays.
        Mr. Devine, you talked about the importance of having an
    understanding about the state of interoperability or the state
    of communications that are around you, whether it's in your
    State or across borders. I understand, Dr. Boyd, that DHS
    intends to assess the state of interoperability by the year
    2005 by means of a nationwide survey. Can you tell us a little
    bit about what questions this survey will contain and how does
    DHS plan to establish a baseline measure of first responder
    communications capabilities nationwide?
        Dr. Boyd. Part of what the research will be responsible for
    is developing the specific questions to be asked in the fields.
    In general, these are the kinds of things that we're asking
    them to do as part of this baseline. We want to know the degree
    to which they actually have interoperable equipment, if they
    actually have plans for interoperability, the degree to which
    they have both agreements with adjacent jurisdictions and the
    degree to which they're actually able to communicate with them.
    And we're also going to ask them about future funding plans,
    where they're either putting together plans they're going to
    propose, or they're putting together plans which they actually
    knows will be funded.
        This will probably be a scientific sample survey, but it
    won't be a written survey. I have a bias against written
    surveys because in the Justice Department, we learned very
    early on that if you use a written survey, it tends to go to
    the person the agency can spare to fill the survey out, because
    they get lots of requests to complete surveys.
        So we'll actually be putting teams on the ground, going to,
    looking at and helping agencies to identify what this model
    level of interoperability is. Because we want to be able to
    characterize where the Nation is now so that we actually have a
    starting point against which to measure our performance and
    against which we can take the statement of requirements and
    figure out what the real shortfalls are nationally, so when we
    come back to you we can answer some of those questions that
    Congress is regularly asking us, and that is, what is the scope
    of the problem and what is the cost of fixing it. No one can
    reliably do that now. We will be able reliably to make that
    kind of identification by the end of next year.
        Ms. Washbourne. I know a data base will probably be highly
    technical. Is it the FCC or DHS that will be responsible for
    this data base, and who will fund it and upgrade it and require
    that people put information in it that's helpful in their
    communities, since it's going to take long for us to get our
    act together on this?
        Dr. Boyd. Well, there are two data bases that we're
    concerned about. One of them is the data base for the baseline.
    We will create that data base. Out of it we intend them to
    create as well a set of self assessment tools that localities
    can use to determine for themselves what their interoperability
    gaps are. Then we intend to try to create a voluntary reporting
    process, we have no authority to require one, but to ask the
    States if when they're able to collect and use this
    information, they would also share it with us.
        The other data base is the CAPRAD data base, which of
    course is a frequency data base. We intend to continue to
    support that.
        Ms. Washbourne. Mr. Muleta, do you have a responsibility to
    collect this data or are you interested in it?
        Mr. Muleta. I think, we have a licensing data base in which
    as we issue licenses we record the information, the sort of
    core information as to who the licensee is, whether or not
    they're a public safety agency. Because a lot of different
    rules and regulations are triggered by whether, under the
    Telecommunications Act, based on the definition of the
    licensee.
        I think the underlying issues are data bases don't go to
    actual use and actual types of systems that are being used. We
    can sort of guess fairly well if somebody's signing up for 800
    megahertz or for 450 what kind of systems they're using. But
    their technology choices and things like that are not recorded,
    they're not required because we don't go to regulating specific
    types of equipment. We do, as you use certain channels, we do
    have that.
        I think we also try and balance sort of mandatory reporting
    of this, because we have an obligation not to be overly
    burdensome on the localities that are using it. So we are
    using, like I said earlier, the sort of planning and the State
    coordination committees to help us develop and provide opt-in
    information to the extent people feel this is important that
    they want to provide us with that education. That's the process
    we've been using in the past.
        Ms. Washbourne. Thank you. I have one more question for all
    of you. With the recent advances in technology and the push
    from the FCC to implement systems having greater spectral
    efficiency, public safety agencies will be migrating to digital
    technologies. Mr. Nash, in your written testimony you stated
    that most digital technologies currently being marketed are
    mutually incompatible and therefore just designating channels
    or allocations for public safety users is not enough, that for
    interoperability to occur, one and only one digital technology
    can be employed on each channel. And the FCC must regulate
    technical rules for all public safety bands.
        Can each one of you comment on Mr. Nash's observation?
        Dr. Boyd. We like the standards based approach, because we
    believe there needs to be some minimal level of communications
    capability. We would, however, encourage some caution in
    establishing any kind of standards or rules that are too rigid,
    because we don't want to interfere with innovation.
        The approach we likely would take is to try to ensure that
    as people build new systems, that they ensure that they also
    build in a capability to be interoperable with other
    disciplines and other jurisdictions. But we would not want to
    limit too much what the new technologies, which may be
    dramatically improved, in the future if we don't cripple
    innovation.
        But it's conceivable that something we haven't thought of
    might also come along. So we wouldn't want to limit that
    innovation, even though we would want to make sure that they
    took into account interoperability requirements as they put the
    systems in place.
        Mr. Muleta. As I stated in my testimony, starting January
    2005 we will require new systems that have interoperability
    built into it. I think that the sort of bigger issue is
    something that, as part of both the personal level
    coordination, there's a need to do sort of backward
    compatibility. Because a lot of local authorities have sort of
    long term funding cycles. So you sort of get a bond issue and
    it takes, it's designed for a 10 year system. And we're in an
    environment for which the technology for radio communications
    is rapidly evolving. It's down to about 3 to 5 year life
    cycles. So part of the challenge is, if you mandate something,
    and say you have to move in 5 years, you might leave a whole
    bunch of people behind, because they might not be in the right
    funding cycle to be able to support these things.
        So we have to deal with legacy systems. So the Commission
    has in the past adopted transition mechanisms that have
    provided a long lead times and we hope, through all of the
    initiatives that Dr. Boyd and other folks, both at the State
    and local and Federal level are doing, that we can provide
    positive incentives for people to adopt technologies a lot
    faster. Our rules are really designed to get that as an opt-in
    measure to get everybody to buy in and move along as fast as
    possible.
        But we are concerned not only about new technologies, but
    making sure that old technologies can work with new
    technologies.
        Mr. Devine. The identification of the baseline and the
    interoperable quotient, as it were, is something that's
    important. Different areas, California has different needs than
    Missouri than Connecticut. It's important that while we find
    the common thread we don't necessarily try to put users in
    those areas into boxes that aren't appropriate for them to be
    effective.
        So the systems that are out there, funding, as Mr. Muleta
    indicated, you've got fire departments that generate revenue
    from bake sales. You've got to keep in mind their funding
    mechanism, and if they need to be elevated to a different
    interoperable baseline, then they'll need some assistance in
    funding. But every area has to be looked at as its unique needs
    move on. And then of course look toward the future and whether
    technology will be available for them.
        Mr. Nash. It's my comment, so I obviously support it. I
    think we are faced here with this dilemma that we move to
    digital technology, it is very desirable to be able to migrate
    our systems with the advance in technology. But we're also
    faced with the reality of government funding. And government
    funding at a local level, where money is just not available. We
    often talk about a 10 year replacement cycle. The reality, when
    you get down into the very small communities, is yes, they have
    a 10 year replacement cycle, they're buying the equipment that
    the State just discarded after being 10 years old. So their
    equipment is now 20, 25 years old.
        When you're dealing with those kinds of time lines, it's
    critical that you have a stable standard that you're using for
    interoperability purposes. Because as we look to
    interoperability requirements and bringing together people from
    not only widely dispersed geographic areas in a very large
    event, but we're bringing together people from many different
    levels of jurisdiction on a localized basis.
        If we look simply at a wildland fire, those fires often,
    they occur in forest lands. The first people on the scene are
    often a volunteer fire department of the people that live in
    that community. They are then augmented by State and Federal
    forces that come with more resources. But a large number of the
    people there are, they're local volunteers, they don't have the
    money to be buying equipment every 3 years.
        So we do need that stable level of interoperability. We
    need to set the standards, and we need to have a process that
    says yes, we're going to review those standards and
    periodically update them. But we need to give serious thought
    to the impact that a change in the standard is going to have on
    the broad community that is using it.
        Mr. Shays. At this time the Chair would recognize
    Congresswoman Watson.
        Ms. Watson. I want to thank the Chair. And also the
    gentlemen at the table for providing us with what I feel is
    most needed information.
        I represent Los Angeles, California. And Mr. Muleta, I am
    addressing my comments to you and I would like to extend an
    invitation to possibly all of you. Being a part of Pacific Rim,
    and the city of Los Angeles, the largest city in our State, as
    Mr. Nash knows, we have a lot of vulnerability. I hosted a
    meeting at the Culver City city hall last year where we brought
    together the first responders. Culver City is in my district as
    well.
        And we were talking about a radio and that will be used for
    homeland security, for first responders independently of the
    others. And I suggested to them that we look at our major
    organizations beyond first responders, like school districts
    that roll out hundreds of thousands of students per day, and
    being able to communicate with enroute and being able to
    communicate with these school districts. Because if there is a
    biological attack, for instance, they certainly are in
    jeopardy, and I would think that those who meant to do us harm
    would probably go to places where the most people congregate.
    We want to tie not only first responders together but other
    large organizations.
        So Mr. Muleta, would you comment on what kinds of
    communication systems are already in place? We feel that we,
    being so far to the west, we're the last to receive our full
    funding for homeland security. They tell me it's in the
    pipeline, I want it there at the destination. And we need to
    have a system. Our State could be divided up into three States,
    Mr. Nash knows that well. And we're at the southern part of the
    State. But we are the major city, like San Francisco is the
    major city in the midland part of the State.
        So it's absolutely critical that we focus on securing our
    communications. And I'll just, in my comments for now, the fact
    that on September 11 my office was at Carpet Point, which is
    near the airport, and we were evacuated. The plane of course
    never reached its destination. But it was so sensitive, that
    area was so sensitive that they evacuated every facility near
    the airport.
        So who knows where and when the next attack will be? But I
    know now we need to look at our communication systems, and I'd
    like you to comment, please.
        Mr. Muleta. Thank you. I spend a lot of time in California.
    I've built a personal relationship with one of the public
    safety officials in Los Angeles, and also with the folks in San
    Bernardino County and Mr. Nash here as well. The issue that you
    talked about is, do we have systems for dealing across other
    organizations that influence the public safety system, such as
    schools and other things. The FCC is looking comprehensively at
    how all these systems interact with each other. One of the key
    steps is not that there is not a lack of spectrum. I believe
    most school systems have probably a private wireless system
    that they use to communicate with their buses and things like
    that.
        I think the key step that's actually needed is something
    that we've all focused on here, which is sort of integrated
    planning, so that if an incident takes place, I was in Pasadena
    in April and there was an incident at a school. I was watching
    it on TV, in which somebody had come in with a gun or something
    like that, and the whole school system was shut down. So you
    had all the worst possible kinds of things, parents trying to
    get their children, schools under lockdown and nobody knowing
    what the incident was. All you had were these terrible visual
    images.
        I think yes, it's necessary. So I think there are enough
    resources and enough communication systems available, but
    what's really needed ultimately is a plan that says what do we
    do with our children if we're under a lockdown situation, and
    how do we communicate that to all the commanders that need to
    take action, whether it's fire department, it's hazmat, it's
    Federal, State, local, police, fire, whatever it is.
        So I do think there are enough resources, but the planning
    around the kinds of incidents we have to worry about is, I
    think, probably the most important ingredient. Part of what we
    have been driving at the FCC is to force and sort of opt in all
    of the organizations that are involved to participate through
    the statewide planning. Because that's where it's got to start.
    You've got to have all the regional groups understand, here are
    the kinds of threats, here's how we respond to them and here's
    all our communication facilities, such as the baseline that Dr.
    Boyd described. How do we make it all work for us seamlessly
    the day we need it.
        So I believe that thinking is beginning to permeate across
    the 40,000 public safety agencies and all of the things we've
    talked about today will encourage that and help that along.
        Ms. Watson. Thank you for that.
        We are used to all kinds of natural disasters, we throw an
    earthquake, we have a fire going here and we have floods when
    it rains. All these things we get used to, and we do a pretty
    good job in responding. The sheriff in L.A. County started this
    dedicated radio band. And when we met last year, I suggested
    they bring other organizations. So I really need you to
    probably come out again and let's do it. I think a dedicated
    radio band, because you don't have a television always
    available, but you can have a transistor radio. But a band
    dedicated, so nothing else comes on that band but responding
    and directing under homeland security.
        It has already been started by our county sheriff, Sheriff
    Baca. But I think we need to have other entities brought into
    it. And I would be willing to hold a meeting, I did tell them
    I'd followup with a meeting, bring some of the Feds in to talk
    about it, and I'd like to invite you to take part in that and
    we'll talk.
        Mr. Muleta. I'd be happy to participate. Thank you very
    much.
        Mr. Shays. In my community that I represent, the Fourth
    Congressional District in Connecticut, it's near New York City,
    it's 17 towns. A few years ago we had a tabletop exercise in
    Bridgeport, Connecticut. The thing that was most stunning, it
    was a great tabletop exercise, lasted 2 days and had about 200
    participants. It was really amazing. We had a chemical
    explosion on an Amtrak train in Bridgeport, and we had people
    who were first responders become ill and some of them were
    theoretically killed.
        But the thing that came out there was, the Department of
    Health had no communication, forget whether it was
    interoperable. And it was stunning, because they were a huge
    part of the challenge.
        And we had another tabletop exercise in Stanford,
    Connecticut, and there it was an explosion at the railroad
    station that was so close to the railroad tracks, obviously,
    but also I-95, that both became inoperable, the transportation
    network. The thing that was so stunning in that one was that
    the Department of Education wasn't even at the table. And the
    first thing that came up, in the middle of the day, was all
    those workers who wanted to find their kids. And there was no
    communication available to call the schools, to direct and so
    on.
        It pointed out the value of these tabletop exercises, both
    communities are a lot better off because they've gone through
    that. But it also pointed out some major weaknesses.
        The GAO, in their report, says lives of first responders
    and those whom they are trying to assist can be lost when first
    responders cannot communicate effectively as needed. So we're
    obviously talking just about first responders, we're talking
    about their mission. It may fail.
        And then GAO recommends that the Secretary of the
    Department of Homeland Security continue to develop a
    nationwide data base and common terminology for public safety
    interoperability communications channels, two, assess
    interoperability in specific locations against defined
    requirements and, three, through Federal grant awards,
    encourage States to establish and support a statewide body to
    develop and implement detailed improvement, and four, encourage
    that grant applicants be in compliance with statewide
    interoperability plans once they are developed. Those are just
    pretty sensible recommendations.
        I'm curious, and I want a candid answer, I know it would be
    honest, but do you think that if we had this hearing in 5 years
    that we would be a long way from where we are today? Do you
    think honestly, given the challenge and given the resources and
    given the attention that we'll be pretty close to where we're
    at right now? And 5 years from now, if you say it's different,
    I want you to tell me what will be different. I'm going to
    start with you, Mr. Jenkins.
        Mr. Jenkins. I think in the absence of some changes that
    will be not much further along than we are, and those two
    changes that have to be made, or one is that there has to be
    some clear notion of how all the participants are going to get
    together to address this issue.
        Mr. Shays. How the what get together?
        Mr. Jenkins. How all the participants, Federal, State,
    local, first responders get together to address this issue in a
    comprehensive, coordinated way. There's still not a real way to
    do that. There is some progress that has been made, but there
    is still not a real way to do that.
        This Office of Interoperability and Compatibility can
    possibly----
        Mr. Shays. OK, let's go to the next one. Go to the next
    one. That's one. It will depend on how all the participants get
    together.
        Mr. Jenkins. How all the participants get together, if they
    can overcome these cultural barriers. The cultural barriers
    being that, if it's not my system, I don't want to play,
    essentially. I want to be, or if I can be in control, I want to
    play. But if somebody else is in control in a particular
    incident, I don't want to play.
        Mr. Shays. OK, that's one. What's the other one?
        Mr. Jenkins. The other one has to do with setting time
    lines, target dates. There need to be very specific target
    dates for getting certain tasks done. And that there has to be
    some sort of carrot and stick approach in terms of
    accomplishing those tasks. That's one of the reasons we
    recommend that grant guidance is one mechanism in order to do
    that.
        For example, right now it's not possible really for people
    to not be able to buy equipment because they don't have a plan.
    So we don't recommend that you not get the money to buy
    equipment because you don't have a plan. But there should be a
    point in the future where if you don't have a plan, a clear,
    comprehensive plan, then you shouldn't get money to buy
    equipment.
        Mr. Shays. Before I go to the others, who can get all the
    participants together? Whose shoulder does that rest on?
        Mr. Jenkins. In terms of getting the people together, right
    now it rests on the States and Federal Government together, I
    think.
        Mr. Shays. I may not hear you well. But I want to know, is
    it like everyone's in charge so no one's in charge? Does
    someone, if a commission was looking back 5 years from now and
    they were saying, well, nothing happened, would they be able to
    identify one person at this table or one organization, say, it
    was your job to bring people together? Or is it just not
    defined? Is that part of the problem?
        Mr. Jenkins. I think it's the latter. I don't think it is
    defined. It is not really defined who is in charge and what
    their authority is to make it happen or to get people together.
    It's a very amorphous thing.
        Mr. Shays. Is that a failure of our designing the
    Department of Homeland Security? Because the Department of
    Homeland Security is clearly responsible.
        Mr. Jenkins. I think it's partly inherent in the structure
    of it. We have some work ongoing now in terms of how the
    Department is trying to look at and implement an all hazards
    approach in its programs across the Department. But there are
    instances where it's difficult to say who's in charge. When we
    were doing our work on this job, the report that was issued
    today, there did seem to be some disconnect between ODP and
    SAFECOM with regard to a couple of projects, the ODP project in
    Kansas City and the SAFECOM project in Virginia.
        Mr. Shays. OK.
        Mr. Jenkins. Those two efforts did not seem to be
    coordinated.
        Mr. Shays. I'm really happy I asked the question I asked,
    I'm happy you gave me the answer you gave, if it's right.
    Because it depends, I don't want to be here--I want to be here
    5 years from now. Let me say that again. I would like to be
    back. I would like to be here 5 years from now, but I don't
    want you all back here 5 years from now saying the same thing.
        And so, Dr. Boyd. The question is, where will we be, will
    there be much progress in the next 5 years, and if not, why
    not?
        Dr. Boyd. I think the answer to that is that things are
    already significantly different. Let me talk a little bit about
    my history with interoperability. Back in 1993, while I was
    still in Justice, we thought it would be useful based on what
    the public safety guys were telling us to create an
    interoperable solution for law enforcement, just for law
    enforcement.
        Mr. Shays. When was this?
        Dr. Boyd. This was in 1993. And we decided we would try to
    do it in a single county, just to see what was involved in
    doing it, to see whether it was feasible to achieve
    interoperability in a practical way because it had already been
    identified, a considerable time before that as a fairly serious
    issue.
        We worked with the Navy the fire dispatch center, who
    provided us a panel on the condition that we would provide the
    funding to implement a fairly straightforward and fairly
    primitive switching system which nevertheless, provided more
    interoperability than existed in the county. Implementing the
    technology took about 30 days. Getting the players in the
    county to work together--the local, State and Federal players--
    took 2 years. That was just to get everybody to agree they
    would be part of it.
        Now, let's move forward--at that time, the money I had to
    use to fund that was general money that we could scrape off
    other programs. Now, let's move forward to now. DHS stood up,
    of course, in March. We just took formal responsibility in S&T
    for SAFECOM in July.
        Here's how dramatically things have changed. At the
    direction of the Secretary of Homeland Security, we have a
    program called RAPIDCOM 9/30. What we've been asked to try to
    achieve, is a command level incident based interoperability
    capability for emergencies, something the footprint of about a
    Twin Cities, and to be able to do that by the end of this year
    in the 10 cities where the intelligence tells us the threat is
    greatest. We're not going to stop there, but that's where we're
    going to try to be by the end of September.
        Mr. Shays. You're losing me a little bit. Where is this
    story going?
        Dr. Boyd. The point I want to make is now when we go to
    these cities, we're accepted immediately by all the players who
    are involved. All of them want to work with us to fix the
    problem. There is, I think a much, much better understanding of
    the importance of interoperability, and of course, we've had
    interoperability money from Congress for the last 2 years for
    the first time. Before there was never any money designated
    specifically for that.
        So I think you've seen some dramatic changes. And in the
    Department, with the creation of the Office of Interoperability
    and Compatibility, I think you're looking for the first time at
    the development of a serious central office that's going to be
    responsible for pulling all of these things together.
        Mr. Shays. OK. I'm going to come back to you, but I want
    you to respond to Mr. Jenkins' comments about it will depend on
    if we get all the participants together, and that we need to
    set targets and dates. I want you to tell me who gets all the
    participants together.
        Dr. Boyd. We frankly think that it's in large measure our
    role to bring together folks at the national level, at the
    Federal level, and to provide a model to help the States
    actually bring people together in their States. In the State of
    Virginia, for example, we were asked to come in and help to use
    the SAFECOM model to bring folks in from the bottom up in the
    development of a model State interoperability plan for
    Virginia. We'll be publishing that report probably within the
    next month or so.
        And we hope to use Virginia as a model that we can provide
    to others, in particular to those States that don't yet have
    statewide interoperability plans, to help them understand----
        Mr. Shays. It makes me a little uneasy though, as I think
    about it, you were asked. I mean, it's nice you were asked. But
    if you weren't asked, you wouldn't have done it. And that's
    what makes me uneasy. And it may be you weren't given the
    authority.
        Dr. Boyd. We have no authority. We had to be asked in this
    case, because we have no authority to cause any of these things
    to happen.
        Mr. Shays. Mr. Muleta.
        Mr. Muleta. I'm a glass half full kind of guy. So I have to
    tell you, actually, I think in 5 years at least at one level we
    will have a lot of success, which would be on the planning
    level. I think there is a wide level of recognition across all
    of the people that are involved that planning is integral and
    we have to do all the things we've been talking about.
        I think the actual systems implementation is a very long
    cycle. I don't think in 5 years it would be fair to actually
    even measure whether we're successful or not. I think we can
    look at the highest density population, New York City types of
    areas, and we can actually probably make some measurement,
    Kansas City, L.A. are all places we can probably see some
    significant advances in terms of systems implementation.
        But on the planning level, I actually do think
    interoperability is something that all of the public safety
    officials are always now talking about, whether it's e-911
    interoperability or public safety radio interoperability. It is
    a focus of all of our attention. And that is, primarily because
    I think Congress is now focused on it and has provided the
    funding, has provided the guidance.
        Mr. Shays. I thought you had the capability to clear bands
    and to make some extraordinarily significant decisions that
    would protect communication bands.
        Mr. Muleta. I think we're already putting those in place
    already. However, I don't think we can compel any one
    individual actor whether or not to use their system. So if they
    decide to use it, yes, our rules, for example, 700 will provide
    that mechanism for doing that.
        Mr. Shays. Is that the be all and end all, or is that just
    an indication that you did something dramatic that was helpful
    and that you could do more of that?
        Mr. Muleta. I think we need to do more of that. All of the
    FCC decisions are driving toward that. The focus on the States
    for planning purposes, the issue of moving to mandatory, I
    think one of the core issues that Mr. Devine mentioned was
    should we make State planning mandatory. It's under our system
    of government, mandating that the States do something is
    something that I think requires close, careful deliberation. I
    think Congress can also be helpful, like I said, by providing
    funding and guidance. We will do what we're authorized to do
    under the Communications Act.
        Mr. Shays. If we just see progress in terms of planning in
    5 years, I'll consider that a gigantic failure. It's got to be
    more than just planning in 5 years. And the glass if half full
    to you. But I don't think the glass would be half full. I think
    it would be one quarter full.
        Mr. Muleta. If I can respond to that. I have, there are
    40,000 public safety agencies, different geographies. So I just
    want to make sure that we set out reasonable targets for folks
    to achieve, if we plan. I would say that's 80 percent of the
    issue. For us, 80 percent of the issue comes to people not
    knowing what to do when an incident happens.
        Mr. Shays. But right now you have 40,000 agencies that are
    planning and implementing. And if they're just waiting for you
    to plan, it just strikes me that they're going to be
    implementing bad things.
        Mr. Muleta. I think we're all in agreement, sir, that the
    planning today is uncoordinated. When I say planning in 5 years
    will be the fact that everybody here on the table can actually
    hopefully pull out and say, here's the incident response and
    the systems that we're all using, the baseline is there and
    everybody can work off of that. I think that's a different type
    of planning than what's done today. What's done today is very
    local, doesn't take into account all the types of incidents
    that we have to worry about. I think if you look 10 years back
    and say, what were we worried about, it would be a very
    different set of things locally than what we do today. That's
    why I think in 5 years it will be a significant achievement for
    us to get the planning right.
        Mr. Shays. Thank you. Mr. Devine and Mr. Nash, I'd like you
    both to jump in. Where are we going to be in 5 years, as you
    see it now, not trying to be optimistic or pessimistic, just
    realistic.
        Mr. Devine. I'll go first. To me, it's directly
    proportional to the mechanisms and the way we do business. If
    outreach and dialog are increased and, such as Mr. Muleta
    indicated, the planning, when a State has to create a plan, and
    invites the local people to it, that's far more receptive at
    the local level than somebody saying, you will do this. When
    it's an inclusive environment and they come and they want to
    participate in the creation of that plan, I think all of a
    sudden you're ahead of the game, because now people want to
    contribute and they realize that in the contribution, there's a
    betterment and something for them in it.
        So in that type of mandatory planning, I think all of a
    sudden now you've got a dialog. Without the dialog, we will be
    at the same place we are now in 5 years or worse. Any dialog
    and outreach is an improvement. Then people begin to realize,
    you know, we have these things in common, and the only thing
    that stopped us from identifying that previously is because we
    never talked to each other.
        Mr. Shays. OK, let me just say to you that Senator Nunn
    said that, I'm describing a little bit of progress here, is
    what, people are starting to talk. But Senator Nunn said, a
    cheetah chasing a deer, a deer running away from a cheetah may
    be running in the right direction. The question is, how fast is
    it running and how fast is the cheetah running. I'm not
    encouraged by what you're telling me. I want some concrete
    sense of where we are today versus where will be, then which is
    more than just that we're communicating with each other. What
    that says to me is things are so pathetic that gosh, if we just
    started to talk with each other we would be a lot better off.
        Mr. Devine. I think that's the greatest impediment,
    frankly. The lack of dialog is non-existent.
        Mr. Shays. But the dialog is a process to get to something
    else. And you're telling me that we don't even have the dialog.
        Mr. Devine. Correct. What I'm saying is once the dialog is
    created, I think we'll find that in many areas, they are not
    too far part, the solutions aren't that far away. But until
    it's ever communicated, they'll never realize that.
        Mr. Shays. OK. Mr. Nash.
        Mr. Nash. I would agree. I think what's going on right now
    is that there are several funding programs----
        Mr. Shays. You would agree with what?
        Mr. Nash. I don't think things are going to be much better.
    In some ways, I think they could be worse, because we think
    they're better. And that's what concerns me, is that funding
    programs today are very short cycled. People are throwing money
    at it. They're buying equipment based on some salesman's
    promise that it's going to make things better. Yet they really
    don't understand what the problem is, or how the solution fits
    the problem. But they have a solution. So now they believe they
    have it taken care of. And that's what really concerns me.
        I think we really do need some serious level planning, and
    we need to have people sit down and whether it's tabletop
    exercises or what it is, that you sit down and work through
    some of these things, and you figure out who do you need to
    talk to and why do you need to be able to talk to them. Then
    you look at how can I do that. It is not necessarily everybody
    together on one big radio system. Because quite frankly, one
    big radio system, where everybody's trying to talk at once, you
    have no communication.
        I mentioned that I was recently at a presentation about the
    communications aspect of President Reagan's funeral. Something
    that really caught my attention there was, the comment was made
    that the different agencies came together and they agreed to
    communicate with each other. That was the essential point. It
    wasn't a matter of they were all on one radio system or that
    they could all talk to each other. They agreed to communicate
    with each other. And in some cases that meant they were in
    different rooms of a building, they were in different trailers
    parked around that building, they were on different radio
    systems.
        But it all came off very well because they had agreed to
    communicate with each other and expressed their needs, and
    asked each other for help to do those things. That's what's
    critical. I really think the planning aspect of it is very
    critical, and we need to support the planning aspect and get
    not just public safety officials, but as you mentioned, when
    you deal with a big disaster, it goes beyond simply police,
    fire and EMS. You now have utilities involved, you have the
    telephone companies, you have businesses, you have the schools,
    you have the hospitals, you have health care officials, you
    have disaster organizations. It gets huge very quickly.
        Mr. Shays. Well, I'm left with the fact that 5 years from
    now, it's not going to be all that different. And I'm a pretty
    optimistic person. Because what I think is happening right now
    is, I think the Department of Homeland Security has to exert
    authority almost like the courts did a long, long time ago, and
    then have someone say they don't have the right to do it. They
    have to just, I think when I voted for the Department of
    Homeland Security, I voted for believing that we had this huge
    challenge and that the Department needed to be there to get all
    these disparate players cooperating.
        So that's one view I have. The other view I have is the
    FCC's got to make some decisions. And every year they wait,
    it's going to be more costly. And that they are going to be
    tough decisions, and they are going to be criticized by a lot
    of people. You're going to be criticized anyway.
        So that's kind of what I'm getting from this panel. I mean,
    I've got a lot of important information, but that's kind of
    what I'm left with. And it tells me I think what our committee
    could, the full committee could be recommending when we write a
    report.
        Any comment? I'd like to get to the next panel. This room
    is going to be used at 2 by another subcommittee. There's lots
    more we could ask. Is there anything that any of you would like
    to put on the record? Mr. Devine.
        Mr. Devine. Yes, Mr. Chairman. Mr. Muleta indicated earlier
    that with regard to SIEC and mandating of that, in many States
    there are planning committees. And to make sure, I think what
    he had indicated was, the FCC is probably hesitant to require
    something of a State, whether it has something or not. But if
    it has something currently existing, they are hesitant to
    duplicate that or force that down upon the State in the form of
    a mandate.
        So what it might require is some communication with the
    States to say, you need one of these bodies. If you have one,
    it should be inclusive, it should include locals, it shouldn't
    be just State government. It should include everybody, all of
    the people who are going to be responding, and maybe they can
    use that in a way to communicate to the State and say, if you
    have one, just make sure it does these things, rather than
    forcing another entity on them or another body.
        Mr. Shays. I hear you. And I also am struck by the fact
    that maybe the Department of Homeland Security, it gets
    criticized by local communities. But maybe it needs to step in
    and acknowledge what States are really doing a great job and
    are good models, and which States are just simply dropping the
    ball.
        Mr. Devine. We agree entirely. In fact, part of what we're
    working to do now and as we've done with Virginia and other
    States, South Dakota, some of the experiences out of California
    and Missouri, is to try to collect those best practices.
    Because they provide a variety and enough range of flexibility
    among them that we think a lot of States could take some really
    valuable lessons from these. So a key part of what we're trying
    to do is sort of bottle that information so we can share it
    with all the rest of the States.
        As you've heard, a number of States not only don't have a
    body to coordinate this, they don't have an SIEC, neither do
    they have any other kind of a structure to help coordinate
    these things at the State level.
        Mr. Shays. And in the State of Connecticut, we don't even
    have counties to help organize.
        Anybody else who would like to put something in the record?
    Mr. Jenkins.
        Mr. Jenkins. This point has been made in our report, but I
    think it's very important, and that is that to the extent that
    the grant guidance itself and the way the Federal grants are
    structured actually encourages this sort of fragmented
    approach, and they do, the way that they're structured. They're
    part of the problem, they're not part of the solution. And I
    think one of the things that needs to be looked at is the way
    that grants are structured, the number, the purposes that they
    can be used for and the accountability for them.
        Right now, the fragmented nature of Federal grant structure
    actually makes it difficult for localities or regions to come
    together and use those different grants for a common purpose.
    That is something that needs to be addressed as well.
        Mr. Shays. Mr. Devine.
        Mr. Devine. Just one more quick note, with regard to Mr.
    Jenkins' comment. In Missouri, we had an 18 county region
    wanting to apply for communications equipment through the grant
    process as a region. And literally, the guidelines didn't allow
    that. It required up to a county level.
        So here you're actually negating the cooperation and
    coordination between these people by the regulations saying,
    no, you can't apply for that as one, as an 18 county entity. It
    has to be 18 separate requests, which bleeds down into a whole
    bunch of other complicated matters. So it's an interesting
    point.
        Mr. Shays. Well, we have our work cut out for us. We're all
    people of good will here, I know. But ultimately, I'm struck,
    Dr. Boyd, by the fact that somebody has to be in charge of
    this. And I will tell you, I believe ultimately, most Members
    of Congress thought it was the Department of Homeland Security
    that would help be the basis of it. If you are so inclined to
    start to exert more authority on this, you'll find a number of
    people, or at least get the Department to, that will say you're
    doing your job.
        Thank you all very, very much. We appreciate it a lot.
        We have our second panel, which is Mr. Hanford Thomas,
    director of the New York Statewide Wireless Interoperability
    Network; Mr. William Gardner, radio shop supervisor, Suffolk
    County, NY, Police Headquarters; Mr. Glenn Corbett, Department
    of Public Management, John Jay College of Criminal Justice,
    City University of New York. We invite all three to stay
    standing and we will swear you in.
        Thank you very much. I'd just like to say, for the first
    panel and second panel, we will be writing letters of questions
    that we didn't get to and it would be helpful to get a
    response. Thank you all.
        Mr. Thomas, Mr. Gardner, Mr. Corbett, if you'd stay
    standing, please. If there is anyone else that is joining you
    in that dialog, we have Mr. Gardner in the middle.
        Please raise your right hands.
        [Witnesses sworn.]
        Mr. Shays. Note for the record that all three witnesses
    have responded in the affirmative.
        You all have been here for the first panel and that's
    helpful, because you might want to make comments about that as
    well. Mr. Thomas, we'll go with you and then Mr. Gardner and
    then Mr. Corbett. We welcome your comments, your statement will
    be on the record if you want to just ad lib based on what
    you've heard already, feel free. It's your choice.
        Mr. Thomas.

     STATEMENTS OF HANFORD C. THOMAS, DIRECTOR, STATEWIDE WIRELESS
    NETWORK PROJECT, NEW YORK STATE OFFICE FOR TECHNOLOGY; WILLIAM
       J. GARDNER, SUPERVISOR, SUFFOLK COUNTY POLICE DEPARTMENT,
     TECHNICAL SERVICES SECTION, SUFFOLK COUNTY, LONG ISLAND, NY;
     AND PROFESSOR GLENN P. CORBETT, JOHN JAY COLLEGE OF CRIMINAL
                                JUSTICE

        Mr. Thomas. Good afternoon, Chairman and members of the
    subcommittee. I want to thank the subcommittee chair for the
    opportunity to testify today regarding the New York State
    statewide wireless network, an integrated, statewide land
    mobile and radio network for both State and local emergency
    first responders.
        My name is Hanford Thomas. I'm the Director of the
    Statewide Wireless Project under the Office for Technology. I
    was appointed in January 2000 and I'm responsible for the
    development and implementation of an integrated wireless land
    mobile radio network with statewide coverage, which will
    provide a common communication platform for New York State's
    public safety and public service agencies.
        The project is one of the largest technology projects ever
    undertaken in the State, and the first comprehensive upgrade of
    statewide radio communications in more than 30 years.
        Mr. Shays. Mr. Thomas, I'm going to interrupt you. We have
    Carolyn Maloney, who wanted to make sure that this panel was
    going to be part of our hearing. Regretfully, the stock option
    goes to the Floor and she has an amendment. I would like her to
    be able to make a statement then I'll come right back to you.
        Mrs. Maloney. I made an opening statement. I just want to
    thank the chairman again and all of you for your work. I can't
    think of anything more important than having a communication
    system that works. I just find it, I'm mystified that there
    hasn't been more of an effort focused on communications and to
    getting the systems working.
        I specifically asked for a panel on New York, because we
    still remain target No. 1, and we still have radios. The radios
    that didn't work on September 11 still do not work. And any
    insight that you can give us on how we can move this forward
    will be greatly appreciated.
        I am saddened that I can't stay to hear your testimony. I
    have, literally I have to debate on the Floor on something that
    I feel is very important to the safety and soundness of our
    financial markets. So I regret that I have to leave. My staff
    assistant is here, and I thank the chairman.
        Mr. Shays. We'll make sure they pay close attention.
    [Laughter.]
        Thank you.
        I'm sorry, Mr. Thomas, I wanted that to be on the record.
    Thank you.
        Mr. Thomas. The State of New York is working on many fronts
    involving enhanced operability. With the Canadian border to our
    north and New York City in the south, we are working to develop
    operational plans and technical capability to address all
    issues.
        The Canadian border activity brings together New York State
    Police, Federal agencies and the Royal Canadian Mounted Police
    to control border crossings and apprehend terrorists. These
    activities required shared, secure radio communications. My
    office is engaged in the development of a statewide wireless
    radio network. We are near the end of an extensive procurement
    practice. We have selected a prime contractor for the proposed
    award and are currently in final contract negotiations. SWN
    will be used by all State agencies and will also be available
    for use by other government entities, including authorities,
    counties and other local government and Federal agencies.
        The systems that exist today do not provide adequate
    coverage throughout the State. As a matter of fact, there are
    areas where coverage is spotty or non-existent. It is currently
    possible in some areas of the State that an emergency medical
    services team enroute to a medical facility with a critically
    ill patient might at times be unable to communicate or a police
    officer would be unable to relay vital information regarding a
    pursuit.
        To address these issues which place both the public and the
    public safety community at risk, the Statewide Wireless Network
    specifications require that the network provide 90 percent
    coverage on road and navigable waterways and 95 percent area
    coverage in each county in order to eliminate any potential for
    lost communications. In addition, the Statewide Wireless
    Network requirements call for 97 percent portable coverage in
    street in New York City.
        Just as standard voice communications have given way to
    electronic transfer of data in the office environment, the need
    for data transport to supplement voice and mobile
    communications is equally important. The purpose of
    interoperability is not whether government agencies can
    communicate, but whether or not they can communicate in a way
    that enhances their ability to respond effectively in a public
    safety crisis. Today, that capability is severely constrained
    by outmoded technology and disparate radio systems operating on
    different frequency bands. Individual agencies in New York
    State have a basic ability to communicate, but their ability to
    communicate between agencies in real time over wide areas is
    extremely limited.
        The most robust form of interoperability today is achieved
    by having all or a large number of agencies operating on the
    same or similar communications networks. Interoperability is
    seamless with no technology or geographic limitations. For
    those agencies whose current communications systems require
    replacement, joining a multi-agency shared network such as the
    Statewide Wireless Network is a cost effective way to achieve
    the highest level of interoperability. For those agencies that
    elect to maintain their own networks, the wireless network will
    offer them the option of linking to the statewide network. This
    will allow those agencies to communicate to other public safety
    agencies which they otherwise would not be able to do easily or
    on an expansive basis.
        An important public policy goal is fostering State and
    local partnerships. The Statewide Wireless Network encourages
    voluntary partnerships with local governments. The SWN advisory
    council and other outreach activities have been and will
    continue to be used to identify and address local government
    needs.
        The Statewide Wireless Network will replace the outdated
    standalone State agency systems and will be used for day-to-day
    operations, as well as disaster and crisis situations. The new
    radio network will make it easier for all agencies to
    communicate in both day-to-day and crisis situations and allow
    agency to agency communications where none exist today. New
    York State's Statewide Wireless Network will bring public
    safety communications in New York State into the 21st century
    by bringing as many as 65,000 Federal, State and local
    government users under one modern communications network, and
    providing links into other existing Federal and local
    government communications and data networks. SWN will
    facilitate full, seamless interoperability between the
    Statewide Wireless Network participating agencies any time, any
    place in New York State.
        New York State continues to seek use of public safety
    communication spectrum promised under the 1997 Balanced Budget
    Act in the 700 megahertz band width as part of crucial homeland
    security planning. To gain useful access to the spectrum, two
    actions must occur. First, the commercial television
    broadcasters must be compelled to vacate the spectrum no later
    than the current 2006 deadlines. Second, the FCC must
    facilitate frequency harmonization with Canada.
        To date, the FCC continues to license use of 700 megahertz
    public safety spectrum to low powered television stations in
    the New York City area, even though the wireless network is
    already licensed to operate on these same frequencies. This
    will only create additional obstacles which must be overcome as
    we build out the statewide wireless network.
        The FCC is currently negotiating with Industry Canada to
    harmonize use of 700 megahertz public safety band frequencies
    across the U.S.-Canadian border. It is critical that these
    negotiations be completed as soon as possible. At the same
    time, resolution of this issue alone will not allow New York
    State public safety agencies access to the new spectrum.
    Commercial television broadcasters must be compelled to vacate
    the spectrum again no later than the 2006 deadline.
        The Office for Technology has supported the development of
    the consensus plan and anxiously awaits the final details. The
    Statewide Wireless Network holds approximately 450 licenses
    that will be affected by the plan, and is one of the major
    public safety license holders in the country. As was
    accommodated within the FCC 700 megahertz plan, New York State
    would like the FCC to issue New York State's 800 megahertz
    frequency replacements in a block for statewide use.
        Large scale shared-use systems provide optimum efficiency
    in the use of spectrum. Trunking systems provide better
    spectrum utilization. In addition, the system can be designed
    and built for the future, which presently includes benchmarks
    for mandatory conversion to narrow band channels. By
    participating in a single large scale system, interoperability
    between the multiple agencies' systems users is inherently
    optimized.
        Interoperability systems to date have been constructed on a
    limited basis to meet minimal requirements. Systems that have
    been implemented for mobile coverage will be inadequate for
    portable coverage inside buildings. However, this limited
    deployment does not ensure that units arriving from distant
    areas will be equipped for operation on the implemented
    channels. In order to acquire the significant quantities of
    equipment necessary to build large area radio coverage on the
    FCC and NTIA designated interoperability channels, funding
    support will be required.
        That is the conclusion of my comments.
        [The prepared statement of Mr. Thomas follows:]

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        Mr. Shays. Thank you, Mr. Thomas.
        Mr. Gardner.
        Mr. Gardner. Thank you for the opportunity to submit my
    testimony and to be present at this meeting. My name is William
    Gardner, and I'm a lifelong resident of Suffolk County, New
    York. I'm the Supervisor of the Technical Services section of
    the Suffolk County Police Department, 13th largest police
    department in the country.
        When I joined the Department in 1977, we had five single
    site base stations for police communications, one shot of
    microwave radio and a handful of computers. In the year 2004,
    today, the police communications system has a 22 channel, 800
    megahertz trunk system with 8,000 users on it, 179 different
    base stations at 13 different sites, we have a mobile data
    computer system with 700 computers in sector cars.
        There is also a separate infrastructure that runs that
    mobile data computer system using 13 UHF frequencies at 13
    different sites. In addition, we have a digital microwave radio
    system with a 6,000 channel capacity at 17 different sites.
        Since 1993, Suffolk has invested more than $50 million in
    these systems. Some of that money has come from COPS MORE
    grants. We had a $15 million grant back in 1997 or 1998, but at
    that level of investment, I was picking up on what the
    gentleman from New York was saying, the State, I think we're at
    odds a little bit about building the statewide infrastructure.
    We've got $50 million invested in our system. Our neighbor,
    Nassau County, currently has an RFP out on the street. They're
    looking to spend $48 million to build out their system. I think
    this problem of communication and who's in charge here, who's
    running the show, gets to be problematic.
        As our systems expanded, so did interoperability. The trunk
    system ties together, the Suffolk County trunk system ties
    together Federal, State, county, town and village agencies. All
    23 individual police departments in our county have access to
    the trunk system. Any of the 8,000 users can talk to any other
    user on that system.
        For mass response situations, there are law enforcement
    only talk groups, for county-wide disasters, we have county-
    wide talk groups that allow all agencies access to any other
    agency. We also have the capability of direct communications to
    fire rescue dispatch. This has all been done since 1995.
        Radio communications with our neighbor, Nassau County and
    New York City still are very much lacking. I'm sorry to say
    that if a similar event to September 11 happened tomorrow, we
    would be in exactly the same communications problem that we
    were almost 3 years ago. We have no radios that are compatible
    with the system. Nassau County has only a handful of radios
    that are compatible with the system.
        Only recently, we established a radio link to Nassau Police
    headquarters. But without some intermediate intervention, such
    as that by a duty officer or watch commander, there is no
    direct radio communication between the departments. Similar
    circumstances exist for communications with NYPD.
        There are many reasons and causes for this lack of
    interoperability. Agencies build or are forced to build systems
    that they know cannot communicate with other agencies due to
    their own frequency, monetary or operational constraints. To
    improve our own interoperability in our area, the Suffolk
    police requested and were granted a Federal grant through
    Congressman Steve Israel's office, specifically to assist with
    interoperability with NYPD and Nassau County. The grant will
    allow the Suffolk police agencies to utilize the NYMAC UHF
    channels. Those channels were granted to us by the FCC.
        This grant request was a direct result of the events of
    September 11 where some 200 police from Suffolk County traveled
    to New York City, only to find a black hole of communications.
    The officers were out of range of the Suffolk system and they
    could not talk to any New York city officers, as we did not
    have any radios that were compatible with their system.
        Again, should a similar situation arise today, utilizing
    the grant radios which, if I can just backtrack a bit, it took
    2 years from grant approval to grant procurement. We only got
    the final OK from our own legislature last month in June. It
    took us 2 years from start to finish to make that grant and get
    the money. And we still don't have the equipment on the street.
        With the grant money, should a similar situation arise
    today, utilizing these grant radios, officers will now be able
    to communicate directly to any of the five city boroughs and
    directly to New York City police dispatch. The grant will also
    extend that UHF system out into Nassau and Suffolk Counties.
    This will allow NYPD officers and NYPD personnel as they come
    out onto Long Island, they will be able to utilize their own
    radios to talk on a system that we will maintain. They can
    commenced to us and we can communicate to them.
        Finally, the grant will also enhance the coverage of the
    800 megahertz national channels. We will extend the backbone of
    the national channels to three new locations, one in Nassau and
    two in Suffolk. NYPD will be provided with radio control
    stations which will tie in directly to these national channels.
        State participation, from my point of view, up to this
    point has been minimal, almost non-existent in the metropolitan
    area. Now it is pursuing a statewide wireless system intended
    to provide connectivity throughout the State for certain State
    agencies and local agencies and provide improved communication
    to other localities. Personally, I have reservations about this
    from a local perspective, but the general idea of improving
    interoperability and interconnectivity is a worthwhile pursuit.
        The FCC has been active locally through the efforts of
    Region 8 planning committee. By opening up the 800 megahertz
    spectrum, much needed new spectrum became available in the
    region. However, that available spectrum was quickly used up
    and there are no new frequencies available in the region on the
    800 megahertz spectrum.
        Fire departments in Suffolk County, for example, cannot be
    accommodated without additional frequencies. This and similar
    problems led to the opening of they 700 megahertz spectrum and
    the 4.9 gig spectrum, and Region 8 is now setting rules and
    guidelines for its use. We desperately need this new frequency
    spectrum.
        In my opinion, a major component of the FCC's future
    involvement is the adoption of the consensus plan for rebanding
    users within the 800 megahertz spectrum. Public Safety is a
    strong advocate of the consensus plan, which will separate the
    useable spectrums of commercial and public safety, greatly
    reduce interference, add more frequencies to the public safety
    pool, and make the 800 and 700 megahertz spectrums a contiguous
    spread of public safety only spectrum. I consider the consensus
    plan to be an extremely critical component of improving
    communications period, as well as having the capability of
    greatly improving future interoperability.
        I just want to take 1 second and say personally, this is,
    while it's not totally analogous, I think back to what we did
    in Y2K. I hear these stories about planning for 3 years and 5
    years and 7 years, and why we can't do this and we can't do
    that now. I know that when we worked to solve what was really a
    Y2K problem, we came together, we discussed issues at all
    levels of government. We had meetings, conferences. We brought
    together State, local and Federal Governments, commercial
    agencies, public agencies. We exchanged ideas, discussed
    issues. We identified problems and solutions and we implemented
    them.
        Much was made of the alleged scare tactics relative to Y2K
    when nothing of major proportions happened. However, I am
    firmly convinced that nothing major happened because of the
    efforts at all levels of government. We did such a great job
    that we overcame those obstacles in our path. If we can apply
    the same dedication and same level of cooperation, we can also
    overcome the obstacles of full interoperability.
        Thank you.
        [The prepared statement of Mr. Gardner follows:]

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        Mr. Shays. Thank you, Mr. Gardner.
        Mr. Corbett.
        Mr. Corbett. Chairman Shays and members of the House
    Subcommittee on National Security, Emerging Threats and
    International Relations, my name is Glenn P. Corbett. I'm the
    Assistant Professor of Fire Science at John Jay College in New
    York City. I also serve as a captain in the Waldwick, New
    Jersey fire department and as technical editor of Fire
    Engineering magazine, a 127 year old fire service trade
    journal. I want to thank you for inviting me to speak on this
    very important topic of public safety communications. I'd like
    to provide yo my observations of emergency communications in
    the New York City metropolitan area as well as provide you with
    a set of general recommendations.
        As has been noted before, effective communications are the
    life blood of all emergency responses, determining the level of
    success that is achieved. As has been well documented, gaps in
    communications had disastrous results at the World Trade Center
    on September 11. More than 100 firefighters likely never heard
    evacuation orders to leave the north tower, although police
    officers in the same structure were able to escape. Lack of
    radio interoperability and separate command structures in New
    York City's fire department and police department stood in the
    way of survival of these firefighters.
        Nearly 3 years have passed since the disaster at the World
    Trade Center, with some progress having been made in New York
    City and the metropolitan region. We still have a very long way
    to go, however. Significant monetary, technical, bureaucratic
    and political hurdles are in our path. Since September 11, the
    NYPD and FDNY have taken steps to integrate their
    communications at large scale incidents. They have for example
    ensured that NYPD helicopters will carry FDNY chiefs, who can
    then communicate to FDNY units on the ground. They've also
    provided radio equipment to senior level FDNY and NYPD officers
    who can communicate with each other.
        The FDNY itself has instituted the use of a post-radio
    system, a portable signal amplifier that allows for better
    communications in high rise structures. The unit is, however,
    currently limited to command officer to command officer radio
    transmissions and must be physically taken up in the building
    to a floor near the fire floor or floor where the incident is
    taking place.
        Utilization of this equipment replaces an extra middle man
    in the communications chain. For example, orders to evacuate a
    building from the lobby command post must first go through the
    chief officer on the fire floor and then be re-communicated to
    the firefighters themselves. Many consider this to be, this
    post radio to be a temporary fix with a long term permanent
    solution still years away.
        These improvements still leave significant problems to
    overcome. The FDNY still cannot communicate effectively in
    subway locales, although plans are apparently underway to
    improve the situation. This is the case despite the fact that
    the metropolitan transit authority has had subway communication
    system radio capabilities for some time. It must be pointed out
    that poor communications are not just a radio problem, but an
    issue involving radios, antennas, signal amplifiers, repeaters
    and the like. For example, achieving proper communications in a
    tall high rise building may necessitate the use of powerful
    radios in conjunction with a repeater installed inside the
    building.
        Who pays for this equipment is also at issue. While the
    radio is typically a city purchase, the repeater may need to be
    purchased and installed by the building owner.
        Perhaps even more problematic is the issue of
    interoperability in the context of New York City's new city-
    wide incident command system, or CIMS. This new response
    protocol in my opinion greatly complicates response to
    chemical, biological and radiological terrorist attacks and
    what would be considered to be normal hazardous materials
    releases. It places the NYPD in charge of assessment, while
    placing FDNY in charge of life safety of such incidents. The
    net result is that both the FDNY and NYPD have personnel
    operating in dangerous hot zones of the incident, both under
    separate tactical level commanders and operating with different
    communications equipment.
        Communications problems are woven throughout this New York
    City battle of the badges, most recently surfacing during a
    mock drill involving a subway attack. A firefighter was thrown
    to the ground when he attempted to pass a police officer who
    was securing an area due to the presence of a suspected
    secondary explosive device. It's very possible that firefighter
    never understood that because it wasn't communicated to him.
        Communication challenges remain outside New York City as
    well. Bergen County, where I serve as a fire captain, has 69
    fire departments and over 100 police and emergency medical
    service agencies. This multiplicity of emergency response
    organizations obviously complicates communications. While nine
    mutual aid organizations have existed for decades to coordinate
    the 69 fire departments within Bergen County, radio frequency
    and channel standardization has been difficult at best.
    Although Bergen County has established a common frequency for
    all fire apparatus, this single one frequency would be quickly
    overloaded in any major disaster.
        Only recently have portable radios been issued to
    coordinators of these nine mutual aid groups to organize large
    scale responses. These radios, however, only allow for
    communication between the mutual aid coordinators and Bergen
    County's Office of Emergency Management. Interoperability
    between the multitude of agencies within Bergen County at a
    large scale incident, especially at the tactical level, remains
    an elusive need.
        Considering that another major terrorist attack on the
    order of September 11 in the New York City area would
    necessitate a region wide response involving multiple counties
    and possibly States, the problems grow exponentially. Although
    some progress in terms of integrating a multi-jurisdictional
    response has been made at the State level in both New Jersey
    and New York, I do not believe that the tangled communications
    snake pit has been straightened out.
        While New York City and its metropolitan regions are unique
    in many respects, many of the public safety communications
    issues that I have identified are applicable across the
    country. I have prepared the following recommendations to
    address these concerns.
        The first one is that the Department of Homeland Security
    Office of Interoperability and Compatibility must take a
    proactive role in equipment purchases at the State and local
    levels. Secretary Ridge recently announced the creation of this
    office within DHS. There is a critical need for this entity to
    take a close look at how Federal funds are being disbursed for
    acquisition of communications equipment at the State and local
    levels, specifically how these purchases fit into the region
    wide big picture in each State.
        This review could take place as part of DHS' role in the
    review of local emergency operations plans through the
    enactment of the National Incident Management System protocol.
    DHS also must play a more forceful role in encouraging
    interstate communication agreements where appropriate.
        The second idea is that States should be more forceful in
    assuring proper communications planning at the county and local
    levels. The States play a crucial role in overcoming turf
    battles within the borders. Too often, inter-jurisdictional
    jealousies lead to improper response protocols with a
    corresponding communications gap.
        A third idea would be that we need to ensure
    interoperability at the responder tactical level. This is
    something I didn't really hear a lot about today. This is the
    issue where basically, we have a concern that although one
    jurisdiction can talk to another, we don't have the
    interoperability between jurisdictions at the lower levels, the
    firefighters and police officers.
        Not that police officers and firefighters have to talk
    together, but if I would find myself, for example, in Stanford,
    Connecticut responding from Bergen County for whatever reason,
    I have no idea what channels or radios or equipment would even
    be utilized there. So we've got to make sure that this is not
    just a senior level State or county-wide situation, that this
    is in fact something that goes all the way down to the actual
    people where the rubber meets the road, basically.
        And the fourth suggestion I would have is that SAFECOM
    should increase their efforts to ensure the equipment is
    interchangeable. Proprietary technology creates immense
    barriers to purchases by State and local governments.
    Jurisdictions should not find themselves locked into a
    particular vendor and equipment purchases should not be an
    impediment to interoperable communications.
        That's something also I didn't hear a lot about today but I
    would encourage it. That's a very important thing, that
    whatever equipment is purchased needs to be interchangeable,
    that we can't have operating platforms, radio platforms that
    don't match across jurisdictions.
        Thank you very much for the opportunity to testify. I
    welcome any questions that you might have.
        [The prepared statement of Mr. Corbett follows:]

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        Mr. Shays. Thank you. Professor Corbett, because of your
    honesty, I'd like to ask unanimous consent to bestow on
    Professor Glenn Corbett an honorary doctorate in national
    security communication. Your degree will be your name plate
    that says Dr. Corbett.
        Mr. Corbett. Thank you.
        Mr. Shays. Without objection, so ordered.
        Mr. Corbett. Thank you.
        Mr. Shays. It's great to have this power. [Laughter.]
        I want to ask you, Mr. Gardner, the communications that you
    have with Nassau, should I in a sense visualize it like a red
    phone that you pick up and the only way you can communicate
    with Nassau is through that red phone? Or do you have the
    capability just integrated into your existing system and can
    Nassau communicate with any of your players or just the one
    holding the phone?
        Mr. Gardner. Two parts. It starts out as a hot phone,
    basically. It's from duty officer to duty officer. It cannot be
    activated by anybody out in the field, it has to be requested
    of somebody at the duty officer's position, for instance, in
    Suffolk County they can get on a talk group which is a radio
    channel dedicated specifically to talk only to Nassau County
    duty officer. On the Nassau County end, the Nassau County PD
    can then take one of their frequency bands, highway band,
    precinct band, whatever they want, patch it onto that talk
    group, patch it onto our system through the patch that the duty
    officers just made, and they can talk to any player in Suffolk
    County.
        Mr. Shays. So if the two gatekeepers choose to, almost
    anyone in Suffolk can talk to anyone in Nassau?
        Mr. Gardner. Correct. But it must have that third party
    intervention. It must be activated on both ends. But those are
    both, those are 7 day, 24 hours a day positions. There is
    always someone there at both of those positions. And basically
    it's not a phone, it's actually getting on a radio.
        Mr. Shays. I understand.
        Mr. Gardner. It's just basically me talking to you, when
    you hear that radio, you know it's me talking to you, pick it
    up, activate a patch on your end, and I do it on mine and we're
    in business.
        Mr. Shays. OK. Would both of you comment about the SWN
    system, what New York is doing? What are its positives, what
    are its negatives?
        Mr. Gardner. The hangups that I see is, and again, this is
    only my personal opinion, and I'm not nearly as smart as I'd
    like to be, we have invested locally, and I'm going to say
    Nassau and Suffolk County, over $100 million if you include
    Nassau's bid that just hit the street last week. We have an
    extremely robust infrastructure that talks for the length and
    breadth of Suffolk County. We have Federal, State and local
    agencies on it. There are 8,000 radios already utilizing it.
        I can't see a statewide system coming in and replacing that
    and doing anything better than we do. I don't know the full
    extent of what they're going to do within Suffolk County,
    whether they just want to talk or latch onto our system. But
    then if that's the case, then from a personal and taxpayer
    perspective, the amount of money that it's going to cost to
    build this system statewide does not benefit me to the amount
    of investment that I'm going to be getting from Nassau, Suffolk
    and New York City to put into this project.
        Mr. Shays. Professor Corbett.
        Mr. Corbett. I'm not knowledgeable enough, I think, to
    speak on that issue as far as statewide communications within
    New York State goes.
        Mr. Shays. In New York City itself, can someone speak to
    this issue, have they resolved how you communicate around
    buildings and the obstructions that occur? Is that a solvable
    problem without a lot of expense?
        Mr. Gardner. If I may, I'm a member of NYMAC, New York
    Metropolitan Area Advisory Committee for the FCC. We work
    fairly well together with the city. The city doesn't
    necessarily have coverage problems as much as they have the
    interoperability problems. Their coverage problems are not
    nearly as bad as they used to be. Their system has gotten more
    robust, and robust to the point where they can almost fully
    operate on portable radios throughout the city. That's always
    been their intention. And that is not nearly as much a problem
    as the interoperability questions.
        But we've even approached them, the FCC almost
    serendipitously, the day before September 11, those licenses,
    they're called the INTEROP channels in New York City, they
    operate in the UHF range, because those are radios that New
    York City already had. It was a question of the tail shaking
    the dog here.
        We have an 800 megahertz system that they can't talk to. We
    can't talk to their UHF system. Nassau couldn't talk to us. But
    you had this big 8,000 pound gorilla in New York City with
    almost 30,000 radios. You weren't going to ask them to change
    and go to the national system.
        So what we did is through the efforts of the NYMAC
    committee and the FCC, we got 6 INTEROP channels specifically
    for interoperability with and within New York City. Those
    channels are dedicated to interoperability and are manned 24
    hours a day by the city.
        Going back to one of the problems that was mentioned
    earlier, these timeframes that it takes to get this things
    going, those frequencies had only been established for probably
    7 or 8 days as being legally usable within the city by the FCC.
    If they had been done 6 months prior, maybe other radios could
    have been programmed in time to utilize them while we went into
    the city. Maybe other city agencies could have used them. Maybe
    the fire department could have used them.
        We worked at that problem for almost 7 years to get it
    resolved. It did ultimately get resolved, but it just takes so
    long to get these things done.
        Mr. Shays. Professor Corbett.
        Mr. Corbett. I would actually disagree with Mr. Gardner as
    far as the city goes. The fire department, I don't believe, is
    anywhere near where they need to be as far as communications
    within the subways.
        Mr. Gardner. I don't want to argue, but we were talking
    police. I didn't mention fire.
        Mr. Shays. OK. I know, you were talking police. So let me
    just say, so the police we think are OK but the fire we think
    we've got a challenge?
        Mr. Corbett. Yes. And I think that was, the police have a
    much more robust system within New York City. The fire
    department doesn't have near as much ability to communicate
    throughout the city. That's one of the major challenges that
    they have before them. And again, this post radio was an
    attempt, I guess a temporary fix to try to address that issue,
    at least in high rises. But they have significant gaps.
        To tell you the truth, I mean, I haven't seen evidence that
    they've actually identified where all these areas are within
    New York City. I mean, the logical places, but I don't know
    that they've done a comprehensive effort to try and identify
    every square inch of New York and where those problems are.
        Mr. Shays. Mr. Gardner, is there within Suffolk County the
    capability for fire and police and everyone to communicate with
    each other?
        Mr. Gardner. Yes, we can. Not on an individual radio to
    radio basis, but we can talk to fire dispatch and fire dispatch
    can communicate on all the police precinct channels and all the
    police county-wide channels.
        Mr. Shays. Is that same gatekeeper model where----
        Mr. Gardner. No, sir. Those are established talk groups on
    the radio system. They are usable without any level of
    intermediate action. They are in the radios and ready to go.
        Mr. Shays. So the $50 million you're talking about is just
    basically within the police department in Suffolk?
        Mr. Gardner. Not necessarily, sir. I am a member of the
    police department, but we also manage, because of the money
    invested in it, our system, as I said earlier. It takes in
    Federal agencies, State agencies, county agencies, town and
    village agencies.
        Mr. Shays. But it doesn't include fire?
        Mr. Gardner. It doesn't include any of the local fire
    departments, no. When the system originally was designed and
    requested, there were not frequencies available to accommodate
    that extra loading that the fire departments would have had on
    the system. And in addition, because it had big brother and
    cultural issues that were mentioned, they didn't want to be
    part of it as a whole. They actually opted out of it when we
    designed it.
        Mr. Shays. Interesting. They opted out.
        Mr. Gardner. Yes.
        Mr. Shays. How long ago did they opt out? When was this
    decided?
        Mr. Gardner. Our system went on line in 1993.
        Mr. Shays. So pre-September 11th?
        Mr. Gardner. Yes, sir.
        Mr. Shays. Thank you. Mr. Thomas.
        Mr. Thomas. The Statewide Wireless Network was never
    conceived as a, or scaled to replace all the radio systems in
    the State of New York, one, just due to cost. It's also in
    recognition of the fact that a lot of municipalities, a lot of
    counties, public safety and emergency first responders,
    agencies within that sphere have very good communications
    systems. They have, like Suffolk County, a modern digital 800
    megahertz radio system.
        The purpose of the Statewide Wireless Network as it was
    initiated was to replace the State's aging infrastructure for
    its public safety and emergency first responder agencies, New
    York State Police, Department of Transportation, DAX, ENCON and
    several other agencies.
        Decisions were made at the front end that once this network
    was put out, or as it was put out to cover the State agency
    needs, and to upgrade our systems, that because it had a
    statewide footprint with statewide coverage, it would also
    serve to enhance interoperability between agencies on a
    statewide basis, either through gateways with existing modern
    systems or for those agencies in other parts of the State which
    unfortunately aren't as sophisticated as Suffolk County's, and
    where there is not enough funding to adequately upgrade those
    systems that we would offer them the opportunity on a voluntary
    basis to partner with us in the wireless network and come onto
    the network and have us be their radio system. But again, on a
    voluntary basis.
        Having this statewide footprint out there creates a radio
    umbrella for us on a statewide basis where we can, using a
    digital trunked radio system, set up talk groups, set up
    interoperability with any locality that needs it. It also
    provides us the opportunity to foster those partners and
    produce efficiencies such as the ability to coordinate upstate
    resources as we move them or downstate resources as we move
    State resources around the State, whether we're involved in a
    problem in the western part of the State in the Niagara
    Frontier, the Adirondacks or the greater metropolitan New York
    area.
        We've also got several other things going currently with
    respect to the city of New York. We have a partnering
    arrangement we're working on now with the MTA in New York City.
    I spoke earlier about the use of the 700 megahertz frequencies
    that we've been allocated, and the need to have the DTB
    transition completed so that we get better access to those
    frequencies. For the purposes of the MTA, those are available
    right now, and we are working with the MTA to assist with their
    radio system in the tunnels within New York City, where we can
    in fact use those frequencies right now.
        Mr. Shays. Professor Corbett, you don't have any horse in
    this race. How do you react to what Mr. Thomas said?
        Mr. Corbett. Well, I think he pointed out, made a very
    important point that this seems to be a system where they're
    trying to get coverage across the State as far as point to
    point goes. But again, I go back to the issue of when it comes
    down to moving groups of people, firefighters, police officers,
    what have you, I think that's where it drops off the map here.
    Because we're still lacking, again, at those lower levels, that
    interoperability to talk to each other.
        This is a system where, and there are other systems out
    there, I know for example in New Jersey they've connected all
    the hospitals together. But that doesn't necessarily mean that
    they can go hospital to hospital, it doesn't mean that we can
    take a group of people in one area and talk to another. I think
    that's my observation, I think that's where we still lack a lot
    of capability basically.
        Mr. Thomas. This is not a point to point radio system. This
    will support any level of interoperability right down to
    individual and users. It will support 65,000 users at any given
    time on a statewide basis. It will support a quarter of a
    million pieces of equipment or unique addresses. It is
    specifically designed to provide that level of
    interoperability.
        Mr. Shays. We're not having a debate, so what's interesting
    is what you hear him say then he can clarify, then I'd love you
    to just react to that. Does that make it a more valuable
    effort?
        Mr. Corbett. Yes, I mean, that certainly explains it a
    little better. I think I understand it a little better now. But
    again, this, and correct me if I'm wrong, but I think the issue
    is not that the platform perhaps is there to communicate, but
    we actually don't have that communications capability. I mean,
    radio to radio, if one particular jurisdiction said, I want to
    be able to communicate from one group of firefighters to
    another, is that possible. I think the system exists, but I----
        Mr. Thomas. For one, the system doesn't exist. But
    ultimately yes, it will do what you're talking about.
        Mr. Corbett. Right.
        Mr. Shays. So before we close, give me an assessment of
    what I should learn from this panel. Hearing what we learned
    from the first panel, I'm kind of thinking that there may be
    some valuable pieces of information that I may not be picking
    up. What do you think this panel is sharing with the committee?
    In general, we have a statewide system--I'll tell you what I'm
    hearing. I'm hearing that we have a statewide system that will
    allow communities to communicate, that you can provide specific
    communication between community A and community T, I'm making
    an assumption that could mean fire or police communicating from
    place to place.
        I'm hearing Mr. Gardner tell us that they've got a pretty
    robust system in Suffolk, particularly as it relates to police,
    that it is totally modernized, digital and so within the
    county, they've got a pretty good communication, and now they
    have an agreement with Nassau to basically be able to tap in
    and vice versa. They can tap into your good system and you can
    tap into their good system and basically accomplish the same
    thing county by county. That's what I'm hearing.
        What is the negative I'm hearing and what's the positive?
    All three of you jump in. Mr. Thomas, what isn't happening that
    should happen? And let me put it this way, all of you think
    about it. Given what you heard in the first panel, where are
    we? Should I say, this is pretty good, we've got a good
    statewide system in New York, an important State, we've got an
    important county that's got a good system, we're on our way?
    What should I be hearing?
        Mr. Thomas. Well, I would think, I would be encouraged at
    the fact, the work that Suffolk County has already done. One
    thing that needs to be said with respect to the wireless
    network, we have had an advisory council for a very long time
    with different people involved. In fact, we've had Suffolk
    County serving on the advisory council, as we've produced the
    specifications for this system. A procurement of this size and
    magnitude, it's actually unprecedented.
        Mr. Shays. On a statewide basis?
        Mr. Thomas. On a statewide basis.
        Mr. Shays. What are we talking about in terms of dollars?
        Mr. Thomas. Estimates for the project run well over $1
    billion.
        Mr. Shays. Wow!
        Mr. Thomas. Now, having said that, I can't give you any
    more detail, because we're currently in contract negotiations.
    What I'd like to point out to public safety community here and
    in New York State, is we have, because of the procurement, and
    the way procurements are structured, had a need to not discuss
    the technology solutions that we are working on here that have
    been proposed by the vendors and so on. Those will be available
    as we conclude our negotiations and get this contract signed in
    the next few months.
        It is our intent and I think it will serve a lot of
    people's purposes once we can get out there, tell them exactly
    what the technology is, and they can avail themselves of this
    network to the extent that it serves their best interests, or
    they don't have to use it at all.
        Mr. Shays. If you haven't designed it well, or it will be
    outdated shortly, that will be one heck of a billion dollar
    expenditure.
        Mr. Thomas. This has been a very long procurement, and it
    has been very long because we've put an extensive amount of
    effort into correcting every problem we've seen develop in
    other States to ensure that we have a system that is current,
    it is sophisticated with respect to the technology, is
    spectrally efficient, but also that will be refreshed over the
    term of this contract, so that we're never again in the
    position of having 20 year old technology and having to do this
    type of upgrade again.
        Mr. Shays. When we've tried to upgrade our computer, IT
    systems in the Federal Government, it is a continual process of
    taking so long by the time we get it, it is an outdated system.
    It really is kind of pathetic.
        Any other reaction?
        Mr. Gardner. I would echo what we heard earlier from the
    earlier panel, too. The crying need is for frequencies. We have
    the need for frequency and frequency spectrums. And to make
    those spectrums able to talk to each other.
        The 700 megahertz, for instance, right now, there is no
    equipment made that will operate in those frequency ranges. So
    we can talk all we want about them and where they're going to
    be and who's going to use them. But there is no equipment you
    can buy today that will operate on those frequencies. We need
    to do things today and we also know what we can do 2 or 3 or 4
    years from now.
        We need the FCC, if at all possible, to speed up their
    decisions, speed up their regulatory process. We can't be
    waiting 3, 4, 5, 10 years, even when they make guidelines you'd
    like to be able to budget out what can I do 3 years from now,
    what I can do 5 years from now. If I don't know that they're
    going to make a decision, for instance, at all, new radios must
    be digital by year whatever, I can't plan now to upgrade my
    system, to begin changing out my system, to begin buying
    radios.
        If I had to go home today and buy radios, I couldn't
    because it would be a capital project, I'd have to put it in
    next year, and the earliest I would see the money would be
    2006. So these processes need to work hand in hand, and we need
    to get things in place as quickly as we can as far as planning
    goes and implement those plans.
        I also agree with what the panel I think earlier came up
    with about there needs to be some leadership, either at a
    Federal level or within the State. We have systems that can
    talk to each other that don't because they chose not to. We
    have systems that could have talked to each other but
    frequencies weren't available for them to buy or purchase or
    use, whether it's a commercial system or another town or a
    local government.
        Nassau County, again, our neighbor to our west, they're
    putting almost $40 million into a UHF system. We are a trunked
    system. They're going to be trunked with UHF, we're going to be
    trunked 800.
        In a perfect world, every one of those radios should be
    able to talk together with just a flick of a switch or a
    changing of the channel on a radio. Right now it's not going to
    be able to be done.
        I have another town to the east of us that built an 800
    system but chose not to build it onto ours. And I mean ours by
    Suffolk County. God bless them, they can make their own
    decisions and do whatever they want. But they made the
    deliberate decisions not to be part of a bigger county-wide
    system and enjoy the benefits of that. That would have allowed
    them access to the 8,000 radios on our system. They can't do
    that now, because they chose to build a standalone system.
        Same county, different towns, same State. There needs to be
    somebody who can sit and say, you will do this, you should do
    this, be sure to look at these options, have you looked at
    this, have you thought of this. Too much money is being spent,
    too much money in my opinion is being wasted.
        Mr. Shays. Anybody else want to make comments before we
    adjourn?
        Mr. Corbett. Yes. I would just echo what Mr. Gardner just
    said, but I would mention that DHS has to take that active
    role, as you mentioned earlier. That's the critical point.
        But it's got to get all the way down to the local level. It
    can't just be the States. Because I don't think the States have
    stepped up to the plate, at least in New Jersey, I don't
    believe we have, to address these issues. It's got to get all
    the way down, and I think there's mechanisms that do that, as I
    mentioned earlier through the NIMS enactment as well as through
    the funding that they provide. There's a mechanism to ensure
    that this is taken care of.
        Mr. Shays. Thank you all very much. You've been a wonderful
    panel and been very helpful. I appreciate it. Thank you.
        With that, this hearing is adjourned.
        [Whereupon, at 1 p.m., the subcommittee was adjourned, to
    reconvene at the call of the Chair.]
        [The prepared statement of Hon. Dennis J. Kucinich and
    additional information submitted for the hearing record
    follow:]

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