[House Hearing, 108 Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
CHILD PRODUCT SAFETY: DO CURRENT STANDARDS PROVIDE ENOUGH PROTECTION?
=======================================================================
HEARING
before the
SUBCOMMITTEE ON
COMMERCE, TRADE, AND CONSUMER PROTECTION
of the
COMMITTEE ON ENERGY AND COMMERCE
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
ONE HUNDRED EIGHTH CONGRESS
SECOND SESSION
__________
OCTOBER 6, 2004
__________
Serial No. 108-129
__________
Printed for the use of the Committee on Energy and Commerce
Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.access.gpo.gov/congress/
house
__________
U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE
97-273PDF WASHINGTON : 2004
____________________________________________________________________________
For Sale by the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office
Internet: bookstore.gpo.gov Phone: toll free (866) 512-1800; (202) 512-1800
Fax: (202) 512-2250 Mail: Stop SSOP, Washington, DC 20402-0001
COMMITTEE ON ENERGY AND COMMERCE
JOE BARTON, Texas, Chairman
W.J. ``BILLY'' TAUZIN, Louisiana JOHN D. DINGELL, Michigan
RALPH M. HALL, Texas Ranking Member
MICHAEL BILIRAKIS, Florida HENRY A. WAXMAN, California
FRED UPTON, Michigan EDWARD J. MARKEY, Massachusetts
CLIFF STEARNS, Florida RICK BOUCHER, Virginia
PAUL E. GILLMOR, Ohio EDOLPHUS TOWNS, New York
JAMES C. GREENWOOD, Pennsylvania FRANK PALLONE, Jr., New Jersey
CHRISTOPHER COX, California SHERROD BROWN, Ohio
NATHAN DEAL, Georgia BART GORDON, Tennessee
RICHARD BURR, North Carolina PETER DEUTSCH, Florida
ED WHITFIELD, Kentucky BOBBY L. RUSH, Illinois
CHARLIE NORWOOD, Georgia ANNA G. ESHOO, California
BARBARA CUBIN, Wyoming BART STUPAK, Michigan
JOHN SHIMKUS, Illinois ELIOT L. ENGEL, New York
HEATHER WILSON, New Mexico ALBERT R. WYNN, Maryland
JOHN B. SHADEGG, Arizona GENE GREEN, Texas
CHARLES W. ``CHIP'' PICKERING, KAREN McCARTHY, Missouri
Mississippi, Vice Chairman TED STRICKLAND, Ohio
VITO FOSSELLA, New York DIANA DeGETTE, Colorado
STEVE BUYER, Indiana LOIS CAPPS, California
GEORGE RADANOVICH, California MICHAEL F. DOYLE, Pennsylvania
CHARLES F. BASS, New Hampshire CHRISTOPHER JOHN, Louisiana
JOSEPH R. PITTS, Pennsylvania TOM ALLEN, Maine
MARY BONO, California JIM DAVIS, Florida
GREG WALDEN, Oregon JANICE D. SCHAKOWSKY, Illinois
LEE TERRY, Nebraska HILDA L. SOLIS, California
MIKE FERGUSON, New Jersey CHARLES A. GONZALEZ, Texas
MIKE ROGERS, Michigan
DARRELL E. ISSA, California
C.L. ``BUTCH'' OTTER, Idaho
JOHN SULLIVAN, Oklahoma
Bud Albright, Staff Director
James D. Barnette, General Counsel
Reid P.F. Stuntz, Minority Staff Director and Chief Counsel
______
Subcommittee on Commerce, Trade, and Consumer Protection
CLIFF STEARNS, Florida, Chairman
FRED UPTON, Michigan JANICE D. SCHAKOWSKY, Illinois
ED WHITFIELD, Kentucky Ranking Member
BARBARA CUBIN, Wyoming CHARLES A. GONZALEZ, Texas
JOHN SHIMKUS, Illinois EDOLPHUS TOWNS, New York
JOHN B. SHADEGG, Arizona SHERROD BROWN, Ohio
Vice Chairman PETER DEUTSCH, Florida
GEORGE RADANOVICH, California BOBBY L. RUSH, Illinois
CHARLES F. BASS, New Hampshire BART STUPAK, Michigan
JOSEPH R. PITTS, Pennsylvania GENE GREEN, Texas
MARY BONO, California KAREN McCARTHY, Missouri
LEE TERRY, Nebraska TED STRICKLAND, Ohio
MIKE FERGUSON, New Jersey DIANA DeGETTE, Colorado
DARRELL E. ISSA, California JIM DAVIS, Florida
C.L. ``BUTCH'' OTTER, Idaho JOHN D. DINGELL, Michigan,
JOHN SULLIVAN, Oklahoma (Ex Officio)
JOE BARTON, Texas,
(Ex Officio)
(ii)
C O N T E N T S
__________
Page
Testimony of:
Cowles, Nancy A., Executive Director, Kids in Danger......... 37
Felcher, E. Marla............................................ 34
Ginzel, Linda................................................ 26
Klein, Gary S., Senior Vice President Government, Legal and
Regulatory Affairs, Toy Industry Association............... 40
Lipin, Lisa A................................................ 29
Stratton, Hon. Hal, Chairman, U.S. Consumer Product Safety
Commission................................................. 6
Weintraub, Rachel, Assistant General Counsel, Consumer
Federation of America...................................... 45
Additional material submitted for the record:
Stratton, Hon. Hal, Chairman, U.S. Consumer Product Safety
Commission:
Response for the record.................................. 64
Letter dated November 4, 2004 enclosing additional
material for the record................................ 65
Weintraub, Rachel, Assistant General Counsel, Consumer
Federation of America, response for the record............. 61
(iii)
CHILD PRODUCT SAFETY: DO CURRENT STANDARDS PROVIDE ENOUGH PROTECTION?
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WEDNESDAY, OCTOBER 6, 2004
House of Representatives,
Committee on Energy and Commerce,
Subcommittee on Commerce, Trade,
and Consumer Protection,
Washington, DC.
The subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 10 a.m., in
room 2123, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Cliff Stearns
(chairman) presiding.
Members present: Representatives Stearns, Shimkus, Terry,
Issa, Schakowsky, and Green.
Staff present: David Cavicke, majority counsel; Chris
Leahy, policy coordinator; Shannon Jacquot, majority counsel;
Billy Harvard, legislative clerk; Jonathan Cordone, minority
counsel; Turney Hall, staff assistant; and Ashley Groesbeck,
minority research assistant.
Mr. Stearns. Good morning. The subcommittee will come to
order.
The business of commerce is always a serious matter, and
when the business involves protection of our most valuable
citizens, our children, there is indeed added significance.
Children are a treasure for all of us, obviously, and when they
are harmed accidentally we are all emotionally affected.
Especially when these accidents occur involving products
provided obviously with the best intentions, the parents, the
families, and the caregivers all give great concern.
I would like to commend my colleague, the ranking member of
the subcommittee, Ms. Schakowsky, for focusing us today on
child product safety issues and the effectiveness of this
current regulation that we have. These issues are extremely
important to all of us as lawmakers, caregivers, parents, and,
for some who shall remain anonymous, as grandparents.
Again, I would like to commend the ranking member and her
staff for their work on this important area, and I am
interested to hear from the diverse panel of witnesses today
what is working and obviously what is not working.
The jurisdiction over child product safety rests with the
Consumer Product Safety Commission, or the CPSC as we use the
term. They enforce specific child product safety regulations,
including regulations related to paint and coating materials,
pacifiers, rattlers, sharp edges and points, and small parts
that could be swallowed or inhaled. The CPSC can initiate
investigations that ultimately lead to recalls for items that
present a substantial risk of injury to the public or if they
violate specific safety standards issued by this Commission.
Regardless of the regulatory mechanism, we hear buzz words
like sharp and small objects. They can create immediate anxiety
for any parent or caregiver, because children always seem to
find trouble very quickly when a parent or caregiver's watchful
eyes are distracted or unable to supervise.
In terms of statistics, the U.S. toy industry is a very
large business. The industry had sales of $20.7 billion in
2003, and during that same year the CPSC recalled 96 toys and
children's products involving almost 14 million separate
products. Sadly, there were 11 toys related to deaths in 2003
and approximately 206,500 injuries.
I would note that the toy sales figures do not include
other children's products or consumer products affecting
children.
The protection of our children and child product safety is
as important as any issue this subcommittee will ever consider,
and I intend to give these issues a thorough hearing today.
First, I would like to understand in statistical terms how
the CPSC is doing--what it is doing to address unsafe
children's products that are already on the market and on the
secondary used market.
Second, I would like to examine how we can improve these
numbers, including getting a better idea of where and how money
is deployed at the CPSC as well as how industry is working with
the regulators to improve child product safety.
And last, my colleagues, providing parents and caregivers
with the proper information to protect their children from
unnecessary risk is also an important element of safety. I
would like to learn more about what the CPSC provides publicly
and what the toy manufacturers are offering to consumers
regarding child product safety. As we all know, generous
consumer information that leads to well-informed consumers can
go a long way, a long way in helping to prevent needless
accidents.
Some of the most important questions this subcommittee is
interested in are as follows: Are current standards providing
enough protection for children? What are the most significant
product safety risks today for children? What does the data
show regarding how effective recalls are in removing unsafe
children products from the market, including these used items?
What is the industry doing to improve the safety of children's
products? And what is the actual data, including recalls and
accidents, for the last 5 or 10 years? You know, in general,
are things improving?
I commend those who are working so hard to improve child
product safety in the public and private sectors, including
efforts to make children's products safer and better so that
potential problems can be identified before they become much
worse. The regulatory system likewise can be improved and made
better to ensure even safer children's products today, products
that provide so much fun and enjoyment for our children.
I would like to thank Chairman Stratton in particular for
being here today. He was scheduled to be in Los Angeles to
inspect the port and rearranged that visit to testify on our
committee this morning, and I appreciate his taking that time
to do so. So he will be leaving directly from this hearing, so
I wish him the best on that trip and I encourage him to
continue his good work on the Commission.
With that, I will yield to the ranking member, Ms.
Schakowsky.
Ms. Schakowsky. I sincerely thank you, Chairman Stearns,
for holding this hearing today on what I consider to be one of
the most important issues under our subcommittee's
jurisdiction, child product safety standards and whether they
provide enough protections for our most vulnerable consumers.
I am also pleased to welcome the witnesses, including
Consumer Product Safety Commission Chairman Stratton, whose
Commission, in my view, is grossly underfunded and
understaffed, and the three tireless child product safety
advocates that are here from Chicago as well as the other
witnesses.
I would like to welcome Lisa Lipin, a constituent from my
district, whose son was nearly strangled by a seemingly
harmless toy, a yo-yo ball. And I would also like to thank
Linda Ginzel for joining us today. Linda lost her son Danny
when a portable crib collapsed around his neck. These women are
here today as examples of how people can turn tragedies or near
tragedies into action. Ms. Ginzel and her husband Boris Keysar
co-founded an advocacy group, Kids in Danger, to educate about
and advocate for safer products.
Ms. Lipin has single handedly brought the yo-yo ball danger
to the attention of parents, reporters, and elected and
appointed government officials; and because of her efforts six
major chain stores have agreed to pull the yo-yo balls off
their shelves.
Unfortunately, the experiences which prompted their
advocacy are not unique. Parents across the country buy toys
and other products for their children assuming, because they
are on the shelves, they are safe. A 1999 Coalition For
Consumer Rights survey in Illinois found that 75 percent of
adults believe that the government oversees premarket testing
for children's products; 79 percent believe that manufacturers
are required to test the safety of those products before they
are sold. For most products, neither is true. In fact, there
are no mandatory safety standards for the majority of the
children's products being sold today.
Congress passed legislation in 1981 that prohibits the
Consumer Product Safety Commission, the agency that oversees
product safety, from establishing mandatory standards in most
cases. The few standards that are in place are set by the very
industries looking to make profits, and they are also expected
to police themselves.
Let me stress what that means. Although there may be
voluntary standards in place, there are no requirements that
all potential hazards are addressed in those standards, no
requirement that products be tested in the field, no
consequences for the manufacturer if the standards are not met,
and no requirement for products to be tested to see if the
standards are met.
This is true even for baby carriers, cradles, play pens,
high chairs, and other items bought specifically for use by
infants and children.
Although the CPSC requires no testing and manufacturers may
or may not perform their own tests, do not be mistaken.
Children's products are tested. They are tested in our own
homes with our own children and grandchildren as test dummies.
The costs of those tests can be a panicked child, bruised
fingers, fractured skulls, or a dead child.
In 2001, an estimated 69,500 children under the age of 5
were treated in U.S. Hospital rooms for injuries associated
with nursery products. According to the CPSC, an average of 65
children under the age of 5 die each year in incidents
associated with nursery products. Unintended injuries are the
leading cause of death for children under the age of 4. But as
Marla Felcher's book reveals, many of these deaths are because
of unsafe products. And, as the title of her book says, it is
no accident. Too many unsafe children's products are on the
shelves in homes and in day care centers.
CPSC's primary means for responding to a dangerous product
is to issue a recall. However, as Ms. Lipin's story will tell
you, the Commission is hesitant to issue recalls or even to
recommend that stores voluntarily take dangerous products off
their shelves. In the case of yo-yo balls, although the CPSC
has received at least 392 incident reports of strangulation,
eye injuries, and skin irritations due to yo-yo balls, the toys
are still on the store shelves.
Instead of a culture of consumer production, it seems there
is a culture of caution and delay. Is the CPSC waiting for a
child to die? Even when a product is recalled, it remains a
danger to too many children for too many years.
A recent report by Kids in Danger shows that in 2002, yet
another child was killed by a crib that had been recalled in
1997. Unfortunately, once a recall is issued, only 10 to 30
percent of consumers respond to it because of inadequate
notification, inadequate notification, inspection, and
enforcement activities. The crib that killed Danny had been
recalled in the day care center that was inspected 8 days
earlier.
I believe that we must work to keep dangerous products from
ever making it onto store shelves or into nurseries, child care
centers, or homes. That is why I introduced legislation, The
Infant and Toddler Durable Product Safety Act, H.R. 2911, that
would require infant and toddler products to receive a Federal
seal of approval before they are sold. This seal would
demonstrate that those products have been independently tested
and have met required national safety standards.
I hope that when we return next year that we will be able
to consider my bill and other potential solutions to the
problems we will hear about today.
Additionally, I believe we need to look for better ways to
inform the public about dangerous products already on the
market to make sure that not one more child or family has to
experience a preventable tragedy.
For those reasons, I truly appreciate today's hearing. I
look forward to hearing from our witnesses and about their
ideas on how to prevent what we know are no accidents.
Mr. Stearns. I thank the gentlelady.
Mr. Shimkus.
Mr. Shimkus. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and I want to thank
you for the hearing, and I want to recognize my colleague from
Illinois. She has really been on this issue long before she
even came to Congress, I know she did in the general assembly
in Illinois, and it is an interest of great concern for her. So
I applaud her passion and her resolve.
I am going to pull up on the site there, our kids.us site.
And we have numerous hearings that deal with kids, and I am
amazed that every time we have groups that are supposed to be
or are working hard to protect kids or shield kids, they don't
know about this site or they are not actively engaged in
putting information on this site. So this is my 2 minutes and
19 seconds of advertising and encouraging both panels to get up
on the site.
Jan mentioned kids 5 and under who have been harmed. My
sisteris taking classes to become a teacher at night, and I
went to her Technology in the Classroom class. It was in the
evening and I brought my 4-year-old son to explain kids.us. And
it is great, and I have--the teacher put pictures and an
explanation on the Web associated with Greenville College in
Greenville, Illinois. And my 4-year-old is sitting there on a
safe site for kids. So if we have problems with toys, you know,
for young kids--and my 4-year-old will go to that site, it is
his default site so he doesn't know any difference, he gets on
the Internet and this pops up. And then you can't get out
because it is--there is no hyper links, there is no chat rooms.
It is an education information site only. And the stuff that is
placed on here is approved through the NTIA and through a third
party group.
So those of you who are fighting for kids, I am fighting
for you to get on the kids.us site. There is no excuse not to
be on here. If we want to educate kids, if we want to make sure
they are safe, there is a lot of venues through which we can
attack the problem. This is one of them. I am not saying it is
exclusionary, but what I am saying is, look at it, research. If
you go to www.kids.us--and you can look up there--my son
directly goes to games, and his favorite is Nick Junior, and
that is where he hangs out. But there is also how to register
information, what are the safeguards. All that stuff is on
there. Please, please, if you are in this battle, whether you
are the industry or you are the consumer rights folks
protecting kids, both of you ought to be on this site doing
what you can to help educate kids. Not only kids, because once
kids get on this site, sometimes the parents are going to look
and see what is on there also.
So with that, Mr. Chairman, thank you for this time, and I
look forward to hearing the testimony.
Mr. Stearns. I thank the gentleman, and I thank him for his
presentation.
The gentleman from Nebraska.
Mr. Terry. Waive.
Mr. Stearns. All right. The gentleman waives.
[Additional statement submitted for the record follows:]
Prepared Statement of Hon. Ed Towns, a Representative in Congress from
the State of New York
Thank you Mr. Chairman for holding this important hearing today.
The Consumer Product Safety Commission plays a critical role in
protecting American consumers, especially our young children. Thus, it
is critical that the agency has the funding and regulatory powers to
effectively carry out its mission. Unfortunately, much of the testimony
submitted today indicated that the commission needs help to better
protect our children.
An issue under the Commission's jurisdiction that has been of
concern to me for a long time is the regulatory treatment of toy guns.
When toy guns look real, in the eyes of law enforcement, they are real.
Police officers have to make split second decisions and often do not
have the opportunity to distinguish a real gun from a toy.
Nearly one year ago today, a toy gun closed the offices on Capitol
Hill for two hours. This was another reminder of how real toy guns can
appear, and the problems that this can cause. The fact that a toy gun
could close down one of the most heavily guarded buildings in the
country shows how much trouble one toy gun can cause. In fact,
according to press reports at the time, the police described the
supposed intruder as a white male with a .38 caliber gun. While this
misunderstanding was resolved without anyone losing his or her life,
toy guns can and have resulted in fatal shootings.
In Brooklyn alone, three kids and one adult have been killed over
the confusion of a toy gun. Additionally, one young Brooklyn child was
shot 17 times and critically wounded by two officers while riding his
bike--WHILE RIDING HIS BIKE--because he had a toy gun that looked real.
In fact, the last time data was collected, local police agencies
reported during a five-year period more than 5,800 robberies or
assaults were committed involving toy guns.
Obviously, it is the person not the toy that commits the crime. But
toy guns make it easier for youngsters to commit the crime and only
serve to wet young kids appetite for a real gun when they get older.
Toy guns serve no purpose in society. My legislation, H.R. 211, would
ban toys which in size, shape, or overall appearance resemble real
handguns. This would eliminate any confusion and prevent needless
tragedies from occurring.
I look forward to a discussion of this issue, along with the
Commission's overall effectiveness with today's witnesses. Thank you
Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Stearns. And with that, the Honorable Stratton, we
welcome your opening statement.
STATEMENTS OF HON. HAL STRATTON, CHAIRMAN, U.S. CONSUMER
PRODUCT SAFETY COMMISSION; LINDA GINZEL; LISA A. LIPIN; E.
MARLA FELCHER; NANCY A. COWLES, EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR, KIDS IN
DANGER; GARY S. KLEIN, SENIOR VICE PRESIDENT GOVERNMENT, LEGAL
AND REGULATORY AFFAIRS, TOY INDUSTRY ASSOCIATION; AND RACHEL
WEINTRAUB, ASSISTANT GENERAL COUNSEL, CONSUMER FEDERATION OF
AMERICA
Mr. Stratton. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Stearns. We just need you to turn the mike on and maybe
pull it up to you.
Mr. Stratton. Is that better?
Mr. Stearns. That is much better.
Mr. Stratton. Mr. Chairman, I am pleased to be here today
at this very important hearing on child product safety. While
the U.S. Consumer Product Safety Commission is concerned about
the safety of products for all consumers, we have a special
concern about those products that are used by our most
vulnerable populations, particularly our children. As the
Chairman of the Commission and as the father of two young
daughters ages 9 and 5, I appreciate this committee's focus on
children's products today.
By way of background, the Consumer Product Safety
Commission is a relatively small, independent agency charged
with protecting the public from unreasonable risks of serious
injury or death from more than 15,000 types of consumer
products. We work to achieve that mandate with 471 employees
and an annual budget of approximately $59 million. We are a
small agency with a big mission, and we are proud of the work
that we do to build a safer America.
Because of the committee's interest in our safety standards
for children's products, I would like to discuss the
procedures, structure and governing statutes that guide us when
we are investigating a consumer product hazard, taking
enforcement action, or educating the public on the subject.
The Consumer Product Safety Act is our agency's enabling
statute. It established the agency in 1973, defines its basic
authority, and provides that the CPSC can develop consumer
product safety standards to reduce or eliminate any
unreasonable risk of injury associated with a consumer product.
The CPSC also administers the Federal Hazardous Substances
Act, or the FHSA, which requires that certain household
products be labeled to alert consumers to potential hazards.
Any toy or other article that is intended for use by children
and that contains a hazardous substance is banned under the
FHSA if a child can gain access to that substance. The CPSC
also administers the Flammable Fabrics Act and the Poison
Prevention Packaging Act.
The CPSC's Office of Hazard Identification and Reduction
collects information needed to assess product hazards and
develop injury reduction strategies. In this regard, I am
particularly proud of our new National Burn Center reporting
system that focuses on home fire burn injuries to children
under the age of 15. These activities lay the groundwork for
our safety standards setting activities.
Under our governing statutes, the CPSC must defer to
voluntary standards rather than issue mandatory standards
whenever compliance with a voluntary standard eliminates or
adequately reduces the risk of injury addressed, and whenever
it is likely that there will be substantial compliance with
that standard by the industry.
With regard to enforcement, the CPSC may initiate an
investigation on its own, or an investigation may result from
reports from firms that are required by law to report product
hazards to the Commission. In addition, the CPSC conducts
programs to monitor compliance with mandatory and voluntary
standards by conducting field inspections of manufacturing
facilities and distribution centers and making purchases at
retail establishments or via catalogs and the Internet. The
CPSC staff also conducts surveillance at ports of entry and
investigates samples of imported products that are a major
source of children's toys.
The CPSC is empowered to seek recalls of consumer products
that create a substantial product hazard or that violate a
safety regulation. The word ``recall'' is a generic term in
this case that refers to a corrective action which can include
a repair or replacement of the defective product or a refund to
the customer for the product.
The CPSC's Office of Compliance seeks voluntary remedial
action whenever possible. The recent recall of 150 million
units of toy jewelry was achieved voluntarily. However, if the
staff were unable to reach such a resolution, administrative
litigation may ensue to force the recall.
The CPSC recalls of children's products have increased 10
percent this year from the previous year and represents 161
million units of recalled children's products. The CPSC also
has the authority to assess civil penalties for violations of
the Act. In the fiscal year that just ended, the agency
assessed over $4 million in civil penalties from companies that
failed to comply with the Act, and I might add here
prospectively, I think you are going to see that number go up
in the next fiscal year.
One area of special concern to me regarding the safety of
products is imported children's products. China is now the No.
1 toy producing country in the world, and the United States is
the No. 1 toy consuming country in the world. I am proud to
have been the first chairman of the Consumer Product Safety
Commission to go to China. As a result of this outreach, in
April of this year we entered into a formal Memorandum of
Understanding with our counterparts in the government in
Beijing to establish a formal liaison between our two agencies
on product safety.
I might also add, on a subsequent trip I had the
opportunity to tour many of the toy producing or manufacturing
factories and speak to the IOS, the International Organization
for Standardization, Toy Committee in Guangzhou. The main
reason for doing this was to impress upon them the need to make
sure that toys and products are safe before they come to our
shores.
Mr. Chairman, protecting the American public, young and
old, from dangerous consumer products is a critical mission,
and our professional team at the CPSC takes it very seriously.
Thank you again for the opportunity to discuss this important
subject, and I am pleased to answer any questions you might
have.
[The prepared statement of Hon. Hal Stratton follows:]
Prepared Statement of Hon. Hal Stratton, Chairman, U.S. Consumer
Product Safety Commission
Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and good morning. I am pleased to be with
you this morning for this important hearing on child product safety.
While the U.S. Consumer Product Safety Commission (CPSC) is concerned
about the safety of products for all consumers, we have a special
concern about those products that are used by our most vulnerable
populations, and those include our nation's children. As the Chairman
of the Commission, and as the father of two young daughters ages nine
and five, I appreciate the Committee's focus on children's products
today.
By way of background, the Consumer Product Safety Commission is a
small bipartisan, independent agency charged with protecting the public
from unreasonable risks of serious injury or death from more than
15,000 types of consumer products under the agency's jurisdiction. We
work to achieve that mandate with approximately 470 employees who are
located at our headquarters office and laboratory in nearby Maryland
and at our field locations across the country. Our annual budget is
approximately $59 million.
Since its inception, the CPSC has delivered critical safety
benefits to America's families and has made a significant contribution
to the decline in the rate of deaths and injuries related to hazardous
consumer products. We are a small agency with a big mission, and we are
proud of the work we do to build a safer America.
As noted earlier, children's products are of special concern to the
agency and to its mission. Hazards to children are associated with a
wide range of consumer products. Examples include strangulation deaths
from window blind cords and clothing drawstrings; swimming pool and
other at-home drownings; lethal falls from playground equipment; fatal
choking incidents related to some children's toys; and various hazards
with infant products, such as highchairs, cribs, infant cushions and
strollers.
Head injuries in particular are a leading cause of death and
disability to children in the United States. Studies have shown that
children have a higher risk of head injury than adults and that
children's head injuries are often more severe than many other injuries
and can have life-altering consequences.
The types of consumer products under the Commission's jurisdiction
that are most often associated with head injuries to children include
bicycles and playground equipment. Participation in sports is also
associated with a high number of children's head injuries.
The Commission is taking aggressive action across the board on
these and other identified hazards, with a special emphasis on those
that cause death and lasting injuries. One example of the agency's
attention to these hazards is our work on crib safety. The Commission
has worked on crib safety for more than 30 years on both mandatory and
voluntary standards.
CPSC's mandatory standards include requirements for side height,
slat spacing, mattress fit, hazardous cut-outs and other aspects of
crib performance and construction. The voluntary standards address
hazards of entanglement on corner posts, slat performance and
structural and mechanical failures.
As a result of these efforts, infant deaths associated with cribs
have declined significantly. In 1973 it was estimated that as many as
200 infants died annually from injuries associated with cribs. Our most
recent data indicates that the number of deaths has declined to about
20 annually. However, that is still 20 deaths too many, and we continue
to work on measures that would reduce this number.
Since most infant deaths now occur in older, previously used cribs
that do not meet current safety standards, the CPSC has been active
through the media and grassroots organizations in alerting the public
to the dangers of used or old cribs. For example, unsafe cribs are
highlighted in our annual Recall Roundup Campaign which focused this
year on resale outlets such as thrift stores. CPSC joined forces with
the National Association of Resale and Thrift Shops and the Danny
Foundation to stop resale, consignment and thrift stores from selling
previously recalled or banned products and products that do not meet
safety standards. Additionally, safety seminars were conducted across
the country to educate store employees about CPSC and how to check
their stores for hazardous products.
The CPSC also continues to work jointly with eBay to ensure that
dangerous products, such as older cribs and recalled products, are not
sold on its public auction website. eBay worked with CPSC to develop a
``children's product prompt'' which is triggered when a seller attempts
to register a children's product for auction. The prompt urges the
seller to review the CPSC's website to make sure their product has
never been recalled. With baby cribs, eBay requires each seller to
review a CPSC-developed electronic crib safety information sheet prior
to listing their crib for auction. eBay also denies access to its
website to persons attempting to sell any product that has been banned
by the CPSC. These public outreach and educational efforts will
continue as long as there are unsafe children's products being used or
sold.
Because of the Committee's interest in our safety standards, I
would like to take a moment to discuss the procedures, structure and
governing statutes that guide us when we are investigating a product
hazard like crib safety, taking enforcement action or educating the
public on the subject.
The Consumer Product Safety Act (CPSA) is CPSC's umbrella statute.
It established the agency in 1973, defines its basic authority, and
provides that the CPSC can develop a standard to reduce or eliminate
any unreasonable risk of injury associated with a consumer product. The
CPSA also provides the authority to ban a product if there is no
feasible standard, and it gives CPSC authority to pursue recalls for
products that present a substantial product hazard or violate a safety
standard regulation.
The Federal Hazardous Substances Act (FHSA) requires that certain
hazardous household products bear cautionary labeling to alert
consumers to potential hazards and to inform them of the measures they
need to take to protect themselves from those hazards. This Act gives
the Commission authority to ban by regulation a hazardous substance if
it determines that the cautionary labeling is inadequate to protect the
public.
Any toy or other article that is intended for use by children and
that contains a hazardous substance is also banned under the FHSA if a
child can gain access to the substance. In addition, the Act gives the
Commission authority to ban by regulation any toy, or other article
intended for use by children which presents a mechanical, electrical or
thermal hazard and risk of serious injury.
The CPSC's actions with regard to promulgating, enforcing and
publicizing safety standards for children's products and other products
are directed by these governing statutes, as well as the Flammable
Fabrics Act and the Poison Prevention Packaging Act.
The CPSC's Office of Hazard Identification and Reduction (HIR)
collects the information needed to assess product hazards and develop
injury reduction strategies. The staff collects data on consumer
product related injuries and deaths, as well as hazard exposure
information, for those products under our jurisdiction. Along with
CPSC's Field Operations Directorate, HIR also investigates specific
injury cases to gain additional knowledge about injuries or hazards and
how the reported product was involved.
In addition to news reports and consumer complaints, staff collects
information about product related injuries treated in hospital
emergency rooms through our National Electronic Injury Surveillance
System (NEISS). This unique system provides statistically valid
national estimates of product-related injuries from a probability
sample of hospital emergency rooms across the country and is the
foundation for many Commission activities.
CPSC also collects mortality data with the purchase and review of
death certificates covering product-related deaths from all 50 states.
Our Medical Examiner and Coroner Alert Project collects and reviews
additional death reports from participants throughout the country.
We are continuing to strengthen our data collection and analysis
process. Recent improvements include the implementation of our National
Burn Center Reporting System which focuses on children's clothing and
the development of new statistical systems for collecting information
on consumer product related fire deaths and injuries. Staff also
conducts several types of studies each year, including special
investigations and emerging hazard evaluations.
These activities lay the groundwork for our standard setting
activities. Under our governing statutes, CPSC must defer to voluntary
safety standards rather than issue mandatory standards whenever
compliance with a voluntary standard eliminates or adequately reduces
the risk of injury addressed and whenever it is likely that there will
be substantial compliance with that voluntary standard.
Our governing statutes dictate a unique multi-stage rulemaking
process that is initiated with work on studies and findings to prepare
an Advance Notice of Proposed Rulemaking or ANPR. Using toys and
children's products as an example under the Federal Hazardous
Substances Act, a proceeding to adopt a mandatory safety standard must
be commenced by publication in the Federal Register of an ANPR that (1)
describes the product to be regulated; (2) summarizes other regulatory
alternatives being considered by the Commission; (3) notes any existing
voluntary standard and why it appears to be inadequate; (4) invites
comment on the information published; (5) invites submission of an
existing standard as an alternative; and (6) invites commitment to
develop a new voluntary standard.
Following the required public comment period, the Commission may
determine that a voluntary standard submitted to CPSC in response to
the ANPR would adequately reduce risk, and the Commission may proceed
to publish it as a proposed standard. If the Commission determines that
the voluntary standard would adequately reduce the risk and it is
likely that there would be substantial compliance, the Commission must
then terminate the formal rulemaking and notify the public of its
decision to rely on the voluntary standard. Before relying on the
voluntary standard in this manner, the Commission must provide a
reasonable opportunity for public comment.
If the Commission instead decides it must proceed with a mandatory
rule, the next step in the process is the issuance of a Notice of
Proposed Rulemaking or NPR, which must contain the text of the proposed
rule. In addition, the Commission must issue a preliminary regulatory
analysis which must contain (1) a preliminary description of the
potential benefits and costs of the proposed rule; (2) an explanation
why any standard submitted to the Commission was rejected; (3) an
explanation why any proposal to develop a voluntary standard was not
adequate; and (4) a description of any reasonable alternatives to the
proposed rule, their potential costs and benefits, and why they would
not be proposed.
To then proceed to a Final Rule following the second public comment
period, the Commission must publish a final regulatory analysis
containing (1) a description of the potential benefits and costs of the
regulation; (2) a description of any alternatives that were considered
by the Commission and reasons why they were rejected; and (3) a summary
of any significant issues raised in the public comments and the
Commission's assessment of them.
The final rule must also include specific findings: (1) that the
toy (or other article intended for use by children) is a ``hazardous
substance,'' that is, it poses an unreasonable risk of injury or
illness due to a thermal or mechanical hazard, or otherwise; (2) that
any voluntary standard is not likely to adequately reduce the risk or
that substantial compliance is unlikely; (3) that the benefits expected
from the standard bear a reasonable relationship to its costs; and (4)
that the standard imposes the least burdensome requirement which
prevents or adequately reduces the risk.
This three-step rulemaking process meets the requirements of our
governing statutes.
When a ban or a safety standard is established, it is CPSC's Office
of Compliance, working closely with the agency's field staff, that
enforces the law. There are two primary types of investigations that
the staff conducts. One focuses on identifying products that violate
specific safety standards already issued by the Commission. The other
type of investigation is designed to identify defective products that
may present a substantial risk of injury to the public but are not
subject to specific CPSC standards.
The CPSC may start an investigation on its own initiative or an
investigation may result from statutorily required reports from firms.
Under Section 15 of the Consumer Product Safety Act, manufacturers,
retailers and distributors must report to the Commission when they
obtain information that one of their products is defective, fails to
comply with a safety standard, or creates an unreasonable risk of
serious injury or death. The purpose of the reporting requirements is
to provide the Commission with sufficient information to determine
whether a product presents a hazard that requires remedial action under
one of the statutes that the Commission administers.
The compliance staff may start an investigation based on any of the
following types of information: (1) hotline complaints, web
communications, newspaper reports or written correspondence from
consumers or Freedom of Information Act requesters; (2) reports or
inquiries from state and local governments, federal agencies, or
Congress; (3) coroner, medical examiner, fire marshal, or police
reports; (4) reports from fire investigators and forensic testing
laboratories; (5) data from the National Electronic Injury Information
System; (6) incident reports in the Commission's data bases; or (7)
trade complaints, news clippings and reports from insurers.
In addition, CPSC conducts programs to monitor compliance with
mandatory and voluntary standards by conducting field inspections of
manufacturing facilities and distribution centers and making purchases
at retail establishments or via catalogs or the internet. Numerous
sample collections have been conducted over the last several years at a
variety of mass merchandise, general department and dollar type stores
to monitor compliance with CPSC requirements. Additionally, there have
been a number of voluntary recalls involving dollar type stores. CPSC
staff has worked with owners of these stores on an individual basis to
ensure future compliance with our requirements.
Staff also conducts surveillance and sampling of imported products
at ports of entry. The CPSC has conducted 255 seizures and detentions
of over 6.7 million units in 2004. This is an increase from 181
seizures and 1.6 million units in the previous year. Some of CPSC's
most effective efforts at identifying violative unsafe products have
been through working with the U.S. Customs Service identifying these
products before their distribution in the United States. With Customs'
increased attention on homeland security, the CPSC has adapted to new
enforcement tools including internet surveillance and working with
Customs' data base systems to identify incoming shipments and collect
samples on their arrival at U.S. ports.
Both the Consumer Product Safety Act and the Federal Hazardous
Substances Act permit the Commission to seek public notice and
corrective action for defective products that create a substantial risk
of injury to consumers.
The CPSC uses the generic term ``recall'' to refer to corrective
action plans that are announced to the public; however, by law
``recalls'' may involve (at the election of the product's manufacturer,
distributor or retailer) the repair or replacement of the defective
product, or the refund of its purchase price less a reasonable
allowance for use.
The Office of Compliance staff seeks voluntary remedial action,
whenever possible. The recent recall of 150 million units of toy
jewelry, some of it containing accessible lead, was achieved
voluntarily. However, if staff is unable to reach such a resolution,
litigation may be necessary.
The Commission may institute an administrative proceeding to
require a manufacturer, distributor, or retailer to recall a banned
product or a defective product that presents a substantial product
hazard. If after a formal hearing before an administrative law judge
and any appeal to the Commission, the Commission determines that a
product presents a substantial hazard warranting a recall, it can order
the firm to give public notice of the hazard and order the firm to
repair or replace the product or refund the purchase price of the
product less a reasonable allowance for use at the election of the
firm.
CPSC recalls have increased significantly this year. In 2004 the
agency has conducted 356 recalls which is a 27% increase from the
previous year. These recalls cover more than 200 million consumer
products as compared to 41 million the previous year.
The CPSC's Office of General Counsel is responsible for working
with the Department of Justice in bringing actions in federal court.
Once a case is referred to the Department of Justice, the Compliance
staff works with the Department and the Office of General Counsel on
the case.
The CPSC has the authority to assess civil penalties. In the fiscal
year that just ended, CPSC assessed $4.2 million in civil penalties
from companies that violated federal safety standards. That figure
represents an increase over the previous year's figure of $2 million.
CPSC's statutes also authorize criminal penalties in appropriate cases.
Only last week, a grand jury in California handed down an indictment
against an individual who was caught reselling unsafe toys after a CPSC
recall.
One key element of any recall is targeted public notice to inform
owners of a recalled product of the hazard and remedies available.
Among the tools CPSC's Office of Information and Public Affairs uses to
disseminate information about recalls are: joint press releases; video
news releases; point of purchase posters; direct mail; paid
advertisements; web site notification; and notification to outside
organizations, such as pediatricians or day care providers, who in turn
provide information to consumers.
Additionally, CPSC continues to be pro-active in improving recall
effectiveness. I earlier mentioned our initiative with thrift stores
and web-based sales. Recently, we launched the Neighborhood Safety
Network. Through this initiative CPSC is partnering with other
government agencies and private sector organizations to communicate
important safety messages to vulnerable and hard-to-reach populations.
Our goal is to build a network of community leaders and
organizations that are in regular contact with people who may not get
their news from traditional media outlets or may not have access to
computers or may not trust the federal government as the messenger. We
are working with the American Academy of Pediatrics, Boys and Girls
Clubs of America, Indian Health Services and many others to distribute
CPSC's safety messages. Meetings with groups such as the National
Safety Council, National Safe Kids Coalition, HHS and others have
generated a great deal of support for the project.
Another initiative that I am particularly proud of is Recalls.gov.
In conjunction with five other federal agencies, CPSC introduced this
new website that will benefit your constituents and provide
streamlined, one-stop service in alerting consumers to unsafe,
hazardous or defective products. Consumers can now go to one single
resource to get information on all government recalls. They no longer
have to try to figure out which government agency has jurisdiction for
the particular product about which they are concerned.
Additionally, your constituents can register at this site to
receive instant e-mail alerts on all product safety recalls, and
consumers can use the site to report a problem with a consumer product,
motor vehicle, boat, food or environmental product. CPSC has developed
a sample press release for Congressional offices to consider using in
their home districts.
Before closing, I would like to address one other subject of
special concern to me regarding the safety of children's products, and
that is importation. As a government regulator, I recognize that given
the vast expansion of international trade and increasing safety
concerns of consumers about the goods they purchase, such as toys for
their children, the need for closer cooperation and coordination
between international government authorities is more important now than
ever before.
China is now the number one toy producing country in the world, and
the United States is the number one toy consuming country in the world.
Developing a strong understanding regarding consumer product safety
with China is essential. I am proud to be the first Chairman of the
Consumer Product Safety Commission to go to China. As a result of this
outreach, in April of this year, I signed a formal Memorandum of
Understanding with Chinese Minister Li of the General Administration of
Quality Supervision, Inspection and Quarantine, to establish a formal
liaison between our two agencies on product safety.
I returned to China in June to be the first commissioner to ever
address the International Organization for Standardization on toy
safety. With homeland security concerns taking precedence at our
nation's ports of entry, it is more important than ever to get to the
source of these safety problems before they are ever loaded onto a ship
bound for America. I can assure the Committee that I will go wherever I
have to go to achieve that goal.
In closing, I would be remiss to come before the Committee and not
commend to you the outstanding professional staff at the CPSC. Since
starting as Chairman two years ago, I have had the opportunity to meet
and work with some of the most competent and talented civil servants
and professionals that you can imagine. These people have the kind of
technical and scientific skills that the private sector would reward
handsomely, but they have chosen instead a career of public service and
they dedicate themselves to improving product safety for America's
families.
Mr. Chairman, thank you again for the opportunity to discuss this
important subject, and I am pleased to answer your questions.
Mr. Stearns. Thank you, Chairman. I will start with my
questions. I guess probably the main question you are going to
get, I will ask it from the beginning, do you have enough
resources, in your humble opinion, to adequately enforce the
standards to provide the necessary manpower to identify the
products and the enforcement mechanism to establish a recall?
Do you feel that you have the resources to do so?
Mr. Stratton. Mr. Chairman, I think that you can always do
more with more resources. So it depends on what the Congress
wants us to do. We carry out our mandate as in the various Acts
that I have listed quite well with the resources that we have,
and I can tell you that as the numbers of our employees have
dropped and frankly as our funds have dropped in real terms, I
see people actually working harder to get the job done.
So I think we are doing the job that you contemplate us to
do. If you want us to do other things beyond what we are doing
or if you want us to do more of what we are doing----
Mr. Stearns. I understand. But I would say your agency is
one of the few that I have seen in government that not
necessarily has increased. I mean, I asked the staff of the
Budget back 30 years ago and I see the Budget today, and you
have less people. But I mean you could also argue that we have
technology and we have a lot more resources in terms of
technical support that would increase productivity. So that
would indicate that maybe your resources are adequate. But I
will tell you something that I want to commend you for, and
that is going to China. I think all of us know that China is
importing a lot of toys, and obviously a lot of these toys
might be counterfeit. So maybe you could tell me and to the
American people, what assurance do we have that you have a
handle on this enormous influx of toys from China? Since you
don't have any control over the standards in China, what can
you do in terms of reciprocity, and what about the counterfeit
toys that are coming in from China?
Mr. Stratton. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. That is an excellent
question and one I like to talk about, because one of the good
things about our particular Act, the Consumer Product Safety
Act, is that it imposes the obligations of that Act upon not
just the manufacturers of the products but also on the
distributors, the importers, and the retailers. Therefore, when
a company like a big retailer, Wal-Mart, Target, or someone
like that sells a defective product, they are just as liable
under our Act as are the manufacturers of that particular
product. What this means is, it is of great interest to these
retailers because they know we are going to go out and seek to
fine them if we have to or seek the recalls if we need to. So
it is in their interest to make sure that those products coming
over are safe, and they have a lot of people over there
themselves working to do that.
Now, in our opinion, of course that is not enough. We also
look to the importers and the distributors. Frankly, that is
who we mainly go after when we have violative products, the
importers because they are the persons, they are the entity
that is closest to the particular product at the time.
And then, finally, that is what the effort of going to
China is for. It was very important, many people thought, to
visit China and impress upon the authorities over there how
important it was that we not have to rely on these safeguards
once they get to the United States to make sure products are
safe, but to make sure that when they are manufactured and when
they are shipped over that they are safe. And that is what we
have done in our Memorandum of Understanding where we have
opened up discussions and lines of communication and exchange
of information with China. So we have a threefold way to try to
make sure those products are safe.
Now, you talked about counterfeit products. And the one
thing we worry about mostly in the counterfeit area are
counterfeit certifications, such as an Underwriters Laboratory
or an ELT, Electronic Testing Laboratory, fake counterfeit mark
on various products coming over. Now, our statute does not
grant us any authority over counterfeit articles. Our statute
tells us we are supposed to make sure that products are safe,
not that they are not counterfeit. So technically, we don't
have any real authority to make any kind of determinations
based upon whether something is counterfeit or not.
What our policy is, however, at least since I have been
there, is if we have a particular product that has a mark on
it, like UL, that turns out to be counterfeit, we immediately
suspect that it is not as good as it ought to be, and then we
tend to investigate it and make the determination as to whether
it is safe or not or whether it should be pulled off the
market. Now, sometimes we find that--I think most of the time
we probably find that they are of lesser standard than a
typical one that would have a proper mark, but I have been told
by staff at the agency that we have actually found products
that were better than the actual noncounterfeited products. So
that is where counterfeiting comes into play with us. That is,
once again, primarily an FTC and a Customs matter, but we are
cooperating with Customs, UL, and others.
We recently had an interdiction of about $6 million worth
of counterfeit marked products, including counterfeit extension
cords, that we worked closely with Homeland Security and with
UL to do.
Mr. Stearns. If I can take the liberty to merely--Kolcraft,
and on the second panel we are going to have, Ms. Ginzel is
going to testify. And is Kolcraft, was this product that she is
going to testify about, was this built in the United States?
You don't know. Okay.
Mr. Stratton. Is this a crib?
Mr. Stearns. It is a crib. But, I mean, you don't know if
the crib was built in the United States or did it come from
outside the country?
Mr. Stratton. I am sorry, I don't know that.
Mr. Stearns. Okay. I guess, does the CPSC have the adequate
tools to go after people like a manufacturer of Kolcraft in
which this product collapsed? Do you need anything from
Congress in terms of more legislation to give you more
authority or something like that?
Mr. Stratton. Well, Mr. Chairman, I don't think we need
more authority. If, for instance, that crib was manufactured in
China, then there is nothing you can do to give us jurisdiction
over the manufacturer in China. If we do have jurisdiction over
the product, the question is how do you enforce that against a
foreign manufacturer. That is why we enforce those things
against the distributors, the importers, and the retailers in
the United States.
Mr. Stearns. I am told it wasn't made in China. So I guess,
do you have--so you are saying this morning you have the tools
to go after companies that do not implement adequate recall
efforts. In other words, what tools does the CPSC have to go
after companies that do not implement adequate recall efforts
like Kolcraft?
Mr. Stratton. Well, we have the ability----
Mr. Stearns. And are the tools sufficient? I guess that is
my question.
Mr. Stratton. Mr. Chairman, I think that they are. I am not
sure what happened in that particular case. I believe that was
a recalled crib and it had been recalled. Now, we do have a
problem in getting back all of the products that we can get
back from out there when they have been recalled. It is
difficult at times to get the word out to consumers. The
Congresswoman mentioned that, and I certainly agree with that.
It is a very difficult, big task to get the word about recalls
out to every single person who has that particular product. It
is also difficult sometimes to get consumers to return the
product. Not necessarily in this particular case, but just
because you notify people doesn't mean that they are going to
comply with the recall. So there are a lot of issues regarding
recalls that aren't necessarily susceptible to having better
legislation. There are practical problems that we deal with
every day, how do you get the word out to 150 million or to 7
million people who have purchased a product around the United
States, and then what incentives can you give them to return
them.
Mr. Stearns. My time has expired. Ms. Schakowsky.
Ms. Schakowsky. Mr. Stratton, I am glad that you are here.
I am disappointed that you can't stay, because my hope was that
you would be able to hear from the entire panel that follows
you. And I certainly hope that you will carefully read all of
the testimony of all of the witnesses who at great effort and
often emotional expense have come here to tell their stories.
So that I hope that you will look at those as well.
I am interested to note that you are neither asking for
more money. And I am assuming that, since the agency has not
been reauthorized for--CPSC has not been reauthorized since
1990, are you saying that were it to be reauthorized you
wouldn't seek any additional or different powers?
Mr. Stratton. Well, can I answer the first question first?
We are seeking more money through the appropriations process.
Ms. Schakowsky. What is your request?
Mr. Stratton. $63 million is our current request. So each
year we do seek more money. And, frankly, the Commission over
the years has sought a lot more money than has been
appropriated. So it is not for want of asking----
Ms. Schakowsky. But you feel that you have sufficient
resources? I just heard you say that.
Mr. Stratton. Well, I feel like we are doing a good job
with the resources that we have. We can always do more with
more money.
Ms. Schakowsky. Let me give you an example. Regarding
establishing standards for baby bath seats, comments were due
March of 2003. Since then, nothing has happened. In 2003, 14
children died in baby bath seats, and now a total of 119
children have died in bath seats. Is it reasonable for
consumers, for parents to have this lag time? Why haven't you
moved on this?
Mr. Stratton. Congresswoman, I don't think it is
reasonable. I think it is too long of a time, and I think it
takes too long to move. In this particular case, if you
reviewed the record on this, you know that the entire
Commission unanimously supported the new regulation on baby
bath seats. At the same time, the voluntary standards
committee, the third-party standards committee, was working on
a voluntary standard which is identical to our particular
standard, or substantially identical I am told, and, frankly,
they promulgated that standard before we finalized ours. And
currently, the staff is reviewing whether that particular
standard is going to be substantially complied with. And if it
is, as you pointed out in your opening statement, the law
requires us to stop the process of going forward.
I personally on this one would prefer the mandatory
standard, and I have evidenced that to staff, and we have had
long discussions, and I have had discussions with my general
counsel on it, but I have been informed that in order to go
forward properly we have to determine whether there is going to
be substantial compliance with the voluntary standard.
Let me mention one other thing that is of great concern.
Ms. Schakowsky. And you don't see this as a problem, as an
impediment to saving the lives of children that the law
requires you to go through these kinds of machinations in order
to get to a place where we stop? I mean, how many have died in
2004? How many might die next year if we don't move on this
thing?
Mr. Stratton. I think the process needs to go faster. I
think it needs to be faster, and I think our particular
statute, as you are well aware, imposes about double the number
of steps that you have to take to pass a normal regulation.
Ms. Schakowsky. Well, maybe we ought to reconsider that in
a reauthorization then.
Let me ask another question, because time is limited here.
The yo-yo ball, I heard you say on national television that you
took that ball away from your children. You don't want them to
play with the yo-yo ball. Is that correct?
Mr. Stratton. I did take it away from my daughter.
Ms. Schakowsky. And there has been 300-plus incident
reports. And in the correspondence that I have had with you and
that Lisa Lipin has had with you, you have said that there were
no permanent injuries and that there was some risk of
strangulation. I am curious why nothing more than a mild
warning to parents, since you think it is not suitable for your
children--and we are going to hear pretty dramatic testimony
about what happened not only to Lisa's son, but she has been in
touch with parents all over the country who have been near
death and unconscious. How could you say that there is no
permanent injuries and that it is not sufficient to recall this
product?
Mr. Stratton. When we first started looking at this
particular toy prior to even hearing from any of the people in
this room, our compliance staff, our engineering staff, our
hazards reduction staff, our human factors staff all got into
the act working on--and including the lab, working on this to
determine whether we could actually make the showing that this
was a substantial product hazard to recall it. They worked on
this about 5 or 6 months. They then came to me with the warning
that I think is a strong warning, not just a mild warning, it
is a strong warning. But, nevertheless, they came to me and
they said, Mr. Chairman, you know, we cannot provide you with
the data on this to make the showing under the statute that
this particular product needs to be recalled.
Ms. Schakowsky. What does it take then? Does a child have
to die?
Mr. Stratton. No, a child does not have to die. We hundreds
of recalls every year where children do not die, but most of
those are voluntary recalls. In fact, almost everything we do
is a voluntary recall. Once again, getting back to the
procedure in our agency, to do a mandatory recall takes years,
virtually years.
Ms. Schakowsky. Think about what you are saying. Think
about that, what you are communicating to parents, that it
takes years to have a mandatory recall of a product that poses
a serious and real and possibly fatal threat to children in our
country. Don't you think that we need to do better?
Mr. Stratton. We do need to do better. We strive every day
to do better. But let me just put the yo-yo ball in
perspective. We have--in looking at the data on the yo-yo
balls, we have approximately 10 emergency room visits from yo-
yo balls. We have in the same time period--this is for 2003--67
emergency room visits for tether balls. This would translate
into approximately 1,700 tether ball emergency room visits,
32,000 emergency room visits from softballs, and 99,000
emergency room visits from baseballs. So just because 99,000
people get hurt with baseballs every year, we don't eliminate
baseballs from the market. There are things that people
consider to be worthy. And it is not the baseball that is
causing the problem. Kids are going to play with baseballs.
Ms. Schakowsky. So let me get it clear. You are equating a
yo-yo ball that can easily wrap around a neck with a baseball
as a threat?
Mr. Stratton. Absolutely not. I am telling you that I have
99,000 emergency room visits from baseballs and I have well
less than that, I have 10 known emergency room visits from yo-
yo balls.
Ms. Schakowsky. And is that how we do it? That we don't
evaluate the possibility of this toy--obviously there is more
baseballs than there are yo-yo balls. And it seems like a no-
brainer to me, that if you would take this away from your
children, if you have well over 300 complaints, if you have
children that are blue in the face and passed out, who have eye
damage, permanent eye damage because of a yo-yo ball, that it
might merit a recall.
I know my time has more than expired. I am hoping we could
do another round though, Mr. Chairman. I ask for that.
Mr. Stearns. I thank the gentlelady.
Mr. Shimkus.
Mr. Shimkus. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I am going to just,
on a one note Johnny here on this, I want to ask the Chairman,
has the Federal Government approached, specifically the
Department of Commerce, have they worked with you to try to
educate you on the kids.us Web site? Is this the first you
heard of that site?
Mr. Stratton. This is the first I have heard of it,
Congressman.
Mr. Shimkus. And, Mr. Chairman, I think we need to talk to
the Department, because that is one of their requirements under
the law, is to not only help advertise it across the country
but also to look at relevant Federal agencies that might be
involved and engaged in this. You know, and really, the
discussion is meritorious because there is an educational
aspect that can be done. I have small children, so, you know, I
kind of understand what they are dealing with these days. One
is 11, one is 9, and one is 4. And the 4-year-old, I asked him
just last week, what did you learn in preschool? And he said
healthy foods. Like what? Like carrots. And we eat a lot of
carrots at home. And I said what else did you learn? And he
says junk food. Like--and I was thinking like daddy eats
probably is what I was thinking.
But my point is, as we learn that education is the key,
kids will push their parents to eliminate things that they are
learning in school that are dangerous to them. They will go to
parents and say, why are you smoking? We learned in school that
smoking is bad.
So I am going to continue to push the aspect of not just
for you--and I think I have made my point--but also the
consumer groups that will be testifying afterwards to look at
this safe site for kids under the age of 13 to help educate. I
mean, even if you are the toy industry and you are still going
to sell and market this yo-yo ball, you may want to go up on
the net and say, hey, you know, just like we do legal, there is
concerns. Or, as we are talking about these child seats in the
bath tub, which we used for Daniel and I used for Joshua--now,
Joshua doesn't ask me to say that because he is 9 now. But
Daniel did, and they are very helpful when you are a parent,
but you still have to be present. And reiterating that fact
that you still have to be present when you are using this child
seat in the bath tub could also help save lives.
Mr. Chairman, that is my focus. Again, I applaud the
hearing. It is okay that we discuss and debate and talk about
child safety. We were successful through this committee doing
that with child safety seats, as you know, which we passed and
signed into law, and we helped change the way that we have new
standards. We had very old standards for car seats for
children. Within the last couple of years we changed that; we
have created higher standards with industry cooperation. That
is another way where the Internet could help educate kids. They
are going to see their brother put into a 15-year-old child
safety seat and they are going to say, hey, no, that is not
good enough, mom, dad. It doesn't have the padding on the left
or the right.
So I will--that is kind of my focus. I appreciate it. It is
not really a question, it is just I want you all to take
advantage of it and look at that site, and let us get up and
make good use of it, and I yield back my time.
Mr. Stearns. The gentleman yields back the balance of his
time.
Mr. Green.
Mr. Green. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and I would like
unanimous consent to place my statement into the record.
[The prepared statement of Hon. Gene Green follows:]
Prepared Statement of Hon. Gene Green, a Representative in Congress
from the State of Texas
I'd like to thank Chairman Stearns for holding this hearing and
Ranking Member Schakowsky for brining light to this important issue.
First, I'd like thank Ms. Ginzel for being here today to testify.
It takes a brave person to come before a body such as this to talk
about the tragic loss of a loved one. I hope this committee will
address this issue in a way that will make it even less likely that an
accident such as Danny's will happen again.
I have 2 children and they're now adults so it's been a while since
I have had to make purchases for a child. However, with my daughter and
son-in-law expecting, I'm now back in the market for toys and items
that will be essential to the development and entertainment of my
grandchild.
Given that I'll be a proud grandfather soon, I'd like to think that
we've come a long way in toy safety since my children were very young
in the 1970's and it seems we have. We have moved from an estimated 200
deaths due to faulty cribs in the early 70's to 20 today. This is
evidence of great progress, but as Chairman Stratton mentions in his
testimony, that is 20 deaths too many.
With out a doubt, this decrease in deaths and injuries related to
faulty products relating to children has a lot to do with the creation
of the Consumer Product Safety Commission in the early 70's. The CPSC
opened its doors the same year my oldest child was born, and since then
has been able to assist in recalling those products that are most
dangerous to our children.
However, according to the statistics I've seen in this panel's
testimony, recalls only yielded a 16 percent return rate in 1997 and
this is the most recent year we have recall data on. It concerns me
that millions of recalled products are still in our homes. While I
understand the CPSC has made great improvements in making recalls more
effective in the last few years, I believe this committee needs to
address how the federal government can work with industry to make these
recalls more effective.
I'm a co-sponsor of Ms. Schakowsky's legislation that would set
safety standards for durable infant and toddler products. The fact that
there are no mandatory safety standards for items such as play yards,
strollers and high chairs concerns me. I hope this hearing can bring us
closer to considering this important legislation.
I look forward to hearing this panel's testimony and learning how
we can make our children and grandchildren safer.
Thank you Mr. Chairman. I yield the balance of my time.
Mr. Stearns. So ordered.
Mr. Green. And I want to thank both the Chairman and
ranking member for this hearing. Some of us, my kids are long
grown.
Mr. Shimkus. Grandpa.
Mr. Green. Not quite. Almost. Some of my colleagues know my
daughter is expecting our first grandchild, so I am getting
more interested in things for our children.
One of the things I was noticing over the weekend, because
my wife was talking to me about getting a crib for our house.
And I said we have that one up in the attic. And my daughter,
who explained to me that is probably not sufficient because it
was in 1973 when she was born, her crib. So--and I know our
district is not a wealthy area and we have a lot of what we
call in the auto industry after-market use of products, and I
have garage sales that seem like they go on 7 days a week, flea
markets and everything else, and that bothers me. So obviously
we have a lot of pre-standardization, whether they are
voluntary standards or what the CPSC has said is mandatory.
And, again, I think public information, whether it is over the
Internet, whether it is things you issue, are very important to
consumers. Because I know of no parent--a good example from my
colleague from Illinois, Mr. Shimkus, is the car seats, because
we do an event where we give car seats to people. And we find
out that people, you know, they hand these car seats down not
only from child to child but also from generation to
generation. And those are not safe by any means. The ones I
used in the 1970's are nowhere near adequate for today.
In your testimony, Mr. Chairman, you say that CPSC is not
allowed to set mandatory standards for products if the industry
establishes voluntary standards that are deemed adequate. And
how long does it take to establish, whether it is voluntary
standards or the mandatory? I would assume an industry would
establish--when I was in business, I always wanted to do it
myself instead of having somebody telling me how to do it. How
long does it take to get a voluntary standard, for example?
Mr. Stratton. Well, that depends, Congressman. I think you
can maybe--depending upon the product, you can get a voluntary
standard in a year or two. I happen to know that the more
recent hot water heater standard took about 10 years just to
get a voluntary standard.
Mr. Green. And your agency participates in that. And I
guess you will suggest that to industry, whether it is toys or
baby equipment or whatever, that a voluntary standard would be
much quicker. And, you know, in all honesty, we hear that
lawsuits are so prevalent, and I would think that someone would
be more interested in a voluntary standard just because, if a
child gets hurt by something, you know, I may not be able to
own that Chinese factory but I will sure find out who the
retailer of those toys or products are.
How long does it take to get a mandatory standard? You said
10 years for a water heater. How long does it take, for
example, for an upgrade, if we find something on the--a good
example that was mentioned earlier, the yo-yo ball? What is an
example on that? Is there a voluntary standard on that? Of
course, I assume it is all produced overseas.
Mr. Stratton. Congressman, to give you an example. When I
came into the Commission 2 years ago, I began to oversee two
standards that we were working on. The CPSC has never passed a
major rule or regulation under the Federal definition. We have
never done that, and we are working on two now. One is on a
flammability safety standard for upholstered furniture. The
other one is for mattresses. The petition for a flammability
standard for furniture was filed in 1994. There was a lot of
preliminary work that went on before that. The one for
mattresses was filed in 1997. And we are going to have a
package, I am happy to say, on the mattresses by the end of
this month, and you will have a regulation that the Commission
will vote on on a new cutting edge standard for mattresses, and
in November we are going to have the furniture flammability
standard come out in a package from our staff, and it will be
ready to be commented on and then voted on.
Mr. Green. Seven years would be, that would be the average?
Mr. Stratton. I hesitate to say what the average is. But
with the procedure and with all of the stakeholders that are
involved and all of the legal requirements that are involved,
it takes a very long time to pass a standard.
Mr. Green. Let me ask another question, because since
talking to a lot of retailers most of our toys, for example,
are made in China. And I am glad you are aggressively trying to
deal with that. We have that problem in lots of manufacturing,
the standards maybe in China are so much different from ours.
And are you, for example, if Babies-R-Us imports X number of
toys, I assume Babies-R-Us is such a large retailer they would
have some interest in making sure that whatever they are
importing meets not only your standards or their industry
standards, but also that they don't want to be sued by some
irate parent or definitely not an irate grandparent. Who
inspects those when they come in? Is it just left to the
retailer?
Mr. Stratton. Well, some of them are inspected by U.S.
Customs Service, and by our staff. We have staff at the ports,
which is where I am going later today to tour and to work with
Customs at the Port of Los Angeles, which is the biggest port.
Mr. Green. The biggest port for the Far East.
Mr. Stratton. So it is done there. But, like Customs, we
don't do nearly all of them. And that is why we do have to rely
upon the importers, holding their feet to the fire, and also
holding the retailers' feet to the fire. I believe that the
retailers, most all of them, certainly the ones you are talking
about, have people right there in the factories, right there in
China making sure on a day-to-day basis that these toys are
built to standard.
Mr. Green. Okay. Mr. Chairman, I appreciate my time. Thank
you, again. Thank you for calling this hearing and raising
attention to the issue.
Mr. Stearns. Thank you.
Mr. Terry.
Mr. Terry. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman, in your statement, I am--just a couple of trivia
type questions here. You had mentioned that in 2004 the
agencies conducted 356 recalls, a 27 percent increase from the
prior year, covering more than 200 million consumer products
compared to 41 the previous year. It sounds like you are doing
a pretty decent job here. As another parent of a 10-year-old, a
6-year-old, and a 4-year-old, obviously we have got a lot of
toys and one of my favorite places to shop is a store called
Nobbies that sells just basically the stuff that you get at
little fairs and stuff, and I love it because they are about 50
cents apiece as opposed to the--and break very quickly; they
just break a little bit sooner than the more expensive versions
is all.
As a parent, I know I have a certain responsibility. But as
a parent I am curious; with 200 million consumer products that
you have dealt with, that CPSC has dealt with this year,
generally what are some of those? Does it fall in one
particular category of toys or products.
Second, I am curious as to how those 200 million come to
your attention. Is it by consumer complaints? Is it by
inspections at the ports? How do you find out about 200 million
products that are potentially unsafe?
Mr. Stratton. The way that we find out about most of the
products that result in recalls is reports by the manufacturer
or the retailer. They are required by the CPSA, Consumer
Product Safety Act, to immediately report any product that has
a known product hazard. If they do not, we are able to fine--
fine is not the legal term--up to $1.65 million. I can assure
members, nobody likes to be fined by the Consumer Product
Safety Commission. It does not matter how much it is; it is
like getting on TV and knowing you have a product that you have
been fined for and that you have not reported. That is the way
we find out about most of them.
We also find out from consumer complaints and from the
media from time to time, and then we do have across the country
our staff that goes in and shops the stores. We go in and buy
various products in stores. They go in and inspect things, as
well, in the stores to see if things are meeting standards.
Frankly, it is mostly the reports that we get from the
manufacturers because of the very severe legal requirement they
have on them.
Mr. Terry. Do you feel this severe legal requirement is
effective? I call it a self-report. How do you feel; do we
catch the vast majority, 100 percent, 90 percent, versus just
the percent that stay quiet and let them be distributed
throughout our toy stores?
Mr. Stratton. I don't know the number. I know it is taken
very seriously by the industry. Easily the most contentious
issue I have had to deal with at the Consumer Product Safety
Commission with the industry are these penalties. We are
involved with a number of them now, trying to figure out better
ways for them to report. There is no doubt in my mind they take
it very seriously.
Mr. Terry. How many fines have you been able to levy to
make your point?
Mr. Stratton. The number was 4.2 million this last year. It
will probably be a little more than that in the upcoming year.
It was down the previous year, so these fluctuate from time to
time. The Commission started taking the penalty situation
seriously in the year 2000. Prior to that time penalties were
not an issue. As you can see from the graph, they have gone up
substantially since that time. We are using it more and more.
Mr. Terry. And you feel that is effective and getting their
attention? Self-reporting is up, and do you feel that is why
you have 200 million in 2004 versus 41 million the prior year?
Mr. Stratton. Based upon what I hear, what people say to
me, I know it is effective and I know it is the biggest concern
folks have when it comes to having to deal with the Commission
from a penalty standpoint.
Mr. Terry. Getting back to my initial question, is there
any particular category that makes up the predominant area of
recalls?
Mr. Stratton. Talking about toys?
Mr. Terry. Toys. Or child products. And/or.
Mr. Stratton. Last year we had 11 deaths from toys in the
country of children under the age of 15. Almost all of those
were choking hazards. Three or four were balloons that children
choked on. The others are small balls. So the biggest concern I
have always had as a parent--because I go home to the
laboratory every night with a 9- and 5-year-old--are things
that kids could choke on.
Small parts--we have a small-parts rule that indicates that
you cannot have a toy made for children age 3 and under with
small parts that can come off with a certain amount of
pressure. That, and sharp points; those things that are obvious
are the other things that are the biggest things to look for.
Mr. Terry. Products, any products particularly inherently
more dangerous?
Mr. Stratton. We talked about baseballs. I mean, you see a
number of injuries with baseballs.
Bicycles. We have 650,000 emergency room visits a year from
bicycles.
Scooters. There are plenty of things out there that injure
people.
Mr. Terry. Thank you. That is all, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Stearns. Mr. Issa.
Mr. Issa. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
I am a very interested observer, although like a lot of us
in the Congress, we are in the doughnut hole. My son is 23 and
single. I don't know how he got to be 23. He bicycled, he
scootered, he surfed, he played baseball and football. Poorly
but aggressively. He did the merry-go-round, the monkey bars,
the swings, and always came off the swing for that big jump
that you can get at the top of the arc. He still loves trees
and has not broken anything, amazingly, from a tree. He has
other ways.
I guess my concern is I don't think we should take lightly
three deaths from a specific toy, or 300 complaints. But if I
heard you correctly, the fact is that your ability--
government's ability in this case, is to, one, set standards
that even if they are voluntary, if they are adhered to, will
make safer product; if they are not adhered to, will clearly
put companies at risk of product liability claims, higher
losses if they are sued and the like.
We can certainly require marking and education on the
products, and we have done that. Congress has done that in many
areas, cigarettes being the most notable. We can sponsor
education with our own money or with industry's money, and we
can operate in a prohibition mode of saying thou shall not
import, you will not have that. Those are the tools we have in
government.
If I understand correctly, the ranking member seems to
think that prohibition is an important tool here, and I would
like you to respond if I have missed it somewhere, that if we
want to save lives and prevent injury, baseball, football, all
small balls, balloons, especially at birthday parties where
there are multiple young children, and I guess I am throwing in
monkey bars and everything else in the way of exercise
equipment, including bicycling, should be part of that
prohibition and we would save a lot of lives, wouldn't we?
Mr. Stratton. If you eliminated all of those products?
Mr. Issa. Yes, sir.
Mr. Stratton. I suppose you would.
Mr. Issa. My question is what would kids go to then, under
the sink and the Clorox bottle? Isn't there an inevitability if
you do not do your best to have well-described, well-regulated,
well-regulated toys from quality manufacturers, that the
alternative is they will do what we did as kids, made our own
toys, most of which were far more lethal?
Mr. Stratton. I am sure that is correct. I went through the
same thing when I was a kid. Frankly, based on what I do with
my kids, I am surprised I am here.
Mr. Issa. I do have one question and I don't want to appear
to be making light of this hearing. I think it is very
important. I heard an unconscionably long process that you
inherited 2 years ago when you came in, not unlike our ability
to move legislation here; 7 years is not considered to be
unreasonable for significant actions.
What can we do here in the Congress, possibly even on this
committee, to empower you to dramatically increase the speed at
which you can operate to point out changes necessary, either
voluntarily or in other ways, and what can we do to help you
enforce compliance?
Mr. Stratton. Let me make sure I understand the question.
Your question is directed toward compliance or toward
promulgation of safety regulations?
Mr. Issa. First of all, safety regulations. If the pet rock
were around for more than 7 years at its heyday, that would be
great. But if the pet rock were dangerous, we would quit making
and selling them in about 5 years.
Mr. Stratton. We have a three-step process by which we have
to go about promulgating regulations. I am told that other
agencies in the Federal Government only have to do this process
when it is a major regulation, yet we have to do it on all
regulations. I have the staff here, and many of our people have
been at this agency 30 years and know this better than I do.
Mr. Issa. They have seen 2 or 3 regulations concluded.
Mr. Stratton. There are not that many regulations, but I
think that doubles the time that it takes us to promulgate the
regulation. When you take a situation right now that we are in
where we have a consensus amongst all of our stakeholders
regarding a new mattress flammability regulation, yet we have
to proceed through what I think are unnecessary steps, I think
some improvement could be made in our enabling legislation
maybe to put us on the same footing as other agencies in the
Federal Government as far as going forward with regulations.
Mr. Issa. I would look forward with my staff to helping
author such legislation. I am also quite certain that the
chairman and ranking member would look forward to assisting in
that, and that could be the greatest benefit of today's
hearing. Thank you.
Mr. Stearns. The ranking member has requested another
round. I had suggested she could ask one more question. I know
you have a flight at Dulles a little after noon.
Ms. Schakowsky. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
We talked about voluntary standards. My understanding is
that the process for setting voluntary standards ends with a
vote among the stakeholders; is that correct?
Mr. Stratton. It is a vote on the voluntary standard
committee. You could call them stakeholders. I have not heard
them referred to like that, but it is whoever is on that
particular voluntary committee.
Ms. Schakowsky. I am going to quote from Marla Felcher who
is one of her witnesses, her book. ``As a final step the group
as a whole, the manufacturers, engineers, testing labs, recall
consultants and the consumer advocates will vote to accept or
reject the new voluntary standard for carriers.'' Each
organization gets one vote. That is, each manufacturer, testing
lab, consultant, and consumer group, except the CPSC. The
agency is required to participate in the discussions, but it is
not allowed to vote. ``Outnumbered by the manufacturers and
their service providers, the consumer advocates rarely win.''
It seems to me that a process where the people who stand to
profit from the sale of a product, that they are the ones who
establish a voluntary standard so they can comply or not comply
because it is voluntary, and they get to vote and in a way
stack the vote by having the larger number, how can that be in
the public interest?
Mr. Stratton. Well, I can tell you what we do that is a
check on that process. We do not acknowledge the voluntary
standard until it has been reviewed by our technical staff and
they determine that it adequately meets the risk to be
remedied. Second, that it is able to be complied with.
So CPSC professional staff make a determination before CPSC
acknowledges that standard. It doesn't really matter who has
voted on it or who has not voted on it, it is whether CPSC
staff has made that determination on behalf of the agency and
the government.
Ms. Schakowsky. But they are not making an independent
judgment just given the facts. They have to examine what the
vote is. I am just saying it seems to me that by the very
nature of the process, it is skewed toward the interest of the
manufacturers and those who stand to profit, rather than just
an objective analysis, which I think is what is required.
Mr. Stratton. I understand your point of view, but I will
quarrel with whether they are making an independent judgment.
When they look at these, it does not matter who participated in
it. It could have been all consumer groups or all industry.
They look at it to determine from an engineering standpoint,
human factors standpoint, consumer products safety standpoint,
if it meets the risk that is to be remedied.
Mr. Stearns. Chairman Stratton, thank you very much for
your time. Obviously some day we hope to reauthorize your
agency. We have put in for it. It is not as high priority as it
should be, we on this committee think it is. We appreciate your
time, and we thank all of those people who have served so many
years in the agency for all of their hard work. I think the
American public appreciates their efforts, too.
Mr. Stratton. Thank you. We are completely at the
committee's service when it comes to reauthorization because we
understand that process, and we are happy to cooperate however
we can be of help.
Mr. Stearns. We have had other agencies we have not done
either, and you might think in terms of what you would like to
see. We have an election, God willing I come back, and I would
like to sit down and see what you would like to see, including
more funding. Funding over the last 30 years has not kept up,
certainly, compared to other government agencies. You are doing
an important job with a lot less money, inflationary-wise than
other agencies.
With that, we will bring up the second panel, and we
appreciate your patience for waiting.
Mr. Stearns. Ms. Ginzel, we will start with you.
STATEMENT OF LINDA GINZEL
Ms. Ginzel. Good morning, Chairman Stearns and Ranking
Member Schakowsky. It is a privilege to be here today. My name
is Linda Ginzel. I am on the faculty at the University of
Chicago Business School. I live in Chicago, Illinois with my
husband and three sons.
I would like to start by telling you about my son, Danny.
Danny was a healthy, happy, and beautiful kid. He had this
amazing ability to engage anyone he met. When he was about a
year old, I took him to New York to visit my sister. The
passenger in the seat in the plane next to me played with him,
and the flight attendants took turns holding him. Four months
after that trip to New York, Danny was dead. Among the
condolences my family received, there was an e-mail from one of
the passengers on that flight. She had heard about Danny's
death on the local news, remembered his name, remembered I told
her I taught at the university, and she realized he was that
sweet baby she played with on the airplane.
She wrote, ``I remember what a wonderful baby he was on
that flight and how others were amazed as well.'' She was also
mourning his death.
I am here to testify today because 6 years ago on May 12,
1998, my 16-month-old son Danny was strangled at his licensed
day care in my Chicago neighborhood, Lincoln Park. I am here to
testify because there is absolutely no reason for this to
happen to anyone ever again. Danny's death was completely
preventable.
My beautiful little boy was killed by a defective
children's product, a crib, the Playskool Travel-Lite portable
crib. It was where he napped in the afternoon at his child care
home. This particular crib has hinges in the top rail that
allow it to fold flat for storage. This crib is defective
because it can collapse unexpectedly with a child still inside,
and this is what happened to my son. The top rails collapsed
into a V-shape around his neck, and, like an animal trap, his
own weight caused the V-shape to close tighter and tighter
around his neck. It cutoff the oxygen to his brain. This crib
collapsed without falling over, without making a sound, and
within minutes my son was dead.
At first we thought it was a freak accident. No one to be
blamed, it was no one's fault. It was a loving child care
provider, there was no rhyme or reason; bad luck, bad timing.
But the day after we buried our son we learned that it was not
an accident. We read in the Chicago Tribune that the Playskool
Travel-Lite crib had been recalled 5 years ago. The recall was
in 1993 and Danny died in 1998. We discovered to our horror
that he was the fifth baby whose neck was caught between the
top rails of that crib, that brand of crib.
The first baby, Arnold from Commerce, California, died in
1991.
Elisa from Solon Springs, Arkansas died in 1992.
The third baby, Elizabeth from Agoura, California, died in
the crib on January 5, 1993.
It was only after three dead children that the Playskool
Travel-Lite crib was recalled with a press release issued on
March 10, 1993.
Two years after the recall, the fourth baby, William from
Indianapolis, Indiana, died in that Playskool crib, and my
beautiful Danny was the fifth child to be strangled to death.
We read in the newspaper that morning, we learned it was
not a freak accident. Danny was dead because the Playskool crib
is a death trap. We could not understand why babies were still
dying after a recall. What exactly was involved in a recall we
did not know. We later discovered that the recall was a half-
hearted effort and less than 9,000 of the 12,000 original cribs
were still unaccounted for when the CPSC closed its books on
the recall in June 1996.
Remember, the great majority of these cribs were still out
there, and we did everything we could to notify other parents,
word of mouth, e-mail, media. Our family felt an enormous sense
of responsibility because we had the information, we knew how
many of those deadly cribs were out there. We believed they
would kill again, and they did.
Although my family worked with all of the strength that we
could muster in those weeks and months after Danny was killed,
just 3 months after my son died, another baby in New Jersey
died exactly the same way, the sixth victim of the Playskool
Travel-Lite crib.
I am sure you are asking the question, how is it three
children died after this product was recalled? My husband and I
have spent 6 agonizing years trying to find the answers to this
question.
The most agonizing thing that we learned is that Danny did
not have to die. I hope that during the question and answer,
you ask me about the steps that could have been taken that
would have prevented his death.
Danny was caught between commerce and politics. Danny is
dead because the system of juvenile product safety is broken.
Congress bears a major responsibility and you have the power to
fix it. The case of the Playskool Travel-Lite crib that killed
my son exemplifies all of the elements of this broken system. I
came to Washington today to help you understand what can be
done. I beg you to use your power to act on behalf of all
children.
But there is an even more profound point. What the CPSC
should do, what the American public should do, what Congress
should do, is to ask the real question: Why are there so many
recalls to begin with? Why are there so many defective
children's products on the market? Why is anybody, from fly by-
night operations to trusted giants like Hasbro, allowed to sell
deadly products?
Danny did not die because of a woefully ineffective recall
alone; he died like too many other children, because children's
products are not required to be tested before they are sold.
If I may say something about the product that killed my
son, in the case of the product that killed my son, Hasbro put
its trusted Playskool name on the product that killed him. They
did not perform a single safety test or find out whether the
manufacturer, Kolcraft, did any safety testing. There is no
documentation to be found anywhere that this crib was ever
tested. What is the result? Less than 12,000 Playskool Travel-
Lite cribs were sold, and six babies died. That is one dead
baby for every 2,000 cribs sold. Let me say that again. One
dead baby for every 2,000 cribs sold. Your son or daughter has
much higher odds of surviving a tour of duty in Iraq than being
placed in a Playskool Travel-Lite crib.
My Danny did not have to die. He died because the system is
broken. You have the power to fix it and I sincerely hope you
have the will to do so. I am not asking you to create a
children's product safety system that completely prevents death
and injury. All I am asking is that you not allow other
children to die like my son did. No one's child should die in
an untested, dangerous children's product, and no one should
die because manufacturers refuse to take responsibility for
their deadly products.
We hope that other families will not suffer a tragedy as
senseless as the one we have had to endure since the death of
our beloved son. Without Danny, our family is forever
incomplete. We hope that the work we do in his loving memory
will protect the children you love, and we hope that you have
the courage to help us.
Mr. Stearns. Ms. Ginzel, thank you. We understand CPSC's
general counsel is in the audience, and we have some of the
employees. Even though the Chairman has left, they are kind
enough to have their people stay to hear you, and we appreciate
your advocacy and you have come to the right place.
[The prepared statement of Linda Ginzel follows:]
Prepared Statement of Linda Ginzel
My name is Linda Ginzel. I am a mother. I am also a professor at
the University of Chicago. My husband, Boaz Keysar, is also a
professor. This means that like many parents we rely on childcare.
Six years ago, on May 12, 1998, my 16\1/2\ month-old son Danny was
strangled at his licensed childcare facility in our Chicago
neighborhood. There is absolutely no reason for this to ever happen
again. Danny's death was completely preventable.
My little boy was killed by a defective children's product--a
crib--the Playskool Travel-Lite portable crib--where he napped in the
afternoons at his childcare home.
This crib has hinges in the top rails that allow it to collapse and
fold flat for storage. This type of crib is defective because it can
collapse unexpectedly while the product is in use.
According to the U.S. Consumer Product Safety Commission (CPSC),
Danny was not the first baby to die in the Playskool Travel-Lite, he
was not the second, he was not the third, and he was not even the
fourth child to die. My son, Daniel, was the fifth baby whose neck was
caught between the top rails of this crib when it collapsed and
strangled him to death. On August 19, 1998--three months after Danny
died--10-month old William Curran of Fair Haven, New Jersey became this
crib's sixth victim.
After we buried our son, my husband and I learned that 1.5 million
portable cribs of similar collapsing, top-rail design by five
manufacturers have been recalled, but according to the Chicago Tribune
(June 15, 1998) over one million may still be in use. As of today, the
official death count from these portable cribs stands at 16 children.
The most recent victim was killed in March 2004 in rural Wisconsin.
How is it possible that my son died in this way? How can such a
deadly crib be found in a licensed childcare facility? You should know
that just eight days before this crib collapsed and killed my son, his
childcare home passed a routine inspection conducted by the Illinois
Department of Children and Family Services.
Since Danny died, my husband and I have learned a lot about the
factors that contributed to our son's death: ineffective recall and
failure to test. Unfortunately, the problem goes far beyond collapsing
portable cribs. The CPSC recalls children's products at a rate of two
per week. In 2004 alone, this amounted to over 23 million individual
units, not including car seats. Because the CPSC relies largely on
asking the media to inform the public, many people remain unaware of
the dangers.
In the case of the Playskool Travel-lite crib that killed my son,
here is what we learned about the ineffective recall and failure to
warn the public about this deadly product:
It was only after three children died that Kolcraft recalled the
Playskool crib.
Though the crib was proven deadly, Kolcraft and Hasbro sought to
minimize the publicity surrounding the recall and resisted the
efforts of the US Consumer Product Safety Commission (CPSC) to
make the public aware of the hazards.
In a 1993 letter, the CPSC reprimanded Kolcraft for failing to
provide adequate notice to the public: ``The [. . .] thin stock
`poster' went to retailers had many serious shortcomings, in
our view. It did not even have the Playskool name on the
crib.'' The letter lists additional shortcomings of Kolcraft's
minimal recall efforts and concludes, ``This was a very
disappointing effort and it is not likely to be an effective
public notice mechanism.''
Despite such failings, Kolcraft continued to resist the CPSC's
attempts to warn parents.
Kolcraft then sought to conceal the issue by asking the CPSC to purge
its files of the CPSC's letter that detailed their egregious
conduct.
Less that one month after the recall, Kolcraft tried to reduce
publicity. They questioned the need for distribution of a
video, and tried to justify putting an end to the publicity on
the bass of low recall rates being common in the industry.
They also objected to the number of videotapes suggested by the CPSC
saying that they ``did not want the message replayed.''
By including confidentiality provisions in settlements with other
Playskool Travel-lite victims, they further suppressed
information about the deadly crib.
Hasbro was not involved in the recall. For years, Hasbro did nothing
to inform the public, despite its multi billion-dollar ability
to reach the public when they want to sell their products.
Only after the sixth baby died in August of 1998, and after we sent a
letter to Hasbro CEO Alan Hassenfeld asking them to inform
registered child care facilities of the recall, did they do so.
This is, of course, too little, too late.
Hasbro and Kolcraft continue to have the moral and ethical obligation
to warn their trusting customers. Yet, eight years after the
recall, six babies are dead and thousands of these deadly cribs
are still unaccounted for. Hasbro and Kolcraft have failed this
ethical test miserably.
There is absolutely no reason for another child to die due to the
lack of information about unsafe, recalled products. Manufacturers use
advertising to reach into our homes everyday when they want to sell us
their new products, why can't they could do the same to retrieve their
recalled products?
But beyond informing parents and caregivers about recalls, we
learned that recalls are only a symptom of the real problem: a lack of
adequate pre-market safety testing. Here's what we learned about the
crib that killed our son:
The Playskool crib was originally designed by Ed Johnson, a draftsman
with a high school education.
Kolcraft could not produce documents to show that any safety tests
were actually performed.
There was no evidence that any safety engineer tested the crib before
it was sold.
Hasbro did not verify that any testing was conducted. They asked
Kolcraft to provide test data but they never received any.
Despite putting their Playskool brand name on the crib, Hasbro never
tested the product.
As a result, Boaz and I founded a nonprofit organization called
Kids In Danger dedicated to improving children's product safety
(www.KidsInDanger.org). The immediate focus of our efforts was on
educating the public about dangerous children's products. We believe
that people have the right to know that their children could be in
danger. This is an area where there is so much to be done that even
small efforts can make a big difference in getting the word out to the
public and saving lives. Our long-term goal is to convince
manufacturers to design safer children's products and to do pre-market
safety tests on their products instead of using our homes and childcare
facilities as their testing grounds.
We hope that other families will not suffer a tragedy as senseless
as the one we have had to endure since the death of our beloved son. We
hope that the work we do in Danny's loving memory will protect the
children you love and we hope that you have the will and the courage to
help us. Thank you.
Mr. Stearns. Ms. Lipin.
STATEMENT OF LISA A. LIPIN
Ms. Lipin. Chairman Stearns and Ranking Member Schakowsky
and members of the subcommittee, my name is Lisa Lipin and I
thank you for the opportunity to address you today.
I am a Chicago mother who started a grassroots campaign to
get the Yo-Yo Water Ball banned for sale, not recalled, in the
United States after my then 5-year-old son Andrew was strangled
by the cord, this toy, when I was home. Thankfully I was there
to save Andrew from what I believe could have been a fatal
incident. These toys are being imported from overseas without
any government regulation as to the safety of the product. Yo-
Yo Water Balls were included in the 2003 list of dangerous toys
released by both the U.S. Pirg and World Against Toys Causing
Harm.
I am concerned about the way that CPSC has addressed the
safety concerns of this toy. I contacted the CPSC on July 23,
2003 to file an incident report. I was dumbfounded to find out
that the CPSC was aware of the potential strangulation hazard.
I asked when the CPSC planned to make the public aware of the
dangers of the toy, and was told that a public statement would
not be released until their investigation was complete. I
expressed my dissatisfaction with the CPSC's decision to not
make this important child safety information public. I feared
that a child was going to be seriously if not fatally injured.
Thus, I decided that I would take action by bringing this issue
to the public.
I contacted the media of various retailers, consumer
advocates, and politicians. I spoke with parents around the
country whose children had been injured. One parent, Tina
Schreffler, a New Jersey mother, recently testified before the
New Jersey Assembly Consumer Affair Committee regarding a
proposed State ban. Together, Tina and I have designed a
dedicated Web site to show parents the dangers of this toy.
I contacted CEOs of major corporations to ask them to
remove the toy from their inventory. Most told me that they
rely heavily on the CPSC to determine the safety of the toy.
Some companies were unaware there was a safety issue related to
this toy at all. Because of the limited action taken by the
CPSC, these companies considered this toy safe. I provided
companies with documentation of the severity and true nature of
injuries which is from information gleaned from documents I had
received from the CPSC myself. My efforts persuaded 7-Eleven
Corporation to issue an advisory to 5,300 stores around the
country that this toy could not be sold. eBay, which initially
told me they that they relied on the CPSC for direction, and
therefore would not prohibit the sale of the toy, reversed
their decision just 2 days later after they received my
document and the letter from Congresswoman Schakowsky.
Kmart has recently agreed to stop selling the toys, and KB
Toys has agreed to cancel all future orders. However, these
toys are still available because there are companies, such as
Oriental Trading Company in Nebraska, who continue to sell the
toy despite the information I have provided.
I contacted Congresswoman Schakowsky about my concerns and
to ask for congressional assistance. She promptly got involved
in this issue by writing letters to Chairman Stratton about our
shared concerns. Most recently she spearheaded a letter to
retailers urging them to remove the toy from store shelves.
My son Andrew and I also testified in front of the Illinois
Health and Human Services Committee earlier this year. At my
urging, there has been a bipartisan effort in the State of
Illinois and the writing of a resolution which urged the CPSC
to ban the toy.
I receive monthly updates from the CPSC on injuries
pertaining to Yo-Yo Water Balls. The CPSC has been very
cooperative in providing the information I have requested. To
date, there have been 392 reported injuries, 279 of those were
strangulations. The CPSC issued a mild advisory stating there
were no lasting injuries, and 7 cases had reported broken blood
vessels and the toy posed only a low but potential risk of
strangulation. This advisory failed to mention the true nature
of reported injuries. Parents that I have spoken to have
reported that they found their children unconscious, lifeless,
gasping for air, foaming at the mouth, red, blue and purple in
color. Some children have been hospitalized for strangulation.
One child that passed out in Ohio, a 4-year old, suffered a
skull fracture. Some children have sustained permanent eye
injuries, requiring them to have lens implants and glaucoma
surgeries.
I have tried to get the CPSC to ban the toy and issue a new
advisory stating the true nature of injuries, both of which the
CPSC has refused to do. While Mr. Stratton mentioned there are
only 10 emergency room visits pertaining to this toy, that is
only those emergency rooms that are part of the NEIS System,
the National Emergency Injury Surveillance System; but what
about the ERs in this country that are not part of this system?
A major concern with the CPSC is the manner in which
important safety information is disseminated to the public.
Many parents I spoke to told me while the CPSC investigator who
originally came to their home promised there would be follow-
up, there was none. It appears to me the response of the CPSC
is perfunctory. They do not seem to look past their statutory
mandate to expose real dangers that they know exist. The
consumer believes that when they call and report an incident,
that it will be counted as an actual occurrence. What they are
not told is if they do not return a signed copy of the report,
it is considered unconfirmed by the CPSC, and no follow-up
happens.
Another problem is with the reporting system. When new
incidents about the Yo-Yo Water Balls have come up recently,
the CPSC just sends a letter to the parents and tells them that
they will look into the matter and these parents believe their
incident is isolated.
Another administrative concern is the CPSC's inability to
have all of the data collected in one place. When I requested a
summary of all incident reports, my own report was not included
due to the way it was coded. How many other reports have been
misplaced in the data base?
Last, the CPSC has a tendency to minimize the severity of
the reported injuries by using the term ``partially
strangled.'' This issue is one of being strangled. The fact
that death did not occur does not lessen that injury. It must
be remembered that children have been injured, not partially
injured, some even permanently injured.
It appears, whether true or not, that the CPSC attempts to
minimize the risks of at least this toy, the Yo-Yo Water Ball.
This seems more apparent as other countries have banned the toy
with far less injuries.
The CPSC claims that a proposed ban does not meet
congressionally mandated standards. I believe the CPSC should
itself be bringing this concern to Congress. A product is not
any less dangerous to children just because it is perceived to
have not met the congressional standard. This country needs to
change the guidelines for determining the safety of all
children's products, including toys. Thank you.
[The prepared statement of Lisa A. Lipin follows:]
Prepared Statement of Lisa A. Lipin, Kids In Danger
Chairman Stearns and Ranking Member Schakowsky and members of this
committee, I want to thank you for the opportunity to address you
today. My name is Lisa Lipin. I am a Chicago mother who started a grass
roots campaign to get the Yo-Yo Water Ball banned for sale in the
United States after my then, 5 year old son, Andrew was strangled by
the cord. Thankfully, I was home to save Andrew from what I believe
could have been a fatal incident.
These toys are being imported from overseas without any government
regulation as to the safety of the product. Yo-Yo Water Balls were
included in the 2003 lists of dangerous toys released by both U.S. Pirg
and W.A.T.C.H. (World Against Toys Causing Harm). The toy is a rubber
type liquid filled ball attached to a stretchy rubber cord. The toy is
inexpensive selling for $1-$2. Most often the toy is packaged in a
clear plastic bag without any warning label. The cord of the toy can
stretch several feet posing a strangulation risk to children. The
liquid inside the ball has also been proven by some to be toxic and
flammable. This toy has been banned for sale in countries around the
world. But in the United States it is still available.
I am concerned about the way in which the CPSC has addressed the
safety concerns of this toy. I contacted the CPSC on 7/23/03 to file an
incident report. I was dumbfounded to find out that the CPSC was aware
of the potential strangulation hazard. I asked when the CPSC planned on
making the public aware of the dangers of the toy and was told that a
public statement would not be made until their investigation was
complete. I expressed my dissatisfaction with the CPSC's decision to
not make this important child safety information available to the
public. I feared that a child was going to be seriously if not fatally
injured. Thus, I decided that I would take action by bringing this
issue to the public. I contacted the media, various retailers, consumer
advocates and politicians. I spoke with parents around the country
whose children had been injured. One parent, Tina Schreffler, a NJ
mother, recently testified for the NJ Assembly Consumer Affair
Committee regarding a proposed state ban. Together, Tina & I have
worked to bring this issue to parents around the country by designing a
dedicated website to the Dangers of the Yo-Yo Water Ball.
I contacted CEO's of major corporations to ask them to remove the
toy from their inventory. Most told me they rely heavily on the CPSC to
determine the safety of a toy. Some companies were unaware there was a
safety issue related to the toy. Because of the limited action taken by
the CPSC these companies considered the toy safe. I provided these
companies with documentation of the severity and true number of
injuries. This was information that was gleaned from documents that I
had received from the CPSC. My efforts persuaded 7-Eleven Corp. to
issue an advisory to 5300 stores that this toy could not be sold. eBay,
which initially told me that they relied on the CPSC for direction and
therefore would not prohibit the sale of the toy, reversed their
decision 2 days later after receiving my documentation. K-mart has
recently agreed to stop selling the toy. KB Toys has agreed to cancel
all future orders.
I contacted my Congresswoman, Jan Schakowsky, about my concerns and
to ask for congressional assistance. She promptly got involved with
this issue by writing letters to Chairman Stratton about our shared
concerns. Most recently, she spearheaded a letter to retailers urging
them to remove the toy from store shelves.
My son, Andrew and I testified in front of the Illinois Senate's
Health & Human Services Committee earlier this year. At my urging,
there has been a bipartisan effort in the state of Illinois in the
writing of a Resolution urging the CPSC to ban the toy. Democratic
State Senator Jeffrey Schoenberg and Republican State Representative
Elizabeth Coulson sponsored this Resolution.
I receive monthly updates from the CPSC on injuries pertaining to
this toy. The CPSC has been very cooperative in providing the
information that I've requested. To date, there have been 392 reported
injuries, 279 of those were strangulations. The CPSC issued a mild
advisory stating that there were no lasting injuries and seven cases
had reported broken blood vessels and that the toy posed only a ``low
but potential risk of strangulation''. This advisory failed to mention
the true nature of reported injuries. Parents have reported that they
have found their children unconscious, lifeless, gasping for air,
foaming at the mouth, red, blue, and purple in color. Children have
gone to emergency rooms and some hospitalized for strangulation. One
child that passed out suffered a skull fracture. Some children have
sustained permanent eye injuries requiring them to have lens implant
and glaucoma surgery. I have continuously tried to get the CPSC to ban
the toy and issue a new advisory stating the true nature of injuries,
both of which the CPSC has refused to do.
A major concern with the CPSC is the manner in which important
safety information is disseminated to the public. The parents that I
contacted were not aware of the CPSC Advisory. Parents told me that
while a CPSC investigator was sent to their home, there was no
additional follow-up as promised.
It appears to me that the response of the CPSC is perfunctory. They
don't seem to look past their statutory mandate to expose real dangers
that they know exist. The consumer believes that when they call and
report an incident that it will be counted as an actual occurrence.
They are not told that they must return a signed copy of their report
if it is to be considered ``confirmed'' by the CPSC. If the report is
not returned there is no follow-up. Then the CPSC acts as if the
incident did not occur. Another problem is with the CPSC's current
reporting system. When new incidents about the Yo-Yo Water Ball have
been reported the consumer receives a generic form letter stating that
the CPSC will look into the matter leading the consumer to believe that
their incident may be isolated.
Another administrative concern is seemingly the CPSC's inability to
have all of the data collected about a particular product in one place.
When I requested a summary of all incidents reports, my own report was
not included due to the way it was coded. How many other reports are
misplaced in the data base?
Lastly, the CPSC has a tendency to minimize the severity of the
reported injuries by using the term ``partially strangled''. The issue
is one of being strangled; the fact that death did not occur does not
lessen the injury. It must be remembered that children have been
injured, not partially injured, some even permanently injured. It
appears, whether true or not, that the CPSC attempts to minimize the
risks of at least this toy. This seems more apparent as other countries
have banned the toy with far less injuries.
The CPSC claims that a proposed ``ban'' does not meet
congressionally mandated standards. I believe that the CPSC should
itself be bringing this concern to congress. A product is not any less
dangerous to children just because it does not meet the current
congressional standard. This country needs to change the guidelines for
determining the safety of all children's products including toys.
Thank you for your time.
Mr. Stearns. Ms. Felcher, welcome.
STATEMENT OF E. MARLA FELCHER
Ms. Felcher. Good morning. I would like to thank the
Chairman for inviting me to participate in this important
hearing. I am going to talk briefly today about how I got into
children's product safety, but mostly what I am going to talk
about is what I have not been able to learn. I am going to talk
about censorship at the agency.
The Chairman mentioned that information can go a long way
toward improving safety, and I agree 100 percent with that
statement. I am here today to talk about why and how
information parents need is not getting to them.
First, a little background. For 20 years I spent most of my
waking hours thinking about and doing marketing. I was a
marketing professor at the Kellogg Graduate School of
Management at Northwestern University, and I worked at various
corporate marketing jobs at Gillette, Nabisco, and various
packaged-goods companies. Yet the first I ever heard of recalls
was when my friend's son, Danny Keysar, was killed by a
recalled crib in 1998. I had a Ph.D. in marketing from one of
the top business schools in the world, I had an MBA, I knew a
lot about how to get products into homes through creative
advertising and sales and distribution strategies, but I had
never in 20 years thought about or been taught how to get those
products out of homes when they proved to be dangerous. This is
not what marketers do. They decide what color and how plush to
make a car seat or carrier cushion, whether it will be sold in
Babies R Us or Wal-Mart, and how much it will cost. Decisions
regarding product recalls fall to the corporate lawyers.
It is CPSC's job to look out for our children's interests
while the lawyers are looking out for corporate financial
interests. Yet the agency does not have the tools it needs, and
lately, it seems, sometimes does not have the motivation to
carry out their congressional mandate.
There are more dangerous and defective children's products
on the market today than there were 10 years ago, and the
problem is only going to get worse.
Why? Three reasons:
No. 1, demand for children's products is at an all-time
high. We seem to want and need more stuff for our kids than
ever before.
Second, manufacturers are under an enormous amount of
pressure from retailers like Wal-Mart to keep their costs low.
Parent want cheap prices. Many times they have no idea they are
sacrificing or having to make a tradeoff between safety and
cost. Sometimes retailers provide a hard-to-resist temptation
to manufacturers to scrimp on safety features.
Third, manufacturers have gotten very savvy about keeping
negative information about their products away from the public.
We are bombarded with ads every day about how great these
products are, how they can improve our lives. What we do not
hear is the other side of that equation.
It is no accident then when a child is injured or killed by
a product, most people do not hear about it. This is not, as
some manufacturers would like us to believe and as I have heard
them say, because parents are stupid or lazy or because they
are not doing their research. It is because protective orders
and secret settlements have become the norm in the courts, and
because manufacturers have the power to gag CPSC regulators
from telling the public all they know about a dangerous
product. I would like to spend a couple of minutes to tell you
how they do this.
There is a little known statute in the Consumer Product
Safety Act called 6(b). It prohibits anyone--it prohibits CPSC
from telling anyone, a consumer reports researcher, a mother, a
day care provider, whether a specific product is dangerous or
safe unless the manufacturer gives their permission to the CPSC
to reveal this information.
If a company does not want the public to know a brand
safety record, the CPSC is required to keep the secret. While
it may be in a consumer's best interest to know that almost 200
babies were injured in a Costco infant swing or more than 400
were injured in a Costco stationary entertainer, it is
certainly not in Costco's best interest for the public to know
this. Yet manufacturers and CPSC routinely rely on 6(b) to keep
life-and-death safety information away from the public.
What effect does CPSC's 6(b) policy have on child safety?
In 1998 I started research on what eventually became a couple
of magazine articles and a book on baby product safety. In
2000, after working on this product for more than a year--and I
think it is fair to say I know more about baby product safety
than most people--my sister got pregnant and had a baby, Liam.
My family deemed me Liam's purchasing agent; I was the expert.
My sister did not like her big sister being in this role, but I
did it. It was my job to choose the safest high chair,
stroller, and crib for Liam. Even though at this point I had
written most of this book, I had no idea what brands to buy.
The secrecy imposed on CPSC by the 6(b) statute kept me in the
dark, just like it keeps millions of other families in the
dark. I could tell my sister which products had been recalled,
I could do that by looking at the Web site, but I could not
tell her which products that were currently on the shelf at
Babies R Us would be recalled the day after I bought it.
Lacking reliable safety information, I fell back on that old
price/quality relationship. I figured the more expensive the
product, the safer it would be.
I bought Liam a Peg-Perego high chair. It cost $180. A few
weeks later it was recalled after 51 children had been
entrapped by their heads and arms. Nothing more than sheer luck
prevented Liam from being one of those unlucky children.
Manufacturers and the CPSC will tell you that they warn
consumers about dangerous products each time they issue a
recall press release, but what they do not tell you is how
these press releases get written. Every word that goes out to
the public is negotiated in highly secretive meetings between
CPSC staff and the manufacturer's lawyers.
The president of Baby Bjorn, a company that makes baby
carriers, once gave me insight as to what goes on in these
meetings when he confessed that, of course it is the
manufacturer's to play down the hazard in the press release.
They do not want parents to be alarmed. A member of CPSC's own
recall staff once told me that many companies balk at even
using the word ``recall'' in the recall press release because
parents would think they have to return the product. It is no
wonder when it comes to recalls so many parents are confused,
and they have no idea what to do.
In a few weeks I am going to China with my sister where she
is going to adopt an 18-month-old baby girl. It has been 6
years since my friend's son Danny was killed. My nephew Liam is
5 years old. After all this time has passed, I still do not
know which high chair, stroller, or crib to buy for my new
niece. This is the legacy of 6(b) and CPSC's secrecy. Thank
you.
[The prepared statement of E. Marla Felcher follows:]
Prepared Statement of E. Marla Felcher, Freelance Writer and Lecturer,
J.F. Kennedy School of Government, Harvard University
Good morning. I'd like to thank the committee for inviting me to
participate in this important hearing. I'm going to talk briefly today
about how I got into the world of children's product safety, and what I
have not been able to learn. I'm going to talk today about censorship.
For 20 years, I spent most of my waking hours thinking about and
doing marketing.
I was a marketing professor at the Kellogg Graduate School of
Management in Northwestern University, and I worked in various
corporate marketing jobs, at Gillette, Talbots, and as a consultant to
Nabisco, M&M Mars, Burlington Industries and Lederle Labs.
Yet, the first I ever heard of recalls was when my friends' son
Danny Keysar was killed by a recalled Playskool crib in 1998. I had a
Ph.D. in marketing from one of the top business schools in the world,
and I had an M.B.A. I knew a lot about how to get products into homes,
through creative advertising, sales and distribution techniques, but I
had never, in twenty years, thought about how to get those products out
of homes when they proved to be dangerous. This is not what marketers
do. They decide what color and how plush to make a car seat or carrier
cushion, whether it will be sold in Babies ``R'' Us or Wal-Mart and how
much it will cost. Decisions regarding product recalls fall to
corporate lawyers. It is CPSC's job to look out for our children's
interests, while the lawyers are looking out for corporate financial
interests. Yet, the agency does not have the tools, and lately it
seems, the motivation, to carry out their Congressional mandate.
There are more dangerous and defective children's products on the
market today than there were ten years ago, and the problem is likely
to get worse. Why? There are three reasons: First, the demand for
children's products is at an all-time high and projected to increase.
Second: Manufacturers are under enormous pressure from retailers like
Wal-Mart to keep their prices low, providing a sometimes hard-to-resist
temptation to scrimp on safety features. Third: Manufacturers have
gotten very savvy at keeping negative information about their products
away from the public. It's no accident that when a child is injured or
killed by a product, most people don't hear about it. This is not, as
some manufacturers would like us to believe, because parents are stupid
or lazy, or don't do their research. It's because protective orders and
secret settlements have become the norm in the courts, and because
manufacturers have the power to gag CPSC regulators from telling the
public all that they know about a dangerous product. I'd like to spend
what remains of my time here today discussing how they do this.
There is a statute in the Consumer Product Safety Act, called 6(b),
which prohibits CPSC from telling anyone--a Consumer Reports
researcher, a mother or daycare provider--whether a specific product is
dangerous or safe, unless the manufacturer gives the agency permission
to do so. If a company doesn't want the public to know a brand's safety
record, CPSC is required to keep the secret. While it may be in a
consumer's best interest to know that almost two-hundred babies were
injured in a Cosco infant swing or more than four-hundred injured in
the company's stationary entertainer, it is not in Cosco's best
interest for the public to know this. Yet, manufacturers and CPSC
routinely rely on 6(b) to keep life-and-death safety information out of
the public eye.
What effect does CPSC's 6(b) policy have on child safety? In 1998 I
started research on what eventually became a couple of magazine
articles and a book on baby product safety. In 2000, after I had been
working on the project for more than a year, and subsequently knew more
than most people know about children's products, my sister had a baby,
Liam. My family deemed me Liam's purchasing agent--it was my job to
choose the safest high chair and stroller and crib and carrier and all
of the other stuff parents buy. But you know what? I had no idea which
brands to buy. The secrecy imposed on CPSC by the 6(b) statute kept me
in the dark, just as it keeps millions of other families in the dark
each day. I could tell my sister which products had been recalled, but
I could not tell her which products currently on the shelf at Babies
``R'' Us would be recalled the day after I bought it. Lacking reliable
safety information, I fell back on the old price-quality relationship,
deciding that the more expensive products would be the safest. I bought
Liam a Peg Perego high chair that cost $180. A few weeks later it was
indeed recalled--after 51children had been entrapped by their heads or
arms. Nothing more than sheer luck prevented Liam from being one of
those children.
Manufacturers and the CPSC will tell you that they warn consumers
about dangerous products each time they issue a recall press release.
But what they don't tell you is how these press releases get written.
Every word that goes out to the public is negotiated in highly
secretive meetings between CPSC staff and the manufacturers' lawyers.
The president of Baby Bjorn once gave me insight into what goes on in
these meetings, when he confessed that it is the manufacturer's goal to
play down the hazard in the press release. They don't want parents to
be alarmed. A member of CPSC's recall staff once told me that many
companies balk at even using the word recall in the recall press
release, because they fear that parents will think the product must be
returned. It's no wonder that, when it comes to recalls, so many
parents are confused.
In a few weeks I am going to China with my sister, where she is
going to adopt an 18-month old baby girl. It's been more than six years
since my friends' son Danny was killed by a recalled portable crib. My
nephew Liam is almost five years old. After all of this time has
passed, I still don't know which high chair or stroller or crib to buy
for my new niece. This is the legacy of 6(b).
Mr. Stearns. Thank you.
Ms. Cowles.
STATEMENT OF NANCY A. COWLES
Ms. Cowles. Good morning, Chairman Stearns, Ranking Member
Schakowsky, and committee members. Mr. Chairman, thank you for
this opportunity to present our views on the children's product
safety system and ways to better protect children.
Kids in Danger is a nonprofit organization that is
dedicated to protecting children by improving children's
product safety. Our mission is to promote the development of
safer children's products, advocate for children, and educate
the general public. We have worked with States to implement the
Children's Product Safety Act which prohibits the sale or lease
of recalled or dangerous children's products or their use in
licensed child care, something not prohibited by Federal law.
Seven states currently have such a law. We provided
educational materials to child care providers, health care
professionals, and parents. We work with engineering programs
to increase the knowledge of safety and standards that
tomorrow's designers will bring to children's products. We are
doing all we can to protect children, and welcome this
opportunity to speak to you about the problem and solution.
As Congresswoman Schakowsky mentioned, a survey in Illinois
showed that most voters believe that manufacturers are required
to test children's products for safety before they are sold and
that the government oversees that testing.
I predict any poll of Americans would show a similar
disconnect from the real situation. Most parents, care givers,
health professionals I meet, believe that if they buy a
stroller, a high chair, a baby swing, a playpen, especially one
with a brand name they recognize, that someone, somewhere, has
made sure that product is safe. After all, this is America,
right, the land of regulations and testing and liability. They
are shocked to learn that we have no law requiring safety
testing and that government only takes action after a product
is manufactured, sold, and proved to be unsafe, a very
backwards approach in most people's eyes.
Subsequent surveys by the group that did the original one
show that super majorities, 97 percent, support a requirement
for premarket safety testing, yet it is not required; and many
products make it to store shelves that do not meet standards or
whose design put children at risk. There are many flaws in the
current recall system.
Manufacturers, as Marla mentioned, have editorial veto
power over the press release announcing the recall, allowing
them to try and downplay the danger. The only requirement of
the recall is the press release. Many companies do nothing
further to publicize the recall and millions of potential users
never hear of the danger. An effective recall, according to
CPSC, retrieves or accounts for only 10 to 30 percent of the
recalled products that are already in consumer hands.
But simply improving the recall system will not prevent
injuries and death in unsafe products. Look at just one product
type, the rotating top rail-style portable cribs that were made
and recalled in the 1990's. Linda lost her son in the first of
these cribs, the Playskool Travel-Lite, but four other
companies picked up on this untested design and used it in
their own products. These portable cribs and play areas
contained a deadly flaw that allowed the sides to collapse
strangling at least 16 children. The names of these children
and some of their stories can be found at our Web site in our
Family Voices section.
Of the deaths that we know of, nine took place before the
product was ever recalled and seven took place afterwards. So
even the most effective recall will not prevent these deaths.
We believe the answer lies in the simple solution that most
parents already believe is the case: All children's products
should be tested by independent laboratories to strict safety
standards before they are placed on store shelves. Voluntary
standards, self-reporting have not worked.
H.R. 2911, the Infant and Toddler Durable Product Safety
Act, introduced by Congresswoman Schakowsky, supported by 34
cosponsors, provides a mechanism for strong mandatory standards
and independent safety testing before products are sold. The
legislation would require the CPSC to set up a commission to
set mandatory standards for durable infant and toddler
products, those products used to care for a baby, high chairs,
strollers, cribs, portable cribs, about 16 products in all.
Unlike the ASTM international committee that sets voluntary
standards, this commission must be balanced between consumers,
testing labs, government and manufacturers. In addition to
developing the standards or adopting current standards as
mandatory, the commission would also develop a certification
program for independent testing laboratories and the seal that
would indicate that a product has been tested to these strict
standards. Then manufacturers will contract with testing labs
to certify their products and only products with safety seals
can be sold in the United States. It is the only way to be sure
that the products meant for our most vulnerable consumers are
as safe as we can possibly make them.
In addition, we would urge this committee and Congress to
increase its oversight of the CPSC. While companies are
required to file monthly reports on the effectiveness of each
of their recalls until the recall is closed, this information
is hidden from view, if kept at all. Congress should request an
annual report of all recall efforts that detail the number of
products in consumer use that are returned or accounted for and
the efforts made to reach likely users. Perhaps if the woeful
number shown by most manufacturers were subject to public
scrutiny, they might make more of an effort to retrieve the
products.
The Consumer Product Safety Commission, with a smaller
budget than the FDA has to oversee animal medications, has an
enormous responsibility to keep the public safe from dangerous
products. That responsibility is vital to the health and safety
of our children. We urge you to give the agency the tools they
need to do an effective job and to require them to fulfill
their responsibility.
[The prepared statement of Nancy A. Cowles follows:]
Prepared Statement of Nancy A. Cowles, Kids In Danger
Good Morning Chairman Stern and Ranking Member Schakowsky and
Committee members. Thank you for this opportunity to present our views
on the children's product safety system and ways to better protect
children.
Kids In Danger is a nonprofit organization dedicated to protecting
children by improving children's product safety. We were founded in
1998 by Linda Ginzel and Boaz Keysar, after the death of their son
Danny Keysar in a poorly designed, inadequately tested and finally
recalled portable crib. Our mission is to promote the development of
safer children's products, advocate for children and educate the
general public, especially parents and caregivers, about children's
product safety.
We have worked with states to implement the children's Product
Safety Act which prohibits the sale or lease of recalled or dangerous
children's products or their use in licensed childcare. Currently 7
states have such a law. We provide educational materials on children's
product safety to childcare providers, health care professionals,
parents and caregivers to alert them to the minefield of dangers facing
children. We are working with engineering programs at universities to
increase the knowledge of safety and standards that tomorrow's
designers will bring to children's products. We are doing all we can to
protect children and welcome this opportunity to speak to you about the
problem and solutions.
In 1999, a survey in Illinois 1 showed that 79% of
voters believed that manufacturers were required to test children's
products for safety before they were sold and 67% erroneously believed
that the government oversaw that testing. I predict that any poll of
Americans would show a similar disconnect from the real situation. Most
parents, caregivers and health professionals I meet believe that if
they buy a stroller, high chair, baby swing, or playpen, especially a
name brand they recognize, that someone, somewhere has made sure it is
safe for their baby. After all, this is America, the land of
regulations and testing and liability. They are shocked to learn that
we have no law requiring safety testing and that the government only
takes action after a product is manufactured, sold, and proved to be
unsafe--a very backwards approach in most people's eyes. Subsequent
surveys by the Coalition for Consumer Rights show that super
majorities--97%--support a requirement for premarket safety testing.
Yet it is still not required and many products make it to store shelves
that do not meet standards or whose design puts children at risk.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ Annual Survey of Illinois Voters, Coalition for Consumer
Rights, Chicago, Illinois 1999.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
There are many flaws in the current recall system. Manufacturers
have editorial veto power over the press release announcing the recall,
allowing them to try to downplay the danger. The only requirement is
the press release. Many companies do nothing further to publicize the
recall and millions of potential users never hear of the danger. An
effective recall retrieves or accounts for only 10-30% of the recalled
items already in consumer hands. But simply improving the recall system
will not prevent injuries and deaths in unsafe products.
Look just at one product type--the rotating top rail style portable
cribs that were made and recalled in the 1990's. Linda Ginzel lost her
son in the first of these cribs, the Playskool Travel Lite. But four
other companies picked up on this untested design and used it in their
own products. These portable cribs and play yards contained a deadly
flaw that allowed the sides to collapse, strangling at least 16
children that we are aware of. The names of these children and some of
their stories can be found at our website www.kidsindanger.org in the
Family Voices section. Of the deaths we are aware of, nine took place
before the recall and seven afterwards. So even the most effective
recall will not prevent all deaths from unsafe products.
We believe the answer lies in the simple solution that most parents
already believe is the case--all children's products should be tested,
by independent laboratories, to strict safety standards, before they
can be placed on store shelves. Voluntary standards and self-reporting
have not worked.
HR 2911, the Infant and Toddler Durable Product Safety Act,
introduced by Representative Schakowsky and supported by 34 co-sponsors
provides a mechanism for strong mandatory standards and independent
safety testing before products are sold. The legislation would require
the CPSC to set up a commission to set mandatory standards for durable
infant and toddler products, those products we use to care for a baby--
high chair, stroller, crib, portable crib, etc. a total of about 16
products. Unlike the ASTM International committee that sets the
voluntary standards, this commission must be balanced between
consumers, testing laboratories, government and manufacturers. In
addition to developing the standards, or adopting current standards as
mandatory, the commission will also develop a certification program for
independent testing laboratories and the seal that will indicate a
product has been independently tested to these strict standards. Then
manufacturers will contract with testing labs to certify their products
and only products with the safety seal can be sold in the United
States. This is the only way to be sure that products meant for our
most vulnerable consumers are as safe as we can possibly make them.
In addition, we would urge this committee and Congress to increase
its oversight of the CPSC. While companies are required to file monthly
reports on the effectiveness of the recall, this information is hidden
from view. Congress should request an annual report of all recalls
efforts that detail the number of products in consumer use that are
returned or accounted for and the efforts made to reach likely users.
Perhaps if the woeful numbers shown by most manufacturers were subject
to public scrutiny, they might make more of an effort to retrieve the
products.
The Committee should review repeat offenders--companies with
multiple recalls of children's products. In a 2003 report, Kids In
Danger found that several companies had as many as 12 recalls in a
decade as well as fines for not reporting consumer injuries. While any
company can have a recall, those that continue to rack up recalls each
year clearly need more scrutiny to determine if they are capable of
making safe products for children.
We also believe that the cap on penalties should be removed. If
penalties become a budgeted item, just the cost of doing business, they
will never be an effective deterrent to attempts to hide injuries and
continue to sell unsafe products.
The US Consumer Product Safety Commission, with a smaller budget
than the FDA has to oversee animal medications, has enormous
responsibility to keep the public safe from dangerous products. That
responsibility is vital to the health and safety of children. We urge
Congress to give the agency the tools they need to do an effective job
and to require them to fulfill their responsibility to us all.
Mr. Stearns. Thank you.
Mr. Klein. You have a formidable task here.
STATEMENT OF GARY S. KLEIN
Mr. Klein. Yes. I am Gary Klein with the Toy Industry
Association, and I am pleased to be here, and I want to thank
you, Mr. Chairman, and you, Congresswoman Schakowsky, for the
opportunity.
It is hard to respond to some of what I have heard. I have
two kids. They managed to reach teenagehood, somehow.
Nevertheless, we are all parents and we all share in the
tragedy when something like that happens. It makes it difficult
to go through what I have to say, but I am going to give it a
shot.
TIA is a New York-based, not-for-profit trade association
representing approximately 400 manufacturers, toy testing labs,
product safety consultants, and others. Our members account for
85 percent of the domestic toy sales, and, being global in
character, approximately 50 percent of all toys sold worldwide.
TIA emphasizes the importance that play has on all
children's lives, but to ensure that all children have a
positive play experience, our primary concern and the primary
concern of all of our members is safety.
Together with the U.S. Government and with consumer groups,
TIA and its members have led the world in the development of
toy safety standards by investing heavily in child development
research, dynamic safety testing, quality assurance testing,
risk analysis, and basic anthropometric studies of children.
Moreover, since the 1930's, TIA has established a tradition of
working with others to ensure the manufacture and distribution
of safe toys.
We are proud of our record of significant accomplishments
in the area of toy safety, working with groups such as the
National Safety Council, the National Bureau of Standards,
ANSI, ASTM, and other groups like the International Consumer
Product Health Safety Organization and National Safe Kids
Campaign to advocate the need for product safety initiatives in
both the U.S. and internationally. And, I would add, the U.S.
standards are the model for the rest of the world in toy
safety.
The commitment that we have to toy safety continues today.
In 1999, TIA launched the first year-round toy industry
consumer Web site to assist consumers with questions and
concerns about toy safety. Comprehensive and accurate
information is available any time of day through a specially
designed area on our TIA Web site.
Under the auspices of the NBS, we led in the development of
the first comprehensive safety standard in 1976, and in 1986
the standard was revised and designated under ASTM
international. The current standard is the ASTM F963-03
Standard Consumer Safety Specification For Toy Safety. The
newest revision was published in January 2004.
All Federal toy safety regulations which appear in the CFR
title 16 are referenced, and additional requirements and test
methods are included. The standard is reviewed and revised
every 5 years, at a minimum, and on an ad hoc basis to address
newly identified hazards.
ASTM is one of the largest voluntary standard development
organizations in the world, and, while technically, as we have
heard time and again, the standards are termed voluntary, that
is a misnomer. Not only is adherence to the standard required
for membership in TIA, every retailer requires a separate test.
A manufacturer of a toy can have it tested by a certified lab
and try to get it to a retailer, and that retailer will demand
that it be tested by its own lab again. Try to get a toy on a
retailer's shelf without having it tested. You cannot. Wal-Mart
requires testing in its own lab. Toys R Us requires their
testing. They all have their own labs, and it is regardless
whether it has already been tested by a certified lab. And many
of our members have state-of-the-art, up-to-date labs that go
through these tests.
I invite any Member of Congress to come visit one of these
labs and at one of these factories. Visit the Mattel lab out in
California and see the tests that those products go through.
We also put on seminars in China. Last October we conducted
roughly a week-long safety seminar for Chinese manufacturers of
toys, going over the revised ASTM standards. That was attended
by several hundred representatives from Chinese factories. They
were all translated into Chinese and we had members of the CPSC
over there to engage in discussions as well as senior safety
executives from all of our members.
I would like to talk a little about age appropriateness. We
have heard about toys. Any product, toy or not, can pose a
potential hazard in the hands of a child for whom it is not
intended. For this reason almost all toy packages include a
suggested age range for use. To help manufacturers reach a
greater degree of consistency in age-grading practices and age
labeling on toy packages, CPSC publishes a guide for age-
labeling toys.
Additionally, specific cautionary labeling requirements
specified by the ASTM standard and by the CPSC regulations
cover products such as crib gyms, electrically operated toys,
chemistry sets, and such toy features as functional points and
edges. The standard also contains cautionary labeling
requirements as mandated by CPSC relating to potential choking
hazards, as we have heard, to children under 3 years of age,
from toys or games intended for children over 3 years of age
through age 6, which contain any small part, marble, or
balloon. We supported this legislation in 1994. Regardless of
labeling, however, there is no substitute at any age for
appropriate adult supervision.
We try to make toys among the safest consumer products in
the home and we think the statistics establish that. If you
look at the CPSC statistics, among the 15 most recognized
hazards in the home toys are not even on the list. They rank
below most every other product.
I am going to skip to the end of my statement.
We are here today to address the question of child safety,
child product safety, and do the current standards provide
enough protection? If by enough protection we are talking about
perfect, zero-risk protection, the answer is no. They do not,
nor could they ever. The data tells us clearly that standards
alone are not enough. Tragically, children are still injured or
killed in traffic accidents despite tough car seat and seat
belt laws and state-of-the-art car seat technology.
Backyard pools continue to pose a danger. Children ride
bikes. We have heard about the bike accidents. Children ride
bikes and trikes into traffic. They fall over. Things happen.
Standards and legislation can only do so much. While we may
never get to zero risk for children, we must continue to try to
look for zero risk, to look for new ways to address the true
threats to the safety of our children.
We believe that education holds the key, and my association
has already recognized the importance of education and product
safety. We have to focus on the true hazards and use our
resources accordingly to get the message out. There is no
substitute, ever, for adult supervision; and it should be the
shared role of industry, consumer associations, and the CPSC to
educate consumers as to the risks out there and appropriate
behavior to protect our children. In doing so, we will have
provided parents with the necessary tools to protect the safety
of our most cherished resource, our kids.
[The prepared statement of Gary S. Klein follows:]
Prepared Statement of Gary S. Klein on Behalf of Toy Industry
Association, Inc. (TIA)
Mr. Chairman and members of the Committee, I'm Gary Klein, Senior
Vice President, Government, Legal and Regulatory Affairs, for the Toy
Industry Association, Inc. (TIA). Thank you for providing TIA an
opportunity to testify in this hearing on Child Product Safety: Do
Current Standards Provide Enough Protection?
TIA
The Toy Industry Association, Inc. is a New York City-based not-
for-profit trade association composed of more than 400 members,
including manufacturers whose aggregate sales at the retail level
exceed $24 billion annually (regular members), as well as product
design firms, toy testing labs, product safety consultants, and others
(associate members). The U.S. Toy Industry leads the world in the
innovative, cost-effective design and sale of toy products. We are in
the business of developing fun, innovative products with which children
can play and learn. TIA members account for 85% of domestic toy sales
and, global in character, approximately 50% of all toys sold worldwide.
TIA emphasizes the importance play has in all children's' lives.
Not only is it fun and educational, but a necessary part of growing up.
However, to ensure that all children have a positive play experience,
TIA's primary concern is that play is safe. Together with the U.S.
government, TIA and its members have led the world in the development
of toy safety standards by investing heavily in child development
research, dynamic safety testing, quality assurance testing, risk
analysis and basic anthropometric studies of children. Moreover, since
the 1930's, TIA has established a tradition of working with others to
ensure the manufacture and distribution of safe toys.
TIA is proud of its record of significant accomplishments in the
area of toy safety over many decades through relationships with the
National Safety Council (NSC), National Bureau of Standards (NBS),
American National Standards Institute (ANSI), ASTM International
(formerly American Society for Testing and Materials, ASTM),
International Organization for Standardization (ISO), and, of course,
with the U.S. Consumer Product Safety Commission. We have also worked
in collaboration with consumer organizations and other not-for-profits
to promote the well-being of children. This includes among others, the
International Consumer Product Health and Safety Organization (ICPHSO)
and National SAFE KIDS Campaign, to advocate the need for product
safety initiatives in both the U.S. and internationally.
This commitment to toy safety continues today, and in 1999, TIA
launched the first, year-round, toy industry consumer website to assist
consumers with questions and concerns about toy safety. Comprehensive
and accurate information is available any time of day, through a
specially-designed area on the TIA website: http://www.toytia.org/
Content/NavigationMenu/Parents/Toy_Safety/Toy_Safety.htm
VOLUNTARY ASTM CONSUMER SAFETY SPECIFICATION ON TOY SAFETY IS THE
``GOLD'' STANDARD
Under the auspices of NBS, TIA led in the development of the first
comprehensive safety standard in 1976, and in 1986, the standard was
revised and designated under ASTM International. The current standard
is the ASTM F963-03 Standard Consumer Safety Specification for Toy
Safety, published in January 2004.All of the federal toy safety
regulations, which appear in the Code of Federal Regulations Title 16-
Commercial Practices, are referenced in ASTM F963, and additional
requirements and test methods are included. The standard is reviewed
and revised every five years, at a minimum, and on an ad hoc basis to
address newly identified hazards. ASTM is one of the largest voluntary
standards development organizations in the world. And while,
technically, ASTM F963 is a ``voluntary'' standard, that really is a
misnomer. Not only is adherence to the standard required for TIA
membership; toy manufacturers know that compliance with the ASTM
standard is essential to consumer safety, required by virtually all toy
retailers, and enforced by the Consumer Product Safety Commission.
Further, it serves as a model for other standards worldwide.
In addition, TIA works regularly with the CPSC to review voluntary
standards and to monitor and address, as necessary, any potential
hazards associated with toys already on the market. The standards are
an example of the various ways TIA works to ensure the safety of its
consumers.
AGE APPROPRIATENESS
Any product, toy or not, can pose a potential hazard in the hands
of a child for whom it was not intended. For this reason, almost all
toy packages include a suggested age range for use. A child's actual
age, physical size, skill level and maturity, as well as safety, are
all taken into consideration when developing age labels for different
types of toys. To help manufacturers reach a greater degree of
consistency in age grading practices and age labeling toy packages,
CPSC publishes a guide for age labeling toys.
Since children develop at different rates and vary in their
interests and skills, age labeling on packages is intended to give the
consumer a general guideline on which to base toy selections. Typical
designations might be ``Recommended for children from eighteen months
to three years'' or ``Not recommended for children under three years of
age.'' Additional specific cautionary labeling requirements specified
by ASTM F963 or by CPSC regulations cover products such as crib gyms,
electrically operated toys, chemistry sets, swim-aids and such toy
features as functional points and edges (i.e. paper doll scissors and
toy sewing kit needles).
The standard also contains cautionary labeling requirements, as
mandated by the U.S. Consumer Safety Protection Act relating to
potential choking hazards to children under three years of age from
toys or games intended for children ages three through under six years,
which contain a small part, any small ball, marble or balloon. TIA
supported this 1994 legislation. Regardless of labeling, however, there
is simply no substitute, at any age, for appropriate adult supervision.
The toy industry's active participation in these efforts helps make
toys among the safest consumer products in the home.
HOW THE INDUSTRY TESTS ITS TOYS FOR SAFETY
There are more than 100 separate tests and design specifications
included in ASTM F963 and the federal regulations to reduce or
eliminate hazards with the potential to cause injury under conditions
of normal use or reasonably foreseeable abuse. These tests and design
specifications include use-and-abuse tests, testing for accessible
sharp points and edges, and measuring for small parts, wheel-pull
resistance and projectiles. There are also tests for flammability,
toxicity, electrical and thermal requirements, and acoustics. Several
manufacturers, especially larger ones, have their own in-house testing
laboratories sophisticated enough to ensure that products meet
standards for safety. Those without safety facilities on site use
independent testing laboratories. Manufacturers producing toys overseas
test them before shipping, and then sample production lots again once
they arrive in the United States. TIA and its members are vitally
interested in developing reputations as ``safety conscious'' companies.
toy industry priority is the safety of its young consumers
TIA and its members recognize that standards, alone, are not enough
and take additional measures to ensure the safety of their products in
young consumers' hands. For years, TIA has had in place an extensive,
multi-faceted Safety Assurance Program. Under this program, TIA informs
consumers on how to select age appropriate toys and the importance of
adult supervision through its Fun Play, Safe Play guide (distributed
free of charge, in both English and Spanish, upon request, and on the
TIA website); publishes a guide to play for children with special
needs, and conducts regular educational seminars for industry to keep
them abreast of standards, testing and potential issues.
CHILDHOOD RISKS DEFINED
To consider the question of whether current standards appropriately
protect consumers, it is necessary to first identify the risks to which
children are exposed. In spite of remarkable progress that dramatically
improved the length and quality of children's lives in the U.S. over
the past century, today's children still face significant, real risks.
For example, often-avoidable unintentional injuries take the lives of
more than 1 out of every 10,000 children in the U.S. annually.
Estimated Annual Mortality Risk for Children Under Age 10 (Number
of deaths per million children):1 Motor vehicles, 46; Guns,
5; Drowning, 20; Poisoning, 2; Suffocation, 17; Bicycles, 2; Fire, 16;
and Medical care, 2.
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\1\ Harvard University School of Public Health, Kids Risk
Symposium, March 26-27, 2003 (Kimberly Thompson, M.S. SCP, Assoc.
Professor of Risk Analysis and Decision Science, Children's Hospital
Boston, Harvard Medical School Co-Founder/Director of Research Center
on Media and Child Health; Director HSPH Kids Risk Project.
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In addition, statistics that show other significant risks to young
people include:2
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\2\ Based on 1997 data from: (1) the National Center for Injury
Prevention & Control, Centers for Disease Control and Prevention and
population estimates from Statistical Abstract of the United States for
1997.
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16% of American children under the age of 18 live in families with
incomes below the poverty level
4% live in households experiencing food insecurity with moderate to
severe hunger
69% live in two-parent families, down from 77% in 1980
Birth rate for females (age 15-17) around 26 per 1000
Substance use rates are high
21% of 12th graders smoke daily
30% of 12th graders have at least 5 drinks in a row at least once in
the previous 2 weeks
25% of 12th graders report illicit drug usage in past 30 days
14% of young adults age 18-24 have not completed high school
8% of youths age 16-19 are not in school or working
Clearly, our young people are at risk. But, as you can see, toys do
not figure prominently in much of the data. The actual rates for toys
when compared to other incidents relating to children demonstrate that
such toy related incidents are extremely rare!1 Important work in
creating tools to benchmark and catalogue risk is being undertaken and
should be supported by this Committee, CPSC, industry and others
concerned with the safety of our children.
Compare these childhood risks with the handful of ``toy-related''
deaths per year of children from birth to approximately age 13
(primarily balloons and ride-on toys like scooters), or to CPSC's own
annual report that indicates that of fifteen commonly used household
products, toys had among the lowest number of incidences of injuries
and deaths. Although there are risks associated with some toys, they
are clearly very small by comparison, and it is remarkable that media
attention continues to focus on the small risks associated with toys
while some very big risks remain underappreciated and unaddressed. In a
world where perception is reality, where misinformation often drives
perception, and where some advocacy groups and the media focus on
uncertain hazards, frightening without providing context, it is no
wonder that policy makers and parents lack context for understanding
and managing children's risks. Unfortunately, the net result is that we
often collectively waste scarce financial resources on hypothetical
hazards at the expense of allocating them efficiently to make
children's lives measurably safer. Further, this perpetuates a lack of
coordination between groups that are all arguably committed to helping
children; focuses on individual issues and agendas instead of children
themselves; and competition rather than cooperation for the resources
to truly protect children. This is true at all levels, and anecdotal
evidence includes a scenario in which, despite years of safe use with
no real, measurable effects on children, a commonly used chemical in
plastic toys became the focus of major new stories, needlessly
frightening parents and politicians worldwide. The wealth of
independent, scientific research conducted both here and abroad
determined that vinyl toys were safe.3
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\3\ The American Council on Science and Health (ACSH), a panel
headed by former Surgeon General Dr. C. Everett Koop stated that,
``Consumers can be confident that vinyl toys . . . are safe.'' This
same conclusion was reached this year by the Consumer Product Safety
Commission after considering a report of the Chronic Hazard Advisory
Panel (CHAP), a body of experts nominated by the American National
Academy of Sciences.
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CPSC's extensive NEISS injury data (National Electronic Injury
Surveillance System) do not usually give the details of the
circumstances in which the injury took place. Therefore, when examining
the data it's not always possible to determine whether the particular
toy-associated injury was the result of the accident (e.g., a child
tripping over toys left on the stairs), unintended misuse of the toy,
or a fault in the toy's design, material content, construction or
performance. Studies of NEISS data by the CPSC have shown that most
toy-related injuries appeared to be minor, with hospitalization
occurring less than half as frequently as the overall average for
injuries. Again, as illustrated by the CPSC data, the industry's
commitment to designing and producing safe toys and emphasizing the
importance of adult supervision and appropriate selection of playthings
has made toys one of the safest products in the home.
child product safety: do current standards provide enough protection?
We are gathered here today to address the question of ``Child
Product Safety: Do Current Standards Provide Enough Protection?'' If by
``enough protection'' one means ``perfect, zero risk protection,'' I
would suggest that when viewed from that perspective, they do not, nor
could they. The data tells us that clearly standards, alone, are not
enough. Tragically, children are still injured and killed in traffic
accidents, despite tough car seat and seatbelt laws and state-of-the-
art car seat technology. Children drown in backyard pools and riding
their trikes into traffic. Standards--and legislation--can only do so
much. And while we may never get to zero risk for children--we must
continue to try; to look for new ways to address the true threats to
the safety of our children. I believe that education holds the key and
TIA has long recognized the importance of education in product safety.
We must focus on the true hazards and use our resources accordingly to
get the message out. There is no substitute, ever, for adult
supervision and it is the shared role of industry, consumer
organizations and CPSC to educate consumers as to the real risks out
there and appropriate behavior to protect children. In doing so, we
will have provided parents with the necessary tools to effect change
and ensure the safety of our most cherished resource--our nation's
children.
Mr. Stearns. Ms. Weintraub.
STATEMENT OF RACHEL WEINTRAUB
Ms. Weintraub. Thank you, Mr. Chairman and Ranking Member
Schakowsky. I am Rachel Weintraub, Assistant General Counsel
with Consumer Federation of America. CFA is a nonprofit
association of approximately 300 pro-consumer groups with a
combined membership of over 50 million people that was founded
in 1968 to advance consumer interest through consumer advocacy
and education. CFA appreciates the opportunity to testify here
today on the issue of child product safety, specifically
whether current standards provide enough protection.
The overriding issue here today is that the deaths and
injuries that some of us have suffered here today are not
merely accidents. They are not things that just happen, they
are preventable, and many of us here today have proposed
realistic solutions. Unfortunately, there seems to be a lack of
will to implement these realistic solutions.
The Consumer Product Safety Commission is a small agency
with a monstrous task. This challenge is heightened by the fact
that over the last two decades CPSC has suffered deep cuts to
its budget and its staff. Because of these constraints, CPSC
cannot maintain its current level of safety programs, nor can
it invest in its infrastructure to improve its work in the
future. It is for this reason that CFA believes that one of the
most important things that this subcommittee can do is ensure
that sufficient funding levels are approved.
CPSC's funding level directly affects its ability to
regulate effectively. For example, in every recall matter it
considers, the Commission must be prepared with research
evidence to convince the company of the need for action. This
is very costly. Not having sufficient resources puts CPSC in a
terrible position as an enforcement agency because it cannot be
sure it will have the money needed to follow through.
CFA also suggests that Congress eliminate the cap of $1.56
million on the amount of civil penalties that CPSC can assess.
Chairman Stratton just stated he does not think there needs to
be an increase in the cap and just the cap itself is enough of
a deterrent. We very much disagree.
Eliminating the cap will encourage manufacturers to recall
products faster, will act as a deterrent to noncompliance with
CPSC's regulations, and will strengthen CPSC's bargaining power
when negotiating with companies.
The Senate approved an increase in this cap to $20 million
about a year ago. Unfortunately, the House has failed to act,
thus continuing the status quo which fails to create a
meaningful deterrent for violation of product safety laws.
CFA also encourages Congress to eliminate section 6(b) of
the Consumer Product Safety Act. As Marla said, this provision,
which no other health and safety regulatory agency must adhere
to, requires that CPSC must check with the relevant company
before it can give out information to the public.
This has the obvious affect of delaying or in many cases
denying access to critical safety information.
There are currently a number of issues before the Agency
which illustrate the dire need for not only mandatory safety
standards, but which also compel congressional involvement. The
first issue is recall effectiveness, which has been touched
upon briefly so far this morning. Manufacturers of certain
products should be required to accompany their products with
product registration cards, because our current system of
recall notification is failing. By product registration card, I
mean a card that accompanies certain products which clearly
indicates that it is for safety purpose and would require a
minimum amount of information that the consumer would then send
back to the company in case of a product safety recall.
Most consumers never, ever hear about a recall, and many,
many children have died from products that have been recalled.
Due to this problem, CFA filed a petition with CPSC in June of
2000 requesting that CPSC initiate rulemaking to require all
child product manufacturers to provide a product registration
card with every product. By a vote of 2 to 1, CPSC denied our
petition and has failed to take any steps to directly notify
consumers about a product recall. Congress should act quickly
to institute product registration cards, and there is
legislation that would propose such cards, and that is H.R.
1197 and S. 584.
Unfortunately, the almost 20-year saga of baby bath seats
points out the necessity for mandatory law banning these deadly
products. As of September 15, 2004, just a few weeks ago,
approximately 119 children have drowned to death, and at least
163 were injured while using the product. Caregivers who use
baby bath seats are more likely to take riskier behaviors
because they believe the device provides an added measure of
safety. Furthermore, mechanical problems with the bath seats
make it more likely that a child will drown if unattended.
CFA again petitioned CPSC to ban baby bath seats in July of
2000. CPSC ruled in favor of an advanced notice of proposed
rulemaking in 2001, held a meeting in July of 2003, and on
October 16th, as Chairman Stratton said, unanimously voted to
issue a notice of proposed rulemaking. At that time there were
comments that the public could make which were due on March 15,
2004. It has been 7 months; unbelievably, nothing more has
happened at CPSC. In 2003 alone, 14 children have died while
being bathed in bath seats.
And a few clarifications. The voluntary standard, which has
been mentioned, has not yet been implemented. The voluntary
standard is not equal to the mandatory standard. And there has
been no recall of the baby bath seats that are on the market,
millions of them. The Commission agrees that there needs to be
a complete change in how these products are designed, and yet
all of these products are still on the market creating exposure
to millions of children every single day.
Another issue that CFA has long been concerned about is
all-terrain vehicles. All-terrain vehicles have been so-called
regulated by a voluntary approach to safety which relies upon
warning labels and education, and this system is failing
American consumers miserably. Serious injuries requiring
emergency room treatment increased from 110,100 in 2001 to
113,900 in 2002. The estimated number of ATV-related fatalities
increased 11 percent in the same period. Children under 16
received more serious injuries than any other age group. In
addition, between 1985 and 2002, children under 16 accounted
for 37 percent of all injuries and 33 percent of all deaths;
yet CPSC has not taken action to curb this rise. Through a
petition we filed with CPSC in August of 2002, we have urged
CPSC to ban the sale of adult-type ATVs for use for children.
It has been over 2 years, and nothing has happened.
In conclusion, this subcommittee must make sure that the
Federal Government lives up to the commitment it made to
protect consumers from product-related deaths and injuries when
it created the Consumer Product Safety Commission. CPSC urges
more funds to be appropriated to the Agency. We suggest that a
number of changes be made to CPSC's authorizing statute, and we
urge Congress to work with CPSC to institute a number of
mandatory safety standards. Thank you.
[The prepared statement of Rachel Weintraub follows:]
Prepared Statement of Rachel Weintraub, Assistant General Counsel,
Consumer Federation of America
Chairman Stearns, Ranking Member Schakowsky and members of the
Subcommittee, I am Rachel Weintraub, Assistant General Counsel for
Consumer Federation of America (CFA). CFA is a non-profit association
of approximately 300 pro-consumer groups, with a combined membership of
50 million people that was founded in 1968 to advance the consumer
interest through advocacy and education.
CFA appreciates the opportunity to testify here today on the issue
of Child Product Safety, specifically whether current standards provide
enough protection. Our short answer is, ``no,'' that the current safety
standards which tend to be voluntary are inadequate and that a number
of mandatory safety standards are needed to truly protect children from
unsafe products. In addition, there are other changes to CPSC's
statutes and funding level that must be made to adequately protect
consumers from unsafe products.
First, a bit of background is necessary. The Consumer Product
Safety Commission (CPSC), the federal agency with jurisdiction over
consumer products plays an extremely critical role in protecting
American consumers from product hazards found in the home, in schools
and during recreation. We know from past experience, from survey data,
and from consumers, who contact us on a daily basis, that safety is an
issue that consumers care deeply about and that CPSC is an agency that
consumers support and depend upon to protect them and their families.
Yet, with jurisdiction of over many different products, this small
agency has a monstrous task. This challenge is heightened by the fact
that, over the past two decades, CPSC has suffered the deepest cuts to
its budget and staff of any health and safety agency. To put these
staffing levels and budget appropriations in perspective, it is
necessary to consider the history and authority of this consumer
agency. Established by Congress in 1972, CPSC is charged with
protecting the public from hazards associated with over 15,000
different consumer products. Its statutes give the Commission the
authority to set safety standards, require labeling, order recalls, ban
products, collect death and injury data, and inform the public about
consumer product safety.
In 1974, when CPSC was created, the agency was appropriated $34.7
million and 786 FTEs. Now 28 years later, the agency's budget has not
kept up with inflation, has not kept up with its deteriorating
infrastructure, has not kept up with increasing data collection needs,
has not kept up with the fast paced changes occurring in consumer
product development, and has not kept pace with the vast increase in
the number of consumer products on the market. CPSC's staff has
suffered severe and repeated cuts during the last two decades, falling
from a high of 978 employees in 1980 to just 471 for the past fiscal
year.
While every year an estimated 23,900 American consumers die, and an
additional 32.7 million suffer injuries related to consumer products
under the jurisdiction of the CPSC, this agency, with its reduced staff
and inadequate funds, is limited in what it can do to protect
consumers. Because of these constraints, CPSC cannot maintain its
current level of safety programs, nor can it invest in its
infrastructure to improve its work in the future.
Because of this historically bleak resource picture, CFA is
extremely concerned about the agency's ability to operate effectively
to reduce consumer deaths and injuries from unsafe products. It is for
this reason that CFA believes that one of the most important thing that
can be done to protect consumers, including children, from unsafe
products is to assure that CPSC has a sufficient funding. CPSC's
current budget, staff, and equipment are stretched to the point of
breaking. CPSC salaries and rent currently consume 85% of the agency's
appropriation. An additional 11% of the agency's budget pays for other
functions (such as supplies, communications and utility charges,
operation and maintenance of facilities and equipment) that merely
allow CPSC to keep its doors open for business each day.
Much of CPSC's equipment, particularly at the laboratory is old and
outdated. CPSC's testing laboratory serves a crucial role in CPSC's
compliance investigations and safety standards activities. In spite of
the laboratory's critical importance, no major improvements have been
made in the past 25 years. Rather, CPSC and GSA have made only slight
modifications to its infrastructure, which was originally designed for
military not laboratory use. Currently, CPSC staff working at the lab
are working under merely adequate conditions. If the laboratory were to
be modernized, CPSC would gain significantly through increased
productivity and efficiency.
CPSC's funding directly affects its ability to regulate
effectively. Most of the recalls brought about by the agency are the
result of voluntary agreements reached between CPSC and manufacturers
and/or distributors. However, in every recall matter it considers, the
Commission must be prepared with research evidence to convince the
company of the need for action. In cases where the agency must file a
complaint and litigate the matter, the agency may require even more
extensive testing and research data for use as evidence at trial. This
testing and research, whether leading to a recall or trial, may need to
be contracted out and is very costly. This contingency is one with
enormous ramifications. In effect, not having sufficient resources puts
CPSC in a terrible position as an enforcement agency. It can't put its
money where its mouth is--so to speak--because it can't be sure it will
have the money needed to follow through.
This concern is further exacerbated as new products and new
technologies come on to the market. Sophisticated, high tech products,
such as Segway devices, which CPSC engineers may have never seen, much
less have expertise with, pose particularly resource intensive
challenges. For CPSC to live up to its safety mandate, it must be able
to keep pace with the ever-changing development of technology.
In addition to increasing CPSC's budget, CPSC could do more to
protect children and could be an even more effective agency if a number
of changes were made to the statutes over which CPSC has jurisdiction.
First, CFA suggests that Congress eliminate the cap on the amount
of civil penalties that CPSC can assess, as spelled out in section 20
(a) of the Consumer Product Safety Act (CPSA), against an entity in
knowing violation of CPSC's statutes. The current civil penalty is
capped at $7,000 for each violation up to $1.65 million. A ``knowing
violation'' occurs when the manufacturer, distributor or retailer has
actual knowledge or is presumed to have knowledge deemed to be
possessed by a reasonable person who acts in the circumstances,
including knowledge obtainable upon the exercise of due care to
ascertain the truth of representations. Knowing violations often
involve a company's awareness of serious injury or death associated
with their product. Eliminating the cap will encourage manufactures to
recall products faster and comply with CPSC's statutes in a more
aggressive way. Importantly, the elimination of the cap will act as a
deterrent to non-compliance with CPSC's regulations.
Eliminating the cap will also strengthen CPSC's bargaining power
when negotiating with many companies to take a particular action.
Unfortunately, CPSC has companies under its jurisdiction that have made
products that have caused many deaths and injuries. For example, CPSC
fined Cosco, a Canadian company, which is the largest children's
product manufacturer and distributor in the United States, $725,000 in
September 1996 for failing to report 96 known toddler bed and guardrail
entrapments and one death associated with its toddler beds. In 2001
CPSC again fined Cosco and Safety 1st a record fine of $1.75 million
after failing to report two deaths and 303 injuries to CPSC. However,
these companies never admitted wrongdoing and obviously the penalty did
not deter non-compliance with the reporting requirements.
Unfortunately, while the Senate approved CPSC's reauthorization
including increasing the cap on civil penalties from $1.65 million to
$20 million about a year ago, the House of Representatives has failed
to act, thus continuing the status quo which fails to create a
meaningful deterrent for violation of product safety laws.
Second, CFA urges Congress to eliminate section 6(b) of the
Consumer Product Safety Act. This section of the Act prohibits CPSC, at
the insistence of industry, to withhold safety information from the
public. This provision, which no other health and safety regulatory
agency must adhere to, requires that CPSC, before it can give out
certain information to the public, must check with the relevant company
before disclosing information. If the industry denies access to the
information, CPSC must evaluate their response and may just drop the
issue and deny access of the information to consumers. This has the
effect of delaying or denying access of important information to
consumers.
There are a number of issues currently before the agency which
illustrate the dire need for mandatory safety standards. In each of the
following instances there are voluntary safety standards that are
failing to adequately protect children from unsafe products.
RECALL EFFECTIVENESS
Our current system of recall notification is failing. By relying
upon the media and manufacturers to broadly communicate notification of
recalls to the public, CPSC and the companies involved are missing an
opportunity to communicate with the most critical population--those who
purchased the potentially dangerous product. Due to this failure, CFA
filed a petition with CPSC in June 2001 requesting that CPSC initiate
rulemaking to require all manufacturers, (or distributors, retailers or
importers) of products intended for children to provide along with
every product, a Consumer Registration Card that allows the purchaser
to register information through the mail or electronically, require
recall remedies to be indefinite and require manufacturer
identification and contact information on each product. CPSC agreed to
consider only the issue of product registration cards, a requirement
that the National Highway Transportation Safety Administration (NHTSA)
currently has for child car seats. Unfortunately, on March 7, 2003 by a
vote of 2 to 1, CPSC denied our petition. We were very disappointed
with this decision and continue to believe that product registration
cards are an essential component of any effort to improve recall
effectiveness. We continue to be dissatisfied with CPSC's inaction on
this issue.
Requiring companies that manufacture, distribute, import or sell
products intended for children to take additional measures to assure
the effectiveness of recalls is necessary for the following reasons:
First, return rates for CPSC-recalled products are extremely low. In
Fiscal Year 1996, CPSC recalls experienced an 18% return rate.
In FY 1997, the most recent year for which data is available,
the return rate fell slightly to 16%.
Second, many CPSC recalls involve products for children. In fiscal year
2002, CPSC instituted recall actions involving 84 toy and
children's products, involving more than 11 million product
units.
Third, children are a vulnerable population who deserve additional
protections.
Fourth, the risks of death or serious injury associated with children's
product recalls are substantial. These recalls often occur
because of choking, strangulation, suffocation, burns or
serious fall hazards. All of these too often result in the
death of a child or serious injury. Children have no capacity
to prevent any of these hazards.
The effective recall of hazardous products is an important purpose
of the Consumer Product Safety Commission and should be the priority of
any company that puts a consumer product into the market place. While
CPSC denied the petition based primarily upon industry's arguments that
these cards would be too expensive and may not work, we continue to
believe that the costs involved are reasonable considering the benefit
of the lives that may be saved. In addition, efforts by NHTSA to
require registration cards for child car seats have been successful.
Because child restraints are used in automobiles, NHTSA has
jurisdiction over this product and has required that manufacturers
provide cards to consumers. In a study released January 6, 2003, NHTSA
evaluated its child safety seat registration program. The study found
that child safety seat registration was successful in notifying
purchasers of recalls. Specifically the NHTSA study found:
1) Increased registration rates increased recall compliance rates: the
repair rate on recalled seats is now 21.5% vs. 13.8% in 1993--a
statistically significant 56% increase.
2) The indirect cost to consumers of the mandatory standard is 43 cents
for each car seat sold.
3) Return rates for registration cards are now at 27% vs. 3% before the
rule was implemented.
NHTSA's experience with registration cards over the last decade
provides an important model for CPSC to emulate. NHTSA's recent study
evaluating their product registration card proves that the cards are
not only effective in increasing consumer compliance with recalls but
also achieve a successful result at a low cost to consumers. Currently,
all that is clear is that CPSC has not done enough to improve the way
in which consumers are notified of recalls.
BABY BATH SEATS
Unfortunately, the almost 20 year saga of baby bath seats points
out the necessity for a mandatory law banning these deadly products. As
of October 2003, Since 1981, when baby bath seats came on to the
market, approximately 106 children have drowned to death and 163 were
injured while using the product. One study of caregivers who use bath
seats found that: they are likely to fill the bathtub with more water,
increasing the chance of drowning, and they are more likely to
willfully leave a child in the bathtub alone when a bath seat is in use
believing that the device provides an added measure of safety.
Furthermore, there are mechanical problems with baby bath seats that
make it more likely that a child will drown if a caregiver leaves the
child unattended. However, there are no mandatory safety standards for
these products.
CFA petitioned CPSC to ban baby bath seats in July, 2000. CPSC
ruled in favor of an Advanced Notice of Proposed Rulemaking in 2001 and
held a meeting in July of 20003 on CPSC staff's recommendations for a
notice of proposed rulemaking. On October 16, 2003, the Commission
voted to issue a notice of proposed rulemaking (NPR) proposing
mandatory standards for bath seats. On December 29, 2003, the
Commission published a notice of the NPR and solicited comments from
the public that were to be received by March 15, 2004. Unbelievably,
nothing more has happened at CPSC regarding baby bath seats. It has
been almost 7 moths. CPSC should not wait for more deaths and injuries
to occur before they take action on this hazardous product. A ban of
baby bath seats in necessary, as is a recall of all bath seats
currently on the market. A mandatory standard is needed to
fundamentally alter the way these products are designed.
ALL-TERRAIN VEHICLES
CFA has long been concerned about all-terrain vehicle (ATV) safety.
ATVs have been ``regulated'' by voluntary standards since the 1980s.
Unfortunately our concern with this voluntary approach has been
increasing as injuries and death on ATVs--especially injuries and
deaths to kids--have been on the rise.
CPSC data consistently shows that ATV-related injuries and deaths
are increasing. According to the most recent data, released by CPSC
almost a year ago: serious injuries requiring emergency room treatment
increased from 110,100 in 2001 to 113,900 in 2002; the estimated number
of ATV-related fatalities increased 11 percent from 569 in 2000 to 634
in 2001; children under 16 suffered 37,100 injuries in 2002 up from
34,300 in 2001. This age group received more serious injuries than any
other; between 1985 and 2002, children under 16 accounted for 37
percent of all injuries and 33 percent of all deaths. The CPSC
continues to make clear that the increase in injuries is not explained
by rising ATV sales.
The history of ATVs in the United States proves that the current
approach--the industry's self-regulating approach--to safety is not
working. Self-regulation by the ATV industry has led to larger and
faster ATVs and more children being killed and injured. CPSC's own data
illustrates that CPSC and the states must act to end this hidden
epidemic by moving aggressively to protect young children from the
dangers posed by adult-size ATVs. In particular we have urged CPSC
through a petition we filed in August 2002, to ban the sale of adult
size ATVs for the use of children under 16. CPSC must act soon to
ensure that these trends are reversed. Unfortunately, after three field
hearings held about a year ago, CPSC has not done anything to reverse
the trend of increasing deaths and injuries caused by ATVs. We urge
Congress to monitor this issue closely and to hold oversight hearings
on ATV safety to determine the role Congress should play in this public
health crisis.
In conclusion, this Subcommittee must step in and exercise its duty
to make sure that the federal government lives up to the commitment it
made to protect consumers from product-related deaths and injuries when
it created the Consumer Product Safety Commission. CFA urges more funds
to be appropriated to the agency so that more people will have the
benefit of CPSC's efforts to protect consumers from unsafe products, we
suggest that a number of changes be made to CPSC's authorizing statute,
and we urge Congress to work with CPSC to institute a number of
mandatory safety standards including those related to recall
effectiveness, baby bath seats and ATVs. Mandatory safety standards are
necessary where the current voluntary approach to safety has failed to
curb deaths and injuries.
Thank you.
Mr. Stearns. I thank you.
I will start with the opening, my questions. I think I will
start out by saying, Ms. Ginzel, that we appreciate your
presentation, and I think I share it with all my colleagues how
sorry we are for the loss of your son Danny. And I think it is
more poignant than ever when people who testify like yourselves
speak in such a heartfelt way and speak from such personal
tragedy that it makes the hearing much more significant and
much more current on our things we have to do in a day to think
about this and think what can be done.
And I guess I would give you the floor to say, you say the
system is broken, we have the power to fix it, and I can tell
you how to fix it. Now, we have heard from others here. Ms.
Weintraub has indicated there are other serious problems
besides this Playskool Travel-Lite portable crib, and you
indicated there are 9,000 still unaccounted for, I think you
said. And we can hear these horror stories throughout.
And obviously this Commission probably has not been
reauthorized, and probably there are things we should update
with, and it is not just a case of money, but obviously this
6(b) regulatory should be looked at. I mean, I don't think
after all these years, with the change in scope and all these
imports and everything, it is possible that there is a whole
new presentation that needs to be done. So let me give you the
floor and ask you what you think we should do as a subcommittee
membership.
Ms. Ginzel. Thank you, Chairman Stearns. I am very grateful
for your kind words. It is not easy for me to sit here and to
list the ways that--all the reasons why my son should still be
alive today. When I prepared to be in front of you today, I had
the task of trying to tell my story, but then also maybe trying
to say what could have changed, and what I am focusing on is
just my own son's case. The other panelists have done, I think,
a great job talking about the fact that this is way beyond the
Playskool Travel-Lite crib. Many other products are involved.
But I wanted to tell you how my son's life could have been
saved specifically, three categories or three ways. One is
called reverse marketing. The other is child care notification.
The other is product registration.
Now, Marla talked about her career in marketing prior to
being an advocate. These companies are able--for example, take
the crib that killed my son. When this crib was recalled,
Hasbro the company that licensed its trusted Playskool name to
Kolcraft, did nothing. Kolcraft negotiated with the CPSC, and
the recall basically amounted to a press release. They had some
posters, they sent out some videos with these press releases,
but essentially a press release. Now, does this make any sense
to you? I mean, when my son hurt--my son, who, when his brother
was killed, was at the time was 5 years old. And he said, well,
what if you don't turn on the TV that night? He is 5 years old.
Hasbro spends millions of dollars a year on marketing. They
reach into our home every day when they want to sell us one of
their new products. What is so hard about reaching into our
home when they need to retrieve a deadly product? This is a
time bomb. The Playskool Travel-Lite was a time bomb disguised
as a crib.
I have people testifying that, well, baseballs are
dangerous, and traffic accidents and bicycles and scooters.
Well, those are all risky behaviors. We know that when we
engage in a sport, a child might be hit by a baseball. We know
when we get into a car that we are engaging in a risky
behavior. We assess that risk. You put your child in a crib,
you don't think it is a time bomb. You don't think that the
crib, the very product that is supposed to keep your child
safe, is going to strangle him. So I think there is a
difference in these types of products.
So my son would be alive today if companies would take
responsibility for their products and try to retrieve them from
our homes as--maybe not as much, but a little bit more than
they----
Mr. Stearns. And that is the reverse marketing.
Ms. Ginzel. That is what I would call--well, what has been
referred to as reverse marketing.
Mr. Stearns. Okay.
Ms. Ginzel. Child care notification. Okay. So companies
aren't required to use reverse marketing to reach us, but what
about child care facilities? The fact is that half the children
who died in the Playskool Travel-Lite crib died in child care
settings. Hasbro knew this. Why weren't they notified? After
the sixth child was killed, my husband and I wrote a letter to
Alan Hassenfeld, the CEO of Hasbro, and we asked him to notify
registered day cares. You know what? He did. Now, does this
make any sense to you? Why do the parents of a dead child have
to ask a manufacturer to notify registered day cares? How
expensive is that? How obvious is that? Why isn't that part of
a recall process? Why isn't that a default part of a recall
process? My son would be alive today if they had notified that
day care. So that is child care notification.
Product registration. I want to say one thing. I want
everyone to understand that my son had quality child care. This
is not about dangerous day care, this is about dangerous
children's products. The particular crib that killed my son was
given to the home by the parent of a child who was still in the
day care. She was in touch with the original owner of that
crib. After my son died, people said, oh, it is just too bad
that that person didn't send in the warranty card. I mean, why
didn't she do that? That would at least allow the company to
notify her.
There was no warranty card with this product. It didn't
have one. If it did, my son would be alive today.
Mr. Stearns. A lot of people don't fill out the product
registration cards.
Ms. Ginzel. But she didn't even have the opportunity to
fill out the product registration card. A lot of people do a
lot of things, but we need to have opportunity and choice, and
we don't have that as parents. We are walking through a
minefield, and we don't even know it.
Mr. Stearns. Well, I think you have made some good points.
I think what we will do is do a second round here. It is just
you and I. So, with that, my time has expired.
Ms. Schakowsky.
Ms. Schakowsky. Ms. Lipin, I wanted to--the suggestion or
actually the mandate, if there was one, from the CPSC or the
reaction was that there were no permanent injuries, and there
was this low risk of strangulation. But you have taken it upon
yourself--let me first just congratulate you. It seems to me
that your efforts were probably more successful than CPSC
almost undoubtedly in getting this product off the shelf and
getting these retailers to remove it from their stores. But
could you give us some examples of some of the cases that you
heard about?
Ms. Lipin. Certainly. Thank you.
Missy Mason, son Austin, age 4, they live in Ohio, got hit
with the cord of this. The end, okay, snapped him in the eye,
and Austin had to have a lens implant. He had two to three
surgeries. He uses drops every day for the rest of his life for
glaucoma. He goes to doctors all the time. He has to wear
glasses for the rest of his life.
Ms. Schakowsky. So the CPSC is aware of this?
Ms. Lipin. Yes, they are. Missy has written to them. Her
story is on my Web site. They are well aware of my Web site.
Missy has contacted them. No response.
Ms. Schakowsky. So, actually, worse than no response. So
there is a permanent injury.
Ms. Lipin. Permanent.
That is not the only permanent injury. There is another
child, Gavin Fann, who lives in Indiana also, the same thing,
he got hit in the eye. He got hit with the ball, though. Okay?
He also had surgery, lens implants. These are little kids, they
are 4-years-old, who had perfect vision, nothing wrong with
them until this toy entered their home. Okay? A toy which, I
would like to add, had no warnings labels. I have one here
right now, and it says, ``Made in China.'' It is in a plastic
bag. This is one of those 50-cent toys probably that this
gentleman who was sitting here before mentioned. Okay? So these
parents had no opportunity to know that this toy could be
dangerous.
There is another child who was age 13, okay; who was at
junior high 1 day, and Mom got a call, he got hit in the eye
with a yo-yo ball. He spent 2 nights and 3 days in the
hospital. Okay? He, too, has to go for follow-up procedures all
the time to make sure his vision--he was actually left like
temporarily blind for like 2 days, and the vision did return.
But still, Jacob Wilcox in Ohio also was injured by this toy.
But more serious--I mean, these permanent injuries are very
serious, but the things about children being found unconscious.
There was just recently, 10 weeks ago, a child from Kansas who
was camping with his parents in a campground in Minnesota, and
the child was found--okay, Nicholas Clancy, he is 4--face down
by Mom and Dad, turn him over, unconscious, gushing blood; not
just bleeding a little bloody nose, gushing blood from his
mouth and his nose, okay, because his carotid artery was cutoff
because this cord was wrapped so tightly around his neck.
First, it took Dad a few minutes to get it off of his neck.
They got him to an ER where the doctors again said, you know,
luckily he was okay. Now, he was taken to an emergency room,
one of which I don't believe that is part of this NEISS system.
Okay? So there are emergency visits that have not been recorded
through CPSC's system.
There is a little boy in Ohio also who suffered a skull
fracture, okay, when he fell and hit the concrete. Parents have
told me that they have found their children lifeless, laying
there not breathing, Okay? There is--a part of my testimony is
from a woman Evie Dale, whose daughter Mary recently about I
think it was also 10 weeks ago was found with the toy around
her neck. There was pictures attached to this letter she sent
me, and I included her letter as part of my testimony. Her
question is, why did her child get hurt 15 months later after I
have been doing this? And I started it--injuries came in almost
a year prior to my son Andrew almost being strangled to death.
So I don't understand the system.
Ms. Schakowsky. If I could ask Ms. Felcher, you heard some
testimony from Mr. Klein about the testing process and how
rigorous it is. I am wondering if you would make any comments
about what we know to be the law and what we know to be in
practice about testing.
Ms. Felcher. Right. Well, I am sure that Mattel has a good
lab or an interesting lab. I have asked to go see it, but it is
proprietary. What I witnessed in--I went to many of the ASTM
meetings where the voluntary standards were hashed out and
debated, and I was shocked. I mean, you have to understand that
I was not in this world at all. I mean, I was teaching MBA
students at the time, and someone suggested that I go watch
this process to understand it. And it was--three-quarters of
the committee were industry people. They even have the same--
the meetings take place, I think, this week or next week. The
trade organization, the Juvenile Products Manufacturers
Association, have their meetings back to back with ASTM, the
voluntary standard-setting group, because it is all the same
people.
And so what happens is they say, okay--I was there for many
of the baby bath seat standards, and everyone sits around, and
the head of the committee when I was there was the person
representing Safety First, which was the leading manufacturer
of baby bath seats. So he did have an economic incentive tied
up with this standard. And they would just hash out what one
manufacturer wanted as part of the standard and, more likely
than not, what the manufacturers did not want as part of the
standard. And this would go on for years and years and years,
while at the same time CPSC was tallying the deaths due to
these standards.
So it just, the standards-setting process right now, No. 1,
are voluntary. And, No. 2, it is--there is--the conflict of
interest is there. I mean, there is no way. It is a classic
situation of the fox guarding the hen house.
And, you know, and another issue involved there is that
there are a couple of consumer groups there at these meetings
fighting for kids and fighting for tougher standards, but these
consumers get to run their own dollar. I mean, these consumers
have to quit, stop their jobs, take off a couple days from
their jobs, pay for a few days in Orlando or wherever these
meetings are. And so, of course, there are not going to be as
many consumer advocates looking out for the interests of kids
there. So--and, you know--and again, I didn't go into this
process expecting to see that, and it took me a while to figure
it out. And it is a sham. It is totally a sham, in my mind.
Mr. Stearns. The gentlelady's time has expired. I think we
will go one more round, if you have the patience.
Mr. Klein, this toy they are mentioning here that they have
shown and that the ranking member has in her palm of her hand,
are you aware of this toy?
Mr. Klein. Yeah, I have seen it.
Mr. Stearns. I mean, that company is probably not a member
of the Toy Industry Association.
Mr. Klein. I don't believe they are.
Mr. Stearns. No. So, I mean, there is no way that you would
have any type of regulatory on this particular toy. So it is
pretty much out there, and whoever buys it is caveat emptor.
Isn't that what you would probably say?
Mr. Klein. Well, when you say whoever buys it, I mean, I
hear about these incidents with 4-year-olds. Would I buy it for
a 4-year-old? No. Chairman Stratton said he took it away from
his. Again, it makes me sound callous, and I am not.
Mr. Stearns. You are just saying a certain amount of
personal responsibility is due here.
Mr. Klein. Yeah. And when I hear a 13-year-old who got hit
in the eye, I mean, was he playing with it, or was it thrown at
him? I mean, if it was thrown at him and it hit him in the eye,
that gets put down as a toy-related incident. Is that the way
the toy was intended to be used? Probably not. It is no
different than getting a baseball thrown at you. If you weren't
looking for it, it is going to hit you in the head.
Mr. Stearns. And looking at the package that they have
shown us, it says, ``Made in China.'' But there is no
directions, there is no product registration card, there is no
child care notification. So there is really nothing there, so
it is sort of just fly----
Mr. Klein. Well, and there are a lot of products like that.
You know, there is lots of them that you see in bins when you
go into stores. Sure. I understand that. But they are not made
by our members, and they don't necessarily--if they were made
by our members, they would have to go through all the testing
that all of our members put their products through, Okay? And
if they were filled with a hazardous substance, it would be
banned under the Federal Hazardous Substances Act, which the
CPSC does enforce.
Mr. Stearns. Ms. Felcher, you have alluded to the 6(b)
regulation. And can I characterize your statements, you would
like to eliminate it?
Ms. Felcher. Yes, I would very much like to.
Mr. Stearns. Now, if we eliminated the 6(b), how would you
get companies to voluntarily come in? Now, Hasbro did not seem
to do this, but I assume there are some good companies that are
willing to come in and say to the CPSC, yes, we have this
problem. And so what would you replace it with?
And I guess a larger question is, Ms. Weintraub, is there
any paradigm maybe in Europe or other countries that we could
use to tailor a new CPSC that would make it more credible to
the consumers organizations like the Consumer Federation of
America? So I asked Ms. Felcher.
Ms. Felcher. I drive a Subaru station wagon because I
always felt it was a sensible car. And if someone of you
followed the newspapers a few weeks ago, there was a ranking in
terms of various safety measures for various cars, and I
learned that outside of SUVs, my car has a very high propensity
to tip over. And I went right to the NHTSA Web site, and it
is--being the regulatory agency for cars.
Mr. Stearns. NHTSA is under our jurisdiction, too. So we
have had them here.
Ms. Felcher. And I checked. And I said, my God, I thought
that I am driving this car because it is safe, and it is not.
So automatically I made note to self: Next time I buy a car, I
wanted to buy the safest car. And I am going to buy a Volvo or
whatever is safer.
If I am deciding to go and buy an infant's swing for my new
niece who will be arriving in a couple weeks, there is no
comparable Web site or part of the CPSC Web site that I can go
to get that safety ranking, and that is because of 6(b). So
NHTSA doesn't have this statute. NHTSA doesn't have their hands
tied like CPSC, and, therefore, again, we are getting the
information.
And I know that I am unusual in that not everyone is going
to read a newspaper article and go check the safety ratings.
But, again, there has been a lot of talk about getting
information out there. I am one of those people. And so that
information is there. And my guess, I am not as up on what goes
on at NHTSA----
Mr. Stearns. But you are saying NHTSA is a paradigm that
you think would work.
Ms. Felcher. Right. And car manufacturers still report
problems to NHTSA.
Mr. Stearns. Okay. Is there anything that you would like to
add?
Ms. Weintraub. The one thing that I would like to add is
that I think there is a whole carrot stick issue here, and that
is with the civil penalties. Right now the most that CPSC can
assess against a company that violates one of those----
Mr. Stearns. So if they went to 20 million as opposed to
1.6 million, you think that would make----
Ms. Weintraub. I think that would be----
Mr. Stearns. So would 6(b), in your opinion, then, we could
still continue----
Ms. Weintraub. No. I think that 6(b) should be eliminated
as well. But I think the disincentive for a substantial fine
would also encourage companies to comply with laws in a more
substantial way than they are doing so now.
Mr. Stearns. Staff has shown me that the CPSC has taken a
significant step. They have created a Web site. It is
www.recalls.gov, and on--that is now under the CPSC, but the
Food and Drug Administration, the National Highway Traffic
Safety Administration, the Environmental Protection Agency, the
U.S. Coast Guard, and the U.S. Department of Agriculture. So
all of these folks have joined together sort of to create this
one-stop shop for consumers to go to to facilitate product
recalls. So I think that is a good step. And on this Web site
consumers can register to receive instant e-mail alerts from
the CPSC on all product safety recalls, including children's
products.
So, you know, I think that is important to realize that
consumers can go on this Web site, and then they can get alerts
through their e-mail, and then they will be told of these
problems. In addition, consumers can use this site to report a
problem. So in this case, Ms. Ginzel, you could report a
problem with a consumer product, a motor vehicle, a boat, food,
environmental product.
And I am going to send around a Dear Colleague letter to
all my Members to ask them to tell all their constituents about
this, and do everything I can to get this new Web site out. So,
reverse congressional marketing, so to speak, to try to get
this out so we can get consumers aware of it.
Anything else? My time has expired. Yes.
Ms. Weintraub. Chairman Stearns, if I may. This Web site
could be very useful to some consumers. However, it relies on a
consumer to take a number of affirmative steps to go to the Web
site to learn about the particular recall. No. 1, of course, is
Internet. It relies upon the person to have access to the
Internet. We know there is a digital divide. Not all people
have such access. But significantly, it is sort of--it is the
same old thing.
Now, I think that the Web site is a good idea. However, it
is not a solution to our broader recall problem because the
answer lies in directly notifying consumers for the information
to get to the consumers who actually purchased the product.
Mr. Stearns. They have to have a computer.
Ms. Weintraub. Not necessarily.
Mr. Stearns. I am just saying, your point is that if a
person doesn't have a computer, they can't even go to this
site.
Ms. Weintraub. Correct. If they don't have a computer, they
can't. And there are systems such as the product registration
card which would directly go to the people who actually
purchased the product.
And one other point I wanted to make about existing product
registration cards is that on the cards themselves there are
now huge disincentives for consumers to fill them out. I don't
fill them out many times.
Mr. Stearns. Because of privacy.
Ms. Weintraub. Exactly. Because of privacy. Because they
ask questions about your education level, about your income
level, about how you found out about the product, about your
buying patterns. That has nothing at all to do with safety.
Mr. Stearns. You don't have to fill it out. It is
voluntary. And not everybody tells the truth anyway.
Ms. Weintraub. Correct. But a lot of people, when they see
all those questions, they just throw it out even though sending
it in with just a little bit of personal information could
potentially save a life if there is a recall.
Mr. Stearns. Because then the Hasbros of the world would
send back a notice and say, da, da, da, da, da, beware, and let
us know and so forth, like this. We have had this case, and so
if this product is in your home, be very careful.
Ms. Weintraub. Exactly. And it gets to the people who
purchase the product, and they are the ones who need to know.
Mr. Stearns. My time is up.
Ms. Schakowsky.
Ms. Schakowsky. First, I would like to see if Ms. Cowles,
who has not been asked a question, to see if there is anything
you wanted to add in terms of the dialog that has been going
on.
Ms. Cowles. I think that actually my position has been well
represented. I think that the recalls.gov is a good portal for
people who are Web-savvy and want to use it. It really is just
one additional step, though, you have to go to to get--it just
takes you directly to the CPSC page. So we still refer people,
if they are worried about children's products, to go directly
to cpsc.gov rather than through the portal, because it is just
an additional link that they have to go through.
And I also just want to talk very briefly about the testing
issue and the voluntary standards. I sit on those voluntary
panels for children's products, which, unfortunately, are
meeting right now. So I am here instead. I hope they are not
doing anything too drastic. But as Marla said, my two or three
consumers that usually sit together are often outvoted. For
instance, the bassinet standard which is out there, the
voluntary standard has no requirement for a side height on a
bassinet. You could basically--if this table was sturdy enough,
I could say that it is a bassinet, and they would have to put
the sticker on it saying that it met voluntary standards even
though it has no sides on it because they have no requirement
for a side height on a bassinet. So it is a very unuseful
product for protecting children, I believe, because of the role
of manufacturers. They make products with side heights lower
than what should be recommended, and so they don't want to put
it because they would have to remake those products. So I think
that that system is not working. We need to look at mandatory
regulations.
Ms. Schakowsky. Ms. Lipin.
Ms. Lipin. I just wanted to say one thing about the yo-yo
ball. One of the problems I have found with this, first of all,
a recall--I was never asking for a recall; I was asking for
this product to be banned, because a recall for this particular
product would never work because we don't know who the
manufacturers are. We do know that Imperial Toy Company out of
Los Angeles--because I have spoken to their president of that
company--had brought this toy, and they imported it. I have
communicated with them. They claim this was a fad item and so
forth. You couldn't recall the product because there are
millions of them, they say, like 11 to 15 million of these toys
in.
And when Chairman Stratton was talking about how he has
gone to China, I have also communicated with toy companies in
China via e-mail. It has been really interesting. And what they
told me is they knew of the strangulation hazard of this toy,
and one of the companies told me that he was no longer able--I
wanted to see if I could buy it from China, to get them to ship
it to me. He told me that China would not allow the exportation
of this toy. Now, if China does not allow the exportation of a
toy to the U.S. because of a safety concern, why in the U.S. do
we sell this toy?
Ms. Schakowsky. Well, and more than that, let me----
Ms. Lipin. And other countries have banned it.
Ms. Schakowsky. Let me read to you from a Consumers Union
report of October 5. It says: When a product intended for sale
in the United States violates a mandatory safety standard, and
a manufacturer or exporter wants to ship it abroad, that party
is required to notify the CPSC. The Commission staff rarely
says no. More than 900 times between 1994 and 2004, products
that violated mandatory Federal safety standards were exported,
according to Commission records.
Now, sometimes they go back to the countries that
manufactured it, and they are supposed to be responsible; but
other times, it just simply gets into the marketplace. So we
are, in fact, Mr. Chairman, allowing the export of toys that
are not deemed to be safe and have been recalled in the United
States.
I wanted to get to almost a philosophical issue, and that
is the issue of parent, parental responsibility, and the
enormous sense of guilt, at least initially, that must go with
the idea of a child being injured by a product and where
parental responsibility begins and ends.
Clearly, in Linda Ginzel's testimony, she did everything
and did everything right, and there was absolutely no way to
prevent that, given the regulations as they stood and as they
continue to stand. And I appreciate the recommendations that
seems so very simple. I would add pretesting of the products as
an obvious addition to that. But when we are talking about a
product that by its nature has inherent dangers attached to it
when used properly, it seems to me that we do have a
responsibility.
Linda Lipin was standing right next to her son, and yet he
nearly strangled to death, and other parents as well. So these
are not people who are leaving their kids.
There is a horrific story about a bassinet in Ms. Felcher's
book where a number of children died from a cradle--a cradle
that rocked. A woman had her children taken away from her by
the Child Protection Agency, blaming her for the child's death
when it was known that this was a dangerous product that was
sold.
And so while clearly parents have a responsibility, and
baseballs are always going to hit kids in the head, and they
are going to fall off their bikes, I think it is very important
for us to take very seriously our role as regulators of
products that, when we know them to be a hazard when properly
used, that we do everything we can to make sure they never get
on the shelf in the first place, and that we do something to
get them away.
This notion that the registration cards aren't used anyway,
well, you know, people don't--we could figure out a system, a
simple card that said, if you want to be notified of a recall,
sign this. Manufacturers know how to get people to act in a
certain way. Why can't we apply those standards of marketing to
make sure that we create as safe an environment for our
children?
And I just am not going to buy this idea, well, you know,
parents are to blame, or they are not doing enough if we are
not doing as much as we can. And clearly, from this wonderful
testimony that we have heard, I conclude unequivocally that we
are not doing enough to protect our children, that they are in
essence test dummies for products, and that that is just not
sufficient.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman, for holding this hearing.
Mr. Stearns. Yes. And I thank the ranking gentlewoman for
her participation. And I want to thank all the witnesses for
their work in the area of children's product safety, and
obviously want to thank them for their testimony this morning.
Ms. Schakowsky. If I could ask one more thing, Mr.
Chairman.
Mr. Stearns. Sure.
Ms. Schakowsky. For unanimous consent for the record to be
held open for opening statements and questions, and for the
Consumer Reports article, Hazard on Aisle 5, which reports on
unsafe products on the shelves, to be included in the record.
Mr. Stearns. By unanimous consent, so ordered.
I also would encourage the CPSC folks that are here, if
there is anything they would like to add to this hearing as
footnotes or attachment or appendix, that would be very
helpful.
I think the witnesses have posed some very interesting
questions, and I think it is incumbent upon the Commission to
respond to some of these, because, as it turned out, we had the
first panel of the chairman, and he is unable to respond to
some of these. It would have been helpful perhaps to have him
respond to some of these. So I would suggest to you folks that
you might consider an appendix.
And I am going to thank all of you again for your
testimony, and I think it has been a very great hearing. And,
with that, we are adjourned.
[Whereupon, at 12:30 p.m., the subcommittee was adjourned.]
[Additional material submitted for the record follows:]
Response from Rachel Weintraub, Assistant General Counsel, Consumer
Federation of America to Questions from Hon. Edolphus Towns
1. In your view, why has the Commission been ineffective in
protecting consumers? Is it a lack of funding, regulatory power,
culture, or some combination of the three, and what can Congress do to
change this?
Thank you for the opportunity to answer your questions. The reasons
why the Consumer Product Safety Commission (CPSC) has not been as
effective as it can be in protecting consumers is complex. As your
question supposes, it is a combination of a lack of funding, the
existing regulatory authority, and possibly the current culture flowing
from the leadership of the agency.
A. CPSC Funding
To put CPSC's funding levels in perspective, it is important to
note that, over the past two decades, CPSC has suffered the deepest
cuts to its budget and staff of any health and safety agency.
In 1974, when CPSC was created by Congress, the agency was
appropriated $34.7 million and 786 full time employees (FTEs). Now 28
years later, the agency's budget has not kept up with inflation, has
not kept up with repairing its deteriorating infrastructure, has not
kept up with increasing data collection needs, has not kept up with the
fast paced changes occurring in consumer product development, and has
not kept pace with the vast increase in the number of consumer products
on the market. CPSC's staff has suffered severe and repeated cuts
during the last two decades, falling from a high of 978 employees in
1980 to just 471 for this fiscal year.
CPSC, with its reduced staff and inadequate funds, is limited in
what it can do to protect consumers. Because of these constraints, CPSC
cannot maintain its current level of safety programs, nor can it invest
in its infrastructure to improve its work in the future.
Due to the funding limitations, much of CPSC's equipment,
particularly at the laboratory is old and outdated. CPSC's testing
laboratory serves a crucial role in CPSC's compliance investigations
and safety standards activities. In spite of the laboratory's critical
importance, no major improvements have been made in the past 25 years.
Rather, CPSC and GSA have made only slight modifications to its
infrastructure. Currently, CPSC staff working at the lab are working
under merely adequate conditions. If the laboratory were to be
modernized, CPSC would gain significantly through increased
productivity and efficiency.
CPSC's funding directly affects its ability to regulate
effectively. In every recall matter it considers, the Commission must
be prepared with research evidence to convince the company of the need
for action. This research costs money and could be very expensive,
especially over time.
In addition, as new products and new technologies come on to the
market, the numbers of products under CPSC's jurisdiction increases.
High tech products, such as Segway devices, which CPSC engineers may
have never seen, much less have expertise with, pose particularly
resource intensive challenges. For CPSC to live up to its safety
mandate, it must be able to keep pace with the ever-changing
development of technology.
Because of the lack of funding and the increase in the number and
complexity of the products under CPSC's jurisdiction, CFA is concerned
about the agency's ability to operate effectively to reduce consumer
deaths and injuries from unsafe products. It is for this reason that
CFA believes that one of the most important thing that Congress can do
to protect consumers, including children, from unsafe products is to
assure that CPSC has sufficient funding levels each and every year.
B. CPSC's Regulatory Power
CFA recommends that Congress make a number of changes to CPSC's
authorizing statutes, to give CPSC the regulatory authority it needs to
more effectively protect consumers from unsafe products. Our first
recommendation is for Congress to pass legislation that would eliminate
the cap on the amount of civil penalties that CPSC can assess, as
spelled out in section 20 (a) of the Consumer Product Safety Act
(CPSA), against an entity in knowing violation of CPSC's statutes. The
current civil penalty is capped at $7,000 for each violation up to
$1.65 million. Knowing violations often involve a company's awareness
of serious injury or death associated with their product. Eliminating
the cap will encourage manufactures to recall products faster and
comply with CPSC's statutes in a more aggressive way. Importantly, the
elimination of the cap will act as a deterrent to non-compliance with
CPSC's regulations. Eliminating the cap will also strengthen CPSC's
bargaining power when negotiating with many companies to take a
particular action.
Second, CFA urges Congress to eliminate section 6(b) of the
Consumer Product Safety Act. This section of the Act prohibits CPSC, at
the insistence of industry, to withhold safety information from the
public. This provision, which no other health and safety regulatory
agency must adhere to, requires that CPSC, before it can give out
certain information to the public, must check with the relevant company
before disclosing information. If the industry denies access to the
information, CPSC must evaluate their response and may just drop the
issue and deny access of the information to consumers. This has the
effect of delaying or denying access of important information to
consumers.
In addition, CFA has a number of recommendations that Congress
could implement that would improve CPSC's ability to protect consumers,
which we did not have the opportunity to include in our testimony on
October 6th before the Subcommittee. CPSC does not have jurisdiction
over fixed site amusement parks. CPSC does have authority over mobile
parks, but not over parks that remain in place over time.
Unfortunately, at least fifty-five fatalities have occurred on
amusement park rides in the last fifteen years and serious injuries
have soared 96 percent in the last five years. Federal oversight is
crucial due to the vast variation in state laws and the absence of any
regulation in some states. Congress should pass legislation,
specifically H.R. 2207, The National Amusement Park Ride Safety Act,
which would restore CPSC's authority over fixed-site amusement parks
and should authorize more money to take on this expanded role.
CFA urges Congress to require businesses selling toys on the
Internet to provide on their website the same cautionary labeling that
is required on toy packaging. Online retailers should be required to
post the cautionary warnings on their websites so that consumers can be
aware of the potential safety issues before purchasing the product.
Current law, drafted before millions of consumers purchased products
online, does not contemplate internet purchasing. Thus, in order to
provide online consumers with the same information that consumers in
brick and mortar stores can access, safety labeling should be required
to be displayed online, near the product that is being sold.
Congress can improve CPSC's ability to effectively communicate
recalls to consumers by passing the Product Safety Notification and
Recall Effectiveness Act of 2003 (H.R .1197). This legislation would
solve an enormous problem, currently plaguing CPSC's ability to
communicate recalls to the public, by requiring manufacturers of
certain products to accompany those products with a ``Product Safety
Registration Card'' or online equivalent. Once consumers fill out the
card and send it to the manufacturers, manufacturers will have the
ability to communicate recalls to the people who have to hear it most--
the consumers who bought or received the product.
C. CPSC's Culture
The culture of CPSC is difficult to ascertain and the most
difficult element to improve. CFA would hope that the culture of CPSC
would prioritize doing the most possible, within its regulatory and
financial limitations, to protect consumers from unsafe products. This
would include initiating meaningful safety initiatives, responding
quickly and effectively to deaths and injuries caused by particular
products, communicating to the public frequently about potential
hazards, and working overall, in the best interest of consumers rather
than the special interests, especially the regulated entities. CFA can
not truly determine the current culture of CPSC; however, we can point
to a number of examples that cause us concern. Broadly, we are
concerned about what appears to be a wait and see attitude by the
Commission which has resulted in inaction on a number of critical
issues.
In response to the growing number of injuries caused by yo-yo water
balls, CPSC has merely issued a weak warning to consumers. There has
been no additional or stronger warning, CPSC has not urged retailers
not to sell this product and CPSC has not recalled nor banned these
potentially hazardous products that have been the cause of almost 400
injuries, almost 300 of which have been strangulations.
In response to the rising tide of injury and deaths caused by
adult-size ATVs, CPSC held three field hearings, but has implemented no
change to the current voluntary system to decrease deaths and injuries.
CFA filed a petition with CPSC is August of 2002, urging CPSC to take
action to ban the sale of adult-size ATVs for use for children. It has
been over two years since we filed our petition and CPSC has not even
begun the regulatory process.
CFA filed a petition with CPSC to require manufactures of certain
products to accompany those products with a ``Product Registration
Card.'' CPSC denied the petition and has taken no action to improve the
way manufactures communicate critical recall information to the
consumers who purchased their products.
D. Conclusion
In conclusion, Congress should take a number of actions to improve
the effectiveness of CPSC, including, increasing its funding, and
amending its authorizing statutes to make it stronger and by monitoring
CPSC to ensure that they are prioritizing protecting the public from
unsafe products over the desires of the special interests who are
``regulated'' by CPSC.
2. Your testimony provided an example of how the Consumer Product
Safety Commission failed to implement a product registration card,
which is required by the National Highway Transportation Safety
Administration (NHTSA) for child car seats.
While CPSC decided not to require registration cards, are there
other tools that NHSTA uses for recalls of tire or car parts that the
CPSC should consider to better protect children?
First, I must state that the focus of my work is the Consumer
Product Safety Commission (CPSC), not the National Highway
Transportation Safety Administration (NHTSA), and thus I have much
greater knowledge of CPSC's authority than NHTSA's. That being said,
some tools that NHTSA seems to have at its disposal do make their
recalls more effective than CPSC's. Significantly, NHTSA enjoys a
vastly higher recall compliance rate, about 70%, than does CPSC, which
hovers at about 15 to 20%.
What is it that enables NHTSA to enjoy this relatively high recall
compliance rate? NHTSA and car manufacturers have the ability to do
what CPSC can't do: directly communicate to every owner of the product.
NHTSA can do this because every owner of a car is required to register
their car, thus the contact information is available and accessible.
Even more significantly, NHTSA, in its regulations, requires that
``each manufacturer of motor vehicles shall maintain, in a form
suitable for inspection . . . a list of the names and addresses of the
registered owners . . .'' (49 CFR 573.8) This is a critical
requirement. It allows for the creation of a list of the consumers who
purchased the product and, thus enables each and every one of them to
be directly notified about a recall.
In contrast, not only is product registration not mandatory for
every product under CPSC's jurisdiction, but manufactures are not even
required to attempt to obtain this information through accompanying
their product with a form that a consumer could fill out. Thus, to
communicate the news of recalls CPSC and product manufactures send out
a press release hoping that media outlets will pick it up and cover the
story and also hope or assume that the people who bought or own the
product will happen to read or hear about the recall. NHTSA's model
could; therefore, be a useful tool for CPSC and Congress to consider
when taking action to improve recall compliance rates for consumer
product recalls.
NHTSA's regulations also require that, ``each manufacturer who is
conducting a defect or noncompliance notification campaign . . . shall
submit to NHTSA a . . . quarterly report, with respect to each
notification campaign, for each of six consecutive quarters beginning
with the quarter in which the campaign was initiated . . . or
corrective action has been completed on all defective or noncomplying
vehicles or items of replacement equipment involved in the campaign . .
.'' (49 CFR Sec. 573.7) Each report must include the number of vehicles
or items of equipment involved in the notification campaign; the number
of vehicles and equipment items which have been inspected and repaired;
the number of vehicles and equipment items inspected and determined not
to need repair; and the number of items of equipment repaired and/or
returned by dealers, other retailers, and distributors to the
manufacturer prior to their first sale to the public. (49 CFR Sec.
573.7) A similar requirement for CPSC would strengthen CPSC's ability
to ensure recalls are effective and reaching the necessary consumers.
In addition, NHTSA has the authority to monitor the completion rate
for recalls for six quarters and can issue another notice if an
inadequate number of vehicles or parts have been returned for remedy.
(49 CFR Sec. 577.10) Consumers would be served well by CPSC having this
additional authority. If recall compliance rates for a particular
product were low, CPSC would be able to take additional, and if
necessary, stronger action to communicate the recall to consumers.
Another factor that may impact the relative success of NHTSA's
recall authority is that NHTSA may assess a civil penalty up to
$15,000,000, while CPSC's civil penalty is capped at $1,650,000. The
more significant penalty may serve to encourage car manufactures to
comply more rigorously with the terms of the recall and may act as a
deterrent to non compliance with NHTSA's regulations. An increase in
the amount of civil penalties that CPSC can assess will likely increase
compliance with CPSC regulations, including notifying consumers about
product recalls.
NHTSA has another tool at its disposal that CPSC does not have. A
consumer can go to NHTSA's web site and find comparative safety data
about specific brands of cars. This tool drastically increases
consumers' knowledge about specific vehicles.
However, if a consumer were to go to CPSC's web site to find
comparative safety data on specific brands of strollers, for example,
none could be found. The failure of the public availability of this
information is due to one of CPSC's most onerous regulations, section
6(b) of the Consumer Product Safety Act, which requires CPSC to give
product manufactures veto authority about disclosing information about
specific products to the public. The repeal of 6(b) is critical to
providing consumers with the necessary safety information to make
informed decisions about specific products.
In conclusion, it would be very useful for staff from CPSC and
NHTSA to convene a meeting to discuss recall effectiveness,
specifically to determine the tools that NHTSA has at its disposal that
CPSC could potentially emulate.
______
Questions for the Honorable Hal Stratton, Chairman, U.S. Consumer
Product Safety Commission, From Hon. Edolphus Towns
Question 1. In the testimony of Ms. Linda Ginzel, she stated that a
child was killed this year by the same type of portable crib that
killed her child six years ago. I assume you want to avoid another
similar tragedy. Why are these dangerous products still in the hands of
parents? What specific steps will the Commission take to better ensure
that parents actually return dangerous products when they are recalled?
ANSWER: Because of the Consumer Product Safety Commission's (CPSC)
aggressive action to improve crib safety, most infant deaths now occur
in older, previously used cribs that do not meet current safety
standards. The agency has been aggressive through the media and
grassroots organizations in alerting the public to the dangers of these
old and used cribs. Educating the public and removing these products
from the stream of commerce are two of the most effective tools that
the Commission uses to protect the consumer.
CPSC's Office of Information and Public Affairs disseminates
information about recalls in a number of ways including joint press
releases, video news releases, point of purchase posters, direct mail,
paid advertisements, web site notification, and notification to outside
organizations who in turn provide information to consumers.
As an example of the agency's public outreach, unsafe cribs are
highlighted in our annual Recall Roundup Campaign which this year
focused on resale outlets such as thrift stores. CPSC joined forces
with the National Association of Resale and Thrift Shops and the Danny
Foundation to stop resale, consignment and thrift stores from selling
previously recalled or banned products and products that do not meet
safety standards. Additionally, safety seminars were conducted across
the country to educate store employees about CPSC and how to check
their stores for hazardous products.
The CPSC also works with ebay to ensure that dangerous products,
such as older cribs and other recalled products, are not sold on its
public auction website. ebay worked with CPSC to develop a children's
product ``prompt'' which is triggered when a seller attempts to
register a children's product for auction. The prompt urges the seller
to review the CPSC's website to make sure their product has never been
recalled. With baby cribs, ebay requires each seller to review a CPSC-
developed electronic crib safety information sheet prior to listing
their crib for auction. ebay denies access to its website to persons
attempting to sell any product that has been banned by the CPSC.
CPSC recently launched the Neighborhood Safety Network. Through
this initiative CPSC is partnering with other government agencies and
private sector organizations to communicate important safety messages
to vulnerable and hard-to-reach populations. The goal of the
Neighborhood Safety Network is to build a network of community leaders
and organizations that are in regular contact with people who may not
get their news from traditional media outlets or may not have access to
computers.
Another new CPSC initiative is Recalls.gov. This new website
provides a streamlined, one-stop service in alerting commuters to
unsafe, hazardous or defective products. Because numerous government
agencies have jurisdiction over a variety of products, consumers are
often confused as to where to go to seek information on recalled
products. This site is a user-friendly portal to the recall listings of
six government agencies including the Environmental Protection Agency,
the Food and Drug Administration, the Coast Guard, the Department of
Agriculture and the Food and Drug Administration. Additionally,
consumers can register at this site to receive instant e-mail alerts on
all product safety recalls, and consumers can use this site to report a
problem with a product.
In its efforts to continue to look at other opportunities to
improve recall effectiveness, last year CPSC staff held three public
meetings to discuss new approaches for improving recalls with outside
experts and interested parties. The subjects of the meetings were:
``Motivating Consumers''; ``New Tools for Recall Effectiveness''; and
``Measuring Recall Effectiveness.'' The Commission will be considering
staff recommendations that resulted from this initiative.
______
U.S. Consumer Product Safety Commission
November 4, 2004
The Honorable Cliff Stearns
Chairman
Subcommittee on Commerce, Trade and Consumer Protection
2125 Rayburn House Office Building
Washington, D.C. 20515
Dear Mr. Chairman: I appreciated the opportunity to testify before
the committee and to answer the Members' questions on the subject of
children's product safety. Having reviewed the hearing transcripts, I
would like to follow up on your invitation to comment on some of the
issues that were raised at the hearing by the second panel of
witnesses.
First, I would like to again call your attention to the U.S.
Consumer Product Safety Commission's (CPSC) new website
www.recalls.gov. This site is an important tool that directs consumers
to the appropriate agency when they are concerned about the safety of a
particular product or line of products. As you know, federal agencies
and their jurisdictions can be a frustrating maze of confusion to your
constituents. Our goal with www.recalls.gov is to present this
information on recalls in a user-friendly way and to make it simpler
for consumers to report a problem with a product. I appreciate your
offer to share information on this important resource with your
Congressional colleagues.
Recall effectiveness was an issue that was raised at the hearing.
The CPSC has initiated a recall effectiveness project to better
understand the strategies that can be used to reach the most people in
a recall and to motivate those people to respond appropriately to
eliminate the identified hazard. Staff is using a multiple stage
strategy to evaluate consumers' behaviors and the entire recall process
to better understand the attributes of an effective recall.
Staff has held three public meetings to discuss new approaches for
improving recalls with outside experts and interested parties. The
topics of those meetings included: ``Motivating Consumers,'' ``New
Tools for Recall Effectiveness'', and ``Measuring Recall
Effectiveness.'' A staff briefing package on this study is expected
before the Commission in the near future, and I will be certain to
provide the Committee with a copy of the staff's findings and
recommendations.
In the interim the CPSC will continue to work aggressively and
creatively to alert consumers to recalled products and to remove them
from the stream of commerce. In my written testimony I describe CPSC's
initiatives with our Recall Roundup campaigns, our work with outside
groups such as the Danny Foundation and the National Association of
Resale and Thrift Shops and other organizations, our recent project
with eBay with regard to internet sales, and our new initiative, the
Neighborhood Safety Network, which seeks to build a network of
community leaders and organizations that are in regular contact with
people who may not get their news from traditional media outlets or may
not have access to computers. These initiatives are in addition to our
print and electronic media releases and our regular work and
communications with state and local governments.
In the fiscal year that just ended, CPSC completed 356 recall
actions, and I would like to submit for the record the attached chart
that displays CPSC's recalls over the past ten years. Additionally, in
response to two other issues that arose during the hearing I would like
to submit two other charts for the record. The first is a chart of
CPSC's civil penalty history and the second is a chart of yo-yo ball
incident reports received by CPSC both before and after our public
advisory in September, 2003.
The second panel also raised the question of pre-market testing.
Section 14 of the Consumer Product Safety Act states that the
Commission may require firms to certify compliance of their products
based on proscribed testing programs when a regulation is promulgated
regarding such products. CPSC has done that under a number of
regulations. Under the statute, firms have the option of using outside
private laboratories. While the CPSC is not given any express authority
over these private laboratories, the agency does have the authority to
require record-keeping and do inspections of the manufacturers
according to section 16 of the Consumer Product Safety Act.
Finally, I would like to submit for the record a letter that CPSC's
Executive Director sent to the President of Consumers Union in response
to an article which appeared in their publication, Consumer Reports.
That article was submitted for the record at the hearing.
Again, thank you for this opportunity to follow up on these issues.
We look forward to continuing to work with the Committee on issues of
our mutual concern in the 109th Congress.
Sincerely,
Hal Stratton
Chairman