[House Hearing, 108 Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
CREATING SECURE BORDERS AND OPEN DOORS: A REVIEW OF DHS-STATE
COLLABORATION ON U.S. VISA POLICY
=======================================================================
HEARING
before the
COMMITTEE ON
GOVERNMENT REFORM
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
ONE HUNDRED EIGHTH CONGRESS
SECOND SESSION
__________
SEPTEMBER 9, 2004
__________
Serial No. 108-240
__________
Printed for the use of the Committee on Government Reform
Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.gpo.gov/congress/house
http://www.house.gov/reform
______
U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE
97-229 PDF WASHINGTON : 2005
_____________________________________________________________________________
For Sale by the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office
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COMMITTEE ON GOVERNMENT REFORM
TOM DAVIS, Virginia, Chairman
DAN BURTON, Indiana HENRY A. WAXMAN, California
CHRISTOPHER SHAYS, Connecticut TOM LANTOS, California
ILEANA ROS-LEHTINEN, Florida MAJOR R. OWENS, New York
JOHN M. McHUGH, New York EDOLPHUS TOWNS, New York
JOHN L. MICA, Florida PAUL E. KANJORSKI, Pennsylvania
MARK E. SOUDER, Indiana CAROLYN B. MALONEY, New York
STEVEN C. LaTOURETTE, Ohio ELIJAH E. CUMMINGS, Maryland
DOUG OSE, California DENNIS J. KUCINICH, Ohio
RON LEWIS, Kentucky DANNY K. DAVIS, Illinois
TODD RUSSELL PLATTS, Pennsylvania JOHN F. TIERNEY, Massachusetts
CHRIS CANNON, Utah WM. LACY CLAY, Missouri
ADAM H. PUTNAM, Florida DIANE E. WATSON, California
EDWARD L. SCHROCK, Virginia STEPHEN F. LYNCH, Massachusetts
JOHN J. DUNCAN, Jr., Tennessee CHRIS VAN HOLLEN, Maryland
NATHAN DEAL, Georgia LINDA T. SANCHEZ, California
CANDICE S. MILLER, Michigan C.A. ``DUTCH'' RUPPERSBERGER,
TIM MURPHY, Pennsylvania Maryland
MICHAEL R. TURNER, Ohio ELEANOR HOLMES NORTON, District of
JOHN R. CARTER, Texas Columbia
MARSHA BLACKBURN, Tennessee JIM COOPER, Tennessee
PATRICK J. TIBERI, Ohio BETTY McCOLLUM, Minnesota
KATHERINE HARRIS, Florida ------
------ ------ BERNARD SANDERS, Vermont
(Independent)
Melissa Wojciak, Staff Director
David Marin, Deputy Staff Director/Communications Director
Rob Borden, Parliamentarian
Teresa Austin, Chief Clerk
Phil Barnett, Minority Chief of Staff/Chief Counsel
C O N T E N T S
----------
Page
Hearing held on September 9, 2004................................ 1
Statement of:
Ervin, Clark Kent, Inspector General, U.S. Department of
Homeland Security.......................................... 38
Jacobs, Janice, Deputy Assistant Secretary for Visa Services,
U.S. Department of State................................... 14
Verdery, C. Stewart, Jr., Assistant Secretary for Border and
Transportation Security Policy and Planning, U.S.
Department of Homeland Security............................ 24
Williams-Bridgers, Jacquelyn L., Managing Director,
International Affairs and Trade Team, U.S. Government
Accountability Office, accompanied by Randolph Hite,
Director of Information Technology Architecture and Systems
Issues..................................................... 71
Letters, statements, etc., submitted for the record by:
Cummings, Hon. Elijah E., a Representative in Congress from
the State of Maryland, prepared statement of............... 12
Davis, Chairman Tom, a Representative in Congress from the
State of Virginia:
Prepared statement of.................................... 4
Testimony of the U.S. Chamber............................ 50
Ervin, Clark Kent, Inspector General, U.S. Department of
Homeland Security, prepared statement of................... 40
Jacobs, Janice, Deputy Assistant Secretary for Visa Services,
U.S. Department of State, prepared statement of............ 17
Verdery, C. Stewart, Jr., Assistant Secretary for Border and
Transportation Security Policy and Planning, U.S.
Department of Homeland Security, prepared statement of..... 27
Waxman, Hon. Henry A., a Representative in Congress from the
State of California, prepared statement of................. 91
Williams-Bridgers, Jacquelyn L., Managing Director,
International Affairs and Trade Team, U.S. Government
Accountability Office, prepared statement of............... 74
CREATING SECURE BORDERS AND OPEN DOORS: A REVIEW OF DHS-STATE
COLLABORATION ON U.S. VISA POLICY
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THURSDAY, SEPTEMBER 9, 2004
House of Representatives,
Committee on Government Reform,
Washington, DC.
The Committee met, pursuant to notice, at 10:05 a.m., in
room 2154, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Tom Davis
(chairman of the committee) presiding.
Present: Representatives Davis of Virginia, Souder, Ose,
Maloney, Cummings, Kucinich, Tierney, Van Hollen, Ruppers-
berger, Norton, and McCollum.
Staff present: Melissa Wojciak, staff director; David
Marin, deputy staff director/communications director; Keith
Ausbrook, chief counsel; Ellen Brown, legislative director and
senior policy counsel; Jennifer Safavian, chief counsel for
oversight and investigations; David Young and Jim Moore,
counsels; Robert White, press secretary; Drew Crockett, deputy
director of communications; John Cuaderes, senior professional
staff member; Teresa Austin, chief clerk; Sarah Dorsie, deputy
clerk; Corinne Zaccagnini, chief information officer; Michael
Yeager, minority deputy chief counsel; Earley Green, minority
chief clerk; and Jean Gosa, minority assistant clerk.
Chairman Tom Davis. Good morning. A quorum being present,
the Committee on Government Reform will come to order.
I want to welcome everybody to today's hearing, which
continues the committee's history of oversight hearings on U.S.
visa policy. The committee has previously reviewed visa backlog
issues and the implementation of the US-VISIT program. This
hearing will focus on the collaboration between the Department
of Homeland Security and the State Department in the
establishment and implementation of U.S. visa policy.
We all agree that homeland security is a priority and that,
as a result of the acts of September 11th, we need to closely
scrutinize visitors to our country. This tighter scrutiny has
undoubtedly been a major contributing factor to the increase in
visa application and processing delays around the world.
Lest we think this is a trivial matter, next to issues
concerning Social Security, visa delays tend to be the most
requested issue when it comes to casework within our districts.
We have heard in prior hearings about the serious impact visa
delays have on U.S. businesses, on tourism, institutions of
higher learning, the science community, and many others.
Today, however, the committee will examine the
collaboration between the Department of Homeland Security and
the State Department in the establishment and implementation of
U.S. visa policy, and how this collaboration is mitigating the
delays to facilitate business and tourism while at the same
time ensuring security.
Section 428 of the Homeland Security Act of 2002 grants DHS
the authority to set policy regarding the granting and issuing
of visa. Nearly a year ago, DHS and State announced the
completion of a Memorandum of Understanding that clarifies the
roles of both agencies and established mechanisms through which
interagency concerns could be addressed.
In addition to the requirements set out under Section 428,
a number of policy changes directed by both agency decisions
and statutory requirements have changed the way individuals
seek visas to travel to the United States. These changes are
primarily in the information that is collected in the visa
applications and the procedures by which visa applications are
adjudicated. Despite the fact that DHS is still in its infancy
and State has had over two centuries to practice its mission,
it is essential that the two departments bring together their
personnel, their information and expertise to secure the
borders while facilitating the travel of legitimate visitors.
The hearing will examine the collaboration between DHS and
State, and the challenges facing the two departments in a
number of areas, including the requirements for DHS to deploy
visa security officers as an added security component to the
visa adjudication process. Although these officers were
statutorily required to be installed in Saudi Arabia to review
all visa applications, this specific role has been under
consideration by both State and DHS.
The committee is also interested in the progress in
determining which countries may receive visa security officers
in the future and what value they will add to the visa
adjudication process. The DHS Office of Inspector General
recently released a report that identified several challenges
facing the Department of Homeland Security in the
implementation of the Visa Security Officer program.
Particularly, the IG found that DHS faces challenges in
recruiting, training, and maintaining permanent security
officers in overseas posts. It is our understanding that State
and DHS have established internal working groups to manage the
implementation of requirements under Section 428, and will
discuss the implementation of these requirements.
In a previous hearing, the committee reviewed the visa
backlog problems resulting from the lengthy Security Advisory
Opinion process required for students, scientists, and other
applicants who travel to the United States to work or study
particularly on sensitive technologies. As a result of an
interagency review of the entire process, DHS and State have
recently modified the process to reduce the time required for
applicants to obtain clearance from the applicable agencies
without sacrificing security.
DHS and State have collaborated in the implementation of
the US-VISIT program. State has nearly completed its
installation of equipment and software at the over 200 visa
issuing posts around the world as part of the Visa Biometric
Program. Biometric data collected at embassies and consulates
are being entered into a DHS data base that is then used to
check applicants against watch lists and to confirm the
identity of a visa holder when a visitor attempts entry at a
port of entry.
Today, the Government Accountability Office released its
report on the challenges facing the two departments in the
strategic use of the data being collected, the embassy and the
consulate workflow designs that need to be changed to optimize
biometric checks, and the ensuing facility and personnel needs
that may result from the workflow design changes.
DHS and State access to lost and stolen passport
information is an important tool in preventing visa application
fraud. The information is especially important in preventing
imposters from entering the country via the Visa Waiver Program
by assuming the citizenship of a country participating in the
program.
In a previous report, the DHS Inspector General identified
several challenges in collecting the data from foreign
countries and making the data accessible to the officers at the
ports of entry. The committee looks forward to hearing from
State and DHS on the improvements made in this area.
Through this hearing, the committee hopes to learn about
the effectiveness of the collaboration between State and DHS in
developing and implementing an effective visa policy.
Information sharing is at the core of this effort. The
committee also hopes to look beyond statutory requirements and
deadlines to have a productive discussion on long-term issues.
In many ways this hearing today goes to the heart of
information sharing. Information--who has it, who gets it, and
who acts on it--is paramount in protecting the homeland and
facilitating travel for legitimate purposes. Information
gathered by State or DHS is only useful as long as the other
agencies are able to access and query that information.
Information stovepipes are not only inefficient, they threaten
collective security.
As we have experienced in the past, agencies not only
experience technological and resource limitations to
information sharing, but also have cultural and sometimes
statutory barriers in place that prevent useful information
sharing. But we hope that is becoming a thing of the past. I am
confident that after today's hearing we will have a better
understanding of how agencies that work together can overcome
challenges, what challenges still exist, and how information
sharing is the key to successful visa policy.
I want to thank all of our witnesses for appearing before
this committee today, and I look forward to their testimony.
[The prepared statement of Chairman Tom Davis follows:]
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Chairman Tom Davis. I now yield to any other Members who
wish to make opening statements. Ms. McCollum.
Ms. McCollum. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I would like to
thank you for holding this important hearing on U.S. visa
policy.
Since the September 11th attacks on the United States, the
security of our Nation is the most important issue facing us.
Unfortunately, new visa policies and procedures have been a
hardship for foreign students, academics, scholars, and
scientists who come to the United States to teach, study, or to
conduct research.
We also have foreign nations who are invited to participate
in scholarly conferences who have been affected by these
policies. It is critical that we not only closely examine the
security of our country, but that we work to make changes to
create a system that works for our colleges, universities, and
businesses to allow those who have been invited to attend
conferences and have been accepted to be educated in this
country be able to do so.
I have spoken with college and university presidents,
including my own president, Robert Bruininks, from the
University of Minnesota, President Stephen Trachtenberg from
George Washington University, and many others. These leaders in
education are becoming more and more concerned that the world's
brightest and most talented individuals are increasingly
avoiding the United States to pursue educational opportunities
and professional conferences in other countries.
I want to bring to the committee's attention a recent
survey of the council of 113 graduate schools that indicated
over 90 percent of the schools responding show that they had
major decreases in international graduate student applications
for 2004. The 600,000 international students studying in the
United States each year contribute more than $12 billion to the
U.S. economy. Not only from a scholarly, but from an economic
perspective, our colleges and universities are concerned about
the declining international student applications.
The major factor in this disturbing trend is post-September
11th visa application and approval process. This process does
not allow for the screening of students, scholars, and
scientists in an effective, efficient and timely manner. I have
spoken with many of our Ambassadors in foreign countries. They
are concerned about the process, as well as Secretary of State
Colin Powell. We need a visa process that protects Americans,
but we also need a process that does not disadvantage U.S.
interests in this highly competitive global marketplace for
intellectual capacity.
The former director of the CIA and current president of
Texas A&M University, Robert M. Gates, articulates this well in
a New York Times editorial dated March 31, 2004: ``We simply
cannot tolerate a visa process that fails to differentiate
quickly and accurately between legitimate scholars and students
and those individuals who may pose a genuine risk to our
security.''
This country's global leadership is at risk. For
generations future leaders in government, industry, and
scientists have been educated and trained at U.S. colleges and
universities. These students, scholars, and scientists not only
return home with a degree, technical training or professional
experience, but they also return home a strong friend of the
United States and the people of the United States.
Over the years, millions of these special relationships
have yielded profound diplomatic, economic and cultural benefit
to the United States and the world. For example, the Secretary
General of the United Nations, Kofi Annan, completed his
undergraduate work at McAllister College in St. Paul, MN, and
we are well aware of his relationship that was started at a
U.S. higher education institution over 40 years ago.
At this moment in our Nation's history, cross-cultural
understanding and global relations are critical to the world
and critical to our safety. Now is not the time to discourage
or dissuade the world's future decisionmakers from studying,
teaching, or conducting research in the United States.
In response to a question I asked the 9/11 Commission
during an international relations hearing on August 19th, Susan
Ginsburg, the senior counsel to 9/11 Commission, stated: ``We
didn't see a lot of results, security benefits, from some of
the measures put in place immediately after 9/11.''
Mr. Chair, I look forward to today's testimony. I had
proposed a joint hearing between the House Education and
Workforce, and the International Relations Committee addressing
the problems facing international students. Unfortunately, the
chairman of the House Education and Workforce Committee did not
see this as an important enough issue to examine. So I am
pleased that this committee is looking at all visa processes.
Thank you again very much for this hearing, Mr. Chair.
Chairman Tom Davis. Thank you, Ms. McCollum.
Mr. Souder, any opening comments?
Mr. Souder. Yes, I would like to make a few comments.
One, some of the history of the problem that you are
highlighting in your testimony today originally started in this
committee as a reaction to the failures of the visa program in
the State Department, and when we reorganized there was a very
hot debate over whether this should be left in the State
Department at all.
The State Department, I believe, and those of us who sought
a compromise, made a compelling case that this was an entry
level position for the State Department, and without that
position it would be very difficult to recruit overseas and
staff the State Department effectively; that sometimes State
objections to individuals were not on security reasons, and so
they had a compelling interest to stay involved.
But what that meant is we laid over the top of that a DHS
person there too, so that either agency in effect could flag
and stop a person. If there were State Department interests, if
there were a national security interest, they could overlap.
Now, I think some of what I was just briefly reading
suggests that clearly DHS is behind; they don't have language
people that were trained in languages when we entered into
this. Now, presumably their data base is better than what we
had in the State Department. The plain fact is what we were
faced with, the U.S. Congress, was a US-VISIT program that was
fatally flawed and not working to protect the interest of the
United States.
So now we need to look--and this is what this hearing
process is--to figure out a way to integrate two departments
and to do this in a long-term beneficial way to the United
States that protects both State Department interests as far as
other types of foreign policies and other types of clearance
types of things, as well as national security interests. And
maybe they can blend over time and maybe they can't be blended;
that is what this committee came to a conclusion before.
Otherwise, it would have merely been taken from the Department
of State and put in Homeland Security.
But I understand the difficulty that this has been putting,
particularly in certain areas of the world. The University of
Notre Dame in Indiana has a very high profile case right now of
a visiting professor, and it presents all kinds of problems
when the information that has been gleaned may or may not want
to be released for multiple purposes, and I don't know an easy
way to work through this, and I am interested in the comments.
And if I could make a side comment that doesn't directly
relate to this regarding one problem on entry-exit visits for
U.S. citizens that I would like DHS to look at. Congressman Joe
Pitts and I, as well as a number of Congressmen in Ohio,
represent the largest Amish populations in the United States.
It is becoming an increasing problem at Windsor and Niagara
Falls because in their religion they believe a photo is a
graven image, and it is potentially, so far it is up almost to
the individual agent, whether he waives that if he shows other
types of ID.
But in talking to a number of Amish, we may be able to work
out something with a fingerprint. But clearly this is going to
be, as we get better exit systems for the U.S. citizens, we are
going to have to address that one subgroup that often goes into
Southern Canada across that border who don't believe in photos,
which leaves our system vulnerable to penetration if somebody
disguises themselves if we don't address it.
And I think that community is willing to look at that, but
it is one that is in two of the biggest border crossings where
we have risk zones, at Buffalo, Niagara Falls and at Detroit, a
question we have to work through.
I thank the chairman.
Chairman Tom Davis. Thank you very much.
Do any other Members wish to make opening statements?
Yes, sir, Mr. Ruppersberger.
Mr. Ruppersberger. Thank you, Mr. Davis, for holding this
hearing.
It is our fundamental duty to preserve the openness that so
many have sought upon our shores without providing a logistical
loophole for those with negative intentions to take advantage.
Only with the truest of cooperation between the two departments
can this process create an efficient and secure visa system.
One key component of this new system is the expansion of
the DHS security reach. They augment the international
experience of the State Department with the security expertise
of the Department of Homeland Security. Recruiting, training,
and maintaining such posts and positions must be held at a very
high priority, as they are front lines in the war against lax
security focus.
Not only must we learn from the past and implement for the
present, but we must also expand our vision toward the future.
An integrated personnel data collection system such as the Visa
Biometric Program will facilitate the flow of information to
and from officers at both visa offices and port of entry
points. This real time information will be invaluable to the
prevention of both visa and identification fraud.
Biometric data will allow for more accurate
identifications, and we must work to optimize the system needed
to ensure that this data reaches those who need it most in the
most quick and efficient manner. Therefore, I welcome a more
in-depth look at what programs have been implemented and how
both departments are handling the new visa protocols.
Thank you.
Chairman Tom Davis. Thank you very much.
We now come to our first panel.
Mr. Cummings, any opening statements?
Mr. Cummings. Mr. Chairman, I have a brief statement.
Chairman Tom Davis. Sure.
Mr. Cummings. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman, for
holding this hearing today, which will allow us to look at the
processes in place to expedite the issuing of non-immigrant
visas at U.S. consulates abroad.
It is important, Mr. Chairman, that the existing
collaboration between the Department of Homeland Security and
the State Department regarding visas is functional, because the
threat of terrorism is at an all-time high. It is important
that we are able to readily distinguish between ally and foe.
By the same token, our economy is affected greatly by the
ability to admit foreign visitors who come to this country for
business, pleasure, students or scholars. America has always
been, and must remain, a country that is welcoming to visitors
and immigrants who can enrich the diverse culture of the United
States.
In a previous hearing, ``America's New Welcome Mat: A Look
at the Goals and Challenges of the US-VISIT Program,'' our
committee learned about the plans for the newly implemented
entry-exit tracking program, US-VISIT. At that time we
discussed several challenges of the program, such as the visa
backlog, which had been attributed to the lengthy security
process, as well as the possibility that innocent visitors
might be detained at immigration ports of entry because of
inaccurate and outdated information.
I understand that a DHS and State Department collaboration
has resulted in a modification of the visa application
procedure for security clearance that will reduce the amount of
time needed to process the applications. I applaud DHS and the
State Department for your efforts, and look forward to hearing
about the processes both agencies took in order to make this
improvement possible. I also hope that similar processes are
being put into place to minimize the delays foreign business
travelers, students and scholars are experiencing as well.
At today's hearing I anticipate that the DHS will update
the committee on its overall progress in visa policy and
oversight, and that the State Department will give an update on
its implementation on fingerprinting, interviewing, and
screening requirements for visa applications. I look forward to
the hearing and the testimony.
Mr. Chairman, again, I thank you for holding this hearing,
and with that I yield back.
[The prepared statement of Hon. Elijah E. Cummings
follows:]
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Chairman Tom Davis. Thank you very much.
We will now move to our first panel of witnesses. Thanks
for bearing with us.
I want to welcome the Honorable Janice Jacobs, the Deputy
Assistant Secretary for Visa Services for the Department of
State; the Honorable C. Stewart Verdery, Jr., the Assistant
Secretary for Border and Transportation Security Policy and
Planning for the Department of Homeland Security; and the
Honorable Clark Kent Ervin, the Inspector General for the
Department of Homeland Security.
It is our policy that we swear everybody in before you
testify. If you would rise with me and raise your right hands.
[Witnesses sworn.]
Chairman Tom Davis. Thank you very much.
In order to allow time for questions, your entire statement
is in the record, and the staff and members have reviewed that
for our questions, but we would like to try to keep the
testimony as close to 5 minutes as we can.
We have a light in front of you. It will be green for the
first 4 minutes, yellow for the 5th minute, and then it turns
red. When you see it turn red, if you can just start to
summarize at that point, it will be helpful. We won't hold you
strictly to it because we want to make sure you have an
opportunity to make your case. We are just delighted to have
you here today.
Ms. Jacobs, we will start with you. And thanks for bearing
with us and being here today.
STATEMENT OF JANICE JACOBS, DEPUTY ASSISTANT SECRETARY FOR VISA
SERVICES, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE
Ms. Jacobs. Mr. Chairman, members of the committee, thank
you for inviting me to testify on the cooperation between the
State Department and the Department of Homeland Security on the
implementation of U.S. visa policy. We are very pleased to
review the tremendous progress we have made in the past year.
Working together with the Department of Homeland Security and
other agencies, we have improved the visa process and our
ability to combat terrorism through enhanced information and
data sharing, the use of biometric in travel documents, and an
improved security clearance process.
Since September 11, the Department, working with other
agencies, has made significant improvements to our ability to
share information. We now have 19.6 million records in our
consular lookout system on people potentially ineligible to
receive visas, nearly triple what we had prior to September 11.
We are providing Customs and Border Protection [CBP],
inspectors at ports of entry with electronic non-immigrant and
immigrant visa data so that they can view the electronic files
we have of every visa passenger entering the United States. We
are also sharing our consular data base with the National
Targeting Center [NTC], a 24/7 operation of Customs and Border
Protection within DHS. We have also offered to provide CBP
secondary inspectors with direct access to our Consular
Consolidated Data base, as we have already done at both the NTC
and the Forensic Documents Laboratory.
The Department of State also joined in the establishment of
the Terrorist Screening Center that integrates terrorist watch
lists and serves as the centralized point of contact for
everyone from the U.S. police officer on the beat here in the
United States to the consular officer in the farthest reaches
of the globe.
Together with DHS, we are creating a biometric system to
track the entry and exit of foreign visitors by using
electronically scanned fingerprints and photographs. I am
pleased to report that the program is now operational at more
than 201 posts. The program will be in effect at all 211 visa
adjudicating posts by October 26th of this year.
We have made great progress in improving the interagency
security clearance process in recent months by moving from a
paper-based system to electronic transmission. As security
advisory opinion requests and responses now flow
electronically, there is no longer any possibility that a case
may get lost.
Visa's Mantis procedures have also been greatly
streamlined. The effect has been to clear up many longstanding
cases. The vast majority of Mantis cases are now being turned
around within 30 days.
The State Department is also working closely with DHS and
other agencies as part of an Interagency Working Group to
review information on Visa Waiver Program countries. As part of
that process, we are working together with DHS in the
development and implementation of the U.S. Biometric Passport
Program in conjunction with the U.S. biometric passport
requirements of VWP countries.
Almost 1 year ago, the Departments of State and Homeland
Security signed a Memorandum of Understanding based on Section
428 of the Homeland Security Act. The MOU is our road map for
implementing Section 428, which includes the placement of Visa
Security Officers in selected posts.
Currently, the consular sections in Riyadh and Jeddah are
the only ones with Visa Security Officers, but we expect future
deployments in the near future to additional countries. In
Riyadh and Jeddah we have worked closely with DHS to ensure
that the officers posted there were welcomed into the embassy
family. We expect this level of cooperation to exist when DHS
officers take up their duties at other embassies.
We are working closely with DHS to establish
responsibilities for Visa Security Officers and ensuring that
Chiefs of Mission have the information they need to make an
appropriate decision on officer staffing at their missions in
accordance with NSDD-38.
We are also working to implement other parts of the MOU.
For example, the MOU calls for DHS officers to provide training
to consular officers in certain areas such as counter-
terrorism, anti-fraud techniques, etc. To this end, at least
two DHS officers will soon attend the visa portions of the
consular training curriculum at the Foreign Service Institute.
They will then be able to develop training materials to meet
any needs they determine are not being met now.
With our partner agencies in the U.S. Government, we
continue to seek better ways to make our Nation's borders more
secure. Working together, our goal is to establish procedures
that will provide a sound basis for maintaining an effective,
efficient visa process that secures America's borders from
external threats while continuing to promote legitimate travel
to the United States.
Thank you.
[The prepared statement of Ms. Jacobs follows:]
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Chairman Tom Davis. Thank you very much.
Mr. Verdery.
STATEMENT OF C. STEWART VERDERY, JR., ASSISTANT SECRETARY FOR
BORDER AND TRANSPORTATION SECURITY POLICY AND PLANNING, U.S.
DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY
Mr. Verdery. Good morning, Chairman Davis and members of
the committee. Thank you for the opportunity to present the
progress that the Border and Transportation Security
Directorate has made in fulfilling the visa responsibilities
assigned to us in the Homeland Security Act.
Befiting of the excellent partnership that we have
developed with the Department of State, I would like to
associate myself with the remarks just made by Ms. Jacobs. In
addition, my written testimony goes into great deal into many
of the important issues raised in your opening statement.
Chairman Tom Davis. I have just been corrected. It is
Verdery. I know that. That was the Amherst pronunciation I was
giving, just to let you know that.
Mr. Verdery. You know I am a Williams grad.
Chairman Tom Davis. I knew that. But I have an Amherst grad
next to me, too, so it is two against one today. And I hope you
are prepared for the questions.
Mr. Verdery. Well, you are on the dais.
Chairman Tom Davis. OK.
Mr. Verdery. As I was saying, Mr. Chairman, my written
testimony speaks in great detail to many of the important
issues raised in your opening statement, including how we have
stationed Visa Security Officers overseas, how we are engaging
in a security advisory opinion process in Washington, our
assumption of lead responsibility for broad visa policy
determinations, and how we are managing the Visa Waiver
Program.
I would like to use my brief time here, the 5-minutes or
so, to talk about how we are meshing these visa-related
responsibilities with our broader efforts to secure
international travel and to deploy an effective entry-exit
system at our ports of entry.
The 9/11 Commission has reported in painstaking detail how
the visa issuance process was exploited to facilitate the
September 11th attacks on the United States. As Ms. Jacobs has
described, BTS has been working with the Department of State
and other departments to ensure that visas are only issued to
those eligible consistent with applicable law and following an
appropriate security check.
At the same time we recognize that the ability of
legitimate students, scientists, tourists, or business partners
to visit the United States is crucial to our society. If that
travel is disrupted, either because people are unfairly
rejected for a visa or because they believe travel to the
United States is too inconvenient, we will experience
devastating effects on our economy in the short run.
And perhaps equally as important, in the long run the
ability of foreign visitors to come to this country is crucial
to spreading our democratic ideals, furthering scientific
development, and promoting the image of America overseas.
BTS is responsible for overall policy oversight in DHS's
implementation of Section 428 following the Memorandum of
Understanding between DHS and the Department of State.
Secretary Ridge has assigned operational responsibility to the
Visa Security Unit within U.S. Immigration and Customs
Enforcement [ICE]. Policy development for visa security matters
has largely been assigned to my office, the BTS Office of
Policy and Planning, working where appropriate with U.S.
Citizenship and Immigration Services and reporting to your
former colleague, Under Secretary Hutchinson.
Despite difficult budgetary challenges, BTS has made
substantial progress in implementing Section 428 of the
Homeland Security Act. As was mentioned, we have established
and maintained visa security operations at two posts in Saudi
Arabia, which now review 100 percent of applications in that
country. We have also evaluated and selected five overseas
posts for the next expansion of the VSU.
BTS respects the report prepared by Mr. Ervin's Office of
the Inspector General. We essentially agree with the 12
recommendations to enhance implementation of our Section 428
responsibilities, including those related to personnel
selection and training, and selection to posts overseas. We are
pleased that the OIG has designated all of its recommendations
either closed or resolved.
In sum, the deployment of Visa Security Officers to Saudi
Arabia has yielded the security benefits that Congress
envisioned when it crafted the Homeland Security Act. With the
enactment of the fiscal year 2005 budget in the coming weeks,
hopefully, the program will receive much-needed financial
stability and certainty as we expand our deployments and
transition to full-time employees.
The VSU also has been tasked to participate in DOS's SAO
process, providing the interagency review of visa applications
selected because of risk assessments or because of scrutiny
from the consular official. In coming weeks, BTS plans to
deploy officers to the SAO process to resolve difficult or
disputed cases.
But even as we engage in handling particular SAO cases, we
have been extremely active in the broader field of visa policy
and, of course, under the MOU, we can establish visa policy and
have final authority over DOS-initiated visa guidance. We have
gone through a comprehensive review of these programs, meeting
with the scientific community, business operations, others, and
we have heard their message loud and clear that improvements
need to be made, and you are seeing those improvements, wait
times are dropping.
The times of the applications falling into no man's land
are quickly coming to a close. And I will just quote the
director of Yale's Office of International Students who was
quoted recently as saying that the administration, State
Department, and DHS are listening very carefully to their
concerns.
Ms. Jacobs talked about the Visa Waiver Program reviews. I
won't take time here to do that. I can tell you, though, that
these reviews that are ongoing in 25 countries are not a
cursory process, these are active law enforcement-based
investigations of the meeting of the statutory criteria that
Congress has enacted, and those reviews will be completed by
October.
As important as the visa process is, however, it is not the
only mechanism that we use for screening for potential
terrorists or criminals who might attempt travel to the United
States. One of the keys for security and travel facilitation is
knowing who is getting on the plane, especially for visa waiver
travelers, so that the first line of defense is not when the
passenger arrives at a U.S. airport. As you know, in May we
finalized an important agreement with the European Union
allowing for transfer of so-called passenger name record
information to us for vetting purposes for international
flights, and this PNR information is melded with the APIS
information we have received from passports as planes are
coming in air to the United States, vetting at the National
Targeting Center run by Customs and Border Protection. We can
go into this in more detail. We will be coming out with further
guidance on APIS regulations in the near future, and we have
promised, as part of the secure flight announcement last month,
that we will be promulgating a rule later this fall requiring
the APIS information before wheels up so that we can do better
vetting of flights before they take off from foreign airports
bound for the United States. We are also piloting the
Immigration Security Initiative by placing inspectors overseas
in key hub airports to assist airlines in reviewing passengers
with potential terrorist ties or with fraudulent travel
documents.
If I could just close, the US-VISIT program, the SEVIS
student program, these are obviously signature achievements of
DHS. They have been developed in very close partnership with
the Department of State. In fact, the US-VISIT program and the
Bio Visa Program are essentially one and the same in terms of
the information collected and the linkages back and forth to
make sure that information is being shared appropriately. I
think the current statistics, we processed about 8 million
foreign visitors through US-VISIT without impacting wait times;
we have matched about 790 persons against criminal data,
prevented 264 known or suspected criminals from entering the
country, another about 906 people have been matched while
applying for a visa overseas based on the biometric parts of
the Bio Visa and US-VISIT system.
To close, the President's recent issuance of Homeland
Security Presidential Directive 11 related to screening
provides a formal structure to further coordinate and harmonize
these screening programs. We recognize that much work remains
to be done to create the 21st century borders that our citizens
deserve to protect the homeland and to facilitate legitimate
trade and travel.
I want to thank this committee for its support in this most
important endeavor. Thank you.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Verdery follows:]
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Chairman Tom Davis. Thank you very much.
Mr. Ervin, thanks for being with us.
STATEMENT OF CLARK KENT ERVIN, INSPECTOR GENERAL, U.S.
DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY
Mr. Ervin. Thank you, Mr. Chairman and members of the
committee, for this opportunity to appear today to discuss the
findings of two of our recent reviews. The first concerns the
assignment pursuant to Section 428 of the Homeland Security Act
of Department of Homeland Security personnel called Visa
Security Officers [VSOs], to Saudi Arabia initially, and
eventually to other countries around the world, and the second
concerns the security implications of the Visa Waiver Program.
I will confine my oral remarks just to what we consider to be
the most significant features of both reports, since we have
submitted a longer statement for the record, as you noted.
With regard to the Section 428 report, we found that the
VSO program can enhance the security of the visa issuance
process, but that the program as presently constituted is not
living up to its potential. The aim of the program is to
provide a cadre of full-time Department of Homeland Security
personnel with general expertise in law enforcement and/or
intelligence and specific expertise in document fraud,
interview techniques, and the language and customs of the
applicable country. These officers are to work with Department
of State consular officers to ensure that visas are not issued
to known or suspected terrorists. They are also to work with
host country counterparts to develop more information that can
then be used by the embassy in the visa security process.
Unfortunately, due to funding, organizational and
managerial problems, the 10 officers who are or have been
serving in Saudi Arabia as of March 2004, when we completed our
field work, have been serving on a temporary duty [TDY], basis.
Only 1 of the 10 has served for longer than 90 days. The rapid
turnover and short tenure has hampered their effectiveness. And
though the act stipulated that the VSOs would be dispatched to
Saudi Arabia upon ``enactment,'' the officers did not arrive in
Saudi Arabia until August 2003, some 7 months after enactment.
Further, DHS has not provided the VSOs with the training in
language, fraud detection, and interview techniques required by
statute; only 1 of the 10 officers reads and speaks Arabic. We
saw firsthand, during our own visit to Saudi Arabia in March,
how limited in their effectiveness the officers were who lack
these skills, because many of the documents to be reviewed were
in Arabic and many of the visa applicants to be interviewed and
Saudi officials with whom they have to work speak only Arabic.
Moreover, the VSOs lacked the budgetary, administrative, and
logistical support they needed to be fully effective in their
jobs.
Additionally, we found at the time that the VSOs were
spending too much time entering visa applicant data into DHS
computers that embassy staff had already inputted into State
Department computers, limiting the time that the DHS officers
could devote to adding unique counter-terrorism value to the
visa issuance process.
Finally, when we visited the embassy in Riyadh in March, we
learned that no thorough examination had yet been made of
thousands of visa applications that were submitted and approved
before September 11 to determine whether any of the applicants
had ties to any of the September 11 terrorists. We recommended
that, at a minimum, an evaluation be made by DHS, in
consultation with the State Department and the FBI, to
determine whether conducting such an examination would be cost-
beneficial.
Section 428 contemplates, as you know, that VSOs will
eventually be assigned to embassies and consulates throughout
the world. Before the program is expanded beyond Saudi Arabia,
we believe that the recommendations that we have made to
improve the program and ensure that it meets the statutory
intent should be implemented, and we commend the department for
working toward that end.
Turning briefly to the Visa Waiver Program, that program
permits certain citizens from 27 countries to visit the United
States for up to 90 days for purposes of tourism or business
without a visa. While there are undeniable economic and
diplomatic benefits to the program for America, there are also
security risks. In this post-September 11 world, visa
applicants are intensively scrutinized by consular officials.
Most applicants nowadays are interviewed; they must submit
extensive documentation; their finger scans and photos are
taken, and the finger scans are run against key data bases;
finally, all this information is instantly transmitted to DHS
port of entry inspectors.
By way of contrast, visa waiver travelers are interviewed
for the first and only time at a port of entry, little
information about the traveler is collected and maintained, and
the POE inspector generally has much less familiarity than an
overseas-based consular officer with the language and
documentation of such travelers.
One key recommendation that we made to strengthen the
program was to apply the US-VISIT entry-exit checkout system to
visa waiver travelers as soon as possible. DHS initially
exempted visa waiver travelers from this system, which matches
an entrant's name with a finger scan and photograph. By making
this match, DHS can catch known terrorists and criminals who
use the names of people with clear records to try to enter the
country. Subsequent to the issuance of our draft report, the
department announced that US-VISIT will be extended to visa
waiver countries by the end of this month, and we were pleased
by that announcement.
To conclude, our report also focused heavily on the problem
of lost and stolen passports, particularly those from visa
waiver countries. It is imperative that our recommendations in
this area be implemented as quickly as possible. We found that
these passports can and are still being used to enter our
country and evade the scrutiny of the visa process, and we will
be producing a separate report on this fact in the very near
future.
With that, I conclude and I welcome your questions.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Ervin follows:]
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Chairman Tom Davis. Thank you very much. I am going to
start the questioning with Mr. Souder.
Mr. Souder. Thank you very much.
Chairman Tom Davis. Mr. Souder, before we start, let me
just say we have received written testimony from the U.S.
Chamber regarding its concerns about visa for business
travelers. I ask unanimous consent this testimony be entered
into the record. Without objection, so ordered.
[The information referred to follows:]
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Chairman Tom Davis. And I also ask for unanimous consent
for the record to remain open to receive a written statement by
the Association of American Universities and from George
Washington University. And without objection, so ordered.
Ms. McCollum.
Ms. McCollum. Mr. Chair, I also have some college and
university presidents that are sending letters.
Chairman Tom Davis. Give it to staff. We will keep the
record open for that too. Thank you very much.
Ms. McCollum. Thank you.
Chairman Tom Davis. Thank you very much.
Mr. Souder, you are recognized.
Mr. Souder. Dr. Verdery, is that correct?
Mr. Verdery. Mr. Verdery.
Mr. Souder. Mr. Verdery, in the Inspector General's report,
and it has come up in a number of other hearings over time, the
Inspector General's report alleges that DHS doesn't have a
language training program or a way to try to address this
question. Have you undertaken this in general? I know a lot of
the services, even at our borders, are contracted out when you
need somebody to do interpretation.
Is there any kind of bonus system for people to learn
languages in these at-risk countries, particularly if they are
going to serve tours of duty? What is your strategy of how to
address the language problem? Right now, quite frankly, there
could be packages that are labeled anthrax, and I am not sure
anybody at our borders could read them.
Mr. Verdery. Well, as we set about to meet the statutory
requirement of having Visa Security Officers in Saudi Arabia on
the day that the Memorandum of Understanding was signed between
our Departments last September, we did not receive any funding
for this, so we had to take it out of existing budgets, and we
got very experienced law enforcement officers over there to
meet that requirement; they were on the job, have been on the
job ever since. Some of them do not speak the local language,
as was recognized.
We do recognize over the long haul that this is a
preference, of course, for people to have the language in the
host country. It is difficult in some cases to find people who
can do that. In addition, the training for people to give them
that language skill many times would be longer than the tour of
duty that they would be going on until we move to the full-time
employees, as I mentioned in my statement.
Again, we are operating on TDY funds until the 2005 budget
is enacted, which we again hope will be short and soon. But we
do recognize this is a priority, it is just we have taken
essentially the people we had available to do this
responsibility, and we need to transition to the next phase of
full-time employees with that capability.
Mr. Souder. Well, my concern is that the Department of
Homeland Security needs to not only look at this in terms of
the Saudi embassy and other embassies if we in fact want to use
DHS as a resource for security purposes at these different
embassies around the world, but also at our borders.
In other words, we have multiple language institutes that
the State Department has, that the Department of Defense has,
and is the Department of Homeland Security looking at
interacting with these agencies? Because I don't see it just as
an embassy problem and a tour of duty there, but as we know
certain border crossings have a higher percentage of Arabic
crossings and you need language training there.
At the northern border crossings it is amazing, we don't
even have people who speak French at the Quebec border
crossing. To some degree, there needs to be more sense in the
Department of Homeland Security, and if you need money to do
the training or to send them to the State Department or Defense
Department training centers, you should specifically request
that of Congress.
I also want to raise one additional point that I am sorry
to have to raise at this hearing, Mr. Ervin, but I want to put
it on the record, and that is regarding an issue that has
nothing to do with my district and nothing to do with the
politics with it, but it is regarding a lighthouse transfer in
North Carolina.
We have had correspondence for over a year, we have
multiple meetings for over a year, and I believe that
lighthouse funds have been hijacked by the Department of
Homeland Security. They have had two audits. It is clear to
anybody who visits that lighthouse that the lighthouse has
received more dollars in repairs than were ever taken in by any
group; that they have contracted to repair the tower, and the
Department of Homeland Security has been holding the funds.
The simple solution to this would have been to obligate
those funds for the tower. Little kids, Boy Scout groups,
visitors, all kinds of people gave the money for the
lighthouse, not to have it absconded with by the Department of
Homeland Security. This is transferring lighthouse transfer
program, my legislation that passed; it is threatening
lighthouses all over the United States.
I don't have any lighthouses in my district. The people
involved in this fight, predominantly on the side that I am
representing here, are Democrats. I don't have a political
fight in this. I believe this is one of the biggest travesties
of justice that I have seen, and it is intimidating these
groups that were intended. The Coast Guard has hundreds of
these.
The Department of Homeland Security is going to have a
nightmare if every one of these things takes this kind of
investigation; if you are going to try to figure out whether
the money that they have has been used. Just obligate the
funds; get it off your desk. You have far more important things
to do, as this illustrates today, than worry about this
lighthouse problem. And I understand that we are going to get
this resolved next week.
My opinion is that the two costs of these surveys should be
refunded by the Federal Government. This has been a bullying
tactic and people all across the country for years have kept
these lighthouse towers and buildings intact because the
Federal Government wouldn't invest the funds. And then we pass
a bill to try to do it.
To have it held up in this way has been a chilling effect
across the whole country, and the whole Nation is watching to
see how this gets resolved and whether they are going to be
harassed in the same way. The Department of Interior had signed
off, the Coast Guard had signed off; every agency had signed
off, until the IG Office came trotting in.
Now, I understand there was an investigation request out of
the committee. It was real simple. Audit was done, agencies
have cleared it. Get it out of your office. And I am looking
forward to having that done.
Mr. Ervin. Mr. Souder, I commend you for your interest in
this issue. I want you to be assured that we share your
interest in the issue. As you say, we have been working for
quite some time on this issue, while at the same time working
on counter-terrorism issues like the ones we are discussing
here today. We have been very diligent about it.
I want to assure you we have a team of auditors and lawyers
looking at the issue. It took quite a bit of time for OBC to
conduct the required accounting. It took quite a long time for
the Coast Guard to receive that. It has taken some time for the
Coast Guard to review it. I want to assure you that it is the
Coast Guard ultimately that is the decisionmaker here, not the
Office of Inspector General.
All that having been said, the Coast Guard has now, we
understand, reviewed the accounting, and we will be getting
that in a very, very short period of time. We will then look at
it and make our determination, and I expect, as we have told
you, that we will be able to clear this up no later than 2
weeks, and probably sooner than that.
Mr. Souder. I want to make sure that the general public
understands--and this is, if this continues, going to be the
worst PR nightmare the Department of Homeland Security has ever
faced to this point. If you miss a few terrorists, it will pale
in comparison to that. But this is penny ante stuff. People
drop money into jars, they send checks to these groups, they
pay for this building to keep the towers up.
They already had audits; there are tons of paperwork that
existed. Then the Department of Homeland Security required an
additional audit, which is why it took so long, which is going
to basically turn up the same thing that the first audit
showed. This is the most highly audited, the best organized
group of any that are managing 200 lighthouses. If you are
going to do this for 200 lighthouses, instead of going after
terrorists, when there is no question that the dollars were
intended for lighthouse use and all you had to say was use it
to repair the tower, which, by the way, they have a contract
on, what in the world is the problem?
And, quite frankly, this has been an embarrassment, and I
hope it gets resolved in a positive way, because otherwise what
the Department of Homeland Security is going to have to do is
manage all these hundreds of lighthouses that nobody is going
to want to take because you are going to go back and give them
30,000 to 40,000. Two audits now, because they already had done
one before you got involved in it, and the second audit, it
would bankrupt any of the other groups.
This is the largest single lighthouse group in the country,
and on the verge of going bankrupt because of your harassment.
And it may be the Coast Guard, but the truth was the Coast
Guard had already signed off on it until the Inspector
General's Office got involved, whether it was Coast Guard
Inspector General or the other.
The fact is the Park Service, which manages it, and which I
have oversight of and which I serve on Resources, and I am on
Homeland Security, I find this an incredible embarrassment for
the Department of Homeland Security, and to take time up at a
hearing like this because I can't get responsible answers, and
only under duress can we even get an answer, I just find
appalling.
Mr. Ervin. Well, actually, sir, not to prolong this, but we
have been in constant contact with your staff, both in writing,
on the telephone, and in person, so it is not as if you have
not had an opportunity to raise this issue with us before this
hearing. But, as I say, we will be resolving it very quickly,
no later than 2 weeks, and a lot sooner than that, I expect.
Chairman Tom Davis. Thank you very much.
Ms. McCollum.
Ms. McCollum. Thank you, Mr. Chair. I have two questions,
and I think you can tell from my opening statement how strongly
I feel about working together cooperatively to solve the
student visa issue. So my first question is what steps have the
Department of Homeland Security and the Department of State
made to address the delays in student and scholar visa
processing?
The other question that I have I will set up some
information before I ask it. The Department of State currently
does not provide a new stamp for student or scholar visas. This
possesses a problem when a student, especially, who has to go
home for a temporary visit: wedding, funeral, family emergency.
Such a trip home can cause the individual to be reevaluated
with new background tracks having to be completed, and one
student who was in his last year of medical school found
himself trapped back home after going back home for a medical
emergency for 4 months, disrupting his entire medical
schooling.
So we know that this is a problem and I know you are aware
of it, so I want to know what the Department of State is
considering in a process which would allow students and
scholars who have already gone through a very intensive
background check, that have been granted these visas, is there
a process in which they can have their visa revalidated in the
United States before traveling abroad for personal business or
to attend an international conference that would allow them
less confusion in returning back to the United States to
complete their business?
So those are my two questions, Mr. Chair.
Ms. Jacobs. Thank you very much for the question. I think
that we always enjoy an opportunity to talk about the
processing of students, exchange visitors, scientists, business
travelers, others whose travel is very, very important to us. I
want to say that the State Department certainly endorses
everything that has been said here today about the importance
of continuing to attract legitimate travelers to the United
States.
Secretary Powell often describes the task at hand as being
an effort to maintain secure borders, open doors. And while
security is our first priority, we are working very, very hard
at State and also with the Department of Homeland Security on
trying to look at the measures that have been put into place
after September 11 to make sure that they are targeted, that
they are efficient, and, most of all, predictable.
I think that is something that if people know what is going
to happen to them when they go in to apply for a visa, even if
it sometimes, in some cases, takes a few weeks in order to
actually process the case to conclusion, as long as the process
is predictable, I think people are satisfied with that. And
that is what we are working very, very hard on.
The State Department, as far as students go, over a year
ago we sent out instructions to all of our visa processing
posts, 211 posts, telling them that they had to establish
special procedures for getting students and exchange visitors
in to the embassy in a timely way so that they did not miss
their programs, the beginning of studies.
And I am happy to report that all of our posts do have in
place, in fact, special procedures to get students, especially
during the summer period, in in a timely way so that they don't
miss their fall classes. We did this last year; it worked very
well. We did it this year; it has also worked very well.
The vast majority of students, if they are found otherwise
qualified once they have their interview at the embassy, and
provided they have their documents in order and they are
otherwise eligible, get their visas very quickly. There are a
few overall, in about the 7 million visas that we process each
year, about 2.2 percent of that number of all categories of
applicants to include students are subject to some type of
Washington clearance, a vetting back here by agencies in
Washington.
Those, I think, are the cases that have been talked a lot
about as far as delays and things being more difficult,
perhaps, after September 11, and those are the very cases that
we are working very, very hard on to reduce the delays. And I
am happy to say that in almost all of these cases we are able
to turn these clearances around now in 30 days or less.
For students, research scholars, others who might be
subject to a check to guard against the transfer of sensitive
technology that is often referred to as the Visa's Mantis
program, I am happy to say that because of changes that have
been made recently, 98 percent of those cases are now being
done within 30 days or less. That is a huge improvement over
where we were last year, where we were even 6 months ago.
We also have a renewed commitment from the agencies
involved in the clearance process to turn these cases around
quickly. We have ways now, using this new electronic system
that we have for doing the name checks, of keeping track of the
pending cases, and once a case reaches a certain period of time
in its processing, we notify other agencies to tell them that
the case is overdue. I think we are having much better results.
Some of the stories that we hear from the schools and from
the business community and others I think perhaps may be based
on old cases, perhaps old information. I honestly believe that
we have turned a corner, that we are doing better, and the
statistics that we have on both numbers of applications and
issuances I think verify that. Visa applications, this fiscal
year compared to last fiscal year, are up 10.4 percent. The
number of overall issuances, compared to last year, up 14.6
percent. For student visas, the number of applications up 9.4
percent, and the number of issuances to students up 11.2
percent over last year.
Ms. McCollum. Mr. Chair, if I could just ask a
clarification.
Chairman Tom Davis. You may.
Ms. McCollum. Up from what year?
Ms. Jacobs. From the last fiscal year.
Ms. McCollum. Which was a negative, correct?
Ms. Jacobs. That is right. We are certainly not up to where
we were before September 11, but we are, I think, now for the
first time after September 11, starting to see the numbers go
up again, which I think is really good news.
I think also on the student front we at State, and I know
Department of Homeland Security as well, have met with a number
of the academic organizations to try to explain the procedures,
the things that we are trying to do to streamline, to make them
better.
I think we have had a very good and open dialog with them
about changes. We certainly have heard their concerns and tried
to address them. We will continue to look at all of these
issues, though, and work with our colleagues in the other
Federal agencies, and with the schools and other organizations,
in trying to make further improvements.
Chairman Tom Davis. She asked a second question. We will
give you time to respond in writing to that.
Ms. Jacobs. Sure. The question of people who get a
clearance and then come here and feel that they are not able to
return home because they may be trapped for a long period of
time and not able to get back, a lot of this depends on the
reciprocity schedule that we have with any given government. In
most cases students get multiple entry visas, and what that
means is that they don't have to go and reapply for a visa
every time they leave the United States.
For the ones who get limited visas, for example, a single-
entry visa, who are also subject to some type of name check, we
have been able to reach agreement for those who are subject to
this check, the Visa's Mantis check for tech transfer concerns,
for those who are in a U.S. Government sponsored program who
are going to come back to the same program and there is no
change in their situation, the clearance itself is now good for
a year. So those people can leave, go and apply for a visa.
They don't have to wait for another security check; once they
get their visa, they can come back.
We are working on trying to extend those, make the
clearances valid for even longer periods of time for other
categories. And with the others who are subject to clearances,
again, we have a commitment by all of the agencies involved in
the process to turn these cases around quickly.
Chairman Tom Davis. Thank you very much. Thank you.
This is a question for all panelists. I will start with
you, Ms. Jacobs, first. The IG has basically noted that INS has
had difficulty getting permanent employees overseas because
they didn't want to go there. Is there any plan to create
something like the Foreign Commercial Service or Foreign
Agricultural Service to provide a career track for these Visa
Security Officers?
Ms. Jacobs. OK, well, I think I will defer to Mr. Verdery
to answer that completely, but I think just in general, working
with Homeland Security, that there has been a very serious
effort to try to get Visa Security Officers overseas. We have
worked very, very closely with them to do that.
Chairman Tom Davis. There has, but I am concerned about the
lack of a career track to make it attractive to them. And I
guess I will put it over to you, Mr. Verdery.
Mr. Verdery. I think it is a very interesting concept. I
think we are at a more fledgling state than that. We do not, at
this point, have an army of people we need to worry about; it
is a small number of individuals. We are going to be expanding
in the coming months, once the fiscal year 2005 budget comes
down the pike, but this is not such a large program at this
point, where we are talking about a large number of people.
We are really concentrating on making the Saudi operation
work well, on getting the other hub sites up and running, on
getting the D.C. operations in place, on converting the TDY
individuals over to full-time. Again, I am not sure I have
gotten the point out here, but these are very experienced law
enforcement personnel that are going over to assist essentially
the entry-level folks over at the Department of State who are
working on the visas, providing great value to this process.
But, again, that is kind of a longer----
Chairman Tom Davis. But you are making investments in these
people in language training and the like over the long term,
and I am just thinking over the long term you want to make sure
that there is an appropriate career path to attract people, go
through the kind of training they are going to need to go
through this. I know the program is in its infancy; I am just
trying to look ahead a little bit.
Mr. Verdery. And we are trying to look ahead as well.
Again, once the funding is in place, we are actually going to
be hiring full-time people. That is a very legitimate concern
we need to take into account.
Mr. Ervin. And I would just second that, Mr. Chairman. We
recommended that, as you noted, and we think that the
Department should definitely look at that model.
Chairman Tom Davis. I agree.
Also, the visa waiver review that is expected to be
completed in October, is it going to provide a baseline
standard? And the reason I ask that is you have some countries
that, frankly, the people coming in here are not security
threats. They may be threats to just disappear illegally into
the country, but I am talking about Poland, I am talking about
South Korea. These are countries, frankly, that aren't
terrorist threats, as near as I can tell, and they have people
fighting alongside us over in Iraq and the like. I think it is
important that they get a road map for what it would take to
gain admission to visa entry.
I was just in Korea. One of the complaints we heard from
businesses, from the government there, and what I hear back in
Annandale and Fairfax and my own district is the difficulty in
getting visas for people that are not terrorist threats. There
are other concerns with INS, and that is the people who come
over here and not likely to return, and we understand that.
But if we could give these countries a road map for what it
would take to gain admission to the visa entry program, that
would be helpful. And I think after this report in October,
maybe that could be a road map for it. Can you make a comment
on that?
Mr. Verdery. Again, I think you are right. Our priority is
to get these country reviews done to make sure the countries
who are already in the program are meeting their criteria,
especially on lost and stolen passports responsibilities,
reporting those to us so we can detect these people at ports of
entry.
But there are other very important statutory criteria that
Congress has passed about refusal rates, overstay rates,
cooperation with law enforcement and the like, all the things
you would want from a country that is given this kind of
privilege. And since there is a road map for countries to
understand how they will be judged, and once we get these
reviews done over the next few weeks, we are then going to turn
to reviewing anybody else who would like to apply.
Now, I can tell you that the criteria are fairly stringent,
so I wouldn't want to give people false hope. But there is a
process and we will take that on once we get through these
country reviews.
Chairman Tom Davis. My impression is that some of the
criteria are more anecdotal than they are factually based, in
terms of who we are letting in and not letting in, focusing in
on younger women coming in, that somehow we think they are more
likely to disappear into the population than others, and the
like. Will the data collected from the US-VISIT be used in
evaluating countries that want to join the Visa Waiver Program?
Mr. Verdery. Yes. The VISIT program, as you know, we are
building out the exit part of VISIT with pilot programs at
several airports right now that will give us better departure
data than we have currently so we will be able to understand
overstay rates in a more comprehensive way than we have right
now. We have many departure points to go, we have to pick a
technology for the exit, which is extremely complicated, but
over time we will have much better overstay information that
would be plugged into countries who want to apply for the Visa
Waiver Program itself.
Chairman Tom Davis. I want to put my plug in for South
Korea in particular because they have a current problem in my
district with our large population coming back and forth. I
don't think it is a major security issue that drives it. There
are some elements of that, but getting into that peninsula is
pretty tough.
Mr. Verdery. There is both a security and a overstay issue
here.
Chairman Tom Davis. The overstay issue I think takes
dominance. I think the other we can work through.
Mr. Ervin, you wanted to comment?
Mr. Ervin. Just one quick interjection, if I may, on the
issue of countries like Poland and South Korea. I am very
pleased that the country reviews are being done by the
Department; I think that is very important. I agree that road
maps should be provided for countries like Poland and South
Korea and others that desire to become part of the program.
But just a caution, and that is that it is not necessarily
the case that terrorists will always come from countries in the
Middle East or Islamic countries. Increasingly, in fact, it is
likely that they will come from countries with which
traditionally the United States has had very good diplomatic
relations from which terrorists have not traditionally come.
After all, Zacharias Moussaoui entered our country on a French
passport, and Richard Reid, the shoe bomber, came on a British
passport. So just a caution about that.
Chairman Tom Davis. Yes, but the Korean peninsula is pretty
isolated. Now, I guess in theory you could have a North Korean
come down and sneak down over the border and steal a passport,
but we could find a way around that. To get through that
peninsula, it is not like it is a porous border like the French
passports where people are coming in and out.
I think, in fairness, they have troops fighting alongside
us over there, and I don't want to do anything to discredit
what that government has done and how important this could be
with everything else going on. So that's my own view, but
having been over there and seeing the amount of trade and
commerce going on, the number of people going back and forth,
this would be a primary, in my judgment, for a visa waiver,
just make things a lot smoother.
But if you just let them know what criteria they have to
meet, I think they could take some internal steps to try to
meet that and hopefully meet the concerns that you have, which
we think are legitimate.
Mr. Ervin. Thank you.
Chairman Tom Davis. Thank you.
Mr. Tierney.
Mr. Tierney. Thank you. I am always fascinated by that
subject. Whenever you have a waiver program, you run the risk
that somebody is going to impose upon nationals of another
country to do their dirty work for them.
So I think that there is always that concern, and it is
sort of tough to reconcile a waiver program if security is your
issue, because you are assuming that nobody is ever going to be
imposed upon through blackmail or threats or anything like that
to do something, and it gets difficult on that.
Ms. Jacobs, the VISIT program, there has been criticism in
the past of the fact that the data bases were so large and had
gotten some inaccurate data in the past that had a lot of dated
information, and now we have added millions to it. Can you tell
me what the report is on false positives? Are we getting a lot
of false positives? Has that issue been resolved favorably?
Mr. Verdery. I think that actually probably falls more in
my camp, Congressman. There are false positives where the
fingerprint does bring up somebody else, but it is extremely
low, in the one-tenth of 1 percent kind of phaseout of the 8
million, and they are being resolved within a few minutes.
We have a pretty robust privacy policy within US-VISIT
which we run, and to date there have been very few complaints.
People have actually found the finger scanning, as we like to
call it, fairly innocuous, and we have almost no privacy
complaints. People see it as a great security measure. It
hasn't increased the waits at all.
Mr. Tierney. Can either you or Ms. Jacobs tell me what was
the delay on the Memorandum of Understanding? Why did it take
so long to get that document done?
Mr. Verdery. It is just extremely complicated on dividing
up the responsibilities between the oversight mechanism that we
play, both in Washington and overseas, and the operational
responsibilities for Ms. Jacobs' consular officials and some of
the touchy issues on the recognition of their diplomatic needs
and these things. So this was taking some of our best lawyers,
some of our best policy folks to get it done, and we think it
has worked well.
I wouldn't want the hearing to close without saying that
the point here is cooperation. There are probably no two
departments I know of that cooperate better than we do. There
is no Federal official I talk to more than Janice, and we have
an incredibly strong relationship on the visa program, on
VISIT, and how they mesh together, so I think it is working
very well.
Mr. Tierney. Mr. Ervin's study indicates that many of the
things that needed to be done could have been done prior to
that Memorandum of Understanding being done. Was there a reason
for the delay at the Department of Homeland Security in
implementing what it could have done without the agreement?
Mr. Verdery. I think we have a disagreement over the
legalisms here as to when our officers were required to be
deployed to Saudi Arabia, I think our lawyers and his lawyers
disagree about the exact date. In our view it wouldn't have
made a whole lot of sense to send them over there without
having the legal framework for providing their ability to
engage in the visa process, and they were there the day it was
signed.
So this is a legal issue. I think it has been a year now.
They are providing great value over in Saudi Arabia, have been
engaged in finding people that wouldn't have been detected
otherwise and engaging with the consular officials, so I think
in some ways we are passed that, but there is just a debate
over the statutory interpretation.
Mr. Tierney. I am a little concerned about some of the
things I see in the report about whether or not they are being
that effective when I see that 9 out of 10 of the officers
served over in Saudi Arabia don't read or speak Arabic, and
right on down the line.
But let me, because time is limited, go to the funding
issue. Where do we stand on the funding? Is it still inadequate
to complete the things that need to be completed on that? Where
is it in the process? How far apart are the present numbers
being proposed from what the perceived needs of the Department
are?
Mr. Verdery. Well, as you know, we are winding up fiscal
year 2004. There was no money in the 2004 budget because the
agreement hadn't been signed and the office hadn't been set up;
there was essentially nothing to fund. So we have taken money
from ICE and other parts of the Department to build this
fledgling program.
There is $10 million that is in the appropriations bill
that are pending here that will provide enough money to do the
Washington responsibilities we talked about and turn the Saudi
operation into full-time, permanent employees and at least one
other hub location overseas to full-time, permanent.
Now, we are also looking, very importantly, at having
enough money to deploy rapid response teams. So if we see a
country where there is a security gap or we have intelligence
about a potential security gap, we can get a team of
experienced law enforcement people there, maybe 30 days, 60
days, to engage, to improve the situation, to get us through a
risk period, and the like. It is a different model than just
sending people everywhere, but we think it is one that should
be explored.
So the money is there. I would think in future years, as
the program meets success and we have the fully engaged
partnership developed, I would imagine they would expand beyond
the $10 million, but that is what we need for this year.
Mr. Tierney. Thank you.
Chairman Tom Davis. Thank you very much.
Mr. Ruppersberger.
Mr. Ruppersberger. We know what some of the issues are. We
know you have a very difficult time. It is good to see that we
have the Department of Homeland Security and State working
together on this issue. We know what the problems are and we
have attempted to set up the systems, now it is a matter of
implementing and managing those systems.
I would like to talk about two different areas, if I can,
in the time allotted, to get into some more specifics, and that
is something that has been alluded to today. The question is
about the Visa Security Officers and, second, the Biometric
Visa Program, and that is the program, as we know, that
requires applicants for fingerprinting, photographs, and to
await clearance through the IDENT system.
Now, as it relates to the VSO or the security officers,
first thing, why did we just pick Saudi Arabia? Is it a pilot
program? I mean, the law basically states that we must have
these VSO Security Officers in Saudi Arabia.
Mr. Verdery. Part of the Homeland Security Act essentially
said that we could not issue any visas after the date the MOU
was signed unless we had the DHS Visa Security Officers in
Saudi reviewing those applications.
Mr. Ruppersberger. OK, now, I know.
Mr. Ervin. May I just interject? Actually, the statute said
that notwithstanding any other provision of law, that after the
enactment of the act, which was January 2003, there had to be
onsite DHS personnel to review visa applications in Saudi
Arabia, and it was because 15 of the 19 September 11 terrorists
were from Saudi Arabia.
Mr. Ruppersberger. OK. Well, let me ask you this. Do we
have a job description for that position, for the VSO? What is
the job description? And what I am alluding to--let me go a
little bit further. Do we have issues that would relate to
language? What is the funding mechanism? What is the plan to go
into other countries?
I mean, what this does is give a stronger security
component to the visa process, but it is not just having a
couple people out there and throwing them out there without
training and the ability to speak the language. What do we need
to do to make this a stronger program to then take this to
other countries where we have just as much vulnerability as
Saudi Arabia?
Mr. Verdery. Well, there is a plan in place on training the
officers, on providing the job descriptions, on moving on to
other countries, the hub countries, as I mentioned. Some of
these we have interim training programs in place and are moving
on to more full-time programs. For instance, we are required to
train the VSOs. We have been doing that in-house.
We are now going to be working with FLETC, Federal Law
Enforcement Training Center, to provide that professional
training to the VSOs as they are deployed overseas. So in some
ways we have come up with interim measures that have fit the
bill during this interim year. Now we are moving on to full-
time employees, about the language issues and the like.
In terms of the deployment to other locations, we expect
that to be done throughout fiscal year 2005 as the money comes
in, to get people out to high-risk areas. We have identified
five. We think we will probably do at least one in fiscal year
2005, in addition to these rapid response teams I mentioned
that we would like to be able to do.
So there are plans in place. I would be not fully honest if
I said this has been a difficult program to manage with no
funds. So we have taken it out of----
Mr. Ruppersberger. Well, my concern is this looks like a
good program, but we are woefully inadequate as far as the
personnel is concerned, the training is concerned. If you can't
speak the language, I wonder if there is expertise in
intelligence analysis, the ability to analyze what we have.
What is the integration, if we have the technology there,
the integration between getting information and getting into
other arenas or finding out where to get that information? I
think it is a program that makes a lot of sense, but I am very
concerned about what I hear today about implementing it, the
technology, the training, the job descriptions, all of those
areas.
Mr. Verdery. We obviously agree. We think this is very
valuable. The people who have been doing this have found it
valuable. The State Department colleagues have found it to be
valuable. We are finding people in the application process that
would not have been found otherwise. The law enforcement
experience and the access that they bring to the broader range
of DHS----
Mr. Ruppersberger. I am going to interrupt you because I
see my yellow light is on. I want to get to the Biometric Visa
Program, which really I think is a great program. I know that
the GAO is expected to issue a report that there is not enough
uniform guidance as far, as the management of this program, for
those individuals that are adjudicating the visa applications.
The good news is that GAO is going to say that you are
ahead of schedule on the implementation of the program, which
is supposed to start, I think, in October 2004. My question
basically is if the GAO is coming out with that recommendation,
they are concerned about the uniform guidance, how do we expect
to deal with that?
Ms. Jacobs. Thank you for the question. The Bio Visa
Program is one that the State Department is very, very proud
of. We were able to get it out to the field very quickly. We
started in September 2003. We will definitely meet our October
26 deadline for having the program up and running at all of our
211 visa processing posts.
The study that the GAO did pointed to some recommendations
about more policy guidance to the field, more instructions on
implementing the program. In our response to the GAO report, we
did point to a number of instructions, policy guidance that was
sent out to the field beginning in September 2003, when we
first deployed the program, and I would be happy to provide you
with sort of a list of all of those telegrams that have gone
out.
Some of the issues raised in that report had to do with
procedural questions that were still being worked out because
it was a new program. We are really joined at the hip with DHS
in implementing this program. I think it is one of the best
examples of the cooperation between our two agencies.
But there were some technical systems issues that we has to
address along the way, and we did keep the field informed. One
of the questions was getting the result of the name check, the
IDENT check back before an interview seemed to be important to
the GAO investigators, and as we explained in our response, no
visa can be issued until the results have been looked at by the
adjudicating officer.
So it would be nice to have the information, but sometimes,
given the way that the system is set up and works, that is not
always possible. But the information is always available before
the visa is actually adjudicated.
Mr. Ruppersberger. Thank you. I think it is very important
that we have a lot of oversight on the Visa Security Officers
program. It is a good idea. Where it is now, I think it is
really doomed for failure, and yet I think we need this type of
program. So if you could report back, at least to me, if not
the committee, on where we are in this program and what it
needs to be successful; otherwise, I believe we are wasting
money.
Chairman Tom Davis. Thank you very much.
Mr. Verdery. We would be happy to. And, again, we agree
this is a very key priority of Under Secretary Hutchinson, and
we are going to make the most of the money that is coming our
way.
Chairman Tom Davis. Thank you very much.
Mr. Van Hollen.
Mr. Van Hollen. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
I want to thank all the witnesses for being here. I was
also pleased to hear of the cooperation between DHS and the
State Department on many of these issues. I would say in our
district office the overwhelming number of constituent cases
that we deal with, we deal with immigration issues, both on the
permanent immigration side but very often on the non-immigrant
visa issue. It is the No. 1 issue with respect to constituent
concerns.
And in that regard, as I understand it, we have really got
a couple of processes: you can be in the Visa Waiver Program in
1 of 27 countries where you go through no visa process or a
couple of the other exceptions, or you can be from a country
where we are going through a much more vigorous visa
application process.
And with respect to that second category of countries, my
question deals with those individuals who apply for a visa,
they go to the consular officer, they are determined not to be
a security risk, they go through all the background checks and
determine that this person has no history of any kind of
wrongdoing or anything, but they are denied a visa because of a
concern that they are going to overstay their visit.
And we have so many people who are trying to come here for
weddings, in many cases funerals, where the individual is
denied on the basis that they claim that they are going to be
at risk of overstaying; not a security risk, risk of
overstaying, but really given no reason in many cases, provided
no argument or rationale for why this person is denied and what
that person would have to show in order to meet the tests of
the consular officer.
So I would appreciate it if you could address that issue,
because it comes up constantly in our district office.
Ms. Jacobs. OK, I would be happy to try to address that.
The section of law that you are talking about is Section 214(b)
of the Immigration Act, which basically presumes that all non-
immigrant applicants are intending applicants until they
overcome that presumption. And 214(b) remains the primary
reason that people are denied visas, more so certainly than
people being suspected of being terrorists or security risks.
Section 214(b) does loom large for the vast majority of
applicants. It is something that has certainly existed before
September 11, and it is something that all of our consular
officers receive training before they are put in a position of
having to adjudicate visas, training in how to identify bona
fide applicants and those who may be coming who are in fact
intending to remain in the United States.
The officers who are at our embassies adjudicating visas
have received a lot of other types of training, they are very
familiar with the host country, the social, political, economic
conditions in that country, and they really are able to tell,
for the most part, applicants who really are coming for the
intended purpose and those who have not been able to overcome
this presumption of being an intended immigrant.
There are certain countries where there is a lot of
pressure to immigrate to the United States, either to find jobs
because there are family, friends here, other reasons, and in
those countries, again, most of the cases are denied because of
this intending immigrant presumption.
We do give officers training. I know that sometimes
applicants feel that they are not given an explanation. All
applicants are supposed to be given in writing the reason that
the visa was denied.
We do give all kinds of suggestions about what an applicant
can bring in the way of documents and otherwise to show that
they have strong ties to the home country, to give proof about
the purpose of the visit to the United States. So the officer
looks at every case on its individual merits, looking at the
case as a whole, and uses the training and the knowledge about
the host country to make the best decision possible.
Mr. Van Hollen. OK. Well, I would appreciate the
opportunity to work with your office on some of these cases
because there are some that I think we would all agree, fair-
minded people would agree are cases where there was absolutely
no risk of someone not returning to their homeland, a case
where someone wanted to see his dying brother who had brain
cancer, in fact, we were finally able to resolve it and the
person went back.
But there are cases where it seems to me understandably
consular officers who are the front line since September 11 are
denying people far more automatically than they were before,
even where there is no issue of security. Obviously if there is
any hint of a security risk, that person needs to be fully
vetted and make sure that we don't allow that person to enter,
but these are people who there is no finding of security risk
and yet it seems that there has been an increase in denials
without providing any rationale for the decision. So I hope
that at least on certain cases we are able to work together.
Mr. Verdery. Congressman, could I just add two points
related to this?
One, we have been working quite closely with the business
community to try to figure out better mechanisms for business
travelers to avoid getting caught up in this kind of 214(b)
issue. We have had very productive discussions on making sure
that they provide the best documentation available, that we can
work with the companies to figure out, yes, these are
legitimate company employees, that kind of thing, to try to
help on that front.
The second thing goes back to the point I think Congressman
Tierney raised, the importance of the exit part of US-VISIT.
Essentially, now, when somebody arrives, we really don't know
when they are leaving, so having that capability over the next
few years to be built out will really add to the value of
understanding when you give somebody a visa, what does that
mean; are they leaving, are they staying, what countries are
problem areas, and the like. So getting that right is extremely
important, but very difficult when you think of imposing that
kind of requirement at airports or land borders.
So look forward to working with you on both of those.
Mr. Van Hollen. Right. No, I think that is critical, being
able to document who is overstaying or not. My concern is that
often we are not doing it on an individual basis, we are
generalizing with respect to countries.
So an individual who may have a very good individual case
to come here is somehow tainted because others from that
country may have overstayed. But I think you are absolutely
right, it is important to get the data so that we can take a
look at these things.
Chairman Tom Davis. And also I just hope you would consider
US-VISIT information, too, in the visa process so the barriers
that exist now, we are going to get a lot of information out of
that, and as we talked before, not just for the Visa Waiver
Program, but in some of the other areas, we want to optimize
the use of this information. We will come back and revisit this
when we get it.
I think that will conclude this panel. The committee will
take about a 1-minute recess as we move our next panel.
Oh, Mr. Souder has one last question.
Mr. Souder. I am sorry. I wanted to ask Ms. Jacobs are all
State Department employees required to know the language when
they go into a country?
Ms. Jacobs. For the most part, yes. Our positions are
language-designated or not, but in most instances consular
officers do speak the language of the host country.
Mr. Souder. And do you have training programs for those
people? Because pretty much everybody I have met has to
understand the language when they are in that country as part
of their training program before they go over.
Ms. Jacobs. Yes, sir, we do, we have a very intensive
language program provided by our Foreign Service Institute.
Mr. Souder. What is your estimate of the cost of that
program per person, do you have it in your budget when you
figure you have to train somebody?
Ms. Jacobs. I can get back to you with that number.
Mr. Souder. OK, thank you.
Chairman Tom Davis. Thank you again. Our thanks to this
panel. We will take a 1-minute recess, then we will have
Jacquelyn Williams-Bridgers, Managing Director of the
International Affairs and Trade Team for the Government
Accountability Office, next.
[Recess.]
Chairman Tom Davis. We will now move to our second panel,
and I want to thank Jacquelyn L. Williams-Bridgers, the
Managing Director of the International Affairs and Trade Team
for the Government Accountability Office for being here.
It is the policy of this committee that all witnesses be
sworn. If you would rise with me and raise your right hands.
Who do you have with you we need to identify?
Ms. Williams-Bridgers. With me is Randolph Hite, who is the
Director of International Technology Architecture and Systems
Issues.
Chairman Tom Davis. Mr. Hite, welcome. We will swear you in
as well in case we have any questions.
[Witnesses sworn.]
Chairman Tom Davis. Thank you.
I know you know the rules. We are trying to beat a vote, so
if we can get through your testimony and get through questions
and hopefully, when they call the vote, we can go on for 10
minutes and then dismiss you and not have to hold you until
afterwards, and that will save you some time. Thanks for being
with us.
STATEMENTS OF JACQUELYN L. WILLIAMS-BRIDGERS, MANAGING
DIRECTOR, INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS AND TRADE TEAM, U.S. GOVERNMENT
ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, ACCOMPANIED BY RANDOLPH HITE, DIRECTOR
OF INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY ARCHITECTURE AND SYSTEMS ISSUES
Ms. Williams-Bridgers. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman
and members of the committee, for having us here today to
discuss the results of our report issued to you on the results
of GAO's review of the Biometric Visa Program, as well as other
aspects of visa and border security programs that highlight the
need for joint, coordinated efforts by the Department of State
and the Department of Homeland Security.
Since September 11, the U.S. Government has made a
concerted effort to better protect our borders by enhancing
visa issuance policies and procedures, as well as improving the
screening of millions of foreign visitors who enter, stay, and
exit the United States each year. State's Biometric Visa
Program complements the DHS-run US-VISIT program by extending
border security improvements beyond U.S. ports of entry.
The Biometrics Program requires pre-screening of visa
applicants at U.S. consulates overseas to ensure that they are
qualified to obtain visas. The US-VISIT program, among other
things, verifies that the same person who applied for a visa is
the one who is actually entering the United States using that
visa.
My statement today will focus on our observations and
recommendations that call for joint collaboration of effort
between State and DHS to improve border security programs
specifically with regard to the Biometric Visa Program and the
US-VISIT program.
In summary, State and DHS have made many improvements to
visa issuance policies and border security. Nevertheless, in
our reviews we have found weaknesses that both agencies need to
address. For example, we found that State is implementing the
Biometric Visa Program on schedule and will likely meet the
mandated October 2004 deadline for issuing visas with biometric
identifiers.
As of last week, State had installed program hardware and
software at 201 of 207 overseas posts that issue visas, and
State plans to complete installation at the remaining six posts
by the end of this month. The biometric technology installation
has progressed smoothly; however, DHS and State have not
provided comprehensive guidance to consular posts on when and
how the information on visa applicants obtained from IDENT
should be considered by adjudicating officers.
In the absence of such guidance, officers may be unclear on
how to optimize the use of IDENT information provided under the
Biometrics Program. Therefore, we recommend in our report that
DHS and State develop and provide such guidance to consular
posts on how information on visa applicants available through
IDENT should be used to help adjudicate visa applications.
Further, DHS has employed an initial US-VISIT operating
capability, including the use of biometric, for entry at 115
airports and 14 seaports. DHS plans to expand the initial
operating capability at the fiftiest busiest land ports of
entry by December 2004 and to all remaining land ports of entry
by December 2005. It has deployed an exit capability on a pilot
basis at two airports and one seaport to enable electronic
matching of biometric data collected at entry to those
collected at exit.
However, earlier this year we reported that DHS's homeland
security enterprise architecture had not yet been adequately
defined. By this I mean DHS had not fully constructed an
operational context or a blueprint to provide, for example, all
US-VISIT stakeholder agencies a common frame of reference for
how to implement US-VISIT in terms of such things as the
desired program outcomes, the business processes, information
flows, and areas of responsibility.
DHS released an initial version of its enterprise
architecture in September 2003; however, we found that this
architecture was missing important content. This content is
needed to help verify, clarify, and optimize the relationships
between US-VISIT and other homeland security programs and
operations such as State's Biometric Visa Program. DHS plans to
release a new version of its enterprise architecture in several
weeks.
Also in 2003 we identified systemic weaknesses in another
program key to homeland security: the visa revocation process.
Many of the weaknesses we identified were the result of a
failure of U.S. agencies to share and effectively utilize
information that was shared. Last summer we reported that
information on individuals with visas revoked on terrorism
grounds was not fully shared between State and appropriate
immigration and law enforcement agencies.
A followup review just this summer showed that although
State and DHS had made some improvements in the revocation
process in response to our recommendations, some weaknesses
remained. For example, in some cases, State took a week or
longer to notify DHS that it had revoked visas based on
potential terrorism concerns. As a result, we made additional
recommendations to both agencies which they have agreed to
implement.
Timely information sharing among State, DHS, and other
agencies also affects the time it takes to adjudicate a visa
for science students and scholars, as has been discussed during
the previous panel. In some cases consular officers determine
that some of these applicants must undergo the Visa's Mantis
check to protect against sensitive technology transfers.
In February of this year we found that it was difficult to
resolve some Visa's Mantis cases expeditiously, given the way
that the information was disseminated among State, DHS and
other agencies. State and DHS are currently working to
implement recommendations that we have made.
In conclusion, overall our work has demonstrated that
coordinated, joint actions taken by State and DHS are critical
to homeland and border security. State and DHS have worked
together to roll out the biometric technology to consular posts
worldwide and on schedule. Moreover, their cooperation on US-
VISIT has been, and will continue to be critical to ensure that
information available to consulates is there and ready for them
to adjudicate visa applications in a timely manner.
We recognize that it may not be feasible for each post
around the world to implement biometric visas in the exact same
way, given the variances in consulates' workloads, their
physical facilities, the level of personnel, and security of
concerns with the applicant pool. However, guidance to posts on
how to optimize use of biometric information would enable posts
to develop best operating procedures to identify their resource
gaps and to implement mitigating actions to address their
unique circumstances.
Therefore, we made a number of recommendations to State and
Homeland Security to develop guidance that should address the
planned uses of information generated by the Biometric Visa
Program, including guidance to consular officers on when and
how such information should be considered. Further, we
recommend that the Secretary of State direct consular posts to
develop implementing guidance. State has acknowledged there
might be some lag in the guidance they have already provided by
way of the 13 telegrams; however, we believe that additional
action is needed.
Mr. Chairman, this concludes my prepared statement. As I
mentioned, I am joined by my colleague, Randolph Hite, and
would be glad to entertain any questions that you or members
might have.
[The prepared statement of Ms. Williams-Bridgers follows:]
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Chairman Tom Davis. Thank you very much. Let me start. In
your testimony you mentioned that the DHS enterprise
architecture is missing important content relating to US-VISIT.
Can you elaborate on that concern?
Mr. Hite. If I could, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Tom Davis. Mr. Hite.
Mr. Hite. It is missing content with respect to US-VISIT
and all homeland security programs, because the enterprise
architecture is designed to define how homeland security is
supposed to function, both in operational and technical terms,
not just within the Department of Homeland Security, but across
all Federal agencies that are involved in homeland security,
and it extends to State and local governments as well.
So what we did was use accepted criteria that are out in
the public domain concerning what the content of an enterprise
architecture should include. We had 34 criteria governing the
target architecture, the target environment that you want to
move toward, and then we also had 5 criteria governing what
should be in the transition plan, which moves you from your
current environment to your target.
And basically what we found was that it partially satisfied
about 60 percent of those criteria, those key elements, and had
not satisfied 40 percent. So it is clearly a work in process
that right now didn't have the level of detail and depth and
scope of coverage that would allow programs to be implemented
in a way so that they interoperate and optimize cross-
organizational performance.
Chairman Tom Davis. Could you comment on the necessity for
the State Department to identify IDENT information retrieval
time requirements for optimal visa interviews so that DHS can
appropriately set the systems requirements necessary for US-
VISIT?
Ms. Williams-Bridgers. Yes. What we found was, unlike what
was mentioned in the prior panel, adjudicating officers, those
officers at posts who actually conducted the interviews of visa
applicants, do not always have all of the information that is
returned from an IDENT search.
For example, in one of the posts that we visited, there is
one consular officer who will review an IDENT response once
fingerprints have been taken and another consular officer who
conducts the interview. So, for example, information that may
be returned in an IDENT response that is not clearly
derogatory, meaning that it is not a hit on a watch list, but
may be relevant or even contradictory to information obtained
by an interviewing officer, is not always made available to
that interviewing officer. Therefore, we believe that sometimes
decisions can be made by an adjudicating officer without the
benefit of all the information that may be contained in the
IDENT response.
Chairman Tom Davis. Also there have been some concerns
about facility limitations, the use of Americans outside the
hard line to collect finger scans and the use of Foreign
Service Nationals to collect biometric data. How could these
challenges impede on the optimal workflow for obtaining IDENT
information prior to a visa interview?
Ms. Williams-Bridgers. In those posts where there is enough
physical space in the consulate to allow for the collection of
fingerprint data, allow for the applicants to wait in an
environment so that the IDENT information can be processed and
then, given a 15 or 30 minute turnaround in the IDENT response,
to be given to the adjudicating officer, it would allow the
adjudicating officer to have all the information available to
them.
In those consulates where there is not the physical space
to allow the number of applicants to wait while the IDENT
responses are returned to the consulate, it does not allow for
that timely and expeditious consideration of the information.
Therefore, an interviewing officer may complete the interview
before the IDENT response is made available to them, therefore
prolonging the whole of the visa consideration process.
Chairman Tom Davis. Thank you very much.
Mr. Tierney, any questions?
Mr. Tierney. Thank you. I read your report, and it is very
thorough and I appreciate it. Let me ask you a general
question. Do you find that the Department of Homeland Security
and the Department of State are generally receptive to your
recommendations and attempt to work with them, or are they
resistant and disputing those recommendations with you?
Ms. Williams-Bridgers. I would characterize the Department
of Homeland Security and State as being receptive to our
recommendations. They have generally concurred with the
recommendations that we have made on the visa policy and
process; however, there are some outstanding steps that we
think would improve the ability of the consular officers to
make best use of the information generated from the Biometrics
Visa Program.
Mr. Tierney. Do you have indications that the Department of
Homeland Security and Department of State are going to act on
those outstanding issues or are they still unresolved?
Ms. Williams-Bridgers. There are some unresolved issues as
of the report that was just issued today, though, but we are
quite hopeful that over time, and we will followup with them--
--
Mr. Tierney. I am sorry, I didn't mean to interrupt you. I
am sorry.
Ms. Williams-Bridgers. I am sorry. And we will followup
with them in ongoing work that we have looking at outstanding
visa vulnerabilities.
Mr. Tierney. Because they have actually seen your report
before you issued it today; you gave them a copy for their
response.
Ms. Williams-Bridgers. Yes. And their comments are
incorporated.
Mr. Tierney. Right. So when you say they are unresolved, do
their comments indicate that they dispute them or that they
intend to try to work with you to try to resolve the issues?
Ms. Williams-Bridgers. State and DHS have disagreed with
our recommendation of the need for additional implementing
guidance to be issued to consulates. They believe that the
overall policy, as Ms. Jacobs referred to earlier, contained in
the 13 telegrams allow general operating guidance to the
consulates, but then allow additional flexibility for the
consulates given the types of physical constraints that they
may have, the number of personnel, and the language
capabilities that result in them relying on Foreign Service
nationals to integrate into the whole of the visa adjudication
process.
So both the DHS and State have agreed in concept to many of
the recommendations, but they have not agreed to that part of
the outstanding recommendation that we believe is so important
to providing actual direction and guidance to the consulates.
Mr. Tierney. Now, you went out and made field inspections
after what they perceived to be adequate guidance had already
been issued to the field.
Ms. Williams-Bridgers. That is correct.
Mr. Tierney. And found it to be inadequate.
Ms. Williams-Bridgers. That is correct.
Mr. Tierney. And gave us the examples in your report, and
you cited in your testimony today, of what can happen in those
situations.
Ms. Williams-Bridgers. That is correct.
Mr. Tierney. Thank you.
Mr. Chairman, I think that probably warrants, we probably
should have done this in the reverse order, because I would
like to have now asked questions of the Department of State and
Department of Homeland Security. Perhaps we can followup with
some written questions.
Chairman Tom Davis. That would be fine.
Ms. Williams-Bridgers. I would be glad to respond.
Mr. Tierney. Not necessarily of this witness, but the other
witnesses with respect to their disagreements.
Thank you very much for your testimony. I appreciate it.
Chairman Tom Davis. Thank you.
Mr. Souder.
Mr. Souder. I want to make a brief comment. I congratulate
you on your report. Our ultimate security is dependent on
knowing who is coming in and being able to establish and follow
them if they are at risk, and this program is critical to that.
Thank you for your input on that and the report. Anybody who
ever goes to an admittance desk knows this tremendous tradeoff
of wanting to bring people into America, whether they be
students or visitors, encouraging that trade in that aspect,
and at the same time we need to make sure we are secure.
One of the things we heard on the drug issue down in the
Caribbean was a number of the countries there that particularly
are part of the European countries, whether it be Dutch or
French, that they then can get a European visa if they live
there a certain number of years, and that Libya had in fact
been putting in people who were establishing residency so they
could get a European passport with which to come in to the
United States via Puerto Rico.
And if we don't have systems to make sure we can track
this, it isn't just the countries involved, but people who come
in from other countries. In Colombia, watching Venezuelans in a
Venezuelan embassy watching that Colombians don't come through
in the drug trade. We are vulnerable on these categories. We
have time, but we need to systematically work at it, and I
thank you for your input and advice to Congress and the
agencies.
Ms. Williams-Bridgers. Thank you very much, Mr. Souder.
Chairman Tom Davis. Sounds like you are getting away easy,
but we have a vote on, so we are going to dismiss you. Thank
you very much for your testimony and your report that are
included in the record, and we may have some followup. Thank
you.
The hearing is adjourned.
[Whereupon, at 11:53 a.m., the committee was adjourned.]
[Note.--Additional information is on file with the
committee.]
[The prepared statement of Hon. Henry A. Waxman and
additional information submitted for the hearing record
follow:]
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