[House Hearing, 108 Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
HOMELAND SECURITY SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY: PREPARING FOR THE FUTURE
=======================================================================
HEARING
before the
SUBCOMMITTEE ON CYBERSECURITY,
SCIENCE AND RESEARCH & DEVELOPMENT
of the
SELECT COMMITTEE ON HOMELAND SECURITY
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
ONE HUNDRED EIGHTH CONGRESS
FIRST SESSION
__________
MAY 21, 2003
__________
SERIAL NO. 108-7
__________
Printed for the use of the Subcommittee on Cybersecurity, Science and
Research & Development and the Select Committee on Homeland Security
Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.access.gpo.gov/congress/
house
__________
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SELECT COMMITTEE ON HOMELAND SECURITY
CHRISTOPHER COX, California, Chairman
JENNIFER DUNN, Washington JIM TURNER, Texas, Ranking Member
C.W. BILL YOUNG, Florida BENNIE G. THOMPSON, Mississippi
DON YOUNG, Alaska LORETTA SANCHEZ, California
F. JAMES SENSENBRENNER, JR., EDWARD J. MARKEY, Massachusetts
Wisconsin NORMAN D. DICKS, Washington
W.J. (BILLY) TAUZIN, Louisiana BARNEY FRANK, Massachusetts
DAVID DREIER, California JANE HARMAN, California
DUNCAN HUNTER, California BENJAMIN L. CARDIN, Maryland
HAROLD ROGERS, Kentucky LOUISE McINTOSH SLAUGHTER,
SHERWOOD BOEHLERT, New York New York
LAMAR S. SMITH, Texas PETER A. DeFAZIO, Oregon
CURT WELDON, Pennsylvania NITA M. LOWEY, New York
CHRISTOPHER SHAYS, Connecticut ROBERT E. ANDREWS, New Jersey
PORTER J. GOSS, Florida ELEANOR HOLMES NORTON,
DAVE CAMP, Michigan District of Columbia
LINCOLN DIAZ-BALART, Florida ZOE LOFGREN, California
BOB GOODLATTE, Virginia KAREN McCARTHY, Missouri
ERNEST J. ISTOOK, JR., Oklahoma SHEILA JACKSON-LEE, Texas
PETER T. KING, New York BILL PASCRELL, JR., New Jersey
JOHN LINDER, Georgia DONNA M. CHRISTENSEN,
JOHN B. SHADEGG, Arizona U.S. Virgin Islands
MARK E. SOUDER, Indiana BOB ETHERIDGE, North Carolina
MAC THORNBERRY, Texas CHARLES GONZALEZ, Texas
JIM GIBBONS, Nevada KEN LUCAS, Kentucky
KAY GRANGER, Texas JAMES R. LANGEVIN, Rhode Island
PETE SESSIONS, Texas KENDRICK B. MEEK, Florida
JOHN E. SWEENEY, New York
JOHN GANNON, Chief of Staff
UTTAM DHILLON, Chief Counsel and Deputy Staff Director
STEVEN CASH, Democrat Staff Director
MICHAEL S. TWINCHEK, Chief Clerk
Subcommittee on Cybersecurity, Science, and Research & Development
MAC THORNBERRY, Texas, Chairman
PETE SESSIONS, Texas, Vice Chairman ZOE LOFGREN, California
SHERWOOD BOEHLERT, New York LORETTA SANCHEZ, California
LAMAR SMITH, Texas ROBERT E. ANDREWS, New Jersey
CURT WELDON, Pennsylvania SHEILA JACKSON-LEE, Texas
DAVE CAMP, Michigan DONNA M. CHRISTENSEN,
ROBERT W. GOODLATTE, Virginia U.S. Virgin Islands
PETER KING, New York BOB ETHERIDGE, North Carolina
JOHN LINDER, Georgia CHARLES GONZALEZ, Texas
MARK SOUDER, Indiana KEN LUCAS, Kentucky
JIM GIBBONS, Nevada JAMES R. LANGEVIN, Rhode Island
KAY GRANGER, Texas KENDRICK B. MEEK, Florida
CHRISTOPHER COX, California, ex JIM TURNER, Texas, ex officio
officio
(II)
C O N T E N T S
----------
Page
STATEMENTS
The Honorable Mac Thornberry, Chairman, Subcommittee on
Cybersecurity, Science, and Research & Development, Select
Committee on Homeland Security
Oral Statement................................................. 1
Prepared Statement............................................. 2
The Honorable Robert E. Andrews, a Representative in Congress
From the State of New Jersey................................... 23
The Honorable Sherwood Boehlert, a Representative in Congress
From the State of New York..................................... 28
The Honorable Dave Camp, a Representative in Congress From the
State of Michigan.............................................. 32
The Honorable Donna M. Christensen, a Delegate in Congress From
the U.S. Virgin Islands........................................ 19
The Honorable Christopher Cox, Chairman, Select Committee on
Homeland Security and a Representative for the State of
California..................................................... 36
The Honorable Jennifer Dunn, a Representative in Congress From
the State of Washington........................................ 24
The Honorable Bob Etheridge, a Representative in Congress From
the State of North Carolina
Prepared Statement............................................. 6
Oral Statement................................................. 17
The Honorable Sheila Jackson-Lee, a Representative in Congress
From the State of Florida
Prepared Statement............................................. 5
The Honorable John Linder, a Representative in Congress From the
State of Georgia............................................... 19
The Honorable Zoe Lofgren a Representative in Congress From the
State of California
Oral Statement................................................. 3
Prepared Statement............................................. 5
The Honorable Ken Lucas, a Representative in Congress From the
State of Kentucky.............................................. 27
The Honorable Kendrick B. Meek, a Representative in Congress From
the State of Florida........................................... 30
The Honorable Pete Sessions, a Representative in Congress From
the State of Texas............................................. 15
The Honorable Lamar S. Smith, a Representative in Congress From
the State of Texas............................................. 4
The Honorable Jim Turner, a Representative in Congress From the
State of Texas................................................. 33
The Honorable Greg Weldon, a Representative in Congress From the
State of Oregon................................................ 21
WITNESS
The Honorable Charles McQueary, Ph.D., Under Secretary for
Science and Technology Science and Technology Directorate, U.S.
Department of Homeland Security
Oral Statement................................................. 7
Prepared Statement............................................. 9
MATERIALS SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD
Reponses to Questions for the Record from Under Secretary Charles
E. McQueary.................................................... 51
HOMELAND SECURITY AND TECHNOLOGY: PREPARING FOR THE FUTURE
----------
WEDNESDAY, MAY 21, 2003
House of Representatives,
Subcommittee on Cybersecurity, Science and
Research and Development,
Select Committee on Homeland Security,
Washington, DC.
The subcommittee met, pursuant to call, at 2 p.m., in room
2118, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Mac Thornberry
[chairman of the subcommittee] presiding.
Present: Representatives Thornberry, Sessions, Boehlert,
Smith, Weldon, Camp, Linder, Lofgren, Andrews, Christensen,
Etheridge, Lucas, Langevin, Meek, Cox (ex officio), and Turner
(ex officio). Also present, Ms.Dunn.
Mr. Thornberry. The subcommittee will come to order. This
hearing of the Subcommittee on Cybersecurity, Science and
Research and Development will take testimony today on Homeland
Security Science and Technology: Preparing for the Future. It
is the intention of the chairman and ranking member, Ms.
Lofgren, that as many members as possible have a chance to ask
questions. Therefore, we are going to ask that members strictly
abide by the 5-minute rule and ask unanimous consent to waive
oral opening statements beyond the chairman and ranking member,
but allow all members to put a written opening statement into
the record. And without objection, it is so ordered.
I want to welcome members, witnesses and guests to this
hearing. This subcommittee is charged with oversight of several
complex and important issues related to homeland security.
During the nearly 2 years which Congress considered legislation
to create the Department of Homeland Security, I became
convinced that one of the keys to success for the new
Department would be the ability to identify and research and
develop and field quickly products and services that help make
us safer. Getting this part right is very important,
organizationally and operationally. And whether it is computer
technology that allows us to integrate government databases or
whether it is new detectors that help keep radiological
material from coming into this country, technology is central
to a safer America.
And yet we can not be satisfied with a government as usual
approach where in the case of the things that are often
discussed in this committee, it can take up to 20 years to
field new technologies. We are facing an enemy that is fast,
nimble and lethally aggressive, and we have got to be just as
fast and just as aggressive, not just in pursuing the enemy,
but in pursuing new technologies that help keep us safer.
That is why I know the subcommittee is anxious to hear
today how the new Department is doing to set up the Science and
Technology Directorate. We are interested to see how the
Department intends to identify existing technologies that we
need and get them out into the field quickly. We are interested
to see how the new Department intends to conduct research and
development and set priorities in those areas. We are
interested in how we can best ensure a productive cooperative
relationship with the private sector, the academic community
and government, because we are all going to have to work
together if we are going to be successful. We are interested in
whether the Homeland Security Act of 2002 needs to be changed
in some way to help us get the job done.
And I will say that this subcommittee is interested in
being a full partner with the Department and the administration
because it is only with a new kind of legislative executive
partnership that we will be as successful as we need to be. We
have a lot of challenges ahead of us. But obviously, we have
the ability to work together and overcome them. Before
yielding, I want to thank the Armed Services Committee for
allowing us to use their facilities here. I also want to thank
Eric Fischer and his team from the Congressional Research
Service, who have done a terrific job in helping us prepare for
this hearing, but also have prepared some outstanding reports,
which I would commend to all members.
Finally, I want to thank my partner on this subcommittee,
Ms. Lofgren, for her help and her contributions in getting this
subcommittee started as we are getting the full committee
going. Ms. Lofgren brings a wealth of knowledge and expertise
to these issues, as well as a cooperative spirit, and I
certainly look forward to our continued work together and I
would yield to her at this time.
PREPARED STATEMENT OF THE HONORABLE MAC THORNBERRY, CHAIRMAN,
SUBCOMMITTEE ON CYBERSECURITY, SCIENCE, AND RESEARCH & DEVELOPMENT,
SELECT COMMITTEE ON HOMELAND SECURITY
I want to welcome Members, our witness, and guests to this hearing
conducted by the Subcommittee on Cybersecurity, Science, and Research
and Development of the Select Committee on Homeland Security.
This Subcommittee is charged with oversight of several complex and
important issues related to homeland security.
During the nearly two years that Congress considered legislation to
create the Department of Homeland Security, I became convinced that one
of the keys to success for the new Department would be the ability to
identify, research, develop, and field products and services quickly.
Getting this part right--organizationally and operationally--is very,
very important.
Whether it is computer technology that allows government agencies
to see the full range of information about a potential visitor to the
United States or various sensors and detectors that help prevent
weapons of mass destruction from being smuggled into the country,
technology is central to a safer America.
Yet, to be successful, we cannot be satisfied with a standard,
government ``business as usual'' approach. We must do better. We are
facing an enemy that is fast, nimble, and lethally aggressive. We've
got to be just as fast and just as aggressive, not just in pursuing
this enemy, but in pursuing new technologies that will help keep our
cities and towns more secure.
That's why the Subcommittee is anxious to hear how far along the
new Department is in setting up the Science and Technology Directorate.
That's why we're interested to see how the Department intends to
identify existing technologies that are needed for homeland security
and then field them quickly.
That's why we're interested to see how the Department intends to
conduct research and development in areas that are needed but do not
presently exist.
We are also interested in how the Department intends to set
priorities, rather than simply spread money around indiscriminately.
We're interested in how we can best ensure a productive,
cooperative relationship among business, the academic community, and
government because this challenge is going to require the best from all
of us.
We're interested in whether the Homeland Security Act of 2002 that
established the Department needs to be tweaked or changed in some way
to make sure that the job gets done.
And we're interested in being full partners with the Department and
the administration because it is only with a new kind of legislative-
executive partnership that we will be as successful as we need to be in
protecting our homeland.
We have enormous challenges before us--bureaucratic and political
pressures among them. But together, we must overcome those challenges
and quickly get tools that help protect and defend our homeland into
the hands of those who need them.
Before I turn to our witness, I want to thank Eric Fischer and his
team from the Congressional Research Service for helping to prepare for
today's hearing.
I also want to thank my partner in this subcommittee, Ms. Lofgren,
for her help and contribution to getting things going. She brings a
wealth of knowledge and expertise to these issues, as well as a
cooperative spirit, and I look forward to our continued work together.
Ms. Lofgren. Thank you. Today is the first hearing for the
Cybersecurity, Science and Research and Development Subject
Committee. But before I make some brief comments on today's
hearing, I want to take a minute to thank Chairman Mac
Thornberry and his talented staff. I greatly appreciate your
efforts to work in a bipartisan manner, and I look forward to
cooperating with you in the coming months on the significant
cybersecurity and technology challenges that our country faces.
There is no shortage of issues that this subcommittee should
address, and I am confident that we will be able to accomplish
much together.
Today's hearing marks the second time that I have had the
opportunity to hear Dr. McQueary testify in front of Congress
in the past week. Dr. McQueary appeared before the House
Science Committee last Wednesday, and the fact that he has
testified before two different committees recently, underscores
the importance that we in Congress place in the mission of the
science and technology directorate and, of course, the
Department of Homeland Security as a whole.
We face major challenges to secure our country. The Select
Committee on Homeland Securities' oversight should be devoted
to getting the new Department up and running as quickly and
efficiently as possible. This subcommittee must also ensure
that the issue of cybersecurity, science and research and
development receive a proper level of attention within DHS
itself.
I want to be assured that Dr. McQueary has the budget,
staff, resources and most important, access to get the job
done. Since our appointment to this subcommittee, Chairman
Thornberry and I have spent much of our time studying and
learning about the many complex issues involving cybersecurity,
science and research and development. These issues are
sometimes difficult to grasp and not as easy to comprehend as
the threats to our borders and infrastructure. I believe it is
important for this subcommittee to help inform the public by
explaining the threats and vulnerabilities involved in
cybersecurity. I hope that Dr. McQueary will spend some time
today explaining these threats and vulnerabilities. If these
issues are better understood, then we can better prepare and
defend our country and its citizens. I also would like to hear
from you today on the Department's relationship with agencies
like the National Science Foundation, the National Institute of
Standards and Technology, and DARPA.
It is critical that DHS cooperates with these and other
like agencies. The Department can gain valuable experience from
each. However, I also think it is important that these agencies
remain independent from DHS. I am concerned that the Department
may drain these agencies of their resources, and I don't want
to hear from the good people at NIST that all their best staff
has been detailed to DHS.
Finally, I represent Silicon Valley, one of the most
innovative places on earth. The people in the valley thrive on
solving complex problems. Since my appointment, countless
engineers, programmers, professors, researchers and high tech
CEOs have approached me to express their interest in helping
DHS with their mission. Some have innovative homeland security
products. Others have theories on information systems
protection, and some have seen, done academic studies on
cybersecurity. All have valuable expertise to offer.
The problem that almost all encounter is they do not know
whom to approach to pass on their experience and ideas, and I
hope that Dr. McQueary will shed some light on the structure of
the science and technology directorate. I want to know what
office will handle inquiries from the private sector and
academic community. Thank you again for appearing today. I look
forward to working with you, Dr. McQueary, in the weeks and
months to come and certainly, our very able Chairman
Thornberry, and I yield back the balance of my time, Chairman.
Mr. Thornberry. I thank the gentlelady. And Dr. McQueary,
let me welcome you. Let me explain just briefly that there are
a variety of things going on at this time. Your colleague, Asa
Hutchinson, is over in the Capitol giving a briefing to members
and members are coming and going. I think there may also be a
markup in the Judiciary Committee. I would yield to the
gentleman from Texas, Mr. Smith, briefly for his personal
explanation.
Mr. Smith. Thank you Mr. Chairman. First of all, of course,
thank you for convening such an important hearing. I don't know
of a more important subject we can be considering. Also having
served as the chairman of the Crime Terrorism Homeland Security
Subcommittee, I have a special interest in cyber crime. Having
said that, however, I do have a markup of the Judiciary
Committee that is going on right now, so I want to explain to
you and to our witness why I need to be leaving immediately.
But I would ask you if it is at all possible to submit three
questions that I have in writing to our witness and hope for a
response in a reasonable amount of time.
Mr. Thornberry. We will absolutely do so. Without objection
those questions will be submitted for the record and we will
work with the folks at the Department to get an answer.
[The information follows:]
PREPARED STATEMENT THE HONORABLE ZOE LOFGREN, A REPRESENTATIVE IN
CONGRESS FROM THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
Today is the first meeting of the Cybersecurity, Science, and
Research & Development Subcommittee. Before I make some brief comments
on today's hearing, I want to take a minute to thank Chairman Mac
Thornberry and his talented staff. I greatly appreciate it your efforts
to work in a bipartisan manner, and I look forward to cooperating with
you in the coming months on the significant cybersecurity and
technology challenges that our country faces. There is no shortage of
issues that this subcommittee should address, and I am confident that
we will be able to accomplish much together.
Today's hearing marks the second time that I have had the
opportunity to hear Dr. Charles McQueary testify in front of Congress
in the past week. Dr. McQueary appeared before the House Science
Committee last Wednesday. The fact that Dr. McQueary has testified
before two different committees recently underlines the importance that
we in Congress place in the mission of the Science and Technology
Directorate, and of course, the Department of Homeland Security (DHS)
as a whole.
We face major challenges in trying to secure our country. The
Select Committee on Homeland Security's oversight should be devoted to
getting the new Department up and running as quickly and efficiently as
possible. This subcommittee must also insure that the issues of
cybersecurity, science, and research & development receive a proper
level of attention within DHS itself. I want to be assured that Dr.
McQueary has the budget, staff resources, and most important, the
access to get the job done.
Since our appointment to this subcommittee, Chairman Thornberry and
I have spent much of our time studying and learning about the many
complex issues involving cybersecurity, science, and research &
development. These issues are difficult to grasp, and not as easy to
comprehend as the threats to our boarders and infrastructure. I believe
it is important for this subcommittee to help inform the public by
explaining the threats and vulnerabilities involved in cybersecurity. I
hope that Dr. McQueary will spend some time today explaining these
threats and vulnerabilities. If these issues are better understood,
then we can better prepare and defend our country and its citizens.
I also would like to hear from you today on the Department's
relationship with agencies like the National Science Foundation (NSF),
the National Institute of Standards and Technology NIST), and the
Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA). It is critical that
DHS cooperate with these and other like agencies. The Department can
gain valuable experience from each. However, I also think it is
important that these agencies remain independent from DHS. I am
concerned that the Department may drain these agencies of their
resources. I do not want to hear from the good people at NIST that all
of their best staff has been detailed to DHS.
Finally, I represent Silicon Valley, one of the most innovative
places on Earth. People in the Valley thrive on solving complex
problems. Since my appointment, countless engineers, programmers,
professors, researchers and high tech CEO's have approached me to
express their interest in helping DHS with their mission. Some have
innovative homeland security products, others have theories on
information system protection, and some have even done academic studies
on cybersecurity. All have valuable expertise to offer. The problem
that almost all encounter is that they do not know whom to approach to
pass on their experience and ideas. I hope Dr. McQueary will shed some
light on the structure of the Science and Technology Directorate. I
want to know what office will handle inquiries from the private sector
and academic community.
Thank you again for appearing today. I look forward to working with
you in the weeks and months to come.
PREPARED STATEMENT OF THE HONORABLE SHEILA JACKSON-LEE, A
REPRESENTATIVE IN CONGRESS FROM THE STATE OF FLORIDA
Mr. Chairman and Mr. Ranking Member, I thank you for convening this
important hearing today to continue our efforts to protect our
homelands.
I look forward to hearing the testimony of our witness today. The
Department of Homeland Security's Directorate of Science and Technology
has a unique function. The Directorate is charged with developing and
deploying cutting edge technologies and new capabilities so that the
men and women responsible for protecting our homeland can do so most
efficiently.
The development of new technologies to protect our homeland opens
the door to possible violations of personal rights and invasions of
privacy. I am particularly concerned about the use of the internet to
invade privacy in the name of conducting law enforcement
investigations.
The Select Committee on Homeland Security's Subcommittee on
Cybersecurity, Science, Research, and Development has the
responsibility of ensuring that violations of personal privacies and
rights do not occur while still giving law enforcement agents adequate
discretion to do their jobs.
The Internet has become a cornerstone of our economy and
information network. Our national infrastructure depends on maintaining
the distribution of goods and services that are essential to the
defense and economic security of the United States. To an ever
increasing extent, this distribution is becoming dependent on the free
use of the Internet. I am concerned that we will diminish the value of
the Internet in our haste to protect the country against terrorist
attacks.
In addition to the use of the Internet as a market place for goods
and services, the Internet may be the most perfect embodiment of the
American ideals of free speech, open communication, and the
``marketplace of ideas'' that has ever existed. As the Supreme Court
has written, online ``any person with a phone line can become a town
crier with a voice that resonates farther than it could from any
soapbox.''
Speakers and listeners with great and small resources have access
to an almost unlimited amount of content and diversity of views. That
marketplace of ideas is threatened when monopolies that control access
to the Internet can also control the available speech.
Internet Service Providers control both the content and the
services that their customers can receive, which gives them the power
to shape the market place of commercial goods and of ideas. It concerns
me that commercial organizations have such power, but I am even more
concerned about the power that the government is capable of assuming in
its efforts to ensure cybernet security against terrorists.
The United States has now reached the point where a total
surveillance society has become a realistic possibility. Many people
still do not grasp that Big Brother surveillance is no longer the stuff
of books and movies. Given the capabilities of today's technology, the
only thing protecting us from a full-fledged surveillance society are
the legal and political institutions we have inherited as Americans.
Unfortunately, the September 11 attacks have led some to embrace the
fallacy that weakening the Constitution will strengthen America.''
From government watch lists to secret wiretaps - Americans are
unknowingly becoming targets of government surveillance. It is
dangerous for a democracy that government power goes unchecked and for
this reason it is imperative to maintain government accountability, no
matter how frightened we become by the threat of terrorism.
I look forward to hearing Dr. McQueary's testimony to address these
concerns.
PREPARED STATEMENT OF THE HONORABLE BOB ETHERIDGE, A REPRESENTATIVE IN
CONGRESS FROM THE STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA
Thank you, Chairman Thornberry and Ranking Member Lofgren, for
holding this hearing. I would also like to welcome Dr. Charles McQueary
who hails from the great state of North Carolina, although he does not
have the privilege of living in the Second Congressional District.
The work of the Science and Technology Directorate of the
Department of Homeland Security is critical in the protection of
Americans both here and abroad. This group is responsible for research
and development of technologies that will protect not only our nation's
critical infrastructure, but more importantly, the products developed
by this group, in conjunction with private contractors and other
government agencies, will help supply and protect our first responders.
I understand that the Directorate's immediate priorities include
developing and deploying systems to help protect the United States from
illicit radiological, nuclear, biological and chemical agents, as well
as high explosives. I am glad to see that the Directorate intends to
work closely with private industry to identify appropriate and!or
adaptable products that are on the shelf or in the development
pipeline. Our country is blessed with entrepreneurs with great talent,
good ideas and amazing ingenuity, and it is incumbent upon the federal
government to utilize these resources.
America is also the home of some of the best research universities
in the world, many of them in North Carolina. The professors,
researchers and students at these world-class institutions are involved
in cutting-edge research that have a broad array of applications for
homeland security. It is critical that the Department of Homeland
Security encourage and foster this research, as well as the education
of the scientists, mathematicians and other technologists our country
needs now and in the future to continue America's tradition of state-
of-the-art research and development.
I also look to the Science and Technology Directorate to look
beyond colleges and universities to promote science and math education
for our children. In the 2001 Hart-Rudman report ``Road Map for
National Security: Imperative for Change,'' the authors state that the
greatest threat to our country, second only to the detonation of a
weapon of mass destruction, would be ``a failure to manage properly
science, technology and education for the common good over the next
quarter century.''
The Department of Homeland Security will have to balance response
to current threats with long-range planning. Currently, one-third of
all U.S. science and engineering doctoral degrees and 40 percent of
PhDs in computer science go to foreign students. Studies have shown
that American students sorely lag behind their counterparts in other
nations in science and math education. Many students who do go on to
college do not enter technology fields because they see it as ``too
hard,'' and the financial rewards do not seem to balance the time and
effort it takes to get advanced degrees needed for top-level research
positions.
The federal government must work with private industry and schools
across the country to improve basic science and math education by
providing teachers with the opportunities for advanced training in
these fields, the proper equipment for labs and experiments, and time
to teach. Gifted teachers prove every day that students can learn and
come to love science and math. Our children are our future, and
investment now in their educations will provide benefits for many years
to come.
Secretary McQueary, thank you again for briefing our Subcommittee
on the Science and Technology Directorate. I am sure that our questions
and concerns will necessitate many repeat visits, and I look forward to
working with you to determine the best products, methods and procedures
for protecting our country.
Mr. Thornberry. Let me now recognize our witness, honorable
Dr. Charles McQueary, Under Secretary for Science and
Technology. Dr. McQueary has previously served as president of
the business units for General Dynamics, AT&T and Lucent
Technologies. Perhaps most impressively, he holds a Ph.D. in
engineering mechanics and an M.S. in mechanical engineering
from the University of Texas. And no further qualifications are
necessary.
Dr. McQueary, thank you for being here and the floor is
yours.
STATEMENT OF THE HONORABLE CHARLES McQUEARY, PH.D., UNDER
SECRETARY FOR SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY, SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY
DIRECTORATE, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY
Dr. McQueary. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Congresswoman
Lofgren, distinguished members of the committee, it is a
pleasure for me to be here today to discuss the Department of
Homeland Security's Science and Technology Directorate. It is a
great honor and a great responsibility to lead the science and
technology efforts of this Directorate and the Department to
meet the challenges of protecting our homeland and our way of
life. The most important mission for the Science and Technology
Directorate is to develop and deploy cutting-edge technologies
and new capabilities so that the dedicated men and women who
serve to secure our homeland can perform their jobs more
effectively and efficiently. They, as well as the American
people, are my customers.
Our plans for fiscal year 2004 reflect this relationship
and our desire is to provide capability to the field as rapidly
as possible. The threats to our homeland are many. We must
constantly monitor these threats and assess our vulnerabilities
to them. We must develop new and improved capabilities to
counter chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear,
explosive, and cyber threats. And we must mitigate the effects
of terrorist attacks should they occur. The Science and
Technology Directorate's program must also enhance the
conventional missions of the Department to protect and provide
assistance to civilians in response to natural disasters, law
enforcement needs, and other activities.
This Directorate will support the mission needs of the
Information Analysis and Infrastructure Protection Directorate,
the Border and Transportation Security Directorate, the United
States Coast Guard, the United States Secret Service, and the
Emergency Preparedness and Response Directorate through
coordinated and focused research and development programs.
Through the initial planning process for the Science and
Technology Directorate, we were guided by current and future
threat assessments, by our current capability to respond to
that threat, and by the priorities spelled out in the
President's National Strategy for Homeland Security.
Thus, our key specific areas of emphasis are listed as
follows: Develop and deploy state-of-the-art high-performance
low-operating-cost systems to prevent the illicit traffic of
radiological nuclear materials and weapons into and within the
United States. Second item is to provide state-of-the-art high-
performance, low-operating-cost systems to rapidly detect and
mitigate the consequences of the release of biological and
chemical agents.
Third, provide state-of-the-art high-performance, low-cost-
operating systems to detect and prevent illicit high explosive
transit into and within the United States. Fourth, enhance the
missions of the Department operational units through targeted
research, development, test and evaluation, and systems
engineering and development. Fifth, develop and provide
capabilities for protecting cyber and other critical
infrastructures. Sixth, develop capabilities to prevent new
technology as a surprise by anticipating emerging threats. And
finally, item Number 7, develop, coordinate, and implement
technical standards for chemical, biological, radiological, and
nuclear countermeasures.
We will implement our activities through focused portfolios
that support our mission. These portfolios are as follows:
biological countermeasures, chemical and high explosive
countermeasures, radiological and nuclear countermeasures,
critical infrastructure protection, threat and vulnerability
testing and assessment, and the standards and State and local
program. Through the Homeland Security Advanced Research
Projects Agency, our directorate will explore cutting-edge
approaches to addressing current and emerging threats. It is
our estimate that at least $350 million of the overall requests
will be carried out by a HSARPA in fiscal year 2004. Our
strategy includes evaluation, prototyping and rapid deployment
of available technologies to the field.
To do this, we will establish a technology clearinghouse
and partnership with the Technology Support Working Group,
which has performed a similar mission over the past several
years with great success for the Departments of State and
Defense. Through this partnership, we will encourage and
support innovative solutions to enhance homeland security, and
we will engage the private sector in rapid prototyping of
homeland security technologies.
A knowledgeable workforce focused on Homeland Security is
essential to our ability to address advancements in science and
technology. Declining enrollments in specific academic fields
such as radiochemistry is leading to a lack of workers in areas
of science and technology, important to America's efforts to
protect the homeland. Therefore, we will establish fellowship
programs at the graduate and post-graduate levels to encourage
research activities in these areas, and thus develop the
foundation America needs to sustain our technical advantage in
the war against terrorism.
We will also establish university centers of excellence to
provide an enduring and focused research capability to the
Nation in this effort.
Mr. Chairman, thank you again for the opportunity to appear
before this subcommittee. This concludes my prepared statement.
With the committee's permission, I would like to request that
my formal statement be submitted for the record.
Mr. Thornberry. Without objection.
PREPARED STATEMENT OF THE HON. DR. CHARLES E. McQUEARY
Introduction
Good afternoon. Chairman Thornberry, Ranking Member Lofgren, and
distinguished members of the subcommittee. It is a pleasure to be with
you today to discuss the Department of Homeland Security's Science and
Technology Directorate. It is a great honor and a great responsibility
to lead the science and technology efforts of this Directorate and the
Department to meet the challenges of protecting our homeland and our
way of life.
The most important mission for the Science and Technology Directorate
is to develop and deploy cutting edge technologies and new
capabilities, so that the dedicated men and women who serve to secure
our homeland can perform their jobs more effectively and efficiently--
they are my customers. Our plans for fiscal year 2004 reflect this
relationship and our desire to provide capability to the field as
rapidly as is possible.
The threats to our homeland are many. We must constantly monitor these
threats and assess our vulnerabilities to them; develop new or improved
capabilities to counter chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear,
explosive, and cyber threats; and mitigate the effects of terrorists
attacks should they occur. The Science and Technology Directorate's
program must also enhance all of the Department's missions, whether or
not they are focused on the threat of terrorism.
Throughout the initial planning process for the S&T Directorate we have
been guided by the Homeland Security Act, current threat assessments,
our understanding of capabilities that exist today or that can be
expected to appear in the near term, and, importantly, by the
priorities spelled out in the President's National Strategy for
Homeland Security.
Thus, our key specific areas of emphasis are to:
Develop and deploy state-of-the art, high-performance,
low operating-cost systems to prevent the illicit traffic of
radiological/nuclear materials and weapons into and within the
United States.
Provide state-of-the art, high-performance, low
operating-cost systems to rapidly detect and mitigate the
consequences of the release of biological and chemical agents.
Provide state-of-the art, high-performance, low
operating-cost systems to detect and prevent illicit high
explosives transit into and within the United States.
Enhance missions of all Department operational units
through targeted research, development, test and evaluation
(RDT&E), and systems engineering and development.
Develop and provide capabilities for protecting cyber
and other critical infrastructures.
Develop capabilities to prevent new-technology as a
surprise weapon by anticipating emerging threats.
Develop, coordinate and implement technical standards
for chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear (CBRN) non-
medical countermeasures.
Research, Development, Test and Evaluation Portfolio
We are requesting $803M in fiscal year 2004 to provide applied
research, development, demonstrations, and testing of products and
systems that address these key areas of emphasis. The Science and
Technology Directorate will implement its activities through focused
portfolios that address biological, chemical, radiological and nuclear,
and cyber threats; support the research and development needs of the
operational units of the Department; and receive innovative input from
private industry and academia as well as national and Federal
laboratories. In particular, the Homeland Security Advanced Research
Projects Agency (HSARPA) will have an essential role in meeting the
goals and objectives of the Department and the Directorate across the
range of the portfolios.
These portfolios and activities are described as follows:
Biological Countermeasures--Biological threats come in many forms. They
can be toxins, viruses, or bacteria, distributed by airborne aerosols,
or in food or water supplies, or in the case of contagious diseases,
spread among infected people or animals. Timely detection and early
initiation of prophylaxis and decontamination is the key to mitigating
the consequences of any biological attack, should it occur. We are
requesting $365M in fiscal year 2004 to:
Develop and deploy a Biological Warning and Incident
Characterization System (BWIC). BWIC will consist of three
major elements: a nationwide bio-surveillance system that looks
for early biological indicators of the exposure of people,
animals and plants to biological agents; development of a
public health surveillance system working through the
Department of Health and Human Services and its Centers for
Disease Control and Prevention's (CDC) public health
surveillance system to detect early adverse health events in
the population as a result of such agents; and environmental
monitoring networks in selected cities that can detect the
agent directly. S&T plans to work closely with the CDC in
developing this seamless sentinel system. This activity will be
available as a pilot in fiscal year 2004.
Continue the National Biodefense Analysis and
Countermeasures Center (NBACC), initiated in fiscal year 2003,
as a key component in implementing the President's National
Strategy for Homeland Security. The NBACC will leverage the
expertise of America's cutting- edge medical and biotechnical
infrastructure to focus on the biological agent threat,
including performing risk assessments. It is an essential, new
approach to integrating national resources for homeland
security, supporting public health, and law enforcement. The
analytical capabilities of the NBACC will be functional in
fiscal year 2004, and closely coordinated with the National
Institute of Health and the Food and Drug Administration.
Finally, the Plum Island Animal Disease Center is expected to be
transferred from the Department of Agriculture to DHS in June 2003. We
plan to work closely with USDA in areas of mutual concern in animal
disease research and diagnostics.
Chemical Countermeasures--According to the National Research Council's
Report Making the Nation Safer, ``chemicals continue to be the weapon
of choice for terrorist attacks. They are readily available and have
the potential to inflict significant casualties.'' In fact, terrorist
attacks on civilian populations with chemical warfare agents have
already occurred. In the Aum Shrinrikyo attack on the Tokyo subway,
casualties were limited only because the attackers did not use an
effective agent dispersal method. Similarly, accidental releases of
toxic industrial chemicals have demonstrated that materials relatively
widely available in modern industrial societies can result in a large
number of casualties.
Significant work on chemical defense in military situations has been
conducted focusing on battlefield attacks using chemical warfare
agents. However, major gaps exist regarding civilian defense, most
notably in strategies for dealing with the broader spectrum of threats
(e.g. toxic industrial materials); detection systems capable of
continuous monitoring with very low false positive rates; deployed
chemical defense systems; and a robust forensic capability. The
Chemical Countermeasures portfolio is requesting $55M to address these
shortcomings through a balanced mix of activities: 1) systems studies
will be used to prioritize efforts amongst the many possible chemical
threats and targets; 2) new detection and forensic technologies will be
developed and demonstrated; 3) protective systems that integrate
physical security, ultra-sensitive detection, information management,
and consequence management strategies will be developed and piloted in
selected high value facilities such as airports and subways; 4) the
Science and Technology Directorate will work with the Information
Analysis and Infrastructure Protection and Borders and Transportation
Security Directorates to characterize and reduce the vulnerability
posed by the large volumes of toxic industrial materials in use by the
critical infrastructures, stored or transported within this nation; and
5) ensuring coordination with the CDC for public health response and
management of detected events.
High Explosives--Detection of high explosives and mitigation is now a
prime focus of the Transportation Security Administration (TSA). The
current terrorist threat extends beyond air transport to all other
modes of transportation and fixed facilities. The Department of
Homeland Security will build on TSA's R&D in this area to develop and
deploy more effective explosives detectors that can address the broader
threats. Development of reliable stand-off detection capability of
large quantities of explosives, especially in vehicles, is particularly
needed. For this purpose $1OM is requested in fiscal year 2004.
Radiological and Nuclear Countermeasures--Countering the threat of
radiological or nuclear attack is one of the top priorities of the
Department of Homeland Security and the Science and Technology
Directorate. The Radiological and Nuclear Countermeasures portfolio is
requesting $13 7M to address this threat through a comprehensive
systems approach that emphasizes early detection; effective
intervention capabilities at the Federal, state and local levels;
development of mitigation technologies and science-based consequence
management programs for use should an attack occur; and effective
training at all levels of response. Concurrent efforts focused on
deployment, evaluation and improvements to currently available
technologies; a research and development program for advanced
technologies and their continuous insertion into operational use; and
the provision for an enduring science and technology base to address
long-term challenges such as the detection of highly-enriched uranium
and heavily shielded radioactive sources is used to address both
today's threats and those of the future.
Threat and Vulnerabilitvg Testing and Assessment--The purpose of the
Threat and Vulnerability, Testing and Assessment (TVTA) program is to
create advanced modeling, and information and analysis capabilities
that can be used by the organizations in the Department to fulfill
their missions and objectives. One thrust of this program is to develop
advanced computing, information, and assessment capabilities in support
of threat and vulnerability analysis, detection, prevention and
response. This portfolio also conducts extensive research and
development activities in the area of cybersecurity, addressing areas
not currently addressed elsewhere in the Federal government. An example
of this is developing tools and techniques for assessing and detecting
the insider threat. The TVTA program uses a strategy of multi-year
investments that infuse new capabilities into the DHS mission
directorates on a regular basis based on strategic five year road maps.
A spiral development process ensures early use and feedback by intended
users and operators of all technologies developed within the program.
Successively, more complete and refined prototypes lead to operational
pilots and fully operational systems for the Department organizations.
$90M is requested in fiscal year 2004 to support this activity.
Critical Infrastructure Protection--Our national infrastructure
provides the continual flow of goods and services that are essential to
the defense and economic security of the United States. Many of these
functions are so vital that major disruptions would cause severe
consequences to the behavior and activities of our citizens. Our free
society and the high quality of life that we value depend upon the
reliable operation of the infrastructure. In addition, we must protect
the lives of our citizens and key assets such as many national
monuments and icons.
The Critical Infrastructure Protection (CIP) portfolio has three
primary goals: (1) develop, implement, and evolve a rational approach
for prioritizing CIP strategies and resource allocations using
modeling, simulation, and analyses to assess vulnerabilities,
consequences, and risks; (2) propose and evaluate protection,
mitigation, response, and recovery strategies and options; and (3)
provide real-time support to decision makers during crises and
emergencies--$5M is requested in fiscal year 2004 for this activity,
which also leverages work being done elsewhere in the Federal
government and the Department of Homeland Security.
Standards/State and Local Programs--Standards should be applied to all
elements of the homeland security infrastructure to ensure a robust
capability to defend against and to respond to any crisis situation--
whether it is the result of terrorism, natural causes, or a
catastrophic accident. Organizing and integrating the efforts of the
government and the private sector will enable the Department of
Homeland Security to develop standards for equipment used for detection
of materials that could be used in a terrorist attack. This will reduce
the probability of a successful terrorist attack on the United States
and facilitate development of a vital and enduring ability to respond
to national emergencies.
The Standards/State & Local Program will provide consistent and
verifiable measures of effectiveness of homeland security related
equipment and systems in terms of basic functionality, appropriateness
and adequacy for the task, interoperability, efficiency, and
sustainability. The Science and Technology Directorate will facilitate
the development of guidelines in conjunction with both users and
developers. The guidelines will encompass user needs and operating
conditions, as well as the capabilities and the limitations of the
technologies. The Standards/State and Local Program will develop, in
collaboration with operational end-users, performance measures, testing
protocols, certification methods, and a reassessment process
appropriate to each threat countermeasure and for the integrated
system. The Standards/State and Local Program will address all elements
of the homeland security mission including equipment, information,
analyses, personnel, and systems. Special emphasis will be placed on
soliciting input from the actual users in the state and local response
communities, and on providing effective methods for communicating
information back to these agencies.
Major program objectives include working with the private sector to
establish a network of homeland security certification laboratories.
This will provide a consistent level of assurance in the effectiveness
of detection and other operational equipment. Consistent standards for
training and certification of personnel will also be developed. The
program will continue to broaden the suite of technical standards for
various forms of equipment and systems and will provide protocols and
standard data collection formats for test and evaluation projects
undertaken by the Science and Technology Directorate. $25M is requested
in fiscal year 2004 to support this important effort.
Support to Department of Homeland Security Components--The Science and
Technology Directorate has the responsibility to provide Federal, state
and local operational end-users with the technology and capabilities to
protect the United States homeland from catastrophic terrorist attacks
and enhance their capabilities for conducting their conventional
missions. An essential component of this responsibility is to
coordinate and collaborate with the other components of the Department
to assist and enhance their technical capabilities through integrated
research and development activities. The integration of the Science and
Technology Directorate research and development efforts with the
Information Analysis and Infrastructure Protection Directorate is
specifically described in the Threat and Vulnerability, Testing and
Assessment, and the Critical Infrastructure Protection portfolios. In
addition, the Science and Technology Directorate will support the
mission needs of the Border and Transportation Security Directorate,
the United States Coast Guard, the United States Secret Service and the
Emergency Preparedness and Response Directorate through coordinated and
focused research and development programs. Research and development in
potentially high payoff technologies will be emphasized. $55M is
requested in fiscal year 2004 for this purpose.
Rapid Prototyping Program--Significant capabilities exist in private
industry for the rapid development and prototyping of technologies in
support of the homeland security mission. A mechanism to quickly and
easily access the capabilities of private industry will allow the
Department of Homeland Security to more effectively fulfill its mission
requirements. The Science and Technology Directorate will establish a
partnership with the Technical Support Working Group (TSWG) to provide
the Department with a technology clearinghouse to encourage and support
innovative solutions to enhance homeland security and to engage the
private sector in rapid prototyping of homeland security technologies.
$30M is requested in fiscal year 2004 to solicit from the private
sector near-term capability that can be rapidly prototyped and fielded.
Homeland Security Fellowship Programs Programs--Advancements in science
and technology have the potential to change or increase the threats to
our security; these advancements also improve our ability to thwart
these emerging threats, A knowledgeable workforce focused on homeland
security is essential to our ability to address advancements in science
and technology.
The vast scope of the science and technology needed to address homeland
security coupled with declining enrollments in specific areas such as
nuclear science and technology, and radiochemistry are leading to a
lack of qualified applicants for relevant research and development.
This program requests $10M to support strategic partnerships with the
academic community to provide support for qualified students and
faculty.
Emering Threats--Advancements in science and technology have the
potential to change or increase the threats to our security. These
advancements also improve our ability to thwart these emerging threats.
The Emerging Threats program will support the exploration of
innovative, cross-cutting, out-of- the box approaches for anticipating
and responding to new and emerging threats. It will also establish and
support studies and analyses to be conducted by the new Homeland
Security Institute. $22M is requested in fiscal year 2004 for this
purpose.
The scope of the work to be conducted by this budget is broad but
focused on the areas that improve our capabilities to thwart terrorist
attacks by early detection and identification of the threat, effective
protection and intervention technologies, mitigation of potential
consequences should an attack occur, and a robust forensics and
attribution capability. Our strategy includes early deployment of off-
the-shelf technologies to provide initial defensive capability and
near- term utilization of emerging technologies to counter today's
terrorist threats and the development of new capabilities to thwart
future and emerging threats. A key part of our efforts will be
conducted through the Homeland Security Advanced Research Projects
Agency to engage industry, academia, government, and other sectors in
innovative research and development to meet operational needs. Although
I have described the budget request along product lines, such as
biological and chemical countermeasures, it is our estimate that at
least $350M of the overall request will be carried out by HSARPA in
fiscal year 2004.
Mr. Chairman and members of the subcommittee, this concludes my
prepared statement. I would be pleased to address any questions.
McQueary. And I would now be pleased to answer any
questions that you might have for me.
Mr. Thornberry. Thank you. I will reserve my questions
towards the end and recognize the ranking member, Ms. Lofgren.
Ms. Lofgren. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And thank you,
Doctor. I assume, from your testimony, that the technology
clearinghouse, or partnership, would be the point of contact
for individuals who have technology that they want to make
known to you. I am wondering, and I think the chairman has had
the same experience I have had, and I think all the members
have had. I mean, there are a lot of people with good ideas and
some of them aren't very good as well. There are people who are
vendors and there is nothing wrong with that, but it is
certainly not something that the committee wants to deal with.
We want to make sure that vendors are dealt with in an
appropriate fashion administratively, but that good ideas have
an opportunity to be heard because there are some very smart
and innovative things that are out there. Can you tell us, with
some detail, how people with ideas or products may interface
with you specifically so that we can deal with these
individuals in an appropriate manner?
Dr. McQueary. I would be happy to do that. As you may
recognize, we are just building the Science and Technology
Directorate, and we are about 50 people at the present time and
continuing to grow. And so our ability to be able to respond to
all of the inputs we get has been limited from the standpoint
of having face-to-face contact. So with that as the backdrop,
we have really three methods that are available to us.
One, we have enlisted the Technical Support Working Group,
from which we have recently issued a broad agency announcement
to indicate areas that we have interest in, and we will also
use that same organization to review for us and make
recommendations on an e-mail site that we have. It is
[email protected], which, at the present time, I have,
I would say, about 500 inputs that have come in from various
industry sources. So those two areas. And then--when we see
things that look like they might have near-term applicability
we are actually inviting people in to meet with them to hear
what kinds of things that might be of interest.
So it is really three methods that we have. And my
objective is to get the point where we can respond in a very
respectful and rapid way to the inputs we are getting, because
I am finding there are an enormous number of ideas out in
America that people have to offer for us, and what we need to
do is be in a position to evaluate those.
Ms. Lofgren. On a similar vein, there are certainly, you
know, people with a product to sell are trying to sell a
product and that may be good or bad depending on how good a
product it is. The academic community has a different focus
obviously. And I am aware, and I am sure other committee
members are aware that there are some incredible talent out in
our academic communities, and that is a lot of transportation
to and fro between defense agencies and academia as well.
Certainly, in California we have a wealth of information both
at Berkley and at Stanford, and I am wondering if you can give
us some insight on how we might best incorporate the wealth of
talent information ideas that we find at such academic
institutions with what you are doing in a way that would be
most productive.
Dr. McQueary. Well, first of all, if you know of something
specifically, we would certainly encourage you to either
contact us directly, have your staff contact us, or have
someone from the organization contact us too using the methods
that I described earlier, because we are anxious to hear about
as many things as we can. I personally am trying to get out and
to see and listen to as many different things as I can.
Obviously my ability to be able to do that every day is not
possible. And with our relatively small staff, we are having it
is a challenge to be able to get the people out on the road to
listen to the many different things. But universities are
extremely important to us and will be an important part of our
program as we go forward and we certainly expect to find
cutting-edge research in the university.
We expect we will find instances where private industry and
universities partner in order to create a broader capability to
bring things to us. And so certainly, universities are going to
be a key issue and, of course, we are going to identify some
number of centers of excellence that will be in universities as
a part of our overall program.
Ms. Lofgren. Perhaps the committee could be of assistance
to you, as we--the chairman and I have talked about our work
plan through the year and even have thought about going out
into the country and maybe we can collaborate, the three of us,
on how to bring all of those talents together.
Dr. McQueary. I would welcome the opportunity to discuss it
in more detail with you.
Ms. Lofgren. Last week, Chairman Boehlert asked if you
could provide him with a list of people and dollars working on
cybersecurity nwithin DHS. Have you had a chance to do that
yet.
Dr. McQueary. No, we have not. We have not completed that
yet. But we will provide that as we indicated.
Ms. Lofgren. I wonder if this committee could also get a
copy of that.
Dr. McQueary. Absolutely. We would be happy to do that.
Ms. Lofgren. Thank you very much. Also last week, we asked
if we could get a copy of the memorandum of understanding
signed on May 19 between DHS and the Department of Commerce,
specifically with NIST. Has the MOU been signed yet?
Dr. McQueary. No, it actually has not been signed. We ran
into scheduling difficulty and I expect to meet with Secretary
Phil Bond tomorrow to accomplish that. That is the current
plan. One never knows when the schedule may have to be changed
again, but that's our current plan.
Ms. Lofgren. Again, perhaps this committee could also get a
copy of this MOU.
Dr. McQueary. Absolutely. Anything we have is available to
you.
Ms. Lofgren. Also, last week, we had a discussion--brief
discussion of the--what is necessary to provide an analysis of
biometric standards. And I see actually since the chairman's
being very kind, my time is up and we probably will have time
for a second round. I am going to reserve that question and set
an example for all of us to stay within our 5 minutes.
Mr. Thornberry. The Chair thanks the gentlelady, and it is
my intention to have another round of questions, particularly
if folks are as good as the ranking member in observing the
clock. The Chair would yield at this time to the vice chairman
of the subcommittee, the gentleman from Texas, Mr. Sessions.
Mr. Sessions. I thank the chairman very much, and also
greatly respect and appreciate the questions that have been
asked by the ranking member.
Dr. McQueary, welcome. We are delighted that you are here
today. As you can tell you have an eager group of members in
front of you who are really after information from you to know
how we should proceed. Obviously, I believe that the road map
that you have given us today is not only well presented and
well prepared, but gives us an idea of the measures that you
have before you.
The first question I would have to you is as related to
page 3, where you go through the seven pieces or piece parts,
things that you are interested in doing. Where did these
pieces--were they handled by some portion of government before
you came into this job? Is someone else--had they developed
these? It was somewhere, or was this something that you believe
that the government is taking up for the first time?
Dr. McQueary. If you could guide me, which page, what are
you referring to?
Mr. Sessions. Page 3.
Dr. McQueary. Of my oral remarks, or--
Mr. Sessions. Yes, sir. It would be in your oral remarks.
For instance number one is develop and employ state of the
art--
Dr. McQueary. Oh, yes.
Mr. Sessions. Those things, did those--did you come up with
those yourself, or had work been underway in some other part of
the government and then you had to go in and extract that?
Dr. McQueary. Well, if you go back to the President's
National Strategy on Homeland Security, you will find that each
and every one of those are listed as key priorities in the
National Strategy. So we have taken that as explicit guidance
of our work package. We have also reviewed it in areas to see
whether it should be supplemented, and I would say that at this
point, not only I but also the team who has been working on
this are very comfortable with those seven items as being the
key priorities for us.
Mr. Sessions. I am also. So include me in that list of
people.
Dr. McQueary. All right. Thank you.
Mr. Sessions. What my question is, sir, is had someone in
this government been working on any of these products before
you listed them where there would be prior work that could be--
had been done to where you would review, or at least take up
where that had come? Because it seems like this will be,
obviously, your function. Are you picking up the pieces of any
of these from some work that had previously been done?
Dr. McQueary. Yes. In fact, many of those items were
already being investigated by the Department of Energy and that
was transferred to us as a part of the overall restructuring to
form the Department of Homeland Security. So most of those
items that are listed there, and I could be--if you would like
me to be--I would be happy to provide you with explicit ones.
Mr. Sessions. No. I am very happy--what you are saying is
that some of this work had been going on. Did you get those
people with them, too?
Dr. McQueary. We did not--we received six people out of
DOE, and in the case of work that's being done at the national
labs, of course those people are available to us. But we did
not get more than the six from DOE in terms of program managers
and people who run the programs.
Mr. Sessions. These items that are listed here, come--and I
think are listed properly, and I agreed with them, but they
come at a high priority to this Congress and certainly the
American public at this time. Can you talk with me about the
rapid prototyping program and how quickly you believe that they
will be to a point to where you are satisfied that they are
producing not only the processes to evaluate these items, but
to move them forward to where they become readily available to
us? Would you mind spending just a minute and talking about
that because that is going to decide, I believe, our success or
failure in the immediate future. And your time table as to an
evaluation there would help this committee.
Dr. McQueary. If I could back up just a little from that
question and provide a little bit more detail for you. Our
primary focus today, if you will, and for the next several days
and short number of months is to investigate what kinds of
things already exist out in America today that we believe could
be brought to the test stage where we could go into the field
and try these things, and then initiate a development program
and subsequent manufacture if that seems to be productive.
Now, I believe that you have--the question you have asked,
I am interpreting that to be a little bit later in the process
in which we have got, we have had an idea. We develop a
prototype and we are not quite sure what to do. My experience
in industry is that it is very important if you have a
prototype you must go into a full-scale development within a
short time frame, and also, in order to be able to effectively
transfer whatever the product might be into manufacturing, if
you expect to be able to get it in a timely fashion and at a
cost, you can afford and get it on a schedule that--and be able
to have it perform the way you want it to perform. So--
Mr. Sessions. Good. I completely agree with that. I am just
going to make one additional comment, and then I am going to
yield my time. It is my hope that we can as rapidly as
possible, and is seems like it fits your philosophy, to
determine as quickly as possible what is out there, how it
might be used, quickly deployed. And as long as we get
something that's leading edge, I hope we don't have to be
perfect with it.
Dr. McQueary. I am believe the 95 percent quickly, is much
better than 99 percent if it takes forever.
Mr. Sessions. Right. And so I am very hopeful that you will
find that this rapid prototyping program lives up to its name.
And I will be intensely interested in seeing the success of
that. And I want to thank you for being here today. I yield
back, chairman.
Dr. McQueary. Thank you.
Mr. Thornberry. I thank the gentleman. And I think he is
exactly right. The Chair yields to the gentleman from North
Carolina, Mr. Etheridge.
Mr. Etheridge. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And let me welcome
you again also and thank you. I want to ask one question, a
little bit off of cybersecurity, but it's important. You
visited, I think, in the last couple of weeks, with a number of
the folks in universities in North Carolina. And one of the
individuals, Dr. Barker, I believe, who is the director of
Textile Production and Comfort Center, raised an issue about
the need for consistent standards for first responder
equipment. Could you sort of summarize where we are with that?
You had indicated that we were going to be working with NIST to
get a memorandum of understanding, so we would have a
consistent standard across as we spent money on that very
quickly. Can you sort of give us some indication of where we
are?
Dr. McQueary. Well, yes. As I indicated earlier, we expect
to sign a memorandum of understanding with NIST tomorrow,
assuming things come as we think they are. We have already
issued the draft standards for radiological devices because
those are important ones, and we would expect and we are doing
that, by the way, in concert with support from NIST, as well as
the American National Standards Institute, too, as well as some
other standards agency. And so that is our approach. And we
will continue that as being a long-term effort. We have, I
believe, $15 million program in fiscal year 2003, and 25
recommended for fiscal year 2004 to make sure that we do
continue that effort. It is very important.
Mr. Etheridge. Great. Thank you, sir. Last week when you
testified before the House Science Committee, you talked about
the need for increased spending on cybersecurity and I think
this committee feels strongly about that. Yesterday, Secretary
Ridge indicated that more than 80 percent of the Nation's
critical information infrastructure is in private hands. Now,
that being true, let me just ask several questions and I'll try
to keep them together. In addition to the Department of
Homeland Security, how many Federal agencies are currently
involved with assessing vulnerabilities and recommending
solutions to the Nation's cybersecurity infrastructure?
Dr. McQueary. The ones that I am most familiar with are the
group that testified last week. DARPA has some work going on in
that area, and NIST has work going on, as well as the National
Science Foundation. And of course ourselves, with our emphasis
being in the infrastructure, Information Analysis, and
Infrastructure Protection Directorate with the strong
scientific support from the Science and Technology Directorate.
Mr. Etheridge. I guess my question to follow that then, the
agency, you said you are working together. Are they cooperating
in a way that will further this research and development that
we so badly need to do?
Dr. McQueary. I believe so, sir. In fact, one of the things
that I have found in doing this job is that the cooperation
seems to abound when we talk about Homeland Security. There is
a spirit of we need to be working together in order to do this
major job that we all have to work in.
Mr. Etheridge. And that invariably leads to the next
question on overlap. I know it is early in the game. But I do
hope that as you move along, that you will make every effort
possible, that they won't have overlap, because obviously that
is not the best use of resources when we have limited
resources.
Dr. McQueary. I completely agree with you, and I believe
one of the major responsibilities I have is to make sure that
we do not have overlap, not only in that area, but in other
areas too. And that is why we are interested in finding out
what is going on outside of Department of Homeland Security.
Mr. Etheridge. Good. Now having come from the private
sector, you will appreciate the next question I am going to
ask, because it is one that many times people in the private
sector and the public sector find a bit sensitive. And I think,
given our charge and our challenge it should be asked and we
need to deal with it. What role should the Federal Government
play in ensuring that the private companies protect these
critical information infrastructures that are so critical not
only to them, but to the security of the American people?
Dr. McQueary. Well, this is my view that the government can
provide standards recommendation guidance, but I firmly
believe, having come out of the private sector, that it is the
individual company's responsibility in order to have a secure
system for handling information. Quite frankly, I believe that
those companies that rise to the occasion and do it well can
find themselves at a competitive advantage over those who do
not.
Mr. Etheridge. And that will lead to one additional
question, because in the 2001 Hart-Rudman report, the road map
to national security imperatives for change, one of the
critical issues that was pointed out in that was the failure to
manage properly science technology and education for the common
good over the next quarter of a century. It could be a very
destructive issue for this country and our ability to compete
and protect the homeland.
That being said, the Department of Homeland Security will
have to balance the responses of the current threat with long-
term planning. That is always the case, but it is going to be a
critical piece. Currently, one-third of the U.S. science and
engineering doctoral degrees and 40 percent of the Ph.D.'s in
computer science are going to foreign students, many of whom
are leaving this country. I hope there is some planning down
the road and that this Department will get involved as well as
others to help us deal with this issue. I see this as a real
long-term challenge.
Dr. McQueary. I agree with you, and that was one of the
motivating factors in our deciding that we wanted to provide
scholarships and fellowships from Homeland Security to get
people focused on problems that are relevant to the mission
that we have.
Mr. Etheridge. Thank you very much. Thank you, Mr.
Chairman.
Mr. Thornberry. Thank the gentleman. The Chair yields to
the gentleman from Georgia, Mr. Linder.
Mr. Linder. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I just have a couple
of questions. How much are you using the CDC and how are you
using them?
Dr. McQueary. How much are we using the CDC?
Mr. Linder. And how are you using them?
Dr. McQueary. One of the key areas in our relationship with
CDC is in the development of software programs that can give
early indications of whether biological events might have taken
place. And they have done some very good work on that, and we
expect to continue to work with them to improve that. I think
that's an area that we will certainly want to engage ourselves
in extensively because I think it's really important,
particularly in the biological area, to be able to have good
information, be able to decide what do, and react quickly--more
so perhaps than in any other of the other threats we have.
Mr. Linder. Do you see them in anything other than
biological?
Dr. McQueary. That has been the primary--when I say
``biological,'' I include in that illnesses, sicknesses and so
forth. Maybe I didn't use the proper terminology, but that's
what I mean.
Mr. Linder. One of the reasons they have been so successful
is they have understood their mission was an informational one.
They put the scientists together and got the correct scientific
information and made it available to other government local and
State governments and they have had a huge success and I hope
you will think about the value of sharing information. My
personal view is that Homeland Security ought to be more
informational than programmatic. Although there would be some
of both there. But you are going to have to share information
with first responders across the country, and get the best
information and share it. The CDC has had a huge success in
doing just that. It is a good model. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Thornberry. Thank you. I thank the gentleman. The Chair
recognizes the gentlelady, Ms. Christensen.
Mrs. Christensen. Thank you, Mr. Chairman and welcome Dr.
McQueary.
Dr. McQueary. Thank you.
Mrs. Christensen. I will start out with two questions. In
your testimony, you said the Science and Technology Directorate
will implement it's activities through focus portfolios that
address biological chemical, radiological et cetera and support
research and development needs of operational units. The
Department receives the innovative input from private industry
and academia, as well as national and Federal laboratories.
Mine is not a--my question is not related to cybersecurity
either. We have had two hearings on Project Bioscience. And I
wonder if you could tell me how your office relates to that,
how you interact on the Project Bioscience, which has come
before us and asked for the mandatory permanent funding and
certain, support for certain programs that they want to
implement that seem to be included in what I just read.
Dr. McQueary. I would say at this point, our interaction
with people of bioscience has been somewhat limited, just
because we have only been in existence for a little over 2
months. But certainly we would expect to be engaged in the
scientific discussions about what items should be considered
under the bioscience guidance that has been proposed or that is
bioscience. I guess we are still waiting for the final bill to
be passed. But we would be a participant in that. I really
could not go into any detail, because I simply don't know today
how to answer your question in more specific detail than that.
Mrs. Christensen. Well, in your role as the Under Secretary
for Science and Technology, when projects like these are being
developed, shouldn't they be developed in conjunction with your
office?
Dr. McQueary. Well, in this particular case, for bioscience
the leadership role, as specified in the development in the
bill that created Homeland Security, left the scientific work,
if you will, largely with Health and Human Services. In fact,
the budget for the work is included there. So we are in more of
a support role to help make sure that from Homeland Security
perspective that what goes on there is what is needed.
Mrs. Christensen. OK. I wanted to ask a question about the
university centers. Homeland Security Act requires the creation
of one or more university-based centers for Homeland Security.
How many centers do you expect to establish? How will you
decide where to establish them? And I am particularly
interested in the minority serving institutions and what
outreach will be made to ensure that they participate and that
their research infrastructure is at a level to allow them to
participate.
Dr. McQueary. The approach we--first of all we have not
decided how many centers of excellence that we should have at
this point. I am sure that we will have more than one, though.
We have engaged already in discussions with the American
Association of Universities, National Science Foundation, and
the American Association for the Advancement of Science. Most
of these, all of these groups represent affiliations,
university membership in some form, and so we are asking for
inputs as to whom those groups feel would be the most qualified
universities to be considered to be the centers of excellence.
On the issue of minority colleges, you may, if you read my
bio, you know that I was on the board of trustees for a
historically black college, North Carolina A&T University, so I
am intimately familiar with the value that such an institution
can bring to the roles that we have to do here. And certainly,
we will make sure, I can assure you that I will make sure that
we will give due consideration to all schools as we look at
where these centers of excellence should be.
Mrs. Christensen. And Dr. McQueary, since this is a new--
the Department is new, the times of research that we will be
looking to do is relatively new, or building on some old
research for a new purpose, would we anticipate that there
would be funding to assist universities that may not have the
capacity now to be able to have the capacity to be a centers of
excellence, such as the HBCUs?
Dr. McQueary. I have not had a discussion with anyone about
that subject. But it is certainly one worthy of us considering,
and, if I could, if you pose a question, maybe I could offer
you an answer after I have had a chance to think it through
carefully, because it is an important question.
Mrs. Christensen. Thank you. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Thornberry. I thank the gentlelady. The Chair yields to
the gentleman from Pennsylvania, Mr. Weldon.
Mr. Weldon. I thank the chairman. Dr. McQueary, thank you
for being here. I am going to run through some issues. You may
not be able to answer them today. But I would like you to get
back to us. A few years ago, 5 years ago we had an initiative
underway called the MEDEA Project. Are you familiar with that?
Dr. McQueary. No, sir, I am not.
Mr. Weldon. The MEDEA Project was designed by the
Intelligence Community and our Defense Agency to allow a
selected number of scientists around the country to get access
to classified technology to assist us in both Homeland Security
and in threats that were emerging. One of the initiatives that
came out of that was called FIRESAT, where we took $14 million
that I got plussed up as the chairman of the Defense R&D
Committee to use our overhead satellites to detect forest and
wildlands fires. That system was developed. It was a multi-
agency function. The software was completed. There was a
disagreement over who would fund it and who would operate it,
and today the software sits in boxes in Crystal City, Virginia.
So while America burns and while forest fires eat up
hundreds of billions of dollars a year, for this country and
impose a significant homeland security threat for lack of $5
million to put the program back into place, that program is
sitting in boxes. And I put Secretary Ridge on notice
yesterday, he is a good friend of mine. We are going to hold
the agency accountable this year.
Last year, Joe Albaugh convinced me to put language in the
defense bill to move the program from NOAA to FEMA. I did that.
And FEMA has jurisdiction. FEMA now says they can't fund it
until 2005 or 2006. That's unacceptable, so I would urge you to
use your office. This is not your fault. It is a problem you
have inherited but it is a science and technology activity that
could directly benefit the Homeland Security this year. Before
the forest fire season occurs again, please use your good
influence to assist us in that. And also, look at the
possibility of doing similar type of things with the use of
technology, primarily coming from DOD resources in the future.
As you probably know, I think communication is our biggest
challenge domestically. We still do not have a domestic
integrated communication system. There have been some cutting
technology, like Raytheon has developed to give you a localized
unit that you can pre-program in up to 14 separate frequencies
at the site to give us that integration of high and low band
digital and so forth. We need to expedite short-term solutions
for our first responders, but have the long-term objective of
creating a national integrated communication system, and with
your background from Lucent and from Bell Labs, you know the
problem here very well, the middle ware problem.
But it needs to be our top priority. Along with that, we
need you to help convince Secretary Ridge that he has got to
stand up and mandate that we set aside frequency spectrum
allocation for public safety. That's currently a big issue.
APCO has made it one of there top priority agenda items. Jane
Harman and I have introduced a bill to do that and we would
really appreciate and use the support of the Agency to set
aside that frequency.
Tech transfer. We are doing a terrible job in the military
of transferring technology for the first responder. It is a
disaster. And I say it as the vice chairman of our Defense
Committee and former chairman of Defense R&D. I have been on
most of our disasters in the country. And the lack of
transferring existing technology is absolutely disgraceful. I
will give you a case in point. A pet peeve of mine is that we
develop GPS capability for use of our troops in the battlefield
to know where they are. We have also developed sensor
technology, and transmission technology for an undergarment
that a soldier can wear that can not only tell you where the
soldier is, but their vital signs. Their pulse, their breathing
rate. That same technology needs to be made available
immediately to the one million volunteers and paid firefighters
and paramedics and police officers nationwide.
If we had had that technology up in Boston we wouldn't have
lost six firefighters who got lost in the warehouse when their
air supply ran out and no one knew where they were. So we have
got to do a better job. And I think you can help from your
position at pushing the Pentagon to get more of that technology
out the door quicker. We spend $40 billion a year on technology
for the military. That technology, when developed, should
immediately be applied where applicable to the first responder.
In the case of cybersecurity, two issues. Both involving
education. I think the focus has got to be away from training
young people how to use computers, to what I call information
dominance, information security.
Purdue developed the first graduate degree program followed
by the Navy post graduate school. I think we have got to do a
more aggressive job in convincing universities to develop
graduate level and post doctoral programs in information
dominance.
In fact, to go beyond that. In the military and defense
budget, we are looking at creating a cyber core. We would
actually create a position like we do when we were short
medical officers to run young students through undergrad and
graduate programs, commissioning them as second lieutenants,
just like we did with our doctors when we were short doctors so
that we create a whole new generation of young officers that
serve the military for up to 5 years, give us that core
technology competence that we need and then allow them to go
work for the private sector and maintaining the information
security and dominance so vital for our private corporations
and other entities.
So those are a few of my thoughts. And the final one, I am
out of time, but I will put it on the record, is EMP. We don't
hear much about. Most people don't even know what
electromagnetic pulse is. You know what it is? It is perhaps
the largest and most severe threat to our use of information
technology, and along with the threat of directed energy, we
need to have a whole focus on that. And so I would ask you to
get back to us on what are you doing with the threat of EMP.
We have an EMP commission right now that's working for DOD,
but also the whole threat posed by directed energy weapons.
Thank you.
Dr. McQueary. Yes, sir.
Mr. Thornberry. The Chair recognizes the gentleman from New
Jersey, Mr. Andrews.
Mr. Andrews. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I appreciate the
witness's testimony. I apologize for not being personally
present, but I did have a chance to read it. Doctor, I want to
ask you a question about how we best assure the cyber defenses
of critical infrastructure in the nongovernmental sector in the
utility companies, banks, health care institutions and so
forth. First of all, would you agree with the assertion that
cyber defenses generally speaking in the private sector are not
as high as they technologically could be.
Dr. McQueary. I would agree with that statement yes,
without--that's obviously a very general answer.
Mr. Andrews. It is. And let me add parenthetically I do not
mean that as a critical statement of the private sector. The
private sector's responsibility is to protect its proprietary
and commercial interests. If it extends beyond that point, it
is frankly doing a disservice to the owners or shareholders of
the venture. I don't mean to be critical. It seems to me that--
would you also agree with the statement that some of the
private sector critical infrastructure institutions in
cyberspace are very critical indeed, that they are--they deal
with our power grid, with our health care system and so forth.
Would you agree with that.
Dr. McQueary. I do agree with that.
Mr. Andrews. In thinking about this problem, it strikes me
that there are four ways that we could approach it. The first
is to kind of let the market run its course and let the private
industry do what it will do, but no more. The second would be
to mandate that private industry harden their defenses on a
continuous basis to the highest level, which I think would be
an unfair imposition of a public responsibility on private
sector institutions. The third option would be to in effect
nationalize these institutions to, to have the government take
over the power grid, the government take over the 911 system in
every way. I think this would be antithetical to our way of
doing things and it is a proposal I would never embrace.
And the fourth way would be to find some appropriate way to
subsidize the hardening of cyber defenses to the extent that
the market will not harden those defenses, but no more than
that, so that we are providing an appropriate level of public
subsidy or incentive to raise that cyber barrier to its highest
level but not to do so in such a way that we are having the
taxpayers pay for something that the private concerns
themselves might pay for. My question to you is, have I left
out any alternatives? And if so, what are they? And the second,
as a general strategy among those four choices, what would you
suggest that we follow to try to harden those critical
infrastructure cyber defenses.
Dr. McQueary. Well, you asked two questions. Let me try
both. I--just sitting here, as you are talking, I couldn't
think of another, but I also would like to request the time to
go back and talk to the people who are more intelligent than I
am on this subject.
Mr. Andrews. Well, you are certainly more intelligent than
me. So I would welcome that opportunity.
Dr. McQueary. And trying to choose one as I am sitting
here, I don't think it is appropriate as a scientist to make
such a critical choice as we sit here talking about this in
this form. But I would be happy to consider it and offer you my
opinion based upon a considered thought process.
Mr. Andrews. I would certainly welcome that and I would
welcome the chance to be briefed on that and share it with the
rest of the committee as well. I raise this issue because it is
my observation as an amateur in this area that the places in
cybersecurity where we are most vulnerable are the places
typically not controlled by the Department of Defense or by the
Federal Government. Thank goodness, because we are a society
that's not nationalistic in that way. But, it is--the problem
here is that we are dealing with cyber defense in the private
sector as a commercial venture. But it is a national security
problem. And if someone wanted to attack us by shutting down
the power grid, they would be attacking the systems of the
utility companies and other private entities.
If someone wanted to create chaos by diverting 911 calls
away from dispatchers, they would be attacking the systems of
telecommunications companies and local governments where we are
most vulnerable, we are least able to control by Federal law.
So we have to find some way that does not exercise control and
therefore substitutes, you know, this institution for the ones
that do a much better job than we would.
But we still have to find a way to do it. I mean, my
experience in this has been that in the military side, we have
made great strides in the last few years since operation
eligible receiver and some of the other exercises of the late
1990's, where DOD systems are hardened and they are being
hardened on a continuous basis. But the critical infrastructure
has nothing to do with that. And I think one of our real
challenges and one the Department's challenges is to figure out
a way to do that, to push those walls out further without
imposing an unfair burden on private industry, but by getting
the job done. I would welcome your thoughts and the
Department's input. Thank you.
Dr. McQueary. Thank you.
Mr. Thornberry. I thank the gentleman for his thoughtful
questions and contribution and I would just chime in briefly,
Dr. McQueary, that I think this is obviously a key subject of
interest to this subject committee, and we want to work with
you as well as the IP folks at the Department on the best
approach. The gentleman from New Jersey has obviously put lots
of thought and has lots to offer in this area. The subcommittee
is very pleased that the Vice Chair of the full committee is
with us, and the Chair would yield to the gentlelady from
Washington for questions that she might want to ask.
Ms. Dunn. I thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. Welcome, Dr.
McQueary. It is great to have you here and to get an update on
how busy you have been since you took over this operation.
Dr. McQueary. Thank you.
Ms. Dunn. I represent a district in Washington State, a
district that is very close to a major deepwater port, the
third largest port in the United States. And also has about 120
miles of maritime border with Canada and then an extensive
northern land border. There are many, many initiatives, some we
have talked about today, and in other meetings for port
security, the Container Security Initiative, for which we have
negotiated, the last time I heard, with 17 of the major mega
ports, of the 20 in the world that our people be there on the
ground when containers are loaded before they come toward our
United States ports.
The Customs Trade Partnership Against Terrorism, the Coast
Guard's 96-hour notice of arrival, and then new technology that
would scan containers, radiation portals being one that I can
think of, what is the status of the implementation and the
coordination of some of these container and vessel tracking
initiatives that are so vital to ports like the one I am very
close to in Washington.
Dr. McQueary. And that obviously is a very, very important
area that is being worked, as I am sure you know. Currently the
Border and Transportation Security organization, the
directorate as well as the Coast Guard, have the prime
responsibility to deal with the issues that you have just
talked about and do have the lead on that. I have to tell you
today we have not been engaged in any great detail at all from
the Science and Technology Directorate standpoint, simply
because that work was ongoing at the time when we actually
became into existence. But it is an area that I would expect
that we will work very closely from the scientific standpoint
to make sure that those organizations do have the latest and
best scientific capability to decide what would best work, and,
in fact, we would work very--if a new program were starting, we
would work very closely with them to help establish what the
requirements are and provide scientific guidance.
But this one has been underway for a while. And so we are
in the mode of trying to catch up, quite frankly.
Ms. Dunn. Good. It sounds like you have the same challenge
that we have with multiple jurisdictions and how we divide down
that responsibility. There is certainly no shortage of ideas
for technological innovations in the new Department. DHS has
been inundated we know with funding requests from private
companies that have Homeland Security-related technology. I
think those of us who serve in the Congress know, and can
imagine the burden you are under, because we are getting calls
from people in our districts who have all sorts of ideas, and
in fact, in my own district, we have had to develop a way to
provide input for those firms so that we can take advantage of
these ideas.
The chairman of our committee has talked about a technology
fair that would bring together people who might have great
ideas from the government sector, but also from the private
sector. And I am wondering if you know, given the numbers of
requests that we are under, how the Department of Homeland
Security will, first of all, give access to small business, the
voices of small business people, and then once you have
developed a system for listening to their ideas, as I said,
that fair might be one way of doing it. How will you prioritize
these requests?
Dr. McQueary. Well, certainly we will be looking for things
that fit in with the, what the national priorities for Homeland
Security would be. And that would be a sort of a guiding
principle for us. We are also going to use the technology--
TSWG. I have used the abbreviation so long--Technical Support
Working Group as being--as helping us to prioritize and make
the selections, based upon criteria that we would provide, of
those that are most promising, and, in addition to that, we
will be using that same group to review some 500 e-mails that
we have received into our Homeland Security site. And I would
say to you that most of those e-mails have come from what
appear to be small businesses.
So there is an intense interest by small business in being
able to make a contribution. So we intend to evaluate each and
every one of those inputs. And it has been more a matter of
getting the necessary people resources to be able to look at
the things to provide considered and respectful responses to
those people who have input.
Ms. Dunn. So should we tell our constituents to e-mail you
with their ideas?
Dr. McQueary. Not me. If you would send it to
[email protected]. It will definitely get considered.
The other issue is we have a broad agency announcement that
just came out last week from the Technical Support Working
Group that lists many different areas of technological interest
that we have from the Science and Technology Directorate
standpoint. And that's another very good place for people to
examine to see whether their products and capabilities fit in
with what we are saying that we are interested in now.
Ms. Dunn. Good. Well, as long as we have access to those
source, phone numbers or e-mail addresses, then I think that
would be great and it would give us another avenue for them to
feel like they are being heard by the government.
Dr. McQueary. And they need to be heard. I fully agree with
you.
Ms. Dunn. They do. And certainly, we are looking on the
government side looking for the best answers. Along that line,
in my home State of Washington, as in many places around the
country, I know that local law enforcement officers are
desperately seeking technologies to help them do their job of
protecting the Nation from future terrorist attacks. Where do
you feel the Department of Homeland Security currently is in
the development of a nationwide communications network that
would allow local law enforcement officials the ability to
coordinate with State and Federal offices?
Dr. McQueary. We have just assumed--we, the Science and
Technology Directorate, on behalf of the Department, have just
assumed responsibility for a project called SAFECOM. If you
happen to be familiar with that, that was a part of the e-
government initiative that was underway being imagined by the
office--OMB and we have just recently had that assigned to us,
I shouldn't say assigned to us. We said that we would be happy
to take on the responsibility for managing that and a part of
that initiative is to begin to work what should be the system
architecture for providing a large-scale communications system
within the country, one that can cope with surges such as we
saw on 9/11 and being able to deal with emergency situations
that that might represent.
So that we can be in a position to guide people that are
buying locally, will have guidance standards to be able to use,
so that, as people begin to buy new equipment, we can begin to
move towards an interoperable communication system, because
there are some 44,000 different locations in the country that
have their own separate communication systems. And to suddenly
launch upon a path that says we fix that very quickly would be
a probably too expensive to even contemplate.
Ms. Dunn. Thank you very much. And thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Thornberry. Thank the gentlelady. And I would just
mention that one of my intentions is to try to put together
information for all members so that they can direct
constituents to the right phone number and e-mail sites and so
forth with the ideas that they have, because I think the
gentlelady raises a very good point, as Ms. Lofgren did, that
we all have a number of constituents and groups and companies
that are interested in offering their services.
The Chair recognizes the gentleman from Kentucky, Mr.
Lucas.
Mr. Lucas. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Doctor. Some of the
questions I am going to piggyback on, but we talked about, you
know, the country revolves around cell phones, it seems like.
And is there any work being done on any kind of an override
capacity, where emergency personnel and the local officials
could get through with cell phones as opposed to--anything like
that at all?
Dr. McQueary. There is a government system that is called
Government Electronic--GETS, I have forgotten what the acronym
stands for--that that capacity exists now. So it is known how
to do such a thing. If there is any specific work going on to
make it be readily available to people that are at the local
level, I can't answer the question, but I will find out.
Mr. Lucas. We don't know that it is workable? I mean, it
hasn't ever been tried?
Dr. McQueary. I have been led to believe that it has been
tried enough to believe that it works.
Mr. Lucas. OK. I didn't know if something happened next
week, if they could put it into effect.
Dr. McQueary. I think it is the number of people that can
actually access it is not sufficient if you had a national
emergency.
Mr. Lucas. Along with Ms. Dunn, we have so many people
contacting us, vendors with ideas and technology. And you
mentioned that they can contact by e-mail,
[email protected]. Is there any other communication
that they can go through, or any phone number?
Dr. McQueary. Well, we do have a Web site too, that has
some information, although that is more informational than
anything else. And then the broad agency announcement I touched
upon earlier that is being managed for us by the Technical
Support Working Group. That would be another path they can use.
That is Web-site based. You can enter the whole proposal in at
the Web site and track what is being done with it as it is
being evaluated and considered, too.
So those would be the two. And here is that Web site. It is
www.tswg.gov.
Mr. Lucas. Thank you very much. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Thornberry. Thank the gentleman.
Dr. McQueary. I would give you my own telephone number, but
my telephone is ringing off the wall already.
Mr. Thornberry. Please don't do that. We need you to do the
job.
The Chair would yield to the distinguished chairman of the
Science Committee, Mr. Boehlert.
Mr. Boehlert. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. And
welcome, Dr. McQueary. I was sort of surprised to learn you
have been on the job a couple of weeks now and you don't have
all of the answers to all of the questions. Is that supposed to
comfort me?
No, I am just kidding you, obviously. I really appreciate
that.
But let me take advantage of this opportunity, putting on
another hat that I wear as Science Committee chair. We have
some outstanding requests for you, and I just would like to
remind you. One we wrote to the President back in January,
before you were on the horizon, about the impact of the
transfer of life science programs to DHS, and posed several
questions. Then we have provided that letter to your people.
And we would like to get some answers to those questions to see
how you intend to proceed. That is one.
Number two, a passion of mine: Cargo Mate. We are still
awaiting some sort of additional contact on that, because Mr.
Chairman and members of the committee, this is a way to track
cargo in ports, and you can pinpoint where it is at any given
time, which is I think a very valuable resource in providing
port protection.
So I would remind you of those two. If you can get back in
a timely manner.
Mr. Boehlert. Now, let me ask specifically. You have
testified before and said a number of times that your job is
going to be one of management and that you are going to tap the
scientific and engineering expertise that exists in our
universities and in the private sector and other government
agencies to do the critical homeland defense research and
development, such as work on cybersecurity.
How do you go about using these groups? Do you have
specific ideas?
Dr. McQueary. Well, specifically, we will be issuing a
number of contracts for work. We will be issuing RFPs, we will
issue broad agency announcements for people to respond to.
Mr. Boehlert. Do you have a feeling for a timetable yet?
Dr. McQueary. Well, we have the one BAA out right now. The
money for fiscal year 2003 is largely committed at this point.
There is very little opportunity for anyone to bid on new
programs other than through the BAA that we have. Certainly
there is going to be a very large opportunity, if our budget is
approved as presented for fiscal year 2004, in which we have
$803 million proposed at this time to--
Mr. Boehlert. Do you have any idea how much, like on a
percentage basis, a guesstimate--I wouldn't expect a precise
figure--on how much of your external funds will go to
activities research, activities at universities and the
university community?
Dr. McQueary. Well, in the very beginning it is my
considered professional judgment that we need to be focusing
our energies on things where we can bring answers to bear
quickly. That is not to say that we should neglect the longer-
term research issues, because there are some areas that do need
that.
But in terms of economic balance, I would expect that most
of our energies are going to be on things that can be
accomplished quickly, and then we can evolve into what I will
call a more steady-state operation in which we have a balance
between ongoing activities as well as those looking to the
future.
But right now, we have a number of things that I am
confident we can do, based upon the limited amount of exposure
I have had to what is going on in America, that we can bring to
bear some real answers quickly.
Mr. Boehlert. I would agree with that analysis on
priorities, the short term immediately.
Do you envision providing any funds to other agencies like
NSF or NIST or NIH, or do you think they have sufficient
resources to do what they need to do?
Dr. McQueary. I believe that--and I could be convinced
otherwise--but I believe those organizations have sufficient
funds in their areas. We do have agreements as to how we would
work with them in most if not all cases.
Mr. Boehlert. I am comforted by the fact that you do have a
good working relationship with these other agencies. I assume
you are strengthening that as each passing day goes by.
Dr. McQueary. Absolutely.
Mr. Boehlert. I think we do expect miracles from you guys.
You have got a very demanding job in a very difficult time
period with some real challenges on the horizon, and we expect
instant results. Just go forward, knowing that you have a lot
of support from Capitol Hill, from people who appreciate people
like you with outstanding records of service and bringing a lot
to the table as you have come to take on this most challenging
and demanding position.
Let me ask you one other thing. Talking about
communications systems and ``interoperability'' is the big
deal. That is the big word. Talk a little bit about that, will
you? We know, for example, in 9/11 with the Twin Towers down,
it was a hell of a difficult problem that we were not able to
overcome in having interoperable communications systems, so
that one can talk to the other and get the message through.
Dr. McQueary. Well, the fundamental problem as I understand
it there--and I was not close to it, so I don't want to go very
far and prove that I don't know what I am talking about--but
when you design a communications system, you have to design
what kind of peak load capacity you expect that system is going
to have to accommodate. And, in general, you make
accommodations for that. When I worked for AT&T, Mother's Day
used to be the most active calling day of the year for
communications. So we always had to make sure that you could
get through rather quickly if you are trying to call your
mother.
I doubt that anyone would have conceived of trying to
design a wireless communications system for New York that could
have accommodated what had to have transpired when that awful
tragedy occurred. And so I think the answer for such a system
would be one that was touched upon earlier: Is there some kind
of priority so that those who really do need to get through to
make calls can indeed make them? I do believe that there are
ways of accomplishing that.
Mr. Boehlert. Thank you very much. Mr. Chairman, thank you
for the time.
Just let me pass with one observation. Those of us who have
come to know Dr. McQueary know that he is a good guy with
outstanding credentials, and he brings something very important
to public service. But how refreshing it is to have a witness
of your distinction who on occasion will say, ``Gee, I don't
have the answer to that one, I am trying to figure it out
myself.'' We are all trying to figure out a lot of things.
Mr. Thornberry. The Chair appreciates the chairman's
comments. It is reassuring to me, too.
The Chair recognize the gentleman from Florida, Mr. Meek.
Mr. Meek. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. Thank you for
being here today, Mr. Secretary.
I had a question along the lines of communications. We can
talk about cyberspace and get even into a bigger conversation
as it relates to servicing your customers. I was reading over
your opening statements, and I am sorry that I missed it. I am
on the Armed Services Committee and the bill is on the floor
now.
The folks back in Florida where I am from, one of the
biggest concerns they have, outside of many others, is the
issue of communications. And we know now, many of us in this
committee room, we have Blackberrys and cell phones and
whatever, even is touching their Palm these days. But the
average American, they just have simply the home phone. And if
something was to happen, especially when first responders are
trying to respond to a scene or contain a bad situation, if it
is in a downtown area, big or small town, many of the people
will not know of what is going on and what they should do at
that particular time.
Does the Department have the technology to notify
individuals--let's say, for instance, USA America City, medium-
sized city, has a downtown area; if we were to have a terrorist
attack at a building, you wanted to keep everyone in the
building or out of the building, how would the Department
contact those individuals or how would--do we have functions
locally?
Dr. McQueary. That activity would be managed by FEMA. And I
have to tell you that I don't know the details of all of their
communications capability right now. But certainly what you are
describing is something that, if we have not adequately
addressed, it does need to be addressed.
I have seen, in fact, proposals that have come in during
this time of people sending in to our e-mail address that I
alluded to earlier, in which people believe that they have
possible solutions for that. We have not had a chance to
evaluate those to determine whether they have efficacy or not.
Mr. Meek. That is a very serious issue because, being a
past first responder myself, I know that in the early stages of
any incident it is important, need it be trauma care or need it
be direction to the general public.
One of the things that I think is important, and myself and
other members on the Homeland Security Committee, we are going
to draw up a bill tomorrow. But you may already have this
authorization--I don't know--to be able to allow the
Department, on the discretion of the Secretary, to contract
with a telecommunications company to be able to call people or
call an office building when you need to be able to share
pertinent information with them, need it be in a city, in a
block grid, need it be across America so that people will know.
I have heard all kind of different ways that we can do this,
through weather radios and, I mean, you name it. I am pretty
sure that you have a bunch of ideas either stuck in your e-mail
or on your desk right now, waiting for folks to review.
But, I think it is important that we get to that as soon as
possible. Do you have that ability now to do that? I know some
cities have moved forward saying, go on to our Web site, we
will e-mail you or Blackberry you if there is an emergency in
our county or what have you. But the average American doesn't
have that technology. And how would they be notified?
I mean, if something was to happen now, of course, our
Blackberrys will go off. But we have no way of knowing unless
someone tells us.
Dr. McQueary. Well, certainly many Americans only have a
phone and/or television, or some may not have either one. So it
depends on the range of how you contemplate notification, and
if one goal is to the full extent you must be able to notify
every person independently whether they have a communication
device or not, that probably becomes a very challenging, if not
unworkable, kind of system to deal with.
Mr. Meek. That capability is available. Over 86 percent of
Americans do have at least one hard line in their home or work
where they can be contacted. And I think communications is key,
especially some of the exercises the Department has done
recently.
That kind of bioterrorism, what have you, is important. I
am not saying that you are saying--that you are not saying that
it is--but communications. And so while you all are looking at
research and development, maybe talk with some of the people in
one of the industries. I know you mentioned your background
there in the telecom industry.
Those that I have been in contact with said that at the
drop of a hat--and people can be contacted, need it be a public
line or a private line that is in their home, probably go as
far as a cell phone if that could happen.
I think communications is key in this new era that we are
moving into. We can talk about being on line or having the
technology, or investing 100 or $300 in some sort of hand-
carried computer. But Mr. and Mrs. Smith, they are waiting on
the phone to ring. If the phone doesn't ring--forget about them
being at home, I am talking about if they are at work, they can
be there--on 9/11, you read some of the stories; it took people
a long time for a lot of folks before they knew what was going
on.
So communications is important. I just want you to be able
to service your customers well. So I want you to take that as
an idea. Hopefully you all can be in support of the legislation
when it comes out.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Thornberry. The Chair thanks the gentleman. And one of
the things that we may consider in this subcommittee is some
sort of a briefing for members on this first responder
communication issue, because obviously there is a lot of
interest. We have heard everything from dedicated spectrum to
priority calling, to a whole variety of technologies.
At least for my purposes, I need someone to kind of give me
the range of options and help put this whole thing in context.
We heard a lot about this when Secretary Ridge testified in
front of the whole committee yesterday. And I don't know
exactly who the best folks are, but I think that would be a
helpful thing for me to understand, the range of the
technologies. We may pursue that.
The Chair recognizes the gentleman from Michigan, Mr. Camp.
Mr. Camp. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you, Doctor. As
chairman of the Border and Infrastructure Subcommittee, it is
clear that we don't have enough people or facilities to really
make the kinds of security arrangements that we need to make,
and technology is going to be a critical part of that.
And I wonder, to what extent you have begun working with
Customs and Border Patrol and Immigration--as you know, those
systems don't talk to one another, the computer systems--and to
what extent, now that Immigration is really in two separate
agencies, to what extent you have begun trying to get the
agencies to be able to communicate together. And if it hasn't
begun, do you have any sort of time line in terms of when you
are going to begin to start doing that?
Dr. McQueary. Well, the key thing that we have done to date
is that we are the lead systems engineer role in science and
technology, for the U.S. VISIT system. So we are very closely
partnered with the Border and Transportation Security
Directorate. And that touches, I believe, upon most of the
elements that you talked about. That is the most significant
thing that we have going on at this point. We have begun some
investigations looking at unmanned aerial vehicles, too, as
having possible application there.
But in working the issue of trying to foster further
communications among those agents, I, quite frankly--I would
suggest that Secretary Hutchinson probably has that high on his
own list to make that happen. I would be more than happy to
assist him in any way, but I wouldn't be presumptuous enough to
try to go and take on that role unless he called upon me to do
so.
Mr. Camp. We hope to be hearing from him pretty soon as
well. I know you touched on the university-based centers that
are mentioned in the Homeland Security Act. And I just wonder,
did you answer how many centers you expect to establish?
Dr. McQueary. We have not determined at this point. In
fact, I don't think it will be as many as ten; it will be more
than one. But we have not reached any kind of a firm
conclusion. We have begun looking at what the criteria need to
be and also, as I mentioned earlier, working with National
Science Foundation, American Association of Universities, and
American Association for the Advancement of Science to help us
sift through recommendations as which universities would be the
logically ones.
And by the way, it doesn't necessarily have to be just a
university. I can envision where more than one university might
get together to have a partnership of two or three or more,
that would be stronger than just any one, and have that
designated as a Center of Excellence. So we are not pinned down
to the idea of a university Center of Excellence only.
Mr. Camp. Thank you. I want to add my voice to the chorus
you have heard about the inquiries we are getting from
companies, individuals, who really have ideas to improve our
security. And I appreciate knowing about the Web sites.
But can you tell me a little bit more about what happens
once an individual or a small business might sign up on one on
of these Web sites, the process from there on? Are they
contacted and things of that nature?
Dr. McQueary. The first formal thing that we put in place
was the e-mail address, because it was clear that we had a
pent-up emotional demand from people that wanted to be able to
tell us about things that they were doing. So we gave out the
e-mail address in an interview that I had with a newspaper a
couple of months ago, maybe 3 months ago at this point.
And after that was done, we just were flooded with inputs
through this, because lots of people read this particular
newspaper. And what we do with those, I actually read every one
of them myself. And when I say I read them, those that are many
pages long, I only read the executive summary to get a sense of
what is there.
Some of them are so intriguing that I will immediately send
them to one of my associates and say, Please take a look at
this, because it looks like something we can use.
Others will simply say--I had one that said, Please tell me
what you are interested in and we will let you know whether we
have anything. It didn't take too long to deal with that
particular one.
And then I had one from a high school student that I
responded to him myself, because I thought if a high school
student would write to me that he deserved to have an answer
from me.
Mr. Camp. So are you expecting, then, a sort of formal
review procedure that--with a certification attached to it?
Dr. McQueary. We will use the Technical Support Working
Group as the formal review and certification, and listen to
their recommendations as to what we should pursue and fund as a
result of that review.
Mr. Camp. All right. Thank you. Thank you very much. I
appreciated your testimony. And thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Thornberry. The Chair appreciates the gentleman. The
subcommittee is very pleased to have the Ranking Member of the
full committee, the gentleman from Texas, Mr. Turner. The Chair
would yield to him for any questions he may have.
Mr. Turner. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you, Dr.
McQueary for being with us today. I am sure it has been a
whirlwind to have taken over this responsibility just a few
weeks ago.
I notice that you have about 50 people on board, and I
assume that will grow. I don't know if it can grow in the
current budget or whether it will take the next budget cycle
for that to happen.
Dr. McQueary. We have approval for 79 FTEs in our current
fiscal year 2003 budget. We expect to take that to 180,
assuming our 2004 budget is approved as presented.
Mr. Turner. I know Ms. Christensen asked a question about
Project Bioshield. And I gather you haven't had a chance to
take a look at the legislation that was before our committee
recently on that subject, and I don't know if there is somebody
within your operation that has. There are some issues there
that our committee needs your help on because the bill was
referred to us because of the role that the Department of
Homeland Security has in trying to develop biodefenses.
It seems to me that we are in the state now where we need
to be sure that as we carry out our role with respect to the
Bioshield legislation. I believe we have crafted that
legislation in a way that is consistent with the objectives and
the statutory directives of your Department has, including in
the Information Analysis Directorate where they gather
intelligence about the biothreats.
In your statement that you have given the committee today,
you have set out two specific roles that you will have. One is
the deployment of the biological warning and incident
characterization system, which I gather is an effort to try to
detect the presence of biological agents.
Dr. McQueary. That is correct.
Mr. Turner. Then you also mention the National Biodefense
Analysis and Countermeasures Center.
Dr. McQueary. Yes.
Mr. Turner. You state in your opening statement that that
Center will leverage the expertise of America's cutting medical
and biotechnical infrastructure to focus on the biological
agent threat, including performing risk assessments. You say it
is an essential new approach to integrating national resources
for homeland security supporting public health and law
enforcement. You go on to say that the analytical capabilities
will be functional in 2004 and coordinated with the National
Institutes of Health and the Food and Drug Administration. Is
that correct?
Dr. McQueary. That is correct.
Mr. Turner. That section, that biological warning system
and the National Biodefense Analysis Countermeasures Center,
represents, really, the largest section of your 2004 budget
request, $265 million.
Dr. McQueary. 365.
Mr. Turner. Excuse me, 365. Now, what I think we are
struggling with on this committee is trying to be sure that we
understand the role of this Center, the Biodefense Analysis and
Countermeasures Center, and how this fits in with the other
agencies that are already in existence, like the Centers for
Disease Control, National Institutes of Health, and try to make
some logical assessment of whether we have divided up this
responsibility properly and what it is that we are going to
accomplish.
I have several questions that come to my mind. Maybe you
can respond to all of them at once. I am trying to figure out,
first, what role the Biodefense Analysis Countermeasure Center
has with respect to Project Bioshield, which is the legislation
before us.
Second, will the Center, be responsible for developing
vaccines or other medical countermeasures to biological
threats? That is, will your Center be in charge of assessing
likely biological threats, or is that role carried out by the
Information Analysis Directorate?
Third, once the threats have been assessed and determined,
will it be the Department of Homeland Security's role to
trigger the procurement of the vaccines we hope to develop
through Project Bioshield?
Last does the work of the Center duplicate or compliment
the work that is being done at other centers, like NIH, Centers
for Disease Control, and the Army's Medical Research Institute
for Infectious Diseases?
I know that I have given you a lot of questions, but we
need to explore these issues in depth so that when we pass that
legislation out of this committee, we have taken care of the
homeland security piece of Project Bioshield.
Dr. McQueary. Let me give you a partial answer, and then
suggest perhaps that some of my staff can get together with
yours to understand in detail the issues that you have so that
we can provide a reasoned and thoughtful response to that.
But first of all, my intent, to the maximum extent that we
can, is to make sure that we do not have duplicative efforts
elsewhere. My intent is to try to be sure that we take
advantage of what the government has paid for, what industry
has already done, and not engage in duplicative work, because
of the point that was made earlier that is wasteful of
resources, and we never have enough resources to do all of the
things that we want to do. That is point number one.
The role that we expect to play in each of these areas that
engage--whether it is NIH or any part of HHS or USDA, our role
is to--the things that we would be funding is what I will call
to fill gaps that are not currently being investigated in other
areas. So part of our responsibility is to make sure that we
have a close enough relationship to the work that is going on
relative to homeland security in these agencies so that we can
determine where we might make contributions.
And, specifically, and the things that you are talking
about, is the areas that we would expect to be fully engaged
in: the threat analysis in concert with the IAIP, as you
correctly observed. We would expect to be engaged in
establishing what the prioritization of threats would be from
the scientific standpoint. And we would certainly be involved
in the details of acquisition strategy and setting the
requirements for whatever it would be that we would ultimately
buy to assist homeland security.
So I think if you think of those three things, it is not
really something that NIH or other parts of HHS or USDA would
normally be doing as they support homeland security.
Mr. Turner. Well, I think if that is your intent, I think
we probably need to be sure that is included in the Project
Bioshield legislation, because I think there is competition for
those roles.
I respect very much what you said and we certainly don't
want to duplicate activities within the government. But I am
not sure that it is clear what role the Department will play.
But I approve of what you said and I agree that it is your
responsibility to assess the biological threat. I think it is
your responsibility to set the priorities of which threats we
should deal with first, and in what order. And I think the
issue of decisionmaking about procurement may very well be your
responsibility as well. I wish you would work with us on this,
because we are on a tight time frame.
And you know, I even think it would be appropriate for the
Department to take an even stronger role, and I suggested this
in the hearing, because Project Bioshield, as currently
drafted, envisions that we will find a private sector answer to
developing vaccines in every instance.
And we have had some people share with this committee their
views that we need to find such an answer as a first step, but
we also need to be willing to have some entity within the
Federal Government, not necessarily within the Department of
Homeland Security--but it could be--where the research is
taking place to try to find and discover the vaccines that we
need to deal with these dangerous biological agents.
And if that is a view that you share, we need to hear that:
Otherwise, we have placed all of our eggs in the basket of
counting on the private sector and the drug companies to step
forward to solve these problems for us. There are some people
who have suggested that such an approach may not work. If it
doesn't work, we have lost valuable time in addressing these
threats.
Dr. McQueary. Sure.
Mr. Turner. And any ideas you have on that, I certainly
want us to have the benefit of them as we try to move forward
on this bill.
Dr. McQueary. I will be happy to engage in a discussion
with our folks about that and get to you in short order,
because it is an important question.
Mr. Turner. Thank you, Doctor.
Mr. Thornberry. Thank the gentleman. The subcommittee is
very pleased to have the Chairman of the full committee, the
gentleman from California. He is recognized.
Mr. Cox. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Welcome, Dr. McQueary.
This is, of course, the Subcommittee on Cybersecurity, as
well as Science, Research and Development. And we have
structured the subcommittee in this fashion because it seemed
so clear that there has to be a relationship between ongoing
R&D and the deployment of cybersecurity countermeasures in
real-time if we are going to succeed in that area of our
mission.
Unlike almost all other aspects of national security, cyber
doesn't sit still, particularly as compared to the old paradigm
of guns, guards, and so on. We have to commit ourselves to
making a constant investment in cyber almost every day you
wonder if the measures that you had in place yesterday are
going to be good today. The speed of change and the number of
participants in making that change happen really has no analog
or precedent in the history of warfare.
As a result, I am very interested in what Secretary Ridge
told us yesterday; specifically, that he is going to create
inside the Information Analysis and Infrastructure Protection
Directorate, a division for cybersecurity. And I am
particularly interested in asking you, since you are here
today, how you are going to interact with that division.
Dr. McQueary. Our responsibility will be to support them
with the very best science and technology that they need in
order to accomplish that. And we do have people that are
experienced in cybersecurity on my staff. We have one person at
least that is detailed to us from the IAIP organization, and so
we will be closely coupled with the IAIP group; but they will
have the lead, and we will support them in any way that we can
based upon the scientific capability that we have.
Mr. Cox. Do you have cyber priority within your ambit?
Dr. McQueary. We have, within our budget this year and
proposed budget for next year, moneys that were intended to be
in a support role. I would hasten to say that our budget was
put together when the Critical Infrastructure Board existed,
and therefore we may end up having to relook at that, whether
we do have enough allocated. But we would certainly come back
to you before doing anything, obviously.
Mr. Cox. The reason I ask that question is that in your
written testimony there isn't any mention of it. In the budget
allocations that you have laid out to us, which you submitted
to us in writing, we have the largest amount for bio. And then
we have amounts for chem, high explosives, radiological,
nuclear. And the smallest amount, only $5 million is for IT. I
take it that must be the vessel in which you are thinking of
cyber, the subset of the smallest amount that has been
requested. It seems essentially trivial. And that may be
appropriate, because it may be that is someone else's business
and not yours.
Dr. McQueary. Well, we will provide the support that is
needed for IAIP. Keep in mind the 2003 budget was put together
last year before the Department ever existed, and essentially
the same thing--well, the same thing with the 2004 budget, too.
And at the time when the 2004 budget was created, the
President's Center for Infrastructure Protection existed at
that time, and it was believed, we believed, our people putting
together the budget believed, that the major leadership role
was going to be there. And so quite frankly we didn't know in
detail what the responsibility was going to be for science and
technology other than there was a view that we would probably
be called upon for some scientific support.
With that responsibility now focused in the IAIP
Directorate, we will provide whatever support is needed in that
very important area. Because if we need to revisit the budget
in order to accomplish that, that is what we will do.
Mr. Cox. When we wrote the Homeland Security Act
legislation, as it was moving through Congress one of the
things that was in flux was the name of the IAIP Directorate,
and in fact for a time the first word in that directorate was
cybersecurity. That was true on the House floor, in fact.
We always intended, in any case, that that be a huge piece
of that directorate. And so I am not disturbed that that is
where it is going on at all. That is where Congress intended it
to go on. But what I want to be sure of is that to the extent
that developmental R&D investment, ongoing imagining about what
comes next as a part of that mission, that if you are not doing
it, they are equipped to do essentially what you are doing in
these other areas such as bio, chem, radiological and so on.
When it comes to cyber, are they going to be able to do
essentially your mission inside their directorate when it comes
to cyber?
Dr. McQueary. We are obviously two separate directorates
and will supply the number of people needed in order to support
the mission they have for cybersecurity.
Mr. Cox. Except that you have to make decisions. You are
planning. You are asking Congress for money, presumably you are
going to get it. When that happens, you are going to get the
biggest slug of money for bio. With my limited imagination, I
can't see how a whole lot of that is going to be useful for
cybersecurity, although everything is ultimately connected.
And the same with chemical and the same with high
explosives and so on. Those are different silos. And by the
time we get down to IP, you are asking for $5 million, and that
includes infrastructure protection per se, not just the subset
that is IP via IT attacks. And so there really isn't going to
be much in the way of significant resources within your area
for this because we haven't asked for it.
Dr. McQueary. And I will say once more, if we find
collectively--and I include the Congress in that evaluation--
that the amount that we have in there is inadequate, then we
will find a way to recommend that we reprogram the budget in
order the put more money into that area. But right now the
largest--
Mr. Cox. That wouldn't be necessary, Dr. McQueary, if it
were adequately provided for in IAIP. And so it may be that it
is not fair to ask you about what is going on there. But I need
to know from somebody at some point whether or not that is
being provided for within that directorate.
Dr. McQueary. Right. And I think we owe you that answer.
And I can't answer for them, because I don't know what the
budget number is for them.
Mr. Cox. All right.
The second, and I think in the interests of time, Mr.
Chairman, the last area that I will open up is the question of
how you are prioritizing threat analysis within S&T, because,
of course, that is one of the responsibilities that you have
undertaken.
Particularly, you have that interest with bio. I think Mr.
Turner touched on that a little bit. How are you getting threat
analysis to be prioritized within your area?
Dr. McQueary. Well, first of all, we have--what we have
taken is the--what are called the threats that can obviously do
the greatest damage to the country as being very high on our
prioritization. And the biological threat as well as the
nuclear threat are the two that can do the most damage with a
single incident, and, therefore, that is why those have such
high priority in terms of the proposed investment strategy.
That is not to say that the other areas in chemical and
radiological as well as high explosives should be ignored,
because they should not be, because, quite frankly, the most
likely thing that we may be faced with is someone deciding that
they are going to set off one of those three kinds of devices.
But in terms of damage that one can do to the country,
setting off a large--a nuclear weapon of almost any size in a
largely populated area would do more enormous damage than any
one of the other three, if you had them, all three, coming at
the same time.
Mr. Cox. What is the source for that threat analysis?
Dr. McQueary. Just simply looking at--if you had-- Sandia
and Lawrence Livermore have both done analysis that would
support the idea that if you set off a multikiloton nuclear
weapon in New York City, it doesn't take much imagination to
know what kind of kill radius one would have and how many
people can be damaged in that area.
Mr. Cox. Maybe you mean it exactly that way, the answer you
just gave, but I am not sure. What I mean is, are we relying on
Sandia for the threat analysis, or where is the threat analysis
coming from?
Dr. McQueary. Well, the detailed nuclear effects work would
certainly come--I would call it DOE, because that is
traditionally where that analysis has been done. And the
country relies upon the expertise that is in those areas to
provide that.
Mr. Cox. I ask this question because the statute requires
analytical capability within--inside the Department, and it is
not there yet. It is a work in progress. We have other sources
of information for the threat analysis. And then, second, you
are responsible, according to the law and your testimony here,
for prioritizing the R&D work on countermeasures. And so you
have got to do a second level of prioritization, once we go
through the threat analysis. If this is the chemical threat,
then these countermeasures are more worth pursuing than the
next level, the next level and so on. I am reasonably confident
that you can do the latter, and that you are doing the latter,
although I would be interested in hearing an explanation of
how, and I am not at all sure about the former. And I suspect
we must be getting it over the transom in the short run,
because we can't do it in-house.
Dr. McQueary. Well, I think I answered a question that you
did not ask. I apologize for that.
Mr. Cox. I apologize for not asking the question clearly
enough.
Dr. McQueary. We do participate in prioritizing what the
threat would be. And looking at--we view the nuclear weapon
incident as low priority, but the--as low likelihood of
happening, but the potential damage is enormous.
Similarly, maybe higher likelihood of incidence, but with
biologics enormous damage could be done to the country through
that, and, therefore, you take the combination of likelihood of
happening and weigh that with the damage that can be done, and
the combination of those two things assist us in deciding where
the priority should be and what the expenditures should be
accordingly.
Mr. Cox. There may be less difficulty in imagining the
ultimately devastating effects of a nuclear detonation. But
with respect to the likelihood, which is a question of, among
other things, capabilities of various people, groups,
individuals, where are we getting that information in the short
run right now?
Dr. McQueary. Well, in the short term, that is really a
discussion that probably should be handled in a classified
setting.
Mr. Cox. I don't mean that. I mean, which part of the
government?
Dr. McQueary. Well, directly, the experts in this are at
Sandia and Lawrence Livermore. I mean, the experts in knowing
what the consequential damage would be for a nuclear weapon
detonation would come from those organizations.
Mr. Cox. With respect to the likelihood question, the rest
of the analysis, the likelihood of that as opposed to another
kind of attack and the capabilities of real enemies as opposed
to what just in theory might happen, does that also come from
Sandia?
Dr. McQueary. No. The likelihood has to come out and will
come out of the IAIP, the Information Analysis and
Infrastructure Protection Directorate.
Mr. Cox. Is that happening right now? Are you getting that
kind of information from IAIP?
Dr. McQueary. Just a moment.
Okay. The--the answer is we--I participate weekly, twice a
week, in threat analysis briefings, and we have people in our
organization, as I mentioned earlier, that came out of the
infrastructure analysis and protection group. That group worked
very, very closely in the formation of--when the homeland
security organization was being put together, the IAIP and the
science and technology groups were co-located in the same
location. In fact, you have a gentleman behind you there that
was an integral part of helping work the IAIP piece of this. So
there has been, and continues to be, a very close collaboration
between the two organizations.
I have not personally sat down and reviewed detailed
material that has been presented, and so I am not knowledgeable
enough to be able to speak to that.
Mr. Cox. Are you getting information out of T-TIC?
Dr. McQueary. T-TIC is a very important part of what the
threat would be, yes.
Mr. Cox. All right. I thank you, Mr. Chairman. And I
particularly appreciate your willingness to keep considering
the cyber question. Possibly we can follow up in writing or
over the telephone even just to learn how the R&D piece of this
is getting handled when it comes to cyber, because I can see
from your presentation that it is not a big money piece of your
operation. But your willingness to do it, if Congress wants to
push it that way, is much appreciated.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Thornberry. Appreciate the chairman's comments.
Dr. McQueary, I wanted to follow up with a number of topics
that have been raised today, if you don't mind. One of them is
that yesterday in his testimony before the full committee,
Secretary Ridge said that one of the first priorities of your
directorate is radiological detection. And in your comments
with the chairman, you alluded to part of the reason that is
true: the tremendous devastation that can come.
But as I looked through your outline of how much money is
going into each of the seven areas, it doesn't look like it is
as high as the Secretary seemed to indicate that it was
yesterday. Now, is that--am I right about that? Is it because
you have only a limited number of places to put money at this
stage? Or how is that--where--how is that prioritization
working, particularly on radiological detection?
Dr. McQueary. Well, to answer the question, if I may, in a
general sense, the--when you look at what kind of budget you
need to attack one of these things, one of the key issues is
how complex is the problem that needs to be examined, and that
weighs into the challenges, too. And certainly the work that we
need to do in the biological area is one of the more complex,
because of the short time scale that one has there. So that
weighs into helping us determine what the distribution of
funding can be.
We had what we call portfolio managers responsible for each
one of these areas. We asked them to put together detailed
plans as to what they believed the investment program should
be. That was reviewed by the program plans and budgeting
organizations within Science and Technology, and then
ultimately I have the responsibility for what was submitted to
that.
But I am comfortable, as we speak today, with where--what
the priorities are as laid out. But since this is a very
complex, fast-moving kind of threats that we are dealing with,
I think it is very important that we recognize that should we
conclude that the distribution of funding is inappropriate,
than we have a responsibility to come back to you and others to
recommend that we make a change in that, because I am not so
wedded to any budget that I believe this is the only one that
is there. I think it has to be continually evaluated. But we do
believe that is the right one, given the circumstances of where
we are today.
Mr. Thornberry. I appreciate that. As you know, among
others on the full committee, the chairman of the Homeland
Security Appropriations Subcommittee is a member, and I think
all members of this committee and his committee are willing
to--are interested in changes that you may want to make, or
different prioritizations, different opportunities, because it
has been difficult to try to get this up and running and make
your allocations. And you haven't been there long. All of those
factors we understand. I just think it is important that you
feel free to come to the appropriate folks and let us know.
Let me ask you about another one that the Secretary talked
about yesterday. He received a lot of questions about the
technology to screen cargo in airplanes and whether that
existing technology existed, whether further research and
development needed to be done. He also talked about that being
a high priority of your directorate. What is happening
generally in that area?
Dr. McQueary. From what we are doing right now is to
understand what capabilities--when I say capability, it may be
in the prototype stage--trying to understand what kinds of
things already exist and what kinds of things are being
contemplated.
Primarily, at least what I have seen so far, is that work
is being done in the national labs, and I have seen some very--
within the last 2 weeks, I have seen some very interesting
technologies that suggest to me that we can make some strides
forward in that area. But I am not here today to say that we
should launch a program to do one of these things, but I have
seen some things that do clearly warrant quick and early
examination and determination as to what direction we should go
with them.
Mr. Thornberry. It occurs to me that in this area, as in
the first responder communication area, you have got a lot of
folks in the country that are very anxious to get something
done. Your challenge is how patient you are to get it better
versus getting something out there. You have had an exchange
earlier with somebody about it. That is a difficult balance to
get. I don't envy your job at all.
Let me ask, going back to where Ms. Lofgren began the
questioning, about how you look at various ideas and products
and services that people have. And you have given us some
information that we will certainly get around to our colleagues
throughout the House. But you clearly have a very important
role for the Technical Support Working Group.
There are those that have a little bit of concern about
that. Number one, it is under the Department of State,
technically, to oversee it. second, you have got folks from a
variety of agencies that sit on this group, and the fear is
that you may be end up with the least common denominator, and
you are certainly not going to have anybody willing to stick
their neck out on anything that is really innovative. They are
going to end up with a more conventional approach to problems,
and we are going to not explore, as we should, all of the
alternatives, particularly if it comes--you know, if it is
something outside of the mainstream from some small company.
Does that worry you at all that this interagency group has
such a central role in assessing the ideas that come to you?
Dr. McQueary. Well, you always had to worry whether you
have gotten the very best idea that comes forth. But I do
believe that with the multilevel of review process that we
have--and I have worked on the industrial side of things
working with the Technical Support Working Group, and have
submitted proposals to them in the past, and had proposals
evaluated and reviewed, and I didn't always agree with the
results that came out of that.
And there may be some in which we don't agree from a
homeland security standpoint either, but that is why they are
doing a job in support of us rather than taking over the
responsibility for that. So we will--through the HSARPA
organization is where we will manage the projects that will be
selected by the Technical Support Working Group.
So I am satisfied that we have a number of possibilities
for review. And my experience would tell me if people,
companies, feel that they haven't been fairly treated, they do
not generally hesitate to make it known to more senior people
in the organizations that they are dealing with on how they
feel about that.
It is not a perfect process; it never will be a perfect
process. My suspicion will be that we will have far more--in
fact, I know this is going to happen without even seeing the
results, but we are going to end up with far more inputs with
people that probably have more good ideas than we have money to
fund. And so it will be a matter of setting priorities, rather
than why don't we fund, you know, 2- or 300, and only spend
maybe 10- or 15K with each one, which isn't enough to get a
good idea launched.
Mr. Thornberry. Well, and I think we appreciate the--this
was an existing organization, and you had to get moving
quickly. So you want to take advantage of it, and I appreciate
that. I just think it is important for both--for all of us to
be mindful of the concern that they are not inclined perhaps to
be as innovative as we would like, although I am not sure that
that is a fair criticism.
One of the things that you were asked about earlier today,
or you discussed, is your priorities overall within your
directorate. And you mentioned that in the immediate term your
priorities are the applied side. What can we do to find things,
get technology out there quickly to make us safer, but
understanding that the longer-term sort of research is also
important? Have you set goals as a percentage of your budget,
for example, on how much is basic research, how much--or
whatever categories you want to use, longer-term research
versus how much is more immediate and applied?
You know, one of the concerns that I have had over the
years in the Department of Defense is that we have not
adequately put the longer-term R&D money into the programs, and
when that happens, it is impossible to catch up. You can't make
that deficiency up in the near term. Obviously you are just
getting started. You have got immediate priorities. Whether it
is this year or over the next 5 years, do you have goals as a
percentage of your research budget that would go for this
longer-term, more basic kind of research?
Dr. McQueary. We have not established any specific goals at
this point. I think it is a little premature to have put out
numbers that we would have confidence in at this stage. But I
certainly have no difficulty at all that the objective needs to
be to have goals in such areas and try to move towards those,
because I certainly share your view, that longer-term research
is going to be very important to this.
As I think about this system we have to deal with, it is a
very complex system, homeland security with all of its inputs
and outputs. We have a state, if I may describe it this way,
that exists today. As the Science and Technology Directorate,
we have to be able to characterize what state we want to move
it to; in other words, what its capabilities are going to be.
And our huge challenge, in fact the major challenge, that this
country has is how do we evolve from where we are today to
where we want to be.
To do that we will have to have a combination of
evolutionary changes and a combination of revolutionary
changes. It would be my judgment that when we get to the final
state, which itself will be one that evolves, that we then will
move into what will likely be an evolutionary operation.
So we have got to go through evolutionary and revolutionary
so we can eventually to get to evolve the system at a rate
consistent with whatever the future threats turn out to be.
Mr. Thornberry. Well, I guess the challenge is knowing
which stage you are in, because each of those stages could last
a while.
Let me ask briefly about two other areas. Then I want to
yield to my colleagues, because I know that they may have other
questions.
Obviously one of the things that is very much in the news
today is this incident, single incident, of BSE which was found
in Canada.
My understanding is that in June, the Plum Island facility
will be transferred to the Department of Homeland Security, and
I think that will be in your directorate; is that correct?
Dr. McQueary. That is correct.
Mr. Thornberry. Have you looked at all about making sure
that the Plum Island facility is able to do whatever needs to
be done with livestock diseases that could pose a risk to the
health, as well as livestock diseases which could be terrorist-
induced and could threaten the country?
Dr. McQueary. I have people that are at Plum Island today,
this week. They are reviewing, you know, exactly where we are
in preparation for this transition.
We do not have a research program that is identified for
Plum Island as of today. And as I am sure you know, our
responsibility becomes one of being the landlord in facilities,
and USDA will continues it operation as it was planned there,
and then we have the option of adding to their programs should
we conclude that there are things that need to be done.
At this point we have not developed any programs that we
would conclude that we need to conduct there. One thing I will
say, though: some newspapers have reported that we were
contemplating moving that facility to a biolevel 4. That is
simply erroneous information and not based upon any factual
reporting or discussion either. It is at biolevel 3; that is
where we intend to continue to operate should we do anything.
Mr. Thornberry. I am sure that you will do all you can as
the landlord to make sure that the other work that they do
there continues?
Dr. McQueary. Yes, sir. And the USDA had undertaken a
facility study because they have had some problems there. We
will continue that to make sure that facility is operated with
the integrity that it must be for the important work that it
does.
Mr. Thornberry. Great. Let me just give you an opportunity
to make suggestions to us because, as I mentioned in my opening
statement, it was over the course, really, of nearly 2 years
that Congress wrote the Homeland Security Act of 2002, and we
did not get it perfect. And I wonder if you have specific
suggestions off the top of your head today, where maybe some
adjustments need to be made in the act, some problems you have
already run into. Obviously, an open invitation for you to
continue to provide input for us, but is there something that
you have run into already that needs some adjustment or
tweaking in the law?
Dr. McQueary. There is nothing that I have run into already
that I think needs adjusting. In fact, I think I have read the
law as you might guess. Knowing I was going to move into this
job, I wanted to make sure I had a reasonable understanding of
what it was I was getting into, so I have read it several
times. I think it is, from a Science and Technology
standpoint--I wouldn't comment upon the others because I
haven't studied it--I think it is a well-crafted law and that
it gives us the flexibility that we need in order to run an
effective organization. So I don't view that the way it was put
together is an impediment.
The only area that we might come back to you on that I know
about today, is this the initiation of the Homeland Security
Institute. I think that's a good idea, and I am not sure
whether we will want to say that having a sunset clause on that
is something that should be done, but I would put that in the
category of a minor item and not a major item. But that is the
only thing that has surfaced. And it is too premature today to
even say that that should be changed because we are not far
enough into it.
Mr. Thornberry. When will that get up and running do you
think?
Dr. McQueary. We have--for the Homeland Security Institute,
we are preparing a request for a proposal right now, and we
expect to name an FFRDC, federally Funded Research and
Development Center, to have that lead role before the end of
this fiscal, or certainly by November.
Mr. Thornberry. And the concern has been raised with me to,
that if you have a sunset, it may make it hard to recruit top-
rate people into that organization. At least a sunset that is
three years away. It may be hard to get people to leave their
current job and come to the Homeland Security Institute if they
know the institute is only going to be around three years or at
least has to be renewed, and I do think that that's something
that we want to continue to discuss with you.
Dr. McQueary. I think that's an important point, by the
way, that you raise. Someone's given you very good advice on
that.
Mr. Thornberry. I have good people, and I try to listen.
The Chair yields to the gentlelady from California.
Ms. Lofgren. Thank you again.
By the way, I very much agree with the point you just made
on the sunset. I think that we need to examine that. I just
have a couple of final questions.
Section 302 of the Act really puts you in charge of doing
R&D and evaluation and the like, and I assume that your
Priority Number 4 on Page 3 really is the implementation of
that. And as I have listened--and I think this has been a very
helpful hearing. I have been thinking about, how do you
separate out the things that we--are obvious from--and harmful,
like an atomic bomb, a chemical attack, a biological attack,
from what's sort of in the background but if unattended, can
cause very serious problems as well.
And that gets me to the question I was about to ask, and
now, I will ask it a little bit broader. When the initial set
of questions started, and that has to do with biometrics and
how--who is going to do the analysis of--what is the best
biometric? And I assume that the standards would be
reliability, ease of deployment, cost, scalability and probably
some other things I haven't thought of, so that we can deploy
that in a way that makes sense. And the reason why I am
mentioning it is it is similar to the interoperability issue
for local law enforcement. People are making decisions right
now without good scientific data. And by the time we get around
to having you--I realize you have got a million things to do
all at once, but by the time we get to this, we may have a
bigger problem because decisions have been made.
For example, and I am not saying it is the wrong decision
because I don't know, the use of fingerprints in the FBI
heavily influences the use of fingerprints as a biometric
potentially for the Immigration Service. Except 10 percent of
the population can't get their fingerprints taken on the
machines, and there is a reliability issue. Is there, you know,
something that's quicker, that's cheaper, that's more reliable?
I don't know. I mean, various people give me information about
that, but in the area of immigration, right now we have
nothing. You know, the State Department just announced that
they are going to ask for face-to-face interviews with
pictures. I guess that's kind of a biometric. But, you know, if
we are worried about attacks, we also need to worry about who
is going to be implementing those attacks, and we are mindful
that the 19 hijackers did come into the United States to do
that damage.
So I am eager for your office to pay attention to the
deficits, the technology deficits, in other parts of the
Department of Homeland Security, and specifically the area of
immigration, and I serve on the Immigration Subcommittee and
Judiciary and have for quite some time. And prior to that, I
used to teach immigration law and practice immigration law. And
it is a mess. It has been a mess for decades. It is still a
mess. I worked with the last, you know, confirmed real
commissioner, who tried in vain to get a CIO, which he couldn't
really get because it is civil service and any--they are
nowhere.
And I think if we--one of the unique opportunities you have
is to step in and set some standards, do some standard setting.
We were told by Secretary Ridge yesterday that there are
multiple watch lists that have not been integrated, and if they
have not been integrated, they are also not fully shared with
those who are making decisions about who should come in and who
should not come in.
We know that there are over a 113 different databases in
the Immigration Service, and they can't communicate with each
other. They are still creating paper files and microfiche.
Obviously, you can't do a data search if it is on microfiche.
And so, I am hopeful that you will not wait to be asked by
diverse elements of the Department, but to take it upon
yourself, not to implement because that is not your job, but to
provide the standard setting that will allow others to
implement in a way that actually works to defend our country,
because I think it is very serious that we make the right
decisions.
You know, recently, I learned of a situation where we
invited Russian scientists to come to the United States to be
briefed on how to secure plutonium in Russia, a very important
thing for our country. And the scientists were unable to
actually come in to get the training that we asked them to take
because the visa didn't get processed in time. So, I mean, it
is ludicrous, but unfortunately it is routine. So the question
is, I mean it is a long and rambling question, but this is a
very serious problem. I know that it is not being attended to
now. How would you proceed and how could we support you in
proceeding to set standards and to assist in the technology
deficits of this element of the Department?
Dr. McQueary. Well, first, I believe that the U.S. Visa
System will be a--is a very positive step moving in the
direction where you are. And I believe Under Secretary
Hutchinson--I saw in some recent testimony it said that he
believed that a combination of pictures and fingerprints was
probably the most likely combination of biometrics to be used.
I share that view, considering where we are today. Iris scan is
another one that is very important. However, if we look at what
we are trying to accomplish, we are trying to determine whether
there are people who would do us harm. And we have a much
larger fingerprint database, obviously than we do of iris
scans. And so--but that would not say that we should neglect
that. I think that we should be constantly looking at other
opportunities.
I just read an interesting article yesterday, where DARPA
had funded some work on looking at the way people walk as being
a possible way of determining who they are. And apparently a
college in, I believe it is in Georgia, maybe University of
Georgia, had been able to run some tests on a hundred different
people--and a hundred is not five billion, but it is a hundred
different people in which they were getting about an 80 to 95
percent success rate in being able to identify people.
So I think we have to continually be looking for new ways
of improving the quality of determination of who it is that's
coming across our border, because we must know the answer to
that, and we must know who leaves. That is essential to be done
in this Homeland Security protection that we have.
Ms. Lofgren. If I could follow up. I mean, part of the
issue--you're right. We have some data on fingerprints and
maybe that's in the end, what we will end up with. But the
question we have is not just what we have a record on, because
most of the people we have in fingerprints are not looking for
visas, they are Americans or they are permanently here, but
what is scalable that will connect an individual with an
identity, even if it is a false identity, but that will nail
that person as a single unit, and we are not doing that today.
And the reliability issue, I think is very important. And I
would love to see some analysis and I don't have, I mean I have
got some guesses, but I don't have a conclusion on what that
ought to be, and I would hope that we wouldn't just assume, I
mean photographs are easily doctored. And I think that we
should look to something that is reliable. And I would look to
the scientific community, and you, to try and give us some
guidance on that.
And second, and I know we are running out of time, and you
have been very indulgent with your time. Is there an
opportunity to provide some hardware and software expertise to
the immigration function? For example, I just learned, frankly
by reading the newspapers, that we are going to try and use the
SEVIS system for the new visa program. Well, the SEVIS system
is crashing every day already. It doesn't work, and you know,
if it did work I would be fine, but it doesn't work. And so I--
obviously, we need some additional expertise in this area to be
successful. Do you have the capacity to do that?
Dr. McQueary. I don't have the capacity today, but that's
not to say that we could not muster the resources, because we
are not going to be an organization that has all of its
indigenous capacity within our organization. We expect to call
upon skilled people in private industry, universities and the
like. So we certainly have the capacity to be able to lead such
an effort, and, in fact, I mentioned earlier, we have the
Systems Engineering Lead working on the US Visa System to help
determine what the characteristics of that system should be. So
that when the system goes out for a bid, they will be in a
stronger position to be able to know what to ask for, and we
are participating in that today.
Ms. Lofgren. Could I ask you, later, to send to the
committee kind of where--the steps you have taken so far, on
that specific area?
Dr. McQueary. Sure.
Ms. Lofgren. And then, any additional thoughts you might
have that could be done, and how we might be supportive in that
area?
Dr. McQueary. Be happy to.
Ms. Lofgren. I would thank the Chairman for his time, and I
don't know if Mr. Turner has additional questions.
Mr. Thornberry. I thank the gentlelady. Gentleman from
Texas.
Mr. Turner. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Dr. McQueary, I know the hour is getting late here, and
I'll try to be brief.
Under Section 861 of the Homeland Security Act, a section
called the SAFETY Act, there is a provision that allows
contractors with the Department to be granted liability
protection so that they will have the incentive to sell certain
items to the government which they might not otherwise sell
because of the business risk entailed in providing terrorism-
related equipment, services, and products. It's the
Department's responsibility to implement the regulations to
carry that provision out. I have heard from many private
contractors, in the defense contracting field that want to do
business with the Department, saying that these regulations
have not been issued. They are somewhat concerned about that
process.
Could you tell me what the status of that undertaking is to
get the SAFETY Act regulations issued so that we can know that
when we need to procure something it will be available?
Dr. McQueary. I cannot tell you precisely where it is. I
can give you a general description, but I can certainly find
out in detail and report back to you.
Our intent was to have a private industry have an
opportunity to comment upon the regulations to see whether they
make sense. Now, the likelihood of getting unanimity of view is
not high, but certainly having the input would be very valuable
to us. We have internal discussions, in fact, there is--one of
our documents that establishes delegation of authority is under
review right now, and if it goes through as it has been put
together, the authority for deciding who will be given the
approval for whatever the act turns out to be, that will likely
be assigned to me. And it appears--unless the Secretary decides
he wants to do it a different way.
So my input would be, the industry needs to feel free that
it should openly provide to us, on what their views are on
that. I had someone call me just within the last week on that
subject. Turns out it was someone that I knew, wanting to know,
saying we are very worried--a major company--we are very
worried about this. I said, why don't you send us a letter and
tell us what you think about it because we would like to have
input? So we don't have--and so that would be beneficial to us.
Mr. Turner. I might mention to you, as you begin to try to
deal with this, that the delegation of whose responsibility
this is really hasn't even been made yet. Is it premature to
ask who is creating the regulations?
Dr. McQueary. Right.
Mr. Turner. This was an issue of some controversy when the
bill was passed. I will tell you, up front, that I was on the
other side of the prevailing side because I advocated a
position that the private sector and the defense contractors
advocated, which was that the Department should be granted the
authority given to the Department of Defense under current law,
which allows them to grant indemnity on a negotiated basis,
product by product, to the provider. Most of your contractors
will tell you that this has worked well in the Department of
Defense. But what happened is that point of view that I
advocated was defeated when I offered the amendment by one vote
on the floor of the House, in favor of the language that is in
the bill. You are now required to plow new ground, and to
basically certify that a product is safe. Once you have done
so, then the provider is home-free with regard to any
liability. I thought that was probably an ill-chosen path to
try to send the Department down, but if you come to the point
where you find that too burdensome, I would urge you to take a
look at what the Department of Defense has done for the last 25
years and see if that might not work more smoothly to
accomplish this goal. If so, we might find the extra vote we
needed on the floor of the House to get it back to the way DOD
has handled it.
Dr. McQueary. Yes, sir.
Mr. Thornberry. Dr. McQueary, I do appreciate your patience
as well. I want to get your impressions in a couple of areas,
and then there will be, I am sure, other questions we want to
submit in writing.
Obviously, the Homeland Security Department was bringing
together 22 different agencies into one entity. My
understanding is that there were about 15 different programs
that were either created or transferred into your jurisdiction.
Generally, how has that management challenge gone during--do
you feel? Are we getting them together to work as one unit? It
is a very difficult thing, and, obviously, you have had only a
limited time to work on it, but what's your general impression
about how well that's gone?
Dr. McQueary. My view is, it has been relatively seamless
in making the transition. The programs--we are continuing the
programs that were being done in DOD. They were good programs,
and what we have done is take the programs based upon their
character and assign them to our portfolio manager. So we have
a lead person reporting into the program plans and budget
organization. And that portfolio manager assumed responsibility
to continue the work that was going on. And so it seems to have
gone quite well from my perspective. In fact, I have had--no
difficulties have been brought to my attention about that
transition.
Mr. Thornberry. Good. One other area. It came up today
during a long series of questions from Mr. Weldon.
This concern or interest in being able to transfer
technology that may be in the Homeland Security Department, may
be in the Department of Defense, may be somewhere else into
first responders or somebody else who needs it. Is that
something that your directorate will be considering?
Identifying technologies that may be somewhere in the
government and seeing how and whether it may be appropriate to
transfer those to first responders, among others?
Dr. McQueary. Yes, sir. In fact, I have met with Assistant
Secretary Paul McHale twice already. He and I have agreed upon
a working relationship, from the Department of Defense
standpoint, working, having the Homeland Defense Organization.
And basically, that organization will be one in which he and I
will formally get together on a quarterly basis, and then we
will encourage open dialogue between Science and Technology and
the Department of Homeland Security and the resources he has in
the Department of Defense. So that's a start.
I have also met with Admiral Jay Cohen and the Office of
Naval Research to establish, I mean a couple of things. He has
provided his people and also been very open about anything they
have got that we can bring to bear. And so I put this in the
category, when I mentioned earlier, we must understand what's
available before we launch into large development programs to
do something that could be duplicative. And I think it is
fundamental to our responsibility that we do that and do it not
only well, but quickly.
Mr. Thornberry. Yes. I think that's very encouraging. And
then you can, once you have identified if it is appropriate to
get it into the hands of firemen or police or whatever, then
you are able to do that. So I do think that's encouraging.
I appreciate very much your time today, as well as the
efforts that you make. I hope you get a sense that you have a
number of members on this subcommittee, but also the full
committee who are very hungry to be active partners with you
and the Department to help this Department of Homeland Security
succeed in making us safer. And we look forward to continuing
to work with you toward that goal.
Without objection, the record will remain open for 10 days
for additional questions, and we will work with your folks on
written responses to those questions.
If there is no further business before the subcommittee, we
stand adjourned.
[Whereupon, at 4:22 p.m., the subcommittee was adjourned.]
Materials submitted for the Record
Reponses to Questions for the Record from Under Secretary Charles E.
McQueary for the Subcommittee on Cybersecurity, Science, and Research
and Development for a hearing held on May 21, 2003 titled ``Homeland
Security Science and Technology: Preparing for the Future''
1. Priority-Setting
a. How were priorities established for each of the seven R&D portfolios
described in Department budget documents? What were the major factors
that were considered, and how did you arrive at specific funding levels
for each portfolio?
Answer S&T 1.a. The priorities within each of the portfolios are
the initial responsibility of the portfolio manager, with review and
concurrence of those priorities by the Assistant Secretary, Plans,
Programs and Budgets, with the ultimate responsibility for these
priorities being mine.
Factors that were considered include national assessments of
terrorist threats, the national strategy for homeland security, and the
state of our ability to detect and deter those threats. Specific
funding levels for each portfolio were identified in accordance with
our current assessment of the efforts needed to meet our mission and
objectives. We will continue to assess both the state of our science
and technology and its ability to meet the objectives, and the effort
needed to develop and/or demonstrate that technology.
b. Do you anticipate any changes in the near-term in those priorities
or in the methods used to set them?
Answer S&T 1.b. We do not anticipate any changes in the near-term
for the current priorities of our portfolios nor the methods used to
set those priorities. However, we are continuously evaluating the
factors used to set our priorities and we will adjust our priorities as
necessary to be consistent with those factors.
c. In setting priorities, how does the Directorate use vulnerability,
threat, and risk assessments? What methodologies are used in making
such assessments and translating them into priorities? What are the
potential pitfalls with the approach(es) used and how do you avoid
them?
Answer S&T 1.c. We use existing information on threats and
vulnerabilities to identify high consequence potential threats. Our
work focuses on detecting, deterring, and if necessary, mitigating the
impact of a successful attack for these high consequence threats
because of the potential they have to cause major loss of life, result
in severe economic damage, significantly disrupt our critical
infrastructure, or damage national symbols. Our Threat and
Vulnerability, Testing and Analysis (TVTA) Portfolio will be the
principal provider of these net assessments, working closely with the
Department of Homeland Security's (DHS's) Information Analysis and
Infrastructure Protection (IAIP) Directorate. These net assessments are
then used to help set our priorities. Potential pitfalls to any
assessment of threats, vulnerabilities and our current ability to
thwart these threats are recognized and include uncertainties in the
state of knowledge of the threats and vulnerabilities and a constantly
evolving technology base which aids our efforts to counter these
threats but may also provide new capabilities to our enemies. Constant
and ongoing assessments with independent evaluations offer the best
defense against surprise.
d. To develop new countermeasures, the Directorate will need to
identify and employ the right mix of activities throughout the R&D
pipeline, ranging from long-term, basic research all the way through
deployment. For each stage, how will you decide what is the right level
of investment in each of these activities, including projects with
large potential benefits but high risk of failure?
Answer S&T 1.d. DHS does not break down its Research, Development, Test
and Evaluation (RDT&E) efforts into 6.1-6.4 categories like the
Department of Defense (DoD). It is safe to say, however, that our
initial focus will not be in basic research (6.1), but rather 6.2-6.3
(to use DoD categories). Below is a table that indicates the percentage
of fiscal year 2003, fiscal year 2004 and fiscal year 2005 funds that
go to basic research, applied research, and development.
Science and Technology Directorate R&D Investments (in millions of $)
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Fiscal Year Fiscal Year Fiscal Year
Fiscal Year 2003(actual) 2004(estimated) 2005(proposed)
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Basic................................ 47 117 80
Applied.............................. 59 56 229
Developmental........................ 398 608 643
Total................................ 504 781 952
percent basic........................ 9.3 percent 15.0 percent 8.4 percent
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Some of the cyber forensics efforts will be basic in nature, as
will our efforts in the social sciences (such as behavioral or
autonomic indicators of hostile intent, or efforts to develop an
understanding of people's reactions to threat warnings.)
In addition, longer-term research efforts are a specific
responsibility of the Homeland Security Advanced Research Projects
Agency (HSARPA) within the Science and Technology (S&T) Directorate, by
their investing in higher risk, higher payoff technology development.
Our Emerging Threats Portfolio is designed to foster long-term
innovative and creative exploratory RDT&E programs to anticipate and
counter new and emerging threats. Both programs will be structured to
encourage individuals or teams of researchers to pursue high-risk/high-
payoff mission-related projects. In addition, the national laboratories
will be expected to leverage and apply the expertise gained from basic
science programs supported by the DOE/Office of Science, National
Science Foundation, and other government agencies towards the homeland
security mission.
To determine the correct mix of basic and applied research, our
portfolio managers coordinate with operational end-users and use their
expert judgment to define needs and requirements for their research
areas.
e. How do you make sure that needed technologies make it all the way
through this pipeline--for example, how do you avoid the so-called
``death valley'' problem, where promising research results are not
picked up by industry because of market uncertainties, and at the same
time avoid interfering in the marketplace?
Answer S&T 1.e. Capturing the entire range of research and transition
activities in one organization helps to ensure the coordination
necessary for successful transition to end-users. Constant dialogue
with the operational end users, use of proactive solicitation of ideas
and products from the private sector through the interagency Technical
Support Working Group (TSWG) and Broad Agency Announcements (BAAs) also
help us focus our efforts and keep us informed of the current state of
technology. The Technology Clearing House will also provide a mechanism
for private industry to become aware of available technologies. We will
use the Systems Engineering and Development organization within our S&T
Directorate to manage this transition process. We also will use
independent and objective reviews of our programs to ensure we are
meeting the overall mission requirements. Moreover, we have a process
through the National Science and Technology Council's Infrastructure
Subcommittee to work with the privately owned parts of the critical
infrastructure sectors to identify their prioritized requirements. With
this process, we are likely to avoid the ``death valley'' problem as it
is industry itself that has identified the need. Through Department of
the Treasury lead, the financial sector provided their prioritized R&D
agenda in late 2003.
f. Guidelines for merit review of R&D programs--Consistent with the
Homeland Security Act's requirement for the Secretary to develop and
oversee guidelines for merit review of R&D projects and disseminate
research conducted by the Department:
Which office within the S&T Directorate is responsible
for developing these guidelines?
When will they be completed? If they have been
completed, please provide a copy to the Committee.
Answer S&T 1.f. The development and implementation of guidelines for
merit review of research and development (R&D) projects has been
assigned to the respective components of the S&T Directorate having
responsibility for the selection and execution of our R&D projects.
This approach was taken because of the differing nature of the R&D
projects; some are more fundamental, some are applied and some are
technology development. The Office of Research and Development, HSARPA
and the Rapid Prototyping Portfolio are developing and implementing
merit review guidelines appropriate to their respective
responsibilities.
The Rapid Prototyping Portfolio is using the Technical Support
Working Group (TSWG) to help assess the proposals received through that
mechanism.
Each of our HSARPA solicitations goes through a rigorous merit
review process, using external as well as internal reviewers. HSARPA
prefers technical review to peer review. The white papers, proposals
and other submissions we ask for require multi-dimensional technology
reviews that involve expertise from related fields in science,
technology, and engineering. HSARPA Program Managers assemble groups of
qualified colleagues to act as reviewers. In the unusual event that
they do not have access to a particular expertise, our procedures also
allow the engagement of any individual expert from outside the
government for this specific purpose. All reviewers are required to
sign detailed non-disclosure agreements. In evaluating the proprietary
information that private entities entrust to us, we prefer to use the
government Program Manager as the lead reviewer on the assembled team,
the government Deputy Director as the Source Selection Authority, and
the appointed Director exercising total visibility and oversight.
HSARPA routinely offers submitters the option of having their proposals
reviewed by government-only teams, further ensuring that their valuable
proprietary data is not exposed.
The Office of Research and Development (ORD) uses a combination
internal-external review process for DOE National Laboratory proposals.
Portfolio Managers help to recruit PhD scientists to act as reviewers
from both federal agencies and the academic community. These panels
conduct a technical review of the proposals. The proposals that are
most highly-reviewed are then put through an S&T internal relevance
review. Appended to this document (appendix A) are guidelines from ORD
on their peer review process.
2. Current Organization of the Directorate
a. For each major organizational unit within the Directorate, please
provide its name, the name of the individuals responsible for each
unit, and a current telephone number for each such individual.
Answer S&T 2.a. A current organizational chart is appended to this
document (Appendix B). The relevant phone numbers are listed in the
Office Directory that is contained in Appendix C.
b. Please provide the most current contact information for the S&T
Directorate, as well as the appropriate contact information for vendors
to use if they wish to bring a product or proposal to the attention of
the Department.
Answer S&T 2.b. The most current contact information is contained in
Appendix C. We are in the process of creating procedures by which all
vendors who wish to bring a product or proposal to the attention of the
Department can do so fairly. Currently, HSARPA is evaluating proposals
and ideas from vendors who complete the Federal Acquisition Regulations
listed at http://www.arnet.gov/far/loadmainre.html, Section 15.605
(Unsolicited Proposals). As our procedures change, we will keep
Congress informed.
c. Homeland Security Advanced Research Projects Agency (HSARPA)
Has HSARPA been established? If not, when does the
Department expect to establish it?
What initial research topics will it focus on?
How will HSARPA be structured and what criteria are
you using to determine that?
Please describe the process by which HSARPA
establishes research priorities, and the means by which
intelligence information is, or will be, communicated to HSARPA
to inform its research priorities.
Answer S&T 2.c. HSARPA was established in March of 2003 when the
Department was stood up.
HSARPA's initial research interests will focus on the area of novel
and improved chemical and biological sensors. Future solicitations will
support research and development in the technical areas of Radiological
and Nuclear Countermeasures, Explosives Detection, Critical
Infrastructure Protection, Standards, Maritime Surveillance and
Security, Borders and Transportation Security, Threat Vulnerability and
Threat Assessment, and Emergency Preparedness and Response.
HSARPA is a mission-oriented R&D funding organization within the
S&T Directorate. To determine the structure, S&T leadership looked at
other government funding organizations, examining their strengths and
weaknesses and the similarity or difference in their missions compared
to HSARPA. For mission-oriented research, having a technical program
manager (PM) empowered to accomplish specific objectives is a key
element for success. HSARPA is thus organizing around PMs as the
operational level, grouped into technical offices with an experienced
senior technical manager as the Office Director. The Office Directors
then report to the HSARPA Director and Deputy Director. In designing
its internal processes, HSARPA is focusing on streamlining the
paperwork and layers of oversight, while maintaining sufficient
management and fiscal control. In start-up mode, program managers have
not been grouped into Offices. This is to develop a cross-program and
cross-technical area collaborative culture that might be stymied by a
rigid office structure in the beginning. Within six months, technical
offices will be established.
HSARPA has three missions established in law: to promote
revolutionary changes in technologies related to homeland security; to
advance development, testing and evaluation and deployment of those
technologies; and to accelerate prototyping and development of
technologies that redress homeland security vulnerabilities.
To establish research priorities for revolutionary technologies,
available technical opportunities are assessed in light of the outcomes
that can be expected from the investment dollars available. Priorities
are established to achieve the best expected research results from the
total research investment.
For the remainder of the HSARPA research program, priorities are
established by the Portfolio Managers (located in the Plans, Programs
and Budget section of S&T) and followed carefully. Portfolio Managers
assess DHS customer needs, use available intelligence reports and
products, analyze threats and vulnerabilities, identify potential
opportunities, and prioritize their operational needs. HSARPA Program
Managers collaborate closely with them to design and to execute
programs to satisfy these operational needs.
In establishing HSARPA, serious attention is being paid to hiring
and obtaining qualified technical personnel with required security
clearances, specification of facilities for proper handling of
classified information, and providing electronic links and
communications arrangements with intelligence counterparts in other
agencies. Being able to handle and secure classified intelligence
obtained from those sources is crucial to being able to work at the
forefront of technologies related to Homeland Security.
d. Technical Support Working Group (TSWG)
What is the relationship between the S&T Directorate and the
State Department-led TSWG?
What activities has the TSWG been involved in to date on
behalf of the Department?
You have indicated that the Directorate will develop the
technology clearinghouse in collaboration with the TSWG. Please
describe how that collaboration will work.
Which clearinghouse activities will be handled by TSWG and
which by the Directorate?
Does the Department intend to create its own TSWG, or will it
continue to have to rely on an entity not formally a part of the
Department?
Some observers have expressed concern that TSWG's approach
results in recommendations that are too conservative. Please address
that concern. In particular, how will you ensure that break-through
technologies are adopted when appropriate?
Answer S&T 2.d. The Technical Support Working Group (TSWG) is an
interagency national forum that identifies, prioritizes, and
coordinates interagency and international research and development
(R&D) requirements for combating terrorism. The Department of State
exercises oversight.
On June 4, 2003, DHS issued a $33M procurement request to TSWG to
``solicit commercial-off-the-shelf technologies for use by federal,
state, and local entities, providing the technical clearing house
function. . ., and to upgrade its infrastructure to perform this
function.
The TSWG rapidly develops technologies and equipment to meet the
high-priority needs of the combating terrorism community.
On May 14, 2003 TSWG and DHS issued a joint Broad Agency
Announcement seeking technology for fifty top priority requirements.
TSWG received 3,344 responses to this call. From these responses, TSWG
requested 223 proposers to submit White Papers. Based on the evaluation
of these White Papers, TSWG requested and received 47 full proposals.
TSWG has completed these evaluations and is now in the contracts
negotiation process. TSWG has also supported DHS S&T by providing
technical evaluation of unsolicited proposals. DHS has provided an
additional $30M in fiscal year 2004 to fund the most meritorious of
these submissions.
DHS has not made final decisions on how to implement the
clearinghouse functions. Until firm decisions can be made, and staff
gathered to support them, the clearinghouse function required in
Section 313 is being satisfied in two ways; funding of Public Safety
and Security Institute for Technology (PSITEC) ($10M in fiscal year
2004) to perform the clearinghouse function and the DHS working
relationship with the Technology Support Working Group. PSITEC develops
knowledge-based services that provide access to, and distribution of,
information and services relevant to public safety technologies. PSITEC
will serve as the clearinghouse--a single point of entry--for the
public safety and first responder community, providing access to
relevant information on technologies and products, test and evaluation,
as well as engaging in projects of interest and importance to them.
HSARPA has a single focus and a single funding source for its
research. Its staff is experienced; its research goals are stressing.
The planned research will press the state of the art and about $13M of
the fiscal year 2004 HSARPA budget is targeted specifically to nurture
break-through research on the most difficult homeland security
problems. Although true break-through technologies are rare, HSARPA's
organization, plans, budgets and assigned functions ensure that if one
emerges, it will be developed and moved quickly to field use.
e. Homeland Security Institute (HSI)
Has the HSI been established?
If so, how many people are employed there?
Who is leading the Institute?
What is its budget for the current fiscal year?
What tasks and responsibilities has the Secretary assigned to
the Institute?
What products or results has the Institute reported?
If it has not been established, when does the Department
expect to establish it?
Answer S&T 2.e. The Homeland Security Institute will be established in
fiscal year 2004. In early December 2003 the Science and Technology
Directorate released a Request for Proposals to establish the Institute
as as a federally funded research and development center (FFRDC) to
provide analytic support for the Department. Proposals were due January
28, 2004, with award projected on May 1, 2004. The budget is expected
to be $128M over 5 years ($8.5M in fiscal year 2004, approximately $30M
per year fiscal year 2005-fiscal year 2008). The Homeland Security
Institute will provide a wide range research, studies, analyses,
analytic and computational models, simulations, and other technical and
analytical support useful for policy and program planning, and
management by the Department. Core competency areas include: systems
evaluations, technology assessments, operational assessments, resource
and support analyses, analyses supporting the SAFETY Act, and field
operations analyses.
f. Establishment/Contract with a Federally Funded Research &
Development Center (FFRDC)
What steps has the S&T Directorate taken, to date, to
contract with or establish an FFRDC?
If no selections have been made, please describe the
process and selection criteria that the Department will use to
make any selections.
Answer S&T 2.f. addition to information provided in response 2.e.
selection criteria identified in the Request for Proposals included
Management and Technical Approach, Past Performance and Past
Experience, Subcontracting, and Cost and Financial Capability.
g. University-Based Centers for Homeland Security
How many university-based centers does the S&T
Directorate expect to establish?
What criteria will the Directorate use in establishing
such Centers?
What types of research work does the Directorate
intend to assign to such Centers?
Answer S&T 2.g. On November 25, 2003, the Department announced
selection of the University of Southern California as the first
Homeland Security Center, for Risk and Economic Analysis of Terrorism
Events. The Center will develop modeling capabilities that cut across
general threats against critical infrastructure targets, such as
electrical power, transportation and telecommunications. The Center
will also develop tools for emergency response planning. Center staff
recently met with S&T officials and portfolio managers to begin
detailed dialogue on a work plan to guide the Center's research. The
Center has assembled a team of experts across the country, to include
partnerships with the University of California at Berkeley; the
University of Wisconsin-Madison's Center for Human Performance and
Analysis; Structured Decision Corporation; and New York University's
Institute for Civil Infrastructure Systems.
Our objective is to create additional Centers, each focusing on a
different area important to homeland security, including social
sciences, psychology, and life sciences as well as engineering and
physical sciences. These Centers will be mission-focused and targeted
to research areas that leverage the multidisciplinary capabilities of
universities. We are pleased to have the support of the National
Academies of Science, which has agreed to convene two workshops to
solicit university community and scientific expertise input on a
forward-leaning agenda for the Centers of Excellence program. The NAS
held the first workshop on the research agenda last month (January
2004) and will hold its second workshop on the education agenda in
April 2004.
Our intent is to manage solicitation processes and announce awards
for two additional Centers of Excellence this year. On December 12,
2003, DHS released a Broad Agency Announcement (BAA) in the area of
agricultural biosecurity. Through this BAA, we will fund two Centers of
Excellence, one dedicated to education and research of foreign animal
and high-consequence zoonotic diseases; and a second Center dedicated
to post-harvest food security.
h. Headquarters Laboratory Section 309 of the Homeland Security Act
gives the Secretary authority to contract with or enter into joint
sponsorship agreements with a DOE laboratory.
Has the Secretary established a headquarters laboratory, in
accordance with section 308 of the Homeland Security Act?
If so, where is it, who is running it, how many people are
working there, what is the funding for the current fiscal year, and
what functions does it perform?
If it has not been established, will the Department do so? If
so, when?
Answer S&T 2.h. No, the Department of Homeland Security has not
established a headquarters laboratory. The S&T Directorate is accessing
the capability base of the national laboratories in accordance with DHS
mission requirements for the intramural and extramural programs. The
DOE national laboratories, sites, and technology centers have a
tremendous breadth of technical expertise and capability in areas
related to homeland security. The DHS/S&T is committed to maximizing
the opportunities for all of the DOE assets to play a role in
supporting the missions of the Department.
i. Federal Clearinghouse
Has the Secretary established a federal clearinghouse for
dissemination of homeland security technology information? If not, when
will it be established?
Where is it?
Who is running it?
What is its telephone number?
What is its budget for this fiscal year?
Answer S&T 2.i. DHS has responsibility for the clearinghouse function.
However, it has not been ``established'' as a separate entity within
the S&T Directorate to date. Currently, the clearinghouse functions
required in Section 313 of the establishing legislation are being
satisfied in two primary ways.
First, on June 4, 2003, DHS established a working relationship with
the Technology Support Working Group by providing funding ($33M in
fiscal year 2003 and $30M in fiscal year 2004) to ``solicit commercial-
off-the-shelf technologies for use by federal, state, and local
entities, providing the technical clearing house function. . ., and to
upgrade its infrastructure to perform this extra work.
Second, in fiscal year 2004, DHS will fund the Public Safety and
Security Institute for Technology (PSITEC) ($10M in fiscal year 2004)
to perform the clearinghouse function.
PSITEC develops knowledge-based services that provide access to,
and distribution of, information and services relevant to public safety
technologies. PSITEC will serve as the clearinghouse--a single point of
entry--for the public safety and first responder community, providing
access to relevant information on technologies and products, test and
evaluation, as well as engaging in projects of interest and importance
to them.
For the longer term, DHS is considering a range of possible
solutions for carrying out the ``centralized Federal clearinghouse''
function. Some appear more cost effective than establishment of a
separate, stand-alone clearinghouse. Until decisions can be made based
on experience, these two methods together with other activities such as
information provided on the public website, issuing Federal Funding
Opportunities for technologies and research (with explicit information
on research topics and submission procedures), and writing standards to
evaluate technologies, constitute the clearinghouse function.
The clearinghouse function as described above resides in the S&T
Directorate of DHS. Pending the establishment of a single centralized
Federal clearinghouse, the Points of Contact information listed on the
public webpage (as described above) should be used.
The clearing house function has no separable budget. DHS has
provided a total of $63M to TSWG, a small portion of which covers
clearinghouse functions. In fiscal year 2004, $10M will be used to
support PSITECH and its functions.
3. Standards
a. Your statement to the Subcommittee describes development and
implementation of standards as a key area of emphasis for the
Directorate, and you have recently signed a Memorandum of Understanding
(MOU) with the National Institute of Standards and Technology to
facilitate that.
Please provide the Subcommittee with a copy of the
signed MOU.
What are the responsibilities of the Science and
Technology Directorate for homeland security standards, and
what responsibilities lie elsewhere within the Department and
other federal agencies?
Answer S&T 3.a. The MOU with the National Institute of Standards
and Technology is included as Appendix D.
Standards are an integral component of the mission of the S&T
Directorate because they provide the objective measures of homeland
security systems effectiveness. Standards are a fundamental component
of the cradle to grave research, development, test, evaluation and
transition to service product cycle. Thus, standards for homeland
security applications must be constructed in parallel with the
defensive systems to establish minimum criteria for effectiveness that
encompass: basic functionality, adequacy for the task,
interoperability, efficiency, and sustainability. Standards development
requires a detailed knowledge of the technical attributes and
capabilities of the system and a comprehensive understanding of the
user requirements and operating conditions. A tight coupling must be
maintained between the operational users, standards, and all the
technologies that comprise the system at each step in the research,
development, test and evaluation process.
During the transition phase of the Department, the need for
standards to address design, procurement, deployment, and use of the
radiological and biological detectors was determined to be a key need.
In collaboration with the National Institute of Standards and
Technology (NIST), the American National Standards Institute (ANSI) and
the Institute of Electrical and Electronic Engineers (IEEE), the DHS
S&T transition team began development of standards for four high-
priority classes of radiation detection equipment. The four classes are
personal dosimeters (``pagers''), alarming hand-held detectors, hand-
held isotope identifiers, and radiation portals. These standards have
been released in draft form and will soon go to ballot, in accordance
with ANSI process requirements for national consensus standards. A
contract to develop a standard test method for hand-held bulk anthrax
immunoassay kits has been negotiated with the private sector group AOAC
International. A Task Force set up under this contract has developed a
plan of work to validate these test kits at Dugway Proving Grounds,
Utah.
Work is also progressing in the areas of training standards and
personnel certification. Additional standards needs for both detection
and response are being identified as part of a systematic evaluation of
capabilities versus needs for standards to support the homeland
security mission related equipment, operators, models and analyses,
data and information, and integrated systems.
In addition, the S&T Directorate has been working with the Oklahoma
City Memorial Institute for Preventing Terrorism (MIPT) to deploy a
web-based tool that will communicate directly with user communities.
The user community has had a broad representation in the development of
the tool. ``Project Responder,'' with direct input from DHS, is
evolving into a tool that can catalog technologies, provide links to
manufacturer data, and indicate which standards apply and also the
degree of compliance with DHS standards. It will also show links to
appropriate training and with potential grant programs.
In all of these standards projects, the S&T Directorate coordinates
with the customers in the operational directorates and with experts in
other federal agencies including DOE, DOD, HHS, EPA, FDA, USDA and
others.
b. Are your efforts focused only on technical standards for equipment,
or do they include other things such as preparedness and cyber security
standards?
Answer S&T 3.b. S&T Standards are not limited to technical standards.
They will also include standards for Information Technology (IT)
products and services that are needed by the operational directorates.
These include cyber security standards, as well as standards for
biometric identification technologies, ``smart cards'', and
radiofrequency ID cards (RFID) for baggage identification. The
standards process also involves developing tools for accreditation of
laboratories for Test and Evaluation (T&E) for technical products and
services as well as IT products and services.
c. How are you engaging the private sector, including standards-setting
organizations, in these efforts?
Answer S&T 3.c. A number of Standards Development Organizations (SDOs)
have stepped forward to offer their help to the S&T Directorate in
development of consensus standards for Homeland Security. The American
National Standards Institute (ANSI) has volunteered to coordinate the
activities of about 280 SDOs that are members of ANSI as well as other
SDOs to be identified in development of standards under the auspices of
the Homeland Security Standards Panel. Other SDOs are establishing
their own Homeland Security committees and engaging DHS directly in
their planning processes. Four of the many important private sector
groups are: the National Fire Protection Association (NFPA), American
Society for Testing and Materials (ASTM), the Institute for Electrical
and Electronics Engineers (IEEE), and The Infrastructure Security
Partnership (TISP). Each of these groups draws heavily from private
sector volunteers in establishing committees and standards writing
groups.
d. The American National Standards Institute (ANSI) recently announced
a charter for its Homeland Security Standards Panel. It cited ten
priority standards needs identified by DHS. Is that list an accurate
description of the Directorate's priorities in this area?
Answer S&T 3.d. The ANSI Homeland Security Standards Panel (HSSP) has
held a number of meetings of an Interim Steering Committee with DHS S&T
staff and one full meeting of the HSSP on June 9 and 10, 2003. The ten
areas identified on the HSSP web site (posted in May 2003) are those
where it was judged that the HSSP could provide useful coordination in
the early stages of establishing writing groups. Progress is being made
in these 10 areas. However, there are other areas, including standards
needed for public health, which were not on the initial list because
ANSI had yet to identify the SDOs who could contribute in the near
term. In such cases, DHS is working directly with other SDOs.
How will the Directorate be working with ANSI in the
development of these and other standards?
Answer S&T 3.d. Bullet 1. Under the charter of the HSSP, ANSI does not
develop standards. Rather they identify a member SDO (IEEE, for
example) to develop a consensus standard for a given technical
application. The SDO then coordinates directly with S&T Directorate in
preparing a scope of work for the new standard. The writing group for
the standard typically includes representatives from DHS, other federal
state and local agencies as well as private sector users and
manufacturers. The HSSP recognizes the need to involve representatives
of emergency responders on these writing groups as appropriate. As a
recent example of this process, the IEEE is preparing a suite of four
standards for radiation detectors for emergency responders under an N42
subcommittee. Writing group members came from the private sector, from
state and local agencies as wells as the DOE national labs, the
National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) and several other
federal agencies. The standards will be published as ANSI standards in
the United States. A similar activity is underway to develop standard
methods for detection of anthrax spores working with the Association of
Analytical Chemists (AOAC International).
Are there any areas where an approach other than voluntary
consensus will be needed? If so, what are they and how will you
proceed?
Answer S&T 3.d. Bullet 2. Under the National Technology Transfer Act,
DHS will use consensus standards to the full extent possible.
Exceptions to the use of voluntary consensus standards will arise in
development of Test and Evaluation (T&E) protocols for detectors used
for CBRNE agents (chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear and
explosives). The writing groups preparing these protocols will require
access to sensitive information that cannot be shared with the usual
volunteer committee. The S&T Directorate is supporting working groups
now at the federal and national labs and appropriate levels of
clearance are required to participate in these efforts. Standards for
other protective measures may also contain sensitive information and
participation on the writing groups will be limited as required by
security considerations.
Will any of these standards require the participation of
international organizations, such as the International Standards
Organization (ISO), the International Electrotechnical Commission
(IEC), and the International Telecommunications Union Standardization
Department (ITU)? If so, how will you work with them?
Answer S&T 3.d. Bullet 3. The answer is yes: all of these international
standards organizations will be engaged. And, two others should be
mentioned: the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), and the
International Committee on Information Technology Standards (INCITS).
One of the near term goals of the ANSI HSSP is to plan a workshop on
international standards for homeland security that will allow the
national committees to coordinate with the appropriate international
counterpart. Much of this coordination is already underway with ISO,
IEC, IAEA and INCITS. The US private sector has a very strong
multinational component, and manufacturers want to have common
standards for their products for their US and overseas markets. With
appropriate coordination we expect that many American National
Standards will be adopted internationally by one of the umbrella
organizations.
4. Funding for the S&T Directorate--The Directorate of Science and
Technology requests $804 million for research and development (R&D)
efforts for next fiscal year, representing a 43 percent increase over
current year levels. However, even after accounting for such an
increase, the Directorate's funding level for its science and
technology programs is only two percent of the overall request for the
Department of Homeland Security for fiscal year 2004. Other government
agencies that engage in research programs, as well as private sector
firms, try to budget upwards of ten percent or more of their total
budget for their R&D work.
a. Is the Directorate's budget request for fiscal year 2004 adequate to
address all of the S&T needs of the Department?
b. What, if any, key shortfalls exist (such as R&D work regarding cyber
security)?
Answer S&T 4.a. The Science and Technology Directorate has reviewed its
authorized fiscal year 2004 funding and its proposed fiscal year 2005
funding and presently believes the current and proposed funding is
adequate. However, we continue to assess our research and development
plans. If we determine that the proposed amount of our funding is not
sufficient to meet requirements, we would bring that information
forward for consideration through the appropriate mechanisms.
Additionally, in order to accurately determine what level of funding is
needed for our research, development, testing and evaluation (RDT&E)
activities, we will continue to work with other agencies with R&D
responsibilities to identify requirements and gaps in funding. This
coordinated approach will assist in making the right investments while
preventing unnecessary and wasteful duplication.
Answer S&T 4.b. The Science and Technology Directorate is currently in
the process of identifying and reviewing all relevant homeland security
documentation to determine the requirements for research and
development. If we identify needs that are not currently being
addressed, we will bring that information forward through the
appropriate mechanisms.
5. Time lines Please provide the subcommittee with time lines for
specific steps the Directorate is taking to implement the following:
a. The Homeland Security Advanced Research Projects Agency
b. University-Based Centers for Homeland Security
c. The Homeland Security Institute
d. The Technology Clearinghouse and the Homeland Security
Science and Technology Advisory Committee
(The time lines should include expected dates of naming and hiring key
personnel, program staffing, solicitations, decisions, awards,
acquisitions and procurement, and other key milestones.)
Answer S&T 5.a. HSARPA was established in March of 2003 when the
Department was stood up.
Answer S&T 5.b. In fiscal year 2004, S&T established the Department of
Homeland Security's first University-based Center of Excellence, for
Risk and Economic Analysis of Terrorism events. The Center, based at
the University of Southern California, will aid in the protection of
our nation's critical infrastructure and provide tools to improve
operational planning for emergency response. A request for proposals
has been issued for the next two Centers of Excellence, which will
focus on Foreign Animal and Zoonotic Disease Defense and Post-Harvest
Food Protection and Defense. These proposals were due on February 9,
2004, and are currently under review.
Answer S&T 5.c. A formal solicitation was issued in December 2003 for
the Homeland Security Institute, a legislative requirement for a
federally funded research and development center to assist the
Secretary and the Department in addressing important homeland security
issues that require scientific, technical, and analytical expertise.
Proposals were received in January 2004. Those proposals are currently
being evaluated with an expected five-year award by early May 2004.
Answer S&T 5.d. Technology Clearinghouse: DHS has responsibility for
the clearinghouse function. However, it has not been ``established'' as
a separate entity within the S&T Directorate to date. Currently, the
clearinghouse functions required in Section 313 of the establishing
legislation are being satisfied in two primary ways.
First, on June 4, 2003, DHS established a working relationship with
the Technology Support Working Group by providing funding ($33M in
fiscal year 2003 and $30M in fiscal year 2004) to ``solicit commercial-
off-the-shelf technologies for use by federal, state, and local
entities, providing the technical clearing house function. . . '', and
to upgrade its infrastructure to perform this extra work.
Second, in fiscal year 2004, DHS will fund the Public Safety and
Security Institute for Technology (PSITEC) ($10M in fiscal year 2004)
to perform the clearinghouse function.
PSITEC develops knowledge-based services that provide access to,
and distribution of, information and services relevant to public safety
technologies. PSITEC will serve as the clearinghouse--a single point of
entry--for the public safety and first responder community, providing
access to relevant information on technologies and products, test and
evaluation, as well as engaging in projects of interest and importance
to them.
For the longer term, DHS is considering a range of possible
solutions for carrying out the ``centralized Federal clearinghouse''
function. Some appear more cost effective than establishment of a
separate, stand-alone clearinghouse. Until decisions can be made based
on experience, these two methods together with other activities such as
information provided on the public website, issuing Federal Funding
Opportunities for technologies and research (with explicit information
on research topics and submission procedures), and writing standards to
evaluate technologies, constitute the clearinghouse function.
The clearinghouse function as described above resides in the S&T
Directorate of DHS.
Pending the establishment of a single centralized Federal
clearinghouse, the Points of Contact information listed on the public
webpage (as described above) should be used.
HS S&T Advisory Committee: S&T has now established the Homeland
Security Science and Technology Advisory Committee, a legislative
requirement for an advisory committee to be a source of independent,
scientific and technical planning advice for the Under Secretary for
Science and Technology. The committee will hold its initial meeting in
February 2004.
6. Outsourcing IT work--Has the Department, and the S&T Directorate
specifically, investigated any national security considerations to the
outsourcing of IT work by American firms to foreign companies and the
potential impact to the security of U.S. critical infrastructure that
is owned and operated by the American firms? If so, what are the
concerns of the Department?
Answer S&T 6. The S&T Directorate has not specifically investigated any
national security concerns related to the outsourcing of IT work by
American firms to foreign companies and the potential impacts to the
security of U.S. critical infrastructure that is owned and operated by
the American firms.
7. First Responder
a. What are the major science and technology issues that the Department
of Homeland Security has identified to support communications needs for
first responders, evacuation centers, emergency command centers, and
other critical rescue operations at the scene of a disaster and at
nearby hospitals, and other components of the emergency response
network? What actions is the Science and Technology Directorate taking
to address these needs?
Answer S&T 7.a. To enhance public safety communications and
interoperability, the Department of Homeland Security's (DHS) Science
and Technology Directorate (S&T), through the efforts of the SAFECOM
Program, is addressing the key public safety communication needs for
technology solutions, technology assistance and outreach, standards,
federal coordination, and policy direction.
b. Describe the goals and objectives of Project SAFECOM and the nature
and extent of the Department's involvement in it. What type of system
architecture does the Department envision will be needed for a first
responder communications system?
Answer S&T 7.b. Several government programs have done a good deal of
work on this issue; unfortunately, much of it has been disconnected,
fragmented, and, at times, at odds with larger goals. In an effort to
coordinate the various Federal initiatives, SAFECOM was established by
the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) and approved by the
President's Management Council (PMC) as a high priority electronic
government (E-gov) initiative. The mission of SAFECOM is to enable
public safety nationwide (across local, tribal, State and Federal
organizations) to improve public safety response through more effective
and efficient interoperable communications. By definition,
communications interoperability refers to the ability of public safety
agencies to talk across disciplines and jurisdictions via radio
communications systems--to exchange voice, data and/or video with one
another on demand, in real time, when needed. To this end, SAFECOM
recognizes that before interoperability can occur, reliable, mission-
critical, agency-specific communications are first necessary for public
safety agencies. SAFECOM subsequently is addressing the intricately
related issues of public safety communications and communications
interoperability.
By leveraging the knowledge and expertise of the public safety
community and through examining other programs and studies addressing
this same issue, SAFECOM has saved time and money in identifying key
issues, needs, and existing efforts. The efforts of the Federal
Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) to identify these leaders of the
public safety community, engage them in a strategic dialogue, and
establish the governance structure for SAFECOM have enabled the program
to efficiently grasp the depth of issues associated with public safety
communications. However, it became clear that in order to address many
of the problems, a technical capacity would be necessary to deal with
issues such as spectrum, standards, and the development and
incorporation of emerging communications technologies. As DHS stood up,
S&T became an obvious home for SAFECOM. At S&T, SAFECOM is building off
of the work of FEMA and developing both short- and long-term strategies
to address immediate public safety communication needs while creating a
migration strategy toward more spectrally efficient systems.
SAFECOM's long-term vision of the public safety communications
architecture is a national ``system of systems'' that adapts to an
incident, as illustrated below.
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T7119.001
c. Wireless Communications
What science and technology requirements have you
identified with respect to network architecture and security,
equipment and software, frequencies used for wireless
communications, system redundancy and back-up, participation of
the appropriate federal agencies, authentication of
participants (credentialing), the use of developing
technologies such as artificial intelligence and database
mining, and standards?
Answer S&T 7.c. Bullet 1. SAFECOM is currently supporting the
development of a comprehensive statement of requirements for public
safety communications. This SoR will provide SAFECOM with an assessment
of functional needs that public safety has in order to communicate,
both via voice and data. Additionally, through its coordination with
projects such as Disaster Management and the Capital Wireless
Integrated Network (CapWIN), SAFECOM is addressing issues related to:
how best to structure wireless networks so they interface well with
existing wired architectures; identification of what equipment is
needed, where more capacity (including redundancy) is needed; how to
link all participating Federal, State, and local agencies; and the
identification of ways in which to authenticate network users and apply
encryption. Because the wireless world includes increasing use of
technologies such as voice over IP and remote database management and
data mining, SAFECOM will continue to address standards to ensure
integration of public safety wired and wireless solutions. No
potentially useful technology is being overlooked or will be excluded
from consideration, either as a commercial off the shelf (COTS)
solution, or for R&D.
Are there any efforts underway to develop an override
capacity for the cell phones of key emergency personnel and
local officials to ensure that they can communicate with one
another in the event of an emergency? Is the S&T Directorate
involved in the Wireless Priority Program? If so, how?
Answer S&T 7.c. Bullet 2. The National Communications System (NCS),
which is part of DHS, was instructed in January 1995 to work with
industry and Government to implement a wireless priority service for
national security and emergency preparedness workers. To this end, the
Priority Services (PS) group of NCS conducts technical analyses and
research and development focused on identifying wireless and Internet
priority service solutions to overcome blockage in cellular systems
when availability is most critical. SAFECOM has met with NCS
representatives to discuss areas of coordination, and more importantly,
to begin examining the relationship between priority cellular services
and public safety owned land mobile radio systems (LMRS). Understanding
the intricacies of relating cellular services to LMRS is important
since LMRS provides first responders and broader public safety
community with their mission-critical communications. As wide spread as
cellular services are, the infrastructure is yet not adequate to
support crucial public safety communication needs. The National Task
Force on Interoperability report released in February 2003 offers an
explanation as to why public safety cannot currently rely on commercial
services for emergency communications.
Although public safety personnel regularly use cellular phones,
personal digital assistants (PDAs), and other commercial wireless
devices and services, these devices are currently not well suited for
public safety mission-critical communications during critical
incidents. Public safety officials cannot depend on commercial systems
that can be overloaded and unavailable. Experience has shown such
systems are often the most unreliable during critical incidents when
public demand overwhelms the system. Public safety officials have
unique and demanding communications requirements. Optimal public safety
radio communication systems require
Dedicated channels and priority access that is
available at all times to handle unexpected emergencies.
Reliable one-to-many broadcast capability, a feature
not generally available in cellular systems.
Highly reliable and redundant networks that are
engineered and maintained to withstand natural disasters and
other emergencies.
The best possible coverage within a given geographic
area, with a minimum of dead zones.
And, unique equipment designed for quick response in
emergency situations--dialing, waiting for call connection, and
busy signals are unacceptable during critical events when
seconds can mean the difference between life and death.\1\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ ``Why Can''t We Talk? Working Together to Bridge the
Communications Gap To Save Lives: A Guide for Public Officials,'' The
National Task Force on Interoperability, February 2003, page 11.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
SAFECOM looks forward to continued coordination and work with NCS
with respect to providing input on the communication issues and needs
of public safety.
d. How will the S&T Directorate's work regarding the testing and
evaluation of first responder equipment relate to similar work to be
carried out by the Office of Domestic Preparedness? Does the Department
plan on continuing this division of labor between the two Department of
Homeland Security organizations?
Answer S&T 7.d. The primary focus of the ODP program has been on
Personal Protective Equipment (PPE) for emergency responders. The S&T
Directorate is responsible for the science and technology and testing
and evaluation (T&E) of all equipment, products, services and systems
needed for a national program in homeland security. The T&E activity
needs to be performed as one component of equipment development. This
includes identification of the need, development of performance
specifications, testing and evaluation by accredited testing
laboratories, and certification. The DHS system to certify equipment
for emergency responders should take full advantage of this
infrastructure for measurements, standards and certification being
developed by the S&T Directorate. The S&T Directorate has in fiscal
year 2003 launched major efforts to develop detector standards for
emergency responders for radiological/nuclear and biological agents.
The S&T Directorate is coordinating on development of S&T standards
with NIOSH, NIST/Office of Law Enforcement Standards (OLES) and SBCCOM
(Army) personnel who are the performers for the ODP sponsored work. The
technical direction for this work in fiscal year 2004 should reside in
the S&T Directorate to ensure that consistent and complete standards
are developed for homeland security applications for emergency
responders.
e. What types of standards will be developed for state and local first
responders? What types and categories of equipment will standards be
developed for? When will such standards be developed? How will the
Department communicate its decisions to state and local governments?
Answer S&T 7.e. There are several ways to categorize standards for
emergency responders. The needs that have been identified to date can
be put into categories such as CBRNE threat agents used in three phases
of a terrorist attack: detect/prevent, response/recovery, and
mitigation/decontamination. State and local first responders are most
interested in the instruments and detectors used in the early stages.
Other cross cutting projects that require standards include:
communications hardware and software, certification (of products,
service and personnel), personal protective equipment (PPE), and
training. Working groups are being established to look at standards
requirements in each of these areas. The radiation detector standards,
developed on a fast track, will be available in 2003. The standards for
immunoassay kits for anthrax detection will be available in 2004. The
DHS Office for State and Local will be apprised on the state of
development of standards and will serve as a conduit to the state and
local emergency planners. In addition, almost all the standards writing
groups will have participants for national groups that coordinate at
the state and local level.
f. What steps are being taken by the S&T Directorate to upgrade
biohazard detection technology so that first responders and health care
workers can know the threat they face? Please outline any specific
actions that have been initiated by the Department and when they will
be completed.
Answer S&T 7.f. The S&T Directorate has partnered with the Office of
the Secretary of Defense (DOD) to fund AOAC International to develop
reference methods for detection of anthrax using immunoassay kits.
These kits are widely used by emergency responders for qualitative
testing of suspicious powders and at present there is no guidance to
purchasing agents for first responders and health care workers on the
performance specifications for these detectors. The contract with AOAC
called for establishment of a Task Force to identify a reference
method, a reference laboratory and a protocol for testing commercial
products to an agreed standard. This Task Force is co-chaired by
scientists from the Office of Science and Technology Policy (OSTP) and
the DHS S&T Directorate, and includes representatives from DOD, CDC,
USDA, FDA as well as private sector manufacturers and representatives
from state and local user groups. After two meetings this summer the
Task Force has recommended a draft protocol and authorized tests by the
reference laboratory at the Army's Dugway Proving Grounds in Utah. Upon
completion of initial testing by the reference laboratory, a round of
multilab measurements will take place in Winter 2003-2004 and
validation of the commercial kits is expected in May 2004. First
responders and health care workers will then have the assurance that
these immunoassay kits can be used as one component of their detection
and prevention strategy.
8. Intelligence Input for S&T--What types of intelligence is the S&T
Directorate regularly receiving on threats to the homeland, which can
inform priorities for research and development work? What relationships
has the S&T Directorate established with the Information Analysis and
Infrastructure Protection Directorate and other elements of the
Intelligence Community?
Answer S&T 8. The S&T Directorate is receiving current threat and
vulnerability information through the Information Analysis and
Infrastructure Protection Directorate. Members of our staff engage in
intelligence community activities related to science and technology,
and a number of our staff participate in interagency working groups
that are addressing the various threats. Staff from our Threat and
Vulnerability, Testing and Assessment portfolio and the Critical
Infrastructure Protection portfolio regularly interact with staff from
the IAIP Directorate. In addition, we have established an Office of
Comparative Studies to provide threat and vulnerability assessments
with the aid of IAIP.
9. Biodefense
a. In your statement before the Subcommittee, you indicate that $365
million is requested for fiscal year 04 for biological countermeasures,
specifically for the National Biodefense Analysis and Countermeasures
Center (NBACC) and for a Biological Warning and Incident
Characterization System (BWIC). Please provide the Subcommittee with a
breakdown of fiscal year 03 funding and the fiscal year 04 request for
those two programs and other activities in this area of emphasis,
including funding you expect to administer through HSARPA.
Answer S&T 9.a.
Our fiscal year 2004 Appropriation was $286.5M of which $88M is
directed to NBACC construction. Fiscal year 2004 execution plans in the
above areas allocated as follows:
NBACC--
R&D program--$60M
Construction--$88M
Biological Warning and Incident Characterization Integration-
$4.1M* *includes use of authorized carryover from fiscal year
2003
Fiscal year 2005 President's Budget is allocated as follows:
NBACC--
R&D program--$65M
Construction--$35M
Biological Warning and Incident Characterization Integration -
$9M
b. How do the bioterrorism R&D activities in the Directorate differ
from the Department of Health and Human Services and the Department of
Defense efforts? What specific mechanisms is the Directorate using to
coordinate bioterrorism R&D with these other agencies (including the
collaboration required by Sec. 304 of the Homeland Security Act) and
with the Environmental Protection Agency?
Answer S&T 9.b. The Directorate's bioterrorism R&D activities focus on
the development of domestic biological countermeasures for deterrence,
detection, and mitigation of potential biological attacks on the
nations population, infrastructure and agriculture. Priorities are
focused on countermeasures against catastrophic events including large
scale anthrax or small pox attacks, and a foot and mouth disease in
cattle. The Department of Defense bioterrorism R&D efforts focus on
force protection and readiness with a concept of operations that
support detection thresholds and decontamination not directly
applicable to civilian requirements. Military doctrine views chemical/
biological threat more as an area denial weapon that mobility can
counter. This does not apply to the domestic situation and potential
scenarios where mobility is not a major factor for large populations.
The Department of Health and Human Services is focused more on health
and medical applications such as clinical diagnostics, therapeutics,
and vaccines. For example, fundamental research includes the study of
pathogencity mechanisms and host response associated with a specific
agent. The Environmental Protection Agency has programs in water
security and decontamination. The Directorate's Biological & Chemical
Countermeasures Portfolio works closely with the DOD Joint Program
Office for Chemical and Biological Defense, the Defense Threat
Reduction Agency, Joint Requirements Office and the Office of the
Assistant to the Secretary of Defense for Nuclear, Chemical, and
Biological Defense Programs to leverage activities and minimize
overlapping efforts. For example, a program is underway to develop a
national template for a joint military and civilian consequence
management response following urban detection of an aerosolized
biothreat agent. The Directorate also has liaisons that work with DHHS
CDC and NIH to identify areas of common interest to maximize resource
allocation. The Directorate identifies NIH research deliverables that
will apply to assay development, bioforensics, and detection
technologies. The Directorate also works closely with the EPA to
understand how the water security and restoration efforts contribute to
the overall national biodefense system.
c. Please describe how the National Bio-Weapons Defense Analysis Center
is being established.
(1.) Is this entity the same as the National Biodefense
Analysis and Countermeasures Center described in the
Department's fiscal year 2004 budget request?
(2.) What will be the role of other agencies in administering
this Center?
(3.) Who will set its priorities?
(4.) Please provide a detailed description of BWIC, including:
How you decided that this system should be a priority
compared to investment in other needs such as cybersecurity or
radiological countermeasures?
How you decided what its components should be?
What issues and hurdles you need to overcome to
develop and deploy this system and make it ``seamless,'' and
how you intend to overcome them?
How you will develop and deploy the system, including
how you will involve other government agencies, industry, and
academic research centers?
Answer S&T 9.c. The fully integrated, biological warning and incident
characterization (BWIC) system enables timely warning and response in
the event of a biological attack. The system combines information from
Biosurveillance and environmental monitoring systems with key modeling
tools and databases to asses the extent of the attack, extent of area
contaminated and exposed and affected population. BWIC will provide
decision makers with a better understanding of the scale of the event
and allow rapid formulation and implementation of appropriate
responses, including phasing of critical resources. Through discussions
with the Homeland Security Council, Office of the Vice President, and
Office of Science and Technology Policy, it was established that the
BWIC system will be instrumental in the success of an overall national
biodefense posture and thus, a high priority for the Directorate's R&D
efforts. Because there are many agency participants, some of which have
programs underway that will need to provide data for BWIC, coordination
is essential for success. Through the development of an interagency
steering committee, which will include an avenue for local user input,
each respective agency will develop the path forward and timeline
together to ensure the resulting BWIC system will meet the consensus
requirements. The system will be systematically linked with existing
biomonitoring networks (BioWatch, USPS) and CDC's biosurveillance
system. BWIC will be compatible with CEC, local, regional, and national
emergency operation centers, and the Homeland Security Operation Center
and incorporate plume model/hazard and epidemiological prediction codes
for use as a public health response tool. Federal, State, and local
government agencies and, through appropriate extramural R&D competitive
mechanisms, industry and academia will be involved in many of the
critical steps for successful BWIC development and deployment.
10. Cybersecurity R&D
a. How is the Directorate managing R&D with respect to cybersecurity?
Answer S&T 10.a. The Science and Technology Directorate's Cybersecurity
Portfolio Manager sets long-term strategies and the planning and
budgeting to accomplish those strategies. Work is conducted through
either the Homeland Security Advanced Research Projects Agency or the
Office of Research and Development. This entire process is guided by
the needs and requirements of our customers.
b. Does the S&T Directorate intend to support a single official to
oversee its cyber security programs? If so, where, organizationally,
will it be located, and what principal duties will be assigned to it?
How will it relate to cyber security work within the Information
Analysis and Infrastructure Protection Directorate? In light of the
fact that the Critical Infrastructure Board no longer exists, is the
S&T Directorate adequately resourced consistent with its new cyber
security responsibilities?
Answer S&T 10.b. The Science and Technology Directorate designates a
single manager to be responsible for the cyber security work conducted
by the S&T Directorate. This individual is a member of the management
team of the Threat and Vulnerability, Testing and Assessment Portfolio.
The work the S&T Directorate conducts in cyber security is closely
coordinated with the Information Analysis and Infrastructure Protection
Directorate so that the work is complimentary, not duplicative. The S&T
Directorate is adequately resourced to conduct the cyber security work
for which it is responsible.
c. Your statement lists cybersecurity as one activity in the Threat and
Vulnerability, Testing and Assessment portfolio, for which the total
fiscal year 04 budget request is $90 million. What specific kinds of
R&D activities are being undertaken in cybersecurity, and what are the
current and requested levels of funding for them? How were those
priorities identified?
Answer S&T 10.c. The Cyber Security Funding Portfolio is funded at a
level of $18M in fiscal year 2004, and has a request of $18M for fiscal
year 2005. The Portfolio is currently divided into six programs. Five
of these programs have budgets ranging from $1M to almost $5M. These
programs focus on (1) next-generation cyber security technologies, (2)
cyber security infrastructure technology (the application of more
generic technologies, such as modeling, simulation, visualization, to
support and facilitate the development, deployment or management of
cyber security technologies), (3) small (high impact, low cost)
development projects, (4) technical research studies, and (5)
cooperative communities, which involves pilot projects, fostering
public-private partnerships, community building and workshops. The
sixth program is the Small Business Innovation Research (SBIR)
component of the S&T budget, for which $450k (2.5% of the portfolio's
funding) has been set aside.
In addition to the programs described above, a contract has been
awarded for technical support for the Cyber Security Research and
Development Center. This ``virtual'' Center is the umbrella under which
DHS-funded cyber security R&D activities will be performed. The
technical support contract for the center is focused on supporting S&T
in executing its cyber security R&D programs, and on supporting the
Department's emphasis on public-private partnerships through
interactions with university and industry research groups, cyber
security product and service vendors, and the venture capital
community.
Some of the priorities that are currently being addressed in the
Cyber Security R&D Portfolio include (but are not limited to):
Infrastructural issues associated with securing protocols that
underlie the Internet--work focused on Secure Domain Name System
(DNSSEC) and Secure Border Gateway Protocol (Secure BGP);
Development of large scale data sets to facilitate cyber
security testing and to enable the development of the kinds of
evaluations that can lead to metrics for cyber security;
Co-funding with the National Science Foundation of two large
multi-university collaborative efforts: a large scale testbed and a
cyber security testing framework;
Critical infrastructure-specific cyber security needs,
including coordination of R&D on supervisory control and data
acquisition (SCADA) systems with DHS's Critical Infrastructure
Protection Portfolio, as well as collaboration with the Department of
Treasury to focus on Banking and Finance Sector needs;
Research focused on DHS internal customer needs, such as
Internet Priority Services.
These priorities were derived from a wide variety of sources. These
include:
Written policy documents (such as the National Strategy to
Secure Cyberspace);
Cyber Security R&D requirements provided by customers internal
to the DHS Information Analysis and Infrastructure Protection
Directorate (the National Cyber Security Division and the National
Communications System);
Various cyber security research needs documents developed by
the government, critical infrastructure sectors, and others;
Discussions and coordination with members of the government
research community in various interagency fora, regarding ongoing
research, research needs, vulnerabilities, and threats;
Discussions with the private sector, including both cyber
security technology developer and end user perspectives.
. . . All considered in the overall context of the Department of
Homeland Security Science and Technology Directorate mission.
d. You have announced the establishment this year of a Cybersecurity
R&D Center.
Where will that center be established and what funding
will it receive?)
Answer S&T 10.d. On December 13, 2003, a Request for Proposals and
Statement of Work for technical and administrative support for the
virtual Cyber R&D Center was published to seven capable performers
listed on the GSA schedule. The deadline for response was December 15,
2003, and two responsive proposals were received. Evaluation of those
proposals was completed by January 9, 2004; a technical and
administrative support contract was awarded in February 2, 2004.
How will it interact with IAIP (in particular the new
cybersecurity office)?
Answer S&T 10.d The National Cyber Security Division within IAIP will
provide a staff member to work with the S&T portfolio and program
manager at a deputy director level.
11. Working with the Private Sector
a. Review of Vendor Solicitations: What process is the Department is
using to identify useful homeland security products and technologies
and reject those that are not useful or not likely to work? Once a
product or technology has been identified as useful, what is the next
step in the development or procurement process? How is all of this
information being communicated to state and local governments?
Answer S&T 11.a. Two formal processes used to identify useful products
and technologies for DHS are the formal federal funding opportunities
publicly announced through the FEDBIZOPPS, and the unsolicited RDT&E
proposal process.
Formal funding announcements, such as Requests For Proposals, Broad
Agency Announcements, Research Announcements, etc., are used to procure
goods, products, and services by DHS as well as to solicit ideas and
technologies for further development. The announcements are posted on
the DHS website (http://www.dhs.gov,) and the FEDBIZOPPS website
(http://www.fedbizopps.gov). DHS also published a forecast of its
expected fiscal year 2004 contracting opportunities over $100K on its
website (See ``Working with DHS''). While this forecast was prepared
for small businesses, the information may be used by anyone. Usually,
any business, academic group, or institution may respond to these
announcements. Unless specifically justified and approved for sole
source, or set aside for small business, the procurements are
competitive. All responses for S&T ideas and concepts are screened by
experts using a set of published criteria and those with merit are
selected for funding.
The unsolicited RDT&E proposal process is run by the S&T
Directorate and handles all unsolicited ideas, comments and suggestions
received from the public to develop a new technology. Each unsolicited
suggestion is read and assigned to one of fourteen categories for
further action. These actions range from referral to another more
appropriate agency, or if merited, full technical evaluation of the
idea by government experts in the field. No idea or suggestion is
rejected without deliberate consideration. If the unsolicited
suggestion is found to be technically and programmatically sound, it
then competes for funding priority with established programs.
Unsolicited proposals must be scientifically valid, contain enough data
to evaluate properly, and become higher priority than existing, funded
programs.
If either of these methods develop a clear technology winner, DHS
S&T has the capacity to carry it through prototype development to
commercial production.
DHS works with state and local professional responder organizations
in standards setting activities to: identify their needs, establish
minimum equipment performance levels, and standardize equipment suites.
Two DHS partners in this effort are the Interagency Board for Equipment
Standardization and Interoperability and the Emergency Response
Technology Program Advisory Board. Standards setting activities
determine the criteria and test protocols that describe and evaluate
required minimum levels of performance (such as for equipment, models,
data, systems, and personnel) or acceptability (such as for
environmental contaminants). The activities apply measurement science
to develop and implement consistent, verifiable standards and test
methods that measure effectiveness in terms of: basic functionality,
appropriateness and adequacy for the task, interoperability,
efficiency, and sustainability. Technologies and equipment that are
certified by DHS have met the stipulated standards. Whether or not a
product is certified, performance information will be available to
state and local responders when making procurement decisions.
In addition, DHS S&T is funding the Public Safety and Security
Institute for Technology (PSITEC) ($10M in fiscal year 2004) to perform
the technology clearinghouse function. PSITEC develops knowledge-based
services that provide access to, and distribution of, information and
services relevant to public safety technologies. PSITEC will serve as
the clearinghouse--a single point of entry--for the public safety and
first responder community, providing access to relevant information on
technologies and products, test and evaluation, as well as engaging in
projects of interest and importance to them.
b. R&D Proposals by the Private Sector: In addition to the one Broad
Area Announcement (BAA) that has been released regarding radiation
detector technologies, what others are planned for release in the near
future? What types of R&D proposals will the Department concentrate on
initially?
Answer S&T 11.b The first Broad Agency Announcement was issued on May
14, 2003 by the Technology Support Working Group (TSWG) on behalf of
DHS. It closed on June 13, 2003. This BAA solicited ideas, concepts and
technologies for fifty research needs in the areas of Chemical,
Biological, Radiological and Nuclear Countermeasures, Explosives
Detection, Improvised Device Defeat, Infrastructure Protection,
Investigative Support and Forensics, Personnel Protection, and Physical
Security. TSWG received 3,344 responses to this call. From these
responses, TSWG requested 223 proposers to submit White Papers. Based
on the evaluation of these White Papers, TSWG requested and received 47
full proposals. TSWG has completed these evaluations and is now in the
contracts negotiation process. DHS has provided an initial $33M in
fiscal year 2003 and an additional $30M in fiscal year 2004 to fund the
most meritorious of these developments.
On 22 September, 2003, HSARPA issued its first Research
Announcement (RA) for Detection Systems for Biological and Chemical
Countermeasures. Its purpose is to develop, field-test, and transition
to commercial production the next generation of biological and chemical
detectors. This RA addresses two areas in biological countermeasures
and three areas in chemical countermeasures. In response to the initial
request, 518 white papers were received. One hundred twenty six
proposals were received from all sources. Forty of those proposals
entered negotiations for award and all are expected to complete
satisfactorily.
The Homeland Security Advanced Research Projects Agency (HSARPA)
issued its first Small Business Innovation Research (SBIR) Program
Solicitation on November 13, 2003. The purpose of this solicitation is
to invite small businesses to submit innovative research proposals that
address eight high priority DHS requirements. There were 374 responses
received in the eight categories and following evaluation, 66 will
enter negotiations for Phase I contract award this month.
On 2 February, 2004 HSARPA published its second Broad Agency
Announcement, BAA04-02, Detection Systems for Radiological and Nuclear
Countermeasures. The solicitation contains six separate Technical Topic
Areas. For each Technical Topic Area, respondents may submit proposals
for (a.) near-term improvements incapability with rapid prototype
development, (b.) development of next generation systems with
significant improvements in performance, or (c.) development of
enabling technologies to support next generation systems.
Additional BAAs will be issued by HSARPA in the areas of
Radiological and Nuclear Architecture, Explosives Detection, Borders
and Transportation Security, and Threat Vulnerability and Threat
Assessment.
c. SAFETY Act: The SAFETY Act, in Section 861 of the Homeland Security
Act, was established to provide contractors with the Department of
Homeland Security with liability protection so they could risk placing
homeland security and counter-terrorism products on the market that
result in liability exposure in excess of the available insurance
coverage. In order to gain the protections of the SAFETY Act, the
Secretary must designate that a technology qualifies for protection
pursuant to regulations to be issued by the Secretary.
When does the Secretary intend to issue proposed and final
regulations?
Has the procurement of homeland security products been
inhibited in any way by a lack of such regulations?
Have any products been placed on the Approved Product List for
Homeland Security (per section 863(d)(2) of the Homeland Security Act)?
Answer S&T 11.c. The Interim Final Rule (6 CFR Part 25) to support the
Safety Act completed a second public comment period on Dec. 15, 2003.
Eighteen entities made comments, with numerous comments being submitted
by each entity. Comments are presently under review at DHS. A number of
modifications were made to the Interim Rule after assessment of the
substantive comments provided by 49 entities. The Department will
address the most recent set of comments and submit the Final Rule to
OMB for review in March 2004.
Applications for sellers of technologies potentially covered by the
Act will be available on Sept. 1, 2003. In order to implement the Act
in a rigorous, defensible, and impartial manner, extensive efforts have
been underway to develop a process that will govern the evaluation of
applications against the complex criteria mandated in the Act. There
has also been a concerted effort to implement an electronically based
application, evaluation, and tracking system that will support
consistent and efficient processing of what are expected to be numerous
applications. A series of 5 seminars are being held across the country
in order to provide information regarding the application and
evaluation process. The intent is to assist potential applicants in
first determining whether or not it is in their best interest to use
resources to pursue SAFETY Act designation and/or certification and
also to help them understand how to move through the process.
No products have yet been designated as Qualified Anti-Terrorism
Technologies, nor have any yet been certified under the SAFETY Act.
12. Coordination
a. What progress has been made by the Department to date in
coordinating the Department's science and technology agenda with other
federal agencies to reduce duplication and identify unmet needs,
consistent with the Homeland Security Act?
Answer S&T 12.a. S&T recognizes that many organizations are
contributing to the science and technology base needed to enhance the
nation's capabilities to thwart terrorist acts and to fully support the
conventional missions of the operational components of the Department.
We have begun our coordination process by evaluating and producing
a report on the research, development, test, and evaluation work being
conducted within the Department of Homeland Security that was not
already under the direct cognizance of the Science and Technology
Directorate. Where it is appropriate, the Science and Technology
Directorate will absorb these R&D functions. In other cases, the
Science and Technology Directorate will provide appropriate input,
guidance, and oversight of these R&D programs.
We are now initiating the effort needed to coordinate homeland
security research and development across the entire United States
Government, including the Departments of Agriculture, Commerce,
Defense, Energy, Justice, Health and Human Services, State, and
Veteran's Affairs; within the National Science Foundation, the
Environmental Protection Agency and other Federal Agencies; and by
members of the Intelligence Community.
Several interagency working groups already exist that are
addressing issues important to homeland security. The Science and
Technology Directorate has been, and continues to be, an active
participant in these working groups, and in most cases has taken a
leadership role. These fora foster an active exchange of information
and assist each participating agency in identifying related needs and
requirements, conducting research and development of mutual benefit,
and avoiding duplication of effort.
We also continue to have discussions at multiple levels of
management with Federal Departments and Agencies, as well as the Office
of Management and Budget, the Office of Science and Technology Policy,
and the Homeland Security Council to ensure that the strongest possible
links are made and the best possible coordination occurs between our
Department and those who are conducting sector-specific research. By
the autumn of 2004, all Department of Homeland Security research and
development programs will be consolidated and all United States
Government research and development relevant to fulfilling the
Department's mission will have been identified and coordinated as
appropriate. It is important to note that this identification and
relevant coordination does not imply the Department of Homeland
Security should have the responsibility and authority for these
programs within other Federal agencies; it does recognize that science
and technology advances can have many applications, including homeland
security.
b. How does the Directorate interact with the Homeland Security
Council, the President's Office of Science and Technology Policy, the
National Science and Technology Council, and TSWG?
Answer S&T 12.b. Our Directorate works hard to ensure that we interact
productively with the Homeland Security Council (HSC), the Office of
Science and Technology Policy (OSTP), the National Science and
Technology Council (NSTC) and TSWG. We are working with the Office of
Management and Budget, the Office of Science and Technology Policy, and
the Homeland Security Council to ensure that the strongest possible
links are made and the best possible coordination occurs between our
Department and those who are conducting sector-specific research.Sec.
Our high explosives scientists are working with the Technical
Support Working Group to evaluate commercial off-the-shelf systems with
capabilities against suicide bombers, and the Director of the Homeland
Security Advanced Research Projects Agency is a member of the TSWG
Executive Committee. In addition, our staff are in frequent contact
with the Office of Science and Technology Policy on a range of issues,
and several are members and co-chairs of committees and subcommittees
of the National Science and Technology Council.
c. For each of the portfolios or activities you describe in your
statement, please indicate what kinds of interactions and collaboration
you anticipate having with other Directorates within DHS, with other
federal agencies, and with stakeholders/ providers in academia and the
private sector, and how you will coordinate activities and avoid
wasteful duplication?
Answer S&T 12.c The S&T Directorate has put a strong emphasis on
interacting with other Federal departments and agencies and with the
other components of the Department of Homeland Security. Knowledge of
other science and technology programs and their results, appropriate
collaboration between agencies, coordination of relevant programmatic
activities, and information sharing are essential for us to best meet
our mission requirements. Interactions are occurring between our
cybersecurity personnel and those at the National Science Foundation
and the National Institute of Standards and Technology, who dialog
frequently and have already established collaborative and coordinated
programs to ensure no duplication of effort. Our biological and
chemical countermeasures staff have partnered with DOD's Defense Threat
Reduction Agency (DTRA) to plan and execute the BioNet program and
roadmap the biological countermeasures R&D programs in both agencies to
understand capabilities and shortfalls. They work with the National
Science Foundation on pathogen sequencing. The BioWatch program,
although led by the Science and Technology Directorate, was
accomplished through collaboration with personnel from the Department
of Energy's National Laboratories, contractors, the Environmental
Protection Agency, and the Center for Disease Control. We work with
DOD's Office of Homeland Defense to ensure the effective transfer to
the Department of relevant DOD technologies.
Our high explosives scientists are working with the interagency
Technical Support Working Group, managed by the Department of State, to
evaluate commercial off-the-shelf systems with capabilities against
suicide bombers. The Director of the Homeland Security Advanced
Research Projects Agency is a member of the TSWG Executive Committee.
Our staff are in frequent contact with the Office of Science and
Technology Policy on a range of issues, and several are members and co-
chairs of committees and subcommittees of the National Science and
Technology Council. Our Office of Research and Development works
closely with the Department of Agriculture to ensure that the Plum
Island Animal Disease Center facility is operating smoothly and fully
meeting its mission. The Office of Research and Development also
interfaces with the Department of Energy to keep the Office of Science,
as well as the National Nuclear Security Administration, apprised of
our long-term homeland security requirements.
In addition, the S&T Directorate has established formal liaison
with the Border and Transportation Directorate, the Emergency
Preparedness and Response Directorate, the Information Assurance and
Infrastructure Protection Directorate, the United States Coast Guard,
and the United States Secret Service. Some of these functions are
fulfilled by staff from the other internal Departmental organization
being matrixed to the S&T Directorate and some by S&T staff being
responsible to coordinate with the other Departmental organization; in
both cases, the purpose is to ensure that the S&T requirements and
needs of the other components of the Department of Homeland Security
are identified and addressed.
d. The Homeland Security Act transfers a number of science and
technology programs from other agencies and creates several new ones--
it appears that about 15 programs are created or transferred. Knitting
these together into a single functioning entity is a challenge. How do
you intend to accomplish that?
Answer S&T 12.d The Science and Technology Directorate has been very
successful in bringing in transferred programs. Part of the reason we
have been so successful in integrating pre-existing programs is the
concurrent transfer of knowledgeable key personnel with the programs
into our Directorate.
e. What mechanisms have been, or will be, established in the S&T
Directorate to transfer homeland security technologies to federal,
state, and local government, and to the private sector? If no mechanism
currently exists, when does the Department intend to complete this
task? Which specific office will lead it?
Answer S&T 12.e. In the Science and Technology Directorate, there are
multiple mechanisms for the transfer of technologies through the
private sector to state and local governments, first responders and
field agents.
The Office of Systems Engineering and Development (SED) develops
systems' context for solutions, conducts rapid full-scale development,
conducts acceptance testing, and transitions mature technology to
production and deployment. In performing its missions, SED works
directly with private industry to produce affordable technology
products that are of real value when purchased by the larger security
community.
The Office of Planning, Programming and Budgeting has a Portfolio
Manager dedicated to gathering State and Local requirements and
providing information regarding the science and technology programs and
developments underway. This portfolio works with State and local
organizations, professional first responder associations, and other
interested groups to gather and codify the science and technology
requirements of the first responders.
The Homeland Security Advanced Research Projects Agency (HSARPA)
directly engages the private sector. Its preferred mechanism of
technology transfer is by modification or adaptation of existing
products, through commercial manufacturers, to meet the immediate needs
of first responders.
The Office of Research and Development will transition technologies
resulting from sponsorship of research and development at the National
and Federal laboratories either through SED or by allowing individual
technology transfer offices at the laboratories to fulfill this
function.
f. Has the S&T Directorate, or the Department overall, entered into an
agreement with the Department of Energy (DoE) for the use of national
laboratories? If so, please describe any such agreements that have been
entered into and the specific purpose of such agreements. How does, or
will, the S&T Directorate deconflict its work plan with that of DoE?
Answer S&T 12.f. In order to ensure the availability of DOE
capabilities under existing site contracts, the Secretaries of Energy
and Homeland Security entered into a Memorandum of Agreement (MOA),
effective March 1, 2003. The objective of this MOA is to authorize a
modified process for the acceptance, performance and administration of
DHS work by DOE contractor and Federally operated laboratories, sites
and other facilities. The MOA implements provisions of the Homeland
Security Act specifying that national laboratories perform homeland
security work on an equal basis with other missions at DOE sites.
13. Miscellaneous:
a. National Policy and Strategic Plan for CBRN (per sec. 302(2) of the
Homeland Security Act)
Has the national policy and strategic plan been developed? If
so, please provide the Committee a copy.
Have priorities, goals, objectives, and policies for
developing CBRN countermeasures been established?
Who is responsible for doing so?
Do these individuals have access to the intelligence products
necessary to make such judgments?
Answer S&T 13.a. National policy and strategic plan: Congress
recognized the importance of the research and development being
conducted by numerous Federal departments and agencies, and in the
Homeland Security Act of 2002, directed the Under Secretary of Science
and Technology to coordinate the Federal government's civilian efforts
to identify and develop countermeasures to current and emerging threats
and create a national plan. The S&T Directorate takes this
responsibility very seriously. We have begun this coordination process
by evaluating and producing a report on the research, development,
testing, and evaluation work that was being conducted within the
Department of Homeland Security but was not already under the direct
cognizance of the Science and Technology Directorate. Where it is
appropriate, the Science and Technology Directorate will absorb these
R&D functions. In other cases, the Science and Technology Directorate
will provide appropriate input, guidance, and oversight of these R&D
programs.
We are now initiating the effort needed to coordinate homeland
security research and development across the entire United States
Government. Research and development for homeland security is being
conducted by the Departments of Agriculture, Commerce, Defense, Energy,
Justice, Health and Human Services, State, and Veteran's Affairs;
within the National Science Foundation, the Environmental Protection
Agency and other Federal agencies; and by members of the Intelligence
Community. Several interagency working groups already exist that are
addressing issues important to homeland security. The Science and
Technology Directorate has been, and continues to be, an active
participant in these working groups, and in most cases has taken a
leadership role. These fora foster an active exchange of information
and assist each participating agency in identifying related needs and
requirements, conducting research and development of mutual benefit,
and avoiding duplication of effort.
We also continue to have discussions at multiple levels of
management with Federal Departments and Agencies, as well as with the
Office of Management and Budget, the Office of Science and Technology
Policy, and the Homeland Security Council. These discussions ensure
that the strongest possible links are made and the best possible
coordination occurs between our Department and those who are conducting
sector-specific research. By the autumn of 2004, all Department of
Homeland Security research and development programs will be
consolidated and all United States Government research and development
relevant to fulfilling the Department's mission will have been
identified and coordinated as appropriate. It is important to note that
this identification and relevant coordination does not imply the
Department of Homeland Security should have the responsibility and
authority for these programs within other Federal agencies; it does
recognize that science and technology advances can have many
applications, including homeland security.
Prioritization and Responsibility for Prioritization: The Science
and Technology Directorate has prioritized its research and development
(R&D) efforts based on the directives, recommendations and suggestions
from many sources, including:
Homeland Security Act of 2002;
The fiscal year 2004 Congressional Appropriations for
the Department of Homeland Security;
President Bush's National Strategy for Homeland
Security, the National Strategy for the Physical Protection of
Critical Infrastructure and Key Assets, the National Strategy
to Combat Weapons of Mass Destruction, the National Strategy to
Secure Cyberspace, and the National Security Strategy;
President Bush's nine Homeland Security Presidential
Directives;
Office of Management and Budget's 2003 Report on
Combating Terrorism;
Current threat assessments as understood by the
Intelligence Community;
Requirements identified by other Department
components;
Expert understanding of enemy capabilities that exist
today or that can be expected to appear in the future; and
The report from the National Academies of Sciences on
``Making the Nation Safer: The Role of Science and Technology
in Countering Terrorism,'' and the reports from the Gilmore,
Bremer and Hart-Rudman Committees.
Identifying and integrating the information contained in these
sources has not been a small task, but the result, coupled with expert
evaluation and judgment by our scientific staff, is the basis for
determining the research and development (R&D) needed to meet our
mission requirements.
Within each portfolio, the portfolio manager (PPB) determines the
final prioritization of research and development activities based on
the external guidance as previously mentioned, end-user input, threat
and vulnerability assessments, and subject matter expertise as provided
in-house.
Intelligence inputs: S&T is currently working with the DHS
Information Analysis and Infrastructure Protection Directorate to
ensure that portfolio managers within S&T have the accurate and up-to-
date intelligence they need to structure their portfolio's activities.
b. Nuclear Detection Technology--Is the Department aware of any
technology that currently exists to detect a CBRN device within a
container at our nation's ports? Is the Department actively working to
develop a technology that can be used internationally and at our
nation's ports to detect the presence of a CBRN device?
Answer S&T 13.b. The DHS is not aware of any existing technology that
is capable of detecting all of the variety of possible chemical,
biological, radiological and nuclear devices within a container. The
detection of the wide variety of WMD is a challenging problem that is
not solvable via a single technology which will also yield the required
sensitivity and integrate into our operations. Sec.
The Department is actively working to develop technology that can
be used at our nation's ports and internationally for the detection of
CBRN. DHS has initiated active research and development programs
targeting each of the various WMD threats; chemical, biological, and
nuclear/radiological. The approach taken by S&T includes new detection
technology but, more importantly, also includes development of system
architectures, and the means to test different system integration
concepts. Understanding system architectures, achievable detection
sensitivities, and how those technologies can be integrated into
existing operations is critical to understanding the effectiveness of
technologies in the variety of possible architectures.
In the nuclear/radiological detection technology area, we are
investigating advanced passive radiation detection technologies as well
as advanced radiography and means for the direct detection of special
nuclear materials. Some of these technologies are intended for the
detection of radiological and nuclear threats in cargo but will be
developed in a manner that most benefits security and is most easily
integrated into our existing operations. These technologies will be
developed such that they can, in most cases, be commercialized.
In the chemical detection technology area, toxic industrial
chemical and warfare agent detectors are being developed that can be
deployed to specific venues, such as ports, either permanently or as
the threat requires. These technologies also can be used by the first
responder for hazard identification or understanding the extent of
contamination during restoration. Discussions are underway with the
Bureau of Customs and Border Protection to better understand specific
requirements for R&D strategic planning.
In the biodetection technology area, detect-to-warn (facility) and
detect-to-treat (wide area) are being developed that can be deployed to
specific venues, such as ports, either permanently or as the threat
requires. These technologies also can be used by the first responder
for hazard identification or understanding the extent of contamination
during restoration. Currently technology for stand off detection of the
biothreat is not feasible so container contents will need to be
screened either through more conventional swipe and analysis.
Discussions are underway with the Bureau of Customs and Border
Protection to better understand specific requirements for R&D strategic
planning.
c. Air Cargo Detection--Is the Department aware of technology that
exists to screen air cargo before it is shipped on passenger aircraft?
How mature is it? Are you aware of any efforts by the Transportation
Security Administration to install such technology at our nation's
airports? If not, what role, if any, is the Directorate playing in
getting the technology tested and evaluated?
Existing technologies and physical inspection can be effective in
screening most air cargo commodities for improvised explosive devices
(IEDs). Not all technologies are good for all commodities, and physical
inspection cannot be satisfactory for some shipments. However, a
combination appropriately applied we believe can provide an effective
air cargo screening regime. The Transportation Security Laboratory
(TSL) is testing existing equipment against a broad range of
commodities.
d. Cargo Mate--Please describe the S&T Directorate's current
involvement in the ``Cargo Mate'' initiative (as referenced by Mr.
Boehlert in the recent subcommittee hearing). Does the Department
believe that ``Cargo Mate'' is a worthwhile initiative?
Answer S&T 13.d. ``Cargo Mate'' is a project by a commercial firm to
use wireless technology to help ensure safe shipping. The S&T
Directorate has no current or prior involvement in the ``Cargo Mate''
Initiative identified in the question and has no basis to evaluate the
initiative.
14. Question from Rep. Kendrick Meek, Subcommittee Member--Please
comment on how the Department plans to use and fund social and
behavioral science research that goes to the heart of the Homeland
Security mission, such as: psychological and sociological research on
how terrorists act and think, statistical data analysis as relates to
law enforcement and the nation's transportation infrastructure, and
international relations research on how U.S. foreign policy impacts the
campaign against terrorism worldwide.
Answer S&T 14. S&T's social and behavioral sciences terrorism studies
program goes to the heart of the U.S. Homeland Security mission by
focusing on the current and future (dynamic and escalating) terrorism
threat environment and employing a comprehensive and multidisciplinary
social and behavioral sciences approach. Leading edge conceptual
methodologies and tool kits will be employed to help the homeland
security--and wider combating terrorism--communities better understand
how to assess, model, forecast and preemptively respond to current and
future terrorist threats, whether conventional low impact, conventional
high impact, or CBRN--with the latter two types of warfare considered
high impact catastrophic attacks.
Two primary research and analysis projects will be conducted during
fiscal year 2004 and fiscal year 2005, with the third project the
creation of a comprehensive open-source-based Global Terrorist Incident
Database (linked to other on-going databases), with a robust social
sciences methodological computerized engine, to be used to generate a
spectrum of indicators, including measuring and mapping combating
terrorism effectiveness, that will be used to support the program's
projects. Above all, the findings from all the projects will be widely
disseminated throughout the Homeland Security (and combating terrorism)
community via a Web Portal that will serve as a knowledge-base and
interactive `virtual community.'
The first project comprehensively addresses the primary components
in how terrorists act and think by focusing on the terrorist life cycle
(TLC) and terrorist attack cycle (TAC). It begins with the study of the
underlying root causes of terrorism which give rise to terrorist
insurgencies. To bring scientific rigor to such a study, a root cause
analysis software tool kit, developed for the business world, will be
adapted to hierarchically decompose and map all the significant root
causes listed in the academic and practitioner literature on terrorism.
Such a methodological approach has never before been applied to the
study of terrorism, so this is one example of how our approach will
advance the state of the terrorism analytic discipline. A second
example of the uniqueness of our approach is the use of a link analysis
tool kit to diagram the formal and informal organizational structures
and linkages among terrorist groups, including various front
organizations (political, commercial or charity), in groups such as al
Qaida and its affiliates, which pose the greatest threat to the U.S.
Homeland and overseas interests. Both of these sets of diagrams will be
used to structure follow-on research, including the first research
effort, followed by an experts' workshop, that will use such data to
identify, vet and prioritize key nodes and linkages in the TLC and TAC
that may be most vulnerable to counteraction and influence. This will
include (but not limited to) such indicators as the nature of a group's
leadership, its ideology and strategy, its modus operandi, including
recruitment patterns, developing a support infrastructure, attaining
the capability to launch a spectrum of attacks, and choosing targets
and their locations. In a second research effort, followed by an
experts' workshop, the project will then seek to identify, vet and
prioritize those counterterrorist measures that could be used to
influence those nodes and linkages in the TLC and TAC deemed most
vulnerable or most crucial to counteract. The third research effort
will attempt to formulate metrics for assessing counterterrorism
effectiveness, which will be discussed, vetted and prioritized by the
third experts' workshop. A comprehensive report on findings, including
templates of the root causes and organizational formations diagrams,
will then be disseminated to the homeland security's (and wider
combating terrorism's) scientific and operational communities.
The second project will utilize the multi-disciplines of the
social, behavioral and cognitive/neurosciences, combined with subject
matter and operational expertise of military, law enforcement, and
intelligence professionals, to better understand and respond to suicide
terrorism, at the individual, group, and societal levels. Academic,
scientific and operational experts will form the study team for the
project. Following initial research, a series of expert workshops will
be held. The National Institute of Mental Health (NIMH) is interested
in co-funding the project. A monograph will be produced and
disseminated to the homeland security's (and wider combating
terrorism's) scientific and operational communities.
Adopting such a multi-disciplinary approach is expected to greatly
advance the state of the discipline on this problem area. The challenge
of counteracting suicide attacks as an asymmetric instrument of
terrorism is one of increasing concern and severity, not only in the
Middle East but elsewhere around the globe. While significant social
and behavioral research on this phenomenon has been ongoing, it is
still in a relatively early stage and has yet to fully involve some of
the social science disciplines that could enhance understanding of the
problem and potential programmatic approaches to its counteraction.
The objective of the research program is to study the
underpinnings, processes, life cycles and attack cycles of those who
manage and engage in suicide terrorism within the framework of the
groups, societies and religions that encourage and perpetuate such
activities. The results of this program, including study efforts and
workshops of area experts will be important in the formulation of
effective and forward-learning behavioral and technological responses.
The proposed program will be conducted over the course of two fiscal
years (fiscal year 2004 and fiscal year 2005), with interim results
being provided as they become available.
In addition to these two primary research projects, and creation of
the Web Portal, the social and behavioral program is contributing to
the Homeland Security mission in several other important areas.
First, the program's manager serves as the co-chair of
an interagency working group, under the White House Office of
Science & Technology Policy, on how the social, behavioral and
economic sciences can be used to support counterterrorism, by
prioritizing research areas for government agencies.
Second, the program will be leveraging the expertise
acquired in its projects to contribute to the social and
behavioral communities on these issues, such as the national
laboratories, the National Science Foundation, the National
Academy of Science, and the scientific and academic
communities, as well as the homeland security's (and combating
terrorism's) operational communities.
15. Question from Rep. Jane Harman, Member of the Full Committee--
The Department of Homeland Security will need to integrate data from
disparate source systems in order to provide analysts and enforcement
agencies with timely information for further action. Has the Science
and Technology Directorate researched and evaluated commercially-
available data fusion and analytic technologies that are capable of
providing predictive analysis (including of non-obvious relationships)
and able to meet anticipated volumes of data and speed of response? If
so, can you provide a summary of your findings and recommendations? If
this research has not yet been done, is it part of your areas for
effort in fiscal year 2004?
Answer S&T 15. Information analysis and data fusion are encompassed
within the technologies being investigated through the Threat and
Vulnerability, Testing and Assessment (TVTA) Portfolio in S&T. The
portfolio is also investigating two closely related technology areas,
namely, collaboration tools and advanced visualization techniques, as
part of its effort to provide analysts with a near-real time capability
to find, retrieve, integrate, and analyze information from multiple,
distributed, disparate data sources. These technologies will form the
basis for the so-called Threat-Vulnerability Integration System (or
TVIS), for which TVTA initiated in fiscal year 2004 a research and
development program as well as a prototyping effort. The efforts are
being addressed through both intramural research with the National
Laboratories and a comprehensive research effort with commercial
vendors through a BAA. For fiscal year 2004, the approach is to seek
advanced technologies that address the specific, immediate requirements
of the Department's Information Analysis and Infrastructure Protection
Directorate rather than initiate a test and evaluation program for
commercial tools. Creating a testbed enabling ongoing, comprehensive
evaluation of advanced analysis, visualization, and collaboration
tools--from the commercial, private, and government sectors--is planned
for fiscal year 2005.
APPENDIX
Appendix A--Peer Review Procedures (Office of Research and Development)
REVIEW AND SELECTION OF PROPOSALS FROM THE U.S. DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY
NATIONAL LABORATORIES TO THE U.S. DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY
SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY DIRECTORATE RADIOLOGICAL AND NUCLEAR
COUNTERMEASURES PORTFOLIO
Michael J. Burns
Office of National Laboratories
Office of Research and Development
Science and Technology Directorate
U.S. Department of Homeland Security
August 14, 2003
Abstract
The process to be followed by the Office of National Laboratories
(ONL) to make recommendations for the placement of work at DOE National
Laboratories from the Rad/Nuc Countermeasures portfolio is detailed
here. Submissions responsive to needs expressed by the Rad/Nuc
portfolio manager are expected from two consortia of national
laboratories by August 25, 2003. These submissions will be organized
into sections containing detailed project proposals. Each proposal will
be subjected to both a semi-quantitative numerically-scored review
consisting of Technical Merit, User Relevance, and Execution Planning
components, as well as an overall Management Assessment. The Technical
Merit portion of the review will be conducted by external reviewers
utilizing the ORISE PeerNet system and organized with separate review
teams for each section of the submissions. Numerical scores for all
three scored components will be assigned based upon criteria listed in
this paper and an overall numerical score calculated with a weighting
of 40% assigned to the first two components and 20% assigned to the
third. The scored portion of the review will be combined with the
outcome of an overall Management Assessment that consider inputs and
issues not well-captured by the scored portion of the review. The
scored rankings and the Management Assessment will form the basis for
ONL's recommendations for work assignment to the labs. ONL will present
these recommendations to the Director, Office of Research and
Development (ORD) for funding decisions. The remaining fiscal year 03
funds will be distributed and fiscal year 04 plans made (with fiscal
year 04 funding awaiting congressional action to establish the DHS
fiscal year 04 budget) based upon ORD's decisions. ORD decisions will
be certified by the Director, Office of Plans, Programs, and Budgets
(PPB). ONL anticipates the funding decisions to be made by September
19, 2003.
I. Introduction
The U.S. Department of Homeland Security's (DHS) Science and
Technology Directorate (S&T) has solicited proposals from certain U.S.
Department of Energy (DOE) National Laboratories to execute new
programs within the Directorate's Radiological & Nuclear (Rad/Nuc)
Countermeasures Portfolio. Although this portfolio has many on-going
programs that are underway at some national laboratories, a significant
amount of new work is scheduled to begin and is intended for execution
at DOE's national labs. Assignment of this work will be made through
the review of specific laboratory proposals made in response to S&T's
Rad/Nuc portfolio needs. It is the purpose of this paper to outline the
process that S&T's Office of National Laboratories (ONL) will use to
review proposals and make recommendations to the Director, Office of
Research and Development (ORD) for the ultimate placement of work at
the labs.
Section II of this paper presents a brief overview of the Rad/Nuc
portfolio that is intended as useful background for those considering
the review process. Section III of this paper presents the general
structure expected of the laboratory submissions and also discusses the
subsequent review process. This section outlines some specific
requirements of the labs in formatting and delivering their
submissions. It also presents an overview of the review process.
Section IV summarizes the PeerNet system hosted by the Oak Ridge
Institute for Science and Education (ORISE) that will be used by
external reviewers to enter their comments regarding specific
proposals. PeerNet is an established system for independent anonymous
review of technical proposals and provides a convenient method to
capture reviewer comments, organize them efficiently for DHS S&T
review, and to maintain documentation of the review process. PeerNet
has been used extensively by certain U.S. Government agencies for this
purpose in the past. Section V presents the review criteria that will
be used by the various reviewers who will examine the laboratory
proposals. Criteria are listed here for both the numerically-scored
components of the review and the Management Assessment. Finally,
Section VI provides a discussion of the dates associated with this
review and a check-list of actions required by the laboratories in
support of the review.
II. Overview of the Radiological and Nuclear Countermeasures Portfolio
The technology, materials, and expertise required to build
radiological and nuclear weapons are spreading inexorably. The
Department of Homeland Security's Science and Technology Directorate
has developed the Radiological and Nuclear Countermeasures Portfolio to
develop science and technology useful in addressing this pressing
homeland security issue. The portfolio strategy is comprehensive:
securing existing materials; providing technologies for detection of
radiological materials at the nation's borders and in transit within
the transportation infrastructure; and providing an effective
intervention capability at the local, state, and federal level. The
portfolio will also support the development of the best available
technologies, training, and information to assist in crisis response,
incident management and recovery, and attribution.
The Rad/Nuc portfolio focuses on providing federal, state, and
local end users (including Borders and Transportation Security
agencies, Emergency Preparedness and Response agencies, the U.S. Coast
Guard, and port authorities) the most appropriate and effective
detection and interdiction technologies available to prohibit the
importation or transportation and subsequent detonation of a
radiological or nuclear device within the nation's borders. Key
initiatives include the deployment, evaluation, and evolution of
currently available technologies at ports of entry; the development and
prototyping of systems for detection within the transportation
infrastructure; the development of advanced technologies for more
effective crisis response at the time of an event; and the development
of an effective, science-based consequence management program. The
portfolio will also provide an enduring science and technology base for
addressing such long-term challenges in radiological and nuclear
detection systems as the detection of Highly-Enriched Uranium (HEU) and
shielded plutonium and radioactive sources. Technical expertise will
also be provided to the operational directorates of DHS as needed and
the performance of deployed systems will be continually assessed to
identify vulnerabilities and opportunities for improvement.
Assessment of proposals submitted in support of Rad/Nuc portfolio
goals will require a broad cross-section expertise that could include
nuclear science, nuclear chemistry, engineering, nuclear medicine,
systems analysis, and emergency response.
III. General Structure of Submissions and Review
ONL expects two large submissions from two groups of DOE national
laboratories. These submissions will contain specific proposals to
execute work in response to needs outlined by the S&T Rad/Nuc portfolio
manager in a briefing to the laboratories given on July 22, 2003 in
Washington, DC. Each of the two submissions will contain major sections
as described during the ONL/National Laboratories meetings on this
subject conducted July 22-23, 2003 in Washington, DC. Each section will
contain specific proposals for work in support of the Rad/Nuc
portfolio. These specific proposals must be contained in separate
files.
ONL has been notified that the Lawrence Livermore National
Laboratory (LLNL), the Los Alamos National Laboratory (LANL), and the
Sandia National Laboratory (SNL) will be the principal authors of one
submission. This submission may also contain work that is proposed for
execution at other national laboratories. ONL has also been notified by
the Argonne National Laboratory (ANL), Bechtel/Nevada (BN), the
Brookhaven National Laboratory (BNL), the Idaho National Environmental
and Engineering Laboratory (INEEL), the Oak Ridge National Laboratory
(ORNL), and the Pacific Northwest National Laboratory (PNNL) that this
group of laboratories will team as principal authors to generate a
second submission. Again, this submission may have roles identified for
other institutions.
Each submission must be delivered electronically in files formatted
in standard ``.pdf'' format. Electronic submission will be made to the
PeerNet website according to instructions that will be supplied to the
labs in the near future. Authors can check the web-site at
www.orau.gov/dhsuce for a similar site. Questions concerning submission
should be directed to the Deputy Office Director of ONL (Dr. Caroline
Purdy, [email protected]).
Each submission must be received by 8:00 a.m., EDT, on August 25,
2003.
Each submission must be clearly separated into distinct sections
that roughly align with the Work Breakdown Structure devised for the
Rad/Nuc portfolio. These sections will be used by ONL to organize
proposals for separate review groups. The major elements of the Rad/Nuc
portfolio Work Breakdown Structure are Systems Architecture and Pilot
Deployments, Pre-Planned Product Improvement, Technology Development
Initiatives, and Incident Management. In the July 22-23, 2003 ONL/
National Laboratories meeting concerning the Rad/Nuc portfolio, it was
agreed that there was not significant National Laboratory work in the
Pre-Planned Product Improvement WBS element. The Laboratories also
indicated a preference for organizing their proposals into sections
that represented broad capabilities. Finally, ONL desired to group the
proposals into major categories for which separate review teams could
be formed. Therefore, there should be six major sections for each
submission. These sections are :
1. Systems Analysis and Integration
2. Pilot Demos
3. Passive Detection Technology
4. Active Detection Technology
5. Pre-Event Incident Prevention and Response
6. Post-Event Incident Prevention and Response
The Systems Analysis and Integration section is to contain
proposals addressing systems analysis, systems integration, and sensor
network needs shown in the Rad/Nuc portfolio briefing on July 22, 2003.
The Pilot Demos section is not to include the ongoing New York/New
Jersey Port Authority project but should include proposals addressing
surreptitious entry needs from the Rad/Nuc portfolio briefing and any
additional work concerning TSA or other operational elements,
representative pilot demos, etc. The Passive and Active Detection
Technology sections are self-explanatory and the detailed needs listed
in the July 22 briefing should be addressed. The Pre-Event Incident
Prevention and Response section should include all attribution
material.
Each submission must be clearly separated into these areas so that
ONL and ORISE can present each to a separate review team. Each section
should contain specific, individual proposals for work. Each of the
individual proposals should be contained in a separate ``.pdf'' file.
Each proposal should each have a specific, unique name, and be
associated with a specific section of the submission. The PeerNet
system will also generate a unique numerical designation for each
proposal. Each proposal should be responsive to the goals and
objectives of the Rad/Nuc portfolio or include work that falls within
that DHS mission space. Each proposal must represent a clearly defined
project or research effort, with clearly defined objectives or problems
to be addressed, clearly defined assumptions, clearly defined methods
of accomplishment (including as much detail as possible on facilities,
techniques, and personnel to be used), clearly defined deliverables, a
clearly defined schedule, and a clearly defined cost.
S&T will choose to fund laboratories at the proposal level and will
not necessarily be choosing one of the two consortia submissions over
another. Instead, S&T will consider each proposal in each section of
the submissions. The final assignments made by S&T are expected to
consist of a mixture of proposals from each submission.
Each proposal will be subjected to two types of review. The first
will be a semi-quantitative, scored review. The second type will be a
management assessment that considers issues and inputs difficult to
address using the scored system.
The scored review has three components. These components are
Technical Merit, User Relevance, and Execution Planning. Numerical
scores will be given for each of several criteria that are defined
below for each component. An overall numerical score will be generated
by weighting the scores for each component. Technical Merit will
account for 40% of the overall score. User Relevance will also account
for 40% of the final score. Execution Planning will account for the
remaining 20%.
Independent technical experts shall be utilized by ONL to conduct
the Technical Merit component of the scored review. These experts will
be selected from organizations such as the American Physical Society,
the American Chemical Society, academia, other government agencies, or
private industry. National Laboratories will not be asked to provide
reviewers. The reviewers will be grouped into teams of 3-4 persons with
each team reviewing a separate section of the submissions. Numerical
scores will be given according to the Technical Merit criteria
discussed below and entered by the reviewers into the PeerNet system.
Telephone conferences will be held between ONL and the reviewers before
the review begins and near the end of the review. During the second
conference, ONL will check to see if there are unanswered questions
that could affect the final scoring of proposals. If such questions
exist that can be answered quickly, ONL or the reviewers will contact
the proposal authors for clarification and the results of that contact
considered before the Technical Merit component of the review is
finalized.
The User Relevance component of the scored review will permit user
input to influence the selection of proposals to be funded. ONL will
ask S&T portfolio managers that represent DHS operational elements to
serve as reviewers for this component of the review. Portfolio managers
representing the U.S. Coast Guard, U.S. Secret Service, the DHS Borders
and Transportation Security Directorate, the DHS Information Analysis
and Infrastructure Protection Directorate, and the DHS Emergency
Preparedness and Response Directorate will serve as reviewers to score
each proposal that could impact their area of responsibility according
to the User Relevance criteria below.
Finally, the Execution Planning component of the scored review will
be conducted by the Portfolio Manager and Program Managers of the Rad/
Nuc portfolio and the ONL Director and Deputy Director. The criteria
for this component are also shown below.
Upon conclusion of the scored review, a Management Assessment
review will be conducted. This review is necessary to consider inputs
and issues that are not well captured by the scored part of the review.
These inputs and issues are listed in the Review Criteria section below
as well. The Management Assessment will be conducted by the ONL
Director with assistance from the ONL Deputy Director and the Portfolio
Manager and Program Managers of the Rad/Nuc portfolio
Upon completion of the scored components of the review and the
Management Assessment, ONL will compile a rank-ordered list of
proposals for each of the three major sections of the national
laboratory submissions. These rank-ordered lists of proposals and ONL's
recommendations for funding actions will be presented to S&T's
Director, Office of Planning, Programs, and Budgets (PPB), and
Director, Office of Research and Development (ORD). The final decision
as to which proposals will be funded will be made by the ORD Director,
a federal government employee. The PPB Director will certify this
decision and be S&T's final signature on funding documents that will
move funding and authorization to the laboratories.
Finally, ONL will furnish documentation of the review including a
proposal evaluation form that will summarize the results of the review
for each proposal in each section of the submissions.
IV. PeerNet
PeerNet is a secure, web-based peer review system maintained by the
Oak Ridge Associated Universities (ORAU) through its operation of the
Oak Ridge Institute for Science and Education (ORISE) for the U.S.
Department of Energy. Neither ORAU nor ORISE are associated with ORNL.
Annually, ORAU coordinates over 30 panel and postal reviews involving
more than 1,300 reviewers of over 1,600 proposals for DOE, the
Pennsylvania Department of Health, and now DHS. ORAU coordinated 96% of
the peer reviews for the DOE Office of Science in fiscal year 2002.
PeerNet was used to record reviewer scores and comments and provide
reports to the sponsors of the review. The scientific focus areas of
the fiscal year 2002 reviews were varied and included biomedical,
clinical, and health services, as well as science, energy, defense, and
environmental programs. This system was designed to streamline
collecting, tabulating, and reporting evaluative comments and/or scores
from multiple reviewers with common criteria. It has a straightforward
interface to provide access to significant flexibility for each peer
review.
ORAU also has access to extensive professional networks to recruit
and select reviewers with the necessary expertise for each review,
including an 86-member university consortium and councils, other
universities, relevant professional organizations, and public lists. We
will access ORAU's list of possible reviewers and combine it with S&T's
contacts to establish credible review panels for each section of the
laboratory submission.
After selection by ONL, each reviewer will sign a conflict of
interest form to ensure that each reviewer is an uninterested external
examiner of the proposal. They will then be assigned by ORISE a
password for access to the secure portion of PeerNet. Electronic
versions of each laboratories submission will be posted on PeerNet.
ORISE or ONL will have separated each submission into its component
sections and will have organized each section into its component
proposals. Each proposal will be associated with one of the two
submissions and carry a unique title provided by the submission
authors. A unique numerical identification number will also be
associated with each proposal by the PeerNet operators. To support this
system, it is therefore necessary for each submission to be provided to
ONL electronically in standard ``.pdf'' format.
Each reviewer will read the proposals on-line and score them
according to the criteria below. Each reviewer will also enter their
individual comments as needed. Any questions, especially those that
affect the reviewers final scoring, will be noted by ONL. The
submission authors will be provided an opportunity to respond to
question with a rapid one- or two-day turnaround. Therefore, authors
will not be able to rewrite the proposal, but will be able to offer
clarifications.
Upon receipt of any answers that were requested, reviewers will
conclude their review. ORISE will then compile the results as directed
by ONL.
We anticipate that PeerNet will be used for all components of the
scored portion of the review.
V. Review Criteria
The scored components of the review will use a scoring system
running from 1 to 4. Generally, a value of 1 is assigned to excellent
proposals and 4 to poor proposals. The Technical Merit and User
Relevance components of the scored review will also include a single
qualitative indicator as shown below.
To the extent possible consistent with delivery of submissions by
August 25, authors are encouraged to write their proposals as clearly
as possible with respect to the review criteria shown below. In this
way, reviewers will be more likely to consider all information that the
laboratories think is important for each reviewer to complete the
evaluation.
The Technical Merit component of the review will apply a numerical
score for ``technical merit'' and a second numerical score for
``technical team'' as shown below. A single qualitative indicator for
``technical risk assessment'' will also be provided. The Technical
Merit scoring criteria are:
``Technical Merit''
1. Scientifically and technically sound; technical approach is
clear and appropriate
2. Scientifically and technically sound, but there are minor
questions about the technical approach or underlying
assumptions
3. There are one or more significant questions about the
technical approach or the scientific/technical basis of this
proposal
4. Scientifically or technically unsound; OR the technical
approach is very unclear, missing, or inappropriate
``Technical Team''
1. The Principal Investigator (PI, if identified) and team have
an established record of technical achievement in this area or
in closely related work
2. The PI and team have an established record in an area that
is indirectly related to the proposed work
3. The PI and team are generally experienced in related work,
but have little or no track record in the area of the proposal
4. The PI and team's record is poor
``Technical Risk Assessment''
``Low''--straightforward technical path, no significant
challenges or impediments to success
``Medium''--moderately difficult technical path; impediments
can probably be overcome
``High''--very challenging technical path; impediments could
prevent successful outcome
The User Relevance component of the review will apply a numerical score
for ``alignment with DHS missions and needs'', a second numerical score
for ``time to return-on-investment'', and a third numerical score for
``difficulty of user implementation (assuming technical success)'', as
shown below. A single qualitative indicator for ``operational risk
assessment'' will also be provided. The User Relevance scoring criteria
are:
``Alignment with DHS missions and needs''
1. The outcome of the proposed work is highly aligned with the
broad missions and needs of DHS; meets a goal in the Rad/Nuc
PADs; a specific DHS user community is highly interested in the
outcome of the proposed work.
2. The outcome of the proposed work is generally aligned with
the broad missions and needs of DHS, although it is not in the
Rad/Nuc PADs; there is general interest from one or more DHS
user communities
3. The outcome of the proposed work is clearly not aligned with
the broad missions and needs of DHS and is not in the Rad/Nuc
PADs; no DHS user community has expressed interest, but
interest should be solicited before proposal disposition is
decided
4. The outcome of the proposed work is not relevant to the
missions and needs of DHS; OR no DHS user community has
expressed an interest and solicitation of interest is not
recommended
``Time to return-on-investment''
1. The outcome of this work is likely to impact a relevant DHS
user group in less than 2 years
2. The outcome of this work is likely to impact a relevant DHS
user group in 2-5 years
3. The outcome of this work is likely to impact a relevant DHS
user group in 5-10 years
4. The outcome of this work may impact a relevant DHS user
group in 5-10 years, but DHS funding is not appropriate
``Difficulty of user implementation (assuming technical success)''
1. Straightforward implementation; no significant challenges to
implementation
2. Moderately difficult; implementation challenges can probably
be overcome
3. Very challenging; there are significant difficulties to
implementation, but implementation is plausible
4. Too challenging; there are significant difficulties to
implementation so that implementation is not plausible
``Operational Risk Assessment''
``Low''--straightforward; no significant challenges or
impediments to success
``Medium''--moderately difficult; impediments can probably be
overcome
``High''--very challenging; impediments could prevent
successful outcome
The Execution Planning component of the review will apply a numerical
score for ``project management plan'', a second numerical score for
``Resources (people and facilities)'', and a third numerical score for
``overall plan execution risk'', as shown below. The Execution Planning
scoring criteria are :
``Project management plan''
1. Plan is very clear and credible; tasks, milestones, and
deliverables are well defined; proposed funding is consistent
with the scope of the project
2. Plan is generally clear and credible, but there are minor
questions about tasks, milestones, deliverables, or funding
levels
3. There are one or more significant questions about the
project management plan (tasks, milestones, deliverables, or
funding levels)
4. Plan is missing, unclear, or not credible; OR significant
prior deliverables for the project have not been met
``Resources (people and facilities)''
1. The proposed technical team, facilities, and resources are
known to be available at the necessary level and the resource
plan includes all required resources
2. The proposed technical team, facilities, and resources are
not complete or not fully available, but the gap can probably
be filled without significant difficulty
3. The reviewer has one or more significant questions
concerning the proposed technical team, facilities, and
resources, and it is not clear that these gaps can be filled
without significant difficulty
4. The proposed technical team, facilities, and resources have
significant gaps or questions that are not likely to be
addressed.
``Overall Plan Execution Risk''
1. Risk for successful execution is acceptable or a robust
mitigation plan is in place
2. A risk mitigation plan has been prepared and is plausible
3. There are multiple risks with questionable mitigation
strategy
4. Risk is considered too high; risk mitigation plan is
unacceptable or not identified
After the scored components of the review have been compiled, an
overall Management Assessment of the proposals will be conducted to
address inputs and issues not captured by the scored components of the
review. The final ranking of the proposals will consider both the
scored results and the qualitative results of the Management
Assessment. The list of issues that will be considered during the
Management Assessment include :
A. The possibility of congressional language or guidance
B. S&T strategy for the development of a manageable intramural
national laboratory capability
C. The total funding available to the portfolio
D. The balance of risk for all projects across the portfolio
(S&T believes that risk is not inherently bad, but we seek the
right balance of low, medium, and high risk projects )
E. The merit of proposals or approaches that show innovation to
address problems in a way S&T of the DHS User Community had not
considered
F. Integration with other S&T portfolios, other DHS
directorates, and other federal agencies, such as DOE/NNSA.
G. The overall technical and program execution performance of
the proposed technical team for similar projects in the past.
VI. Dates and Check List.
July 22 ONL/National Laboratories meeting to present details from the
Rad/Nuc portfolio and develop structure for proposal submissions
Aug. 25 Laboratory submissions received at ONL by 8:00am EDT. ONL and
ORISE parse the submissions and install in PeerNet. ONL distributes to
other reviewers as needed, including User Relevance reviewers and
Management Assessment reviewers.
Sept. 5 Initial technical merit review closes
Sept. 8 ONL compiles initial technical merit review results and
distributes to the National Laboratories any clarification questions
that may have been developed.
Sept. 9 First session of User Relevance review.
Sept. 10 National laboratories provide responses as needed to requests
for clarification from technical merit review. ONL distributes
responses to technical reviewers as needed. Technical reviewers use
these responses to finalize their review.
ONL distributes to National Laboratories any requests for clarification
that May have been developed in the first session of the User Relevance
Review.
Sept. 12 Technical Merit review is finalized.
National Laboratories respond by the beginning of the day with
responses that may be required to complete the User Relevance review.
Second and final session of the User Relevance review.
Sept. 15 ONL compiles final results of the Technical Merit and User
Relevance reviews.
Sept. 16 Management Assessment review and development of ONL
recommendations
Sept. 17-18 ONL delivers recommendations to ORD and PPB
Sept. 19 Funding decisions by ORD, certified by PPB, provided to ONL.
Processes to distribute funds initiated.
The following checklist for National Laboratory submissions may benefit
the principal authors to ensure the submissions can be effectively
evaluated by S&T.
Organize the overall submission with six clearly identified
sections as shown below:
1. Systems Analysis and Integration
2. Pilot Demos
3. Passive Detection Technology
4. Active Detection Technology
5. Pre-Event Incident Prevention and Response
6. Post-Event Incident Prevention and Response
Ensure each section contains clearly identified proposals. Each
proposal is contained in a separate ``.pdf'' file. Each proposal must
represent a clearly defined project or research effort, with clearly
defined objectives or problems to be addressed, clearly defined
assumptions, clearly defined methods of accomplishment (including as
much detail as possible on facilities, techniques, and personnel to be
used), clearly defined deliverables, a clearly defined schedule, and a
clearly defined cost.
Submissions must be received by 8:00am, EDT, August 25, 2003.
Submissions must be in the standard ``.pdf'' format.
Be prepared to respond to possible requests for clarification from
ONL concerning the Technical Merit review on Sept. 8, 2003 with
responses due on Sept. 10, 2003.
Be prepared to respond to possible requests for clarification from
ONL concerning the User Relevance review on Sept. 10, 2003 with
responses due at the start of business, eastern time, on Sept. 12,
2003.
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T7119.002
Appendix C is being retained in the Committee's files.
Appendix D--NIST/DHS MOU
MEMORANDUM OF UNDERSTANDING
between the
DIRECTORATE OF SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY,
U.S. DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY
and the
TECHNOLOGY ADMINISTRATION,
NATIONAL INSTITUTE OF STANDARDS AND TECHNOLOGY,
U.S. DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE
I. PURPOSE
The Department of Homeland Security (``DHS'') Science and Technology
Directorate (``Directorate'') is developing technological tools to
protect our nation's homeland. Successful development, testing,
evaluation, and deployment of these technologies require expertise in
measurement science and in the development of standards. The
Directorate intends to take advantage of the significant capabilities
that exists in these areas within the Department of Commerce's
Technology Administration (``TA''), specifically at the National
Institute of Standards and Technology (``NIST'').
Therefore, wherever possible and mutually beneficial, the Directorate
and TA seek to collaborate on research and planning activities, and
share where appropriate facilities, personnel, and scientific
information. This Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) sets forth the
basic principles and guidelines under which the parties will work
together to accomplish these goals.
II. Authority
Authority for cooperation in areas of overlapping interests and
responsibilities is provided for the Directorate pursuant to the
authority of Public Law 107-296, The Homeland Security Act of 2002 that
established DHS and for NIST, under the National Institute of Standards
and Technology Act (15 U.S.C. 271 et. seq.)
III. Implementation
(a) In order to enable close and effective collaboration, it is
agreed that the scope of cooperative activity will be reviewed
annually. Both the Directorate and TA will identify managers to
implement and coordinate the MOU. The managers shall meet on a
regular basis to discuss and direct activities conducted under
the MOU.
(b) The managers shall obtain appropriate express written
agreement by the Directorate and TA on each significant
activity to be undertaken pursuant to the MOU--including
consensus on the scope of work; deliverables (if any) and
delivery dates; anticipated products and outcomes; periods of
performance; levels of funding and resources to be provided for
each activity by the parties; and any other appropriate and
necessary aspects of mutual activities.
(c) Costs associated with the participation of the Directorate
and TA shall be subject to the availability of appropriated
funds and designated personnel of each party, or the approval
of other sources of funding. Funding for, and resources
allocation to, each significant activity undertaken pursuant to
this MOU shall be arranged in accord with the applicable
written implementing agreement of the parties required in the
above paragraph II(b).
(d) Costs associated with participation by Directorate-
supported personnel who use TA facilities and resources,
including equipment, laboratory, and office facilities, will be
provided through the Directorate. Costs associated with
participation by TA-supported personnel who use the
Directorate's facilities and resources, including equipment,
laboratory, and office facilities, will be provided through TA.
(e) The managers shall seek to resolve any dispute concerning
the MOU through good-faith discussions.
IV. EFFECTIVE DATE
This MOU is effective upon signature of the parties and will remain in
effect unless and until terminated as provided under Article VI.
V. AMENDMENTS
This MOU may be modified or amended by written agreement among the
parties hereto. Additionally, any terms or conditions involving the
Directorate and TA not stated in this MOU but expressly agreed to in a
future MOU signed by the Secretary of the Department of Homeland
Security and the Secretary of the Department of Commerce is considered
integrated into this MOU.
VI. TERMINATION
This MOU will expire sixty (60) months from the date of execution
unless renewed by mutual agreement of the parties. This MOU may be
terminated at any time by mutual agreement of both parties. Expiration
or termination would affect only pursuit of new projects under the MOU.
Projects under way will be governed by the specific individual
agreements anticipated above.
AGREED TO BY:
Charles E. McQueary .............. Phillip J. Bond
Under Secretary for Science Under Secretary for Technology
and Technology Science and Technology
Technology Administration Directorate
U.S. Department of Homeland Security U.S. Department of Commerce
On this date: May 22, 2003 On this date: May 22, 2003