[House Hearing, 108 Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
FIRST RESPONDERS; HOW STATES, LOCALITIES AND THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT ARE
WORKING TOGETHER TO MAKE AMERICA SAFER
=======================================================================
HEARING
before the
SELECT COMMITTEE ON
HOMELAND SECURITY
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
ONE HUNDRED EIGHTH CONGRESS
FIRST SESSION
__________
JULY 17, 2003
__________
SERIAL NO. 108-17
__________
Printed for the use of the Select Committee on Homeland Security
Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.access.gpo.gov/congress/
house
__________
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SELECT COMMITTEE ON HOMELAND SECURITY
Christopher Cox, California, Chairman
Jennifer Dunn, Washington Jim Turner, Texas, Ranking Member
C.W. Bill Young, Florida Bennie G. Thompson, Mississippi
Don Young, Alaska Loretta Sanchez, California
F. James Sensenbrenner, Jr., Edward J. Markey, Massachusetts
Wisconsin Norman D. Dicks, Washington
W.J. (Billy) Tauzin, Louisiana Barney Frank, Massachusetts
David Dreier, California Jane Harman, California
Duncan Hunter, California Benjamin L. Cardin, Maryland
Harold Rogers, Kentucky Louise McIntosh Slaughter, New
Sherwood Boehlert, New York York
Lamar S. Smith, Texas Peter A. DeFazio, Oregon
Curt Weldon, Pennsylvania Nita M. Lowey, New York
Christopher Shays, Connecticut Robert E. Andrews, New Jersey
Porter J. Goss, Florida Eleanor Holmes Norton, District of
Dave Camp, Michigan Columbia
Lincoln Diaz-Balart, Florida Zoe Lofgren, California
Bob Goodlatte, Virginia Karen McCarthy, Missouri
Ernest J. Istook, Jr., Oklahoma Sheila Jackson-Lee, Texas
Peter T. King, New York Bill Pascrell, Jr., New Jersey
John Linder, Georgia Donna M. Christensen, U.S. Virgin
John B. Shadegg, Arizona Islands
Mark E. Souder, Indiana Bob Etheridge, North Carolina
Mac Thornberry, Texas Charles Gonzalez, Texas
Jim Gibbons, Nevada Ken Lucas, Kentucky
Kay Granger, Texas James R. Langevin, Rhode Island
Pete Sessions, Texas Kendrick B. Meek, Florida
John E. Sweeney, New York
John Gannon, Chief of Staff
Uttam Dhillon, Chief Counsel and Deputy Staff Director
David H. Schanzer, Democrat Staff Director)
Michael S. Twinchek, Chief Clerk
(II)
C O N T E N T S
__________
Page
STATEMENTS
The Honorable Christopher Cox, Chairman, Select Committee on
Homeland Security............................................ 1
The Honorable Lincoln Diaz-Balart, a Representative in Congress
From the State of Florida.................................... 15
The Honorable Jennifer Dunn, a Representative in Congress From
the State of Washington...................................... 7
The Honorable Bob Etheridge, a Representative in Congress From
the State of North Carolina
Oral Statement............................................... 14
Prepared Statement........................................... 15
The Honorable Barney Frank, a Representative in Congress From
the State of Massachusetts................................... 11
The Honorable James R. Langevin, a Representative in Congress
From the State of Rhode Island............................... 15
The Honorable Sheila Jackson-Lee, a Representative in Congress
From the State of Texas
Prepared Statement........................................... 13
The Honorable Nita M. Lowey, a Representative in Congress From
the State of New York........................................ 11
The Honorable Edward J. Markey, a Representative in Congress
From the State of Massachusetts.............................. 11
The Honorable Bill Pascrell, Jr., a Representative in Congress
From the State of New Jersey................................. 51
The Honorable Loretta Sanchez a Representative in Congress From
the State of California...................................... 9
The Honorable Bennie G. Thompson, a Representative in Congress
From the State of Mississippi................................ 8
The Honorable Jim Turner, a Representative in Congress From the
State of Texas............................................... 26
The Honorable Curt Weldon, a Representative in Congress From
the State of Pennsylvania.................................... 28
WITNESSES
The Honorable Mitt Romney, Governor, Commonwealth of
Massachusetts
Oral Statement............................................... 16
Prepared Statement........................................... 18
Mr. Michael Grossman, Captain, Los Angeles County Sheriff's
Department
Oral Statement............................................... 43
Prepared Statement........................................... 45
Mr. George Jaramillo, Assistant Sheriff, Orange County,
California Sheriff's Department
Oral Statement............................................... 39
Prepared Statement........................................... 40
Mr. Ray Kiernan, Fire Commissioner and Chief of New Rochelle
Fire Department and Member of Westchester Career Fire Chiefs
and Northeast Fire Consortium, New Rochelle Fire Department,
New Rochelle, New York....................................... 47
Mr. Jamie Metzl, Senior Fellow and Coordinator for Homeland
Security Programs, Council on Foreign Relations
Oral Statement............................................... 33
Prepared Statement........................................... 36
(III)
MATERIALS SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD
Questions and Reponses for the Record.......................... 54
Prepared Statement of the Honorable Dick Murphy, Mayor, San
Diego, California............................................ 58
Letters Submitted for the Record............................... 60
(IV)
FIRST RESPONDERS; HOW STATES, LOCALITIES AND THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT ARE
WORKING TOGETHER TO MAKE AMERICA SAFER
----------
Thursday, July 17, 2003
House of Representatives,
Select Committee on Homeland Security,
Washington, D.C.
The committee met, pursuant to call, at 1:02 p.m., in Room
2318, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Christopher Cox
[chairman of the committee] presiding.
Present: Representatives Cox, Dunn, Smith, Weldon, Camp,
Diaz-Balart, Linder, Shadegg, Souder, Sweeney, Turner,
Thompson, Sanchez, Markey, Frank, Slaughter, DeFazio, Lowey,
Norton, McCarthy, Jackson Lee, Pascrell, Christensen,
Etheridge, Lucas of Kentucky and Langevin.
Chairman Cox. [Presiding.] Good afternoon. A quorum being
present the Select Committee on Homeland Security will come to
order. The committee is meeting today to hear testimony on how
states, localities and the federal government are working
together to make America safer.
I would like to welcome the members in attendance this
afternoon, advise members that we expect votes to come up on
the floor as soon as 15 minutes from now. The first vote would
likely be a 15-minute vote, so it is my hope that we can go
through very brief opening statements and immediately to the
testimony of our first witness, Governor Mitt Romney from the
Commonwealth of Massachusetts.
I would like to thank both distinguished panels of
witnesses for appearing today. None of us will ever forget the
images seared into our memories of those who gave their lives
to rescue an estimated 15,000 men and women from the World
Trade Center towers, or those who responded so quickly at the
Pentagon on September 11.
The events on that tragic day reminded all of us of the
indispensable role of firefighters, police officers and
emergency medical service personnel, a role that they fulfill
every day.
It forced all of us to rethink the way in which the federal
government works with state and local communities to detect and
prevent, but also to prepare to respond effectively to acts of
terrorism.
Since that tragic day in September, Congress has increased
the funding for the estimated 2 million first responders by
over $20 billion--1,400 percent increase since September 11.
Unfortunately, however, this massive infusion of funding is
not reaching our first responder community effectively. It is
not getting there fast enough, and sometimes the money is not
getting there at all.
We are here today to find out how we can do better. Just
last month, the committee visited California for hearings on
port security at the ports of Los Angeles and Long Beach, and
to meet with the first responder community in Los Angeles and
Orange Counties.
One of our witnesses there is also a witness here today,
Assistant Sheriff Jaramillo, who was eloquent in discussing the
broken pipeline funneling money from Washington to the states,
and in offering suggestions on how to better coordinate federal
grant programs.
There was also some good news. We have heard encouraging
testimony from the sheriff of Los Angeles County, Lee Baca, and
the sheriff of Orange County, Mike Carona, about
interjurisdictional information sharing between Orange and Los
Angeles Counties, among them some 25 million people, and about
the joint Orange/Los Angeles County Homeland Security Advisory
Council, which meets regularly and brings federal, state and
local government officials together with private sector
representatives to develop a homeland security strategy for the
region.
They have, on their own initiative, made real progress,
which we want to recognize and reward. Regional cooperation in
funding decisions should be a top priority.
Washington must also encourage the states to quickly and
efficiently release federal grant moneys to the localities that
are most at risk. Washington must do its part to fix the broken
pipeline, which carries federal money to the states to enhance
they statewide efforts.
We, in Congress, must also do a better job of providing
states and localities the information they need to allocate
resources efficiently to those areas facing the greatest risk
of attack.
But perhaps the most important point is that these funds
can no longer be distributed based on political formulas. In
this and so many other areas of the homeland security mission,
we need better intelligence to understand the terrorist threat.
And we must get this information to the first responders,
who require it to enhance our security. We must have better
intelligence, and we must find ways to share it more broadly if
we are to bound the terrorist threat, if we are to limit our
vulnerabilities, and if we are to develop cost-effective
solutions.
Nearly two years after the attacks of September 11, grants
are still being distributed to states using political formulas,
formulas, in fact, that take no account of whether the
recipient is, based on our best intelligence, at risk.
Presently, the Office for Domestic Preparedness within the
Department of Homeland Security distributes a baseline amount
of 0.75 percent of the total amount appropriated to the grant
program to every state, regardless of location, population,
geographic size, number of critical assets or terrorist
targets. This baseline amount is then followed by a
distribution based merely on population. The formula has
resulted in an astonishing distortion in funding for first
responders.
California, a state with seven times the population of
Wyoming, receives just under $5 per person in first responder
grants, while Wyoming receives over $35 per person. Even on a
population formula alone, therefore, the system isn't working.
Wyoming's largest city, Cheyenne, has a population of
53,000, while California has 140 cities with populations equal
to or above that number. A distribution system based on
population alone creates such distortions. We need to apply
some common sense and bring threat assessment into the
equation.
Congress has offered ODP virtually no guidance on the
structure of first responder grants. The Homeland Security Act
simply does not address this. We have provided no guidance on
the methods of distribution or guidelines to recipients,
unallowable uses of the funds. As a result, Congress is
appropriating and the department is allocating billions of
dollars to states with very little input from Congress on how
these decisions should be made.
This is not to say that Wyoming may not face the greatest
risks of terrorism. We simply aren't using that kind of
analysis in making these decisions. In fact, every state of the
union faces plenty of risk and has many vulnerabilities. But
the great disparity and the distribution of funds must be
addressed on an objective basis so that states--all states and
all people within the United States--are best prepared to face
potential terrorist threats. We need to prioritize based on
real risk of attack, real threats.
Today the committee looks forward to hearing suggestions on
how the grant formulas can be changed to integrate risk-based
analysis into the formula, so that states facing the highest
risk, localities facing the highest risk, and regions, whether
they be within states or among states facing the highest risk,
receive priority assistance from the federal government. We
also look forward to hearing your thoughts on ways to simplify
the process for states and localities to seek and receive funds
for their first responders and how these funds have been
utilized.
At present, we have in many cases a 12-step formula for
obtaining first responder grants. Legislation that we are
considering here today would change that to a two-step formula
and vastly speed up the process, simplify it, make it more
understandable and comprehensible for people around the
country.
Lastly, we would like to hear your suggestions on how the
Department of Homeland Security can further support states,
local governments and first responders in the full range of
their responsibilities.
Chairman: I would like to welcome the Members in attendance
this afternoon and thank both distinguished panels of witnesses
for appearing today.
None of us has forgotten the images of those first
responders who gave their lives to rescue an estimated 15,000
men and women from the World Trade Center Towers or those who
responded so quickly at the Pentagon on September 11, 2001.
The events on that tragic day reminded all of us of the
indispensable role our firefighters, police officers, and
emergency medical service personnel fulfill every day. It
forced all of us to rethink the way in which the federal
government works with state and local communities to detect and
prevent, but also to prepare to respond effectively, to acts of
terrorism.
Since that tragic day in September, Congress has increased
the funding for the estimated 2 million first responders by
over $20 billion, a 1,400 percent increase in anti-terrorism
aid to states and localities. Unfortunately, however, this
massive infusion of funding is not reaching our first responder
community fast enough, and sometimes not at all. We are here
today to find out how we can to do better.
Just last month, the Committee visited California for a
field hearing on Port Security in the Ports of Los Angeles and
Long Beach, and to meet with the first responder community in
neighboring Orange County. One of our witnesses here today,
Assistant Sheriff Jaramillo, was eloquent in discussing the
broken pipeline funneling money from Washington to the States
and in offering suggestions on how to better coordinate Federal
grants programs.
There was also some good news. We heard encouraging
testimony from Los Angeles County Sheriff Lee Baca and Orange
County Sheriff Mike Carona about inter-jurisdictional
information sharing between Orange and Los Angeles Counties and
about the joint Orange-LA County Homeland Security Advisory
Council. The Council meets regularly and brings federal, state,
and local government officials together with private sector
representatives to develop a homeland security strategy for the
region. They have--on their own initiative--made real progress,
which we want to recognize and reward. Regional cooperation is
a top priority.
Washington must also encourage the states to quickly and
efficiently release Federal grant money to the localities that
are most as risk. Washington must do its part to fix the broken
pipeline which carries federal money to the states to enhance
their state-wide efforts. We in Congress must also do a better
job of providing states and localities the information they
need to allocate those resources efficiently to those areas
facing the greatest risk of attack.
But perhaps the most important point is that these funds
can no longer be distributed based on political formulas. In
this and so many other areas of the homeland security mission,
we need better intelligence to understand the terrorist threat
and we must get this information to the first responders who
require it to enhance our security. We must have better
intelligence and we must find ways to share it more broadly if
we are to bound the terrorist threat, if we are to limit our
vulnerabilities, and if we are to develop cost-effective
solutions.
Nearly two years after the attacks of September 11, grants
are still being distributed to states using political formulas.
Formulas, in fact, that take no account of whether the
recipient is, based on our best intelligence, at risk.
Presently, the Office for Domestic Preparedness within DHS
distributes a baseline amount of .75 percent of the total
amount appropriated to the grant program to every state--
regardless of location, population, geographic size, number of
critical assets and terrorist targets. This baseline amount is
then followed by a population-based distribution.
The formula has resulted in an astonishing distortion in
funding for first responders. California, a state with 70 times
the population of Wyoming--receives just under $5 per person in
first responder grants while Wyoming receives over $35 per
person. Wyoming's largest city--Cheyenne--has a population of
53,000, while California has 140 cities with populations equal
to or above that number. A distribution system based on
population alone creates such distortions. We need to apply
some common sense and bring threat assessment into the
calculation.
Congress has offered ODP virtually no guidance on the
structure of first responder grants, the methods of
distribution, or guidelines to recipients on allowable use of
these funds. As a result, Congress is appropriating and the
Department is allocating billions of dollars to states with
very little input from Congress on how these decisions should
be made.
This is not to say that Wyoming faces no risk of
terrorism?every state in the Union faces some risk and plenty
of vulnerabilities. But the great disparity in the distribution
of funds must be fixed so that states are better supported to
face these risks. We need to prioritize based on real risk of
attack?real threats.
Today, the Committee looks forward to hearing suggestions
on how the grant formula can be changed to integrate risk-based
analysis into the formula so that states facing the highest
risk receive priority assistance from the federal government.
We also look forward to hearing your thoughts on ways to
simplify the process for states and localities to seek and
receive funds for their first responders, and how these funds
have been utilized. Lastly, we would like to hear your
suggestions on how the Department of Homeland Security can
further support States, local governments, and first
responders.
I would recognize next, for purposes of an opening
statement, my distinguished colleague from Texas. The gentleman
is the ranking member on the committee, Mr. Turner.
Mr. Turner. Thank you, Mr. Chairman and welcome, Governor.
We are glad that you are with us today. I had the
opportunity to visit just a few minutes ago with your co-chair,
Governor Minner of Delaware. I had good visit with her, and
both of you seem to be doing outstanding work on behalf of the
governors. It is a pleasure for us to have the opportunity to
hear from you today.
As we convene this hearing today, Mr. Chairman, we all know
that it is likely that somewhere a terrorist group is
developing plans to use chemical, biological, radiological or
other weapons of mass destruction to attack our nation.
At the same time, federal, state and local emergency
preparedness officials across the nation are working to prevent
and prepare for such attacks.
Congress created the Department of Homeland Security to
comprehensively address the need to prevent, prepare for,
respond to and recover from the threat of terrorism. And as I
have suggested in the past in meetings of this committee, a
principal mission of the Department of Homeland Security is to
ensure that all levels of government, across the nation, have
the capability to work together efficiently and effectively,
using a national approach to domestic incident management.
We are gathered here today to make sure that these words
become a reality, and that the Department of Homeland Security
is creating a genuine partnership among the state, federal and
local officials who are committed to making America safer. It
is our duty to make sure that the might of federal government
is being put into action to prepare America, to prevent,
respond to, and recover from attacks.
On June 29, the Council of Foreign Relations's Independent
Task Force on Emergency Responders released a report entitled,
``Emergency Responders: Drastically Underfunded, Dangerously
Unprepared.'' The report stated that nearly two years after
September 11, the United States is drastically underfunding
State and local emergency responders, and remains dangerously
unprepared to handle a catastrophic attack on American soil.
The work of this expert, bipartisan task force makes clear
it that we must move faster and stronger to prepare our
communities in order to protect our nation. We rightly made a
commitment to provide the very best training and equipment to
our troops in Afghanistan and Iraq. Now we must make the same
level of commitment to the men and women who will be the first
to respond in the case of a terrorist attack here at home.
Both the task force report and my ongoing discussions with
emergency responders around the country have demonstrated to me
that the time for comprehensive change in our preparedness
programs is now. I plan, with the help of the members on the
Democratic side--and I hope to work jointly with the chairman--
to address both the critical deficiencies identified in the
report, and the Department of Homeland Security's partnership
with state and local governments by introducing legislation to
deal with these issues.
This first responder legislation, in my judgment, should
deal with four critical issues.
First, we must define preparedness. The legislation should
require the Department of Homeland Security to provide clear
guidance to communities on necessary skills and resources
required to prevent, prepare for and respond to terrorist
attacks.
Communities will apply this guidance to their individual
threats and vulnerabilities, in order to determine their
specific needs and necessary funding.
Second, we must build, State and local capabilities.
Our legislation should direct the Department of Homeland
Security to create a single terrorism preparedness grant
program and a one-stop shop to cut bureaucratic red tape in
order to address communities' lack of essential equipment and
training capabilities.
Traditional programs, such as COPS and the Fire Grant
Program, should be preserved, but the new combined grant
program should be flexible enough to address the legitimate
needs that we are hearing about every day from our first
responders.
The third area that our legislation must address is the
issue of interoperable communications. The legislation should
direct the Department of Homeland Security to make
recommendations on spectrum needs, provide funds for an interim
interoperable communications capability in major metropolitan
areas, and work with industry and first responders to set
standards for equipment and communications systems.
And lastly, our legislation should revise the early warning
system.
The legislation should direct the Department of Homeland
Security to reform the homeland security advisory system to
identify threats by region and by critical infrastructure
sector.
The department also should ensure continuous, actionable
information sharing with state and local officials. Security
clearance for state and local personnel should be funded and
expedited as appropriate.
The task force report that I referred to earlier and the
continued call for systemic to the funding system changes from
state and local emergency responders are a wake-up call to our
nation. They show that America's security needs are great, that
they are not being met and that we must act now.
America's enemies are united in their desire to harm
America, and we must be united in moving faster and deploying
stronger forces to win the war on terror.
I look forward to hearing the excellent testimony that will
be offered to this committee today, and I want to thank in
advance all those who have come to share their ideas with this
committee, to help us move faster and stronger in support of
our first responder community.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Cox. Thank the gentleman.
The Chair next recognizes for the purpose of an opening
statement the Gentlelady from the State of Washington, the vice
chairman of the full committee, Ms. Dunn.
Ms. Dunn. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
Thank you and thank you, Governor Romney, and to our entire
panel for being here with us today.
It is so important to us in our effort to figure out what
is working well and what needs improvement, to hear from you
who are there on the front lines and from all representatives
at all levels of the network that is charged with keeping our
constituents safe.
We will only be successful in preventing attacks and
preparing for disasters if everybody is engaged in the effort,
including federal, state and local government, as well as the
private sector.
First responders are absolutely essential to securing our
homeland. They are on the ground, often risking their own lives
to help keep the rest of us safe.
Most of the time they are working for a local government
who can't afford the costs of prevention, preparedness and
response any more than can the governors of the states, or the
federal government. These organizations must be provided the
resources necessary to carry out training exercises, to hire
personnel and to buy the equipment that they need.
I have heard recently growing criticism and growing concern
among local law enforcement and first responder groups about
the channels through which federal dollars must pass before
reaching them. Some complain that instead of flowing through
the governors' offices, the funding should be directed to local
jurisdictions.
I look forward to hearing our witnesses talk about whether
current funding strategies are working. Our job as an oversight
committee is to help make sure that committed federal dollars--
and we know there are many--are being delivered and spent
efficiently and are getting to those who are on the ground and
who need this money to carry out their own responsibilities.
I recently had the opportunity to witness the first
responder organizations in my own district, in Washington
state, exercising their emergency preparedness skills during
the TOPOFF 2 exercise that was held in Seattle. The lessons
learned from this exercise will prove to be invaluable to the
Department of Homeland Security and to all of us on this
committee.
It is without a doubt that exercises such as this one
improve our capabilities and develop a network of the
stakeholders who are involved in disaster response and crisis
management.
I was pleased to see top federal and state officials,
mayors, city managers, hospitals, law enforcement units, fire
departments, the Red Cross and local businesses all working
together during TOPOFF 2. Their ability to, in effect, practice
the response to a potential terrorist-caused disaster enabled
them coordinate who would act as the lead agency and how and
who would make the critical decisions. This communication
network is a critical base on which the public will rely for
timely response in an emergency situation.
I cannot underscore enough to you our belief in the
importance of first responders to the broad goal of keeping our
constituents safe. We must keep our focus on steps that will
allocate funds in an efficient, but a sensible way, and make
sure the dollars get to the ground.
I look forward to the hearing.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Cox. I thank the gentlelady.
Who next seeks recognition for purposes of an opening
statement?
Mr. Thompson?
Mr. Thompson. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
I am pleased that we have assembled this witness panel
today to discuss the critical issue of the federal, state and
local partnership for terrorism preparedness.
In previous hearings, officials from the Department of
Homeland Security have stated that they are working to ensure
that all levels of government across the nation have a
capability to work efficiently and effectively together using a
national approach to terrorism preparedness.
As I have stated before, the job of this committee is to
provide an oversight function for the department, and thereby
assist local units of government in three key phases of hazard,
mitigation, prevention, response and recovery.
To that end, I continue to encourage the department to
listen closely to the needs, successes and frustrations of our
first line of homeland defense, the first responders.
DHS must create more open and frequent lines of
communication. The men and women who prepare our communities
for disasters and then help our communities to rapidly recover
are absolutely critical.
I have met frequently with these men and women in my
district, and I have told them that the work we do here in
Washington must match the needs of the people at the local
level. It is my belief that these needs are not being met.
Put simply, DHS is not preparing local communities to
prepare for and respond to terrorist attacks. For example, DHS
has not worked with state and local governments to determine
when communities are prepared for terrorist attacks. We don't
know what equipment, planning, training and personnel and how
much funding are needed to secure communities.
The first responder grant program is broken. Current grants
can't target the greatest needs, take too long to reach first
responders, pit agencies against each other in applying for
funds and are overly bureaucratic. Our response personnel can't
talk to each other. DHS is not assessing the interoperability
communications problems.
Finally, specific threat information is not readily
available to states and localities. DHS is not providing first
responders with timely intelligence and threat information. We
must move faster, and we must be stronger in our efforts to
protect and defend the United States of America.
I hope the testimony we hear today will assist us, Mr.
Chairman, in developing a road map for doing so.
Lastly, representing primarily a rural area, I don't want
us to miss rural America in this discussion. We have to include
rural America.
I yield back.
Chairman Cox. I thank the gentleman. Obviously, there is
now a vote on the floor. There will be 15 minutes in the first
vote. And so, we will proceed either with opening statements or
the testimony of our first witness. Members are reminded that
under the rules of the committee, a member who waives his
opening or her opening statement have three minutes added to
their opportunity for questioning the witness.
Who seeks recognition on this side for purposes of an
opening statement?
Seeks recognition of the gentlelady from California.
Ms. Sanchez. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Chairman, I have a written opening statement. I would
like to submit it for the record. And just to save a little
time here, I would just like to go over some six points just
for our panelists in case, when you are talking to us, you
might be able to hit in particular on these six that I would
like to try to get some information on what we can do to make
this system better.
The first would be the whole issue of allocating resources
from the federal government on a risk basis, as the chairman
indicated. I think it is the most important reason that we are
here, and we would like to hear your ideas.
The second would be how to make the pipeline shorter. And I
know that we have the governor here from Massachusetts. But, at
least in my state, people are telling me that when you send it
to the state, it doesn't necessary get to the local level. So
for the locals here, I would like to hear what ideas you have
with respect to shortening that pipeline to getting it down.
The third thing would be to preserve the cops and the fire
programs that we have and not be cannibalizing from those and
saying that it is homeland security money now. So I would like
to hear if that is happening to any of you out there.
The fourth, it is my belief, in having met with all of my
first responders up and down the state now in California, and
there is quite a bit, all from the very smallest agency to our
great sheriffs in L.A. and in Orange County, that maybe our
grants aren't hitting the right items. In other words, we don't
have grants for overtime or personnel costs. And, in the city
of Anaheim, protecting Disneyland and all our other great
assets there. It is about money, money spent to pay our first
responders when we go on orange alert.
I also would like to hear, and I haven't taken the look all
the way down, on the hospitals because I think they are a piece
of the first responder equation that some of us tend to forget.
So if any of you have any ideas on how we might be able to help
there.
And lastly, and some of the members have mentioned it, I
think the chairman mentioned it in his opening remarks, the
whole issue of standards. For example, some of my local law
enforcement said that the standards for masks and these types
of equipment are really military standards. And are they
necessarily the standards that we need for equipment that would
be used on a first responder basis within our own city?
So if you have any ideas on that, I would appreciate it.
And I will yield back to Mr. Chairman.
PREPARED STATEMENT OF THE HONABLE LORETTA SANCHEZ, A REPRESENTATIVE IN
CONGRESS FROM THE STATE OF TEXAS
Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I would first like to welcome our
distinguished guests and thank each of you for coming here today to
talk about this well-publicized and enduring issue facing local
communities throughout the country. Since September 11 our local first
responders have taken exemplary measures to make sure that, in the face
of a new national security reality, they are ready to respond to
another terrorist event. However, despite these efforts, recent high-
profile reports, such as the one that was completed by one of our
distinguished witnesses here today, have determined that our first
responders remain ``drastically underfunded'' and ``dangerously
unprepared.''
As Members of Congress, many of us have met with our local
responders, and we know how dire the situation is. We have heard what
they are telling us, we understand their need for federal funds, and we
fought in a number of venues-- during the tax cut, through the
appropriations process, etc.--to bring more money home to our local
police, fire fighters, emergency personnel, and hospital
administrators. However, here we are, almost two years later, and for
most of these individuals and agencies the situation remains
unimproved. Our locals don't have clear guidelines on what it means to
be ``prepared,'' they are not receiving the information they need to be
aware of impending threats, and many of them still haven't seen ANY of
the billions of dollars in new funding that the Administration has
constantly promised to help with their new national security mission.
This cannot go on.
We need to start doing more than just talking. We need to develop a
threat-based plan that will provide adequate money to our first
responders without overspending, that will provide the means to ENSURE
that this money promptly gets to the entities that need it, and that
will provide first responders the guidance on how to best use this
money. And we need to be doing this as quickly as possible.
It has been almost two years since September 11. I don't think that
anyone in the homeland security business doubts that a terrorist group
somewhere has been using that time to plan another attack on our
country. Ideally, we would be able to foresee and prevent such an
attack. However, if we are not so lucky, we need to make sure that our
first responders are ready. We need to make sure that America's own ill
preparedness doesn't end up hurting us more than the terrorists could
themselves.
Chairman Cox. Thank you, gentlelady.
The gentlelady from New York is recognized for purpose of
an opening statement.
Mrs. Lowey. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Cox. Oh, I am sorry. I have gone in the wrong
order here. I apologize.
I wanted to recognize one or both of the gentlemen from
Massachusetts, for purposes of recognizing and introducing our
first witness. But if you want to also make an opening
statement, I will recognize now for that purpose.
The gentleman from Massachusetts.
Mr. Markey. Thank you. And I will just take a minute.
And it will also be a welcome to the governor as well. We
are very grateful to you, Governor, for coming down here today
to provide your insights to the Homeland Security Committee on
these very important issues.
The governor was the chairman and the CEO of the very
successful Olympics in Salt Lake City. Obviously, there he had
the great responsibility of providing against a successful
terrorist attack upon their very high profile international
event, and he did a very good job in ensuring that we had a
very successful Olympics.
Up in Massachusetts, obviously, there are many issues that
provide examples, illustrations, of the problems that we have
nationally. Logan Airport is the place where both planes were
hijacked that flew into the World Trade Center.
The LNG facilities in Boston Harbor are the only urban-
sited LNG facilities in the United States. They provide special
security problems. And next year we are going to have the
Democratic National Convention in Boston, and the governor's
working very hard on that issue.
Never before has a Republican worked so hard and providing
so much safety for so many Democrats, and the governor is doing
a good job in ensuring that we are going to have a great
convention next year.
And we welcome you, Governor. And we thank you for your?
Mr. Frank. Mr. Chairman?
Chairman Cox. The gentleman from Massachusetts, Mr. Frank.
Mr. Frank. I fully agree with everything my colleague said,
except one slight amendment. The governor gets a lot of
practice in providing protection for a lot of Democrats every
day that he provides security at the State House, as we know.
I am very pleased that the governor is going to come here
and share his broad experience with us. I just want to stress
the central point. We are here talking about how essential it
is that government, federal, state and local government, have
access to enough resources to protect us.
We have in this society debates about what is appropriate
for the private sector or the public sector, and there is a
role for the private sector here. But it is overwhelmingly a
public sector responsibility, and it is, I hope, important for
people to remember there is a temptation to kind of demonize
government, there is an argument that says less government is
always better.
And we should be very clear, this is a public function we
are talking about, to be discharged only by government. And let
us also be very explicit. State, local and federal government
can only do their jobs if taxes are at a level sufficient to
produce revenues for them to do this.
There is sometimes a disconnect in this society in which
taxes are always bad, and the things that taxes pay for are
always good. I am a great believer in volunteerism, and I know
there are volunteer fire departments some places.
But the people I am aware of, the cops and the firefighters
and the EMTs and the others, on the whole, I don't expect them
to be volunteers. I don't think we can expect people to risk
their lives on a regular basis and acquire a great degree of
expertise on a regular basis as volunteers.
So I just would remind everybody we are talking here about
government.
And the notion that you can continually shrink government
and denounce government and demonize government and talk about
public employees as somehow people who don't produce as much,
and do this job well, don't work together.
So I am very glad to be here as we on a bipartisan basis
celebrate the importance of government.
Chairman Cox. I thank the gentleman. There are seven
minutes remaining in the vote. Does any member wish to be
recognized for purposes of an opening statement?
The gentlelady from New York.
Mrs. Lowey. Yes, I will take a couple of minutes, because
it is my distinct pleasure to thank Fire Commissioner Ray
Kiernan for joining us today. Mr. Kiernan is the fire
commissioner of the New Rochelle Fire Department, a member of
the Westchester Career Fire Chiefs, the Northeast Regional Fire
Consortium, and Commissioner Kiernan visits us from my district
in Westchester County, New York, and I am delighted to have him
here.
Ray has given over 30 years of his life to protecting our
local community, and we are grateful for his service. He is on
the front lines of emergency preparedness and response, and can
speak firsthand to the challenges he has faced throughout the
years and since the attacks on September 11.
We are here today to discuss additional efforts we can take
to win the race between those plotting to harm this country and
those working to prevent it.
It is critical that we as a committee and as a Congress
make smart, calculated decisions on how funds are allocated,
based on input from our first responders and state and local
officials.
We must address issues of operability, communication and
coordination, and we must address them now. I agree with the
Council on Foreign Relations that we obviously can't spend
every last dime of the GDP on response and preparedness. Nor
would this be fruitful.
However, two things are clear: First responders are
underfunded, and a better process must be put in place to
coordinate and disseminate these funds. The federal, state and
local governments cannot operate in a bubble. And every first
responder unit cannot work independently of one another.
We will hear Commissioner Kiernan describe an exceptional
example of how one community came together and made a strategic
decision to coordinate preparedness efforts and maximize
available funding. Commissioner Kiernan and his colleagues in
Westchester County are doing everything they can to keep our
communities safe. But they, like many others, need additional
support.
I am pleased that I was able to secure funding for this
preparedness program through the appropriations process. While
this funding will be helpful, however, we all know that this
piecemeal approach is the wrong way to get things done. We must
coordinate better. We must make responsible decisions. And we
must listen to our local heroes.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Welcome, Governor and welcome to all of our other
witnesses. Thank you.
Chairman Cox. I thank the gentlelady.
PREPARED STATEMENT OF THE HONORABLE SHEILA JACKSON-LEE, A
REPRESENTATIVE IN CONGRESS FROM THE STATE OF TEXAS
We are here today to strengthen the partnership between federal,
state, and local homeland security officials. Our main goal should be
getting funds and equipment to our local communities. Our local
communities and first responders need to prepare for terrorist attacks
now. To prepare they need federal funds now. Hundreds of millions of
dollars have been authorized and appropriated for homeland security,
but far too many of our first responders tell us they are not getting
the funds they need. We must expedite the funding process and get
resources to our local communities immediately.
The amendment I proposed would have helped local communities
prepare for terrorist attacks immediately. The amendment directed a
percentage of funds directly from the Department of Homeland Security
to city and county agencies to eliminate unnecessary paperwork and
delay. For many homeland security grant programs, local communities
must submit a lengthy grant application to the Department of Homeland
Security. If the grant is approved the funds are allocated to the
States, not to the locality that applied for the funds.
Presently, there are twelve steps that a local agency must go
through in order to receive grant funds. That is far too much delay;
The Members of the Select Committee on Homeland Security must
collaborate with our federal, state, and local agencies to expedite the
process so that needed funds can be received, equipment can be
purchased, and training programs can be conducted.
As I have said many times before, America is still not safe. Our
communities remain vulnerable to terrorists, our police departments,
fire departments, hazardous materials teams, and emergency medical
technicians remain insufficiently funded, trained, and equipped. Our
hearing today to discuss strategies for strengthening the partnership
between federal, state, and local agencies is an important step. But we
must follow through with action. The safety of every American citizen
depends on it.
The Chair announces that the hearing will remain open
during this vote, but we will postpone further statements or
the introduction of our witness until the conclusion of the
current round of votes on the floor of the House. I anticipate
that will put us back in this hearing room immediately after
the last vote, at approximately 2:15.
I thank the witnesses and the members for their patience.
[Recess.]
Chairman Cox. I would like to welcome our members back from
the floor.
Again, I would like to thank our distinguished witnesses
for your indulgence.
Governor Romney, I understand that you have committed to be
with us for two hours, and that you have a hard deadline that
you have to meet at 3:00, and we appreciate that.
I believe that we are finished with opening statements, but
I will ask if those members that are here whether any member
wishes to make an opening statement.
Mr. Etheridge?
Mr. Etheridge. I will be brief, Mr. Chairman, recognizing
the governor's time.
Thank you.
And let me thank you and the ranking member for giving
those of us on Homeland Security Committee the first
opportunity to hear from state and local officials.
And Governor, we are glad to have you here.
As has been stated already, former Senator Rudman and the
Council on Foreign Relations have provided Congress with an
important evaluation of the state of our nation's first
responder community with a report, ``Emergency Responders:
Dramatically Underfunded, Dangerously Unprepared.''
I think it documents many things we have to do, should do
and must do to help our first responders across the nation, and
I have heard that firsthand from my people in North Carolina.
And as we all know, law enforcement officials and
firefighters will be the first people on the scene of any
domestic terrorist incident. And Congress must make sure that
they have the training and the equipment they need to properly
evaluate the situation, to best protect the public and
themselves.
I welcome the opportunity to hear from the governor, and
representatives of Los Angeles and Orange County Sheriff's
Department and others who are here today.
They obviously have a lot of experience in terrorist
prevention activities.
However, I think it is absolutely critical that the Select
Committee on Homeland Security hear from testimony from
emergency responders from small states and rural areas. We need
to hear from police officers, emergency medical technicians,
emergency room doctors, public works officials. Those are the
people on the front line every single day of the year.
And they play a critical role in our nation's defense and
response network, and I would say, Mr. Chairman, why that is so
critical: When the response code goes up it doesn't say just to
New York or to Boston or somewhere else, you would be on alert.
It says to every state, every volunteer fire department, every
police department, you have to go up on alert.
So they don't where it is going to happen. And the results
of that I acknowledge that there are those who need to have
more, but we can't ignore the thousands upon thousands of
volunteers across this country, who have to meet the same
standard every time that code goes up.
So Governor, we look forward to hearing from you.
You should have some information that we could use, and I
look forward to it.
And thank you, Mr. Chairman, and I yield back.
PREPARED STATEMENT OF THE HONORABLE BOB ETHERIDGE, A REPRESENTATIVE IN
CONGRESS FROM THE STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA
Thank you, Chairman Cox and Ranking Member Turner, for giving
members of the Homeland Security Committee the first opportunity to
hear from state officials and local first responders on their needs and
concerns.
Former Senator Rudman and the Council on Foreign Relations have
provided Congress with an important evaluation of the state of our
nation's first responder community with their report ``Emergency
Responders: Drastically Underfunded, Dangerously Unprepared.'' The
report documents many of the concerns I have heard from the first
responders in North Carolina.
As we all know, law enforcement officials and firefighters will be
the first people on the scene of any domestic terrorist incident.
Congress must make sure that they have the training and equipment they
need to properly evaluate the situation to best protect the public and
themselves.
I welcome the opportunity to hear from Governor Romeny and
representatives of the Los Angeles and Orange County Sheriff's
Departments. They obviously have a lot of experience in terrorism
prevention activities.
However, I think it is absolutely critical that the Select
Committee on Homeland Security hear testimony from emergency responders
from small states and rural areas. We need to hear from police.
officers, emergency medical technicians, emergency room doctors and
public works officials. These people are on the front lines every day,
and they play crucial roles in our nation's defense and response
networks.
I call on the Congress and this Administration to make the training
and equipping of our nation's first responders a top priority. It is
the responsibility of the Administration and Congress to make sure that
they have the information, training and resources necessary to protect
the men, women and children of America, as well as themselves.
Chairman Cox. I thank the gentleman for his statement.
PREPARED STATEMENT OF THE HONORABLE LINCOLN DIAZ-BALART, A
REPRESENTATIVE IN CONGRESS FROM THE STATE OF FLORIDA
Mr. Chairman I believe this hearing gets to the heart of the
matter. If local, state, and federal officials aren't working as an
effective team, we place ourselves at a grave disadvantage in
preventing another terrorist attack, and particularly will endanger
many more Americans if one were to occur.
The Bush Administration and the Congress have made emergency
preparedness and response a top priority since the attacks on September
11, 2001. This commitment is clearly evidenced in the House version of
the Homeland Security Appropriations bill.
In the House passed Homeland Security Appropriations bill for
fiscal year 2004, we have funded the Office of Domestic Preparedness'
basic formula grant program at $1.9 billion.
The House has also approved $500 million each for the state and
local law enforcement terrorism prevention grant program and the high-
threat, high-density urban areas grant program. We further provide $750
million for Firefighter Grants and $200 million for Infrastructure
Grants. However, our responsibility does not end with the
appropriations process. We must also ensure that the funds are getting
into the hands of our local first responders, but we must also make
certain that this is done in a way that the process ensures strategic
thinking and coordination.
Thank you Governor Romney particularly for your written statement.
I agree that our states must be prepared with comprehensive response
plans and that the plans must be based in a sound analysis of the
potential terrorist threat.
We've seen in Florida that the only way to respond to such a
disaster as a hurricane, federal, state, and local officials have to be
working as one with clear roles and clear communication.
Unfortunately, a terrorist attack often gives no warning compared
to most natural disasters. It will test our officials and response
mechanisms to a greater degree. But we have fine men and women that
understand the magnitude of their efforts.
Thank you again, and I look forward to your testimony.
PREPARED STATEMENT OF THE HONORABLE JAMES R. LANGEVIN, A REPRESENTATIVE
IN CONGRESS FROM THE STATE OF RHODE ISLAND
Thank you, Mr. Chairman. We have an exceptional group of witnesses
with us today, and I am very much looking forward to hearing their
testimony.
I am particularly interested to hear from Jamie Metzl about the
work of the Council on Foreign Relations on first responder issues and
the conclusions and recommendations of the Council' recent report. We
all know that more needs to be done to ensure our communities are
prepared for an emergency, but putting those needs into concrete terms
has been a continuing challenge. Mr. Metzl and his colleagues have
provided an excellent tool for us to use in rising to that challenge,
and I hope Congress and the Department of Homeland Security will take
advantage of their research and use it as a blueprint for continued
progress.
It has become clear that one of the critical ``missing links'' on
the path to preparedness is a set of national standards and guiding
principles that can be used at the federal, state and local levels to
measure progress and determine shortfalls. I hope our witnesses will
spend some time discussing the issue of preparedness standards and how
they might help sharpen the focus of emergency responders on the most
critical capabilities and provide direction to Congress in determining
where our limited federal resources will be most effective.
Finally, and at the risk of sounding like a broken record, I am
interested to hear about one of my top priorities--the intelligence
aspect of DHS. It is my strong conviction that the regular
dissemination of reliable and specific threat information from DHS to
state and local agencies and emergency responders is critical to
achieve a satisfactory level of preparedness. I hope Governor Romney
and our first responder witnesses will speak to the frequency and
quality of intelligence that they have been receiving from the
Department. If, as I suspect, the information you are receiving has not
been sufficient, I would like to know what additional information you
need, how often and in what form, in order to ensure the safety of
those who rely on you.
Again, I thank our witnesses for being with us today, and I
appreciate the Chairman giving me this time.
And we next will hear from the Honorable Mitt Romney,
governor of the Commonwealth of Massachusetts, who comes to us
as former president and CEO of the first post-9/11 Olympics.
You have a unique understanding of the challenges we face
in preparing against potential terrorist acts for that reason
alone. But you come, also, to us as governor of a coastal
border state, a high-tech state, a popular state with a diverse
industrial base that was one of the staging areas for the 9/11
hijackers. And you come to us as co-chairman of the National
Governors Association, homeland security efforts.
And so, Governor Romney, you are uniquely qualified to
address the issues that are before us today, and we welcome you
and thank you for being here with us.
We have your prepared testimony, and we thank you for that.
It is in the record. And so you are free to summarize your
remarks as you see fit.
STATEMENT OF THE HONORABLE MITT ROMNEY, GOVERNOR, COMMONWEALTH
OF MASSACHUSETTS
Governor Romney. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, also Congressman
Turner and the congressman from Massachusetts, who are I
believe are returning. Thank you for welcoming me here today.
I do come representing the National Governors. And along
with Governor Ruth Ann Minner of Delaware, we worked together
to help chair a homeland security committee at the National
Governors Association.
Mr. Chairman, you mentioned my experience with the
Olympics. I had in that respect a real learning experience
associated with homeland security. And in that setting, where
there was a limited time frame and limited geography, I saw how
homeland security efforts can be planned and implemented in
such a way to really create a very effective, comprehensive
homeland security plan.
As I become governor I recognize we have much greater
challenges. We are dealing with issues on a much greater scale.
But I acknowledge that, if you will, the metaphor, Are you
going from drinking from a drinking fountain to drinking from a
fire hydrant, as you look at the scale of issues that we have.
I salute the effort that is being done by the Department of
Homeland Security, by the governors, by the first responders,
by all who come together in the area of homeland security. But
we are facing enormous challenges with very little time. And we
are working very quickly, and I think good progress is being
made.
There were, however, some principles from the Olympic
experience where I think the homeland security effort was in
many respects ideal, that I think can help us as we look at
what we are doing on the homeland security front nationwide.
First, I believe we were successful in part because we had
a comprehensive, holistic homeland security plan for the assets
and people we were protecting.
In the Atlanta games, we learned that if you ask each of
the communities to come up with their own plans, that the
communities cobble together their individual plans, but in many
respects these plans aren't comprehensive. They are gaps
between them. Oftentimes, the communications systems are
lacking. There is not a centralized command and control system.
And in Atlanta we learned that the system did not work by
asking all of the municipalities to create their own plans and
somehow stapling it together and thinking that was a holistic
plan.
Following Atlanta, a decision was made to create a far more
comprehensive effort. And by funneling the funds through one
source, and that was the Utah Olympic Public Safety Command, we
were able, in the state of Utah preparing for the games, to
have the local, state and federal agencies all work together in
one entity that created a plan for the safety of the community
being protected.
That plan was holistic, comprehensive, and it allowed us to
have equipment that worked across the venues to have personnel
that could move across the venues, a single training system.
That kind of holistic approach to planning is essential, I
believe, in homeland security. I would say that the decision to
have states be the source of the funding is a critical element
in having the ability to create a holistic plan.
I have noted that in the most recent appropriation that has
been made by the federal government to the states, directing
that 80 percent of the funds reach local municipalities, that
virtually every single state that has received these funds has
now within 45 days distributed the money to the localities.
This is a big change from the past, but the pipeline is now
open and functioning well. This is on the basis of a National
Governors Association survey that we have carried out.
Secondly, I would note that it is essential to have
guidelines as to what it is we are trying to accomplish. If you
ask the cities and towns and the states how much money they
need for homeland security, but don't tell them what you expect
them to do, what kind of event they are trying to prepare for,
how they are supposed to protect a particular asset, then the
sky's the limit as to what they will come back with.
In the case of the Olympics, we said precisely what we were
trying to accomplish at each venue, the level of security
required, and then developed a plan to achieve it.
Number three, we had to make sure that the money at the
Olympics was going to the place where the risk was greatest,
and so we assessed all of the things we were doing at the
Olympics, the degree of risk associated with each of them, and
we allocated our resources according to those risks, and made
sure that the dollars were going where the threat was greatest.
I recognize that the Department of Homeland Security has
adopted that very principle in carrying out the homeland high-
threat assessment and developing procedures by which funds are
going to the areas of greatest risk.
Fourth, I would say that, Mr. Chairman, you mentioned the
word of prevention and intelligence. I think one of the areas
that is a potential gap in our own state's homeland security
effort is in thinking about the gathering of information,
taking information and turning it into intelligence, through
analytical work, and deciding who it is that is responsible for
that intelligence function.
Is that a local function? Is it something our state police
should be doing? Is this something that is the sole
responsibility of the FBI? But we need to have a very clear set
of guidelines as to who it is that is doing the intelligence
work, how that is being funded, how it is being supported, what
kind of communication we have across the intelligence world, to
gather and process this information.
And I believe that there is much more that we as a state,
and I am sure we as a nation, should do to assure a more
effective program, not just in responding to homeland security
crises, but in preventing them, and assuring that our
intelligence is superb.
I would say that particular aspect of the Olympic
experience was the most unique in my regard. We had a very
large number of intelligence teams evaluating threats prior to
the games and during the games. That is primarily why the games
were safe, not just defensive, not just the magnetometers, but
the fact that we had intelligence work going on extensively
prior to and during the event itself.
I appreciate the chance to meet with you.
There were many questions that were asked by the various
members as they made their introductory comments. I would be
happy to respond to those anytime you would like to provide.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and also Mr. Turner.
[The statement of Governor Romney follows:]
PREPARED STATEMENT OF THE HONORABLE MITT ROMNEY, GOVERNOR, COMMONWEALTH
OF MASSACHUSETTS
Mr. Chairman: I appreciate this opportunity to testify before the
House Select Committee on Homeland Security and thank you and Ranking
Member Turner for seeking the input of Governors in your oversight of
this most crucial issue.
I would also like to express my gratitude to Secretary Tom Ridge of
the Department of Homeland Security, who has worked tirelessly to
assist my colleagues and myself in meeting the challenges of governing
in the aftermath of the September 11 attacks. It is miraculous to see
the homeland security apparatus that has sprung up under Secretary
Ridge's leadership in the short time since he answered President Bush's
call to service. As a former Governor, he is keenly aware of the
difficulties we face balancing fiscal pressures with our overriding
commitment to the public safety. As a former Congressman, he
understands the responsibility this body has to demand results for the
taxpayer's money. This combination makes Secretary Ridge the right man
for a very difficult job. We are all grateful for his vision and
leadership and salute the Secretary, and the dedicated men and women
who serve in the Department, for their success in preventing subsequent
terrorist incidents.
With everything that has happened since September 11, it is
sometimes easy to forget that we are still in the early stages of
defining the homeland security mission. Much remains to be done in both
the public and private sectors. Therefore, it is appropriate that
Congress assess the lessons learned to date, ensure that there is
consensus at every level of government on both the degree of progress
made and the most critical next steps, and establish a framework for
future actions and funding. I commend you and the members of this
Committee for the commitment you have made to this task.
Similarly, I want to express my appreciation for the steps that
Congress and the Bush Administration have taken, just since my visit
earlier this year to testify on this subject before the Senate
Committee on Governmental Affairs, to make our citizens safer and our
nation stronger.
In Massachusetts, and throughout the nation, we have overseen the
distribution of nearly $10 billion in federal homeland security-related
funds for federal fiscal year 2003. Your decision to funnel the vast
majority of that money through state government has helped to ensure
that we avoid duplication, maximize efficiency, prevent gaps in first
responder coverage and address the most significant threats and
vulnerabilities that we face statewide. As you know, each state, even
each Congressional district, has unique needs and capabilities that
would make direct appropriations to cities and towns an extremely
cumbersome process. Moreover, Governors believe that attempting to do
so would be detrimental to our ongoing, coordinated efforts to secure
the homeland.
In return for the trust you have placed in us to distribute federal
funds appropriately, Governors have taken great pains to ensure that
the requirements placed on states by Congress have been met. While the
45-day window for passing the most recent round of federal funding
through to local authorities has not expired for all states, all
evidence indicates that those for whom it has expired have exceeded the
minimum 80 percent pass-through and done so within the time allotted.
This while facing logistical hurdles ranging from procurement
restrictions to establishing a means for the electronic submission of
grant proposals.
In spite of these challenges, states have been remarkably
innovative in their grant-making efforts, with an eye towards creating
the most coordinated, interoperable homeland security network possible.
Several, including Massachusetts, have brought together the various
branches of the public safety community, as well as neighboring
municipalities, for the first time in memory to gather a truly
comprehensive picture of homeland security needs and to address them in
a holistic, coordinated fashion. And the cooperation has not stopped at
the border. In my region, the Northeast Regional Homeland Security
Agreement will unify planning and sharing of resources across 10
states, while strengthening the information sharing process and
creating an inventory of resources and assets available to be shared
across borders. There are similar examples throughout the country.
Recently, Governor Ruth Ann Minner of Delaware and I were asked by
the National Governors Association to serve as ``co-lead Governors'' on
Homeland Security issues. In this role, we will work with our nation's
Governors to develop recommendations and consensus positions on a
number of the key issues under discussion in this arena. Our goal is to
provide a single point of contact for the Congress. As a first step, we
have conducted a survey of our fellow Governors to determine their
priorities. Three issues stood out as overwhelmingly important to
Governors, and they will serve as the centerpiece of my testimony
today. These are:
Investing resources based on comprehensive and integrated
state-wide plans
Maximizing the investment in intelligence gathering and
analysis
Working with the Department of Homeland Security to
develop guidelines for states to follow in the prevention of and
response to terrorist attacks
First, we believe it is critical that homeland security funding and
resources be applied against comprehensive and integrated state-wide
plans. Frankly, this is the only way that our nation's citizens can be
assured that we are getting the maximum impact from the billions of
dollars we are investing annually in Homeland Security. You have all
heard the anecdotes that are beginning to circulate--of communities
side-by-side that purchase incompatible radio equipment and cannot when
responding to multi-jurisdictional emergencies. Or of the rural
community that I understand requested homeland security funds for a new
fire truck, despite the fact that they had neither roads on which to
operate it nor a building in which to house it. Unfortunately, if we
who are responsible for overseeing the expenditure of homeland security
funding are not careful, those stories will become legend. The reality
is that almost every state and community in this country is in fiscal
crisis this year yet, like the federal government, we are all choosing
to provide the necessary funding and resources for homeland security.
But, recognizing how tight dollars are, I believe you will find that
all Governors and municipal officials are eager to ensure that we get
at least a dollar's return in additional security for every dollar we
spend. And the most critical step to maximizing our resources is
developing integrated statewide plans and channeling virtually all
homeland security funding through these plans.
The National Strategy for Homeland Security, signed by President
Bush on July 16, 2002 articulates a comprehensive vision for the common
defense of the nation. The nation's Governors are very supportive of
the strategy because they recognize that to effectively combat
terrorism in this country requires a fully collaborative partnership
between federal, state and local governments. However, for these plans
to truly be effective, they must not simply be a compilation of
individual plans as a package. We need to bring all jurisdictions
together to develop an integrated plan for public safety--one that
maximizes the resources on hand and provides a detailed framework for
training, operations and equipment.
As most of you know, I was the CEO of the 2002 Salt Lake Olympic
Games, which has been described by many as a model for an integrated,
comprehensive public safety plan. Although there are aspects of that
planning process that would be hard to duplicate in all fifty states,
it nevertheless it provides a strong example of the difference between
a coordinated plan and an integrated plan.
Interestingly, the decision for Salt Lake to pursue a fully
integrated federal, state, local and private sector security plan for
the Games was a result of the security planning process for the Atlanta
Olympics. The Atlanta planning process followed what was until then a
traditional format. Each of the affected jurisdictions--federal, state
and local--developed individual plans for the activities within their
jurisdiction--law enforcement, fire, and emergency response. Then those
plans were meshed into a single whole. Unfortunately, when the plans
were pulled together, they didn't mesh well. Several areas had more
resources than needed, others were significantly under-funded. Some
areas were deemed the responsibility of more than one entity, while
other areas were deemed to be no one's responsibility and had been
completely left out. Although there was a security plan, in reality it
was a hodge-podge of individual plans and there were clearly holes.
The federal government stepped in to assist in filling these holes
and to help merge the plans and operations of the individual
jurisdictions. But, the lessons learned from this experience were
relayed in detail to the Salt Lake team and we decided to try something
new. Federal, state and local governments, together with the private
sector Olympic Committee, all agreed to come together and jointly
develop one plan and use the planning process to work out
jurisdictional issues, assess resources available, and agree on a plan
that would use the minimum in additional resources to achieve the
maximum in security.
And that's what we did. Over a period of several years, an
integrated plan was developed that identified all the activities to be
done and determined the resources necessary to carry out those
activities. In many cases it was the federal government that provided
guidance on the standards we were to use--much as we look to the
Department of Homeland Security today to provide guidance to states on
best practices and standards for securing critical infrastructure.
Then, perhaps most uniquely, the participants identified all the
resources each had to put towards carrying out the missions. Federal,
state, and local government all participated in this, as did the
private sector. Air and ground resources were pooled, communications
resources were pooled, IT and dispatch resources were pooled, and
manpower was pooled. And when we had thus maximized the use of our
existing resources, we were able to clearly articulate to the federal
government where we were short in resources and exactly what we needed
those resources to do. Moreover, those resource shortfalls were part of
an integrated security plan that the federal government--specifically
the Secret Service, FBI and FEMA--had helped to develop.
During the months that the Olympic Security Plan was operational,
this integrated planning effort led to an integrated and well-
coordinated training program. It also led to more efficient procurement
of resources since we were able to use bulk purchasing to the maximum
extent possible. And, as you could predict, it then led to a well-
integrated operational effort during the Games. Federal, state and
local public safety operations merged seamlessly and cooperated closely
with the private operations that we were running at SLOC. Not only was
this approach operationally superior, but in the world of public safety
and counter-terrorism where the enemy can exploit any gap, the tight-
knit coordination and integration among all security and public safety
operations was essential.
In my role as Governor of Massachusetts, I have sought to apply the
lessons learned during the Olympic Games to the implementation of our
statewide homeland security program. We have begun the process of
developing an integrated plan by starting with a ``bottoms up''
assessment of our state of preparedness and an inventory of our
resources. My Secretary of Public Safety, Ed Flynn, has led this effort
and it has been conducted across federal, state, and local governments
and the private sector. While the assessment has identified a number of
positive actions taken to date, it has also identified a number of
deficiencies, which must be addressed across our Commonwealth.
Massachusetts established a model process for awarding federal
homeland security dollars. We were the first state to apply for this
money, the first to receive it, and the first to deliver it to
municipalities. We combined the FFY03 and FFY03 Supplemental funding
into one grant process. This allowed us to award $21.5 million nearly a
month before the 45-day deadline. And we established a competitive
grant process, encouraging communities to work across jurisdictions and
across disciplines to put together comprehensive plans for homeland
security.
Rather than award money based solely on population or location,
Massachusetts evaluated applicants on four criteria:
1. Degree of Threat
Population
Critical infrastructure
2. Degree of Readiness
Emergency management plan
Training
3. Degree of Cooperation
Mutual aid agreement(s)
Training across jurisdictions
4. Reasonableness of Request
Grant request must complement existing
equipment
Equipment must not be duplicative
Every proposal was evaluated and scored by three readers.
Massachusetts called on grant readers from throughout the region with
various areas of expertise to score the proposals and, at our request,
a federal Department of Homeland Security representative participated
in the review process, answering technical questions.
One of the most encouraging ramifications of this experience in
Massachusetts has been the way in which a statewide process that
required coordination and communication of its disparate public safety
community has brought this community together. With the ``carrot'' of
federal homeland security dollars, states can make this type of
interagency, multi-jurisdictional cooperation the rule, rather than the
exception.
I share this experience to show you how seriously my fellow
Governors and I take the charge you have given us to spend homeland
security funds in the most efficacious way possible. Each of my
colleagues recognizes that working with local governments and the
federal government in the development of a comprehensive state-wide
plan is a matter of the utmost importance to the people of their state.
And it is through those plans that we can ensure that homeland security
funding is spent only for activities that will have the maximum impact,
resulting in the highest level of public safety.
For that reason, I, along with the other Governors, believe that
Homeland Security funding should flow to the states and should be
distributed then in accordance with the state-wide plans. It is only by
flowing funding through the funnel of the state that we can ensure that
funds are spent effectively and efficiently. Programs and funding that
bypass the states could easily be spent outside the state-wide plan and
lead to gaps in coverage, incompatible equipment including
communications systems, and wasteful duplication. The National Strategy
calls for states to develop a plan that sets priorities based on
assessment and vulnerability analysis. Therefore it is only logical
that funds should be distributed in accordance with those priorities.
Second, we need to maximize our nation's investment in information
and intelligence sharing. One of the primary ways that state and local
governments can work to prevent future acts of terrorism is to ensure
the effective flow of information among federal, state and local law
enforcement. In the months that preceded the attacks of 9/11, agencies
were unable to draw a larger pattern out of disparate bits of
information contained in separate databases about the activities of
terrorists involved in the attack. We will never know whether better
data sharing would have helped thwart the attacks. But we do know that
terrorists often use traditional crimes such as drug trafficking, money
laundering, bank robbery and illegal weapons trafficking to offset the
costs and further support their political/terrorist objectives.
In fact, the first indication that a terrorist cell is operating
within the United States may be behavior discovered during an
investigation by state or local police, following the report of
suspicious circumstances or some type of criminal event. Whether the
focus in on stopping drug trafficking or preventing an act of
terrorism, rapidly collecting and disseminating solid information about
the people who commit crimes and where they commit them is key.
Yet most police, public health entities, parole officers and courts
are operating with 20-year old technology. Even though high-speed
digital technology is currently available, many police officers still
wait long periods to receive basic information about a vehicle or
person they stop. Days or weeks may pass before criminal warrants find
their way into state databases, leaving dangerous criminals on the
street and police without this information. Judges might sentence
offenders with outdated information regarding their criminal history
records. Investigators in one jurisdiction may be unaware that
information regarding an individual under investigation exists in a
neighboring jurisdiction.
This must change if we are to be successful in preventing future
acts of terrorism.
Another challenge we face in information sharing is ensuring that
there is an appropriate exchange of information between the federal
government and the state and local officials who may be able to use
that information. We recognize that there is information critical to
the nation's security that must be guarded at the highest levels. Yet,
as mentioned above, it is often state and local officials and
responders who can facilitate the apprehension of potential terrorists
if they have the necessary information.
Additionally, state and local officials need information if they
are to match their response to an increased threat level appropriately
to the increased risk. For example, if our nation moves to Threat Level
Orange in response to increased risks, then state and local officials
need to know if that increased risk is contained to only one region of
the country or one type of critical infrastructure. With that
information, they can develop an appropriate response. Without it, they
have no choice but to take actions that assume that the highest level
of threat may be aimed at their region and at the various types of
critical infrastructure in their state. The point here is that every
community cannot be equally vulnerable at the same time to terrorism.
If information is available, the sharing of that information will
ensure that money and resources are not wasted in a region of the
country that does not have an increased threat.
One way to address the intelligence-sharing dilemma is for security
clearances to be standardized and reciprocal between agencies and
levels of government--perhaps within the Department of Homeland
Security. There is also a need to process federal security clearances
more expeditiously. Some states have waited over a year for vital
security clearances for their law enforcement agents. The bottom line
is that a more effective liaison must be established between the FBI,
CIA, DHS and other national security agencies if we are to maximize our
nation's investment in intelligence.
The third challenge is to work with the Department of Homeland
Security and other relevant federal agencies to establish minimum
guidelines and standards for state homeland security practices. In its
recent report on the state of emergency responder preparedness, the
Council on Foreign Relations suggested that Congress, ``require the
Department of Homeland Security (DHS) and the Department of Health and
Human Services (HHS) to work with state and local agencies and
officials as well as emergency responder professional associations to
establish clearly defined standards and guidelines for emergency
preparedness. These standards must be sufficiently flexible to allow
local officials to set priorities based on their needs, provided that
they reach nationally determined preparedness levels within a fixed
time period.''
I strongly support this recommendation. In the wake of September
11, states have each taken and are continuing to take the interim steps
necessary to ensure that our citizens are protected. In many cases,
these actions may not be the most cost efficient, such as temporary use
of the National Guard to secure airports while a permanent security
force is hired and trained. Yet, the priority of each Governor has been
to take the immediate actions necessary to ensure the safety of our
citizens.
Even as we take these short-term steps, each of the states, through
the comprehensive state-wide planning process, is developing a
blueprint for homeland security. Among the many areas to be addressed
in those plans are:
A focus on prevention: what actions and investments can we
take to ensure that critical information is shared, analyzed and acted
upon in a timely manner? What are the appropriate steps for securing
our nation's critical infrastructure including the 362 ports
nationwide, approximately 168,000 public drinking water systems,
600,000 miles of sanitary sewers, and 200,000 miles of storm sewers?
Likewise, how can we protect our food supply from the threat of
terrorist attack and build the capacity to trace potential food borne
illness outbreaks, food contamination and infectious animal diseases?
Incident management: Clarification of roles, ensuring that
training throughout the state is uniform and coordinated, developing
necessary reciprocal agreements both within the state and with
surrounding states, ensuring the interoperability of equipment, and
ensuring the capacity for disease surveillance and detection exists
throughout the state.
Response: Identification of the training and equipment
needed by first responders, plans for escalating response beyond the
local jurisdiction to surrounding jurisdictions, state-wide and then
beyond the state borders, and identification of medical supplies and
personnel and facilities necessary to treat victims of a public health
emergency.
These are questions that are best answered in coordination with
federal officials who have decades of experience in countering and, for
the most part, preventing terrorism. Governors believe that the
Department of Homeland Security should take the lead in sharing this
expertise with state and local officials charged daily with the
protection of potential terrorist targets. Moreover, the Department
should encourage states to share their own unique homeland security
experiences and, with the assistance of federal experts, make
information on how to duplicate anti-terror ``successes'' available to
all state and local officials.
The Department should also increase its role in serving as a
clearinghouse for technology and products related to homeland security.
Currently, each state's homeland security advisor is inundated with
vendors' products addressing the diverse issues of security. In the
tight timeframe within which federal dollars must be turned around by
the states, evaluating the competing claims of these vendors can be
extremely difficult. And the technical and or scientific expertise
needed to separate the truly innovative and effective products from the
snake oil is often lacking. A ``Consumer Reports''-like department that
can test products, interview purchasers/users and disseminate that
information would be tremendously helpful.
I am encouraged to see that language necessary to meet these goals
was included in Senator Collins' first responder legislation, and has
been spoken of positively by the leadership of this committee.
Similarly, I applaud the efforts in both the House and Senate to
streamline and simplify the myriad grants available to state and local
governments for homeland security-related purposes. Establishing ``one-
stop shopping'' for these funds is another means by which the federal
government can consolidate and make available valuable information to
states.
In conclusion, Mr. Chairman, we can best ensure that we are able to
invest wisely in homeland security in this nation if funding is
distributed through the states based on a comprehensive and integrated
state-wide plan, if information sharing and intelligence sharing
between federal, state and local governments is maximized, and if state
and local officials have access to the most up-to-date information
available in the field. Mr. Chairman, the nation's Governors understand
the difficult task and the challenges ahead in protecting the homeland,
and stand ready to work in partnership with the President and Congress
to meet these challenges.
Chairman Cox. I want to thank you very much for your
testimony. I am going to ask two questions. I am going to put
them together, so one you can tell me first whether it is
accurate or not, and then provide some analysis.
A recent article in USA Today pointed out instances in
which local agencies received such a large influx of money that
they weren't sure how to spend it. One of the examples they
cited was the Massachusetts Steamship Authority, which runs the
ferries in and out of Martha's Vineyard. One of the Vineyard
harbors was awarded $900,000, to upgrade port security last
week.
The Oak Bluffs harbor master, Todd Alexander, told the
Vineyard Gazette newspaper, and this was recounted in USA
Today, ``Quite honestly, I don't know what we are going to do,
but you don't turn down grant money.''
Now, this is probably an example in the extreme of grant
that is not based on threat assessment. But are you familiar
with this example? And is it anomalous, or is there more to
this story?
Second, I really do want to delve into the conclusion of
your testimony, which focused on your experience at the
Olympics with intelligence analysis and your suggestion that we
solve the problem of how we coordinate the roles of everyone
from FBI, CIA and the other 15 intelligence agencies here in
Washington to the state police in Massachusetts, the local
police and so on. You posed very good questions about whose job
and whose role that should be.
I wonder if you could give us your best answers to those
questions? How would you suggest, as we write legislation
designed to sort this out, that we go about it?
Governor Romney. Let me begin with your question about Oak
Bluffs. I had guessed that that might attract the attention of
at least one of the members of this committee, and was likewise
chagrined to hear of a substantial grant being given to a
community and the community didn't know how it was going to
spend it, but was happy to receive it.
This is in fact a prime example of what happens when the
federal government makes appropriations directly to communities
rather than having the appropriations and the grant money go
through a state, which can evaluate the grant requests of
various communities. This was a grant that was made by GSA. It
was made to the port authority on the island of Martha's
Vineyard. The funds went to Oak Bluffs. And this was not part
of our state-wide plan.
Let me contrast that with the funds that have come from the
federal appropriation. Those funds which we were to distribute
within 45 days and actually distributed the money 10 days
before that 35 days were up, were appropriated, I believe, in a
way that was correct.
We began by contacting all of the communities in the state,
some 351, and said we will be happy to respond to grant
requests that come from you. However, we will respond based
upon the risk assessment that we make of your community and the
particular assets and areas that may need protection. And
number two, we will look at your request and favor those
requests which are submitted on a regional basis.
So if you are the community of Everett or the city of
Boston or the community of Belmont, we will pay much more
attention to your request if it is combined with other
communities around you. So if you are asking, for instance, for
a mobile command center, if you are just a single town or city,
you are not likely to get that funding. But if you combine with
five or six other communities around you and work together on a
regional basis, we will make that appropriation.
We received 117 grant requests. We approved 34 of them.
These requests were read by individuals from three different
states. We wanted to draw on homeland security expertise beyond
our borders. So we read those different requests and then sent
those monies out, ranking all of the requests based upon
whether they were a regional request and also what the degree
of threat was.
I contrast that again with a process where the federal
government is trying to send out money, and, in the case of my
state, the 351 different communities, without understanding our
state-wide plan, without understanding the needs of our
respective communities.
We have even had a circumstance where one entity made an
application to the federal government for funding, received an
approval, and the same entity had another division which made
an appropriation request to the state for a different piece of
equipment. And within the same entity, these pieces of
equipment were noncompatible. They didn't know that they were
each making these requests. And the federal government, TSA,
had approved one; we were about to approve the other.
And I just think it is critical to make sure that funding
goes through a single source. And whether it is a single office
in the federal government, and I would prefer a single office
at the state level, to assure that the money going out is going
out according to threat assessments and need and a regional
plan and a comprehensive, holistic plan having been developed.
So that is part one with regard to Oak Bluffs.
Secondly, with regards to intelligence, I am very much of
the view that this becomes the critical element of our
protection, which is not just the police officer standing at
the base of the bridge, and we know that can be a deterrent,
but also the extensive intelligence work to assess what threats
are coming into our country, where people might be located,
what actions are being carried, and letting people know that we
are watching them.
In that regard, I believe the responsibility of the local
police department is to gather information, to gather data, to
gather information, to report crimes. I believe the state
police departments should then take that information and
compare it, look for trends, look for information that suggests
perhaps a criminal activity that might have a foreign source,
or a broader organized criminal activity, which may have
associated with it a terrorist route.
But that information is taken by the state police and given
to federal authorities, namely the FBI. And the FBI carries out
the intelligence work to assess the degree of risk and perhaps
begin a process of monitoring or surveillance associated with a
particular type of criminal activity.
These different stages could be defined in a different way.
But what I do know is that right now we have cities, the state
and the federal government all working in the area of
intelligence, but without a clear understanding of who is doing
what.
One of the most frequent questions I am asked by local law
enforcement is what are we supposed to be doing with regards to
homeland security? What are we supposed to be gathering? If I
receive information about someone who I think is at risk, what
am I supposed to with that? Who do I give it to? Is it the
state police? Is it the FBI?
Then they wonder if they gave it to the FBI, what was ever
done with it. Did someone follow up? Was there any processing
of that information?
This kind of intelligence effort, I believe, needs to be
thoroughly defined. And we as a state, and I am sure our local
communities will march to the direction we receive, to make
sure that we are carrying out a complete intelligence effort
and that we are leaving no gaps.
But I am afraid right now that a lot of information is
being gathered, but it isn't being analyzed and turned into
true intelligence. And those kind of gaps could result in the,
if you will, very serious consequences if we don't thoroughly
evaluate them.
Chairman Cox. Thank you very much for those responses.
The gentleman from Texas.
Mr. Turner. Governor, thank you again for your presence and
your testimony today.
The issue you just raised is one that we have certainly
heard about before. I think it is very important that we get
the information out to local law enforcement officials, so that
when they do have information, they do know where it is
supposed to go. It is my understanding that the Department of
Homeland Security is the place to and from which that
information is supposed to flow, and where it should be is
integrated, analyzed and utilized.
So, currently, I believe that when local law enforcement is
passing on some information, they are probably giving it to the
FBI, which is fine, too.
But I also think the Department of Homeland Security has
the responsibility to carry out the function that you describe
as missing today.
The other issue I am interested in hearing your comments
on, from the perspective of the governors, is what kind of
information flow on intelligence do you see flowing from the
federal level down to the states and local government?
If you respond to that, I have a follow-up on that too I
want to ask you about.
Governor Romney. Well, I appreciate the information we do
receive.
We have a joint terrorism task force, a task force that
meets under the direction of the U.S. attorney in Boston, and
we receive, I believe, timely, effective information of
potential threats.
On the basis of that information which is, by the way, far
more detailed than just code orange or code yellow?we receive
pretty specific information?we make assessments of what actions
we should take to protect critical infrastructure, or to
protect individuals.
And so the code orange is a helpful indication of the level
of threat, but we go beyond that code information to actually
have direct communication with the Department of Homeland
Security, or the FBI, or other federal sources.
And on the basis of that further information, we decide
what specific action we should take, and in some cases, for
instance at the beginning of the Iraq war, the threats were of
such significance that we took very extensive precautions.
However, the more recent code orange assessment was far
more generic, and we took less aggressive action. And that is
something which we assess on a basis of having direct
communications with Washington.
So I would tell you we receive a good deal of information.
I hope we do a good job in getting out to our localities. We
have a system in our state called our Saturn System, where we
communicate to the respective first responders the information
we think will help them in being able to respond or prevent
attack on any critical asset or group of individuals.
Mr. Turner. I notice in your written testimony that you
suggest we should modify the current system we have on levels
of alert, that it should be more specific, aimed at regions,
and aimed at critical infrastructure as appropriate.
I certainly agree with you on that.
I think some refinement is necessary. Many of the states
and localities have complained to us that if their response is
the same every time we move up a notch, it costs them hundreds
of thousands of dollars that may not be need to spent in their
particular locale or in a particular category of critical
infrastructure.
Every time you apply for federal money, if I understand the
process, you are required to submit a state plan. When you
prepared your state plan, or when your other counterparts
prepared their state plan, what kind of intelligence
information did you have at that time upon which to base your
state plan?
Governor Romney. Well, first of all, I think the term
``state plan'' is reminiscent of the Atlanta Olympics.
And I can't speak for all states--I believe our state is
doing an excellent job, but in many respects our state plan
consists of some broad principles which we apply at the state
level, but it is also a collection of what is being done on a
local level. It is taken together and put a notebook and said,
here, here is all of our local plans collected, now it is a
state plan, as opposed to a thoroughly prepared, comprehensive,
directed, holistic plan being created on a statewide basis.
And that is something which we are attempting to do, but
has not been completed yet to my satisfaction, not to the level
that I saw at the Olympics, and I think we have more effort in
that regard.
With regards to the intelligence input, I would say that I
think more than knowing a specific threat that we are to
respond to for our state plan, it would be helpful to know
what, if you will, guidelines or template might be suggested to
us as to the level of capability, the level of homeland
security resources to be applied to our various assets.
And by that I mean one would look at a state and say, What
is the degree of risk in a particular state? And given that
risk, let us look at different types of assets, from a nuclear
power plant to a drinking water source to a bridge to a tunnel
to a major facility of another kind. And the Department of
Homeland Security could provide us guidelines as to the level
of protection that might be appropriate for one of those
assets, given a certain level of risk, meaning green, yellow,
orange, red and so forth.
That kind of template would allow us to determine exactly
what the level of resources might be for our entire state.
Today, we make that assessment ourselves. Today, we decide
if we have a tunnel, what we think we should do to protect that
tunnel. My guess is that Delaware does something different, New
York does something different, California does something else.
What is the appropriate level? What is the level which is
being done in other states? What is the best practice?
And the communication of best practices which would allow
us to set, if you will, state by state templates, guidelines, I
think would be helpful for us to be able to create truly
holistic, comprehensive statewide plans.
That is something which the Department of Homeland Security
is racing to do. That is something which we are doing on a
state basis as well as we can. And it is something which if we
don't make enough progress, why I think the National Governors
Association should undertake on its own, but I think the
Department of Homeland Security is going to lead the way.
Mr. Turner. Governor, I really appreciate the clarity of
your answers, because it points to a problem about which the
chairman and I have been very concerned. I think you are
absolutely right: The comprehensive, holistic plan that you
require has to be based on some intelligence information that
you do not have at present.
We are purporting to pass out money today based on state
plans that I think in many ways we must all acknowledge are
inadequate to the task of making critical decisions.
Before you can have a comprehensive plan--you are
absolutely right--we have got to have the Department of
Homeland Security set out standards and best practices from
which you can then move to develop a plan using those best
practices.
Therefore, you have pointed out two very critical areas,
and I really appreciate your testimony.
Chairman Cox. Mr. Weldon.
Mr. Weldon. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Thank you, Governor, for being here.
Governor, I have read through your statement and can tell
you I agree with many of the assessments you provided, and
especially be concerned about the fact that our governors do
not yet have the same classified status that members of
Congress have, which I think that is a shortcoming which needs
to be corrected.
I would say that I do have some problems with your heavy
focus on the state level.
As you know, the bulk of the first responder community in
this country in fire service is not paid and is not a part of
government. The bulk of the 32,000 fire departments in this
country are volunteer. It is nice to tell them they should do
something, it is nice to tell them they have bought
incompatible radio equipment. But by and large, the bulk of
those departments bought it with money they raised from chicken
dinners and from tag days.
And it is nice now for the federal government to come in
and say, or the state government, Well, you should have done
this, when the states weren't providing, in most cases, a dime
of money over the past 200 years.
I know. I was a volunteer fire chief and represent all the
firefighters of this country. And having been a mayor and a
county commissioner, I get upset that states sometimes think
they have all the answers when the history of this country for
200 years, the 32,000 departments have handled every disaster
we have had, from that large warehouse fire in your state,
where six firefighters were killed, to hazmat incidents,
hurricanes, floods.
And in my opinion, our problem has been we have been
listening too much to the bureaucrats at the top, and not
enough to the first responder on the bottom, who have been out
there where the rubber meets the road.
When our first training programs were set up to provide
training for homeland security and terrorism before 9/11, the
fire service wasn't even brought in. We hired consultants at
the government level, paid bureaucrats in Washington who are
supposedly going to tell these firefighters how to do what they
have been for 200 years. It was a slap in their face.
And what I think, and what I know, is that the program that
we established in Congress who, for the first time, give
dollars on a competitive basis to the fire and EMS departments
in the country has been the most successful program we have
operated.
In your testimony you single out a community that you
understand bought a fire truck without roads. I am not aware of
that. I wish you would tell me that. Because the GAO has done
an investigation of our grants program. It is the most
successful program we have in Washington. In fact, your state,
many of your departments have paid 10 percent or 30 percent of
the match to get those funds.
The concern that local departments have--and I have been in
every state, I have been in your state many times meeting with
your fire leaders--is that states siphon off money for
bureaucracy. They take money the federal government provides
and they build fiefdoms, they build consultants.
And I know. I was a county commissioner. They develop
people who can tell others how to do the job. But when that
alarm sounds, when that incident occurs, don't look for those
bureaucrats, because that first apparatus driver had better
have the equipment to respond.
And when you talk about communication systems, and you talk
about communities side by side purchasing incompatible radio
equipment, that was a problem in the past, because those local
fire departments had to raise the money on their own to buy
that equipment.
What I don't see here, and what is the number one issue for
the emergency responders, is for the government to take on the
communications industry and set aside the frequency spectrum
allocation to allow for a standardized communication system.
They want to go to high band frequency. They want to go to a
standardized system. But because the networks will not give up
the frequency spectrum that they were supposed to give up
within two years, the fire service and the emergency responders
and law enforcement community can't get access to that
frequency spectrum. That is not an issue they can control. That
is an issue that this Congress and the federal government needs
to respond to--recommendations made by the Pitswack advisory
committee in 1995.
Now the strength of the emotion in my response is aimed at
you personally. It is aimed at frustration of being here 17
years, leading the effort for our firefighters, and now all of
a sudden having groups like the Council on Foreign Relations
coming in and saying what we have been saying for 17 years. I
mean, where was Senator Rudman when he was here? Where was his
effort to support the first responders? This wasn't a new need
after 9/11. This was something that should have been addressed
decades ago.
So my only concern is that the focus does not just have to
be at the state level. I agree with statewide planning.
California has an excellent model. But they buy the fire
apparatus, not the local fire department. And they bring them
in when they need them for disasters.
I agree with that coordination. But I also think we have to
be sensitive to the people who are paying the bill. And in most
cases in America, those bills are still being paid by local
volunteers, who raise the money through chicken dinners and tag
days.
Thank you.
Governor Romney. Let me make just a comment with regards to
a couple of points that you made, many of which I agree with.
I would note that in the case of the grants that are being
made to our state, of federal funds, that these grants are
going to out communities based upon regional plans, and those
plans are being proposed by fire departments, police
departments, EMS departments, that combine together to look for
specific resources that will help them on a regional basis.
And I will use as an example the fact that we have an LNG
tanker and LNG plant that comes into the Boston Harbor on a
weekly basis. The fire equipment necessary to contain a fire of
LNG is not the kind of equipment that any one fire department
would propose to acquire. The community came together and said,
We as a group of communities want to purchase a particular type
of equipment. It is aquatic-based equipment. And that is
something we feel is appropriate to support and provide money
for.
And so that is an example of the local fire departments
coming together and requesting equipment that allows them to
deal with the threat that no one of them alone would find as an
appropriate appropriation or allocation.
I note as well that with regards to the state share, that
Congress, I think, wisely in the most recent appropriation, has
said that 80 percent of the funds should go directly to the
localities and the locality needs. And 20 percent would stay at
the state level.
In our case, we have made the full distribution within
actually 35 days for the localities. And we have not kept the
full 20 percent, even though we have a substantial state police
effort that could just end National Guard effort that could
justify maintaining some of those funds.
We have distributed a larger amount than the 80 percent
required by Congress. I think Congress continues to have the
right, and I would suggest the appropriate direction in
suggesting which portion of the funds go to local first
responders.
Chairman Cox. I thank the gentleman.
Governor Romney, I understand that you have a hard 3:00
deadline. We also have members who want to ask questions. And
we also have our own hard 3:45 deadline, because of the joint
session of Congress. What I would like to do is take one more
question from the minority side, and then let you go, if you
would be willing to stay for that even though we are past the
appointed time.
Who seeks recognition?
The gentleman from Massachusetts?
Mr. Markey. I will yield to the other gentleman from
Massachusetts.
Chairman Cox. The gentleman from Massachusetts, Mr. Frank,
is recognized.
Mr. Markey. --if you don't mind and it would just be to
make the point, before I yield, that although it is not
immediately obvious from the hinterlands, people like Curt
Weldon and I have always been in silent agreement on these
issues and pride working together over the years to provide
funding.
But we do wind up in communities like Everett, where the
LNG facility is actually located in my district where the mayor
has had to lay off 20 of the 105 firemen in that community,
even though it does present maybe the greatest terrorist
target.
Let me yield to the other--
Mr. Frank. Actually, I think, Governor, in another part of
the state in which I represent, there is a proposal now pending
for another LNG plant, as you know, in Fall River. And
obviously, people there are concerned, probably because of this
resource remained, and we hope to be able to work with you.
I have one specific question and one more general one. You
mentioned an entity in Massachusetts which had applied for two
different pieces of equipment, one through the federal
government and one through the state, and it applied for
inconsistent equipment. What entity was that?
Governor Romney. That was Massport.
Mr. Frank. They had applied and had--were in the process of
trying to get two inconsistent pieces of equipment?
Governor Romney. My understanding is that the harbor
portion of Massport had requested equipment and received a
grant from TSA, and that the airport side of Massport applied
to the state--
Mr. Frank. Governor, since all of us were about to fly into
that place, I am probably sorry I asked you.
Governor Romney. We are still very safe, thank you.
And that actually the--
Mr. Frank. It wouldn't help to go by boat.
Governor Romney. The state system required the chief
executive of Massport to sign the grant request. And in signing
that grant request, he identified the fact that they were
coming from--that two areas were asking for equipment to
happened to not be compatible.
Mr. Frank. The more general question: You had this
responsibility to take all these applications and parcel them
out, and I am partly concerned about the adequacy of research,
and particularly since, as my colleagues pointed out, on the
one hand because of other issues we are seeing first responders
laid off--police, fire, emergency drivers.
And obviously, there aren't two separate entities out
there, one group that deals with homeland security and two, the
regulars. That is the same group. And there is a tradeoff
there.
My question is as you got this list of projects, what
percentage of the worthy projects are you able to fund? I mean
answer the question, the adequacy of resources. Did you find
yourself in the position of having to say no to projects which
you thought had merit, even though, obviously, you funded the
ones you thought were best?
But how many projects that were well thought out and met a
real need did we have to turn down because there was scarcity
of resources?
Governor Romney. We did not come away thinking that we had
left major holes, and that many of the grant requests were
worthy, but we just didn't have enough money to fund them. We
thought that a number of the grant requests were not
appropriate, because they were municipally based, rather than
regionally based, and encouraged the communities to go back and
prepare a more regionally based plan.
I would tell you, however, that there is clear indication
that there is more need than dollars. And you are not going to
hear any governor say anything different, nor will you have any
mayor or selectman say anything different than that.
We were dismayed that not all of our communities put in
grant requests. There were regions of the state. In the time
frame during which we were directed to distribute funds, 45
days, some communities couldn't get a grant in quickly enough.
And so your community, the city of Fall River, for
instance, made no application for funding. New Bedford did put
in a substantial request, and we provided funding to New
Bedford and many other portions of your district, but Fall
River didn't.
We recognize that, gosh, this is a major hole, so we put
some money aside, and said, We are going to send this to Fall
River, even though they didn't have a request in, but it is
suggested--
Mr. Frank. I appreciate it. I didn't mean to be parochial.
That is for the Appropriations--
[Laughter.]
But I thank you for acknowledging that there is this
problem, there is more need than dollars.
Governor Romney. Yes, there is more need than dollars.
And let me draw that back to the original point that I made
about needing to have a sense of where we are trying to go, and
a national and state-wide plan. And I say we have had many
requests for hazmat teams and for mobile command centers. Well,
how many hazmat teams does a state need? We have a population
of 6.5 million people. Should we have 1 per 100,000? One per
million? One per 50,000? Every community will ask for hazmat
dollars, even our smallest communities. But I am not sure what
the standard is we are trying to get to.
Are we looking for hazmat capability at level A, B or C on
a national basis? We can make great grants to provide hazmat
equipment. But I don't know what the level we are trying to
reach might be.
Likewise with regard to protecting our LNG tankers.
What is the level of protection we need? I know that with
regards to nuclear plants that over the years the Nuclear
Regulatory Commission has said this is the outline of what
effective security is for a nuclear plant.
That level of guidance may well be appropriate for key
assets, key to critical assets. Medical response key assets.
Gatherings of large individuals.
What is the standard we are shooting for? Once we know what
the standard is, we will know how much money we need?
Mr. Frank. I will just close up. On the medical, I just
said this before. We got problems in the emergency rooms on
Friday night from people hitting each other over the head and
running each other over, much less somebody being a terrorist.
So, there is clearly a greater need.
I would just say I appreciate your acknowledging that there
is more need than dollars. I just think that the next time
people think that what we need are fewer government dollars,
they ought to understand that that would widen the gap between
need and dollars.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Cox. Thank you, Governor Romney, for your
excellent help to this committee and to our work and for your
excellent support for our national effort in homeland security.
I hope you have a secure flight.
Governor Romney. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Cox. We now welcome our next panel. And as the
members of the next panel are being seated, I will briefly
introduce them.
Jamie Metzl is the senior fellow and coordinator for
Homeland Security Programs at the Council on Foreign Relations.
Captain Michael Grossman, commander of the Emergency
Operations Bureau, Los Angeles County Sheriff's Department, is
also the head of the multiagency Terrorism Early Warning Group.
Chief George Jaramillo is here from the Orange County
Sheriff's Department. And I am especially grateful because, of
course, I hail from Orange County myself, for your appearance
here today.
Ray Kiernan is the Fire Commissioner and Chief of the New
Rochelle Fire Department, a member of the Westchester Career
Fire Chiefs and Northeast Fire Consortium. He has been
described as a fireman's fire chief.
And we are very happy to have all four of you. We
appreciate your outstanding prepared testimony, which we have
already included as part of the record. And we invite you each
to summarize your testimony.
We will begin with you, Mr. Metzl. Thank you.
STATEMENT OF MR. JAMIE METZL, SENIOR FELLOW AND COORDINATOR FOR
HOMELAND SECURITY PROGRAMS, COUNCIL ON FOREIGN RELATIONS;
Mr. Metzl. Mr. Chairman, Congressman Turner, members of the
committee, particularly my congresswomen from my home town of
Kansas City, Karen McCarthy, thank you very much for inviting
me to testify before you today. It is an honor for me to be
here.
I serve as project director for what Congressman Weldon
described as the Johnny-Come-Lately Council on Foreign
Relations when we arrived here. And as you all, I believe,
know, we issued a report two weeks ago entitled Emergency
Responders: Drastically Underfunded, Dangerously Unprepared.
Our task force is chaired by Senator Rudman. And members of
our task force include many prominent Republicans and
Democrats, including George Schultz, William Webster, former
chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, former chief of staff of
the Army, three Nobel Laureates and others.
The task force met with emergency responders around the
country and with emergency responder professional associations
and others. And based on our extensive contacts and the
totality of our investigation, we came to one very simple
conclusion. Almost two years after September 11, America is not
sufficiently prepared for another terrorist attack.
This is not to say that we are not at all prepared. It is
not to say that we are not in some ways better prepared than we
were on September 11. But the gap is too large to be
acceptable. As Senator Rudman has said, the question is not if
the next attack will place, but rather when it will take place.
There are many elements of emergency preparedness and many
elements of the overall homeland security picture. And we
focused on only one, which was emergency responders.
What we found shocked us. And our report, as I believe all
of you have, outlines gives some examples of what is missing.
That fire departments across the country have only enough
radios to equip on average half the firefighters on a shift.
There is not adequate breathing apparatus. The public health
system in the United States is in a terrible, dangerous state
of disarray.
In sum, we found that emergency responders across the
country don't have the equipment and the training they need to
respond safely and effectively to a terrorist attack.
So we worked with these emergency responders and
professional associations to try to quantify what was missing.
And we were very clear that what we were looking for wasn't a
wish list.
We carefully reviewed the data that we collected, and we
believe we were very, very conservative in our estimates. But
based on our calculations, we believe that America will fall
roughly $98.4 billion short of meeting critical emergency
responder needs over the next five years if current funding
levels are maintained.
Getting to this level would require as much as tripling
overall expenditures. And if one believes that this is a
federal responsibility, it would require quintupling federal
expenditures.
While these critical needs must be addressed immediately,
our task force is the first to admit, and we did so in our
report, there our figures for meeting them are preliminary, and
that the United States must develop a more sophisticated
requirements generation process, as Governor Romney and others
have mentioned.
Unless we both get the necessary resources to America's
frontline responders and create a policy framework for spending
these funds most efficiently, the American taxpayer will not
receive the best return on our investment in homeland security,
and, more importantly, we will not be as safe as we must
become.
If we allocate the funds without getting the policy issues
right, or if we get the policy issues right without allocating
the funds, we will not be prepared. America must do both.
The centerpiece of this policy framework, as has been
discussed, must be national preparedness standards. We need to
define what preparedness is, so we can know where we are and
build a road map for getting from where we are to where we need
to be. Otherwise, we are going to be throwing money at the
problem and our response capabilities will be uneven.
We need a requirements generation process, similar to what
the military has, where we identify the threats, we determine
the capabilities necessary for responding to those threats, and
then we generate requirements for reaching those capability
levels.
If we don't have that, money is going to be wasted, and at
the end five years we will have spent a lot of money. We will
have some extra capabilities out there, but it will be
dangerously uneven.
As you, Mr. Chairman, and others have mentioned, we need to
change the formula grant process. Right now, we are
distributing money in a very inefficient way.
And even if the federal government fixes the federal
formula, we need to make sure that the states fix their
formula. It makes no sense that if there is a federal formula
based on threat and risk, which we don't have yet, but I
imagine that at some point we will, but then states are evenly
distributing finds based on the old system, we are not going to
be as safe as we need to be: We are going to be diluting funds
to the point of being wasted.
Another issue is that we need to encourage and incentivize
long-term thinking among cities and states. If cities and
states receive funds and don't have confidence that additional
funds will consistently be coming, there is an incentive to
spend on short-term needs, rather than doing what needs to be
required, what needs to be done, which may include adding
staff, it may include maintenance, it may include long-term
training. And we need to incentivize that type of long-term
thinking.
This committee has spent a lot of time discussing the
congressional oversight issue, and I imagine that you would all
agree with the recommendation in our report that the
congressional oversight process needs to be streamlined, and we
believe, as, Mr. Chairman, I know you do, that this committee
would be transformed into a standing committee with a formal,
leading role in the authorization of emergency responder
expenditures.
And I would agree with your proposal that this committee
should have legislative jurisdiction over the Department of
Homeland Security, and oversight jurisdiction over federal
homeland security activities.
Finally, federal and state grants systems are duplicative
and need to be streamlined. As Congressman Turner and Senator
Collins and others have mentioned, we need to have a system for
one-stop shopping.
It makes no sense that states often have to submit as many
as five separate homeland security plans covering the same
ground. We need to make this process easier, not harder, so we
can have the kind of coordination that Governor Romney has
mentioned.
America's local emergency responders will always be the
first to confront a terrorist incident, and will play the
central role in managing its immediate consequences. Their
efforts in the first minutes and hours following an attack will
be critical to saving lives, reestablishing order and
preventing mass panic.
America wouldn't think of sending our military to fight a
war overseas without proper equipment and training, but that is
what we do every day with our emergency responders across the
country, who are the front lines of our war on terror.
One of the many lessons we learned from?
Chairman Cox. Mr. Metzl, I just need to ask you to
summarize.
Mr. Metzl. Last sentence. Last long, run-on sentence. One
of the lessons we learned from September 11 is that our
emergency responders will rush to the scene of a terrorist
incident, even if they don't have the tools to respond
effectively. We cannot afford for them and for us to have that
be the case. We need to get them the equipment and the training
they need; otherwise, we will all be in danger.
Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
[The statement of Mr. Metzl follows:]
PREPARED STATEMENT OF MR. JAMIE F. METZL
Mr. Chairman and Members of the Committee, Thank you for inviting
me to testify before you today. It is an honor for me to be here.
I serve as Project Director of the Council on Foreign Relations
Independent task Force on Emergency Responders, where I work with our
Chairman, Senator Warren Rudman and Senior Advisor Richard Clarke. The
non-partisan task force has brought together leading Americans from
diverse political and professional backgrounds to examine whether or
not America is sufficiently prepared for another terrorist attack. Our
members include former Secretary of State George Shultz, former CIA and
FBI Director William Webster, the former Chairman of the Joint Chiefs
of Staff, the former Chief of Staff of the Army, three Nobel laureates,
and other senior experts of a similar stature.
The Task Force met with local emergency responders across the
country, worked closely with emergency responder professional
associations, and partnered on spending-related issues with two of the
national leading budgetary analysis organizations, the Center for
Strategic and Budgetary Assessment and the Concord Coalition. Based on
these extensive contacts and the totality of our investigation, we came
to one very simple conclusion: almost two years after 9/11, America is
not sufficiently prepared for another terrorist attack.
This is not to say that we are not better prepared to address some
aspects of the terrorist threat or that the government has done nothing
since 9/11. In our report entitled Emergency Responders: Drastically
Underfunded, Dangerously Unprepared which we released on June 30, the
Task Force credited the Bush administration, Congress, governors, and
mayors with taking important steps since the September 11 attacks to
respond to the risk of catastrophic terrorism. It is to say, however,
that we are not as prepared as we must be given the magnitude of the
threat we face and the tremendous repercussions of another attack. As
Senator Rudman has said, the question is not if the next attack will
take place, but rather when it will take place.
Somewhere in the world, perhaps even here in America, terrorists
are now likely planning attacks on the United States. At the same time,
America's diplomats, military officers, intelligence agents, policemen,
firefighters, and others are working frantically to prevent and prepare
for such an attack. These two groups of people are in a race with each
other that our side cannot afford to lose.
An effective homeland security strategy must therefore play both
offense and defense. We must attack terrorists wherever they are, cut
off their financing, and destroy their networks. We must also address
global causes of instability that provide fertile soil for the
recruitment of terrorists. At home, we must protect our critical
infrastructure, keep our airways, ports, and highways safe, and make
sure that our local policemen, firefighters, health workers and others
have the equipment and the training they need to prevent and respond to
terrorist attacks. Although there are many aspects of homeland security
that need to be reviewed, our examination focused on the preparedness
of emergency responders. What we found shocked us.
We found that on average, fire departments across the country have
only enough radios to equip half the firefighters on a shift, and
breathing apparatuses for only one third. We found that a mere ten
percent of fire departments in the United States have the personnel and
equipment to respond to a building collapse. We found that police
departments in cities across the country do not have the protective
gear to safely secure a site following an attack with weapons of mass
destruction. We found that public health labs in most states still lack
basic equipment and expertise to adequately respond to a chemical or
biological attack, and that 75 percent of state laboratories report
being overwhelmed by too many testing requests. In sum, we found that
emergency responders across the country don't have the equipment and
the training they need to respond safely and effectively to a terrorist
attack.
In order to quantify this preparedness gap, we worked with each
emergency responder community--fire, police, emergency medical, public
health, emergency management, and others--and asked them to determine
and cost out the minimum essential capabilities they required to be
prepared for a terrorist attack. We were very clear that we were not
asking for a wish list, and we carefully reviewed the data we collected
from these sources. We were extremely conservative in our estimates.
The high funding estimate provided to us by the fire community, for
example, was roughly $85 billion over five years. The number that we
ended up using for our calculation, however, was $37 billion. The high
estimate for establishing interoperable communications was $18 billion
over five years, but we used the much lower number of $6.8 billion
based on the more economical funding model of the Capital Wireless
Integration Network project in the greater DC area. Most significantly,
because police organizations were unable to provide us with any
reliable estimates of their need, we decided not to include a police
figure rather than include a number we would not be able to support.
Finally, we assumed that every dollar allocated for emergency
responders would be used to address terrorism preparedness needs, not
for more generic purposes.
Based on our calculations, we found that America will fall roughly
$98.4 billion short of meeting critical emergency responder needs over
the next five years if current federal, state, and local funding levels
are maintained. According to our estimates, combined federal, state,
and local expenditures would need to be as much as tripled over the
next five years to address this unmet need. As you know, states across
the country are in their worst financial situation in decades, and
there are many who argue that terrorism is a national security threat
which, according to the constitution, is primarily a responsibility of
the federal government. Covering the $98.4 billion funding shortfall
using federal funds alone, therefore, would require a five-fold
increase from the current level of $5.4 billion per year to an annual
federal expenditure of $25.1 billion.
Among other things, these additional funds are badly needed to
enhance federal and local urban search and rescue capabilities; to
foster interoperable communications systems for emergency responders
across the country; to enhance public health preparedness by
strengthening laboratories and disease tracking capabilities, and
training public health professionals for biological, chemical, and
radiological events; to provide basic protective gear and WMD
remediation equipment to firefighters; to support an extensive series
of national exercises that would allow responders to improve on
response techniques; to enhance emergency agricultural and veterinary
capabilities for response to a potential national food supply attack;
and to help develop surge capacity in the nation's hospitals to help
them better prepare for a WMD attack.
While these critical needs must be addressed immediately, our Task
Force is the first to admit that our figures for meeting them are
preliminary and that the Unites States must develop a more
sophisticated requirements-generation process. Unless we both get the
necessary resources to America's front-line emergency responders and
create a policy framework for spending these funds most efficiently,
the American taxpayer will not receive the best return on our
investments in homeland security and, more importantly, we will not be
as safe as we must become. If we allocate the funds without getting the
policy issues right, or if we get the policy issues right without
allocating the funds, we will not be prepared. America must do both.
The centerpiece of this policy framework must be national
preparedness standards. America needs national standards that define
what emergency preparedness means. Every city of a given size should
have a minimum set of capabilities--they should be able to respond to a
biological event of a certain size, decontaminate a certain number of
people, etc. But because America has not defined what preparedness is,
we have no way of knowing systematically how prepared we are or what we
need to do to get from where we are now to where we need to be.
Standards should not become the basis for federal micromanaging of
state and local governments, but they must establish minimum essential
capabilities that every jurisdiction of a certain size should either
have or have access to. Within these parameters, state and local
governments should be allowed flexibility for determining priorities
and allocating resources so long as national standards are met over a
fixed period of time.
National standards can then provide the basis for a requirements
process similar to that employed by the United States military. Threats
must be identified, capabilities for addressing threats determined, and
requirements generated for establishing or otherwise gaining access to
necessary capabilities. Effective coordination and planning between and
among all levels of government and emergency responders on the ground
must then transform new capabilities into a national preparedness
system.
A second element in getting the policy framework right is fixing
the system for allocating scarce emergency responder funds. It makes no
sense to distribute funds based primarily on a divide the spoils
formula. As Secretary Ridge and others have correctly asserted, we need
to think less about politics and more about our vulnerabilities and the
hierarchy of threats facing us when making decisions about distributing
funds. This must be the case on both the federal and on the state
level. Otherwise, our funds will be diluted to the point of being
wasted. America must smartly allocate our limited resources to address
our greatest vulnerabilities.
In addition, the erratic nature of federal funding has created
perverse incentives for short-term thinking among cities and states,
and this process must be fixed. State and local governments can't make
long-term decisions to address their needs without confidence that
increased federal funding will be sustained. Multi-year funding is
extremely difficult in our political system, even for military
appropriations, but we must work to create confidence among states and
localities that funding levels will be maintained over time in order to
establish proper incentives for systematic, long-term planning.
You are the experts on the issue of Congressional oversight, and I
am therefore hesitant to make recommendations regarding how Congress
might be organized. Nevertheless, the Task Force found that an
estimated 88 committees and subcommittees of the House and Senate have
a hand in the unwieldy homeland security authorization and
appropriations process. For this reason, the Task Force has recommended
that the authorization and appropriations processes must be focused and
streamlined both to ensure necessary oversight and to better guarantee
that funds will be appropriated and distributed with necessary speed.
The Task Force believes that Congress should have a lead committee, or
an effective joint committee, to shape overall policy in order to
prevent the fragmentation of oversight and the distortion of
appropriations. As I'm sure you know, the Task Force has recommended
that the House of Representatives transform this committee into a
standing committee and give it a formal, leading role in the
authorization of all emergency responder expenditures.
Finally, the federal and state grants systems are duplicative and
unnecessarily complicated and serve to slow the funding process for no
real benefit. The current inflexible structure of homeland security
funding, along with shifting federal requirements and increased amounts
of paperwork, place unnecessary burdens on state and local governments.
For example, some states have been required to submit as many as five
homeland security plans in order to qualify for federal assistance.
While a balance should be maintained between the need for the rapid
allocation of emergency preparedness funds and the maintenance of
appropriate oversight to ensure that such funds are well spent, the
present danger is too great to allow for business as usual. As part of
an overall response to this larger structural problem, we believe that
Congress should require DHS to work with other federal agencies to
streamline homeland security grant programs in a way that reduces
unnecessary duplication and establishes coordinated ``one-stop
shopping'' for state and local authorities seeking grant funds.
America's local emergency responders will always be the first to
confront a terrorist incident and will play the central role in
managing its immediate consequences. Their efforts in the first minutes
and hours following an attack will be critical to saving lives,
reestablishing order, and preventing mass panic. America would not
think of sending our military to fight a war overseas without proper
equipment and training. It is therefore unconscionable that we are not
providing those same necessities to the local emergency responders who
are also on the front lines of the war on terror.
One of the many things we learned from the 9/11 attacks is that our
local emergency responders will rush to the scene of a terrorist
incident, even if they do not have everything they will need once they
get there. In New York, this led to inexcusable deaths. The United
States has both a responsibility and a critical need to provide our
emergency responders with the equipment, training, and other necessary
resources to do their jobs safely and effectively. Otherwise, we will
all be in unnecessary danger. America must do better.
Thank you very much. I look forward to answering any questions you
may have.
Chairman Cox. Thank you. Mr. Chief Jaramillo.
STATEMENT OF MR. GEORGE JARAMILLO, ASSISTANT SHERIFF, ORANGE
COUNTY, CALIFORNIA SHERIFF'S DEPARTMENT
Mr. Jaramillo. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. On behalf of
Sheriff Mike Carona and the men and women of the Orange County
Sheriff's Department, as well as the people from your district,
we appreciate the opportunity to be heard on this.
We have submitted, as you know, a more extensive written
testimony, but I want to give you a brief overview of a few
things that are paramountly important within that testimony.
Orange County is the second-most populous county in
California. It has got 3 million residents, and 38 million
yearly visitors. If it were a stand-alone economy, it would be
the 31st largest economy in the world.
Unfortunately, it is a major target, also. It has
Disneyland, John Wayne Airport, Anaheim Stadium and San Onofre
nuclear generating station. We've got a great partnership with
Los Angeles County.
We work very well with Sheriff Lee Baca and the men and
women of his department. In fact, California's divided into
mutual aid response regions.
Orange County and LA County combine to form Region 1, which
is the largest response region in America. Region 1 has 122
cities, exceeds 50,000 emergency responders, and has a 13
million resident population.
These two counties alone represent 40 percent of
California's first responders, and 36 percent of California's
total population. Together, both counties have, with
multidisciplines in mind, (law, fire and health,) jointly
participated in several full-scale training scenarios and
tabletop exercises, as well as developed compatible plans for
regional emergency response.
This training establishes relationships, tests equipment,
communications and command and control capabilities. Beyond
this, we have established our terrorism early warning groups.
Both in L.A. and Orange County, these countywide
multidisciplinary units established before 9/11 bring together
law enforcement, fire, health, special districts, public
utilities and private sector businesses to share and
disseminate information and intelligence.
We coordinate daily with Los Angeles and other counties.
These TEWGs, as we call them, monitor trends and potentials to
prevent and mitigate any potential terrorist threat to Orange
and L.A. counties, all of Region 1.
The TEWG managea a list of sites critical to the county's
infrastructure, and maintains response plans based on the
threat assessment and current trends.
Additionally, private sector terrorism response groups, and
Region 1 homeland security advisory councils, bring together
business and industry leaders from Orange and L.A. counties on
a regular basis, to advise both sheriffs, to network and, most
importantly, to identify what resources they could share if
something happens and the government isn't there to provide.
That is the good news. Here is what is needed. First, we
need to get dollars from the federal government, we need to get
them fast. As an example, Orange County has been supposedly
awarded nearly $12 million in grant funding. To date, we have
seen about $875,000 of those dollars.
Second, our war on terror is labor intensive. We have to
understand that.
It requires additional personnel. Grant monies should be
more flexible and reflect our needs and provide us the ability
to pay for those all-too important personnel costs associated
with our terrorism early warning groups and our joint terrorism
task force.
In fact, as we assign personnel to take care of homeland
security issues, we have to backfill personnel in our original
missions. This creates the cost of taking care of the homeland
security problem, as well as the additional, generally time-
and-a-half, costs of taking care of our original police
mission.
Number three, grant funds should be focused on the local
agency, whichever that is, whether it is state, county, or more
local, city, on the local agency primarily charged with the
responsibility for fighting terrorism.
This entity, not necessarily state, not necessarily county,
perhaps even at a city level, should be primarily responsible
for a cohesive plan, producing a cohesive plan, that will work
in that region or that area.
It makes sense then that it is within this entity that the
funds should be trickled down.
Last, there must be more work done to ensure interagency
intelligence sharing.
While establishing a joint task force staffed with federal
and local law enforcement officers is a great concept,
information sharing only works if the local officers are given
access to information which they can bring back to the agencies
they represent.
Mr. Chairman, we stand committed, as you in Congress do, to
fight terrorism.
We now must ensure that all our people stand ready to do
so.
Thank you.
[The statement of Mr. Jaramillo follows:]
PREPARED STATEMENT OF MR. GEORGE JARAMILLO
Chairman Cox, members of the committee, thank you for the
opportunity to testify before you today on behalf of the Orange County
Sheriff's Department, and our Sheriff, Mike Carona. This is the second
opportunity within a short timeframe that our agency has been invited
to testify before the Select Committee, and I would like to acknowledge
extra gratitude for the hard work and due diligence of Chairman Cox and
all of the Committee members.
It was the request of Chairman Cox that my remarks today focus on
the inter-jurisdictional intelligence sharing efforts and working
relationship that has been put in place between Orange County and our
neighbors to the north, Los Angeles County.
First, I would like to provide you with some background on Orange
County, which is the second most populous county in California with 3
million residents and over 38 million visitors annually. Orange County
is the 31st largest economy in the world. The County includes 34
incorporated cities, 42 miles of coastline, 3 harbors, numerous
internationally known tourist attractions, technical/manufacturing
locations, shopping malls including the third largest shopping mall in
the nation, John Wayne Airport, various venues hosting national and
international entertainment and sporting events, and large convention
centers. Over 16,500 private and commercial yachts valued over $2
billion are moored within the three harbors of Orange County.
The Orange County Sheriff's Department has taken a primary role in
preparedness for acts of terrorism within our communities. With over
9,000 emergency responders in Orange County from law, fire, and health
disciplines, the response capabilities of these dedicated men and women
are, in my opinion, unsurpassed. Over 160 participants from local
agencies respond to the County Emergency Operations Center when
activated for the San Onofre Nuclear Generating Station annual graded
exercise. Several tabletop and full-scale exercises are conducted each
year to prepare our emergency responders for natural disasters and acts
of terrorism. Utilizing Unified Command and Standardized Emergency
Management principals, the County of Orange is on the leading edge in
disaster preparedness and mitigation. This concept is also used in the
fight against terrorism. Several terrorism specific exercises have been
conducted and more are planned, to combat terrorism and its threat.
Prior to September 11, 2001 the Orange County Sheriff's Department
saw the need to establish a county wide multidisciplinary unit to
enhance communication and interoperability efforts within the 114 local
government entities of Orange County. The Terrorism Early Warning Group
(TEWG) was formed to bring law enforcement, fire, health, special
districts, public utilities, and private sector businesses together to
share and disseminate information and intelligence. This TEWG monitors
trends and potentials to prevent and mitigate any possible terrorist
threat to the Orange County Operational Area. Open source data and
information received by Terrorism Liaison Officers from local agencies
is collected, verified, and disseminated to local, State, and Federal
agencies. The TEWG interlinks with their TEWG counterparts in Los
Angeles County and other adjacent counties to provide a synthetic
analysis of local intelligence in the quest to deter terrorists. The
TEWG has developed relationships with literally hundreds of these
agencies including private businesses throughout the nation. This
communication link is vital during crisis management of an actual event
and during ongoing public awareness and prevention efforts. TEWG
maintains liaison officers within the FBI though our Joint Terrorism
Task Force and the State through the California Anti Terrorism
Information Center where all information is shared.
The TEWG manages a list of sites critical to the county
infrastructure and maintains response plans based on the threat
assessment and current terrorist trends. With over 85 percent of Orange
County's infrastructure owned by private business, the Private Sector
Terrorism Response Group plays an essential role in the fight against
terrorism. Business leaders and security personnel meet on a bimonthly
basis to discuss current trends and potentials. These companies, many
in the Fortune 500, are potential targets or have assets available
during consequence management in a terrorist attack.
This year the TEWG received 77 terrorism related incidents in
Orange County. Of these, 50 advisories have been disseminated to
agencies both inside and outside of Orange County. The TEWG has
provided presentations to hotel and hospital security directors,
created dispatch advisory cards, and liaisons with the Homeland
Security Advisory Counsel.
The Orange County Operational Area is utilizing standardized 800
mhzradio communication equipment for interoperability between agencies.
Every agency in the Operational Area has access to this system.
Additionally, the Orange County Sheriff's Department and Los Angeles
County Sheriff's Office are working to provide interoperability in
communications for deputies working in bordering cities with these two
counties.
The Orange County Operational Area has established training and
equipment committees to research and recommend standardized Personal
Protective Equipment for emergency responders. These items were also
compared with Los Angeles County Sheriff's Office for compatibility as
these two counties are in the same Mutual Aid response region.
An Emergency Responder Preparations Plan was developed by emergency
responders from all public safety agencies to address equipment,
training, planning, and exercise needs for the Operational Area. We
have been able to utilize funds received through both fiscal year 2002
Office for Domestic Preparedness Grants and fiscal year 2003 Homeland
Security Grants to assist us in meeting the goals set out in this plan.
California is divided into Mutual Aid Response Regions. Region One
includes Orange and Los Angeles County. Our two counties, particularly
law, fire, and health agencies, have participated in several full scale
training scenarios and tabletop exercises to establish a rapport and
test equipment, training and communication compatibility. The Sheriff's
agencies share a particular bond with Emergency Management. The Mutual
Aid Response Plans and methods of operation are similar where deputies
responding across county lines are familiar with general training and
tactics.
The Terrorism Early Warning Groups in Orange and Los Angeles
Counties are nearly identical in concept and design. These units
converse on a daily basis sharing information and intelligence. Members
of these teams regularly attend training seminars, exercises, and
conventions together. As a result of the efforts of the effectiveness
of the Terrorism Early Warning Group, agencies from California,
Washington, Nevada, New York, Oklahoma, and Nebraska have formed
TEWG's. The information sharing and dissemination at a local level
continues to grow. Monthly conference calls have been established with
several southland agencies where information is shared regarding
terrorism issues.
Orange and Los Angeles County's have developed a Homeland Security
Advisory Council. These key leaders within the business community from
Orange and Los Angeles County meet on a bimonthly basis. The goal is to
provide direct interaction among senior executives from industry and
the community with law enforcement and public safety services in
support of Homeland Security, civil protection, and critical
infrastructure protection. This creates a bridge for the business
community to have a direct contact with subject matter experts for
counsel and advice in support of planning, training, and activation.
The Orange County Sheriff's Department is the local agency charged
with the protection of our county's harbors and interacts diligently
with local lifeguards, State Fish and Game, United States Coast Guard,
and Seal Beach Naval Weapons Station staff towards this goal. The high
visibility approach by the Harbor Patrol has hardened the protection
against acts of terrorism within our harbors and along the coastline of
Orange County.
With the close proximity to the Long Beach and Los Angeles Harbors,
the Orange County Sheriff's Harbor Patrol trains closely with and works
alongside Los Angeles County, State and Federal agencies assigned to
protect their ports.
The challenge before all of us in local law enforcement is a
daunting one. The heightened level of vigilance and preparedness has
created a need to prioritize and reorganize, and to focus and redeploy
tremendous amount of personnel and resources towards the important task
of Homeland Security.
I can tell you that we have been, and continue to do everything
within our means to make Orange County as safe as possible from the
threat of terrorism. Additionally, we are doing everything in our power
to ensure that should something occur with our county, we are prepared
to quickly respond and deal with that crisis. We stand ready to assist
our neighboring jurisdictions, including Los Angeles County, should the
need arise.
Orange County has been awarded nearly $12 million in grant funding,
although as of today we have only received $875,000 of these funds.
This grant funding has been for equipment, planning, training and
exercises for the 9,000 first responders, 35 law, fire and health
agencies representing this large county. Los Angeles County has been
awarded over $35 million with an additional $45 million to the City of
Los Angeles. Taken together, both counties comprise over 40 percent of
California's emergency responders, and over 36 percent of California's
population.
Some recommendations that I would make to the Select Committee,
relative to grant funding, are as follows. First, I would re-examine
the process that is being used to fund these grants, and move federal
dollars out to the states, and to the local government level charged
with combating terrorism. I cannot emphasize enough how the lengthy
process is creating difficulties for those of us who are First
Responders to purchase equipment, and to give optimal training and
exercises to our personnel.
Equally as important, the grant process should be altered to factor
in threat assessment, and should be based more on local needs. There
should also be more flexibility on how local agencies spend grant
dollars. Each jurisdiction is unique, and the grant process should
recognize that fact.
Another suggestion that I would make, relative to grant funding, is
to allow for some grant monies to be used towards personnel costs. In
order to plan and provide training and conduct exercises, and to
conduct local intelligence gathering and work with federal agencies on
an operational basis, it requires additional personnel. Currently,
grant funding may not be used to fund additional personnel--and I
believe that decision should be re-evaluated.
Grant funds should also be focused on the local jurisdiction that
is charged with the primary responsibility for fighting terrorism. For
example, if a county, under grant-distribution guidelines, is required
to disburse funds to dozens of smaller cities, it becomes a significant
challenge for the county to retain enough funds for major expenditures
that benefit the entire Operational Area.
Finally, I would like to suggest that while we have come a long
way, more work must be done to ensure the sharing of intelligence data
between federal and local agencies. While establishing join task forces
is a great concept, information sharing only works if those
representing local agencies are given access to information, which they
can bring back to their agencies.
In closing, I would like to once again take a moment to thank the
Congress, and specifically the members of the Homeland Security
Committee for their diligent and tireless work as we all do everything
in our power to ensure that the United States is as safe as possible
from all enemies, foreign and domestic.
Chairman Cox. Thank you very much.
Chief Grossman?
Mr. Grossman. Thank you, sir.
STATEMENT OF MR. MICHAEL GROSSMAN, CAPTAIN, LOS ANGELES COUNTY
SHERIFF'S DEPARTMENT
Mr. Chairman and members of the committee, I am here
representing Sheriff Lee Baca from Los Angeles County Sheriff's
Department, and I will try not to reiterate some of the
positive things that are being done between the two counties.
But I will elaborate on some of the things that we are
doing, and then talk about some of the things where we need
some assistance.
The terrorism early warning group that was mentioned was
developed back in 1996. It is a multiagency, multidisciplinary
organization made up of fire, law and health, all first
responders of local, state and federal agencies all working
together to share information and cooperate with one another in
making sure that we are prepared to respond to and prepare for
potential terrorist attacks.
The terrorism early warning group has been recognized as a
model for the nation, and through the Memorial Institute for
the Prevention of Terrorism in Oklahoma City, we are on an
expansion project to expand that to six other cities.
And now with the Office of Domestic Preparedness in DHS,
there are 24 additional cities that we will be expanding that
too.
Now, the terrorism early warning group can be designed to
fit any local needs, whether it is a large area or small area,
but the major point is that it is all first responders working
together, as well as all jurisdictions, from local, state and
federal, truly working together.
We have members from our own organizations on the joint
terrorism task force, and we can exchange information back and
forth. The clearances that a lot of areas are trying to get, we
have several individuals in our units with clearances, and that
part is working.
We do need to improve it, but we are on our way to do that.
Another thing we established based on a very successful
program in the South Bay region of Los Angeles County is a
terrorism liaison officer program. And that is created to
establish a point of contact for each law enforcement agency in
the county. It was done within that regional area of Los
Angeles County.
We have expanded that to every law enforcement agency in
the county. That includes railroad police, specialty police,
the Los Angeles Port Police, and the airport police, as well as
all the universities.
So all law enforcement agencies in Los Angeles County have
a terrorism liaison officer, as do, we have expanded it to
include fire departments and health agencies. And the same
concept is going to be replicated in Orange County, with whom
we work every day.
My counterpart, Captain Catherine Zurn, at their emergency
operations unit, we collaborate on these issues frequently.
The next thing that we have done is Sheriff Carona and
Sheriff Baca have created the Homeland Security Advisory
Council, made up of CEOs of major corporations and
infrastructure in both counties, to connect the private sector
to what we do, so that we can share information and share
resources between industry and first responders, in order to
prepare for the hardening of targets by completing assessments
of locations and different types of facilities.
To this end, we recently held a subcommittee meeting with
the Entertainment Subcommittee. The Entertainment industry is
one of the targets that has been mentioned in the past. We had
heads of security for all the different entertainment industry
locations. And we also had the TLOs from fire and law at this
meeting so that the local jurisdictions could meet each other.
When a studio calls for help, these are the guys that are going
to come help them, so they can meet them and do some planning
and meet the people ahead of time, as opposed to waiting until
they have to dial 911.
We are in the process of setting up a terrorist threat
assessment center with the Los Angeles Police Department
primarily, and we will also bring in other agencies in the
county, a representative from each of the mutual aid areas in
the county.
And this will be an intake center and an analysis center
for all information and all threats. This will bring in the
public number, the 877 number currently published in Los
Angeles, will come into this center as will, information from
the terrorism liaison officers from fire, law and health.
Fire department goes out on a scene. They will see
different things than law enforcement sees, and there may be
vital information that gives us leads and pieces of a bigger
puzzle to solve, that may indicate, give indications, warnings
or trends for a type of terrorist threat.
So we have, basically, all information coming into this
center and analyzed by analysts from the sheriff's department,
the FBI, the California Anti-Terrorism Information Center,
which is the state level, and Los Angeles Police Department.
And we will be training analysts from the other agencies as
well.
One of the things we need assistance with here is some
financial, but mostly political, support to build a SCIF, a
secure compartmentalized information facility, so we can
receive and store classified information at the local level.
None exists at a local level at this time. We need to have
that, so that we don't have to either drive across Los Angeles,
and if you have been there, you know that is a challenge in
itself, or fly in a helicopter over to Westwood to meet the FBI
to read the classified documents. We need to be able to receive
those in our own locations in a secure manner, and share that
with all of our entities within our county, as well as Orange
County, and the neighboring counties if a threat is indicated
for their counties.
Although we have not yet received a great deal of federal
resources, we have applied for and expect to get a great deal
of equipment and training for new equipment to prepare for
response to terrorism. There are a couple things that we would
recommend here regarding the issue that the current urban
security initiatives brings money directly to specific cities.
In Los Angeles County, we have an organization based on the
region. And we need to enhance the regional capability, as
opposed to any individual city. We have a group where we have
all met from all the entities in the county to divide up the
money with pretty much the goal of everyone leaves the room
equally unhappy, because there is never enough money to get all
the things that you need. We far exceeded our goals in that
area, but we continue to look for more resources.
We recommend that future funding be appropriated consistent
with existing regional procedures, which ensure area-wide
readiness, as opposed to specific cities that are within the
region. We would recommend the formation of a task force
comprised of first responders and emergency managers from
regions large and small acting as an advisory group to the
federal government for effective distribution of funds to local
areas.
Future grant guidelines should also include provisions for
additional personnel where costs cannot be borne by local
governments from existing budgets. We are creating new
positions, things that local law enforcement and fire agencies
have not done in the past: things like strategic analysis, as
opposed to case analysis for crimes, intelligence analysis, and
that is a whole new field. And so we have to create new
positions. We have to fund those positions. If we take from
other areas in the department and try to move people in, we
don't meet our goals in those areas.
Chairman Cox. Captain Grossman, I do need to ask you to
summarize.
Mr. Grossman. I am done, sir.
Chairman Cox. That was the shortest summary ever.
Mr. Grossman. On behalf of Sheriff Baca, I would like to
thank the committee for this opportunity to represent our
region in discussing our status and concerns with respect to
the homeland security issues. Thank you, sir.
[The statement of Mr. Grossman follows:]
PREPARED STATEMENT OF MR. MICHAEL GROSSMAN
My testimony today will address the structure established to
facilitate inter-jurisdictional coordination and intelligence sharing
between Los Angeles and Orange Counties, relative to the prevention of,
and response to terrorism. I will also discuss some recommendations for
improving the current Federal Homeland Security Grant process to better
benefit our regional security effort.
The issue of inter-jurisdictional intelligence sharing between Los
Angeles and Orange Counties is addressed in several ways. Steps to
craft a solution for combating terrorism in Los Angeles County were
initiated in 1996 with the formation of the the Terrorism Early Warning
(TEW) Group. This is an entity which provides the framework for
coordination of effort between agencies that heretofore were often
competitors for scarce resources rather than collaborators. The TEW
applies a networked approach, integrating law enforcement, fire,
health, and emergency management agencies to address the intelligence
needs for terrorism and critical infrastructure protection.
The TEW integrates a multi-agency (local, state and federal) and
multi-disciplinary (fire, law and health) network within L.A. County to
gather, analyze, and share information related to terrorist threats. It
relies primarily upon open source intelligence (OSINT) for monitoring
trends and potentials that influence training and doctrinal needs.
During an actual threat period or attack, the TEW provides consequence
projection (forecasting) to identify potential courses of action to a
Unified Command Structure. The TEW maintains daily contact with the
FBI's Joint Terrorism Task Force (JTTF), the California Anti-Terrorism
Information Center (CATIC), and other local, state and federal agencies
dealing with terrorism issues. The TEW has been replicated in Orange
County with whom we maintain continuous contact on issues of emerging
threats and related cases. TEWs have also been established in adjacent
counties and are developing in many cities across the nation as a part
of the TEW expansion project, supported by the Memorial Institute for
the Prevention of Terrorism (MIPT) in Oklahoma City.
In order to directly involve the private sector in this effort,
Orange County Sheriff Mike Carona and Los Angeles County Sheriff Leroy
Baca have created the Region I Homeland Security Advisory Council
(HSAC) to provide direct interaction among senior executives from
industry and the community with the law enforcement and public safety
services in support of homeland security, civil protection, and
critical infrastructure protection. This effort enhances the
effectiveness of the Los Angeles and Orange County Terrorism Early
Warning (TEW) Groups by providing a capacity for direct contact with
subject matter experts for counsel and advice in support of planning,
training and activation.
A successful adjunct to the TEW is the Terrorism Liaison Officer
(TLO) Program. The TLO program is based on a successful model
implemented in the South Bay area of Los Angeles County, which has been
expanded to the entire Operational Area (County). Every Sheriff's
station, law enforcement, fire, and health agency in the County has a
liaison officer assigned to facilitate networking and information
sharing within mutual aid areas in the county, and with the TEW. The
Terrorism Liaison Officer program is also linked with the private
sector through the Region I Homeland Security Advisory Council. The TLO
concept is being replicated within Orange County and will further
enhance the flow of information between the field to the TEWs.
One proposal I wish to bring to your attention concerns the timely
sharing of pertinent classified information and the associated
coordination required between local and federal entities. It is our
hope to build a Secure Compartmentalized Information Facility (SCIF)
within the Los Angeles County Emergency Operations Center (CEOC). This
building currently serves as the hub for emergency operations within
the Los Angeles Operational Area and as the home site of the Los
Angeles TEW. An on-site SCIF would greatly enhance our information
sharing capabilities, therefore we are seeking political and financial
assistance for this proposal.
Although we have yet to directly benefit from federal resources, we
have applied for and are awaiting the receipt of federal funds from the
Homeland Security Grant Programs. These funds will significantly
enhance our ability to acquire the necessary resources and equipment
needed to protect our personnel in the event of a terrorist attack. We
have successfully worked with all of the first- responder agencies in
our County to ensure that these funds have been equitably distributed
to best prepare one of the most target rich and complex regions in the
Nation.
There are, however, two specific areas that need revision for these
funds to be utilized effectively. The first area of concern is the
current funding stream and the second is the need to fund personnel as
opposed to simply funding equipment.
The most recent grants, known as the Urban Area Security
Initiatives, do not sufficiently benefit the California Counties of Los
Angeles and Orange ? a region which is home to nearly 13 million
citizens. The funds from these grants have been allocated directly to
designated cities, to be expended in cooperation with the contiguous
counties. While the cities of Los Angeles and Long Beach have special
needs, there remain 86 additional cities and many square miles of
unincorporated county area, all with contiguous borders, that make up
the Los Angeles ?Operational Area.? This dispersal method is counter to
the process that has been followed in all previous Homeland Security
Grant Programs, and does not address the overall regional readiness and
needs requirements. Any attack in the Los Angeles/Orange County area
would unquestionably require a regional response.
The second issue is the need for additional personnel dedicated to
anti and counter-terrorism. When equipment provided in the grants
arrives at the local level, a critical void still exists for adequate
personnel to accomplish the many related tasks to combat terrorism at a
level never before required of local law enforcement. Therefore, I
recommend the following:
-- Future funding be appropriated consistent with the existing
regional procedures which ensure area-wide readiness
-- Formation of a task force, comprised of first-responders and
emergency managers from various regions across the country, who
would act as an advisory group to the Federal Government for
the effective distribution of funds to local areas.
-- Future grant guidelines include provisions for additional
personnel where the cost can not be borne by local government's
existing budgets.
On behalf of Los Angeles County Sheriff Leroy D. Baca, I wish to
thank the Committee for this opportunity to represent our region in
discussing our status and concerns with respect to Homeland Security
issues.
Chairman Cox. Thank you very much.
Chief and Commissioner Kiernan?
MR. RAY KIERNAN, FIRE COMMISSIONER AND CHIEF OF NEW ROCHELLE
FIRE DEPARTMENT AND MEMBER OF WESTCHESTER CAREER fIRE CHIEFS
AND NORTHEAST FIRE CONSORTIUM, NEW ROCHELLE FIRE DEPARTMENT,
NEW ROCHELLE, NEW YORK.
Mr. Kiernan. I want to thank the chairman and Nita Lowey,
my congresswoman. And I would like to say hello to Bill
Pascrell from New Jersey--very helpful on a lot of the things
we have done in the fire service. And to Chief Weldon, my
fellow chief in Waukesha, Pennsylvania. Always good to see him.
But anyway, I plan to submit a formal testimony for the
record. But under time constraints, I was unable to prepare one
in advance. I was called last night finally to come to the
hearings today. And as you know, when people call the fire
department, we come right away.
What I would like to do is take you back to--everybody
always takes the, you know, it is 20 months since the last
World Trade Center attack and all this. We go back, we say, no,
it is 10 years; that was the first World Trade Center attack,
and that is when we should have really woke up.
We are the guys when all the plans of the sheriffs and all
the plans of the governors don't work, we are the guys that
inherit the rest. And I have been the commissioner and the
chief of department of my department for many years. And it is
the seventh largest city in New York state, and it borders New
York City on the north. We were one of the first departments
into New York City when the Twin Towers were hit. And we, you
know, did the best job we could and helped out any way we
could.
It is very difficult to this day to realize, after seeing
that horrific site and seeing things that you still couldn't
believe you saw, that not one dime has reached us. Not a single
penny has reached us to help our plight at all.
I am not sure how the money goes out. You know, we always
say when we hear about the billions in Washington, we say it is
like the weatherman: There are billions up there, but none of
it is raining, and it is not reaching the ground. We down in
the trenches have not seen any money.
After months of receiving no guidance, no standards, no
communications from the state or federal authorities,
firefighters from New Rochelle, Yonkers, Mount Vernon,
Scarsdale, Eastchester, Fairview, Greenville, Hartsville, White
Plains and other places came together and created the
Westchester Career Fire Chiefs Task Force.
We thought and listened to everything Secretary Ridge said
what he expected; what he thought a good plan would be:
regionalization, standardization, communications,
compatibility. We did all of this because we knew from
experience when you don't have hose threads, for example, that
match your neighbors, you can't really function well with him.
So we approached Congresswoman Lowey and asked her could
she help us out. Well, she found some money someplace and got
money to our team. And we were able to train 600 firefighters
in weapons of mass destruction training: six hundred men with
not an awful lot of money.
But the sad thing is once they received the training, they
went back to their fire departments and had no equipment--no
equipment. As difficult as it is to believe, after seeing the
effects of the attacks, we would go back and know what we were
supposed to have and would end up having a situation where we
know the guys would respond and go into situations that would
be virtually suicidal.
What we proposed was to have--we think the firefighter is
the answer to the whole situation, post-incident situation.
Your neighborhood fire houses exist already, your fire
departments exist already, you are here to talk about setting
up teams. We know the response time of state and federal teams,
of 24, 48 hours to be operational. Here the guys down the
street will be there in four minutes.
We talk about equipment them so that they could at least
remove people from harm's way, suits on trucks, training, that
if there were a sarin gas thing, if there was some sort of a
biological attack that you knew about, that they could remove
people from harm's way, and probably mitigate a lot of the
situations and reduce casualties dramatically.
If we had to wait for federal teams to arrive, then state
teams to arrive, it would be forever. And it would be very,
very probably an unnecessary loss of life.
So what we are saying here is for some reason the money
hasn't reached us, for some reason we fell we are the answer
post-incident. These guys have done a hell of a job preventing
things from happening. But post-incident, we are the guys.
We need to be trained in building collapse. All of these
incidents involved tremendous fires after they occurred. And
now the next threat, of course, is some sort of a biological or
chemical or some type of an attack of that nature. And your
area firefighters have to be equipped to respond into it.
And what we need is guidance, we need, certainly, money.
New York State, we have met with--the chiefs of New York State
have met with those giving out the money, and we just told
them, We think your plan is nuts. It is just not getting to us.
I have no idea what we have to do or what to get money, but it
is not reaching us.
So any help you can give us in that way, we would be more
than happy to listen.
Chairman Cox. Thank you very much, Chief.
Mr. Kiernan. Thank you.
Chairman Cox. I want to thank all of our panel. You have
been exceptionally helpful to us.
I am going to yield my time to the members because we are
looking forward to our joint session in just a few minutes with
Prime Minister Blair.
Who seeks recognition on our side?
Mr. Weldon.
Mr. Weldon. Mr. Chairman, thank you.
And I thank all of you for coming.
And I hate to sound cynical at this hearing of an issue
that has been a passion of mine for my lifetime. But I have to
be a little cynical.
First of all, I want to congratulate the California folks,
because I think they wrote the book on emergency response and
the way you can integrate agencies.
I was at Loma Prieta, Northridge, I saw the way you moved
equipment in. I was at the wild lands fires in the south, the
way you prepositioned equipment where the state pays for it and
bring it when it is needed. And you have done an outstanding
job; you really have kind of wrote the book on how to integrate
the entire statewide network.
And Chief, up in New York you have done a great job. You
convinced your legislature to create the LOWSAT program, which
helps encourage people to volunteer.
And you know what frustrates me, Mr. Chairman? We get more
studies. Now we got Nobel laureates. Nobel laureates are going
to tell the fire chief how to better protect his town that he
has been defending and protecting for 200 years. The fire
service is older than America. But it takes a Nobel laureate to
come in and tell us what we need.
Excuse my cynicism.
But I mean there is nothing new here. I mean, Governor
Gilmore showed three Gilmore Commission reports before 9/11. If
you took the time to read the Gilmore Commission reports, as I
know my good friend Mr. Pascrell did, all the recommendations
were there. There is nothing new. You get money for the D.C.
Fire Department, and they can't buy the boots to put on the
firefighters, because they used the money for some other
purpose.
The same thing was true down in Fort Worth, Texas.
So Mr. Chairman, I get a little upset that the focus on the
headline grabbers, as opposed to the substance of what the 1.2
million men and women in this country need who are out there
serving in 32,000 departments, just as Chief Kiernan mentioned
here today--Commissioner Kiernan.
You know, Mr. Chairman, it is really simple. These fellows
are out there, and these women, doing the job. Eighty-five
percent of them are volunteers. Why don't we come up with some
recommendations of how we can encourage more volunteers? Maybe
a Nobel laureate could address that. Maybe tax policies would
give you more incentives to get more people to volunteer, since
85 percent of your members are volunteers. Do you agree, Chief?
Wouldn't that be helpful?
Or maybe we could address the issue of why the publicly--
see frequency spectrum allocation issue has not been addressed.
Maybe because our liberal lawyers don't want to take on the
industry leaders in the communications sector, who don't want
to give up the frequency spectrum to let our public safety
officials have an integrated communication system.
And why don't our Nobel laureates take on the issue of the
union versus volunteer? You have it up in New York, Chief, you
know what I am talking about. The IAFF has got an item on their
agenda that basically tells paid firefighters they can't
volunteer when they are off duty. I wonder if that is covered
in the Council on Foreign Relations report to our
distinguished--and I am not aiming this at the executive
director, because it is not his fault.
It is just the frustration I have, Mr. Chairman. I wouldn't
be in this job were it not for the fire service. I have been on
every disaster we have had in the last 15 years, from Loma
Prieta-Northridge, the Murrah Building bombing in Oklahoma
City, Hurricane Andrew, Hugo, the floods, all of them. The
World Trade Center in 1993, the World Trade Center in 2001.
And what I see coming, keep coming out, are more reports;
and the L.A. Times has a big headline: Oh, now all of a sudden
we know what the problem is.
The problem is the same as it has been for the last 50
years. We don't listen to the people where the rubber meets the
road.
They know what they need. They know what their concerns
are. And if we pay attention to them, as opposed to some
grandiose scheme of creating some new mechanism where the
states are going to tell them how to better do their job, I
think we would all be a lot better off.
I wish I would have heard somebody talk about technology
transfer.
Mr. Chairman, we had five firefighters die up in Boston
because--actually, six--because two firefighters, when their
air supply ran out in the building, no one knew where they
were. Four other firefighters went in to rescue them. If we
would had the same equipment that the taxpayers have paid for
for the Army, GPS equipment with sensor technology to tell us
the vital signs of the soldiers, those six firefighters might
be alive today.
We would have known where they were in the building, and we
would have known their vital signs when their air ran out.
Does it take a Nobel laureate to tell us that, Mr.
Chairman? And if it doesn't, why isn't that in the report?
Because they are the kinds of things that we could and should
be doing now.
The first responder community in this country has been
slapped around repeatedly by people pretending to have all the
answers. And damn it, I want the first responders to be
listened to directly, because they know what they need.
The same thing applies to the resources for first
responders. I don't know how we arrived at a figure of $33
billion. It sounds good because I am for supporting this.
But I can tell you this. The first year of the grant
program, which that gentleman down there led the effort on,
Bill Pascrell, and we worked together, every fire department in
America could apply. There are 32,000. We had 20,000 fire
departments apply with 30,000 requests. The total amount of the
requested money was $3 billion.
Now where do you get $33 billion from that, Mr. Chairman I
have no idea. But maybe there is some other magical figure that
we pulled out of the air to create a headline.
I am saying we need a solution. We don't need more
rhetoric. We don't need more pie in the sky bullshit--excuse
me. We need solutions to help the first responders.
Chief, you know what I am talking about. It has been the
subject of every conference you have been at, every conference
I have been at, in every state. It is about time we respond.
Thank you. Be happy to yield, even though I don't have any
more time.
Mr. Pascrell. I think the organization that the gentleman
represents, Mr. Metzl, wouldn't you agree that they have a
confusion, because they can't distinguish between basic needs,
which existed before 9/11, and the needs which exist in terms
of terroristic vulnerability?
And if you don't understand the difference between the two,
then you make mistakes like this gentleman and the governor. I
am sorry he had to leave. I am sorry he had to leave.
But the program he talked about doesn't even go through
this team. It goes through the Transportation Security Act. But
we can't talk to him. So. He has gone.
Thank you.
Chairman Cox. I will--
Mrs. Lowey. Well, I think my good colleague, Curt Weldon,
said it all. And I am not a firefighter. I am just a
congresswoman. But I happen to have three children and six
grandchildren. And as Commissioner Kiernan knows, I have been
meeting with the first responders. I have been meeting with the
hospitals. I have been meeting with the police. I have been
meeting with superintendent of schools. I have been meeting
with parents.
And frankly, when, and I can't remember, when we had a
witness here who is head of the office of emergency--about a
month ago. And he said, Commissioner Kiernan, that he was going
out with an RFP within the year. This is on the
interoperability of communication systems. He was first going
out with an RFP. And then he was going to let you all know what
the results of his success were.
But we figured if you go out with the RFP, by the time a
year and a half to two years, God forbid there is another
emergency, we will probably be able to let you know the state
of the art of the equipment.
Well, I know that through this regional organization you
have figured out how to deal with interoperability of
communication systems, which is just one of the emergency needs
you need.
And I was talking to my colleague Curt Weldon, who was
giving us some advice. But you figured it out yourself.
And this is what is so tragic to me, because you exemplify
what is happening everywhere. The federal government formed
this agency, the Agency of Homeland Security. And they are
finding office space. And they are trying to hire people.
Well, it is way past September 11. And you are all having
to fend for yourselves, trying to figure out how you are going
to get this equipment, because you are not the money. I did
find some money to do some of the work. We won't discuss that.
We did find some. And some of us are scrounging here and there.
But you and I know that there is so much more that is
needed.
So I really want to thank you. You made your position
absolutely clear. I am not going to take the time to ask you
additional questions. But I am sure that you would welcome some
guidance from the federal government, some expertise that must
be there some place in the federal government, so that you can
move forward with your purchasing equipment. And in fact, I
know that you would welcome some additional money. It is moving
very, very slowly.
And I want to thank you again for keeping our community
safe, for your expertise that you are sharing with the other
communities in Westchester.
And I want to thank Mr. Metzl, Mr. Jaramillo, and Mr.
Grossman for your testimony.
I would hope that we can just all wake up. As you said, we
had a wake-up call 10 years ago. And I haven't seen, frankly,
an efficient response to our communities.
And in addition to the fire service, I can remember a
police chief from Greenburgh said if, God forbid, anything
happened and we have a nuclear plant in our district at Indian
Point, he would have to go out with his raincoat to protect the
community.
So we have a lot of work to do.
Thank you all for coming here. I do hope through this
committee we can move the process to work more efficiently.
Thanks.
Ms. Jackson Lee. Would the gentlelady yield?
Chairman Cox. The gentlelady has a minute remaining.
Mrs. Lowey. I would be delighted to yield for the minute.
Ms. Jackson Lee. That light was on green. Had a little bit
more time.
Let me thank the gentlelady. And I want to thank the
panelists. It looks as if business on the floor is going to
cause us to shorten the hearing more than I would like.
I particularly want to send my greetings out to Sheriff
Baca, whose wonderful hospitality, the pointed insight when
this committee took their tour out to Long Beach, L.A. ports.
And I thank you for your special hospitality on that.
But again, waking this committee up.
Let me just say, Mr. Chairman, I thank you for this
hearing.
We are talking, gentlemen, not because we are disrespectful
of your testimony. But we are talking because many of us have a
commitment to homeland security, having organized our own first
responder, if you will, anti-terrorist advisory committee.
Then, I would like to leave these two points on the table.
Mr. Chairman, I hope that in the next 24 hours we can
reestablish this committee as a fix-it committee, as a problem
solver committee, as an implementing committee. Because you
have heard from all of us, my dear friend Congressman
Weldon?well, we said a lot about our frustration.
And, Mr. Chairman, I would really think it would be
important, one, to take up the issue that I have argued for,
which is the expediting of funds directly to the first
responders, and directly to the local entities, in their hands.
The other thing I want to look at is we think that we have
a day of Sundays for you to file applications and to have them
reviewed, as if we are trying to build a local park. You are
dealing with crisis issues. And an application process that
allows you to fill out some paperwork, even if it is e-mail and
even if it is sent by the Internet, I would argue that it is
too much of a delay.
And there must be a system to document to document your
credibility and to get these funds in your hands.
So Mr. Chairman, what I am arguing for, I have listened to
the first responders collectively from all over the country. I
respect what they are doing. But I think this committee has got
to restructure itself to fix problems.
We have heard over and over again about money going
directly to these entities. I think we have got to rewrite the
legislation, and do that first of all. The second thing is I
think we have got to re-change this application process. My
police in Houston right now, with a director of public safety,
are still waiting for money.
Why? They are sitting around talking about what plan are we
going to have, and what application process are we going to put
in place. And then let us get with the local county people and
see how they are going to put it in place.
And any moment, even though we are not operating at the
highest alert right now, we could be subject to a terrorist
attack.
It is imperative that this committee take its rightful
place in this House and start designing efforts to direct our
dollars and have oversight out where the dangers are, and make
sure that we can work toward a secure nation and secure
neighborhoods.
I said I was closing, and I am, Mr. Chairman, because you
have been very kind. Gentlemen, I hope that you will go back
and encourage your neighborhoods to become part of the Citizen
Corps, that is something under homeland security, a program
under Homeland Security, that will secure neighborhoods.
Most of America does not know that it even exists. And I
would like to encourage this committee not only to work with
Citizen Corps, but to provide a revenue stream to help these
neighborhoods become secure.
And I encourage that; it is happening in Houston with the
Millennium Effort in our community, and I hope it will happen
around the nation.
I yield back, Mr. Chairman, I thank you.
Chairman Cox. I thank our panel. You have been
extraordinary witnesses. Chief Kiernan, I appreciate your
coming on short notice. To all of you, thank you.
As you know, the war on terrorism requires coordination
among the federal, state and local levels. It also requires
international coordination with foreign governments.
And we are now going to rush over to the House floor and
join our Senate colleagues in hearing from the British prime
minister, Tony Blair. He is going to talk to us about many of
these same subjects.
So you are here on an eventful day. This is very important
work.
Godspeed to all of you.
This hearing is adjourned.
[Whereupon, at 3:54 p.m., the subcommittee was adjourned.]
Questions and Reponses for the Record:
Mr. George Jaramillo Responses to Questions from Rep. Langevin.
1. I assume you have all been, and will continue to be, involved in
training exercises and other efforts to gauge your preparedness levels
and identify problem areas.
Question: a. After you complete these exercises, is there any
process by which your experiences and findings are shared with
theDepartment of Homeland Security?
Response a. In California after any training exercise or
activation of the local Emergency Operations Center, we are
required to complete an After-Action Report (AAR) and submit it
to the State Office of Emergency Seivices. These AAR's identify
future training needs based on what worked well and what did
not. A segment on ``lessons learned'' is included to assist in
revising current or developing future protocols, plans, and
equipment needs.
Question: b. Have you received any information from DHS about
best practices and lessons learned in other communities that
might be helpful to you?
Response b. To date, we have not received any in formation from
DHS about best practices and lessons learned in other
communities. I do want to emphasize that we have developed a
network among our mutual aid partners in all disciplines and at
all levels (national, state, regional, local) to share lessons
learned during a training exercise. We are unaware of any
formal distribution of information that has been developed by
DHS to share with local first responder agencies.
Mr. George Jaramillo Responses to Questions from Rep. Etheridge.
Question: 1. How many people in your departments are primarily
responsible for anti- terrorism activities?
Response: 1. The Orange County Sheriff's Department is the largest
law enforcement agency in Orange County with over 4,000 members. We
have 15 full-time members responsible for anti-terrorism activities
along with approximately 40 members who have auxiliary duties relating
to anti- terrorism. Additionally, we have marshaled hundreds of
volunteers to assist in these efforts.
Question: 2. Have you found that the increased emphasis on
terrorism diverted people and resources from your daily crime-fighting
activities?
Response: 2. Absolutely there has been a strong impact on our daily
crime-fighting activities with the diverted people and resources to
anti-terrorism. Due to lack of funding, there have been only seven
replacements for the 15 full-time members who have left their prior
assignments, including general and special crime investigation duties,
training academy assignments, investigation assistance, and field
patrol work. Monies have also been diverted for equipment needs,
computer software networking, and office support for the full-time
anti-terrorism staff members.
Question: 3. How has the current state budget crisis affected your
ability to protect the citizens in Orange and Los Angeles Counties?
Response 3. The current state budget crisis in California has
impacted the release of anti-terrorism and homeland security funding
from the State level to the local levels. The grant guidance set forth
by California's Office of Homeland Security and Office of Emergency
Services are set up to release the equipment, training, exercise, and
planning funds on a reimbursement basis. This severely impacts the
first responder agencies that have to purchase the equipment or develop
the training and exercises within their existing budget in the hopes
that reimbursement will follow. At this time, Orange County Sheriff's
Department has been approved for the 2003 Homeland Security Grants Part
I and Part II in excess of $9 million plus the 2002 Office of Domestic
Preparedness Grants for over $1 million on behalf of the entire county.
No monies have been received to date as agencies are scrambllng to re-
allocate monies to cover the initial costs prior to submitting
reimbursement in voices to the State. The State has consistently
imposed unrealistic timelines and expectations for expenditures without
clear guidance or agreement on the release of grant funds to the 58
designated Operational Areas in the State of California.
Mr. George Jaramillo Responses to Questions from the Minority Staff.
Question: 1. This question regarding the High Threat Urban Area
grants and is directed to Captain Grossman from Los Angeles County
Sheriffs Department.
Response: 1. No response requested from Assistant Sheriff
Jaramillo.
Question: 2. Can you describe the timeline between when the
Department of Homeland Security has announced funds for California, Los
Angeles, and Orange County and when the funds have arrived?
Response 2. The 2003 Homeland Security grant was issued in two
parts. Part I (CA -$45 million) was announced by DHS on March 10, 2003.
The State of California notified the 58 Operational Areas including Los
Angeles and Orange County by letter on March 28, 2003. The letter
advised that grant guidelines would be distributed on or before April
11 On April 15 we received the grant guidelines with a due date for
submission of May 15, 2003. We met the grant guidelines and were
telephonically notified on June 5 that our grant application was
approved for $284,369. No money has been received to date due to the
reimbursement requirement of the grant. The State developed the
required reimbursement forms and made them available late June.
2003 Homeland Security grant Part II was announced by DHS in early
May2003 (CA--$103,355 million). We received the grant guidelines from
the CA Office of Homeland Security on May 14 with a due date of June
15, 2003. We submitted our grant a, on June 13 and received a letter of
grant approval dated August 8 for $6,727,564. To date, no monies have
been received due to the reimbursement requirement of the grant
funding. We are in the process of re-prioritizing our budget to
purchase the equipment, provide the training, and develop the exercise
with existing funds with the expectation that reimbursement funding
will occur in a timely manner. Together, Part I and Part II grant
funding for homeland security will cost Orange County an outlay of $9
million with an unknown reimbursement date by the State of California
for costs incurred in anti-terrorism and homeland security
preparedness.
Question: 3. Sheriff Jaramillo's statement says ``I cannot
emphasize enough how the lengthy process is creating difficulties for
those of us who are First Responders to purchase equipment, and to give
optimal training and exercises into our personnel.'' He adds that
``Orange County has been awarded nearly $12 million in grant funding,
although as of today we have only received $875,000 of these funds.''
Governor Romney testified that the stares are passing though federal
funds to the local level within Congress' 45-day requirement. If the
delay isn't at the state level, should we assume that it is slow to
come out of the Department of Homeland Security?
Response 3. We have been unable to receive confirmation through the
State of California whether the homeland security grant funds have been
transferred to the state coffers from OHS. All indications are that OHS
is not responsible for the slow distribution of funds. Because of the
design of California's grant guidelines with the grant requiring
reimbursement to Operations Areas after costs are incurred, no funding
has yet been received for homeland security or anti- terrorism
equipment, training, exercises, or planning.
Question: 4. What federal resources do you have to address the
personnel needs you have to adequately conduct anti-terrorism
operations?
Response 4. In California, all federal resources must be accessed
through SEMS (Standardized Emergency Management System) after local
resources are depleted. As the County Operations Area we are the link
between our local jurisdictions and the State to obtain additional
resources as needed. We also have in Orange County a Joint Terrorism
Task Force (JTTF) that we co manage with the FBI.
Question: 5. I assume you both run frequent exercises...to gauge
your preparedness for terrorist attack. After you do the exercises and
identify the lessons learned, do you share this information with DHS?
Does DHS send you lessons learned from exercises in other regions?
Response 5. In California after any training exercise or activation
of the local Emergency Operations Center, we are required to complete
an After-Action Report (AAR) and submit it to the State Office of
Emergency Sevices. These AAR's identify future training needs based on
what worked well and what did not. A segment on ``lessons learned'' is
included to assist in revising current or developing future protocols,
plans, and equipment needs. To date, we have not received any in
formation from DHS about best practices and lessons learned in other
communities. I do want to emphasize that we have developed a network
among our mutual aid partners in all disciplines and at all levels
(national, state, regional, local) to share lessons learned during a
training exercise. We are unaware of any formal distribution of
information that has been developed by DHS to share with local first
responder agencies.
Mr. Michael Grossman Responses to Questions from Rep. Langevin.
1. I assume you have all been, and will continue to be, involved in
training exercises and other efforts to gauge your preparedness levels
and identify problem areas.
Question: a. After you complete these exercises, is there any
process by which your experiences and findings are shared with
the Department of Homeland Security?
Answer: a. We have not shared information (lessons learned)
with the Department of Homeland Security after the completion
of training exercises, and are not aware of any existing
process to do this.
Question: b. Have you received any information from DHS about
best practices and lessons learned in other communities that
might be helpful to you?
Answer: b. No, we have not received any information about best
practices from other regions in the nation.
Question: 2. Are any of you receiving regular intelligence
briefings or updates from DHS to assist you in preparing for the most
likely threats?
Answer: 2. Yes, we receive advisories from the State and Local
Watch at the Homeland Security Operations Center. However, our primary
source of intelligence from the Federal Government is the weekly FBI
Intelligence Bulletin that we receive from our sworn personnel assigned
to the Los Angeles Joint Terrorism Task Force (JTTF).
Question: a. If so, I'm interested to know how often and in
what form you receive the information.
Answer: a. The DHS Advisories are transmitted via email as
information is available.
Question: b. If not, how is the lack of threat information
affecting the decisions you make every day about where to focus
personnel, what equipment to purchase and how to prioritize
training and other efforts?
Answer: b. N/A
Question: c. What kind of information would be most helpful to
you in making the most efficient and effective use of your
limited resources?
Answer: c. It would be most helpful to receive information that
is already verified and accurate in order to prevent the
unnecessary deployment of personnel and equipment. As mentioned
in the written testimony, it is vital to have the ability to
have a secure compartmentalized information facility (SCIF) in
order to receive classified information in a timely manner,
particularly if it pertains to an impending threat to our
region.
Mr. Michael Grossman Responses to Questions from Rep. Etheridge.
Question: How has the current state budget crisis affected your
ability to protect the citizens in Orange and Los Angeles Counties?
Answer: The Los Angeles County Sheriff's Department currently has
29 sworn and civilian employees assigned full-time for anti-terrorism
activities which includes intake, analysis and investigations. There
are also three part-time management positions that dedicate a good
portion of their time to anti-terrorism efforts. This is not nearly
enough for an area of our size and vulnerability. Hence the reference
in the written testimony to provide funding for additional personnel
and positions in future grants.
Question: Have you found that the increased emphasis on terrorism
diverted people and resources from your daily crime-fighting
activities?
Answer: Yes, the increased emphasis on terrorism has diverted
personnel from other necessary law enforcement activities. Of the 29
assigned to the full-time effort, eight are on loan to the Emergency
Operations Bureau/Terrorism Early Warning Group from detective, patrol
and other units throughout the sheriff's department.
Question: How many people in your departments are primarily
responsible for anti-terrorism activities?
Answer: The current budget situation in the State of California has
a direct effect on our ability to protect the citizens of Los Angeles
County. The sheriff's department is experiencing a nearly $100 million
reduction in our operating budget for this fiscal year, with additional
cuts pending. This renders us unable to redistribute any additional
personnel from essential law enforcement functions to the anti and
counter-terrorism effort. It also makes it impossible to even loan
additional personnel without replacement.
Mr. Michael Grossman Responses to Questions from the Minority Staff.
Question: 1. Captain Grossman, do I understand your testimony--that
the City of Los Angeles has received tens of millions of dollars in the
High Threat Urban Area grants, but that your department and the region
outside the city gets none of that? Isn't the ``Urban Area'' much
larger than the city itself? Do you know why the Department of Homeland
Security specified the grant that way?
Answer: 1. I do not know why the Department of Homeland Security
specified the grant in this manner. The County of Los Angeles
``Operational Area'' is made up of 88 cities, including L.A. and Long
Beach. The previous Office of Domestic Preparedness (ODP) equipment
grants were allocated through the state to the county to be distributed
as needed to the first-responder agencies in the region. The Urban Area
Security Initiative (UASI) process differs in that it allocated funds
directly to the designated cities with the guidance that the funds
were, . . .``to be expended in cooperation with the contiguous cities
and county.'' We believe that this method does not address the overall
regional preparedness because it is not consistent with existing
procedures for our Operational Area (county).
In the first phase of the UASI grants, the City of Los Angeles was
allocated $12.5M. The County of Los Angeles is waiting to receive its
share that will total approximately $lM (for fire and sheriff). In the
second phase, L.A. City is anticipating an award of $18.87M, and the
City of Long Beach (both cities are in the Los Angeles County
Operational Area) $6.46M. The allocation process is still in progress
for the distribution of these funds. Unlike the first phase, this
requires extensive needs assessments, which are underway, to establish
the strategy which will determine the apportionment. To this date, we
have not received any of the funds from the UASI grants. The only funds
the sheriff's department has received from all of the grants totals
$297K from the 2001 ODP Equipment Grant Program.
Question: 2. Can you describe the timeline between when the
Department of Homeland Security has announced funds for California, Los
Angeles, and Orange County and when the funds have arrived?
Answer: 2. I can not address the funding for Orange County,
however, the attached Grant Summary Sheet describes the timeline and
status of all of the federal grants for Los Angeles County. This does
not include the Urban Area Security Initiative (UASI) grants that are
being administered by the cities of Los Angeles and Long Beach. The
process requires that the state pass the funds to the local entities
within 45 days. The difficulty is that we are processing the multiple
grants with vary requirements, all at the same time. Of the seven
grants, we have received only $297K (to the sheriff's department),
which is from the 2001 grant. We are in various stages of processing on
all of the other grants and have not yet received any additional funds.
Question: 3. Please help me understand what is somewhat conflicting
testimony. Sheriff Jaramillo's statement says ``I cannot emphasize
enough how the lengthy process is creating difficulties for those of us
who are First Responders to purchase equipment, and to give optimal
training and exercises to our personnel.'' He adds that ``Orange County
has been awarded nearly $12 million in grant funding, although as of
today we have only received $875,000 of these funds.'' Governor Romney
testified that the states are passing through federal funds to the
local level within Congress' 45 day requirement. I have heard from my
constituents that the funds aren't flowing. So if the delay isn't at
the state level, should we assume that it is slow to come out of the
Department of Homeland Security?
Answer: 3. The 2001 grant is the only one that is a direct
appropriation of funds. All of the subsequent grant programs require
reimbursement for the distribution of funds. This means that once the
grant is approved, the recipient agency must purchase the items
consistent with their jurisdictions procurement rules, and once the
products are finally received they can then submit for reimbursement
under the grant. This appears to be the primary cause for the long
delays in actually receiving granted funds.
Question: 4. What federal resources do you have to address the
personnel needs you have to adequately conduct anti-terrorism
operations?
Answer: 4. We have not received any federal resources to address
personnel needs. As previously stated in the response to Rep.
Etheridge, we strongly encourage that funding for additional personnel
be included in the 2004 and subsequent grants on a non cost-sharing
basis.
Question: 5. I assume you both run frequent exercises, both real
and tabletop, to gauge your preparedness for terrorist attack. After
you do the exercises and identify the lessons learned, do you share
this information with the Department of Homeland Security? Does the
Department send you lessons learned from exercises in other regions?
Answer: 5. We have not shared information (lessons learned) with
the Department of Homeland Security after the completion of training
exercises, and are not aware of any existing process to do this. We
have not received any information about best practices from other
regions in the nation.
Questions and Responses for the Record from Mr. Raymond F. Kiernan
Question: I--Do you think the Fire Act should be maintained
separately from other First Responder Grants?
Answer: Yes. The American Fire Service is in sad shape in many
communities. Please see the enclosed executive summary of the results
of a survey commissioned by Congress on the American Fire Service
The F.I.R.E. Act is the first federal money to go to anyone in the
Fire Service in the history of the Country.
We can no longer expect chicken dinners, fish fries and bake sales
to keep the balance of our Departments in business to protect its
citizens. One has to sell a lot of brownies to purchase a $250,000 fire
truck.
The F.I.R.E. Act has been one of the most successful programs ever
because money goes directly to the Department and not filtered through
the States for their cut and control.
In your State of North Carolina so far, $4,303,692.00 has been
awarded to 71 Fire Departments of all sizes for necessary equipment.
Much of this could never have been bought by them. (Enclosed North
Carolina FIRE Act recipients.)
Question: 2--Do you think the Fire Grant Program should emphasize
anti-terrorism equipment and training or should it consider all
requests equally?
Answer: No. Each year millions upon millions of dollars work of
valid requests go unfilled with the FIRE Act. The amount of money
allotted in no way meets the demand for assistance. The FIRE Act could
be $5 billon annually and still wouldn't meet requests.
As you can see from the Congressional Report, local Fire
Departments are lacking the basics. To further dilute this by putting
WMD items into the mix would seriously affect the small and rural Fire
Departments, as their risk level might be considered low.
My suggestion is to leave the F.I.R.E. Act alone. Fund it more
generously next session, as it is a great success.
Develop a method of getting Homeland Defense monies to First
Responders, which has been a total failure.
We are here, just down the road from your house. Give us the tools
to do the job.
Material for the Record
PREPARED STATEMENT OF THE HONORABLE DICK MURPHY, MAYOR, SAN DIEGO,
CALIFORNIA
Chairman Cox and Honorable Members of the committee, on behalf of
the citizens of San Diego, I appreciate this opportunity to address the
committee and articulate some of the challenges facing San Diego in its
efforts to prepare for and respond to terrorist threats.
San Diego Background
San Diego is the nation's 7th largest city with a diverse
population of 1,275,100. Despite the comfortable small town atmosphere
of the city and its residents, San Diego is a large city and the
protection of its residents and critical infrastructure is of utmost
importance.
San Diego is a city with potentially high-profile vulnerabilities.
Some of those distinctive attributes include: multiple military
installations; the San Ysidro International Port of Entry--the busiest
border crossing in the nation; regional water and wastewater
facilities; a full service maritime port including a substantial
military presence; an international airport; large professional sports
facilities, major tourist attractions such as Sea World and the San
Diego Zoo, as well as other symbolic sites such as the Coronado Bridge.
Of particular note is the City's responsibility for critical
infrastructure of national significance. San Diego is not only the home
to multiple military installations, but is the sole provider of water
and wastewater services to all military installations within the City
as well as the provider for naval bases home to three of the nation's
aircraft carriers and several nuclear submarines.
Homeland Security Grant Programs:
A significant concern for San Diego is the distribution method of
State Homeland Security Grants (SHSG). The base plus population
distribution to States is not effectively delivering federal funds to
large urban cities such as San Diego. Instead, States are determining
how to ``pass through'' the federal funds to the local jurisdictions on
a state by state basis with no consistency across the nation. Under
California's rules for SHSG distributions, the Counties control the use
of federal funding support, including what amount they retain or pass
on to cities.
For example, San Diego is one of 18 cities within San Diego County,
but represents approximately 43 percent of the region's population. San
Diego has the largest most sophisticated police and fire departments in
the region, and is the primary first responder and mutual aid provider
to a majority of the people in the urban area of San Diego County.
These City departments are most likely to be the first to respond to
any large scale emergency, should one occur. However, of the current
funding allocated to the region by the State, only 24 percent of the
region's share was dedicated to San Diego.
Additionally, the City of San Diego has entered into a Joint Powers
Agreement with the other 17 cities in the county as well as the County
government, to provide hazardous materials response for the entire
region. Despite being the lead agency responsible for responding to
hazardous materials incidents anywhere in the county, the SHSG program
does not require funds be allocated to such an agency for this purpose.
A potential solution for the inequitable distribution plans being
adopted across the nation is to support direct federal funding to the
largest U.S. cities based on population served, threat/need criteria,
and recommend that future State funding account for high-threat
metropolitan areas.
The largest U.S. cities have sufficient scale and sophistication to
justify direct federal funding. For example, the population of the City
of San Diego is larger than Rhode Island and New Hampshire yet the
method for distribution does not recognize this size and
sophistication. Instead the system creates three layers of
administrative bureaucracy, which reduces funds ultimately available to
service providers and delaying expenditure.
Planning/Overtime Expenses:
Another challenge facing cities is the inability to use federal
funds for personnel costs such as planning and overtime reimbursement.
While some funds have been identified in SHSGP II (2003 Supplemental
Appropriations bill), not nearly enough have been identified for
planning purposes. In order for public safety agencies to be adequately
prepared for a terrorist emergency, funding for the development of
response plans, training personnel and exercising the plans is
necessary. Once emergency plans have been developed and exercised,
public safety entities will have an even greater knowledge of the
equipment needed to respond to terrorist incidents.
San Diego is an area with many potential terrorist targets and
therefore incurs exceptionally large added personnel costs for
heightened security, especially when the Department of Homeland
Security raises the national threat level to High (Code Orange) or
Severe (Code Red). These additional expenses are difficult for cities
to absorb, especially given the current budget conditions of cities and
the very real threat of additional revenue reductions by the State.
California is facing an estimated $38 billion state budget deficit, and
cities and counties are expecting to see a severe reduction in revenues
in the near future.
Future SHSG funding should allow the funding to be allocated to
personnel expenses and overtime costs for personnel assigned to
homeland security functions (planning, training and exercising) and
incremental ``backfill'' expenses of overtime and benefits for others
to replace those personnel in regular duties.
Conclusion:
In conclusion, I would respectfully request the committee include
the issues I identified above in their recommendations on how to
improve the partnership between Federal, State and Localities by
improving the current distribution system of federal funding. Those
issues are:
1. Recognize the unique characteristics in certain large cities and
the necessity to identify funding accordingly;
2. Revise the distribution of State Homeland Security Grants to
include direct funding for the largest U.S. cities; and
3. Allow planning and overtime expenses to be considered eligible
for SHSG funds.
Again thank you Chairman Cox and members of the committee for the
opportunity to share San Diego's perspective on some of the Homeland
Security challenges facing the City.
Letters Submitted for the Record
The President,
The White House
Mr. President,
My name is Thomas Kennedy and I am a retired New York City
Fire Department Deputy Chief and a member of the Northeastern
States Fire Consortium.
The Northeastern States Fire Consortium (NSFC) is made up
of State Fire Officials and Fire Organizations from
Connecticut, Maine, Maryland, Massachusetts, New Hampshire, New
Jersey, New York, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island and Vermont.
The NSFC strongly supports the House of Representatives
proposal that retains the management of the FIRE Act in the Us
Fire Administration (USFA),
The USFA is the reason the FIRE Act is such a successful
program. The USFA knows and understands the needs of the Fire
Service. Under the USFA the funding goes directly to where it
is needed, the local Fire Departments. Why alter a successful
program?
Again, the NSFC strongly urges that the USFA retains
management of the FIRE Act.
Sincerely,
Thomas M. Kennedy, Committee Member
Additional Note: FIRE Act information can be accessed at http:/
/www.firehouse.com/funding/fireact/2003/recipients/nc.html
U.S. House of Representatives
Select Committee on Homeland Security
Washington D.C. 20515
Hon. Christopher Cox
Chairman, House Select Committee on Homeland Security, The
Capitol, Washington, D.C.
Mr. Chairman: I was somewhat puzzled when Governor Romney
during his committee testimony volunteered with no particular
context that the city of Fall River had failed to apply for
homeland security funds. I had asked him no question to which
that would have been the answer, and he seemed to me to be
trying to make some political point. The reason for his seeking
to do and the point itself were unclear to me then and remain
so.
My puzzlement deepened when I learned from Edward Lambert,
the Mayor of Fall River, that the city had in fact applied for
funds, directly contrary to the Governor's testimony, in fact,
Fall River's experience appears to contradict the Governor's
testimony. In several ways. In his testimony Governor Romney
defended the view that Federal Homeland Security funds should
go through the states, stressing that local governments should
form regional groupings to make their amplifications, so as to
provide greater efficiency. The irony is that Fall River did
exactly that, at the urging of the Romney administration.
As the following letter from Mayor Lambert says, Fall River
was told by the Romney administration not to apply on its own,
but rather as part of a regional collaborative. It was that
regional collaborative application that was rejected. It is
thus ironic that Governor Romney inaccurately accused the city
of Fall River of failing to apply. I have worked closely with
Mayor Lambert over the past years along with my colleague Mr.
McGovern who shares with me the representation of Fall River.
The mayor is very aggressive-- which is entirely appropriate--
in seeking both federal and state help for the city of which he
is Mayor, and I have found Mayor Lambert and his administration
willing and able partners in putting together proposals for
funding to meet the needs of Fall River and its citizens. As
mayor Lambert's letter says, the Governor's incorrect assertion
that the city failed to apply for funds ``only adds insult to
injury'' and while I am unable to correct the injury that Fall
River suffered when the collaborative of which it was a part
was denied funds, I do want to take this opportunity to rebut
the insult.
BARNEY FRANK
Attachment
Dear Congressman Frank: I was outraged when it was
communicated to my office that Gov. Mitt Rorrmey, in testimony
before the Congressional Select Committee on Homeland Security,
said that the City of Fall River did not apply for funding in
the recent round of federal grants for Homeland Security.
The fact is that Fall River did apply, as part of a
regional colloborative as we were encouraged to do by the
state, only to be rejected in spite of the tremendous need we
have for such security funding.
Jane Tewksbury, Chief of Staff for Public Safety Secretary
Ed Flynn, has admitted to me, as recently as today, that
cities, during the application process, were discouraged from
hung applications on their own, being directed instead to file
applications with other communities identi a regional response
to homeland security issues. Fall River played by that set of
rules as we were told to by the state, then found ourselves
without funding as other cities were rewarded with their own
grants. In fact, the awarding process seems to have left a lot
to be desired, as many cities and regions were funded that do
not have any of the port security, interstate transportation,
or water resource issues that we have in Fall River.
Our city's inability to access these homeland security
funds given the tremendous needs that we have and the strength
of the collaborative application we filed, is a glaring
omission. The Governor's incorrect assertions, that we didn't
even seek funding before your committee, only adds insult to
injury.
Sincerely,
Edward M. Lambert, Jr., Mayor