[House Hearing, 108 Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
AFGHANISTAN: ARE THE BRITISH COUNTERNARCOTICS EFFORTS GOING WOBBLY?
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HEARING
before the
SUBCOMMITTEE ON CRIMINAL JUSTICE,
DRUG POLICY AND HUMAN RESOURCES
of the
COMMITTEE ON
GOVERNMENT REFORM
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
ONE HUNDRED EIGHTH CONGRESS
SECOND SESSION
__________
APRIL 1, 2004
__________
Serial No. 108-224
__________
Printed for the use of the Committee on Government Reform
Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.gpo.gov/congress/house
http://www.house.gov/reform
______
U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE
96-745 WASHINGTON : 2004
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COMMITTEE ON GOVERNMENT REFORM
TOM DAVIS, Virginia, Chairman
DAN BURTON, Indiana HENRY A. WAXMAN, California
CHRISTOPHER SHAYS, Connecticut TOM LANTOS, California
ILEANA ROS-LEHTINEN, Florida MAJOR R. OWENS, New York
JOHN M. McHUGH, New York EDOLPHUS TOWNS, New York
JOHN L. MICA, Florida PAUL E. KANJORSKI, Pennsylvania
MARK E. SOUDER, Indiana CAROLYN B. MALONEY, New York
STEVEN C. LaTOURETTE, Ohio ELIJAH E. CUMMINGS, Maryland
DOUG OSE, California DENNIS J. KUCINICH, Ohio
RON LEWIS, Kentucky DANNY K. DAVIS, Illinois
JO ANN DAVIS, Virginia JOHN F. TIERNEY, Massachusetts
TODD RUSSELL PLATTS, Pennsylvania WM. LACY CLAY, Missouri
CHRIS CANNON, Utah DIANE E. WATSON, California
ADAM H. PUTNAM, Florida STEPHEN F. LYNCH, Massachusetts
EDWARD L. SCHROCK, Virginia CHRIS VAN HOLLEN, Maryland
JOHN J. DUNCAN, Jr., Tennessee LINDA T. SANCHEZ, California
NATHAN DEAL, Georgia C.A. ``DUTCH'' RUPPERSBERGER,
CANDICE S. MILLER, Michigan Maryland
TIM MURPHY, Pennsylvania ELEANOR HOLMES NORTON, District of
MICHAEL R. TURNER, Ohio Columbia
JOHN R. CARTER, Texas JIM COOPER, Tennessee
MARSHA BLACKBURN, Tennessee ------ ------
PATRICK J. TIBERI, Ohio ------
KATHERINE HARRIS, Florida BERNARD SANDERS, Vermont
(Independent)
Melissa Wojciak, Staff Director
David Marin, Deputy Staff Director/Communications Director
Rob Borden, Parliamentarian
Teresa Austin, Chief Clerk
Phil Barnett, Minority Chief of Staff/Chief Counsel
Subcommittee on Criminal Justice, Drug Policy and Human Resources
MARK E. SOUDER, Indiana, Chairman
NATHAN DEAL, Georgia ELIJAH E. CUMMINGS, Maryland
JOHN M. McHUGH, New York DANNY K. DAVIS, Illinois
JOHN L. MICA, Florida WM. LACY CLAY, Missouri
DOUG OSE, California LINDA T. SANCHEZ, California
JO ANN DAVIS, Virginia C.A. ``DUTCH'' RUPPERSBERGER,
JOHN R. CARTER, Texas Maryland
MARSHA BLACKBURN, Tennessee ELEANOR HOLMES NORTON, District of
PATRICK J. TIBERI, Ohio Columbia
------ ------
Ex Officio
TOM DAVIS, Virginia HENRY A. WAXMAN, California
J. Marc Wheat, Staff Director
Nicole Garrett, Clerk
Tony Haywood, Minority Counsel
C O N T E N T S
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Page
Hearing held on April 1, 2004.................................... 1
Statement of:
Charles, Robert B., Assistant Secretary of State for
International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs........ 9
Letters, statements, etc., submitted for the record by:
Charles, Robert B., Assistant Secretary of State for
International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs:
Followup question and response........................... 24
Prepared statement of.................................... 14
Cummings, Hon. Elijah E., a Representative in Congress from
the State of Maryland, prepared statement of............... 7
Souder, Hon. Mark E., a Representative in Congress from the
State of Indiana, prepared statement of.................... 3
AFGHANISTAN: ARE THE BRITISH COUNTERNARCOTICS EFFORTS GOING WOBBLY?
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THURSDAY, APRIL 1, 2004
House of Representatives,
Subcommittee on Criminal Justice, Drug Policy and
Human Resources,
Committee on Government Reform,
Washington, DC.
The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 11:30 a.m. in
room 2154, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Mark Souder
(chairman of the committee) presiding.
Present: Representatives Souder, Cummings, and Clay.
Staff present: Marc Wheat, staff director and chief
counsel; Nicole Garrett, clerk; Tony Haywood, minority counsel;
and Jean Gosa, minority assistant clerk.
Mr. Souder. The subcommittee will come to order.
Good morning, and I thank you all for coming. Our
subcommittee continues its oversight work on the impact of
Afghan opium poppy production and what impact it has on the
global supply of heroin. Last year's Afghan opium poppy
production was the second highest on record. According to data
and maps provided to the subcommittee by a U.S. intelligence
agency, Afghan opium poppy cultivation is soaring, and the
estimates of hectares under cultivation are now approaching the
highest level of past production. I am concerned, because over
20,000 Americans die every year from drugs, and 7 percent to 10
percent of heroin sold in the United States is traced to the
Afghan region.
The United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime [UNODC], has
conducted annual opium poppy surveys in Afghanistan since 1994.
The 2003 survey shows that Afghanistan again produced three-
quarters of the world's illicit opium last year, resulting in
income to Afghan opium farmers and traffickers on the order of
$2.3 billion, a sum equivalent to half the legitimate GDP of
the country. The UNODC concluded that ``Out of this drug chest
some provincial administrators and military commanders take a
considerable share. Terrorists take a cut as well. The longer
this happens, the greater the threat to security within the
country and on its borders.''
Today, we bring into focus a very time-sensitive concern
that the British-led effort on eradication of opium poppy is
stalled just as the opium harvesting season in the south of
Afghanistan is upon us. Reportedly, the weather has been
remarkably good for the growth of poppy, and therefore the
harvest season is accelerating. The subcommittee has received
disturbing reports that while our British allies were supposed
to eradicate a targeted 12,000 acres of opium poppy, they are
barely off the ground in Helmand and have done almost nothing
in Nangarhar. According to our sources, there is dithering on
agreement on how to measure what is actually being eradicated,
which hampers accountability among the governments pledging
counternarcotics resources.
Let me be clear: if it is true that there is some degree of
foot dragging by the British in this complex matter, the U.S.
Department of Defense comes off far worse. Let me quote from
our House Government Reform Committee's Views and Estimates on
the Fiscal 2005 Budget of the United States, which was
unanimously approved by the committee on February 26, 2004: Our
British allies have identified many Afghan opium processing
plants necessary to the heroin trade. Yet despite the financing
of terrorists and other destabilizing elements from the drug
trade, the Department of Defense does not view these as
military targets. The committee urges in the strongest terms
for the Department to reconsider, and will monitor this issue
incident to its oversight activities on behalf of the public
safety. Therefore, if the Department is unwilling or otherwise
task saturated and unable to fulfill its authorizations, the
committee would support the President's requested reduction
with the provison that the funds be redistributed to other
agencies capable of filling the void.
Let me continue by saying this. I am tough on everyone
working the difficult mission of counternarcotics in
Afghanistan because the stakes are so high. I met with both the
former King and President Karzai in Kabul just recently. I had
previously met with the former King when he was in exile in
Rome. Both told me and other Members of Congress who were there
that elimination of the drug trade is vital to the future of
Afghanistan. They also pointed out that it didn't used to be in
Afghanistan years ago, that it was a very productive
agricultural country prior to heroin.
And when Mr. Cummings and I met with him in Rome, he made
that very clear. He said, I don't want my country to go back
and be an opium country. I want us to work with alternative
development, to come up with other things. It would be a
devastation for Afghanistan to go this direction.
They agreed again on this last trip with the U.N.
Assessment Office of Drugs and Crime, that there will be a
palpable risk that Afghanistan will again turn into a failed
state, this time in the hands of drug cartels and
narcoterrorists. We owe it to the people of Afghanistan and the
people of the United States and of Europe and around the world
to make sure that this does not in fact happen.
[The prepared statement of Hon. Mark E. Souder follows:]
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Mr. Souder. I now yield to the distinguished ranking
member.
Mr. Cummings. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Chairman, just over a month ago, this subcommittee
heard testimony concerning the rapid rise in production in
Afghan opium and the state of international efforts to combat
opium production in Afghanistan. The testimony received from
DEA Administration Karen Tandy and Assistant Secretary of State
Robert Charles, who appears again before us today, underscored
the importance of coalition counter-drug efforts to the success
of the broader reconstruction effort in Afghanistan.
The testimony also revealed what an enormous challenge
Afghanistan faces in terms of establishing a governmental
presence and respect for the rule of law and how high the
stakes are for curtailing the drug trade. As the Director of
the U.N. Office on Drugs and Crime put it recently, Afghanistan
is at a critical juncture. It could go either way. It could
embrace democracy and the rule of law and prosper under it, or
it could devolve into a lawless narcostate in which terrorist
and extremist elements once again thrive.
Clearly, Mr. Chairman, we cannot afford to allow the latter
to take place. Given that opium harvesting season is imminent
and Presidential elections in Afghanistan are on the near
horizon, the next several weeks and months will be critical to
Afghanistan's future. The links between the drug trade and
factions seeking to destabilize the interim Karzai government
and/or perpetrate international terrorism appear to be well
established. Breaking those linkages is critical to the effort
to provide for security and stability in Afghanistan and to
eliminate what appears to be a key source of funding for
terrorists and other groups hostile to democracy in and beyond
Southwest Asia.
Eradication of opium poppy is regarded by experts as a key
component of coalition counterdrug efforts in Afghanistan.
Thus, it is troubling to hear that on the verge of the
harvesting season, the United Kingdom may not be equipped,
literally speaking, to handle its share of the load in this
area, despite being the lead nation on counter-drug efforts in
Afghanistan.
The subcommittee has not received much in the way of
background on the particular issue of the British readiness to
pursue eradication aggressively. Thus, I look forward to
hearing the testimony of Assistant Secretary Charles, and hope
that he can shed some light on the situation on the ground in
Afghanistan as it relates to the United Kingdom's commitment
and capacity to eradicate opium poppy in its areas of
responsibility.
With that, Mr. Chairman, I thank you and I yield back.
[The prepared statement of Hon. Elijah E. Cummings
follows:]
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Mr. Souder. Thanks. I want to add just a little bit further
that several years ago, when I traveled with this subcommittee
to England and we met with the different departments there in
London as well as the intelligence there, they were very
critical of our efforts in Afghanistan and our commitment on
the heroin question and urged us to be more aggressive against
our own Government in pushing them on, which we have been
doing.
At last year's InterParliamentarian conference that was
held in Europe, one of the major discussions in addition to
another prevention conference that Ambassador Sembler's wife,
Betty Sembler, organized in Rome, UNODC directly criticized the
United States for not being more aggressive on the heroin
effort in Afghanistan. We need to be working together, and with
our close allies, of which Britain is clearly our closest ally
in the world right, and on this effort. They've been prompting
us and we need to work together. I wanted to make sure I got
that into the record.
Also, the unusual title of today's hearing about, ``Are the
British Counternarcotics Efforts Going Wobbly,'' I want to make
sure people understand why we chose that title. When President
Bush was presenting the Medal of Freedom to Margaret Thatcher,
he used the story, he said, I called her to tell her we were
fully intending to interdict Iraqi shipping, we were not going
to let a single vessel heading for Oman enter the port down at
Yemen without being stopped. She listened to my explanation,
agreed with the decision and then added these words of caution,
words that guided me through the Gulf crisis, words I'll never
forget as long as I'm alive, remember, George, she said, this
is not time to go wobbly.
And that's very appropriate as we tackle this Afghan heroin
question. We both need to be pushing hard.
With that, I look forward to hearing more data on what's
exactly happening on the ground over in Afghanistan from
Assistant Secretary Charles. Thank you for coming this morning.
STATEMENT OF ROBERT B. CHARLES, ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF STATE
FOR INTERNATIONAL NARCOTICS AND LAW ENFORCEMENT AFFAIRS
Mr. Charles. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And thank you,
Congressman Cummings.
I appreciate the opportunity to be here in front of you to
testify on this topic and on the topics that orbit this topic.
Your hearing today is extremely timely and could not be more
important. I might note very briefly that today's Washington
Post has an article on page A19, ``Afghans Asked for Economic
Aid to Prevent Domination by Drug Trade,'' a critical telling
signal of our times. And I just wanted to quote one statement
from what was a very poignant plea yesterday.
Mr. Souder. I'm sorry, I forgot a procedural matter that
you're very well familiar with. I need to swear you in.
Mr. Charles. Yes, sir.
Mr. Souder. Please stand and raise your right hand.
[Witness sworn.]
Mr. Souder. Let the record show you responded in the
affirmative. Also let me take care quickly of the other two
procedural things, I'm sorry. I ask unanimous consent that all
Members have 5 legislative days to submit written statements
and questions for the hearing record, that any answers to
written questions provided by the witnesses also be included in
the record. Without objection, so ordered.
I also ask unanimous consent that all exhibits, documents
and other materials referred to by Members and the witnesses
may be included in the hearing record and that all Members be
permitted to revise and extend their remarks. Without
objection, so ordered. What made me think of that is that we'll
submit that article for the record.
Sorry to interrupt.
Mr. Charles. Not at all. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
I thought I might also just quote from President Karzai's
quite poignant speech yesterday in Berlin. Many poignant lines
in the speech, but perhaps the most powerful one was the quote,
the fight against drugs is actually the fight for Afghanistan.
And that relates of course to democracy, stability, rule of law
and all the things we value, not to mention the impact here.
Two opening thoughts before I go to my formal testimony.
One is that while all seems quiet, I will always tell you the
straight facts as you ask me to come before you, and I will
respond as fully as I can in this open session to every
question you ask. You have both been leaders in this area and I
feel that my obligation very much to the U.S. Congress and
people is to give you everything I can give you.
While it is all quiet, this is crunch time in Afghanistan.
The first crop is coming very rapidly. And if we don't react
collectively, all those who wish to bring democracy the kind of
hope that it has there, we will pay a price later if we don't
react right now.
The second thing I want to say is that what happens in
Afghanistan directly affects us here. It affects us because the
Afghan heroin goes directly to the world heroin market, but it
also affects us because it feeds the extremists and the
terrorists that have destabilized so much of the globe.
So once again I'm grateful for the chance to be here. and
for your steadfast leadership. I am here chiefly to update you
on the status of the impending 2004 poppy crop and the
eradication efforts that we are jointly undertaking in
Afghanistan. There is no more urgent or fundamental issue than
the drug situation, which left unchecked will become a cancer
that spreads and undermines all that we otherwise are achieving
in the areas of democracy, stability, anti-terrorism and rule
of law.
Opium is a source of literally billions of dollars, if you
count it out, to extremists and criminal groups worldwide. As a
result, it should go without saying that cutting down the opium
supply is central to establishing a secure and stable democracy
as well as winning the global war on terrorism. A chart I have
here today shows the potential relationship of Afghan opium to
some of the terrorist and extremist groups. I don't know if
there's any way to put it up, but you have it in front of you
at the very least. In fact, there are two charts, one is color
coded, the other is a description of the four of the main
extremist/terrorist groups in Afghanistan, the HIG, the
Taliban, the IMU and Al-Qaeda. You'll see that one has a full
description of the linkages and the other one has the various
levels of linkage as we know them.
Of course, terrorists don't carry cards. So the idea of
having a card carrying terrorist of a various organization is
always subject to review and rethinking. But the bottom line is
that there are linkages that seem quite clear, and that's one
of the reasons we're most concerned about the Afghan heroin.
It's hard to imagine how any economic development program
can be feasible if it ignores the fact that the IMF estimates
how that as much as 50 percent of the GDP of Afghanistan is
derived from narcotics, or the opium crop can yield up to 100
percent more profit than the alternatives. Clearly, Afghan
drugs affect Afghanistan and the progress of democracy there.
But Afghan drugs also affect all consuming nations and dozens
of countries on the drug trafficking routes. Afghan heroin
presents a sobering domestic issue for our European allies,
since 90 percent of the heroin in the European streets comes
from Afghanistan.
As Ronald Reagan was fond of pointing out, facts are
stubborn things. Initial reports just in from the field
indicate that we could be on a path for a significant surge.
Some observers indicate perhaps as much as 50 to 100 percent
growth in the overall 2004 crop. Those are troubling figures,
because they give us an uptick from what was already the second
largest production year last year.
By these measurements, unless direct, effective and
measurable action is taken immediately, we may be looking at
well over 120,000 hectares, certainly in the range of 90,000
hectares, of poppy cultivation this year. That would constitute
a world record crop, empowering traffickers and the terrorists
they feed, raising the stakes and vulnerability of the Afghan
democracy, and raising the supply of heroin in the world
market.
Even more disturbing, these reports indicate that the clock
is ticking faster than many anticipated, due partly to warmer
than expected weather in southern Afghanistan, and I should say
southern and eastern Afghanistan. You have before you a map
which has been declassified, as in fact the other two charts
are declassified. It shows that among the places where a great
deal, in fact two of the breadbaskets, if you will, of heroin
are Helmand and Nangarhar, and that in these locations and the
others to the south, the weather is warmer now than was
anticipated. In other words, there's been good weather and
they're seeing as a result an earlier harvest.
I have recently learned that the U.N. Office of Drugs and
Crime expects that the unusually warm weather in southern
Afghanistan will result in an early harvest, which in some
provinces has already started. As you know, the U.K. is the
designated lead on counternarcotics efforts in Afghanistan. Our
two nations have worked very closely together with the Afghan
government and our coalition partners to achieve a consensus on
how best to combat the illicit drug economy in a free
Afghanistan.
Let me say unequivocally that we have no better ally on
counterterrorism and counternarcotics in the world than the
United Kingdom. The cooperation between our governments, our
diplomatic services, our military forces, our intelligence
agencies and our law enforcement agencies has never been
greater and continues to yield innumerable successes in these
areas. Some of these I can talk to you about in this setting,
others I can't but I can talk to you about in another setting.
With respect to counternarcotics efforts in Afghanistan in
particular, we continue to work hand in hand to achieve our
mutual goal of destroying the illicit drug economy in
Afghanistan. It's a daunting task.
In general, the support of overall counternarcotics program
in Afghanistan, the United Kingdom is providing roughly 70
million British pounds over a 3-year period. There is a
typographical error I think in the text there, but it is over a
3-year period. Their focus has been on drug law enforcement,
capacity building and demand reduction. one program which has
received significant results is the Afghan interdiction unit,
whose efforts are strongly supported by the United Kingdom.
Under the supervision of the Afghan Ministry of the interior,
which is also quite dedicated, this special drug interdiction
force is playing a crucial role as part of the wider Afghan law
enforcement effort on illegal drugs.
As the lead government on counternarcotics in Afghanistan,
the United Kingdom has pledged approximately 2 million British
pounds, approximately $3.6 million, for manual eradication by
provincial Governors. The United Kingdom is integrally involved
in the creation of what they call the central planning cell
within the Afghan Ministry of the Interior to address
eradication. The British have pledged to provide eradication
targeting options directly to senior levels of the Afghan
government and provincial Governors. The U.K. counternarcotics
officers have also worked closely with INL officers to develop
a phased eradication plan for the three key provinces. I
mentioned before Helmand and Nangarhar. I mentioned also the
third very big one, which is Badakhshan. And I'll talk more
about the phased program if asked.
Though it's too early to predict the level of success in
our overall eradication effort and what we will ultimately get,
we continue to work together to achieve significant results.
Here I must pause. It would be inaccurate to say that we are in
complete agreement on all aspects of the eradication effort or
on the ways to achieve the essential, critical and mutual goal
of eradicating a measurable and significant quantity of heroin
poppies.
For example, we believe that the current set of eradication
targeting criteria, while designed with the best of intentions,
may be overly restrictive. Criteria such as developing
alternative development to be in place and a preoccupation with
avoiding any possibility of resistance may restrict our ability
to collectively reach these eradication goals. By current
estimates, without targeting approximately 35,000 hectares for
eradication, the Afghan-led, British supported phase I effort,
combined with the Afghan-led U.S. supported phase II effort,
will not effectively counter and deter the 2004 crop.
We believe eradication of a significant portion of this
target is achievable and in fact would be sufficient to deter
future planting across the country. I know that Chairman Souder
and Congressman Cummings have both been involved in efforts
previously in other hemispheres, this hemisphere, for example,
in which similar percentages of targeting have actually
generated very significant results. So I think that it's clear
that if we do what we set out to do, we can achieve the kinds
of results that we all believe we need to.
In addition, we firmly believe that it is the role of the
British-led planning cell to provide the Afghan government with
a comprehensive target list to determine, based on domestic
considerations and concerns, what targets are suitable, and
then aggressively support eradication in these areas. If
Afghanistan's future matters, and it does, we cannot speak
warmly of progress in eradication without the planning, blood,
sweat and conviction that will make our words real.
Since you have obviously also seen the worrisome phase I
progress to date, and thus called this hearing, we would
encourage the British Government to revisit the issue also of
funding available to their program in support of the Governor-
led eradication. The window of opportunity for effective
eradication in the two major opium producing provinces of
Helmand and Nangarhar is fast closing. Substantial efforts must
be made immediately if we are to begin genuinely deterring the
expansion of the opium growth. Specifically, we are entering
the first stage of the poppy harvest. The harvest begins in the
southern provinces, and actually has already begun, in fact,
and will continue in counter-clockwise pattern across the
country, including in the northern provinces in September.
Actually if you look at the current projections on whether it
may even be August or July, possibly even as early as June.
The U.K. financed, Governor-led eradication effort
commenced just in one province this past weekend, and has
reportedly been unfolding somewhat slowly. There is still time
for it to unfold in a way that will make a direct, significant
impact in these provinces.
Speaking frankly, I think it is now important that we and
the U.K. redouble our efforts and provide the necessary
additional resources to achieving our mutual, critical and
attainable goals. The climb is steep but the pace must be swift
and our resolve must be unwavering. Indeed, it has to match
President Karzai's words, again, I want to note that he says,
the fight against drugs is the fight for Afghanistan.
We are going to continue to work with our closest ally and
together send a clear message, together, to traffickers that
heroin has no place in Afghanistan. Mr. Chairman, I hope that
on my next appearance I will be able to report that we are in
fact accomplishing many of these common objectives. And I stand
ready for questions.
I did want to add one last footnote, because I know it's of
extreme importance to you and Mr. Cummings and the rest of the
subcommittee. This morning, or last night, I think in many ways
because of the pressure that you have provided upon all of us,
including my office, we did come into possession of what
appears to be the frag, or the guidance, military guidance that
will govern what our military does in Afghanistan. I believe it
is unclassified. I think it's all unclassified. And I would
like to be sure that you get a copy of that, if you don't
already have one.
I stand ready for questions.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Charles follows:]
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Mr. Souder. We will also insert any unclassified portions
into the record.
Let me start with just clarifying again just exactly what
we're talking about today. You're saying that the poppy is
coming to harvest, meaning it's ready to be cut by the people
who are going to send it to the processor to ship to market.
Now, it's already being processed and it's earlier than we
expected.
Mr. Charles. Yes, sir. In the southern portions of the
country, southeastern.
Mr. Souder. That is expected to continue to be early, as it
moves to the north as well?
Mr. Charles. Correct.
Mr. Souder. And when you said the U.K. financed--well, let
me ask you this question first. It's my understanding that the
British have the overall lead in counternarcotics efforts in
Afghanistan. They have particular responsibility for helping
the Afghans in the Pashtun speaking areas, which would be the
south, predominantly, the east, while the United States is
supporting a major eradication effort in the Tajiki speaking
north, where the harvest season begins probably around May.
If there is minimal effort in the next few weeks at
eradicating in the Pashtun speaking areas but a major effort
then undertaken in the Tajiki speaking areas, wouldn't it be
natural for the people of the north to think that there has
been discrimination against their section where the Pashtuns
are and the Pashtuns got off easy? Couldn't they blame
President Karzai, who is in fact Pashtun?
In other words, when the British don't move in this area,
in the Pashtun area, how does that affect us in the north and
our ability to follow through? How does it impact potentially
the elections in Afghanistan if there is discrimination? And in
fact, the British backing off could put us in a box or
President Karzai in a box and the north as well.
Mr. Charles. Yes, sir, let me address that with two
thoughts. First, I want to make clear that the British have
begun in the Helmand area. I think the main point again, to
respond directly and honestly to what you have asked today of
me, the main point is that we need to be more aggressive and we
need to be more complete and we need to be more determined and
we need to be more ambitious about addressing these two huge
and significant producers of heroin poppy. So I don't want to
say that it has not begun, and I think that's important.
The second point is a significant overlay to the production
issue by itself. You're absolutely right, these two provinces,
Helmand and Nangarhar, are Pashtun majority and actually, the
entire north basically, or the portions you've been talking
about, Badakhshan, are Tajiki. So you do have what could
seriously be a problem in terms of the sense that we have made
a commitment to eradicate, and the United States takes over on
May 1 the support of the central government in eradicating in
Badakhshan. And actually probably in time beyond that at great
numbers, thousands of hectares.
If we have not been highly aggressive in the south in doing
the same, I think the question could be raised, why not. And I
think your point almost speaks for itself.
Mr. Souder. When you say that they have begun, and that you
believe they are proceeding slowly, do you believe they have
adequate resources devoted to this to eradicate the crop before
it's going to market? That's really two questions. One is, do
they have adequate resources to do the eradication fast enough,
and at the pace they're moving, will they get it eradicated, or
is it going to get to market unless there is a change?
Mr. Charles. The resources that the British have dedicated,
as I understand it, to these regions, amounts to about $3.6
million. It is certainly, I guess if you were asking me whether
we both, both countries could use more money and that would
have an effect, I think the answer is yes, we could use more,
and yes, it would have an effect. My sense is that if there is
still a window, that window remains open for us to become more
aggressive and for the British support of the provincial
Governors, who incidentally have to be brought along to this
effort, but are being brought along, if there were more money
available, it would probably move faster and it would probably
also give us a better shot at creating the kind of deterrence
that you have aptly described needs to be created.
Mr. Souder. You said in your testimony that one of the
problems here was that they believe the alternative development
process needed to be in place before eradication. Could you
clarify what precisely that means? All of us believe that
alternative development is critical for Afghanistan. All of us
realize we need to spend more money in that. The question is,
do you have, what do you mean, do you mean that they are going
to let the coca out if they don't have the alternative
development in place. The coca is going to be cut down and
processed and go to the streets of the United States and Europe
if they don't have the alternative development in place?
Mr. Charles. I think there are several layers of continuing
discussion which probably need to be accelerated to a
conclusion pretty rapidly on the ground in Afghanistan between
the British and the United States. One of them does relate
directly to the sequencing and the way in which alternative
development or alternative incomes are made available. I think
our position is that it would be valuable to have alternative
incomes available at the time.
It is also true, however, that vast majority of the Afghan
cultivated land, in fact 92 percent of the Afghan cultivated
land, without alternative development, I might add, is planted
with wheat, that's the No. 1 crop. The No. 2 crop is barley,
the No. 3 crop is corn. Only 8 percent actually of the overall
crop of cultivated, not cultivatable but cultivated land, is
heroin poppy.
It appears that our point of disagreement, to some degree
here, and I point to it very directly, is that we believe that
if there are alternative income streams, but more importantly,
if there is heroin poppy there, which needs to be eradicated,
we shouldn't be picking and choosing, we shouldn't be delaying,
we shouldn't be making it conditional upon providing an instant
and available income stream.
I would note that the 92 percent which are alternative
crops, that's the free market doing its job. Where the
invisible hand is creating in effect, corn seeds and fertilizer
are available, so is wheat, so is barley. The bottom line is
what we need to do is make sure that this heroin poppy crop is
actually destroyed. And the key here again is that deterrence
occurs not because you have put alternative development
programs in place first, or simultaneously. It occurs because
it is no longer economically feasible to go to this roughly
twice as valuable crop to them, and why does that matter to us?
It matters to us, Mr. Chairman, because if we allow this to go
on for anything like another year or year and a half or two,
what we will see is the institutionalization of Colombia-like
cartels in this domain, where the traffickers coerce the
farmers very, very vigorously to produce. That is what we are
seeking hard to avoid. And frankly, that's what I think
President Karzai has made very clear is his priority.
So the short answer is, we do have a point of disagreement.
We have time to resolve it, but we need to resolve it very
quickly. And the point being that our priority should not be,
it seems to me, some kind of misplaced sympathy for someone who
will have to do a little more work, provide more resources
ultimately for fertilizer and seed in order to grow an
alternative crop, but rather to look at both the direct and
indirect impact, the direct being destabilization of that
government, the indirect being the destabilization of other
governments and frankly the killing of many people through
heroin in the rest of the world. We have to be direct and, this
is a business that involves not looking away from the hard
questions, but looking hard directly at them and resolving
them. And in this case, heroin poppy eradication is a front and
center problem that we need to just tackle.
Mr. Souder. Mr. Cummings.
Mr. Cummings. First of all, I want to thank you for all
your hard work. I thank you for just being so candid with us.
As you well know, we share many of your views with regard to
trying to rid our world of illegal drugs. So I'm really glad
that you would come at such short notice at our request.
Can you tell me why it is, and you may have answered this
when I left for a moment, why is it that production has gone up
so high in such a short period of time? I think you said the
production of opium has just skyrocketed. Is that because the
country is in disarray or what?
Mr. Charles. I think that two things are at work. One
involves the rule of law and the other involves economics. The
rule of law piece is that this is a country which is recovering
from war. They had been dominated by a group that was shot
through with terrorists, and frankly, they are a post-war,
post-conflict environment in which it is still difficult out in
the fields to be assured of stability and security.
In that situation, criminal elements frankly have an
opportunity to grow up. So the rule of law has to be properly
established and addressed, and frankly, part of that is
prosecuting bad guys, which they are doing, and frankly, the
United Kingdom has also been very helpful on interdiction and
on prosecution, law enforcement support in a number of ways.
But the other part of it has to do with eradicating the crop
which is in fact illegal.
The second piece of that is purely economics. Survival is a
day to day issue for the many Afghans. They can survive by
growing wheat, they can survive by growing corn, they can
survive by growing heroin poppy right now until we make it
clear that the heroin poppy is not, and the Afghan government
is able to with our help make it clear that the heroin poppy is
not going to be a staple of their future economy.
But what do they do right now? They get about $1 at the
farm gate, if you will, for what commands about $100 on the
streets of Paris or London. And therefore, they don't make very
much money on this, the farmers. The people who make the money
are the traffickers, who in turn are feeding a lot of the
extremist groups that I have no chart that you have seen. The
short answer again is that we are seeing what is the natural
evolution of criminal organizations who, I would even say
criminal individuals at this point, it has not been fully
institutionalized, who are taking advantage of the average,
everyday farmer. And some of it's forced, some of it is just
survival.
But what we have to do is make it crystal clear, there is
such a thing as a rule of law and we have to be extremely
supportive, both we and the British, of what the President,
President Karzai and his team want to do. I have heard no more
moving speeches in the last year than the speech he gave
yesterday in Berlin, and frankly, the one that was also given
by Minister of the Interior Jalali who departed from his
prepared remarks to make it crystal clear that the drug
problem, including right down to and very much the eradication
issue, are central to the success of a democracy in
Afghanistan.
As you may have heard me say once before, because I think
it's a good metaphor, you cannot build a castle that will last
for any length of time on sand, and you cannot build a
democracy that will last for any length of time on a heroin
economy. So what we're seeing is the natural outgrowth of a
war-torn country that is now seeking to get back on its feet
with legitimate crops and legitimate economic inputs.
Mr. Cummings. When you and Administrator Tandy were here
not very long ago, you all talked about the training of police
and just basically putting together the law enforcement
apparatus to ensure that those involved in the drug trade would
be arrested and hopefully prosecuted. Where are we with that
right now? Have we made any progress? I know it was just about
a month ago that you were here. But how are we moving with
that?
And talk about this whole idea of the urgency of this
moment and exactly what time period do we have to act. And if
you could have a wish list as to how to address this 50 percent
more heroin going out into the market, what it is that we could
do in the Congress. Because that's what this is all about. How
do we take steps now to prevent drugs from flowing all over the
world? And just listening to your testimony, it appears that we
could possibly do something right now that would be far less
expensive than allowing all of these drugs to flood the market
and then for us to have to deal with its consequences, not only
based upon the expenditure of funds, but the wasting away of
human lives.
So this is a critical moment from what I'm hearing from
you. I want to know how critical and I want to know how long
the moment is.
Mr. Charles. Yes, sir. We are all reacting, of course, to
the assessment that the season has come earlier and that we
need to be very aggressive right now. Let me address each of
your questions in turn, police, progress and wish list.
Police. We have trained about 6,500 police right now,
frankly, with German assistance, in Afghanistan. That is the
beginning of an effort that will produce 20,000 police by July
1 if not sooner. We are on track, we have the PERT charts, we
watch it every day, we have seven academies, actually we have
six up right now and we have two more on line coming. We have a
very aggressive effort to be sure that everything that Minister
Jalali and President Karzai need and want for purposes of
stability, we are aggressively supporting.
Congressional support has been absolutely essential to
that, the bipartisan congressional support has been absolutely
essential to the product that I'm trying to produce by
supporting the government there. So we could say a lot more
about security, but the answer is, since the last hearing when
Administrator Tandy and I testified, we are on track and we are
in fact producing more police every day. The capacity is
actually rising in each of the schools and more schools are
being opened.
Point two, progress, and in particular, progress with
respect to counternarcotics as a result of this and also a
result of British participation and non-interdiction. There are
some things, and I will just say it elliptically here that the
British are doing to support the Afghan government and that we
are doing which have a lot to do with interdiction, information
sharing, intelligence sharing and taking down both terrorists
and drug traffickers. Those particular efforts are highly
successful. And you may want to get a brief from me or from
others in the Federal Government about exactly what those are.
But they are successful, and the mechanisms being used are
successful.
I would note that as an adjunct to that, in Badakhshan, for
example, in January, there were seized and destroyed about 2
tons of opium and heroin. Laboratories and equipment were
destroyed and there were 11 arrests. Direct progress from what
we're doing. In March, in Nangarhar, again, one of the three
big provinces for these purposes, about 500 kilograms of heroin
and 150 kilograms of opium were destroyed, 5 heroin producing
laboratories were destroyed and a large quantity of weapons
were seized. Several traffickers were arrested.
At 4 p.m. yesterday, in fact, there was a dramatic
takedown, and I'm hoping I have a copy of it here somewhere,
which involved a number of laboratories and actually produced
the kind of result that we all wished for on the interdiction
front, a very direct apprehension of people and a number of
arrests. I will get you a copy of that, I don't seem to have it
right at my fingertips. But I will get you a copy of that.
[The information referred to follows:]
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T6745.011
Mr. Charles. With respect to wish lists, I think I want
divide it out into two different categories, if you will, of
wish lists. What you are reacting to, the UNODC assessment that
there is a dramatic uptick, that this is the first harvest,
that we must not fail here, because ultimately if we fail here,
the entire crop will be affected. The amount of heroin and of
cultivation and of heroin that they have gotten from their
cultivation will be dramatically and negatively affected if we
do not right now, within a matter of the next week or two,
become highly aggressive and the British in their lead position
supporting the two provinces that we're talking about are not
able to tackle with all of the various elements we've talked
about already today, tackle it and get at it.
I think that my wish list in the first instance would be,
you've done it here, I guess, I guess it's not really, I don't
wake up looking for opportunities to testify, but by calling me
up here and asking me these questions, you have answered one
question, you've helped to push this forward in a way that
makes it clear that we have to, for example, we have to
collectively go after the fully flowering poppy. We can't say,
well, these farmers have put a lot of effort into the poppies,
so let's let it go this time. There is no let it go this time.
If there's a let it go this time, there may not be a next time.
So that's why we have to be highly aggressive at taking out
the fully flowering poppy. We have to say, yes, of course, we
all want alternative development support. But we cannot make
our eradication efforts conditional on pre-existing or
parallel, the necessity of parallel development. We have to be
in lockstep with each other, all of us, the United States
working under the British lead, the British and the United
States working with both the provincial Governors, who the
British are chiefly leading with in phase I, and with the
central government where the United States is leading for phase
II which begins May 1st.
So I would tick down through a list, if you will, of minor
roadblocks or obstacles that I feel we are all guilty in effect
for not having yet resolved, and we need to get those resolved
and we need to get them resolved fast, because there isn't a
lot of time.
The last point I would say, you asked about resources. The
truth is that if you look to 2005, sir, we will probably, I
think the British and we probably could use twice the amount of
money we have right now dedicated to eradication. As you know,
the United States has dedicated just to eradication $40 million
and $250 million to the overall effort including police and
counternarcotics. But $40 million is going to be enough to help
us in May, but by the time the clock ticks around again, we may
very well need twice that amount of money. The same is probably
true with the British effort.
I think what you're really seeing is, I think you could
help us by encouraging us, which you are doing, to be as
aggressive as we can be in support of the Karzai government and
the provinces, the provincial Governors. And you could
encourage us, no doubt, by continuing to ask whether we could
use more resources, which I think in this instance we probably
in time will.
Mr. Cummings. Just one other thing. One of the things that
certainly, in reading your testimony, and it's certainly a
concern for this Congress, is the link between the drug trade
and terrorism. It seems to me that if there is a link, and I do
believe that there is, the urgency becomes even more
significant. The President has been very clear that terrorism
is a major concern for all of us. And when you think about
Osama bin Laden and Al-Qaeda and those folks who do these
harmful acts all over the world, I'm sure Americans sit and ask
the question, where does the money come from to do this stuff?
And we get an answer in part from what's happening in
Afghanistan and what we're talking about today. I just was
curious, I know we have come to certain conclusions in the past
that there is a link between the terrorism and this drug
trading. As you move forward, are you seeing evidence more and
more of that?
Mr. Charles. Yes, sir, I am.
Mr. Cummings. So you're thoroughly convinced that there is
a direct link?
Mr. Charles. Let me explain. Very often when people get on
this topic, including me, we find ourselves being conclusory.
We intuitively understand that terrorists need money and that
bad guys spend time together and that somehow the linkages in
places like Colombia where the ELN and the AUC are active, that
it's sort of self evident. To a lot of people, I think it isn't
self evident. And that leads to both understatement and
overstatement of the problem. Let me tell you why I am
convinced, particularly in this area.
First, our intelligence does support, and I'd like to use
the word linkage, because I think linkage gives us bread, those
who say, well, do we have corroborating evidence, do we have
wire taps, do we have card carrying members of one group also
to be found with a card from another group in their same
billfold. Well, no, very often you don't have the level of
evidence that beyond a reasonable doubt would allow you in a
court of law at a 99 percent certainty to achieve utter and
complete overlap between the two.
So let's talk about linkages and indications and very
strong suggestions and anecdotal evidence. Again, you'll see
much of this captured in the two charts that I've declassified,
which I don't think have ever showed up in a newspaper, which
are extremely relevant. And let me say that there are things
happening right now that are changing and tightening that link.
Let me give you some examples.
In 2002, the efforts supported by the U.S. Congress of
President Bush were extremely successful at squeezing or
wringing the terrorist financing out of the banking system and
out of institution to institution transfers. There was
approximately $125 million of terrorist money taken immediately
in that first year after September 11 out of the system. That's
more than $125 million actually, because if you think about it,
really those bank accounts were instant flow-throughs. They
were channels, they were tubes through which the terrorists
pumped lots of money from many sources, including drugs, but
from many sources.
What we did is put a grate down right in the middle and we
knocked them backward in that way. In 2003, that effort
continued and we pulled an additional $15 million, and Treasury
and all the departments that have worked together on this out
of that system. What did that do to the terrorist world? What
it did was it obviously set them back, but it also pushed them
to move value, because they need money for OPSEC, they need it
for recruiting, they need it for operations, they need it for
maintenance, they need it for execution, they need it for all
the things they do. Some are high value, some are low value,
but they need money.
It moved them to three different areas right away. It moved
them to something called alternative remittances, or ``huala,''
with which I know you're familiar, in which you have informal
exchanges country to country. It moved them to commodities that
are high value and easily transported and carry their value in
low quantity, gold, diamonds, other what you'd call legitimate
commodities but being traded for illegitimate purposes and for
money laundering.
The third thing it did is it pushed them into false
receipts, trade falsification of documents between countries in
particular. What's happened as a result of that? Well, in the
last year in particular there has been a very highly aggressive
follow-on strategy which has produced significant movement
toward trade transparency, which in turn begins to wring the
money out of those, we're not done, but wring the money out of
those conduits.
Where does that push the terrorists? It pushes them very
naturally to high value, non-perishable, easily divisible,
easily transferrable assets that are otherwise untracked. And
what are two of the biggest ones? Heroin, which you can bury in
the ground and come back weeks later and find exactly as you
left it, high value, low quantity, and amphetamine type
substances. So what I think you're seeing is a movement
naturally, do we have rock solid, 99 percent certainty
evidence? Of course not. But we have movement naturally,
intuitively and objectively in that direction.
Another thing that's happening is that they are realizing
that in places like Colombia and Afghanistan that there is a
high quantity of drug money available, and that's why we have
to attack this with every ounce of effort and every sinew of
our fiber to try to get after it.
And the last thing I'll say is that in many ways, I've used
the metaphor once before in writing, but I think it is true
that if you wait to see the jaws, we spend time in my family
sometimes up in the north Atlantic, if you wait to see the jaws
of a shark, and we have seen them often, it is too late. You
don't see the jaws of a shark, you see the fin. When you see
the fin, you act. The fin is the drug money. The jaws are the
terrorist acts that grow directly out of the financing that we
permit them to have.
Mr. Cummings. We're about to go out of session, so we have
2 weeks that we won't even be here. So what is it that we can
do, right here, right now? As I understand it, a decision, you
said, is in the process of being made? Is that accurate?
Mr. Charles. Let me say, sir, yes, but let me say where the
decision is being made. My understanding is that both President
Bush and Prime Minister Blair are in absolute synch on the
significance of this issue and of attacking it with vigor. I
don't think there's any sunlight between them. I don't think
there's any sunlight between Secretary Powell and the foreign
minister. I think that somewhere down in the chain, somewhere
in our chain, somewhere in their chain, there is not yet full
agreement on the significance. I know there is not yet full
agreement, and you know from the documents that you've put in
front of me that there is not yet full agreement on how urgent
this is.
My view is, it is urgent, you are right, the United Nations
is right. My office and my effort has to be 150 percent to go
after it now, but we do phase II, we are preparing for phase
II. That's the May 1 launch, working with the central
government to go after the north. The British are leading in
the support of phase I, which is in the south.
And I think one of the things that you can do and you are
doing is you bring to my attention and to their attention that
this is something that we cannot stutter step on, neither of
us. We have to do everything in our power to get to immediate
agreement and get to immediate execution. And I think we're
willing to do that. I think we know that we have to do that,
but your leadership and public effort to make us do that is
doubly important.
Mr. Cummings. Well, let me just send a message, if it
helps, and thank you very much for your indulgence, Mr.
Chairman, but I think this is such a critical moment. I hope
that you will deliver, from this side of the aisle, and I'm
sure the chairman can speak for his side of the aisle, is that
we believe in the efficient and effective use of taxpayers'
dollars. We also are very, very concerned about the eradication
of illegal drugs, wherever they may be found.
When you put those two together and you look at what's
happening based on your testimony and what we have before us,
it is only rational, logical and it just simply makes sense
that we act with all deliberate speed to address this issue.
Because doing otherwise simply allows those drugs to flood
neighborhoods all over the world, and then we go against the
very things that we preach over and over again, that is the
effective, efficient use of taxpayers' dollars.
I would ask you to deliver, from this side of the aisle, an
urgent message that we must act at this critical moment,
critical. And I do appreciate your testimony and hopefully we
will save some lives, hopefully by acting immediately we will
save some anguish and pain and suffering and we will save the
taxpayers money so that we can then have more money in the long
run to continue the efforts that we have been making in this
regard.
Mr. Charles. Yes, sir, I will deliver that message.
Mr. Cummings. Thank you.
Mr. Souder. Thanks. I want to cover a few more particular
questions. If I can understand what you said, that you are
saying that the British have a reluctance to eradicate heroin
poppy as it's flowering, is that true or not? Is that the U.S.
policy as well? Why would there be such a reluctance?
Mr. Charles. First, I want to say again, I feel as though
in many ways we're discussing the one room in the house where
there is still a little clutter when the rest of the house is
as neat and tidy as you would ever want it to be. These are our
best allies in the world, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Souder. Well, as cleaning people, we're interested in
the one room that might need cleaning. I've sponsored the
resolution, praised Britain for what they've done, Tony Blair
came to Congress, he's our hero for standing with us in many
ways, and he's taken a lot of grief back home. The fact is, if
we have a cluttered room, we're trying to look at the cluttered
room.
Mr. Charles. Yes, sir, and I think in this particular case,
the clutter could grow elsewhere if we don't address it here.
I guess I will say it this way. My understanding, I think
it's the policy of the United States wherever we are to
eradicate and when we set out to eradicate poppy fields, which
in turn turn into opium and into heroin, we do not say, well,
it's gotten to a point where they've put so much effort into
it, we really hate to do that. That would be tantamount to
saying, gosh, the trafficker is right on the steps of the bank,
it really seems a shame to not let him make his deposit.
The bottom line here is all of us are convinced, and I
think everybody, frankly, I think the British and the United
States, everybody is convinced that when you have the
opportunity for maximum impact on the grower of heroin poppy
you should go after it. I think probably somewhere down in the
lower parts of our organizations is where the information comes
back up to me that there is some, let's call it, absence of
clarity, absence of commitment that we both share, that we are
completely on board with the idea that even if we don't have
alternative development right there at our fingertips for
people who are having their crops destroyed, that we need to go
ahead and do the act of destroying drugs which in turn will
have a horrible ripple effect if we don't destroy them out
across all the regions, not just Afghanistan but trafficking
routes and into London itself and frankly into the United
States. Some of these drugs make it here, too.
So I think that what I was expressing to you is that it has
come back to me that there is maybe just an absence of
agreement on this point, and that I wanted to let you know that
my conviction is that wherever and however there is a crop
which has gotten to maturity, it's my conviction that we do not
stop, it is our position that you don't stop eradicating
because for some reason it would be inconvenient or might have
a disproportionately direct impact based on the amount of time
that someone's put into growing it.
Remember, they make about one one-hundredth of what the
trafficker is going to make on that crop. They may not make as
much by growing the wheat or the barley or the corn, but right
now that 92 percent that's out there that's grown is really not
the direct result of alternative development programs. It has
to do with the fact that the risks and costs for those people
of growing something that's illegal and has all these bad,
negative effects downstream are higher than the incentives that
come with a stable, non-criminal feed your family crop in a
different area.
So what we want to get to better agreement on, and you're
putting the burden on me, and I understand that, and it is
true, we need to get to full agreement that we are not going to
be stutter stepping in this. We are absolutely dedicated, both
we the United States and Great Britain.
Mr. Souder. In Colombia, we see when we do eradication, we
look at it from the air, we monitor from the ground on a
regular basis, and we're told that with X number of reduction.
Are they monitoring this? Will we be able to see next week or
the week after whether in fact it's being eradicated?
Mr. Charles. In theory, we should be able to see that. In
fact, I do not know of any monitoring that's in place.
Mr. Souder. So we could be looking at a situation like
happened a few years ago under the Taliban where we saw this
huge surge and then in fact a drop the following year merely
because so much hit the market that they don't grow it the next
year, because the market is saturated. And this surge could
come at the very time when it's under ours and Britain's watch.
Mr. Charles. Let me clarify. We will have certain national
technical means and other means by which we will measure the
total cultivation in the succeeding year. Frankly, what you're
seeing is----
Mr. Souder. Once the people on the street are dying of
heroin and buying the heroin, we'll know that we've had a big
increase.
Mr. Charles. Yes, sir, that would be one way to know. And
the other way----
Mr. Souder. Will we know, when it's time to cut it down,
will we know whether there's a big increase?
Mr. Charles. And that's what I was responding to. I do not
know at this point of a Phase I metric saying that this is the
large number. I think we have to be looking country-wide at
about 35,000 hectares, if we're going to be serious about this.
And I think we need to actually get down at least 25,000
hectares. And I think more than half of that has to occur
probably in these two provinces we're talking about in Phase I
in which the British are in support of the provincial
governments, which we have to work with again and bring aboard
and bring along.
But the bottom line is, I do not know of any, if you're
asking me if I know of a monitoring mechanism for identifying
how much, do I know that there has been a monitoring mechanism
agreed by which we will measure how much the British support
efforts in the south right now will be eradicating, or what the
metrics are, no, I do not know of that. But if you're asking
the larger question, which is will we know later this year by
technical means with a high degree of certainty both through
the U.N. and through our own Government what the actual crops
are, yes, we will know that. And of course, as you indicate, we
will also know it because if the heroin in the global economy,
the global heroin economy is increased we will see that,
because we will probably see prices fall further and all the
other----
Mr. Souder. So we'll know how much is planted and some
measure of indication of how much was bought on the street by
price-supply. But we won't know how much was harvested.
Mr. Charles. No, I want to be clear again. For the phase II
U.S. part----
Mr. Souder. Yes, and when you say phase II, that's the
United States.
Mr. Charles. We will track the amount that's harvested. We
are actually contracting to do that right now.
Mr. Souder. But you don't know whether the British----
Mr. Charles. I do not know.
Mr. Souder. Let me ask one other round of questions. The
British Government officials in the region have told our staff
that attacking static targets like the opium warehouses and
processing plants, in other words, if these flowering poppies
are harvested and they go to market, we've failed at round one.
Now we're going to round two.
They're arguing that the opium warehouses and processing
plants right now would have an enormous impact on destructing
the drug trade in and around Afghanistan. How many warehouses,
laboratories and other stationary drug targets have been
destroyed? Do you have any idea?
Mr. Charles. I would say it is in the double digits, but it
is not in the triple digits, based on what I know. Clearly this
is a choke point, and we must--and when I say we, I don't mean
just the British or just the Afghans, I mean we the United
States as well, we have to be very aggressive at tackling both
the warehouses and the laboratories.
There was one very significant destruction that occurred,
and when I say double digit I'm referring to both laboratories
and warehouses, there was one very significant destruction of a
warehouse that occurred in January. The effect that one
destruction had sent a shock wave, a shiver throughout the
entire affected economy. And frankly, it said very clearly that
if you send a signal on eradication and you send a signal in
interdiction that drugs will not be tolerated, that this is a
criminal act and it will be both prosecuted and destroyed, you
will have a very direct effect.
And why? You'll have a direct effect more there than almost
anywhere in the world, because it has not been
institutionalized, because there are other strong factors that
will support the idea of a non-drug economy. There is nothing
inevitable, nothing inevitable about the Afghan economy being
dependent upon heroin, nor the Afghan people. I think any
democracy that's going to survive, and it will, and it is
making enormous progress in this direction, has to recognize
that, and we have to recognize that in support of them we have
to get the drugs out of their economy in a significant way.
I think the point is, if we stay on the course we're at,
where we're doing both strong interdiction, for which the
British deserve enormous credit, but we also do strong
eradication, and we don't let the horses get out of the corral
in the first place before we go try to hunt them down, we've
got to bring them back in again, we've got to make sure that we
stop the heroin from actually being produced at the farm gate
and then we have to go after the places where it does get out
and we have to be very effective about it. And we can be very
effective about it.
Mr. Souder. How do you request assistance or assets from
the Department of Defense, and do you usually get what you ask
for, and how about when you seek it from the British?
Mr. Charles. I think with respect to the coordination and
cooperation with our Department of Defense, there are really
two aspects. One is information sharing. I was in Kabul about a
month or a little more than that now ago, and one of the points
I made there is that we need to do a good job, a better job of
sharing with each other, if you're hunting terrorists and you
find drugs, you need to share that information with the people,
like the DEA and others who are going to go out and tackle the
drug issue. If we're hunting drugs and we find information in
other ways, where the Afghan government does and we're working
with them, then we need to share that mutually so we can make
maximum use of it, and maybe it's also feeding terrorists. And
we need to tackle that.
So information sharing is a big one. And by and large, I
think that relationship is a good one and it's getting better.
The second piece of course that I think can be very
valuable, our programs are multi-faceted. We support, this
Bureau supports the training of the police, it supports many of
the things happening in the field in the judicial sector, we're
actually building courthouses, training judges, training
prosecutors, helping the Afghan government to get institutional
support capacities, to be able to do the things it needs to be
able to do to bring people to justice. And of course we do the
eradication piece and a lot of the counternarcotics support.
But at the same time, I think that, I do think that
probably one of the things that has to happen is that we have
to be better at getting at the interdiction side, and frankly,
this piece of guidance that just came out is something that I
myself have been looking for for quite a while, and I know you
had put great pressure on all of us to find this. I find it
redeeming, it really does say that drugs are found, they will
be destroyed, and I haven't studied it in any great depth. I
know that there is----
Mr. Souder. Let me ask you a question about this, because
we have a hearing come up that's been delayed, but it will be
in April with the Department of Defense, and like you say, I'm
really happy to see some of the clarifications. It's a little
disturbing that some of these things weren't done, for example,
the discovery of drugs and drug paraphernalia by coalition
forces has resulted in a need to clarify procedures. Now in the
clarification they're saying if they find drugs and drug
paraphernalia they should seize it, if I basically understand
the document to say. It also says that by seizing drugs and
drug paraphernalia, on the last page, during the course of
normal operations, that doesn't mean that they're now on a drug
mission or a law enforcement mission, they're still in the
military.
But then it says, it says also they will report any
quantity of drugs or drug paraphernalia found during normal
operations. Which means no special operations, basically, and
then confiscate and destroy the drugs and drug paraphernalia.
Which is good news, it makes you wonder what the position was
before the order. Then it says this authority does not extend
to the destruction of poppies in fields or unprocessed poppies.
It also through silence doesn't suggest if it's not discovered
in the course of normal operations, in other words, there won't
be special operations.
Does that mean that they won't help you when you request?
Does that mean that they're undergoing, if they see a lab but
it's not in the course of normal operations, they won't hit it?
Do they then tell you in your agency?
Mr. Charles. Those are good questions, sir, and the
document does say what you say it says. I think that we will
have to see how this plays out.
I guess I can make two observations. One, I look at the
date-time group on it, and I notice that it was promulgated by
this command, by JTF, I'm sorry, CJTF 180 in Afghanistan on
January 31, 2004. So apparently it's been out there, that's
good to know. So maybe there are some documents and facts out
there already to be found.
Second, I have had no moment at which we have a
disagreement in any way between the Department of State and the
Department of Defense on this issue, except to the extent that
I think going forward the problem gets bigger. We have to be
able to both prioritize counternarcotics, not in place of
counterterrorism in any way. Counterterrorism is essential. And
it is the priority.
But we also have to recognize, as President Karzai said,
that the fight against drugs is actually the fight for
Afghanistan, that if you win the battle today but you lose the
war, it's not going to do you any good. If you right the
sailboat and we're all content that we've gotten the democracy
piece right but we're heading over a waterfall, we're in bad
shape.
So we have to be able to go directly to both of these
problems, coordinate well within the U.S. Government, which I
think we are doing, and this is to me great evidence of the
fact that it has been raised as a priority, perhaps by your
leadership. But it certainly is out there, and it is making,
it's going to make, I have no doubt it will make a difference.
Then we have to coordinate well with our allies, which we are
increasingly doing and frankly, we are doing well on almost
every other category than the couple of rough spots we've
discussed today.
Mr. Souder. But you haven't received any calls from the
Department of Defense or British coalition forces saying, it's
not in our area but we know from our intelligence that there's
a drug lab over here, there's a stockpile over here, we can't
hit it, can you do something?
Mr. Charles. I would have to consult with people in the
field to know whether a call like that had come in.
Mr. Souder. Must not be very regular.
Mr. Charles. Well, I will tell you, again, I just got this
frag today, this morning. So I will have to go back now and
find out, maybe the next time I testify you can ask me whether
we've gotten progress in greater and greater coordination.
Mr. Souder. I will ask you in writing for this thing and
try to get that out.
Mr. Charles. Certainly.
Mr. Souder. Because as we get into our followup hearings,
one of the questions is what is the coordination. We've been
arguing the Department of Defense needs to see this as not the
primary but part of their mission there. If it isn't part of
their mission, then at least they should have the transfer of
information.
Let me just say, on the ground, having been there, I know
they're getting the information. The question is, what do they
do with it. I saw it with my own eyes.
Mr. Charles. Yes.
Mr. Souder. So without getting into any specifics with it,
I know the information is there because of the way they're
doing their things in Afghanistan.
Mr. Charles. Right.
Mr. Souder. So the question is, how does that information
get transferred, and if they're not going to take action, how
do we turn it over to other departments as we up the DEA
presence there, as you have the law enforcement and narcotics
eradication and alternative development in force. But whose
responsibility is this, because the American people aren't
pouring billions of dollars into Afghanistan to watch it turn
into the heroin poppy nation of the world and an undemocratic,
narcoterrorist controlled state. That's not why we went there.
That's not why people in my district, who are there right now
risking their lives along the border, getting shot at, are
there fighting so that it can become a narcostate.
Mr. Charles. I could not agree with you more, and I take on
full responsibility for the counternarcotics piece that the
Department of State is responsible for in that country, and I
do reach out to my DOD colleagues and I have had good response
in general. I find great hope in this document, because I think
it suggests that whoever is sending the message, it's being
received that we have a dual mission and it is terribly
important, and as the Department of Defense migrates naturally
from being war fighters and just tacklers of terrorists, at the
same time there is going to be a counternarcotics component and
it's going to grow and we're going to see goodness out of that.
I will say that when I was in Kabul, either shortly before
or shortly after you were, I will say that I did ask the
question, had this gotten to the field yet, and at that time,
the Marines I spoke to said they were more than willing to
destroy drugs, but that the guidance had not actually arrived
at that point. I now think based on what I'm reading here that
it's there, and I think what that says to me is that on this
topic, with respect to U.S. coordination among ourselves, this
is a very good thing. I think we're headed in the right
direction and I think the Department of State and Department of
Defense will work well together.
Mr. Souder. Well, thank you for coming to this hearing
today. I appreciate the time you took, and on short term
notice. It's very important that our allies in Britain move
aggressively. I strongly support alternative development
efforts. We know that there's going to be huge challenges. Most
of the people are following the law, all the people need to
follow the law, raise legitimate products.
But the bottom line is, while we feel empathy to very poor
people in many parts of the world, we cannot allow heroin and
cocaine to come into the world markets that destroys families
all over the world and eventually will come back and destroy,
if not sooner, it will later destroy the countries that are
producing it. We've seen this in Colombia, we saw how it
corrupted their system, how judges were killed, how mayors are
still killed and how President Arribe and Estran and others
before him had to fight and we're still pouring billions of
dollars into Colombia to try to make sure it gets stabilized.
We know President Karzai is committed to democracy, to
reform in Afghanistan. The country is struggling. We cannot, as
the coalition forces there, forget the long term, because we're
struggling so hard and so importantly in the short term.
Thank you for your leadership with this, and we look
forward to continuing to work with you.
Mr. Charles. Thank God for your leadership, sir. Thank you.
Mr. Souder. The subcommittee hearing stands adjourned.
[Whereupon, at 12:54 p.m., the subcommittee was recessed,
to reconvene at 2:30 p.m. the same day.]