[House Hearing, 108 Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
HEARING ON RESPONSE TO TERRORISM: HOW IS THE DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND
SECURITY IMPROVING OUR CAPABILITIES?
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HEARING
before the
SELECT COMMITTEE ON
HOMELAND SECURITY
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
ONE HUNDRED EIGHTH CONGRESS
SECOND SESSION
__________
JUNE 19, 2003
__________
Serial No. 108-11
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Printed for the use of the Select Committee on Homeland Security
Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.access.gpo.gov/congress/
house
__________
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SELECT COMMITTEE ON HOMELAND SECURITY
Christopher Cox, California, Chairman
Jennifer Dunn, Washington Jim Turner, Texas, Ranking Member
C.W. Bill Young, Florida Bennie G. Thompson, Mississippi
Don Young, Alaska Loretta Sanchez, California
F. James Sensenbrenner, Jr., Edward J. Markey, Massachusetts
Wisconsin Norman D. Dicks, Washington
W.J. (Billy) Tauzin, Louisiana Barney Frank, Massachusetts
David Dreier, California Jane Harman, California
Duncan Hunter, California Benjamin L. Cardin, Maryland
Harold Rogers, Kentucky Louise McIntosh Slaughter, New
Sherwood Boehlert, New York York
Lamar S. Smith, Texas Peter A. DeFazio, Oregon
Curt Weldon, Pennsylvania Nita M. Lowey, New York
Christopher Shays, Connecticut Robert E. Andrews, New Jersey
Porter J. Goss, Florida Eleanor Holmes Norton, District of
Dave Camp, Michigan Columbia
Lincoln Diaz-Balart, Florida Zoe Lofgren, California
Bob Goodlatte, Virginia Karen McCarthy, Missouri
Ernest J. Istook, Jr., Oklahoma Sheila Jackson-Lee, Texas
Peter T. King, New York Bill Pascrell, Jr., New Jersey
John Linder, Georgia Donna M. Christensen, U.S. Virgin
John B. Shadegg, Arizona Islands
Mark E. Souder, Indiana Bob Etheridge, North Carolina
Mac Thornberry, Texas Charles Gonzalez, Texas
Jim Gibbons, Nevada Ken Lucas, Kentucky
Kay Granger, Texas James R. Langevin, Rhode Island
Pete Sessions, Texas Kendrick B. Meek, Florida
John E. Sweeney, New York
John Gannon, Chief of Staff
Uttam Dhillon, Chief Counsel and Deputy Staff Director
Steven Cash, Democrat Staff Director
Michael S. Twinchek, Chief Clerk
(II)
C O N T E N T S
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MEMBER STATEMENTS
The Honorable Christopher Cox, Chairman, Select Committee on
Homeland Security.......................................... 1
The Honorable Lincoln-Balart, a Representative in Congress
From the State of Florida.................................. 30
The Honorable Dave Camp, a Representative in Congress From
the State of Michigan...................................... 25
The Honorable Donna M. Christensen, a Representative in
Congress From the U.S. Virgin Islands...................... 22
The Honorable Jennifer Dunn, a Representative in Congress
From the State of Washington............................... 6
The Honorable Bob Etheridge Representative in Congress From
the State of North Carolina................................ 41
The Honorable Sheila-Lee Jackson, Representative in Congress
From the State of Texas.................................... 33
The Honorable James R. Langevin, a Representative in Congress
From the State of Rhode Island............................. 37
The Honorable Zoe Lofgren, a Representative in Congress From
the State of Rhode Island.................................. 27
Prepared Statement......................................... 8
The Honorable Nita M. Lowey, a Representative in Congress
From the State of New York................................. 31
The Honorable Eleanor Holmes Norton, a Representative in
Congress From the District of Columia...................... 47
The Honorable Bill Pascrell, Jr. Representative in Congress
From the State of New Jersey............................... 39
The Honorable Loretta Sanchez, a Representative in Congress
From the State of California............................... 5
The Honorable Bennie G. Thompson, a Representative in
Congress From the State of Mississippi..................... 3
Prepared Statement......................................... 7
The Honorable Jim Turner, a Representative in Congress From
the State of Texas......................................... 3
WITNESS
The Honorable Michael Brown, Under Secretary for Emergency
Preparedness and Response, Department of Homeland Security. 9
Prepared Statement......................................... 12
ADDITIONAL MATERIAL SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD
Questions for the Record..................................... 59
(III)
HEARING ON RESPONSE TO TERRORISM: HOW IS THE DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND
SECURITY IMPROVING OUR CAPABILITIES?
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Thursday, June 19, 2003
House of Representatives,
Select Committee on Homeland Security,
Washington, DC.
The committee met, pursuant to call, at 2:05 p.m., in room
2318, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Christopher Cox
[chairman of the committee] presiding.
Present: Representatives Cox, Dunn, Camp, Diaz-Balart,
King, Linder, Thornberry, Granger, Sessions, Turner, Sanchez,
Harman, Lowey, Norton, Lofgren, McCarthy, Jackson-Lee,
Pascrell, Christensen, Etheridge, Lucas, Langevin and Meek.
Chairman Cox. [Presiding.] Good afternoon. A quorum being
present, the Select Committee on Homeland Security will come to
order. The committee is meeting today to hear testimony on the
status of the Emergency Preparedness and Response Directorate.
I would like to welcome the members in attendance this
afternoon and thank our witness, Undersecretary for
Preparedness and Response Michael Brown, for appearing before
this committee.
Mr. Brown, your comments will be particularly relevant as
the committee prepares to embark for a visit to the ports of
Los Angeles and Long Beach, in California, for a series of
meetings with Los Angeles and Orange County first responders.
The mission of the Emergency Preparedness and Response
Directorate is critical to fulfilling the overarching goal of
the Department of Homeland Security: to make America safe from
terrorism.
More specifically, the mission of the department is, first
and most importantly, to prevent a terrorist attack; second, to
enhance our preparedness, in particular by focusing on critical
infrastructure; and third, to ensure the most effective
response should an attack occur despite our best efforts to
prevent it.
The decision to create the Homeland Security Department was
intended to ensure that prevention, preparedness and response
would be seamlessly integrated. The legislation authorizing the
department enacted just last year created the Emergency
Preparedness and Response Directorate, which consolidates six
Federal entities, in order to permit a structure that lets us
tailor our emergency preparations to the known and suspected
threats that we face.
The more that the Homeland Security Department develops its
capabilities to analyze and assess the capabilities and
intentions of America's terrorist enemies, the better will be
our preparedness and our response.
The Homeland Security Act identifies specific duties for
the EP&R Directorate. Among those are to promote an effective
emergency responder program. Since we enacted the Homeland
Security Act of 2002, Congress has been making unprecedented
levels of appropriations, sharing resources to achieve this
objective.
Since September 11, we have supported the estimated 2
million first responders across America by increasing the
funding for first responder grants by over 1,000 percent.
However, homeland security is a team effort that requires a
new partnership between and among the Federal Government, state
and local first responders. The Federal Government is committed
to providing the funds and training to first responders so that
they can be adequately prepared to protect our citizens in the
event of a terrorist attack.
But first responders need more than dollars. They also need
information.
How is the department providing states and localities the
intelligence they need to allocate resources and to be
prepared? How is the EP&R directorate working to build two-way
communications to glean intelligence information from first
responders that they learn from the streets on the front lines
in the war on terrorism?
How are the states doing by way of providing the Federal
Government with their emergency response plans so that the
department can coordinate priorities regionally and nationally?
How is the department using intelligence and its own threat
analyses of terrorist capabilities and intentions to distribute
funds to those areas where the terrorist threat is greatest?
Title V of the Homeland Security Act also charges the
directorate with the responsibility of developing a Federal
response plan. The intent of this provision is to ensure that
our nation has a single, coordinated plan to respond in the
event of another terrorist emergency. The committee looks
forward to hearing how far the directorate has come in
developing this plan.
Title II of the act requires that the Secretary, through
the resources of the information, analysis, and protection
directorate shall ``provide intelligence and information
analysis and support to other elements of the department. Just
as EP&R makes use of the most advanced meteorological
information to predict a hurricane or a tornado and to pinpoint
possible affected areas, EP&R must make use of intelligence
information to inform its planning and preparedness activities.
The committee will be interested to hear how that intelligence
information is being analyzed and developed within the
department, how it is being used within the directorate, and
how it is being shared with state and local law enforcement and
first responders.
Mr. Brown, I appreciate the challenge you have before you
given that the department was first organized less than four
months ago. Much of your effort necessarily can only be a work
in progress. But in homeland security, time is of the essence.
And I and members of this committee are looking forward to your
assessment of how far we have come, how much farther we need to
go, and how this committee can be of help.
I look forward to hearing your testimony.
The Chair now recognizes Mr. Turner, the ranking Democrat
member, for any statement he may have.
Mr. Turner. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
It is good to have Secretary Brown here with us today.
Welcome.
I think we all understand that the attacks of September 11
changed our world, and made it clear that the Federal
Government had to change the way we will meet the clear and
present danger to this country posed by terrorism. Therefore we
created the Department of Homeland Security. A core mission of
that department was stated in Homeland Security Presidential
Directive 5; To ensure that all levels of government across the
Nation have the capability to work efficiently and effectively
together using a national approach to domestic incident
management.''
Our purpose here today is to make sure that that mandate is
being fulfilled. It is our duty to make sure that the full
force of the U.S. government is being put into action to
prepare America to prevent, respond to and recover from
terrorist attacks.
The first reports from the front lines of the war on
terrorism are mixed. I have talked with state and local
officials across the country, men and women who are responsible
for our the public safety, the individuals who make the key
decisions locally on how to prepare their communities. Some of
them tell me that they haven't yet heard from the Department of
Homeland Security about the coordination of Federal, state and
local response assets. They have yet to be involved in the
development of an integrated terrorism response strategy, one
that I believe would meet the standard of the efficient and
effective mandate of the presidential directive.
We look forward to hearing today from Secretary Brown about
the approach that we are taking to enhance incident management.
In my conversations with firefighters, police officers, and
health care workers who will be the first to respond to an
attack on our soil, many of them tell me that they have yet to
receive the specialized training and equipment they believe is
necessary to respond to and recover from a terrorist attack.
In the case of the nation's fire service, many departments
lack basic training and equipment that they need to protect
their communities from emergencies. The people I have talked to
range all the way from the mayor of New York City to citizens
on the street in my hometown of Crockett, Texas, population
7,500.
In addition, people ask in all quarters, ``What does the
Homeland Security Advisory System and its color codes really
mean to me?''
A recent survey of New York City residents reported that
although 64 percent of the population is very concerned about
the possibility of another terrorist attack, only 16 percent
took any action in response to the most recent elevation of the
alert level.
So we have a large number of concerned citizens, but the
truth is that many of them have no idea what they should be
doing when an alert is given.
Our government must lead forcefully, but thus far the
message does not seem to be getting through. After talking with
state and local officials, first responders, and others about
improving our capacity to respond to the threat of terrorism,
one message comes through loud and clear: We must move faster,
and we must be stronger in our efforts.
Faster in our efforts to bring together the Federal, state,
and local officials to meet the mandate of the Department of
Homeland Security, to ensure that all levels of the government
across the Nation have the capacity to work efficiently and
effectively together. Stronger in our efforts to train,
exercise, and equip the men and women on the front lines, and
more vigorous in our efforts to prepare individuals, families,
and communities for the threats that lie ahead.
This is what we owe to the American people. When our nation
has been under its greatest time of trial, this Congress and
the government have worked with speed and strength of purpose.
We all recall from our history books that in the first 100
days of President Roosevelt's tenure, he worked with the
Congress to build a plan that saved the Nation from economic
devastation.
It has been 16 months since September 11. It has been well
over 100 days since the founding of the Department of Homeland
Security. In my judgment, we must move faster, and we must be
stronger in our efforts to protect America.
This is our objective. It is one that I think we all
approach with unity and with resolve, and I am glad that we
have the opportunity today to discuss these critical issues
with you, Secretary Brown.
And thank you, Madame Chairman.
Ms. Dunn. [Presiding.] Thank you, Mr. Turner. I now yield
myself a few minutes for an opening statement. We are very
happy you are here with us today, Secretary Brown. Thank you
for coming before us today. We are eager to hear your
testimony.
First, I want to thank you for the help you have provided
in supporting first responders all over the country. It is very
important in our effort to fight terrorism that those
individuals on the front lines have the resources that they
need to effectively prevent and respond to a terrorist attack,
or to a natural disaster.
I believe an integral part in achieving success is through
adequate funding levels. I was very happy to hear that the
Appropriations Committee recently reported out a bill that will
include $4.4 billion for first responders.
They are the backbone of our communities, and it is
important that we give them the proper resources for training,
equipment, exercises and for planning.
My home state of Washington has many elements that make it
susceptible, especially susceptible to a terrorist attack, with
both a large deep-water port and hundreds of miles of border.
Through ODP funding and the High-Threat Urban Area Program,
my state of Washington has received over $70 million in grants
in fiscal year 2003. And I thank you, Secretary Brown, for
assisting local responders in my state for preparing for an
attack.
However, there continue to be many concerns in local
communities that they are not receiving enough funding for
equipment and training. This is exasperated, of course, when
the threat level is adjusted upward.
An important part of this committee's mission is to have
oversight over the newly created Department of Homeland
Security. Currently, ODP funds are allocated directly to
states, with 80 percent being passed through the local
communities.
There are concerns that arise when states pass the majority
of their funds to large cities, with smaller communities not
receiving their fair share.
I believe it is important to look into this formula for
first responder funding, and address of the changes needed.
Secretary Ridge agreed, and said that you are doing such a
review currently.
In addition, a primary part of your mission at EP&R is to
minimize losses from all disasters, including terrorist attack.
When Congress approved the Homeland Security Act, we integrated
six different components into your directorate to help you
achieve that mission.
When integrating so many different components into a single
unit, communication becomes a major priority.
Communication between the different components, as well as
with state and local officials, is needed for effective
response. And I hope today to hear your efforts in that field
as you testify before us.
While I believe we have done a good job in routing out
terrorism around the world, we know that the threats still
exist, and we must be ready to respond. So I too look forward
to hearing how the Department of Homeland Security is prepared
to deal with this eventuality.
Are there other members who wish to give opening
statements?
Any members on this side?
All right, the Chair recognizes Ms. Sanchez for an opening
statement.
Ms. Sanchez. Thank you, Madam Chair.
And thank you, Secretary Brown, for being here with us
today.
You know, since September 11, one of the most high profile
issues surrounding our nation's new homeland security mission
is of course the whole nature of first responders, who is to do
that, and who is to pay for emergency response system.
And I am sure that there hasn't been a single member who
has not discussed this with their local police and their fire,
their hospitals, their emergency health care workers, because
many of them do feel that it is an unfunded mandate, something
coming from the Federal Government.
I mean, they know that they have to do it. They know that
they are responsible for their people. They are the first ones
there. But it is costing them quite a bit of money to do all of
this, and in particular when we go from a yellow to an orange
alert or an orange alert to a red alert, they consider that
they need to staff up, need to put more people out, need to
protect more assets.
And so, many of them are very, very worried about the whole
issue of funding. And I hope that as we detail what you have
been able to do in this department, that you will also talk
about some of the funding issues.
And one that I want to put right on the table is the whole
issue of the fact that we have, to some extent, done some
granting processes, either through the congressional method,
through a supplemental and also through the appropriations
process.
But more importantly, I know that the department has done
some grant-based and state grant-based types of programs.
What I see to be one of the biggest problems with that is
that those programs revolve around additional equipment or
equipment that different agencies might need. Whereas in
talking to law enforcement and fire and others, up and down the
state of California, at least, where a large amount of the
population lives--we are the fifth largest economy in the
world--their biggest problem has been that they need to put
more staff on, or they need to pay overtime.
And so, fully over 80 percent of their costs when they go
on Orange alert, for example, are really for monies that aren't
covered in any way coming out of the Federal system.
And so, I would like to, when the question begins, get your
opinion on what we could do at the Federal level to help with
some of those costs that really are just a very heavy burden at
the local level.
In addition to that, we have, of course, FEMA, urban search
and rescue teams. We have nuclear incident response teams. We
have a whole bunch of other first responders that we need to
discuss and talk about and see how this is all fitting. And, of
course, a lot of it comes to funding.
The chairman, Mr. Cox, talked about the fact that we need
to share intelligence. And that is true. But when you have an
incident and you need to respond, it is all about being able to
get there.
So as somebody who represents Disneyland, Anaheim
Convention Center, the World Champion Angels, the Arrowhead
Pond with its might docks, all these places, it is very
important for me to see that we are working at the Federal
level to ensure we have a good plan and we have a good funding
plan.
Thank you.
Ms. Dunn. Thank you very much, Ms. Sanchez.
Are there members on the other side who wish to give
opening statements?
Let me call then on Mr. Langevin for an opening statement.
Mr. Langevin. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I would like to
welcome our witness, Undersecretary Michael Brown. I know you
have a mammoth task facing you, and I appreciate your
willingness to be here today to provide some insight on the
progress you are making, and to answer our questions about
critical issues of preparedness and response.
The Emergency Preparedness and Response Directorate is a
critical component of DHS, in particular because of its close
relationship with our state and local officials and first
responders. If this unit is not operating effectively, all of
our communities are placed at tremendous risk. So, I am very
interested in hearing about how the EP&R Directorate is
operating thus far, what level of communication and outreach is
taking place between EP&R and our state and local personnel,
what additional resources and assistance we on the Committee
might provide to help you improve your operations, and what
message we can bring back to the elected officials and first
responders in our districts about where they should be focusing
their energies and what help and guidance is available to them
from DHS.
I am perplexed, along with many of my colleagues, about the
apparently overlapping roles of the EP&R Directorate and the
Office for Domestic Preparedness, housed within the Border and
Transportation Security Directorate. This division, at least on
its face, looks like a recipe for duplication of efforts; or
worse, crucial tasks falling through the cracks. In addition,
it seems to be breeding unnecessary confusion at the state and
local level, at the very time we should be ensuring a clear,
direct and streamlined system for information-sharing,
technical guidance and funding assistance. Our governors,
mayors, firefighters, police officers and emergency medical
workers are relying on us to provide this consistency and
stability.
Finally, I am interested to hear about an issue that is a
top priority for me, and that is the intelligence aspect of
DHS. Specifically, I hope the Undersecretary will touch on the
level of interaction he and his staff have had with the
Information Analysis and Infrastructure Protection Directorate,
and whether he is receiving sufficient intelligence to properly
determine where to dedicate scarce resources and how to best
guide state and local responders to do the same. Without this
intelligence capacity, it seems to me that DHS cannot operate
effectively.
Again, I thank Undersecretary Brown for being with us
today, and I appreciate the chairman giving me this time.
Chairman Cox. [Presiding.] Does any member of the majority
side wish to make an opening statement?
Ms. Lofgren. I would like to ask unanimous consent to
submit my statement for the record.
Chairman Cox. Without objection, all members will be
permitted five days to submit additional statements, which will
be included in full in the record.
Any other member wish to be recognized for purposes of an
opening statement?
PREPARED STATEMENT OF THE HONORABLE BENNIE THOMPSON, A REPRESENTATIVE
IN CONGRESS FROM THE STATE OF MISSISSIPPI
I am pleased that Under Secretary Brown has joined us today to tell
us how the Emergency Preparedness and Response Directorate is improving
the Nation' ability to respond to terrorism. As the Ranking Member on
the Subcommittee that provides oversight for his Directorate, I am very
interested in Mr. Brown' testimony, and sincerely hope that he can
clarify the specific responsibilities of his Directorate, as opposed to
the responsibilities of other components of the Department, such as the
Office for Domestic Preparedness.
Specifically, it is important for the Committee to understand the
division of responsibility between ODP and the EP&R Directorate, given
that so many of their functions seem to overlap. State and local
governments have expressed confusion about which organization within
DHS is their principal point of contact as they enhance their
capability to respond to acts of terrorism and other disasters and
emergencies. Ultimately, who in the Administration is `` charge''of
assuring that the Nation is prepared--at all levels--to respond to
terrorist acts?
The Department has stated that it is working to ensure that all
levels of government across the Nation have the capability to work
efficiently and effectively together, using a national approach to
domestic incident management. We must make sure that the might of the
U.S. Government--working hand in hand with State and local
governments--is being put into action to prepare America, so that we
can prevent, respond to and recover from terrorist attacks.
In order to be more effective, the Department of Homeland Security
must work harder to listen to the needs, successes and frustrations of
our first line of homeland defense--the first responders. DHS must
create more open and lines of communication. The men and women who
prepare our communities for disasters and then help our communities to
rapidly recover are absolutely critical. I have met frequently with
these men and women in my District, and I have told them that the work
we do here in Washington must match the needs of people at the local
level.
In its former life as FEMA, the EP&R Directorate was widely viewed
as a ``success story,'' by becoming more responsive to communities
after major disasters and emergencies. Can EP&R still effectively
perform its traditional disaster response and recovery mission, given
DHS's primary focus on terrorism prevention and preparedness? Are we
ready for the next major earthquake or hurricane, or in my District,
the next major flood?
On April 24 of this year, the President declared a flood disaster
in 31 Mississippi counties, including 10 counties within my District. I
want to ensure that EP&R--as a component of DHS--still has the
resources and support of both the Department and the Administration to
quickly distribute desperately needed disaster relief to affected
residents and local governments.
Our focus on terrorism, while appropriate, must not overtake our
critical responsibility to quickly and efficiently respond to all
disasters, natural or man-made. EP&R must have the authorities to
assemble and direct the response resources of the Federal Government
whenever they are required.
In addition, the Administration should fully support all emergency
grant programs for State and local governments. I am concerned that the
Administration's fiscal year 04 budget request for both the FIRE Grant
program and the Emergency Management Performance Grant program were far
below the appropriated levels in fiscal year 2003. How does DHS propose
that States and localities plan, train, and exercise for--and respond
to--acts of terrorism and other disasters without sufficient resources
to build their response capabilities?
We must move faster and we must be stronger in our efforts to
protect and defend the United States of America. I hope the testimony
we hear today will clearly describe the Administration's plan for doing
so.
PREPARED STATEMENT OF THE HONORABLE ZOE LOFGREN, A REPRESENTATIVE IN
CONGRESS FROM THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
Thank you Chairman Cox and Ranking Member Turner for holding this
important hearing. I also want to welcome Undersecretary for Emergency
Preparedness and Response, Michael D. Brown. I look forward to your
testimony and comments.
A little over 10 years ago, the Federal Emergency Management Agency
(FEMA) was widely thought to be one of the least effective departments
in the Federal Government. It was inefficient, unresponsive and
wasteful.
Under the outstanding leadership of Director James Lee Witt, FEMA
underwent a dramatic change throughout the 1990's. Director Witt
transformed the very culture of FEMA. It became an effective disaster
response agency that provided hands-on assistance to those at risk,
both before and after disaster strikes. FEMA adopted a new emphasis on
customer service providing communities and businesses with skills,
knowledge, services and technology to minimize damage and loss from all
kinds of natural and man-made disasters. In short, FEMA became a model
government agency.
When people think of FEMA today, they think of an agency that helps
our citizens in the most desperate of times. FEMA teaches people how to
get through a disaster. It helps equip local and state emergency
preparedness officials. It coordinates the Federal response to a
disaster. It makes disaster assistance available to states,
communities, businesses and individuals. FEMA' mission is crucially
important, and the people of FEMA work very hard each and every day to
complete their mission. I want to make sure that FEMA keeps its
sterling reputation.
As we all know, FEMA is now part of the Department of Homeland
Security. I consider FEMA to be one of the true bright spots within
DHS. That being said, I have serious concerns about the mission of FEMA
becoming blurred.
In section 101 of the Homeland Security Act (PL 107-296) the
mission of the Department of Homeland Security is explicitly defined.
One of the primary missions of the Department is to ``...ensure that
the functions of the agencies and subdivisions within the Department
that are not related directly to securing the homeland are not
diminished or neglected except by a specific explicit Act of
Congress;''
Is DHS in compliance with this directive? Is the staff of FEMA
spending more time on fighting terrorism than disaster preparedness?
Both of these are important tasks, and both must be done well. However,
disaster preparedness, response and recovery must not take a back seat
to the war on terror.
Is FEMA still fully prepared to address multiple disasters? Not too
far to the west of Washington, DC, there are terrible floods ravaging
West Virginia. What is FEMA doing to help people recover? If a major
earthquake, like the Loma Prieta earthquake of 1989, struck my hometown
of San Jose tomorrow, would FEMA also be able to provide critically
needed resources to the San Francisco Bay Area?
I want to be reassured by Undersecretary Brown that FEMA is
fulfilling its mission. I want to hear that you have the staff,
resources and access within DHS to get the job done. I do not want to
see a slow return to the early 1990' when FEMA was nothing more than an
ineffective bureaucracy.
To be perfectly honest with you, I have not been impressed with the
overall leadership of the Department of Homeland Security. The
Department is moving too slow, and we do not have the luxury of time.
We are quickly approaching the 2-year anniversary of the September 1 1
Is America actually safer than it was on September 10, 2001? Have we
accurately and comprehensively identified the threats? Have we reduced
our vulnerabilities? Is the Nation sufficiently prepared to prevent and
respond to future terrorist attacks? Unfortunately, I believe the
answer to these questions is, for the most part, no.
Undersecretary Brown, FEMA should be a shining example of
efficiency within DHS. I hope that you will tell us today that you are
playing a leading role to get this department up and running. It would
be most unfortunate and irresponsible for FEMA to fall apart as a
result of its absorption into the Department of Homeland Security.
If not, the committee welcomes our witness, Hon. Michael Brown, for
your opening statement.
STATEMENT OF HON. MICHAEL BROWN, UNDER SECRETARY FOR EMERGENCY
PREPAREDNESS AND RESPONSE, DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY
Mr. Brown. Good afternoon, Chairman Cox, Mr. Turner, and
members of the committee. My name is Michael Brown, and I am
the undersecretary of Homeland Security for emergency
preparedness and response.
I really appreciate the opportunity to testify before you
today. You invited me here today to discuss the question have
we improved our capability to respond to a terrorist attack?
My answer is yes, we have. By bringing 22 different
departments agencies into the Department of Homeland Security,
and integrating their capabilities, we are strengthening our
ability to respond to terrorist attacks.
EP&R, in particular, has increased its ability to respond
to terrorist attacks by incorporating new assets into our
directorate, thereby strengthening the well-tested, all-hazards
focus that FEMA previously had.
We have increased coordination of Federal planning and
response activities, and are more effectively using resources
to support first responders and preparedness efforts at the
state and local level.
These improvements will continue to strengthen our ability
to respond to all types of disasters. Our mission in the
Department of Homeland Security is to prepare for, respond to,
recover from and lessen the impact of all types of disasters.
This all-hazards approach is the core of our strength in
responding to any disaster, including those caused by acts of
terrorism. Regardless of the cause of an incident, we have
established a robust system of emergency management.
This system has been practiced at the local, state and
Federal levels of government. It is the foundation for
responding to a terrorist attack. Over the past 5 years, we
have responded to an average of more than 100 presidentially
declared disasters and emergencies each year.
Thanks to the leadership of President Bush and Secretary
Ridge and the Congress, we now have the opportunity to
coordinate our Federal preparedness and response systems as
never before.
On February 28, President Bush signed Homeland Security
Presidential Directive Number Five, On the Management of
Domestic Incidents. HSPD-5 calls for the creation of a single,
comprehensive, National Incident Management System and for the
integration of the separate Federal response plans into a
single, all-discipline, all-hazards National Response Plan.
The Secretary of homeland security is responsible for
developing and implementing both of these initiatives. We are
actively participating in the task force created by Secretary
Ridge to develop the National Response Plan and a framework for
the National Incident Management System.
Establishing who is in charge is an important
accomplishment in the post-9/11 era. EP&R's new structure for
response is based on the Incident Management System.
Thus, we are better aligned to meet the needs of both the
state and local responders. The division now includes many
national response assets formerly maintained within other
Federal agencies.
These assets include the National Disaster Medical System,
the Domestic Emergency Support Team, the Strategic National
Stockpile, the Nuclear Incident Response Teams, and the
Metropolitan Medical Response System.
Consolidating national response plans and assets improves
our responsibilities and increases coordination within DHS,
other Federal departments and agencies, as well as the state
and local entities.
The Federal Government will continue to provide the
services the American people have become accustomed to during
emergencies and disasters. But now, within the Department of
Homeland Security, we are better able to maximize Federal
resources, streamline delivery processes and focus programs and
assets on state and local response needs.
But increased coordination by itself does not entirely
account for our improved ability to respond to disasters. The
Department of Homeland Security has distributed significant
resources in support of homeland security efforts directly into
out neighborhoods, our communities and the states.
In order to help state and local governments prepare for
disasters, including terrorism, EP&R is working in close
partnership with other grant-making organizations within the
department to distribute our fiscal 2003 grants.
In April we provided $165 million to help state and local
governments better prepare to respond to all-hazards
preparedness activities and emergency management.
Just last week, we began to distribute the $745 million
appropriated by Congress for the Assistance to Fire Fighters
Grant Program. At the end of this process, we will have
distributed nearly 7,000 grants directly to local fire
departments.
These grants will help build their basic response
capabilities for all types of emergencies. We will begin
awarding nearly $74 million in grants to upgrade and enhance
state and local emergency operations centers later this month.
Along with the Office of Community Oriented Policing
Services, we will award $146.5 million this fiscal year to fund
demonstration projects establishing standards for interoperable
equipment nationwide.
Just last month, we provided nearly $19 million in grants
to states and territories to expand the Community Emergency
Response Team program. This program trains citizens to better
prepare for emergency situations in their local communities.
The CERT program is a key component of Citizen Corps,
President Bush's initiative to involve Americans into
preparedness of their communities. We have increased the number
of local Citizen Corps councils by 209 just since March 1, for
a total of 560 councils in 51 states and territories.
When I recently announced the CERT grants in Olaphe,
Kansas, I had the good fortune to meet CERT members who had
worked to help their neighbors recover from the recent record
number of tornadoes in the Midwest. This is an excellent
example of what the CERT program and Citizen Corps can do to
accomplish preparedness at the local level.
Since the creation of the department, we have demonstrated
the operational readiness of EP&R's National Interagency
Emergency Operations Center, our regional operations centers,
the NDMS, the desk, and other specialized support teams that we
now have.
During Operation Liberty Shield, these assets and team
worked in close coordination with the DHS Homeland Security
Center and other elements of the department to prepare for any
potential domestic incidents.
The recent TOPOFF II exercise allowed DHS to test its new
procedures. EP&R was able to establish an operational
relationship with the DHS Crisis Action Team and our new
systems, such as the Strategic National Stockpile.
This exercise was very useful, not only because it helped
us to see what is working but also to see what needs
improvement.
By pinpointing challenges through exercises, we are helping
ensure a better response and a more timely delivery of
assistance. Practicing with these specialized teams and working
in close partnership with the other DHS elements, we will
strengthen what we have done well in the past.
Since March 1, EP&R has provided disaster relief in 33
presidentially declared disasters and emergencies in 26 states
from Alaska to New York.
These disasters include events such as a Presidents Day
snowstorm, the Columbia Shuttle and the devastating, and the
devastating number of tornadoes that struck across the Midwest
and the South.
Increased coordination, effective use of resources and
continual training have helped us to improve our capability to
respond to a terrorist attack and simultaneously sustain our
ability to respond to all kinds of disasters, including
terrorism.
There is more that we can do to continue that improvement,
and I have outlined some of the actions that we are going to
take to do that. Following the leadership and the direction of
President Bush and Secretary Ridge, I am committed to making
certain that we are ready to respond to any incident that
occurs, whether natural or manmade.
The department looks forward to working with Congress as a
partner in that commitment.
Mr. Chairman, I appreciate the opportunity to testify
today, and I am certainly happy to answer any questions the
members might have.
[The statement of Mr. Brown follows:]
PREPARED STATEMENT OF THE HONORABLE MICHAEL BROWN, UNDER SECRETARY
EMERGENCY PREPAREDNESS AND RESPONSE DIRECTORATE DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND
SECURITY
Good morning, Chairman Cox and Members of the Committee. I am
Michael Brown, Under Secretary for the Emergency Preparedness and
Response Directorate of the Department of Homeland Security.
Since becoming the Emergency Preparedness and Response Directorate
(EP&R) of the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) just over 100 days
ago, the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) has continued its
traditional role of leading the Nation in preparing for, preventing,
responding to, and recovering from disasters caused by all hazards.
Because the Department was created to secure the homeland, FEMA has
also taken on new emergency management and homeland security
responsibilities.
By bringing 22 Departments and Agencies into DHS and integrating
their capabilities, we are strengthening our ability to respond to
terrorist attacks. EP&R in particular has increased its ability to
respond to terrorist attacks by incorporating new assets into our
Directorate, thereby strengthening our all-hazards focus.
When FEMA became part of DHS on March 1, 2003, we were responding
to the loss of the Space Shuttle Columbia. Since that time, we have
responded to an additional 33 major disasters and emergencies in 26
States caused by tornadoes, floods, and snowstorms.
We have continued to better prepare First Responders and State and
local governments for all hazards through grants and training programs.
We have provided assistance to thousands of disaster victims and
continued our efforts to support the recovery of New York from the
terrorist attack on the World Trade Center on September 11.
In short, we have continued to carry out our mission to lead
America to prepare for, prevent, respond to and recover from disasters,
whether they are natural or man-made. This was our mission before
joining the new Department and remains our mission today. As a result
of the Homeland Security Act, we have also taken on new emergency
management and homeland security responsibilities as we entered the
Department.
It was an honor to serve Joe Allbaugh as the Deputy Director and
General Counsel of FEMA. It is also a great honor for me to now serve
Secretary Tom Ridge as I lead the Emergency Preparedness and Response
Directorate (EP&R) into a new era as part of DHS. EP&R will be divided
into four disciplines--preparedness, mitigation, response and recovery.
This reorganization reflects the traditional areas of emergency
management. It also resembles the organizational flow used by many
States, who continue to be our principal partners in emergency
management.
Preparedness
Since March 1, the Preparedness Division has continued to implement
its preparedness grants and training programs, and has already put to
use its new assets since the transition to DHS. The Preparedness
Division had the opportunity to test its capabilities during the
exercises including the nationwide Top Officials 2 exercise (TOPOFF II)
in May 2003, as well as providing funding to State, tribal and local
governments through a variety of grant programs.
The recent Top Officials 2 (TOPOFF II) exercise served as a good
test of significant new organizational structures and provided some
good lessons as to how our efforts could be improved. It tested new
procedures, such as our operational relationship with the DHS's Crisis
Action Team, and inherited systems, such as the Strategic National
Stockpile. This exercise was a success, in part because it revealed
several areas for improvement that the Directorate is now addressing.
By pinpointing challenges through exercises, we can help ensure a
better response and a more timely delivery of assistance. The exercise
also validated that our existing processes and procedures will allow
EP&R to respond to a disaster, including a terrorist attack with a
weapon of mass destruction.
Although national level exercises like TOPOFF II are important and
valuable, community-based exercises are equally important for a
comprehensive and truly effective national exercise program. Recently,
a train carrying hazardous materials derailed near Laguna, New Mexico.
Fortunately, local emergency responders and the New Mexico Office of
Emergency Services were ready. A response exercise held just weeks
earlier had prepared responders for such an event. The bottom line is
that community-based exercises work, and they work at the first
responder level, where they are most needed.
Communities must have the funding to support such planning and
exercises. In April, we provided $165 million in Emergency Management
Performance Grants (EMPG) to help state and local governments better
prepare to respond to all hazards preparedness activities and emergency
management.
As a sign of the growing national interest in individual and
community preparedness, Citizen Corps has increased its number of local
councils by 377 since March 1, for a total of more than 628 Councils in
51 States and Territories. Councils are serving nearly 35 percent of
the U.S. population or approximately 90 million people. Five new
affiliates have partnered with Citizen Corps since March, including the
U.S. Junior Chamber of Commerce, the National Volunteer Fire Council,
the National Voluntary Organizations Active in Disaster, the Points of
Light Foundation, and the National Safety Council.
A key component of Citizen Corps is the Community Emergency
Response Team (CERT) program, which helps train citizens to be better
prepared to respond to emergency situations in their communities. In
May 2003, we provided nearly $19 million in grant funds to states and
territories to expand the CERT program through additional state-offered
Train-the-Trainer courses and to help communities start CERT programs
and expand existing teams. When I announced these grants recently in
Olathe, Kansas, I had the good fortune to meet Community Emergency
Response Team members who worked together to help their neighbors
recover from the recent destructive tornadoes in the Midwest. This is a
fine example of what CERT can accomplish.
DHS is committed to helping fire fighters improve their
effectiveness and stay safe. The responsibilities of the fire service
have increased since 9/11 to include planning for and responding to
possible terrorist attacks. This year, Congress appropriated $750
million for grants to increase fire departments? basic fire suppression
response capabilities for all types of emergencies, including fire
suppression. For fiscal year 2004 the Administration proposes to better
coordinate fire department grants with other First Responder programs
and focus the grants on the equipment and training required for
responding to terrorist events as part of the Office for Domestic
Preparedness.
Our National Emergency Training Center, which includes the National
Fire Academy and the Emergency Management Institute, continues to
provide training to the leaders of the first responder community. We
train more than 15,000 students a year on campus and more than 100,000
students a year off campus. Our training prepares first responders from
the fire, EMS and emergency management community, as well as local
officials all across the country. With the addition of Noble Training
Center in Anniston, Alabama, our capabilities are being expanded and we
will be able to reach more first responders than ever before.
Many of our State and local partners told us that their Emergency
Operations Centers (EOCs) are in need of physical and technical
improvements to enable them to provide an effective command and control
structure to respond to all-hazards disasters and to house secure
communications equipment. We expect to award nearly $74 million in
grants to upgrade and enhance state and local EOCs this month.
Mutual aid remains one of our top priorities, both through the
enhancement of existing mutual aid systems such as the Emergency
Management Assistance Compact and through the development of new inter-
local and intrastate agreements and compacts. There is an urgent need
to enhance and integrate mutual aid agreements among State and local
governments and to tie them into a national system for requesting,
receiving, and managing emergency response resources. Such a system
will greatly enhance the Nation's ability to respond to all types of
disasters and will provide senior officials and elected leaders at all
level of government with the ability to ``see'' real-time an inventory
of nearby response assets. This month, working with EP&R and the
National Emergency Management Association, eight States participated in
a test to identify the kind, type and quantity of resources available
in their community that could be used for mutual aid response.
Interoperability is a critical component of any response,
regardless of the hazard. EP&R, in close coordination with the Office
of Community Oriented Policing Services (COPS), will award a total of
$146.5 million in grants this fiscal year. Local jurisdictions across
the Nation will compete for demonstration projects that will explore
uses of equipment and technologies to increase interoperability among
the fire service, law enforcement, and emergency medical service
communities. These demonstration projects will serve as models of
interoperable solutions that can be shared throughout the nation.
On February 28, 2003, the President established a single,
comprehensive national incident management system and provided for the
integration of separate Federal response plans into a single all-
discipline, all-hazards national response plan. The Secretary of
Homeland Security is responsible for developing and implementing both
initiatives. EP&R is actively participating in the task force created
by Secretary Ridge to develop the National Response Plan (NRP) and a
framework for National Incident Management System (NIMS). As directed
in the Department of Homeland Security Act of 2002, EP&R will play a
key role in the management and maintenance of NIMS once it is
developed.
Mitigation
Since the integration into DHS, the Mitigation Division has focused
primarily on two Presidential initiatives: the flood map modernization
program and pre-disaster mitigation. This groundwork sets the stage for
results for the rest of this fiscal year and beyond.
We have nearly $200 million available for our flood map
modernization program this fiscal year--$149 million appropriated by
Congress and $50 million in National Flood Insurance Program (NFIP)
policyholder fees.
The funding enables us to embark on a multi-year effort to update
and digitize our flood map inventory, which consists of 100,000 paper
panels. Updating flood insurance rate maps will make community
assessment of flood risks more accurate and improve floodplain
management decisions. An updated map inventory will also provide the
basis for prudent flood insurance decisions and an actuarially sound
insurance rating.
Flood risk identification is central to informing decision-makers
at all levels of government and in helping to shape their assessment of
risks. Effective flood hazard mitigation hinges, in the final analysis,
on accurate identification of the risk. A sustained commitment to the
President's initiative for updating the NFIP's flood map inventory will
result in even more effective risk reduction.
Our flood map modernization initiative reflects, too, the
President's overall management agenda: the effort will be citizen-
centered, results-oriented, and market-based. We have been laying the
groundwork for this significant undertaking and plan to award a
contract for the flood map modernization program this summer.
We have also continued our commitment to hazard mitigation
programs. This fiscal year, Congress appropriated $149 million for the
Pre-disaster Mitigation Program. We have provided planning grants to
the states and five territories to assist in identifying and
prioritizing cost effective mitigation projects.4
The competitive Pre-Disaster Mitigation Grant (PDM) program will be
announced soon. This competitive pre-disaster program is another
Presidential initiative that will allow us to do risk reduction work
before the next disaster occurs. The intent of this new program is to
provide a consistent source of funding to State, Tribal, and local
governments for pre-disaster hazard mitigation planning and projects.
The PDM program provides a significant opportunity to raise risk
awareness and to reduce the Nation's disaster losses through mitigation
planning that includes risk assessment, and the implementation of pre-
identified, cost-effective mitigation measures before disasters occur.
Examples of these measures include establishing retrofitting existing
structures to protect against natural hazard events and acquisition and
relocation of flood-prone structures. Funding these hazard mitigation
plans and projects will reduce overall risks to the population and
infrastructure and - in the long-term - will reduce reliance on funding
from disaster assistance programs following an event.
EP&R also issued guidance for the Flood Mitigation Assistance (FMA)
program for fiscal year 2003. As in prior years, EP&R will award
planning, technical assistance and flood mitigation project grants
under the FMA program. For fiscal year 2003, we have established a
national priority of mitigating National Flood Insurance Program
repetitive flood loss properties for both the PDM and FMA programs.
Response
Since March 1, the Response Division has been working to merge our
various new assets, teams and responsibilities into the Emergency
Preparedness and Response Directorate.
The Response Division's structure is based on the Incident
Management System so that it is aligned to meet the needs of State and
local responders. In addition, it is designed to meet the President's
direction to establish a National Incident Management System (NIMS).
Further, the Division includes many national response assets formerly
maintained within other Federal agencies. These include: the National
Disaster Medical System (NDMS); the Domestic Emergency Support Team
(DEST); the Strategic National Stockpile; and the Nuclear Incident
Response Team (NIRT).
As part of these efforts, over the last 100 days, the Response
Division has detailed personnel to the Transportation Security
Administration to develop the National Response Plan (NRP) and the NIMS
and has initiated the necessary steps to create dedicated, rapid-
deployment DHS Incident Management Teams.
We have conducted joint planning with DHS to enhance operational
readiness of the National Interagency Emergency Operations Center
(NIEOC), Regional Operations Centers, NDMS, DEST and other specialized
support teams during Operation Liberty Shield.
We have been working with the Office of Emergency Response,
including the NDMS, on a wide array of issues, such as transferring
staff to the EP&R headquarters building, integrating NDMS assets into
the EP&R structure, and enhancing operational readiness of NDMS teams.
We continue to work with the Department of Health and Human Services to
delineate roles and responsibilities related to the Strategic National
Stockpile. We are incorporating the DEST and NIRT into EP&R planning
and response capabilities. We have been working to integrate these
response assets into a mission capable organization that will build
upon the proven disaster response foundation.
This consolidation of national response assets allows the Federal
Government not only to provide the services which existed prior to the
establishment of DHS that the American people have become accustomed to
during emergencies and disasters, but also it enhances our ability to
maximize Federal resources, streamline delivery processes and focus
programs and assets on State and local needs.
Prior to joining DHS, the focus of the disaster programs within
FEMA was one of an all- hazards approach. This focus remains today and
benefits from the more global perspective of DHS and its related
components.
However, we are not resting on our past achievements. We will be
working with the Congress, other Federal partners, state and local
leaders, and other affected stakeholders to continue to enhance our
ability to respond effectively to all types of disasters.
Recovery
EP&R has provided disaster relief in 33 presidentially declared
disasters and emergencies in 26 States from Alaska to New York since
March 1. These disasters include such events as the President's Day
snowstorm and the devastating tornadoes that struck across the Midwest
and South last month.
When I traveled to some of the areas hardest hit by the tornadoes,
I had the opportunity to meet with some of the victims of these
terrible storms. Their lives had been totally devestated. They had lost
family members. They had lost their homes. I can't adequately describe
in words the impact of looking into the eyes of people who have lost
everything. But when things are at their worst, our people are at their
best--I have never been more proud to be a part of the Federal
organization that already had individuals on the ground providing
assistance to those in need and getting the process of disaster
recovery underway.
We have received more than 66,000 disaster assistance applications
at our National Processing Services Centers and have provided disaster
victims with more than $80 million for housing and other immediate
disaster relief needs.
Further, EP&R is conducting regular assessments of our Disaster
Field Office activities, including After Action meetings for disasters
such as Typhoon Chata'an and Pongsona that devastated Guam and Chuuk,
so that we can continually make improvements in our disaster
operations.
EP&R has already declared two Fire Management Assistance grants
this wildfire season for Hawaii and New Mexico to assist in
controlling, managing, and mitigating fires that were threatening to
become major disasters.
In our ongoing efforts to assist the recovery from the terrorist
attacks of September 11, EP&R is finalizing a Memorandum of
Understanding with the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention to
fulfill requirements in the Consolidated Appropriations Resolution of
2003. This agreement will provide $90 million for administering
baseline and follow-up screening, clinical exams, and health monitoring
for emergency services, rescue, and recovery personnel.
EP&R continues to break new ground in disaster relief as we
implement improvements in our programs following Congressional
approval. We have just recently implemented the new replacement housing
provision authorized by the Disaster Mitigation Act of 2000 for the
first time on a large scale during the recent tornado disasters.
Additionally, EP&R is implementing new regulations for the Crisis
Counseling and Training Program that provides states with funds for
crisis counseling for disaster victims. This program proved to be
vitally important in our recovery efforts for 9/11. While there are
established program timelines for providing counseling services, the
new regulations provide greater flexibility to extend the program in
limited circumstances to deal with the impacts of catastrophic events,
such as terrorism.
As we provide assistance to disaster-stricken communities, we
continue to look for ways to improve. The Recovery Division has also
taken the first steps in redesigning the Public Assistance Program.
While we process Public Assistance in a timely and efficient maimer, we
want to reduce delivery times to State and local governments, and be
more prepared to provide this assistance under the stress of terrorist
incidents and other catastrophic events.
If our first hundred days within DHS are any indication, the next
100 days may be just as busy for our recovery programs as we provide
disaster relief in the upcoming hurricane and wildfire seasons, as well
as for disasters and emergencies that may be caused by other hazards,
whether natural or man-made.
Conclusion
During the first 100 days as part of the Department of Homeland
Security, the Emergency Preparedness and Response Directorate has
continued to carry out its mission to prepare for, prevent, respond to,
and recovery from disasters and emergencies caused by all hazards. And
we will continue to do so.
Again, I appreciate the opportunity to testify before you today. I
would be glad to answer any questions that you have.
Chairman Cox. Well, I thank you very much for that
outstanding statement.
Let me begin by asking about the coordination between your
directorate and the rest of the department on the subject of
threat-based decision-making for grant allocation. We are, in
Congress, as you know, increasing substantially the amount of
money that we are making available for both the preparedness
and response. We are expecting in the future that we will have
within the department a capability to analyze intelligence and
rank threats, to look at capabilities of terrorist, enemies of
the United States, and to look at their intentions so to spend
our money accordingly.
We know that because this is early on in the construction
of this department, that that capability isn't there yet and we
are working in Congress to help the department get it
established. What are you doing in the short term to base your
spending decisions, your grant decisions and so on, on
prioritized threats from terrorist groups with specific
capabilities, rather than simply rationing the money out to
feed so many hungry mouths?
Mr. Brown. I would respond in two ways, Mr. Chairman. I
would say, let me divide it up into two categories. First of
all, we recognize and want to appreciate the incredible
resources that the Congress has given us.
And I will use the Fire Grants as an example of the first
way that I think we are working to better coordinate the
dispersal of those dollars.
Every time I speak or I am out talking to groups, and we
also need to include this concept about grants guidance, is
that we have got to get smarter about how we utilize the money.
So I say to the departments I speak to, and will use my
home state of Colorado as an example, that when we do these
Fire Grants, we do not want Denver and Boulder and Longmont and
Fort Collins, all those communities along the front range, all
applying for the same thing.
I mean, it is great for us all, for every fire department,
to have the same toy, I know they all want the best equipment
they can get.
But instead our approach should be this: Along the front
range of Colorado, what are the vulnerabilities? What
capabilities do they need to build? And so I want them to come
together and apply for those Fire Grants based on that
intrastate regional basis, and look at it as how we build
capabilities and solve vulnerabilities.
And if we write that into the grant-making process and
force them to do that, that will mean that instead of Denver,
Boulder and Fort Collins and Longmont all applying for the same
thing, they will apply for different things by which they are
most qualified to get, and then on a regional basis they will
get what they are qualified for and solve the vulnerabilities.
That is the first point.
Chairman Cox. Which goes to a priority that you are placing
on the joint use of resources, rather than replicating them
side by side?
Mr. Brown. Absolutely, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Cox. And what my question goes to rather is the
extent that you are operating in the area of fire suppression
grants, for example. How is it that we determine that fire is
the more serious threat that we face from terrorists, we have
got to sort of work backward to the event that we are preparing
for, and how did we pick that compared to some other thing?
I mean, let me tell you what is behind my questioning and
my inquiry into how the department is facing these challenges.
FEMA's job in the past was a lot easier in this respect,
because we have all of human history to rely upon in predicting
the weather, for example.
So if we are responding to natural disasters--tornadoes,
floods, even forest fires, and so on--we know with a fair
degree of mathematical certainty what it is we can expect. We
know the physics of how it operates, we know a lot about it. We
can even rather accurately predict the frequency. And certainly
if it is tornadoes and so on we can pinpoint regions that are
more prone to this.
Terrorism is completely different because we start out with
question marks in all of these boxes and then we fill it in
based on what we can garner through intelligence.
And so if we are going to make the kinds of decisions that
have been routine and become second nature for FEMA in the
natural disaster area, we have got to be able to tap into
increasingly analysis of terrorist capabilities and intentions
and estimate what they are going to do to us, where and how,
what is the most likely. And then from there flows our decision
to prepare in a certain way, to look at this or that kind of
infrastructure, to give our first responders this or that
equipment and training.
Mr. Brown. You are absolutely right, Mr. Chairman. That is
the second point that I want to make, is that in addition to
doing the dual use, there is a second component of how we use
the money smarter and more wisely, and that is to coordinate
closely with IAIP, state and local, FBI, CIA, to develop that
threat analysis that tells us what the vulnerabilities are. And
we currently do that through a capability assessment review
program that we have in the states, where we go to them and
say, What are the vulnerabilities, both natural and manmade?
The terrorist vulnerabilities, for example.
And then once we get those vulnerabilities, then within the
department we will issue grants guidance that will drive the
money toward those vulnerabilities.
Now, what I will tell you is what we don't have the answer
to yet, at least that I don't have the answer to yet, is how we
are going to rank those vulnerabilities. But the whole concept
of getting a threat assessment through IAIP, working with all
the other directors, including the science and technology
group, identifying the capability assessments, whether those
threats are, and then driving the money to those threats is
exactly what the plan is for the department.
Chairman Cox. Is it fair to say that, from the creation of
the department, which was, after all, just last year, that is
not the way we have been making these grants in the past, and
that our end point is as you described and that we are now
headed in that direction?
Mr. Brown. You know, I hate to sound like a lawyer, Mr.
Chairman, but it is a little bit of both. We were doing some of
that prior to March 1, in the sense that FEMA had always tried
to get folks to focus on what are the needs, what are the
capabilities that we have to build?
What is the additional factor now post-March 1, actually
post-9/11, how do we identify the threats, what are the threats
and what are the vulnerabilities, and drive the many toward
those threats and vulnerabilities.
The focus has shifted more to the latter.
Chairman Cox. I want to thank you for fully addressing
that.
I reserve the balance of my questions for later on if we
have time.
And recognize Mr. Turner for 5 minutes of questions.
Mr. Turner. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Secretary, I want to ask you a little bit about the
role of your directorate and the role of the Office for
Domestic Preparedness. For example, the Office for Domestic
Preparedness maintains a database of state terrorism
preparedness assessments and statewide strategies for
terrorism. As I understand it, that is the information that is
required of the states in order to even be eligible for
participation in the grant program.
Am I correct on that?
Mr. Brown. I think so.
Mr. Turner. That is pretty important information, I would
think, to know what the state preparedness assessments are and
what their strategies are for dealing with terrorism. Does
anyone in your directorate have access to that information?
Mr. Brown. Yes, we do, Mr. Turner. And what is interesting
is--President Bush originally proposed that ODP move into FEMA.
And, so we had started down a path of building a relationship
with ODP and FEMA about how we were going to work together and
coordinate all these assessments.
Now that it is gone the other direction and those programs
are moving all into ODP, we just have to reverse process. And
so there is a close coordination between ODP and Emergency
Preparedness and Response about how we do the exercises
together, how we do the capability assessments together, so
that we are not duplicating efforts and that we are truly
addressing vulnerabilities.
Mr. Turner. Well, who it is in your directorate that has
access to the information that is available in the ODP state's
file?
Mr. Brown. It is the preparedness division.
We have preparedness, response, recovery, and mitigation.
The preparedness division, which is where our original Office
of National Preparedness was housed, it is that core group of
people that have access to it.
Mr. Turner. And who in that preparedness section is the
person that reviews the filings that the state makes with ODP?
Mr. Brown. I assume it would be Dave Garrett, who is one of
our branch managers.
But I will double check that and make for sure about the
individual name.
Mr. Turner. And when Mr. Garrett reviews it, what does he
do with it? What is the purpose of his review?
Mr. Brown. The purpose is to see that until we come fully
together, that all of the grant programs that we have are not
duplicating what ODP is doing and vice versa, so that when Andy
Mitchell and his group is putting out money that they are not
duplicating what we are doing. The end game is to have a one-
stop shop where we have an effort to review all of these
capability assessment reviews and we would put the money where
it is going to be best used.
Mr. Turner. So am I correct to say that at this point, the
sole purpose of and the sole use of those documents that the
states have prepared is to determine who gets grants and how
much?
Mr. Brown. Well, not necessarily, because a capability
assessment review process can be used for numerous things. I
mean, it can be used for, obviously, preparing grant programs
for what people need to be doing in that particular
jurisdiction. But it can also be used to identify what types of
first responder needs we might have on other bases. You don't
do a capability assessment review on one single, narrow
vulnerability, but on a wide scope of vulnerabilities.
So we do that wide scope review and then figure out what is
best. We even make those reviews available to other departments
within the Federal Government that might have programs that
could utilize that information. It is not something that we all
grab and hold close to our chest that we try to use across the
Federal Government.
Mr. Turner. How will DHS know if a state or a local
government has done enough to prepare for a terrorist attack or
natural disaster or some other type of accident in which you
might be involved?
Mr. Brown. Secretary Ridge and the President both have a
great philosophy, that this is going to be a matrixed and
measured organization, and that we will have measurements by
which we will gauge the development of standards. And then if
states meet those standards as the world goes on, as the
terrorists get better, which we hope they don't and we can stop
them from doing that, but as technology changes, those
standards will change.
So the whole concept is to develop standards, keep those
standards moving up with technology and measure the states'
performance against those standards.
Mr. Turner. Do you have in place standards that have been
made available to states and local governments in areas such as
communication equipment, so that they will be interoperable, or
standards for other type of equipment that would be needed in
case of response. Have those standards have been published and
disseminated?
Mr. Brown. Congress has just given us somewhere in excess
of $54 million, which we are going to use on a competitive
basis to identify the best demonstration projects across the
states to do interoperating studies so that we can create and
put in place those standards.
Right now, everyone wants to talk about interoperability
and say that we have got to have everyone talking to everyone
else, and they always use the example of 9/11 and that no one
could talk to anyone else.
What we want to avoid is creating a situation where,
indeed, everyone can talk to everyone else, because we will be
just as interoperable if that occurs.
So what we are trying to do is establish a National
Incident Management System, and a National Incident Management
Standard by which people will be able to talk to one another
when they need to talk to one another.
And it is through these demonstration projects that we will
establish standards for one how and when you do that, and two,
the equipment that it will take to meet those standards.
Mr. Turner. Thank you, Mr. Secretary.
Ms. Dunn. [Presiding.] The gentleman's time has expired.
Mr. Secretary, this committee is very focused on homeland
security. It is our responsibility to be the oversight
committee over the department, as you well know.
You are a FEMA guy, and you are coming into an organization
where FEMA is one of the primary agencies that has been meshed
under your responsibilities.
We are looking for a focused approach to the consideration
of our vulnerabilities and the responses to a terrorist attack.
What percentage of your time would you say you are spending on
looking at the area of natural disasters, which was certainly
your responsibility before you came to this job, versus
considering our vulnerability with respect to potential
terrorist threats?
Mr. Brown. I would say, Madame Chairman, that I spend all
of my time looking at all vulnerabilities, and that we do not
differentiate on a broad scale the difference between terrorism
and natural disasters.
What we focus on like a laser beam is how do we get this
country, one--the department focuses like a laser beam--on how
do we prevent a terrorist attack from occurring.
My response within my directorate is to focus like a laser
beam on how we respond if, indeed, there is a terrorist event.
And the response system for doing that is very similar to what
you would do in a natural disaster.
So what I have to do is to develop the capability of first
responders to respond to a natural disaster, to respond to a
terrorist incident, and, unfortunately, to respond to something
like a terrorist incident that is not caused by a terrorist but
caused by just, you know, some goofball that causes an
anhydrous ammonia truck to spill out here on 395.
I have got to make certain that every first responder has
everything the need to respond to all of those incidents.
Ms. Dunn. Do you believe it is appropriate to retain all of
the responsibilities of FEMA within the Homeland Security
Department? For example, the dealing with natural disasters
like hurricanes and floods.
Mr. Brown. Absolutely, absolutely. What you do not want to
do is to create a dual-track system of response in this
country. We have, throughout the course of this country,
developed incredibly good state and local partnerships. And we
cannot forget, folks, we really cannot forget that--I know this
becoming trite because everyone uses it now--but when they dial
911, the don't reach 202-646-3900. They reach somebody in your
district and in your hometown.
And so what we have to do is make certain that they have
the training and the equipment to respond to everything.
Firefighters, policemen, the FBI, the Department of Defense,
everyone will tell you that the best way to respond to any kind
of disaster, any kind of incident is through a structured
incident command system. And we must keep that incident command
system in place for any kind of disaster.
And if we go down the path of trying to separate the two,
we are going to have duplicative efforts. We are going to have
wasted money. We are going to have people that are not going
to--I mean, they are going to worry about whether they should
be thinking about a tornado or a hurricane or a natural
disaster or a terrorist incident or what I call the goofball
incident. And we can't have that. We have to have them prepared
to respond to any incident.
Ms. Dunn. Do you believe there should be a Department of
Homeland Security official in each region around the United
States?
And if you do believe that, do you believe that they should
be housed with FEMA? Or do you think FEMA ought to be the
representative?
Mr. Brown. Well, interestingly, one of the things that I
proposed during the transition prior--before we were even going
to know if there was going to be a department--any legislation
or not, was the concept of putting someone in every state. FEMA
kind of does that now with our FCO program. When a disaster
occurs, we have someone there.
And I think--I don't think, I know--that the vision of
Secretary Ridge and Secretary England is to create a regional
concept such that we are in very close contact with the state
and locals on a day-to-day basis and know what their needs are,
know how to communicate with them. And that is the model I want
to take from FEMA.
I mean, let's be honest, FEMA has been successful over the
past, you know, since its creation since 1979 primarily because
it has partnerships with state and local and other departments
within the Federal Government. We must create that same kind of
partnership with the Department of Homeland Security in order
for us to be successful also.
And that is exactly the kind of strategy that Secretary
England and Secretary Ridge and the President want to pursue in
this department.
Ms. Dunn. The Homeland Security Act states that the Nuclear
Incident Response Team shall operate as an organizational unit
of the department in case of emergency. I know during the
recent TOPOFF exercise that took place in my hometown in
Seattle, the response team was temporarily transferred over to
the Department of Homeland Security.
My question is in case of a threat of an attack, how do you
determine when the Nuclear Incident Response Team will be
transferred over to the Department of Homeland Security? What
takes place? And what is the communication in making that
decision?
Mr. Brown. Well, actually, this is a very good example of
how we are already coordinating with some of the assets that we
have been given operational control over, but which remain
housed in another department. And we have already entered into
an MOU with the Department of Energy on how that will operate.
And I am proud to tell you that we have worked incredibly
close with the NIRTs and have actually deployed the NIRTs prior
to TOPOFF II to do surveillance, to do other types of works.
And so the operational aspect that we have with the NIRTs is
working incredibly well. And I think that is the same with the
stockpile, with the desk, which we exercised in TOPOFF II.
Those operational agreements are already in place.
Are they in their final form? They are today. And I can
tell you that as we get operational experience through all the
exercises that we will do, I am sure we will tweak those as we
go along.
Ms. Dunn. Thank you very much, Mr. Secretary.
We are going to go in order of appearance at this hearing,
so if you have questions you want to start out?
Let me call then on Ms. Christensen, who will have the
floor for 8 minutes for questions.
Ms. Christensen. Thank you, Madame Chair. I, too, want to
welcome Mr. Brown to the committee. We are glad to have you,
and have your FEMA experience on board in the Department of
Homeland Security, and I want to thank you for the attention
that you have been paying to the territories in your new
capacity.
Are you planning to do a regional approach in managing your
directorate, and if so, how close are you to setting that
structure in place?
Mr. Brown. We are. What is interesting is since FEMA
comprised the majority of the assets that came in to the
emergency preparedness and response, we have just simply
adopted that FEMA regional structure. We are currently using
that.
So what we are doing now is partaking the other assets that
we have and figuring ways that we can match those assets up to
our regions. For example, the Strategic National Stockpile has
certain locations around the country, and so we are making
certain that we tie those in into the closest geographical FEMA
region, and/or the closest region that makes sense in terms of
the operational capability.
Ms. Christensen. So it is already set up so that is the
Virgin Islands, for example, has to get a quick response in the
case of any incident, they know that they go to New York where
they always have done it?
Mr. Brown. Absolutely. None of that has changed today.
Ms. Christensen. I am still also concerned with the
coordination of the different agencies that are a part of the
emergency preparedness and response.
I know you have answered several questions already about
the Office of Domestic Response. What about the Department of
Health and Human Services, which has some responsibility also
for emergency preparedness and response?
Can you talk a little bit about the coordination between
your directorate and that department?
Mr. Brown. Certainly. And I will give you and example of
that. While we have operational control of the Strategic
National Stockpile, we still rely upon the expertise of the
CDC, HHS and others to tell us what needs to be in there and
how best to deploy and utilize the stockpile.
So those kinds of operational coordination efforts are in
place and working incredibly well, in my humble opinion. I
think the recent SARS example is a great, the SARS outbreak, is
a great example of how that kind of coordination occurs from
the moment we know something is occurring
On the Saturday that we kind of first learned of SARS, HHS,
DHS were already in contact with CDC, had conference calls all
day long about what is the threat, is it terrorist-related, not
terrorist-related, what are the vulnerabilities in this
country, what do we need to do with the stockpile?
Those kinds of things occur today. We are not waiting. I
mean, time, as the chairman said earlier, is of the essence. We
are doing that now.
Ms. Christensen. So, I do have that concern that a lot of
time is going to be wasted in coordinating, but you feel that
through the exercises that, for example, like the one that we
just had that those efforts at coordinating will be fine-tuned
so that they move smoothly and efficiently and they are able to
respond immediately?
Mr. Brown. Let me just say, there was never any serious
discussion that I heard, but, you know, you heard, you always
hear rumblings in Washington, and one of the rumblings I heard
was that we perhaps might postpone TOPOFF II.
There was no desire within the department to do that. We do
not want to waste any time. I brought with me today, which I
will certainly share with the full committee at the appropriate
time, the June exercise schedule.
This is just June, of all the exercises that we are doing
to practice this coordination with the state and local. Madame
Chairman, we are not going to waste any time.
I mean, I think it is of the utmost importance that we
continue down this path of trying to do exercises and
strengthening our relationships, not only with the territories,
but the state and locals, all of the partnerships that we have.
Ms. Christensen. The National Response Plan is to create a
single comprehensive national approach. This question may have
been asked, maybe not exactly: Is there a template plan that
each state and territory has to guide us in developing our
portion, segment of the plan?
Mr. Brown. You are just about to get that. That is a great
question. We have developed the concept, the concept is in
place, the task force is now vetting that through the
department, and we are getting ready to include the state and
locals in that vetting process so that the are a part of that
National Response Plan.
We would be absolutely nuts if we did not include them,
because they are the ones who, again, natural disaster,
terrorist incident, are going to get that 911 call, so they are
an integral part of what we are doing in terms of the NRP.
Ms. Christensen. And for this single national coordinated
approach, for things like communication systems, what are you
telling the different localities in terms of moving ahead on
their own communications systems?
Are they being told to wait until we do this on the
national level? We have reached some consensus on a national
level as to the best way to proceed? Are they being told, well,
use these parameters at this point so that we know that they
will be able to be interoperable? What are you telling the
local agencies?
Mr. Brown. Well, we are, I guess I would say, telling them
two things. One is we are telling them that whatever they have
ongoing, make sure it is what you really need.
And two, we are telling them that the money that the
Congress has given us for the interoperability studies is
coming out. And to the extent that they might want to wait to
see how those demonstration projects come about, that is great.
But do not do anything that is going to risk the lives or
property in your jurisdictions today. If there is something
that you have, a system that is going to meet your needs today,
go ahead and do that.
We have had a few questions about the ability of these
people to respond and the cost of their beefing up security,
for example, when we are at Orange Alert.
I am ranking member on National Parks, Recreation, and
Public Lands. And the director of the park service tells me
that every time we go to Orange Alert, they end up spending
$64,000 a day of funding in their agency that would otherwise
be spent perhaps for park maintenance or other necessities.
Is that being addressed? And is it addressed through the
budget requests so that the agencies don't have to spend funds
that ought to be spent elsewhere, similarly to the cities and
towns around the country?
Mr. Brown. Secretary Ridge recognizes that the threat-level
matrix right now is causing the exact kind of concerns that you
are addressing in your question. And we are doing internally a
review of what can we do to take the IAIP piece, the portion of
it we have now, and better get information to local law
enforcement about what they need to know, help them to develop
a checklist of what they can or cannot. Well, cannot: They can
do anything they want to do. But the thing we would suggest
they do or not do at different levels just like we do within
EP&R.
When we go from one level to another, based on the
intelligence and the information we have about the threat
level, we may have a checklist of 100 things. But based on the
information and the intelligence we have, we might do 40 of
those or 20 of those. We might do 100 of them, all of them
based on that intelligence that we have.
And what we want to do, and I think what the Secretary
wants to do, is develop a system where we can get that same
kind of information to state and locals so they can make an
informed decision about are they going to do everything or just
portions of things, and do they need to do it in this
jurisdiction but maybe not in a different jurisdiction.
Ms. Christensen. I just have a question--
Ms. Dunn. The gentlelady's time has expired.
Ms. Christensen. Thank you.
Ms. Dunn. Thank you, Ms. Christensen.
Time now goes to Mr. Camp. Eight minutes, Mr. Camp.
Mr. Camp. I thank the chairman.
Mr. Brown, I raised this issue with Secretary Ridge when he
testified before our committee. The Red Cross is the only
nongovernmental agency with mandated responsibilities. Under
the Federal response plan--and I know they were involved in
TOPOFF II exercise--and obviously, because of their expertise
in disaster preparedness and response.
But I am interested in your thoughts on their role in the
overall homeland security effort and particularly as it relates
to mandated activities that the Red Cross pursues, and whether
you envision any funding provided by the department to the Red
Cross for the activities that they perform that are required
under homeland security functions or other areas. But I am just
interested in your thoughts on that.
Mr. Brown. First of all, let me just say publicly that the
Red Cross is an incredibly good partner of the Department of
Homeland Security. They provide an invaluable service to us,
particularly in times of any kind of disaster, whether it is 9/
11 or hurricanes or anything else.
One of my goals is to create a system where all of the
volunteer agencies--and whoever becomes the leader of that is
kind of immaterial to me--but we have to develop a system where
once emergency preparedness and response and the Department of
Homeland Security has done everything it is authorized to under
the law for a victim, that we have a central database where we
know at that point that this particular victim can also tap
into the resources of the different volunteer agencies.
And so much like we have an emergency support team function
within the department, a crisis action team where we bring
everyone together, I would like to see the volunteer agencies
do that also. And I think the Red Cross is very well positioned
to do that type of effort so that once we have exhausted the
resources that we have and the authorities that we have and
they now need to turn to other places to get assistance or
help, there is that place to do it. And the Red Cross is
perfectly situated to do that for us.
Mr. Camp. It sounds like you are envisioning almost a two-
step process where first they determine what Federal resources
are available and then they go somewhere else and determine
where the private resources are. Is that correct?
Mr. Brown. That is correct in the recovery phase. In the
response phase, I am not suggesting any change at all. In the
response phase, the Red Cross does exactly what it should be
doing, helping us coordinate all the volunteer efforts,
coordinating blood supplies, coordinating medical response,
everything.
I am talking about in terms of the long-term recovery after
disaster has occurred.
Mr. Camp. And with regard to any required functions that
the Red Cross may perform, any thoughts on funding that may be
made available to the agency because of that?
Mr. Brown. No, there is not. I know that they have come and
spoken to me about some of their funding needs. And I
appreciate their concerns. We just have to go the budgetary
process and see what we might be able to do to help.
Mr. Camp. You have also mentioned in your prepared
testimony the goal of expanding national training courses and
programs, obviously, to involve more first responders in those.
And I am interested in the standards that the states may use to
oversee those programs.
Are there any national standards in place, particularly for
the training programs? And then, I guess, for equipment as well
that often is used in these programs.
Mr. Brown. Just want to make sure I understand the
question, Mr. Camp. Are you talking about training for first
responders or training for volunteers?
Mr. Camp. Training for first responders.
Mr. Brown. OK. Yes. Certainly. We have all the standards
that we established that went to our grant programs and to our
training programs though Emmetsburg U.S. Fire Administration.
ODP has the same kind of standards that they provide to first
responders.
So there is a standard baseline by which we are trying to
get all first responders to, including urban search and rescue
teams.
So as we work on those standards, it is an evolving
process. But the standard today is going to change based on the
intelligence that we receive and what the threat is tomorrow.
And so, that standard today may be different tomorrow.
Mr. Camp. How about for equipment?
Mr. Brown. It is a great point because we often talk about
inoperability of communications. And we forget that there is
also interoperability of equipment.
And we forget that there is also interoperability of
equipment. And that is to me an equal percent as
interoperability of communications.
There is a great photograph at the U.S. Fire Academy about
two fire departments that were fighting a fire. And they have
flocked together joints that are about the length of this table
I am sitting at to try to get one fire truck from one county to
hook up to a fire truck from another county. And so, we are
trying to establish those kind of standards of interoperability
also.
Mr. Camp. Thank you, and I wondered how the agency of the
department assesses the capabilities of state and localities to
respond to a disaster. I realize programs like TOPOFF II, and
it looks as though you have a number of programs scheduled for
June as well. What are the criteria for assessing the
preparedness of states and localities and also Native Americans
for responding to these problems?
Mr. Brown. I think the best way for me to answer the
question is to say that we do it through the capability
assessment review. So what I need to do is to get to you the
specifics of those cars, as we call them, that apply standards
to different types of jurisdictions. Again, while we may have a
baseline and a standard for all first responders, a first
responder obviously in Los Angeles may have different needs
than a first responder of, you know, where my home is in the
backwoods of Colorado.
So we have different standards based on what their needs
are. And those capability assessment reviews provide those
different levels.
And I just off the top of my head couldn't give you those
different standards. But we will certainly get those to you.
Mr. Camp. And lastly, I think all of us are inundated with
private sector and other ideas about equipment and standards,
and I know this has come up in other testimony with, I think,
the Secretary and others. And I know there is a Web site and
all of that. But if you have any ideas in terms of how best we
can forward on the ideas that we receive? And if you can
describe the way you sort of vet those and how you review those
and try to bring to the surface the ideas that may actually be
helpful.
Mr. Brown. This is actually probably one of the most
exciting things that is going on in the Department of Homeland
Security. And it is particularly exciting for me, as you said,
Congressman, one of the old FEMA guys, and that is that we have
never had before what I would call an R&D shop, which is the
science and technology director of the Department of Homeland
Security.
So for the first time I have the ability to turn to
somebody and say, You know, I have got these guys screaming at
me all day about they have got the best product in the world
that is going to solve everything and it is the greatest thing
since sliced bread. Would you really look at this and tell me
if that is true or not?
So now within the department we have that R&D shop to do
that very thing. So I would say if you have got ideas, hopes,
industries in your districts that say we have got the greatest
thing that is going to solve all of homeland security's
problems, give those to me and I am going to give them to Chuck
Queary in science and technology and say, Go tell me if this is
something that works and go tell me if this is something that I
can utilize.
Sometimes we don't even know what questions to ask, and
that is why we have the science and technology groups tell us,
We have been watching how you are doing business and you ought
to do it this way, or we have this product that is going to
help you better.
Mr. Camp. All right, thank you very much.
Thank you, Chairman.
Chairman Cox. [Presiding.] Ms. Lofgren?
Ms. Lofgren. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
And thank you, Mr. Brown.
I have listened with great interest today, and I have
actually listening to your all hazards description recalling
back on my prior life as a member of local government, which
was a lot of fun. And really, historically, although the
individuals involved in FEMA, I think were always excellent,
there was a time when the department itself was not well
regarded. And I assure you we remember that time.
And really, it has been good since. I remember the response
to Loma Prieta was disorganized, in 1989. FEMA really went
through a transformation and became an agency that was really
known for efficiency and cutting some red tape, really one of
the best Federal agencies that existed. And it was not
inefficient or unresponsible or wasteful, as it had been in the
past.
And so, I want to ask the question really from a different
point of view, which is I want to make sure that as we turn our
attention to terrorism, as obviously we must, we also don't
lose the efficiency that is so important to the Nation on the
non-terrorist disasters. I mean, there may or may not be a
terrorist attack in San Jose. There will be an earthquake in
San Jose. I mean, that is--
Mr. Brown. You are stealing my lines without using my
speeches.
Ms. Lofgren. Oh, is that right? Gosh.
So I wanted to probe and get some assurances from you that
we are not diminishing our capacity in the non-terrorism side
of your activities. Can you give me any guidance there?
Mr. Brown. Let me give you an example. The first couple of
weeks of May, we were going to the TOPOFF II exercise in which
we had the dirty bomb in Washington and the bioattack in
Chicago. FEMA actively participated in that. EP&R actually
participated in that exercise. Over 500 people, we exercised
the domestic emergency support team, the nuclear incident
response teams, the national disaster medical teams, and at the
same time responded to 492, a record number, of tornadoes in
the Midwest.
We did all of that simultaneously. I think it speaks very
highly of the men and women who have made up FEMA in the past,
who now make up the Emergency Preparedness Response
Directorate, that we know how to do that job, and we know how
to do it under multiple difficult circumstances.
Ms. Lofgren. Well, let me follow up, because I have a
concern, and maybe it is misplaced relative to the Fire Grant.
Really the purpose of the Fire Grant program initially was
really to enhance the capacity of fire departments across the
country that have a variety of preparedness levels. And we have
had requests for grants that way exceed the amount of funding
that has been available.
This was pre-9/11. I mean, just to get departments up to
speed. And my understanding is that the grants-to-request
ratio, they were only able to respond to 10 percent of the
requests pre-9/11.
Now, this is a question, not a statement. It is my
understanding that at this point, the Administration has asked
that all the Fire Grant funds be aligned with terrorism
preparedness planning. And I am concerned that if we were not
adequately bringing our fire departments up to standard, just
in terms of regular fire issues, and now we are realigning what
funding there is available to terrorism alone, what are we
creating in terms of preparedness for your garden variety city
fire departments?
Mr. Brown. And with all due respect, I would not
characterize it in that fashion.
Ms. Lofgren. OK.
Mr. Brown. I think what we have said is we want to make
certain that you are one, addressing basic fire fighting needs
and if there is a terrorism component, if indeed you are a
department that is already kind of well staffed and well
equipped but you are coming in for another grant for something
else, that there is a terrorism component to that.
At the same time, we don't want to ignore the very small
fire departments that, as you say, lack the very basic
equipment to do anything. Because even though they may be a
small department, they may be the first responder to a chemical
attack or a chemical accident somewhere.
And to go to your other point, about the ratio, just for
the record, we have 20,000 applications for the Fire Grants
requesting over $2.2 billion in grants. We will do
approximately 7,000 grants this year with the $745 million that
you gave us. So there is a lot of demand out there.
What Secretary Ridge wants to make certain that I do is
that we use that money wisely and we use it for both things,
those basic fire fighting services and terrorism, where it is
appropriate.
Ms. Lofgren. Following up on the chairman's line of
questioning at the opening, we do want to make sure that
funding follows threat. I mean, the component with the Fire
Grant program is unrelated to terrorism, and that is just to
bring departments up to standard. But I am concerned that
lacking the kind of threat assessment that we should have, we
really can't do that. When will we have that kind of guidance
accomplished to your satisfaction?
Mr. Brown. When will we have the guidance that fits into
the threat?
Ms. Lofgren. The threat analysis.
Mr. Brown. Well, the threat analysis, I am really not
qualified to answer that. But I will certainly go back and talk
to my colleagues in the department and find out what kind of
time line.
But the point you make is absolutely correct is that once
we start, you know, once we really integrate all of the
intelligence gathering apparatus, once we have all of those
threat assessments done, we will be able to do a phenomenal
job. And I think the Administration will just, I mean, we will
be on cloud nine when we are able to marry those two up and
drive that money to where it is addressing those threats.
Ms. Lofgren. Let me ask you, there was an article, and it
may not be accurate, but I will quote it and you can set us
straight if it is wrong, on the chemical attack readiness in
The Washington Post about a week and a half ago indicating that
we do not have the ability in the United States really even to
test for the common chemicals that would be used in an attack.
Are you involved with remedying that? Or is that an accurate
analysis?
Mr. Brown. I am not familiar with the quote. But
generically I would say I don't think that is totally accurate,
because we do a lot of training, particularly with the fire
departments, about chemical, you know, making sure they have
the right kind of protective equipment. What are the kinds?
I will tell you, we just had a briefing today with the CIA
about particular kinds of chemicals that are potential threats.
So we use that kind of analysis and intelligence now to drive
the kind of equipment and training that we do for the first
responders.
Ms. Lofgren. If I get you a copy of the article, would you
mind getting back to me on the details of where we actually
are?
Mr. Brown. Sure. Be happy to. Certainly, be happy to do
that.
Ms. Lofgren. I would very much appreciate that.
Mr. Brown. Happy to do that.
Ms. Lofgren. And I guess I have lots more questions, but I
see the yellow light is on and my time is about up. So I will
thank you for your courtesy in being here with us today. Just
on the interoperability of equipment, if I could. I remember
during the Oakland fire when mutual aid came into play, but
none of the hoses would fit into Oakland's hydrants. I mean, it
was a disastrous situation.
So I am eager if you could also, when you take a look at
that article, give us some idea of, you know, what needs to be
standardized and where we are in standardizing them in first
responder-land. And that would be very helpful.
Mr. Brown. Be happy to do that.
Ms. Lofgren. Thank you.
I yield back.
Chairman Cox. Mr. Diaz-Balart?
Mr. Diaz-Balart. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Thank you, Mr. Brown, for being here today.
Mr. Brown. My pleasure.
Mr. Diaz-Balart. I have appreciated your testimony in fact
have liked what I have heard. Ms. Lofgren took some of my
questions, in fact. I wanted to hear--
Mr. Brown. I have a couple here that you can--
Mr. Diaz-Balart. --and did hear from you and appreciate it.
Your commitment that response preparation with regard to
natural disasters will continue to be a priority.
Coming from Florida, we are big fans of FEMA because we
have seen how FEMA has responded and helped our communities
with even extraordinary natural disasters, such as major
hurricanes. So I was very pleased to hear that commitment from
you.
With regard to the issue of I guess what we would call the
double threat of terrorist utilizing the occurrence of a
natural disaster to attack, perhaps could you tell us about the
resources and thinking that you have devoted to preparing with
exercises and/or other ways for that double threat possibility?
Mr. Brown. Let me answer the question this way. I would be
happy to sit down with you and talk to you about some of the
thought processes that we have gone through about how
terrorists might utilize a natural disaster to complicate and
exacerbate the problem. What I really don't want to do is
publicly discuss kind of our thoughts about how they might do
that. But that is something that is in our thinking.
Mr. Diaz-Balart. Very well.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Cox. Ms. Lowey?
Ms. Lowey. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And welcome, Mr.
Secretary.
I want you to know that we all understand the enormity of
your responsibilities. In fact, as I look at the little boxes,
I can't quite figure it out.
And I was going to start with another question, but maybe I
should just ask this one. I think you mentioned that your
office and the office of Domestic Preparedness were to become a
one-stop shop.
Now, if that is the case, then why is it, as I am looking
at this chart, that ODP and EP&R, two different directorates,
that both disseminate first responder funds, are not operating
on the same directorate for increased coordination.
In fact, as I look at this list of appropriations grants--
unfortunately, you didn't get too many--they will all come
through the other agency, ODP, basic formula grants, state and
local law enforcement. There is a whole list, adding up to
$4.446 billion, et cetera, et cetera, et cetera. A lot of zeros
there.
Is this a mistake?
Mr. Brown. My commitment to--
Ms. Lowey. Shouldn't it all be in your directorate? The
national exercise program, standards and testing. You talk
about your work on standards and testing, prepositioned
equipment caches, management and Administration contractor
support, et cetera, et cetera. So it has all going to ODP.
Mr. Brown. The President originally proposed that it all
come to FEMA, EP&R. The Administration now wants it all to go
to ODP. My commitment is that we will fulfill wherever it goes.
Frankly, I mean that, wherever it goes.
Ms. Lowey. That is a nice answer, but what do you really
think?
Mr. Brown. I am not trying to be disingenuous here.
Wherever it goes, we are going to make it work, because it is
not about the money. It is not about who has the grants. It is
about getting that money out to the state and locals as
effectively and efficiently as we can. And I mean that from the
bottom of my heart.
Ms. Lowey. But you don't have control over it. It is going
through ODP.
Mr. Brown. No, but you know, what? I have got a lot of--
Ms. Lowey. You will call them morning and tell them what to
do?
Mr. Brown. I have got a lot of folks that I am going to
send over there to show them and help them put out grants and
put out guidance and everything else.
Ms. Lowey. Well, I understand that you are respectful of
Administration directives, but in this difficult time, when
everyone is trying to sort it all out, I would hope that you
would watch this carefully and express your views. And if it is
not operating as efficiently as you think it should, maybe
there would be changes.
And following up on that, I am delighted that you are going
to be working on interoperability. I am wondering if you will
have some kind of a buy-provisions.
Now September 11--I am from New York--September 11 happened
a long time ago in the eyes of many of the firefighters and the
police and the average citizens. And there have been many
Orange Alerts since then.
However, many of the communities don't want to wait. There
is no directive from the states as to what kind of a equipment
they should buy. And many of our counties, every town and
village, are buying different equipment. But now you are doing
a study now that is quite a while from September 11, and I am
pleased that you are doing it now. And you are going to be
providing directives.
By the way, I had called FEMA months ago trying to see if
there was any kind of directive to the states, to the towns, to
the villages, because I really wanted to save them money. But
there wasn't any. Everyone should do what they have to do.
So maybe you should really think about that, because when
do you think your study will be completed? Ms. Lofgren
mentioned the hoses. I was talking about interoperability of
communications. When do you think your study will be completed?
Mr. Brown. Well, we are going to get the money out the door
just as quickly as we can. In fact, I think--yes, the grant
money for the interoperability demonstration project is
starting to go out the door next month. And that is $54 million
to do those projects. And--
Ms. Lowey. And how long do you expect those funds--
Mr. Brown. That is the rub right there, to do those
projects will take probably, you know, six months to a year or
more and then to study then and figure out what is the best one
and how do we get those standards out there.
At the same time that we are doing that, technology is
moving along at 100 miles an hour. And I am already aware of
some technology that is out there. But even though someone may
have a particular system, with this other system, you could
actually come in and take control of the frequencies and allow
these folks to communicate with one another. So we have to stay
on top of that daily. And I have not heard the concept of a
buy-back provision. But it is something that we would--
Ms. Lowey. I am just saying that because I know that in
my--in New York, in my district--the towns and villages are
really being squeezed. The property taxes are up 18 to 20
percent. And yet they feel this is so important. They are
buying the trucks that hold the various communication systems,
MICK systems, and you know all of the ones, I expect, that are
out there.
And so I think we should maybe think about that, because
they have to balance their budgets and the Federal Government
doesn't. And it might be helpful if we can provide some
assistance to these towns and villages that are really strapped
and need the help.
Mr. Brown. OK.
Ms. Lowey. A specific question regarding Indian Point
Energy Center in Buchanan, New York. It is located, as you
probably know, on the eastern bank of the Hudson River a few
miles north of my district. Nearly 300,000 people reside within
10 miles of the plant. And the 50-mile peak injury zone
encompasses all of New York City, major urban centers in New
York, New Jersey and Connecticut.
And independent analysis of the emergency response plan for
Indian Point, completed by former FEMA director James Lee Witt,
concluded that the plans were fundamentally unworkable. In the
four counties surrounding Indian Point Nuclear Facility and New
York State have all refused to submit certification documents
to FEMA, similarly convinced that the plans are wholly
inadequate.
Yet FEMA has repeatedly postponed ruling on the adequacy of
the plans, demanding certain planning documents from the
counties almost five weeks after its decision was due. And the
counties aren't going to provide that information, because
there is concern that FEMA might use any information to approve
the plans, which they all think shouldn't be approved.
Westchester and Rockland Counties have made it clear time
and time again that they will not submit certification
information, which is their right.
My question to you, sir, has the agency set itself a new
submission deadline, or is it operating under an open-ended
schedule? Is it possible that FEMA would certify the emergency
response plans without the cooperation of the states and the
counties?
Mr. Brown. I am surprised by the question.
Ms. Lowey. You are really not.
Mr. Brown. No, in all seriousness, we have received the
plans from Rockland, Orange and Putnam Counties. We do not have
the plans yet from Westchester County.
I am not going to have an open-ended process.
Ms. Lowey. You have them from Rockland?
Mr. Brown. Yes.
Ms. Lowey. I do not think so.
Mr. Brown. I think we do. We will figure it out. I think we
do, I think it is Westchester.
Ms. Lowey. Well, we will discuss that. I think Westchester,
Rockland have not submitted plans, unless they did it today.
Mr. Brown. OK. I am not committed and am not going to have
an open-ended process on a review of this, because our number
one priority is to protect the health, welfare and safety of
the residents in that area.
Number two, I am working very closely with the Nuclear
Regulatory Commission to look at Director Witt's report and
what needs to be done.
And I have made a commitment to myself and to others that
we are going to get a decision out on this and get a decision
out on this very quickly. And we are going to do it based on
our review of those plans, and we are going to work very
closely with the state and locals.
Ms. Lowey. I hope so. My red light is on. OK, is that my
red light? Let me just say thank you.
Chairman Cox. I do not know who else's it would be.
[Laughter.]
Ms. Lowey. Thank you very much, and I hope we can follow
up, because there is a great deal of concern, as you can
imagine in the communities.
Mr. Brown. I am very aware of that.
Ms. Lowey. Thank you very much.
Chairman Cox. Ms. Jackson Lee.
Ms. Jackson-Lee. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
Appreciate the committee's indulgence, and the witness's
indulgence. And as I indicated to the chairman as I was in the
room at the very beginning, we are holding a homeland security-
somewhat hearing in judiciary.
We are dealing, Mr. Chairman, ranking member, with the
question of identity cards from the Mexican consulars, and our
hearing is simultaneous, and I serve on that committee.
So I thank the witness for his indulgence as we proceed.
Let me first of all say that we want to be able to help
you, and we want to be able to make this nation safe. And it
comes to my attention that I believe that on this date, June
19, 2003,--and might I note to Texans, a happy Juneteenth; it
is a very special holiday for us--but I notice that on June 19,
2003, I do not think that we have reached the level of promise
that necessitates or gives us comfort of safety.
This is not in any way to suggest that there are not a lot
of hard-working individuals that are doing so. So I am going to
have a series of questions, first of all a very simple one,
does your particular sub-department have the Citizen Corp
responsibility?
Mr. Brown. Yes, ma'am, we do.
Ms. Jackson-Lee. Tell me where we are in the Citizen Corps,
how you are doing outreach, and because we are keeping to this,
Mr. Chairman, I decided to do an opening--I am trying to
determine my time, how much time do I have?
Eight minutes, thank you very much.
Tell me what the outreach has been on the Citizen Corps.
How do you reach to communities to even provide them with the
information that such opportunities exist? How many have you
done, and can I get a report on how many you have done
throughout the nation, and break it down between urban and
rural, and then how many you have done in the state of Texas?
If I could start with that I would appreciate it.
Mr. Brown. Well, one, I will get those figures to you,
Congresswoman Jackson Lee. I will tell you that just yesterday
I was in New York City doing a Citizen Corps presentation to
the Megacities Conference in which all of the largest urban
areas across the country had come together to form Citizen
Corps Councils and to figure out how to strengthen those
Citizen Corps Councils in those megacities.
And I was extremely pleased by the turnout. We have since
March 1--I was just kind of getting ready to thumb through my
opening statement--we have, I think, about 500 Citizen Corps
Councils around the country, and it has--
Ms. Jackson-Lee. How much, I am sorry, sir--
Mr. Brown. In excess of 500. I will go back and look in my
statement.
Ms. Jackson-Lee. And what has been your outreach to let
them know about it? I now you had a speech yesterday, but what
has been the approach to reach out to these cities and rural
areas?
Mr. Brown. In rural areas? Speaking engagements, we have a
staff that is doing nothing but trying to reach through
congressional districts, through the senators, through the
governors, through county governors working through the U.S.
Conference of Mayors.
All of these different intergovernmental groups are getting
the Citizen Corps, USA Freedom Corps message of the President
out to all those areas.
Ms. Jackson-Lee. And the Citizen Corps is organizing
communities around the idea of homeland security and giving
them skills and training?
Mr. Brown. Absolutely. Through the CERT Program is probably
the cornerstone of--
Ms. Jackson-Lee. Are they getting funding?
Mr. Brown. They did not get funding in 2003. But with the
2002 money, we have taken that 2002 money and increased it even
without the money. We have been able to get that grass roots
effort going to form these councils.
There is currently within the department, I think, a
request that is coming up to the Hill to reprogram about $25
million for those efforts.
Ms. Jackson-Lee. Let me, I don't want to cut you off, but
if I can get that in writing, specifically that broad question
that I asked, I think you have something here that you wanted
to say, and I certainly will let you do that. Some note that
has just been passed to you.
But let me be sure to emphasize that where I am from there
is little to zero knowledge about Citizen Corps.
Now, I would like to publicly invite you to my region, my
area in particular, the fourth-largest city in the nation,
Houston, and it has been, it is, number seven on the
vulnerability list.
But let me move on to a next point, so if we can get, let
me extend that invitation to you as we speak.
Mr. Brown. And we will do that.
Ms. Jackson-Lee. Because I think it is very important. You
now, what we experience, we are close to the border, and as I
indicated we are in a very intense hearing now on the Mexican
matricula card that people are complaining about as the
potential to terrorism.
I have a different opinion, but we have all these concerns.
Let me move now to just this idea of getting the
communities, the neighborhoods safe. That has been what I have
been arguing for and advocating for, and that is why I opened
up and said are we safe?
I think whatever question we ask in this hearing, in any of
the hearings of homeland security, I am very pleased that we
will be visiting one of the regions out West, and onsite
hearing that the chairman and ranking member are allowing to
have, on-site, in the neighborhoods, in the region, to find out
about safety of ports.
But my concern is are we safe, do people believe that we
are safe? No, I do not think so. With the backdrop of the Iraqi
war, with the looters, the continued deaths in the region, I
still think people are looking that terrorism is around the
corner.
My concern, you have got $750 million--I think that is the
number: I hope it is not billion; I think it is million. I wish
it was, but I think it is million, and our folk are frustrated.
I have got neighborhoods that are organizing themselves in
an appropriate manner to secure those neighborhoods. They
cannot access dollars.
I have got the University of Texas Medical Center that is
attempting to put together a structure that is dealing with
bioterrorism, and they cannot access dollars.
So they are confused about how to access dollars, and, of
course, when you hear University of Texas Medical Center, you
are saying, you possibly could not be confused, but this is at
the grass-roots level where they are collaborating with the
community.
What are we doing to get the dollars in the hands of our
first responders, our community groups, and might I say to you,
this trickle-down effect going to the state, the states then
layering it with let me get some applications together, let me
get some instructions.
What are we doing to get the dollars in the hands of our
first responders, our community groups, and might I say to you,
this trickle-down effect going to the state, the states then
layering it with let me get some applications together, let me
get some instructions.
And then when I go home, my director of public safety or
director of security--it is called homeland security, I
believe--director for the city of Houston is without knowledge.
Not that he is without knowledge, but he does not have any
access directly to getting these dollars.
Mr. Secretary, we are in trouble. And our monies are being
held and coddled and nurtured. They might be gaining interest,
but they are not gaining interest on behalf of the security of
the American people and where I come from.
So tell us why can't we convince you that we can be secure.
And when I say that, secure from thievery and the misuse of
Federal funds? In this instance, just as we have created a
crisis with respect to our colored alerts and we tell people
when you hear the orange you are one step away, get ready. They
tell you to calm down a little bit on yellow and down the road.
But I believe you have got to get rid of these so-called
binding, restrictive regs that are not getting the dollars so
that these folk can get on the ground with a variety of secure
measures. We can't even communicate with each other across
county lines because our first responders don't have the money
to buy the equipment.
Let me stop for a moment and answer the question. I want us
to get a regulation in this committee to break the regulations
that you have already got to get the money inside firsthand to
the first responders. Houston is not the only city, but we are
number seven on the list in terms of what we call threats. Can
you just answer that very large and long question?
Mr. Brown. Well, yes. One, I want to thank you for your
perception that citizen preparedness and preparing and securing
neighborhoods and communities is the way to secure this
homeland. You are absolutely correct.
And I think the President was absolutely brilliant in
forming USA Freedom Corps and Citizen Corps, because that is
the way that we can accomplish two things. One, is to secure
the homeland. And two, is take some of the pressure off the
first responders.
For every individual citizen that is doing something in a
Citizen Corps program, that is one less thing that a first
responder has to do. So the President was brilliant in that
regard and we have got to get that message out and get those
programs going.
And so, I am more than happy to come down and work with you
in your district--
Ms. Jackson-Lee. Excellent.
Mr. Brown. --to get those going.
In terms of the money, I will do everything in my power to
get the money down as quickly as possible. The department has
already distributed about $4.4 billion. I will go back to my
oral statement, but, I mean, I won't do it now, but the list of
the monies that we have done fire fighting grants, the ODP
grants for the all hazard preparedness training that we are
doing. I think it was $165 million. The $54 million that we are
doing next month for the interoperability demonstration
project. There is a huge list of dollars that we are getting
out.
What I am hearing from you is the concern that those monies
are not getting down to the level it needs quickly enough. I
share that concern. And the Secretary and I will make certain
that we address that problem and get that done.
Ms. Jackson-Lee. We will work hand in glove, then, Mr.
Secretary, on this, because I believe this is a plus of safety
and security in this nation. Because when the orange goes to
red, where we will be looking to will be the people that will
have to address the question on the ground, outside of the
beltway. Thank you.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Cox. Mr. Langevin?
Mr. Langevin. Since the creation of this Select Committee,
one of my primary concerns has been the intelligence
collection, analysis and distribution capabilities of the
Department of Homeland Security. I share the strong belief of
our Ranking Member, Mr. Turner, and many other members, that
this function is the lifeblood of the new agency, and until it
is fully operational, all other agency functions will be
compromised.
Therefore, I am interested in a detailed description of
what relationship the EP&R Directorate has with the IA/IP
Directorate-what information are you receiving, in what form is
it presented to you, and from whom are you receiving it? Once
you receive this information, how are you using it to
prioritize your efforts and decide how to expend staff, time
and financial resources?
Finally, while I firmly believe our first responders need
significantly more resources in order to effectively perform
the responsibilities with which we have entrusted them, it is
equally important that they know what to do with these
resources once they get them. I would like to know how, or
whether, the necessary intelligence is making its way to our
state and local responders so that they, too, can properly
prioritize their efforts and be prepared for the most
threatening risks. Are you confident that they have the
guidance they need from DHS, and from EP&R specifically, to
protect our communities?
Mr. Brown. We are getting the information. There, as you
are very well aware of, there are currently six people staffed
in the IAIP directorate within the Department of Homeland
Security. So with those limited resources and that staffing
that they are just now going through, I mean, they don't even
have a Senate-confirmed--General Labute--I don't think has even
been confirmed yet, may have just have had a hearing.
But even with that limited amount of staffing, we are
already able to get both classified and unclassified
information.
Give you a couple of examples how that works and what we do
with it. During Operation Liberty Shield--let me just back up,
Congressman: Even before Operation Liberty Shield, we were
still getting classified and unclassified information, CIA,
FBI, law enforcement agencies. We will take that information,
we do take that information, within EP&R and we use that
information to preposition assets, to inform local first
responders about particular threats, to maybe utilize the
strategic national stockpile to maybe move it, locate it in
particular areas, to use the Nuclear Incident Response Team, to
preposition it or utilize some of its capabilities to do lab
analysis and other things for us.
So we are already getting the information and utilizing
that information in determining how we are going to respond if
indeed there is a terrorist attack.
You are also asking what form that we get that? I am not
going to hazard a guess how many different forms, but I will
just describe to you generally the different kind of forms we
get it.
I get it personally from briefings from intelligence
analysts, from folks who do the presidential briefings on
threat analysis. CIA analysts will come and brief me and other
members, secretaries in the Department of Homeland Security. We
will get it through copies of the threat matrix. We will get it
through the law enforcement announcements, law enforcement
threats that come through. And I am sure there are other ways,
but just off the top of my head, those are the kinds of forms
that we get the information.
Mr. Langevin. At or above the top secret level?
Mr. Brown. Oh, yes. I am talking about TS and SCI
information. We are talking about the highest levels of secure
information.
We then use that to either preposition assets or to
activate regional operation centers, to put certain assets on
notification, whether it is a 24-hour notification or a 12
hour, sometimes a 6-hour notification. We use it in all sorts
of ways to shorten our response time, which is one of my
priorities and goals in the new department.
Does that adequately answer your question?
Mr. Langevin. Do I have any remaining time?
Chairman Cox. The gentleman has two minutes and 15 seconds
remaining.
Mr. Langevin. I Yield my time to the ranking member if he
would like.
Chairman Cox. Mr. Turner is recognized under yielded time
for 2 minutes.
Mr. Turner. I will yield my--
Mr. Brown. Mr. Chairman, while they are yielding their
time, may I clarify one thing I said to you, Congressman?
We have six people at EP&R who are assigned IAIP to help us
do and transfer that information. Not that there are six people
at IAIP.
Mr. Langevin. I may have some additional questions--
Mr. Brown. Absolutely, sure.
Chairman Cox. Mr. Pascrell is recognized for one minute and
40 seconds and has his own time following.
Mr. Pascrell. Thank you.
Undersecretary Brown, I am very interested in what you said
in response to the question concerning the Fire Act. I know
FEMA has done a spectacular job in a very short period of time
processing about 18 or 19,000 applications per year from the
31,500 fire departments throughout the United States, 1 million
firefighters.
They have done such a great job that now you are suggesting
we move the Fire Act out of the U.S. Fire Administration, where
FEMA is. And under the President's budget, you want to put that
program into the Office of Domestic Preparedness. So far, am I
correct?
Mr. Brown. That is the proposal, yes, sir.
Mr. Pascrell. Well, I have to take issue and big issue at
this. I wrote the act. It belongs in FEMA, and it does not
belong to be melded with the terroristic aspects of the
preparedness division. And I will tell you why. That is why I
feel about this, strongly.
Secretary Ridge sat in our chair not too long ago and
guaranteed the integrity of the Fire Act. The Fire Act was
written long before 9/11. It reflects the very basic needs of
fire departments throughout the United States of America. There
were $4 to $5 billion in needs that were requested in a program
which started with $100 million, as you well know.
FEMA put its ragtag group, and I mean that respectfully,
together with the assistance of firefighters to review every
application. And they did a spectacular job. What was so unique
about the fire act is that the money went directly to the
community fire department. Did not go through the county. Did
not go through the state where any money could be siphoned off.
That is one of the reasons it is so successful. And that is one
of the reasons why some people want to dig their teeth into it.
Let me bring to your attention what has happened to the
COPS program and then I would ask you the question, can you
assure me that this is what you don't have in mind. The COPS
program budgeted the last year--
Chairman Cox. Will the gentleman yield?
Mr. Pascrell. Sure.
Chairman Cox. The gentleman has used up an additional 1
minute beyond the yielded time. If the gentleman would like to
ask unanimous consent to take his allotted time out of order,
he could continue with his questioning.
Mr. Pascrell. Yes.
Chairman Cox. Without objection.
Mr. Pascrell. Thank you.
In the COPS program, $928 million dollars was budged in the
2003 budget. This year, in 2004, the President is recommending
that the COPS program get only $163 million. The program has
bipartisan support. It has been successful.
There is a $500 million per state and local law enforcement
terrorism prevention grants. What we are doing, Mr. Brown, is
melding many of these programs, and now we are not responding
to the very basic needs that exist in the smaller as well as
the larger communities.
And I am very concerned, and I want to state very clearly,
that the Fire Act was not meant to be sent to the governors of
any state. It was meant to respond to our brave firefighters,
as was the COPS program, that goes directly to the police
departments of each community. It does not go through the
governors.
Obviously, there is a great need. Obviously, every
university report and survey has indicated there is a reduction
of crime, and that is one of the reasons, not the only reason,
but that is one of the reasons we have put more cops on the
street.
We had very basic needs before 9/11. We have other needs
now also.
I am afraid that when you meld those monies, that the
firefighters are going to play second fiddle. And I would ask
you this question very specifically: Can you make a commitment
today that the integrity of the Fire Grant program will not be
changed?
Mr. Brown. Yes.
Mr. Pascrell. Thank you.
My second question is this, what are you doing to improve
coordination between the Department of Homeland Security and
state and local officials? Do you know what the main problem
was on 9/11? What are you doing about it?
Mr. Brown. A couple of things, Congressman. First is trying
to integrate them into the development of the national response
plan. They have to be a part of that. If they are not, if we
fail to include them, then we have just ignored the partnership
basis upon which other members of this committee have
recognized has made FEMA and now EPNR successful.
At one time it was not very successful. And I think it was
not successful because we did not know how to work with the
state and locals.
So my commitment to you is that I will continue to work
with state and locals because I recognize, I used to be a local
guy. I used to be a state guy.
Mr. Pascrell. I know.
Mr. Brown. And I know that is where the rubber meets the
road, and that is where the 9/11 calls go to. And that is who
we have to prepare to defend this country in case of a
terrorist attack or a natural disaster.
So I want to do everything that I possibly and humanly can
to maintain and strengthen those state and local partnerships.
We cannot--when I say we, I am talking about the Federal
Government--cannot succeed without those partnerships.
Mr. Pascrell. Let me ask you this question. How many
consultants has your division hired?
Mr. Brown. I am not trying to play games here. Define
``consultant.''
Mr. Pascrell. The office of undersecretary, and you have
many divisions; I am looking at your chart. I want to know over
these different divisions within your area, your office, how
many consultants have you hired?
Mr. Brown. Well, I have hired no consultants. We have some
technical advisers, now technical advisory contracts. And if
that is the information you want, I will get that information
for you.
Mr. Pascrell. Why I am asking the question, Mr. Brown, is
this, and you said, and I am glad I know, you have local
experience. And I know that you appreciate what I am saying as
an example the Fire Act and the COPS program, although the COPS
program is not under your jurisdiction.
The best consultants we have, Mr. Brown, I am convinced of
this, is the cops and firefighters and EMTs in the local
communities. They know what is needed. And we don't need any
high-priced consultants from Washington, D.C., to tell the
locals what they need.
Mr. Brown. Amen.
Mr. Pascrell. They can clear up a tremendous amount of the
complexities here. We can get right to the chase. And if we
listen to them, if we bring them to Washington and sit them
down and ask them, What do you need? And by the way, I have
done that in my own local community, as many of the Congress
folk have.
And we have found out that one of the major problems is
communication. And we need cooperation from the FCC. There are
not enough bands there. This is crucial and at the very center
of trying to protect ourselves.
We are in a different situation now. We are dealing with
non-state terrorism. State terrorism is easy to respond to.
Non-state terrorism is absolutely impossible, but we try to
make it possible.
So you are going to need all of the communication you need.
Please help the first responders put up a network of
communication, which we do not have in most areas of this
country. I beg of you to make that a priority.
Mr. Brown. Two responses, Congressman. Number one, I will
make that commitment to you.
Number two, as you well know, I am preaching to the choir
here, the reason the Fire Grant program is successful and the
reason that I think it is money very well spent by the Federal
Government, is that, as you well know, we use a peer review
process. We bring firefighters in to tell us what they need and
where it is going to best be utilized. They compete against
themselves and analyze themselves and do a good darn good job
of it.
Mr. Pascrell. Thank you. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Cox. Mr. Etheridge.
Mr. Etheridge. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And let me
associate myself with my friend's comments on the first
responders as you can appreciate, there again.
Let me ask you a question because having come from North
Carolina, the scene of an awful lot of disasters over the last
several years with floods, hurricanes, droughts. We have seen
most all of it except the frogs. And I hope we don't have
those.
[Laughter.]
But let me ask this question. How would the state and
Federal response differ from, let's say, a natural disaster,
which we have had a number of there and such as hurricanes, et
cetera and a terrorist attack, let's say a dirty bomb? who
would take the lead in responding to such an incident?
Mr. Brown. Under HSPD-5, the Secretary, Secretary Ridge, is
in charge. There is no question about that. He would devolve
that under the delegations of authority to myself as the
undersecretary, and we would have an incident commander on site
running the incident.
To answer your other question, there is, in essence, no
difference in the response to a terrorist attack, a dirty bomb,
or a natural disaster. There is a minutia in the differences
maybe in the assets that you use or in the way that you
approach the response. But once the terrorist incident has
occurred and you are in response mode, the response mode is not
different.
Mr. Etheridge. OK, thank you. I thought it was very
important to get that out, because I know a lot of folks who
have thought about it just didn't understand the subtleties of
it.
According to the February 28 presidential directive, the
Secretary of Homeland Security is supposed to provide regular
reports to the President on ``the readiness and preparedness of
the Nation at all levels of government to prevent, prepare for,
respond to and recover from domestic incidents.'' And I am
reading now from the law. Would you mind sharing with us what
steps have been taken thus far to prepare for this assessment?
Number two, what are the baselines? When we talk about
readiness, what is that baseline?
And third, do they differ by state and by locality?
Let me tell where I am coming from on my last question.
Having come from the FEMA side, you understand there are great
big differences in localities because there are localities,
number one, that have nuclear plants, that have a number of
storage areas for fuels, et cetera, and others may be in vast
open areas. OK?
Mr. Brown. We actually prior to the creation of the
Department of Homeland Security, we in FEMA started doing those
baseline assessments immediately following the September 11
attack, at the request of then director of the Office of
Homeland Security, Secretary Ridge. And that is the baseline by
which we are now doing the assessments post-9/11 to see where
the states and localities are.
And we are trying to take into consideration all the
factors that you just mentioned, Congressman, locality, type of
threats that they might face from both manmade or natural
disasters. And then trying to plug that into all of the grant
programs that we currently have within the department, of how
can we best get those grant programs out to those particular
areas.
We are also at the same time trying to do an analysis of
how we can better communicate with those state and locals about
the threat levels, about the threats they have, about the
vulnerabilities they have and to encourage them to do
intrastate planning, regional planning, interstate, if you
will.
You know, I keep picking on Cincinnati and Louisville only
because I was just there talking to them a few weeks ago, of
how can they address their vulnerabilities and get mutual aid
agreements across those state lines. And if there are
regulatory or statutory barriers that we need to break down,
then let's break those down.
So that is how we are going to develop those standards
based on those assessments.
Mr. Etheridge. So you are working with local and state
officials, then?
Mr. Brown. We have to. We have to because they are they are
the only ones that know what their capabilities are. We can go
in and do sorts of an analysis, but they have to tell us what
training they have done, what equipment they have, what mutual
aid agreements they have, what kind of agreements they have
entered into. You get into the basic level, intercounty,
intracounty, multi-jurisdictions, where you have municipal
government and county government all consolidated. How are they
doing? We have to hear that from them.
Mr. Etheridge. We keep raising that question simply
because, you know, we go back and we understand that. But it is
easy when you get a distance away, somebody else help make the
decision.
Let me move on.
Mr. Brown. We are not going to lose that perspective in the
Department of Homeland Security, Congressman, I promise you.
Mr. Etheridge. Good, I hope not.
The presidential directive also states that ``state and
localities have to adopt the National Incident Management
System by Fiscal year 2005 in order to be eligible for Federal
grants and contracts.'' However, the National Response Plan
says that ``the Federal plans should be flexible enough to
accommodate state and local incident management systems.''
OK, now that being said. How can you reconcile these
requirements from the draft plan that was developed with
virtually no input from state and local responders?
Mr. Brown. Well, we can't and that is why I am committed to
getting the input from them on the NRP.
But let me go back and address what seems to be the
inconsistency of making certain that the NRP recognizes the
flexibility of different incident command structures. And that
is much like recognizing the difference between responding to a
terrorist attack and a natural disaster.
It is all a matter of semantics. If you look at any
incident command system, as long as the basic structure is
there, they can use different words about how they implement
and utilize it as long as they have ``a basic incident command
system.'' So that is why the flexibility is built into the NRP.
Mr. Etheridge. But the wording doesn't necessarily indicate
that.
Mr. Brown. The wording is superfluous.
Mr. Etheridge. But it--well, I am not so sure. Words are
very powerful when you don't want to follow them. If you have
someone in leadership who understands they are flexible, they
are.
My point is that I would encourage to work to make them
more accurate and less--
Mr. Brown. Oh, I have no problem with that whatsoever.
Mr. Etheridge. I think that will be helpful.
Mr. Brown. And I think, just to build on your point, the
other thing that we have to do is to make certain that we do
get those state and locals who might have a little bit of
difference in the semantics of their command systems to start
working together.
And we will bang them over the head on that.
Mr. Etheridge. Well, my point is that if words are in
conflict, and people need a reason not to be involved, they
have it.
My final question, Mr. Chairman, and I know I am running
out of time, the National Response Plan states that ``Private
businesses and industry play a significant role in helping to
mitigate the fiscal effects and economic costs of domestic
incidents,'' and I am quoting. And according to the plan, ``The
Secretary of Homeland Security should urge businesses to
identify their risks, develop contingency plans and to take
action to enhance their overall readiness.''
My question is, is the department prepared to offer private
industry the risk identification guidelines they will need to
meet and do this. And second, to what degree is the government
relying on the private sector to really take care of itself?
Mr. Brown. Growing the analogy to the natural disaster
role, I want to inculcate within the department, and I think
the Secretary, I know the Secretary agrees, the whole idea that
you mitigate ahead of any sort of disaster, whether it is, you
know, a cyber-security attack, whether it is, you know, a
hurricane coming up the North Carolina coast, whatever it is,
that we influence, educate and train the private sector about
what they can do to minimize their damage in these sort of
attacks.
We are going to do that within the department. We are going
to do that in a couple of ways. Cyber-security board,
information analysis, and particularly the infrastructure
protection piece of that directorate is going to work very
closely with the private sector, and most importantly, I think,
is the Private Sector Coordination Office, which Al Martinez-
Fonz heads up, that is in constant contact with the private
sector about what they can do and how they can work with them.
And then at the end of this month, I am meeting with the
Homeland Security Advisory Council that is kind of our
connection next to the private sector about how we start
working together to do those kinds of things.
They are an integral part of securing this homeland. You
know, the Federal Government does not own a whole lot. The
private sector owns most everything.
And so we have got to rely on them and educate them and
work with them about how to protect themselves.
Mr. Etheridge. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you. North
Carolina respects FEMA because they have great reputation in
North Carolina. And I think you come from that background, you
can use this as a great tool to make that happen.
Mr. Brown. That is my intention. Thank you, Congressman.
Chairman Cox. Ms. Sanchez.
Ms. Sanchez. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And thank you, Mr.
Brown, for being before us. I actually have several questions.
Why do I not go down the list and give them to you, because I
do not know if they are going to call a vote at some point and
I hope it is not before the rest of us get to finish our
questions.
You have heard a lot of my colleagues talk about the fact
that there are in particular their communications systems do
not work between fire and the different law enforcement pieces
that they have in the area, and I come from Orange County,
California. We actually over the last 10 years have scrimped
and saved and done without for other things and we have
interoperability, especially with respect to communications.
It cost us $100 million to do that for our 32 different
municipal agencies, our county, our sheriffs and others. On the
other hand I look to the north of me right, you know, 20
minutes away, and we have Los Angeles County, where they have
nothing that is really operable.
What are you going to, my first question would be, you
know, if everybody wants to do interoperability of
communications, it is a very expensive thing to do, at least to
have done it on the same system that we have, for example, in
Orange County.
Are areas like Orange County going to have to step back
from funding and wait until everybody else gets funding because
they need this interoperability, or, you know, how are you
going to make decisions about what you fund and what you do not
with respect to that, especially if this is coming down in
grant-type programs?
You know, because we did with a lot things in order to,
with a vision to the future. So the first question is how are
you going to take a look at that? Because this is a very
expensive proposition to have that communication.
second, because equipment is such an important piece of
this, are we, or who is going to take the lead to make the
standards necessary for some of this equipment that we are
talking about?
For example, on gas masks and breathing apparatus, most of
the standards that we have been set for military use, in other
words people who are making these things are sending them to
the military, and yet we might have different parameters,
different situations going into a sort of terrorist attack or
something that would warrant that we have different type of
equipment, even though it is breathing apparatus or chemical
masks, et cetera.
So is that part of what you are tasked with, and if it is,
what is the time line for something like that, because a lot of
my agencies are asking, they are afraid to buy equipment
because it may be the wrong type or standards set to a
different field of operation, that being the military.
The third question I have for you has to do with the
staffing and the overtime that I spoke about in my opening
statement. You know, there is a basic need of equipment for
some of these agencies.
I really do not feel too badly asking for some of this
money, and talking about these issues because I come from an
area that is very high priority area, and I think by any
standard you would say that a nuclear power plant, a
Disneyland, an LAX, Crystal Cathedral, believe it or not,
people like to blow those types of things up, as opposed to
other places in the Nation where, quite frankly, 85 percent of
our law enforcement agencies have less than 10 people to them.
Mine have a lot more, and so we understand we have a lot
more people, we have a lot more problems.
Our biggest cost is staffing and overtime. When the city of
Anaheim has to go on Orange Alert, it is an additional $30,000
a day just in people it needs to put out there. The fact that
we need to bring all the police officers, you know, working.
And yet we don't have any kind of a grant program from
that. I want your opinion on whether we should. Or what are we
going to do with respect to, sort of, this unfunded Federal
mandate.
And the fourth question I have is your opinion, especially
coming from FEMA, with respect to our emergency hospitals and
the way that we take care of a potential attack. Give an
example, you know, one of my many venues there, let's say the
Anaheim Stadium, where you have people. We don't have beds. Our
hospitals are really stretched right now. They are in a Band-
Aid approach. They can barely take 15 people through the front
door, let alone the 400 we might ship from the Anaheim Stadium
and the, you know, 100 who will self diagnose and will arrive
to the hospital before we even ship the ones who truly are
under these conditions and are again taking these beds and
having this problem.
What say you to the whole issue hospitals, because it seems
to me that is a very weak link with respect to first response?
Mr. Brown. Are you ready?
Ms. Sanchez. Ready.
Mr. Brown. Here we go.
Let me challenge your premise that interoperability is an
expensive proposition. Now, we are going to spend $54 million
to identify the best demonstration projects around the country.
But in the conversations that I have had with the science and
technology folks, with vendors, with other people who have
approached me, they have said, you know what, there is really
some basic commercial off-the-shelf stuff that you can be using
now that is going to solve some of your interoperability
problems.
If that is the case, I think we shouldn't just assume that
this is all going to be very, very expensive. Sometimes I think
that may be driven by people who want to sell us things. And we
need to be aware of that and be very cognizant of it.
So I would just challenge the proposition that
interoperability is necessarily going to be expensive. Yes it
will in terms of if we try to do this nationwide and solve all
of these problems, it certainly might. We recognize that there
is an expense there. I want to try to keep it as low as
possible.
Ms. Sanchez. I would agree, especially since, you know,
that is not what we are going to be asking for.
Mr. Brown. Right, exactly. Who takes the lead? I think two
groups take the lead. I think the science and technology group
within the Department of Homeland Security, at least that is
who we are going to rely upon once we start identifying the
demonstration projects and start getting the results, we are
not going to claim to have the expertise within EP&R to say
that is a great technology, you ought to do that. That is why
we have science and technology.
We will rely on our other Federal partners, the National
Institute of Standards and others, who can come in and educate
us and help tell us what those standards should be. So we are
not going to try to do it ourselves.
Ms. Sanchez. And have you started those talks because, I
mean, people are--
Mr. Brown. Oh, absolutely, absolutely. And that is the only
reason why I questioned the premise about the expensiveness of
doing interoperability because I am starting to hear from Dr.
Queary and others that yes there are some things out there we
need to be looking at. There are certain things that the
Department of Defense already has that solved some of their
interoperability problems that we have got to look at adopting
for ourselves.
So we shouldn't just assume that it is going to be really
expensive. And we are trying to look across a broad spectrum of
what we can do to address that problem.
Staffing and overtime, I don't know. I wish I had the
answer for you. I think there are a couple things that we can
do that are kind of a prophylaxis-type approach that we can
take. We need to get smarter. The Secretary has agreed that we
are going to look at the threat warning system and how we can
maybe adjust that or really kind of tailor it for specific
kinds of threats.
I want to encourage, to the best that I can, state and
locals to adopt what we have done within EP&R and the
department of having a checklist. And when we go from one level
to another, just not automatically doing everything. But based
on the threat, which gets back to us able to communicate that
threat out to the state and locals, of doing what is
appropriate based on the change in the threat level.
Other than that, all I can say to you in all honesty today
is I recognize that the staffing and overtime problem is a
problem. And we know that and we will try to address that and
figure out what we can do to help state and locals.
I am fascinated that you mentioned emergency hospitals
because that is one of my priorities. We have not done enough
catastrophic planning. While we are focused on terrorism, I am
also focused on the catastrophic earthquake that might occur in
California. And how are we going to at that point have enough
hospital beds, enough medical personnel and other things to
address a catastrophic disaster.
We need to do that. And we have not done catastrophic
planning in several years and that is one of my priorities
within the new organization. Once we do that catastrophic
planning, we will be able to come back to you and say here is
how we are going to do it.
Ms. Sanchez. And our hospitals have major problems. I mean,
they are doing decontamination chambers. Very, very seismic. In
California is an incredible cost right now.
Mr. Brown. Right, right. But no, it is one of the problems
that we have to address. And catastrophic planning is the way
to do that.
Ms. Sanchez. Thank you.
Mr. Brown. We don't like to think about catastrophic
planning, but boy it needs it.
Ms. Sanchez. Well, we look forward to working with you on
these issues because they are very important, in particular a
metropolitan area like L.A., Orange County.
Mr. Brown. I understand.
Chairman Cox. Ms. Norton?
Ms. Norton. With a vote bearing down upon us, I have stayed
this long, Mr. Secretary, and I apologize for having to go in
and out on business involving my district.
But I have stayed because of a report that I found very
serious that was issued last week that suggested that the
country does not have the necessary emergency preparedness for
a chemical attack.
And frankly, it raised my hair. Perhaps what Americans most
fear is a chemical attack, based on what the Administration has
told us about the affects of a chemical attack. And we keep
hearing these substances thrown out--ricin, cyanide, which 41
states you can get naturally, sarin, VX--you know these have
been thrown out at us.
So when you get a report that says that our emphasis has
been basically on bioterrorism, smallpox, plague, with almost
no emphasis on preparing for a chemical attack, that got my
attention. And it was a non-partisan, non-profit, called Trust
for America's Health and looked at every state.
And on this state-by-state analysis, they found that only
two states, Georgia and Iowa, have the equipment and the
expertise to test the cyanide. That is just one chemical. And
that is the one that is available naturally in 41 states.
And it found, and here where the emergency preparedness
point comes in, that only eight states had drafted plans for
responding to a chemical attack. I have to ask you, in light of
this report, on a state-by-state basis, what you intend to do
to prepare first responders and health officials to deal with a
chemical attack, which, frankly, may be more likely than a
smallpox attack or a plague attack, which, of course, are
biological attacks.
Mr. Brown. This is the second time in the hearing I have
heard about this report. And I am going to try to get a copy of
it and look through it and see what it says.
We have done a couple of things. One is through the Fire
Grant program, we have made certain that personal protective
equipment is one of the categories that local first responders
can get, so that they can be trained in now to use that PPE--
personal protective equipment--and how to respond to a chemical
attack, to do training.
So that is something that is done through the Fire Grant
programs.
Ms. Norton. And you believe that people are purchasing--
Mr. Brown. Oh, you mean, purchasing through the Fire Grant
program?
Ms. Norton. Yes.
Mr. Brown. Absolutely. That is one of the purchases that is
being made through those grants.
The second thing is Congress was again very good to us last
year and gave us some great money for the urban search and
rescue teams, and we have done all of the training. And I think
we are not quite finished equipping all of them, but we are
getting pretty close to equipping all of the urban search and
rescue teams to be WMD capable.
So those are two specific--
Ms. Norton. It seems to be the equipment and the expertise
that is lacking, so you can have all of the training in the
world, but if you don't have the equipment and you don't know
what to do.
Mr. Brown. Right.
And that is why we thought the urban search and rescue
teams were a priority. That should be one of the priorities for
the Fire Grants also. That is one of the categories that they
can apply for to get the training.
But then I want to address a third area, and that is, you
know, we have talked a lot about Citizens Corps and citizen
preparedness. I think we need to do a better job and I think
the Ready Campaign that the Secretary launched through the
department, the Citizen Corps campaign that the President
launched, the USA Freedom Corps, are all very good programs
about telling citizens two things: What is the real risk, and
what can they do?
Because oftentimes, the risk is--well, a chemical attack is
dangerous. Sometimes the smartest thing to do is stay in the
house. Wait there for two or three hours. The chemicals
dissipate, and then it is safe to leave.
Oftentimes, people are going to panic and hear there has
been a chemical spill, and they are going to run outside and--
Ms. Norton. And so when are we going to begin, when are
people going to begin to understand that and to learn that?
Mr. Brown. Well, we are doing our darndest and trying to
educate everyone through these campaigns now about that. Yet we
took some hits in the initial start of that about the duct tape
and plastic sheeting. And I am not embarrassed to talked about
it here today.
Because remember when the barge explored in New York harbor
from the off-loading of the oil? The first thing that the local
emergency manager told people in that neighborhood in Staten
Island was, Stay indoors, close your windows, turn off your air
conditioner.
So sheltering in place is an absolute credible tool for
emergency management. And we need to educate folks about how to
do that, and how not to panic when those things occur.
So I will go back and look at this report, and then we will
come back and talk to you about exactly what we are doing in
those other areas to train and equip first responders to deal
with it.
Ms. Norton. I do think what you say about getting the word
out, stop, look and listen, rather than running outside,
perhaps right into the chemical attack, is very important.
Mr. Brown. Yes.
Ms. Norton. I would suggest that you respond to the
chairman, to the committee and to the ranking member on this
notion that, literally, most states wouldn't have any
information to relay because they have neither the equipment
nor the expertise to know what the chemical attack is.
So that is on the threshold level, at the ground level. And
I would appreciate that whatever you could give the committee
about the goals you have and when you intend to meet them for
helping the states to get that kind of equipment and that kind
of training.
Mr. Brown. Be happy to do that.
Ms. Norton. Thank you very much, Mr. Secretary.
Chairman Cox. We thank the gentlelady.
The Chair thanks the witness for his time today.
And this hearing stands adjourned.
[Whereupon, at 4:23 p.m., the subcommittee was adjourned.]
Questions for the Record from the Majority Members
Question 1: The mission of the Emergency Preparedness and Response
(EPR) Directorate within DHS is to improve the Nation's capability to
reduce losses from all disaster, including terrorist attacks. Given
that the EPR is anchored by the incorporation of FEMA, how are the
objectives of this new mission being met by an agency that has
historically functioned to aid cyclical natural and other major
disasters?
Answer: FEMA's heritage comes from being prepared for all hazards,
including a nuclear threat during the Cold War. While some natural
disasters are cyclical, tornadoes, flash flooding, and earthquakes, for
example, happen without notice, demanding that FEMA he prepared to
coordinate the Federal government's response and recovery efforts to
supplement state and local activities.
Although many people think of FEMA in our most common very public
role in responding to natural disasters, our capabilities have already
been fully tested in other events such as terrorism. In fact, our
management of response and recovery efforts after the Oklahoma City
bombing and the terrorist attacks of 9/11 were completely in keeping
with the work we do in responding to natural events. FEMA's activities
focused on saving lives and protecting life and property, such as
coordinating Urban Search and Rescue Teams, Disaster Medical Assistance
Teams, and Disaster Mortuary Teams, and providing assistance for debris
removal, emergency protective measures, temporary housing, disaster
unemployment, and crisis counseling, and are the same regardless of the
cause of the event.
The lessons learned from these events have been shared with the
emergency management community and help to improve our training and
preparation for future events. FEMA's mission is all-hazards, which now
includes a focus on terrorism as a threat to our nation. FEMA was also
asked to lead a Departmental and interagency effort to develop a
Catastrophic Incident Response Annex to the National Response Plan.
This Annex, while all-hazards in scope, is nevertheless focused heavily
on WMD events precipitated by acts of terrorism.
Terrorism preparedness and response are not new missions for FEMA.
Executive Order 12148, Federal Emergency Management, of July 1979,
paragraph 2-103, provided that: ``The Director [ FEMA] shall be
responsible [...]for the coordination of preparedness and planning to
reduce the consequences of major terrorist incidents.'' FEMA responded
to the April 19, 1995, bombing of the Murrah Federal Building in
Oklahoma City before it responded to the September 11, 2001, attacks on
the World Trade Center and the Pentagon.
If FEMA has provided response and recovery assistance to state and
local governments, certain nonprofits, and individuals more in
``cyclical natural and other major disasters'' than in large-scale
terrorism incidents, that is because historically there have been far
more such natural disasters on U.S. soil than there have been large-
scale terrorism incidents. However, FEMA was directed in Executive
Order 12148 to ensure that ``all civil defense and civil emergency
functions, resources, and systems of Executive agencies are [
developed, tested and utilized to prepare for, mitigate, respond to and
recover from the effects on the population of all forms of
emergencies'' (emphasis added).
The ongoing challenge for FEMA, and for state and local emergency
management, is to give each hazard's unique characteristics its due
(based on risk and/or policy-makers' preferences), while maintaining a
foundation of functional responses common to multiple hazards that can
provide the flexibility to deal with the unusual, such as the space
shuttle Columbia incident. That is what FEMA means by an ``all-
hazards'' approach: not that response to every type of emergency is
exactly the same, but that there are commonalities. Getting those
commonalities right is the foundation for addressing the unique aspects
of certain hazards successfully, and provides the greatest adaptability
for addressing newly emerging hazards and threats in a community,
state, or Nation.
FEMA continues to take an all-hazards approach to preparedness,
response, mitigation, and recovery. We recognize that in the present
environment, terrorism requires immediate and direct attention. Our
core mission is to provide leadership and support to reduce the loss of
life and property and to protect our nation's institutions from all
types of hazards through a comprehensive, risk-based, all-hazards
approach. We continue to work with state and local governments, the
first responder community, and our Federal partners to take an all-
hazards approach to emergency preparedness and response.
Substantial effort is being made to consolidate and integrate all
of the different disaster response programs, teams, and assets in DHS.
FEMA is designing new approaches and implementing new efficiencies that
will result in a more unified, integrated, and comprehensive approach
to all-hazards disaster response. The improved coordination of all
response programs and efforts to introduce a new response culture will
make DHS better able to elevate operational disaster response
capabilities to a whole new level of proficiency, one that will further
the principles of the National Response Plan and National Incident
Management System and better serve the American people.
All of the disaster response operations, programs, and activities
are being reviewed to make sure that they are complementary and form a
cohesive national response system that eliminates duplication and
inefficiencies. Related to this review, measures are being planned that
will help reduce the time it takes for disaster response teams to get
to a disaster site and the time it takes to deliver needed disaster
supplies. In addition, greater emphasis will be placed on catastrophic
disaster planning, including planning for responding to acts of
terrorism.
Question 2: The Homeland Security Act transferred the functions,
personnel, and assets of the Strategic National Stockpile to the EPR,
the law mandates that the HHS Secretary continue to manage the
stockpile and determine and procure its contents. What exactly is the
role of the EPR in regards to Stockpile and how are you coordinating
deployment decisions with CDC and other public health agencies?
Answer: The Homeland Security Act of 2002 established joint
management of the Strategic National Stockpile (SNS) by DHS and the
Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) on March 1, 2003. The two
Departments signed a Memorandum of Agreement (MOA) that delineated the
individual management responsibilities of each Department. DHS and HHS
have amended the MOA to articulate more clearly the roles of the two
Departments. Currently, DHS provides the strategic direction and
performance levels that HHSICDC must meet in management of the SNS on a
day-to-day basis. Capabilities of the SNS have not changed. Requests
for SNS materiel and response procedures remain the same.
DHS and HHS continue to work closely to ensure that the joint
responsibilities for the SNS allow it to respond effectively in concert
with the other DHS response elements. New drugs and vaccines developed
under Project BioShield, the comprehensive effort to develop and make
available effective drugs and vaccine to protect against attacks using
biological and chemical weapons or other dangerous pathogens, will
ultimately reside in the SNS and also be available to help ensure the
health security of the United States. The first interagency agreement
under the BioShield program has been negotiated between DHS and HHS,
for development, procurement and eventual inclusion in the SNS of
Recombinant Protective Antigen (rPA), a next-generation anthrax
vaccine.
In the fiscal year 2005 budget proposal, and in the current
Bioshield legislation, the Administration has proposed to return
principal responsibility for the SNS to HHS. HHS would coordinate with
DHS in operating the SNS.
Question 3: Do you feel that the Homeland Security Act gives you
adequate authorities beyond those in place for natural disaster in
light of your enhanced counter-terrorism mission?
Answer: In FEMA's role of preparing for, responding to, recovering
from, and mitigating against all-hazards, including terrorist-related
events, the Stafford Act provides FEMA with sufficient authority to
carry out its role and responsibilities as enhanced by the Homeland
Security Act. The HSA continued the existing authority provided
pursuant to the Stafford Act and supplemented those authorities with
additional assets, including the Domestic Emergency Support Team, the
National Disaster Medical System, the Nuclear Incident Response Team,
and the Strategic National Stockpile. it is important to note, however,
that Homeland Security Presidential Directive 5 (HSPD-5) required DHS
to ``review existing authorities and regulations and prepare
recommendations for the President on revisions necessary to implement
fully the National Response Plan.'' This authorities review is
currently underway and will include recommendations for any additional
authorities that may be necessary and consistent to implement the
National Response Plan.
Question 4: What intelligence products is your directorate
routinely receiving today and how are they reaching you? Are those
products getting to you quickly and in a form that enables you quickly
to pass them on to your field personnel--as well as the state and local
officials--who need them?
Answer: FEMA is well connected with the intelligence community
through dedicated personnel liaison contacts, cleared couriers, and
electronic communications systems to include secure facsimile, AUTODIN,
the Joint Worldwide Intelligence Communications System, and the Secure
Internet Protocol Network. FEMA also receives the Director of Central
Intelligence Senior Executive Intelligence Briefing via cleared
couriers Monday through Saturday, as well as finished intelligence
produced by the National Intelligence Council and the Directorate of
Intelligence. Further, the DHS Information Analysis and Infrastructure
Protection Directorate provides FEMA with applicable intelligence
information and warning products through their representation in the
Homeland Security Operations Center.
FEMA is not an intelligence collection or production and is
prohibited from creating and disseminating finished intelligence
outside of its own organization Intelligence of interest to non-
headquarters FEMA offices and organizations possessing the proper
clearance and ``need to know'' can be accomplished at the non-
compartmented level through secure facsimile and the FEMA Secure Local
Area Network as well as through the AUTODIN.
Question 5: Do you get routine intelligence briefings? How often
and from what agencies? Is the IAIP directorate giving you any
independent threat analysis of its own?
Answer: FEMA receives the Director of Central Intelligence Senior
Executive Intelligence Briefing via cleared couriers Monday through
Saturday, as well as finished intelligence produced by the National
Intelligence Council and the Directorate of Intelligence. Further, the
JAIP Directorate provides FEMA with intelligence and warning products
produced by the Directorate, as is applicable, through their
representation in the Homeland Security Operations Center.
Question 6: Has creation of the Department of Homeland Security
increased the flow of intelligence information into the entities that
are now in the Department's EP&R directorate, or is the intelligence
flow about the same as before?
Answer: Yes, the intelligence flow has increased. Additionally,
Critical Infrastructure Protection intelligence flows from the DHS
Information Analysis and Infrastructure Protection (TAIP) Directorate
into the United States Fire Administration's Emergency Management and
Response Information Sharing and Analysis Center (EMR-ISAC). This
information is then disseminated to the EMR community for its use in
protecting their own infrastructures.
Question 7: Frequently the front line responders are the first on
the scene of an event. What process has been established within your
Directorate to up-feed that information to the decision makers at the
EPR?
Answer: FEMA receives information from state and local responders
through the Governor or the state emergency manager. The Response
Division's structure is based on the Incident Management System so that
it is aligned to meet the needs of state and local responders. In
addition, it is designed to meet the President's directives established
within Homeland Security Presidential Directive (HSPD)-5, which called
for the National Incident Management System (NIMS) and the National
Response Plan (NRP). The Response Division is managing the activities
of many national response assets formerly maintained within other
Federal agencies. These include: the National Disaster Medical System,
the Domestic Emergency Support Team, the Strategic National Stockpile,
and the Nuclear Incident Response Team. By consolidating response
plans, programs, and systems for delivering assistance and responding
to various types of incidents into one coordinated, consolidated, and
comprehensive national system, the Department will be able to provide a
more streamlined approach to incident management. This streamlining and
consolidating will serve to improve the information flow in both
directions, up to senior decision makers and down to the State and
local first responders in the field.
FEMA's United States Fire Administration (USFA) is integrating
information about the NIMS and the NRP into all courses at both its
National Fire Academy and its Emergency Management Institute. Both
institutions have taught courses on the Incident Command System--one of
the primary components of the NIMS--for many years. Courses at both
institutions, with consistent NIMS information, will ensure that front
line responders receive the appropriate training to be able to
effectively manage an incident and provide the necessary information
from the Incident Management Team (IMT), through the multi-agency
coordination system, to the appropriate Federal entity within the NRP.
The USFA is also providing IMT training to develop Type 3 IMTs within
States and Urban Area Security Initiative regions; these Type 3 IMTs
will provide for a smoother transition and more effective communication
flow during major and or complex incidents, including incidents of
national significance.
Furthermore, FEMA's ten regional offices are in communication with
state and local government offices and emergency management
professionals on a daily basis. These relationships foster the
efficient and effective exchange of information, particularly when an
event occurs. For example, when there is an approaching hurricane, FEMA
regional offices send designated employees to state emergency
management offices to help prepare, to begin gathering information, and
to provide guidance for Federal assistance.
Question 8: Of the seven categories of functions described in the
President's reorganization plan for the EPR, five focus on response and
recovery activities. How are you providing adequate attention to
preparedness activities for the directorate?
Answer: Within FEMA, the Preparedness Division has responsibility
for a broad range of programs and initiatives for all-hazard capability
building and capability assurance. These include training programs at
the National Fire Academy and Emergency Management Institute, the
Chemical Stockpile Emergency Preparedness Program (CSEPP), the
Radiological Emergency Preparedness Program (REPP), and all-hazards
assessment and exercise activities, such as the National Emergency
Management Baseline Capability Assessment Program. Under the National
Emergency Management Baseline Capability Assessment Program, FEMA is
funding and sponsoring assessments of state-level emergency management
capability against a common set of voluntary standards. All 56 state
and state-level jurisdictions are expected to participate in this
program, slated for completion in fiscal year 2005. The results of
these assessments will help FEMA, the Department of Homeland Security,
and states develop strategies to better target assistance to areas of
greatest common need. For improving FEMA's response and recovery
efforts, the Preparedness Division has implemented and manages a very
robust Remedial Action Management Program that ensures field-level
response and recovery issues are brought to the prompt attention of
functional decision-makers for the purpose of commencing appropriate
remediation. In short, while preparedness may not have garnered many
lines in the reorganization plan, FEMA's employees pay substantial
attention to preparedness every day, using the resources Congress and
the Administration have allocated to this important work. Most
important, the local civilian responders are the same persons that FEMA
works with in exercises whether it is CSEPP, REPP, or the Capability
Programs. Thus, the critical continuity with our state and local
partners in preparedness continues into our response and recovery work,
where knowing the participants can smooth the way for the most
effective response. Please also see the answer to Question 13.
FEMA's Preparedness Division provides leadership in the
coordination and facilitation of preparing the Nation to respond to and
recover from disasters and emergencies of all types through development
of standards, training, assessments and exercises for groups and
individuals having key emergency responsibilities, including state and
local governments, first responders, and communities. Our goal is to
minimize loss of life and property and suffering and disruption caused
by disasters and emergencies through better preparedness at all
levels--from the Federal Government to the individual. The Preparedness
Division is organized into a number of branches and sections. It
continues to:
Develop and provide resource materials for training aids,
and overall planning and operational guidance to assist state, local,
and tribal governments in preparing for the response to and recovery
from all-hazards disasters and emergencies.
Coordinate the development of national operational
standards/performance measures and protocols, and state and local
mutual aid standards and protocols to support all-hazards capability
building, program guidance, implementation procedures, and reporting
criteria.
Enhance existing emergency preparedness systems to
effectively respond to a public health crisis, especially a weapons of
mass destruction event.
The United States Fire Administration (USFA) continues its work
with the fire and emergency service community and in the training
arena. The USFA's National Emergency Training Center, including the
National Fire Academy and the Emergency Management Institute, and the
USFA's Noble Training Center continue to deliver quality training to
the nation's first responder and emergency management community.
Question 9: The National Domestic Preparedness Office (NDPO) was
established in the FBI to coordinate Federal assistance to first
responders in the area of domestic terrorism preparedness. The function
of NDPO was transferred from the FBI to FEMA to consolidate all Federal
domestic preparedness. What is the functioning status of NDPO?
Answer: The NDPO essentially ceased to exist prior to the passage
of the Homeland Security Act, and thus no longer functionally exists,
therefore there were no functions of the NDPO to be transferred to
FEMA; no staff or funding transferred. Within DHS, the Office for
Domestic Preparedness has been assigned responsibility for coordinating
Federal terrorism preparedness assistance to first responders.
Question 10: The Domestic Emergency Support Team (DEST) is a stand-
by interagency team of experts led by the FBI to provide advice and
guidance in a situation involving WMDs. The Act transferred the
functions of DEST from the FBI to the EPR. How are you working to
coordinate the activities of DEST with the FBI?
Answer: The Domestic Emergency Support Team (DEST) provides
information management support; enhanced communications capabilities;
tailored expertise, assessment, and analysis capabilities; and
consequence contingency planning capabilities. The operational control
of the DEST transferred from the FBI to DHS on March 1,2003. While each
agency supplies its own personnel and equipment to the DEST, DHS has
assumed the administrative and logistical responsibilities for the
team. Coordination with the FBI will continue through FBI
representatives who serve on the DEST.
Question 11: The Act directs the HHS Secretary to set goals and
priorities and to collaborate with the Secretary of DHS to develop a
coordinated strategy to improve state, local and hospital preparedness.
Please update the committee on the level of coordination that the EPR
has had with HHS in preparing our front line health care programs,
professionals and hospitals.
Answer: There are several areas of collaboration with HHS. FEMA is
working closely with ODP and HHS on procedures for implementation of
HSPD 8 and national goal setting. We coordinate closely with HHS on the
contents, budget and deployment of the Strategic National Stockpile. We
continue to work with HHS in the integration of the NDMS system into
FEMA. We also continue to work with HI-IS regarding the Noble Training
Center.
NDMS has worked closely with HHS on surge capacity issues
identified during Exercise TOPOFF II. Also, DHS representatives have
actively participated in workgroups that are proposing methodologies to
enhance hospital surge capacity through training of personnel,
identifying resources, and developing plans. DHS and HHS will be
working to improve the coordination between our two agencies.
The NDMS staff continues to look at integrated strategies to
enhance hospital preparedness. HHS and DHS have worked very closely in
the workgroups to ensure that DHS and HHS programs are coordinated,
including joint efforts to develop the Catastrophic Incident Response
Plan Annex to the NRP. DHS and HHS continue to coordinate the SNS
efforts to prepare state and local health organizations to receive and
distribute SNS material. NDMS assets are being fully incorporated into
FEMA disaster response team and logistic activities, and increases in
NDMS hospital training and exercises, as well as improving the
capability to evacuate patients, are planned in the coming years.
FEMA's United States Fire Administration (USFA) is also working to
increase the coordination between first responders and hospitals during
multi-casualty arid mass casualty incidents of all types. USFA's
National Fire Academy (NFA) delivers courses on topics including EMS
Management, EMS Special Operations, EMS Operations at Multi-Casualty
Incidents, Incident Command System for EMS, and Fire Service/Hospital
Coordination for Multi-Casualty and WMD Incidents. USFA's Emergency
Management Institute (EMI) offers Hospital Emergency Response Training
for WMD Events. Both NFA and EMI offer courses at USFA's Noble Training
Cent in Anniston, Alabama, a former military hospital established for
EMS and medical response training. Last year, we delivered the training
schedule initiated by HHS while we developed additional offerings in
the area of mass casualties and weapons of mass destruction. This year
we are offering an expanded schedule of FEMA courses at Noble in
partnership with HHS (CDC and the Health Services and Resources
Administration).
Additionally, DHS and HHS have an equally close relationship with
regard to Project Bioshield. The proposed BioShield program and the
current legislation call for DHS to perform threat assessments and to
inform HHS of potential threats. HI-IS, based on the threat information
received, will decide if an adequate countermeasure for the threat
currently exists.
Questions on TOPOFF II
Question 12: TOPOFF II cost an estimated $16 million and involved
more than 8,500 people from 100 Federal, state and local agencies, the
American Red Cross, and the Canadian government. Understandably, no
results or conclusions have been published from the exercise, however,
can you give us a sense of what the Directorate learned from TOPOFF II?
Answer: As you note, specific findings from the exercise are ``For
Official Use Only'' and are not available at this time for the public
record. However, in the most general sense, TOPOFF II allowed us to
appreciate more fully some of the new interactions and coordination
requirements associated with becoming part of a larger Department that
has been assigned certain responsibilities by the President under
Homeland Security Presidential
Directive 5. We also were able to test integration of non-FEMA
assets that are now part of DHS. We did much of this at the same time
as we were responding to real-world tornadoes.
Question 13: The purpose of an emergency drill is to learn where
your weaknesses are so that you can address those areas. What areas of
weakness did you identify?
Answer: TOPOFF II provided important lessons regarding Federal,
state, and local integration. The exercise appeared to lead to some
uncertainty about who had the authority to deploy certain assets. Also,
it became apparent that as the NRP undergoes development, the
integration of response plans and policies merit
consideration?particularly where existing plans are considered
effective for emergency response. TOPOFF II results indicated that the
roles and responsibilities of the principle Federal official (PFO) need
to be clarified with respect to those of the FBI Special Agent in
Charge, the FEMA regional director, and the Federal coordinating
officer. In addition, the PFO requires an emergency support team with
the flexibility and expertise to provide support across the full range
of homeland security operations.
We expected beforehand that communications would be a problem in
TOPOFF II. Communications is not just about technology. Technology is a
tool to create a channel for communications, but good communications is
also about common understanding of who is supposed to receive what
content in what form by when, and even an appreciation of why. In any
exercise or real-world operation, there is always at the very least one
person or organization that does not share in this common
understanding--and so there is always at least one person or
organization that will identify communications as a problem, or it will
be identified as the source of the problem, even if things ``work''
overall. In that sense, while communications is not necessarily a
weakness, we will always have plenty of work to do in preparedness--in
the policy, planning, training, and exercise worlds--to foster and then
sustain a common understanding of coordination relationships and
information requirements in response. Technology can help bring the
information together and display it in a better ``common operating
picture.''
Question 14: Will another such exercise be necessary in the future?
If so, what will you do differently?
Answer: Exercises like TOPOFF II--for terrorism and for other
scenarios--are valuable, and we will continue to support large-scale
exercises of our response and recovery operations. However, we can add
more value to our participation in such large-scale exercises by doing
more to make them the culmination of smaller, tightly focused exercises
for our response teams and decision-makers. TOPOFF II, with its issue
seminars, was an improvement over TOPOFF 2000 in that regard. In
addition, since first response to almost any emergency is at the
community level, we have to put equal or greater emphasis on
conununity-based exercises. The Office of Domestic Preparedness is
responsible for scheduling, coordinating and conducting large-scale
exercises involving national-level participation through their National
Exercise Program. They are currently planning for the third Top
Officials exercise, TOPOFF III.
Question 15: One area of concern post-September 11 was the ability
of levels of government to communicate effectively and coordinate
plans. Was the communication system a success in TOPOFF II
(a) How effective was coordination between local, state, and
Federal agencies?
Answer: All levels of government worked well together in TOPOFF II.
That is not to say that communications and coordination were perfect.
They were not. But contact was established, information was shared, and
there were means for consultation. It is important to note that TOPOFF
II was conducted just a few short months following the establishment of
the new Department. In many respects, TOPOFF II served as a test for a
number of new processes, procedures and protocols established to
coordinate incident management activities, and it was invaluable in
that regard.
(b) Some press reports indicated that there were capacity
problems in Chicago's hospitals during the exercise. Is this
true?
Answer: Chicago was hit harder by the 1995 heat wave than by TOPOFF
II; during the exercise several Chicago hospital officials indicated
they were able to keep up with the number of people arriving at their
emergency rooms. It is important to take a systems approach regionally
and nationally, sharing information on general and specialized hospital
capacity, in order to meet any surge in demand for medical care. Along
those lines, the federally coordinated National Disaster Medical System
NDMS) offers a single, integrated medical response capability to assist
state and local governments when they are faced with a public health
emergency. Within NDMS, Federal Coordinating Centers recruit hospitals
for voluntary agreements to commit a number of acute care beds, subject
to availability, for NDMS patients.
(c) What contingency plans are being put in place so that in
the case of a widespread outbreak people would be able to find
treatment?
Answer: Within DHS, the federally coordinated National Disaster
Medical System (NDMS) offers a single, integrated medical response
capability to assist state and local governments when they are faced
with a public health emergency. Within NDMS, Federal Coordinating
Centers recruit hospitals for voluntary agreements to commit a number
of acute care beds, subject to availability, for NDMS patients. FEMA
also would deploy the Strategic National Stockpile if requested, along
with a technical response unit to provide technical assistance and
assist the State in breakdown and distribution.
In the event of a widespread outbreak, HHS would be the lead
Federal agency. In that event, HHS would utilize the NDMS and other
assets, from the PHS Commissioned Corps Readiness Force, the Centers
for Disease Control and Prevention, the Department of Veterans Affairs.
and the Department of Defense. We also note that, within HHS, the
Health Resources and Services Administration has a Hospital
Preparedness program to ready hospitals and supporting health care
systems--primary care facilities, EMS systems, poison control centers--
to deliver coordinated and effective care to victims of terrorism and
other public health emergencies. The President's fiscal year 05 budget
request includes funding for medical surge capability and pilot
programs.
Question 16: During this exercise, the threat level was raised to
``Red'' to indicate that the country had been attacked. Can you
describe what additional procedures are put into place as a result of
this elevated status?
Answer: Without entering into details, FEMA increases the security
posture of its facilities, takes measures to preserve the continuity of
its essential operations, and depending on the specifics of the threat,
alerts or deploys specific response assets.
Question 17: Some critics of the exercise argued that it wasn't
effective because it was too planned out and lacked the element of
surprise. How do you answer those criticisms?
Answer: The exercise achieved its intended goal; it not only
demonstrated and validated those response capabilities and processes
that work well, it also revealed areas that need further improvement.
Those are the overarching goals of every exercise, and, within that
context, the exercise was a success. All exercises are planned We
create artificial stimuli to see whether or not we elicit an expected
response, and we line up resources from a resource pool that is not as
extensive as what we have to draw upon in a real-world event. An
exercise would only be too planned-out if everything worked perfectly
and no one learned anything--but then it would be a demonstration
rather than an exercise. Obviously, the players did not have the total
script and could not have total certainty that actual response actions
would be the expected response actions. Just as with an SAT exam, where
students know when the test will be given and have test preparation
books and courses available to them, they still have to perform.
Questions for the Record from The Honorable Kay Granger
U.S. Customs placing VACIS/Radiation Detection Equipment at the
Borders:
Question: As you may be aware, U.S. Customs is entering into an
effort to deploy VACIS detection equipment at border crossings to
screen all rail cargo entering the United States, The railroad industry
has been cooperating with this effort, but it appears that Customs
expects the railroads to bear all costs related to constructing
inspection facilities.
(1). Is your department aware of the costs that the railroad
industry will bear with the implementation of these facilities?
Answer: Customs and Border Protection (CBP) has provided direction
to the rail companies impacted by the deployment of Rail VACIS
technology. This direction comes from two sources. The first source is
the language contained in the Declaration of Principles (DOP). The DOP
is the culmination of months of discussions between CBP, Canada Customs
and Revenue Agency (CCRA), Canadian Pacific Railway (CP) and Canadian
National Railway (CN). The document is a road map of principles to be
utilized by parties from the United States and Canada aimed at
improving overall rail security on our common border.
Item number seven of the DOP addresses examination facilities and
states the following: ``In return for CBP providing the screening
equipment at Walkerville Yard and Sarnia Yard, CN and CP agreed to
provide, where currently lacking, facilities in the United States for
conducting security examinations. CN and CP further agreed to arrange
for and fund the labor for unstuffing these shipments for examination,
up to a maximum annual examination rate of 5 percent of total
shipments. CBP will incur the expense for all examinations performed
over 5 percent of rail cars.'' The DOP emphasizes that it is the
responsibility of the Canadian Rail Companies (CN and CP) to bear the
cost of exam facilities.
The second source of direction comes from the Tariff Act of 1930 as
amended, and the implementing regulations governing the presentation of
merchandise for customs examination. While DHS always seeks to do its
job in the most efficient way for business, when examinations are
required, longstanding regulations at 19 CFR 151.6 are clear that ``the
importer shall bear any expense involved in preparing the merchandise
for Customs examination and in the closing of the packages.'' This
regulation applies regardless of the mode of transportation, including
rail.
(2). Is Customs aware of the potential railroad congestion
consequences related to VACIS inspections, especially for passenger
trains using the same tracks as inspected freight trains?
Answer: We have discussed this area of concern with the appropriate
parties. Options are available to the rail companies, including
providing necessary trackage for the purpose of railcar inspection. In
some cases this may mean an additional siding where railcars are
removed from the mainline, thus allowing the continued flow of rail
traffic.
Our non-intrusive inspection (Nil) technology, such as Rail VACIS,
is viewed as a force multiplier that enables us to effectively and
efficiently screen or examine a larger portion of the stream of
commercial traffic while facilitating the flow of legitimate trade and
traffic.
(3). Would you be willing to explore funding options to assist the
rail industry in the amelioration of VACIS-related problems? These are
costs that other modes of transportation do not bear and, thus, place
an unfair burden on one of the securest modes of transportation. Does
Customs have any plans for reimbursing the railroads for these costs?
Answer: The priority mission of CBP is to detect and prevent
terrorists and terrorist weapons from entering the United States while
simultaneously facilitating legitimate trade and travel. The deployment
of large-scale NIT technology such as Rail VACIS will provide CBP with
the ability to effectively screen 100 percent of rail traffic arriving
in the United States from Canada for contraband, including weapons of
mass destruction.
The rail industry is free to explore any and all finding options
available to them. CBP is not in a position to advise or assist in that
endeavor. Other modes of transportation have been required to provide
the same type of examination facilities that the rail sector is only
now being asked to provide. There are no plans for reimbursement at
this time.
Questions for the Record From Ranking Member Jim Turner
EP&R and ODP Coordination
Member Comment: In April of 2002, GAO testified, ``In general, the
lack of effective coordination among Federal agencies, and also between
Federal agencies and state/local entities is the result of basic
problems that need to be resolved: (1) The problem of overlap and
duplication of programs; lack of a clear definition of appropriate
roles leads to confusion; and (2) a lack of direction and guidance as
should be provided by Federal agencies to state and local governments
and also the private sector. In addition, GAO has identified at least
16 Federal grants that can be used by first responders--states, local
governments, and fire and law enforcement officials--to buy equipment,
train, run exercises, and conduct preparedness planning.
Question I: How has DHS addressed these problems that GAO
identified over one year ago, specifically with respect to the grant
programs administered by the EP&R Directorate and the Office for
Domestic Preparedness?
Answer: The DHS Secretary provided notice to Congress on January
26, 2004, of his intent to consolidate ODP and the Office of State and
Local Coordination (SLGC) into anew office entitled the Office of State
and Local Government Coordination and Preparedness (SLGCP). The purpose
of this consolidation is to enhance overall coordination and to provide
greater program integration, simplified application and award
processes, and greater. consistency in policy and program development.
Question 2: State and local governments remain confused about who
in DHS is their point-of-contact for all preparedness and response
issues. How will DHS and your Directorate streamline, simplify, and
coordinate multiple grant programs to make it easier for first
responders to get the funds and technical assistance they need?
Answer: The DHS Secretary provided notice to Congress on January
26, 2004, of his intent to consolidate ODP and the Office of State and
Local Coordination (SLGC) into a new office entitled the Office of
State and Local Government Coordination and Preparedness (SLGCP). The
purpose of this consolidation is to enhance overall coordination and to
provide greater program integration, simplified application and award
processes, and greater consistency in policy and program development.
Question 3: What is the rationale for keeping ODP as a separate
organizational entity outside of EP&R, as opposed to having ODP report
to the EP&R Under Secretary? Was this not the Administration's original
proposal when it created the Office for National Preparedness in FEMA,
a move that was applauded by GAO?
Answer: The Homeland Security Act directed that ODP be a separate
office in a different directorate in DHS. The Homeland Security Act
mandates a role for ODP to conduct terrorism preparedness, and for FEMA
to conduct preparedness for all-hazards.
Question 4: What role, if any, does the Office for State and Local
Government Coordination play in grant process?
Answer: The Office of State and Local Government Coordination
(SLGC) and the Office for Domestic Preparedness (ODP) will be merged
into a single entity to be called the Office of State and Local
Government Coordination and Preparedness (SLGCP). SLGCP will meet the
need for a single point of contact for state and local preparedness
grant programs.
Question 5: How have ODP and EP&R logically separated these two
preparedness programs? How is such a separation consistent with the
all-hazards preparedness and response plans that have been developed by
the states and localities? Are states and localities required to
develop two parallel plans, one for WMD incidents and one for
``normal'' disasters?
Answer: Within the Department, we are working to coordinate our
programs more closely. We are working closely together to set goals for
preparedness and ensure our programs taken together will meet the
objectives. The Administration has moved certain FEMA grant programs to
ODP and has expressed the intent to merge ODP and the Office for State
and Local Government Coordination, in order to better facilitate a
``one-stop shop.''
Question 6: What is EP&R's specific role--if any--in terrorism
preparedness, training and exercises? Does EP&R have any role in
terrorism preparedness, or is it only responsible for other hazards?
Answer: Title V of the Homeland Security Act of 2002 makes the
Under Secretary of EPR responsible for ``helping to ensure the
effectiveness of emergency response providers to terrorist attacks,
major disasters, and other emergencies'' and for ``building a
comprehensive National Incident Management System [... for ...] such
attacks and disasters.'' The Act also requires FEMA to retain its
functions and responsibilities under the Stafford Act. FEMA has a role
in terrorism preparedness because FEMA has a responsibility for all-
hazards preparedness.
FEMA possesses a wide-ranging operational mission, and is populated
with staff with extensive experience in preparing for, responding to
and recovering from the consequences of incidents, emergencies and
disasters, irrespective of cause or complexity. This body of
operational expertise makes FEMA uniquely qualified to continue its
long-standing responsibility of coordinating operational all-hazards
preparedness to the nation.
FEMA continues to support all-hazards emergency preparedness,
training, and exercises on the basis that the management of the
consequences from any event has numerous essential elements that may
need to be supplemented by special actions for some events. As an
example--Mass Care Sheltering is common to all events that cause
persons to be displaced; they need to be sheltered and fed in a safe,
healthful, and secure location. This requires the same basic facilities
and services in natural events and may only need supplemental screening
persons for weapons of mass destruction (WMD) contamination if the
event is terrorist-initiated (this would be the same for an industrial
chemical accident as well). Significant hazards facing the Nation
continue to be addressed. FEMA continues to provide public assistance
and individual assistance, including crisis counseling, and organizes
Disaster Legal Assistance, in presidentially declared natural and
manmade disasters and emergencies.
Operational planning is a key Preparedness function, and FEMA has
years of experience and accumulated expertise planning for, responding
to and recovering from emergencies and disasters. Accordingly, FEMA was
asked to lead a Departmental and interagency effort to develop a
Catastrophic Incident Response Annex to the National Response Plan.
This Annex, while all-hazards in scope, is nevertheless focused heavily
on WMD events precipitated by acts of terrorism. The draft Annex
outlines a strategy for accelerating the provision of needed Federal
resources and assistance in support of the response to a catastrophic
incident involving mass casualties and mass evacuees. Since it is
expected that such a catastrophe will so overwhelm the local response
architecture that their ability to execute timely needs assessments
will be impaired, a key component of this strategy is to immediately
begin pushing predetermined assets to a federal mobilization center
near the incident venue, to ensure they are immediately available to
support the incident management effort when requested by state/local
authorities.
FEMA, through its United States Fire Administration (USFA),
provides training for first responders and technical assistance for
first responder and emergency management agencies on all hazards,
including emergency response to terrorism incidents and terrorism
response planning. Some of the courses were developed jointly with ODP
while they were in the Department of Justice. The USFA's National Fire
Academy (NFA) has an Emergency Response to Terrorism curriculum with
eight courses, plus many additional courses related to incident
management (including the NIMS), which apply to all hazards. Similarly,
USFA's Emergency Management Institute has several terrorism-related
courses for emergency management personnel
Question 7: Is EP&R participating in the ODP process of collecting
updated preparedness data from the states? For example, did EP&R have
any input in revising the ODP data collection tool?
Answer: FEMA is working closely with ODP on the development of the
National Preparedness Goal under l-ISPD-8. FEMA has provided input into
the revised ODP data collection tool. Some of the questions now go
beyond terrorism-specific concerns to include an all-hazards approach
to traditional terrorism-specific concerns--for example, in the areas
of planning and interoperable communications.
FEMA has detailed three individuals to ODP to ease program
transition, and both agencies work together on a daily basis. FEMA
worked closely with ODP to develop its fiscal year 2003 State Domestic
Preparedness Program assessment documentation and has participated in
conducting regional workshops to ensure the agencies' programs
complemented, but did not duplicate, one another.
Question 8: How often do EP&R staff access the ODP information, and
what exactly is the process for accessing this information (e.g., is
the EP&R information technology network linked to the ODP database, or
do EP&R staff have to access the database at the ODP office?).
Answer: FEMA submits a request for information and views the
information at ODP. In the last 11 months, FEMA has requested
information four times.
Question 9: What duplications of effort or grant programs have EP&R
and ODP discovered, and how have these duplications been resolved?
Answer: As earlier stated, the DHS Secretary intends to consolidate
ODP and the Office of State and Local Coordination (SLGC) into a new
office entitled the Office of State and Local Government Coordination
and Preparedness (SLGCP). The purpose of this consolidation is to
enhance overall coordination and to provide greater program
integration, simplified application and award processes, and greater
consistency in policy and program development.
Question 10: How exactly does the ODP data inform the FEMA
Capability Assessment for Readiness (CAR) process, as well as other
EP&R programs? When will the current CAR be completed, and will the
results of the CAR be provided to Congress?
Answer: ODP's previous assessment effort was primarily oriented
toward training, equipment, and exercises. CAR has attempted a holistic
assessment of states' emergency management programs. In 2001, FEMA
provided Congress the results of the 2000 State CAR. We are currently
conducting a National Emergency Management Baseline--Capability
Assurance Program (NEMB-CAP). Under the NEMB-CAP, FEMA is finding and
sponsoring assessments of state-level emergency management capability
against a common set of voluntary standards. All 56 state and state-
level jurisdictions are expected to participate in this program, slated
for completion in fiscal year 2005. The results of those assessments
will help FEMA, ODP, the Department of Homeland Security, and the
states develop strategies to better target assistance to areas of
greatest common need. An initial Progress Report was produced in
November 2003, and we will continue to develop and produce progress
reports every six months. Because these reports identify aggregate
areas of weakness, and potential vulnerabilities, they are For Official
Use Only.
Question 11: Through the CAR, or other programs, how is DHS helping
first responders assess their risks, capacity needs, and readiness? How
is DHS ensuring that first responders (particularly state and local
governments) are using a common method for assessing risks, determining
needs, and measuring readiness? Finally, how is DHS providing
information and intelligence to help them make these assessments?
Answer: FEMA has provided two versions of its Local CAR, unabridged
and abridged (e.g., for smaller communities without an extensive
emergency management program), for states' use in assessing the
emergency management capabilities of their local governments. Likewise,
we have provided a version of CAR specifically for Tribal governments
to use on a voluntary basis. We have developed a terrorism-specific
supplement to the Local CAR as well. FEMA is also funding and
sponsoring assessments of state-level emergency management capability
against a common set of voluntary standards under our National
Emergency Management Baseline-Capability Assessment Program. Finally,
we are developing an interactive, web-based self-assessment tool for
Federal, state, tribal, and local governments based on the National
Incident Management System.
Question 12: How will DHS know when state and local governments
have done enough to prepare for terrorist attacks, natural disasters,
and accidents?
Answer: HSPD-8 ``establishes policies to strengthen the
preparedness of the United States to prevent and respond to threatened
or actual domestic terrorist attacks, major disasters, and other
emergencies by requiring a national domestic all-hazards preparedness
goal, establishing mechanisms for improved delivery of Federal
preparedness assistance to Stat and local governments, and outlining
actions to strengthen preparedness capabilities of Federal, State, and
local entitie FEI and ODP are working closely on the implementation of
these policies and the development of a National Preparedness Goal.
Preparedness is an on-going effort. Even where local and state
governments may reach a defined level of preparedness, they must
grapple with personnel turnover, equipment maintenance, changes in
organizations and resources that affect plans, new or revised policies,
and so on. They also must continually demonstrate to themselves and
others that, where they have achieved a standard, they continue to meet
it.
The National Incident Management System NIMS), published March 1,
2004, by DHS, establishes the framework and requirements for effective,
interoperable incident management at all levels of government. To
facilitate and coordinate standards development in the areas of
training, equipment, organization, and capability, as well as to
measure and assure compliance with those standards, DHS is establishing
a NIMS Integration Center. Progress is already underway. An initial
version of a National Incident Management Capability Assessment Support
Tool has been developed and will provide a mechanism for all
jurisdictions to report (and for the Department to monitor and track)
compliance with NIMS requirements.
FEMA is working with the Science and Technology Directorate to
identify existing standards for Emergency Management, Fire Services,
Law Enforcement, and all first responders,which will be validated. This
process will identify any standards that require revision or updating,
as well as identify the areas where standards are missing and require
priority action to produce the missing standards. The complete
inventory of applicable standards will then provide the foundation of
the capability assurance process that will measure the implementation
of the standards.
Assistance to Firefighters Grant Program
Member Comment: Authorized in 2000, the F.I.R.E. Act directed the
FEMA Director to make grants on a competitive basis directly to fire
departments of a state for the purpose of enhancing the department's
ability to protect the health and safety of the public as well as that
of firefighting personnel facing fire and fire-related hazards. Under
current law, the ``Response to Terrorism or Use of Weapons of Mass
Destruction'' is only one authorized use of assistance to firefighter
grant funds. The Administration's fiscal year 2004 request requires
that all grant funds be used for, ``terrorism preparedness or dual-use
activities, provided that these activities are aligned with state or
local terrorism preparedness plans.''
In response to questions from the Committee during the hearing
regarding the requirement that all FIRE grant funds be aligned with
terrorism preparedness planning, Under Secretary Brown stated, ``I
would not characterize it in that fashion.''
Question 13: Does the Administration's fiscal year 2004 budget
request require that the use of FIRE Grant funds be aligned with state
or local terrorism preparedness plans. If so, is this requirement
consistent with the legislative intent of this program?
Answer: The fiscal year 2005 budget request states that priority
shall be given to fire grant applications enhancing terrorism
preparedness. Currently, there is no legislative requirement to
coordinate with state or local preparedness plans. Since the grants are
competitive, requirements are viewed as elements that diminish the
competitive structure. However, if such alignment were preferred, it
could be reflected as a part of the competitive rating of applications.
In spite of this, we emphasized the eligibility of terrorism
preparedness initiatives in our guidance for the fiscal year 2004 Fire
Grant program. Applications requesting equipment or training to prepare
for terrorism events should be validated as being aligned with state
terrorism preparedness plans by state representatives who are familiar
with the plans.
Question 14: What was the rationale for transferring the management
and administration of this program, given the fact that USFA's
stewardship of this program has been universally praised, particularly
the program's peer-review process?
Answer: In order to facilitate a ``one-stop shop'' approach to
grants to the states, the Office for Domestic Preparedness has been
named the lead office for financial assistance to first responders, and
the fire grants are intended for some of the same customers. The peer
review process will remain part of the fiscal year 2004 Fire Grant
Program under ODP. Under the fiscal year 2004 Appropriation and the
President's fiscal year 2005 budget request, fire grants will remain in
the Office for Domestic Preparedness.
Question 15: Can EP&R assure Congress that this program will
continue to function efficiently and effectively--with grants
distributed directly to local fire departments--should ODP or another
DHS component assume responsibility for program management?
Answer: FEMA will continue to work closely with ODP to support the
programmatic efforts to administer these grants as intended by Congress
and the Administration's budget request.
Question 16: What are the plans and timeframes for getting this
office fully operational? What priorities has DHS set for this office
to improve coordination and collaboration with our state and local
partners?
Answer: The Office of State and Local Government Coordination
(SLGC) was established by the Homeland Security Act of 2002 to serve as
a single point-of-contact for facilitation and coordination of
Departmental programs that impact state, local, territorial, and tribal
governments. This office was operational as of March 24, 2003; however,
it has grown and now has representatives from all four functional
Directorates in DHS as well as law enforcement liaisons.
Priorities for SLGC include: (1) facilitating the coordination of
DHS-wide policies and programs that impact state, local, territorial,
and tribal governments; (2) serving as the primary point-of-contact
within DHS for exchanging information with state, local, territorial,
and tribal homeland security personnel; (3) identifying homeland
security- related activities, best practices. and processes that are
most efficiently accomplished at the Federal, state, local or regional
levels; and (4) utilizing this information to ensure that opportunities
for improvement are provided to our state, territorial, tribal, and
local counterparts.
In a January 26, 2004, letter to the Speaker of the House of
Representatives, Secretary Ridge stated his intent to consolidate the
Office for Domestic Preparedness (ODP), which currently is within the
Directorate for Border and Transportation Security, with SLGC, which
reports directly to the Secretary. The Secretary stated further that he
intended to assign the current Director of ODP to the position of
Executive Director of this consolidated office, which will be entitled
the Office of State and Local Government Coordination and Preparedness
(SLGCP) and shall report directly to the Secretary.
Role of EP&R and Office for State and Local Government Coordination
Question 17: How will this office work with the EP&R Directorate
and increase its outreach to state and local jurisdictions to get their
input and buy-in for policies, measures, standards, etc.? What is the
division of responsibility for state and local government coordination
between the EP&R Directorate and the Office of State and Local
Government Coordination?
Answer: We have participated in the Office of State and Local
Government Coordination's (OSLGC's) efforts to determine what
assessment activities are taking place with local and state
governments. We will continue to work with OSLGC and support efforts to
satisfy common local and state customers of the Department's multi-
faceted activities. OSLGC is a staff office, and we are a line office
dealing with local and state governments on a regular basis in
executing our programs.
Communications Equipment Standards
Member Comment: The fiscal year 2003 Supplemental Appropriations
Bill provided the EP&R Directorate with $54,750,000 for the Emergency
Management Planning and Assistance account for interoperable
communications. In his prepared testimony for the Con Under Secretary
Brown indicated that the funds used for grants to local jurisdictions
that will compete for demonstration projects that will explore uses of
equipment and technologies to increase interoperability among the fire
service, law enforcement, and emergency medical service communities.
These demonstration projects will serve as models of interoperable
solutions that can be shared throughout the nation.
Question 18: When will EP&R select the jurisdictions that will
conduct the demonstration projects? If the jurisdictions have already
been selected, please provide the Committee with a list of those
jurisdictions.
Answer: On Thursday, September 25, 2003, Secretary Ridge announced
the 17 communities that will receive a total of $79.6 million in funds
for interoperable communications demonstration projects. The recipients
of the fiscal year 2003 Interoperability Communication Grants include:
Conway, AR ($2,082,385);
Rehoboth Beach, DE ($2,406,284);
St. Clair County, IL ($6,000,000);
Woodbury County, IA ($5,995,822);
Worcester County, MD ($5,629,013);
Monroe County, MI ($6,000,000);
Ramsey County, MN ($6,000,000);
Independence, MO ($5,496,750);
Lewis and Clark County, MT ($4,475,916);
Grafton County, NH ($2,176,168);
Erie County, NY ($6,000,000);
Tulsa, OK ($846,263);
Westmoreland County. PA ($5,964,973);
Narragansett, RI ($3,041,942);
Charlottesville/Albemarle County/UVA, VA ($6,000,000);
Clallam County, WA ($5,765,100); and
Harrison County, WV ($5,689,684).
Question 19: When will the demonstration projects be completed,
arid when will the findings of these projects be made available? Please
provide a general overview of the types of information that will be
included in final reports on the demonstration projects.
Answer: Officially, the performance period for the grant program is
12 months from the date of the award and will be closed out at the end
of September 2004. In September 2004, the grantees will be required to
conduct an evaluation to document the successes and impediments
experienced by the grant recipients in implementing the demonstration
projects. Grantees will be required to submit the evaluation to FEMA.
The evaluations will help to export the lessons learned to other states
and communities. The evaluation template will be developed in
coordination with SAFECOM and AGILE and distributed by FEMA and COPS
for conducting the final evaluation. SAFECOM, AGILE, and NIST will
provide assistance for completion of the template.
Standards and Personnel Costs for Elevated Threat Alerts
Question 20: What guidance, if any, has DHS provided to Federal,
state, and local responders with regard to the actions they should take
or consider when the national threat level increases--for example, from
yellow to orange? If there is guidance, is it the same across the
nation, or does it vary by location--e.g., for major ports, sparsely
populated areas, etc.?
Answer: According to ODP, states and localities are utilizing
Critical Infrastructure Protection grant funds to pay for some overtime
costs, as well as other preparedness functions associated with
elevations in the national threat level.
In addition, the United States Fire Administration has developed
and distributed a document, Fire and Emergency Services Preparedness
Guide for the Homeland Security Advisory System, to assist fire,
emergency medical services, and emergency management agencies with
implementing the Homeland Security Advisory System (HSAS) into their
operations. This preparedness document also provides guidance for
agency response to changes in the HSAS threat level.
Question 21: What other funding mechanisms is DHS considering to
offset the costs incurred by state and local governments caused by
elevations in the national threat level? Are state and local
governments using the ODP Critical Infrastructure Protection grants
solely to fund personnel and overtime costs?
Answer: The Department of Homeland Security (the Department)
recognizes the significant financial impact that periods of High
(ORANGE) threat levels have had on state and local governments. To this
end, the Department, through the Office for Domestic Preparedness
(ODP), is providing support for states and localities to offset some of
the costs associated with periods of heightened security.
Through ODP's fiscal year 2003 State Homeland Security Grant
Program (SHSGP), Part II, the Department provided $200 million for
states to dedicate to ``Critical Infrastructure Protection.'' States
could use these funds for purposes including: (1) public safety agency
overtime costs; (2) contract security personnel costs; and (3) state-
ordered National Guard deployments required to augment security at
critical infrastructure during the ORANGE threat alert level periods
from February 7, 2003, through February 27, 2003; March 17, 2003,
through April 16, 2003; May 20, 2003, through May 30, 2003; and
December 21, 2003, through January 9, 2004. Reimbursement is available
for costs incurred during those time periods only. However, states that
did not expend all their allocated Critical Infrastructure Protection
funds during those periods were allowed to retain the funds through the
end of the award period for use in conjunction with future periods of
heightened threat.
Additionally, through ODP's fiscal year 2003 Urban Areas Security
Initiative (UASI), Part II, 30 urban areas were provided $700 million
to address the unique security requirements of large urban areas. Under
UASI, Part II, grantees and sub grantees were eligible to use up to 25
percent of the gross amount of their award to reimburse for operational
expenses including: (1) public safety agency overtime costs; (2)
contract security personnel costs; and (3) state-ordered National Guard
deployments required to augment security at critical infrastructure
during the above-mentioned four ORANGE threat alert level periods.
Reimbursement is available for costs incurred during those time periods
only.
To determine the impact on states of heightened states of alert,
ODP asked states to provide information on expenses incurred for
protections of critical infrastructure protection during the most
recent Orange threat alert level period (from December 21, 2003,
through January 9, 2004). ODP provided a template to every state and
received feedback from 25 states, which reported to have spent a total
of $12,840,568 on overtime costs associated with the protection of
critical infrastructure sites during that period. Of this total, a
majority was spent on public safety officers' overtime costs.
ODP has also opened the fiscal year 2004 UASI, which will provide
$725 million to 50 urban areas and 25 selected transit systems, to
allow for not more than 25 percent of the total grant award in the
reimbursable categories noted above under SHSGP, Part II and UASI, Part
II. States may provide reimbursement for such expenses incurred during
the most recent Orange threat alert level period (from December 21,
2003, through January 9, 2004). In addition, states may use up to 25
percent of their Law Enforcement Terrorism Prevention Program (LETPP)
portion of the fiscal year 2004 Homeland Security Grant Program (HSGP)
for the same operational expenses noted above under SHSGP, Part II and
UASI, Part II. Under the fiscal year 2004 HSGP, states were allocated
$500 million for LETPP.
Top Officials (TOPOFF) II Exercise
Question 22: ODP led the Administration's efforts in managing the
TOPOFF II exercise. Will ODP continue to manage this exercise series?
What is EP&R's role--if any--in future terrorist exercise programs?
Will EP&R lead the conduct of any exercises this year involving state
and local governments? If so, please describe these exercises.
Answer: We anticipate that ODP will continue to manage the TOPOFF
series as part of its responsibility to manage the National Exercise
Program. Also, we anticipate that FEMA, as the DHS focalpoint for
response and recovery efforts, will continue to be a major player in
terrorist exercises--as it was this year, for example, in Northern
Command's UNIFIED DEFENSE 04. FEMA's regions collaborate extensively
with state and local governments to coordinate participation in
national-level exercises. FEMA regions also work with state and local
governments on other exercises. Finally, FEMA's Radiological Emergency
Preparedness Program and Chemical Stockpile Emergency Preparedness
Program have substantial exercise components as part of meeting FEMA's
responsibilities for evaluating offsite preparedness around nuclear
power plants and chemical stockpile locations.
Question 23: If a terrorist incident occurred tomorrow, what would
be the organizational structure for response coordination? Who in DES
makes the final decisions regarding the Federal response, and are all
participating agencies cognizant of the Federal command and control
structure?
Answer: According to both the National Incident Management System
(NIMS) and the draft National Response Plan (NRP), management of
incidents is the responsibility of the local government; state and
Federal entities support the local response. FEMA's United States Fire
Administration, in addition to providing incident management training
for all first responder agencies, is developing Incident Management
Teams (IMTs) at the local, regional and state levels. These IMTs would
be trained in ICS, NIMS, and the NRP, and would provide a smooth
interface with Federal resources.
Deployment of Federal disaster response assets is the
responsibility of the Secretary, DES, and this authority has been
delegated to the Under Secretary for EPR. All decisions on deploying
Federal resources are closely coordinated between the EPR Under
Secretary and the DHS Secretary's office. Under HSPD-5, the Attorney
General coordinates deployment of law enforcement assets to respond to
the site of a terrorist incident.
The mission of FEMA is to prepare for, respond to, and recover from
disasters of all kinds, regardless of whether caused by terrorist
attacks, natural disasters, outbreaks, or technological accidents.
The structure of the Response Division of FEMA is based on the
Incident Management System so that it is aligned to meet the needs of
state and local responders. In addition, it is designed to meet the
President's directive in Homeland Security Presidential Directive
(HSPD)-5, which called for a National Incident Management System. The
Response Division includes and manages many national response assets
formerly maintained within other Federal agencies. These include the
National Disaster Medical System, the Domestic Emergency Support Team,
the Strategic National Stockpile, and the Nuclear Incident Response
Team.
This consolidation of national response assets allows the Federal
Government not only to continue to provide the same level of services
to which the American people became accustomed during emergencies and
disasters, but it also enhances the ability of DHS to maximize Federal
resources, streamline delivery processes, and focus programs and assets
to state and local needs. The basic disaster response process familiar
to the 26 Federal agencies that are signatory to the Federal Response
Plan continues to form the foundation of disaster response.
Question 24: What are the roles and responsibilities of the DHS
Principal Federal Official versus those of the FEMA/EP&R Federal
Coordinating Officer?
Answer: Under Homeland Security Presidential Directive (HSPD-5),
the Secretary of Homeland Security is the principal Federal official
for domestic incident management. The Federal Coordinating Officer is
responsible for coordinating all disaster relief activities. Pursuant
to the Homeland Security Act of 2002, the Secretary is responsible for
coordinating Federal operations within the United States to prepare
for, respond to, and recover from terrorist attacks, major disasters,
and other emergencies. The Secretary coordinates the Federal
Government's resources utilized in response to or recovery from
terrorist attacks, major disasters, or other emergencies if and when
any one of the following four conditions applies: (1) a Federal
department or agency acting under its own authority has requested the
assistance of the Secretary; (2) the resources of state and local
authorities are overwhelmed and Federal assistance has been requested
by the appropriate state and local authorities; (3) more than one
Federal department or agency has become substantially involved in
responding to the incident; or (4) the Secretary has been directed to
assume responsibility for managing the domestic incident by the
President.
The Secretary of Homeland Security promulgated the Initial National
Response Plan by memorandum dated September 30, 2003. The Initial NRP
provides interim guidance on Federal coordinating structures for
domestic incident management until the full NRP becomes effective in
approximately June 2004, and keeps the current family of Federal
incident management and emergency response plans in effect during the
interim period, except as specifically modified by the Initial NRP.
Under the Initial NRP, when an incident meeting one of the four
conditions listed above occurs, or in anticipation of an incident
meeting those conditions, the Secretary may designate a Federal officer
to serve as the Principal Federal Official (PFO) to represent the
Secretary locally and oversee and coordinate Federal activities
relevant to the incident. The roles and responsibilities of the PFO
include the following:
a. Representing the Secretary as the senior Federal official on
scene to enable the Secretary to carry out his role as the
principal Federal official for domestic incident management;
b. Ensuring overall coordination of domestic incident
management activities and resource allocation on scene,
ensuring seamless integration of Federal incident management
activities in support of state, local, and tribal requirements;
c. Providing strategic guidance to Federal entities and
facilitating interagency conflict resolution as necessary to
enable timely Federal assistance to state, local, and tribal
authorities;
d. Serving as primary, although not exclusive, point for
Federal interface,with state, local, and tribal government
officials, the media, and the private sector for incident
management;
e. Providing real-time incident information, through the
support of the Federal incident management structure on scene,
to the Secretary, as required;
f. Coordinating the overall Federal public communications
strategy at the state, local, and tribal levels and clearing
Federal interagency communications to the public regarding the
incident.
Using the protocols identified in existing plans, to include the
Federal Response Plan, the PFO will oversee the coordination of the
deployment and application of Federal assets and resources in support
of the on-scene conimander. The PFO will do this in coordination with
other Federal officials identified in existing plans, such as the
Federal Coordinating Officer (FCO) and the Federal Bureau of
Investigation Special Agent in Charge. [Source: Interim NRP, September
30, 2003]
The Stafford Act provides for the appointment of a Federal
Coordinating Officer (FCO) by the President immediately upon his
declaration of a major disaster or emergency (See 42 U.S.C. Sec. 5143).
The FCO, within the affected area, makes an initial appraisal of the
types of relief most urgently needed; establishes field offices, as
(s)he deems necessary and as are authorized by the President;
coordinates the administration of relief, including activities of the
state and local governments, and other relief or disaster assistance
organizations, which agree to operate under his advice or direction;
and takes such other action (s)he may deem necessary to assist local
citizens and public officials in promptly obtaining the assistance to
which they are entitled, including making certain that all Federal
agencies carry out their appropriate disaster assistance roles. We are
continuing to work on the inter-relationships between these two roles
to assure that they are fully complementary as we work to finalize the
National Response Plan.
Question 25: What is the role and responsibilities of the DHS
Homeland Security Center and Crisis Action Team versus those of the
FEMA/EP&R HQ Operations Center and Emergency Support Team? Which
organization should state and local governments be working with during
disaster response?
Answer: The Initial NRP established the National Homeland Security
Operations Center (HSOC) and the Interagency Incident Management Group
(11MG). The HSOC, located at DHS Headquarters, is the primary national-
level hub for operational communications and information pertaining to
domestic incident management. The HSOC integrates and provides overall
steady state threat monitoring and situational awareness for domestic
incident management on a 24/7 basis. The 11MG facilitates incident
specific national-level domestic incident management and coordination
and replaces the Crisis Action Team. [ details on the HSOC and IIMG are
contained in the Interim NRP.] The HSOC and 11MG coordinate and analyze
information from all of the different DHS components, including FEMA
and the Emergency Support Team (EST), to formulate and provide high-
level, strategic recommendations to the Secretary. The FEMA EST manages
the actual interagency operational disaster response activities for DHS
to respond to the needs of state and local governments. It maintains
constant contact and coordination with the DHS IIMG and HSOC. The
procedures for interaction between the state/local governments and the
IIMG have not been developed, but will be an interagency collaboration
that will be published by the Secretary of Homeland Security in a
separate document.
In the meantime, state and local governments should continue to
work through the EST to address disaster response needs.
Question 26: As of today, who makes deployment decisions for the
specialized public health assets utilized in response to disasters,
such as the strategic national stockpile and National Disaster Medical
System Assets. In the event of a disaster, who approves the use of
these resources, EP&R, Secretary Ridge, or HHS Secretary Thompson?
Answer: Activation of the National Disaster Medical System (NDMS)
is the responsibility of the Secretary of DHS. This authority has been
delegated to the Under Secretary for EPR Directorate. DHS is the owner
of the Strategic National Stockpile (SNS). However, the Memorandum of
Agreement between DHS and HHS has been amended to allow HHS to deploy
SNS when either the Secretary of HHS or the Secretary of DHS determines
it necessary to do so. DHS will also coordinate with the Secretary of
HHS in any actual deployment of the SNS. Also, the Secretary of HHS has
authority to request that DHS activate the NDMS when he is leading an
ESF-8 response.
In the fiscal year 2005 budget proposal and the proposed Bioshield
legislation, the Administration has proposed to return principal
responsibility for the SNS to HHS. The Secretaries have also entered
(are working to finalize?) into an MOA that outlines each agency's role
with regard to SNS responsibilities.
Question 27: How does DHS plan to improve coordination of these
assets, and is new legislation required to clarify the funding
mechanisms necessary to access and deploy response resources?
Answer: Substantial effort is being made to consolidate and
integrate all of the different disaster response programs, teams, and
assets in DHS. FEMA is designing new approaches and implementing new
efficiencies that will result in a more unified, integrated, and
comprehensive approach to all-hazards disaster response. The improved
coordination of all response programs and efforts to introduce a new
response culture will make DHS better able to elevate operational
disaster response capabilities to a whole new level of proficiency, one
that will further the principles of the National Response Plan and
National Incident Management System and better serve the American
people.
All of the disaster response operations, programs, and activities
are being reviewed to make sure that they are complementary and work
together to form a cohesive national response system that eliminates
duplication and inefficiencies. Related to this, measures are planned
that will help to reduce the time it takes for disaster response teams
to get to a disaster site and the time it takes to deliver needed
disaster supplies. In addition, greater emphasis will be placed on
catastrophic disaster planning, including planning for responding to
acts of terrorism.
Furthermore, FEMA is in the process of assessing whether any
legislative or regulatory changes would facilitate the implementation
of its new statutory responsibilities. We will continue to keep
Congress informed of any needed changes, as they develop.
Threat Analysis
Question 28: Has EP&R worked with other DHS organizations, such as
the IAIP Directorate, to define the types and format of threat
information EP&R will require to better prepare states and localities
for acts of terrorism and other hazards?
Answer: For executing its responsibilities under PDD-39 and the
CONPLAN, FEMA developed a template for the information the consequence
management community would need from intelligence and law enforcement
to develop a response to a terrorist threat. Essentially, this involves
what, where, when, and how, as well as an estimate of the intelligence
and law enforcement communities' confidence in the information.
In an environment with multiple terrorist threats and
vulnerabilities, there must be some means of prioritizing among them.
The terrorist threat, while the primary concern of the Department, must
also be balanced against other risks and hazards facing states and
locals. FEMA's Mitigation Division maintains substantial information on
natural hazards vulnerabilities, working in partnership with other
agencies.
FEMA has coordinated closely with ODP in the development of its
fiscal year 2003 State Domestic Preparedness Program assessment
documentation and has participated in the regional workshops. FEMA is
also working closely with UDP on the development of the National
Preparedness Goal under HSPD-8.
Question 29: When does EP&R expect to receive sufficient threat
information from other DHS components, such as the IAIP Directorate, to
begin tailoring grant programs to the areas of highest threats and
vulnerabilities?
Answer: DHS has decided to consolidate most grant programs in the
Office for Domestic Preparedness (ODP), which will need to work with
1AIP and the Office for State and Local Government Coordination to
determine how to tailor the grants to the highest risk and
vulnerabilities in the nation.
Chemical Attack Preparedness
Member Comment: On June 4, 2003, The Washington Post reported that
the Upited States remains highly vulnerable to a chemical terrorist
attack (``Readiness for Chemical Attack Criticized,'' page All), in
large part because the Department of Health and Human Services and the
Environmental Protection Agency still have not decided which agency
would spearhead chemical testing. The article further stated that a
spokesman at the Department of Homeland Security said he was unable to
answer questions regarding the threat of chemical agents and chemical
testing capabilities in the country.
Question 30: What organization in DHS is working with state and
local governments to ensure that their response plans include
procedures and identify laboratory facilities for chemical agent
testing? What standards is DHS using to measure state and local
preparedness for terrorist attacks using (or accidental releases of)
chemical agents?
Answer: DHS, through the Information Analysis and Infrastructure
Protection Directorate and the other components of the Department, has
asked jurisdictions to prepare for nerve agents, blister agents,
choking agents, vomiting agents, incapacitants, and tear agents by
utilizing a cache of equipment and pharmaceuticals purchased through
MMRS funds to treat up to 1,000 victims. Jurisdictions are required to
include planning for receipt and distribution of the Strategic National
Stockpile. The response plan to manage the health consequences of an
incident resulting from the use of CBRNE agents will include components
to detect and identify the weapon material or agent, extract victims,
administer the appropriate antidote, decontaminate victims and triage
them, and provide primary care prior to their transportation to a
definitive medical care facility. The plan calls for emergency medical
transportation of patients to hospitals or to pre offsite treatment
facilities, as well as for emergency and inpatient services in
hospitals that have the capacity and capability to provide the
definitive medical care required, including the management of patients
without prior field treatment/screening or decontamination.
Furthermore, through HSPD-8, additional goals and standards will be
developed in conjunction with the implementation of the National
Preparedness Goal.
Question 31: Are you aware of this dispute between HHS and EPA, and
is DHS working to resolve this issue? In the event of a chemical
attack, what agency would DHS utilize to provide analysis of the
agent(s)?
Answer: In the event of a chemical attack by terrorists, DHS/FEMA
would use the current Federal Response Plan (National Response Plan)
organizational structure to assign the task of analyzing chemical
agents. DHS would consult HHS and EPA, as the respective leads for ESF-
8 and-10, on the best course of action. As the overall coordinator for
terrorism responses, DHS would facilitate technical disagreements
raised by the two agencies. EPA is the Primary Agency for ESF-10
Hazardous Materials. Thus FEMA could issue a mission assignment to EPA
to provide an analysis of the agent(s) in question. EPA, as Primary
Agency for ESF-10, would work with other ESF-10-Support Agencies to
accomplish the task, including HHS, DHS, U.S. Coast Guard, Department
of Defense (DoD), and others. The Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI)
would conduct the criminal investigation aspect of the Federal
response, and thus could directly task another Federal agency to
identify and assess a chemical agent.
To ensure that the country has adequate chemical analysis
capability for clinical and environmental samples during a chemical
attack, DHS's Science and Technology Directorate is leading an inter-
agency working group with primary participation from HHS, EPA, and the
FBI. During initial meetings, HHS and EPA identified problems in the
ESF-10 coordination, which was highlighted during the past events. EPA
has the capacity for the analysis of Toxic Industrial Chemicals but not
chemical warfare agents in environmental samples, which need special
handling precautions and facilities. HHS does have capacity to analyze
a limited volume of clinical samples during an attack. Therefore, these
agencies along with others would rely on the same few select contract
and DoD laboratories to provide chemical analysis in the event a
warfare agent is used The FBI also utilizes these laboratories for
forensic analysis. If the attack remains limited in scope, then these
laboratories could process the number of samples generated for human
health and environmental risk assessment along with needed forensics
capability.
The inter-agency working group is drafting a coordination committee
plan for sampling, analysis and data reduction during a chemical attack
to ensure that the proper number and types of samples are collected,
analyzed, and reported for all agencies participating in the response.
DHS would chair this committee during a chemical attack with input from
top- level subject matter experts from each respective agency. The
group is also conducting a survey of the entire Federal, including
contract laboratory, capability that could be used during an attack to
determine how much additional capability would be needed for large
chemical attacks. These measures will determine which laboratories can
be used and how much additional laboratory capability needs to be
established for the preparation of a chemical attack.
Disaster Relief Fund
Question 32: What is the current funding balance of the Disaster
Relief Fund? Please provide the Committee with a detailed accounting of
all fiscal year 2003 Disaster Relief Fund obligations, to include
specific amounts, dates, and purposes for which the funds were
obligated.
Answer: As of March 17, 2004, the Disaster Relief Fund (DRF)
unobligated balance was $1,889,237,000. Enclosed is an Excel chart that
identifies fiscal year 2003 DRF obligations for declarations for major
disasters, emergencies, and fire management assistance (citing the
declaration dates); DRF funding for the repetitive loss and map
modernizations programs; Office of Inspector General reimbursements;
and FEMA dministrative and surge activities. DRF funds are obligated as
needed throughout the fiscal year.
[This chart is maintained in the Committee Files]
Question 33: Given historical trends and your own analysis, do you
have enough unobligated funds to respond to and recover from major
disasters and emergencies for the remainder of fiscal year 2003, or
will the administration request a supplemental appropriation? If a
supplemental is requested, when could that request be expected?
Answer: Based on the funding needs for fiscal year 2003, the
Administration, at the request of the Department of Homeland Security,
requested an fiscal year 2003 supplemental for the DRF. Congress
appropriated supplemental funding in the amount of $983,600,000 on
August 1, 2003. In addition, Congress approved a supplemental for
$441,700,000 signed on September 30, 2003.
Emergency Management Performance Grant (EMPG) Program
Member Comment: The National Emergency Management Association
(NEMA) describes EMPG grants as the backbone of the nation's emergency
management system, because it is the only source of direct Federal
funding to state and local governments for emergency management
capacity-building. In fiscal year 2003, EMPG received a $29.9 million
increase--for a total of $165 million--after over ten years of
straight-lined funding. NEMA believes continued funding increases are
necessary to meet increased state and local commitments, because
funding has not kept pace with inflation or with increasing demand. The
increased flexibility of EMPG is offset by overall program funding
shortfalls, estimated in a 2002 NEMA study to be $117.8 million.
Question 34: Both the International Association of Emergency
Managers (IAEM), representing local governments, and NEMA, representing
state governments, have identified EMPG needs totaling approximately
$300 million per fiscal year. What analyses, if any, has DHS/EP&R
conducted to determine the needs of the state and local emergency
management community?
Answer: To help determine and target assistance to areas of
greatest common need, FEMA is funding and sponsoring assessments of
state-level emergency management capability against a common set of
voluntary standards. All 56 state and state-level jurisdictions are
expected to participate in this program, slated for completion in
fiscal year 2005. FEMA also publishes and distributes Local and Tribal
Capacity Assessment for Readiness (CAR) self-assessment tools that
local jurisdictions and tribes can use, on a voluntary basis, to
determine their areas of need within an emergency management context.
Question 35: How does DHS propose that states and localities plan,
train, and exercise for--and respond to--acts of terrorism without
sufficient, experienced professional staff?
Answer: The Administration has proposed that it is the
responsibility of states and localities to provide funding for staff.
The Federal Government's responsibilities lie more in providing
guidance and resources for planning, training, and exercises.
Homeland Security Presidential Directive-5 (HSPD-5)/Management of
Domestic Incidents. National Response Plan
Member Comment: Under the Homeland Security Act of 2002, EP&R is
responsible for ``consolidating existing Federal Government emergency
response plans into a single, coordinated national response plan.''
This national response plan (NRP) effort is described by HSPD-5,
``Management of Domestic Incidents.'' According to a June 3, 2003, DHS
briefing for state and local association representatives, EP&R is not
managing the plan revision process. This process is being managed by a
DHS task force, headed by Admiral Loy (the Administrator of the
Transportation Security Administration), where EP&R only provides input
to the process.
Question 36: Why is the development of the National Response Plan
being managed by a Task Force, headed by the TSA Administrator? What
was DHS's rationale for assigning this responsibility to another compon
of the Department rather than EP&R?
Answer: The development of the NRP is being led by a Special
Assistant to Secretary Ridge. The decision was made to place the
leadership of the effort in the Secretary's immediate office to give it
the appropriate level of attention, visibility and direct access to the
Secretary. This decision reflects the criticality of the NRP
development effort. The NRP core writing team includes cross-component
representation within DHS, to include EPR, BTS, USCG, S&L Coordination
Office, and ODP. The cross-component representation is integral to the
broadened scope of the NRP document to include a full spectrum of
incident management domains: prevention, preparedness, response, and
recovery. The NRP builds upon the best practices of existing Federal
plans, consolidating them into a single document. DHS EPR is fully
engaged in the development of this very important effort.
Question 37: How are state and local governments involved in the
National Response Plan development process? How do EP&R and other DHS
organizations intend to use the NRP to integrate into state and local
response systems?
Answer: A conference was convened the week of August 11, 2003, to
solicit additional comments and input from Federal, state, and local
officials to help with the further development of the NRP and the
National Incident Management System (NIMS). Representatives from 12
Federal agencies, the International Association for Emergency Managers,
and National Emergency Management Association, as well as other
representatives from the fire, police, and emergency management
communities attended the conference. A similar conference to solicit
input on NIMS was convened the week of November 17, 2003.
The collective input and guidance from all of the homeland security
partners--state, territorial, local, tribal and Federal--has been and
will continue to be vital to the development of an effective and
comprehensive NRP and NIMS. [Source: Secretary Ridge's memo
promulgating the Initial NRP, September 30, 2003]
Additionally, FEMA's United States Fire Administration, in addition
to providing incident management training (including training on the
NIMS and the NRP) for all first responder agencies, is developing
Incident Management Teams (IMT5) at the local, regional and state
levels. These IMTs would be trained in ICS, NIMS, and the NRP, and
would provide a smooth interface with Federal resources under the NRIP.
Comment: In his May 20 and 22 prepared testimony before the
Committee, Secretary Ridge stated, ``To improve on-site management of
Federal assets in the immediate aftermath of an incident, EP&R
initiated plans for the rapid deployment of DHS Incident Management
Teams.'' He further testified that, ``To significantly strengthen DHS
emergency response capabilities, EP&R began incorporating Domestic
Emergency Support Teams, Nuclear Incident Response Teams, the National
Disaster M and the Strategic National Stockpile into its planning and
response capabilities.''
Question 38: Which DHS component organization, and associated
budget account, is funding the NRP and National Incident Management
System (NIMS) planning processes? What are the costs to date for this
program, and what are the total expected costs for fiscal year 2003 and
beyond?
Answer: To date, costs directly associated with the NIMS planning
process have been less than $1 million. This was funded from DHS's
Departmental Operations funding. Immediate future planning costs are
expected to be less than another $750,000. The source of this funding
has not been determined. Costs do not include costs for government
employee time spent on the project.
Question 39: Both of these initiatives are characterized as being
the ``planning'' stage. When will the Incident Management Teams be
fully operational, and what DHS component agencies (and other Federal
agencies) will be included on the Incident Management Teams?
Answer: The Incident Management Team (IMT) concept involves
eventually standing up four fully functional, self contained, rapid
deployment teams that would consist of 10-12 members each. The IMT
would form the core on-scene management component of the Federal
disaster response capability interfacing with the state/local Incident
Commander. Various options on where these teams will be placed, who
will be assigned to the teams, and how they will be used are still
under development. The JMTs have not been fielded yet but are an
important aspect of FEMA's implementation of Homeland Security
Presidential Directive (HSPD)-5. Plans are to staff, train, and equip
the teams as resources permit over the next year.
Question 40: Is the planning for Incident Management Teams being
coordinated with the development of the National Response Plan, and if
so, how is it being coordinated? Similarly, when will all of the DHS's
response resources be fully incorporated into the National Response
Plan?
Answer: In accordance with HSPD-5 concerning management of domestic
incidents, DHS has initiated the development of a National Response
Plan (NRP) that integrates Federal domestic prevention, preparedness,
response, and recovery plans into one all-discipline, all-hazards plan,
including catastrophic incidents. The fully developed NRP will set
forth the structures and mechanisms for providing national-level policy
and operational direction to support state and local incident managers,
and for exercising direct Federal authorities and responsibilities.
Currently the Department has a full range of response resources, to
support and supplement state, local, voluntary, and private response
capabilities that can be activated through the existing Interim
National Response Plan. Some of these include:
Strategic National Stockpile
Mobile Emergency Response Support communications,
teams, and equipment
Emergency Response Teams
Nuclear Incident Response Teams
Urban Search and Rescue Task Forces
National Disaster Medical System
Logistics Centers
Additional resources would be requested from other Federal agencies
(e.g., Environmental Protection Agency, Department of Transportation,
Federal Protective Service, and Department of Defense), as required.
The current Fed Response Plan remains functional, as modified by
the Initial NRP. All DHS Federal response assets will be integrated
under the NRP once it is finalized. To optimize use of all available
resources and to ensure consistent and timely allocation, the
Department will work closely with the affected states in identifying
the greatest needs and most effective strategies for resource
allocation. Efforts will be made to facilitate the use of interstate
mutual aid, taking advantage of all available resources. When requests
exceed available Federal resources, the interagency Catastrophic
Disaster Response Group will be convened to prioritize resource
allocations to meet critical needs.
By consolidating response plans for various types of incidents into
one coordinated and consolidated NRP, the Department will be able to
provide a streamlined approach to incident management for the state and
local responders.
The Incident Management Teams, now named the Federal Initial
Response Support Team (FIRST) by the NRP, will be fully incorporated
into the incident command structure of the NRP/NIMS. These teams will
act as the core, field-level response for major disasters, emergencies
or acts of terrorism.
Citizen Preparedness, Citizen Corps, and ``Ready.GOV''
Member Comment: In his May 20 and 22 prepared testimony before the
Committee, Secretary Ridge stated, ``Citizen Corps signed a partnership
with the U.S. Junior Chamber (Jaycees) to raise public awareness about
emergency preparedness, first aid, disaster response training and
volunteer service. Citizen Corps initiated a partnership with the
National Volunteer Fire Council (NVFC) to work together to raise public
awareness about emergency preparedness, fire hazards, volunteer service
programs and the development of fire safety training. Citizen Corps has
added 15 additional states and territories and 266 local governments to
the Citizen Corps Council roster. This brings the total of Citizen
Corps Councils to 43 and 524 respectively.''
Question 41: When will the Jaycees and the NVFC public awareness
campaigns be completed, and how will they be implemented?
Answer: The Jaycees and the NVFC public awareness campaigns are
ongoing, and they are implemented through the many activities and
marketing tools available to them. The Jaycees and the NVFC are 2 of 12
Affiliate organizations that are part of Citizen Corps through the
National Affiliate program.
Citizen Corps is a national initiative that reaches out to four
main sectors to create a community-based movement to raise public
awareness, provide preparedness training, and foster volunteer
opportunities in support of the local first responders. The four main
sectors are:
(1) The National Citizen Corps Council. These are national
organizations that advance the mission of first responder-
citizen preparedness. Each of the Citizen Corps charter
partners (i.e., FEMA, Department of Justice, and the Department
of Health and Human Services) works with its respective
national groups to promote the Citizen Corps mission.
(2) National Affiliates. These are national not-for-profit
organizations that provide resources and materials for public
education or training, offer volunteer service opportunities,
and represent volunteers with an interest in homeland security.
(3) Other government organizations. These, too, are part of the
National Affiliates, and they focus on bringing other
government resources into the mix.
(4) Private partnerships. These are corporations and other
private sector entities that are seeking ways to support state-
or community-level Citizen Corps efforts.
By creating networks and partnerships with each of these major
groups, Citizen Corps seeks to prepare for all hazards including crime,
public health issues, and other medical emergencies. To date, 50
governors of the 56 states and territories have formalized statewide
Citizen Corps Councils and more than 700 local governments have formed
Councils at either the city, county, or regional level. Approximately
75 new councils are being formed each month.
In addition to the Jaycees and the NVFC, other Affiliates are:
American Safety & Health Institute, Civil Air Patrol, Department of
Education, Environmental Protection Agency, National Crime Prevention
Council, National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration, Veterans of
Foreign Wars, the National Fire Protection Association, the Save A Life
Foundation, the National Voluntary Organizations Active in Disaster,
the Points of Light Foundation, the National Safety Council, the
American Radio Relay League, and the American Red Cross. Since these
groups have strong local community presence, they become part of
Citizen Corps Councils and promote Citizen Corps programs such as
Volunteers in Police Service, Medical Reserve Corps, Community
Emergency Response Training, Neighborhood Watch, and others.
Question 42: What are the goals of these campaigns, and how will
their success be measured?
Answer: Listed below are the goals of the Agreements signed by both
organizations.
Together DHS and the Jaycees agree to work in collaborative
partnership to:
Raise public awareness about appropriate actions to take
regarding emergency preparedness, first aid and disaster response
training, and volunteer service
Promote the formation of local Citizen Corps Councils
through local Jaycee chapter participation and assist these Councils
with implementing the programs and practices associated with Citizen
Corps
Provide volunteer service opportunities that support first
responders, disaster relief organizations, and community safety efforts
Publicly acknowledge the affiliation of Citizen Corps and the
Jaycees, which may include website links, co-logos on publications, and
references in printed materials, including articles and news releases
Coordinate their respective activities to further their
shared mission
Keep each other informed of activities conducted in
support of Citizen Corps and provide an annual report summarizing those
activities
Together DHS and the NVFC agree to work in collaborative
partnership to:
Raise public awareness about fire hazards and actions that
can reduce vulnerability through the national, state, and local Citizen
Corps Councils
Encourage communities to further develop fire safety
training, volunteer service programs, and education initiatives with
support from local Citizen Corps Councils;
Publicly acknowledge the affiliation of Citizen Corps and
the NVFC, which may include website links, co-logos on publications,
and references in printed materials;
Coordinate their respective activities at a level that
furthers their shared mission; and
Keep each other informed of activities conducted in
support of Citizen Corps and to provide an annual report summarizing
those activities.
Examples of how the Jaycees are involved include the following:
In May 2003, many of the Jaycees State Presidents visited with
members of Congress. They offered to coordinate Town Hall meetings that
would focus on homeland security, preparedness, and Citizen Corps.
Recently, in Boone County, Kentucky, a Citizen Corps Council was
formed after the local Jaycees chapter initially approached the
county's Emergency Management office about starting the Council.
The Jaycees coordinated the ?Volunteer Orientation? that was
featured on national TV affiliates and that recruited more than 150
people for the various Citizen Corps programs.
The Jaycees plan to focus on working with local government leaders
to start or sustain Councils.
The NVFC, representing the nation's volunteer fire, EMS, and rescue
personnel, has launched a nationwide recruitment campaign in an effort
to boost the ranks in volunteer fire service. The 1-800-FIRE-LINE is a
toll free number that links interested citizens with emergency
opportunities in their community. Publicity materials have also been
developed. Schools and libraries can receive a video about
opportunities and the 1-800-FIRE-LINE program.
Question 43: How much has the ``Get Ready'' and the ``Ready.GOV''
public relations campaign cost the Department and to what effect?
Answer: The campaign has been made possible through a $3 million
grant from the Alfred P. Sloan Foundation to the Ad Council. DHS spent
approximately $150,000 on printing a trifold brochure in support of the
campaign.
The campaign has had the most successful launch in Ad Council
history. The website has received 1.5 billion hits and 17 million
unique visitors. Approximately 2.7 million brochures have been
downloaded from the website and an additional 144,000 brochures have
been requested through the campaign's toll-free number. The Ad Council
estimates that roughly 113 million people have heard or read about the
Ready Campaign through public relations outreach. Donated media to the
Campaign is estimated to be valued at $100 million.
A Spanish outreach campaign, also funded through the Sloan
Foundation, will launch iif December 2003, though the Spanish website
and Spanish brochure will be available sooner.
Question 44: How exactly has Citizen Corps enhanced the
preparedness of state and local governments: What activities are being
executed by Citizen Corps Councils, and how are these activities
enhancing the programs that fall under the Citizen Corps umbrella?
Answer: The Citizen Corps mission is to have every American
participate in homeland security through community-based activities in
preparedness, training, and volunteer support to first responders. As
of August 20, 2003, a total of 50 states and territories have
formalized statewide Citizen Corps Councils, and more than 700 local
Citizen Corps Councils have been formed. Citizen Corps Councils help
drive local citizen participation by coordinating Citizen Corps
Programs, developing community action plans, assessing possible
threats, and identifying local resources. The four Federal programs
under the Citizen Corps umbrella include FEMA's Community Emergency
Response Team Program, HHS' Medical Reserve Corps Program, DOJ's
Neighborhood Watch Program, and the Volunteers in Policy Service
program.
Citizen Corps has 16 Affiliate partnerships, Citizen Corps
Affiliate Programs, and Organizations offer communities resources for
public education, outreach, and training; represent volunteers
interested in helping to make their communities safer; or offer
volunteer service opportunities to support first responders, disaster
relief activities, and community safety efforts. Citizen Corps
Affiliates include the:
American Radio Relay League
American Red Cross
American Safety & Health Institute
Civil Air Patrol
Department of Education's Office of Safe and Drug Free
Schools
Environmental Protection Agency
National Crime Prevention Council
National Fire Protection Association
National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration
Natiom
National Volunteer Fire Council
National Voluntary Organizations Active in Disaster
Points of Light Foundation and the Volunteer Center
National Network
Save A Life Foundation
United States Junior Chamber (Jaycees)
Veterans of Foreign Wars
Following are some of the activities that State and local councils
have conducted:
Response to Emergencies:
Washington State Community Emergency Response Teams (CERT)
were called out to assist in sandbagging during unexpected flash
floods.
The Republic, Missouri, Emergency Management Agency 911
crew, consisting of teenagers, assisted with tornado damage in an
adjoining county.
The City of Batavia Council in Illinois has had tornado spotters
out during 14 storm watches.
In Johnson County, Kansas, CERT team members have
responded to tornado and ice storm damage.
In Republic, Missouri, a 911 crew was created to assist
the city in disaster response. One area they support is the city's
storm shelter.
Emergency Alert System Plans:
Melrose, Massachusetts, alert level designations are
prominently displayed in City Hall. A distinctive note is posted giving
the current level along with appropriate bulletins.
Mississippi County, Arkansas, Citizen Corps Council alert
plan calls for e-mail communications to inform council members of the
changes, and refers them to the appropriate section in the plan.
Catalina, California, Citizen Corps Council/Golder Ranch
Fire Dept is developing a communications system/database that uses a
variety of means of emergency communication, including local cable,
radio, television, and telephone trees.
The Mississippi County Council in Arkansas is working to
expand the RACES/Skywarn program to provide severe weather and damage
assessment information and has developed plans to respond to the
National Alert System.
The Cortlandt Council in New York has developed internal-
use, e-mail notification action plans for government response to
yellow, orange, and red alerts. It has also developed a local first
responder resource manual.
The Hays County Council in Texas has plans to establish a
public service FM radio station to assist with emergency
communications.
Participation in Emergency Training Exercises:
California's Fresno Citizen Corps Council members were all
invited to be observers and/or participants in the multi-agency
disaster exercise on May 1, 2003.
Wichita County, Texas, Citizen Corps Council/Local
Emergency Planning Committee members observed and participated in a
Conoco-Phillips Incident Command exercise that demonstrated how they
would handle spill situations and what resources would be needed from
the local community.
Pierce County in Washington had more than 200 volunteers
perform in TOPOFF II as terrorists and victims.
The City of Batavia, Illinois, Council set up and ran the
citywide Emergency Operations Center during TOPOFF II.
The Capital Area Citizen Corps Council in Florida works
with county emergency management to facilitate multi-agency smallpox
tabletop exercises.
Biological, Chemical, and Medical Hazard Mitigation Programs:
Catalina, California, CCC/Northwest Community Hospital has
an in-place plan covering almost every aspect of emergency response,
including patient evacuation, space isolation, and coordination with
other medical facilities, emergency systems, etc.
The Fresno, California, Citizen Corps Council has two
committees surveying 650 houses of worship to determine the nature and
scope of human and physical resources that could be made available in
the event of a major disaster.
The Mississippi County Council in Arkansas participated in
the development of a smallpox response plan.
The Michigan City nd LaPorte County Councils in Indiana
have assisted witl smallpox inoculations.
The Melrose Council in Massachusetts has medically trained
volunteers who assist in mass inoculations, including local flu
vaccinations.
Emergency response training:
The Citizen Corps Council of Southern Arizona has brought
the CERT training under the organizational umbrella of Pirna Community
College, with collaboration of the county and MMRS and will train 1000
by the end of the year.
Ashtabula County, Ohio, Citizen Corps plans to bring the
Shelter in Place and Master of Disaster programs to the local schools.
The Sierra County, New Mexico, Citizen Corps with the
Sierra County Evacuation Committee will hold Evacuation and Self-
preparedness training in senior housing centers and meal sites (where
it has been identified that special needs evacuations are needed) to be
made aware of how to shelter in place or evacuate safely.
Most Citizen Corps Councils offer CERT training.
Many Citizen Corps Councils offer First Aid and CPR
training to residents in addition to CERT.
Question 45: What is the relationship between the Citizen Corps
Councils and the Local Emergency Planning Committees (LEPC), community-
based emergency planning organizations that have existed since 1986?
Aren't many of the Citizen Corps Council and LEPC activities
duplicative?
Answer: Citizen Corps Councils are all about working with resources
that communities already have. Communities are strongly encouraged not
to ``re-invent the wheel'' and to use what they have to make this
concept work. For example, most state and local governments have tapped
into their existing homeland security task forces and added a Citizen
Corps Committee; others have tapped into their emergency management
committees or Local Emergency Planning Committees (LEPCs) and have
added a volunteer/citizen participation component to these existing
groups.
Many of the 700 local councils are LEPCs. To recognize this
partnership and encourage the best use of limited resources at the
local levels, DHS entered into a formal agreement with the
Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), which has responsibility for the
LEPCs. The July 2003 Agreement states the following partnership
commitment:
Together, DHS and EPA agree to work in collaborative partnership
to:
Encourage LEPCs to serve as the nucleus for local Citizen
Corps Councils or to form a collaborative partnership with Citizen
Corps Councils, as appropriate
Promote mutual collaboration between SERCs and State
Citizen Corps Councils
Pursue an all-hazards approach to community and family
safety
Publicly acknowledge the affiliation of Citizen Corps and
EPA, which may include website links, co-logos on publications, and
references in printed materials, including articles and news releases
Coordinate their respective activities to further their
shared mission
Keep each other informed of activities conducted in
support of Citizen Corps and to provide an annual report summarizing
those activities