COMBATING TERRORISM: TRAINING AND EQUIPPING RESERVE COMPONENT FORCES

HEARING

BEFORE THE
SUBCOMMITTEE ON NATIONAL SECURITY,
EMERGING THREATS AND INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS
OF THE
COMMITTEE ON GOVERNMENT REFORM

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

ONE HUNDRED EIGHTH CONGRESS
SECOND SESSION

MAY 11, 2004

Serial No. 108–211

Printed for the use of the Committee on Government Reform

Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.gpo.gov/congress/house
http://www.house.gov/reform

U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE

WASHINGTON : 2004
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COMBATING TERRORISM: TRAINING AND EQUIPPING RESERVE COMPONENT FORCES

TUESDAY, MAY 11, 2004

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES,
SUBCOMMITTEE ON NATIONAL SECURITY, EMERGING
THREATS AND INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS,
COMMITTEE ON GOVERNMENT REFORM,
Washington, DC.

The subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 1 p.m., in room 2154, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Edward Schrock (acting chairman of the subcommittee) presiding.

Present: Representatives Schrock, Shays and Watson.

Staff present: Lawrence Halloran, staff director and counsel; R. Nicholas Palarino, senior policy analyst; Robert A. Briggs, clerk; Richard Lundberg, detailee; Kristin Amerling and Andrew Su, minority professional staff members; Jeff Baran, minority counsel; and Jean Gosa, minority clerk.

Mr. SCHROCK. This hearing will come to order.

A quorum being present, the Subcommittee on National Security, Emerging Threats and International Relations hearing entitled, “Combating Terrorism: Training and Equipping Reserve Component Forces” is called to order.

Let me first thank all the witnesses for their time today in helping us address and improve a program that is vital to the men and women who put themselves in harms way for our country. As one of just a handful of military retirees serving in Congress, I believe I have a unique perspective and sensitivity to this issue.

This war in Iraq and against terrorism has been personal to me since the beginning and has hit home in a very real way in the past few weeks with the deaths of military members from the district I am privileged to represent. I am sure I do not need to tell any of today’s witnesses that it makes no difference to the enemy whether or not you are active duty or a Guard or Reservist. All of these men and women are placed in harms way without prejudice. Clearly it is our duty to ensure each and every soldier, airman, sailor, Marine and Coast Guardsman, regardless of active or reserve status is adequately equipped, trained and prepared to the highest degree possible to enter any war zone be it in Iraq, Afghanistan or anywhere we find our folks in harms way. Anything else is simply unacceptable.

I recognize that utilization of the Guard and the Reserve military is at a pace we have not experienced in over 50 years. This has put tremendous pressure on the Pentagon to make everything come together. I also recognize we have had major obstacles in meeting
these requirements, that many have been overcome, but that still more remain.

I look forward to hearing from these witnesses today on what remains to be accomplished, and what recommendations they have to better help us meet these needs. I certainly expect they will address whatever inadequacies remain and explain what has been done or is being done to rectify such issues.

I would like to recognize the chairman of this subcommittee, Mr. Shays, for any opening comments he might have.

Mr. Shays. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

National Guard and reserve units collectively called “Reserve Component forces” constitute an indispensable element of our national military power. No longer a rarely called upon supplement to the active force, they bring skills and specialties integral to modern warfare fighting, post-conflict stabilization and peacekeeping.

It appears many RC units, still find themselves at the short end of the supply chain unable to train as they fight for new and evolving missions in challenging environments. Shortages of first-quality body armor, too few shielded Humvees, and limited pre-mobilization access to mission-specific training facilities have challenged Guard and Reserve unit effectiveness and put men and women at risk.

We asked RC veterans of recent deployments and their Pentagon leadership to describe how the hard-won lessons from today’s dynamic conflicts are applied to the equipment and training needs of the total force, particularly the Guard and Reserves. We asked how doctrine tactics and material are being adapted so deploying forces will be protected and will prevail against improvised explosive devices and other emerging threats.

Ironically, the military occupational specialties like civil affairs, once regulated by cold war planners to Reserve component units, are proving essential on the front lines today. The policing skills many civilians bring to their military duties are in high demand on city streets from here to Baghdad. These units no longer are an extra element of the force package, but highly valuable and perishable assets that should be as well supported and judiciously deployed as their active duty components.

Rick helped teach us that lesson. Army Reserve Staff Sergeant Richard S. Eaton, Jr., from Guilford, CT, voluntarily deployed to the Iraqi theater with the 323rd Military Intelligence Battalion. Before he died from apparent heat-related causes last August, he wrote to ask why members of his unit were activated twice in 2 years without required time at home? Why were RC personnel deemed “mission essential,” rushed to Kuwait only to find there was no mission? Meanwhile, was homeland security needlessly put at risk by their departure from the police departments, law enforcement units and intelligence agencies they left behind? His service, his dedication, his sacrifice compel us to pursue his questions about the preparation and tasking of the many thousands of men and women like Rick who put their Nation first and have every right to expect their national military leadership to reciprocate.

This hearing is part of a sustained examination of National Guard and Reserve readiness issues by the Government Reform Committee. Past reports and testimony brought needed attention to
mobilization pay errors, medical screening and structural strains caused by growing tensions between RC units’ global combat and homeland security missions.

As is our practice, we will hear first from veterans service members whose personal experiences and insights always prove invaluable to our oversight. We deeply appreciate that our distinguished second panel of Pentagon witnesses agreed to waive their customary right to open the hearing. Thanks to their forbearance, our subsequent discussion will be better grounded and more meaningful.

Thank you all for being here. We look forward to hearing your testimony.

[The prepared statement of Hon. Christopher Shays follows:]
ONE HUNDRED EIGHTH CONGRESS
Congress of the United States
House of Representatives
COMMITTEE ON GOVERNMENT REFORM
2157 RHOBURN HOUSE OFFICE BUILDING
WASHINGTON, DC 20515-6143

Statement of Rep. Christopher Shays
May 11, 2004

National Guard and Reserve units – collectively called “Reserve Component (RC) forces” – constitute an indispensable element of our national military power. No longer a rarely called-upon supplement to the active force, they bring skills and specialties integral to modern war fighting, post-conflict stabilization and peacekeeping.

But it appears many RC units still find themselves at the short end of the supply chain, unable to “train as they fight” for new and evolving missions in challenging environments. Shortages of first-quality body armor, too few shielded Humvees, and limited pre-mobilization access to mission-specific training facilities have challenged Guard and Reserve unit effectiveness and put men and women at risk.

So we asked RC veterans of recent deployments, and their Pentagon leadership, to describe how the hard-won lessons from today’s dynamic conflicts are applied to the equipment and training needs of the total force, particularly the Guard and Reserves. We asked how doctrine, tactics and materiel are being adapted so deploying forces will be protected, and will prevail, against improvised explosive devices (IEDs) and other emerging threats.
Ironically, the military occupational specialties like civil affairs, once “relegated” by Cold War planners to Reserve Component units, are proving essential on the front lines today. The policing skills many civilians bring to their military duties are in high demand on city streets from here to Baghdad. These units are no longer an extra element of the force package, but highly valuable and perishable assets that should be as well supported and judiciously deployed as their active duty counterparts.

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His service, his dedication and his sacrifice compel us to pursue his questions about the preparation and tasking of the many thousands of men and women, like Rick Eaton, who put their nation first and have every right to expect their national military leadership to reciprocate.

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Thank you all for being here. We look forward to your testimony.
Mr. SCHROCK. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

It is customary that we swear our witnesses if you will please rise.

[Witnesses sworn.]

Mr. SCHROCK. Our first panel members this afternoon are: First Sergeant Gerald Neill, 323 Military Intelligence Battalion, U.S. Army Reserve, Maryland; Staff Sergeant Juan SanchezLopez, 2nd Battalion 23rd Marines, Reserves; Specialist Michael Tanguay, 143rd Military Police Co., National Guard from the chairman’s home State of Connecticut; Lieutenant Colonel Steve J. Novotny, 530th Military Police Battalion, U.S. Army Reserve, Nebraska; our good friend Dr. Andrew F. Krepinevich, Executive Director, Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments; and Major General (Ret.) Richard C. Alexander, president, National Guard Association of the United States, Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments. We are delighted to have all of you here.

First Sergeant Neill, the floor is yours.

STATEMENTS OF FIRST SERGEANT GERALD G. NEILL, 323 MILITARY INTELLIGENCE BATTALION, U.S. ARMY RESERVE, MARYLAND; STAFF SERGEANT JUAN SANCHEZLOPEZ, 2ND BATTALION 23RD MARINES, RESERVES; SPECIALIST MICHAEL TANGUAY, 143RD MILITARY POLICE CO., NATIONAL GUARD, CONNECTICUT; LIEUTENANT COLONEL STEVE J. NOVOTNY, 530TH MILITARY POLICE BATTALION, U.S. ARMY RESERVE, NEBRASKA; ANDREW F. KREPINEVICH, EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR, CENTER FOR STRATEGIC AND BUDGETARY ASSESSMENTS; AND MAJOR GENERAL (RET.) RICHARD C. ALLEXANDER, PRESIDENT, NATIONAL GUARD ASSOCIATION OF THE UNITED STATES, CENTER FOR STRATEGIC AND BUDGETARY ASSESSMENTS

Sergeant Neill. I would like to begin my testimony with a silent moment recognizing the loss of life of our service members in Iraq. I want to particularly recognize Staff Sergeant Richard S. Eaton, Jr., from Bravo Co. 323 Military Intelligence Battalion, U.S. Army Reserves. He was a soldier and my friend, and he died in Iraq.

[Moment of silence.]

Sergeant Neill. Thank you for this opportunity to testify before you here today. You have my written testimony and I have to limit my time so I can only give you the highlights.

I am a First Sergeant from Bravo Co. 323 Military Intelligence Battalion. I have 30 years of service. I have experience in team building, unit building and training. I have spent many years of working and developing sources and information in the Metropolitan Police Department in Washington, DC.

MI units work as teams. Solid teams contain a mix of young soldiers fresh from school and older soldiers, some with previous job skills with infantry training, motor training, supply, drill sergeants, communications, civilian street police experience are excellent pluses to any team. In the field in intense situations, they are the ones who stand above and carry the team to safety. We have a shortage of sworn officers who are their officer team leaders and they are the officer team builders.
I believe soldiers fight as they train and that every Army trains for the next war based upon lessons learned from the last. If we accept this, we must look at training in two ways, pre-mobilization which is basic training, military occupation skills, leadership training and unit training and second, mobilization. Pre-mobilization training is adequate except at the unit training level. Unit training and annual training time is too often used up with administrative functions or other distractions. Here is where team building takes place. Six soldiers make a team and these teams may deploy in either tactical or non-tactical situations.

A major problem for us was vehicle care and use requirements that take up one quarter of a drill weekend. The stated time allotment would more than double if the driver requirements were followed to the letter. Our unit avoided this requirement by turning our vehicles into sites and since we didn’t have our vehicles, we did not have our radios and they were not mounted. Radio communication was a major problem for us in Iraq. While active duty units came to the theater with satellite phones and can use them for communications, we had none. Many years ago motor sections, com sections were all moved from military intelligence companies and sent to battalion levels. Their staffing was reduced and they became ineffective. Maybe it is time to look at bringing them back to the company level.

Weapons training from our reserve unit was completely inadequate due to ammo shortage for the past 3 years. Weapons training at the mobilization site was only marginal and only marginally prepared soldiers to be effective and use their weapons. Equipment shortages were extremely problematic. Short call-up and mobilization times further impacted supply problems. Consequently, soldiers deployed without insect protection measures, bug juice, insect netting needed to endure the harsh environment. At one point in Iraq while we were waiting for a mission to start, heat stroke and illness exhausted the ability of a local aid station to support us and I had to send half of my unit to the hospital for treatment and recovery. Many soldiers fell ill when preventive measures were known but not provided.

Mobilization, we were the prisoners of Fort Dix. Army Reservists could not leave post and this was a bitter pill to swallow for many Reservists and they still speak ill of it now. Unit sponsorship was nonexistent. Stepchildren receive better care from their sponsors than we did.

The best training we received in-theater was action on contact where soldiers went through simulated combat drills, conducting our vehicles in desert conditions. We set up our vehicles, mounted our M-60 machine guns on improvised plywood platforms and aligning the bottom of our vehicles with sand bags. These teams were prepared to move to the field in two vehicle convoys.

In August, some 8 months after our activation we assumed our original mission. We replaced the Marines. They left us with much needed equipment not available to our organic MI chain of command but the Marines proved it was needed to be successful in our operations. They left us non-tactical vehicles which allowed us quicker traveling speeds in the 55 to 60 miles a hour tactical vehicles move at. They did not alert the Iraqi citizens that they were
coming as the motor sound of the Humvee truly earned its name. You can hear it a long ways off. We varied our speeds on highways, change of lanes as we approached bridges and not let anyone pass us once we were on the highway.

Our job is to know the enemy. It is their job to know us. We presented the appearance of a battle ready element. Every team had a heavy machine gun as well as automatic rifles, handguns and grenades. We looked at everyone who looked at us. We considered everyone a potential threat until we knew otherwise. What I learned as a policeman is to watch people as you drive into bad neighborhoods. If they start running or start moving quickly when they see you, that is not a good sign. It is a good sign that something is amiss. I passed this to my soldiers.

Soldiers purchased much of their own equipment. They paid for vehicle repairs, purchased maintenance parts for which they were not reimbursed and stated as an aside, we left an Iraqi mechanic holding an $1,100 bill for vehicle repairs and I am not sure the bill was ever paid.

In terms of intelligence operations, intelligence contingency funds were not available to us until just prior to redeployment to the States. Sources did provide information for a variety of reasons but money was not available as an incentive. We all had issues with doctrine that would not allow us to task sources for information. We could suggest but not task. Sources do not need suggestions, they need direction. You ask them a question and tell them to come back with the answer.

One final point deals with sources and I will be brief. Sources provide information expecting to see action. If they do not see action, they lose faith in us and quit providing information. In a country where explosive devices litter the landscape, the best way to stop roadside bombings is to act on information provided by sources as to the old who, what, where, when and how can I catch them questions.

In closing, we arrived as a unit and returned as a unit. We fought for just about every living and working space we had in Iraq and we left our replacements in improved living and working conditions. Let me say that I took what I consider the best trained, best qualified soldiers any Nation can offer to war. They did an outstanding job and I am proud of them. Additionally, I know they are proud of themselves and their service to our great Nation.

Thank you and I will answer any questions you have.

[The prepared statement of Sergeant Neill follows:]
Testimony of
First Sergeant Gerald G. Neill, Jr.
Before the
Subcommittee on National Security, Emerging Threats, and International Relations
May 11, 2004

I would like to begin my testimony with a silent moment recognizing the loss of life of our service members in Iraq. I want to particularly recognize Staff Sergeant Richard S. Eaton Jr. of B Company, 323rd MI Battalion, U.S. Army Reserves. He was my soldier and my friend.

Chairman Shays, other members of the Committee, thank you for this opportunity to testify before this Oversight Hearing on Combating Terrorism: Training and Equipment Reserve Component Forces. I am here as a service member with 30 years combined service in the U.S. Army, the National Guard, and the U.S. Army Reserves. I am here just returning from Iraq as the first sergeant for B Company, 323rd Military Intelligence Battalion, which is currently located at Ft. George G. Meade, Maryland. I am here in hopes that we can improve training and thereby improve performance and survivability on the battlefield.

I have been a first sergeant since 1985, and have experience in team building, unit building and training. I am a first sergeant who is also a Counter Intelligence Agent. I have been a CI agent since 1983. I have many years of experience working sources for information in my military role as well as my civilian profession as a member of the Metropolitan Police Department, here in Washington, D.C. In the past I have been a Court Narcotics Expert, Gun Recovery Expert, as well as an affiant or co-affiant on over several hundred narcotics and gun search warrants. I am a police officer who likes to take information, develop it and then take action on it. I am that same type of soldier/senior NCO.

Let me say that I took what I consider the best trained, best qualified, highly motivated soldiers any nation can offer to war. They all did outstanding jobs and I am proud of them. Additionally, I know that they are proud of themselves and their service to our great nation.

Soldiers come to units either fully qualified or as will trains. Generally qualified soldiers are younger and come straight from basic training and MOS training. Will trains generally are older soldiers that come from other units with other MOS skills and possess the desire and ability to become qualified in their new units and in their new MOS. Units need both groups of soldiers to meet mission requirements. Will train soldiers bring to their new units previous MOS skills that can be called upon to carry them through times and events when support is not available. Soldiers with infantry training, motor mechanics, supply, drill sergeants, communications and civilian street police experience are excellent pluses to any team. In the field, in tense situations, they are the ones who step up to carry the team to safety and to assist in accomplishing the mission.
We have a shortage of Warrant Officers who are the Officer Team leaders. It is my belief that this shortage could be filled directly from the senior NCO ranks where soldiers are forced out of the Army because of age, time in grade and time in service.

I believe that soldiers fight as they train and that every Army trains for the next war based on lessons learned in the last war. If we accept this then we must look at training in two parts:

1. Pre-mobilization that is, Basic Training, Military Occupation Specialty (MOS) training, leadership development and Unit training.


Pre-mobilization

Current training schools and soldier development courses do a good job in making and developing today's soldier. There is nothing wrong with our Basic Training, MOS Training, and Leadership Training. Where we have problems is in unit training. Units have 12 weekends a year and two weeks annual training to take trained soldiers and forge them into teams. These teams may deploy in either tactical or non-tactical roles. Six soldiers make a team. Too often, weekend training and annual training time is used up in administrative functions or other distractions. This seriously cuts into time and energy needed for unit mission training.

A major problem for us was vehicle care and use requirements that take up one quarter of a drill weekend. This stated time allotment would more than double if driving time requirements were followed to the letter of the regulation. Our unit and every unit in the Army would be a motor unit, and driving vehicles would be the weekend accomplishment. The way that Commands avoid this requirement is to turn the vehicles into motor storage shops. Consequently, our vehicles were stored in a post storage area and only drawn out maybe once or twice a year. The drawing of vehicles and weekend training were major events on training schedules and usually were planned as field exercises or range training.

As you may know radios are mounted in vehicles. Since we did not have possession of our vehicles, our radios were not mounted. The basic installation takes several hours of technical expertise. Once the basic installation is completed the radios can be slid in and out of place but can never be left in the vehicles unless they are secured by a locking bar with an approved lock. Some of our vehicles did not have the basic installation equipment and only one had a locking bar, as they were in short supply in our battalion.

While we had soldiers who could set radios to working frequencies, this could not be done with all of our radios and by all of our soldiers. Reliable radio communication was a major problem for us in Iraq. While active duty units came into theater with satellite phones and could use them for communications, we had none. We had great soldiers and teams, but did not have adequate availability of equipment nor services to install radios and maintain radios on the company level. Many years ago motor sections and communications sections were all moved from intelligence companies and sent to battalion level organizations where their staffing was reduced
and where they became ineffective. Maybe it is time to look at bringing them back to individual companies.

Weapons' training at my reserve unit was completely inadequate. Prior to this unit's deployment, most of the soldiers had not qualified at a weapons range for several years due to a shortage of ammo. In the context of war, this is unacceptable. Soldiers need multiple training opportunities at the weapons range every year in order to familiarize and hone critical survival skills needed in combat. Although the entire unit was required to qualify with weapons at the mobilization station at Ft. Dix, this last minute weapons training only marginally prepared soldiers to carry and effectively use their weapons. Additionally, there was no opportunity to cross-train soldiers on various weapons systems at the mobilization station due to ammo shortages. This became critical later, when the handguns carried by most agents proved inadequate against the AK-47 assault rifle. The company later trained its soldiers on the M16 and AK-47 since the handguns were only useful at close range enemy fire. Weapons cross training and foreign weapons familiarization are key to survival in a tactical combat environment.

Equipment shortages were extremely problematic. Although this unit was, perhaps, the best equipped Reserve MI Battalion deployed in the Iraqi Theater, other sister MI units came to war with virtually nothing. This placed these soldiers at risk and placed an additional burden on scarce resources from the Active Duty Army units in theater. No MI unit, section, or team, should be allowed to deploy to a combat zone without weapons, body armor, vehicles, tents, communications, or power generation sets.

Extremely short call up and mobilization times further impacted supply and equipment problems wasting many valuable hours spent conducting inventory, packing, unpacking, re-inventorying, many, many times. Most of this repeated inventory of equipment would have been reduced if supply sergeants and supply sections were adequate at the company level. They are not staffed to take the lead in this area, and this caused major problems throughout the deployment. Soldiers deployed without insect protection measures, bug juice, and insect netting needed to endure harsh environments. Many soldiers were bitten and fell ill when preventive measures were known but not provided.

Mobilization

We were the prisoners of Ft. Dix. Initial activation brought us to the mobilization site at Ft. Dix, where active duty Army soldiers could leave post and where, as Army Reservists, we could not. This was a bitter pill to swallow and many soldiers still speak of it. With only four days notice they were activated and after four days at Ft. Meade, soldiers did not have time to adequately prepare for what turned into a 14-month deployment. It simply did not make sense to soldiers that draftee soldiers from previous wars were not locked down and that they, soldiers who were volunteers, were locked down. They point to this experience and say that this is one of the reasons they will not be activated again. It is my belief that the two months activation period at Ft. Dix was entirely too long. Most of the training was good, as it was designed for individual, teams, and units, but it did not test personnel and equipment, as equipment was being shipped to theater.
Unit sponsorship was nonexistent. Step children receive better care from their sponsors than we did from our war-trace unit, the 513th MI Brigade. Before deployment to theater we were told that our sponsoring unit, the 513th MI, was a professional organization and was waiting and prepared for us in theater. We had a mission and we knew what that mission was. When we arrived in theater we found that the 513th was waiting, but they were not waiting for us. The commander for the 513th told all of us that they were not expecting all of the units that arrived and did not have jobs for us. The 513th was the unit that had all of the equipment, but did not want to share or acquire any for us. We set up training and training schedules to fill our day, but quite frankly spent six hours out of an eight-hour work day in chow lines.

A bit of investigation revealed that the 513th had 2,500 MI soldiers attached to it. Two hundred and fifty of them were CI agents. It was easy to see that we were not wanted or needed. We were detached from our battalion several times and sent to other battalions on what were called “made up missions”.

Morale calls are required by Army Regulation, but my unit did not make a call until they were in the country some 11 days. Morale calls let family and friends know that the soldier arrived in country safely and lets the soldier know that their family is safe in their absence. My soldiers had no means to make the calls and yet we saw soldiers from the 513th on satellites all day long calling home. Additionally, every soldier wanted to know the latest war news. The 513th had several tents set up with satellite TVs for that purpose, but while their soldiers could watch the news with no limit, our companies’ one representative was thrown of the tent.

The best training we received was “action on contact” training from the 221st Georgia National Guard. This training consisted of soldier combat drills conducted in our vehicles in desert conditions, not the cold weather training we received at Ft. Dix, but in real theater environment. We set up our vehicles as they set up theirs, mounting our M-60 machine guns on improvised plywood platforms and lining the bottoms of our vehicles with sand bags. We were fully prepared, minus communication equipment, to assume our mission.

We moved into Iraq focused and ready to handle whatever we encountered, and more importantly we “looked” ready. As our missions changed we remained focused and it was “game on” every time we moved out of our camps and into our communities to perform our missions. We crossed trained on each others weapons, took each others vehicle assignments, and vehicle movement roles, as well as picked up additional weapons and ammo, since our battalion refused to authorize drawing of our own authorized basic ammo load. Members of our Battalion Staff began to call us the Bandit Company as we acquired what we needed to operate. We liked the name.

Once in Iraq we became part of the outer perimeter of a group of tankers who occupied a site which use to be a trash dump. The site was infested by insects and everything bit us. Daytime temperatures reached in excess of 120 degrees. We waited in the desert in tents and soldiers made shelters for 30 days for a mission to start. During this waiting period many of my soldiers became heat casualties. At one point their illness exhausted the ability of the tankers aid station to support us and I had to send half of the unit to the hospital for treatment and recovery.
In August, some eight months after our activation we assumed the mission we were told would be ours when we first activated in January 2003. We replaced the Marine Corps intelligence units in Southern Iraq. They left us with much needed equipment that was not available to our organic MI chain of command, but which the Marines proved was needed to be successful in our operations. Both the 205th MI Battalion, and CJTF-7 refused to supply us with the equipment the Marines, ultimately, left us. Failure is not in their creed and they did not wish to see us fail. Kudos to the Marines. This equipment included non-tactical vehicles (NTVs), satellite telephones, phone cards, digital cameras, small GPS, and more weapons and ammo. Absent the short barrelled MP4 Carbine, which was not available to our soldiers, the AK47 rifle without the stock was the best weapon available for inside the vehicle movement to firing positions. Review of daily intelligence reports kept us current of enemy tactics. Movement in NTVs allowed us quicker traveling speeds than the 55-60 miles an hour the tactical vehicle could move at, and they did not alert the Iraqi citizens that we were coming as the motor sound of the NTV was much quieter then the tactical vehicles. We varied speeds on the highways, changed lanes as we approached bridges, and did not let anyone pass us once on the highway.

It is our job to know the enemy and it is their job to know us. We presented an appearance of a “battle ready” element. Every team had a heavy machine gun, as well as automatic rifles, handguns, and grenades. We looked at everyone who looked at us. We considered everyone a potential threat until we knew otherwise. What I learned as a policeman is to watch how people react to you as you drive into a bad neighborhood. If they run, or start moving quickly when they see you, that is a good sign that something is amiss. We pointed our weapons at people who we saw taking such action, and every time they saw us react to them, they stopped doing whatever they were about to do and paid full attention to us. We also waved to everyone, and they usually waved back. Our thought here was that if someone was waving at you they could not be shooting at you. These lessons should be taught to all soldiers coming into the theater of operations as standard operating procedures.

High preparation and full focus resulted in the safe returning of all of our soldiers’ home from the CJTF-7 mission.

Soldiers purchased much of their own equipment. They purchased cell phones that we used for communications, clothing, bug spray, GPS systems, hand-held radios for in-between vehicles comms, office supplies, transformers, refrigerators and coolers. Additionally, they paid for NTV vehicle repairs and purchased parts for maintenance, for which they were not reimbursed. Stated as an aside, we left an Iraq mechanic holding a $1,100 bill for vehicle repairs, and I am not sure that the bill was ever paid. Our Battalion did not begin to support us until late October 2004. At one point they held our mail hostage. We could not get supplies, we could not get radios repaired, and if vehicles broke down we stopped using them or traded them off to local police chiefs. In terms of intelligence operations, Intelligence Contingency Funds were also not available to this unit until just prior to our redeployment home. This was unacceptable, as it significantly degraded our mission. Sources did provide information for a variety of reasons, but money was not available as an incentive. We also had issues with doctrine which would not allow us to task sources of information. We could suggest but not task. Sources do not need suggestions, they need direction. You ask them a question and tell them to come back with an answer. One final point with sources and I will be brief here. Sources provide information expecting to see action.
If they do not see action, they lose faith in us and quit providing information. In a country where explosive devices litter the landscape, the best way to stop road-side bombing is to act on information provided by sources as to the old who, what, when, why, and how can I catch them questions.

In closing, we arrived as a unit and returned as a unit. We turned our mission over to soldiers who were back-filled into positions to make up a unit. We left them with some NTV vehicles, the digital cameras, the GPS, two cell phones and our own hand-held radios. We turned the remaining equipment we had back over to the Marines who were now returning to Iraq. We left our replacements with enough equipment to sustain operations for several months. In total, we traveled some 30,000 miles between teams and cities in support of our teams. We fought for just about every living and working space we had in Iraq and we left our replacements in improved living and working conditions. We were proud to serve our country and to accomplish our mission.

We were proud to serve our country and to accomplish our mission, but were frustrated by pre-mobilization issues with vehicles, equipment, supply, communications, weapons, and training prior to deployment, as well as a shortage of experienced Warrant Officers to lead the teams in the field. Once mobilized, these problems greatly hindered our performance, exhausted our soldiers' strength and resolve, making them feel abused as well as abandoned. In spite of all of the obstacles, the soldiers excelled in the field. I tell you that it was hard to keep them motivated when they felt information they collected was not acted upon. In the end, we all felt we saved countless American and Coalition forces lives, but believe that our efforts could have been more effective given the proper amount of training, equipment, preparation, and support.

I will be happy to answer any questions that you may have.
Mr. SCHROCK. Sergeant, thank you for your testimony and thank you for saying the nice things you say about your men and women. We know that to be true and I think the whole country does.

Staff Sergeant SanchezLopez, thank you for being here and the floor is yours.

Sergeant S ANCHEZLOPEZ. My name is Staff Sergeant SanchezLopez, a member of the 2nd Battalion, 23rd Marines, U.S. Marine Corps Reserve located in Encino, CA.

I was mobilized in support of Operation Enduring Freedom and reported to Camp Pendleton, CA where I served for 13 months. My unit was deployed with Regimental Combat Team 1, 1st Marine Division in support of Operation Iraqi Freedom on February 2003 for an additional 4 months and returned to the United States in May 2003. I served on active duty for a total of 24 months. Prior to serving in the Reserves, I served on active duty for 8 years and I have been in the Reserves for 4 years. My military occupation specialty is Motor Transportation Chief.

My unit was not involved in fighting the insurgents but we did change our fighting tactics based on how the enemy was fighting us. Our roadblock procedure was one of the biggest changes, based on the intelligence reports we conducted our roadblocks. The change was based on information from Marine regiments, from RCT2. Marines changed their tactics once they entered Baghdad. These changes involved convoy procedures. At the time we stopped allowing Iraqis civilian vehicles from passing and mixing in our convoys. This was due to reports of attacks on convoys from passing vehicles.

Our battalion recently completed a battalion field exercise in which we incorporated the lessons we learned from the war in our training. Some of these lessons were convoy procedures and local security. My unit participated in the same training as our active duty counterparts at Camp Pendleton. Prior to deploying from the United States to Kuwait, we served on active duty 13 months prior to departing the United States in support of Enduring Freedom. One of our equipment difficulties was we did not know prior to crossing from Kuwait to Iraq where we would be equipped with amtracks or trucks. We didn't find out until a week prior to the ground offensive which we changed our tactics to how we were going to employ that.

I would like to thank all the members of this committee for allowing me to speak. I hope my testimony will assist in answering any questions you may have.

Thank you.

[The prepared statement of Sergeant SanchezLopez follows:]
STATEMENT OF
STAFF SERGEANT JUAN SANCHEZ LOPEZ
UNITED STATES MARINE CORP
BEFORE THE
GOVERNMENT REFORM COMMITTEE
HOUSE SUBCOMMITTEE ON NATIONAL SECURITY, EMERGING THREATS,
AND INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS
CONCERNING
COMBATING TERRORISM: TRAINING AND EQUIPPING
RESERVE COMPONENT FORCES
ON
MAY 11, 2004
Introduction

Chairman Shays, distinguished Members of the Subcommittee, my name is Staff Sergeant Juan Sanchez Lopez. I am a member of 2nd Battalion, 23rd Marines, United States Marine Corps Reserve, located in Encino, California. I was mobilized in support of Operation Enduring Freedom and reported to Camp Pendleton, California where I served for 13 months. My unit was deployed with Regimental Combat Team One, 1st Marine Division in support of Operation Iraqi Freedom in February 2003 for an additional 4 months, returning to the United States in May 2003. I served on active duty for a total of 24 months. Prior to serving in the Reserves, I served on active duty for 8 years. I have been in the Reserves for four years. My Military Occupation Specialty is Motor Transport Chief.

While serving in Iraq we did not face insurgents. During the fighting we faced Iraqi Regular Army and Republican Guard units. These units were defending from within buildings and forested areas. These Iraqis normally fell back once we attacked. There were some incidents of Iraqis in civilian clothing attacking our positions while driving taxis and private vehicles that had been hijacked. We believed that Iraqi Army and Republican Guard units held the driver's family members captive and ordered the males to attack our positions. Sometimes Iraqi soldiers forced women and children to stay in the vehicles while the vehicles were used to attack our positions.

My unit was not involved in fighting insurgents during Operation Iraqi Freedom I. We did change our fighting tactics based on how the enemy was fighting. Our roadblock procedures were one of these changes: based on intelligence reports we changed the setup for the conduct of roadblocks. This change was based on information from another Marine Regiment. Another
change to our tactics occurred once we entered Baghdad. These changes involved our convoy procedures. At this time we stopped allowing Iraqi civilian vehicles from passing and mixing in with our convoys. This was due to reports of attacks on convoys from passing cars.

My battalion recently completed a battalion field exercise. In this exercise we incorporated the lessons we learned from the war into our training. Some of these lessons were convoy procedures and local security procedures.

I am not familiar with the Army's Improvised Explosive Device Task Force or the Central Command Combined Explosives Exploitation Cell. During our support of Operation Iraqi Freedom we did not experience any incidents of Improvised Explosive Devices. The minefields we did see were known ahead of time and marked as we crossed the Kuwait-Iraq border.

My unit participated in the same training as our active duty units prior to deploying from the United States to Kuwait. We served on active duty for 13 months prior to departing the United States in support of Enduring Freedom. Our only equipment difficulty was we did not know whether we would be using amtracks or trucks to transport the entire battalion during the war until after we got to Kuwait. The decision to move our battalion on trucks was made approximately one week prior to the start of the ground offensive.

I would like to thank all the Members this committee for allowing me to speak. I hope my testimony will assist in answering any questions you may have.
Mr. SCHROCK. It does and it will and we thank you for serving.  
Specialist Tanguay, welcome.  
Specialist TANGUAY. Mr. Chairman and members of the commit- 
tee, thank you and good afternoon.  
My name is Specialist Michael Tanguay, a member of the 143rd  
Military Police Co., a National Guard Unit out of Hartford, CT  
which was mobilized February 7, 2003 in support of Operation  
Iraqi Freedom. I have been invited here today to testify before you  
in regard to my experience with pre-deployment and deployment to  
Iraq as it pertains to the training and equipment we received. I  
thank you for this opportunity. It is the intent of my testimony  
today to provide you with the curriculum of training we received  
prior to and during our deployment, equipment issues we faced and  
most importantly, lessons we have learned. The goals I have set for  
myself and present to this committee in testifying here before you  
will aid in rectifying known problems and potential trouble spots  
coupled with insight to the lessons we have learned.  
In preparation for deployment, my unit moved to Fort Drum, NY  
for a train-up mission. It is here where we received 2 months of  
theater-specific training ranging from Arabic language lessons to  
convey security operations. As a military police combat support  
unit, we have a wide range of missions we can perform. Facing the  
uncertainty of war, we did not know our specific mission, so we  
took the time to review all standard operating procedures for each  
mission or task that we could face.  
We performed several live fire exercises that sharpened our  
marksmanship skills and refamiliarized ourselves with each weap- 
ons system. Mine awareness and unexploded ordinance classes  
were conducted. However, improvised explosive devices did not sur- 
f ace until we were once in theater. Medical aid, urban warfare tac- 
ts, patrol techniques, prisoner of war detainee doctrine, area secu- 
rity operations and convoy security procedures were key classes  
conducted that ultimately benefited us during our deployment.  
The 2-month train-up phase of the deployment provided ample  
time to train and become a unified fighting machine. However, poor  
time management skills, severe logistical issues and improper  
equipment prevented us from training the way we ended up fight- 
ing. This motto of train the way we fight highly adopted by my unit  
is a foundational building block of a training curriculum. Nonethe- 
less, without the proper equipment at our training site, in prepar- 
ing for a desert climate while bundled in three layers of winter  
clothing, and mismanagement of precious training time turned into  
a last minute dash to get up to speed in preparing for war.  
The deficiency of the highly sought after unarmored Humvee and  
interceptor vests, lack of training and time at the mock urban war- 
fare town, and unintentional misguided operational procedures for  
various mission tasks proved to be key lessons learned and areas  
to improve. More time spent at the mock urban warfare town  
would have proved extremely beneficial in building clearing tech- 
niques, possible ambush situations and civilian considerations on  
the battlefield. Our unit spent 2 days out of the 2-months at this  
training site. Time is extremely precious in preparing for war but  
a 2-week minimum at the site would have proved extremely bene- 
ficial.
Unintentional misguided operational procedures placed us at a temporary setback during the early going while we were in theater. Situational dictations coupled with an under manning strength hindered us in the way we trained and the way we ended up combating. For example, a traditional MP line company as myself is broken up into a 10 person squad with three vehicles, an ideal and perfect situation for any MP task. However, while on the ground in Iraq our squad consisted of six personnel and only two trucks, a severe setback in security concern when conducting such operations as area and convoy security. The operational tempo as high as it was along with a high demand for MP type missions dictated changes that took place.

Arriving in Kuwait on April 15, 2003 proved to be our last ditch effort to improve upon our training and ready our gear for the bush toward Baghdad. In our 3-week stay in Kuwait, we learned of our vague mission task. It was an encompassing task to patrol sectors of Baghdad, a very indistinguishable and non-definitive mission task at best. We readied our unarmored vintage aged Humvees and dawned our Vietnam era non-protective flak vests for the ride north.

Severe logistical issues regarding equipment surfaced here again. No ammunition for our brand new MK–19 weapon system, no up armored Humvees to patrol in, and still no interceptor ceramic plated vests to protect us. We adapted and overcame the best we could, sandbagging the floor boards of our 1985 Humvees, creating weapons mounts for our other weapon system the M–249 SAW, and retrofitting a couple Humvees with diamond plating on the side doors of the trucks.

Once in Baghdad things didn’t improve much. We finally received our interceptor vests after a month in Baghdad complete with ceramic plates but still had problems with ammunition and non-armored vehicles. We were quickly improving and overcoming great obstacles with what we had to work with. Training was a continuous process. Overcoming enemy tactics such as IEDs in the roadways forced us to vary our routes, continually improve base and area security, and maintain a high level of situational awareness.

The U.S. military is a highly trained, skilled, adaptive and intelligent force. The Guard and Reserve component forces have a lot to bring to the table as far as civilian background and how it is incorporated into use on the battlefield. For example as a Military Police unit, we have a large number of civilian law enforcement officers whose expertise and knowledge of policing provided firsthand knowledge of patrol tactics, weapons proficiency, an urban backdrop and general policing duties to those of us less experienced. That factor alone made a true impact on our success during this deployment.

The 143rd Military Police Co. and myself completed a 1-year tour of duty in Baghdad, Iraq honorably while facing extreme odds and extenuating circumstances not in our favor. Several lessons have been learned, some unfortunately due to casualties sustained and fellow brothers and sisters in arms lost.

First and foremost, let us equip our troops with the best possible gear to all units whether active duty, National Guard or Reserve
component. Up armored Humvees, interceptor vests and IED jamming systems are great initiatives but need to be dispersed to all troops deploying overseas. Next, let us phase in a training doctrine that relates more to theater specific training regiment. There are several training sites in California, Nevada and Louisiana that provide the type of climate troops will soon see before they deploy. The mock urban warfare training ranges and sites are great tools that need to be taken advantage of. Language classes are also great tools that prove beneficial.

Finally, it is imperative that the lessons learned from veterans be heard and the suggestions set forth to integrate the training doctrine to all deploying units. Let us continue to be the most intelligent, best equipped, fighting force out there.

Thank you.

[The prepared statement of Specialist Tanguay follows:]
Testimony Of

SPC. Michael J. Tanguay
143rd Military Police Company
United States Army

To The Subcommittee On National Security, Emerging Threats, And International Relations
Good morning ladies and gentlemen. My name is SPC Michael J. Tanguay, a member of the 143rd Military Police Company. We are a National Guard unit out of Hartford, Connecticut, which was mobilized February 7, 2003 in support of Operation Iraqi Freedom. I have been invited here today to testify before you in regards to my experience of pre-deployment and deployment to Iraq as it pertains to the training and equipping we received. I thank you for this opportunity. It is the intent of my testimony today to provide you with the curriculum of training we received prior to and during our deployment, equipping issues we faced, and most importantly lessons we have learned. The goals I have set before myself and present to this committee, in testifying here before you, will aid in rectifying known problems and potential trouble spots coupled with an insight into the lessons we have learned.

In preparation for deployment my unit moved to Fort Drum, New York for a train-up mission. It is here where we received two months of theater specific training ranging from Arabic language lessons to convoy security operations. As a military police combat support unit we have a wide range of missions we can perform. Facing the uncertainty of war we did not know our specific mission so we took the time to review all standard operating procedures for each mission or task that we could face. We performed several live fire exercises to sharpen our marksmanship skills and re-familiarize ourselves with each weapon system. Mine awareness and unexploded ordnance classes were conducted, however Improvised Explosive Devices did not surface until we were once in theater. Medical aid, urban warfare tactics, patrol techniques, prisoner of war/detainee doctrine, area security operations, and convoy security procedures were key classes conducted that ultimately benefited us during our deployment.

The two-month train-up phase of the deployment provided ample time to train and become a unified fighting machine. However, poor time management skills, severe logistical issues, and improper equipment prevented us from training the way we ended up fighting. This motto of train the way we fight, highly adopted by my unit, is a foundational building block of our training curriculum. Nonetheless, without the proper
equipment at our training site, in preparing for a desert climate while bundled in three layers of winter clothing, and mismanagement of precious training time turned into a last minute dash to get up to speed in preparing for war.

The deficiency of the highly sought after unarmored humvee and interceptor vests, lack of training and time at the mock urban warfare town, and unintentional misguided operational procedures for various mission tasks proved to be key lessons learned and areas to improve on. More time spent at the mock urban warfare town would have proved extremely beneficial in building clearing techniques, possible ambush situations, and civilian considerations on the battlefield. Our unit spent 2 days out of the 2 months at this training site. Time is extremely precious in preparing for war but a 2-week minimum would prove extremely beneficial. Unintentional misguided operational procedures placed us at a temporary setback during the early going while we were in theater. Situational dictations coupled with an under manning strength hindered us in the way we trained and the way we ended up combating. For example, a traditional MP line company as myself is broken up into a 10-person squad with three vehicles, an ideal and perfect situation for any MP task. However, while on the ground in Iraq our squad consisted of six personnel and only two trucks, a severe setback and security concern when conducting such operations as area and convoy security. The operational tempo as high as it was along with a high demand for MP type missions dictated the changes that took place.

Arriving in Kuwait on April 15, 2003 was our last ditch effort to improve upon our training and ready our gear for the push towards Baghdad. In our 3-week stay in Kuwait we learned of our vague mission task. It was an encompassing task to patrol sectors of Baghdad, a very indistinguishable and non-definitive mission task at best. We readied our unarmored vintage aged humvees, and dawned our Vietnam era non-protective flak vests for the ride north. Severe logistical issues regarding equipment surfaced here again. No ammunition for our brand new MK-19 weapon system, no up armored humvees to patrol in, and still no interceptor ceramic plated vests to protect us. We adapted and overcame the best we could, sandbagging the floor boards of our 1986
humvees, creating weapons mounts for our other weapon system the M-249 SAW, and retrofitting a couple humvees with diamond plating on the side doors of the trucks.

Once in Baghdad things didn’t improve much. We finally received our interceptor vests after a month in Baghdad complete with ceramic plates but still had problems with ammunition and non-armored vehicles. We were quickly improving and overcoming great obstacles with what we had to work with. Training was a continuous process. Overcoming enemy tactics such as IED’s in the roadways forced us to vary our routes, continually improve base and area security, and maintain a high level of situational awareness. The United States military is a highly trained, skilled, adaptive, and intelligent force. The Guard and Reserve component forces have a lot to bring to the table as far as civilian background and how it is incorporated into use on the battlefield. For example, as a Military Police unit we have a large number of civilian law enforcement officers whose expertise and knowledge of policing provided first hand knowledge of patrol tactics, weapons proficiency, an urban backdrop and general policing duties to those of us less experienced. That factor alone made a true impact on our success during this deployment.

The 143rd Military Police Company and myself completed a one-year tour of duty in Baghdad, Iraq honorably while facing extreme odds and extenuating circumstances not in our favor. Several lessons have been learned some unfortunately due to casualties sustained and fellow brothers and sisters in arms lost. First and foremost let us equip our troops with the best possible gear to all units whether active duty, National Guard or Reserve component. Up armored Humvees, Interceptor vests, and IED Jamming systems are great initiatives but need to be dispersed to all troops deploying overseas. Next, let us phase in a training doctrine that relates more to a theater specific training regiment. There are several training sites in California, Nevada, and Louisiana that provide the type of climate that troops will soon see before they deploy. The mock urban warfare training ranges and sites are great tools that need to be taken advantage of. Language classes are also great tools and prove beneficial. Finally, it is imperative that these lessons learned from veterans be heard and the suggestions set forth to integrate this training doctrine to
all deploying units. Let us continue to be the most intelligent, best equipped, fighting force out there.

SPC. Michael J. Tanguay
143rd Military Police Company
Connecticut Army National Guard
United States Army
Mr. SCHROCK. Thank you very much. Very impressive.

Colonel Novotny, welcome. You have come a long way today and we are anxious to hear what you have to say. Welcome.

Colonel NOVOTNY. Chairman Shays and distinguished members of the subcommittee, I am Lieutenant Colonel Steven Novotny, Battalion Commander of the 530th Military Police Battalion from Omaha, NE. I am honored to have the opportunity to speak before your committee today.

In January 2003, my battalion headquarters was mobilized in support of Operation Iraqi Freedom. After receiving orders for active duty, my unit was certified for deployment at Fort Riley, KS, deployed overseas and established operations at two separate camps in Iraq. While our primary mission was providing force protection at Camp Bucca, we also managed several other important missions.

Several days a week, we coordinated visitation with 100 prisoners and over 500 family members that were being held at our camp. Our property team, responsible for annotating and inventory of prisoner personal effects, successfully returned many personal items to hundreds of prisoners upon departure of our camp. In addition, we entered into an agreement with British MPS to serve as a Quick Reaction Force if they needed assistance.

Health care was coordinated with the Czech and British hospitals in Basra to treat our soldiers and prisoners on an emergency basis. The British also provided a dedicated Air Medical Evacuation Team that supported our camp. My unit, the 530th MP Battalion attached 20 soldiers to the 101st Airborne, supporting prisoner constriction. These soldiers also provided instruction on law enforcement and correction tasks to Iraqi nationals who would assume control over these facilities.

While the 530th was in control of operations of our entire camp, we placed tremendous effort on improving the quality of life for our soldiers. We constructed a landing pad for helicopters, improved food variety, started an exchange program for medical personnel from the British hospital and established an MWR, a morale, welfare and recreation center. We also constructed a fixed shower facility. While this may not sound like much, our troops truly looked forward to one creature comfort, improving significantly our quality of life. Other things we did to improve morale was establish a local PX and having a 2-day bazaar.

In November, the 530th MP Battalion moved to a new location approximately 45 northeast of Baghdad where we secured a group of 3,800 detainees. In approximately 10 days our processing team entered all 3,800 detainees into an identification data bank with the assistance of a civilian assistance review team. Our processors were recognized for maintaining a high degree of dedication and professionalism while achieving an extremely high first-time acceptance rate for data input. Many soldiers supported other units to include traffic control points and convoy security, while conducting combat operations in our area of operation throughout our stay at Camp Ashraf.

Upon assuming command of my battalion, I conducted a review of my unit training program to ensure that our training program supported the essential tasks that were required of my unit if we
were mobilized. I directed that a staff exercise be organized to exercise my unit staff, non-commissioned officers and individual soldiers from the unit. This training was focused on our primary wartime mission. I directed that all officers within my battalion participate in a staff training exercise where we prepared estimates for conducting convoys.

All soldiers were trained on individual defensive tactics and while using the SINGARS communications equipment, we trained on our communications skills. Additionally, we worked on our critical task skills, on prisoner handling and management as well as specific areas within the Geneva Convention that applied to prisoners.

Before and after mobilization, our active component liaisons from the 75th Training Division were instrumental in providing our staff with current doctrine and guidance that we used to plan future training sessions. While at our mobilization station, we conducted training on convoy operations, conducted nearly 2 weeks of training on military operations and warfare in an urban environment. This training was organized as a direct result of lessons learned from the incident of the maintenance unit that became disoriented in the city during convoy movements and was required to fight its way out of an urban environment.

Early in our mobilization, I was invited to view exercises of possible wartime maneuver scenarios at Fort Hood along with my higher headquarters. These training sessions were invaluable in providing me the focus of potential missions of my battalion. Prior to leaving for Iraq, the 530th Military Police Battalion dispatched liaison noncommissioned officers to meet with subordinate companies that were located at Fort Lewis, Fort McCoy and Fort Bragg. These NCOs assured a coordinated, clear standard operating procedure was distributed to all units and that lines of communication along with clear and understood chain of command was established.

The primary wheeled vehicle we had in our headquarters company was the Humvee. These were configured as two and four seat vehicles. Several were used as utility vehicles and could haul a limited amount of supplies and personnel. None of these vehicles were equipped or configured with protective armor or machine gun mounts. Companies assigned under my control brought a variety of Humvee vehicles. These varied from vehicles with no armor to those with up-armored Humvees.

Immediately upon our arrival at our first location, I ordered that all vehicles be sandbagged with protective measures against mines. Units were outfitted with the armored Humvees were heavily tasked to provide convoy escorts for VIPs, prisoner transport, medical movement, logistic escort and force protection missions. All assigned line companies were equipped with 2 1/2 ton trucks as our primary logistics vehicle. While most of these trucks were over 30 years of age, the battalion was able to maintain an acceptable operational readiness rate.

While in Iraq, our battalion received new medium trucks at our home station in Omaha. Unfortunately, those vehicles were provided to other units who were scheduled to mobilize after us. Prior to moving to Camp Ashraf, all soldiers received the most current
body armor to include front and rear plates. The 530th MP Battalion left all vehicles and most equipment to include the light engineer equipment in-country for follow-on forces to utilize after our departure.

One lesson learned that would have improved our mission capability would have been an increase in allocation of medium machine guns and additional ammunition to allow for more soldiers to qualify on these weapons. While communications equipment was adequate, we needed additional backup equipment such as cables and microphones. We found that while we deployed with all of our soldiers we were supposed to have with our manning roster, our communications soldier was not enough. This was one person to support an entire battalion.

I would also recommend that some elements within the command structure be equipped with armored security vehicles, ASVs. These would provide MPS with increased fire power and survivability. Our war fighting doctrine was based on an MP battalion being placed approximately 80 miles behind the front lines. This doctrine did not account for an MP battalion to establish detainee camps while on the move and following lead combat forces.

Prior to mobilizing, all staff officers reviewed the After Action Review from our unit from Operation Desert Shield/Desert Storm. The staff would take information from actual events and modify our training accordingly. The battalion would send advance and quartering parties to identify critical issues at future locations that we would anticipate moving to.

The battalion conducted after action reviews after primary training events or actual situations in order to capture critical issues and provide updated guidance to our soldiers. We utilized IED employment templates which identified patterns of employment in our area and along routes that our convoys would move. Prior to convoys leaving our base, the S2 would request an IED update from our supporting brigade. If necessary, we could postpone convoy movements or take alternate routes.

We encouraged postponing convoy departures due to heavy fog in the morning. The battalion conducted detailed mission briefs utilizing sand tables which are a military method of visualization of the battlefield prior to all missions. My staff and I used the Combined Arms Lessons Learned [CALL], Web site from Fort Leavenworth. This is a storehouse of all Army lessons learned. We depended heavily on the operations and intel update for current information from the 2nd Combat Brigade of the 4th ID.

The 530th Executive Office was tasked with forwarding current situational updates with our lessons learned to the 89th Regional Reserve Command in Wichita, KS so they can incorporate our lessons learned into training plans for other Reserve forces. The 89th was able to emphasize to following units issues such as bringing as much PLL, prescribed load list items as possible with them. In addition, the convoy portion of the mobilization train-up was modified to incorporate lessons learned from units in-theater and pass on information to improve safety. Another result was a subordinate unit bringing in a Humvee with increased protection instead of what had been authorized previously.
During the 530th’s mobilization, we commanded nine companies from active duty, Army Reserve and National Guard. My battalion did the best to forge all companies into one team while providing them with the best leadership, guidance and resources they would require. I am extremely proud of all of our soldiers I have served with from California, South Carolina, Nebraska, Texas, Georgia, Wisconsin, Kentucky and Puerto Rico.

Thank you again for your time and I will answer any of your questions.

[The prepared statement of Colonel Novotny follows:]
Chairman Shays and distinguished members of the committee, I am Lieutenant Colonel Steve Novotny, battalion commander of the 530th Military Police (MP) Battalion Enemy Prisoner of War (EPW)/Civilian Internee (CI), from Omaha, Nebraska. I am honored to have the opportunity to speak before your committee today.

In January 2003 my battalion headquarters was mobilized in support of Operation Iraqi Freedom. After receiving orders to active duty my unit was certified for deployment at Fort Riley, Kansas, deployed overseas and established operations at two separate camps in Iraq. While our primary mission was providing Force Protection at Camp Bucca, we also managed several other important missions. Several days a week we coordinated the visitation of about 100 prisoners and 500 family members that were being held at our camp. Our property team, responsible for annotating and inventory of prisoner personal effects, successfully returned many personal items to hundreds of prisoners upon departing our camp. In addition, we entered into an agreement with British MP’s to serve as a Quick Reaction Force if they needed assistance. Health care was coordinated with the Czech and British hospitals in Basra to treat our Soldiers and prisoners on an emergency basis. The British also provided a dedicated Air
Medical Evacuation Team that supported our camp. My unit, the 530th MP BN, attached 20 soldiers to the 101st Airborne, supporting prison construction. These Soldiers also provided instruction on law enforcement and corrections tasks to Iraq nationals who would assume control over these facilities. While the 530th was in control of the operations of the entire camp we placed a tremendous effort on improving the quality of life for our soldiers. We constructed a landing pad for helicopters, improved food variety, started an exchange program for medical personnel from the British Hospital and established a MWR (Morale, Welfare and Recreation) Center. We also constructed a fixed shower facility; while this might not sound like much our troops truly looked forward to this one creature comfort, improving significantly our quality of life. Other things we did to improve morale was establishing a local PX and having a 2 day Bazaar.

In November the 530th MP BN moved to a new location approximately 45 miles northeast of Baghdad where we secured a group of 3,800 detainees. In approximately 10 days our processing team entered all 3,800 detainees into an Identification Data Bank with the assistance of a civilian assistance review team. Our processors were recognized for maintaining a high degree of dedication and professionalism while achieving an extremely high first time acceptance rate for data input. Many soldiers supported other units, to include traffic control points and convoy security, while conducting combat operations in our area of operation throughout our stay at Camp Ashraf.
TRAINING THE FORCE: Upon assuming command of my battalion I conducted a review of my unit training program to ensure that our training program supported the essential tasks that were required if my unit were mobilized. I directed that a Staff Exercise be organized to exercise the unit staff, Noncommissioned officers, and individual Soldiers of the unit. This training was focused on our primary wartime mission. I directed that all officers from within my battalion participate in a staff training exercise where we prepared estimates for conducting convoys. All soldiers were trained on individual defensive tactics and while using the SINGARS communications equipment we trained on our communication skills. Additionally we worked on our critical skills on prisoner handling and management, as well as specific areas within the Geneva Convention that applied to prisoners. Before and after mobilization our active component liaisons from the 75th Training Division were instrumental in providing our staff with current doctrine and guidance that we use to plan future training sessions. While at our mobilization station we conducted training on convoy operations and conducted nearly two weeks of training on military operations/warfare in an urban environment. This training was organized as a direct result of the lessons learned from the incident of the maintenance unit that became disoriented in a city during convoy movements and was required to fight its way out of an urban environment. Early in our mobilization I was invited to view exercises of possible wartime maneuver scenarios at Ft. Hood along with my higher headquarters. These training sessions were invaluable in providing me the focus of potential missions of my battalion.
Prior leaving for Iraq the 530th MP Battalion dispatched liaison noncommissioned officers to meet with subordinate units that were located at Ft. Lewis, Ft. McCoy, and Ft. Bragg. These NCO's assured that a coordinated, clear Standard Operating Procedure (SOP) was distributed to all units and that lines of communication along with a clear and understood chain of command was established.

EQUIPPING THE FORCE: The primary wheeled vehicle we had in our headquarters company was the HUMMWV. These were configured as two and four-seat vehicles. Several were used as utility vehicles and could haul a limited amount of supplies and personnel. None of the vehicles we deployed with were configured with protective armor or machine gun mounts. Companies assigned under my command brought a variety of HUMMWV vehicles; these varied from vehicles with no armor to those with up- armored HUMMWV's. Immediately upon arriving at our first location, I ordered that all vehicles be sandbagged as protection against mines. Units that were outfitted with the armored HUMMWV's were heavily tasked to provide convoy escorts for VIP's, prisoner transport, medical movement, logistic escort, and force protection missions. All assigned line companies were equipped with 2 ½ ton trucks as our primary logistics vehicle. While most of our trucks were over thirty years of age, the battalion was able to maintain an acceptable Operational Readiness Rate. While in Iraq our battalion received new medium trucks at our home station in Omaha, unfortunately those vehicles were provided to other units who were scheduled to
mobilize. Prior to moving to Camp Ashraf all soldiers received the most current body armor to include front and rear plates. The 530th MP BN left all vehicles and most equipment, to include light engineer equipment, in country for follow on forces to utilize after our departure. One lesson learned that would have improved our mission capability would have been an increase in our allocation of medium machine guns and additional ammunition to allow for more Soldiers to qualify on these weapons. While communication equipment was adequate we needed additional back up equipment, i.e. cables and microphones, and we found that while we deployed with all the Soldiers we were suppose to have on our manning roster, our one communication Soldier was not enough.

I would also recommend some elements within the command structure be equipped with Armored Security Vehicles (ASV). This would provide MPs with increased fire power and survivability.

Our war fighting doctrine was based on an MP BN that would be placed approximately 80 miles behind the front line. This doctrine did not account for an MP BN to establish detainee camps while on the move, following the lead combat forces.

LESSONS LEARNED: Prior to mobilizing, all staff officers reviewed the After Action Review (AAR) of our unit from Operation Desert Shield/Storm. The staff would take information from actual events and modify our training accordingly. The battalion would send advance/quartering parties to identify critical issues at future locations that we would anticipate to move to. The battalion conducted AAR’s after primary training events or actual situations in order to capture critical
issues and provide updated guidance to our Soldiers. We utilized IED employment templates, which identified patterns of employment in our area and along routes that our convoys would move. Prior to convoys leaving our base, the S-2 Section would request IED updates from our supporting brigade. If necessary we could postpone convoy movements or take alternate routes. It was encouraged to postpone convoy departures due to heavy fog cover in the morning. The battalion conducted detailed mission briefs to include utilizing sand tables (a military method to visualize the battlefield) prior to all missions. My staff and I used the Combined Arms Lessons Learned (CALL) website available at Ft. Leavenworth. This is a storehouse for all Army lessons learned. We depended heavily on the operations and intelligence update for current information from the 2nd Brigade Combat Team (BCT). The 530th executive officer was tasked with forwarding current situational updates to the 89th Regional Reserve Command, Wichita, KS, so they could incorporate our lessons learned into training plans for other reserve forces. The 89th was able to emphasize to follow on units issues such as bringing as much prescribed load list (PLL) as possible. In addition the convoy portion of the mobilization train-up was modified to incorporate lessons learned from units in theater and pass on information to improve safety. Another result was a subordinate unit bringing a HUMMWV with increased protection instead of what had been previously authorized.

During the 530ths mobilization, we commanded nine companies from the active duty, Army Reserve and National Guard. My battalion did our best to forge all our
companies into one team while providing them with the leadership, guidance and resources that they would require. I'm extremely proud of all our Soldiers who I have served with from California, South Carolina, Nebraska, Texas, Georgia, Wisconsin, Kentucky and Puerto Rico. Thank you again for your time and I would like to answer any questions.
Mr. SCHROCK. Thank you, Colonel, and thank you for being here.

Dr. Krepinevich, thank you. It is nice to have you here again and
the floor is yours.

Dr. KREPINEVICH. Thank you and thank you for the opportunity
to appear before you today and share my views on this important
issue.

As you know, my expertise on the details of training and prepar-
ing our troops for deployment to Afghanistan and Iraq is far from
comprehensive. Consequently, I will focus my comments in placing
the training issue within the larger context of our operations in
these two countries.

For people my age and those of us who have served in the mili-
tary, there is a sense that we have been to this movie before. In-
deed, 42 years ago almost to the day, President Kennedy in ad-
dressing the graduating class at West Point said the following,
“This is another type of war, new in its intensity, ancient in its ori-
gins, war by guerillas, subversives, insurgents, assassins, war by
ambush instead of by combat, by infiltration instead of aggression,
seeking victory by eroding and exhausting the enemy instead of en-
gaging him. It requires in those situations where we must counter
it a whole new kind of strategy, a wholly different kind of force,
and therefore, a wholly different kind of military training.” When
he spoke those words, he was referring to places like Vietnam and
Colombia but I think they are quite apt for the kind of combat that
these people find themselves confronting today in Afghanistan and
Iraq.

First, we are victims of our success. Our military so dominates
that the conventional form of warfare that we have essentially
driven people out of that business. Those who want to confront us
are now like North Korea and Iran, looking for nuclear weapons.
Those that can’t do that such as the opposition in Afghanistan and
Iraq, seek the route of insurgency and practice the tactics the
President spoke of some 42 years ago.

Second, as they have gotten into this business, we find that we
have been out of this business. We got out of this business after
the Vietnam War. “No more Vietnams” was voiced not only by the
American public and the political leadership but quite frankly also
by our military as well. The 1980’s saw the Weinberg and Powell
doctrines, go in with everything you have, overwhelming force and
leave quickly. The 1990’s when we had situations where we did de-
deploy overseas, we can think of Somalia, Haiti and Bosnia, there
was all discussion about exit strategies. Let us not stay there too
long. That seemed to work. Unfortunately, September 11 changed
everything. Now we don’t have the luxury of leaving a Haiti or So-
malia, especially when they are named Afghanistan and Iraq just
because we got tired or we don’t feel we are as successful as we
should be. Nevertheless, this approach, this no more Vietnams,
Weinberg-Powell Doctrine and exit strategy concept practiced by all
of us, Republicans, Democrats and military alike, led to the atro-
phy of the kinds of skills, the kind of doctrinal development, the
kind of thinking about what it takes to prevail in this kind of war.

Thus, the tactics we talk about the insurgents practice in places
like Afghanistan and Iraq, while they seem perhaps new to us,
they are hardly new at all. Suicide bombers are not new. Neither
are car and truck bombs. We saw those as far back as 1983 in Beirut and Lebanon. Certainly attacks on convoys aren’t new. As for improvised explosive devices, we have seen them before as well. In 1966 in Vietnam, over 1,000 Americans were killed in combat because of improvised booby traps and what we would call today IEDs. If it seems new, if these challenges seem new and the training requirements seem new, it is because just as they have gotten into this business, we find that we have been out of it for too long.

The third point I would like to make is that insurgencies are typically protracted conflicts. Since they are protracted conflicts, we need not only the kinds of adaptive fixes that these men have been talking about but we also need to move beyond this hastily organized fix for training. We need a coherent, focused, long-term approach to bring the U.S. military’s training infrastructure for irregular warfare as counter insurgency is up to the standards we have established for conventional warfare training facilities such as at the Army’s National Training Center and other facilities.

Fourth, the issue of a training gap. Insurgencies are, as I said, protracted conflicts. What we have is a force that will continue to rotate over time. We have already gone through the first rotation. Insurgents don’t rotate. They continue to receive the best possible training, contact with American forces. If this occurs as it does over time, if this is a protracted conflict as most insurgencies are, a training gap will likely emerge between our forces and theirs, making it all the more important to make sure that our training standards are up to the highest level possible.

Indeed, as troops rotate out of the theater of operations, their skills begin to atrophy. Not only that, but since they don’t participate directly in the conflict, the fact the insurgents are adapting may make these skills not only atrophy but also less relevant over time. This means is that we need to find ways to mitigate the training gap, not only through the training infrastructure but also by prompt, accurate feedback that can be used in training forces in that infrastructure at the relevant kind of tactics and operations at the relevant scale.

We need a stable rotation base that can insure high retention rates. If in fact over time we are going to be deploying forces again and again to Iraq and Afghanistan and other places where we are confronted by insurgents, we are going to need people who have had that experience before.

Finally, the Army’s concept of unit manning might even prove more productive in that it would not only rotate people back, people who have better experience but finally, people who are operating as a cohesive unit. Failure to retain people will lead to an even greater burden on our training infrastructure.

My final point as First Sergeant O’Neill said, our troops and units train the way they fight. They train the way they fight and they fight as a function of the doctrine and the way they are organized, the force structure. Again, just as training has atrophied over the last 25 years, so has doctrine. The NTC may be fine for conducting training on sweeps to detect guerilla forces in open desert but it is far less relevant if our doctrine emphasizes securing and holding towns and urban areas for protracted periods. In this vein, it is critical to have a clear sense of the strategy that we are
pursuing in Afghanistan and Iraq because the fact is that no matter how tactically proficient we are, that is not going to be a substitute for good strategy or effective doctrine.

Let me sum up. Again, let me compliment the committee for raising the awareness of this important issue. Again, I think the fact we are engaged in dealing with insurgency today is a function of our military dominance. Nevertheless, although insurgency may be a form of warfare of the weak and not the strong, it still presents us, as Secretary Rumsfeld has said, with a long, hard slog to victory. This means we must move beyond the service’s immediate training fixes, helpful though they may be, to undertake reform and restructure of our training programs to address a form of warfare that has received all too little attention these past two decades.

Finally, it is critical to note that improved training at the tactical level of warfare cannot make up for deficiencies in strategy and military doctrine.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

[The prepared statement of Dr. Krepinevich follows:]
Combating Terrorism
Training and Equipping Reserve Component Forces

Testimony of

Andrew F. Krepinevich, Jr.

Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments

May 11, 2004
Introduction

“This is another type of war, new in its intensity, ancient in its origins—war by guerrillas, subversives, insurgents, assassins; war by ambush instead of by combat; by infiltration, instead of aggression, seeking victory by eroding and exhausting the enemy instead of engaging him . . . . It requires in those situations where we must counter it . . . a wholly new kind of strategy, a wholly different kind of force, and therefore a new and wholly different kind of military training.” (emphasis added)

John F. Kennedy

These words were spoken by President Kennedy as he addressed the graduating class at West Point in June, 1962. Forty years later, they sum up the challenge facing today’s military in countries like Afghanistan and Iraq, and highlight the interrelationship between strategy, force structure, and training. If anything, the challenge is far more formidable today than it was in Vietnam.

Mr. Chairman and members of the committee, it is an honor to appear before you today to offer my thoughts on the timely and important issue of “Combating Terrorism: Training and Equipping Reserve Component Forces.” My expertise on the specific details of our training efforts to prepare our troops for deployment to Afghanistan and Iraq is far from comprehensive. Consequently, I will focus my comments on placing the training issue—both for the Active and Reserve Components—within the larger context of our military operations in these countries.

What Kind of War?

The US military’s doctrine, force structure and training infrastructure are oriented primarily on large-scale conventional military operations. However, our military has been so successful in fielding forces capable of waging conventional war that adversaries are, for the present, dissuaded from confronting the United States in that manner. Instead, they are seeking shelter at
the extreme ends of the conflict spectrum. At the high end, hostile states like North Korea and Iran are rushing to develop nuclear capabilities, while at the lower end hostile groups such as al Qaeda, the Taliban, remnants of Saddam Hussein’s Ba’athist regime, splinter Iraqi Shi’ia elements and similar groups pursue insurgency warfare.

An insurgency is a protracted struggle conducted, at least initially, from a position of great military weakness, whose objective is to overthrow the existing order. Insurgencies typically comprise three phases: first, insurgent agitation and proselytization among the mass populace—the phase of contention; second, overt violence, guerrilla operations, and the establishment of sanctuaries—the equilibrium phase; and third, open warfare between insurgent and government forces designed to topple the existing regime—the counteroffensive phase. Today in Afghanistan and Iraq, US forces are encountering insurgent movements that are a mix of Phase I and Phase II operations. American forces must train for both, as well as for the prospect of countering the insurgents in Phase III operations.

There is an important distinction to be made between insurgent movements that are being principally countered by indigenous government forces, and those that primarily confront the forces of an external power. The latter, of course, is the situation in Afghanistan and Iraq. In the former country, US/NATO forces predominate; while in the latter, US/Coalition forces shoulder most of the burden. This is important because it becomes possible for the insurgents to win in a different way—by draining the will of the foreign powers to the point where they abandon an infant regime before it is capable of standing on its own and defending itself. In a democracy such as the United States, this translates to eroding popular support for the war.

Thus, in an insurgency, the principal target of both insurgent and counterinsurgent forces is not the enemy’s military force; rather, in Afghanistan and Iraq, the center of gravity is the population—both the indigenous population and public opinion on America’s home front. The insurgents cannot hope to defeat US military forces in open battle (i.e., by moving to Phase III of the insurgency). American forces cannot be militarily forced out of these countries. However, the insurgents are relying on the active cooperation or passive acceptance of the vast majority of the indigenous population to sustain them. If they can achieve this, they can avoid defeat. Even
though they are far weaker than the forces that oppose them, by simply not losing—by “staying in the game”—over a protracted period, the insurgents hope to win by convincing the American public and its leaders that the war is not worth the cost in blood and treasure.

While the United States does not confront a unified, coherent enemy in either Afghanistan or Iraq, as it did in Vietnam, insurgent elements do seem to be pursuing traditional insurgent strategies and tactics. Since the insurgents are too weak to challenge coalition forces openly, they pursue an indirect approach, the target of which is the population. If the insurgents can gain control over the population through fear, popular appeal, or, more likely, a mixture of both, their chances of surviving, and winning, improve dramatically.

As T.E. Lawrence (“Lawrence of Arabia”) noted, “rebellions can be made by two percent active in a striking force, and 98 percent passively sympathetic.” Access to the population, and (if possible) control over the population enables the insurgents to deny critical intelligence to coalition forces. After all, if the coalition forces know who and where the insurgents are, they have more than enough military capability to engage and defeat them. Insurgent access to the population also enables them to recruit new members to their cause, as well as to appropriate food, medicine and other supplies. Correspondingly, the inability of the governments in Kabul and Baghdad to exercise control over their population will sap away at their strength, denying them replacements for the armed forces, making taxes difficult or impossible to collect, and drying up sources of badly needed intelligence.

Thus US and coalition forces find themselves engaged in stability operations designed to win the “hearts and minds” of the Afghan and Iraqi population. To date, the majority of US Soldiers and Marines killed and wounded in these operations have been victims of gunfire, rocket and mortar attack, and improvised explosive devices (IEDs). Improvised rocket launchers are being used to attack fixed targets, like buildings. Roadside bombs (e.g., IEDs) are employed to slow convoys, making them vulnerable to other forms of attack, such as suicide bombers or guerrilla assaults.

Foreign fighters are infiltrating Iraq, either working in separate cells or teaming up with local insurgent elements. Attacks there are becoming more coordinated and sophisticated, possibly due
to the leadership of these foreign elements. The enemy has shown the ability to stand and fight, rather than merely to “shoot and scoot.” Although the insurgents apparently lack a unified command, they are showing the discipline to operate in groups of 20-40 fighters. Recent uprisings in cities like Fallujah and Najaf witnessed insurgent groups massing in substantially larger numbers, although at this point their command element’s ability to coordinate large force groupings appears problematic. The shifts in the scale and form of insurgent attacks could have important implications for training.

Having said that, it should be noted that the tactics employed by the various insurgent movements with which coalition forces must contend are, in most cases, not new. Suicide bombers are hardly novel; nor are car and truck bombs a recent phenomenon.\(^1\) Attacks on convoys in Iraq, which are increasing, again reflect nothing new in insurgency warfare.

As for IEDs, American forces have seen them before as well. For example, owing to the US military’s emphasis on firepower, in Vietnam in 1966, over 27,000 tons of unexploded ordnance (artillery shells that were fired or bombs dropped by aircraft), or “duds” were generated. The Viet Cong proved expert at converting these duds into mines and booby traps—their version of IEDs. Over 1,000 US soldiers died that year from these weapons. During the first six months of 1967 the problem worsened, as 17 percent of all US casualties (539 killed and 5,532 wounded) were caused by these devices.

Insurgents in both Afghanistan and Iraq have demonstrated a willingness to target noncombatants, including their own people. Again, this is nothing new. Indeed, when in doubt as to their ability to win the “hearts” of the people, insurgents have often used intimidation and terror to win their “minds,” and thereby gain their unwilling cooperation, or passivity.

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\(^1\) Consider, for example, the attack on the US Marine Corps barracks in Beirut over two decades ago, and the Khobar Towers attack on US forces in 1996.
The Challenge for the US Military

“No More Vietnams”
This raises the question: If the insurgents are not employing dramatically different strategies or tactics, why is the US military so challenged by them? One reason is that both the Army and Marine Corps’ skills in this form of warfare have atrophied over the last 30 years.

In the wake of the United States’ traumatic experience in fighting communist insurgents in Vietnam during the 1960s and 1970s, there emerged a strong desire among the American people, their political leaders, and the military itself to avoid involvement in such conflicts in the future. The phrase “No More Vietnams” proved a comfortable fit for the American people and its military. Even before US involvement in Vietnam ended, President Nixon set forth the Nixon Doctrine, which called for the United States to support friendly regional powers opposing insurgent forces, but not to plan on deploying US combat troops to assist them.

With the 1980s came the Weinberger and Powell Doctrines. They essentially advocated applying overwhelming US force to defeat the enemy promptly, and to facilitate rapid US disengagement. When the Marine Corps barracks in Beirut was attacked, the US quickly withdrew its forces from Lebanon. Where US advisors were involved in counterinsurgency operations, as in El Salvador, strict limits were place on their numbers. The pattern persisted through the 1990s. When US troops were dispatched to conduct peacekeeping operations in Haiti, Somalia, and the Balkans, there were demands for “exit strategies,” lest American forces become bogged down in a Vietnam-like quagmire.

Benign Doctrinal Neglect
It is, therefore, not surprising that the US military’s focus on counterinsurgency warfare declined, with predictable consequences for doctrine, force structure and training. Following Vietnam, Army doctrinal efforts again focused overwhelmingly on conventional warfare. Even after the Soviet Union’s collapse and its deployments during the 1990s to a series of low-intensity conflicts, the Army’s operational concepts for its Future Force marginalized
counterinsurgency. The consequences of this for training are clear. The Army and Marine Corps emphasize training in accordance with their doctrine. If the doctrine accords low priority to counterinsurgency operations, training in the skills associated with this kind of warfare is likely to be marginalized, as it has been.

**Force Restructuring**

The Army’s force structure also reflects the admonitions of the nation’s political leadership over the past three decades. Truth be told, it also reflects the Service’s own preference to avoid creating forces for large-scale, protracted counterinsurgency operations, and instead to focus on what it does best: conduct highly complex, highly integrated, combined arms operations against a conventional adversary in mid-intensity conflicts.² The assumption that such forces could address insurgency warfare as a “lesser included case” of conventional military operations has not held in Afghanistan or Iraq, just as it did not hold in Vietnam.

The Active and Reserve Components, while not structurally identical, do bear a substantial resemblance. With respect to both the AC and RC, the Army finds itself not only having to regenerate certain skills (e.g., convoy security) that have been accorded low priority over time, but also to reclassify a significant portion of its Soldiers to field sufficient forces to conduct counterinsurgency operations on the scale required in Afghanistan and Iraq. Thus some field artillerymen must not only be trained in counterinsurgency tactics, techniques and procedures, but also in the skills of a different military occupation specialty—as infantrymen or military police, for example.

**The Training Infrastructure**

The requirement to train both individuals and units for counterinsurgency operations in Afghanistan and Iraq, and to support training associated with the conversion of force structures to those more relevant for counterinsurgency operations, has strained a training infrastructure that is optimized to develop soldiers and units for conventional warfare. The Army’s National Training Center (NTC), for example, was designed with conventional military operations in
mind. Neither the Army nor the Marine Corps has sufficient urban warfare training facilities to
provide training for all those units who require it. Moreover, urban warfare training centers do
not replicate the urban environment in its full form (e.g., dense concentrations of high-rise
buildings, subterranean features like sewers and subways). Consequently, Army and Marine
units cannot receive the kind of high-fidelity training in urban operations on a scale (i.e., brigade-
level) comparable to that received at the NTC.

Regrettably, neither the Clinton nor Bush administrations took steps to create either a Joint
National Training Center (JNTC) or a Joint Urban Warfare Training Center (JUWTC), as
recommended by defense experts, including those on the National Defense Panel. This is
important, as counterinsurgency warfare is typically protracted in nature. This means that US
forces will likely find themselves engaged in this form of conflict for the better part of this
decade, and perhaps a major part of the next. Thus the US military could benefit substantially
from creating the necessary infrastructure to support high-fidelity counterinsurgency training.

To be sure, both the Army and Marine Corps are trying to adopt their training to prepare those
Soldiers and Marines, and their units, for combat operations in Afghanistan and Iraq. For the
most part, however, these efforts appear to be hastily organized. A more coherent, focused, long-
term approach is needed to bring the US military’s training infrastructure for irregular wars, like
counterinsurgency, up to the standards of its conventional warfare training facilities, and to meet
the dramatically increased demand for such training.

“Training For What?” The Role of Strategy
There is an old saying that units should “train the way they fight.” This means that training
should, to the maximum extent possible, present the individual Soldier or Marine, and their units,
with a training environment as close as possible to that which they will encounter once deployed
into the theater of operations. The US military takes this matter very seriously. Its high-fidelity
training facilities are the world’s finest, and have represented a source of enduring advantage for

1 The Army was so intent on avoiding future “Vietnams” that, in wake of that conflict, General Creighton Abrams,
then the chief of staff, restructured the force in such a way that large-scale, prolonged deployments of combat forces
required a call-up of the Reserves.
US forces. But most of these facilities were created during the Cold War, and reflect the demands of that era, not the one the military now confronts.

Moreover, "the way you fight" depends not only on the threat posed by the enemy. It also depends on the strategy chosen to achieve one's objectives. Once a strategy is adopted, war plans or campaign plans are developed to execute the strategy. Joint and Service doctrine at the operational level of war also comes into play. It represents an authoritative, approved way for accomplishing a task, be it organizing and running a convoy or conducting a campaign against insurgents.

Because counterinsurgency doctrine at the operational, or campaign level, of warfare languished in the US military in the three decades since the end of US involvement in the Vietnam War, the military does not have a well-honed doctrine for addressing such contingencies, especially at the operational level. This is important for training, as doctrine at the operational level of war sets the tasks that units (e.g., brigades, battalions) must be trained to accomplish. Importantly, operational doctrine also informs tactical doctrine—the tasks that small units and individual Soldiers and Marines must be prepared to accomplish.

For an example of how operational doctrine can influence individual and small unit training, consider the US military's experience during the Vietnam War. During the roughly two decades of significant US military involvement, a number of different operational concepts were put forth for defeating the communist insurgents. They included search and destroy operations; coastal enclaves; invading North Vietnam; and a variation on enclaves known as the Demographic Frontier. Each was interrelated in some form with efforts to provide security and rural development (roughly analogous to reconstruction efforts in Iraq). There were, as well, several different campaign concepts for pacification (e.g., Agrovi4les, Strategic Hamlets, Civil Operations and Revolutionary Development Support, or CORDS). Thus the type of training program designed for individual Soldiers and Marines, and for units, small and large, will be influenced significantly by the strategy chosen to achieve US objectives, and the campaign plan developed to execute it.
In this vein, it is critical to have a clear sense of the strategy the US military is pursuing to defeat the insurgencies in Afghanistan and Iraq. It cannot be overemphasized that tactical proficiency is no substitute for good strategy or effective doctrine at the operational level of war.

Avoiding the “Training Gap”: Establishing a Sustainable Rotation Base and Unit Manning

The effectiveness of US Soldiers and Marines, and of their units, depends not only on training them for the mission at hand, but maintaining their training proficiency over time. This is particularly true in a protracted war.

Consider that insurgent forces in Afghanistan and Iraq do not rotate in and out of the theater of operations, as US units do. They may rest and refit themselves from time to time, but they are always in the theater of operations—and in insurgency warfare, there is no “rear area.” This enables the insurgent force to accumulate skills in the best possible training environment: actual operations against counterinsurgent forces. Conversely, Army and Marine units deploy to Afghanistan and Iraq for a relatively brief period, “typically” from six months to a year. Then they rotate home. When they do, their skills begin to atrophy. Moreover, as time passes operations and tactics change as US and enemy forces try to gain an advantage. Thus not only do skills decline, they may become progressively less relevant. A “training gap” emerges between American troops and their adversaries, in favor of the latter.

At some point, these Soldiers and Marines may rotate back to Afghanistan or Iraq. If they are deployed back into the area where they were previously deployed, this training gap may be mitigated.

For this to happen, retention rates must remain high. For retention rates to remain high, a rotation base must be established that encourages high retention rates. At present, the rotation base for Army (in particular) and Marine forces deployed on hardship/combat tours appears woefully inadequate to sustain high retention rates. This could pose serious problems over time, both for US military effectiveness in Afghanistan and Iraq, and for the US military’s training infrastructure. If, in this protracted conflict, the US military is not able to deploy units that
contain a significant number of veteran Soldiers and Marines, the training gap between them and their adversary may widen. During the Vietnam War, when US forces had a high percentage of draftees in their ranks who were discharged after a few years’ service, including one year in Vietnam, it was said that the United States military had “one year’s worth of experience in Vietnam ten times over,” whereas many of the communist guerrillas they confronted had a decade or more of experience. A similar phenomenon could occur in today’s volunteer military if retention rates decline.

Should this occur, it will place greater stress on the military’s training infrastructure to make up the difference. A training infrastructure optimized for conventional warfare will have to prepare a higher percentage of “green” troops for counterinsurgency warfare.

The implications for US military effectiveness could be striking. In the past, training at the Army’s NTC, the Air Force’s “Red Flag” exercises and the Navy’s “Top Gun” training provided US service members with a competitive edge in combat, especially as they were often matched up against opponents with less experience and inferior training.

But things have changed. As noted, it is far from clear that the “training gap” will favor US forces in Afghanistan and Iraq over time. Nor can it be taken for granted that the US military’s training infrastructure can be adapted quickly enough, and on a sufficient scale to make up for a substantial decline in Active and Reserve Component retention rates. Hence the need to establish a rotation base for the long haul.6

Of course, military effectiveness is a function of unit training as well as individual training. The effectiveness of unit operations might be enhanced, perhaps dramatically, if a major portion of its members remained together over successive deployments. There is some debate as to whether such “unit manning,” as envisioned by the Army, actually produces greater unit cohesion, or that

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5 One reason this might not happen is if enemy insurgent forces are suffering severe casualties, or experiencing substantial defections. This could increase substantially the percentage of inexperienced insurgents in their ranks.

6 Although retention is a function of myriad factors, it appears that, for the Active Component, a rotation ratio of 4:1 (e.g., maintaining four active brigades in order to keep one of them forward deployed at all times) and a Reserve Component ratio of 7:1 or 8:1 may suffice to maintain current retention rates. Unfortunately, moving to such rotation ratios would lead to a substantial decline in US troops available for duty in Afghanistan and Iraq.
the gains in unit cohesion are worth the costs of creating it. However, there would seem to be significant benefits to be derived from unit manning and rotation if, as part of the Army and Marine rotation sequences, units that had operated in a particular area of Afghanistan or Iraq returned to those same areas in their successive deployments.

“Soft” Training
Tactics are clearly important in military operations, and Soldiers and Marines must be tactically proficient in individual and small-unit training on tasks such as detecting and handling IEDs, conducting convoy operations, clearing urban structures, and manning checkpoints. But counterinsurgency training is even more challenging. Soldiers, Marines and small units must also be trained in unconventional, or at least traditionally peripheral, tasks that are not central to the “fire and maneuver” or “move, shoot and communicate” that form the core of conventional combat operations. These tasks include:

- Expressing an appreciation of cultural norms;
- Maintaining fire power restraint;
- Undertaking civic action with local government and civic leaders;
- Operating (and perhaps integrating) with local security forces; and
- Providing security and other forms of support to reconstruction efforts—domestic, American, and third party.

It is not clear how well individual Soldiers and Marines, or small units, can be “trained up” for these tasks prior to their deployment to the combat theater. Training in some skills may be relatively easy. There are, for example, ongoing programs to provide US forces with an appreciation of Afghan and Iraqi customs and cultural norms. Here in America, police training emphasizes restraint in the use of force. These techniques may be applied to train US troops in firepower restraint. On the other hand, US forces operating with local security forces can be
critical to an effective counterinsurgency campaign, as demonstrated by the Army’s Special Forces in the Buon Enao program and the Marine Combined Action Platoons initiative in Vietnam. Yet other than personal experience, and relying on well-crafted “lessons learned” reports, it would seem difficult to conduct training in these types of tasks beyond basic military skills (e.g., patrolling). Similarly, building the necessary confidence among local leaders and the population in general, so as to promote civic action, enhance security, and thus win their “hearts and minds” is likely to be, at least in part, a function of US troops’ “people skills,” upon building up a level of trust that can only occur over time, and on the strategy and operations chosen.\(^5\)

**Summary**

In conclusion, let me compliment the committee for raising the awareness of this important issue. We are confronted with insurgency warfare today in no small measure because of our military’s dominance in conventional warfare. Insurgency is a form of warfare of the weak, not the strong. Yet the defeat of an insurgent movement typically comes only after a protracted period of conflict. Winning, to cite Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld, will likely involve a “long, hard slog.” This means we must move beyond the Services’ immediate training fixes, helpful as they may be, to undertake to reform and restructure our training programs to address a form of warfare that has received all too little attention over the past few decades.

Finally, it is critical to note that improved training at the tactical level of warfare cannot make up for deficiencies in strategy and military doctrine.

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\(^5\) For example, a strategy that emphasizes periodic sweeps through an area is far less likely to provide the level of contact that “secure and hold” operations would. Familiarity can breed trust, as well as contempt. If the local population trusts coalition forces will provide it with security, it becomes easier to obtain the intelligence that is critical to defeating the insurgents. The choice between a strategy that emphasizes periodic sweeps and one that places high priority on sustained presence in an area could have a significant influence on the type of skills most needed in the force, and thus on what might constitute an optimal training program.
Mr. SCHROCK. Thank you. It is an incredibly important subject. We appreciate your thoughtful comments and hope everyone was listening because it is very important.

General Alexander, we are glad to have you here. You represent a magnificent organization. It is my privilege to yield the floor to you.

General ALEXANDER. Thank you very much for inviting me to testify on behalf of the National Guard Association of the United States.

As you know, the mission of the National Guard has changed drastically since September 11. Today’s Guardsmen and Guardswomen are not only supporting missions to defend and protect our homeland but they are also deployed abroad in our ongoing war against terrorism.

The state of the National Guard is good. However, as the Guard participates in Iraq, Afghanistan and other locations throughout the world, challenges continue and they will continue for some time. I believe the Guard has demonstrated they are up to these challenges. The current military leadership understands the hardship the Guard is enduring. The families and employers of these brave men and women understand and support the commitment that their loved ones, co-workers and friends have elected to make. An Arkansas spokesman says, “Guard families are doing OK. Though they have anxiety, they still support the Guard.” These comments were in light of the Arkansas Guard sustaining five combat related deaths just a few weekends ago in Operation Iraqi Freedom.

In preparing my testimony, I solicited comments from members of the National Guard Association and received feedback from the Adjutants General of the States and communications from Special Forces soldiers and those soldiers returning from areas of operation in Iraq and Afghanistan. I will report to you those in the field are thankful for the forward thinking preparation that has been demonstrated by our Nation’s Adjutants General. In several instances, training from lessons learned has been instituted from the ground up, that is State level rather than top down from the Federal level. As such, many States have taken the lessons learned from their returning or deployed units and incorporated new training regimes to prepare soldiers for their deployment in theater.

Several States have initiated their own programs to prepare their soldiers for combat operations such as additional combat arms training to enhance basic soldier skills outside of the MOS skill set and years of additional funding to enhance communication and coordination training for units preparing for deployment.

In preparation for my testimony, I reviewed questions that you posed to us. As such in my capacity as president of the National Guard Association, I would like to focus on two aspects of the questions you presented to us, training and resourcing. With regard to training, some units are reporting that redundancy in training has extended their stay at mobilization stations. Other feedback indicates that some of the existing training at home station does not fit the scenarios that our personnel are encountering. This also is increasing time at mobilization stations. This is requiring our soldiers to be gone for 18 months or more. There should be a review...
of our current policies and procedures to maximize training and certification at home station.

There exists instances where we are using training doctrine as stated earlier that is more than 3 years old. We should make every effort to reduce time at mobilization stations by addressing this training gap. In addition, there should be a review of training for the Air National Guard transportation units. Some Air National Guard units are being deployed without training and as a result are required to train up in theater. This is the transportation piece. A greater attempt should be made to train these units prior to deployment.

Allow me to read comments from a Special Forces unit that has returned from operations in Afghanistan. Transition that occurred in Afghanistan between National Guard Special Forces groups and active duty Special Forces groups did not allow for an effective passage of information or situational awareness for two reasons. Active component intelligence and command personnel who had been deployed in the region for less than 8 months did not have confidence in the National Guard to further develop a valuable situational awareness or understanding. The transition schedule also did not allow for sufficient overlap.

After returning to home station for deployment, most units did not see value in their receiving lessons learned or heads-up information from us, that is the Guard Special Forces group. They viewed such as an ad hoc means of relating information to be a training distractor. These unit commands believe that their power projection platforms and higher headquarters would be able to provide them the information they needed to succeed. Some units have accepted offered briefings and work groups only to limit attendance and to assure that these meetings were kept short. Attempts at providing information failed because unit commands were not reachable or did not return attempted contacts.

With regard to the issue of resourcing our Guard forces, the following comments were made from the field. Adequate training with sappy plates and body armor should be done stateside. Soldiers need to be comfortable and familiar with all the equipment they will be using before deploying to their theater of operations. We should be training and resourcing our forces at C–1 level rather than taking extended time to train at C–3 level. We must ensure that our personnel have the materials and equipment they will be using in the area of operation.

Also allow me to read excerpts from one of several e-mails I received from soldiers serving abroad when we posed your questions to them. The current military table of organizations do not provide the necessary equipment for units operating in this environment. For example, our truck company is not authorized radios in each vehicle to maintain communications between drivers. The unit purchased secure handheld radios prior to deployment which have been essential to that unit.

The M–16 A2 is not the best weapon for transportation soldiers to quickly engage the enemy and they should be replaced with M–4s. A hatch cut in the top of a het would offer better field of fire observations. Up-armored Humvees must be standardized. As you
may have heard, a number of our soldiers are being inundated and all kinds of ways are being used to protect themselves in Humvees. The standard military weapons training must be enhanced to include close quarter battle and enhanced weapons training for all soldiers. This is very true for our transportation company personnel who during an ambush transitioning to modern infantry is a must. At present, the individual States are purchasing equipment and providing training required. MOS training schools must spend more time focusing on critical combat skills and eliminate nonsurvival skills such as drill and ceremony. Every minute of training time on skills that will keep a soldier alive in combat is what we should be about.

In the fog of war and in light of logistics and resourcing challenges facing our Guard units, they are producing innovations in the field as relates to the individual equipment and vehicles. For the record, I would ask that an article from the Topeka Capital Journal be entered into the record for the committee's review. I believe that has already been submitted.

Mr. SCHROCK. Without objection.

General ALEXANDER. As you can see, there have been challenges that need to be addressed. I believe the Guard units and their leadership are responding. I believe that our Guard units and Adjutants General are focusing on training and preparing their personnel in order to protect the lives of our citizens.

Again, our Guard personnel are rising to the new challenges each and every day. We must continue to evaluate our mission and how we train and equipment for such missions.

I applaud you and this committee for focusing on this important issue in order to serve our military men and women. They are our greatest asset. Without them, we cannot fight and defend our country. We must honor the sacrifices they make each day.

Thank you again for the opportunity to testify and look forward to your questions.

[The prepared statement of General Alexander follows:]
Statement of the National Guard Association of the United States (NGAUS)

On

Combating Terrorism: Training and Equipping Reserve Component Forces

Provided to the
Subcommittee on National Security, Emerging Threats, and International Relations
Of The
House Committee on Government Reform

Presented by
Richard C. Alexander
Major General (Ret)
President
NGAUS

May 11, 2004
Thank you, Chairman Shays and Congressman Waxman for inviting me to testify on behalf of the National Guard Association of the United States.

As you well know, the mission of the National Guard has changed drastically since September 11, 2001. Today, Guards men and women are not only supporting missions to defend and protect our homeland, but they are also deployed abroad supporting our ongoing war on terrorism.

Today, there are more than 94,000 National Guard personnel serving on active duty in support of the global war on terrorism. These men and women, who are serving in harm’s way, contribute over 40% of our fighting force in the Global War on Terrorism.

Mr. Chairman, the state of your National Guard is good. However, as the Guard participates in Iraq, Afghanistan and other locations throughout the world continue, we will always encounter challenges. I believe the Guard has demonstrated they are up to these challenges.
Our men and women serving in the Guard realize they have become more than “weekend warriors” as they support the war on terror each and every day at home and abroad. Many within the Guard are adjusting to the changing demands of military missions. It is not uncommon for members of the Army National Guard to be mobilized and deployed for an 18-month period. However, irrespective of the duration of deployment and the unpredictability in their call-ups, our minutemen and women are answering the call to fight and defend our country. Realizing these new missions, the National Guard is still recruiting some of America’s best and brightest citizen soldiers.

The current military leadership understands the hardships that the guard is enduring. The families and employers of these brave men and women understand and support the commitment that their loved-ones, coworkers and friends have elected to make. An Arkansas spokesman says, “Guard families are doing OK, though they have anxiety, they still support the Guard.” The Arkansas Guard has sustained five combat-related deaths while serving in Operation Iraqi Freedom, all deaths occurring just last weekend.

In preparing my testimony, I have solicited comments from the members of the National Guard Association and received feedback from The Adjutants General from the states, and communications from special operations forces and soldiers returning from areas of operations.

I would report to you that those in the field are thankful for the forward thinking and preparation that has been demonstrated by our nation’s Adjutants General (TAGs). In
several instances, training from lessons learned has been instituted from the ground up (state level) rather than top down from the federal level. As such, many states have taken the lessons learned from their returning or deployed units and incorporated new training regimens to prepare soldiers for their deployment in theater. Several states have initiated their own programs to prepare their soldiers for combat operations such as additional combat arms training to enhance the basic soldiers skills outside of the MOS skill set; and the use of additional funding to enhance communication and coordination training for units preparing for deployment.

In preparation for my testimony, I reviewed the questions that you posed to us. As such, in my capacity as President of National Guard Association, I would like to focus on two aspects of the questions you presented to us: training and resourcing.

With regard to training, some units are reporting that redundancy in training has extended stays at mobilization stations. Other feedback indicates that some of the existing training does not fit the scenarios that our personnel are encountering; this is also increasing time at mobilizations stations. This is requiring our soldiers being gone for eighteen months. There should be a review of our current policies and procedures to maximize the training and certification at home state. There exist instances where we are using training doctrine that is three years old. We should make every effort to reduce time a mobilization stations.
In addition, there should be a review of training for ANG transportation units. Some Air National Guard units are being deployed without training and required training in theater. A greater attempt should be made to train these units in the CONUS prior to deployment.

Allow me to read comments from a Special Forces unit that has returned from operations in Afghanistan.

- Transitions that occurred in Afghanistan between a National Guard SF Group and an Active duty SF group did not allow for an effective passage of information or situational awareness for two reasons.
  - Active component intelligence and command personnel who had been deployed to the region less than 8 months ago did not have confidence in the National Guard to further develop a valuable situational awareness or understanding.
  - The transition schedule did not allow sufficient overlap.

- After returning to home station from deployment most units did not see value in their receiving lessons learned or “heads-up” information from us. They viewed such an ad-hoc means of relaying information to be a training distracter. These unit’s commands believe that their power projection platforms and higher headquarters will be able to provide them the information they need to succeed. Some units have accepted offered briefings and work groups, only to limit attendance and to ensure that these meetings were kept short. Pro-active attempts at providing information failed because unit’s commands were not reachable or did not return attempted contact.
With regard to the issue of resourcing our Guard forces, the following comments were made:

- Adequate training with SAPP1 plates and body armor should be done stateside. Soldiers need to be comfortable in their equipment before deploying to the theater of operations.
- We should be training and resourcing our forces at the C-1 level rather than taking extended time to train at the C-3 level. We must insure that our personnel have the materials and equipment that they will be using in the area of operations (AOR).

Mr. Chairman, allow me to read some excerpts of one of several emails I received from soldiers serving abroad:

"The current MTOEs do not provide the necessary equipment for units operating in the environment. For example our Truck Company is not authorized radios in each vehicle to maintain communications between drivers. The unit purchased secure hand held radios prior to deployment, which have been essential to the unit. The M16A2 is not the best weapon for transportation soldiers to quickly engage the enemy and should be replaced with M4s. A hatch cut in the top of the HETs (Heavy Armored Trucks) would offer better fields of fire and observation. Up-armored HMMWVs must be the standard. HETs and Medium trucks should receive additional armor and ballistic blankets to protect soldiers. The standard military weapons training must be enhanced to include Close Quarter Battle
and enhanced weapons training for all soldiers. This is very true for our transportation company personnel who during an ambush, transitioning into a mounted infantry soldier. At present, the individual states are purchasing equipment and providing the training required. MOSQ training schools must spend more time focusing on critical combat skills and eliminate non-survival skills such as Drill & Ceremony. Use every minute of training time on skills that will keep a soldier alive in combat.”

In the fog of war and in light of logistic and resourcing challenges facing our Guard units, they are producing innovations in the field as it relates to their individual equipment and vehicles. For the record, I would ask that an article from the Topeka Capital-Journal be entered into the record for the committee’s review.

As you can see there have been challenges that need to be addressed. I believe that our Guard units and their leadership are responding. I believe that our Guard units and TAGs are focusing on these training and preparing their personnel in order to protect the lives of our citizen soldiers.

Again, Mr. Chairman, our Guard personnel are rising to the new challenges each and every day. We must continually evaluate our mission and how we train and equip for such missions. I applaud you and this subcommittee for focusing on this important issue in order to serve our military men and women. They are our greatest assets. Without them, we cannot fight and defend our country. We must honor the sacrifices they make each day.
I thank you again for the opportunity to testify and look forward to your questions.
Published Wednesday, April 21, 2004

Topeka Capital-Journal Online

Heavy metal
Kansas Guard unit fortified Humvees on its own

By Gregory Platt
Morris News Service

ALAD, Iraq -- If there is a way to make military equipment faster, safer for occupants or deadlier for the enemy, U.S. soldiers have always found it. Such improvisation helped some Kansas Army National Guard soldiers in February before they started a trek into war-torn Iraq.

The 350 guardsmen arrived at a staging base in Kuwait and awaited delivery of their Humvees and trucks, which would carry the troops and gear into Baghdad. The unit needed to outfit 79 vehicles with armor plating -- important protection against small-arms fire, shrapnel and small explosive devices.

But as sometimes is the case in a war zone, demand far outweighed the supply. The soldiers soon found out the Army had only eight armor kits available for their vehicles.

Time for some GI ingenuity.

Many soldiers from the 2nd Battalion of the 130th Field Artillery, based in Hiawatha, are engineers, welders, carpenters or other tradesmen in their day jobs back in northeast Kansas. The battalion has units in Abilene, Atchison, Concordia, Marysville, Horton, Sabetha, Salina and Troy. Putting their heads together, the group came up with a plan to armor up their vehicles.

"I told them that whatever they do, it has to be a good design, it has to be safe and it will have to protect against small-arms fire and Improvised Explosive Devices (roadside bombs)," said Maj. Douglas Hinkle, the battalion's executive officer.

Having too few armor kits isn't uncommon in the region, according to news reports and accounts from soldiers. Despite Pentagon leaders testifying otherwise, other units in Iraq have had to add armor sporadically to vehicles. At least one soldier, a reservist, has designed an armor kit that has been installed on dozens of vehicles since last fall.

But few situations have matched what the Kansas Guardsmen produced. In less than a month, 79 armored war wagons rolled off a makeshift assembly line that would make Mel Gibson's movie character, Mad Max, proud.
"We had the talent and we want to protect our soldiers," Hinkley said. "We wanted to be prepared to win the war."

**Army falls short**

The Army learned from troops stationed in Iraq during the past year that vehicles appearing fortified -- extra armor and soldiers manning large machine guns -- made poor targets, Hinkley said.

"Passive-looking convoys got attacked," explained Hinkley, who was posted on temporary duty at Camp Anaconda, located more than 50 miles north of Baghdad.

However, the military hasn't tracked how many soldiers have been killed as the result of attacks on unarmored Humvees, according to a fact sheet e-mailed by the Coalition Joint Task Force-7.

Task Force-7 serves as the headquarters running the military mission in Iraq for Central Command, which is based in Tampa, Fla.

News stories have attributed at least 70 deaths from attacks on vulnerable equipment since fall. When asked for an interview, Task Force-7 provided no one to comment on the numbers in those reports, only the fact sheet.

The situation soon caught the eye of folks in Washington. During defense budget hearings in late January and early February, senators questioned Pentagon leaders about a shortage of vehicle armor.

Maj. Gen. N. Ross Thompson III, commander of the Army's Tank-automotive and Armaments Command, responded by saying the Army is more than prepared to protect vehicles.

"We met CENTCOM's requirement for up-armored Humvees a year ago and (now) we are meeting new requirements ahead of schedule," Thompson said in an Army News Service release in early February.

Six Army depots, the Marine Corps Maintenance Center in Albany, Ga., and Jacksonville, Fla.-based Armored Holdings Inc. produce armor kits for the Humvee and some military trucks.

Most vehicles are dressed in armor while in theater, and it takes at least two days to place a kit on a vehicle.
For continued operations in Iraq, CENTCOM requested 5,000 kits, according to Tank-automotive and Armaments Command, based in Warren, Mich. An Army News Service release said the command shipped 1,000 kits from November to early February.

"We expect to meet our requirement in December 2004," according to the Task Force-7 fact sheet. But as of the middle of March, Task Force-7 still needed 3,500 kits, the sheet said.

About the same time, Thompson told senators the Army had more than enough kits, but the Kansas Guardsmen were learning they wouldn't get any more armor for their vehicles.

**Wheeling and dealing**

A stark reality stood before the Kansas battalion: It would take the better part of a year to get all of their vehicle kits delivered.

"We knew we had to do the armor job because the Army wouldn't do it for us," said Staff Sgt. Tony Jordan, of Troy, Kan.

The guardsmen had only a couple of weeks at Camp Virginia in Kuwait before their vehicles were scheduled to arrive by ship and a month before they were supposed to leave for Baghdad.

Hinkley split the unit into teams.

"In the first couple of days, we sent out a team to find the materials we needed," said Sgt. William Rahe, who owns a small welding shop in Morrill, Kan.

The team searched in several U.S. camps in Kuwait and found armor sheets three-eighths of an inch thick. The soldiers traded work in the metal shops at a few bases for the armor sheets, Hinkley said.

"We got lucky to find 100 sheets in one location," said Jordan, who builds trucks for utility companies.

They had the armor, but now they needed tools. Unfortunately, their equipment was on board the ship carrying their vehicles, Rahe said in a phone interview from Baghdad.

Specifically, the team needed welding torches, welding wire, grinders, gas and clothing, but the unit didn't have money for the items. So Hinkley did some more horse trading with another unit to raise the cash.
The neighborhood hardware store doesn't exist in Kuwait, so they had to buy the tools in a back alley from Kuwaiti locals.

"One of my guys told me he thought a drug deal was going down when we bought the equipment," said Hinkley, who works for Sandia National Laboratories in Albuquerque, N.M.

**Like a pit crew**

In the meantime, another team inspected vehicles from units coming back from Iraq to gauge the best design for armor plating.

The second team measured Humvees and trucks, while Rahe and Jordan designed the doors, hinges and protective plates for the underside of the vehicles.

For about two weeks, another team of 14 soldiers cut the armor sheets and created the pieces for the Kansas Guardsmen's kit, Rahe said.

Setting up an assembly line in the battalion's motor pool was a task for Hinkley's lean manufacturing skills.

"I told them I wanted to set up my motor pool (assembly) as a pit crew sets up at the Indianapolis 500," Hinkley said. "This had to be an efficient operation."

The soldiers placed engineering tape to partition the different assembly areas in the motor pool. As ordered, the assembly crews rehearsed their jobs for three days before the vehicles arrived, Hinkley said, adding that many of the battalion's other soldiers helped out by pulling the duties of soldiers on the vehicle crew.

When the vehicles arrived, the soldiers worked in two 12-hour shifts and were able to add armor and machine gun mounts on the battalion's 79 vehicles in a week, Rahe said.

"And the finished vehicle looks good," Rahe said.

Other National Guard, reserve and active-duty units came to see the Kansas operation and liked the design, Hinkley and Rahe said.

In fact, the guardsmen's reputation spread so quickly that they were asked to help other units to armor their vehicles. Even officers from the Army's armoring program came to see the operation and finished product, Hinkley said.

At the end of February, when the battalion was set to leave for Baghdad, soldiers were watching as the Kansas war wagons headed out into the desert.
"When we drove out of Camp Virginia, we looked like a big, bad unit," Hinkley said. "As the soldiers looked at us, they weren't saying, 'There goes a Humvee.' They said, 'There goes a Humvee with armor.' And we took pride in our work."
Mr. SCHROCK. Thank you, General.

Let me start the questioning by asking our first three witnesses, if you had the opportunity to ask questions of your senior leadership, what questions would you ask?

Sergeant NEILL. We did ask questions of our senior leadership. We asked them what was wrong with their supply system and who was responsible. They fingerpointed and would not accept responsibility. Anything that happened in my company, as the First Sergeant I am responsible for it, good or bad. So the senior leadership has to provide an answer for us. They didn’t always have an answer.

We asked about training, we asked about plus up of ammo. We didn’t have our basic load. We were able to get ammunition from other people, ask them and they gave it to us. Our own battalion wouldn’t support us for many months. We didn’t have, like other soldiers said, the basic material we should have had to go to war.

Mr. SCHROCK. Staff Sergeant.

Sergeant SANCHEZLOPEZ. Well, sir, for us, we did have the opportunity to speak to General Maddis who was in charge of us, the 4th Marine Division Commander came up and took questions from the individual Marine and Lance Corporal. Whatever he didn’t have an answer to, he took it down, went back and came back with an answer.

Mr. SCHROCK. Specialist Tanguay.

Specialist TANGUAY. We did ask quite a few questions during our training mission and once we were overseas. Several questions were raised at the training site in regards to seminination training which is a realistic training exercise involving the M-9 pistol, the barrel is interchangeable with a seminination barrel and it fires a projectile most commonly referred to as a paintball. That training we have ample opportunity, we have the equipment in our possession but we didn’t train with it. Why didn’t we train with it? It provides a realistic opportunity for soldiers to train with it. Why didn’t we train with it? We asked that question.

Mr. SCHROCK. What was the answer?

Specialist TANGUAY. The answer was none of your business was a command directive. It was a commander’s responsibility for providing the training at our training site. We did not receive that training.

The next question that was raised by subordinates along with NCOs was the truck issue, the Humvee, the up-armored Humvee once we got overseas. Several questions were raised why aren’t we getting the up-armored and so forth. The up-armored were in such high demand and in short supply. Basically every other week we were getting an answer but they came out with these retrofitted survivability kits they call them for the Humvees. Primary answer to that question was funding. They didn’t have the money to purchase these kits. That was the answer we received from our command staff in regards to that issue.

We did ask questions. We were provided the opportunity to ask questions. Some of the answers we received were not adequate.

Mr. SCHROCK. Colonel, would you want to comment on that?

Colonel NOVOTNY. Reference funding for the add-on kits, we were able to obtain funding which allowed us to have add-on armor to
our vehicles that were not armored at all. While it didn’t give us
the same protection as an up-armored vehicle, it provided some
protection against fragmentation and small arms fire.

Questions after we were deployed on the logistics side, we con-
tacted the CFLC G–4 and they sent a rep to our camp to ensure
that my battalion and all subordinate companies were tied in the
best we possibly could to ensure we received the PLL, all parts and
items that we were authorized and to ensure the system was
streamlined. Back at Fort Riley, I understand the criticality of am-
munition. The STRAC Manual only allows so much ammunition for
qualification for primary machine gunners and other machine gun-
ers.

When we deployed, my HHC and the headquarters immediately
realized that was not adequate for our needs because we were now
providing security on a 24-hour basis and we had to train-up our
own soldiers in order for them to handle machine guns.

One thing I would say is that we need to look at how units are
authorized and how they are aligned in a peacetime environment.
I mean by that when I was mobilized, the companies that fell
under me, I had not had any contact with those commanders before
and that is the primary reason why I sent that liaison to those
company commanders to ensure we were tied in the best we pos-
sibly could to command control and structure so they knew the
530th MP Battalion and knew our standards.

Mr. SCHROCK. Let me do a follow on. To your knowledge, have
your replacements over there experienced the same deficiencies or
have some of these problems been adequately addressed, to your
knowledge? First Sergeant.

Sergeant NEILL. Our replacement company, the company that
came in behind us, actually had a much better supply system than
we had. We left them with all our vehicles, we left them with extra
weapons, we left them with all our body armor and we left them
with non-tactical vehicles and equipment we acquired that actually
Marines left us. It made it much easier to do their mission. They
didn’t have enough non-tactical vehicles but they surely had a bet-
ter supply system in place than we had.

Mr. SCHROCK. Only because you left in-country what you took in
country?

Sergeant NEILL. We left a lot, they had better support coming in.
We are a unit that has teams that deploy in cities away from our
company. We are a company that was detached from our battalion
and our battalion didn’t support us. The other battalion we came
to, some of them took better care of us than our battalion did but
we stretched our asses also. So our teams were pretty much operat-
ing every day in two vehicle convoys in the communities by them-
selves.

We carried supplies to them once a week and in our time in Iraq
put some 30,000 miles in two vehicle convoys between the five
southern cities of Iraq, Desaqut, Desja, Dewina, Karbala and Hella.
They were better off than we got there.

Mr. SCHROCK. Staff Sergeant.

Sergeant SANCHEZ-LOPEZ. The follow-on units, we were slated to
stay back if they didn’t have enough equipment. What happened is
they had enough equipment and we got to rotate back out of Iraq.
In Kuwait, we did an asset inventory of what we had and the question was what can you do without back in the States to sustain your training when you get back that you could give up to other units. So we hashed out, gave them hardback hummers which was the Humvees they are describing, gave several of those, tow vehicles, anything anyone needed, we gave them.

Mr. SCROCK. Specialist Tanguay.

Specialist TANGUAY. I also agree that the unit that replaced us was far better equipped than we were when we first got there. We also left our up-armored vehicles that we did receive after being in theater for 12 months. We left those behind. We left behind crew serve weapons, excess ammunition, parts and service and logistical issues that we experienced were hashed out for the unit that replaced us. So they were far better equipped when we left than when we first got there.

Mr. SCROCK. Colonel.

Colonel NOVOTNY. I would agree. The battalion that replaced us was much better off than we were going in. My staff had organized many lessons learned as far as the train-up. We had a good cross-over between the two battalion staffs. One issue that should be raised is that while we were both MP battalion staff and headquarters, we were organized differently. My battalion headquarters had a R&U section which was capable of performing light engineer tasks, building small items. One thing that was key for us was showers for ourselves. A lot of times you could not depend on a shower unit being at our facility and it was a tremendous asset for us. Also, their primary focus is to support the prisoner population in the compounds for light engineer resources and tasks. Our guys did a tremendous effort for our battalion. The follow-on unit did not have that and it was a shortfall they probably had, but overall, they were better.

Mr. SCROCK. Staff Sergeant.

Sergeant NEILL. I can't answer that question. I am too new back to this country. I have only been back 30 days. I can't answer.

General ALEXANDER. I would like to comment on that question. There are several instances where that is in fact happening. The heads training area located in the State of Louisiana has been very innovative to embrace convoy operations that provide for the exercise of modern infantry skill set. The State of New Mexico has also been leaning forward to ensure that the present tactics that are utilized are regimented into their original training institute. There are lessons learned that are being exercised that are taking advantage of our acts of war.

Mr. SCROCK. Staff Sergeant.

Sergeant SANCHEZLOPEZ. We are applying what we learned specifically to our unit. We do have a lot of new personnel. We have a lot of experienced Staff NCOs and we are sharing that knowledge to everyone so everybody will be on board. It doesn't matter if they are a cook, admin, transportation, everybody will be on the same level.
Mr. SCHROCK. Did you want to comment?

Specialist TANGUAY. I have also only been back 3 weeks, so I really can’t comment on the situation of administrative functions and the reality of training.

Mr. SCHROCK. That big smile on your face tells me you are glad to be home.

Colonel.

Colonel NOVOTNY. I can state that follow-on forces from within my own group back home, they have modified the training at Fort Riley for convoy operations where they conduct live fire exercises as part of that convoy process.

Mr. SCHROCK. The prisoner abuse cases that are certainly dominating the news have cast tremendous doubt on how effective military police and military intelligence training is inculcating in military personnel the humane treatment of prisoners of war and detainees. Three of you are connected with military police and military intelligence. Were you ever provided training focusing on the care, handling and management of prisoners of war according to the Geneva Convention rules? First Sergeant.

Sergeant NEILL. Yes, sir. Every time we deployed, and this was my second deployment, we were provided with Geneva Convention training and an initial training in MOS training, you are provided with that same training which says you will treat any prisoner the same way you treat your own soldiers, that they have protective equipment during an attack, they will be allowed to wear that equipment. To see soldiers violate that Geneva Convention hurts all of us. It hurts us as soldiers, it hurts us as Americans. That is not what this country is about.

If I could, I found the Iraqi citizens to be hard working and they want the same things we want. They want employment, protection for their families and they want to earn an honest living. To see that happen, hurts every citizen in America.

Mr. SCHROCK. It hurts us too.

Specialist Tanguay, do you want to comment on that?

Specialist TANGUAY. Yes, sir. During our 16 weeks of military police school, MOS specialty school, you learn a great deal about how to handle prisoners, detainees and prisoners of war, so it is absolutely certain that we did receive the training, both at the 16 weeks of our specialty school along with our pre-deployment mobilization phase, the necessary training in the Geneva Convention process and detainee and prisoner of war operations.

Mr. SCHROCK. Colonel.

Colonel NOVOTNY. I agree with the comments of the other panel members. We have also received that instruction as part of mandatory training, it was part of the process at Fort Riley, it was part of the process that I directed my people go through and shortly after I took over my unit, we completed for our certification at Fort Riley a very similar exercise that we move individuals from one location to another from compound to compound as far as receiving these individuals who were prisoners. They were actually citizens or soldiers dressed up in uniforms.

Prior to the mobilization, I read every word of the Geneva Convention that applies to taking care of prisoners to establish my basis. I also was in the same unit during Desert Shield/Desert
Storm where we took care of 18,000 prisoners. I was assistant operations officer and also an enclosure commander and came in contact with nearly every prisoner that came in our facility. I was charged with ensuring that they were properly cared for, bringing them, accounting for them, making sure they had their ID card and they were in our system for accountability.

After the prisoner situation was stabilized, I was tasked to lead another element to conduct an identification process for 12,000 refugees who fled Iraq and were in the process of confirming the identification process for them in the neutral zone.

Mr. SCHROCK. Hindsight is always 20–20 but had any of you observed such abuse, what do the relative training modules and/or the regulations say you as an observer should do because obviously there were people who were observers who did nothing. By regulation, what were you to do?

Colonel NOVOTNY. I would say report immediately to your chain of command if that were to happen. I had minor situations where a guard had pushed a prisoner. My NCOs reported it immediately through the chain of command to me. I took what I considered appropriate actions against those individuals. Their chain of command was present. To my NCO who was specifically tasked to run the facility where that happened, I ensured that every case would be reported up the chain of command and that would not be tolerated in the future.

Mr. SCHROCK. First Sergeant.

Sergeant NEILL. That action would have stopped immediately, sir. I agree with the Commander, ensuring that the soldier was adequately counseled, disciplined if required and efforts redirected.

Mr. SCHROCK. Specialist.

Specialist TANGUAY. Absolutely report it up the chain of command, without a doubt.

Mr. SCHROCK. Mr. Shays.

Mr. SHAYS. Thank you.

I have now learned what happens when you allow someone to chair the committee and get 15 minutes. [Laughter.]

Mr. SCHROCK. Make hay while the sun shines.

Mr. SHAYS. This committee allows for extensive questioning by a Member instead of just doing 5 minutes. When we do that, I think we learn so much. I learned so much from your questions and I thank you.

I want to say this is a wonderful example of how a process works because I had a community meeting in Oxford, CT and I had two fairly young moms who had sons in Iraq complain to me about the fact that their sons were in Humvees that didn’t have shielded proper equipment. So I task the gentleman on my right to be in touch with your mom. I thought one of the things, Mr. Tanguay, that I would not want is to have had to go back to your mom and express my sorrow for your death, for your not having the proper equipment since I sent you there. Whether I sent you there or not, I would never want that to happen.

It has been a real surprise to me when Mr. Murtha had gone to Iraq and found our soldiers did not have the fully armored vests, it was a surprise to me to learn from your mom that our Humvees were not properly shielded and that is the way the process some-
times works. When we find out, we start to see some incredible action. When I was in Iraq for my fifth visit with the professional staff to my right, we were in Haniken and we had three Humvees so we just kind of knocked on the door of the 257th Armored Brigade and they had three Humvees, one that had no armament, one that was makeshift and one with the kit, and I understand the kit was a little better because if a shell hit, it would maintain its integrity a little better.

The question I want to ask each of you, it is hard for me to imagine that we would have sent you there without the proper equipment. Is this an example of where we just didn’t think we needed the equipment? If it is not, I want to know. I want to ask each of you. You all must have thought about this. Why would you have been sent there without the proper equipment? Let us start with you, Mr. Neill.

Sergeant Neill. I couldn’t answer that question. We were surprised to see that. We had Internet access home, we saw the papers and people back home were saying we would have the vests in a certain month. We were already in country 6 or 8 months before we had them. It was 3 or 4 more months after that before we finally received the vests. When we left, our vehicles were not plus-up armored and our job was to go into community every day. We didn’t have ammo, we had to acquire extra weapons from other companies in our battalion. We mounted our weapons ourselves.

The important thing for us was to go out battle ready and be prepared for whatever came and giving the appearance that we were ready. I think that deterred it.

Mr. Shays. Do you think that was because you weren’t part of the active force or do you make the same claim as active force did not have the same quality equipment?

Sergeant Neill. The active force that we saw, MI, did not have the same quality vehicles that we had. Some of them had plus-ups, some of them did not. They had the same exact things we had but they were doing the same mission we were. The countryside is littered with ammo, artillery rounds everywhere. What brought us back safely was we used NTVs.

Mr. Shays. Non-tactical vehicles.

Sergeant Neill. And we could travel faster. We became a difficult target for them to hit. We could travel at 120 miles a hour. An Humvee can only do 55 miles a hour and you can hear it coming from about a quarter of a mile away. We would see the citizens in the field look up from their work when they heard the Humvee coming.

Mr. Shays. What was the speed of the other vehicle?

Sergeant Neill. We could go 120 miles a hour, sir. We used Trailblazers, seized vehicles that the Marines purchases.

Mr. Shays. You are saying the SUVs?

Sergeant Neill. Yes, sir, the SUVs. The Humvee could do a maximum of 55 to 60 miles a hour.

Mr. Shays. You would rather have been in an SUV than the Humvve?

Sergeant Neill. For where we were, yes, sir.

Mr. Shays. The irony is the SUV got better mileage.

Staff Sergeant.
Sergeant SanchezLopez. It was our understanding about those vests that went into our flak jacket, they were just beginning that process of fielding to the Marines when we were getting to go, so as we got our desert camis issued, we got our ballistic shields issued. When we got in theater in Kuwait, we didn’t bring our stuff because the ship arrived 2 days prior for us crossing the line of departure. So we stuffed our Humvees, our trucks, our ammo and took off. They said we are crossing at this time.

The only shortfalls we had was didn’t find out we were going to have trucks until the week before. We were waiting for the gear that was on the ships and they said, oh, no, we’re going to give you some other stuff coming in from other ships.

Mr. Shay. I think there are always reasons for everything, obviously, and what I am trying to understand is the reasons why you didn’t have the ammunition, the reason why you didn’t have the plus-up Humvees, the reason why you didn’t have the vests, reasons other than just they weren’t available. The question I raise is did they think you didn’t need them, that in other words the war was over. Were you being sent before engagement or before the removal of Saddam or after?

Sergeant SanchezLopez. We were part of the OIF–1.

Mr. Shay. So they knew you would be in combat.

Sergeant SanchezLopez. We needed everything that we were provided.

Mr. Shay. Specialist Tanguay.

Specialist Tanguay. We knew we needed everything we could get. Unfortunately there were severe logistical issues that prevented us from receiving what we needed. We knew we needed better protective vests, we knew we needed better vehicles, we knew we needed more ammunition than what we received. It was not a question of did we need this or not. It was a question of we knew we needed it, but we didn’t receive it.

Mr. Shay. Tell me why you think you didn’t receive it?

Specialist Tanguay. I am not sure. There were logistical issues beyond the control of myself or our command staff at levels far above our control that prevented us from getting what we needed. We needed to be prepared for any MP type mission we were going to be assigned. MP type missions encompass a wide range of tasks.

Mr. Shay. It seems very clear that you would need the protective gear and you would want to be in a Humvee that is shielded.

Specialist Tanguay. Correct.

Mr. Shay. Colonel.

General Alexander. I would say that—

Mr. Shay. Is that the prerogative of the General? I said Colonel and I heard from the General.

General Alexander. I am sorry.

Mr. Shay. General, I am going to let you be the closer in this line of questioning. Colonel.

Colonel Novotny. I felt that the reason why we went with the vehicles we did, as I stated earlier, was the doctrine was that my kind of unit would be organized and would be set up behind the lines. If we were in an environment where there was a low threat, I would have no problem with soft skin hummers, excellent vehicle, go anyplace, do anything but it did cause some concern when we
crossed the border a few days after the ground forces and we weren't sure what kind of environment we were going into.

After we deployed forward, I believe we were on the same basis as the active component units in our area. There was no difference between AC, Guard or Reserves there, same vehicles, we helped them and they helped us.

Mr. Shays. What do you do when you are in a command position and you know you are sending your men into battle without proper equipment? What do you do? Do you complain about it? Do you tell your men you are sorry? Do you just say, stiff upper lip? What do you say? What do you do? What do you think?

Colonel Novotny. We had to do some negotiations to get the correct body armor along with the plates. We coordinated. One of my units was redeploying back home and at a redeployment point they dropped off their armor, they accounted for it, we picked it up, within a couple of days we moved north to our second location.

Mr. Shays. Thank you. Dr. Krepinevich, do you want to make a comment or should we go to the General?

Dr. Krepinevich. I would just echo what the Colonel said about the issue of doctrine. We are talking about not only an enemy that is presenting us with a kind of problem that we haven't really focused on for several decades now, but in the case of the Army, the Army is transforming. If you look at the difference between the first and second Gulf wars, the first Gulf war was a 1-year advance, there was a clear front and a clear rear and you could operate in the rear in a Humvee without much protection and you would be just fine.

Mr. Shays. That sounds very logical.

Dr. Krepinevich. But in the second Gulf war, the Army and quite frankly the Marine Corps is shifting to something they call non-linear warfare which there isn't a long front line, there isn't a forward area that is clearly delineated and a rear area. Even in the portion of major combat operations, you had splatters of U.S. troops all over Iraq. In those circumstances where there is a non-linear battlefield, where you don't have that clarity even in conventional operations, you are going to have to think differently about how you do a lot of things, including resupplying units, providing rear area security, all sorts of things. We saw that as early as the initial operations with the Fedayeen who are operating in the rear area, what traditionally would have been the rear area. This is part of the larger issue, what is our strategy, what is our doctrine for dealing with these kinds of situations. Obviously going back to what President Kennedy said, it is the new environment, a new strategy, a new doctrine and that leads to different kinds of forces and different kinds of equipment and different kinds of training.

Mr. Shays. Thank you. General.

General Alexander. There have been several instances where we had deployed Guard units to theater to perform Mission A in Kuwait and out of necessity, they were required to perform Mission B in Baghdad. The classic example is the infantry battalions from Florida. As a result of these rapidly changing mission sets, these units chose to do their job with a lot of creativity, thus the steel plates that are put on vehicles, the sandbagging and the like, but I believe that initially the idea was to rebuild Iraq in a peaceful
setting and the insurgency tactic came on so fast that the OIF–1 units were not quite able to recover.

Today, every effort is being made to ensure that those mistakes don't occur. I think the equipping strategy will in fact, if the resourcing continues, catch up. It is the training doctrine, the ability to do urban warfare at home station is what the challenge is going to be.

Mr. SHAYS. Do you mind if I go another round or do you want to go now and I will come back? Let me just make a comment.

The comment is this. The administration has wanted more authority, and I believe there has to be more legislative oversight when there is more authority but one of the things I am actually convinced of is, and this hearing just adds confirmation to it, when the story of Iraq is told one of the biggest criticisms will be that Congress didn't do proper oversight. For Mr. Murtha to go and discover that our troops didn't have proper vests, thank God he went there but we didn't know it before. Had we gone into Iraq last year and gone to the prisons, I am absolutely convinced we would have been told things. Had I not had a community meeting, I wouldn't have learned about the failure to provide the kind of protection on our Humvees given the mission we were asking you and others to do.

My job as a Member of Congress is to make sure it is never a fair fight. I think I was deprived of the knowledge that would have been helpful. In other words, I want it never to be a fair fight. We are going to know that literally hundreds of Americans were killed, in my judgment, because we didn't give them in some cases the proper training, the proper equipment and so on. I never thought I would be saying that. I didn't think in this day and age that would be the case.

I would like to ask more questions but we have time. Thank you.

Mr. SCHROCK. We are glad to be joined by the gentlelady from California who I would like to recognize for any questions and comments she has, Ms. Watson.

Ms. WATSON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

First, I want to say to all of you thank you so much for the service to your country. We love you and we care about you. That is the reason why we are here, to be sure you have what you need to do your jobs on command. So what might come up in the form of a question is only because we care about you and we appreciate you.

I too have been following exactly what you have been following. I do know someone who was in Iraq. He was a Reservist and he was at a community college and was called up. He was a Marine and he went over unprepared. He said they didn't have the Kevlar inside the clothing, they didn't have proper equipment. I have been hearing that families have had to purchase and outfit and in some cases send money for equipment.

Let me ask Sergeant Neill, is that the case? Do you know if that is the case?

Sergeant NEILL. I can tell you, we bought our own vests before we left. We bought the level vests that police officers wear on the street. We knew we would be in a civilian environment, pretty much our teams would be by themselves, six or eight person teams.
They bought their own vests and then additionally purchased the panels that go in the vests for additional coverage. We were prepared to do our job. Even if the military wasn’t going to provide it, we knew what was out there and we got it.

Ms. Watson. I feel that we let you down. Money was appropriated, why did it not get out to you.

The other concern I have is that it should have been known beforehand that this battle would be fought in an urban environment. We watched shock and awe. The military in Iraq could not compete with that but I think they must have said we will catch you in the streets, we will catch you in the doorways because I was told by returning personnel that they never knew where the bullets were coming from and they never knew how to fight back. They just hit. So urban warfare is what you are experiencing at the current time.

What kind of training was there prior to your detachment going into Iraq on how to be prepared for urban warfare?

Colonel Novotny. I would like to address that. We designed a pretty extensive training plan for urban warfare. When my unit initially was going to be a quick deploying unit and we realized we had time to train, we coordinated for the facility at Fort Riley, it was blocked out for us. My NCOs led our soldiers through a training program from ground up, they covered everything from issuing and order in a mock environment to movement as an individual, movement as a team, movement as a platoon, how to clear buildings, how to defend. I was fortunate that we had 2 weeks of training in that facility and the reason for that is I felt there was a good possibility somewhere along the line that my unit may be engaged in a contact like that and we might have to perform the exact mission just as you described.

Ms. Watson. I am wondering if your units are representative across the system. I am hearing a different system from those who have returned, that they certainly weren’t prepared, particularly in a desert environment. I have had contact with some of the POWs and the story of how they got lost out in the desert and every sand dune looks like every other one and so they were ambushed and some were killed.

My concern is have we done extensive planning and counter insurgency training because it looks like that is the way war is to come if we are going to be in the Middle East or other places, the Far East, would have to be fought. Are we planning ahead, are we giving adequate training, are we prepared? Anyone who would like to address that?

Sergeant Neill. I don’t think it was planned for when we first deployed but as we deployed and recognized the situation was changing and the people were adapting to our vehicle convoys, we changed what we were doing also. We instructed our soldiers in vehicle contact, how to take contact right, contact left, how to shoot at people they see firing at them, where they see fire coming from, the actual flashes, where they see smoke coming from, the actual smoke coming from weapons, where they see dust coming from the ground. Since we’re in an environment where everything that moved caused dust to fly and move, if you couldn’t see the people shooting at you, you could surely see one of those other things. Our
job was to put down fire and move out of there unless we were disabled.

Ms. WATSON. Dr. Krepinevich, maybe you can add to that?

Dr. KREPINEVICH. Yes, ma'am. As I mentioned in my testimony, the U.S. military has the world's best training infrastructure. However, it is a training infrastructure that is optimized principally for conventional warfare not counter insurgency. We, the U.S. military, for the last quarter of a century has essentially convinced itself we are not getting back into those kinds of conflicts. The military has had a lot of encouragement from the American people and the American political leadership. Right after Vietnam, the slogan was “No More Vietnams,” the 1990’s was the decade of exit strategies and the 1980’s, the Powell and Weinberger doctrines. So in a sense for a combination of reasons, we have a marvelous training infrastructure that really is designed for a counter insurgency environment.

As I mentioned earlier, it is not just the training facilities, it is a matter of doctrine having languished as well, a doctrine that as Sergeant O’Neill said, we train the way we expect to fight. If you don’t expect to fight that way, you are not going to train that way. So it is also are we structured. Do we have the requisite skills not only at the individual level but at the unit level, the company level, the battalion level, the brigade level.

Right now, of course, General Schoomaker is engaged in the process of restructuring the Army, including rerolling units, converting artillery men to military police and so on. This is going on in the active force and the Reserve force. It is laudable but it is also a reflection of the fact that in some respects we found ourselves behind the curve here playing catch up. As I mentioned, because insurgencies do tend to be protracted, I think if we are looking at accomplishing the kinds of goals the administration has set for us in Afghanistan and Iraq, we are looking at a long term conflict and probably in other parts of the world as well. Because of the enormous power of our military, we have driven enemies to insurgency, to terrorism and these forms of warfare.

If we are going to be involved in this and we are in it for the long haul, the long hard slog that Secretary Rumsfeld talks about, then it is not just a matter of the kind of innovative approaches and quick fixes to training that these men are talking about, we also need to look more fundamentally at the doctrine we have for conducting these kinds of operations and what kind of training infrastructure we need to create to make sure that our soldiers and Marines get the right kind of training.

Ms. WATSON. Thank you so much for your comment.

My questions, Mr. Chairman, should probably be addressed to the second panel but again, I want to let you know how much we appreciate your service.

Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. SCHROCK. Thank you, Ms. Watson.

Mr. Shays.

Mr. SHAYS. I know we need to get to the second panel but let me ask this because I am actually convinced we have the best trained and best equipped military in the world and the best experienced. In fact, because of our engagements, I am told there is nothing that
gives you better training than the reality of live ammunition coming at you and the fear of death.

I want to be clear on this. It strikes me that if you are a Reservist or National Guard, you have less time to train, and so you specialize in a particular mission but when you are sent off to battle, you may end up doing something different than your MOS. Is that a fair way to describe it or does someone need to qualify my view or would you agree with it?

General ALEXANDER. Based upon the comments from the field, that is in fact a reality. That is happening. Units are being deployed for a mission. In theater they are being rerolled to accomplish different missions.

Mr. SHAYS. Let me ask, is it more likely that if you are active duty, that transition is not as big a challenge because you are training every day?

General ALEXANDER. I would say that perhaps it is a greater challenge for the Reserve components even though they are adjusting to it.

Mr. SHAYS. Colonel, did you want to make a comment?

Colonel NOVOTNY. Yes, sir. My primary mission in my battalion is to handle prisoners of war, civilian internees and detainees. When we actually hit ground in Iraq, our primary mission switched to force protection for the camp. While it is different, we were trained for that. Force protection was one of the critical subtasks that we identified well in advance of our mobilization that we needed to train on. We also had individuals who were trained on force protection before, we had sent people to school for force protection, we had people who had combat arms background and we were very fortunate to have engineers at our location to help with berming and entering protective environment force.

Mr. SHAYS. Part of the purpose of this hearing was lessons learned and the capability of the military to adjust and learn and grow from experiences. So, for instance, you would have the Center for Army’s lessons learned, I think that deals primarily with the training, it is a short term focus; you would have training and doctrine command which is more long term; you would have the rapid field initiative which would be short term dealing with equipment.

Do any of the Reservists have an opportunity, or the National Guard, to interface in this process of being able to forward lessons learned? One of the complaints is that the Reservists and National Guard don’t feel as much a part of this role, even though they have opinions.

Sergeant NEILL. Sir, we lesson learned the unit that came to replace us. We haven’t lesson learned anybody else. We lesson learned the teams that replaced us. Lessons learned to everyone else hasn’t happened yet but our training begins with individual team member selection. We select people to be on teams to do any job. We did a tactical job, they were prepared for it. What they weren’t prepared for was the equipment shortage we faced and we didn’t have the equipment the active duty had and we saw them with it.

Mr. SHAYS. Let me go to lessons learned. Colonel, you are looking at me like I may be walking off a cliff here.
Colonel NOVOTNY. No, sir. Lessons learned were a two-way street. The information we provide up the chain, I felt went up and went through our active brigade, the Reserve Brigade that was above us and the information also came back down to us so that we could take the information that other people learned and apply it to our own tactics and doctrine we were currently employing in the field.

Mr. SHAYS. Mr. Chairman, we could keep this panel here for a long time. Our next panel has waited a long time and I think we need to interact with them, but I want to thank you as well for being here today and thank your mom for doing her part as an American citizen and loving her son so much that she would have strangled her Congressman if he didn’t take action.

Mr. SCHROCK. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Let me too thank you all for being here. Your testimony was very helpful. Your answers to the questions were very helpful. We thank you very much for what you have done for our country.

Let me mention one more thing before we go to the next panel. We are all familiar with General Taguba’s report that he did on Abu Ghraib prison and some of the problems and hopefully how we can solve some of those problems, but in that report, he mentions one battalion commander who did his job very well in the detention business, better than anybody else I would imagine and that one person was Lieutenant Colonel Steve Novotny who is with us today. I think we ought to thank him for that.

[Applause.]

Colonel NOVOTNY. Thank you very much, sir.

Mr. SCHROCK. May be they need you back—no, I don’t want to say they need you back over there, your family won’t like that very well but they need to take the lessons learned from you and apply them there. Thank you again.

Thank you all very much.

We will take a 3 or 4 minute break before the next panel.

[Recess.]

Mr. SCHROCK. Let me welcome the second panel. As you saw with the first panel, it is traditional that we swear folks, so if you will stand with me.

[Witnesses sworn.]

Mr. SHAYS [assuming Chair]. I would note for the record that the witnesses all responded in the affirmative.

We are glad to have you all here today. As I told Lieutenant General Hanlon a minute ago, I think legally if he comes up here one more time, I will have to claim him as a dependent. I see all of you all the time and that is a good thing.

We are happy to have today Lieutenant General Edward Hanlon, Commandant, Marine Corps Combat Development Command; Lieutenant General Roger C. Schultz, Director, Army National Guard; Lieutenant General James R. Helmy, Chief, Army Reserve; and Brigadier General Louis W. Weber, Director of Training, U.S. Army. We are glad to have you here and thank you very much.

With that, I will turn the floor over to General Hanlon.
STATEMENTS OF LIEUTENANT GENERAL EDWARD HANLON, COMMANDANT, MARINE CORPS COMBAT DEVELOPMENT COMMAND; LIEUTENANT GENERAL ROGER C. SCHULTZ, DIRECTOR, ARMY NATIONAL GUARD; LIEUTENANT GENERAL JAMES R. HELMELY, CHIEF, ARMY RESERVE; AND BRIGADIER GENERAL LOUIS W. WEBER, DIRECTOR OF TRAINING, U.S. ARMY

General Hanlon. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you very much for the invitation to be here today.

It is good to be back to the committee because I was here a few years ago when I had the opportunity to testify before one of the subcommittees here on some of the training encroachment hearings we had back in those days. I thank you for the help you gave us because as was said on the first panel, train the way we will fight, had it not been for the foresight of some of this committee, I am not so sure we would have made the gains we did in the last couple of years in that regard, so I want to thank you.

I have some written notes here but I think what I am going to do with your permission is in the interest of time and to allow for more questions and answers, let me make a few comments off the cuff and I will turn it over to the other panel members.

Staff Sergeant SanchezLopez I think basically said it all when he talked about his Reserve battalion that was called up and went off to I believe he said Afghanistan and later into Operation Iraqi Freedom. He made the comment that his battalion was trained and equipped very much like his active duty counterparts. I think it is very important you all understand that from the Marine Corps perspective because that is exactly how we treat our Reserve units. We don’t make any distinction between how our Reserve units, whether they be ground, aviation, combat element or combat service support, how they are trained and equipped from their regular counterparts.

All of you as Congressmen I am sure have Reserve units in your districts. I would invite you when you have a chance, if you haven’t had a chance yet, to go down to your local Marine Reserve center some weekend when you are back in the district and go in and see what goes on in one of those Reserve units because you will find that embedded in each Reserve unit is an organization we call an I&I, instructor inspector who is an active duty cadre and their job is to make sure that Reserve unit is trained and equipped and ready to go to war when they are called up. The idea is that they are trained already, they simply get mobilized and they join their regular counterparts and off they go. That is the way we have been doing business in the Marine Corps going back 50 or 60 years.

I think the proof is in the pudding because we take a look at the way the Reserve units performed in Operation Iraqi Freedom, Operation Enduring Freedom, you will see no distinction between them and their regular counterparts. In Desert Storm and Desert Shield, you saw the same thing. I always like to point out in the Korean War in defense of the Pusan perimeter, the first Marines that went in there, the first brigade that held the line when North Koreans were almost pushing us off peninsula were Marine Reservists who came in there and held the line. Many of the Marines that went across the seawall at Inchon just a few months later, were for
the most part Reservists. So since 1950 to 2004, we really don’t make a distinction between how we train and equip our Reserves and our regular Marines. Staff Sergeant Sanchez-Lopez is a Reservist but he is no different from me in that regard in that we are both Marines.

I also wanted to point out with you that one of the things that is very important to us are the lessons learned. We can talk about that in the Q&A, if you have any questions on how we do that.

Sitting behind me is Colonel Phil Exner. Phil is my Director of Studies Analysis at Quantico. He will soon be leaving to take an appointment, a cushy appointment over in Brussels at NATO but for the last 3 years I have had him as the Director of our Lessons Learned Team where he was running our efforts in Afghanistan, a year ago in Iraq and currently the operations we have in Iraq in which his responsibility is to capture real time the lessons learned we are gathering from the Marines who fought the last 3 years and turn that very rapidly into tactics, techniques and procedures for the Marines today, whether Reserve or active duty. I wanted to bring Phil with me today so you could see him and if you have any particular questions, he is certainly available to answer any of those questions.

I would simply say it is a pleasure to be here. I thank you for the chance to be here and I look forward to your questions.

Thank you.

[The prepared statement of General Hanlon follows:]
STATEMENT OF
LIEUTENANT GENERAL EDWARD HANLON, JR
UNITED STATES MARINE CORP
DEPUTY COMMANDANT FOR COMBAT DEVELOPMENT
BEFORE THE
COMMITTEE ON GOVERNMENT REFORM
HOUSE SUBCOMMITTEE ON NATIONAL SECURITY, EMERGING THREATS, AND INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS
CONCERNING
COMBATING TERRORISM: TRAINING AND EQUIPPING RESERVE COMPONENT FORCES
ON
MAY 11, 2004
Introduction

Chairman Shays, distinguished Members of the Subcommittee, I am here today to report to you on the Marine Corps’ initiatives to apply lessons learned from Operations ENDURING FREEDOM (OEF), IRAQI FREEDOM (OIF), and SECURE TOMORROW (OST) in the development of improved training, tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTPs); and equipment, for both Active and Reserve forces. The Marine Corps is a Total Force organization, and I hope to impress upon you that all Marines, Active and Reserve, receive the same training and equipment when deployed in support of the Global War on Terrorism (GWOT) or any other contingency. For example, Marine Corps Reserve units are participating in all aspects of Operation IRAQI FREEDOM, providing air, ground, and combat service support as well as a large number of individual augmentees to Marine and joint staffs.

During the peak of operation ENDURING FREEDOM and Operation IRAQI FREEDOM, the Marine Corps had 21,316 Reserve Marines on Active duty. Our Reserve force proved once again that it was ready, willing, and able to accomplish its primary mission of augmenting and reinforcing the active component by seamlessly integrating into I Marine Expeditionary Force and other organizations.

The Marine Corps’ Expeditionary Force Combat Assessment Team (EFCAT), currently deployed to Afghanistan, Iraq, and Haiti continues to identify a wide variety of issues regarding training, equipment, and organizational processes that affect current, and possibly, future operations. These observations and lessons are being documented and shared with Headquarters Marine Corps, Training and Education Command, Marine Corps Systems Command, the operating forces, the supporting establishment, and the Marine-Air-Ground-Task-Force (MAGTF) Advocates who are responsible for integrating them into the Marine Corps’
Expeditionary Force Development System. These emerging lessons are proactively
disseminated to deployed and deploying units. The goal is to train and equip Marine forces
capable of accomplishing their assigned missions while protecting the force against traditional
and emerging threats.

As combat assessment and data collection continues, adjustments to TTPs are
documented and distributed through a secure web site available to units in theater and in the
United States. Active and Reserve forces preparing to deploy monitor this information source
for training initiatives, TTPs, and lessons learned. Ongoing assessments by the EFCAT include:

- Improvised Explosive Device (IED) and convoy TTPs
- Vehicle hardening options, effectiveness, and suitability
- Process for requesting improved equipment and training
- Relief-in-place and turnover-of-authority (RIP/TOA) procedures
- Performance of Aircraft Survivability Equipment
- Political/Military issues and empowerment of Iraqi institutions
- Developing a cadre of qualified trainers for Iraqi agencies

My command, the Marine Corps Combat Development Command, based in Quantico,
Virginia, continues collaboration with the other Services and Joint Forces Command to collect
and implement recommended Doctrine, Organization, Training, Materiel, Leadership, Personnel
and Facilities improvements in the face of ongoing threats to forces in Iraq, Afghanistan, and
Haiti. Improving force protection is an ongoing priority and we have therefore focused much of
our force protection efforts on improved training. In addition to improvements in the pro-
deployment training of Active and Reserve forces, the Marine Corps’ Training and Education
Command continues to analyze EFCAT lessons to identify areas of improvement in the Entry
Level Training pipeline and the Marine Corps Common Skills program. The Entry Level Training pipeline includes Officer Candidate School and The Basic School for developing junior officers and the Marine Corps Recruit Depots and Schools of Infantry for developing our young enlisted Marines. The Marine Corps Common Skills program is a system of Individual Training Standards directives that provide progressive, building-block skills expected of all Marines. Recent changes to the Marine Corps Common Skills program, initiated in response to OEF and OIF lessons, resulted in curriculum improvements at our Entry Level Training schools.

Training and Education Command’s analysis of OEF and OIF lessons validated the Marine Corps’ philosophy that every Marine is a Rifleman. Overall, non-infantry Marines’ basic rifleman and marksmanship skills are sufficient to allow them to perform their primary mission while contributing to the overall force protection mission. Areas for improvement include weapons handling, communications, and crew-served weapons training. Surveys completed by OIF Marines stated a requirement for more training in Military Operations in Urban Terrain and convoy operations at both The Basic School and the School of Infantry. This feedback resulted in modifications and enhancements to both school’s curricula. The Schools of Infantry have included periods of instruction on Improvised Explosive Devices (IEDs) and Vehicular Ambushes. The Basic School has modified the student’s “war” from the traditional offense/defense using a symmetrical battlefield to a much more intensive Stability and Support Operations (SASO) environment that encompasses urban patrolling, civil disturbance, convoy operations, and vehicle checkpoints/entry control points.

During March 2004, the greatest threat faced by U.S. Marines returning to Iraq was from IEDs to include Vehicle Borne IEDs (VBIED) and Remote/Radio Controlled IEDs (RCIED). During convoy operations, vehicles lacking armor protection are particularly vulnerable. One
enemy tactic is to trap vehicles in a kill zone for ambush through emplacement of obstacles (i.e. IEDs, disabled civilian vehicles, debris). This attack is more prevalent in Iraq where the deposition of large amounts of debris along roadways conceals IEDs. Vehicle hardening has mitigated the effects of some types of IEDs and improved the survivability of personnel riding in trucks and HMMWVs.

In Afghanistan, civilians salvage roadside items, except those located in unsafe areas such as in minefields. This, and the rural area of operations, leads to the tactic of burying IEDs, much like land mines. Tactics such as “triple-stacking” of anti-tank mines are being employed to enhance lethality. IEDs are often employed in both theaters to initiate ambushes and establish a kill zone reinforced by supporting small arms or Rocket Propelled Grenade (RPG) fire.

In Iraq, there is the constant threat of suicide bombers employing IEDs against hardened coalition facilities, indigenous security forces, and civilian facilities. These are predominantly VBIEDs. Overall, suicide attacks against hardened facilities have had marginal success; however, the rare success sometimes produces significant casualties. In Iraq, this tactic is being more effectively employed against soft targets to include Iraqi security posts and civilian Non Governmental Organization facilities.

Since offensive operations began in Ramadi and Fallujah, over 75% of Marine combat deaths have been due to direct fire, with the rest being roughly split between IEDs and indirect fire. The Marine Corps is relentlessly pursuing improved TTPs and countermeasures to overcome and mitigate enemy tactics. Examples of pre-deployment training adapted to reduce casualties from direct fire weapons, indirect fire weapons, and IEDs include:
- Urban Combined Arms Exercise (UCAX): The Tactical Training Exercise Control Group (TTECG), located at the MAGTF Training Command, Twentynine Palms, CA, has adapted the
CAX training goals to emphasize lessons learned from OIF. Coordination continues with the operating forces and the lessons learned of the Army have also been incorporated.

- Basic Urban Skills Training (BUST): Between January and March 2004, six reinforced infantry battalions were trained in Stability and Support Operations (SASO 1-04) for a total of nearly 10,000 personnel. Currently underway is another round of BUST (SASO 2-04) training that will result in an additional 10,000 trained Marines and Sailors.

- Exercise DESERT TALON: Marine Aviation Weapons and Tactics Squadron One (MAWTS-1) training for aviation elements deploying in support of OIF focused on the training of Forward Air Controllers (FACs), convoy operations, and casualty evacuation in urban and desert environments. Over 1,100 Marines and Sailors were trained and 760 sorties were flown thus far in this recurring exercise.

Detection is a significant element in countering the effects of IEDs against our forces, and intelligence is a contributing element of detection. Our overall IED detection capability needs improvement. Additional human intelligence collectors and analysts experienced in techniques of link analysis, pattern analysis, and competitive hypothesis analysis are needed, particularly in Iraq, to mitigate the IED threat. These techniques would help explain relationships between individuals and insurgent groups, enemy capabilities, and intentions.

Also, fielding analytical software such as “analyst toolbox” and biometric analysis tool (BAT) will improve our detection capability. Training of drivers, convoy leaders, and individual Marines to detect signs of IEDs is an effective means of avoiding threats where possible. Through a combination of extensive training prior to deployment and significant experience gained on the ground, Marines have become skilled at finding IEDs before detonation. By constantly updating our TTPs, we are finding more IEDs and forcing the enemy to repeatedly
change tactics. Through our aggressive offensive action, emplacement of hard-wired IEDs has become more risky for the enemy, so remote detonation of IEDs has increased. As Radio Frequency jamming and neutralizing technologies in theater increase, the enemy will be forced back to hard-wiring IEDs with a greater chance of being captured or killed. Other areas where we are seeing success in countering enemy IED tactics include:

- The Marine Corps is providing improved local customs and language skills training for Marines in order to develop better information from civilians.

- The Marine Corps is using secure databases to track and assess IED events and is coordinating all activities with the Army IED Task Force.

- The Army has requested designation as the DoD Executive Agent for IEDs. This will focus the efforts of over 130 separate counter-IED organizations that do not currently fall within a single DoD organizational construct.

- The Army IED Task Force focuses on counter IED TTPs and compiles and disseminates “Blue” counter-IED TTPs and corresponding “Red” TTPs through their cell at the Center For Army Lessons Learned. This TF maintains an extensive classified website of TTPs and has recently produced an IED training module CD and IED Smart Cards. The training module CDs have been made available to 1 MEF and over 50,000 IED Smart Cards are headed to 1 MEF.

- The Army IED TF and USMC IED Working Group are working with industry to ensure our needs are known and the most mature technologies are being evaluated and developed for deployment.

Additional systems being developed to mitigate the threat of IEDs include: explosive detection devices; electromagnetic jamming; remote detonation of Radio Frequency and electrical IED triggers; and the continued hardening of trucks and HMMWVs.
As Marine forces develop new training programs, TTPs, and equipment, enemy forces adapt. Enemy tactics have become increasingly sophisticated and complex. US forces are continuing to adapt by exploiting some of the inherent vulnerabilities created as the insurgents move to larger attacks requiring massing of forces and more complicated coordination.

Additionally, we continue to insert technology to meet the needs and requests of our Marines in theater, giving them enhanced combat capabilities. In addition to training at home station on new equipment, we have sent, and will continue to send, mobile training teams to Iraq to provide instruction on new technologies. Examples of new technologies include the Dragon Eye Unmanned Aerial Vehicle, Gladiator Tactical Unmanned Ground Vehicle, and the Dragon Runner Unmanned Ground Vehicle. These systems are designed to improve the ground commander’s situational awareness while reducing the exposure of friendly forces to enemy direct fire weapons. We are also fielding enhanced communication equipment such as the Personal Role Radio and Multiband Inter/Intra Team Radio to deployed units. Also, the Advanced Combat Optical Gunsight has been fielded to all infantry Marines, improving their ability to identify and engage enemy targets. At the request of I Marine Expeditionary Force, we will test an over-the-horizon communication and position location system called the Expeditionary Tactical Communication System. This capability will improve the commander’s ability to command and control his forces.

A critical requirement in the preparation of Marine forces for deployment is ensuring Reserve forces receive the same training and equipment as the Active forces with whom they will serve. As I stated in my opening, the Marine Corps is a Total Force organization and the Active and Reserve Tables of Organization (T/O-personnel) and Tables of Equipment (T/E-equipment) are identical for like units. The Training Allowance (T/A) of Reserve units provides
the equipment required to support monthly and Annual Training requirements. Upon reserve
unit mobilization, the T/E vs T/A delta is primarily the responsibility of the Gaining Force
Command for sourcing. In the case of OIF, the Gaining Force Command is I MEF, and all
Reserve units have received their T/E allowance. However, units earmarked for deployment are
responsible for identifying any equipment shortfalls to the Gaining Force Command. Active and
Reserve units identify specific OEF/OIF requirements through the urgent Universal Need
Statement (UNS) process. The urgent UNS process has provided all deploying forces with a
proportionate amount of equipment beyond their T/E allowance. Also, National Guard &
Reserve Equipment Appropriation funding was made available in October 2003, to fund
communication assets distributed to Selected Marine Corps Reserve units prior to deployment.

The ability of the Marine Corps Reserve to rapidly mobilize and integrate into the active
component in response to the Marine Corps’ operational requirements is a tribute to the
dedication, professionalism, and warrior spirit of every member of the Marine team, both Active
and Reserve.

The EFCAT has documented many lessons in support of preparing Reserve Marines for
activation and deployment. In response to OEF/OIF lessons, the Marine Corps provided
comprehensive pre-deployment training to Reserve personnel to ensure they are mission capable.
In most cases, Reserve units were mobilized 30-45 days prior to deployment to afford them the
opportunity to complete critical training. Reserve Marines returning from deployment are in turn
training the units and Marines in subsequent rotations. The Gaining Force Command and
Marine Forces Reserve push threat information via websites, message traffic, and mobile
assistance teams to the deploying Reserve units and their personnel.
Reserve Unit Training: Subordinate commands at MCCDC, such as the Marine Corps Warfighting Laboratory, have sent representatives to Iraq to ensure that the training provided to deploying units, both Active and Reserve, reflects the most recent lessons learned by our forces currently on the ground. The Lab deployed the Marine Corps’ Officer-in-Charge of Stability and Support Operations (SASO) training, which we are providing to battalions deploying to Iraq, to validate the training program and incorporate the lessons into the next training iteration. Two Reserve battalions; 2nd Battalion, 24th Marines, and 3rd Battalion, 24th Marines underwent SASO training in the early spring 2004, at March Air Reserve Base in Riverside, California. Two more Reserve battalions; 2nd Battalion, 24th Marines, and 1st Battalion, 23d Marines are scheduled to attend this training in June and July 2004. The training received by Active and Reserve units in SASO is exactly the same, and we have made Herculean efforts to ensure that the latest lessons are incorporated into preparing all Marines for deployment. In addition to their development of SASO training plans, the Marine Corps Warfighting Laboratory also publishes “X-files,” which quickly disseminate proven TTPs from experimentation and assessments. These “X-files” are available to all Marine components and other services via website.

Reserve Individual Training: In order to ensure sustainability of operations, we are watching our deploying units to ensure that Marines who have previously deployed in support of GWOT are provided a reasonable break from deployment. We initially attempt to fill shortfalls in deploying units by “cross-leveling,” that is by filling vacancies with Marines of similar skills from non-deploying or non-scheduled units. When “cross-leveling” does not provide sufficient manpower, we contact appropriately skilled Individual Ready Reserve (IRR) Marines to fill the personnel gaps. Thus far, we have managed to meet the preponderance of our Reserve unit personnel requirements with unit personnel and IRR volunteers; however, at the current pace of
operations, volunteers will eventually not be sufficient to meet the demands. We are initiating programs to retrain Reserve Marines in certain high demand Military Occupational Specialties (MOSs). All of our Military Police and Civil Affairs assets have deployed at least once, some more than once, so these are areas we are targeting for retraining, either through formal schools or on-the-job training. In regard to individual augmentation, billets are identified by the Combatant Commander and validated through HQMC for either global sourcing or Reserve fill. As priorities are identified to the Reserve, we perform targeted solicitation of the SMCR and IRR. Individual augmentation, rather than unit augmentation, is currently our main focus of effort. Marines qualified to perform required duties are administratively processed and trained by Marine Corps units and then sent to the Combatant Commander. We also have identified a pool of volunteers who are willing to retrain in the high-demand/low-density MOSs and subsequently deploy as individual augmentees.

Reserve Equipment: I am most pleased to report that every Reserve Marine deployed during Operation ENDURING FREEDOM and Operation IRAQI FREEDOM, is fully equipped with the most modern Individual Combat Equipment available, and every Reserve aircraft, both rotary and fixed-wing, will have the latest Aircraft Survivability Equipment installed either prior to departure, enroute - while embarked aboard amphibious shipping, or shortly after arrival in theater. In addition, we are aggressively replacing aging ground equipment to include purchasing 1162 HMMWV-A2 and 604 Medium Tactical Vehicle Replacement (MTVR) trucks. Both new vehicle systems embrace the latest sustainability and maintainability technological improvements available to the Marine Corps.

The Gaining Force Command sourcing of equipment shortfalls continues to improve with each OIF/OEF rotation. Examples:
- Blue Force Tracker was fielded to SMCR units.
- Target Laser Designation Handoff System was fielded to SMCR units.
- All SMCR forces deployed with Outer Tactical Vests and the Small Arms Protection Insert Plates.
- Several Non Lethal Weapons kits were procured via NGREA funding.
- NGREA funding was made available in October 2003, to purchase comm assets such as: AN/PRC-117; AN/PRC-150; RT-1523B for the AN/PRC-119F; Various Alternate Power Sources; a Digital Command Operations Center capability; the Secure, Mobile, Anti-jam, Reliable, Tactical - Terminal (SMART-T) - a MILSTAR satellite communications transmit-and-receive terminal; and Iridium Phones.

Conclusion

Overall, I am confident that Marines deployed in support of the Global War on Terrorism, whether Active or Reserve, are receiving the same training and equipment to accomplish their assigned missions. This is an area that has our priority attention and vigilance. In my capacity as the Marine Corps’ chief combat development authority, I continue to work closely with LtGen Conway, the Commanding General, I MEF; LtGen McCarthy, the Commander, Marine Forces Reserve; and other senior commanders to improve on our recent successes and to correct any shortcomings. Through the support of this subcommittee, Congress, and the American people, we will achieve our objectives.
Mr. SHAYS. Thank you, General.

General Schultz.

General SCHULTZ. Thank you.

It is an honor for me to appear before you again here today. I want to express my appreciation for the support of our soldiers and the families to this committee personally. Simply said, your support is critical to our mission success. Today, the Guard has over 93,000 soldiers deployed in missions around the world and we take preparing these soldiers for their assigned duty very seriously. You have my pledge to always keep their well being in mind as we proceed with missions assigned to Army National Guard units.

Our soldiers ask for so little, yet they carry the burden of our priorities and proudly serve this Nation. They are selfless to the person. I am proud of every one of them. Now to the focus of this hearing on combating terrorism. I share your interest and your concerns.

In perspective, we have made progress. You know well that many of our soldiers were called to active duty on very short notice. Many were placed on duty in less than 2 weeks. Although the mobilization process was accomplished well ahead of anything outlined in our plans, we can still do better. To the credit of our soldiers and their leaders, our units assembled, deployed and performed their missions. To date, almost 60,000 soldiers from the Army National Guard have been demobilized since the September 11 attacks but work remains.

We are concentrating in two principal areas, equipping our units and training our soldiers. While progress is being made with our rapid fielding initiatives, you will not find us satisfied until our equipment shortages have been fully accomplished. While it took longer than we had planned, individual body armor has now been provided to all of our soldiers in the Afghanistan and Iraqi theaters. We continue to distribute up-armored and add-on armor systems to our wheeled vehicle fleet. So I end where I started. The real credit for our current condition goes to our soldiers. They are truly outstanding indeed. Our Nation’s call, they have answered and we too owe them our very best.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

[The prepared statement of General Schultz follows:]
STATEMENT BY

LIEUTENANT GENERAL ROGER C. SCHULTZ
DIRECTOR, ARMY NATIONAL GUARD

BEFORE THE
COMMITTEE ON GOVERNMENT REFORM
SUBCOMMITTEE ON NATIONAL SECURITY, EMERGING THREATS, AND
INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

UNITED STATES HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

ON
COMBATING TERRORISM:
TRAINING AND EQUIPPING RESERVE COMPONENT FORCES

MAY 11, 2004

NOT FOR PUBLICATION
UNTIL RELEASED BY THE
COMMITTEE ON GOVERNMENT REFORM
STATEMENT BY
LIEUTENANT GENERAL ROGER C. SCHULTZ
DIRECTOR, ARMY NATIONAL GUARD

Chairman Shays and members of the subcommittee: Thank you for your continued support to our National Guardsmen and women deployed around the world. Since 9/11, over 184,000 Army National Guardsmen have served in a federal active duty status, which constitutes about 52 percent of our force. We have demonstrated strength and resilience to transform to operational needs. National Guardsmen have been in Iraq since the war began. Our Soldiers are currently in Iraq, Afghanistan, Kosovo, Bosnia, the Sinai, and Cuba. They provide protection to key infrastructure in the United States and at special events. Many of these missions were variations that were not fully anticipated or planned, but our Soldiers have exhibited adaptability in executing their roles and missions.

The National Guard’s goal is to have all of our units manned, equipped and trained before they get the call to go to war. With a predictable cycle of an overseas deployment every five years units will be able to efficiently train to certifiable standards, and deploy in a minimal amount of time.

Over time, the Army has accepted risk in the Army National Guard equipment resourcing to support a variety of update programs to modernize Army forces. The logic that supported this strategy was sound at the time, however we are now experiencing the results of that risk - large shortfalls in equipment inventories while we are mobilizing and deploying units to the theater at full capability. Critical items include night vision devices, individual body armor, small arms and crew served weapons, communications, command and control systems, and other items. The Department of the Army and Forces Command has assisted greatly in filling the requirements for our current forces in the theater. Herculean efforts have assured that every soldier has the latest in body armor, personal protection and comfort equipment, unit equipment for operations in built up areas, and weapons upgrades.
The Army National Guard has moved equipment from later or non-deploying units to assure that our Soldiers have everything we can provide to support them in the harsh environments they experience in Iraq and Afghanistan. Some of the critical, high cost shortfalls are mitigated in theater through a process termed “stay behind equipment”, wherein a unit entering the theater will go without equipment and use that of a like unit returning home. At this point, that is serving us well, however continuing to rotate equipment between units may eventually present Sustainment challenges due to the harsh environment present in theatre. To help offset this challenge, and because of the developing operational scenario more organic equipment will be sent with the next rotations. Of course, soldier protection is always first and foremost in our priorities of equipping the force.

A key tool in reacting to the challenges of equipping our forces has been the National Guard Reserve Equipment Appropriation. Through your efforts, we have been able to procure critical small arms, night vision devices, various vehicle models, and some communications equipment. The ARNG used some of the funds to develop a variety of simulation tools that have proven invaluable in preparing our units for current operations. We have developed several key tools - Abrams and Bradley Full Crew Interactive Skills Trainer modified into HMMWV/Tactical Truck Crew Trainers to support convoy operations training in a virtual Baghdad database with real world scenarios developed from lessons learned in theater. Also, the Army National Guard relies heavily on the Laser Marksmanship Training System and the Engagement Skills Trainer that simulate individual, team and squad battlefield scenarios using small arms and crew served weaponry. We are able to deploy the systems throughout our units to quickly enhance their training opportunities at a critical period in their mobilization process.

Fully incorporating the Army National Guard into the Army Modularity transformation is essential to our ability to provide forces during national crises such as the Global War on Terrorism. This includes modernizing our equipment to support the
change in unit configurations. We have a very robust refurbishment program within the Army National Guard to assure that our older equipment remains in the best condition possible, however modern equipment is essential for training and fighting in today's worldwide environment.

The U.S. Army Center for Lessons Learned (CALL) at Ft. Leavenworth is the official repository for lessons learned. CALL is conducting post-deployment operations with returning units from OIF as well as analyzing current reports from the field to build web-based modules that Soldiers and units can access before deployment and during actual operations. At the National Guard Bureau, we are working with CALL to develop web-based modules to train and educate deploying RC Soldiers on lessons learned from Operation Iraqi Freedom. Deploying units are trained in the lethal tactics used in Iraq and Afghanistan when they get to their Mobilization Stations and begin collective training. Even before that point the information is available on the Center for Army Lessons Learned (CALL) website. Our units are continually going to the website to get the latest information to disseminate to their Soldiers even if they are not alerted.

Both sites are open to our leaders and Soldiers so they can obtain the latest operational information to ensure their training programs are timely and relevant. We encourage all of our units to go to CALL and get information so they can be up-to-date on the latest information.

The Army National Guard is working hand in hand with both the Center for Army Lessons Learned (CALL) and the Pentagon's IED Task Force to improve training against IEDs for units deploying to OIF and OEF. CALL and the IED task force are developing web based and computer based distributive learning (DL) modules for Soldiers to access during pre-mobilization training, post mobilization training and while deployed in theater. The Army National Guard is assisting both organizations in developing IED and other needed DL training modules to enhance the individual soldier's readiness.
The Army National Guard has formal mechanisms for inserting lessons learned into unit training programs. The Distributed Battle Simulation Program (DBSP) prepares weekly post-mobilization Situational Reports (SITREPS) during each unit's post-mobilization training period. The report discusses the unit's training requirements based on the unit's Contemporary Operational Environment (COE) Mission Essential Task List (METL) and offers the use of this information for later deploying units. In addition, units returning from Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF) and Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF) provide specific Area of Responsibility (AOR) lessons learned which are incorporated into training programs for other units prior to their mobilization. The Army National Guard's Battle Command Training Center (BCTC) at Ft. Leavenworth trains Battle Staff on key individual and collective command and control tasks. BCTC is resourced to deliver just-in-time training events for units anticipating alert and mobilization. Furthermore, the U.S. Army's Training Support XXI (AC to RC support) program uses lessons learned from the field to integrate Active Component operational experience directly into Reserve Component training. This helps ensure that Reserve Component leaders at all levels are receiving relevant training.

Prior to deployment ARNG units execute post mobilization training under the control of the Commanding General, U.S. Army Forces Command culminating in a multi-echelon training event called a Mission Rehearsal Exercise (MRX). One of the U.S. Army's major training centers hosts the MRX and ensures that training for each rotation is tailored to the current theater. This ensures that relevant tactics, techniques and procedures learned overseas are trained at home.

We are finding great value in incorporating the lessons learned into the training plans. The Combat Training Centers (JRTC/NTC) are replicating the area of operations to the best of their ability. The deploying Brigades live in areas, as they train, that represent Forward Operating Bases on the outskirts of local villages and have Arabic speaking personnel there constantly during training. Not all of our combat support and combat service support units (CS/CSS), the units getting hit with roadside explosive devices, are being given the opportunity to go through JRTC and NTC. The Training
Support Brigades (TSB) tasked with the pre-deployment training at other locations, are not able to provide the same level of threat replication. Our CS and CSS units need this experience of going through JRTC or NTC in a direct support roll, prior to deploying. We are now working toward providing all National Guard units the same outstanding collective training prior to deploying.

We have had some units that deploy more frequently than others. The War on Terrorism required that we activate every Military Police unit we have in the Guard today. Our two Special Forces Groups have played a major role as well. Our plan is to increase the number of our High Demand units as one measure to reduce the stress on these Soldiers. We have already begun converting some units into Military Police and plan to increase the number of Military Police by 12,000.

As National Guard commanders transfer both soldiers and equipment required by units for their assigned missions, we maintain one priority: Every Soldier in every unit will be certified for deployment in equipment and medical readiness prior to their movement to their area of operation. These transfers of equipment and personnel are essential elements in making units ready to perform their mission.

In closing, we have the best Soldiers in the world today. We can ensure that they remain so by supporting their finances, families, and employers and providing reliable equipment and medical care. Army National Guard citizen-Soldiers are actively protecting our country, and they are proud to serve.

Thank You.
Mr. SHAYS. Thank you, General.

General Helmly.

General HELMLY. Mr. Chairman and members of the subcommittee, thank you for the opportunity and the privilege to testify on behalf of the 211,000 soldiers, civilian employees and families of the U.S. Army Reserve, an integral component of the world's greatest army, an army at war for a Nation at war.

I am Ron Helmly, Chief of Army Reserve and an American soldier in your Army and exceptionally proud of it. I have a brief statement that I would ask be entered into the record.

This is my first opportunity to address this subcommittee. As the Chief, Army Reserve, I am profoundly humbled and sobered by my responsibility for the readiness, training and welfare of our soldiers and families. Today as we speak nearly 60,000 Army Reserve soldiers are on active duty in Iraq, Kuwait, Afghanistan and the continental United States and elsewhere around the world as part of America's global war on terrorism.

Since September 11, 2001, more than 100,000 Army Reserve soldiers have served on active duty as part of this global war on terrorism. Tragically, 38 Army Reserve soldiers have made the ultimate sacrifice in service to our Nation. We are deeply in their debt and honor their memories by our actions here today.

Your invitation to testify comes at a time of profound and unprecedented change in the dynamics of our Nation’s security environment. From the start, we have understood that this will be no brief campaign or a short war. It will be an enduring global war, a protracted war, a long struggle that lacks clear, well defined borders. Have no doubt, however, our soldiers understand and our fellow soldiers, airmen and Marines all understand it is in fact a war. It challenges our national will and our perseverance, it tries our patience and indeed our moral fiber.

As we engage these enemies, we recognize that carrying out current missions is not in and of itself sufficient. The very forces that cause this war to be different have propelled the world into a period of unprecedented change and volatility. We live in a much changed world and we must change to confront it. We must simultaneously confront today’s challenges while preparing for tomorrow’s. The Army will maintain its nonnegotiable contract to right and win our Nation’s wars as we change to become more strategically responsive and maintain our dominance at every point across the spectrum of military operations. The confluence of these dual challenges transforming while fighting and winning and preparing for future wars is the crux of our challenge today, transforming while at war.

The Army Reserve is part of a public institution founded in law. Our mission and our responsibility comes from this law. I would note that the law does not say for big wars, for little wars, short or medium wars. It says whenever our Nation, our Army and our Armed Services require us, we are to provide trained units and qualified soldiers. We must change to continue fulfilling the mandate of that law while simultaneously perfecting and strengthening the quality force we have today.

The Army Reserve is fully engaged in the global war on terrorism. Every day we are dealing with challenges to ensure our sol-
diers are properly trained, adequately equipped and competently led. We are making every effort to incorporate lessons learned from the soldiers facing threats every day to better prepare mobilizing and deploying soldiers to survive and win on a lethal, complex battlefield. Your attention to this issue should help us design and resource the Army Reserve for success.

I would be pleased to answer any questions you may have.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

[The prepared statement of General Helmly follows:]
STATEMENT BY
LTG JAMES R. HELMLEY
CHIEF, ARMY RESERVE
DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY

BEFORE THE

SUBCOMMITTEE ON NATIONAL SECURITY, EMERGING THREATS, AND INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS
COMMITTEE ON GOVERNMENT REFORM
UNITED STATES HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

SECOND SESSION, 108TH CONGRESS

COMBATING TERRORISM: TRAINING AND EQUIPPING RESERVE COMPONENT FORCES

MAY 11, 2004

NOT FOR PUBLICATION
UNTIL RELEASED BY THE
COMMITTEE ON GOVERNMENT REFORM
INTRODUCTION

Mr. Chairman and members of the subcommittee, thank you for the opportunity and the privilege to testify on behalf of the 211,000 Soldiers, 12,000 civilian employees, and the families of the United States Army Reserve, an integral component of the world’s greatest Army, an Army at war for a nation at war. I’m Ron Helmy, and I’m an American Soldier in your Army, and proud of it.

This is my first opportunity to address this subcommittee. As the Chief, Army Reserve, I am profoundly humbled and sobered by my responsibility. The Army Reserve is an organization that daily demonstrates its ability to be a full and equal partner, along with the Active component of the Army and the Army National Guard, in being the most responsive dominant land force the world has seen. Together with the Marine Corps, Navy, Air Force, and Coast Guard, the Army Reserve of your Army fights as part of the joint team: the sum of the parts is much greater – and that’s the power we bring to the battlefield today.

Today as we speak, nearly 60,000 Army Reserve Soldiers are on active duty in Iraq, Kuwait, Afghanistan, in the continental United States, and elsewhere around the world as part of America’s global war on terrorism, serving courageously and proudly. They are joined by another 151,000 Army Reserve Soldiers training and preparing for mobilization or resting and refitting after being demobilized. These modern-day patriots are your neighbors who live in your communities, work in your factories, teach your children, provide your healthcare, deliver your mail, and share your everyday lives. They willingly answered the call to duty to perform missions they have trained for, and to honor their commitment as part of a responsive and relevant force, an essential element and indispensable component of the world’s finest land force, the United States Army.

The strength and added value we bring to that partnership is drawn from the people who serve in our formations. With nearly 25 percent of its Soldiers female, and
more than 40 percent minority, the Army Reserve is the most ethnically and gender-diverse force of all the armed services. Overall, 92 percent of our force holds high school diplomas. Our force consists of individuals who are community and industry leaders, highly trained and educated professionals, experts in their chosen fields who give of their time and expertise to serve our nation.

Since September 11, 2001, more than 100,000 Army Reserve Soldiers have served on active duty as part of the global war on terrorism. Tragically, 38 Army Reserve Soldiers have made the ultimate sacrifice in service to our nation to keep their fellow citizens and their families and neighbors safe and free. We are deeply in their debt and honor their memories by our actions here today.

THE CHALLENGE

Your invitation to testify comes at a time of profound and unprecedented change and challenge in the dynamics of our nation’s security environment. Since September 11, 2001, we have been embroiled in a war with determined enemies, who are intent on destroying our very way of life. In this global war on terrorism, we are confronting regional powers; facing the potential use of weapons of terror and mass destruction at home and abroad; and struggling with the challenges of how to secure our homeland while preserving our precious rights and freedoms. From the start, we have understood that this will be no brief campaign or a short war. It will be an enduring global war, a protracted war, a long struggle that lacks clear, well-defined borders. Have no doubt, it is a war. It challenges our national will and our perseverance. It tries our patience and our moral fiber.

As we engage these enemies we recognize that carrying out current missions is not by itself sufficient. The very forces that cause this war to be different have propelled the world into a period of unprecedented change and volatility. We live in a much-changed world and we must change to confront it. We must simultaneously confront today’s challenges while preparing for tomorrow’s. The Army will maintain its non-negotiable contract to fight and win the nation’s wars as we change to become more
strategically responsive and dominant at every point across the spectrum of military operations. The confluence of these dual challenges, transforming while fighting and winning, and preparing for future wars, is the crux of our challenge - transforming while at war.

To balance these two imperatives while including lessons learned from current operations, we have issued long-term training guidance to support and integrate Army Reserve actions preparing the force for imminent mobilization and to reset returning forces. Embedded in this training guidance is the concept, supporting that of The Army, of moving toward a joint and expeditionary mindset – in our leaders and in our soldiers. Further, we seek to reinforce the Army Reserve’s mission to “provide fit, trained, and ready Soldiers and units.” This training guidance provides the enabling instructions to more fully realize our migration from a “Alert – Mobilize – Train – Deploy” model of the past towards the future of “Train – Alert – Deploy.”

We are at war. We will continue to fortify the Army Reserve’s wartime posture. Our posture must be sustainable until the Global War on Terrorism is won. It cannot be a sudden expansion.

ARMY RESERVE – FORCE PROVIDERS

A critical issue that should be recognized is that this is the first extended duration war our nation has fought with an all-volunteer force. January marked the 30th anniversary of the all-volunteer force. This tremendous policy change in our Nation has brought the Army Reserve, and the Armed Forces, an unheard of quality of people. Yet the all-volunteer force also brings expectations and sensitivities that we must confront with regard to how we support our people, and how we train them, and how and when we employ those people.

Title 10 of the United States Code directs the Army Reserve to provide units and Soldiers to the Army, whenever and wherever required. Since 1973, the Active and Reserve components have met this challenge with a force of volunteers, men and women who have freely chosen to serve their nation. Perhaps more than any other
policy decision, this momentous move from a conscript force to a force, Active and Reserve, manned solely by volunteers has been responsible for shaping today’s armed forces, the most professional and capable military the world has seen. Working through this sea change in how we lead our force has highlighted differing challenges that we simply must recognize and address if we are to maintain this immensely capable force.

The Army Reserve is part of a public institution founded in law. Our mission and our responsibility come from this law. I would note that the law does not say for big wars, little wars, short wars or medium wars, it says whenever our Army and our armed services and our nation require us, we are to provide trained units and qualified individuals. We must change to continue fulfilling the mandate of that law while simultaneously perfecting and strengthening the quality force we have today.

RENEWED EMPHASIS on WARRIOR TRAINING

In planning our units’ pre-mobilization training, we provided the commanders of the Army Reserve-specific guidance outlining both command instructions and expectations in the area of individual and unit (collective) training. We seek to develop the warrior that will be necessary to carry our Soldiers through the Global War on Terrorism. To achieve this goal we are concentrating on skill qualification and professional development for all members of the Army Reserve, ensuring that all of our Soldiers are well grounded in their basic warrior skills. These skills and their associated training include weapons training and qualification, warrior task training, improved physical fitness, and well being, land navigation, battle drills, and chemical, biological, radiological, and high yield explosive defense, among others. We expect that this pre-mobilization training will further hone and focus our Soldiers’ skills and build Soldier confidence in their individual and unit skills.

Our current command training guidance is the most prescriptive and aggressive in the history of the Army Reserve. It addresses the culture change-taking place throughout the Army Reserve in addition to the simultaneous transformation of the Army.
Reserve into an expeditionary force. Some of the areas addressed are physical fitness, Warrior Ethos and the 40 Warrior Training Tasks along with the newly created 9 battle drills for combat support and combat service support units, and semi-annual individual weapons qualification for all Soldiers. Bottom line, it moves the Army Reserve into the Train-Alert-Deploy mode necessary to support the ongoing Global War on Terrorism.

The dynamic transformation of America’s strategic environment demands an equally dramatic transformation in how we prepare the Army Reserve for combat and non-combat operations. For more than 40 years, we prepared to defeat a known enemy, with known doctrine and order of battle, on a known terrain supported by a modern European infrastructure. Today’s force prepares primarily for force projection operations against conventional and unconventional forces in a wide variety of undeveloped and unfamiliar theaters of operations.

This transformed strategic environment has a major impact on the needs of the joint force commander and Army combatant commanders. Emphasis has shifted from deliberate to adaptive war planning, and from permanent organizations and large hierarchies to smaller, highly distributed joint and combined forces, and standing joint task forces that integrate service capabilities at the lowest levels. Reliance on the Army Reserve has shifted from a strategic reserve to being a prominent part of the deployable force.

This strategic shift has a correlated, immediate impact on the training that supports the war fight and readiness, and must be viewed from an entirely new perspective. To be effective and support the needs of the combatant commanders in the new strategic environment, training required a dramatic change. Training must emphasize crisis-action planning, joint force organization and mission rehearsal. It must prepare the force to learn, improvise, and adapt to constantly changing threats in addition to executing doctrine to standards. We must do all of this while accommodating the unique training requirements of the Reserve’s to ensure Total Force readiness.
The change has begun. Just as secure rear areas no longer exist, our threats come from multiple sources and areas of operation. The Army Reserve in conjunction with Army is changing to meet the new threats while maintaining the capability to support more conventional military operations. The Army Reserve is a full partner and participant in transformation of the Army training process.

Building on Department of Defense and Army training transformation planning, the Army Reserve’s training transformation is focused along three primary axes: structure, training and ethos. Today’s Army Reserve culture, structure and the way we train must and is changing. (The culture of a part-time force with a two days a month of administrative and training activities culminating with a two week annual training event no longer meets the nation’s or the Army’s needs.)

First, allow me to address the training and ethos areas. In planning our units’ pre-mobilization training, we provided the commanders of the Army Reserve specific guidance outlining both command instructions and expectations in the area of individual and unit (collective) training. This is the training guidance referred to earlier. We seek to more fully develop the warrior and combat-ready teams needed to win the Global War on Terrorism. To achieve this goal we are concentrating on skill qualification and professional development for all members of the Army Reserve, ensuring that all of our Soldiers are well grounded in their basic warrior skills. These skills and their associated training include weapons training and qualification, warrior task training, improved physical fitness, land navigation, battle drills, and chemical, biological, radiological, and high yield explosive defense, among others. We expect that this pre-mobilization training will further hone and focus our Soldiers’ skills and build Soldier confidence in their individual and unit skills.

This command training guidance is the most prescriptive and aggressive in the history of the Army Reserve. It drives the required culture change taking place throughout the Army Reserve while simultaneously transforming the Army Reserve into a viable and full partner in the Army’s contribution toward future joint and expeditionary forces. In addition to improved physical fitness and weapons training, we are placing
great emphasis on indoctrinating our force with the Army’s Warrior Ethos. To this end, we are aggressively training to improve each soldier’s competency in the 40 Warrior Training Tasks and our units’ proficiency in the newly created 9 battle drills for combat support and combat service support units. These “40 and 9” are a direct result of lessons learned from the combat theater and the work of the Chief of Staff, Army’s Task Force “Soldier” focus area. Finally, we have established a requirement for all Army Reserve soldiers to qualify on individual weapons semi-annually. A soldier who cannot shoot, isn’t. Improvement of marksmanship skills and safe weapons handling procedures by our each of soldiers, a major deficiency recognized by many levels of leadership internal and external to the Army Reserve, is an imperative. The Laser Marksmanship Training System, initially intended for basic marksmanship training, has been leveraged for advanced marksmanship training, deployable ranges, convoy ranges (shooting from moving vehicles), military operations in urban terrain, and boat defense. The Army Reserve will receive its first three Laser Convoy Counter Ambush Training Systems in the next few weeks. Bottom line, the Army Reserve is moving quickly to the Train-Alert-Deploy mode necessary to support the ongoing Global War on Terrorism, informed by lessons learned and internal training assessments.

We are conducting training advisory boards for all unit types. Their purpose is to leverage the expertise, both lessons learned and technical knowledge, of the Army Reserve’s functional commands. The product will be establishment of specific training tasks whose mastery is required in the contemporary operating environment. This output will be documented in new training requirements promulgated in the publication of our Command Training Guidance.

Inculcating “Warrior Ethos” into the Army Reserve culture is a top priority. Every Army Reserve Soldier and civilian must understand we are at war and their actions reflect not only themselves but the Army and America. Our conduct in peacetime and wartime must be consistent with America’s traditions and Army values.

ADAPTING LEADER DEVELOPMENT
Training Year 2004 was identified by the Army Reserve as the Year of the Leader. The Army Leadership Campaign Plan has direct links to military education transformation and is linked to Global War on Terrorism lessons learned. A pre-command course is required by all individuals identified to assume command within six months of the assumption date. Our Senior Leader Training Program is designed to provide education and team building for colonel level and above.

We designed and are implementing a company team leader development course for decentralized execution by a combination of regional readiness commands and the Army Reserve Readiness Training Center. We are developing a combat leader validation effort, primarily aimed at our company and detachment commanders. The three major components of this program are a live combat leader council, establishment of a virtual Army Reserve web site and an Army Reserve combat leader validation checklist. The council will bring together our experienced Operation Iraqi Freedom/Operation Enduring Freedom leaders who have returned from combat operations and link them with the leaders of next year’s rotation into theater . . . direct transmission of lesson learned.

The Army Reserve is a full and active partner in the transformation of the Army’s institutional training for our officers, warrant officers and non-commissioned officers. Some changes in the Army’s schoolhouses, including those extensions of schoolhouses operated by the Army National Guard and Army Reserve, have already occurred. I would briefly cite one change in our Non-Commissioned Officer Education System. Based largely on lessons learned and feedback from theater, the Army’s Basic Non-Commissioned Officer Course will include (starting on 1 Oct 04 for the Active component and 1 Jan 05 for the Reserve component schools) training on improvised explosive devices, casualty evacuation, and convoy operations. Changing our leader development programs is essential to improving readiness of our force and necessary to changing the larger culture.
LESSONS LEARNED and RESERVE TRAINING

Capturing and leveraging lessons learned in a relevant and timely manner continues to be a challenge. To complement the Army Center for Lessons Learned (CALL) actions, the Army Reserve is developing a number of initiatives. The combat leader validation and the training advisory boards discussed earlier are principle examples.

The Army has always been a strong believer in after-action reviews, and over time has developed an extensive, formalized approach to lessons learned, especially in combat situations such as we face in Iraq and other areas of the CENTCOM theater of operations. This process begins in-country as operations and daily events unfold and are analyzed by local personnel to identify emerging threats to our troops and the most effective way to confront and to counter them. The after-action data are forwarded to the Center for Lessons Learned at Ft. Leavenworth, Kansas, where the Training and Doctrine Command staff performs further analysis and the develops programs of instruction that ultimately are posted daily as computer based packages on the Army’s web system, making them available to all levels of the force.

The Army Reserve Readiness Training Center at Ft. McCoy, Wisconsin, is also incorporating lessons learned into its pre-command courses, its First Sergeant Course, and its Battle Staff Course. The USARCT inspector general visits returning units to capture challenges, problems and situations that Soldiers experienced during their deployments.

EQUIPMENT PROCUREMENT AND MODERNIZATION

Increasing demands placed on the Army Reserve highlight the importance of equipment that is mission-essential. In addition, the increased use of Reserve forces in operational missions and the global war on terrorism has highlighted the importance of having compatible and modern equipment. In order for our Soldiers to be able to
seamlessly integrate on the battlefield, our equipment must be operationally and technically compatible. Without complete interoperability, the ability of the Army Reserve to accomplish its combat support and combat service support missions would be diminished. The need to quickly and efficiently deploy Army Reserve units invalidates the old Cold War planning that Army Reserve units will have sufficient mobilization time to replace non-interoperable equipment or fill shortfalls deliberately accepted as “necessary risk.” Retaining older, less effective equipment or filling the Army Reserve’s authorized levels of equipment only partially, leads to delays as a limited pool of Army Reserve equipment is transferred between deploying, redeploying and non-deploying units and Army Reserve Soldiers are trained or retrained to operate more modern equipment, they did not have access to during drills and annual training. The National Guard and Reserve Equipment Appropriation (NGREA) has been a significant and essential tool to improve the Army Reserve through force modernization.

Meeting these challenges requires not only that the Army Reserve be issued modern, interoperable equipment, but that the resources to maintain the readiness of this equipment also be provided. Sufficient funding needs to be provided to allow the Army Reserve to reach higher standards of readiness than currently maintained as an element of risk accepted by the Army under constrained budgets. Until the Army Reserve can be fully equipped with modern items, sustaining the combat and deployment readiness of the equipment currently on hand is essential. This requires full funding of operations and maintenance requirements and continuing support of the Army’s depot maintenance program, which is vital to maintaining the readiness of Army Reserve equipment, while extending service life, reducing life cycle costs and improving safety for Army Reserve Soldiers.

Combat support and combat service support transformation is a vital link to the Army Transformation Plan. The Army Reserve is the main provider of this capability for the Army and the Army must continue to modernize the Reserve components along a timeline that ensures the Reserve components remain interoperable and compatible with the Active component. The Army Reserve is continuing to support the Army’s
Transformation through the assignment of equipment from Army Reserve units to Army prepositioned stocks and stay-behind equipment in Iraq and Afghanistan.

Equipment modernization of the Army Reserve is indispensable in meeting the goals of the Army’s Transformation Campaign Plan. Full integration into the Army’s modernization plan to implement force interoperability enables our units to deliver required combat service and combat service support ensuring our Army’s operational success.

CONCLUSION

The Army Reserve is fully engaged in the Global War on Terrorism. Everyday we are dealing with challenges to ensure our soldiers are properly training, adequately equipped and competently led. We are making every effort to incorporate lessons learned from the soldiers facing threats everyday to better prepare mobilizing and deploying soldiers to survive and win on a dynamic and complex environment. Your attention to this issue should help us design and resource the Army Reserve for success.
Mr. SHAYS. Thank you very much.

General Weber.

General WEBER. Thank you for having me today. I appreciate the opportunity to appear before you to discuss how the Department of the Army is incorporating lessons learned from operations in Iraq and Afghanistan into the training and equipping of our Reserve and National Guard units prior to deployment.

The Army appreciates your continued support of the men and women who make up our great Army as we conduct operations around the globe. Thank you so much.

As you know, the Reserve and National Guard components are integral to the Army and indispensable to a quality force. We cannot perform effectively without employing National Guard and Reserve forces. Accordingly, the Army is committed to serving all components by providing common doctrine, standard organizations, fielding and supporting equipment and shared opportunities for training and leader development.

We can expect the situation in Iraq and Afghanistan to continue to challenge the persistence and perseverance of our soldiers deployed there. Our forces face an adaptive threat that will continue to fight from the shadows without regard for conventional norms of warfare and will seek ways to undermine our resolve and support. The continuing readiness and effectiveness of our forces in Iraq and Afghanistan depends in no small part upon our ability to analyze and quickly address lessons we learn there on a rapidly changing basis.

We have expanded our available assets to identify, gather, categorize and analyze operational lessons learned and then to rapidly develop and disseminate products associated with those lessons learned. The Center for Army Lessons Learned [CALL], established at Fort Leavenworth, KS, plays the most central role in this process and is used as the central repository for lessons learned, observations and associated tactics techniques and procedures [TTP].

Operational lessons learned are routinely disseminated immediately to units already employed in theater and to those preparing to deploy. Lessons learned are also disseminated appropriately throughout the institutional Army as you heard from the previous panel, and aggressively applied the institutional processes. A top priority for the U.S. Army’s doctrine development resources is generating TTPs for forces based on lessons learned from Afghanistan and Iraq.

Our training base schools, both active and Reserve, do a remarkable job of providing individual leaders but the foundation, knowledge and skills need to be adapted asymmetrically in today’s complex, contemporary operating environment, an environment as we know where leaders at all levels from sergeant through the general officer ranks are faced with decisions that have significant impacts on the enemy, their units, mission success and the indigenous population.

The competencies that our soldiers and leaders, the main beneficiaries of lessons learned, need to execute operations across the entire spectrum or develop further at the Army combat training centers. We work hard at incorporating TTPs in what we are learning into the scenarios and training at the CTCs as well as our home
station and mobilization training sites. Further, the information age has also enhanced the ability for direct communications between personnel and have completed an operational rotation or are currently deployed and those who are preparing to deploy. Currently, soldiers are using direct e-mail and Web sites both official and unofficial sites to share information about recent experiences and informal lessons learned. Commanders and leaders at all levels have invested an interest in using every tool available to better prepare their units and soldiers.

In terms of resources, I would like to briefly describe how the Army decides to provide resources to the force. The Army Strategic Planning Board is the principal vehicle we use to prioritize requirements and resources. It functions as an iterative and adaptive planning body to provide an integrating framework to organize and synchronize support for a global campaign. In order to support the regional combatant commanders, the ASPB recommends solutions to immediate requirements, anticipates intermediate needs and puts sound thought into future requirements to win this war but also to posture the Army for other future contingencies. Since its establishment, the ASPB has developed recommendations for and has tracked over 500 discreet tasks in support of combatant commanders. It has obligated over $5.5 billion to support the war on terrorism and has synchronized the Department of the Army's planning and execution. The ASPB is the vehicle that we use to synchronize the priorities and the requirements that come into the building and then determine the prioritization for resourcing those requirements.

The IED Task Force led by Colonel Joe Votel I think provides an excellent example of how the Army quickly adapts to changing circumstances. This task force was chartered to adopt a holistic approach focused on intelligence, tactics, techniques and procedures in information ops in order to turn around the lessons learned associated with IEDs back into the field.

This particular task force has made numerous recommendations for doctrinal changes, training and organization adaptations to assist in the response to the IED threat.

In conclusion, I would like to say the Army process for capturing lessons learned and providing solutions to deployed and deploying forces is generally a great success story. As you heard, it is a daunting task but adaptive leaders at every level are identifying the solutions and making recommendations for improving training, doctrine and material solutions. We are committed to providing the best resources available to every component and the best training we can develop to properly prepare our force.

Thank you and I look forward to responding to any questions you may have.

[The prepared statement of General Weber follows:]
STATEMENT BY

BRIGADIER GENERAL LOUIS W. WEBER
UNITED STATES ARMY
DIRECTOR OF TRAINING

BEFORE THE

SUBCOMMITTEE ON NATIONAL SECURITY, EMERGING THREATS,
AND INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS
GOVERNMENT REFORM COMMITTEE
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STATEMENT BY
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Introduction

Chairman Shays, distinguished members of the committee, I appreciate the opportunity to appear before you to discuss how the Department of the Army is incorporating lessons learned from operations in Iraq and Afghanistan into the training and equipping of our Reserve and Guard units prior to deployment. The Army appreciates your continuing support of the men and women who make up our great Army as we conduct operations around the globe. As you know, the Reserve Components are integral to the Army and indispensable to a quality force. We cannot perform effectively for long without employing Army Reserve and Army National Guard forces and, accordingly, the Army is committed to serving all components by providing common doctrine, standard organizations, fielding and support for equipment, and shared opportunities for training and leader development.

Lessons Learned

• The Challenge in Iraq and Afghanistan
We can expect the situation in Iraq and Afghanistan to continue to challenge the persistence and perseverance of our Soldiers deployed there. Our forces face an adaptive threat that will continue to fight from the shadows without regard for conventional norms of warfare and will seek ways to undermine our resolve and support. The continuing readiness and effectiveness of our forces in Iraq and Afghanistan depends in no small part upon our ability to analyze and quickly address lessons we learn there on a rapidly changing basis.
• **Gathering Lessons Learned**

We have expanded our available assets to identify, gather, categorize, and analyze operational lessons learned and to then rapidly develop and disseminate products associated with those lessons. The Center for Army Lessons Learned, known as CALL and established in Fort Leavenworth, KS, plays a central role in this process and is used as the central repository for lessons learned observations and associated tactics, techniques, and procedures. CALL employs a number of techniques to aggressively seek out lessons learned. It employs Combined Arms Assessment Teams, created using subject matter experts from Army schools and units, to closely examine specific issues in the field. It also employs study groups to examine operations; one was used to examine major combat operations in Iraq. Another is planned in June 2004 to examine subsequent operations. CALL embeds analysts within units employed in theater – it currently has analysts embedded with Combined Joint TF-7 HQ in Iraq, Combined Joint TF-180 in Afghanistan, and with all Division HQs in Iraq. During major combat, CALL also embedded analysts with each US Army Division HQs. CALL is visiting and interviewing Wounded In Action patients in medical facilities in the continental United States to solicit their personal insights, observations, and ‘what if’ opinions. Finally, CALL provides an avenue for any individual or unit to submit unsolicited personal insights and observations based on their experiences in Iraq and Afghanistan. Major Army Commands that provide forces to the Combatant Commander actively seek out lessons learned from returning units, report them to the consolidated CALL database, and adjust training for deploying forces accordingly.

CALL has a Joint Integration Cell. Presently the Joint Integration Cell consist of three individuals, headed by a CALL DA civilian team chief, a liaison officer from the Joint Staff, J7 (a contracted Joint Lessons Learned Specialist), and a liaison officer (COL/O6) from U.S. Joint Forces
Command Joint Center for Lessons Learned. Coordination and discussion between CALL the Joint Staff and Joint Forces Command regarding tactical and operational lessons learned is conducted daily. All formal Army joint lessons learned generated by CALL are vetted, approved and submitted to Joint Forces Command by the DA, DCS G3.

- **Processing Lessons Learned**
  Regardless of the source, when received by CALL, lessons learned are categorized and processed as “Urgent” for immediate dissemination, as “Important” to follow-on forces, or as “Routine”. Generally, CALL analysts in Iraq or Afghanistan distribute Urgent or Important lessons learned horizontally to other units and commands in-theater, before submitting them. However, the CALL analysts at Fort Leavenworth query the sender to ensure that this dissemination has taken place and take an aggressive role in seeing information is distributed quickly. Fort Leavenworth analysts then use email to disseminate both Urgent and Important level information to follow-on-force units down to brigade level and to Army Combat Training Centers, who train follow-on force units. Using classified email, operational lessons learned are routinely disseminated immediately to units already employed in theater and to those preparing to deploy. Additionally, lessons learned are posted into classified and unclassified CALL databases, which are accessible through the Internet and searchable by units Army-wide. Finally, CALL integrates lessons learned into CALL handbooks, newsletters, and Initial Impressions Reports; which are published periodically and disseminated to the force and the institutional Army.

- **Leveraging Lessons Learned**
  Operational lessons learned are disseminated appropriately throughout the institutional Army and aggressively applied to follow-on-forces and institutional processes. The top priority for U.S. Army Training And
Doctrine Command doctrine development resources is publishing Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for deploying forces based on lessons learned from Iraq and Afghanistan. Newly published Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures are included in the CALL database and are available via the Internet to units Army-wide.

The Training and Doctrine Command also uses lessons learned to adjust instruction during initial military training and follow-on professional development courses. There are numerous examples: Basic Combat Training was adjusted for certain Military Occupational Specialties to include actual missions Soldiers may execute in theater, Fort Sill and Fort Benning offer examples of this training; the Officer Basic Courses have incorporated convoy operations and convoy defense classes, as well as reaction to improvised explosive devices and urban operations; and traditional weapons familiarization firing conducted by the Training and Doctrine Command was adjusted to include engaging targets at 150 meters and closer. The Training and Doctrine Command also is arranging for veterans of Iraq and Afghanistan to give mission-tailored instruction to officers and non-commissioned officers being assigned to deploying units. In sum, lessons learned in Iraq and Afghanistan have caused many adjustments to virtually all courses offered by the Training and Doctrine Command for officer and non-commissioned officer professional development and for officers assuming command at the battalion and brigade levels. As a result, our training base schools (both active and reserve) do a remarkable job of providing individuals and leaders with the foundation knowledge and skills they need to be adaptive and to think asymmetrically in today’s complex contemporary operating environment – an environment where leaders at all levels, from sergeant through the general officer ranks, are faced with decisions that have significant impacts on the enemy, their unit’s mission success, and the indigenous population.
• **Combat Training Centers**

Because training base schools must continue to provide competencies that Soldiers and leaders need to execute across the entire spectrum of operations, perhaps the main benefactors of lessons learned from operations in Iraq and Afghanistan are the institutions that prepare forces for deployment. Primary among these are the Army's Combat Training Centers.

As noted above, 'Urgent' and 'Important' lessons learned are fed immediately by the Center for Army Lessons Learned to the Combat Training Centers who use them to update training scenarios, the training environment, and opposing forces. The U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command's Deputy Chief of Staff for Intelligence oversees the process for updating opposing forces at Combat Training Centers. In March 2004, he convened the 9th annual opposing force conference, whose theme was "Synchronizing the Worldwide Opposing Force Effort for Adaptive Threats." Opposing forces at maneuver Combat Training Centers now act 24 hours a day and present threats that Soldiers will likely experience in Iraq and Afghanistan; e.g., suicide bombers, terrorists, rifle-propelled grenades, and improvised explosive devices. At one center, opposing forces can now operate from caves and bunker complexes. All centers have increased civilian presence on the battlefield.

Similarly, as resources become available the Combat Training Centers are updating their capability to challenge units with Urban Operations. The intention is that every Combat Training Center training event will continue to increase urban operations conditions for the training unit, complicated by the presence of civilian role players on the battlefield. Furthermore, when a Combat Training Center is used to provide a Mission Rehearsal Exercise for deploying forces, the center works within available resources to replicate the actual mission operating environment. Mission Rehearsal
Exercises are provided at live maneuver Combat Training Centers for brigades and below and at the Battle Command Training Program for brigade headquarters and above. The Battle Command Training Program works closely with CALL and units in theater to ensure mission rehearsal exercises are “current.” A theater-focused Battle Command Seminar (an academic seminar) is conducted before each mission rehearsal exercise. A two-day urban operations seminar is conducted with all brigades prior to deployment. Because of time constraints, all Reserve Component maneuver brigade headquarters receive a combination urban operations / battle command seminar prior to their mission rehearsal exercise at a maneuver Combat Training Center. Mission rehearsal exercises make extensive use of Subject Matter Experts, of current in-theater personnel, and of the CALL database of lessons learned.

- **Direct Communications**

The information age has enhanced the ability for direct communication between personnel that have completed an operational rotation and those who are deploying for the same mission. Currently, Soldiers are using direct email and websites (both official and unofficial) to share information about recent experiences and informal lessons learned. Examples are companycommander.mil; XO/S3.mil; NCOTeam.org; FirstSergeant.com; Squad-Leader.com; and platoonleader.mil. The Army, as part of our Training Transformation effort, is working to establish a system of official sites and capabilities to support this individual sharing of information and learning and enable access to subject matter experts and other support mechanisms to create what we call network-centric learning. This learning goes beyond courses and extends to the individual in the context of their mission to create knowledge and distribute it. We are also working to enable knowledge sharing among individuals through establishing official communities of practice, communities of interest, and structured professional forums within a Battle Command Knowledge System.
Requirements to Solutions

- Army Strategic Planning Board Process
  The Army Strategic Planning Board (ASPB) was established on 14 September 2001, with the charter to manage the Army's rapid transition to a wartime focus as well as sustain the Army's continuing contribution to the security of the Homeland and the Nation's war against terrorism.

  The ASPB functions as an iterative and adaptive planning body to provide an integrating framework to organize and synchronize support for a global campaign, provide a bridge between national strategic guidance, national military guidance, and Major Command/Army Service Component Command plans and efforts, provide a linkage between near-term demands in the Year of Execution and Budget Year for resource realignment, and provide a framework for future planning and analysis that enables responsive risk mitigation.

  In order to support the Combatant Commanders, the ASPB recommends solutions to immediate requirements, anticipates intermediate needs, and puts sound thought into future requirements to win this war and to remain postured to succeed in other contingencies.

  When a unit identifies a need, they initiate an Operational Needs Statement in accordance with Army Regulation 71-9. The Operational Needs Statement is sent forward through the unit's chain of command for endorsement and is signed by the first General Officer in the chain of command. At this point, while the Operational Needs Statement continues formal staffing through the operational chain of command for assessment, an information copy is provided directly to HQDA, Requirements (DAMORQ) for an initial check to ensure the requested capability and operational concept is clearly stated.
Once the Operational Needs Statement has been endorsed and is received at HQDA, the requirements action officer begins working a solution to the requested capability. The action officer provides a holistic solution to the unit’s requirement by identifying the equipment to meet the required capability and by coordinating all required support such as training, structure, prioritization of fill, and redistribution. Actions are generally staffed within 7-10 days.

Once the action officer has completed the staffing, he or she presents the recommended solution to the Council of Colonels (DA staff). The Council of Colonels meet each Tuesday and review all actions scheduled for the Deputy Chief of Staff, G3 ASPB meeting on Wednesdays. Once briefed on the requirement and solution the Deputy Chief of Staff, G3 provides a decision on the action.

Deputy Chief of Staff, G-8 receives validated requirements for equipment from the Deputy Chief of Staff, G-3 and resources them to meet the needs of combatant commanders based on the Deputy Chief of Staff, G-3’s prioritization strategy. This strategy supports an equitable distribution of equipment in short supply. The Deputy Chief of Staff, G-8 resources the Army and combatant commanders with equipment procured from production, depot stocks, and redistribution from across the Army. Another source of equipment used by the Deputy Chief of Staff, G-8 in resourcing commanders comes from existing stocks left in the theater of operations. Generally, this equipment is in high demand and low density.

If there are not enough quantities of the required equipment within the Army, the action is passed to Assistant Secretary of the Army (Acquisition, Logistics, and Technology) who works through the contracting, testing, materiel, safety release, and waivers in an expedited manner in order to
provide the equipment. If the required equipment can be provided via redistribution of assets, the affected Major Army Commands coordinate the release of equipment in accordance with priorities established in the fielding plans.

The Deputy Chief of Staff, G3's decision is provided with the solution (resource) back through the operational chain of command to the unit. This accelerated process is generally completed within 1-2 months, whereas historically, it required 24-48 months.

Since its establishment, the Army Strategic Planning Board has developed recommendations for and has tracked over 500 discrete tasks in support of Combatant Commanders, obligated over $5.5 Billion to support the War on Terrorism effort, and synchronized the Department of the Army’s and Major Commands' planning and execution of their Title 10 United States Code support for the War on Terrorism.

The Army’s Rapid Fielding Initiative distributes a selected list of equipment to deploying Soldiers. The equipment list for this program currently includes items such as the Advanced Combat Helmet, weapons optics, improved boots, and other items that improve Soldiers' lethality, mobility, and force protection. Every Soldier deploying in support of Operation Iraqi Freedom or Operation Enduring Freedom receives this equipment either before leaving the continental United States or before employment while in theater.

**Improvised Explosive Devices**

The proliferation of Improvised Explosive Devices (IED) on the battlefield in both Iraq and Afghanistan has posed the most pervasive threat facing Coalition Forces in theater. The persistent effectiveness of this threat has
impacted unit operations, US policy and public perception. As a result, the Army Chief of Staff directed the Deputy Chief of Staff, G3 to form an IED Task Force to orchestrate Army efforts to defeat IED threats, recommend best available responses against IED threats, and direct the development and fielding of selected responses.

The IED TF was chartered to adopt a holistic approach focused on intelligence; tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTP); Information Operations (IO); and the tenets of assured mobility (protection, prediction, detection, prevention, neutralization). The goal is to identify and neutralize the enemy leaders, suppliers, trainers, enablers, and executors responsible for the employment of IEDs against Coalition Forces. Achievement of this goal requires development of a full spectrum analysis of IEDs that considers and applies multiple materiel, doctrinal, and training strategies to effectively counter the IED threat.

An IED TF Senior Advisory Group has been formed to facilitate this process by bringing to bear the expertise of organizations both within the Army Staff and Major Commands, as well as our Joint and International partners. This multi-Service collaboration of senior subject matter experts coordinates support, identifies and assigns responsibilities, and leverages resources across the DOD spectrum. The Army would like to see this focused IED effort evolve into a single Joint Task Force supported by a similarly focused strategic resourcing board that provides necessary resourcing allocation and policy development to ensure that all available resources and technologies are leveraged in a coordinated campaign to defeat the IED threat.

The Deputy Director, Information Operations (G3, DAMO-ODZ) serves as the IED TF Director and the Director of the Rapid Equipping Force (REF) serves as the IED TF technical director and lead for evaluation and
assessment of all materiel solutions. The primary elements of the IED Task Force include an Operations Cell, Field Teams, a Center for Army Lessons Learned (CALL) IED Cell, a National Ground Intelligence Center (NGIC) IED Group, an Evaluation and Integration Team, and CONUS Advisory Teams (CAT). Each of these elements has a specific role to play in providing the holistic response required to defeat the IED threat.

The Operations Cell, soon to be expanded with the addition of Army National Guard, Army Reserve and USMC personnel, coordinates all operational matters and provides common support functions to ensure effective connectivity between all Task Force elements. The key operational arm of the IED TF consists of the forward deployed Field Teams in Kuwait, Iraq and Afghanistan. Chartered to perform on-the-ground observation, information collection and dissemination, and IED training in-theater, these teams assist in collecting technical, operational, and contextual details relating to IED events and provide an immediate and vital link to theater intelligence and operations.

The information collected by the Field Teams is disseminated, not only to the Coalition Explosive Exploitation Cell within the theater of operations, but also directly to the National Ground Intelligence Center (NGIC) IED Group, the Center for Army Lessons Learned (CALL) IED Cell, and the Evaluation and Integration Team. The NGIC IED Group collects and disseminates IED information and intelligence, develops collection plans for the Field Teams, and provides specific IED information and intelligence for evaluation, while the CALL IED Cell focuses on collecting tactics, techniques and procedures and lessons learned related to IEDs, with the goal of rapid dissemination of information to Army forces, institutional training organizations, and Joint organizations. The Evaluation and Integration Team prioritizes potential solutions, provides recommendations for technical solutions to be explored or expedited, and is proactive in
threat evaluations. As appropriate, requirements for acquisition and fielding of available technologies are coordinated through the Rapid Equipping Force (REF). In coordination with NGIC and the REF, the IED TF continually assesses and tests technical and tactical solutions to fill capability gaps, to identify the most effective systems and best employment methods, and to expedite TTP development. We are continually seeking all viable options, both low and high tech, to defeat the constantly evolving IED threat. The focus of this effort is to identify, test and field technologies that improve our abilities to predict, detect, prevent and neutralize IEDs while protecting the force. Potential material solutions are evaluated according to maturity level, capabilities provided and operational needs to prioritize them for rapid development and fielding. Technologies being explored include electronic counter measures, biometrics, detection technologies and protective systems.

While materiel solutions play an important part in defeating the IED threat, battlefield experience has validated the fact that Soldier and leader training is the most important factor in minimizing the effectiveness of the enemy IED effort. As battlefield lessons learned are assimilated, the IED TF focuses on providing training to our own forces in the most current tactics, techniques and procedures being used by the enemy, and the best available US tactics, techniques and procedures to eliminate the IED threat. A primary effort of the IED TF is to prepare Soldiers and units, Active, Guard and Reserve, during pre-deployment training to face the IED threat. The Center for Army Lessons Learned is helping the IED TF to develop videos and other training materials to assist in keeping Soldiers current on enemy and friendly IED tactics, techniques and procedures.

To disseminate IED tactics, techniques and procedures throughout the Army, from schoolhouse to the individual Soldier, the IED TF CONUS Advisory Teams have developed a counter-IED training strategy and
associated training task list as the basis for its multi-echelon pre-deployment training campaign. The IED CONUS Advisory Teams travel to deploying units as well as Army institutional organizations to provide IED awareness training briefings and materials to support unit training strategies. These teams provide commanders the resources to incorporate IED awareness training into their pre-deployment training plans at collective training sites, unit home stations and in institutional schoolhouse curriculum. Using tactics, techniques and procedures derived from the latest lessons learned, these traveling teams provide a multi-echelon training approach that includes a Senior Leadership Overview (division to corps leadership); Unit Leader Training (battalion and Brigade Commander and Command Sergeant Major); Battle Staff Training (battalion and brigade level); and, Individual Soldier Training. This multi-echelon training is designed for early infusion in the training process and refinement throughout the train-up period. Units identified for Operation Iraqi Freedom III and Operation Enduring Freedom IV are currently being scheduled for assistance visits, as well as the Combined Training Centers, mobilization stations, and Army schools responsible for preparing them to deploy. A leave-behind component being developed for this program is a CD-based training package consisting of six modules designed to present current IED threat awareness and substantive training tips for Soldiers and leaders. Topics addressed by this product include defeating the IED threat to convoys, defeating vehicle-borne IEDs, battle drills training, and IED incident reporting. The efforts of the CONUS Advisory Teams (CAT) are closely integrated and synchronized with the Army's Combat Training Centers (CTC), Training Support Battalions (TSB) and Battle Command Training Program (BCTP). This ensures that the latest counter-IED TTP are quickly assimilated in the Army's institutional training base curriculum, providing Soldiers across the force with the best tools available to defeat the IED threat.
The IED TF continues to pursue finding new ways of training Soldiers to recognize and deal with the IED threat, to disseminate the latest information on enemy and friendly IED TTPs, and to seek new doctrinal and technical solutions for eliminating the threat. To this end a classified web site (http://iedtaskforce.army.smil.mil) has been established where the latest information about the IED threat and the best counter IED strategies are posted for ready availability to commanders and trainers. To ensure timely and responsive support to theater operations the IED TF continues to mature its quick assessment capabilities, facilitated by its Field Teams in Kuwait, Iraq and Afghanistan.

The IED TF was created to provide a rapid and effective response to a new and deadly enemy threat capability. This threat is pervasive and likely to be a component of the war on terror for the foreseeable future. To counter this long-range threat, work has begun on establishment of a permanent Army organization to institutionalize the efforts of the IED TF, expanding its future operational capabilities to support all Combatant Commanders wherever an enemy asymmetric threat may be encountered. In conjunction with this initiative, the IED TF will continue to promote multi-Service and Joint participation, ultimately working toward establishment of DOD/ Joint level oversight and synchronization of future counter IED programs.

**Lessons Learned Shape Training Requirements for Deploying Forces**

Army Major Commands that provide operational forces routinely update, in coordination with U.S. Army Central Command, their training guidance for Continental United States Active and Reserve Component units deploying to Iraq and Afghanistan. At Annex 1 is the current list of training tasks required by U.S. Army Forces Command for units deploying after 1 May 04. The updated training guidance identifies individual, leader, and
collective training requirements for combat arms, combat service, and combat service support units by echelon from squad/section/crew through division and includes training for combat and stability operations. Such lists are not all-inclusive, as commanders at any level may adjust tasks to this list to ensure their units are properly trained for their specific mission. Units use the websites maintained by the Center for Army Lessons Learned to refine their training.

Conclusion
Army processes for capturing lessons learned and providing solutions to employed and deploying forces is generally a success story. Ensuring that units receive lessons learned that apply to their mission is a daunting task, especially for some Reserve Component forces that have historically been resourced as part of the strategic reserve and have a higher preparation requirement to accomplish before deployments.

The major Army initiatives under taken by Chief of Staff, GEN Schoomaker, will go a long way toward enhancing the capability and readiness posture of both Active and Reserve Component forces as units rotate through operational deployments. Army efforts to rebalance the force will minimize involuntary mobilizations of Reserve Component forces within the first 30 days of a contingency and efforts to modularize the force with standardized formations will serve to establish better resource parity among rotating forces of all Components. Efforts to stabilize the force will provide predictability and mission-focus offered by unit life cycles. In all these efforts, the Army looks forward to continued Congressional support to achieve all these ends.
Annex 1. Forces Command Training Required by Deploying Forces

1. U.S. Forces Command units deploying to the Central Command Area of Operations after 1 May 04 will accomplish the training specified below before deployment.

2. Theater Specific Individual Training. Individuals deploying as part of a unit must be trained in the specific tasks below.

2.A. Country orientation brief to include a general overview of the political, military, cultural, religious, and economic conditions in the specific country. Information for this brief is obtainable at the CIA world fact book website at (www.odci.gov/cia/publications/factbook/index.html).

2.B. Anti-terrorism/Force Protection Training Level 1 Category 2 (medium to high threat area) IAW and to the standards stated in AR 525-13 appendix F. AR 525-13 may be accessed through the USAPA website: (www.usapa.army.mil/).


2.E. Weapons Qualification. Qualification with assigned weapon / weapon system IAW DA Pam 350-38 within 6 months prior to deployment date. Additionally, all units will ensure that Soldiers have been thoroughly trained on proper weapons clearing procedures IAW applicable operator and technical manuals.

2.F. NBC Personal Protective Measures.
2.F.1 (031-503-1035) Protect Yourself From Chemical/Biological Contamination Using Your Assigned Protective Mask
2.F.2 (031-503-1036) Maintain Your Assigned Protective Mask Replaces Task (031-503-1024, 1026)

2.G. First aid tasks to be trained.
2.G.1. Evaluate A Casualty (081-831-1000)
2.G.2. Prevent Shock (081-831-1005)
2.G.3. Give First Aid For Burns (081-831-1007)
2.G.4. Recognize And Give First Aid For Heat Injuries (081-831-1008)
2.G.5 (018-831-1032) Perform First Aid For Bleeding Of An Extremity replaces task (081-831-1016)
2.G.7. (018-831-1032) Perform First Aid For Bleeding Of An Extremity replaces task (081-831-1017)
2.G.8. (081-831-1026) Perform First Aid For An Open Chest Wound replaces task (081-831-1015)
2.G.9. (081-831-1033) Perform First Aid For An Open Head Wound replaces task (081-831-1034)

2.H. Unexploded Ordnance (UXO) and Improvised Explosive Device (IED) Training. Units that do not fall into categories listed in paragraph 6d may use the DA IED TF website resources to assist in planning this training (see paragraph 4.b).

2.I. Complete Common Task Training on all CTT tasks identified in ATSC Test Bulletin, for the current training year.


2.K. Individual Movement Techniques.

2.L. Combat Lifesaver (CLS) Training. Goal is to have one CLS trained Soldier per squad, section or team.

2.M. Combat Stress And Suicide Prevention Training.

2.N. All regulatory briefings specified in applicable Army publications:
   General Orders
   OPSEC / SAEDA
   Law Of War
   Equal Opportunity And Prevention Of Sexual Harassment
   DA Fraternization Policy

3. Theater Specific Leader Training. Individuals in leadership positions, deploying as part of a unit, must be trained in tasks below. These are the minimum requirements to ensure individuals in leadership positions are trained for combat and stability operations. The level of leadership to which these tasks apply may vary. Not all apply to all levels of leadership nor must every leader understand the same level of detail. For example, Perform Risk Management is applicable at all levels; however, Plan And Conduct Urban Operations may be a higher-level training task. This list is not all-inclusive. Commanders at any level may add additional tasks as required.
3.A. Understand the military, political, cultural, economic, and religious environment. Brigade and division leaders are encouraged to attend the five-day cultural awareness seminar provided by the Jordanian peace operations center. Coordinate through FORSCOM G3 Training Division.

3.B. Utilize An Interpreter IAW CALL Handbook #04-7 Interpreters Operations.


3.F. Plan And Conduct Urban Operations (UO) IAW FM 3-06.11, Combined Arms Operations In Urban Terrain.


3.H. Conduct Casualty And Medical Evacuation IAW FM 8-10-6, Medical Evacuation In A Theater Of Operations.


3.J. Supervise Traffic Control IAW TC 7-98-1, Lesson 16: Checkpoints

3.K. Cordon And Search IAW TC 7-98-1

3.L. Understand and/or develop unit SOPs that address: force protection postures, graduated response matrix, weapon readiness levels and security postures.

3.M. Unexploded Ordnance (UXO) and Improvised Explosive Device (IED) Training (See paragraph 4.B)

3.N. Crowd Control IAW FM 19-15 Chap 6 & 8

3.O. Combat Stress IAW FM 22-51 Chap 2, and Suicide Prevention training IAW DA Pam 600-24
3.P. Conduct Wheeled Vehicle Operator training IAW AR 385-55 and TC 21-305.

4. **General Collective Competencies.** Units should be trained to a P in competencies that are general in nature and inherent in a unit's normal duties and responsibilities. This requirement enables units to transition to offensive and defensive operations if needed. These include:

4.A. Gunnery and Live Fire Exercises. Meet the training readiness condition standards as prescribed by DA Pam 350-38, combat arms units will be qualified to Table XII standards. All CS/CSS units will conduct Collective Live-Fire Exercises (LFX), e.g. Convoy React To Ambush, Base Defense, etc. CSS LFXS will normally be conducted at platoon level. LFXs may be conducted at homestation, mobstation or at a combat training center and require AC OC/T validation.

4.B. Maneuver brigades will schedule level 1 thru level 4 DA TF IED briefings prior to start of collective training. MP and TC units exposed to significant IED threats will schedule level 1 to level 3 DA TF IED briefings. The DA IED TF has established a classified IED website which provides up-to-date information and lessons learned on IED operations. Briefing dates will be coordinated through CONUSAs or Corps to FORSCOM G3 Training. G3 Training POC is CPT Jesus Chong at DSN 367-5449 or LTC Ring DSN 367-6303. Additional training may be coordinated through the IED TF. HQDA POC is LTC Lutz (703) 697-5210 or SFC Lee (703) 697-0756 and units may get further information from SIPR website iedtaskforce.army.mil

4.C. Common tasks related to the units normal mission that the commander determines the unit needs to train on (i.e. an engineer platoon must be proficient in the collective tasks needed to perform the duties normally expected of an engineer platoon).

4.D. Mission essential tasks focused on offensive and defensive operations at the platoon level with battalion level staff proficiency in TF command and control tasks. Training tasks are identified below by echelon. The more complex tasks are defined by several sub-tasks.

4.D.1. Combat Arms

4.D.1.A. Team/Squad
- Team/Squad Movement (07-3-1180, 07-3-1270, 07-3-1279)
- Attack (07-3-1009, 07-3-1000)
- Conduct Link Up (07-3-1081)
- Patrolling (07-3-1108, 07-3-1153)
- MOUT (07-3-1279, 07-3-1406, 07-3-2036, 7-3-1000)
- Conduct Troop Leading Procedures (07-3-5036)
- React To Sniper (07-3-1406)
4.D.1.B. Platoon
- Conduct Troop Leading Procedures (07-3-5036)
- Conduct Maneuver (07-3-1180, 07-3-1270, 07-3-1279)
- Cross Danger Area (07-3-1189)
- Attack (07-3-1009)
- Action On Contact (07-3-1423)
- Breach Obstacle (07-3-1027)
- Break Contact (07-3-1054)
- Knock Out Bunker (07-3-13333)
- Assault Building (07-3-1000)
- Clear Trench (07-3-1036)
- Convoy Operations (07-3-1225)
- Conduct MOUT (07-3-1279, 07-3-1406, 07-3-2036)
- React To Sniper (07-3-1406)

4.D.1.C. Company
- Employ QRF (07-2-1387)
- Cordon And Search (07-2-1045, 07-2-1027)
- Defend (07-2-1045)
- Attack (07-2-1000, 07-2-1256)
- Guard/Counter Recon (07-2-1063)
- Support By Fire (07-2-3000)
- Conduct Breach (07-2-1477)
- Conduct MOUT (07-2-2054, 07-2-1261, 07-2-1351, 07-2-1378, 07-2-2054)
- Establish And Operate Cp (07-2-5090, 07-2-5135, 07-2-2032)
- Conduct Light/ Heavy Operations IAW FM 7-10, App-B

4.D.1.D. Battalion
- Conduct Command And Control Operations (07-1-5027)
- Defend In Sector (07-1-1027)
- Deliberate Attack (07-1-1171)
- Movement To Contact (07-1-1072)
- Plan Operations Using The MDMP (07-5189)/(Inf Bn/Tank And Mech Inf Bn Task Force) From Chapter 2 Of ARTEP 71-2-MTP
- Plan, Integrate & Conduct Ground & Air Operations (07-1-5009, 07-1-5018, 07-1-5135, 07-1-5190 *, 07-1-5135, 07-1-5162)

4.D.1.E. Brigade
- Conduct Command And Control Of Operations (07-2-1604)
- Plan Operations Using The MDMP (17-01-0005.07)
- Plan, Integrate & Conduct Ground & Air Operations (17-1-0005.07, 17-1-3806.07, 44-1-1050.07, 71-6-6006.07)

4.D.1.F. Division
- Conduct Command And Control Of Operations (07-2-1604)
- Plan Operations Using The MDMP (17-01-0005.07)
- Plan, Integrate & Conduct Ground & Air Operations (17-1-0005.07, 17-1-0005.07,
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4.D.2. Combat support/combat service support units must be proficient in METL tasks at level organized with staffs competent in MDMP.

4.D.2.A. Battalions And Groups
- Conduct Command And Control Of Operations (07-2-1604)
- Plan Operations Using The MDMP (17-01-0005.07)
- Conduct Information Operations (IO) IAW FM 3-13
  (http://www.adtdl.army.mil/cgi-bin/adtdl.dll/fm/3-13/fm3-13.htm)

5. Stability Operations Collective Competencies. Units must be trained to at least a P in the competencies CJTF-7 has identified as having significant relevance to units conducting stability and support operations (SASO). Again, EAD and EAC units need to train on SASO tasks they are reasonably expected to perform. Commanders should use results of pre-deployment site surveys (PDSS) and coordination with units being relieved to develop mission specific training requirements. Units will train these tasks to the standards indicated in applicable field manuals.

5.A. Squad/platoon level stability operations specific competencies.
5.A.1.A. Conduct A Personnel Search
5.A.1.B. Conduct A Vehicle Search
5.A.2. Observation Post Operations IAW FM 7-98, Chapter 4,
  (www.adtdl.army.mil/cgi-bin/adtdl.dll/fm/7-98/f798.htm)
  (www.adtdl.army.mil/cgi-bin/adtdl.dll/tc/7-98-1/toc.htm) (platoon only)
5.A.4. Quick Reaction Force Operations IAW unit SOP (platoon only)
5.A.5. Cordon And Search Operations IAW, FM 3-06.11, Chapter 14
  (www.adtdl.army.mil/cgi-bin/adtdl.dll/fm/3-06.11/toc.htm) (platoon only)
5.A.6. Urban Operations IAW FM 90-10-1 FM 3-06.11
  (www.adtdl.army.mil/cgi-bin/adtdl.dll/fm/3-06.11/toc.htm) (platoon only)

5.B. Company Level Stability Operations Specific Competencies.
  (www.adtdl.army.mil/cgi-in/adtdl.dll/tc/7-98-1/toc.htm)
5.B.2. Quick Reaction Force Operations IAW unit SOP
5.B.3. Cordon And Search Operations IAW, FM 3-06.11, Chapter 14
  (www.adtdl.army.mil/cgi-bin/adtdl.dll/fm/3-06.11/toc.htm)
5.B.4. Urban Operations IAW FM 3-06.11 (www.adtdl.army.mil/cgi-
        bin/adtdl.dll/fm/3-06.11/toc.htm). The commander determines which tasks
        the unit is to train on during mission analysis.
5.B.5. Establish And Operate A Company Command Post IAW FM 71-1

5.C. Battalion/Task Force Level Stability Operations Specific Competencies.
5.C.1. Liaison With Outside Agencies IAW FM 7-98
5.C.2. Plan, Command And Control Quick Reaction Force Operations
IAW unit SOP.
5.C.5. Media Relations IAW TC 7-98-1, Lesson 8, Media Strategy (www.adtdl.army.mil/cgi-bin/adtdl/tc/7-98-1/toc.htm)
5.C.6. Coordination Of Conventional And Special Operations Forces IAW FM 7-20, Appendix D.

5.D. Task Force/Brigade Level Stability Operation Specific Competencies.
5.D.2. Liaison With Coalition Forces And Outside Agencies IAW FM 7-98 (www.adtdl.army.mil/cgi-bin/adtdl/fm/7-98/fm798.htm)
5.D.3. Information Operations (IO) IAW FM 3-13 (http://www.adtdl.army.mil/cgi-bin/adtdl/fm3-13/fm3-13.htm). This includes:
- IO Considerations/Fundamentals In Urban Operations and SASO
- Prepare IO Section For Deployment
- IO Capabilities In OIF
- Develop/Provide IO Input Into IPB
- Provide IO Input To The Deliberate Planning Process
- Provide IO Input To Crisis Planning
- Conduct Effects Based Targeting For IO
- Cultural Considerations In IO Planning/ Execution
- Establish The Information Operations Working Group (IOWG)

5.E. Division/Corps Level Stability Operation Specific Competencies.
5.E.2. Liaison With Coalition Forces And Outside Agencies IAW FM 7-98 (www.adtdl.army.mil/cgi-bin/adtdl/fm/7-98/fm798.htm)
5.E.3. Information Operations (IO) IAW FM 3-13 (http://www.adtdl.army.mil/cgi-bin/adtdl/fm3-13/fm3-13.htm). This includes:
- IO Considerations/Fundamentals In Urban Operations And SASO
- Prepare IO Section For Deployment
- IO Capabilities In OIF
- Develop/Provide IO Input Into IPB
- Provide IO Input To The Deliberate Planning Process
- Provide IO Input To Crisis Planning
- Conduct Effects Based Targeting For IO
- Cultural Considerations In IO Planning/ Execution
- Establish The IO Working Group (IOWG)


6. **Exercises And Training Venues.**

6.A. Units will participate in a capstone exercise to demonstrate proficiency in the combat and SASO collective tasks in paragraphs 4 and 5 above.

6.B. Maneuver brigades will conduct MDMP staff training focused on command and control operations (paragraph 4) in either a CPX or FTX. CSG/ASG/CSB units will ensure that staffs are fully trained to track mission status in their area and to coordinate with subordinate units. Participation in a SIMEX as means for integrating entire staff prior to deployment is recommended where feasible but is not mandatory.

6.C. Maneuver brigades will conduct leader and staff training focused on urban operations in SASO in a LTP type event conducted by BCTP. Maneuver brigades schedule and conduct urban operations seminar through BCTP. Training audience is brigade commanders and staffs. Events described here and in paragraph 6.b may be combined.

6.D. Division and above commanders and staffs need to include increased IO and CMO into warfighter exercise scenarios to better prepare for deployment into theater.

7. **Coordinating Instructions.**

7.A. Divisions tasked to provide maneuver brigades as follow-on forces for OIF will provide their training plan thru their corps to FORSCOM. Plans shall include the timing and location of major events, resources required that the parent corps cannot provide, training tasks/events that cannot be conducted due to time/resource constraints, and an operational risk assessment based on training that cannot be conducted of the brigade's ability to conduct the mission.

7.B. All brigade sized units and above need to conduct a pre-deployment site survey (PDSS), if possible, prior to start of collective training for leaders and staffs to determine first hand requirements for their units. All
units will report PDSS dates to FORSCOM G3 Training And Operations for situational awareness. Any follow-on PDSS will also be reported. Units should attempt to conduct the PDSS with the unit they are replacing or in the area they will be operating within.
Mr. SHAYS. Thank you.

I wanted to hear all of your testimony. I am going to be gone for about 5 minutes and give Ms. Watson the chair. I will be back shortly.

Ms. WATSON [assuming Chair]. I want to thank all of you for your testimony and your brevity. We will carry on in the absence of the Chair but we don’t want to take you through a long ordeal. Our purpose here today is to find out how we can help and what it is that we need to pay attention to.

I have heard, as many of you have heard, that the people involved in the atrocities at the prison were untrained. They had not had the experience, most of them were young, and therefore their decisionmaking ability was not quite shaped. Any one of you can answer but maybe we ought to start with General Helmly and find out what kind of training would have taken place, did it take place in this instance, or were the military police of the 372nd Co. of the 800th Brigade just thrown into this situation and told to act as guards when their training was to be prepared to fight a more conventional and traditional way? General Helmly.

General HELMLY. First of all, the 372nd Military Police Co. is in fact organized as what we call a combat support military police company. That means that its primary organization, training and equipping is for general purpose missions, principally route reconnaissance, armored reconnaissance, convoy escort, rear area protection. Its parent battalion at Abu Ghraib and the 800th MPW Brigade were organized, trained, equipped specifically for IR operations. As you heard on the last panel, Lieutenant Colonel Novotny commanded a sister battalion to the 320th which was a specialty prisoner of war, detainee internment unit, specifically organized, trained and equipped for that purpose. So the 372nd was not specifically organized, trained and equipped. However, as you heard the young military police soldier from the Connecticut National Guard describe, his unit was a combat support, military police company. He described the training that he received which for military police soldiers of any specialization is extensive regarding the handling, the treatment, the security of detainees and prisoners of war.

I have reviewed the training of all three of those units involved. Prior to their mobilization, they did in fact receive training on the law of land warfare and Geneva Convention. At their mobilization stations as was described by Colonel Novotny they received additional training regarding Geneva Convention and I will tell you my view is that what we have witnessed is an abject failure of leadership and personal conduct. It is true there is an old Army axiom that a soldier never receives enough training and thus shortly after the report was briefed to me in February, I initiated a special inspection by our Army Reserve Command Inspector General of the training we received with emphasis on military police and military intelligence units across our force with emphasis on interrogation, detainee handling and security, leadership and ethical decision-making because I felt strongly and I feel strongly today that there was a fundamental lapse of leadership and ethical decision-making that went on in leadership channels and that lacked courage to stop these abuses.
I accept that training needs to be improved, it should be improved. We will never get enough. We will emphasize more strongly in the days, weeks and months ahead across our Army, not just Army Reserve, training in the law of land warfare and handling of detainees, and so forth but I reject any notion that a lack of training led to abuses that are this horrendous and this devastating.

Ms. Watson. Do you feel that this particular group of military police were adequately trained? Do you feel prior to even going this group had the kind of character that would be able on the spot to make the kind of decisions that we would hope our well trained personnel would make? We have heard this particular outrageous event described as an aberration. I have tried, I had to go home this weekend, I couldn't hardly get out of the airport because when they see us coming through with our little badges, that is why I took mine off, I didn't want to be identified. They stop us in security, they stopped us on the streets, what are you doing about this. So I am saying we are looking into it. We are finding the truth. Personally, I don't feel that the people who were involved did it on their own because what strikes me is how do they have the trained dogs right onsite if this was a flash reaction? They seemed to have all of the resources necessary, these ropes and duct tape and so on. Who supplied that for that kind of spontaneous, negligent reaction? So I am thinking did someone look the other way? I am going to repeat as I monitored the news what I heard and all of you have heard it is that those involved said they were directed by the contract interrogators and the military interrogators. So can you respond to how the resources got in their hands to do the atrocities that were committed and that we saw on film?

General Helmy. The kinds of resources that you cited are commonplace. I think you understand we use those for a variety of purposes.

Ms. Watson. The trained dogs too?

General Helmy. We use trained military police working dogs, yes. Those are not used for prisoner abuse, they are there to detect mines, explosives, to walk with military police, the walking perimeter guards around the prisons at night. They are an excellent tool used by all the armed forces for security purposes. In this case, the dogs were misused rather like using a simple broom instead of its intended purpose to hit or to abuse someone. So the kinds of things you cited were misutilization of common resources.

With regard to the word character, that in my judgment is the fundamental flaw. The Uniform Code of Military Justice provides an authorization for a soldier when they believe an order they have been given is illegal in nature to question that order. We had one simple specialist who had the courage to question an order and to report what he felt were abuses. That then led to this investigation with regard to the six or seven soldiers currently charged. There could be other charges brought for either administrative disciplinary action or further action under the Uniform Code of Military Justice. I would note that the investigations are not complete. General Taguba's investigation is complete, it has spawned others and further inquires are ongoing as a result of General Taguba's investigation. We will be relentless in determining how to prevent recurrences of this nature.
Ms. WATSON. Thank you very much, General.
I am glad you mentioned General Taguba's report because in
that report he found that the military police were never trained in
interment operations and his conclusion is inconsistent with what
you have just said to us.

General HELMLY. Yes, I think in that case he is referring to the
372nd Military Police Co. and I acknowledge that was a combat
support military police unit, not specifically organized, trained and
equipped for interment operations.

Ms. WATSON. I see. Are you saying that they were misused or
misplaced, they should not have been there?

General HELMLY. No, I am not saying that at all. They were as-
signed there because there was a shortage of the specialty units,
so they were assigned there. They are capable of fulfilling that role.
We had other combat support military police units pressed into se-
curity duties for interment and detainee security and none of those
units felt obliged, that we know of, to commit such atrocities.

Ms. WATSON. Apparently they were just substitute units that
were put in there and they said they never had the interment oper-
ations training. I would think any person whose conscience was
functioning would not commit the kind of acts they did. I don't
know what is going on here.

In terms of the dogs that are used and very well used and a nec-
essary component as you survey and secure, can anyone go in and
check out one of those dogs or do they have to go with the person
who trained them, can people who are brought in at the last
minute use those dogs efficiently and effectively, can they give the
signals that would have the dogs siced on a prisoner? How does
that work?

General HELMLY. We call those military working dog teams be-
cause there is a human handler with the animal. They are trained
by the Air Force at the same time at the same school and each of
the Armed Services employs them as teams. I could not go out or
you could not go out or another soldier not trained with that par-
ticular animal and cause the animal to perform its trained task.

Ms. WATSON. Then how did these military police have custody
and access to those dogs and get those dogs to act the way they
did? If they have to go out with somebody who has trained with
them, then how did they get into the hands of the people who you
saw in the pictures?

General HELMLY. We have military police working dog teams.
These are military police soldiers trained as dog handlers with the
dogs.

Ms. WATSON. So they knew exactly what they were doing?

General HELMLY. That could be attached to such a military police
unit. As I noted, they are frequently used for external security,
walking perimeter guard to detect people who would be trying to
infiltrate or to sabotage these operations.

Ms. WATSON. Would you explain to the committee what the rela-
tionship is between the contract interrogators, the military interro-
gators and the military police, the 372nd?

General HELMLY. Candidly, I am not qualified to answer that
question. I was not in command on the ground and in my position,
I provide forces to the combatant commanders.
Ms. Watson. I understand. Is there anyone on the panel who could respond? What we are trying to do here is to look at this and get to the truth so we can reorganize if we need to and we can correct the tremendous mistakes that were made. I want to know if anyone can respond, and maybe you can’t, why the person who was in charge of the prison was told that she could not be around when interrogations were taking place and why someone did not go in and monitor what was going on? I also want to know why there were photographs taken of these violations? Can anyone hazard a response?

Mr. Shays [resuming Chair]. Since the gentlelady is on her third 5 minutes, we will defer that question and allow that question to be answered, but I want to get back to the focus of this hearing and I want to be real clear about not losing what was said in the first panel.

I found it pretty difficult to think that I sent men and women into battle who did not feel they were properly trained, who did not feel they had the proper equipment and I want to know how you reacted when you had someone say basically, we didn’t even have enough ammunition. Walk me through that and have me understand how you reacted when you listened to the first panel. If we could start with you, General Helmly?

General Hanlon. I think in listening to Staff Sergeant SanchezLopez’s comments, I would like to think that those comments did not apply to any of the Marine units that were involved. Let me give you an example. All the Marine units that came back from Operation Iraqi Freedom from last year, and had returned by August 2003. We then found out this past November that we were going to have to go back into Iraq with a force of about 25,000 Marines, of which there would be a mix of regular and Reserve Marines. We made sure that all of those Marines, whether Reserve or regular, were properly equipped and properly trained for the mission they were going to.

Ms. Watson, I know you are from the district right outside of Los Angeles. Not far down the road from you at Riverside, CA, there is the former air base called March Air Force Base. We went there and with the help of the base, took over what used to be the old housing area there and put together a special training facility so that every single battalion that was going to go back into Iraq, Reserve and regular, went through a special urban training environment to walk them through scenarios and vignettes that they could experience when they were in Iraq. This is where the efforts of Colonel Exner who I introduced earlier was so important because his team which was embedded and had gone forward into Iraq, were sending back to us the kinds of things we needed because we were relieving the 82nd Airborne Division. So we were pulling down from our Army colleagues the things they were learning, we were transferring that very rapidly to the training our Marines were getting. That group of Marines will be returning sometime in the August/September timeframe.

Mr. Shays. General, let me say this to you. We have not had testimony that I am aware of, that Marines have said they were short on ammunition. This is where the efforts of Colonel Exner who I introduced earlier was so important because his team which was embedded and had gone forward into Iraq, were sending back to us the kinds of things we needed because we were relieving the 82nd Airborne Division. So we were pulling down from our Army colleagues the things they were learning, we were transferring that very rapidly to the training our Marines were getting. That group of Marines will be returning sometime in the August/September timeframe.
chase and maybe we can have that addressed. The Marines has its challenges but I guess that wasn’t one of them.

General SCHULTZ. I am responsible for the Army National Guard, as you know. I was surprised to find out that we didn’t have ammunition in theater. We have had spot shortages of ammunition here in the continental United States and General Weber can obviously get inside the detail, talk about the numbers and types of ammunition and so on. We have said as a priority units going to combat will have the preference for ammunition. So we have moved ammunition around the Guard, around some of our supply points so we can at a minimum prepare soldiers for their combat duty they are about to deploy to.

In terms of training, I listened carefully to the first panel and take significance interest in the tone of the messages and the themes that were mentioned by the panel members. Every unit is certified by a team outside the Guard as we prepare to deploy units into combat. When Guard units don’t satisfy minimum deployment standards, they don’t deploy. We have changed out unit leadership, we have changed out unit commanders, held up the latest arrival dates to be certain that our units satisfy minimum deployment, meaning combat readiness standards. When they don’t satisfy the standards, they don’t deploy on the schedules. So I take very seriously the issue that our units were in theater and felt they weren’t prepared because in my mind we had processes in place, systems in place, second opinion by a team outside the Guard channels to certify our units for deployment. What I learned from the first panel is we have some more work.

Mr. SHAYS. Any other comments?

General HELMLY. Sometimes old bad habits die very hard. Training didn’t start yesterday obviously, it started a long time ago, in the past, the first panel explained that the nature of the war we are fighting at the tactical level has changed, there is no secure rear area, we are fighting an enemy that is very adaptive and lethal and we found ourselves disorganized for it, soft skinned vehicles and not the right kind of weaponry, as cited in the first panel we did not have communications for individual truck drivers, and so forth, we were short night vision goggles. When we entered this war, our strategic guidance was that we were in a period of strategic pause, that we could take risks with near term readiness and invest in research and development for the farther out requirements.

I am exceptionally proud of the fact that the Army leadership has grabbed hold of this. Our current chief has been nothing less than a bull dog in terms of rectifying, as General Schultz noted, the shortages of individual body armor, shortages of ammunition. General Weber can speak to the details but almost $1 billion in the past 6 months was put into ammunition production and shortages of up-armored Humvees.

I will note though that it also requires an immense change in the way we think about things. Only in the last 2 years has Army Reserve Command training guidance focused our soldiers on the performance of warrior tasks in conjunction with their technical support tasks. In the past, the training guidance focused on technical training and no one really worried. I can go back in time where I
have had soldiers tell me I didn’t have training ammunition. I look at the allocation and the command didn’t shoot its full allocation of training ammunition. That is because our leaders were not doing their job and training soldiers for war. So we have corrected that.

I must tell you we have an immensely strong effort to train our soldiers and prepare them for close combat, all soldiers so that we do not repeat stories of 507th maintenance company again. That was a training failure of the first order. We do not intend to repeat those mistakes.

Mr. SHAYS. Thank you. General Weber, if you would respond?

General WEBER. Last year I had the privilege of being Assistant Division Commander for Support for the 3rd Infantry Division during its fight up to Baghdad. I can tell you that you are never well enough equipped to do what you think you are going to have to do in the next war. In spite of our best efforts, in spite of what we would like to do, the fact of the matter is when it comes down to correct resourcing and applying the money to buy those resources and ensuring that your troops have those resources, those are very complex issues as you know.

The 3rd Infantry Division in this case, all of our troops were not fully equipped with SAPI plates for example. With the limited amount of resources that were available to the division, we positioned those resources where we thought the threat was the greatest. We didn’t have everything we needed. The truth of the matter is you go to war with what you have, you don’t go to war with what you would like to have because sometimes it is not completely available. Up-armored Humvees, for example, we have a huge requirement for up-armored Humvees. It has grown over time. The current validated requirement in the theater is 4,454 up-armored Humvees. Currently we have 3,139 that have been produced and positioned toward the theater.

Part of our problem is the industrial base capabilities of our country to produce what we need. Because you apply resources in terms of money and funding to buy what you need does not imply that it is immediately available. This month alone, the production for up-armored Humvees will hit 220 vehicles. We have been at war over a year. Some would argue that perhaps we need to take another look at our industrial base capabilities. That production rate will rise to 300 per month starting in July and with the current requirements, we plan on producing 300 vehicles a month through March 2005.

The fact of the matter though is we don’t have enough up-armored Humvees today in the inventory to do what is required in the theater. As you heard earlier, SAPI plates and body armor has been taken care of but again, that took us time. The production capability was not there to get it to us when we needed it. One could argue we did not forecast well enough what we might have needed, but the current assumptions about how the war was going to be conducted and the assumptions we were using a year ago based on after operations have proven to be invalid to a certain extent we could argue and we have responded to that as best we could I think.

Mr. SHAYS. I appreciate your honest answer. I knew they would be honest but candid answers. It will be very interesting when the
story is told in the years to come what are the things that had unintended consequences. For instance, when we disbanded the government, the army and the police, in my five visits to Iraq, four of them with the military and outside the umbrella of the military, I had countless Iraqis tell us they would love to have guarded the hospitals and other sites. They also said there are bad people in the military and the police and in the government but most are very decent people. They would say to me, how would you have survived in Saddam's government, how would you have fed your family? That forced us to do things with our military.

When I came from Algute in a taxi and we were late getting to the green zone, I saw three Humvees in front of us and I said to the taxi driver, follow them, they are clearing the path. The taxi driver said, I don't know how he said it but it was in his language, like are you crazy. I am haunted by it now, thinking were they patrolling with no armament in their Humvee and you could see the tension in their necks. The driver had his left hand on the steering wheel and his right hand with this rifle across his lap with it on the trigger. I am thinking it shouldn't be like that, it shouldn't have turned out this way. It makes me want to know if the so-called best practices, lessons learned and so on, all the lessons we are going to learn I hope we have a real good analysis of this.

I will say again, I think one of the analyses should be you should be having more congressional oversight. There should have been Members of Congress walking that prison in September of last year. When I was in other places this time someone from Bremer's organization in the Babylon area said, Congressman, we only have seven people. I am supposed to have 100 and the Marines are leaving and the Poles are taking their place or someone else coming up to me and saying we don't have enough money, in September last year. These are things I could come back and raise questions. I am certain if you had members walking that prison, we would have seen maybe human waste being thrown at our troops and we would have raised questions about that but we would have someone come up and say, I am a cook, I don't know what I am doing here. I don't have the training that I need. That would have forced a dialog a lot sooner and we would have been able to break through the chain of command or somehow as you have all said, a failure of leadership. It is also a failure of Congress to not do its job.

Ms. Watson, you have 10 minutes for any questions you want to go through. She had a question on the table.

Ms. Watson. I want to get some ideas back from you. I don't understand the chain of command and what authority do the contract interrogators have. What is their relationship to the military personnel there and the military intelligence, those interrogators, what is their relationship to the Guard, to the MPs? Can someone respond?

General Helmy. I don't know, as I was about to say earlier, what instructions were provided.

Ms. Watson. I just want to know how does the chain of command work in that scenario?

General Helmy. That is what I am explaining. I don't know what guidance was provided to the chain of command. I will tell
you that I think all of us at this table are quite accustomed to working with contractors.

Ms. Watson. Let me clarify my question because I am not being clear. I would like to know does a private interrogator, contractee interrogator have a relationship to the MPs and if so, what is that? Who would tell the general who was in charge of determent and the prisons what to do and what not to do in terms of the interrogation? Where in the chain of command does this take place?

General Helmy. I don’t feel qualified to answer that. I think General Taguba’s investigation went into that. I will simply say that had I been in charge of that, I feel if I am in command, I am in full command and if you are a contractor or civilian employee, you work for me.

Ms. Watson. That helps. If you were in charge of prisons, then you would be in full command. Could you and do you and can you go through at any time and inspect and monitor what is going on?

General Helmy. I would have insisted upon that access and had I been denied that access by anyone, short of physical actions, I would have informed my superiors that they could no longer hold me accountable because if I am in command, I will go anywhere in the organization I wish to go.

Ms. Watson. Thank you. Maybe Lieutenant General Hanlon can address that same question too. Can the civilian contractor order the MPs to do something?

General Hanlon. I will answer that question by saying that I am deferring to my colleagues in the Army who probably have a bit more familiarity with that situation than I. I don’t have any at all but I will tell you, and I think the General gave an excellent answer a second ago when he said I think it is safe to assume that any commander any place, any time, anywhere where you have civilian contractors working for you, in the mess hall much less interrogators, ultimately are responsible to you as the commander for the good order, discipline and the functioning of whatever their job is. So I thought his answer was very good but I can’t give any more definition than that because I am really not familiar.

Ms. Watson. That is acceptable to me. We are just trying to get some things clarified. I was interested in the chain of command.

What obligations does the civilian-private contractor have when they come into say a prison to interrogate? Is there an obligation to report to whoever is in charge? Do they have to go through the personnel that is already there, the MPs? How does that work?

General Helmy. Contractors are not independent operators. I think General Hanlon addressed that part. They sign a contract to perform tasks for the U.S. Government. We have contracting officers, technical representatives and contracting officers representatives. The COTRs, I have been one of those myself and within the terms of that contract, I always gave them guidance, direction and instruction and insisted upon reports from them, visited their workplace and I think all of us have done that, not in my case with interrogators but again, with the exception of the function being performed, I would not try to administer such a contract any differently than I do with contract employees who do staff work for us here in the Pentagon.
Ms. WATSON. Is it a usual thing for the intelligence interrogators, the contract or military, to say to the prison guards, the MPs, whoever, soften them up. Is this something that is said when they are preparing to go into a situation, soften them up, and who would say that, and would the military police have to respond accordingly?

General HANLON. I am not in any way shape or form trying to dodge your question but I am not an intel officer, I am not a military police officer, I run the Marine Corps Combat Development Command and there is no way I can begin to answer that question because I have no idea what the authorities were or any guidance given in that particular case.

Ms. WATSON. All right.

General SCHULTZ. Ms. Watson, I have been in the Army over 41 years. I have not heard the term, never been associated with the use of that term. I also must clarify I am not a military police officer.

General HELMLY. I don't think any of us are trying to dodge your question but I believe the question is with any degree of clarity and accuracy, it is probably impossible for any of us to answer given the fact that none of us were there, none of us are military police and today do not run military police or military intelligence operations. I will simply say if someone instructed—

Ms. WATSON. Sir, I know you weren't there. What I am trying to find out and maybe somebody would come forward and let me know what the chain of command is in a prison setting. Who oversees, who orders people to do things?

Mr. SHAYS. Could the gentlelady suspend just a second, so we understand? I want the gentlelady to be able to ask these questions but I want to understand the expertise of the witnesses we have to make sure we are not tasking them beyond their expertise.

Ms. WATSON. Chain of command.

Mr. SHAYS. Chain of command is, I want to say, a very logical question that anyone should be able to ask. I just want to know in terms of prison guarding and so on, what expertise do you gentlemen bring to this issue just so we understand. Have you had those tasks during your time in the military? Who has so we know who to ask if any? Do any of you have that responsibility?

General WEBER. Sir, speaking for myself, no. I am an armored cavalryman by trade. I have very little to do with MPs and military intelligence.

General HELMLY. Sir, as Commander, I am responsible for the training of the U.S. Army Reserve but I have no direct expertise in detainee operations or interrogations.

Mr. SHAYS. But in terms of making sure you have people trained, that would be the closest we have gotten so far.

General Schultz and then I will let you get back to our questioning, just so we know.

General SCHULTZ. In our units, we have military police capabilities and we have soldiers in our subordinate chains of command that prepare them for their duty in theater including prison related work. I am not personally involved in the question you asked, however.
Mr. SHAYS. General Hanlon.

General HANLON. In my past, I have been a base commanding general. As a base commanding general, I have had military police work for me for the good order and discipline of protecting the military base and we had a brig aboard the base which did normal functions for what brigs are designed for, but I have not had any experience at all in any kind of facility dealing with detainees or prisoners of war.

Mr. SHAYS. I appreciate that you are trying to be helpful to Ms. Watson who is asking questions that all of us in Congress would like answers to. We are just trying to break the surface here and begin to understand. I am sorry, Ms. Watson. We will keep the clock running for you.

Ms. WATSON. I just have one or two more things. General Schultz, were there any Marine Reservists accused of shall I say violations within that prison setting?

General HANLON. You said General Schultz, did you mean General Hanlon?

Ms. WATSON. Lieutenant General Schultz.

General SCHULTZ. I am not familiar with any.

Ms. WATSON. General Hanlon.

General HANLON. Would you repeat that question?

Ms. WATSON. I understand that Marine Reservists have been accused of abuses of Iraqi prisoners. Are you aware that there have been some accused?

General HANLON. There were allegations from a year ago involving some Marines. My understanding is that all the cases are being adjudicated. In fact, I think in a couple of cases there are pending courts martial. Many of the charges were dismissed and I know each and every one of those cases has been under investigation. That is about all I know about it because it involved commands other than my own. My understanding is they have all been investigated and they are all being properly adjudicated.

Ms. WATSON. In this kind of situation, in a detention facility, who can command a Marine Reservist to treat prisoners one way or the other? Who is in direct charge of them?

General HANLON. You have a Marine, a rifleman, say he is a Lance Corporal and say this Lance Corporal is in a platoon in a company in a battalion in a regiment, so he has a chain of command. If he is a Lance Corporal, he will have a squad leader, a squad leader will have a platoon leader, a platoon leader will have a platoon commander, a platoon commander will have a company commander, a company commander will have a battalion commander, a battalion commander will have a regimental commander, so there is a set chain of command that Marine is responsible to every single day. If he is a Lance Corporal, he is probably reporting to a Corporal or to a Sergeant.

Ms. WATSON. In a detention facility?

General HANLON. In any facility. No matter where a Marine is located, he will have a boss.

Ms. WATSON. I want to focus on a detention facility, just say detention facility.

General HANLON. I don't know what that means, a detention facility. Are we talking like what?
Ms. Watson. I am talking about the detention facility in question, a prison, interment wherever. Who can direct a Marine Reservist?

General Hanlon. First of all, I would like to go back to something I said earlier.

Ms. Watson. Let me ask you, can a contractor do that?

General Hanlon. No, ma'am.

Ms. Watson. Thank you. You have answered my question.

General Hanlon. My understanding is that a Marine will always take his instructions from another Marine. I just want to say one thing, something I said in my opening comments. We don't make distinctions between Reservists and active duty Marine. A Marine is a Marine.

Ms. Watson. OK. Very good. I appreciate your response and I will try to figure it out.

General Hanlon. Thank you.

Ms. Watson. That is it.

Mr. Shays. Let me ask a question I have been very curious about. When I hear that mothers and fathers are buying protective vests for their children in Iraq, is it the same quality vest that you would see our own military have when they have their vest? Is it the same or is it something less than what the military could buy?

General Schultz. Mr. Chairman, the cases I am familiar with, they will meet a police standard for police operations here in the continental United States but will not satisfy a U.S. military criteria. It is slightly different.

Mr. Shays. Really what starts to happen is that if they have nothing, something is better than nothing but it doesn't in most cases meet the standard of the military?

General Helmy. That is correct.

Mr. Shays. First Sergeant Neill made four points. I would like to go through those points with you and get a response. He said, "We have a shortage of warrant officers who are the officer team leaders. It is my belief that this shortage could be filled directly from the senior NCO ranks where soldiers are forced out of the Army because of age, time and grade and time and service." Do you have any response to that comment?

General Schultz. Mr. Chairman, we have a shortage of 1,500 warrant officers in the Army National Guard today. The First Sergeant's recommendation is the very issue we are working right now. That would be to take from our senior non-commissioned officer ranks those soldiers that satisfy the skills to become warrant officers and they clearly could begin to fill those shortages that we have outlined here that come time of war, no doubt have to all be filled. So the point he raises, although he is an Army Reservist, applies to the Guard no doubt.

Mr. Shays. This is his second point. "Many years ago, motor sections, supply sections and communications sections were all moved from intelligence companies and sent to battalion level organization where their staffing was reduced and became ineffective. Maybe it is time to look at bringing them back to individual companies." What is your response to that?

General Helmy. Mr. Chairman, that is a part of the modified table of organization and equipment, the organizational structure
laid down by the Department of the Army. I would tell you that we are relooking every kind of organization in the Army under an action called modularizing our units. I have every confidence that will be relooked. Whether the Army will change that, I don't know but we are relooking the organizational structure of virtually all of our units.

Mr. SHAYS. Under the heading of mobilization, he said, “We were the prisoners at Fort Dix.” What was he driving at?

General HELMLY. He was pointing out that the installation Commander stated soldiers mobilizing there would be restricted to the installation. That was done principally for safety and security. We found that some soldiers were attempting to take a day or an afternoon drive too far after 16–18 hours of training and we were incurring accidents. So many of the installation commanders said, you have to stay on the installation.

Mr. SHAYS. How long a time before they were deployed were they at Fort Dix?

General HELMLY. I don't know for that particular unit. I will take that for the record and tell you how long they were at Fort Dix.

[The information referred to follows:]

The unit’s processing at Fort Dix lasted 63 days.

Mr. SHAYS. I have no comprehension. Are we talking a month or two or potentially many, many months?

General HELMLY. We had some units that were in OIF–1 that were stagnated in the flow of forces to the theater and spent 3 to 4 months at a mobilization station. I will tell you in those instances most Mob Commanders then tried to take action to provide for passes and that kind of thing in a measured manner.

Mr. SHAYS. I want to say I don’t know your reaction but I thought the panel we had was a thoughtful group of individuals. I felt they care about their job, they care about the military and want it to work better. They just want people to listen and that is one of the reasons I appreciated that we had all four of you taking the time to listen. It means a lot to them and it means a lot to this committee that you did that.

His fourth point was, “We also had issues with doctrine which would not allow us to task sources of information.” In other words, if an Iraqi told him something that was informative, he could gain passive information but he could not say, why don't you go back and see if you find this. It strikes me that it would have been potentially helpful to do that. What are the pros and cons of doing that and why didn't we allow it? Do you want to take a stab at it, General Hanlon?

General HANLON. I guess I did not hear that particular comment but I would only say to you that I would like to think since I am responsible for the doctrine in the Marine Corps and how we train Marines, I would like to think that under no circumstances would we ever have doctrine that would in any way, shape or form stifle the initiative of a Marine when it comes to getting a piece of information and acting on it. In fact, we encourage them to do just that.

Mr. SHAYS. He was basically saying sources did provide information for a variety of reasons but money was not available as an in-
centive. “We also had an issue with doctrine which would not allow
us to task sources of information. We would suggest but not task.
Sources do not need suggestions, they need directions. You ask
them a question and tell them to come back with an answer.” Does
someone from the military want to take a shot?

General HELMLY. Sir, I think General Hanlon made an excellent
point. We write doctrine to provide us guidance. Sometimes one
finds that it is interpreted more as dogma by some and I would like
to echo your remarks and agree with you. All of these service mem-
bers we saw, Staff Sergeant SanchezLopez and the three Army sol-
diers, all the officers and non-commissioned officers and the en-
listed soldier, all remind us of the immensely strong, capable, com-
petent, professional force we all have and are very proud of. In this
case, I took the First Sergeant’s remarks to mean that he felt he
probably had a shortage of money to pay informants from which he
could get information. I believe we are tackling that. We under-
stand, as our Chief has said, that in fact, we find ourselves fighting
a network when we are organized as a hierarchy and we have
found several times we have to go too far up in that hierarchy to
get permissions. As we find those cases, we are rapidly trying to
change those in order to adapt ourselves to this kind of battlefield.

Mr. SHAYS. To give some credit to the Army, General Patrayus,
when we met with him, he didn’t wait for the CPA, he just started.
He started to interact with Iraqis, he started to meet with them,
he tried to understand their culture, he did a lot of things that I
think Marines would probably take pride in as well, showing that
kind of initiative and not being held back by the doctrine, probably
taking a risk or two but I think made a very important contribu-
tion.

General WEBER. If I could comment, please?

Mr. SHAYS. Yes, thank you.

General WEBER. What General Patrayus was doing was not any
different than what any other unit was doing in Iraq immediately
after the war. All of us in the 3rd Infantry Division were doing the
same thing and if you go over today, battalion, brigade and even
company commanders are doing exactly what you described. They
are meeting with the people who are involved, they are trying to
develop the intelligence community and information they need to
fight the fight at their own levels and that is going on. That is
what we do, that is how we adapt to the environment and that is
what our unit commanders are responsible to do. I would like to
highlight that is what our Army is all about, we take the current
threat conditions, take the environment we are operating in and
adjust to try to get in front of the enemies and the threat.

Mr. SHAYS. Let me say this with all due respect, General Weber.
Having been there five times, there are some people that did it bet-
ter than others and he pushed the envelope a little further. I will
tell you that I know our troops were during the day fixing up the
schools and painting and cleaning them up and at night looking for
the bad guys. I know that happened, so I want to agree with your
general point, but what happened with General Patrayus is in-
stantly there were people waiting for CPA to do some of what we
said CPA should do. He just couldn’t wait and I think he started
the ball rolling a little sooner. I just want to say that to you be-
cause I met with a number of Army personnel and I was struck with the fact that he was pushing it a little bit more than others, but your point is extraordinarily valid.

One more point of our first testifier. He said, “Soldiers purchased much of their own equipment. They purchased cell phones that we used for communications, clothing, bug spray, CPS systems, handheld radios for in between vehicle communication, office supplies, transformers, refrigerators and coolers. Additionally, they paid for NTV vehicle repairs and purchased parts for maintenance for which they were not reimbursed.” It strikes me, I don’t want to say it is embarrassing, but it is good there was this ingenuity, but it strikes me I am looking at myself and Congress and saying where did I drop the ball or where did other Members of Congress drop the ball that this happened? Is it that things simply got out of hand?

I will tell you what I am wrestling with. I was chairing a Budget Committee hearing and we had one of the commanding officers accompany Mr. Wolfowitz or Mr. Wolfowitz was responding. I have great respect for Mr. Wolfowitz. It was mentioned that we might need 200,000 plus troops and it was immediately argued that we didn’t need as many, but I am struck by the fact that we overworked our folks. They got very little sleep, they worked morning, noon and night and I am just struck by the fact that it seems to me things got out of hand.

General Weber. If I could comment? You are familiar with the rapid fielding initiative and that was the result of the lessons learned early on from the OIF piece but also from the OEF lessons learned. What struck me about the previous panel was a lot of those comments were associated with the OIF–1 units that granted had some shortages, had some problems, etc. What I find interesting today is with the OIF–2 rotation, every unit that was sent, in theory but we try to make it happen, was fielded with a basic set of equipment under the rapid fielding initiative for soldiers to take care of some of those problems you just identified.

I would try to explain it to you that the Army has noticed a shortfall and a shortcoming and we have taken corrective action to try to field the soldier with the right equipment that he needs.

Mr. Shays. I will just make a point to you. It would sometimes be good to learn this from the command rather than from the field. We were learning things from what soldiers were telling their loved ones back home and so on. I think we need to have a lot of respect for each other and our capability to deal with this. We were learning in some cases indirectly and I think that is what is so unsettling about this whole issue with the prisons.

Let me close by asking you what is the point of the first panel that you agreed with most and what is the point you agreed with least? This isn’t a quiz, I know you must react and say, I don’t agree with that. If there wasn’t anything said in the first panel you don’t agree with, then I would like to know that or if you want to qualify it. I realize we have three Army personnel and one Marine, but is there anything you would like to comment about the first panel?

General Schultz. The first panel outlined for me the urgency of the equipping issues. You know we have been working this for
some months, years now and it has just come a little too slow to satisfy anyone, so I am reminded we just have to keep some issues on our list of priorities because we still have soldiers in harms way that are not as equipped as we would want them. This is after months of combat.

Mr. SHAYS. Let me respond to that and have you react. One of the challenges we know exists, because this committee has done work in this area, is that we have an inventory challenge. We can't do what K-Mart can do, we can't tell you where supplies are and so we sometimes have an overabundance of supplies, sometimes an under abundance. Was that part of the issue or was it we simply didn't have these supplies anywhere and was it in fact a money issue or just a backlog in orders, if you could respond to that?

General SCHULTZ. Initially, a little of both actually, a resourcing item initially and then we had a distribution problem with the body armor, probably had enough total armor systems in certain theaters and then we had sizing issues with some, so it was really resourcing. Then we had the industrial base that General Weber already talked about, so a combination of about three things.

As I listened to that first panel, the one thing they left me with was they all departed their areas of operations leaving the units to follow on in better shape which makes me feel pretty good even though we have a lot of work yet.

Mr. SHAYS. General Helmy.

General HELMLY. I would first of all highlight the remarks that Dr. Krepinevich made. I am mindful sometimes that it is difficult to appreciate the accuracy of the content of a problem if one does not appreciate the larger context within which it occurred. I thought Dr. Krepinevich gave an excellent outline of the immense change that the strategic context within which our armed forces operate has occurred. Beyond that, I found virtually everything that Colonel Novotny and the three enlisted and non-commissioned officers and the soldier spoke about to be compelling evidence of why we must be mindful this is the first extended duration conflict our Nation has fought with an all volunteer force because the immense quality of the Marine and the soldiers showed this committee today is proof positive that we must be careful as we operate and fight this war to maintain that force.

General WEBER. I think the comments about the equipping and the lessons learned were very positive. I think the Army is headed in the right direction. We have tried to identify some problems and problems were identified to us. In that sense, I think the previous panel was accurately reflecting the conditions that existed at the time they were deployed. I would hope if we went back with the OIF–2 units, some of those conditions would be different and our reactions to the OIF–1 problems have been ameliorated if not resolved in some cases. I hope we are on the right track there.

The only disagreement I would have is some of the comments previously about the combat training centers. The combat training centers have responded very quickly to the conditions and the environments that our troops are operating in both at JRTC at Fort Polk, NTC at Fort Irwin and CMTC at Hohenfels, Germany. If you went out and looked at those training centers, the operations groups and those responsible for training there are doing great
things. They are working hard with the unit commanders who are deploying into these conditions to set the right training conditions and scenarios and environments for them to get the most out of the CTC event.

Mr. SHAYS. Let me just ask you, because you brought up that issue and it is very related, the active and the Reserve components, do they interface in training? They interface on the battlefield but I am hearing that is one of the questions, that the Guard is rarely invited to participate in simulations in training opportunities with the active force.

General Weber. I will defer to my colleagues but from my perspective, we try to do as much of that as time allows and as the timing of the events permit as well. In some conditions, we work very well. The civil affairs community is always embedded in our rotations normally if they are available but we try to do as best we can with that.

General Schultz. We have an opportunity to train thousands of soldiers at both Fort Irwin and Fort Polk. Last year the schedule was simply so busy we couldn't send soldiers, we had them committed elsewhere, so there is an opportunity to train that we are not able to take advantage of right now.

Mr. SHAYS. But you would say there is value clearly in having the Reservists in there?

General Schultz. Absolutely.

Mr. SHAYS. General Schultz, this is kind of a curiosity but I would like to it on the record. When the National Guard units leave their equipment behind, what do they go home to?

General Schultz. In some cases, they don't have a whole lot when they get back to their local motor pools. What we are doing in the Army is moving equipment around, literally around the Army from the Reserve, from the Guard, from other places so that we reequip units with a minimum level of equipment initially. We have to redistribute equipment back into those motor pools where there is none.

Mr. SHAYS. Why do you say between the Reserve and the Guard? If they are doing the same role, wouldn't you also do it from the active?

General Schultz. Oh, yes. In fact, that is exactly our plan.

Mr. SHAYS. General.

General Hanlon. Going back to your original question. I think it was Dr. Krepinevich who talked a little bit about some of the lessons learned we have had over the last decade from the way the military used to train with the lessons we have picked up as a result of Iraq and the whole issue of urban environment. We have been concerned in the Marine Corps about fighting in cities for a long time. In fact, back in the 1996–1997 timeframe, our warfighting lab started doing a number of experiments looking specifically at combat in the built up area. In fact, the training I mentioned to Ms. Watson that we do out of March Air Force Base is really a result of what we learned back in the late 1990's and how we need to train Marines to fight in the built up area.

Fighting in a built up area is something you don't want to do if you have a choice but keeping in mind the latest statistic I think I heard is like 70 percent of the population in the world lives in
built up areas, one can assume somewhere, someplace if you are going to get into a fight you could well be in an urban built up area. In fact, you remember probably our former Commandant, General Krulak used the famous line of the three block war in which we used to talk about the difficulties of training and fighting in an urban environment. So this is something we have been focusing on for a long time, it is something we continue to focus on, our warfighting lab down at Quantico, and one of the things I have talked to my Army counterparts about. There is an Army General by the name of General Burns who has the Army equivalent to my command which is TRADOC command, is the need for looking in the future at building joint MOC facilities that both soldiers and Marines can use that will give a state-of-the-art, large training area we can put our battalions through and both take advantage of that. We are looking at how we might build something like that, say a 29 Palms or Fort Irwin so that both organizations can take advantage of that.

I will tell you something we focus on all the time and it drives a lot of the work we are doing on technology and special equipment to not only protect Marines fighting in an urban environment but to give them the fighting edge. I think you said in your comments earlier that you want to set it up so we always win.

Mr. SHAYS. I said it should never be a fair fight.

General HANLON. It should never be a fair fight, a great line, and that is precisely what we are trying to do not only through our tactics and techniques and procedures but also with our technology. We are doing as much as we possibly can and that is why the lessons learned that we are garnering from the experiences over in Iraq right now, I think will pay huge dividends for us in the future.

Mr. SHAYS. I will add that I think we owe it to our soldiers and our Marines, all our military, to help make sure they have some cultural sensitivity. Maybe I am speaking now as a Peace Corps volunteer, but it is hugely advantageous to understand the actions you take and how people react to them, just knowing their culture and so on. If in fact the battlefield will be in urban areas, there are a lot of women and children and others but it is nice to know their culture and how they react to things.

General HANLON. Absolutely right. That is part of the culturization and the training you try to give the Marines. When we were showing the House Armed Services Committee about a month ago how some of the new devices, the phrasalators that the Marines can carry, actually a little gadget where you can say something in English, hit a button and it will come back in the local dialect, things of that sort so you make sure you can communicate which is always the first step. Sir, your points are right on.

Mr. SHAYS. Any last comments before we adjourn?

[No response.]

Mr. SHAYS. Let me just conclude by thanking all four of you and your staff and say this is really an effort of the subcommittee as well as the full committee. We are working together on this. Sometimes the full committee has a hearing and sometimes it is the subcommittee, but we are all working for the same basic cause. We would like our National Guard and Reservists to be paid on time and the salaries they are owed. We would like them to be better
equipped. We would like the training to keep improving. We would like them not to be overworked. My big fear is that you are going to start to see spouses who are simply say, honey, I don’t want you, and it may be a man to his wife who is in the military. We lost one young lady and we lost one young man in my district and I am concerned the spouses are going to say, don’t sign up, don’t reenlist. I hope we are thinking that one through too.

Thank you all very much.

With that, this hearing is adjourned.

[Whereupon, at 4:25 p.m., the subcommittee was adjourned, to reconvene at the call of the Chair.]