    [House Hearing, 108 Congress]
    [From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]

      COMBATING TERRORISM: TRAINING AND EQUIPPING RESERVE COMPONENT FORCES

    =======================================================================

                                    HEARING

                                   before the

                       SUBCOMMITTEE ON NATIONAL SECURITY,
                       EMERGING THREATS AND INTERNATIONAL
                                   RELATIONS

                                     of the

                                  COMMITTEE ON
                               GOVERNMENT REFORM

                            HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

                          ONE HUNDRED EIGHTH CONGRESS

                                 SECOND SESSION

                                   __________

                                  MAY 11, 2004

                                   __________

                               Serial No. 108-211

                                   __________

           Printed for the use of the Committee on Government Reform

      Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.gpo.gov/congress/house
                          http://www.house.gov/reform

                                      ______

                          U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE
                                 WASHINGTON : 2004

    96-409 PDF

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                         COMMITTEE ON GOVERNMENT REFORM

                         TOM DAVIS, Virginia, Chairman
    DAN BURTON, Indiana                  HENRY A. WAXMAN, California
    CHRISTOPHER SHAYS, Connecticut       TOM LANTOS, California
    ILEANA ROS-LEHTINEN, Florida         MAJOR R. OWENS, New York
    JOHN M. McHUGH, New York             EDOLPHUS TOWNS, New York
    JOHN L. MICA, Florida                PAUL E. KANJORSKI, Pennsylvania
    MARK E. SOUDER, Indiana              CAROLYN B. MALONEY, New York
    STEVEN C. LaTOURETTE, Ohio           ELIJAH E. CUMMINGS, Maryland
    DOUG OSE, California                 DENNIS J. KUCINICH, Ohio
    RON LEWIS, Kentucky                  DANNY K. DAVIS, Illinois
    JO ANN DAVIS, Virginia               JOHN F. TIERNEY, Massachusetts
    TODD RUSSELL PLATTS, Pennsylvania    WM. LACY CLAY, Missouri
    CHRIS CANNON, Utah                   DIANE E. WATSON, California
    ADAM H. PUTNAM, Florida              STEPHEN F. LYNCH, Massachusetts
    EDWARD L. SCHROCK, Virginia          CHRIS VAN HOLLEN, Maryland
    JOHN J. DUNCAN, Jr., Tennessee       LINDA T. SANCHEZ, California
    NATHAN DEAL, Georgia                 C.A. ``DUTCH'' RUPPERSBERGER,
    CANDICE S. MILLER, Michigan              Maryland
    TIM MURPHY, Pennsylvania             ELEANOR HOLMES NORTON, District of
    MICHAEL R. TURNER, Ohio                  Columbia
    JOHN R. CARTER, Texas                JIM COOPER, Tennessee
    MARSHA BLACKBURN, Tennessee          ------ ------
    PATRICK J. TIBERI, Ohio                          ------
    KATHERINE HARRIS, Florida            BERNARD SANDERS, Vermont
                                             (Independent)

                        Melissa Wojciak, Staff Director
           David Marin, Deputy Staff Director/Communications Director
                          Rob Borden, Parliamentarian
                           Teresa Austin, Chief Clerk
              Phil Barnett, Minority Chief of Staff/Chief Counsel

     Subcommittee on National Security, Emerging Threats and International
                                   Relations

                    CHRISTOPHER SHAYS, Connecticut, Chairman

    MICHAEL R. TURNER, Ohio
    DAN BURTON, Indiana                  DENNIS J. KUCINICH, Ohio
    STEVEN C. LaTOURETTE, Ohio           TOM LANTOS, California
    RON LEWIS, Kentucky                  BERNARD SANDERS, Vermont
    TODD RUSSELL PLATTS, Pennsylvania    STEPHEN F. LYNCH, Massachusetts
    ADAM H. PUTNAM, Florida              CAROLYN B. MALONEY, New York
    EDWARD L. SCHROCK, Virginia          LINDA T. SANCHEZ, California
    JOHN J. DUNCAN, Jr., Tennessee       C.A. ``DUTCH'' RUPPERSBERGER,
    TIM MURPHY, Pennsylvania                 Maryland
    KATHERINE HARRIS, Florida            JOHN F. TIERNEY, Massachusetts
                                         DIANE E. WATSON, California

                                   Ex Officio

    TOM DAVIS, Virginia                  HENRY A. WAXMAN, California
                Lawrence J. Halloran, Staff Director and Counsel
                  R. Nicholas Palarino, Senior Policy Analyst
                            Robert A. Briggs, Clerk
                 Andrew Su, Minority Professional Staff Member

                                C O N T E N T S

                                  ----------
                                                                       Page
    Hearing held on May 11, 2004.....................................     1
    Statement of:
        Hanlon, Lieutenant General Edward, Commandant, Marine Corps
          Combat Development Command; Lieutenant General Roger C.
          Schultz, Director, Army National Guard; Lieutenant General
          James R. Helmly, Chief, Army Reserve; and Brigadier General
          Louis W. Weber, Director of training, U.S. Army............    83
        Neill, First Sergeant Gerald G., 323 Military Intelligence
          Battalion, U.S. Army Reserve, Maryland; Staff Sergeant Juan
          SanchezLopez, 2nd Battalion 23rd Marines, Reserves;
          Specialist Michael Tanguay, 143rd Military Police Co.,
          National Guard, Connecticut; Lieutenant Colonel Steve J.
          Novotny, 530th Military Police Battalion, U.S. Army
          Reserve, Nebraska; Andrew F. Krepinevich, executive
          director, Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments;
          and Major General (ret.) Richard C. Alexander, president,
          National Guard Association of the United States, Center for
          Strategic and Budgetary Assessments........................     6
    Letters, statements, etc., submitted for the record by:
        Alexander, Major General (ret.) Richard C., president,
          National Guard Association of the United States, Center for
          Strategic and Budgetary Assessments, prepared statement of.    57
        Hanlon, Lieutenant General Edward, Commandant, Marine Corps
          Combat Development Command, prepared statement of..........    85
        Helmly, Lieutenant General James R., Chief, Army Reserve:
            Information concerning processing days...................   156
            Prepared statement of....................................   106
        Krepinevich, Andrew F., executive director, Center for
          Strategic and Budgetary Assessments, prepared statement of.    41
        Neill, First Sergeant Gerald, 323 Military Intelligence
          Battalion, U.S. Army Reserve, Maryland, prepared statement
          of.........................................................     9
        Novotny, Lieutenant Colonel Steve J., 530th Military Police
          Battalion, U.S. Army Reserve, Nebraska, prepared statement
          of.........................................................    31
        SanchezLopez, Staff Sergeant Juan, 2nd Battalion 23rd
          Marines, Reserves, prepared statement of...................    16
        Schultz, Lieutenant General Roger C., Director, Army National
          Guard, prepared statement of...............................    98
        Shays, Hon. Christopher, a Representative in Congress from
          the State of Connecticut, prepared statement of............     4
        Tanguay, Specialist Michael, 143rd Military Police Co.,
          National Guard, Connecticut, prepared statement of.........    22
        Weber, Brigadier General Louis W., Director of training, U.S.
          Army, prepared statement of................................   120

      COMBATING TERRORISM: TRAINING AND EQUIPPING RESERVE COMPONENT FORCES

                                  ----------

                             TUESDAY, MAY 11, 2004

                      House of Representatives,
    Subcommittee on National Security, Emerging Threats
                           and International Relations,
                                Committee on Government Reform,
                                                        Washington, DC.
        The subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 1 p.m., in
    room 2154, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Edward Schrock
    (acting chairman of the subcommittee) presiding.
        Present: Representatives Schrock, Shays and Watson.
        Staff present:: Lawrence Halloran, staff director and
    counsel; R. Nicholas Palarino, senior policy analyst; Robert A.
    Briggs, clerk; Richard Lundberg, detailee; Kristin Amerling and
    Andrew Su, minority professional staff members; Jeff Baran,
    minority counsel; and Jean Gosa, minority clerk.
        Mr. Schrock. This hearing will come to order.
        A quorum being present, the Subcommittee on National
    Security, Emerging Threats and International Relations hearing
    entitled, ``Combating Terrorism: Training and Equipping Reserve
    Component Forces'' is called to order.
        Let me first thank all the witnesses for their time today
    in helping us address and improve a program that is vital to
    the men and women who put themselves in harms way for our
    country. As one of just a handful of military retirees serving
    in Congress, I believe I have a unique perspective and
    sensitivity to this issue.
        This war in Iraq and against terrorism has been personal to
    me since the beginning and has hit home in a very real way in
    the past few weeks with the deaths of military members from the
    district I am privileged to represent. I am sure I do not need
    to tell any of today's witnesses that it makes no difference to
    the enemy whether or not you are active duty or a Guard or
    Reservist. All of these men and women are placed in harms way
    without prejudice. Clearly it is our duty to ensure each and
    every soldier, airman, sailor, Marine and Coast Guardsman,
    regardless of active or reserve status is adequately equipped,
    trained and prepared to the highest degree possible to enter
    any war zone be it in Iraq, Afghanistan or anywhere we find our
    folks in harms way. Anything else is simply unacceptable.
        I recognize that utilization of the Guard and the Reserve
    military is at a pace we have not experienced in over 50 years.
    This has put tremendous pressure on the Pentagon to make
    everything come together. I also recognize we have had major
    obstacles in meeting these requirements, that many have been
    overcome, but that still more remain.
        I look forward to hearing from these witnesses today on
    what remains to be accomplished, and what recommendations they
    have to better help us meet these needs. I certainly expect
    they will address whatever inadequacies remain and explain what
    has been done or is being done to rectify such issues.
        I would like to recognize the chairman of this
    subcommittee, Mr. Shays, for any opening comments he might
    have.
        Mr. Shays. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        National Guard and reserve units collectively called
    ``Reserve Component forces'' constitute an indispensable
    element of our national military power. No longer a rarely
    called upon supplement to the active force, they bring skills
    and specialties integral to modern warfare fighting, post-
    conflict stabilization and peacekeeping.
        It appears many RC units, still find themselves at the
    short end of the supply chain unable to train as they fight for
    new and evolving missions in challenging environments.
    Shortages of first-quality body armor, too few shielded
    Humvees, and limited pre-mobilization access to mission-
    specific training facilities have challenged Guard and Reserve
    unit effectiveness and put men and women at risk.
        We asked RC veterans of recent deployments and their
    Pentagon leadership to describe how the hard-won lessons from
    today's dynamic conflicts are applied to the equipment and
    training needs of the total force, particularly the Guard and
    Reserves. We asked how doctrine tactics and material are being
    adapted so deploying forces will be protected and will prevail
    against improvised explosive devices and other emerging
    threats.
        Ironically, the military occupational specialties like
    civil affairs, once regulated by cold war planners to Reserve
    component units, are proving essential on the front lines
    today. The policing skills many civilians bring to their
    military duties are in high demand on city streets from here to
    Baghdad. These units no longer are an extra element of the
    force package, but highly valuable and perishable assets that
    should be as well supported and judiciously deployed as their
    active duty components.
        Rick helped teach us that lesson. Army Reserve Staff
    Sergeant Richard S. Eaton, Jr., from Guilford, CT, voluntarily
    deployed to the Iraqi theater with the 323rd Military
    Intelligence Battalion. Before he died from apparent heat-
    related causes last August, he wrote to ask why members of his
    unit were activated twice in 2 years without required time at
    home? Why were RC personnel deemed ``mission essential,''
    rushed to Kuwait only to find there was no mission? Meanwhile,
    was homeland security needlessly put at risk by their departure
    from the police departments, law enforcement units and
    intelligence agencies they left behind? His service, his
    dedication, his sacrifice compel us to pursue his questions
    about the preparation and tasking of the many thousands of men
    and women like Rick who put their Nation first and have every
    right to expect their national military leadership to
    reciprocate.
        This hearing is part of a sustained examination of National
    Guard and Reserve readiness issues by the Government Reform
    Committee. Past reports and testimony brought needed attention
    to mobilization pay errors, medical screening and structural
    strains caused by growing tensions between RC units' global
    combat and homeland security missions.
        As is our practice, we will hear first from veterans
    service members whose personal experiences and insights always
    prove invaluable to our oversight. We deeply appreciate that
    our distinguished second panel of Pentagon witnesses agreed to
    waive their customary right to open the hearing. Thanks to
    their forbearance, our subsequent discussion will be better
    grounded and more meaningful.
        Thank you all for being here. We look forward to hearing
    your testimony.
        [The prepared statement of Hon. Christopher Shays follows:]

        [GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED]

        [GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED]

        Mr. Schrock. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        It is customary that we swear our witnesses if you will
    please rise.
        [Witnesses sworn.]
        Mr. Schrock. Our first panel members this afternoon are:
    First Sergeant Gerald Neill, 323 Military Intelligence
    Battalion, U.S. Army Reserve, Maryland; Staff Sergeant Juan
    SanchezLopez, 2nd Battalion 23rd Marines, Reserves; Specialist
    Michael Tanguay, 143rd Military Police Co., National Guard from
    the chairman's home State of Connecticut; Lieutenant Colonel
    Steve J. Novotny, 530th Military Police Battalion, U.S. Army
    Reserve, Nebraska; our good friend Dr. Andrew F. Krepinevich,
    Executive Director, Center for Strategic and Budgetary
    Assessments; and Major General (Ret.) Richard C. Alexander,
    president, National Guard Association of the United States,
    Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments. We are
    delighted to have all of you here.
        First Sergeant Neill, the floor is yours.

      STATEMENTS OF FIRST SERGEANT GERALD G. NEILL, 323 MILITARY
      INTELLIGENCE BATTALION, U.S. ARMY RESERVE, MARYLAND; STAFF
        SERGEANT JUAN SANCHEZLOPEZ, 2ND BATTALION 23RD MARINES,
      RESERVES; SPECIALIST MICHAEL TANGUAY, 143RD MILITARY POLICE
     CO., NATIONAL GUARD, CONNECTICUT; LIEUTENANT COLONEL STEVE J.
     NOVOTNY, 530TH MILITARY POLICE BATTALION, U.S. ARMY RESERVE,
    NEBRASKA; ANDREW F. KREPINEVICH, EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR, CENTER FOR
     STRATEGIC AND BUDGETARY ASSESSMENTS; AND MAJOR GENERAL (RET.)
    RICHARD C. ALEXANDER, PRESIDENT, NATIONAL GUARD ASSOCIATION OF
         THE UNITED STATES, CENTER FOR STRATEGIC AND BUDGETARY
                              ASSESSMENTS

        Sergeant Neill. I would like to begin my testimony with a
    silent moment recognizing the loss of life of our service
    members in Iraq. I want to particularly recognize Staff
    Sergeant Richard S. Eaton, Jr., from Bravo Co. 323 Military
    Intelligence Battalion, U.S. Army Reserves. He was a soldier
    and my friend, and he died in Iraq.
        [Moment of silence.]
        Sergeant Neill. Thank you for this opportunity to testify
    before you here today. You have my written testimony and I have
    to limit my time so I can only give you the highlights.
        I am a First Sergeant from Bravo Co. 323 Military
    Intelligence Battalion. I have 30 years of service. I have
    experience in team building, unit building and training. I have
    spent many years of working and developing sources and
    information in the Metropolitan Police Department in
    Washington, DC.
        MI units work as teams. Solid teams contain a mix of young
    soldiers fresh from school and older soldiers, some with
    previous job skills with infantry training, motor training,
    supply, drill sergeants, communications, civilian street police
    experience are excellent pluses to any team. In the field in
    intense situations, they are the ones who stand above and carry
    the team to safety. We have a shortage of sworn officers who
    are their officer team leaders and they are the officer team
    builders.
        I believe soldiers fight as they train and that every Army
    trains for the next war based upon lessons learned from the
    last. If we accept this, we must look at training in two ways,
    premobilization which is basic training, military occupation
    skills, leadership training and unit training and second,
    mobilization. Pre-mobilization training is adequate except at
    the unit training level. Unit training and annual training time
    is too often used up with administrative functions or other
    distractions. Here is where team building takes place. Six
    soldiers make a team and these teams may deploy in either
    tactical or non-tactical situations.
        A major problem for us was vehicle care and use
    requirements that take up one quarter of a drill weekend. The
    stated time allotment would more than double if the driver
    requirements were followed to the letter. Our unit avoided this
    requirement by turning our vehicles into sites and since we
    didn't have our vehicles, we did not have our radios and they
    were not mounted. Radio communication was a major problem for
    us in Iraq. While active duty units came to the theater with
    satellite phones and can use them for communications, we had
    none. Many years ago motor sections, com sections were all
    moved from military intelligence companies and sent to
    battalion levels. Their staffing was reduced and they became
    ineffective. Maybe it is time to look at bringing them back to
    the company level.
        Weapons training from our reserve unit was completely
    inadequate due to ammo shortage for the past 3 years. Weapons
    training at the mobilizationsite was only marginal and only
    marginally prepared soldiers to be effective and use their
    weapons. Equipment shortages were extremely problematic. Short
    call-up and mobilization times further impacted supply
    problems. Consequently, soldiers deployed without insect
    protection measures, bug juice, insect netting needed to endure
    the harsh environment. At one point in Iraq while we were
    waiting for a mission to start, heat stroke and illness
    exhausted the ability of a local aid station to support us and
    I had to send half of my unit to the hospital for treatment and
    recovery. Many soldiers fell ill when preventive measures were
    known but not provided.
        Mobilization, we were the prisoners of Fort Dix. Army
    Reservists could not leave post and this was a bitter pill to
    swallow for many Reservists and they still speak ill of it now.
    Unit sponsorship was nonexistent. Stepchildren receive better
    care from their sponsors than we did.
        The best training we received in-theater was action on
    contact where soldiers went through simulated combat drills,
    conducting our vehicles in desert conditions. We set up our
    vehicles, mounted our M-60 machine guns on improvised plywood
    platforms and aligning the bottom of our vehicles with sand
    bags. These teams were prepared to move to the field in two
    vehicle convoys.
        In August, some 8 months after our activation we assumed
    our original mission. We replaced the Marines. They left us
    with much needed equipment not available to our organic MI
    chain of command but the Marines proved it was needed to be
    successful in our operations. They left us non-tactical
    vehicles which allowed us quicker traveling speeds in the 55 to
    60 miles a hour tactical vehicles move at. They did not alert
    the Iraqi citizens that they were coming as the motor sound of
    the Humvee truly earned its name. You can hear it a long ways
    off. We varied our speeds on highways, change of lanes as we
    approached bridges and not let anyone pass us once we were on
    the highway.
        Our job is to know the enemy. It is their job to know us.
    We presented the appearance of a battle ready element. Every
    team had a heavy machine gun as well as automatic rifles,
    handguns and grenades. We looked at everyone who looked at us.
    We considered everyone a potential threat until we knew
    otherwise. What I learned as a policeman is to watch people as
    you drive into bad neighborhoods. If they start running or
    start moving quickly when they see you, that is not a good
    sign. It is a good sign that something is amiss. I passed this
    to my soldiers.
        Soldiers purchased much of their own equipment. They paid
    for vehicle repairs, purchased maintenance parts for which they
    were not reimbursed and stated as an aside, we left an Iraqi
    mechanic holding an $1,100 bill for vehicle repairs and I am
    not sure the bill was ever paid.
        In terms of intelligence operations, intelligence
    contingency funds were not available to us until just prior to
    redeployment to the States. Sources did provide information for
    a variety of reasons but money was not available as an
    incentive. We all had issues with doctrine that would not allow
    us to task sources for information. We could suggest but not
    task. Sources do not need suggestions, they need direction. You
    ask them a question and tell them to come back with the answer.
        One final point deals with sources and I will be brief.
    Sources provide information expecting to see action. If they do
    not see action, they lose faith in us and quit providing
    information. In a country where explosive devices litter the
    landscape, the best way to stop roadside bombings is to act on
    information provided by sources as to the old who, what, where,
    when and how can I catch them questions.
        In closing, we arrived as a unit and returned as a unit. We
    fought for just about every living and working space we had in
    Iraq and we left our replacements in improved living and
    working conditions. Let me say that I took what I consider the
    best trained, best qualified soldiers any Nation can offer to
    war. They did an outstanding job and I am proud of them.
    Additionally, I know they are proud of themselves and their
    service to our great Nation.
        Thank you and I will answer any questions you have.
        [The prepared statement of Sergeant Neill follows:]

        [GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED]

        [GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED]

        [GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED]

        [GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED]

        [GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED]

        [GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED]

        Mr. Schrock. Sergeant, thank you for your testimony and
    thank you for saying the nice things you say about your men and
    women. We know that to be true and I think the whole country
    does.
        Staff Sergeant SanchezLopez, thank you for being here and
    the floor is yours.
        Sergeant SanchezLopez. My name is Staff Sergeant
    SanchezLopez, a member of the 2nd Battalion, 23rd Marines, U.S.
    Marine Corps Reserve located in Encino, CA.
        I was mobilized in support of Operation Enduring Freedom
    and reported to Camp Pendleton, CA where I served for 13
    months. My unit was deployed with Regimental Combat Team I, 1st
    Marine Division in support of Operation Iraqi Freedom on
    February 2003 for an additional 4 months and returned to the
    United States in May 2003. I served on active duty for a total
    of 24 months. Prior to serving in the Reserves, I served on
    active duty for 8 years and I have been in the Reserves for 4
    years. My military occupation specialty is Motor Transportation
    Chief.
        My unit was not involved in fighting the insurgents but we
    did change our fighting tactics based on how the enemy was
    fighting us. Our roadblock procedure was one of the biggest
    changes, based on the intelligence reports we conducted our
    roadblocks. The change was based on information from Marine
    regiments, from RCT2. Marines changed their tactics once they
    entered Baghdad. These changes involved convoy procedures. At
    the time we stopped allowing Iraqis civilian vehicles from
    passing and mixing in our convoys. This was due to reports of
    attacks on convoys from passing vehicles.
        Our battalion recently completed a battalion field exercise
    in which we incorporated the lessons we learned from the war in
    our training. Some of these lessons were convoy procedures and
    local security. My unit participated in the same training as
    our active duty counterparts at Camp Pendleton. Prior to
    deploying from the United States to Kuwait, we served on active
    duty 13 months prior to departing the United States in support
    of Enduring Freedom. One of our equipment difficulties was we
    did not know prior to crossing from Kuwait to Iraq where we
    would be equipped with amtracks or trucks. We didn't find out
    until a week prior to the ground offensive which we changed our
    tactics to how we were going to employ that.
        I would like to thank all the members of this committee for
    allowing me to speak. I hope my testimony will assist in
    answering any questions you may have.
        Thank you.
        [The prepared statement of Sergeant SanchezLopez follows:]

        [GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED]

        [GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED]

        [GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED]

        Mr. Schrock. It does and it will and we thank you for
    serving.
        Specialist Tanguay, welcome.
        Specialist Tanguay. Mr. Chairman and members of the
    committee, thank you and good afternoon.
        My name is Specialist Michael Tanguay, a member of the
    143rd Military Police Co., a National Guard Unit out of
    Hartford, CT which was mobilized February 7, 2003 in support of
    Operation Iraqi Freedom. I have been invited here today to
    testify before you in regard to my experience with pre-
    deployment and deployment to Iraq as it pertains to the
    training and equipment we received. I thank you for this
    opportunity. It is the intent of my testimony today to provide
    you with the curriculum of training we received prior to and
    during our deployment, equipment issues we faced and most
    importantly, lessons we have learned. The goals I have set for
    myself and present to this committee in testifying here before
    you will aid in rectifying known problems and potential trouble
    spots coupled with insight to the lessons we have learned.
        In preparation for deployment, my unit moved to Fort Drum,
    NY for a train-up mission. It is here where we received 2
    months of theater-specific training ranging from Arabic
    language lessons to convey security operations. As a military
    police combat support unit, we have a wide range of missions we
    can perform. Facing the uncertainty of war, we did not know our
    specific mission, so we took the time to review all standard
    operating procedures for each mission or task that we could
    face.
        We performed several live fire exercises that sharpened our
    marksmanship skills and refamiliarized ourselves with each
    weapons system. Mine awareness and unexploded ordinance classes
    were conducted. However, improvised explosive devices did not
    surface until we were once in theater. Medical aid, urban
    warfare tactics, patrol techniques, prisoner of war detainee
    doctrine, area security operations and convoy security
    procedures were key classes conducted that ultimately benefited
    us during our deployment.
        The 2-month train-up phase of the deployment provided ample
    time to train and become a unified fighting machine. However,
    poor time management skills, severe logistical issues and
    improper equipment prevented us from training the way we ended
    up fighting. This motto of train the way we fight highly
    adopted by my unit is a foundational building block of a
    training curriculum. Nonetheless, without the proper equipment
    at our training site, in preparing for a desert climate while
    bundled in three layers of winter clothing, and mismanagement
    of precious training time turned into a last minute dash to get
    up to speed in preparing for war.
        The deficiency of the highly sought after unarmored Humvee
    and interceptor vests, lack of training and time at the mock
    urban warfare town, and unintentional misguided operational
    procedures for various mission tasks proved to be key lessons
    learned and areas to improve. More time spent at the mock urban
    warfare town would have proved extremely beneficial in building
    clearing techniques, possible ambush situations and civilian
    considerations on the battlefield. Our unit spent 2 days out of
    the 2-months at this training site. Time is extremely precious
    in preparing for war but a 2-week minimum at the site would
    have proved extremely beneficial.
        Unintentional misguided operational procedures placed us at
    a temporary setback during the early going while we were in
    theater. Situational dictations coupled with an under manning
    strength hindered us in the way we trained and the way we ended
    up combating. For example, a traditional MP line company as
    myself is broken up into a 10 person squad with three vehicles,
    an ideal and perfect situation for any MP task. However, while
    on the ground in Iraq our squad consisted of six personnel and
    only two trucks, a severe setback in security concern when
    conducting such operations as area and convoy security. The
    operational tempo as high as it was along with a high demand
    for MP type missions dictated changes that took place.
        Arriving in Kuwait on April 15, 2003 proved to be our last
    ditch effort to improve upon our training and ready our gear
    for the bush toward Baghdad. In our 3-week stay in Kuwait, we
    learned of our vague mission task. It was an encompassing task
    to patrol sectors of Baghdad, a very indistinguishable and non-
    definitive mission task at best. We readied our unarmored
    vintage aged Humvees and dawned our Vietnam era non-protective
    flak vests for the ride north.
        Severe logistical issues regarding equipment surfaced here
    again. No ammunition for our brand new MK-19 weapon system, no
    up armored Humvees to patrol in, and still no interceptor
    ceramic plated vests to protect us. We adapted and overcame the
    best we could, sandbagging the floor boards of our 1985
    Humvees, creating weapons mounts for our other weapon system
    the M-249 SAW, and retrofitting a couple Humvees with diamond
    plating on the side doors of the trucks.
        Once in Baghdad things didn't improve much. We finally
    received our interceptor vests after a month in Baghdad
    complete with ceramic plates but still had problems with
    ammunition and non-armored vehicles. We were quickly improving
    and overcoming great obstacles with what we had to work with.
    Training was a continuous process. Overcoming enemy tactics
    such as IEDs in the roadways forced us to vary our routes,
    continually improve base and area security, and maintain a high
    level of situational awareness.
        The U.S. military is a highly trained, skilled, adaptive
    and intelligent force. The Guard and Reserve component forces
    have a lot to bring to the table as far as civilian background
    and how it is incorporated into use on the battlefield. For
    example as a Military Police unit, we have a large number of
    civilian law enforcement officers whose expertise and knowledge
    of policing provided firsthand knowledge of patrol tactics,
    weapons proficiency, an urban backdrop and general policing
    duties to those of us less experienced. That factor alone made
    a true impact on our success during this deployment.
        The 143rd Military Police Co. and myself completed a 1-year
    tour of duty in Baghdad, Iraq honorably while facing extreme
    odds and extenuating circumstances not in our favor. Several
    lessons have been learned, some unfortunately due to casualties
    sustained and fellow brothers and sisters in arms lost.
        First and foremost, let us equip our troops with the best
    possible gear to all units whether active duty, National Guard
    or Reserve component. Up armored Humvees, interceptor vests and
    IED jamming systems are great initiatives but need to be
    dispersed to all troops deploying overseas. Next, let us phase
    in a training doctrine that relates more to theater specific
    training regiment. There are several training sites in
    California, Nevada and Louisiana that provide the type of
    climate troops will soon see before they deploy. The mock urban
    warfare training ranges and sites are great tools that need to
    be taken advantage of. Language classes are also great tools
    that prove beneficial.
        Finally, it is imperative that the lessons learned from
    veterans be heard and the suggestions set forth to integrate
    the training doctrine to all deploying units. Let us continue
    to be the most intelligent, best equipped, fighting force out
    there.
        Thank you.
        [The prepared statement of Specialist Tanguay follows:]

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        Mr. Schrock. Thank you very much. Very impressive.
        Colonel Novotny, welcome. You have come a long way today
    and we are anxious to hear what you have to say. Welcome.
        Colonel Novotny. Chairman Shays and distinguished members
    of the subcommittee, I am Lieutenant Colonel Steven Novotny,
    Battalion Commander of the 530th Military Police Battalion from
    Omaha, NE. I am honored to have the opportunity to speak before
    your committee today.
        In January 2003, my battalion headquarters was mobilized in
    support of Operation Iraqi Freedom. After receiving orders for
    active duty, my unit was certified for deployment at Fort
    Riley, KS, deployed overseas and established operations at two
    separate camps in Iraq. While our primary mission was providing
    force protection at Camp Bucca, we also managed several other
    important missions.
        Several days a week, we coordinated visitation with 100
    prisoners and over 500 family members that were being held at
    our camp. Our property team, responsible for annotating and
    inventory of prisoner personal effects, successfully returned
    many personal items to hundreds of prisoners upon departure of
    our camp. In addition, we entered into an agreement with
    British MPS to serve as a Quick Reaction Force if they needed
    assistance.
        Health care was coordinated with the Czech and British
    hospitals in Basra to treat our soldiers and prisoners on an
    emergency basis. The British also provided a dedicated Air
    Medical Evacuation Team that supported our camp. My unit, the
    530th MP Battalion attached 20 soldiers to the 101st Airborne,
    supporting prisoner constriction. These soldiers also provided
    instruction on law enforcement and correction tasks to Iraqi
    nationals who would assume control over these facilities.
        While the 530th was in control of operations of our entire
    camp, we placed tremendous effort on improving the quality of
    life for our soldiers. We constructed a landing pad for
    helicopters, improved food variety, started an exchange program
    for medical personnel from the British hospital and established
    an MWR, a morale, welfare and recreation center. We also
    constructed a fixed shower facility. While this may not sound
    like much, our troops truly looked forward to one creature
    comfort, improving significantly our quality of life. Other
    things we did to improve morale was establish a local PX and
    having a 2-day bazaar.
        In November, the 530th MP Battalion moved to a new location
    approximately 45 northeast of Baghdad where we secured a group
    of 3,800 detainees. In approximately 10 days our processing
    team entered all 3,800 detainees into an identification data
    bank with the assistance of a civilian assistance review team.
    Our processors were recognized for maintaining a high degree of
    dedication and professionalism while achieving an extremely
    high first-time acceptance rate for data input. Many soldiers
    supported other units to include traffic control points and
    convoy security, while conducting combat operations in our area
    of operation throughout our stay at Camp Ashraf.
        Upon assuming command of my battalion, I conducted a review
    of my unit training program to ensure that our training program
    supported the essential tasks that were required of my unit if
    we were mobilized. I directed that a staff exercise be
    organized to exercise my unit staff, non-commissioned officers
    and individual soldiers from the unit. This training was
    focused on our primary wartime mission. I directed that all
    officers within my battalion participate in a staff training
    exercise where we prepared estimates for conducting convoys.
        All soldiers were trained on individual defensive tactics
    and while using the SINGARS communications equipment, we
    trained on our communications skills. Additionally, we worked
    on our critical task skills, on prisoner handling and
    management as well as specific areas within the Geneva
    Convention that applied to prisoners.
        Before and after mobilization, our active component
    liaisons from the 75th Training Division were instrumental in
    providing our staff with current doctrine and guidance that we
    used to plan future training sessions. While at our
    mobilization station, we conducted training on convoy
    operations, conducted nearly 2 weeks of training on military
    operations and warfare in an urban environment. This training
    was organized as a direct result of lessons learned from the
    incident of the maintenance unit that became disoriented in the
    city during convoy movements and was required to fight its way
    out of an urban environment.
        Early in our mobilization, I was invited to view exercises
    of possible wartime maneuver scenarios at Fort Hood along with
    my higher headquarters. These training sessions were invaluable
    in providing me the focus of potential missions of my
    battalion. Prior to leaving for Iraq, the 530th Military Police
    Battalion dispatched liaison noncommissioned officers to meet
    with subordinate companies that were located at Fort Lewis,
    Fort McCoy and Fort Bragg. These NCOs assured a coordinated,
    clear standard operating procedure was distributed to all units
    and that lines of communication along with clear and understood
    chain of command was established.
        The primary wheeled vehicle we had in our headquarters
    company was the Humvee. These were configured as two and four
    seat vehicles. Several were used as utility vehicles and could
    haul a limited amount of supplies and personnel. None of these
    vehicles were equipped or configured with protective armor or
    machine gun mounts. Companies assigned under my control brought
    a variety of Humvee vehicles. These varied from vehicles with
    no armor to those with up-armored Humvees.
        Immediately upon our arrival at our first location, I
    ordered that all vehicles be sandbagged with protective
    measures against mines. Units were outfitted with the armored
    Humvees were heavily tasked to provide convoy escorts for VIPs,
    prisoner transport, medical movement, logistic escort and force
    protection missions. All assigned line companies were equipped
    with 2\1/2\ ton trucks as our primary logistics vehicle. While
    most of these trucks were over 30 years of age, the battalion
    was able to maintain an acceptable operational readiness rate.
        While in Iraq, our battalion received new medium trucks at
    our home station in Omaha. Unfortunately, those vehicles were
    provided to other units who were scheduled to mobilize after
    us. Prior to moving to Camp Ashraf, all soldiers received the
    most current body armor to include front and rear plates. The
    530th MP Battalion left all vehicles and most equipment to
    include the light engineer equipment in-country for follow-on
    forces to utilize after our departure.
        One lesson learned that would have improved our mission
    capability would have been an increase in allocation of medium
    machine guns and additional ammunition to allow for more
    soldiers to qualify on these weapons. While communications
    equipment was adequate, we needed additional backup equipment
    such as cables and microphones. We found that while we deployed
    with all of our soldiers we were supposed to have with our
    manning roster, our communications soldier was not enough. This
    was one person to support an entire battalion.
        I would also recommend that some elements within the
    command structure be equipped with armored security vehicles,
    ASVs. These would provide MPS with increased fire power and
    survivability. Our war fighting doctrine was based on an MP
    battalion being placed approximately 80 miles behind the front
    lines. This doctrine did not account for an MP battalion to
    establish detainee camps while on the move and following lead
    combat forces.
        Prior to mobilizing, all staff officers reviewed the After
    Action Review from our unit from Operation Desert Shield/Desert
    Storm. The staff would take information from actual events and
    modify our training accordingly. The battalion would send
    advance and quartering parties to identify critical issues at
    future locations that we would anticipate moving to.
        The battalion conducted after action reviews after primary
    training events or actual situations in order to capture
    critical issues and provide updated guidance to our soldiers.
    We utilized IED employment templates which identified patterns
    of employment in our area and along routes that our convoys
    would move. Prior to convoys leaving our base, the S2 would
    request an IED update from our supporting brigade. If
    necessary, we could postpone convoy movements or take alternate
    routes.
        We encouraged postponing convoy departures due to heavy fog
    in the morning. The battalion conducted detailed mission briefs
    utilizing sand tables which are a military method of
    visualization of the battlefield prior to all missions. My
    staff and I used the Combined Arms Lessons Learned [CALL], Web
    site from Fort Leavenworth. This is a storehouse of all Army
    lessons learned. We depended heavily on the operations and
    intel update for current information from the 2nd Combat
    Brigade of the 4th ID.
        The 530th Executive Office was tasked with forwarding
    current situational updates with our lessons learned to the
    89th Regional Reserve Command in Wichita, KS so they can
    incorporate our lessons learned into training plans for other
    Reserve forces. The 89th was able to emphasize to following
    units issues such as bringing as much PLL, prescribed load list
    items as possible with them. In addition, the convoy portion of
    the mobilization train-up was modified to incorporate lessons
    learned from units in-theater and pass on information to
    improve safety. Another result was a subordinate unit bringing
    in a Humvee with increased protection instead of what had been
    authorized previously.
        During the 530th's mobilization, we commanded nine
    companies from active duty, Army Reserve and National Guard. My
    battalion did the best to forge all companies into one team
    while providing them with the best leadership, guidance and
    resources they would require. I am extremely proud of all of
    our soldiers I have served with from California, South
    Carolina, Nebraska, Texas, Georgia, Wisconsin, Kentucky and
    Puerto Rico.
        Thank you again for your time and I will answer any of your
    questions.
        [The prepared statement of Colonel Novotny follows:]

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        Mr. Schrock. Thank you, Colonel, and thank you for being
    here.
        Dr. Krepinevich, thank you. It is nice to have you here
    again and the floor is yours.
        Dr. Krepinevich. Thank you and thank you for the
    opportunity to appear before you today and share my views on
    this important issue.
        As you know, my expertise on the details of training and
    preparing our troops for deployment to Afghanistan and Iraq is
    far from comprehensive. Consequently, I will focus my comments
    in placing the training issue within the larger context of our
    operations in these two countries.
        For people my age and those of us who have served in the
    military, there is a sense that we have been to this movie
    before. Indeed, 42 years ago almost to the day, President
    Kennedy in addressing the graduating class at West Point said
    the following, ``This is another type of war, new in its
    intensity, ancient in its origins, war by guerillas,
    subversives, insurgents, assassins, war by ambush instead of by
    combat, by infiltration instead of aggression, seeking victory
    by eroding and exhausting the enemy instead of engaging him. It
    requires in those situations where we must counter it a whole
    new kind of strategy, a wholly different kind of force, and
    therefore, a wholly different kind of military training.'' When
    he spoke those words, he was referring to places like Vietnam
    and Colombia but I think they are quite apt for the kind of
    combat that these people find themselves confronting today in
    Afghanistan and Iraq.
        First, we are victims of our success. Our military so
    dominates that the conventional form of warfare that we have
    essentially driven people out of that business. Those who want
    to confront us are now like North Korea and Iran, looking for
    nuclear weapons. Those that can't do that such as the
    opposition in Afghanistan and Iraq, seek the route of
    insurgency and practice the tactics the President spoke of some
    42 years ago.
        Second, as they have gotten into this business, we find
    that we have been out of this business. We got out of this
    business after the Vietnam War. ``No more Vietnams'' was voiced
    not only by the American public and the political leadership
    but quite frankly also by our military as well. The 1980's saw
    the Weinberg and Powell doctrines, go in with everything you
    have, overwhelming force and leave quickly. The 1990's when we
    had situations where we did deploy overseas, we can think of
    Somalia, Haiti and Bosnia, there was all discussion about exit
    strategies. Let us not stay there too long. That seemed to
    work. Unfortunately, September 11 changed everything. Now we
    don't have the luxury of leaving a Haiti or Somalia, especially
    when they are named Afghanistan and Iraq just because we got
    tired or we don't feel we are as successful as we should be.
    Nevertheless, this approach, this no more Vietnams, Weinberg-
    Powell Doctrine and exit strategy concept practiced by all of
    us, Republicans, Democrats and military alike, led to the
    atrophy of the kinds of skills, the kind of doctrinal
    development, the kind of thinking about what it takes to
    prevail in this kind of war.
        Thus, the tactics we talk about the insurgents practice in
    places like Afghanistan and Iraq, while they seem perhaps new
    to us, they are hardly new at all. Suicide bombers are not new.
    Neither are car and truck bombs. We saw those as far back as
    1983 in Beirut and Lebanon. Certainly attacks on convoys aren't
    new. As for improvised explosive devices, we have seen them
    before as well. In 1966 in Vietnam, over 1,000 Americans were
    killed in combat because of improvised booby traps and what we
    would call today IEDs. If it seems new, if these challenges
    seem new and the training requirements seem new, it is because
    just as they have gotten into this business, we find that we
    have been out of it for too long.
        The third point I would like to make is that insurgencies
    are typically protracted conflicts. Since they are protracted
    conflicts, we need not only the kinds of adaptive fixes that
    these men have been talking about but we also need to move
    beyond this hastily organized fix for training. We need a
    coherent, focused, long-term approach to bring the U.S.
    military's training infrastructure for irregular warfare as
    counter insurgency is up to the standards we have established
    for conventional warfare training facilities such as at the
    Army's National Training Center and other facilities.
        Fourth, the issue of a training gap. Insurgencies are, as I
    said, protracted conflicts. What we have is a force that will
    continue to rotate over time. We have already gone through the
    first rotation. Insurgents don't rotate. They continue to
    receive the best possible training, contact with American
    forces. If this occurs as it does over time, if this is a
    protracted conflict as most insurgencies are, a training gap
    will likely emerge between our forces and theirs, making it all
    the more important to make sure that our training standards are
    up to the highest level possible.
        Indeed, as troops rotate out of the theater of operations,
    their skills begin to atrophy. Not only that, but since they
    don't participate directly in the conflict, the fact the
    insurgents are adapting may make these skills not only atrophy
    but also less relevant over time. This means is that we need to
    find ways to mitigate the training gap, not only through the
    training infrastructure but also by prompt, accurate feedback
    that can be used in training forces in that infrastructure at
    the relevant kind of tactics and operations at the relevant
    scale.
        We need a stable rotation base that can insure high
    retention rates. If in fact over time we are going to be
    deploying forces again and again to Iraq and Afghanistan and
    other places where we are confronted by insurgents, we are
    going to need people who have had that experience before.
        Finally, the Army's concept of unit manning might even
    prove more productive in that it would not only rotate people
    back, people who have better experience but finally, people who
    are operating as a cohesive unit. Failure to retain people will
    lead to an even greater burden on our training infrastructure.
        My final point as First Sergeant O'Neill said, our troops
    and units train the way they fight. They train the way they
    fight and they fight as a function of the doctrine and the way
    they are organized, the force structure. Again, just as
    training has atrophied over the last 25 years, so has doctrine.
    The NTC may be fine for conducting training on sweeps to detect
    guerilla forces in open desert but it is far less relevant if
    our doctrine emphasizes securing and holding towns and urban
    areas for protracted periods. In this vein, it is critical to
    have a clear sense of the strategy that we are pursuing in
    Afghanistan and Iraq because the fact is that no matter how
    tactically proficient we are, that is not going to be a
    substitute for good strategy or effective doctrine.
        Let me sum up. Again, let me compliment the committee for
    raising the awareness of this important issue. Again, I think
    the fact we are engaged in dealing with insurgency today is a
    function of our military dominance. Nevertheless, although
    insurgency may be a form of warfare of the weak and not the
    strong, it still presents us, as Secretary Rumsfeld has said,
    with a long, hard slog to victory. This means we must move
    beyond the service's immediate training fixes, helpful though
    they may be, to undertake reform and restructure of our
    training programs to address a form of warfare that has
    received all too little attention these past two decades.
        Finally, it is critical to note that improved training at
    the tactical level of warfare cannot make up for deficiencies
    in strategy and military doctrine.
        Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        [The prepared statement of Dr. Krepinevich follows:]

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        Mr. Schrock. Thank you. It is an incredibly important
    subject. We appreciate your thoughtful comments and hope
    everyone was listening because it is very important.
        General Alexander, we are glad to have you here. You
    represent a magnificent organization. It is my privilege to
    yield the floor to you.
        General Alexander. Thank you very much for inviting me to
    testify on behalf of the National Guard Association of the
    United States.
        As you know, the mission of the National Guard has changed
    drastically since September 11. Today's Guardsmen and
    Guardswomen are not only supporting missions to defend and
    protect our homeland but they are also deployed abroad in our
    ongoing war against terrorism.
        The state of the National Guard is good. However, as the
    Guard participates in Iraq, Afghanistan and other locations
    throughout the world, challenges continue and they will
    continue for some time. I believe the Guard has demonstrated
    they are up to these challenges. The current military
    leadership understands the hardship the Guard is enduring. The
    families and employers of these brave men and women understand
    and support the commitment that their loved ones, co-workers
    and friends have elected to make. An Arkansas spokesman says,
    ``Guard families are doing OK. Though they have anxiety, they
    still support the Guard.'' These comments were in light of the
    Arkansas Guard sustaining five combat related deaths just a few
    weekends ago in Operation Iraqi Freedom.
        In preparing my testimony, I solicited comments from
    members of the National Guard Association and received feedback
    from the Adjutants General of the States and communications
    from Special Forces soldiers and those soldiers returning from
    areas of operation in Iraq and Afghanistan. I will report to
    you those in the field are thankful for the forward thinking
    preparation that has been demonstrated by our Nation's
    Adjutants General. In several instances, training from lessons
    learned has been instituted from the ground up, that is State
    level rather than top down from the Federal level. As such,
    many States have taken the lessons learned from their returning
    or deployed units and incorporated new training regimes to
    prepare soldiers for their deployment in theater.
        Several States have initiated their own programs to prepare
    their soldiers for combat operations such as additional combat
    arms training to enhance basic soldier skills outside of the
    MOS skill set and years of additional funding to enhance
    communication and coordination training for units preparing for
    deployment.
        In preparation for my testimony, I reviewed questions that
    you posed to us. As such in my capacity as president of the
    National Guard Association, I would like to focus on two
    aspects of the questions you presented to us, training and
    resourcing. With regard to training, some units are reporting
    that redundancy in training has extended their stay at
    mobilization stations. Other feedback indicates that some of
    the existing training at home station does not fit the
    scenarios that our personnel are encountering. This also is
    increasing time at mobilization stations. This is requiring our
    soldiers to be gone for 18 months or more. There should be a
    review of our current policies and procedures to maximize
    training and certification at home station.
        There exists instances where we are using training doctrine
    as stated earlier that is more than 3 years old. We should make
    every effort to reduce time at mobilization stations by
    addressing this training gap. In addition, there should be a
    review of training for the Air National Guard transportation
    units. Some Air National Guard units are being deployed without
    training and as a result are required to train up in theater.
    This is the transportation piece. A greater attempt should be
    made to train these units prior to deployment.
        Allow me to read comments from a Special Forces unit that
    has returned from operations in Afghanistan. Transition that
    occurred in Afghanistan between National Guard Special Forces
    groups and active duty Special Forces groups did not allow for
    an effective passage of information or situational awareness
    for two reasons. Active component intelligence and command
    personnel who had been deployed in the region for less than 8
    months did not have confidence in the National Guard to further
    develop a valuable situational awareness or understanding. The
    transition schedule also did not allow for sufficient overlap.
        After returning to home station for deployment, most units
    did not see value in their receiving lessons learned or heads-
    up information from us, that is the Guard Special Forces group.
    They viewed such as an ad hoc means of relating information to
    be a training distractor. These unit commands believe that
    their power projection platforms and higher headquarters would
    be able to provide them the information they needed to succeed.
    Some units have accepted offered briefings and work groups only
    to limit attendance and to assure that these meetings were kept
    short. Attempts at providing information failed because unit
    commands were not reachable or did not return attempted
    contacts.
        With regard to the issue of resourcing our Guard forces,
    the following comments were made from the field. Adequate
    training with sappy plates and body armor should be done
    stateside. Soldiers need to be comfortable and familiar with
    all the equipment they will be using before deploying to their
    theater of operations. We should be training and resourcing our
    forces at C-1 level rather than taking extended time to train
    at C-3 level. We must ensure that our personnel have the
    materials and equipment they will be using in the area of
    operation.
        Also allow me to read excerpts from one of several e-mails
    I received from soldiers serving abroad when we posed your
    questions to them. The current military table of organizations
    do not provide the necessary equipment for units operating in
    this environment. For example, our truck company is not
    authorized radios in each vehicle to maintain communications
    between drivers. The unit purchased secure handheld radios
    prior to deployment which have been essential to that unit.
        The M-16 A2 is not the best weapon for transportation
    soldiers to quickly engage the enemy and they should be
    replaced with M-4s. A hatch cut in the top of a het would offer
    better field of fire observations. Up-armored Humvees must be
    standardized. As you may have heard, a number of our soldiers
    are being inundated and all kinds of ways are being used to
    protect themselves in Humvees.
        The standard military weapons training must be enhanced to
    include close quarter battle and enhanced weapons training for
    all soldiers. This is very true for our transportation company
    personnel who during an ambush transitioning to modern infantry
    is a must. At present, the individual States are purchasing
    equipment and providing training required. MOS training schools
    must spend more time focusing on critical combat skills and
    eliminate nonsurvival skills such as drill and ceremony. Every
    minute of training time on skills that will keep a soldier
    alive in combat is what we should be about.
        In the fog of war and in light of logistics and resourcing
    challenges facing our Guard units, they are producing
    innovations in the field as relates to the individual equipment
    and vehicles. For the record, I would ask that an article from
    the Topeka Capital Journal be entered into the record for the
    committee's review. I believe that has already been submitted.
        Mr. Schrock. Without objection.
        General Alexander. As you can see, there have been
    challenges that need to be addressed. I believe the Guard units
    and their leadership are responding. I believe that our Guard
    units and Adjutants General are focusing on training and
    preparing their personnel in order to protect the lives of our
    citizens.
        Again, our Guard personnel are rising to the new challenges
    each and every day. We must continue to evaluate our mission
    and how we train and equipment for such missions.
        I applaud you and this committee for focusing on this
    important issue in order to serve our military men and women.
    They are our greatest asset. Without them, we cannot fight and
    defend our country. We must honor the sacrifices they make each
    day.
        Thank you again for the opportunity to testify and look
    forward to your questions.
        [The prepared statement of General Alexander follows:]

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        Mr. Schrock. Thank you, General.
        Let me start the questioning by asking our first three
    witnesses, if you had the opportunity to ask questions of your
    senior leadership, what questions would you ask?
        Sergeant Neill. We did ask questions of our senior
    leadership. We asked them what was wrong with their supply
    system and who was responsible. They fingerpointed and would
    not accept responsibility. Anything that happened in my
    company, as the First Sergeant I am responsible for it, good or
    bad. So the senior leadership has to provide an answer for us.
    They didn't always have an answer.
        We asked about training, we asked about plus up of ammo. We
    didn't have our basic load. We were able to get ammunition from
    other people, ask them and they gave it to us. Our own
    battalion wouldn't support us for many months. We didn't have,
    like other soldiers said, the basic material we should have had
    to go to war.
        Mr. Schrock. Staff Sergeant.
        Sergeant SanchezLopez. Well, sir, for us, we did have the
    opportunity to speak to General Maddis who was in charge of us,
    the 4th Marine Division Commander came up and took questions
    from the individual Marine and Lance Corporal. Whatever he
    didn't have an answer to, he took it down, went back and came
    back with an answer.
        Mr. Schrock. Specialist Tanguay.
        Specialist Tanguay. We did ask quite a few questions during
    our training mission and once we were overseas. Several
    questions were raised at the training site in regards to
    seminition training which is a realistic training exercise
    involving the M-9 pistol, the barrel is interchangeable with a
    seminition barrel and it fires a projectile most commonly
    referred to as a paintball. That training we have ample
    opportunity, we have the equipment in our possession but we
    didn't train with it. Why didn't we train with it? It provides
    a realistic opportunity for soldiers to train with it. Why
    didn't we train with it? We asked that question.
        Mr. Schrock. What was the answer?
        Specialist Tanguay. The answer was none of your business
    was a command directive. It was a commander's responsibility
    for providing the training at our training site. We did not
    receive that training.
        The next question that was raised by subordinates along
    with NCOs was the truck issue, the Humvee, the up-armored
    Humvee once we got overseas. Several questions were raised why
    aren't we getting the up-armored and so forth. The up-armored
    were in such high demand and in short supply. Basically every
    other week we were getting an answer but they came out with
    these retrofitted survivability kits they call them for the
    Humvees. Primary answer to that question was funding. They
    didn't have the money to purchase these kits. That was the
    answer we received from our command staff in regards to that
    issue.
        We did ask questions. We were provided the opportunity to
    ask questions. Some of the answers we received were not
    adequate.
        Mr. Schrock. Colonel, would you want to comment on that?
        Colonel Novotny. Reference funding for the add-on kits, we
    were able to obtain funding which allowed us to have add-on
    armor to our vehicles that were not armored at all. While it
    didn't give us the same protection as an up-armored vehicle, it
    provided some protection against fragmentation and small arms
    fire.
        Questions after we were deployed on the logistics side, we
    contacted the CFLC G-4 and they sent a rep to our camp to
    ensure that my battalion and all subordinate companies were
    tied in the best we possibly could to ensure we received the
    PLL, all parts and items that we were authorized and to ensure
    the system was streamlined. Back at Fort Riley, I understand
    the criticality of ammunition. The STRAC Manual only allows so
    much ammunition for qualification for primary machine gunners
    and other machine gunners.
        When we deployed, my HHC and the headquarters immediately
    realized that was not adequate for our needs because we were
    now providing security on a 24-hour basis and we had to train-
    up our own soldiers in order for them to handle machine guns.
        One thing I would say is that we need to look at how units
    are authorized and how they are aligned in a peacetime
    environment. I mean by that when I was mobilized, the companies
    that fell under me, I had not had any contact with those
    commanders before and that is the primary reason why I sent
    that liaison to those company commanders to ensure we were tied
    in the best we possibly could to command control and structure
    so they knew the 530th MP Battalion and knew our standards.
        Mr. Schrock. Let me do a follow on. To your knowledge, have
    your replacements over there experienced the same deficiencies
    or have some of these problems been adequately addressed, to
    your knowledge? First Sergeant.
        Sergeant Neill. Our replacement company, the company that
    came in behind us, actually had a much better supply system
    than we had. We left them with all our vehicles, we left them
    with extra weapons, we left them with all our body armor and we
    left them with non-tactical vehicles and equipment we acquired
    that actually Marines left us. It made it much easier to do
    their mission. They didn't have enough non-tactical vehicles
    but they surely had a better supply system in place than we
    had.
        Mr. Schrock. Only because you left in-country what you took
    in country?
        Sergeant Neill. We left a lot, they had better support
    coming in. We are a unit that has teams that deploy in cities
    away from our company. We are a company that was detached from
    our battalion and our battalion didn't support us. The other
    battalion we came to, some of them took better care of us than
    our battalion did but we stretched our asses also. So our teams
    were pretty much operating every day in two vehicle convoys in
    the communities by themselves.
        We carried supplies to them once a week and in our time in
    Iraq put some 30,000 miles in two vehicle convoys between the
    five southern cities of Iraq, Desaqut, Desja, Dewina, Karbala
    and Hella. They were better off than we got there.
        Mr. Schrock. Staff Sergeant.
        Sergeant SanchezLopez. The follow-on units, we were slated
    to stay back if they didn't have enough equipment. What
    happened is they had enough equipment and we got to rotate back
    out of Iraq. In Kuwait, we did an asset inventory of what we
    had and the question was what can you do without back in the
    States to sustain your training when you get back that you
    could give up to other units. So we hashed out, gave them
    hardback hummers which was the Humvees they are describing,
    gave several of those, tow vehicles, anything anyone needed, we
    gave them.
        Mr. Schrock. Specialist Tanguay.
        Specialist Tanguay. I also agree that the unit that
    replaced us was far better equipped than we were when we first
    got there. We also left our up-armored vehicles that we did
    receive after being in theater for 12 months. We left those
    behind. We left behind crew serve weapons, excess ammunition,
    parts and service and logistical issues that we experienced
    were hashed out for the unit that replaced us. So they were far
    better equipped when we left than when we first got there.
        Mr. Schrock. Colonel.
        Colonel Novotny. I would agree. The battalion that replaced
    us was much better off than we were going in. My staff had
    organized many lessons learned as far as the train-up. We had a
    good crossover between the two battalion staffs. One issue that
    should be raised is that while we were both MP battalion staff
    and headquarters, we were organized differently. My battalion
    headquarters had a R&U section which was capable of performing
    light engineer tasks, building small items. One thing that was
    key for us was showers for ourselves. A lot of times you could
    not depend on a shower unit being at our facility and it was a
    tremendous asset for us. Also, their primary focus is to
    support the prisoner population in the compounds for light
    engineer resources and tasks. Our guys did a tremendous effort
    for our battalion. The follow-on unit did not have that and it
    was a shortfall they probably had, but overall, they were
    better.
        Mr. Schrock. I want to address the POW issue in a minute
    but let me ask one question of everybody. Have Guard and
    Reserve units properly addressed or are they addressing and
    improving in-CONUS administrative procedures to foster better
    real training for the war fighters?
        Sergeant Neill. I can't answer that question. I am too new
    back to this country. I have only been back 30 days. I can't
    answer.
        General Alexander. I would like to comment on that
    question. There are several instances where that is in fact
    happening. The heads training area located in the State of
    Louisiana has been very innovative to embrace convoy operations
    that provide for the exercise of modern infantry skill set. The
    State of New Mexico has also been leaning forward to ensure
    that the present tactics that are utilized are regimented into
    their original training institute. There are lessons learned
    that are being exercised that are taking advantage of our acts
    of war.
        Mr. Schrock. Staff Sergeant.
        Sergeant SanchezLopez. We are applying what we learned
    specifically to our unit. We do have a lot of new personnel. We
    have a lot of experienced Staff NCOs and we are sharing that
    knowledge to everyone so everybody will be on board. It doesn't
    matter if they are a cook, admin, transportation, everybody
    will be on the same level.
        Mr. Schrock. Did you want to comment?
        Specialist Tanguay. I have also only been back 3 weeks, so
    I really can't comment on the situation of administrative
    functions and the reality of training.
        Mr. Schrock. That big smile on your face tells me you are
    glad to be home.
        Colonel.
        Colonel Novotny. I can state that follow-on forces from
    within my own group back home, they have modified the training
    at Fort Riley for convoy operations where they conduct live
    fire exercises as part of that convoy process.
        Mr. Schrock. The prisoner abuse cases that are certainly
    dominating the news have cast tremendous doubt on how effective
    military police and military intelligence training is
    inculcating in military personnel the humane treatment of
    prisoners of war and detainees. Three of you are connected with
    military police and military intelligence. Were you ever
    provided training focusing on the care, handling and management
    of prisoners of war according to the Geneva Convention rules?
    First Sergeant.
        Sergeant Neill. Yes, sir. Every time we deployed, and this
    was my second deployment, we were provided with Geneva
    Convention training and an initial training in MOS training,
    you are provided with that same training which says you will
    treat any prisoner the same way you treat your own soldiers,
    that they have protective equipment during an attack, they will
    be allowed to wear that equipment. To see soldiers violate that
    Geneva Convention hurts all of us. It hurts us as soldiers, it
    hurts us as Americans. That is not what this country is about.
        If I could, I found the Iraqi citizens to be hard working
    and they want the same things we want. They want employment,
    protection for their families and they want to earn an honest
    living. To see that happen, hurts every citizen in America.
        Mr. Schrock. It hurts us too.
        Specialist Tanguay, do you want to comment on that?
        Specialist Tanguay. Yes, sir. During our 16 weeks of
    military police school, MOS specialty school, you learn a great
    deal about how to handle prisoners, detainees and prisoners of
    war, so it is absolutely certain that we did receive the
    training, both at the 16 weeks of our specialty school along
    with our pre-deployment mobilization phase, the necessary
    training in the Geneva Convention process and detainee and
    prisoner of war operations.
        Mr. Schrock. Colonel.
        Colonel Novotny. I agree with the comments of the other
    panel members. We have also received that instruction as part
    of mandatory training, it was part of the process at Fort
    Riley, it was part of the process that I directed my people go
    through and shortly after I took over my unit, we completed for
    our certification at Fort Riley a very similar exercise that we
    move individuals from one location to another from compound to
    compound as far as receiving these individuals who were
    prisoners. They were actually citizens or soldiers dressed up
    in uniforms.
        Prior to the mobilization, I read every word of the Geneva
    Convention that applies to taking care of prisoners to
    establish my basis. I also was in the same unit during Desert
    Shield/Desert Storm where we took care of 18,000 prisoners. I
    was assistant operations officer and also an enclosure
    commander and came in contact with nearly every prisoner that
    came in our facility. I was charged with ensuring that they
    were properly cared for, bringing them, accounting for them,
    making sure they had their ID card and they were in our system
    for accountability.
        After the prisoner situation was stabilized, I was tasked
    to lead another element to conduct an identification process
    for 12,000 refugees who fled Iraq and were in the process of
    confirming the identification process for them in the neutral
    zone.
        Mr. Schrock. Hindsight is always 20-20 but had any of you
    observed such abuse, what do the relative training modules and/
    or the regulations say you as an observer should do because
    obviously there were people who were observers who did nothing.
    By regulation, what were you to do?
        Colonel Novotny. I would say report immediately to your
    chain of command if that were to happen. I had minor situations
    where a guard had pushed a prisoner. My NCOs reported it
    immediately through the chain of command to me. I took what I
    considered appropriate actions against those individuals. Their
    chain of command was present. To my NCO who was specifically
    tasked to run the facility where that happened, I ensured that
    every case would be reported up the chain of command and that
    would not be tolerated in the future.
        Mr. Schrock. First Sergeant.
        Sergeant Neill. That action would have stopped immediately,
    sir. I agree with the Commander, ensuring that the soldier was
    adequately counseled, disciplined if required and efforts
    redirected.
        Mr. Schrock. Specialist.
        Specialist Tanguay. Absolutely report it up the chain of
    command, without a doubt.
        Mr. Schrock. Mr. Shays.
        Mr. Shays. Thank you.
        I have now learned what happens when you allow someone to
    chair the committee and get 15 minutes. [Laughter.]
        Mr. Schrock. Make hay while the sun shines.
        Mr. Shays. This committee allows for extensive questioning
    by a Member instead of just doing 5 minutes. When we do that, I
    think we learn so much. I learned so much from your questions
    and I thank you.
        I want to say this is a wonderful example of how a process
    works because I had a community meeting in Oxford, CT and I had
    two fairly young moms who had sons in Iraq complain to me about
    the fact that their sons were in Humvees that didn't have
    shielded proper equipment. So I task the gentleman on my right
    to be in touch with your mom. I thought one of the things, Mr.
    Tanguay, that I would not want is to have had to go back to
    your mom and express my sorrow for your death, for your not
    having the proper equipment since I sent you there. Whether I
    sent you there or not, I would never want that to happen.
        It has been a real surprise to me when Mr. Murtha had gone
    to Iraq and found our soldiers did not have the fully armored
    vests, it was a surprise to me to learn from your mom that our
    Humvees were not properly shielded and that is the way the
    process sometimes works. When we find out, we start to see some
    incredible action. When I was in Iraq for my fifth visit with
    the professional staff to my right, we were in Haniken and we
    had three Humvees so we just kind of knocked on the door of the
    257th Armored Brigade and they had three Humvees, one that had
    no armament, one that was makeshift and one with the kit, and I
    understand the kit was a little better because if a shell hit,
    it would maintain its integrity a little better.
        The question I want to ask each of you, it is hard for me
    to imagine that we would have sent you there without the proper
    equipment. Is this an example of where we just didn't think we
    needed the equipment? If it is not, I want to know. I want to
    ask each of you. You all must have thought about this. Why
    would you have been sent there without the proper equipment?
    Let us start with you, Mr. Neill.
        Sergeant Neill. I couldn't answer that question. We were
    surprised to see that. We had Internet access home, we saw the
    papers and people back home were saying we would have the vests
    in a certain month. We were already in country 6 or 8 months
    before we had them. It was 3 or 4 more months after that before
    we finally received the vests. When we left, our vehicles were
    not plus-up armored and our job was to go into community every
    day. We didn't have ammo, we had to acquire extra weapons from
    other companies in our battalion. We mounted our weapons
    ourselves.
        The important thing for us was to go out battle ready and
    be prepared for whatever came and giving the appearance that we
    were ready. I think that deterred it.
        Mr. Shays. Do you think that was because you weren't part
    of the active force or do you make the same claim as active
    force did not have the same quality equipment?
        Sergeant Neill. The active force that we saw, MI, did not
    have the same quality vehicles that we had. Some of them had
    plus-ups, some of them did not. They had the same exact things
    we had but they were doing the same mission we were. The
    countryside is littered with ammo, artillery rounds everywhere.
    What brought us back safely was we used NTVs.
        Mr. Shays. Non-tactical vehicles.
        Sergeant Neill. And we could travel faster. We became a
    difficult target for them to hit. We could travel at 120 miles
    a hour. An Humvee can only do 55 miles a hour and you can hear
    it coming from about a quarter of a mile away. We would see the
    citizens in the field look up from their work when they heard
    the Humvee coming.
        Mr. Shays. What was the speed of the other vehicle?
        Sergeant Neill. We could go 120 miles a hour, sir. We used
    Trailblazers, seized vehicles that the Marines purchases.
        Mr. Shays. You are saying the SUVs?
        Sergeant Neill. Yes, sir, the SUVs. The Humvee could do a
    maximum of 55 to 60 miles a hour.
        Mr. Shays. You would rather have been in an SUV than the
    Humvee?
        Sergeant Neill. For where we were, yes, sir.
        Mr. Shays. The irony is the SUV got better mileage.
        Staff Sergeant.
        Sergeant SanchezLopez. It was our understanding about those
    vests that went into our flak jacket, they were just beginning
    that process of fielding to the Marines when we were getting to
    go, so as we got our desert camis issued, we got our ballistic
    shields issued. When we got in theater in Kuwait, we didn't
    bring our stuff because the ship arrived 2 days prior for us
    crossing the line of departure. So we stuffed our Humvees, our
    trucks, our ammo and took off. They said we are crossing at
    this time.
        The only shortfalls we had was didn't find out we were
    going to have trucks until the week before. We were waiting for
    the gear that was on the ships and they said, oh, no, we're
    going to give you some other stuff coming in from other ships.
        Mr. Shays. I think there are always reasons for everything,
    obviously, and what I am trying to understand is the reasons
    why you didn't have the ammunition, the reason why you didn't
    have the plus-up Humvees, the reason why you didn't have the
    vests, reasons other than just they weren't available. The
    question I raise is did they think you didn't need them, that
    in other words the war was over. Were you being sent before
    engagement or before the removal of Saddam or after?
        Sergeant SanchezLopez. We were part of the OIF-1.
        Mr. Shays. So they knew you would be in combat.
        Sergeant SanchezLopez. We needed everything that we were
    provided.
        Mr. Shays. Specialist Tanguay.
        Specialist Tanguay. We knew we needed everything we could
    get. Unfortunately there were severe logistical issues that
    prevented us from receiving what we needed. We knew we needed
    better protective vests, we knew we needed better vehicles, we
    knew we needed more ammunition than what we received. It was
    not a question of did we need this or not. It was a question of
    we knew we needed it, but we didn't receive it.
        Mr. Shays. Tell me why you think you didn't receive it?
        Specialist Tanguay. I am not sure. There were logistical
    issues beyond the control of myself or our command staff at
    levels far above our control that prevented us from getting
    what we needed. We needed to be prepared for any MP type
    mission we were going to be assigned. MP type missions
    encompass a wide range of tasks.
        Mr. Shays. It seems very clear that you would need the
    protective gear and you would want to be in a Humvee that is
    shielded.
        Specialist Tanguay. Correct.
        Mr. Shays. Colonel.
        General Alexander. I would say that----
        Mr. Shays. Is that the prerogative of the General? I said
    Colonel and I heard from the General.
        General Alexander. I am sorry.
        Mr. Shays. General, I am going to let you be the closer in
    this line of questioning. Colonel.
        Colonel Novotny. I felt that the reason why we went with
    the vehicles we did, as I stated earlier, was the doctrine was
    that my kind of unit would be organized and would be set up
    behind the lines. If we were in an environment where there was
    a low threat, I would have no problem with soft skin hummers,
    excellent vehicle, go anyplace, do anything but it did cause
    some concern when we crossed the border a few days after the
    ground forces and we weren't sure what kind of environment we
    were going into.
        After we deployed forward, I believe we were on the same
    basis as the active component units in our area. There was no
    difference between AC, Guard or Reserves there, same vehicles,
    we helped them and they helped us.
        Mr. Shays. What do you do when you are in a command
    position and you know you are sending your men into battle
    without proper equipment? What do you do? Do you complain about
    it? Do you tell your men you are sorry? Do you just say, stiff
    upper lip? What do you say? What do you do? What do you think?
        Colonel Novotny. We had to do some negotiations to get the
    correct body armor along with the plates. We coordinated. One
    of my units was redeploying back home and at a redeployment
    point they dropped off their armor, they accounted for it, we
    picked it up, within a couple of days we moved north to our
    second location.
        Mr. Shays. Thank you. Dr. Krepinevich, do you want to make
    a comment or should we go to the General?
        Dr. Krepinevich. I would just echo what the Colonel said
    about the issue of doctrine. We are talking about not only an
    enemy that is presenting us with a kind of problem that we
    haven't really focused on for several decades now, but in the
    case of the Army, the Army is transforming. If you look at the
    difference between the first and second Gulf wars, the first
    Gulf war was a 1-year advance, there was a clear front and a
    clear rear and you could operate in the rear in a Humvee
    without much protection and you would be just fine.
        Mr. Shays. That sounds very logical.
        Dr. Krepinevich. But in the second Gulf war, the Army and
    quite frankly the Marine Corps is shifting to something they
    call non-linear warfare which there isn't a long front line,
    there isn't a forward area that is clearly delineated and a
    rear area. Even in the portion of major combat operations, you
    had splotches of U.S. troops all over Iraq. In those
    circumstances where there is a non-linear battlefield, where
    you don't have that clarity even in conventional operations,
    you are going to have to think differently about how you do a
    lot of things, including resupplying units, providing rear area
    security, all sorts of things. We saw that as early as the
    initial operations with the Fedayeen who are operating in the
    rear area, what traditionally would have been the rear area.
    This is part of the larger issue, what is our strategy, what is
    our doctrine for dealing with these kinds of situations.
    Obviously going back to what President Kennedy said, it is the
    new environment, a new strategy, a new doctrine and that leads
    to different kinds of forces and different kinds of equipment
    and different kinds of training.
        Mr. Shays. Thank you. General.
        General Alexander. There have been several instances where
    we had deployed Guard units to theater to perform Mission A in
    Kuwait and out of necessity, they were required to perform
    Mission B in Baghdad. The classic example is the infantry
    battalions from Florida. As a result of these rapidly changing
    mission sets, these units chose to do their job with a lot of
    creativity, thus the steel plates that are put on vehicles, the
    sandbagging and the like, but I believe that initially the idea
    was to rebuild Iraq in a peaceful setting and the insurgency
    tactic came on so fast that the OIF-1 units were not quite able
    to recover.
        Today, every effort is being made to ensure that those
    mistakes don't occur. I think the equipping strategy will in
    fact, if the resourcing continues, catch up. It is the training
    doctrine, the ability to do urban warfare at home station is
    what the challenge is going to be.
        Mr. Shays. Do you mind if I go another round or do you want
    to go now and I will come back? Let me just make a comment.
        The comment is this. The administration has wanted more
    authority, and I believe there has to be more legislative
    oversight when there is more authority but one of the things I
    am actually convinced of is, and this hearing just adds
    confirmation to it, when the story of Iraq is told one of the
    biggest criticisms will be that Congress didn't do proper
    oversight. For Mr. Murtha to go and discover that our troops
    didn't have proper vests, thank God he went there but we didn't
    know it before. Had we gone into Iraq last year and gone to the
    prisons, I am absolutely convinced we would have been told
    things. Had I not had a community meeting, I wouldn't have
    learned about the failure to provide the kind of protection on
    our Humvees given the mission we were asking you and others to
    do.
        My job as a Member of Congress is to make sure it is never
    a fair fight. I think I was deprived of the knowledge that
    would have been helpful. In other words, I want it never to be
    a fair fight. We are going to know that literally hundreds of
    Americans were killed, in my judgment, because we didn't give
    them in some cases the proper training, the proper equipment
    and so on. I never thought I would be saying that. I didn't
    think in this day and age that would be the case.
        I would like to ask more questions but we have time. Thank
    you.
        Mr. Schrock. We are glad to be joined by the gentlelady
    from California who I would like to recognize for any questions
    and comments she has, Ms. Watson.
        Ms. Watson. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        First, I want to say to all of you thank you so much for
    the service to your country. We love you and we care about you.
    That is the reason why we are here, to be sure you have what
    you need to do your jobs on command. So what might come up in
    the form of a question is only because we care about you and we
    appreciate you.
        I too have been following exactly what you have been
    following. I do know someone who was in Iraq. He was a
    Reservist and he was at a community college and was called up.
    He was a Marine and he went over unprepared. He said they
    didn't have the Kevlar inside the clothing, they didn't have
    proper equipment. I have been hearing that families have had to
    purchase and outfit and in some cases send money for equipment.
        Let me ask Sergeant Neill, is that the case? Do you know if
    that is the case?
        Sergeant Neill. I can tell you, we bought our own vests
    before we left. We bought the level vests that police officers
    wear on the street. We knew we would be in a civilian
    environment, pretty much our teams would be by themselves, six
    or eight person teams. They bought their own vests and then
    additionally purchased the panels that go in the vests for
    additional coverage. We were prepared to do our job. Even if
    the military wasn't going to provide it, we knew what was out
    there and we got it.
        Ms. Watson. I feel that we let you down. Money was
    appropriated, why did it not get out to you.
        The other concern I have is that it should have been known
    beforehand that this battle would be fought in an urban
    environment. We watched shock and awe. The military in Iraq
    could not compete with that but I think they must have said we
    will catch you in the streets, we will catch you in the
    doorways because I was told by returning personnel that they
    never knew where the bullets were coming from and they never
    knew how to fight back. They just hit. So urban warfare is what
    you are experiencing at the current time.
        What kind of training was there prior to your detachment
    going into Iraq on how to be prepared for urban warfare?
        Colonel Novotny. I would like to address that. We designed
    a pretty extensive training plan for urban warfare. When my
    unit initially was going to be a quick deploying unit and we
    realized we had time to train, we coordinated for the facility
    at Fort Riley, it was blocked out for us. My NCOs led our
    soldiers through a training program from ground up, they
    covered everything from issuing and order in a mock environment
    to movement as an individual, movement as a team, movement as a
    platoon, how to clear buildings, how to defend. I was fortunate
    that we had 2 weeks of training in that facility and the reason
    for that is I felt there was a good possibility somewhere along
    the line that my unit may be engaged in a contact like that and
    we might have to perform the exact mission just as you
    described.
        Ms. Watson. I am wondering if your units are representative
    across the system. I am hearing a different system from those
    who have returned, that they certainly weren't prepared,
    particularly in a desert environment. I have had contact with
    some of the POWs and the story of how they got lost out in the
    desert and every sand dune looks like every other one and so
    they were ambushed and some were killed.
        My concern is have we done extensive planning and counter
    insurgency training because it looks like that is the way war
    is to come if we are going to be in the Middle East or other
    places, the Far East, would have to be fought. Are we planning
    ahead, are we giving adequate training, are we prepared? Anyone
    who would like to address that?
        Sergeant Neill. I don't think it was planned for when we
    first deployed but as we deployed and recognized the situation
    was changing and the people were adapting to our vehicle
    convoys, we changed what we were doing also. We instructed our
    soldiers in vehicle contact, how to take contact right, contact
    left, how to shoot at people they see firing at them, where
    they see fire coming from, the actual flashes, where they see
    smoke coming from, the actual smoke coming from weapons, where
    they see dust coming from the ground. Since we're in an
    environment where everything that moved caused dust to fly and
    move, if you couldn't see the people shooting at you, you could
    surely see one of those other things. Our job was to put down
    fire and move out of there unless we were disabled.
        Ms. Watson. Dr. Krepinevich, maybe you can add to that?
        Dr. Krepinevich. Yes, ma'am. As I mentioned in my
    testimony, the U.S. military has the world's best training
    infrastructure. However, it is a training infrastructure that
    is optimized principally for conventional warfare not counter
    insurgency. We, the U.S. military, for the last quarter of a
    century has essentially convinced itself we are not getting
    back into those kinds of conflicts. The military has had a lot
    of encouragement from the American people and the American
    political leadership. Right after Vietnam, the slogan was ``No
    More Vietnams,'' the 1990's was the decade of exit strategies
    and the 1980's, the Powell and Weinberger doctrines. So in a
    sense for a combination of reasons, we have a marvelous
    training infrastructure but it is not a training infrastructure
    that really is designed for a counter insurgency environment.
        As I mentioned earlier, it is not just the training
    facilities, it is a matter of doctrine having languished as
    well, a doctrine that as Sergeant O'Neill said, we train the
    way we expect to fight. If you don't expect to fight that way,
    you are not going to train that way. So it is also are we
    structured. Do we have the requisite skills not only at the
    individual level but at the unit level, the company level, the
    battalion level, the brigade level.
        Right now, of course, General Schoomaker is engaged in the
    process of restructuring the Army, including rerolling units,
    converting artillery men to military police and so on. This is
    going on in the active force and the Reserve force. It is
    laudable but it is also a reflection of the fact that in some
    respects we found ourselves behind the curve here playing catch
    up. As I mentioned, because insurgencies do tend to be
    protracted, I think if we are looking at accomplishing the
    kinds of goals the administration has set for us in Afghanistan
    and Iraq, we are looking at a long term conflict and probably
    in other parts of the world as well. Because of the enormous
    power of our military, we have driven enemies to insurgency, to
    terrorism and these forms of warfare.
        If we are going to be involved in this and we are in it for
    the long haul, the long hard slog that Secretary Rumsfeld talks
    about, then it is not just a matter of the kind of innovative
    approaches and quick fixes to training that these men are
    talking about, we also need to look more fundamentally at the
    doctrine we have for conducting these kinds of operations and
    what kind of training infrastructure we need to create to make
    sure that our soldiers and Marines get the right kind of
    training.
        Ms. Watson. Thank you so much for your comment.
        My questions, Mr. Chairman, should probably be addressed to
    the second panel but again, I want to let you know how much we
    appreciate your service.
        Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
        Mr. Schrock. Thank you, Ms. Watson.
        Mr. Shays.
        Mr. Shays. I know we need to get to the second panel but
    let me ask this because I am actually convinced we have the
    best trained and best equipped military in the world and the
    best experienced. In fact, because of our engagements, I am
    told there is nothing that gives you better training than the
    reality of live ammunition coming at you and the fear of death.
        I want to be clear on this. It strikes me that if you are a
    Reservist or National Guard, you have less time to train, and
    so you specialize in a particular mission but when you are sent
    off to battle, you may end up doing something different than
    your MOS. Is that a fair way to describe it or does someone
    need to qualify my view or would you agree with it?
        General Alexander. Based upon the comments from the field,
    that is in fact a reality. That is happening. Units are being
    deployed for a mission. In theater they are being rerolled to
    accomplish different missions.
        Mr. Shays. Let me ask, is it more likely that if you are
    active duty, that transition is not as big a challenge because
    you are training every day?
        General Alexander. I would say that perhaps it is a greater
    challenge for the Reserve components even though they are
    adjusting to it.
        Mr. Shays. Colonel, did you want to make a comment?
        Colonel. Novotny. Yes, sir. My primary mission in my
    battalion is to handle prisoners of war, civilian internees and
    detainees. When we actually hit ground in Iraq, our primary
    mission switched to force protection for the camp. While it is
    different, we were trained for that. Force protection was one
    of the critical subtasks that we identified well in advance of
    our mobilization that we needed to train on. We also had
    individuals who were trained on force protection before, we had
    sent people to school for force protection, we had people who
    had combat arms background and we were very fortunate to have
    engineers at our location to help with berming and entering
    protective environment force.
        Mr. Shays. Part of the purpose of this hearing was lessons
    learned and the capability of the military to adjust and learn
    and grow from experiences. So, for instance, you would have the
    Center for Army's lessons learned, I think that deals primarily
    with the training, it is a short term focus; you would have
    training and doctrine command which is more long term; you
    would have the rapid field initiative which would be short term
    dealing with equipment.
        Do any of the Reservists have an opportunity, or the
    National Guard, to interface in this process of being able to
    forward lessons learned? One of the complaints is that the
    Reservists and National Guard don't feel as much a part of this
    role, even though they have opinions.
        Sergeant Neill. Sir, we lesson learned the unit that came
    to replace us. We haven't lesson learned anybody else. We
    lesson learned the teams that replaced us. Lessons learned to
    everyone else hasn't happened yet but our training begins with
    individual team member selection. We select people to be on
    teams to do any job. We did a tactical job, they were prepared
    for it. What they weren't prepared for was the equipment
    shortage we faced and we didn't have the equipment the active
    duty had and we saw them with it.
        Mr. Shays. Let me go to lessons learned. Colonel, you are
    looking at me like I may be walking off a cliff here.
        Colonel Novotny. No, sir. Lessons learned were a two-way
    street. The information we provide up the chain, I felt went up
    and went through our active brigade, the Reserve Brigade that
    was above us and the information also came back down to us so
    that we could take the information that other people learned
    and apply it to our own tactics and doctrine we were currently
    employing in the field.
        Mr. Shays. Mr. Chairman, we could keep this panel here for
    a long time. Our next panel has waited a long time and I think
    we need to interact with them, but I want to thank you as well
    for being here today and thank your mom for doing her part as
    an American citizen and loving her son so much that she would
    have strangled her Congressman if he didn't take action.
        Mr. Schrock. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Let me too thank you all for being here. Your testimony was
    very helpful. Your answers to the questions were very helpful.
    We thank you very much for what you have done for our country.
        Let me mention one more thing before we go to the next
    panel. We are all familiar with General Taguba's report that he
    did on Abu Ghraib prison and some of the problems and hopefully
    how we can solve some of those problems, but in that report, he
    mentions one battalion commander who did his job very well in
    the detention business, better than anybody else I would
    imagine and that one person was Lieutenant Colonel Steve
    Novotny who is with us today. I think we ought to thank him for
    that.
        [Applause.]
        Colonel Novotny. Thank you very much, sir.
        Mr. Schrock. May be they need you back--no, I don't want to
    say they need you back over there, your family won't like that
    very well but they need to take the lessons learned from you
    and apply them there. Thank you again.
        Thank you all very much.
        We will take a 3 or 4 minute break before the next panel.
        [Recess.]
        Mr. Schrock. Let me welcome the second panel. As you saw
    with the first panel, it is traditional that we swear folks, so
    if you will stand with me.
        [Witnesses sworn.]
        Mr. Shays [assuming Chair]. I would note for the record
    that the witnesses all responded in the affirmative.
        We are glad to have you all here today. As I told
    Lieutenant General Hanlon a minute ago, I think legally if he
    comes up here one more time, I will have to claim him as a
    dependent. I see all of you all the time and that is a good
    thing.
        We are happy to have today Lieutenant General Edward
    Hanlon, Commandant, Marine Corps Combat Development Command;
    Lieutenant General Roger C. Schultz, Director, Army National
    Guard; Lieutenant General James R. Helmly, Chief, Army Reserve;
    and Brigadier General Louis W. Weber, Director of Training,
    U.S. Army. We are glad to have you here and thank you very
    much.
        With that, I will turn the floor over to General Hanlon.

      STATEMENTS OF LIEUTENANT GENERAL EDWARD HANLON, COMMANDANT,
      MARINE CORPS COMBAT DEVELOPMENT COMMAND; LIEUTENANT GENERAL
      ROGER C. SCHULTZ, DIRECTOR, ARMY NATIONAL GUARD; LIEUTENANT
      GENERAL JAMES R. HELMLY, CHIEF, ARMY RESERVE; AND BRIGADIER
        GENERAL LOUIS W. WEBER, DIRECTOR OF TRAINING, U.S. ARMY

        General Hanlon. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you very
    much for the invitation to be here today.
        It is good to be back to the committee because I was here a
    few years ago when I had the opportunity to testify before one
    of the subcommittees here on some of the training encroachment
    hearings we had back in those days. I thank you for the help
    you gave us because as was said on the first panel, train the
    way we will fight, had it not been for the foresight of some of
    this committee, I am not so sure we would have made the gains
    we did in the last couple of years in that regard, so I want to
    thank you.
        I have some written notes here but I think what I am going
    to do with your permission is in the interest of time and to
    allow for more questions and answers, let me make a few
    comments off the cuff and I will turn it over to the other
    panel members.
        Staff Sergeant SanchezLopez I think basically said it all
    when he talked about his Reserve battalion that was called up
    and went off to I believe he said Afghanistan and later into
    Operation Iraqi Freedom. He made the comment that his battalion
    was trained and equipped very much like his active duty
    counterparts. I think it is very important you all understand
    that from the Marine Corps perspective because that is exactly
    how we treat our Reserve units. We don't make any distinction
    between how our Reserve units, whether they be ground,
    aviation, combat element or combat service support, how they
    are trained and equipped from their regular counterparts.
        All of you as Congressmen I am sure have Reserve units in
    your districts. I would invite you when you have a chance, if
    you haven't had a chance yet, to go down to your local Marine
    Reserve center some weekend when you are back in the district
    and go in and see what goes on in one of those Reserve units
    because you will find that embedded in each Reserve unit is an
    organization we call an I&I, instructor inspector who is an
    active duty cadre and their job is to make sure that Reserve
    unit is trained and equipped and ready to go to war when they
    are called up. The idea is that they are trained already, they
    simply get mobilized and they join their regular counterparts
    and off they go. That is the way we have been doing business in
    the Marine Corps going back 50 or 60 years.
        I think the proof is in the pudding because we take a look
    at the way the Reserve units performed in Operation Iraqi
    Freedom, Operation Enduring Freedom, you will see no
    distinction between them and their regular counterparts. In
    Desert Storm and Desert Shield, you saw the same thing. I
    always like to point out in the Korean War in defense of the
    Pusan perimeter, the first Marines that went in there, the
    first brigade that held the line when North Koreans were almost
    pushing us off peninsula were Marine Reservists who came in
    there and held the line. Many of the Marines that went across
    the seawall at Inchon just a few months later, were for the
    most part Reservists. So since 1950 to 2004, we really don't
    make a distinction between how we train and equip our Reserves
    and our regular Marines. Staff Sergeant SanchezLopez is a
    Reservist but he is no different from me in that regard in that
    we are both Marines.
        I also wanted to point out with you that one of the things
    that is very important to us are the lessons learned. We can
    talk about that in the Q&A, if you have any questions on how we
    do that.
        Sitting behind me is Colonel Phil Exner. Phil is my
    Director of Studies Analysis at Quantico. He will soon be
    leaving to take an appointment, a cushy appointment over in
    Brussels at NATO but for the last 3 years I have had him as the
    Director of our Lessons Learned Team where he was running our
    efforts in Afghanistan, a year ago in Iraq and currently the
    operations we have in Iraq in which his responsibility is to
    capture real time the lessons learned we are gathering from the
    Marines who fought the last 3 years and turn that very rapidly
    into tactics, techniques and procedures for the Marines today,
    whether Reserve or active duty. I wanted to bring Phil with me
    today so you could see him and if you have any particular
    questions, he is certainly available to answer any of those
    questions.
        I would simply say it is a pleasure to be here. I thank you
    for the chance to be here and I look forward to your questions.
        Thank you.
        [The prepared statement of General Hanlon follows:]

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        Mr. Shays. Thank you, General.
        General Schultz.
        General Schultz. Thank you.
        It is an honor for me to appear before you again here
    today. I want to express my appreciation for the support of our
    soldiers and the families to this committee personally. Simply
    said, your support is critical to our mission success. Today,
    the Guard has over 93,000 soldiers deployed in missions around
    the world and we take preparing these soldiers for their
    assigned duty very seriously. You have my pledge to always keep
    their well being in mind as we proceed with missions assigned
    to Army National Guard units.
        Our soldiers ask for so little, yet they carry the burden
    of our priorities and proudly serve this Nation. They are
    selfless to the person. I am proud of every one of them. Now to
    the focus of this hearing on combating terrorism. I share your
    interest and your concerns.
        In perspective, we have made progress. You know well that
    many of our soldiers were called to active duty on very short
    notice. Many were placed on duty in less than 2 weeks. Although
    the mobilization process was accomplished well ahead of
    anything outlined in our plans, we can still do better. To the
    credit of our soldiers and their leaders, our units assembled,
    deployed and performed their missions. To date, almost 60,000
    soldiers from the Army National Guard have been demobilized
    since the September 11 attacks but work remains.
        We are concentrating in two principal areas, equipping our
    units and training our soldiers. While progress is being made
    with our rapid fielding initiatives, you will not find us
    satisfied until our equipment shortages have been fully
    accomplished. While it took longer than we had planned,
    individual body armor has now been provided to all of our
    soldiers in the Afghanistan and Iraqi theaters. We continue to
    distribute up-armored and add-on armor systems to our wheeled
    vehicle fleet. So I end where I started. The real credit for
    our current condition goes to our soldiers. They are truly
    outstanding indeed. Our Nation's call, they have answered and
    we too owe them our very best.
        Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        [The prepared statement of General Schultz follows:]

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        Mr. Shays. Thank you, General.
        General Helmly.
        General Helmly. Mr. Chairman and members of the
    subcommittee, thank you for the opportunity and the privilege
    to testify on behalf of the 211,000 soldiers, civilian
    employees and families of the U.S. Army Reserve, an integral
    component of the world's greatest army, an army at war for a
    Nation at war.
        I am Ron Helmly, Chief of Army Reserve and an American
    soldier in your Army and exceptionally proud of it. I have a
    brief statement that I would ask be entered into the record.
        This is my first opportunity to address this subcommittee.
    As the Chief, Army Reserve, I am profoundly humbled and sobered
    by my responsibility for the readiness, training and welfare of
    our soldiers and families. Today as we speak nearly 60,000 Army
    Reserve soldiers are on active duty in Iraq, Kuwait,
    Afghanistan and the continental United States and elsewhere
    around the world as part of America's global war on terrorism.
        Since September 11, 2001, more than 100,000 Army Reserve
    soldiers have served on active duty as part of this global war
    on terrorism. Tragically, 38 Army Reserve soldiers have made
    the ultimate sacrifice in service to our Nation. We are deeply
    in their debt and honor their memories by our actions here
    today.
        Your invitation to testify comes at a time of profound and
    unprecedented change in challenge in the dynamics of our
    Nation's security environment. From the start, we have
    understood that this will be no brief campaign or a short war.
    It will be an enduring global war, a protracted war, a long
    struggle that lacks clear, well defined borders. Have no doubt,
    however, our soldiers understand and our fellow soldiers,
    airmen and Marines all understand it is in fact a war. It
    challenges our national will and our perseverance, it tries our
    patience and indeed our moral fiber.
        As we engage these enemies, we recognize that carrying out
    current missions is not in and of itself sufficient. The very
    forces that cause this war to be different have propelled the
    world into a period of unprecedented change and volatility. We
    live in a much changed world and we must change to confront it.
    We must simultaneously confront today's challenges while
    preparing for tomorrow's. The Army will maintain its
    nonnegotiable contract to right and win our Nation's wars as we
    change to become more strategically responsive and maintain our
    dominance at every point across the spectrum of military
    operations. The confluence of these dual challenges
    transforming while fighting and winning and preparing for
    future wars is the crux of our challenge today, transforming
    while at war.
        The Army Reserve is part of a public institution founded in
    law. Our mission and our responsibility comes from this law. I
    would note that the law does not say for big wars, for little
    wars, short or medium wars. It says whenever our Nation, our
    Army and our Armed Services require us, we are to provide
    trained units and qualified soldiers. We must change to
    continue fulfilling the mandate of that law while
    simultaneously perfecting and strengthening the quality force
    we have today.
        The Army Reserve is fully engaged in the global war on
    terrorism. Every day we are dealing with challenges to ensure
    our soldiers are properly trained, adequately equipped and
    competently led. We are making every effort to incorporate
    lessons learned from the soldiers facing threats every day to
    better prepare mobilizing and deploying soldiers to survive and
    win on a lethal, complex battlefield. Your attention to this
    issue should help us design and resource the Army Reserve for
    success.
        I would be pleased to answer any questions you may have.
        Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        [The prepared statement of General Helmly follows:]

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        Mr. Shays. Thank you very much.
        General Weber.
        General Weber. Thank you for having me today. I appreciate
    the opportunity to appear before you to discuss how the
    Department of the Army is incorporating lessons learned from
    operations in Iraq and Afghanistan into the training and
    equipping of our Reserve and National Guard units prior to
    deployment.
        The Army appreciates your continued support of the men and
    women who make up our great Army as we conduct operations
    around the globe. Thank you so much.
        As you know, the Reserve and National Guard components are
    integral to the Army and indispensable to a quality force. We
    cannot perform effectively without employing National Guard and
    Reserve forces. Accordingly, the Army is committed to serving
    all components by providing common doctrine, standard
    organizations, fielding and supporting equipment and shared
    opportunities for training and leader development.
        We can expect the situation in Iraq and Afghanistan to
    continue to challenge the persistence and perseverance of our
    soldiers deployed there. Our forces face an adaptive threat
    that will continue to fight from the shadows without regard for
    conventional norms of warfare and will seek ways to undermine
    our resolve and support. The continuing readiness and
    effectiveness of our forces in Iraq and Afghanistan depends in
    no small part upon our ability to analyze and quickly address
    lessons we learn there on a rapidly changing basis.
        We have expanded our available assets to identify, gather,
    categorize and analyze operational lessons learned and then to
    rapidly develop and disseminate products associated with those
    lessons learned. The Center for Army Lessons Learned [CALL],
    established at Fort Leavenworth, KS, plays the most central
    role in this process and is used as the central repository for
    lessons learned, observations and associated tactics techniques
    and procedures [TTP].
        Operational lessons learned are routinely disseminated
    immediately to units already employed in theater and to those
    preparing to deploy. Lessons learned are also disseminated
    appropriately throughout the institutional Army as you heard
    from the previous panel, and aggressively applied the
    institutional processes. A top priority for the U.S. Army's
    doctrine development resources is generating TTPs for forces
    based on lessons learned from Afghanistan and Iraq.
        Our training base schools, both active and Reserve, do a
    remarkable job of providing individual leaders but the
    foundation, knowledge and skills need to be adapted
    asymmetrically in today's complex, contemporary operating
    environment, an environment as we know where leaders at all
    levels from sergeant through the general officer ranks are
    faced with decisions that have significant impacts on the
    enemy, their units, mission success and the indigenous
    population.
        The competencies that our soldiers and leaders, the main
    benefactors of lessons learned, need to execute operations
    across the entire spectrum or develop further at the Army
    combat training centers. We work hard at incorporating TTPs in
    what we are learning into the scenarios and training at the
    CTCs as well as our home station and mobilization training
    sites. Further, the information age has also enhanced the
    ability for direct communications between personnel and have
    completed an operational rotation or are currently deployed and
    those who are preparing to deploy. Currently, soldiers are
    using direct e-mail and Web sites both official and unofficial
    sites to share information about recent experiences and
    informal lessons learned. Commanders and leaders at all levels
    have invested an interest in using every tool available to
    better prepare their units and soldiers.
        In terms of resources, I would like to briefly describe how
    the Army decides to provide resources to the force. The Army
    Strategic Planning Board is the principal vehicle we use to
    prioritize requirements and resources. It functions as an
    iterative and adaptive planning body to provide an integrating
    framework to organize and synchronize support for a global
    campaign. In order to support the regional combatant
    commanders, the ASPB recommends solutions to immediate
    requirements, anticipates intermediate needs and puts sound
    thought into future requirements to win this war but also to
    posture the Army for other future contingencies. Since its
    establishment, the ASPB has developed recommendations for and
    has tracked over 500 discreet tasks in support of combatant
    commanders. It has obligated over $5.5 billion to support the
    war on terrorism and has synchronized the Department of the
    Army's planning and execution. The ASPB is the vehicle that we
    use to synchronize the priorities and the requirements that
    come into the building and then determine the prioritization
    for resourcing those requirements.
        The IED Task Force led by Colonel Joe Votel I think
    provides and excellent example of how the Army quickly adapts
    to changing circumstances. This task force was chartered to
    adopt a holistic approach focused on intelligence, tactics,
    techniques and procedures in information ops in order to turn
    around the lessons learned associated with IEDs back into the
    field.
        This particular task force has made numerous
    recommendations for doctrinal changes, training and
    organization adaptations to assist in the response to the IED
    threat.
        In conclusion, I would like to say the Army process for
    capturing lessons learned and providing solutions to deployed
    and deploying forces is generally a great success story. As you
    heard, it is a daunting task but adaptive leaders at every
    level are identifying the solutions and making recommendations
    for improving training, doctrine and material solutions. We are
    committed to providing the best resources available to every
    component and the best training we can develop to properly
    prepare our force.
        Thank you and I look forward to responding to any questions
    you may have.
        [The prepared statement of General Weber follows:]

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        Mr. Shays. Thank you.
        I wanted to hear all of your testimony. I am going to be
    gone for about 5 minutes and give Ms. Watson the chair. I will
    be back shortly.
        Ms. Watson [assuming Chair]. I want to thank all of you for
    your testimony and your brevity. We will carry on in the
    absence of the Chair but we don't want to take you through a
    long ordeal. Our purpose here today is to find out how we can
    help and what it is that we need to pay attention to.
        I have heard, as many of you have heard, that the people
    involved in the atrocities at the prison were untrained. They
    had not had the experience, most of them were young, and
    therefore their decisionmaking ability was not quite shaped.
    Any one of you can answer but maybe we ought to start with
    General Helmly and find out what kind of training would have
    taken place, did it take place in this instance, or were the
    military police of the 372nd Co. of the 800th Brigade just
    thrown into this situation and told to act as guards when their
    training was to be prepared to fight a more conventional and
    traditional way? General Helmly.
        General Helmly. First of all, the 372nd Military Police Co.
    is in fact organized as what we call a combat support military
    police company. That means that its primary organization,
    training and equipping is for general purpose missions,
    principally route reconnaissance, armored reconnaissance,
    convoy escort, rear area protection. Its parent battalion at
    Abu Ghraib and the 800th MPW Brigade were organized, trained,
    equipped specifically for IR operations. As you heard on the
    last panel, Lieutenant Colonel Novotny commanded a sister
    battalion to the 320th which was a specialty prisoner of war,
    detainee internment unit, specifically organized, trained and
    equipped for that purpose. So the 372nd was not specifically
    organized, trained and equipped. However, as you heard the
    young military police soldier from the Connecticut National
    Guard describe, his unit was a combat support, military police
    company. He described the training that he received which for
    military police soldiers of any specialization is extensive
    regarding the handling, the treatment, the security of
    detainees and prisoners of war.
        I have reviewed the training of all three of those units
    involved. Prior to their mobilization, they did in fact receive
    training on the law of land warfare and Geneva Convention. At
    their mobilization stations as was described by Colonel Novotny
    they received additional training regarding Geneva Convention
    and I will tell you my view is that what we have witnessed is
    an abject failure of leadership and personal conduct. It is
    true there is an old Army axiom that a soldier never receives
    enough training and thus shortly after the report was briefed
    to me in February, I initiated a special inspection by our Army
    Reserve Command Inspector General of the training we received
    with emphasis on military police and military intelligence
    units across our force with emphasis on interrogation, detainee
    handling and security, leadership and ethical decisionmaking
    because I felt strongly and I feel strongly today that there
    was a fundamental lapse of leadership and ethical
    decisionmaking that went on in leadership channels and that
    lacked courage to stop these abuses.
        I accept that training needs to be improved, it should be
    improved. We will never get enough. We will emphasize more
    strongly in the days, weeks and months ahead across our Army,
    not just Army Reserve, training in the law of land warfare and
    handling of detainees, and so forth but I reject any notion
    that a lack of training led to abuses that are this horrendous
    and this devastating.
        Ms. Watson. Do you feel that this particular group of
    military police were adequately trained? Do you feel prior to
    even going this group had the kind of character that would be
    able on the spot to make the kind of decisions that we would
    hope our well trained personnel would make? We have heard this
    particular outrageous event described as an aberration. I have
    tried, I had to go home this weekend, I couldn't hardly get out
    of the airport because when they see us coming through with our
    little badges, that is why I took mine off, I didn't want to be
    identified. They stop us in security, they stopped us on the
    streets, what are you doing about this. So I am saying we are
    looking into it. We are finding the truth.
        Personally, I don't feel that the people who were involved
    did it on their own because what strikes me is how do they have
    the trained dogs right onsite if this was a flash reaction?
    They seemed to have all of the resources necessary, these ropes
    and duct tape and so on. Who supplied that for that kind of
    spontaneous, negligent reaction? So I am thinking did someone
    look the other way? I am going to repeat as I monitored the
    news what I heard and all of you have heard it is that those
    involved said they were directed by the contract interrogators
    and the military interrogators. So can you respond to how the
    resources got in their hands to do the atrocities that were
    committed and that we saw on film?
        General Helmly. The kinds of resources that you cited are
    commonplace. I think you understand we use those for a variety
    of purposes.
        Ms. Watson. The trained dogs too?
        General Helmly. We use trained military police working
    dogs, yes. Those are not used for prisoner abuse, they are
    there to detect mines, explosives, to walk with military
    police, the walking perimeter guards around the prisons at
    night. They are an excellent tool used by all the armed forces
    for security purposes. In this case, the dogs were misused
    rather like using a simple broom instead of its intended
    purpose to hit or to abuse someone. So the kinds of things you
    cited were misutilization of common resources.
        With regard to the word character, that in my judgment is
    the fundamental flaw. The Uniform Code of Military Justice
    provides an authorization for a soldier when they believe an
    order they have been given is illegal in nature to question
    that order. We had one simple specialist who had the courage to
    question an order and to report what he felt were abuses. That
    then led to this investigation with regard to the six or seven
    soldiers currently charged. There could be other charges
    brought for either administrative disciplinary action or
    further action under the Uniform Code of Military Justice. I
    would note that the investigations are not complete. General
    Taguba's investigation is complete, it has spawned others and
    further inquires are ongoing as a result of General Taguba's
    investigation. We will be relentless in determining how to
    prevent recurrences of this nature.
        Ms. Watson. Thank you very much, General.
        I am glad you mentioned General Taguba's report because in
    that report he found that the military police were never
    trained in interment operations and his conclusion is
    inconsistent with what you have just said to us.
        General Helmly. Yes, I think in that case he is referring
    to the 372nd Military Police Co. and I acknowledge that was a
    combat support military police unit, not specifically
    organized, trained and equipped for interment operations.
        Ms. Watson. I see. Are you saying that they were misused or
    misplaced, they should not have been there?
        General Helmly. No, I am not saying that at all. They were
    assigned there because there was a shortage of the specialty
    units, so they were assigned there. They are capable of
    fulfilling that role. We had other combat support military
    police units pressed into security duties for interment and
    detainee security and none of those units felt obliged, that we
    know of, to commit such atrocities.
        Ms. Watson. Apparently they were just substitute units that
    were put in there and they said they never had the interment
    operations training. I would think any person whose conscience
    was functioning would not commit the kind of acts they did. I
    don't know what is going on here.
        In terms of the dogs that are used and very well used and a
    necessary component as you survey and secure, can anyone go in
    and check out one of those dogs or do they have to go with the
    person who trained them, can people who are brought in at the
    last minute use those dogs efficiently and effectively, can
    they give the signals that would have the dogs sicced on a
    prisoner? How does that work?
        General Helmly. We call those military working dog teams
    because there is a human handler with the animal. They are
    trained by the Air Force at the same time at the same school
    and each of the Armed Services employs them as teams. I could
    not go out or you could not go out or another soldier not
    trained with that particular animal and cause the animal to
    perform its trained task.
        Ms. Watson. Then how did these military police have custody
    and access to those dogs and get those dogs to act the way they
    did? If they have to go out with somebody who has trained with
    them, then how did they get into the hands of the people who
    you saw in the pictures?
        General Helmly. We have military police working dog teams.
    These are military police soldiers trained as dog handlers with
    the dogs.
        Ms. Watson. So they knew exactly what they were doing?
        General Helmly. That could be attached to such a military
    police unit. As I noted, they are frequently used for external
    security, walking perimeter guard to detect people who would be
    trying to infiltrate or to sabotage these operations.
        Ms. Watson. Would you explain to the committee what the
    relationship is between the contract interrogators, the
    military interrogators and the military police, the 372nd?
        General Helmly. Candidly, I am not qualified to answer that
    question. I was not in command on the ground and in my
    position, I provide forces to the combatant commanders.
        Ms. Watson. I understand. Is there anyone on the panel who
    could respond? What we are trying to do here is to look at this
    and get to the truth so we can reorganize if we need to and we
    can correct the tremendous mistakes that were made. I want to
    know if anyone can respond, and maybe you can't, why the person
    who was in charge of the prison was told that she could not be
    around when interrogations were taking place and why someone
    did not go in and monitor what was going on? I also want to
    know why there were photographs taken of these violations? Can
    anyone hazard a response?
        Mr. Shays [resuming Chair]. Since the gentlelady is on her
    third 5 minutes, we will defer that question and allow that
    question to be answered, but I want to get back to the focus of
    this hearing and I want to be real clear about not losing what
    was said in the first panel.
        I found it pretty difficult to think that I sent men and
    women into battle who did not feel they were properly trained,
    who did not feel they had the proper equipment and I want to
    know how you reacted when you had someone say basically, we
    didn't even have enough ammunition. Walk me through that and
    have me understand how you reacted when you listened to the
    first panel. If we could start with you, General Helmly?
        General Hanlon. I think in listening to Staff Sergeant
    SanchezLopez's comments, I would like to think that those
    comments did not apply to any of the Marine units that were
    involved. Let me give you an example. All the Marine units that
    came back from Operation Iraqi Freedom from last year, and had
    returned by August 2003. We then found out this past November
    that we were going to have to go back into Iraq with a force of
    about 25,000 Marines, of which there would be a mix of regular
    and Reserve Marines. We made sure that all of those Marines,
    whether Reserve or regular, were properly equipped and properly
    trained for the mission they were going to.
        Ms. Watson, I know you are from the district right outside
    of Los Angeles. Not far down the road from you at Riverside,
    CA, there is the former air base called March Air Force Base.
    We went there and with the help of the base, took over what
    used to be the old housing area there and put together a
    special training facility so that every single battalion that
    was going to go back into Iraq, Reserve and regular, went
    through a special urban training environment to walk them
    through scenarios and vignettes that they could experience when
    they were in Iraq. This is where the efforts of Colonel Exner
    who I introduced earlier was so important because his team
    which was embedded and had gone forward into Iraq, were sending
    back to us the kinds of things we needed because we were
    relieving the 82nd Airborne Division. So we were pulling down
    from our Army colleagues the things they were learning, we were
    transferring that very rapidly to the training our Marines were
    getting. That group of Marines will be returning sometime in
    the August/September timeframe.
        Mr. Shays. General, let me say this to you. We have not had
    testimony that I am aware of, that Marines have said they were
    short on ammunition. This is, I think, frankly more a National
    Guard problem than maybe even a Reservist issue, so let us cut
    to the chase and maybe we can have that addressed. The Marines
    has its challenges but I guess that wasn't one of them.
        General Schultz. I am responsible for the Army National
    Guard, as you know. I was surprised to find out that we didn't
    have ammunition in theater. We have had spot shortages of
    ammunition here in the continental United States and General
    Weber can obviously get inside the detail, talk about the
    numbers and types of ammunition and so on. We have said as a
    priority units going to combat will have the preference for
    ammunition. So we have moved ammunition around the Guard,
    around some of our supply points so we can at a minimum prepare
    soldiers for their combat duty they are about to deploy to.
        In terms of training, I listened carefully to the first
    panel and take significance interest in the tone of the
    messages and the themes that were mentioned by the panel
    members. Every unit is certified by a team outside the Guard as
    we prepare to deploy units into combat. When Guard units don't
    satisfy minimum deployment standards, they don't deploy. We
    have changed out unit leadership, we have changed out unit
    commanders, held up the latest arrival dates to be certain that
    our units satisfy minimum deployment, meaning combat readiness
    standards. When they don't satisfy the standards, they don't
    deploy on the schedules. So I take very seriously the issue
    that our units were in theater and felt they weren't prepared
    because in my mind we had processes in place, systems in place,
    second opinion by a team outside the Guard channels to certify
    our units for deployment. What I learned from the first panel
    is we have some more work.
        Mr. Shays. Any other comments?
        General Helmly. Sometimes old bad habits die very hard.
    Training didn't start yesterday obviously, it started a long
    time ago, in the past, the first panel explained that the
    nature of the war we are fighting at the tactical level has
    changed, there is no secure rear area, we are fighting an enemy
    that is very adaptive and lethal and we found ourselves
    disorganized for it, soft skinned vehicles and not the right
    kind of weaponry, as cited in the first panel we did not have
    communications for individual truck drivers, and so forth, we
    were short night vision goggles. When we entered this war, our
    strategic guidance was that we were in a period of strategic
    pause, that we could take risks with near term readiness and
    invest in research and development for the farther out
    requirements.
        I am exceptionally proud of the fact that the Army
    leadership has grabbed hold of this. Our current chief has been
    nothing less than a bull dog in terms of rectifying, as General
    Schultz noted, the shortages of individual body armor,
    shortages of ammunition. General Weber can speak to the details
    but almost $1 billion in the past 6 months was put into
    ammunition production and shortages of up-armored Humvees.
        I will note though that it also requires an immense change
    in the way we think about things. Only in the last 2 years has
    Army Reserve Command training guidance focused our soldiers on
    the performance of warrior tasks in conjunction with their
    technical support tasks. In the past, the training guidance
    focused on technical training and no one really worried. I can
    go back in time where I have had soldiers tell me I didn't have
    training ammunition. I look at the allocation and the command
    didn't shoot its full allocation of training ammunition. That
    is because our leaders were not doing their job and training
    soldiers for war. So we have corrected that.
        I must tell you we have an immensely strong effort to train
    our soldiers and prepare them for close combat, all soldiers so
    that we do not repeat stories of 507th maintenance company
    again. That was a training failure of the first order. We do
    not intend to repeat those mistakes.
        Mr. Shays. Thank you. General Weber, if you would respond?
        General Weber. Last year I had the privilege of being
    Assistant Division Commander for Support for the 3rd Infantry
    Division during its fight up to Baghdad. I can tell you that
    you are never well enough equipped to do what you think you are
    going to have to do in the next war. In spite of our best
    efforts, in spite of what we would like to do, the fact of the
    matter is when it comes down to correct resourcing and applying
    the money to buy those resources and ensuring that your troops
    have those resources, those are very complex issues as you
    know.
        The 3rd Infantry Division in this case, all of our troops
    were not fully equipped with SAPI plates for example. With the
    limited amount of resources that were available to the
    division, we positioned those resources where we thought the
    threat was the greatest. We didn't have everything we needed.
    The truth of the matter is you go to war with what you have,
    you don't go to war with what you would like to have because
    sometimes it is not completely available. Up-armored Humvees,
    for example, we have a huge requirement for up-armored Humvees.
    It has grown over time. The current validated requirement in
    the theater is 4,454 up-armored Humvees. Currently we have
    3,139 that have been produced and positioned toward the
    theater.
        Part of our problem is the industrial base capabilities of
    our country to produce what we need. Because you apply
    resources in terms of money and funding to buy what you need
    does not imply that it is immediately available. This month
    alone, the production for up-armored Humvees will hit 220
    vehicles. We have been at war over a year. Some would argue
    that perhaps we need to take another look at our industrial
    base capabilities. That production rate will rise to 300 per
    month starting in July and with the current requirements, we
    plan on producing 300 vehicles a month through March 2005.
        The fact of the matter though is we don't have enough up-
    armored Humvees today in the inventory to do what is required
    in the theater. As you heard earlier, SAPI plates and body
    armor has been taken care of but again, that took us time. The
    production capability was not there to get it to us when we
    needed it. One could argue we did not forecast well enough what
    we might have needed, but the current assumptions about how the
    war was going to be conducted and the assumptions we were using
    a year ago based on after operations have proven to be invalid
    to a certain extent we could argue and we have responded to
    that as best we could I think.
        Mr. Shays. I appreciate your honest answer. I knew they
    would be honest but candid answers. It will be very interesting
    when the story is told in the years to come what are the things
    that had unintended consequences. For instance, when we
    disbanded the government, the army and the police, in my five
    visits to Iraq, four of them with the military and outside the
    umbrella of the military, I had countless Iraqis tell us they
    would love to have guarded the hospitals and other sites. They
    also said there are bad people in the military and the police
    and in the government but most are very decent people. They
    would say to me, how would you have survived in Saddam's
    government, how would you have fed your family? That forced us
    to do things with our military.
        When I came from Algute in a taxi and we were late getting
    to the green zone, I saw three Humvees in front of us and I
    said to the taxi driver, follow them, they are clearing the
    path. The taxi driver said, I don't know how he said it but it
    was in his language, like are you crazy. I am haunted by it
    now, thinking were they patrolling with no armament in their
    Humvee and you could see the tension in their necks. The driver
    had his left hand on the steering wheel and his right hand with
    this rifle across his lap with it on the trigger. I am thinking
    it shouldn't be like that, it shouldn't have turned out this
    way. It makes me want to know if the so-called best practices,
    lessons learned and so on, all the lessons we are going to
    learn I hope we have a real good analysis of this.
        I will say again, I think one of the analyses should be you
    should be having more congressional oversight. There should
    have been Members of Congress walking that prison in September
    of last year. When I was in other places this time someone from
    Bremer's organization in the Babylon area said, Congressman, we
    only have seven people. I am supposed to have 100 and the
    Marines are leaving and the Poles are taking their place or
    someone else coming up to me and saying we don't have enough
    money, in September last year. These are things I could come
    back and raise questions. I am certain if you had members
    walking that prison, we would have seen maybe human waste being
    thrown at our troops and we would have raised questions about
    that but we would have someone come up and say, I am a cook, I
    don't know what I am doing here. I don't have the training that
    I need. That would have forced a dialog a lot sooner and we
    would have been able to break through the chain of command or
    somehow as you have all said, a failure of leadership. It is
    also a failure of Congress to not do its job.
        Ms. Watson, you have 10 minutes for any questions you want
    to go through. She had a question on the table.
        Ms. Watson. I want to get some ideas back from you. I don't
    understand the chain of command and what authority do the
    contract interrogators have. What is their relationship to the
    military personnel there and the military intelligence, those
    interrogators, what is their relationship to the Guard, to the
    MPs? Can someone respond?
        General Helmly. I don't know, as I was about to say
    earlier, what instructions were provided.
        Ms. Watson. I just want to know how does the chain of
    command work in that scenario?
        General Helmly. That is what I am explaining. I don't know
    what guidance was provided to the chain of command. I will tell
    you that I think all of us at this table are quite accustomed
    to working with contractors.
        Ms. Watson. Let me clarify my question because I am not
    being clear. I would like to know does a private interrogator,
    contractee interrogator have a relationship to the MPs and if
    so, what is that? Who would tell the general who was in charge
    of determent and the prisons what to do and what not to do in
    terms of the interrogation? Where in the chain of command does
    this take place?
        General Helmly. I don't feel qualified to answer that. I
    think General Taguba's investigation went into that. I will
    simply say that had I been in charge of that, I feel if I am in
    command, I am in full command and if you are a contractor or
    civilian employee, you work for me.
        Ms. Watson. That helps. If you were in charge of prisons,
    then you would be in full command. Could you and do you and can
    you go through at any time and inspect and monitor what is
    going on?
        General Helmly. I would have insisted upon that access and
    had I been denied that access by anyone, short of physical
    actions, I would have informed my superiors that they could no
    longer hold me accountable because if I am in command, I will
    go anyplace in the organization I wish to go.
        Ms. Watson. Thank you. Maybe Lieutenant General Hanlon can
    address that same question too. Can the civilian contractor
    order the MPs to do something?
        General Hanlon. I will answer that question by saying that
    I am deferring to my colleagues in the Army who probably have a
    bit more familiarity with that situation than I. I don't have
    any at all but I will tell you, and I think the General gave an
    excellent answer a second ago when he said I think it is safe
    to assume that any commander any place, any time, anywhere
    where you have civilian contractors working for you, in the
    mess hall much less interrogators, ultimately are responsible
    to you as the commander for the good order, discipline and the
    functioning of whatever their job is. So I thought his answer
    was very good but I can't give any more definition than that
    because I am really not familiar.
        Ms. Watson. That is acceptable to me. We are just trying to
    get some things clarified. I was interested in the chain of
    command.
        What obligations does the civilian-private contractor have
    when they come into say a prison to interrogate? Is there an
    obligation to report to whoever is in charge? Do they have to
    go through the personnel that is already there, the MPs? How
    does that work?
        General Helmly. Contractors are not independent operators.
    I think General Hanlon addressed that part. They sign a
    contract to perform tasks for the U.S. Government. We have
    contracting officers, technical representatives and contracting
    officers representatives. The COTRs, I have been one of those
    myself and within the terms of that contract, I always gave
    them guidance, direction and instruction and insisted upon
    reports from them, visited their workplace and I think all of
    us have done that, not in my case with interrogators but again,
    with the exception of the function being performed, I would not
    try to administer such a contract any differently than I do
    with contract employees who do staff work for us here in the
    Pentagon.
        Ms. Watson. Is it a usual thing for the intelligence
    interrogators, the contract or military, to say to the prison
    guards, the MPs, whoever, soften them up. Is this something
    that is said when they are preparing to go into a situation,
    soften them up, and who would say that, and would the military
    police have to respond accordingly?
        General Hanlon. I am not in any way shape or form trying to
    dodge your question but I am not an intel officer, I am not a
    military police officer, I run the Marine Corps Combat
    Development Command and there is no way I can begin to answer
    that question because I have no idea what the authorities were
    or any guidance given in that particular case.
        Ms. Watson. All right.
        General Schultz.
        General Schultz. Ms. Watson, I have been in the Army over
    41 years. I have not heard the term, never been associated with
    the use of that term. I also must clarify I am not a military
    police officer.
        General Helmly. I don't think any of us are trying to dodge
    your question but I believe the question is with any degree of
    clarity and accuracy, it is probably impossible for any of us
    to answer given the fact that none of us were there, none of us
    are military police and today do not run military police or
    military intelligence operations. I will simply say if someone
    instructed----
        Ms. Watson. Sir, I know you weren't there. What I am trying
    to find out and maybe somebody would come forward and let me
    know what the chain of command is in a prison setting. Who
    oversees, who orders people to do things?
        Mr. Shays. Could the gentlelady suspend just a second, so
    we understand? I want the gentlelady to be able to ask these
    questions but I want to understand the expertise of the
    witnesses we have to make sure we are not tasking them beyond
    their expertise.
        Ms. Watson. Chain of command.
        Mr. Shays. Chain of command is, I want to say, a very
    logical question that anyone should be able to ask. I just want
    to know in terms of prison guarding and so on, what expertise
    do you gentlemen bring to this issue just so we understand.
    Have you had those tasks during your time in the military? Who
    has so we know who to ask if any? Do any of you have that
    responsibility?
        General Weber. Sir, speaking for myself, no. I am an
    armored cavalryman by trade. I have very little to do with MPs
    and military intelligence.
        General Helmly. Sir, as Commander, I am responsible for the
    training of the U.S. Army Reserve but I have no direct
    expertise in detainee operations or interrogations.
        Mr. Shays. But in terms of making sure you have people
    trained, that would be the closest we have gotten so far.
        General Schultz and then I will let you get back to our
    questioning, just so we know.
        General Schultz. In our units, we have military police
    capabilities and we have soldiers in our subordinate chains of
    command that prepare them for their duty in theater including
    prison related work. I am not personally involved in the
    question you asked, however.
        Mr. Shays. General Hanlon.
        General Hanlon. In my past, I have been a base commanding
    general. As a base commanding general, I have had military
    police work for me for the good order and discipline of
    protecting the military base and we had a brig aboard the base
    which did normal functions for what brigs are designed for, but
    I have not had any experience at all in any kind of facility
    dealing with detainees or prisoners of war.
        Mr. Shays. I appreciate that you are trying to be helpful
    to Ms. Watson who is asking questions that all of us in
    Congress would like answers to. We are just trying to break the
    surface here and begin to understand. I am sorry, Ms. Watson.
    We will keep the clock running for you.
        Ms. Watson. I just have one or two more things. General
    Schultz, were there any Marine Reservists accused of shall I
    say violations within that prison setting?
        General Hanlon. You said General Schultz, did you mean
    General Hanlon?
        Ms. Watson. Lieutenant General Schultz.
        General Schultz. I am not familiar with any.
        Ms. Watson. General Hanlon.
        General Hanlon. Would you repeat that question?
        Ms. Watson. I understand that Marine Reservists have been
    accused of abuses of Iraqi prisoners. Are you aware that there
    have been some accused?
        General Hanlon. There were allegation from a year ago
    involving some Marines. My understanding is that all the cases
    are being adjudicated. In fact, I think in a couple of cases
    there are pending courts martial. Many of the charges were
    dismissed and I know each and every one of those cases has been
    under investigation. That is about all I know about it because
    it involved commands other than my own. My understanding is
    they have all been investigated and they are all being properly
    adjudicated.
        Ms. Watson. In this kind of situation, in a detention
    facility, who can command a Marine Reservist to treat prisoners
    one way or the other? Who is in direct charge of them?
        General Hanlon. You have a Marine, a rifleman, say he is a
    Lance Corporal and say this Lance Corporal is in a platoon in a
    company in a battalion in a regiment, so he has a chain of
    command. If he is a Lance Corporal, he will have a squad
    leader, a squad leader will have a platoon leader, a platoon
    leader will have a platoon commander, a platoon commander will
    have a company commander, a company commander will have a
    battalion commander, a battalion commander will have a
    regimental commander, so there is a set chain of command that
    Marine is responsible to every single day. If he is a Lance
    Corporal, he is probably reporting to a Corporal or to a
    Sergeant.
        Ms. Watson. In a detention facility?
        General Hanlon. In any facility. No matter where a Marine
    is located, he will have a boss.
        Ms. Watson. I want to focus on a detention facility, just
    say detention facility.
        General Hanlon. I don't know what that means, a detention
    facility. Are we talking like what?
        Ms. Watson. I am talking about the detention facility in
    question, a prison, interment wherever. Who can direct a Marine
    Reservist?
        General Hanlon. First of all, I would like to go back to
    something I said earlier.
        Ms. Watson. Let me ask you, can a contractor do that?
        General Hanlon. No, ma'am.
        Ms. Watson. Thank you. You have answered my question.
        General Hanlon. My understanding is that a Marine will
    always take his instructions from another Marine. I just want
    to say one thing, something I said in my opening comments. We
    don't make distinctions between Reservists and active duty
    Marine. A Marine is a Marine.
        Ms. Watson. OK. Very good. I appreciate your response and I
    will try to figure it out.
        General Hanlon. Thank you.
        Ms. Watson. That is it.
        Mr. Shays. Let me ask a question I have been very curious
    about. When I hear that mothers and fathers are buying
    protective vests for their children in Iraq, is it the same
    quality vest that you would see our own military have when they
    have their vest? Is it the same or is it something less than
    what the military could buy?
        General Schultz. Mr. Chairman, the cases I am familiar
    with, they will meet a police standard for police operations
    here in the continental United States but will not satisfy a
    U.S. military criteria. It is slightly different.
        Mr. Shays. Really what starts to happen is that if they
    have nothing, something is better than nothing but it doesn't
    in most cases meet the standard of the military?
        General Schultz. That is correct.
        Mr. Shays. First Sergeant Neill made four points. I would
    like to go through those points with you and get a response. He
    said, ``We have a shortage of warrant officers who are the
    officer team leaders. It is my belief that this shortage could
    be filled directly from the senior NCO ranks where soldiers are
    forced out of the Army because of age, time and grade and time
    and service.'' Do you have any response to that comment?
        General Schultz. Mr. Chairman, we have a shortage of 1,500
    warrant officers in the Army National Guard today. The First
    Sergeant's recommendation is the very issue we are working
    right now. That would be to take from our senior non-
    commissioned officer ranks those soldiers that satisfy the
    skills to become warrant officers and they clearly could begin
    to fill those shortages that we have outlined here that come
    time of war, no doubt have to all be filled. So the point he
    raises, although he is an Army Reservist, applies to the Guard
    no doubt.
        Mr. Shays. This is his second point. ``Many years ago,
    motor sections, supply sections and communications sections
    were all moved from intelligence companies and sent to
    battalion level organization where their staffing was reduced
    and became ineffective. Maybe it is time to look at bringing
    them back to individual companies.'' What is your response to
    that?
        General Helmly. Mr. Chairman, that is a part of the
    modified table of organization and equipment, the
    organizational structure laid down by the Department of the
    Army. I would tell you that we are relooking every kind of
    organization in the Army under an action called modularizing
    our units. I have every confidence that will be relooked.
    Whether the Army will change that, I don't know but we are
    relooking the organizational structure of virtually all of our
    units.
        Mr. Shays. Under the heading of mobilization, he said, ``We
    were the prisoners at Fort Dix.'' What was he driving at?
        General Helmly. He was pointing out that the installation
    Commander stated soldiers mobilizing there would be restricted
    to the installation. That was done principally for safety and
    security. We found that some soldiers were attempting to take a
    day or an afternoon drive too far after 16-18 hours of training
    and we were incurring accidents. So many of the installation
    commanders said, you have to stay on the installation.
        Mr. Shays. How long a time before they were deployed were
    they at Fort Dix?
        General Helmly. I don't know for that particular unit. I
    will take that for the record and tell you how long they were
    at Fort Dix.
        [The information referred to follows:]

        The unit's processing at Fort Dix lasted 63 days.

        Mr. Shays. I have no comprehension. Are we talking a month
    or two or potentially many, many months?
        General Helmly. We had some units that were in OIF-1 that
    were stagnated in the flow of forces to the theater and spent 3
    to 4 months at a mobilization station. I will tell you in those
    instances most Mob Commanders then tried to take action to
    provide for passes and that kind of thing in a measured manner.
        Mr. Shays. I want to say I don't know your reaction but I
    thought the panel we had was a thoughtful group of individuals.
    I felt they care about their job, they care about the military
    and want it to work better. They just want people to listen and
    that is one of the reasons I appreciated that we had all four
    of you taking the time to listen. It means a lot to them and it
    means a lot to this committee that you did that.
        His fourth point was, ``We also had issues with doctrine
    which would not allow us to task sources of information.'' In
    other words, if an Iraqi told him something that was
    informative, he could gain passive information but he could not
    say, why don't you go back and see if you find this. It strikes
    me that it would have been potentially helpful to do that. What
    are the pros and cons of doing that and why didn't we allow it?
    Do you want to take a stab at it, General Hanlon?
        General Hanlon. I guess I did not hear that particular
    comment but I would only say to you that I would like to think
    since I am responsible for the doctrine in the Marine Corps and
    how we train Marines, I would like to think that under no
    circumstances would we ever have doctrine that would in any
    way, shape or form stifle the initiative of a Marine when it
    comes to getting a piece of information and acting on it. In
    fact, we encourage them to do just that.
        Mr. Shays. He was basically saying sources did provide
    information for a variety of reasons but money was not
    available as an incentive. ``We also had an issue with doctrine
    which would not allow us to task sources of information. We
    would suggest but not task. Sources do not need suggestions,
    they need directions. You ask them a question and tell them to
    come back with an answer.'' Does someone from the military want
    to take a shot?
        General Helmly. Sir, I think General Hanlon made an
    excellent point. We write doctrine to provide us guidance.
    Sometimes one finds that it is interpreted more as dogma by
    some and I would like to echo your remarks and agree with you.
    All of these service members we saw, Staff Sergeant
    SanchezLopez and the three Army soldiers, all the officers and
    non-commissioned officers and the enlisted soldier, all remind
    us of the immensely strong, capable, competent, professional
    force we all have and are very proud of. In this case, I took
    the First Sergeant's remarks to mean that he felt he probably
    had a shortage of money to pay informants from which he could
    get information. I believe we are tackling that. We understand,
    as our Chief has said, that in fact, we find ourselves fighting
    a network when we are organized as a hierarchy and we have
    found several times we have to go too far up in that hierarchy
    to get permissions. As we find those cases, we are rapidly
    trying to change those in order to adapt ourselves to this kind
    of battlefield.
        Mr. Shays. To give some credit to the Army, General
    Patrayus, when we met with him, he didn't wait for the CPA, he
    just started. He started to interact with Iraqis, he started to
    meet with them, he tried to understand their culture, he did a
    lot of things that I think Marines would probably take pride in
    as well, showing that kind of initiative and not being held
    back by the doctrine, probably taking a risk or two but I think
    made a very important contribution.
        General Weber. If I could comment, please?
        Mr. Shays. Yes, thank you.
        General Weber. What General Patrayus was doing was not any
    different than what any other unit was doing in Iraq
    immediately after the war. All of us in the 3rd Infantry
    Division were doing the same thing and if you go over today,
    battalion, brigade and even company commanders are doing
    exactly what you described. They are meeting with the people
    who are involved, they are trying to develop the intelligence
    community and information they need to fight the fight at their
    own levels and that is going on. That is what we do, that is
    how we adapt to the environment and that is what our unit
    commanders are responsible to do. I would like to highlight
    that is what our Army is all about, we take the current threat
    conditions, take the environment we are operating in and adjust
    to try to get in front of the enemies and the threat.
        Mr. Shays. Let me say this with all due respect, General
    Weber. Having been there five times, there are some people that
    did it better than others and he pushed the envelope a little
    further. I will tell you that I know our troops were during the
    day fixing up the schools and painting and cleaning them up and
    at night looking for the bad guys. I know that happened, so I
    want to agree with your general point, but what happened with
    General Patrayus is instantly there were people waiting for CPA
    to do some of what we said CPA should do. He just couldn't wait
    and I think he started the ball rolling a little sooner. I just
    want to say that to you because I met with a number of Army
    personnel and I was struck with the fact that he was pushing it
    a little bit more than others, but your point is
    extraordinarily valid.
        One more point of our first testifier. He said, ``Soldiers
    purchased much of their own equipment. They purchased cell
    phones that we used for communications, clothing, bug spray,
    CPS systems, handheld radios for in between vehicle
    communication, office supplies, tranformers, refrigerators and
    coolers. Additionally, they paid for NTB vehicle repairs and
    purchased parts for maintenance for which they were not
    reimbursed.'' It strikes me, I don't want to say it is
    embarrassing, but it is good there was this ingenuity, but it
    strikes me I am looking at myself and Congress and saying where
    did I drop the ball or where did other Members of Congress drop
    the ball that this happened? Is it that things simply got out
    of hand?
        I will tell you what I am wrestling with. I was chairing a
    Budget Committee hearing and we had one of the commanding
    officers accompany Mr. Wolfowitz or Mr. Wolfowitz was
    responding. I have great respect for Mr. Wolfowitz. It was
    mentioned that we might need 200,000 plus troops and it was
    immediately argued that we didn't need as many, but I am struck
    by the fact that we overworked our folks. They got very little
    sleep, they worked morning, noon and night and I am just struck
    by the fact that it seems to me things got out of hand.
        General Weber. If I could comment? You are familiar with
    the rapid fielding initiative and that was the result of the
    lessons learned early on from the OIF piece but also from the
    OEF lessons learned. What struck me about the previous panel
    was a lot of those comments were associated with the OIF-1
    units that granted had some shortages, had some problems, etc.
    What I find interesting today is with the OIF-2 rotation, every
    unit that was sent, in theory but we try to make it happen, was
    fielded with a basic set of equipment under the rapid fielding
    initiative for soldiers to take care of some of those problems
    you just identified.
        I would try to explain it to you that the Army has noticed
    a shortfall and a shortcoming and we have taken corrective
    action to try to field the soldier with the right equipment
    that he needs.
        Mr. Shays. I will just make a point to you. It would
    sometimes be good to learn this from the command rather than
    from the field. We were learning things from what soldiers were
    telling their loved ones back home and so on. I think we need
    to have a lot of respect for each other and our capability to
    deal with this. We were learning in some cases indirectly and I
    think that is what is so unsettling about this whole issue with
    the prisons.
        Let me close by asking you what is the point of the first
    panel that you agreed with most and what is the point you
    agreed with least? This isn't a quiz, I know you must react and
    say, I don't agree with that. If there wasn't anything said in
    the first panel you don't agree with, then I would like to know
    that or if you want to qualify it. I realize we have three Army
    personnel and one Marine, but is there anything you would like
    to comment about the first panel?
        General Schultz. The first panel outlined for me the
    urgency of the equipping issues. You know we have been working
    this for some months, years now and it has just come a little
    too slow to satisfy anyone, so I am reminded we just have to
    keep some issues on our list of priorities because we still
    have soldiers in harms way that are not as equipped as we would
    want them. This is after months of combat.
        Mr. Shays. Let me respond to that and have you react. Once
    of the challenges we know exists, because this committee has
    done work in this area, is that we have an inventory challenge.
    We can't do what K-Mart can do, we can't tell you where
    supplies are and so we sometimes have an overabundance of
    supplies, sometimes an under abundance. Was that part of the
    issue or was it we simply didn't have these supplies anywhere
    and was it in fact a money issue or just a backlog in orders,
    if you could respond to that?
        General Schultz. Initially, a little of both actually, a
    resourcing item initially and then we had a distribution
    problem with the body armor, probably had enough total armor
    systems in certain theaters and then we had sizing issues with
    some, so it was really resourcing. Then we had the industrial
    base that General Weber already talked about, so a combination
    of about three things.
        As I listened to that first panel, the one thing they left
    me with was they all departed their areas of operations leaving
    the units to follow on in better shape which makes me feel
    pretty good even though we have a lot of work yet.
        Mr. Shays. General Helmly.
        General Helmly. I would first of all highlight the remarks
    that Dr. Krepinevich made. I am mindful sometimes that it is
    difficult to appreciate the accuracy of the content of a
    problem if one does not appreciate the larger context within
    which it occurred. I thought Dr. Krepinevich gave an excellent
    outline of the immense change that the strategic context within
    which our armed forces operate has occurred. Beyond that, I
    found virtually everything that Colonel Novotny and the three
    enlisted and non-commissioned officers and the soldier spoke
    about to be compelling evidence of why we must be mindful this
    is the first extended duration conflict our Nation has fought
    with an all volunteer force because the immense quality of the
    Marine and the soldiers showed this committee today is proof
    positive that we must be careful as we operate and fight this
    war to maintain that force.
        General Weber. I think the comments about the equipping and
    the lessons learned were very positive. I think the Army is
    headed in the right direction. We have tried to identify some
    problems and problems were identified to us. In that sense, I
    think the previous panel was accurately reflecting the
    conditions that existed at the time they were deployed. I would
    hope if we went back with the OIF-2 units, some of those
    conditions would be different and our reactions to the OIF-1
    problems have been ameliorated if not resolved in some cases. I
    hope we are on the right track there.
        The only disagreement I would have is some of the comments
    previously about the combat training centers. The combat
    training centers have responded very quickly to the conditions
    and the environments that our troops are operating in both at
    JRTC at Fort Polk, NTC at Fort Irwin and CMTC at Hohenfels,
    Germany. If you went out and looked at those training centers,
    the operations groups and those responsible for training there
    are doing great things. They are working hard with the unit
    commanders who are deploying into these conditions to set the
    right training conditions and scenarios and environments for
    them to get the most out of the CTC event.
        Mr. Shays. Let me just ask you, because you brought up that
    issue and it is very related, the active and the Reserve
    components, do they interface in training? They interface on
    the battlefield but I am hearing that is one of the questions,
    that the Guard is rarely invited to participate in simulations
    in training opportunities with the active force.
        General Weber. I will defer to my colleagues but from my
    perspective, we try to do as much of that as time allows and as
    the timing of the events permit as well. In some conditions, we
    work very well. The civil affairs community is always embedded
    in our rotations normally if they are available but we try to
    do as best we can with that.
        General Schultz. We have an opportunity to train thousands
    of soldiers at both Fort Irwin and Fort Polk. Last year the
    schedule was simply so busy we couldn't send soldiers, we had
    them committed elsewhere, so there is an opportunity to train
    that we are not able to take advantage of right now.
        Mr. Shays. But you would say there is value clearly in
    having the Reservists in there?
        General Schultz. Absolutely.
        Mr. Shays. General Schultz, this is kind of a curiosity but
    I would like to it on the record. When the National Guard units
    leave their equipment behind, what do they go home to?
        General Schultz. In some cases, they don't have a whole lot
    when they get back to their local motor pools. What we are
    doing in the Army is moving equipment around, literally around
    the Army from the Reserve, from the Guard, from other places so
    that we reequip units with a minimum level of equipment
    initially. We have to redistribute equipment back into those
    motor pools where there is none.
        Mr. Shays. Why do you say between the Reserve and the
    Guard? If they are doing the same role, wouldn't you also do it
    from the active?
        General Schultz. Oh, yes. In fact, that is exactly our
    plan.
        Mr. Shays. General.
        General Hanlon. Going back to your original question. I
    think it was Dr. Krepinevich who talked a little bit about some
    of the lessons learned we have had over the last decade from
    the way the military used to train with the lessons we have
    picked up as a result of Iraq and the whole issue of urban
    environment. We have been concerned in the Marine Corps about
    fighting in cities for a long time. In fact, back in the 1996-
    1997 timeframe, our warfighting lab started doing a number of
    experiments looking specifically at combat in the built up
    area. In fact, the training I mentioned to Ms. Watson that we
    do out of March Air Force Base is really a result of what we
    learned back in the late 1990's and how we need to train
    Marines to fight in the built up area.
        Fighting in a built up area is something you don't want to
    do if you have a choice but keeping in mind the latest
    statistic I think I heard is like 70 percent of the population
    in the world lives in built up areas, one can assume somewhere,
    someplace if you are going to get into a fight you could well
    be in an urban built up area. In fact, you remember probably
    our former Commandant, General Krulak used the famous line of
    the three block war in which we used to talk about the
    difficulties of training and fighting in an urban environment.
    So this is something we have been focusing on for a long time,
    it is something we continue to focus on, our warfighting lab
    down at Quantico, and one of the things I have talked to my
    Army counterparts about. There is an Army General by the name
    of General Burns who has the Army equivalent to my command
    which is TRADOC command, is the need for looking in the future
    at building joint MOC facilities that both soldiers and Marines
    can use that will give a state-of-the-art, large training area
    we can put our battalions through and both take advantage of
    that. We are looking at how we might build something like that,
    say a 29 Palms or Fort Irwin so that both organizations can
    take advantage of that.
        I will tell you something we focus on all the time and it
    drives a lot of the work we are doing on technology and special
    equipment to not only protect Marines fighting in an urban
    environment but to give them the fighting edge. I think you
    said in your comments earlier that you want to set it up so we
    always win.
        Mr. Shays. I said it should never be a fair fight.
        General Hanlon. It should never be a fair fight, a great
    line, and that is precisely what we are trying to do not only
    through our tactics and techniques and procedures but also with
    our technology. We are doing as much as we possibly can and
    that is why the lessons learned that we are garnering from the
    experiences over in Iraq right now, I think will pay huge
    dividends for us in the future.
        Mr. Shays. I will add that I think we owe it to our
    soldiers and our Marines, all our military, to help make sure
    they have some cultural sensitivity. Maybe I am speaking now as
    a Peace Corps volunteer, but it is hugely advantageous to
    understand the actions you take and how people react to them,
    just knowing their culture and so on. If in fact the
    battlefield will be in urban areas, there are a lot of women
    and children and others but it is nice to know their culture
    and how they react to things.
        General Hanlon. Absolutely right. That is part of the
    culturization and the training you try to give the Marines.
    When we were showing the House Armed Services Committee about a
    month ago how some of the new devices, the phrasalators that
    the Marines can carry, actually a little gadget where you can
    say something in English, hit a button and it will come back in
    the local dialect, things of that sort so you make sure you can
    communicate which is always the first step. Sir, your points
    are right on.
        Mr. Shays. Any last comments before we adjourn?
        [No response.]
        Mr. Shays. Let me just conclude by thanking all four of you
    and your staff and say this is really an effort of the
    subcommittee as well as the full committee. We are working
    together on this. Sometimes the full committee has a hearing
    and sometimes it is the subcommittee, but we are all working
    for the same basic cause. We would like our National Guard and
    Reservists to be paid on time and the salaries they are owed.
    We would like them to be better equipped. We would like the
    training to keep improving. We would like them not to be
    overworked. My big fear is that you are going to start to see
    spouses who are simply say, honey, I don't want you, and it may
    be a man to his wife who is in the military. We lost one young
    lady and we lost one young man in my district and I am
    concerned the spouses are going to say, don't sign up, don't
    reenlist. I hope we are thinking that one through too.
        Thank you all very much.
        With that, this hearing is adjourned.
        [Whereupon, at 4:25 p.m., the subcommittee was adjourned,
    to reconvene at the call of the Chair.]