[House Hearing, 108 Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
COMBATING TERRORISM: CHEMICAL PLANT SECURITY
=======================================================================
HEARING
before the
SUBCOMMITTEE ON NATIONAL SECURITY,
EMERGING THREATS AND INTERNATIONAL
RELATIONS
of the
COMMITTEE ON
GOVERNMENT REFORM
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
ONE HUNDRED EIGHTH CONGRESS
SECOND SESSION
__________
FEBRUARY 23, 2004
__________
Serial No. 108-156
__________
Printed for the use of the Committee on Government Reform
Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.gpo.gov/congress/house
http://www.house.gov/reform
______
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COMMITTEE ON GOVERNMENT REFORM
TOM DAVIS, Virginia, Chairman
DAN BURTON, Indiana HENRY A. WAXMAN, California
CHRISTOPHER SHAYS, Connecticut TOM LANTOS, California
ILEANA ROS-LEHTINEN, Florida MAJOR R. OWENS, New York
JOHN M. McHUGH, New York EDOLPHUS TOWNS, New York
JOHN L. MICA, Florida PAUL E. KANJORSKI, Pennsylvania
MARK E. SOUDER, Indiana CAROLYN B. MALONEY, New York
STEVEN C. LaTOURETTE, Ohio ELIJAH E. CUMMINGS, Maryland
DOUG OSE, California DENNIS J. KUCINICH, Ohio
RON LEWIS, Kentucky DANNY K. DAVIS, Illinois
JO ANN DAVIS, Virginia JOHN F. TIERNEY, Massachusetts
TODD RUSSELL PLATTS, Pennsylvania WM. LACY CLAY, Missouri
CHRIS CANNON, Utah DIANE E. WATSON, California
ADAM H. PUTNAM, Florida STEPHEN F. LYNCH, Massachusetts
EDWARD L. SCHROCK, Virginia CHRIS VAN HOLLEN, Maryland
JOHN J. DUNCAN, Jr., Tennessee LINDA T. SANCHEZ, California
NATHAN DEAL, Georgia C.A. ``DUTCH'' RUPPERSBERGER,
CANDICE S. MILLER, Michigan Maryland
TIM MURPHY, Pennsylvania ELEANOR HOLMES NORTON, District of
MICHAEL R. TURNER, Ohio Columbia
JOHN R. CARTER, Texas JIM COOPER, Tennessee
MARSHA BLACKBURN, Tennessee ------ ------
------ ------ ------
------ ------ BERNARD SANDERS, Vermont
(Independent)
Melissa Wojciak, Staff Director
David Marin, Deputy Staff Director/Communications Director
Rob Borden, Parliamentarian
Teresa Austin, Chief Clerk
Phil Barnett, Minority Chief of Staff/Chief Counsel
Subcommittee on National Security, Emerging Threats and International
Relations
CHRISTOPHER SHAYS, Connecticut, Chairman
MICHAEL R. TURNER, Ohio
DAN BURTON, Indiana DENNIS J. KUCINICH, Ohio
STEVEN C. LaTOURETTE, Ohio TOM LANTOS, California
RON LEWIS, Kentucky BERNARD SANDERS, Vermont
TODD RUSSELL PLATTS, Pennsylvania STEPHEN F. LYNCH, Massachusetts
ADAM H. PUTNAM, Florida CAROLYN B. MALONEY, New York
EDWARD L. SCHROCK, Virginia LINDA T. SANCHEZ, California
JOHN J. DUNCAN, Jr., Tennessee C.A. ``DUTCH'' RUPPERSBERGER,
TIM MURPHY, Pennsylvania Maryland
------ ------ JOHN F. TIERNEY, Massachusetts
------ ------
Ex Officio
TOM DAVIS, Virginia HENRY A. WAXMAN, California
Lawrence J. Halloran, Staff Director and Counsel
R. Nicholas Palarino, Senior Policy Advisor
Robert A. Briggs, Clerk
C O N T E N T S
----------
Page
Hearing held on February 23, 2004................................ 1
Statement of:
Liscouski, Robert P., Assistant Secretary of Homeland
Security for Infrastructure Protection, Department of
Homeland Security; Robert Full, chief, Allegheny County
Department of Emergency Services; and Thomas W. Headley,
vice chairman, Forward Township Board of Supervisors....... 8
Stephenson, John, Director of National Resources and
Environment for the U.S. General Accounting Office; Pamela
Witmer, president of the Pennsylvania Chemical Industry
Council; Marty Durbin, team leader for security and
opeerations and senior director of Federal relations for
the American Chemistry Council; and Jennifer C. Gibson,
vice president of government and public affairs, National
Association of Chemical Distributors....................... 50
Letters, statements, etc., submitted for the record by:
Durbin, Marty, team leader for security and opeerations and
senior director of Federal relations for the American
Chemistry Council, prepared statement of................... 84
Full, Robert, chief, Allegheny County Department of Emergency
Services, prepared statement of............................ 18
Gibson, Jennifer C., vice president of government and public
affairs, National Association of Chemical Distributors,
prepared statement of...................................... 105
Headley, Thomas W., vice chairman, Forward Township Board of
Supervisors, prepared statement of......................... 22
Liscouski, Robert P., Assistant Secretary of Homeland
Security for Infrastructure Protection, Department of
Homeland Security, prepared statement of................... 11
Shays, Hon. Christopher, a Representative in Congress from
the State of Connecticut, prepared statement of............ 3
Stephenson, John, Director of National Resources and
Environment for the U.S. General Accounting Office,
prepared statement of...................................... 53
Witmer, Pamela, president of the Pennsylvania Chemical
Industry Council, prepared statement of.................... 76
COMBATING TERRORISM: CHEMICAL PLANT SECURITY
----------
MONDAY, FEBRUARY 23, 2004
House of Representatives,
Subcommittee on National Security, Emerging Threats
and International Relations,
Committee on Government Reform,
Washington, DC.
The subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 9:30 a.m., at
Moon Township Municipal Building, Auditorium, 1000 Beaver Grade
Road, Moon Township, PA, Hon. Christopher Shays (chairman of
the subcommittee) presiding.
Present: Representatives Murphy, Shays and Turner.
Staff present: Lawrence Halloran, staff director and
counsel; R. Nicholas Palarino, Ph.D., senior policy advisor;
and Robert A. Briggs, clerk/policy analyst.
Mr. Shays. A quorum being present, the Subcommittee on
National Security, Emerging Threats and International Relations
hearing entitled, ``Combating Terrorism: Chemical Plant
Security,'' is called to order.
Let me first thank Congressman Tim Murphy for inviting the
subcommittee here today. He is a thoughtful, active participant
in our oversight, and we are happy to have the opportunity to
examine the important issue of chemical plant security from
this perspective. I will be turning over the chairmanship once
we've sworn in our first panel, and he'll conduct the rest of
the hearing.
According to a February bulletin from the Department of
Homeland Security [DHS], National Infrastructure Protection
Center, industrial chemical plants remain ``viable targets''
for attacks by al Queda terrorists. So we meet this morning to
ask if the public and private sectors are pursuing an equally
viable strategy to repel or respond to those attacks.
Many in this area may not think so, and for good reason.
Through last year, a series of media reports pointed to
chronically lax security and obviously avoidable
vulnerabilities at chemical facilities here and across the
Nation. A porous perimeter of fallen fences and poorly aimed
security cameras that failed to stop intruders armed only with
pens and cameras is not likely to deter trained terrorists
seeking access to deadly chemicals.
What is at risk? More than 15,000 U.S. facilities use large
amounts of extremely hazardous substances; 3,000 of those sites
project worst-case hazardous zones in which released chemicals
could reach more than 10,000 people nearby or far downwind.
Vulnerability zones around 125 chemical plants could each
encompass more than 1 million people.
Securing this widely dispersed network of chemical
production, storage and distribution facilities poses difficult
challenges and demands tough choices. Given the undeniable
attractiveness of toxic and flammable compounds terrorists
could use as prepositioned weapons of mass destruction, the
need for increased physical security is obvious. But gates,
guns and guards are not the only answers. Chemical
infrastructure could remain economically critical, but less
vulnerable, if inherently safer substances and processes were
adopted to reduce their toxic utility to terrorists. Increased
security and reduced chemical risk need not be mutually
exclusive, but so far sustained progress on either seems much
too elusive.
Another challenge posed by increased chemical facility
security pits the need for public information and awareness
against the effort to keep facility plans and strategies out of
the hands of terrorists. Documents on emergency response plans
and chemical plant preparedness have been removed from the
Internet and other public sources. The question remains whether
that loss of transparency enhances security more than it
shields poor planning from needed public security.
As in other areas of terrorism preparedness, the chemical
industry and those who regulate it are hard pressed to answer
the question, ``Prepared for what?'' Without threat-based
standards against which to measure security spending, money and
time are being wasted lurching from crisis to crisis, as each
code orange alert and sensational media incursion highlights
new vulnerabilities.
The Department of Homeland Security is conducting an
inventory of America's critical infrastructure in formulating
preparedness standards to secure key industrial targets from
terrorists. The Assistant Secretary of DHS for Infrastructure
Protection, Mr. Robert Liscouski, will testify on the status of
those efforts. We obviously appreciate him being here today.
State and local officials, industrial association
representatives and an expert from the U.S. General Accounting
Office will also testify. We appreciate the time, dedication
and expertise of all our witnesses, and we look forward to
their testimony.
[The prepared statement of Hon. Christopher Shays follows:]
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[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T4257.002
Mr. Shays. At this time the Chair would recognize Michael
Turner, the vice chairman of the committee.
Mr. Turner. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, for being at this
field hearing. You have been instrumental in leading this
community's charge to improve our homeland security and to
assist our first responders in being prepared for threats that
our country now faces.
I would also like to thank Representative Tim Murphy for
hosting us here today and bringing this important issue of
chemical plant security before this subcommittee.
Representative Murphy is a leading member of the Government
Reform Committee and effective legislator and colleague, served
as vice president of our freshman class, and has been a strong
advocate in the areas of homeland security, education and
health care.
The issue of security of chemicals facilities is very
important to our Nation. I'm encouraged to see that the private
sector has taken a lead in preparing security assessments of
not only their facilities, but also for the process of moving
chemicals from location to location.
However, the Federal Government should be a partner in that
process and work with companies to develop quality,
comprehensive risk management plans. I mentioned there are
witnesses from the private sector today on how the Federal
Government can be an effective partner in addressing these
security concerns.
Since September 11 our knowledge of the threat we face of
these facilities has changed, and so must our response. Under
our chairman's direction, this subcommittee has reviewed issues
from first-responder resources, our police and fire, nuclear
power plant safety, our Federal nuclear weapons storage
programs and the issue of the safety of our disposal of our
Nation's nuclear weapons stockpile.
This issue today is important, of course, to our national
security, but it is also important to our communities and our
families who are in close proximity to these plants and could
be affected by our preparedness. That is why it is so important
that Congressman Murphy has requested that this field hearing
be held here today rather than Washington, an area where the
community and the families are affected most by this issue.
Thank you.
Mr. Shays. Thank you, gentleman.
I recognize Mr. Murphy.
Mr. Murphy. I thank you, Mr. Chairman, and I thank you for
convening this hearing here in Moon Township, in Pittsburgh
where we have many members of the chemical industry with
plants, manufacturing and storage facilities.
We know that securing America's chemical facilities has
long been a priority for the chemical industry and the
thousands of people living in communities near large storage of
potential hazardous materials. I'd like to thank not only
Chairman Shays for coming here to this special field hearing,
but also all the staff who has worked on this issue.
As you probably know, a local newspaper reporter, Carl
Prine, and the TV media in this town have done a series of
investigative reports on the very serious concerns about the
levels of security we have at chemical facilities since the
terrorist attacks on September 11, 2001; even CBS picked up the
story, and 60 Minutes aired a show highlighting the impact of
this issue across the United States.
In the last 2 weeks, the National Security Subcommittee
staff has worked hard to make this hearing possible. I want to
thank the witnesses who are going to testify before this
committee today. This is a complicated issue of tremendous
concern to countless citizens across the country. Ensuring the
security of the Nation's chemicals demands the attention of
several different parties with often-times competing
industries. There are no easy answers, but I appreciate the
willingness of these individuals to participate in an ongoing
conversation.
Now, I have to admit, I am somewhat disappointed the
companies themselves declined our invitations to testify this
morning. While I'm looking forward to the testimony to be given
by representatives of the chemical industry and expect it to be
very informative, the firsthand testimony of the steps various
companies in the Pittsburgh community have taken to improve
security since September 11th would have been invaluable.
I do appreciate the companies' concerns for revealing
security procedures in a public forum; however, this committee
will still pursue a careful and thorough review of their
policies and procedures in the interest of public safety.
I believe chemical facilities are, in fact, concerned with
the security of their sites and the safety of the communities
in which they reside. It is, and always has been in the best
interest of the companies to be conscious of the possible
threats the chemicals they produce and store pose to both their
employees and the families living nearby.
In recent days, the crux of this issue has not been only
one of facilities housing large quantities of dangerous
materials should be required to conduct vulnerability
assessments and then take action to reduce those
vulnerabilities. The issue before us today is simply asking who
should be responsible for regulating those assessments and
improvements.
Federal, State and local governments have always played an
integral role in ensuring that a certain level of security is
maintained at chemical facilities, and had the companies
testified today, we probably would have heard about all the
different regulations they already are required to adhere to
and the various government agencies that impose them.
Many of the facilities currently meet standards set by the
Environmental Protection Agency, the Department of
Transportation, the Coast Guard, State environmental agencies,
State emergency management agencies and local municipalities.
Our immediate response should not be to automatically slap
industry with additional security measures without first
thoroughly investigating the issue; however, there are many
hard questions that must be answered. Could more be done?
Should more be done? And who should oversee it and at what
cost?
Each of the witnesses that we hear today represent the
different seats at the security table. I'm looking forward to
hearing from witnesses at the Federal, State, local industry
levels. Not only will we be hearing testimony from Federal
industry representatives on the appropriate balance that should
be struck in determining oversight and assessment authority,
but we will also hear from a local township supervisor
testifying to his firsthand experience working to increase
security at a local company. We will also hear from the chief
of the Allegheny County Department of Emergency Services on the
relationship that the department has with local businesses with
large chemical stores and emergency response plans in place.
Finally, let me say this: Any decision made by Congress
must be based on sound science and not initial knee-jerk
reactions. The safety of the American people must be our top
priority, and I firmly believe the best way to ensure their
safety is to make the most informed and educated decisions
possible. That is why this and future hearings on the issue are
so important.
I thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Shays. I thank you, gentleman, and, again, appreciate
this invitation to have this hearing here rather than in
Washington.
To take care of some housekeeping first before calling on
our witnesses, I ask unanimous consent of all members of the
subcommittee be permitted to place an opening statement in the
record and that the record remain open for 3 days for that
purpose. And without objection, so ordered.
I ask for the unanimous consent that all witnesses be
permitted to submit their written statements in the record.
Without objection, so ordered.
At this time I'll recognize our three panelists, our three
participants in our first panel, the Honorable Robert P.
Liscouski, Assistant Secretary of Homeland Security for
Infrastructure Protection, Department of Homeland Security;
Chief Robert Full, chief, Allegheny County Department of
Emergency Services; and Mr. Thomas W. Headley, vice chairman,
Forward Township Board of Supervisors.
I think you all know that it's our custom on this committee
to swear in our witnesses, and at this time we would just ask
you if you would stand and raise your right hands.
[Witnesses sworn.]
Mr. Shays. Note for the record our witnesses responded in
the affirmative.
I've chaired this subcommittee and the previous
subcommittee now for over 8 years, and we've sworn in every
witness except one, and you probably could guess that it was I
who essentially chickened out. But other than that, everyone
has been sworn in, so thank you very much.
We're going to start with you, Mr. Liscouski, and then
Chief Full and then Mr. Headley. We'll go in that order.
At this time I'm turning over the Chair to Mr. Murphy, so
you're in charge.
Mr. Murphy [presiding]. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Shays. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Murphy. Actually, before I do that, I should make sure
I understand how much time each Member has.
Mr. Shays. We're going to give you 5 minutes. We're going
to roll it over for another 5 minutes. So you have 10 minutes,
but feel free to be somewhere in that range of 5 to 10, and
that's how we'll proceed, and then I think what we can do is
10-minute questions for each Member that we ask.
Mr. Murphy. Thank you. And, Mr. Liscouski, you can proceed.
STATEMENTS OF ROBERT P. LISCOUSKI, ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF
HOMELAND SECURITY FOR INFRASTRUCTURE PROTECTION, DEPARTMENT OF
HOMELAND SECURITY; ROBERT FULL, CHIEF, ALLEGHENY COUNTY
DEPARTMENT OF EMERGENCY SERVICES; AND THOMAS W. HEADLEY, VICE
CHAIRMAN, FORWARD TOWNSHIP BOARD OF SUPERVISORS
Mr. Liscouski. Thank you, sir. Thank you for the
opportunity to appear, Mr. Chairman, and members of the
committee. I am pleased to be here this morning before your
subcommittee to discuss the Department's efforts to protect and
secure our Nation's critical infrastructure.
The Department's Information Analysis and Infrastructure
Protection Directorate carries out comprehensive assessments of
the vulnerability of the key resources and critical
infrastructure of the United States, including the performance
of risk assessments to determine the risks posed by particular
types of terrorist attacks within the United States.
Our overall protection methodology leverages an integrated
physical/cyber protection approach to reduce vulnerabilities
and to optimize our response when an attack does occur. Because
of the disproportionately high physical threat facing U.S.
chemical facilities, however, my remarks for today's hearing
are directed at our physical security efforts toward
safeguarding U.S. chemical facilities.
The IAIP Directorate has a dedicated organization committed
to protecting physical assets that includes the Infrastructure
Protection Office for which I am responsible. The organization
responsible for protection is the Protective Security Division.
Today I am here to give you a progress report on where we are
now and what we have in store for the coming months to
implement the President's National Strategy for Homeland
Security as it relates to chemical security.
Since last year the Office for Infrastructure Protection
has implemented a consolidated and coordinated team of physical
security professionals. These experts were charged with
responsibility for the following: Identifying critical
infrastructure and key assets; assessing their vulnerabilities;
assessing the risk to and the consequences of an attack against
those infrastructures and assets; and working with State,
local, territorial and private sectors to implement appropriate
security measures.
More specifically, the Office of Infrastructure Protection
is working to improve the safety and security of the Nation's
chemical plants and facilities as part of the infrastructure
protection directives in the Homeland Security Act and the
National Strategy for Homeland Security. Despite the many
organizational and cultural challenges associated with
integrating these elements into one entity, our initial efforts
have yielded effective, tangible and measurable results.
Every day at DHS we ask ourselves how are we safer today,
and how do we measure our progress? Today I have some answers
to those questions. Since its inception in 2003, less than a
year ago, DHS, and specifically my office, has placed chemical
site security on the top priority list for physical
infrastructure protection.
We have managed Operation Liberty Shield, a domestic
protection strategy that includes the deployment of members of
State and local police officers, the National Guard to
approximately 150 sites across the United States, over half of
which are chemical sites.
We have conducted a national risk analysis of the chemical
sector to identify the most hazardous and highest-risk sites.
We have deployed DHS protective security counterterrorism
specialists to top priority chemical sites to identify
vulnerabilities to attacks and develop prevention strategies
with site management and local officials, and we have completed
vulnerability assessments, developed specific buffer zone
security plans and provided training and assistance to
implement those plans.
This approach includes full engagement with the protective
security community at the State and the local levels to include
the private sector, and this has already resulted in the
increased safety and security of millions of Americans living
near the highest-risk sites.
We have developed a report on chemical facility common
vulnerabilities. We have developed templates for protection
plans for areas adjacent to those chemical facilities and a
report on potential indicators of terrorist activities related
to chemical sites which have been shared with State and local
authorities. These reports have been published and distributed
throughout the country to law enforcement authorities and to
each of the States' homeland security advisor.
In addition, we are developing and using a graded approach
to the approximately 66,000 sites. This is based on EPA records
in the United States and identifying the 4,012 sites that
should have vulnerability assessments performed. We are
reviewing the amount of toxic materials stored at those sites,
developing plume modeling for 146 chemical plants using the
National Atmospheric Release Advisory Center [NARAC], for more
detailed effects prediction.
We're reviewing the population density in the vicinity of
large amounts of toxic chemicals and evaluating possible
impacts of intentional attack as opposed to accidental release
models used in safety programs.
High-risk sites will be visited on a regular basis to
assist in the implementation of security recommendations, and
we will also visit additional sites to provide training,
support and recommendations, and we will do further followup
visits on a regular basis. These visits and the protection
plans will reduce risk to millions of Americans.
The Office of Infrastructure Protection's close association
with the industry is exemplified by our close interaction with
more than 20 Information Sharing and Analysis Centers [ISACs].
One example of this interaction is the Vulnerability Assessment
Methodology for the Petroleum and Petrochemical Industries,
which was published by the American Petroleum Institute and
collaboratively crafted by my office and the API, published in
May 2003.
Protecting our critical infrastructure is a Departmentwide
responsibility. In 2002, the Maritime Transportation Security
Act was passed. Regulations now in place require some 5,000
sites to provide security plans to the Coast Guard, including
289 chemical facilities which were included in that list.
Security plans are being prepared and submitted as we speak.
The Environmental Protection Agency [EPA], is another
agency we work closely with. Historically, the EPA has been
charged with identifying chemical and other substances that
could affect the quality of the air we breathe and the water
that we drink. Part of their mission includes regulations
requiring chemical facilities that meet or exceed certain
guidelines to develop and update these documents that are
called risk management plans. These plans center on accidental
releases of chemicals harmful to humans into the air or the
water. The EPA published that there are about 15,000 chemical
plants in the United States.
Before detailing our future programs and initiatives,
however, I would like to address the EPA numbers as they are
being used by the media and others regarding security at
chemical plants. While these facts may adequately address
environmental, emergency preparedness, and first responders'
concerns, they do not appropriately reflect the possible
results of terrorist attacks. Our analysis of terrorist
scenarios show that of the 15,000 or so chemical sites
identified by the EPA, approximately 4,000 if attacked would
affect populations of 1,000 or more.
Over the next year the DHS will engage with approximately
4,000 sites, chemical sites, throughout the United States to
continue to enhance security of our critical infrastructure
sites in the chemical sector. These additional visits and
protection plans will reduce the risk to tens of millions of
Americans in 50 States, the District of Columbia and the U.S.
territories.
The Department is working to ensure that the security of
our Nation's critical facilities and infrastructure is a focus
of our efforts.
I appreciate the opportunity to testify before you today,
and I would be pleased to answer any questions that you have at
the appropriate time. Thank you.
Mr. Murphy. Thank you.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Liscouski follows:]
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Mr. Murphy. We will now turn to Chief Robert Full, who is
the chief of the Allegheny County Department of Emergency
Services.
Chief, please proceed.
Chief Full. Good morning, Mr. Murphy, Mr. Chairman, thank
you very much, and members of the committee, I thank you for
this opportunity to provide testimony before you today. Also,
on behalf of Chief Executive Dan Onorato, our Allegheny County
Chief Executive, I would also like to thank you for being here
in our fine county as well, and rest assured your safety is
paramount to us, and we wish your stay here to be very well.
I come before you not only as the Chief of the Department
of Emergency Services, but also the Allegheny County emergency
management coordinator, the chairman of the Allegheny County
Local Emergency Planning Committee and also the Pennsylvania
Region 13 Counterterrorism Task Force.
Mr. Murphy, I'd like to compliment you on your efforts and
your interest in our things that we do here locally, as I know
that you've attended our meetings before and provided us a
great deal of support in our endeavors with not only terrorism,
but also safety in the community.
Allegheny County, PA, has a population of 1.28 million
persons in a 730-square-mile area, with 130 municipalities
including the city of Pittsburgh. The county is a large center
for research and development, retail, manufacturing,
specialized medical care centers, major educational
institutions and numerous other industries and small
businesses.
The county is a major transportation hub for North and
South, East and West travel nationally via U.S. interstate
highways, Pennsylvania State highways as well as local
roadways; home to the Pittsburgh International Airport, major
railroads, underground and above-ground pipelines, traffic
tunnels, downtown subway, hundreds of bridges, and the three
rivers recognized as being the busiest inland water port in the
United States.
Allegheny County has 235 chemical facilities which the EPA
has classified as having at least one or more of the extremely
hazardous substances on their list of 300 with an additional
700 others requiring EPA 312 reporting.
This hearing is actually being held less than 2 miles away
from one of the focal chemical facilities on the 60 Minutes
program. That particular facility lies here in Allegheny County
in an area that sits upwind from the city of Pittsburgh. With
prevailing weather conditions such as today, any major release,
accidental or intentional, would drift into the downtown
population center within 10 to 15 minutes; before then even
tens of thousands of people would be affected.
We can all sleep at night through the efforts and success
of local, State and Federal Government working together to
craft key legislation such as the SARA Title III laws that
occurred back in the 1980's, as well as here in Pennsylvania
when the Pennsylvania Legislature enacted Pennsylvania Act 165.
These two pieces of legislation and others are responsible for
ensuring that plans, training and exercises, information,
funding, accountability, emergency response and mitigation of
programs are in place to ensure the safety of our community.
Chemical safety has been taken very seriously here, and we've
been recognized as being much ahead of the curve in prevention
and response to chemical releases either from fixed facilities
or a transportation accident.
Security of our chemical facilities from an intentional act
from within their own employees as learned from that tragic
event in Bhopal, India, or an act of domestic or international
terrorism has been an issue with our local emergency planners
and local emergency planning for years, long before September
11th. I am and those particular groups, the LEPC, are in favor
of legislation to ensure the security of all facilities that
use, store and transport chemicals.
The facility that was the focus of the 60 Minutes program
was one of our upstanding chemical facilities that sit on our
LEPC and have one of the finest safety records that we have
here, and we enjoy a great working relationship. We, too, at
the local emergency planning committee and I personally was
amazed to see the story and the issue in regards to access into
their facility by the reporters.
The American Chemical Council has done an excellent job in
being out front in the security issue, but I know firsthand
that many of the companies that I am most concerned with are
not members of the American Chemistry Council.
There continues to be facilities, many of them in my county
here, that one could walk straight in under the guise of
darkness and cause significant damage and public danger. Some
of the facilities have no more security than maybe perhaps a
padlock or a chain, and we would be lucky in those cases as
well.
The first to respond to any emergency is always the
affected local government followed by State and Federal
Governments. The sharing of information on security issues
pertaining to chemical plant security and transportation issues
needs to be enhanced to include local law enforcement
authorities and the local emergency planning committees as soon
as possible.
Allegheny County, the Pennsylvania Region 13 terror threat
assessments have all concluded that targeting one of our many
chemical plants and/or the chemical transportation system ranks
very high than the threat of something or somebody running
through a neighborhood street disbursing some sort of military
war agent.
The best terrorist event to incur is never to let it happen
in the first place, and this could also be said for fire safety
as well. You can have the best trained and equipped fire
department, but when the fire occurs, people get hurt, may die,
and buildings are lost. All this can be minimized by good fire
prevention, but not totally prevented. Strong fire codes and
enforcement, smoke detectors, exit plans and sprinklers
contribute greatly to reducing bad outcomes, so the best fire
to have is not to have one in the first place.
We are continuing to improve our ability to respond to a
WMD event locally and nationwide. Congress and the President
and all of you have made available billions of dollars for
homeland security at the local level, and it is finally
beginning to be seen at the lowest levels of government and
public safety in this county. This is for planning, training,
exercises and equipping responders. I personally don't want to
ever test that system.
Chemical security enhancement with the partnership of
government as demonstrated with the great successes through
SARA Title III as well as our local ordinances and our State
laws through reasonable legislation and cooperation is a must.
We need to do everything to ensure we never experience a terror
attack again. We already know that chemical facilities and
their transportation are a risk. Shame on us if we do not do
everything possible to protect them. They sit in our counties,
our cities, and towns and our neighborhoods.
Thank you very much.
Mr. Murphy. Thank you, Chief Full.
[The prepared statement of Chief Full follows:]
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Mr. Murphy. We will now hear from Mr. Headley, who is vice
chairman of the Forward Township Board of Supervisors.
Mr. Headley, please proceed.
Mr. Headley. OK. Before we start here, I'd like to make one
correction to my written statement. The facility in question is
now known as Univar, but was previously known as Vopak, and in
my statement I've used both names, and the correct current name
is Univar.
Thank you for the opportunity to address the panel this
morning on an issue of local and national importance. My name
is Tom Headley, and I'm vice chairman of the Forward Township
Board of Supervisors, one of three part-time elected officials
who form the governing body of our municipality.
Forward Township has a population of just less than 3,800
people in an area of more than 20 square miles. The area is
mostly rural with a concentration of population around the town
of Elizabeth and several small communities along the
Monongahela River including the community of Bunola.
I am here today because Univar, a distributor which
receives, warehouses and ships a wide variety of chemicals, has
a large facility located in Forward Township at Bunola. This
location is one of an estimated 123 chemical facilities
nationwide with an accidental toxic release worst-case scenario
where more than 1 million people in the surrounding area could
be at risk of exposure to a cloud of toxic gas. Prior to
September 11 people in the area were aware of this facility,
and the various chemicals were present, but were not overly
concerned. After that date, with increased potential for acts
of terror against a facility of this type, the vulnerability
and security of this plant became a major concern.
A meeting to discuss these issues with company management
was requested. At this meeting our police chief, our emergency
management coordinator and myself met with Vopak executives to
review site security. It was apparent that a major upgrade was
necessary. Our chief performed a site survey and developed a
list of minimum security upgrades which the municipality would
require. Management raised the issue of cost and indicated this
expense would place them at a competitive disadvantage relative
to others in their industry. I made it clear these improvements
would be made either on a voluntary basis, or the township
would pass ordinances mandating their completion.
I am pleased to report Vopak made the recommended
improvements costing more than $200,000. Perimeter fencing,
automatic gates, security cameras and monitoring devices,
improved lighting and security during off-hours were included.
In addition, an emergency plan for the community was developed,
a warning siren installed, and emergency information was
distributed to all residents in the immediate area and downwind
of the plant.
In spite of these changes, this plant remains vulnerable.
The 30-acre plant site runs from a State highway, Bunola River
Road, to the Monongahela River, and includes six buildings. The
main line of the CSX Railroad bisects the property, and
buildings are located on both sides. Each side is fenced;
however, the main track and the siding where loaded tank cars
of chlorine are stored is not secured. The quantities of
chlorine present are the reason for the serious worst-case
scenario. In addition, there's a barge unloading facility
located along the riverfront where chemicals are pumped from
barges into storage tanks. More than 50 loads of various
chemicals are shipped in and out of this location during an
average day.
Should there be any type of security problem at the plant
or with a load in transit while in the township, the Forward
Police Department would be notified to respond. We have a
professional department with five full-time and two part-time
officers. Normally one officer is on duty per shift. Response
time to an incident at the plant will depend on the location of
the officer in the township and could be more than 10 minutes
from the time the call was received.
Our officer can request and receive assistance from
surrounding departments and Allegheny County, but, again, time
is required for help to arrive. Our municipal budget is just
over $800,000 per year, and well over half that amount
represents police department and associated costs. The township
is not in a position to employ sufficient police to provide
adequate security to meet the potential threats faced by this
facility.
After reading the GAO report, GAO-03-439, I would like to
make the following comments as a public official in a host
municipality for a chemical facility, and I'll just hit the
major points here. Those of you who have the written statement
can see the specifics which I've added.
Security for chemical plants must be improved. The
government must mandate reasonable minimum security standards
at all locations which produce, process, warehouse or
distribute chemicals and other hazardous materials.
Voluntary compliance or self-regulation by the industry is
not appropriate in this situation. Substitutes for the most
dangerous chemicals should be encouraged and strict limits
placed on maximum allowable quantities of these materials at
each location.
One agency of the Federal Government must be given specific
overall authority for chemical industry security. My suggestion
would be the Department of Homeland Security. The present
shared security responsibility is unwise and unable to deal
with today's potential threats.
The scope of any risk management plan must include not only
the plant site, but also the risks inherent in the movement of
materials to and from the plant.
Money for staffing, training and equipment for local police
departments must be made available immediately, and any new
risk management plan must think outside the box and anticipate
nontraditional threats.
I thank you for your attention to this information.
Security in these times is an issue which affects everyone
regardless of location. From a huge city like New York with a
population of many millions to the small town of Bunola with
fewer than 300 residents, everyone is concerned about threats
to their safety and well-being. Steps need to be quickly taken
to minimize these risks, and the Federal Government must assume
the lead role in this endeavor.
I will be pleased to answer any questions you might have.
Thank you.
Mr. Murphy. Thank you, Mr. Headley.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Headley follows:]
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Mr. Murphy. I'd like to start off by asking a couple
questions of each of you. I think each Member has 10 minutes to
ask questions.
Mr. Liscouski, let me first start off, if you could give us
a general idea, what do you perceive is the greatest threat
that chemical facilities face in a terrorist attack?
Mr. Liscouski. Sir, there's probably a couple of ways to
answer that question. In the context of the different types of
methodology that various terrorist groups will use to target
facilities, they're always going to look at greatest
consequence of loss depending upon the perspective of the
group. So if I interpret your question to say which group is
most interested in chemical facilities or types of attack----
Mr. Murphy. Actually, groups and, yes, types of facilities.
Mr. Liscouski. I mean, we know al Queda has expressed
interest in the past, based upon bogus reporting, to attack
chemical facilities. We've had no specific reporting about
those types of threats with locations, but we know generally
speaking that's always been an area of interest.
We know, based upon their tactics in the past historically
that they've not targeted specific chemical facilities
overseas, but we know based upon how they conducted attacks in
the past, we extrapolate from those tactics into what we think
we need to protect against here.
Without going into great detail of those tactics, you know,
we look at ways that they've attacked facilities in the past;
we just extrapolate to those methodologies here in the United
States.
Mr. Murphy. One of the things that Mr. Headley has pointed
out, that Forward Township has voluntarily complied and
invested a great deal of money in some safety features. As I've
read, one of the factors of the plant there and at other
chemical plants that they can't control is they put fences
everywhere else, but they cannot block rail traffic that
actually goes to their facilities.
Is that my understanding, this rail traffic goes right by
the----
Mr. Headley. It bisects the property. It goes right through
the middle. Both sides are fenced, but the center portion and
the rail sidings is not fenced.
Mr. Murphy. So someone could enter from there, or you could
have a chemical or a train car go through there, too.
Are we doing some things to deal with assessing those
vulnerabilities in the chemical plants and making changes
there?
Mr. Liscouski. Mr. Chairman, we're taking a whole list of
security concerns across the Nation, and we can talk about
specific concerns and specific sites, but I'd like to start off
with sort of the methodology and how we look at the
prioritization of where we need to be putting our efforts.
And I'd like to open up again by stressing in terms of
priority, we share very common concerns with the committee and
with our State and local counterparts about the need to protect
the Nation, particularly from the most dangerous threats that
we face and where those consequences might manifest themselves,
and my concern is in the chemical industry specifically. We
know that we have a lot of work to do there.
Again, DHS will be celebrating our first anniversary here
next week, and in the context of that, the focus we've had from
day 1 when we opened the door has been on improving our
chemical site security plans, our strategies, and, most
importantly, putting tactics where we need to ensure that we
can reduce the greatest vulnerabilities we have.
By way of context, there are many vulnerabilities across
the United States in many critical areas, in many critical
infrastructure areas, and even if we focus every single one of
our resources on improving the chemical sector alone, we still
couldn't do enough in 1 year to satisfy me. But clearly in
terms of reducing the vulnerabilities, this is going to be a
work in progress over a period of time. So we're prioritizing
our efforts and looking at every available resource and tool we
have in our tool kit to reduce those vulnerabilities.
So in the context of the respective vulnerabilities, job
one we have is assessing those vulnerabilities to ensure that
we understand what do we have to focus on first, and it's
everything from chemicals being stored--if we focus on the
chemical sectors for purposes of this hearing, looking at
chemicals in storage, looking at chemicals in transit,
identifying those vulnerabilities, the mitigation techniques
necessary, what's effective and sustainable over time.
And to that end it's important to note here that a lot of
the industry's concerns when they talk about money--and I'm not
here representing the industry for a moment. I'll just tell you
that from a practical perspective, sometimes any amount of
money isn't sufficient enough to reduce the vulnerability in
some cases without a long-term strategy about how that money is
going to be implemented to reduce vulnerabilities over a long
period of time.
So we look at tactics in terms of which we have--what
tactics do we have to apply to reduce vulnerabilities in the
immediate sense, those highest priorities. We look at
strategies and tactics that we employ over time to develop
cost-effective, sustainable and very effective programs that
reduce the threat, and we can respond to threats in a very
dynamic environment.
So to talk about which specific modality of theft in the
context of chemicals in place or those chemicals in transit, we
are looking at the entire chain of the chemical sector's
vulnerabilities.
One other point and I'll conclude, and that is it's
important to note that when we talk about the chemical sector
and all sectors within the critical infrastructure, that we're
not looking at things in the context of their single
vulnerability or their single place in the critical
infrastructure chain. With all these sectors there are
interdependencies, and when we talk about the impact of the
chemical sector and what we might be able to do to reduce very
specific vulnerabilities, we may be creating other
vulnerabilities by reducing those.
So we've got to take a very holistic look at the entire
dependency chain around the companies' dependencies between the
chemical sector, board of treatment, the production of
pharmaceuticals and the impact of that, and this is something
we look at very carefully, and there is a significant amount of
work being done there as well.
Mr. Murphy. Thank you.
Chief Full, let me turn toward you and ask you as someone
who deals with local first responders, and obviously they would
be part of what we're dealing with here, I want you to describe
for the board a scenario that there was some intentional attack
on a chemical facility, what that would do to the region. And
certainly there are areas of the Nation where the outcome of
the worst-case scenario are looking at in the millions; though
tragic here, it would be tens of thousands or hundreds of
thousands or so. But the key in response to the first
responders and medical facilities, do you conduct training with
the chemical industry and fire and police departments and
hospital personnel to cover various scenarios and drills of how
one might react in this situation?
Chief Full. Congressman, we do. We have, again, an
aggressive, again, consequence management program here in
Allegheny County which primarily does focus an awful lot on
training and preparation and response with 5 Pennsylvania
State-certified hazardous materials response teams, our 26
hospitals.
As you know, with our 130 municipalities, we have 217
separate fire departments, 119 police departments and 70 EMS
agencies in our county alone, and we have worked hard over the
many years here to bring their level of training up to at least
hazardous materials awareness and recognition, and many more of
the departments have been operationally trained.
There still needs to be a lot of work to be done. There
again, through the processes of planning for a chemical
facility release or a transportation accident in our county
here, there's a different nature of the beast whenever you have
responders that they're able to go out and respond to some sort
of an accident or something that was unintentional. But there's
a new dynamic now for first responders that are charged now
with possibly responding to events that have been intentionally
created with the full intent not only to kill and maim a number
of the public, but also to kill them, even through the aspect
of secondary issues, a secondary problem be established just to
take out the first responders.
But we do do the training, and it has been funded primarily
through the SARA Title III and local emergency management and
planning committee funds that we secure from the chemical
plants themselves. I believe we do have a strong partnership
with those chemical plants, but at the same time we have not
addressed and we have no knowledge really of the things that
have been going on behind the scenes with security with them as
well.
Mr. Murphy. Let me ask you, too: The EPA is supposed to
have on file, reports of the response management plan that you
have for chemical companies, and that information is not being
made public, but it should be accessible.
Have you been able to access that information?
Chief Full. Yes, we have. And those reports are made
available; the R&P reports and the Tier 2 reporting and all
that reporting is made available to our office, and we
disseminate that out to the local communities here in Allegheny
County. It is also made available to the local fire departments
as required under the law.
Mr. Murphy. And has there been--we only have 2 seconds left
for yourself and Mr. Headley--full cooperation and direct face-
to-face conversations with the chemical companies to engage the
information you need, training for those firefighters, etc.,
for those specific chemicals onsite.
Chief Full. We have met with a very positive response in
most cases in that regard. I'll tell you, Congressman, one of
the things that concerns us the most is most of the folks are
under the regulations, the current regulations. They're not our
biggest problems and our biggest offenders, and many of the
other offenders are the smaller businesses as well that we are
concerned about that have things within their properties that
fall just under the thresholds, but, you know, you can't make a
determination. If you have a threshold planning limit of 1,000
pounds, can you tell me the difference between 999 pounds of
that particular chemical and how it's going to react versus
1,000 pounds?
I would argue that there's not much difference, but there's
many of the companies that have gone to--and what we want to do
is we want to have them to limit their amount of storage and so
forth. A lot of them have gone to putting their chemical
storage in the transportation networks, and they have brought
themselves a couple pounds underneath the reportable limits so
they won't have to do additional planning, and they won't have
to pay additional fees to reinforce and support our hazardous
materials response program.
Mr. Murphy. Mr. Headley, I'll give you a chance to respond
to that, too.
Mr. Headley. Well, I know that Forward Township, as I say,
is home to one major chemical storage facility, and we have had
orientations with the fire departments, not only our local fire
departmentm but the other likely fire departments who would
come to assist. To my knowledge, the primary focus of that
training was a fire situation or maybe an accidental release
rather than an intentional problem caused by someone else.
And I'm not aware of all the training that's going on at
the county level or the State level and the Federal level, but
I would encourage a very strong emphasis on a coordinated
response from the county because they're the ones that are best
equipped to deal with a problem like this to get together with
local police and emergency management people and train for a
scenario where there is a willful act and an unintentional
release as a result of that, and that would be my major
suggestion.
Mr. Murphy. I thank you.
I will now turn over to Mr. Turner, who, I should also
note, as a former mayor of Dayton, OH, has particular insight
of the eastern involved urban areas. Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Turner. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
I'm fascinated by all that has been accomplished without
any particular legislative authority. If you listen to Mr.
Headley and Chief Full and Mr. Liscouski, you talk about each
of your agencies and communities and what you have done both
with the private sectors and with companies, what the
association for the Department of Homeland Security has done,
there certainly are some impressive accomplishments.
So I think from your testimony we're hearing from each of
you that there is a very wide gap in the ability to include
everyone in this committee; but also in the sharing of
information from successes, we know that we have some standards
that we're all complying with.
Mr. Headley, you had cited the success that you had with
Univar where you first approached the company and you requested
access to the facility. And you were granted access to the
facility where you were able to make recommendations, and
through continued discussions with the company, they ultimately
made changes, modifications as a result of your
recommendations. And I wrote down one sentence from your
testimony where you said: I made it clear these improvements
would be made either on a voluntary basis, or the township
would pass ordinances mandating their completion. Certainly
after all this has came down to Congress as to our willingness
to take action to provide the authority.
I want to go back to that very first meeting that you had
with Univar when you requested access to the facility. Did you
have any ability to compel or demand access if they had not
invited you in?
Mr. Headley. I really can't answer that question because
that situation did not arise. These people have always been a
good neighbor. They realized that they had a problem, we
realized they had a problem, and we decided we would work
together to solve that problem, and it was done on a very open
and amicable basis.
My concern is there are probably--based on what I'm hearing
from the other two gentlemen on this panel, there are numbers
of other plants and facilities throughout the country who maybe
don't have that cooperative attitude, and that's why my
recommendation would be that you have to have some Federal
legislation with some teeth in it to mandate that these people
comply, because, being a businessman myself, everything comes
down to cost, and you don't want to put one company at a
competitive disadvantage to another, and if you do force some
and not others, then the people who have not made the required
improvements and made the required investments are going to be
more competitive and will be able to sell at a lower price
because they haven't spent the money. And that's not fair, and
it doesn't make common sense.
Mr. Turner. Your proactive efforts are certainly to be
commended, and one thing that I thought of in hearing your
description of doing an assessment and providing the company
with information as to your recommendations is to what extent
are we working to capture that.
Are you working with other agencies on a State or Federal
level so that we can benefit from your experience so that when
we look at the standards of other facilities, that might be
able to be replicated?
Mr. Headley. Well, most of the things that we did were
common-sense things, and I think obviously somebody with a much
higher degree of sophistication and ability, such as Department
of Homeland Security and maybe the chemical industry, in
concert should develop standards, because all we did, as I say,
were common-sense things. I'm sure there are a multitude of
other improvements and changes that should be made and could be
made, but we are not aware of that.
Mr. Turner. In your testimony in calling for Federal
oversight and authority, you specifically identify the
Department of Homeland Security as your recommended choice for
that authority, and I wonder if you could give us your insight
as to why you didn't choose the EPA where some individuals have
advocated that.
Mr. Headley. Well, in my printed statement I just--and this
is not meant to be all-inclusive, but when you take a look at
the entire problem, the storage and the transportation of
chemicals, you have a multitude of various Federal agencies,
and getting five or six different agencies or seven or eight
different agencies to work together to do this is probably--
it's probably not most effectively done on a cooperative basis.
My recommendation would be that somebody have the ultimate
authority to require everyone else to go along, because there
are too many people who have a piece of the regulatory or
enforcement pie for any of them to do an effective job
individually.
Mr. Turner. Chief Full, in your testimony you also
indicated that there was a need for Federal authority or for an
agency to have oversight, but you did not identify a preference
as to EPA or Department of Homeland Security. I wondered if you
had one.
Chief Full. I didn't do it intentionally. My recommendation
would be the Department of Homeland Security.
I believe with all the efforts that have been done to date
with channeling various levels of government into the
Department as it would pertain to terrorism prevention and also
security issues, even consequence management, I believe that
has been very, very positive compared to the way it used to be
with everybody having to go out and you would go on the
Internet, or you would open up the White Pages, and you would
go into that blue section and look what level of government,
what agency covers this. But clearly I believe that this is
something that the expertise lies in the Department of Homeland
Security.
Mr. Turner. Chief Full, have you experienced instances
where there might be a company or facility where they have not
been helpful in providing access? You don't have to name them,
but I'd like you just to describe if that has happened and what
your attempts might be to resolve that.
Chief Full. Yes, we have. And literally we've been on the
doorstep of chemical facilities that have had obvious leaks,
even in progress, over the course of my experience and so forth
where we had to stand there with law enforcement and threaten
the arrest of the occupants of the building so we could gain
access to see what was actually leaking in the chemical
facility itself.
I come with 32 years of emergency response experience, and
I've documented over 1,000 chemical spill responses in my
career, and in my career in those chemical responses I've had
the opportunity to experience a few of those situations. The
vast majority of companies are compliant.
We probably have a greater threat--I know we're focused in
on the facilities themselves. There's a lot of expertise that
lies in the facilities, but I think that there is a tremendous
void on the transportation networks and the quality of training
of the drivers of the trucks that are carrying chemicals, and
the railroads and the ready information that would be readily
at hand.
If I had to pick my choice or the thing that would most
disturb me or have the greatest consequence in our community
would be an event regarding a chemical transportation incident.
Obviously they would be moving the chemicals in and out of one
of our facilities, but there are great limitations in quick
access to information and so forth in dealing with those from
the first responder's aspect.
Here in our county, being a major transportation network,
we fear even out here on the local interstate when a truck
driver carrying some very serious chemicals--and they're all
very serious, some of them are as serious as the Bhopal
chemical that was released in Bhopal--that if the driver
decides at a rest stop to go in and take a rest for a few
minutes and leaves that truck running here, they can drive--
pick up that truck and drive it into the downtown business
district or through one of our communities.
We have the inland barge traffic here in our community
here. Those barges carry 770,000 gallons of various chemicals.
We have the second, I understand, largest chemical loading in
our community of any inland port. All it would take is somebody
with a--some sort of a small device to throw it off one of our
bridges onto one of those tank barges, and we would have a
significant problem.
A lot of other folks take a look at these extremely
hazardous substances as well. We believe that the bulk storage
chemicals, your fuels and even something as mundane as diesel
fuel, can wreak havoc in a community.
We are known here as being one of the inland oil spill
capitals of the world, and back in 1988 we had a significant
release of over a million gallons of diesel fuel that went into
our rivers that impacted our community for over a week with
people not being able to draw water.
In 1987, we had a train derailment involving a major
release of chemical and fire, which necessitated an evacuation
of 16,000 people in the city of Pittsburgh for 2 days.
We know firsthand what it would take in the event that if
we would have an act which would occur with these facilities in
our neighborhoods and so forth, that we can't quickly enough
protect the population, and there would be so many of them
affected, and that's very hard to deal with.
Mr. Turner. I thank you, sir.
I thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Murphy. Thank you, Mr. Turner.
Mr. Shays.
Mr. Shays. Thank you, Mr. Murphy.
Following this panel we will have GAO address us, and I
just would like to put in some perspective what we're going to
hear and have all of you respond; Mr. Liscouski, you put into
perspective the so-called worst-case scenario of 127--123
chemical facilities throughout the United States that could
potentially expose 1 million people, 700 facilities that could
potentially threaten 100,000 people, and 3,000 facilities that
could potentially threaten 10,000 people. What does that mean?
Mr. Liscouski. I think this is drawn from the R&P data
base, sir.
Mr. Shays. Could you bring your microphone closer?
Mr. Liscouski. Sure.
Mr. Shays. Thank you.
Mr. Liscouski. I think the GAO data you're referring to is
drawn off of the R&P data base by EPA.
Mr. Shays. What does that mean, though? I don't know how to
translate it. I mean, I want to give you an opportunity to tell
me what it means.
If you're saying there are 123 chemical sites that could
negatively impact a million people, I need to know as a
legislator what that means. I don't know what that means. I
want to know what it means to you; I think I know what it means
to me.
Mr. Liscouski. First off, I think we have to level-set the
numbers. The numbers that we're dealing with from that lineup
to the R&P data base of 15,000 sites in that data base are
drawn off of data based upon absolute worst-case safety-based
scenarios. Those don't correspond to what we look at from a
tourism perspective and realistic plume models that would
ultimately have to be projected and then a determination made
upon how large of a population. So the numbers we're dealing
with are somewhat different than the numbers off of the R&P
data base.
When we went through the prioritization of the chemical
sites around the United States, we had to apply more realistic
and more deterministic models to understand what the impact of
a terrorist attack would be, and then subsequently what the
effect would be on the population. So our numbers are different
than what's been purported in the R&P data base to allow us to
really focus on realities based upon the plume modeling. So
we're drawing off of two sets of data, sir.
Mr. Shays. This committee began to undertake the terrorist
threat in 1999. We rewrote our rules so that we would look at
terrorists at home and abroad. We had 20 hearings before
September 11th, in which we discussed various scenarios. We had
the three primary commissions come before us: Hart-Rudman,
Gilmore and the Bremer Commission. They all agreed there's a
terrorist threat, they all agreed that we needed a new
strategy, and they all agreed we needed to reorganize the
government, but Hart-Rudman ultimately was the most radical.
When we and this committee talked to Americans before
September 11th about the need to reorganize and create a
Department of Homeland Security, the basic response was, what
are we, Great Britain? There was just no willingness to come to
grips with the terrorist threat. We had September 11th, we
basically took the Hart-Rudman model, we created a department
that you now work for.
Is it your sense that it was a wise thing in creating the
Department of Homeland Security?
Mr. Liscouski. Without question. I mean, without question,
because I think the opportunities that have been presented to
DHS for coordination for preparedness response, protection
response without question have added value to America's
security.
Mr. Shays. Well, we probably should have done it sooner, no
doubt about that. The reason we didn't do it sooner in part was
those in government didn't fully comprehend the threat, and
clearly the public didn't.
And so I'd love to get a sense from you how much do you
think the public has a right to know about the threat? I mean,
in this community, for instance, what are they allowed to know,
and where do we draw the line?
Mr. Liscouski. If I can just take the liberty of engaging
with you just to describe it further, because my sense when we
say was there a right to know the threat, the public has a good
understanding of the threat, we have a duty to inform the
public about the threat, so we clearly communicate threat
information fairly robustly and, in some folks' consternation,
probably too much information at times. And we don't have
perfect information, but that's just the nature of the
intelligence that we have access to. But there are many other
components to managing the threat, and I believe, sir, that's
what you're referencing when you ask the public's right to
know.
Mr. Shays. Not just the threat. I don't mean threat in a
generic way, code orange and so on. I mean does the public have
a right to know about vulnerabilities?
Mr. Liscouski. Vulnerability, that's what I was about to
get to. There's a whole chain of events that goes into
protecting the public, some of which, as we discussed, should
not be within the public's purview for knowledge related to
protection responsibilities and protection methodologies.
Mr. Shays. Can you give me a hypothetical what they should
never have a right to know?
Mr. Liscouski. Well, I can just talk holistically about
what the program is, and maybe I can add some more clarity to
the approach, and I would be happy to get down to the details.
As we heard Chief Full describe and Mr. Headley describe
about their abilities to understand what they need to know
about the--at the local level, there is no question, and DHS is
actively engaged in this process, and I speak of DHS and the
Federal Government at large in sharing that information with
those State and local authorities who have to prepare, have to
respond to, have to understand what the first-responder
requirements are. In the context of working with State and
local authorities, we share information with the local police
through the Homeland Security Advisory and through other
mechanisms about protective methodologies and vulnerabilities.
So we regularly share with the public in the context of the
authorities that ultimately have responsibility at the local
level to interact with the public. The constituencies here are
many and varied, and I wouldn't want to speak for either
gentleman on each side of me about how they view their
respective constituencies, but clearly we all strive to share
as much information as we can, and I think we do a pretty good
job at it, but clearly we need to do a better job at it,
there's no doubt about that.
We have a number of information-sharing mechanisms to go
out to the public, to the private sector, to the State and
local governments. Since DHS has been established, the
Information Sharing Analysis Centers, the information bulletins
we regularly and routinely put out not just about the threat
information to raise the alert level, but on preparedness and
prevention and protective measures, which we routinely share
with all government.
So I think we're in agreement, sir, about the public
needing to know. We clearly share the information, so I
appreciate your perspective.
Mr. Shays. OK. I'm not sure if we're connecting because I
find tremendous reluctance on the part of the government to
inform the public, and, for instance, I find it beyond my
comprehension to know why--what code are we at right now?
Mr. Liscouski. Yellow, sir.
Mr. Shays. Yellow means there's a likelihood for an attack.
Mr. Liscouski. It's elevated risk, right.
Mr. Shays. Elevated, in other words, it's not general, but
we're acting like it's general, and to the general public it's
general; you know, we're under a threat, but we're on one level
above. But yet we went to code orange, which meant, you know,
there was a serious likelihood of attack. We knew we had
concerns about planes, and we had concerns about dirty weapons
in public places. We told the public that basically they should
continue to do what they normally do.
So, I mean, I have a pretty big dispute that you and I will
have to resolve with the Department on going to code orange and
yet telling people do what you normally would do.
But let me just ask you in terms here, if we have 123 sites
that could impact a million people, as you pointed out and I
agree with, the plume isn't going to go in 360 degrees. If it
did, it probably would not have the concentration to be as
deadly, at least as to the distances, as you got into more
distance. But you have two sites here; you have the Neville
Chemical and Univar, which is in your area. Don't we have a
sense that the plumes will more likely go in a certain
direction? Don't we have historic data that would tell us that
would be the case?
Mr. Liscouski. Yes, sir, we do. In fact, that's how we were
able to further refine the R&P list from 15,000 to the list
that we have of about 4,012.
Mr. Shays. No. That's different; 15,000 are the number of
chemical plants.
Mr. Liscouski. Well, 15,000 are the R&P data base, which I
believe were reflective of an impact of 1,000 people or more.
Mr. Shays. Yes. But, see, 1,000 people or more to me
doesn't tell me anything. That implies there's 1,000. Those
1,000 could be 100,000. I mean, the 1,000 or more--you get my
gist?
Mr. Liscouski. No, sir, actually, I don't. The R&P data
base considered the worst-case scenario from an EPA
perspective.
Mr. Shays. 4,000 sites.
Mr. Liscouski. No, sir, 15,000. The R&P data base, which
was drawn by EPA, considered the worst-case scenario as related
to the plume modeling perspective, which is virtually a 360-
degree plume model----
Mr. Shays. Right.
Mr. Liscouski [continuing]. Because of the safety concerns
and what the EPA mandated from a safety perspective.
The plume modeling we applied from NARAC was a more
realistic plume model based upon historical environmental
conditions and the understanding of where the plume models
would impact on the populations, and we adjusted that within
the context of the plume model to, again, be a worst-case
scenario, further refine the numbers.
Let me just respond to one thing you mentioned earlier.
Mr. Shays. I'm not quite sure--you can go on to your
agenda, but I'm not quite sure you responded to what I'm just
trying to understand.
Mr. Liscouski. Sure. And I apologize. I'm not trying to
obfuscate you, I'm trying to understand your question.
Mr. Shays. You have a lot of knowledge, and I want to make
sure I know it, but allow me to understand. We're not talking
about 4,000 sites; 1,000 more----
Mr. Liscouski. Yes, sir, 4,000 sites.
Mr. Shays. Let's just deal with 4,000 sites, 1,000 or more.
What I was trying to convey to you is when you--let me just
tell you why I have this bias----
Mr. Liscouski. Sure.
Mr. Shays [continuing]. And concern.
I voted for the Patriot Act. A majority of my constituents
aren't sure they like the Patriot Act, I'm making that
assumption. Congress repealed the power of us to go into a
library, take the hard disk, understand who a terrorist may be
talking to, being able to not have to tell the terrorist that
we think they're a terrorist so that they go back and continue
to communicate so that we can improve our intelligence.
I happen to believe strongly in the Patriot Act. I've come
to the conclusion that the public doesn't believe the Patriot
Act because they don't think there's a terrorist threat out
there. And I have certainly come to the conclusion they don't
think there's a terrorist threat because I think we haven't
conveyed a terrorist threat because we don't want people to be
needlessly concerned.
And so in the process of trying to not scare people, we
are, in my judgment, endangering the public and weakening our
ability to get information, because some of the powers that we
need in order to get information may disappear because we may
not renew the Patriot Act.
I'm just trying to put context to my question--I have this
basic view that we need to tell people a threat, and then they
get some power to deal with it, and then we both have a good
sense of why that's happening.
When you say 4,000 sites, 1,000 or more, there are how many
sites with 100,000 or more of that 4,000, and that's what
concerns me.
Mr. Liscouski. And as we've gone through the refinement
process, sir, that's precisely how we've begun to prioritize
our efforts. So I think we're very much in alignment and
understand our priorities as you've just articulated them.
One thing, as Chairman Murphy understands well, that we
don't want to create a situation with the public where we
create panic around the situation by not providing information.
And by the same token, sir, you're a psychologist, so,
therefore, you've got a much deeper background in this than I,
but I know from the concerns that we have in terms of getting
the public to do the right thing and providing enough
information, I agree with you, not enough information can
create the same condition as too much information which might
be shared irresponsibly.
DHS, as you pointed out, I think, has been fairly good, and
our track record has been very good over the past several
months and has gotten better. Sharing information with State
and local authorities and sharing information with our industry
partners and sharing information with the public, we've tried
to give as much context around the threat to allow people to
plan, to allow people to understand what the threat means to
them.
The one thing we don't control, frankly, is the information
that the Intelligence Community can ultimately generate and
acquire, and the information, you know, that can provide the
appropriate level of context to the general population.
Mr. Shays. Let me just ask our two other participants--do
you mind if I have an additional 5 minutes?
Mr. Murphy. Not at all.
Mr. Shays. Have you both been told about plume modeling at
either site, and do you have a sense of where these plumes go?
Chief Full. I have not been told of those. I know in our
own planning we do for accidental releases, we deal with the
fact that we have prevailing weather issues, but we also have
experienced events here that with that type of release that
we've had instantaneous wind changes and things along those
lines, and my experience lends itself to that even though that
we know it's going to go probably in one direction, that
through a course of a major event, it could go and turn around.
And we have had past history in that regard. We have no
knowledge of that. Usually when we're asked, it's emergency
planners, plant people that have said, what do you think the
worst case is? But there's very little or no science behind it.
Mr. Shays. Mr. Headley, are you pleased with the security
model?
Mr. Headley. Pleased is a relative term. We're certainly
far better off than we were 2 years ago, but I think there's
some room for improvement.
If I might want--I'd like to add one other thing, and in
Mr. Liscouski's favor I think what we have here is EPA--
information that was developed that the EPA modeled for one
purpose, and we are trying to use it possibly for another
purpose. And I think it's important that Homeland Security or
whoever it is that's charged with the responsibility to do an
accurate assessment given a terrorist scenario rather than an
accidental release scenario, which is what was used to develop
the EPA model.
And one thing, not to alarm anyone, but the EPA model is
based, I believe--I'm not an expert on this--on the largest
uncontrolled release from one particular vessel, whether it be
a tank or a tank car or a truck or whatever; it did not
anticipate the possibility for multiple releases from multiple
trucks or tanks or railroad cars, and we have those scenarios
in a terrorist situation that weren't present in an accidental
release scenario, and I think those need to be examined.
Mr. Shays. Coincidentally, Mr. Murphy and I are
participating in an exercise called Dark Porthole, which will
address the potential impact of a combination of different
types of attacks.
I feel like I'm just starting to edge into something that I
would like to get into in more depth, but I guess what I'd like
to ask all three of you is EPA is not here, and I have my own
sense of why they're not here, they refused to come, and yet
EPA has the expertise, it seems to me, at least in the past,
and they have--it seems to me that a terrorist attack would
create a greater challenge than one that would be national--
first of all, let me back up and say the chemical industry has
an unbelievably good record of safety. It is just astounding in
one sense how successful it has been, but that's based on
everybody doing their job and people of goodwill working in the
plant; it's not based on someone infiltrating the plant. It's
not based on a plane attack, so on and so on.
So I guess what I'd like to ask as my last question for
this round is should I believe that a terrorist attack would be
less deadly or more deadly than what EPA has used as their
scenario?
Maybe I'll start with you.
Mr. Liscouski. Yeah, and I appreciate the opportunity to
respond to that because I guess from my perspective as
responsible for infrastructure protection, there isn't a single
death that we want to live with. I think we have to level-set
that.
We're getting kind of caught up in a numbers discussion
here. We're going to be candid with you, it's not realistic to
think we can prevent anything or every event. But I think our
goal is to actually try to prevent every event that we possibly
can.
Mr. Shays. See, the difference is that chemical plants we
allow to be near the public because we thought people of
goodwill would be in charge, and now the scenario is different.
Just as before World War II, we moved chemical plants inland
because we were concerned of their vulnerability on the
shoreline. You know, that was World War II. Then we had a
Communist threat, and now we have the terrorist threat, and the
terrorist threat seems to me to change all the assumptions.
Mr. Liscouski. Well, it does change all the assumptions,
and the discussion we're having today is predicated on our
thinking around the September 11 environment. And on that level
we have to think about the DHS prospective and my colleagues
here is that we have to think in a dynamic threat environment
which does evolve.
So I think, you know, I'm glad to see the support for this
because, quite candidly, the recognition of how challenging
this problem is, is something which we need a lot of public
education on. We are not standing still and remediating
vulnerabilities in the highest priority sites that we have, and
I wish I had a magic wand or a crystal ball----
Mr. Shays. My question I asked--and my time has run out--
the question I asked was the EPA came out with their worst-case
scenario, which we knew as a 360-degree plume and so on, but
that notwithstanding, it seems to me, and correct me if I'm
wrong, I can ask the next industry, but I'd like to know--I
know what I'm going to ask them, and I don't know what they're
going to say, but I want to know what you are going to say to
the same question.
Do you believe that a terrorist attack in a chemical plant
would be more serious, more likely to be more serious than one
that would be accidental?
Mr. Liscouski. Well, the potential is there. I mean,
there's clearly no question when we talk about the potential,
the potential for a terrorist attack to exceed an accidental
release depending upon where we are on the scale, you know,
that's just a reality.
Mr. Shays. So the question----
Mr. Liscouski. I think in the various scenarios you have, I
could come up with scenarios that would be less catastrophic
than an accidental release. I can come up with scenarios that
would be more catastrophic.
Mr. Shays. So what do you finally conclude?
Mr. Liscouski. I'm concluding, sir, we're planning based on
the priorities that we have of catastrophic loss. We're not
stopping at a specific end line for total continuous
improvement for the chemical sector.
I guess I don't want to be put into a box to say could a
terrorist attack be worse than a worst-case scenario of an EPA
release. I think if I look at the way the EPA data----
Mr. Shays. The answer would be yes.
Mr. Liscouski. No, sir.
Mr. Shays. The answer would be yes.
Mr. Liscouski. The answer would be no, then, I think,
because the EPA worst-case scenario considers a 360-degree
plume.
Mr. Shays. Well, other than the 360-degree plume.
Mr. Liscouski. I can't qualify it.
Mr. Shays. You have to make assumptions.
Mr. Liscouski. I am.
Mr. Shays. Let's just say the plume goes in one direction.
I'm talking about the accident in a facility. Isn't it true
that if you have an accident, you can focus on it; whereas, if
it's terrorist, you might have more than one event in a
chemical site and under that circumstance wouldn't it be worse?
Mr. Liscouski. No, sir. I think there's a lot of education,
I think, that has to go on here, and I regret that EPA isn't
here. They could probably respond to their EPA modeling and
what the worst-case scenarios are better than I because I don't
pretend to be an EPA expert.
Mr. Shays. This is one of the things that this hearing has
pointed out is that clearly the administration doesn't want EPA
to be involved in this.
Mr. Liscouski. I can't speak to why they're not here.
Mr. Shays. I am. I have the floor right now; I can speak to
it. We've asked them--we know why they don't want to be here.
We know there's a significant challenge. And one of the things
before we let this panel go, I want to understand your
relationship with the EPA.
I thank you for the time, and I'll come back.
Mr. Murphy. Thank you, Mr. Shays.
I have a list of what EPA requires reports on, some 350
different chemicals that they're considered extremely hazardous
substances of various levels.
As I look over this list, I mean, I obviously have to be a
Ph.D. in chemistry to understand all the effects of all this,
but, Chief Full, it brings to mind a comment you made earlier
which particularly concerned me, and you said that companies
may have some storage of some chemicals onsite, and that they
may have to report or take certain actions if they are above a
certain threshold, and they intentionally lower the amount of
chemical onsite so that they do not have to take the same
security steps. I want to make sure I understand that
correctly. That's quite concerning to me.
Chief Full. I don't believe that I can justify that they
may do it for security purposes, but we do know that they do it
on the process of minimizing their exposure to pay for chemical
fees and so forth that have been allowed under the particular
law.
And so, you know, if they're doing it for security
purposes, then that certainly would be very, very tragic and
just very disturbing to me. But I know for a fact, and it's
been just a--it's been an ongoing effort over the last several
years that the chemical industry has reduced the amount of
chemicals that are typically stored on their facilities, and
much more of those chemicals are being placed into the
transportation network versus being stored at plants.
Mr. Murphy. Thank you.
Another question I have relates to first responders, and I
know Congress has appropriated a significant amount of money
over the last several years to deal with this. I mean, with the
Clinton administration there was 100 million put into the
budget in fiscal year 2001, and the Bush I budget was $360
million, and then $750 for 2003, $750 million for 2004 and
continue on with that.
And I know looking at the kind of grants the local fire
departments receive around my area, and my colleagues can
attest to that, too, are they getting the right kind of
equipment needed in areas where there might be chemical
vulnerabilities?
Chief Full. Congressman, right now I can say that the money
is beginning to get to the right level, but, you know, the
first appropriations took place several years ago. It's taken
way too long to be able to get some of the moneys and the
purchasing done to the local level. And what's occurred here, I
know in my county I can say that we have now put equipment out
in the law enforcement community, the fire service, the EMS
community, and enhanced our hazardous materials teams, but we
are just scratching the surface on their needs.
And what we have found now, that now that the money has
down to the local levels, the vendors now are being inundated
with the request for equipment, they can't fill the orders fast
enough. So I believe the logjam here in even Pennsylvania has
been corrected, but the vendors, again, can't fill the orders
fast enough, but we're satisfied right now with the way that
the money is coming. There is concerns the way that--whether or
not that they will be shut off anytime sooner, and as well we
would like more discretionary control over how some of the
moneys are being spent in regards to how they can be used for
exercises and some particular training.
Mr. Murphy. Thank you.
Mr. Liscouski, I have a question for you. Without revealing
things that were given to us in security briefings, repeatedly
we hear patterns of terrorists that they go back and repeat
their goals and their tactics until they achieve some results.
And we've heard repeatedly comments from Bin Laden and from
other terrorist networks that they're looking at something on
the level of spectacular or massive in terms of casualties or
injuries in the United States.
In a chemical area--and actually a big chemical attack we
had was not done by external terrorists at all, it was actually
done in the Oklahoma City bombing. It was done with fertilizer
and using other chemical components there in a way that the
chemicals can be controlled, and someone can use chemicals for
a weapon.
It comes down to when dealing with terrorists, they're
looking for something that also shows the vulnerabilities. I
mean, that's the terrorists; they want to frighten people to
hurt the economy, to shut down industries and to really harm
many people whether it's personally, healthwise, politically or
whatever that is.
Are we in an area of intentional access where someone may
take chemicals, purchase them legally or whatever, and use them
in some way as weapons of mass destruction? Are we also making
some headway on any sort of regulatory efforts in controlling
that aspect?
Mr. Liscouski. Sir, I can't speak to the regulatory aspects
of that, that's an EPA issue; however, working closely with the
FBI and other partners in the law enforcement community, the
FBI has very strong authority on following up reports of
incidents that might include sabotage or forging of documents
for obtaining those materials for elicit purposes. That's not
within my area of responsibility and expertise. I can add value
to it, but I'm afraid I wouldn't do it justice with respect to
the Federal Bureau in that regard.
We're concerned about it. We look at all those
vulnerabilities. I haven't seen specific reporting or evidence
that al Queda is using those tactics to apply chemicals. I have
seen reporting historically of other U.S.-based groups,
frankly, that you are particularly referring to as well of
using that type of----
Mr. Murphy. More domestic terrorists.
Mr. Liscouski. More domestic terrorists.
We're looking at all aspects. I don't want to minimize that
as a threat. We look at all aspects of that, but I have to then
relate to my stronger partnership with the FBI, other Federal
and State and local agencies that have to remain investigative
in the law enforcement field.
Mr. Murphy. Thank you.
Mr. Turner, 5 minutes.
Mr. Turner. I would like to go back to an issue that
Chairman Murphy raised in the initial questions; that is, the
availability of public information not on the issue of
terrorist threats, but through the EPA processes and where
we've allowed information to be out in the public and that
might aid someone that has a threat potential for a facility.
I want to tell you that I'm a big fan of the community
participatory process that the EPA laws, regulations have
permitted. They give both environmental groups and community
groups an opportunity to bolster the responses of government by
actively participating, and then that way they can have a stake
on the effect or outcome being positive in the regulatory
process of responses at these facilities.
But we've already recognized that those very same processes
that enhance the community's local participation also provide
information to bad actors to recognize the testimony that, for
example, the information concerning these facilities can be
taken off the Internet.
I'd like, if you will, for each of you to talk for a moment
about your concerns you might have about the availability of
some of this information to the public and also then your
concerns, and specifically Mr. Headley and Chief Full, of your
desire--obviously the communities benefit from some of this
information being public so the community can participate, but
at the same time our terrorist threat has--might change our
evaluation of that. I'd like you to comment.
First, Mr. Headley.
Mr. Headley. Well, Chief Full is the one who could most
adequately describe what the progression of information is from
Homeland Security through our police department; and then
whether that information is disseminated directly to the
chemical industry and then through their chain, I really don't
know.
I know that from time to time information is passed along,
I believe, from the FBI to the police department that there is
some concern about something specific, and our police
department takes additional steps to try to recognize that
threat. Beyond that I'm not--I don't have expertise to speak to
that issue.
Mr. Turner. Just to reiterate, the question is about--and I
appreciate your comments, Mr. Headley, about terrorist threats,
but my question is about the availability of information with
respect to the regulatory process pertainable to planning for
emergency responses, permitting processes for these facilities.
So much of our information, including what is stored at a
facility, how the facility might respond and what its
vulnerabilities might be have been made public through the EPA
process of allowing communities to understand what's going on
in their backyard. I was just wondering about contrasting that
with given the fact that this information is made available to
the public, but it's also available to people who we would not
want to have it.
Chief Full. I wish I could give you a solid answer,
Congressman. I have mixed emotions about it. I was one who
was--very much like yourself, I was very supportive of being in
the public arena.
We pride ourselves even with our local emergency planning
committee here with 60 members, with a vast array of public and
private participation and all the various groups and so forth,
but since September 11th it's very hard to take out of the
mind-set that somebody could realize that one of the products
inside one of those facilities would be ideal to wreak havoc.
With that said, though, I believe that here at the local
level there are ways to get around that, that government, as
long as we've established a procedure that when people want
information, and rightfully so--I mean, a resident living next
door to a community chemical plant should still have the right
to be able to see what's in that plant, and we've established
procedures for that through our local emergency planning
committee that they can come in and see all that. But to have
it out in the open arena, we've sort of gone away from the
thoughts that we don't want people to be able to search around
there for the best case or where they can maximize the most
damage on the Internet, but we have still established ways that
people can find that information out by visiting us or calling
us, and we'll work with them on a one-on-one basis.
But for somebody to call up right now, what would concern
me is you get a general call from somebody that says, I'd like
a list of all your chemical plants and all your chemical plants
that have these following chemicals. That kind of a request
would be very suspicious to us right now, and we wouldn't honor
that request, but a legitimate request from a resident or a
particular government official or something along those lines,
we would make any and all of our information still available to
them.
Mr. Liscouski. Mr. Turner, thank you.
And I probably have the easiest answer in this space than
anyone does, but I do that out of compassion for my colleagues,
because from a pure protective standpoint I prefer we share no
information with the general public. If we could prevent people
in the open-source world from gaining access to information
which could be used to exploit vulnerabilities, I'm all over
that, and if I was at the one end of the spectrum to suggest
that's what we ought to do, I'm here to tell you that I'm
mandated, I'm charged with trying to protect the critical
infrastructure of the United States, and that's a tool in the
tool kit.
Now, I say that, but by the same token I know that my
colleagues at the local level have to live in that space, and
not having information really hampers their ability to do that.
We're not going to prescribe how we share information or what
the local officials share with their constituency and the
population. As Chief Full pointed out, they can do that, they
live with that, they live in the local area, they know the
locals, they can talk with folks, they can share information
responsibly.
It's a national problem, but there's no Federal answer for
this at the local level to respond to it. But I can tell you
that it's my concern that we do protect information that can be
exploited by terrorist groups and others that are looking to do
us harm.
Mr. Headley. If I might just add one thing, if you're
talking about availability of information, on February 13th I
downloaded the TRI data on this facility from the Internet,
which tells you all the quantities--the reporting here was
2001, it's not the most recent information, but if someone is
interested in what chemicals are at that facility, it's widely
available.
Mr. Murphy. OK. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Shays.
Mr. Shays. Thank you. Maybe the best way to spend my time
is to understand EPA's role and DHS's role. I don't really
quite understand it. I don't understand whether the EPA has any
role over the terrorist threat, and if not I need to know why,
so maybe you can start me out.
Mr. Liscouski. Sure. Let me start by describing what DHS's
role here is vis-a-vis the Homeland Security Act and then how
that's evolved or how we got to the Homeland Security Act and
what that means to DHS and then how that's evolving in the
context of providing security in cooperation with EPA.
Homeland Security Act 2002 established DHS----
Mr. Shays. Can you move the mic closer.
Mr. Liscouski. Excuse me, sir. I'm sorry.
The Homeland Security Act of 2002 established DHS as the
lead agency for chemical security in the chemical sector and in
partnership with the EPA we're pursuing that. And that was a
balance between safety and security. We did not assume the
responsibilities for safety for which DHS--EPA--has the clear
mandate, and the legislative and regulatory authority for
safety programs are crucial, as we're discussing here, to
providing good foundation for security. You cannot separate
those two things. But the responsibility for security for DHS,
it was never intended to be a separate or mutually exclusive
responsibility that moved to DHS without the cooperation of the
EPA. We can't do that. I would never support it.
If the law provided for that I would quickly develop the
relationships that I needed within the EPA to draw upon their
expertise in this area because they have that domain expertise.
Good government doesn't mean we should replicate
responsibilities; good government means that we leverage
responsibilities and capabilities across our government and
that's precisely what we're doing with the EPA.
We work closely with the EPA to understand what the threats
are, understand the priorities and, most importantly, the
solutions and the remedies to the vulnerabilities.
To extend the Homeland Security Act 2002 which was
effectively a strategy for what good nationwide homeland
security is, the Homeland Security Presidential Directive No.
7, just recently signed by President Bush in December, is how
we have to do those responsibilities collectively.
We're in the process of developing those, the tactics
behind that strategy and the partnerships between the
respective agencies that have responsibilities for all critical
infrastructure; we're in dialog and constant negotiation with
these agencies, and specifically with EPA, determining how we
broker the respective responsibilities for ensuring we have
protection for chemical, as well as the Department of
Transportation who has authority in this area, as well as TSA
and the Coast Guard who have authority in this area.
So we're taking a very holistic look at an end-to-end sort
of perspective for chemical security effective at the ports, in
transit, and ultimately in place at the sites themselves. So
that has a responsibility broad spectrum across, as I pointed
out, EPA, Coast Guard, DFT, TSA, DHS at a greater role, and
probably a couple others that are not coming to mind.
So this is intended to be a very well-coordinated effort.
DHS has responsibility in the context of actually doing the
tactical things as well as the strategic responsibility of
coordinating our efforts nationwide.
Mr. Shays. There's no Federal law evidently that explicitly
requires all chemical facilities to take security actions to
safeguard their facilities against terrorist attack.
Do you think this is wise and, if so, why?
Mr. Liscouski. Well, MTSA is responsible for the act
enabling the Coast Guard with their oversight role in this area
for the ports by virtue gives the Coast Guard that authority in
part.
And working with the Coast Guard and, as I pointed out,
with DOT, we believe that, you know, we can always make
improvements; but we believe we can exploit the current
regulatory authorities within those respective agencies to
achieve a national level of security as it relates to chemical
security.
Mr. Shays. How does the Coast Guard impact us here.
Mr. Liscouski. Well, with the two citations here, both of
these sites, both in Neville Island and in Forward Township,
are TSA, sir.
Mr. Shays. Maybe you gentlemen can explain it to me.
Mr. Liscouski. I can amplify it if you like.
Mr. Shays. I must be out of my territory. I want to know,
we don't have Federal laws that require the chemical plants to
do security and I'm trying to ask if this made sense, and
you're telling me that, you know, the Coast Guard--through the
Coast Guard we somehow are getting chemical plants to do this.
So are you saying that they have requirements or they don't
have requirements?
Mr. Liscouski. No, I'm saying they do have requirements.
The MTSA, the Maritime----
Mr. Shays. So you disagree with the statement. You think
our laws now require chemical plants to secure their
facilities.
Mr. Liscouski. Within certain parameters, sir. The Coast
Guard has mandated vulnerability assessments based upon
standards to be provided to them by December 2003. We're in the
process of collecting those standards currently. So under the
MTSA----
Mr. Shays. That's for all chemical plants.
Mr. Liscouski. No, those that fall within the purview of
the MTSA, sir. That's what I was saying. This is a holistic
approach, some of which are covered by regulations, some of
which are covered by oversight by DHS.
You're asking for one--I think you're asking, do we need
one single Federal law for security risk to chemical plants.
Mr. Shays. [Nods affirmatively.]
Mr. Liscouski. Then I would say at this point in time, I
think, working with the administration, I would say all things
are on the table, but I'm not in a position to worry about
that.
What I'm in a position to worry about is what's the
security currently and what are we doing to improve that, and
I'm telling you right now we're taking a very active approach
to it.
Mr. Shays. I'm not trying to get you in a position where
you're telling me what the administration has to do for policy,
but I basically conclude you're the person in charge. The EPA
has basically decided, fairly late, not to participate.
I'm trying to understand, you know, who's in charge if
anyone in terms of what kind of absolute mandates we can make
on chemical plants and whether we should, and I've seen two
folks locally and I'm just trying to think, you know, what
information is being shared with them. And I know there's a
reluctance on the part of you to overstate or even understate
the challenge. I'd like to get something out of this hearing
that I can go home with and say, well, we need to move in this
direction or that direction.
You're not giving me the opportunity to draw on your
expertise to know whether you think that more Federal law is
necessary, or some Federal law. You're telling me how you're
coping and, you know, I mean, maybe that's the way we end this
hearing, but it's not a very satisfying one from my standpoint
in trying to learn something.
I'm trying to understand--I mean, for instance, I'm near a
nuclear power plant. They have to have an evacuation plan, they
have to determine where the plume goes and the probability of
the plume, they have to have requirements for safety, and maybe
it's a bad comparison, maybe we just don't need it, but I think
if we have it for nuclear plants why not for chemical?
So I thought maybe in this hearing I'd learn that, but
maybe I've got to ask someone else. I don't know, it's getting
to be a bit frustrating because I feel like I'm in a game. I
just want to know some answers.
Gentlemen, tell me, do you have evacuation plans for
neighborhoods around the chemical plants?
Mr. Headley. As part of the improvements that we made at
Vopak we came up with an evacuation plan for an accidental
release, which obviously would apply for an intentional release
as well, which essentially was to put in a warning siren, to
send information to the people in the neighborhood and
downstream to warn them that there was a problem. It's one of
those things where you stay in place and put plastic over your
windows and do that kind of thing until the threat dissipates.
Beyond that, I can't comment about the regulatory or who
has ultimate authority on these matters because I just don't
know.
Mr. Shays. Chief.
Chief Full. My experience--and, again, the chemical
facility and the Forward Township being in my county I can tell
you that they are more the exception than the rule.
Mr. Shays. What's more the exception than the rule.
Chief Full. What they have accomplished, both at the
company level and with the municipality through their efforts,
have been nothing less than extraordinary and outstanding in
the spirit of cooperation. However, they are only 1 of 230
facilities I have in my county right now, and I am concerned
about the fact that we don't have something. And, quite
frankly, at this point in time at the local level, I don't care
where it comes from, but there has to be something to improve
the accountability for security of the facilities.
As I take a look at what we've discussed here this morning,
I'm in the business of responding to those things when they
have occurred; and with that, we've got to ensure that it
doesn't occur and we can't be shopping around with who's going
to do it under one regulation, I mean, we already are mandated
under a number of different regulations that either come out of
EPA or FEMA or something along those lines.
We, too, have a power plant 10 miles from here and I'm very
familiar with what you've experienced with your power plant,
and we have evacuation plans for our chemical facilities, as is
required under our EPA reporting and so forth. But they have
nothing to do--there's not one thing in there about security;
it really doesn't even ask, do you have a site security plan?
We have everything for consequence purposes, responding to if
there's an emergency, but there is nothing to do with security
at all, there's--and----
Mr. Shays. Mr. Liscouski, why wouldn't we just give the EPA
that same responsibility and I'll just give you the analogy
that I have. I mean, under FEMA they have natural disasters and
they have man-made disasters and they respond to both and they
deal with both.
Why would we separate that? Why wouldn't we just keep the
EPA involved with the same--I mean, logically what is the
argument for not doing it?
Mr. Liscouski. I can only speak to what is, sir; I can't
talk about the retrospective reasons as to why people made
decisions.
I'll just tell you that when we talk about the
responsibility for coordinating across the national picture for
infrastructure protection and security, it makes sense that DHS
has the responsibility to do that, working with our Federal
partners.
Now, we talk about legislation and we talk about
regulation, I think it's important to note, and we talk about
things that have to be done at a minimum. As it relates to
security, one of the things I'm always fearful of when people
talk about legislation that deals with regulation is that it
goes up to the fence line and typically deals with minimum
standards.
When we talk about minimums here we're often talking about
those things which don't meet a dynamic threat environment. The
world that we come from and the world that we all currently
live in with respect to the September 11th--the post-September
11th world is one in which we have a great dynamic threat.
My fear is legislation can only move at a certain pace and
if we require chemical companies to achieve a minimum, the
minimums, then they will go to the minimum; and if the threat
exceeds that minimum, are we going to wait to enact legislation
which is going to then take them to the next level of a minimum
standard which might respond to an evolutionary threat?
My job is to ensure that we have robust capabilities and
thinking going on. So to that end, irrespective of legislation
sitting in the hopper or not, regardless of what requirements
there are to meet regulatory requirements, we regularly work
with the chemical sctor across the industry, associations,
individual companies, to assess their vulnerabilities, to get
them to work and make the investments they need to do the
things that they need to do, and we check up with them.
That's not requiring a legislative mandate to do that.
We're moving out on that now, we're making improvements, and I
can tell you right now we're exceeding anything that I've seen
on the table yet with respect to legislation. Now, are we
making progress to my satisfaction in terms of getting all
4,000 sites done to the level that we need to? No. Is there
enough money to do that right off the bat? I'm not so sure it's
a question of money. It's a question of time. And this is an
evolutionary problem. We have to attack it as much as we can.
But if you want to leave this hearing satisfied, I can only
tell you right now that we are not sitting waiting for
legislation, good thought, to be passed by the Congress or
anyone else before we take action. We're very aggressive about
it. We're moving out and we're reducing vulnerabilities.
I'd like to say we're touching all the points that we need
to be. We can be doing a better job, but the public should not
be thinking that DHS is waiting for guidance from anybody
before we move out there.
We're working hard with the industry, we're pushing them
hard. I suspect you're going to hear on the next panel from the
American Chemistry Council how hard we're pushing them, how
hard we're working them, and I'm upsetting some people by doing
that. Do I care if I upset them? No. Do I care about making
sure we've got the right security for the United States? Yes.
That's what I've got to answer to, sir, not about making sure
I've got some regulation, but making sure we understand the
vulnerabilities and that we've got the right protection
programs.
Mr. Shays. Our job is oversight of DHS under the law. We
have oversight of the Department of State and the Department of
Defense, FEMA and all the parts there.
Our job is to look at programs to see if they're working
well, and then part of it is to determine whether we have to
rewrite laws. Our committee has come up with tremendous amounts
of recommendations, some to the Department of Homeland
Security, and in the process of hearings we learn things that
we can then recommend. It's not your job to write the law, it's
our job. I understand that.
Mr. Liscouski. I agree.
Mr. Shays. But it's our job to understand if we're doing it
the right way and the best way. Is this the best way? We bring
people before us to learn that.
And so I am just wrestling right now--and I think you can
think it's pretty logical, we have EPA, they have it for
accidental, and yet we have testimony from two people locally
that they have nothing now for security. And I'm wondering why
it's better to have DHS do it than not just to have EPA just
revise what they do to have it also under security.
And that's what I'm wrestling with, and I'm not trying to
play a game with you or anybody else, I'm asking a logical
question and I'm hearing your answer saying, well, we're doing
the best we're doing, we're not waiting.
What I wanted to know is what is the logic of not having
EPA do it. Tell me that, please. Is there logic or is it just a
value judgment?
Mr. Liscouski. No, I believe there's logic for this for the
same reason the Transportation Security Administration was
formed from the likes of FAA and where there was a security
component beforehand.
I think there is some recognition that there is a
difference between safety and security, that safety provides a
good foundation for security programs, but security has to be
within the responsibility of an organization whose mandate and
primary focus is security for the United States. That's DHS.
Mr. Shays. So your point about transportation--and then I'm
done--is what? I'm missing your point. You're speaking too
quickly for me.
Mr. Liscouski. Sorry.
Mr. Shays. What's your point about Department of
Transportation? The analogy to what to what.
Mr. Liscouski. Well, prior to September 11th, the
Department of Transportation did have airline security within
its mandate. And then subsequent to September 11 the
Transportation Security Administration was formed to ensure
that we had an even greater focus, and that focus was then
transferred to----
Mr. Shays. We took Coast Guard from Transportation and we
moved it to DHS, I understand that. I'm not suggesting we take
EPA and give it to you. But the question is, are we now doing
two separate things? They're both dealing with security, that
one is dealing with national and you dealing with man-made
causes, and I am just wondering why. That's what I'm wrestling
with.
We didn't do it in other areas. We haven't brought FEMA in,
and FEMA does both. And I don't understand why we're separating
it. That's what I'm trying to understand. If you don't know the
answer to it then that's fine.
Mr. Liscouski. Perhaps I'm not being clear. I think I do
know that answer. The FEMA responsibility, which is now
Emergency Preparedness and Response, is not a security
responsibility but a preparedness and response capability.
The security responsibilities we have in the DHS are across
a number of different elements. The safety responsibility for
EP&A remains at EP&A. EP&A really never had a very robust
security capability. We're trying new security programs based
upon solely safety forces.
The industry--the government would obviously serve in terms
of what the Homeland Security Act provided for--felt that DHS
was the appropriate place for a nexus for security as it
relates to all of our critical infrastructure and specifically
to the chemical sector.
So I think the answer is there, perhaps I'm just not
articulating it correctly and I apologize for that, but I'd be
happy to spend more time with you trying to get clarity on it.
Mr. Shays. The Department of Homeland Security legislation
emanated from this committee. We had the very first hearing on
it and I understand the genesis of the legislation. I still for
the life of me don't understand why EPA is not more involved in
the security side and that's what I don't understand.
I don't understand why these gentlemen know that they have
emergency plans when it relates to natural causes, but somehow
they don't have it for man-made problems. I don't for the life
of me understand that and I know you're trying to answer, but I
don't understand.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Murphy. Mr. Shays.
We will move on to the next panel now. I thank you for your
testimony, I appreciate it very much.
Mr. Liscouski. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
[Recess.]
Mr. Murphy. All right. We'll continue now with our hearing
and ask that the people about to give testimony please rise and
be sworn.
[Witnesses sworn.]
Mr. Murphy. I note for the record that the witnesses
responded in the affirmative.
I'd like to introduce our panel, the second panel, for
witnesses. These include Mr. John Stephenson, Director of
National Resources and Environment for the U.S. General
Accounting Office; Ms. Pamela Witmer, president of the
Pennsylvania Chemical Industry Council; Mr. Marty Durbin, team
leader for security and operations and senior director of
Federal relations for the American Chemistry Council; and we
have Ms. Jennifer C. Gibson, vice president of government &
public affairs, National Association of Chemical Distributors.
I welcome all the witnesses today to this hearing and I
guess we'll begin with Mr. Stephenson, your testimony. Each
person will get----
Mr. Shays. Five minutes.
Mr. Murphy [continuing]. Five minutes and we'll roll over
if we need to do that.
Mr. Stephenson.
STATEMENTS OF JOHN STEPHENSON, DIRECTOR OF NATIONAL RESOURCES
AND ENVIRONMENT FOR THE U.S. GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE; PAMELA
WITMER, PRESIDENT OF THE PENNSYLVANIA CHEMICAL INDUSTRY
COUNCIL; MARTY DURBIN, TEAM LEADER FOR SECURITY AND OPEERATIONS
AND SENIOR DIRECTOR OF FEDERAL RELATIONS FOR THE AMERICAN
CHEMISTRY COUNCIL; AND JENNIFER C. GIBSON, VICE PRESIDENT OF
GOVERNMENT AND PUBLIC AFFAIRS, NATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF CHEMICAL
DISTRIBUTORS
Mr. Stephenson. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you for the
opportunity to discuss our work on the security of the Nation's
chemical facilities and the recommendations that we made to
address this issue over a year ago in our March 2003 report.
As the events of September 11, 2001 showed, terrorists can
cause enormous damage to our country by attacking
infrastructure essential to our economy and jeopardizing public
health and safety. Following these events, the President, in
the National Strategy for Homeland Security, identified the
chemical industry as 1 of 13 sectors critical to the Nation's
infrastructure. Across the Nation, literally thousands of
industrial facilities manufacture, use, or store hazardous
chemicals in quantities that could potentially put large
numbers of Americans at risk in the event of a chemical
release.
The Federal Government's role in protecting chemical
facilities from terrorist attacks has been much debated since
September 11. Initially EPA had the lead responsibility for
chemical security, but it has now been shifted to the new
Department of Homeland Security, as you just heard. Public
debate has centered on whether the Federal Government should
impose security requirements on chemical facilities or whether
voluntary industry actions alone are sufficient.
Let me briefly summarize the findings in our report. First,
most experts agree that the Nation's chemical facilities are
indeed attractive targets for terrorists intent on causing
massive damage. The risk of an attack varies among facilities
and upon several factors including the types of chemicals they
use and their proximity to populated areas.
According to EPA data on accidental toxic release worst-
case scenarios, as you heard, 123 chemical facilities located
throughout the Nation could each potentially expose more than 1
million people in the surrounding area if a toxic release
occurred, and another 700 facilities could each threaten at
least 100,000 people.
Now, there's a chart in the back of our testimony that kind
of in part explains the difference between those numbers and
the 4,000 that DHS was talking about.
Numerous studies and media accounts of reporters gaining
access to facilities indicates that the vulnerabilities are
very real. Just a few months ago, as was already mentioned once
here, the Pittsburgh Tribune Review did an expose on the
vulnerability of such facilities in this area that CBS later
used in a broader 60 Minutes piece on chemical plant security.
Despite the obvious risk, no Federal laws as yet explicitly
require that all chemical facilities assess vulnerabilities or
take security action to safeguard them from an attack. While
some facilities must take action under recent legislation
covering water treatment plants, part of those 15,000, or
plants near ports, which is about 300 of those 15,000, no
Federal regulation right now requires that all of them be
assessed.
Furthermore, well over 2 years after the events of
September 11 the Federal Government is still not
comprehensive--has still not comprehensively assessed the
chemical industry's vulnerability to terrorist attacks. EPA,
the Department of Homeland Security, and the Department of
Justice have each taken preliminary steps to assist the
industry in its preparedness efforts, but no agency monitors or
documents the extent to which chemical facilities have
implemented security measures. Consequently, Federal, State and
local entities in general lack information on preparedness.
To their credit chemical manufacturing industry
associations have taken a number of voluntary initiatives to
address security at their member facilities. For example, the
American Chemistry Council, represented on this panel, requires
its members to follow its responsible care approach and
preparedness. ACC's efforts are commendable, but its members,
while some of the Nation's biggest chemical companies, include
less than 1,000 of the approximately 15,000 facilities the EPA
estimates manufacture or store dangerous chemicals.
Relying on voluntary efforts alone without Federal
oversight or third-party verification may not be sufficient to
address the considerable threat. Indeed, relying on voluntary
efforts alone raises serious concerns, and the extent the
facilities are participating in such efforts is at this point
unclear.
In light of the gravity of a potential threat and the
obvious challenges facing the industry in addressing it, we
recommended a year ago that the Department of Homeland Security
and EPA jointly develop a comprehensive national strategy that,
one, identifies high-risk facilities and collects information
on preparedness--that sounds like that's partially being done
according to the DHS witness; two, further specify the roles
and responsibilities for addressing the threat; three,
establish appropriate information sharing mechanisms; and,
four, develop legislative proposals to require chemical
facilities to expeditiously assess their vulnerability and,
when necessary, make corrective actions.
Legislation is now working its way through the Congress
that, if enacted, and I haven't seen the latest draft of this
legislation, but would direct DHS and EPA to in part adopt most
of these recommendations.
Mr. Chairman, that concludes the summary to my statement
and I'll be happy to respond to questions at any time.
Mr. Murphy. Thank you, Mr. Stephenson.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Stephenson follows:]
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Mr. Murphy. Ms. Witmer.
Ms. Witmer. Good morning, Mr. Chairman and members of the
House Subcommittee on National Security, Emerging Threats and
International Relations. As Congressman Murphy indicated, my
name is Pam Witmer and I am president of the Pennsylvania
Chemical Industry Council. PCIC represents over 70 companies
involved in the manufacture, distribution, and use of chemicals
along with those companies that support our industry.
Pennsylvania's business of chemistry is an approximately
$27 billion a year industry employing almost 62,000
Pennsylvanians. These jobs represent over 8 percent of the
Commonwealth's entire manufacturing work force, a work force
that takes home on average over $68,000 a year.
I'm pleased to appear before you today to discuss the
efforts that have been undertaken post September 11 by those
involved in Pennsylvania's chemical industry. We are committed
to work in partnership with Federal, State and local
governments to further ensure the security of materials that
are used to make everyday products like Kevlar for bulletproof
vests for our military and law enforcement, water purification
systems, bicycle helmets for our children, siding and
insulation for our homes and lifesaving medicines. Hazardous
materials are used to make the products that drive our economy
and contribute to our well-being. It is equally important to
understand that of the hazardous materials manufactured and
transported, only a small portion of them would be considered
attractive to a would-be terrorist.
The chemical industry has long taken security seriously. In
this ``just in time'' culture it's imperative that materials
are moved from manufacturer to customer in a timely, efficient,
cost-effective and secure manner. As well, the industry has
made it a priority to establish a good working relationship
with members of the local first-response community.
I think the key word used to describe the industry's
security efforts to date is ``proactive.'' Efforts to further
enhance security through formal industrywide guidelines were
undertaken immediately following the tragic events of September
11th. Shortly following 9/11, industry had developed,
distributed and began training on the use of the Site Security
Guidelines for the Chemical Industry. These guidelines were
followed by the more comprehensive American Chemistry Council
Responsible Care Security Code. These documents were developed
jointly by the American Chemistry Council, CHEMTREC, the
Chlorine Institute, the Synthetic Organic Chemical
Manufacturers Association, and subsequently supported by many
other chemical industry associations including the Pennsylvania
Chemical Industry Council.
PCIC supports efforts to pass Federal legislation that
would place authority for establishing national standards for
chemical site security and overseeing their implementation with
the Department of Homeland Security. PCIC also suggests that
such Federal legislation recognize the ACC Responsible Care
Security Code as an acceptable security standard. PCIC does not
support individual States acting on their own in absence of
Federal legislation.
From PCIC's perspective there are three themes essential to
the successful development and implementation of a security
plan: use of sound science and actual risk posed, outreach and
training.
Sound science and actual risk. The Site Security Guidelines
and the more recent Security Code represent a risk-based
approach to identify, assess and address vulnerabilities,
prevent or mitigate incidents, enhance training and response
capabilities and maintain and improve relationships with key
stakeholders. The Guidelines and Security Code were written
specifically for those who have responsibility for the safe and
secure management and distribution of their products and raw
materials. The Responsible Care Security Code outlines a tiered
risk-based approach to identifying vulnerabilities and
implementing security programs and practices that managers can
consider and tailor to a company's specific situation as
identified in vulnerability assessment. The two documents offer
flexibility to design a program according to the chemical being
used and the actual risk posed.
Some of the more obvious strategies being employed include
changing the direction trucks enter a facility, use of employee
identification cards, background checks for employees and
contractors, additional surveillance in the forms of obvious
cameras as well as placement of more covert cameras, additional
fencing, more security guards, etc.
As I mentioned, these are some of the obvious methods
employed to better secure the sites that manufacture, store,
use and distribute hazardous materials. Actual security plans
are, of course, confidential and, on the advice of law
enforcement, not discussed.
The second element of a successful security plan is
outreach and information sharing. Hazardous materials security
is a shared responsibility. It is not just the job of
government agencies, law enforcement or a particular industry
sector. It is all of these groups working together that would
provide the best opportunity to prevent or respond
appropriately to an act of terrorism, international or
domestic.
Information sharing is a critical element for effective
security. Along with understanding the real risk posed by a
particular chemical, being provided with accurate information
can trigger heightened or tightened security.
This shared responsibility extends to those involved in the
manufacture and distribution of chemicals. A number of
initiatives have been established that do enable government
agencies, law enforcement, and various industry sectors to
interact on information sharing. Some of these efforts include
the Chemical Sector Sharing and Analysis Center. In April 2002,
ACC and the National Infrastructure Protection Center, which
was then part of the FBI, signed a formal agreement
establishing a communications network that operates 24 hours a
day to provide an exchange of security and threat information
between the Federal Government, the chemical manufacturers,
carriers and distributors. PCIC is also a subscriber of the
Chemical Sector ISAC to ensure that chemical manufacturers and
distributors not affiliated with ACC are provided with the
latest security and threat information.
Some of the other advances in information sharing include
the Railroad Alert Network, the Surface Transportation
Information Sharing and Analysis Center, the Chemical
Transportation Emergency Center and the Association of American
Railroads and the American Chemistry Council Security Task
Force.
As you can see, much has been done in the way of providing
better access to information. However, there still exists a
reluctance to pass along critical intelligence because of the
sensitive nature of the intelligence or its source.
Consideration should be given by the Federal Department of
Homeland Security to developing a process that would provide
top security clearance for certain chief security executives
within companies, as many of these individuals come from the
intelligence or law enforcement community.
The third theme of all hazardous materials security
efforts, training, is essential. PCIC member companies
participate in drills to determine whether or not the plan is
effective, sharpen skills and responses and to determine what
needs to be done better.
An example of a cooperative training effort that took place
this past November was the national level terrorism-related
preparedness drill involving the U.S. Coast Guard, the FBI,
PCIC member company ConocoPhillips and State and local law
enforcement agencies for Pennsylvania and New Jersey. This
particular training exercise utilized a scenario involving a
simulated terrorism-induced oil spill in the Delaware River to
test the Unified Command's capability to respond to a breach in
port security while at the same time containing and responding
to a major oil spill.
PCIC and many of our member companies also voluntarily
participate in and support a national organization called
TransCAER, which stands for Transportation Community Awareness
Emergency Response. Pennsylvania TransCAER is a unique
organization that counts among its members the Federal
Environmental Protection Agency, the Federal Emergency
Management Agency, the Pennsylvania Emergency Management
Agency, the Pennsylvania Department of Transportation and the
Keystone Emergency Management Association, in addition to
chemical manufacturers, distributors and hazardous materials
cleanup companies. Pennsylvania TransCAER, an award-winning
affiliate of the national TransCAER organization, has as its
mission, outreach and training to communities in which our
facilities are located and through which our materials are
transported.
Pennsylvania TransCAER has just completed its second
consecutive year of providing free hazardous materials incident
response training to county and local first responders. This
unique training utilizes actual scenes from within the county
in which the training is being held, allows first responders to
role play all elements of a hazardous materials transportation
incident, from the initial call reporting the incident, to
managing the incident, to cleanup, to reporting relevant
information to medical and hospital personnel, to working with
the media.
I am pleased to announce this voluntary effort will be
offered free to an additional seven Pennsylvania counties in
2004. Allegheny County was one of the first counties to be
offered this free training in 2002 and neighboring Beaver
County participated in the Pennsylvania TransCAER training
event in 2003.
On a more local level, many employees of PCIC member
companies are active participants in their county's Terrorism
Task Force. They are volunteer firefighters or emergency
medical technicians. As well, some of our member companies have
agreements with their local emergency planning coordinator that
allow the company's hazardous materials response team to go
offsite and assist in a hazardous materials emergency.
This unprecedented information sharing, outreach and
training is taking place not just between law enforcement and
industry, but also with other Federal and State agencies. An
example of this cooperation on a national level is the
industry's participation in a Federal Department of
Transportation study that is currently underway to field test
various new technologies that may be beneficial for tracking
shipments of hazardous materials under a variety of scenarios.
PCIC is a member of the security discussion group created by
Pennsylvania's Homeland Security Director, Keith Martin.
As you can see, the manufacturer and distribution of
hazardous materials is more secure today than it was last year
and certainly more secure than it was 5 or 10 years ago.
This does not mean that we are done nor does it mean that
there will never be a successful terrorist attack. It does mean
that we recognize our responsibility to try and secure our
employees and communities through which our materials are
transported and manufactured.
A number of positive and proactive voluntary initiatives
have already been taken to develop more secure movement of
hazardous materials. Research will continue looking for better
ways to improve approaches to security that are based on sound
science and developed on the basis of actual risk. But society
as a whole faces the problem that in response to all types of
threats, terrorism, natural disasters, etc., in general there
is no such thing as zero risk. Whether it's airports, water
treatment plants, high-rise buildings or hazardous materials,
we must all realize there are real costs to every person for
each effort made to reduce the likelihood of risks negatively
impacting us.
I realize I went way over my time, but thank you and
whenever it's appropriate I'll answer questions.
Mr. Murphy. Thank you.
[The prepared statement of Ms. Witmer follows:]
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Mr. Murphy. Mr. Durbin.
Mr. Durbin. Good morning. Again, my name is Marty Durbin
and on behalf of the members of the American Chemistry Council
I certainly appreciate the opportunity to address security in
the business of chemistry, a critical sector of America's
infrastructure.
ACC represents 140 of the leading companies in the U.S.
Chemical manufacturing industry. It's an industry with the
largest exporting sector in our economy directly employing a
million people and is the largest private industry investor in
research and development. Products we manufacture are essential
to our modern lives, from plastics to pharmaceuticals, from
cars to clothing, and they keep our drinking water safe,
support agriculture and spur medical invasions that prevent and
treat disease.
Now, you've asked that we address voluntary actions the
chemical industry has taken to address security and assess the
Federal Government's roles and programs in this area. I welcome
the opportunity to highlight three specific areas. One is the
leadership role that I believe ACC members have taken with
regard to security to further ensure the security and safety of
their products facilities and the communities in which they
operate; and, second, the strides the Federal Government has
made in the last year in this area; and, third, the remaining
challenges and where we need to go from here.
As has been mentioned several times, safety and security
have been primary concerns of this industry since long before
September 11th; however, those attacks forced every part of
America's critical infrastructure to reevaluate security
preparedness. Our members didn't wait for government direction.
Building on the ethic of stewardship embodied in our trademark
Responsible Care Program now in it's 16th year, our members
acted swiftly, adopting an aggressive plan to further enhance
security, and that is the ACC Responsible Care Security Code.
Through the code, ACC members are making serious
commitments and significant investments. Implementation of the
code, which addresses site, cyber and transportation security
is mandatory for all members. Regarding facilities
specifically, the code requires that for every facility in all
four categories, a rigorous security vulnerability assessment
be conducted, security enhancements are implemented, and that a
third party verify that those enhancements have indeed taken
place.
The code emphasizes that security is a shared
responsibility requiring actions by others in order to be
effective. That includes suppliers and customers as well as
government agencies, first responders law enforcement and
everyone else we've been speaking about this morning.
The ACC Security Code has been called a model program by
Secretary Ridge, and, as Mr. Stephenson mentioned, in the GAO
report last year it was commended. More recently the Code was
recognized by the U.S. Coast Guard, by the State of New Jersey,
and by the city of Baltimore as essentially a best practice for
chemical security. I'd be happy to go into more detail on that
during the question period.
ACC's efforts, of course, extend far beyond the boundaries
of just our facilities. We understand that effective response
systems are key to safety and security and, as such, we have
longstanding public service programs such as CHEMTREC, which we
mentioned earlier, a 24-hour emergency response center that has
now been a public service of the American Chemistry Council for
over 30 years, and the TransCAER program, again, as Ms. Witmer
discussed.
The GAO report last year said that ACC's efforts were
commendable, but we have not been content to rest on our
laurels. Our members have continued to push themselves to
strengthen our partnerships with law enforcement, first
responders as well as local, State and Federal Government, and
to meet the ambitious timetable of our security code. I'm
pleased to report that our members are meeting their timetable.
Every member facility has completed a vulnerability assessment
and with many enhancements already in place we're on a path to
full implementation of security enhancements by the end of this
year.
Now, second, regarding the Federal Government and its role,
We've been working very closely with the Department of Homeland
Security during its first year of existence. We concurred with
GAO's recommendations last year that the Federal Government
should develop a comprehensive national chemical security
strategy that's both practical and cost effective and that
would focus in the following four areas.
First, identifying high-risk facilities. Now, I can tell
you that starting in March of last year DHS partnered with ACC
and Mr. Liscouski mentioned much of that in his testimony.
Today DHS and the Coast Guard are actively visiting chemical
facilities and working in conjunction with local law
enforcement and responders to protect facilities and their
communities.
In addition it's worth noting that U.S. Customs has
developed the Customs Trade Partnership Against Terrorism
program [CTPAT], to help identify potentially vulnerable or
suspect shipments and works with manufacturers and shippers
through the value chain, both foreign and domestic, to secure
global trade.
Second, GAO identified the need to specify the roles and
responsibilities of Federal agencies. Since their report was
published, and as has already been mentioned, the President
signed a Presidential Directive in December that more clearly
defines security roles of various Federal agencies and
specifically names DHS as the lead agency for the chemical
sector.
Third was the need to develop appropriate information
sharing mechanisms. As has been mentioned, the FBI through the
National Infrastructure Protection Center contacted ACC shortly
after September 11th and asked that we sponsor and host the
chemical sector ISAC and through our CHEMTREC program we
provide that 24/7 capability for a direct two-way communication
between DHS and our sector to hundreds of participants
representing not only our members but other segments of the
chemical sector as well.
I would also note that while the national terrorist threat
level was at orange during December and January, DHS
established daily contact with ACC and its member companies to
maintain a clear understanding of threats and countermeasures
that were taken.
Finally, GAO recommended developing a legislative proposal,
and here I want to be very clear that the members of ACC fully
recognize that strengthening safety and security and having
Federal oversight at our facilities is in the best interest of
our plant communities, our companies and our Nation.
As such, ACC supports chemical security legislation that
will establish national guidelines for security at chemical
facilities, require facilities to conduct vulnerability
assessments and implement security plans, provide oversight and
inspection authority to the Department of Homeland Security and
create strong enforcement authority.
Now, we've been very pleased with the constructive
relationships we're developing with our Federal partners to
address the security in the chemical sector, and frankly
Assistant Secretary Liscouski is to be commended for the focus
that he personally has brought to this effort; however, I will
confirm what he's telling you, that he is certainly going to
great lengths to push our members in our industry to do even
more than they are to help develop and establish what this
higher level of sustainable security is at our member
companies. But we look forward to working with our government
partners to continuously enhance security of our products, our
facilities, our employees and our communities.
Although much has been done there are areas in which we
must continue to focus our attention, and they include improved
public/private intelligence sharing regarding threats and
vulnerabilities, coordinated training activities, improved
coordination of chemical security initiatives within DHS and
all of its various agencies, and agreement on other security
needs of the chemical sector. And I'm pleased to say the dialog
in all of these areas is underway.
In conclusion, I want to say that security is a
responsibility shared by industry and government. ACC members
will continue to step up to their security responsibilities;
however, we know we can't do this alone.
Our members have already invested hundreds of millions of
dollars to further enhance security, but unilateral security
investment by the private sector is not enough.
ACC members will continue to work with law enforcement,
first responders and government partners to ensure the security
of our essential products and contributions this industry
provides to our country. We demonstrated our commitment and
willingness to step up to this challenge, but we cannot
shoulder the burden alone. We need to embrace a more
comprehensive and more integrated partnership with our public
sector colleagues. Frankly, security is just not an option for
the members of the American Chemistry Council.
Thank you, again. I'm happy to answer your questions at the
appropriate time.
Thank you, Mr. Durbin.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Durbin follows:]
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Mr. Murphy. Ms. Gibson.
Ms. Gibson. Good afternoon, Mr. Chairman and members of the
subcommittee. My name is Jennifer Gibson and I am the vice
president of government and public affairs at the National
Association of Chemical Distributors.
NACD's 300 member companies represent between 80 and 90
percent of the chemical distribution facilities in the United
States. NACD members process, repackage, warehouse, transport
and market chemical products for an industrial customer base of
750,000. Approximately 18 billion of U.S. chemical industry
sales are through distributors.
To become and remain a member of NACD chemical
distribution, companies must take title to product and adhere
to management practices related to health, safety, security and
the environment as outlined in the association's Responsible
Distribution Process [RDP].
Since well before September 11, 2001 NACD members have
adhered to the policies and procedures outlined by the
Responsible Distribution Process. These requirements have
always called for security and risk management considerations
within and outside each facility. Members are also required to
complete two stages of independent third-party verification of
their RDP policies and procedures including an onsite
independent verification once every 3 years. Companies who are
found to be out of compliance by the third-party verifier are
terminated from NACD membership; therefore, security is not a
new issue for chemical distributors.
NACD as the leading association of chemical distributors
was the first industry association to adopt new additional
practices addressing security following September 11. In April
2002 NACD added security requirements to RDP within key
distribution operations, specifically in the handling and
storage of chemical products at facilities, in carrier
selection for distributing chemical products and in customer
qualifications for chemical products of concern to various
Federal agencies. NACD's RDP verification is now underway to
confirm implementation of these new security requirements at
sites and we expect all of these verifications to be complete
by the end of next year.
Regarding the current Federal programs addressing security
at chemical facilities, we think the Federal Government has
gotten off to a very good start. NACD also supports Federal
legislation that would mandate vulnerability assessments for
chemical facilities and recognize the management practices
already in place that provide for enhanced security of chemical
manufacturing and distribution.
We would also like to see DHS develop a vulnerability
assessment model for chemical distribution facilities, as it
did for the chemical manufacturing sector. We have five
programs underway to close potential loopholes that could allow
commercial HAZMAT transport drivers with felony records to
obtain positions at chemical distribution facilities
unbeknownst to their employers. The plan is to fingerprint all
commercial driver's license holders with HAZMAT endorsements is
a positive step. We strongly encourage the subcommittee to urge
TSA and DHS to utilize the successful fingerprinting program
already in place for airport and aviation personnel. The
hazardous materials truck driver population is more than double
the size of the aviation personnel that require fingerprinting.
We urge the subcommittee to insist that Congress and the
executive branch consult with the American Association of
Airport Executives that designed, implemented and operated the
aviation clearinghouse to ensure that there will be no
interruptions to the interstate transportation of chemicals
because of the inability to process HAZMAT driver fingerprints.
This program was originally scheduled to go into effect late
last year and now the effective date will be April 1st of this
year.
In the event of a catastrophic occurrence at a chemical
distribution facility, Federal agencies should work
collaboratively with first responders, industry and incident
response agencies. It is important that Federal agencies work
side by side with as many stakeholders as necessary to respond
to any catastrophic event should it occur. Existing emergency
response networks that are well-established and widely used by
industry, namely CHEMTREC, play a vital role in crisis and
incident management.
Third, the only shortcoming we perceived in the area of
Federal support of local and State emergency response
activities is a lack of regular communication in some cases
and, therefore, the possibility of uncoordinated activities.
The Federal Government should continue to take a leadership
position in directing more formalized and regular communication
among federally supported local and State emergency response
personnel as well as individuals with similar responsibilities
at chemical facilities. We greatly applaud the government's
development of the Information Sharing and Analysis Centers
that includes the chemical sector as one of several with which
it collaborates and shares information on related security
issues.
Thank you for the opportunity to address the subcommittee
today. I will be happy to answer any questions.
Mr. Murphy. Thank you.
[The prepared statement of Ms. Gibson follows:]
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Mr. Murphy. I want to thank all the witnesses.
Mr. Stephenson, I'd like to start off with a question for
you. In your report you write on page 6 of it, it says, ``In
testimony on February 6, 2002 the Director of the Central
Intelligence Agency warned of the potential for an attack by al
Queda on chemical facilities.''
Without getting too much into intelligence on that, what
actions have been taken, voluntary actions from the chemical
industry? In your analysis are we at the same risk, elevated
risk, or low risk based upon some of the actions we have heard
today?
Mr. Stephenson. Unfortunately, we haven't done any updates
to our work in the last year, but voluntary actions by industry
have gone a long way toward reducing the risk, I would say.
Unfortunately, organizations like ACC only represent a
small portion of the facilities that store or use hazardous
chemicals. In addition, we at GAO are satisfied that there is
still no Federal requirements that mandates vulnerability
assessments across the board to all facilities who use
hazardous chemicals.
Mr. Murphy. Let me followup with that so that I understand
the association. The American Chemistry Council did an
assessment of 15,000 facilities.
Mr. Durbin. That's correct.
Mr. Murphy. Now, I list some of the other associations, the
National Association of Chemical Distributors, and then there
are manufacturing associations, but according to the American
Institute of Chemical Engineers, American Petroleum Institute,
State association, etc., when you add all these associations
together, two things: one, how close are we to having all
15,000 plants and distributors involved in this; and, two, do
all these associations adhere to the same security guidelines
identified by the ACC?
Mr. Durbin. I will try to answer that. If you look at the
population of the 15,000 communities, you know, again, ACC or
chemical manufacturing is only about 7 percent, you add the
others that you mentioned, you certainly do start to add up--
add to that number. However, if you look at the vast numbers,
the larger numbers, you're looking at water treatment and
drinking water facilities, agriculture retailer facilities,
refrigeration warehouses that use ammonia for their
refrigeration.
So, again, you're still not--even if you mention all the--
take all the ones you mentioned, you're not coming close to
getting to the majority of facilities that would fall under
that 15,000.
Mr. Murphy. Now, how much has been--in terms of the
compliance issues, do we know how much money has been invested
so far and what will it take for all the plants to be in
compliance with just the standards that you have said? Any idea
what we're talking about?
Mr. Durbin. Again, just speaking for the ACC members, we
don't have a definite number yet, we're actually doing some
economic surveys with the membership. And I will just qualify
that over the last year the investments are now being made.
What I can tell you and what we do know is that the number
at this point is literally over $100 million and into the
hundreds of millions of dollars that have been invested. Again,
on average right now it appears that there has been at least $2
million per company that has been spent. You know, membership
of 140 companies, you're ranging in size from very large to
very small; but, again, we are talking literally over hundreds
of millions of dollars that have been spent already.
Mr. Murphy. And, Ms. Gibson, I think in your testimony
regarding the National Association of Chemical Distributors, I
think you mentioned that plants or distributors have been given
a couple chances to comply.
Ms. Gibson. Right.
Mr. Murphy. By the third time, third strike they're out.
What enforcement abilities do you have on a national level
or State level with regard to if plants and distributors do not
reach their security guidelines that you have set on a
voluntary basis, what can you do besides kick them out of the
association?
Ms. Gibson. That's our measure that we can take to get them
to comply, and if they don't, well, they're out. And that's why
we support Federal measures to require these measures.
Mr. Murphy. Are there such things as the association
working, for example, that those who may purchase products made
by these plants or distributed by the distributors that--to
discourage people from purchasing from plants that are not in
compliance? That's a big financial aspect added to it.
Ms. Gibson. Right. Exactly. Yeah, to be a member of NACD
everyone has their NACD logo, Responsible Submission Process
logo, and purchasers know that these products have gone through
Responsible Submission Process, so that is a good economic
incentive.
Mr. Murphy. So, for example, if your company is
distributing chemicals manufactured by other associations going
through the States, does word go out that XYZ Co. is not in
compliance, and therefore other plants and distributors are
given some sort of warning not to purchase from them? Does it
go that far?
Mr. Durbin. If I may, I'm not an attorney, but I believe
you start to get into problems of antitrust concerns if you
have members of an association starting to single out a
particular company for any reason to say do or do not purchase
from that company.
Mr. Murphy. So then this just goes----
Ms. Witmer, do you want to add something to that?
Ms. Witmer. I was just going to follow that up that we, in
fact, follow very strict antitrust rules and that whenever
there's a gathering of association members, our legal counsel
reminds them, you know, that they are not, in fact, to talk
about those kinds of activities for, you know, fear that we
would be in violation of the antitrust.
And that is why, as Ms. Gibson pointed out, we are so
strongly in favor of Federal legislation, so that there is one
national standard and then perhaps maybe a reporting mechanism
as well.
Mr. Murphy. So the bottom line, in absence of Federal
standards requiring this, there's no enforcement capability
that any of your associations can foster, even within your
association, other than kicking them out?
Ms. Witmer. Not from a legal perspective.
Ms. Gibson. Right.
Mr. Murphy. Let me ask you another thing, too. How long
before the highest-risk facilities are brought up to a standard
that your agencies have set? Are we at that level yet, the
highest-risk facilities?
Mr. Durbin. Again, speaking for the ACC facilities, they
were broken into four tiers; the tier I facilities completed
their vulnerability assessments at the end of 2002, by the end
of 2003 they would have had to implement all their security
enhancements.
Now, they have until March of this year to have those
verified, but those tier 1 facilities are, again, essentially
done; tier 2 facilities will be done by June of this year and
all of our facilities are, again, as I mentioned in my
testimony, are scheduled to be through by the end of this
calendar year.
Mr. Murphy. One of the recommendations I had for security
here, is it possible within the plants and distributors, large
or small, that some external source could hack into the
computer and cause problems with regard to release of chemicals
or locking security measures, or is it all done internal with
no connection to the outside?
Ms. Gibson. I'll let Mr. Durbin speak to this as well, but
I know that's been--specifically in the past several months now
that we've kind of addressed the facility perimeter security,
we've really started to look more at the cyber security aspect
of it, really evaluating what information those companies have
on their computers and how can that information be protected,
because that is just as important as the physical security.
So we're starting to get into that more and more and
there's a joint industry group looking at those in
collaboration with the government.
Mr. Durbin. And, in fact, I would say what's interesting
about the cyber security piece of this is that more than the
physical security side, they almost have a leg up, because many
of our member companies have already been working very closely
on cyber-related issues because of simple E business, business-
to-business issues, Y2k issues.
So there were already groups of our member companies very
much focused on securing not only their IT systems and
information, but, again, many of our facilities and our
processes are controlled by computer, so making sure that they
cannot be hacked into from outside, outside the facility, to be
able to cause a release.
Mr. Murphy. And then one area, too, I want to ask about
because the plants that we specifically have heard about today,
a couple of those were investigated by the media, and we know
there's many more throughout the country they covered; for
example, in the 60 Minutes story, Baltimore, California, New
York, other places, too.
Despite what we heard earlier today on Univar, despite
efforts taken on those sites, they still cannot block access
through the rail lines that bisect their plants and I saw
mention in here that the rail industry and chemical industry
are working cooperatively.
What else do we have to do on those sites other than--I
don't know, what else can be done on those sites, because that
still seems to be a critical aspect, materials transported by
rail, by truck; where do we go from there?
Mr. Durbin. No question; and I think, as Ms. Witmer
mentioned in her testimony, we did establish a task force
between AAR, the Rail Trade Association, and ACC to address
three specific issues. One was communication to our customers,
and I can discuss that more in a moment, but the two other
areas were storage in transit and access to the plants.
Traditionally, you know, the railroads and transportation
of our chemicals, obviously a very important part of your
business, intended to have fairly free access to the facility,
you know, 24 hours a day drop-off materials and what have you.
A lot more has gone into now determining, kind of putting
together rules of the road for access to the facility, gates
over the rail access, and in some cases where there aren't
gates you've still got electronic surveillance and alarms and
other things that are now instituted. But, again, this is an
evolving process and one where we're continuing to find the
existing vulnerabilities and working very hard, very fast, to
try to address those vulnerabilities.
Mr. Murphy. Also, I know that I have little doubt that some
reporters, all they have to do is walk on those plant sites and
look at those aspects and, as was already testified to, there
are reporters sent by the media to see what is actually
happening there. And I don't want to see these kind of breaches
take place without a quick response. I really need you to know
that, and I appreciate that you will continue to work with
Congress in order to draft these high-standard initiatives to
make sure we protect these areas for the public.
Mr. Turner.
Mr. Turner. Mr. Chairman, when we talked with our first
panel about the issue of EPA and the Department of Homeland
Security being the lead agency with respect to having authority
in this terrorist threat arena, we all voted for the Department
of Homeland Security.
I want to give each of you an opportunity to tell us your
preference: the Department of Homeland Security or EPA and your
rationale.
Mr. Stephenson. Well, I don't want to give you my
preference. I will say that EPA has a great deal of knowledge
on this subject stemming from its Clean Air Act
responsibilities and the 1990 amendment which established this
risk management plan approach, so they have an incredible
amount of knowledge on those 15,000 facilities with hazardous
chemicals.
On the other hand, Department of Homeland Security brings
to it the threat-based analysis. Both of those things have to
be considered when you're assessing vulnerabilities at an
individual facility.
So I would hope that they're working very closely together.
I think both of them have a contributing role in this. DHS,
since it is a security issue, may be more appropriate. But I
would hope that all this experience that EPA has developed over
the last decade won't go to waste.
Mr. Turner. Ms. Witmer.
Ms. Witmer. The Pennsylvania Chemistry Industry Council
supports DHS as the oversight agency for security, presumably
because they have the expertise in developing and assessing
security plans.
There is potentially a role for EPA to play, certainly from
a response perspective. Their mission is to protect the
environment, not to--they don't have the expertise to assess
the security plans.
Mr. Durbin. ACC has also been on record that DHS would be
the appropriate primary agency to have a lead over the chemical
sector security, but, again, that is not to say that there
isn't a need to be able to pull in the expertise of other
agencies.
No. 1, I would point out that while we have worked and will
continue to work very closely with EPA on all of their programs
what is needed now is an agency that not only has the charter
mission to protect all the critical infrastructures, but they
can appropriately look across all of the interdependencies of
the various critical infrastructures. If you look at any one
facility you've got, you know, the power grid coming in, water
grid, transportation grid, and you need to be able to
coordinate all of those.
Additionally, if I can add a little bit more context as
well, you're talking about an industry that already has a long
history of working with various Federal agencies not just on
physical hardening of our facilities but on the potential
misuse of our products, whether they're stolen or have chemical
weapons conventions, dual-use chemicals, drug precursors, and
even the fertilizer industry was mentioned earlier that works
with ATF. And there's a coordination that needs to go on here
that involves EPA, Department of Commerce, Department of State,
ATF, the FBI, and I think that the way DHS has been created
it's only appropriate that they have to play that primary
coordinating role.
Ms. Gibson. I would concur with Mr. Durbin's comments about
I think the most important aspect is to have one clear agency
coordinating all these security efforts. And given the focus of
DHS--threat, security analysis assessment, vulnerability
assessment, site security approval--I think they are the most
appropriate agency to take on that role.
Mr. Turner. My next question goes to the association of
representatives. I already indicated in panel one that I'm a
fan of the EPA processes that require disclosure of information
because of how it has assisted the community in empowering them
to be able to be at the table and have an impact, I think even
to the benefit of affecting the facilities by giving them
additional security consulting information, even though at
times I think it has been an augmentation of the government's
ability to advise and to plan for potential incidences at these
facilities.
For your members, though, what are their thoughts with
respect to the extent of the public information that is
available? Are they concerned as it relates to a terrorist
impact that so much information is currently available about
them?
Ms. Witmer. Members of the Pennsylvania Chemical Industry
Council are urged to work with their communities, including
their residents in the area in which the facility is located,
as well as the first responders and government officials to
reach out and let them know what is happening at the facility.
As far as an actual security plan, no, we don't think that
individuals in the neighborhood, so to speak, should, in fact,
be able to look at those. The emergency management plans are
available to the local first responders. They have them, they
know what's there at the facility, so that if there is an
incident, when they respond they know what they're dealing
with.
So there's a balancing act that we think we are
successfully negotiating. We don't think there needs to be that
information placed on the Internet for anyone to look at, but
there does need to be a lot of communication with the community
in which the facility is located.
Mr. Durbin. I would concur with Ms. Witmer's comments.
There is information that has to be shared with the community
and then there's talking about the security vulnerability
assessments and the plans we've implemented to address those
vulnerabilities and making them publicly available.
Ms. Gibson. Part of NACD's Responsible Distribution
Practice for companies is to become involved with the local
agencies and invite them for tours and go through the training
and emergency response exercises, so we clearly support as much
communication as possible with the local officials.
As far as having information on the Internet, that's--
everybody knows the obvious dangers of that--that could easily
fall into the wrong hands. So, as Ms. Witmer said, it is a
balancing act.
Mr. Turner. My next issue relates to as individual plants
in several communities begin to take efforts to secure their
facilities, they are learning more than they did before in the
capture of this information, the sharing of this information,
so that our collective learning curve can be diminished, and
then we can adopt best practices as it occurs.
From the association's perspective, you talk about your
efforts to capture that expertise and disseminate it among your
members and also from GAO's perspective the lost opportunities.
And I'll go to Ms. Gibson.
Ms. Gibson. I'm sorry, I don't quite understand the
question.
Mr. Turner. Your members are undertaking security
enhancements.
Ms. Gibson. Yes.
Mr. Turner. And they may be undertaking very different
types of security enhancements that they might benefit from
sharing that information among each other.
Ms. Gibson. Right.
Mr. Turner. Can you tell us what among your association
you're doing to help capture that information and share it
among the various members so that we can all have a greater
enhancement of that?
Ms. Gibson. Kind of within the association it's always--
security is a funny topic, as you know; companies are sometimes
reluctant to actually publicize the specific measures they're
taking. But we do have guidelines under the Responsible
Distribution Process for companies to follow and they have done
that.
We're also probably going to start this year outlining some
best practices along the RDP process to go over at our annual
meetings so those companies know all the different areas and
programs to share information and what works.
Mr. Turner. Obviously the reason why I'm asking the
question is I don't believe we're doing very well. I know
you've indicated some effort to do that, but still this is, you
know, a critical area where we really need to be finding our
best and brightest and best solutions and sharing them.
Mr. Gibson. Even among--just among all the different
chemical trade associations, there is a lot of communication
among all the different trades; even though distribution may
differ from manufacturing, we work very closely together on
these issues through the ISACs and different initiatives.
Mr. Durbin. Just to follow that, many of the guidelines we
put together were in conjunction with NACD and others so we try
to reach out there. As far as--I think you put your finger on a
very important role and something that we do need to be able to
capture, the best practice, and make sure that we share this
appropriately.
Again, just within our association and among the
association, issues around process safety or just safety has
always been an area where we've kept very robust networks of
sharing, sharing best practices.
We are now doing the same thing on the security level. We
have a security network. In fact, just last week in Washington
we had a 2-day meeting, which we had about 40 security
directors from facilities around the country, and it is
structured in such a way just to put the issues on the table
that they are having issues with, concerns, or, again, best
practices, what are you guys doing about this. And so in that
regard we're seeing a very robust communication with our
members.
I think we do need to look at how do we capture that and
make sure we get it out, you know, more broadly. All of the
guidelines that we've put together, even our Responsible Care
Security Code, is not something we keep insulated just to
ourselves; it's public, it's published, available to anyone out
there who wants to use those guidelines.
Ms. Witmer. Would you like me to address that or do you
want to go on? It's really just an agreement statement with,
you know, the other two responders.
One thing that we do differently perhaps at PCIC, we have
an Internet-based ability for folks in the security network to
talk to each other if they have a particular issue that they're
dealing with. Rather than having to come in physically to a
meeting to talk about it, we have set up two-way communication
on the Internet where they can discuss those sorts of issues as
well.
Mr. Turner. Mr. Stephenson.
Mr. Stephenson. Just quickly, the Information Sharing and
Coordination Centers [ISACs], that were set up for each of the
13 infrastructure elements are designed for this purpose, to
share best practices. These are public/private partnerships
consisting of the lead trade association and these Federal
agencies responsible for a given infrastructure.
So maybe there's a little bit of confusion since DHS is new
to this responsibility, and coordination that isn't working as
well as it should. DHS is taking charge of vulnerability
assessments, but has not fully addressed the information
sharing aspects of the ISAC function. So I think hopefully the
Federal Government can encourage better sharing of information
as well; it's a role we need to fulfill.
Mr. Murphy. Anything else? Mr. Turner.
Mr. Turner. I'm finished.
Mr. Murphy. Mr. Shays.
Mr. Shays. Thank you. I'd like to have a sense of who
handled security before there was a terrorist threat. Who had
the responsibility.
Mr. Durbin. I'm sorry. Within the government? Within
industry.
Mr. Shays. Walk me through it.
Mr. Durbin. Well, again, security I think before September
11th was certainly--it was dealt with at the company level,
certainly from a different paradigm, at least here in the
United States.
I can tell you some of our larger corporations that are,
you know, multinational depending on where they're located,
certainly have had to deal with the issue of terrorism, whether
it's in Ireland or different parts of Africa or Indonesia or
what have you. But I think prior to September 11th, our
security directors at our companies were dealing more with the
traditional break-ins, misuse of chemicals, and even just
employee issues within the facilities.
Mr. Shays. So the EPA--was EPA the----
Mr. Durbin. No, there was no specific government role over
security of chemicals.
Mr. Shays. So they dealt with safety, they didn't deal in
any way of maybe having a fence up or something like that? EPA
wouldn't require that.
Mr. Durbin. Not that it would have been required. It would
have been part of the risk management plans that the EPA
program encouraged and helped develop to get the communication
going from the facility, the plant community and the local
responders. I mean, that discussion was then able to say what
is necessary----
Mr. Shays. But it happened under the context of the EPA.
Ms. Witmer. It was more of safety, you know--as you know, a
lot of these facilities are on rail lines or in a community
where there are kids walking and so, you know, it was a safety
issue.
Mr. Shays. So it was a security issue, but not from the
standpoint of people intending bad things, but still security
was handled by EPA in that sense; correct.
Ms. Witmer. I would disagree that it was security, but that
it was more of safety.
Mr. Stephenson. The risk management plan was premised on
accidental releases, not intentional releases, but, again, they
did worst-case scenarios on an accidental release and that's
where the information on putting millions at risk in certain
situations came from. Chemical facilities themselves came up
with those worst-case scenarios, it wasn't EPA.
Mr. Shays. So basically it was silent to security--
basically the EPA and security was--and the consequence of a
release was whose responsibility? OSHA's.
Mr. Stephenson. Well, OSHA set safety standards.
Consequences of a release is part of what the risk management
plans were supposed to address. Again, that's where the risk
numbers came from.
And let me correct something on the earlier panel, it
wasn't--the chemical companies--and ACC can correct me if I'm
wrong--did look at things like wind direction, types of
chemicals used, and proximity to populated areas. This notion
of a 360-degree pattern isn't exactly right from my
understanding of what the risk management plans did and what
the worst-case scenario estimates involved.
And also the one gentleman was right. The worst-case
scenario was from a single vat, whatever the largest toxic
chemical that was stored onsite. So your question about could a
terrorist act be worse; yes, if for example it targeted two
vats, it would be worse than one.
Mr. Shays. I felt that it was such a simple question, that
it wasn't a trick question. All he had to do was say yes, it
would obviously be worse if there would be more.
But the bottom line is the worst-case scenario under the
EPA makes certain assumptions.
Mr. Stephenson. Right.
Mr. Shays. And one of those assumptions was that it was
going to be, as you said, one vat.
Mr. Stephenson. Right.
Mr. Shays. You could have a whole host of them, correct,
under a terrorist attack.
Mr. Stephenson. You could. You could. And the difference
between the 4,000 number that the Department of Homeland
Security quoted and the 7,000 from the risk management plans
isn't exactly clear.
Mr. Shays. Currently what.
Mr. Stephenson. DHS mentioned 4,000 high-risk facilities
and if you look at the risk management plans it has about 7,000
facilities affecting over 1,000 people, so I'm not sure what
the 3,000 difference is.
You can get part way from the 15,000 facilities by
eliminating the ones that affect under 1,000 population. That's
a good share of the 11,000 number. But then DHS said there were
4,000 facilities that affect 1,000 or more; the risk management
plans say there are 7,000 facilities that affect 1,000 or more.
So I'm not clear what that 3,000 difference is.
Have I thoroughly confused you?
Mr. Shays. No. I mean, I was confused by the comments
earlier. I find that we try to understate the concern to not
get people anxious, and in the process there's not--I don't
have a constituent right now who really believes there is a
terrorist threat. Well, I am overstating. We've minimized it to
such an extent.
I mean, I wrote down while you were testifying, I wrote
down that basically I don't feel people really believe there's
a threat. And if they did believe there was a threat, they
think the odds are so low that it will impact them that they're
not concerned.
And I don't feel any, you know, what's said in rooms in
Washington are the chemicals are the greatest vulnerability,
they represent the potential greatest harm, that they are the
most tempting target, that their security is not all that great
yet, and we know that and from those who would intend to do
harm, you know. But it's kind of like someone who swims in
shark-infested waters. They get out and say, listen, I did it,
there's no big problem here. But there were still sharks there
and you were fortunate you didn't get caught up in it.
I guess my point to all of you is that I'm just fascinated
to know when there is an attack on a chemical plant, what the
industry is going to say. I just don't know what they're going
to say, because we all know right now we're very vulnerable.
That's the reality. We are extraordinarily vulnerable.
Mr. Durbin. If I could, Mr. Shays, that's exactly why an
organization like the American Chemistry Council said we think
we've gone out and we're doing the right thing. Our members
have set very vigorous guidelines for themselves and they're
meeting their own deadlines. But we know it's not enough. We
know we don't represent the entire community of concerned
facilities, facilities that would be of concern, and why we
think that there does need to be Federal legislation that would
establish guidelines for everyone. We have been actively trying
to get legislation enacted and would be happy to work with you.
Mr. Shays. Let me ask you this: Do you do plume studies for
these various plants? Do you recommend that they do that? Was
it being done under EPA?
Let me back up a second. I still don't know who deals with
consequence. That's what I don't understand. Before there was
the concern of terrorism, who dealt with consequence?
Mr. Durbin. Meaning if an incident were to occur?
Mr. Shays. Yes, an accident.
Mr. Durbin. Well, that's something that the risk management
plans help to coordinate what would be the response at the
local level. I mean, I think what's clear to say no matter
where----
Mr. Shays. I guess I don't have a sense of the
sophistication of the consequence management. Does it vary from
State to State, community to community.
Ms. Witmer. If there's an incident in Pennsylvania, if
there is an accidental release in a facility or if there's a
distribution----
Mr. Shays. This talks to pre-September 11th.
Ms. Witmer. Right. Exactly.
If there was an incident involving hazardous material the
primary State agency would be the Department of Environmental
Protection because they're responding to the incident from a
cleanup--a consequence--a cleanup perspective, as well as, you
know, the local first responders being the first ones on--I
think that's what you're getting at as the consequence.
Mr. Shays. That's part of it. Were there pre-September 11th
automatic procedures that so many homes within a certain area
have to be evacuated and so on.
Ms. Witmer. It depends, you know, if it was a
transportation-related incident or if it was at a facility, as
well as, you know, what the material was that was involved. And
that was part of the risk management plan that was developed by
the facility.
Mr. Shays. So if it was a certain material there were just
instantly guidelines that would--and were local communities
apprised of those.
Ms. Witmer. Absolutely. A material safety data sheet for
each of the chemicals is provided to the local communities.
Mr. Stephenson. That's one of the primary purposes of the
risk management plan is so that the first responders know
what's going on in that chemical plant and know what could
potentially happen if there was an accidental release.
Mr. Shays. And that was under the auspices of the EPA.
Mr. Stephenson. Right. It existed for over a decade.
Mr. Shays. So what happens now if there is a terrorist
attack? Is EPA in the ball game.
Ms. Witmer. From--I think we're talking about----
Mr. Shays. I'm talking consequence now.
Ms. Witmer. Right. Exactly. So we're talking after the
incident.
Mr. Shays. Yes.
Ms. Witmer. And, of course, the EPA would have a role. And
I think what each of us said is that EPA does have a role and
that it's from a consequence perspective but not from before
the incident, from determining what the vulnerability is and
from setting guidelines and standards on what is appropriate
from a security standpoint. EPA, from my perspective with the
Pennsylvania Chemical Industry Council, would come in from a
consequence management role.
Mr. Shays. Wouldn't their role be far more important than
DHS to deal with the consequences? What does DHS know and why
would we reinvent the wheel? I mean, who cares.
I mean, you know, if a building is on fire the fire
department comes out and puts the dang thing out. And whether
or not it was, you know, an arson or a natural cause, we deal
with it the same way. That's kind of what I'm wrestling with
right now.
Mr. Stephenson. Well, EPA does have an emergency response
capability to handle such things as the hazardous spill in the
Baltimore Tunnel that happened less than a year ago, or anthrax
in the Capitol Complex, as you know.
However, I think the ACC witness said it best. There's some
cross-agency issues here that all need to be coordinated.
Transportation used to be Department of Transportation, now
it's Homeland Security. So there's a coordination function.
Mr. Shays. They moved that section over; correct.
Mr. Stephenson. Right.
Mr. Shays. We're not talking about that. They didn't move
EPA into, you know, DHS.
Mr. Stephenson. Right.
Mr. Shays. It's still EPA.
Ms. Witmer. That's why I think we need an agency to be the
oversight and coordinating agency because you have that many
different agencies that have a role, but you need someone to be
able to be the director.
Mr. Shays. And who should that be.
Ms. Witmer. Department of Homeland Security.
Mr. Shays. Why, if it's consequence.
Ms. Witmer. But there's more than consequence involved in
first hopefully preventing and then mitigating an incident.
Ms. Gibson. So much of this has been done at the local
level in the past, and that will continue. And you get into a
terrorist attack, you have all these other issues coming in,
law enforcement will be there, it's just a different scenario.
I think DHS, their role is at the prevention of all this to
try to assess the threats and figure out how to prevent them
from happening. And then as far as consequences I don't think
there's a whole lot of change from how it would have been
anyway.
Mr. Shays. See, what I suspect is--and we've been along
this, but what I suspect is that there is a part of the
chemical industry that doesn't want people to be alarmed by the
various scenarios because some of the scenarios are quite
frightening and so it doesn't want to push that.
What I am fearing is that we aren't leveling with ourselves
as to what the consequence could be and so--and because we're
not doing that, we're leaving our constituency very vulnerable.
That's what I feel.
Mr. Durbin. But I think you raise that and that's a
separate issue. I would agree with you there's a lot of
improvement that has to take place in the way of information
sharing, even at the level of DHS trying to tell just the
private sector and the different critical infrastructure
sectors about what we should be prepared for.
I mean, this is an evolving role here that we don't have it
perfect yet, and DHS gets certain intelligence information and
they're running through their own processes figuring out how
much they can tell us, how much they can't, protecting sources
and methods. And then they find themselves getting into a
situation where they say, well, now we've cleansed so much
information out of it, if we do provide it to anybody it's not
of any use.
So, I mean, there's no question there's real challenges as
far as providing the right types of information out both to the
public and to the sectors themselves.
Mr. Stephenson. You know, there's not a standard model
here. When you look at the other 13 infrastructure elements DHS
does not have the lead for all 13 of those. EPA still has the
water and----
Mr. Shays. Slow down. They don't have the role for what.
Mr. Stephenson. DHS does not have the lead role, the lead
Federal agency role for all 13 infrastructure elements. There's
not a single model that applies. For example, EPA is still the
lead for the water infrastructure, Agriculture is still the
lead for food security and the likes. If you look at all those
13 infrastructure elements that are set out in the
administration's Homeland Security Plan, DHS doesn't control
them all.
So there are different models that work in different
infrastructure segments. So, who the lead agency should be is
maybe not a simple answer, maybe it's one that needs to be
studied.
Mr. Shays. And there are 13 infrastructure areas.
Mr. Stephenson. There are, yeah, 13 stated in the
President's Homeland Security Strategy.
Mr. Shays. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Stephenson. For example, power companies are a key.
Mr. Shays. Let me ask you, is there anything that the four
of you would like to respond to based on any question of the
first panel, just any information you need to correct or get
out on the table or you need to just agree with or disagree
with.
Mr. Stephenson. The main thing I would reiterate is need
for Federal legislation requiring vulnerability assessments of
the chemical sector. There is a Federal requirement for most
sectors, but at this point such a requirement is curiously
absent from this sector.
Mr. Shays. And there is that consensus, then, agreed, which
is helpful. Thank you.
Mr. Stephenson. That's our point of view.
Mr. Murphy. Anybody else who wishes to add any comments for
the panel?
Ms. Witmer. Just one thing, and it's sort of a minor point.
I don't remember which of you had asked whether or not there
were emergency evacuation plans in place, and, in fact, there
are as part of the risk management plans that companies have
had to develop. And those, as you had mentioned, regardless of
whether it's an accidental release or a terrorism-related
incident, that emergency management plan would kick in and, you
know, people would be evacuated.
Mr. Shays. See, the difference is before--can I go, Mr.
Chairman?
Mr. Murphy. [Nods affirmatively.]
Mr. Shays. We did a review of Y-12 and their evacuation
plan and this is a nuclear--is it a processing site.
Mr. Halloran. Manufacturing.
Mr. Shays. Pardon me.
Mr. Halloran. Manufacturing.
Mr. Shays. Manufacturing.
But what was interesting is when they thought of it only in
terms of safety--when they thought of it in terms of terrorism,
those willing to go up in flames with it, it always was you had
to come in and you had to get out, and so the scenario was such
that they didn't need as many people because even if someone
got inside, they still had to get out and so they wouldn't be
able to take the material and get away.
Well, you know, now with terrorism they don't have to come
in and take away, they just have to come in, and they could
come in under sight; in other words, the assumption has totally
changed and we realized all these sites were vulnerable around
the country.
In other words, someone willing to be a suicide bomber
becomes a whole different scenario. And so what I wonder about
these plans is if you have a circumstance now where you are
basically saying that you could have someone on the inside, you
could have three vats instead of one, you could have someone
blow up a road. Then your scenario is totally different, and
I'm not struck by the fact that we're even coming close to
dealing with evacuation plans based on that.
I realize that, you know, we would want to put focus on the
plants that are most likely to be attacked, I mean, there's
some in the countryside, there's some--and I realize we're
going to be getting half of what we need to get done today to
start paperwork and things like that. I just wonder who's
dealing with it, and I don't feel anyone is really right now.
Mr. Murphy. I'd like to thank all the witnesses from both
panels today for being here. You've helped us a great deal and
we will attempt to report an understanding of the Federal
Government's role in this.
I would think that if there's any fear I have of what comes
out of these--well, two fears. One is overreaction and one is
underreaction. Looking around the room I can't put my eyes on
anything in this room that did not have some level of
manufacturing impact by the chemical industry, everything that
is involved in our lives, and we are dependent upon it. This is
not an attack of the chemical industry, this is what we know
and are responsible with the chemical industries to be involved
with changes.
My fear of other reaction is, and particularly in an
election year, that there will be so much politicization of
these issues that some people will say the threat is
exaggerated.
I pulled up an article from the Internet regarding risk of
chemical plants. This was published in 2000, and basically it
was pooh-poohing the whole idea that there have been terrorist
attacks on this country and we didn't have to worry about that.
What a naive concept that was and I think we're still involved
with that.
I appreciate your candor and we don't have any further
questions for this panel, but we have to get answers to these
issues and continue to protect the American public.
Mr. Shays. And if I could also thank you for hosting this
hearing. It was important, I think, for us to be out in the
field, and I do appreciate our panel very much. Thank you.
Mr. Murphy. Thank you, Mr. Shays, Mr. Turner, for coming
out here to visit us.
Mr. Shays. And, Transcriber, you did it with a smile the
whole time.
Mr. Murphy. This hearing is adjourned.
Note.--The General Accounting Office report entitled,
``Homeland Security, Voluntary Initiatives Are Under Way at
Chemical Facilities, but the Extent of Security Preparedness is
Unknown,'' may be found in subcommittee files.]
[Whereupon, at 1 p.m., the subcommittee was adjourned.]
[Additional information submitted for the hearing record
follows:]
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