[House Hearing, 108 Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
S. Hrg. 102-000 deg.
A SMALL BUSINESS COMPONENT TO THE FEDERAL FLIGHT DECK OFFICER PROGRAM:
IT'S A WIN-WIN STRATEGY
=======================================================================
FIELD HEARING
before the
SUBCOMMITTEE ON RURAL ENTERPRISES, AGRICULTURE, & TECHNOLOGY
of the
COMMITTEE ON SMALL BUSINESS
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
ONE HUNDRED EIGHTH CONGRESS
SECOND SESSION
__________
WASHINGTON, DC, JANUARY 15, 2004
__________
Serial No. 108-49
__________
Printed for the use of the Committee on Small Business
Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.access.gpo.gov/congress/
house
______
93-476 U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE
WASHINGTON : 2003
____________________________________________________________________________
For Sale by the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office
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COMMITTEE ON SMALL BUSINESS
DONALD A. MANZULLO, Illinois, Chairman
ROSCOE BARTLETT, Maryland, Vice NYDIA VELAZQUEZ, New York
Chairman JUANITA MILLENDER-McDONALD,
SUE KELLY, New York California
STEVE CHABOT, Ohio TOM UDALL, New Mexico
PATRICK J. TOOMEY, Pennsylvania FRANK BALLANCE, North Carolina
JIM DeMINT, South Carolina ENI FALEOMAVAEGA, American Samoa
SAM GRAVES, Missouri DONNA CHRISTENSEN, Virgin Islands
EDWARD SCHROCK, Virginia DANNY DAVIS, Illinois
TODD AKIN, Missouri GRACE NAPOLITANO, California
SHELLEY MOORE CAPITO, West Virginia ANIBAL ACEVEDO-VILA, Puerto Rico
BILL SHUSTER, Pennsylvania ED CASE, Hawaii
MARILYN MUSGRAVE, Colorado MADELEINE BORDALLO, Guam
TRENT FRANKS, Arizona DENISE MAJETTE, Georgia
JIM GERLACH, Pennsylvania JIM MARSHALL, Georgia
JEB BRADLEY, New Hampshire MICHAEL MICHAUD, Maine
BOB BEAUPREZ, Colorado LINDA SANCHEZ, California
CHRIS CHOCOLA, Indiana BRAD MILLER, North Carolina
STEVE KING, Iowa [VACANCY]
THADDEUS McCOTTER, Michigan
J. Matthew Szymanski, Chief of Staff and Chief Counsel
Phil Eskeland, Policy Director
Michael Day, Minority Staff Director
SUBCOMMITTEE ON RURAL ENTERPRISES, AGRICULTURE AND TECHNOLOGY
SAM GRAVES, Missouri, Chairman FRANK BALLANCE, North Carolina
BILL SHUSTER, Pennsylvania DONNA CHRISTENSEN, Virgin Islands
SUE KELLY, New York ED CASE, Hawaii
SHELLEY MOORE CAPITO, West Virginia MICHAEL MICHAUD, Maine
MARILYN MUSGRAVE, Colorado BRAD MILLER, North Carolina
PATRICK TOOMEY, Pennsylvania
Piper Largent, Professional Staff
(ii)
C O N T E N T S
----------
Witnesses
Page
Mills, Mr. Buz, President & CEO, Gunsite Academy................. 4
Luckey, Captain Stephen, Chairman, National Security Committee,
Air Line Pilots Association, International..................... 5
Sapio, Mr. Terry, Captain, Southwest Airlines.................... 7
Roberts, Mr. Dean, Security Committee Chairman, Southwest Pilots
Association.................................................... 9
Appendix
Opening statements:
Graves, Hon. Sam............................................. 30
Prepared statements:
Mills, Mr. Buz, President & CEO, Gunsite Academy............. 32
Luckey, Captain Stephen, Chairman, National Security
Committee, Air Line Pilots Association, International...... 35
Sapio, Mr. Terry, Captain, Southwest Airlines................ 39
Roberts, Mr. Dean, Security Committee Chairman, Southwest
Pilots Association......................................... 43
(iii)
A SMALL BUSINESS COMPONENT TO THE FEDERAL FLIGHTDECK OFFICER PROGRAM:
IT'S A WIN-WIN STRATEGY
----------
THURSDAY, JANUARY 15, 2004
House of Representatives,
Subcommittee on Rural Enterprises,Agriculture, and
Technology,I06Committee on Small Business,
Washington, D.C.
The Subcommittee met, pursuant to call, at 1:10 p.m., at
Gunsite Academy, Inc., Paulden, Arizona, Hon. Sam Graves
[chairman of the Subcommittee] presiding.
Present: Representatives Graves and Renzi.
Chairman Graves. I would like to welcome everybody here
today and say good afternoon. Welcome to this hearing of the
Rural Enterprise Agriculture and Technology Subcommittee of the
House Small Business Committee.
At today's hearing at Gunsite Academy, we are going to be
looking at adding a small business component to the Federal
Flight Deck Officer program. I would very much like to thank
Mr. Mills for graciously allowing us to have this hearing here
at the academy. I very much appreciate Mr. Renzi being here. We
had also originally had scheduled Representative Hayworth and
Representative Shadegg. Unfortunately, we are in competition
today with the Vice President, who is down in Mesa, and I
completely understand them wanting to attend that event.
I'm sure everyone remembers that shortly before Christmas,
Secretary Ridge raised the terror alert level due to Al-Qaeda
threats to hijack a passenger plane from abroad. Fighter planes
were ordered to be ready to shoot down a hijacked plane if
needed.
Two years after September 11th, we are still faced with the
possibility of shooting down a passenger flight as the last
line of defense. We have to do more to provide airline pilots
the opportunity to arm and protect themselves and their
passengers and crew. By adding pilots to the line of defense,
we can combat terrorists who seek to use planes as weapons of
mass destruction to wage war against our country and our people
here.
In response to the September 11 attacks, Congress enacted
the Federal Flight Deck Officer program to provide willing
pilots the necessary training to protect their passengers and
crew from future attacks. The Transportation Security
Administration, or TSA, has begun implementing this program,
and they graduated their first class of 44 pilots in April of
2003.
In July, TSA began running classes of nearly 50 pilots once
a week at the Federal Law Enforcement Training Center in
Georgia. Due to demand and over-capacity, the TSA has located
this training to the federal facility in Artesia, New Mexico.
However, at TSA's current rate, only 2,600 pilots can be
trained per year. There are more than 100,000 commercial pilots
throughout North America, and the Airline Pilots Security
Alliance estimates that over 40,000--and I've heard estimates
it's even higher--40,000 pilots wish to take part in the
Federal Flight Deck Officer program. And these numbers don't
even begin to account for cargo pilots that recently have been
given the right to participate in the program. There are many
who believe that while significant security enhancements have
been made to our passenger airlines, cargo planes have not
received the same scrutiny and I believe pose even greater
security threats.
While TSA certainly has initiated the Federal Flight Deck
Officer program, I believe it is finally time to heed the
congressional directive to extend this program to all
interested pilots. When Congress passed the legislation that
created the Flight Deck program, we intended that private
facilities could be used to ensure that there were multiple
locations where pilots could be trained. Moreover, since pilots
must provide for their own travel, lodging and daily expenses,
it makes sense to have the locations spread throughout the
United States.
In order to accommodate pilot demand more effectively and
efficiently to implement the Federal Flight Deck Officer
program, small businesses should play a crucial role in the
commercial and cargo pilots' flight deck officer training. By
increasing the number of facilities eligible to train federal
flight deck officers, we will ensure that pilots who choose to
protect themselves and their aircraft from potential terrorist
threats have the ability to do so. The Flight Deck Officer
program can serve as an example of how the government can work
with small businesses to protect our nation in the war on
terrorism. It is a win-win scenario for our people and our
country.
Now, I'm going to turn to Mr. Renzi for an opening
statement. And, again, I appreciate very much you being here.
This is also his district, and I appreciate you hosting us.
Mr. Renzi. I'm grateful you came. Thank you.
Good afternoon to everyone. I want to thank Chairman
Graves, local officials, and members of the community for
attending here today. I do appreciate the subcommittee holding
its hearing here in Arizona's first congressional district. I
would also like to welcome everyone to beautiful rural Arizona,
especially Yavapai County, given the extraordinary weather we
are having today.
I welcome our witnesses, and thank Gunsite and Buz Mills
especially for their hospitality.
Before taking office, I slowly began to become educated by
a lot of people in this room on the need and the role that the
private sector could play in assisting in the training and
arming of our pilots. It seems like a logical step that TSA
would move forward and use the private sector to ensure that
our pilots are properly trained and our skies remain safe.
When we talk about Gunsite, we are talking about a
professional, private training facility that is state of the
art as far as training law enforcement facility officers,
military personnel, and qualified citizens. Not only is Gunsite
professionally qualified to train, but Gunsite is a prime
location. And this is important as we get into testimony today
when we talk about selection of locations. Gunsite is close to
the proximity of a world-renowned aviation security university,
one of the only universities in America that actually gives
courses on global security and global terrorism, Embry Riddle
Aeronautical University, just one and a half hours from Phoenix
Sky Harbor Airport. And it is surrounded by a community who is
willing to take on this endeavor.
Gunsite has trained all branches of our armed forces as
well as federal law enforcement officers, Arizona law
enforcement officers, and regional and local law enforcement
officers. Their list of accreditation is extensive.
Gunsite has prepared a complete course of instructions for
the Federal Flight Deck Officer program and has offered this
subject matter and expertise to the TSA. Gunsite has indicated
their willingness to work with TSA and agrees that the
oversight be performed by TSA, a partnership between a federal
and private enterprise.
In January of 2003, I met in my office in Washington with
TSA officials and have sent two follow-up letters to TSA, one
dated February 10th, 2003; the other dated November 5th, 2003,
on the issue of training pilots in private facilities. Both
letters to TSA have gone unanswered. I have not received a
response on any of the points made in my correspondence. I am
deeply concerned that TSA is ignoring a prime opportunity to
use many experienced, private facilities to train our pilots
and protect our skies.
Chairman Graves, I look forward to our testimony today. I
thank the witnesses for attending and thank you all for coming
from all over the state to be with us. Thank you.
Chairman Graves. Thanks, Mr. Renzi. I would ask all
statements of members and of the witnesses be placed in the
record in their entirety.
And I also have the written testimony from TSA, who chose
not to be here today, that we will be submitting also.
[Transportation Security Administration Acting Director
David Stone's statement may be found in the appendix]
Chairman Graves. I would like to thank our panel of
witnesses for coming out today very much. I appreciate it and
look forward to hearing your testimony.
We will go through each of you individually, and then we
will ask questions. We will wait until all of you have
testified and then we will go through questions after that.
Chairman Graves. We will start with Mr. Mills, who is
president and CEO of Gunsite Academy. And this is an excellent
facility. In fact, I have trained here before. Before I ever
was a member of Congress, several years ago, I came to Gunsite.
The first time I was here, as a matter of fact, training in
tactical pistol, and I appreciated that training then and have
gotten to know the crew here even better since that time.
Thank you for letting us be here today and I appreciate
your hospitality.
STATEMENT OF OWEN MILLS
Mr. Mills. Mr. Chairman, thank you very much. It's a
pleasure to have you and it's definitely our pleasure to host
this.
My name is Owen Mills. I'm the owner of Gunsite Academy in
Paulden, Arizona. Gunsite is the largest, the oldest and
premiere privately-owned small arms training facility in the
United States. Gunsite is a small business. I've been the owner
and operator of small businesses for over 30 years. I'm well-
qualified to testify to the contributions these businesses have
made and can make to American business and industry.
At Gunsite, we are strong supporters of the Federal Flight
Deck Officer program. We worked for its passage in the Homeland
Security bill and we are big supporters.
It is our conviction that armed pilots, properly trained
and equipped, can be effective deterrents against air piracy by
terrorists and a repeat of the horrors that we suffered in
September of 2001.
The greatest shortcoming of the Federal Flight Deck Officer
program, so far, has been TSA's decision to ignore the intent
of Congress to utilize privately-owned facilities to train
pilots. It's commonly known in the industry that federal
facilities are operating at near capacity with existing
personnel and infrastructure.
The pilots unions estimate that 30 to 35 thousand of their
members will volunteer to become Federal Flight Deck Officers
and will need training within the near term. With the inclusion
of air cargo pilots, the number may approach 50 to 60 thousand.
But, after the initial training is completed, these numbers
will be greatly reduced.
We believe the pilots who will need training cannot be
effectively, efficiently or economically accommodated on a
timely basis using only existing government resources. There
are several privately-owned, quality, small business
organizations which currently train thousands of law
enforcement officers, military personnel and civilians
annually. They already have the facilities; they have the
personnel and the capacity to accommodate much of this program.
It's my firm belief that the FFDO program can be done by
small business, such as Gunsite, more quickly and more
economically than can be accomplished using existing federal
facilities and resources alone. After the initial build-up,
you, the government, will have none of the after-program costs
of winding the facilities down and personnel down. That's one
of the advantages that the private sector offers.
We proposed to TSA that Gunsite be designated as the
western training center for the Federal Flight Deck Officer
program and that Gunsite could accommodate 5,000 pilots a year
without having a negative impact on our existing operations. We
prepared a complete, one-week FFDO training curriculum that
includes all the requirements of the federal law. At their
request, Gunsite supplied TSA with this information.
We have installed a Boeing 727 aircraft cabin for the
simulator portion of our pilot training program. We assembled a
team of airline pilots, Gunsite graduates all, to flight test
our cockpit defense training. From this, we learned there are
many unique requirements to this program which must be
emphasized in the pilot training. We affirmed to TSA that
Gunsite could begin its first class within two weeks of TSA
approval and thereafter train a hundred pilots a week.
Now in our 27th year of continuous operation, Gunsite's
clients include all branches of the U.S. military and federal
protective services, as well as state and local law
enforcement. Our clients include kings, heads of state, Fortune
500 companies, dignitaries, and many, many qualified citizens.
We have over 1,600 acres. We have state-of-the-art classrooms,
20 outdoor ranges and six simulators. All of our courses are
credit approved by the State of Arizona for law enforcement
credit continuing education. Many federal and military
organizations accept these credits as well.
In the war against terrorism, the FFDO program is a step in
the right direction. It can be greatly improved by qualifying
small businesses such as Gunsite to help conduct the program.
Thank you for your attention and your concern for these
issues which are important to our national security and to
Americans everywhere.
Chairman Graves. Thanks, Mr. Mills.
[Mr. Mills' statement may be found in the appendix]
Chairman Graves. We are now going to hear from Captain
Stephen Luckey, who is chairman of the National Security
Committee of the Air Line Pilots Association. I've heard you
testify before in the Aviation Subcommittee, also, which I sit
on, and I look forward to your testimony here. Thanks for being
here.
STATEMENT OF CAPTAIN STEPHEN LUCKEY
Mr. Luckey. Thank you, sir.
Good afternoon. I'm Captain Steve Luckey, chairman of the
National Security Committee of the Air Line Pilots Association,
International, representing the security interests of 66,000
pilots who fly for 43 airlines in the U.S. and Canada.
The Air Line Pilots Association was the first organization
to request--requesting the creation of the FFDO program, and it
became a reality, of course, with the passage of the Arming
Pilots Against Terrorism Act which was enacted as part of the
Homeland Security Act of 2002. ALPA applauds Congress for its
vision in recognizing the need for the program, the tremendous
value it represents, and for passing the legislation needed to
make it a reality. We also express our gratitude for the
opportunity to have worked hand in hand with Congress and the
Congressional leaders on this important initiative.
Since January of 2003, ALPA has actively participated in a
TSA-sponsored industry-working group convened to provide
guidance to the TSA efforts to establish the FFDO program. In
April 2003, 44 pilots successfully completed the prototype FFDO
training curriculum at the FLETC in Glynco, Georgia. And I was
part of the--I was a participating observer in that program.
Since then, hundreds of FFDOs have been trained, deputized,
and field deployed. The majority of these new federal law
enforcement officers are ALPA members, so we have a key
interest in the program and we enjoy a close working
relationship with the TSA. When viewed from an economic
perspective, the program's value is abundantly apparent. The
aviation industry and the nation benefit from the service of
pilots who unselfishly volunteer to serve as federal law
enforcement officers.
The TSA has developed an effective initial training
curriculum designed to prepare FFDOs for the challenges they
will be facing when field deployed. The training site at
Artesia, New Mexico, despite its logistical challenges, has
received praise for being well-equipped, staffed and capable of
expansion. With the recent doubling of training capacity,
throughput capabilities have increased dramatically. It also
offers affordable food and lodging accommodations to pilot/
students. And this is a significant factor because pilots have
to incur, personally, the costs for the training and
transportation, et cetera, to these programs.
Meeting certain goals is crucial to the ongoing success of
the FFDO program, especially during the initial training.
First, the training must be standardized, of course, in a
consistent fashion, providing the FFDOs with the best tools,
training, and tactical knowledge to meet the challenges they
may face.
Secondly, the curriculum must be adaptable to meet the
changing needs and conditions. Training updates must be easily
deployable and consistently provided.
The third--but I think this is a very important goal of the
program--the training process must provide the FFDO with a
sense of institutional pride and belonging. I think this is
important in any law enforcement organization. It's critical
that the FFDOs understand they are deputized federal law
enforcement officers, trained and supported by the federal
government to protect the aviation component of the nation's
critical infrastructure. We cannot underestimate the real and
perceived value of this key element of the training process,
particularly during the initial training phases.
We do have the highest respect for the capabilities of
several private facilities, Gunsite being a prime example of
these facilities. In order to guarantee that these FFDO
training goals are reached, the initial training should
continue to be provided either at federal law enforcement
facilities or under the auspices and guidance of a federal
oversight.
It's worth noting that most federal, state, and local law
enforcement agencies send their officer candidates to academies
that are owned and operated by their respective governments,
and very few use private facilities. This ensures that the
training meets the government standards and is supervised on
location by government instructors.
Regarding recurrent training, we do see a very significant
value for incorporating private facilities into this portion of
the FFDO training. These facilities would complement the FFDO
program by offering strategically located, federally certified,
professional training facilities where FFDOs could maintain
skills proficiency and receive updated training. This approach
provides a win-win for all involved. The TSA can offer high-
quality training at multiple locations across the country and
pilots will be able to schedule their training at locations
that minimize their out-of-pocket costs and time away from
home.
ALPA recommends a few safeguards be implemented for FFDO
training administered by--at non-federal sites. First, we think
a federal representative should be on site to ensure that the
quality and consistency meet federal standards. We believe that
instructors should be federally certified. I believe most of
the Gunsite instructors here are. The curriculum should be
presented in a manner that reinforces the FFDO's understanding
that the training is being offered under the auspices of his or
her federal agency, the TSA.
ALPA commends TSA for investing a significant amount of
time and resources in the development of the program. As the
initiative matures, the possibilities for enhancing the
existing programs are becoming even more apparent. We encourage
the TSA to continue its efforts to enhance the FFDO program to
best utilize the untapped potential contained therein.
I'd like to thank you again for inviting me to testify here
today and for your attention and your dedication to our
efforts.
Chairman Graves. Thanks, Captain Luckey.
[Captain Luckey's statement may be found in the appendix]
Chairman Graves. We are now going to hear from Terry
Sapio--I hope I said that right--who is a pilot with Southwest
Airlines. I appreciate you being here. I know you've been on
the schedule, and thanks for coming in.
STATEMENT OF TERRENCE SAPIO
Mr. Sapio. Thank you, Chairman Graves and Congressman
Renzi, for this opportunity to testify on the full
implementation of the Federal Flight Deck Officer, FFDO,
program and the impact of a small business component.
My name is Terrence Sapio. I've been flying jets for over
23 years, and I have logged over 18,000 flight hours. I'm
currently a captain for Southwest Airlines, and have flown
Boeing 737s since 1987. Prior to flying for Southwest, I was a
United States Air Force C-141 instructor pilot. I was qualified
as an expert in firearms and on occasion was required to carry
a firearm during missions.
I'm not testifying as a representative of any business or
organization, but as a commercial airline pilot who is
interested in effective deterrents against air piracy and
terrorism.
In conversing with others in my profession, I believe my
views represent the opinions of most airline pilots. The
Federal Flight Deck Officer program has the potential to be a
formidable deterrent to terrorists' attacks. With armed and
trained pilots in the cockpits of commercial aircraft targeted
by terrorists, the likelihood of a successful hijacking attempt
should be eliminated. If terrorists believe their attempt to
gain control of an aircraft has a high probability of failure,
they are less likely to make the attempt in the first place.
The terrorists must believe, however, that there is a high
probability that the pilots of a target aircraft are armed, or
there is no deterrence.
Currently, there are not enough participating pilots to
provide that deterrence, and under the current Transportation
Security Administration, TSA, rules, it's unlikely there will
ever be enough participating pilots to accomplish a significant
deterrence. The FFDO program could be the means for thousands
of volunteer pilots to provide deterrence to terrorists at very
low cost to taxpayers. Unfortunately, the FFDO program passed
by Congress has been hobbled by the TSA. Thousands of pilots,
myself included, who previously expressed an interest in
volunteering for the FFDO program now have no intention to
volunteer under the current terms set by the TSA.
Pilots who participate in the FFDO program accept the
responsibility to deter future terrorist attacks at significant
personal expenditure of time and money. Nearly all of the
pilots give up a week of vacation or a week's pay to attend the
initial training.
Instead of trying to facilitate participation, the TSA has
made every aspect of volunteering, training and performance of
FFDO duties as difficult, inconvenient, expensive and onerous
as possible. The TSA has caused thousands of pilots to
reconsider participation in the FFDO program and thwarted the
will of Congress.
The first deterrent to participation is the psychological
and background screening of FFDO applicants. The TSA puts
pilots through psychological and background screening that far
exceeds that of federal air marshals, law enforcement officers,
or TSA officers.
The second TSA deterrent to FFDO participation is the
limited and remote location for training. To get to the Artesia
facilities, FFDO candidates fly to El Paso for a four-hour bus
ride or to Albuquerque for a four-and-a-half-hour bus ride.
Further, the facility is not capable of training all of the
pilots who would participate if the FFDO program was more
acceptable.
This is where the small business component to the FFDO
program could contribute. Private training facilities such as
Gunsite Academy would greatly increase the FFDO training
capacity. They are also much more accessible. Phoenix is a
major crew base for both Southwest and America West Airlines.
Their pilots would simply drive two and a half hours to Gunsite
for initial and recurrent training. For pilots not based in
Phoenix, a rental car or shuttle from Sky Harbor Airport still
makes Gunsite Academy convenient.
The third TSA deterrent to FFDO participation is Draconian
rules for firearms management. The TSA requires FFDO
participants to keep their firearm in a lock box any time not
on duty in the cockpit, and in the cargo compartment when
flying in the cabin. These irrational requirements jeopardize
the safety of the pilot and passengers. The boxed and bagged
firearm hinders the pilot's duties and increases the likelihood
the firearm will be lost or stolen.
Pilots travel with a carry-on bag, a book bag, and
frequently a laptop commuter. To add an additional bag for the
lock box is impractical at best, and dangerous at worst. The
TSA is well aware of how common it is for a bag to be lost or
stolen in an airport, yet they insist on putting the FFDO
firearms, and subsequently the airport and aircraft, at risk.
The only safe and secure place for the firearm is on the
pilot, whether concealed or in plain view. The public expects a
policeman to be armed, and terrorists should expect pilots to
be armed, too.
It is my hope that this subcommittee, with the assistance
of your fellow legislators in Washington and private training
facilities such as Gunsite Academy, will be able to put the
FFDO program on the fast track to maximum terrorist deterrence.
It's time for the terrorists to see air piracy as an exercise
in futility.
Mr. Renzi. Thank you.
Chairman Graves. Thanks, Mr. Sapio. I appreciate it.
[Mr. Sapio's statement may be found in the appendix]
Chairman Graves. We are now going to hear from Dean
Roberts, who is the security committee chairman for Southwest
Pilots Association. I think you bring a unique perspective to
this panel yourself, and I look forward to hearing your
testimony. Thanks for being here.
STATEMENT OF DEAN C. ROBERTS
Mr. Roberts. Thank you. First, I want to thank you for the
opportunity to testify on the full implementation of the
Federal Flight Deck Officer program and the positive impact it
could have on small business.
My name is Dean Roberts. I have been involved with the U.S.
military, Federal law enforcement aviation, and firearms
training for 23 years. Prior to flying for Southwest Airlines,
I was a pilot for the U.S. Customs Service, as well as a
special agent/pilot and firearms instructor for the Drug
Enforcement Administration in Lima, Peru.
I'm a graduate of the Federal Law Enforcement Training
Center as well as the FBI Academy in Quantico, Virginia. My
background in flying armed is extensive, but there are many
pilots in the industry with similar backgrounds, most of who
want nothing to do with this program in its current flawed
state.
I was invited to attend the first FFDO class in April of
last year. I was also one of four pilots that were dropped from
training. And in my case, one hour before graduating. When
pressed for answers by my airline on why I was dropped from
training, the TSA said that I was dropped because I did not
complete the program.
This is the type of doublespeak TSA has been engaged in
since day one of this program. I'm sure my work on the pilot
working group and my exposing of flaws and unworkable policies
are what led to my dismissal from training. TSA management
staff overseeing the first class was not interested in hearing
about problems with the program.
I'm not testifying as a representative of any business, but
as a concerned commercial airline pilot. In August of 2002,
when it became obvious that the FFDO program was going to
become a reality, I was asked by my airline pilot union to be
part of a pilot working group with several other airlines. This
working group was tasked to develop policies and procedures
that would facilitate the armed pilot into daily airline
operations. I believe my background in federal law enforcement
and firearms training made me uniquely qualified to provide
meaningful input in this area.
In November of 2002, the FFDO program became a reality and
the pilot working group met with TSA early in December. From
our very first meetings with TSA, it was evident that they
already had a policy in place and were not looking for any
input from pilots. We repeatedly offered suggestions to make
the program more functional. Our recommendations were rejected
outright without even as much as a review or discussion. TSA's
meeting with the pilots was eye wash, and at times there was
heated discussion.
When it became obvious that TSA was overstepping its
mandate and imposing policy that was not in the legislation,
the TSA staff attorney told us that he was the attorney for the
agency and that he would interpret the legislation in such a
narrow manner that nobody would volunteer for the program. This
is just one story of many that the pilots working group would
contend with in the months before the first FFDO class was
selected.
In February of 2003, the pilot group was presented the
final policy governing this program. Upon our review, it was
obvious that the program as TSA was imposing on the pilots
would not work as Congress intended and would minimize pilot
participation just as TSA wanted. When the group voiced
concerns over the policies, we were told that for the most
part, the policies were written in stone and would not be
changed, especially the method of carrying a weapon.
The policies of the TSA are what brings us here today. Just
as TSA wanted, pilot participation in this program has been
minimal, no matter what TSA may say publicly. At my airline, I
would say that eight out of ten pilots interested in the
program will not volunteer because of the application process,
the outrageous and unnecessary policies regarding
transportation and handling of the weapon, and the inconvenient
and remote training location.
TSA has had an army of attorneys pour over every aspect of
this program and is engaged in a delay, impede and obstruct
policy by throwing up one roadblock after another. If this
program is to succeed as Congress envisioned, and provide a
significant level of deterrence to future terrorist attacks,
several areas need to be addressed by Congress immediately.
First and foremost, the application and screening process
is unnecessary. Currently, the pilots are required to fill out
a 13-page application. This is longer than any airline
application I've ever filled out. It's longer than any
government application I've filled out to be a federal law
enforcement officer. This is unnecessary and is one of the many
roadblocks TSA has erected. Pilots employed by major airlines
should be eligible for this program as soon as a criminal
history check is completed. This can be done in a matter of
minutes.
Next is the whole idea of psychological testing. This,
again, is unnecessary and adds to the hassle factor for the
pilot. TSA claims that a pilot that shoots an attacker must
then be able to land the aircraft. The TSA claims that not all
pilots possess this ability. Will this testing separate those
capable of this and those that are not? I think not. Airline
pilots train constantly for emergency situations, and even if a
pilot was to become incapacitated after shooting an attacker,
there is another fully-qualified pilot in the seat right next
to him. Pilots are already required to submit to and pass a
medical examination by a government flight surgeon every six
months. This medical exam is all that should be required by the
TSA to participate in this program.
The next area that needs to be addressed is the current
method of carrying a weapon. The current policies imposed by
TSA in this area are unsafe and do not conform to accepted law
enforcement flying armed protocol. The current policy puts the
custody and security of the weapon in question and has resulted
in weapons being misplaced daily. This is just another
roadblock that TSA has erected for the pilots who want to
participate in this program.
The TSA has dragged its feet on this program for almost two
years. Training has been slow, and since pilot participation is
minimal, TSA is able to claim its seats go empty in FFDO
training weekly.
I would suggest to you if TSA were forced to implement this
program as Congress envisioned, the number of pilots
volunteering for the program would be so great that TSA would
be forced into contracting much of the training out to private
sector training facilities like the Gunsite training academy.
TSA has not made participating in this program easy. In
fact, they have gone out of their way to make it as problematic
as possible. They have reinvented the wheel in every aspect of
this program, and the result has been pilot--minimal pilot
participation, just as the TSA wanted.
One would think that TSA would welcome free help in
securing the nation's aircraft. Instead, TSA views us as a
threat to future manning and has chosen to play politics over
providing an effective deterrent to future terrorist attacks.
It is my hope that with the help of this subcommittee and
the pressure of your fellow legislators in Washington, pressure
can be put on the obstructionists at TSA. Individuals like John
Moran, Frank Scrosky, Tom Quinn need to be removed from
positions of power over this program and people brought in that
will work with the pilots instead of working against us.
I believe that this program, if this program is implemented
as Congress envisioned, the number of pilots wanting to
participate would require that TSA enlist the services of
private training facilities like the Gunsite Academy to keep up
with training demands. I only hope that another 9/11 incident
is not the catalyst for change at TSA. Thank you.
Chairman Graves. Thanks very much, Mr. Roberts. I
appreciate you, again, all being here.
[Mr. Roberts' statement may be found in the appendix]
Chairman Graves. We are now going to open it up for
questions from Mr. Renzi and myself. And, Rick, feel free to
jump in at any time.
A frustrating thing for me is--and I have heard a lot of
arguments on why it is we shouldn't use private facilities, a
lot of these crazy rules that they have implemented. One of the
things that they like to point out is that we can't use private
facilities because these are deputized officers. They have to
go through a federal facility because they are deputized. But,
yet, when you look at the procedures that a pilot--if a pilot
is dead-heading, or whatever you want to call it, back to
another facility and they aren't actually flying the aircraft,
they have to keep this thing in a lock box or down in the cargo
hold but, yet, they are considered a deputized officer. Any
other deputized officer, whether they are with the U.S.
Department of Agriculture or whatever the case may be, if he
declares it, he can carry a weapon on board the aircraft. And
it's frustrating to me that it's a little bit of a double
standard here. They are saying you can't train at a private
facility because you have to be deputized; but, yet, they
aren't treating you like a deputized federal officer when you
are on board the aircraft.
And I have to ask you, it seems to me that--and I know,
sometimes I'll know ahead of time if I'm on an aircraft that
there is a federal officer on board. And if they happen to be
carrying, it just makes you feel a little bit better if there's
not necessarily an air marshal on there, but somebody that
knows how to use a handgun. And it would seem to me--and there
are always pilots travelling back and forth to other
destinations on board an aircraft--that you've just increased,
you know, a hundredfold your--the opportunities there to stop a
perpetrator.
I would like for any of you to comment on that. I mean, how
many pilots are doing that? You know, riding in the jump seat
or sitting out there in the passenger compartment on any one
particular flight? I see them all the time.
Mr. Roberts. It happens all the time. It happens all the
time. You know, they're holding the pilots in this program to a
higher standard than federal law enforcement officers but then
not letting them carry the gun. If you're going to hold us to
higher standards, at least give us the same authority to carry
the weapon as a meat inspector, as a special agent from the
Peace Corps has.
I'm all for having more guns in the back. I would say to
you that if the people involved in the accidents on 9/11, if
every crew member on the airplane was armed that day, could the
events have been any worse?
Chairman Graves. Precisely.
Mr. Roberts. You know, could it have been any worse?
Mr. Renzi. I wanted to give--go ahead, Mr. Luckey.
Mr. Luckey. One comment on this.
The government has gone halfway on this thing in the
beginning. They should have listened to the law enforcement
people when they implemented this, but policies developed in
this thing. Everyone knows a lot of people fought tooth and
nail. It wasn't a popular program and we had to sell it. And
that's what the testimony, previous testimony--I believe you
were present when I gave some of it--was.
But if you look at this thing, you should never take a
resource that you develop, that costs money and volunteers, the
way we have this FFDO set up, and then restrict it. You should
actually try to multiply it and provide it to meet the threat.
If a week's training is inadequate to have the custodial
responsibility required for this training, then perhaps they
should have a day or two more. Because we don't need driving,
we don't need them to tell us about any traffic stops,
warrants, serving warrants, any of that kind of stuff. All we
need to do is police that cockpit and then be a backup, a force
multiplier.
When you have this resource and you've got a deputized
federal officer, this whole program to train one guy is less
than it costs a couple federal marshals who go out for a
mission to cover a series of flights. It's the best bang for
the buck that I've ever seen the government have. So why
restrict it? In other words, what we need to do is use this as
a force multiplier, recognize it for the potential it is.
There is a reason why cops carry weapons the way they do.
It's an evolutionary process, like they do everything else. And
that custodial responsibility is very important, and it's
something that we have in place and we are just not using it.
And we need to know this.
Mr. Renzi. I appreciate it.
I wanted to give Mr. Mills a chance to expand on an issue
here and particularly get it in the Congressional Record.
When I had TSA come over to my Washington office and I sat
down with them, I asked specifically, is there any history at
all of a private facility or a private contractor ever training
a federal law enforcement officer? I was told no. Come to find
out, later, that was incorrect information I was given. That's
what the follow-up letters have gone over.
I also believe and know you to be a patriot and know that
you're out front on this. You're probably leaning out on the
edge on this, and that, given the leadership we are seeing at
TSA right now, you possibly could be subject to retaliation for
helping the private sector engage in a training that's going to
help America. That's what I believe.
And I want to give you a chance not to just talk about the
qualities of Gunsite, but to talk about the fact that there are
a number of facilities that could do this, a number of
qualified facilities in the private sector role. If you don't
mind, just expand on that.
Mr. Mills. There are--well, go back to the first thing that
you were talking about and the information that they've given
you, Mr. Chairman, as well.
When they talk about that training federal law enforcement
officers have never been done by anybody else, the entire air
marshal program, all of their firearms training was provided by
contractors that provided people to the training facility at
Artesia. It was done at Artesia at the federal facilities.
Contractors did it. I know this because they contacted me--the
contractor did--and wanted to hire my people to go do it. And
they did the bulk of the firearms training over there with
contractors. So that is--you know, that information you
received was incorrect.
And this is well-known throughout the industry. This is
not--I know a fellow that was not one of our firearms
instructors; he was a service manager at a Ford dealer and he
was a competitive shooter. The contractor hired him, sent him
to Artesia. So that brings--that makes you want to say, well,
you know, what's going on here?
Our guys are professional firearms instructors 24/7. If
they are not at Gunsite, they are out somewhere else teaching.
They are either federally certified, state, local certification
training in their department or they are in the military. So
that's the kind of quality of stuff that we have over here.
What I had initially proposed to the TSA was that we take
this a step up, use our federal and certified instructors to
provide the martial arts and the firearms training. I have the
facility; I have the capacity. We have a community that's very
supportive here that can support the lodging and meals and that
sort of thing while you're here. So we have this available. We
want to be a provider.
If we want to provide a real deterrence to these terrorist
acts, let's get as many people in the cockpit as quickly as we
can that are qualified to do this. And have the TSA people
here. Send two or three people, whatever, to cover that
portion, which it's probably--from what I understand from
people who have attended the program, somewhere probably around
40 to 50 percent of the program is classroom work. Have them
provide that, be here, supervise my people providing the
martial arts and firearms training. They award the credentials
and the certificates. It's all a TSA operation. You just
essentially use my people for the portion that we can do well
and then use the facility.
So it would bring--the advantage here, where this works
with small business, is it brings a tremendous amount of
traffic to our community, it makes a contribution to our
community, makes a contribution to our business, and we can do
it on a competitive basis. There are several of these
facilities around the country, cheaper and quicker, and we can
get more people into the cockpit quicker.
Mr. Renzi. Buz, can I follow up? Would the training at your
facility in any way limit the TSA's ability to, quote, evaluate
a candidate's overall fitness for the program and to, quote,
control the quality of the training? Being at your facility
versus being at a FLETC, would it somehow limit the ability of
TSA to evaluate a candidate's overall fitness and control the
quality of training?
Mr. Mills. I don't see that we would have a negative impact
on either of those. We can provide whatever facilities they
need to do that. In fact, our instructors, our people watch all
of our clients that come here. They are watched very closely
and we evaluate them constantly on their ability to complete
the operations. And we have, on several occasions, asked people
to leave because they just couldn't handle it.
Mr. Renzi. Right.
Mr. Roberts, in your experience--we are dealing with a
controlled issue here with TSA, obviously. I'm looking at the
statement submitted by Mr. David Stone, Acting Administrator
for TSA, who didn't come today but he submitted a written
statement. And in going through his logic, it seems to be a
real control issue.
In your time, in your expertise--which is significant in
listening to your statement today--is there an ability to
provide the quality that we're looking for, to be able to meet
the capacity that we need to, but for some reason just because
we've always done it in the past at a federal facility, not do
it at a private facility?
Mr. Roberts. It's ridiculous.
Mr. Renzi. Please.
Mr. Roberts. One thing has to be addressed before we answer
that question. You have to have the capacity. You have to have
the volunteer pilots. Right now, nobody wants to participate,
so TSA can say, hey, it's minimal participation; we've got
enough facilities to do it, we'll just keep it all to ourselves
because we don't have enough guys; seats go empty every week
because not enough guys are volunteering and we told you people
wouldn't volunteer. That's their logic.
If Congress forces TSA to implement this program and lift
the restrictions and the foolishness, pilots will volunteer to
an extent there will be so many volunteers, they'll have to
farm--they'll have to contract out. And if you have people on
site here when every class goes through, those people could be
tasked with overall review and checking out the students and
certifying their suitability for the program, as well as
certifying the training at the end of the program.
You don't have to have ten guys at Artesia watching the
class. Have two. They could certify the whole training class at
the end of it with one or two guys here on a TDY assignment. It
would certainly be cheaper to send a couple of government
employees out here on a TDY assignment for a month to certify
students as they go through here, as opposed to opening another
training center.
Mr. Renzi. Plus up cost. Well said. Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Graves. Buz, do you know offhand how many people
you train, total, in a year's time?
Mr. Mills. About 1,200 a year.
Chairman Graves. About 1,200?
Mr. Mills. Yes.
Chairman Graves. One of the things--another frustrating
statement by the TSA originally was that a lot of the private
facilities are inaccessible. And I think it's interesting that
they have now moved this--or the new training to New Mexico,
which is completely, completely inaccessible.
But I've got a question for all of you. And you don't have
to answer if you don't want to. But would--in your opinion,
what is TSA's reason for making the requirements or the burdens
you have to, or the hoops you have to jump through to go
through training just overwhelming? What do you think is the
reason?
Mr. Roberts. Government employees, people that run the air
marshal program and that run TSA, get promoted based on how
many people work for them. Not if they do a good job. They get
promoted on how many people work for them. If we hire more air
marshals, we get more government employees, we get more
management, and so the empire grows.
TSA employees, U.S. Customs, the people that run the air
marshal program now, they get nothing by hiring 10,000 armed
airline pilots. Nobody gets a corner office; a nice, new
government vehicle; nobody gets a GS-15 promotion out of this.
So, there's no support. What's in it for TSA? You got free help
here that want to come to this thing, but TSA doesn't get a
promotion out of it, so we're not going to support it.
Mr. Sapio. I agree 100 percent. The emotional reaction is
that pilots believe that the TSA either doesn't trust them or
doesn't think the pilots are capable to perform the duties
when, in essence, for example, the pilots on combat air
missions during alert status orange, or terrorist status orange
are flying the F-16s and the F-15s with the missiles ready to
shoot down a hijacked airplane. And then those very same pilots
go to their real job, which is to be an airline pilot, and the
TSA isn't going to let them have a gun in the cockpit? I mean,
it's ridiculous. So, everybody realizes that the pilots are
fully capable of performing the duties, and everyone realizes
that the airline pilots are absolutely trustworthy with the
responsibility.
But the real reason, I agree, is that the TSA is trying to
build an empire, and volunteer, unpaid pilots do not add to the
TSA empire. And I think that's the number one reason why the
TSA doesn't want to arm pilots. They would much rather put more
federal flight deck--I mean more federal air marshals on the
TSA payroll because it builds their empire. Unpaid airline
pilots do not.
Mr. Renzi. Terry, can I follow up?
When we talk about TSA air marshals, one of the issues I'm
faced--my district goes almost to the border, and I'm told we
lost a considerable number of border patrol agents, did a
lateral federal transfer over to TSA. Now, I'm told that the
air marshal program itself, we are beginning to lose people
from the air marshal. So we bring our young men and women in to
protect the border. Tough on the border, don't pay them enough,
don't take care of them enough; lateral transfer into TSA, and
then we are losing them. So we've got this revolving door going
on. We are taking people off the border, which we need right
now, trying to put them in the skies, and then losing them,
sitting on an airplane for eight, ten hours a day eating
airplane food and watching a movie as an air marshal.
When I leave Reagan National, when the Chairman and I leave
Reagan National and we take off, we're told to stay in our
seats for a half hour. On approach, you have to be in your seat
for a half hour. And, typically, we are told on that flight is
an air marshal to protect us who is carrying a concealed
weapon. That weapon is carried in some sort of a holster that
he can draw out quickly.
You, as a pilot--and you talked about the lock box. What
kind of a hindrance, what kind of inability for you to be able
to control that weapon, for you to be able to draw that weapon,
to properly use that weapon in the tight space of a cockpit is
being imposed on you by these regulations?
Mr. Sapio. Well, once you are inside the cockpit, it's not
a hindrance because the weapon is removed out of the lock box
for the flight. That's after the cockpit door is closed and
locked. And----
Mr. Renzi. Is there a holster, a chest holder, or--.
Mr. Sapio [continuing]I don't know.
Mr. Roberts. Similar.
Mr. Sapio. Okay. So it is immediately accessible once the
cockpit door is closed. But it's the transportation of that.
When the pilot is riding in the back--one of the questions that
you had was how often is it for a pilot to ride in the back of
the airplane? It's more common than not that you have jump
seating pilots in the back of the aircraft.
Mr. Renzi. Let me stop you for a second. I want to go back.
Is the holster location classified?
Mr. Roberts. You know, I participated in the program, so I
want to be very careful about what I--.
Mr. Renzi. Okay. I just want to go to a question of the
drawing of the holster and the location of the holster is not
now impeded; that's been worked through? Those issues?
Mr. Sapio. Once you're in the cockpit and the door is
closed.
Mr. Luckey. To some extent. The genesis of this is
important.
First of all, the equipment and allocation and idea that
they came up with in the beginning, first of all, they wanted
to give the FFDOs revolvers. We had to actually take people out
at Dulles, get them in the cockpit of a 757, and demonstrate
that with multiple perpetrators, you just don't shoot somebody
once and have them fall down. We had these people assault the
cockpit, and with multiple hits with a revolver, you know--
reloading a revolver is difficult at best. And when you have
four and five--in historical reference, four or five
perpetrators come in, you have to have more ammunition. So as
soon as we did that, they got rid of the revolver idea and we
went over to the magazine, semiautomatic weapon.
If you look at the genesis, then, essentially, how this
thing evolved, they didn't want to put--for example, we could
talk about this at class, but it didn't happen. We've got to be
able to access that weapon, acquire that weapon when you're
bent over, because we had people coming in, perpetrators coming
in over the backs of the pilots in an explosive entry type
thing. You've got to acquire that weapon. Of course, the best
way to do it--and you don't want the muzzle arc to go across
your co-pilot or your captain depending on how you are sitting.
These are all tactical considerations that were very
carefully addressed, but for some reason they had this thing so
restricted--and they still have it very restricted--so that it
doesn't happen. We can't access the resource adequately on the
job.
In other words, if you put the firearm in any of the
scenarios on 9/11, you can see the difference that thing would
make. And if you carry the weapon in a lock box and it's down
below and you have a hijacking going on, the argument the TSA
comes out with right now, they said, well--and I have these in
quotes, by the way. I brought them with me. They think that the
pilot is going to go crazy and just start shooting everybody.
That was one.
We have had--by TSA's records, in 45 days of keeping
records, they have had 345 reported mishandling of weapons.
They figure that they're getting 50 percent reported. That
makes 700 mishandlings in 45 days by their own reporting. These
are all things happening in the program that need remedial
action, and we need to fix these things.
I think that if you look at the genesis of how this worked,
it's what happens when you set policy without consulting the
end user. And people who do this on a regular basis, like Buz
Mills, should be the people who can provide this expertise.
TSA is not a law enforcement entity. And the federal air
marshals just went over to vice. They went over to immigration
and customs, so they lost those. So this is the only entity
they have right now.
I carried a weapon on an airplane for 15 years back in the
mid '70s. The program was run by the Justice Department, and we
carried it on our person. I carried it all the time because,
obviously, even though your jurisdiction is in the cockpit, the
threat far exceeds that. The threat could be anywhere. Why
restrict a resource that you spent money and time to develop
that's proven to be an evolutionary concept that works? Why do
that? It just doesn't make sense to me. So--and I don't think
it makes sense to anyone else. And to say that a pilot isn't
qualified to do this is ludicrous.
Mr. Sapio. I would just like to add to that, that the list
of law enforcement agencies that are entitled to carry their
firearms in the back of the aircraft as a passenger is quite
lengthy, and it even includes postal inspectors.
So for the TSA to say, you know, pilots cannot be trusted
to be sitting in the back of the airplane with a firearm when
they are allowing our historical law enforcements that don't
have such a good track record to carry the firearm in the back,
it just doesn't make any sense. And they realize the fallacy of
that argument and they know that it's not true. And when they
speak this stuff, they're just blowing smoke because, once
again, the real reason that we all believe that they are trying
to hamper the pilots from participating in this program is so
that they can build their own TSA empire with federal air
marshals.
Mr. Roberts. One point, also. There was a pilot that was
due to be here with us today that just finished the training,
and he was told by TSA if he came and spoke, that he would be
out of the program.
So they are not up for any kind of dissension, or, or they
don't want to hear any bad news. And there was four qualified
guys in that first class in April that got sent home. Not
because they weren't qualified, not because they didn't pass
any of the training, because they pushed and they demanded
answers. And as soon as you got pushy and said things aren't
going to work, well, you're out of here.
Mr. Renzi. Retaliation.
Mr. Roberts. Yes. They didn't want to hear anything about
problems with the program. If there was any dissension, you're
gone.
Mr. Renzi. Mr. Chairman, a real quick follow-up and I'll
turn it back to you.
You were talking--and I appreciate you teaching me on the
procedures and all. Are we still operating under a government-
issued weapon, or are we operating under a standard that has to
be purchased by the individual?
Mr. Luckey. Initially, they issued a Glock .22, and they
went to a Heckler and Koch, H&K USP Model .40 Smith and Wesson.
Mr. Renzi. Forty?
Mr. Luckey. It's an H&K which, if you look at the purchase
requirements--first of all, it was supposed to be a hammerless
semiautomatic not made--that was manufactured in the United
States. Of course, H&K is a German company. It's--I think the
USP is a hammer-fired weapon. It's not a striker-fired weapon.
There were a couple other things in there. I'm not bad-mouthing
the U.S. weapon.
Mr. Renzi. No.
Mr. Luckey. I'm not bad-mouthing that, I'm just saying it
didn't meet the criteria at all.
Mr. Renzi. But the knock down power, are we all in
agreement, in the gun--.
Mr. Roberts. It's fine.
Mr. Luckey. The .40 is a compromise between--if you want
penetration, I suppose a nine-millimeter penetrates. But I'm of
the old school that bigger is better. I think a .45 caliber is
the one I would choose if I could.
Mr. Roberts. A .40 is a pretty standard law enforcement
round these days, also. That's pretty much what the feds issue.
DEA issues it. It's a pretty standard bullet, and I think it's
adequate for this.
Mr. Renzi. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Graves. One of the problems we have is a lot of
misinformation out there to--even in Congress, there is a lot
of individuals who don't understand the issue, don't understand
aircraft, and there are a lot of those fallacies, I guess, that
we are going to have to reverse. And one of them is--and you
even hear it from some members of Congress--they are scared to
death of, you put more armed individuals on an aircraft and
they start shooting holes in the aircraft and then you've got,
you know, you hear--and I'm a pilot, so I know the answer, but
I want to get an answer from you all for the record.
But, you know, this doom and gloom about penetrating the
skin of an aircraft. You don't have--you don't blow an aircraft
out of the air when that happens. And you all are experts and
you might comment on that, too, just for the record so we will
have it in there.
Mr. Luckey. First of all, a handgun round is not a very
powerful weapon. I mean, it's--you've heard the old story maybe
that a handgun is something you'd use to fight your way to a
real gun if you were in a gunfight.
But, really, the penetration--you can stand in the back of
an aircraft and give somebody a box of ammunition--I would be
comfortable flying a T-category commercial aircraft. You would
have some real problems if your mission was to hurt that
airplane. And as far as holes go, you know, the skin on an
aircraft is made out of ripstop aluminum, but it's made to be
punctured and still survive. The outflow valves from
pressurization are huge on most aircraft, and they control--
they are like baffles, and they open and close. And we don't
even use maximum bleed air when we operate the aircraft. We
usually run about half of the available bleed pressure.
So you can stand back there and punch holes in that
thing without even losing cabin pressure. People have seen
too many movies about people getting sucked out and all this
stuff. And the reality involved, even hitting a hydraulic line,
unless you get a perpendicular, 90-degree shot, you may bend
it, you may dent it, but you can hang tubing all over here and
shoot it all day long. It's difficult. A low velocity round
compared to a rifle round--a rifle round will punch through it.
A lot of times a handgun round--and Buz will back me up on
this, I think--will bend it, shear off it, but it will not cut
it, penetrate it. You would have trouble doing that.
So these are severely overstated things, and I think
everyone needs education on this.
Mr. Sapio. I'd like to add a little bit to that.
Essentially, you could shoot up anything and everything in
the cockpit, and the airplane is still going to fly. You have
triple redundancy on the electrical system; you have triple
redundancy on the hydraulic system. You have--even if you were
to lose the hydraulic system, the airplane would still fly with
manual reversion. If you were to lose your, all three of your
generators, you would still fly with battery.
The windows in an airliner are made out of plexiglass.
They're not made out of safety glass. So when people watch the
movie Goldfinger and they watch this big guy getting sucked out
a tiny window of the business jet, it's not going to happen on
an airliner. It's not safety glass, which is designed
specifically to shatter so that people don't get severely cut
in a car accident. It's made out of plexiglass. It's designed
to hold the pressure of an airplane in.
It's also designed to withstand bird strikes. I had a bird
strike flying into Houston. I was flying at 320 knots
indicated, leveling off at 10,000 feet, so our true air speed
was much greater than 320 knots, and a large bird hit the
windshield. It's sounded like a cannon went off inside the
cockpit. It didn't even crack the plexiglass.
So these airplanes are tough, and the windows are extremely
tough. And even if the bullet could penetrate the window, which
is unlikely, it would only put a half-inch diameter hole in it.
It's not going to shatter the way you see it in the movies.
Mr. Renzi. Terry, was that an endangered species that hit
your window?
Mr. Sapio. Well, it was after that.
Mr. Renzi. I was going to ask--I want to move, if I could,
Mr. Chairman, the discussion to location.
This morning, when I read TSA's testimony, I noticed that
the testimony begins to try and say that they are being
inclusive to small businesses and private facilities. We are
being told that by TSA in their testimony. I don't know if
you've had a chance to read their testimony, but it will now be
part of the public record and will be available to you. In
their testimony, they talk about how they contracted Lockheed
Martin to conduct a study on the requalification sites.
And for the audience, what we are talking about is, the TSA
is saying, okay, we want to do the first training but we will
let the ``requal'' be done by private sector, which doesn't
make any sense to me since, if you're going to give up control
on the requal, you might as well go to the best and first
position.
The site selection study that was done by Lockheed Martin
identified ten hub cities where, ultimately, they want to go
for their requal. They identified Newark, Philadelphia,
Atlanta, Miami, Minneapolis, Dallas, Chicago, Los Angeles,
Seattle and Denver. Not Phoenix, which is interesting to me.
Now, I'm under the impression that most of this training
will be done indoors, but some possibly would be done outside.
And, so, in the cities of Newark, Philadelphia, Atlanta,
Minneapolis, Chicago, Seattle and Denver, which are in subzero
weather today, those sites would be at a disadvantage given
climate consideration, which does not seem to be considered in
the survey.
In addition, I'd like to discuss the location as we talk
today about the New Mexico facility and the disadvantage so
that Phoenix, Arizona, which was not identified, which is the
hub for America West, one of the, one of the better airlines
that we now have, in all honesty, in the skies, who flies
substantially around the country, Mr. Chairman, and whose
pilots are based, a good majority, in Phoenix, those pilots
aren't able to drive an hour and a half north or aren't able to
access any kind of training typically in the southwest other
than Dallas. So the southwest has been somewhat left out of
this survey completely.
So I'd ask, please, for a better understanding as it
relates to location, outside training, and the detriments at
the training facility in New Mexico if we could expand on that.
Mr. Roberts. First of all, you mentioned America West
having a hub in Phoenix. Southwest does, too. We have 800
pilots based in Phoenix. So, right there, you have America West
and Southwest. They could easily drive up here and requal.
So, you know, the Artesia training facility was, by TSA's
comments, was underused. They wanted to find a reason to
breathe life into it. They wanted to find a reason to keep it
up and running, so put the pilots out there. Once again, put
the inconvenience on the pilots. If they want to play, they'll
come out here. That's been their attitude on every aspect of
all of this. If these guys are willing to jump through all
these hoops, we'll let them carry the gun. It's just another,
another roadblock they have thrown up to make it difficult; let
them go out there to Artesia do it.
Mr. Renzi. Thank you.
Mr. Luckey. I was at the Lockheed Martin meeting on the 4th
of November 2003 where this stuff was discussed. I have that
same list of cities.
According to the two people who were in charge of it,
designated by Lockheed Martin--it was Chuck Faremooth and
Grandy Williams--they told us that they considered 971 ranges
around the United States. They used 47 criteria elements to
analyze this, and they come up with a primary and a secondary
list.
And I asked them to tell me why Phoenix wasn't in there.
Because, obviously, they had a map and a Power Point with all
these things on it. I said our people have to travel there,
they have to spend time away from home, it's a big deal, it's
all volunteer and they incur the costs. And they said that they
were going to look at Phoenix in the future at some time. It
was a very ambiguous meeting.
I was very disappointed in the amount of attention that
they had paid to this. And the other thing that I was a little
bit disappointed in was that they didn't, again, consult the
end user: Where would you like to see these people trained,
where are the hubs, where do they live, where do most of them
fly out of? And I think these are considerations that they
claim to have looked at, but their selection didn't reflect
that.
Mr. Roberts. This is another horror story from the first
class, but this actually happened.
We brought up problems like this, and at some point the
lawyer, the staff attorney, said, guys, your inconvenience and
the inconvenience and adverse effect to your airline regarding
this program is not our problem, it's your problem; you and
your airline will have to figure out ways to implement this and
make it work; we did not take into consideration your
inconvenience and the hassle to your airline.
That's the attitude we are dealing with.
Mr. Renzi. They didn't look at where the pilots live or
reside.
Mr. Roberts. In one of our negotiations with them prior to
the whole thing--the negotiations probably went on in January
and February of last year. We were sitting down with TSA, and
their psychologist, Ann Quigley, was overheard telling the TSA
people, guys, stop asking the pilots so many questions; we're
not here for their input; it's our program, we will tell the
pilots how it's going to be; we don't want them to think that
they have input here. That's Ann Quigley, the psychologist,
telling them.
So they would meet with us so they could say we met with
the pilots; we went through all this with the pilots. They did.
They met with us, and when the day was up--.
Mr. Renzi. Sounds like psychobabble.
Terry.
Mr. Sapio. Southwest Airlines has 900 pilots based in
Phoenix. And America West Airlines, I don't know the exact
count, but it's probably comparable to Southwest Airlines, if
not more.
So there's a very large number of pilots that live only an
hour and a half away from Prescott and Gunsite Academy. And for
the TSA to say if you want to carry the firearm, if you want us
to let you carry the firearm in the cockpit, you have to do
this, this and this and this, and you have to do it our way,
otherwise, you don't get to do it--and they are completely
missing the point. All of us would rather not have to carry the
firearm at all. We would all rather that 9/11 never happened.
But the simple fact of the matter is, is that if another
one happens, it will devastate the airline industry, it will
devastate our economy, and most of us will be in the
unemployment lines. And we don't want that to happen, so we're
willing to volunteer at no costs, no pay whatsoever. We are
volunteering to do our part to deter the terrorists from ever
doing another 9/11. And the TSA is doing everything that they
can to deter us from volunteering. It doesn't make any sense
whatsoever.
Mr. Renzi. It kind of segues into my next question, which
was going to be, when we talk about voluntarism, we talk about
the deterrence, we talk about the fact that factually, right
now, TSA is pointing to the fact they have slots open at the
training facility. And there is a statement in the record that
Mr. Roberts has made that that voluntarism would grow if these
deterrents went away.
Can you expand for me on what you see is the bottled-up
anxiety, or what are the numbers? What kind of small changes
could be made to allow that bottled-up anxiety to be removed or
the frustration to be taken out of the way so that these guys
could--and these gals could get----
Mr. Roberts. They could loosen up the restrictions to get
involved in the program.
Mr. Renzi [continuing] The application process.
Mr. Roberts. Yeah, this whole 13-page application. I've got
a whole list here of guys that have been turned down for
whatever reason. It's a lengthy list of, you know, airline
pilots, military officers, former federal law enforcement
people, all turned down. This isn't even, this isn't even
mentioning the people that haven't even applied.
I know in Orlando, where I'm based, there's six federal law
enforcement officers, formerly, that don't want anything to do
with this because of the 13-page application, the psych test,
the psych evaluation, and then travelling out to Artesia to do
this.
That's what needs to be loosened up, and people will start
applying.
Mr. Renzi. Captain Luckey, when we talk about loosening up
criminal background checks, psychological evaluations, we do
have pilots, we have in the news the history of pilots with
alcoholism. And what--since the industry seems to be a real
resource in helping us drive and change this to be a better
fit, where in the application process, what pieces do we keep
and what pieces are overly excessive? Anybody on the panel.
Mr. Luckey. Think, first of all, in answer to your
question, one, going back to the private facility, one of the
concerns that our FFDOs and the Air Line Pilots Association
expressed to me they were skeptical about going into a private
facility is that they would be labeled as a non-federal
legitimate entity and the reason they aren't trusted to carry
the weapon like any other federal officer is because if they
would go to a private facility.
But I've discussed this with Buz, and he said his concept
of really contracting--it's a government facility. It's a
government program. It's a private facility, but it's overseen,
the oversight is by TSA, et cetera. So you get around that. It
is----
Mr. Renzi. Let me ask you something. When TSA came to my
office in D.C., their whole hangup that day was the graduation
ceremony and making sure that the certificate and--is there a
badge also awarded?
Mr. Luckey [continuing] No badge.
Mr. Roberts. No badge, because we're afraid you guys will
try to badge your way out of speeding tickets. That's what we
were told.
Mr. Luckey. Hey're talking about it now. Since--I've got to
say this. Since the operations, the TSA operation has taken
over custody of the FFDO program, there's a different mind set
there. The breakdown is between the upper level between Admiral
Stone's office--used to be James Loy's office--and the
operations people headed by Paul Kinberg, I believe his name
is. He is the head of the operations that oversees the FFDO
program. He's very receptive to some of the recommendations
that we have made; however, his comments are that there's no
way that you're ever going to have the custodial responsibility
that we want. So we need to get around that.
And I think all of the pilots recognize the quality and the
expertise and the product that facilities like Gunsite puts
out. I don't think it can be paralleled anywhere. So these are
all important ingredients in this, in the recipe for success in
deterring terrorism.
So, I guess what we need to do is beg congressional help to
try to get the emphasis in the right place.
Mr. Renzi. Any movement where the trade association would
develop a better application and submit it as a compromise, an
alternative?
Mr. Roberts. An application to come to the program?
Mr. Renzi. Yes, where you guys would take the 13-page
application and recognize the features that need to stay and
then offer that--.
Mr. Roberts. Personally, I think you could have a one-page
application and state the name of the airline you work for and
be done with it.
Mr. Luckey. Right. They could use the FBI application. It's
a lot simpler.
Mr. Roberts. You know, an airline pilot, by the time he's
working for a major airline, has probably had four or five
jobs. He's been checked out numerous times, and every--.
Mr. Renzi. Any other, any other major deterrents besides
the application?
Mr. Roberts. Psychological testing.
Mr. Sapio. Psychological.
Mr. Renzi. Why would we want to get rid of that? Why not--
why wouldn't we want a psychological evaluation on a civilian
pilot who possibly has alcoholism?
Mr. Sapio. If the TSA feels that it's necessary to have the
extensive psychological evaluation of pilots, why don't they do
that with their own federal air marshals?
Mr. Renzi. Well, true, but--.
Mr. Sapio. And the thing is, the pilots that are
volunteering have already been flying--most of them have been
flying for a long period of time before they ever get hired by
an airline. Many of them are ex-military who have flown nuclear
weapons, fighter jets with missiles aimed at airliners; they
have flown--have had top secret security clearances. And the
military trusts us, the airline trusts us. Every day, you know,
every flight, they have a plane full of people, and everybody
trusts us except for the TSA.
And that's not really the point, Congressman Renzi. It's
not that the TSA doesn't trust us. The real point is the TSA
doesn't believe in the FFDO program. We all think it's because
it doesn't contribute to their empire.
And the purpose of the psychological testing is not to
screen the pilots. The purpose of the psychological testing is
to intimidate the pilots so that they don't volunteer. And the
TSA has got to stop intimidating the pilots; otherwise, what's
happening is going to continue to happen, and that is the vast
majority--when this whole program was being--the legislation
was being put together by Congress, everybody I talked to was
all in favor of it. Anything we can do to help deter terrorism
is wonderful.
As soon as we found out what the, how the TSA was going to
implement it and all the onerous rules, regulations and
intimidation of the pilots that were participating, everybody
said, well, there's 11 million flights a year, it's been two
years since the last terrorist attack, that's 22 million
flights. It's only happened four times, so, you know, do the
math. That's about, that's already one in five million flights,
and the count is going up higher, so the chances are that if it
happens again, it's not going to happen on my flight. I'm not
going to get my throat slit by a terrorist, it's going to
happen to somebody else, so why should I go through all the
hassle, all the aggravation and all the intimidation from the
TSA to do something that is expensive to me?
I checked with Southwest Airlines, and you have to either
take a week vacation--which I have plans to do things with my
family when I'm on vacation--or be pulled from a week of
flying. Typically, we fly three or four days a week, and I
average a thousand dollars a day income when I go fly. So
that--in other words, I would have to give up three or four
thousand dollars' worth of income to go--to be pulled from a
trip and to go to TSA for a week of training. So why should I
spend three or four thousand dollars and be hassled,
intimidated, interrogated and everything else by the TSA when
they know that it's all just designed to be harassment, to
discourage me from participating in the program when I know the
chances are one in millions that it would ever happen on my
flight anyway?
And that's not the purpose of the FFDO program. The purpose
of the FFDO program is to get enough armed pilots in the
cockpit so that none of us ever have to use our firearm. It's
to convince the terrorists that trying to take over an airplane
is an exercise in futility; it's just not going to happen, so
don't even try it. And, then, none of us ever have to fire a
shot.
But the TSA doesn't see it that way. They see that the way
to go is with federal air marshals. They are on the TSA
payroll, they build the TSA empire, and the pilots, you know,
they do not deserve to participate in the TSA empire.
Mr. Renzi. Well said, Terry.
Mr. Luckey. Mr. Chairman, a little bit of background on the
psychological testing. I look at it a little bit different,
having been involved in federal law enforcement for a number of
years.
Back in the '70s, we found out that about 25 percent of the
federal agents probably couldn't shoot anybody. That's before
all the human resources work and everything else, and we had
some rather frightening experiences on the street where people
were required to----
Mr. Renzi. 25 percent couldn't?
Mr. Luckey [continuing] 25 percent probably couldn't take a
human life. That's a significant factor, and that's when the
human resources and human factors people and the shrinks got
hold of this thing and they started evaluating people for the
ability of the application of lethal force.
And I think every federal law enforcement officer that I
know of goes through a rather significant psychological
profile. I know I went through a very significant one with the
FBI. And, granted, I was in a very nonstandard program, so it's
a little different.
But I think, since we're provided tort liability protection
by the government, just like any other federal agent, when
you're sworn, if you make a mistake and you shoot somebody, God
forbid, you're protected and so is your employer protected
under the auspices of the act.
So I think these are considerations that you have to really
take in and you have to weigh this out and balance it out. But
some psychological profiling for the ability to apply lethal
force, maybe suicidal tendencies and compulsive/aggressive
behavior, are really not out of the question when you give
somebody a weapon.
Chairman Graves. Buz, you said you could be up and going in
two weeks?
Mr. Mills. Yes.
Chairman Graves. And how many can you train?
Mr. Mills. We could train, initially, a hundred pilots a
week. We could do 5,000 a year without having, without having
to increase any infrastructure or capital or any of that sort
of thing. We could expand. We have almost 2,000 acres here, and
we can expand, you know, to do whatever number that you want to
do with some time and some effort. But without any capital
infusion or without any increased infrastructure, we feel that
a hundred a week would be easily accomplished.
And, as you can see, you're here, Mr. Chairman, January the
15th, in the dead of winter, and in the beautiful high desert
of Arizona, the temperature is 55 degrees. Beautiful training
environment, even in the dead of winter.
Mr. Renzi. Absolutely.
Chairman Graves. Do you have any----
Mr. Renzi. I have one more.
Chairman Graves [continuing] Okay.
Mr. Renzi. Is that okay?
Chairman Graves. Yes. I was going to say, one of the
focuses of this hearing is the small business aspects of it.
And it's a little patronizing, I guess. TSA does point out in
their, in the testimony that they do use small businesses in
their program. They include procuring items such as lock boxes
where the firearm must be stored, holsters and magazine
pouches. So they are doing their part, I guess, to support the
small business when it comes to training.
Mr. Roberts. I'd suggest that they do just enough to
qualify, so they can say we're participating. You know? You'll
hear them time and time again say we worked with the pilots on
this thing. They did just enough. They met with us, like I
said. They never took any of our recommendations, but they did
meet with us so they could say we met with the pilots on this.
So, just like small business, hey, we got a few.
Mr. Sapio. Congressman Renzi, just a little bit more on the
question about the psychological screening.
What I have here is--I printed this off of the Internet.
It's from the APSA, APSA website, which is the----
Mr. Renzi. American--.
Mr. Roberts. Airline Pilots Security Alliance.
Mr. Sapio [continuing] Okay. Airline Pilots Security
Alliance. And they have excerpts of statements from many pilots
that have been turned down by the TSA during the screening
process. And here is one of them, one of the remarks about the
psychological screening. It says: I've asked numerous federal
air marshals if they ever interviewed with a psychologist
during their interview process. Every one of them, without
exception, attests that they did not ever speak with a
psychologist, even those coming straight out of college with no
law enforcement experience.
So they are unknown quantities. The pilots that the TS--
that are volunteering to do this, we've had many years'
experience flying. You know, I'm sure it's probably hundreds of
thousands of passengers personally in 18 years, safely, without
incident, without any problem whatsoever.
So somebody like me would be a known quantity. Somebody
fresh out of college with no experience whatsoever is an
unknown, and they never have even one interview with a
psychologist. So, yet--and it goes on to say: Yet the TSA
insists that responsible airline pilots with years of
experience in providing safety to air passengers be subjected
to a contract psychologist's evaluation.
And the thing is, it's not about the stability of any
particular pilot. I mean, the pilots prove themselves day after
day after day for many years before they even get to this
point.
Mr. Renzi. Is there--there's an annual evaluation you go
through for Southwest--is there, when you guys go through your
annual review for step ups in grade or pay, is there an
evaluation that's done?
Mr. Sapio. Not a psychological evaluation.
Mr. Renzi. But there's observation annually?
Mr. Sapio. Oh, sure. And there's also, there's always two
pilots, at least two pilots in the cockpit. And flying is very
competitive by nature, and each pilot is always evaluating and
judging the other pilot, how good his skills are and how he
manages the flight and that kind of thing. So you put, you
know, two egos together and we're always being judged by our
peers every single day we go to work.
Mr. Renzi. So there is a--.
Mr. Sapio. And if anybody was not trustworthy, that would
quickly become apparent and that would quickly be dealt with in
any airline.
Chairman Graves. I'd like to submit that for the record,
too, in its entirety.
Mr. Sapio. Certainly. Yes, Mr. Chairman.
[Information not submitted to the Record]
Mr. Renzi. My final question--and I appreciate it. I feel
like we've really done a good job here of fleshing a lot of
this out--is if we continue down the road with no changes, if
we stay without making any kind of optional alternatives,
without making it easier for the pilots, where do we go? Where
is the capacity issue, where is the ability not to--ultimately,
where do you see this thing headed?
Obviously, you know, it's easy to see you see it as a
failure. But without the changes, without the, including the
private sector in, where are we headed as a nation in the
future?
Mr. Roberts. I think you are going to have a very, very
small program. You are going to have a very small percentage of
the pilots participating, and you are going to be able to have
TSA control all aspects of it, including all the training. And
at some point, the initial classes, they are not going to have
to have one a week, they can have one a month because there's
not going to be the people applying. And there will be people
in the program that will require recurrent training, but I
think as time goes on, you are going to see that TSA can handle
that with their own facilities like they are doing now because
of small numbers of guys.
And I think, eventually, if nothing changes, people are
going to go, you know, I've been doing this for a year and this
is a pain and I'm out of it, and they are going to send the box
and the gun and everything else back to TSA and say, you know,
I got nothing out of this for me; there is zero upside for the
pilot, zero, hundred percent hassle; why? And send the box
back.
Mr. Renzi. That's well said.
Mr. Roberts. You know, the first class that went through, I
can tell you, the majority of people I spoke to before I went
home said, you know what, I'm finishing so I can get the
credentials, but the box is going in my closet; I'm not doing
this.
So a lot of guys are going to go through training and put
it in the closet and not carry it because of all the hassle
factor. Many people that were at that first class had no idea
what was coming down the pipe. There were a handful of us that
did, but many guys didn't know what was coming down. When they
heard the policies, they were in awe of how foolish they were.
Mr. Luckey. One of the things I think we have to look at
here is that commercial aviation is about eight and a half
percent of our gross domestic product in the United States. I
think, right now, if we don't use every resource that we can
develop here and, you know, according to the July 25th
statement, to protect the infrastructure of the U.S. that the
president signed last year--he spent a hundred billion dollars,
not counting the government, not counting the military, to
protect the infrastructure of this country.
I think this is the type of program where we need to focus,
because I think one of the greatest deterrents against
terrorism is to harden this target. Because every layer of
security has a degree of porosity, and as these layers get
closer to the principal point of protection, they must become
more predictably reliable and more dependable. In other words,
that door has to be good, because there's nothing between that
door and that F-16.
And I don't think that in this country, the U.S. industry,
aviation industry could survive a catastrophic shoot down by a
fighter on American soil full of Americans to protect the
infrastructure. I just can't see it. And I think anything that
we do to focus on this, to make this program good--this isn't
going to cost a bunch. Like I said, this is the best bang for
the buck that I've ever seen Uncle Sam get, and I think we run
the risk of being the most politically correct extinct industry
in the world if we don't utilize these resources in the
country.
Mr. Roberts. The expenses for this program are not coming
from the pilots. We're free. The expenses are coming from the
psychological staff they've got and this army of people doing
background checks that are unnecessary. You know, that's where
the expenses are coming. Ask for TSA's budget. Find out where
the money is going on all these studies and people to vet the
flight crews and to interview us. This is where the money is
going on this program. It's not to buy us guns and put us in
the cockpit. That's minimal. They are spending a ton of money
on something that can be done, you know, with a phone call,
basically.
Mr. Sapio. And background checks, we've already had. We've
all been fingerprinted. We've all had the background checks. In
the military, we've all had the background checks. So I've
already had a couple background checks; I've been fingerprinted
several times. So pilots--and we have cockpit voice recorders,
we have cockpit flight data recorders. We get drug tested, we
get alcohol tested. Pilots are more probed and poked and
invaded than any other career group in the country.
Mr. Roberts. It's a fact.
Mr. Sapio. And the TSA says it's not enough, we want to
poke and prod some more. And it's absolutely, totally
ridiculous.
Mr. Renzi. There's a joke in there somewhere.
Mr. Sapio. So, you know, basically, you have, Congress has
two choices. They can continue to let the TSA thwart the
legislation and the intent of the legislation, which is--
obviously, the intent is to ensure that a 9/11 never happens
again; that terrorists never have the opportunity to take
control of a large aircraft and fly it into a building again.
And the best way to ensure that it never happens again is
to convince the terrorists that it's not even worth trying
because it's not going to happen. And the best way to ensure
that is to have so many pilots carrying so many firearms that
they, the terrorists don't even try.
Mr. Renzi. That's well done. Thank you.
Mr. Chairman, I just want to thank you very much for coming
all the way out here from Missouri.
Buz, thank you for the hospitality. Thank you for pushing
on the envelope a little bit given the leadership at TSA, who
at times possibly has enacted--I don't want to see any
retaliation towards you, particularly what you're trying to do
for our nation and the private sector. I'm grateful for the
expertise today. It was--all of it was great testimony.
Chairman Graves. I, too, appreciate everybody coming out
today. I think we have kind of demonstrated why TSA doesn't
want businesses to train additional pilots. In my opinion, they
are crippling this program to an extent. There is really no
good reason that I can see. In fact, I think small business, or
some of these private entities are uniquely qualified to a good
job of training these pilots.
And with all the findings we will have today, I will be in
discussion with the Chairman of the Aviation Subcommittee. He
also is in agreement that we need to be training more pilots
and getting more pilots out there to protect their aircraft and
the people that are flying on these aircraft, and I will be
discussing our findings with him and some of my ideas and some
of the things I want to do.
Again, I appreciate everybody being here. I hope, I hope
that we never have another hijacking in this country, but the
fact of the matter is, it will eventually happen again. And I
certainly hope that we don't have a situation where we have
officers--or pilots on that plane that aren't carrying a
weapon. And an even worse case scenario is there's a weapon on
that plane but it's stuck in a box down in the belly of that
aircraft. I think that's something we all need to think real
hard about.
But I want to thank everybody for being here and all of you
for coming out. Mayor, it was nice to meet you. And I
appreciate the testimony. This will go a long ways towards
helping us in our goal, and that's to get more pilots armed.
Thank you.
[Whereupon, at 2:45 p.m., the subcommittee was adjourned.]
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