

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE APPROPRIATIONS
FOR 2004

HEARINGS
BEFORE A
SUBCOMMITTEE OF THE
COMMITTEE ON APPROPRIATIONS
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
ONE HUNDRED EIGHTH CONGRESS
FIRST SESSION

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SHERRY L. YOUNG and CLELIA M. ALVARADO, *Administrative Aides*

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DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE APPROPRIATIONS FOR 2004

THURSDAY, MARCH 27, 2003.

FISCAL YEAR 2003 SUPPLEMENTAL APPROPRIATIONS FOR IRAQ AND AFGHANISTAN

WITNESSES

HON. DONALD H. RUMSFELD, SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
PAUL WOLFOWITZ, DEPUTY SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
GENERAL RICHARD B. MYERS, CHAIRMAN, JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF,
UNITED STATES AIR FORCE
DOV ZAKHEIM, UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE (COMPTROLLER)

INTRODUCTION

Mr. LEWIS. The Committee will come to order.

Today it is my pleasure to welcome the Secretary of Defense, Donald H. Rumsfeld, and General Richard B. Myers, Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff. Thank you very much for taking the time to be with us. Dr. Paul Wolfowitz, Deputy Secretary of Defense, and Dov S. Zakheim, Under Secretary of Defense, Comptroller, are also back again. We had a great session yesterday by the way, Mr. Secretary.

I have a rather detailed and wonderfully prosed introductory speech that I am going to pass on. In the meantime, by way of introduction nonetheless, let me say that we hear every day from our constituents across the country about the American people's pride as they view and share both the frustration, the pain, and the concern of our great young men and women doing the job that they are doing for us and for freedom in the Middle East. And they are going above and beyond that which anyone could really expect, but they are themselves individually, as well as collectively, in the business of eliminating from the face of the Earth an administration, a scourge on governmental processes like the world has seldom seen.

There is little doubt that the effort to free the people of Iraq is going very well. We have a problem, Mr. Secretary, that I do not know exactly how to deal with, and that is that we have now an explosion of talk show hosts around, who spend most of the day having to say something almost every minute of the day, and so small things are repeated dozen of times as though it was brand-new news. It is part of our modern world and we must deal with that.

Between now and then, there is little doubt that the American people support the Commander in Chief's effort, and they admire

the work that is being done by the commanders, chiefs, those people who are in front of us.

It is a privilege to have you here. I understand there are some limitations on General Myers's time. The Secretary has to leave no later than 3 o'clock. We have to get out of this room, by the way, at about 10 minutes after 3, for there is another Committee meeting after this one in this same room. In the meantime, gentlemen, your entire statements will be included in the record. I will give you my speech if you would like to read it. But between now and then, welcome and please proceed, Mr. Secretary.

Secretary RUMSFELD. Thank you very much.

Mr. LEWIS. Maybe you ought to let me yield to Jack Murtha. He really was apologizing because he was late, but in the meantime that had to do with votes.

REMARKS OF MR. MURTHA

Mr. MURTHA. I just want to say what a good job your Comptroller did. We have never had such frank, open testimony from a Comptroller. Comptrollers are usually this, that, and the other. But this guy did a masterful job. He is as good as I have ever heard, and I just wanted to compliment him before the Secretary, so that you would know he is representing you well.

SUMMARY STATEMENT OF SECRETARY RUMSFELD

Secretary RUMSFELD. I would like to say I taught him everything he knows. The problem is it is just the reverse. Thank you, I appreciate that.

Mr. Chairman and members of the Committee, I will make a brief statement. General Myers has a brief statement, and at that point Dick Myers and I have to leave while Dr. Wolfowitz and Dov Zakheim take over.

STATUS OF THE WAR IN IRAQ

We appreciate this opportunity to discuss the President's emergency supplemental. We are now less than a week into Operation Iraqi Freedom. The major ground war began last Thursday at 10 p.m. at night, and the major air war started on Friday, the following day, one week ago at 1 p.m. So while the conflict is well begun, it is only begun, and we are certainly still closer to the beginning than we are to the end.

Already, coalition forces have made good progress, and certainly the men and women in uniform, U.S. and coalition alike, are doing a superb job. They face an adversary that has demonstrated its contempt for the laws of war, dressing its forces as liberated civilians, sending them out waving white flags, feigning surrender in order to draw coalition forces into ambushes and then shooting them. They are using hospitals as a base from which to launch attacks and they are hiding behind human shields.

Coalition forces have raced across more than 200 miles of Iraqi territory, coming from the south towards Baghdad, through enemy fire and inhospitable terrain, with difficult weather as you have read, some winds gusting up to 60, 70 miles an hour, to reach a

point about 50 miles south of Baghdad in less than a week. It is an impressive rate of advance.

They have successfully secured the Iraq southern oil fields, prevented an environmental disaster in the destruction of the critical resources that the Iraqi people will certainly need once this regime has been removed.

Given the fact that the Republican Guard have moved towards Baghdad from the north coming south, from the South going north, from the west moving toward the east, the campaign could well grow more dangerous in the coming days and weeks as the forces close in on Baghdad, as coalition forces close in on Baghdad. But the outcome is assured: The regime will be removed. The only thing that remains unclear is precisely how long it will take.

FISCAL YEAR 2003 SUPPLEMENTAL REQUEST

We do know that these efforts cost money and the cost of the operation and the other missions currently underway in the global war on terror can no longer be absorbed without an emergency supplemental appropriation that the President has requested.

Since the new fiscal year began, every month since October of 2002—we've been through October, November, December, January, February, and most of March—we have had to borrow from other programs to pay for the costs of the war. The pattern cannot continue much longer. The services have already gone through their discretionary spending for the first, second, and, for the most part, third quarters of 2003, and they will soon have exhausted the fourth quarter of discretionary funding. If this continues we will run out of discretionary funds by late spring or early summer is their estimate, which could force us to curtail training, maintenance, and other activities.

The President submitted a supplemental of \$74.7 billion dollars of which \$62.6 billion is for the Department of Defense:

The request for DoD includes, among other things, \$7.1 billion for the round-trip cost of transporting our forces and equipment from their permanent bases to the theater of operation;

\$13.1 billion to provide warfighters in theater with fuel, supplies, repairs, parts, maintenance and other operational support;

\$15.6 billion for incremental personnel costs such as special pay and compensation for mobilized reserves;

\$7.2 billion to start reconstituting the forces by replacing the many cruise missiles and smart weapons and other key munitions that are being expended;

\$12 billion for stability operations, military operations to root out terrorist networks and deal with any remaining pockets of resistance, humanitarian assistance, and operations to search for and destroy weapons of mass destruction. We have teams of people that are prepared to go in, following the forces, to search out suspect sites as soon as the ground is occupied;

\$1.5 billion for coalition support in the global war on terror, including \$1.3 billion for reimbursement to Pakistan and other key cooperating countries assisting in that effort, and \$165 million for training of the Afghanistan National Army; and

\$6.1 billion for other requirements outlined in the request to support military operations in Iraq and the global war on terror.

Of the \$62.6 billion requested for DoD, some \$30.3 billion have already been spent or committed. By "committed," I mean that if you are flowing the forces over and you know you have to bring them back, that is committed. If the Iraqi regime had agreed to voluntarily disarm and prevent a war, the cost of sustaining our military pressure in support of diplomacy through the rest of this fiscal year would have been in excess of \$40 billion. So even without a war, the costs of disarming Iraq would have been significant.

OTHER SOURCES OF FUNDS

When it comes to reconstruction, before we turn to American taxpayers, we will turn first to the resources of the Iraqi Government and the International Community. That is why the President last week seized foreign Iraqi assets in the United States, so that they can be put to good use. The sources of funds are frozen assets of—Iraqi assets in the U.S. and other countries.

Second, the Oil for Food funds which run varying between \$10 and \$12 billion, of which currently some \$7 billion I am told are committed to contracts. On the other hand, those contracts were entered into by the regime of Saddam Hussein, and I suspect that a lot of those contracts ought not be honored and certainly there ought to be a very careful review of those contracts, which would free up some of that estimated \$7 billion and increase the amount of difference between contracts that are committed and good and the total amount of \$10 to \$12 billion.

INTERNATIONAL SUPPORT

In addition, an international coalition of countries will be participating; indeed, they already are. A number of countries have volunteered a variety of different things, including food and medical assistance and the like.

Once Saddam Hussein is gone, the U.S. will work with the Iraqi Interim Authority that will be established to tap Iraq's oil revenues, the funds Iraq is owed in the U.N., as I mentioned.

Reconstruction will require a significant international effort. The threat posed by this regime is a global threat. That is why some 49 nations today are publicly supporting the coalition against Iraq. There are another 11 countries, I am told, which are privately supporting it but prefer not to be mentioned publicly. There are a growing number of countries that are participating with military capabilities.

FINANCIAL FLEXIBILITY

In addition to needing a supplemental, we also need greater flexibility as to how we spend it. We need to be able to adjust to the constantly changing circumstances of the war. It is our hope that the period of intense combat will be short and that the coalition operations can shift from combat to restoring stability and civil order, supplying humanitarian assistance, and helping Iraq's people rebuild and assume functional and political authority over their country from the coalition.

That is our hope. But when it will happen is certainly not knowable.

We do not know when the period of intense combat will end. We do not yet know how much damage there will be to Iraq's infrastructure, although I should say the coalition forces are making efforts to keep that damage minimal while inflicting maximum damage to regime targets.

We do not know how the international efforts will unfold and the specifics of what other countries will be able to offer.

With all those unknowns, it is clear we need flexibility.

Just as the military plan General Franks has developed has flexibility built into it so that our forces can deal with the unexpected events of the battlefield, including weather, our budget plan must also have flexibility to deal with changing circumstances on the ground. That is why it is important that the funding requested for the Defense Emergency Response Fund, or DERF, be appropriated in that Fund, with its own transfer authority, so we will have the flexibility to respond to the inevitable changes on the ground.

It is also important that Congress approve the general provision that the President has requested in the supplemental, especially the request for increased general transfer authority. The President has requested a general transfer authority ceiling of 2.5 percent of the fiscal 2003 DoD budget. That figure we believe is reasonable and certainly supports our clear need for flexibility.

SUMMARY

\$74.7 billion is not the cost of the war. That figure is the best estimate of the money that the State Department, the CIA, the Department of Homeland Security, and the Department of Defense need to carry us from October 1, 2002 to the end of this fiscal year. Since we cannot know how long the effort in Iraq is going to last, we certainly cannot tell what it is going to cost. It is not knowable. What I do know is whatever it ends up costing will be small compared to the cost of lives and the threat of another attack like the one we experienced on September 11 or a weapons of mass destruction attack that could be far worse.

Our mission in the global war on terror is to do everything in our power to prevent a chemical, biological, or nuclear attack that would make September 11 seem modest by comparison; an attack where we could lose not 3,000 people, but 30,000 or 300,000.

Mr. Chairman, we need the funds. We need the flexibility as to how they are spent so we can adapt to unforeseen and unknowable circumstances that will unfold in the weeks and months ahead. We appreciate the strong support that you have shown for the President and this Committee has for men and women in uniform. They are doing a truly remarkable job and there is no question but that they will succeed in their mission.

[The statement of Secretary Rumsfeld follows:]

**TESTIMONY OF U.S. SECRETARY OF DEFENSE DONALD H. RUMSFELD
FY 2003 EMERGENCY SUPPLEMENTAL APPROPRIATIONS
HOUSE APPROPRIATIONS COMMITTEE – SUBCOMMITTEE ON DEFENSE
MARCH 27, 2003**

Mr. Chairman, members of the Committee, thank you for this opportunity to update you on our progress in the global war on terror, and to discuss the President's emergency supplemental request to fund worldwide operations in support of that war.

We are now less than a week into Operation Iraqi Freedom. The major ground war began last Thursday at 10 p.m., and the major air war started on Friday, the following day at 1 p.m. Eastern Time. So while the conflict is well begun, it has only begun—we are still closer to the beginning than the end.

Already, coalition forces have made good progress. The men and women in uniform—U.S. and coalition forces alike—are doing a superb job. They have engaged the enemy in demanding circumstances—enduring wind gusts in excess of 85 miles-an-hour, and sand storms so intense that they literally turn day into night, blacking out the sun. They face an adversary which has demonstrated its contempt for the laws of war—dressing its forces as liberated civilians; sending them out waving white flags, feigning surrender, in order to draw coalition forces into ambushes; using hospitals as a base from which to launch attacks and hiding behind human shields.

In spite of these challenges, what coalition forces have accomplished in less than a week is remarkable:

- Coalition aircrews have flown thousands of sorties, striking leadership and Republican guard targets day and night.
- Coalition ground forces have raced across more than 200 miles of Iraqi territory—through enemy fire and inhospitable terrain—to reach a point just south of Baghdad in less than a week. It is an impressive rate of advance.
- They have secured Iraq's southern oil fields, preventing an environmental disaster and the destruction of critical resources that the Iraqi people will need once Saddam Hussein has been removed.
- In the North, the coalition has launched devastating attacks on terrorist targets, is having success in disrupting terrorist operations, and has prevented an Iraqi advance on the Kurds.
- In the West, coalition forces have had good success securing the region and dealing with the regime's capability to threaten neighboring countries from that part of Iraq.

As the battle unfolds in Iraq, coalition forces are also engaged in operations elsewhere in the world in support of the global war on terror. Just a few weeks before the Iraq campaign began, the al-Qaeda network was dealt a serious blow with the capture of one of their most senior operatives—Khalid Sheik Mohammed. And last week, as Operation Iraqi Freedom got underway, coalition forces also launched a major assault on terrorists operating in the southern

mountains of Afghanistan—Operation Valiant Strike. Many other anti-terrorist efforts are underway throughout the world—efforts that are, of necessity, often unseen, but which are helping to protect our people from further acts of terror.

The point is this: all elements of national power are fighting the global war on terror on all fronts. The coalition is putting steady pressure on al-Qaeda, in Afghanistan and across the globe. And the Iraqi regime is discovering they made a serious miscalculation in rejecting 12 years of efforts to secure their peaceful disarmament.

The campaign could well grow more dangerous in the coming days and weeks, as the forces close in on Baghdad. But the outcome is assured. Saddam Hussein's regime will be removed. The only thing that remains unclear is precisely how long it will take.

We do know this much: these efforts cost money. The costs of military operations in Iraq, and the other missions currently underway in the global war on terror, cannot be absorbed without the emergency supplemental appropriation the President has requested.

Since the new fiscal year began, every month since October 2002—October, November, December, January, February and now March 2003—we have had to borrow from other programs to pay for the costs of the global war on terror.

That pattern cannot continue much longer. The Services have already gone through all of their discretionary spending for the 1st, 2nd and 3rd quarters of 2003—and will soon have exhausted 4th quarter discretionary funding.

If this continues, we will run out of discretionary funds by late spring/early summer—which could force us to curtail training, maintenance and other critical activities.

The President has submitted a supplemental request of \$74.7 billion. It includes \$62.6 billion for the Department of Defense to support military operations in Iraq and throughout the global war on terror. Our troops are depending on it—those engaged in battle, those preparing for battle, those stationed at critical outposts across the globe, and those deployed here in the United States defending the homeland.

The request for DoD includes, among other things:

- \$7.1 billion for the round-trip costs of transporting our forces and equipment to and from the theater of operations;
- \$13.1 billion to provide war fighters in theater with the fuel, supplies, repair parts, maintenance, and other operational support they need to prevail;
- \$15.6 billion for incremental personnel costs, such as for special pay and compensation for mobilized reservists;
- \$7.2 billion to start reconstituting our forces by replacing the cruise missiles, smart bombs, and other key munitions being expended in the course of the conflict.

- \$12 billion for stability operations, military operations to root out terrorist networks and deal with any remaining pockets of resistance, humanitarian assistance, and operations to search for and destroy Iraqi WMD.
- \$1.5 billion for coalition support in the global war on terror—including \$1.3 billion for reimbursement to Pakistan and other key cooperating nations assisting the effort in Afghanistan, and \$165 million for training of the Afghan National Army.
- And \$6.1 billion for other requirements outlined in the request to support military operations in Iraq and the global war on terror.

Of the \$62.6 billion the President has requested for DoD in this supplemental, \$30.3 billion are funds that have already been spent or committed—including the cost of flowing forces into the region to support the diplomatic efforts before Operation Iraqi Freedom began.

If the Iraqi regime had agreed to voluntarily disarm and prevent a war, the costs of sustaining that military pressure through the rest of the fiscal year would have been in excess of \$40 billion. So even without a war, the costs of disarming Iraq would have been significant.

The President has also requested funds in this supplemental for both an Iraq Relief and Reconstruction Fund, and a Natural Resources Risk Remediation Fund to help with emergency fire fighting and repair of damage to oil facilities. It is important that we have these resources available.

But let me be clear: when it comes to reconstruction, before we turn to the American taxpayers, we will turn first to the resources of the Iraqi government itself and the international community. That is why the President last week seized frozen Iraqi assets in the United States—so that they can be put to use to rebuild the country. Once Saddam Hussein is gone, the U.S. will work with the Iraqi Interim Authority that will be established to tap Iraq's oil revenues, the funds Iraq is owed in the UN's "oil for food" program, and other Iraqi resources to fund their reconstruction effort.

Reconstruction will require a significant international effort. The threat posed by Saddam Hussein's regime is a global threat—which is why some 47 nations have publicly associated themselves with the coalition in Iraq, and many more are helping privately. Already, a number of countries have indicated that they want to help with reconstruction and stability in a post-Saddam Iraq.

Mr. Chairman, in addition to needing this supplemental, we also need greater flexibility in how we spend it—so we can adjust to the constantly changing circumstances of the war.

It is our hope that the period of intense combat in Iraq will be as short as possible—and that the coalition operations can shift quickly from combat to restoring stability and civil order, supplying humanitarian assistance, and helping Iraq's people rebuild and assume functional and political authority from the coalition.

That is our hope. But when it will happen is not knowable.

- We do not know when the period of intense combat will end.
- We do not yet know how much damage there will be to Iraq's infrastructure—though the coalition forces are making efforts to keep that damage minimal while inflicting maximum damage to regime targets.
- We do not know how the international effort will unfold and the specifics of what each country is willing to offer.
- Moreover, France has announced it will veto any new Security Council resolution and block coalition efforts to give the UN an appropriate role in the post-Saddam reconstruction effort.
- That means we cannot know the extent to which the UN will be permitted to help the Iraqi people, what access the coalition will have to the UN's "oil-for-food" program funds, when economic sanctions might be lifted, and the answers to many other unknowns.

The point is that: with so many unknowns, we will need some flexibility. Just as the military plan General Franks developed has flexibility built into it so that our forces can deal with unexpected events on the battlefield, our budget plan must also have flexibility to deal with changing circumstances on the ground.

That is why it is important that the funding requested for the Defense Emergency Response Fund (DERF) be appropriated in that fund—with its own transfer authority—so we will have the flexibility to respond to the inevitable changes on the ground.

It is also important that Congress approve the general provisions the President has requested in the supplemental—especially the request for increased general transfer authority (GTA). The President has requested a General Transfer Authority ceiling of 2.5% of the FY 2003 DoD budget. That figure is reasonable. Increased flexibility is needed.

The President has requested a war supplemental of \$74.7 billion. That figure is not the cost of the war; that figure is the best estimate of the money that the State Department, the CIA, the Department of Homeland Security, and the Department of Defense need to carry us from October 1, 2002 through the end of this fiscal year.

We can't know how long the effort in Iraq is going to last—and we certainly can't tell what it is going to cost. It is not knowable.

What I do know is that, whatever it ends up costing, it will be small compared to the cost in lives and treasure of another attack like the one we experienced on September 11th—or a weapons of mass destruction attack that could be far worse.

The Milken Institute estimated that metropolitan areas throughout the U.S. sustained losses of about \$191 billion as a result of 9/11 and some 1.6 million jobs were lost as a result of the

attacks. And that's not to mention the cost in lives lost and the pain and the suffering of so many who lost husbands and wives, fathers and mothers, sons and daughters, sisters and brothers on that terrible day.

Our mission in the global war on terror is to do everything in our power to prevent a chemical, biological or nuclear attack that would make 9/11 seem modest by comparison—an attack where we could lose not 3,000 people, but 30,000 or 300,000, or more.

Yes, \$74.7 billion is a lot of money—but the cost of not investing that \$74.7 billion would be far greater.

Mr. Chairman, we need the funds—and we need flexibility in how they are spent, so we can adapt to unforeseen and unknowable circumstances that will unfold in the weeks and months ahead.

We will continue to brief the Congress regularly as events unfold on the ground, as these unknowns come into better focus. We appreciate the strong support you have shown for the President, and for the men and women in uniform. They are doing a remarkable job and I know that they will succeed in their mission.

I'd be happy to take your questions.

##

Mr. LEWIS. Excuse me, Mr. Secretary. I know that General Myers has to leave at 2:15, which is not very long from now, but I know he would like to at least hear what might happen to the supplemental by way of schedule, and we are privileged to have the Full Committee Chairman here, if he would, just a few moments to give us an idea what we will do with the supplemental.

REMARKS OF MR. YOUNG

Mr. YOUNG. Mr. Chairman, thank you very much. I think hopefully the Secretary and the Chief will appreciate our schedule. Actually the hearing that we are in now is the last hearing. We got this supplemental package on Monday morning. We have vetted it as thoroughly as we could between then and today. We have had four hearings today and we are prepared to circulate this bill tomorrow, with a plan to mark it up on Tuesday morning in the Full Committee. Should that happen successfully, we will then hopefully have it on the floor by Friday. I think Senator Stevens is moving on a very fast track as well, and he and I are trying to keep our bills as close together as we can, so that a conference will not be difficult and that we can have this on the President's desk very shortly.

We understand the importance of meeting wartime requirements. There have been suggestions, Mr. Chairman and Mr. Secretary, that maybe we could transfer some money from the defense part of this bill to do some other things, and I want to give my word that is not going to happen. We are not going to take any money out of the defense account to move it someplace else.

Secretary RUMSFELD. That is good news.

Mr. YOUNG. We hope to maintain this schedule. We understand the importance of it, and we want to congratulate you and all of the military services for the really good job you are doing many, many thousands of miles away from home. That is a long supply line and you are doing a tremendous job.

Secretary RUMSFELD. Thank you very much.

Mr. LEWIS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

General MYERS. That is really good news, Mr. Chairman. Thank you very much.

Mr. LEWIS. Welcome. And we know you are on a short string.

SUMMARY STATEMENT OF GENERAL MYERS

General MYERS. Thank you, and I will keep this statement brief.

Chairman Lewis and members of the Committee, Chairman Young, it is a pleasure to be here with you. I will not repeat what the Secretary said, but I want to take this opportunity to point out the dramatic successes that our servicemen and women have achieved this week in Iraq. They have executed our plan superbly and have exploited the flexibility inherent in that plan. Their performance is marvelous, and we are truly proud.

The environment, as we have seen on TV, is demanding; and our men and women are offering exceptional examples of the dedication, bravery, and professionalism of our entire joint forces. In the first 100 hours of the ground phase of Desert Storm, we moved a bit over 100 miles into Iraq. Yet as Secretary Rumsfeld mentioned,

coalition troops moved over 200 miles into Iraq during Operation Iraqi Freedom in the first 36 hours. That is about twice as far in less than half the time. I must also point out that our Special Operations teams throughout the country, in cooperation with U.S. Government agency assets and our coalition partners, have done an incredible and largely unrecognized job. Clearly, the unrecognized part is for operational security reasons.

FUNDING THE WAR ON TERRORISM

We are additionally engaged in a global war on terror in the Philippines, in Georgia, in Yemen, and the Horn of Africa, and we are still fighting remnants of al Qaeda and Taliban in Afghanistan. The global war on terror is in fact global in scope and in nature. All of our Nation's soldiers, sailors, airmen, marines and Coast Guardsmen, as well as our Department of Defense civilians and coalition partners, have performed exceptionally well.

But this effort, protecting America in our new and challenging strategic environment, has generated significant costs. American and British people have born the tragic price of casualties in battle, and we grieve with the families of these heroes. We will not forget them or their sacrifice, and they are a reminder of the best our country and Britain have to offer.

There is no doubt that we will succeed in disarming Iraq. We will remove their weapons of mass destruction. We will remove their thugish leader and we will lift the people of Iraq from under the boot of their oppressor. We must recognize, though it pales in personal importance, that we have borne steep monetary expenditures fighting the war on terror and prosecuting the campaign in Iraq. As we meet here today, our Nation's military forces are in need of prompt and full passage of the President's supplemental request. And I appreciate the comments, Chairman Young and Chairman Lewis, that you just made in that regard.

NEED FOR SUPPLEMENTAL APPROPRIATIONS

The Department cannot absorb the more than \$62 billion in incremental costs the war on terror has demanded. In fact, as the Secretary said, the four military services will soon exhaust borrowing from their fourth quarter operations and maintenance and personnel accounts. Without prompt passage of the supplemental appropriations, most of the services' funds in those accounts will run out. Prompt action is needed to sustain our troops in the field, and it is as important to ensure that those in training here at home have the best possible support to accomplish their vital task of providing for the common defense today and tomorrow.

If the full request is not appropriated, shortfalls will cause a severe curtailment of training, maintenance, and other funding from later in the fiscal year. This would undoubtedly reduce the readiness and morale of our hardworking and hard-fighting men and women. It would reduce the Defense Department's efforts to fight the global war on terrorism. Indeed, prompt funding will further demonstrate to our men and women that they have the full and unwavering support of the people of the United States.

While we have troops in combat, the importance of our support from home cannot be overstated. It is up to us to show them that

our words are reflected in our actions. Furthermore, given the challenging dynamic in the war on terror at this time, flexibility of execution is almost as important as flexibility on the battlefield. And this flexibility in execution will enable the Department to rapidly meet unforeseeable, unknowable requirements to achieve the greatest payoff.

Members of the Committee, Secretary Rumsfeld has outlined our expenses by operational phases and other funds and provisions. These are our best projections of our expenses in defeating the Iraq regime and winning the global war on terrorism. We really appreciate your support. It is essential to our success in protecting America and winning this war on terror. Thank you.

Mr. LEWIS. Thank you, General Myers.

Mr. Secretary, we have acknowledged the presence of Dr. Wolfowitz and Dr. Zakheim. It is great to have them here, as they have responded before. I think we will proceed with questions. In the meantime, General Myers, it strikes me that maybe we ought to get you on the road, and I certainly do not want you to miss that next appointment.

General MYERS. I am looking forward to it myself, sir. Thank you, Chairman Lewis, and thank you for the opportunity to be here in front of the Committee.

Mr. LEWIS. Thank you.

Mr. Secretary, it strikes me that perhaps we might invite to the panel Lieutenant General Jim Cartwright who might help with some of the questions that might be asked.

Secretary RUMSFELD. That is fine.

Mr. LEWIS. Lieutenant General Cartwright is the J8 on the Joint Staff, and if we get into some technical monetary details beyond what these guys are dealing with, it could be helpful.

By way of beginning the questioning, it is kind of my pattern to not begin with questions myself, but rather pass off to members, and if there is time available to me we will get to that. So let me suggest that we will stay as close as we can to the 5-minute rule, but I would like to start by calling on my colleague from Pennsylvania, Mr. Murtha.

ADEQUATE SUPPLEMENTAL FUNDING

Mr. MURTHA. Mr. Secretary, how many more troops we are going to need that will make an impact on the budget. For instance, I have been concerned there is not enough money in the supplemental for the military side of it. And if we are going to need more troops, obviously to transport them over we will need more money.

Secretary RUMSFELD. The plan that General Franks has developed has been in place and the troop flow determined for many, many weeks. It is constrained. It is all funded in this budget. And forces are increasing, the number of forces are increasing in Iraq every day. They seem to go up by 1,500 to 2,500 almost every day. They went up somewhat more than that yesterday with the arrival of the 173rd Airborne Brigade in the North. But the plan includes funds for those forces that are part of the plan that was developed by General Franks.

Mr. MURTHA. So the short answer is you are not going to put any additional troops in, and you will not need any additional money.

Secretary RUMSFELD. The answer is that there are additional troops going in continuously and they are flowing in in a steady flow every day. The number of troops in Iraq is increasing, number one.

Number two, a plan is a plan. It is possible that at some point General Franks could draw a conclusion that he wanted to change the plan in one way or another, up or down. He may decide he does not need the force.

Mr. MURTHA. Mr. Secretary, all I am asking is do you need more money? I understand the flexibility of a commander, but do you have enough money in this budget to take care of the contingencies that you may face?

Secretary RUMSFELD. The budget was designed and planned to take care of the force flows that are incorporated in General Franks's plan. Is it conceivable there could be a contingency down the road between now and the end? Sure. But nothing we could foresee when this was put together.

Mr. MURTHA. And the last time the coalition came up with \$60 billion. The most I have heard was a few billion. Dr. Zakheim pointed out a few things in a closed hearing the other day. When you talk about that \$10 to \$12 billion, does that not have to go through the U.N., and will that not be a problem? Did you anticipate being able to actually use that for anything except rehabilitation?

Secretary RUMSFELD. The money belongs to the Iraqis, the \$10 to \$12 billion that I am told that is in the Oil for Food account, of which some \$7 billion are for committed contracts. That belongs to the Iraqis. The only thing the U.N. can or will do is decide what mechanism do they want to have to make the decisions as to how those funds are used.

CONTRIBUTIONS FROM OTHER COUNTRIES

Mr. MURTHA. But what I am asking you, you will not be able to use that for military purposes. I am trying to think if there is any reimbursement we will get for our military expenditures.

Secretary RUMSFELD. Oh, no. I doubt that you will get reimbursements from Iraqi funds for that activity. We are getting contributions from other countries. You will recall last time in 1991, the bulk of the funds came from Kuwait, Japan. Three countries I think supplied an overwhelming fraction.

FLEXIBILITY AND ACCOUNTABILITY

Mr. MURTHA. Japan, Kuwait and Saudi, I think it was \$40 billion they provided.

The only other thing we talked at great length about is flexibility, and we have accountability responsibilities. We always argue about that, so we understand your position and we know our position.

Secretary RUMSFELD. Well, Congressman, let me make sure that you fully understand our position; because I, as a former Congressman, certainly understand your responsibilities. But the reality is that it is not possible to know the kind of things that are going to be required. And you cannot wait 3, 4, or 5 months to get authority to do something.

For example, in Afghanistan, we were not able to pay anything to begin the development of an Afghan National Army. It took months before we got a dime for that. You know that is unhelpful. It is much better to be funding that army than to be funding our people. We owed the Pakistan Government something like \$450 million for months. How long, Dov, 6 months?

Mr. ZAKHEIM. More than that, sir. About 8 months.

Secretary RUMSFELD. About 8 months. They were supplying gas, apron space, assistance of all kinds, while this war in Afghanistan was going on, and we did not have any authority to pay them a nickel. That is not right. We need some flexibility to be able to do that kind of thing.

Mr. MURTHA. Mr. Secretary, now just think how short a time we will have on the supplemental which is substantially larger, and we are talking about a \$70 billion supplemental which will be passed in 10 days from here, and maybe the Senate in another 10 days, so we will have it hopefully before we go home, in plenty of time to pay the bills.

Secretary RUMSFELD. That is a good thing. We appreciate it. We hope that happens. The reality is that when we come up for re-programming, sometimes it takes weeks and weeks and weeks to do that. You know that. We have to go to a number of committees. It is not your fault, but the reality is the way the rules and the understandings are, we have gone months and months and months without being able to do things that are very much in the national interest.

Mr. LEWIS. Mr. Secretary, let me interpose. We had a rather thorough discussion on this matter in a closed session yesterday. We reviewed with care that which was the congressional process during Desert Storm. The Committee then expressed, and they did yesterday, their concern about not setting precedent here that becomes the way of doing business in a common way at the Department; in the meantime, fully realize and support not just the funding but the flexibility that you are going to need to carry forward this war. We just do not want to have people to presume that that means from this point forward there will be no effective oversight as well as control. And I think that is what you are suggesting, and that will be the intention of the Committee.

Secretary RUMSFELD. Absolutely.

Mr. LEWIS. And I really think we need to get to the heart of some of your challenges immediately, and we will get the money there as quickly as we can. In the meantime, I would not want the whole session to swirl around this particular point.

Mr. Young.

Mr. YOUNG. Mr. Chairman, thank you.

Mr. Secretary, one of the issues that we will hear a lot of debate about is the flexibility. And the other night at the meeting with the President, I asked the Director of the OMB would he explain his term, which was "unusual flexibility." he did not explain it all that well. But anyway, I think we know what it means and I have no problem with that, by the way. I agree with you. You have got to have the flexibility to do what you have to do when you have to do it. But if we do not have a problem with the flexibility, can we

get you to agree that you will not have any problem with accountability?

Secretary RUMSFELD. Absolutely. You ought to hold us accountable for the things—the decisions we make, and we have an obligation to notify you of what we are doing. You need to have good visibility into it, and I do not disagree with that at all.

Mr YOUNG. I really appreciate that.

Mr. Obey and I were very successful in moving a \$40 billion supplemental following September 11, 2001. In fact, we had it out of here, through both houses on the 14th of September and we did that by working together. And we included a lot of flexibility in that and accountability. The trouble is, there are still a lot of questions we have asked about that fund that we have never gotten answers to. But I know that working directly with your Department, you have always been willing to let us know, let us do what our job is under the Constitution.

Secretary RUMSFELD. I do not think you still have questions about the defense portion of that fund, do you?

Mr. YOUNG. I am not sure.

Secretary RUMSFELD. I hope not. I know there are some questions about the nondefense portions of the fund.

END STRENGTH OF THE MILITARY SERVICES

Mr. YOUNG. Basically the nondefense portions, exactly. Because you know that we dealt with a lot of defense issues in a later supplemental which worked out okay. And the problem has never been with your Department. OMB is not always the most forthcoming with answers to questions.

Now, I want to ask a policy issue. For a number of years most of us on this Committee objected to the reduction in end strength of our military services, and I know we have all heard Congressman Hunter's speech on the number of divisions we had in the Army in Desert Storm and how many we have left today; the number of surface combatant ships; the number of Marines. We held the end strength better on the Marines than we did the other services, but the Marines being a smaller unit, I understand that almost all of the Marine Corps is in over the region right now.

Is it time to start talking about increasing end strength?

Secretary RUMSFELD. I do not think so, Mr. Chairman. We still have a lot of people in uniform who are doing tasks that are not military tasks. We still have not gotten the full flexibility we believe we would benefit from by being able to go out and hire contractors to do things that are not core competencies of the Department of Defense. And third, I would say that I feel it is important that we continue to have pressure for the Department of Defense to end activities when they ought to be ended. I am putting a lot of pressure on bringing folks home from the Sinai who have been there for 22 years.

We are looking at our force deployments around the world right now. General Ralston, when he was CINC, did a good job of bringing down the NATO forces in Bosnia and Kosovo. Those numbers have been coming down. And I think that at the moment, while you are right, there is a lot going on in the world and we have had to activate a lot of Reserves. In my view, I think that the pressure

to run this place better, the Department better, and make better use of people in uniform than we have been doing in the past is a good thing, not a bad thing. And if at any point we think we need more, we will sure come up and say so.

Mr. YOUNG. I cannot disagree with that, by the way. I think you are exactly right.

Mr. Chairman, thank you very much for the time, and I hope you know we are here in partnership with you to protect our American soldiers who are fighting the war, to provide them with an improved quality of life every chance that we get, to provide them with whatever they need to accomplish their mission and protect themselves while they are doing it. And I think you all are doing a really good job here.

Secretary RUMSFELD. Thank you very much, sir.

Mr. LEWIS. Thank you, Chairman Young.

Mr. Obey.

LEGISLATIVE AUTHORITIES REQUESTED

Mr. OBEY. Mr. Secretary, let me say certainly that there is not a Member of the Congress who is not going to vote to provide whatever money is necessary to bring this war to a completion. I think everybody understands that. In that sense this vote will be a non-event. But I have got a problem because I have been in Congress since the same month that you left it, and so I remember things.

Secretary RUMSFELD. That is a long time.

Mr. OBEY. Yes. But one of the virtues of that service is that I remember things, and some of them are even useful. And I just want to express to you my disquiet about the various authorities that the administration has asked for. If you run down the kind of authorities that you would like, in addition to putting \$59 billion into a very broadly defined account, the administration requests authority to use DoD funds for undetermined military construction projects anywhere in the world. As I read that, that could have been used in the old days to fund that airstrip that was used by the Contras, for instance.

You are requesting \$150 million for indigenous forces to fight the war on terrorism anywhere in the world without Congress receiving quarterly reports, or with the Congress receiving quarterly reports after the fact. In the foreign operations section, the emergency fund for complex foreign crises could go to any country, in any amount, for any purpose, notwithstanding any provision of law. At least that is what we are told.

The administration is asking for authority to borrow unlimited amounts from any account in the bill, including DoD accounts or any prior foreign operations bill, in any amounts, for reconstruction and relief of Iraq, notwithstanding any other provision of law.

And then authority is requested to transfer up to \$200 million between accounts in the foreign operations section without notice as many times as the administration wishes.

And to make a long story short, the way I read that is that the administration would have, through the mixing of authorities, they would have authority and resources to put U.S. resources and U.S. troops, for that matter, into almost any country in the world, at any time, in any capacity, with the national security interests of

the United States therefore being defined almost solely by the President. That is a considerable reach.

Now you might say well, nothing that you are worried about is going to happen. But the Chairman has referred to accountability. And I recall that after September 11 when we provided three etss of funds to the administration, that we provided one \$20 billion amount to the administration with the provision they could spend it any way they wanted, provided that they contacted the Committee ahead of time and consulted with us about how they intended to spend the money.

As I recall, the net consultation that we got was an e-mail after the fact telling us how they had spent the \$20 billion. Now, given that track record—

Secretary RUMSFELD. I do not think that is true of the Defense Department portion.

Mr. OBEY. Well, most of it was not in defense.

Secretary RUMSFELD. I understand.

Mr. OBEY. Whether it is defense, whether it is TSA, or whether it is State, or you name it, when Congress says spend \$20 billion and but talk to us ahead of time, and then we are told afterwards, oh, by the way, boys and girls, here is what we did, you can understand why we are not interesting in playing kissy-face with these authorities.

Every Member wants to provide you—certainly we are willing to look at providing some additional flexibility if that is needed. But flexibility is one thing, and being able to turn the Constitution into a pretzel is another thing. And frankly I have not yet ever met a President of either party who thought that Article I of the Constitution was a mistake.

Secretary RUMSFELD. Mr. Congressman, let me make a couple of comments. First, I agree with Chairman Young that the Congress has that obligation, and that to the extent that any flexibility is provided, the individuals given flexibility need to be held accountable and they need to report to the Congress and they need to notify the Congress, and the Congress needs to understand the logic of what they are doing in close proximity to the time it is done.

Now, in this case, some 50 percent, close to 50 percent of the requests for the Department of Defense, is either already spent or committed. That seems to me to reduce the concern that one ought to have.

Let me give you an example of a situation, and I do not want to pick on any one country, but it is an interesting example. We had the 4th Infantry Division in the Mediterranean, hoping to bring it in through Turkey and put it in the North. And it would have come in by boat and rail across Turkey into northern Iraq. We waited and we waited and we waited. It did not happen. It was not approved by the Turkish Parliament, ultimately.

There is an airfield in northern Iraq, I think it is called Bashir. And you mentioned military construction. So at the last minute what are we doing, we are flying aircraft in there, and engineers and construction people, trying to fix that airport so that we can bring, like we just did from the north, we brought in the 173rd, and they came in yesterday and they will be coming in over a period of time. There was not time to come and go through a process

of weeks or months to be able to get the military construction approval to fix that airport, so that in fact we would have the kind of forces in the north that will be of concern to Saddam Hussein and his crowd, that will be there to see that what takes place there does not in any way run the risk of having that country fracture, and it is an important thing that had to be done and it had to be done in real time.

It is one thing that seems to me to say to somebody, look, you are starting here and you are going to go there, but we are not going to tell you how to turn every corner and when to slow down and whether or not there will be an accident at the next corner and whether the weather will be bad. Those things are not knowable. So I think a degree of flexibility is realistic and understandable, notwithstanding the importance of Article I of the Constitution.

Mr. OBEY. Mr. Secretary, I think what has just happened here is, I have given a good illustration of how it should not happen, and you have given a good illustration of how perhaps you might need to have something happen. There ought to be some territory in between that we can both agree on so we do not wind up running into either your problems or ours. I would suggest, for instance, that moving from \$2 billion to \$9 billion in one account, that could build a lot of airfields.

Secretary RUMSFELD. I kind of like Chairman Young's idea of accountability.

Mr. OBEY. So do we. I wish we had seen it last time. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. LEWIS. Thank you very much, Mr. Obey. Mr. Hobson.

GUARD AND RESERVE FORCE STRUCTURE

Mr. HOBSON. Gentlemen, you are doing a great job. We always have our things that we have to look at. I am concerned, and I will talk to Dov about it later, about some money that was spent over the last year that I used to be chairman of Military Construction and I never heard about it until it was done. But I do not want to talk about that today.

On forces, I do think, sir, that you need—it would be prudent, and you may be already doing this, to look at the kind of MOSs and AFSCs that you have in the Guard and Reserve, as there may be some balance that needs to be shifted around when a large part of the military police were put into those some years ago, and now those people are being called-up and recalled, and we just need to look at that to make sure you have the right career fields in the right places.

Secretary RUMSFELD. You are exactly right. We have got to fix it. Those Guard and Reserve who are in skills that do not exist on active duty get called up over and over and over again and for longer and longer periods, and we have got to fix it. We have got to see that we have got on active duty all the skills we are likely to be needing, and that we use the Guard and Reserve as the total force concept as support in peak periods rather than on a relatively steady basis.

BUY AMERICA LEGISLATION

Mr. HOBSON. The other thing I would like to talk about a little bit is some of us have a concern the Defense Department is currently buying—I do not want to name countries here—but brakes from a company that I have asked about that is going on our airplanes, and they do not buy any airplanes from us. There is a sealant going on the building that you all occupy that is not being made in this country, when there is a competitive, cheaper product being made in this country.

And I am concerned that we do not use taxpayers' dollars to reward, either here or in Iraq, those people who have made this job much more difficult to do and probably more expensive to do than it needed to be. And I hope you all would, Mr. Secretary, take a look at those things and try to do what you can. I know someone will come from the State Department, but I think from this Member's standpoint, I think it is terrible to take taxpayers' dollars for those types of things.

Secretary RUMSFELD. Well, I do not know quite what I would say. There are so many ways that things get acquired through defense funds. In some cases you delegate the responsibility to a contractor, and he has subcontractors, and they make judgments that occur down the line. And I do not know of any way that, for example, every aspect of every contract could be looked at to see those kinds of things, other than by the contractors.

Mr. HOBSON. Then you will see some of us putting more "Buy American" language into the bill, which I do not like to do because it does tie your hands. But if these things are not being looked at to where we have cheaper products here that can be used as the same product, then we are going to have to take oversight into our hands, and we will tie it up and say you have to come back for approval. And I do not want to do that. And I do not want to argue with you about it now but it is something that affects the people that I represent; and I do not like to see it happen.

Secretary RUMSFELD. Dov seems to know something about this.

Mr. ZAKHEIM. Yes, I am familiar with the country you are referring to, and here is the problem—without getting into that specific country. It is one thing to say there may be a cheaper alternative in the United States, and those are things we do look out for all the time. When you are dealing with some of the countries that have been more than a little awkward over the past few weeks and quite troublesome, one has to look at the entire context. And that particular country, for instance, has been exceedingly helpful in Afghanistan. And so we have to balance to some extent what people do for us in one context as opposed to what they might not be doing for us with another, and we do not want to throw the baby out with the bath water.

So I would similarly urge some caution, which is a very different issue from where we know that we may have something cheaper at home, in which case we really need to be looking into it; as the Secretary said.

Mr. LEWIS. Thank you, Mr. Hobson.

Mr. Dicks.

AIR SUPERIORITY

Mr. DICKS. Thank you, Mr. Secretary. I want to congratulate you on the job that is being done. I think all these situations are always very difficult. And one thing that I have noted in 1990, 1991, especially during the 1991 phase of the war, was that the use of air power was very, very effective against the Iraqi forces. And I know that you have got a plan and the plan is proceeding. It just seems to me that taking the time to make sure we have used the advantage, the incredible advantage we have in air power, I think was an example of that yesterday when these forces were moving south out of Baghdad and they brought in the B-52s and gave tremendous support to the people on the ground.

As I recall it, many of the divisions in Kuwait were attrited below 50 percent military capability and made the actual ground war much easier. I know you are taking these things into account. I just mention that because I know there is a tendency to want to rush and push and get it done fast, but sometimes you have to do it the right way, and I know you are going to do it the right way.

Secretary RUMSFELD. Thank you. There is no question but that the coalition forces have overwhelming air superiority and air dominance in, must be, 80, 90 percent of the country. And that is a wonderful advantage and the right thing to do and we are using it.

INCREASE IN GENERAL TRANSFER AUTHORITY

Mr. DICKS. Let me ask you, on the increase in transfer authority, Dr. Zakheim, that is going to go from \$2 billion to \$9 billion?

Mr. ZAKHEIM. We are talking about 2½ percent of the fiscal year 2003 numbers, so you are approximately correct, yes.

Mr. DICKS. Would you rather have it just appropriated? Would it be better just to give you the money rather than to take items away from the fiscal year 2003 budget? I mean, every nickel we have for defense it seems we should protect. And why not just give you the \$7 billion and then you can put it in your fund and then you would have it?

Mr. ZAKHEIM. That presupposes that we are actually going to use all of that authority, and that is something we do not know until we actually look at how we have expensed what we have.

The whole point about the flexibility that the Secretary mentioned is that very often we find ourselves with overages and underages. For instance, sometimes it is a matter of spiraling fuel costs, where clearly we just cannot predict what our costs will be. For that we need to be able to move funds around. It is not a matter of simply adding more money. We cannot even anticipate that. So when we ask for that kind of authority—and remember, we still would be coming back to you, of course, and we would have to have four Committees agreeing to this—it is not a matter of your losing any control over what we are doing. It is just the matter of having the ability to move funds.

This Committee was extremely generous with us and gave us an additional half billion dollars for moving monies around for fuel, and our current supplemental request has another \$400 million be-

cause fuel prices are going up. So it is the flexibility we are talking about.

Mr. DICKS. Let me ask you this. What is the rationale for requesting the amount needed for sunk costs in the transfer account? Why do we just not pay the bill?

Mr. ZAKHEIM. The answer is simple. We know that those costs are sunk. What we have not received are all the details regarding which particular account. For instance, that is a function, as the Secretary said, of when the commander in Central Command is moving people back and forth. We know who we are sending out, we know we will have to bring them home, so we know what the aggregate cost will be. But are we bringing more Marines home, or more Army home or more Navy home. Are they Active or Reserve? That we do not know yet, so we need the flexibility. We do not want to put money in, for example, to bring Navy folks home, when it turns out it is the Army folks we need to bring home. That just causes reprogramming issues. We have to come back to four committees and address everything else that the Secretary pointed out.

Mr. DICKS. So out of the \$33 billion, you do not know how any of it was spent?

Mr. ZAKHEIM. No, no, no, we have a sense.

Mr. DICKS. There ought to be some bills that have accrued. If you spent the \$33 billion, should not some of those bills be there that you could just pay?

Mr. ZAKHEIM. Remember the Secretary said committed; we are committed. We know that we will have a commitment of \$30.3 billion. Of the actual expenses, I do not believe we have much yet in hand, although the estimates we are giving you are obviously far more accurate than an estimate of the rest of the amount, which still depends on the fortunes of war.

Secretary RUMSFELD. The answer to your question has to be yes, that there are some things that are known. For example, we know that people have been mobilized and what we are paying them, and we know which service they are in. So there is a small portion of the total that is knowable today. But Dov's point is particularly valid, that you do not know what the combatant commander is going to want to move here or there, or demobilize, or when.

Mr. LEWIS. Mr. Dicks, as you know, the Secretary has to leave.

Mr. DICKS. Of course. I am done, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. LEWIS. By way of making a point as I pass the gavel on one more time, this is a supplemental for the fiscal year 2003 appropriations process, so there is a time certain here that this is controlled by—the flexibility involves the balance of this fiscal year at the max, and between now and then the 2004 will be ahead of us. So there will be plenty of time for accountability as well as our responsibilities.

Mr. Bonilla.

COALITION SUPPORT

Mr. BONILLA. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. Secretary, as a former House Member, you know that we all hear directly from our people every day about whatever the current events are. Obviously this war is the biggest event going on now. All of you should know clearly that the people are not just sup-

porting you out there, they are cheering for you. They are very proud of what you all have accomplished thus far, and are anticipating a resounding victory before too long. So they see through sometimes the smokescreens and the talking heads on TV, and the people realize that a handful of kooks in the big cities on each coast that are stopping traffic for whatever reasons are not indicative of what the overwhelming majority of Americans are feeling out there. So I hope you all know that and hear that on a regular basis, because it is true and it is happening.

My only question, Mr. Secretary, relates to what the responsibility is of some of our "allies" in what they are doing to help pay for some of these military costs. Everything from sharing the cost of the current war to supplementing the Defense Emergency Response Fund involving the Global War on Terrorism. I mean, obviously, we are the greatest Nation on Earth, and the richest, and we have got to help pay these bills for fighting terrorism all over the world. But my goodness, do you see any light at the end of the tunnel for some of these countries to belly up to the bar and help pay some of these bills to not just protect us but to protect themselves?

Secretary RUMSFELD. We do. We have a large and growing coalition of countries. They are supplying ships, they are supplying aircraft, they are supplying medical units. They are doing things, and we are deeply appreciative to all of those countries. It is a sizable group, and I know that Dr. Zakheim can provide some specific details if it would be helpful.

I must say I agree with you completely. The American people have a very good center of gravity and an inner gyroscope that balances them. And despite the overwhelming volume of information about what is going on in Iraq and these slices of drama, they get it in my view. They understand it. And they can understand what we are doing is important and that it is important that those weapons of mass destruction be dealt with and that that regime be replaced, and they have got the patience and the understanding to support what is going on. And I thank you for that.

Mr. BONILLA. Yes, sir. Again, just to reiterate the concerns that I think some of us have for some of our allies pulling their weight out there in terms of paying some of these bills. I know, as you said, a lot of them are doing a lot, but in the view of many of us they are they are not doing enough because we are putting our people out there. Now we are putting our money out there. We are glad to do it, but it is amazing how some of the folks around the world do not see the light.

Secretary RUMSFELD. There are 52,000 coalition forces in Iraq, and that is a lot. And there are Special Operations forces. There are ships that are at sea that are supporting maritime interdiction and doing mineclearing. There is a British ship, the Sir Galahad, that is bringing food and humanitarian supplies into that port in the south part. There is a lot happening.

Mr. BONILLA. Thank you very much. Keep up the good work, all of you.

Secretary RUMSFELD. Thank you very much.

Mr. LEWIS. Thank you very much, Mr. Bonilla. We have a number of members that have been here for quite a while. I would call next on Mr. Nethercutt.

RECONSTRUCTION EFFORTS IN IRAQ

Mr. NETHERCUTT. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. Thank you, gentlemen, for being here. I echo the same sentiments of the other members who are complimentary of you and the efforts of your team.

I want to ask you specifically about the issue of the post-Saddam period as it relates to the Department of Defense and the reconstruction efforts that may be undertaken. I know there is some reference in your testimony, Secretary, about reconstruction efforts, and in Dr. Zakheim's testimony yesterday in our Committee about reconstruction efforts.

I know there is a growing sentiment in the Congress, I would argue, in favor of the coalition partners and against those who have not become willing participants in the allied effort. And I am wondering to what extent, assuming that there could be language drafted that would be appropriate, recognizing the Afghanistan conflict and others that by which there is a history of participation by other countries, would you be willing to support the concept of giving preferential treatment for contracting for reconstruction efforts that might be undertaken, that will be undertaken for those coalition supporters, allied supporters, rather than those who express sentiments against this effort in Iraq.

Secretary RUMSFELD. Well, clearly one's natural human feeling would be to prefer to deal with people who are helpful and constructive as opposed to people who are not. On the other hand, the goal is not for the United States to make those kinds of decisions. The goal is for the Iraqi people to make those kinds of decisions, and for the United States to stay there as long and be helpful for as long as we have to, but not a day longer, and to see that there is an Interim Iraqi Authority that grows up, and that they get their sea legs and develop a government that is representative and respectful of the rights of all the people in the country. And it is for them to make those kinds of decisions, one would think.

Mr. NETHERCUTT. I understand that and I appreciate that, but my sense is also that the Department of Defense will have a role to play in letting contracts, who are making judgments about reconstruction work under the jurisdiction of the Department. That is perhaps more what I am speaking of. And I am wondering to what extent you would be comfortable with the concept of making sure, not that we necessarily Buy America, but we buy allies, so to speak.

Secretary RUMSFELD. I guess I do not know that I am in a position to answer the question. The Department of State does an awful lot of the contracting for things like that, AID and the others, and I am not sufficiently knowledgeable that I could answer.

Mr. NETHERCUTT. And I appreciate that. I suspect there may be an effort undertaken along these lines that may be even more acute or restrictive than that which I am speaking of, so perhaps we can talk with your office and at least get your advice.

Secretary RUMSFELD. Thank you, Mr. Congressman.

Mr. LEWIS. Thank you Mr. Nethercutt.
Thank you, Mr. Moran, for being patient.

GUARD AND RESERVE BENEFITS

Mr. MORAN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. Secretary, Mr. Wolfowitz, Mr. Zakheim, nice to see you. Thank you for your leadership.

I have a number of questions. The first one I wanted to ask you about is something that a number of us are experiencing among our constituencies. I think it is a concern that is going to grow. There are over 200,000 National Guard and Army Reserve members now on active duty. It is almost up to 220,000. Those folks get paid, on average, substantially less than they were getting in the jobs that they were regularly employed at, particularly when you are looking for the kind of skilled people that the Secretary referenced. Those are the kinds of folks that we particularly need, and they continually get called up. In their private sector jobs they oftentimes make more money.

But not only do they get a pay cut, they lose their health insurance. Employers do not maintain their health insurance. And most of them have families. In fact, 40 percent of the young members of the Guard and Reserve have no health insurance coverage for their families when they go to war.

Mr. MORAN. There are a number of bills that have been offered here, but I think it would be better for the administration to take the initiative. Have you given some thought to this situation, particularly at that the war has prolonged and these folks lined up in situations that really jeopardized the health and safety of their families?

Secretary RUMSFELD. Yes. First let me correct something. If I indicated that the 52,000 coalition forces were in Iraq, I misspoke. They are in theatre. They are in—they may be in Kuwait or aboard right nearby, and I don't want to leave a misunderstanding.

The members of the Guard and Reserve are volunteers. They are people who made a conscious decision that that is something they want to do, and what we have to do is manage their pay, their health care, the frequency with which they are called up, in a way that we are able to continue to attract and retain the number of people we need. And I worry a little bit about isolating out a single aspect of compensation or circumstance for the Guard and Reserve, just as I do for active service. It is the totality of their circumstance that determines the extent to which we are or are not successful in retracting and retaining them. And that mix is something that needs to be looked at together as opposed to pulling one piece out and worrying about it.

IRAQ OIL FIELDS

Mr. MORAN. I am not going to argue with you, Mr. Secretary, except that you know better than I that the media is going to start focusing on some of these families. Invariably one of them is going to have a serious health problem and have no health insurance coverage since they lost it when they went into the Guard or Reserve. You know, we have got a transformation going on here increasing

reliance on the Guard and Reserve, and I think it jeopardizes that transformation if we don't attend to that.

So I am just raising it. Think about it. I know you have.

Some of this money is going to be used to repair some of the oil—the drilling rigs, et cetera, in Iraq, I understand. Is that not correct?

Secretary RUMSFELD. There is some funds in here for that.

Mr. MORAN. If we do that, the United Nations takes those over, why wouldn't the United Nations be repairing it if they are—let me put it this way: Why would the American taxpayer pay what is probably going to be first-class investment in bringing these oil wells up to a better condition than they have ever been, only to turn them over to the United Nations?

The other thing related to that is that you have got a stash request in here for additional fuel costs, \$430 million. It seems to me that some of Iraq's neighbors who are drowning in oil might be able—that might be one thing they could contribute in kind. Have there been offers of in-kind contributions? You have set up a fund I know, the Defense Cooperation Fund, to get much and in-kind contributions from donor nations. Have any of those oil-rich countries in the Middle East that we are allegedly helping out with this investment of personnel and money, many of them suggested, well, let us at least pick up your fuel cost?

Secretary RUMSFELD. First, let me say that I haven't heard any-one talk about turning oil wells over to the United Nations.

Mr. MORAN. So you intend to hold on to them?

Secretary RUMSFELD. Could I just respond? The work that the United States is contracted to do is to put out the fires, and that is a military activity. And that is what is happening. The extent to which the Iraqi oil fields, which are rich, are improved so that they can get increased liftings, one would think would be paid for by Iraqi money. That is the oil wells that belong to the Iraqi people and the revenues from those wells belong to the Iraqi people.

Second, with respect to fuel costs, the answer is yes. A number of nations in the neighborhood and elsewhere have been providing fuel for a variety of different purposes, ours and coalition forces. And a number of countries have been providing force protection so that we didn't have to activate additional reserves and provide force protection. There are a lot of nations there are helping. I don't know what the number is today, but I think it went up by 2 yesterday, and it is something like 65 countries are supporting this activity.

Mr. MORAN. Well, I hope that is the case, but you are asking us to provide \$430 million for fuel costs. That is what raised the question. And you are asking for many millions of dollars for these oil wells, and I just want to make sure if we make a substantial investment, we don't turn them over to the United Nations.

Secretary RUMSFELD. I have not heard anyone suggest that.

AMMUNITION REQUIREMENTS

Mr. MORAN. All right. Last question. You have got a request in for \$3.2 billion for anticipated future ammunition requirements. What period of time did you take into account in determining the

ammunition requirements for future operations? How did you figure that, Mr. Secretary?

Secretary RUMSFELD. There were multiple variables that went into the calculations. Because it is not knowable as to how long the kinetics will last and what particular munitions would be used, it is a function of the war plan and what happens and what the weather is. For example, we used very little in the last couple of days because of the weather, and we are undoubtedly going to be using a lot more over the next 3 or 4 days, because the weather is going to be good. But what they do is they go through and make a series of ranges on things and then come to some conclusions. And it is an estimate. It is not precise. Let there be no doubt. This is not the cost of the war. This is the best estimate people can come up with as to what has been spent, what has been committed, and what we think might be reasonable just for the rest of the fiscal year, which is only about 6 more months.

Mr. LEWIS. Thank you, Mr. Moran.

Mr. MORAN. All right, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. LEWIS. Mr. Cunningham.

PRECISION WEAPONS

Mr. CUNNINGHAM. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Chairman Hunter has discussed the affordable weapon with you, and it tracks with Mr. Moran's discussion on ammunition. Do you know what the requirements are? We have many systems in progress, even production. But the affordable weapon can be brought online very, very quickly, perhaps quicker than some others we are buying. I am thankful that the Department is taking a look at that.

I think Chairman Hunter, even though he is an Army guy and can't shoot very well, he is a pretty good chairman. And he and I agree on the value of affordable weapon.

SHIP DEPOT MAINTENANCE

Secondly, I would like to discuss ship repair—Dr. Zakheim is going to free up some money for that in this supplemental. But the Navy O&M accounts, as you are well aware, the Marine Corps, and others as well, are the “pay-for” accounts. There are many bills paid in the O&M accounts. So, the dollars that we get for ship repair—we would like to see somewhat protected. Three ships are returning now, and some of them are not in the best shape.

ALLIED CONTRIBUTIONS

The other issue is that some of our allies haven't been supportive of our Iraq effort.

And what we are saying—and it goes along with my colleague here—many of us feel that we know we need the United Nations and we need these countries, but there should be some kind of penalty for their refusal to support this effort. We should not be rewarding these people with contracts for Iraq's reconstruction.

If you help us fight al Qaeda, but you don't support us in Iraq, or if you don't let us use a base—which caused us to come all the way around the other side and delayed our troops and got some of our people killed—there needs to be some kind of accountability for

hurting our efforts. I think that is all we are saying, Mr. Secretary, on that issue. And I think that is just about it, sir.

Mr. LEWIS. You have got about enough time to respond, and then I promise you have to be on your way here shortly, Mr. Secretary.

Secretary RUMSFELD. Well, I hear you, and I understand. How is that for being diplomatic?

SUSTAINING FUNDING

Mr. LEWIS. Mr. Secretary, first, we appreciate not just the job you are doing but the responsiveness that you have demonstrated relative to the concern of the American people reflected in the concern by Members of Congress in both bodies. You are in this supplemental asking for very serious money for very serious purposes. The public is very much behind what you are doing, and I think America is just beginning to understand the monster that we are dealing with in Saddam Hussein, a regime that has gone out of its way to kill its own people in the past, and apparently today there is evidence he is doing that very thing to individuals who would not choose to be in this fight.

This regime will disappear as a result of your effort, but, Mr. Secretary, as you leave, I would like to remind you of this reality. The public is with us today. There is a huge surge in the Congress to make sure the money is available, and indeed, money available with flexibility during the 2003 fiscal year.

Beyond that, however, once the war is over and this monster has disappeared, we will have problems and challenges with the war on terrorism, but the air will be out of a very big balloon here. And sustaining the funding over time is going to take a lot of salesmanship and a lot of education, a lot of understanding, beyond this committee. And so while it is very, very positive scene at this moment in the Congress, and indeed, I know we are proud of what our men and women are doing, the fight down the line relative to competitive appropriations is not going to be an easy one in the months ahead.

Secretary RUMSFELD. I think that is right, and it is important that there be a good solid common understanding of the nature of the world we live in and the nature of the threats we face and the capabilities that are spreading across this globe and that we are going to have to be able to cope with and address and deter and defend against over the coming decades.

Mr. LEWIS. Thank you, Mr. Secretary. I am going to be calling on Mr. Frelinghuysen after you leave us, but in the meantime, Dr. Wolfowitz, Dr. Zakheim, as I understand it, and General Cartwright will be present. We very much appreciate your being with us for the time you have had available so far. We are sorry about the votes, but it is not lightly said. Godspeed, Mr. Secretary.

Secretary RUMSFELD. Thank you very much.

Mr. LEWIS. Mr. Frelinghuysen.

SMART MUNITIONS

Mr. FRELINGHUYSEN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I guess this is directed to Dr. Wolfowitz. A lot has been mentioned by Secretary Rumsfeld of the incredible efforts that have been expended to use smart munitions to protect our soldiers on the ground, our Armed

Forces. And Mr. Moran touched on where do we stand relative to what we have available? I see several figures in the budget submission. One is for \$7.2 billion, and then there is another figure of about half that amount. Where do we stand relative to existing stocks and to what extent are the funds you are requesting going to be addressing those needs?

Mr. WOLFOWITZ. I think we are in basically very good shape, particularly because early last year we ramped up considerably our production of a number of the key precision munitions which we expended at very high rates. It is difficult to predict exactly how much we will use, and some of it is related to the intensity of conflict. Some of it is related to the number of targets, but we have very ample stocks, including further contingencies. No one should think that dealing with Iraq is the only thing that we are capable of.

Let me say one other thing, and then I might ask General Cartwright or Dr. Zakheim to comment on the precise detail if there is more, but I think it is really important to emphasize that this precision not only saves American lives; it is saving Iraqi lives. And the Secretary has said repeatedly, we didn't bomb Baghdad; we bombed the regime in Baghdad. And the fact that so many people are going about their normal business in Baghdad is real testimony of the fact that they know we are accurate and they know we are not aiming at them. And I don't think you will ever find an example in history where a country had this much power and used it this carefully.

OIL FOR FOOD PROGRAM

Mr. FRELINGHUYSEN. And it is good to know. I think that is an adequate response. Obviously winning the war is our primary responsibility, but as we look ahead, could you comment further on the potential role of the United Nations? From what I gather, the Oil for Food account and program is controlled by the United Nations. What do we literally know of the management of those funds, their expenditures to date, the nature of the places they deposit those dollars, and if, in fact, as some people have told me, there is any way of verifying whether those funds have ever been audited? In other words, have these funds been used for the purposes for which they were meant to be used?

Mr. WOLFOWITZ. Congressman, those are very important and good questions, and I think if you will let me answer them in detail for the record, I will give you a somewhat more general answer, which is to remember that the Oil for Food program was set up to try to monitor the use of money by this criminal regime, which we are about to remove. And there clearly is a role for the United Nations in the transition from the existing arrangement to something where these funds are in the hands of and controlled by a government that represents the real interests of the Iraqi people. And at that point it should be the Iraqi people who decide how their money is spent, not the United Nations.

Mr. FRELINGHUYSEN. Some have suggested that the United Nations' hands, in some regards, are not particularly clean in terms of their oversight of these particular dollars. It is more than just obviously how the regime uses the money, which we know go to

build larger and bigger bunkers and not defeat the people. But any additional information you can provide to the Committee in that latter regard would be appreciated.

Mr. WOLFOWITZ. No. I understand. And of course in some respects, the U.N. was set a task of monitoring a volume of expenditures that probably they did not have the real resources to handle in any case. So there were gaps in that system that you point to, and I will try to get you an answer either classified or unclassified on what we do know about it.

Mr. FRELINGHUYSEN. Thank you. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

[CLERK'S NOTE.—The Department did not provide a response for the record.]

Mr. LEWIS. Mr. Tiahrt.

Mr. TIAHRT. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. LEWIS. Let me say that Mr. Visclosky has been kind enough to let me go through—these guys have been sitting through for a while, and he wants to ring the bell at the end of it anyway.

Go right ahead.

TURKEY

Mr. TIAHRT. General Franks had plans to move some of our forces through Turkey. Subsequently, we have had to move them around to the Persian Gulf. In this supplemental we have consideration for Turkey, and financial consideration and some other ideas to help them along. I have two questions: Number one is have we estimated the additional cost that we have incurred financially, not in terms of irritation or human lives or any other aspect, but in terms of cost to move our forces around to the Persian Gulf? And the reason I ask this is because if I were to go to Main Street in Kellogg or in Wichita, Kansas and stop the first 10 cars, each and every one of them will tell you that they are angry with Turkey, they are angry with France, they are angry with Canada and other countries that have stood in our way to try to make the world a safer place.

And I think there is value in our relationship with Turkey, but it has cost us something. So I wonder if we have made an estimate of what it has cost to move our troops around. And then I would like you to comment a little bit on how important Turkey is to our efforts in Iraq today and what—about our relationship in the future.

Mr. WOLFOWITZ. Those are very good questions. It is a very complicated and incredibly important subject. First, with respect to the specific question, by the way, the fact that the costs turn out to be different is one of the reasons why we need the kind of flexibility we are asking for, but this isn't why you asked the question. The cost of moving through the canal and around the other way are not trivial, but they are small compared to many other numbers that we are talking about.

The real cost of not having the Fourth Infantry Division going through Turkey is the lack of having a heavy combat division in northern Iraq right now. It would make a big difference, and until we know how this conflict actually comes out, we won't know how big a difference it would have made and even then we will be guessing, but there is no question, if we had a U.S. armored force

in northern Iraq right now, the end would be closer to—we would be able to see the end even closer. And so would Saddam and his people.

And I am not about to conceal my own personal disappointment in the—I know the President and Secretary Rumsfeld are deeply disappointed that the Turks didn't step up to the proposal that we made to them, but to be fair and to be clear, Turkey did not undertake the activities that some of the other countries that have been mentioned by name or alluded to of actively opposing U.S. policy. We were asking something very substantial from Turkey, very difficult for them to do. In the end of the day, they came close. The parliament actually voted for it, but they needed a majority of all members rather than just those present. It was a new government that I think didn't quite know what it was doing. It was a big, big mistake. And it is a big mistake for Turkey, because I think Turkey stood to benefit from that extra capability, and Turkey stood to benefit from the package that we were proposing of \$6 billion to help offset their potential losses here. And that is clearly gone.

But Turkey has stepped up to some very considerable responsibilities. A little bit late, but in time Turkey permitted overflight of Turkish airspace. Now, some people will say, well, so did every other NATO ally, but Turkey is the only NATO ally that borders Iraq; and, therefore, it is the only NATO ally that has armed Tomahawks flying through its airspace. It is the only NATO ally that has B-2 bombers flying through its airspace, I believe. It is certainly the only NATO ally that has our Naval aircraft flying through on combat missions in Iraq; and it is the only NATO ally through which we are putting ground forces, including the 1,000 paratroopers that jumped last night into airfields in northern Iraq.

So overflight of Turkey is a very big thing, and they gave it to us unconditionally. They didn't say, okay, now, what is the price for that?

But the money that is in the supplemental requested for Turkey—and here I am in danger of stepping into State Department terrain, but I think we have a common understanding here—it is to try to deal with what we expect are going to be some real short-term economic losses for Turkey stemming from this conflict. It is on their doorstep. It does disrupt their tourist business. It does disrupt many things that go on there, and Turkey's economy is in difficult circumstance, and that is not good for us. But the final thing I would say—and this I say to any Turks who are listening to this some way or other—not only I think did Turkey make a very big mistake by not offering us the full cooperation that we asked for, but the fact is that what we are undertaking with enormous help from our British ally, and from quite a few other allies, is going to relieve a huge economic burden for Turkey in the medium and long run, opening up peaceful trade with an Iraq that is not under U.N. sanctions is going to be good for Turkey and good for the Turkish economy. It is a matter of trying to help them get through the short term, and I wish we were in a better situation with a country that is a long-standing ally.

Mr. LEWIS. A very good brief response. That was great.

Mr. WOLFOWITZ. Sorry.

Mr. TIAHRT. I want to say that my brother-in-law who flies on AWACS has been stationed in Turkey. He is not currently there now, but he has been there a couple of times, and we have had good relationships with Turkey, and I think we need to be long term in the way we look at our relationships.

Mr. WOLFOWITZ. I appreciate that very much.

Mr. LEWIS. Thank you very much, Mr. Tiahrt. We have got limits in terms of the use of the room and so on, and so I am concerned a bit.

Mr. Wicker.

RECONSTRUCTION OF IRAQ

Mr. WICKER. Well, I will echo that sentiment that Mr. Tiahrt just expressed. Let me also say that members of the Committee have been most complimentary of Secretary Rumsfeld. Those words also are intended for the entire team. I have met with some of you several times during the buildup to this conflict, and we very much appreciate what you are doing.

It is important that we win this war. There is no question in the minds of Americans that we will do so. Maybe not equally as important, but very, very important is what we do after we have won this war, and history is replete with examples of the United States being successful in armed conflict and then making monumental mistakes with years and years of negative consequences.

I notice that your request contains very little for the rebuilding of Iraq, there is the accomplishment of a temporary civilian office of reconstruction and humanitarian assistance, and the request anticipates some \$489.3 million in natural resource risk remediation. Is that about all we have, gentlemen, in rebuilding Iraq? And if that is the case, have you made a current cost estimate of how much it is going to cost to rebuild Iraq, and who do you expect is going to pay for that?

Mr. WOLFOWITZ. Actually, I think the supplemental includes a category of \$12 billion that is categorized as transition in Iraq stability, and that includes considerable amount of what would normally be classified as peacekeeping operations.

If I could just—really quickly three points. Number one, we haven't always done well, but—one case we did really well and it is worth mentioning because it is relevant, was in northern Iraq a month after the Gulf War, we went in. We left after 6 months. Jay Garner, by the way, was the deputy commander of that force. And we left behind a situation that except for Saddam's occasional invasions, has been pretty stable in the 12 years since.

Number two, that is the principle we like to see applied here, which is get the Iraqi people on their feet and functioning as quickly as possible. Don't create one of those dependent relationships that we have in a number of places where a doctor in Kosovo can make more money as a driver for the United Nations than practicing medicine.

And number 3, there is a lot of money to pay for in that doesn't have to be U.S. taxpayer money, and it starts with the assets of the Iraqi people. They will now own those assets instead of a dictator that owns them, and they should spend them for their own welfare.

So this is not the total of what is needed, but it is an estimate of what our contribution needs to be through the rest of the fiscal year, most of it for our military contribution.

Mr. WICKER. Can you give us that estimate?

Mr. WOLFOWITZ. I said it covers \$12 billion for what we are calling transition in—

Mr. WICKER. That is for our contribution. But what do you think the entire package is going to be?

Mr. WOLFOWITZ. Oh, it is—I mean—

Mr. LEWIS. You don't have that.

Mr. WOLFOWITZ. We really don't, and the real number would be not what is going to get through the rest of the fiscal year, but what is it going to be over 2 to 3 years. And a rough recollection—well, the oil revenues of that country could bring between \$50 and \$100 billion dollars over the course of the next two or three years. Now, there are a lot of claims on that money, but we are not dealing with Afghanistan. It is a personal innocent ward of the international community. We are dealing with a country that can really finance its own reconstruction and relatively soon.

Mr. WICKER. Thank you.

Mr. LEWIS. Thank you very much. In the meantime we will all be depending upon—they are calling him "Tin Cup" Zakheim.

Mr. Visclosky.

INVOLVEMENT OF ARMY CORPS OF ENGINEERS IN IRAQ

Mr. VISCLOSKY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Gentlemen, thank you very much, and I would want to follow up on Mr. Wicker's line of questioning on reconstruction. Could you, for the record, break out how much of that \$12 billion for transition would be set aside for construction? Obviously, you have a military construction component, but I, too, would be interested in the issue of any original estimates and costs for reconstruction that is nonmilitary-related.

Also I would like to have an explanation as to what the role and financing would be as far as the involvement of the Army Corps of Engineers with that. I serve on Energy and Water, and obviously we have a lot of Army Corp personnel over there now, and want to see the implications on their budget and how it is handled on the defense side.

Mr. WOLFOWITZ. I will try to get you something for the record, recognizing that whatever we give you now is going to be a best guess and not—

Mr. VISCLOSKY. I understand. I would like to see what the best guess is, and again, I have a particular interest, serving on Energy and Water, how the Army Corps with specificity fits into that estimate. I would want some specificity as far as the Corps' role and the financing of that.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

[The information follows:]

As detailed in our fiscal year 03 Supplemental Request, this \$12 billion is essentially all military funding. There is no nonmilitary-related funding, nor any funding set aside specifically for construction. The \$12 billion is to finance military operations to stabilize the security environment in Iraq, supply immediate humanitarian assistance, and reestablish civil order.

Mr. LEWIS. Thank you very much. Let's see. I doubt that there are any other members who would have additional questions since we are supposed to be out of this room, but I do see a finger somewhere being raised. Mr. Dicks, did you want to say something?

SHIP DEPOT MAINTENANCE

Mr. DICKS. Dr. Zakheim, how much is in this budget for ship depot maintenance for the United States Navy? They are very worried that all of these ships are going to come back and they are not going to have the money to repair them.

Mr. ZAKHEIM. If my memory serves me correctly it is \$1.7 billion.

Mr. DICKS. \$1.7 billion in 2003 money?

Mr. ZAKHEIM. Fiscal year 2003 money.

Mr. LEWIS. A record for Mr. Dicks and a response, by the way.

Mr. OBEY has a quick question.

SMALLPOX VACCINE

Mr. OBEY. Totally different subject. In light of the controversy about the smallpox vaccine in our other subcommittee, can you tell us what has been our experience with that vaccine and how many negative reactions—or bad reactions that we had from our armed service personnel.

Mr. WOLFOWITZ. Let me get you a precision answer for the record. I do remember the last time I saw statistics, which was a few weeks ago, we seem to be doing much better than had been predicted before the vaccine was administered. This is an important subject to be precise on, and I will get you numbers.

[CLERK'S NOTE.—The Department did not provide a response for the record.]

Mr. ZAKHEIM. From a personal perspective, since my stepson is in bed and had to take that vaccine and called my wife and was very nervous, we checked into it. They were both reassured that this vaccine has had minimal side effects. And that is personal.

Mr. OBEY. Okay.

Mr. LEWIS. Very important subject and I am glad the question is in the record. Gentlemen, we very much appreciate you being present. In the weeks, days, months ahead, we will be working with each other a lot, and we appreciate the work that you are all doing.

The Committee is adjourned.

[CLERK'S NOTE.—Questions submitted by Mr. Lewis, and the answers thereto follow:]

ASSUMPTIONS USED TO DEVELOP SUPPLEMENTAL REQUEST

Question. Approximately one-half of the supplemental request is associated with "sunk costs" of the war in Iraq; the other half is the cost of the war effort based on a set of assumptions. What are the assumptions you used to determine the cost of the war?

Answer. The other half of the supplemental, not related to coercive diplomacy, was based on three phases of military operations:

1. Major Conflict—The supplemental request included \$13.1 billion to finance the costs for a short, extremely intense period of combat operations using a full range of U.S. and coalition forces. The estimated timeframe for major combat operations was approximately one month.

2. Transition and Iraq Stability—The supplemental request included \$12.0 billion to finance the limited combat "mopping up" operations, stabilization of the environ-

ment within Iraq, and reestablishment of civil order. During this phase, the Department estimated that the overall U.S. forces would decline rapidly while retaining only those forces necessary to ensure the security of the Iraqi people and resources. This phase also included establishment of a temporary civilian Office of Reconstruction and Humanitarian Assistance, which would serve as an interim organization until international and coalition partners can be incorporated into the reconstruction efforts. The estimated timeframe for lower intensity operations was approximately 3 or more months.

3. Reconstitution—The supplemental request included \$7.2 billion to finance redeployment of combat forces, replacement of key munitions expended in the conflict, and depot maintenance and repair of weapons and systems platforms.

Question. Is it true that the Services submitted data based on a set of assumptions that later changed?

Answer. Yes. The initial cost estimate for Iraq operations was prepared using the U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM) Concept Plan (CONPLAN), which outlined the Department's plan for joint operations in Iraq. Several months later, this initial estimate was refined when CENTCOM developed the Operational Plan (OPLAN), which represented the full development of the concept of military operations in Iraq. It specified the forces and support needed for the conduct of joint operations and the transportation schedule required to move those resources. In developing this plan, CENTCOM and the Services developed a detailed flow of resources into the theater to support the approved OPLAN concept. After forces were selected, time-phased support requirements were determined, and transportation feasibility was established, the detailed planning information was generated and stored as a "time-phased force and deployment data" (TPFDD) file. Subsequently, this data was incorporated into the Contingency Operations Support Tool (COST) model, which further refined the cost estimate based on DoD's assumptions for the three major phases of the Iraq Operation.

Question. If so, what was the genesis of the assumptions you are using to support this supplemental request and how have these assumptions changed in the past four weeks?

Answer. The initial Iraq operation cost estimate was prepared using the concept plan developed by the U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM). Subsequently, this initial estimate was refined based on CENTCOM's Operational Plan (OPLAN). Several months later, the Department conducted a formal review of the supplemental requirements. During this review, the cost estimates for military operations in Iraq and ongoing global war on terrorism were further refined based on the Time Phased Force and Deployment Data, (TPFDD), prepared by CENTCOM and the Military Departments, and other known factors (e.g., executability of the supplemental funds). Thereafter, this data was incorporated into the Contingency Operations Support Tool (COST) model based on DoD's assumptions for the four major phases of the Iraq Operation. As the plans changed, the Department also changed the cost estimates accordingly.

Question. Understanding the need for "flexibility" in expenditure of funds for emerging requirements of the war, with clearly one-half of the amount already spent, what is the rationale for requesting the amount needed for "sunk costs" in a transfer account?

Answer. The Department requested that the majority of supplemental funding be appropriated in a transfer account because of the unpredictable scope, duration, and intensity of military operations. The transfer account would provide the necessary flexibility to fund emerging requirements. For the funds that the Department has already incurred for coercive diplomacy, Department intended to transfer the requested resources to DoD's normal appropriation accounts. Therefore, the Department would not object if the Congress appropriates the funds requested for coercive diplomacy directly into the DoD's normal appropriation accounts.

Question. Within the transfer account you are requesting, are there funds to support the ongoing global war on terrorism? If so, can you differentiate the amount for Operation Iraq Freedom and the amount for the war on terrorism?

Answer. Yes, the Department included approximately \$56.5 billion for Operation Iraq Freedom and \$6.1 billion for ongoing global war on terrorism.

SUFFICIENCY OF THE REQUEST

Question. The Central Command has multiple operations underway in its area of responsibility: the war on terrorism in Afghanistan and Pakistan and the war in Iraq. Are you confident that the amount in this Supplemental is sufficient to sustain the war in Iraq given the CENTCOM's multiple efforts?

Answer. Yes, this request supports our best estimate of the costs we see at this time.

Question. Does this supplemental request finance the requirement as identified by CENTCOM?

Answer. The initial Iraq operation cost estimate was prepared using the concept plan developed by the U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM). Subsequently, this initial estimate was refined based on CENTCOM's Operational Plan (OPLAN). No one can predict with certainty exactly how any major combat campaign will progress. However, based on current circumstances, the supplemental request is sufficient to finance CENTCOM's requirements.

Question. The fiscal year 2003 budget request did not include the additional costs of the global war on terrorism, nor did it include the additional cost of a war with Iraq. How much above the amount provided in the Department of Defense Appropriations Act, 2003 (Public Law 107-248), is needed to finance these efforts?

Answer. The incremental increase of \$68.7 billion above the amount appropriated in the FY 2003 DoD Appropriations Act is required to finance military operations in Iraq and the ongoing global war on terrorism. The Congress appropriated \$6.1 billion in the FY 2003 Consolidated Appropriations Resolution (P.L. 108-7) and the remaining \$62.6 billion is included in the DoD's FY 2003 supplemental request.

COST OF IRAQ OPERATIONS

Question. What are your projections for total cost of the war through the end of hostilities?

Answer. The fiscal year 2003 supplemental request includes \$55.4 billion for coercive diplomacy, major conflict, and transition and Iraq stability phases of the Iraq operations. This is the Department's best estimate of the cost of the war through the end of hostilities.

Question. What is the expected duration of hostilities?

Answer. The supplemental request includes the necessary resources to finance a short, extremely intense period of combat operations lasting approximately one month. This phase is then followed by a period of approximately three or more months of limited combat "mopping up" operations and lower intensity, sporadic fighting.

Question. Please describe your methodology for estimating these combat costs. What are the cost drivers, and the daily burn rate?

Answer. The Combatant Commanders first developed the concept plan, which was later refined as the Operational Plan (OPLAN). Thereafter, the Time Phased Force and Deployment Data (TPFDD) was prepared by the Services working closely with the Central Command Combatant Commander. Using this detailed data and other known factors, the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) Cost Team generated cost estimates for military operations based on the type of mission/contingency, duration, operational tempo (OPTEMPO), number of personnel and equipment deployed, transportation needs, subsistence for personnel deployed, and the originating and destination site. Each primary cost category was further subdivided into multiple functional cost elements. These functional cost categories formed the basis of the cost breakdown structure used in the cost models to calculate the total cost of the operation. The daily burn rate estimate for the major conflict phase was approximately \$400 million to \$500 million (excluding coercive diplomacy).

Question. What is your current estimate for the rebuilding of Iraq?

Answer. It is too early to know the ultimate costs of Iraq's recovery. However, the \$2.475 billion requested and appropriated was built on a sector specific relief and reconstruction plan. We are now evaluating how the assumptions and requirements identified in that budget plan reflect actual needs in Iraq.

The Iraq Relief and Reconstruction Fund was requested with flexible authorities because of these uncertain conditions and requirements. The structure of the Fund will allow those resources to be transferred for use for other urgent requirements.

Moreover, Iraq's troubles began long before the war. Iraq has suffered from 30 years of mismanagement of the economy and deliberate policies of neglect targeted at real or imagined foes of the former regime. These policies have taken a significant toll on Iraq's infrastructure and institutions. The Coalition is committed to repairing damage done in the war and assisting the Iraqi people in their task of reconstructing infrastructure and institutions damaged or destroyed by years of misrule and systematic oppression.

It is worth noting that numerous countries around the world are contributing to restoration efforts in Iraq, and the prospects for full recovery look very good. Iraq enjoys significant human and natural resources that will make an important dif-

ferences in recovery. The Iraqi people are talented, educated, and resourceful, and they have fertile soil, major rivers and significant oil reserves.

Question. Are your estimates for rebuilding and administering Iraq based on assumed participation by the United Nations or some collection of countries that are not now participating in the combat?

Answer. Yes, DoD estimates for rebuilding and administering Iraq are based on assumed participation by the United Nations (UN) and a collection of countries that did (and did not) participate in combat operations in Iraq.

Pursuant to the UN Security Council Resolution 1453 and upcoming technical meeting in New York at the United Nations the week of 23 June 2003, DoD fully expects continued and additional significant contributions from donor countries and parties around the world. This meeting will be co-hosted by the UN Development Program, the World Bank and Coalition countries. It will discuss needs assessments and the way ahead to a donor's conference this fall.

Question. Are there funds in this request for refugee operations?

Answer. The funds appropriated to the President for Other Bilateral Economic Assistance total \$2.475 billion. These funds are designed to address the costs associated with supporting relief efforts related to refugees, internally displaced persons, and vulnerable individuals, including assistance for families of innocent Iraqi civilians who suffer losses as a result of military operations.

Question. How much have we spent in preparation for refugee operations in and around Iraq?

Answer. The Report to Congress pursuant to Section 1506 of the Emergency Wartime Supplemental Appropriations Act, 2003 (Public Law 108-11) demonstrates that the funds apportioned to the Department of State Bureau of Population, Refugee and Migration (PRM) total \$39.1 million. Approximately \$40.1 million has been allocated by PRM to date. An additional \$111.6 million was apportioned to support relief efforts related to refugees, internally displaced people and vulnerable individuals.

The Department of State's Bureau for Population, Refugees, and Migration contributed assistance for the pre-positioning and emergency response activities of the U.N. High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), the International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies (IFRC), and the International Organization for Migration (IOM).

Also in the Emergency Wartime Supplemental Appropriations Act 2003, Congress appropriated \$2.475 billion for the President's Iraq Relief and Reconstruction Fund, which is the primary source of U.S. government funding for Iraqi recovery activities. Congress also made \$489 million available to the Department of Defense within the Iraqi Freedom Fund for use, if needed, to repair damage to Iraqi oil facilities and to preserve a petroleum distribution capability.

The \$2.475 billion requested and appropriated reflects USG assumptions about expected costs and was built on a sector specific relief and reconstruction plan.

Question. If the requested supplemental funds are provided, will the services be able to replace all funds borrowed from normal operating accounts, such as for building repair?

Answer. Yes, the DoD's request of \$30.3 billion for costs required for coercive diplomacy will replace all funds borrowed from normal operating accounts. For instance, this amount is necessary to reimburse the Components for estimated military personnel costs and transportation of personnel and equipment to the area of military operations. Also, the Services will need to be reimbursed for building repairs and facility enhancements (such as in Kuwait) in preparation for military operations in Iraq.

Question. If not, what activities that were provided for in the fiscal 2003 appropriations act, will not be accomplished?

Answer. If the DoD's total supplemental request is appropriated before May 2003, the Department will be able to replace all funds borrowed from normal operating accounts.

AFGHANISTAN OPERATION ENDURING FREEDOM

Question. Besides the war in Iraq, military operations and humanitarian rebuilding efforts are continuing in Afghanistan. What are your estimates of the additional funds needed to continue the Afghanistan operation through the end of the year? What is your method for estimating costs?

Answer. The Department reviewed all the cost estimates for the cost of Afghanistan Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF) submitted by DoD Components. In addition, the Department also reviewed the cost of Operation Noble Eagle (ONE). Based on execution of approximately \$1.1 billion per month in the first quarter of FY 2003

for ONE and OEF, the Department included \$6.1 billion in the FY 2003 supplemental request. This is required in addition to the \$6.1 billion appropriated in the FY 2003 Consolidated Appropriations Resolution.

Question. What work is being accomplished by other countries in Afghanistan? What is the estimated cost of humanitarian and rebuilding operations in Afghanistan to the end of the fiscal year? Are these costs fully funded?

Answer. The scope of the Humanitarian Assistance (HA)/reconstruction effort in Afghanistan is beyond the Defense Department's area of responsibility, although we work closely with State and USAID on these efforts. To date, over 37 countries have contributed to the rebuilding of Afghanistan.

The work being accomplished includes but is not limited to:

- Establishment of a refugee camp,
- Providing food, medical and water supplies,
- Technical assistance to the banking sector,
- Building education facilities,
- Providing clean water and sanitation to refugees,
- Extensive medical assistance,
- Logistical coordination,
- Pharmaceuticals,
- Demining equipment,
- Construction of a women's center, and
- Providing various vehicles.

This list is not comprehensive and is a sample of accomplished work in Afghanistan to date.

Additionally, 20 coalition partner countries have contributed forces to the coalition military operation in Afghanistan, focused on creating the conditions for security, stability and reconstruction.

Question. What cash or in-kind contributions have been received or promised by other countries to assist with operations in Afghanistan?

Answer. Since the beginning of the war on terrorism, foreign nations have provided approximately \$2.7 billion in logistical support to the United States.

Question. In the Omnibus Continuing Appropriations bill approved last month, Congress provided an additional \$6.1 billion for the Department of Defense. How have these funds been used?

Answer. These funds were used to reimburse the Services for the costs incurred in support of Operation Noble Eagle and Operation Enduring Freedom.

Question. What is the current unobligated balance of the \$6.1 billion appropriated. (Please provide this information by appropriation).

Answer. The current unobligated balance (as of March 27, 2003) is approximately \$160 thousand.

PAYMENTS TO PAKISTAN AND JORDAN

Question. The supplemental request includes \$1.4 billion for payments to Pakistan, Jordan, and other key cooperating nations, for logistical and military-related support provided, or to be provided, to the United States in connection with military action in Iraq and the global war on terrorism. How much has been provided in the past for such support? Of the request, how much represents payments that have already been made for which the Department is seeking reimbursement?

Answer. Pakistan, Jordan, and other key cooperating nations have been reimbursed a total of \$1.2 billion for logistical and military-related support provided to the United States in connection with the global war on terrorism. Of this amount, \$530 million was taken from the O&M accounts to make a payment under the Acquisition and Cross Servicing Agreement with Pakistan.

Question. What nations have received funding for such support, and what nations do you expect will receive assistance in the future?

Answer. As of September 30, 2003, the following nations have received reimbursement or have reimbursements pending from the FY 2002 Supplemental (\$390 million) and the FY 2003 Supplemental (\$1.4 billion).

(In millions of dollars)

Country	FY 2002 supplemental (\$390M)	FY 2003 supplemental (\$1.4B)
Czech Republic	0.9	
Djibouti	5.4	
Pakistan (Jan-Jun 2002)*	317.0	

[In millions of dollars]

Country	FY 2002 supplemental (\$390M)	FY 2003 supplemental (\$1.4B)
Pakistan (Jan–April 2003)	21.9	
Pakistan (Jan–April 2003)		234.2
Pakistan (May 2003)		60.1
Pakistan (June 2003)		67.4
Pakistan (July 2003) (pending)		67.4
Jordan	21.5	
Jordan (Sept 2003) (pending)		52.0
Uzbekistan	15.7	
Oman	4.1	
Slovakia	1.1	
Tajikistan	2.4	
Thailand		0.5
Iraq Multi-National Division (pending) (Sec Def authorized up to \$530M)		530.0
Total	390.0	1011.6

*Note: Pakistan received \$530.2M reimbursement via an Acquisition and Cross Servicing Agreement for the period July–Dec 2002

Question. How does the Department of Defense ascertain which costs should be reimbursed?

Answer. The following financial management guidelines have been established to ensure that the U.S. taxpayer interests are adequately protected. The following steps are adhered to in making payments to key cooperating countries for the cost of goods, services, or use of facilities provided in support of U.S. military forces in connection with the global war on terrorism:

1. A country providing support to U.S. military forces in connection with the global war on terrorism sends requests for U.S. reimbursement through the American Embassy in country. The country request for reimbursement should include a breakdown of costs by the types of cost (base support, food, medical, airlift) and justification on the level of support provided (number of troops, types of assets, number of hours flown, number and types of aircraft).

2. The country request for reimbursement is provided to the Department of Defense for evaluation and payment.

- a. The information is reviewed by the appropriate combatant commander's staff for confirmation that the level and type of support claimed by the country was actually provided to U.S. military operations in connection with the global war on terrorism. Any significant changes in the level of support will be justified by the combatant commander's staff.

- b. The Office of the Under Secretary of Defense (Comptroller) staff uses financial management tools to determine whether the claimed costs are reasonable. At a minimum an assessment is done to ensure that the cost avoidance to the U.S. is greater than the cost of the support being provided by cooperating countries.

3. The Secretary of Defense determines the appropriate payments to countries for justified claimed costs, in coordination with the Secretary of State, and in consultation with the Director of the Office of Management and Budget. Not earlier than 15 days following notification to the appropriate Congressional committees, DoD makes the reimbursement to the requesting country.

Question. What role does the Secretary of State play in this process, since the request includes language that provides that he must concur in such payments?

Answer. The Department of Defense forwards all recommended reimbursement packages to the Department of State prior to submitting the package to the Secretary of Defense for approval. Only after the Department of State concurs with the package is it sent forward to the Secretary of Defense for approval, and notification of the appropriate Congressional committees.

Question. The supplemental request includes language that provides that not to exceed \$50 million may be used to "support the military operations or activities of foreign nations of furtherance of the global war on terrorism, including equipment, supplies, services, and funding . . . with the concurrence of the Secretary of State". How does this authority differ from the \$1.4 billion sought to reimburse nations for military support to the United States?

Answer. This provision would allow the U.S. to help nations enhance their counterterrorism capability so that they can contribute more effectively to the global war on terrorism in the future.

The \$1.4 billion, conversely, is provided as reimbursement to key cooperating nations for support provided to U.S. military operations in support of the global war on terrorism.

Question. Elsewhere in the supplemental request, the Secretary of State is seeking over \$2 billion in military assistance through the Foreign Operations Subcommittee; how does this \$50 million differ from that request?

Answer. The State Department's security assistance programs are largely planned far in advance and cover a broad spectrum of needs. The special authority requested for the Department of Defense is intended to provide flexibility to respond quickly to emerging requirements for specialized training in counter-terrorism.

Well-trained local security forces not only reduce the demand for U.S. military forces, but because of their status, language skills and regional knowledge, they are capable of performing missions in ways U.S. forces cannot.

SUPPORT TO INDIGENOUS FORCES

Question. The supplemental request includes language that authorizes not to exceed \$150 million to support indigenous forces assistance United States military operations or activities relating to the global war on terrorism, including equipment, supplies, services, and funding. Why is this request being made?

Answer. A number of foreign countries, including Afghanistan and the Afghan National Army, are providing the United States with operational military support in the Global War on Terrorism (GWOT).

In addition, indigenous forces that are not part of formal military structures may also be available to engage in activities in support of United States forces operating consistent with existing Congressional Resolutions or any subsequently enacted Congressional Resolution authorizing the use of force.

This provision provides resources, to include defense articles, services, education and training, and funds, over the near-term to both nations and indigenous forces that provide United States forces with operational support.

These forces would be critical to continue our efforts for GWOT or in the conduct of any new operations in other regions of the World.

Question. Would this authority be used in Iraq?

Answer. Yes. If enacted, this provision would further DoD's objectives in its mission to prosecute the Global War on Terrorism, and, if both authorized by Congressional Resolution and deemed necessary, to take military action against Iraq. This provision provides resources, to include defense articles, services, education and training, and funds, over the near-term to both nations and indigenous forces that provide United States forces with operational support.

These forces would be critical to continue our efforts for GWOT or in the conduct of any new operations in other regions of the world.

Question. Can you provide specific instances of how this authority would be used in the future?

Answer. Once a country no longer functions as a sovereign state all forces are indigenous. The Department of State has the responsibility for supporting sovereign states. But there is no general responsibility or authority for supporting indigenous forces of failed states such as the Northern Alliance in Afghanistan.

It is in DoD's interest to seek authority to support these forces as it did the Northern Alliance in Afghanistan.

These forces could be critical to continue our efforts for GWOT or in the conduct of any new operations in other regions of the world.

This provision requires no additional appropriations or budget authority above the President's Budget request.

The Secretary of Defense will determine the terms and conditions of the support to be provided, with the concurrence of the Secretary of State. The DoD would carefully monitor all requests for such support.

Question. What oversight would Congress have on this use of these funds?

Answer. The Secretary of Defense will provide the congressional defense committees with a 15 day notification and a financial plan for the use of these funds.

GUARD AND RESERVE CALL-UP

Question. What is the total number of troops called up at this time?

Answer. As of 10 June there were 211,950 mobilized Reservists and Guardsmen on duty. Breakout by Service is as follows: Army—141,312; Navy—11,211; USAF—34,074; USMC—21,087; and USCG—4,266.

More than 20,000 reservists have been demobilized since April, when levels peaked at more than 233,000. This reduction reflects our commitment to demobilizing reserve forces as soon as possible.

Question. How fast do you expect to ramp down the reserve component troops that have been called up?

Answer. The Department is committed to releasing Guardsmen and Reservists at the earliest opportunity, and we are currently demobilizing approximately 10,000 per month. This issue has the personal attention of the Secretary of Defense, who has directed initiatives to relieve pressure on these patriotic citizens, their families, and their employers.

For example, significant numbers of the National Guard and Reserve personnel mobilized during the buildup to war were required for missions other than direct combat or combat support in Iraq. Many of these people were assigned to augment headquarters staffs in the U.S. and around the world to help with the increased workload experienced by commands supporting the war effort. They served as staff officers, operations center watchstanders, intelligence analysts, etc., and provided a necessary and valuable service. However, given the reduced intensity of current operations, we have directed the Combatant Commanders and Services to review their use of these personnel and submit appropriate demobilization plans to the Secretary of Defense.

It should be noted, though, that some Guardsmen and Reservists will be required to stay on active duty, at least for the immediate future, to solidify the liberation of Iraq. As you are aware, although the majority of Iraqis have welcomed the freedom restored by the U.S. and our coalition partners, there remain pockets of resistance from people who benefited from the despotic rule of Saddam Hussein and other rogue elements in the population. We are committed to remaining in Iraq as long as necessary, and with the forces necessary, to ensure that these destabilizing influences are defeated. Our goal is to help the Iraqi people establish internal security and develop stable self-government. U.S. forces required for these missions include combat support personnel, civil support personnel, and other specialists, a significant proportion of whom are Guardsmen and Reservists. We are currently assessing the impact of this mission and other Central Command requirements on reserve demobilization.

Question. What do you expect the number will be at the end of June? At the end of September?

Answer. The Services recently prepared monthly mobilization projections based on what is known on projected military requirements of evolving military requirements in Iraq. There are many variables and these estimates are subject to change. The estimates for June through September are as follows:

<i>End of month</i>	<i>Estimated number of mobilized reservists</i>
June	215,235
July	197,235
August	189,235
September	181,235

These estimates indicate an average demobilization rate of more than 8,000 per month.

Question. How will your cost estimate change if you need to hold on active duty a large number of reservists that you thought you would be able to send home shortly after the end of combat operations?

Answer. Our cost estimate assumes relatively rapid demobilization shortly after the completion of intense conflict. If this assumed demobilization does not materialize, we would trade-off requirements (e.g., reconstitution) against any increased costs since these would be "must-pay" bills.

Question. Many units have been deployed, and are no longer at their home bases, consuming supplies. Have accounts been scrubbed aggressively to ensure that the maximum amount available has been applied to offset war costs?

Answer. Yes. Our supplemental request included offsets. Also, we continue to monitor our budget execution to ensure that all available resources are effectively applied to our requirements.

RECONSTITUTION OF EQUIPMENT AND PERSONNEL

Question. One of the most significant contributions to the ability of the United States to successfully wage war, is the readiness of its force and equipment prior to the war. The ability of the Army and Marine Corps to roll combat ready equipment off of the sealift ships, is directly tied to the combat readiness of the equipment loaded on the ship. The ability of the Navy and Marine Corps to fly hundreds of sorties off aircraft carriers, is directly tied to the ability of those carriers to get to the fight. What has been included in your supplemental request for bringing the

equipment back to the United States and putting it through the depot maintenance process?

Answer. The cost estimate assumes that equipment will return to the originating location after it is no longer needed by the combat forces in the Iraq theater of operations. The depot maintenance estimate is based on two primary factors, first the composition of the units being deployed and second, the duration of operations in the theater. Furthermore, the duration factor includes both a combat operational tempo and a lower intensity operational tempo based on the anticipated length of each phase of the operation.

The current plan is for major Air Force and Naval units to redeploy back to their originating bases as quickly as possible after the combatant commander has released the unit from the area of operations. It is anticipated that major Army ground units will remain deployed in the theater for a longer period of time and will take longer to redeploy back to originating locations.

In most situations, depot maintenance will be initiated as soon as possible in order to bring the equipment back to combat ready levels. Transition through the depot will be paced by the arrival of the equipment to the depot maintenance facility, level of repair required, the need to defer maintenance due to other military requirements, and the availability of repair facilities.

Question. What are the assumptions you used to develop these costs?

Answer. The Iraq operation cost estimate is primarily based on the Time Phased Force and Deployment Data, (TPFDD) prepared by U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM) and the Services.

The estimate is based on: the type of mission/contingency; duration; operational tempo (OPTEMPO); number of personnel and equipment to be deployed; transportation needs; subsistence for personnel being deployed; and the originating and destination site. The result is an estimate stratified on the basis of personnel (military and civilian) costs; personnel support; the actual operation; and transportation to and from the contingency.

The estimate for munitions is partially based on targeting plans, weapon utilization rates, and inventory objectives for post conflict reconstitution. The estimate for depot maintenance and spare parts were estimated by Services based on local environmental considerations using lessons learned from Desert Storm.

A major cost driver behind the estimate is the assumed combat intensity that is categorized by various operational tempo (OPTEMPO) levels. OPTEMPO level 2 is defined as heightened operations short of combat; for the OIF estimate, OPTEMPO 2 describes operations in the transition and stabilization period. OPTEMPO level 3 characterizes the combat period.

The estimate for the major conflict period is based on planning factors contained in the TPFDD force package. Each unit (a force package) is individually tasked and priced for a specific duration. The cost for transportation included both inter-theater and intra-theater costs. Inter-theater transportation cost is primarily limited to re-supply missions, and intra-theater transportation moves personnel and equipment to and from the area of operations. During the major conflict period, most of the cost for transportation is for intra-theater transportation.

Following a force build up period, the cost estimate is based on a nominal short and intense combat period, followed by period of transition and stabilization of Iraq. The number of combat units, equipment and personnel deployed in support of the various phases of the operation is driven by specifications outlined in the TPFDD in support of the CENTCOM plan and approved by the Secretary of Defense.

Question. In some cases, the scheduling of the maintenance may push this cost into fiscal year 2004. Do you have a plan for addressing additional costs in fiscal year 2004 due to the need to restore and upgrade equipment such as ships and airplanes?

Answer. Maintenance of the equipment used in Iraqi operations depends on when it is returned to its originating location, and when it is subsequently sent to the depot maintenance facility. Furthermore, the maintenance schedules for any particular piece of equipment is also partly dependent on other mitigating circumstance, such as the possible need for that equipment to support other military missions and the availability of maintenance facilities to perform the required maintenance.

Assuming that the intensive combat phase executes as planned, many for the fixed wing aircraft and naval assets will return to their home locations in FY 2003. Other equipment, especially that used by some Army units may have to be retained in the theater of operations for a longer period. Maintenance on much of that equipment may have to be deferred to FY 2004. We will have a better idea of the how much of the required maintenance costs will fall in FY 2004 as the operation and prospective drawdown of forces proceeds.

Question. In addition to equipment, properly placed and trained personnel contribute greatly to the readiness of the military. In some cases, deployed personnel have missed training opportunities, separation dates or moving on to new assignments. What has been included in your supplemental request for "reconstituting" the military personnel as they return to the United States (i.e. training, permanent change of station moves)?

Answer. Nothing was specifically included in the supplemental request for "reconstituting" the military personnel as they return to the United States. The amount required for this purpose in FY 2003 remains in the baseline budgets. Much of the reconstitution will need to occur during FY 2004.

Question. What are the assumptions you used to develop these costs?

Answer. For both Active and Reserve Component personnel, we assumed that some personnel would return in time to accomplish the scheduled training. It was clear that some training exercises would be cancelled, so the cost avoidance for those exercises was considered. In a number of areas, the funding that would have otherwise been spent on these training exercises was applied to the cost of war bills before the supplemental request was submitted, thus reducing the supplemental request.

Equipment that is not destroyed will be returned to its home station. Because the operational stress placed on equipment in a battlefield situation is much higher than that of normal peacetime use, it is anticipated that some of the equipment will have to be refurbished at a government or contractor depot facility. Other equipment may suffer damage beyond what would be economically prudent to try to repair. Plans to procure replacement equipment will be carefully evaluated by the Department to ensure that the equipment being replaced is consistent with the transformation initiatives that the Department is pursuing.

The cost estimate is based on a specific time duration of intensive combat operations, followed by a lower operational tempo period while Iraq is stabilized. Therefore, funding requested for reconstitution of equipment is based on the anticipated duration of operations in Iraq.

UNITED STATES SPECIAL OPERATIONS COMMAND

Question. The Special Operations Command is playing an important role in the Global War on Terrorism in Afghanistan, Iraq, and a number of other locations. Special Operations forces are still heavily engaged in operations in and around Afghanistan. How much longer do you anticipate they will be needed there?

Answer. Until we kill/capture the AQ terrorists and eliminate the Taliban remnants it is a long-term journey. While Afghanistan's democracy grows its internal capabilities grow (ANA), and the international community plays a bigger role, our Special Forces and conventional forces will continue to play an important role in mission accomplishment.

Question. How many of these forces are involved in operations and how many are involved in training the Afghan National Army?

Answer. We currently have approximately 1084 personnel involved in operations. No-SOCOM personnel are involved with ANA training.

Question. How much of the supplemental request will support Special Operations activities in various operations? How much is requested for additional flying hours? How much is requested for the reconstitution of ammunition and other items used thus far and projected to be used in combat? How much is requested for procurement for the use of Special Operations Forces? For what items? What items will be procured?

[CLERK'S NOTE.—The Department was unable to provide a response to the above questions in time to be printed in this hearing volume.]

UNITED STATES SPECIAL OPERATIONS COMMAND MH-47 HELICOPTERS

Question. Since October of 2001, the 160th Special Operations Regiment has experienced battle damage to ten of its MH-47 fleet in eleven different instances. Two of these aircraft were destroyed beyond repair. If the Congress approves the fiscal year 2004 request for additional special operations MH-47 helicopters, there will still be a shortfall of at least 8 helicopters. How does the Department plan to meet this requirement?

Answer. The Department is reviewing the options to ensure that both the Army and USSOCOM have the rotary wing lift capability that they need. There are currently 53 MH-47G conversions planned through FY 2009, to include two replace-

ment helicopters funded through the Defense Emergency Response Fund in FY 2002.

Question. Given the contributions that these helicopters have thus far provided in the Global war on terrorism, why is there no request in the supplemental to replace the two helicopters, which are a total loss?

Answer. The Department funded two replacement helicopters in FY 2002 using \$57 million of Defense Emergency Response Funds. These two helicopters will be delivered in FY 2005.

END-ITEM LOSSES

Question. In support of the Global War on Terrorism and in Operations in Iraq, the Services have sustained the loss of numerous equipment end items such as aircraft. In the Army alone, 39 aircraft have been either been lost or sustained heavy damage during the past year. Please describe the losses due to combat and mishaps of major end items in support of operations in Iraq and the Global War on Terrorism.

Answer. Due to ongoing, dynamic combat operations, the list of equipment losses due to combat and mishaps is continuously changing. A complete list of equipment losses will be provided at the completion of operations in Iraq and the Global War on Terrorism.

Question. Mr. Secretary, the Supplemental request appears to replace only certain end items lost in the Global War on Terrorism and in operations in Iraq. What is the criteria used to determine which items would be replaced?

Answer. Given the dynamic nature of the operations, we have structured the Supplemental request to maximize our flexibility to ensure that the most critical items are replaced. Some items may not be replaced, as inventory levels may be sufficient that are no longer in production. In this case, we may procure substitute items that provide a similar capability. The Department will evaluate end-item losses and notify the Congress on funds to be transferred to investment accounts to replace expenditures.

Question. Please describe the type and quantity of such items included in the Supplemental request.

Answer. Given the current status of military operations, it is too early to determine the Department's specific requirements for replacement equipment. The Supplemental request is structured with the flexibility needed to ensure requirements can be addressed as they arise despite the unknowns of ongoing combat operations.

Question. In some cases, such as aircraft, there have been significant issues. Why did the Department choose not to initiate replacement of this equipment in the Supplemental request?

Answer. Given the current status of military operations, it is too early to determine the Department's specific requirements for replacement equipment. The Department was hesitant to predict losses of specific aircraft prior to the onset of hostilities. Once we have a better understanding of what specific aircraft are lost in Iraq, we can determine which ones are our highest priorities to replace.

PATRIOT MISSILES

Question. News reports indicate that Patriot missiles successfully intercepted several Iraqi missiles during the initial phase of operations in Iraq. These reports are unclear as to whether the intercepted missiles were Scuds or another type of missile such as the al Samoud. Reports also indicate that a Patriot missile inadvertently downed a coalition aircraft. What types of Patriot missiles are deployed in support of operations in Iraq PAC-2? PAC-3? Both?

Answer. Coalition forces deployed PAC-2, Guidance Enhanced Missiles (GEM), GEM+ and PAC-3 missiles in support of operations in Iraq.

Question. Backup materials for the fiscal year 2003 Supplemental budget request suggest that additional funding is included for additional Patriot missiles. How many and what types of Patriot missiles?

Answer. The Supplemental request is for 22 PAC-3 missiles.

Question. What is the production lead-time between funding and receipt of additional Patriot missiles?

Answer. For the FY03 PAC-3 missile production contract, lead time between contract award and first delivery is 17 months.

Question. Early media reports indicate that several Iraqi missiles were successfully intercepted in the early stages of operations. Do you yet know the type of missiles that were intercepted?

Answer. The specific types of Short Range Ballistic Missiles (SRBMs) successfully intercepted by PATRIOT units during the course of Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF) were either the al-Samoud or Ababil/Al Fatah SRBMs.

Question. How many attempted intercepts did U.S. or other forces initiate?

Answer. U.S. Army and Kuwaiti PATRIOT units initiated nine engagements against confirmed Iraqi Short Range Ballistic Missiles (SRBMs) during the course of Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF). All nine Iraqi SRBMs that threatened specific U.S. and Kuwaiti forces/assets were successfully destroyed by either U.S. or Kuwaiti PATRIOT batteries using either PAC-2 class or PAC-3 interceptors.

Question. Recent news reports indicate that a Patriot missile accidentally downed a coalition aircraft. Do you know if this incident represented a failure of the missile system? Command and control over the launch? Are there other reasons?

Answer. The cause of the friendly fire incidents is still under investigation.

AMMUNITION FUNDING

Question. The Supplemental request provides for \$3.7 billion for ammunition both to replace what has been used in combat and in anticipation of continued operations. OSD justification materials indicate that \$500 million of the \$3.7 billion is related to ammunition consumed to date, and \$3.2 billion anticipated future ammunition requirements. This requirement is very broadly defined, and includes everything from small arms ammunition up to cruise missile and Patriot missiles. Mr. Secretary, when you developed the ammunition component of the Supplemental appropriations request, what assumptions were used as to the type and duration of operations?

Answer. The munitions component was developed with input from the military departments based on various duration scenarios. The final request is based on a short duration, high intensity conflict, using a variety of weapons from precision guided standoff weapons to conventional ground ammunition.

Question. Does this request replace ammunition used in combat? Does it anticipate ammunition requirements for future operations?

Answer. The supplemental request will replace munitions used in combat, though not necessarily on a one-for-one basis. Munitions expended that are in production will be replaced to the extent possible, but it may be necessary to replace some munitions with more recent versions, depending on when the items were produced. The supplemental will also be used, to the extent possible, to anticipate munitions requirements for future operations based on careful examinations of inventories after the conflict.

Question. Please provide a breakout of known expended munitions.

[CLERK'S NOTE.—The Department was unable to provide a response in time to be printed in this hearing volume.]

Question. How has the term "ammunition" been defined in this request? Does it include items generally purchased through the Services' ammunition procurement accounts? Does it include other items such as replacement missiles?

Answer. The term "ammunition" includes both conventional ammunition purchased through the ammunition accounts, as well as precision guided munitions and missiles. The precision guided munitions are purchased through both the ammunition and missile/weapons accounts, depending on the exact weapon.

Question. Please provide a list by type of ammunition of those items you have included in the Supplemental request.

Answer. The supplemental request for munitions was developed before the start of the conflict, and is intended to be a fund to replenish munitions based on their expenditure during the conflict, as well as the state of the Services' inventory of munitions. Conventional ammunition may include items such as bomb bodies, small and medium caliber, tank ammunition, mortars, artillery, rockets, grenades, fuzes, anti-tank mines, signals, demolition munitions, flares, cartridges, and others as necessary. Precision guided munitions may include items such as Tactical Tomahawk, Laser Guided Bombs, Joint Standoff Weapon, Javelin, Laser and Longbow Hellfire, Army Tactical Missile System, Multiple Launch Rocket System, Patriot, Stinger, and others as necessary.

Question. Will current production capabilities be able to meet the request for additional replacement munitions given fiscal year 2003 and fiscal year 2004 production requests?

Answer. The Department will ensure that production capabilities are present in replenishing munitions through the supplemental request, as well as the baseline budget request for munitions. With respect to producing additional munitions with the supplemental request, the Department will only include high priority items

where production capability is present, and the additional workload does not create undue delay in the overall production schedule of that item.

Question. What is the timeline for replacing these munitions?

Answer. In replacing munitions through supplemental funding, the majority of replacements will take place during the Fiscal Year 2003 funded delivery period. However, there may be some instances where some production will be added to the Fiscal Year 2004 funded delivery period, if this is necessary to achieve a more balanced production schedule between those two periods.

Question. Are there differences between the requests submitted by the Services for ammunition and the level of funding included in the request? Please explain.

Answer. The munitions requirements were developed with input from the Services, based on many different conflict duration scenarios. The final request, developed before the conflict, represents the Department's best estimate for a short term, high intensity conflict, based on usage of both precision guided standoff weapons, as well as conventional ammunition.

Question. How is the \$3.7 billion requested for ammunition divided between the various services?

Answer. Due to the uncertainty of the exact nature and duration of the conflict, as well as the number of joint weapons to be used, the supplemental request for munitions is not precisely split among the Services. The request was developed before the conflict, and represents the Department's best estimate of a fund required to replenish and restock inventories of a wide variety of munitions after examination of the actual combat usage.

SERVICES CASH RUN-OUT DATES

Question. Mr. Secretary, we understand that given the pace of ongoing operations, the Army and Marine Corps, especially, have the potential of running out of money in mid-April or early May. When do you estimate the Services will run out of obligation authority?

Answer. Approval of the FY 2003 Supplemental prevented this from happening.

Question. How long would "Feed and Forage" action extend the run-out date?

Answer. Approval of FY 2003 Supplemental prevented this from happening.

CONSTRUCTION PROJECTS USING OPERATION AND MAINTENANCE FUNDS

Question. Please discuss the construction of temporary and durable or semi-permanent buildings and support facilities, such as fuel tank farms, in the Gulf region.

Answer. Section 2801 defines a military construction project as a facility under the control of a Secretary of a Military Department. The Department used O&M funds to construct temporary facilities if there was not a Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA) in place and if the facility was temporary, i.e. if it was to be used after the operation. If the facility was in a country that had a SOFA or was under the control of a Secretary of a Military Department, or if the facility could be used after the operation, then it was considered military construction.

Question. What is the total Operation and Maintenance appropriations that have been used to construct such facilities?

Answer. The Department used approximately \$758 million of O&M, \$128.6 million of Military Construction, \$21.2 million of DERR O&M, \$63.1 million of DERR Military Construction, and \$3.9 million of Exercise Related Construction (ERC).

Question. On what authority does the Department base its decision to use O&M appropriations instead of MILCON appropriations for this construction?

Answer. Section 2801 of 10 U.S.C. That section defines a Military Construction project as a facility under the control of a Secretary of a Military Department and if the facility is temporary.

CONTRIBUTIONS FROM OTHER COUNTRIES

Question. What is the status of the Defense Cooperation account, or other fund used by the Department to collect contributions from other countries for this war with Iraq?

Answer. The Defense Cooperation account has a balance of \$13,141,644.

Question. How much is in the fund?

Answer. The Defense Cooperation account has investments totaling \$13,140,838 and cash of \$806.

Question. What are your projections for receipts to the funds?

Answer. The Defense Cooperation account has, since October 1, 2001, had an average total monthly contribution rate of \$645,663. The total average rate is made up of individual contributions of \$366,467 per month and foreign contributions of

\$279,196 per month. The contribution amounts, however, vary greatly by month. The average individual contributions was influenced by a one-time contribution in January 2002 of \$6,353,462, and the average foreign contributions was influenced by a one-time contribution in June 2002 of \$5,000,000.

Question. Who are the expected donor countries?

Answer. The Department of Defense is seeking donors throughout the world to aid in fighting the global war on terrorism and the relief and reconstruction of Afghanistan and Iraq. Contribution efforts have concentrated on support to coalition partners and relief and reconstruction, and have not, however, especially involved the Defense Cooperation account, which is used by the Department for its expenses, as appropriated by the Congress.

Question. Are there restrictions on any of the contributions, such as it can only go to help with humanitarian work or for non-lethal purposes?

Answer. There are no restrictions on any of the contributions to the Defense Cooperation account. The money in the Defense Cooperation account can be spent as appropriated by the Congress.

Question. What sort of things have been or are expected to be received as "In-kind" contributions?

Answer. Categories of In-kind contributions include (1) airlift, (2) base operations support, (3) biological and chemical detection and decontamination, (4) engineering services, (5) fuel and underway replenishment services, (6) intelligence/interdiction/surveillance/escort, (7) logistics support, (8) mine hunting and clearing, (9) hospital and medical support, (10) equipment and vehicles, and (11) force protection and security forces.

Question. This supplemental request includes \$340 million for additional fuel cost. Why not ask allies in the region to provide the fuel?

Answer. Saudi Arabia has been providing free fuel related to Operation Southern Watch for some years. When Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF) began, the Kingdom continued that level of support. In addition, Saudi Arabia also provided concessionary pricing on some of the additional fuel procured by the US for use during OIF. Japan has been providing free fuel from its oiler fleet for U.S. Navy ship consumption since shortly after September 11, 2001. Kuwait is providing significant free fuel for use in OIF. Kuwait also constructed fuel pipelines northward without charge to aid the war effort.

The requested funding is net of the free and discounted fuel we are receiving. At the same time, we are continuing to solicit allied support.

Other than the free fuel mentioned above, allies are providing fuel we need that we must buy. Aircraft operations are originating in many geographic locations that are not providing free fuel. For OIF, these locations include Diego Garcia, Egypt, Germany, England, Italy, and some countries around the Persian Gulf. Some B-Saudi Arabia has been providing free fuel related to Operation Southern Watch for some years. When Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF) began, the Kingdom continued that level of support. In addition, Saudi Arabia also provided concessionary pricing on some of the additional fuel procured by the US for use during OIF. Japan has been providing free fuel from its oiler fleet for U.S. Navy ship consumption since shortly after September 11, 2001. Kuwait is providing significant free fuel for use in OIF. Kuwait also constructed fuel pipelines northward without charge to aid the war effort.

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Costs of fuel are up world-wide. The funds are requested to cover that increased cost.

NATURAL RESOURCES RISK REMEDIATION FUND

Question. The Supplemental request includes a separate appropriation almost \$500 million for the Natural Resources Remediation Fund. The Committee understands that this request is to pay for the emergency fire fighting and repair of oil wells that have been set on fire in Iraq. How were the costs estimated?

Answer. The DoD Supplemental request included \$489.3 million in the Natural Resources Risk Remediation Fund to address emergency fire fighting, repair of damages to oil facilities in Iraq, and temporary operation of the fields. The \$489.3 million is the estimate of the cost of: anticipated fire fighting operations and fire fight-

ing equipment, specialized vehicles, well testers, oil pipeline, parts, fittings, oil field equipment and pump parts to replace damaged or destroyed items, contracts for mission support by specialized contractors, Army Corps of Engineers personnel travel and per diem and related expenses, training requirements, damage assessment teams, and other expenses. The Corp of Engineers worked with CENTCOM to refine the contingency plans and cost estimates developed by private contractors, and determined the contracting strategy for support services.

Question. How does the work get done, that is, who does the actual work? Private sector contractors or the Corps of Engineers?

Answer. The U.S. Army Corps of Engineers (USACE) is the Army's Executive agent for this area. The USACE has issued a contract to Kellogg/Brown and Root, which is responsible for day to day operations. The USACE oversees KBR's activities to ensure they comply with the specifications of the contract.

Question. Do you anticipate this fund will be used for anything besides fighting the fires and repairing the wells?

Answer. Yes. The Natural Resources Risk Remediation provision would provide funds not only for emergency fire fighting, and repair to damaged oil facilities, but also to preserve and rebuild the fuel distribution system.

Question. What amounts, if any, have thus far been expended?

Answer. As of March 25, 2003, \$94 million was expended out of the Natural Resources Risk Remediation Fund.

Question. Can this fund accept contributions of cash or in-kind goods and services from individuals or from other countries? If so, how do you anticipate managing this fund?

Answer. The Secretary of Defense can accept contributions of money for Natural Resources Risk Remediation Fund (NRRRF) purposes and credit the money directly to the NRRRF. Funds received from private individuals or foreign countries would be realigned through the Department of Treasury to the NRRRF. Upon receipt of these funds, the Department of Treasury would apportion the additional funds to DoD via the Office of Management and Budget. The Office of the Secretary of Defense would subsequently issue the NRRRF funds to the Department of the Army for execution.

COOPERATIVE THREAT REDUCTION PROGRAM

Question. Currently, the CTR program is designed to help the nations of the former Soviet Union to reduce and eliminate weapons of mass destruction (WMD). The supplemental request includes language that would expand this program worldwide. Why is this fundamental change in the nature of the program being requested in an emergency supplemental appropriations bill?

Answer. Given the new threats confronting the United States, the Department of Defense (DoD) believed it important to promptly seek legislative language that would expand the geographic scope and flexibility of the CTR Program to address dangerous WMD proliferation threats, thereby providing the President another useful option in his WMD response tool-kit. If the proposed language is approved, DoD plans to leverage its special expertise and unique access to deal with WMD, related materials and infrastructure in countries where it currently has a large footprint, such as Afghanistan and Iraq. In the long term, DoD wants to be able to address WMD threats in other countries where strong military-to-military relationships could be leveraged.

Question. Would the language affect only the CTR programs of the Department of Defense, or those funded through the Department of State and Department of Energy as well?

Answer. The proposed language would affect only the Department of Defense CTR Program.

Question. Is the Administration proposing similar legislative language to the authorizing committee?

Answer. Yes. The Administration proposed to the House and Senate Armed Services Committees that similar language be included in the FY 2004 National Defense Authorization Act.

Question. What kind of programs would be funded if Congress accepted this modification, and where would such programs occur?

Answer. DoD would fund proliferation threat reduction projects and activities outside the states of the former Soviet Union (FSU) designed either to help resolve critical emerging proliferation threats that jeopardize United States national security interests, or to take advantage of unexpected opportunities to achieve long-standing United States nonproliferation goals. We anticipate employing this authority where DoD has a sizable presence, in close coordination with other departments to maxi-

mize the expertise United States agencies can bring to bear to address a proliferation threat.

We believe there remains not only fissile material and possibly nuclear weapons, but also dangerous pathogens and perhaps chemical weapons or weaponized chemical agents in countries outside the former Soviet Union that pose imminent threats to the United States and its allies. The reality of the WMD threat is so changed since 9/11 that we need to rethink how we position the United States to respond quickly and decisively to emerging WMD proliferation threats. DoD has special expertise in this area and, sometimes, special access. Therefore, we believe it important that DoD be provided the flexibility to leverage these factors when appropriate and in full coordination with the interagency.

COUNTER-TERRORISM ACTIVITIES IN COLOMBIA

Question. The President's supplemental request includes \$34 million in the Drug Interdiction and Counter-drug Activities program to fund increased operational tempo in Colombia's unified campaign against narcotics trafficking and terrorist activities. Three American DoD contract employees are currently being held hostage by the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (the FARC), a long time narco-terrorist organization. What portions of this request are intended to provide support to ongoing counter-drug activities and what portions are intended to help the Colombians in their counter-terrorist effort?

Answer. The entire \$34 million provided in the supplemental is designed to assist the Colombian military in their fight against narco-terrorists. Terrorism and narcotics trafficking are clearly linked. The Colombian narco-terrorist organizations (FARC, ELN, and AUC) receive a large majority of their funds from the illegal drug trade. Congress provided DoD expanded authority during fiscal years 2002 and 2003 to support a unified campaign against narcotics trafficking and terrorist organizations operating in Colombia. Attacking both terrorism and narcotics trafficking simultaneously leverages limited resources and provides the most effectiveness.

Question. What portion of these funds will support American DoD personnel and what portion will be provided to Colombia?

Answer. DoD funds will provide approximately \$11 million to support DoD personnel assisting Colombia in their war against narco-terrorists. This includes Operations and Intelligence Teams, which will advise and train Colombia military units in operational and intelligence planning at the strategic, operational, and tactical levels. Funding also supports costs associated with the Air Bridge Denial resumption. Although this funding supports the deployment and sustainment of DoD personnel, the direct benefit is to Colombian military units. Approximately \$23 million will be provided to purchase equipment, construct facilities and force protection upgrades, and provide contract logistics support for the Colombian military.

Question. Are there funds requested to provide force protection for U.S. personnel in Colombia?

Answer. Yes. Limited force protection funding for the Operations and Intelligence Teams was included in the Supplemental. In addition, funds will be used for force protection support for Colombian facilities in which we have invested DoD support. In addition, supplemental funds will provide force protection support for Colombian facilities supporting expanded authorities at multiple locations. DoD personnel normally operate from several of these locations.

Question. Are you confident that the request is consistent with current Congressional authorizations which address the use of Counter-drug funding for Counter-terrorism activities?

Answer. Yes. We review all of our activities to ensure compliance with the law.

Question. Why is this requested in the Supplemental request for funding the War in Iraq?

Answer. The supplemental request is directly related to the Global War on Terrorism. The FARC is one of the largest, most well-organized terrorist groups in the world. The FARC has killed Americans, including DoD contractors, and was seeking to assassinate multiple foreign dignitaries, including the U.S. Ambassador, in a failed mortar attack against President Uribe at his inauguration. The FARC is multinational in character, with cells and financiers in several countries. The FARC currently holds three U.S. government contract personnel hostage. The FARC's main source of income remains the drug trade. Narco-terrorist elements in Colombia actively seek to overthrow the freely elected Colombian government, the oldest democracy in Latin America. Supplemental funding was requested for Colombia based on commitments the Secretary of Defense and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff made to Colombian President Uribe. These commitments include an increased support to Colombia against narco-terrorists, part of the Global War on Terrorism.

We seek to provide a surge of training and equipment to Colombian military and police forces. The U.S. will remain in a supporting role.

Colombia is waging a valiant effort to reclaim territory from the narcoterrorists. President Uribe is working to destroy narco-terrorist organizations and illegal armed groups, and the ability of these groups to undermine Colombia's democracy and national security. The Government of Colombia urgently needs U.S. support to improve its counternarcoterrorism capabilities. With the momentum provided by the election of President Uribe, there is a window of opportunity to significantly affect narco-terrorist organizations operating in Colombia.

DEFENSE HEALTH PROGRAM

Question. There is \$301.7 million in the supplemental for Defense Health Program. How is this divided among the Army, Navy/Marine Corps and Air Force?

Answer. The Defense Health Program (DHP) is currently undergoing a midyear execution review, along with all other DoD organizations, conducted by the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense (Comptroller). Once that action has been completed, the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Health Affairs) will review any adjustments to the DHP budget, all additional funding requirements surfaced during the review; and, after soliciting input from the Armed Services Surgeons General, make a decision on the \$301.7 million proposed in the Emergency Wartime Supplemental Appropriations Act.

No distribution will be made to the Marine Corps as their health services are provided by the Navy.

Question. Does this amount include initial supply and resupply of medical units in theater?

Answer. No. Funding for those requirements were included in Service "line" portion of the Emergency Wartime Supplemental Appropriations Act, identified for distribution to the Army, Navy, and Air Force. No amounts were identified for the Marine Corps as their health services are provided by the Navy.

Question. Is this amount based on the number of servicemen and women currently deployed?

Answer. The Emergency Wartime Supplemental Appropriations Act appropriated \$501.7 million for the Defense Health Program. Of this amount, the \$301.7 million in the Department's request was based on the number of activated Reserve and National Guard personnel, to pay the anticipated health care costs for those personnel and their family members. The additional amount of \$200 million was added by the Congress for additional requirements.

DISPOSITION OF EQUIPMENT AFTER THE WAR

Question. Will any of the equipment that we have shipped over to the Gulf be kept in the area after the war is over?

Answer. This question goes to the heart of our "Pre-positioning" strategy. As part of the strategic mobility triad, consisting of airlift, sealift, and pre-positioned material, we use "Pre-positioned war materials"—frequently referred to as "Prepo"—to reduce the response time to a contingency around the world. Under this concept, DoD assets are placed in pre-selected global locations to provide quicker response times to potential contingencies. We have maintained prepo assets in the CENTCOM AOR for many years and this strategy will remain an essential part of our overall strategy into the future. In fact, with the new emphasis on relooking our overseas footprint, this program may well become more important, particularly in a region as critical as the CENTCOM AOR.

We are currently conducting a "Post-War Defense Assessment" which will involve taking a look at our near and long-term strategic goals, plans for setting the force, and reviewing our integrated global footprint in the near and long-term. This assessment will not be completed until the late summer or fall of '03 but it will have a major impact on our global presence and contingency plans. These decisions will impact the near and long-term. This assessment will not be completed until the late summer or fall of '03 but it will have a major impact on our global presence and contingency plans. These decisions will impact the near and long term decision on the final positioning of our prepo assets and ultimately determine if equipment will be kept in the area into the future.

Question. If so, are costs included in the estimate to properly repair and store the equipment?

Answer. The cost to repair and store the pre-positioned materials used in the war were included in the supplemental, however, there may still be additional cost associated with future decisions to change the posture of the pre-positioned equipment. As part of our pre-positioning strategy we must complete our "Postwar Defense As-

assessment" prior to determining the final plans to stage equipment in CENTCOM or determine what equipment will be left in theater. Any plan to pre-position material based upon the outcome of the assessment will involve additional costs. These costs include transporting, overhauling, and maintaining the equipment in an operational status. Our assessment is not complete, as a majority of this equipment is still engaged in operations. Based on the condition of the equipment that has been returned, significant maintenance cost will be incurred. We fully expect the FY Supplemental to cover the cost of repairing the equipment that has been returned to date. This includes the Marine Corps equipment that will be repaired in theater and returned to the Maritime Prepositioned Squadrons to be available for future missions. It is important to note that in all cases only the best and most modern equipment will be repaired and returned to PREPO. Like all aspects of our basing and force positioning strategy, PREPO equipment will continue to evolve into a more agile and flexible capability.

Question. Will any plans for restationing of our forces that are now based in Europe impact the places to which you would ship the equipment?

Answer. The "Post-War Defense Assessment" will involve taking a look at our near and long-term strategic goals, plans for setting the force, and reviewing our integrated global footprint in the near and long-term. This assessment will have a major impact on our global presence and contingency plans. These decisions will also impact the near and long-term decisions on the final positioning of our military assets. Such a plan will incorporate the changing environment in Europe and our long-term plans and interest on the European continent as part of a comprehensive review of placement of prepositioning in the future.

Question. How long do you intend to keep the hospital ship USNS COMFORT in the region?

Answer. The USNS COMFORT departed the CENTCOM AOR on 10 May 03. Her deployment lasted from Jan 6, 2003 to June 13, 2003.

STORM DAMAGE

Question. The Air Force facilities on Guam suffered over \$130 million in damage due to Typhoon Pongsong earlier this year. Now the Department has deployed additional bombers to Guam in order to be ready for anything that might happen in Korea. What is the condition of the hangar facilities in which we are storing the bombers, or doing maintenance on the aircraft?

Answer. After Typhoon Pongsana in December 2002, the Air Force spent approximately \$14M to provide essential repairs to restore limited operational capability to Andersen Air Force Base. The super typhoon substantially damaged 3 of the 4 large hangars. Hangar 1 (concrete structure built in 1981) was undamaged. Hangars 2, 3 and 4 were heavily damaged. These three smaller nose dock/hangar facilities were used for B-2 Low Observable maintenance, but were badly damaged with major portions of the siding torn-off, electrical/lighting and environmental controls destroyed. Basically, the facilities are unusable. Minimal work was needed immediately to secure unsafe structures until a new storm proof hangar can be constructed. As a result of the typhoon, aircraft servicing is severely limited, especially for B-2s. Only Hangar 1 provides shelter from elements for sensitive internal systems. Hangar 1 can house one B-52 or two B-2s but is not environmentally controlled and, therefore, not suitable for maintenance on sensitive B-2 systems. The other hangars could house one B-2 each and were environmentally controlled before the latest typhoon.

Question. Are the bombers adequately protected?

Answer. No. With only one hangar large enough to house a B-52, hard-broken aircraft that could not be flown away before the storm hit would be unprotected in the event of a super typhoon.

Question. Does the supplemental request include funds to repair the storm damage on Guam?

Answer. The supplemental request included O&M funds to repair damage caused by Typhoon Pongsana, but the request did not include MILCON or MFH funds.

Note: The table below summarizes supplemental funding received/to be received for Andersen AFB, Guam storm damage.

[In millions of dollars]

Appropriation	Damage estimate	Supplemental	Funding shortfall
O&M	\$68.0	\$58.5	\$9.5*
MILCON (hangar)**	37.3	37.3	0

[In millions of dollars]

Appropriation	Damage estimate	Supplemental	Funding shortfall
MFH**	1.8	1.8	0
Total	107.1	97.6	9.5

* After further review, the Air Force determined that supplemental funding should not be used to source \$9.5 million in Typhoon Pongsona O&M damage as these facilities do not directly support the global war on terrorism. The Air Force has included these O&M requirements on its FY2003 O&M Unfunded List. Should additional resources become available, these requirements will be considered for funding along with other critical, must-pay shortfalls.

** MILCON and MFH funds were added to the supplemental by the House and Senate appropriators

ACQUISITION OF REPLACEMENT UAVS

Question. The Committee understands that within the supplemental request is approximately \$57 million for the acquisition of additional Predator UAVs to replace combat losses. How many Predator UAVs in support of the Iraq military action have been lost?

Answer. Three Predator unmanned aerial vehicles were lost.

Question. Would it be your intention to purchase additional vehicles, ground stations, or other equipment such as laser designators and hellfire missile kits?

Answer. The Supplemental included \$57 million for Reconstitution. This was justified as "Predator requires the reconstitution of aircraft, ground and communications equipment and spares to continue to support and sustain fielded and in-production aircraft needed by the combatant commanders to fight the ongoing Global War On Terrorism."

[In millions of dollars]

2 Fixed Ground Control Stations and 2 Launch Recovery Elements	\$7.4
Communications Equipment	15.4
Ground Support Equipment	7.8
2 Readiness Spares Packages	11.4
3 MQ-1 Predator Aircraft	15.0

Question. How many Predator UAV vehicles are currently available for use—is there sufficient inventory at this time to replace the vehicles that have been lost?

Answer. Currently, we have 38 aircraft in the inventory—of which 26 are available for operations and training to replace the vehicles lost until the inventory can be augmented.

Question. Understanding the need to replace lost vehicles, does it make sense to replace one for one what was lost? Would it make sense to purchase equipment that would provide better capability for the future?

Answer. Unlike older generation aircraft that may have been lost in the war and replaced with a more capable aircraft, the Predator unmanned aerial vehicle is a new aircraft that has provided the warfighter with valuable intelligence information. The plan is to replace the aircraft lost with an upgraded Predator air vehicle capable of carrying the Hellfire missile.

Question. Please provide a detailed description of the capabilities and items that would be purchased with the request.

Answer. The Supplemental request for \$57 million will provide for the reconstitution of aircraft, ground and communications equipment and spares to continue to support and sustain fielded and in-production aircraft needed by the combatant commanders to fight the ongoing Global War On Terrorism.

[In millions of dollars]

2 Fixed Ground Control Stations and 2 Launch Recovery Elements	\$7.4
Communications Equipment	15.4
Ground Support Equipment	7.8
2 Readiness Spares Packages	11.4
3 MQ-1 Predator Aircraft	15.0

GENERAL PROVISIONS

Question. The supplemental request includes a number of legislative provisions. Would you briefly discuss each one. Increase funding authority for the Combatant Commander Initiative Fund. (Formerly known as the CINC Initiative Fund.)

Answer. The primary focus of the Combatant Commander Initiative Fund is to support unforeseen contingency requirement critical to Combatant Commanders

joint warfighting readiness and national security interests. The fund allows the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff the capability to address unanticipated requirements that the Department's normal Planning, Programming, and Budgeting System (PPBS) cannot handle on a timely basis. Since September 11, 2001, the Combatant Commander Initiative Fund has been a key enabler with respect to supporting emergent, low-cost, high-benefit initiatives that enhance DoD's warfighting capabilities in the war on terrorism. With the ongoing operations in Iraq and the continued hunt for terrorists around the globe, the number and associated cost of unforeseen combatant commander requirements has grown significantly. All indications are that this growth trend will continue for the foreseeable future. As a result, the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, requires additional authority to quickly respond to mission critical requirements identified by combatant commanders.

Question. Provide additional authority for extraordinary and emergency expenses, from \$34.5 million to \$69 million.

Answer. The war with Iraq has created uncertainties that were not factored in when we submitted the FY 2003 budget, shortly after 9-11. Moreover, our FY 2003 budget did not adequately take into account the increasing uncertainties associated with the global war on terrorism. In fact, our E³ request for FY 2003 was only slightly higher than the annual amounts requested for the preceding three fiscal years (pre 9-11), as shown below: FY 2003—\$34.5 million; FY 2002—\$33.5 million; FY 2001—\$30.0 million; and FY 2000—\$32.3 million.

The Secretary of Defense's E³ authority is used to satisfy the requirements of all the Defense agencies, the Joint Staff and Combatant Commanders, as well as the Office of the Secretary of Defense. In order to meet the requirements associated with the war with Iraq and the ongoing global war on terrorism, much of the FY 2003 requirements previously identified by the Defense agencies have been deferred.

An increase of E³ authority to \$69.0 million is required to backfill the Defense agencies requirements, and also meet emergent requirements associated with the war with Iraq and the global war on terrorism.

Approximately 75 percent of the Secretary of Defense's FY 2003 E³ authority (\$34.5 million) has already been allocated. Critical Defense Intelligence Agency and U.S. Special Operations Command missions requiring E³ authority still lie ahead. In addition, other Defense agencies' (including National Security Agency's) requirements currently uncovered due to more urgent needs must also be satisfied.

Question. Provide authority for the DoD to use funds appropriated in this act to undertake military construction projects with the requirement that the Congress be provided with a description and cost estimate 15 days before obligating the amounts.

Answer. Section 1901 of the Emergency Wartime Supplemental requires the Department to notify the Congress 7 days prior to transfer the money appropriated in this act and to notify the Congress 15 days after the funds are obligated. Section 1901 allows up to \$150 million to be transferred to Military Construction, Defense-wide for projects that are not authorized by law.

So far, we have notified the Congress for 3 Army Military Construction projects totaling approximately \$10.4 million that are required to wash vehicles that were used in the Iraq war prior to bringing them back to the United States.

We are evaluating several Navy and Air Force projects but haven't approved them yet. Therefore, we haven't notified Congress prior to transferring the funds.

Question. Provide additional general transfer authority, up to an amount equal to 2.5% of the DoD Appropriations Act for fiscal year 2003. This would increase transfer authority from \$2 billion to approximately, \$9 billion.

Answer. This additional authority is critical to give the Department the flexibility needed to respond to emerging requirements, especially related to military operations in Iraq. It would remove the deadline for submitting notification of multiple reprogrammings to the Congress, giving DoD more time to assess mid-year changes in priorities.

Question. Reimburse the services for a drawdown of \$165 million under the Afghanistan Freedom Support Act of 2002.

Answer. This authority would enable the military services to be reimbursed for expenditures related to Afghanistan operations—thus reducing the strain on readiness and quality of life for the rest of the fiscal year. The drawdown was necessary to support emergent requirements for training and equipping the Afghan National Army (\$150 million), to build a bridge between Tajikistan and Afghanistan (\$8 million), and to assist Jordan in its operations in Afghanistan (\$7 million).

Question. Authorized reimbursement funding from DoD to the services for \$63.5 million under the Iraq Liberation Act of 1998; and make up to \$150 million of funds appropriated to DoD available for support to indigenous forces.

Answer. The \$63.5 million was necessary to address emergent requirements for training and equipping the Free Iraqi Forces. The \$150 million is needed to support indigenous forces that assist U.S. military forces in carrying out military operations or activities, including those in furtherance of the global war on terrorism, and activities necessary to prepare for participation in active military operations.

Question. Authorized the President to use each fiscal year up to \$50 million in Cooperative Threat Reduction funds outside the states of the former Soviet Union, including Iraq. Existing law limits the use of such funds to the states of the former Soviet Union.

Answer. This legislative proposal would authorize the President to use up to \$50 million each fiscal year in Cooperative Threat Reduction funds outside the states of the former Soviet Union, including Iraq, if the President determines such funds would assist the United States in resolving critical emerging proliferation threats or otherwise would permit the United States to take advantage of opportunities or requirements, including those related to the Global War on Terrorism, to achieve long-standing nonproliferation goals. Existing law limits the use of such funds to the states of the former Soviet Union. The provision would allow the President to provide equipment, goods, and services for a project or activity. To the extent possible, such assistance will be provided to the recipient states pursuant to international agreements with terms similar to those in existing international agreements concerning the provision of Cooperative Threat Reduction assistance to states of the former Soviet Union.

[CLERK'S NOTE.—End of questions submitted by Mr. Lewis.]

TUESDAY, SEPTEMBER 30, 2003.

**FISCAL YEAR 2004 SUPPLEMENTAL APPROPRIATIONS
FOR IRAQ AND AFGHANISTAN**

WITNESSES

HON. DONALD H. RUMSFELD, SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

**GENERAL RICHARD B. MYERS, CHAIRMAN, JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF,
UNITED STATES AIR FORCE**

DOV ZAKHEIM, UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE (COMPTROLLER)

INTRODUCTION

Mr. LEWIS. The Committee will come to order.

We would like to welcome today the Secretary of Defense, Donald H. Rumsfeld, General Richard B. Myers, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and Dov Zakheim, Under Secretary of Defense (Comptroller).

This afternoon the Committee is holding an open hearing on the President's fiscal year 2004 request for supplemental appropriations on military operations and, most prominently, for activities in Iraq and Afghanistan.

Mr. Secretary, you may or may not know that I have just returned from a delegation trip to Iraq, some 17 members traveled along. It was a fabulous experience and exposure to the real world as it is out there. Within the mix, a number of our own delegation, our own subcommittee, were in the delegation. Norm Dicks was present, Henry Bonilla, Rodney Frelinghuysen, George Nethercutt, and Todd Tiahrt.

The significance of that experience, besides the fact that you just can't see it unless you really go there and talk to people involved in the midst of that operation, was that our membership, many of whom had questions how we got there, what we were doing or otherwise, had their questions answered, had an experience that caused them all to be very positive about the role America must play in this region, and indeed the reality that we cannot afford to lose the peace in Iraq.

I was very, very encouraged, and never have I been more proud to be a Member of Congress than to watch this wonderful team of members interact with people doing such great work. So it is our pleasure, Mr. Secretary, to welcome you and General Myers and your Comptroller, Dov Zakheim, to the Committee. Your statements in their entirety will be included in the record. We will get to questions as quickly as we can so we can put you on your way to work that is really worthwhile.

Mr. Secretary.

SUMMARY STATEMENT OF SECRETARY RUMSFELD

Secretary RUMSFELD. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. I am delighted that you and your colleagues were able to visit Iraq and visit the troops. I know it is important for their morale and encouragement that members of the House and the Senate do that, and we have encouraged that to happen, and I thank you so much for taking the time to do it.

I appreciate this opportunity to testify on the President's emergency supplemental request.

Earlier this month, the American people marked the anniversary of the September 11th attacks. Thanks to the courage of the men and women in uniform, two nations and 46 million people have been rescued from tyranny. Thousands of terrorists have been captured or killed, and numerous planned attacks have been stopped, and terrorist assets have been seized and lives have been saved.

Each of the young men and women in uniform volunteered for service, and in the course of this war, a number have given their lives. Still others have suffered wounds. Certainly our hearts go out to the families of all those who have been injured or killed in this war, U.S., coalition, and increasingly, I would add, the Iraqi security forces that are now involved with the Iraqi Army, the police, the civil defense, site protection groups and border patrols.

We are grateful also for the brave soldiers and fine civilian staffs from coalition countries now serving in Iraq and Afghanistan and elsewhere in the global war on terror.

As a sign of his conviction that we, as you indicated, have to prosecute this war and defeat those who threaten us, the President has requested \$87 billion in emergency funds to fight the war on terror. The vast majority of needed funds will go for troops who are risking their lives in the struggle.

FUNDS FOR MILITARY OPERATIONS

Of the \$87 billion in the request, \$66 billion is to support ongoing military operations. The President has requested \$51 billion for military operations in Iraq, \$11 billion for military operations in Afghanistan, the Horn of Africa and other Operation Enduring Freedom Missions.

So, \$66 billion of the \$87 billion of this request is really to support the troops, and they need it. The remaining \$21 billion is to help in Afghanistan and Iraq to secure their nations for freedom, to get on a path of stability, self-government and reliance, self-reliance.

FUNDS FOR AFGHANISTAN

For Afghanistan, the request is for \$400 million to train and support the Afghan National Army, which I should add is doing an increasingly good job. They are working with our forces on the ground and getting high praise from everybody, to support the national police, Border Patrol and the highway patrol. \$120 million is to train, demobilize militia and help them find jobs and other private sector initiatives. \$300 million for roads, schools and clinics, and nearly \$300 million to help support the rule of law elections and other critical support for the Afghan nation government.

FUNDS FOR IRAQ

The President has also requested \$20 billion for the Coalition Provisional Authority in Iraq, \$15 billion to speed repairs to Iraq's starved, and as I am sure you observed, dilapidated infrastructure, and \$5 billion to help Iraqis assume responsibility for the security of their country.

The \$20 billion that the President requested does not cover all of Iraq's needs, which are far greater, nor is it intended to. We expect the international community to step up with additional contributions as well and the hope and intention is over the coming years the bulk of funds for Iraq's reconstruction will come from Iraqis themselves, from oil revenues, from recovered assets, from international trade and foreign and direct investment.

The funds the President requested are designed to help Iraqis so they can generate the income and provide the security necessary for them to rebuild their own country.

Take oil, for example. Ambassador Bremer testified that Iraq will earn about \$2.5 billion in oil revenues in 2003. That is an estimate. A substantial sum, considering the dilapidated conditions of its infrastructure. With improvements to that infrastructure, he estimates that Iraq's oil revenues should grow to as much as \$12 billion next year and as much as \$20 billion by 2005. Recently, Iraq's finance minister announced sweeping reforms of their tax and foreign investment laws.

To attract foreign investment into Iraq, they must have more than just attractive tax and investment laws. They have to have reasonable security environment. That is why the President requested \$5 billion to train Iraqis to help defend their own country. It includes \$2 billion for public safety, including training of an additional 40,000 police in the next 18 months, \$2 billion to train a new three division Iraqi Army and an Iraqi civil defense corps, and almost \$1 billion for the Iraqi justice system.

The funds for DoD and the \$20 billion for the Coalition Provisional Authority are linked tightly. Both are needed. The requested CPA investments are needed for the work that General Abizaid, General Sanchez and their troops are engaged in.

The investments the President is requesting are, in a very real sense, a critical element of the coalition's exit strategy. The sooner the Iraqi's can defend their own people, the sooner the U.S. and coalition forces can come home. Reaching our goals requires investments to improve critical infrastructure and basic services necessary to jump-start their economy.

Iraq cannot make those improvements today without assistance from others, us and the international community. The purpose is to help them get on a path where they can rebuild their own country. That is why the President requested the \$20 billion be granted, and not loaned. Iraq is a nation with considerable economic potential, but it also has substantial debt, and certainly it is in no position, given its circumstances, to take on additional debts. If we want to encourage Iraqi self-reliance so they can fund the reconstruction and so U.S. and coalition forces can turn over the security tasks to the Iraqis and come home, it would not be helpful to saddle Iraq with more debt.

The President has requested the \$20 billion investment in the future of Iraq. To put that in context, the Marshall Plan, after World War II, cost roughly \$90 billion in today's dollars. Those investments helped transform a region that has been a source of violent war and instability for centuries and turn it into a place of peace, prosperity and mutually beneficial trade.

PROGRESS IN IRAQ AND AFGHANISTAN

I recently returned, as you did, from Iraq and also Afghanistan. If you saw what I saw, you saw that progress is being achieved in both countries. Afghanistan is on the road to democracy and self-government. After 2 years of training, the Afghan National Army has been fighting side-by-side with coalition forces in our most recent anti-terrorist campaigns. The central government is working to extend authority to the provinces. Together with the Afghan Authority, the coalition has deployed Provisional Reconstruction Teams, or PRTs, to four provinces, with four more on the way. Afghanistan faces challenges, to be sure, but progress has been measurable.

In Iraq, the coalition forces also face difficulties and dangers, let there be no doubt, including the threats from regime remnants, criminals and foreign fighters who come into the country to oppose the coalition.

What is remarkable is that despite the dangers, the coalition civil and military staff in Iraq has, in less than 5 months, I guess it is 5 months tomorrow since the major combat operations ended, racked up a series of achievements in both the security and the civil sides that may be without precedent.

Consider a few accomplishments. In less than 5 months, virtually all major Iraqi hospitals and universities have been reopened. Hundreds of secondary schools, until a few months ago, often used as weapons caches, they have been rebuilt and are ready to start the fall semester. 56,000 Iraqis have been armed and trained and they are contributing to the security and defense of their country. Another 14,000 have been recruited and are currently in training, for a total of 70,000, from zero on May 1 at the end of combat operations.

Today, a new Iraqi Army is being trained and more than 40,000 Iraqi police are conducting joint patrols with coalition forces. By contrast, it took 14 months to establish a police force in post-war Germany and 10 years to begin training a new German army.

The Independent Iraqi Central Bank was established and a new currency announced in just 2 months, accomplishments that took 3 years in post-war Germany. The Iraqi Governing Council has appointed an Iraqi Cabinet of Ministers, something that took 14 months in Germany. In all major cities and most towns and villages, Iraqi Municipal Councils have been formed, something that took 8 months in Germany. 100 percent of the Iraqi people today are living under representative councils, either at the village, town, city or provincial level.

COALITION SUPPORT

All this and more has taken place in just 5 months. It may be without parallel, whether compared to Japan, to Germany, to Bos-

nia or Kosovo. I keep hearing that the U.S. should not go it alone. Well, the U.S. is not going it alone. There are at this moment 17 other nations in the Coalition Provisional Authority. Moreover, there are more than 32 countries with troops in Iraq today. These include Albania, Azerbaijan, Bulgaria, the Czech Republic, Denmark, the Dominican Republic, El Salvador, Estonia, Georgia, Honduras, Hungary, Italy, Kazakhstan, Korea, Latvia, Lithuania, Macedonia, Moldova, Mongolia, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Nicaragua, Norway, the Philippines, Poland, Romania, Slovakia, Spain, Thailand, Ukraine and the United Kingdom, and one or two others that prefer not be mentioned.

That is not going it alone. Portugal is at this moment preparing to deploy forces to Iraq as well. Of the 19 NATO nations, 11 have already committed troops to Iraq. We are currently in discussions with 14 other countries that have expressed a possible interest in sending forces.

Now, do these equal the total number of U.S. forces? No. Do the contributions they are making financially equal ours? No, they do not. But they do represent a significant military commitment and a political commitment for those nations, and we are, as we should be, deeply grateful to them for their contributions, for their courage, both political and personal, and for their friendship.

In Afghanistan, NATO has just taken over the command of ISAF, the Alliance's first mission outside of Europe in its history. Between Iraq and Afghanistan, there are 49 countries with forces on the ground, with many others making important contributions in other ways. So this business that America is going it alone is simply not factual. It is false.

SPENDING FOR DEFENSE

Let me conclude by recalling why we are requesting these funds. The Wall Street Journal recently tallied the cost to our country and economy the September 11 attacks. They concluded that the 9/11 attack alone cost the American people hundreds of billions of dollars, and that is not counting the price paid in lives and the immense suffering of their families and loved ones.

Our Nation can afford whatever it needs to defend our people and our way of life. In the Eisenhower and Kennedy presidential years, we spent about 9 or 10 percent of Gross National Product on defense. The last time I was Secretary of Defense in the 1970s, we spent 4 or 5 percent of GDP on defense. Today we spend about 3.1 percent. It is a great deal of money, to be sure, let there be no doubt, but it is modest fraction of our Nation's wealth.

A British author wrote that "If a Nation values anything more than freedom, it will lose its freedom; and the irony is that if it is comfort or money that it values more, it will lose that as well."

\$87 billion is a lot of money, but it is necessary for the security of our country and the stability of the world. The price of sending terrorists a message that we are not willing to spend what it takes to do and that we value comfort or money more than freedom would be far greater.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. LEWIS. Thank you, Mr. Secretary.

[The statement of Secretary Rumsfeld follows:]

PREPARED TESTIMONY BY U.S. SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
DONALD H. RUMSFELD
HOUSE APPROPRIATIONS COMMITTEE - DEFENSE SUBCOMMITTEE
WASHINGTON, DC
SEPTEMBER 30, 2003

Mr. Chairman, thank you for this opportunity to testify on the President's emergency supplemental request.

Earlier this month, the American people marked the anniversary of the September 11th attacks — and took stock of all that had been accomplished in the two years since this war on terror was visited upon us two years ago.

Thanks to the courage of our men and women in uniform, two brutal regimes have been removed from power, two nations rescued from tyranny. Thanks to those who fight the battles, seen and unseen, in the war on terror, thousands of terrorists have been captured or killed—including nearly two-thirds of known senior al-Qaeda operatives, and most of those responsible for the 9/11 attacks. With the support of dozens of nations, a number of planned attacks have been stopped, terrorist assets seized, and thousands of lives saved.

We have much to be grateful for. But perhaps our greatest blessing is the fine men and women who wear our nation's uniform. Each of them volunteered for service — and in the course of this war, many have given their lives. They are heroes — they will not be forgotten. Still others have suffered serious wounds. I've visited with many of them, at Bethesda and Walter Reed, and Brooke Army Medical Center — to thank them for their service and sacrifice.

Our hearts go out to the families of all those who have been injured and killed in this war — U.S. and Coalition forces alike. And we are grateful also for the brave soldiers and fine civilian staffs from Coalition countries now serving in Iraq and Afghanistan.

Together, we have accomplished a great deal. But much work still remains. Notwithstanding our successes, dangers persist. Many terrorists are behind bars — but those that remain at large are planning future attacks. Standing between our people and the gathering dangers is the courage of our men and women in uniform — and the determination of our country to see this war through.

As a sign of his conviction that we must prosecute this war, and defeat those who threaten us, the President has requested \$87 billion in emergency funds to fight the war on terror.

The vast majority of the funds the President has requested will go to the troops who are risking their lives in this struggle. Of the \$87 billion in the President's request, \$66 billion is to support ongoing military operations — money for military pay, fuel, transportation, maintenance, weapons, equipment, life-saving body armor, ammunition and other critical military needs.

The President has requested:

- \$51 billion for military operations in Iraq,
- \$11 billion for military operations in Afghanistan, the Horn of Africa and other missions related to Operation Enduring Freedom,
- \$2.2 billion for defending the U.S. homeland, and
- \$1.4 billion to support coalition partners, many of whom are stepping forward with troops willing to risk their lives in this effort — but whose governments lack the resources to support those deployments.

So \$66 billion — or 75% of this request — is for troops. They need it — and they need it soon.

The remaining \$21 billion is to help the people of Afghanistan and Iraq secure their nations for freedom — so that they can get on a path to stability, self-government and self-reliance.

For Afghanistan, the President will reallocate nearly \$400 million in funds from existing accounts, and has requested an additional \$800 million to accelerate reconstruction efforts now underway.

This includes:

- \$300 million for roads, schools, clinics;
- \$400 million to train and support the Afghan National Army and the national police, border patrol and highway patrol;
- \$120 million to train demobilized militia and help them find jobs, and to support other private sector initiatives; and
- Nearly \$300 million to support rule of law, elections and other critical support for the Afghan government.

This support is in addition to the \$1.8 billion previously appropriated, and the \$5 billion that has been pledged thus far by the international community.

The President has also requested \$20 billion for the U.S. contribution to support the Coalition Provisional Authority in Iraq— including \$15 billion to speed repairs to Iraq's starved and dilapidated infrastructure, and \$5 billion to help Iraqis assume increasing responsibility for the security of their country—including training of Iraqi police, border guards, facilities protection services, a new Iraqi Army and a new Iraqi Civil Defense Corps, and for the Iraqi justice system.

The \$20 billion the President has requested does not cover all of Iraq's needs, which are vastly greater than this—nor is it intended to.

We expect that the international community to step up with additional contributions as well. Already, some 60 nations have made pledges or contributions of \$1.5 billion—and there are

discussions with others, who have expressed an interest in contributing as well. A free and stable Iraq is in the world's interest.

The hope and intention is that over the coming years the bulk of the funds for Iraq's reconstruction will come from the Iraqis themselves—from oil revenues, recovered assets, international trade, and foreign direct investment. The funds the President has requested are designed to help Iraqis so they can generate the income, and security, necessary to rebuild their own country.

Our goal is to help the Iraqi people get on a path to self-reliance. The investments proposed are intended to help them do that.

Today, Iraq is not yet producing enough income to pay for essential services. The \$15 billion the President has requested to pay for urgent repairs to Iraq's infrastructure will, along with international contributions and Iraqi funds, help Iraqis begin generating the income necessary to eventually pay their own way.

Take oil, for example. Ambassador Bremer testified that Iraq will earn about \$2.5 billion in oil revenue in 2003—a substantial sum considering the dilapidated conditions of its oil infrastructure. With improvements to that infrastructure, Ambassador Bremer estimates that Iraq's oil revenue should grow to about \$12 billion next year, and should reach roughly \$20 billion by 2005.

Investments are needed in water, sewage, power and other essential services that were allowed to degenerate over three decades—starved of investment as Saddam Hussein built his palaces and weapons. These are critical not only to the lives of Iraqis, but also to Iraq's ability to attract foreign investors.

Iraq's interim leaders are already taking steps to make Iraq hospitable to trade and foreign investment. Recently, Iraq's finance minister announced sweeping reforms of Iraq's tax and foreign investment laws. The Iraqi economy will be open to foreign capital and investment, with 100% foreign ownership permitted in all sectors except natural resources. Tariffs on imports will be 5% across the board, except for necessities like food, medicine and clothing—which will be tariff-free.

It is safe to say that, with the implementation of these provisions, Iraq will have some of the most enlightened—and inviting—tax and investment laws in the free world.

But to attract foreign investment, Iraq must have more than just attractive tax and investment laws; it must also have a reasonable security environment.

This is why the President has requested \$5 billion to train Iraqis to help defend their country. This includes \$2 billion for public safety, including the training of an additional 40,000 police in the next 18 months; \$2 billion to train a new three-division Iraqi Army and an Iraqi Civil Defense Corps; and almost \$1 billion for the Iraqi justice system. All of these investments are critical to the efforts of General Abizaid, General Sanchez and their troops' efforts.

Helping Iraqis provide for their own security is critical. The investments the President is requesting are, in a real sense, a critical element of the Coalition's exit strategy. The sooner Iraq can generate income and defend its own people, the sooner U.S. and Coalition forces can come home.

As foreign investment begins to flow, Iraq's leaders can invest in reconstruction and other efforts to bolster the economy and create growth and prosperity—so that the Iraqi people can achieve self-reliance.

That is the goal. But reaching that goal requires investments now to restore critical infrastructure and basic services necessary to jump-start their economy. Iraq cannot make those improvements today without assistance from the U.S. and the international community. But the purpose of this assistance is to help Iraqis get on a path where they can rebuild their own country—so that they do not become permanent wards of the international community.

This is why the President has requested that the \$20 billion be granted, and not loaned. Iraq is a nation with considerable potential—water, oil, vast wheat and barley fields, biblical sites and great potential for tourism, and an educated population. But it also owes almost \$200 billion in debts and reparations.

Iraq is in no position to pay its current debt service, let alone take on more additional debt. If we want to encourage Iraqi self-reliance, so that Iraqis can fund their reconstruction and so that American troops can come home, it would not be helpful to saddle Iraq with more debt it could not reasonably be expected to repay.

What the President has requested is a \$20 billion investment in the future of Iraq. To put that in context, the Marshall plan after World War II cost roughly \$90 billion in today's dollars. Those investments helped transform a region that been a source of violent war and instability for centuries, and turn it into a place of peace, prosperity and mutually beneficial trade.

Today, in Iraq and Afghanistan, we have a similar opportunity to help nations that were sources of terror and war get on a path to becoming sources of freedom and moderation in a turbulent region. If we have the vision to do so, the people of the world will reap the benefits of that investment for generations to come.

Still, \$87 billion is a lot of money. And the American taxpayers deserve to know that it is being spent wisely. So let me say several things:

I recently returned from Iraq and Afghanistan, as did Secretary Powell. He will tell you, as I will, that progress is being achieved in both countries.

Afghanistan is on the road to stability, democracy and self-government. After two years of training, the Afghan National Army has been fighting side-by-side with Coalition forces in our most recent anti-terrorist campaigns – Operations Mountain Viper and Warrior Sweep.

The central government is working to extend authority to the provinces. Together with Afghan authorities, the Coalition has deployed Provincial Reconstruction Teams (or PRTs) to four provinces, with four more on the way. Afghanistan faces challenges to be sure, but the progress has been measurable. The terrorist training camps are gone. Al-Qaeda is on the run. The Afghan people are liberated and the country is on the path to democracy.

In Iraq the Coalition forces also face real difficulties and danger—including the threat from regime remnants, and foreign fighters who are coming into the country to oppose the Coalition. What is remarkable is that, despite the significant dangers they face, the Coalition civil and military staff in Iraq has—in less than five months—racked up a series of achievements, in both security and civil reconstruction, that may be without precedent.

Consider a few of their accomplishments:

- In less than five months, virtually all major Iraqi hospitals and universities have been re-opened, and hundreds of secondary schools—until a few months ago most often used as weapons caches—have been rebuilt and were ready for the start of the fall semester.
- 56,000 Iraqis have been armed and trained in just a few months, and they're contributing to the security and defense of their country. Another 14,000 have been recruited and are currently in training, for a total of 70,000. Today, a new Iraqi Army is being trained and more than 40,000 Iraqi police are conducting joint patrols with Coalition forces. By contrast, it took 14 months to establish a police force in post-war Germany—and 10 years to begin training a new German Army.
- As security improves, so does commerce. Some 5,000 Iraqi small businesses opened since liberation on May 1st. The independent Iraqi Central Bank was established and a new currency announced in just two months—accomplishments that took three years in post-war Germany.
- The Iraqi Governing Council has appointed an Iraqi cabinet of ministers—something that took 14 months in Germany.
- In all major cities and most towns and villages, Iraqi municipal councils have been formed—something that took 8 months in Germany.
- To date, the Coalition has completed some 8,000 civil affairs projects—with many more underway.

All this, and more, has taken place in less than five months. The speed and breadth of what Ambassador Bremer, General Tom Franks, General John Abizaid, General Rick Sanchez, and the Coalition military and civilian teams have accomplished is impressive—it may be without historical parallel, whether compared to post-war Japan, Germany, Bosnia, or Kosovo.

These successes would not be possible without many months of preparation—planning that began before Operation Iraqi Freedom was launched. And they would not be possible without substantial international support and cooperation.

I keep hearing that the U.S. should not “go it alone.” Well, the U.S. is not going it alone. There are, at this moment, some 17 nations in the Coalition Provisional Authority – it is a genuinely international operation. Moreover, there are currently 32 countries with troops in Iraq today.

These include: Albania, Azerbaijan, Bulgaria, the Czech Republic, Denmark, the Dominican Republic, El Salvador, Estonia, Georgia, Honduras, Hungary, Italy, Kazakhstan, Korea, Latvia, Lithuania, Macedonia, Moldova, Mongolia, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Nicaragua, Norway, the Philippines, Poland, Romania, Slovakia, Spain, Thailand, Ukraine, and the UK.

Portugal is at this moment preparing to deploy forces to Iraq. Of the 19 NATO nations, 11 have already committed troops to Iraq. We are currently in discussions with 14 other countries that have expressed possible interest in sending forces.

Do they equal our forces or financial contributions? No they do not. But do they represent a significant military commitment and a political commitment for those nations? Yes, they do. And we are, as we should be, deeply grateful for their contributions, their political courage, and their friendship.

The international forces in Iraq are extraordinary. Earlier this month, I met many of them when I visited the Polish Multinational Division in Babylon, which had just taken over from the Marines in the South-Central sector of Iraq. That division alone includes troops from 17 nations, with four more nations providing civil support—for a total of 21 countries.

Many were from nations that had only recently recovered their own freedom and independence—and were proud to be helping the Iraqi people recover theirs. It was an honor to meet them, and see their enthusiasm and their commitment.

In Afghanistan, NATO has just taken over command of ISAF—the Alliance’s first mission outside of Europe in its history. I met with the new German commander of ISAF forces in Kabul. What they are doing is important for Afghanistan, and for the NATO alliance.

Between Iraq and Afghanistan, there are 49 countries with forces on the ground—with many others making important contributions in other ways. So this business that America is “going it alone” is not factual, plain and simple—it is false.

Finally, let me conclude by recalling why we are spending that money.

The *Wall Street Journal* recently tallied the costs to our country and economy, of the September 11th attacks.

.They include:

- \$7.8 billion in lost income for the families of the more than 3,000 victims—money that would have gone to pay for braces and summer camps, schools and colleges.
- \$21 billion sent to New York City for direct damage costs.
- \$4 billion for the victims fund.
- \$18 billion to clean up the World Trade Center site.
- \$700 million to repair the Pentagon.
- As much as \$6.4 billion in reduced or lost wages and salaries for workers in New York industries.
- 1.3 million net jobs lost nationwide.
- \$150 billion in reduced GDP.
- \$50 billion in costs to the insurance industry.
- \$11 billion in lost business to the airline industry.
- The bankruptcy of two airlines, even after a \$15 billion federal bailout.
- \$38 billion in costs for new border security, protection against biological threats, and emergency preparedness.
- \$1.3 billion in costs to state governments for homeland security, and
- \$33 billion in spending by the private sector for new protective services.

Even assuming for some overlap, the 9/11 attack alone cost the American people literally hundreds of billions of dollars—and that is not counting the enormous price paid in lives, and the immense suffering of their families and loved ones—men and women from all walks of life, of all races and religions, and from most countries of the world.

If September 11th cost more than three thousand lives and hundreds of billions of dollars, it makes \$87 billion pale by comparison.

Our nation can afford whatever it needs to defend our people, our way of life and our vital interests. At the height of the Cold War, in the Eisenhower and Kennedy years, we spent roughly 10% of GDP. The last time I was Secretary of Defense, in the 1970s, we spent roughly 5% of GDP on defense. Today, we spend a little over 3%—a great deal of money, to be sure, but a modest fraction of our nation's wealth.

Our job is to work to prevent another attack like the one we experienced on September 11th—before it happens. There is only one way to do so—by taking the battle to the terrorists, and those who give them support and sanctuary.

As President Bush told the UN last week, “events during the past two years have set before us the clearest of divides: between those who seek order, and those who spread chaos... between those who honor the rights of man, and those who deliberately take the lives of men and women and children without mercy or shame. Between these alternatives there is no neutral ground.... Because a coalition of nations acted... Iraq is free... [and] people are safer because an unstable aggressor has been removed from power.”

To defend freedom in the 21st century, we need to root out the terrorists. We need to make clear to the world's terrorist states that defying 17 UN resolutions, filing false declarations with the UN, refusing to cooperate with UN inspectors, and refusing to disarm and prove to the world you have done so, has consequences. We need to help the now free people in Iraq and Afghanistan rebuild from the rubble of tyranny, and claim their places as responsible members of the community of nations.

A British author once declared: "If a nation values anything more than freedom, it will lose its freedom; and the irony is that if it is comfort or money that it values more, it will lose that too."

Is \$87 billion a great deal of money? Yes. But can we afford it? Without question. Because it is necessary for the security of our nation and the stability of the world—and because the price of sending terrorist a message that we are not willing to spend what it takes or do what it takes—that we value comfort or money more than freedom—would be far greater.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

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Mr. LEWIS. I think, as you know, the Committee tries to use very little time by way of dialogue from this side of the podium, introducing this. I do intend to call upon Jack Murtha first for discussion or questioning, and my Chairman, Bill Young as well.

In the meantime, I know that General Myers has a statement. We welcome your statement. General.

SUMMARY STATEMENT OF GENERAL MYERS

General MYERS. You would like me to make a statement. It is relatively short.

Chairman Lewis, Representative Murtha, members of the Committee, I thank you for the opportunity to address the supplemental budget request for the war on terrorism. I would also like to thank you for your continuing tremendous support of our men and women in uniform, and I think your recent and previous trips, these are not easy trips, they are difficult in the kinds of environment you are in, but it is just one more example of that kind of support, and, I can tell you, we appreciate that very much.

With the help of our coalition partners, as the Secretary said, from more than 70 nations, our servicemen and women are, in fact, winning the war on terrorism and, of course, winning is the only option.

In my view, the stakes could not be higher. Defeat means destruction of our way of life that we forged over 2¼ centuries, and victory will restore the sense of security that was shattered on September 11, 2001.

INDICATORS OF SUCCESS

There is plenty of evidence of our success in the war on terrorism. We have toppled two brutal regimes, disrupted terrorist safe havens, destroyed their training camps, and seriously degraded Al Queda's leadership. But, just as importantly, two countries that were once breeding grounds for brutality and terror are building a future based on liberty and peace. The coalition is helping to lay the foundation for that future.

In Iraq there are, as the Secretary said, more than 41,000 Iraqi police and thousands more Iraqis recruited for duty with the new Iraqi Army, the Civil Defense Corps, the Facilities Protection Service and the Iraqi Border Guards. The total number today is approximately 56,000 on duty, as the Secretary said, with many more in the pipeline to be trained.

These numbers highlight that the Iraqi people are willing to take on the responsibility and risk to ensure their own peaceful future. Iraqi police, among others, are already making significant contributions to preventing attacks, and some of these Iraqis have given their lives in the service of the new free Iraq.

In my view, the tide has turned against those who desire to return to the tyranny of the former regime. I am sure on your recent trip you saw the confidence that our troops displayed and the progress that they have made.

The funds in this supplemental budget request for Iraq will provide more training for Iraqi security forces and help set the condi-

tions for economic and political progress as well, all of which are necessary for a secure future for Iraq.

The story in Afghanistan is similar. Ten Afghan National Army battalions, some 4,600 soldiers, have been trained and ANA forces have begun patrolling the borders of Afghanistan side-by-side with U.S. forces, Afghan militia and coalition forces and have engaged in combat operations and acquitted themselves very, very well. The Afghan people are very proud of their new Afghan Army as they should be.

STAYING THE COURSE

Osama bin Laden said some years ago he wanted to reduce the United States to a shadow of its former self and, by implication, the rest of the free world. He is simply not going to succeed. But winning this war is going to take patience on the part of the American people. It is a difficult enemy one that can't be defeated with just military might. We are winning, but we must stay the course.

Winning is also going to take our Nation's commitment. We have never been more focused or more committed to winning this war. Failure simply isn't an option. We have got to win.

Commitment comes at a cost. The price is paid from our national treasure, not just in dollars, but in sacrifices that our servicemen and women are willing to make for their country and freedom. Most importantly, besides patience and commitment, our country has to have the will to win. The terrorists have said and think they are going to win. They don't believe that we have the will to stick this out. In my view, again, they are absolutely wrong. We can't let them win, and we won't, as long as we have the continuing will of the American people, and for that matter, freedom-loving people everywhere.

In a recent article in the Boston Globe an Iraqi family talked about their gratitude to the United States and their hope for the future. The father said "the Americans did us a great favor by getting rid of Saddam. We owe them." he added, "I don't think they will abandon us."

We won't. We have come so far and our servicemen and women have sacrificed a great deal. But, as you saw firsthand, our troops understand what they are doing is important and they are committed to winning this war.

So we owe them our committed support, and owe it to the coalition partners who worked and sacrificed as well; and to the people of Iraq and Afghanistan working with us to help build a prosperous and democratic future. Most importantly, we owe it to the American people and people everywhere who want a better, more secure future for our children.

I ask you, sir, and the Committee, to support this supplemental budget request. It is an investment we cannot afford not to make.

Thank you.

Mr. LEWIS. Dr. Zakheim.

Mr. ZAKHEIM. Thank you. I am fine.

Mr. LEWIS. Thank you very much.

Before I call upon Jack Murtha, I wanted to mention to you gentleman that while in Iraq we spent a good deal of time with military leaders, including Lieutenant General Rick Sanchez, and he

said something that kind of surprised me. He talked about the importance of the military piece of this supplemental. But the surprise came when he said in his mind's eye, the reconstruction piece, the \$20 billion piece, was every bit as important for the interests that we are attempting to impact positively in Iraq. I would say the very security of our troops in Iraq is, in no small part, based upon the progress we made in terms of rebuilding the confidence and economy the people of Iraq.

Mr. Murtha.

JAMMERS

Mr. MURTHA. When I was in Iraq, I found a number of shortages, and I appreciate the letter I received, Mr. Secretary, saying you are taking care of those, and your personal commitment on the jammers, General, because today I just talked to a young woman who lost her eye. She walked up to a package in the middle of the street and saw wires from it, tried to turn, couldn't get away, she was wounded badly on the whole side of her face.

But I asked her about jammers. She said she never even heard of jammers. So the division I talked to was short. I know we are working with on it, and it is something we need a sense of urgency on. I saw it in the supplemental, which I didn't see before.

One thing you mentioned, Mr. Secretary. You said defense is 3.1 percent of our GDP. When Vice President Cheney was Secretary of Defense, he used to complain it was below 5 percent. Now, we are giving you everything you asked for. So you can't say to us 3.1 is below what it should be, because whatever you request we have put into the budget since you have been here. Cheney used to complain that we cut it back.

Secretary RUMSFELD. Absolutely. I didn't suggest that in the slightest. I just was pointing out while \$87 billion is a lot of money, we can afford it, because we are down to 3.1, and it is exactly what the President requested.

MIX OF ACTIVE AND RESERVE FORCES

Mr. MURTHA. Let me talk about the Reserves, because it looks like to me you have got money for 130,000 all through the year. If I read the document right, we are going to have 130,000 people in Iraq through the rest of the year. That is the way the funding stream looks to me.

Now, as I also look at it, unless you change the mix, we are going to have more Reserve and Guard people over there. Right now we have 60 percent regulars and we have 40 percent Guard. It looks like to me we are going to have 60 percent Guard and 40 percent regular. Is this how you see it? Is this the way it is going to end up?

Secretary RUMSFELD. Dick may want to comment on this, but Dick Myers and I have been working with the services who, of course, have the responsibility for organizing, training and equipping the rotation, and it is not finally decided exactly how that will work. It could be, as you say, I suppose, but it may very well not be. Of course, it depends on the level there as well, and we can't predict what the level will be at the end of the year.

Mr. MURTHA. Well, what I worry about, Mr. Secretary, is I am starting to get serious complaints from the public, especially Guard and Reserve families. For instance, I saw a Smith Barney poll that showed defense spending support from the American public went from 50 percent to 30 percent in less than a month. Obviously, we react to those kind of poll figures.

There is no question, you know how I stand. I am for the reconstruction money, I am for the \$87 billion completely. But what worries me is the Guard who is older, we find they are about 10 years older, from what I understand, a lot of problems, health problems which we didn't anticipate, some of them are not in as good condition as they should be in, because it is just the nature of being in the Guard as opposed to being in the regulars.

If we keep sending them over such an extended period of time, there is all the disruption to their life. I hope we can find a different way of doing it. I don't know what the answer is, but certainly we have got some Marine units out there, we got maybe some other ways of doing it. But when you get a mix of more Reserve and Guard people than you have regulars, I worry about that mix, and I worry about the support of the public.

I can see a difference in the people in the hospitals. I was just out to the hospital today. Ms. Pelosi asked me to go out with her. From the time I went out there when they first came in during the war, and the times I went out since then, I can see a difference from the families and so forth, and I just worry that there is so many Guards and Reserves out there, the employers are starting to get upset. So we are going to have an erosion, which we can't afford. We have to have the support of the American public or we are not going to get this job done, because it is such a tough job.

CONTRIBUTIONS FROM DONOR COUNCIL

The other thing, you know, we talk about the coalition forces. I think we have to be realistic. The last war we collected \$60 billion. It went through this Committee, so I know exactly how much it was. This time, let me ask Dr. Zakheim, how much do you think we are going to collect from this Donors Council you are having?

Mr. ZAKHEIM. I certainly cannot make that kind of prediction. But I can tell you though, Mr. Murtha, we have made it very clear in all our discussions with potential donors, that we have come to the Congress and asked for \$20 billion, that Ambassador Bremer has identified a total need of \$50 billion; to \$75 billion; and that we are looking for donations that are in the billions rather than the millions. We have made that unequivocal.

Mr. MURTHA. I say \$5 billion is unrealistic?

Mr. ZAKHEIM. I wouldn't hazard a guess. Whatever I say, there will be some that will say that is too much, there will be others that say we cannot do it. We just want to go after these folks and tell them, "people, don't think in the millions, think in the billions."

Mr. MURTHA. The reason I asked that question, I remember when you came for \$6 billion and I asked you, is that enough money? You said it was enough money. It wasn't enough money, you knew it wasn't enough money. All of us knew it. So I would hope we are getting enough money.

This reconstruction money is as important as anything we do, in my estimation. It is just as important as the military money, and I hope that we are getting enough out there initially to get the electricity back, to get the people to work and so forth. So I would just ask that we get the urgency to get this stuff out to the field once you get the money, get the money to Bremer.

Secretary RUMSFELD. May I just make a comment on the first part of your question concerning the forces. You are right, there is nothing more important in the Department of Defense than the people, and we simply have to manage the force in a way that is respectful of the employers and respectful of the family, and we have to find that balance. We are working with the services to see that that happens.

The other thing I would say is that we look not just to the United States forces for the security if Iraq, we are looking to U.S., coalition and the Iraqis. To go from zero to 56,000, plus another 14,000 recruited and in training, for a total of 70,000, in a matter of 4 or 5 months, reflects the urgency that we put on seeing that the Iraqis are taking over the security of that country. That is their job and we need to be willing and ready and have them ready to transfer that responsibility to them.

Mr. MURTHA. Well, as you said, the amount of time it took to do this in other countries, and I think we may be unrealistic to think we can do it so quickly, because, as Ambassador Bremer said, we put some police out there, we are going to have to draw back because some of them aren't doing too well. I talked to an MP today who was wounded. She thought there was progress. I talked to another young fellow, he thought they were worthless. It depends on the individual how it is going to turn out. But I have always urged an urgency in this thing, because I think we have a limited time to get the thing on track.

Mr. LEWIS. Thank you, Jack. We are going to be staying close to a 5-minute rule for the members individually, maybe get a couple of rounds perhaps as we go forward here.

Let me call on Mr. Young, our Chairman.

REMARKS OF MR. YOUNG

Mr. YOUNG. Mr. Chairman, thank you very much. I would say that you look awfully good for just having made a very lengthy trip to the war zone.

Mr. Secretary, General and Dr. Zakheim, we have to complete this mission. We have to complete it as efficiently and expeditiously as we can. There are some who have suggested that we are mortgaging our children's future because of the additional costs involved here. But my point is that what we do here today is to secure the next generation and the generations to follow, so that we can have them have a lifestyle that is free from airplanes flying into buildings or biological or germ warfare or chemical warfare, attacking people in our streets, in our homes, in our businesses. So I think it is essential that we do this.

I am pleased that the President struck out boldly after September 11, because I know and you know that in previous years, with the bombing of the U.S.S. COLE, the bombing of Khobar Towers, the bombing in Tanzania and Kenya of our embassies, that the

response was rather lukewarm; a lot of words but not much action. I think this emboldened the terrorists, that while the United States, this big giant, is not going to respond to these terrorists attacks, so they get bolder. We know they planned September 11 for a long time.

So the Congress has been very supportive of the President, and the Congress will continue to be supportive of the President and those of you who carry out his directions as we make this investment in our future generations so that we can be free from the fear of terrorism.

I spoke earlier I think to you, Mr. Secretary, personally. I intend to move this supplemental bill as quickly as I can. It is important that the Congress has questions answered. It is important I think for the President and the administration to have a full and open transparent program here. So we will have some interesting questions.

But I believe that you will find strong support in the House to complete this mission and to do what has to be done to guarantee that those next generations of our children and grandchildren, great grandchildren, do not have to live with the fear of terrorism.

FLEXIBILITY AND ACCOUNTABILITY

Now, I do have some questions though that relate specifically to the bill. In September right after the attack on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon, Mr. Obey and I moved a bill through the Congress, \$40 billion, a \$40 billion supplemental, not knowing exactly how much was needed, because this was new to us, having this kind of attack in our homeland.

But we moved quickly and gave the President considerable discretion because we felt he had to have considerable discretion to do whatever had to be done to recover and to prevent a future event. Of that \$40 billion, there was a \$14 billion discretionary account that you pretty much had total control over, other than eventually reporting to the Congress.

Then in a later supplemental, there was another \$11.9 billion in a discretionary account, along with the other monies that were appropriated. And then in a spring supplemental this year, there was another \$15.7 billion into discretionary accounts. These are over and above the specific accounts.

Now in the request of the \$87 billion, you have asked for transfer authority of another \$7.5 billion that would allow you to transfer from one account to another.

SPECIAL OPERATIONS COMMAND AUDIT

What I am getting at here is you have had considerable flexibility in an awful lot of money, \$41.6 billion just in the supplementals alone. So I am wondering about something that you have read about, a story that has taken on a life of its own because of an e-mail that was sent from one Elaine Kingston to Special Operations Command asking for \$40 million to be parked in some account that would give OSD considerable flexibility in using that money.

One of my questions will be, is that a normal practice? If it is not, what brought this about on this occasion. And if it is a normal

practice, since the special operations command is one of your smaller budgets, I wonder how much other agencies might have been asked to park money in this program. This may be totally within the rules and the regulations and the procedures that we go by, but if that is the case, we need to know that.

The thing that created a little suspicion on my part was a follow-up in the e-mail that said, and I am quoting from the e-mail now, "I just wanted to follow up with an e-mail to ensure that the staffer briefing slides for these programs do include these funds and that the briefer not highlight or discuss them during staffer briefings."

We depend on our staff to get as much detail as they can for us.

The e-mail goes on to say, "In other words, we can't say my original program was XX, but OSD parked some money in it, so now it is YY."

I am not sure why the briefers, it would be suggested that they not let Congress know about this, and if they should be asked, they should defend it as their own account, not OSD's, but the money was to be parked for OSD.

Tell me something about this. Frankly, I am curious about this, and a lot of other people are curious about it. One of my Senators in Florida has a big headline going on the story. The Washington Post had a story this morning. The Associated Press put out on their wire services a story about this. It may be totally proper, but I think we need to either—if it is proper, we need to put it to rest. If it is not proper, we need to find out where we stand on it.

Secretary RUMSFELD. Mr. Chairman, we have seen the article as well, and my understanding is that the Defense Department Inspector General is currently auditing that and has been, I think, for a couple of months, since August. You may know more than I do.

Mr. ZAKHEIM. Yes. Mr. Chairman, yes, we got a letter from the Inspector General at the beginning of August, I think dated August 6, that they were going to audit this. The first thing that needs to be cleared up, is that this is not an investigation. The inspector General made that very, very clear. They have also made clear to me that I have to be very careful about what I am saying, because I am not supposed to talk about an audit they have undertaken. Finally, although audits can normally take as much as a year, they are trying to get this done in a matter of months. That is number one.

As to your larger question, "parked" is obviously a pretty unfortunate term, needless to say.

Mr. YOUNG. It was not my term. I was quoting.

Mr. ZAKHEIM. I know. I have not seen those e-mails, by the way. What I can say is that, in the first place, we do not do this kind of thing in some kind of sleight-of-hand way. In fact, we can't even move more than \$10 million because anything more than \$10 million, even from one line item to another, requires prior approval re-programming. So that is number one.

Secondly, in the budget formulation, certainly neither I nor my deputy nor his deputy instructed anybody to hide anything from the staff. We prepare a budget, we present it to the staff, the staff scrutinizes it and scrubs it.

Third of all, the accounts, are what are called Defense-Wide accounts, and those, unlike the service accounts, clearly are going to be managed by OSD. We simply look for priorities as we are allocating the funds and we put the monies into priority areas.

Clearly, SOCOM is a priority. So, both in terms of how we put it together, in terms of how we move the money, and in terms of how we allocate the priorities, I think the method is tried and true and very much above board. But I can not talk to the specifics of the audit, for obvious reasons. I hope that helps you a little bit.

Mr. YOUNG. It helps a little bit, and I understand the Inspector General has his own requirements as to privacy during the investigation. But I think probably I was more concerned about the second half of that e-mail, where it was an obvious intent to keep from Congress what was happening. Frankly, I think that would make you suspicious, it makes me a little suspicious, and you don't have to do that.

You know, this Congress has been very supportive of this administration in all of these supplemental requests. I don't think you have to hide anything from us, and you should not. The Constitution is pretty clear when it points out that Congress must appropriate the money. But that section of the Constitution goes even further and says that Congress will have an accounting for the money.

So, we will be anxious to learn about the Inspector General's review of this. But maybe there should be a sensitivity training for people that write e-mails not to hint that we should avoid letting Congress know what is happening.

Secretary RUMSFELD. We will be as interested in learning about the e-mails as you.

Mr. YOUNG. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. LEWIS. Thank you, Mr. Young.

Mr. Obey.

Mr. OBEY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. Chairman, first of all, I ask unanimous consent to put in the record the article to which the Committee Chairman just referred in his comments and questions.

Mr. LEWIS. Without objection.

[The article follows:]

The Washington Post

Pentagon Investigates Movement of Funds:[FINAL Edition]

Thomas E. Ricks. The Washington Post. Washington, D.C.: Sep 30, 2003. pg. A.17

Full Text (512 words)

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The Pentagon's internal auditor is investigating allegations that Defense Department officials tried to hide \$20 million from Congress by temporarily putting the funds in the budget of the Special Operations Command, Defense officials said yesterday.

Officials at that secretive military headquarters, which oversees the Green Berets and other units that specialize in clandestine operations, were first asked to hide \$40 million, but told Pentagon officials that they couldn't handle so large an amount, according to an article in yesterday's edition of the St. Petersburg Times.

The newspaper, quoting what it identified as internal documents from the command, said that an official in the office of the Pentagon's comptroller, or chief financial officer, called the command's comptroller, Elaine Kingston, and asked if she could "park" \$40 million in Special Operations' proposed budget for fiscal 2003.

"They needed an answer in five minutes," Kingston later wrote in an e-mail the paper said it had obtained. "The agency they had parked it with had a problem and they couldn't do it." Kingston also allegedly coached colleagues not to bring the budgetary move to the attention of congressional staffers.

Army Col. Samuel Taylor, the spokesman for the command, said that Kingston was not available to comment, but that she didn't mean to indicate that the money was being hidden in her budget. "Parked" is a bad word to use," and Kingston "didn't mean it in that sense," he said.

The Pentagon's comptroller is Dov Zakheim, who during the 2000 presidential election was one of the Bush campaign's "Vulcans," or advisers on national security issues. He did not respond to calls to his office.

The amount of money involved is tiny relative to the Pentagon's annual budget of nearly \$400 billion. But the allegation that the Pentagon sought to mislead Congress about any expenditures is explosive, especially because many legislators have complained that the Pentagon under Defense Secretary Donald H. Rumsfeld has not been responsive to their concerns.

"Our job is to know where every dollar goes," said Rep. Ike Skelton (Mo.), the senior Democrat on the House Armed Services Committee. If there was indeed an effort by Defense officials to mislead Congress about planned expenditures, he said, "it won't play well at all."

Rep. C.W. Bill Young (R-Fla.), chairman of the House Appropriations Committee, is expected to grill Rumsfeld about the alleged padding of the Special Operations Command's budget at a hearing today on the Bush administration's request for an additional \$87 billion to spend in Iraq and Afghanistan. Young told the Times he wants to know "if it's common practice with the secretary."

Marine Lt. Col. Rose-Ann Lynch, a spokeswoman for the Pentagon's inspector general, confirmed that "there is a current Department of Defense audit into allegations concerning financial issues."

She added, "U.S. SOCOM is cooperating fully with a team of DoD auditors as they conduct their audit." She said that the inquiry began with a complaint to the inspector general's hotline last summer.

Taylor, the Special Operations Command spokesman, said that a complaint was made internally at the command, perhaps by the same person

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LONG TERM COSTS FOR OPERATION IRAQI FREEDOM

Mr. OBEY. Mr. Secretary, I recognize that we cannot pull the plug on this operation once we started it. I think to do so would be like a surgeon opening up a patient and then deciding he is going to say the heck with it, it is not going to do the patient much good at that point unless you finish the job. I understand that.

But I have also got an obligation to know what I am doing, and I have an obligation to know what you are doing. And I have got a series of questions which I just want to pop at you, some of which are not so pleasant, but it is my job.

First of all, we have already appropriated over \$60 billion for this operation, as you know, and at the time we were told that was going to be all that was going to be required. Now we are being asked to appropriate another \$87 billion to cover the next 15 months. But anyone I talk to certainly believes that it is going to wind up having expenses beyond that 15-month period and that they are going to be substantial.

So I would like to know, and I have asked this of every witness so far and I have gotten a total non-answer, I would like to know what is the administration's best estimate of the range of costs that we could expect to see us incur over the next—well, for the duration of this operation, out as long as 5 years.

Secondly, you mentioned the Marshall Plan. I think a lot of people in the Congress and the country would like to know how we are going to pay for this. Harry Truman instituted the Marshall Plan, but Harry Truman also paid for it. He paid his bills. He was the last president to balance the budget over the length of his term.

I would also like to know what our real expectations are? What can we tell these families of the Guard and Reserve? What are our real expectations in terms of the length of time they are going to have to serve? How do we intend to deal with the world wide strain this is putting on the services, especially the Army? How are we going to meet our rotation requirements?

I want to quote a question or comment from General Zinni. Excuse the language, but it is his language, not mine. He said, "Our enlisted men and women are the greatest treasure the United States has and when we put them in harm's way, it had better count for something. It can't be because some policy wonk back here had a brain fart or an idea of a strategy that isn't thought out. They should never be put on a battlefield without a strategic plan, not only for the fighting, our generals will take care of that, but for the aftermath and winning that war."

Where are we, the American people, if we accept this, if we accept this level of sacrifice, without that level of planning? I think we need to ask that same question.

So, basically I would like to know, in addition to the questions I have asked, what can we really expect by way of long-term costs? We are told that the reset costs, for instance, might be as much as \$15 billion, and yet there are only about \$2 billion requested in the administration's request that we have before us right now. Those are my basic questions. Why don't you have at them?

Secretary RUMSFELD. I will get started here, and possibly ask Dr. Zakheim to comment or General Myers.

First, I don't know who said to you that some amount you mentioned would be all that would be required. Certainly I didn't. Second, I think you said that the amount is expected to cover the next 15 months.

Mr. OBEY. That is what we were told by Mr. Bremer.

Secretary RUMSFELD. Fifteen months is the number you used. My understanding of the situation is that the Department of Defense's portion of this bill is for 2004, and to the extent that operation Iraqi freedom continues into 2005, I would expect that—as I would expect it would, to some extent, then the intent would be to fund the 2005, the 2005 portion of Iraq, by a 2005 supplemental. We have been asked by Congress not to put that into our normal budget. We tried to do it last year and Congress rejected it and said they would prefer to handle the war on terror through a supplemental.

Second, with respect to the Coalition Provisional Authority portion, my understanding is that they don't, OMB does not anticipate additional requests for 2004 and that 2005 would likely be dealt with in the normal authorization and appropriation process, which is I believe what—

Mr. OBEY. If I can interrupt, that is essentially what I had suggested to Mr. Bremer, and the response I got from him was just the opposite. So what I would like to know is in addition to the costs that you have laid on us—

Secretary RUMSFELD. You are right. The Coalition Provisional Authority is on a calendar year, and we are on a fiscal year, and that is where you get the 15 month. I apologize.

Mr. OBEY. What I want to know is we know what it has cost so far, we know what you are asking for. But the question is, what haven't you asked for yet that you have reasonable expectations at some time down the line will have to incur before this operation is over?

Secretary RUMSFELD. I know of nothing that we have not asked for that we are looking for for fiscal year 2004 that is not in this supplemental. As I indicated a minute ago, as it continues into 2005, we would come back very likely for a 2005 supplemental, because we have been asked by Congress not to fund the Global War on Terror in the normal manner.

Mr. OBEY. That gives me two answers to the same question. They go in the opposite direction. You are telling me you don't expect to need more than you are asking for, yet you are telling me if you need more, you are going to be asking for it in 2005. I understand the process. My question is, you put together 5-year plans every year, and I can't believe that you do not have some estimate of what this operation is going to cost us, both in the military side and on the reconstruction side, both of which are essential. I can't believe that you don't have some range that you can share with us.

I know you don't have an official budget request, but if we incur certain costs this year, unless you expect all of our troops to be out, the reconstruction to be over and that Iraq will have replaced New Hampshire on the presidential primary circuit because it will be such a beacon of democracy, unless you expect that, I would like to know what—if I am going to go to my taxpayers and say look, you have got to be prepared to bear these costs for X amount of

time, isn't there somebody in the administration who is going to give us some hint of what that amount could be, within a range? I don't expect you to nail an exact number. We have a right to know the range. What are we getting ourselves in for if we follow through on this?

Secretary RUMSFELD. Let me try to respond to a few of those questions. My recollection is that Jerry Bremer indicated that some of the international organizations estimated that the Iraq need over a period of several years, 3 to 4 to 5, I forget, was \$60 billion to \$75 billion. What is being proposed here is \$20 billion for the United States. It is estimated, I believe I mentioned in my remarks, that the Iraqi oil revenues would be something like \$2 billion this year, I think \$12 billion next year, and maybe \$20 billion, maybe \$20-plus billion in successive years thereafter, depending on how much investment goes into the infrastructure.

In addition, as Dr. Zakheim mentioned, there is a donors conference taking place next month, in October, I believe in Madrid, Spain, and there is an effort to go out and raise funds from other people. The administration, as I understand it, does not anticipate coming back and asking for additional funds in the Coalition Provisional Authority portion of the budget during this year.

Now, you then say what about next year or the year after that.

Mr. OBEY. What about the reset costs? My time is up, I know.

Secretary RUMSFELD. Could I answer a couple of other questions that he posed? You asked about the Guard and the Reserve. There are a variety of things we are doing. We are deeply concerned about that. We have to see that that force is not stressed excessively, which is the reason we are making such dramatic efforts to increase the Iraqi security capabilities and to relieve the stress on our force.

In addition, the services are, at the present time, rebalancing the active and Reserve components so that we can have on active duty people who are needed on active duty and not have to keep calling up the same Guard and Reserve people who have distinctive skills that are in very short supply in the active force.

So, the exit strategy, I think you used the phrase, or the transition, would be to pass the security responsibilities over some reasonable period of time to the Iraqis rather than continuing to rely on U.S. and coalition forces.

Mr. LEWIS. Mr. Hobson.

Thank you, David.

QUALITY OF LIFE

Mr. HOBSON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Gentlemen, I would like to talk to you a little bit about quality of life and also purchase of equipment. They are two separate things, but they are somewhat intertwined, and then about step two and step three.

Talking about quality of life, in Mr. Obey's question, in September of 2002, I wrote a letter to you, Mr. Secretary, in which I outlined a lot of problems you encountered with the Guard and Reserve. And you wrote me back a letter saying you shared those. Then I got a rather, what I would say, bureaucratic letter back from the gentleman who seems to handle these things over there. And I can tell you, I do want to thank you for a decision you made

last week when you overruled some people to treat the Guard and Reserve better, but you had to overrule, as I understand it, this same fellow who wrote me this letter, because the Guard doesn't—and you can also look—I am going to submit a number of questions for the record.

These people really don't know whether they are going to be on the ground for 12 months, 18 months, whether they are going to do 6 months here under a certain status and then 12 under another. I think you acted hopefully last week to take care of some of that. But that is a real problem with families. They don't know.

I have been called up, and I know what it is to be called up, and I know what it is to live in a barracks overseas. A lot of these kids aren't living in barracks overseas, by the way. But it is war and they are handling it extremely well. These are wonderful young troops and wonderful families. But we owe them an obligation to some degree of certainty and status. I think you are sensitive to this. I am not sure the people who report to you in certain places are.

PURCHASE OF EQUIPMENT

I would like to raise that as a comment to you. Then I would like to go into one other thing, because I only have 5 minutes in this round, and that is in this supplemental, you fellows or you people are finally, we have all been hit in the head over the years, for being pork-barrelers, because we added armored Humvees to the bill, in substantial numbers. They all have the "Murtha seat" in them by the way, I understand.

But we knew in Bosnia that these were important. We know in Afghanistan they are important. And yet, in the last couple of years, we have had to add them, and now you all are adding them.

The one thing that the people in my district have a lot of problem with is not—well, they have a problem that you are not buying armored Humvees, but that is not my district. That is somebody else's district. Those were done for the safety of kids, because they can walk away from a lot of hits in those that regular Humvees can't. And your trucks don't have any security in them, and you need to look at that.

BUY AMERICA

But what I am also concerned about, if you buy garbage trucks, I hope they are made in America. And I know you don't like this part of it. I hope if you do a 9/11 system or something or you do some other equipment, that a lot of it is bought in America.

When you buy trucks, when you buy vehicles, we have all got people out there paying taxes, and they need to know that this money is all not going into the pockets of other people, like we are buying brakes on some airplanes, General Myers, or some sealer for the Pentagon, that Americans make a better sealer. It is the same price, same stuff. You all were going to buy it from a German company, until we raised heck about it, and then finally we did, and you guys changed, but then the fellow that works for you all says to the company, you will never get another one out of us. That shouldn't be the attitude.

I want to be assured that people get a fair shot at America. If it is America's money that is going to be spent over there, we ought to be buying as much as we can of American products without affecting the Defense Department.

Secretary RUMSFELD. I agree.

Mr. HOBSON. You fought it in the authorization bill.

Secretary RUMSFELD. You mean the other aspects of Buy America. I think that is different. You are talking about Iraq, and I agree with you that to the extent—there are two things that I feel. One is on the money that the United States taxpayers are paying for Iraq, we certainly ought to be focusing to the extent we can on American contractors and suppliers. And, I would add, we need to focus on people who will hire Iraqis, because it is critically important that Iraqis get employed and get money in their pocket and see their circumstance of that country improving and getting better and add some hope for their future.

The technicalities of Buy America is something that is still being negotiated out and it involves the Department of Commerce, Department of Defense, Special Trade Rep, the White House, OMB and all of them are trying to find a way to work out something in the conference.

Could General Myers comment briefly on your comment about the certainty question for the troops and the rotating forces?

RESERVE FORCES DEPLOYMENTS

Mr. HOBSON. I know there was a meeting, I think last week, on that.

General MYERS. We have one about every other day on that because that is such an important issue, I think, with all the Joint Chiefs and the Secretary and his staff as well. The history is at the max, just before April of 2003, we had 223,000 reservists called up. We have demobilized 58,000 since April of this year. Where that goes in the future—our current number is under 170,000—where it goes in the future, we are still trying to look at and predict the security environment and the needs that we will confront next spring and summer, and that is something I can discuss off line with anybody but not in an open hearing.

Mr. HOBSON. Step 2 is being put together right now, I think.

General MYERS. We call it OIF. Operation Iraqi Freedom 2 is being put together right now. The ground rules are that people, whether they are Active or Reserve going to Iraq, will spend 1 year on the ground—Iraq, up to 1 year. And then what we are trying to do, we are trying to get the mobilization process, which as you know is fairly antiquated, it goes back to a different era, a different time, perhaps even different objectives that we can make a lot more efficient and we can break out combat support, combat service support that don't need the long lead times; the long mobilizations, the combat troops, might need more. So we are trying to break that out so we can give the families and the individuals and their employers some sense of what they can expect.

Mr. HOBSON. The Air Guard does that. The Army has had the big problem.

General MYERS. Understand. And that is where we have had most of our discussions, matter of fact.

Mr. LEWIS. Thank you, Mr. Hobson. Mr. Dicks.

RECONSTRUCTION

Mr. DICKS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And I had the good fortune to accompany Mr. Lewis and other members of the subcommittee on this trip. And I think we are doing some things very, very effectively. I would say to my colleagues, I came away convinced that we have to have the reconstruction money because that is going to help on security as well. I mean, when these people feel like we are doing something to help them, it makes a big difference.

I was up in Mosul with members of the subcommittee, and General Patraeus is doing an outstanding job. That should be the model for the rest of the country, Mr. Secretary. I was so impressed with the level of detail and involvement and interaction that the 101st is having with all these people in those provinces. I think that should be the model. If we follow that and give those generals the resources necessary to keep up their effort, I think we can do this.

Security is still an issue, by the way. I mean, don't kid yourself. You were just there and we were there. We have a lot of work to do. And it was mentioned that you need these trucks that can prevent these improvised explosive devices from exploding and other equipment like that.

RECAPITALIZATION AND PROCUREMENT

The one thing I am worried about, and I think we are going to do this and do it successfully—General Myers always testifies every year in his statement that—and I told this to the President and the White House staff on this issue—that we are well below where we have to be on procurement. We are at like \$71 to \$72 billion and CBO and everybody else says we should be at \$100 to \$110 billion. What I worry about is we are wearing out this equipment at a record rate and I don't think we are putting enough money away. The Army said that it needed something like \$17.5 billion to repair and replace equipment used in Iraq and Afghanistan. And as I understand it, the Department is only requesting \$5.6 billion. And of that, \$3.7 billion is for classified programs. So we are going to make a bad situation worse.

I had the opportunity, I should put it, to fly on probably five or six different C-130s and most of them were 1962-64 vintage. I mean, these Guard and Reserve people do an amazing job keeping that old stuff going. At some point we have to start replacing this equipment or somewhere down the line, when you and I are beyond the scene, some future President, some future Secretary of Defense, isn't going to have the equipment needed for some future contingency.

So I hope you will consider that. I really think we have got to come to grips with this. This has been pushed to the right for too long and we now need to do something about it or we are going to have real problems out in the future. Operation and maintenance is going to go right through the roof with the cost of maintaining and repairing all this equipment.

I would ask for your comment and General Myers' comment on that issue on the recapitalization and procurement.

Secretary RUMSFELD. I understand we have funds for about \$2.8 billion for depot maintenance. And you are right; tracks and various aspects of the equipment are getting used at a rate that in some cases it is 2 or 3 times the normal usage.

I would also add, however, that we found after the Afghan campaign that requirements were adjusted and things were not replaced on a one-for-one basis; that the services made a judgment that they wanted to purchase something else. And so the total inventory is migrating over, understandably, as a result of the lessons being learned.

General MYERS. The only thing I want to add there is a pretty large chunk in the supplemental to help the depot maintenance piece, as I said, and I think that is really, really critical. On the procurement piece we are going to have to see how we come out of this period, and we are using the equipment very, very hard. And you saw that and we know that. And the usage is much higher than is predicted in a peacetime environment.

Mr. DICKS. What happened—go ahead.

General MYERS. I would just say that the fiscal year 2004 budget that was put together and the defense planning budget got us better in procurement throughout that time frame. And I think it was, for the most part, a very realistic expectation where we can be in procurement. We couldn't make it all up in fiscal year 2004, as you know. But we are chopping away at it in fiscal years 2005, 2006 and 2007. And I think the Department has done a pretty good job of that.

Mr. DICKS. I hope we don't keep pushing it to the right, which is a tendency. You have to pay more for health care and other things and you keep pushing procurement and new equipment to the right.

General MYERS. That is the danger. As more entitlements come on the books, then something has to give. You have a lot of must pays there. What usually gives, the account that always gives—and you are right—procurement always gives it up. That is where it has to give up.

Mr. LEWIS. Mr. Bonilla.

NEWS COVERAGE IN IRAQ

Mr. BONILLA. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

One of the great frustrations is getting the truth out there. It is not a secret, but some of the information we are talking about in this room, and some of us that were in Iraq got to see firsthand the reality, which is that the glass is really more than half full and not half empty and how the projects that are being undertaken there, whether they are border security projects, education or hospitals, or trying to build a police force or a good military, they are not just ideas that are abstract. There are good forms of measurement that are being taken on a regular basis that show if you charted them on a graph, these are real projects that are being successfully undertaken in partnership, walking hand in hand with the Iraqi people.

Talking just recently to a member of the media, it was astounding; we were having an off-the-record conversation. Even this person's impression of what's happening in Iraq, they thought it was chaotic and we didn't have a grip of what is going on there. If people at that level, who are supposed to be informed, don't know what is going on there, imagine how difficult it is for the average person wandering the malls out there trying to understand what we are trying to do. And it is so frustrating because, again, when we were on the ground in Iraq and talking to folks at the State Department and part of Bremer's team, the news conference is—the information flow is out there every day, but somehow it seems like nobody wants to take up the cause and just tell the truth. And unfortunately the portrayal of what is happening there is just told in a few minutes each night, sometimes on the evening news, about the casualties, and that is not reflective of the big picture. Obviously that is a very serious issue when you lose anyone or anyone is wounded, so that is not the big picture.

In contrast to the war itself, where we got good coverage and the message was out there very clear with the embedded reporters, is it possible to have some kind of embedded project as well to have folks spend time with General Patraeus? I couldn't agree more with my colleague, Mr. Dicks, about the great impression that is made just by spending a little time with him to see how he is managing this entire part of the country.

There has to be some way to get this message out there, because otherwise it seems like the cynics and the agitators are the ones in my view, that claim to be loyal Americans, really want us to fail and they stir this up all the time and, unfortunately, they are succeeding. How can we get this message out there better?

Secretary RUMSFELD. If I knew the answer, we sure would be doing it. You are quite right. Let me first comment about General Patraeus and General Dempsey, the situation in the different parts of the country are very different. What is going on in the north is quite different distinctively from the central and the south. And the techniques that are being used by these innovative, creative generals and their teams are really fascinating to see. They are doing a wonderful job.

You are right. There are some 6,000 individual reconstruction projects that have been completed. All the schools, universities, and hospitals are functioning. And the 1st Armored Division in Baghdad is working on 5,000 small businesses on its local business council, up from zero May 1st.

I don't know quite why there is so much misinformation around, but the phrase I hear most is "You have no plan," which is utter nonsense. How do you go from zero to 56,000 Iraqis providing security in that country if you don't have a plan? How do you deal with the oil well fires without a plan? How do you deal with the humanitarian crisis? How do you deal with the internally displaced people?

It is utter nonsense that there has been no plan. There has been very good planning here. The bridges, the central bank has been stood up, the schools, the water. The electrical system is being worked on. The judicial system is out and functioning, civil defense people, village clerks. There is something going on that—people

think it is fun to repeat something that isn't the case. And my impression—

Mr. BONILLA. What about the idea of trying to have an embedded program to make the opportunities available for some of the people who form opinions.

Secretary RUMSFELD. There is an embedded program and no one wants to embed. In Baghdad, very few people are embedded right now. In Baghdad they have access to telephones, satellites and hotels and all the things they need to do their job. So you have a larger number of them in Baghdad than you do out in the other areas. I must say I think having Members of Congress go there, and other folks have a chance to see it themselves, they do get a very distinctly different impression.

Mr. BONILLA. We certainly had a fabulous trip, because we were able to become more educated about this. And I think in a bipartisan way, those—if you could hear some of the comments that were made in an earlier public event that we had here in the Capitol earlier today, it was well worth it, and I think the message will start getting out there a little more at least through many of us.

Mr. LEWIS. Thank you, sir. Mr. Sabo.

COST ESTIMATING

Mr. SABO. I guess I don't have so much a question but just an observation. I am someone who voted against the resolution to go to war. I have no reservations about that vote. If I had to do it again, I would make the same vote with more certainty than I had some months ago. And on the other hand, I understand the reality of where we are today.

And I assume you would like to have some of us who thought you were wrong to go to war vote for what you want to do today. Maybe I am wrong, but I assume that. But you make it very difficult, because we thought then that we were being sold—oversold. And today we are being undersold.

To follow up on Mr. Obey's questions, my assumption is the costs are going to be substantially more than what we are being told today, both in terms of long-term and military obligation and also in terms of reconstruction of Iraq. I think the assumption that billions are going to flow from other countries just doesn't pass the reality test. And I think the American people need to understand this is something that is going to be very expensive for a longer period of time than most of them expect.

We are also in a mess fiscally in this country. It is not your department, but it is reality, and what goes on here complicates that and makes it more difficult to sell.

I find it difficult when I hear that this is an extension on the war on terrorism, because I think it is something fundamentally other than that. We were simply seeking supplemental funds to deal with the war on terrorism. Clearly part of that supplemental would be some significant additional funding for a variety of very crucial programs in our own country to deal with security issues that might relate to terrorism. The administration has not been particularly generous in funding those programs.

So I find you make it very difficult for some of us to vote yes, but we will still seriously consider it, because the truth is the alter-

native to proceeding is probably chaos, and chaos in another part of the Middle East would in the long run be incredibly dangerous for this country. So we will keep our options open. But, boy, I wish some of the rhetoric would be a little more accurate to the point. And rather than underestimating our ability to deal with the truth today, where we are, I would like to see us have the American people and the Congress fully understand where we are at and what our responsibility is.

I might say one of my comments early on, before this conflict started, my assumption was that in the end that some of us who voted no would have the responsibility of voting yes for reconstitution on Iraq. Those people who voted yes ran away from the consequences of their vote.

Mr. LEWIS. Thank you, Mr. Sabo. Any comments?

Secretary RUMSFELD. I would say this. It would be unwise and unfair for me to think I could speak about the future with precision. It is hard; you can't. There are things that aren't knowable. And I think the way I phrased it is exactly correct, that the—our expectation for the military side of the \$87 billion is what we believe it will cost for the calendar—correction, fiscal year 2004.

I said earlier and I believe that it is unlikely there would not be a military bill to pay for 2005 and that that would be handled in a supplemental.

Now, that is directly and straightforward as I can be. I can't tell you what that number will be. I don't think anyone could. We are just in the beginning process of developing those budgets, and the Coalition Provisional Authority hasn't even started.

With respect to the Coalition Provisional Authority, I have never believed that it is the job of the United States of America to rebuild Iraq. Iraq is suffering not from the war damage; Iraq is suffering from 30-plus years of Saddam Hussein's Stalinist-like economic policies and denial and starvation of that infrastructure, because he was building palaces and armies and doing other things.

So what we need to do is to, as you correctly said, make sure that you don't end up in chaos. Make sure that they are put on a path, politically, economically, and from a security standpoint, so they can get on a path for the future that is sensible and constructive for that part of the world. And we believe that this proposal, which we do hope you will support, provides the kind of resources that are needed to do that. I take what you have said very seriously.

Mr. LEWIS. Thank you. Mr. Nethercutt.

POST-WAR PLANNING

Mr. NETHERCUTT. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Welcome, gentlemen.

Mr. Secretary, I think you make a very sound point relative to the issue of whether there is or is not a plan. As one who just came back with the delegation, I think the plan has worked remarkably well, frankly, given where we were 5 months ago and where the people of Iraq were 5 months ago and where they are today.

Now your military personnel are very well positioned I think, as I observed parts of that country along with the rest of the members. I think they are preparing to protect their own security and

the lives of our men and women over there. I found that the provisional authority, the CPA, to be very responsive to our inquiries, our comments, our suggestions. The police force is being stood up and I just think this is a great success story.

And it is easy for all of us to sit here peacefully in the United States and be critical, and that is our right as Americans in a free society. But I will tell you, I am more convinced than ever that we have done the right thing in being there, and I think we all are proud of your Department and the people who defend this Nation from situations like terrorism, that we didn't start, that was visited upon us. And I have no doubt in my mind, as one Member, that if we didn't take this stand in Afghanistan and Iraq, who knows where in the world we would be and who would be against us?

I think this is the battleground now in Iraq for the war against terrorism. The borders are difficult to surveil and to protect, and there are people coming into that country who are anxious for us to fail and anxious to keep the people of Iraq oppressed.

I congratulate your Department on the plan, on the execution of the plan, the implementation of a post-Saddam plan. It is a good one. It isn't all-knowing. We can't know precisely what is going to happen tomorrow, the day after, and the next day after that. So I think you are smart in not telling us exactly what the numbers are for the next 5 years. Who in the world can know?

I remember Secretary Perry coming to talk to us about Bosnia and saying it is a 1-year \$1.5 billion deal. That wasn't the facts and that wasn't the result. So my question goes to this and my comments go to this. This reconstruction period is vitally important, and the international assistance in the reconstruction period I think is also vitally important. The more infusion of money we have early from our country and the rest of the world, the faster we are out of there and the faster we hand it off to the Iraqis.

PLEDGES/CONTRIBUTIONS FROM OTHER COUNTRIES

My question to you and the panel, Dr. Zakheim, is really this: Can you tell us with certainty how much have we had in the way of pledges from allies around the world? How much will we ask for from our allies when we want to contribute to this very important reconstruction period? And I think that is evidence we need to have and information we need to know so we can have some sense of the planning that goes into determining what is our next down payment on this long-term—or hopefully short-term—experience that we have.

Mr. ZAKHEIM. As of August, we had about \$1.5 billion worth of pledges. That is funds that does not include, obviously, the military people that are serving out there right now. These are purely funds for reconstruction. The conference in Madrid will raise, we hope, in the billions. We have made it very clear at all levels to the major governments we are speaking to—and it is no secret who those are, the Europeans, our friends in Japan, our friends in the Gulf—that the United States administration is asking the Congress for \$20 billion and we are looking to the rest of the international community and the financial institutions to provide resources in the billions, not in the millions.

Mr. NETHERCUTT. Well, the European Union just pledged \$200 million. Is pressure being brought to bear for the billions, especially from the European Union?

Mr. ZAKHEIM. As I understand it, the \$200 million is a recommendation that the European Commission staff makes to various countries. You have, in addition to what the European Union might itself contribute as the European Union—and by no means are we accepting the \$200 million as the last word—the countries themselves of the European Union, many of which are quite wealthy, also could contribute. We are not saying thank you for \$200 million and going home.

Mr. LEWIS. Thank you, Mr. Nethercutt. Mr. Visclosky.

BUY AMERICA

Mr. VISCLOSKY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. Secretary, I would like to essentially ask two questions. One is a follow-up on the line of questioning from Mr. Hobson. You had mentioned that Buy America provisions and the issue of Buy America is different in Iraq than something else. I didn't quite get the "something else," and that is my first question.

Secretary RUMSFELD. Yes, sir. I think what I was referring—what is the—

Mr. VISCLOSKY. What is the difference buying America for Iraq and something else? What is different?

Secretary RUMSFELD. The reference I made was to the fact that I believe in the current conference that is being held on the authorization bill, there is a very specific debate and discussion taking place on some proposals that the House side made with respect to a series of so-called Buy America provisions, full stop.

The other thing we were talking about is something quite different in my view, and that is the point that was made by Mr. Hobson, that you've got a number—a large sum of U.S. dollars going into Iraq, and to the extent possible, it certainly makes sense to have American equipment and American contractors involved. And I added that I thought it also was important that we use people that hired Iraqis to the extent possible, because we have got to get that economy going.

Mr. VISCLOSKY. Mr. Secretary, I would make the observation that we have a lot of money in the defense bill, period, and that the American taxpayers are paying every one of those dollars that we spend, and that Buy America is important in Iraq, Buy America is important in Korea, Buy America is important in Florida, Buy America is important in Illinois. And it ought to be the same.

I understand what your point is about looking for people who want to hire Iraqis. I also think we ought to look for firms that want to hire Americans. I had a firm in Indiana who made magnets, rare earth magnets used in the JDAMs. We wrote to the President of the United States twice. We wrote to the Secretary of Treasury twice. Didn't write to you. Never got a piece of paper back. And from my perspective, that technology, important to our defense, is now being manufactured in China, and those 180 jobs that used to exist in the State of Indiana are gone. And we are worried about getting reservists back to the United States to their jobs. I hope there is something left for them.

TERRORIST ACTIVITY IN IRAQ

The second question I would have, Mr. Secretary, is do you think we overestimated, underestimated, or got it about right as far as the level of guerilla activity, sabotage, border incursion, and terrorist activity that has occurred since the end of the conflict?

Secretary RUMSFELD. Someone went back and looked at the intelligence on the subject and sent me a packet of instances where the U.S. Intelligence community had, in fact, raised these issues as possibilities; that in a post major combat period, you could have the kinds of things that you have enumerated. So that I guess the answer is that the Intel Community had references to those possibilities.

Mr. VISCLOSKY. So having references made, did they get it about right or were they under or over?

Secretary RUMSFELD. I think I want to go back and study it to be judgmental about the Intelligence Community, because I don't want to be unfair.

INTELLIGENCE AGENCIES INFORMATION

Mr. VISCLOSKY. My conclusion—and I am not an intelligence expert—is that there are several parts of intelligence. One is it is gathering. And secondly, internally, from what you are saying, it is dissemination as to those making a decision.

You have indicated in your testimony today that there is a plan. And I assume there was a plan for postwar Iraq on the use of the intelligence that you are going to go back and study as far as the planning that DoD did, that the administration did for postwar Iraq. Do you think they over-, under-, or got it about right as to how to utilize the information they got from the U.S. Intelligence agency?

Secretary RUMSFELD. Why don't I take a stab and, General Myers, and why don't you take a stab at this? My impression is that the war was highly successful. The success in getting to Baghdad and ending that regime occurred in a relatively short period of time, and that one of the aspects of that was that the—in a non-trivial way, a substantial portion of the forces north of Baghdad disappeared into the countryside and did not end up in a sufficient number of battles where they could be captured or killed. That means they are still there, a number of those folks.

Mr. VISCLOSKY. Was that anticipated, not anticipated, or do you think you got it about right?

Secretary RUMSFELD. I would say for myself, I expected the battle to continue going farther north and to not have it, in effect, end as precipitously as it did.

Dick, what about you?

General MYERS. There are some things that we got—we underestimated, you know, and we have talked about those. That is IDPs, the fire—oil well fires and so forth. It turns out the way we constructed this flow of people into the region was to give General Franks and his folks maximum flexibility on how this plan would be executed. We did not use all the combat force that was on its way to the theater. Once major combat operations ended, we have not added force—I mean, so many were still flowing in and they

continue to flow in. And we have had some changeouts, but we have actually taken people out of there.

Remember we had 160,000 U.S. personnel, troops, in Iraq. We are now down to 130,000. So you know there are puts and takes here. I think in that area where most of the incidents happened, I think we expected that to be very, very difficult and that is why we put the division we did in there. In the north, in the south, we expected those—I mean, they are playing out as we planned.

Secretary RUMSFELD. Certainly for a long period, we expected to get the 4th Infantry Division in through Turkey, and it did not get in through Turkey. And that, of course, changed the plan, that General Franks called for an adjustment in his plan. And it is conceivable that had the 4th Infantry Division come in through the north, that you might have ended up with a different behavior pattern on the part of those Republican Guard forces north of Baghdad and north of Tikrit in that area.

General MYERS. I think the tenacity of the fighters and former regime loyalists, they are probably more tenacious than many calculated.

Mr. VISCLOSKEY. I assume my time is up, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. LEWIS. We are ready to move on. That is right. Mr. Frelinghuysen.

OPERATIONS IN IRAQ

Mr. FRELINGHUYSEN. There has been a fair amount of venting this afternoon, and I want to vent a little bit as well. First of all, I think our involvement in Iraq does count for something, no matter that General Zinni and others may have a view. Some of these people may have had the same view that we may be bogged down in a virtual war for 2 years to get to Baghdad, and then somehow swallowed their words after we got in there in a remarkably short period of time with a minimum loss of life.

Like many Members of Congress, when I came back I got on the phone this morning and called some of the parents and talked to them and their children. These are young people that are out there in a hellishly hot environment. Their spirits are up and they are doing a hell of a good job. And they know that their work there counts for something. They feel very strongly about it, and they are damn frustrated that the message isn't getting out.

And it counts for something because this guy is gone, yet there is some question as to whether he is still living. And certainly what we have done there is send a message to Syria, sent a message to the Iranian clerics. And I for one feel that it has opened up, I think, the possibility for some sort of road map to peace between the Palestinians and the State of Israel.

PUBLIC INFORMATION

So I am an optimist about our involvement there, but I am concerned about getting the message out. Quite honestly, I am not entirely satisfied with your response to Congressman Bonilla. If five Arab TV stations—and I repeated this to my colleagues on the trip—can be on the air 24 hours a day pounding away, negating all the good things we are doing there, given all that we have about American ingenuity—I am not talking about DoD or PIO or one of

Ambassador Bremer's public information officers—there must be some major effort undertaken here to promote a more positive message about what we are doing. I am not just talking about out-and-out propaganda. There needs to be some constant repetition and somebody needs to go to the drawing boards with either your operation or somebody else's to create that counterbalance.

Maybe, Mr. Secretary, it is too difficult to do it. It is more than just the press conference that Ambassador Bremer has every day there on the ground. He says he has press conferences. You have had plenty, and you have been masterful at doing them. But there is something wrong in that theater that we are not getting the message out, because we certainly shook them up by doing what we did.

I would like you to revisit that issue and come up with some better answer. Thank you.

Secretary RUMSFELD. Congressman, your finger is right on the problem. You are right, it is repetition that is critically important. It is being done in Washington. It is being done in Iraq. It is being done by the Central Command. It is being done by Ambassador Bremer's operation, and it rarely gets carried. What gets carried is the bad news. What gets carried is something that is harmful or unhelpful. It is not just the Arab television stations, it is a broad range of things that, for whatever reason, seem to be less interested in the actual facts of what is taking place in that country than in a few dramatic things that keep occurring that are unfortunate.

And let us be honest, it is a dangerous and difficult spot, and there are still people getting killed. And it is understandable that those things are going to get reported, and I accept that. But we are working as hard as I know how, with an awful lot of people, trying to help and trying to overcome what you properly say is a wave of bad press in the region that is affecting the Iraqi people, it is affecting the other people in the region, and it is harmful. It is harmful because it is not the truth. It is not conveying a balanced presentation of what is actually taking place.

Mr. LEWIS. Mr. Moran.

COSTS FOR RECONSTRUCTION OF IRAQ

Mr. MORAN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

We need to get the information out to the Iraqi people that we don't have any plans for being longtime occupiers of their country or really to transform that country into our own image. We want them to be able to run their own country for their own benefit. We can't spend ourselves—we don't want to deceive ourselves into the situation we confront.

You mentioned 47 nations in your testimony, Moldova, Mongolia, Lithuania, Estonia and all kinds of very other important countries. But the fact is that of the amount that they are contributing, it is only about 1 percent of the cost, is it not, of the war and reconstruction to date?

Secretary RUMSFELD. Countries I listed are countries that are contributing troops. There are 32-plus, I believe, that are contributing troops. And a lot of them are small countries. And the proportion of troops they are contributing is not trivial from the stand-

point of their population size. And it does show they have political courage and personal courage, to send their forces into a dangerous and difficult part of the world. I said it represents about 23,000 troops, compared to our 130,000 troops. So I said it is not equal to ours by a long shot.

Mr. MORAN. No. And it stands in stark comparison financially and in terms of troop commitment to the original Persian Gulf war. And so we really haven't done the job in terms of making this a multinational coalition to accomplish something that should be a shared objective with every other democratic nation. And that would seem to be a reasonable expectation and request on the part of the American people.

You told us that eventually Iraq should be generating about \$20 billion of oil revenue on an annual basis. That is what Mr. Bremer told us—by 2005. He also said the cost of running the Iraq Government is about \$15 billion. Even I can figure out that is about \$5 billion left. But then you tell us that Iraq has all kinds of debt, so the American taxpayer needs to give them grant money rather than loans. But that debt was generated by France and Germany and Russia for very self-centered reasons, obviously, and much of it went into building palaces and any number of things that are hardly noble in their objectives. And as we know, a lot of those countries, they operate in areas we can't, because they are perfectly willing to give payoffs to generals and so on to get the contracts. And yet we feel that paying off that debt is more important than paying the cost to the American taxpayer of fronting this effort.

So I don't see why we can't continue to look at the possibility of this money being borrowed, with the expectation that eventually it will get repaid. Heck, the IMF and the World Bank lend money for the long term and sometimes they forgive it, but they try to get it back. But it would seem that the American taxpayer should expect no less than that. So that is a legitimate line of questioning it would seem.

FORCE RECONSTITUTION

But right now, something that is particularly troubling is that we are told that much of the uniformed services—the military's funding requirements to reconstitute the force were not even considered by your office or OMB in the preparation of this supplemental request. As it turns out, those funding requirements were beyond the arbitrary funding level that you set. Well, that is clearly a definition of a top-down approach and it could have dire consequences, we are told, when we have to consider the risk to our readiness to meet other contingencies such as North Korea with decreased capabilities.

Now, what is the story there? We are told that the request that the armed services made was considerably more, in the range of \$16 billion, to reconstitute our forces. And you granted, what, \$2 billion of that in this supplemental? Are you going to ask for more money at a later stage, Mr. Secretary?

Secretary RUMSFELD. Let me respond to several of those questions. First, you are right; there is a big difference between Operation Iraqi Freedom and the Gulf War in 1990 and 1991. In 1990 and 1991, Kuwait was invaded and Saudi Arabia was threatened,

and they provided overwhelmingly the amount of money that was provided by other nations: \$16 billion for Saudi Arabia, and \$16 billion for Kuwait. And there were three other countries that stepped up quite smartly and they were Germany, Japan, and the UAE, UAE also being somewhat threatened.

Mr. MORAN. Last I looked, Saudi Arabia and Kuwait are still Iraq's neighbors, and Saddam Hussein would seem to be more of a threat to them than the United States.

Secretary RUMSFELD. So it was a different situation. Second, the debt that was incurred by Saddam Hussein, I agree completely, ought not to be paid by the American taxpayers.

Mr. MORAN. But you are asking them to pay, but you are not suggesting we borrow any of this money and we not use the oil revenue to pay off the cost of this supplemental.

Secretary RUMSFELD. Quite the contrary. You wouldn't want to leave the impression that any taxpayers' dollars are going to pay off Saddam Hussein's debts to any country.

Mr. MORAN. Mr. Secretary, during your testimony you cited out the amount of debt that is outstanding and that is why this needed to be grant money, unreimbursed.

Secretary RUMSFELD. My understanding is that the—I forget what it is called—the G7 has had a meeting and they have decided that any debt payments for Iraq would be put off through calendar year 2004, and that anyone involved in those meetings is thinking of the rescheduling or writing off of substantial portions of that. And I don't know, I can't speak how all these countries will ultimately make their decision. But certainly this administration does not intend that these dollars go to paying off the debts of Saddam Hussein.

Mr. MORAN. But they are going to if we don't demand them as reimbursement for the up-front cost of saving that country from his dictatorship.

Mr. YOUNG. Would the gentleman yield for one second? I would like to advise the gentleman that at the hearing that we held with Ambassador Bremer, I advised the Ambassador that the bill that we present to the Committee and to the House will include a provision that says none of the funds may be used to pay off any of Saddam Hussein's or Iraq's debts to foreign debtors.

Mr. MORAN. This is your idea and it is an excellent idea. I am not surprised you are putting it in. I am asking the Secretary why it wasn't initiated by the administration.

Secretary RUMSFELD. The administration never intended that that happen, and therefore they may very well—it is an OMB budget supplemental. I don't know whether they considered it or not, but they never intended that this money go this way. And I am sure that Chairman Young has met with nothing but support for his suggestion; is that correct?

Mr. MORAN. Do you support that language, Mr. Secretary?

Secretary RUMSFELD. I haven't read it, but I certainly agree with the principle. I just said so.

Mr. MORAN. You wouldn't have any problem if that was included in the bill?

Secretary RUMSFELD. First of all, it is not for me to decide, it is for the President and the Office of Management and Budget.

Second, you asked my personal opinion. And I answered it in that I do not believe that the funds in this bill should be used to pay Saddam Hussein's debts.

Mr. LEWIS. Thank you, Mr. Moran. Mr. Tiahrt.

REBUILDING IRAQ

Mr. TIAHRT. Thank you Mr. Chairman.

A week ago on Tuesday as I was coming into the Capitol, I heard an ABC news report on the radio on Iraq. The news radio report said there was chaos in the streets. There was limited water, sporadic power. The criminals ran the streets and the Iraqis resented our presence. In my trip over the weekend, I found that to be totally false. I found life going pretty much as usual. There was traffic on the streets. The marketplaces were open. The lights were on. There was water. Somebody was picking up the garbage. Hospitals were open. Schools were open.

I think our troops are doing a great job over there. I found the Iraqi people to be friendly, but they are struggling. They are having a hard time. And I think it would be very difficult for them to pay back a \$20 billion debt when they are trying to rebuild their country from scratch. Ninety-five percent of the damage to that country was done by Saddam Hussein. Our military was very precise. The bridges were still up. The electrical power plant I visited was not hit by any bombs.

I think it is a little bit unfair for us—I mean, if we are going to say this is a loan, then we ought to be prepared to forgive it, because they won't be able to pay it back until we can get some reconstruction. But, again, I found our troop morale here and our generals are doing an excellent job over there.

I do have three questions that I would like you to respond to though. This supplemental includes money for our military to train Iraqi National Police, their Highway Patrol, their Border Patrol. Why aren't these jobs being done by the INS instead of our military, or why aren't they being done by the FBI and with people who have experience as highway patrolmen? And I didn't see much cooperation between the DOD and these other agencies, and I think that needs to be addressed by you and the administration.

Second, we are being asked to rebuild these old power generation facilities like al-Durah. It was built in the late fifties and early sixties by the Germans. There are a lot better technologies out there, like our peak power plants and like our municipal plants. They are smaller, less capital investment, more efficient. It doesn't make good sense to me. It is like continuing to fly 43-year-old tankers when we should be leasing 767 tankers. I want to know why we aren't investing in new American technology in the power.

Third, currently about 4 percent of Iraq is tilled. Most of it is farmed like it was when Nebuchadnezzar ruled Babylon. They use hoes and shovels and they herd their sheep while they are on foot. They live in mud huts. And I think they are growing the wrong crops. It is basically like the central valley of California. They ought to be growing fruits and vegetables instead of wheat and corn. They are farming—very few tractors. Why aren't we including in our supplemental plans to get their resources up to the 27 or 28 percent of the country that could be tillable and supplying them

with new farm equipment that could help them feed themselves and the surrounding nations?

Secretary RUMSFELD. Congressman, first let me say that the Coalition Provisional Authority has people from practically every department and agency in the government in it. They don't walk around with a sign saying which department they are from, but there are people from Justice, there are people from FBI. There are people from State and Energy, and right down the line. And they have been there from the beginning. There are also, I might add, people from, I believe, 17 different countries that have people in the Coalition Provisional Authority. I was at one of the prisons and the man who was assisting there happened to be from Ireland.

And so there is a high degree of cooperation taking place on the ground in that country, not only among the domestic agencies but also between the CPA, the Coalition Provisional Authority, and the Central Command which is intimately involved in what they are doing.

The question of new technology versus old equipment is a dilemma. And there is a lot of people going in and looking at it and saying, gee, they can do it by just scrapping it and starting over. That is one way of doing it, but also expensive in the near term.

There are a lot of very good Iraqi engineers and they are used to, over decades apparently, trying to patch together with paper clips, chewing gum, and Scotch tape and making these things work. And the question is for them, where should their resources go; what should they invest in to jump and leapfrog towards new technology?

My personal view is the place they ought to be doing it is in the oil infrastructure, because that is going to get the biggest immediate payout in terms of kicking revenue into that economy over time. They could substantially improve their revenues.

You are quite right on the water. They are water-rich. It is an impressive resource they have and it is terribly managed. An enormous fraction of it is being wasted into the ground and not being properly handled through the various acequias or whatever they call them in Iraq—I guess in New Mexico they are called acequias—but canals, ditches or what have you. The potential they have for agriculture is just enormous.

Mr. TIAHRT. Mr. Secretary, I think it is very important for the American public to know that we are fighting the battle of terrorism in the streets of Baghdad and Tikrit instead of the streets of Washington, D.C. And New York. I think for us to cut and run now, for us to not let this supplemental go through, would potentially bring that battle of terrorism back home. So, onward.

Mr. LEWIS. Mr. Wicker.

Mr. WICKER. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. I too, want to ask three questions. I may pause in the middle for answers, and I notice that 5 minutes lasts shorter down at this end of the table than maybe down toward the center.

Secretary RUMSFELD. It has always been so.

ADEQUATE SUPPLEMENTAL FUNDING

Mr. WICKER. Dr. Zakheim, regarding procurement, I think I agree with Mr. Dicks that we are probably not asking for enough.

But on the \$5.3 billion that is not classified, of the weapons and goods needed, are we only replacing items lost during combat? If so, are we replacing all of those items or will we be using some of that procurement money to buy new items? Will anything be included in there for force protection enhancement?

Mr. ZAKHEIM. I know, sir, that there are some new items. There are some upgrades as well. And, of course, the depot maintenance is just that. And we are not fully resetting the forces here. We are doing what we can in Fiscal Year 04. It is a start and it is a significant start, but I wouldn't tell you that we are fully resetting the force right now.

BUY AMERICA

Mr. WICKER. Let me proceed into the point that has been made by several people, first by Congressman Hobson, about Buy America. And I appreciate what the Secretary said about hiring Iraqis, because I know that thousands of them were working for the government in this statist society and they need to feel that there is hope for them being employed.

But do you have an estimate, Dr. Zakheim, about how much of this procurement money will actually be spent in America—how much of it will be manufactured in America or how much of it will at least be plowed back into our economy? Because I hear economists saying we are spending \$87 billion overseas, as if not a penny of it has helped Americans manufacture something or participate in employment. So if you could comment on that, or any of the three of you.

Mr. ZAKHEIM. I will have to get you the exact proportion for the record. I think it is safe to say that the overwhelming proportion of what we buy will obviously be made in this country. And I would also point out that as long as we are talking about the \$20 billion program, as we are, we can in fact insist on American contractors. If, for example, there were loans involved, then the Iraqis who would be the recipients of the loans could hire any contractors they want, from anywhere they want, and that would be a serious loss to America.

Secretary RUMSFELD. If I may, Mr. Chairman, I would like to introduce Dave Oliver who is sitting behind me here. Dave was the principal Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for a number of years for Acquisition and Technology and Logistics. And he has been out in Baghdad with Ambassador Bremer, fashioning the Coalition Provisional Authority's budget and he is part of the Office of Management and Budget for Ambassador Jerry Bremer under very difficult circumstances, and we appreciate what he is doing and being here.

Mr. WICKER. If I may continue—and I appreciate that, Mr. Secretary.

On Buy America and investing in American jobs and putting part of this money back into our economy, how are we doing on the \$60 billion that we have already appropriated?

Mr. ZAKHEIM. Again, I would have to get you that for the record, but I think my answer would be the same; that the money that we have spent invariably is overwhelmingly spent in this country, for this country.

[CLERK'S NOTE.—The Department was unable to provide a response in time to be printed in this hearing volume.]

RESERVE COMPONENT RETENTION

Mr. WICKER. Do you think you could quantify that for us before the debate on the floor, because we are doing it in the national interest for national security, but if there is a very important indirect benefit for Americans, we need to know about that.

And finally, Mr. Chairman, if I might, following up on what so many members of this Committee said about the seeming disparity between active duty personnel on the ground in the theater and Guard and Reserve personnel, I would echo I think the sentiments of the majority of members of this Committee, that that needs to be looked at very carefully. And I would ask you, General Myers, what effect do people in your shop think this is going to have on future recruitment of Guard and personnel? Are we running people out of the program because of the overcommitment?

General MYERS. Short answer to that, Congressman Wicker, is that it is really too early to tell. And I say that advisedly. In terms of the active force, recruiting and retention so far are meeting all goals. That is the active force. However, we do have the effect that stop-loss is having and we have to see if stop-loss comes off on certain skill sets, what effect that has on the active force.

On the Reserve side, if you take a macro look at it, both the Reserves and the National Guard think they are going to have the end strength they need as far as they can see. But in terms of recruiting, generally strong.

Some issues with the Army National Guard. In the third quarter they were down a little bit. They are back up now. And the Reserves, you saw the article in the paper today. I have just read it. But it is something; you know, I have a two-star Guard and two-star Reserve adviser to keep me informed of what is going on out there in the field. What I say is we are okay now, but that doesn't mean we are going to be okay in 6 months or a year. That has to be carefully managed. The Secretary has insisted that the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the services and the service secretaries manage this issue very carefully. So I think we are okay for now, but we have to do the things we promised to do.

And the other part of that is, as you saw—I assume you talked to some guardsmen and reservists out there, no doubt. You can't go anywhere in Iraq that you don't see these people—or Afghanistan. And they understand why they are being called up, too. And it needs to be understood that, in fact, we are a Nation at war. And when a Nation is at war, you use your Reserve component. They are asked to make extraordinary sacrifices. And when they raise their right hand and say, I swear to support and defend the Constitution of the United States, they know what they are doing. Our job is to provide them as much predictability, the training, the leadership, the equipment to do the job. And we haven't been perfect in that. I mean, our communications and so forth. I am talking about the whole Department and so forth. We have not been perfect at that.

We have to get better. The Secretary is pushing on us every day. This is an everyday conversation we have in how we can do better

in treating not only the active but the Reserve component, because they have got the employers to worry about and they got family situations.

But I think, in the end, that they value their service to our country and will stick with us. But we have got to do our part in that.

Mr. LEWIS. Thank you, Mr. Wicker.

Mr. WICKER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

DEBT FORGIVENESS FOR IRAQ

Mr. LEWIS. Mr. Secretary and gentleman, if the American people really knew what Saddam Hussein and his regime were about, they would be right out front on point insisting that we do something about that horrid regime and the impact it has had and continues to have on humanity. If they really had a sense for the fact that Saddam Hussein murdered a minimum of 300,000 but probably closer to 1.5 million of his own citizens and built palaces in the meantime while the infrastructure went you-know-where in a handbasket, if the American people really knew that he went out of his way to make sure that a formula for feeding children was polluted by water that essentially was refuse water, to kill babies, in Lord knows what numbers, if they could visit the killing fields that we visited and brought tears to the eyes of our members, America would be the first to get rid of that kind of force, and not just in Iraq but anywhere on the face of the globe.

This country is not going to make it unless we successfully help them turn their economy around. This \$20 billion that General Sanchez said is every bit as important as the military funding, is trying to impact that funding. I don't know if Congress will insist upon some kind of debt language or otherwise, but, frankly, when a country has \$100 billion in debt owed to other countries, that is now on the back of the people of Iraq, that was created by Saddam Hussein, you have to scratch your head about that. \$120 billion in reparations, so you have got \$250 billion approximately of money that is a load on the back of the economy.

I would hope, Mr. Secretary, that—even though it is not your direct job, I would hope that you would play a role with your key responsibility within the administration to have us urging forgiveness at those conferences in Spain. If we can begin to make sense out of that sort of debt load, then the oil will mean something out there in terms of their independence and will better ensure that we won't have to commit more of our dollars in the months and years ahead.

Would you react to that thought?

Secretary RUMSFELD. I agree.

Mr. LEWIS. Is it your intention to be involved in attempting to push the issue?

Secretary RUMSFELD. As you properly point out, it is not in my area. It is the Department of Treasury and the Office of Management and Budget and the President, and they will be negotiating with lots of other countries. But it just seems to me the comments that have been made by Mr. Moran and others on this Committee are right on the mark. That country is saddled with an enormous amount of debt that was incurred by Saddam Hussein, and the goal is to get them on an up path. You don't get them on an up

path by leaving them in a hole like that. So my guess is there will be substantial restructuring taking place sometime next year, I would guess.

Mr. LEWIS. That is the end of our first round.
It is my pleasure to call on Mr. Cunningham.

IRAQI DEBT

Mr. CUNNINGHAM. Sorry I am late. I just got in on an airplane and came running in here, Mr. Secretary.

Secretary RUMSFELD. Good to see you.

Mr. CUNNINGHAM. But it was for a worthy cause.

I would like to ask a two-part question. With the economy starting to turn and come back, I would hate to see something slow it down. Is it possible in the future—I know all the funds from oil production is going to rebuild Iraq. But in the future, is it possible that, say, Iraq might give us a special break, or the others that are helping them, give us \$2 off a barrel of oil, and over a short period of time? If so, it would not take very long, to repay some of this debt and we would not be saddled with the full costs of rebuilding.

I believe it is necessary. I sit on the Select Committee for Intelligence, and I know what this rascal Hussein has been up to. You are old enough, like me, to remember our own highways were littered. Not today. If you throw something out of your car, somebody is going to honk at you or turn you in. I think if we can have Egypt and Saudi Arabia and Afghanistan and Iraq, when a terrorist raises their ugly head, stand up and turn somebody in or holler and say it is not in our best interests. We can clear up problems over there. That is why I support your initiatives and this spending package.

My main question is this: You know the shortages we have in defense, sir. How are we going to separate out the Iraqi reconstruction funds from those necessary for the military? Because it seems like—not that it is your fault—but for some reason, a lot of these funds are diverted away from the military in other directions. I would like to know if there is a plan to protect their funds so that we can be assured our men and women in uniform are taken care of, sir.

Secretary RUMSFELD. Maybe Dr. Zakheim would want to comment or General Myers, but the decision was made to include in the supplemental in negotiation with the Congress funds for Iraq and Afghanistan and the global war on terrorism expenses here in the United States for Noble Eagle, the caps and that type of thing, and to deal in the 2004 budget—2005 budget that is being built now the issues that you are raising.

Do you want to elaborate beyond that?

Mr. ZAKHEIM. No, I think that sums it up pretty well.

We restricted it quite deliberately to Operation Iraqi Freedom, Enduring Freedom and Noble Eagle. We restricted it also to the monies that could actually be expended in fiscal year 2004; and obviously, beyond that, we are building the 2005 budget and the future year defense plan to take account of your concerns.

Mr. CUNNINGHAM. Thank you, Mr. Secretary.

General, we are going to get you those F-22s. This is coming from a Navy guy.

I yield back.

Mr. LEWIS. Mr. Obey.

COST ESTIMATING

Mr. OBEY. Mr. Secretary, just some random thoughts to sum up reaction to what I have heard today from a variety of sources here.

First of all, someone suggested that a lot of people who are expressing concerns about the Iraqi situation today are the same people who said that we would be involved in a long, protracted military campaign that might takes months and months. I certainly don't know anybody at this table who said anything other than that we expected the military campaign itself to go well and be over relatively quickly, as wars go.

I think it is obvious that if you spend \$350 billion-plus on military expenditures and the other guy spends \$10 billion, we are likely to win, and I am glad we did. But that doesn't have a whole lot to do with what our concerns are about the future, because, for whatever reason, whoever was right, whoever was wrong, we are in it, and we have to go on from there.

Someone else suggested that you shouldn't be expected to lay out exactly what the 5-year costs could be expected to be. No one is silly enough to expect you to be able to do that. What we are continuing to do, however, is to ask whether we have a clue about what the range of costs will be over the next number of years that we are engaged in Iraq.

Thirdly, you asked who on Earth had told us that there would be no money required beyond the initial \$60-some billion that we provided last year. We were told that by the Office of Management Budget Director, and I think we ought we have a right to assume they know what they are talking about at OMB.

Secretary RUMSFELD. Did they say no more that year, or no more forever?

EQUIPMENT REPAIR

Mr. OBEY. The question was, how much more you could expect; and, in fact, on one occasion they indicated that they didn't think there was much reconstruction that we would have to do. I don't think we should crucify anybody for making a wrong judgment. I have made a spectacular number in my lifetime. But I do think what it points up is the need for us to know at least what you know or what you have a suspicion about.

Going back to another example, the refurbishing costs which were discussed awhile ago, it is my understanding that in fact what the Army is getting in this package is around \$1 billion, when the cost of refurbishing that equipment we are told will be around \$17 billion. That means there is another substantial cost coming our way. If we don't intend to do that, then what we are saying is that we have had about five divisions active in one way, shape or form. They have all had equipment that needs refurbishing; and if we don't do that, that means that half of our capability will be sitting on the sideline. So if we have another problem—so I assume we are going to take care of the equipment, and we would kind of like to know what the full expectation of those is going to be.

So, I would say I guess, Mr. Secretary, I don't really have a question, I just have a plea: We have been on all sides of this issue. We have had people for the war, people against the war, people that didn't know how they felt. That is all behind us. What is important is that we try to be together now; and, as Mr. Sabo said, it is going to be very difficult to do that, even though a lot of people want to be, if we can't get, as Paul Harvey used to say, the rest of the story.

So that is what we are looking for. Just give us what you would give good old Paul Harvey, if he asked the question. That is all we are asking for.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. ZAKHEIM. Mr. Obey, I would like to address the part of the question about refurbishing. You are absolutely right. The \$2.8 billion and even the \$1.9 billion in procurement is a down payment. There is no doubt about it. But that already involves an increase in both the private and public sectors of about 25 percent in each, in depot maintenance. So we are ramping up for 2004.

Beyond that, we are putting together our fiscal year 2005 budget. We have to look at a number of factors. One is, what else do we want to refurbish and when? Secondly—

Mr. OBEY. Where did the number come from that is in your package then? If there is more to come, where does this number come from?

Mr. ZAKHEIM. That was based on an assessment of current capacity and planned inductions. In other words, we looked at what we are already doing, what we plan to do and how much more we could ramp up. That is where this number comes from. So it addresses the capacity issue.

Beyond that, we again have to look at capacity for the following year, as well, as the Secretary mentioned earlier, whether we want to replace things one for one, what new procurement items are coming in, and so forth.

Mr. OBEY. I know the Chairman wants to end this, so let me respond by saying, we have gotten a number which is essentially from the Secretary's office. What I want to know is, when you take into consideration what the services themselves say they are going to need over time in order to get us ready to deal with the next problem that comes down the pike, I want to have a reasonably hard number on what that is going to be so I can go to my folks in my district and say, look, I know you don't like this, but the decision has passed us. We have got certain responsibilities in the world. And I can put my own credibility on the line and say, this is what I honestly believe is going to be a rough estimate of the costs that will have to be paid, so I don't get accused of trying to sell low.

With all due respect, the language you use in suggesting that you are going to go after contributions from our allies, God bless you, I wish you luck, but I will make you a flat bet that the Chicago Cubs have a better chance of winning the World Series than you have of getting a major amount of money from any of our allies at this point. I want to know what the realistic outlook is.

Secretary RUMSFELD. I would stick with the Cubs, too.

Mr. ZAKHEIM. I am a Mets fan, so I don't bet this year.

Mr. LEWIS. Thank you, Mr. Obey.
Mr. Young.

MILITARY END STRENGTH

Mr. YOUNG. Well, Mr. Secretary, I don't think there is any question that the members agree enthusiastically and will support the legislation, at least as it relates to the issue of our own troops. We are going to give our troops what they need. We are going to protect them the best we can while they carry out the mission that they are assigned to.

But I think it is time for a real serious discussion on the end strength of our forces. We are, in fact, wearing out troops. We are, in fact, wearing out equipment. If we were required to go to the second MRC, which I don't recall whether it is an MRC any more or not, a major regional conflict, we would be hard-pressed right now.

During Desert Storm we had 18 Army divisions. Today we have 10, and we deployed a lot of those. More than half of the Marine Corps was deployed during Iraqi Freedom.

I am not suggesting that we should not have available the Guard and Reserve when it is necessary, but we might want to start a discussion on the issue of what the end strength really ought to be in the world that we face today.

Mr. Lewis said that if the American people could see the type of tyranny that Saddam had foisted upon his own people that they would be first in line to do something about it. The fact of the matter is, they were first in line, and they are still first in line to do something about it. But the rest of the world I think could use an education on what Saddam is, what he was, and what he was about.

DONOR CONFERENCE

Now, having said that, I want to go back to the subject of the donor conference. I know the question has been asked several times, how much do you expect—how much do you think other countries will be willing to come forward with, recognizing the threat that Saddam presented to the world?

So I am not going to ask that question again about how much money you expect to get, but let me ask this question: How many countries have agreed to attend the donor conference so that we at least have an opportunity to persuade them that this is in their best interest to solve the issue of Iraq?

Mr. ZAKHEIM. I know the answer is in excess of 50. We had a conference in New York that was a precursor to that, and we had about 50 countries. I think it will be at least 50, probably over 60.

Mr. YOUNG. Mr. Chairman, thank you.

I am through with my questions, but I would like to say that you have tremendous troops serving in our uniform today. I did not get a chance—while Mr. Frelinghuysen and I were in the region as far as Afghanistan and our headquarters with General Franks and General Abizaid, we were not able to get into Baghdad, because maybe we were a little too early, because other Members are making that visit now. We were not able to get into the region. So we

don't know firsthand from being in Iraq. Rodney just came back, so he does.

But I had an opportunity, along with my wife, to visit almost every soldier and Marine that has been wounded and came through Walter Reed Army hospital and the Navy hospital in Bethesda. I can tell you these kids have different degrees of serious injury, but their morale is tremendous. They believe in what they were doing. They believe the Iraqi people are very honest and genuine in their appreciation for what America has done, despite some of the news media that the rest of the world and even here at home we are seeing.

It is very impressive to see a young man lying there with one or both legs blown off, or the loss of an eye. You know what the cases are because you visit them, too. These kids, they are a tremendous representation of young America. Their morale is high, and they do believe in this mission. They do believe that what they were doing and are continuing to do is right. I believe this Congress will back that up strongly when we put this bill on the floor to guarantee the success of the mission and the support of our troops.

Secretary RUMSFELD. Mr. Chairman, thank you. You are right on the mark. I know you and particularly Mrs. Young have spent a great deal of time with those troops, and it certainly is deeply appreciated.

With respect to the stress on the force, you suggested that we need to address it. We are addressing it. We have worked through a series of about 25 or 30 things that we think can help in reducing stress on the force. We have to. And we have had several meetings of our senior level group, military-civilian together, on this. The most recent was late last week, as I recall. We are making good progress, and we would be happy to come up and walk through some of these tasks that have been assigned so that we can do exactly what you are interested in seeing done.

Mr. YOUNG. Thank you.

Mr. LEWIS. Thank you, Mr. Young. I had expected that we would get the Secretary and his staff out of here considerably sooner than this. I understand you all spent 6 hours across in the other body.

Secretary RUMSFELD. Six hours and 50 minutes.

Mr. LEWIS. Mr. Visclosky is going to pass.

Mr. Moran.

ESTIMATING REQUIREMENTS

Mr. MORAN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Obviously, we want to win this war, and nobody questions the benefits of getting rid of Saddam Hussein, but basically there are five areas, to summarize, that we are going to still scrutinize. It is the taking care of the troops, it is the top-down approach to budgeting, it is the real cost of occupation, including the foreign support, it is the intelligence issue and the go-it-alone strategy.

In terms of taking care of the troops, you know of the situation with the Active and Reserve forces. Their families are beside themselves. They have no idea what is coming. But the Army by most accounts cannot sustain their troop levels much beyond the spring of next year. We are concerned that we are not going to be able to recruit adequately in the future once the job market recovers.

I understand that you are planning to move from 40 percent non-enlisted to 60 percent non-enlisted in terms of the presence of troops in Iraq. That would be one area of concern. You did not answer the issue that I think needs to be answered, whether the uniformed services, their request for reconstituting the force was adequately included within this supplemental request. If it wasn't, how much more are we going to need to reconstitute the force to be prepared for North Korea and other dangers around the world? We understand there is only \$2 billion out of \$16 billion needed here.

You and Deputy Secretary Wolfowitz publicly chastised Army Chief of Staff Shinseki for suggesting that the U.S. troop presence in Iraq would be more than 100,000 during the post-war period. Today it is 130,000. We expect it will remain at at least 120,000. That is a legitimate area of inquiry. What is our real commitment?

Now, in terms of foreign support, you are going to give \$1.4 billion of the supplemental to foreign countries, and you have got a total of \$1.5 billion pledged. I would like to know if there is a chance you could hold off on giving those other nations that \$1.4 billion to see if we actually get that \$1.5 billion in pledges.

Then, lastly, this strategy of relying upon people that really didn't give us very accurate information in terms of intelligence, and I reference Mr. Chalabi for one, and I would like to know whether he is still on the Pentagon payroll, since he, we read, contributed in great part to our failed post-war expectations.

Does that give you enough to start with, Mr. Secretary?

Secretary RUMSFELD. It does. Thank you, Congressman Moran.

First, I don't have the text in front of me, but this Shinseki issue has become quite prominent in the press. My recollection is—and if I am wrong, someone calibrate me. But my recollection is that he was testifying before I think a Senate Committee, and he was asked how many forces he thought it would take at the end of the war to occupy the country of Iraq, and he said something to the effect that he thought it would take several hundred thousand. Now where I come from in Chicago, several hundred thousand is 300,000 or more; and he said he thought several hundred thousand, or about what it took—what it should take to win the war.

Now, Tom Franks, as General Myers has just testified, used something—100,000 to 130,000 troops to win the war, not several hundred thousand. We currently have, I believe, 133,000 troops in the country, not several hundred thousand. So I can't quite imagine why one would bring that subject up and suggest that he was correct.

Now I happen to have a lot of respect for him, and he was pressed, and he just said what he believed, and that is fair enough. It took 500,000, I believe, in the Gulf War, so a guess of 300,000, which he was guessing, you know, wasn't—

Mr. MORAN. He may have high-balled, but you low-balled, I think it is fair to say.

Secretary RUMSFELD. That is not correct. It is absolutely not correct, Congressman. I never gave an estimate as to how many troops it would take. I know what I don't know, and I didn't. So your suggestion that I did is inaccurate.

Now, second, with respect to the \$1.4 billion for foreign country's troops, it is a lot cheaper, a lot cheaper, for the taxpayers of the United States to use dollars to assist countries that want to help us in Iraq, want their forces to participate, are willing to put them at risk but don't have the resources to pay for all of their expenses. So we have provided some lift—

Mr. MORAN. I am just being told General Shinseki was specific, 200,000 before this subcommittee. He might have said something different before another subcommittee. Excuse me for the interruption.

Secretary RUMSFELD. Now if you need a certain level of forces in a country, and we have choices between three types—ours, international contributions, coalition forces and Iraqis—it seems to me that it is a lot more expensive to have our forces in Iraq than it is to have international forces. To the extent we can pick up some of their expenses, not their salaries, but in fact lift and airlift and that type of thing and some logistics support, that that is a very good deal for us and for the American people, and we are grateful for that.

So I think it would be unwise to suggest that we should in any way reduce funds for the participation of other coalition countries.

With respect to the Chalabi issue, I am afraid I am just not knowledgeable enough. He is a member, he is an appointed member of the Iraqi Governing Council, and he has been acting president of it, and I certainly am not knowledgeable enough to know what kind of intelligence he gave. You seem to have the opinion he gave bad intelligence. I just don't know that.

Mr. MORAN. It has been reported by so many people so many times that he was giving a lot of the information through the Pentagon Special Operations team that heavily influenced the thinking in terms of how the Iraqi people would respond. You know that as well as I do.

Secretary RUMSFELD. I know there are articles to that effect. I don't know that that makes it correct.

Mr. LEWIS. Mr. Frelinghuysen.

Mr. FRELINGHUYSEN. I want the record to actually reflect what I said. I didn't invoke General Zinni's comment, other than I object to the notion that our involvement in the war, in this particular war in Iraq, doesn't count for something. I think it does count for something. I wasn't suggesting for a minute that it was Members of Congress who suggested we might be bogged down for 2 years on the road to Baghdad. I suggested that many retired general officers were giving commentary that suggested that, mostly on TV. I was not suggesting that Members of Congress who serve on this Committee would suggest—had suggested such a thing.

Just for the record. Thank you.

Mr. LEWIS. Thank you very much.

Gentleman, we very much appreciate your being present with us. I might mention to my colleagues that remain that one of our colleagues on the trip, Congressman Rick Larson, reflected the way I believe the House could very well be moving. That particular Member of Congress voted against going to war in the first place. After observing the results of Saddam Hussein and otherwise, Congress-

man Larson said it is going to be tough back home, but I think it is time for us to get out in front of this. It is time for us to lead.

We are going to move forward on this supplemental.

Mr. Secretary, General Myers, Dr. Zakheim, it was a pleasure to be with you.

The Committee is adjourned.

[CLERK'S NOTE.—Questions submitted by Mr. Hobson and the answers thereto follow:]

NATIONAL GUARD AND RESERVE FORCES

Question. Do we currently have sufficient forces in the active components or are we to expect continuing mobilizations of reserve components?

Answer. The Department of Defense currently has sufficient forces to execute assigned missions. We are executing a "win decisive" operation in Iraq while continuing to prosecute the War and Terrorism and meet other on-going global commitments. At this time, some of our Active and Reserve forces are exceeding peacetime deployment levels in support of these efforts, but we see this as a temporary spike that mainly affects our ground forces. In the long term, we see operational tempo returning to lower, less stressful levels.

The senior leadership of the Department is carefully considering the matter of stress on our Active and Reserve forces. We are reviewing some 25-plus separate initiatives to better manage the forces that are currently available. The unified view of the senior civilian and military leadership, at this time, is that it would be prudent to fully evaluate these avenues of reducing stress on the force prior to requesting any additional military end strength.

For example, we are carefully studying what functions within our military structure could be performed by civilians or contractors. Studies done during the previous administration concluded that there are approximately 320,000 positions filled by military personnel that are performing duties in specialties or situations that could be performed by civilians or contractors. Even if only 20,000 of these positions could be converted, we would significantly improve our long-term military availability and reduce the stress on the Active and Reserve forces without relying on military end strength increases.

Additionally, the Secretary has already directed that the Department develop a plan to rebalance our total force mix. His goals are to reduce the need to mobilize Reserves involuntarily, eliminate the need to mobilize Reserves early in conflicts, and limit the mobilization of individual Reserve units, when required, to no more than once every six years. Work is underway to achieve these goals.

Overall, multiple efforts are in progress that should reduce our reliance on the Reserve forces without costly military end strength increases, while continuing to provide our nation with a strong defense.

Question. Will future reserve component mobilizations be of 12 month total duration or will they be 12 months "on the ground" and 18 months (or longer) total deployment?

Answer. Future reserve component mobilizations will be based on operational requirements or other needs. The Department's preferred duration for initial orders remains no more than 12 months. When it is determined necessary to issue initial orders to Reserve component units or members for more than 12 months, Service Secretaries shall advise the Secretary of Defense, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and the Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness of the actions they are taking.

Question. The ground commander in theater is authorized to release units he has determined are no longer needed; if both active and reserve units are affected, which will have priority to be returned home? What is the rationale?

Answer. Department of Defense Instruction 1235.10 paragraph 4.4.1. establishes the framework for redeployment priorities: "Members of the Ready Reserve ordered to active duty without their consent shall be retained on active duty no longer than absolutely necessary. They shall receive priority for redeployment from the area of operations over Active component units, and be released from active duty as expeditiously as possible, consistent with operational requirements." The intent of the policy to prioritize Reserve units for redeployment first is to return our part-time personnel to their employers and families as soon as possible and reinforces the Department's policy on judicious and prudent use of the Reserve component forces.

Question. Is DOD meeting is prescribed timetable for notification of units selected for mobilization?

Answer. The Department's goal is for Reserve Component members to receive mobilization orders 30 days prior to deployment so they may take care of employer, family, financial, legal, and other issues before departing. It has not always been possible to meet this goal. Some units, based on their designed operational capability have standing policies requiring Reserve Component members to report for mobilization within as few as 24 hours after receipt of formal notification, and be prepared to deploy within 72 hours. Affected Service personnel understand this policy and maintain an increased readiness posture. Although "meeting mission requirements takes first priority" is the most common reason for late receipt of orders, we know that in many cases we must improve notification times. As we prepare for Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF) II and Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF) V, the predictability of the requirements needed to support these rotations has enhanced our ability to provide Reserve members with 30 days notice.

Question. How is DOD tracking the personnel tempo (PERSTEMPO) of units/individuals in reserve components with respect to exceeding prescribed maximum length of mobilized service?

Answer. DOD has been tracking both Active and Reserve Component data since October 1, 2000. In accordance with current legislation, Reserve Component days are measured against the same 730-day rolling window as the Active Component. On October 8, 2001 the Deputy Secretary of Defense invoked §991(d) of Title 10, United States Code, to suspend the management of the PERSTEMPO program in view of the terrorist attacks on September 11, 2001, and the Presidential declared National Emergency. This suspension terminated the accumulation of deployment days for purposes of determining eligibility for high deployment per diem payments and the statutory requirement for general and flag officers to personally manage the deployment of certain members. As a matter of policy, Services must continue the tracking and reporting requirements to the Defense Manpower Data Center (DMDC), which serves as the DOD repository, on a weekly basis. DMDC publishes a monthly report on the status of the services which is monitored by the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness. The waiver signed by the Deputy Secretary provided needed financial and administrative relief to the services during the war on terrorism.

Question. Are you going to authorize payment of the prescribed \$100.00 per day for each reserve component soldier beginning on the 401st day of active duty out of a period of 730 Title 10 active duty days?

Answer. DOD has been tracking both Active and Reserve Component data since October 1, 2000. In accordance with current legislation, Reserve Component days are measured against the same 730-day rolling window as the Active Component. However, on October 8, 2001, the Deputy Secretary of Defense invoked §991(d) of Title 10, United States Code (U.S.C.), to suspend the management of personnel tempo (PERSTEMPO) program in the wake of the terrorist attacks on September 11, 2001. This suspension terminated the accumulation of deployment days for purposes of determining eligibility for high deployment per diem payments.

The Department has proposed legislation that would amend section 436 of title 37, U.S.C. to replace the current high-deployment per diem amount of \$100/day with a progressive, monthly high deployment allowance of up to \$1,000. The revised payment schedule would expand the authority of the Services to compensate members for both excessively long and frequent deployments, in some cases providing concurrent payment, within the \$1,000 maximum, for surpassing both thresholds. The proposed amendment also includes a provision that would pay a monthly allowance to Reserve Component members who have been called to active duty for a second time for more than 30 days for the same contingency. Reserve Component members will receive this high deployment pay based on frequency and duration at the same rate active component members are authorized.

This approach strikes a balance between the intent to properly compensate members for excessive deployment while allowing the Services to meet mission requirements. In addition, the scale progressively increases in compensation as the burden associated with more and longer deployment increases. The Services envision initially setting monthly payments for high deployment allowances in the \$200-to-\$650 range, depending on the frequency and/or duration of a member's deployment.

NIGHT VISION GOGGLES

Question. Your budget justification mentions that the \$5.6 billion for Procurement and Research, Development, Test and Evaluation include among many other things, "replacements for basic soldier gear such as night vision goggles." How much is requested for these goggles? Who are the recipients?

Answer. As part of the supplemental, \$11.2 million was requested for night vision goggles. This amount would purchase 3,720 devices, which will be fielded, to units deploying to Operation Iraqi Freedom 2 and Operation Enduring Freedom 5 that do not already have their authorized amount of night vision goggles. These units include 1 Infantry Division, 25th Infantry Division, 76th enhanced Separate Brigade, and several smaller Combat Support/Combat Service Support units.

KEVLAR BODY ARMOR

Question. We all read last Saturday's (27 September 2003) Washington Post where our distinguished Ranking Minority Member, Jack Murtha, was quoted as saying "Every single wounded person I met at Bethesda or Walter Reed (hospital) after Afghanistan and Iraq said, 'if I had had Kevlar, this wouldn't have happened to me.'" Is there body armor in this request? If so, does it include the hard body armor plates (SAPI plates) that makes the armored vest capable of stopping an AK-47 round?

Answer. Interceptor Body Armor (IBA) is not in the request. The Department has opted to fund this requirement through a transfer from the FY03 Iraqi Freedom Fund. The funding provided in the transfer will fund the Outer Tactical Vests (OTV) and the Small Arms Protective Insert (SAPI) plates.

Question. Is the request sufficient to ensure that every Marine (or substitute soldier) has these plates, including replacement plates as necessary due to wear and tear in the field?

Answer. Yes, the funding the Army will receive from the FY03 Iraqi Freedom Fund is sufficient to ensure every Soldier has his or her own set of Interceptor Body Armor (IBA), to include the Small Arms Protective Inserts (SAPI), as well as extra IBA due to wear and tear.

COLD WEATHER EQUIPMENT

Question. With the onset of winter approaching, what has been done to ensure soldiers are prepared? This is especially important in northern Iraq where the 101st is located in the mountains and the area is known for harsh winters.

Answer. The health, welfare and safety of our troops are a major concern of the Department of Defense and commanders at every level. To that end, US Central Command and Combined Forces Land Component Command have conducted a theater-wide assessment of cold weather preparedness and developed a cold weather plan. The plan calls for every individual to deploy with cold weather gear and current forces have either the Battle Dress Uniform or Desert Camouflaged Uniform Cold Weather Gear. All other necessary cold weather preparations are underway and some forces are currently executing missions in cold weather regions in northern Iraq. Requisitions are in place and the Combined Joint Task Force Seven C4 has set the distribution plan. Units will conduct driver training as part of their Cold Weather Training Plan. Additionally, the 101st has a snow removal and winterization plan to be executed as required.

EQUIPMENT MAINTENANCE AND REPAIR

Question. What steps are being taken to ensure the large quantities of equipment deployed are ready for future requirements? The desert is very hard on vehicles and aircraft and we must have a plan to rebuild/repair this equipment that has been used extensively.

Answer. The Army is taking steps to maintain the large quantities of combat equipment, both ground and air, for use in future operations. This initiative includes repair of pre-positioned war reserves used by Combined Forces Land Component Command in Operation Iraqi Freedom for future operational use. Currently there are five Forward Repair Activities (FRA's) within Iraq. Those FRA's support air and ground equipment and are provided by the Tank Automotive Command, Communication Electronic Command, and Aviation Missile Command. Combined Joint Task Force Seven C4 has established a "High Mobility Multi-Purpose Wheeled Vehicles (HMMWV) Support Center" in Logistics Support Element Anaconda. This maintenance activity is designed to support up to 40 HMMWVs per day. Over time, the plan is to build maintenance support centers that service all ground vehicles. In addition to these initiatives, the Army Material Command (AMC) has maintenance support teams in Iraq in support of combat units. AMC is continuing to expand the repair and rebuild capabilities and build fixed maintenance facilities into Iraq. Central Command, AMC and Combined Joint Task Force Seven are assessing this initiative to determine contractual and material costs to set up fixed maintenance facilities.

The Marine Corps Maritime Pre-positioned Squadrons (MPSRON) 1 and 2 are completing maintenance and loading of equipment used in Operation Iraqi Freedom for use in future operations.

REST AND RECUPERATION LEAVE

Question. How are we paying for the thousands of soldiers taking leave from Iraq? I have seen news reports of these soldiers returning home on leave to two weeks and am concerned about transportation requirements for such a large effort.

Answer. The FY 2004 Supplemental request includes a request for \$300.0 million for the Rest and Recuperation Leave Program. The program provides travel and transportation allowances to each member participating in the program to travel for two weeks on leave at the expense of the United States.

COALITION PROVISIONAL AUTHORITY

Question. Has the efficiency of the Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA—administered by Ambassador L. Paul Bremer) improved? I still hear great concerns that many promises made by CPA for projects and support are not fulfilled—disillusioning not only the Iraqis, but our service members as well.

Answer. The efficiency of the Coalition Provisional Authority is improving daily as demonstrated by the successful completion of over 14,000 projects as of October 15th. The completion of these projects, valued at over \$3 billion dollars, is evidence of the great strides being made in our reconstruction efforts.

Some of the significant accomplishments to date include:

- Increasing electric production to surpass pre-war peak output levels in excess of 4,400 MW;
- Increasing water availability from a pre-war level of 12.9 million liters of potable water per day to 21.3 liters per day in November;
- Iraqi Security Forces now account for 46% of all security forces in Iraq; and
- School registration and attendance is stabilizing at approx. 3.6 million primary and 1.5 million secondary students.

[CLERK'S NOTE.—End of questions submitted by Mr. Hobson. Questions submitted by Mr. Tiahrt and the answers thereto follow:]

MILITARY VEHICLE AND AIRCRAFT TIRE PROCUREMENT/SUPPLIES

Question. From previous information provided to Congress we have been told that military tires are not a separately budgeted line-item in the Army/DoD Appropriations request. Tire funding requirements are grouped together with all of the other Class IX items of supply requirements (engines, transmissions, starters, track, etc.) managed at TACOM and this is forwarded to the Army Material Command. Here the funding requirements from TACOM and other Commodity Commands are consolidated and forwarded to Department of the Army (DA) for the annual budget request.

(Army/DoD Tire Procurement Issue Paper submitted to Senator Sessions' office, August, 2003). Given the above information, then please provide for the record the separate tire funding requirements breakout referred to above, specifically, the breakout for military tires prior to tires being "grouped together with all other Class IX items of supply." Provide this information for the original fiscal year 2004 budget request (in terms of total tire units, ground and aircraft) as well as what is assumed in this \$87 billion fiscal year 2004 Supplemental request.

Answer. The original fiscal year 2004 budget request for ground tires (President's Budget fiscal year 2004 dated Feb 2003) was \$69.1 million. Requirements for Aviation tires are managed by the Defense Logistics Agency. The budget submission did not include requirements for CONOPS and Reset. The total fiscal year 2004 ground tire requirement is \$177 million. It is assumed that \$107.9 million will be funded out of the supplemental.

Question. For the past two fiscal years (FY), tires have only been funded at about 75 percent of the dollars required. As we approach the end of each subsequent FY, we are further behind in meeting the soldiers' needs from both the current and previous FYs. We currently have \$22 million in tire awards we could make today if funding was available. Due to Operation Iraqi Freedom, we are averaging over \$4 million per week in tire requisitions and TACOM is currently out of funds. We could award an additional \$32 million this FY if funds were available." Given the statements above, provide for the record the details on tire requirements that the serious funding shortfalls described above are based on.

Answer. As of June 3, 2003, we had approximately \$30 million in stacked tire procurements (ready for award, but no available funding). Since that time we received additional fiscal year 2003 funding, and we have received over \$1.4 billion in spares funding so far in fiscal year 2004 of which \$68.4 million is earmarked for tires. Given this funding, we awarded all stacked tire procurements and have \$159.8 million due-in from procurement.

Question. The Army/Department of Defense (DoD) Tire Procurement Issue Paper submitted to Senator Sessions' office in August, 2003 also stated that: "In fiscal year 2002 (fiscal year 2002), we awarded \$55 million in tire contracts, in fiscal year 2003, we have already awarded \$136 million in contracts. We are currently in a Budget review for fiscal year 2004 and this data is not yet available. It is safe to assume that if our Soldiers continue to be stationed in Iraq at the same Operating Tempo for fiscal year 2004, we will need \$208 million for tire support (based on current average of \$4 million per week)." Why would fiscal year 2004 "original" budget request data not yet be available in August of 2003, if the original fiscal year 2004 budget request was submitted to Congress in February, 2003? Is this information available today?

Answer. The ground tire data was available in the President's Budget (PresBud) February 2003. The original PresBud fiscal year 2004 budget request for ground tires was \$69.1 million. Requirements for Aviation tires are managed by the Defense Logistics Agency.

Question. What was the original budget request (prior to Iraqi Freedom) projected level of contract awards for military tires, ground and air, for both fiscal year 2003 and fiscal year 2004?

Answer. The original fiscal year 2003 budget request for ground tires (President's fiscal year 2003 dated February 2002) was \$36.1 million. The original fiscal year 2004 budget request for ground tires (President's Budget fiscal year 2004 dated February 2003) was \$69.1 million. Requirements for Aviation tires are managed by the Defense Logistics Agency.

Question. Will any of the current fiscal year 2004 military tire purchases/contracts replenish stockpiles or reserve inventory requirements?

Answer. Tires are managed by two DOD activities. The Army manages tires for tactical wheeled vehicle systems (ground) at the US Army Tank-automotive and Armaments Command (TACOM), a Major Subordinate Command of the Army Materiel Command. The Defense Logistics Agency (DLA) manages aircraft tires at the Defense Supply Center Richmond (DSCR) located in Richmond, Virginia.

Ground: Fiscal year 2004 funds are being used to replenish stockpiles for military vehicle tires. On average, vehicle tires are procured every 90 days to refill wholesale replenishment stocks. These stocks are then utilized to fill customer requisitions to include requisitions to support Operation Iraqi Freedom. War Reserve stocks on hand were previously funded and are included in the Army Acquisition Objective for the individual tire stock numbers. As of 1 December 2003, no War Reserve military vehicle tire procurements are expected with fiscal year 2004 War Reserve funds.

Aircraft: Defense Supply Center Richmond (DSCR) anticipates no constraints in managing aircraft tire inventory. DSCR is fully funded to support and their current inventory is not depleted. According to analysis completed on 1 Dec 03, DSCR manages 27 National Stock Numbers (NSN) in support of aviation tires. Currently there is a total of eleven (11) items with zero on assets on hand. Of those, five (5) are at zero balance with replenishment stock due in to replenish forecast inventory requirements. There are six (6) items at zero balance; however, the Acquisition Advice Code (AAC) for each is "J" indicating, "Not Stocked" (procurement will be initiated only after receipt of requisition). The remaining item at zero balance is AAC "Y" indicating, "Terminal Item" (Non-stocked). Back Order Lines and quantities are indicated in Column F and due-ins are noted in Column G. Again, all open contracts will replenish forecast requirements for FY04 and beyond. Please note that NSN 2620-01-137-3398 (line 16) and NSN 2620-01-168-0164 (line 18) are type 5 policy back orders in support of Foreign Military Sales.

There are seven (7) items with assets below required levels. All seven have purchase requests in process and/or stock due in on contracts. (Those items are identified in the attached spreadsheet with a "Yes".) The Acquisition Cost for each NSN is included.

Please note, DSCR does not preposition tires for Army use.

DLA Aircraft Tires as of 1 Dec 03
GOS4039_TABLE_SPLY

NSN	AAC	Acq Cost	Item Name	Below Required Levels	BOs	KTR Due In
2620001487409	J	\$108.86	TIRE,SPECIAL	No	0/0	0
2620002697553	D	\$172.19	TIRE,PNEUMATIC	No	0/0	144
2620002697626	Z	\$25.81	TIRE,PNEUMATIC	No	0/0	0
2620002880248	Z	\$44.00	TIRE,PNEUMATIC	Yes	0/0	3
2620004660897	Z	\$86.00	TIRE,PNEUMATIC	No	0/0	0
2620005288875	Y	\$229.00	TIRE,PNEUMATIC	N/A	0/0	0
2620005289203	Z	\$305.00	TIRE,PNEUMATIC	No	0/0	0
2620005421366	Z	\$50.00	TIRE,PNEUMATIC	No	0/0	0
2620007260119	Z	\$180.00	TIRE,PNEUMATIC	No	0/0	0
2620007527991	J	\$65.00	TIRE,PNEUMATIC	No	0/0	0
2620009021599	Z	\$140.00	TIRE,PNEUMATIC	No	0/0	0
2620009385964	D	\$109.00	TIRE,PNEUMATIC,AIRC	No	0/0	627
2620010798583	Z	\$20.39	TIRE,PNEUMATIC,AIRC	No	0/0	0
2620011015087	D	\$85.00	TIRE,PNEUMATIC,AIRC	Yes	28/144	1,147
2620011373398	D	\$149.00	TIRE,TUBELESS	Yes	1/12	931
2620011634847	D	\$125.00	TIRE,PNEUMATIC,AIRC	Yes	7/19	613
2620011680164	D	\$95.00	TIRE,PNEUMATIC,AIRC	Yes	1/6	231
2620011936212	Z	\$65.14	TIRE,PNEUMATIC,AIRC	No	0/0	0
2620012228777	J	\$126.11	TIRE,PNEUMATIC	No	0/0	0
2620012589346	Z	\$847.30	TIRE,PNEUMATIC	No	0/0	0
2620012696578	J	\$177.70	TIRE,PNEUMATIC	No	0/0	0
2620013142500	Z	\$109.00	TIRE,PNEUMATIC	No	0/0	0
2620013330249	J	\$45.05	TIRE,PNEUMATIC	No	0/0	0
2620013689949	Z	\$441.21	TIRE,PNEUMATIC	Yes	4/5	13
2620013822834	J	\$191.25	TIRE,PNEUMATIC	No	0/0	0
2620014107964	Z	\$270.57	TIRE,PNEUMATIC,AIRC	No	0/0	0
2620015010651	D	\$368.53	TIRE,PNEUMATIC,AIRC	Yes	0/0	0

Question. Are all ground and air tire stockpiles, or reserve inventories, depleted? Provide a list of those, by specific military tire, stockpiles or reserve inventories that are depleted or below required levels.

Answer. Tires are managed by two DOD activities. The Army manages tires for tactical wheeled vehicle systems (ground) at the US Army tank-automotive and Armaments Command (TACOM), a Major Subordinate Command of the Army Materiel Command. The Defense Logistics Agency (DLA) manages aircraft tires at the Defense Supply Center Richmond (DSCR) located in Richmond, Virginia.

Ground: TACOM Wholesale level managed assets consists of stocks to support operations/maintenance and War Reserve/Prepositioned Stockpiles. Wholesale stocks to support operations/maintenance are not depleted. There are currently 44 tire National Stock Numbers (NSNs) that are key to support of Operation Iraqi Freedom requirements. As of 3 Nov, only one each NSN was at zero balance. This item has a contract in place and direct deliveries to Southwest Asia in process.

A majority of TACOMs managed War Reserve assets of tactical tires are nearly exhausted. Most of the assets on hand are prepositioned in Northeast Asia (Korea) or are CONUS stocks dedicated to support of Northeast Asia requirements.

War Reserve requirements for tactical tires are currently \$3.079 million. Of this amount, only \$1.736 million is funded, or in War Reserve terms "protected". Of this funded level, only \$503,000 worth of tire assets is on hand.

The reason that the funded or protected level is only 56 percent funded is that historically the Army War Reserve Secondary Item (AWRSI) Army Working Capital Fund (AWCF) has not been fully funded. Tires funded at 56 percent is consistent with the total TACOM War Reserve requirement/funded levels.

TACOM War Reserve has not allocated available funds to fill tire requirements because tires have historically been available on short notice and they have a relatively short shelf-life. The shelf-life on tires is normally 5 years, non-extendable. TACOM War Reserve has stocked only the minimum quantities to meet Brigade Set Associated Stockage List (ASL)/Prescribed Load List (PLL) requirements, and initial conflict sustainment needs. This minimizes the impact of not being able to consistently rotate stocks outside of the major defense distribution centers.

Aircraft: DLA manages tires for the Army. DLA's Defense Supply Center Richmond (DSCR) manages all aircraft tire inventory. According to a query pulled on 6 Nov 03 by DSCR-O Systems Analysts, twenty-seven aviation tire NSNs are managed at this Inventory Control Point. Two NSNs have zero stock on hand; one NSN has zero backorders and a contract delivery of October 2003, the second item has a total of five backorders, and a purchase request for thirteen each with an estimated delivery of January 2004. Those tires are:

NSN 2620-00-288-0248, Stock = 0, ROP = 2, Due in = 3.

NSN 2620-00-01-368-9949, Stock = 0, ROP = 1, Due in = 13.

Five additional NSNs are below their respective reorder points, have zero backorders, with stock on hand and contracted deliveries due. Those tires are:

NSN 2620-00-288-0248, Stock = 11, ROP = 644, Due in = 1167.

NSN 2620-01-368-9949, Stock = 13, ROP = 547, Due in = 613.

NSN 2620-00-288-0248, Stock = 26, ROP = 135, Due in = 144.

NSN 2620-01-368-9949, Stock = 228, ROP = 434, Due in = 218.

NSN 2620-01-368-9949, Stock = 744, ROP = 1463, Due in = 521.

Ten NSNs have stock on hand, and are above their individual reorder points with no existing backorders. An additional nine NSNs were identified as being managed by DSCR, with six items having an Acquisition Advice Code (AAC) for each of "J", indicating "Not Stocked" (procurement will be initiated only after receipt of requisition). All nine show no demand history.

One item at zero balance is AAC "Y" indicating, "Terminal Item" (Non-stocked). This was replaced by one of the five NSNs listed showing zero backorders/stock on hand/contracted deliveries due in.

In answer to the last part of the question, DSCR does not preposition tires for Army use.

Question. How many items (the exact number) make up the "Class IX items of supply requirement" referred to in the Army/Department of Defense Tire Procurement Issues Paper submitted to Senator Sessions' office in August, 2003? Please provide a list of these items for the record.

Answer. The Tank and Automotive Command (TACOM) Wholesale level managed assets consist of stocks to support operations/maintenance and War Reserve/Prepositioned Stockpiles. The total list of tires and tire products managed by TACOM contains 824 separate items.

[CLERK'S NOTE.—End of questions submitted by Mr. Tiahrt. Questions submitted by Mr. Lewis and the answers thereto follow:]

ARMY ROTATION PLANS IN IRAQ

Question. Mr. Secretary, please explain the Army's unit rotation plan for major combat units into and out of Iraq and other theaters of operation.

Answer. The Army's goal is to meet the mission requirements of the Combatant Commanders while simultaneously providing improved predictability to soldiers and families and increased sustainability of the force. The Army's Vice Chief of Staff presented the unit rotation plan in July; that plan continues to be revised based upon the requirements of the Combatant Commander. At present, all Army units, Active and Reserve, will remain in Iraq for up to one year unless the Combatant Commander determines that their capability is no longer needed.

Question. This rotation plan is based on a one-year deployment for combat forces. Are you considering establishing a 6-month rotation plan? If so when would that take effect?

Answer. Forces deploying to Iraq for Operational Iraqi Freedom will perform a 12-month tour of duty unless the Combatant Commander adjusts the requirements. The length of time that units deploy to theater, and length of time between deployments, is dependent upon the global requirements of all Combatant Commanders, the particular of each operation, and the pool of available forces.

Question. Are you considering a different rotation policy for the Reserve forces?

Answer. We are a nation at war, and our Army is at war. All units, Active, Guard and Reserve, will serve "up to 12 months" in theater. I want to emphasize that it is all about capabilities required in theater, not numbers. If the Combatant Commander determines a certain capability is no longer needed, then the units will return to home station.

PAYS AND ALLOWANCES

Question. Explain the alternative proposal the Department has recommended in the supplemental request dealing with the increased rates for Family Separation Allowances, Imminent Danger Pay and Hardship Duty Pay.

Answer. The fiscal year 2004 Supplemental Request includes \$1.2 billion for Imminent Danger pay, Family Separation Allowance, and Hardship Duty pay. The supplemental request covers the cost enhanced special pays, for those personnel Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF) and Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF) deployed personnel in theater or in direct operational support.

The fiscal year 2003 Emergency Wartime Supplemental increased IDP temporarily by \$75 per person per month (from \$150 to \$225 per month) and FSA by \$150 per month (from \$100 to \$250 per month), effective from October 1, 2002 through September 30, 2003. The Department intends to continue paying IDP and FSA at these increased rates through December 31, 2003.

Beginning on January 1, 2004, the Department's plan is to begin paying an additional \$225 per month in HDP to military personnel serving in OIF/OEF in a combat zone. This would maintain the same level of special pay as IDP and FSA, via increased rates HDP. Further, it would increase the special pay amount for members without dependents, who are serving in the same operation in the same location, by \$150 (these latter members receive a \$75 increase in special pay only via IDP) as a result of P.L. 108-11, whereby married members serving alongside them had received a total increase of \$225 (an additional \$75 in IDP and an additional \$150 in FSA). The same increase in special pays should be normalized for all troops in combat, regardless of marital or dependency status. The additional \$225 per month being paid to members in combat should be in recognition of the risk that they all face—not drawing any distinctions as to their marital status or number of family dependents.

The fiscal year 2004 Supplemental funding request does not include funding for special pays for personnel other than those involved with OEF, OEF and Operation Noble Eagle (ONE). For example, funding for special pays for troops deployed to Bosnia or Kosovo is not included in the 2004 Supplemental funding request.

Question. What is funded in the supplemental request for the incremental cost for each of these special pays?

Answer. The FY 2004 Supplemental requests funds for the incremental cost of Imminent Danger pay (IDP), Family Separation Allowance (FSA), and Hardship Duty pay (HDP) by Service are as follows:

[Dollars in millions]

	IDP	FSA	HDP	total
Army	\$339.9	\$146.4	\$541.4	\$1,027.7

[Dollars in millions]

	IDP	FSA	HDP	total
Navy	28.6	10.5	28.6	67.7
Marine Corps	13.6	5.0	21.7	40.3
Air Force	31.7	30.4	50.4	112.5
Total	413.8	192.3	642.1	1,248.2

MORALE WELFARE AND RECREATION

Question. The Supplemental budget request includes \$431,000,000 for Morale, Welfare, and Recreation costs. Please elaborate on what these funds will go for, and in what locations.

Answer.

Category	FY 2004 supplemental	
MWR for Deployed Forces	\$90.0	
Army	86.2	CENTCOM AOR.
Navy	3.2	Ships deployed in CENTCOM AOR.
Air Force	0.2	CENTCOM AOR.
Marine Corps	0.4	CENTCOM AOR.
R&R Program	392.6	CONUS visits
Army	362.6	
Navy	1.1	
Air Force	10.6	
Marine Corps	18.3	
Family Support	63.6	Provided to families back home.
Army	44.2	
Navy	7.4	
Air Force	3.7	
Marine Corps	6.3	
SOCOM	2.3	
Exchange Support	45.0	Support remote and increased demands.
Family Counseling	15.9	Provided to families back home
Total	607.4	

LIFT AND SUSTAIN MULTINATIONAL FORCES

Question. United States forces are getting some help in Afghanistan and Iraq from coalition forces. And we understand the Administration is working to get more coalition or multinational forces and to thus relieve the pressure on U.S. forces.

Please recap the multinational forces being provided by other countries now, and in the coming rotations.

Answer. 46 nations are currently providing support for stability and humanitarian operations in Iraq. Of this, 32 nations are providing approximately 24,000 military personnel for stability operations.

An additional 14 nations, including Pakistan, Turkey, and South Korea are considering providing combat forces for Iraq.

Additionally, we have just completed an analysis of combat support requirements for future rotations, and have identified 19 various missions which may be met by coalition forces. An evaluation of what countries can best fill these missions is ongoing.



Stability Contributors-Iraq

AS OF 22 OCT 03

Countries with forces in Iraq

32

TOTAL ~24,000

- Azerbaijan
- Albania
- Bulgaria
- Czech Rep
- Denmark
- Dom. Rep.
- El Salvador
- Georgia
- Estonia
- Honduras
- Hungary
- Italy
- Kazakhstan
- Korea
- Latvia
- Lithuania
- Macedonia
- Mongolia
- Moldova
- Netherlands
- New Zealand
- Nicaragua
- Norway
- Philippines
- Poland
- Portugal
- Romania
- Slovakia
- Spain
- Thailand
- Ukraine
- UK

Countries considering decision
to provide forces for Iraq

14

TOTAL TBD

46 Countries

Potentially Supporting
Iraqi
Stability and
Humanitarian Relief

Unclassified

Question. What is meant by providing lift and sustainment to these multinational forces?

Answer. A significant number of countries with limited financial resources are willing to provide military forces for stability operations in Iraq. For these countries, the United States is providing strategic lift to the theater of operations, a 6 month personnel rotation, and re-deployment of forces and equipment to the home nation after forces have been deployed for 12 months.

The United States is also providing life sustainment and other logistical support to some coalition forces in Iraq at no cost. This includes the provision of water, food, laundry services, showers/latrines, vector control, medical care, fuel (including petroleum, oils, lubricants, and gasoline), and some equipment to include vehicles, battle dress uniform, and communications equipment. Equipment costs are largely covered by State Department Peacekeeping Operation (PKO) funds provided in the FY 2003 Emergency Supplemental.

Question. Are some countries that are not willing to contribute military units willing to contribute in this sustainment area by providing funding, equipment, or contractor provided services?

Answer. Nations that are not providing military forces for the most part have not demonstrated a willingness to provide funding, equipment, a contract provided services. One Gulf nation provided airlift to the Bulgarian battalion serving in the Polish-led division to the theater of operations at no cost.

Based on fundraising efforts over the last six months, we believe it is more effective to ask for contributions for reconstruction activities in Iraq rather than contributions for funding, equipment, or contractor services for U.S. and/or coalition forces currently operating in Iraq.

MILITARY PERSONNEL END STRENGTH LEVELS

Question. Each of the Services will start fiscal year 2004 above their normal end strength levels. What is the number of personnel each Service is currently over strength?

Answer. The table below provides the active duty end strength overages as of 30 September 2003 as compared to FY 2003 authorized end strength levels.

	<i>30 Sept. 2003 end strength overage</i>
Army	19,301
Navy	6,535
Marine Corps	2,779
Air Force	16,062
Total DoD	44,677

Question. What is the amount requested in the Supplemental for the cost of the military personnel over execution?

Answer. The Supplemental request includes \$2.5 billion for active duty over strength.

Question. What are the current active duty end strength levels for Iraq, Afghanistan and CENTCOM AOR?

Answer. The table below provides the number of active duty personnel mobilized by military operation as of the week of 22 September 2003. These force levels include active duty personnel supporting each operation, whether in theater of CONUS.

	<i>Active duty personnel</i>
Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF)	132,600
Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF)	7,900
Operation Noble Eagle (ONE)	—
Total	140,500

Question. What is the current Guard and Reserve mobilization level for Reserve forces by operation?

Answer. The table below provides the approximate number of Guard and Reserve personnel mobilized by military operation as of the week of 22 September 2003. These force levels include all Guard and Reserve members supporting each operation, whether in theater or CONUS.

	<i>Mobilized Guard/ Reserve</i>
Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF)	65,600

Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF)	32,900
Operation Noble Eagle (ONE)	71,000
Total	169,500

Question. What does the Supplemental request assume the Reserve mobilized levels will be during fiscal year 2004?

Answer. The Supplemental request includes an average Reserve and National Guard end strength of 191,950 to be mobilized during fiscal year 2004. This force level includes all Reserve and National Guard end strength members supporting contingency operations, whether in theater or CONUS (e.g. those on CONOPS orders, but in CONUS training up).

UNIT LEVEL REBUILDING PROJECTS

Question. Recent news articles have noted numerous projects that are being performed by military units, that is, by companies or platoons. These types of efforts are said to be under-reported and that these projects represent the good news and successful side of the occupation operation. An example is the rebuilding of a school.

Would you elaborate on these types of efforts by military units to help to rebuild Iraq?

Answer. United States military units do indeed assist the Iraqi people to rebuild their country. Examples include helping to rebuild schools and restore official buildings to a usable condition. Units involved are both specialized, such as engineer companies, and non-specialized, such as infantry or artillery units, which may have access to heavy equipment such as bulldozers and hoists. Normally, the Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA) will identify appropriate projects through its contacts with local Iraqi officials. CPA will then coordinate with CJTF-7 and U.S. military commanders to apply the resources. The U.S. division commander is the final authority to approve a unit's participation. It must be emphasized that these civic assistance projects are conducted only when manpower and time are available. They do not interfere with the unit's primary missions and tasks or degrade security.

Question. How are such military rebuilding projects funded . . . does the unit use operating funds that would normally go for parts and fuel?

Answer. The Coalition Provisional Authority has been funding a Commander's Emergency Response Program (CERP) using seized Iraqi assets to fund the military rebuilding projects. None of the seized Iraqi assets can be used to pay for parts and fuel for the U.S. military.

Question. How much has been spent so far for such projects?

Answer. As of 22 November 2003, the military has spent \$97 million from the Commander's Emergency Response Program (CERP) funding on urgent humanitarian and reconstruction projects in Iraq.

Question. Does the supplemental funding request include estimated amounts needed to continue such activities? If yes, how much?

Answer. As of 30 September the supplemental request did not include funding for the Commander's Emergency Response Program (CERP). However, since the seized Iraqi assets were becoming exhausted, the Department of Defense added to its supplemental request. In the fiscal year 2004 Supplemental for Iraq and Afghanistan, Congress provided to the Department of Defense the authority to use up to \$180M of DoD appropriations to continue the flexible and responsive CERP for urgent humanitarian and reconstruction projects in both Iraq and Afghanistan for fiscal year 2004.

BODY ARMOR

Question. It has been reported that modern body armor has saved the lives of numerous soldiers in Afghanistan and Iraq. However, we continue to hear that units deployed to the combat zones do not have enough of the modern body armor, with the ceramic plate inserts, to equip all their soldiers. The shortages seem to be most acute in deploying guard and reserve units. What are the key differences between the so-called Vietnam era flak jacket, and the modern body armor with armor plate inserts?

Answer. Each new generation of body armor is designed to increase protective capability to stop or slow fragments and reduce the number of wounds over older versions. The latest version, which is being fielded to troops in Afghanistan and Iraq, is called Interceptor Body Armor (IBA). Below is a comparison, in size medium, between the Vietnam-era Flak Vest, the Desert Storm era Personal Armor

System for Ground Troops (PASGT) with the Interim Small Arms Protective Vest (ISAPV), and the current Interceptor Body Armor (IBA), which consists of the Outer Tactical Vest (OTV) and the Small Arms Protective Inserts (SAPI).

	Vietnam-era FLAK VEST	Desert Storm-era PASGT with ISAPV	Today's IBA
Weight	28 lbs (dry)	Vest—9.1 lbs	OTV—8.4 lbs
		ISAPV—16 lbs	SAPI—8 lbs
		Total—25.1 lbs	Total—16.4 lbs.
Ballistics	Fragmentation only	Vest—fragmentation only	OTV—fragmentation plus
		With ISAPV—small arms up to 7.62mm.	9mm handgun
			With SAPI—multiple hits from 7.62mm ball ammo.

Other design elements incorporated into IBA that were not part of the previous version of body armor, the PASGT, address load carrying and modularity. Webbing on the exterior of the IBA's OTV allows the mounting of various items of field gear in place of having to wear additional load bearing suspenders to accommodate ammunition pouches, etc, thus helping to reduce overall weight. Also various components, including the ballistic panels, can be replaced within the IBA, which allows for ballistic material upgrades and easier repairs to the nylon camouflage shell.

Question. What is the supply status of modern body armor sets, including the availability of armor plate inserts, the SAPI (Special Armor Plate Insert) plates?

Answer. To date, the Army has fielded 265,200 Outer Tactical Vests (OTV) and 135,860 sets of Small Arms Protective Inserts (SAPI) Army-wide. One set of SAPI, consisting of two individual SAPI plates, combined with an OTV equals one "modern body armor set" called Interceptor Body Armor (IBA). The Coalition Forces Land Component Commander (CFLCC) still requires 30,426 OTVs and 56,382 sets of SAPI. In anticipation of receiving funding from the FY03 Iraqi Freedom Fund in the very near future, the Army has already begun to take steps to further increase IBA production rates in order to fulfill CFLCC's remaining IBA requirements as soon as possible.

Question. Does the current supplemental budget request fully fund the estimated need for modern body armor and armor plate inserts? When will all the needed modern body armor be available to the troops?

Answer. The Department plans to use \$310 million from the FY03 Iraqi Freedom Fund to procure Interceptor Body Armor (IBA), which includes the Outer Tactical Vest (OTV) and the Small Arms Protective Inserts (SAPI). This \$310 million will fully fund the Department's remaining IBA requirement for all Soldiers deployed in support of Operation Iraqi Freedom. Our current plan calls for the remaining IBA requirement to be filled with November 2003 production quantities.

DEPOT MAINTENANCE

Question. The supplemental request includes almost three billion dollars for incremental depot maintenance of weapons, and weapon system platforms requiring major service after the wear and tear of combat operations in Iraq, Afghanistan, and elsewhere. All this equipment must be restored to mission-capable status to prevent degradation in readiness and to be available for any future combat operation.

Please discuss how the services are rotating equipment back to the depots for repair and overhaul.

Answer. The Navy restores its ships, aircraft, and weapons during scheduled maintenance periods. These schedules have been modified to support both OIF/OEF and restoration to full operating conditions. This process is part of DOD's plan for resetting the force. Repair and overhaul work is performed in both the public and private sectors.

Question. Do you have a good assessment of the amount of depot work that needs to be done? Do you have assessment teams operating in theater to determine how much work and what kind of work will be required?

Answer. Yes, the Navy does have a good assessment of depot maintenance and repair work that must be accomplished. Naval aircraft and ships are inducted into naval air depots, naval shipyards, and private facilities in one of two ways: scheduled and unscheduled. Scheduled events are calendar based; so in any given year, month by month, the number of aircraft and ships ready to be inducted into maintenance and repair facilities is known. Naval aircraft engine repair requirements are based on the number of predicted engine failures per flight hour and meeting the Chief of Naval Operations' Readiness Based Spared (RBS) requirements. RBS re-

quirements count the number of engines required to go into each of the Navy's aircraft plus an additional number for spares.

To sustain the Navy's forward-deployed mission, a network of public and private depot support facilities is in place to meet unscheduled/emergent repair requirements. The Fleets determine how much and what kind of work is needed based on in-theater inspections, system condition assessments, and maintenance plans.

Question. I believe the 3rd Infantry Division drew its equipment from pre-positioned sets. Will that equipment be used by follow-on-forces, or will it go to the depot for overhaul and then back into storage?

Answer. The majority of equipment used by 3ID was from Army Prepositioned Stocks (APS), totaling over 7,000 major pieces of equipment. The Army expects to use the majority of this equipment for rotational forces during Operation Iraqi Freedom's continuing operations. To date, only that equipment requiring depot level work is being processed for shipment to CONUS depots.

Question. Can the depot system absorb all of this extra work?

Answer. The Army's focus remains on RESETing the force as rapidly as possible to meet future combatant commanders' requirements. To achieve this goal, the Army RESET requirements will be satisfied through a combination of organic and contract support. The Army has developed a plan to ramp up production at their five organic depots that will permit 41% of the RESET workload to be performed by the depots. To accommodate this additional workload, the depots will expand production through use of increased overtime, new hires, optimization of their Public/Private Partnerships, augmentation of their workforces through contract field teams, and improved productivity from process improvements.

Question. Will the depots go to additional shifts? Are the skilled workers available for additional shifts?

Answer. The depots are currently working a 2nd and 3rd shifts in select shops as result of our effort to support the Army in fiscal year 2003. These shifts have been retained and additional shifts for the remaining depot production shops are being hired to ramp up production across the spectrum. The Army's five maintenance depots have assessed available pools of potential employees (civilian and military retirees, BRAC95 displacements, and other qualified individuals) within their geographic areas, and are confident of their ability to hire the personnel needed to execute the plan described above. The depots have already started the recruitment process and coordinated with all necessary civilian personnel office centers (CPOCs) to expedite the referral list. Various depots are generating additional skilled labor by utilizing contractor field teams (CFTs).

COST ESTIMATING

Question. We understand that the supplemental budget request is based on a combination of modeling and some specific cost factors based on actual experience in Iraq and Afghanistan thus far.

Is the funding requested in this supplemental adequate to restore Army and Marine Corps equipment to the standards specified in the operators' manual and unit maintenance manuals? Is necessary depot maintenance fully funded? If not, how much more is needed?

Answer. The amount requested corresponds with the funding that can be executed in FY 2004, after depots surge to accommodate additional work (with overtime and extra work shifts). However, these funds will not restore all equipment to required levels. A significant amount of equipment and weapons systems will not return from theater in time to be repaired this year. The funding requested was calculated based on return schedules of ships, aircraft, and tanks and workload capacities in both the organic and private sector depots. This funding will restore equipment to meet readiness levels required. Returning all equipment to pre-war standards will take place over the next several years.

Question. Is the funding requested in this supplemental adequate to restock prepositioned sets for supply stocks, repair parts, water decontaminating equipment, etc. If not, how much more is needed?

Answer. In FY 2003, the Department transferred funds from the Iraq Freedom Fund (IFF) to ensure that U.S. forces are reconstituted in a timely manner and military readiness is not compromised. Over \$100 million was allocated to the Army to restock the Army prepositioned sets, both land based and aboard ships, in order to return them to combat ready condition. Any additional requirement to reset the prepositioned stocks will be reviewed during the President's budget and execution review in FY 2004.

PERSONNEL SUPPORT COSTS

Question. About three billion of the supplemental request is for the cost of incremental personnel support for active component and mobilized reserve component forces.

Are these costs related to calling up forces or are they related more specifically to deploying forces to a particular place, with associated special clothing and equipment needs?

Answer. Yes, Personnel support costs includes funding for both Active forces and mobilized Reserves Component (RC) and National Guard (NG) personnel directly related to the incremental costs for Operation Noble Eagle (ONE), Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF), and Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF). The supplemental request asks for \$3.6 billion under the personnel support costs category. Below is a summary of this section of the supplemental:

	<i>(Dollars in millions)</i>
Active Forces Operation and Maintenance funding	1,641
Reserve Forces Operation and Maintenance funding	431
National Guard Operation and Maintenance funding	835
Health Support for Reserve and Guard	658
Total	3,565

The Operation and Maintenance funds finance temporary duty allowances, the purchase of clothing and peculiar equipment that is needed by individual service personnel in the Iraqi and Afghanistan theaters. The category also includes the health care funding for medical support of the mobilized Reserve and National Guard personnel and their dependents.

Question. What are some specific examples of incremental personnel support costs?

Answer. The supplemental request provides for the incremental personnel costs for both Active and Reserve Component forces.

For Reserves Components (RC) and National Guard (NG) personnel mobilized in support of Operation Noble Eagle (ONE), Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF), and Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF), the supplemental provides for their mobilization pay and certain special compensation directly related to service in a combat zone. With regards to Active personnel, the supplemental only addresses the incremental costs of the special pay.

Personal, Active or Reserves deployed in the U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM) area of operations are eligible for enhanced special pays, including Imminent Danger Pay (IDP), Family Separation Allowance (FSA), and Hardship Duty Pay (HDP).

In addition to special pay, the supplemental also provides funding for certain peculiar equipment like clothing that the personnel being deployed in the CENTCOM area of operations will need to accomplish their duties.

Question. Will these types of expenses be encountered every time we rotate forces in and out of Iraq and Afghanistan, or will some of the equipment be reused?

Answer. Force rotations fluctuate between various military Components and are influenced by the location of the force (Iraq or Afghanistan) being rotated. For this reason, every military unit's rotation schedule and the composition of the rotation differs depending on the mission requirement and the structure of the successor unit. Often equipment of the rotating unit (departing force) is left in the deployment location for use by the successor unit (arriving force). However, this not practical or beneficial in all circumstances. Some equipment may rotate out with the departing unit if the equipment is no longer needed, needs repair that can not be accomplished in the theater (mainly depot level maintenance activities), or if the unit being rotated into the theater is not specifically trained on that particular set of equipment. While every effort is being made to recycle equipment and reduce transportation costs, a portion of the equipment, particularly heavily used transport vehicles, will have to be replaced at some time because of the high operational tempo. For this reason, many of the vehicles currently in the Iraq will be rotated during FY 2004 despite the fact that similar equipment is still needed in the field. This equipment will be replaced with new equipment as time permits and as units rotate in order to perform needed maintenance.

SUPPORT FOR MULTINATIONAL DIVISIONS

Question. The budget justification indicates that part of the request for the Iraq Freedom Fund would be made available for supplies, services, transportation, and other logistical support to one multinational division of ground troops in Iraq.

How much would be obligated from the IFF for this purpose, if it becomes necessary to provide this support?

Answer. \$390.9 million would be obligated should this prove to be necessary.

Question. What is the funding policy regarding U.S. support of foreign troops being deployed in Iraq? How much of their costs are being reimbursed or supplied by the United States, and how much is being covered by the nations supplying the troops?

Answer. The Office of the Secretary of Defense, Joint Staff, Department of State and appropriate combatant commanders evaluate whether a nation has the financial resources to transport and sustain themselves in Iraq. If a country has a capability that is needed, yet does not have the financial resources to deploy to Iraq, the United States will provide financial assistance to transport and sustain their forces. This includes the provision at no cost of airlift and sealift, food, water, billeting, power generation, showers/latrines, vector control, medical care, and other logistical/life support.

The United States will not pay for/reimburse a nation for the following costs: salaries, insurance for personnel and equipment that are deployed to theater, special combat pay or stipends, pre-deployment training costs, and medical exams/vaccinations.

Question. How much of the supplemental request will be obligated for support of foreign forces, including all the requested special authorities to provide goods and services to foreign nations?

Answer. The request includes:

\$390.9 million in Army O&M for lift and sustain

\$390.0 million in IFF for lift and sustain

\$1.4 billion in coalition support funding which can be used to reimburse key cooperating nations providing military or logistical support.

In addition, the request includes \$200 million in authority (but no dedicated funding) for training and equipping foreign military forces.

ASSISTANCE FOR FOREIGN NATIONS

Question. The supplemental request includes language that provides that "funds available to the Department of Defense may be used, notwithstanding any other provision of law, to provide supplies, services, transportation, including airlift and sealift, and other logistical support to coalition forces supporting military and stability operations in Iraq".

How does this authority differ from the \$1.4 billion sought to reimburse nations for support to United States military operations?

Answer. The most effective use of the authorities provided with the \$1.4 billion Congress generously provided in the fiscal year 2003 supplemental has often proven to be through an Acquisition and Cross Servicing Agreement (ACSA) with the cooperating nation. In some cases, however, it would be more efficient for one of the services to provide the support directly rather than go through an ACSA process. Moreover, we may need to work with a cooperating nation where we have no ACSA in place.

Question. How does this authority differ from the request for \$200 million to provide assistance to military forces in Iraq, Afghanistan, "and other friendly nearby regional nations"?

Answer. The \$200 million in requested authorities is for training and equipping foreign military forces rather than reimbursing foreign military forces for operational or logistical support for U.S. military operations.

Question. Why is this additional authority needed? What other authorities does the Department of Defense or other departments and agencies of the government have to provide such assistance and services?

Answer. There is no permanent statutory authority for DOD to reimburse key cooperating nations for military or logistical support for our military operations. This authority would enable the U.S. military to streamline the reimbursement process where the U.S. military is providing lift or logistical support for military forces supporting our operations.

Question. How much do you anticipate will be obligated pursuant to this authority in fiscal year 2004?

Answer. While we have no firm estimate, however, in this supplemental request we have included \$390.9 million in the Army Operation and Maintenance (O&M) request, enough to lift and sustain a multinational division of approximately 10,000 troops for one year, so that should this authority be exercised the services will not be forced to absorb such costs. In addition, the MND led by the Polish armed forces

is planned to be supported from FY 2003, IFF supplemental funds carried forward into FY 2004.

ASSISTANCE TO MILITARY FORCES IN IRAQ, AFGHANISTAN, AND OTHER REGIONAL NATIONS

Question. The supplemental budget request includes language that would authorize the use of not to exceed \$200 million to provide assistance to military forces in Iraq, Afghanistan, and other friendly nearby regional nations to enhance their capability to combat terrorism and to support U.S. military operations in Iraq and Afghanistan.

Why is this additional authority needed?

Answer. Currently, we have a slow and cumbersome process which relies on a patchwork of authorities that is inappropriate to meet today's train and equip requirements. Programs are designed around available resources and their inherent restrictions, rather than driven by actual requirements.

The Department of Defense needs a flexible source of funding to respond expeditiously to emerging, non-traditional threats, which are directly associated with the Global War on Terrorism.

To fight the kind of war that we face, we need maximum flexibility to benefit from contributions that foreign military forces, who share our goals, could make. In some cases, these forces are unable, or are limited in their ability, to provide effective assistance without equipment, training and funding.

The language that the DoD is requesting would eliminate these problems. DoD would be able to respond quickly to operational needs by providing needed training, equipment and other support to foreign forces to enhance their capability to combat terrorism, operate in conjunction with U.S. forces, and in many cases, assume missions currently being executed by U.S. forces.

The DoD cannot continue to rely on authorities that were not designed for train and equip purposes, and which will not allow the quick execution of train and equip missions. We need to mitigate the risks of failure as future unanticipated threats materialize.

Question. Doesn't the President already have authority to provide such assistance through the Secretary of State under the Foreign Assistance Act and the Arms Export Control Act? Why aren't existing authorities and mechanisms being used?

Answer. The State Department possesses several authorities under which train and equip missions can be funded, principally Foreign Military Financing (FMF) and Presidential Drawdown Authority. Both of these authorities, however, have a number of limitations.

FMF funds cannot be executed rapidly, and are designed for long-term security cooperation projects including defense reform, self-defense, peacekeeping, public works, and internal security. FMF funds are not designed to meet unanticipated emerging requirements. These funds are often obligated by the middle of a fiscal year, and are extremely difficult to reprogram. As a result, in practice unanticipated train and equip missions are only partially funded with FMF.

Presidential Drawdown is an authority, not a source of funding. Any goods, services, and supplies have to come from existing Department of Defense stocks. U.S. readiness can be affected when resources are taken from already defined and funded requirements to fund other programs. Additionally, with the exception of drawdown authority provided under the Afghan Freedom Support Act, drawdown does not provide new contracting authority, thus limiting what can be provided under drawdown to equipment "in stock". Relying on equipment that is "in stock" greatly complicates mission planning and execution.

The DoD cannot continue to rely on these two authorities alone because they were not designed for train and equip purposes, and they do not allow the quick execution of train and equip missions.

Question. What is the division of funding responsibility between the Department of Defense and the Department of State for (a) training and equipping a new Afghan army; (b) training and equipping a new Iraqi army; (c) providing assistance for coalition partners in Iraq; (d) providing assistance for partners in the Global War on Terrorism.

Answer.

(a) The Department of State and Department of Defense have jointly funded the training and equipping of the Afghan National Army (ANA). Department of State Foreign Military Financing (FMF) funds and Peacekeeping Operations (PKO) funds have been used to pay salaries, train, and equip the ANA in 2002 and 2003. Department of Defense (DoD) appropriations have been used to train and equip the ANA through the presidential drawdown authority provided in the Afghan Freedom Sup-

port Act. DoD Emergency and Extraordinary Expense (EEE) authority and CINC Initiative Fund appropriations have also been used in the past to fund the training and equipping of the ANA, albeit to a much lesser degree.

(b) Currently, the Department of Defense has the responsibility for training and equipping the New Iraqi Army, under the authorities assigned to the Administrator of the Coalition Provisional Authority. Funding to train and equip the New Iraqi Army has come from DoD appropriations and Iraqi assets.

(c) The United States is providing some financial assistance to enable coalition partners to provide military forces for stability operations in Iraq. Department of Defense appropriations are being used to reimburse some coalition partners for transportation, logistical support, and life sustainment expenses in theater. Department of State Peacekeeping Operation Funds appropriations have been used to provide essential military equipment to coalition partners in Iraq, including battle dress uniforms, and communications equipment.

(d) The Department of Defense does not provide foreign aid/assistance to coalition partners in the global war on terrorism; The Department of State has responsibility for providing foreign aid and other assistance. The Department of Defense, however, has the legal authority to reimburse nations for any expenses that may incur supporting U.S. military operations in connection with the global war on terrorism. In this regard, the United States has reimbursed Pakistan, Jordan, Uzbekistan, Djibouti and other countries for the costs that they have incurred supporting U.S. military operations in connection with the global war on terrorism.

Question. What nations do you anticipate would receive assistance under this request?

Answer. Some train and equip missions which might be undertaken with this new authority include the following:

- Train and Equip an Azeri peacekeeping brigade which Azerbaijan plans to send to Iraq.
- Enhance DoD's ongoing train and equip mission in Georgia.
- Sustain and expand DoD's ongoing and highly successful Counterterrorism training in Yemen.

STATUS OF IRAQ FREEDOM FUND

Question. In the fiscal year 2003 Emergency Wartime Supplemental Appropriations Act, Congress created the Iraq Freedom Fund and appropriated \$15.7 billion to that account. In this supplemental request, you are seeking almost \$2 billion for this account.

What is the status of the funds appropriated in the fiscal year 2003 supplemental?

Answer. As of September 30th, the balance in the Iraq Freedom Fund (IFF) was \$5,319.3 billion. With the passage of the FY 2004 Appropriations Act (P.L. 108-87), the balance was reduced to \$1,822.7 billion because of the congressional rescission of funds (\$-3,490.0 billion).

Known planned transfers include the four actions noted below; when these transfers are approved and processed, the balance in the IFF will be \$937.9 million. The remaining funds are earmarked for battlefield clearing (\$150.0 million), Coalition Support funding (\$638.3 million), counter-terrorism training activities (\$25.0 million), and procurement of the Joint Air to Surface Stand-off Missile (JASSM).

Notification	Purpose of transfer	Funding
October 1, 2003	Construction of the 1st Armored Division Headquarters facility at West Baghdad International Airport.	\$6.6 million.
October 9, 2003	Reimburse the Army for the administrative Support provided to the Coalition Provisional Authority.	\$174.8 million.
October 14, 2003	Procure Soldier Armored Protective Inserts (body armor).	\$310.0 million.
October 31, 2003	Funding to reimburse coalition partners in the War on Terrorism.	\$400.0 million.

Question. Why are you seeking additional funds through the IFF, rather than through traditional appropriations accounts?

Answer. The Iraq Freedom Fund, as a transfer account, provides the financial flexibility to quickly respond to new requirements in the war against terrorism. In the FY 2004 Supplemental Appropriations Request, we are seeking \$1,988,600,000 to fund urgent wartime requirements such as support for coalition forces, additional U.S. forces if necessary, over-ocean transportation, airlift and linguists. Since the

exact cost and nature of the requirements are uncertain, funding is sought in the transfer account so that funds may be moved to the correct appropriation as the requirement is defined.

CONTRIBUTIONS FROM OTHER COUNTRIES

Question. What is the status of the Defense Cooperation Account, or other funds used by the Department to collect contributions from other countries for activities in Iraq? (a) How much is in the fund? (b) What are your projections for receipts to the fund? (c) Who are the expected donor countries?

Answer. The \$13,215,000 balance in the Defense Cooperation Account was transferred to the Natural Resources Risk Remediation Fund on May 22, 2003, to fund emergency fire fighting and repair of damage to oil facilities in accordance with Public Law 108-11, Apr. 16, 2003.

(a) The current balance of the Defense Cooperation Account is \$1,314.63.

(b) There are no projections for receipts to the Defense Cooperation Account. Donor countries are, however, being actively solicited to provide to Iraqi reconstruction and humanitarian assistance. Funds in the Defense Cooperation Account are restricted to use as stated in the Annual Authorization of Appropriations in accordance with Title 10, United States Code, section 114.

(c) There are no projections of expected donor countries to the Defense Cooperation Account. However, many countries are contributing funds to Iraq via the MultiDonor Trust Fund or directly to the Coalition Provisional Authority. (Note: Attached is a Congressional Research Service Report that includes a list of the country contributions to reconstruction and stabilization in Postwar Iraq.)

Question. Are there restrictions on any of the contributions, such as it can only go to help with humanitarian work, or for non-lethal purposes?

Answer. Donations to the Defense Cooperation Account are not accepted by the Department if they are given with any restrictions. The use of the funds in the Defense Cooperation Account is within the sole discretion of the Congress in accordance with Title 10, United States Code Section 2608(c)(2) which states that: "Funds in the Defense Cooperation Account shall not be made available for obligation or expenditure except to the extent and in the manner provided in subsequent appropriations Acts."

Question. What sort of things have been or are expected to be received as "In-kind" contributions?

Answer. The pledging and provision of in-kind contributions has been significant and come from many countries. To date, contributions have largely focused on the humanitarian arena. Examples include:

- Italy's provision of staff with banking and audit talents, as well as power plant and traffic control expertise.
- Japan deployed several C-130s to provide transportation services for UN agencies.
- Austria's treatment of severely sick Iraq children in Austria.
- Numerous countries are participating in the adopt-a-hospital program, and provided food and medical supplies.
- Bosnia's provision of teams to perform the removal of landmines
- Croatia's provision of blankets, tents, sleeping bags, flour, sugar and water disinfectants.
- Many countries sent workers to rehabilitate water production units, train security forces and construct public health centers.

Question. This supplemental request includes \$600 million for additional fuel costs. Why not ask allies in the region to provide the fuel?

Answer. The allies in the region have, and continue to, provide fuel for military and humanitarian operations. The \$600 million requested in the supplemental is over and above what has been provided both as assistance in kind to U.S. Forces and for humanitarian relief of the Iraqi people. The main products required are Liquefied Petroleum Gas (LPG), used for cooking; kerosene, used for heating in the winter months; benzene, for auto fuel, and diesel, to fuel larger equipment and power generation.

PAYMENTS TO PAKISTAN, JORDAN AND OTHER NATIONS

Question. The supplemental request includes \$1.14 billion for payments to Pakistan, Jordan, and other key cooperating nations, for logistical, military and other support provided, or to be provided, to United States military operations.

Of the \$1.4 billion provided for similar purposes in the fiscal year 2003 supplemental appropriations act, how much remains unobligated?

Answer. Of the total \$1.4 billion, the Department has expended or is in process of expending (i.e., the Secretary has provided the Congress with a 15-day notification of his intent to make a reimbursement) approximately \$481 million. CENTCOM is in process of finalizing an additional reimbursement request for Pakistan totaling approximately \$130 million, and the Secretary has set-aside \$530 million to fund the Multi-National Division in Iraq (for which reimbursement requests have not yet been received). This leaves an unobligated balance of approximately \$259 million to cover future reimbursement requests from Pakistan, Jordan and other key cooperating nations.

Question. What nations have received funding for such support, and what nations do you expect will receive assistance in the future?

Answer. The following countries have received reimbursement for support provided to U.S. military operations:

Czech Republic
Djibouti
Pakistan
Jordan
Oman
Uzbekistan

The Department currently is processing a reimbursement request for the Government of Thailand, will make additional reimbursements to Pakistan and Jordan for their continuing support, and will reimburse Poland for costs incurred with Multi-National Division in Iraq. Other nations that provide support to U.S. military operations may be reimbursed provided their requests satisfy the criteria for reimbursement.

Question. How does the Department of Defense ascertain which costs should be reimbursed?

Answer. The Department follows a rigorous review process in determining which costs should be reimbursed. The following steps outline the process used:

- The U.S. Embassy submits the reimbursement request to the OUSD(Comptroller) and the Combatant Commander.
- The Combatant Commander validates the level and type of support provided.
- The OUSD(Comptroller) analyst reviews documentation and determines if the amount requested for reimbursement is reasonable.
- OUSD(Comptroller) prepares a reimbursement package for review by the Department of State, Office of Management and Budget, and internal OSD Legal Review.
- Upon receipt of State Department and OMB concurrence, and of all internal OSD coordinations, a reimbursement package is prepared for Secretary of Defense approval.
- When the reimbursement package is approved by the SECDEF, notification letters are sent to the Congress providing 15-day notice of SECDEF's intent to make a reimbursement.
- 15 days after delivery of the notification letters, funds are transferred to the country.

Question. What roles do the Secretary of State and the Director of OMB play in this process, since the request includes language that provides that they must concur in such payments?

Answer. All reimbursement requests are coordinated with the State Department and the Office of Management and Budget prior to submitting the reimbursement request package to the Secretary of Defense. Both the State Department and OMB must concur with the reimbursement request before the SECDEF will authorize payment.

Question. The bill language that has been submitted as part of this request expands upon previous language that limited payments to nations that provided only logistical and military support, as opposed to other support. In addition, such payments were limited to nations that provided support in connection with military action in Iraq and the global war on terrorism; the new request contains no such limitation. Why is the Department seeking broader authority?

Answer. The Administration requested the additional authority to provide flexibility in responding to requests for support from coalition partners to cover unknown eventualities not otherwise covered by military or logistics support.

PROCUREMENT OF ITEMS

Question. The supplemental request includes almost \$5.3 billion for procurement of a variety of weapons and good needed to maintain our operations in Iraq, Afghanistan, and in support of Operation Noble Eagle.

Are these funds only being requested to replace items lost during combat operations, or will new items be purchased to enhance our military readiness?

Answer. Funds requested will replace items lost during operations and will also provide new equipment and capabilities for units deploying to Iraq. Additionally, for funds requested to replace items lost during combat operations, if an upgraded item exists (i.e. a newer model vehicle or computer processor) it will be purchased rather than the older version that was destroyed/expended. Significant new items being procured are up-armored HMMWVs (UAH) and equipment to support deploying Enhanced Separate Brigades.

Question. Will the supplemental funding allow for the replacement of all items lost during combat operations in Iraq and Afghanistan? If not, what items will not be replaced, and why not?

Answer. Only items that have been deemed critical and whose inventory levels dictate that replacement items must be purchased will be replaced. If every item destroyed or expended were to be replaced, the cost would rapidly become prohibitive.

Question. Will the supplemental funding allow for the purchase of equipment to enhance force protection in Iraq and Afghanistan?

Answer. Yes, the supplemental allows for purchase of force protection items, in fact, certain things in the supplemental are for the express purpose of enhancing force protection for deploying units—for example, up-armored HMMWVs and counter-sniper, or counter-mortar radars (procured under the Rapid Equip the Force initiative). Other procurement items include mission essential equipment that will enhance the dismounted soldier's capability advantage against the enemy.

Question. Will supplemental funding provide for improved housing morale related items for U.S. forces? If so, will such funding provide only for U.S. forces or for other coalition forces as well?

Answer. Yes, the FY 04 supplemental funding will cover the cost for improved habitability for U.S. forces such as power generators, latrine units, mess facilities, laundry, and relocatable quarters. These deployed troops will be moved out of sub-standard, vacant buildings and tents. They will be provided with secure, non-permanent billeting in temporary base camps. Furthermore, the supplemental request will also provide Morale, Welfare, and Recreation (MWR) support for deployed personnel, such as the Rest and Recreation Leave program for active duty military members and civilians serving in combat locations. Other MWR support for the troops and their families includes recreation/entertainment activities, commissary support, family support, and exchange support.

For coalition forces, the supplemental funding will provide basic sustainment (food, shelter, laundry, supplies) support for those countries that cannot cover those costs themselves. This support will be funded separately from any MWR funding for U.S. forces.

DRUG INTERDICTION AND COUNTER-DRUG ACTIVITIES

Question. Included in the supplemental request, is \$73 million for Drug Interdiction and Counter-Drug Activities. These funds are requested for such activities related to Afghanistan.

What activities, specifically, will be supported with this \$73 million request?

Answer. The United States Government is still working with the international community to develop specific programs, which address the drug production problem in Afghanistan. DoD envisions providing support for infrastructure for land ports of entry; an intelligence fusion center; maintenance facilities, hangars, trucks, etc.; establishing communications networks; individual non-lethal equipment such as night vision goggles and global positioning systems; ground sensors between ports of entry; research and development; and other regional support.

Question. In material accompanying the request, is an explanation that these funds will be used for Afghanistan's, unified campaign against narcotics trafficking and terrorist activities. Does the language, as submitted to Congress, allow for these funds to be used in support of counter-terrorism activities?

Answer. The Department's counterdrug activities include those measures taken to detect, interdict, disrupt, or curtail any activity that is reasonably related to narcotics trafficking. This includes, but is not limited to, measures taken to detect, interdict, disrupt, or curtail activities related to substances, material, weapons, or resources used to finance, support, secure, cultivate, process, or transport illegal

drugs. Since some narco-traffickers are also involved in funding terrorist operations, the money from drug trafficking could support terrorist activities.

Question. Is this a continuation of existing activity or does the request support new activities?

Answer. The Counternarcotics Central Transfer Account currently funds minimal counternarcotics efforts in the CENTCOM Area of Responsibility, primarily Special Operations Forces counternarcotics training deployments. This program supports the international community to address drug production in Afghanistan and is a new initiative within the Department.

Question. If the request is to fund training, equipment, and other items related to Afghanistan's narcotics trafficking problem, what assumptions were used to develop this estimate for example, what is the estimated extent of the training? What types of equipment will be provided?

Answer. DoD is currently working with the U.K. and other international partners to develop a counternarcotics training plan in Afghanistan. The cost estimate was developed based on the Department's experience supporting counternarcotics efforts in Colombia, Thailand and other nations.

Question. The request includes a provision that allows for the transfer of funds to the usual Department of Defense appropriations and for the transfer back from these appropriations if the funds are not necessary for drug interdiction and counter-drug activities. Would it be your intent to provide the Congress with an accounting of any funds transferred back to this appropriation?

Answer. The authority to move funds back to the Counternarcotics Central Transfer Account is not new. We were given this authority in Fiscal Year 2003 and all funds transferred back to the Drug Interdiction and Counter-Drug Activities appropriation is recorded on a DD1415-3, Internal Reprogramming Action. We have always shown the Congress our previous execution year experience when we submit our Congressional Justification Budget in February. Additionally, we submit prior year execution data to Office of National Drug Control Policy (ONDCP) to fulfill the congressional reporting requirement of Section 705(d) of the ONDCP Reauthorization Act of 1998.

REQUESTS FOR FBI, DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY, AND COAST GUARD

Question. The supplemental budget request for Defense activities includes funding of \$15.5 million for the FBI, \$3 million for the Department of Energy, and \$80 million for the Coast Guard.

Why aren't separate requests being made for these activities in the applicable appropriation accounts that fund these agencies?

Answer. The DoD supplemental request includes \$80 million for Coast Guard operations in the USCENTCOM Area of Operations (AOR). The Coast Guard has historically had a military role during war, and this occasion is no exception. The Coast Guard possess and contributes to Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF) with capabilities, authorities, and expertise in the area of harbor control and interdiction of commercial shipping, which exceeds the mission of the U.S. Navy. The availability of Coast Guard ships and personnel in OIF allows the Navy to concentrate their assets on their primary mission.

Because the Coast Guard is operating in the AOR under CENTCOM control, performing a military mission under a Deployment Order issued by the Secretary of Defense, it was determined that their costs should be treated in the same manner at the other Armed Services, with their funding request included in the Navy's estimate.

The DoD supplemental request does not specifically include funds for the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) and the Department of Energy (DoE). However, there is a potential that DoD Components may during the execution of the FY 2004 program, employ services and capabilities possessed by the FBI and the DoE.

TRANSFER AUTHORITY

Question. The Administration's request for supplemental Defense spending includes language that would permit the Secretary of Defense to transfer up to \$5 billion between the appropriations accounts contained in the supplemental bill. In addition, nearly \$2 billion is requested for the Iraq Freedom Fund, which is essentially a transfer account. Finally, transfer authority of up to \$500 million is proposed for military construction activities. That totals \$7.5 billion in transfer authority.

Why is such a large level of transfer authority needed by the Department? Don't you have a fairly refined model of determining the cost of OPTEMPO that is already reflected in the budget request?

Answer. The DoD has prepared a realistic estimate of the cost of the operations in Iraq and Afghanistan. The Operation Tempo (OPTEMPO) estimate is based on the most current available force structure plans and assumptions from the Joint Staff and CENTCOM headquarters. However, even the best-prepared plans are subject to threat and requirement driven changes. Because of the complexity of modern warfighting, the Military Component's tactics and strategies during execution often differs from plans developed only weeks before. Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF) and Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF) are no exception in this situation. Military operations are dynamic in nature, thus the funding that supports them must be adaptable as situations and requirements change. The DoD requires the flexibility to adapt to these changes in the environment, and consequently, needs to be able to shift funding between appropriations in order to address these changes.

The DoD has asked that \$1.989 billion of the amounts requested to be appropriated in the Iraq Freedom Fund (IFF) appropriation, a transfer account that provides the DoD the flexibility to realign funds based on the most current situation in the theater. The Congress will be notified in writing prior to transferring the funds from the IFF to a DoD appropriation.

The authority to transfer \$500 million for military construction is needed by the DoD in order to be able to react quickly to contingency construction requirements without having to seek additional funds from the Congress. The Congress will be notified prior to any transfer of funds.

[CLERK'S NOTE.—End of questions submitted by Mr. Lewis.]

THURSDAY, MAY 1, 2003.

MISSILE DEFENSE AGENCY

WITNESS

LIEUTENANT GENERAL RONALD T. KADISH, DIRECTOR, MISSILE DEFENSE AGENCY, UNITED STATES AIR FORCE

INTRODUCTION

Mr. LEWIS: The Committee will come to order. Today the Committee will have the pleasure of welcoming Lieutenant General Ronald T. Kadish, who is the Director of the Missile Defense Agency. On behalf of the Subcommittee, I want you to know how much we appreciate your service and the critical importance of the work that you are about. Our friends are on their way from other very important meetings. Our Commander in Chief has said that we have to keep you guys on time, so we might as well move ahead. I will begin by brief opening remarks and call upon my friend Jack Murtha as well. As you know, per usual, your entire statement will be in the record and so then we will call upon you to give the remarks that you like and go to questions.

The budget that is before us is approximately \$9.1 billion related to this subject area. It is very clear in this shrinking world that the sooner we are able to deploy an effective missile defense system in a practical way that the better off we will be, but also we think that the world will be. Let me say that the heart of this hearing today is to talk about the practical side of this. There are those who are asking questions as to why we didn't have one yesterday. There are other people who are suggesting that while we are making very significant progress, that there is technology in early stages that still needs to be very carefully measured before we expend too much money and maybe go too far too fast and have to play catchup. There are questions about how we should deploy these systems over time.

You have proposed national teams to help us with a lot of that analysis. The mix and makeup of all that raises a number of other questions for all of us. But probably most importantly to me, we are within this Subcommittee a group of men and women who have been able over time to develop a fabulous environment of almost nonpartisan work and our purpose is to secure the national defense as well as the peace.

This \$380 billion is not just for casting beans out there but rather to get very positive results. The goal, long range, is to deal with a problem I hear about all the time. That is, many of my constituents as well as friends presume that someday out there, 15 or 20 years, we obviously are going to have a confrontation with one of the huge emerging countries in the Far East. It is my view that the reason for the expenditure of these dollars is to make certain

that that absolutely does never have to be the case, because if America continues on the path that we are on, we are by far the strongest force in the world. I think leaders of this shrinking world will determine that maybe there are other avenues besides confrontation to get a share of the economic pie. So that these moneys are expended for purposes of not just our national defense but because we are the force for peace in the world.

That certainly is the heart of what your work is about, General Kadish. We want to welcome you to the Committee again and welcome also your statement. Mr. Murtha?

REMARKS OF MR. MURTHA

Mr. MURTHA. General, if I remember, you worked with us on the C-17 program and you were the key person that really brought that C-17 program back. They couldn't pick a better person to be in charge of this very complex technologically, forward-looking system than you. You don't say a lot but you get the work done and we appreciate it. If you had been in charge of the C-17 earlier instead of Kelly, I don't remember who Kelly was, Kelly Burke I think it was, who killed the program for the B-1, we would have been better off. But at any rate we have got a good airplane out there and you were the major person responsible for it. We hope you will have the same success with this program.

General KADISH. Thank you, Mr. Murtha.

Mr. LEWIS. General Kadish, your entire statement will be placed in the record and you may proceed as you desire.

SUMMARY STATEMENT OF GENERAL KADISH

General KADISH. Good morning, Mr. Chairman and members of the Committee. If I might, I would like to just take a few minutes to highlight some of the key elements of the Missile Defense Program as we see it today and the progress that we have made in my opinion.

RESTRUCTURING OF MISSILE DEFENSE PROGRAM

As you know, in early 2001 we started restructuring the Missile Defense Program to develop capabilities to defend the United States, our allies and friends, and deployed forces against all ranges of missiles in all phases of flight. With the support of Congress and in particular this Committee, we have made great progress in demonstrating those key technologies that are necessary for that mission. Our testing and our analysis today gives us confidence that the hit-to-kill technologies are actually working as we intended and the initial steps we are proposing to provide this modest initial capability are on track to provide us capability where none exists today. Altogether, we have made great progress. Our testing has been aggressive and productive. Over the past 2 years, we have achieved four for five successful ground-based intercepts against long range targets. We are three for three in our sea-based intercepts against medium range targets and we are five for seven with the Patriot Advanced Capability-3 interceptor in the test program. During the question period, I might add the wartime performance as we understand Patriot-3 later on. And we are mak-

ing steady progress with the Airborne Laser to develop the revolutionary speed of light technologies for missile defense.

There is no question we have had failures. We will in all probability continue to have some failures, but this scorecard has increased our confidence in the technical approaches that we are taking.

Mr. LEWIS. Excuse me, General, I hate to interrupt your comment. I was concerned that we might have to have a motion to close but apparently we are at one level of security, which is secure. Just let me say to the members that while this is not a closed hearing and our staff can remain, unlike a part yesterday—obviously my staff has informed me ahead of time on this. So I won't move the staff out but you are assured and the staff should know that this material discussed today ought to be kept in this room. Jack, I guess you don't have to read that statement I just made. Go ahead.

FIELDING INITIAL CAPABILITIES

General KADISH. Okay, Mr. Chairman. Last December, the President directed the Department of Defense to field an initial set of missile defense capabilities in view of our technical progress and our total lack of missile defenses against intermediate and long range ballistic missiles. Given our fielding approach using the test bed we have been working on and given our testing successes and analysis to date, I believe we are actually ready to take this step. With the President's decision, we now have a basic near-term architecture for a limited system to address a range of missile threats. I want to stress that we have no fixed long-term architecture yet. We will evolve and improve the capability of this block 4 system, as we call it, over time so that what we propose to field initially in the 2004 and 2005 time frame may evolve to look very different even a decade later.

EVOLUTIONARY IMPROVEMENT

The number and type of missile defense assets and their locations and the basing arrangements may be expected to change to make the system more integrated and more capable over time. This is consistent with the approach I have described in previous hearings. We are building and fielding a limited militarily useful capability as soon as they can be made available to us from a technological standpoint. We have said all along that when we do field, we will not field a system that will fully meet our missile defense needs. We will have constraints, limitations and gaps. Let there be no illusions about that. The system we will be fielding initially will have some restraints operationally even. But we went down this road knowing that there would be these types of limitations with a process that is specifically designed to make up for those limitations as soon as practical.

With an evolutionary capability based acquisition approach, we can put capability into the field, we can test it, we can use it, we can get comfortable with it, learn what works and does not work and improve it as soon as we can.

Before the President's decision, the fiscal year 2004 President's budget would have reflected the development of a set of test bed

capabilities that could have been made operational. Today we are asking Congress to approve funds to allow us to add to this test bed and make it operational in 2004 and 2005. In other words, instead of building a test bed that might be used operationally, we are fielding an initial defensive capability that could be used to test. Because of this relationship between initial defense capability and testing, we are asking that all the funding associated with both efforts be under the defensewide RDT&E appropriation.

TESTING STRATEGY

With respect to the issue of operational testing before a deployment, I would argue that what we are faced with today is a timing issue. This is unique, unprecedented technology in its early stages of maturity. We have to strike a balance between our desire for our perfection in missile defenses that we might deploy and our desire to have as soon as possible some defensive capability where none exists today. Can we continue to test the elements and components of a system we might also use to defend ourselves? I believe we can. And why do I believe we can do that? Because we have shown that the nuts and bolts of this missile defense capability we are planning to field in this block 4 time frame can work.

Over the past two years, we have conducted a total of 55 flight tests and 60 grounds tests. Seventeen of these tests were flight intercept tests. Each test builds our confidence. We know that hit-to-kill works. We have a significant degree of repeatability represented in the tests that we have conducted to date, and we are well along in our goal of demonstrating reliability. Regardless of the names we apply to our testing, we must have assets and infrastructure in the field if we are going to begin to test under operationally realistic conditions. We do not have the weapons and sensors fielded at operationally useful sites and locations today and we cannot really do a good job of hooking this all up until we put it in the places that we need it to make sure it works.

This program and this budget do just that. Our intentions are to test the system, the complete system, as soon as possible. Over the next, two years, we are planning another 68 flight tests and 58 ground tests and about the same number of intercept tests as before. We have done the testing to have the confidence to proceed and we want to continue to strike the right balance in our test program. The elements of the test bed will also have some inherent defense capability. We can do operational testing while having the system on alert, in my opinion, and we should take advantage of that.

COST CONTROL

I believe, Mr. Chairman, that we are ready to take the next step in missile defense for another reason. Our test bed evolutionary approach to initial defensive capability is rational from a cost standpoint as well. We do not now have adequate understanding to submit a budget for many tens of billions of dollars for a huge, long-term, fixed architecture, and I don't believe we need to submit such a budget to achieve our initial goals. We are able, however, to purchase and field the capabilities in small numbers. This approach will allow us to control costs and with an increase of \$1.5 billion

over, two years, we could provide this country with a modest missile defense capability where none exists today.

SUMMARY

Mr. Chairman, America's Missile Defense Program is on track today. The Missile Defense Agency is doing what we told the Congress we would do and your support has been important to that progress that we have made to date. We have tried to listen to the concerns that people have had and sought to address them in a responsible manner. Our tests and our analysis give us confidence that we can take the first steps toward the initial defensive operations while we continue to prove our technologies and demonstrate missile defense combat utility through realistic testing. I really believe there is a tremendous benefit to putting this unprecedented technology into the field in manageable increments to provide some defense, to learn more about it, gain experience with it and test it to the point where the operational users are comfortable with it.

I would like to thank you, Mr. Chairman, for the opportunity to testify today and I think I will just stop there and go into the questions as you might direct.

[The statement of General Kadish follows:]

Unclassified Statement of

Lieutenant General Ronald T. Kadish, USAF

Director, Missile Defense Agency

Before the

**House Appropriations Committee
Defense Subcommittee**

Closed Hearing

Thursday, May 1, 2003

*Embargoed Until Released by the
Appropriations Defense Subcommittee
U. S. House of Representatives*



Biography

Office of External Affairs, Missile Defense Agency
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Lieutenant General Ronald T. Kadish
United States Air Force
Director, Missile Defense Agency

Lieutenant General Ronald T. Kadish is the director of the Missile Defense Agency (MDA), Office of the Secretary of Defense, Pentagon, Washington, DC. The MDA is Presidentially-chartered and mandated by Congress to acquire highly effective ballistic missile defense systems for forward-deployed and expeditionary elements of the U.S. Armed Forces. Additionally, MDA will develop options, and if directed, acquire systems for ballistic missile defense of the United States. As director, General Kadish is the Acquisition Executive for all Ballistic Missile Defense systems and programs.

The general entered the Air Force in 1970 after graduating from the Reserve Officer Training Corps program at St. Joseph's University. He was the program director for the F-15, F-16 and C-17 System Program offices, as well as director for manufacturing and quality assurance for the B-1B System Program Office. He is a senior pilot with more than 2,500 flying hours, primarily in the C-130. Before assuming his current position, he was commander, Electronic Systems Center, Air Force Materiel Command, Hanscom Air Force Base, MA. He was responsible for the Air Force's Center of Excellence for command and control systems, handling more than \$3 billion in programs annually.

EDUCATION:

1970 Bachelor of science degree in chemistry, St. Joseph's University, Philadelphia
1975 Master's degree in business administration, University of Utah
1975 Squadron Officer School, Maxwell Air Force Base, AL
1981 Distinguished graduate, Air Command and Staff College, Maxwell Air Force Base, AL
1988 Industrial College of the Armed Forces, Fort Lesley J. McNair, Washington, DC
1990 Defense Systems Management College, Fort Belvoir, VA.

ASSIGNMENTS:

1. June 1970 - June 1971, student, undergraduate pilot training, Vance Air Force Base, OK
2. June 1971 - June 1974, C-130E pilot and instructor pilot, 62nd Tactical Airlift Squadron, Little Rock Air Force Base, AR
3. June 1974 - June 1976, wing operations staff officer, 314th Tactical Airlift Wing, Little Rock Air Force Base, AR
(MORE)

Kadish Biography, page 2

4. June 1976 - June 1977, Air Force Institute of Technology's Education-with-Industry, Vought Corp., Dallas
5. July 1977 - August 1980, subsystem co-production officer, F-16 System Program Office, Aeronautical Systems Division, Wright-Patterson Air Force Base, OH
6. August 1980 - June 1981, student, Air Command and Staff College, Maxwell Air Force Base, AL
7. June 1981 - March 1982, C-130E instructor pilot, 37th Tactical Airlift Squadron, Rhein-Main Air Base, West Germany
8. April 1982 - January 1983, wing and base chief, aircrew standardization and evaluation division, 435th Tactical Airlift Wing, Rhein-Main Air Base, West Germany
9. January 1983 - July 1984, operations officer, 37th Tactical Airlift Squadron, Rhein-Main Air Base, West Germany
10. July 1984 - September 1985, director for manufacturing and quality assurance, B-1B System Program Office, aeronautical systems division, Wright-Patterson Air Force Base, OH
11. September 1985 - July 1987, executive to the commander, Aeronautical Systems Division, Wright-Patterson Air Force Base, OH
12. July 1987 - June 1988, Student, Industrial College of the Armed Forces, Fort Lesley J. McNair, Washington, DC
13. June 1988 - July 1989, chief, program integration division, Office of the Secretary of the Air Force for Acquisition, Washington, DC
14. July 1989 - May 1990, military assistant to the Assistant Secretary of the Air Force for Acquisition, Office of the Secretary of the Air Force for Acquisition, Washington, DC.
15. May 1990 - September 1990, student, Defense Systems Management College, Fort Belvoir, VA
16. September 1990 - August 1992, F-15 program director, Aeronautical Systems Center, Wright-Patterson Air Force Base, OH
17. August 1992 - September 1993, F-16 program director, Aeronautical Systems Center, Wright-Patterson Air Force Base, OH
18. October 1993 - August 1996, program director for the C-17 System Program Office, Aeronautical Systems Center, Wright-Patterson Air Force Base, OH
19. August 1996 - June 1999, commander, Electronic Systems Center, Hanscom Air Force Base, MA
20. June 1999 - present, director, Missile Defense Agency (MDA), Office of the Secretary of Defense, Pentagon, Washington, DC

FLIGHT INFORMATION:

Rating: Senior pilot

Flight hours: More than 2,500

Aircraft flown: C-130, T-37, T-38, F-16, F-15, C-17

MAJOR AWARDS AND DECORATIONS:

Defense Distinguished Service Medal

Legion of Merit

Meritorious Service Medal with three oak leaf clusters

Air Medal

Air Force Commendation Medal with two oak leaf clusters

Air Force Outstanding Unit Award

(MORE)

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Air Force Organizational Excellence Award with three oak leaf clusters
Combat Readiness Medal
Air Force Recognition Medal
National Defense Service Medal with service star
Air Force Overseas Ribbon - Long
Air Force Longevity Service Award Ribbon with seven oak leaf clusters
Small Arms Expert Marksmanship Ribbon
Air Force Training Ribbon

EFFECTIVE DATES OF PROMOTION:

Second Lieutenant June 3, 1970
First Lieutenant December 14, 1971
Captain December 14, 1973
Major November 28, 1979
Lieutenant Colonel March 1, 1985
Colonel September 1, 1989
Brigadier General September 1, 1993
Major General October 1, 1995
Lieutenant General August 16, 1996

(Current as of March 2003)

Lieutenant General Ronald T. Kadish, USAF
Director, Missile Defense Agency
Missile Defense Program and Fiscal Year 2004 Budget
Before the House Appropriations Committee, Defense Subcommittee
May 1, 2003

Good morning, Mr. Chairman, Members of the Committee. It is an honor to appear before you to present the Department of Defense's Fiscal Year (FY) 2004 Missile Defense Program and budget.

In early 2001 we restructured the missile defense program to develop the capability to defend the United States, our allies and friends, and deployed forces against all ranges of missiles in all phases of flight. With the support of Congress, we have made considerable progress in demonstrating key ballistic missile defense (BMD) technologies and system integration. Our testing and analysis give us confidence that hit-to-kill technology works and that we can take the initial steps we are proposing to bolster defenses against short- and medium-range ballistic missiles and introduce a modest defensive capability to defeat a limited long-range threat. Today I will review our progress, discuss why we are confident in our approach, and outline our plans and challenges ahead.

Over the past two years we have conducted several successful intercept tests. We achieved four for five successful long-range, Ground-based Midcourse Defense (GMD) intercept flight tests, demonstrating the hit-to-kill technologies of the Exo-atmospheric Kill Vehicle, critical sensor technologies, and the integration of many geographically dispersed missile defense assets. The failure of the most recent such test (Integrated

Flight Test-10) last December resulted from the non-separation of the interceptor and the surrogate booster rocket. This was not a failure of new missile defense technology, but a failure of our quality control processes. We are increasing our already focused quality control efforts. We are taking steps to ensure this separation problem is not repeated. Furthermore, future GMD tests will no longer use the surrogate booster and instead will use one or both of the boosters currently under development.

We are three for three in our ship-based exo-atmospheric intercept tests. Last year Aegis BMD successfully completed its Aegis Lightweight Exo-Atmospheric Projectile (LEAP) Intercept (ALI) project. Based on these results we accelerated the insertion of the follow-on Aegis BMD capability into the Test Bed. Our third intercept in November 2002 was the first ever intercept of a ballistic missile in the ascent phase of flight.

Patriot Advanced Capability 3 (PAC-3) has made significant strides. Since January 2001, we have had five for seven successful intercepts of ballistic missile targets and have begun fielding the first PAC-3 missiles. We also executed more than a dozen successful test flights of the Airborne Laser (ABL) aircraft, completed significant aircraft modifications, and accomplished successful subsystem testing and full-up ground-tests of the first laser module. While we are in the difficult phase of integrating the components into the ABL, our progress to date has increased our confidence that ABL can eventually be integrated into the BMD system (BMDS).

Mr. Chairman, America's missile defense program is on track. The Missile Defense Agency is doing what we told Congress it would do. We listened to your concerns and have sought to address them in a responsible manner. We have faced

significant technical and management challenges, but through aggressive testing we have proven that hit-to-kill technology works. We have demonstrated system integration through complex system testing. These tests, combined with analysis of simulations and exercises, give us confidence that the system can take the first steps toward initial defensive operations while performing as a test bed for further realistic testing and continued spiral development.

The President's FY 2004 budget will allow us to continue this significant progress and is structured to incorporate the recommendations of the Defense Science Board summer study of 2002.

Evolutionary Approach to Missile Defense

The BMD system involves many sensors and interceptors that are integrated and layered to enable engagements against hostile missiles in the boost, midcourse, and terminal phases of flight. Layered defenses can allow multiple shot opportunities across all of the engagement segments and potentially within each one of those segments, greatly enhancing our ability to handle countermeasures and destroy in-flight missiles and their payloads.

As I have explained in past hearings, we are building the missile defense system using an evolutionary acquisition approach, so that the system's capability can be enhanced over time. Our plan continues to be one of incrementally providing the decision makers the ability to field militarily useful capabilities based on their technological readiness, suitability for operational use and threat developments.

Last December the President directed the Department to field an initial set of missile defense capabilities in order to reduce the vulnerabilities of the United States, our troops, and our allies and friends. Given our fielding approach, and given the successful testing we have accomplished to date, I believe we are ready for this. The proposed budget for FY 2004 and across the 2004-2009 Future Years Defense Program (FYDP) supports Research, Development, Test and Evaluation (RDT&E) activities to accomplish that goal. We plan to begin operating modest land and sea defense capabilities in 2004 to provide limited protection of our country as well as our troops and critical assets overseas.

In missile defense, we deal routinely with revolutionary technologies and unprecedented engineering requirements. The program we are currently executing recognizes the unique challenges we face and sets out a disciplined course to develop the BMD system in an evolutionary way. Having spent the last couple of years looking at different missile defense options, we are now narrowing our program activities and focusing on development and fielding of the most promising elements.

Consistent with the approach I have described in previous hearings, we are building and fielding limited, militarily useful capabilities as soon as they can be made available. This approach takes into account known and projected threats and the present state of technology. With a capability-based acquisition approach we put capability into the field, test it, use it, get comfortable with it, and learn what works well and what does not. We have structured Test Bed fielding opportunities to occur in "blocks" every two years to improve what we have fielded as needed. Block 2004 (initial defense

capabilities) represents 2004-2005, Block 2006 represents 2006-2007, and so on. These blocks will deliver elements and components that are ready for continued rigorous testing and full integration into the system.

With the President's decision, we now have a basic near-term architecture for a limited system to address a range of missile threats. I want to stress that we have no fixed, long-term architecture. We will evolve and improve the capability of the Block 2004 system over time, so that what we propose to field initially in 2004 and 2005 may evolve to look very different a decade later. The number and type of missile defense assets and their locations and basing arrangements may be expected to change to make the system more integrated and capable.

We have adopted this evolutionary approach because a single acquisition cycle is not responsive to rapid changes in threat and technology and is not structured to deal with surprise. We want to avoid prematurely constraining system design by using the traditional requirements process and waiting up to twenty years or more for a defensive capability that would result from using traditional acquisition rules. In a world marked by increasing ballistic missile activity, our nation, forces, and allies cannot afford to wait that long.

In using this evolutionary approach, we still have the ability to incorporate the discipline and intent of the traditional acquisition process. For example, the warfighting community has been heavily involved from the beginning in the development of system elements and components. We are successfully using a spiral development process to put new technologies into play more quickly than if we were to use the traditional approach.

Spiral development requires regular dialogue and active participation between user and developer for delivering a militarily useful set of capabilities. Once we field the initial capability, uniformed personnel will operate the system.

Despite the many uncertainties we face, this approach allows us to be good stewards of the taxpayers' money. The President's recent announcement stands as a good example of this. We are not making an early commitment to large-volume serial production and very large-scale investments. Our fielding commitment will be scaled over time and rise with our confidence that we are on the right development path for this complex, multifaceted system.

Aggressive Research, Development and Test Activities

As we prepare to implement the President's directive, we plan to continue the program's intensive testing activities up to and beyond the 2004-2005 timeframe. We have a single, robust RDT&E program dedicated to the development and demonstration of missile defense technologies and integration concepts. In fact, consistent with our investments over the past two years, the lion's share of the FY 2004 budget request of \$7.7 billion for the Missile Defense Agency, roughly \$6 billion, will support RDT&E activities that are not directly tied to system fielding. Significant development efforts in FY 2004 include continued work on Theater High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD), ABL, and kinetic energy boost-phase interceptors in the post-Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty environment.

These aggressive RDT&E activities are the basis for proceeding as the President has directed and for continuing development work to build a multi-layered BMD system. We will continue our practice of assessing these activities on a regular basis to see if they can be accelerated or whether they must be truncated or modified in some manner. RDT&E activities occurring in FY 2004 will contribute to Blocks 2004, 2006, 2008 and 2010.

We are still evaluating the impact of our withdrawal from the ABM Treaty. The treaty successfully did what it was intended to do. It severely restricted missile defense development and fielding options. The President's action has made it possible to begin to develop and test aggressively the full range of missile defense technologies and pursue capabilities that make the most sense from the standpoints of technology, operations, and cost.

For example, as a result of the treaty withdrawal, Aegis BMD, the sea-based defense element, began its successful participation in GMD integrated flight tests conducted last October and December. While initially only collecting boost and ascent phase radar data, Aegis BMD has begun engineering efforts to become a full participant in future tests and will eventually provide fire control data to the BMD system.

Our intercept tests against long-range ballistic missiles are very complex, yet since October 1999 we were forced to restrict ourselves to the same intercept flight geometries because of artificial constraints in our current Test Bed and our obligation to remain compliant with the ABM Treaty. Today, in order to test our GMD interceptors, we must launch targets from Vandenberg, AFB in California and interceptors from Kwajalein Atoll in the Pacific Ocean. We are changing that. The Test Bed we are building will

introduce flexibility into our test approach and help overcome some basic geographic and geometric limitations by allowing us to test weapons and sensors against ballistic missiles of all ranges along different azimuths and using different trajectories. For test purposes we will introduce variable target launch and impact points and engagement areas.

Robust, realistic testing is absolutely critical to developing an effective missile defense system. Over the past two years we conducted a total of 55 flight tests and 60 ground tests. Seventeen of these tests were flight-intercept tests. Each test builds our confidence in the BMD system. From our flight-testing, we know that the hit-to-kill approach works. We know our sensors can successfully detect and track the target and that our software algorithms can discriminate between reentry vehicles and basic decoys and debris. We know our battle management system can generate orders that put a kill vehicle in a position to achieve intercept. We will continue to refine and improve the system's performance in all areas. Our test program continues to add to our confidence that the basic technologies are sound and that they will work together to provide the nation an effective BMD system.

Our program and budget will continue to maintain a high tempo of increasingly complex ground- and flight-testing. Over the next two years we are planning another 68 flight tests, 58 ground tests, and maintaining the same pace of intercept tests as before. We do system testing to give us confidence that we have the ability to integrate geographically dispersed missile defense elements and components into an effective system. This does not include the many experiments we conduct routinely, the modeling and simulation activity, and the wargame exercises. Our computer predictions are very

valuable in this process and give us a great deal of confidence that we are on the right paths.

We remain committed to our aggressive testing approach, where we mature midcourse, boost, and terminal missile defense components and elements through rigorous testing under increasingly realistic and challenging conditions. When we have adequately demonstrated technologies, decisions can then be made concerning their integration into blocks for fielding. Testing activities remain central to what we do and are well supported within our funding request.

Initial Defense Capabilities

The Congress has already funded plans to put five midcourse interceptors into the test bed in silos at Fort Greely in Alaska, develop Aegis BMD, and test the SM-3 interceptor at the Pacific Missile Range Facility in Hawaii. Other activities are currently underway to improve the missile defense Test Bed by upgrading or developing launch sites (including Vandenberg, AFB), radar sensors, battle management and command and control components, communications terminals and networks, and associated test infrastructure in the United States and the Marshall Islands (including airborne, sea-based, and ground-based data collection assets).

Today we are asking the Congress to appropriate funds that will allow us to add to this Test Bed and make it operational by 2004. These initial defense capabilities, fielded over a two-year period, will include ground-based interceptors to counter long-range threats, sea-based interceptors to defeat short- and medium-range threats, additional

PAC-3 units, and early warning and tracking sensors based on land, at sea, in the air, and in space.

Before the President's decision, the FY 2004 President's Budget would have reflected the development of a set of Test Bed capabilities that could have been made operational. Instead of building a Test Bed that might be used operationally, we are fielding an initial defensive capability that we will continue to test. All RDT&E activities will support the initial defense capability, and the system elements and components we field will continue to support RDT&E. Because of the relationship between initial defense capabilities and testing, we are asking that all funding associated with both efforts be under Defense-wide appropriations RDT&E. With the December announcement we have quickened the pace at which we are moving forward, but we have not changed the direction in which we are moving.

We are proposing to do in FY 2004 what we said we were going to do in previous hearings, that is, field tested missile defenses a little at a time using a step approach. The missile defense operations we are proposing are unprecedented, and there still is much to learn. I believe there is tremendous benefit in putting this unprecedented technology into the field, in manageable increments, to provide some defense, to learn more about it, gain experience with it, and improve it over time.

The Israeli Arrow program stands out as an example of how fielding militarily useful capability in block increments and in a timely manner can work and how successful it can be. With only four successful intercept flight tests, Israeli officials declared their first Arrow battery operational on October 17, 2000 and fielded that

country's first capability to defeat incoming ballistic missiles launched from nearby states. The Israeli system has been operational for more than two years now, and during that time it has conducted additional intercept and flight tests to enhance the system's performance. Plans are moving forward to augment it even further. Surrounded by states having an active interest in ballistic missiles, Israel found a way to field a limited defensive capability on an accelerated timeline and at a time when it could not afford to wait for system testing to be completed.

We in the United States, of course, are not strangers to fielding an unprecedented military capability on an accelerated schedule. Our leadership struggled in the early stages of deploying the first reconnaissance satellites and land- and sea-based ballistic missiles. Urgent national security requirements pressed us to deploy capability soon, and through trial and error we did. Despite test failures, the country persevered and made militarily useful capabilities operational. Since that time, we have dramatically improved the capabilities of those first-generation systems. The parallels between these pioneering programs and the missile defense program are clear.

I believe, Mr. Chairman, that we are ready to take this next step in missile defense. Our fielding approach will not only help rationalize the force structure we deploy from the technological and threat standpoints, but also from the standpoint of cost. We do not now have adequate understanding to submit a bill of many tens of billions of dollars for a huge, long-term fixed architecture. We are able, however, to purchase, produce, and field capabilities in small numbers. This approach will allow us to control costs. With a modest investment and increase by the Department of a total of \$1.5 billion spread over

the FY 2004 and 2005 budgets, we will provide this country with militarily useful capabilities where none exists today.

In short, this \$1.5 billion primarily will add a small number of ground-based interceptors as well as more SM-3 interceptors to the test bed capability we are already building. Future fielding decisions, as we have said all along, will be made in the outlying years based on the progress of technology and the evolution of the threat, subject to the annual congressional appropriations process.

Confidence in Initial Defensive Operations

In assessing our level of confidence with the planned initial missile defense capabilities, we have to strike a balance between our desire for perfection in the missile defenses we deploy and our desire to have as soon as possible a defensive capability where none exists today.

Adequate testing is the key to achieving that balance. And while this testing may not fit the mold of classical operational testing that would traditionally take place prior to full-rate production, we do follow a testing discipline that I believe can give us the confidence to say that what we deploy will work as we have said it would under threat circumstances that we believe we might have to face.

I believe that to strike the right balance we must go through an intense period of testing to demonstrate that the technologies on which we are relying can work consistently under conditions that are increasingly stressful and realistic. We have spent the past two years demonstrating the technologies we propose to employ in the Block

2004 Test Bed. We have said all along that when we do field we will not field a system that will fully meet our missile defense needs. We will face limitations and have gaps, let there be no illusions there. The system we are initially fielding will be limited operationally. But we went down this road knowing that there would be gaps and with a process that is specifically designed to fill those gaps and make up for performance limitations as soon as practicable.

Among the limitations that should be included here is that of operational experience. We need to build operational experience over time with the system that will be guarding our nation and our troops. There is no better way to do that than to put basic elements out into the field and to begin working with those assets to develop the doctrine and concepts of operation we will need and to train the military personnel who will operate it.

We have spent significant amounts of money on testing the GMD and Aegis BMD elements of system. All of the tests to date have been what we have called "developmental tests." Regardless of the names we apply to our testing, we must have assets and infrastructure in the field if we are going to begin to test that system under operationally realistic conditions. If we do not have the weapons and sensors fielded at operationally useful locations, we cannot really do a good job of hooking it all up to make sure it works.

The President's decision allows us to put this materiel out in the field for testing, in locations that make sense from an operational point of view. Given the recent events in the international security environment, the President's decision reflects an urgent need

to make that test bed as operational as we possibly can. That decision also recognizes that we will not be fielding the perfect system at the outset.

What we are faced with today is a timing issue. Must we do what has been traditionally called "operational testing" before we can say that we have a capability we can use in an extreme security situation, or can we do both? Can we continue to test the elements and components of a system we also could use to defend ourselves if needed? I believe we can.

Why do I believe that? Because we have shown that the nuts and bolts of the missile defense capabilities we are planning to field in Block 2004 can work. We have had a significant degree of repeatability represented in the tests we have conducted to date, and we are well along in our goal of conducting these tests reliably. We are now to the point where we need to assemble selected missile defense elements into a test bed that will permit operationally realistic testing using different azimuths and trajectories, different launch and target points, and different arrangements in our sensors and weapons. That test bed will allow us to test in different ways so that we can refine our all-too-important battle management and command and control infrastructure. The elements of the test bed also will have some inherent defense capability. We can do operational development testing while having the system on alert. We should take advantage of that.

Our intentions are to test the complete system and to be ready to respond to ballistic missile threats against the United States, our deployed forces, and our friends and allies. We have conducted the rigorous testing needed to give us the confidence that

we are far enough along to do operationally realistic testing in an integrated way. Testing will always be an important part of this system—always. We will always be improving what we have in the field. The budget we have submitted will support the testing required to ensure that the elements of the Block 2004 system we would like to field will adequately serve the defense needs of this nation.

Our RDT&E activities are extensive and are important part of our acquisition approach. Below are three areas of special interest.

BMD System Radar Activity

The MDA's Family of Radar concept is continuous and flexible global detection, tracking, discrimination, and hit assessment. Ideally, we want to be able to watch missile payloads deploy and accomplish prompt and early battle assessment. We are currently pursuing multiple sensor technologies and identifying and developing sensors to give the BMD system the "eyes" it will need. In order to identify the most promising technologies and reduce risk, we are investigating, in parallel, sensor alternatives on land-, sea-, air- and space-based platforms to add robustness to the BMD system and improve opportunities to collect multiple phenomenology on the threat missile or target complex. Evaluations of different sensor and weapon combinations and alternatives will help us assess their overall benefit to an integrated, layered BMD system. An important element in this effort is the mobile Sea-Based X-Band radar (SBX), which we plan to build by September 2005 to greatly improve both testing and our initial defense capability.

The BMDS Radar project, a new activity, is funded in the FY 2004 budget to expand the engagement battle space and assess missile defense concepts of operation that we were not allowed to consider under the ABM Treaty. We will validate the concept of forward-basing and sensor layering and evaluate advanced algorithms using both MDA- and non-MDA-owned sensors. Current plans call for the BMDS Radar to be available for integration into the Test Bed in late 2006. We will support continuous sensor research to improve capabilities and develop advanced algorithms for Block 2008 and beyond.

BMD System Infrared Sensor Activities

The Department restructured the Space Based Infrared System-Low (SBIRS Low) element in FY 2002, renaming it the Space Tracking and Surveillance System (STSS). We will explore new technologies to enhance missile detection, improve reporting on ballistic missile launches regardless of range, azimuth, or launch point, and provide critical midcourse tracking and discrimination data.

The Russian-American Observation Satellites (RAMOS) project is a cooperative effort between the United States and the Russian Federation to improve early warning technologies. RAMOS represents an innovative space-based sensor R&D initiative. We are proceeding towards a joint Preliminary Design Review this summer and expect to conclude the design and development phase in early FY 2005. The United States is actively striving to reach a bi-lateral agreement to conduct activities beyond the design

and development phase. If we are able to move forward with this project, we would launch two satellites in late FY 2008.

BMD System Interceptor Activity

Our longer-term goal is to develop low-cost enhanced interceptors for integration with different platforms to defend against missiles in the boost, midcourse, and exo-atmospheric terminal phases of flight. We are consolidating all next-generation kinetic energy interceptor (booster and kill vehicle) development efforts and placing them under our BMDS Interceptor activity. Relying heavily on existing hardware and proven technology, we will develop a hit-to-kill boost phase capability by Block 2008 and deliver capability enhancements for Block 2010 and beyond.

In FY 2004 we will begin developing a space-based kinetic energy interceptor Test Bed to explore the technological feasibility and operational advantages of engagements from space. This plan is consistent with the Defense Science Board's recommendation, released last August, to establish a comprehensive development program for a space-based kinetic system. Following up on last year's successful experiments to understand key sensor technologies, we will conduct in 2004 a Near Field Infra-Red Experiment to observe from space a boosting rocket. This data will assist in the selection of seeker and sensor technologies for a ground-based boost interceptor and development of interceptor guidance and homing algorithms.

Block Activities and Budget

We are working within the MDA and with the Department's operational community to meet the President's objective to establish an initial defense capability in 2004, which begins with Block 2004. The following describes by block our planned fielding opportunities across the FYDP.

Block 2004

This block continues development and integration of elements, components, and facilities in the Test Bed. Block 2004 RDT&E funding will deliver capabilities directed by the President for operational use in FY 2004-2005. We plan to add different capabilities to point-defense capabilities already provided by PAC-3 units. This initial fielding will grow the RDT&E program and expand the physical infrastructure of the Test Bed.

Funds in this block will enable us to conduct major target and countermeasure development and capability demonstrations, integration tests, and experiments. We are investing in a substantive system test program to test system command, control, and battle management (C2BM) and communications across the elements. The Block 2004 Master Test Plan lays out the strategy for conducting a comprehensive set of integrated and distributed ground- and flight-tests to verify performance and characterize the capability of the system. This test program will form the basis of operational and military utility assessments of the Block 2004 initial defense capability.

We will have three major system integration flight tests, the first of which is a large-scale integration event that tests C2BM and communications during multiple element intercept tests. We plan to demonstrate C2 capabilities and communications among C2 and battle management nodes, weapons, and sensors and to continue work with the Services, Combatant Commands, and the Office of the Secretary of Defense to ensure BMD system interoperability with legacy and planned Department systems and standards.

We are requesting \$3.2 billion in FY 2004 to support RDT&E for fielding Block 2004. Our estimated expenditure for Block 2004 activities across the FYDP is \$6.2 billion (see Table 1).

Table 1: Block 2004 Funding FY02-09 (\$M Then-year)*

	FY02	FY03	FY04	FY05	FY06	FY07	FY08	FY09	TOTALS FY02-09
C2BMC Block 2004	21	80	114	79	0	0	0	0	295
Hercules Block 2004	0	0	18	27	0	0	0	0	46
Joint Warfighter Support Block 2004	0	0	24	13	0	0	0	0	37
Test & Evaluation Block 2004	47	57	37	33	0	0	0	0	174
Targets & CM Block 2004	75	104	197	170	0	0	0	0	547
THAAD Block 2004	808	888	622	635	85	0	0	0	3018
GMD Test Bed Block 2004	636	452	1205	888	0	0	0	0	3161
Aegis BMD Test Bed. Block 2004	413	440	648	894	98	0	0	0	2492
ABL Block 2004	454	348	345	150	0	0	0	0	1296
TOTALS	2454	2369	3212	2868	163	0	0	0	11065

*Numbers may not add exactly due to rounding.

Boost Elements. We are developing directed energy and kinetic energy boost phase intercept capabilities to create a defense layer near the hostile missile's launch point. We require quick reaction times, high confidence decision-making, and redundant engagement capabilities to counter ballistic missiles in this phase.

ABL is currently under development to acquire, track, and kill ballistic missiles in boost phase using speed-of-light technology. ABL integrates three major subsystems (Laser; Beam Control; and Battle Management, Command, Control, Communications, Computers and Intelligence (BM/C⁴I)) into a modified commercial Boeing 747-400F aircraft. We will continue major subsystem integration and testing activities. Block 2004 activities involve completion of ground-testing, to include first light on the test bed aircraft, first flight of the complete weapons system, and the successful track and high-energy laser engagement of a missile-shaped target board dropped from high-altitude. In FY 2005, we will deliver one aircraft for BMD system integration and testing and demonstrate a missile shoot-down against a boosting threat-representative target.

Midcourse Elements. Midcourse defense elements engage ballistic missiles in space after booster burnout and before the warhead re-enters the atmosphere. The GMD element defends against long-range ballistic missile attacks, and Aegis BMD will counter from the sea medium- and short-range ballistic missiles.

The Department's plans are to add by the end of FY 2004 one more Ground-Based Interceptor (GBI) at Fort Greely in Alaska for a total of six GBIs at that site, and four interceptors at Vandenberg, Air Force Base, for a total of up to 10 interceptors at both sites. The decision to develop two interceptor sites is consistent with our layered approach and operational concept and will allow us to work through critical integration, battle management, and command and control issues early on.

There are a number of other activities we need to undertake in FY 2005. We are asking for appropriations to produce up to ten additional GBIs for fielding at the Fort

Greely site, for a total of sixteen interceptors in Alaska and four in California. We also plan to produce by the end of 2005 between ten and twenty SM-3 missiles for deployment on three Aegis ships converted to the missile defense mission. Because we are starting from a base of zero, each interceptor we field between now and 2005, up to the full complement of twenty ground-based and twenty sea-based interceptors, will increase significantly our overall capability to defend this country, our troops, and friendly countries against long- and medium-range threats.

Included in the Test Bed and as part of the initial missile defense architecture are plans for integrating Early Warning Radars (EWR) at Eareckson AS (the Cobra Dane radar at Shemya, Alaska) and Beale AFB (Upgraded EWR). We will add to this infrastructure multiple fire control nodes and improved lines of communications connecting sites in Alaska and the continental United States using fiber optics and satellites. As you know, the Administration is working to secure allied approval to upgrade and integrate into the BMD system early warning radars currently located in the United Kingdom and Thule, Greenland to view threat missiles launched out of the Middle East. The United Kingdom already has approved the use of the Fylingdales radar. We also plan to build by September 30, 2005 a Sea-Based X-Band Radar (SBX) to improve the testing regime and enhance initial missile defense system performance.

We have made dramatic progress in recent months with the GMD element, including in the areas of silo construction, development of a nationwide communications network, and integrated flight-testing. We have excavated six silos at Fort Greely, seven

weeks ahead of schedule, and we are in the process of constructing and establishing appropriate security for multiple Test Bed facilities at Fort Greely and Eareckson.

By the end of 2005, we will upgrade SPY-1 radars on fifteen Aegis warships for enhanced surveillance and track capability. Three prototype surveillance and track Aegis destroyers will be available starting in 2003; we will modernize additional destroyers for surveillance and track and BMD engagement capability. Two Aegis cruisers in addition to the USS LAKE ERIE, our test cruiser, will receive BMD engagement modifications.

The next SM-3 flight test, scheduled for later this year, will use a reengineered Monolithic Divert and Attitude Control System (MDACS) for the first time in the interceptor's kinetic warhead. MDACS has proved to be more reliable than the previous model, faster to build, and less expensive. Five at-sea flight tests and numerous tracking exercises, including participation in GMD integrated flight-tests, are planned through 2005. Our cooperative research with Japan will continue to enhance the capabilities of the SM-3 interceptor. The focus of that research is on four components: sensor, advanced kinetic warhead, second stage propulsion, and lightweight nosecone.

Terminal Elements. THAAD is designed to be rapidly deployable and protect forward-deployed U.S. and friendly troops, broadly dispersed assets, population centers, and sites in the United States by engaging short- to medium-range ballistic missiles or their payloads at endo- and exo-atmospheric altitudes. THAAD could have more than one intercept opportunity against a target, a layering potential that makes it more difficult for an adversary to employ countermeasures effectively. This terminal defense capability will help mitigate the effects of a WMD payload.

This year we will complete missile and launcher designs, initiate manufacturing of missile and launcher ground test units, and begin testing the first completed radar antenna. We will continue fabrication of the second radar and building the battle manager and launcher test beds. A total of four exo-atmospheric flight tests at the White Sands Missile Range, New Mexico are planned for FY 2004-05.

PAC-3 provides terminal missile defense capability against short- and medium-range ballistic missiles, anti-radiation missiles, and aircraft with a low radar cross-section employing advanced countermeasures. PAC-3 successfully completed initial operational testing last year, intercepting ballistic missiles, aircraft, and cruise missiles. The tests uncovered problems that we have since corrected in collaboration with the Army. We have completed development of the PAC-3 missile and made C2BM modifications to enable PAC-3's integration into the BMD system. We will continue to conduct PAC-3 tests this year. Later in Block 2004 we will demonstrate PAC-3's integration with other BMD system elements.

With the support of Congress, the Department already has accelerated PAC-3 missile production and currently has a plan to increase that production rate to 20 missiles per month in 2005. Given current production plans, by the end of 2005 the PAC-3 inventory will stand at 332 missiles.

The Department has transferred PAC-3 procurement and RDT&E funding to the Army, which is reflected in the Army's FY 2004 budget request. The MDA will retain responsibility for defining and testing BMD system interoperability and continue to work with the Army on PAC-3 engineering, development, and testing. The Department

realigned the Medium Extended Air Defense System (MEADS) program on March 31, 2003 to the Army.

The Arrow Weapon System, developed jointly by the United States and Israel to counter short- to medium-range ballistic missiles, is operational at two sites in Israel and interoperable with U.S. missile defense elements. We worked with Israel to deploy its first two Arrow batteries, and are currently assisting that country to procure a third battery.

The Arrow System Improvement Program, a spiral development upgrade of the current operational system, includes technical cooperation to improve the performance of the Arrow system and test it at a U.S. test range. The first flight test was conducted successfully on January 5, 2003. We continue to support additional Arrow flight-testing to assess technology developments and overall system performance and to collect data and conduct annual hardware-in-the-loop exercises with Israel to enhance interoperability.

Block 2006

Block 2006 work continues to improve existing capabilities and provide new sensors and interceptors for integration with fielded elements. Our focus will be on evolving and integrating the capability to achieve a more synergistic and layered BMD system. We will continue rigorous system and element flight-test demonstration and validation efforts and use wargames to help develop concepts of operation and operational procedures.

We are requesting \$2.2 billion in FY 2004 to support RDT&E for Block 2006.

Our estimated expenditure for Block 2006 activities across the FYDP is \$11.3 billion (see Table 2).

Table 2: Block 2006 Funding FY02-09 (\$M Then-year)*

Program	FY02	FY03	FY04	FY05	FY06	FY07	FY08	FY09	FY02-09	TOTALS FY02-09
C2BMC Block 2006	4	27	53	104	116	0	0	0	273	304
Hercules Block 2006	0	0	19	18	45	45	0	0	127	127
Joint Warfighter Support Block 2006	0	0	0	12	24	12	0	0	48	48
Test & Evaluation Block 2006	1	1	2	9	41	39	0	0	92	93
Targets & CM Block 2006	1	4	32	110	213	172	0	0	526	530
THAAD Block 2006	0	0	109	208	598	498	113	0	1525	1525
GMD Block 2006	2460	2109	1605	1774	1354	1235	0	0	5969	10538
Aegis BMD Block 2006	0	0	24	73	377	299	0	0	773	773
ABL Block 2006	0	0	10	86	150	79	81	55	461	461
BMDS Radars Block 2006	0	0	101	145	134	0	0	0	380	380
STSS Block 2006	55	232	276	285	285	204	75	35	1160	1447
TOTAL	2520	2372	2232	2823	3335	2583	270	90	11333	16225

*Numbers may not add exactly due to rounding

Boost Elements. We will enhance and test the integration of the ABL aircraft into the BMD system. Candidate enhancements include improvements in BMC4I, interoperability, pointing and tracking, and target engagement. We will continue evaluation of the ABL test aircraft capability against a range of threats. This aircraft will be available to provide an emergency operational capability except for a maximum of six months during FY 2007 when it may undergo modifications and enhancements.

Midcourse Elements. We plan to enhance defensive capability and further develop the Test Bed by maturing hardware and software of all GMD interceptor, sensor, and C2BM components. We will continue our ground- and flight-testing to demonstrate improved weapon and discrimination performance and critical interfaces with external

sensors. We also plan to complete the upgrade of the Thule EWR should we get approval from Denmark.

Aegis BMD flight missions will incorporate remote engagements of targets as well as demonstrations against intermediate-range ballistic missile (IRBM) targets. We will continue development of Aegis BMD sensor discrimination capability. Prototype BMD signal processors will be tested aboard Aegis ships with SPY-1 radar modifications. SM-3 missile deliveries will begin in 2004. Our plans are to build an inventory of up to thirty-five SM-3 interceptors by the end of 2006. Also, if directed, we would prepare to field up to twenty additional SM-3 interceptors in 2007. We will proceed with our cooperative BMD research with Japan to enhance the SM-3. We have two joint flight tests of the advanced nosecone planned in the FY 2005-2006 timeframe, and we will continue to look at possibilities for co-development.

Terminal Elements. The THAAD interceptor begins in the third quarter FY 2006 a series of five flight tests that are scheduled to conclude in first quarter FY 2008. We will improve THAAD's exo-atmospheric and endo-atmospheric endgame discrimination capability against increasingly complex targets.

Sensors. Current plans call for a new forward-based radar in late 2006 for positioning close to the threat at sea or on land. Enhanced forward-based sensor capabilities and improved sensor netting will enable the BMD system to handle threats posing a more difficult discrimination challenge and provide a launch-on-remote capability. A midcourse radar will be added as part of our layered approach. Additional radar configurations will be procured as necessary to satisfy Block 2006 objectives.

Current plans are to launch two low-earth orbit satellites in FY 2007 to validate space-based sensor concepts for target acquisition, tracking, and discrimination and to provide a space node for the Test Bed. STSS will improve in subsequent blocks to provide data fusion, radar/sensor cueing over-the-horizon, and interceptor handover and fire control. Production alternatives will be evaluated at least annually based upon element performance and integrated BMD system performance.

Block 2008

Block 2008 represents a major step in BMD system evolution. We plan to complete multiple layers of weapons and sensors, based on fixed and mobile platforms, to counter a range of ballistic missiles. This block will include C2BM components that enable integrated control of all system assets throughout the battlespace. Primary development projects include adding boost phase weapons to the Test Bed, integrating space sensor platforms, and fusing multi-sensor discrimination products. We will integrate capability-based targets and payload suites (to include new and more complex countermeasures) into our system testing to demonstrate effectiveness against evolving threats.

We are requesting \$572 million in FY 2004 to support RDT&E for Block 2008. Our estimated expenditure for Block 2008 activities across the FYDP is \$16.3 billion (see Table 3).

Table 3: Block 2008 Funding FY02-09 (\$M Then-year)*

Project	FY02	FY03	FY04	FY05	FY06	FY07	FY08	FY09	FY02-09	TOTALS FY02-09
C2BMC Block 2008	0	0	1	12	27	144	145	147	476	476
Hercules Block 2008	0	0	19	17	17	17	62	60	192	192
Joint Warfighter Support Block 2008	0	0	0	0	0	12	29	31	71	71
Test & Evaluation Block 2008	0	0	1	1	4	13	85	87	190	190
Targets & CM Block 2008	0	0	0	57	77	68	239	253	694	694
THAAD Block 2008	0	0	0	0	237	227	369	300	1134	1134
GMD Block 2008	0	0	0	0	0	0	878	877	1756	1756
AEGIS BMD Block 2008	0	0	0	116	186	322	470	396	1481	1481
ABL Block 2008	11	237	256	402	582	561	366	267	2435	2603
BMDS Radars Block 2008	0	0	0	0	0	136	102	22	261	261
STSS Bk 2008	0	0	0	0	0	82	177	89	348	348
BMDS Interceptor Block 2008	54	100	296	529	1013	1562	1939	1890	7229	7383
TOTAL	65	337	572	1134	2145	3146	4862	4409	16269	16669

*Numbers may not add exactly due to rounding

Boost Elements. ABL will integrate new technologies to improve performance and lethality and enhance operational suitability. We will continue development of promising technologies for insertion into Block 2008 and beyond and design and develop a system-level ground-test facility for ABL. We plan to test a second ABL aircraft in the Test Bed during Block 2008.

Plans also are to develop and integrate a mobile ground-based boost phase hit-to-kill capability into the Test Bed for flight-test demonstration. We will initiate a space-based test bed development to determine the feasibility of intercepting missiles from space. Initial on-orbit testing would commence with three to five satellites in Block 2008.

Midcourse Elements. We will conduct up to three GMD flight-tests annually to demonstrate advanced engineering and pre-planned equipment improvements for the boosters, interceptors, early warning and fire control radars, and C2BM and communications software builds. We plan to enhance the Aegis Weapons System

AN/SPY-1 radar to improve discrimination for engaging both unitary and separating targets. We will assess GMD integration with the BMDS Interceptor and also test the interceptor on board an Aegis warship.

Terminal Elements. We will complete the development and testing of the THAAD weapon system. We are planning up to eight developmental and operational-type flight tests to stress interceptor, radar, and C2BM performance in realistic scenarios that include advanced countermeasures.

Sensors. Our work will build on the initial BMDS Radar configuration and conduct sensor research to improve capabilities and develop advanced algorithms. We will improve Family of Radar coverage, performance, and flexibility and address vulnerability within the context of the overall BMD system global sensor network. STSS operations will continue to be integrated with other BMD elements in the Test Bed and support enhanced C2BM development initiatives. STSS will demonstrate the ability to acquire, track, and discriminate midcourse objects with space-based infrared sensors.

Block 2010

Work in this block will continue spiral development projects for weapon and sensor improvements and platform integration. C2BM and communications improvements will enable highly resolved sensor data to be exchanged with all BMD system elements.

We are requesting \$24 million in FY 2004 to support RDT&E for Block 2010.

Our estimated expenditure for Block 2010 activities across the FYDP is \$4.7 billion (see Table 4).

Table 4: Block 2010 Funding FY02-09 (\$M Then-year)*

	FY02	FY03	FY04	FY05	FY06	FY07	FY08	FY09	FY10-09	TOTALS FY02-09
AEGIS BMD Block 2010	0	0	0	0	0	8	104	145	257	257
STSS Block 2010/2012	179	55	24	44	232	565	750	1065	2680	2914
BMDS Interceptor Block 2010	0	0	0	0	97	146	585	974	1803	1803
TOTAL	179	55	24	44	329	719	1439	2184	4740	4974

*Numbers may not add exactly due to rounding.

Boost Elements. Block 2010 activities will improve exo-atmospheric BMDS Interceptor performance and enable greater basing mode flexibility, to include possible adaptation to sea-based platforms. We will develop and test an advanced space-based test bed to augment or replace the Block 2008 space-based test bed.

Midcourse Elements. We will continue flight-testing improved weapon and sensor components and work toward the integration of an advanced BMDS Interceptor. Aegis BMD will incorporate prior block developments into the Navy-developed next-generation, open architecture Combat System.

Terminal Elements. THAAD will integrate proven technologies to enhance its capability against longer range and faster ballistic missiles without sacrificing existing mobility and performance. Fielding and survivability upgrades also are planned to demonstrate a capability against both IRBM and ICBM threats.

Sensors. New technologies will be inserted into subsequent STSS blocks to provide precise threat tracking and improved discrimination. We will develop and launch

a satellite with improved sensors integrated into the first common satellite bus, and develop and integrate advanced ground station equipment and software. The Block 2010 STSS will deliver a space-based capability to acquire, track and discriminate ballistic missiles based on larger aperture track sensors, increased vehicle lifetime, and increased, near-real-time on-board data processing. The funding also includes launch services for Block 2010 satellites. C2BM funding focuses on integrating STSS data into the sensor net.

Mission Area Investments

Our Mission Area Investments are investments common to the entire BMD system that enable us to implement over time our block fielding approach. Mission Area Investments maintain core development and testing infrastructure and facilitate the integration of future block capabilities. The President's Budget requests \$1.69 billion in FY 2004 for these investments. This program activity accounts for about \$11.3 billion, or just over 20% of the total funding estimate across the FYDP. Table 5 provides a detailed breakdown of funding for each investment activity.

Table 5: Mission Area Investments Funding FY02-09 (\$M Then-year)*

										TOTALS FY02-09
System Engineering	236	397	436	474	501	510	580	578	3079	3713
C2, BM & Communications	16	16	119	125	178	201	204	218	1045	1076
Test & Targets	359	332	338	332	328	352	316	333	1998	2688
International Programs	211	205	148	215	129	100	89	89	769	1185
Advanced Concepts	347	176	388	418	363	437	524	534	2664	3187
Program Operations	232	170	264	252	283	306	317	333	1754	2156
TOTAL	1400	1296	1692	1817	1783	1904	2029	2083	11309	14005

*Numbers may not add exactly due to rounding

The significant Mission Area Investments are as follows:

System Engineering

The System Engineering activity defines, manages, and integrates the layered BMD system. Capability-based acquisition requires continual assessment of technical and operational alternatives at the component, element, and system levels. Our system engineering process assesses and determines system design and element contributions and the impact of introducing new technologies and operational concepts to ensure properly synthesized system blocks. These activities provide the technical expertise, tools, and facilities to develop the BMD system and maintain an intelligence and research capability to ensure that the system evolves in a way that is responsive to known and anticipated threats.

We are increasing our focus on risks related to producibility, manufacturing, quality, cost, and schedule of the BMD system elements. We dedicate resources to examine the applicability of technology to system needs and transition readiness. Industrial and manufacturing investment strategies for achieving system affordability and facilitating insertion of successive new capabilities are increasingly vital to the program.

Command and Control, Battle Management & Communications (C2BMC)

Our activities related to C2BMC create interoperability among a wide variety of legacy systems and emerging elements over joint and coalition networks. The C2BMC activity will continue development and integration of the C2BM and communications functions for the BMD system. By fielding software development spirals that improve

system synergism, integration capability, and interoperability with external systems, this activity expands the inherent C2BM capabilities of fielded terminal, midcourse, and boost defenses. Communications funding will develop and improve BMD system-wide communication links and sensor netting functions to enable enhanced early warning and quicker interceptor response times. The Joint National Integration Center (JNIC) provides a common environment for the BMD elements to conduct experiments, demonstrations, and exercises and is a key-operating C2BM component of the Test Bed.

BMD Tests & Targets

The missile defense program includes significant test and evaluation infrastructure, test execution capabilities, and analytical tools for program-wide use. The Agency conducts risk reduction, developmental, and operational element and component testing as well as tests to collect critical measurements, such as plume signatures. We also have a rigorous measurements test program to collect data in support of design, development, and engineering activities. Measurements from dedicated test events and targets of opportunity enable us to design components, characterize potential countermeasures, test algorithms, undertake lethality and kill assessment, and validate our critical models and simulations.

Investments providing ballistic missile targets, countermeasures, and other payloads support our test objectives. Presentation of the targets and payloads for flight test events involves designing, prototyping, developing, procuring, certifying, and

qualifying for testing. In FY 2003 we will establish a single prime contractor to further enhance system level management of targets and countermeasures activities.

In FY 2004 we will continue to resource critical test facilities, launch capabilities, instrumentation, telemetry, communications, and safety systems underpinning our testing regime. With the enhanced realism of the Test Bed, the increasing complexity of our tests, and the escalating tempo of test activity, our investments in this area will emphasize flexibility, standardization, and mobility.

International Programs

The President has underscored the importance of working with other countries to develop missile defenses and provide protection against ballistic missile threats. We are building defensive layers that could potentially involve a variety of locations around the globe and probably involve many other countries. Last summer interagency teams briefed key allies on the international participation framework. Today we are well along in our discussions with several governments regarding their possible participation in the missile defense program and improvements in our industrial relationships.

Advanced Concepts

We have several Science and Technology (S&T) initiatives to increase BMD system firepower and sensor capability and extend the engagement battle space of terminal elements. In FY 2004, we will continue to focus on the Miniature Kill Vehicle (MKV) project, which could lead to a flight-test in FY 2005. FY 2004 funding will support investigating Early Detection and Tracking (ELDT) technology, Laser/LADAR

technologies for improved tracking, weapon guidance, and imaging, and technologies for a space-based, high-power laser. While our S&T activities are not on a critical path for insertion into the BMD system, each one of them is being considered for their block enhancement value.

Program Operations

Our Program Operations expenses are primarily for government personnel performing management support activities, contractors that assist in performing these activities, and O&M-like costs associated with operations and maintenance at numerous facilities around the country, supplies and equipment, communications and printing, travel and training, and information technology management.

Management and Oversight

The missile defense program uses an acquisition approach tailored to the unprecedented nature of the technology involved in missile defense. We will continue to work very hard to ensure that the program has adequate management and congressional oversight. There is an improved process in place within the Department that preserves management, technical, and financial oversight by cognizant authorities on the Senior Executive Council and the Missile Defense Support Group. Senior warfighters, including the Joint Requirements Oversight Council, have reviewed missile defense objectives and will continue to do so several times a year. Internally we have in place configuration management procedures, and we produce on a regular basis the necessary threat, system, and configuration control documentation to ensure that our activities continue to support

our development and fielding objectives. As directed in the 2002 and 2003 Defense Authorization Acts, we have identified cost, schedule, testing, and performance goals and developmental baselines in the President's FY 2004 Budget justification materials and shown clear linkages between the Agency's budget and key performance measures.

Closing

Mr. Chairman, we are on track with our missile defense program. We know that the technology fundamental to the current generation of missile defenses works. We have demonstrated many times over the past two years that we can collide with a warhead and destroy it. We have the confidence to proceed with plans for an initial defense capability. A few years ago, I could not have said this to the American people. Today I can. We will build confidence in the system over time as we invest in the program.

We also recognize that we have much more work to do to improve the BMD system. The architecture we have in 2004 and 2005 will probably be very different a decade later, depending on how our RDT&E efforts proceed. Our objective continues to be one of improving missile defense capability over time. We have made considerable progress in missile defense over the past three years. With the President's direction, and with your approval of our budget request, we will take another important step on that long road before us.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

MISSILE DEFENSE THREATS AND CAPABILITIES

Mr. LEWIS. Thank you very much, General Kadish. I might mention that our staff has done some very fine work at developing a variety of mix of questions. We will not be able to get to all of them in this session, I am sure, but we would appreciate your reviewing and submitting for the record responses that we don't deal with otherwise.

In the meantime, taking a pathway that is not a part of our script, let me start by asking you to describe the "why." That is, we are talking about multiple billions of dollars over time to build a missile defense system. As you describe the why, would you give the Committee your guesstimate of where the threat, the threats, may lie and describe those threats and capability a bit? In terms of our defense system's eventual deployment, we are talking about deployment on our part from Alaska, Vandenberg, Aegis cruise missile. If you would kind of mix that in in terms of as you respond to why and then why those locations. Other than that—

General KADISH. That is a tall order, Mr. Chairman, but let me try to lay this out. When we looked at the program in the absence of the ABM Treaty, the why of the way we wanted to build a system became very clear. Without the treaty, we have much more flexibility to address the threat that would come at us and not just attack it in one specific regime of flight. When we looked at this as a mission to attack all ranges of missiles in all phases of flight, our response to that was to build a layered missile defense system that would attack a missile shot at us in the boost phase, possibly many times in the boost phase, in the midcourse phase, possibly many times in the midcourse phase, and eventually in the terminal phase. So that you get very high probabilities of successfully defending against these very difficult targets in a layered defense system.

That is actually no different than what we have done in other air defense type systems. When you look at all ranges of threats, the short range threat that we saw in Iraq is proliferated tremendously. There are great numbers out there. But the short range threat, even though it is proliferated, can be handled by some of our systems like Patriot and the systems that we are building in our R&D program. The threat that we face against long range missiles, however, is more problematic. We don't see a lot of the long range missile threat demonstrated today but we certainly see intelligence that indicates that this threat is developing.

One of the benefits of having a deployed capability as rudimentary as it might seem that we are proposing in this budget is to act as a deterrent to building and cheapen the investment that potential adversaries might have by building longer range missiles with weapons of mass destruction. So there is a significant, in my opinion, deterrent value in having an operational system of this nature, limited as it might be against longer range missiles.

So when you look at the threat and what we were asked to do, the budget submission that we have proceeds against a broad range of technologies and activities to take our testing and test beds, provide initial capability against short, medium and long range missiles and build on that over time by adding the develop-

ment capability of airborne laser, for instance, THAAD program, and fill in the layers of that layered system over time.

That is kind of it in a nutshell, if that helps with the question that you asked. The layered defense is the why. The technologies that we are working on and the budget submitted supports efforts in each one of those regimes of flight. And the early deployment is a capability of defense against a potential long range threat from countries like North Korea, Iran, I don't think we have to worry about Iraq anymore; Libya and those types of threats. Not the Russian threat as we know it today. And then these limited quantities could be adjusted based on what we see the perception of the threat over time as the technologies mature.

Mr. LEWIS. Mr. Murtha.

NORTH KOREAN THREAT

Mr. MURTHA. When you say threat, you are talking about capability?

General KADISH. That is correct. ———.

Mr. MURTHA. And you have a very narrow pathway to the United States from Korea. In other words, short-term Korea could have the capability if the CIA is accurate, and you will have a layered defense at what time frame against that?

General KADISH. We are trying to have an initial capability in the late 2004 calendar year, 2005 time period against long range missiles in the midcourse, against medium range missiles in the midcourse with Aegis cruisers and against short range missiles by using Patriot 3. What we would like to do is fill in a boost phase capability as soon as we can in that mix by the end of the decade.

Mr. MURTHA. You assume they are firing from Korea?

General KADISH. ———.

Mr. MURTHA. What is your best estimate of the range of their capability now, the North Korea capability?

General KADISH. ———.

THEATER HIGH ALTITUDE AREA DEFENSE (THAAD)

Mr. MURTHA. Ten years ago, Secretary Perry thought that the greatest crisis during his tenure was the North Korean buildup and the tension between South and North Korea after the one election. We started to push that. Of course we pushed it to failure, is what it amounted to. Where is THAAD now?

General KADISH. The THAAD program in particular?

Mr. MURTHA. Yes.

General KADISH. The THAAD program we put back into redesign after we did the final two tests, which were successful. Right now we are going to resume flight testing of that system in the late 2004 time frame. The program that we put together to do that redesign is ahead of schedule and under cost. We are doing all the ground testing that our critics pointed out that we didn't do the first time around. We have been fixing the failures we have been having in the ground tests. Actually I am very confident that when we do fly that, the THAAD missile, our first flight test will be very high probability of success for what we are doing right now.

Mr. MURTHA. That will be the first line of defense at that point?

General KADISH. It will be added to the layering of the defense, because THAAD will work in concert with Patriot as higher up in the altitude in the terminal defense, and then if we have Aegis Standard Missile 3, it will carry the flight and the trajectory to the ascent phase in the midcourse and to even the descent phase in the midcourse and then as we add the airborne laser if we can do that toward the end of the decade, we will have a boost phase capability. So it is a key element in the layering of our defenses.

Mr. MURTHA. Where do you deploy it? You have got the Patriots. If you deploy them in Korea, where do you deploy the THAAD? Also in Korea?

General KADISH. It is land based so we would lay it down in Korea, South Korea potentially; Japan. Without the treaty now we can actually hook the radars into the system to aid the Aegis, the Standard Missile 3 activity, and that is what we have undergoing with our national team engineering activity is to make sure that we can go beyond interoperability and actually make this an integrated layered defense. So that the THAAD radar can actually be a fire control mechanism for Aegis standard missiles and that Aegis radars can help us with early warning Patriot 3. And in fact in the Gulf War, the most recent PAC-3 performance, Patriot performance actually had the USS Higgins providing early warning cues to the radars and helping in the defense. So we already have some experience with this. It is a key element of the program now without the treaty preventing us from doing this to have the integration of this system to make it layered like I discussed.

DEFENSE AGAINST OFFSHORE THREATS

Mr. MURTHA. What is the defense against shipping a nuclear device or, say, a device hooked to a Scud missile closer to the shore? Do we have any defense against that at all?

General KADISH. ———.

Mr. MURTHA. I am impressed the way you are doing things, very reasonable, down the line. You are solving the problems with research before you get into the operational side of it. I appreciate your testimony.

General KADISH. Thank you, Mr. Murtha.

Mr. LEWIS. Thank you, Mr. Murtha.

Mr. Bonilla.

MISSILE DEFENSE THREATS

Mr. BONILLA. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. General, at what point does it become advantageous for the public to know about threats like the one you are talking about in North Korea? Because a lot of times we have to go out, and I am completely supportive as I know members of this Committee are of what you are doing for missile defense in general, but as you know, there are a lot of crackpots out there that are always trying to take a shot at the military and they say, oh, there is no threat and this is a big boondoggle. I think something like this is important for the general public to see so they can—when you start telling them that this is a real solid threat and we have got intelligence that shows that, I am sure that especially in light of what we have been dealing with lately in the Mideast that they would see this as a real threat.

General KADISH. Yes, sir. That is an interesting problem. The poll data I have seen, and I don't study this, so this is kind of something I have to go research to back up, but the last poll data I saw, that 70 to 80 percent of the American people believe we already have a missile defense. So it is very difficult to articulate this. However, from a threat perspective, I would commend to you that the national intelligence estimate has an unclassified section to it that describes this threat in some detail. To the degree that people pay attention to that, I think the threat would become very real if people paid attention to that document, for instance. I could pass it on to you if you would like or actually provide it for the record. But there is both a classified and an unclassified section of that. What I have said here in the classified mode could be articulated in an unclassified way in that national intelligence estimate.

Mr. BONILLA. Before you made the comment, you wanted to make sure appropriately that this was a classified briefing.

General KADISH. Right. Because I wanted—some of the details that support how we got to that conclusion, ——— but the fact that they have the capability is in the unclassified national intelligence estimate.

Mr. BONILLA. Because capability is one thing but the real development is one step further that I think people need to know about.

General KADISH. ———.

AIRBORNE LASER PROGRAM

Mr. BONILLA. Let me just ask a question, I was looking through some of the notes here. On the ABL program, the Airborne Laser Program, we are supposed to have a test on that in 2005. Yet I understand you are asking for less money in the 2004 budget. Can you explain the dollar side of that? Also, I don't know a lot about that program but it sounds like a fascinating program to use a 747, to use this laser technology to shoot down missiles. If you would explain that and also the strategy on the dollars.

General KADISH. The Airborne Laser Program is what I would call revolutionary technology. Certainly hit-to-kill in the kinetic energy field is revolutionary as well. But we have never been able to make a high energy laser work in a defensive mode to the degree that we are attempting in the airborne laser. So what we have is a 747 that is going to essentially carry in the back of it a chemical plant. That chemical plant generates photons that are focused by some very exotic mirrors that shoot the laser power out the nose of the aircraft in a turret. One of the problems we are trying to overcome with that weapons system is the timelines associated with trying to kill something in the boost phase. If we could do it with the speed of light, we get more time to shoot down a boosting rocket. If you try to shoot a rocket at another rocket, you can imagine the different geometries that you have and the difficulty of the time-distance problem. So high energy laser can really help us in this area.

In the Airborne Laser Program, we have been working on this, I could calculate, almost 35 years depending on where you want to start. But we are at a point with the airborne laser where we have 18 percent of the program left to go. It is the hardest 18 percent when you hook all the material up, put that chemical plant in the

back of an airplane and then hook all the lenses up to make sure that the beam goes in the right direction and the battle management to make sure you are shooting at the right things.

All that is happening at Edwards Air Force base today. That is where we are actually assembling this equipment. So the hardware has been built, it has been put at the place where we are going to assemble it, and it is in the process of being assembled on the ground today before we put it on the airplane. And we are going to test what we call first light where you get the photons out of the modules hopefully this summer. When we do that, this is such a new technology that we run into problems all the time and we take two steps forward and one step back, maybe sometimes three steps back. So we are managing the schedule very carefully.

When we come to the budget for that, we are at a stage where a lot of the development activity is behind us, so we have spent about 80 percent of our money already. And the budget request, even though it is reduced from last year, reflects the fact that a lot of that activity has been done, the equipment is at Edwards and now we are paying for the actual integration of the equipment, and we have enough dollars to do it. On the difficult side, and I know this is a long answer, but it is very important, is that we are projecting about a 30 percent overrun on the contract to do this. So we believe we have enough budget, especially if we have the appropriation levels that we are asking for in 2004, but we are overrunning our original estimate for the contracts. Some are in the neighborhood of 20 to 30 percent at this point in time.

As a reference point, I am not proud of it in terms of missile defense, but in the Patriot-3 development, depending on how you calculate it, we are somewhere overrunning the development of about 30 to 50 percent, depending on when you start tracking the overall effort. It is about 30 percent overrun on the contract with Lockheed. So it is not out of bounds with some of the other difficult technologies that we have, but we are watching this very close in. Over the next 18 months to two years, it is really crunch time for the ABL program. We are either going to make it or we are going to have a difficult time.

Mr. BONILLA. It is an incredible project, General. My time is up but I appreciate you being here and thank you for your testimony.

Mr. LEWIS. Mr. Dicks.

TESTING STRATEGY

Mr. DICKS. General, I have read your testimony and I understand you are trying to go forward with this system. What worries me is that according to my reading of things, we are going to be doing about half the testing which had been previously scheduled for last year. And also I noted that you are asking for legislation in the budget request which deems the ballistic missile defense system to have reached the system development and demonstration phase. Is this provision in effect a waiver of normal testing requirements as has been widely reported? In other words, we got SBIRS in trouble, we are cutting back on the testing half by 50 percent, we are going to spend a billion dollars more on testing. I know this is difficult, but should we be concerned here that this program is in serious trouble?

General KADISH. I don't believe so, Mr. Dicks. Let me address two—there are two excellent points, because there has been a lot of confusion on this issue. Let me take this idea of waiver of normal testing. We have asked for no such waiver. The interpretation of the language to include that I think has been made very clear by Secretary Aldridge that operational testers are intimately involved with what we are doing with the whole program and specifically the ground based portion. I think if Mr. Christy, the Operational Test Director at DoD, if he was with me today, would testify to that effect as well.

Mr. DICKS. But hasn't the testing been cut in half from what you proposed last year?

General KADISH. We are actually doing seven ground-based missile defense flight tests in fiscal year 2003 and are proposing four flight tests in 2004. What results as that perception is that those are not all intercept flight tests. For instance, this year we need to prove that we have a booster that is operationally useful to us and we have two different alternatives to make that booster work. And all those flight tests are going to be done this year. They are not intercept tests, however.

So the perception—we have not scheduled intercept tests that we originally provided for two reasons. One was we needed to do the tests on the booster this year and next, and the second reason is that when I looked at the flight test profiles of those tests and the costs of those tests, we were going to repeat something we already knew in the objectives of the test. We were going to use the same trajectory out of Vandenberg into Kwajalein. It would be a better use of the taxpayers' money in my opinion to do those tests when we actually have the operational system hooked up so we can launch out of operational silos at more operationally realistic tests or targets.

Mr. DICKS. Are you going to test out of Fort Greely?

General KADISH. Right now the environmental process is not to the point where I could say yes, but the intention that I have and the approach that we are taking is to look very carefully and have a bias toward flying out of operational silos that are in Fort Greely. But we will also have operational silos at Vandenberg. They will be on alert and provide us the data we need from an operationally useful test. I would expect that we will adjust the flight test program in missile defense every time you see the budget, but it will always be with a bias toward doing as much realistic testing, as much as we can and as much as we can afford over time.

Mr. DICKS. Any multiple warhead tests right now?

General KADISH. Against multiple warheads? MIRVed warheads?

Mr. DICKS. Yes.

General KADISH. ———.

PATRIOT MISSILE PERFORMANCE IN IRAQ

Mr. DICKS. What happened with the Patriots in Operation Iraqi Freedom? We had three or four incidents where they shot down airplanes, one British and a couple of our own. Can you explain what happened with that?

General KADISH. I would at a classified level. The first thing you have to understand about Patriot is that it is a mix of older mis-

siles with the Patriot 3, which is designed primarily for killing ballistic missiles, short range ballistic missiles. It is an upgrade to Patriot. The Patriot system that we have other than PAC-3 is capable of shooting down short range missiles with blast fragmentation capability. But the whole system called Patriot is an air defense system that we have added a ballistic missile capability to with Patriot 3. So its predominant use is for air defense.

When I say air defense, really to oversimplify it is it shoots at things that fly horizontally, cruise missiles and airplanes, and then we added the Patriot 3 to shoot at things that come in vertically on a ballistic trajectory. The performance in the war from a ballistic missile standpoint was absolutely tremendous. The Patriot 2—as I recall, there were a total of 17 what we call volleys shot at us, missiles shot at us. Nine of those were engageable and what that means, they were headed for a defended asset that Patriot was defending against. The rest of them fell out in the desert or whatever. Of the nine that we engaged, seven of them were by Patriot 2s and two of them were by Patriot 3s. Every single one of those based on the data we have today, because those have no test telemetry like we do in a test—they are enemy missiles—all the data that we have to date says that we rendered them combat ineffective. In other words, they did not reach their target. How we hit them and how we destroyed them is something we are going to investigate for many, many more months, but they didn't hit their target.

The problem we have with the Patriot system as a whole is that it shot down two of our airplanes in the air defense mode. So it did very well in the theater ballistic missile mode. None of those reached the target that was intended, and therefore it was a great success in my view as a system. We have some bugs to work out but we will take care of them. The problem came in the air defense mode. That is a problem that we recognized and I have been working on for some years now, is adding missile defense to air defense is a problem with combat identification, what you are shooting at. The rest of our systems outside of Patriot are only ballistic missile killers, so we won't have this problem with THAAD or a ground based program or something like that.

In the case of the fratricide, there were two instances where we shot down an airplane. One was an RAF Tornado and the other one was a Navy F-18. There was another incidence where an F-16 shot an antiradiation missile at the Patriot system and actually hit our radar but nobody was killed. I can't say much about why that happened, whether that is a system problem of radar not working right or software, or whether it was an operational problem that somebody pushed the wrong switch or misinterpreted something or did something wrong in the way we do air defense. We have an IG investigation by the Army going on. The Brits are investigating. Mr. Aldridge sent out a Defense Science Board group to do an independent technical look at these issues.

The combat identification problem is a serious one and we are going to have to deal with that and the air defense mode of the system very seriously. The tragic loss of those people can never be made up for and we are going to have to learn some very hard lessons as a result of that. It is a difficult thing to say, but the fact

is that the missiles worked pretty good. They were very lethal. On the other hand, should they have been shot and how they were shot is really the issue we have got to address.

Mr. DICKS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

OPERATIONAL TESTING AND COMMITTEE OVERSIGHT

Mr. LEWIS. Thank you very much, Mr. Dicks. Before I call on Mr. Cunningham, let me mention that the early part of Mr. Dicks' questions related to the ongoing concern of this Committee in making sure that we test systems before we throw money. In the meantime it also is a reflection of the fact that there are those in the House who don't really believe in the need for these systems and they are going to be talking about why you are reducing the testing budget, doesn't that indicate that you may be making a big mistake here, et cetera.

I might further say that while the Department does look to flexibility in the way they have funding flows, the Committee continues to emphasize its responsibility for oversight.

Mr. Cunningham.

HIGH ALTITUDE ENGAGEMENTS

Mr. CUNNINGHAM. General, I was fortunate enough to be honored to speak at the Air Force Academy this week to some 6,000 cadets. It was a lot of fun. ———?

General KADISH. Yes, sir. There are only really two systems right now that we are developing that work in the atmosphere. One is the Patriot 3. ———. The THAAD program that I mentioned earlier has a trans-atmosphere capability. So it is at the 100 kilometer type level. ———. I am very confident we know how to handle that in a space environment. The transatmosphere I think is a matter of test program for THAAD. We have laid out a program I think that is pretty good to test those issues.

PARTICLE BEAM WEAPONS

Mr. CUNNINGHAM. The airborne laser I know, like you said, has been in development 25 years. When most of us were just starting the program, we thought, well, we will never have the technology. We thought it is not achievable. At the same time there was a parallel system on particle beam weapons. Sir, is that program totally dead, or is there actually still some research ongoing in particle beam?

General KADISH. We are not doing anything on particle beams at this point in time. I think the technology isn't there enough to even invest in the early stages of it right now. So we are spending a lot of our money in other areas than particle beams.

EFFECT OF ABM TREATY ANNULMENT

Mr. CUNNINGHAM. The last short question for you is this: The ABM treaty hasn't come up, but I know for example that the Navy, with its Aegis cruisers are limited by it. If the treaty continues to limit the speed of the missiles, we will literally have to double the number of Aegis cruisers out there, just to defend our own system, for example, in a Taiwan Scenario. Is there any threat in the fu-

ture that you know of politically, from a foreign policy perspective, where the treaty limits would put a damper on our efforts to defend U.S. forces?

General KADISH. Are you talking about the speed of the threat?

Mr. CUNNINGHAM. Yes. The treaty has been interpreted to limit the speed of our missiles.

General KADISH. Right. And we had this—in the treaty codicils, we had this difference between theater and ICBM type. That no longer exists. We are trying to now exploit that fact from a missile defense standpoint. There were artificial limitations before. They no longer exist. However, we are still living with some of the decisions that were made a number of years ago under that treaty. But we are progressing beyond that.

AIR FORCE CADET

Mr. CUNNINGHAM. This navy pilot would like to take credit for saving one more Air Force Academy cadet. I have carried this coin since 1966. My dad gave it to me as a reminder not to quit before I left for pilot training. He gave it to me as a reminder not to quit, because 70 percent of the pilots going through quit. I had it with me when I met a young woman at the academy. She was ready to quit. She was facing physical and workload challenges, and was considering leaving the Academy. I told her the story about my coin, its meaning and gave one to her. Heather Wilson recently visited the Academy and the Superintendent told her that after I spoke, the senior member of the cadets' class gave this silver dollar to Christine Washington. He asked her not to quit. Her whole class went over there, and the superintendent went over there and spoke to her. She has since said she is not quitting. So we have saved one more Air Force cadet, who I believe will be a credit to the service.

General KADISH. Super.

Mr. LEWIS. Thank you, Duke. Mr. Visclosky.

ARROW MISSILE PROGRAM

Mr. VISCLOSKY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you, General. As far as the Arrow program, how effective do you think it is as far as its mission?

General KADISH. The test data from the Arrow program is really impressive. We are actually bringing the Arrow to shoot in the States against some Scud-like missiles here over the next year, I think it is. The Israelis were confident enough in the system to put the first layered system together for the defense of Israel here during the war. They have about 50 or so Arrows that were on alert, supported by Patriot 2 capability as well as the point defense layer. So when you look at the test data that we have gathered from Arrow as well as the confidence that the Israeli military has as a result of working with it and that data that they have, I think it is a pretty effective system for what their needs are. It is blast fragmentation. Destruction is not hit-to-kill, although the accuracy that I have seen would make it a hit-to-kill.

Mr. VISCLOSKY. What is it for their purposes?

General KADISH. Their national territory is a lot smaller than the United States, for instance.

Mr. LEWIS. Would you yield just for a moment?

Mr. VISCLOSKY. Yes.

Mr. LEWIS. General, on this, I believe what he is really asking is what is their real threat. We have just spent a lot of energy eliminating a lot of their potential threat but we could anticipate someone coming along and saying, hey, our threat really may be Libya so we need more of your money, not less of your money. It is that kind of question, I think.

General KADISH. I am sorry, I misinterpreted.

Mr. LEWIS. I am not sure that was.

Mr. VISCLOSKY. I heard you—I understood you to say that there is a distinction between the Arrow system and Patriot as far as what it is designed to do.

General KADISH. That is right. And the threat could also come from Syria and a whole bunch of the people in that neighborhood, from a short range missile threat. So they are subjected to not intercontinental ballistic missile threats, they are subjected to the shorter range missiles, short and medium range missiles potentially and that is what Arrow is designed to go against in the process.

Mr. VISCLOSKY. And it would have nothing to do with aircraft?

General KADISH. Arrow is not an air defense system, that is correct. It is a missile defense system alone.

ARROW MISSILE TESTING

Mr. VISCLOSKY. In the recent test, was that a live intercept or not?

General KADISH. The recent test of the Arrow?

I have to be careful here. I might get this for the record to be exactly right but the last test I recall the Arrow doing was a multiple launch test for the ground based equipment and was not an intercept test. So what they did was they launched a missile out of the launcher set along with three other dummies to test the fact that they could do multiple launches at the same time which I thought was a great idea. In fact, I am going to copy it in some of our other activities. But it was not an intercept test. The last intercept test they did was very successful.

Mr. VISCLOSKY. Do I hear lack of enthusiasm?

General KADISH. Of enthusiasm for?

Mr. VISCLOSKY. Arrow?

General KADISH. No, sir. It doesn't fit our architecture for our needs, but for what we did for the Israelis and what we learned from them, it was very good. We spent over a billion dollars on that effort.

Mr. VISCLOSKY. Is one of the goals also for interoperability with our systems as well?

General KADISH. That is correct.

Mr. VISCLOSKY. Is that a goal still?

General KADISH. It is a goal. In fact, we did an exercise called Juniper Cobra prior to the war and working with Aegis systems as well as U.S. Patriot systems. It was extremely successful.

FUNDING REQUEST FOR THE ARROW PROGRAM

Mr. VISCLOSKY. Is the program fully funded in the budget request for 2004?

General KADISH. The Arrow program?

Mr. VISCLOSKY. Yes, sir.

General KADISH. Yes, as far as our perspective goes, as far as what we are going to accomplish with that program, there are two parts to it. There is a production part that the U.S. industry is co-producing the missiles, and then there is a continued development part. Both of those, to the best of my knowledge, are funded adequately, from our perspective.

Mr. VISCLOSKY. Adequately is different than fully.

General KADISH. Depends on your definition of full.

Mr. VISCLOSKY. It is fully funded, General?

General KADISH. It is fully funded for your requirements and our agreements with the Israelis.

Mr. VISCLOSKY. Do you think it will be fully funded from my perspective?

General KADISH. I couldn't answer that question, sir.

Mr. VISCLOSKY. You have answered my question.

Thank you, General.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. LEWIS. Thank you, Mr. Visclosky.

Mr. Frelinghuysen.

PAKISTAN, IRAN, AND NORTH KOREA

Mr. FRELINGHUYSEN. Good morning, General. ———?

General KADISH. That is correct.

Mr. FRELINGHUYSEN. So for all of the ridicule of the expression "Axis of Evil" this is news to me. I read the newspapers, and I don't think I have seen that revelation. Why aren't we talking about it?

I think this is an issue that I explored with you when you were here last. I wouldn't call it a failure, but what obligation does the administration have to let us know that something like this is occurring? You are not suggesting that necessarily Iran and the Pakistanis are testing North Korean missiles, but, in fact, they are testing the essential missiles North Korea has at present? Why aren't you talking about it more?

General KADISH. ———. As far as talking about it, I reference the unclassified national intelligence estimate. I believe that a lot of that information is in there.

As to the derivative of some of that, I have to go back and read it, maybe provide it for the record. But I am somewhat at a disadvantage because of the source of the information that I provide is very highly classified, and it is hard to talk about it under those circumstances.

MISSILE DEFENSE IN SOUTH KOREA

Mr. FRELINGHUYSEN. Secondly, when you are talking about deploying missiles in South Korea, there are so many weapons aimed at South Korea now that are non—I assume the major portion of them are artillery guns, but I assume that a lot of them are missiles, that we would have to have one hell of a system, wouldn't

we? They could rain down such havoc just in terms of conventional weapons. What would be the value of having a missile defense—why would we need a system there if in fact they could annihilate millions of people just doing conventional weapons?

General KADISH. Well, there are a couple of reasons for that. First, as I said earlier, we are trying to build a layered missile defense against all ranges of missiles. So, you can postulate very credible scenarios where North Korean conflict would not be confined only to the Korean Peninsula; and the way that they would prosecute that war would be using ballistic missiles with weapons of mass destruction against Japan and other countries in the region, including us. —

Mr. FRELINGHUYSEN. Considering their bizarre and erratic behavior, of all of the nations, this is the nation that would do it?

General KADISH. It disturbs me greatly. I wish we could go faster in the technology for that reason, for a deterrent capability, if nothing else.

Mr. FRELINGHUYSEN. Thank you.

Mr. LEWIS. Thank you.

Mr. Moran.

NORTH KOREAN NUCLEAR WEAPONS CAPABILITY

Mr. MORAN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I was reading this Missile Defense Agency Digest. They were talking about the statement that North Korean negotiators made. They told United States officials in Beijing that they had nuclear weapons and threatened to export them or conduct a physical demonstration. And in this article they talk about the fuel rods as well, of course, which we have talked about at length. But it says, if the North Korean assertion about reprocessing is correct, it would signify a massive intelligence failure by the United States. Is that really true? That is not true, is it?

General KADISH. —

Mr. MORAN. But, at this point, you have no reason to believe that there is any massive intelligence failure with regard to North Korea's capability?

General KADISH. —

Mr. MORAN. Sure. But at this point there is no reason—even if they came up with that, it is—we may not have disclosed everything. But, in terms of intelligence, it is not—we don't feel that we have been caught unawares?

General KADISH. —

IRAQ WAR MISSILE FIRINGS

Mr. MORAN. You talked about the 24 missiles that were fired in the Iraq war. I wanted to—nine short-range Iraqi missiles were intercepted, another two landed in the Persian Gulf and one in the desert, and one exploded shortly after launch. Now did they land because they were not on path to a target that we were protecting, or did they just get through the screen?

General KADISH. It is the former case. Those were not engaged because they weren't threatening a protected area.

That is the disadvantage of a point defense system, because it can only protect a certain footprint. What we are trying to do in

the overall system is enlarge that footprint as much as we possibly can and cover more territory.

MISSILE DEFENSE COMMAND AND CONTROL

Mr. MORAN. Let me ask you, General, what is the chain of command for the MDA between your agency vis-a-vis the combatant commander, I guess it would be NORTHCOM, if there was an attack or an apparent attack from North Korea? Who calls the shots?

General KADISH. That is a very, very good question. At this point, we are just getting what I would call used to dealing with the cultural and command issues associated with having a layered missile defense.

When we talk about just having a ground-based mid-course defense against long-range missiles, it was pretty clear that NORTHCOM and their predecessor commands would be the key element in the overall defensive structure.

When we moved to a layered defense, and we have mobile defenses against all ranges of missiles, the change to the unified command plan by putting STRATCOM in the planning control of that is a major change for us that we are now starting to deal with.

So you can have a situation where the deliberative command and control planning is done by STRATCOM for all combatant commanders, including NORTHCOM, and then the actual prosecution of a defensive engagement would be done by the local commander, depending on where the origin of the missile occurred.

Some of those issues—actually, I would say most of those issues we are in active discussion with not only the joint staff but with Admiral Ellis's staff and the NORTHCOM staff to work out the details.

Mr. MORAN. Does it rely upon a decision by the President or the Secretary of Defense?

General KADISH. That is to be determined. Because it is not a practical thing in a defensive operation and the timelines that you are dealing with to have a command authority at the presidential level in a timely way. So we are going to have to work out some rules of engagement for defensive operations that allow us to meet our timelines, and this is part of the major discussions that we need to have not only with the combatant commanders but within the DOD in general on how we are going to deal with that.

Mr. DICKS. If the gentleman will yield. What about communications? Do we have that figured out? How we are going to—NORAD to the interceptor. How is that going to work?

General KADISH. That is part of the design of the system. What I am discussing is not a technical problem. We can get the communications hook-up. It is more of a human nature practical problem of how do you—if a missile is launched at 2 o'clock in the morning and the President is in China, that is a difficult situation.

Mr. MORAN. That is what I was getting at. I wasn't getting at the technology.

General KADISH. I think this is a management policy issue, not a technical problem.

SHOT DOCTRINE

Mr. MORAN. Right. Now following up on that, if a missile reenters the atmosphere, do you shoot at it twice, or do you shoot and then look and then shoot again? What is the capability?

General KADISH. That is a very good question. We call it the shot doctrine, how many times do we shoot at a particular warhead; and there is a difference in the shot doctrine between whether—when a system is operating autonomously or in conjunction in a layered system. Our desire and the design of all of our systems is to shoot more than once at the target.

Now, in the Patriot case, the shooting doctrine is, shoot/shoot. In other words, as the warhead is reentering, there is no time to take a shot, look at it, and take another shot. So we want to get very high probabilities of kill, so we shoot two missiles at the warhead.

When we move into the layered system, our ground-based system that we are going to put at Ft. Greely and Vandenberg, the shooting doctrine could encompass both the cases, ———. The overall goal, however, is to get the probability of kill as high as we can get it and still conserve how many missiles we have to shoot; and that is all mechanized in the battle management and thought through ahead of time. So we want to shoot multiple times. If we do, our probabilities of success go up significantly; and we can do that many different ways.

Mr. MORAN. I assume that it depends, obviously, on whether there is more than one missile coming?

General KADISH. That is correct.

MISSILE DEFENSE AGENCY AND NATIONAL TEAM

Mr. MORAN. Can I ask just one last question, Mr. Chairman? Thank you.

You have talked about these national teams that would be involved in the development of basic aspects of missile defense technology, and you would have a contractor in charge of the national team for its development. Now would that contractor be able to bid on the work? I mean, we have got very few defense contractors left, as you know. They have all consolidated, been acquired or whatever. So it seems to me you are going to have contractors, defense contractors in charge of national teams who would be also the most likely bidder for the technology that they are developing, wouldn't you? How do you isolate the business unit?

General KADISH. We worried about that problem an awful lot when we formed what we called the national team in missile defense, and there is some confusion on this. So, if I might, I would like to take a few minutes to discuss this.

Mr. MORAN. I am done with my questions.

General KADISH. When we looked at the problem of how do you take—how do you manage a program that crosses service lines and actually is designed to have defenses against all ranges of missiles and all phases of flight and when I looked at that program after two years being in the job, it became—some things became very clear to me.

The first one is that no one company in this country can do that job. But we needed the help of all of them. Not only the companies, but the FFRDCs, the SETA contracts, and government personnel.

The second thing that became very clear to me is that if we did this from a government-only perspective, we didn't have the talent to do it. In other words, if the government took on the integration challenge, like they did in the Apollo program and like we did in the Polaris program and some of the other activities.

So what we came up with was a very strict approach that says not only could the—no one company do this from a competitive standpoint and all of the things that you mentioned, they didn't have the talent. No one company could provide us the talent that we needed to do this job. So we came up with this national team idea.

The national team encompasses government, SETA contractors, FFRDCs and industry, the major industry partners; and what we ended up doing there was asking the industry to form a part of this national team by including at least the top six and any other entrants that might be available to contribute people and not to make anything, to help us do the engineering and then hold accountable the people for actually building this.

The idea was that the national team would provide the brain-power and engineering sense, and then whatever came out of that would be competed with the major industrial partners and even small business. In order to do that, we would have to have these individuals that get contributed by these companies to sign what we call firewall agreements where conflict of interest then becomes a major exclusion for them.

There are two types of conflict of interest exclusions, organizational for the companies involved and personal for the people who are on the team. They actually have to sign agreements so that they cannot work on a competitive aspect of the program after being on a national team for a period of at least three years. That is a legal document that they sign and that we are monitoring very carefully.

Now this environment allows us to share proprietary data and get the types of decisions that I think are necessary to build an integrated system of this nature, and we are about 15 months into it. It is working fairly well. We still need to mature it a little bit. So we don't have the situation that you described, that even though we have Boeing and Lockheed helping us run these teams, the people who are doing this are excluded from actually providing their parent companies advantage in the competitive framework.

So we have a competition going on, for instance, now for kinetic energy boost, that Northrup and Lockheed, with teams of Raytheon and Boeing, are competing for this, even though they have people working on the national team that are isolated from that competition.

Mr. MORAN. You have got to—it is tough to keep them isolated. I think it is a very narrow wire that you are trying to walk, at least in terms of public perception. I trust that you are doing what needs to be done in the most appropriate manner. It is a risky thing when you have got billion-dollar contracts involved, you have got

people working on those contracts whose company is also submitting a bid and has to go back to the company at some point.

I am not going to pursue it. I don't have criticism.

General KADISH. Well, it is a very important point that we pay a lot of attention to.

Mr. LEWIS. We discussed this, you and I discussed this in some depth yesterday. The gentleman is raising an important question. It is an area of concern of the Committee.

We also wanted to make sure that there is real competition, and the firewalls you are talking about are pretty hard to define in terms of perfection. But, in the meantime, Mr. Moran has illustrated the Committee is very concerned about the area as well.

Mr. Tiahrt.

AIRBORNE LASER PROGRAM

Mr. TIAHRT. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

General Kadish, in the Defense News recently there was a charge that the 747 and the ABL, once all of the components were present, it would be too heavy to fly.

The last time I was on the airplane was the day before it flew to Edwards Air Force Base for testing, and I recall walking on the main deck. Inside the 747 above the wings there was ballast, quite a few. I think there was 24 different containers that were about 2-feet wide and the width of the airplane with ballast.

Was that just to offset the nose modification or was that to represent the configured—final configuration weight, and have you tested—have you flown the airplane with what you believe to be the final configuration weight?

General KADISH. I am trying to remember. But I recall that the ballast was for center of gravity limitations of the airplane. When you put the heavy nose on there and we don't have the plant in the back, you need ballast in order to make sure that the airplane flies right.

The issue associated with weight in the ABL I think is misunderstood. There are two aspects of weight on an airplane. The first aspect is what the center of gravity is, like I just talked about. And the laser modules on this particular airplane approach the center of gravity limitations of the airplane. But it is not an issue whether it can fly or not. It is certainly capable of doing that. —. And the tests that we have done to date indicate that we can certainly do that.

Mr. TIAHRT. Have you run any refueling tests, problems with having an aircraft above what aerodynamic problems may come from that?

General KADISH. The initial refueling tests we did, I am not aware of any problem refueling the aircraft. Although it is rather startling to see a picture of an 747 behind the KC-135 and the size differences there.

Mr. TIAHRT. You have set up charts in your testimony of block 2004, block 2006. The ABL block 2004 ends in 2005, and then you pick up—in the other block 2006 with an ABL funding that starts in fiscal year 2004 and continues. Is that the difference between first aircraft and second aircraft? What are the differences?

General KADISH. The second aircraft is really—the way we have got the program planned is a block 8 aircraft. The block 4, block 6 differentiation is between the first increment of flight tests and the building of the block 4 airplane, and then block 6 improves and expands the test envelope for that block 4 airplane. So it is a continuation of the first airplane's test program.

Mr. TIAHRT. When do you need the second airplane?

General KADISH. The second airplane—we would like to have it on contract by the end of this summer. However, I have put a restriction on the contractor that says that until we get first light out of the ground-based modules in the ground-based configuration we are not going to award that contract. Because if we get significant delays in that first light on the ground, I would have a hard time buying an airplane to start the block 8 without knowing that the first one works as advertised.

So although we have the tremendous benefit of having it authorized and funded right now, I don't want to take that step until we actually get some technical performance out of the airplane that we expect; and that first demonstration is first light out of the modules.

Mr. TIAHRT. As you know, this is a commercial line, and you need to reserve a spot on it. I hope someone is saying this spot in line is going to be for this aircraft.

General KADISH. We are working that with Boeing. We have that pretty well in hand.

RAMOS PROGRAM

Mr. TIAHRT. It seems like when we withdrew from the ABM treaty that would give us hands-free design effort in our BMD program. Is that true? Are we still trying to live by any facets of that program? And then how does that affect RAMOS, this agreement? I don't know how they are going to intertwine. But it seems like we are going to have the joint capability for a satellite with the Russians; and we are working some kind of configuration on this ABM treaty, some kind of—are we still trying to mesh the old standards of the treaty? And how does that play together?

General KADISH. Sir, I can assure you that the treaty issues are not affecting any decisions we are making on the program now. In fact, I have to say my life got a lot easier once—the minute we got out of that treaty, just because the decisions that we would have to make—

So we are making progress, and it is not being constrained in any way that I am aware of. In fact, we have the opposite problem, of making sure that people understand that they don't need to be constrained by the treaty anymore in their thinking. But we are doing very well on that.

In regard to RAMOS, this has become a difficult issue at this point. We have tried for a number of years—I guess I can go back 7 or 8—to get RAMOS into a program that made sense. We thought we had done it a couple of years ago, but we still had a problem with the Russian Federation coming to agreement on what that program really is.

We in the DOD have been part of a team, however, that have engaged with the Russians to find out what things, other than

RAMOS, might be better to do in a cooperative, transparent way with the Russians. Just this past week, in Geneva, it looks like we have gotten a response from the Russians that is very promising, more promising than I have seen for many years now; and we are going to pursue that. But it is uncertain where RAMOS and the Russian cooperative efforts that we are pursuing very actively are going to go at this point in time.

Mr. TIAHRT. So there is nothing in relationship to RAMOS that affects our BMD program?

General KADISH. No.

Mr. TIAHRT. We are not relying—

General KADISH. We are not relying on RAMOS for anything that is key to our success in the program at this point. It is a technology effort.

Mr. TIAHRT. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. LEWIS. Mr. Wicker.

Mr. WICKER. Thank you. And thank you, General.

It sounds to me like you wouldn't be surprised if these two RAMOS satellites did not in fact get launched in fiscal year 2008?

General KADISH. We are—I don't think it would be a surprise to me, no. I am very realistic or trying to take a very realistic approach with the Russians on this issue. And it is—it has been a difficult negotiation. We are trying real hard.

SPACE TRACKING AND SURVEILLANCE SYSTEM AND SATELLITES

Mr. WICKER. I note that the Space-based Infrared Surveillance-Low program that has been renamed STSS, you plan to place satellites in low earth orbit, two satellites by the year 2007 and then a common bus for future satellites. My question is this, what is going to be the role of satellites in this entire missile defense program? Is it a concern that Russia has an anti-satellite program and China is developing one? And do you have concerns about the fact that the United States has, for the present time at least, shelved its anti-satellite program?

General KADISH. The role of satellites is key to us, particularly in the sensor area.

For instance, the Defense Support Satellite that exists today on orbit is a key element of our architecture for 2004. It gives us the early warning capability already. So that is already part of the architecture. The objective of that particular program now is to get the data we need to make that decision.

Mr. LEWIS. Will the gentleman yield?

The subject, General, that Mr. Wicker is raising, I think you may remember the Committee raised serious questions about SBIRS-Low in our last go-around. I must say that the Department was very responsive to our concerns. That has led to a restructuring; and part of the question that is being asked here is that, if you would dwell on that, too.

General KADISH. The restructuring I think was in response to all of our concerns about SBIRS-Low, because we had at the time a very active program that was doing many different things, very expensive, with the potential constellation of measures in the 30s, very long-range activity.

The program we have restructured is designed to answer some key questions first and then take a step-wise approach as to whether we can or should afford that kind of a constellation. I think we are on track to do that.

Going beyond that role as a sensing capability, which we will also like from space, we have very early steps to seeing whether or not interceptors can be put on orbit, because that solves our geography problem in some of these areas; and I think that we have \$14 million to start that kind of a development program in the 2004 budget.

In regard to anti-satellite efforts, that is a threat that we pay attention to. ———.

ANTI-SATELLITE PROGRAM EFFORTS

Mr. WICKER. Well, and then the last part of my question was, the fact that the kinetic energy anti-satellite program has been shelved for the time being, do you have any concerns about that?

General KADISH. I don't at this point. I don't have any concerns about that at this point. Space control is both a policy and a technical issue that will have to be debated. But at this point in time our anti-satellite capability is not a key issue for me in this mission area at this point; and an ———.

Mr. WICKER. Thank you.

Mr. FRELINGHUYSEN. Mr. Visclosky.

Mr. VISCLOSKY. Thank you. No questions.

MICROWAVE TECHNOLOGY

Mr. TIAHRT. Thank you.

Microwave technology is not part of what we are doing with BMD, but—as far as I know. The Russians have used microwave technology.

There is an oilman from Wichita, Kansas, that does business in Russia; and he was approached by Russian scientists that said that they had the capability to bring an airplane down with microwave technology. They were selling it as a post-September 11th, 2001, technology to protect something stationary like a nuclear power plant. They claim that if an airplane violated the air space around the cone, around a nuclear power plant, they could take out that airplane and bring it down involuntarily.

Is this something that was just smoke and mirrors, that they were approaching this guy to try to get access to American citizenship, or is this a very real threat?

General KADISH. We don't have any microwave technology efforts for missile defense capability under way, and I don't know about the specific instance that you described. But there is a concern.

For instance, our X band radars are pretty—approach microwave; and we do have a safety area around those radars for aircraft. We don't want to put too much energy—when you hit this huge radar, it is not good to put energy on radar systems of that nature.

So I don't know of any programs to deal with this, but I would suspect that the science there would support some of these claims.

Mr. TIAHRT. There has been a rumor that has floated around that some—that one of our satellites was disabled, potentially, by

microwave technology used by Russia. Is there any—have we known of any of that kind of capability?

General KADISH. I am not aware of anything of that kind, Congressman. I couldn't comment on that.

Mr. TIAHRT. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

NAVY—MDA AEGIS "LAKE ERIE" AGREEMENT

Mr. LEWIS. Okay. Mr. Tiahrt, thank you.

Other questions from members?

Okay, we have had at least a reasonable amount of discussion with people in the Navy regarding the Aegis cruiser and that that agreement between the Navy and the Department—and the question of control is involved here. In that agreement, there is reference to control and what the definition might be. Could you kind of explain that to us?

General KADISH. I am not sure I understand the question, Mr. Chairman. The Navy agreement in regard to giving us the Lake Erie for tests, is that the issue?

Mr. LEWIS. That is it.

General KADISH. I think that is a wonderful agreement that we have come up with.

Mr. LEWIS. Of course.

General KADISH. We struggled in the preparation of the 2004 budget and swung a number of times of how we were going to continue our testing not only for SM-3 but for other things we would like to put at sea, and we came up with a number of schemes. The CNO, in particular the senior Navy staff, were very responsive to our needs; and I think that the agreement that we struck—

Mr. LEWIS. Very responsive. Does that mean that they expressed their concerns?

General KADISH. They had a lot of concerns, as we had. Because I could not—we could not—they wanted their ship back is basically—because, of course, the operational impacts of not having all of the ships dedicated to the mission—so this was discussed, and all of the issues were laid out. I think the CNO and the Department made exactly the right decision to dedicate the Lake Erie to us.

Mr. LEWIS. Take us forward a minute. Let's say that we wanted to expand the program. Then there is expense involved. If control means MDA control rather than the Navy, then who pays for it?

General KADISH. Well, the agreement, at least as I understand it right now, is that anything we do in terms of that ship with modifying it for future capability and doing tests and that type of thing, we would pay for under our MDA budget and the development thereof.

The ship's crew and the some of the operating expenses and maintenance expenses for that ship would continue under the Navy auspices, because they are the best knowledgeable about how to do that, and we don't want to lose the connection of having an operational crew available to us for the Lake Erie in emergency situations or those types of issues.

So we struck a balance between who pays for the O&S versus who pays for all of the rest of it, and certainly the lion's share of

that expense is going to be on MDA's budget requirement. So that is the way we—I think we have split it up.

And how it—when you get into writing MOUs and the actual budget documents, truth sometimes doesn't turn out that way. But that is the way that we have got it done.

Mr. LEWIS. General Kadish, I think this has been a very valuable hearing. We have lots of other questions expressed by the Committee, and I suggest we will submit those to you.

Are there other members who have questions at this moment?

If not, sir, you got plenty to do, so the Committee is adjourned.

General KADISH. Thank you. Thank you for your time.

[CLERK'S NOTE—Questions submitted by Mr. Lewis and the answers thereto follow:]

BALLISTIC MISSILE DEFENSE SYSTEM—CAPABILITIES

Question. In December 2002 the President directed the Department of Defense to begin fielding an integrated and evolutionary Ballistic Missile Defense System (BMDS) of initial modest capability.

What capabilities does the initial deployment possess?

Answer. The capabilities called for by the president for 2004–2005 include up to 20 ground-based interceptors (GBIs) against an intercontinental-range ballistic missile threat—up to 16 located at Fort Greely, Alaska, and up to 4 located at Vandenberg Air Force Base in California. The GBIs will be available on a continuous basis to intercept long-range missiles during their midcourse phase of flight. The Ballistic Missile Defense System supporting the GBIs will include an initial set of integrated sensors based on land and at sea, and cued by early warning sensors in space. Over time, capabilities will be added to the BMDS, making it more robust and capable of engaging broader types of threats.

Question. Recent OSD testimony before the Congress estimated the effectiveness of the initial BMDS capability at 90%. What is the basis for this estimate?

Answer. Using the estimate probability of kill for each interceptor and multiplying it by the performance range for the rest of the system achieves a 90% effectiveness.

Question. Do you feel this estimate is accurate?

Answer. Yes. MDA concurs with estimate provided during OSD testimony to Congress.

Question. Your direction is to establish a layered defense to intercept missiles in all phases of flight against all ranges. Given the technologies available to you today, please explain how you intend to apply the layered defense concept?

Answer. The initial BMDS layered defense consists of a variety of mature technologies that are currently affordable for engineering, development, and fielding. The development objective provides an integrated layered defense against three phases of ballistic missile flight—boost phase, midcourse phase and terminal phase. Initial terminal phase defenses have already been fielded through PAC-3. Initial midcourse phase defenses will be added during the initial fielding at Ft. Greely, AK, Vandenberg AFB, CA and at sea on Aegis cruisers and destroyers. Boost phase defense capability is being pursued through the Airborne Laser (ABL) and surface-based kinetic boost, but will not be available until FY08 at the earliest. In addition, there are the Command, Control, Battle Management, and Communications (C2BMC), which integrates and provides interconnectivity, and sensors, consisting of existing satellites and upgraded early warning radars. The integration of and interconnectivity across all three missile defense phases will provide a layered ballistic missile defense capable of intercepting a variety of ballistic missile threats. MDA will continue to develop less mature technologies for future systems that will enable greater defensive coverage and effectiveness over time. These include space-based radars, the X-band radar, and surface-based kill systems. By engineering and integrating these technologies as they mature we will provide effective defense across all three phases of ballistic missile flight.

Question. What threats is the system intended to meet?

Answer. The Ballistic Missile Defense System is not being designed to meet a specific threat. The system is being designed to engage threats to the United States, Friends, Allies and Forward Deployed forces in all phases of flight. Therefore, the Missile Defense Agency has developed an Adversary Capability Document that details over 200 threat parameters that can be utilized to evaluate Ballistic Missile Defense Performance across the entire threat spectrum. This threat spectrum is

bounded by physical boundaries of each threat parameter and evaluated against known Intel based missile systems.

Question. The initial capability envisions evolutionary development. Please explain this strategy. What capabilities do you believe you will add over the next 5 years? 10 years?

Answer. MDA applies evolutionary acquisition to incrementally develop and expand on its initial BMDS capability. Evolutionary acquisition is the preferred DoD strategy for rapid acquisition of technology for the user. An evolutionary approach delivers capability in increments and recognizes, up front, the need for future capability improvements. The objective is to balance needs and available capability with resources, and to put capability into the hands of the user as quickly as possible. The success of this approach depends on consistent and continuous definition of needed warfighter capabilities. Its success also hinges on the maturation of technologies that lead to disciplined development and fielding of capabilities that provide increasingly effective missile defenses against evolving and changing threats. Specific future capabilities are described in the classified BMDS Statement of Goals (SOG), which MDA can make available.

Question. What threats do you envision that the enhanced capabilities will meet?

Answer. Threats detailed within the evolution of the Ballistic Missile Defense System design will continually be evaluated against the Adversary Capability Document threat parameters.

BALLISTIC MISSILE DEFENSE SYSTEM—TESTING PROGRAM

Question. The fiscal year 2004 budget request proposes a general provision designating the initial Ballistic Missile Defense System testbed as having reached the system development and demonstration (SDD) phase for purposes of any law governing the development and production of a major defense acquisition program. The provision does not explicitly state, but the provision appears to waive the usual testing required for a system to reach the SDD phase of development.

General Kadish please explain the need for the legislation proposed in the budget request which deems the Ballistic Missile Defense System to have reached the system development and demonstration (SDD) phase.

Answer. Section 8061 of the FY 2004 Budget says in part: "funds available to the Department of Defense under the heading RDT&E Defense-Wide may be used to develop and field an initial set of missile defense capabilities." This language addresses a concern about using RDT&E funds to develop, acquire, and deploy missiles in the Test Bed to provide a limited missile defense in a national emergency. It was included to ensure that RDT&E funding is all that will be necessary to be used for the initial set of missile defense capabilities used in the FY 2004 initial Missile Defense Test Bed. This sentence continues: "such fielding shall be considered to be system development and demonstration for purposes of any law governing the development and production of a major defense acquisition program." This second part was intended as an expansion of the first for clarification. It was not, as it has been misunderstood repeatedly, in any way a request for a waiver from operational testing. The Test Bed allows RDT&E assets to be evaluated by DOT&E in operational environments. In fact, both developmental and operational test data will form the basis of DOT&E assessments of the BMDS.

Question. Please explain how this provision will effect the development and testing of those programs that comprise the Ballistic Missile Defense System initial capability.

Answer. The Ballistic Missile Defense System (BMDS) is managed as a single RDT&E program. Therefore all elements and components will continue to undergo rigorous developmental and operational testing. The Department of Defense has no plans to exempt the missile defense system from developmental and operational testing. The Director of Operational Test and Evaluation (DOT&E) is directly involved in the review and assessment of all missile defense testing activities and will provide his operational assessment report to Congress each year. DOT&E supports the BMDS Test Bed concept because it will increase test realism and will mitigate many test limitations previously identified.

Question. What testing results give the Missile Defense Agency the confidence to deploy the testbed as an initial operating capability by 2004?

Answer. Results of previous flight (through IFT-10) and ground tests provide confidence that the initial integration of the developing system (sensors, battle management and weapon components) successfully meets objectives for system functionality and operations. Planned enhancements to the interceptor, sensors, and battle management components, including the integration of Aegis BMD surveillance and tracking capabilities, will be tested during a series of eight upcoming flight tests.

These will include two booster verification flights and six integrated flight tests (IFTs), with two planned as intercept tests. In addition, a series of integrated ground tests will be completed in fiscal year 2004 using actual system hardware and software. These ground tests, performed using threat representative scenarios, significantly augment flight test results and provide overall confidence in the deployment of limited systems defensive capabilities. These system capabilities will be exploited and built upon as MDA continues to integrate additional capabilities with future block developments of the BMDS.

Question. Are there specific technical developments that facilitate deployment at this point without a more extensive testing regimen?

Answer. Integration of system improvements, such as new booster developments, Exoatmospheric Kill Vehicle (EKV) enhancements, sensor and battle management upgrades, including integration of AEGIS BMD surveillance and tracking capabilities, will all be thoroughly tested within the flight test and ground test program planned to precede Initial Defensive Operations (IDO) and Block 04 overall. MDA does have an extensive test regimen planned for the BMDS. What are being deployed in 2004 are a limited defensive capability and an operationally realistic Test Bed that will be used to continue operational testing of the BMDS.

Question. The Committee understands that the Department of Defense may be considering revisions to the proposed language. Please explain any changes you recommend to the requested language.

Answer. The question refers to proposed section 8061, which read in full: "Sec. 8061. Funds available to the Department of Defense under the heading, "Research, Development, Test and Evaluation, Defense-Wide" may be used to develop and field an initial set of missile defense capabilities, and such fielding shall be considered to be system development and demonstration for purposes of any law governing the development and production of a major defense acquisition program. The initial set of missile defense capabilities is defined as "Block 04" Ballistic Missile Defense system fielded in fiscal year 2004 and 2005. Subsequent blocks of missile defense capabilities shall be subject to existing laws governing development and production of major defense acquisition programs."

This was not drafted to waive operational testing, as the fielded developmental items will continue to be tested. However, we understand concerns that the language "and such fielding shall be considered to be system development and demonstration for purposes of any law" would have that effect, and agree to delete it and all that follows.

GROUND-BASED MIDCOURSE DEFENSE—INTERCEPTOR COMPONENTS

Question. In December 2002, the President directed the Missile Defense Agency to employ a Ballistic Missile Defense System (BMDS) that provides a layered defense using test assets to provide an initial capability. The Missile Defense Agency will implement this capability in the fiscal year 2004/2005 timeframe. The Ground-Based Midcourse Defense (GMD) element of this program includes fire control/communications systems, interceptors (booster and kill vehicle), and sensors. The fiscal year 2004 budget includes \$2.8 billion for this effort of which \$707.5 million is for the interceptor.

The Missile Defense Agency is pursuing development of two deployable boost vehicles, both of which are non-developmental ICBM-class booster motor stacks, to support the groundbased interceptor for BMDS.

Please explain the reason why the MDA chose to use ICMB-class boosters to support the GMD interceptor. Does this strategy save costs? Development time? Are there other reasons?

Answer. Central to the stated mission of the Ground-based Midcourse Defense element of MDA is intercepting and destroying incoming warheads outside the earth's atmosphere. Given the weight of the Exo-atmospheric Kill Vehicle (EKV), the distance it has to travel and the acceleration needed to get from the ground to space at the speeds needed to complete the mission, the only means currently available to deliver the EKV for an exo-atmospheric intercept is the multi-stage ICBM-class booster. All boosters of this class in use today are generally reliable and benefit from decades of development and technological improvement. This strategy of using proven, state-of-the-art technology reduces the research and development phase of the ground-based interceptor effort and results in significant savings in both time and funding.

Additionally, at the direction of Congress, Boeing conducted a study to consider alternative booster concepts. Boeing selected Orbital Sciences Corp for a developmental contract and, as a risk mitigation effort, turned development of their own booster over to Lockheed/Martin for continued development and production. Both

the Orbital Sciences Corp booster and the Boeing/Lockheed-Martin booster are based on proven booster stacks that possess the speed, range and throw weight necessary for this mission.

Question. Do you envision eventually down-selecting to a single booster?

Answer. MDA no longer plans to downselect to one booster provider. As a result of the president's direction to field an initial defensive operational (IDO) capability in 2004, the current plan is to use all ten of the boosters (five BV+ and five OSC Test Bed) currently being acquired to populate the IDO/Test Bed silos at both Fort Greely (six silos) and Vandenberg AFB (four silos).

Question. The DOT&E fiscal year 2002 Annual Report indicates that testing of the boost vehicles thus far has been limited to relatively low velocity intercepts which test only a small portion of the threat engagement space. Please comment on the testing plan and your view of the comments in the DOT&E report.

Answer. Flight testing through IFT-10 used a surrogate booster vehicle called the Payload Launch Vehicle (PLV), a two-stage design that achieved a lower velocity than the booster vehicles which will be fielded for Block 2004 BMDS IDO/Test Bed. The Ground-Based Interceptors used for future IFTs will achieve significantly higher velocities than the PLV, thereby expanding the engagement space. The Test Bed will permit the MDA to employ test geometries that provide greater verification of the system employment envelope, and permit use of more of the actual operational assets in the flight test program. There will continue to be, however, some constraints attributable to range safety limitations.

Question. Please describe the kill vehicle (warhead) that MDA has selected for the initial operational capability. Is it a kinetic energy weapon or does it work by other means?

Answer. The GMD Exoatmospheric Kill Vehicle (EKV) destroys the target via hit-to-kill, which is a body-to-body, metal-on-metal collision that obliterates both the EKV and the target. No explosives are involved.

The attached slide includes a diagram of the EKV that will be flown in future flight tests, and fielded in the Block 2004 BMDS IDO/Test Bed.


EKV SYSTEM OVERVIEW

System Description

*A Hit-to-Kill Projectile for
Destroying Ballistic
Warheads in Midcourse
Phase of Flight*

System Components

- Kill Vehicle
 - Sensor
 - Divert and Attitude Control
 - Structure
 - Electronics
 - Communication
- Adapter
 - Structures
 - Separation Systems
 - Ordnance Initiation



Question. How do you determine success for the kill vehicle? Is it simply a matter of making contact with the reentry vehicle? If so, what if any measures can be taken to address residual effects once a reentry vehicle has been intercepted?

Answer. During testing, the Ground-Based Radar-Prototype (GBR-P) determines whether the intercept was successful, based on the fragments of the target that remain. After it is integrated into the BMDS, the Sea-Based X-Band Radar (SBX) will perform this function.

Making contact with the reentry vehicle is one measure of success for the kill vehicle. During an intercept, the EKV has a specific "aim point," which is the optimal spot on the target to achieve destruction sufficient to render the reentry vehicle harmless. In testing, the target's photonic hit indicator (PHI) provides data to determine the specific point that the EKV hit.

Question. The DOT&E fiscal year 2002 Annual Report indicates that in a December 2002 test flight (IFT-10), the warhead failed to separate from the booster and could not be guided to its target. Please comment on this test flight and the results.

Answer. The root cause of the Integrated Flight Test (IFT)-10 mission failure on December 11, 2002, was determined to be an intermittent, open electrical circuit on the U20 Application Specific Integrated Circuit (ASIC) within the Laser Firing Unit (LFU).

The intermittent opening of an electrical circuit was due to a failed wire pin in an ASIC mounted on a circuit card assembly (CCA) in the LFU. In addition, the CCA was inadequately attached and supported in the LFU. The LFU is part of the laser initiation system (LIS) installed in the EKV payload adapter, which initiates the ejection of the EKV from the booster. Evidence based on telemetry, ground tests and analyses, indicates that the opening in the electrical circuit was caused by vibration imposed during ground environmental stress screening (ESS) resulting in a fatigue type failure. Inadequate attachment and support of the CCA likely contributed to the vibrations. The original design of the LFU had foam injected in order to prevent excessive vibration in the ESS and the flight environment. Subsequent removal of the foam left no way to absorb excess vibrations. Inadequate design margin, qualification testing verification, and certification and failure to document Class and Class design changes were also contributing factors.

As a result of the EKV's failure to separate from the booster, the test could not demonstrate EKV performance; however, a number of other critical flight test objectives were achieved, including:

- Demonstrate integration of system components;
- Demonstrate sensor performance for detection, acquisition, track, discrimination, and hit assessment;
- Collect data for modeling and simulations verification and validation and GMD component effectiveness and suitability analysis;
- Exercise GMD Fire Control (GFC) operating in a variable message format mode;
- Gather information and data on TPS-X and Aegis acquisition and track performance of the IFT-10 target suite during boost phase.

Question. What measures have you taken to correct the problem of warhead separation to support future flight tests?

Answer. Key corrective actions include: (1) restoring the injected foam; (2) improve qualification, verification, and acceptance testing; and, (3) improve the design approval and review processes approval for all Class 1 and Class 2 changes.

Question. Did the results of IFT-10 affect other testing and development activities? If so, how?

Answer. The IFT-10 failure prevented verification via flight test that the solution implemented to address the EKV Track Gate Anomaly that occurred during IFTs-7, -8, and -9 did, in fact, correct the problem. Therefore, solution verification cannot occur until the next intercept flight test. Otherwise, since IFT-10 was intended to be the final flight test with the PLV and the legacy EKV design, the failure did not adversely impact the plans for subsequent tests. It should also be noted that the objectives achieved from IFT-10 did contribute to the further development of the GMD sensors and the GMD Fire Control component.

GROUND-BASED MIDCOURSE DEFENSE—SENSORS

SEA-BASED X-BAND RADAR

Question. The Sea-Based X-Band Radar is one element of the Ground-Based Midcourse Defense (GMDS) sensors. The fiscal year 2004 budget request includes \$441.1 million for this program. The schedule to develop this element of GMDS has been accelerated significantly compared to the program funded in fiscal year 2003.

Please describe the role of the Sea-Based X-Band radar, and the platform used to carry this radar.

Answer. The Sea Based Test X-Band Radar (SBX) project will provide the GMD Element of the BMDS a long-range sensor for midcourse detection, tracking, discrimination, and kill assessment that serves both operational and test requirements. The SBX enables full use of BMDS extended test range capabilities. It is on schedule to be completed by 30 September 2005 and integrated into the BMDS in fourth quarter calendar year 2005.

The platform is a Moss Maritime CS-50 self-propelled, semi-submersible platform, originally constructed for the oil industry but procured as a new, bare platform to receive SBX equipment and facilities. The X-Band Radar will be mounted on top of the platform.

Additionally, by enabling full use of the BMDS extended test range facilities, the SBX will enable more robust and realistic testing of the GMD element, thereby improving MDA's knowledge base and expanding the capability to protect against a ballistic missile attack.

Question. How does this program add to the layered defense proposed by the Administration?

Answer. Ballistic missile defenses benefit, due to increased engagement opportunities, when threat missiles can be engaged during all phases of flight. The Sea-based X-Band Radar provides that capability by enhancing performance across the BMDS. Specifically, the SBX provides system-wide enhancements by:

(1) Maneuvering to close gaps in sensor coverage by providing radar coverage where there is none or providing greater detail and faster responses than possible with existing radars.

(2) Supporting future capabilities in both boost and terminal defenses although the radar initially supports the GMD for midcourse defenses.

(3) Promoting integration across the BMDS and verifying test performance across boost and midcourse defenses.

(4) Providing sensor capabilities that enhance target discrimination and improve performance for both midcourse and terminal defenses.

SBX will provide sensor support for multiple engagement sequences across all three phases—boost phase, midcourse, and terminal. As capabilities in each layer develop, SBX will continue to provide early warning, tracking, in-flight interceptor communications and discrimination (when applicable) for all layers of missile defense.

Question. The Committee understands that this system represents an improvement over current L-band radars. Why?

Answer. The Sea-Based X-Band Radar (SBX) will indeed provide improved capabilities over the current Cobra Dane radar at Shemya, Alaska, which operates in the L-Band. L-Band radars provide good long-range search and tracking, as well as some discrimination capability. However, unlike Cobra Dane, which has a fixed orientation with electronic scanning, the SBX includes electronic and mechanical scanning to provide hemispheric coverage. SBX includes search capability to acquire threats from a cueing sensor and, because it operates at X-Band, offers much improved tracking, discrimination, and kill assessment capabilities. Additionally, X-Band Radars have reduced sensitivity to nuclear effects and radar countermeasures.

Question. Will this sensor support the 2004/2005 deployment of an initial missile defense capability? Please explain.

Answer. Yes. When the SBX is integrated into the BMDS, it will provide GMD a long-range X-Band Radar for midcourse detection, tracking, discrimination, and kill assessment that serves both operational and test requirements.

BALLISTIC MISSILE DEFENSE SYSTEM—AEGIS SM-3 MISSILE

Question. One element of the Midcourse Defense Segment of the Ballistic Missile Defense System (BMDS) is the Aegis BMD program. This system is intended to defend against exo-atmospheric short-range ballistic missiles (SRBMs) and Intermediate Range Ballistic Missiles (IRBMs) in the terminal and midcourse phases. The system uses the Aegis Weapons System and the Navy Standard Missile (SM-3) as the interceptor. The fiscal year 2004 budget request includes \$726.2 million and makes the USS Lake Erie available to the Missile Defense Agency as a dedicated testbed for this element of BMDS.

The Committee understands that one Aegis cruiser is under the control of the Missile Defense Agency for purposes of a testbed. Please explain what "control" means in this case.

Answer. While missile defense test support will be the primary focus of the test ship, the Navy may assign additional multi-mission tasking as feasible. Despite the

rigors of current testing schedules, the Navy plans to keep the test ship ready in other cruiser mission areas for contingency tasking as either a missile defense or conventional battle group asset. To that end, the MDA testing schedule will be the primary determinant for potential employment of the test ship.

Question. If an Aegis class ship serves in the Aegis BMD program, is the ship also available for other surface combatant missions? Please explain why or why not.

Answer. Yes. When not involved in Aegis BMD specific testing, the test ship will be capable of participating in other naval mission areas normally assigned to an Aegis equipped ship. It is important to note, however, that when the test ship is at sea, it will operate in either normal multi-mission mode or in BMD mode. When operating in BMD mode, the extent of its ability to also perform other surface combatant missions is limited. Multi-mission capability in BMD mode will be restored through future upgrades.

Question. Please explain the funding requested for fiscal year 2004. Is the funding needed to support missile production and modifications? Ship modifications? Are there other requirements?

Answer. The funding request for fiscal year 2004 is explained in detail in the R-document budget exhibits submitted to Congress in February 2003. The figure below summarizes the budget exhibit numbers and shows a break out of the Aegis BMD President's Budget for fiscal year 2004. Of the eight SM-3 missiles to be purchased in fiscal year 2004, six of them are Initial Deployment Rounds, and are shown under the "Off Ramp" line item (the other two missiles will be used for Block 2004 flight testing). The modifications for six Aegis destroyers for Long Range Surveillance and Tracking are also contained under the "Off Ramp" line item.

<i>RDTE&E (\$ millions)</i>	<i>Fiscal year 2004 request</i>
Total Funding (\$ millions)	726.2
Block 04	648.3
Weapon System Development	402.2
Aegis Weapon System	109.2
SM-3 Missile	191.0
Vertical Launching System	11.0
System Engineering	28.7
Program Management	62.3
Advanced Radar	—
Test and Evaluation	70.8
Low Exo-atmospheric Experiment	25.3
Additional Missiles	120.0
Aegis BMD Ships	30.0
Block 06 Development:	
BMD Signal Processor Development	23.9
Japan Cooperative Development	54.0

Question. Please describe the threat that the Aegis Weapon System will respond to with respect to: boost phase, mid-course phase, or terminal phase; and with respect to types of missiles.

Answer. Modifications to the Aegis Weapon System and STANDARD Missile will provide an initial BMD capability for Aegis Surface Combatants to detect, track, intercept, destroy ballistic missiles and share BMD information with a joint multi-layered Ballistic Missile Defense System (BMDS). Subsequent modifications and upgrades will provide capability to defeat threats of greater range and sophistication. The Block 04 system will include exoatmospheric intercept of short and medium range ballistic missiles during midcourse flight. Additional capabilities against longer range more complex ballistic missiles and intercepts will be added and fielded within the framework of two-year BMDS improvement Blocks.

Question. The Committee understands there are technical issues concerning attitude control on the SM-3 missile. Please explain the technical challenges you face, and how you believe this will affect your ability to deploy the Aegis BMD system.

Answer. The successful flight tests in 2002 demonstrated SM-3s ability to intercept both in descent and ascent phase scenarios using a sustain mode Solid Inert Attitude Control System (SDACS). SDACS development has continued from that foundation, through additional analysis plus a series of successful ground tests that demonstrated the addition of a high-energy pulse (pulse 1). The SDACS successfully completed ground qualification testing in May 2003.

The sustain mode SDACS demonstrated prior to FM-5 utilized a "tube" design. This design utilized welded rhenium tubes to provide gas flow within the SDACS valves. The SDACS design that was demonstrated in FM-5, and will be used in future test flights, is a monolithic configuration. This design resolves the prior atti-

tude control switching issue, and improves producibility by reducing the number of welds by 80%, resulting in reducing SDACS lead time from 15 months to 9 months. This approach resolves initial manufacturing concerns that existed with the original "tube" design. In addition, this monolithic design improves structural and thermal margins over the "tube" design.

Development work is still ongoing to finalize the addition of a second high-energy pulse (pulse 2) ultimately planned to be used in terminal mode against some threat types. Previous ground tests have resulted in missed switching during pulse 2, and there is considerable ongoing engineering effort to understand and resolve this issue. When Pulse has been proven operationally in ground testing, it will be flight tested and subsequently introduced as a future change to the SM-3 missile when appropriate. While this design feature is not needed for capability against Block 04 threats, it does provide additional margin against a broader set of ballistic missile threats.

Flight Mission (FM)-5 data analysis is now complete and the cause of the failure is with the SDACS Attitude Control Assembly (ACA), which had a "stuck valve" most likely caused by a cracked diverter ball. Details are described in the following statement, recently released by MDA headquarters.

"Q: Has MDA completed the post-test analysis for FM-5? Have you been able to determine why there was no intercept of the target?

"A: The primary objective of Flight Mission (FM-5) was to characterize the Stand-ard Missile -3 Kinetic Warhead's (KW) guidance, navigation and control operation in space using an upgraded solid divert and attitude control system (SDACS). FM-5 was the first flight of the upgraded SDACS.

"The KW ejected normally, stabilized, acquired, and tracked the target, which was then centered in the KW's field of view. Seconds later, a slight increase in SDACS pressure was immediately followed by a large unexpected negative angular yaw acceleration. This negative acceleration was indicative of the Attitude Control Assembly (ACA) yaw valve operating improperly. Basically, the valve was "stuck," resulting in the KW going into a flat spin, causing the loss of the target from its seeker field of view, with resulting loss of target track.

"The SDACS attempted to counter the spin, by commanding the yaw thruster to fire in the opposite direction, but to no avail. The KW spin was confirmed by telemetry and by imagery. The FM-5 investigative team composed of government, industry and laboratory participants examined test data, and we believe that the most likely cause of the anomaly was a failure in the ACA Valve Ball Chamber, possibly due to a cracked diverter ball, which resulted in the KW's flat spin just prior to the planned intercept.

"At this point, we don't know precisely why the ball cracked. We are examining specification tolerances and conducting stress analyses. The Aegis ballistic missile defense program continues to progress, and we plan to conduct FM-6 near the end of this year."

The SDACS, as currently configured, is fully capable of responding to all Block 2004 threats and will not affect the ability of Aegis BMD to deploy its Block 2004 system. Preliminary analysis is showing that even with an SDACS in the "sustain" mode the system should be capable of responding to Block 04 threats. This is true, despite the constraints on the SDACS configuration, because the Aegis BMD weapon system has proven that it exceeds expected performance, demonstrating "handover errors" that are much smaller than required, resulting in a much more precise guidance of the missile than specified.

Question. Please describe the program schedule and testing objective for the SM-3 missile.

Answer. SM-3 Flight Mission schedule and objectives are outlined in the following chart.

[CLERK'S NOTE.—The Department did not provide this chart.]

BALLISTIC MISSILE DEFENSE SYSTEM—LAUNCH FACILITIES

Question. The initial Ballistic Missile Defense System capability will rely on Ground-Based Midcourse Defense (GMD) which consists of interceptors located at Ft. Greely, Alaska, and Vandenberg Air Force Base, California.

What land-based sites will support the initial capability of the Ballistic Missile Defense System?

Answer. The following land-based sites will support the BMDS' initial defensive capability:

- Fort Greely, Alaska: six silos and interceptors; interceptor communications terminal; GMD Fire Control node

- Vandenberg Air Force Base, California: four silos and interceptors; interceptor communications terminal
- Shemya, Alaska: upgraded Cobra Dane radar; interceptor communications terminal
- Joint National Integration Center (JNIC): GMD Fire Control Node
- Beale Air Force Base, California: Upgraded Early Warning Radar
- Buckley Air Force Base, Colorado: downlink node for Defense Support Program satellites
- Reagan Test Site, Kwajalein Atoll, Marshall Islands: Ground-Based Radar—

Prototype and interceptor communications terminal may participate in defensive operations, depending on the scenario; however, they would be out of range for some scenarios

Question. How many interceptors will be based at each of these sites in block 2004 and in subsequent blocks of development?

Answer. During BMDS Block 2004, there will be six interceptors located at Fort Greely and four at Vandenberg AFB. In calendar year 2005, by the end of Block 2004, an additional ten interceptors will be added at Fort Greely. Future block configurations are still under consideration.

Question. Is the number of interceptors restricted by the number of launch tubes available at each site?

Answer. The number of interceptors that can be placed in the ground is limited by the number of launch tubes available. Launch tubes can be reused once an interceptor is fired. However, due to funding and time constraints to meet the presidentially directed Initial Defensive Operations (IDO), there are no spares available to replace interceptors that have been used.

Question. Will each launch site contain only one type of booster? If not, why?

Answer. In order to achieve the required interceptor fielding rate, it may be necessary to field both booster types at each site, particularly at Ft. Greely. The system is designed to operate this way if necessary.

Question. Is unique launch control hardware required for each different type of booster?

Answer. The present Command Launch Equipment (CLE) hardware can support the OSC booster or the BV+ booster, but not both simultaneously with the present software version.

Question. Do you require military construction funding to prepare the launch sites for the initial deployment of the Ballistic Missile Defense System? If so, is funding requested in the fiscal year 2004 budget?

Answer. No, military construction funding is not required to prepare Fort Greely and Vandenberg AFB. Funding for development and construction at these facilities is requested under RDT&E PE 0603882C, Ballistic Missile Defense Midcourse Defense Element.

MDA has requested statutory authority to use RDT&E funding to field initial capabilities, and H.R. 1588 as passed by the Senate includes such authority in the following provision:

SEC. 221. FIELDING OF BALLISTIC MISSILE DEFENSE CAPABILITIES.

Funds authorized to be appropriated under section 201(4) for the Missile Defense Agency may be used for the development and fielding of an initial set of ballistic missile defense capabilities.

With section 221, military construction funding will not be required.

BALLISTIC MISSILE DEFENSE SYSTEM—COMMAND AND CONTROL

Question. The Unified Command Plan indicates that all forces within the geographic area of responsibility (AOR) assigned to a combatant commander shall be assigned or attached to and under the command of that combatant commander—unless otherwise directed by the President or Secretary of Defense. The ground-based components of the Ballistic Missile System testbed are located in Alaska and California, within the U.S. Northern Command area of responsibility (AOR).

Do the elements of the Ballistic Missile Defense System testbed, located in Alaska and California, presently fall under command and control of the Missile Defense Agency, U.S. Northern Command or another combatant commander(s)?

Answer. The Missile Defense Agency is not a military unit and does not exercise the command authorities of combatant command, operational control, or tactical control. The Ballistic Missile Defense System testbed is being developed by the MDA; command and control functions will be performed by the supported combatant commander. The exact command relationships are still being worked by the Joint Staff and Combatant Commanders.

Question. Does the Unified Command Plan require a specific decision by the President or the Secretary of Defense to assign the assets of the testbed from the Missile Defense Agency to U.S. Northern Command or another combatant commander?

Answer. The Missile Defense Agency (MDA) has been directed to make available the ballistic missile defense capabilities of the testbed for combatant commanders beginning in 2004. Ballistic missile defense will be executed like all other military operations—under authority of the President and Secretary of Defense, through the combatant commands. Testbed elements will remain MDA assets and capabilities will be made available to United States Strategic Command (USSTRATCOM), the supported commander for missile defense, for further use by other combatant commanders as the situation dictates.

Question. Is such a decision being considered in the case of the initial operating capability provided by the Ballistic Missile Defense System testbed?

Answer. The initial operating capabilities of the testbed have been directed to be deployed for operational use beginning in 2004. Specifics are not currently available, but once they are, the Joint Staff would be the most appropriate organization to answer this question.

Question. What is the chain of command that the Missile Defense Agency and the combatant commander will rely on to determine whether to respond to an apparent attack?

Answer. Ballistic missile defense will be executed like all other military operations—under authority of the President and Secretary of Defense, through the combatant commands. Detailed questions on the military chain of command and how the orders to assign/attach the assets of the testbed to a combatant commander should be addressed to the Joint Staff.

BALLISTIC MISSILE DEFENSE SYSTEM—ACQUISITION STRATEGY

Question. Unlike most other major acquisition programs, the initial capability of the Ballistic Missile Defense System does not have a fixed system architecture, and does not have an operational requirements document (ORD). Also, within the Department of Defense the philosophy for developing the system is that no single system integrator has the expertise to bring together all the technologies needed to develop and integrated a missile defense system. Therefore, the Missile Defense Agency has established a National Team approach for System Engineering, and Battle Management and Command and Control. The concept is similar to the Lead System Integrator (LSI) approach used by the Army to develop the Future Combat System.

Please explain the National Team model employed by the Missile Defense Agency to develop missile defense technologies.

Answer. Prior to fiscal year 2003, Missile Defense consisted of a collection of individual programs (e.g., Ground-based missile defense (GMD), Theater High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD), PATRIOT, Airborne laser (ABL), etc.). With submittal of the fiscal year 2002 Amended Budget, the Secretary of Defense directed the Missile Defense Agency to create a single, fully integrated Major Defense Acquisition Program with the mission of defeating a wide range of missile threats, from boost to terminal phases of flight. This program was also to be capability-vice requirements-based. In other words, the program would increase in capability over time as new concepts and ways of integrating and using elements and components were developed.

The Missile Defense National Team is the concept determined to be the most appropriate vehicle for obtaining the best and brightest people from industry, Government support contractors, and Government to provide the Ballistic Missile Defense System (BMDS)-level systems engineering and command, control, battle management, and communications expertise to create this single integrated, capability-based, program. The Missile Defense National Team has two parts: the MDNT (Systems) and the MDNTB (Battle Management Command and Control). While Element Programs continue to have systems engineering functions for their specific mission, the MDNTS has systems engineering responsibility for the entire BMDS mission. The MDNTB has the responsibility for the C2BMC element of the BMDS which integrates all of the sensor and weapons elements into a single BMDS.

Question. The Missile Defense Agency has adopted an evolutionary development strategy that organizes its programs into a series of blocks with each subsequent block representing a new increment of "militarily useful technology". This process begins with block 2004. Please define for the Committee the capabilities in block 2004 and any other blocks funded in the fiscal year 2004 budget request.

Answer. The fiscal year 2004 budget requests funds for Blocks 2004, 2006 and 2008. Only Block 2004 has been defined in specific capabilities. Blocks 2006 and

2008 are defined in terms of estimated capabilities based on projected technical maturity and expected threat environments.

Ballistic Missile Defense (BMD) evolutionary development in Block 2004 is focused on four major capability areas:

- Ground-based defense versus long-range threats
- Sea-based defense versus short/medium-range threats
- Air-based boost kill demonstration
- Forward-based tracking sensors

Technologies supporting each of these capability areas constitute the "militarily useful technology" from which incremental development of new capabilities will continue through Blocks 2006 and 2008.

Major capabilities areas for Block 2006 and 2008 are identified in both the classified and unclassified MDA Statement of Goals (SOG), which identifies and specifies key goals and objectives for the Ballistic Missile Defense System (BMDS).

Block 2006 will build on militarily useful technologies from Block 2004 that provide capabilities for:

- Ground-based defense versus short/medium-range threats
- Netted, forward-based tracking and discrimination sensors (ground, sea)
- Space-based tracking sensors
- Advanced C2BM and discrimination software

Block 2008 continues evolutionary development of capabilities in the areas of:

- Ground-, sea-, and air-based boost kill versus long-range threats
- Sea-based sensors/weapon advances against short-, medium-, long-range threats
- Advanced sensor fusion and discrimination software

Question. Each block is intended to present a "militarily useful" capability. How do you define that term? Does it indicate an increase in the quantity or quality of assets, or both? Please explain.

Answer. Military Utility is the term used to describe the possession of a "militarily useful" capability. Military Utility is the military worth of a system performing its mission in a competitive environment, including versatility (or potential) of the system. It is measured against the operational concept, operational effectiveness, safety, security, and cost/worth. Military utility estimates form a rational basis for making management decisions. Military utility can be applied to an increase in quantity of assets as measured against the operational concept and successful accomplishment of the mission. Military utility can also be applied to an increase in quality of assets as measured against operational effectiveness in the ability to accomplish the mission reliably and safely. When taken in the context of a particular block, an increase in military utility can be based on: an increase in the quantity of assets, improved performance of an asset(s), or a combination of quantity and quality.

Question. The Committee understands that the Missile Defense Agency has chosen not to develop an operational requirements document (ORD) for the initial BMDS capability. Why?

Answer. In January 2002, the Department made the decision to cancel the ORDs that were in effect for the different missile defense programs as part of the creation of the combined Ballistic Missile Defense System (BMDS) program.

The traditional development process started with specific military requirements generated by the user and became formalized in the Operational Requirements Document, or ORD. This traditional ORD approach has generally served the Department well, especially in procurements involving well-known technologies, proven systems, sizeable production runs, and established operational experience. However, these conditions do not exist in missile defense.

For us, the strengths of the traditional requirements generation process can also be its weaknesses. It is rigorous, but that very rigor translates into a lack of the flexibility needed to deal with unprecedented technology development and uncertainty with the threats. Requirements defined in ORDs are typically set many years before actual system deployment, and can often lead to less than optimum capability against a threat that exceeds the description specified earlier. Furthermore, at the moment, we do not yet know all the technical approaches that will work best. A capability-based approach allows us to adjust to those changes in ways that the traditional requirement-based approach does not.

Although capability-based acquisition changes the approach for determining a project's baseline, once those baselines are set the development process continues normally down to the contract level. So there is accountability in terms of end product.

In summary, capability-based acquisition is a flexible approach to the acquisition of complex systems, incorporating advanced technologies, that permits the early de-

ployment of a limited but effective capability that can be progressively enhanced over time as needed. It provides for continuous warfighter involvement and disciplined development aimed at reducing cycle time. It stays relevant to the threat and remains technologically current. That is our vision for the capability-based approach and also how we intend to execute it. This structure supports our capability-based approach by allowing necessary flexibility for the development of the program, while retaining the equally important structure to guide development efforts.

Question. How does the lack of an ORD effect the testing requirements to support developing the BMDS?

Answer. The lack of an ORD does not affect BMDS testing requirements.

The development and acquisition of the BMDS follows a different approach than traditional acquisition programs. MDA is developing the BMDS using an evolutionary acquisition approach, which leverages incremental development, to adapt to changing threats and maturing technologies. This allows MDA to build a capability to defend against threat capabilities instead of specific point solutions that might be easily defeated or become out of date with warfighter needs. The ORD-based requirements process became too slow and cumbersome to respond to changes in the threat and technological innovations available for solutions. Capability-based planning allows MDA to field an effective initial defense and then upgrade this rudimentary but effective capability over time.

It is important to remember that the lack of an ORD does not mean a lack of documented needs. BMDS components will continue to undergo rigorous testing, and will be subject to annual assessment by the Director of Operational Test and Evaluation (DOT&E). This assessment, which will be reported to Congress, will include the Department's operational assessments of system suitability and system effectiveness at each Block decision point beginning with Block 04. Over time, the missile defense system will undergo increasingly stressing testing and results will be used to improve the initial capabilities that President Bush directed MDA to field.

AIRBORNE LASER PROGRAM

Question. The Airborne Laser (ABL) program integrates a laser onto a 747 aircraft to shoot down ballistic missiles during the boost phase. The fiscal year 2004 budget request includes \$610 million for this effort. A lethal shootdown test is scheduled for the first quarter of fiscal year 2005.

Please describe the laser system including the number and weight of the laser modules, and the total weight of the laser.

Answer. The High Energy Laser (HEL) system is located in the rear two-thirds of the YAL-1A aircraft. The system consists of six Chemical Oxygen-Iodine Laser (COIL) modules, which together produce a megawatt-class beam. The COIL works by combining, in different stages of its operation, basic hydrogen peroxide (BHP), chlorine, and iodine. Each COIL module is made up of around 3,600 parts and is approximately eighteen feet tall. Loaded with BHP, each module weighs about 6,500 pounds. However, with the supporting equipment, including tanks and plumbing, reactant chemicals, refrigeration and heating systems, optical system, and support structure, the entire HEL system weighs about 100,000 pounds.

Question. When is the first planned test of the laser modules? Does this test include the full complement of laser modules—equal to the amount planned for a fully functional weapon system? If not, when is the first planned test of the full complement of lasers?

Answer. The first COIL module intended for actual installation on YAL-1A was tested at TRW's Capistrano Test Site late in 2001 and early in 2002. In its final tests in January 2002, it produced 118% of required power. That laser module has been "cloned" five times and together these six modules will make up the HEL grouping on YAL-1A. The first test of all six laser modules operating at the same time—called "first light"—is now anticipated to take place later this year. These six modules will comprise the weapon system that will be used in the missile shootdown now scheduled for FY05.

Question. The Committee understands that the aircraft requires extensive modifications to cope with the weight of the laser system. Please describe these modifications and their associated costs.

Answer. The primary purpose of the extensive aircraft modifications was not due to the weight of the laser as much as it was to physically attaching the laser, the turret, the optical benches and all the associated subsystems to the structure of the aircraft. The modification consisted of over 22,000 new parts with an estimate at completion on the order of \$225 million.

Question. What is the projected weight of the fully laden block 04 aircraft as configured for the shootdown demonstration? Please compare this to the gross takeoff limit of a 747 airframe?

Answer. The weapon system aboard YAL-1A (which includes lasers, optics, surveillance system, and the 12,000-pound nose turret) is expected to weigh approximately 200,000 pounds. The takeoff weight of YAL-1A is about 700,000 pounds. A basic Boeing 747-400F has a gross take off limit of 800,000 lbs.

Question. The fiscal year 2004 budget request was reduced \$220.4 million from the previous FYDP level. Please explain why.

Answer. Funds for the ABL Block 2008 weapon system and the ABL Ground Test Facility (a.k.a. Iron Bird) design efforts were rephased to fiscal year 2005 and fiscal year 006 as the result of more detailed planning for these efforts and to accommodate MDA funding priorities in fiscal year 004.

Question. The Committee understands that part of the funding reduction compared to the previous FYDP is the result of a change in budgeting practices for aircraft termination liability. Please explain.

Answer. The reduction in funds from the previous FYDP was not affected by aircraft termination liability.

RUSSIAN AMERICAN OBSERVATION SATELLITES (RAMOS)

Question. The Missile Defense Agency budget materials explain that RAMOS is not an operational element of the overall Ballistic Missile Defense System (BMDS). It is a cooperative effort with the Russian Federation on "mutually beneficial" research that is missile defense related and serves as the basis for future cooperative efforts. The planned launch of satellites developed in this program is fiscal year 2008 with a two-year on-orbit life expectancy. The budget request for fiscal year 2004 includes \$29.6 million for this program. Through the current FYDP, the program totals \$329.8 million.

What is the objective of the RAMOS program? What contribution does it make to missile defense capabilities?

Answer. The program content has been jointly defined so as to not violate the technology export protections of the two countries. There are two objectives to the RAMOS Program: (1) to increase cooperation and trust between U.S. and Russian Federation (RF) agencies by developing working relationships within the scientific community in order to establish the groundwork for future cooperative efforts between the RF and the U.S. to improve early warning and theater missile defense related technologies and (2) to develop mutually beneficial research such as measuring missile warm body intensities against earth background using mid-to-long wave infrared (MLWIR) in order to demonstrate the potential effectiveness of tracking sensors in this band for below-the-horizon (BTH) to above-the-horizon (ATH) trajectory determination; study the application of MLWIR and stereo for missile tracking; measure the utility of infrared passbands to mitigate clutter and reduce false alarms and to study the use of multi-spectral stereo observations for environmental monitoring and forecasting. Specific contributions to missile defense are technical research on potential spectral regions for missile hardbody tracking, techniques for multi-sensor data fusion, mitigation of early warning false alarms, and environmental monitoring of weather systems. This research is intended to benefit space-based missile defense systems by validating polarization solar clutter mitigation techniques for shortwave infrared (SWIR) acquisition sensors, by improving robustness of BTH midcourse tracking, and by demonstrating detection and geo-location of missile ignition through clouds.

Question. The Committee understands that a government-to-government agreement with Russia needs to be signed for the program to proceed. Approval of this agreement is currently predicted for the fourth quarter of fiscal year 2003. Do you view this as realistic?

Answer. Yes, that is feasible. The Russian side claims to be prepared for finalization this year. The U.S. side has identified no "show stoppers." However, final agreement may not be reached until after calendar year 2003.

Question. What program costs are paid by Russia?

Answer. Russian program costs include nonrecurring engineering for the satellite platform used for both satellites; nonrecurring engineering for defense conversion of launch vehicles and launch services for both satellites; development of a satellite ground station network; ground station equipment and mission operations center manning and facilities; scientific, thematic analysis of shared data, and management and administrative support. It appears by their development pace that the Russian effort is supported with funds in addition to what is provided by the U.S.

KWAJALEIN ATOLL TEST RANGE FACILITIES

Question. The United States State Department is currently engaged in negotiations to continue U.S. access to test range facilities on Kwajalein Atoll.

General Kadish, the Committee understands that the State Department is presently engaged in renegotiating use of the range facilities at Kwajalein. How are the negotiations proceeding?

Answer. Negotiations are complete. Formal signing of the renegotiated Compact of Free Association as well as the amended Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA) and the amended Military Use and Operating Rights Agreement (MUORA), occurred on 30 April 2003. The renegotiated MUORA extends U.S. access to the Kwajalein defense sites until 2066, and possibly to 2088 if the U.S. so desires. The State Department will submit the amended Compact texts, including the MUORA extension, to Congress.

Question. In your view, is there a risk that we may lose access to this facility?

Answer. At this point there does not appear to be any risk of losing access to the facility. Both the State Department and the Government of the Republic of Marshall Islands appear to be satisfied with the renegotiated agreements.

Question. If DoD were to lose access to the facility at Kwajalein, are there other facilities that afford the Missile Defense Agency with similar capabilities?

Answer. The other Pacific test ranges offer some similar capabilities. However, the radar instrumentation suite at Kwajalein is unmatched in terms of capability and until the GMD test silos are complete at VAFB, Kwajalein is the only facility that can launch GMD interceptors.

PATRIOT PAC-3 MISSILES

Question. The fiscal year 2004 budget request proposes \$561.6 million to procure 108 Patriot PAC-3 missiles. Including the acceleration of this program funded in the fiscal year 2003 Omnibus Appropriations Act, \$592.2 million is available for this program in fiscal year 2003. The Omnibus added \$104 million to the program and increased the procurement quantity to 100 missiles. The fiscal year 2004 budget also proposes transferring funding and management of this program from the Missile Defense Agency to the Army.

Please explain the results of the Patriot PAC-3 acceleration funded in the fiscal year 2003 Omnibus Appropriations Act.

Answer. In September 2002, the Deputy Secretary of Defense directed the acceleration of Patriot Advanced Capability-3 (PAC-3) Missile production. The fiscal year 2003 Omnibus Appropriations Bill passed on 20 February 2003, contained \$104 million for the accelerated delivery of PAC-3 Missiles already on contract (LRIP-2 and LRIP-3) and the procurement of 12 additional missiles in FY03, for a total of 100. On 10 March 03, the Lower Tier Project Office and AMCOM Acquisition Center executed the contract modifications to implement the acceleration. Accelerated deliveries were first realized in April 2003. LRIP-2 (40 missiles) will be delivered 3 months ahead of the contracted schedule and LRIP-3 (72 missiles) 10 months ahead of schedule.

Question. Does the quantity proposed in the fiscal year 2004 budget rely on the acceleration funded in the fiscal year 2003 Omnibus Appropriations Act?

Answer. No.

Question. What quantity of Patriot PAC-3 missiles is proposed in fiscal year 2004? Through the FYDP?

Answer. Previous-264, fiscal year 2004-108, fiscal year 2005-131, fiscal year 2006-144, fiscal year 2007-144, fiscal year 2008-184, fiscal year 2009-184, TOTAL-1159.

Question. Please explain how accelerating the Patriot PAC-3 program fits into the Administration's plan to deploy a Ballistic Missile Defense System in 2004-2005?

Answer. The PAC-3 acceleration decision in September 2002 was required in preparation for Operation Iraqi Freedom and was unrelated to the Presidential decision to deploy a Ballistic Missile Defense System (BMDS) in 2004-2005. The added missiles will remain in the Army inventory and unless expended will be available for missile defense missions.

Question. In April 2003, the Department announced the intent to merge the Patriot and MEADS programs. Please explain the intended effect of this consolidation.

Answer. The Department of Defense has directed the Army to pursue a combined program that addresses the evolution from current PATRIOT capability to an integrated PAC-3/MEADS full capability. Combining the closely related PATRIOT and MEADS programs in an integrated spiral development program will provide Objective Force MEADS capabilities earlier while simultaneously maintaining fielded PAC-3 capabilities. Overall life cycle costs will be reduced for the combined program

vice two stovepipe programs while preserving international cooperation. The combined program provides efficiencies in replacing PATRIOT/PAC-3 end items with objective MEADS end items in a streamlined evolutionary and capabilities based acquisition approach.

Question. How will the consolidation of the Patriot and MEADS programs effect resource requirements in fiscal year 2004?

Answer. None. While overall life cycle cost reductions will be realized from the combined PATRIOT/MEADS program approach, all requested fiscal year 2004 funds are required to initiate this revised program approach. A reduction in funding would signal weak U.S. support for the revised program approach to our international partners.

Question. In the fiscal year 2003 Omnibus Appropriations Act, funding for an enhancement to the Patriot PAC-3 program was cut to fund accelerated missile production. Please describe this enhancement. Does the Department intend to continue development and implementation of this enhancement to the PAC-3 missile? What is the current state of development of the Pegasus enhancement to the PAC-3 missile?

Answer. The PAC-3 Missile Segment Enhancement (MSE) program, formerly known as Pegasus, increases the range of the PAC-3 missile against its full complement of threat systems. The Department intends to continue development and implementation of this enhancement. A sole-source development contract to Lockheed-Martin Missiles and Fire Controls is scheduled for award in July 2003.

Question. What is the relationship between the Patriot PAC-3 and PAC-2 missiles. What are the similarities and differences? Do these missiles use common launch hardware?

Answer. The PAC-2 missile employs a blast fragmentation warhead. It has a limited capability against ballistic missile threats. The Guidance Enhanced Missile (GEM) and GEM+ are improvements to the PAC-2 that increase the capability against ballistic missiles and cruise missiles. The PAC-2, GEM and GEM+ launcher load is four. The PAC-3 missile is a hit to kill missile. It has an expanded defended area and a significantly improved capability against ballistic missiles. The hit to kill missile mitigates weapons of mass destruction threat. The PAC-3 launcher load is sixteen. The PAC-2 launcher must be upgraded with the Enhanced Launcher Electronic System (ELES) to fire PAC-3 missiles. An upgraded launcher can fire PAC-3, GEM, GEM+ and PAC-2 missiles.

Question. The fiscal year 2004 budget request transfers Patriot PAC-3 funding and management responsibilities from the Missile Defense Agency to the Army. Why? What criteria were used to make this recommendation?

Answer. In a recent decision, USD(AT&L) determined that the PAC-3 interceptor met the criteria of Section 224(b) of Title 10, United States Code in that: (1) sufficient confidence in an improved capability to counter ballistic missiles is based on successful testing (to include the IOT&E program); (2) plans and resources are in place to ensure that facilities are available to support production (production is ongoing and production capacity improvements are on contract); and (3) funds are programmed in the Future Years Defense Program to carry out the production plans (now in the POM). As a result of this determination, USD(AT&L) directed that PAC-3 program management be transferred to the Army.

PATRIOT DEPLOYMENT—OPERATION IRAQI FREEDOM

Question. Reports on the deployment of the Patriot missile system in support of Operation Iraqi Freedom have been mixed. The system successfully intercepted several Iraqi missiles during the operation, but the system was also involved in three friendly-fire incidents including the downing of two coalition aircraft.

What types of Patriot missiles are deployed in support of operations in Iraq, PAC-2? PAC-3? Both?

Answer. Coalition forces deployed PAC-2, Guidance Enhanced Missiles (GEM), GEM+ and PAC-3 missiles in support of operations in Iraq.

Question. Media reports indicate that several Iraqi missiles were successfully intercepted in the early stages of operations. Do you yet know the types of missiles that were intercepted?

Answer. The types of missiles intercepted were ABABAIL, and AL SAMOUD.

Question. How many attempted intercepts did U.S. or other forces initiate?

Answer. There were a total of 9 Patriot engagements.

Question. Backup materials for the fiscal year 2003 Supplemental budget request suggest that additional funding is included for additional Patriot missiles. How many and what types of Patriot missiles?

Answer. The Supplemental request is for 22 PAC-3 missiles.

Question. What is the production lead-time between funding and receipt of additional Patriot missiles?

Answer. For the fiscal year 2003 PAC-3 missile production contract, lead time between contract award and first delivery is 17 months.

THEATER HIGH ALTITUDE AIR DEFENSE SYSTEM

Question. The Theater High Altitude Air Defense (THAAD) system will provide a deployable defense capability against short- and medium-range ballistic missiles. Is THAAD part of the initial Ballistic Missile Defense System capability?

Answer. THAAD is not part of the Missile Defense Agency's (MDA's) Initial Defensive Operations (IDO), but is part of the planning for MDA's Block 2004 capability.

Question. The Committee understands that the THAAD radar may complement the BMD system. How will THAAD be integrated into the larger architecture? Where will the radars be deployed?

Answer. Current plans are to integrate all BMDS elements via the BMDS Command and Control/Battle Management (C2/BM) element. The BMDS will take advantage of each element's capability to contribute to missile defense missions. The THAAD system was designed to defeat tactical theater ballistic missiles. The THAAD system (which includes its own C2/BM component) will be integrated into the BMDS primarily to meet this mission need. Plans are to establish connectivity between the BMDS C2/BM component and the THAAD system. This integration will provide for the THAAD system to contribute to other BMDS missions, and to contribute overall BMDS effectiveness. Some of the options include providing cues to the THAAD system and, conversely, using the THAAD radar component to cue other BMDS elements (e.g. Aegis or Ground-based Midcourse Defense). These capabilities will be realized through the BMDS C2/BM element. Modifications to the THAAD system will be required to facilitate connection to the BMDS and to implement functionality beyond its original mission area. Current plans are to procure additional THAAD radar components and modify them to function as forward deployed sensors to support all BMDS missions. This work involves development of new software to operate the radar differently and to provide connectivity to the BMDS C2/BM element. There are currently no firm deployment plans.

Question. THAAD is intended to be a strategically deployable system. Does the fact that THAAD may be deployed to support contingencies limit its contribution to the BMD system?

Answer. No. The THAAD element is an integral part of the overall BMDS. The deployment of the THAAD system in support of contingencies will not limit its contribution to the BMD system.

Question. Please explain the lift requirements needed to deploy THAAD into an area of operations. The Committee understands that five C-17s are required to deploy the system including the radar, missiles and launcher. Is this correct?

Answer. THAAD is C-130, C-141, C-17, and C-5 transportable. Deployment of a THAAD minimal launch equipment requires five C-17 aircraft. Deployment of a full-up THAAD battery requires twenty-one C-17 aircraft. For intra-theater transport all THAAD elements are C-130 transportable except for the radar components which are transportable by C-141 and larger aircraft.

Question. The Committee understands that the THAAD system has suffered numerous test failures because of hardware quality. Please comment on the testing difficulties that have affected this system.

Answer. During the Program Definition and Risk Reduction (PD&RR) phase of the THAAD program there were nine test flights prior to successful target intercepts on flights ten and eleven. Flight one was a characterization flight to demonstrate launch and early flight characteristics of the missile. This flight met all objectives. Flight two and three were not intercept flights, but design defects prevented the flights from meeting all objectives. The design defects were corrected for subsequent flights. Flight four had defective avionics software logic, which caused the Divert and Attitude Control System (DACS) to expend too much fuel. This was corrected for subsequent flights. Flight five had a design defect in the separation connector, which prevented separation of the kill vehicle. This too was corrected for subsequent flights. Flight six failed due to contamination of the focal plane of the seeker. Stringent cleaning and handling procedures were implemented to prevent recurrence of this problem. Flight seven failed due to epoxy contamination of the battery connector on the DACS power system. Fabrication procedures were revised to preclude this problem. Flight eight failed due to contamination of a connector in the Thrust Vector Actuator (TVA) causing an electrical short. Fabrication procedures were revised to correct this problem. Flight nine failed due to a cracked

thruster nozzle in the DACS, which prevented flight control of the missile. Fabrication procedures were revised to prevent this problem. Flights ten and eleven were successful intercepts.

THAAD has implemented many design changes and greatly enhanced its Quality Assurance program as a result of "lessons learned" from failures due to poor hardware quality during PD&RR. These changes and an increased emphasis on Quality Assurance practices have resulted in a rigorous Quality Assurance program and will preclude the same type of failures experienced during PD&RR. To the present time, testing is being conducted to verify the acceptability of THAAD component design to meet requirements and to verify fabrication processes. Current, rigorous ground testing at the piece part level is greatly facilitating the early identification and resolution of technical issues.

Question. The Committee understands that the current THAAD program baseline has added 18 months of testing and \$850 million above the previous baseline. Please explain why the schedule and funding requirements have changed.

Answer. The additional 18 months of testing addressed compares the current THAAD baseline to the previous phase of the program. For the current Development Phase of the element program in the BMDS, additional time was allocated to comprehensively test the system at the piece-part and sub-assembly levels and to complete the verification of design testing prior to completion of design activity on the program. The current program baseline allows for much more extensive pre-flight qualification testing to occur prior to the first flight. In addition, program funding was increased in fiscal year 2002 to advance design and ground test activities, conduct earlier integrated element testing, and add two flight tests to the program. Hardware deliveries and software upgrades have been re-phased to allow for a minimum of three flight tests a year beginning in late fiscal year 2004 and continuing each fiscal year through the conclusion of the flight test program in second quarter, fiscal year 2009. Program changes have resulted in extending the duration of the flight test schedule to second quarter fiscal year 2009 (originally planned to end in first quarter fiscal year 2008).

Question. Please explain the relationship between the THAAD radar and the Green Pine radar used for the Arrow missile defense system.

Answer. The THAAD and Arrow radars both provide targeting data that is transmitted to the system interceptors for defensive operations. However, the radars operate in different frequencies with different operational characteristics. Both THAAD and Arrow use Link-16 interoperability, allowing the radars to exchange track and cueing data.

a. The Arrow Green Pine is an L-band radar. L-band provides excellent long-range surveillance but has limited discrimination capability. The Green Pine was designed for operation at fixed sites. While the radar is road-mobile, it is not strategically deployable by air due to size and ground support requirements. L-band is generally less expensive than X-band, and the Israelis chose L-band for the Arrow primarily due to cost considerations.

b. The THAAD system uses an X-band radar. X-band provides better discrimination and smaller radar antenna size than lower-frequency bands, but the resulting narrower beam width limits its capability for wide area surveillance. The THAAD radar generally uses external satellite cueing for initial tracking. Because of its smaller size, the THAAD radar can be both tactically and strategically deployed by aircraft very rapidly anywhere in the world.

SPACE TRACKING AND SURVEILLANCE SYSTEM (STSS)

Question. Formerly the Space-Based Infrared Surveillance-Low (SBIRS-Low), the Space Tracking and Surveillance System (STSS) will place satellites in low earth orbit to demonstrate this technology and enhance tracking performance of BMDS interceptors. The Missile Defense Agency plans to launch two satellites to complement BMDS radar assets. A key aspect of this program is the additional discrimination that infrared sensors provide as a complement to the radar systems used in the BMDS.

Please explain how the infrared capability provided by the STSS program complements tracking radars that operate within the earth's atmosphere? What is timeline for implementing these capabilities?

Answer. A constellation of STSS satellites would provide global tracking of missiles from the boost phase through interception filling the gaps in terrestrial-based radars. STSS' infrared sensors complement radars as the two phenomenologies perform differently against countermeasures. Radar countermeasures do not have much effect on infrared tracking and discrimination and infrared countermeasures do not have much effect on radar tracking and discrimination. STSS will field two R&D

satellites in fiscal year 2007 with additional satellites planned for Block 2010. These satellites will provide the data needed to determine the future role of space based infrared sensors in the BMDS architecture. A constellation of STSS satellites would have the additional benefit of providing continuous global tracking.

Question. Block 2006 calls for fiscal year 2007 launch of two "low-risk" satellites for contribution to the BMD test bed. Please describe the planned satellite launches and other activities planned for block 2006 as funded in 2004 budget request.

Answer. The Block 2006 program consists of satellite hardware from the Flight Demonstration System (FDS) program and a ground station for the operation of the 2006 and future STSS satellites. The FDS satellites were planned demonstration flights under the SBIRS Low program. As the hardware is already built and performance relatively well understood, the hardware is considered low risk. The 2004 budget request supports the continued testing, integration and launch of the FDS satellites in 2007.

Question. Please compare the planned satellite launches under the STSS program to the launches planned under SBIRS-Low.

Answer. The STSS program, through a spiral development approach, will launch a series of R&D satellites beginning in fiscal year 2007, with follow-on satellites containing more advanced technologies in Block 2010. These satellites will work in conjunction with the BMDS Testbed with the expressed purpose of demonstrating the contribution of space based infrared sensors to missile tracking and closing the fire control loop. While the inherent discrimination capability of the Block 2006 satellites will be assessed, follow-on satellites will explore this contribution more thoroughly. The performance of the R&D satellites will provide the basis to make an informed decision on what kind of constellation would optimize BMDS performance.

The old SBIRS Low program was a traditional ORD based acquisition program. The first satellite of the operational constellation was to be launched in 2006 with the full constellation on orbit in the 2011 timeframe.

Question. Part of block 2006 includes a "system capability review". What is the purpose of this review? Is it a surrogate for the more traditional acquisition process milestones? Is it a gateway to subsequent blocks of missile defense development?

Answer. System Capability Reviews replace System Requirements Reviews as the initial step in defining a block capability.

Question. Blocks 2008 and 2010 emphasize improvements in algorithms and discrimination. Please explain the objectives of these blocks of development.

Answer. Block 2008 provides upgrades to the Ground Segment, data processing and discrimination algorithms of the Block 2006 satellites. Block 2010 provides an additional R&D satellite, nominally planned for launch in 2011. As the desired capabilities of the Block 2010 satellites have not yet been determined, there is uncertainty in this launch date. One of the key goals in the Block 2010 program is to advance the understanding of the discrimination capabilities of space based infrared sensors.

Question. Block 2010 proposes developing a common "bus" for future satellites. Please explain the objective of this part of the STSS program. Will the bus increase commonality of satellite design and reduce costs? Improve reliability? Are there other benefits?

Answer. The objective of the common bus is to provide a common basis for the series of R&D satellites being developed under STSS. As the STSS program is structured to field progressively more advanced sensors to demonstrate key functionality to the BMDS, sensors will evolve from block to block. While the corresponding bus composition for each may not be identical, the goal of the common bus is to have an open architecture with as many standard components as possible—such as communication gear, cooling systems, solar arrays, and satellite superstructure. This common bus design will provide a common framework into which multiple sensors can be integrated and operated as a heterogeneous constellation. Long-term benefits are expected to be reduced costs, quicker design cycles, and increased reliability.

TARGETS AND COUNTERMEASURES

Question. In the fall of 2001 the Missile Defense Agency (MDA) created a program to develop targets and countermeasures to support the Ballistic Missile Defense System (BMDS). MDA indicates that this effort develops "capabilities driven" materials intended to test BMDS components over a range of possible conditions rather than attempting to duplicate specific threat systems. \$278.3 million is included in the fiscal year 2004 budget request for this program.

Explain the objectives of the Targets and Countermeasures program and your progress to date developing materials to test the BMDS system.

Answer. Note: The fiscal year 2004 President's Budget request for the Targets and Countermeasures program was \$249.1 million, and not \$278.3 million.

Objectives of Targets and Countermeasures: The Targets and Countermeasures program mission is to:

- Design, develop, fabricate, and provide capability-driven, reliable, and cost-effective ballistic missile targets and countermeasures to test the Ballistic Missile Defense System (BMDS).
- Implement advanced developmental initiatives that are capabilities driven to support BMDS Block development. Develop threat credible new target boosters and payloads to support increased complexity and pace for the BMDS and BMDS Elements' testing. This includes countermeasures, reentry vehicles, instrumentation, and adaptor sections/deployment mechanisms.
- Award the Prime Contract for single system management of Targets and Countermeasures. The prime contractor will be responsible for managing and executing the entire MDA Targets and Countermeasures Program. The prime contract will provide comprehensive Systems Engineering support, deliver reliable target system performance, provide assistance to understand, manage and continually reduce target acquisition cycle time drivers and constraints, control program costs to attain best value and to stimulate creative cost reduction initiatives, and focus on components and capability-based product lines through integration and launch of target systems.

Materials Development to Date:

- Developed two reentry vehicle systems (Medium Target Reentry Vehicle and Generic Rest Of World) and associated countermeasure/decoy suites to address test requirements of multiple components of the BMDS.
- Established a program for payload development and successfully completed countermeasure payload development for two Advanced Concepts Flight Tests (third quarter, fiscal year 2003).
- Completed development of a countermeasure payload for the Critical Measurement Program (CMP-4) planned for second quarter, fiscal year 2005-2007.
- Initiated the design phase of the Small Low Observable (SLO) target suite, which includes a dynamic range reentry vehicle and associated countermeasures. SLO is a robust target designed to test a wide span of the BMDS capability space during fiscal year 2007.xxxxxxxxxx
- Initiated payload development for the Critical Measurements and Countermeasures-1 Flight Test.
- Completed awards for the Short Range Air Launch Targets (SRALT) and Long Range Air Launch Targets (LRALT), Medium Range Target, Short Range Liquid Fuel Target Booster, and Foreign Materiel Acquisition Risk Reduction Flight. A risk reduction flight of the LRALT target is planned for the fourth quarter, fiscal year 2003.

Question. The Committee understands that the program philosophy is to develop targets and materials to test a range of capabilities rather than to duplicate specific threat systems. What will MDA do to ensure that this program is periodically updated to reflect the capabilities of threat systems?

Answer. MDA has a capability-based system engineering and integration and testing process which defines, manages, integrates, demonstrates, and tests all BMDS capabilities. The BMDS evolutionary acquisition process is driven to counter the adversary's capability (threat) as described in the Adversary Capability Document (ACD). Targets are designed to emulate the technical parameters in the ACD that demonstrates the capability of the BMDS beyond current threat capabilities. The ACD will be updated periodically based on intelligence information, but the goal of the capabilities-based BMDS development, which also extends to the test target program, is to anticipate and stay ahead of the threat.

Question. The Committee understands that one of the major program goals for fiscal year 2004 is the award of a prime contract for a single system manager of Targets and Countermeasures. How will this contract award advance the Targets and Countermeasures program?

Answer. The prime contractor, as a single system management element, will be responsible for managing and executing the entire MDA Targets and Countermeasures Program. The prime contract will provide comprehensive Systems Engineering support, deliver reliable target system performance, provide assistance to understand, manage and continually reduce target acquisition cycle time drivers and constraints, control program costs to attain best value, stimulate creative cost reduction initiatives, and focus on interchangeable components and capability-based product lines including integration and launch of target systems.

[CLERK'S NOTE.—End of questions submitted by Mr. Lewis.]

THURSDAY, MARCH 13, 2003.

**COMBATANT COMMANDER, UNITED STATES NORTHERN
COMMAND**

WITNESS

**GENERAL RALPH E. EBERHART, COMMANDER, NORTH AMERICAN
AEROSPACE DEFENSE COMMAND, AND UNITED STATES NORTHERN
COMMAND, UNITED STATES AIR FORCE**

INTRODUCTION

Mr. LEWIS. The Committee will come to order. I am sure someone communicated to you that the President was scheduled to be at an Irish luncheon here in the building, and some of us decided to attend, and the President was called to other things, and Vice President Cheney was present. In the meantime, we very much appreciate you being with us. You and I spent a little time together yesterday. But at the beginning of the meeting I would like to have a motion to close in order to carry forward the business at a level of security that is necessary.

So with that, the room is secure. It is conceivable we will get to the point where the security will be on the level that, if that is the case, you will help us honor that, General, we may need to clear the room and we will see what happens.

We are pleased to welcome the commanding general of U.S. Northern Command, General Ralph E. Eberhart. Northern Command was established in October of 2002, and General Eberhart is its first commanding general. He is not only our newest regional commander, but the one who is responsible for executing the Department of Defense's role in homeland defense.

As we had our personal conversation yesterday, we spent a lot of time discussing the reality that homeland defense is a new idea seemingly to all of us, the role that you have to play with those who are responsible at a domestic level, local law enforcement otherwise, is certainly a brand-new kind of experience and a challenge for all of us. But then bringing in those agencies who have dealt in challenges overseas as well, the CIA and the FBI and others, new ground is being laid.

I want to tell you how much I appreciate the service that you have given throughout your career to the country. If there is a guy with stars on his shoulders who is up to this challenge, I consider General Eberhart to be certainly that guy. I am not going to dwell on extensive comments on my own. But first, as you are assigned to deter, prevent, defeat threats and aggression aimed at the United States, its territories, interests within your area of responsibility, U.S. NORTHCOM has been the lead DoD command in providing military assistance to our country's civil authorities as well.

The responsibility which falls to you also involves work that you have done for years here dealing with the aerospace community and the like.

General, I personally look forward, as does the Committee as well, to your assessment of not just where we stand today, but where we are headed. It is great to have you with us. We will have your entire statement included in the record. I think you know that is standard operating procedure. Before we ask you to go forward with that, let me call upon my friend, Mr. Murtha.

Mr. MURTHA. No comments.

Mr. LEWIS. That is because I was late, General.

SUMMARY STATEMENT OF GENERAL EBERHART.

General EBERHART. Mr. Chairman, thank you very much, Mr. Murtha, distinguished members of the Committee. It is a pleasure to be with you once again. First, thank you for your continued interest and commitment to a strong national defense and your support of those marvelous men and women and their families out there who serve this great Nation. As you know, Northern Command was established this past October, as the chairman said. It is like all other U.S. unified regional combatant commands. The other commands trace their roots back to the National Security Act of 1947 where we went to a Department of Defense from a Department of War and a Department of the Navy. At that time, and in fact in December of 1947, the Pacific Command, European Command, Southern Command were all established. We didn't establish a command for this area of responsibility at that time because we believed it wouldn't be necessary because of two friendly neighbors and two wide oceans that afforded us protection.

In the 1950s we established the North American Aerospace Defense Command because the threat we perceived at that time was from the air and from Intercontinental Ballistic Missiles or ICBMs. But now in the aftermath of September 11, it became clear that we did, in fact, need a Northern Command, one command that is responsible for defense against all hazards in this area of responsibility.

With that as background, Mr. Chairman, I have been asked by your staff to provide a very short brief, and I assure you it is short, to sort of tell you what Northern Command is and is not, and use that as a point of departure for our discussions. I am not in the habit of coming to brief you in this kind of forum, but with your permission, I will proceed as requested.

Mr. LEWIS. General, that is our purpose. We are very anxious to have you outline some of those solutions to challenges as you see them and we couldn't have a more important subject than this, that is the military's role in defending the homeland. So please proceed.

UNITED STATES NORTHERN COMMAND

(CHART 1)

General EBERHART. I refer members of the Committee to the briefing slides entitled, obviously, U.S. Northern Command Briefing, to this committee. The first slide that is titled United States

Northern Command reiterates that we stood up this past October, what we call initial operational capability. We are proceeding to full operational capability 1 October of this year, but I can assure you if we can get there earlier, that is what we will do.

Secondly, I would put a little hedge on this and say that we probably are never going to be at full operational capability because we should never be satisfied with where we are. This mission will continue to evolve. We have got to stay steps, if not miles, ahead of the enemy. So we need to evolve and push for more capability over time.

It is one of those basic rules that we follow everywhere else except here in this area of responsibility, one command, one commander. Centralized command and control, decentralized execution and on 1 October we set that right. As you said, Mr. Chairman, one stop shopping for active duty military support, whether it is in the homeland defense or homeland security arena.

And then finally, I would offer to you, that regrettably this is going to become increasingly important as these threats increase to our great Nation.

U.S. NORTHCOM MISSION

(CHART 2)

We move to slide 2. The first bullet is a statement that pertains to any unified command—protect the United States's interests and the interest of our friends and allies in the area of responsibility, the classic homeland defense national security mission. But what is different with this area of responsibility is that our homeland is in our area of responsibility. So all things aren't equal in our area of responsibility, the crown jewels are in our area of responsibility.

Therefore, you have the second bullet, and that is, provide military support to civil authorities when one, they ask; and two, the President decides that that is appropriate. And that is what makes this command different as shown in the second bullet there.

U.S. NORTHCOM'S AREA OF RESPONSIBILITY

(CHART 3)

As we move to slide three, what this slide is designed to do is show you our area of responsibility. It is also designed to reemphasize what I just said, that all things aren't equal in our AOR. Those green areas you see on this chart, are areas that are homeland, those are the things that we are really interested in. And they come first in terms of our priority.

And then finally we have the forward region out there. I have that annotated because what we really want to do is deter, prevent, and defeat as far forward as we possibly can. I would much rather capture or kill a terrorist in Afghanistan, in Iraq, out at sea in the Pacific or the Atlantic before they get inside our area of responsibility and certainly before they get inside the green areas, if you will.

So we are interested in things that happen anywhere in the world that might pose a threat to our area of responsibility and to this great Nation.

OUR ROLE IN PROTECTING THE HOMELAND

(CHART 4)

The next slide is an attempt to depict the spectrum of activity. At the far left and bottom are special security events where we will provide security as we did for the Olympics, as we did for the recent State of the Union address, which you all attended. The spectrum goes all the way to the far upper right, which is the classical homeland defense national security mission. Our involvement will vary across the spectrum based on what the capabilities are of the States, the other lead Federal agencies, the size of the threat, how long the threat persists, and what the President decides regarding use of military force.

What is different is that in almost every case in the homeland security mission, we are not going to be in charge. We will be in support of another lead Federal agency. But then in the homeland defense mission we will, in fact, be in charge.

PROVIDING FORCES TO U.S. NORTHCOM

(CHART 5)

We move to the next slide, it is a little bit busy, and I guess my alibi is that I cleaned it up a little bit. It was much busier before. But let's go up to number 1 in the upper left hand side of the slide. How this unfolds, in terms of whether it is a crisis management or a consequence management homeland security issue, that usually a governor, sometimes a lead Federal agency, but almost always a governor, would ask the President for help, for support. He or she does not have, inside the confines of that State, the wherewithal to deal with the threat as they perceive it or the consequence management situation confronting them.

They ask the President for support. The President decides, yes, we should provide Federal support. And at that time, in accordance with Federal Response Plan, or as the President dictates, a lead Federal agency is established. The lead Federal agency decides that they do, in fact, need active duty military support as they work this problem, whether it is crisis management or whether it is consequence management.

At that time the President approves military support. The President goes to the Pentagon and the Pentagon, at number 2, tells U.S. NORTHCOM you are the belly button, you are the one-stop shopping for military support, and tells us, in fact, to support this.

Now, I think it is important here to stop for a second and say we are not sitting there waiting for this to happen. We are trying to, in my words, lead turn this. Obviously we are not getting ahead of the President, we are not getting ahead of the governor, but if we know there is a threat or if we know there is a natural disaster, we are pulling the plans off the shelf, we are looking at the forces that are available to us, we are starting to get our head in the game so that we can respond quickly. In some cases, we can even put forces on military installations close by and wait for the President to tell us to go ahead and engage.

So what is different is that we are focusing on this all day, every day. We are dressing out, if you will, waiting for them to call our plan. And then once orders are issued to us, then we have forces

assigned. If we need additional forces, there is a request for forces. Just like when Tommy Franks needs B-2s or B-1s, he goes to the Pentagon and he gets them.

And then we get those forces. Sometimes we get them from the National Guard, sometimes from Joint Forces Command, and sometimes we will get them from Pacific Command from the West Coast. And those forces will come to us for operational or tactical command and control. And we will employ those forces.

What we do day in and day out, whether we think we are about to have a hurricane hit, a flood, a forest fire, whatever it might be, we ask ourselves some very basic questions: What do we know? And does everyone else who needs to know? So it is more of a "need to share" information approach to life as opposed to the old "need to know," if you will.

The next thing we do is say who will be in charge. Will it be FEMA, will it be the FBI, will it be the Coast Guard? The next thing we ask ourselves is what might they need? What can we provide? We have to think differently here. A perfect example is the sniper attack here in the D.C. area. In most cases in the past, we wouldn't have thought about this, but we said what do we have that we can use in accordance with the laws of the land to protect the citizens of this great Nation? We had some surveillance capability that, in my view, proved valuable.

And then next, we ask ourselves what will be the command and control of those forces? How will we organize ourselves to support that lead Federal agency? We go through a very, very important checklist prior to the event.

So, again, we are ready, our head is in the game so we can respond quickly if the governor or the lead Federal agency, and the President, wants us to engage.

BALLISTIC MISSILE DEFENSE

(CHART 6)

Next slide, please. Obviously we shift from that to a classical national defense mission, and that is ballistic missile defense. Right now we are part of a partnership with the Missile Defense Agency, with the Strategic Command, and with other combatant commands. Essentially, what the Unified Command Plan states is that Strategic Command will be in charge of the overall architecture, the holistic global approach to missile defense, the layered approach that you have heard the President speak of. Strategic Command will also be in charge of detecting, characterizing the attack, and telling Pacific Command, European Command, Northern Command that a missile is headed your way. We think it is going to this place in your AOR and this is the kind of missile it is.

Now, our Area of Responsibility Northern Command, will be a little bit unique in that we will have interceptors in Alaska and, to a limited degree, in California that we will be able to use in the Initial Defensive Operations to counter those ICBMs. Strategic Command will have the overall global holistic view. They will do the detection, provide indications and warning, characterize the attack for us, and then we in Northern Command, would be the trigger pullers of those missiles that exist.

As you know, the clock is ticking. We will have this capability in September of 2004, the last day of September 2004, as we roll into 1 October. So we are busily working with the Missile Defense Agency, Strategic Command and other combatant commanders to develop concepts of operations to ensure we can command and control this capability.

U.S. NORTHCOM BUDGET HIGHLIGHTS

(CHART 7)

The next slide is something I know is very important to you as you proceed here with your markups. This is what our budget is in terms of the headquarters and our components. At the bottom is an Advance Concept Technology Demonstration, an ACTD, that we think will be very important in terms of sharing of information and command and control. We believe the ACTD will have application, not just with U.S. NORTHCOM, not just with the Department of Defense, but will, in fact, be very valuable as we work with the Homeland Security Department and other agencies involved in the security of this Nation.

DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY

(CHART 8)

One of the questions we often get is, "do you work for the Department of Homeland Security?" Again, we need to go back to the basic premise that we are like all other U.S. unified combatant commands. Therefore, our chain of command is to the Secretary of Defense, so we work for the Secretary of Defense. However, that interface, that interaction with the Department of Homeland Security is critical to the success of this mission.

So I like to look at it in terms of strategic, operational, and tactical relationships. At the strategic level, where we set policy, where we make resource commitments department to department, that will be the Secretary of Defense to the Secretary of Homeland Security. Where we do the operational planning so that we can ensure that we can execute that policy, that will be, to some extent, OSD and the Joint Staff. In large measure, that will also be Northern Command working with our counterpart organizations in the Department of Homeland Security. In some cases, it won't be in the Department of Homeland Security, they would be the FBI or any other organization that we need to work with.

Then you have the tactical level. We know how important that tactical level is because that is the "boots on the ground" the young men and women out there who are going to have to train together, exercise together and prepare for the unthinkable. That will be the tactical level department to department, Coast Guard with soldiers, sailors, it will be us with FEMA, and FBI, and the list goes on and on.

CHALLENGES FOR U.S. NORTHCOM

(CHART 9)

Many challenges. And I believe all these challenges are workable. To the last slide. Obviously, resources and budgets are difficult. Although this is not a lot of money, it is a significant

amount. We need the right resources at the right time. The most important thing is to get the right people in this command. I can tell you that the Services are leaning forward and providing excellent support so that we can get the right faces in the right spaces to work this critical issue.

Relationships. I can tell you, Mr. Chairman, that I am very optimistic about what I have seen so far. I also regret to say that I was somewhat pessimistic earlier that people would be interested in their cultures, their turf. But as we bring people together in these table-top exercises, these war gaming events that we have conducted in Colorado Springs, I have seen, without exception, people from all of these other departments wanting to be part of the solution and not part of the problem.

And then finally, the key is the rapid deployment and employment of forces. Getting some place quickly so we, in fact, can hopefully be on the front end to deter, prevent, defeat. And if not so, that we can mitigate the damage of an attack, whether it is a natural disaster or whether it is man-made. That will be the key.

We ask for your support as we proceed down this road. Obviously we have just started this journey. What I can tell you is that compared to a year ago, or 6 months ago, or 3 months ago, we are much more prepared to deal with the unthinkable than we were before.

But we have got a long way to go. We need your support so we can do what the Secretary of Defense has said that this command is all about. It is to protect the men and women of this great Nation where they work and live. Thank you very much.

[The statement and charts of General Eberhart follow:]

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HOUSE APPROPRIATIONS COMMITTEE, DEFENSE SUBCOMMITTEE

STATEMENT OF
GENERAL RALPH E. EBERHART, USAF
COMMANDER
NORTH AMERICAN AEROSPACE DEFENSE COMMAND
AND
UNITED STATES NORTHERN COMMAND
BEFORE THE
HOUSE APPROPRIATIONS COMMITTEE,
DEFENSE SUBCOMMITTEE
13 MARCH 2003

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HOUSE APPROPRIATIONS COMMITTEE, DEFENSE SUBCOMMITTEE

Chairman Lewis, Congressman Murtha and Members of the Subcommittee:

It is an honor to appear before this Committee again, and to represent the outstanding men and women of North American Aerospace Defense Command (NORAD) and United States Northern Command (USNORTHCOM). The soldiers, sailors, airmen, Marines, Coast Guardsmen, National Guardsmen, reservists and civilians serving in our Commands are truly the "best of the best," and give our two great Nations--the United States and Canada--every reason to be proud.

NORAD

Our number one priority is to strengthen aerospace warning and control of United States and Canadian airspace. Prior to 11 September 2001, we focused on threats originating from outside North America. As a result of these terrorist attacks, we now also look for threats from within our borders.

Thanks in large part to the timely passage of the Fiscal Year 2002 Defense Emergency Response Fund, today we have connectivity with 70 Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) long-range interior en route radars, better ground-to-air communications, and a robust coordination capability to provide comprehensive coverage of our airspace.

Throughout this integration effort, the FAA has been very responsive to our requests for technical assistance. This strong partnership of dedicated people is committed to further improving our ability to protect the Nation's airspace.

Operation NOBLE EAGLE. NORAD defends North America from domestic air threats through Operation NOBLE EAGLE. Across the United States and Canada, armed fighters are on alert and flying irregular combat air patrols to identify and intercept suspect aircraft. Since 11 September 2001, we have flown over 27,000 sorties to deter, prevent and defend against potential terrorist attacks, without a single mishap. This tremendous accomplishment is a tribute to the professionalism and perseverance of the men and women executing these missions.

In addition, we are supporting homeland defense operations with a layered air defense of the National Capital Region. We have developed new relationships across the Department of Defense (DoD) and with interagency partners to establish a comprehensive shield to guard our Nation's capital.

To maintain our warfighting edge, we routinely exercise and evaluate our ability to defend against the full spectrum of air threats. United States' and Canadian civil agencies continue to make air travel safer through increased airport and aircraft security measures. However, if called, we stand ready as the last line of defense against threats within our airspace.

North American Air Surveillance Plan. In our efforts to provide the best possible coverage of North America, we have teamed with the FAA and North American Air Surveillance Council to further enhance our wide-area surveillance capabilities. There has been an outstanding level of interagency cooperation to develop a comprehensive North American Air Surveillance Plan that addresses our requirements to detect, identify and classify all aircraft within North American airspace. We look forward to fielding expanded capabilities that track even smaller, low-altitude threats.

NORAD'S RELATIONSHIPS

USNORTHCOM. NORAD and USNORTHCOM are two separate commands. Neither command is subordinate to the other or a part of the other, but we work very closely together. Members of the two commands work side-by-side within the Cheyenne Mountain Operations Center and, in many cases, United States military members are dual-hatted in positions on both staffs.

Bi-National Planning Group. The Departments of Defense and State have been working with their counterparts in Canada to develop additional areas of cooperation to better protect our citizens. One promising outcome of this collaboration is an agreement to establish a Bi-National Planning Group for a two-year term.

This group will identify additional ways to protect our citizens and strengthen air, land and maritime defense of North America, while respecting the national interests and sovereignty of each nation. Members have already begun arriving and will be appended to NORAD.

USNORTHCOM

On 1 October 2002, the President established USNORTHCOM as a regional combatant command to provide "unity of command" for United States military actions that counter threats to our homeland from the air, land, or sea domain. We are just like the other regional combatant commands, with one important difference--the United States homeland is in our area of responsibility.

We conduct operations to deter, prevent, and defeat threats and aggression aimed at the United States, its territories and interests. We also provide military assistance to civil authorities, when directed by the President or the Secretary of Defense. When we work with civil authorities, we will most likely be in a support role to a lead federal agency, providing "one-stop shopping" for federal military assistance. The President's decision to establish USNORTHCOM has enhanced the DoD's ability to provide quick, responsive support, when and where needed.

Organization. USNORTHCOM has few permanently assigned forces. Whenever mission requirements dictate, we will request additional forces from the Secretary of Defense, and if approved, receive them from our force provider, United States Joint Forces Command. Our day-to-day operations are conducted by three subordinate commands:

- The Joint Force Headquarters--Homeland Security supports land and maritime defense planning for the continental United States, and provides military assistance to civil authorities.

- The Joint Task Force-Civil Support provides command and control of consequence management forces that respond to chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear, and high-yield explosive events.
- The Joint Task Force-6 provides support to federal, state and local counterdrug law enforcement agencies.

Exercises. Over the past several months, we have trained and exercised with 55 federal, state and local agencies across a broad spectrum of scenarios. During UNIFIED DEFENSE 02-2 in September 2002, we validated our initial capability to command and control forces in response to future attacks. Most recently, in February 2003, we completed a second major exercise, UNIFIED DEFENSE 03-01, to strengthen the trusted relationships we need with interagency partners to defend our Nation's homeland.

Current Operations. We have demonstrated our ability to conduct operations in a number of emergency situations. During the Washington D.C. sniper attacks, we coordinated aerial surveillance for the Federal Bureau of Investigation's efforts. Most recently, we supported military operations in the aftermath of the Space Shuttle Columbia tragedy. As directed by the Secretary of Defense, we established a response task force to provide command and control for DoD resources and units, in support of the Federal Emergency Management Agency.

We have also been called upon to conduct operations in support of pre-planned events. In October 2002, using forces provided by United States Pacific Command, we supported the President's attendance at the Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation Conference in Los Cabos, Mexico. In January 2003, we provided command and control of all military support to the State of the Union Address, to include security, emergency medical, and chemical and biological response forces.

Emergency Preparedness and Response. We have the capability to assist local responders and lead federal agencies in their response to a bioterrorism incident. Although biohazard investigative expertise exists in most local and state health departments and in the Federal Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, these resources may become overwhelmed in emergency circumstances. When directed by the President or Secretary of Defense, we will provide bioterrorism experts to a lead federal agency to help prevent or contain a situation. Likewise, we are ready to provide field medical units, as well as logistics, transportation and security capabilities to assist federal, state and local agencies, as required.

USNORTHCOM'S CHALLENGES

Intelligence. Homeland defense relies on the sharing of actionable intelligence among the appropriate federal, state, and local agencies. Our Combined Intelligence and Fusion Center collates and analyzes data from the United States Intelligence Community and nearly 50 different government agencies. One of our greatest challenges lies in sifting through the volumes of intelligence and operational data from these sources. Our goal is to help connect the dots to create a clear threat picture, playing our appropriate military role as part of the interagency team. Another shared challenge is to overcome cultural and procedural differences among the DoD and other Departments for information that is collected, categorized, classified, analyzed and disseminated.

Homeland Command, Control and Communications. We need to be able to command and control forces and to coordinate planning and operations with agencies at the federal, state and local levels. Interoperable communication architectures and trusted information exchange environments provide the framework for coordinated operations. We have ongoing efforts with our homeland defense and civil support partners to upgrade existing architectures and to better integrate our information collection and exchange capabilities.

Ballistic Missile Defense. We are working with the Missile Defense Agency, United States Strategic Command and other combatant commands to develop the Concept of Operations that will ensure the United States has an effective missile defense capability by the fall of 2004.

Posse Comitatus. We will remain vigilant in ensuring that USNORTHCOM is used in accordance with the laws of our great Nation—respecting the rights and liberties of every American. We understand the Posse Comitatus Act and related laws and the clear limits placed on military support to civil law enforcement. We believe the Act, as amended, provides the authority we need to do our job, and no modification is needed at this time.

USNORTHCOM'S RELATIONSHIPS

Our Command is built upon a total force and total national team concept that includes members from all five Services, the National Guard, the Reserves, DoD Civilians and numerous federal, state, and local agencies. We believe we are redefining "jointness" by forming new partnerships within the DoD and with numerous civilian agencies, as well as strengthening existing ones. Developing these strong relationships is key to our success.

Department of Homeland Security. The Secretary of Defense will coordinate with the Secretary of Homeland Security on policy and resource issues. In accordance with decisions by the Secretary of Defense, we will work with various sectors of the Department of Homeland Security on operational planning, training and execution.

Assistant Secretary of Defense for Homeland Defense (ASD(HD)). We have frequent interaction with Paul McHale on a broad range of issues. As ASD(HD), his principal duty is the overall supervision of the homeland defense activities of the DoD.

Other Combatant Commands. We have established a conceptual framework with Admiral Jim Ellis, Commander, United States Strategic Command; Admiral Ed Giambastiani, Commander, United States Joint Forces Command; and General

Charlie Holland, Commander, United States Special Operations Command to secure the homeland. We are also working closely with the regional combatant commanders to eliminate threats to our homeland from afar. Our focus is to address gaps in coverage and any overlapping responsibilities to ensure that we provide an integrated defense for our citizens at home and abroad.

National Guard. We have a close relationship with the National Guard Bureau, which is enhanced even more by having Major General Steve Blum, an Army National Guardsman, as our Chief of Staff. We believe that no force is better suited to help deter, prevent, and defeat many of the threats we face than today's National Guard. Through the National Guard Bureau, USNORTHCOM coordinates with state headquarters for planning purposes and maintains situational awareness of National Guard actions and commitments.

To support our missions of homeland defense and military assistance to civil authorities, we are looking at the feasibility of evolving the current mobilization process into something closer to the current air defense model used by the Air National Guard in support of NORAD's mission. Specifically, Air National Guard fighter units of 1st Air Force have been successfully employing instantaneous Title 10 USC orders for several years. These orders allow an individual to volunteer, with consent of the Governor, to be federalized for specific missions prior to execution. We believe we can achieve a higher level of readiness if we apply the air defense mobilization model to the existing National Guard response forces, when needed in a federal capacity.

Coast Guard. Maritime Defense missions involve traditional military activities such as combat air patrols and naval operations within our area of responsibility. In these cases, we would take the lead and the Coast Guard would likely be called upon for support. It is important to note that the Coast Guard does not report to USNORTHCOM, although we do have several Coast Guardsmen on our staff, including Rear Admiral Jim Van Sice, who serves as

our Deputy Director of Operations. The Coast Guard is in the Department of Homeland Security, and any requests for Coast Guard assistance to DoD would come from the Secretary of Defense to the Secretary of Homeland Security.

By contrast, the Coast Guard would be the lead federal agency for maritime homeland security. When directed, we would support Coast Guard homeland security missions through our naval component commander. This support might include maritime air surveillance, the use of naval surface combatants with Coast Guard Law Enforcement Detachments onboard, or the use of specialized DoD capabilities.

Interagency. We are leveraging the unique capabilities and expertise of federal, state and local agencies to protect our homeland. Our Joint Interagency Coordination Group is working to help synchronize interagency plans, exercises and operations. In addition, we have a growing number of liaison officers in our headquarters staff at Peterson AFB, to include the Federal Bureau of Investigation, Central Intelligence Agency, Federal Emergency Management Agency, and the National Imagery and Mapping Administration.

POTENTIAL FUTURE CAPABILITIES AND MISSIONS FOR NORAD AND USNORTHCOM

We continue to address critical command and control challenges highlighted by the terrorist attacks on our homeland. We are committed to improving our situational awareness by developing a common operating picture for the air, land and maritime domains.

Combatant Commanders' Integrated Command and Control System. We are pursuing ways to leverage the Combatant Commanders' Integrated Command and Control System to modernize our aging 60's era air and missile warning systems and infrastructure. This will allow us to migrate to our next-generation Battle Control System and provide the foundation for a fully integrated NORAD-USNORTHCOM command and control capability.

Battle Control System. The upgraded Battle Control System will provide connectivity with a wide array of radars and sensors across North America, thereby giving our homeland a more integrated air defense capability. As future increments are fielded, we will be able to process air defense data faster, as well as improve our battlespace awareness.

High Altitude Airship (HAA) Advanced Concept Technology Demonstration. The Office of the Secretary of Defense, the Missile Defense Agency, the United States Army and NORAD are spearheading the effort to demonstrate the technical feasibility of an unmanned, untethered, long-duration HAA. The prototype airship will stay airborne for one month and carry a 4,000-pound payload. We expect the objective HAA to have the capability to stay airborne for up to a year and carry a payload greater than 4,000 pounds. A robust HAA capability would give warfighters persistent wide-area surveillance of the battlespace against a full spectrum of air, land and sea threats.

Homeland Security Command and Control Advanced Concept Technology Demonstration. USNORTHCOM is sponsoring this Advanced Concept Technology Demonstration to provide the DoD Homeland Security community with operationally relevant command and control capabilities. This initiative will help us rapidly insert mission-enhancing technologies and promote information sharing, collaboration and decision-making in a trusted information exchange environment.

CONCLUSION

We are grateful for everything the members of this committee have done to ensure our ability to defend our homeland. The National Defense Appropriations Act for Fiscal Year 2003 reflects your commitment to our mission, as well as to our servicemen and women, and we appreciate your continued support. With your help, our Nation will be safer tomorrow than it is today. I am honored to appear before you, and look forward to your questions.



United States Northern Command

- Stood up 1 Oct 02
- Centralized Command and Control - - One Command, One Commander
- “One – stop – shopping” for military support
- Increasingly important as we face asymmetric threats to our Homeland

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USNORTHCOM Mission

Conduct military operations to –

- Deter, prevent and defeat threats to the United States, its territories and interests within assigned area of responsibility
- Provide military assistance to civil authorities, including consequence management operations
 - As directed by the President or Secretary of Defense



Deter, Prevent, Defeat


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Chart 2

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USNORTHCOM's Area of Responsibility



Securing the Domestic Battlespace--a Highly Complex Environment

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Our Role in Protecting the Homeland





Chart 4

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Providing Forces to USNORTHCOM





Ballistic Missile Defense

- We are working with the
 - Missile Defense Agency
 - US Strategic Command
 - Other Combatant Commands
- To develop a concept of operations that will ensure the United States has an effective missile defense capability
 - Fall of 2004

"The effective deployment of missile defense is an essential element of the United States' broader efforts to transform our defense and deterrence policies and capabilities to meet the new threats we face."

--President George W. Bush



USNORTHCOM Budget Highlights (\$M)

FY 04 President's Budget Request


\$134M

• Headquarters:	80
• Components:	40
• Standing Joint Force Headquarters Homeland Security	
• Joint Task Force - Civil Support	
• Joint Task Force - 6	
• Advanced Concept Development:	14
• Homeland Security Command and Control	

Department of Homeland Security



USNORTHCOM relationship with Department of HLS



"...prevent, protect against, & respond to acts of terrorism on our soil."

--President George W. Bush, 25 Nov 02

Challenges



- **Resources**
- **Relationships**
- **Rapid deployment and employment of forces**

Mr. LEWIS. Thank you very much, General Eberhart.

Normally our chairman of the full Committee is not able to be at every meeting we might have. But he especially wanted to be here today because he admires your work so much. And with that, I would like to call on the chairman.

U.S. NORTHCOM'S BUDGET

Mr. YOUNG. Mr. Chairman, thank you very much and you are exactly correct, I do admire General Eberhart. I have worked with him and watched him as he went through many different missions and assignments, and he always excelled in all of them. He is just the type of person that we are proud to have. And he and I had a very good meeting yesterday. I probably used up more of his time than he could afford, but nevertheless, he was generous with the time.

I am going to just briefly talk about something that, just to put on the record, and that is as we look at the President's request for your NORTHCOM budget, \$134 million, that is in 2004. What about 2003, a supplemental for 2003?

General EBERHART. Yes, sir. When you look at our 2003 request, it is relatively small. It is designed to help us work things like continuing the FAA radar coverage that we have today. But there are two or three items in the supplemental that OSD is working now that we ask for your support. But again, I don't think there will be any problems with those issues because I think they will be very persuasive and convincing to the Committee.

Mr. YOUNG. I don't think there will be any problem. We expect to move the supplemental just as quickly as we can. We are already starting to get a little pressure from downtown about a supplemental, but they haven't sent it to us yet. I would like to ask you the question, but I won't, but what I would like to ask you is how is the supplemental going to treat you based on your request versus what comes out of OMB, but I will not ask you that question. The few times I have asked that question in the last couple of weeks, I found out that I really shouldn't have asked that question, at least for the record.

But any way, we have—are you okay now, do you have any real pressing dollar needs? In other words, do you need that supplemental today or is it okay if it is two weeks from now? In some areas, they need the money last month but where do you fall in that situation?

General EBERHART. Sir, right now I can't stand in front of you and say I need the supplemental tomorrow or next week. At the same time, I know that my counterparts do, in fact, need it tomorrow. They needed it yesterday. But that is not the case for me.

RELATIONSHIP WITH DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY

Mr. YOUNG. I know that you have spent considerable time with Secretary Ridge and his deputy, Gordon England. I get the feeling from you that as far as working together, their responsibility is one area, yours is another area, but you obviously have some overlapping. But I expect that you are working very well with them, they are working very well with you, and probably better than most people would expect.

General EBERHART. Yes, sir. And again, I don't want to say I am surprised by it. I am pleased that it is working as well as it does. When we do these various exercises, war games, they are in Colorado Springs and other places, members of their staff, members of their individual organizations that comprise the Office of the Department of Homeland Security, all participate. So we are all sitting around a table much like this, working our way through those various scenarios, some of which, as I said, are unthinkable, but we have to think about them.

Mr. YOUNG. General, I for one feel very confident with you in that position. And I know you have a tremendous staff of officers and enlisted who work with you. And I think that my friend, Jerry Lewis, will tell you that we stand ready to respond to your needs, whatever they are, because your needs are the Nation's needs.

And Mr. Chairman I thank you very much for the good work that you do in getting us to the point of being able to move these defense related appropriations bills and you have been a strong leader and thank you very much.

Mr. LEWIS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I know you are pushed schedule-wise, so I appreciate you being with us.

I watched my friend from Pennsylvania, Jack Murtha, mulling over in great depth these charts that you were presenting, so I am sure he is full of questions.

INTELLIGENCE

Mr. MURTHA. I don't understand this relationship between you and Homeland Defense, you report to the Secretary of Defense, you have no troops to speak of, you have administrative people. Tell me the exact relationship between you and Homeland, who decides what the threat is, who orders you to do something, how does that work?

General EBERHART. Sir, we start from the intelligence reports in the morning, and we all receive them first thing every morning.

Mr. MURTHA. The intelligence you get from?

General EBERHART. I get the intelligence from a variety of sources, sir, but it is fused by our Intelligence Center in Colorado Springs. When I go into the intelligence briefing every morning it is different from what we grew up with in terms of intelligence, it's not just the classical military intelligence from service sources or from national intelligence agencies.

The Intelligence I get will also be gleaned from law enforcement agencies. I have an FBI agent that sits there in the intelligence brief and makes sure I get any information that might be relevant for homeland security and homeland defense. We have FAA representatives, we have National Security Agency, NSA reps, the list goes on and on.

So we are trying to get all that intelligence, in some cases, not classical intelligence, it is information, but when fused properly as the Secretary has said, allows us to connect the dots and get a picture that we act on. So let's take a situation where we decide that there is a credible threat against the Department of Energy facilities across the Nation. Then the next thing we do is we start working with the FBI and the Department of Energy to see if they need help securing those facilities.

RELATIONSHIP WITH DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY

Mr. MURTHA. Go back and tell me the relationship between the Department of Homeland Defense and yourself. For instance, what do they do?

General EBERHART. The Department of Homeland Security, sir?

Mr. MURTHA. Yes. What is their job?

General EBERHART. Sir, they have just stood up, but they are doing the same thing. They are doing exactly the same thing. But I am looking at it through the eyes of what might I need to provide from a military perspective. They are looking at it through the eyes of what they are going to do with law enforcement agencies and other agencies out there that are part of their Department. What I am trying to anticipate is what we can bring to the fight, what solution set we can provide with military force.

Mr. MURTHA. So you are looking at missile defense; you are not looking at containers that come into the country in and a danger that might be in those containers?

General EBERHART. I do look at that, sir. For example, I track every high interest vessel that is approaching our shores. I track that every day. I look and make sure that the Coast Guard is working that problem. That is their issue, they are the lead. I look at what might they need from us.

Mr. MURTHA. Does the Coast Guard work for you or Homeland Security?

General EBERHART. They work for Homeland Security, but they work like this with me. We cooperate together in our harbors and off our shores. We will have Naval ships with Coast Guard law enforcement detachments on those Naval ships. So it is a partnership that predates NORTHCOM and is working exceedingly well. I spent last week with the Coast Guard. I went and visited the Coast Guard on the West Coast, and I went out to Hawaii to visit the Coast Guard. When I have a commander's conference, the two 3-star Coast Guard commanders east and west coast come to those conferences. If you look at our wiring diagram, you see the Coast Guard into our headquarters with a dotted line.

WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION—CIVIL SUPPORT TEAMS

Mr. MURTHA. I guess what I don't understand, we set up 26 or 27 biological chemical warfare response teams in the National Guard all over the country. There are two teams, one Army and one Marine Corps. They don't fall into your jurisdiction normally, but you can ask for them to be attached to you if you had that kind of a threat that happens? For instance, the Olympics, would you run the Olympic security then in those cases?

General EBERHART. Yes, sir. Yes, sir, I would. And every day I track those Civil Support teams (CST) and the Chemical Biological Incident Response Force (CBIRF) teams, I know their status, I know which teams are on gold alert, which teams are on less alert. We moved CST teams during the Columbia tragedy. We used those CST teams very effectively to support FEMA and NASA, we tracked that movement. We know that we can either move them under a Title 32 status or Title 10 status. Frankly it doesn't make any difference to me as long as we get the job done.

Mr. MURTHA. So the President doesn't go to Homeland Security and Homeland Security come to you, the President goes to the Secretary of Defense and bypasses Homeland Security Secretary in this case.

General EBERHART. What would happen, sir, is that if we detected a threat that would normally be worked by law enforcement or another lead Federal agency, but we had something to offer, we would be working with them off line. They would go to Homeland Security, Homeland Security would go to the President and say we need help, and we think the military can help us with these kinds of things. The President would say you are right, he would call the Secretary of Defense and say go help them. And then I would be the person.

COUNTERDRUG ACTIVITIES

Mr. MURTHA. Let's take something that is a little bit different, drugs for instance, that are such a threat to this country. You wouldn't play in this unless what happens?

General EBERHART. Sir, there are two ways I would play in counternarcotics. One is that Joint Task Force 6 in El Paso works for us. So our support for counternarcotics is directed through NORTHCOM. Day in and day out we will provide support to the Border Patrol, to Customs, to others as they do the counternarcotics mission, not only along our southern border with Mexico. We will also do it inside States with intelligence analysts that we have in many States working with your State drug enforcement folks, and we also do it along the northern border.

The other way we can get involved is when we have reason to believe that the Border Patrol is not going to be able to deal with a specific threat. In that case, we would reinforce the Border Patrol, but we would do that in accordance with the laws of the land, posse comitatus, et cetera. We provide additional capability and capacity for the Border Patrol, Customs, and Coast Guard.

Mr. MURTHA. Your troops would support the law enforcement officials, whether it is FBI or whoever it is trying to interdict the drugs coming in. Now do you have direct responsibility for counternarcotics effort in the United States now versus the FBI?

General EBERHART. No, sir. I just have what active duty military support we provide under Northern Command.

Mr. MURTHA. What is the threat right now?

General EBERHART. Sir, I believe the threat is as high as it ever has been. If you will allow me to go off course just a second here, I believe that what we need to do is start looking at the borders in terms of homeland security/homeland defense, a broader mission, if you will. Then we look at these subsets as part of that. So illegal aliens, black marketing, drug trafficking are all important. We shouldn't pull back the throttle in terms of our effort there. But I think we need to look at it in terms of homeland security. Because I don't know how you stop that person who is coming across the border and say, "Are you a narco guy, are you a terrorist or are you just coming to this Nation because you want to live here and work here and make a contribution?" Very difficult, difficult issue.

Mr. MURTHA. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. LEWIS. Thank you, Mr. Murtha.
Mr. Hobson.

AREA OF RESPONSIBILITY

Mr. HOBSON. General, nice to see you. I saw you in the hallway yesterday as I was walking over. I would like to take a brief moment to question how this all came about. I see that Puerto Rico is in your command, Hawaii is not. I guess Guantanamo is still in SOUTHCOM. How do the numbers, how does that cause you to interact, say, with—is there a difference in the way you would treat something as it relates to Hawaii as opposed to Puerto Rico?

General EBERHART. Sir, it is based on the geographic lines of the area of responsibility. Hawaii is in Pacific Command, so Pacific Command takes care of Hawaii. They are in charge of homeland defense of Hawaii, Guam and the protectorates in the Western Pacific. Pacific Command is in charge of providing support to civil authorities in Hawaii. If Pacific Command needed help, then it would be the classic supporting relationship, just like Pacific Command helps us with forces, we would look for ways to support Pacific Command. But the reason Hawaii is not in our area of responsibility is it is in Pacific Command's, Admiral Fargo's area of responsibility.

As you look down to the south, that is not quite as clear as you pointed out. Our area of responsibility was drawn to make sure that we picked up the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico and the U.S. Virgin Islands. So it was important that someone was providing for the defense and civil support activities down there, and the Secretary does not want a seam there between Southern Command and Northern Command. So that is why Puerto Rico and the U.S. Virgin Islands are part of U.S. Northcom's AOR.

Cuba is in our area of responsibility in terms of protecting against threats from Cuba. However, Guantanamo will remain with Southern Command because they have run that operation for years. They know how to run that operation. Those relationships are established. If we ever got to a mil-to-mil relationship with Cuba, that would be with Southern Command, because Cuba is more aligned with Central and South America than it is with North America. So that is why those lines were drawn that way, sir.

Mr. HOBSON. Okay. Thank you, General.
Mr. LEWIS. Mr. Dicks.

WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION—CIVIL SUPPORT TEAMS

Mr. DICKS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And I want to congratulate General Eberhart for standing up Northern Command and by getting off to a very quick start, I believe. And you know, you and I had a chance to talk and I am pleased to see in your presentation this whole concept of deter, prevent, and protect. Because as you and I talked about, I see this as such a change in that, for the first time we are really talking about, as you said, the crown jewel, the United States of America, and how we are going to protect it. And you know we have thought about this in the past in terms of traditional law enforcement, the Coast Guard, but it has been—it was not a coordinated effort with a strategy and plan.

I think what the Administration is doing here is quite good. I talked to the Customs Service the other day, the Coast Guard on how they are dealing with containers. It is starting to come together. And there is a role for the military here.

And I think, you know, one of the things that is important is the idea of not only preventing these things from happening, and that means deterrence and having these people realize that there is a possible use of military force against them if they, in fact, are going to try to conduct a terrorist attack against the United States. I think you are doing a great job. You and I talked about some of these forces, I think you know, the question of Civil Support Teams. Now, are those—there is supposed to be one in every State. But what is the status of the Civil Support Teams? Can you tell us what they do a little bit?

General EBERHART. Sir, right now we have resourced 32 Civil Support Teams. 27 of those have been certified, five are remaining to be certified as you alluded to, Mr. Murtha.

And they will be certified.

Last year's bill directed the Department to add an additional 23 Civil Support Teams that actually take us to 55. One for each of the 54 States and territories. California, because of its geography, has two. So that is why it is 55 as opposed to the 54. As we said, the rub there is that those teams were authorized but not appropriated last year. The Department is trying to come to grips with how they work that issue. If they work that in a supplemental, they come back to you.

Mr. DICKS. Whose budget is that in? That is not this Committee is it? Is it the Homeland Security Committee?

General EBERHART. It would have been in this Committee the last year. Now this year I don't know if they have moved it. But last year it would have been this Committee. It would have been probably through the National Guard, but I am not sure, sir. But I can find that out for you. Obviously, and you know, I will be very straightforward here, I am a big fan of the CST teams.

I have seen them in action. I think if you go out, which many of you have, and visit your CST teams, they are your bridge between your local responders and everyone else. And they help you in terms of interoperability, standardization, cross-tell, benchmarking from State-to-State, county to county, it goes on and on.

I personally think we need to look at taking the CST teams to the next level. Because right now, as valuable as they are, essentially what they can do is come out and tell you you are sick. They can't do a lot about it. They can tell you where to go to get well and who has to fix you, but we need to give them more capability to fix you.

My view is you take the CST teams, you make them more like the CBIRF. We probably can't afford 55 of those, but you can do them by region or population centers or something here.

Mr. DICKS. What was that unit called?

General EBERHART. It is the Chemical Biological Incident Response Force. General Krulak stood that up about 1995 or 1996, in my view, well ahead of the time. It was the right thing to do. And we moved that to Indian Head. And they are the people who were

here behind the scenes at the State of the Union address ready to take whatever action.

Mr. DICKS. There are two of those units.

General EBERHART. There is one unit that has about four teams in it. It is out at Indian Head. It is located at Indian Head for a reason, that is, the National Capital Region. So we would think long and hard before we moved it out of there, but we would if we had to. We need more of those, in my view, strategically located around the United States. Regardless of how we posture our forces, the first people on the scene are going to be the first responders, the fire department and the policemen. They are going to be there. We can't beat them due to time and distance. Next, in my view, will be the CST team that will provide this bridge between them and your State militias. And then you will have other States helping you either from State militias, fire departments or whatever. Our Federal forces will now start to flow, depending on the situation. But those relationships, interoperability, working together, will be what is so important in the months and years to come.

QUICK REACTION FORCES AND RAPID REACTION FORCES

Mr. DICKS. Now you mentioned also Army's Quick Reaction Forces and the Rapid Reaction Forces. Could you tell us a little bit about that?

General EBERHART. Right now we are on alert, we have 6 QRF, RRF teams, in my view, strategically located around the states. Some are Army, some are Marine. The QRF is a company level, at the RRF, it is a battalion level. The example we used earlier, Mr. Murtha, of we think are at risk and we need to secure those and we need to secure those right away. If the States don't have the wherewithal, and we decide we are going to secure them with Federal forces; that is what I would do.

I would move when the President told me. I would move those QRF, RRF forces to those facilities. We have those depending on the threat we perceive, anywhere on a ———. And right now we have them on alert in ———. So we are prepared to move and we have some in the center of the United States in the ———.

Mr. LEWIS. Thank you, Mr. Dicks.

Mr. Cunningham.

Mr. CUNNINGHAM. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Sorry, General, some of us were celebrating the green and it took precedence over listening to the blue.

General EBERHART. The light blue or the dark blue?

Mr. CUNNINGHAM. I am looking at your number of flying hours, sir, and it is not enough.

General EBERHART. We are in agreement on that.

Mr. CUNNINGHAM. But I also thought when I took command, it was going to double my logbook. Instead, you end up cancelling more flights to handle administrative issues.

But I understand why you are in the position. I know for a fact that a FAC, forward air controller, takes a look at the air order of battle and decides what assets and weapons will be used and then you organize all of that for the fighter pilot to execute. I think that is a critical role. I think the Committee, starting off with Jack Murtha will have some other questions we need to get our arms

around, I wasn't sure myself of how the whole Northcom structure worked. And of the hearings we have, I think at least for me, this has been very informative. I still am putting it all together.

RELATIONSHIP WITH DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY

If Homeland Security tasked you, Northern Command, and then you take a look at your assets, are you just the manager or do you actually have your own assets to go out? Do you have your own personal assets or do you task as a manager different organizations?

General EBERHART. First of all, it is a nuance, but I want to make sure we are clear, the Homeland Security Department wouldn't task me. The only person who can task me is the Secretary of Defense.

Mr. CUNNINGHAM. Yes, sir.

General EBERHART. So the Homeland Security Department would go to the President, the President would say provide military support, and the Secretary of Defense would task me. I have some assets that are set aside for me that are available on alert, the Quick Reaction Forces, the combat air patrols sitting alert, I have some ships that have been designated off each coast. And in some cases, I can move those right now without asking. And in other cases, I have to pick up the phone, call the Secretary of Defense and say we want to move the QRF from Fort Hood Texas to Harrisburg, Pennsylvania. And the Secretary of Defense would say, yes, press ahead. The Secretary of Defense, and rightfully so, wants to make sure that before we start moving armed people around in the United States and into downtown Harrisburg or wherever, that it is clear what we are going to do and we have the right authority. But those forces are available to us day in and day out. And in some cases, again, I have to ask the Secretary, and in other cases I don't. Now, if I need other forces, for example, let's say that we have this ship that we think is suspect in terms of what it is carrying and we want to go out and take a look at it 400 miles off the coast, then I would ask for surveillance aircraft to be chopped, to be transferred to me. I would command and control those through subordinate commanders but the command and control line is a solid line from that airplane, ship, soldier, marine, up through the subordinate commander to me, to the Secretary of Defense.

So I am not just out there tasking, and then not have responsibility and authority. I would have that.

INTEROPERABILITY

Mr. CUNNINGHAM. I think that helps. And one of the things to think about when you are executing is the technology San Diego has, quality technologies come from places like TRW and SAIC. In Grenada, many of our units couldn't talk to each other. Do you feel that this Committee can help in any way in that problem?

General EBERHART. Mr. Cunningham, I can't say that we are where we need to be. We have interoperability problems. We are right now trying to decide, what are the golden nuggets, because I am sure what happens to me happens to you. Somebody is at

your door every day with a solution for you and you are trying to sort through what really is ground truth here.

We have done several things. We have established a strategic relationship with Sandia Labs and with DTRA, the Defense Threat Reduction Agency, to help us sort through what technology will be most valuable to us. We have this Advanced Concept Technology Demonstration to help us work some of these information technology, IT, issues to make sure that we can move information, that we have a common operational picture, air, land and sea, that we can command and control our forces.

And then we are struggling, as you and I struggled throughout our career, with interoperability between the services. I think we have sort of rounded the corner there. We still have a long way to go and we can't take our eye off that ball, but now I would offer to you we have to start thinking about interoperability from the local responders to the Federal forces through the CST team, the CBIRF team and all these other players that are going to show up at the scene.

Mr. CUNNINGHAM. That was my thought. I thought of all the people you talked about. What a communication garble if you can't talk to one or the other or they can't talk to one or the other. It would be difficult to coordinate. I think it would help this Committee if we had a better understanding of what your needs are and how we can help. That is my last question.

General EBERHART. That is one of the things the chairman and I discussed yesterday. My view is that you can help us formally, if you will, through the budget process but help us informally in your districts by asking people about that. You know you can talk to your CST team. You can talk to your State militia. When was the last time you ran an exercise with Federal forces, with NORTHCOM, et cetera? And again, the CST teams are working those kind of things as we speak, because they have translators in their communications van that allow them to do that.

But we go to cities, one of which is in California, where the police department couldn't talk to the fire department. And there is technology out there where they can take their radios that they have today and make a fairly minor inexpensive modification, and they can talk to each other.

Mr. CUNNINGHAM. Thank you.

Mr. LEWIS. Mr. Sabo.

RESPONSE TO TERRORIST ATTACK

Mr. SABO. Thank you, General. And welcome. You know, on this latest question, I am not sure how inexpensive that is. We are involved in our area of trying to get common radios between law enforcement, state patrol, and it is a very expensive proposition. They are making headway but it is slow.

Mr. SABO. And part of this involves significant expenditure for towers. Local governments are pressed, and we are making progress, but it is not moving quickly.

I am still trying to understand this relationship with Homeland Security. Let me phrase the question this way: If you had existed on September 11, what would have happened?

General EBERHART. On September 11, what would have been different, first and foremost, is that Secretary of Defense, and in turn, the President would have one commander to talk to as we decided how we were going to then change our alert levels, change our force posture in terms of air, land and sea. On September 11 until 1 October of last year, the Secretary of Defense had to go to the Commander of NORAD to do air and space, and had to go to the Commander of the Joint Forces Command to do land and maritime. So we did not have centralized command and control. And we had seams between our command and the command there in Norfolk, Joint Forces Command.

Now, in terms of what would have happened in the aftermath of 9/11—

Mr. SABO. Or really, going back to when they were aware that planes were being hijacked.

General EBERHART. Nothing different would have happened during that time. I wish something different would have happened, but I can't tell you that anything different would have happened during that time.

Mr. SABO. Because the decision was made to deploy some planes, but it took a little while.

General EBERHART. Yes, sir. Yes, sir. We had 14 airplanes on alert that day. Today we have in excess of 50 on alert. And we can get almost any place in 20 minutes today, and we couldn't do that that day. We were on our coast looking out as opposed to looking in. But what would have been different, had the State of New York and the city of New York City needed Federal assistance—they were able to cope with this using their own resources for all practical measure—had they needed additional resources that day, there would have been one-stop shopping and centralized command and control of those resources as we provide Federal forces. But that day people were offering them resources, and people were posturing resources to help them in case they needed it, and I applaud that. But this was the Air Force, this was the Navy, this was Joint Forces Command. This was a variety of different entities, if you will, that they were trying to deal with and sort their way through, and I think in and of itself that was confusing.

Mr. SABO. If they had needed additional resources, it probably would have been fire, police or health?

General EBERHART. Again, I think it depends—that is right. Depending on the situation, you could run into a situation where you would have—I hate to even use the word rioting, looting, these kinds of things—had to deploy Federal forces to help the Governor to maintain law and order. So that situation could have occurred. Or they could have needed additional medical. In many cases we can get there with the medical quicker, especially if it is a situation that has to deal with chemical/biological, which that was not. That was a kinetic attack.

But those are the kinds of things that we stand ready to provide. I hope we don't have to provide them. I mean, my hope, frankly, is that every one of these situations that unfolds over the next 5 or 10 years or forever can be dealt with at the local level. But we can't afford to bet on that, and that is why we have our head in the game every day ready to go assist.

Mr. SABO. Thank you.

Mr. LEWIS. Thank you, Mr. Sabo.

Mr. Tiahrt.

COLORADO SPRINGS AND CHEYENNE MOUNTAIN

Mr. TIAHRT. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

General, welcome. It is nice to see you again.

In your testimony you talk about the relationship with NORAD, how it is kind of parallel, and your staffs actually overlap. NORAD has been around for a long time. What is the status of the facility in Cheyenne Mountain?

General EBERHART. Right now one of the reasons that Colorado Springs and Cheyenne Mountain was selected as the headquarters for Northern Command was the command and control infrastructure that existed in Colorado Springs, specifically Cheyenne Mountain. Also there was an additional issue of a new building that was being built for U.S. Space Command and NORAD, and with U.S. Space Command merging with STRATCOM, there was a MILCON facility that was available that was cost avoidance for the American taxpayer.

We leveraged those resources, and we will use those resources in Cheyenne Mountain to support NORAD, to support Northern Command, and to continue to support the new Strategic Command. In some cases we have systems in there that are of 1970s vintage, and we are in the process of upgrading those systems. Before we were interested in a common operational picture of the air, and we need to expand that common operational picture so now it is not only just air, but it is for sure maritime and eventually a land common operational picture that will allow us to put all this together in one command as we work our way through possible threats or assistance. So in our view, Cheyenne Mountain is critical to our success in doing what the Secretary of Defense has said.

Mr. TIAHRT. Do you have the technology to meet the requirements, the new computers, the new control systems, the new communications?

General EBERHART. Those are in our budget. If you look at our budget for 2003 that you all approved, and now for 2004, they are in that budget, and they are a very important part of that budget. Of that \$80 million for the headquarters, I think about \$15 million of it is for command and control.

COOPERATION WITH CANADA

Mr. TIAHRT. Excellent. Okay.

I met recently with some Members of the Canadian Parliament. As you know, Chretien has been critical of what we have been trying to do in the war on terrorism, particularly in Iraq, and I met with members of the opposition party, and they themselves, our cousins to the north, were embarrassed by some of the statements that have been made by the government. But we talked about some larger issues on how we defend not only the continental United States, but North America itself, and they believe that we ought to have an interactive sort of a meshing of the two.

And I notice that you are working with the equivalent of the State Department, their equivalent of their Department of Defense.

But my question is what needs to happen between our two governments in order to be cohesive in our efforts to overcome terrorism?

General EBERHART. First I think we saw a strong commitment from the Canadians on September 11 and the days after as we diverted airplanes up there, and they supported us as we grounded all airplanes, they did the same thing. And then as we moved into Afghanistan, they supported us with troops. So I think they are truly committed to this Global War on Terrorism.

To take this relationship to the next level, our intent is to use the NORAD scheme and to see if what has worked for us so well in air and space should extend to maritime, possibly land, and for sure civil support. For those who have a common border, Mr. Dicks, with Canada, we have been doing this to a limited degree for years, state to province. And in my view, we need to take a harder look at how we can help each other, especially along the border, if there was, in fact, a terrorist attack or a natural disaster, if you will, because, as you know, chemo, bio, they know no borders, and it could affect cities on both sides.

So agreements, exercises, training together, again, common equipment, all those kinds of things that we have talked about, I think, are very important along the border, with both borders eventually, but starting with Canada. We have established a Bi-National Planning Group that is forming in Colorado Springs as we speak, with representatives from the Canadian Government and representatives from our government to see if we can take this relationship to the next level. We propose maritime cooperation and civil support cooperation. And even if we decide not to, I think the sharing of information in this Bi-National Planning Group will prove valuable for both of our Nations.

UNMANNED AERIAL VEHICLES

Mr. TIAHRT. I think it is going to be impossible for us to defend that border. It is very porous. We want to have the trade. I mean, they are our largest trading partner. It makes sense for us to coordinate, but if there are some barriers that come into play that keep us from having that coordination, whether it is some policy they have on having immigrants come in that they don't track very well or something, I hope that you will pass that on to us so we can work with our counterparts to try to close those gaps in the security.

And the last thing I wanted to ask you about, there was recently reported that Iraq has built unmanned aerial vehicles. There is some concern that they may possibly have been smuggled in already. We believe there are sleeper cells here in America. How would we combat something like an unmanned aerial vehicle? How could we get down to that level of protection?

General EBERHART. Obviously, that is, you know, one of those things that many of us, frankly, lose sleep over. The key to our success there is the front end, and the front end is actionable intelligence where we know, in fact, that it has happened, we know somewhere to look, and then we can use resources, law enforcement resources, Federal resources, to try to ferret out where this might be and make sure they don't launch it. A difficult task, but frankly, once they have launched one of these UAVs at ——— feet

above the ground, we are not going to detect it with the radar systems we have, and we are not going to be able to intercept it in time.

Mr. TIAHRT. We have got to get it at the front end then.

General EBERHART. We have got to work the front of the problem.

Now, part of this is just things that make sense. I mean, I hate to use this term, but it is a good neighborhood watch program. If you see somebody out there that has got something suspicious, and I know that is hard to do inside of a 500-acre or a 1,000-acre ranch or farm, but if somebody is flying one around, and they are new to the area, et cetera. I don't think they are going to go in and just fly it first time under an operational mission, especially when you look at the lack of sophistication of some of those systems they have. Also, and I hate to even say this, but if they fly it at the nap of the Earth, and it is very small, frankly, it is not going to be carrying much. Now, that doesn't give us a good feeling because that shouldn't happen. But when it does dispense, it is going to go over a very small area. If they fly it at a high altitude, when it dispenses, it is going to diffuse quite a bit.

So I am not saying don't worry about this because whoever is there, it is a big deal for them, but it is not as bad as some people would paint it. That doesn't mean we shouldn't be concerned about it, and don't work the problem, but it is not quite as bad.

Mr. LEWIS. If the gentleman would yield.

Mr. TIAHRT. Go ahead.

Mr. LEWIS. On that point, using the UAV as an illustration, nonetheless, the front end is an important question, and I am wondering, since we have kind of recently lowered the color, the level of intensity across the country for some reason, but, General, do you on the front end have communication lines right now that are causing you to be concerned about the inflow?

General EBERHART. Sir, I have no credible information other than anecdotal about a UAV being in this country.

Mr. LEWIS. I am not thinking about UAV. I am thinking about that or other flows.

General EBERHART. No, sir.

Mr. LEWIS. And is there communication taking place that is meaningful that would allow you to be alerted if—

General EBERHART. —.

Mr. TIAHRT. All right. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. LEWIS. Thank you, Mr. Tiahrt.

Mr. Visclosky.

Mr. VISCLOSKY. No questions.

Mr. CUNNINGHAM. I have got a quick question.

Mr. LEWIS. Okay. He is going to take it. Go ahead.

Mr. CUNNINGHAM. It is a quick question.

Mr. LEWIS. We are getting very close to a vote here, that is why.

EXERCISES

Mr. CUNNINGHAM. It seems that it would be much better instead of you having to pick up the telephone, or your people, calling fire, police, Border Patrol, DoD, that you had each city had its own little central command so that they could reach out and communicate.

Are there any models or are there any things, because I have talked to San Diego PD and Sheriff's Department, Border Patrol. They are concerned, A, of the training. But we have got the Navy there. We have got biotech, and we have got huge resources there that could be hit, and if there is ever an exercise that could be run, a training exercise, I think San Diego would be a good model to start with. And if there is any coordination of doing something like that, we would love to be involved of just training, to do an exercise to see how does it work, having Mayor Murphy there and the folks that generate, because maybe you could—I just think that Los Angeles or San Francisco or San Diego, for you to get out the information to the responders, if you had a central command like you do, like the President has now with you, and you filter that down, it would be much easier.

Mr. MURTHA. If the gentleman would yield. Johnstown has done that. Since we had so many incidents, with Flight 93, we have that kind of a central location, after the big corporation exodus up there, with the fire and police, but the whole two-county area in that one location, so you can call them.

Now, we also fixed the communication between the State police and the local guys in the last couple of years so that what you are saying should work exactly the way you are talking about. I would highly recommend that for every city to have that kind of command post.

Mr. DICKS. Mr. Chairman.

Mr. LEWIS. Do you want to respond to that?

General EBERHART. I think San Diego and other cities provide a wonderful opportunity to work these types of things, exercises, training, because of the coast issue, the critical infrastructure, the presence of the Navy, Coast Guard, the list goes on and on. In fact, I was there in November, and we discussed an exercise like that, and we will be running those kinds of exercises this summer. I don't think San Diego is on the list this summer, but there may be smaller exercises run there.

Mr. CUNNINGHAM. We volunteer.

General EBERHART. Yes, sir. Yes, sir. And we will take another hard look at that. But I agree.

Mr. LEWIS. Sure, Mr. Dicks. But Mr. Frelinghuysen hasn't been up yet. We will go to you.

Mr. DICKS. You are the Chairman.

Mr. LEWIS. He has been really anxious coming back and forth

FOOD SUPPLY PROTECTION

Mr. FRELINGHUYSEN. General, thank you for your work. If this question has been asked in another form, please tell me.

It doesn't take much to contaminate our Nation's food supply. I know periodically there are exercises about you know how to deal with those—that type of a potential disaster. Hoof and mouth disease. I just wonder how you integrate your responsibilities with the Department of Agriculture. We assume that all of these contingencies have been looked at; is that correct?

General ELBERHART. Sir, the contingencies that you mentioned have been looked at. Obviously, I am sure there is something out there that we haven't looked at yet, and hopefully we think of it

and we look at it. But in the case that you cite, we have looked at the types of things that the U.S. military could provide the Department of Agriculture or whoever it turns out, Centers for Disease Control (CDC), whatever, whoever becomes the lead Federal agency, and what we would be able to provide, things like medical support, I hate to say it, but things like troops that would help us with a quarantine. Those kinds of things we have table-topped, we have exercised, and in those cases we wouldn't be in the lead, but we would be in support of whoever the lead Federal agency was.

Mr. FRELINGHUYSEN. The troops could be quarantined to some extent. They could be carrying contaminants. I assume we have looked at that possibility.

General EBERHART. Sir, we have looked at all of that, and that is why we are taking people like our Joint Task Force Civil Support and giving them those types of inoculations against the things that we anticipate.

But you are right. I mean, the troops could show up, and then suddenly they are part of the quarantine, so then you have got to have another perimeter outside that so that people cannot come and go.

CYBERWARFARE

Mr. FRELINGHUYSEN. Cyberwarfare. Where do we stand?

General EBERHART. Sir, in terms of cyberwarfare, this is the exception, if you will, because cyberwarfare and cyberdefense remain with Strategic Command. In our view, cyberdefense knows no borders, so when you look at cyberdefense, you need to look at it globally. Cyberdefense used to be with U.S. Space Command. When we put Strategic Command and U.S. Space Command together, that mission went to Strategic Command.

Mr. FRELINGHUYSEN. It is a global issue admittedly, but with the setting up of a new command, that doesn't introduce into your equation—other steps that you have to—that you might have to take that now you wouldn't take, you would have to take as a result of setting up a new command.

General EBERHART. Yes, sir. And I guess the point I would like to make is that in that case, if it was in the United States of America, in our area of responsibility, I would be the supported Commander; Strategic Command would be the supporting Commander. But these people are so unique, and there are not many of them. Instead of parsing them out, some to Northern Command, some to Pacific Command, some to European Command, what the Department has elected to do is keep that center of excellence, for the lack of a better example, and that is the Joint Task Force for Computer Network Operations, which is a subunified command or a joint task force under the new Strategic Command, and they provide that for us at Northern Command, Pacific Command, et cetera.

Mr. FRELINGHUYSEN. The reason I ask, we had testimony earlier today from the—William Winkenwerder, Assistant Secretary of Defense for Health Affairs, and covered a lot of ground relative to some problems that they have had in terms of protecting information. I just wondered to what extent your purview covered that, for those types of issues as well.

General EBERHART. Sir, with the specific issue you reference, I am not directly involved other than the fact that my folder was one of them that they got.

Mr. FRELINGHUYSEN. That is Duke Cunningham's folder right there.

General EBERHART. I know. But when they went into those files, I got the letter saying, Dear General Eberhart, they got you health records.

Mr. FRELINGHUYSEN. Thank you very much.

Mr. DICKS. Mr. Chairman.

Mr. LEWIS. Since you have got more seniority over over Mr. Moran, I think, you know, unless he really gets unhappy, I will let you.

Mr. DICKS. You haven't had a chance to ask any questions.

Mr. MORAN. I haven't.

Mr. DICKS. I yield. Go ahead. No, no, go ahead.

Mr. LEWIS. I will be glad to yield to Mr. Moran.

HOMELAND DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE

Mr. MORAN. All right. Thank you. And thank you, Mr. Chairman.

General, first of all, on the Combined Intelligence and Fusion Center, some people are a little antsy about this because of the extensiveness of the information that it collects, both the depth and the breadth of information it tends to fuse. Will you be having operational control over that when it is set up, do you think?

General EBERHART. Sir, if you are talking about our fusion center, Peterson Air Force Base, we have operational control over that today.

Mr. MORAN. No, I am talking about the one that is being set up at the Pentagon, which I thought was a kind of a larger model of the fusion center you have.

General EBERHART. I am embarrassed, sir. I am not sure if you are talking about the total information.

Mr. MORAN. The one that Poindexter is working on. You know the one.

General EBERHART. Oh, that is what they call Total Information Awareness.

Mr. MORAN. A fusion center is basically what it is. It is a combined intelligence and fusion center, I think. Now, maybe I am not—the term, I think, applies to it just as much.

General EBERHART. The answer to your question is that if that does come to pass, that I would not have operational control over that.

Mr. MORAN. Well, it is a concern of mine because I think under your operational responsibilities, you could make a pretty strong case that it ought to fit under that, rather than being under the sort of the civilian branch of these folks that are doing—kind of doing their own thing. Now—so I won't ask you about that then because you are not responsible for it, but I think it is a source of concern to many people.

Another source of concern is that Secretary Rumsfeld has indicated that he thinks it would be in the national best interest to put all of our intelligence agencies under the Defense Department. Now, you know, you can be guarded in your answer, whatever, and

I guess I would anticipate what I am going to hear, but what do you think about that idea?

General EBERHART. Sir, my belief is that if we sit down and analyze that course of action, and we believe that it, in fact, better serves this Nation and better allows us to deal with threats, the age-old threats, the legacy threats, if you will, and these new asymmetrical threats, this is something that should seriously be considered. But I think we have to prove value added of that realignment, if you will, and if we can prove value added, then we ought to proceed down that course.

FLIGHT RESTRICTION OVER NATIONAL CAPITAL REGION

Mr. MORAN. Yeah. Okay. For whatever it is worth, I think that the independence of the CIA can be a helpful aspect of the information that we get.

And this is the last thing, and I—far be it from any of us to be parochial in our line of questioning, but we still have general aviation grounded in the Washington area. Just got with the Signature Airline people. They have lost \$30 million, you know, the thousands of jobs and so on. I won't bore you with this, but it falls under your decisionmaking control. I don't think you are the decision maker on this, but on the chain of command, this is something you are responsible for, the air protection of the Washington area, and that is the guise under which it has all been closed down.

Now, these people with general aviation, you know, they get very heavily screened, and they have come up with what they think is foolproof security means so that it is a heck of a lot safer for one of these planes to operate than it is for commercial airlines, which are more difficult to screen. But right now all we have got is Attorney General Ashcroft's plane there apparently and maybe a few military jets. So I would like to hear your take on this. Why is it that we can't let that aspect of our economy function?

General EBERHART. Sir, you were correct in saying that I don't make that decision. That decision is made at the Cabinet level based on inputs from the Department of Transportation, the Attorney General, the Department of Defense, and then the President takes the decision.

Mr. MORAN. Yes, but under your areas of responsibility—so it is not an outlandish question to be asking you.

General EBERHART. Oh, no, no. What we do is we assess the risk of allowing people to fly by the visual flight rules in this area. If you allow people to fly in this area without squawking their identification codes, then this is the risk that we see if you allow that. Now, then, it is up to the Secretary and others to decide that that risk is acceptable or not. All I want to make sure is they know that if an airplane takes off from this point, then there is no way with airborne Combat Air Patrols (CAPS) or even with the air defense artillery, because of the tight command and control we have, that I am able to shoot that airplane down. Then it is up to others to decide whether or not we accept that risk.

Mr. MORAN. But it would be up to you to shoot it down.

General EBERHART. Well, I would, in fact, go all the way to the President if we have time to make that decision. But some of those time lines don't allow that.

Mr. MORAN. Okay.

General EBERHART. I believe, though, that right now we have some procedures that are, frankly, very acceptable in terms of people, in terms of the right screening of their crews, in terms of that they are capable to do this Identification Friend or Foe, and other things that should be. We think those are reasonable screens, they mitigate the risk. So we are leaning forward to try to relax some of those rules, but keep this 30-mile radius around the Capitol.

Mr. MORAN. General, we were here—and I appreciate the Chairman's indulgence—we were here in this very room on 9/11 at 9 a.m., and there was a plane that was off course. We thought it was turned around to hit the Capitol, but as it turns out, there was one flying over Congressman Murtha's district that would have. If that had been the case, if you had known that, would you have shot it down today if the situation was the same as existed on 9/11? What would you have done with that commercial airliner heading towards the White House or the Capitol?

[The information follows:]

We would have intercepted the aircraft and tried to divert it. Had the aircraft posed a threat to those on the ground—White House, Capitol Building, or elsewhere—we would have shot it down.

Mr. LEWIS. General, if I could interrupt you for—I think this is a very interesting and stimulating question, and it gives me an opportunity to tell you that we have less than 3 minutes on a vote, and we have a vote just after that. So we are going to be coming right back, and it seems to me that that might attract lots of other Members to come back as well, and so maybe we ought to break and let him answer when we come back. What do you think?

Mr. MORAN. Okay. Unless it is a yes or no, and then we are finished.

Mr. LEWIS. I don't want a yes or no.

Mr. Dicks, we will then take care of you.

Mr. DICKS. We are going to come back?

Mr. LEWIS. Yes, right after the second vote, and we will be done in about 5 minutes or so.

Mr. Dicks, we are going to have you be up.

Mr. DICKS. Thank you.

Mr. LEWIS. When Mr. Moran comes back, we may very well read-just.

HOMELAND DEFENSE PLANNING

Mr. DICKS. No problem.

General, you and I have had a chance to talk for a brief moment, and I wanted you to clarify on this issue of how the planning is going to be done for various operations. Here it is. On page 4 of your statement it says, the Joint Forces headquarters—Homeland Security supports land and maritime defense planning for the continental United States and provides military assistance to civil authorities. But that is part of your operation; isn't that correct?

General EBERHART. Yes, sir.

Mr. DICKS. Can you tell me how that works a little bit?

General EBERHART. Yes, sir. This was initially stood up by Joint Forces Command just about a year ago, and one of the first and only standing Joint Force headquarters. On 1 October when we

stood up, that subordinate command transferred to us. It no longer works for Joint Forces Command, it works for us. Frankly, it has our veterans in it. It has the people who have been working this issue now for over a year. We have been working since 1 October. So we view them as an extension of our staff. We view them as a headquarters that allows us to do a lot of what ifs. Again, back to keeping our head in the game, if we had to go out and secure all the Department of Energy facilities, they get all that information, and they come up with a course of action how we would do that. So they are very valuable members of our team, and I commend Joint Forces Command for standing them up. Major General Honore is the Commander of that organization.

Mr. DICKS. Now, you mentioned again—I will just go back to this just for a second. You mentioned the group that does—at Indian Head that does the chemical/biological and nuclear response. What is that group called again?

General EBERHART. Sir, the acronym we use is—and I apologize for it—is CBIRF, and that is easier to say than the full name. And that is Chemical Biological Incident Response Force. Chemical Biological Incident Response Force. Again, General Krulak had the force—

Mr. LEWIS. One more acronym.

General EBERHART. Yes, sir. Exactly. Pushed us over the edge. Stood that up in the mid-1990s; obviously, in my view, a great thing to do, a timely thing to do. Initially they were down at Camp Lejeune. It became obvious that the right place for them was here at Indian Head close to the National Capital Region.

Day in and day out they are not under our command or control, but when we need them, we get them. For example, the State of the Union Address, we had a joint task force commander, a Major General Grizzle here, who was in charge of all the military support, and he reported to me, and the CBIRF reported to him.

Mr. DICKS. Okay. Now, you said—didn't you say, and I want to make sure we got this right—didn't you say that you thought we needed like four of these around the country; that one unit just simply isn't enough, which I would certainly concur, just for deployment purposes?

General EBERHART. I am not sure if four is the right answer, sir, but my view is that we need more of them. We need to look at what the right number is, where they should be located. But my intuition, everything I have seen as we have worked through these war games is that we need more of that capability in this Nation.

Mr. DICKS. Now, is that unit one of your units?

General EBERHART. No.

Mr. DICKS. CBIRF?

General EBERHART. No. Again, that unit day in and day out doesn't belong to me, but if they went to work, if they did anything here in the United States of America, they would work for me when they do that. I have been to visit them. We have exercised with them. We clearly know what the lines of authority and command would be.

Mr. DICKS. Now, do you think this is one of the major deficiencies of the local governments as well is the ability to deal with hazardous materials and chemical and biological potential attacks?

I mean, isn't that one of their—I mean, I know they all have maybe one unit, but, I mean, is that a deficiency from what you have seen in your exercises and training?

General EBERHART. Sir, it is. And I believe that that might be the rare case when we would be asked to possibly even assume command and control because there would not be either the air expertise or wherewithal at the local or even the State level to do that. So I believe that we need to, in fact, bolster that capability, but we can't afford to do that in every village and town. I mean, that is cost-prohibitive.

Mr. DICKS. You would have to set up some priorities; I mean, more of a regional effort.

General EBERHART. Exactly, sir. I think that is—

Mr. DICKS. Now, who should do that? I mean, is that going to be left to the locals to do, or do we have to do that?

General EBERHART. Sir, I believe that we need to work that collectively with the Homeland Security Department in the lead.

Mr. DICKS. Okay.

General EBERHART. Working down through the State and the county and local governments is the way to do that, but, again, in conjunction—

Mr. DICKS. But you see that as one of the major deficiencies thus far.

General EBERHART. Yes, sir, I do.

Mr. DICKS. Okay. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

BALLISTIC MISSILE DEFENSE

Mr. LEWIS. Okay. Thank you very much, Mr. Dicks.

General Eberhart, because of your background, but also because of the growing interest among our committees around here relative to threats to the country that involves missile threat possibility, I kind of helped to—asked my staff to help me pull together a whole bunch of the questions that we have here into just a line for some discussion. So with that in mind, on a date after, let's say, September 30, 2004, someone out in Northeast Asia, without any warning, launches an ICBM at the U.S. Would you walk us through missile defense alert, command and control, intercept decision processes, how they will work? You know, does NORTHCOM do the intercept, or does STRATCOM, et cetera?

General EBERHART. I need to caveat that by saying I believe this is how it will unfold. We will continue to work these conceptive ops, these command and control relationships between now and September 2004. We will model them yearly, probably twice a year, as we approach that date in what we call a command and control simulation out there at Schriever Air Force Base, which we have been doing for almost 10 years.

But the way I believe that will work is that Strategic Command, having the sensors, having the Defense Support Program and the Space-Based Infrared System that is replacing it, will detect the launch. They will then, based on correlation, decide that it is a Taepo Dong or whatever it might be, and then, based on the profile as they see it, decide that it is, in fact, headed for you pick it, X place in the United States.

We will immediately—all commands at that time, whether you are under attack or not, come up on this conference, and they will get this information voice, and they will get this information by data and then decide whether or not they are the command under attack or not. And in your case we are under attack in North America, so at that point our folks in Cheyenne Mountain would contact me, or whoever is acting if I am someplace where I cannot be reached. They will then characterize the attack to us. We will then decide what action is appropriate. ———.

Now, a lot of people say—and Mr. Hobson asked this question—well, how about Hawaii? As you well remember, one of the main reasons that these interceptors will, in fact, be in Alaska is so that they can protect Hawaii, too. We could have put them in North Dakota where we initially looked at this type of capability. But we couldn't protect all of our States, and if it is headed for Hawaii, it would be the classic supported/supporting relationship. I would be the supporting Commander. I would be supporting the supported Commander, who would be Tom Fargo. It is kind of a moot point because I am going to shoot it and kill it, but I am doing it for him.

Mr. DICKS. Just one point on the same subject on missile defense.

General EBERHART. And again, this is all very sensitive, please.

Mr. LEWIS. Yes. That is right.

CRUISE MISSILE DEFENSE

Mr. DICKS. Well, how are you going to deal with cruise missiles? I mean, is that going to be with aircraft? That is the only thing we have really got, isn't it?

General EBERHART. Yes, sir. And you have heard me say in my previous hat as U.S. Space Command and as NORAD that I think we have a way ahead now for ballistic missiles, and I am excited about that. And I believe we now need to get just as serious about cruise missiles, and that starts with wide-area surveillance. With a launch out of Korea my view is if we see them rolling it out, we are nuts to let them get it airborne. I mean, we ought to put Tomahawks in there. We ought to put whatever we do and kill it on the pad and not let them launch it. And that is what we ought to do with cruise missiles. I mean, if it is on a ship out there, wherever it is, we ought to take it down.

Mr. DICKS. Sink the ship.

General EBERHART. Exactly. We ought to take it down.

There could be some capabilities here as we work this Aegis, this whole layered defense to deal with cruise missiles and to better detect them with radars, et cetera. And we have to put this all together in a package.

Mr. LEWIS. Mr. Dicks, the general won't admit this, but I have every sense that he has got some potential schedule difficulties, so I want to raise that point with you. We will just talk back and forth for a moment. I wonder how many of our Committee members have gone to Cheyenne Mountain. I don't have any idea. I know that I am sure you have.

Mr. DICKS. I have been there. I have been to Northern Command just recently.

Mr. LEWIS. I have not been, and I am thinking that maybe we ought to have—find out when some of our Members might want to go visit you personally and extend the variety and flavor of this conversation in a different kind of way.

General EBERHART. Sir, as you know, you have an open invitation to do that. I would suggest that we go through one of these table-top exercises, that we have a representative from some of these different government agencies. I think this would be very instructional for all of us as you make your inputs and your suggestions along those lines. So I would welcome that, and if we get the right lead time here, then we can have an exercise, and we can have the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) reps at the table, the FBI reps, and the Coast Guard and on and on and on. We can work through some of these issues, and I think it will become clearer if we get involved in a specific scenario and we walk it through from start to finish, and not just one scenario. Frankly, one scenario is easy, but let's run, two, three, four in parallel and make them different.

Mr. LEWIS. We will talk about this further here among us and communicate with you. I think that would be a really worthwhile item.

General, I know that you are anxious to spend another couple of hours with us, but in view of the circumstances, we will adjourn the Committee.

Thank you. The Committee is adjourned.

[CLERK'S NOTE.—Questions submitted by Mr. Lewis and the answers thereto follow:]

RELATIONSHIPS WITH OTHER COMBATANT COMMANDS

Question. General Eberhart, we understand that when USNORTHCOM was stood up on October 1st of 2002, that some responsibilities were transferred to USNORTHCOM from other commands and that some missions were shifted to others, for example the USSPACECOM mission was shifted from Colorado to Omaha, Nebraska.

General Eberhart, would you describe the relationship between USNORTHCOM, US Strategic Command, Joint Forces Command and NORAD?

Answer. USNORTHCOM has established a conceptual framework for homeland defense with U.S. Strategic Command and U.S. Joint Forces Command (USJFCOM) using traditional supported and supporting relationships. The relationship of USNORTHCOM to other combatant commands is one of mutual support and frequent interaction.

NORAD and USNORTHCOM are separate commands (but with the same commander) with complementary homeland defense missions. Members of the two commands work side-by-side at HQs NORAD and Cheyenne Mountain Operations Center.

Question. Please explain how the homeland defense responsibilities are divided between combatant commands.

Answer. USNORTHCOM is responsible for homeland defense—air, land and sea—of the continental United States (CONUS), Alaska, Puerto Rico, and the U.S. Virgin Islands. NORAD is responsible for aerospace warning and control of North America. U.S. Pacific Command is responsible for homeland defense of Hawaii as well as U.S. territories and possessions in the Pacific.

Question. If the Combat Air Patrol over the United States had to take immediate, aggressive, potentially lethal defensive actions, how would that decision process flow?

Answer. We would initiate an Operation NOBLE EAGLE event conference call. If we determined the track of interest has hostile intentions and is nonresponsive to normal communications and fighter intercept procedures, a shoot-down order could be given as a last resort.

CURRENT OPERATIONS

Question. General Eberhart, when USNORTHCOM was established, control of Joint Task Force Six, the counter-drug task force, was transferred from Joint Forces Command to USNORTHCOM. Joint Task Force Six falls under your homeland security component, which is Joint Force Headquarters Homeland Security.

What is your assessment of the readiness and mission accomplishment of Joint Task Force Six?

Answer. Joint Task Force Six (JTF-6) is fully trained and ready to accomplish its mission to support federal, state and local counterdrug law enforcement agencies.

Question. Have you made command and control or operational changes since assuming control of Joint Task Force Six? Do you contemplate changes?

Answer. We have not made any changes to JTF-6. However, the Department of Defense (DoD) is evaluating command and control alternatives for transforming the Department's counternarcotics activities, which may impact JTF-6 operations. USNORTHCOM is participating in this process.

Question. Do you have any other ongoing operations for homeland defense or civil support besides the counter-drug effort?

Answer. Yes, we support the President when he travels outside of the Washington DC area and we conduct irregular combat air patrols over major metropolitan areas and key critical infrastructure. We also have command and control over the Integrated Air Defense assets protecting the National Capital Region. In addition, we recently concluded support for Space Shuttle COLUMBIA recovery operations. In support of the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) and the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA), we established a Response Task Force to coordinate recovery efforts with National Guard's Weapons of Mass Destruction-Civil Support Teams (WAD-Casts), the Navy Research Lab and U.S. Navy divers.

COMMAND OF BALLISTIC MISSILE DEFENSE FACILITIES

Question. In December 2002, the Administration announced its intention to make operational the Ballistic Missile Defense System test-bed thus providing an initial missile defense capability in the 2004-2005 timeframe. The Unified Command Plan indicates that all forces within the geographic area of responsibility (AOR) assigned to a combatant commander shall be assigned or attached to and under the command of that combatant commander—unless otherwise directed by the President or Secretary of Defense. The ground-based components of this capability are located in Alaska and California, within the U.S. Northern Command area of responsibility (AOR).

Does the Unified Command Plan require a specific decision by the President or the Secretary of Defense to assign forces in your AOR to a combatant other than yourself?

Answer. Yes, and that decision has been made. Almost all the forces in our AOR are assigned to either U.S. Joint Forces Command or U.S. Pacific Command. In addition, the Joint Staff is working revisions to the Forces For Unified Commanders and the Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan to reflect forces assigned or apportioned to USNORTHCOM.

BALLISTIC MISSILE DEFENSE TECHNOLOGY

Question. The Unified Command Plan indicates all forces within the geographic area of responsibility (AOR) assigned to a combatant commander shall be assigned or attached to and under the command of that combatant commander—unless otherwise directed by the President or Secretary of Defense. In order to establish an initial missile defense capability, the Administration announced in December 2002 that it will use the current Ballistic Missile Defense System test-bed to provide an operational capability.

Please comment on the state of development of the initial ballistic missile defense capability.

Answer. The Missile Defense Agency is on schedule to deliver an initial defensive capability against a limited ballistic missile attack by October 2004. We believe it will provide our homeland with limited defense against limited attacks.

Question. Are you comfortable that the Ballistic Missile Defense System test-bed will provide an effective initial capability?

Answer. We are confident the Missile Defense Agency will deliver an initial defensive capability against a limited ballistic missile attack by October 2004.

Question. The Committee understands that the Missile Defense Agency is seeking a waiver for certain types of testing associated with the initial capability provided

by the Ballistic Missile Defense System test-bed. Do you agree with the philosophy of reducing weapons testing in order to more rapidly field an initial missile defense capability?

Answer. We believe the timely fielding of a missile defense capability is critical to our Nation's defense and should continue to be a priority.

RELATIONSHIP WITH DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY

Question. USNORTHCOM has the responsibility for the sea and air approaches to the North American continent, but Homeland Security has the responsibility to establish defensive measures in the actual ports.

General Eberhart, would you explain the relationship between USNORTHCOM and the Department of Homeland Security and its various subordinate agencies?

Answer. As directed by the President and Secretary of Defense, USNORTHCOM's mission is to provide civil support to Lead Federal Agencies, many of which fall under the Department of Homeland Security. We conduct day-to-day coordination on operations, plans and training with the Department of Homeland Security. Policy and resource issues are handled at the Departmental level.

Question. How do you draw the line and establish exactly who does what?

Answer. The Secretary of Defense has defined the three circumstances under which DoD would be involved in homeland security activities within the United States: (1) extraordinary circumstances that require DoD to execute traditional military missions, such as combat air patrols and maritime defense operations; (2) emergency circumstances of a catastrophic nature, either natural or manmade, that require DoD to act quickly to provide and supply capabilities that other agencies simply do not have; and (3) missions or assignments that are limited in scope when other agencies have the lead from the outset, such as national security special events like the Olympics.

Question. What areas of responsibility or control, if any, remain to be sorted out?

Answer. We believe USNORTHCOM responsibilities are clear in accordance with the Secretary of Defense's direction. As they arise, issues regarding roles and responsibilities will be resolved at the Departmental level.

USNORTHCOM EXERCISE PROGRAM

Question. Do you have a list of forces that exercise with your headquarters in these various scenarios?

Answer. To date, USNORTHCOM has exercised with service components from United States Joint Forces Command (USJFCOM), Army Forces Command, Atlantic Fleet, Marine Forces Atlantic and Air Combat Command. In addition, these exercises have also included the National Guard, U.S. Coast Guard and over 55 federal, state and local agencies.

Question. Does Joint Forces Command participate in USNORTHCOM exercises? If so, please describe.

Answer. USJFCOM supports all of our major exercises from their Joint Warfighting Center by providing exercise control groups and scenario development support.

Question. How do you exercise your civil support responsibilities?

Answer. A major element of all our planned exercises is how we would provide support to civil authorities across a full spectrum of events. Our involvement in the Space Shuttle Columbia tragedy is a prime example of such support. At the direction of the Secretary of Defense (SECDEF), we established a Response Task Force to lend military support to federal, state and local civil authorities, per NASA's and FEMA's requests.

Question. Who serves as the "Red" forces when you conduct exercises or simulations?

Answer. Our exercises to date have been scenario-based and have not included "live" aggressor play. For future exercises, our Combined Intelligence and Fusion Center (CIFIC) is developing an in-house Red Team in coordination with the Central Intelligence Agency.

Question. What are some of the key lessons you have learned?

Answer. Our exercises have resulted in several key lessons:

- We need to know the enemy order of battle-man-made and natural. We need to understand what forces are available to respond quickly to reduce casualties and limit damage.
- A "need to share" versus a "need to know" protocol for information sharing is vital for mission success.
- We cannot accomplish our mission without the National Guard, Reserves and our interagency partners.

- We need a secure training facility that can accommodate up to 300 people.

FORCE PROVIDER RESPONSIBILITIES

Question. Since the bulk of the United States Armed Forces are home based in the USNORTHCOM geographical area, would it make sense for USNORTHCOM to assume the role of the force generator or force provider?

Answer. We are very comfortable with the current arrangement where U.S. Joint Forces Command is the major "force provider" in our AOR.

Question. Alaska falls within the USNORTHCOM area of responsibility, but the troops based there are earmarked for United States Pacific Command (USPACOM). Please discuss how that works? In some cases could those Alaska-based troops be assigned to perform a mission for USNORTHCOM?

Answer. If Alaska-based forces are required for homeland defense or civil support missions, Commander, USNORTHCOM will, upon approval from the Secretary of Defense, receive forces from Commander, U.S. Pacific Command.

COMMUNICATIONS

Question. Are USNORTHCOM command, control, and communications capabilities fixed or mobile?

Answer. USNORTHCOM, its subordinate units, and alert forces have fixed and mobile communications capabilities. These range from tactical voice, video, and data networks to limited commercial mobile communications.

INTELLIGENCE ASSIMILATION

Question. General Eberhart, the USNORTHCOM Combined Intelligence and Fusion Center (CIFIC) is taking a very comprehensive approach to intelligence assimilation, more comprehensive than in the Joint Intelligence Center (JIC) and Joint Analysis Centers (JAC).

Please explain how the CIFIC works.

Answer. Using a process known as Operational Net Assessment (ONA), the CIFIC provides actionable threat estimates and timely warning by fusing all-source intelligence and information from nearly 50 different government agencies. ONA allows the CIFIC to integrate law enforcement and counterintelligence information.

Question. Please elaborate on how the CIFIC is different from previous intelligence centers.

Answer. The CIFIC is a transformational organization in terms of size, mission, and responsibility. While the average theater JIC consists of approximately 400 people, CIFIC manning is set at 124. Unlike other DoD intelligence centers, the CIFIC does not develop intelligence products. They integrate and fuse a wide range of intelligence and information into a threat picture for military and first responder customers.

Question. Do you anticipate that the CIFIC will meet USNORTHCOM's intelligence requirements?

Answer. Yes, the CIFIC has made great strides in laying the groundwork and establishing the relationships needed to meet requirements.

Question. Could the CIFIC become the model for the intelligence center of the future?

Answer. The CIFIC organization construct complements our mission and AOR. We do not believe one size fits all. It is too soon to tell if this is a model that could be implemented across the DoD.

THREAT VS. CAPABILITIES

Question. General Eberhart, do you develop and resource defensive capabilities based on a threat assessment, or based on a range of potential enemy or terrorist capabilities?

Answer. We develop our Integrated Priority List (IPL) using a capabilities-based threat analysis. The Services develop and resource defensive capabilities to meet our IPL requirements.

BUDGET FORMULATION

Question. General Eberhart, the funds that support the USNORTHCOM headquarters and Joint Task Force headquarters are provided to USNORTHCOM directly from Headquarters, U.S. Air Force. Forces that are assigned to perform missions for USNORTHCOM are equipped and resourced for operations by their parent Services.

General Eberhart, did USNORTHCOM have a role in the formulation of the fiscal year 2004 budget, especially as it pertains to the equipping and operational funding of units that could be called upon to support your defensive operations?

Answer. Yes. USNORTHCOM's requirements were coordinated with the Office of the Secretary of Defense, the Joint Staff, and the Services during development of the fiscal year 2004 budget.

Question. Do you provide budget input in the form of an Integrated Priority List?

Answer. Yes. USNORTHCOM submitted an Integrated Priority List.

Question. What are your top unfunded requirements?

Answer. Our biggest unfunded challenges are in the following areas:

Fiscal Year 2003 Unfunded Challenges—

- USNORTHCOM Headquarters Phase II Military Construction
- FAA Interior Radar Sustainment
- National Capital Region Integrated Air Defense
- Manpower

Fiscal Year 2004 Unfunded Challenges—

- USNORTHCOM Headquarters Phase II Military Construction
- FAA Interior Radar Sustainment
- Mobile Consolidated Command Center
- Reconfiguration of Cheyenne Mountain Operations Center consistent with mission changes

Question. Is Operation NOBLE EAGLE, the protective combat air patrol the Continental United States, fully funded for the current fiscal year, in the fiscal year 2004 request?

Answer. We are analyzing various options for Operation NOBLE EAGLE over long term. When this analysis is completed, we will be better able to determine if our requirements are fully funded for the current and next fiscal year.

Question. What additional flexibility in control of resources, budget formulation and execution, and in acquisition procedures would help USNORTHCOM to better accomplish its mission?

Answer. It is too soon to tell what resource and acquisition changes are warranted, if any, to support USNORTHCOM. We will have a better understanding of these issues after we reach full operational capability.

CONTRACTOR SUPPORT

Question. General Eberhart, a topic which frequently surfaces in the media is the degree to which various government agencies depend on contractor support for analysis, and literally, in operating the organization, even in forward deployed war zones. Recently for example, the heavy dependence on contractor support to NASA has been discussed at length.

General Eberhart, to what extent do you augment your headquarters staff with contractor personnel?

Answer. We use contractors with skill sets and experience levels not resident within our staff. We employ 266 full-time contractors in USNORTHCOM, which is approximately 23 percent of the total workforce. We anticipate this number will grow in the next several months as we work toward full operational capability. Even after government employees with the correct skill sets are hired, we will rely heavily on contractors.

Question. What tasks or functions are supported by contractors?

Answer. Our contractors provide a broad range of support, to include building security, planning, intelligence, engineering and technical services. We have contractors on shift supporting 24-hour watch duty, as well as day-to-day operations in each of our directorates.

Question. How do you ensure oversight and quality in work performed by contractors?

Answer. For every contract or task order, we appoint a trained Quality Assurance Evaluator to assess the contractors' work products and ensure deliverables are within the scope and terms of the contract or task order. Each contract and task order specifies security clearance requirements. All contractor security clearances are verified through the USNORTHCOM Directorate of Intelligence.

USNORTHCOM'S RDT&E AND PROCUREMENT REQUIREMENTS

Question. Are there any unique Research, Development, Test and Evaluation or Procurement items in the fiscal year 2004 budget request that apply to USNORTHCOM's mission?

Answer. Yes, the FY 2004 budget includes three projects, which support USNORTHCOM's mission.

- Combatant Commander Integrated Command and Control System (CCIC2S). CCIC2S will provide for the integration of Missile Warning and Missile Defense Systems. It will improve event correlation, attack characterization, and event reporting. CCIC2S is a procurement line item.
- Battle Control System (BCS). BCS will fuse military and FAA sensor data into a Common Operational Picture. It will provide management of a minimum of 10,000 active flight plans with connectivity of data from at least 200 sensors. BCS is a procurement line item.
- Homeland Security/Homeland Defense Command and Control Advanced Concept Technology Demonstration (HLS/D C2 ACTD). HLS/D C2 ACTD is an RDT&E initiative to provide a trusted information-sharing environment and command and control tools to homeland security and homeland defense decision makers. It will increase interoperability among DoD organizations and federal and state agencies.

USNORTHCOM'S CHEMICAL, BIOLOGICAL, RADIOLOGICAL AND NUCLEAR (CBRN)
THREAT MISSION

Question. Please describe for us what, if any, involvement USNORTHCOM has in the area of detection and decontamination against chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear threats.

Answer. USNORTHCOM would direct the military response to CBRN events within the Command's AOR. If needed, we would have operational control of response forces such as the Chemical Biological Incident Response Force and the National Guard WMD-CSTs (Title 10 status only).

Question. What CBRN detection, protection, and decontamination equipment is assigned to USNORTHCOM?

Answer. No CBRN detection, protection, or decontamination equipment is organic to USNORTHCOM. However, fully equipped CBRN forces will be assigned to USNORTHCOM, as required.

Question. Are there any unfunded requirements for USNORTHCOM's JTF-CS CBRN mission?

Answer. No, all JTF-CS CBRN mission requirements are fully funded.

Question. Does USNORTHCOM conduct CBRN threat reaction training?

Answer. USNORTHCOM does not conduct CBRN threat reaction training. In accordance with their Title 10 responsibilities, the Services provide CBRN unit and individual training, as required.

[CLERK'S NOTE.—End of questions submitted by Mr. Lewis.]

WEDNESDAY, APRIL 30, 2003.

**COMBATANT COMMANDER, UNITED STATES SPECIAL
OPERATIONS COMMAND**

WITNESSES

GENERAL CHARLES R. HOLLAND, COMMANDER, UNITED STATES SPECIAL OPERATIONS COMMAND, UNITED STATES AIR FORCE

COMMAND MASTER CHIEF RICHARD M. ROGERS, UNITED STATES SPECIAL OPERATIONS COMMAND, UNITED STATES NAVY

HARRY SCHULTE, SENIOR ACQUISITIVE EXECUTIVE, UNITED STATES SPECIAL OPERATIONS COMMAND

SERGEANT FIRST CLASS MIKE McILHENY, UNITED STATES SPECIAL OPERATIONS COMMAND, UNITED STATES ARMY

INTRODUCTION

Mr. LEWIS. The Committee will come to order.

The Committee welcomes today General Charles R. Holland, Commander, United States Special Operations Command.

General Holland, I want to welcome you here today. This is a very special meeting for this Committee. We intend to spend as much time as necessary reviewing your budget, reviewing missions past and prospective missions perhaps as well, but most importantly Special Operations Forces has gotten the level of attention and understanding in recent months that I think has not ever existed in the general community, also not existed in some parts of the building across the river.

All of us share together the impact upon the country of that attack that was experienced by our Nation on September 11, 2001. One important part of that attack took place 5 miles away from where we are sitting. Indeed, I have been reminded of that statement of a Japanese admiral following Pearl Harbor who turned and said, I am afraid we may have awakened a sleeping giant. There is little doubt that the American public has reacted to that experience in a very special way.

The Global War on Terrorism that the President has formulated and so well articulated is a part of our current existence. We have just been through a piece of that experience in both Afghanistan as well as Iraq. During all of that, the performance of the men and women who make up our Special Operations Forces is not just to be commended but is a fabulous reflection of just how great this country is.

We are going to have a session here that will last for as long as the members choose to ask questions, and then we will be recessing for a little bit and go upstairs to discuss other matters that can't be discussed even in this closed session.

I am not going to go into any further extended remarks. But we will have questions as we go forward, and I am sure other members will ask you to provide information by way of the record.

Let me call on my colleague Mr. Murtha.

REMARKS OF MR. MURTHA

Mr. MURTHA. I just want to say one thing. I have never seen a guy with black hair that had so many stripes on his arm. That is the youngest Master Chief I have ever seen. You just look young, or are you young?

Master Chief ROGERS. Sir, I knew this baby face would come in handy.

Mr. LEWIS. Let me call on our chairman, Mr. Young.

REMARKS OF MR. YOUNG

Mr. YOUNG. Well, Mr. Chairman, thank you, Mr. Chairman. I want to welcome the General and all of his colleagues who are here with him today.

General, as we discussed earlier last week, Doug and I spent quite a bit of time in the region in Qatar and in Afghanistan and have spent a lot of time with General Franks, and I have got to tell you that everyone we talked with, including your Commander there, but especially those who are not related directly, could not say anything but the greatest accolades for what your forces have done and how you changed the whole battlefield. And I just wanted to put that on the record and congratulate you and everybody that works for you. You did just a super job, and are still doing a super job there.

Mr. LEWIS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. General Holland, we are here to review your budget as well as to have exchanges that I have mentioned. We will be happy to take your entire statement in the record, and please proceed.

SUMMARY STATEMENT OF GENERAL HOLLAND

General HOLLAND. Mr. Chairman, Congressman Murtha and distinguished members of the Committee, before I even start with my opening remarks, I would like to make just a few comments about the two men seated next to me. Harry Schulte is our Senior Acquisition Executive. When you think about Special Operations Command making a difference for our people out in the field, it is a fact that we have a plan where we can very quickly get equipment to the people in the field, and Harry Schulte is the man that makes that happen within the command.

On my right is my Senior Enlisted Adviser. This man is going to get ready to transition at the end of August. He is beyond his mandatory retirement date, and he volunteered to stay on with me during my tour here as the Combatant Commander of Special Operations Command.

And also seated behind me is Sergeant First Class Mike McIlheny, who was with Karzai during that very important mission in Afghanistan, and, yes, he is wounded—he sustained a debilitating injury—is here today. I want all of you to know he has reenlisted in our United States Army. These are the types of people I

have in the room with me. And with that, Mr. Chairman, I would like to say it is a privilege to come before you this afternoon and talk about the United States Special Operations Command, or USSOCOM, and the men and women that make up our command.

I have a few points I would like to highlight at this time, but with your permission as you have already granted me, I will enter the longer prepared statement for the record.

As I continue to answer your questions, I will also look for both Mr. Schulte and the Command Master Chief to be part of the question and answer period.

DEPLOYMENTS

Mr. Chairman, the United States military is on the offensive against terrorism around the globe. Special Operations Forces are at the tip of the spear. Last year over 7,000 special operators were deployed to over 150 foreign countries, providing regional commanders with a force unsurpassed in both low density, agility and lethality. Today in what is undoubtedly the most robust use of Special Operations Forces in the history of our military, we have had more than that number deployed in support of operations in Iraq. The recent success for our men and women during Operation Enduring Freedom and now during Operation Iraqi Freedom have given the world a much clearer insight into the skills and dedication of America's Special Operations Forces, and through your support, we continue to get even better.

USSOCOM will now transform from being primarily a force provider to the geographic command to become a warfighting command, with the additional mission of planning and execution, of combat operations against terrorist organizations.

And I would stress, Mr. Chairman, that this expanded role as a supported commander is not meant to replace or otherwise marginalize the Special Operations organizations assigned to the regional commanders. In fact, it is designed to dramatically increase the effectiveness and the efficiencies of our operations by ensuring that we are totally synchronized and focused on the global war on terror wherever it breeds.

RESOURCE REQUIREMENTS

With this added responsibility comes additional resource requirements, and they will come to allow us to be better positioned around the world, have more responsive forces, ensure collaboration with our regional combatant commanders, and the intelligence agencies, as well as increase the needed planners at the theater Special Operations Commands and at USSOCOM headquarters in Tampa. It will also alleviate some of the high demand low-density issues and give us more overall agility and flexibility around the world.

At USSOCOM we have built a Special Operations Joint Inter-agency Collaboration Center to ensure there is no seam between our intelligence agencies and our planning and execution efforts. We have built a world class Joint Operations Joint Center. While in a temporary facility, it provides the needed connectivity to our forces currently around the world.

And, Mr. Chairman, I am happy to report the Department of Defense has worked very hard to ensure SOF at every level have what they need to get the job done. Now, while we have focused on the war on terror, we have not lost any momentum in our extremely important ability to rapidly design, build, acquire and field the best equipment possible for our operators on the ground, in the air and at sea. And as you know, Congress empowered the command to develop and acquire Special Operations peculiar equipment, materiel and services. We have implemented streamlined and cost-effective processes to provide our SOF soldiers, sailors and airmen with the technology and equipment they need to execute the myriad of warfighting and peacetime missions.

We leverage the Services and other agencies in the development of programs to look for technology to apply to our Special Operation's needs. At the end of the day, the warfighter has the tools necessary to fight the most committed enemy across the spectrum of conflict.

FISCAL YEAR 2004 BUDGET REQUEST

The new President's budget will increase the command's annual funding approximately \$1.5 billion to a total of \$6.7 billion in fiscal year 2004. This additional funding will allow us to increase procurement, RDT&E and the programs vital to the success of our force. These include CV-22, MH-47G, the AC-130U gunships and a myriad of C4I initiatives and operator equipment.

NEW TECHNOLOGIES

And, Mr. Chairman, the current state of SOF capabilities is strong, but to meet the evolving capabilities of potential adversaries we must invest now to ensure reliable support for the defense strategy. Our people are certainly our most important asset, and that we won't forget. But maintaining and improving materiel capabilities remains one of the command's most difficult challenges. SOF must keep its equipment up to date while keeping the cost of sustaining its warfighting systems under control. And we depend on leading-edge technology to provide critical advantage and support participation in the growing numbers of technologically complex missions and operations.

These technologies include risk reduction, high bandwidth reachback communications, underwater communications, unmanned systems, battery and fuel cells, remote sensing and advanced trained systems, bioengineering and directed-energy weapons. The Department's recognition and support of our critical force structure requirements will result in an end strength of almost 4,000 personnel over the next five years, and I believe it is worth mentioning that USSOCOM has also worked closely with the Department of Defense to find funding for a much-needed state-of-the-art warfighting center to be located at our headquarters in Tampa, a facility that will afford us the highest levels of efficiency and integration as we plan the war on terrorism.

RECONSTITUTION

Thanks to your help in improving the fiscal year 2003 supplemental funding, we can cover the current costs we have incurred and begin the process of reconstituting our forces. Our battlefield successes this year consumed a significant amount of resources that we will now begin to replace using these funds and ensure we are prepared to meet continuing and developing threats.

SPECIAL OPERATIONS PERSONNEL

And finally, Mr. Chairman, I would like to mention the special operators who have made the ultimate sacrifice since September 11, 2001. Daily, the press reports just a small sample of the amazing missions being done in OEF and OIF. Our people are engaged on the battlefield nightly, performing the full spectrum of missions that mark Special Operations. They are working in a level of intensity, sophistication and commitment never before seen in the history of Special Operations, and quite frankly they are amazing. These men and women, several who have been wounded as well as all of the special operators who put their lives on the line around the world and in fact many that have lost their lives, are some of America's truest heroes.

I would like to point out again Sergeant First Class Mike McIlheny, a Special Forces soldier who lost part of his arm in Afghanistan in December 2001 and reenlisted with the 5th Special Forces Group last June. Mr. Chairman, with people like these I know we will succeed.

I would therefore like to close by acknowledging the great support that you and the other Committee members have given our soldiers, sailors, airmen, Marines and our civilians, and I thank you for the opportunity to be here today, and I look forward to addressing your questions.

[The biographical sketch and statement of General Holland follow:]

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SUBCOMMITTEE ON DEFENSE

STATEMENT OF
GENERAL CHARLES R. HOLLAND, U.S. AIR FORCE
COMMANDER
UNITED STATES SPECIAL OPERATIONS COMMAND
BEFORE THE
HOUSE COMMITTEE ON APPROPRIATIONS
SUBCOMMITTEE ON DEFENSE
ON THE STATE OF
SPECIAL OPERATIONS FORCES

APRIL 30, 2003

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Biography

United States Special Operations Command

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GENERAL CHARLES R HOLLAND, USAF

General Charles R. Holland, U.S. Air Force, became the Commander of the United States Special Operations Command, headquartered at MacDill Air Force Base, Florida, on 27 October 2000. As commander, he is responsible for all special operations forces of the Army, Navy, and Air Force, both active and reserve.

The general entered the Air Force in 1968 after graduation from the U.S. Air Force Academy. He attended undergraduate pilot training at Reese Air Force Base, Texas, in 1968. In 1969, he attended initial C-130E pilot qualification training, Sewart Air Force Base, Tennessee. From 1969 to 1972, he was a C-130 pilot. In 1972, he attended AC-130E combat crew training, Hurlburt Field, Florida. He served as an AC-130E/H aircraft commander, instructor pilot and standardization and evaluation pilot, 16th Special Operations Squadron, Ubon Royal Thai Air Force Base, Thailand. He is a Command Pilot with more than 5,000 flying hours in C-130, C-37, H-1, H-3, HC-130, MC-130, MH-53, MH-60 and T-39, including 79 combat missions in an AC-130 gunship in Southeast Asia.

He has commanded a squadron, two air force wings, served as vice commander, Headquarters U.S. Air Forces in Europe, as deputy commanding general of the Joint Special Operations Command, and was commander of the Special Operations Command Pacific. He also served as commander of the Air Force Special Operations Command, Hurlburt Field, Florida.

The general served as the 21st Tactical Airlift Squadron commander, Clark Air Base, Philippines, from September 1983 to June 1985. In July 1985 to June 1986, he attended the Industrial College of the Armed Forces, Fort Lesley J. McNair, Washington, D.C. Next, he was deputy chief, Airlift and Training Division, Directorate of Operational Requirements, and deputy chief of staff, Research, Development and Acquisition, Headquarters U.S. Air Force, Washington, D.C. from June 1986 to June 1987.

From June 1987 to June 1988, he served as chief, Airlift and Training Division, Directorate of Strategic, Special Operations Forces and Airlift, Military Deputy for Acquisition, Office of the Assistant Secretary of the Air Force, Washington, D.C. In June 1988 to June 1991, he became vice commander and later commander, 1550th Combat Crew Training Wing, Kirtland Air Force Base, New Mexico.

He returned to Hurlburt Field, Florida, in June 1991 to June 1993, as the 1st Special Operations Wing commander. Next, he was the deputy commanding general, Joint Special Operations Command, Fort Bragg, North Carolina, from June 1993 to June 1995. He also served as commander, Special Operations Command Pacific, Camp H.M. Smith, Hawaii, from June 1995 to June 1997.

In July 1997 to August 1999, General Holland served as commander, Air Force Special Operations Command, Hurlburt Field, Florida. He also was the vice-commander, United States Air Forces in Europe, Ramstein Air Base, Germany, from August 1999 to October 2000.

His awards and decorations include the Distinguished Service Medal, Defense Superior Service Medal with two oak leaf clusters, Legion of Merit with oak leaf cluster, Distinguished Flying Cross, Meritorious Service Medal with two oak leaf clusters, Air Medal with four oak leaf clusters, Joint Meritorious Unit Award with one oak leaf cluster, Armed Forces Expeditionary Medal with service star, Vietnam Service Medal, Southwest Asia Service Medal with service star, Republic of Vietnam Gallantry Cross with Palm, and Kuwait Liberation Medal (Kuwait).



STATEMENT OF
GENERAL CHARLES R. HOLLAND
COMMANDER
UNITED STATES SPECIAL OPERATIONS COMMAND

Mr. Chairman and distinguished Members of the Committee, it is an honor and privilege to report to you on the state of the United States Special Operations Command (USSOCOM) and special operations forces (SOF). I am pleased to report that SOF remain the most capable and ready force in the world today.

We have seen great change in our Nation as America takes action against terrorism. As you know, USSOCOM has been a key player in that response. I will report to you on how we are facing two critical challenges and provide an overview of our Fiscal Year 2004 (FY04) budget request. The two challenges addressed are fighting terrorism on a global scale and transformation.

Let me first address the war against terrorism on a global scale. USSOCOM has been at the forefront of this fight since initiation of combat operations following the September 11th attacks. Given the character of this war and the stakes involved, SOF is on the offensive. The aspect of today's international terrorist is far different than in the past, as terrorists now have global reach, infrastructure, and significant resources. The attacks on our Nation on September 11, 2001, clearly demonstrated that determined terrorists will go to any lengths to inflict catastrophic losses on Americans, regardless whether they are civilians or military personnel. Of greater importance is the fact that these terrorists have chemical, biological, nuclear, and high-yield explosive weapons and the desire to kill as many Americans as possible and undermine our Nation's interests and influence around the world.

SOF play a vital role in combating and defeating global terrorism, by disrupting terrorist organizations and bringing their members and supporters to justice ... or by taking justice directly to them. The mission of USSOCOM is expanding to planning direct combat missions against terrorist organizations around the world and executing those missions as the supported Command, while maintaining the role of force provider and supporter to the Geographic Combatant Commanders. To meet this challenge, USSOCOM must establish command and control infrastructures which complement the Geographic Combatant Commanders and invest in programs and systems improving SOF's speed, agility, precision, lethality, stealth, survivability, and sustainability. USSOCOM must also be forward-deployed for rapid response. The requirement to plan, synchronize, and execute operations on a global scale necessitate a globally capable SOF ready for full spectrum integrated operations.

Full spectrum integrated SOF are the refinements that must occur to tailor SOF capabilities for the war on terrorism. These SOF capabilities will ensure greater operational agility, flexibility and mobility, sufficient global command and control, focused intelligence, signature reduction, and a collaborative planning environment that facilitates simultaneous multi-echelon planning. Additionally, SOF capabilities must continue to address other national and military strategies, including homeland defense and forward deterrence, swiftly defeating the efforts of adversaries and decisively winning lesser contingencies.

All personnel of USSOCOM - Active duty, Reserve Component and civilians, are engaged in this multi-front global war on terrorism (GWOT). The battlefield successes in this campaign have proven again and again the foresight of Congress in the creation of USSOCOM. Our organizational flexibility and streamlined acquisition and resourcing authorities continue to allow unequaled response to the needs of our operators. The capability of

conducting joint operations is enhanced by synchronizing SOF, which include Army Special Operations Aviation, Special Forces, Rangers, Civil Affairs, and Psychological Operations forces; Air Force Special Operations Aviators and Special Tactics Squadrons; and Navy Sea, Air, and Land (SEAL), SEAL Delivery Vehicle Teams, and Special Boat Teams.

The continuing action in Afghanistan is a great example of how joint warfighting has evolved from the Goldwater-Nichols legislation as a powerful and precise tool to support our Nation's vital interests. Daily Civil Affairs teams and other SOF continue to play an active role in Afghanistan to ensure we win the peace. Our activities in Operation Enduring Freedom have given the world a much clearer insight into the skills, dedication, and power across the spectrum of America's SOF, specifically as part of a larger joint and interagency team - each bringing their specific skills and capabilities to the team. The ability to win across the spectrum of military operations requires seamless joint teamwork and USSOCOM is privileged to team with the Services to create the best warfighting capability the world has seen.

Our other opportunity is transformation. The hallmark of SOF is that they are always open to change and "out of the box" thinking. Transformation embodies our SOF core values ... integrity, courage, competence, and creativity. The success of change and transformation is the ability to maintain the goodness of the past, while taking calculated risks that promise competitive advantages on the battlefield for our future forces. We must change to ensure that we have maximized the ability of the human to think and problem solve, while taking advantage of the rapid pace of technology. Transformation is not about equipment, it is about a holistic approach producing sweeping advances for the individual, to the organization structure, to the appropriate application of technology to build the right capability at the right time to defeat any threat ensuring the safety of our Nation now and into the future. Transformation of SOF is a journey, not a

destination and there is no mark on the wall that will indicate we are finished transforming.

While SOF activities remain constant, the context of how and the manner in which they are executed has changed significantly. Traditionally, SOF were employed as a force multiplier to wage war against other nation states. Traditional warfare focused on the destruction of large massed armies, navies and air forces. Supporting intelligence communities developed capabilities to locate and track these large enemy combat elements. In traditional conflicts, the main effort was expended on the physical destruction of the enemy's military capability during large battles. USSOCOM is transforming intelligence and interagency capabilities not to locate and destroy large enemy combat elements, but to locate and track individual terrorists across the globe and conduct small surgical operations with minimal risk to the employed force.

In addition to the war on terrorism, our forces are still committed to the Geographic Combatant Commander's theater security cooperation plans. These include the European Command (EUCOM)-led campaign in Bosnia and Kosovo, the Pacific Command's (PACOM) support to combating terrorism in the Philippines and exercises with our allies in the Republic of Korea, Southern Command's (SOUTHCOM) narco-terrorism programs, providing crucial SOF for Central Command's (CENTCOM) combat operations including OPERATION ENDURING FREEDOM, as well as cooperative efforts with Joint Forces Command (JFCOM) and the newly established Northern Command (NORTHCOM).

STRATEGY

Our broad, yet unique, mission areas and capabilities allow us to make a number of important contributions to the National Security Strategy, especially in the War on Terrorism. Although SOF cannot address every crisis, we provide policymakers an expanded set of options for rapidly resolving strategic crises with relatively limited resources, fanfare, and

risk. Our ubiquitous presence as "Global Scouts" serves to assure our allies and friends of the United States' resolve. SOF's selective and integrated participation in support of Theater Security Cooperation Plans (TSCP) to include: Joint Combined Exchange Training (JCET), Humanitarian Demining (HD), Humanitarian Assistance (HA), Narco-Terrorism (NT), and Foreign Internal Defense (FID) programs which provide tangible benefits in support of war on terrorism objectives and Geographic Combatant Command strategies while building rapport with our friends and allies.

The global presence of SOF and our unique capabilities dissuade potential adversaries by disrupting their planning, while providing the President and Secretary of Defense a wider array of options for dealing with potential adversaries. Forces organized, trained, and equipped to execute the SOF principal missions of combating terrorism and counterproliferation of weapons of mass destruction also provide critical deterrence against adversaries that might contemplate producing or employing these weapons against the homeland or our friends and allies. SOF can deter threats and counter coercion through the deployment and employment of forces specially tailored to counter adversaries' capabilities through direct and surrogate means.

By operating "in the seam" between peace and war, SOF can address transnational and asymmetric threats through direct military means or concerted action with conventional military forces or other government agencies. SOF help shape the pre-conflict environment, setting the conditions so they are favorable to U.S. objectives and provide a strategic economy of force in areas of the world left uncovered by the commitment of conventional forces to other priorities.

EXPANDED ROLE OF USSOCOM

While our Nation is at war, we realize this war is unlike any other ever fought. It is a war without formal declaration, concrete resolution,

nation state boundaries, and against adversaries willing and able to strike directly against our homeland or our citizens abroad. It is a potentially interminable war in which our adversaries are likely to use weapons designed to cause catastrophic injury to our citizens and our way of life.

The nexus of the Department of Defense's global war on terrorism effort is at USSOCOM. Our strategy encompasses the entire spectrum of special operations missions, capabilities and methods; then incorporates conventional capabilities, as necessary, for mission success. USSOCOM's nine legislated activities remain relevant in determining our missions and activities in the fight against terrorism. To accomplish this, USSOCOM is employing SOF simultaneously worldwide through focused deployments to priority regions in order to prepare the battlespace, both physically and psychologically, and set the conditions for global war on terrorism operations. As the situation develops and terrorist targets are located, operations are conducted to further identify and acquire the target, followed by combat operations. The overall intent is to seize and maintain the initiative through constant pressure against known or suspected terrorist organizations and infrastructure.

As USSOCOM's role expands, this will generate changes in our manpower, organizational structure, facilities, equipment, and special programs relating to the expanded responsibilities. As we assess the specific changes needed to meet these expanded operational requirements, we will continue to collaborate with the other Combatant Commands and inter-agency partners that have key information operations (IO) supporting responsibilities in order to accomplish our changing mission in a responsible, coordinated manner.

COMMAND RELATIONSHIPS

Our headquarters organization and activities are changing dramatically to fight the war on terrorism. As the supported Commander for planning the Department's global war against terrorist organizations, USSOCOM will plan

and selectively execute combat missions against terrorists and terrorist organizations around the world. In order to most effectively enhance our ability to respond as both a Supported and Supporting Command, we are formulating the integration of our intelligence, operations and planning, and analysis divisions into a single facility. The effect will be a synergy of talent into a single entity which will significantly enhance and focus our unique war fighting capabilities.

Our planning efforts will focus on the development of recommended courses of action to the Secretary of Defense and the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff. We are also developing the processes and organizations required to collaboratively draft, coordinate, and globally synchronize plans and operations. These forces could include any of our special operations forces or part of the Theater Special Operations Command (TSOC), but may also include conventional forces, as necessary.

During the execution phase, USSOCOM will conduct detailed planning and execute the approved courses of action using the TSOC or a Joint Task Force or Joint Special Operations Task Force as our operational and tactical coordinator. This is a significant and transformational change in strategic military command and control and will require a major adaptation of USSOCOM headquarters and the Geographic Combatant Commanders' TSOCs.

The Geographic Combatant Commander's area of responsibility in which the operation is to be executed supports our request for forces by providing operational control of the forward deployed forces necessary to execute the approved courses of action, in accordance with the Department's deployment order. USSOCOM will be prepared to conduct follow-on operations based upon exploitable intelligence and operational opportunity.

We have formed a collaborative planning environment through the Geographic Combatant Commands' staff and interagency liaisons. The collaborative planning identifies interagency requirements, issues planning

guidance as appropriate, reviews, validates, and submits plans with recommended delegation of command relationships for execution for Departmental approval. This command relationship recommendation may not always recommend USSOCOM as the supported command, but may in fact, recommend the Geographic Combatant Commander as the supported Command and USSOCOM will remain in its traditional role as supporting command. In that instance, during planning, the Geographic Combatant Commands' staff (designated as the supported command for execution) determines the forces, tactics, methods, procedures, and communications for employment. During execution, the Geographic Combatant Command's staff executes the approved courses of action, collaborates with USSOCOM, and provides post-operation assessments. The Geographic Combatant Command will be prepared to conduct follow-on operations based upon exploitable actionable intelligence and operational opportunity.

USSOCOM's traditional role of a "supporting" command; responsible for providing trained and equipped SOF to the Geographic Combatant Commanders is thus a "supported command for planning" and, when necessary, "supported command for execution" within the Geographic Combatant Commands' areas of responsibility. Under these circumstances -- supporting or supported for execution -- a flexible command relationship structure that exploits the command and control capabilities already present in the Geographic Combatant Commanders' staff. This will enable us to prosecute missions supporting the war on terrorism will allow USSOCOM to focus our energies.

TRANSITION AND SHARING OF SOF EMPLOYMENT TASKINGS

SOF are traditionally small, highly trained, specifically organized, and uniquely equipped to perform missions conventional forces are not trained, organized, or equipped to perform. To better focus our efforts in the war on terrorism, the Department and USSOCOM are conducting reviews of the SOF principal missions and collateral activities in order to identify the mission employment taskings currently performed by SOF that could be

transitioned or shared with our conventional force partners or other governmental agencies. Our measuring stick is those missions, tasks, and activities as they pertain to access, intelligence development, and operational preparation to prosecute combat operations in the war on terrorism. SOF routinely consider leveraging conventional forces and interagency partners to perform certain missions. However, if a mission task does not align directly or indirectly with the war on terrorism, or provide access to a significant area or objective, SOF have the ability to transition or load-share these tasks with conventional forces. Examples of this load-sharing are the Georgia Train and Equip missions and personal security detail for Afghanistan's President Karzai, which were transitioned to conventional forces or other government agencies -- seamlessly. Future SOF deployments should identify at the time of deployment a conventional force to be prepared to assume the mission taskings as they are identified and when the unique capabilities of SOF are no longer required, both operational and support. The transition of SOF employment taskings to a conventional force, while prioritizing and focusing all SOF deployments, in coordination with Geographic Combatant Commanders, is essential to our continued success in planning and executing the war on terrorism.

STRATEGIC CHALLENGES AND RISK

We know that current terrorist networks are linked with non-state actors with very different local strategies but mutually self-supporting goals. These nodes operate across international boundaries, spanning and circumventing current geographic constructs. The imprecise nature of terrorist goals and the ambiguous international environment have nullified traditional responses. This dangerous mix catapults the need for an extremely sophisticated joint, interagency, combined and coalition strategy to unparalleled levels, which currently challenge our Nation to unprecedented levels.

Global access is vital to the preservation of U.S. national security and SOF must have the ability to access and operate anywhere in the world, in any mission environment, from benign to hostile. SOF maintain access and an understanding of local issues through geographic orientation, cultural acuity, and continued forward presence and security cooperation. Although theater security cooperation events provide SOF access to most parts of the world, SOF must retain the ability to operate where U.S. forces may be unwelcomed or opposed through unconventional warfare methods. Potential adversaries are acquiring weapons and developing asymmetric capabilities to deny United States forces access to critical theaters of operations in a crisis. As first responders -- global scouts, pathfinders, and door openers -- SOF set the stage for follow on forces.

The risks facing USSOCOM include Operational Risk during preparation of the battlespace encompassing Force Management Risk, and Future Challenges Risk. Operational Risk is the ability of a force to achieve military objectives in a near-term conflict or other contingency. Force Management Risk is the ability to recruit, train, retain, and equip sufficient numbers of quality personnel and sustain the readiness of the force while accomplishing its many operational tasks. And, lastly, Future Challenges Risk, refers to the ability to invest in new capabilities and develop new operational concepts needed to dissuade or defeat mid- to long-term military challenges.

Like the Services, SOF have reduced operational risk by reallocating resources from its modernization and recapitalization accounts to fund current readiness. Nevertheless, SOF will require significant enhancements in capability, capacity and speed of response enhancements to meet all priorities. SOF may have to accept operational risk in some areas in order to build new operational capabilities. Some key issues associated with operational risk include: sizing the force to conduct effective operations,

optimizing basing to support strategic objectives, and improving SOF strike and mobility capabilities.

In many respects force management risk is the most critical problem facing SOF. The special operations community must retain its experienced and seasoned personnel to gain the significant return on investments made in the areas of assessment, selection, training, and education. For example, today's Green Beret is the only operational specialty that requires a foreign language for qualification - a critical skill that must be retained as we posture for future operations. Some key issues associated with force management risk include: retention of mid- and senior- grade personnel and growing the force to meet current as well as emerging operational requirements.

Dealing with future challenges will require force transformation - where these challenges can be overcome by using fundamentally different organizations, tactics, techniques and procedures than those used by today's forces. Some key issues associated with Future Challenge Risk include improving trans-regional information capabilities to support global operations; building a linguistically, culturally and ethnically diverse force; improving capabilities to operate for extended periods in anti-access environments; providing force protection in adverse environments; improving ground-directed fire support; and improving capabilities to operate in urban environments.

TRANSFORMATION AND REORGANIZATION

SOF must continue to operate effectively in joint, combined, and interagency environments while also fusing capabilities that reflect U.S. political, military, economic, intellectual, technical, and cultural strengths into a comprehensive approach to future challenges. USSOCOM, therefore, embraces the process of transformation in a disciplined manner that allows the command to move towards its goal of full-spectrum, integrated

SOF. Our use of full-spectrum, integrated SOF will allow us to tap into diverse areas, such as commercial information technologies, utilization of space, biomedicine, environmental science, organizational design and commercial research and development. All aspects of SOF – the organization, force structure, platforms, equipment, doctrine, tactics, techniques, procedures, and missions – must continuously transform to meet the needs of the nation and seize the opportunities manifested by change.

As we develop the tools to conduct our expanded mission in the fight against terrorism, we must transform our headquarters into one that includes the traditional train, organize, and equip mission with the capability to plan and execute the warfight against terrorism. Our component commands face this same challenge. Some areas already being addressed include the growth in our warfighting staff to build an organization oriented on the expanded mission of an operational headquarters without degrading the necessary work of our resourcing and acquisition headquarters. We have also developed a 24-hour joint operations center with the connectivity to work with the Geographic Combatant Commanders and the TSOCs and a Campaign Support Group from a myriad of commands and interagency partners. In the near future we will see these activities consolidated into a "state of the art" warfighting center.

The 21st century SOF warrior – selectively recruited and assessed, mature, superbly trained and led – will remain the key to success in special operations. These warriors must be capable of conducting strategic operations in all tactical environments – combining a warrior ethos with language proficiency, cultural awareness, political sensitivity, and the ability to maximize information age technology. We must also have the intellectual agility to conceptualize creative, yet useful, solutions to ambiguous problems, and provide a coherent set of choices to the Combatant Commands or Joint Force Commander.

People will always remain the most important component of SOF capability. However, future SOF will use technological advances more effectively. Technology improvements will allow commanders to track and communicate discretely with SOF in the field. Improvements in unmanned vehicle technologies will provide better precision fire, force protection, personnel recovery, and logistics support. SOF must develop new competencies and enhance existing ones in support of critical national requirements, including the ability to locate, tag, and track mobile targets and support trans-regional information operations.

USSOCOM is focused on providing the most accurate and complete intelligence support to our tactical commanders and deployed forces. We do this by leveraging national, theater, and Service intelligence resources with our SOF-peculiar systems and intelligence professionals.

USSOCOM continues to transform our PSYOP force structure and capabilities to improve our support to Geographic Combatant Commander's influence initiatives, and on-going military operations. Lessons learned from multiple contingency operations, including OPERATION ENDURING FREEDOM, identified a requirement to increase our PSYOP force structure to meet the demands of the Geographic Combatant Commanders. The Department of the Army agreed to crosswalk the necessary manpower in order to activate two additional Active Duty and four Reserve Geographic PSYOP Companies. To modernize our PSYOP force we are proposing an Advanced Concept Technology Demonstration (ACTD) that will explore emerging technologies to increase the dissemination range of our PSYOP products into denied areas and develop state of the art PSYOP analytical planning tools. We are also modernizing our PSYOP EC-130E COMMANDO SOLO television and radio broadcast aircraft by cross-decking the EC-130E into the newer EC-130J model.

We have also developed a new construct in joint warfighting with the fusion of a Marine Corps USSOCOM Detachment into one of our Naval Special

Warfare Squadrons. Naval Special Warfare Command (NSWC) continues to pioneer U.S. Navy warfighting capabilities to support special operations in the War on Terrorism. NSWC is the lead agent on the establishment of the SOF module on the Littoral Combat Ship (LCS) and evaluating SOF modifications for U.S. Navy rotary wing programs. In addition, NSWC's transformation efforts include unprecedented experimentation in the new SSGN conversion effort. Our Naval Special Warfare component is also collaborating with the Department of the Navy to pursue technologies and concepts to find, fix, and finish non-state threats such as the global War on Terrorism.

USSOCOM and the Marines have signed an agreement to establish the initial Marine Corps force contribution to SOF, which will jointly train and deploy with naval special warfare in the Spring of 2004.

Finally, and most important, the improvement of SOF training, education, and experience contributes to the development of SOF's capability. Doctrine, organization, and materiel factors have additive value to the force; leadership and personnel factors, however, exponentially multiply investments in doctrine, organization, and materiel. As training, education, and experience influence the quality and effectiveness of leadership, these variables have the greatest long-term effect on SOF capabilities. In order to maintain strategic flexibility and maximize the likelihood of operational success, SOF will increase their commitment to "train for certainty, educate for uncertainty."

USSOCOM's expanded mission and organizational changes constitute a new vector that will require a continual effort to refine our Transformation Roadmap based on this new azimuth. USSOCOM will be a hybrid of the Geographic Combatant Commanders and a specified command for Special Operations support. More than ever, our transformation is truly a process, not a destination.

BUDGET AND ACQUISITION

One of the strengths of the command, thanks to the wisdom of Congress, was the establishment of a separate Major Force Program (MFP), MFP-11, for SOF along with the requisite acquisition and research, development, test and evaluation (RDT&E) authority. It is a powerful tool that allows us, as you know, to quickly meet the soldier, sailor, or airman's equipment needs. This is accomplished by a world class acquisition center at Tampa, made up of folks who live by some very specific and exacting acquisition principles. Our fundamental acquisition strategy is to rapidly field the 80 percent solution while working with the warfighters and industry to continue to address the last 20 percent.

Our expanded role in the war on terrorism has resulted in expanded resources as the Department recognized the challenges confronting SOF and the Nation. Our FY04 budget request is \$6,735 million, 1.8 percent of the Department of Defense budget. A summary and some highlights of SOF's FY04 request is provided below.

Military Personnel

Today, the relative health of the special operations community remains strong. The long-term stabilization of our health depends upon continued efforts to ensure our people experience a quality of life commensurate with their hard work and their dedication to duty. Increased pay and allowances and special pays are crucial to the continued health of our community. It is imperative that we continue to improve military pay and allowances and fund the Reserve Component military pay for additional schools as well as training days necessary for Reserve Component SOF Military Personnel (MILPERS) requirements. Congressional support is a powerful signal to our deserving men and women and will have a tremendous impact on our future health and readiness.

The total SOF end strength for FY04 will grow to 49,848 manpower resources with about one-third of our military manpower in Reserve Component

units. Thanks to the Department's recognition of a need for more SOF, and the Services' cross-walking end strength to SOF, we will see an end strength increase of 3,869 over the next five years.

This end strength growth primarily supports the manning requirements to wage the global war on terrorism. The increases are focused on fixed and rotary-wing aviation, SEAL Teams, Civil Affairs (CA), PSYOP, TSOCs, and support to USSOCOM as the supported combatant commander in the war on terrorism. While USSOCOM budgets for SOF personnel, the Services execute the funds. For FY04 our MILPAY request totals \$2,210.8 million.

Operation and Maintenance (O&M)

Operation and Maintenance (O&M) is the heart of maintaining SOF operational readiness. O&M includes the day-to-day costs of SOF unit mission activities, such as civilian pay, travel, airlift, special operations-peculiar equipment, equipment maintenance, minor construction, fuel, consumable supplies, spares and repair parts for weapons and equipment, as well as the headquarters functions of USSOCOM and its Service components. Our FY04 O&M request is \$1,994.1 million. An additional \$12 million supports SOF from MFP-3 (command, control, communications and intelligence [C4I]) O&M funds.

Operating forces include the necessary resources for SOF tactical units and organizations, including costs directly associated with unit training, deployments, and participation in contingency operations. Resources support civilian and military manpower, SOF peculiar and support equipment, fielding of SOF equipment, routine operating expenses, and necessary facilities.

Procurement

Along with the authority to budget and program for SOF activities, USSOCOM also has the authority to develop and acquire Special Operations peculiar equipment to prepare SOF to carry out their assigned missions. This provides the warfighter with the tools necessary to fight not only the most

committed industrial age power, but also the means to fight entities that would and could wield influence through terror by any means. USSOCOM's FY04 Procurement request is \$1,978.3 million, an increase of over \$1 billion over the amount appropriated in FY03. Speaking of FY03, we would like to thank Congress for the procurement increases received - over \$137 million - including the transfer of funds from the Defense Emergency Response Fund.

The current state of SOF capabilities is strong, but to meet the evolving capabilities of potential adversaries, we must invest now to ensure reliable support for the Defense Strategy. USSOCOM's aim in pursuing technological transformation is to guarantee our forces remain relevant to any fight, and ensure we minimize risk to our Nation's vital interests.

To enhance our force projection capabilities, we must continue to invest in programs to improve strategic mobility, force protection, research and development, and information dominance.

Our Air Force Special Operations rotary-wing capabilities must remain safe, sustainable and relevant. We are working to ensure the airworthiness and defensive system capabilities of our MH-53 helicopters to allow them to fly in the threat environments they face on the battlefield.

The heart of our future rotary wing capability as we transform Air Force special operations to the CV-22 is the rotary-Wing upgrades and sustainment funding provided for critical improvements to our Army special operations aircraft. These aircraft must be capable of operating at extended ranges under adverse weather conditions to infiltrate, reinforce, and extract SOF. The FY04 budget provides ongoing survivability, reliability, maintainability, and operational upgrades as well as procurement and sustainment costs for fielded rotary wing aircraft and subsystems to include forward-basing of MH-47 helicopters. In FY04, the Department made a concerted effort to mitigate our most pressing problems associated with SOF low density/high demand rotary wing assets. In particular, the MH-47

inventory was increased by 16 aircraft in FY04 by diverting CH-47D aircraft from the Army's service life extension program (SLEP) production line to the SOF MH-47G production line to help alleviate USSOCOM's critical vertical lift shortfall due to battle damages. We are grateful to the Army for their support. The MH-60 fleet begins a major program in FY04 to extend its useful life, which will significantly upgrade our MH-60 fleet. Improvements to both fleets will enhance SOF's ability to conduct both medium and long range penetration into denied or sensitive areas. These programs will keep our Army rotary wing relevant well past 2020.

The command is committed to the CV-22 aircraft and its unique capabilities. We will continue to assure the CV-22 is safe, reliable, and maintainable for SOF forces. The long-range, high speed, vertical lift CV-22 fills a long-standing SOF mission requirement not met by any other existing fixed or rotary wing platform. The Navy is the lead Service for the joint V-22 program and is responsible for managing and funding the development of the baseline V-22, Osprey. The Air Force will procure and provide the fielding of 50 CV-22 aircraft and purchase service common support equipment for USSOCOM. Initial Operational Test and Evaluation will be conducted as soon as practical, after Developmental Test is complete. The support we have received from the Department for an additional test aircraft will significantly reduce the technical and schedule risk for this "flagship" program. USSOCOM will continue to fund the procurement of SOF peculiar systems for the CV-22 such as the terrain following/terrain avoidance radar, and electronic and infrared warfare suites.

The FY04 AC-130U Gunship program continues modification of four additional C-130H's into the gunship inventory. C-130 modification programs provide for numerous survivability and capability modifications to our C-130 fleet. The Department accelerated the MC-130H Combat Talon II aerial refueling modifications to FY04 because this capability is crucial to the war

on terrorism. In addition, the Air Force is providing USSOCOM 10 additional C-130Hs to convert to MC-130Hs. This increased capability will make up for attrition losses, enable SOF to forward-station additional rapid mobility assets, and allow us to assure our allies through increased forward presence. In FY04, we will continue programs including the Directed Infrared Counter Measure (DIRCM) Laser and several modifications to our COMMANDO SOLO fleet.

The Advanced SEAL Delivery System (ASDS) is a specially designed combatant submarine that will provide clandestine undersea mobility for SOF personnel and their mission support equipment. The ASDS is capable of operating in a wide range of threat environments and environmental extremes, providing increased range, payload, communications, loiter capability and protection of SOF personnel from the elements during transit. The ASDS provides a quantum leap in our undersea mobility capability. ASDS boat #1's Initial Operational Capability is planned for third-quarter, FY03. In FY04, program activities for the ASDS will continue to focus on procurement of long lead material items to support ASDS boat #2 fabrications and the development of technology improvements in the areas of sensors, cameras and communications. The ASDS is the only capability of its kind in the world.

In addition to the ASDS, USSOCOM remains committed to the Navy's SSGN program, converting four OHIO Class Ballistic Missile Submarines into dual role Strike/SOF platforms that will provide SOF with unprecedented worldwide access for both the ASDS and the SEAL Delivery Vehicle. The transformational changes incorporated into the SSGN will allow SOF to deploy a larger and more flexible force package than has ever been possible. Additionally, the command, control and communications capabilities designed into these platforms will permit SOF to operate independent from, or in conjunction with, any land or sea-based Joint Task Force.

Research, Development, Test and Evaluation (RDT&E)

We must continue to invest in making our SOF more capable in all environments. Our Research and Development (R&D) activities focus on exploiting technologies to improve SOF Command, Control, Communications, Computers, and Intelligence (C4I), mobility, weapons, and survivability. Our R&D program, while modest, is producing great capability enhancement products. USSOCOM's FY04 RDT&E request is \$440.4 million, as compared to \$512.5 million in FY03.

Two examples of capability enhancement products are our National Systems Support to SOF and our Advanced Tactical Laser (ATL) Advanced Concept Technology Demonstration programs.

The National Systems Support to SOF project is successfully integrating national intelligence systems capabilities into the SOF force structure. For example, the project is rapidly transitioning Blue Force Tracking equipment from development to operational use by SOF deployed in OPERATION ENDURING FREEDOM. These systems enable command and control elements, as well as combat search and rescue elements, to identify and track friendly forces. They also significantly increase our capability to execute surgical strike missions in the proximity of friendly forces by providing an effective means to distinguish between friendly and enemy forces.

The Advanced Tactical Laser (ATL) ACTD evaluates the military utility of a tactical directed energy weapon on the battlefield to provide support to the war fighter. A directed energy weapon has inherent performance capabilities that can support extremely precise and selectable strikes, effects and lethality, and multi-axis engagements. In FY04 program activities will focus on design completion of an objective ATL system, procurement of long lead material items, and begin the Military Utility Assessment (MUA) using ATL simulations and component hardware testing in conjunction with military exercises.

We are working on an array of improvements across our mission areas, including: improved body armor and chemical protection, advances in gunship armaments, developing and leveraging Information Operations (IO) tools. USSOCOM's primary success has always been ensuring we select the right people and train them for innovation: we equip the warrior, not man the equipment. We clearly recognize that the modern battlefield is comprised of land, air, sea, space and the virtual domains. IO has the potential to help SOF operators remain undetectable in hostile area -- a critical element in most SOF missions. We intend to actively pursue IO capabilities and develop standing authority to employ these capabilities when needed. This will improve SOF effectiveness and access to previously denied environments, and dissuade potential competitors from engaging even if they perceive quantitative advantage.

Some of our most successful development programs have or will make a real difference in the fight against terrorism. The Multi-Band Intra-Team Radio (MBITR) radio provides a small, lightweight, software reprogrammable handheld radio capable of providing both secure and clear voice and data communications over 100 selectable channels. Thanks to support from the Department and Congress, USSOCOM has been able to accelerate fielding of these radios to our forces.

Another program worthy of mention is the hemostatic bandage. The development and rapid fielding of the hemostatic dressing embodies the first of our SOF truths - that humans are more important than hardware. The family of hemostatic dressings, which include the fibrin and chitosen dressings, were not due for fielding until 2007, but with the heroic actions and ultimate sacrifices of SOF in Afghanistan, USSOCOM focused on accelerated fielding of these dressings. Thanks to the combined efforts of the Department, the Services, and other Combatant Commands, this revolutionary medical technology was catapulted from the research laboratory to the field

five years ahead of schedule. These dressings stop the bleeding almost effectively as surgical closure of a wound. We aim to put this technology into the hands of every soldier, hoping to end preventable hemorrhage on the battlefield.

Military Construction

USSOCOM's military construction efforts ensure our highly specialized SOF personnel and equipment are provided a modern array of SOF training, maintenance, operational, and command and control facilities to successfully execute SOF missions. USSOCOM relies on the Services to provide community support facilities and programs construction only for facilities directly contributing to SOF training, readiness and operational capabilities. USSOCOM's FY04 MILCON request is \$99.4 million for 12 projects.

CONCLUSION

Now and in the future, SOF continue to improve their ability to execute the war on terrorism, while remaining ready to deal equally with demands of both our warfighting and peacetime roles. SOF will be deliberate in its transformation to ensure continued support to critical national requirements.

But let us never forget those who have paid the last full measure. We want to acknowledge the 26 men and women killed in direct support of our Nation's response to terrorists since October 2001 and others lost or wounded in combat operations to ensure their skills were honed and ready for the next fight. We face adversaries who would destroy our way of life. In response, SOF will not rest until we have achieved victory in the war on terrorism.

Thank you for the opportunity to provide the state of SOF and for your continued support of our Soldiers, Sailors, Airmen, Marines, and civilians; the men and women of the United States Special Operations Command.

OPERATION TEMPO

Mr. LEWIS. Thank you very much.

General Holland, much has been said about the fabulous job that has been done by Special Operations Forces. Many of us have read reports as well as had communications with you, General Holland, and others. It is remarkable what Special Ops have accomplished in Afghanistan. Forty-nine days after spending a little time there and moving around a bit, Kandahar fell, and we all watched with great interest at the reaction, not just of your colleagues in arms in Afghanistan, but indeed the world began to pay a very special attention.

It was equally impressive to see what our Special Operations Forces were able to accomplish in Iraq in a very, very difficult circumstance, having a huge impact in setting the tone for a magnificent success there.

We have all, my colleagues, read of the role Special Operations Forces played in the freeing of our prisoner of war from that hospital, Jessica Lynch, a phenomenal reflection of the best of our people. I am not sure if this is accurate, but if it is accurate, it certainly struck my heart and is a reflection of what we are about as we discovered that we had a POW in a hospital and the homework was done to get a lot of assistance, by the way, not only understanding the design of the hospital, the number of forces that were inside, but one of our people walked in the room, and taking off some kind of cover said "Ma'am, I am a U.S. soldier." I understand she said, "I am a U.S. soldier, too, son," or something like that. We are all in this together. Fabulous reflection.

What concerns me is that we know that you were pushed to the wall as we went through Operation Iraqi Freedom with a very sizable percentage of your people deployed. The OPTEMPO is a critical problem that you face as you move forward from here. We want to explore questions like, what is this OPTEMPO doing to our troops? Do we have the numbers in place and the prospects of increasing those numbers to meet some of the challenges that are just ahead of us? We want to know more as we look at your budget about the equipment problems, et cetera. The members will help me explore that. The reason for today is to have them ask many of those questions and begin the process of looking very carefully at what is a very significant adjustment in your budget and what appears to be a very significant adjustment in all of our perception of your mission, a very significant change.

Before I go to the other members for questions, I wonder if you will bear with me, General. I would appreciate it if we could call upon Sergeant Mike McIlheny. I told him that was a great Chinese name when I talked to him earlier and told him my mother's name was O'Farrell. But, Mike, among other things in Afghanistan, lost an arm. He is continuing his service with us in spite of many a challenge, and perhaps could share with us his impression of Special Operations and just how our troops feel about their role and mission from your perspective.

Sergeant MCILHENY. Well, sir, it is really quite simple. All the men and women that I have met in Special Operations want to be successful, and this is a place that we can go to be successful. Ev-

everyone there has a unique opportunity to travel around the world and see the different countries and the different cultures, and, you know, the bottom line is we love this country. We want to help those people. Cultures are relative to who you talk to, but the men and women in the Services, and in the Special Operations as well, will sacrifice whatever it takes to maintain this life we have here. And simply put, I mean, that covers a broad spectrum of discussions, but that is it, and I love this country and I don't have any regrets. And I would do it again. And all the men and women that I serve with I am sure would say the same thing.

Mr. LEWIS. Well, son, I didn't give you any forewarning that I was going to call on you. It is a little dangerous to have a young Sergeant be that articulate off the top—maybe you will be running for office here. Thank you very much for being with us, sir.

We have referenced by way of Jack Murtha comments from Master Chief Rogers. I went to Alaska a year or so ago and saw some of those SEALs being trained up there. I wasn't going to ask you for extended remarks, but indeed I would be very, very interested in your comments about Special Operations Forces as well, and then we will move on with the members.

Master Chief ROGERS. Thanks, sir. I would say morale is high. You might ask why is morale high if we are being stretched as thin as some people say we are being stretched and OPTEMPO so high and that sort of thing. The reason I say morale is high is because just like the rest of the military, Special Operations Forces, want to do something meaningful, and they are doing something meaningful right now. They want to feel like somebody cares about what they are doing over there, and I think they believe that also. They want to feel like their families are being taken care of. And so for all of those reasons, at the moment morale is high.

I think they would also say that they would like to thank the members for their continued support for things that affect them and their families—things like pay and the targeted pay raises we have received the last couple years, and other quality of life issues, housing and barracks and those sorts of things. So they would like to thank you for that. But don't stop.

Mr. LEWIS. Thank you very much, Master Chief Rogers. I might say before we go forward from here that for all here listening, you all have very serious support within this subcommittee. We want to do everything that we can to help develop this shift in mission and be supportive whenever it is feasible. Between now and then, however, we are in this war on terrorism, and many a challenge, in the days, the weeks, the months, or very likely the years ahead. And so there will be many a call that none of us would anticipate, but we are going to do everything we can to provide every possible line of support that is available.

So with that, let me call first on the chairman of my Committee for questions he might have and then call on Mr. Murtha and go from there.

PSYCHOLOGICAL OPERATIONS

Mr. YOUNG. Mr. Chairman, thank you very much. I am going to be very brief, and I do have a question. General, I assume that these are leaflets that were distributed throughout the region.

General HOLLAND. Yes, sir, those are.

Mr. YOUNG. After Shock and Awe. Could you tell us what some of these things say? What were some of the messages? I can look at the pictures but I can't read the writing.

General HOLLAND. Well, our whole message we put together in a theme and, especially at the beginning of the war, our theme was to ensure that the people realized that the United States of America was not coming in to occupy their country. From a perspective of America and the relationship with Iraq, we want that to be a positive sense.

But we also wanted to get the clear word out to the people that if you continued to support Saddam Hussein, weapons of mass destruction, or terrorist activities, that we and the coalition would find you wherever you are located. We used these leaflets very effectively. We already received input back that when people did not perform actions we anticipated they would perform, they said the reason they didn't is because they knew they would be punished.

The greatest example was when our SEALs took down the gold plat, which is a gas and oil platform. And Congressman Murtha, we also had a Marine fast team that came in as we secured that. And we asked the people, well, why did you allow us to have time, and why didn't you shut off the valves? And what we found out was that they knew that because of what we had distributed, not only the psychological operations from the Commando Solo which was overhead but also from the leaflets, that there was a strong message that the United States of America was sending.

Mr. YOUNG. I wanted to ask you specifically about the one that shows the three Iraqis on one side with their full face, on the other side it shows them with partially skeletal—I couldn't quite figure out what that message was. Does that mean we are going to get you if you don't shape up?

General HOLLAND. Yes, sir. That was as we were coming in that if you propose to use weapons of mass destruction, that you would be targeted. And so it was a very subtle message and a very hard message. Now, these messages that we send, they are adjusted as the theme evolves during the war, and we want to make sure that whatever message we send is appropriate for the time and that the capabilities that we have developed within our Psychological Operations Forces allow them to adjust with the current theme.

Mr. YOUNG. Did you run this particular effort, the psychological effort? Was that run by Special Operations?

General HOLLAND. Sir, the leaflets, all those are done by our Psychological Operations people. You have probably seen our places there at Fort Bragg where we have that distribution capability, and we also had forward deployed capability over into the region. And so the primary emphasis there is that we have the people that are very culturally aware. They understand the intent of what General Franks needed to do, and that information then was conveyed through those mediums which we were able to bring on from a Special Operations standpoint, whether it be EC-130 Commando Solos out of Harrisburg, Pennsylvania, whether it be the leaflets which were, by the way, dropped from B-52s, F-16s, F-18s and also Combat C-130s. And also now in Iraq, we have broadcasting stations which are in Baghdad broadcasting today. So it is all of those dif-

ferent mediums, and all of those different mediums are a part of the Special Operations Command.

Mr. YOUNG. Well, it was a great effort, and despite some of the naysayers that I watched on TV, you all did a tremendous job. Thank you.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. LEWIS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. Murtha.

SUPPLEMENTAL FUNDING

Mr. MURTHA. Do you have enough money for the rest of the year?

General HOLLAND. Yes, sir. That is a great question to ask because we were a little concerned before the last supplemental. We went forward to the Department of Defense, and they realized that with our OPTEMPO the way it was we would not have enough money to make it through the year. So the Department requested and you in Congress provided us \$531 million until the FY03 supplemental came through, and then with the supplemental there was additional funding we anticipate about \$1.2 billion. And that will get us through the end of this year.

So unless there is something unforeseen, we feel very good about the supplemental, and we feel very good about where our priorities were weighed in conjunction with the other Department priorities as they did that rack-up.

RESERVE COMPONENT INTEGRATION

Mr. MURTHA. You mentioned the National Guard unit in Harrisburg. Of course we fund those C-130s, which are about \$90 million a piece. Did it work well? Did those guys really—being National Guard members, did they come on board and do a good job?

General HOLLAND. Yes, sir. I have been associated with the 193rd Special Operations link for many years, and I flash back to Panama. Some of the first birds that we were launching were the 193rd. I can remember Haiti. They were there with us as well. And the same thing here. We have not lost a step. And the question that people pose to me is, how can you put the only capability that you have in the U.S. military with a National Guard unit? And I say it is very easy, because they are there whenever we need them. And these people have responded. They are great Americans. They have a great community, and they have great employers. I have met with a lot of the employers, and the satisfaction that they derive is the fact that they are making a sacrifice so the people that work for them, if they are part of the 193rd, that they can go do whatever the mission is that our country calls upon them to accomplish.

Mr. MURTHA. Well, all the National Guard and Reserve have done a good job, but the Air Force does a better job than anybody else integrating people into the system. I know in Desert One they went into—the F-16s from Syracuse went in and went right into combat I think the next day, and they tell me in Turkey, where they were flying these missions all the time, they go in one day and the next day they are flying combat missions. So it is marvelous the way you are able to integrate them and keep them up to speed all the time.

V-22 AIRCRAFT

Now, you mentioned the V-22. The V-22 is all right? Are there any problems with that? I know you call it the CV-22. But any problems with your version of the V-22?

General HOLLAND. Sir, we are watching that very closely. In fact, I will let Mr. Schulte discuss a few things about that as well. Right now we are continuing to be in the test phase. The test phase is event driven. It is not schedule driven, because we have got to make sure, as we bring this airplane on board, that it is safe, reliable and maintainable. And when we look at it from a SOF perspective and I look at the environments that we operate in and the altitudes, that we need to have an airplane that can do that job very safe.

As we continue to fly the program, we have continued to make significant inroads, and I would tell you today I am cautiously optimistic. We still have a ways to go on the MV-22 which brings—the CV-22, which brings on the terrain-following, terrain-avoidance radar. We still need to do the electronic warfare suite, and we have just now started into that. So about another year from now I will be able to say to even a better finality how I really feel about the program all and all as far as being a Special Operations craft for the future.

Right now we are cautiously optimistic, but I would like to have Mr. Schulte give you an acquisition perspective.

Mr. SCHULTE. Well, General Holland is exactly right. We are in the test program now. As you gentlemen know, we stood down for quite a while after the unfortunate accidents. The MV-22 has been flying for about 11 months now, back from shutting down, and the CV-22 test aircraft at Edwards has been flying since September. So we are getting good test data.

No. 7 is the airplane that is flying right now. No. 9 is in for some mods. It will start flying next month. So we will have two CV-22 airplanes, test birds. The one airplane is basically dedicated to the terrain following, terrain avoidance radar testing, which is very thorough to have that kind of testing done. CV-22 No. 9 will basically do the defensive electronics suite on the airplane, and that is the kind of testing that we will be doing.

One thing you will see us asking for this year is a change in some money. It was decided by the Department that as a risk reduction measure we ought to have a third test airplane for CV-22. There are MV-22s right now that are parked and aren't being used until some of the mods can get done. And so we are going to take one of those MV-22s, mod that into a CV, the third CV-22 test aircraft, as a risk reduction measure in the rest of our test program. The test program is going——

Mr. MURTHA. What is the difference in cost between the V-22 and the CV-22 and what is the difference in capability?

Mr. SCHULTE. I think the cost is on the order of \$15 to \$20 million different. The difference between an MV and a CV is to the equipment that is on the airplane. One of the major differences is the suite of integrated RF or Radio Frequency countermeasures. That is the ECM, electronic countermeasure, system against radar

kinds of threats. That doesn't exist on the MV-22. That is one of the major subsystems on the CV-22.

The other complementary system is an IR (infrared) counter-measure system called the directional infrared countermeasures, or DIRCM. That will also be going on the CV-22. That is not part of the MV-22. There are other things different about it, like additional fuel. We carry fuel in the wings on the CV-22. That is not done on an MV-22. We have additional radio capabilities, more SATCOM radios on there. We have flight engineers, a third crew member in the cockpit on a CV-22, because the workload in a cockpit when you are doing night low-level flying is much higher for our air crews than they might be for the Marines. There is also a seat and a console for that flight engineer. We also have a station in the back of the aircraft for the troop commanders, so guys in the back can have situational awareness on threats. He can communicate when he is en route to the mission. So those are the kinds of changes that you would see in a CV-22.

Mr. MURTHA. Do you lose range and speed when you load them down with this electronic equipment?

Mr. SCHULTE. You lose a little bit—not speed. The speed is still the same. We are meeting all the requirements for speed and range. We are a little bit heavier because of that kind of equipment. We have a requirement for a 500 nautical mile out and back with a hover, and we are meeting that requirement right now with our equipment. Even with the heavier equipment on there we are meeting that.

POST DEPLOYMENT BRIEFINGS

Mr. MURTHA. The Special Operations Forces have come a long ways. I remember when Jack Marsh was Assistant Secretary of the Army. At the same time he was Secretary for Defense and head of Special Operations. Your budget was less than a billion dollars. So you folks have come a long way, and we are real proud of you. But if the Chief would put in the record the one thing I worry about is these guys coming back from this long combat and the type of things that you are doing to keep them from having the type of incidents we had at Fort Bragg. I know you haven't had any instances, and that is surprising to me, because if somebody is in intensive combat like they are, I would be interested in what you are doing differently than what the regular military is doing and the problems that they had at Fort Bragg.

General HOLLAND. Yes, sir. What happened at Fort Bragg, we looked into that very carefully, because that obviously has a large impact when these people think the answer is suicide, when in fact we all know that that is not what people do to solve their problems. What we are doing this time, as you said, Congressman Murtha, we have not had any incidents yet, but the people are starting to come back, and we are putting a lot more stress on post-deployment briefings, more briefings with the spouses, and more involvement with the leadership. Our family support centers, which are throughout our Services, are also more engaged. And so this is one of those things where, when it deals with people, people are our most important asset and definitely in our business they are more

important than hardware. We will continue to put that emphasis on the family situation as they return.

Mr. MURTHA. I compare your folks an awful lot with the ones who were in Vietnam where they had intense combat for a long period of time and of course got no counseling at all when they came back, and we still have people that have problems from that era because they got no kind of help at all, or it was way too late to have any impact. So I appreciate what you are doing to try to alleviate that situation.

Mr. WICKER. Mr. Chairman, rather than jump from subject to subject, I wonder if the ranking member would yield on that Fort Bragg question.

Mr. LEWIS. Well, you can ask him to yield any time you like, and it is his choice whether he yields or not.

Mr. WICKER. Well, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. LEWIS. And we will proceed member by member. Please go ahead.

Mr. WICKER. Well, if you could, General, you said you looked into that very carefully. Could you enlarge on what you found? Were these just isolated incidents? Is there any information you can provide to the subcommittee that might be helpful to us?

General HOLLAND. I would like to say that we had something that was very definitive, but to tell you what it really came down to, in each one of these instances, there was marital discord in all four of these families. So that was the one common aspect of the four suicides, that the marriage had broken down.

Mr. WICKER. Was this type of duty simply coincidental?

General HOLLAND. Yes, sir, because our Special Operations Forces continue to deploy around the world, as they have been doing for years. I always remember when I was at Tory Station and General Shelton, who was in this position, came to see me, and he said, "Hey, we are going to cut back on the number of operations that you people are going to deploy on," and the people in the battalion of the 1st Special Forces Group said, "Sir, that is why we signed up for SOFSEF, because we want to deploy." So our people have had a lot of deployments in their past, and so to extrapolate that the reason—marital discord is really the only one common bond that we saw.

Mr. MURTHA. Let me follow up on what Mr. Wicker said. One fellow committed suicide in jail. That worries me that we incarcerate somebody and then he commits suicide after he commits the crime. Now, I don't know how—I think the other three committed suicide right at the time, but there is a lot of marriage discord every place, and you didn't find any correlation between the combat and coming back to the marriage. I wonder if that is not an excuse by the people who are looking into it rather than really trying to get to the bottom of it.

General HOLLAND. Well, sir, the Army was very much involved as they went forward to Fort Bragg. They were with the different commanders on base, because the 18th Airborne Corps has that responsibility for Fort Bragg. Our United States Army Special Operations Command people were involved, and there is a lot of support structure in place, and why these four—as I mentioned before, the thing we came away from that was the marital discord. Now, that

doesn't say that we can't do a lot of things better, and that is what we are going to do, have more involvement with leadership, more involvement with the post deployment briefings, because that is very important. When a person has been in combat and when they do return, the spouse needs to understand the one that is returning and the one that is home, what that individual has been through.

Mr. MURTHA. I appreciate what the Master Chief said, because no Committee unanimously has accepted more responsibility for the morale and welfare of the troops than we have as far as pay, as far as pensions, as far as benefits. This Committee has done everything it can to fund it fully, so we are real concerned when something like this happens, but I appreciate what you are doing and the direction you are going.

Mr. LEWIS. Thank you very much, Mr. Murtha.

Mr. Bonilla.

OSAMA BIN LADEN

Mr. BONILLA. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Gentlemen, just to concur with what has been said here today already, speaking not just as a member of Congress but as a citizen of this country, we greatly appreciate your service to this country, and we appreciate you bringing Mike with you today. He is somebody that we are going to remember for the rest of our lives for what he has done. So this Committee stands united wanting to help you in any way possible any time that we can do our small part to help you do the job that you are doing around the world. You have made us very proud.

I only have a couple of questions, and they are more out of just curiosity in terms of what your views are and what the likelihood is of us finding bin Laden in the search that has been going on for a while now. Have there been any missed opportunities in your view where some Special Forces operations have encountered an opportunity perhaps that maybe rules of engagement might have prevented him from moving forward, and also on weapons of mass destruction in your view how long will it be before we find something in Iraq? So there are two different things.

General HOLLAND. Yes, sir. On bin Laden, I would rather be in our position than his. Our people will continue as long as it takes to be able to bring that individual to justice. ———

Mr. BONILLA. So he is isolated then. Obviously he is not—being dead is best case scenario, but the fact that he cannot communicate with his folks is a big deal, is it not?

General HOLLAND. Yes, sir, that is, but he can also employ couriers that would meet with him and then take the word back to the people so that that would protect the location where he currently resides. ———

WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION

Each time we go into these facilities, like the facility that you heard probably about at a previous time, we have taken all of these documents. We have taken all the evidence that we can, and we are bringing it back, and that is as I speak continuing to be analyzed. We know that they wanted to develop those capabilities. To say we have a smoking gun, no, we do not have a smoking gun at this point. But I think as we continue to go to all the areas, and

continue to debrief the scientists that were involved, that we will find out exactly what capability he did bring to bear and what capability he might have for the future.

Mr. BONILLA. Is it your view that it is a matter of time, or is it possible that we might not find anything? What is your view?

General HOLLAND. Sir, I think we will find something there.

Mr. BONILLA. Well, in closing, I just want to thank you all for being here, and again, a special thanks for bringing Mike. The story he tells is, again, very important and one that we will certainly carry as a source of pride and joy for what you do for this country.

Thank you.

General HOLLAND. Thank you, sir.

Mr. LEWIS. Thank you, Mr. Bonilla.

Mr. Dicks.

USSOCOM BUDGET INCREASE

Mr. DICKS. I want to apologize for not being here for the testimony. I just got caught up and couldn't be here.

Let me ask you a question. You have done a very good job in getting your budget increase. How did you do it?

General HOLLAND. Sir, as you take a look at people like Mike. When you take a look at the NCOs we have and what they have done and how we have taken SOF forces to exploit the different Services' capabilities, I think people see that, and when they see that they are willing to invest. And that is exactly what happened during this last session with the Department as we went forward for overguidance. So I think people have gained a greater respect for what Special Operations Forces can do, not only when they operate on a particular special operation mission but also when they are operating in support of conventional missions as well.

SOF OPERATIONS IN IRAQ

Mr. DICKS. Good. Well, I was very impressed. Chairman Lewis and I had a chance to go out and see some of the activities prior to the war starting in Operation Iraqi Freedom, and we were told extensively about how these — I guess in many areas of Iraq, and the role that is played in the air war, especially being able to use laser designators and other equipment—okay. Tell me about how Special Operations Forces played in this, if you can. If we have to wait till the next session, I can wait.

General HOLLAND. Well, in the next session we can go into some other greater detail, but SOF is always very important on the front end because, number one, they know the terrain, they have cultural awareness, they know how to operate in small numbers. And if you think about how Special Operations Forces need to look towards the future, we look at small teams operating forward, being responsive in a clandestine manner, and that is exactly what these SOF teams did. Think about the people like Mike and his involvement on an A-team. An A-team only consists of 12 people, and when those individuals are able to go into a particular country and develop that relationship, they are also able to develop the capabilities that are brought to bear from that host nation, working with

the indigenous forces. Special Operations Forces does that extremely well. There is no one that does it better than they do on the front end, and we can go into more detail in the next session on that piece of it.

And then of course there are other elements of that that come together, not only from the Navy perspective, our SEALs, our Special Boatmen, our Air Commandos, the aviation support, the Rangers. So the list goes on.

Mr. DICKS. You play a role in the war on terrorism. It is kind of the lead military entity, and you have to work with NORTHCOM. Can you explain how that is going to work?

General HOLLAND. Yes, sir. The new direction that the Secretary of Defense gave to Special Operations Command. He said: "We are going to transform your command." and what he meant is that we can be a supportive commander, or as we are doing in Iraq, I am a support team commander of General Tommy Franks. But when it comes to the global war on terrorism, we are the supported commander for the global war on terrorism.

Mr. DICKS. What does that mean?

General HOLLAND. That means that our people are working in concert with the Services, the geographic combatant commanders, interagency, and we are working together to put together what that plan should be. We are looking all across the board. We are looking at diplomatic, we are looking at informational, military and economic on what a campaign plan or campaign strategy needs to be. That is taking place right now at MacDill Air Force Base.

The people that are part of this campaign support group are elements not only of all of the Services and the geographic commanders, but we also have State Department, have interagency, Treasury, Justice—they are all represented. So what we are able to do is come together in a joint interagency collaboration and come up with what we need to do for the long term. —

General HOLLAND. Yes, sir. If they were—now, when it comes to NORTHCOM, then obviously they would have the responsibility working with other lead Federal agencies within the United States.

Mr. DICKS. Right.

General HOLLAND. And—

Mr. DICKS. Like FEMA or the FBI, for instance.

General HOLLAND. Yes, sir, and we would continue to see FBI taking the lead, or whichever agency that had that lead, and then we would be in a supporting role.

Mr. DICKS. Would you see, like, rescues or things like that, hostage situations where you might with your expertise and training, that might be the role you—

General HOLLAND. Well, probably a better example might be weapons of mass destruction, because we do have a lot of experience with weapons of mass destruction, in how to handle those types of operations. And right now we have that responsibility. And that is a very — but it is clearly one of those that is outside the capabilities of any existing civilian structure to be able to handle. So because we — . And the mechanism for that would be through Northern Command as they work with the lead Federal agencies.

Mr. DICKS. Well, I just want to congratulate you on the outstanding job you have done, both in Afghanistan and Iraq, and we know that you will be ready when other contingencies arise.

General HOLLAND. Yes, sir.

Mr. LEWIS. Thank you, Mr. Dicks.

Mr. Tiahrt.

MH-47 HELICOPTERS

Mr. TIAHRT. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thanks for the great job all your people do. It is just amazing. They, I think, have confounded every talking head and commentator on television, and I was very proud of the job you did, and so are the American people.

MH-47s and all your MH-47s, the model number does not depict the average age of these helicopters but it has to be very close. How many did we lose in Operation Iraqi Freedom? Did you lose any MH-47s?

General HOLLAND. None in Operation Iraqi Freedom. We lost two in Afghanistan. We have had a lot of our birds shot up very badly, which is why we have gone back to the Department to get an additional 16 aircraft, with 8 more that we feel that we need to have in the short term.

Mr. TIAHRT. How many do you have now?

General HOLLAND. We have 37.

Mr. TIAHRT. 37.

Mr. DICKS. Are these C-130s?

General HOLLAND. No, sir. He was talking about the MH-47s. We have MH-47 Deltas and MH-47 Echoes, and then what we want to do is to go through this 5-year defense plan and at least get the plus-up of 24 additional MH-47s. Within this budget there are 16 that are represented.

Mr. MURTHA. Would the gentleman yield? On the MH-47s, now, we found the CH-46s are only carrying the—the CH-46 is carrying 8 people. It used to carry 24. Have you got problems with your rotor blades in the MH-47s? Is there any diminution of weight in the MH-47s?

General HOLLAND. No, sir. The MH-47 has of course larger engines, and it can operate at the higher altitudes. And in fact it operated in the higher altitudes in Afghanistan and did extremely well.

Mr. MURTHA. So you have no blade problems that you have in the 46s?

General HOLLAND. No, sir. And there have been a lot of modifications accomplished within our MH-47 fleet. We are going to continue to do modifications now, and we are going to upgrade them to a G model conversion, and that is what is in work at this moment.

Mr. MURTHA. Do you have any CH-46s at all?

General HOLLAND. No, sir.

Mr. TIAHRT. When will you have the upgrade? Are you going to rotate your—is that why you need the extra so you can start rotating them through some kind of a—

General HOLLAND. Yes, sir. Well, the reason we need it, and probably this question will come out later, but one thing that we have not done well is support General Tom Franks with forward-

based forces. You know, I was a Commander in Special Operations Command Pacific, and I had forces that were forward deployed with me in the Pacific. We also have the same type of facilities and equipment located within Europe, but the one place we don't have is within Southwest Asia. And so what we want to do is to permanently station a MH-47, also MC-130s, with SEALs, Special Forces teams and the right mix so that they can have a full theater Special Operations Command forward deployed in that region of the world.

To do that we need to purchase additional aircraft, and that is one of the large reasons why we went back to get the additional planes.

V-22 AIRCRAFT

Mr. TIAHRT. General, when you say additional, are you talking about the V-22 line, or are you talking about picking up some MH-47s someplace else?

General HOLLAND. I am talking right now the MH-47s. Our requirement for the CV-22 is 50 CV-22s.

Mr. TIAHRT. I am trying to get to the CV-22s, because we have waited a long time for them, and we need them sooner rather than later. When are you scheduled to get your first 16 CV-22, and is that still not determined? I mean, we are not into any low-rate production or anything. We are still in flight test, and we have been in flight test for a decade.

General HOLLAND. Well, let me let Mr. Schulte talk to that.

Mr. SCHULTE. Sir, we are right now building two production representative test vehicles that are on the line now. They will be delivered in 2005. Our first actual production of airplanes are in this budget, this 2004 budget. So the first two are in 2004. They get delivered in 2006.

And we build a 2, 3, 3, 2 production schedule. It is a very low-rate schedule right now through the following years. So at the current rate of production, planned production for CV-22, we don't get the 50th airplane until the year 2017. So what we are hoping is going to happen, quite frankly, is that if the test program goes well over the next two or three years, and as General Holland said, things are looking good now, we are optimistic, it is too early to claim victory, of course, we will probably go back to the Department and say we need to accelerate that production. We need to get them faster. But until the test program is further along, it is not prudent to do that at this point in time.

Mr. MURTHA. If the gentleman would yield, I think we would need the figures for what it would cost, how much less it would cost per unit as you increase the number of buys because it always decreases the cost, but that would help us once you get out of the test program.

Mr. SCHULTE. Yes, sir. Right now the program overall is at a production rate of 11 aircraft per year. That is the minimum sustaining production rate for the MV and CV. There is a Defense Acquisition Board (DAB) scheduled with Mr. Aldridge later in May. One of the requests is going to be can we raise that minimum sustaining rate, has the program made enough progress that we can go above 11, maybe to 15 or something like that. Mr. Aldridge

would have to, you know, make a decision on that, because that would help. Even in this short run that would help. If we could build 15 or so a year, that would help the price, too. What we need to get this thing up to is like—I think the Marines used to be looking at 15 or 20 a year. We were probably going to be looking at 6 or so a year. So if you can get it up to that rate, you are going to save a lot of money. I don't have the exact figures, sir, but you are going to save a lot of money if you can do that.

MODULAR INTEGRATED COMMUNICATION HELMET

Mr. TIAHRT. Mr. Chairman, for the last hour I have been looking at that helmet on the table here, and I was hoping we would get some kind of a story that goes along with it.

Mr. LEWIS. This is your last question.

Mr. TIAHRT. What is the story behind the helmet?

Mr. SCHULTE. I am afraid the story is not going to be near as good as I hoped it would be. This is actually a test helmet. The reason we wanted to bring this helmet is because this committee has been very supportive in giving us money. This is called the Modular Integrated Communications Helmet. It was developed by USSOCOM with a lot of help from this Committee giving us money to buy these things out. So these are the helmets that the SOF guys are wearing. We happened to bring this one in. This was a test helmet. It would be terrible if it was a real helmet and some poor guy got shot four different times. He was really having a bad week. But this is a test helmet that you put on a dummy. This happened to be fired with a 9 millimeter from 25 meters just to test the hardness of the helmet. It has been an excellent helmet both in Afghanistan and in Iraq, and we just brought it as, an example just to say these are some of the things that we have been able to develop because we have the acquisition authority that Congress gave us and because we have gotten additional resources that your Committee has given us to go out and get these things for our warfighters.

Mr. LEWIS. Thank you for that, Mr. Schulte.

Mr. TIAHRT. My last question is—

Mr. LEWIS. Your time is up.

Mr. TIAHRT. I just wanted to know how many shots it took to get 5 of them to hit that at 25 meters.

Mr. LEWIS. Do not respond, General. It is classified.

Mr. LEWIS. Mr. Moran.

LANGUAGE TRANSLATION

Mr. MORAN. Thanks very much, Mr. Chairman. I was reading the description of testimony that General Brown provided to the Senate Subcommittee on Emerging Threats and Capabilities. He described his snapshot of the 21st century special operators. That is what you call this, special operators?

Mr. SCHULTE. Yes, sir.

Mr. MORAN. And it says it is somebody that combines a warrior ethos with language proficiency, cultural awareness, political sensitivity and the ability to maximize information age technology. Some people try to apply that to us. I am not sure how well it applies. But then you say that today's Green Beret is the only oper-

ational specialty that requires a foreign language for qualification, which is a critical skill. Are you going to start requiring these additional skills for Special Ops? Because it seems to me that one of our problems, both in Afghanistan and in Iraq, has been the language barrier. I know you dropped these leaflets, which they may be lacking a bit of subtlety. I suppose they achieved their mission. But they are somewhat crude, I think you would agree. And yet, when our Special Ops Forces get on the ground, there has got to be language problems that impede or make less than efficient the achievement of their objectives. So have you given some thought about language requirements? And how quickly are you training people to be able to communicate directly with, for example the Arabs?

General HOLLAND. Yes, sir. Our difficulty has been predicting which type of language we need. Little did we know how important Dari and Pashtun would be at this juncture. We are continuing to reassess. Language skills are very important for our people. Each person in SF is required to have a language qualification. And because of that, that is why they are so effective in the field because they have that cultural awareness. Now, those places where we have not had a chance to get to the capability that we need, we are working with industry. And initially, with DARPA today we are working—what is called a “phrase lator,” where you can point to a question and it will say that in the Dari, Pashtun or whatever language you want and then that can be interpreted for you. We bought about 400 of those systems. We gave them to our people in the field and they are saying that those are very helpful, but we need two-way communication. And so I was talking to DARPA and Dr. Tony Tether, who heads up DARPA, and they are now working two-way communication, so it is like you are having your own interpreter between you and that individual. But we will continue to try to see what languages are appropriate for the 21st century and we are going to continue to make this an emphasis item and we will continue to take a look at where we need to expand in the other services as well.

Mr. LEWIS. Would you yield a minute, just for a second?

Mr. MORAN. Yes.

Mr. LEWIS. It is a very fascinating area and we won't spend a lot of time on it. Presently, over time I can see this being a huge challenge for—we don't anticipate any problems with what I consider to be my second country for example, which is India, but I do know that Hindi is the base language there. But the reality is there are some 200 dialects and a vast percentage of people walk 50 miles from their home and they can't talk to their people even though it is theoretically Hindi. And I don't know how you do that with a phrase lator but it is a challenge that must be met. I don't know about China, if we have that problem. But it is a really interesting subject area and I would like to know more about it.

General HOLLAND. Yes, sir.

WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION

Mr. MORAN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. In this testimony it was also said, I guess we all agree of greater importance is the fact that these terrorists still have chemical, biological, nuclear and high

yield explosive weapons and so on and so forth. What I wanted to ask you about was you have gone into Afghanistan in such a way that you now have a pretty good sense of the capabilities of al Qaeda, at least while they were camped in Afghanistan. Have you found any chemical or biological weapons or any attempt to develop any kind of nuclear capability?

General HOLLAND. Sir, all we have seen today is that as we take a look at the documents, ———. But we do know that that has been in the discussion. It has been in their documents that we have been able to confiscate and that analysis is continuing as we speak.

GREEN TIP AMMUNITION

Mr. MORAN. Yeah. So it is just there is a clear criminal intent to acquire such weapons. ———. And I know that is what we are working on in Iraq as well. And I trust we will find them.

Just lastly, before my time is probably about to expire, but would you tell me just a little bit about the green tip ammo that was the principal ammo that the Special Ops Forces decided to use?

General HOLLAND. Yes, sir. Well, as we brought the green tip ammo on board, with the high velocity and the penetrating capability we found that in some people that it would just pass through so quickly and then not do the damage that is needed to really take the individual down.

Mr. MORAN. So it just goes right through them?

General HOLLAND. Well, yes. Now if it hit and missed all the vital organs then it would just go through versus another bullet. So we came up with a different grain. I think it is 77 grain. We are continuing to take a look at other things in our procurement scheme to come up with what is the right ammo. But the new type of grain, the 77, we have been using in Iraq and we have not had any concerns from our people. Now I will be able to report more clearly to you. Tomorrow I am leaving to go to that part of the world and we are going to ask that question because we have not had any of the concerns from the people there.

Master Chief, do you want to add anything to that? Or Mr. Schulte?

Mr. MORAN. But you are considering getting a more lethal form of ammunition since some people haven't been downed because it has gone right through them?

Master Chief ROGERS. I will make one comment. Sometimes I think the people have unrealistic expectations based on movies and television when you shoot somebody. When you shoot somebody they don't always go down right away unless you hit them right between the eyes, and even then, we have got people that have been wounded over there that have had miracle bullets hit them and not hit any vital organs. So I am saying that this is not an exact science. The art of warfare, using a weapon to shoot somebody, is not something that has got a set of rules and say if I put one round or two rounds or whatever. So the issue of the green tip was raised in Afghanistan. We are working on that. The General has mentioned what we are doing and we are going to go over there in a little while and we will find out what the folks in Iraq have to say.

Mr. MORAN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. LEWIS. Thank you. Mr. Wicker.

Let me mention, we are scheduled to have a members only briefing here shortly. There are three members who haven't asked questions. We may go through Mr. Wicker, see what happens here. There are four votes. What I am worried about and I don't want to keep everybody forever, but in the meantime, if we can—not all these people will be here. So go right ahead and we will spend another 10 minutes and see what happens, okay?

SMALL CRAFT INSTRUCTION AND TRAINING SYSTEM

Mr. WICKER. Thank you very much. And it is hard to add much to what has already been said about the admiration that we all have for you. But it is sincerely felt down to the last and most junior member of this subcommittee, so thank you very much. You are the best in the world.

I was taking a defense related tour of the Mississippi Gulf Coast and went by the Stennis Space Center. There is a lot more that goes on at the Stennis Center than space and NASA. We saw some riverine units of SEALs training. Are those your guys?

General HOLLAND. Yes, sir, they are.

Mr. WICKER. Are all the SEALs under your command, sir?

General HOLLAND. Yes, sir, they are.

Mr. WICKER. So what sort of training were they doing there? And were they—were you able to use any of that type of activity in either Afghanistan or Iraq?

General HOLLAND. We call it NAVSCIATS. It is Small Craft Instruction And Training System. And all that training, for our SEALs is done there at Stennis. We also—

Mr. WICKER. They are there on a temporary basis?

General HOLLAND. The SEALs will come in. But there is a permanent party that is stationed there as well. And they also provide training for other foreign countries that come in and receive the training. It is a good opportunity for us on foreign internal defense to help other countries develop those types of capabilities. The craft that you just mentioned, the SOCRs, Special Operation Craft Riverine. You know that is really the area that we are continuing to look to expand and the ability to use that particular craft in that area.

Mr. WICKER. Did we use any of that sort of thing in the last conflict?

General HOLLAND. Yes, sir. In fact, they have been deployed into Iraq.

Mr. WICKER. The Euphrates and Tigris Rivers?

General HOLLAND. Yes, sir. They started out in the Bay and worked themselves up. I am not sure that they were all the way into Baghdad. But they have been operating over there in that part of the world.

ADVANCED SEAL DELIVERY SYSTEM

Mr. WICKER. Okay. Well, let me ask you to comment on the Advance SEAL Delivery System then, which I understand is a mini submarine which is designed to improve combatant delivery system. Is this way over budget? Is it way behind schedule? Have you solved the battery problems and noise level questions? Could you just comment on that for the subcommittee's benefit?

General HOLLAND. Okay. Let me just say a few words from an operational view and then let me have Mr. Schulte talk about that aspect of it. I was in Hawaii, with some SEALs and they are really impressed with the capability that the ASDS will bring us. I look at this as stealth from the sea. When you have a marriage of an Advanced SEAL Delivery System with a Trident submarine and the ability that that gives us to put our SEALs into many different places around the world, that is going to far exceed our capabilities today. And what is unique about it is when you look at our SEAL delivery vehicles—and I always make the comment that the SEALs always like to put me inside of it because it is very small, cramped versus the Advanced SEAL Delivery System, which is in a dry environment, because remember the SEAL delivery vehicles we have today are a wet environment. What they like is the fact that they could get in close to the target, have a chance to rehearse the platoon size operation and then at that part start their combat swim. So from their perspective they saw the efficiencies and the effectiveness of being able to do the job far exceed the way that they have been able to do it in the past.

Now that doesn't say that the SEAL delivery vehicles no longer have a use. They have a use, too, but this allows us to have a greater capability for the future. And we are continuing to work the technological shortcomings and I think we have a way ahead on that and, Harry, you can talk about that.

Mr. SCHULTE. Well, quite frankly, sir, the number one boat is way over cost and way beyond schedule. We think in the last year and a half we have got our arms around that now. It has been a tough process. I mean that contract was awarded in 1994 and here we are in 2003. I am happy to report it went into OP eval today, which is basically the operational test and evaluation of the boat. It was loaded on the back of the Greenville yesterday and it is going to sea and doing its OP eval within the next couple of weeks.

Yes, it has been over budget and schedule. It has been on track for about the last year and a half. But the previous years it has been very difficult. We think we have a handle on what the next boats are going to cost. We will be buying those boats under a fixed price arrangement as opposed to the first boat of course was bought at a cost plus, so you pay what the freight is. We will have a fixed price to the rest of them. So I am optimistic that we are going to get our arms around that.

Let me talk about the two problems that you mentioned, both battery and noise. We haven't completely solved the silver zinc battery problem yet. The first three battery sets we had problems with them. They were redesigned to some extent and battery set number 4 was a lot better. In fact we took it on a test that was equivalent to an OP eval and it passed all its tests. So the boat can do what it is supposed to do. The problem with that silver zinc is that we are not going to get as many cycles out of it as we wanted to. We had planned on being able to use that, bring it back, recharge it like 20 different times. That would last several years if you were able to do that. We are not getting those kind of recharge cycles on that. So we can meet the mission, but the logistics cost with that silver zinc battery if it doesn't improve is going to be too high.

What the Navy Program Office has done is they have let three contracts recently for lithium ion technology, three different companies to come in and show us what technology they can bring to us, and we will pick one of those and buy a battery set of lithium ion and put it on the boat probably next summer, probably August of 2004.

One last thing on noise. We had the propeller noise issue. It was basically an aluminum propeller. It was thin on the edges. It was causing an acoustic problem. Through the Navy and through Penn State they designed a composite propeller. It is being installed on boat number 1 and it will be used during OP eval, and we think that is going to solve the largest of the noise problem.

We also know there are a couple of pumps that we need to change out that are little bit noisy but not until we solve the propeller issue which was clearly the biggest noise problem. The pumps won't be that big of a challenge. We will solve that, too. So I think noise is under control.

Mr. WICKER. Is the rest of it composite? Is any of it composite?

Mr. SCHULTE. Yes. Some of it is. The nose assembly and the tail assembly are composite.

Mr. LEWIS. Thank you. Mr. Visclosky.

Mr. VISCLOSKY. I am fine, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. LEWIS. Okay. Mr. Nethercutt has one brief question and then we will recess for these votes. We will come back and at that point it will be a members only briefing in this very room. That is correct.

ADVANCED TACTICAL LASER

Mr. NETHERCUTT. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Gentlemen, welcome and welcome to your team behind you. I know you are all part of the team and we appreciate all you have done. Let me have you address the issue of the Advanced Tactical Laser, that program to be fielded on an AC-130 gunship. Can you tell the Committee about what new capabilities this will provide, what your assessment of it is, what is the requirement for laser power? How do you see it playing out in the future? Maybe just summarize for the committee what you know and what you like about it or what your concerns are.

General HOLLAND. Yes, sir. I will let Mr. Schulte also have a touch on this to show you an example of some of the tests we have done.

As a gunship person from Southeast Asia days, when you take a look at basically what is on the gunship today, we had 40 millimeter back in the early 1970s. And we need to take a look at the gunship of the future. What should it look like? What type of capabilities? Is it a high power microwave? Do lasers have a way? What about the conventional weaponry that we have today and what is the best suite to have on board?

So as a result of that, the people came forward and said, well, why don't you try out a laser and see if it has some function? And that is exactly what they are doing. It is a test program to see and we have already had some successes in the succession program. But there is still a lot more to go.

So, Harry, I will let you take it from there.

Mr. SCHULTE. General Holland said it exactly right. It is an ACTD, an advanced concept technology demonstration. It is not an acquisition program at this point in time. The idea is to go out and say, hey, can you make this thing work and if it can work, does it have any military utility? Is it of any use to you? We are putting a laser on a C-130 to see what kind of power we can get out of it and see what kind of military utility it has. The answer may be, hey, this is great stuff because you can go after targets that you can be very precise. It is covert. You won't have to bank the airplane the way you have to do for a gunship because there will be a turret right on the bottom you can shoot all the way around and you can kind of dial up the power you want to do that. What kind of effect do you want? Do you want to burn something up? Do you want to just stop it? What do you want to do? You can have those kind of things.

For instance, if you have got a vehicle next to a mosque, which is not all that farfetched these days, you could go down and do something to that vehicle without worrying about blowing up the mosque or something like that. So it has potential. I can't tell you right now how any of this is going to come out. We are just not that far along on the program.

What I have here is a kind of interesting device. Two of the things we want to demonstrate in the test program are, for instance, can you stop a vehicle in a convoy? You pick out a single vehicle, the fourth vehicle or the sixth vehicle. Can you just stop that vehicle? And so we did a test up at Wright Patterson AFB, Ohio, with a laser that simulated what we were going to be doing and shot a hole through the hood of this little truck right into the manifold. This is the manifold, and of course it blew, of course it went through the hood of the truck in about two seconds, went through that manifold in about another two seconds. It spews gas all over. You have got an engine fire. Whoever is in that truck is getting out of that truck. He is not going to be there very long. And that truck stops in about another—

Mr. LEWIS. That is a pretty good answer. We have less than two minutes to go back upstairs and it is very interesting. Since you didn't read your entire statement, General Holland, we are going to put your bio in the record anyway. We will be back in approximately 20 to 25 minutes for a members only session, so the room will be cleared.

The Subcommittee adjourned and proceeded in an Executive session.

[CLERK'S NOTE.—Questions submitted by Mr. Lewis and the answers thereto follow:]

SPECIAL OPERATIONS BUDGET PROCESS

Question. The United States Special Operations Command (USSOCOM) is the only operational Combatant Command within the Department of Defense directly responsible for determining its own force structure and related material and funding requirements, procuring Special operations unique equipment, and training and deploying units. In other words, it is the only Combatant Command with its own budget.

The Secretary of Defense has assigned new responsibilities for the Command including an expanded role in the war on Terrorism, placing it more in line with the other Combatant Commanders who do not have their own budget responsibilities.

Is this a reason to change the role the Special Operations Command has in determining its own budgetary requirements?

Answer. No, the United States Special Operations Command's (USSOCOM) budgeting authority has been the key to our success. The command's acquisition and budgeting authority is vital to our effectiveness. We have built an award winning acquisition system that has consistently accelerated emerging technologies into usable systems. Shifting that authority back to the services would most likely result in the reemergence of the same difficulties that led Congress to give USSOCOM these authorities in the first place.

Question. Military personnel resources are planned and programmed by USSOCOM, but budgeted and executed by the individual services. With a significant increase in personnel being requested for the Command this year due to its expanded responsibilities and with no additional personnel being provided to the Services, how have the services reacted to the requirement to provide USSOCOM additional personnel?

Answer. This was an unforeseen situation for both the services and United States Special Operations Command (USSOCOM) and required an immediate shift in the normal programming cycle. Having to crosswalk spaces with the dollars created stress on each of the services, which is going to be difficult to absorb in the near future.

Question. How is the total amount of Budget Authority provided to the Command for Operations and Maintenance, Procurement, and Research and Development established?

Answer. In accordance with Deputy Secretary of Defense (DEPSECDEF) Atwood's December 1, 1989 memorandum, United States Special Operations Command (USSOCOM) establishes budgets using the same procedures as the military services under Major Force Program (MFP)-11. We actively participate in all aspects of the Planning, Programming, and Budgeting System (PPBS) process just like a military department. Internally, we use a capabilities-based Strategic Planning Process to rank and resource validated Special Operations-unique requirements across various appropriations. USSOCOM works with the Services to garner financial support for service-common items required by special operations forces (SOF). Military personnel resources are planned and programmed by USSOCOM, but budgeted and executed by the individual Services.

Question. If the method for establishing these amounts differs for Supplemental requests what are the differences?

Answer. United States Special Operations Command (USSOCOM) develops Supplemental requests in line with Department guidance. In all cases, that guidance has been focused specifically on the operational shortfalls at the time. It is considered vital that integrity is not sacrificed at any time during this process.

Question. Describe the level of detailed guidance provided to the USSOCOM by the DoD Comptroller and the Office of Management and Budget (OMB)?

Answer. United States Special Operations Command (USSOCOM) receives very detailed guidance from the Department during the development of budget requests. These include the Defense Planning Guidance (DPG), the DoD Financial Management Regulations, and the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) Circular A-11. There are also a number of reviews performed on all the budget requests received from the Services and Agencies to ensure that the intent of the guidance is being met prior to submission.

Question. Does guidance that flows to the USSOCOM go to the project, activity, and program level? In what ways?

Answer. The Department issues its guidance in specific terms that focuses on the intent of the Administration's objectives. During the reviews that are performed by the Department and Office of Management and Budget (OMB) the discussions invariably focus on the requirements down to the project, activity, and program levels to ensure that they are compliant with the Administration's objectives.

FISCAL YEAR 2002 DEFENSE EMERGENCY RESPONSE FUND (DERF) AND SUPPLEMENTAL FUNDING

Question. Special Operations Forces were the first DoD personnel on the ground in Afghanistan and they played a major role in the early defeat of the Taliban and the killing and capture of thousands of al Qaeda operators. The Special Operations Command received \$751.7 million from the DERF and \$773.8 million in Supplemental funding for fiscal year 2002. How were the requirements for those funding requests developed?

Answer. United States Special Operations Command (USSOCOM) used a very deliberate process based on requirements submitted by the Component Commanders

and the Commanders on the ground, while focusing on paying for the deployment costs and purchasing the items that ensured the success of special operations forces (SOF). The headquarters reviewed the requirements for appropriateness and then integrated into a prioritized list of known shortfalls and additional requirements needed by the troops on the ground.

Question. When were those requests presented to the DoD?

Answer. United States Special Operations Command (USSOCOM) submitted its Defense Emergency Response Fund (DERF) requirements to the Department on September, 21 2001. The FY2002 submission was given to the Department on January, 24 2002.

Question. How long did it take for funding to flow to the Special Operations Command?

Answer. United States Special Operations Command (USSOCOM) received its first increment of Defense Emergency Response Fund (DERF) funding on September, 26 2001, and its first increment of FY2002 Supplemental funding on September, 17 2002.

Question. How much of that funding was reimbursement of operational expenditures?

Answer. \$339 million of the \$751.7 million DERF and \$450 million of the \$771 million of FY2002 Supplemental.

Question. What portion of those funds was used for the unconventional warfare phase of the war?

Answer. Funds used in support of unconventional warfare through December 2002 totaled approximately \$289 million.

Question. How much of that funding went to training and equipping anti-Taliban opposition groups?

Answer. Equipping of anti-Taliban opposition groups was funded by Other Government Agencies, not by United States Special Operations Command (USSOCOM). Due to the operational immediacy of the situation, there was no formal training for the training of anti-Taliban opposition groups. Rather, special operations forces (SOF) engaged in "advise and assist" activities with opposition groups in the field in direct preparation for or as part of military operations. These activities fall within the spectrum of combat operations, and associated costs are not separable from the actual combat operations themselves.

Question. What portion of the funds received was used to purchase equipment?

Answer. \$413 million of the \$751.7 million DERF funding and \$321 million of the \$771 million of FY02 Supplemental.

Question. What types of equipment were fielded that were not a part of the normal acquisition process?

Answer. We define "types of equipment fielded that were not part of the normal acquisition process" as requirements that meet the criteria for USSOCOM's Combat Mission Need Statement (CMNS) process. CMNS is defined as an expedited process for documenting and staffing urgent, time-sensitive requirements. It is the method used to satisfy deficiencies that arise during combat or crisis operations or when it is believed that urgent and compelling acquisition procedures are necessary. Below is a listing of all CMNS actions as of 31 March 2003 to include source of funding:

Combat Mission Needs Statement (CMNS)

[Component: USSOCOM]

<i>UDA Program</i>	<i>Funding source</i>
Blue Force Tracking Devices	DERF.
Small UAV	DERF.
AC-130U All Light Level TV	DERF.
Specific Emitter ID Detection	DERF.
Remote Sensing	02 SUP.
Non-Standard Commercial Vehicles	DERF.
Remote Camera Controller	DERF.
Laser Targeting Device	DERF.
All Terrain Vehicles	DERF.
Video Teleconferencing Capability	DERF.
Standoff Explosive Detection System	DERF.
Hardened Sport Utility Vehicles	DERF.
Special Purpose Receiver	DERF.
Leaflet Delivery	DERF.
Remote Weather Capability	DERF.
Thermal Identification Device	DERF.

Combat Mission Needs Statement (CMNS)—Continued

[Component: USSOCOM]

*UDA Program**Funding source*

Man-Portable Decontamination	DERF.
Remote Observation Post	DERF.
MH-47D HAVE CSAR	DERF.
VHF Repeater	DERF.

FISCAL YEAR 2003 SUPPLEMENTAL REQUIREMENTS

Question. The Global War on Terrorism operations, ranging from Afghanistan, and operations in Yemen, the Philippines, the former Soviet Republic of Georgia, and now in and around Iraq have placed enormous strains on your operating accounts. The Congress provided \$531 million to the Special Operations Command for OPERATION ENDURING FREEDOM as a subset of the \$10 billion it provided in the Omnibus Appropriations Act for Fiscal Year 2003. The Congress provided \$1.2 billion in the fiscal year 2003 Supplemental. What is the estimated total requirement for OPERATION ENDURING FREEDOM for the rest of fiscal year 2003?

Answer. Our FY2003 Supplemental requirement of \$1.2 billion fully addresses our known requirements for both Operation ENDURING FREEDOM (OEF) and Operation IRAQI FREEDOM (OIF).

Question. How much of that requirement is for Deployment costs?

Answer. \$750 million.

Question. How much for Flying Hours?

Answer. \$126 million.

Question. How much for equipment?

Answer. \$405 million.

Question. In addition to ongoing OEF costs, there will be costs associated with our operations in and around Iraq. How much do you anticipate those costs will be?

Answer. \$1.2 billion in FY2003 Supplemental funding supports both Operation IRAQI FREEDOM (OIF) and Operation ENDURING FREEDOM (OEF) anticipated requirements. However, United States Special Operations Command (USSOCOM) has very little funding flexibility to meet unforeseen requirements. While the Services are able to absorb their OIF/OEF requirements within their baselines, USSOCOM doesn't own any Base Operating Support (BOS) funds from which to draw.

Question. Was the amount included in the Supplemental passed by the Congress earlier in the month enough to last the entire fiscal year?

Answer. Yes, based on the criteria used to build the FY2003 supplemental request. However, this supplemental doesn't address any United States Special Operations Command (USSOCOM) platform losses since the commencement of combat operations. These may be addressed through the "Constitution"/"Setting the Force" efforts underway presently, but will certainly require additional Total Obligational Authority (TOA.)

FISCAL YEAR 2004 BUDGET REQUEST

Question. The President's budget proposes a significant increase for the Special Operations Command of approximately 33 percent as well as an expanded national mission. Heretofore, SOCOM has been a force provider and supporter to the Geographic Combatant Commanders. In addition to its traditional missions the Command's expanded role will include planning direct combat missions against terrorist organizations around the world and executing those missions as a supported Command.

How much of this increase is attributable to the Command's expanded role planning and executing command in the war on terrorism?

How much of the increase is attributable to personnel increases?

How much is attributable to an expanded operational role?

How much is provided to resource equipment?

Answer. (We understand the intent of the above questions, but it's very difficult to answer them separately due to the way the FY04 President's Budget is structured.)

The majority of the 33 percent increase is in the procurement account—about \$1.1 billion. About half of the procurement increase is to mitigate the most pressing problems associated with SOF low density/high demand rotary wing and fixed wing assets (MH-47, MH-60, and MC-130). The remaining increase in procurement is

attributed to the plus up of four AC-130U gunships, two CV-22 production aircraft, and various types of soldier systems and communication equipment. The budget increase tied to the Command's expanded role as a planning and executing command in the war on terrorism is a relatively small portion of the 33 percent increase—\$78 million and 389 additional personnel. Only 118 of the additional personnel are here at United States Special Operations Command (USSOCOM). The remainder are for Joint Special Operations Command (JSOC) and the Theatre Special Operations Commands (TSOC)s. The budget increase requested in FY04 tied to our expanded operational role in the War on Terrorism is also relatively small—\$203 million and 357 additional personnel. The majority of the added personnel are at Joint Special Operations Command (JSOC) or units with the primary responsibility for Counterterrorism and Counterproliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction.

END STRENGTH INCREASES TO SUPPORT THE WAR ON TERRORISM AT USSOCOM HEADQUARTERS

Question. In October of 2002, the Secretary of Defense directed the United States Special Operations Command to establish plans for and direct the war on terrorist organizations on a global scale. The End Strength for USSOCOM will increase by 3,932 personnel over the FYDP, 2,053 in FY2004 alone. How many additional personnel will be required at the United States Special Operations Command Headquarters?

Answer. 118 personnel.

Question. The Committee is aware that additional personnel have been requested for USSOCOM headquarters to man a 24/7 Joint Operations Center, establish a Campaign Support Group, and create additional Operational Planning Capability. How many personnel will be required for each of these functions?

Answer. United States Special Operations Command (USSOCOM) plus up is 118 spaces, with the 24/7 Joint Operations Center (JOC) receiving 92 spaces and 26 spaces for Operational Planning Capability. The Campaign Support Group (CSG) has 88 spaces already on the books. This capability is additive to accomplishing current Title 10 missions.

Question. How will these additional personnel enhance existing capabilities?

Answer. Additional personnel will enable USSOCOM headquarters to transform from a resourcing headquarters to a headquarters that will establish plans and direct the war on terrorism against terrorist organizations on a global scale.

Question. Is existing space adequate for these new functions?

Answer. No; however, our top two unfunded Military Construction (MILCON) projects are the Add/Alter Bldg 501A (Warfighting Center) and Information Technology Facility. These projects will greatly enhance our spacing needs to consolidate the strategic planning capability associated with these personnel increases.

THEATER SPECIAL OPERATIONS COMMANDS

Question. The Committee is aware that additional Special Operations personnel are being requested to be deployed at the Theater Special Operations Commands for the Central, European, and Pacific Commands. How many personnel are currently assigned at each Command?

Answer. We currently have 551 military and civilian personnel assigned to our Theater Special Operations Commands (TSOC). The breakout for each TSOC is as follows:

SOCCENT	124
SOC SOUTH	125
SOCKOR	45
SOC PAC	92
SOCEUR	85
SOCJFCOM	80

Question. How many additional personnel are being requested for each Command?

Answer. Special Operations Command Central (SOCCENT) 84 positions, Special Operations Command Europe (SOCEUR) 79 positions, and a Joint Special Operations Air Component of 10 positions. Special Operations Command Pacific (SOPAC) 79 positions. This provides a forward based Theater Special Operations Command (TSOC) in Central Command (CENTCOM) and a 24 hour-per-day/7-day-per-week (24/7) Joint Special Operations Task Force (JSOTF) capability in all three theaters.

Question. What missions will they perform that are currently not being performed by others?

Answer. In times of conflict or crisis, the Theater Special Operations Command (TSOC)s provide theater commanders a Joint Special Operations Task Force Headquarters (JSOTF) to plan and conduct Special Operations. Traditionally, TSOCs form the core of the JSOTF headquarters but must be augmented to be fully capable. For execution of the War on Terrorism, the functions of the TSOC and JSOTF expand from planning and coordinating SOF support to actually planning and executing the war on terrorism (WOT) campaign for the theater commander. TSOCs must be structured to support command and control of multiple JSOTFs when required.

Question. Why are there no personnel assigned to Northern Command?

Answer. Special operations forces (SOF) personnel are assigned to Northern Command (NORTHCOM), with more arriving this summer. NORTHCOM and United States Special Operations Command (USSOCOM) conducted a manpower study and has tentatively agreed on a 17-man Special Operations Detachment. Currently, NORTHCOM's entire (not just SOF) manning document is still being worked.

Question. Why are no additional personnel being requested for the Southern Command?

Answer. United States Special Operations Command (USSOCOM) did request additional personnel for Special Operations Command South (SOC SOUTH), but the increase was not approved.

CENTRAL COMMAND (CENTCOM)

Question. The Committee is aware that SOCOM plans to forward base forces including a Crisis Response Element (CRE) in the CENTCOM area of responsibility. Where will these forces be stationed?

Answer. In the Central Command (CENTCOM) area of responsibility (AOR), decisions on an exact location for forces in theater have not been finalized, but proposed locations will be in the Persian Gulf region.

Question. How many forces will be required?

Answer. United States Special Operations Command (USSOCOM) plans to forward base the following special operations forces (SOF) in the Central Command (CENTCOM) area of responsibility (AOR):

1 Theater Special Operations Command	152
4 MH53s or MH47s, 3 MC-130s, Joint Special Operations Air Component (JSOAC), STS (These forces combine to make up the Air Component)	313
1 SEAL platoon with Command and Control (C&C) and Ground Mobility Vehicles (GMV)	24
1 SF Co mounted	130
Total personnel	619

Question. What will be the costs associated with this initiative?

Answer. The Major Force Program (MFP)-11 costs associated with this initiative were funded in Program Decision Memorandum (PDM) I. The Central Command (CENTCOM) Forward Presence section of the PDM funded additional MC130s, additional SEAL Teams, deployment costs, NAVSPECWARCOM Ground Mobility Detachments, and acceleration of HMMWV conversions into Ground Mobility Vehicles for United States Army Special Operations Command (USASOC). The LD/HD section of the Program Decision Memorandum (PDM) funded additional MH47s that will support the Crisis Response Element (CRE) and the Strategic Planning Capability and Theater Special Operations Commands section of the PDM funded additional operations and maintenance (O&M) for Special Operations Command Central (SOCCENT). The total force structure funded by PDM I was required to establish an adequate rotational base to support those forces listed in paragraph 2 above. The total funding in PDM I related to this initiative was \$2.7 billion.

Question. Will they report to the CENTCOM commander or will they report to USSOCOM?

Answer. Central Command (CENTCOM) exercises operational control (OPCON) of the Crisis Response Element (CRE) through the Theatre Special Operations Command (TSOC). The CRE was established in order to provide the theater with a crisis response capability permanently located within the area of responsibility (AOR).

Question. Will similar Crisis Response elements be established at EUCOM? PACOM?

Answer. There is no requirement to establish Crisis Response Elements (CRE)s in the other combatant command areas of responsibility (AOR)s. Each has permanently assigned special operations forces (SOF) which serve as the theater "in-extreme" force. With the establishment of the Central Command (CENTCOM) CRE,

all theater combatant commands now have the capability to respond to crises with SOF already present in theater. The CENTCOM CRE was established because CENTCOM was the only theater combatant command without a permanently assigned "in-extreme" capability.

Question. How will the establishment of these Crisis Response elements enhance the current capabilities of the Commander of USSOCOM to perform his responsibilities?

Answer. The Central Command (CENTCOM) Crisis Response Element (CRE) and "inextremis" forces assigned to the other theaters provide both the geographic combatant commanders and the United States Special Operations Command (USSOCOM) Commander with a rapidly deployable special operations forces (SOF) element when emerging high value targets are identified and located during the prosecution of the War on Terrorism. These elements, and others, will provide the capability to respond quickly and effectively to time sensitive targets.

CENTRAL COMMAND AVIATION AND SEAL COMPONENTS

Question. The Committee is aware that SOCOM plans to establish an aviation component and two SEAL teams in the Central Command Area of Responsibility. What aircraft will this aviation component fly?

Answer. The Central Command (CENTCOM) Aviation Component will have four (4) MH-53M or MH-47G helicopters and 3 MC-130s.

Question. Are they currently in the inventory?

Answer. There are no MH-47Gs off of the mod line yet. The first one comes off in FY 2005.

Question. How many forces will be required to forward base this element in the CENTCOM area of responsibility?

Answer. The Department resourced 313 (out of a total of 410 for ARSOA plus up) people for the aviation component.

Question. What will be the costs associated with this initiative?

Answer. FY 2004 cost is \$132 million.

Question. Is the equipment for the two new SEAL teams currently in the inventory?

Answer. No, however the Department has provided funds for the equipment for these two Teams within the Future Years Defense Program.

Question. How many personnel will be required to forward base these teams in the CENTCOM area of responsibility?

Answer. United States Special Operations Command (USSOCOM) plans to forward base the following special operations forces (SOF) forces in the Central Command (CENTCOM) area of responsibility (AOR):

1 Theater SOC	152
4 MH53s or MH47s, 3 MC-130s, Joint Special Operations Air Component (JSOAC), STS (These forces combine to make up the Air Component)	313
1 SEAL platoon with Command and Control (C&C) and Ground Mobility Vehicles (GMV)	24
1 SF Co mounted	130
Total personnel	619

NEW PSYCHOLOGICAL OPERATIONS COMPANIES

Question. The Committee is aware that SOCOM plans to establish two new active and four reserve regional Psychological Operations Companies. Please describe the mission of the current Psychological Operations Companies including their end strength.

Answer. The two new active component (AC) Psychological Operations (PSYOP) Companies will conduct theater PSYOP in Central Command (CENTCOM) and Pacific Command (PACOM) with a combined total end strength of 154 soldiers. The four reserve component (RC) PSYOP Companies will conduct tactical PSYOP with Ground forces wherever they are deployed. Total RC end strength of 308 RC soldiers.

Question. Where are they located?

Answer. The two active component (AC) and four reserve component (RC) Psychological Operations (PSYOP) Companies will be located at Fort Bragg, North Carolina the RC companies are part of the multi-composition (RC/AC) units.

Question. Where will the new Psychological Operations Companies be located?

Answer. The new Psychological Operations (PSYOP) Companies will be located at Fort Bragg, North Carolina.

Question. What will be the costs associated with this initiative?

Answer. Funding in the amount of \$205 million across the Future Year Defense Plan (FYDP) was received for the Psychological Operations (PSYOPS) initiative; \$99 million in operation and maintenance (O&M); \$71 million in Procurement; \$31 million in research, development, test and evaluation (RDT&E), and \$4 million in Military Construction (MILCON).

SPECIAL OPERATIONS PROCUREMENT BUDGET

Question. The President's budget proposes to increase the Special Operations Procurement budget by 126% from \$873.3 million in Fiscal year 2003 to \$1,978.5 million in Fiscal year 2004. This increase is in addition to the \$691 million for the procurement of items provided by the Congress above the budget through the DERF and the Supplemental during fiscal year 2002, and what has been included in the Fiscal year 2003 supplemental budget request. The fiscal year 2002 increases above the budget were added in response to the events which occurred on September 11th. They were intended to provide Special Forces operators with items which could be procured quickly to meet unanticipated needs. Please provide the Committee a detailed list of the items procured and fielded.

Answer. Items procured and fielded to meet the unanticipated needs of the special operations forces (SOF) operators are provided by P-1/Program in the following Defense Emergency Response Fund (DERF) and FY02 Supplemental Listings:

SOF DERF FUNDING FOR GWOT—COMPONENT: USSOCOM

P-1 Line/Program

C-130 Modifications

- AC-130U All Light Level TV
- ALL TV Time Multiplex
- MC-130 Air Refueling
- Moving Map Capability

Communications Equipment & Electronics

- Special Mission Radio Systems
- Multi-Band Multi-Mission Radio
- Multi-Band Inter/Intra Team Radio
- Blue Force Tracking Devices
- PLGR-11 and ARC-231 Radio Systems
- Video Teleconferencing Capability
- Tactical Local Area Network
- C4 & Intelligence Automation System
- SCAMPI
- Joint Base Station
- AN/PRC-112 Radios

SOF Intel

- Tactical Local Area Network
- Joint Threat Warning System
- Multi-Mission Advanced Tactical Terminal
- Special Operations Tactical Video System
- Remote Miniature Weather System
- Special Operations Joint Interagency Collaboration Center

PSYOP Equipment

- Leaflet Delivery
- PSYOP Distribution System

Special Reconnaissance Capability

- Remote Observation Post
- Remote Camera Controller
- Standoff Explosive Detection System
- MASINT

Rotary Wing Upgrades/Sustainment

- CH-47D to MH-47E Mods
- Radar Warning Receiver
- Ballistic Protection System
- Air Transportability Kits
- MH-47D HAVE CSAR
- MH-53 Upgrades

Miscellaneous Equipment

- Civil Engineering Support Equipment
- Joint Operational Stocks
- Sustainment Equipment
- Sustainment Ammunition

- Small UAV
- Thermal Identification Device
- Internal Transportable Vehicle
 - Non-Standard Commercial Vehicles
 - All Terrain Vehicles
 - Hardened Sport Utility Vehicles
- Small Arms & Weapons
 - Dessert Patrol Vehicle Weapons
 - Body Armor & Improved Ballistic Protection
 - Human Patient Simulator
 - JOS Weapons
 - Night Vision Devices
 - Modular Integrated Comm Helmet
 - NSWC Weapons
 - M4A1 SOF Carbine Accessory Kits
 - Lightweight Ensemble Protective
 - Special Purpose Receiver
 - Man-Portable Decontamination
- Classified Programs

FY 2002 SUPPLEMENTAL FOR GWOT—COMPONENT: USSOCOM

P-1 Line/Program

- Communications Equipment & Electronics
 - Joint Base Station
 - Multi-Band Inter/Intra Team Radio
 - Multi-Band Multi Mission Radio
 - SCAMPI
 - SOF Tactical Assured Connectivity System
 - Tactical Local Area Network
 - Video Teleconferencing
- SOF Operations Enhancements
- SOF Intelligence Systems
 - Integrated Survey Program
 - Joint Threat warning system
- Tactical Local Area Network
- AC-130U Gunship
 - AC-130U Weight Reduction
- SOF Training Systems
- SOF Planning and Rehearsal System
- C-130 Modifications
 - APQ Radar
- PSYOP Equipment
 - PSYOP Broadcasting System
- Small Arms and Weapons
 - Advanced Lightweight Grenade Launcher
 - Body Armor/Load Carrying System
 - Improved Night/Day Observation Device
 - M4A1 SOF Carbine Accessory Kit
 - Modular Integrated Comm Helmet
 - SOF Laser Acquisition Marker
 - SOF Personal Equipment Adv Req
- Miscellaneous Equipment
 - Joint Operational Stocks
- Rotary Wing Upgrades
 - MH-47 Mini Gun Replacement
 - MH-53 Upgrades
 - MH-47/60 Modular Avionics
 - MH-47/60 Mission Processor Upgrades
 - MH-47/60 Multi-Function Display
 - MH-60 Altitude Hold
 - MH-60 Machine Gun
 - MH-47 Initial Spares
- Ordnance Replenishment
 - SOF Munitions
- Ordnance Acquisition
 - SOF Demolition Kit
 - Remote Activated Munitions System

**105 MM High Fragmentation Rounds
Foreign Weapons and Ammunition**

Question. The fiscal year 2003 increases above the budget were provided to pay for sunk costs and anticipated needs for ongoing Operations ENDURING FREEDOM and IRAQI FREEDOM. Please provide the Committee a detailed list of the items you expect to procure with these funds.

Answer. We do not have the detailed list at this time. We're certain that funding will be used to address shortfalls in deployment and redeployment related expenses, flying hour costs, reconstituting the equipment and spares shortages. The original Supplemental list was developed in November, and we're currently going through the process of revalidating shortfalls and prioritizing the Commander's highest priority combat needs.

Question. The fiscal year 2004 requests reflect the need for increased capability requirement and force structure requirements based on the Command's expanded mission. Even though the increase is large, the Command still has a substantial Unfunded Requirements list. Please provide the Committee with this list.

Answer.

MFP-11 UNFINANCED REQUIREMENTS

[\$ in millions]

Priority	O&M	RDT&E	PROC	Total	Item
1			88.56	88.56	Advanced Lightweight Grenade Launcher.
2			16.50	16.50	Special Operations Craft—Riverine (SOC-R).
3			23.00	23.00	EC-130J Command Solo Conversion.
4			5.85	5.85	Joint Threat Warning System (JTWS).
5	0.20		19.70	19.90	Multi-Band, Multi-Mission Radio (MBMMR).
6		9.00		9.00	Special Tactics Air-Ground Interface Simulator.
7		10.00		10.00	Multi-Band, Multi-Mission Radio (MBMMR).
8		1.00	10.00	11.00	Precision Laser Targeting Device (PLTD).
9	0.20	1.50	25.00	26.70	Lightweight Counter Mortar Radar (LCMR).
10	1.50	16.00	38.40	55.90	MAAWS. Includes Systems & Ammo and AT4 Confined Space.
11	0.40	6.50	50.10	57.00	Night Vision & Laser Targeting Devices.
12			41.25	41.25	Additional Dry Deck Shelters.
13		3.00	12.00	15.00	APR-46 Modification Program.
14			3.10	3.10	MH-60L Altitude Hold.
15			2.30	2.30	Training Support Boat Standardization.
16			2.20	2.20	NSWG3 MK8 MOD1 Battery Charging System.
17	0.75		7.25	8.00	Special Operations Logistics Support Craft.
18		3.00		3.00	PCMCIA Embedded Broadcast System Receiver.
	3.05	50.00	345.21	398.26	UFR Total

MFP-11 MILCON UNFINANCED REQUIREMENTS

[\$ in millions]

Priority	Construct cost	Design cost	Unit	Location	Description
1	13.80	1.24	SOCOM	MacDill AFB FL	Information Technology Facility.
2	13.90	1.10	NSWC	San Clemente, CA	Maritime MOUT.
3	12.58	0.46	AFSOC	Duke Field, FL	Mobility/Aerial Delivery Facility.
4	13.00	1.17	NSWC	Ft Story, VA	Combat Skills Compound.
5	2.80	0.25	NSWC	Coronado, CA	Small Arms Range.
6	8.40	0.40	USASOC	Ft Campbell, KY	Aquatic Survival Training Facility.
7	9.00	1.30	NSWC	Little Creek, VA	SEAL Team Ops Facility.
8	5.20	0.47	NSWC	North Island, CA	Boat Launch Facility.
	78.68	6.39			MILCON Totals.

MH-47 HELICOPTER

Question. The Special Operations Command has a requirement to increase its inventory of MH-47 helicopters and to forward deploy more of them to participate in future conflicts anticipated in the Global War on Terrorism. The Committee is

aware that during OPERATION ENDURING FREEDOM, the MH-47 was the only airlift helicopter in the inventory able to fly at the high altitudes required in the mountains of Afghanistan. How many MH-47 helicopters have experienced battle damage during OPERATION ENDURING FREEDOM and IRAQI FREEDOM and how many are total losses?

Answer. Since October 2001, the 160th Special Operations Aviation Regiment (SOAR) has experienced battle damage to ten of its MH-47 fleet in eleven different instances. Two were destroyed beyond repair. All remaining damaged aircraft have been repaired.

Question. What is the current authorized inventory of MH-47 helicopters?

Answer. The current authorized inventory of MH-47 helicopters is 37. This includes 23 MH-47E and 11 MH-47D on hand. The inventory requested in FY04 is 53. All will eventually be MH47G. Included in that number are three aircraft that are being reconstituted to the MH-47G configuration. One is a previously crash damaged (1996) MH-47E, while the other two are CH-47D aircraft provided by the Army to replace combat losses.

Question. What is the objective inventory approved by the Department of Defense for USSOCOM?

Answer. The objective inventory for MH-47s approved by the Department of Defense is 61 aircraft.

Question. What is the real world requirement (USSOCOM's acquisition objective) for Special Operations MH-47s based on the Command's increased role in the war on terrorism?

Answer. The real world requirement is the Objective Force requirement of 74 aircraft.

Question. The Special Operations MH-47 capabilities exceed those of the Army's CH-47 based on its mission requirements. Please explain the differences in capabilities.

Answer. The MH-47 incorporates a variety of unique equipment that allows it to successfully complete its special operations forces (SOF) mission. It is much more capable, lethal and survivable than is its Army CH-47 counterpart. Major differences include: long-range fuel tanks, aerial refuel probes, a highly advanced digital/glass cockpit, advanced avionics/navigation suite, Aircraft Survivability Equipment (ASE) to defeat both IR and RF threats, a mini-gun weapons system, and a Multi-Mode Radar for terrain following/terrain avoidance navigation.

Question. The Fiscal Year 2004 budget proposes to provide for the conversion of 16 U.S. Army CH-47Ds to the MH-47G configuration which, barring further battle or training loss, should bring the inventory to 53 aircraft leaving Special Operations Forces 8 aircraft short of its DoD objective inventory. How will you make up that shortfall?

Answer. Additional funds are being sought within the Department.

Question. Where are MH-47 aircraft permanently forward deployed today?

Answer. There are six MH-47 aircraft permanently forward deployed in Pacific Command (PACOM) area of responsibility (AOR) (specifically in the Republic of Korea). MH-47 aircraft have had a constant presence in the Central Command (CENTCOM) AOR since October 2001 supporting both operation ENDURING FREEDOM (OEF) and operation IRAQI FREEDOM (OIF).

Question. Where do you propose to forward deploy them in the future?

Answer. European Command (EUCOM) and Central Command (CENTCOM).

Question. How important is it to reach the inventory objective?

Answer. It is imperative that we reach the Objective Force requirement of 74 aircraft, given the increased operational tempo (OPTEMPO) and requirements we have experienced since September 11, 2001. The capability that the MH-47 provides cannot be replaced or replicated anywhere else within DoD. Without this capability, operation ENDURING FREEDOM (OEF) would not have been possible on the timeline in which it was executed.

CV-22 AIRCRAFT

Question. The CV-22 is the Air Force Special Operations variant of the Marine Corps MV-22 and has a requirement to perform the covert high-speed, long-distance insertion/extraction/resupply of Special Operations Forces at night and in adverse weather. To accomplish this mission, the CV-22 will have a terrain following/terrain avoidance (TF/TA) radar whereas the MV-22 has no radar. When do you expect to complete testing on the TF/TA radar, which will be installed in the CV-22?

Answer. Developmental testing of the AN/APQ-186 Terrain Following/Terrain Avoidance (TF/TA) Radar is scheduled for completion in conjunction with the com-

pletion of the overall CV-22 Developmental Test and Evaluation (DT&E) in the Spring of CY06.

Question. The CV-22 will have a suite of Defensive measures and Countermeasures that the MV-22 will not have. What are those systems and when do you anticipate the testing will be complete for them?

Answer. The heart of the CV-22 Defensive Avionics suite is the ALQ-211 Suite of Integrated Radio Frequency Countermeasures (SIRFC) electronic warfare (EW) system with the capability to detect (and if necessary, jam) enemy threat radars. This system is complemented with the AAQ-24 Directional Infrared Countermeasures (DIRCM) system (which includes the AAR-54 Missile Warning Sensor) to actively defeat heat-seeking threats. In addition to these active systems, the CV-22 carries a full load of passive EW chaff and flare countermeasures. In addition to the two aft sponson-mounted ALE-47 dispensers common with the MV-22, the CV-22 also has two forward-firing dispensers. (The forward-firing chaff and flares assist in protecting the aircraft from "nose-on" engagements, and two dispensers are required to provide an adequate quantity of consumables for the long-duration, high threat missions that the CV-22 is designed to perform). Development of these systems is complete, and developmental testing aboard the CV-22 will conclude in conjunction with overall CV-22 Developmental Test and Evaluation (DT&E) in the Spring of CY06.

Question. What other systems and capabilities does the CV-22 have that the MV-22 does not have?

Answer. In addition to the major sub-systems previously described, the CV-22 also incorporates numerous other modifications to enhance its ability to perform the special operations forces (SOF) mission. Most notable of these are:

- Integral wing fuel tanks to provide 600 additional gallons of fuel for the longer range SOF missions
- The addition of a Flight Engineer as a third cockpit crewmember to assist with the intense cockpit workload associated with low-level, night TF/TA flight
- An upgraded communications system to enhance command and control (4 satellite communication (SATCOM) capable radios vs. 2 for the MV-22)
- Upgraded mission computer and moving map display
- A situational awareness station for the embarked SOF troop commander, enabling him to maintain communications with his command and control element, as well as access updated intelligence, threat and position information.

Question. What is the status of the development of each of those systems?

Answer. Initial development of all of these systems is complete and they are currently undergoing developmental testing as part of the overall CV-22 Developmental Test and Evaluation (DT&E) program going on now at Edwards Air Force Base, California. The one exception to this is the Crash-worthy Flight Engineers Seat. The initial design for this seat did not provide the Flight Engineer with the cockpit access and mobility required to adequately perform his tasks. As a result, we are redesigning the seat, and the new seat will not be available for testing until late in CY2006.

Question. When do you expect the CV-22 to complete Initial Operational Test and Evaluation testing?

Answer. The Program Manager's current estimate for completion of CV-22 initial operational test and evaluation (IOT&E) is September 2006.

Question. Is the CV-22 a replacement for existing Special Operations platforms, or does it fulfill a requirement that is not currently being met?

Answer. The CV-22 Osprey is not a direct replacement for any single special operations forces (SOF) weapon system since it fulfills a long-standing shortfall in long-range, high-speed, vertical lift missions that today cannot be accomplished.

Question. Are there aircraft, which will be eliminated from the inventory when the CV-22 becomes available?

Answer. Although it is not a direct replacement, United States Special Operations Command (USSOCOM) will draw-down and retire the MH-53J/M Pave Low fleet in conjunction with the fielding of the CV-22.

Question. What would USSOCOM do to replace those aircraft if the MV-22/CV-22 program were cancelled?

Answer. In the near term, we would need to immediately institute a costly Service Life Extension Program (SLEP) on our remaining MH-53's in order to address critical structural and power plant issues. In the mid and long term, we would need to begin another development program aimed at meeting the long-range, high speed, vertical lift mission capability deficiency that the CV-22 is planned to solve. The special operations forces (SOF) have had a validated need to perform these long-range, vertical lift missions within a single period of darkness for over 20 years. The need will not go away should the V-22 program be cancelled. Although we are

aware of several interesting technologies currently in the laboratory, nothing apart from the tilt-rotor technology at the core of the CV-22 is available, today or on the drawing boards in the next 10 years, that can fill this long-standing SOF operational need. If we must begin a new development program today, we estimate it will be another 20+ years before the newly developed system could be fielded in sufficient quantities to fulfill our national tasking.

Question. The V-22 program has experienced delays and several catastrophic crashes. Does the USSOCOM expect those events to change its requirement for the CV-22?

Answer. No. Our requirements are based on the need to perform certain assigned missions, in this case, the long-range infiltration, exfiltration and resupply of special operations forces (SOF) teams, within a single period of darkness. Our requirements are not based on any specific weapon system or technology.

ADVANCED SEAL DELIVERY SYSTEM (ASDS) INCREASED CAPABILITY

Question. The Advanced SEAL Delivery System (ASDS) is a mini submarine which will serve as an improved combatant delivery system for clandestine insertion and extraction of Special Operations Forces. It will deliver its complement of Special Operations Forces in a "dry" delivery vehicle and will replace the existing "wet" SEAL Delivery (SDS) system. What other differences, capabilities and advantages does the ASDS have over the current SDS?

Answer. The ASDS has many advantages over the SDV aside from the dry vs. wet environment. These include increased range (ASDS range is over twice current SDV range), endurance (ASDS endurance is over 4 times longer than SDV), and payload (ASDS can carry twice the number of personnel compared to the SDV, and has the ability to carry larger, more flexible payloads than SDV). ASDS also has a built-in anchor and loiter capability, where it can remain submerged for days as compared to hours with the SDV. The ASDS can also operate in far greater environmental extremes and depth ranges than the SDV. Other advantages include Electronic Surveillance Measures (ESM), the ability to detect threats to the ASDS, something the SDV does not have, and an organic communications suite that allows for near real time intelligence data collection and transmission. The ASDS will not replace the SEAL Delivery Vehicle (SDV).

Question. Will the ASDS be used for any other missions in addition to the delivery and extraction of SEAL teams?

Answer. Yes. The ASDS has already proven itself as an extremely capable Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance (ISR) platform. During Joint Forces Command Exercise Millennium Challenge 02, the ASDS conducted a harbor penetration and surveillance mission, taking high resolution digital images of the target area and transmitting them back to the joint headquarters in near real time. The ASDS also has the ability to perform sensor emplacement missions in a high threat environment, a crucial mission for which current NSW capabilities are limited.

Question. The ASDS will be an integral subsystem of the SSGN, four of which are currently expected to be converted. How many ASDS will be carried on each SSGN?

Answer. The SSGN is being designed to carry two ASDS, two Dry Deck Shelters (DDS), or one of each. In order to provide the most flexible special operations force package with SSGN, the more likely configuration will be one ASDS and one DDS per SSGN. This would allow the operational commander the ability to employ ASDS, SDV and/or multiple SEAL platoons all from the same SSGN.

Question. What is the USSOCOM requirement for ASDS?

Answer. The USSOCOM requirement is six ASDSs, based on the Operational Requirements Document, Revision 4, updated in June 2001.

Question. How many are included in the POM?

Answer. In fiscal years 2004-2009, there are three ASDSs programmed.

ADVANCED SEAL DELIVERY SYSTEM (ASDS) DEVELOPMENTAL PROBLEMS

Question. The first ASDS vehicle was originally scheduled for Initial Operational Capability (IOC) in 1997 at a cost of \$62 million. To date the ASDS has cost \$625.431 million and has yet to complete Operational Evaluation which precedes IOC. The ASDS is a battery powered vehicle and was originally designed to be equipped with a Silver-Zinc battery. There have been persistent problems with this battery. What is the current status?

Answer. The silver-zinc propulsion battery does not provide the projected number of re-charge cycles, which limits the number of missions that can be conducted before the battery must be replaced. USSOCOM and NAVSEA are continuing to develop improvements to the existing silver-zinc battery. These improvements have already improved battery performance, however, additional work is continuing. Poor

performance of battery sets 1 through 3 prompted an investigation and subsequent redesign of the battery, which led to limited success with set 4. Battery set 4 performed much better and satisfied the Maximum Combat Range and Endurance KPPs, but did not achieve the desired recharge cycles. This means that increased logistics costs will be incurred with continued use of current silver-zinc batteries. NAVSEA has reinstituted the battery Integrated Process Team (IPT) to investigate further modifications and improvements to the current silver-zinc batteries.

Question. At the request of USSOCOM, the Committee provided resources to develop a Lithium-Ion replacement battery. What is the status of this battery development?

Answer. The Program Office has currently awarded three Lithium Ion battery contracts. The first was to Alliant Technologies, Inc (ATK), and the next two were awarded as part of a recent competition to SAFT American and Yardney Technical Products. The recent competition has been protested, and the award is currently under review by the GAO. The Program Office expects a decision from GAO by June 2003. The current program of record for Lithium Ion battery procurement shows a down select in December 2003 and installation in ASDS #1 in August 2004.

Question. When is the Lithium-Ion battery expected to be installed in the ASDS?

Answer. If the current protest is resolved quickly, the program office estimates that the first Lithium-Ion battery set could be installed in ASDS #1 by August 2004.

Question. When the ASDS underwent sound trials in February 2002, the Vehicle did not meet the operational requirements with regard to noise levels produced. Was the major problem the propeller?

Answer. Yes.

Question. What is the status of the new propeller which is being developed?

Answer. The new composite propeller was delivered to Hawaii in March 2003 and installed in April 2003. Modeling conducted at the Applied Research Lab at Penn State University showed that the new propeller would meet acoustic thresholds. Limited acoustic testing was conducted before and during Operational Evaluation. (OPEVAL), with favorable results that indicate acoustic signature is substantially reduced.

Question. Are there any other major impediments to the first vehicle being acceptable to USSOCOM?

Answer. No. United States Special Operations Command (USSOCOM) and Navy Special Warfare Command (NAVSPECWARCOM) remain committed to Advanced SEAL Delivery System (ASDS) and the transformational capabilities it will bring to special operations forces (SOF), and feel that the ASDS will prove itself in its first operational deployment, scheduled for early FY 2004.

AC-130 GUNSHIPS

Question. One of the most effective weapons systems in the entire DoD inventory is the AC-130 Gunship. It is also one of the most requested platforms by the combatant commanders. The Committee provided funding for an additional AC-130 Gunship conversion in fiscal year 2003. What was the unit cost of the original 13 AC-130U conversions?

Answer. The first aircraft, which included all development costs, manufacture tooling costs, software development, test and evaluation costs (ranges, telemetry, etc.) as well as modification costs, was \$190 million. Aircraft 2-13 were \$60.2 million each.

Question. What is the estimated cost of the conversions budgeted in fiscal year 2004?

Answer. The target (negotiations still underway) per unit cost for the four additional gunships is \$122.86 million (objective) and \$135.15 million (threshold). This unit cost is greater than the original aircraft primarily due to a reduced quantity purchase and the additional modifications that have been added since the initial procurement.

Question. What is the total gunship requirement?

Answer. 25 total gunships, which includes 8 AC-130Hs built in the early 1970s, 13 original AC-130Us, and 4 new U models.

Question. Will that requirement be met with the conversions in fiscal year 2004?

Answer. No, delivery of the last AC-130U will be made in CY 2005 using fiscal years 2003-2005 funding.

GREEN TIP AMMO

Question. It is the Committee's understanding that the current Army-common ammunition issued to SOF forces is the 5.56mm M885 or "Green Tip" ammo. This ammunition was developed for use against lightly armored personnel and when fired

at enemy who are not wearing body armor, its penetration capability allows it to pass right through an enemy soldier. Anecdotal evidence provided to the committee during examinations in the field suggests that unless the round directly impacts a vital organ it has very little debilitating effect. How serious a problem is this for the SOF personnel currently deployed?

Answer. The M885 is still a serious problem for special operations forces (SOF) personnel currently deployed. M855 was developed for lightly armored personnel. Soft enemy targets engaged can have the round pass right through them. The goal of the 77 grain ammunition developed to counter this problem is two fold: it increases the accuracy of the round by having a more stabilized flight and has proved more lethal by having a somewhat slower velocity causing better effects upon soft targets. The problem with the M855 was enough of an issue to seek an alternative. United States Special Operations Command (USSOCOM) currently is continuing to procure the 77 grain because it is in use in both Operation Enduring Freedom and Operation Iraqi Freedom and has become a high use item.

Question. What is the solution to this problem?

Answer. United States Special Operations Command (USSOCOM) is currently using a special operations forces (SOF) unique line of ammunition that has been brought into the SOF inventory. This ammunition is the 5.56mm, 77 grain round. This ammunition has proved to be both more accurate at range as well as more lethal than the standard M885. The 5.56mm, 77 grain round has been used in support of both Operation Enduring Freedom and Operation Iraqi Freedom.

Question. Are there forces that are equipped with ammunition which is more lethal than the "green tip" ammo?

Answer. Currently, all special operations forces (SOF) components, to include United States Army Special Operations Command (USASOC), Navy Special Warfare Command (NAVSPECWARCOM), and Air Force Special Operations Command (AFSOC), have the 5.56mm, 77 grain ammunition.

Question. What is the plan to equip SOF troops with more lethal ammunition?

Answer. United States Special Operations Command (USSOCOM) has an ongoing procurement to meet inventory requirements.

ADVANCED LIGHTWEIGHT GRENADE LAUNCHER (ALGL)

Question. The ALGL is an improved 40mm grenade launcher designed to replace the current weapon with a precision fire weapon system. The Committee has added funding to the President's budget for the development and fielding of the ALGL system for a number of years and understands that it is the Number One priority on your unfunded requirements list. What is the inventory objective for this weapons system?

Answer. Total Basis of Issue Plan (BOIP) is 548 systems. (63 systems for Navy Special Warfare Command (NAVSPECWARCOM) and 485 systems for United States Army Special Operations Command (USASOC)).

Question. How many are on hand at present?

Answer. Through fiscal year 2003, 128 systems will have been purchased.

Question. How many are proposed to be procured in the fiscal year 2004 President's budget?

Answer. No systems are programmed for FY2004, however, ALGL is United States Special Operations Command (USSOCOM)'s number one FY2004 Unfinanced Requirement (UFR). The \$88.5 million UFR, if fulfilled, will buy out the remaining Basis of Issue Plan (BOIP) and supporting ammunition.

Question. Are there plans to procure any of these systems with funding provided in previous supplemental appropriations?

Answer. There are no plans to procure systems with the previous supplemental funding.

ADVANCED TACTICAL LASER (ATL)

Question. The Special Operations Command proposed a new ACTD RDT&E program to develop a tactical laser to be fielded aboard an AC-130 gunship last year. Usually R&D funds are used to develop Special Operations Command unique items rather than those used throughout the services. What is Special Operations unique about the Advanced Tactical Laser?

Answer. The AC-130 Gunship is a special operations forces (SOF) unique weapon system. The Advanced Tactical Laser (ATL) offers unique attributes in accuracy by utilizing a narrow, silent, invisible and high-energy laser beam. This provides the ability to disable/damage/destroy targets that are of particular interest to SOF. The inherent attributes of a high-energy laser also provide the SOF operator with the potential to accomplish the clandestine mission. This, along with a multi-directional

firing capability, enhances the survivability of the Gunship. The ATL ACTD represents a significant step forward by placing this technology into the hands of SOF for evaluation. The ACTD is specifically tailored to demonstrate capabilities relevant to United States Special Operations Command (USSOCOM). USSOCOM has delegated to the Air Force Special Operations Command the responsibility for conducting the Military Utility Assessment of this system. Laser weapons will not be unique to SOF. As laser technology matures and the size of tactical lasers that can provide operationally useful power is reduced, there will be increased interest in laser weapon systems from the conventional forces.

Question. What targets will it enable the SOCOM to eliminate that it does not currently have the capability to destroy?

Answer. The issue is not the destruction of targets; it is creating battlefield effects that allow our special operations forces (SOF) operators to successfully accomplish their mission. The Advanced Tactical Laser (ATL) does not provide United States Special Operations Command (USSOCOM) the capability to prosecute any additional target sets. The kinetic weapons of today provide only one type of effect, explosive. These kinetic weapons, while effective, also have limitations. In the recent engagement in Iraq, we observed the enemy placing military equipment in civilian and culturally sensitive target areas. This limited the number and frequency of shot opportunities with kinetic weapons. An ATL system, with precision accuracy (4" diameter beam) and the ability to destroy, disrupt, and/or annoy a target, will provide for an expanded number of shot opportunities and create a better battlefield environment for SOF operators. As experience is gained with this new technology during the ongoing ATL ACTD, new SOF missions and better ways to conduct current operational missions may be identified.

Question. What is the total cost of the ACTD?

Answer. The total cost of the Advanced Tactical Laser (ATL) ACTD is \$217 million (a combination of contractor and government efforts).

Question. What is the level of risk associated with this development?

Answer. All of the technologies contained in the major components of the Advanced Tactical Laser (ATL) ACTD system have been successfully demonstrated in a laboratory environment. This has driven the component risk level to Low from Moderate. The key risk in the program is associated with the integration into the aircraft and demonstration of the laser system in an airborne environment. We assess this risk to be Moderate. A tremendous amount of our integration and demonstration risk has been mitigated using lessons learned from other laser development programs, such as AirBorne Laser (ABL) and Tactical High Energy Laser (THEL).

Question. What is the required power level of the laser?

Answer. ———.

Question. What power has been achieved to date?

Answer. Chemical Oxygen Iodine Laser energy is very scalable, as demonstrated by ABL program and the experience of Boeing with the Advanced Tactical Laser (ATL) ACTD sub-scale demonstration laser. Our demonstration goal for this device was 18 kW. To date, we have demonstrated 22 kW.

Question. The ACTD is currently designed to produce a laser that will take up the entire space of an AC-130 gunship, leaving no room for the weapons currently deployed on the airframe. Is that the desired configuration?

Answer. DoD made a deliberate decision at the start of the Advanced Tactical Laser (ATL) ACTD not to spend scarce funding on reducing the size of the laser system. It was deemed more important to concentrate on building the laser, integrating the components, and conducting the live fire demonstrations. One of the key reasons for conducting an ACTD is to provide an environment that allows the operators to use new technology which they are unfamiliar with and determine what military utility this system may have. It is not at all clear, at the early stage of this ACTD, what is the correct mix of laser and conventional weapons. Over the next several years, Air Force Special Operations Command (AFSOC) will be reviewing the ATL ACTD performance, the results of the Next Generation Gunship (NGG) Analysis of Alternatives, and current operations of the AC-130 to determine what suite of weapons will provide the most effective battlefield performance.

Question. How would you assess the risk of reducing the size of the tactical laser to allow the gunship to also carry the weapons it does today?

Answer. The specific risk of reducing the laser size will depend upon the operator's system performance requirements (i.e. effective range, magazine depth and/or target effects). There are ongoing research and development programs outside of this ACTD that are addressing technologies that may significantly reduce the size and weight of chemical oxygen iodine laser (COIL) components as well as improve the efficiency of the laser. There is also current research and development in solid-

state lasers that offers the promise of smaller, operational size at appropriate power levels. Based on the continuing development in COIL technology and the strong investment in solid-state lasers by the Army, the Air Force, and the High Energy Laser Joint Technology Office, the risk associated with getting to an operational-sized tactical laser that would be compatible with future AC-130s capabilities is assessed as moderate.

OPERATION ENDURING FREEDOM UNCONVENTIONAL WARFARE

Question. The military campaign in Afghanistan began with the clandestine insertion of Special Operations Forces into the country to marshal indigenous forces to conduct what we all now know as "unconventional warfare". Combined with the ability of U. S. forces to target the enemy from the ground and to destroy them with precision guided munitions it took 49 days from the first insertion of SOF teams to the fall of Kandahar, the pivotal strategic point in the war. How many SOF operators took part in this phase of the war?

Answer. The numbers that were tracked at the beginning of the war in Afghanistan were not very accurate for "special operations forces (SOF) operators" and included support troops and sometimes, conventional forces supporting SOF, as well as some Coalition SOF. From these numbers the average number of "SOF" personnel deployed to Afghanistan during the months of October–November 2001 was 2,743 with a peak of 3,256. If you count just the Operational Detachment Alpha (ODA)'s, SOCC'E's, and Operational Detachment Bravo (ODB)'s personnel, it averaged around 285 during this period.

Question. What was their role in recruiting and paying forces of the Northern Alliance?

Answer. _____.

Question. What was their role in equipping and training forces of the Northern Alliance?

Answer. _____.

Question. The Committee is aware that there were at least eight factions of the Northern Alliance that worked with SOF forces. Were there occasions when those forces attempted to engage each other as opposed to al Qaeda and Taliban forces?

Answer. There were limited incidents in the North only after the whole of the North had been freed from the Taliban.

Question. SOF forces also worked with forces in the south, many aligned with the present ruler Hamid Karzai. How are all of the various factions of indigenous forces working together today?

Answer. Although various factions can improve methods of interaction, we are not aware of any serious incidents in the South.

SPECIAL OPERATIONS FORCES LOSSES

Question. It is an unfortunate fact of war that forces are killed and wounded and equipment is destroyed either in combat or as a result of accidents. To date how many SOF forces have lost their lives in direct support of OPERATION ENDURING FREEDOM?

Answer. Thirty-nine special operations forces (SOF) have lost their lives. This includes 19 killed in action (KIA), 1 died of wounds received in action (DWRIA), and 19 non-hostile casualties—death (NHCAS-D).

Question. To date how many SOF forces have lost their lives in direct support of OPERATION IRAQI FREEDOM?

Answer. Five were killed in action (KIA).

Question. How many of those forces lost their lives due to friendly fire? What lessons from those experiences can we take into future conflicts?

Answer.

- OPERATION ENDURING FREEDOM (OEF): Four of the 19 killed in action (KIA) or died of wounds received in action (DWRIA) were lost due to friendly fire—3 due to close air support (CAS) ordnance explosion and 1 during Operation Anaconda.

- OPERATION IRAQI FREEDOM (OIF): One of five KIAs was due to friendly fire.

Lessons learned are still being worked at this time and are not yet available.

Question. How many SOF forces have lost their lives in direct combat with the enemy?

Answer.

- OPERATION ENDURING FREEDOM (OEF): Fifteen were lost in direct combat with the enemy, total 19: 18 killed in action (KIA) and 1 died of wounds received in action (DWRIA).

• **OPERATION IRAQI FREEDOM (OIF):** Four were lost in direct combat with the enemy, total five KIA.

Question. Were any of those losses avoidable through better training, equipment, or communications?

Answer. Until accident investigations, after action reports, and lessons learned are completed or compiled, it is not possible to determine if better training, additional equipment or communications improvements could have prevented forces or equipment from damage.

Question. How many aircraft have been a total loss?

Answer. The following aircraft have been destroyed during OPERATION ENDURING FREEDOM (OEF) and OPERATION IRAQI FREEDOM (OIF): 1 MC-130H, 1 MC-130P, 2 MH-53Ms, and 2 MH-47Es.

Question. How many aircraft have been lost and are either back in service or in the process of being returned to a usable service?

Answer. In addition to the aircraft destroyed as mentioned above the following aircraft have been damaged during OPERATION ENDURING FREEDOM (OEF) and OPERATION IRAQI FREEDOM (OIF): 2 MC-130Hs, 1 MC-130P, 2 MH-53Mx, 2 MH-47Ds, 7 MH-47Es, 2 MH-60Ks, and 2 MH-6Js. All damaged aircraft have been repaired or are in the process of being repaired.

OPERATION ANACONDA/TAKUS GHAR

Question. The final major combat operation in Afghanistan was an effort to kill or capture those al Qaeda and Taliban forces remaining in country after the fall of Kandahar, which were regrouping in the mountains along the Pakistani border. This operation code named OPERATION ANACONDA included a battle to occupy a 10,000 foot peak called Takur Ghar where 7 Special Operations Forces lost their lives, the most SF lives lost in direct combat in one day since Mogadishu in 1993. What began as an insertion of Special Operations forces into a strategic observation point turned into a rescue mission to recover Petty Officer First Class Neil Roberts, a Navy SEAL who fell out of his helicopter and tragically lost his life along with the other Special Operations forces? How important was the occupation of this strategic objective in the prosecution of OPERATION ANACONDA?

Answer. Extremely important. The operation that Petty Officer First Class Neil Roberts and his SEAL team were planning to occupy (later named Roberts Ridge) dominated the entire Shahi Kot valley. Its occupation was an essential part of the overall Combined Joint Task Force (CJTF) Mountain mission to block the enemy's rat lines, find, fix, and destroy the enemy attempting to flee into the mountains, and to deny him further sanctuary there. The location immediately around Roberts Ridge was also an area of interest for high value targets among the al Qaeda fighters.

If Roberts's fire team had successfully occupied Takur Ghar's summit, it would have gained immediate tactical advantage, providing overwatch from the western slopes above objective Remington, overwatch along the enemy's primary rat line through the draw below the southern slope of Takur Ghar into the mountains of Eastern Afghanistan, and the ability to effectively utilize close air support.

Question. In hindsight, how could this operation have been conducted to minimize the risks to SOF forces?

Answer. There are several key factors which increased the already inherent risks to special operations forces (SOF) supporting OPERATION ANACONDA. Most notably the enemy chose to stay and defend this area rather than flee. SOF team's like Roberts's once compromised were fighting from a significant numerical disadvantage.

Additionally, the infiltration was not a deliberate one. In the interest of time, Roberts and his team decided to infiltrate directly onto the operation rather than move from the originally planned helicopter landing zone (HLZ) to the operation site. Once the first MH-47 descended onto the summit of Takur Ghar, tactical surprise was lost.

As the first crew and fire team came under fire, the ability to communicate over Satellite Communications (SATCOM) to higher headquarters was ineffectual. This served to degrade the effectiveness of close air support (CAS), the Quick Reaction Force (QRF), and the supporting crews as the situation unfolded. Finally, the lack of sufficient qualified SOF liaisons embedded with Combined Joint Task Force (CJTF) Mountain reduced interoperability and diminished situational awareness for all of the conventional and SOF units entering the battle space.

Question. What lessons have been learned from this operation about the capabilities of our forces and the equipment we provide them?

Answer. Lessons Learned on this operation are still being compiled and are not available at this time.

Question. In addition to the loss of lives several MH-47 helicopters were lost. What other helicopters in the inventory can operate at the altitudes required to perform this particular mission?

Answer. The MH-53E (3 engine USMC version) and the Army's CH-47 can also fly the high/heavy lift mission.

PSYCHOLOGICAL OPERATIONS (PSYOPS)

Question. An important tool in modern warfare is the use of Psychological Operations. How were PSYOPS used during the Afghan phase of ENDURING FREEDOM?

Answer. Psychological Operations (PSYOP) was employed tactically and operationally through the use of leaflets, loudspeaker broadcasts, handbills, and ground/air based radio (eventually host nation stations). Most importantly face-to-face interaction between PSYOP soldiers and local populace was used.

Question. What forces were used and what platforms were employed in the PSYOPS campaign?

Answer. Elements of 4th Psychological Operations Group (POG) (8th Psychological Operations Battalion (POB), 3rd POB, 9th POB) with Reserve tactical forces from the 2nd POG and 7th POG. Platforms include: EC-130E (Commando Solo-broadcast); MC-130E (leaflet drops- 79); B-52, F-16, F-18 (leaflet drops- 1305). Ground based: SOMS-B for broadcast.

Question. How many leaflets, handbills and posters were disseminated during the conflict?

Answer. A total of 87,223,648 were disseminated.

Question. How many hours of broadcasts were employed?

Answer. 10,331:39 hours (SOMS-B, Commando Solo, host nation, and Maritime).

Question. What is the status of integrating EC-130J aircraft into the Special Operations inventory?

Answer. 2 EC-130Es are currently being demodified and the Special Mission Equipment (some of which is being upgraded) is being cross-decked to the EC-130J. The first EC-130J (Commando Solo) is slipping and should arrive in May 2004.

SOF POST-AFGHANISTAN CONFLICT

Question. From acting as personal bodyguards for Afghanistan's present ruler Hamid Karzai, to training a new Afghan national army to support the country's central government, Special Operations Forces have played a significant role in Afghanistan following the war. How many Special Operations forces remain in Afghanistan?

Answer. As of April 18, 2003, there were 1,817 special operations forces (SOF) personnel in Afghanistan. For Fiscal Year 2003 (as of April 18, 2003), the maximum SOF deployed was 2,636 and the average was 2,158.

Question. What functions are they performing?

Answer. Special operations forces (SOF) forces are performing Tactical Reconnaissance (TA), Counter-Guerrilla Operations (CGO), Foreign Internal Defense (FID) (Afghanistan National Army Training), and Internal Defense and Development (IDAD).

Question. Are any of these missions more suited for regular DoD forces?

Answer. Afghanistan National Army Training (ANA): The Afghanistan National Army training mission can be accomplished by conventional forces and the Army is to relieve the special operations forces (SOF) forces of this particular mission in June 2003. Air Force Special Operations Command (AFSOC) Combat Controller (CCT) for Department of State Personal Security Detail (PSD) (President Karzai): The CCT assigned to the PSD is currently being used as a line Radio Telephone Operator (RTO)/Communications Security (COMSEC) custodian with various other non-SOF related tasks, such as paying the contracted security forces. These duties can be filled by any line RTO, rather than an high density/low demand (HD/LD) asset. This is in line with the Secretary of Defense's guidance to relinquish non-SOF tasks to other forces capable of performing that mission. CCT's are trained to provide terminal guidance of aircraft in the objective area as well as Air Traffic Controller/Close Air Support (ATC/CAS) functions. Specific missions are: establish (to include placement of navigational aids such as Tactical Air Navigation (TACAN)s and Multi Mode Landing Systems (MMLS) and portable airfield lighting) and provide air traffic control at austere airfields; controls full spectrum of fires (Terminal Guidance Operations (TGO), helicopter calls for fire, AC-130 calls for fire, fighter CAS in support of SOF operations (Direct Action/Special Reconnaissance (DA/SR),

etc); conducts assault zone surveys and assessments to determine feasibility for use as landing zones, drop zones etc.; works as part of a Combat Search and Rescue (CSAR) team as the ground command and control (C2) and fire support asset; overall air-ground interface integrating SOF ground troops with the full spectrum of air power. United States Special Operations Command (USSOCOM) will maintain this tasking until July 10, 2003. Department of State (DOS) is making arrangements to replace the individual with a contract person or a conventional force replacement.

Question. Are any of these missions more suited for U.S. Civilian agencies or Non-Governmental Agencies

Answer. No.

SOF/FT. BRAGG SUICIDES

Question. On March 23rd of this year, an Army Special Forces soldier charged with killing his wife after returning from Afghanistan nine months prior hanged himself in a jail cell. He was the fourth soldier at Ft. Bragg suspected of killing their spouses during a six-week stretch last summer, three of whom were in Special Operations units. What can you tell us about the circumstances which might have caused these tragic events?

Answer. Prior to these tragic events, there were no indicators that would have alerted commanders to problems within the families. During the Serious Incident Review Board process it was ascertained that each of the families had marital problems.

Question. To what extent do you believe the Afghan conflict was a contributor?

Answer. United States Army Special Operations Command (USASOC) has soldiers deployed daily from throughout the command. Special Forces (SF) Groups at locations other than Fort Bragg, North Carolina had larger numbers of soldiers deployed. If the Afghan conflict were a contributor, one could extrapolate that the murders/suicides would not have been restricted to Fort Bragg. The report rendered by the 19-member Epidemiological Consultation Team (EPICON) stated there was no clear evidence that deployment, Operational Tempo (OPTEMP), or drugs caused the violence. The one commonality was marital discord.

Question. How many other soldiers have committed suicide following their service in Afghanistan?

Answer. We are thankful there were no others than the aforementioned four.

Question. What lessons have we learned to better prepare SOF forces and their families so that similar events will not occur after the Iraq conflict?

Answer. Top down emphasis and resourcing for staff will have an overall positive effect on the services and programs offered to our families. Both pre and post deployment training will be provided for all soldiers. Training and outreach for family members prior to, during, and after the deployment will also be provided. Leadership will ensure any and all red flags are identified and swiftly followed up on. Training will emphasize and ensure that all comments are taken seriously. Chaplains will be appropriately brought into the process depending on given situations. Leadership will ensure contact between families and rear detachment commanders is on-going and will ensure early returns are treated the same as full unit returns. Leadership seminars were conducted to emphasize the commander's role in preventing and resolving domestic violence, and counseling programs were instituted for soldiers returning from a forward-deployed location. Additionally, the DoD sponsored Lifeworks system was implemented to assist families with myriad issues, to include domestic violence.

SPECIAL OPERATIONS ACTIVITIES IN OPERATION IRAQI FREEDOM

Question. The military goals of operation IRAQI FREEDOM were declared largely met 25 days after U.S. and British Forces entered Iraq. Special Operations Forces played a pivotal role in this operation. What proportion of the Special Operations Operators were deployed in and around Iraq to participate in Iraqi Freedom?

Answer. Effective April 18, 2003, there were 9,014 special operations forces (SOF) personnel supporting OPERATION IRAQI FREEDOM.

Question. What role did Special Operations forces play in the pre conflict phase?

Answer. Special operations forces (SOF) conducted pre D-Day activities with interdicting Visual Observers (VISOBs), conducted operations in the West such as Special Reconnaissance (SR), and conducted airfield surveys.

Question. When the northern advance through Turkey into Iraq became unavailable to U.S. conventional forces, special operations forces worked with Kurdish military elements to attack Iraqi forces north of Baghdad. Can you elaborate on that phase of OPERATION IRAQI FREEDOM?

Answer. In northeastern Iraq, designated Joint Special Operations Area North (JSOA-N) Combined Joint Special Operations Task Force North (CJSOTF-N) conducted Unconventional Warfare, Special Reconnaissance, Direct Action, and call-for-fire missions against thirteen Iraqi divisions arrayed against the Kurds. Its primary mission was to disrupt the Iraqi operational center of gravity in northern Iraq and render the enemy's combat power ineffective.

Denied use of key Turkish bases, CJSOTF-N, also known as Task Force (TF) Viking, had to adjust its campaign plan based on the use of a different forward staging base, much farther from Iraq than the originally planned location in Turkey. This complicated the infiltration of troops and logistics into the JSOA and demanded an abundance of flexibility and creativity to overcome these obstacles.

TF Viking's first order of business was the conduct of Unconventional Warfare (UW). The task force deployed advanced force teams to link up with key Kurdish military and political leaders to assess their capabilities and commitment, and to make accommodations for the arrival of the main body. Working effectively with the Peshmerga (the name for Kurdish guerrillas), would prove to be crucial to the campaign's later successes.

The Iraqis had postured a large conventional force of 13 divisions along the Green Line, a nebulous and historically static boundary separating the Iraqi and Kurdish forces. Before the actual start of the war, Special Operations Forces (SOF) occupied key observation posts along probable Iraqi avenues of advance in order to be in the best positions to call in close air support.

On March 22, 2003, TF Viking commenced infiltration of special operations forces (SOF); MC-130s, Air Force Special Operations fixed-wing aircraft, flew through heavy Iraqi anti-aircraft fire and inserted a contingent of Army Special Forces teams and Air Force Combat Controllers. TF Viking quickly expanded its foot print within JSOA-N to include three Special Forces battalions operating as Forward Operating Bases (FOBS), encompassing a total of 51 Operational Detachment Alpha's (ODA), commonly known as "A-Teams".

In its first offensive action, TF Viking directed a combined force of SOF and 10,000 Peshmerga guerrillas to attack the Ansar al Islam terrorist enclave of 700 entrenched, heavily armed fighters in the Khurma area. The operation commenced on March 28th. Within 30 hours the SOF-Peshmerga force effectively destroyed the opposition.

TF Viking then postured two battalions forward against Iraqi forces along the Green Line. Following a brief defensive phase, during which the observation posts engaged Iraqi positions with close air support, Viking launched an offensive. This consisted of a series of coordinated attacks along the Green Line, which were normally preceded by bombing Iraqi defenses.

As the Iraqis retreated, SOF and Peshmerga troops occupied their positions. At a number of salients along the front the Iraqis counterattacked with armor and artillery, but SOF used Close Air Support (CAS) to blunt the attack and maintain the offensive momentum. The effective integration of air and ground forces destroyed the enemy's will to fight and opened avenues of approach to the two largest northern cities, Kirkuk and Mosul.

Meanwhile, TF Viking assumed tactical control of the 173rd Airborne Brigade. Assigning a conventional light infantry brigade to a JSOTF had not been done since the Vietnam War. The 173rd jumped into the Kurdish Autonomous Zone on 26 March and began supporting coalition operations. These airborne soldiers conducted an area defense operation to deny Iraqi movement along the major lines of communications between Mosul and Kirkuk. TF Viking would also assume operational control of another conventional unit, the 26th Marine Expeditionary Unit (MEU).

SOF and their Peshmerga allies attacked Kirkuk from three sides on 10 April and the city fell by nightfall. More SOF and elements of the 173rd Airborne Brigade soon reinforced Kirkuk and secured nearby oil fields. Other TF Viking forces negotiated the orderly capitulation and occupation of Mosul, where widespread violence erupted following the sudden disintegration of the Iraqi 5th Corps. Responding to pleas from factional leaders, SOF worked to reestablish order and civil services to bring stability to the volatile city.

In May, most of CJSOTF-N re-deployed. Some elements of TF Viking remained to serve in support of ongoing peacekeeping operations. Operations in JSOA-N were deemed to be an overwhelming success and contributed greatly to USCENTCOM's campaign to liberate Iraq. SOF overcame numerical enemy superiority to defeat a large conventional Iraqi army through the effective application of UW doctrine.

SPECIAL OPERATIONS ACTIVITIES IN THE PHILIPPINES

Question. Special Operations Forces have been deployed to the Philippine island of Basilan to take part in counter-terrorism exercises with the Philippine armed forces who are engaged in eliminating the Abu Syyaf terrorist organization. How many forces have been deployed to the Philippines and what is their status?

Answer. Effective April 18, 2003, there were 250 special operations forces (SOF) personnel in the Philippines. The FY 2003 average number of SOF deployed to the Philippines was 353 with an FY 2003 maximum deployed of 582.

Question. What are the rules of engagement for Special Operations forces in the Philippines?

Answer. Normal peacetime rules of engagement (ROE) with some supplemental. The bottom line was that US forces had self-defense ROE for the entire operation due to sensitivities and possible constitutional issue on the Philippine side to the use of force by U.S. combat troops. U.S. forces complied with those ROE and adjusted our operations accordingly to reduce risk while still accomplishing the mission to advise and assist the AFP.

Question. On February 22, 2002, a Special Operations helicopter crashed in the Philippines resulting in the loss of life of all onboard. What was the cause of that crash?

Answer. A collateral investigation of the MH-47E mishap concluded the cause was pilot error related to spatial disorientation. Additional factors played a contributory role in the crash: (a) Acute stress and fatigue; (b) Co-pilot self medication; (c) Environmental and weather conditions; d) Command climate (operational risk management).

Question. What type of mission were those forces conducting at the time of the crash?

Answer. The mishap aircraft was the second in a formation of two MH-47E helicopters whose mission was to deliver Special Forces soldiers to Zamboanga and Basilan islands in support of OPERATION ENDURING FREEDOM. The mishap occurred during the over water return segment of the mission, after the soldiers had been delivered.

Question. On June 21, 2002, Abu Syyaf, the leader of this terrorist organization, was killed in a pre-dawn attack conducted by Philippine Marines. Did Special Operations Forces take part in that operation?

Answer. _____.

Question. What has been the effect of the elimination of Abu Syyaf on the terrorist organization he once led?

Answer. The loss of Sabaya lifts the credibility of the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) and the government of the Philippines. The ASG remains active on other islands but our success on Basilan places them at increased risk if they return there. It is worth pointing out that, of the 14 Abu Syyaf Guerrillas (ASG) who held the Burnhams captive at the time of their recovery, 13 were killed or captured in the next several weeks due to US assistance and AFP persistence in their pursuit. Ongoing humanitarian activities intended to connect the people to their government left a sense of hope on Basilan that has resulted in increased cooperation between the population and the government. The ASG is led by a small band of ruthless men but the organization consists mainly of disillusioned youth who see a chance for recognition or income in an otherwise relatively hopeless situation. The continued progress on Basilan offers an alternative to kidnap for ransom as a means of livelihood. Elimination of key leaders offers the best chance to eliminate the group.

[CLERK'S NOTE.—End of questions submitted by Mr. Lewis.]

**[For Fiscal Year 2004, no public hearings
were held for outside witnesses. The fol-
lowing statements were provided for the
record:]**

(1)

(Clerk's Note: The following statement was submitted for the record by the National Association of State Universities and Land-Grant Colleges (NASULGC).)



NASULGC National Association of State Universities and Land-Grant Colleges

March 31, 2003

Honorable Jerry Lewis
Chairman
House Appropriations Subcommittee Defense
H-149, Capitol
Washington, D.C. 20515

Dear Mr. Chairman:

The National Association of State Universities and Land-Grant Colleges (NASULGC) urges you to provide an increase of 15% for FY 04 for the Department of the Navy basic research (6.1). We are very grateful for all your past efforts on behalf of basic research and we look forward to your continued leadership on this issue.

While the Administration's request for Navy 6.1 is \$456.6, an increase of \$35 million, or 8 percent over FY 03, this figure does not actually constitute an increase because the '04 budget seeks to transfer a number of programs, such as the University Research Initiatives, from the Defense-wide accounts, to the individual services. Thus, many of the increases in the budgets of the services, especially in the 6.1 accounts, are not as generous as they may first appear. If the transfers are accepted, 15% growth would translate to about \$520 million.

A 15% increase is justified because there has been enormous shrinkage in the last decade, when considering the increase in cost of living. The Office of Naval Research historically supported 20-30 year R&D, which made the U.S. Navy the best in the world in areas such as acoustics and ocean turbulence. This spawned not only basic ocean research but also new ocean instrumentation. ONR fulfilled a unique role in its ability to look at the long time horizon and high risk research without focusing solely on immediate payoffs. No other agency could do that.

NASULGC is the nation's oldest higher education association. Currently the association has over 200 member institutions -- including the historically black Land Grant institutions -- located in all fifty states. The Association's overriding mission is to support high quality public education through efforts that enhance the capacity of member institutions to perform their traditional teaching, research, and public service roles.

Universities have always played a major role in the ONR research portfolio and they will continue to do so. Indeed, it was largely through advances in acoustics and temperature-salinity

Page Two
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measurements that the Navy was able to do its share in winning the Cold War. That is why we also appeal to you to support the multi-Agency oceanographic partnership that the Congress created under the statute: "National Oceanographic Partnership Program". The partnership is focusing on creating long-term national ocean observation systems

There is an asymmetry in the dollars spent by our enemies on lethal technologies including chemical and biological weapons, and what we must spend to counter that threat. Basic research performed by the Navy is vital to keep pace with the proliferation of these weapons of mass destruction. Basic research is also responsible for the technologies that are giving the Navy its outstanding performance in the U.S. effort to liberate Iraq.

Basic research is essential in meeting the grand, national challenges facing the Navy. These challenges occur in areas of ocean optics, ocean acoustics, ship hydrodynamics, manpower, and marine erosion. With the demand for manpower greater than ever, but with supply highly questionable, the science of man-machine interface – visualization, ergonomics, etc. -- is very important. Navy 6.1 research is aimed at bringing down the cost of machines, and the cost of personnel (the largest cost factor), including the price of health care. Navy 6.1 basic research is now fully engaged in the development of a new era of stand-off weaponry – keeping man out of the conflict. Other critical areas of 6.1 research include improved understanding of the marine environment and the water column, and development of new information technologies for communication and intelligence gathering.

Some of the FY 01 increase will be dedicated to various aspects of understanding the oceans that affect America's way of life. In some cases the Navy is the majority stakeholder in whole segments of oceanography. The knowledge gained from its investments is equally important in addressing civil coastal and deep ocean needs. In other cases, the Navy has built effective partnerships with other agencies.

We believe that Navy basic research is vital to our nation and urge you and your Committee colleagues to give it sufficient funding.

Sincerely,



Mark Abbott
 Dean, College of Oceanic and Atmospheric
 Sciences
 Oregon State University
 Chair, NASULGC Board on Oceans and
 Atmosphere

(Clerk's Note: The following statement was submitted for the record by Oklahoma's Center for Aircraft and Systems/Support Infrastructure (CASI):)

Statement on Behalf of the Coalition of Oklahoma Institutions of Higher Education
Center for Aircraft and Systems/Support Infrastructure (CASI)
Provided to the Subcommittee on Defense Appropriation
U.S. House of Representatives
April 18, 2003

Mr. Chairman:

Mr. Chairman and members of the Subcommittee, we thank you for the opportunity to submit this testimony for Oklahoma's Center for Aircraft and Systems/Support Infrastructure (CASI). This testimony will identify the motivating national interest and describe the CASI approach to serve those needs.

We gratefully acknowledge Congress's incremental funding for the past year to the Department of Defense in the amount of \$3 million for the CASI program. Today we respectfully request an additional \$8 million in the pending FY '04 budget for CASI to meet vital technical support needs of the Air Force. Plans for investment of these funds include an expanded program of summer collaborative initiation projects, in-depth problem solving on these and other priority topics, collaborative engineering support/technology insertion activities, education/training support, augmentation of technical and programmatic capabilities at the CASI universities, a pilot exchange program placing a CASI researcher in four-month residence at the Oklahoma City Air Logistics Center (OC-ALC), and aggressive expansion of statewide participation by 4-year regional universities and 2-year community colleges. The OC-ALC on-going process of project definition and prioritization now includes over \$14 million of unfunded mission-critical topics.

Statement of National Interest:

The U. S. is operating in a new era that requires a military force capable of high readiness and mobility. The aircraft fleets to support this mission have become increasingly expensive to develop, maintain, and operate. Fewer new aircraft are being built and the existing fleets must be retained in service periods that, in some cases, dramatically exceed the original design lifetime. For example, the C/KC-135 fleet is scheduled for retention in the operational inventory until the year 2040, when the average aircraft age will approach 80 years. Thus, the maintenance, repair, and overhaul (MRO) capabilities of the Air Force's Air Logistics Centers (ALCs) are vital to force readiness in support of the warfighter. The OC-ALC supports the C/KC-135, E-3A (AWACS), B-1, B-2, and several propulsion systems. The increased level of operations since 911 will necessitate extensive MRO in the coming years. These weapons systems have again demonstrated their vital role in our national security through Operation Enduring Freedom and Operation Iraqi Freedom. Although MRO costs of these aircraft and systems are rapidly increasing, the option of fleet replacement is deemed beyond serious consideration, both in terms of cost (\$ billions) and availability (years). The technical challenges of maintaining an aging fleet are comparable to, and in some respects exceed, those in development of new military aviation platforms and systems. Along with weapons systems hardware and software technology, the ALCs as large industry plants must adopt commercial best production practices

to enhance efficiency and exploit leading environmental technologies to manage water and air waste streams.

The OC-ALC and other military aircraft programs and logistics facilities rely extensively on aircraft original equipment manufacturers (OEMs) and secondary engineering support firms to establish and update aircraft maintenance technologies and practices. However, the private sector sometimes lacks the specific expertise needed at the critical times to fully support the ALCs. There is also a need for an independent source of alternative approaches, innovations, translational R&D, and new technology insertion. Oklahoma's research universities can partner with private-sector firms to provide this timely infusion of necessary expertise under the CASI framework and utilizing DoD contracting mechanisms. Several firms have already engaged CASI to provide specialized and complementary expertise. CASI helps fill these needs.

CASI Mission and Approach:

CASI is the first academic entity of its type in the nation focusing on creation of a state-wide, multi-disciplinary approach for conducting applied research and development, modeling, technology insertion, and engineering support activities for aircraft MRO sustainment. CASI has been organized under the aegis of Oklahoma's State Regents for Higher Education to provide a single point of contact through which the aviation community may access the capabilities of universities in the State. CASI supports public and private-sector partners with economics-based life-cycle engineering, management methods, and technology insertion to assist aircraft fleet owners in increasing readiness, lowering maintenance cycle times and costs, promoting environmental compliance, and improving safety.

The comprehensive universities primarily responsible for CASI administration are the University of Oklahoma (OU) System, the University of Tulsa (TU), and the Oklahoma State University (OSU) and A&M System. These systems of higher education include main campuses in Norman, Tulsa, and Stillwater, respectively; system campuses such as Cameron, Langston, and Northeastern Oklahoma A&M; and the University of Oklahoma Health Sciences Center. Langston University and Rose State College are the CASI Affiliate institutions, mobilizing and representing the perspectives of the 4-year regional universities and 2-year community colleges, respectively. Other regional institutions such as the University of Central Oklahoma and Cameron University are also involved, in technical topics such as corrosion electrochemistry and digital design capture. The five-person CASI Board of Directors consists of Campus Leads from OU, TU, and OSU, Langston and Rose State. Representatives on the CASI Board act under the authority of the Presidents or Vice-Presidents of Research at the respective institutions. The Board includes Dr. Major Madison of Langston University (Director), Dr. John Nazemetz of Oklahoma State University (Director), Dr. James Sorem of the University of Tulsa (Director), Dr. Thomas Landers of the University of Oklahoma (Executive Director), and Dr. Terry Britton of Rose State College (Director).

The OC-ALC Technology Thrust Areas represent the kinds of engineering support required by the Air Logistics Centers: Structural/Materials, Avionics/Electronics/Software, Information Technology, Environmental, and Depot Industrial Processes. CASI provides research and technological support in workforce, workplace and work tools across the TTAs. Expertise is dispersed throughout Oklahoma's Higher Education System corresponding to these requirements, including:

- Corrosion management, high performance materials, aircraft coatings, and ultra-precision surface finishing methods.
- Fatigue and fracture mechanics.
- Propulsion, power, and energy.
- Avionics and ground electronics supportability applications such as real-time aircraft health assessment, fault isolation and detection, repair verification testing and calibration.
- Modeling, simulation, and forecasting for reliability, physics of failure, and logistics.
- Supportability and economic cost-of-ownership modeling and business management.
- Hazardous waste stream abatement, remediation, environmental monitoring methods, and pollution prevention technologies.
- Industrial, manufacturing, and human factors engineering (e.g., man-machine studies, resource allocation, machining and metrology, quality and process productivity improvements, material handling and logistics, metrics and benchmarking, and industrial hygiene).
- Non-destructive inspection and testing.
- Information Technology in cyber-security and in the product realization and sustainment process, including digital collaborative design, database management, and data mining.

In FY'00, the CASI consortium established a cost-share program designed to stimulate the CASI collaboration with the OC-ALC and other air logistics centers. The Oklahoma Experimental Program to Stimulate Competitive Research (EPSCoR) office, Oklahoma State Regents for Higher Education, and CASI universities provided seed funding for this initiative. The State Regents and CASI universities have also invested over \$1.25 million to develop the center infrastructure, including Center leadership and activation of contract mechanisms. The state cost share programs have fostered several new technology insertion activities with collaborating entities at the OC-ALC.

During the past three years, CASI faculty and students have initiated approximately \$6 million in projects supporting OC-ALC through contracts managed by firms in the private sector. These projects span the five Technology Thrust Areas. Five projects (5 faculty) in summer of 2000, 19 projects (23 faculty and 17 students) in summer 2001, and 18 projects (23 faculty and 23 students) in summer 2002 have initiated collaboration with mission-critical programs at OC-ALC. Twenty-five (25) additional projects, involving 38 faculty, are scheduled to begin in July 2003. Of these, 10 are summer projects involving 14 faculty and 14 or more students. The summer projects immerse the faculty and students in the problem domains and foster both short-term benefits to force readiness and long-term benefits to the growing partnership. In CY 2002 and 2003 we have initiated an extended research program including 27 projects (43 faculty and ~60 students). Four projects in Summer 2001 and 2002 illustrate the positive impact of CASI work on force readiness, particularly in terms of reduced costs and process cycle times:

- **B-1B (Lancer) Pitot Probe Interface** – Development of leak-testing and calibration apparatus, technology and process, significantly benefiting B-1B force readiness. The project resulted in estimated cost reductions of \$480 thousand per year (a 1-month

payback) and compression of the calibration cycle time by a factor of 7:1, from two weeks to two days. This dramatic reduction in flow days translates directly in higher state of readiness and increased rate of sortie generation. The Air Force anticipates rapid force adoption due to active participation and highly favorable reception by maintenance staff. A private-sector partner (SAIC) has been awarded the contract for initial ship sets. World-wide field deployment to operating maintenance units is scheduled to begin in CY '03.

- ***E-3A (AWACS) Torque Tube Reengineering*** – Rapid prototyping and reverse engineering resulted in a viable sourcing of scarce replacement parts. Through substitution of machined aluminum for cast titanium, replacement parts may be fabricated by a wide range of small businesses or even on base at the ALC in a few days and at lower cost. The previous sourcing required a lead-time of months.
- ***Reverse Engineering*** – Technology assessment of non-contact 3D imaging to capture parts geometry data, with potential savings of up to \$7 million per year.
- ***Geothermal Heat Pump*** – Evaluation of energy recovery from the industrial wastewater treatment plant for heating of base facilities, with estimated payback of 4 to 6 years, depending upon the facilities implemented.

CASI is participating in the OC-ALC Science and Engineering Career Panel (SECP) to define requirements and develop strategies for meeting OC-ALC hiring needs in these critical career fields associated with expanding workload and impending retirements during the next decade. The CASI program introduces students to ALC mission and career opportunities. The CASI Executive Director serves on the advisory panel for an OC-ALC facilities modernization study.

CASI faculty have begun entering into strategic relationships to provide technology support for DoD systems maintained at sites outside of Oklahoma, including the Ogden Air Logistics Center (OO-ALC) at Hill Air Force Base in Utah and the Warner Robins Air Logistics Center (WR-ALC) at Robins Air Force Base in Georgia.

(Clerk's Note: The following statement was submitted for the record by Frank Lutz, Ph.D., Dean of the School of Science, Technology, and Engineering, and William Tepfenhart, Ph.D., Professor of Software Engineering, Monmouth University:)

**Testimony Submitted to the House Of Representatives
Defense Appropriations Subcommittee
By Frank Lutz, Ph. D
Dean of the School Of Science, Technology, and Engineering
William Tepfenhart, Ph. D.
Professor of Software Engineering
Monmouth University**

April 18, 2003

"Establishment Of A Rapid Response Data Center"

The United States Military has significant experience in coordinating large numbers of individuals to achieve a common goal. It has lead the development of software systems and technologies for the identification of threats, planning appropriate responses to highly dynamic and evolving situations, and containment of the consequences of major emergencies. In addition, the military has experience in integrating diverse systems and capabilities represented within a multi-national environment. These technologies have benefits that are significant beyond military applications.

Efforts to support suburban areas responding to large-scale emergencies face several critical barriers that are not present in large cities such as New York, Los Angeles, and Chicago. In particular, these areas are characterized by a large number of relatively small townships that independently support their own police and fire departments. These localized departments are plagued by limited resources that are often bridged by legal contracts between towns. There has been little or no effort to provide uniform communications equipment and software that will enable multiple townships to respond to large-scale events in a seamless fashion. This is to be contrasted with a large city, like New York, which can leverage acquisition of critical emergency equipment and assure interoperability among all of the organizations due to a single over reaching government body.

Many of the technologies already developed for the military can be adapted to provide solutions to the barriers facing suburban areas in threat recognition and response. A major effort will be to tailor them to the smaller scale and greater diversity that can exist at the county level.

Meeting the Challenge: Monmouth University and the School of Science, Technology, and Engineering

I represent the School of Science, Technology, and Engineering at Monmouth University. It is a community of learners and teacher-scholars. The school's goal is to lead in the innovative development and delivery of curricula and in providing creative solutions to problems that include significant technical components. There is a focus on the application of technical research to the solution of contemporary global problems of regional interest. Educational programs build a foundation for life-long learning, critical thinking, and collaborative, technical problem solving in professional and business contexts.

A major contemporary problem of regional interest is that of providing a coordinated response to large-scale events that could occur in Monmouth County. The school's goal, in collaboration with the Monmouth County Health Department, is to provide research that will support the local towns of Monmouth County. That is, our school is helping to identify critical barriers to effective cooperation arising from the independent nature of the emergency services of individual towns and to provide bridges over those barriers.

Needs Exceeding Resources

The usefulness of many pairs of eyes has long been recognized; witness the FBI's 10 Most Wanted List and, more recently, America's Most Wanted television show. The increasing availability of wide spread, distributed and wireless communication promises to increase the pairs of eyes helping to come to the observation of consequences that could be the result of a covert terrorist act.

Many organizations are attempting to fulfill this promise by distributing various forms of mobile, lightweight communication devices to achieve various objectives. However, distributed communication is only part of the solution. Equally important is the ability to synthesize the collective intelligence being reported into a coherent world view, and then feeding that view of what is actually happening back to the participants. Feedback is crucial, first because it provides value for the participants, giving them a reason to contribute to the initial data stream. In addition,

When a disaster occurs, it is necessary to coordinate the actions of multiple individuals and groups. This includes fire departments, police, hospitals, EMS units, and various city, county, state, and federal governmental agencies. Some steps need to be taken immediately. Others may depend on the results of the first steps. The steps that need to be taken will depend on the particulars of the incident. Is it a biological crisis? Is it chemical? What is the geographical location(s) of the problem(s)?

The most appropriate actions to be taken may change as more information is converted into a view of what has happened. Indeed, some of the actions are carried out specifically to obtain needed information. The changes in the plan must be made with an understanding of what has already been carried out. How can this new information be most efficiently incorporated into an effective analysis of possible causes?

It is necessary to research how best to construct a computer-based planning system to automate the coordination of the various activities. Response needs to be immediate and must be revised in real-time as further information about the nature of the crisis arrives. For example, the choices of which responders should be sent to which locations need to be made with an integrated knowledge of geography and of the capabilities of each group. Once the information arrives that a piece of equipment belonging to a particular emergency unit is not working, changes in assignments and allocations need to be rapidly and optimally performed. Perhaps steps need to be taken in order to obtain permission to call a particular organization. These steps need to be strategically incorporated into the plan.

We do not of course expect that the automated system will work independently, but in conjunction with individuals who have appropriate authority. Ideally, the automated system would provide instantly all the available and needed information to each decision maker. Once the decision is entered, then the overall plan may need to be updated and various individuals at other positions may need to be informed.

Predictive modeling of health impacts from emergencies enhances planning and training of emergency response personnel. It also assists in the rapid evaluation of possible responses during and after actual emergencies. Research on current and emerging predictive epidemiological models is needed to forecast the short-term spread of disease in a community. Predictive models that are currently used for high population density urban communities will be studied to determine whether they are applicable or adaptable for use in areas with lower population densities such as suburban and rural communities. Another area of research involves the integration of predictive epidemiological models with other types of models. This includes environmental models for chemical and radiological hazards. The goal of the research would be to integrate and execute predictive models and simulations that are designed for different purposes. An integrated simulation system would be able to account for the many aspects of a complex emergency response scenario including traffic flow, positioning of emergency personnel, hazardous chemical cloud movement and evacuation plans.

To give quick warning to our residents when any emergency occurs within our community, we may need to consider what is necessary to achieve a super information 'monitor'. This monitor would quickly reflect

any abnormal change or occurrence of data from variant narrow domain databases (for example, hospitals, schools, and airports). An example of unusual data could be an increase of patients with the same symptoms (like SARS), sudden deaths of large numbers of animals, large-scale withering of trees, or other unexpected events.

Advanced database techniques and information resources, including the WWW, must be integrated to provide a sensitive information center capable of searching and catching unusual data. Once caught, it will be necessary to analyze and predict the moving trend of the data. This would allow us to give people early-warning, instant information updating and correspondingly rapid advice from established expert databases.

Generally, the data analysis task includes data integration, which combines data from multiple sources into a coherent data store. These sources may include multiple databases or flat files. A number of problems can arise during data integration. Real world entities in multiple data sources can be given different names. How does an analyst know that the employee-id in one database is the same as the employee-number in another database. We plan to use meta-data to solve the problem of data integration. Data coming from input sources tends to be incomplete, noisy and inconsistent. If such data is directly loaded in the central store, it can cause errors during the analysis phase resulting in incorrect conclusions. Data cleaning methods will attempt to smooth out the noise, while identifying outliers, and correct inconsistencies in the data. It is necessary to investigate the following techniques for noise reduction and data smoothing.

- 1) Binning: These methods smooth a sorted data value by consulting the values around it.
- 2) Clustering: Outliers may be detected by clustering, where similar values are organized into groups or clusters. Intuitively, values that fall outside of the set of clusters may be considered outliers.
- 3) Regression: Data can be smoothed by fitting the data to a function, such as with regression. Using regression to find a mathematical equation to fit the data helps smooth out the noise.

The totality of these efforts require resources that exceed those currently existing within the School of Science, Technology, and Engineering. Establishment of a new Center would assemble the resources needed to make a significant contribution to the development of a model approach to maintain homeland security.

The Rapid Response Data Center

The Monmouth University Rapid Response Center will be housed within the School of Science, Technology and Engineering. The Center will spearhead the application of science and technology to the effective management of first responders at a county and eventually state level in New Jersey. The Center will serve as a focal point for the development of leading edge approaches to the solution of problems facing local first responder organizations and decision-makers at all levels of government by:

- Developing data acquisition, processing, and results for use by first responders and supporting organizations; and
- Fostering collaboration between citizens, community organizations, governmental agencies, local businesses, the scientific community, and other parties interested in supporting first responders.

Specific objectives of the Monmouth University Rapid Response Center include:

- Establish mechanisms to facilitate access to objective and scientifically sound information on effective techniques to protect and restore areas that have been subject to biological and chemical threats.
- Establish collaborations with the local and Defense Industries to incorporate decision aide technology into the civilian sector for use by first responders.
- Research data-analysis and integration techniques for storing, combining, and processing data from large numbers and types of data sources.
- Research computer-based planning systems to support real-time crisis management.
- Research techniques for acquiring countywide health and service data across the multitude of different formats and contents.
- Identify techniques and methodologies for processing health-related information for responding to health threats.

Research predictive models detailing the spread of health impacts under a variety of circumstances and threats.

To amplify support from private foundations, corporations, and individuals, we are seeking government support. Properly equipped laboratories and cheaply available communication devices would allow us to establish projects to determine how these issues might successfully be resolved. The Center's efficiency will significantly increased by partnering with the Monmouth County Health Department as its primary conduit to data sources and first responders.

(Clerk's Note: The following statement was submitted for the record by Dr. Raymond Bye, Jr., Vice President for Research, The Florida State University:)

Testimony Submitted
by
Dr. Raymond Bye, Jr.
Vice President for Research
The Florida State University
Before the Subcommittee on Defense
Committee on Appropriations
US House of Representatives
April 18, 2003

Mr. Chairman, I would like to thank you and the Members of the Subcommittee for this opportunity to present testimony. I would like to take a moment to briefly acquaint you with The Florida State University.

Located in Tallahassee, the Capitol of Florida, FSU is a Carnegie doctoral/research-extensive university with rapidly growing research activities and programs. The University serves as a center for advanced graduate and professional studies, exemplary research, and top-quality undergraduate programs. Faculty members at FSU maintain a strong commitment to quality in teaching, to performance of research and creative activities, while retaining a strong commitment to public service for the State and Nation. Among the faculty are numerous recipients of national and international honors, including Nobel laureates, Pulitzer Prize winners, and members of the National Academy of Science. Our scientists and engineers do excellent research, have strong interdisciplinary interests, and often work closely with industrial partners in the commercialization of the results of their research. Having been designated as a Carnegie Research I University several years ago, The Florida State University had \$147.9 million in research support this past year.

One of our recent highlights is the fact that FSU has initiated a new medical school, the first in the U.S. in over two decades. Our emphasis is on training doctors as primary care physicians, with a particular focus on geriatric medicine—consistent with the demographics of our state.

With a student body of 37,000, we attract students from every county in Florida, every state in the nation, and more than 100 foreign countries. The University is committed to high admission standards that ensure quality and diversity in its student body, which currently includes some 278 National Merit and National Achievement Scholars, as well as students with superior creative talent. At The Florida State University, we are very proud of our successes as well as our emerging reputation as one of the nation's top public universities.

Mr. Chairman, let me tell you about a few project we are pursuing this year.

Center for Advanced Power Systems- Instrumentation Funding

The Florida State University, in cooperation with the FSU's National High Magnetic Field Laboratory and the College of Engineering, established the Center for Advanced Power Systems (CAPS) in 2000. This center focuses on advanced power systems and technologies with particular emphasis on propulsion systems. With federal funding from the Department of the Navy's ONR, FSU has lead the organization of the Electric Ship Research and Development Consortium (ESRDC), an academic-industry partnership focused on the application of recent advances in power semiconductors, materials, advanced controls and superconductivity to advanced power system technologies.

FSU and its academic and industrial partners have complementary programs in power systems. CAPS researchers focus on two fundamental areas: power systems including control and integration, and superconductivity R&D. "Dual Use" technologies have been fostered by structuring the consortium to include Navy, commercial, and utility-based industrial participation. The technology problems to be solved in both Naval and commercial power systems are similar and related. Both will benefit from a joint approach.

Breakthroughs in superconductor materials are key to major advances in both Navy and utility power system technology. The FSU program in superconductivity has been greatly increased to provide more emphasis on the overall system design issues, which include cryogenics and new machine designs. Research facilities have been added that provide unparalleled capabilities to advance materials development. CAPS is pursuing the application of superconductivity by developing a prototype-superconducting transformer for shipboard use in cooperation with industry.

State-of-the-art power system research facilities are essential to understanding power system problems and integrating new technologies such as superconductivity into power systems. In the summer of 2003, CAPS will commission the first phase of the power system test bed with real-time simulation and hardware-in-the-loop testing capabilities that will provide the capability for testing prototype equipment in a simulated power system environment. With FY2003 funding CAPS is moving ahead with additional test facilities with focus on energy storage and hardware testing.

FSU is requesting an additional \$6 million in FY2004 above the Navy's budget request for ESRDC for additional instrumentation and power generation equipment needed to complete the test bed in the Force Protection/Applied Research Account (PE0602123N). A portion of the funds will be used to begin the manufacturing process for the prototype-superconducting transformer in cooperation with our industrial partners.

Nanotubes Optimized for Lightweight Exceptional Strength (NOLES): Composite Materials with Multi-Functionality

The US Army has undertaken the mission of developing a lighter fleet of fighting vehicles that will have the firepower and survivability of an M1 tank and yet be transportable in a C130. The most promising approach appears to be the diminutive single wall carbon nanotubes. Florida State University, with its team of multi-disciplinary

faculty and students drawn from throughout the science and engineering departments at FSU has developed unique computational, analytical and experimental capabilities in the fields of composites and nanotube research. A National Science Foundation funded multi-institutional Industry-University Cooperative Research Center (IUCRC) in this technology has recently been established at FSU, partnering with Ohio State University and University of Wisconsin-Madison. Its core research programs are nationally recognized and supported by over 40 companies and federal agencies. Operating under the leadership of FSU research faculty, the academic-industry-Army team will develop, validate and implement those technologies to transition nanotubes from the laboratory into applications such as those associated with the Army's future combat systems (FCS). FSU is seeking \$5M for this new and important activity through the Army University and Industry Research Centers Program Account (PE0601104A).

US Navy Training, Performance, and Expertise

The study of expertise is aimed at eliciting the mechanisms and -practices underlying an expert performance. Expertise consists of a vast knowledge structure in the form of neural networks and synapses, which enable cognitive operations such as attention and concentration, anticipation, problem solving, decision-making, and motor execution to be performed skillfully and effortlessly. Recent research has been devoted to the functions and mechanisms underlying the performance of teams. In addition to individual superior performance, explicit and implicit communications and coordination are needed for a team to perform as an expert unit.

The Learning Systems Institute at Florida State University proposes to focus with the Navy on expert performance in individuals and teams in the US Navy. More specifically, the studies which will be conducted for the Navy are sequential in nature and are focused on the following issues:

Defining expert performance criteria for critical roles/tasks for the Navy; developing valid tools for expert performance examination in both "real-life" tasks and simulated conditions in the laboratory; defining and developing procedures for the examination of "distributed cognition (i.e., team functioning)," in selected tasks; developing procedures to examine communication and coordination of teams in the Navy in real and simulated conditions.

LSI/FSU will also develop practices to attain individual and team expert performance and will develop simulation laboratory for training individuals and teams to attain expert performance.

Florida State University is requesting \$5 million from the Office of Naval Research (ONR) Warfighter Sustainment/Applied Research Account (PE0602236N) to undertake these efforts for the Navy.

Army Performance and Training

The Army Training Support Center (ATSC), an element of the Army Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC), is pioneering the design of digital, reusable content

"objects" for the Army. They have been working for just over a year with the Learning Systems Institute at Florida State University to develop expertise in object-oriented analysis and design, automated design support, and human performance analysis. FSU, in collaboration with the ATSC, is currently conducting research into a new methodological framework that incorporates both human performance analysis and object thinking. Initial research efforts began on this project at the end of 2002 and have progressed rapidly; our review committee made up of leaders from industry, academia and the DOD's ADL initiative has favorably received the work. We intend to extend the object and performance thinking into the delivery and evaluation of training and performance support. In addition, through refining and field-testing our software prototypes, we will shape a vision for the future of automated design support within the military. We are requesting additional funding in the amount of \$4M in FY2004 to continue our efforts with the Army Training Support Center through the Army's Manpower/Personnel/Training Technology Account (PE 0602785A).

Research on Chiropractic Care at Designated Military Treatment Facilities

The Naval Defense Authorization Act provides active duty service members the opportunity to be treated by a chiropractic health care provider for neuro-musculoskeletal conditions if referred by their primary care manager at one of the designated military treatment facilities. Florida State University is actively developing a new School of Chiropractic and is establishing interdisciplinary research with health related programs and faculty within the University. Chiropractic, Sports Medicine and Exercise Science investigators at FSU will conduct three projects in collaboration with the Jacksonville Florida Naval Hospital Chiropractic services site in order to evaluate the effectiveness of chiropractic care on the health and readiness of Navy and Marine Corps personnel in their performance of peacetime and contingency missions. These three projects include: Testing and Evaluation of Protocols for Referral for Chiropractic Services, Outcomes Research on Chiropractic Services and The Influence of Various Training on Approach The Nature and Occurrence of Musculoskeletal Injuries Presenting for Chiropractic Services. FSU is requesting \$1.5M for this activity in FY04 from the Navy/ RDT&E Navy/ Medical Development (PE#0603706N) account.

Mr. Chairman, this is just a few of the many exciting activities going on at Florida State University that will make important contributions to solving some key concerns our nation faces today. Your support would be appreciated, and, again, thank you for an opportunity to present these views for your consideration.

(Clerk's Note: The following statement was submitted for the record by the University of Medicine and Dentistry of New Jersey:)

TESTIMONY OF THE
UNIVERSITY OF MEDICINE AND DENTISTRY OF NEW JERSEY
PRESENTED TO THE HOUSE APPROPRIATIONS
SUBCOMMITTEE ON DEFENSE

April 17, 2003

The following is the testimony of the University of Medicine and Dentistry of New Jersey (UMDNJ), the largest freestanding public university of the health sciences in the nation. We appreciate the opportunity to bring to your attention two priority projects -- the Center for BioDefense, and the Dean and Betty Gallo Prostate Cancer Center -- which are consistent with the mission of this committee.

The University is located on five statewide campuses and contains three medical schools, and schools of dentistry, nursing, health related professions, public health and graduate biomedical sciences. UMDNJ also comprises a University-owned acute care hospital, three core teaching hospitals, an integrated behavioral health care delivery system, a statewide system for managed care and affiliations with more than 200 healthcare and educational institutions statewide.

UMDNJ is home to the International Center for Public Health, a strategic initiative that has created a world-class infectious disease research and treatment complex at University Heights Science Park in Newark, New Jersey; the UMDNJ-New Jersey Medical School National Tuberculosis Center, a model TB Prevention and Control Center funded by the Centers for Disease Control, the Center for Emerging and Re-emerging Pathogens at the New Jersey Medical School, which serves as a focus for infectious disease research; the Environmental and Occupational Health Sciences Institute (EOHSI), a joint venture of UMDNJ and Rutgers University, recognized as one of the nation's leading environmental health programs; and a statewide system of Level I and II Trauma Centers.

In addition, UMDNJ plays a dominant role in providing continuing education, outreach and other assistance in all aspects of emergency preparedness and response. Basic and applied research among the UMDNJ campuses directly addresses the biomedical implications of biological and chemical weapons and appropriate response in the event of their use.

UMDNJ's scientific and academic expertise has positioned us to develop a comprehensive program to combat chemical and biological terrorist attacks. With the strong support of this committee, UMDNJ has achieved over \$9 million in Congressionally directed appropriations over the past four years to develop a Center for BioDefense in New Jersey. This funding has enabled the Center to develop statewide and national efforts to combat chemical, biological, and other terrorist threats with programs focused on research, education, training, public health, and emergency response. Beginning in 1993 with the first incident at the World Trade Center, through the Anthrax attacks in the fall of 2001, New Jersey has been affected by and was a target of terrorism, both directly and indirectly. As the nation's most densely populated state, and home to a myriad of high technology, pharmaceutical, radiological and chemical industries, New Jersey is vulnerable to the potential for further terrorism to occur in and around our state. The Center for BioDefense is actively involved in many critical areas to meet the needs of the state, region, and country to minimize the potential impacts of these acts against our domestic security.

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Congressionally directed appropriations of \$4.2 million secured for the Center in Fiscal Year 2000, 2001 and 2003 are being utilized to develop novel strategies for detection of biological weapons agents. Through proposals accepted by the U.S. Army Medical Defense Research Program, scientists at the Center aim to develop faster, more efficient methods of identifying specific infections.

This work is vitally important in protecting all Americans, especially in the event of multiple and simultaneous use of biological weapons.

Infections by many of the agents of bioterror show similar symptoms during early stages. Furthermore, during early infection, it is often difficult to isolate the infecting organism to detect its presence. Traditional methods of testing for these diseases can take days to weeks. Using cutting edge microarray (DNA gene chip) technology, researchers at the Center are developing gene markers to detect the presence of these agents in human blood samples - within hours of the initial infection. This research could lead to highly reliable and rapid testing to be used by military and civilian forces to help determine the presence and identity of disease.

We have made excellent progress in carrying out the experiments approved by the Department of Defense and the US Army. During the first year of funding, we opened our state-of-the-art Biosafety Level Three (BSL-3) laboratory, equipped the genomics laboratory, and began the infection experiments. To date, we have performed these experiments with the causative agents of tuberculosis, anthrax, and glanders. Data acquired from these experiments are being used to develop and test additional custom DNA chips for use as novel diagnostic tools to provide early warning of infection by select agents.

The Center's research program has attracted state and national attention. Its Biosafety Level Three facility serves as back up to the state labs in the event of another biological attack. In addition, the Center is a key player in a \$60 million grant proposal submitted to the NIH as part of a consortium to establish a Regional Center of Excellence (RCE) in Biodefense and Emerging Infectious Diseases. Because of the Center's reputation as a regional center of expertise on biodefense issues, it was asked by such exemplary institutions as Yale University, Columbia University and the State University of New York at Stony Brook to join them in addressing the biodefense research agenda of NIAID through this comprehensive RCE application.

UMDNJ respectfully requests funding of \$2 million for the Center for BioDefense to further its basic science investigations into the development of early warning technology for biological warfare agents, and for other research relating to the human genetic response to infection by select agents.

In addition to research, the Center for BioDefense is playing an increasingly important role in all other areas of counter-terrorism and biodefense activities within the State of New Jersey and across the nation. Congressionally directed appropriations approved for the Center in fiscal

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year 2002 are establishing a novel statewide system of resources and expertise to enhance the capabilities of New Jersey's emergency responders to react to and mitigate the effects of terrorism, mass casualty incidents, and other high-impact events. The Center's Incident Support and Operational Planning (ISOP) unit trains and educates first responders, assists with emergency operations planning and exercising efforts, and is strategically locating specially equipped (mass casualty) vehicles in each region of the state to ensure prompt and effective deployment of these resources and subject matter experts in the event of a large scale emergency.

Helping to bridge the gap where training is lacking, the Center is taking a lead role in making New Jersey the best prepared, with the most educated first responders. Since the fall of 2001 the Center has conducted more than 200 training sessions in all regions of the state. The Center recognizes that the definition of first responders has expanded and has targeted paid and volunteer EMS and fire departments, law enforcement, public health professionals, nurses, and school professionals, among others for training and educational sessions. Novel and unique programs have been and are being developed to approach the concepts of domestic security and preparedness from new and innovative angles. As part of this effort, practical lessons in epidemiology, surveillance and other public health issues are provided to local and state officials through the Center's "Public Health War College" to enhance their capabilities to effectively plan for and respond to public health emergencies.

UMDNJ respectfully requests additional funding of \$3 million for the Center for BioDefense to expand the Center's training and education programs. Requested funds would be utilized to continue and broaden the reach of the Center's ISOP unit, including the introduction of cross-disciplinary training programs to forge more common understanding of the scientific issues and incident response issues that relate to homeland security across different population groups.

Our second priority is the **Dean and Betty Gallo Prostate Cancer Center (GPCC)**, established at the Cancer Institute of New Jersey (CINJ) in New Brunswick, the only NCI-designated comprehensive cancer center in New Jersey. The goal of the Center is to eradicate prostate cancer and improve the lives of men at risk for the disease through research, treatment, education and prevention. The Center was founded in memory of Rep. Dean Gallo, a New Jersey Congressman who died of prostate cancer diagnosed at an advanced stage.

Prostate cancer is a devastating health problem in the nation and in the state of New Jersey, which continues to experience one of the highest rates of cancer incidence and mortality. Prostate cancer is the most common form of cancer, other than skin cancer, among men in the United States and is second only to lung cancer as a cause of cancer-related death among men. The American Cancer Society estimates that 189,000 new cases of prostate cancer will be diagnosed and approximately 30,200 men will die of the disease in 2002. Statistics released by the Centers for Disease Control in 2002 placed New Jersey fourth in the nation for the rate or prostate cancer incidence.

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The GPCC unites a team of outstanding researchers and clinicians who are committed to high quality basic research, translation of innovative research to the clinic, exceptional patient care, and improving public education and awareness of prostate cancer. GPCC is a center of excellence of the Cancer Institute of New Jersey, which is the only NCI-designated comprehensive cancer center in the state. GPCC efforts are focused in four major areas:

1) Basic, Clinical and Translational Research; 2) Epidemiology and Cancer Control; 3) Comprehensive Patient Care; and 4) Education and Outreach.

Basic, Clinical and Translational Research: GPCC scientists are investigating the molecular, genetic and environmental factors that are responsible for prostate cancer initiation and progression. Appropriate model systems developed by Dr. Abate-Shen at the GPCC are being utilized to facilitate the design and implementation of novel strategies for prevention and treatment. GPCC physicians are conducting clinical trials involving vaccines, novel agents and complementary medicines, and are fostering multi-disciplinary efforts that will lead to the effective translation of basic research to improved patient care. The translational research program developed at the Gallo Prostate Cancer Center has been recognized at national scientific meetings such as those organized by the American Association for Clinical Research.

Epidemiology and Cancer Control: Additional research activities of the GPCC seek to understand the etiology of prostate cancer susceptibility and to find effective modalities for prevention of prostate cancer.

Comprehensive Patient Care: Exceptional patient care is provided through a multi-disciplinary patient care team in the areas of urological oncology, radiation oncology and medical oncology for each patient during all stages of the disease. Currently the Center has fourteen active clinical trials that provide our patients with novel clinical approaches for treating all stages of prostate cancer.

Education and Outreach: GPCC is continuing to educate the public throughout the State of New Jersey about the importance of early detection of prostate cancer, particularly in underserved communities where there is a population at high risk for the disease. The Gallo Center has developed an extensive network of partnerships with organizations such as the 100 Black Men of New Jersey, the Men's Health Network, and the National Black Leadership Initiative on Cancer to offer education and outreach on prostate cancer screenings in minority and other underserved communities. The Gallo Center has recently partnered with the Jewish Renaissance Foundation to extend outreach within the Latino community of Perth Amboy and the Asian Indian community of Edison. The goal of all these activities is to extend prostate cancer screening services to all 21 New Jersey counties by 2004.

To date, the Gallo Center has raised over \$12.2 million in external public and private funding sources (including over \$8 million in support from this committee) to expand its research, cancer control and public outreach initiatives. The UMDNJ commitment to the overall development of

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The Cancer Institute of New Jersey and of the Gallo Center total over \$83 million. This important funding has enabled us to establish a world-class program in prostate cancer research that includes publications in prestigious journals such as the New England Journal of Medicine, Genes and Development, The Journal of Clinical Oncology, Cancer, Cancer Research, and Clinical Cancer Research.

The University's Statewide Center of Excellence initiative for cancer calls for expanding the Gallo Prostate Cancer Center to the northern and southern regions of the state to ensure the highest quality of care for all residents of New Jersey. The strong support of this committee provided the Gallo Prostate Cancer Center with \$1 million in Fiscal Year 2003 earmarked appropriations to start moving effective programs in clinical, basic and behavioral research to serve the northern and southern regions. In order to enhance patient access to the latest novel approaches for treatment of prostate cancer, the clinical research program will educate physicians and prostate cancer patients regarding participation in new innovative clinical trials for treatment of the disease. Fiscal Year 2003 funding will also allow our basic science researchers to continue to develop translational research program; to conduct behavioral studies research to help identify barriers to effective prostate cancer education and participation in clinical trials; and to address the etiology of prostate cancer susceptibility to find effective modalities for disease prevention.

Our FY2004 initiative is designed to support the further expansion of the Center's basic and clinical research initiatives, public outreach and cancer control efforts in both the Newark and north Jersey region, and the Camden/southern New Jersey region where we can increase the availability of cancer programs to the state's major population regions. Activities supported under this FY04 initiative would generally increase public awareness about early detection of prostate cancer and specifically launch a prostate awareness medical van that would serve African-American and other medically underserved communities where the need and risk for prostate cancer are greatest. As part of this effort, researchers at the Cancer Institute of New Jersey will seek to improve outreach outcomes by investigating how aspects of cultural diversity affect cancer education and prevention among different population groups.

We respectfully seek support of \$3 million to expand the Center's public outreach and screening activities to reach vulnerable populations in the greater Newark and Camden communities, and in other locations across the state. Additional support \$3 million is requested to strengthen the Center's basic and clinical research programs. This additional funding will also allow us to enhance our treatment of patients with prostate cancer through several new clinical trials for patients at all stages of the disease.

We thank this committee for its strong support of the University's initiatives and urge your consideration of our two priority requests, the Center for BioDefense, and the Dean and Betty Gallo Prostate Cancer Center.

(Clerk's Note: The following statement was submitted for the record by the National Prostate Cancer Coalition:)

National Prostate Cancer Coalition

awareness • outreach • advocacy



Statement of Richard N. Atkins, M.D.
CEO, National Prostate Cancer Coalition

Mr. Chairman and distinguished members of the subcommittee, on behalf of the National Prostate Cancer Coalition (NPCC) I thank you for the opportunity to share my remarks. As the war against terrorism and the conflict in Iraq persist, we must also continue to wage an effective war on cancer. While we support the efforts necessary to protect our safety both at home and abroad we, as President Franklin Delano Roosevelt stated at the dedication of the National Institutes of Health in 1940, "cannot be a strong nation unless we are a healthy nation." We must fund the war on prostate cancer and stop a killer that will be diagnosed in 220,900 men and claim the lives of another 28,900 this year.

As Americans, we must support and protect our troops abroad and ensure their well-being and that of their families when they return home. About 85 percent of individuals serving in active or reserve duty are men, approximately 2.2 million. If one applies the average risk of prostate cancer to this group, over 350,000 men will be diagnosed with the disease in their lifetimes. That's more than the number of American servicemen lost in both World Wars.

To effectively fight prostate cancer, NPCC requests that you allocate at least \$100 million in FY04 for the Prostate Cancer Research Program (PCRP) conducted by the Department of Defense through the extramural Congressionally Directed Medical Research Program (CDMRP) and provide at least \$10 million in funding for the intramural Uniformed Services University of the Health Sciences (USUHS) and Walter Reed Army Medical Center (WRAMC) program called the Center for Prostate Disease Research (CPDR).

Since its inception in FY97, the PCRP has been the most efficient federally directed prostate cancer research program because it builds sound accountability mechanisms into its fundamental operation. The PCRP strives "to offer awards to fill gaps in ongoing research and complement initiatives sponsored by other agencies." The program is also focused on non-duplication of effort, fostering the science of projects that are unique and are not receiving funding from other sources. The PCRP has engaged survivors of prostate cancer into its accountability practices from its outset. This consumer input helps drive the program to become more ambitious and creative in seeking out new areas of research, because it maintains its focus on what is important to survivors, advocates and researchers.

The PCRP offers awards such as the "Idea Development" and "New Investigator" grants that seek innovative and revolutionary studies that deviate from previous research. The goal is to stimulate "venture research" projects that reward sometimes speculative but promising ideas that can lead to huge returns on investments. Grants such as the "Historically Black Colleges and Universities (HBCU) Collaborative Partnership" and the "Health Disparity Training" awards focus on researching the disproportionate impact of prostate cancer on African-American men. While the PCRP's award mechanisms continue to stimulate exciting new research, the program is unable to fund its clinical trials awards appropriately. At least \$100 million is needed to allow the program to resume sound clinical trials which is paramount in translating research from the lab into new treatments and medicines for patients.

Among other achievements, the intramural CPDR program at DOD has helped determine the effectiveness of the prostate specific antigen (PSA) screening exam. A recent CPDR study found a significant increase in five-year survival rates of those diagnosed with the disease and a decreased chance of losing life to the disease, both attributed to the implementation of the PSA screening. NPCC supports early detection through screening and believes that the PSA test along with the digital rectal exam (DRE) saves lives.

On behalf of our community of advocates – families, researchers, physicians, and others touched by the disease, I would like to thank you and the committee once again for your time and leadership. The investments we make today can greatly reduce medical costs and save lives tomorrow. Together, we can eliminate prostate cancer as a threat to men and their families.

1154 15th Street, NW Washington, DC 20005 ~ Phone: 202-463-9455 ~ Fax: 202-463-9456 ~ www.npccallition.org

(Clerk's Note: The following statement was submitted for the record by the National Brain Injury, Research, Treatment, and Training Foundation:)



NBIRT

National Brain Injury Research,
Treatment & Training Foundation

**TESTIMONY IN SUPPORT OF FUNDING THE
DEFENSE AND VETERANS HEAD INJURY PROGRAM**

**SUBMITTED TO
THE HOUSE APPROPRIATIONS COMMITTEE
SUBCOMMITTEE ON DEFENSE
BY
MARTIN B. FOIL, JR.,
MEMBER OF THE BOARD OF DIRECTORS**

MARCH 27, 2003

NBIRT FOUNDATION
P.O. BOX 5266, Charlottesville, Virginia 22905-5266
(434) 220-4824

Dear Chairman Lewis, Congressman Murtha and Members of the House Appropriations Subcommittee on Defense:

My name is Martin B. Foil, Jr. and I am the father of Philip Foil, a young man with a severe brain injury. I serve as a volunteer on the Board of Directors of the National Brain Injury Research, Treatment and Training Foundation (NBIRTT)¹ and Virginia NeuroCare in Charlottesville, Virginia (VNC).² Professionally, I am the Chief Executive Officer and Chairman of Tuscarora Yarns in Mt. Pleasant, North Carolina.³

On behalf of the thousands of military personnel that receive brain injury treatment and services annually, I respectfully request that \$5 million be added to the Department of Defense (DoD) Health Affairs budget for Fiscal Year 2004 under Operation and Maintenance for the Defense and Veterans Head Injury Program (DVHIP).

I appreciate the opportunity to provide testimony regarding this important program which is a collaborative effort among DoD, Veterans Affairs (DVA), the Henry M. Jackson Foundation for the Advancement of Military Medicine and the Uniformed Services University of the Health Sciences (USUHS).

I. The Defense and Veterans Head Injury Program (DVHIP)

Established in 1992, the DVHIP is a component of the military health care system that integrates clinical care and clinical follow-up, with applied research, treatment and training. The program was created after the Gulf War to address the need for an overall systemic program for providing brain injury specific care and rehabilitation within DoD and DVA. The DVHIP seeks to ensure that all military personnel and veterans with brain injury receive brain injury-specific evaluation, treatment and follow-up. Over time, the research conducted by the DVHIP has come to define optimal care for military personnel and veterans with brain injuries. A multi-center clinical care and clinical research program, the program's motto is "working for a cure."

The DVHIP has been proactive since its inception, developing numerous innovative programs that enable patients to have a variety of treatment options at each site. Clinical care and research is currently undertaken at seven DoD and DVA sites and one civilian treatment site,⁴ allowing single and multi-center trials to be conducted informing future clinical care and treatment strategies. In addition to providing treatment, rehabilitation and case management at each of the

¹ NBIRTT is a non-profit national foundation dedicated to the support of clinical research, treatment and training.

² VNC provides brain injury rehabilitation to military retirees, veterans and civilians through an innovative and cost effective day treatment program.

³ I receive no compensation from this program. Rather, I have raised and contributed millions of dollars to support brain injury research, treatment, training and services.

⁴ Walter Reed Army Medical Center, Washington, DC; James A. Haley Veterans Hospital, Tampa, FL; Naval Medical Center San Diego, San Diego, CA; Minneapolis Veterans Affairs Medical Center, Minneapolis, MN; Veterans Affairs Palo Alto Health Care System, Palo Alto, CA; Virginia Neurocare, Inc., Charlottesville, VA; Hunter McGuire Veterans Affairs Medical Center, Richmond, VA; Wilford Hall Medical Center, Lackland Air Force Base, TX.

8 primary DVHIP traumatic brain injury (TBI) centers, the DVHIP includes a regional network of additional secondary veterans hospitals capable of providing TBI rehabilitation, and linked to the primary lead centers for training, referrals and consultation. This is coordinated by a dedicated central DVA TBI coordinator and includes an active TBI case manager training program.

The DVHIP is a model program of efficient and effective collaboration between DoD and DVA.

II. DVHIP Stands Ready to Treat Troops and Veterans Sustaining Brain Injuries

Head injury is a leading combat concern in modern warfare. Neurotrauma (traumatic brain and spinal cord injuries) accounts for almost 25% of combat casualties. In addition, secondary brain injuries – resulting from stroke, cerebral ischemia, seizures which are induced by radiation, exposure to ionizing or iron plasma, nerve agents, cyanide, toxic concentrations of oxygen, neurotoxicity due to central nervous system (CNS) malaria or treatment with antimalaria agents, and other CNS traumas, have a significant impact on the health and readiness of military personnel. Many of the currently feared terrorist threats would involve secondary brain injuries, particularly those involving chemical or biological neurological insults.

The DVHIP is prepared to provide a full continuum of care for military personnel injured during current and potential future hostilities.

III. Examples of Military Personnel Injured, Treated and Returning to Work

The following are examples of injured active duty military personnel who recently received care provided by the DVHIP:

A. On January 16, 2003, President Bush visited Walter Reed Army Medical Center (WRAMC) and saw five soldiers injured in Afghanistan, one of whom sustained a brain injury along with a fractured skull and other broken bones. *The Washington Post* reported on the President's visit and noted that some 200 troops have been injured in Afghanistan. The unidentified soldier was treated by the staff of the DVHIP.

B. Another soldier treated at WRAMC was featured on the front page of WRAMC's publication *Stripe*, on January 17, 2003. A photo showed First Sgt. Colin Robert Rich, A Company, 1st Battalion 504th Parachute Infantry Regiment, receiving a visit from Secretary of the Army Thomas E. White. Sgt. Rich had been shot in the head on December 28, 2002 while serving in Afghanistan. *Stripe* reported that Sgt. Rich explained to the Secretary that the round went through his Kevlar helmet, "which decelerated it enough that it didn't blow my head up. It ricocheted and it did shatter the skull." Rich added, "Love your Kevlar, sir, that's my motto." Rich received initial acute care at a hospital in Germany within 15 hours of being shot and arrived at WRAMC on January 4, and was discharged home on January 16, 2002.

C. In June of 2002, a 32 year old female TSgt. customer service and unit deployment manager fell asleep while driving and rear-ended a stationary 18-wheeler at highway speed. She

sustained a severe brain injury and remained in a coma for 7 days at Memorial Hermann Hospital in Houston, Texas. She was transferred to the Veterans Affairs Palo Alto Health Care System for inpatient rehabilitation on July 11, 2002. Her admission evaluation revealed multiple neurological, physical and cognitive symptoms.⁵ By August 13, 2002 she was discharged with improved neurological, physical and cognitive abilities and returned home to San Antonio with her husband and two young children. She received outpatient therapy at Warm Springs Rehabilitation Hospital in San Antonio through the end of the year. On November, 20, 2002 she was evaluated by the medical board at Wilford Hall Medical Center (WHMC) and showed mild residual symptoms.⁶ The board recommended trial of duty, initially half days with close supervision. She underwent a six-month evaluation by DVHIP staff on February 5, 2003 at WHMC and a driving re-evaluation on February 7, with full driving privileges recommended. She began her trial of duty on February 11, 2003 and anticipates going to the NCO academy if all goes well.

D. Sgt. MF, a 39 year old Army Recruiter was involved in a motorcycle accident in July 2002, resulting in a traumatic brain injury. His initial evaluations showed a very serious brain injury to the right and left side of the brain with a sub-dural hematoma and massive swelling. He underwent major brain surgery to remove part of the bleed and resulting damage to the right side of the brain. He received his acute care in Louisville, Kentucky and was subsequently transferred to McGuire Veterans Hospital in Richmond, Virginia (VA) for post-acute rehabilitation and then to Virginia NeuroCare (VNC) in October 2002 for community re-entry rehabilitation. He was discharged to the Medical Holding Company Unit at his Army station of origin on March 8, 2003. MF stated that he was very satisfied with his care throughout his entire recovery and rehabilitation. He stated that the DVHIP staff took a one-on-one interest in him and he was happy with his rehabilitation experience.

At VNC, Sgt. MF was particularly appreciative of the opportunity to live independently in a transitional apartment. He reported that the therapy program was good, and he appreciated the fact that the program was tailored to individual needs. His volunteer placement at the local Army Recruiting Station during the final phase of his rehabilitation at VNC was a positive experience that led him to believe he would get his life back.

These are just a few examples of what DVHIP does for thousands of military personnel each year – from being ready to care for injured troops in the acute care setting to neuro-rehabilitation involving the entire patient to full community integration.

IV. DVHIP Accomplishments and Ongoing Research Initiatives

⁵ Her symptoms included mild dizziness, headaches, continued diminished rapid toe and finger movements on the right, abnormal gait but walking unassisted, difficulties with fluency, naming, reading and word-finding difficulties. Greatest cognitive impairments continued in the areas of memory and problem solving - modified independent level of function in bathing and dressing due to wearing a brace for the vertebral fracture. Independent in all other area of basic self-care.

⁶ Improved speech, persistent mild facial numbness, mild disequilibrium without vertigo, walking independently, continued weakness in verbal memory but effective use of compensatory techniques, able to care for 4 year-old and 10-month old children at home

- Established the War on Terrorism Brain Injury Registry to examine clinically relevant issues in the management of brain injury sustained in theatre.
- Completed research on functional rehabilitation versus cognitive rehabilitation for severe brain injury.
- A randomized controlled study of sertraline for post concussive syndrome is being carried out in all DVHIP military and VA sites.
- Started new randomized controlled trial of valproate for brain injury related agitation at James A. Haley Veterans Hospital, Tampa, Florida.
- Provided successful rehabilitation and return to work and community re-entry for active duty military personnel and veterans.
- Ongoing studies are being conducted with Army paratroopers and cadets and U.S. Marines at Fort Bragg, West Point, and Camp Pendleton. These studies are investigating brief evaluation instruments to determine which injured service members require immediate treatment and which can return to duty. The goal of these studies is to preserve our nation's fighting strength while conserving medical resources for those injured and requiring treatment.

V. Fiscal Year 2004 Goals

- There is a need to expand clinical capacity to care for an increasing number of injured military personnel and veterans.
- Improve rehabilitation and treatment program for active duty service members with mild cognitive impairment following possible chemical or biological exposure.
- Establish a multi-center trial to provide the first evidence on the effectiveness of cognitive rehabilitation and stimulant medication early in recovery from severe brain injury.
- Conduct the study of enhanced protection from parachute injury by field testing approved novel helmet configurations at Fort Bragg.
- Develop return to duty guidelines through analysis of data collected in the West Point sports concussion study and the Fort Bragg concussion study.
- Examine biomarkers in mild brain injury and injury recovery in collaboration with Ron Hayes, Ph.D. at the Evelyn F. and William L. McKnight Brain Institute at the University of Florida.

- Examine the utility of mobile transcranial Doppler ultrasonography to identify cerebral blood flow alterations in mild brain injury and recovery patterns.
- Report to the U.S. Army the findings from the War on Terrorism Brain Injury Registry regarding incidence of closed head injury and the impact of early wound closure in penetrating brain injury.
- Extend outcomes research through the evaluation of long-term work and duty status in DVHIP rehabilitation trial participants.
- Disseminate evidence based guidelines on pharmacological management of neurobehavioral consequences of brain injury.
- While funding is critical to continue the full spectrum of care for military personnel and veterans sustaining brain injuries, DVHIP investigators are also using the DVHIP Registry Data to follow up with individuals with mild TBI to determine the amount of persisting symptoms and their current functioning.

VI. Conclusion

As our nation faces crises both at home and abroad, the DVHIP is in a unique position to help prevent, treat, and provide education regarding brain injury and to lead efforts to better the lives of active duty and retired military personnel affected by brain injury. The DVHIP stands ready to assist in the care of troops injured in this time of war.

I respectfully urge your support for \$5 million for the DVHIP in the Fiscal Year 2004 Defense Appropriations bill in the DoD Health Affairs budget under Operation and Maintenance to continue this important program.

Sincerely,

Martin B. Foil, Jr.
Member of the Board
NBIRTT Foundation

(Clerk's Note: The following statement was submitted for the record by the National Coalition for Osteoporosis and Related Bone Diseases:)

Testimony of
the National Coalition for Osteoporosis and Related Bone
Diseases (the Bone Coalition)

Submitted April 29, 2003

Mr. Chairman and Members of the Committee, this testimony is submitted by Joan Goldberg, Executive Director of the American Society for Bone and Mineral Research (ASBMR), representing the National Coalition for Osteoporosis and Related Bone Diseases, which includes the National Osteoporosis Foundation, the Paget Foundation for Paget's Disease of Bone and Related Disorders, the Osteogenesis Imperfecta Foundation, and the ASBMR.

Together we represent over 44 million Americans who have bone diseases or are at risk for them, along with the more than 5,000 scientists dedicated to improving the diagnosis, treatment and understanding of bone diseases and disorders.

Bone health is integral to overall health. Our bones support our muscles, protect vital organs, and store the calcium essential for bone density or mass, and strength. What makes bones healthy? It's a complex interaction involving many nutritional, hormonal, behavioral, genetic and environmental factors. What we eat and drink, the type and

**Testimony of the National Coalition for Osteoporosis and Related Bone Diseases
(the Bone Coalition)
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duration of our exercise, our family history...these are some of the pieces of the puzzle that fit together when addressing bone health.

Bone health is a critical component to consider when evaluating military readiness and performance. Why is bone health so critical to our military? Stress fractures occur in up to 15% of military recruits. Stress fractures are most common in the legs and feet, but also occur in the ribs and upper extremities. For healing to occur, recruits often need to stop running or marching for weeks. Not only do these fractures delay military readiness and performance, but they represent a cost of over \$10 million per year. Our recent engagement in Iraq highlights some additional considerations when it comes to bone health. For example, soldiers routinely carried packs that weighed 70-90 pounds over rough terrain for miles on end in a harsh climate. For many, a fracture often spelled an exit from the combat theater as quickly as a shrapnel injury.

It is vitally important to understand how to prevent stress fractures in recruits and in combat to reduce suffering, minimize the time it takes to ready soldiers for combat, prevent fractures in training situations and in combat, and reduce the significant costs associated with these fractures.

The DoD has learned a great deal from research to improve soldiers' bone health, but there is more to be learned. Recent research has investigated:

**Testimony of the National Coalition for Osteoporosis and Related Bone Diseases
(the Bone Coalition)**

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- the effects of impact forces, such as running, on bone formation
- the effect of specific nutritional regimens on bone health
- the effects of weight management behaviors on bone health

Ongoing research will help address:

- the role of and effect of non-steroidal inflammatory medications on bone health and performance
- the role of remodeling and nutrition on bone quality
- the role of electrical fields to speed bone repair
- the role of new diagnostic tools

Additional topics critical to our understanding and our recruits' military health include:

- novel approaches, such as the possible use of low frequencies to build high quality bone
- explorations of how different types of physical training affect bone at a cellular level
- investigations aimed at identifying the best training and nutritional regimen in terms of exercise duration and intensity, and nutrient amounts, to optimize fitness levels and bone health and to prevent injury

**Testimony of the National Coalition for Osteoporosis and Related Bone Diseases
(the Bone Coalition)**

Page 4

Mr. Chairman, stress fractures compromise the health, military readiness and performance of our recruits and troops. A strong and well-trained military proved to be crucial in Iraq and will continue to be a vital component of our country's future. We thank you for maintaining 2003 funding for the Bone Health and Military Medical Readiness Program of the U.S. Army Medical Research and Materiel Command located in Fort Detrick, Maryland. We know there are many worthy projects in need of funding, especially in the Army's Bone Health and Military Medical Readiness Program. Without additional support not only are these in jeopardy -- and future results that will save money, prevent additional fractures, and further healing -- but we risk losing researchers who are dedicated to bone health and these projects in particular.

We respectfully request that you consider an appropriation of \$10 million to maintain an aggressive and sustained DoD bone research program in FY2004. Thank you for your commitment to the U.S. military's health and safety.

(Clerk's Note: The following statement was submitted for the record the Joslin Diabetes Center:)

Joslin Diabetes Center

*Dedicated to the
treatment and study
of diabetes and
endocrine disorders*

One Joslin Place
Boston, MA 02215
www.joslin.org

617 732 2400

SUBCOMMITTEE ON DEFENSE COMMITTEE ON APPROPRIATIONS U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

March 31, 2003

Written Testimony
Dr. Sven Bursell, Joslin Diabetes Center



Introduction

Mr. Chairman and Members of the Committee, I would like to thank you for the opportunity to submit written testimony on behalf of Joslin Diabetes Center regarding the Joslin Diabetes Project.

Joslin is extremely appreciative of the funds provided for this valuable project in the FY 2003 Defense Appropriations Act.

Summary

This request of \$5,900,000 represents the collective costs of Joslin and associated expenses of The Department of the Army, RDT&E.

FY 2003 Status Report

JVN Eye Care Deployment:

By March 2003 we will have deployed a total of 11 independent remote JVN imaging sites and 5 centralized reading center sites operating off 2 independent servers in the Department of Defense Infrastructure concentrating on sites in Hawaii, Walter Reed Army Medical Center and Alaska at Kodiak Island. In the VA system we will have deployed a total of 8 remote imaging sites, 3 reading center sites operating off 2 independent servers and at the Joslin Diabetes Center we will have 7 imaging sites and 4 reading center sites operating of the Joslin JVN server for a total of 38 separate sites operating the JVN system.

Additionally, a total of 21 JVN imagers, 16 JVN readers and 3 senior JVN adjudicators have been trained and certified throughout the participating organizations.

JVN Eye Care Validation:

The JVN validation studies have been completed and the results published in the March 2001 issue of Ophthalmology and in Press for an issue of Retina in 2003. The results demonstrated the equivalence, with respect to level of diabetic retinopathy assessment, between JVN digital video imaging through a non-dilated pupil to the current clinical gold standard of the Early Treatment Diabetic Retinopathy Study protocol of dilated 7 stereo standard field 35-mm photography (Ophthalmology Publication) as well as equivalence to a dilated eye examination performed by an ophthalmological specialist in diabetic retinopathy (Retina Publication). In addition the above prestigious peer reviewed publication the JVN studies have resulted in a further 5 peer reviewed publications and a total of 30 abstracts accepted for presentation at the Association for Research in Vision and Ophthalmology, American Diabetes Association, and American Telemedicine Association national meetings.

JVN Eye Care Application Enhancement:

The next generation JVN application is developed using totally non-proprietary hardware and software. Workstations are now standard PCs with MicroSoft 2000 operating systems interfaced to the Agfa PACS environment. The system is fully DICOM and HL7 compliant as well as being compliant to emerging HIPAA security standards. The development off the Agfa PACS environment facilitates direct interfaces to the DoD CHS and VA VISTA medical record systems. Thus the JVN system becomes an integrated component of the DoD and VA patient medical record system. Additionally, the JVN system is operational over the internet using Virtual Private Network (VPN) technologies with the appropriate securities implemented.

Deployment of the Advanced Systems for JVN Eye Care:

The initial prototypes of the system have been tested, issues identified and optical designs modified during 2002. The final optical design for the new non-mydiatic retinal imaging system has been completed and a patent is being sought for the optical design of the illumination component of the retinal imaging system. The prototype is currently under production and it will be tested on the JVN system at the Joslin Diabetes Center from April through June of 2003. By October or November of 2003 we anticipate producing a number of production units to be deployed in existing JVN sites for further testing in the clinical environment. These production units will be manufactured by a well known optical manufacturer and negotiations are currently ongoing to finalize production costs and timelines. The rationale for this development effort was to enable a portable and significantly less expensive retinal imaging system that would overcome the current limitations of the commercially available models. The portability is a critical requirement for mobile operations to remote communities as well as in the DoD.

The automated reading center application is also being readied for deployment. The first phase of the application was developed using the existing JVN database of 48,000 retinal images that have already undergone manual grading for

diabetic retinopathy. The validation testing provided a sensitivity that indicated the need for improvement of the algorithm before implementation in the reading center. The testing of the improved algorithm will be performed during the period of May to September of 2003. The application is currently designed to automatically detect any abnormalities in the retinal images. It is anticipated that the implementation of this application will reduce the reading center workload by at least 75%.

FY2004 Objectives

Deployment of JVN Eye Care:

We anticipate that the current level of funding for 2003 will allow us provide support for existing JVN systems and to target new deployment for 1 additional JVN system in collaboration with the participating agencies. This will make a total of 28 sites deployed through the DoD and VA that will be operating the JVN system.

JVN Eye Care Application Enhancements:

There will be ongoing development work to continue enhancements to the JVN platform. These enhancements will include incorporation of a module to facilitate rigorous multicenter clinical research studies in diabetic eye disease as detailed in our proposal for 2003, to validate JVN imaging for the detection of other eye diseases such as glaucoma and age related macula degeneration, to investigate algorithms designed to enhance the quality of retinal images and hence visibility of retinal lesions, to integrate the JVN eye care into diabetes disease management, and to perform a rigorous multicenter study aimed at determining, based on the diabetes status of the patient as derived from the disease management application described below, the appropriate frequency of ophthalmological dilated eye examination with intervening JVN non-dilated eye examinations.

JVN Diabetes Care: Comprehensive Diabetes Management Program

Work on the development of an interactive comprehensive diabetes management program was initiated in 2001 and involved leaders in diabetes clinical management, education, lifestyle modification and medical informatics from the Joslin Diabetes Center, the Department of Defense, the Veteran Health Affairs and the Indian Health Services. The rationale for this effort was the recognized need to be able to provide a continuum of care for diabetic patients in contrast to the current more disjointed care that is provided. This need was further highlighted by recent results from the Diabetes Prevention Program (DPP). These patients were randomized to either intensive life style modification, metformin or placebo treatment. After follow up of 4.6 years, life style modification reduced the progression to diabetes by 58%. Moreover, the development of diabetes was reduced by 31%. The results indicated that one of the primary reasons for the success of this study was the implementation of a case management program. This is exactly what we are developing for the CDMP, namely a care manager centric interactive application that provides more continuous and immediate

contact between patients, care managers and physicians over secure websites. Work will be continuing for the development of the appropriate modules that will be deployed and implemented in the web-based comprehensive diabetes management program.

It is anticipated that the development of the interactive web-based education and behavior modules will provide the largest potential benefit with respect to motivating patients to set reasonable goals for their management of diabetes and thus maximize the clinical benefit.

Deployment of JVN CDMP:

The JVN CDMP application is currently live and being used at the Joslin Diabetes Center. It will be deployed and live at Walter Reed Army Medical Center by April 30 2003 followed by deployments at the VA in VISN 1 and the DoD and VA in Hawaii by October 2003 as well as integrating the CDMP into the TriCare On Line application through the DoD. With these deployments of CDMP in the participating sites it is expected that we will then initiate the multicenter clinical trials aimed at documenting cost efficiency and clinical benefit of this program in the last quarter of 2003. As part of this process all agency participants will be working on defining study design and protocols for the proposed clinical trials. Thus in 2004 we expect to implement all planned clinical trials through the different participating centers and funding will be allocated to support personnel involved in these trials.

Deployment of the Advanced System:

We will incorporate full automation into the new retinal imaging system. This will facilitate the imaging of the different fields required for assessment of level of diabetic retinopathy. This will reduce the time for retinal imaging and significantly increase patient throughput.

We will also continue our development efforts to enhance the capability of the automated retinal reading application to detection of specific types of retinal lesions. This will further enhance the efficiency and reduce the resource load that would be needed to staff a JVN reading center.

Joslin Diabetes Center

DOD Admin & Mgmt Costs (@12%)	\$708,000
DOD-JVN Participation Expenses (Includes costs for studies and addition of new site)	\$2,060,000
Joslin-JVN Expenses (Includes costs for studies and support as well as JVN eye care enhancements)	\$1,884,000
Shared CDMP Costs (Cost benefit and clinical benefit studies as well as addition of new modules to application)	\$1,248,000
TOTAL, Joslin Diabetes Center	\$5,900,000

Mr. Chairman, Joslin is pleased to be a part of this project with the Department of Defense and we are grateful for the support that you and your colleagues have provided to us. Please know that we would be grateful for your continued support again this year.

FF

Principal Investigator/Program Director (Last, first, middle):

BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCH

Provide the following information for the key personnel in the order listed on Form Page 2.
 Photocopy this page or follow this format for each person

NAME Sven-Erik Bursell		POSITION TITLE Investigator and Associate Professor	
EDUCATION/TRAINING (Begin with baccalaureate or other initial professional education, such as nursing, and include postdoctoral training.)			
INSTITUTION AND LOCATION	DEGREE (if applicable)	YEAR(s)	FIELD OF STUDY
King's College University of London, England	B.Sc. (Hon)	1971	Physics
Boston University, Boston, MA	M.A.	1975	Physics
Boston University, Boston, MA	Ph.D.	1980	Biophysics

RESEARCH AND PROFESSIONAL EXPERIENCE: Concluding with present position, list, in chronological order, previous employment, experience, and honors. Include present membership on any Federal Government public advisory committee. List, in chronological order, the titles, all authors, and complete references to all publications during the past three years and to representative earlier publications pertinent to this application. If the list of publications in the last three years exceeds two pages, select the most pertinent publications. DO NOT EXCEED TWO PAGES

Professional Experience:

1980-82 **Research Associate**, Eye Research Institute/Retina Foundation, Boston, MA
 1983-84 **Research Associate**, Department of Medicine, Harvard Medical School, Boston, MA
 1983-84 **Research Associate**, Eye Research Section, Research Division, Joslin Diabetes Center, Boston, MA
 1984-86 **Instructor in Medicine**, Department of Medicine, Harvard Medical School, Boston, MA
 1984- **Investigator**, Eye Research Section, Research Division, Joslin Diabetes Center, Boston, MA
 1986-92 **Instructor in Ophthalmology**, Harvard Medical School, Boston, MA
 1992- **Assistant Professor** in Ophthalmology, Harvard Medical School, Boston MA
 1995-2001 **Scientific Director**, Joslin Vision Network, Joslin Diabetes Center, Boston MA
 2000- **Associate Professor**, Dept. Ophthalmology, Harvard Medical School
 2001- **Director**, Joslin Vision Network, Joslin Diabetes Center, Boston MA

Honors and Awards:

B.Sc. Honors, King's College, University of London, England (1971)
 NIH-ARVO Travel Fellowship, National Institutes of Health (1981)

Research Projects Ongoing or Completed During the Last 3 Years:

"Diabetic Retinopathy: Pathogenesis, Prediction and Prevention"

Principal Investigator: Sven-Erik Bursell, Ph.D.

Research grant from the Massachusetts Lions Eye Research Fund (Year 18, July 30, 2002- Aug 1, 2003)

The major goals of this continuing project are to determine the association between retinal blood flow abnormalities and development of diabetic retinopathy, to investigate novel potential therapies such as oral vitamin E treatment and to establish and validate criteria for diagnosing retinal disease in the eyes of diabetic patients using our video based technology platform.

"Characterization of Vitamin E's Effect on Normalization of Renal Function in Early Diabetes"

Principal Investigator: Sven-Erik Bursell, Ph.D.

Agency: American Diabetes Association

Type: Research Award (1/1/98-12/31/00)

Studies to characterize the mechanisms of vitamin E's effect using diabetic rats and assessing the physiological impact through our measurements of retinal blood flow and retinal vascular permeability changes.

"Endothelin Effects on Retinal Cells and Blood Flow"

Co-Investigator: Sven-Erik Bursell, Ph.D.

Agency: National Eye Institute

Type: 2 R01 EY09178-08 (King) (1/1/97 - 12/31/01)

The major goals of this competitive renewal application are to characterize the expression and production of ET-1 in the retinal capillary endothelial cells, identify the various signal transduction pathways used by ET-1 and study the expression and effect of ET-1 and ET-3 receptors.

FF

Principal Investigator/Program Director (Last, first, middle):

"Diabetes Detection, Care and Treatment: Analysis of Access, Cost Savings and Quality of Care for Diabetic Patients in the Department of Defense and Veterans Administration".

Principal Investigator: Sven-Erik Bursell, Ph.D.

Agency: Department of Defense

Type: Cooperative Agreement DAMD 17-98-2-8017 (4/1/98-3/31/2003)

The major goals of this continuing project are the establishment of a telemedicine system for the assessment of diabetic retinopathy that provides increased access for diabetic patients to appropriate eye care that can be performed in a cost effective manner and that maintains the high standard of care required for the appropriate management of diabetic patients.

"Live Microscopy and Cytometry in Vascular Biology"

Project Leader: Sven-Erik Bursell, Ph.D.

Agency: National Eye Institute

Type: Bioengineering Research Partnership RO1 EY14106-01 (C.P. Lin) (9/1/02-8/31/07)

The goal of the project is to investigate mechanisms responsible for endothelium dysfunction in diabetic retinopathy and its potential amelioration through vitamin E treatment using new imaging modalities developed through other participating projects in this program

"High Sensitivity detection of autoimmune T cells in T1D"

Co-Investigator: Sven-Erik Bursell, Ph.D.

Agency: National Institute of Diabetes and Digestive Kidney Diseases

Type: R21 DK063516 (C. Benoit) (10/01/02-9/30/04)

This project is focused on the design and Implementation of a high throughput cell imaging system in order to examine T lymphocytes reactive against pancreatic antigens

"Retinal Imaging Tests for Systemic Microvascular Functions"

Co-Investigator: Sven-Erik Bursell, Ph.D.

Agency: National Eye Institute

Type: R21 (G.L. King) (10/01/02-9/30/04)

This project is aimed at correlating retinal hemodynamic and electrophysiological abnormalities in diabetes to peripheral microvascular and sensory functions

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Principal Investigator/Program Director (Last, first, middle)

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Principal Investigator/Program Director (Last, first, middle)

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