[House Hearing, 108 Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
PRIVATE SECURITY OFFICER EMPLOYMENT AUTHORIZATION ACT OF 2003
=======================================================================
HEARING
BEFORE THE
SUBCOMMITTEE ON CRIME, TERRORISM,
AND HOMELAND SECURITY
OF THE
COMMITTEE ON THE JUDICIARY
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
ONE HUNDRED EIGHTH CONGRESS
SECOND SESSION
ON
S. 1743
__________
MARCH 30, 2004
__________
Serial No. 89
__________
Printed for the use of the Committee on the Judiciary
Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.house.gov/judiciary
______
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COMMITTEE ON THE JUDICIARY
F. JAMES SENSENBRENNER, Jr., Wisconsin, Chairman
HENRY J. HYDE, Illinois JOHN CONYERS, Jr., Michigan
HOWARD COBLE, North Carolina HOWARD L. BERMAN, California
LAMAR SMITH, Texas RICK BOUCHER, Virginia
ELTON GALLEGLY, California JERROLD NADLER, New York
BOB GOODLATTE, Virginia ROBERT C. SCOTT, Virginia
STEVE CHABOT, Ohio MELVIN L. WATT, North Carolina
WILLIAM L. JENKINS, Tennessee ZOE LOFGREN, California
CHRIS CANNON, Utah SHEILA JACKSON LEE, Texas
SPENCER BACHUS, Alabama MAXINE WATERS, California
JOHN N. HOSTETTLER, Indiana MARTIN T. MEEHAN, Massachusetts
MARK GREEN, Wisconsin WILLIAM D. DELAHUNT, Massachusetts
RIC KELLER, Florida ROBERT WEXLER, Florida
MELISSA A. HART, Pennsylvania TAMMY BALDWIN, Wisconsin
JEFF FLAKE, Arizona ANTHONY D. WEINER, New York
MIKE PENCE, Indiana ADAM B. SCHIFF, California
J. RANDY FORBES, Virginia LINDA T. SANCHEZ, California
STEVE KING, Iowa
JOHN R. CARTER, Texas
TOM FEENEY, Florida
MARSHA BLACKBURN, Tennessee
Philip G. Kiko, Chief of Staff-General Counsel
Perry H. Apelbaum, Minority Chief Counsel
------
Subcommittee on Crime, Terrorism, and Homeland Security
HOWARD COBLE, North Carolina, Chairman
TOM FEENEY, Florida ROBERT C. SCOTT, Virginia
BOB GOODLATTE, Virginia ADAM B. SCHIFF, California
STEVE CHABOT, Ohio SHEILA JACKSON LEE, Texas
MARK GREEN, Wisconsin MAXINE WATERS, California
RIC KELLER, Florida MARTIN T. MEEHAN, Massachusetts
MIKE PENCE, Indiana
J. RANDY FORBES, Virginia
Jay Apperson, Chief Counsel
Elizabeth Sokul, Counsel
Katy Crooks, Counsel
Bobby Vassar, Minority Counsel
C O N T E N T S
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MARCH 30, 2004
OPENING STATEMENT
Page
The Honorable Howard Coble, a Representative in Congress From the
State of North Carolina, and Chairman, Subcommittee on Crime,
Terrorism, and Homeland Security............................... 1
The Honorable Robert C. Scott, a Representative in Congress From
the State of Virginia, and Ranking Member, Subcommittee on
Crime, Terrorism, and Homeland Security........................ 2
WITNESSES
Mr. Michael Kirkpatrick, Assistant Director, Federal Bureau of
Investigation, Criminal Justice Information Services Division,
Department of Justice
Oral Testimony................................................. 4
Prepared Statement............................................. 5
The Honorable Jeanine Pirro, District Attorney, Westchester
County, NY
Oral Testimony................................................. 7
Prepared Statement............................................. 9
Mr. Don Walker, Chairman, Pinkerton Security, Executive Member,
American Society of Industrial Security, Board of Directors,
National Association of Security Guard Companies
Oral Testimony................................................. 11
Prepared Statement............................................. 12
Mr. Lewis Maltby, President, National Work Rights Institute
Oral Testimony................................................. 27
Prepared Statement............................................. 28
APPENDIX
Material Submitted for the Hearing Record
Prepared Statement of the Honorable Sheila Jackson Lee, a
Representative in Congress From the State of Texas............. 41
Questions and Responses for the Record from Michael Kirkpatrick.. 46
Questions and Responses for the Record from the Honorable Jeanine
Pirro.......................................................... 51
Questions and Responses for the Record from Don Walker........... 52
Prepared Statement of Ira A. Lipman, Founder and Chairman,
Guardsmark, LLC................................................ 69
Prepared Statement of William C. Whitmore, Jr., President and
Chief Executive Officer, Allied Security, LLC.................. 79
Prepared Statement of Cecil Hogan, President, National Burglar &
Fire Alarm Association (NBFAA)................................. 86
Prepared Statement of the National Association of Security
Companies...................................................... 86
Letter from Warren B. Rudman, Counsel, Paul, Weiss, Rifkind,
Wharton, & Garrison LLP........................................ 88
PRIVATE SECURITY OFFICER EMPLOYMENT AUTHORIZATION ACT OF 2003
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TUESDAY, MARCH 30, 2004
House of Representatives,
Subcommittee on Crime, Terrorism,
and Homeland Security
Committee on the Judiciary,
Washington, DC.
The Subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 1:27 p.m., in
Room 2141, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Howard Coble
(Chair of the Subcommittee) presiding.
Mr. Coble. Ladies and gentlemen, I apologize for the delay,
but as I said to you previously, when we have bills from this
Committee on the floor, we suspend the hearing time. The debate
has been completed, I'm told, so now we can commence with our
hearing.
Today the Subcommittee on Crime, Terrorism, and Homeland
Security is holding a hearing on S. 1743, the ``Private
Security Officer Employment Authorization Act of 2003,'' and
the need for background checks in general.
More and more, private security officers are utilized to
protect our nation's assets, both in the Government and in the
private sector. These assets are as diverse as the protection
of the neighborhood shopping center to the protection of
nuclear power plants. These officers act as the eyes and ears
of both private corporations and the law enforcement community.
The problem is, as USA Today reported in January of 2003, most
of the nation's 1 million plus guards are unlicensed,
untrained, and not subject to background checks. Their
burgeoning $12 billion industry is marked by high turnover, low
pay, few benefits, and scant oversight. And according to
Government officials and industry experts, little has changed
since September 11, 2001.
S. 1743 addresses the unique need of the security officer
industry for criminal history background checks on employees
and prospective employees. Without such checks, those entrusted
to protect our citizens and critical infrastructure could be
the very people the security guards are hired to protect
against--that is, terrorists and criminals.
As we continue waging the war against terrorism, other
industries may also realize a need for criminal background
checks but we must also examine the need for criminal history
background checks, that may involve nonterrorism concerns, such
as child care workers, for example. The Committee believes that
certain types of employment should require additional screening
of employees and applicants, but I have to wonder if the way
that we have been addressing this issue, one bill at a time, is
the most effective or most efficient.
The bill we will hear about today can trace its history to
1991. There are at least two dozen different laws with
different definitions and different process structures
directing the Attorney General and the FBI to conduct criminal
history background checks. Since the September 11, 2001
attacks, the number of checks conducted by the FBI's integrated
automated fingerprint identification system has grown from an
average of 41,400 per day to 48,215 per day. Other queries of
the FBI databases for immigration, law enforcement, and other
purposes have also shown significant increases.
We're looking forward to hearing from our distinguished
panel of witnesses today, and I am now pleased to recognize the
distinguished gentleman from Virginia, the Ranking Member of
the Subcommittee, Mr. Bobby Scott.
Mr. Scott. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I'm pleased to join you
in convening the hearing on S. 1743, the ``Private Security
Officer Employment Authorization Act of 2003.'' The private
security workers play a vital role in not only securing our
businesses and personal properties from theft and vandalism but
also protecting critical infrastructure, both public and
private, from threat of terrorism. Because of the nature of a
security position and the importance of the work, it is
necessary that employers have background information on
applicants, such as their criminal record history, to ensure
that they are trustworthy.
The private security industry is a growing industry,
particularly since the 9/11 tragedies, and is important to our
economy. At a time when many of the traditional manufacturing
jobs, which have been the foundation of our economy and the
livelihood of so many families, we must ensure that we have
sufficient workforce both in the quantity and the quality of
people available for jobs.
Criminal records checks can assist in weeding out
untrustworthy persons but must not serve to block worthy people
due to unsubstantial or unreliable information. Raw criminal
record history information viewed by untrained eyes could do
more harm than good in this regard and unfairly deprive an
employee or applicant of a good work opportunity and the
employer of a good worker, as well.
So an important balance must be struck to ensure employers
get relevant information on which to assess qualifications for
important and sometimes sensitive work while avoiding confusing
or unfairly prejudicial information. The Private Security
Officer Employment Authorization Act goes a long way toward
meeting that balance by limiting the access to felonies and
crimes involving dishonesty within the last 10 years. While
some issue has been raised about the advisability of unresolved
arrest data, perhaps a balance can be struck there, as well.
While we would not expect a bank to hire an applicant with an
unresolved bank robbery arrest in the last year, we would not
want bogus, insubstantial charges which are not prosecuted to
deny employment, either.
So Mr. Chairman, I think it's a good bill that may be
improved with some relatively minor tweaking, with eventually
becoming part of a more uniform system of criminal background
checks that we may ask the Attorney General to develop.
And in that vein, Mr. Chairman, I think since there's a
consensus that we'd like the bill to be adopted, I would hope
that the witnesses spend much of their time telling us which
records should be available and how to make those records
available and I yield back.
Mr. Coble. I thank the gentleman.
We're also pleased to have with us the distinguished
gentleman from Florida and the distinguished gentleman from
Ohio, Mr. Feeney and Mr. Chabot.
Today we have four distinguished witnesses, one from the
Federal Government, one from local government, one from the
private sector, and the final witness from a public interest
group serving worker rights.
Our first witness is Mr. Michael Kirkpatrick, Assistant
Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation. Mr.
Kirkpatrick is in charge of the FBI's Criminal Justice
Information Services Division in Clarksburg, West Virginia, the
largest division within the FBI. Mr. Kirkpatrick has over 21
years of service in the FBI and has served at FBI posts in New
Orleans, Pocatello, San Antonio, Cleveland, and Kansas City,
Missouri. In his long and distinguished career he has
investigated or supervised investigations relating to
counterterrorism, counterintelligence, civil rights, applicant
investigations, and white collar crime matters. Mr. Kirkpatrick
is a certified public accountant and a graduate of Purdue
University in West Lafayette, Louisiana.
Our second witness is the honorable Jeanine Pirro, district
attorney for Westchester County, New York. Ms. Pirro was first
selected to serve as the chief law enforcement officer for
Westchester County in 1993. Immediately prior to that she
served as a county court judge after serving in the district
attorney's office in many distinguished positions for over 15
years. Ms. Pirro is the author of two books, several articles,
and is a frequent commentator on national television. She has
brought criminal justice issues to the people by hosting and
producing two local cable television shows. Ms. Pirro has
received numerous awards, including most recently the
Distinguished Women in Law Enforcement Award from the New York
Law Enforcement Foundation. She holds a bachelor's degree from
the University of Buffalo and a Juris Doctorate from the Albany
School of Law.
Our next witness is Mr. Don Walker. Mr. Walker serves as
chairman of Securitas Security Services, U.S.A., Inc., a
subsidiary of the Securitas Group. With over 120,000 security
officers and over $3 billion in revenues, Securitas is one of
the world's largest and most respected international security
companies.
Mr. Walker has held numerous executive positions with
Pinkerton's, Inc., including chairman, CEO, and president. He
is past president of the American Society for Industrial
Security and currently co-chairs their Commission for Security
Guidelines. He's also a member of the board of directors of the
National Association of Security Companies and a member of the
International Association of Chiefs of Police. Mr. Walker is a
former special agent of the Federal Bureau of Investigation and
holds a bachelors degree from the University of Louisville and
a Juris Doctorate from the Nashville School of Law.
Our final witness is Mr. Louis Maltby, founder and
president of the National Work Rights Institute. Mr. Maltby is
a nationally recognized expert on human rights in the workplace
and was an original founder of the National Workplace Rights
Office of the American Civil Liberties Union. Mr. Maltby holds
a Bachelor of Arts degree and a Juris Ddoctorate from the
University of Pennsylvania.
I apologize to you all for my lengthy introduction, but I
think it's important that all of us recognize the background
and the expertise that these witnesses do bring to the witness
table.
Lady and gentlemen, as you all have been previously advised
by us, I hope that you can confine your oral testimony to the
5-minute mark, and we impose the 5-minute mark against us, as
well, when we examine you all. Your 5 minutes will be up when
you see the red light illuminated on that little panel on your
desk, and when the amber light illuminates, you will know that
you'd better start scurrying because it'll soon be red.
Thanks to all of you for being here, and Mr. Kirkpatrick,
we will start with you.
STATEMENT OF MICHAEL KIRKPATRICK, ASSISTANT DIRECTOR, FEDERAL
BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, CRIMINAL JUSTICE INFORMATION SERVICES
DIVISION, DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
Mr. Kirkpatrick. Good afternoon, Mr. Chairman and Members
of the Committee. Thank you for the opportunity to appear
before you this afternoon to discuss the FBI's fingerprint
identification program. I have provided a written statement for
the record but I would like to make just a few comments.
Since 1924, the FBI's been the national repository for
fingerprints and related criminal history data. Today our
fingerprint holdings are divided into two categories: criminal
and civil. The FBI's master criminal fingerprint file contains
the records of approximately 47 million individuals while our
civil file contains the records of approximately 31 million
individuals.
The civil file primarily contains fingerprints of people
who have served or are serving currently in the U.S. military
or in the Federal Government. A civil fingerprint card may also
be submitted regarding an individual who is seeking employment
for a position of trust, such as Federal employment, adopting a
child, seeking U.S. citizenship, or serving as a volunteer.
Civil fingerprint checks are submitted to the FBI based upon a
specific Federal law authorizing such a check or based upon a
State or municipal statute which authorizes such a check in
compliance with Public Law 92-544.
Every day the FBI receives, as you pointed out, nearly
50,000 fingerprint submissions. During the last fiscal year we
received a total of almost 18 million fingerprint submissions.
Of this amount, approximately 48 percent or 8.6 million of
those fingerprint submissions were civil submissions. Our
response goal for civil fingerprint cards electronically
submitted to the FBI is to process and provide a response
within 24 hours. Today we are meeting this goal 99 percent of
the time and, in fact, our average response time is
approximately 2 hours.
So what is the benefit of conducting civil fingerprint
background checks? Our statistics show that an average hit rate
of 12 percent for civil fingerprint checks. This equates to
approximately 900,000 checks every year being identified to
individuals with existing criminal history records.
In addition to the fingerprint check, all civil background
checks undergo a name-based search against the wanted person
file and the terrorist watch list that are located within the
National Crime Information Center.
As Congress considers expanding the occupations and
professions which require fingerprint-based background checks,
I would suggest that the need to develop a comprehensive
national infrastructure to support such checks is vitally
needed. Specifically, many law enforcement agencies, which
typically are the starting point for the capture of civil
fingerprints, are either not equipped to do so in an efficient
manner or do not have the personnel resources to do so.
State identification bureaus, which also play a key role in
this process, are likewise often underequipped and
understaffed. This limits the ability to conduct a thorough and
timely check for those who are applying for positions of
responsibility and trust and could ultimately result in the
need to institute some type of prioritization of such checks as
the existing infrastructure become overloaded.
While the answers to the needs I have just raised are
currently undetermined, the FBI, Department of Justice and our
partners are in the process of finalizing the feasibility study
required under section 108(d) of the Protect Act, Public Law
108-21. This study will begin to answer many of the questions
concerning how best to develop a national infrastructure to
accommodate the growing demand for fingerprint-based background
checks.
Mr. Chairman, I'd like to invite you and Members of the
Committee to visit us in West Virginia and personally see the
investment in our state-of-the-art fingerprint technology.
Thank you again for the privilege to appear before you and I
will obviously be available for any questions that you might
have.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Kirkpatrick follows:]
Prepared Statement of Michael D. Kirkpatrick
GOOD MORNING MR. CHAIRMAN AND MEMBERS OF THE COMMITTEE. I AM
MICHAEL D. KIRKPATRICK AND I AM THE ASSISTANT DIRECTOR IN CHARGE OF THE
CRIMINAL JUSTICE INFORMATION SERVICES DIVISION OF THE FBI. I THANK YOU
FOR THE OPPORTUNITY TO APPEAR BEFORE THIS COMMITTEE IN ORDER TO DISCUSS
THE FBI'S FINGERPRINT IDENTIFICATION PROGRAM.
SINCE 1924, THE FBI HAS BEEN THE NATIONAL REPOSITORY FOR
FINGERPRINTS AND RELATED CRIMINAL HISTORY DATA. AT THAT TIME, 810,188
FINGERPRINT RECORDS FROM THE NATIONAL BUREAU OF CRIMINAL IDENTIFICATION
AND LEAVENWORTH PENITENTIARY WERE CONSOLIDATED TO FORM THE NUCLEUS OF
THE FBI'S FILES. OVER THE YEARS, THE SIZE OF OUR FINGERPRINT FILES HAS
GROWN AND THE DEMAND FOR THE PROGRAM'S SERVICES HAS STEADILY INCREASED.
OUR FINGERPRINT HOLDINGS ARE DIVIDED INTO TWO CATEGORIES--CRIMINAL AND
CIVIL. TODAY, THE FBI'S MASTER CRIMINAL FINGERPRINT FILE CONTAINS THE
RECORDS OF APPROXIMATELY 47 MILLION INDIVIDUALS, WHILE OUR CIVIL FILE
REPRESENTS APPROXIMATELY 30.7 MILLION INDIVIDUALS. THE CIVIL FILE
PREDOMINANTLY CONTAINS FINGERPRINTS OF INDIVIDUALS WHO HAVE SERVED OR
ARE SERVING IN THE U.S. MILITARY OR HAVE BEEN OR ARE EMPLOYED BY THE
FEDERAL GOVERNMENT.
A CRIMINAL CARD IS EXACTLY AS THE NAME IMPLIES. IT IS THE
FINGERPRINTS OF AN INDIVIDUAL WHO HAS BEEN ARRESTED AND CHARGED WITH A
CRIME. A CIVIL CARD IS SUBMITTED REGARDING AN INDIVIDUAL WHO IS SEEKING
EMPLOYMENT IN CERTAIN POSITIONS, SUCH AS FEDERAL EMPLOYMENT, THE
MILITARY, OR THE BANKING/SECURITIES INDUSTRY; OR IS ADOPTING A CHILD;
SEEKING U.S. CITIZENSHIP; OR SERVING AS A VOLUNTEER (E.G., AT A CHILD
OR SENIOR DAY CARE CENTER) AND REQUIRES A NATIONAL FINGERPRINT
BACKGROUND CHECK AS PART OF THE SCREENING PROCESS. CIVIL FINGERPRINT
CHECKS ARE SUBMITTED TO THE FBI BASED UPON A SPECIFIC FEDERAL LAW
AUTHORIZING A NATIONAL FINGERPRINT BACKGROUND CHECK, OR BASED UPON A
STATE STATUTE OR A MUNICIPAL ORDINANCE, IF AUTHORIZED BY A STATE
STATUTE, AUTHORIZING A NATIONAL BACKGROUND CHECK IN COMPLIANCE WITH
PUBLIC LAW 92-544.
FOR ITS FIRST 75 YEARS OF EXISTENCE, THE PROCESSING OF INCOMING
FINGERPRINT CARDS BY THE FBI WAS PREDOMINANTLY A MANUAL, TIME
CONSUMING, LABOR INTENSIVE PROCESS. FINGERPRINT CARDS WERE MAILED TO
THE FBI FOR PROCESSING AND A PAPER-BASED RESPONSE WAS MAILED BACK. IT
WOULD TAKE ANYWHERE FROM WEEKS TO MONTHS TO PROCESS A FINGERPRINT CARD.
HOWEVER, THAT ALL CHANGED ON JULY 28, 1999, WITH THE IMPLEMENTATION
OF THE INTEGRATED AUTOMATED FINGERPRINT IDENTIFICATION SYSTEM, OR
IAFIS. THE IAFIS WAS THE DAWN OF A NEW ERA FOR THE FBI'S FINGERPRINT
IDENTIFICATION PROGRAM AS IT PERMITS THE PROCESSING OF ALL INCOMING
FINGERPRINT SUBMISSIONS IN A TOTALLY ELECTRONIC ENVIRONMENT.
EVERY DAY, THE FBI RECEIVES NEARLY 50,000 FINGERPRINT SUBMISSIONS,
WHICH ARE SENT TO US IN EITHER AN ELECTRONIC FORMAT OR PAPER-BASED. THE
PAPER-BASED SUBMISSIONS ARE CONVERTED TO AN ELECTRONIC FORMAT PRIOR TO
PROCESSING ON THE IAFIS. DURING FISCAL YEAR 2003, THE FBI RECEIVED A
TOTAL OF 17,736,541 FINGERPRINT SUBMISSIONS. OF THIS TOTAL, 48 PERCENT,
OR APPROXIMATELY 8.6 MILLION, WERE CIVIL FINGERPRINT SUBMISSIONS. OF
THE NEARLY 8.6 MILLION CIVIL SUBMISSIONS, 73 PERCENT, OR SLIGHTLY MORE
THAN 6.2 MILLION, WERE SENT TO US ELECTRONICALLY.
IN ADDITION TO THE ELECTRONIC OR PAPER-BASED METHODS OF SUBMITTING
FINGERPRINTS TO THE FBI, THERE ARE TWO PATHS A CIVIL FINGERPRINT MAY
TRAVEL. THE MOST COMMON METHOD STARTS WITH THE FINGERPRINTING OF AN
INDIVIDUAL AT A BOOKING STATION. THE PRINTS ARE FORWARDED TO THE
AUTHORIZED STATE AGENCY FOR A CHECK AGAINST STATE RECORDS. THE STATE
AGENCY THEN FORWARDS THE PRINTS TO THE FBI FOR A NATIONAL BACKGROUND
CHECK. THIS METHOD COMPLIES WITH PUBLIC LAW 92-544 AND PROVIDES A MORE
COMPLETE BACKGROUND CHECK.
THE SECOND PATH INVOLVES THE USE OF A CHANNELING AGENCY, SUCH AS
THE AMERICAN BANKERS ASSOCIATION, ABA, OR THE OFFICE OF PERSONNEL
MANAGEMENT, OPM. THE ABA AND THE OPM, FOR EXAMPLE, SERVE AS A SINGLE
POINT FOR FORWARDING CIVIL FINGERPRINT CHECKS DIRECTLY TO THE FBI.
UNDER THIS METHOD, ONLY A NATIONAL BACKGROUND CHECK IS CONDUCTED.
OUR GOAL FOR CIVIL FINGERPRINT CARDS ELECTRONICALLY SUBMITTED TO
THE FBI IS TO PROCESS AND PROVIDE A RESPONSE WITHIN 24 HOURS. TODAY, WE
ARE MEETING THIS GOAL 99 PERCENT OF THE TIME, AND OUR AVERAGE RESPONSE
TIME IS APPROXIMATELY TWO HOURS. ONCE PAPER-BASED SUBMISSIONS ARE
RECEIVED BY THE FBI THEY ARE CONVERTED TO AN ELECTRONIC FORMAT,
INJECTED INTO THE IAFIS FOR PROCESSING, A PAPER-BASED RESPONSE IS
GENERATED, AND THAT RESPONSE IS THEN MAILED TO THE CONTRIBUTOR. IT
TAKES BETWEEN FIVE AND TEN BUSINESS DAYS FROM THE TIME A PAPER-BASED
CIVIL CARD IS MAILED TO THE FBI AND A RESPONSE IS RECEIVED BY THE
CONTRIBUTOR.
SO, WHAT IS THE BENEFIT OF CONDUCTING CIVIL FINGERPRINT BACKGROUND
CHECKS? OUR STATISTICS SHOW AN ANNUAL HIT RATE OF 12 PERCENT. THIS
EQUATES TO APPROXIMATELY 900,000 CHECKS PER YEAR BEING IDENTIFIED TO
INDIVIDUALS WITH EXISTING CRIMINAL HISTORY RECORDS. IN ADDITION TO THE
FINGERPRINT CHECK, ALL CIVIL SUBMISSIONS UNDERGO A NAME-BASED SEARCH OF
THE SUBJECT AGAINST THE WANTED PERSON FILE AND THE TERRORIST WATCH LIST
LOCATED WITHIN THE NATIONAL CRIME INFORMATION CENTER.
THE FBI CHARGES A FEE FOR PROCESSING CIVIL FINGERPRINT SUBMISSIONS.
OUR FEE FOR THIS SERVICE RANGES FROM $16 TO $22 DEPENDING ON THE TYPE
OF SERVICE REQUESTED. THE FBI USES THIS MONEY TO OFFSET THE OVERHEAD
AND OPERATIONAL COSTS OF PROVIDING THIS SERVICE, AND FOR MAINTENANCE
AND TECHNOLOGICAL REFRESHMENTS TO OUR NATIONAL COMPUTERIZED DATABASES.
AS CONGRESS CONSIDERS EXPANDING THE OCCUPATIONS AND PROFESSIONS
WHICH REQUIRE FINGERPRINT-BASED BACKGROUND CHECKS, I BELIEVE IT MUST
ALSO CONSIDER THE VITAL NEED TO DEVELOP A COMPREHENSIVE NATIONAL
INFRASTRUCTURE TO SUPPORT SUCH CHECKS, INCLUDING THE MEANS OF
COLLECTING THE REQUIRED FINGERPRINTS, AND PROCESSING THE CHECKS.
SPECIFICALLY, MANY LAW ENFORCEMENT AGENCIES, SUCH AS POLICE DEPARTMENTS
AND JAIL FACILITIES, WHICH TYPICALLY ARE THE STARTING POINT FOR THE
CAPTURE OF FINGERPRINTS, DO NOT HAVE THE RESOURCES TO CAPTURE THE
PRINTS FOR A SIGNIFICANTLY HIGHER VOLUME OF NEW CIVIL CHECKS, EITHER
ELECTRONICALLY OR MANUALLY. IN ADDITION, FOR MOST OF THESE NON-CRIMINAL
JUSTICE CHECKS, A LAW ENFORCEMENT AGENCY IS NOT THE MOST APPROPRIATE
VENUE FOR COLLECTING THE PRINTS. STATE IDENTIFICATION BUREAUS, WHICH
ALSO PLAY A KEY ROLE IN THIS PROCESS, ARE LIKEWISE OFTEN UNDER-EQUIPPED
AND UNDER-STAFFED. THIS LIMITS THE ABILITY TO CONDUCT A THOROUGH AND
TIMELY CIVIL CHECKS AND COULD EVENTUALLY RESULT IN THE NEED TO
INSTITUTE SOME TYPE OF PRIORITIZATION OF SUCH CHECKS AS THE EXISTING
INFRASTRUCTURE BECOMES OVERLOADED.
WHILE THE ANSWERS TO THE QUESTIONS I HAVE JUST RAISED ARE CURRENTLY
UNDETERMINED, THE FBI, DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, AND OUR PARTNERS ARE IN
THE PROCESS OF FINALIZING THE FEASIBILITY STUDY REQUIRED BY SECTION
108(D) OF THE ``PROTECT ACT,'' PUBLIC LAW NO. 108-21, LEGISLATION
ENACTED LAST YEAR TO PROVIDE NEW INVESTIGATIVE AND PROSECUTORIAL
REMEDIES AND OTHER TOOLS TO COMBAT THE EXPLOITATION OF CHILDREN. THIS
STUDY IS REQUIRED TO ADDRESS FOURTEEN SPECIFIC AREAS, SUCH AS ``THE
COST OF DEVELOPMENT AND OPERATION OF . . . THE INFRASTRUCTURE NECESSARY
TO ESTABLISH A NATIONWIDE FINGERPRINT-BASED AND OTHER CRIMINAL
BACKGROUND CHECK SYSTEM.'' THE STUDY WILL BEGIN TO ANSWER MANY OF THE
QUESTIONS CONCERNING HOW BEST TO DEVELOP SUCH A NATIONAL INFRASTRUCTURE
TO ACCOMMODATE THE INCREASING DEMAND FOR FINGERPRINT-BASED BACKGROUND
CHECKS.
IN CLOSING, I WOULD LIKE TO INVITE THE MEMBERS OF THE COMMITTEE TO
VISIT THE FBI WEST VIRGINIA COMPLEX AND PERSONALLY SEE OUR DYANAMIC
FINGERPRINT PROGRAM AND STATE-OF-THE-ART FACILITIES. I AGAIN THANK YOU
FOR THE PRIVILEGE TO APPEAR BEFORE THIS COMMITTEE. I AM AVAILABLE FOR
ANY QUESTIONS YOU MAY HAVE.
Mr. Coble. Thank you, Mr. Kirkpatrick. And we have been
joined by the distinguished gentleman from Virginia, Mr.
Goodlatte, and the distinguished gentleman from Wisconsin, Mr.
Green.
Ms. Pirro, you're recognized for 5 minutes.
STATEMENT OF THE HONORABLE JEANINE PIRRO,
DISTRICT ATTORNEY, WESTCHESTER COUNTY, NY
Ms. Pirro. Thank you. Mr. Chairman and Members of the
Committee, I wish to thank you for inviting me to speak this
afternoon and I've come here to urge you to implement
safeguards that employers desperately need in order to make
informed hiring decisions. After more than 25 years in law
enforcement I have learned that the first order of Government
is the protection of its citizens and Government fails when it
does not give employers the right to know who they are hiring
and when the Government allows individuals with ulterior
motives to fake their identifications, to apply for jobs
without verification of who they truly are.
I come from a county of almost 1 million people and we
prosecute almost 35,000 cases every year. I have seen virtually
every kind of violation of the law in my work as both a judge
and a prosecutor and what I know is that every day individuals
seek employment in communities around this country for
sensitive positions, positions of trust, and a history of
maintaining or violating the laws of our society are essential
factors to be weighed by prospective employers before making a
hiring decision.
The public policy objective is self-evident. Employers
deserve access to public information regarding those who seek
their trust, yet our laws do not provide a uniform mechanism
for most employers to access what is perhaps the most telling
information about an individual--a person's criminal record.
There are many things about our lives that we are entitled
to keep private. Criminal convictions are not among them.
Criminal convictions are a matter of public record and if
Government fails to even assist in securing the safety of its
citizens it is abrogating its most essential duty.
You have the means to provide broad access to these records
and I would argue the obligation to do so. The lack of
uniformity in our statutes across the country has led to the
hiring of individuals who misrepresent themselves and their
past in order to obtain a job. In an age of identity theft,
even the documentation an applicant might supply is potentially
suspect. And in the post-9/11 era when we restrict legitimate
employers from finding out critical information about job
applicants, we do so at the risk of public safety.
A piecemeal approach to this issue is not the answer. By
selectively identifying careers that will allow employers to
seek access to public records containing criminal histories, we
effectively preclude other equally desiring employers from the
same access. It is time for Congress to act and to do so with
recognition that it is in the best interest not only of
business but of our nation to craft a statute that allows for
inclusive rather than exclusive access to these already public
records.
Allow me to give you a couple of examples of how piecemeal
efforts at the State level have resulted in far too many holes.
In Westchester County we are entitled to know if someone is
working in a day care facility whether that individual has a
previous criminal record and yet private individuals who hire
someone to care for their children at home are not entitled to
that very same information. And it was only when a 10-year-old
was thrown against a wall in Westchester and killed--a 10-
month-old; excuse me--that we decided that we should change the
law to give parents access to information of prior criminal
histories. In that case the individual had a prior history,
criminal history, that the parent was not allowed to access.
Most employers have no way of knowing who they're hiring.
Just 2 weeks ago I addressed the American Campers Association
when I heard an outcry from camp directors that their efforts
to run background checks on prospective employees are stymied
by lax or nonexistent State statutes. The reality for them is
that they're forced to rely on individuals who simply want the
job, putting their campers and their business and reputation at
risk.
Our laws are a disjointed hodgepodge of narrow provisions
enacted one at a time on a position-by-position basis with no
attempt to rationalize why one sensitive position is subject to
a criminal history check while a different comparably sensitive
position is not.
On school buses in New York there are often two adults in
close confinement with our children--the bus driver and the
monitor. The bus drivers are subject to criminal background
checks. The bus monitor is not. I cannot tell you how many
monitors we've prosecuted in Westchester who would not have
been hired had there been any information that could be
verified regarding their criminal backgrounds.
And after a case in which a public school teacher sodomized
an 8- and 9-year-old boy in Westchester we found out that that
individual had had three prior criminal convictions that the
school could not access. The school was entitled to that
information and those children should not have been subjected
to that sodomy, which will forever affect their lives.
Those who affect children and work with children are but
one example. The issue here is not whether someone with a
criminal past should be disqualified from all employment. Those
who've been punished for breaking our laws should have every
reasonable opportunity to progress toward a normal law-abiding
life. But when there is a relationship between their criminal
history and the job, the employer should be allowed to make an
informed decision.
Just this morning when I was at the airport coming here----
Mr. Coble. Ms. Pirro, if you can wrap up?
Ms. Pirro. I am.
Mr. Coble. Your time has expired.
Ms. Pirro. I'm right there.
Mr. Coble. All right.
Ms. Pirro. I was required to take off my shoes, my jacket,
my coat, and be scanned. This is a privacy issue and I was more
than willing to subject myself to that for national security
and safety. And yet criminal histories that are already public
records are not allowed to be accessed and I believe that we
have an obligation to give to employers the right to know who
it is they're hiring. Thank you.
[The prepared statement of Ms. Pirro follows:]
Prepared Statement of Jeanine Ferris Pirro
Mr. Chairman, Members of the Committee:
I first wish to thank the Committee for inviting me to speak this
afternoon. I have come to Washington to urge you to implement
safeguards employers desperately need in order to make informed hiring
decisions.
Every day individuals seek employment in communities around the
United States for sensitive positions--positions of trust. Histories of
maintaining or violating the laws of society are essential factors to
be weighed by prospective employers before making these hiring
decisions. The public policy objective is self-evident: employers
deserve access to public information regarding those who seek their
trust.
Yet, our laws do not provide a uniform mechanism for most employers
to access what is perhaps the most telling historical information about
an individual--the person's criminal record. There are many things
about our lives that we are entitled to keep private. Criminal
convictions are not among them. Criminal convictions are matters of
public record. If government fails to assist in securing the safety of
its citizens, it is abrogating its most essential duty. You have the
means to provide broad access to these records and, I would argue, an
obligation to do so.
This lack of uniformity in our statutes has lead to the hiring of
individuals who have misrepresented their past in order to obtain their
positions. In the age of identity theft, even the documentation an
applicant might supply is potentially suspect. And in the post-9/11
era, when we restrict legitimate employers from finding out critical
information about job applicants, we do so at the risk of safety and
security.
A piecemeal approach to this issue is not the answer. By
selectively identifying careers that will allow employers to seek
access to public records containing criminal histories, we effectively
preclude other equally deserving employers the same access. It is time
for Congress to act and to do so with the recognition that it is in the
best interest not only of business, but of our nation to craft a
statute that allows for inclusive rather than exclusive access to these
public records.
Allow me to give you a sense of how piecemeal efforts to solve this
issue at the state level have resulted in far too many holes in the
safety net.
In almost three decades of service to law enforcement, it has
become abundantly clear to me that pedophiles are the most cunning,
devious and deceptive of criminals. It is almost invariably the case
that pedophiles will groom their intended victims before undertaking
actual sexual contact. The most effective means of ensuring that their
crimes are not uncovered is to establish themselves as respected and
responsible members of society. Frequently, this involves finding
employment that puts them in direct contact with children.
Employers are permitted by law to inquire if an applicant has ever
been convicted of a crime, permitted to require a formal statement on a
written application to this effect, permitted to deny employment if the
listed criminal conviction bears a relationship with the job offered,
and to discharge the employee if the written statement is false.
But with selected exceptions, most employers have no way of
determining whether the statement the employee has given is the truth,
or is a lie. Just two weeks ago, I addressed the American Campers
Association where I heard an outcry from camp directors that their
efforts to run background checks on prospective employees are stymied
by lax or non-existent state statutes. The reality for them is that
they are forced to reply perhaps on the false assertions of an
applicant, putting their campers and themselves at risk. And they are
but one category of employers who want access to these public records--
access which is denied.
The fact is that our laws in this area are a disjointed hodge-podge
of narrow provisions, enacted one at a time on a position-by-position
basis, with no attempt to rationalize why one sensitive position is
subject to a criminal history check while a different, comparably
sensitive position is not. At best, legislatures across this country
are constantly closing the barn door after the horse has escaped:
enacting legislation in the aftermath of a tragedy, limited to the
singular situation that tragedy involved.
Under New York law, for example, child-care employees in a day care
facility are subject to mandatory fingerprinting and criminal history
checks. But in the early 1990's similar caregivers working in their
employer's homes were not. As a result, when a family in my county
hired a young woman as the nanny for their 10-month-old son Kieran, and
attempted to conduct a criminal background check on her, they were told
that New York law did not permit it. So they never knew of the woman's
criminal past, which she indeed had. Not until it was too late. Not
until after the woman hurled 10-month-old Kieran across the room,
killing him.
As a result of this brutal homicide, working with Governor Pataki
and the New York Legislature, in 1998, we passed ``Kieran's Law'' to
remedy this situation. But ``Kieran's Law'' remedies only this
situation. Scores of similar disparities continue to exist.
For example, on school buses in New York, there are often two
adults in close confinement with our children: the bus driver and the
bus monitor. School bus drivers are subject to criminal background
checks; school bus monitors are not.
After a case in which a public school teacher with a criminal
history was convicted of sodomizing two young boys, New York enacted
the ``Safe Schools Against Violence in Education'' Law which required
fingerprinting and criminal background checks for all prospective
public school teachers and public school employees and volunteers. But
the law does not affect currently employed teachers, or teachers in
private schools, or volunteers working in group homes, or camp
employees, or the employees of private contactors. No, the unfortunate
reality is that we will have to await the commission of future criminal
acts before these criminal history problems will be addressed.
Those charged with the care of children are but one example. The
necessity for employers' access to criminal record checks holds true
for any number of prospective employers engaged in sensitive commerce.
Must we wait until the employer's faith is betrayed by the applicant
who repeats his crimes? What answer do we have for an employer who
unwittingly hires an individual with a criminal history of violence?
Can we afford to take the chance that a job applicant has told the
truth when in fact her intent is to gain access, through this
employment, to new victims? Are terrorists any different than
pedophiles when it comes to hiding their past and, thus, their motives
for obtaining employment?
The issue here is not whether someone with a criminal past should
be disqualified from all employment. Those who have been punished for
breaking our laws should have every reasonable opportunity to progress
toward a normal, law-abiding life. But when there is a relationship
between the employee's criminal history and the job, employers should
be allowed to make informed decisions.
We exist in a modern, mobile, Internet-connected society. This is
the information age. Yet we provide the opportunity for prospective
employees get away with lying because we deny employers the right to
access public records in order to verify the information they have been
given.
I ask the members of Congress to consider that a piecemeal approach
to criminal history checks has created a flawed dragnet--catching some,
while letting the rest pass through. We shouldn't wait until more
tragedies occur to address this problem. And we shouldn't have to
engage the laborious legislative process every time we realize that a
criminal history check is appropriate in a specific situation.
I respectfully ask this Committee to recognize the importance of a
standard, uniform procedure which can be utilized by all employers,
whose foremost interest--like our own--is protection and security.
Mr. Coble. Thank you, Ms. Pirro.
Mr. Walker?
STATEMENT OF DON WALKER, CHAIRMAN, PINKERTON SECURITY,
EXECUTIVE MEMBER, AMERICAN SOCIETY OF INDUSTRIAL SECURITY,
BOARD OF DIRECTORS, NATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF SECURITY GUARD
COMPANIES
Mr. Walker. Mr. Chairman, Members of the Subcommittee, I
appreciate the opportunity to be here to testify on behalf of
S. 1743 and urge the quick adoption by the U.S. House of
Representatives. We badly need this legislation to ensure that
persons who are convicted of serious crimes are identified
before they are deployed to protect our citizens and their
property.
There are roughly 800,000 sworn law enforcement officers in
the United States to protect a population of over 290 million
people. Police agencies are called upon to deter and solve
serious crimes while being engaged in a fight against potential
terrorist attacks orchestrated from abroad. Unfortunately there
is simply neither the public resources nor the personnel to do
the job comprehensively, as we would like to see it done.
Therefore in this era of increased demand for better
protection, private security officers are being asked to fill
the gap, fill the gap in homeland security.
Today the private security industry employs nearly 2
million people. Security personnel are on duty protecting
America in places where our citizens are working, living, and
playing. In addition, 85 percent of the nation's infrastructure
is owned and operated by private industry and private security
officers protect the vast majority of those assets.
Also, most of the first responders in the case of an attack
or other emergency in an office building, manufacturing plant,
public utility, shopping malls, and so forth are private
security officers.
Generally the regulation for private security officers is
left to the State. However, 10 States do not have laws
regulating private security and less than one-half of the
States require an FBI criminal history check before licensing.
Why should we care? I'd like to give you two examples. One
is in the State of California. In 2003 there were over 69,000
applicants for a Guard Card. Of those applicants, 9,000 or more
than 13 percent of the applicants were rejected after
information was received from the FBI Criminal Information
System and these individuals were denied a Guard Card.
Interestingly, the three most common reasons for denial were
one, sex-related crimes; two, battery and robbery; and three,
burglary. Data also showed in California that registered sex of
fenders frequently attempted to obtain a Guard Card.
In my home State of Illinois a review of January 2004
records for applicants that applied for a guard position showed
that the FBI criminal history check provided serious criminal
information four times more frequently than the State-wide
check within the State of Illinois.
Another problem within our industry is turnover and if you
use a conservative 50 percent turnover rate there are more than
79,000 security officers that are being hired each month with
less than one-half of those individuals being screened by an
FBI check. That's over 300,000 people being employed since the
Senate passed this bill in November.
Another factor which has been alluded to is the problem of
fraud, applicant fraud and identify and identity theft.
Mr. Chairman, to the specifics of this bill, first of all,
it's the product of a bipartisan group of senators who share
the belief that Congress needs to act swiftly to prevent
persons who have committed serious crimes from being hired into
positions of trust to protect their constituents, their
families, their homes, and places of employment. 1743 is not a
panacea. It is an important and necessary tool for the security
industry to keep the bad apples from being placed in positions
of responsibility.
Finally, the bill covers three major objectives. One, the
bill permits security companies to request an FBI fingerprint
check regarding prospective employees. Two, the bill protects
the individual's privacy by requiring that an applicant provide
a written authorization to an employer requesting the FBI
record check before such check is initiated. Further, the form
and content of the information provided to the employer will be
consistent with State laws and regulations. Finally, the bill
does not impose any unfunded mandates on the States and
employers may be assessed a fee to handle their requests. In
addition, the States may opt out or decline to participate in
the system.
In summary, Mr. Chairman, passage of 1743 will be a much
improved system and provide quality controls that will block
the most serious offenders from gaining employment in the
private security industry. The industry needs it but, more
importantly, our nation needs it. Thank you very much.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Walker follows:]
Prepared Statement of Don Wilson Walker
Mr. Chairman and Members of the Subcommittee, I am Don Walker,
Chairman of Securitas Security Services USA, Inc. Securitas is a world-
wide leader in providing security services to individuals, businesses,
government and private entities.
I appear today in my capacity as Chairman of the nation's largest
employer of private security officers and as a former President of the
ASIS International (ASIS), the security industry's largest professional
membership organization with over 35,000 members. I am also co-chair of
the ASIS Security Guidelines Commission.
I very much appreciate the opportunity to testify today in support
of S. 1743, the ``Private Security Officer Employment Authorization Act
of 2003,'' and to urge its quick adoption by the U.S. House of
Representatives. We badly need this legislation to ensure that persons
who are convicted of serious crimes are identified before they are
deployed to protect our citizens and their property. Americans need to
know that private security officers are part of the solution--not an
impediment--to preventing harm from any foreign or domestic threat.
By way of background, Securitas AB (Securitas), our parent company,
is organized and headquartered in Sweden. Securitas acquired
Pinkerton's, Inc. (Pinkerton) in 1999. Although we generally operate in
the United States under the Securitas name, Pinkerton still operates in
several localities. At the time of the acquisition, Pinkerton was the
nation's oldest, largest and one of the most respected security officer
companies. Indeed, Pinkerton remains one of the most recognizable brand
names for any product or service around the globe.
Pinkerton has a rich history dating back to1850, when the legendary
Allan Pinkerton, the ``original private eye,'' founded the company.
Since its inception, the company has become synonymous with protecting
the American public from an array of threats from outlaws, bandits and
thieves. In 1861, Pinkerton achieved national recognition when he
uncovered and foiled a threat to assassinate Abraham Lincoln. Later
that year, Pinkerton formed the federal Secret Service, of which he
became chief. Early in the company's history, Pinkerton apprehended
some of the nation's most notorious train and/or bank robbers and
started the interstate identification system to track bandits from
State to State. In the time since, Pinkerton has been at the forefront
of improving the screening, pay and training of security officers.
In 2000, Securitas acquired another legendary American private
security company. Burns International was founded in 1909 by William J.
Burns, who was known as ``the greatest detective the U.S. had
produced.'' In 1921, he was appointed director of the newly formed
Bureau of Investigation that later became the FBI. Like Allan
Pinkerton, Burns' drive, determination and commitment to service helped
his company grow from a small detective agency to the second largest
security provider in the U. S.
Long before the tragic events of September 11, Securitas and our
predecessors called for higher standards and qualifications for private
security officers. Our personnel and customers--your constituents--
deserve no less.
I reference this history as a way of introducing the company's
credentials as well as its long and proud tradition and experience of
protecting the country's human and physical resources. I am proud to
say that Securitas USA, as part of the global Securitas Group, remains
committed to the principles of our founders. Securitas is built around
a core set of values--Integrity, Vigilance and Helpfulness. Like other
responsible employers in the U. S. security industry, we must
constantly strive to improve the standards of our profession. Our
people are the essence of Securitas and we believe in building
relationships based on mutual respect and dignity with all our
employees. To enable our people to carry out their professional duties,
we constantly provide training programs and promote higher wages and
industry standards.
Mr. Chairman, I would like to cite one simple but very important
statistic that is at the heart of the debate today over whether to
authorize a national system for criminal background checks for private
security officers.
The fact is this: There are roughly 800,000 sworn law enforcement
officers in the United States today to protect a population of over 290
million residents. Never in the history of the nation have law
enforcement agencies been called upon to fulfill two fundamentally
different and competing missions--to deter domestic crime while also
being engaged in the fight against potentially new and devastating
terrorist attacks orchestrated from abroad. Unfortunately, there are
simply neither the public resources nor the personnel to do the job as
completely or comprehensively as we all would like. Consequently, in
this era of heightened need and demand for better security, private
security officers are being asked to fill the gap.
The role of private security was recently highlighted by Admiral
James Loy, the Deputy Secretary of the Department of Homeland Security.
He stated at a recent conference in Washington that, ``. . . unlike
wars of the past . . . this is not going to be a situation where the
federal government simply does it for the nation.'' We concur.
Today, private security companies collectively employ nearly two
million security officers nationwide. As we speak, security personnel
are on duty protecting American businesses, public offices, schools,
shopping centers and housing communities. In addition, private security
officers are stationed at many of the nation's critical infrastructure
sites and facilities including nuclear plants, public utilities, oil
pipelines, ports, bridges, tunnels and many other places where our
citizens live, work and play.
Recent estimates indicate that 85% of the nation's infrastructure
is owned and operated by private industry. Private security officers
protect the vast majority of these assets. Similarly, the overwhelming
majority of ``first responders,'' who are first on the scene in the
case of an attack or other emergency situation in our manufacturing
plants, office buildings, banks, public utilities, shopping malls, are,
more often than not, private security officers.
Mr. Chairman, a 2003 Presidential report entitled, ``The National
Strategy for the Physical Protection of Critical Infrastructure and Key
Assets,'' noted . . . ``the private sector generally remains the first
line of defense for its own facilities.'' Further, the report states
that the [Strategy] ``provides a foundation for building and fostering
the cooperative environment in which government, industry and private
citizens can carry out their respective protection responsibilities
more effectively and efficiently.'' The legislation under discussion
today is but one of many key elements that are required in order to
fulfill our responsibilities as providers of reliable security
services.
Clearly, private security is an integral part of our homeland
security. In times of crisis and disaster, businesses rely on private
security to protect people and property. And yet, with so much at risk,
and so much being protected by private security forces, there is little
in the way of federal oversight or regulation of the people we employ.
For the most part, regulation of the private security officers is
left to the States. Only forty (40) States have laws on their books
regulating security officers. Of the forty (40) States with licensing
requirements, thirty-one (31) States either permit or require an
applicant to undergo a FBI fingerprint check for prior criminal
history. However, in those thirty-one (31) states, an FBI fingerprint/
background check is permitted but not required in some jurisdictions,
and required in seven (7) states when the person is applying for an
armed guard position only. Thus, more than half the States do not
automatically subject applicants to some type of background check. (See
Attachments 1 and 2.)
Why should we care? What does it matter? Here's why Congress needs
to act.
In 2003, in the State of California, there were over 69,000 ``Guard
Card'' applicants. Of those applicants, almost 18,000 had an FBI
``rap'' sheet indicating some sort of a prior criminal history. Thanks
largely to a new law that went into effect in California in 2003, over
9,000 or 51% of those applicants with a rap sheet were denied a guard
card. Prior to the implementation of the law, security officers could
have been employed on a temporary basis for three months or longer.
Interestingly, the three most common reasons for denial were for sex
related offenses, burglary/robbery and battery convictions. Data also
showed that registered sex offenders frequently attempted to obtain a
guard card.
Although most states do not keep the type of statistics as provided
by California, limited information from other States tell a similar
story. In States such as Virginia and Florida, the rejection rate due
to FBI records checks is estimated by the states to range from about 1%
to 4% of all security officer applicants.
In my home State of Illinois, a review of January, 2004 applicants
showed that the FBI criminal history records check eliminated four
times as many applicants as the Illinois State Police check for crimes
committed within the State. Put another way, Illinois State Police
clear 87% of all applicants while the FBI check clears only 64%--a 23%
difference.
Equally important is the turnover rate among security officers. The
security industry records one of the highest ``drop out'' rates of
employees. On average, companies suffer between a 20-70% turnover in
security officers. However, some studies suggest a rate ranging between
100-300%. A more conservative estimate is 50%. Thus, at that rate,
there are 79,000 new private security officers being hired each month
based on the current 1.9 million workforce--and only a relatively few
of these applicants are undergoing an FBI criminal history background
check because they are employed in states that have not authorized
these checks.
Another factor that we must contend with is applicant fraud and
identity theft.
I am sure it will come as no surprise to the members of the
Subcommittee when I say that people are not always entirely truthful
when they fill out a job application. In a word, they lie--who they
are, where they live, where they worked, whether they have a criminal
conviction history, whether they are living legally in the country and
so on. Similarly, the incidence of identity theft has been made easier
by computers. Crooks, today, are increasingly sophisticated and are
able to manufacture fake documents such as licenses, social security
and immigration cards that are near perfect matches to the real thing.
Identity theft is rampant throughout the country and afflicts not just
our industry but individuals and businesses everywhere.
Consider this example. In Illinois, applicants for a security
officer position can complete an application at one of our local
offices. If they present some form of identification that appears
legitimate, we forward the application to the State Police for a
background check. A fingerprint check is automatically conducted in the
State and subsequently sent to the FBI. As the statistics cited above
demonstrate, the State Police clear a large percentage of applicants
(87%). However, if that individual had committed a crime in neighboring
states, such as Wisconsin, Iowa, Missouri or Indiana, the State Police
check alone would not uncover those crimes. Nor would the check reveal
whether the applicant had disclosed his/her true identity. Only a
nationwide fingerprint search would ascertain the true identity and
background of an applicant.
These are but a few examples of the kinds of situations security
companies are facing each day.
Mr. Chairman, let me turn now to the specifics of the legislation
under consideration today.
S. 1743 can trace its origins to legislation (S. 1258) introduced
in 1991 by then Senator Al Gore. His bill would have required the
General Services Administration to promulgate rules establishing
standards for the hiring of Federal and private security officers. The
bill also mandated that security officers be subject to a criminal
background check as a pre-condition of employment. Funds would have
also been provided to States to develop a regulatory scheme that
mirrored the GSA's standards. In a statement that accompanied the bill,
Senator Gore said that, ``. . . People naturally believe that security
officers are screened and trained with the same diligence as law
enforcement officers. In fact, that is not always the case . . . the
potential for damage by unfit security officers is obvious. The need
for screening is critical.'' Unfortunately, the bill never gained much
support and it died when Congress adjourned at the end of 1992.
Subsequent efforts likewise failed. In 1993, Representatives
Martinez and Owens introduced H.R. 1534. Two years later, in 1993,
then-Representative Don Sundquist sponsored H.R. 2656. Neither of these
bills received much attention. However, in 1996, Representatives Barr
and Martinez teamed up and introduced H.R. 2092 the, ``Private Security
Officer Quality Assurance Act,'' which would have provided for
background checks of individuals seeking a license as a security
officer. This bill passed the House on September 26, 1996 but the
Senate did not act prior to adjournment that year. In 1997,
Representative Barr sponsored H.R. 103, which passed the House on July
28, 1997, but the Senate did not act on the bill. (See Attachment 3 for
a legislative history of S. 1743.)
Mr. Chairman, S. 1743 is the product of a bipartisan group of
Senators who share the belief that Congress needs to act swiftly to
prevent persons who commit serious crimes from being hired to protect
their constituents, their families, their homes and places of
employment. Sponsors of the original Senate bill (S.2238) included
Senators Carl Levin, Fred Thompson, Joe Lieberman and Mitch McConnell.
When the bill was first introduced in 2002, Senator Levin said that ``.
. . this legislation will enhance the Nation's security. As an adjunct
to our Nation's law enforcement officers, private security guards are
responsible for the protection of numerous critical components of our
Nation's infrastructure, including power generation facilities,
hazardous materials manufacturing facilities, water supply and delivery
facilities, oil and gas refineries and food processing plants--it is
imperative that we provide access to information that might disclose
who is unsuitable for protecting these resources.''
Nothing has changed in the time that has elapsed since the bill's
introduction in 2002. In fact, just the opposite is true. The threat of
attack by America's enemies persists and grows. Personnel and resources
are strained to the limit. The bombings in Spain have further caused
authorities to enhance security measures for rail passengers. From whom
and where the next target will emerge is uncertain. All of this
contributes to our collective sense of vulnerability that our leaders
seek to address on a daily basis. We share that responsibility and we
take our mission seriously.
Mr. Chairman, S. 1743 is a good bill. It is certainly not a
panacea. It is merely an important and necessary tool that the security
industry needs to keep the bad apples from being placed in positions of
responsibility. Former Senator Warren Rudman, who co-chaired the U.S.
Commission on National Security/21st Century, underscored the
importance of this legislation in a letter to this Committee. In his
December 2003 letter, Mr. Rudman stated, ``The legislation's enabling
of a review of the criminal history records of prospective private
security officers is exactly the sort of public-private cooperation
that the Commission viewed as essential to promoting U.S. homeland
security.'' He further stated that ``. . . S. 1743 deserves expedited
treatment based on the critical gap that it fills in our nation's
homeland security.''
In its current form, we believe the bill strikes an important and
appropriate balance between the interests of applicants, employers and
the public.
Essentially, the bill accomplishes three major objectives.
First, the bill permits security companies to request a criminal
background check on prospective employees. Requests must be forwarded
through the States' identification bureau or a comparable agency
designated by the Attorney General of the United States. Employers will
not under any circumstances be given direct access to FBI records. The
States will serve as the conduit for receiving an employer's request,
passing it on to the FBI and, in turn, receive back from the FBI a
report as to the suitability of the applicant for employment as a
security officer. States may charge a reasonable fee for this service.
Second, the bill protects an individual's privacy by requiring an
applicant to provide written authorization to an employer to request a
check before such a background check may be initiated. Further, the
form and content of the information provided to an employer will be
consistent with State laws and regulations governing the qualifications
of individuals to be security officers. In those States where there are
no standards, employers will only be notified as to whether an
applicant has been convicted of a felony or a violent misdemeanor or a
crime of dishonesty within the past 10 years.
Finally, the bill does not impose any unfunded mandates on the
States. Employers may be assessed a fee to handle these requests. In
addition, States may opt out of this regime at any time.
Mr. Chairman, insofar as I am aware, this bill faces no major
opposition from any affected interest. It passed the Senate
unanimously. The Administration as well as law enforcement officials
agree with the scope and intent of the measure. In addition, I would
like to include in the hearing record letters from the National
Association of Security Companies (NASCO) and ASIS International. (See
attachments 4 and 5.) Each of these organizations endorses enactment of
this bill. I would add, parenthetically, that responsible members of
NASCO and ASIS International have worked tirelessly over the years to
improve the security profession. In addition, ASIS has recently
published a draft Private Security Officer Selection and Training
Guideline that, among other things, encourages States to enact
licensing standards and to require FBI criminal history records checks
as part of the licensing process.
As noted above, in the four months that have elapsed since the
Senate passed the bill, security firms have hired over 300,000 new
guards. Only a certain percentage of these individuals have been
thoroughly screened. More people are added to employment rolls each
day. Most are fit for duty. However, some are not. This bill will plug
that hole through which some unqualified candidates have slipped
through in the past.
In summary, Mr. Chairman, passage of S. 1743 will establish a much
improved system and quality controls that will block the most serious
offenders from gaining employment as security officers. The industry
will benefit from this legislation and, more importantly, so will our
nation. We urge its speedy adoption.
Thank you again for the opportunity to testify on this critical
legislation. I will be glad to respond to any question you, or other
Members of the Subcommittee, may have.
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Mr. Coble. Thank you, Mr. Walker.
Mr. Maltby?
STATEMENT OF LEWIS MALTBY, PRESIDENT,
NATIONAL WORK RIGHTS INSTITUTE
Mr. Maltby. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Let me be clear from
the outset that the two critical points the other witnesses
have made are absolutely correct. Employers are entitled to
relevant criminal information in making hiring decisions and
secondly, it is too hard today for employers to get relevant
criminal background information. I've been a private employer
myself. I've run an HR department. I know from my own
experience that it's too hard to get the information you need.
So I agree with the other witnesses on those points and I
think what the Committee and the bill are attempting to do is
very important, but there's another national objective that's
equally important that I don't believe is getting enough
consideration in this context, and that is the absolutely
imperative need to rehabilitate criminal offenders.
Every year 600,000 people come out of jail in America.
There are 13 million people in America today who have been in
jail at some point in their lives and it's absolutely
imperative that these people become productive citizens again,
not just for their own sake but for our sake, because if they
can't become rehabilitated they're going to become criminals
again and that's going to hurt everyone just as much as putting
a bad apple in a guard position.
The most important part of being rehabilitated, and any
professional in the field will tell you that, is getting a job.
If you have to feed yourself and perhaps your kids, if you
can't get a job you know what's going to happen--they're going
to become criminals again.
So what our law needs to do is to strike a very careful
balance. On the one hand we have to make sure that bad apples
don't get into the security guard business. That's imperative.
But it's equally imperative that we don't stand in the way of
good people who are not going the be a risk as a security
guard, who are trying to rehabilitate themselves, by blocking
them from employment. That hurts innocent people and the public
just as much. We have to get the balance right.
In one respect I believe 1743 does take an important step
toward the balance and that is by restricting convictions to a
10-year period. At least a 20-year conviction is not going to
come back to haunt someone who's in their middle age and get in
the way of them getting a job. It's not relevant and the bill
wisely takes it out.
But there are other balancing issues that need more
attention. One of them is the definition of an offense that
gets reported. Under the bill as written, any offense involving
physical force or the attempt to use physical force comes under
this bill. That means, to put it simply, if two people are
sitting in a bar watching Monday Night Football and they get
into an argument because they've both been drinking too much
and somebody shoves the other guy or takes a swing at the other
guy and misses, that's a criminal offense and it's covered by
this bill and now this I'm sorry to say relatively trivial
event is going to hang around for 10 years getting in the way
of this person getting a job.
I don't think that that's what people intended when they
drafted this bill but that's what it says and I think it's
clear that we're all concerned about serious offenses when we
talk about qualifications to be a security guard, not a pushing
match between two guys who got mad at each other after a
fender-bender and we need to be a little more careful about
refining the definition of what the offenses are that are
covered by this bill.
The definition of security officer I think needs some
attention, too. Right now what the bill says is anyone who is
responsible for the safety or another person or protecting
another person's property is a security officer. That means the
parking lot attendant where I parked my car to go to the train
this morning is a security officer. If I'd had time to go to
the Monocle today the person who took my coat in the coat room
would have been a security officer.
I don't think that's what we had in mind. I don't think
whoever owns the Monocle needs Federal legislation to tell them
how they should hire the coat check person. That's not what
we're trying to do but it's what we do. I think that definition
needs a little more attention, as well.
And mostly what I'm trying to say is this. America's scared
today for good reason. We've all seen 9/11. I lost friends and
neighbors in 9/11. My post office in my home town was closed
for a month because it was contaminated with anthrax. I'm
scared, too. The question is how do we react when we're scared?
A lot of employers are reacting understandably but wrong.
Nineteen percent of all companies in America today will not
hire anyone who's been convicted of anything at any time in
their life. That includes giant companies like Eli Lily. Albert
Einstein couldn't work for Eli Lily as a research chemist if he
had been convicted of shoplifting as a teenager.
The country needs guidance from Congress on how to respond
to the situation with judgement and not by panicking in our
fear and making overbroad rules. I would like to see 1743
passed but we need to strike the balance a little more
carefully. State legislatures have been working on this for
years. They may not have solved the problem but there's a lot
of good thinking that's going on at the State level about how
to strike this balance and we should look to some of that and
do some more thinking ourselves and make sure we get it right
before we pass this law. Thank you.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Maltby follows:]
Prepared Statement of Lewis Maltby
The National Workrights Institute is a not-for-profit organization
dedicated to expanding human rights in the workplace.
The Institute supports the objectives of S. 1743. Private security
officers frequently occupy positions of responsibility and it is in the
public interest to ensure that individuals serving as security officers
have the character and integrity to use this responsibility properly.
There are many situations in which a prior criminal conviction
makes it inappropriate for an individual to serve as a private security
officer. This is especially true when the position requires carrying a
firearm. No one wants to see a person who has been convicted of armed
robbery serving as a bank security guard and carrying a gun.
S. 1743, by making it easier for employers to obtain information
that will help them to hire only qualified people as security officers,
is a positive development.
In determining who is qualified to serve as a security guard, it is
also important to consider other national priorities. One of these is
encouraging the rehabilitation of individuals who have committed
criminal offenses. Every year, 600,000 people are released from prison
in America. It is vitally important to these individuals, their
families, their communities, and our entire society that they
rehabilitate themselves and become law abiding responsible citizens. A
critical part of rehabilitation is employment. It is virtually
impossible for a person to rehabilitate themselves if they cannot get a
job. In making rules for the employment of people with criminal
records, we must take care not to unnecessarily deny employment to ex-
offenders. A criminal conviction must not become a scarlet letter than
follows a person for life.
It is vitally important that we strike this balance correctly. If
we allow the wrong people to become security officers, these officers
will commit or tolerate crime and innocent people will suffer. If we
deny employment to people who have rehabilitated themselves we push
them back into a life of crime and innocent people will suffer. We
cannot play it safe by making the qualifications for serving as a
security officer so high that most people can't qualify. We have to do
the hard, unglamorous, work of getting into the details and getting the
balance right.
S. 1743 contains constructive provisions to strike this balance.
For example, section 4(a)(4)(B) (i)(I) provides that only convictions
within the last 10 years are to be reported. This protects people from
being denied employment because of old convictions that indicate little
or nothing about a person's current character.
Additional steps are required to strike the right balance. For
example, as drafted, S. 1743 covers all offenses involving
``dishonesty'' or ``physical force''. This covers virtually the entire
criminal code. Moreover, there is no minimum. Any conviction involving
force is covered. It need not be a felony. It need not even be a
misdemeanor. A person who got into a shoving match following a traffic
accident and was fined $25 by a magistrate would be covered by S. 1743.
This needs to be modified. While a person who has used unlawful
force on another will often be unqualified to be a security officer,
not everyone who has used force should be disqualified. Some minimum
level of offense or harm should be required.
The breadth of the definition of ``security officer'' also raises
concerns. It applies to anyone whose job is to ``protect people or
property''. This sweeping definition includes school crossing guards,
parking lot attendants, receptionists, and coatroom attendants. Do we
really need an act of Congress to make sure the owner of the Monocle
hires the right coatroom attendant?
Technically, of course, the bill doesn't set qualification
standards for security officers. It only makes it easier for employers
to get certain kinds of criminal history. But a Congressional statement
that certain information must be made available to employers who hire
security officers will quickly turn this information into de facto
qualification standards.
America is afraid of crime. We are especially afraid of terrorism,
and with good reason. I lost friends and neighbors on 9/11. My post
office was closed for several weeks because it was contaminated with
anthrax. I'm scared too.
Employers are afraid. Employers have increased their use of
criminal records so fast that the record providers can barely keep up
with the demand. Some of this development is healthy. But employers'
fear is starting to get the best of their good judgment. A large and
growing number of employers now refuse to hire anyone with a criminal
record--no matter how minor the offense, how long ago it occurred, and
no matter how the person has behaved since the offense. Eli Lilly, one
of the world's largest pharmaceutical companies, is one such employer.
You could have won the Nobel prize in chemistry, but you can't work at
Eli Lilly if you were caught shoplifting as a teenager.
Eli Lilly is not alone in its misguided policy. The Congressional
Office of Technology Assessment found that, even before 9/11, 19% of
employers refused to hire anyone with a criminal record, even though
such policies are in violation of Title VII.
If this trend continues, the economic implications for America are
frightening. Approximately 43 million Americans have criminal records.
Over 13 million Americans have been in jail at some point in their
lives. If this many people become unable to work, our gross domestic
product will suffer the greatest drop in our lifetimes and our welfare
system will go bankrupt.
Congress needs to provide leadership to employers on the use of
criminal records. It needs to show by its own actions that criminal
records should be used in the employment process, but used carefully.
We need to create guidelines that prevent violent and dishonest people
from becoming security officers without casting the net so wide that we
undermine the criminal justice systems' efforts to rehabilitate former
offenders or damage our economy.
We can meet this challenge. The Institute would welcome the
opportunity to help.
Mr. Coble. Thank you, Mr. Maltby. We appreciate all of you
being with us.
We were joined by the distinguished gentleman from
Massachusetts, Mr. Meehan, but I think he has since departed.
I recognize myself for 5 minutes.
Mr. Walker, in your statement you indicate that the States
will serve as a conduit for receiving an employer's request,
passing it on to the FBI. Is it the State or the FBI that
determines the applicant's suitability for employment as a
security officer?
Mr. Walker. It would be the State that would make the
determination.
Mr. Coble. Ms. Pirro, you indicate on your website, the
Westchester County District Attorneys' website to be specific,
that ``While our job is to prosecute crimes, our goal is crime
prevention.'' Tell us in some detail what role do background
checks play in effective crime prevention?
Ms. Pirro. Very simply, Mr. Chairman, if we know that
someone is a pedophile or has a prior criminal history for the
sexual abuse of children, then we will prevent that individual
from having access to children because a pedophile will
insinuate himself in any employment where he has access to
another child. If we can identify who these people are,
recognize the high recidivism rate, then in essence we are
protecting our children.
Mr. Chairman, there's one thing that I think is very
important to note here and that is that criminal histories are
public information. Anyone in this room can go into their
county courthouse and access a person's criminal record, so
this is not information that we're not entitled to.
The issue is whether or not we're going to require
employers to go to every courthouse in every State in this
country to find out who's applying for a job. In this age of
technology we should be able to do that in one step.
Mr. Coble. Thank you.
Mr. Kirkpatrick, your resources have no doubt been
significantly stretched since 9/11. Have your financial and
personnel resources expanded commensurately?
Mr. Kirkpatrick. Mr. Chairman, no, they haven't. To date we
have been able to keep up with this significantly expanded
demand for our services with efficiency gains brought about
through automation. Additionally, as it was noted in my written
statement, we have the ability to charge for these checks and
that user fee revenue that these checks generate have been used
to keep up with the demand for these services.
Mr. Coble. Mr. Maltby, elaborate for me if you will on any
civil liability issues that might arise if employers were not
to conduct background checks.
Mr. Maltby. Mr. Chairman, there are probably situations--I
think some of the litigation has occurred already--where an
employer in a very sensitive position, perhaps running a day
care center, had the opportunity to conduct a criminal record
check and failed to do so and that's probably appropriate. If
you're running a critical situation like a day care center or
running a trucking company, there are certain criminal
convictions you ought to be concerned about that ought to be
disqualifying events.
Mr. Coble. Now in your hypothetical when you used the
Monocle, what if the owner of the Monocle wanted to do a
background check on his employees, his coat check worker, for
example? Should he be able to access criminal history records?
Mr. Maltby. The owner of the Monocle or any other employer
ought to be able to access and easily access relevant criminal
history but not irrelevant criminal history and the challenge
facing all of us is to define what is relevant and what's not
relevant. There's no point--the public is not served by
streamlining the ability of employers to get irrelevant
information.
Mr. Coble. Mr. Walker, you indicated that the security
officer industry records one of the highest dropout rates of
employees, and I think you furthermore said that a conservative
figure would be 50 percent turnover, which is drastic. What is
the industry doing or what can you do to promote employee
retention?
Mr. Walker. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Yes, 50 percent is
very high but that's a conservative estimate. Some of the
estimates range anywhere from 100 percent to 300 percent.
Various companies--there are a lot of companies that are
members of NASCO, the National Association of Security
Companies, who have been working on this problem for years and
the responsible organizations have worked to increase wages,
which is one of the issues that we talk about in trying to
attract better people, to increase wages, and I can tell you
what we do in our own company. We have what we call a living
wage program that we've implemented in 1999 and we have a
rigorous screening program to use the resources that we have
available.
We try to sell our wages and benefits to our clients at
above market rates. We provide training programs and other
opportunities for employees to improve themselves and we also
try to promote from within so that we have a number of security
officers that started as security officers that are promoted
through the ranks of the organization up into top management.
Mr. Coble. Thank you.
My time has expired. We have been joined by the
distinguished lady from Texas, Ms. Sheila Jackson Lee. Good to
have you with us, Ms. Jackson Lee.
The Chairman recognizes the Ranking Member, the gentleman
from Virginia.
Mr. Scott. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Kirkpatrick, what information gets into the database
that's checked?
Mr. Kirkpatrick. The information that we maintain is
fingerprint-based arrests and then the related dispositions of
those arrests, whether it be a conviction, a dismissal or an
acquittal.
Additionally, as I mentioned, we also conduct name-based
checks of the wanted persons file to see if that individual's a
fugitive, as well as the terrorist file to see if that person
is a known or suspected terrorist.
Mr. Scott. And what information is released if someone does
a check, send you fingerprints for a check? What information do
they get back?
Mr. Kirkpatrick. The information that we send back is what
we would call a criminal history. It's probably more commonly
known as a rap sheet on that individual that would show the
arrests and the related dispositions of those arrests.
Mr. Scott. So if a person had been acquitted, you would
show that they had been arrested.
Mr. Walker. That's correct, yes.
Mr. Scott. Ms. Pirro, is this the information that the
parents would get if they did one of those checks?
Ms. Pirro. The acquittal information?
Mr. Scott. Right.
Ms. Pirro. Probably not. They would get the conviction
information. The acquittal would most probably be sealed. There
would be a sealing order on that under the New York State
criminal history check.
Mr. Scott. Well, Mr. Kirkpatrick, do parents do background
checks that you're aware of?
Mr. Kirkpatrick. I'm not aware of any situation that we
deal with where an individual parent has the ability to request
a national background check, no, sir.
Mr. Scott. Ms. Pirro, if a parent does one of these
background checks what database do they access?
Ms. Pirro. It goes to New York State under Kieren's Law in
New York State, which is a law that passed as a result of the
woman with the prior criminal history throwing the 10-month-old
against the wall. It gives employers of individuals who work in
their home to care for their children the ability to ask an
employee whether or not they can get permission, whether
they'll give them permission. In that circumstance they can get
a prior criminal conviction from NISIS.
Mr. Scott. And the prospective employer would ask who? The
FBI?
Ms. Pirro. No. In New York under Kieren's Law--you see,
this is exactly the problem. Every State has kind of a
hodgepodge of who can ask for what and from whom. That's why we
need a central database and a registry that gives everyone the
ability to access the same information because that parent in
New York who is doing a background check on the person coming
to work in their home to care for their children will not get
information about a prior conviction in Connecticut, which can
be three miles away from Westchester because it's a different
State. They can only access the New York State database.
Mr. Scott. So if they've got Federal convictions it
wouldn't show up.
Ms. Pirro. No.
Mr. Scott. Hmm.
Well, Mr. Kirkpatrick, you give everything so there's no
screening of what comes out.
Mr. Kirkpatrick. That's correct. We send back the
information we have on file to a recognized agency within the
State or to a recognized agency that's listed in the
legislation that authorizes the background check and that
agency then makes a fitness determination on that prospective
person.
Mr. Scott. Based on what they get.
Mr. Kirkpatrick. That's correct.
Mr. Scott. Okay, Mr. Walker, when you do a background check
who do you call?
Mr. Walker. Currently we would go to the county of
residence or county of employment where the applicant has
worked or lived for the last 7 years and we would do a court-
house-by-courthouse record check.
Mr. Scott. So if they were convicted in the adjoining
jurisdiction, you wouldn't see that?
Mr. Walker. We'd have no way of knowing it unless it was
reported in that particular courthouse. There have been
instances where people have lived in areas that they did not
disclose and we had no way to know that and unfortunately it's
not a good situation. That's what we're trying to correct.
Mr. Scott. And if the bill passes what would you get?
Mr. Walker. If the bill passes then the State agency that
requested the information would get the rap sheet and make a
determination as to whether or not the individual was suitable
for employment.
Mr. Scott. You said the State agency would get----
Mr. Walker. Yes. Like, for example, in Illinois it might be
the Illinois State Police and they would tell the licensing
bureau whether or not that person had a significant criminal
history and the licensing bureau would tell us that the person
is either eligible or not eligible for hire.
Mr. Scott. But you wouldn't get the rap sheet?
Mr. Walker. No, we don't want the rap sheet.
Mr. Scott. Thank you.
Mr. Coble. Ms. Pirro, let me revisit Mr. Scott's question.
Mr. Scott is a prospective employer of mine. I apply for a job.
I have been prosecuted and convicted. Now he would get that
information.
Ms. Pirro. Well, depending on----
Mr. Coble. Let me give you a two-part question. I'm
prosecuted and acquitted. Now as I understood from your
response to his question, he would be beneficiary or someone
would be beneficiary of the conviction, but the acquittal would
not surface.
Ms. Pirro. That would not surface. The arrest that results
in an acquittal would not surface. The information----
Mr. Coble. In New York.
Ms. Pirro. In New York. Only in New York. And every State
has a different approach to it.
Mr. Coble. That seems sort of anomalous is why I wanted to
bring it up. You'd think that would be equally important, the
acquittal as opposed to a conviction. Just curious.
Mr. Goodlatte, the gentleman from Virginia.
Mr. Goodlatte. Mr. Chairman, thank you. I don't have any
questions.
Mr. Coble. The gentlelady from Texas, Ms. Sheila Jackson
Lee, is recognized for 5 minutes.
Ms. Jackson Lee. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman and
Ranking Member.
I may ask questions that may have been covered in your
testimony and I ask your indulgence, since I was held in
another meeting and not able to hear the complete testimony,
but I have a line of questioning that I would like to pursue.
First of all to Mr. Maltby, maybe you indicated this; maybe
there are no problems and I think you're representing the
workers association, if I understand it correctly?
Mr. Maltby. Close enough, ma'am.
Ms. Jackson Lee. That's a description, not the title.
You're involved with those who are employed and working; is
that my understanding or representing----
Mr. Maltby. Our mission is to protect the human rights of
people in the workplace, yes.
Ms. Jackson Lee. All, right, that's what I thought it was.
Why don't you give me your concerns about either this
legislation or the idea of being able to secure this
information.
Mr. Maltby. Ma'am, I have no concern about employers being
able to get relevant information and I think it's worth stating
again, and thanks for giving me the opportunity to say so--it
is too hard for employers to get that information today. It
needs to be streamlined.
The question is what information do we give employers? And
what I've been trying to stress is that we don't want to give
employers irrelevant information that could cause someone to
lose a job for which they should not be disqualified.
And I raise that particularly from the standpoint of our
nation's commitment to rehabilitate former offenders. Everyone
in America agrees that it's the right thing to do. Everyone
agrees it's important. President Bush has joined hands with
some people he doesn't usually join hands with to stress the
need for former offenders to become rehabilitated so they won't
commit another crime. And if you can't get a job you're not
going to be successfully rehabilitated. And it's vitally
important that if someone is trying to become rehabilitated
that they not be denied a job as a security officer or anything
else for a trivial offense that really isn't relevant.
And what I'm urging the Committee to do is to reexamine the
nature and the breadth of the offenses that this will considers
to be relevant because I believe it to be somewhat overbroad.
Ms. Jackson Lee. Doesn't the aspect, as I recall, of the
informing of the employee and getting their permission to
secure the information and then allowing them to see it, how do
you respond to that?
Mr. Maltby. Well, ma'am, consent may be very important in
the eyes of the law but as a practical matter it really doesn't
amount to much because when you need a job and the employer
says please consent to this form or we're going to take your
employment application and throw it in the waste basket, what
choice does the person have but to sign it?
It's really misleading to call it consent. Signing the form
is a condition of employment and we can't get around the
problem of deciding what's relevant information and what isn't
by relying on employee consent.
Ms. Jackson Lee. Is the information from your understanding
to be pulled up would include criminal offenses and civil acts,
such as bad credit?
Mr. Maltby. No, ma'am. I think the bill, to its credit, is
very clear that it only involves criminal convictions, not
civil problems, not arrests without a conviction, except if
they're within the last year. But virtually every criminal
conviction is covered. If two gentlemen get into a fender-
bender on the beltway and somebody shoves the other guy and a
police officer comes and someone becomes convicted for simple
assault or disorderly conduct, that is covered by this bill and
I'm concerned that someone who's an ex-offender, who's trying
to become a good citizen again, is going to be denied a job
opportunity because of a little shoving accident after a
traffic accident and that's not what we're trying to accomplish
here.
Ms. Jackson Lee. Well, I hope you won't be swayed by being
in this great and august room, Members of the Judiciary
Committee, that we are not concerned about rehabilitation. I
happen to be very concerned about that. In fact, I have a good
time legislative initiative to address nonviolent offenders.
But what I would ask from you and I'm going to ask Mr.
Walker a question to follow up, what kind of fire wall would
you suggest that would be included in legislation like this to
take into account circumstances that you have mentioned, which
are altercations at best? You would not think that they would
be threatening to homeland security or threatening to anyone's
life and limb but they have had some past record. Do you have a
suggestion of any kind of language or process that could be
utilized?
Mr. Maltby. Ma'am, if I were smart enough to come in here
and tell you I know the precise definition for how to strike
the balance between serious offenses and the ones that we
shouldn't be concerned about, I'd be a much smarter person than
I am.
But I do believe that that definition can be worked out. I
don't think it's impossible and I would very much appreciate
the opportunity to work with the Committee and the other
concerned parties to try to find the right language that
includes the serious offenses but doesn't suck people into the
system and cost them job opportunities because of minor
offenses.
Ms. Jackson Lee. Mr. Walker, you represent the private
security industry?
Mr. Walker. That's correct.
Ms. Jackson Lee. What is your thought about that in terms
of having at least some respect for people who have minimal
offenses in the past and working in your industry, using this
legislation?
Mr. Walker. Certainly we have a tremendous amount of
respect for individuals and the individuals' rights and we work
hard to protect that, but there are three points I'd like to
make here.
One is arrest records and conviction records currently are
public records and everything--if you check a local courthouse
for a criminal record you get every piece of information they
have in that particular courthouse.
Second of all, under the Fair Credit Reporting Act, if you
use an outside agency to do an investigation for you you have
to get the employee's consent to do that investigation.
And thirdly, even what may appear to be a minor incident,
if it shows the individual has a hot temper and gets into
altercations, that person may not be fit for duty to be a
security officer.
Under this current legislation that we're looking at today,
the protections are actually built in to a greater degree than
they currently exist because we would get--as an employer, we
would get nationwide criminal history information but only
having that information go to a State agency, a law enforcement
agency, an agency of the State government, which would tell us
would could either license that person within the State or not.
So I think the legislation actually builds in some protections
that we don't currently have.
Ms. Jackson Lee. I thank the Chairman. Thank you.
Mr. Coble. Thank you, Ms. Jackson Lee.
Mr. Feeney says he has no questions.
Mr. Keller?
Mr. Keller. No questions, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Coble. I know Mr. Scott has another question or two.
Let me put one question to you, Mr. Kirkpatrick, and then I'll
yield to Mr. Scott.
It is my belief, Mr. Kirkpatrick, that fingerprints are
currently probably the most reliable means of positively
identifying an individual. Look into your crystal ball into the
future and describe what is on the horizon with new technology
and biometrics.
Well first of all, am I correct in my assumption about
fingerprints?
Mr. Kirkpatrick. Mr. Chairman, I believe that you are.
Fingerprints have a more than 100-year history of positively
identifying individuals. They have been proven to work to
positively identify a single individual against an extremely
large database of the magnitude that we're talking about, tens
of millions of individuals.
This is a very good question and it's something that we
deal with daily looking into the future on biometrics. We meet
regularly with law enforcement leaders from not just this
country but internationally. We meet with leaders of the
biometrics industry and I would say that in the short and mid-
term, which would be up to about 5 years out, certainly
fingerprints are going to remain the gold standard for positive
identification of individuals.
Looking beyond that time frame, I think that there's other
technologies that are emerging, such as iris scans, facial
recognition, things like that, that in that period of time will
be improved upon and tested against very large populations.
One of the problems with things like facial recognition and
iris scans is that criminals do not leave their faces nor their
irises behind at crime scenes. They do leave their fingerprints
behind and we can take those latent crime scene fingerprints
and match them up against our criminal database and find out
who committed crimes as an ancillary benefit.
So I think mid-term, fingerprints are it. Looking beyond
that there's the possibility that other biometrics will emerge.
Mr. Coble. Thank you, sir.
The chair recognizes the gentleman from Virginia.
Mr. Scott. Thank you.
Mr. Kirkpatrick, let me go back. Did I understand you to
say that the FBI includes local convictions in FBI files?
Mr. Kirkpatrick. That's correct. The FBI fingerprint
repository is a national repository and it works in such a way
that State and local and Federal law enforcement all report
their arrests to us so that it is, in fact, a national
repository.
Mr. Scott. And Mr. Maltby, as I understand the bill, if a
request is made in a State that has a State agency and
guidelines and qualifications for security officers, then the
agency--you apply to the agency and they get the information,
compare the background check to their qualifications and just
say whether the person is qualified under State guidelines or
not. If there is no such State agency then you get felonies,
convictions involving dishonesty or violence within 10 years or
an unresolved arrest within the year.
Mr. Maltby. I believe that's correct, sir.
Mr. Scott. What's wrong with that?
Mr. Maltby. What's wrong with that is that first, the
definitions in this bill cover virtually the entire crimes
code. I used to be a criminal defense attorney in my youth and
almost every crime on the books involves force or theft or
dishonesty. And to put it very concretely, I don't think that
someone who tried to buy beer with a false ID at 18 ought to
have that become an impediment to getting a job when they're
27. I just don't think that it's relevant, but this bill would
provide it to employers and people who are ex-offenders who
need to be rehabilitated, who we need to be rehabilitated, are
not going to get a job because of this irrelevant information
and they're going to be back on the streets committing another
crime, which is the last thing anybody wants.
What I'm trying to say is that there are many situations
where if you're trying to protect the public safety you just go
a little too far. You throw the net real broad and what harm
could it do but----
Mr. Scott. On the question where you have a State agency,
you don't have a problem with that part of it?
Mr. Maltby. Well, if the State has a real good definition
of what's relevant and what's not relevant, then there would
not be a problem, but most States don't really have a good
definition and if the Federal Government is going to get into
this field and try to fix the problem, it really needs to
address the issue of what's relevant to employment to be a
security officer and what isn't. That's the heart of the
question.
Mr. Scott. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Coble. I thank the gentleman.
Mr. Green, did you have questions, Mr. Green?
Mr. Green. No questions.
Mr. Coble. The gentlelady from Texas, Ms. Sheila Jackson
Lee.
Ms. Jackson Lee. Let me pursue a line of questioning that I
was moving on with Mr. Walker and then Ms. Pirro.
You mentioned under New York law that you would surmise
that acquittals would not be included in information either
transmitted or utilized, so therefore if someone went through
the judicial system and was acquitted it would not be included?
Ms. Pirro. The arrest would not be included. As well, if it
resulted in an acquittal that becomes a sealed record. So it's
not as though there would be an arrest out there with no
disposition where we just seal the acquittal.
So that would not be----
Ms. Jackson Lee. Arrest and possibly acquittal.
Ms. Pirro. Right, right. But I think what's important here
is that we keep hearing an example of someone who throws a
punch and misses. In virtually every State that is not a crime.
That is a violation if there isn't any injury. And in New York
State specifically there would be no rap sheet or criminal
history that would reflect anything less than a crime. So that
a violation, a pushing or a shoving, would not be on the rap
sheet to begin with.
Ms. Jackson Lee. Give us an example of what you might
expect that this bill would be able to cull from States around
the nation.
Ms. Pirro. I'm not really in a position to do that in terms
of the security industry. I guess my position is a more generic
one, and that is this is public information that everyone is
entitled--that employers should be entitled to know because
we're assuming that the person applying for the job under the
scenarios that we keep hearing are people who are in good faith
in trying to rehabilitate themselves.
There are people who are not acting in good faith and when
there is a history and a record and a conviction beyond a
reasonable doubt, that should be able not just to people in the
security business but to employers who are hiring individuals
who have access to our children or who work in power plants or
hospitals or at oil refineries or at any one of a number of
manufacturing companies.
Ms. Jackson Lee. In your personal history as a district
attorney, do you note in a particular segment, in this instance
private security officers, any unique criminal problems or more
unique criminal activity of these private security agents
before this kind of system would be put in place? Has there
been difficulty in hiring private security officers and finding
that they have criminal backgrounds?
Ms. Pirro. It is difficult to identify those individuals
who have a criminal history from another State in New York.
That is the problem and just recently in Westchester there were
several security guards that my office indicted for sexual
assault of students who had criminal histories in other States
that we had no way of knowing and that the schools had no way
of knowing.
Ms. Jackson Lee. Mr. Kirkpatrick, is this legislation
helpful to your system? Or your system in terms of
participating in this, is this a comfortable fit between
legislation like this and what you do?
Mr. Kirkpatrick. Well, it is. We service a number of
different private sector industries and occupations in terms of
licensing and employment checks and our stance on this has
always been that if there is an appropriate law passed for a
particular industry or occupation, we'll do the checks and we
will send the results of those checks back to the authorized
agency to review those records and make a determination as to
whether or not that particular individual meets the
qualifications for that employment situation in that particular
locality.
Ms. Jackson Lee. And in this instance the State entity
would be fine with you?
Mr. Kirkpatrick. That fits in with our model as we
currently do business, yes, ma'am.
Ms. Jackson Lee. Mr. Walker, we know that across the board
the private security industry has had its ups and its downs. It
has been a place of refuge for individuals who have done
themselves well by being hired, as I understand, but maybe in
the past have had some interaction with the law.
I know to be a certified peace officer, to carry a weapon,
it may be that you're prohibited having a criminal record but I
know that officers who do not have or individuals that are
private security guards who do not carry weapons in certain
States have had records in the past.
In your industry have you noted that individuals with those
kinds of pasts--and I'm not suggesting a violent criminal
record but some interaction--have been able to be successful
officers?
Mr. Walker. I'm not aware of a situation where we in our
own company have employed individuals that had a criminal
history that became successful officers. In fact----
Ms. Jackson Lee. And are yours certified peace officers? Do
they carry weapons or----
Mr. Walker. We have some armed security officers, yes, only
1 percent of our workforce.
Ms. Jackson Lee. And the rest are unarmed.
Mr. Walker. Yes. And in those cases, in the States where
there is legislation, they would not get a license or if they
did get a temporary license their license would be revoked and
we would have to terminate their employment. But we do a
background investigation prior to hiring the individual and we
make those local county record checks and we certainly would
not employ anyone who had a serious criminal history.
Ms. Jackson Lee. And do you know of companies within your
industry that have done so? And you said serious and I was not
saying serious. I said some form of altercation, maybe a
juvenile record.
Mr. Walker. Juvenile records are generally sealed and not
available to us.
Ms. Jackson Lee. So you don't get that.
Mr. Walker. We do not get that, anyway. And minor
misdemeanors are not something that would be a knock-out
factor, if you will. In fact----
Ms. Jackson Lee. That's what I'm trying to get at.
Mr. Walker. Right. A statistic from Illinois, I think, we
very interesting to me. The Illinois State Police, in doing
their test in January, had a hit rate where they hit on a rap
sheet within the State of like 8 percent and when they went to
the FBI the hit rate increased. So the FBI reported back 214, I
believe it was, arrests and convictions. The State then did a
manual review, an override, and 132 of those conviction records
were thrown out as not being relevant to the licensing of a
security guard.
So there are safeguards in effect at the State level that
would prohibit discrimination against individuals who should be
given an opportunity to become rehabilitated and work in the
workplace.
Ms. Jackson Lee. Thank you.
Mr. Coble. I thank the lady.
Prior to adjournment I want to remind our Members that we
have a mark-up that will be conducted to commence shortly after
we adjourn. We'd appreciate your remaining for that.
We thank the witnesses for your testimony today. The
Subcommittee appreciates your contribution.
This concludes the legislative hearing on S. 1743, the
``Private Security Officer Employment Authorization Act of
2003.'' Thank you for your cooperation. The Subcommittee stands
adjourned.
[Whereupon, at 2:38 p.m., the Subcommittee was adjourned.]
A P P E N D I X
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Material Submitted for the Hearing Record
Prepared Statement of the Honorable Sheila Jackson Lee, a
Representative in Congress From the State of Texas
Questions and Responses for the Record from Michael Kirkpatrick
Questions and Responses for the Record from the Honorable Jeanine Pirro
Questions and Responses for the Record from Don Walker
Prepared Statement of Ira A. Lipman
Prepared Statement of William C. Whitmore, Jr.
Prepared Statement of Cecil Hogan
Mr. Chairman, and Members of the Subcommittee. The National Burglar
& Fire Alarm Association (NBFAA) appreciates the opportunity to
participate in discussions on issues relating to private security
employment authorization. NBFAA is a national trade association that
represents more than 2,400 companies throughout the fifty states and
four U.S. territories. Our members are engaged in the manufacture,
sale, installation, service and/or monitoring of electronic life safety
& security systems. Since 1948, NBFAA has been dedicated to raising the
level of professionalism within the industry to the benefit of the
consumers, public safety organizations and the electronic systems
profession.
While NBFAA is encouraged by this legislation and the timely
efforts of you and your colleagues, we believe this bill would be more
effective and more strongly supported if its scope were increased. One
of the main functions of NBFAA is to encourage the implementation of
laws at both the state and federal levels with the primary purpose to
promote professionalism of security systems companies, to maintain the
operational reliability and proper use of physical and electronic
security systems and to ensure a minimum level of training.
According to STAT Resources, Inc., Americans spent an estimated
$18.7 billion on professionally installed electronic security products
and services in 2001 (this figure includes monthly monitoring fees).
This number was up from $17.5 billion in 2000 and $16.2 billion in
1999. While all agree that this number has significantly increased over
the past three years, with the tragic events of September 11th,
estimates on the amount of this increase are staggering.
In 2001 alone, an average of approximately 10,000 businesses
nationwide were classified as ``alarm installing entities'' and
spending on electronic security products and services is growing at an
estimated 8.6 percent per year. Further, in the United States, crimes
against commercial establishments have reached epidemic proportions.
Each year, business losses due to crime exceed $100 billion.
While NBFAA and others have had success at establishing licensing
of the electronic life safety and security industry at the state level,
a good deal of work remains. Although 37 states have some sort of state
license requirements for our industry, only 20 of those require
background checks as part of that license. Just as this legislation
illustrates the vital nature of the private security officers work in
the new era of homeland security, so to is the vital work of the
individuals and companies that provide the infrastructure for that
work. However, at this time, many of our members do not have the
ability to effectively screen their applicants and better ensure the
safety of their clients. NBFAA believes strongly that this must change.
States that do not offer the ability to conduct a background check
through state licensing for the electronic life safety, security and
systems industry include Pennsylvania, Ohio, Nevada, Wisconsin and many
more. Our members in these states install security and life safety
systems to commercial properties (i.e. shopping malls, movie theaters,
office buildings) as well as residential properties including apartment
buildings. NBFAA members provide services to critical infrastructure
across the country as well as schools and other institutional entities.
We install security systems, fire systems, CCTV, access control, and
much more.
Simply analyzing the potential dangers surrounding unqualified
private security employee installing an access control system in one of
these critical infrastructures alone is enough to understand our push
for inclusion into this legislation. While ensuring the qualifications
of the private security officer is essential, ensuring that the
infrastructure under which he operates has been installed by qualified
professionals is imperative.
In this new era of homeland security, the need for a partnership
between the public and private security is important. Providing the
resources and structure for this partnership is a role the federal
government must play. While this legislation addresses the American
public's need for the employment of qualified, well-trained private
security personnel, it does not address that same need for the
installers of the systems that protect their homes, their offices,
their lives.
NBFAA appreciates the opportunity to submit this statement for the
record.
__________
Prepared Statement of the National Association of Security Companies
Mr. Chairman and Members of the Subcommittee,
The National Association of Security Companies (NASCO), a trade
association, represents the major national and regional providers of
contract security services in the United States. Our members
collectively employ more than 400,000 private security officers
nationwide.
NASCO companies' private security officers protect sites of all
descriptions throughout America: shopping malls, office buildings,
corporate campuses, hospitals, educational institutions, both
conventional and nuclear power plants, utilities, financial
institutions, water treatment and pumping stations, defense
manufacturing facilities, chemical plants, communications centers,
docks, warehouses, oil and gas production and transmission facilities,
transportation hubs, government facilities, food manufacturing and
processing plants, and bioresearch centers are among our members'
clients.
Regardless of where disaster next strikes, whether as an act of
terrorism, a weather-related emergency, or as an accident, it is a
near-certainty that private security officers will be nearby. In many
instances, private security officers are truly first responders,
already on the premises and familiar with the property, its layout and
structures, persons on the premises, and other significant details
important to both protecting lives and assisting law enforcement.
Protecting lives and other valuable assets at such a vast number of
sites across the nation places a high level of responsibility and a
fundamental role in Homeland Security on our private security officers.
NASCO's members want to hire well qualified candidates into these
positions. To do so, they routinely conduct their own internal
background investigations on job applicants. Maximizing the
effectiveness of that process, however, requires either state or
federal statutory authorization for our applicants to undergo a
fingerprint-based check against the database maintained by the Federal
Bureau of Investigation. That database offers the best assurance that
an applicant in one state does not have a prior record of felony
convictions in a state other than the one in which application is being
made. S. 1743 would provide us that access, and we urge you to adopt it
as an important step toward enhancing the security of our homeland.
At present, the private security industry is regulated in 40
states. The specific requirements for private security officers in
those 40 states vary significantly, even as to the extent of background
investigation required for employment. Only 31 states call for FBI
criminal history records checks, and at least 7 of those limit the FBI
checks to applicants for armed security positions (who constitute a
distinct minority of all private security positions). Also among those
31 state laws are other state regulatory statutes that appear to permit
the FBI checks, but do not require them, leaving yet another gap for an
out-of-state convicted felon or an identity thief to gain security
employment at a sensitive site. These gaps open the door for the very
types of criminal conduct that our employees are typically assigned to
prevent. Good security requires that they be closed.
As a federal bill, the impact of S. 1743 will be in the 10 states
that lack private security regulation, the 9 regulated states that do
not call for criminal records checks through the FBI, and the 7 states
which routinely conduct FBI checks only for armed security applicants.
It will also affect security applications in states which allow, but do
not mandate, FBI checks. If S. 1743 is adopted, the decision to submit
fingerprints for an FBI check could be made not only by the regulatory
authority, but also at the request of an ``authorized employer''.
Mr. Chairman, NASCO has actively endorsed and supported prior bills
intended to address these problems since the early 1990s. We offered
testimony in support of H.R. 1534 in June 1993 when the House
Subcommittee on Human Resources held two days of hearings, an earlier
proposal sponsored by then-Congressman Matthew Martinez. Our support
continued throughout the 1990s. We hoped that a solution was within
reach when H.R. 2092, sponsored by then-Congressman Bob Barr, passed
the House by a vote of 415-6 in 1996, and again when Congressman Barr's
H.R. 103 passed the House by voice vote in mid-1997. Passage of S. 1743
by the Senate has again raised our hopes.
S. 1743 offers a more comprehensive proposal in response to our
need for better background information access. It addresses not only
the need for FBI checks in states that have already charged a specific
agency with regulatory responsibility for private security without
authorizing the federal background checks, but also offers a procedure
by which background information can be obtained even in those states in
which no regulatory body has yet been created.
Regardless of whether a state has a regulatory agency or not, no
additional expense will be imposed on the government because the cost
of processing the fingerprint records will be covered by user fees.
Should a state object to participating in this Homeland Security-
enhancing service for which the industry will absorb the cost, that
state can exercise the ``opt-out'' option provided in the bill.
Mr. Chairman and Members of the Subcommittee, NASCO thanks you for
your attention in this security-critical matter. Please help us to
provide better-screened security officers by passing S. 1743 now.
Letter from Warren B. Rudman