    [House Hearing, 108 Congress]
    [From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]

         PRIVATE SECURITY OFFICER EMPLOYMENT AUTHORIZATION ACT OF 2003

    =======================================================================

                                    HEARING

                                   BEFORE THE

                       SUBCOMMITTEE ON CRIME, TERRORISM,
                             AND HOMELAND SECURITY

                                     OF THE

                           COMMITTEE ON THE JUDICIARY
                            HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

                          ONE HUNDRED EIGHTH CONGRESS

                                 SECOND SESSION

                                       ON

                                    S. 1743

                                   __________

                                 MARCH 30, 2004

                                   __________

                                 Serial No. 89

                                   __________

             Printed for the use of the Committee on the Judiciary

        Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.house.gov/judiciary

                                     ______

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                           COMMITTEE ON THE JUDICIARY

                F. JAMES SENSENBRENNER, Jr., Wisconsin, Chairman
    HENRY J. HYDE, Illinois              JOHN CONYERS, Jr., Michigan
    HOWARD COBLE, North Carolina         HOWARD L. BERMAN, California
    LAMAR SMITH, Texas                   RICK BOUCHER, Virginia
    ELTON GALLEGLY, California           JERROLD NADLER, New York
    BOB GOODLATTE, Virginia              ROBERT C. SCOTT, Virginia
    STEVE CHABOT, Ohio                   MELVIN L. WATT, North Carolina
    WILLIAM L. JENKINS, Tennessee        ZOE LOFGREN, California
    CHRIS CANNON, Utah                   SHEILA JACKSON LEE, Texas
    SPENCER BACHUS, Alabama              MAXINE WATERS, California
    JOHN N. HOSTETTLER, Indiana          MARTIN T. MEEHAN, Massachusetts
    MARK GREEN, Wisconsin                WILLIAM D. DELAHUNT, Massachusetts
    RIC KELLER, Florida                  ROBERT WEXLER, Florida
    MELISSA A. HART, Pennsylvania        TAMMY BALDWIN, Wisconsin
    JEFF FLAKE, Arizona                  ANTHONY D. WEINER, New York
    MIKE PENCE, Indiana                  ADAM B. SCHIFF, California
    J. RANDY FORBES, Virginia            LINDA T. SANCHEZ, California
    STEVE KING, Iowa
    JOHN R. CARTER, Texas
    TOM FEENEY, Florida
    MARSHA BLACKBURN, Tennessee

                 Philip G. Kiko, Chief of Staff-General Counsel
                   Perry H. Apelbaum, Minority Chief Counsel
                                     ------

            Subcommittee on Crime, Terrorism, and Homeland Security

                     HOWARD COBLE, North Carolina, Chairman

    TOM FEENEY, Florida                  ROBERT C. SCOTT, Virginia
    BOB GOODLATTE, Virginia              ADAM B. SCHIFF, California
    STEVE CHABOT, Ohio                   SHEILA JACKSON LEE, Texas
    MARK GREEN, Wisconsin                MAXINE WATERS, California
    RIC KELLER, Florida                  MARTIN T. MEEHAN, Massachusetts
    MIKE PENCE, Indiana
    J. RANDY FORBES, Virginia

                          Jay Apperson, Chief Counsel

                            Elizabeth Sokul, Counsel

                              Katy Crooks, Counsel

                         Bobby Vassar, Minority Counsel

                                C O N T E N T S

                                  ----------

                                 MARCH 30, 2004

                               OPENING STATEMENT

                                                                       Page
    The Honorable Howard Coble, a Representative in Congress From the
      State of North Carolina, and Chairman, Subcommittee on Crime,
      Terrorism, and Homeland Security...............................     1
    The Honorable Robert C. Scott, a Representative in Congress From
      the State of Virginia, and Ranking Member, Subcommittee on
      Crime, Terrorism, and Homeland Security........................     2

                                   WITNESSES

    Mr. Michael Kirkpatrick, Assistant Director, Federal Bureau of
      Investigation, Criminal Justice Information Services Division,
      Department of Justice
      Oral Testimony.................................................     4
      Prepared Statement.............................................     5
    The Honorable Jeanine Pirro, District Attorney, Westchester
      County, NY
      Oral Testimony.................................................     7
      Prepared Statement.............................................     9
    Mr. Don Walker, Chairman, Pinkerton Security, Executive Member,
      American Society of Industrial Security, Board of Directors,
      National Association of Security Guard Companies
      Oral Testimony.................................................    11
      Prepared Statement.............................................    12
    Mr. Lewis Maltby, President, National Work Rights Institute
      Oral Testimony.................................................    27
      Prepared Statement.............................................    28

                                    APPENDIX
                   Material Submitted for the Hearing Record

    Prepared Statement of the Honorable Sheila Jackson Lee, a
      Representative in Congress From the State of Texas.............    41
    Questions and Responses for the Record from Michael Kirkpatrick..    46
    Questions and Responses for the Record from the Honorable Jeanine
      Pirro..........................................................    51
    Questions and Responses for the Record from Don Walker...........    52
    Prepared Statement of Ira A. Lipman, Founder and Chairman,
      Guardsmark, LLC................................................    69
    Prepared Statement of William C. Whitmore, Jr., President and
      Chief Executive Officer, Allied Security, LLC..................    79
    Prepared Statement of Cecil Hogan, President, National Burglar &
      Fire Alarm Association (NBFAA).................................    86
    Prepared Statement of the National Association of Security
      Companies......................................................    86
    Letter from Warren B. Rudman, Counsel, Paul, Weiss, Rifkind,
      Wharton, & Garrison LLP........................................    88

         PRIVATE SECURITY OFFICER EMPLOYMENT AUTHORIZATION ACT OF 2003

                                  ----------

                            TUESDAY, MARCH 30, 2004

                      House of Representatives,
                      Subcommittee on Crime, Terrorism,
                                  and Homeland Security
                                    Committee on the Judiciary,
                                                        Washington, DC.
        The Subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 1:27 p.m., in
    Room 2141, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Howard Coble
    (Chair of the Subcommittee) presiding.
        Mr. Coble. Ladies and gentlemen, I apologize for the delay,
    but as I said to you previously, when we have bills from this
    Committee on the floor, we suspend the hearing time. The debate
    has been completed, I'm told, so now we can commence with our
    hearing.
        Today the Subcommittee on Crime, Terrorism, and Homeland
    Security is holding a hearing on S. 1743, the ``Private
    Security Officer Employment Authorization Act of 2003,'' and
    the need for background checks in general.
        More and more, private security officers are utilized to
    protect our nation's assets, both in the Government and in the
    private sector. These assets are as diverse as the protection
    of the neighborhood shopping center to the protection of
    nuclear power plants. These officers act as the eyes and ears
    of both private corporations and the law enforcement community.
    The problem is, as USA Today reported in January of 2003, most
    of the nation's 1 million plus guards are unlicensed,
    untrained, and not subject to background checks. Their
    burgeoning $12 billion industry is marked by high turnover, low
    pay, few benefits, and scant oversight. And according to
    Government officials and industry experts, little has changed
    since September 11, 2001.
        S. 1743 addresses the unique need of the security officer
    industry for criminal history background checks on employees
    and prospective employees. Without such checks, those entrusted
    to protect our citizens and critical infrastructure could be
    the very people the security guards are hired to protect
    against--that is, terrorists and criminals.
        As we continue waging the war against terrorism, other
    industries may also realize a need for criminal background
    checks but we must also examine the need for criminal history
    background checks, that may involve nonterrorism concerns, such
    as child care workers, for example. The Committee believes that
    certain types of employment should require additional screening
    of employees and applicants, but I have to wonder if the way
    that we have been addressing this issue, one bill at a time, is
    the most effective or most efficient.
        The bill we will hear about today can trace its history to
    1991. There are at least two dozen different laws with
    different definitions and different process structures
    directing the Attorney General and the FBI to conduct criminal
    history background checks. Since the September 11, 2001
    attacks, the number of checks conducted by the FBI's integrated
    automated fingerprint identification system has grown from an
    average of 41,400 per day to 48,215 per day. Other queries of
    the FBI databases for immigration, law enforcement, and other
    purposes have also shown significant increases.
        We're looking forward to hearing from our distinguished
    panel of witnesses today, and I am now pleased to recognize the
    distinguished gentleman from Virginia, the Ranking Member of
    the Subcommittee, Mr. Bobby Scott.
        Mr. Scott. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I'm pleased to join you
    in convening the hearing on S. 1743, the ``Private Security
    Officer Employment Authorization Act of 2003.'' The private
    security workers play a vital role in not only securing our
    businesses and personal properties from theft and vandalism but
    also protecting critical infrastructure, both public and
    private, from threat of terrorism. Because of the nature of a
    security position and the importance of the work, it is
    necessary that employers have background information on
    applicants, such as their criminal record history, to ensure
    that they are trustworthy.
        The private security industry is a growing industry,
    particularly since the 9/11 tragedies, and is important to our
    economy. At a time when many of the traditional manufacturing
    jobs, which have been the foundation of our economy and the
    livelihood of so many families, we must ensure that we have
    sufficient workforce both in the quantity and the quality of
    people available for jobs.
        Criminal records checks can assist in weeding out
    untrustworthy persons but must not serve to block worthy people
    due to unsubstantial or unreliable information. Raw criminal
    record history information viewed by untrained eyes could do
    more harm than good in this regard and unfairly deprive an
    employee or applicant of a good work opportunity and the
    employer of a good worker, as well.
        So an important balance must be struck to ensure employers
    get relevant information on which to assess qualifications for
    important and sometimes sensitive work while avoiding confusing
    or unfairly prejudicial information. The Private Security
    Officer Employment Authorization Act goes a long way toward
    meeting that balance by limiting the access to felonies and
    crimes involving dishonesty within the last 10 years. While
    some issue has been raised about the advisability of unresolved
    arrest data, perhaps a balance can be struck there, as well.
    While we would not expect a bank to hire an applicant with an
    unresolved bank robbery arrest in the last year, we would not
    want bogus, insubstantial charges which are not prosecuted to
    deny employment, either.
        So Mr. Chairman, I think it's a good bill that may be
    improved with some relatively minor tweaking, with eventually
    becoming part of a more uniform system of criminal background
    checks that we may ask the Attorney General to develop.
        And in that vein, Mr. Chairman, I think since there's a
    consensus that we'd like the bill to be adopted, I would hope
    that the witnesses spend much of their time telling us which
    records should be available and how to make those records
    available and I yield back.
        Mr. Coble. I thank the gentleman.
        We're also pleased to have with us the distinguished
    gentleman from Florida and the distinguished gentleman from
    Ohio, Mr. Feeney and Mr. Chabot.
        Today we have four distinguished witnesses, one from the
    Federal Government, one from local government, one from the
    private sector, and the final witness from a public interest
    group serving worker rights.
        Our first witness is Mr. Michael Kirkpatrick, Assistant
    Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation. Mr.
    Kirkpatrick is in charge of the FBI's Criminal Justice
    Information Services Division in Clarksburg, West Virginia, the
    largest division within the FBI. Mr. Kirkpatrick has over 21
    years of service in the FBI and has served at FBI posts in New
    Orleans, Pocatello, San Antonio, Cleveland, and Kansas City,
    Missouri. In his long and distinguished career he has
    investigated or supervised investigations relating to
    counterterrorism, counterintelligence, civil rights, applicant
    investigations, and white collar crime matters. Mr. Kirkpatrick
    is a certified public accountant and a graduate of Purdue
    University in West Lafayette, Louisiana.
        Our second witness is the honorable Jeanine Pirro, district
    attorney for Westchester County, New York. Ms. Pirro was first
    selected to serve as the chief law enforcement officer for
    Westchester County in 1993. Immediately prior to that she
    served as a county court judge after serving in the district
    attorney's office in many distinguished positions for over 15
    years. Ms. Pirro is the author of two books, several articles,
    and is a frequent commentator on national television. She has
    brought criminal justice issues to the people by hosting and
    producing two local cable television shows. Ms. Pirro has
    received numerous awards, including most recently the
    Distinguished Women in Law Enforcement Award from the New York
    Law Enforcement Foundation. She holds a bachelor's degree from
    the University of Buffalo and a Juris Doctorate from the Albany
    School of Law.
        Our next witness is Mr. Don Walker. Mr. Walker serves as
    chairman of Securitas Security Services, U.S.A., Inc., a
    subsidiary of the Securitas Group. With over 120,000 security
    officers and over $3 billion in revenues, Securitas is one of
    the world's largest and most respected international security
    companies.
        Mr. Walker has held numerous executive positions with
    Pinkerton's, Inc., including chairman, CEO, and president. He
    is past president of the American Society for Industrial
    Security and currently co-chairs their Commission for Security
    Guidelines. He's also a member of the board of directors of the
    National Association of Security Companies and a member of the
    International Association of Chiefs of Police. Mr. Walker is a
    former special agent of the Federal Bureau of Investigation and
    holds a bachelors degree from the University of Louisville and
    a Juris Doctorate from the Nashville School of Law.
        Our final witness is Mr. Louis Maltby, founder and
    president of the National Work Rights Institute. Mr. Maltby is
    a nationally recognized expert on human rights in the workplace
    and was an original founder of the National Workplace Rights
    Office of the American Civil Liberties Union. Mr. Maltby holds
    a Bachelor of Arts degree and a Juris Ddoctorate from the
    University of Pennsylvania.
        I apologize to you all for my lengthy introduction, but I
    think it's important that all of us recognize the background
    and the expertise that these witnesses do bring to the witness
    table.
        Lady and gentlemen, as you all have been previously advised
    by us, I hope that you can confine your oral testimony to the
    5-minute mark, and we impose the 5-minute mark against us, as
    well, when we examine you all. Your 5 minutes will be up when
    you see the red light illuminated on that little panel on your
    desk, and when the amber light illuminates, you will know that
    you'd better start scurrying because it'll soon be red.
        Thanks to all of you for being here, and Mr. Kirkpatrick,
    we will start with you.

     STATEMENT OF MICHAEL KIRKPATRICK, ASSISTANT DIRECTOR, FEDERAL
    BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, CRIMINAL JUSTICE INFORMATION SERVICES
                    DIVISION, DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

        Mr. Kirkpatrick. Good afternoon, Mr. Chairman and Members
    of the Committee. Thank you for the opportunity to appear
    before you this afternoon to discuss the FBI's fingerprint
    identification program. I have provided a written statement for
    the record but I would like to make just a few comments.
        Since 1924, the FBI's been the national repository for
    fingerprints and related criminal history data. Today our
    fingerprint holdings are divided into two categories: criminal
    and civil. The FBI's master criminal fingerprint file contains
    the records of approximately 47 million individuals while our
    civil file contains the records of approximately 31 million
    individuals.
        The civil file primarily contains fingerprints of people
    who have served or are serving currently in the U.S. military
    or in the Federal Government. A civil fingerprint card may also
    be submitted regarding an individual who is seeking employment
    for a position of trust, such as Federal employment, adopting a
    child, seeking U.S. citizenship, or serving as a volunteer.
    Civil fingerprint checks are submitted to the FBI based upon a
    specific Federal law authorizing such a check or based upon a
    State or municipal statute which authorizes such a check in
    compliance with Public Law 92-544.
        Every day the FBI receives, as you pointed out, nearly
    50,000 fingerprint submissions. During the last fiscal year we
    received a total of almost 18 million fingerprint submissions.
    Of this amount, approximately 48 percent or 8.6 million of
    those fingerprint submissions were civil submissions. Our
    response goal for civil fingerprint cards electronically
    submitted to the FBI is to process and provide a response
    within 24 hours. Today we are meeting this goal 99 percent of
    the time and, in fact, our average response time is
    approximately 2 hours.
        So what is the benefit of conducting civil fingerprint
    background checks? Our statistics show that an average hit rate
    of 12 percent for civil fingerprint checks. This equates to
    approximately 900,000 checks every year being identified to
    individuals with existing criminal history records.
        In addition to the fingerprint check, all civil background
    checks undergo a name-based search against the wanted person
    file and the terrorist watch list that are located within the
    National Crime Information Center.
        As Congress considers expanding the occupations and
    professions which require fingerprint-based background checks,
    I would suggest that the need to develop a comprehensive
    national infrastructure to support such checks is vitally
    needed. Specifically, many law enforcement agencies, which
    typically are the starting point for the capture of civil
    fingerprints, are either not equipped to do so in an efficient
    manner or do not have the personnel resources to do so.
        State identification bureaus, which also play a key role in
    this process, are likewise often underequipped and
    understaffed. This limits the ability to conduct a thorough and
    timely check for those who are applying for positions of
    responsibility and trust and could ultimately result in the
    need to institute some type of prioritization of such checks as
    the existing infrastructure become overloaded.
        While the answers to the needs I have just raised are
    currently undetermined, the FBI, Department of Justice and our
    partners are in the process of finalizing the feasibility study
    required under section 108(d) of the Protect Act, Public Law
    108-21. This study will begin to answer many of the questions
    concerning how best to develop a national infrastructure to
    accommodate the growing demand for fingerprint-based background
    checks.
        Mr. Chairman, I'd like to invite you and Members of the
    Committee to visit us in West Virginia and personally see the
    investment in our state-of-the-art fingerprint technology.
    Thank you again for the privilege to appear before you and I
    will obviously be available for any questions that you might
    have.
        [The prepared statement of Mr. Kirkpatrick follows:]

                  Prepared Statement of Michael D. Kirkpatrick

        GOOD MORNING MR. CHAIRMAN AND MEMBERS OF THE COMMITTEE. I AM
    MICHAEL D. KIRKPATRICK AND I AM THE ASSISTANT DIRECTOR IN CHARGE OF THE
    CRIMINAL JUSTICE INFORMATION SERVICES DIVISION OF THE FBI. I THANK YOU
    FOR THE OPPORTUNITY TO APPEAR BEFORE THIS COMMITTEE IN ORDER TO DISCUSS
    THE FBI'S FINGERPRINT IDENTIFICATION PROGRAM.
        SINCE 1924, THE FBI HAS BEEN THE NATIONAL REPOSITORY FOR
    FINGERPRINTS AND RELATED CRIMINAL HISTORY DATA. AT THAT TIME, 810,188
    FINGERPRINT RECORDS FROM THE NATIONAL BUREAU OF CRIMINAL IDENTIFICATION
    AND LEAVENWORTH PENITENTIARY WERE CONSOLIDATED TO FORM THE NUCLEUS OF
    THE FBI'S FILES. OVER THE YEARS, THE SIZE OF OUR FINGERPRINT FILES HAS
    GROWN AND THE DEMAND FOR THE PROGRAM'S SERVICES HAS STEADILY INCREASED.
    OUR FINGERPRINT HOLDINGS ARE DIVIDED INTO TWO CATEGORIES--CRIMINAL AND
    CIVIL. TODAY, THE FBI'S MASTER CRIMINAL FINGERPRINT FILE CONTAINS THE
    RECORDS OF APPROXIMATELY 47 MILLION INDIVIDUALS, WHILE OUR CIVIL FILE
    REPRESENTS APPROXIMATELY 30.7 MILLION INDIVIDUALS. THE CIVIL FILE
    PREDOMINANTLY CONTAINS FINGERPRINTS OF INDIVIDUALS WHO HAVE SERVED OR
    ARE SERVING IN THE U.S. MILITARY OR HAVE BEEN OR ARE EMPLOYED BY THE
    FEDERAL GOVERNMENT.
        A CRIMINAL CARD IS EXACTLY AS THE NAME IMPLIES. IT IS THE
    FINGERPRINTS OF AN INDIVIDUAL WHO HAS BEEN ARRESTED AND CHARGED WITH A
    CRIME. A CIVIL CARD IS SUBMITTED REGARDING AN INDIVIDUAL WHO IS SEEKING
    EMPLOYMENT IN CERTAIN POSITIONS, SUCH AS FEDERAL EMPLOYMENT, THE
    MILITARY, OR THE BANKING/SECURITIES INDUSTRY; OR IS ADOPTING A CHILD;
    SEEKING U.S. CITIZENSHIP; OR SERVING AS A VOLUNTEER (E.G., AT A CHILD
    OR SENIOR DAY CARE CENTER) AND REQUIRES A NATIONAL FINGERPRINT
    BACKGROUND CHECK AS PART OF THE SCREENING PROCESS. CIVIL FINGERPRINT
    CHECKS ARE SUBMITTED TO THE FBI BASED UPON A SPECIFIC FEDERAL LAW
    AUTHORIZING A NATIONAL FINGERPRINT BACKGROUND CHECK, OR BASED UPON A
    STATE STATUTE OR A MUNICIPAL ORDINANCE, IF AUTHORIZED BY A STATE
    STATUTE, AUTHORIZING A NATIONAL BACKGROUND CHECK IN COMPLIANCE WITH
    PUBLIC LAW 92-544.
        FOR ITS FIRST 75 YEARS OF EXISTENCE, THE PROCESSING OF INCOMING
    FINGERPRINT CARDS BY THE FBI WAS PREDOMINANTLY A MANUAL, TIME
    CONSUMING, LABOR INTENSIVE PROCESS. FINGERPRINT CARDS WERE MAILED TO
    THE FBI FOR PROCESSING AND A PAPER-BASED RESPONSE WAS MAILED BACK. IT
    WOULD TAKE ANYWHERE FROM WEEKS TO MONTHS TO PROCESS A FINGERPRINT CARD.
        HOWEVER, THAT ALL CHANGED ON JULY 28, 1999, WITH THE IMPLEMENTATION
    OF THE INTEGRATED AUTOMATED FINGERPRINT IDENTIFICATION SYSTEM, OR
    IAFIS. THE IAFIS WAS THE DAWN OF A NEW ERA FOR THE FBI'S FINGERPRINT
    IDENTIFICATION PROGRAM AS IT PERMITS THE PROCESSING OF ALL INCOMING
    FINGERPRINT SUBMISSIONS IN A TOTALLY ELECTRONIC ENVIRONMENT.
        EVERY DAY, THE FBI RECEIVES NEARLY 50,000 FINGERPRINT SUBMISSIONS,
    WHICH ARE SENT TO US IN EITHER AN ELECTRONIC FORMAT OR PAPER-BASED. THE
    PAPER-BASED SUBMISSIONS ARE CONVERTED TO AN ELECTRONIC FORMAT PRIOR TO
    PROCESSING ON THE IAFIS. DURING FISCAL YEAR 2003, THE FBI RECEIVED A
    TOTAL OF 17,736,541 FINGERPRINT SUBMISSIONS. OF THIS TOTAL, 48 PERCENT,
    OR APPROXIMATELY 8.6 MILLION, WERE CIVIL FINGERPRINT SUBMISSIONS. OF
    THE NEARLY 8.6 MILLION CIVIL SUBMISSIONS, 73 PERCENT, OR SLIGHTLY MORE
    THAN 6.2 MILLION, WERE SENT TO US ELECTRONICALLY.
        IN ADDITION TO THE ELECTRONIC OR PAPER-BASED METHODS OF SUBMITTING
    FINGERPRINTS TO THE FBI, THERE ARE TWO PATHS A CIVIL FINGERPRINT MAY
    TRAVEL. THE MOST COMMON METHOD STARTS WITH THE FINGERPRINTING OF AN
    INDIVIDUAL AT A BOOKING STATION. THE PRINTS ARE FORWARDED TO THE
    AUTHORIZED STATE AGENCY FOR A CHECK AGAINST STATE RECORDS. THE STATE
    AGENCY THEN FORWARDS THE PRINTS TO THE FBI FOR A NATIONAL BACKGROUND
    CHECK. THIS METHOD COMPLIES WITH PUBLIC LAW 92-544 AND PROVIDES A MORE
    COMPLETE BACKGROUND CHECK.
        THE SECOND PATH INVOLVES THE USE OF A CHANNELING AGENCY, SUCH AS
    THE AMERICAN BANKERS ASSOCIATION, ABA, OR THE OFFICE OF PERSONNEL
    MANAGEMENT, OPM. THE ABA AND THE OPM, FOR EXAMPLE, SERVE AS A SINGLE
    POINT FOR FORWARDING CIVIL FINGERPRINT CHECKS DIRECTLY TO THE FBI.
    UNDER THIS METHOD, ONLY A NATIONAL BACKGROUND CHECK IS CONDUCTED.
        OUR GOAL FOR CIVIL FINGERPRINT CARDS ELECTRONICALLY SUBMITTED TO
    THE FBI IS TO PROCESS AND PROVIDE A RESPONSE WITHIN 24 HOURS. TODAY, WE
    ARE MEETING THIS GOAL 99 PERCENT OF THE TIME, AND OUR AVERAGE RESPONSE
    TIME IS APPROXIMATELY TWO HOURS. ONCE PAPER-BASED SUBMISSIONS ARE
    RECEIVED BY THE FBI THEY ARE CONVERTED TO AN ELECTRONIC FORMAT,
    INJECTED INTO THE IAFIS FOR PROCESSING, A PAPER-BASED RESPONSE IS
    GENERATED, AND THAT RESPONSE IS THEN MAILED TO THE CONTRIBUTOR. IT
    TAKES BETWEEN FIVE AND TEN BUSINESS DAYS FROM THE TIME A PAPER-BASED
    CIVIL CARD IS MAILED TO THE FBI AND A RESPONSE IS RECEIVED BY THE
    CONTRIBUTOR.
        SO, WHAT IS THE BENEFIT OF CONDUCTING CIVIL FINGERPRINT BACKGROUND
    CHECKS? OUR STATISTICS SHOW AN ANNUAL HIT RATE OF 12 PERCENT. THIS
    EQUATES TO APPROXIMATELY 900,000 CHECKS PER YEAR BEING IDENTIFIED TO
    INDIVIDUALS WITH EXISTING CRIMINAL HISTORY RECORDS. IN ADDITION TO THE
    FINGERPRINT CHECK, ALL CIVIL SUBMISSIONS UNDERGO A NAME-BASED SEARCH OF
    THE SUBJECT AGAINST THE WANTED PERSON FILE AND THE TERRORIST WATCH LIST
    LOCATED WITHIN THE NATIONAL CRIME INFORMATION CENTER.
        THE FBI CHARGES A FEE FOR PROCESSING CIVIL FINGERPRINT SUBMISSIONS.
    OUR FEE FOR THIS SERVICE RANGES FROM $16 TO $22 DEPENDING ON THE TYPE
    OF SERVICE REQUESTED. THE FBI USES THIS MONEY TO OFFSET THE OVERHEAD
    AND OPERATIONAL COSTS OF PROVIDING THIS SERVICE, AND FOR MAINTENANCE
    AND TECHNOLOGICAL REFRESHMENTS TO OUR NATIONAL COMPUTERIZED DATABASES.
        AS CONGRESS CONSIDERS EXPANDING THE OCCUPATIONS AND PROFESSIONS
    WHICH REQUIRE FINGERPRINT-BASED BACKGROUND CHECKS, I BELIEVE IT MUST
    ALSO CONSIDER THE VITAL NEED TO DEVELOP A COMPREHENSIVE NATIONAL
    INFRASTRUCTURE TO SUPPORT SUCH CHECKS, INCLUDING THE MEANS OF
    COLLECTING THE REQUIRED FINGERPRINTS, AND PROCESSING THE CHECKS.
    SPECIFICALLY, MANY LAW ENFORCEMENT AGENCIES, SUCH AS POLICE DEPARTMENTS
    AND JAIL FACILITIES, WHICH TYPICALLY ARE THE STARTING POINT FOR THE
    CAPTURE OF FINGERPRINTS, DO NOT HAVE THE RESOURCES TO CAPTURE THE
    PRINTS FOR A SIGNIFICANTLY HIGHER VOLUME OF NEW CIVIL CHECKS, EITHER
    ELECTRONICALLY OR MANUALLY. IN ADDITION, FOR MOST OF THESE NON-CRIMINAL
    JUSTICE CHECKS, A LAW ENFORCEMENT AGENCY IS NOT THE MOST APPROPRIATE
    VENUE FOR COLLECTING THE PRINTS. STATE IDENTIFICATION BUREAUS, WHICH
    ALSO PLAY A KEY ROLE IN THIS PROCESS, ARE LIKEWISE OFTEN UNDER-EQUIPPED
    AND UNDER-STAFFED. THIS LIMITS THE ABILITY TO CONDUCT A THOROUGH AND
    TIMELY CIVIL CHECKS AND COULD EVENTUALLY RESULT IN THE NEED TO
    INSTITUTE SOME TYPE OF PRIORITIZATION OF SUCH CHECKS AS THE EXISTING
    INFRASTRUCTURE BECOMES OVERLOADED.
        WHILE THE ANSWERS TO THE QUESTIONS I HAVE JUST RAISED ARE CURRENTLY
    UNDETERMINED, THE FBI, DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, AND OUR PARTNERS ARE IN
    THE PROCESS OF FINALIZING THE FEASIBILITY STUDY REQUIRED BY SECTION
    108(D) OF THE ``PROTECT ACT,'' PUBLIC LAW NO. 108-21, LEGISLATION
    ENACTED LAST YEAR TO PROVIDE NEW INVESTIGATIVE AND PROSECUTORIAL
    REMEDIES AND OTHER TOOLS TO COMBAT THE EXPLOITATION OF CHILDREN. THIS
    STUDY IS REQUIRED TO ADDRESS FOURTEEN SPECIFIC AREAS, SUCH AS ``THE
    COST OF DEVELOPMENT AND OPERATION OF . . . THE INFRASTRUCTURE NECESSARY
    TO ESTABLISH A NATIONWIDE FINGERPRINT-BASED AND OTHER CRIMINAL
    BACKGROUND CHECK SYSTEM.'' THE STUDY WILL BEGIN TO ANSWER MANY OF THE
    QUESTIONS CONCERNING HOW BEST TO DEVELOP SUCH A NATIONAL INFRASTRUCTURE
    TO ACCOMMODATE THE INCREASING DEMAND FOR FINGERPRINT-BASED BACKGROUND
    CHECKS.
        IN CLOSING, I WOULD LIKE TO INVITE THE MEMBERS OF THE COMMITTEE TO
    VISIT THE FBI WEST VIRGINIA COMPLEX AND PERSONALLY SEE OUR DYANAMIC
    FINGERPRINT PROGRAM AND STATE-OF-THE-ART FACILITIES. I AGAIN THANK YOU
    FOR THE PRIVILEGE TO APPEAR BEFORE THIS COMMITTEE. I AM AVAILABLE FOR
    ANY QUESTIONS YOU MAY HAVE.

        Mr. Coble. Thank you, Mr. Kirkpatrick. And we have been
    joined by the distinguished gentleman from Virginia, Mr.
    Goodlatte, and the distinguished gentleman from Wisconsin, Mr.
    Green.
        Ms. Pirro, you're recognized for 5 minutes.

               STATEMENT OF THE HONORABLE JEANINE PIRRO,
               DISTRICT ATTORNEY, WESTCHESTER COUNTY, NY

        Ms. Pirro. Thank you. Mr. Chairman and Members of the
    Committee, I wish to thank you for inviting me to speak this
    afternoon and I've come here to urge you to implement
    safeguards that employers desperately need in order to make
    informed hiring decisions. After more than 25 years in law
    enforcement I have learned that the first order of Government
    is the protection of its citizens and Government fails when it
    does not give employers the right to know who they are hiring
    and when the Government allows individuals with ulterior
    motives to fake their identifications, to apply for jobs
    without verification of who they truly are.
        I come from a county of almost 1 million people and we
    prosecute almost 35,000 cases every year. I have seen virtually
    every kind of violation of the law in my work as both a judge
    and a prosecutor and what I know is that every day individuals
    seek employment in communities around this country for
    sensitive positions, positions of trust, and a history of
    maintaining or violating the laws of our society are essential
    factors to be weighed by prospective employers before making a
    hiring decision.
        The public policy objective is self-evident. Employers
    deserve access to public information regarding those who seek
    their trust, yet our laws do not provide a uniform mechanism
    for most employers to access what is perhaps the most telling
    information about an individual--a person's criminal record.
        There are many things about our lives that we are entitled
    to keep private. Criminal convictions are not among them.
    Criminal convictions are a matter of public record and if
    Government fails to even assist in securing the safety of its
    citizens it is abrogating its most essential duty.
        You have the means to provide broad access to these records
    and I would argue the obligation to do so. The lack of
    uniformity in our statutes across the country has led to the
    hiring of individuals who misrepresent themselves and their
    past in order to obtain a job. In an age of identity theft,
    even the documentation an applicant might supply is potentially
    suspect. And in the post-9/11 era when we restrict legitimate
    employers from finding out critical information about job
    applicants, we do so at the risk of public safety.
        A piecemeal approach to this issue is not the answer. By
    selectively identifying careers that will allow employers to
    seek access to public records containing criminal histories, we
    effectively preclude other equally desiring employers from the
    same access. It is time for Congress to act and to do so with
    recognition that it is in the best interest not only of
    business but of our nation to craft a statute that allows for
    inclusive rather than exclusive access to these already public
    records.
        Allow me to give you a couple of examples of how piecemeal
    efforts at the State level have resulted in far too many holes.
    In Westchester County we are entitled to know if someone is
    working in a day care facility whether that individual has a
    previous criminal record and yet private individuals who hire
    someone to care for their children at home are not entitled to
    that very same information. And it was only when a 10-year-old
    was thrown against a wall in Westchester and killed--a 10-
    month-old; excuse me--that we decided that we should change the
    law to give parents access to information of prior criminal
    histories. In that case the individual had a prior history,
    criminal history, that the parent was not allowed to access.
        Most employers have no way of knowing who they're hiring.
    Just 2 weeks ago I addressed the American Campers Association
    when I heard an outcry from camp directors that their efforts
    to run background checks on prospective employees are stymied
    by lax or nonexistent State statutes. The reality for them is
    that they're forced to rely on individuals who simply want the
    job, putting their campers and their business and reputation at
    risk.
        Our laws are a disjointed hodgepodge of narrow provisions
    enacted one at a time on a position-by-position basis with no
    attempt to rationalize why one sensitive position is subject to
    a criminal history check while a different comparably sensitive
    position is not.
        On school buses in New York there are often two adults in
    close confinement with our children--the bus driver and the
    monitor. The bus drivers are subject to criminal background
    checks. The bus monitor is not. I cannot tell you how many
    monitors we've prosecuted in Westchester who would not have
    been hired had there been any information that could be
    verified regarding their criminal backgrounds.
        And after a case in which a public school teacher sodomized
    an 8- and 9-year-old boy in Westchester we found out that that
    individual had had three prior criminal convictions that the
    school could not access. The school was entitled to that
    information and those children should not have been subjected
    to that sodomy, which will forever affect their lives.
        Those who affect children and work with children are but
    one example. The issue here is not whether someone with a
    criminal past should be disqualified from all employment. Those
    who've been punished for breaking our laws should have every
    reasonable opportunity to progress toward a normal law-abiding
    life. But when there is a relationship between their criminal
    history and the job, the employer should be allowed to make an
    informed decision.
        Just this morning when I was at the airport coming here----
        Mr. Coble. Ms. Pirro, if you can wrap up?
        Ms. Pirro. I am.
        Mr. Coble. Your time has expired.
        Ms. Pirro. I'm right there.
        Mr. Coble. All right.
        Ms. Pirro. I was required to take off my shoes, my jacket,
    my coat, and be scanned. This is a privacy issue and I was more
    than willing to subject myself to that for national security
    and safety. And yet criminal histories that are already public
    records are not allowed to be accessed and I believe that we
    have an obligation to give to employers the right to know who
    it is they're hiring. Thank you.
        [The prepared statement of Ms. Pirro follows:]

                   Prepared Statement of Jeanine Ferris Pirro

        Mr. Chairman, Members of the Committee:
        I first wish to thank the Committee for inviting me to speak this
    afternoon. I have come to Washington to urge you to implement
    safeguards employers desperately need in order to make informed hiring
    decisions.
        Every day individuals seek employment in communities around the
    United States for sensitive positions--positions of trust. Histories of
    maintaining or violating the laws of society are essential factors to
    be weighed by prospective employers before making these hiring
    decisions. The public policy objective is self-evident: employers
    deserve access to public information regarding those who seek their
    trust.
        Yet, our laws do not provide a uniform mechanism for most employers
    to access what is perhaps the most telling historical information about
    an individual--the person's criminal record. There are many things
    about our lives that we are entitled to keep private. Criminal
    convictions are not among them. Criminal convictions are matters of
    public record. If government fails to assist in securing the safety of
    its citizens, it is abrogating its most essential duty. You have the
    means to provide broad access to these records and, I would argue, an
    obligation to do so.
        This lack of uniformity in our statutes has lead to the hiring of
    individuals who have misrepresented their past in order to obtain their
    positions. In the age of identity theft, even the documentation an
    applicant might supply is potentially suspect. And in the post-9/11
    era, when we restrict legitimate employers from finding out critical
    information about job applicants, we do so at the risk of safety and
    security.
        A piecemeal approach to this issue is not the answer. By
    selectively identifying careers that will allow employers to seek
    access to public records containing criminal histories, we effectively
    preclude other equally deserving employers the same access. It is time
    for Congress to act and to do so with the recognition that it is in the
    best interest not only of business, but of our nation to craft a
    statute that allows for inclusive rather than exclusive access to these
    public records.
        Allow me to give you a sense of how piecemeal efforts to solve this
    issue at the state level have resulted in far too many holes in the
    safety net.
        In almost three decades of service to law enforcement, it has
    become abundantly clear to me that pedophiles are the most cunning,
    devious and deceptive of criminals. It is almost invariably the case
    that pedophiles will groom their intended victims before undertaking
    actual sexual contact. The most effective means of ensuring that their
    crimes are not uncovered is to establish themselves as respected and
    responsible members of society. Frequently, this involves finding
    employment that puts them in direct contact with children.
        Employers are permitted by law to inquire if an applicant has ever
    been convicted of a crime, permitted to require a formal statement on a
    written application to this effect, permitted to deny employment if the
    listed criminal conviction bears a relationship with the job offered,
    and to discharge the employee if the written statement is false.
        But with selected exceptions, most employers have no way of
    determining whether the statement the employee has given is the truth,
    or is a lie. Just two weeks ago, I addressed the American Campers
    Association where I heard an outcry from camp directors that their
    efforts to run background checks on prospective employees are stymied
    by lax or non-existent state statutes. The reality for them is that
    they are forced to reply perhaps on the false assertions of an
    applicant, putting their campers and themselves at risk. And they are
    but one category of employers who want access to these public records--
    access which is denied.
        The fact is that our laws in this area are a disjointed hodge-podge
    of narrow provisions, enacted one at a time on a position-by-position
    basis, with no attempt to rationalize why one sensitive position is
    subject to a criminal history check while a different, comparably
    sensitive position is not. At best, legislatures across this country
    are constantly closing the barn door after the horse has escaped:
    enacting legislation in the aftermath of a tragedy, limited to the
    singular situation that tragedy involved.
        Under New York law, for example, child-care employees in a day care
    facility are subject to mandatory fingerprinting and criminal history
    checks. But in the early 1990's similar caregivers working in their
    employer's homes were not. As a result, when a family in my county
    hired a young woman as the nanny for their 10-month-old son Kieran, and
    attempted to conduct a criminal background check on her, they were told
    that New York law did not permit it. So they never knew of the woman's
    criminal past, which she indeed had. Not until it was too late. Not
    until after the woman hurled 10-month-old Kieran across the room,
    killing him.
        As a result of this brutal homicide, working with Governor Pataki
    and the New York Legislature, in 1998, we passed ``Kieran's Law'' to
    remedy this situation. But ``Kieran's Law'' remedies only this
    situation. Scores of similar disparities continue to exist.
        For example, on school buses in New York, there are often two
    adults in close confinement with our children: the bus driver and the
    bus monitor. School bus drivers are subject to criminal background
    checks; school bus monitors are not.
        After a case in which a public school teacher with a criminal
    history was convicted of sodomizing two young boys, New York enacted
    the ``Safe Schools Against Violence in Education'' Law which required
    fingerprinting and criminal background checks for all prospective
    public school teachers and public school employees and volunteers. But
    the law does not affect currently employed teachers, or teachers in
    private schools, or volunteers working in group homes, or camp
    employees, or the employees of private contactors. No, the unfortunate
    reality is that we will have to await the commission of future criminal
    acts before these criminal history problems will be addressed.
        Those charged with the care of children are but one example. The
    necessity for employers' access to criminal record checks holds true
    for any number of prospective employers engaged in sensitive commerce.
    Must we wait until the employer's faith is betrayed by the applicant
    who repeats his crimes? What answer do we have for an employer who
    unwittingly hires an individual with a criminal history of violence?
    Can we afford to take the chance that a job applicant has told the
    truth when in fact her intent is to gain access, through this
    employment, to new victims? Are terrorists any different than
    pedophiles when it comes to hiding their past and, thus, their motives
    for obtaining employment?
        The issue here is not whether someone with a criminal past should
    be disqualified from all employment. Those who have been punished for
    breaking our laws should have every reasonable opportunity to progress
    toward a normal, law-abiding life. But when there is a relationship
    between the employee's criminal history and the job, employers should
    be allowed to make informed decisions.
        We exist in a modern, mobile, Internet-connected society. This is
    the information age. Yet we provide the opportunity for prospective
    employees get away with lying because we deny employers the right to
    access public records in order to verify the information they have been
    given.
        I ask the members of Congress to consider that a piecemeal approach
    to criminal history checks has created a flawed dragnet--catching some,
    while letting the rest pass through. We shouldn't wait until more
    tragedies occur to address this problem. And we shouldn't have to
    engage the laborious legislative process every time we realize that a
    criminal history check is appropriate in a specific situation.
        I respectfully ask this Committee to recognize the importance of a
    standard, uniform procedure which can be utilized by all employers,
    whose foremost interest--like our own--is protection and security.

        Mr. Coble. Thank you, Ms. Pirro.
        Mr. Walker?

        STATEMENT OF DON WALKER, CHAIRMAN, PINKERTON SECURITY,
      EXECUTIVE MEMBER, AMERICAN SOCIETY OF INDUSTRIAL SECURITY,
      BOARD OF DIRECTORS, NATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF SECURITY GUARD
                               COMPANIES

        Mr. Walker. Mr. Chairman, Members of the Subcommittee, I
    appreciate the opportunity to be here to testify on behalf of
    S. 1743 and urge the quick adoption by the U.S. House of
    Representatives. We badly need this legislation to ensure that
    persons who are convicted of serious crimes are identified
    before they are deployed to protect our citizens and their
    property.
        There are roughly 800,000 sworn law enforcement officers in
    the United States to protect a population of over 290 million
    people. Police agencies are called upon to deter and solve
    serious crimes while being engaged in a fight against potential
    terrorist attacks orchestrated from abroad. Unfortunately there
    is simply neither the public resources nor the personnel to do
    the job comprehensively, as we would like to see it done.
    Therefore in this era of increased demand for better
    protection, private security officers are being asked to fill
    the gap, fill the gap in homeland security.
        Today the private security industry employs nearly 2
    million people. Security personnel are on duty protecting
    America in places where our citizens are working, living, and
    playing. In addition, 85 percent of the nation's infrastructure
    is owned and operated by private industry and private security
    officers protect the vast majority of those assets.
        Also, most of the first responders in the case of an attack
    or other emergency in an office building, manufacturing plant,
    public utility, shopping malls, and so forth are private
    security officers.
        Generally the regulation for private security officers is
    left to the State. However, 10 States do not have laws
    regulating private security and less than one-half of the
    States require an FBI criminal history check before licensing.
        Why should we care? I'd like to give you two examples. One
    is in the State of California. In 2003 there were over 69,000
    applicants for a Guard Card. Of those applicants, 9,000 or more
    than 13 percent of the applicants were rejected after
    information was received from the FBI Criminal Information
    System and these individuals were denied a Guard Card.
    Interestingly, the three most common reasons for denial were
    one, sex-related crimes; two, battery and robbery; and three,
    burglary. Data also showed in California that registered sex of
    fenders frequently attempted to obtain a Guard Card.
        In my home State of Illinois a review of January 2004
    records for applicants that applied for a guard position showed
    that the FBI criminal history check provided serious criminal
    information four times more frequently than the State-wide
    check within the State of Illinois.
        Another problem within our industry is turnover and if you
    use a conservative 50 percent turnover rate there are more than
    79,000 security officers that are being hired each month with
    less than one-half of those individuals being screened by an
    FBI check. That's over 300,000 people being employed since the
    Senate passed this bill in November.
        Another factor which has been alluded to is the problem of
    fraud, applicant fraud and identify and identity theft.
        Mr. Chairman, to the specifics of this bill, first of all,
    it's the product of a bipartisan group of senators who share
    the belief that Congress needs to act swiftly to prevent
    persons who have committed serious crimes from being hired into
    positions of trust to protect their constituents, their
    families, their homes, and places of employment. 1743 is not a
    panacea. It is an important and necessary tool for the security
    industry to keep the bad apples from being placed in positions
    of responsibility.
        Finally, the bill covers three major objectives. One, the
    bill permits security companies to request an FBI fingerprint
    check regarding prospective employees. Two, the bill protects
    the individual's privacy by requiring that an applicant provide
    a written authorization to an employer requesting the FBI
    record check before such check is initiated. Further, the form
    and content of the information provided to the employer will be
    consistent with State laws and regulations. Finally, the bill
    does not impose any unfunded mandates on the States and
    employers may be assessed a fee to handle their requests. In
    addition, the States may opt out or decline to participate in
    the system.
        In summary, Mr. Chairman, passage of 1743 will be a much
    improved system and provide quality controls that will block
    the most serious offenders from gaining employment in the
    private security industry. The industry needs it but, more
    importantly, our nation needs it. Thank you very much.
        [The prepared statement of Mr. Walker follows:]

                    Prepared Statement of Don Wilson Walker

        Mr. Chairman and Members of the Subcommittee, I am Don Walker,
    Chairman of Securitas Security Services USA, Inc. Securitas is a world-
    wide leader in providing security services to individuals, businesses,
    government and private entities.
        I appear today in my capacity as Chairman of the nation's largest
    employer of private security officers and as a former President of the
    ASIS International (ASIS), the security industry's largest professional
    membership organization with over 35,000 members. I am also co-chair of
    the ASIS Security Guidelines Commission.
        I very much appreciate the opportunity to testify today in support
    of S. 1743, the ``Private Security Officer Employment Authorization Act
    of 2003,'' and to urge its quick adoption by the U.S. House of
    Representatives. We badly need this legislation to ensure that persons
    who are convicted of serious crimes are identified before they are
    deployed to protect our citizens and their property. Americans need to
    know that private security officers are part of the solution--not an
    impediment--to preventing harm from any foreign or domestic threat.
        By way of background, Securitas AB (Securitas), our parent company,
    is organized and headquartered in Sweden. Securitas acquired
    Pinkerton's, Inc. (Pinkerton) in 1999. Although we generally operate in
    the United States under the Securitas name, Pinkerton still operates in
    several localities. At the time of the acquisition, Pinkerton was the
    nation's oldest, largest and one of the most respected security officer
    companies. Indeed, Pinkerton remains one of the most recognizable brand
    names for any product or service around the globe.
        Pinkerton has a rich history dating back to1850, when the legendary
    Allan Pinkerton, the ``original private eye,'' founded the company.
    Since its inception, the company has become synonymous with protecting
    the American public from an array of threats from outlaws, bandits and
    thieves. In 1861, Pinkerton achieved national recognition when he
    uncovered and foiled a threat to assassinate Abraham Lincoln. Later
    that year, Pinkerton formed the federal Secret Service, of which he
    became chief. Early in the company's history, Pinkerton apprehended
    some of the nation's most notorious train and/or bank robbers and
    started the interstate identification system to track bandits from
    State to State. In the time since, Pinkerton has been at the forefront
    of improving the screening, pay and training of security officers.
        In 2000, Securitas acquired another legendary American private
    security company. Burns International was founded in 1909 by William J.
    Burns, who was known as ``the greatest detective the U.S. had
    produced.'' In 1921, he was appointed director of the newly formed
    Bureau of Investigation that later became the FBI. Like Allan
    Pinkerton, Burns' drive, determination and commitment to service helped
    his company grow from a small detective agency to the second largest
    security provider in the U. S.
        Long before the tragic events of September 11, Securitas and our
    predecessors called for higher standards and qualifications for private
    security officers. Our personnel and customers--your constituents--
    deserve no less.
        I reference this history as a way of introducing the company's
    credentials as well as its long and proud tradition and experience of
    protecting the country's human and physical resources. I am proud to
    say that Securitas USA, as part of the global Securitas Group, remains
    committed to the principles of our founders. Securitas is built around
    a core set of values--Integrity, Vigilance and Helpfulness. Like other
    responsible employers in the U. S. security industry, we must
    constantly strive to improve the standards of our profession. Our
    people are the essence of Securitas and we believe in building
    relationships based on mutual respect and dignity with all our
    employees. To enable our people to carry out their professional duties,
    we constantly provide training programs and promote higher wages and
    industry standards.
        Mr. Chairman, I would like to cite one simple but very important
    statistic that is at the heart of the debate today over whether to
    authorize a national system for criminal background checks for private
    security officers.
        The fact is this: There are roughly 800,000 sworn law enforcement
    officers in the United States today to protect a population of over 290
    million residents. Never in the history of the nation have law
    enforcement agencies been called upon to fulfill two fundamentally
    different and competing missions--to deter domestic crime while also
    being engaged in the fight against potentially new and devastating
    terrorist attacks orchestrated from abroad. Unfortunately, there are
    simply neither the public resources nor the personnel to do the job as
    completely or comprehensively as we all would like. Consequently, in
    this era of heightened need and demand for better security, private
    security officers are being asked to fill the gap.
        The role of private security was recently highlighted by Admiral
    James Loy, the Deputy Secretary of the Department of Homeland Security.
    He stated at a recent conference in Washington that, ``. . . unlike
    wars of the past . . . this is not going to be a situation where the
    federal government simply does it for the nation.'' We concur.
        Today, private security companies collectively employ nearly two
    million security officers nationwide. As we speak, security personnel
    are on duty protecting American businesses, public offices, schools,
    shopping centers and housing communities. In addition, private security
    officers are stationed at many of the nation's critical infrastructure
    sites and facilities including nuclear plants, public utilities, oil
    pipelines, ports, bridges, tunnels and many other places where our
    citizens live, work and play.
        Recent estimates indicate that 85% of the nation's infrastructure
    is owned and operated by private industry. Private security officers
    protect the vast majority of these assets. Similarly, the overwhelming
    majority of ``first responders,'' who are first on the scene in the
    case of an attack or other emergency situation in our manufacturing
    plants, office buildings, banks, public utilities, shopping malls, are,
    more often than not, private security officers.
        Mr. Chairman, a 2003 Presidential report entitled, ``The National
    Strategy for the Physical Protection of Critical Infrastructure and Key
    Assets,'' noted . . . ``the private sector generally remains the first
    line of defense for its own facilities.'' Further, the report states
    that the [Strategy] ``provides a foundation for building and fostering
    the cooperative environment in which government, industry and private
    citizens can carry out their respective protection responsibilities
    more effectively and efficiently.'' The legislation under discussion
    today is but one of many key elements that are required in order to
    fulfill our responsibilities as providers of reliable security
    services.
        Clearly, private security is an integral part of our homeland
    security. In times of crisis and disaster, businesses rely on private
    security to protect people and property. And yet, with so much at risk,
    and so much being protected by private security forces, there is little
    in the way of federal oversight or regulation of the people we employ.
        For the most part, regulation of the private security officers is
    left to the States. Only forty (40) States have laws on their books
    regulating security officers. Of the forty (40) States with licensing
    requirements, thirty-one (31) States either permit or require an
    applicant to undergo a FBI fingerprint check for prior criminal
    history. However, in those thirty-one (31) states, an FBI fingerprint/
    background check is permitted but not required in some jurisdictions,
    and required in seven (7) states when the person is applying for an
    armed guard position only. Thus, more than half the States do not
    automatically subject applicants to some type of background check. (See
    Attachments 1 and 2.)
        Why should we care? What does it matter? Here's why Congress needs
    to act.
        In 2003, in the State of California, there were over 69,000 ``Guard
    Card'' applicants. Of those applicants, almost 18,000 had an FBI
    ``rap'' sheet indicating some sort of a prior criminal history. Thanks
    largely to a new law that went into effect in California in 2003, over
    9,000 or 51% of those applicants with a rap sheet were denied a guard
    card. Prior to the implementation of the law, security officers could
    have been employed on a temporary basis for three months or longer.
    Interestingly, the three most common reasons for denial were for sex
    related offenses, burglary/robbery and battery convictions. Data also
    showed that registered sex offenders frequently attempted to obtain a
    guard card.
        Although most states do not keep the type of statistics as provided
    by California, limited information from other States tell a similar
    story. In States such as Virginia and Florida, the rejection rate due
    to FBI records checks is estimated by the states to range from about 1%
    to 4% of all security officer applicants.
        In my home State of Illinois, a review of January, 2004 applicants
    showed that the FBI criminal history records check eliminated four
    times as many applicants as the Illinois State Police check for crimes
    committed within the State. Put another way, Illinois State Police
    clear 87% of all applicants while the FBI check clears only 64%--a 23%
    difference.
        Equally important is the turnover rate among security officers. The
    security industry records one of the highest ``drop out'' rates of
    employees. On average, companies suffer between a 20-70% turnover in
    security officers. However, some studies suggest a rate ranging between
    100-300%. A more conservative estimate is 50%. Thus, at that rate,
    there are 79,000 new private security officers being hired each month
    based on the current 1.9 million workforce--and only a relatively few
    of these applicants are undergoing an FBI criminal history background
    check because they are employed in states that have not authorized
    these checks.
        Another factor that we must contend with is applicant fraud and
    identity theft.
        I am sure it will come as no surprise to the members of the
    Subcommittee when I say that people are not always entirely truthful
    when they fill out a job application. In a word, they lie--who they
    are, where they live, where they worked, whether they have a criminal
    conviction history, whether they are living legally in the country and
    so on. Similarly, the incidence of identity theft has been made easier
    by computers. Crooks, today, are increasingly sophisticated and are
    able to manufacture fake documents such as licenses, social security
    and immigration cards that are near perfect matches to the real thing.
    Identity theft is rampant throughout the country and afflicts not just
    our industry but individuals and businesses everywhere.
        Consider this example. In Illinois, applicants for a security
    officer position can complete an application at one of our local
    offices. If they present some form of identification that appears
    legitimate, we forward the application to the State Police for a
    background check. A fingerprint check is automatically conducted in the
    State and subsequently sent to the FBI. As the statistics cited above
    demonstrate, the State Police clear a large percentage of applicants
    (87%). However, if that individual had committed a crime in neighboring
    states, such as Wisconsin, Iowa, Missouri or Indiana, the State Police
    check alone would not uncover those crimes. Nor would the check reveal
    whether the applicant had disclosed his/her true identity. Only a
    nationwide fingerprint search would ascertain the true identity and
    background of an applicant.
        These are but a few examples of the kinds of situations security
    companies are facing each day.
        Mr. Chairman, let me turn now to the specifics of the legislation
    under consideration today.
        S. 1743 can trace its origins to legislation (S. 1258) introduced
    in 1991 by then Senator Al Gore. His bill would have required the
    General Services Administration to promulgate rules establishing
    standards for the hiring of Federal and private security officers. The
    bill also mandated that security officers be subject to a criminal
    background check as a pre-condition of employment. Funds would have
    also been provided to States to develop a regulatory scheme that
    mirrored the GSA's standards. In a statement that accompanied the bill,
    Senator Gore said that, ``. . . People naturally believe that security
    officers are screened and trained with the same diligence as law
    enforcement officers. In fact, that is not always the case . . . the
    potential for damage by unfit security officers is obvious. The need
    for screening is critical.'' Unfortunately, the bill never gained much
    support and it died when Congress adjourned at the end of 1992.
        Subsequent efforts likewise failed. In 1993, Representatives
    Martinez and Owens introduced H.R. 1534. Two years later, in 1993,
    then-Representative Don Sundquist sponsored H.R. 2656. Neither of these
    bills received much attention. However, in 1996, Representatives Barr
    and Martinez teamed up and introduced H.R. 2092 the, ``Private Security
    Officer Quality Assurance Act,'' which would have provided for
    background checks of individuals seeking a license as a security
    officer. This bill passed the House on September 26, 1996 but the
    Senate did not act prior to adjournment that year. In 1997,
    Representative Barr sponsored H.R. 103, which passed the House on July
    28, 1997, but the Senate did not act on the bill. (See Attachment 3 for
    a legislative history of S. 1743.)
        Mr. Chairman, S. 1743 is the product of a bipartisan group of
    Senators who share the belief that Congress needs to act swiftly to
    prevent persons who commit serious crimes from being hired to protect
    their constituents, their families, their homes and places of
    employment. Sponsors of the original Senate bill (S.2238) included
    Senators Carl Levin, Fred Thompson, Joe Lieberman and Mitch McConnell.
    When the bill was first introduced in 2002, Senator Levin said that ``.
    . . this legislation will enhance the Nation's security. As an adjunct
    to our Nation's law enforcement officers, private security guards are
    responsible for the protection of numerous critical components of our
    Nation's infrastructure, including power generation facilities,
    hazardous materials manufacturing facilities, water supply and delivery
    facilities, oil and gas refineries and food processing plants--it is
    imperative that we provide access to information that might disclose
    who is unsuitable for protecting these resources.''
        Nothing has changed in the time that has elapsed since the bill's
    introduction in 2002. In fact, just the opposite is true. The threat of
    attack by America's enemies persists and grows. Personnel and resources
    are strained to the limit. The bombings in Spain have further caused
    authorities to enhance security measures for rail passengers. From whom
    and where the next target will emerge is uncertain. All of this
    contributes to our collective sense of vulnerability that our leaders
    seek to address on a daily basis. We share that responsibility and we
    take our mission seriously.
        Mr. Chairman, S. 1743 is a good bill. It is certainly not a
    panacea. It is merely an important and necessary tool that the security
    industry needs to keep the bad apples from being placed in positions of
    responsibility. Former Senator Warren Rudman, who co-chaired the U.S.
    Commission on National Security/21st Century, underscored the
    importance of this legislation in a letter to this Committee. In his
    December 2003 letter, Mr. Rudman stated, ``The legislation's enabling
    of a review of the criminal history records of prospective private
    security officers is exactly the sort of public-private cooperation
    that the Commission viewed as essential to promoting U.S. homeland
    security.'' He further stated that ``. . . S. 1743 deserves expedited
    treatment based on the critical gap that it fills in our nation's
    homeland security.''
        In its current form, we believe the bill strikes an important and
    appropriate balance between the interests of applicants, employers and
    the public.
        Essentially, the bill accomplishes three major objectives.
        First, the bill permits security companies to request a criminal
    background check on prospective employees. Requests must be forwarded
    through the States' identification bureau or a comparable agency
    designated by the Attorney General of the United States. Employers will
    not under any circumstances be given direct access to FBI records. The
    States will serve as the conduit for receiving an employer's request,
    passing it on to the FBI and, in turn, receive back from the FBI a
    report as to the suitability of the applicant for employment as a
    security officer. States may charge a reasonable fee for this service.
        Second, the bill protects an individual's privacy by requiring an
    applicant to provide written authorization to an employer to request a
    check before such a background check may be initiated. Further, the
    form and content of the information provided to an employer will be
    consistent with State laws and regulations governing the qualifications
    of individuals to be security officers. In those States where there are
    no standards, employers will only be notified as to whether an
    applicant has been convicted of a felony or a violent misdemeanor or a
    crime of dishonesty within the past 10 years.
        Finally, the bill does not impose any unfunded mandates on the
    States. Employers may be assessed a fee to handle these requests. In
    addition, States may opt out of this regime at any time.
        Mr. Chairman, insofar as I am aware, this bill faces no major
    opposition from any affected interest. It passed the Senate
    unanimously. The Administration as well as law enforcement officials
    agree with the scope and intent of the measure. In addition, I would
    like to include in the hearing record letters from the National
    Association of Security Companies (NASCO) and ASIS International. (See
    attachments 4 and 5.) Each of these organizations endorses enactment of
    this bill. I would add, parenthetically, that responsible members of
    NASCO and ASIS International have worked tirelessly over the years to
    improve the security profession. In addition, ASIS has recently
    published a draft Private Security Officer Selection and Training
    Guideline that, among other things, encourages States to enact
    licensing standards and to require FBI criminal history records checks
    as part of the licensing process.
        As noted above, in the four months that have elapsed since the
    Senate passed the bill, security firms have hired over 300,000 new
    guards. Only a certain percentage of these individuals have been
    thoroughly screened. More people are added to employment rolls each
    day. Most are fit for duty. However, some are not. This bill will plug
    that hole through which some unqualified candidates have slipped
    through in the past.
        In summary, Mr. Chairman, passage of S. 1743 will establish a much
    improved system and quality controls that will block the most serious
    offenders from gaining employment as security officers. The industry
    will benefit from this legislation and, more importantly, so will our
    nation. We urge its speedy adoption.
        Thank you again for the opportunity to testify on this critical
    legislation. I will be glad to respond to any question you, or other
    Members of the Subcommittee, may have.

                                  ATTACHMENT 1

                                  ATTACHMENT 2

                                  ATTACHMENT 3

                                  ATTACHMENT 4

                                  ATTACHMENT 5

        Mr. Coble. Thank you, Mr. Walker.
        Mr. Maltby?

                 STATEMENT OF LEWIS MALTBY, PRESIDENT,
                     NATIONAL WORK RIGHTS INSTITUTE

        Mr. Maltby. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Let me be clear from
    the outset that the two critical points the other witnesses
    have made are absolutely correct. Employers are entitled to
    relevant criminal information in making hiring decisions and
    secondly, it is too hard today for employers to get relevant
    criminal background information. I've been a private employer
    myself. I've run an HR department. I know from my own
    experience that it's too hard to get the information you need.
        So I agree with the other witnesses on those points and I
    think what the Committee and the bill are attempting to do is
    very important, but there's another national objective that's
    equally important that I don't believe is getting enough
    consideration in this context, and that is the absolutely
    imperative need to rehabilitate criminal offenders.
        Every year 600,000 people come out of jail in America.
    There are 13 million people in America today who have been in
    jail at some point in their lives and it's absolutely
    imperative that these people become productive citizens again,
    not just for their own sake but for our sake, because if they
    can't become rehabilitated they're going to become criminals
    again and that's going to hurt everyone just as much as putting
    a bad apple in a guard position.
        The most important part of being rehabilitated, and any
    professional in the field will tell you that, is getting a job.
    If you have to feed yourself and perhaps your kids, if you
    can't get a job you know what's going to happen--they're going
    to become criminals again.
        So what our law needs to do is to strike a very careful
    balance. On the one hand we have to make sure that bad apples
    don't get into the security guard business. That's imperative.
    But it's equally imperative that we don't stand in the way of
    good people who are not going the be a risk as a security
    guard, who are trying to rehabilitate themselves, by blocking
    them from employment. That hurts innocent people and the public
    just as much. We have to get the balance right.
        In one respect I believe 1743 does take an important step
    toward the balance and that is by restricting convictions to a
    10-year period. At least a 20-year conviction is not going to
    come back to haunt someone who's in their middle age and get in
    the way of them getting a job. It's not relevant and the bill
    wisely takes it out.
        But there are other balancing issues that need more
    attention. One of them is the definition of an offense that
    gets reported. Under the bill as written, any offense involving
    physical force or the attempt to use physical force comes under
    this bill. That means, to put it simply, if two people are
    sitting in a bar watching Monday Night Football and they get
    into an argument because they've both been drinking too much
    and somebody shoves the other guy or takes a swing at the other
    guy and misses, that's a criminal offense and it's covered by
    this bill and now this I'm sorry to say relatively trivial
    event is going to hang around for 10 years getting in the way
    of this person getting a job.
        I don't think that that's what people intended when they
    drafted this bill but that's what it says and I think it's
    clear that we're all concerned about serious offenses when we
    talk about qualifications to be a security guard, not a pushing
    match between two guys who got mad at each other after a
    fender-bender and we need to be a little more careful about
    refining the definition of what the offenses are that are
    covered by this bill.
        The definition of security officer I think needs some
    attention, too. Right now what the bill says is anyone who is
    responsible for the safety or another person or protecting
    another person's property is a security officer. That means the
    parking lot attendant where I parked my car to go to the train
    this morning is a security officer. If I'd had time to go to
    the Monocle today the person who took my coat in the coat room
    would have been a security officer.
        I don't think that's what we had in mind. I don't think
    whoever owns the Monocle needs Federal legislation to tell them
    how they should hire the coat check person. That's not what
    we're trying to do but it's what we do. I think that definition
    needs a little more attention, as well.
        And mostly what I'm trying to say is this. America's scared
    today for good reason. We've all seen 9/11. I lost friends and
    neighbors in 9/11. My post office in my home town was closed
    for a month because it was contaminated with anthrax. I'm
    scared, too. The question is how do we react when we're scared?
        A lot of employers are reacting understandably but wrong.
    Nineteen percent of all companies in America today will not
    hire anyone who's been convicted of anything at any time in
    their life. That includes giant companies like Eli Lily. Albert
    Einstein couldn't work for Eli Lily as a research chemist if he
    had been convicted of shoplifting as a teenager.
        The country needs guidance from Congress on how to respond
    to the situation with judgement and not by panicking in our
    fear and making overbroad rules. I would like to see 1743
    passed but we need to strike the balance a little more
    carefully. State legislatures have been working on this for
    years. They may not have solved the problem but there's a lot
    of good thinking that's going on at the State level about how
    to strike this balance and we should look to some of that and
    do some more thinking ourselves and make sure we get it right
    before we pass this law. Thank you.
        [The prepared statement of Mr. Maltby follows:]

                       Prepared Statement of Lewis Maltby

        The National Workrights Institute is a not-for-profit organization
    dedicated to expanding human rights in the workplace.
        The Institute supports the objectives of S. 1743. Private security
    officers frequently occupy positions of responsibility and it is in the
    public interest to ensure that individuals serving as security officers
    have the character and integrity to use this responsibility properly.
        There are many situations in which a prior criminal conviction
    makes it inappropriate for an individual to serve as a private security
    officer. This is especially true when the position requires carrying a
    firearm. No one wants to see a person who has been convicted of armed
    robbery serving as a bank security guard and carrying a gun.
        S. 1743, by making it easier for employers to obtain information
    that will help them to hire only qualified people as security officers,
    is a positive development.
        In determining who is qualified to serve as a security guard, it is
    also important to consider other national priorities. One of these is
    encouraging the rehabilitation of individuals who have committed
    criminal offenses. Every year, 600,000 people are released from prison
    in America. It is vitally important to these individuals, their
    families, their communities, and our entire society that they
    rehabilitate themselves and become law abiding responsible citizens. A
    critical part of rehabilitation is employment. It is virtually
    impossible for a person to rehabilitate themselves if they cannot get a
    job. In making rules for the employment of people with criminal
    records, we must take care not to unnecessarily deny employment to ex-
    offenders. A criminal conviction must not become a scarlet letter than
    follows a person for life.
        It is vitally important that we strike this balance correctly. If
    we allow the wrong people to become security officers, these officers
    will commit or tolerate crime and innocent people will suffer. If we
    deny employment to people who have rehabilitated themselves we push
    them back into a life of crime and innocent people will suffer. We
    cannot play it safe by making the qualifications for serving as a
    security officer so high that most people can't qualify. We have to do
    the hard, unglamorous, work of getting into the details and getting the
    balance right.
        S. 1743 contains constructive provisions to strike this balance.
    For example, section 4(a)(4)(B) (i)(I) provides that only convictions
    within the last 10 years are to be reported. This protects people from
    being denied employment because of old convictions that indicate little
    or nothing about a person's current character.
        Additional steps are required to strike the right balance. For
    example, as drafted, S. 1743 covers all offenses involving
    ``dishonesty'' or ``physical force''. This covers virtually the entire
    criminal code. Moreover, there is no minimum. Any conviction involving
    force is covered. It need not be a felony. It need not even be a
    misdemeanor. A person who got into a shoving match following a traffic
    accident and was fined $25 by a magistrate would be covered by S. 1743.
        This needs to be modified. While a person who has used unlawful
    force on another will often be unqualified to be a security officer,
    not everyone who has used force should be disqualified. Some minimum
    level of offense or harm should be required.
        The breadth of the definition of ``security officer'' also raises
    concerns. It applies to anyone whose job is to ``protect people or
    property''. This sweeping definition includes school crossing guards,
    parking lot attendants, receptionists, and coatroom attendants. Do we
    really need an act of Congress to make sure the owner of the Monocle
    hires the right coatroom attendant?
        Technically, of course, the bill doesn't set qualification
    standards for security officers. It only makes it easier for employers
    to get certain kinds of criminal history. But a Congressional statement
    that certain information must be made available to employers who hire
    security officers will quickly turn this information into de facto
    qualification standards.
        America is afraid of crime. We are especially afraid of terrorism,
    and with good reason. I lost friends and neighbors on 9/11. My post
    office was closed for several weeks because it was contaminated with
    anthrax. I'm scared too.
        Employers are afraid. Employers have increased their use of
    criminal records so fast that the record providers can barely keep up
    with the demand. Some of this development is healthy. But employers'
    fear is starting to get the best of their good judgment. A large and
    growing number of employers now refuse to hire anyone with a criminal
    record--no matter how minor the offense, how long ago it occurred, and
    no matter how the person has behaved since the offense. Eli Lilly, one
    of the world's largest pharmaceutical companies, is one such employer.
    You could have won the Nobel prize in chemistry, but you can't work at
    Eli Lilly if you were caught shoplifting as a teenager.
        Eli Lilly is not alone in its misguided policy. The Congressional
    Office of Technology Assessment found that, even before 9/11, 19% of
    employers refused to hire anyone with a criminal record, even though
    such policies are in violation of Title VII.
        If this trend continues, the economic implications for America are
    frightening. Approximately 43 million Americans have criminal records.
    Over 13 million Americans have been in jail at some point in their
    lives. If this many people become unable to work, our gross domestic
    product will suffer the greatest drop in our lifetimes and our welfare
    system will go bankrupt.
        Congress needs to provide leadership to employers on the use of
    criminal records. It needs to show by its own actions that criminal
    records should be used in the employment process, but used carefully.
    We need to create guidelines that prevent violent and dishonest people
    from becoming security officers without casting the net so wide that we
    undermine the criminal justice systems' efforts to rehabilitate former
    offenders or damage our economy.
        We can meet this challenge. The Institute would welcome the
    opportunity to help.

        Mr. Coble. Thank you, Mr. Maltby. We appreciate all of you
    being with us.
        We were joined by the distinguished gentleman from
    Massachusetts, Mr. Meehan, but I think he has since departed.
        I recognize myself for 5 minutes.
        Mr. Walker, in your statement you indicate that the States
    will serve as a conduit for receiving an employer's request,
    passing it on to the FBI. Is it the State or the FBI that
    determines the applicant's suitability for employment as a
    security officer?
        Mr. Walker. It would be the State that would make the
    determination.
        Mr. Coble. Ms. Pirro, you indicate on your website, the
    Westchester County District Attorneys' website to be specific,
    that ``While our job is to prosecute crimes, our goal is crime
    prevention.'' Tell us in some detail what role do background
    checks play in effective crime prevention?
        Ms. Pirro. Very simply, Mr. Chairman, if we know that
    someone is a pedophile or has a prior criminal history for the
    sexual abuse of children, then we will prevent that individual
    from having access to children because a pedophile will
    insinuate himself in any employment where he has access to
    another child. If we can identify who these people are,
    recognize the high recidivism rate, then in essence we are
    protecting our children.
        Mr. Chairman, there's one thing that I think is very
    important to note here and that is that criminal histories are
    public information. Anyone in this room can go into their
    county courthouse and access a person's criminal record, so
    this is not information that we're not entitled to.
        The issue is whether or not we're going to require
    employers to go to every courthouse in every State in this
    country to find out who's applying for a job. In this age of
    technology we should be able to do that in one step.
        Mr. Coble. Thank you.
        Mr. Kirkpatrick, your resources have no doubt been
    significantly stretched since 9/11. Have your financial and
    personnel resources expanded commensurately?
        Mr. Kirkpatrick. Mr. Chairman, no, they haven't. To date we
    have been able to keep up with this significantly expanded
    demand for our services with efficiency gains brought about
    through automation. Additionally, as it was noted in my written
    statement, we have the ability to charge for these checks and
    that user fee revenue that these checks generate have been used
    to keep up with the demand for these services.
        Mr. Coble. Mr. Maltby, elaborate for me if you will on any
    civil liability issues that might arise if employers were not
    to conduct background checks.
        Mr. Maltby. Mr. Chairman, there are probably situations--I
    think some of the litigation has occurred already--where an
    employer in a very sensitive position, perhaps running a day
    care center, had the opportunity to conduct a criminal record
    check and failed to do so and that's probably appropriate. If
    you're running a critical situation like a day care center or
    running a trucking company, there are certain criminal
    convictions you ought to be concerned about that ought to be
    disqualifying events.
        Mr. Coble. Now in your hypothetical when you used the
    Monocle, what if the owner of the Monocle wanted to do a
    background check on his employees, his coat check worker, for
    example? Should he be able to access criminal history records?
        Mr. Maltby. The owner of the Monocle or any other employer
    ought to be able to access and easily access relevant criminal
    history but not irrelevant criminal history and the challenge
    facing all of us is to define what is relevant and what's not
    relevant. There's no point--the public is not served by
    streamlining the ability of employers to get irrelevant
    information.
        Mr. Coble. Mr. Walker, you indicated that the security
    officer industry records one of the highest dropout rates of
    employees, and I think you furthermore said that a conservative
    figure would be 50 percent turnover, which is drastic. What is
    the industry doing or what can you do to promote employee
    retention?
        Mr. Walker. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Yes, 50 percent is
    very high but that's a conservative estimate. Some of the
    estimates range anywhere from 100 percent to 300 percent.
        Various companies--there are a lot of companies that are
    members of NASCO, the National Association of Security
    Companies, who have been working on this problem for years and
    the responsible organizations have worked to increase wages,
    which is one of the issues that we talk about in trying to
    attract better people, to increase wages, and I can tell you
    what we do in our own company. We have what we call a living
    wage program that we've implemented in 1999 and we have a
    rigorous screening program to use the resources that we have
    available.
        We try to sell our wages and benefits to our clients at
    above market rates. We provide training programs and other
    opportunities for employees to improve themselves and we also
    try to promote from within so that we have a number of security
    officers that started as security officers that are promoted
    through the ranks of the organization up into top management.
        Mr. Coble. Thank you.
        My time has expired. We have been joined by the
    distinguished lady from Texas, Ms. Sheila Jackson Lee. Good to
    have you with us, Ms. Jackson Lee.
        The Chairman recognizes the Ranking Member, the gentleman
    from Virginia.
        Mr. Scott. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Mr. Kirkpatrick, what information gets into the database
    that's checked?
        Mr. Kirkpatrick. The information that we maintain is
    fingerprint-based arrests and then the related dispositions of
    those arrests, whether it be a conviction, a dismissal or an
    acquittal.
        Additionally, as I mentioned, we also conduct name-based
    checks of the wanted persons file to see if that individual's a
    fugitive, as well as the terrorist file to see if that person
    is a known or suspected terrorist.
        Mr. Scott. And what information is released if someone does
    a check, send you fingerprints for a check? What information do
    they get back?
        Mr. Kirkpatrick. The information that we send back is what
    we would call a criminal history. It's probably more commonly
    known as a rap sheet on that individual that would show the
    arrests and the related dispositions of those arrests.
        Mr. Scott. So if a person had been acquitted, you would
    show that they had been arrested.
        Mr. Walker. That's correct, yes.
        Mr. Scott. Ms. Pirro, is this the information that the
    parents would get if they did one of those checks?
        Ms. Pirro. The acquittal information?
        Mr. Scott. Right.
        Ms. Pirro. Probably not. They would get the conviction
    information. The acquittal would most probably be sealed. There
    would be a sealing order on that under the New York State
    criminal history check.
        Mr. Scott. Well, Mr. Kirkpatrick, do parents do background
    checks that you're aware of?
        Mr. Kirkpatrick. I'm not aware of any situation that we
    deal with where an individual parent has the ability to request
    a national background check, no, sir.
        Mr. Scott. Ms. Pirro, if a parent does one of these
    background checks what database do they access?
        Ms. Pirro. It goes to New York State under Kieren's Law in
    New York State, which is a law that passed as a result of the
    woman with the prior criminal history throwing the 10-month-old
    against the wall. It gives employers of individuals who work in
    their home to care for their children the ability to ask an
    employee whether or not they can get permission, whether
    they'll give them permission. In that circumstance they can get
    a prior criminal conviction from NISIS.
        Mr. Scott. And the prospective employer would ask who? The
    FBI?
        Ms. Pirro. No. In New York under Kieren's Law--you see,
    this is exactly the problem. Every State has kind of a
    hodgepodge of who can ask for what and from whom. That's why we
    need a central database and a registry that gives everyone the
    ability to access the same information because that parent in
    New York who is doing a background check on the person coming
    to work in their home to care for their children will not get
    information about a prior conviction in Connecticut, which can
    be three miles away from Westchester because it's a different
    State. They can only access the New York State database.
        Mr. Scott. So if they've got Federal convictions it
    wouldn't show up.
        Ms. Pirro. No.
        Mr. Scott. Hmm.
        Well, Mr. Kirkpatrick, you give everything so there's no
    screening of what comes out.
        Mr. Kirkpatrick. That's correct. We send back the
    information we have on file to a recognized agency within the
    State or to a recognized agency that's listed in the
    legislation that authorizes the background check and that
    agency then makes a fitness determination on that prospective
    person.
        Mr. Scott. Based on what they get.
        Mr. Kirkpatrick. That's correct.
        Mr. Scott. Okay, Mr. Walker, when you do a background check
    who do you call?
        Mr. Walker. Currently we would go to the county of
    residence or county of employment where the applicant has
    worked or lived for the last 7 years and we would do a court-
    house-by-courthouse record check.
        Mr. Scott. So if they were convicted in the adjoining
    jurisdiction, you wouldn't see that?
        Mr. Walker. We'd have no way of knowing it unless it was
    reported in that particular courthouse. There have been
    instances where people have lived in areas that they did not
    disclose and we had no way to know that and unfortunately it's
    not a good situation. That's what we're trying to correct.
        Mr. Scott. And if the bill passes what would you get?
        Mr. Walker. If the bill passes then the State agency that
    requested the information would get the rap sheet and make a
    determination as to whether or not the individual was suitable
    for employment.
        Mr. Scott. You said the State agency would get----
        Mr. Walker. Yes. Like, for example, in Illinois it might be
    the Illinois State Police and they would tell the licensing
    bureau whether or not that person had a significant criminal
    history and the licensing bureau would tell us that the person
    is either eligible or not eligible for hire.
        Mr. Scott. But you wouldn't get the rap sheet?
        Mr. Walker. No, we don't want the rap sheet.
        Mr. Scott. Thank you.
        Mr. Coble. Ms. Pirro, let me revisit Mr. Scott's question.
    Mr. Scott is a prospective employer of mine. I apply for a job.
    I have been prosecuted and convicted. Now he would get that
    information.
        Ms. Pirro. Well, depending on----
        Mr. Coble. Let me give you a two-part question. I'm
    prosecuted and acquitted. Now as I understood from your
    response to his question, he would be beneficiary or someone
    would be beneficiary of the conviction, but the acquittal would
    not surface.
        Ms. Pirro. That would not surface. The arrest that results
    in an acquittal would not surface. The information----
        Mr. Coble. In New York.
        Ms. Pirro. In New York. Only in New York. And every State
    has a different approach to it.
        Mr. Coble. That seems sort of anomalous is why I wanted to
    bring it up. You'd think that would be equally important, the
    acquittal as opposed to a conviction. Just curious.
        Mr. Goodlatte, the gentleman from Virginia.
        Mr. Goodlatte. Mr. Chairman, thank you. I don't have any
    questions.
        Mr. Coble. The gentlelady from Texas, Ms. Sheila Jackson
    Lee, is recognized for 5 minutes.
        Ms. Jackson Lee. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman and
    Ranking Member.
        I may ask questions that may have been covered in your
    testimony and I ask your indulgence, since I was held in
    another meeting and not able to hear the complete testimony,
    but I have a line of questioning that I would like to pursue.
        First of all to Mr. Maltby, maybe you indicated this; maybe
    there are no problems and I think you're representing the
    workers association, if I understand it correctly?
        Mr. Maltby. Close enough, ma'am.
        Ms. Jackson Lee. That's a description, not the title.
    You're involved with those who are employed and working; is
    that my understanding or representing----
        Mr. Maltby. Our mission is to protect the human rights of
    people in the workplace, yes.
        Ms. Jackson Lee. All, right, that's what I thought it was.
    Why don't you give me your concerns about either this
    legislation or the idea of being able to secure this
    information.
        Mr. Maltby. Ma'am, I have no concern about employers being
    able to get relevant information and I think it's worth stating
    again, and thanks for giving me the opportunity to say so--it
    is too hard for employers to get that information today. It
    needs to be streamlined.
        The question is what information do we give employers? And
    what I've been trying to stress is that we don't want to give
    employers irrelevant information that could cause someone to
    lose a job for which they should not be disqualified.
        And I raise that particularly from the standpoint of our
    nation's commitment to rehabilitate former offenders. Everyone
    in America agrees that it's the right thing to do. Everyone
    agrees it's important. President Bush has joined hands with
    some people he doesn't usually join hands with to stress the
    need for former offenders to become rehabilitated so they won't
    commit another crime. And if you can't get a job you're not
    going to be successfully rehabilitated. And it's vitally
    important that if someone is trying to become rehabilitated
    that they not be denied a job as a security officer or anything
    else for a trivial offense that really isn't relevant.
        And what I'm urging the Committee to do is to reexamine the
    nature and the breadth of the offenses that this will considers
    to be relevant because I believe it to be somewhat overbroad.
        Ms. Jackson Lee. Doesn't the aspect, as I recall, of the
    informing of the employee and getting their permission to
    secure the information and then allowing them to see it, how do
    you respond to that?
        Mr. Maltby. Well, ma'am, consent may be very important in
    the eyes of the law but as a practical matter it really doesn't
    amount to much because when you need a job and the employer
    says please consent to this form or we're going to take your
    employment application and throw it in the waste basket, what
    choice does the person have but to sign it?
        It's really misleading to call it consent. Signing the form
    is a condition of employment and we can't get around the
    problem of deciding what's relevant information and what isn't
    by relying on employee consent.
        Ms. Jackson Lee. Is the information from your understanding
    to be pulled up would include criminal offenses and civil acts,
    such as bad credit?
        Mr. Maltby. No, ma'am. I think the bill, to its credit, is
    very clear that it only involves criminal convictions, not
    civil problems, not arrests without a conviction, except if
    they're within the last year. But virtually every criminal
    conviction is covered. If two gentlemen get into a fender-
    bender on the beltway and somebody shoves the other guy and a
    police officer comes and someone becomes convicted for simple
    assault or disorderly conduct, that is covered by this bill and
    I'm concerned that someone who's an ex-offender, who's trying
    to become a good citizen again, is going to be denied a job
    opportunity because of a little shoving accident after a
    traffic accident and that's not what we're trying to accomplish
    here.
        Ms. Jackson Lee. Well, I hope you won't be swayed by being
    in this great and august room, Members of the Judiciary
    Committee, that we are not concerned about rehabilitation. I
    happen to be very concerned about that. In fact, I have a good
    time legislative initiative to address nonviolent offenders.
        But what I would ask from you and I'm going to ask Mr.
    Walker a question to follow up, what kind of fire wall would
    you suggest that would be included in legislation like this to
    take into account circumstances that you have mentioned, which
    are altercations at best? You would not think that they would
    be threatening to homeland security or threatening to anyone's
    life and limb but they have had some past record. Do you have a
    suggestion of any kind of language or process that could be
    utilized?
        Mr. Maltby. Ma'am, if I were smart enough to come in here
    and tell you I know the precise definition for how to strike
    the balance between serious offenses and the ones that we
    shouldn't be concerned about, I'd be a much smarter person than
    I am.
        But I do believe that that definition can be worked out. I
    don't think it's impossible and I would very much appreciate
    the opportunity to work with the Committee and the other
    concerned parties to try to find the right language that
    includes the serious offenses but doesn't suck people into the
    system and cost them job opportunities because of minor
    offenses.
        Ms. Jackson Lee. Mr. Walker, you represent the private
    security industry?
        Mr. Walker. That's correct.
        Ms. Jackson Lee. What is your thought about that in terms
    of having at least some respect for people who have minimal
    offenses in the past and working in your industry, using this
    legislation?
        Mr. Walker. Certainly we have a tremendous amount of
    respect for individuals and the individuals' rights and we work
    hard to protect that, but there are three points I'd like to
    make here.
        One is arrest records and conviction records currently are
    public records and everything--if you check a local courthouse
    for a criminal record you get every piece of information they
    have in that particular courthouse.
        Second of all, under the Fair Credit Reporting Act, if you
    use an outside agency to do an investigation for you you have
    to get the employee's consent to do that investigation.
        And thirdly, even what may appear to be a minor incident,
    if it shows the individual has a hot temper and gets into
    altercations, that person may not be fit for duty to be a
    security officer.
        Under this current legislation that we're looking at today,
    the protections are actually built in to a greater degree than
    they currently exist because we would get--as an employer, we
    would get nationwide criminal history information but only
    having that information go to a State agency, a law enforcement
    agency, an agency of the State government, which would tell us
    would could either license that person within the State or not.
    So I think the legislation actually builds in some protections
    that we don't currently have.
        Ms. Jackson Lee. I thank the Chairman. Thank you.
        Mr. Coble. Thank you, Ms. Jackson Lee.
        Mr. Feeney says he has no questions.
        Mr. Keller?
        Mr. Keller. No questions, Mr. Chairman.
        Mr. Coble. I know Mr. Scott has another question or two.
    Let me put one question to you, Mr. Kirkpatrick, and then I'll
    yield to Mr. Scott.
        It is my belief, Mr. Kirkpatrick, that fingerprints are
    currently probably the most reliable means of positively
    identifying an individual. Look into your crystal ball into the
    future and describe what is on the horizon with new technology
    and biometrics.
        Well first of all, am I correct in my assumption about
    fingerprints?
        Mr. Kirkpatrick. Mr. Chairman, I believe that you are.
    Fingerprints have a more than 100-year history of positively
    identifying individuals. They have been proven to work to
    positively identify a single individual against an extremely
    large database of the magnitude that we're talking about, tens
    of millions of individuals.
        This is a very good question and it's something that we
    deal with daily looking into the future on biometrics. We meet
    regularly with law enforcement leaders from not just this
    country but internationally. We meet with leaders of the
    biometrics industry and I would say that in the short and mid-
    term, which would be up to about 5 years out, certainly
    fingerprints are going to remain the gold standard for positive
    identification of individuals.
        Looking beyond that time frame, I think that there's other
    technologies that are emerging, such as iris scans, facial
    recognition, things like that, that in that period of time will
    be improved upon and tested against very large populations.
        One of the problems with things like facial recognition and
    iris scans is that criminals do not leave their faces nor their
    irises behind at crime scenes. They do leave their fingerprints
    behind and we can take those latent crime scene fingerprints
    and match them up against our criminal database and find out
    who committed crimes as an ancillary benefit.
        So I think mid-term, fingerprints are it. Looking beyond
    that there's the possibility that other biometrics will emerge.
        Mr. Coble. Thank you, sir.
        The chair recognizes the gentleman from Virginia.
        Mr. Scott. Thank you.
        Mr. Kirkpatrick, let me go back. Did I understand you to
    say that the FBI includes local convictions in FBI files?
        Mr. Kirkpatrick. That's correct. The FBI fingerprint
    repository is a national repository and it works in such a way
    that State and local and Federal law enforcement all report
    their arrests to us so that it is, in fact, a national
    repository.
        Mr. Scott. And Mr. Maltby, as I understand the bill, if a
    request is made in a State that has a State agency and
    guidelines and qualifications for security officers, then the
    agency--you apply to the agency and they get the information,
    compare the background check to their qualifications and just
    say whether the person is qualified under State guidelines or
    not. If there is no such State agency then you get felonies,
    convictions involving dishonesty or violence within 10 years or
    an unresolved arrest within the year.
        Mr. Maltby. I believe that's correct, sir.
        Mr. Scott. What's wrong with that?
        Mr. Maltby. What's wrong with that is that first, the
    definitions in this bill cover virtually the entire crimes
    code. I used to be a criminal defense attorney in my youth and
    almost every crime on the books involves force or theft or
    dishonesty. And to put it very concretely, I don't think that
    someone who tried to buy beer with a false ID at 18 ought to
    have that become an impediment to getting a job when they're
    27. I just don't think that it's relevant, but this bill would
    provide it to employers and people who are ex-offenders who
    need to be rehabilitated, who we need to be rehabilitated, are
    not going to get a job because of this irrelevant information
    and they're going to be back on the streets committing another
    crime, which is the last thing anybody wants.
        What I'm trying to say is that there are many situations
    where if you're trying to protect the public safety you just go
    a little too far. You throw the net real broad and what harm
    could it do but----
        Mr. Scott. On the question where you have a State agency,
    you don't have a problem with that part of it?
        Mr. Maltby. Well, if the State has a real good definition
    of what's relevant and what's not relevant, then there would
    not be a problem, but most States don't really have a good
    definition and if the Federal Government is going to get into
    this field and try to fix the problem, it really needs to
    address the issue of what's relevant to employment to be a
    security officer and what isn't. That's the heart of the
    question.
        Mr. Scott. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Mr. Coble. I thank the gentleman.
        Mr. Green, did you have questions, Mr. Green?
        Mr. Green. No questions.
        Mr. Coble. The gentlelady from Texas, Ms. Sheila Jackson
    Lee.
        Ms. Jackson Lee. Let me pursue a line of questioning that I
    was moving on with Mr. Walker and then Ms. Pirro.
        You mentioned under New York law that you would surmise
    that acquittals would not be included in information either
    transmitted or utilized, so therefore if someone went through
    the judicial system and was acquitted it would not be included?
        Ms. Pirro. The arrest would not be included. As well, if it
    resulted in an acquittal that becomes a sealed record. So it's
    not as though there would be an arrest out there with no
    disposition where we just seal the acquittal.
        So that would not be----
        Ms. Jackson Lee. Arrest and possibly acquittal.
        Ms. Pirro. Right, right. But I think what's important here
    is that we keep hearing an example of someone who throws a
    punch and misses. In virtually every State that is not a crime.
    That is a violation if there isn't any injury. And in New York
    State specifically there would be no rap sheet or criminal
    history that would reflect anything less than a crime. So that
    a violation, a pushing or a shoving, would not be on the rap
    sheet to begin with.
        Ms. Jackson Lee. Give us an example of what you might
    expect that this bill would be able to cull from States around
    the nation.
        Ms. Pirro. I'm not really in a position to do that in terms
    of the security industry. I guess my position is a more generic
    one, and that is this is public information that everyone is
    entitled--that employers should be entitled to know because
    we're assuming that the person applying for the job under the
    scenarios that we keep hearing are people who are in good faith
    in trying to rehabilitate themselves.
        There are people who are not acting in good faith and when
    there is a history and a record and a conviction beyond a
    reasonable doubt, that should be able not just to people in the
    security business but to employers who are hiring individuals
    who have access to our children or who work in power plants or
    hospitals or at oil refineries or at any one of a number of
    manufacturing companies.
        Ms. Jackson Lee. In your personal history as a district
    attorney, do you note in a particular segment, in this instance
    private security officers, any unique criminal problems or more
    unique criminal activity of these private security agents
    before this kind of system would be put in place? Has there
    been difficulty in hiring private security officers and finding
    that they have criminal backgrounds?
        Ms. Pirro. It is difficult to identify those individuals
    who have a criminal history from another State in New York.
    That is the problem and just recently in Westchester there were
    several security guards that my office indicted for sexual
    assault of students who had criminal histories in other States
    that we had no way of knowing and that the schools had no way
    of knowing.
        Ms. Jackson Lee. Mr. Kirkpatrick, is this legislation
    helpful to your system? Or your system in terms of
    participating in this, is this a comfortable fit between
    legislation like this and what you do?
        Mr. Kirkpatrick. Well, it is. We service a number of
    different private sector industries and occupations in terms of
    licensing and employment checks and our stance on this has
    always been that if there is an appropriate law passed for a
    particular industry or occupation, we'll do the checks and we
    will send the results of those checks back to the authorized
    agency to review those records and make a determination as to
    whether or not that particular individual meets the
    qualifications for that employment situation in that particular
    locality.
        Ms. Jackson Lee. And in this instance the State entity
    would be fine with you?
        Mr. Kirkpatrick. That fits in with our model as we
    currently do business, yes, ma'am.
        Ms. Jackson Lee. Mr. Walker, we know that across the board
    the private security industry has had its ups and its downs. It
    has been a place of refuge for individuals who have done
    themselves well by being hired, as I understand, but maybe in
    the past have had some interaction with the law.
        I know to be a certified peace officer, to carry a weapon,
    it may be that you're prohibited having a criminal record but I
    know that officers who do not have or individuals that are
    private security guards who do not carry weapons in certain
    States have had records in the past.
        In your industry have you noted that individuals with those
    kinds of pasts--and I'm not suggesting a violent criminal
    record but some interaction--have been able to be successful
    officers?
        Mr. Walker. I'm not aware of a situation where we in our
    own company have employed individuals that had a criminal
    history that became successful officers. In fact----
        Ms. Jackson Lee. And are yours certified peace officers? Do
    they carry weapons or----
        Mr. Walker. We have some armed security officers, yes, only
    1 percent of our workforce.
        Ms. Jackson Lee. And the rest are unarmed.
        Mr. Walker. Yes. And in those cases, in the States where
    there is legislation, they would not get a license or if they
    did get a temporary license their license would be revoked and
    we would have to terminate their employment. But we do a
    background investigation prior to hiring the individual and we
    make those local county record checks and we certainly would
    not employ anyone who had a serious criminal history.
        Ms. Jackson Lee. And do you know of companies within your
    industry that have done so? And you said serious and I was not
    saying serious. I said some form of altercation, maybe a
    juvenile record.
        Mr. Walker. Juvenile records are generally sealed and not
    available to us.
        Ms. Jackson Lee. So you don't get that.
        Mr. Walker. We do not get that, anyway. And minor
    misdemeanors are not something that would be a knock-out
    factor, if you will. In fact----
        Ms. Jackson Lee. That's what I'm trying to get at.
        Mr. Walker. Right. A statistic from Illinois, I think, we
    very interesting to me. The Illinois State Police, in doing
    their test in January, had a hit rate where they hit on a rap
    sheet within the State of like 8 percent and when they went to
    the FBI the hit rate increased. So the FBI reported back 214, I
    believe it was, arrests and convictions. The State then did a
    manual review, an override, and 132 of those conviction records
    were thrown out as not being relevant to the licensing of a
    security guard.
        So there are safeguards in effect at the State level that
    would prohibit discrimination against individuals who should be
    given an opportunity to become rehabilitated and work in the
    workplace.
        Ms. Jackson Lee. Thank you.
        Mr. Coble. I thank the lady.
        Prior to adjournment I want to remind our Members that we
    have a mark-up that will be conducted to commence shortly after
    we adjourn. We'd appreciate your remaining for that.
        We thank the witnesses for your testimony today. The
    Subcommittee appreciates your contribution.
        This concludes the legislative hearing on S. 1743, the
    ``Private Security Officer Employment Authorization Act of
    2003.'' Thank you for your cooperation. The Subcommittee stands
    adjourned.
        [Whereupon, at 2:38 p.m., the Subcommittee was adjourned.]

                                A P P E N D I X

                                  ----------

                   Material Submitted for the Hearing Record

           Prepared Statement of the Honorable Sheila Jackson Lee, a
               Representative in Congress From the State of Texas

        Questions and Responses for the Record from Michael Kirkpatrick

    Questions and Responses for the Record from the Honorable Jeanine Pirro

             Questions and Responses for the Record from Don Walker

                      Prepared Statement of Ira A. Lipman

                 Prepared Statement of William C. Whitmore, Jr.

                       Prepared Statement of Cecil Hogan

        Mr. Chairman, and Members of the Subcommittee. The National Burglar
    & Fire Alarm Association (NBFAA) appreciates the opportunity to
    participate in discussions on issues relating to private security
    employment authorization. NBFAA is a national trade association that
    represents more than 2,400 companies throughout the fifty states and
    four U.S. territories. Our members are engaged in the manufacture,
    sale, installation, service and/or monitoring of electronic life safety
    & security systems. Since 1948, NBFAA has been dedicated to raising the
    level of professionalism within the industry to the benefit of the
    consumers, public safety organizations and the electronic systems
    profession.
        While NBFAA is encouraged by this legislation and the timely
    efforts of you and your colleagues, we believe this bill would be more
    effective and more strongly supported if its scope were increased. One
    of the main functions of NBFAA is to encourage the implementation of
    laws at both the state and federal levels with the primary purpose to
    promote professionalism of security systems companies, to maintain the
    operational reliability and proper use of physical and electronic
    security systems and to ensure a minimum level of training.
        According to STAT Resources, Inc., Americans spent an estimated
    $18.7 billion on professionally installed electronic security products
    and services in 2001 (this figure includes monthly monitoring fees).
    This number was up from $17.5 billion in 2000 and $16.2 billion in
    1999. While all agree that this number has significantly increased over
    the past three years, with the tragic events of September 11th,
    estimates on the amount of this increase are staggering.
        In 2001 alone, an average of approximately 10,000 businesses
    nationwide were classified as ``alarm installing entities'' and
    spending on electronic security products and services is growing at an
    estimated 8.6 percent per year. Further, in the United States, crimes
    against commercial establishments have reached epidemic proportions.
    Each year, business losses due to crime exceed $100 billion.
        While NBFAA and others have had success at establishing licensing
    of the electronic life safety and security industry at the state level,
    a good deal of work remains. Although 37 states have some sort of state
    license requirements for our industry, only 20 of those require
    background checks as part of that license. Just as this legislation
    illustrates the vital nature of the private security officers work in
    the new era of homeland security, so to is the vital work of the
    individuals and companies that provide the infrastructure for that
    work. However, at this time, many of our members do not have the
    ability to effectively screen their applicants and better ensure the
    safety of their clients. NBFAA believes strongly that this must change.
        States that do not offer the ability to conduct a background check
    through state licensing for the electronic life safety, security and
    systems industry include Pennsylvania, Ohio, Nevada, Wisconsin and many
    more. Our members in these states install security and life safety
    systems to commercial properties (i.e. shopping malls, movie theaters,
    office buildings) as well as residential properties including apartment
    buildings. NBFAA members provide services to critical infrastructure
    across the country as well as schools and other institutional entities.
    We install security systems, fire systems, CCTV, access control, and
    much more.
        Simply analyzing the potential dangers surrounding unqualified
    private security employee installing an access control system in one of
    these critical infrastructures alone is enough to understand our push
    for inclusion into this legislation. While ensuring the qualifications
    of the private security officer is essential, ensuring that the
    infrastructure under which he operates has been installed by qualified
    professionals is imperative.
        In this new era of homeland security, the need for a partnership
    between the public and private security is important. Providing the
    resources and structure for this partnership is a role the federal
    government must play. While this legislation addresses the American
    public's need for the employment of qualified, well-trained private
    security personnel, it does not address that same need for the
    installers of the systems that protect their homes, their offices,
    their lives.
        NBFAA appreciates the opportunity to submit this statement for the
    record.

                                   __________
      Prepared Statement of the National Association of Security Companies

        Mr. Chairman and Members of the Subcommittee,
        The National Association of Security Companies (NASCO), a trade
    association, represents the major national and regional providers of
    contract security services in the United States. Our members
    collectively employ more than 400,000 private security officers
    nationwide.
        NASCO companies' private security officers protect sites of all
    descriptions throughout America: shopping malls, office buildings,
    corporate campuses, hospitals, educational institutions, both
    conventional and nuclear power plants, utilities, financial
    institutions, water treatment and pumping stations, defense
    manufacturing facilities, chemical plants, communications centers,
    docks, warehouses, oil and gas production and transmission facilities,
    transportation hubs, government facilities, food manufacturing and
    processing plants, and bioresearch centers are among our members'
    clients.
        Regardless of where disaster next strikes, whether as an act of
    terrorism, a weather-related emergency, or as an accident, it is a
    near-certainty that private security officers will be nearby. In many
    instances, private security officers are truly first responders,
    already on the premises and familiar with the property, its layout and
    structures, persons on the premises, and other significant details
    important to both protecting lives and assisting law enforcement.
        Protecting lives and other valuable assets at such a vast number of
    sites across the nation places a high level of responsibility and a
    fundamental role in Homeland Security on our private security officers.
    NASCO's members want to hire well qualified candidates into these
    positions. To do so, they routinely conduct their own internal
    background investigations on job applicants. Maximizing the
    effectiveness of that process, however, requires either state or
    federal statutory authorization for our applicants to undergo a
    fingerprint-based check against the database maintained by the Federal
    Bureau of Investigation. That database offers the best assurance that
    an applicant in one state does not have a prior record of felony
    convictions in a state other than the one in which application is being
    made. S. 1743 would provide us that access, and we urge you to adopt it
    as an important step toward enhancing the security of our homeland.
        At present, the private security industry is regulated in 40
    states. The specific requirements for private security officers in
    those 40 states vary significantly, even as to the extent of background
    investigation required for employment. Only 31 states call for FBI
    criminal history records checks, and at least 7 of those limit the FBI
    checks to applicants for armed security positions (who constitute a
    distinct minority of all private security positions). Also among those
    31 state laws are other state regulatory statutes that appear to permit
    the FBI checks, but do not require them, leaving yet another gap for an
    out-of-state convicted felon or an identity thief to gain security
    employment at a sensitive site. These gaps open the door for the very
    types of criminal conduct that our employees are typically assigned to
    prevent. Good security requires that they be closed.
        As a federal bill, the impact of S. 1743 will be in the 10 states
    that lack private security regulation, the 9 regulated states that do
    not call for criminal records checks through the FBI, and the 7 states
    which routinely conduct FBI checks only for armed security applicants.
    It will also affect security applications in states which allow, but do
    not mandate, FBI checks. If S. 1743 is adopted, the decision to submit
    fingerprints for an FBI check could be made not only by the regulatory
    authority, but also at the request of an ``authorized employer''.
        Mr. Chairman, NASCO has actively endorsed and supported prior bills
    intended to address these problems since the early 1990s. We offered
    testimony in support of H.R. 1534 in June 1993 when the House
    Subcommittee on Human Resources held two days of hearings, an earlier
    proposal sponsored by then-Congressman Matthew Martinez. Our support
    continued throughout the 1990s. We hoped that a solution was within
    reach when H.R. 2092, sponsored by then-Congressman Bob Barr, passed
    the House by a vote of 415-6 in 1996, and again when Congressman Barr's
    H.R. 103 passed the House by voice vote in mid-1997. Passage of S. 1743
    by the Senate has again raised our hopes.
        S. 1743 offers a more comprehensive proposal in response to our
    need for better background information access. It addresses not only
    the need for FBI checks in states that have already charged a specific
    agency with regulatory responsibility for private security without
    authorizing the federal background checks, but also offers a procedure
    by which background information can be obtained even in those states in
    which no regulatory body has yet been created.
        Regardless of whether a state has a regulatory agency or not, no
    additional expense will be imposed on the government because the cost
    of processing the fingerprint records will be covered by user fees.
    Should a state object to participating in this Homeland Security-
    enhancing service for which the industry will absorb the cost, that
    state can exercise the ``opt-out'' option provided in the bill.
        Mr. Chairman and Members of the Subcommittee, NASCO thanks you for
    your attention in this security-critical matter. Please help us to
    provide better-screened security officers by passing S. 1743 now.

                          Letter from Warren B. Rudman