[House Hearing, 108 Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
US-VISIT--A DOWN PAYMENT
ON HOMELAND SECURITY
=======================================================================
HEARING
BEFORE THE
SUBCOMMITTEE ON IMMIGRATION,
BORDER SECURITY, AND CLAIMS
OF THE
COMMITTEE ON THE JUDICIARY
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
ONE HUNDRED EIGHTH CONGRESS
SECOND SESSION
__________
MARCH 18, 2004
__________
Serial No. 77
__________
Printed for the use of the Committee on the Judiciary
Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.house.gov/judiciary
______
92-616 U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE
WASHINGTON : 2003
____________________________________________________________________________
For Sale by the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office
Internet: bookstore.gpo.gov Phone: toll free (866) 512-1800; (202) 512�091800
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COMMITTEE ON THE JUDICIARY
F. JAMES SENSENBRENNER, Jr., Wisconsin, Chairman
HENRY J. HYDE, Illinois JOHN CONYERS, Jr., Michigan
HOWARD COBLE, North Carolina HOWARD L. BERMAN, California
LAMAR SMITH, Texas RICK BOUCHER, Virginia
ELTON GALLEGLY, California JERROLD NADLER, New York
BOB GOODLATTE, Virginia ROBERT C. SCOTT, Virginia
STEVE CHABOT, Ohio MELVIN L. WATT, North Carolina
WILLIAM L. JENKINS, Tennessee ZOE LOFGREN, California
CHRIS CANNON, Utah SHEILA JACKSON LEE, Texas
SPENCER BACHUS, Alabama MAXINE WATERS, California
JOHN N. HOSTETTLER, Indiana MARTIN T. MEEHAN, Massachusetts
MARK GREEN, Wisconsin WILLIAM D. DELAHUNT, Massachusetts
RIC KELLER, Florida ROBERT WEXLER, Florida
MELISSA A. HART, Pennsylvania TAMMY BALDWIN, Wisconsin
JEFF FLAKE, Arizona ANTHONY D. WEINER, New York
MIKE PENCE, Indiana ADAM B. SCHIFF, California
J. RANDY FORBES, Virginia LINDA T. SANCHEZ, California
STEVE KING, Iowa
JOHN R. CARTER, Texas
TOM FEENEY, Florida
MARSHA BLACKBURN, Tennessee
Philip G. Kiko, Chief of Staff-General Counsel
Perry H. Apelbaum, Minority Chief Counsel
------
Subcommittee on Immigration, Border Security, and Claims
JOHN N. HOSTETTLER, Indiana, Chairman
JEFF FLAKE, Arizona SHEILA JACKSON LEE, Texas
MARSHA BLACKBURN, Tennessee LINDA T. SANCHEZ, California
LAMAR SMITH, Texas ZOE LOFGREN, California
ELTON GALLEGLY, California HOWARD L. BERMAN, California
CHRIS CANNON, Utah JOHN CONYERS, Jr., Michigan
STEVE KING, Iowa
MELISSA A. HART, Pennsylvania
George Fishman, Chief Counsel
Art Arthur, Full Committee Counsel
Luke Bellocchi, Counsel
Cindy Blackston, Professional Staff
Nolan Rappaport, Minority Counsel
C O N T E N T S
----------
MARCH 18, 2004
OPENING STATEMENT
Page
The Honorable John N. Hostettler, a Representative in Congress
From the State of Indiana, and Chairman, Subcommittee on
Immigration, Border Security, and Claims....................... 1
The Honorable Lamar Smith, a Representative in Congress From the
State of Texas................................................. 2
The Honorable Howard L. Berman, a Representative in Congress From
the State of California........................................ 3
The Honorable Steve King, a Representative in Congress From the
State of Iowa.................................................. 3
The Honorable Sheila Jackson Lee, a Representative in Congress
From the State of Texas, and Ranking Member, Subcommittee on
Immigration, Border Security, and Claims....................... 31
WITNESSES
Mr. Robert M. Jacksta, Executive Director, Border Security and
Facilitation, Office of Field Operations, U.S. Customs and
Border Protection, U.S. Department of Homeland Security
Oral Testimony................................................. 5
Prepared Statement............................................. 7
Mr. Robert A. Mocny, Deputy Director, US-VISIT Office, U.S.
Department of Homeland Security
Oral Testimony................................................. 8
Prepared Statement............................................. 10
Mr. Alfonso Martinez-Fonts, Jr., Special Assistant to the
Secretary for the Private Sector, U.S. Department of Homeland
Security
Oral Testimony................................................. 17
Prepared Statement............................................. 18
Mr. Randolph C. Hite, Director, Information Technology
Architecture and Systems Issues, U.S. General Accounting Office
Oral Testimony................................................. 20
Prepared Statement............................................. 22
APPENDIX
Material Submitted for the Hearing Record
Prepared Statement of the Honorable Sheila Jackson Lee, a
Representative in Congress From the State of Texas, and Ranking
Member, Subcommittee on Immigration, Border Security, and
Claims......................................................... 49
Prepared Statement of the Honorable Steve King, a Representative
in Congress From the State of Iowa............................. 50
Prepared Statement of the Honorable Linda Sanchez, a
Representative in Congress From the State of California........ 50
Prepared Statement submitted by the Travel Business Roundtable... 52
Prepared Statement submitted by the Travel Industry Association
of America..................................................... 55
Prepared Statement by the U.S. Chamber of Commerce............... 57
US-VISIT--A DOWN PAYMENT
ON HOMELAND SECURITY
----------
THURSDAY, MARCH 18, 2004
House of Representatives,
Subcommittee on Immigration,
Border Security, and Claims,
Committee on the Judiciary,
Washington, DC.
The Subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 10:05 a.m., in
Room 2141, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. John N.
Hostettler (Chair of the Subcommittee) presiding.
Mr. Hostettler. The Subcommittee will come to order.
Today, the Subcommittee on Immigration, Border Security,
and Claims will examine the Department of Homeland Security's
new capabilities in the entry inspection of foreign travelers
into the U.S. under the United States Visitor and Immigrant
Status Indicator Technology--or US-VISIT--program and review
its progress in meeting its statutory deadlines. The
Subcommittee will also examine how US-VISIT has worked to
prevent and deter alien criminals, terrorists, and immigration
law violators from entering the United States while avoiding
delays for legitimate travelers.
With the recent terrorist bombings in Spain only a week
ago, I am reminded of the horrible tragedy of 9/11 in our own
country. Preventing and deterring terrorism in the U.S. lies at
the very heart of why we have instituted the US-VISIT program
and why we need to continue strengthening and improving it.
Just as the terrorists arrested for the Madrid bombings are
not natives of Spain, it is often noted that all of the 9/11
hijackers were temporary visitors who came to this country with
visas.
When DHS met its statutory deadlines to improve the process
this past December, US-VISIT fused information from airline
passenger manifests, criminal records, State Department visa
records, and immigration data systems so that guests entering
our country are screened in both a more effective and efficient
way.
US-VISIT has already proven its effectiveness in capturing
numerous criminal aliens attempting to reenter the U.S. In
January, US-VISIT detected a convicted Peruvian cocaine
trafficker who has been at large since 1984 after escaping from
prison. An El Salvadoran with an outstanding arrest warrant for
a DUI hit-and-run homicide conviction was also caught by US-
VISIT, even though he had previously used a false identity to
successfully reenter the U.S.
These examples also demonstrate the efficiencies gained
from the newly integrated watchlist systems. Now foreign
travelers are questioned at the ports of entry while scanning
their fingerprints and having their photos taken in the same
place that they were screened before.
Through improved systems techniques, multiple databases are
checked in a few seconds, including the IDENT fingerprint
records. Inspectors are able to screen applicants for entry in
a thorough manner without a discernable increase in waiting
times.
This is of significant benefit to private sector trade and
tourism because efficient handling of people and cargo at our
borders is very important to trade and tourism. While some
foretold of extensive waiting lines, chaotic inspections, and
unprecedented invasions of privacy, none have come to pass.
What have the American people gained with multi-million-
dollar investment, one might ask? Return to the bombing in
Madrid and think of how this tragedy will damage Spain's
tourist industry and potentially its entire economy as a whole,
just as the U.S. is still recovering from the economic damage
of 9/11. As Spain has no equivalent to US-VISIT, how will the
Spanish Government reassure those people who might be
considering a vacation in Spain this summer?
To use a private sector term, one might say US-VISIT is a
``down payment'' on building a secure border--one that deters
or prevents terrorist attacks on the U.S. and at the same time
assists the apprehension of criminals and immigration
violators. These are significant benefits for a substantially
small investment.
The first stage of implementing this long-awaited entry-
exit system was put into effect at the beginning of this year.
Although there was a law enacted in 1996 that required the
development of an entry-exit alien screening system, no
executive agency made discernable progress on this mandate
until the Department of Homeland Security, or DHS, took charge.
The September 11th attacks and the hard deadline set by the
Data Management Improvement Act, authored by my colleague Mr.
Lamar Smith, also provided impetus for DHS to finally make US-
VISIT a reality.
Our guests here today include some of the DHS architects of
US-VISIT. Gentlemen, I must commend you on completing the first
stage of this gargantuan task of putting the US-VISIT system
together on time and within the 1 year the Department of
Homeland Security has actually been in existence. Your
incredible accomplishment provides inspiration for the
employees of your new agency, and I invite you to present your
views on the effectiveness, efficiencies, and private sector
benefits of US-VISIT.
At this time, I would like to recognize the gentleman from
Texas for an opening statement.
Mr. Smith. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and I'll be brief.
First of all, thank you for the mention. I do have a
personal interest in this subject, and it really coincides
with, once again, an opportunity to thank you for taking the
initiative, as you have so often, on holding a hearing on such
important issues as this one.
I also want to acknowledge a long-time friend from San
Antonio, Al Martinez-Fonts, who is a witness today. And having
said that, I also have to apologize in advance. I have a markup
with the Homeland Security Committee that I have to go to right
now, so I will not be able to stay. But I just wanted to
recognize Al, and thank you, Mr. Chairman, and I'll yield back.
Mr. Hostettler. The gentleman's time has expired.
The Chair recognizes the gentleman from California for an
opening statement.
Mr. Berman. Well, thank you, Mr. Chairman. Our Ranking
Member is introducing a witness at another hearing and couldn't
be here, so I would like to use that time because I have a
hearing that I have to go to soon after 10:30. I was hoping
either of the two Administration witnesses in the course of
their opening statement could address one particular--the
interconnection between US-VISIT, a program which I think is a
smart, sensible program to help us keep track of who is coming
to this country, when they leave, what their status is while
they're--and where they are while they're here, and NSEERS
program, which I have some concern--I have a number of concerns
about. And let me just mention, there was confusion about
whether NSEERS continues to exist and its interrelationship
with US-VISIT.
When Secretary Ridge announced the US-VISIT system, it was
widely reported that it was replacing NSEERS entirely. Three
months later, last December, it was widely reported that
Department of Homeland Security had brought NSEERS to an end.
Later, it was clarified that the death of the program had been
prematurely reported, that it was the only--it was only the re-
registration requirements that had been changed and not
eliminated.
The DHS question and answer release on US-VISIT clearly
states that NSEERS will be subsumed entirely by US-VISIT in the
future. Can you elaborate on this? What's the timeline for the
elimination of NSEERS? How does it tie into US-VISIT
implementation? And will this apply to all aspects of NSEERS?
In other words, and in conclusion, will we see parity in
treatment at points of entry, no difference based upon
nationality, and will the re-registration requirements
disappear completely or become a part of US-VISIT?
Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And I appreciate to the extent you
could address any of that in your opening comments, only
because my fear is that at 10:30 I won't be around.
Mr. Hostettler. The Chair now recognizes the gentleman from
Iowa, Mr. King, for an opening statement.
Mr. King. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and I will keep it
brief. But I appreciate you holding this hearing today, and I'm
happy to be here and looking forward to the testimony of the
witnesses. I was concerned when Homeland Security announced
that most Mexicans who currently hold a border crossing card
will now be processed through US-VISIT, and I believe that they
should be. Under current law, those who hold a border crossing
card as a border crossing card can only travel for up to 3 days
in a border zone. But how do we know whether these cardholders
are complying with these restrictions?
In addition, we don't know whether any person is posing as
a cardholder if fingerprints are not verified at each crossing.
So currently DHS inspectors only check a border crossing
cardholder's picture by sight.
So I look forward to the day when US-VISIT will ensure that
no border crossing cardholder stays illegally in the country
for over the allotted 72 hours, and I'm encouraged by the
progress in implementing US-VISIT.
Thank you. I look forward to the testimony.
Mr. Hostettler. I thank the gentleman.
The Chair now will introduce the panel before us. In 2002,
the Commissioner of Customs designated Robert M. Jacksta as the
Executive Director of Border Security and Facilitation, U.S.
Customs and Border Protection. Mr. Jacksta directs the day-to-
day activities of Border Security and Facilitation at the ports
of entry. Mr. Jacksta first joined the Customs Service at New
York's John F. Kennedy Airport in 1973 while attending college.
During his long career, he has worked in the capacity of patrol
officer, inspector, and senior inspector. Mr. Jacksta took an
active role in the field, including work on national task
forces and supervisory assignments, before transferring to
Customs in Washington, D.C., in 1991. Mr. Jacksta has also
served as port director of Washington, D.C., based at Dulles
Airport, and director of passenger programs. The Commissioner
recognized Mr. Jacksta in 1995 by awarding him the Customs
Service's ``Customer Service Award.'' And in December 1999, he
received the Commissioner Outstanding Performance Award. Mr.
Jacksta received a bachelor of science degree from Buffalo
State College in New York in 1976, where he majored in criminal
justice.
Mr. Robert Mocny is currently the Deputy Director of US-
VISIT within the Border and Transportation Security
Directorate. He started his career in 1989 with the Immigration
and Naturalization Service as an inspector at the port of entry
in San Francisco, California. There he developed a series of
automated management programs, later adopted by the INS for
nationwide use. Mr. Mocny was also a special operations
inspector, providing training in the detection of fraudulent
documents. At INS headquarters in Washington, D.C., he
established the Secure Electronic Network for Travelers' Rapid
Inspection, or SENTRI, program, the world's first electronic
border control program that expedites the entry of low-risk
border crossers at the southern border. Mr. Mocny received his
bachelor degree from the University of California at Santa
Barbara.
Alfonso Martinez-Fonts, Jr., is the Special Assistant to
the Secretary for the Private Sector at the Department of
Homeland Security. His duties include providing America's
private sector with an avenue of dialogue with the Department.
He has previously served in the private sector as chairman and
chief executive officer of JP Morgan Chase Bank in El Paso,
Texas, and president of the bank in San Antonio. Mr. Martinez-
Fonts has also served on many boards, including the Greater El
Paso Chamber Foundation, the Fannie Mae Advisory Board, and the
American Bankers Association Communications Council. He
received his undergraduate degree in political science from
Villanova University in 1971 and his MBA in finance from Long
Island University in 1974.
Mr. Randolph Hite is the Director of Information Technology
Architecture and Systems Issues at the General Accounting
Office, or GAO. During his 25-year career with GAO, he has
directed reviews of major Federal investments in information
technology, such as the IRS' tax systems modernization--which
must have been a Herculean task itself--FAA's air traffic
control modernization, the National Weather Service's weather
systems modernization, Customs' import processing
modernization, and DOD's business systems modernization. Mr.
Hite has a business degree from James Madison University and
has completed graduate work at George Washington University,
Carnegie Mellon University, Harvard University, and Syracuse
University.
Gentlemen, thank you for your presence here today. Before I
begin, I would like to also recognize, if not embarrass, a
former employee of this Subcommittee, Lora Ries, who has
returned. We very much appreciate her work on this Subcommittee
over the years and know she is doing a great job for the
Department. So it's good to have Lora here as well.
Mr. Jacksta, the floor is yours.
STATEMENT OF ROBERT M. JACKSTA, EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR, BORDER
SECURITY AND FACILITATION, OFFICE OF FIELD OPERATIONS, U.S.
CUSTOMS AND BORDER PROTECTION, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND
SECURITY
Mr. Jacksta. Good morning, Chairman Hostettler, Members of
the Subcommittee. Thank you for the opportunity to testify
today. I am Robert Jacksta, Executive Director of Border
Security and Facilitation, Office of Field Operations within
U.S. Customs and Border and Protection. I would like to discuss
today the efforts of U.S. Customs and Border Protection to
secure our borders against terrorism and other criminal threats
and how CBP has incorporated US-VISIT as a tool in this
process.
Prior to full integration into the Department of Homeland
Security, U.S. Customs historically shared the responsibility
of protecting our borders with multiple agencies, our closest
partner in this endeavor being the Immigration and
Naturalization Service. Since March 1, 2003, the border
inspection functions of the agency, along with the Agricultural
Quarantine Inspections, have been merged into one border
control agency. Through CBP, all people and goods entering the
United States must legally enter through one of our over 300
land, air, and seaports of entry. In fiscal year 2003, more
than 400 million travelers passed these ports into the United
States.
CBP is committed to programs aimed at efficiently and
reliably identifying compliant travelers while ensuring that
all travelers are screened. The US-VISIT program has integrated
well into the CBP's existing programs to accomplish this
mission. CBP has been a full working partner with the US-VISIT
Program Office, and we continue to work with the Department of
Homeland Security on this important issue.
We have also been working with the Department of State, the
Department of Justice, and other Federal agencies and have made
great strides in improving overall border management. We do
this through the collection of pre-arrival, arrival, and
departure information on international travelers. To this end,
CBP has been able to integrate US-VISIT with other CBP
processes to increase the effectiveness of border management
which includes biometric and biographical checks against law
enforcement databases.
In the fall of last year, in anticipation of US-VISIT
implementation, 2,100 new work stations and document readers
were deployed to each of the 115 airports and 14 seaports where
US-VISIT is in place. In the fall of 2003, CBP trained over
4,700 CBP officers in the use of US-VISIT and the process and
implementation changes needed to make this an effective
program.
Since the initiation of US-VISIT on January 5, 2004, CBP
has processed over 2 million travelers through US-VISIT, with
no interruption in the facilitation of legitimate travelers
into the United States. The US-VISIT process of capturing
biometrics, two fingerscans, and a digital photo takes less
than 15 seconds. The Automated Biometric Identification System
that stores this data, called IDENT, takes only seconds to
capture the person's information. Overall processing of those
travelers has not significantly impacted flight processing. On
the average, most flights are processed in less than 45
minutes.
There have been over 195 verified lookout matches since
January 5, 2004. Those matches have enabled CBP to intercept
rapists, drug traffickers, perpetrators of credit card fraud,
and convicted armed robbers. Others who had been previously
deported or denied entry and attempted to reenter using another
alias have been intercepted and prevented from entering the
country.
One of CBP's important tools is the Advance Passenger
Information System which allows the traveler's biographical
data to be collected and vetted through law enforcement
databases prior to their arrival. The biometrics collected upon
arrival through US-VISIT allows CBP to verify the identity of
the individual for whom the APIS data was transmitted. We have
also established a National Targeting Center to use this
information to generate advance queries and identify actionable
targets. We have also provided important training to our
officers, including anti-terrorism training, interviewing
techniques, and document fraud training.
With CBP's officer intuition, integration of advance
technology, and multi-agency coordination, we have enhanced the
security and safety of all citizens, residents, and visitors.
As we move forward toward the expansion of US-VISIT
initiatives to the land border, CBP will continue to leverage
our existing programs, such as our National Targeting Center,
dedicated commuter lanes, license plate reader program, free
and secure trade, and biometric verification system to assist
in meeting the Department of Homeland Security mandates.
In summary, the US-VISIT process at airports and seaports
has demonstrated its capability to enhance the security of our
citizens and visitors, facilitate legitimate trade and travel,
and ensure the integrity of the immigration service, at the
same time protecting the personal privacy of our visitors. In
just the first 2 months, the first release of US-VISIT has
improved the security of our citizens and visitors. CBP
officers are actually excited about having this new tool in
their arsenal.
Thank you again, Chairman Hostettler and Members of the
Subcommittee. I would also like to invite you and your staff
out to Dulles Airport so we can give you a live demonstration
of an operational environment and how US-VISIT is used on a
daily basis.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Jacksta follows:]
Prepared Statement of Robert Jacksta
Chairman Hostettler and Members of the Subcommittee, thank you for
this opportunity to testify. I am Robert Jacksta, Executive Director
for Border Security and Facilitation, Office of Field Operations. I
would like to discuss the efforts of the U.S. Customs and Border
Protection (CBP) to secure our borders against terrorism and other
criminal threats and how CBP has incorporated US-VISIT as a tool in
this process.
Prior to integration into the Department of Homeland Security, the
U.S. Customs Service historically shared the responsibility of
protecting our borders with multiple agencies, our closest partner in
this endeavor being the Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS).
Since March 1, 2003, the border enforcement functions of the INS and
Customs, along with the Department of Agriculture's Agricultural
Quarantine Inspections have been merged into one border control agency,
CBP. Through CBP, all people and goods entering the United States
through one of over 300 land, air, or seaports of entry into the U.S.
from foreign countries are subject to inspection. In fiscal year 2003,
more than 400 million people passed through these ports into the United
States.
CBP is committed to programs aimed at efficiently and reliably
identifying compliant travelers while ensuring that all travelers are
screened appropriately. The US-VISIT program has integrated well into
CBP's existing programs to accomplish this goal. CBP has been a full
working partner with the US-VISIT Program Office within the Department
of Homeland Security, and has committed to implement each phase of the
US-VISIT mandate.
We have also been working with the Department of State, the
Department of Justice, and other federal agencies and have made great
strides in improving overall border management through the collection
of pre-arrival, arrival, and departure information on international
travelers. To this end, CBP has been able to integrate US-VISIT with
other CBP processes to increase the effectiveness of border management
which includes biometric and biographical checks against law
enforcement databases.
In the fall of last year, in anticipation of US-VISIT
implementation, 2,100 new workstations and document readers were
deployed to each of the 115 airports and 14 seaports where US-VISIT is
now in place. CBP has trained 4,700 Officers in the US-VISIT process
and implemented changes to include US-VISIT as part of the initial CBP
Officers training at the academy in Glynco, Georgia.
Since the initiation of US-VISIT on January 5, 2004, CBP has
processed over 2 million travelers through US-VISIT, with no
interruption in the facilitation of legitimate travelers into the
United States. There have been 195 verified lookout matches with the
use of US-VISIT. Those matches have enabled CBP to intercept rapists,
drug traffickers, perpetrators of credit card fraud, and convicted
armed robbers. Others who had been previously deported or denied entry
and attempted to reenter using another alias have been intercepted and
prevented from entering the country.
One of CBP's important tools is the Advance Passenger Information
System (APIS) which allows the traveler's biographical data to be
collected and vetted through law enforcement databases prior to their
arrival. The biometrics collected upon arrival through the US-VISIT
process allows CBP to verify the identity of the individual for whom
the APIS data was submitted and identify those who may be utilizing
multiple identities or false documents. We have also provided important
training to our Officers including Anti-Terrorism training,
interviewing techniques and document fraud.
With the integration of advance technology, multi-agency
coordination, and front line CBP Officer intuition, we have enhanced
the security and safety of citizens, residents and visitors.
CBP's integration of US-VISIT at ports of entry has not come at the
expense of legitimate travel. The US-VISIT process of capturing
biometrics, two fingerscans and a digital photo, takes less then 15
seconds. The Automated Biometric Identification System that stores this
data, called IDENT, takes only seconds to capture the person's
information. Overall processing of those travelers subject to US-VISIT
has not significantly impacted flight processing. On the average, most
flights are processed in less than 45 minutes; which is about the same
time it took before we implemented US-VISIT.
As we assist US-VISIT in meeting the next phase of mandates in the
initiative, CBP will continue to leverage our existing programs,
including Dedicated Commuter Lanes such as NEXUS and SENTRI, License
Plate Reader programs, Free and Secure Trade and the Biometrics
Verification System.
In summary, the US-VISIT process at airports and seaports has
demonstrated its capability to enhance the security of our citizens and
visitors, facilitate legitimate travel and trade, ensure the integrity
of the immigration system and safeguard the personal information of
visitors from theft or misuse. In just the first two months, the first
release of US-VISIT has improved the security of our citizens and
visitors. CBP Officers have said that the new tools we have put in
place truly help them do their job more effectively.
Thank you again, Chairman Hostettler and members of the Sub-
Committee, for giving U.S. Customs and Border Protection this
opportunity to testify. I would be happy to answer any questions you
may have.
Mr. Hostettler. Thank you, Mr. Jacksta, and I look forward
to that visit.
Mr. Mocny, the floor is yours.
STATEMENT OF ROBERT A. MOCNY, DEPUTY DIRECTOR, US-VISIT OFFICE,
U.S. DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY
Mr. Mocny. Thank you, Chairman Hostettler. Before I begin,
could you afford me some additional time to answer Mr. Berman's
questions, or do you want me to go through my opening statement
first?
Mr. Hostettler. Without objection. He will be leaving in a
short time. That would be very helpful.
Mr. Mocny. As you mentioned, the 30-day and 1-year
provisions of NSEERS have been discontinued. By regulation, we
stopped that as of December of last year. The registration at
the ports of entry will continue for a period of time. That
will continue until we can kind of meld into or develop into
the US-VISIT program the additional questions that we would
need to ask of any individual who might pose a particular
threat. As you know, the five states that sponsor terrorism are
some of the individuals who are a part of that extra
questioning. The other countries are based on actual
intelligence, and without getting into the exact criteria,
those individuals are asked to provide additional information.
We have always had that ability to ask additional questions
of any individual who either poses a threat or, for whatever
reason, cannot quite answer all the questions on the primary,
so we ask those individuals to go back into a secondary area
where we can spend additional time without holding up the
traffic there.
We will bring into US-VISIT the additional scrutiny that
would apply to these individuals. I can't give you a specific
time. I think we've been on the record to talk about an award
in May that we would give to the private sector who look at the
long-term vision of US-VISIT and where we can fit into the
current questioning process and the current processing of US-
VISIT individuals how we might bring in a secondary piece of
that. So it is true that the current process will continue as
it has continued at the ports of entry. These people, of
course, do not have to show up for a 30-day reinterview. They
do not have to show up for a 1-year interview. And there is no
more domestic registration. That was ended as well.
Mr. Hostettler. The Chair now recognizes Mr. Mocny for 5
minutes.
Mr. Mocny. Thank you, Chairman Hostettler and other
distinguished Members. It is an honor to appear before you
today to discuss the Department of Homeland Security's US-VISIT
program. You have just heard from my colleague, Bob Jacksta, on
the positive impacts this program has already had on the safety
and security of the United States. In the next few minutes, I
would like to share with you a glimpse of our vision and how we
will achieve our goals of enhancing national security,
facilitating the entry of legitimate trade and travel, ensuring
the integrity of our immigration system, and protecting the
privacy of our visitors.
Before I do that, let me first thank this Committee for its
leadership in establishing the statutory framework for US-
VISIT. I would like to express my appreciation to Congressman
Lamar Smith, as you did, for his vision of an entry and exit
system and all the others who provided the discipline and focus
that has resulted in the first successful increment of US-
VISIT. I was in front of this Committee in 1998 testifying how
technology could assist us in our entry and exit system. Today,
we can all claim some victory, perhaps later than many of us
would have liked, but victory nonetheless as we have begun to
address the critical issues of illegal immigration and the
safety and security of our Nation.
The Department of Homeland Security has a vision for a
virtual border. This vision involves not only our Department
but also the Departments of State, Justice, Transportation,
Commerce, and others. It depends on the active participation of
the countries in the visa waiver program. Indeed, it involves
the entire international community.
In this vision, we see a decision-making process that
begins far from the physical boundaries that define our
sovereign national territory and long before any foreign
national arrives at a port of entry. Border security will not
occur at a defined point on a map, but through millions of
lines of code in a computer system and millions of human
decisions a day.
Unfortunately, today many of these decisions are made
without full information. Over the decades, we have amassed a
great deal of information on foreign nationals, but that data
is in separate databases in stove-piped systems and spread
across the Federal Government. US-VISIT seeks to take account
of that data, integrate where appropriate, and retire systems
where appropriate, and create new business processes and use
the latest technology to reform the entire system. This
modernization effort will require the collective will and
resources of many of the departments, agencies, and bureaus I
mentioned earlier. We need to assimilate the right information
and provide that information to the decision makers who grant
visas, grant admission to the United States, grant benefits,
and decide who to detain or release.
This means that consular officials from the Department of
State will have up-to-date information generated by the
Department of Homeland Security, and the Department of State
will establish identities through the use of biometrics and
provide these biometrics and other visa information to the
Department of Homeland Security. This will help us decide whom
to move quickly through the clearance process and with whom to
spend more time.
If our mission is to reform our borders, we must build into
the program the right enforcement mechanisms. By virtue of our
name, US-VISIT, we want to remain a welcoming country. But we
must also stand ready to remove those few individuals who
violate the terms of their visa. US-VISIT will supply
information to the Compliance Enforcement Unit of Immigration
and Customs Enforcement so that through online searches of
addresses supplied by the visitor and other contact information
we have collected, agents will be able to locate and remove
non-compliant visitors.
The numbers are daunting. With over 400 million inspections
each year, billions of dollars in trade, dependencies on
tourism, and millions of foreign students attending our
schools, the Federal Government cannot do this alone. So US-
VISIT has reached out to the private sector. The transportation
industry, port authorities, technology companies, and others
will play a critical role in this new vision. You will hear
shortly from Mr. Al Martinez-Fonts who will describe how US-
VISIT engaged with the private industry.
And speaking with the latest technology, our solution for
the land border is dependent on it. As of December 31, 2004,
foreign nationals requiring a visa arriving at one of the 50
busiest land ports of entry will have their two index fingers
scanned and have a digital photograph taken. That's the easy
part. But for the millions of border crossing cardholders and
other foreign nationals who may not require a visa and cross
daily, we need a mechanism to efficiently capture their data.
We need to digitize our borders. We will do this by building
upon the successful SENTRI and NEXUS programs that use radio
frequency technology. This technology has been tested, it is
mature, and it is the solution that will enable us to secure
our borders while we expedite the flow of legitimate trade and
travel that we depend on for a strong economy. Since we last
talked about this subject, as one would expect, technology has
evolved, and within a relatively short period of time, we
believe that we can combine radio frequency technology with
biometrics so that individuals can be positively identified
when they enter the United States and when they exit. We now
have the opportunity and the will to make this a reality.
US-VISIT is only getting started. We have a long way to go,
but along that way we will be able to demonstrably improve the
security of the Nation without harming our economy. The U.S. is
a welcoming country. But we, as stewards of immigration, must
continue to enhance our ability to protect the Nation and
ensure the integrity of the immigration process. We believe
that US-VISIT is a major step in reforming our borders. It is
also the responsible thing to do.
That's the end of my testimony. I believe we now have a
video, if we can, to show the US-VISIT process. These series of
shots were taken at Atlanta's Hartfield Jackson Airport. It is
about 2 minutes long, Mr. Chairman. The volume might be a
little bit low, so if we could have it as quiet in here as
possible, that would be very helpful.
Thank you.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Mocny follows:]
Prepared Statement of Robert Mocny
Chairman Hostettler, Ranking Member Jackson Lee and other
distinguished Members, it is a pleasure to appear before you today to
discuss the Department of Homeland Security's US-VISIT program and how
this fits in with our commitment to protect the homeland.
US-VISIT represents yet another major milestone in enhancing our
nation's security and our efforts to reform our borders. It is a major
step towards bringing integrity back to our immigration and border
enforcement systems.
US-VISIT is a continuum of security measures that begins before an
individual enters the United States and continues through arrival and
departure from the United States. It incorporates eligibility
determinations made by both the Department of Homeland Security (DHS)
and the Department of State.
Using biometrics such as digital, inkless fingerscans and digital
photographs, DHS is able to determine whether the person applying for
entry to the United States is the same person who was issued the visa
by the Department of State. Additionally, the biometric and biographic
data are checked against watch lists, improving the DHS' ability to
make admissibility decisions as well as the Department of State's
ability to make visa determinations.
US-VISIT procedures are clear, simple, and fast for foreign
nationals.
DHS deployed US-VISIT on time, on budget, and has met the mandates
established by Congress, as well as the challenge by the Secretary of
Homeland Security to incorporate biometrics (fingerscans) into US-VISIT
ahead of schedule. By January 5, 2004, US-VISIT entry procedures were
operational at 115 airports (covering 99% of air travelers who use
nonimmigrant visas to enter the United States) and 14 seaports, and we
began pilot testing biometric exit procedures at one airport and one
seaport. As of yesterday more than 2 million foreign visitors have been
processed under the US-VISIT entry procedures.
Already US-VISIT has prevented over 195 people from entering the
United States--91 were stopped at the overseas visa-issuing post and 60
were identified at the port of entry, all because of a biometric match.
Our border management system impacts the security of our citizens
and our visitors, affects billions of dollars in trade and travel and
helps define relations with our international partners. There is a need
to improve this system and bring it into the 21st century with a new
integrated system of technological processes that will keep our
country's economic and national security strong. This 21st century
technology will provide an important step toward achieving the
President's goal of secure U.S. borders.
In just a few months, the first release of US-VISIT has improved
the security of our citizens and visitors. It seems clear that visitors
appreciate the effort we are making to deliver security while
simultaneously facilitating the process for law-abiding, legitimate
travelers. US-VISIT is an effective deterrent,[UB1] for its biometric
capabilities convince many criminals that they will not be able to hide
their true identity.
We must continue to respect our visitors' privacy, treat them
fairly, and enable them to pass through inspection quickly so they can
enjoy their visit in our country. As people attempt to enter our
country, we must know who they are and whether they intend to do us
harm, the ability of US-VISIT to rapidly screen applicants' biometrics
and biographic information through watch lists and databases means we
can have security and control without impeding legitimate travelers,
and we can also help protect our welcomed visitors by drastically
reducing the possibility of identity theft. Moreover, as visitors leave
the country, we must know that they have not overstayed the duration of
their visa.
But we are not finished. This is a complicated job that will take
time to complete. In fact, US-VISIT is designed to be rolled out in
increments to ensure that the foundation is strong and the building
blocks are effective. With the deployment of the entry components at
air and sea ports, we have made a strong beginning, and going into
2004, we are on track to meet the December 31, 2004 deadline to
integrate US-VISIT procedures at the 50 busiest land border ports of
entry.
We are seeing that we can accomplish what we set out to do: keep
out terrorists, enhance the integrity of our immigration system,
facilitate legitimate travel and trade and help protect the privacy and
identity of our visitors. To ensure the continued success of this
important program, we are working with the National Institute of
Science and Technology (NIST) and with the Departments of Justice, and
State to enlarge our capability to identify criminals and terrorist
prior to issuing a visa or granting entry to the U.S.
MOVING TO A ``VIRTUAL BORDER'' SOLUTION
The vision of US-VISIT is to deploy an end-to-end border management
program. This comprehensive view of border management leads to a
virtual border. It elevates the requirement to develop the best
processes to manage data on foreign nationals. It will provide an
information-rich solution that better informs the border management
decision makers and improves upon the information available to support
the pre-entry, entry, status management, exit, and analysis processes.
Much of the emphasis to date on the entry/exit system has focused
specifically on the entry and exit processes at the ports of entry--
thus the ``port-centric'' solution. One of the key initiatives of the
US-VISIT Program is to adjust this focus to a ``virtual border''
solution, placing equal emphasis on the pre-entry, entry, status
management, exit, and analysis processes associated with this Program.
The virtual border will enhance national security by matching the
identity of foreign nationals, facilitate legitimate trade and travel,
and ensure the integrity of our immigration system by improving
enforcement. DOS determines eligibility for a U.S. visa based on a
review of all relevant information including information on criminal
history and possible terrorism activity.
THE ENTRY PROCESS WILL USE BIOMETRICS TO MATCH IDENTITY
Pre-Entry
For millions of visitors, entry into the U.S. must be preceded by
the issuance of travel documents at a U.S. embassy or consulate abroad.
The purpose of the pre-entry process is to determine eligibility for
immigration status and/or visas at DOS consular offices worldwide or
DHS immigration Service Centers.
The pre-entry process is a critical component of the US-VISIT
virtual border. The consular officers gather a large amount of
information prior to a foreign national's arrival at a port. This data
will now be made available to appropriate border management agencies.
In turn, the US-VISIT Program will provide additional information to
the consular officer or Citizenship and Immigration Services
adjudicators who are determining a foreign national's eligibility,
including a history of entries and exits, photographs, and fingerscans
that can be used to search watch lists.
Since the beginning of 2004, the pre-entry process includes
analysis of the manifest supplied by the airlines for each
international flight to determine the nonimmigrant visa holders on
board the plane. This is done through the Advanced Passenger
Information System or APIS. [UB2] This information is used by the U.S.
Customs and Border Protection Officers to identify travelers of concern
and pre-position information to support the inspectors at the port.
Entry Process
The purpose of the entry process is to determine the admissibility
of foreign nationals requesting entry into the U.S. at air, land, or
sea ports. The entry process can begin at a primary port inspection
booth at an air, sea, or land ports, or at a temporary inspection
location such as a ship lounge. Foreign nationals can also be inspected
at certain pre-inspection locations overseas, such as Shannon Airport
in Ireland.
As part of the US-VISIT entry process, foreign nationals will be
required to provide biometric data, biographic data, and/or other
documentation, which provides for increased accuracy when making an
entry/no exit decision.[UB3] This data is used to match identity,
determine proper visa classification, and to query the watch list.
Inspectors match identity of each foreign national collected by DOS,
and determine the visitor's admissibility.
All ports share similarities in inspection processes and inspectors
must quickly conduct a primary inspection and determine if the
applicant should be recommended for a more in-depth review at the
secondary inspection point. The average primary inspection for foreign
nationals, lasts approximately one minute.
Although all inspections involve certain basic tasks, there are
marked differences between an inspection conducted at an air or sea
port and one conducted at a land port because at a land port you have a
very different physical environment. Land ports experience:
A larger volume of inspections.
Limited or non-existent advance access to data about
approaching pedestrians, passengers, or commercial freight.
Multiple modes of transportation, including commercial and
private vehicles, buses, trains, and pedestrians. This
commingling significantly increases the potential for traffic
congestion
A high volume of commercial freight traffic.
Local commuters as a majority of persons arriving.
To expedite the flow of traffic at land ports, several technologies
have been implemented in recent years that are listed below. With
implementation of the virtual border, we will be able to match
information on each foreign national when presented for inspection, and
determine the risk of allowing entry.
The Secure Electronic Network for Traveler's Rapid
Inspection (SENTRI or Dedicated Commuter Lane) program uses an
electronic, radio frequency (RF)-based technology to enable
dedicated commuter lanes. This expedites the flow of low-risk,
frequent border crossers through a port while maintaining the
security of our borders. Users are pre-enrolled, and extensive
background checks are conducted through a network of law
enforcement databases. Each time a participant enters through
the SENTRI lane, the system automatically accesses the database
and displays all persons who are authorized to be in the
vehicle. This system is vehicle-based rather than passenger-
based and relies on transponders for RF transmission
NEXUS (License Plate Reader) uses the same RF
technology as SENTRI and includes a pre-enrollment process to
screen applicants and then issues a proximity card that can be
read as the car moves past the inspection station. The
inspecting officer makes a positive visual identification of
each participant based on the picture and personal information
on screen. This system is individual passenger-based as opposed
to being vehicle-based and uses proximity card technology for
transmission of information.
For land borders, we are considering including expanded use of
Radio Frequency (RF) technology to expedite processing of frequent
border crossers using biographical data as a part of the virtual border
solution. Also, we are currently looking at ways to use RF technology
to facilitate travel and collect entry and exit data. To that end, we
are planning to test RF technology at select primary entry and exit
lanes of the 50 busiest land border crossings. These plans are not part
of the statutory mandate for December 31, 2004. Regardless, we will
work to optimize the use of RF technology at our land ports of entry
such that visitors can pass through the inspection point with minimal
delay.
STATUS MANAGEMENT INCLUDES IDENTIFYING OVERSTAYS
Managing the status of foreign nationals once inside the borders of
the U.S. includes, but is not limited to:
Monitoring the terms of their admission by matching
the entry and exit records to determine if any foreign national
has overstayed the terms of admission
Identifying violations in terms of admission
Referring watch list and visa compliance leads to
agencies and organizations responsible for enforcement.
Maintaining the status of foreign nationals while in the United
States is an integral part of border management and ensuring the
integrity of the immigration system. One of the US-VISIT Program's
primary roles in status management will be the overstay calculation,
and exchanging appropriate entry and exit information with case
management systems, especially those managed by U.S. Citizenship and
Immigration Services.
THE EXIT PROCESS WILL CAPTURE DEPARTURE INFORMATION
With the implementation of US-VISIT's virtual border, the exit
process at air and sea ports will require the visa holder to provide
information to match against the information provided upon entry. One
exit option currently being piloted captures two fingerscans, and
transfers the data to IDENT to match the arrival and departure records.
This information is also run against ADIS and IBIS.
This one pilot process-consisting of automated kiosks--is being
tested at Baltimore-Washington International Airport and at a Miami
Seaport cruise line. US-VISIT will test other departure confirmation
alternatives and evaluate all of the options to develop the best exit
solution.
Implementation of an exit process at land borders has more
complexities and has yet to be determined.
With this virtual border, we will know who left the U.S. through a
port of departure and who remains.
THE ANALYSIS OF INFORMATION PROCESS WILL USE
US-VISIT INFORMATION TO EXTEND THE VIRTUAL BORDER
The purpose of the analysis of information process is to provide
information that will aid border management in their decision-making
process. Currently, the Arrival/Departure Information System (ADIS)
system is the primary data source for use in these analyses.
A visitors' information is stored and routinely updated in the
ADIS. Information compiled in ADIS will tell the officer if an
individual has complied with the terms of his or her admission. ADIS
illustrates a visitor's travel history, information that the U.S.
Customs and Border Protection officer can use to make admission
determinations. If the history illustrates any immigration violations,
the officer would give more scrutiny to the visitor.
As the US-VISIT Program moves into the direction of the virtual
border, this process will take on an ever-increasing level of
importance. In migrating to the US-VISIT virtual border solution,
emphasis will be placed on providing an increased level of information
to all border management personnel (e.g., the consular official, the
inspector, the adjudicator, and the investigative officer) to aid them
in making critical decisions.
WE WILL SAFEGUARD THE PERSONAL PRIVACY OF OUR VISITORS
An obvious concern for all legitimate travelers is that criminals
will use their lost or stolen travel documents to enter the United
States. Biometric identifiers make it difficult for criminals to travel
on someone else's travel documents. This is a significant benefit that
US-VISIT delivers for the millions of legitimate travelers we welcome
each year. In addition, we must continue to respect our visitors'
privacy.
Additionally, one of US-VISIT's primary goals is to safeguard the
personal information in a way that is responsible and respectful of
privacy. US-VISIT will collect personal information of visitors in
order to determine immigration admissibility. This information will be
used for interactions with U.S. officials during the pre-arrival,
arrival, stay and exit from the United States.
We are complying with both the letter and the spirit of the Privacy
Act of 1974 and the E-Government Act of 2002. We are developing a
comprehensive privacy program that ensures that we use personal
information appropriately, that it is protected from misuse and
improper disclosure, and destroyed when no longer needed.
And, in spite of the fact that these laws do not require US-VISIT
to have a Privacy Impact Assessment (PIA), because a PIA applies to
U.S. citizens and lawful permanent residents versus non-immigrants, we
have prepared one as we as we believe that all visitors' information
should be protected. The PIA is being reviewed by external audiences
including several privacy advocacy groups.
Additionally, we have developed a three-step redress process for
visitors to have their records reviewed and amended or corrected to
ensure accuracy, relevancy, timeliness, or completeness.
This comprehensive privacy program is being spearheaded by DHS's
Chief Privacy Officer, Ms. O'Connor Kelly, to ensure that US-VISIT is
in compliance with the appropriate privacy rules and regulations. Also,
US-VISIT hired its own privacy officer to oversee its program.
We have also done extensive outreach, meeting with numerous
advocacy, privacy and immigration groups to solicit input and hear
concerns, which have been taken into account in the development of the
program.
The US-VISIT PIA was hailed by many in the privacy community as an
excellent model of transparency, including detailed information about
the program, the technology and the privacy protections.
US-VISIT'S VIRTUAL BORDER IMPLEMENTATION SCHEDULE
US-VISIT is being implemented in increments, with the first on
December 31 of last year. The other increments will be deployed over
the coming years with the ultimate goal of having a robust system that
can deliver all of the US-VISIT goals. The steps to this program
include:
Increment 1 COMPLETED
Collect and verify biometrics for foreign nationals
arriving with nonimmigrant visas at air and seaports of entry
by 12/31/03
Check admissibility against watchlists using
biographic and biometric data
Establish exit pilots and complete testing by end of
FY 2004 with implementation to occur in FY 2005.
Increment 2A--10/26/04:
Issue U.S. biometric travel documents following
International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) standards
Deploy capability to read biometric travel documents
in compliance with ICAO standards at air and sea ports of
entry.
Increment 2B--12/31/04:
Extend Increment 1 capability to 50 highest volume
land ports
Increment 3--12/31/05:
Extend Increment 2B to remaining land ports
Increment 4:
Launch initial roll-out of US-VISIT envisioned
program
US-VISIT'S BUDGET
We deployed US-VISIT on budget and on schedule. During Fiscal Year
(FY) 2003 we used appropriated funds of $367 million to achieve
successful deployment to 115 airports and 14 seaports. Specifically we
have:
Implemented/interfaced systems to reduce redundancy
and make more information available
Upgraded our infrastructure to support added
biometrics
Deployed the US-VISIT program to 115 airports and 14
seaports on January 5, 2004
Initiated the exit pilot at one airport and one
seaport
Established the US-VISIT program office
During FY 2004, we have a total of $328 million plus an additional
$10 million in no-year funds that we intend to use to continue meeting
our goals. Currently, our FY 2004 Expenditure Plan is approved by the
U.S. Senate and waiting approval from the U.S. House of
Representatives, and when these funds are released we plan to:
Analyze, field test, and initiate deployment of
alternative approaches for verifying identity on exit at air
and sea ports of entry
Implement US-VISIT Increment 1 capabilities at the 50
busiest land border ports of entry by December 2004
Install biometric readers at all air, sea, and land
ports of entry
Continue building our program management capabilities
In addition, we plan to award a contract to a prime contractor for
further development of our end vision. This comprehensive approach to
border management will lead to the creation of a virtual border and
will set the course for improved processes for management of data on
foreign visitors.
THE SUCCESS STORIES OF US-VISIT
Since US-VISIT entry procedures were implemented, it has resulted
in the interception of dozens of individuals who matched various law
enforcement information. These included rapists, drug traffickers,
credit card and visa fraud criminals, and a convicted armed robber.
Here are details of a few examples.
1) Interception of Drug Trafficker who escaped from Prison
On January 14, 2004, at Miami International Airport, a man from
Peru was traveling to the U.S. When he arrived at the CBP
Officer's booth for admittance, he was enrolled in US-VISIT.
His fingerscans matched the ones already in a federal criminal
database. This man was wanted by the U.S. Marshals for escaping
from LaTuna Federal Correction Facility where he had been
serving a sentence for a conviction of dealing cocaine. After
his escape, an arrest warrant was issued. In May of 2003 he re-
entered the U.S. without incident. Now, with the help of US-
VISIT biometric processes, this man was caught and returned to
federal prison on the warrant. US-VISIT prevented an escaped
convict and drug trafficker from roaming the streets of Miami.
2) Closing a Deportation Loop Hole
On January 18, 2004, a man who has had four aliases tried to
enter the U.S., even with a ``failure to appear'' warrant for
him. DHS/ICE issued the warrant on August 8, 2003, and since
then this man had entered the U.S. at least five times. Now,
with the ability to match fingerscans with those in a criminal
database, this man's luck ran out. He was removed from the U.S.
and put on the next flight back to Colombia.
3) Passport Fraud Uncovered
On January 14, 2004, a British West Indies Airways flight
arrived at JFK International Airport in New York carrying a
woman from Trinidad. Because US-VISIT begins at the visa-
issuing post, a photo of the visitor was on file and accessible
by the Customs and Border Protection Officer, who determined
that she had used a false name. In reality, the traveler was a
woman who had been arrested in April 2000 in New Orleans and
convicted of passport fraud. At that time, the woman was placed
on five years' probation and ordered not to enter the U.S.
without the attorney general's written permission. The woman,
whose husband lives in the U.S., then obtained a passport and
U.S. visa by fraud in Trinidad for $2,000.
4) Convicted Sexual Offender Identified
In New York City, on February 19, 2004, a native of Trinidad
and Tobago attempted to enter the United States. He was not
listed as wanted for any crimes after standard biographic
criminal data systems checks, but a biometric check under US-
VISIT uncovered a prior conviction for having sex with a minor
in 2000, his registration as a convicted sex offender, and a
removal from the United States in 2001 as an aggravated felon.
He had also lived and worked illegally in the United States. He
was placed in expedited removal proceedings.
5) Rape Suspect Caught
On February 22, 2004, at Miami International Airport, a man
from Jamaica attempted to enter the United States after
arriving on an Air Jamaica flight. Biographic and US-VISIT
biometric checks alerted officers to an active warrant from New
York City for strong armed rape. Criminal history checks also
uncovered 3 prior convictions for possession or sale of
marijuana in 1994 and 1995, as well as a 1998 rape arrest. He
was turned over to Miami-Dade police for extradition to New
York.
A CBP Trainee Rises to the Occasion
U.S. Customs and Border Protection Officer Trainee Rafal Izycki was
working at primary inspection at Chicago O'Hare International Airport.
An Albanian national seeking admission into the U.S. appeared before
him and presented an Albanian passport. When Inspector Izycki compared
the State Department photo image biometric provided by US-VISIT against
the biometrics photographs on the passport and visa, he realized that
the person in front of him was not the person who had obtained the
visa. He immediately referred the Albanian national for a secondary
inspection where it was determined that the passport had been photo-
substituted and the non-immigrant visa had been altered. The capability
to access the State Department biometric photographs of visa applicants
provides a powerful tool for inspectors working to protect the U.S.
AN UPDATE ON US-VISIT PROGRAM OFFICE
Secretary Ridge approved the creation of a US-VISIT program office,
and positions have been approved to fill the organization and manage
the program. The US-VISIT program team consists of representatives from
the various components of DHS responsible for border security,
including the U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement, U.S. Customs
and Border Protection, and the Transportation Security Administration.
U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services is also represented. Other
DHS components that assist the US-VISIT team include the Directorate
for Management and the Science and Technology Division. In addition,
outside DHS, the team consists of representatives from the Departments
of Transportation, State, Commerce, Justice, and General Services
Administration.
THE CONCLUSION
US-VISIT is critical to our national security as well as our
economic security, and its implementation is already making a
significant contribution to the efforts of the Department of Homeland
Security to provide a safer and more secure America. But US-VISIT and
the broader vision of a `virtual border' cannot be left unfinished. It
is the correct program at the right time, not only for the security of
our country, but also for the integrity of our immigration system. We
will build upon the initial framework and solid foundation to ensure
that we continue to meet our goals to enhance the security of our
citizens and visitors while facilitating travel for the millions of
visitors we welcome each year.
We want to ensure that we continue to be a welcoming nation, a
nation that invites visitors to study, do business, and relax in our
country. We also owe it to our citizens and visitors to deny entry to
persons wishing to do harm, or who are inadmissible to the U.S. Few
would dispute that these steps are necessary. These steps will be made
easier because of US-VISIT and the information
We are committed to building a program that enhances the integrity
of our immigration system by catching the few and expediting the many,
and we recognize that the U.S. is leading the way in helping other
countries around the world keep their doors open and their borders
secure.
Mr. Hostettler. Very good. Thank you.
[Video shown.]
Mr. Hostettler. Thank you, Mr. Mocny.
The Chair now recognizes Mr. Martinez-Fonts for 5 minutes.
STATEMENT OF ALFONSO MARTINEZ-FONTS, JR., SPECIAL ASSISTANT TO
THE SECRETARY FOR THE PRIVATE SECTOR, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF
HOMELAND SECURITY
Mr. Martinez-Fonts. Good morning, Chairman Hostettler,
Ranking Member Jackson Lee, and other distinguished Members of
the Subcommittee. It is both a pleasure and an honor to appear
before you today to discuss the Department of Homeland
Security's US-VISIT program and how the Private Sector Office
works with the US-VISIT program to engage the business
community in this critical program.
Under the charter given us by Congress and the President,
the Private Sector Office was designed to provide America's
business community a direct line of communication to the
Department of Homeland Security. With the guidance and
assistance of Secretary Ridge and our Department colleagues,
the Private Sector Office works directly with individual
businesses, trade associations, chambers of commerce, and other
professional and non-governmental organizations to share
Department information, programs, and partnership
opportunities.
As mandated by the law, we are in the process of developing
the capability to do economic analysis on the effect the
Department's rules and regulations will have on the private
sector.
As a provider of goods and services and the creator of
tools and technologies that make our lives better, it is the
private sector that helps make our Nation more secure. At the
same time, it is the private sector that will be affected by
many of the actions of the Department such as US-VISIT.
Congress and the Administration duly recognize that the private
sector plays a critical role in our Nation's ability to
prevent, respond, and recover from prospective incidents.
Furthermore, all of us here today accept the fact that the
private sector is a fundamental partner in the Department's
nationwide efforts to secure our homeland. The rewards of the
Department's growing relationship with the private sector are
evident in the program we are here to discuss today.
From the very beginning of the US-VISIT program, my office
and our Department colleagues have worked to engage the private
sector, to listen to their comments and to respond to their
concerns every step of the way. Since the program began to take
shape some months ago, the Department and the private sector
have learned a great deal about one another and the challenges
and opportunities we both have to contend with as we go about
modernizing our borders, harmonizing our systems, and creating
a better, faster, and more secure border. The lessons learned
from this endeavor are making US-VISIT a better program and
will help its future implementation at more ports of entry
around the country.
Our efforts in this program have also defined a performance
measure by which the Department can assess the engagement,
partnership, and cooperation with the private sector. With them
as our partner and the guidance and support of this Committee
and Congress, I am confident this success will continue and
make our homeland even more secure.
Thank you again for the opportunity to be with you, and I
look forward to addressing any questions that you might have.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Martinez-Fonts follows:]
Prepared Statement of Al Martinez-Fonts
Chairman Hostettler, Ranking Member Jackson Lee and other
distinguished Members, it is a pleasure to appear before you today to
discuss the Department of Homeland Security's US-VISIT program and how
the Private Sector Office works with the US-VISIT Program Office to
engage the business community in this critical program.
Under the charter given to us by Congress and the President, the
mission of the Private Sector Office is to provide America's business
community with a direct line of communication to the Department of
Homeland Security. With the guidance and assistance of Secretary Ridge
and our Department colleagues, the Private Sector Office works directly
with individual businesses, trade associations, and other professional
and non-governmental organizations to share information about
Department programs and opportunities.
The private sector is a fundamental partner in the Department's
nationwide efforts to secure our homeland. The rewards of the
Department's growing relationships with the private sector are evident
in the program we are here today to discuss.
US-VISIT represents yet another major milestone in enhancing our
nation's security and our efforts to reform our borders. It is a
significant step towards bringing integrity back to our immigration and
border enforcement systems. Perhaps most importantly it represents our
government's commitment to leveraging 21st century technology to ensure
we have both economic security and national security, because we cannot
have one without the other.
As head of the Department of Homeland Security's Private Sector
Office, it has been my job to engage all sectors of the business
community. It is critical for the voices of the private sector to be
heard during all phases of the development and rollout of US-VISIT.
Their contributions and input have been essential in helping to ensure
the effective deployment of US-VISIT.
It is important to note that the private sector has been an
important partner throughout the development and rollout of US-VISIT.
As you know, the first increment of US-VISIT was completed on time and
on budget, and we thank our partners in the private sector for helping
to make this early success a reality. All facets of the aviation
community were integral factors as we planned, piloted and launched US-
VISIT last year.
My colleagues Mr. Mocny and Mr. Jacksta have shared their thoughts
and perspectives on US-VISIT in terms of the breadth and continuity of
the security initiative. As the Department's advocate for the private
sector, I would like to share with you the three basic roles my Office
has played in the formation of US-VISIT. These include: engaging the
private sector; listening to their comments; and responding to their
concerns.
ENGAGING THE PRIVATE SECTOR
There are roughly 25 million businesses in the United States, and
in order to reach as many of them as possible, our engagement and
outreach strategy has been focused on leveraging our relationships
wherever possible. These relationships include the various trade and
industry associations who communicate with and educate their members
and constituents on relevant business issues. By clustering our
outreach into distinct segments, we have been able to communicate the
relevant points about US-VISIT to these business groups. Groups such as
the US Chamber of Commerce, the National Association of Manufacturers,
Business Executives for National Security, the National Federation of
Independent Businesses, and the Business Roundtable bring distinct
voices and valuable perspective to the Department's efforts but these
voices and perspectives are not alone.
Throughout Increment 1 of US-VISIT's development and deployment,
private sector members in the transportation, travel and tourism
communities were not only impacted the most but had the most to offer
in terms of input and feedback. Because this input has been vital to
the Program's success, we have focused much of our outreach on engaging
these business groups on an on-going basis. In the months leading up to
deployment of Increment 1 capabilities at airports and seaports, the
Private Sector Office, in partnership with the US-VISIT Program Office,
held frequent conference calls with the airline, airport, seaport and
general travel and tourism community to ensure they were kept up-to-
date and informed on a variety of aspects. The airlines and airports,
in particular, were integral partners as we planned, piloted and
launched US-VISIT last year. As you know, Increment 1 was completed on
time and on budget, and we thank our partners in the private sector for
helping to make this early success a reality.
This focus on engagement continues as we prepare to accomplish the
Program's 2004 milestones. Most notable of these is the on-going
testing and evaluation of a departure confirmation system at airports
and seaports, and the rollout of the US-VISIT capability at the 50
busiest land ports of entry. Our efforts remain focused on engaging the
trade and industry groups, mostly through meetings with one or more
associations, as well as speaking engagements and panel discussions at
town hall forums, conferences and conventions. I know that the US-VISIT
Program Office maintains an in-depth database to manage the outreach
and track the responses and feedback from hundreds of international
organizations, trade groups, non-profit organizations and businesses,
and communicates with the hundreds who have opted to receive regular
US-VISIT updates through an e-mail newsletter.
LISTENING TO THEIR COMMENTS
US-VISIT's early focus on actively engaging the private sector has
created enormous opportunities for the Department and the Private
Sector Office to hear directly from these most important Program
stakeholders. We have heard their concerns about our ability to
implement the Program's measures without sacrificing our freedoms or
ability to conduct business. One thing I have found in my own personal
involvement in this Program is that once accurate information is
introduced to address rumors and misperceptions, concerns and fears
subside and people once again focus upon our collective need and
commitment to securing the borders without slowing the flow of commerce
and people.
As a result of our listening to our private sector partners, we
have been able to take the first steps at successfully implementing US-
VISIT at all of our nation's air and sea ports of entry. This has
created the kind of measure we as a Department need to continue to
strive for in all of our efforts with the private sector. By
communicating our commitment to the private sector and their interests
throughout this effort, the Department and US-VISIT have been able to
make a significant difference in the way we do business in America.
From the US Chamber of Commerce to the airline industry, we have heard
from most every sector in the private sector, each of them saying US-
VISIT has exceeded their expectations.
While the US-VISIT program has received praise for its execution
and operation thus far, we have heard some concerns about the land
border implementation. We have also been fielding questions about the
departure confirmation system at airports and seaports.
The area with the most concerns by far is along our nation's
southwest border. I have been actively engaged in reaching out to these
border communities, most notably through key groups such as the Border
Trade Alliance. From both personal and professional experience, I
understand and empathize with many of the concerns the communities
along the border have regarding any effort or program that might impact
border operations and activities. My previous professional experiences
as both a banker and not-for-profit founder providing job skills
training and small business development in El Paso and San Antonio,
Texas have helped me to understand and address the economic and
personal concerns of the private sector. Furthermore, my experiences in
living and working in Mexico for six years have provided additional
perspective. Right now, some people in these affected communities are
imagining clogged borders and economic disruption. My Office and others
in the Department have routinely heard, ``Don't slow trade, don't
separate families, and don't ruin the border.''
We have no intentions of causing any harm to these border
communities and take seriously President Bush's and Congress' direction
that we implement a land border solution that does not slow the free
flow of trade and people across our borders. While we all understand
the challenges, it is important that these businesses understand the
unwavering commitment of this Department to modernize our borders,
harmonize our systems and create a better, faster, more secure border.
DHS has been working closely with the US Department of
Transportation as part of its on-going outreach to private sector
groups to ensure that we listen to their concerns and apply them to the
Program's implementation. For example, integrating programs like FAST
(Free and Secure Trade) with US-VISIT should enable truckers to move
their goods across the border faster than they do today.
RESPONDING TO PRIVATE SECTOR CONCERNS
Perhaps the most important thing DHS has done to respond to private
sector concerns is to engage the brightest minds from the business
community to develop the optimum solution for US-VISIT. We heard and
acted upon those concerns during the Program's kick-off this year.
Rather than start the US-VISIT effort on January 1st at the height of
holiday travel, the Program was initiated on January 5, 2004, allowing
everyone a degree or two of flexibility.
Thanks to a combination of policy and technology solutions, we are
now starting to paint a very new picture of the border, one that
includes faster travel without compromising security. In the Private
Sector Office's quest to communicate the truth about US-VISIT--at air,
sea and land ports of entry--we are seeing that people can now begin to
visualize this reality. This reality can only happen through continued
and active engagement with the Department's various public and private
sector partners. By working together, we can all share with one another
our commitment to keeping America's doors open and our nation secure.
As the US-VISIT Program continues to be implemented, the Private
Sector Office, in partnership with the Department's and Program's
leaders, will continue to identify ways to actively engage the private
sector. As our partners in securing our homeland, the private sector
should know at all times that the Department hears their voices and
believes their opinions matter. As their advocate within the
Department, my staff and I have pledged to use every tool available to
us to demonstrate to them and to all others our commitment to use 21st
century technology and innovation to create a 21st century border. With
the guidance and assistance of the Members of this Committee and the
Congress I am confident that we will be successful in that effort.
I thank the Members for allowing me to share my comments today and
I look forward to addressing any questions that you might have.
Mr. Hostettler. Thank you, Mr. Martinez-Fonts.
Mr. Hite, the Chair recognizes you for 5 minutes.
STATEMENT OF RANDOLPH C. HITE, DIRECTOR, INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY
ARCHITECTURE AND SYSTEMS ISSUES, U.S. GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE
Mr. Hite. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
As we have previously reported, the immense importance of
US-VISIT is undeniable. But as is the importance of US-VISIT,
the need to manage it is equally important. With the recent
deployment of the first increment, the time is right to examine
the program's management, and I commend you for holding this
hearing. In addition, I would like to thank Congresswoman
Jackson Lee for the invitation to participate today and note
that my written statement draws heavily from our two issued
reports on US-VISIT.
In addition, I'd note that we have concluded audit work
recently for the Appropriations Committees that build on these
issued reports, and at their direction my written statement
does not include the results of that work. However, they have
permitted me to share this information orally.
In summary, my testimony makes two primary points.
Point 1, US-VISIT is a large, complex, expensive program
aimed at supporting important missions: border security,
privacy protection, immigration, trade and travel. In addition,
the program's scope touches multiple agencies, and estimates of
its cost through 2004 reach well into the billions of dollars.
Just by virtue of what US-VISIT is and is to be, it carries an
appreciable level of risk with it.
Point number 2, large, complex, expensive programs and,
thus, inherently risky programs, like US-VISIT, should be able
to positively answer two basic questions. Question 1, are we
doing the right thing? Question 2, are we doing it the right
way?
To be the right thing, which is Question 1, a program needs
to be justified by sufficient fact-based, verifiable analysis
showing that the program, as it is defined, including near-term
increments, will produce mission value commensurate with
expected costs.
To be done the right way, which is Question 2, a program
needs to be executed effectively, which means that it needs to
employ the necessary mix of people, processes, and tools to
reasonably ensure that promised program capabilities and
expected mission value are delivered on time and within budget.
The answer to Question 1--Are we doing the right thing?--is
not clear at this juncture. The current plan is to deliver US-
VISIT capabilities in four increments, the first three of which
are intended to be interim solutions, with the fourth being a
more strategic, yet-to-be-defined permanent solution. However,
DHS has not yet identified the tangible, measurable benefits
that can be expected from the interim solutions, and it has not
estimated costs associated with these interim solution.
For large and complex programs that involve developing and
implementing many things over many years, it is the best
practice to break the program into smaller incremental parts
and to economically justify the parts before investing
significant resources in each. Without doing so, an
organization risks learning too late whether interim solutions
were a prudent use of resources.
The answer to Question 2--Are we doing it the right way?--
is clear. Unfortunately, the answer is that US-VISIT does not
yet have in place and functioning the kind of industrial-
strength program management capabilities to include people,
processes, and tools that it needs. For instance, program
management processes have not been defined, adequate staff have
not been put in place to implement, and tools have not been
established to support such things as effective acquisition
planning, requirements development and management, contract
tracking and oversight, test and evaluation management, and
configuration management.
The absence of these capabilities was evident on Increment
1 where neither system testing nor the change control aspect of
configuration management was effectively managed. For example,
Increment 1 test execution preceded the development of test
plans, test plans were missing important content, and testing
was not finished before Increment 1 began operating.
Our experience in reviewing other large and complex IT
programs has shown that over the life of a program, this kind
of go, get ready, get set approach ultimately will result in
taking more time and money to implement less capability than
promised.
Our position is that these two points together paint a
picture of a program at risk, and to address these risks, we
have made a number of recommendations, examples of which are
provided in my written statement, and additional
recommendations will be in our soon-to-be-released report to
the Appropriations Committees.
To DHS' credit, it has agreed with these recommendations,
and it has committed to implementing them. Progress to date has
been slow, and this is troubling because most of these
recommendations are aimed at correcting fundamental limitations
in the ability to manage the program in a way that reasonably
ensures success.
Before concluding, I would be remiss if I did not say that,
despite the management challenges that face US-VISIT, the first
increment was deployed and is operating largely as planned, and
in my view, this is owing to the yeoman efforts of DHS and
contractor staff, who deserve credit for their hard work,
dedication, and commitment. However, reliance on a people
effort alone cannot reasonably ensure program success. Rather,
the more tried and proven approach is to take the necessary
steps and apply the necessary resources to ensure that US-
VISIT's defined increments are the right thing and are done the
right way.
This concludes my statement, and I'd be happy to answer any
questions you have.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Hite follows:]
Prepared Statement of Randolph C. Hite
Mr. Chairman and Members of the Subcommittee:
We appreciate the opportunity to participate in the Subcommittee's
hearing on US-VISIT (the United States Visitor and Immigrant Status
Indicator Technology), a large, complex program that is intended to
achieve a daunting set of goals: it is to enhance homeland security and
the integrity of the U.S. immigration system, and at the same time it
is to facilitate legitimate border crossing and protect privacy. To
achieve these goals, US-VISIT relies on information technology, as well
as people, processes, and facilities.
The genesis of US-VISIT was in 1996, when the Congress passed
legislation that directed the former Immigration and Naturalization
Service (INS) to develop a system to monitor the entry and exit of
foreign nationals visiting this country.\1\ As a result of this and
later related legislative direction,\2\ efforts were begun in 2002 to
develop the system now known as US-VISIT. Subsequently, INS was merged
into the Department of Homeland Security (DHS), which is now
responsible for developing and implementing the US-VISIT program.
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\1\ Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of
1996, Pub. L. 104-208 (Sept. 30, 1996).
\2\ Immigration and Naturalization Service Data Management
Improvement Act of 2000, Pub. L. 106-215 (June 15, 2000); Visa Waiver
Permanent Program Act, Pub. L. 106-396 (Oct. 30, 2000). USA PATRIOT
Act, Pub. L. 107-56 (Oct. 26, 2001); Aviation and Transportation
Security Act, Pub. L. 107-71 (Nov. 19, 2001); Enhanced Border Security
and Visa Entry Reform Act of 2002, Pub. L. 107-173 (May 14, 2002).
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In the last three appropriations acts governing the development and
implementation of US-VISIT,\3\ the Congress prohibited the INS, and
later DHS, from obligating funds until the agency submitted to the
Senate and House Committees on Appropriations expenditure plans that
met several conditions, including being reviewed by GAO. We have
accordingly issued two reports on US-VISIT \4\ and will shortly be
issuing a third to the appropriations committees. All three reports
were based on work performed in accordance with generally accepted
government auditing standards. My testimony today is based on our two
published reports and on more current public information on the program
since the reports were issued.
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\3\ 2002 Supplemental Appropriations Act for Further Recovery from
and Response to Terrorist Attacks on the United States, Pub. L. 107-206
(Aug. 2, 2002); Consolidated Appropriations Resolution, 2003, Pub. L.
108-7 (Feb. 20, 2003); Department of Homeland Security Appropriations
Act, 2004, Pub. L. 108-90 (Oct. 1, 2003).
\4\ U.S. General Accounting Office, Homeland Security: Risks Facing
Key Border and Transportation Security Program Need to Be Addressed,
GAO-03-1083 (Washington, D.C.: Sept. 19, 2003); Information Technology:
Homeland Security Needs to Improve Entry Exit System Expenditure
Planning, GAO-03-563 (Washington, D.C.: June 9, 2003).
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RESULTS IN BRIEF
The overall message of our testimony today is that the US-VISIT
program is risky, both because of the type of program it is and because
of the way it is being managed. US-VISIT is a large, complex, and
expensive program aimed at supporting a multifaceted mission-critical
area; thus, it is an intrinsically challenging effort. Several aspects
of the program increase the risk that it will not meet its goals or its
cost, schedule, and performance commitments:
Multifaceted, critical mission. The program aims to
prevent the entry of persons who pose a threat to the United
States. Besides this critical security mission, the program
also aims to achieve law enforcement goals regarding visa
violations, while facilitating legitimate trade and travel and
adhering to U.S. privacy laws and policies.
Large and complex scope. Controlling the pre-entry,
entry, status, and exit of millions of travelers is a large and
complex process.
Challenging milestones. Progress and current status
of the program make it difficult to satisfy legislatively
mandated milestones: for example, that US-VISIT be implemented
at all ports of entry by December 31, 2005.\5\
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\5\ Immigration and Naturalization Service Data Management
Improvement Act, 2000, Pub. L. 106-215 (June 15, 2000).
Significant potential cost. In February 2003, DHS
estimated that the program would cost $7.2 billion through
fiscal year 2014, but this estimate did not include all costs
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and underestimated some others.
Additionally, several factors related to the program's management
increase the risk of not achieving program goals or not delivering
program capabilities on time and within budget. Our imminent report for
the appropriations committees will discuss each of these factors,
including why each is still an area of risk. Examples of the factors
that we have reported on are as follows:
Problems with existing systems. The program is to
rely initially on existing systems with reported problems that
could limit US-VISIT performance.
Program management capability. The program office was
not adequately staffed, roles and responsibilities had not been
clearly defined, and acquisition management processes were not
yet established.
Near-term facilities solutions. Interim facility
planning for high-volume land ports of entry must satisfy
requirements that are both demanding and based on assumptions
that, if altered, could significantly affect facility plans.
Mission value of increments. The benefits versus
costs were not yet known of the interim versions (or
increments) of the program that are being implemented while the
final version is being developed.
Our experience in reviewing large, complex, information-technology-
dependent programs in other federal agencies has shown that such
program management weaknesses typically result in these programs
falling short of expectations. Accordingly, we have made several
recommendations regarding the US-VISIT program to address these
weaknesses and risks.
BACKGROUND
The US-VISIT program is a governmentwide endeavor intended to
enhance national security, facilitate legitimate trade and travel,
contribute to the integrity of the U.S. immigration system, and adhere
to U.S. privacy laws and policies by
collecting, maintaining, and sharing information on
certain foreign nationals who enter and exit the United States;
identifying foreign nationals who (1) have overstayed
or violated the terms of their visit; (2) can receive, extend,
or adjust their immigration status; or (3) should be
apprehended or detained by law enforcement officials;
detecting fraudulent travel documents, verifying
traveler identity, and determining traveler admissibility
through the use of biometrics; and
facilitating information sharing and coordination
within the border management community.
The program involves interdependencies among people, processes,
technology, and facilities, as shown in Figure 1.
Within DHS, organizational responsibility for the US-VISIT program
lies with the Border and Transportation Security Directorate. In July
2003, DHS established a US-VISIT program office with responsibility for
managing the acquisition, deployment, operation, and sustainment of the
US-VISIT system and supporting people (e.g., inspectors), processes
(e.g., entry exit policies and procedures), and facilities (e.g.,
inspection booths).
DHS plans to deliver US-VISIT capability incrementally. Currently,
it has defined four increments, with Increments 1 through 3 being
interim or temporary solutions, and Increment 4 being the yet-to-be-
defined end vision for US-VISIT. Increments 1 through 3 include the
interfacing and enhancement of existing system capabilities and the
deployment of these capabilities to air, sea, and land ports of entry
(POE).
1. The first increment includes the electronic collection and
matching of biographic and biometric information at all major
air and some sea POEs for selected foreign travelers with non-
immigrant visas.\6\ Increment 1 entry capability was deployed
to 115 airports and 14 seaports on January 5, 2004. Increment 1
exit capability was deployed as a pilot to two POEs on January
5, 2004--one airport and one seaport.\7\
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\6\ Classes of travelers that are not subject to US-VISIT are
foreign nationals admitted on A-1, A-2, C-3 (except for attendants,
servants, or personal employees of accredited officials), G-1, G-2, G-
3, G-4, NATO-1, NATO-2, NATO-3, NATO-4, NATO-5, or NATO-6 visas, unless
the Secretary of State and the Secretary of Homeland Security jointly
determine that a class of such aliens should be subject to the rule;
children under the age of 14; and persons over the age of 79.
\7\ The Miami Royal Caribbean seaport and the Baltimore/Washington
International Airport.
2. The second increment is divided into two parts--2A and 2B.
Increment 2A is to include the capability to process machine-
readable visas and other travel and entry documents that use
biometric identifiers at all POEs. This increment is to be
implemented by October 26, 2004. Increment 2B is to expand the
Increment 1 solution for entry to secondary inspection \8\ at
the 50 highest volume land POEs by December 31, 2004. According
to the US-VISIT Request for Proposal (RFP),\9\ 2B is also to
include radio frequency (RF) \10\ capability at the 50 busiest
land POEs for both entry and exit processes.
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\8\ Secondary inspection is used for more detailed inspections that
may include checking more databases, conducting more intensive
interviews of the individual, or both.
\9\ In November 2003, DHS issued as planned a Request for Proposal
(RFP) for a prime contractor for US-VISIT work beyond Increment 2A.
\10\ RF technology would require proximity cards and card readers.
RF readers read the information contained on the card when the card is
passed near the reader, and could be used to verify the identity of the
card holder.
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3. Increment 3 is to expand the 2B capability to the remaining
115 land POEs. It is to be implemented by December 31, 2005.
4. Increment 4 is the yet-to-be-defined end vision of US-
VISIT, which will likely consist of a series of capability
releases.
DHS plans to award a single, indefinite-delivery/indefinite-
quantity \11\ contract to a prime contractor for integrating existing
and new business processes and technologies. DHS plans to award the
contract by May 2004. According to the RFP, the prime contractor's
scope of work is to include, but is not limited to, Increments 2B, 3,
and 4.
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\11\ An indefinite-delivery/indefinite-quantity contract provides
for an indefinite quantity, within stated limits, of supplies or
services during a fixed period of time. The government schedules
deliveries or performance by placing orders with the contractor.
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US-VISIT IS INHERENTLY RISKY
By definition, US-VISIT is a risky undertaking because it is to
perform a critical mission, its scope is large and complex, it must
meet a demanding implementation schedule, and its potential cost is
enormous.
Program Supports Multifaceted, Critical Mission
In announcing the US-VISIT system, the DHS Under Secretary for
Border and Transportation Security stated that the system's goal is to
``give America a 21st Century `smart border'--one that speeds through
legitimate trade and travel, but stops terrorists in their tracks.''
Achieving these goals is daunting: the United States shares over 7,500
miles of land border with Canada and Mexico, and it has approximately
95,000 miles of shoreline and navigable waterways to protect. In fiscal
year 2002, there were about 279 million inspections of foreign
nationals at U.S. POEs. In these circumstances, preventing the entry of
persons who pose a threat to the United States cannot be guaranteed,
and the missed entry of just one can have severe consequences.
Relatedly, US-VISIT is to achieve the important law enforcement goal of
identifying those among these millions of visitors each year who
overstay or otherwise violate the terms of their visas.
Complicating achievement of these security and law enforcement
goals are other key US-VISIT goals: facilitating the movement of
legitimate trade and travel through the POEs and providing for
enforcement of U.S. privacy laws and regulations.
Scope Is Large and Complex
US-VISIT is to provide for the interfacing of a number of existing
systems. It is also to support and refine a large and complex
governmentwide process involving multiple departments and agencies.
This process involves the pre-entry, entry, status, and exit of
hundreds of millions of foreign national travelers to and from the
United States at over 300 air, sea, and land POEs.
The interfaced systems included in Increment 1 are
Arrival Departure Information System (ADIS), a
database that stores traveler arrival and departure data
received from air and sea carrier manifests and that provides
query and reporting functions;
Advance Passenger Information System (APIS), a system
that captures arrival and departure manifest information
provided by air and sea carriers;
Interagency Border Inspection System (IBIS), a system
that maintains lookout data, interfaces with other agencies'
databases, and is currently used by inspectors at POEs to
verify traveler information and modify data;
Automated Biometric Identification System (IDENT), a
system that collects and stores biometric data about foreign
visitors;
Student Exchange Visitor Information System (SEVIS),
a system that contains information on foreign students;
Computer Linked Application Information Management
System (CLAIMS 3), a system that contains information on
foreign nationals who request benefits, such as change of
status or extension of stay; and
Consular Consolidated Database (CCD), a system that
includes information on whether a visa applicant has previously
applied for a visa or currently has a valid U.S. visa.
Figure 2 shows these systems and their relationships.
In addition to integrating numerous systems, US-VISIT also involves
complex processes governing the stages of a traveler's visit to the
United States: pre-entry, entry, status management, and exit. These
processes for Increment 1 are as follows:
Pre-entry process. Pre-entry processing begins with initial
petitions for visas. When the Department of State issues the travel
documentation, biographic (and in some cases biometric) data are
collected and made available to border management agencies. The
biometric data are transmitted from State to DHS, where the prints are
run against the US-VISIT IDENT biometric database to verify identity
and to check the biometric watchlist. The results of the biometric
check are transmitted back to State.
Commercial air and sea carriers are required by law to transmit
crew and passenger manifests to appropriate immigration officers before
arriving in the United States.\12\ These manifests are transmitted
through APIS. The APIS lists are run against the biographic lookout
system and identify those arrivals who have biometric data available.
In addition, POEs review the APIS list in order to identify foreign
nationals who need to be scrutinized more closely.
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\12\ Enhanced Border Security and Visa Entry Reform Act of 2002,
Pub. L. 107-173 (May 14, 2002).
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Entry process. When a foreign national arrives at a POE's primary
inspection booth, biographic information, such as name and date of
birth, is displayed on the bottom half of a computer workstation
screen, along with a photograph obtained from State's CCD. The
inspector at the booth scans the foreign national's fingerprints (left
and right index fingers) and takes a digital photograph. This
information is forwarded to the IDENT database, where it is checked
against stored fingerprints in the IDENT lookout database. If the
foreign national's fingerprints are already in IDENT, the system
performs a match (a comparison of the fingerprint taken during the
primary inspection to the one on file) to confirm that the person
submitting the fingerprints is the person on file. During this process,
the inspector also questions the foreign national about the purpose of
his or her travel and length of stay.
Status management process. The status management process manages
the foreign national's temporary presence in the United States,
including the adjudication of benefits applications and investigations
into possible violations of immigration regulations. ADIS matches entry
and exit manifest data to ensure that each record showing a foreign
national entering the United States is matched with a record showing
the foreign national exiting the United States. ADIS receives status
information from CLAIMS 3 and SEVIS on foreign nationals.
Exit process. The exit process includes the carriers' submission of
electronic manifest data to IBIS/APIS. This biographic information is
passed to ADIS, where it is matched against entry information. At the
two POEs where the exit pilot is being conducted, foreign nationals use
a self-serve kiosk where they are prompted to scan their travel
documentation and provide their fingerprints (right and left index
fingers). This departure record is then stored in ADIS (along with the
person's arrival record) and used to verify if a foreign national has
complied with the admission terms of his or her visa.
Milestones Are Challenging
Key US-VISIT milestones are legislatively mandated. For example,
the Immigration and Naturalization Service Data Management Improvement
Act of 2000 \13\ requires that US-VISIT be implemented at all air and
sea POEs by December 31, 2003; at the 50 highest volume land POEs by
December 31, 2004; and at all remaining POEs by December 31, 2005.
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\13\ Pub. L. 106-215 (June 15, 2000).
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Because of limited progress during the 7 years following the
legislation that originated the entry exit system requirement, DHS
acknowledged that it could not complete permanent solutions in these
time frames, and thus it planned to implement interim (temporary)
solutions. For example, Increments 1 through 3 include the interfacing
of existing systems and the design and construction of interim
facilities at land POEs. Further, DHS officials have stated that it
will be difficult to develop and implement even the interim solutions
at some of the highest volume land POEs (such as San Ysidro,
California; Otay Mesa, California; and Laredo, Texas) by December 31,
2004, because even minor changes in the inspection time can greatly
affect the average wait time at these high-volume POEs. Moreover,
achievement of interim solutions is based on assumptions that, if
changed, could significantly affect facility and staffing plans.
Potential Cost Is Significant
Despite DHS's estimate in February 2003, that the total overall
cost of the US-VISIT program would be about $7.2 billion through fiscal
year 2014, the potential governmentwide cost of US-VISIT over just a
10-year period could be about twice as much. Although the DHS estimate
included a wide range of costs, it omitted some costs and may have
understated others. The estimate included
system investment costs, such as information
technology hardware and communications infrastructure, software
enhancements, and interfaces;
the cost of facilities and additional inspectors;
system and facilities operation and maintenance
costs;
the cost of planning, designing, and constructing
permanent facilities, which according to DHS was about $2.9
billion \14\ (this estimate was based on the assumptions that
(1) no additional traffic lanes would be required to support
the entry processes and (2) exit facilities would mirror entry
facilities--i.e., that a land POE with 10 entry traffic lanes
would require 10 exit traffic lanes);
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\14\ The $2.9 billion is a parametric cost estimate. Parametric
cost estimating is a technique used in the planning, budgeting, and
conceptual stages of projects. This technique expedites the development
of order of magnitude benchmark estimates when discrete estimating
techniques are not possible or would require inordinate amounts of time
and resources to produce similar results. Estimates such as this can
vary 30 to 50 percent.
costs to design and construct building space to house
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additional computer equipment and inspectors; and
costs for highway reconfiguration at land POEs.
However, the estimate did not include the costs to design and
construct interim facilities at land POEs. DHS officials estimated that
the cost of constructing the interim facilities at the 50 highest
volume POEs was about $218 million. Moreover, the estimate is based on
assumptions that, if changed, could significantly affect, for example,
land POE facility and staffing needs.
Finally, although the estimate did include the cost of implementing
biometrics, these costs are understated, because they did not include,
for example, State Department costs. Specifically, in November
2002,\15\ we reported that a rough order of magnitude estimate of the
cost to implement visas with biometrics would be between $1.3 billion
and $2.9 billion initially and between $0.7 and $1.5 billion annually
thereafter. This estimate is based on certain assumptions, including
that all current visa-issuing embassies and consulates will be equipped
to collect biometrics from visa applicants. Assuming that biometrics
are implemented by December 2004, this means that the recurring cost of
having biometric visas through DHS's fiscal year 2014 life cycle period
would be between $7 and $15 billion. In contrast, DHS's estimate for
the entire program through fiscal year 2014 was about $7.2 billion.
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\15\ U.S. General Accounting Office, Technology Assessment: Using
Biometrics for Border Security, GAO-03-174 (Washington, D.C.: Nov. 15,
2002).
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MANAGEMENT OF US-VISIT SYSTEM ACQUISITION
Compounding the risk factors inherent in the scale and significance
of the US-VISIT program are a number of others that can be attributed
to its state of management and its acquisition approach. As described
in our September 2003 report on US-VISIT, these include relying on
existing systems to provide the foundation for the first three program
increments (and thus having to accept the performance limitations of
these existing systems), not having mature program management
capabilities, not having fully defined near-term facilities solutions,
and not knowing the mission value that is to be derived from US-VISIT
increments. Our recently completed audit work for the appropriations
committees addressed each of these factors, which our next report will
discuss, including why each is still an area of risk.
Problems with Existing Systems
The system performance of the interim releases of US-VISIT
(Increments 1, 2, and 3) will depend largely on the performance of the
existing systems that are to be interfaced to create the overall
system. Thus, US-VISIT system availability and associated downtime, for
example, will be constrained by the availability of the interfaced
systems. In this regard, some of the existing systems have had
availability and reliability problems that could limit US-VISIT
performance. Two examples are SEVIS and CLAIMS 3.
Problems have been identified with the availability and reliability
of SEVIS, the system designed to manage and monitor foreign students in
the United States. For example, in April 2003, the Justice Inspector
General reported that many users had difficulty logging on to the
system, and that as the volume of users grew, the system became
increasingly sluggish.\16\ According to other reports, university
representatives complained that it was taking hours to log on to the
system and to enter a single record, or worse, that the system accepted
the record and later deleted it. We are required to report to the House
and Senate Appropriations Committees by April 1, 2004, on SEVIS
performance, among other things.\17\
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\16\ Statement of Glenn A. Fine, Inspector General, U.S. Department
of Justice, ``Implementation of the Student and Exchange Visitor
Information System (SEVIS)'' (Apr. 2, 2003).
\17\ H.R. Conf. Rep. No. 108-280, at 32 (2003).
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We also reported in May 2001 \18\ that CLAIMS 3 was unreliable.
This system contains information on foreign nationals who request
benefits and is used to process benefit applications other than
naturalization. Specifically, we reported that INS officials stated
that the system was frequently unavailable and did not always update
and store important case data when field offices transferred data from
the local system to the mainframe computer.
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\18\ U.S. General Accounting Office, Immigration Benefits: Several
Factors Impede Timeliness of Application Processing, GAO-01-488
(Washington, D.C.: May 4, 2001).
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Program Management Capability
Our experience with major modernization programs, like US-VISIT,
shows that they should be managed formally, which includes establishing
a program office that (1) is adequately staffed (both in numbers and
skill levels), (2) has clearly defined its staff's roles and
responsibilities, and (3) is supported by rigorous and disciplined
acquisition management processes.
DHS established a US-VISIT program office in June 2003 \19\ and
determined that this office's staffing needs were, in all, 115
government and 117 contractor personnel to perform key acquisition
management functions. These functions fall into categories described by
the Software Engineering Institute's Software Acquisition Capability
Maturity Model (SA-CMM ),\20\ which defines a suite of key acquisition
process areas that are necessary for rigorous and disciplined
management of a system acquisition program. These process areas include
acquisition planning, requirements development and management, project
management, solicitation, contract tracking and oversight, evaluation,
and transition to support.
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\19\ The predecessor program office for the entry exit program was
established within the former INS in March 2002.
\20\ Carnegie Mellon Software Engineering Institute, Software
Acquisition Capability Maturity Model, Version 1.03 (March 2002).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Our latest report stated that the US-VISIT program's staffing
levels were far below its stated needs. Moreover, specific roles and
responsibilities had not been defined beyond general statements.
Further, the program had not yet defined plans and associated time
frames for achieving needed staffing levels and defining roles,
responsibilities, and relationships. According to the Program Director,
positions were being filled with detailees from various DHS component
organizations.
Additionally, although the approved program office structure
provided for positions to perform the SA-CMM key process areas
(including acquisition planning, requirements development and
management, project management, and contract tracking and oversight),
none of the process areas were defined and implemented. Until they are,
the program office must rely on the knowledge and skills of its
existing staff to execute these important acquisition functions.
According to the Program Director, needed program staffing and key
process areas were not in place because the program was just getting
off the ground, and it would take considerable time to establish a
fully functioning and mature program management capability. Until the
program office is adequately staffed, positional roles and
responsibilities are clearly defined and understood, and rigorous and
disciplined acquisition process controls are defined, understood, and
followed, DHS's efforts to acquire, deploy, operate, and maintain
system capabilities will be at risk of not producing promised
performance levels, functionality, and associated benefits on time and
within budget.
Near-Term Facilities Solutions
Work by the Data Management Improvement Act Task Force has shown
that existing facilities do not adequately support the current entry
exit process at land POEs. In particular, more than 100 land POEs have
less than 50 percent of the required capacity to support current
inspection processes and traffic levels.\21\ As a result, as part of
US-VISIT (Increment 2), DHS plans to construct interim facilities at
about 40 of the 50 highest volume land POEs by December 31, 2004, and
construct interim facilities at the remaining portion of these 50 POEs
by February 2005.
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\21\ Data Management Improvement Act Task Force, First Annual
Report to Congress (Washington, D.C.: December 2002).
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According to DHS officials, the department plans to design and
construct interim facilities to (1) support the US-VISIT inspection
process, technology, and staff requirements and (2) meet current
traffic wait time requirements at each land POE. To plan for the design
and construction of interim facilities that meet these requirements,
DHS modeled various inspection process and facilities scenarios to
define what inspection process to follow and what interim facilities to
construct. The modeling was based on two key assumptions: (1) the
current staffing level and (2) the current number of inspection booths
staffed for each POE. According to preliminary DHS modeling exercises,
small incremental increases in average inspection times at some high-
volume land POEs could significantly increase average wait times.
Moreover, any changes to decisions about which foreign travelers are
subject to US-VISIT could significantly affect these assumptions and
thus near-term facility requirements.
Mission Value of Increments
OMB Circular Number A-11, part 7, requires that investments in
major systems be implemented incrementally, with each increment
delivering tangible and measurable benefits. Incremental investment
involves justifying investment in each increment on the basis of
benefits, costs, and risks. Although DHS is pursuing US-VISIT
incrementally, it has not defined incremental costs and benefits to
justify its proposed investments in each increment.
In the case of Increment 1, DHS' 2003 expenditure plan stated that
this increment would provide ``immediate benefits,'' but it did not
describe them. Instead, it described capabilities to be provided, such
as the ability to determine whether a foreign national should be
admitted and to perform checks against watch lists. It did not describe
in meaningful terms the benefits that are to result from implementation
of these capabilities (e.g., X percent reduction in inspection times or
Y percent reduction in false positive matches against watch lists).
Also, DHS did not identify the estimated cost of Increment 1. The
Program Director told us that the $375 million requested in the 2003
plan included not only all the funding required for Increment 1, but
also funding for later increments. However, the plan did not separate
the funds by increment, and program officials did not provide this
information.
While DHS developed a benefits and cost analysis for the former
entry exit program in February 2003, this analysis had limitations,
such as an absence of meaningful benefit descriptions. Program
officials acknowledged that this analysis is out of date and is not
reflective of current US-VISIT plans. According to these officials, an
updated analysis will be issued in the very near future.
Without a reliable understanding of whether near-term increments
will produce mission value justifying its costs and whether known risks
can be effectively mitigated, DHS is investing in and implementing
near-term solutions that have not been adequately justified.
To the credit of the hard-working and dedicated staff working on
the program, an initial US-VISIT operating capability was deployed to
major air and selected sea POEs at the beginning of this year. However,
the US-VISIT program still faces the risk factors described in this
testimony, each of which will be discussed in our soon to be released
report. To address these risk factors, our published reports presented
several recommendations regarding the US-VISIT program, including
ensure that future expenditure plans fully disclose
US-VISIT system capabilities, schedule, cost, and benefits to
be delivered;
determine whether proposed US-VISIT increments will
produce mission value commensurate with costs and risks;
define performance standards for each increment that
are measurable and reflect the limitations imposed by relying
on existing systems;
develop a risk management plan and regularly report
all high risks;
develop and implement a plan for satisfying key
acquisition management controls and implement these in
accordance with Software Engineering Institute guidance;
ensure that human capital and financial resources are
provided to establish a fully functional and effective US-VISIT
program office;
define program office positions, roles, and
responsibilities; and
develop and implement a human capital strategy for
the program office that provides for staffing positions with
individuals who have the appropriate knowledge, skills, and
abilities.
Unless DHS addresses the risk factors described in this testimony,
successful deployment of US-VISIT increments is doubtful, because
achieving success will depend too much on heroic efforts by the people
involved, rather than being the predictable outcome of sound investment
and acquisition management capabilities.
Mr. Chairman, this concludes our statement. We would be happy to
answer any questions that you or members of the committee may have at
this time.
CONTACTS AND ACKNOWLEDGEMENT
If you should have any questions about this testimony, please
contact Randolph C. Hite at (202) 512-3870 or [email protected]. Other
major contributors to this testimony included Barbara Collier, Deborah
Davis, Tamra Goldstein, David Hinchman, and Jessica Waselkow.
Mr. Hostettler. Thank you, Mr. Hite.
Before I turn to the Ranking Member for her opening
statement, I would just like to make a point to the gentleman
from the Administration. We did not receive testimony, this
Subcommittee did not receive testimony until 6 p.m. last night,
well under the 24-hour deadline that we require. We understand
that while you folks have your testimony available long before
that, it was at OMB for an extended period of time. We would
just appreciate it if you could take back the message with you
that it's very difficult for us to prepare for such an
important hearing without an understanding of what's going to
be discussed at this hearing. We thank you very much.
At this time I would like to turn to the Ranking Member,
Ms. Jackson Lee, for an opening statement.
Ms. Jackson Lee. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman, and
might I join in your commentary dealing with the receipt, the
timely receipt of testimony, and indicate that, you being very
kind, I think, in terms of his remarks, I have seen some
instances in this Committee where a witness was not allowed to
testify. So I want to associate with both the approach that the
Chairman took and, as well, the admonition of making sure that
we have these materials in a timely basis.
However, let me express my appreciation for all of the
witnesses. I am in the midst of three Committee hearings at
this very moment, and I thank you for your indulgence. I may be
yielding to my distinguished colleague from California if I am
having to depart.
But, Mr. Chairman, let me briefly say that I've had the
privilege and the challenge of seeing in action the prototype
of the US-VISIT and then actually seeing and standing while the
system was being utilized both at Miami International Airport
as part of the Homeland Security CODEL, trying to determine how
it was affected--being effective, rather, and also at the
Houston Intercontinental Airport.
My first comment is to compliment the employees and those
who are utilizing the system because I believe, Mr. Hite, we
are not suggesting, as both of us are raising some questions,
that we believe that the employees that are utilizing the
system are not doing the very best that they can. So I have--I
think that the training seems to be moving along and also the
effort of accommodating the individuals who have to utilize it.
And so I want to go on record with respect to that, and for
those employees that may be listening and within the sound of
my voice, I would welcome any commentary from the field,
because I have spent time in the field all over the United
States, to be able to suggest to me otherwise or what they
might additionally need.
Let me just note that US-VISIT was launched at 115 airports
and 14 seaports on January 5, 2004. The stated objective for
US-VISIT is to enhance the Nation's security while facilitating
the legitimate travel and trade through our borders. The
security measures employed by this program begin overseas at
the U.S. consul offices that issue visas. Digital fingerscans
are taken at these offices and used to determine whether the
applicant is on a database of known or suspected criminals or
terrorists.
When a foreign visitor with a visa reaches our border and
seeks admission to the United States, the fingerscans are used
to verify that the person seeking admission is the same person
who received the visa, and another check is made for
information about any involvement in terrorism or crime.
I have heard positive things about the way the entry
inspection part of the program is being implemented at
airports, but the exit part of the program has not been
developed fully yet. The real test, however, will be
implementing the program at the land ports of entry.
In FY 2003, 79 percent of all travelers seeking entry into
the United States entered at a land port of entry. Land ports
of entry are more problematic for US-VISIT, which includes the
southern border as well as the northern border, than airports
for a number of reasons. Traffic at these crossings consists of
varying combinations of cars, pedestrians, bicycles, trucks,
buses, and rail. And for any of you who have not been in
particular or specifically to the southern border, I invite you
to do so. It is an interesting challenge.
Moreover, land ports pose difficult challenges to the
creation of an automatic alien tracking system due to their
location, infrastructure, geography, and traffic volume, which
can vary extensively among ports of entry.
And might I say, in citing the northern and southern
border, the issue with that is that we have friends coming over
the border as well as we may have those who wish to do us ill.
It is difficult with the US-VISIT process to balance the
friends versus those who may do us harm.
Congress has mandated that an automatic entry program be
implemented at the 50 busiest land ports of entry by December
31, 2004, all land ports of entry by December 31, 2005. I am
particularly concerned with the viability of implementing the
exit check piece of the program. I am also wondering about the
additional need for staff. The ability to analyze the data at
the existing facilities at land points may already be
inadequate. According to a study performed by Data Management
Improvement Act Task Force, more than a hundred of the land
ports of entry have less than 50 percent of the required
capacity to support current inspection processes and traffic.
And apparently DHS plans to address this problem by
constructing interim facilities at 50 of the ports.
I've asked the General Accounting Office to provide a
witness to this hearing to discuss these and other problems.
Mr. Hite, the GAO Director of Information Technology
Architecture and Systems, will tell us about a report issued by
the GAO on September 2003 which describes the most significant
challenges to implementing US-VISIT. According to this report,
which Director Hite will update today, the scope of US-VISIT is
large and complex. It must meet a demanding implementation
schedule, and its potential cost is enormous. The report
indicates that many of the difficulties are inherent to the
program and cannot be easily changed, but others are
attributable to an inadequate state of governance and
management. The report casts doubt on whether US-VISIT will be
able to measurably and appreciably achieve the Homeland
Security Department's goal of enhancing national security while
facilitating legitimate travel and trade.
Even if the Department of Homeland Security is successful
in implementing US-VISIT, the program may not make our country
more secure in any significant way. In 1998, a Senate Judiciary
Committee report found that implementing an automatic entry
visit and control system has absolutely nothing to do with
countering drug trafficking, with halting the entry of
terrorists into the United States, or with any other illegal
activity.
I'm willing to remain open, even with that report, because
we had since that time 9/11. But I think it is truly important,
keenly important, that as we represent to the American people
that we're working to secure the homeland, that we truly have a
grasp of how best to do it and how to be effective and
efficient.
I close by simply saying we know that the securest homeland
is to keep the terrorists out before they even enter into our
borders. The question is how best to do it, and that is the
responsibility of this Committee.
I thank the distinguished Chairman, and I yield back my
time.
Mr. Hostettler. I thank the gentlelady. The Chair will now
entertain questions.
First of all, Mr. Jacksta, as you know, 1 week ago there
was a horrible terrorist bombing in Madrid. The apprehended
suspects, all of them were not native Spaniards. Can you tell
us whether these aliens would have been able to enter the U.S.
had they attempted to?
Mr. Jacksta. Sir, if we had information that was available
to the U.S. Government, we would have been able to stop them at
the border. The reason why we'd be able to do that is that we
would have received the information regarding the individuals
who would be on a plane. At the time that they were on that
plane, we would have done our checks, and we would have had the
plane met at the time that they arrived in the United States
and had our inspectors, our anti-terrorism rovers up there and
would have met the individuals, and at that time take
appropriate action to address the issue.
So addressing your question, if the information is
available to the U.S. Government, we put it into our databases.
The sharing of information that we currently have in place
would allow us to identify these individuals and stop them from
entering the United States.
Mr. Hostettler. Very good. I understand the visa waiver
countries can pass through inspections without going through
US-VISIT. Would this have been the case for Richard Reid, who I
understand is a British national, and Zacarias Moussaoui, who I
understand is a French national?
Mr. Jacksta. What I'd like to express here is that if the
traveler was coming in and they're from a visa waiver country,
they would not have been US-VISIT'd. However, when they do
arrive in the United States, there's a layered approach. As I
indicated, we have advance information. If we have information
regarding a specific person, we put it into our databases, and
we would have identified that individual for an inspection.
But I think it's also important to note that we do train
our inspectors in a number of areas--document fraud,
interviewing techniques--and that training is important to make
sure that we have a layered approach. We don't count on one
specific type of tool to identify individuals. We bring it all
together so that we can respond appropriately.
In the cases of Mr. Reid, hopefully we would have--if we
had information, we would have stopped the individual from
getting on the plane or arriving in the United States. Then we
could have interviewed him at the time of arrival, and at that
point, based on the information questioning, hopefully we would
have been able to identify him as a concern to United States
security.
Mr. Hostettler. Thank you.
Mr. Mocny, as was earlier indicated, the 1996 act initially
required an entry-exit system to be put in place. Can you
explain why it has taken so long to implement such an entry-
exit system?
Mr. Mocny. Thank you for the question. If I can quickly
just verify or just build upon what Mr. Jacksta said on the
visa waiver countries, if they're coming under the visa waiver
program, they would currently be exempt under the process. If
they come with a visa--a British national or a French national
coming as a student perhaps--they would have to have a visa.
They would go through the US-VISIT process. So it's only under
the 90-day-or-less visa waiver program.
As to your question, I guess I referenced the last time I
was in front of this Committee, I can only quote what was
stated by an Administration official at the time, that there
was opposition to section 110 at that time, and there was some
disagreement as how to best implement that program. And so to
give you kind of an honest answer here, it was--I think many
who tried to move the program forward perhaps were met with
some philosophical differences. Again, there was no 9/11, and
so there was, I think, a debate within both sides of the aisle
about whether or not this was the best thing to do. And so for
that reason, a lot of progress was not made, and I can only
then point to your point, which is after 9/11 and after we
moved to the Department of Homeland Security, the focus that
the Secretary put on this program, he made it a number one
priority for the Administration, so that we were able to meet
the date that was put in place in 2000, a modified version of
section 110, which still held us to those dates. We were able
to meet that date.
So I think for those reasons we were delayed, we were
challenged, but we were, thank goodness, able to succeed with
the first increment of the process.
Mr. Hostettler. Thank you.
And then, finally, Mr. Martinez-Fonts, can you describe
whether US-VISIT has adversely impacted foreign travel to the
U.S.? And, specifically, has there been any evidence that there
is a significant reduction in travel to the U.S. after the
implementation of US-VISIT?
Mr. Martinez-Fonts. We don't have any solid evidence that
that has been the case or that has been the cause of it. We
have a lot of information on the land borders that it will
create it, but there is really nothing at this point that would
indicate that, that it has caused any of the downturn in
travel.
Mr. Hostettler. Thank you.
I now turn to the Ranking Member, Ms. Jackson Lee, for
questions.
Ms. Jackson Lee. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
Let me follow the line of reasoning that I offered in my
opening statement that what we're trying to do is to make this
better or to really determine, factually determine whether or
not there are some alternative systems that we should be
considering.
Mr. Jacksta, one of the points that I did make in my
remarks was the issue of staff, and so I would be interested in
knowing what staff increases are you anticipating to implement
the US-VISIT program at land ports in particular, and how much
money are we talking about?
Mr. Jacksta. At the present time, there is no plans to put
additional staff specifically for US-VISIT. We're still working
the process to understand exactly how the outbound process is
going to work.
On the inbound side of the house, we believe that we can
handle the workload that's going to be created on December
31st. So at the present time, there is no additional staffing
being put specifically at the land border locations.
But I think what's important to note is that we are doing a
couple of other things, and one of the things that we are doing
is that we are training our inspectors. Remember that on March
1, 2003, we brought the Immigration and Customs Service
together, and as a fact, we basically added a larger number of
inspectors available to do the job at the land port of entries.
We're training them right now in what we're calling the ``One
Face at the Border,'' giving them training so that they can do
both the Customs and Immigration processing. In addition, we're
giving them additional training so that they'll be able to do
the full range of the jobs that were normally done by
Immigration.
So that's one of the ways that we're going to multiply
the----
Ms. Jackson Lee. Training existing inspectors?
Mr. Jacksta. Yes.
Ms. Jackson Lee. I'm going to come back to you, Mr.
Jacksta.
Mr. Hite, how does that--what does that sound like to you
in terms of being able to--we like to be called multi-tasked,
but does that sound reasonable not having an increased number
of staff for this program and to meet the deadline by the 31st,
2004, I understand?
Mr. Hite. Well, certainly for the entry process, which
involves very few people who are non-immigrant visa holders
coming in across land borders, and those people will be going
to secondary, so the expectation is it's not going to be a
large increase in volume there. However, it does depend on
certain assumptions as to who will be US-VISIT'd. And it does
not include, for example, those with border crossing cards, or
it also includes an assumption that it takes about 15 seconds
to process someone through US-VISIT, an additional 15 seconds.
So it depends on the validity of those assumptions, which
time will tell. The pilot test in Atlanta showed that it
required an additional 19 seconds as opposed to 15, and
analyses have showed that a very slight increase in processing
time then starts to impact wait times in lines.
So it is not an unreasonable assumption at this point, and
as this program has evolved over the last year and will evolve
over this time, as more and more information becomes known and
decisions get made as to how exactly it's going to be
implemented in the different ports of entry, then those
questions will become clearer.
Ms. Jackson Lee. Let me just say to you that--if you will
answer this question. You had noted that more than a hundred
land ports of the city--of entry, of ports of entry have less
than 50 percent of the required capacity to support current
inspection processes and traffic levels. So I want you to just
elaborate on that problem and explain what is needed in this
regard. And then if Mr. Jacksta could finish, if I can come
back to him, and I'm going to throw the question out, then you
can answer.
You mentioned in your statement that there have been 195
verified lookout matches using US-VISIT. How many of those
matches related to suspected persons of terrorists--suspected
of being terrorists? And then give me your sense and what you
are doing about the President's representation to President
Vicente Fox that he's going to have some sort of free-for-all
down at the southern border? Are you all working on that
structure? Are we going to be advised as Members of Congress,
on this Committee or Homeland Security, on where we are on
that? Mr. Hite, can you just talk about what you were speaking
about on the 50-percent capacity?
Mr. Hite. Yes, ma'am. That number, that over a hundred land
ports of entry have less than 50 percent of the capacity that
they need, that number came from the DMIA task force. That's
not the result of our analysis.
Ms. Jackson Lee. Well, how will you address the problem
that that poses?
Mr. Hite. To be honest with you, I don't have an answer to
that question. It's probably more appropriately posed to the
DHS witnesses to how they intend to address that.
Ms. Jackson Lee. And so you have just made--you just will
continue to make an assessment of the problem?
Mr. Hite. We will continue to monitor that problem and see
what's being done to address that limitation?
Ms. Jackson Lee. But it is one that you have noted?
Mr. Hite. Yes, ma'am.
Ms. Jackson Lee. Mr. Jacksta, what about it, how would you
address that, but also if you will explain about the 195 and
the US-VISIT?
Mr. Jacksta. Okay. One of the things, first of all, the
easy question is that as of right now the 195 have not been--
none of them have been identified as specific terrorists.
Ms. Jackson Lee. All right. Thank you.
Mr. Jacksta. But these were individuals that were of real
concern, and obviously when they get into the United States,
they could be a threat at any given time. So although we
couldn't relate them to terrorists right now, clearly we want
to stop them at the border.
Regarding the issue of capacity as we move forward with the
land border locations, obviously that's a concern to CBP, to
DHS. We want to make sure that we have the capacity to make
sure that trade and travel doesn't get inhibited by the
program. We're working very closely with the US-VISIT office to
make sure that any type of issues that do come up get addressed
so that when we move the program out, we're ensuring that we're
working together to address both the facilitation side of the
house as well as the enforcement side. And I think that before
we do move out, we will make sure that we address those
concerns and see if the areas that we're moving to have that
capacity, and if not, what do we need to do to make sure that
the capacity is there to do the job that's necessary for
protecting our borders?
Ms. Jackson Lee. Could you answer the President's proposal?
Mr. Jacksta. I think I would defer to Bob on that one in
the sense that we are working with the foreign governments, the
Administration is working with the foreign governments to try
to address the whole issue of the land border, making sure we
have a number of different initiatives. The Secretary has been
involved with the Mexican Government as well as the Canadian
Government on these issues. And I know that there's a number of
discussions to make sure that once again we continue with the
facilitation, and at the same time the enforcement side of the
house. And I think we can achieve that working together and
having a good working relationship.
Mr. Mocny. Just to answer your specific question, are we
addressing the issues post the President's announcement, yes,
we are. There are several working groups that are looking at,
you know, how we would get individuals into a program such as
this, some of the enforcement mechanisms that would have to be
in place, how we would work with the private industry, how the
Department of Labor would select the individual companies who
might benefit from a temporary guest worker program.
So there is a lot of active discussion going on within the
staff level to be able to look at all of the things that
pertain to standing up a program such as this. Yes, we are.
Ms. Jackson Lee. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Hostettler. I thank the gentlelady.
The Chair now recognizes the gentleman from Iowa, Mr. King,
for 5 minutes.
Mr. King. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I'd direct my questions
to Mr. Hite.
Mr. Hite, you've issued two reports that have highlighted
the risks of US-VISIT, and largely because of the scale and
complexity of the initiative, and you have testified, and more
recently, because of management the office for US-VISIT is
understaffed and underfunded. In fact, isn't the underfunding
of US-VISIT staff very much a reaction by the appropriators to
GAO's earlier reports that you drafted?
Mr. Hite. Congressman, that's not my understanding at all.
All we have provided the appropriators are the facts and our
analysis of the facts, and the way that they, in fact, have
reacted and used them, I cannot speak to.
Mr. King. And you wouldn't have an opinion as to why the
appropriators might have not been as active as they would have
otherwise on the funding for US-VISIT?
Mr. Hite. My understanding and my experience in working
with the appropriators is that they are supportive of US-VISIT
and want it to be done properly and successfully. And it's also
my understanding that the funding that has been asked for
through the appropriations process has been granted or is in
the process of being granted.
Mr. King. That wouldn't be mine, but as the appropriations
have not been up to standards, as has been testified to here,
wasn't that actual result to increase the risks rather than
decrease the risks?
Mr. Hite. If there are insufficient resources to properly
approach this program and manage it in a rigorous and
disciplined fashion, yes, sir, that would increase the risks.
Mr. King. Criticisms of the complications of this process
might add to that.
Mr. Hite. From our perspective, we weren't criticizing the
fact that it's a complicated process, only that it in fact is,
and there is an element of risk associated with doing something
very hard and difficult, which argues more for having the right
resources and the right controls in place to do it right.
Mr. King. Are shortcuts necessary to meet the statutory
guidelines?
Mr. Hite. On any program, when you are schedule-driven,
what you run the risk of is compromising on scope of program in
order to meet schedule. So that is a possibility, and certainly
for Increment 1, while it was delivered largely on time as
promised, there were certain elements of it that weren't
delivered on time. And, as an example, the exit capability was
intended to potentially be part of Increment 1, and it was not
part of Increment 1. And there were certain--there was a sub-
system that was to be part of the integration of the systems
that was not ready January 5th for deployment and was
implemented February 11th.
Those are the kinds of consequences of not having the
resources to bring to the table in order to complete something
on time.
Mr. King. Will your office then continue to emphasize the
risks associated?
Mr. Hite. Yes, sir, we will identify the risks and try to
identify ways to mitigate those risks, and in this particular
case, to ensure that that program office gets the resources it
needs in order to execute its job.
Mr. King. Thank you, Mr. Hite.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Hostettler. I thank the gentleman.
The Chair now recognizes the gentlelady from California,
Ms. Sanchez, for 5 minutes.
Ms. Sanchez. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and I have an opening
statement that I would just ask unanimous consent to include in
the record.
Mr. Hostettler. Without objection.
[The prepared statement of Ms. Sanchez follows in the
Appendix]
Ms. Sanchez. My first question is for Mr. Hite. In your
testimony you discussed the interfacing of several databases as
part of US-VISIT, including ADIS, APIS, and IBIS, among others.
When this Subcommittee held a hearing on the CLEAR Act, one of
the major concerns was compromising the NCIS database, which is
a criminal database, with immigration violations.
I'd like your opinion as to what would be the impact of
interfacing all of these databases into one system and whether
or not any of them would be compromised or overloaded as a
result of compiling them, and, if so, how that could
potentially impact our national security?
Mr. Hite. That's a very good question, and when you address
issues like that as to what's the appropriate level of
integration associated with multiple systems and multiple
databases, you can't presume that full integration of these is
the best solution. It's all driven by need and requirements
associated with the missions that those systems support. And
there are legitimate reasons why you separate databases and you
separate systems and functions.
So my position on that would be, in order to make an
informed decision about what's the proper level of integration
among multiple systems, you have to take a top-down approach to
identifying what's the set of mission needs that we're trying
to satisfy and what's the best allocation of functionality and
data associated with that, and then you apply the appropriate
level of security around those data sets. So there's not a one-
size-fits-all answer to that question.
Ms. Sanchez. But if the database were--if we were to err on
the side of overinclusiveness with the database, could that
potentially pose a risk to our national security?
Mr. Hite. I think if you integrate databases without
considering the implications of what mixed data portends in
terms of access, then, yes, you increase the risk of the
security problem, which would definitely--potentially be a
national security risk.
Ms. Sanchez. Okay. Your testimony also raises concerns
about the interfacing of several agencies with DHS and how
mismanagement can result in inefficiency. Has the GAO to date
conducted any research on the interface between US-VISIT and
intelligence agencies? And if so, how effective has the
interface been? And how, in your opinion, could it be improved?
Mr. Hite. No, ma'am, we have not done any work regarding
US-VISIT and its integration with intelligence agencies.
Ms. Sanchez. Do you think that a study like that would be
potentially helpful?
Mr. Hite. It's certainly a relevant question, that if I was
the Secretary of the Department of Homeland Security I would be
focused on it, so, yes, in that regard, from a congressional
oversight standpoint, it's a relevant question.
Ms. Sanchez. Okay. Thank you.
My next question is for Mr. Jacksta. I'm concerned about
the following up, the tracking that US-VISIT does at the entry
phase, what you call the status management phase, after a
foreign national has already entered the country. How does US-
VISIT work with Federal law enforcement and intelligence
agencies to determine and differentiate between who is a
national security threat and who is a visa overstay that means
no harm to the country?
Mr. Jacksta. If it's all right with you, I'd like to defer
to Mr. Mocny. He's specifically working on that issue.
Ms. Sanchez. Okay. We will pass.
Mr. Mocny. Thank you. The status management piece, it does
occur after the person is admitted into the United States. What
we are trying to achieve with that is to make sure that the US-
VISIT system, and particularly the ADIS, or Arrival and
Departure Information System, has the most up-to-date
information about any given foreign national. I use the analogy
of someone who wants to come to school here, but they don't
know which school they want to go to. So they come in as a B-2
or visitor as an intending student. They look throughout the
country, and they find the school that they want to go to, and
now they want to adjust status to an F-1 or a student. They
would go into the Citizenship and Immigration Services offices
to adjust their status from a B-2 to an F-1.
When they came into the United States, Mr. Jacksta gave
them 6 months to leave the country as a B-2 visitor. We have to
know now that that B-2 doesn't have to leave after 6 months;
they are here for the duration of status. And so we update the
record to ensure that that person is not sought after by the
Immigration and Customs Enforcement agents for spurious
reasons.
With respect to the tie-in to the intelligence agencies,
again, we will work with the TTIC as it begins to stand up and
as we begin to consolidate all the watchlist databases that
would enable--perhaps not in the instance I just gave you,
which is perhaps the more common one, but perhaps if there's an
adverse action, if a foreign national is, in fact, encountered
by a law enforcement agent and/or an ICE immigration agent,
would that agent have the resources available to him or her to
make a decision about, as I said, to release that individual or
not?
That is where we need to go. We don't have that
information. And so, oftentimes, an adjudicator today will
grant a benefit, not being fully informed about what other
information we may have on that foreign national, and very
similarly, an ICE agent or any other law enforcement agent may
make a decision about a foreign national without that full
information. That is what US-VISIT is trying to overcome. It's
trying to provide the decision makers with the appropriate
information so that they make fully informed decisions.
So I don't think we're there yet where we'd like to be.
That is certainly some place that we want to get to in the very
near future.
Ms. Sanchez. Thank you.
I yield back.
Mr. Hostettler. I thank the gentlelady.
The Chair now recognizes the gentleman from Utah, Mr.
Cannon, for 5 minutes.
Mr. Cannon. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
I have a question for all of you, and I recognize in asking
the question that you're focused on border control as opposed
to internal criminality. But I met recently with a group of
people who head organizations that deal with immigrants who are
here sometimes legally, sometimes illegally, and pointed out to
them that there's 10 to 20 times the criminality among those
groups who are here illegally as we have in the rest of the
population. And after talking about profiling and about how
things would work, I asked them if they wouldn't like to see
something happen to help solve the problem of criminals who are
here in America living today who are typically preying on their
own ethnic group.
And I was really actually quite surprised at the reaction.
We talked about US-VISIT and whether that, if you applied the
program and could identify criminals and you could do it
without profiling, could they support the program. I was amazed
at how positive they were at that suggestion.
Can each of you, given your different perspectives, talk
about what the cost would be and what needs to be done and what
the possibilities are of using the US-VISIT program possibly by
enabling the local police forces to get an evanescent
fingerprint from somebody they pull over because they have a
broken tail light or something? And then if they match a
database and meet certain criteria, they can be stopped and
turned over to the Federal forces, or let go and their
fingerprint disappears? Is that a possibility? What would it
cost? Do we have--what databases do we need to integrate into
US-VISIT to make that work? And is it at all feasible?
Thank you. I'll just listen to all of your answers as you
wish.
Mr. Jacksta. Okay. I'd like to just quickly jump in and say
that if a person is coming into the border, we would identify
those individuals and we would prevent them. And I think that's
important to note. So at least there is a safeguard there that
we can utilize that information.
I think also, as we move forward with US-VISIT and we start
doing it on the outbound side of the house, where individuals
are leaving the United States, we would also be able to stop
them and identify them at the port of entries and take
appropriate law enforcement action.
Regarding, I guess, the domestic enforcement of the
program, I'm not really capable of explaining all the issues
that may come up regarding privacy issues and issues along
those lines. So I'm not working on that specific issue. Maybe
the US-VISIT office is thinking about how they're going to work
with the State and locals and might be able to give you a
little bit more information on that.
Mr. Cannon. Let me just point out, again, I recognize the
difference between the border and internal enforcement, and
that they're complicated, also that they may be very expensive.
The question is: Is there something here that's worth looking
at? And have we made any progress--have we done any thinking
about that?
Mr. Jacksta. I think I might want to add that the system
works very well, so what lessons we've learned over the years
at the ports of entry, at the borders, are lessons that
probably would be very valuable to any type of domestic program
as we move forward.
Mr. Cannon. Thank you. Let me just point out for the
record, I agree with that point, that we have learned a lot of
lessons. And Mr. Hite talked about the cost and the complexity
of a program, and that was a very interesting contribution.
But, in fact, we have learned a lot, and so in that context,
I'd like to hear from the others about what the possibilities
are.
Mr. Mocny. I'd be happy to. We talk about five main
business processes within US-VISIT. There's pre-entry, which is
what happens with the Department of State, and anything that
happens prior to the individual getting here. There's entry,
which, of course, happens at the ports of entry, and that
certainly is the focus today because that's the first increment
that we rolled out, was the ports of entry. There's also then
the status management that Ms. Sanchez raised, exit, and then
analysis.
So those are five main business processes that we attain to
the program, and it certainly does entertain the issue of using
ICE agents.
I mentioned that we do have an overstay list; we now can
provide that information to a unit stood up within ICE, the
custody of Compliance Enforcement Unit. Those agents then
prioritize through a list of those people that they cannot find
a departure record for, and then use the information that we've
provided to them, be it an address or other contact information
to actually go out and locate those individuals.
So we have already begun to see a benefit of having online,
not just in paper form, but online immediate access to those
overstay information. It's not obviously where we want to be.
As I said before, we have to improve upon this. And to say that
we now have this opportunity to do all the things that you just
mentioned, to provide this information to that Kansas City cop
at 3 o'clock in the morning who may, in fact, have in front of
him someone that we have interest in, and to have him write a
ticket and let that person go when, in fact, that may not be
the best interest.
So we will continue to work with ICE, we will continue to
work with the Department of State to actually stop people
before they get a visa.
Mr. Cannon. Let me just make a distinction of what you
said. You said stop somebody that you may have an interest in.
Your interests are more narrow than what I'm going after,
because I think society has an interest in getting violent
criminals out, and then there are more and more, larger and
larger groups that we may define as having an interest in. But
those will tend to not be the groups that you're looking at as
a high priority. And so could you just address the ability to
actually use that database for priorities that we may set in
Congress or that a State may set and that you have the data and
ability to support the enforcement of?
Mr. Mocny. Absolutely. We on a regular basis get downloads
from the FBI, from the NCIC's wanted files. So on a regular
basis, Mr. Jacksta mentioned a few of them, and most of the 195
that we have detained have had active warrants from a State. So
there was a crime that was committed in New Jersey, in San
Diego, in Atlanta, and then we would extradite that individual.
More recently, we had someone just the other day from New York.
That person is detained then because that warrant from the
State of New York is part of the process, part of the NCIC
process. We then--and the State of New York did extradite that
individual. We put a detainer on that individual. So after
they're satisfied that they have gone through the prosecution
for that particular individual, we can then take that person
and deport them as appropriate.
So we do work through the NCIC, through the FBI. We are
working with the individual States who provide information to
us so that we can then take appropriate action when either they
show up at a port of entry or that we find them in the interior
of the United States.
Mr. Cannon. Mr. Chairman, I don't think the clock was
reset, and I am loath to abuse my time, but I do have a couple
more questions. I'd like to hear from the rest of the panel if
we could do that. I don't know how you want to handle the
clock.
Mr. Hostettler. We'll have a second round of questions.
Mr. Cannon. Okay. Have I finished my 5 minutes?
Mr. Hostettler. Yes.
Mr. Cannon. Okay. Setting the clock actually helps because
we know where it is. Thank you.
Mr. Hostettler. The Chair now recognizes the gentleman from
Arizona, Mr. Flake, for 5 minutes.
Mr. Flake. I thank the Chairman and thank the witnesses.
I am still having a hard time distinguishing between, you
know, what's happening on the southern border with the border
crossing card, what's happening with US-VISIT, what the
timetable is. It seems a little unclear.
As I understand it, a DHS fact sheet recently said that
laser visa readers will be deployed at all land border points.
Does that apply to the southern border as well?
Mr. Jacksta. Yes, sir. We are deploying a border
verification system to read the BCC card. We hope to have them
out at the 50 largest land border locations by the end of June.
Clearly, we're going to be putting our emphasis on putting them
out in the land border locations on the southern border
initially.
Mr. Flake. For example, I toured the port at San Luis by
Yuma where thousands upon thousands come through between the
hours of 3 and 6 a.m. to work in the fields and then return.
Some are U.S. citizens. Some are legal permanent residents of
the U.S. but live in Mexico because it's cheaper. You have a
mix of a lot of people that come through.
Right now their card is simply checked visually, the
picture on the card and what-not. When that person returns to
Mexico at night or the next evening--they are given 72 hours to
return. Is it checked or entered or anything at this point?
Mr. Jacksta. When they're leaving the United States?
Mr. Flake. Yes.
Mr. Jacksta. Presently, sir, we don't do that unless we
have a special enforcement action.
Mr. Flake. So there's no way to know if they stayed the 72
hours or longer?
Mr. Jacksta. That's correct.
Mr. Flake. When the visa reader--the laser visa reader is
installed, will it check whether they've been in 72 hours?
Automatically that information will be downloaded every time
the card runs through the reader, correct?
Mr. Jacksta. The information that we obtain at the time
that the person comes into the United States will verify that
the person who is crossing the border and the card that they
have are the same person. So we'll identify them through the
biometric fashion. We will not, currently, in the process that
we're putting out there, be able to say whether that person has
overstayed previous times unless we have additional
information.
Mr. Flake. No, no, previous times I understand. But from
the point where the visa reader is employed, say if it's
employed in June, from June onward, when that person returns
then home, it will--they'll run it through again, correct?
Mr. Jacksta. That's correct.
Mr. Flake. Okay.
Mr. Jacksta. Not when they're leaving the United States.
Only when they're entering the United States.
Mr. Flake. But not when they're leaving.
Mr. Jacksta. That's correct.
Mr. Flake. But the visa says they're eligible to be here
for 72 hours.
Mr. Jacksta. That's correct.
Mr. Flake. If they overstay, then, it's just a freebie.
Mr. Jacksta. There's no--currently, there's no mechanism to
determine whether they have overstayed their 72 hours.
Mr. Flake. Wouldn't it be possible to actually just run the
card upon exit? If it's a biometric card and it can--there's
downloadable information. Is that not possible? Or is that
envisioned at some point?
Mr. Jacksta. I think it's clearly possible, sir, but it
does create a tremendous amount of workload issues regarding
individuals starting a process where everybody who leaves the
United States is checked. And I don't think we want to do that
right now on a regular basis. We can do it on special
enforcement actions.
Mr. Flake. How will the primary inspection process differ
from what we have today? Say a car pulls through the station,
will every person in the car have their cards checked when we
have the visa readers installed, or just the driver?
Mr. Jacksta. Initially, sir, when the vehicle comes up, the
inspector will ask the individuals for their identification and
see it. If he has any concerns regarding any individuals, he
would direct them to a secondary area. In the secondary area,
that's where we would read the border crossing card, not at the
primary vehicle lane.
Mr. Flake. You stated that border crossing cards will
continue to be utilized along the southern border. We won't use
the US-VISIT program or it won't be photographed every time.
But how will we know--I mean, we'll have the biometric
information on the BCC as it is right now. Every time a person
goes through they will run that through when we have the visa
reader, correct?
Mr. Jacksta. Yes.
Mr. Flake. And if there's a failure, they'll have to go in
and get screened again or reissue the card or just deny
entrance?
Mr. Jacksta. Well, once again, when a person's coming
across, we're not going to do every individual that comes
across the border with the reader. We're going to basically put
it in the pedestrian lanes in our secondary areas. When
individuals come across, the inspector is going to make a
decision on whether there's any concerns regarding the border
crossing card or the individual. He or she can use that device
at the primary. If there are any concerns or if there's a false
read or if there are concerns regarding the documentation, we
would send the individual back to the secondary area where a
more intense inspection and questioning would take place.
Mr. Flake. Okay. So not everybody will have it read, just
those identified by the screener as a possible threat or
something out of character?
Mr. Jacksta. That's correct, sir.
Mr. Flake. Thank you.
Mr. Hostettler. The Subcommittee will now turn to a second
round of questions, and I would like to follow on the gentleman
from Arizona's line of questioning.
A concern that I have is the exploitation of loopholes that
are created in these various systems, and the US-VISIT program
is an entry-exit program. As the gentleman pointed out in his
line of questioning, for BCCs, for crossing cards, we don't
have an exit at this point to verify the exit of an individual.
That's of a concern to me.
But, also, if we could show the border crossing card that's
been made available to us, when we talk about the use of
biometric data, we have a photo and a fingerprint. The laser
readers will read the data that's on the card. The Border
Patrol agent will review the photo, but there will be no actual
verification that the biometric data--namely, the fingerprint--
matches up with the fingerprint of the individual that is
presenting the card. Is that correct?
Mr. Jacksta. No, sir. I believe that when the individual
brings the card, the inspector will take the card, put it
through the reader. The individual will put his finger on a
reader, just like this here, and at that point the card and the
finger of the individual should match. If they do not match at
that point, the inspector would say, okay, time out here, let's
make sure we refer this person to a secondary area and do
further inspection.
Mr. Hostettler. And that will be done on every individual
that comes through?
Mr. Jacksta. Not every individual, sir. Based on the issue
of during the inspection process, during specific times of the
days, we would send--we would use the machine. But every
individual coming across the border is not going to have their
BCC read.
Mr. Hostettler. Okay. And that would be on a random basis,
some basis where we would pull an individual aside to run them
through that process that you just mentioned.
Mr. Jacksta. Right. And there are certain times during the
day when we'll be able to do it for every traveler coming
across. It's an important tool. The inspectors are going to be
utilizing it. The issue it comes down to is does everybody have
to be read through that. There are certain things that the
inspectors use, their intuition. There's also factors that have
to be taken a look if there is any concerns regarding any type
of delays, what type of travelers would be needed to be
checked. So it's risk management.
Mr. Hostettler. It's possible that every cardholder will
assume that they may be put into a line that's taken and
analyzed. Is that correct?
Mr. Jacksta. That's correct.
Mr. Hostettler. That's good.
One of the other areas that we talked about was the visa
waiver program. Now, with the visa waiver program, an
individual that comes into the country--let's take Mr. Reid
once again, Richard Reid, a British national. If he was able to
obtain a passport of an individual who was very similar looking
as him, because a visa waiver does not go through the
participant does not go through the US-VISIT program, that
individual, Richard Reid may look like the individual on the
passport but will not be subject to the biometric data. And is
that the case?
Mr. Jacksta. Once again, if he is a visa waiver individual
coming under the visa waiver program and he has all the--he
presents himself at the port of entry, the inspector would take
a look at it, since he's currently a visa waiver program, visa
waiver countries are exempt from US-VISIT. It does not prevent
the inspector, if necessary, sending him once again back to the
secondary area, doing an inspection, taking a closer look. We
have equipment out there for our offices that helps them
discover any type of fraudulent documents or any type of
concerns regarding the documents that are being presented.
Mr. Hostettler. But we're placing that burden on the agent
themselves--is that correct?--as opposed to the US-VISIT. And I
just want to clarify that because we very much depend on the
Border Patrol and others to do that wonderful job. And the
purpose for these systems are to aid them in that. And what we
don't want to have happen is we don't want a terrorist or
criminal or whoever to be able to exploit these loopholes, that
if, in fact, we need to look at ways to get rid of these
loopholes, whether it's similar to the border crossing card
where every individual from a visa waiver program country knows
that they may be subject to that--that's probably very
controversial, which I've just said. But, still, it is an
opportunity for that to be exploited.
Are there any other programs, Mr. Jacksta, that you are
familiar with that could be possibly exploited because we will
not be subjecting them to US-VISIT?
Mr. Jacksta. Well, we always want to make sure that we have
as much information as possible regarding an individual, and if
we have additional information, it allows us to make a
decision. Good documents, documents that contain biometrics are
clearly the way that we would like to go where we could have
the ability to identify individuals, the documents that they're
presenting. And I think the Administration is taking a look at
a long-term goal to make sure that documents that are issued by
foreign governments as well as our documents in the United
States have some type of biometric chip. Maybe the US-VISIT
office could add a little bit more on exactly what--when that
will be happening. But, clearly, from CBP's perspective and
having an officer at the port of entry, the more information
they have, the capabilities to identify that the documents are
legitimate documents, to identify that the person who's
presenting the documents is actually the person who owns the
documents, all enhances our security at the border.
Mr. Hostettler. Very good. Thank you.
I don't think we have any others. In conclusion, I want to
thank you gentlemen all for your presence here today, and
especially for your service to our country, and remind Members
that all Members have 7 legislative days to enter into the
record extraneous material and make and revise their
statements.
The business before the Subcommittee being completed, we
are adjourned.
[Whereupon, at 11:30 a.m., the Subcommittee was adjourned.]
A P P E N D I X
----------
Material Submitted for the Hearing Record
Prepared Statement of the Honorable Sheila Jackson Lee, a
Representative in Congress From the State of Texas
The Department of Homeland Security launched US-VISIT at 115
airports and 14 seaports on January 5, 2004. The stated objective for
US-VISIT is to enhance the nation's security while facilitating
legitimate travel and trade through our borders.
The security measures employed by this program begin overseas at
the U.S. consular offices that issue visas. Digital fingerscans are
taken at these offices and used to determine whether the applicant is
on a database of known or suspected criminals or terrorists. When a
foreign visitor with a visa reaches our border and seeks admission into
the United States, the fingerscans are used to verify that the person
seeking admission is the same person who received the visa, and another
check is made for information about any involvement in terrorism or
crime. I have heard positive things about the way the entry inspection
part of the program is being implemented at airports, but the exit part
of the program has not been developed fully yet. The real test,
however, will be implementing the program at the land ports of entry.
In FY 2003, 79% of all travelers seeking entry into the United
States entered at a land port of entry. Land ports of entry are more
problematic for US-VISIT than airports for a number of reasons. Traffic
at these crossings consists of varying combinations of cars,
pedestrians, bicycles, trucks, buses, and rail. Moreover, land ports
pose difficult challenges to the creation of an automated alien
tracking system due to their location, infrastructure, geography, and
traffic volume, which can vary extensively among ports of entry.
Congress has mandated that an automated entry-exit program be
implemented at the 50 busiest land ports of entry by December 31, 2004,
and at all land ports of entry by December 31, 2005. I am particularly
concerned with the viability of implementing the exit check piece of
the program. In addition to the need for additional staff for exit
checks that are not currently being done, the existing facilities at
land points are inadequate. According to a study performed by the Data
Management Improvement Act Task Force, more than 100 of the land ports
of entry have less than 50% of the required capacity to support current
inspection processes and traffic levels. Apparently, DHS plans to
address this problem by constructing interim facilities at 50 ports of
entry.
I have asked the General Accounting Office (GAO) to provide a
witness at this hearing to discuss these and other problems in the US-
VISIT program. Randolph Hite, the GAO Director of Information
Technology Architecture and Systems issues will tell us about a report
issued by GAO on September 2003, which describes the most significant
challenges to implementing US-VISIT (GAO-03-1083). According to this
report, which Director Hite will update today, the scope of US-VISIT is
large and complex; it must meet a demanding implementation schedule;
and its potential cost is enormous. The report indicates that many of
the difficulties are inherent to the program and cannot easily be
changed but others are attributable to an inadequate state of
governance and management. The report casts doubt on whether US-VISIT
will be able to measurably and appreciably achieve the Homeland
Security Department's goal of enhancing national security while
facilitating legitimate travel and trade.
Even if the Department of Homeland Security is successful in
implementing US-VISIT, the program may not make our country more secure
in any significant way. In 1998, a Senate Judiciary Committee Report
(No. 105-197) found that, ``implementing an automated entry-exit
control system has absolutely nothing to do with countering drug
trafficking, with halting the entry of terrorists into the United
States, or with any other illegal activity at or near the borders. An
automated entry-exit control system will at best provide information
only on those who have overstayed their visas.'' In its present form,
US-VISIT only will apply to foreign visitors seeking admission on the
basis of non-immigrant visas. It will not include aliens presenting
lawful permanent resident documents or visitors from the 27 countries
participating in the Visa Waiver Program. Most Canadians are not
subject to US-VISIT. I do not believe that we can rely on such a
limited program to secure our borders, and I question whether the
benefits justify the enormous cost of the program. Thank you.
----------
Prepared Statement of the Honorable Steve King, a Representative in
Congress From the State of Iowa
Chairman Hostettler, Thank you for holding this hearing today. I am
encouraged by the progress made in implementing US VISIT. I will
carefully monitor the implementation of this program because I believe
it is an essential component of our national security.
I was concerned when Homeland Security Under Secretary Asa
Hutchison recently announced that most Mexicans who currently hold a
Border Crossing Card (BCC) will not be processed through US VISIT. I
believe BCC holders must be processed though US VISIT.
Under current law, Mexicans who use a BCC as a border crossing card
can only travel for up to three days in a border zone (within 25 miles
of the California, Texas and New Mexico border, and 75 miles of the
Arizona border). How do we know whether these cardholders are complying
with these restrictions? In addition, we do not know whether another
person is posing as the card holder if fingerprints are not verified at
each crossing. Currently, DHS inspectors only check a BCC holder's
picture by sight.
I look forward to the day when US VISIT will ensure that no BCC
holder stays illegally in the country for over their allotted 72 hours.
I am encouraged by the progress in implementing US VISIT and will
continue to follow it as it develops.
Thank you Mr. Chairman.
----------
Prepared Statement of the Honorable Linda T. Sanchez, a Representative
in Congress From the State of California
I'd like to thank Chairman Hostettler and Ranking Member Jackson
Lee for convening this oversight hearing for the Subcommittee to look
at U.S. Visitor and Status Indicator Technology (US-VISIT), another
Bush Administration program related to immigration and homeland
security. So far this session, the intersection of homeland security
and immigration has been the common theme of this Subcommittee's
hearings. We have held two hearings on funding for immigration in the
President's budget, a hearing on alien removal under Operation
Predator, and now this hearing on the US-VISIT program.
I give credit to the DHS and US-VISIT agents for their hard work in
screening visitors. I also commend DHS for recognizing that many
travelers across the Mexican border do not need to be fingerprinted and
photographed to improve our safety.
It goes without saying that beefing up our homeland security should
be our number 1 concern. The question remains, how do we do that
efficiently? I find that all of the Bush Administration's programs the
Subcommittee has reviewed to date raise serious questions about whether
the programs are effective in fighting terrorism, and whether the
Administration's programs are stifling legitimate immigration and
trade.
The US-VISIT program raises these concerns as well. First of all,
US-VISIT is a very expensive initiative that is not improving our
security enough to justify the money we are putting into the program.
Second, the US-VISIT program wrongly equates immigration with
terrorism, and diverts federal resources away from programs and
proposals that will make our country more secure. And finally, there is
a danger that US-VISIT will hamper legitimate travel and trade.
US-VISIT IS COSTLY, BUT NOT EFFECTIVE
The US-VISIT program is like many other immigration ``enforcement''
initiatives proposed by the Bush Administration, ineffective yet very
costly. Last year, the Department of Homeland Security estimated that
US-VISIT will cost $7.2 billion through fiscal year 2014, and even this
estimate may be low. Needless to say, that is an enormous amount of
money. But even Department of Homeland Security officials have
confirmed that the US-VISIT program is not successfully identifying
terrorists.
At the February 25th hearing on immigration spending in President
Bush's budget, I asked Eduardo Aguirre, the Director of U.S.
Citizenship and Immigration Services, and Michael Dougherty, the
Director of Operations at U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement, how
many terrorists had been identified and captured using the US-VISIT
system. Their answer: zero.
While I was not surprised that no terrorists have been caught using
US-VISIT, I am perplexed at how the President can request $340 million
in his FY'05 for a program that has not caught or identified a single
terrorist. So the question is: if US-VISIT is not capturing terrorists,
what is it doing?
The answer I hear most often is that US-VISIT keeps tracks of who
enters the United States and who overstays a visa. I understand the
argument that tracking immigrants that enter the country, knowing who
is here and who overstayed a visa makes our country safer. But simply
knowing who has overstayed a visa is not going to prevent terrorist
attacks. The tragic events of 9/11 proved that.
We all know that many of the perpetrators of those horrible acts
entered the country on legitimate visas and overstayed. If our
intelligence agencies don't have the resources to identify and remove
terrorists, then overstay tracking doesn't help to protect us.
Therefore, tracking and keeping a database of entrants and visa
overstays, like US-VISIT does, would not have prevented the attacks of
9/11 from happening and will not prevent future attacks.
The recent bombings in Madrid and yesterday's bombing in Iraq show
that mere tracking of travelers will not provide safety for any
country. If we want our homeland to be safe, we need security at our
ports, at locations where terrorists can transport weapons, and at the
potential terrorist targets. We also need intelligence to identify
those who want to carry attacks out.
FOCUS HOMELAND SECURITY ON TERRORISTS, NOT IMMIGRANTS
Another important and needed change, if we really want to improve
our homeland security we need to put funds into comprehensive
immigration reform, and intelligence and federal law enforcement
efforts to identify and apprehend terrorists. Our homeland will not be
secure if we commit our resources to deporting immigrants who are here
contributing to our country.
I've joined my fellow Democrats in repeatedly saying to the
President if you want to reform our system, support good immigration
bills like the DREAM Act and the AgJOBS bill. Also, by providing an
earned legalization program for the immigrants who are here working and
following our laws, we identify those visitors who mean to do this
country harm and those that don't. Equally important, reducing the visa
backlog and allowing families to remain together while immigration
applications are pending minimizes the incentive for illegal
immigration. By implementing these ideas into law we allow our
intelligence agencies to do their job finding terrorists.
Good intelligence is the key to preventing terrorism. We have to
combine our intelligence agencies with our international allies'
intelligence agencies to eliminate terrorist cells abroad before they
attack. Here in the United States, our intelligence agencies must work
with federal law enforcement agencies to target, apprehend, and bring
to justice those terrorists who have managed to get into the country.
This kind of focused, intelligence-based effort will make our homeland
safer.
Too many of the Bush Administration's homeland security efforts do
not make us safer because they fail to draw the distinction between
immigration and terrorism. For example, our hearings on President
Bush's budget showed that the Bureaus of Customs and Border Protection
and Immigration and Customs Enforcement are seeking the largest
increases, $257 million and $281 million respectively, over the amounts
those bureaus received in FY '04.
If the President wants $538 million more to apprehend, detain, and
deport immigrants in this country, most of whom are here to work and
provide for their families, he is not drawing the distinction between
immigrants and terrorists. Unfortunately, the US-VISIT program fails to
draw that distinction too.
The US-VISIT program will spend billions of dollars to fingerprint,
photograph, and read the biometric passports of tourists, visitors, and
immigrants who are not threats to our national security. The
overwhelming majority of visitors who cross our borders are here for
legitimate travel, work, or study, and fingerprinting and photographing
these visitors is not going to prevent a future terrorist attack.
Another problem with US-VISIT is that DHS does not have the human
resources to follow through on the visa overstays that are identified.
Locating, detaining, and deporting visa overstays takes time and
federal agents. The testimony we have heard from DHS officials suggests
that they only have the manpower to locate and remove a fraction of the
visa overstays that the US-VISIT program will identify.
US-VISIT MAY HARM THE ECONOMY
Another concern that we must consider with the US-VISIT program is
how this initiative will impact our economy. The US-VISIT program has
the potential to have a very damaging impact on our travel and trade
industries. I have already heard stories of airplanes landing at LAX in
my district and the passengers having to remain on the plane at the
gate for hours because of passenger screening backups. That's just one
airplane. If you multiply the hours passengers on one plane have to
wait by all of the commercial flights into American airports, the
delays would be astronomical and our airline industry, airline workers,
and their families would suffer.
CONCLUSION
I want the Members of the Committee and our witnesses to know that
I want our country to be safe and I want to bring every person who
threatens our national security to justice. I think that the agents of
the Department of Homeland Security, including the men and women who
implement US-VISIT, are doing their jobs and working hard to protect
our country. However, I think that the Administration needs to review
how it goes about protecting our homeland, and how their programs will
effect immigration and tourism.
All of us agree that we don't want the events of 9/11, or the
recent attacks in Madrid and Baghdad to occur anywhere again. I hope
that as we discuss programs like US-VISIT we don't forget about
securing our ports and protecting our communities.
Again, I thank the Chair and Ranking Member for the opportunity to
express my views. I also thank our witnesses for being her today. I
look forward to their testimony and responses to our questions.
----------
Prepared Statement of the Travel Business Roundtable
OVERVIEW
The Travel Business Roundtable (TBR) would like to thank Chairman
Hostettler and Ranking Member Jackson Lee for holding this important
hearing, and is pleased to have the opportunity to submit a statement
for the record regarding the US VISIT program. TBR is a CEO-based
organization that represents the diverse travel and tourism industry,
with more than 85 member corporations, associations and labor groups.
The travel and tourism industry is an engine for economic development
and job creation. Some 17 million Americans are employed in travel and
tourism-related jobs with an annual payroll of $157 billion. Travel and
tourism is the first, second or third largest industry in 29 states and
the District of Columbia. In the last decade, travel and tourism has
emerged as America's second largest services export and the third
largest retail sales industry. Our industry is in 50 states, 435
Congressional districts and every city in the United States.
It is impossible to stress enough how important international
visitors are to the health of our industry as well as the overall U.S.
economy. From 2001 to 2002, international travelers to the United
States dropped from 44.9 million to 41.9 million. International visitor
spending in the U.S. over that time decreased from $71.9 billion to
$66.5 billion. And our travel trade surplus of $26 billion in 1996
plummeted to $5.5 billion in 2002. This continued downward trend of
international visitor patterns has caused federal, state and local
government travel-related tax receipts to decline from $95.5 billion in
2001 to $93.2 billion in 2002. Moreover, U.S. travel and tourism
industry payrolls have dwindled from $160.3 billion in 2001 to $157
billion in 2002, and industry job growth remained stagnant at 17
million workers.
TBR vigorously supports the efforts of Congress, the Department of
Homeland Security, the State Department and the Bush Administration to
establish and implement programs such as US VISIT to protect our
country. However, it is vital that the agencies incrementally
implementing these programs consider their collective impact on the
traveling public. Being ever mindful of DHS Secretary Tom Ridge's
admonition about the need to create the proper balance between
protecting our homeland and promoting free and open commerce, TBR's
goal is to ensure that the paramount objective of protecting our
nation's security is pursued in a manner that is effective, coherent
and does not unnecessarily compromise our economic vitality.
US VISIT
The US VISIT program was officially launched on January 5, 2004 at
115 airports and 14 seaports. The system, created by Congress to better
track foreign travelers crossing our borders, requires all visitors
entering the U.S. with a visa to submit biometric identifiers at ports
of entry. The initial phase requires two fingerprint scans and a
digital photograph.
Thus far in its implementation, significant delays have not been
reported. However, TBR is concerned that the program's technological
ability may not be able to incorporate significantly more travelers
during peak travel seasons. We are also concerned that, as more
information is added to the database, search times may become lengthy
and delays may occur.
The exit component of US VISIT, a self-service kiosk, is currently
in testing at Baltimore-Washington International Airport and Miami's
seaport. TBR has heard reports that the system, because it is voluntary
in nature and many travelers are not aware of the need to ``check
out,'' may require personnel to guide passengers through it in a timely
manner. Thus far in the pilot program, many travelers have simply
failed to notice the kiosks, which may create problems for them upon
re-entry in the U.S. through no fault of their own.
In testimony before the House Select Homeland Security Subcommittee
on Infrastructure and Border Security on January 28, 2004, James May,
president and CEO of the Air Transport Association of America and a TBR
member, expressed concern that the burden of directing travelers
through the exit program might fall on airline personnel. TBR agrees
that the airline industry should not bear this responsibility.
In the event of excessive wait times at airports and seaports, DHS
has created a contingency plan for mitigating delays. The plan would
exempt select travelers from US VISIT screening if delays exceed one
hour. DHS Under Secretary Asa Hutchinson testified at the same
subcommittee hearing that this system was developed as a precaution and
has not been implemented to date. TBR is concerned that this
contingency response does not adequately address security objectives
and believes a more appropriate response would be the addition of staff
and capacity during excessive wait times in order to conduct necessary
screening.
US VISIT at our land borders is still being evaluated, with
deadlines for its capabilities to be in place at the 50 busiest ports
of entry by December 31, 2004 and all remaining land borders by
December 31, 2005. TBR believes that adequate staffing and technology
must be put in place prior to implementation so that our land borders
are not gridlocked.
THE POTENTIAL NEXUS WITH BIOMETRIC PASSPORTS
The October 26, 2004 deadline requiring travelers from Visa Waiver
Program (VWP) countries to present passports with biometric identifiers
coincides with the extended deadline for all VWP passports to be
machine readable. A potential crisis was avoided with the delay of the
machine readable passport (MRP) deadline last October. However, the new
biometrics deadline still looms on the horizon. While TBR supports the
implementation of these technologies for strengthening security at our
nation's borders, we are concerned that enforcing such requirements
without allowing sufficient time to meet them will harm our industry,
the U.S. economy and our nation's image around the world. TBR supports
the immediate passage of legislation that would allow VWP countries
sufficient time to meet the biometrics requirement either by postponing
the deadline until a date when a majority of the countries estimate
they can be compliant or by constructing an incremental waiver program
whereby each country's deadline is determined by its progress toward
meeting the specified requirements.
The Bush Administration is reportedly considering a solution to the
biometrics issue that would involve extending the existing deadline to
a yet-unspecified date while simultaneously requiring all VWP citizens
to enroll in the US VISIT program. This would subject VWP visitors to
the same fingerprint and facial recognition requirements that travelers
who carry visas currently face.
While the issue of the biometrics deadline for the VWP countries is
significant, TBR believes that the inclusion of VWP travelers in the US
VISIT system, by itself, could also create strong negative impacts.
Attitudes abroad toward collection of personal data by the U.S.
government and the suspect capacity of the US VISIT system to absorb
another 13 million travelers without causing significant delays, could
lead international travelers to eliminate the U.S. as a potential
travel destination altogether. We urge Congress to pass a clean
extension of the biometric passport deadline for VWP travelers that
does not require their inclusion in the US VISIT program.
CONCLUSION
According to reports from DHS, US VISIT has already uncovered 30
known criminals and is building on its suspected terrorist watch list.
TBR is pleased with this success and with the lack of reported
significant delays at ports of entry. However, it is critical that all
aspects of the system function in accordance with one another in order
to monitor our borders and protect our homeland effectively. Therefore,
it is vital that DHS conduct a thorough evaluation of the US VISIT
system in its initial implementation phase at airports and seaports to
determine where problems might exist, develop projections of capacity
for inclusion of additional classes of travelers, test concepts for
future implementation phases before they are undertaken and set
realistic staffing goals to ensure the success of this endeavor.
A variety of other homeland security issues continue to dominate
the travel and tourism industry's legislative agenda. In addition to US
VISIT, changes to the Visa Waiver Program (VWP) and other non-immigrant
visa policies, the introduction of the Computer Assisted Passenger Pre-
Screening (CAPPS II) initiative and other programs collectively place
travel and tourism at the vortex. Unique challenges attendant to each,
when combined with overlapping common concerns, demand a coherent and
harmonized approach to problem solving. TBR has developed a white paper
titled Homeland Security Policy and the Travel and Tourism Industry:
Finding the Proper Balance, which examines these issues in greater
detail. The paper is available on TBR's website, www.tbr.org.
TBR stands ready to work with Congress, the State Department, the
Department of Homeland Security and other relevant federal entities to
ensure that those who wish to do harm to our nation are prevented from
traveling to the U.S., while those who seek to visit our country for
legitimate reasons are treated respectfully and are admitted in an
efficient manner. We appreciate the Committee's attention to these
pressing matters and offer our assistance in any way.
MEMBERSHIP
Jonathan M. Tisch
Chairman, Travel Business Roundtable
Chairman & CEO, Loews Hotels
Affinia
American Airlines
American Express Company
American Gaming Association
American Hotel & Lodging Association
American Resort Development Association
American Society of Association Executives
Amtrak
Asian American Hotel Owners Association
ASSA ABLOY Hospitality
Association of Corporate Travel Executives
Business Travel News
Capital Management Enterprises
Carey International
Carlson Hospitality Worldwide
Cendant Corporation
Choice Hotels International
The Coca-Cola Company
Commonwealth of Puerto Rico
Delaware North Companies Inc.
Detroit Metro Convention and Visitors Bureau
Diners Club International
Fairmont Hotels & Resorts
FelCor Lodging Trust
Four Seasons Regent Hotels & Resorts
Greater Boston Convention & Visitors Bureau
Greater Fort Lauderdale Convention & Visitors Bureau
Greater Miami Convention & Visitors Bureau
Gucci
The Hertz Corporation
Hilton Hotels Corporation
Hotel Employees and Restaurant Employees International Union
HRW Holdings, LLC
Hyatt Hotels Corporation
Inc Magazine
InterContinental Hotels Group
International Association of Convention and Visitors Bureaus
International Council of Shopping Centers
International Franchise Association
Interstate Hotels & Resorts
Interval International
JetBlue Airways Corporation
Las Vegas Convention & Visitors Authority
Loews Hotels
LA INC, The Convention and Visitors Bureau
Lufthansa Systems North America
Mandalay Resort Group
Marriott International Inc.
Maryland Office of Tourism Development
McDermott, Will & Emery
The Mills Corporation
Nashville Convention and Visitors Bureau
National Basketball Association
National Business Travel Association
National Football League
National Hockey League
National Restaurant Association
Nederlander Producing Company of America
New York University
Northstar Travel Media, LLC
NYC & Company
Omega World Travel
Pegasus Solutions, Inc.
Philadelphia Convention and Visitors Bureau
PricewaterhouseCoopers, LLP
Smith Travel Research
Starwood Hotels & Resorts
Strategic Hotel Capital Inc.
Taubman Centers, Inc.
Tishman Construction Co.
United Airlines
Universal Parks & Resorts
United States Chamber of Commerce
United States Conference of Mayors
USA Today
Vail Resorts, Inc.
Virginia Tourism Corporation
Walt Disney Parks and Resorts
Washington D.C. Convention and Tourism Corporation
Waterford Group, LLC
WH Smith USA
World Travel and Tourism Council
Wyndham International
Zagat Survey, LLC
----------
Prepared Statement of the Travel Industry Association of America
The Travel Industry Association of America (TIA) submits the
following comments for the record.
TIA is the national, non-profit organization representing all
components of the $528 billion U.S. travel and tourism industry. TIA's
mission is to represent the whole of the travel industry to promote and
facilitate increased travel to and within the United States. Our more
than 2,000 member organizations represent every segment of the industry
throughout the country.
International business and leisure travel to the U.S. is a vital
component of our national economy. In 2002, over 42 million
international visitors generated $83.5 billion in expenditures, $12
billion in federal, state and local tax revenue, and accounted for one
million jobs nationwide. International travel and tourism to the U.S.
is a service export, and in 2002, generated a positive balance of trade
of $5.5 billion.
International visitation has continually declined over the past
three years. Overseas travel to the U.S. was down 31.8% in 2003
compared to 2000 levels. This decline has drastically reduced the flow
of tax revenue to all levels of government and reduced our
international balance of trade. Since 2000, the loss of international
travel to the U.S. has cost our economy $15.3 billion in expenditures.
The decline in travel is due to a variety of reasons, including
fear of travel because of terrorism, a downturn in the global economy
and confusion over new U.S. visa and border security procedures. While
some of the causes are beyond the reach of an individual country,
actions by the U.S. government can either enhance or harm our nation's
ability to attract increased international travel to the U.S. and
create more jobs and economic opportunities for states and cities
across the country. For this reason, the US-VISIT program must be
implemented with traveler facilitation as one of its primary goals.
Otherwise, international travelers might not wish to return to the
U.S., or may be deterred from visiting in the first place.
TIA supports the US-VISIT program as envisioned for airports and
seaports. TIA believes that the program meets the Department of
Homeland Security's dual missions of enhancing the nation's security
and protecting the economy. By developing a system that verifies the
identity of travelers quickly and efficiently, US-VISIT adds to the
protection of the homeland while ensuring the continuous flow of
legitimate international travelers entering and exiting the country.
However, TIA does have several concerns about the implementation of
the US-VISIT program. Congress should seriously consider these issues
as the program moves forward.
POSTPONE DEADLINE FOR BIOMETRICS PASSPORTS
The Enhanced Border Security and Visa Entry Reform Act of 2002
introduced a new security element to traveler documentation which is a
fundamental component of the US-VISIT program: biometric identifiers.
Capturing a person's biometric and using it as part of the entry
process will allow inspection officials to know the person before them
is the same person to whom the passport or visa was issued. Biometrics
are just now being incorporated into newly-issued U.S. visas. They will
also be required in all new passports issued by the 27 countries
participating in the Visa Waiver Program beginning on October 26, 2004.
TIA supports the use of biometrics in travel documents. However,
most of the Visa Waiver Program countries will not be ready to issue
these newer biometric passports until late 2005 at the earliest.
Missing the deadline would mean that many leisure and business
travelers from those countries would have to obtain visas for entry
into the U.S. The State Department estimates that as many as 5 million
VWP travelers would be affected by this deadline.
Forcing Visa Waiver Program travelers to get visas will deal a
crippling blow to an already ailing travel industry. Approximately two-
thirds of all overseas (excluding Canadian and Mexican) business and
leisure travelers, or nearly 13.5 million visitors, enter the U.S.
under the Visa Waiver Program. Overseas travel to our nation is already
down 32% over the past three years. Additional losses will send even
more workers from the travel and tourism industry to the unemployment
line. It is unrealistic to expect travelers accustomed to visa-free
travel to spend the money and time to obtain a U.S. visa to visit our
country. Especially when these travelers have many other appealing
international destinations that are visa-free. Additionally, the State
Department lacks the capacity to meet this potential increase in
demand. A loss of those 5 million travelers would cost the U.S. economy
$15 billion in sales and thousands of jobs.
It is important to note that the U.S. Department of State will not
be able to start issuing biometric passports until well after the
October deadline. While the State Department is not required by law to
do so, it is hypocritical for the U.S. to require other countries to do
what we cannot.
The October 26 deadline is a Congressional mandate. The
Administration does not have the authority to extend the deadline.
Therefore, TIA calls on the House Subcommittee on Immigration, Border
Security, and Claims to support at least a one-year extension of the
October 26 deadline. By doing this, Congress will provide the time
necessary to allow these important trade and political allies to begin
producing passports in a way that will not discourage inbound
international travel to the U.S.
CONCERN OVER DELAYS
TIA is very pleased that enrollment in the program has only added
an average of 10 to 15 seconds to the normal inspection process. We
commend Homeland Security for their efficiency.
It is critical that this level of performance be maintained during
peak travel periods and also when the U.S. travel and tourism industry
recovers its lost market share. As stated above, overseas travel to the
U.S. has dropped by approximately one-third over the past three years.
TIA is concerned that Homeland Security will not have sufficient
personnel to maintain a 15-second US-VISIT inspection time when
international visitation returns to 2000 levels. TIA urges Congress to
provide adequate funding so that Homeland Security will have sufficient
inspectors available to immediately meet the demands of peak travel
periods.
While TIA is pleased with the efficiency by which individuals are
processed, TIA also believes it is important to process entire flights
in a timely manner. The time an individual spends at primary inspection
is not the only time issue. There is also the concern over how long an
individual waits to finally reach a primary inspection booth. TIA
supports the original Congressionally mandated goal of a maximum wait
of 45 minutes per individual. Although this mandate was repealed in the
Enhanced Border Security and Visa Entry Reform Act of 2002 (PL 107-
173), TIA believes it is still a useful and important goal for Customs
and Border Protection inspectors to meet. TIA urges Congress to
allocate funding to provide sufficient inspectors for the US-VISIT
program both to meet the 15-second individual inspection time and to
keep the wait in line to under 45 minutes.
If primary inspection is perceived to be too much of a hassle, many
visitors will be discouraged from returning to the U.S. in the future.
Additionally, long lines at primary inspection can create a chaotic
environment that is both disruptive and places pressure on inspectors
to shorten their review of travelers. It is critical that the US-VISIT
program have the requisite staff to keep wait times and inspection
times to a minimum. Otherwise, both our security and our economy will
suffer.
OUTREACH TO TRAVELING PUBLIC
TIA urges Homeland Security to increase efforts to educate the
international traveling public about the US-VISIT program.
International travelers coming to the U.S. for business and pleasure
should be told who is impacted, and who is not impacted, by this new
program. Visitors need to understand in advance what to expect in the
process, and what they can do to make the process go more smoothly.
The international traveling public increasingly perceives that the
myriad of new security rules is creating a ``Fortress America.''
International travelers do not just consider the impact of a single
rule, but view all rules and programs in total. They have noted the
increase in visa fees, new visa interview requirements and growing visa
denials. They are also aware of machine-readable passport deadlines,
the future use of biometric identifiers in U.S. visas and Visa Waiver
passports, collection and use of advance passenger information, or API,
along with US-VISIT.
By and large, these new rules and requirements make sense from a
homeland security perspective, and TIA supports these efforts to
enhance national security. But for many prospective international
visitors, wave after wave of new travel requirements paint a ``big
picture'' that the United States is becoming a destination that is too
difficult to enter, too expensive to visit and simply not worth the
effort. In their opinion, the ``welcome mat'' has been pulled. TIA has
heard accounts of how this negative perception has resulted in lost
business. While the Department of Homeland Security cannot respond to
every misperception and rumor, the opportunity exists to set the record
straight on the US-VISIT program and tell international travelers
exactly what the program is and who it affects.
In conclusion, Congress must act in two areas to ensure the
continued success of the US-VISIT program and allow the U.S. to remain
a viable destination for international travelers. Congress must act
immediately to extend the October 26 deadline on biometric passports by
a minimum of one year. Congress also must ensure that the US-VISIT
program has sufficient funds and personnel to meet security and
efficiency objectives. TIA also urges the Department of Homeland
Security to increase outreach and education efforts to the
international traveling public.
----------
Prepared Statement of Randel K. Johnson
On behalf of the U.S. Chamber of Commerce, I would like to request
that this statement be made part of the record of the hearing entitled
``US VISIT: A Down Payment on Homeland Security.'' The U.S. Chamber of
Commerce is the world's largest business federation, representing more
than 3 million businesses. The Chamber's federation includes state and
local chambers throughout the United States and 96 American Chambers of
Commerce overseas. The Chamber's membership includes businesses and
organizations of every size and in every sector of the economy. Chamber
members with interest in the US-VISIT system include companies and
organizations in the travel and tourism industries, companies that
import or export goods and services through our ports of entry,
companies that do business with international customers and clients,
and companies that employ an international workforce. Chamber members
on both the U.S.-Mexico and U.S.-Canada borders, including local
chambers of commerce and American Chambers of Commerce abroad that
conduct business between the United States and other countries, also
have a great interest in the implementation and efficiency of the US-
VISIT system.
I am also the chair of the Americans for Better Borders (ABB)
coalition, which unites regional business organizations and a wide
array of companies and national trade associations representing
manufacturing, hospitality, tourism, transportation, recreation and
other industry sectors to work to ensure the efficient flow of exports
and tourism across our borders while addressing national security
concerns. The ABB coalition was originally founded in 1998 out of
concern for the impact of implementation of the original entry-exit
provision of Section 110 of the Illegal Immigration Reform and
Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996.\1\
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\1\ Americans for Better Borders, www.abbcoalition.org.
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The Chamber and the ABB coalition were instrumental in the creation
and passage of the Data Management Improvement Act (DMIA) of 2000,
which set the current deadlines for implementation of the US-VISIT
program and established the DMIA Task Force, a public-private group
chartered in 2001 by the Attorney General to evaluate and make
recommendations on how the flow of traffic at United States airports,
seaports, and land border Ports-of-Entry (POE) can be improved while
enhancing security. I was privileged to be named by the Attorney
General to represent the U.S. Chamber on the Task Force in 2002. The
Task Force submitted two reports to Congress, one in 2002 and one in
2003. The 2002 report focused on what was then the entry-exit system
and detailed numerous challenges to implementing such a system,
including the differentiation required for the modes of entry, land,
sea, and air, and differences between the northern and southern land
border environments. In 2003, the Task Force report detailed the
significant challenges facing our ports of entry in terms of
infrastructure and technology and the need for greater cooperation and
coordination among federal agencies with border responsibilities, with
state and local governments, and the private sector. Significantly, in
reviewing the progress to date on the US-VISIT system in 2003, the Task
Force report included the following recommendation:
That the first phase at air and sea [Ports of Entry] be
reviewed and evaluated no later than 6 months after
implementation by an independent body. This evaluation must
consider the program's effect on national and economic security
and international trade and travel. Congress should consider
any recommendations from the independent review and evaluation
and also reconsider deadlines for all other entry/exit
statutory requirements. It is further recommended that any
mandates in this area receive appropriate funding.\2\
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\2\ Data Management Improvement Act Task Force Second Annual Report
to Congress, Department of Homeland Security, December 2003.
The Chamber, its members, and the ABB coalition fully support the
efforts of the Department of Homeland Security to improve the security
at our ports of entry and borders. The purpose of my testimony today is
not to denigrate the outstanding efforts of the Department to meet its
difficult statutory and security mandates to protect our borders. We do
not oppose the US-VISIT system; the Department has worked hard over the
last year to listen to the concerns of business and has made
significant strides in adopting systems that attempt to balance the
need for security and the continued facilitation of legitimate travel
at our ports of entry. However, the U.S. Chamber and its members remain
very concerned that, if the US-VISIT system is implemented improperly,
we risk serious economic harm by impeding the billions of dollars in
cross-border trade (particularly at our land borders) and deterring the
millions of legitimate visitors to our country, who also spend billions
of dollars within our borders.\3\
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\3\ The Chamber's concerns are no different from those expressed by
Congress when it created the Department of Homeland Security. The
Homeland Security Act of 2002 gave the new Department, among other
things, the mission to: ``ensure that the overall economic security of
the United States is not diminished by efforts, activities, and
programs aimed at securing the homeland.'' Homeland Security Act of
2002, Sec. 101(b)(1)(F). In addition, the responsibilities of the
Directorate of Border and Transportation Security specifically state
``In carrying out the foregoing responsibilities [relating to border
and transportation security], ensuring the speedy, orderly, and
efficient flow of lawful traffic and commerce.'' Homeland Security Act
of 2002, Sec. 402(8).
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Before moving into the details and the numbers, however, I do wish
to emphasize that there is more at stake here than dollars and cents.
As a member of the DMIA Task Force, I was privileged to visit many of
the border cities, north and south, and to meet with businesses,
chambers of commerce, and individuals which will be directly impacted
by US-VISIT. From these visits, it is clear that there is more involved
here than just commerce. These communities are so intertwined with
those across the border that a way of life is endangered, a recognition
that not just jobs, but whole lives will be changed along with the
fabric and social underpinnings of communities.
These visits also revealed a skepticism of government, its
promises, and its understanding of not only what is at stake under US-
VISIT, but the extreme practical difficulties that need to be dealt
with in effectively processing the massive traffic at our borders,
together with an unrealistic belief in the infallibility of technology.
Technology in a laboratory operating under pristine conditions under
the direction of a well-trained operator may work well in theory. But,
will it be a solution that meets real life demands in outdoor, dusty,
alternatively extremely cold and extremely hot conditions, staffed by
personnel who will, despite their best intentions, encounter
malfunctions and human error in the processing of millions of border
crossers? \4\
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\4\ Technology is wonderful, but it will never be a complete
panacea as we live in an imperfect world. As the Los Alamos technical
support team noted in the DMIA Task Force's 2003 report to Congress,
``Border operations goals are dauntingly diverse and, therefore,
present unusually challenging opportunities that cannot be addressed
solely through technological means.'' Data Management improvement Act
Task Force Second Report to Congress, December 2003, Information
Technology Consultant Analysis Summary Report, p. 32.
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Phrased differently, will the promises of the government be met
when the rubber really meets the road? They may be, but there is a
skepticism that you will hear today wondering if it is all possible,
particularly under existing deadlines. And it is not an overstatement
to say that there is literally no room for error.
Lastly, there is a concern that the government will act too
hastily, without sufficient planning and testing, for fear that any
delay in meeting deadlines will result in criticisms that ``it is weak
on security.'' We would hope that this would not be the case, but this
fear, in a political environment, is understandable. However, the
stakes are simply too high to allow this to occur and we would hope
that the very real concerns over US-VISIT can be weighed in a
bipartisan manner.
Air and Sea Ports
We submitted comments to the Department of Homeland Security on its
interim final rule implementing the US-VISIT requirements for visa
travelers at air and sea ports on February 4, 2004. I believe the
committee has copies of these comments, but I would briefly like to
highlight some of our concerns regarding the air implementation here
today.
First, although major delays in international arrivals have not
been reported from the implementation at US-VISIT at airports (we do
not have information about the seaport implementation), we are
extremely concerned about the capacity of the system to absorb
additional travelers and additional data. This concern arises both on
the technology and personnel, and infrastructure level.
The US-VISIT program has so far been operational only during the
lowest period for international travel to the United States during the
year. As travel season picks up this spring and summer, we expect
additional travelers to arrive requiring enrollment in US-VISIT. In
addition, we understand that while the system currently is only
required of persons holding visas entering the United States, the
Department intends to eventually include all non-citizen entrants, with
persons from the Visa Waiver Program countries next.\5\ To our
knowledge, the Department has not demonstrated that its system can meet
this extra load.
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\5\ `` `It is a problem with the VISIT system that visa waiver
travelers are not enrolled,' [Assistant Secretary for border policy and
planning at the Department of Homeland Security, Stewart Verdery] said.
`We've been talking to [the visa waiver countries] about various
options on how that can happen.' . . . [Verdery] said a policy that
allows U.S. citizens traveling within the Western Hemisphere and
citizens of Canada and other neighboring countries to enter the United
States without showing passports could soon change.'' (Jeremy Torobin,
``U.S. Proposes Stationing Passenger Screeners in Foreign Airports,''
CQ HOMELAND SECURITY, February 18, 2004). This would not be a small
expansion of those covered as visa waiver admissions were more than 13
million in 2002 (2002 Yearbook of Immigration Statistics, Department of
Homeland Security, Office of Immigration Statistics, October 2003).
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We noted that Customs and Border Protection (CBP), as an insurance
against delays, deployed additional personnel to airports in the
initial days of the US-VISIT implementation. We also understand that
some of this additional staffing has since been rescinded. If
additional travelers during peak season or additional classes of
travelers are required to be enrolled in the US-VISIT system, we would
strongly urge CBP to devote adequate staff to ensure expeditious
processing of all international travelers.
We are also concerned about the technical capacity of the system to
expeditiously process larger numbers of travelers. As more and more
individuals are added to the US-VISIT biometric databases, in
particular the ``watch list'' databases against which a traveler's
biometrics are checked, the time required to return a ``match'' or
``non-match'' is likely to increase, unless the capacity of the system
is adequate. We do not know the specific technical capacities of the
databases to support thousands of extensive searches conducted
simultaneously at ports across the country and return accurate data,
but the concern about the time taken for the database search and the
accuracy of the data was expressed recently in testimony before the
House Homeland Security Committee.\6\
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\6\ Transcript of Hearing before the Subcommittee on Infrastructure
and Border Security of the Select Committee on Homeland Security,
January 28, 2003, Dennis Carlton of the International Biometrics Group,
LLC: ``As the size of the database gets bigger, the limited amount of
data that can be acquired from the two fingerprints means that the
system is going to start returning more and more false matches, because
there just isn't sufficient data to find the matching record in the
database.''
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We also have concerns about the proposed exit system for air and
sea ports, which is still in the development phases. The current system
of exit confirmation is the testing of self-service kiosks located near
the passenger security checkpoints at airports. While the concept of a
self-service checkout is appealing, and certainly is the least likely
to cause disruption or additional backups for departing travelers, the
lack of information provided to travelers and the seeming
``voluntariness'' of the system may, in fact, reduce the effectiveness
of the exit system in actually recording departures. The self-service
kiosk also provides the traveler with no documentary evidence that he
or she has complied with the exit verification, and, therefore, should
any discrepancy arise, the traveler will be at a loss to prove
compliance.
Given these discrepancies, any method of exit verification must
include clear directions to the traveler upon entry as to the need to
``check out'' upon departure and the means by which to do so. Since
initially the exit capability will not be available at all airports, we
predict a great deal of confusion by travelers as to the exit
requirement. We have already received questions via our American
Chambers of Commerce overseas regarding whether travelers must exit
from designated airports, and if they do not, how their exit will be
registered and whether it will impact their ability to return to the
United States in the future. A great deal of outreach to travelers (in
multiple languages) must be made to avoid inadvertent noncompliance
with any requirements for exit verification. We would strongly urge a
period of time during which any negative impacts from failure to
register are waived until it is clear that most travelers understand
and are able to comply with the exit requirements.
Land Borders
Of course, the largest challenge to the US-VISIT program remains
the land borders. The circumstances of travel at land borders are
monumentally different than at air and sea ports and the hurdles are
immeasurably higher. The unique situation of the land borders was
discussed extensively in the 2002 DMIA Task Force Report to Congress.
The report stated:
There is a marked difference between an inspection conducted at
an air or sea POE [port of entry] and one conducted at a land
border. Because of their varied status, divergent points of
origin, unfamiliarity with requirements and regulations, and
the increased risk to the U.S., most applicants for admission
at seaports and airports receive a comprehensive inspection
that includes mandatory data systems checks. In contrast, the
great majority of persons arriving at land border POEs are
residents of the border area who cross frequently and are
familiar with requirements concerning their entry into the U.S.
and receive an inspection that may include data systems checks.
The vast majority of all border crossings into the U.S. occur
at land border POEs. . . . Border traffic includes U.S.
citizens who leave and reenter the U.S. multiple times daily,
permanent residents who make multiple entries, and aliens who
hold non-immigrant visas or border crossing cards and commute
back and forth daily or weekly from Canada or Mexico.
Individuals can cross land borders as pedestrians, on bicycles,
in cars, rails, buses, trucks, or other vehicles.\7\
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\7\ Data Management Improvement Act Task Force First Annual Report
to Congress, December 2002, p. 11.
In fact 80% of all inspections take place at the land borders; over
358 million inspections in 2002 were conducted at land borders,
compared to 78 million at airports and 12 million at seaports.\8\ The
land borders also see the crossing of $540 billion in surface trade
between the United States, Canada and Mexico.\9\ As these facts and
statistics reveal, the land borders represent a significantly larger
challenge for the Department in order to ensure that the implementation
of US-VISIT does not impede legitimate commerce and travel.
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\8\ Source: PAS G-22.1 INS Statistics, cited in Data Management
Improvement Act Second Annual Report to Congress, December 2003, p. 15.
\9\ Bureau of Transportation Statistics, U.S. Department of
Transportation, North American Merchandise Trade by U.S. State and All
Land Modes, 2002, www.bts.gov/ntda/tbscd/reports/annual02/state/us--
trade--2002--all.html.
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This testimony has given us the opportunity to reach out to the
state and local chambers of commerce on the land borders to assess the
concerns they have about the impact of the US-VISIT system to their
communities. In the short period of time we had to conduct our survey,
we found that the volume of trade and economic activity that is at risk
at the border is enormous, as are the parallel concerns over the
possible impact of US-VISIT. We have attached to this testimony
documents, including studies of economic impact and resolutions by some
of these local chambers of commerce, but I would like to include in my
statement a variety of the facts and concerns cited, from both the
Canadian and Mexican borders.
Texas
The Laredo Port of Entry is the busiest commercial crossing on the
U.S.-Mexico border, handling more than 9,000 trucks and over 900 rail
cars each day. The Port of Laredo processed more than $32 million in
exports and almost $47 million in imports from Mexico in 2002. In
addition, the crossings in Laredo process almost 25,000 pedestrians and
more than 43,000 passenger cars daily. According to the Laredo Chamber,
``[A]ny delay, no matter how small per entry, multiplies into major
congestion.'' \10\ The Laredo Chamber estimates that at least 50% of
local business is directly or indirectly tied to cross-border trade and
traffic.
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\10\ Response to survey by Miguel A. Conchas, President and CEO of
the Laredo Chamber of Commerce, February 2004.
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A recent study by Dr. Michael Patrick, Director for the Texas
Center for Border Economic and Enterprise Development at Texas A&M
University concluded that a 1% decrease in border crossings would cost
the Laredo economy $19 million in annual sales, and increase local
unemployment by 7.2%. Sales taxes alone would decline by $133,000.
Across all of the major Texas ports, Brownsville, McAllen, Laredo, and
El Paso a 1% decline in crossings would cost the border region $76
million in sales and 1,500 jobs, and decrease the Gross State Product
by $1.2 billion.\11\
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\11\ Patrick, Dr. Michael, ``The Price of Security,'' Inlandport:
The Laredo Chamber's Business and Trade Magazine, January/February
2004.
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The Brownsville, Texas Chamber of Commerce reported an additional
concern: Mexican citizens own approximately 50% of the resort
condominiums at South Padre Island. Because the majority of Mexican
border crossers hold so-called ``laser visas,'' Border Crossing Cards
that also serve as visitor (``B-1/B-2'') visas that generally restrict
their period of stay to 72 hours, the Chamber is extremely concerned
that if border crossings become more difficult, many of these owners
will divest of their real estate, costing the local economy millions of
dollars. If the period of stay for ``laser visas'' is not extended,
long border delays will limit the time that these vacationers can use
their homes, making these investments less attractive.
The El Paso international bridges handle almost one-fifth of all
trade along the U.S.-Mexico border, more than $38 million in 2002.
Local economists estimate between 15% and 20% of the city's retail
sales are derived from Mexican nationals.
According to the Greater San Antonio Chamber of Commerce, Mexican
nationals purchased approximately $170 million in retail goods in San
Antonio last year. Two major malls in the area report that as much as
35% of all sales go to Mexican nationals. Further, according to Visa
International, San Antonio has the second largest usage of their credit
cards by Mexican nationals in the United States (second to McAllen),
with 8.29% of total U.S. purchases.
The Free Trade Alliance of San Antonio, the Greater San Antonio
Chamber of Commerce and the communities of Brownsville, McAllen,
Laredo, Del Rio, and El Paso have agreed to work together to address
these issues. One common goal is to obtain a change to the limitation
on the ``laser visa'' to allow Mexican nationals to stay for longer
periods of time and to be exempt from US-VISIT enrollment, since they
have already submitted to extensive background checks to obtain the
cards, which contain the biometric identifiers required under the US-
VISIT system.
Washington
Whatcom County, Washington has four border crossings, Peace Arch,
Pacific Highway, Lynden, and Sumas, accounting for more than 2 million
crossings per quarter. The region had almost a one-third drop in
crossings since the fall of 2002. While some of this continued the
downward trend since the Canadian dollar weakened in the 1990s, it is
worth noting that border activity has not increased in recent years as
the Canadian dollar has strengthened.
A survey conducted by Western Washington University in the summer
of 2003 revealed that Canadian shoppers make approximately 10% of all
retail sales in Whatcom County, estimated at over $35 million. In 2002
the total trading relationship between Washington and Canada was nearly
$11.3 billion. The Blaine, Washington border crossings are the sixth
largest crossing in value of trade on the Canadian border at $9.9
billion.
According to Department estimates, an additional nine seconds of
inspection time will result in over 700 additional minutes of
cumulative vehicle wait time at the Blaine crossing.\12\ Delays at the
border after September 11 and during periods of heightened security
alert have caused Canadian residents, particularly in the Vancouver
metropolitan area, to believe that border crossing is a hassle. There
is discussion in British Columbia of running commercials on Vancouver
area television encouraging Canadians to return north. Canadian press
has reported stories about US-VISIT expressing great concern that it
will cause additional delays when implemented. The local chamber of
commerce in Bellingham, Washington reports hearing very little about
how the Department is intending to implement US-VISIT and is very eager
for local community outreach.
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\12\ Department of Homeland Security, US-VISIT Industry Day
Briefing, July 2003, http://www.dhs.gov/interweb/assetlibrary/USVISIT--
IndustryConfBrief.pdf.
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Arizona
The Yuma County, Arizona chamber has concerns about the impact of
US-VISIT on the more than 20,000 agricultural workers that visit daily
at the San Luis Port of Entry during the agricultural season. Yuma is a
county of 170,000 people in the southwest of the state called ``the
lettuce capital of the country'' and depends on this agricultural
workforce for its more than $500 million agricultural industry.
According to Ken Rosevear, Executive Director of the Yuma Chamber of
Commerce:
It is extremely important that [these workers] are able to
cross within a short window of time to be able to coordinate
with the busses that transport them to their work areas. These
areas may be as far as 50 miles and require another two hours
of travel. Waiting times at the border during the season can
reach 2+ hours and that delay can cause shortages for that
day's labor force in the fields. . . . [T]hese delays can cost
millions of dollars in lost revenue per day.\13\
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\13\ Response to survey of border chambers, February 2004.
According to the Yuma chamber, a new port of entry at San Luis East
is in the early stages of development because of existing congestion at
the port of entry, including a new highway to run from the port to
Interstate 8. According to Mr. Rosevear, ``As far as ability to absorb
any further delay in either commercial, auto, or pedestrian traffic,
absolutely NONE. This will bring total gridlock to our current port.''
\14\
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\14\ Ibid.
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The Douglas, Arizona Chamber of Commerce reports similar concerns.
Douglas estimates that more than 60% of its retail volume is from
Mexican customers, and it underpins the entire local economy. Currently
crossing times coming into the United States range from 20 minutes to 2
hours, with lines backing up more than 10 blocks into the town. This
traffic backup creates air pollution problems. The regular crossers
include employees of the more than 26 maquiladora plants across the
border, and farm workers. These workers regularly cross the border each
way daily, and sometimes several times.
The Nogales Chamber of Commerce reports that 80% to 90% of business
in the town is tied to the border. The largest employers include the
more than 300 maquiladora plants, produce companies, government
agencies (most tied to the border) and merchants, who estimate that 80%
of their revenue is from Mexican customers. Crossing times at the
Nogales Port of Entry range from 20 to 40 minutes on average with
longer waits during morning and afternoon commute times. According to
Department estimates, a nine second increase in inspection times at the
Nogales Port of Entry would result in an additional 500 minutes of
vehicle wait time.\15\ Of significance is the fact that the Nogales
Chamber was not aware of US-VISIT or its pending implementation until
informed by the U.S. Chamber. Apparently, there has been no outreach by
the border agencies to the local Nogales business community.
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\15\ Department of Homeland Security, US-VISIT Industry Day
Briefing, July 2003, http://www.dhs.gov/interweb/assetlibrary/USVISIT--
IndustryConfBrief.pdf.
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New York
The Watertown Chamber of Commerce recently conducted a study of the
Thousand Islands bridge crossing. The Thousand Islands crossing, which
connects Interstate 81 to Highway 404 in Ontario is one of the fastest
growing travel routes between Ontario, Quebec and the U.S. southern and
mid-Atlantic states and cities, handling more than 2 million passenger
cars per year, andforecasting 80% increase in traffic in the next 30
years. What makes this crossing unusual is that almost two-thirds of
crossings are for recreation, and 63% of the visits are for more than
two nights. Commuter crossings dominate the other major ports of entry
on the U.S.-Canada border. As a major gateway between the recreational
areas of upstate New York and the ``cottage'' areas of Ontario and
Quebec, Thousand Islands is potentially more susceptible to declines in
crossings due to delays, as vacationers may choose to spend their
holidays on their own side of the border. The crossing also
accommodates more than 1,500 commercial vehicles daily, comprising $29
million in trade per day, with more than 165,000 jobs in the U.S. and
Canada dependent on this trade.
According to the Plattsburgh-North Country Chamber of Commerce, the
total economic impact of Canada on the Clinton County, New York area,
surrounding the Champlain/LaColle border crossing, is more than $1.3
billion, including more than 14% of all county jobs, almost $300
million in annual visitor spending on tourism and retail, and $8.7
million in county sales tax generated. The Champlain/LaColle border
crossing is the only crossing in the eastern half of the continent that
does not cross water, and is currently undergoing a major expansion.
Yet, still, at the height of the summer vacation season, backups at
this crossing can be over two hours.
California
The San Ysidro Port of Entry in California is the busiest border
crossing in the world, processing over 40 million passengers and 15
million trucks and busses annually over the past three years. Its
sister port at Otay Mesa, primarily a commercial port, handles more
than $20 billion in two-way surface trade annually, averaging more than
5 million vehicles and 11 million people crossing annually in the last
five years.
According to the San Ysidro Chamber of Commerce, more than 60,000
people cross the border daily, and two-thirds of this volume are
regular crossers, presumably workers. Inbound waits for crossing are
often more than two hours, and the chamber estimates that if each car
is stopped only 10 seconds longer more than nine hours of delay could
result. In the days following September 11, businesses along Main
Street in San Ysidro reported more than 90% lost business. Further,
there is no infrastructure in place for exit inspections, and no room
for expansion; the town of Tijuana starts literally adjacent to the
port of entry. Even so, outbound traffic is often backed up more than
one hour, even though Mexican customs usually waives most traffic
through.
At Otay Mesa, the local chamber of commerce estimates that 95% of
business in the town is generated by cross-border trade, both directly
and indirectly, much of it the maquila industries that operate
facilities on both sides of the border, including Sanyo, Honeywell,
Hitachi, Parker Hannifin, and others. One of the main appeals of the
area is the availability of a skilled, legal workforce that enters from
Tijuana daily.
The El Centro Chamber of Commerce, located just north of the
Calexico border crossing, is concerned with the impact on its retail
economy. El Centro has a population of about 150,000, but the adjoining
town of Mexicali has more than 500,000 ``laser visa'' holders. The
local Costco and Wal-Mart retail outlets depend on this cross-border
shopping, and ground has recently been broken on a large new regional
mall with numerous national retailers to serve this Mexican market.
Further, businesses in El Centro and farms throughout the Imperial
Valley depend on Mexican labor. The El Centro chamber expressed
concerns similar to the Yuma chamber of the impact of US-VISIT on the
entry of agricultural workers to this vibrant growing center in
California.
The Greater San Diego Chamber of Commerce reports that total sales
to Mexican citizens represented $3 billion in retail sales for San
Diego in 2000 and 2001. After 9/11, increased border security resulted
in decreases in sales of up to 80% for several months.
The Greater San Diego Chamber of Commerce, along with the City of
Chula Vista, the City of San Diego, the San Diego Association of
Governments (SANDAG), San Diego Dialogue, Sand Diego Regional Economic
Development Corporation, the San Diego World Trade Center, San Ysidro
Business Association, San Ysidro Chamber of Commerce, and the South San
Diego Economic Development Council, has formed the San Diego Alliance
for Border Efficiency. One of its goals is to mitigate the impact of
US-VISIT on southbound border congestion by ensuring the development of
necessary infrastructure prior to implementation.
Michigan
The Detroit/Windsor border crossings account for more than 27
million inspections annually and almost $100 billion in trade. These
crossings account for almost 40% of all U.S.-Canada trade, with the
Ambassador Bridge being the single busiest border crossing along the
northern border, handling 25% of U.S.-Canada trade itself. The
automotive industry alone accounts for more than $300 million of this
daily trade. More than 160,000 jobs in Michigan and 1.8 million jobs
nationwide are tied to the export of manufactured goods to Canada.
Thirty-eight states and Puerto Rico have Canada as their primary
trading partner, and half of U.S. exports to Canada are produced in 14
states. Of the passenger crossings, the majority of noncommercial
crossings are locals. More than 10,000 people cross the border in
Michigan to work, including more than 1,600 nurses in the city of
Detroit. One hospital estimates that 15% of its nursing staff, and 20%
of its critical care nursing staff, cross the border from Canada.\16\
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\16\ Testimony of Dan Cherrin, former Director of Federal Public
Policy of the Detroit Regional Chamber before the Standing Committee on
Industry, Science and Technology of the Parliament of Canada, November
1, 2001.
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The efficiency of these border crossings is extremely fragile.
Following the September 11 attacks, additional security at the Detroit
border crossings resulted in 20 mile delays on the Canadian side,
taking five hours to enter the U.S. However, delays as little as 20
minutes for just-in-time parts deliveries can result in assembly line
shutdowns, increased costs to reroute trucks or ship cargo by rail,
barge, or air, and create emergency inventory stockpiles (the exact
costs that just-in-time was supposed to replace).
In a June 1998 Senate Judiciary Report on the original entry-exit
system proposed by Section 110 of the Illegal Immigration Reform and
Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996, Dan Stamper of the Detroit
International Bridge Company is cited as estimating that additional
entry and exit procedures that would add only 30 seconds per vehicle
(for only half of the daily crossings) would still add 3,750 minutes of
extra processing time per day. Since there are only 1,440 minutes in a
day, this effect would essentially shut down the border. In a February
26, 2004 letter to the Detroit Regional Chamber, Neal Belitsky,
Executive Vice President of the Detroit & Canada Tunnel Corporation
(which operates the Detroit-Windsor Tunnel), stated:
Our facility is typical of those at the other major crossings
between Michigan or New York and Ontario. The Bridge & Tunnel
Operator's Association (BTOA) represents these crossings.
Plazas were not designed for today's traffic volumes or the
post 9-11 environment. . . . We are concerned that the system
may not be fully field tested prior to installation. This could
lead to significant disruptions in cross border traffic and
trade. Has an assessment been completed that will indicate both
anticipated volumes and risk?'' \17\
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\17\ Letter to Claudia Berry, Public Affairs Group, Detroit
Regional Chamber of Commerce, from Neal Belitsky, Executive Vice
President, Detroit and Canada Tunnel Corporation, February 26, 2004.
These Concerns Are Not Limited to Border Communities
While the above statistics, we believe, are compelling in terms of
painting a realistic picture of what is at stake in our border
communities if US-VISIT results in increased delays, we realize that it
may be deceptively easy to dismiss all of this as a ``border issue,''
which perhaps only the members of Congress from northern and southern
border regions need be concerned about. Unfortunately, this
misimpression characterized much of the debate surrounding reform of
the original Section 110.
This would be a mistake. While we have not yet been able to
quantify what the ripple effect increased border delays might have on
downstream commerce and throughout the American economy far beyond our
ports of entry, it can hardly be gainsaid that we do live in a nation
in which virtually all parts of the economy are interdependent and that
an adverse impact on one part will, like falling dominoes, adversely
impact others. Perhaps the relatively recent 2002 West Coast port
strike most vividly makes this point. There, a work slow down, as a
result of a complex labor-management collective bargaining dispute at
29 West Coast shipping ports, delayed about one billion dollars in
daily shipments. The adverse economic impacts of the delays rolled
through the American economy, resulting in President Bush invoking the
rarely used national emergency dispute procedures of the National Labor
Relations Act. This one example alone demonstrates the obvious: that
the concerns surrounding US-VISIT should be considered national in
character.
Conclusion
As can be seen from the previous information, there is a great deal
of concern among the communities along the border regarding the
implementation of additional border controls. The economic activity
dependent on the border in these communities is significant, and the
trade and travel volumes also are important for states in the interior.
Canada is the number one trading partner of the majority of states in
the United States. Canadian tourism contributes $8 billion to the U.S.
economy. U.S.-Mexico trade amounts to more than $200 billion and more
than 10.8 million Mexicans visit the U.S. annually.
As stated in our comments to the Department of Homeland Security,
we are concerned that the proposed implementation plan for US-VISIT at
land borders, as outlined in the Department's Request for Proposal for
a Prime Contractor for the US-VISIT program and as outlined today by
Undersecretary Hutchinson, while taking into account some of the
concerns of the business community previously expressed, will not be
adequate for the challenges of the land border environment.
As the government has testified before Congress, initial
implementation at the land borders is planned to be limited-applying
only to those holding visas, and conducted away from the primary
vehicle and pedestrian inspection lanes in the secondary inspection
facilities. The exit portion of the system is envisioned to be
accomplished via radio frequency cards and readers in exit lanes.
However limited this implementation may be, it may still result in
additional delays to important border crossers--such as the thousands
of agricultural workers that cross the Mexican border, or professional
commuters at the Canadian border. Since many of these individuals cross
on a daily basis, the Department must consider whether daily
registration in the US-VISIT system is necessary. We have also
expressed concerns regarding the capacity for even this limited
implementation at the secondary inspection facilities at land borders.
Finally, there is no assurance that this described implementation will
in fact be that which is actually deployed in December 2004, and it
seems likely that the universe of individuals covered will ultimately
be significantly expanded.
In summary, although the Department has taken the legitimate
concerns of business and local communities regarding the implementation
into account, there is a great deal of skepticism that the proposed
system will not impede legitimate travel and trade. We have heard
repeatedly from our local chamber affiliates that there has been a lack
of outreach by Department officials, and many questions regarding the
proposed system have yet to be answered.
Thus we urge the Department and Congress to provide additional time
for implementation of the land border portion of the US-VISIT system,
unless the government can publicly and thoroughly demonstrate, in
advance and with thorough testing under realistic conditions, that
whatever entry-exit system it may impose can be implemented with no
additional delays at the borders.
I wish to thank you for this opportunity to share the views of the
U.S. Chamber of Commerce.